THE SALMAN RUSHDIE CONTROVERSY, RELIGIOUS PLURALITY AND ESTABLISHED RELIGION IN ENGLAND

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The candidate confirms that the work submitted is his own and that appropriate credit has been given where reference has been made to the work of others.
Abstract


A thesis submitted by Paul Gareth Weller
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This thesis argues that the Salman Rushdie controversy has a range of "entails" which focus and contribute to the need for a reconsideration of the complex constitutional nexus of religion, society and state currently embodied in the establishment of the Church of England.

Chapter 1: The Introduction, acknowledges the academic and professional contexts that have informed the thesis. It clarifies the central research questions, defines the boundaries of the research and sets out the arguments in brief.

Chapter 2: The Contours of the Controversy, charts the principal features of the controversy as it developed between 1988 and the end of 1995, primarily by highlighting the "critical incidents" during 1989.

Chapter 3: The Controversy: Actions and Reactions outlines a range of positions taken up within the controversy and concludes by distilling five clusters of issues (social, religious, cultural, legal and political) which it is argued have "entails" for established religion in England.

Chapter 4 on Established Religion, The Controversy and the Issues outlines the inheritance of established religion in England. It brings the identified clusters of issues into critical interaction with debates around this inheritance and the constitutional nexus which it represents for the contemporary relationships between religion(s), state and society in England. Finally, some alternative patterns for structuring these relationships are examined.

Chapter 5 on Towards a New Socio-Religious Contract concludes the thesis by arguing that, in the context of the changed composition of English society and the public policies and community responses adopted in relation to these changes, the "entails" of the Rushdie controversy signal the arrival of a "kairos" for established religion and the need for negotiating a new "socio-religious contract." Some alternative models are debated for symbolising, structuring and operationalising the relationships between religion(s), state and society in England within the UK, and a proposal is made for what is argued to be a more theoretically coherent and practically appropriate way forward than either the current form of established religion or the other identified possibilities.
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I would like to express thanks to the editors of the various journals and books who have published articles and papers that I have written on topics related to this thesis and which are listed in the bibliography. I am also grateful for discussions on the areas covered in the thesis with colleagues past and present in the Religious Studies Subject Area of the University of Derby - Ahmed Andrews, Liz Chivers, Geoff Heath, John Hey, David Heslop, Sue Jeffels, Peter Kurti, Alan Race and Norman Richards - as well as for their general support to me while I have been researching and writing the thesis ever since my appointment at the institution in January 1990. In addition, thanks are due to Eileen Fry whose administrative assistance and skills have enabled me to cope with the continuing demands of my job alongside the completion of the thesis. The responses of postgraduate students to papers related to the argument of the thesis and presented in the context of the University's MA in Religious Pluralism course and in the Religious Resource and Research Centre's Graduate Research Seminars and Theology Society meetings have also been stimulating.

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Preisler-Weller who has put up with several years of living with a thesis as well as a husband and has still offered much practical support; and to my children, David, Lisa and Katrina who have sometimes found it difficult to understand why Daddy has all too often disappeared for stretches of time to read and write and who yet still continue to offer me a spontaneous love and trust which has helped to keep the importance of this thesis within another important perspective.

While those named above are to be thanked for their stimulating critical interest and support, the responsibility for the product remains mine alone. There are additional reasons for stressing this in the light of the passions kindled during the controversy which forms the starting-point of the thesis. A number of people close to me expressed some concern when I stated my intention to conduct my doctoral research on matters related to the Salman Rushdie controversy. Given the pain, passion and loss of life involved in the controversy that concern is understandable. I have not myself been immune from occasional anxieties about how parts of the thesis might be read and interpreted by either side of the controversy. However, as Appignanesi and Maitland stated in the Preface (1989: vii) to The Rushdie File, their edited collection of writings from the early days of the controversy: “Fear, however intangible, is insidious and can impose silence where it is least desirable. The issues the Rushdie controversy has brought into the open need to be confronted, publicly argued, not swept under the carpet, if we are to live peacefully together in a multi-cultural world.”

The seriousness of the issues with which this thesis deals means that the passion and pain of Salman Rushdie, his supporters and many ordinary offended Muslims should be acknowledged. This thesis has no wish to be parasitic on this pain and passion. It is written out of a long practical commitment to the social, political, cultural and theological project of improved inter-faith relations and the establishment of racial justice, as an intellectual engagement with the issues to which this commitment has given rise. In the final analysis, this thesis wrestles with the issues with which it is concerned for the sake of the social and religious future that my children David, Lisa and Katrina will inherit and for the sake of the Ahmeds, Fatimas, Rohits, Gurpinders, Schmuels and all other children of our multi-cultural and multi-faith society, the future of which embodies the potential of so much threat and so much promise.
a) Introduction

This chapter begins with a section on "The Background to the Thesis" which locates the research that lies behind the thesis in some of the personal, academic and historical contexts that have informed and motivated it. The second section clarifies "The Research Question" at the heart of the thesis itself, thus enabling the following chapters to be read with this question kept centrally in mind. The next section describes and evaluates the "Research Ethics, Methods and Resources" utilised in the conduct of the research. Since the thesis draws upon data of a contemporary period and the Rushdie controversy still continues, the section on "Temporal and Geographical Parameters" is an important statement on the range of data that is taken into account in constructing the argument.

A section entitled "A Note on Terminology" offers an initial discussion of some of the key terms used in the thesis in relation to their contested meanings and usages in a variety of disciplinary and popular contexts. A final section on "The Argument in Brief" states in outline form the central argument with which this thesis is concerned so that its main lines can be recognised and followed whilst working through the text as a whole. It therefore provides an overview of the direction in which the argument of the thesis proceeds by signposting the reader through its chapters and sections and towards its conclusion.

b) The Background to the Thesis

The original stimulus to conduct the research behind this thesis arose when I was employed as Resources Officer for the Inter Faith Network for the United Kingdom (1988-1989). It was during this time that the Rushdie affair began to develop. Because of my position within an inter-faith organisation, I became aware of the controversy's significance to the Muslim community at an earlier point than the generality of non-Muslims. I also became increasingly convinced that the affair would be something that would continue for a long time. In addition, it became apparent that it was acting as both a lightning rod and catalyst for a whole range of theoretical and practical issues
that have a bearing upon religious communities in their relationships with state and
society in the religiously and culturally plural context of England within the
contemporary United Kingdom.

Initially, the research involved seeking out as much data as possible on the
controversy itself. It therefore ranged across the whole gamut of questions to which
the controversy had given rise, whilst critically engaging with actual and proposed
conceptualisations of the various patterns of religious and cultural pluralism that might
prove theoretically coherent and practically possible within the specific social context
of English society within the UK. Gradually, these questions were crystallised by the
identification of five clusters of issues - social, religious, cultural, legal and political -
that it is argued have been focused by the controversy. The argument was then
developed that, by their interconnections with each other and with the unwritten
constitution, these clusters of issues have "entails" for the complex constitutional
nexus formed by the historical and current patterns in the relationships between state,
religion(s) and society in England, a nexus which is given both symbolic and
operational expression by the continuing position of the Church of England as a
Church by law established in England.

The thesis was then evolved that the Rushdie controversy has significant "entails" for
a re-evaluation of the constitutional nexus expressed by established religion in
England, and that it both focuses and contributes to the need for the negotiation of
what might be characterised as a new "socio-religious contract" in the context of the
contemporary religious and cultural plurality of English society as set within the state
of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland.

By focusing the research in this way, a certain continuity has emerged with aspects
of my Master of Philosophy thesis (Weller, 1998a) on The Theology and Practice of
In a predominantly theological mode, that thesis explored questions concerning the
relationship between theological stances and social and historical circumstances in
determining the appropriate shape of Christian witness within a religiously plural
society. In particular, it did so on the basis of the contributions that it argued could
be made to ecumenical debate from the distinctive notes of Baptist tradition, including
the tradition's affirmation of religious liberty and the theological and ecclesiological principle of the Church as a fellowship of believers separated from the state (see also Weller: 1990e; 1990f; 1992c).

That thesis had, in turn, emerged contextually out of my personal commitment as an individual Christian and, later, as an ordained minister (1978-1986) in the Baptist tradition of Christianity, as well as out of my professional work in race and inter-faith relations for the Greater Manchester County Ecumenical Council (Community Relations Officer, 1982-86), the British Council of Churches' Community and Race Relations Unit (secondment as Field Officer in 1985, together with membership, throughout most of the early part of the decade, of the Board of the Unit), and the British Council of Churches' Committee for Relations with People of Other Faiths (membership of the Committee in 1981-89, including 1984-89 as Chair of the joint Community and Race Relations Unit/Committee for Relations with People of Other Faiths Social Policy Group).

Its roots were in my reflection on the potential contemporary relevance of the traditional stance taken by the Baptist tradition of Christianity against the establishment of religion and in favour of religious liberty. As a theologically reflective Christian working professionally and ecumenically on issues of racial justice and inter-faith relations it seemed to me that this traditional Baptist position might have something distinctive and important to offer within the development of an emerging Christian theology and practice of inter-religious dialogue. Beginning with these germinal ideas, my MPhil research delved into the Baptist tradition and sought to bring its distinctive "notes" into conjunction with the contemporary ecumenical theological and ecclesiological debates concerning the appropriate shape for, and content of, Christian witness in a religiously plural society.

In the conduct of this research I demonstrated that the Baptist tradition of Christianity had always been concerned for religious equality not simply among Christians, but as a universal principle relevant to people of all religions and to those confessing none. I also demonstrated that this concern had been rooted in a theological conviction about the nature of religious believing, belonging and witnessing, rather than being simply a politically expedient position of mere religious toleration. Simultaneously, I argued
that such a Baptist contribution also has practical consequences beyond the Christian community itself in terms of debates about the best possible means for the peaceable governance of a plural society.

The way in which my research into the Rushdie controversy eventually developed therefore offered an opportunity to engage in depth with one specific aspect of these previous concerns, namely the relationship between religion(s), state and society. However, it has proceeded by engaging with a different set of basic data - namely, that provided by the Rushdie controversy - and also by working from within the approaches and argumentation that characterise the disciplinary perspectives of Religious Studies (Whaling, ed, 1984; Sharpe, 1986; King, ed, 1990) rather than those of Theology (Wiles, 1976). Religious Studies differentiates itself from Theology by not working within any single confessional tradition and by not claiming any particularist confessional positions from the standpoint of which to evaluate other religious phenomena. At the same time, a Religious Studies approach does not exclude consideration and exploration of theological positions in terms of analysis of the theological self-understanding of religious communities (Christian, 1987).

c) The Research Question

It is, then, the argument of this thesis that what has come, variously, to be known as "the Rushdie affair", "The Satanic Verses Controversy" or "the Salman Rushdie controversy" is a microcosm which both focuses and contributes to clusters of basic social, religious, cultural, legal and political issues, the "entails" of which have profound significance for the future of English society within the state of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland. It is argued that these clusters of issues find their symbolic and operational nexus in the establishment of the Church of England which, far from being the largely irrelevant piece of religious and political archaeology it is sometimes popularly perceived to be, is actually woven into the heart of the unwritten constitution. It is therefore argued that, because the identified clusters of issues all have linkages into constitutional questions, it is unlikely that any attempt to resolve them individually will be successful.

For the past eight years, debate related to the ramifications of the Rushdie controversy has been a regular feature of life in English society at every level - from household
discussions of media reports to the everyday life of localities such as Bradford, and on through to the agendas of national and international politics. As the political scientist and former Chair of the Commission for Racial Equality, Bhikhu Parekh (1989e), noted "Salman Rushdie's *The Satanic Verses* has become a terrain for many different and interrelated battles. Strange alliances have been formed across different battle lines, and the British cultural, educational and political scene has undergone transformations hardly anyone could have predicted."

The specific issues which the controversy has focused include the relationship between religions and nationhood; the relationship between religions and secularity; the relationship between freedom, responsibility and the law; the relationship between individual artistic creativity and political accountability to communities; as well as specific policy choices as to whether the current common laws of blasphemy and blasphemous libel should be abolished without replacement, extended to all religious traditions, or replaced by other legislation designed to protect believers rather than beliefs (see Commission for Racial Equality, 1990d; Inter Faith Network for the United Kingdom, 1991b). As Clinton Bennett (1990a: 10), the former Executive Secretary of the Council of Churches for Britain and Ireland's Committee for Relations With People of Other Faiths wrote in a special Rushdie Affair edition of the Committee's journal *Discernment: A Christian Journal for Inter-Religious Encounter*, "in the light of the persistence of the whole affair, the insistent question I find myself asking is this - is it any longer about the book at all or has the book become a catalyst for other, perhaps even more crucial issues?"

Bennett's view was also reflected in the statement issued by the officers of the Inter Faith Network for the United Kingdom (quoted in Centre for the Study of Islam and Christian-Muslim Relations, 1989: 18-19) at the time of the Ayatollah Khomeini's *fatwa* on Salman Rushdie and his publishers. This statement reflected that, "There are difficult and divisive issues here which require more considered public debate in a calmer atmosphere as we develop the appropriate social framework for our life together in a multi-faith society." In the context of the sensationalist media coverage of the public burning of a copy of *The Satanic Verses* in Bradford and the Ayatollah Khomeini's announcement of his *fatwa* condemning Salman Rushdie and all those
knowingly involved in the publication of his book, *The Satanic Verses*, this was a significant call for consideration of the less dramatic but more long-term issues which the book-burning and the *fatwa*, but also the reactions to them, had generally squeezed out of public debate.

This thesis concurs with Bennett's judgement that, despite the importance of each of the specific debates around the book itself, there are "even more crucial issues" arising from the Rushdie controversy than these debates and the particular incidents which surrounded the book's publication. In an article reflecting on the contemporary inter-faith movement in the UK, Ahmed Andrews (1994b:123) identified two such "even more crucial issues" by posing the questions, "Is Britain a Pluralistic society?" and, "Can Britain justly claim to be a Liberal Democracy?" remarking that "these questions have been brought into focus by such events as the 'Rushdie Affair'." Implied in these two fundamental questions posed by Andrews are a whole series of further sub-questions related to the "entails" of the controversy.

The use of the word "entail" is precise and is intended to signal that it is not being argued that the events of the controversy will necessarily result in a deterministically inevitable temporal development leading to the disestablishment of the Church of England as a sequential consequence of the controversy. The use of the word "entails" does indicate, however, that the current arrangements for structuring the institutionalised relationships between religion(s), state and society in England within the UK cannot continue without at least some modification. It therefore implies a critique of the status quo. In the way in which it projects possible futures, it suggests a thesis which is concerned with uncovering what it argues are the connections between the events and arguments of the controversy and several theoretically and practically conceivable futures. These futures are, however, argued to be only indicative possible directions and not necessary results. In this connection the thesis argues for the development of new forms of "socio-religious contract" which might meet the "entails" of the controversy in terms of the theoretical issues which it raises. Attention will, however, also be paid to the practical feasibility of any such models in terms of the current social, political and religious conjunctions of English society. Therefore consideration will also be given to the ways in which an "ideal" model may
need pragmatic modification if there is to be any realistic possibility of change from the status quo.

The thesis is developed on two levels. The primary focus is in relation to observation, analysis and theorisation of the “entails” of the controversy for English society as a whole, including religious believers in various traditions, atheists and humanists. Within this, however, some consideration is given to the significance of these “entails” for Christian theological and ecclesiological self-understanding and debate - not as a determining feature of the wider significance of the controversy, but as one important aspect of the overall data. As Robin Gill's *The Social Context of Theology: A Methodological Enquiry* (1975) argues, theological variables can become social determinates. This is especially the case with respect to theological variables in the Church of England where, because of its established status, theological variables originating in an ecclesiastical context can become more socially significant by means of the very fact of establishment. Some wider debates within the Christian community about the theology and ecclesiology of established religion and disestablishment are therefore part of the wider social and theological arguments that are explored here. As the concluding chapter suggests, in the absence of any major precipitating crisis, it is perhaps unlikely that the state will take any steps towards disestablishment without a concurrent, or even prior, move towards this on the part of the established Church itself.

d) Research Ethics, Methods and Resources

In a Europe with at least fifteen million migrants, of whom as many as eleven and a half million are likely to be Muslims (Kettani, 1996) and against whom antagonisms have recently revived in areas where the Islamic presence is many centuries old, it is urgent that practical and theoretical consideration is given to the ways in which European societies can be constructed to allow the fullest possible participation of all their inhabitants. One has only to be aware of the weight of conflict in Christian-Muslim history (Armstrong, 1988) and of the recent armed conflicts that have occurred in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Azerbaijan/Nagorno-Karabakh and Chechenia to realise what it at stake in these matters in a Europe in which the absence of the spectre of communism can so easily be replaced by both popular and more
sophisticated geopolitical concerns about a potential threat from Islam (Esposito, 1993; Huntingdon, 1993). Such concerns are, in turn, exploitable by neo-fascist and racial-populist (O'Sullivan, N, 1983; Wilkinson, 1983) social and political movements (European Parliament, 1985; Hockenos, 1993) in order to create socially inflammable tensions which can all too easily ignite into violence of both organised (Schmidt, 1993) and more spontaneous kinds.

At stake in the Rushdie controversy, together with the fate of an individual writer and those associated with, or opposed to, the publication of one of his books, have been debates concerning the theoretical coherence and practical viability of England as a multi-cultural and pluralist society. In the light of the controversy, the novelist Fay Weldon (1989a: 31) made the stark pronouncement that, "Our attempt at multiculturalism has failed. The Rushdie Affair demonstrates it." The thesis is therefore not a disinterested exercise of commentary upon a controversy, but it is itself a contribution to a theoretical social and religious debate with practical implications in which the researcher does not pretend to a position of theological or political neutrality. As already acknowledged, the writer's own biographical, historical and intellectual inheritance inevitably means that the weight of both theological and social arguments against the currently established forms of religion in England have always seemed more convincing than those that support such a form, and political commitment to anti-racism and the promotion of good inter-faith relations have always seemed basic requirements for the possibility of embodying justice and peace within the social order.

While it is hoped that the aspiration to scholarly objectivity has been a determining feature of the conduct of the research, it must also be acknowledged that such biographical presuppositions inevitably influence the research questions asked, the research itself, and the resulting thesis. Of course, to acknowledge this is to acknowledge no more than the now generally recognised understanding that academic disciplines cannot be detached from personal experience and standpoints - a recognition that has, in recent times, been underlined by postmodernist (Lyotard, 1986) and feminist (Harding and Hintikka, eds, 1983) approaches to the nature of knowledge and its construction.
However, to acknowledge the significance of subjectivity in the construction of knowledge is not to be equated with taking refuge from empirical evidence and rational argument in an appeal to pure subjectivity or relativity (Harris, J, 1992; Gellner, 1992). On the contrary, in order to try to ameliorate the dangers of imposing a pre-existing position upon the data, in the second chapter of the thesis its engagement with the Rushdie controversy explicitly attempts to stand back and record events rather than evaluating them. A recognition of the significance of subjectivity is not a plea for immunity from the norms of academic debate and criticism. It is simply to acknowledge that which, even if it remains unacknowledged, nevertheless still exists and which, by bringing it out into the open, enables a critical reading of the thesis in the light of such acknowledgement.

Apart from methodological questions, there are also ethical concerns related to a thesis of this kind. Appignanesi and Maitland (1989: vii) said of their work in producing The Rushdie File that, "We were continually haunted by the tragic aspects of the affair - threats to lives, the lives lost; the perceived threats to communities." As previously noted in the Acknowledgements to this thesis there is a danger that an academic exercise of this kind, which takes as its starting point a conflict involving religious and social trauma and an individual's loss of liberty, can be open to the charge of being parasitical upon the suffering of others. In the face of such dangers one can only justify continuing with the research and the thesis because of a conviction about the urgency of addressing the issues that underlie this suffering. In a context in which the issues translate into concrete matters of life and death, research and scholarship impose their own moral imperatives towards accuracy, fairness and care in stating the arguments that go beyond even the norms of academic convention, methods and ethics.

Because the controversy ranges across a broad spectrum of social, religious, cultural, legal and political issues, the debates can be approached from a variety of different perspectives and from within a number of different disciplinary traditions, including socio-literary criticism, political economy, ethnic and race relations, law and Religious Studies. Religious Studies utilises a variety of study tools from a wide range of disciplines including historiography, sociology and linguistics and does not exclude
the incorporation of insights and theoretical perspectives from other disciplinary traditions. The physical and mental phenomena with which Religious Studies is concerned may also be the concern of these other disciplines. What distinguishes Religious Studies from alternative disciplines is the centrality of the religious phenomena to its concerns and its refusal to allow either essentialist or reductionist presuppositions to determine or restrict its field of enquiry.

As research within the disciplinary framework of Religious Studies the thesis proceeds from attempting an empirically-based engagement with the evidence about a particular controversy that focuses the position and relationships of the largest religious minority community within English society (namely the Muslim community) in the wider context of the religiously plural nature of English society within the UK. This empirically-based engagement with the contours and contents of the Rushdie controversy is what provides the raw material for analysis of the wider social, religious, cultural, legal and political issues that emerge from the controversy.

This thesis has exclusively utilised primary and secondary bibliographical and documentary research methods in order to collect the raw data upon which its argument is based. Had the thesis been primarily concerned with the Rushdie controversy itself rather than with its "entails", then a variety of other research methods may well have been appropriate (Bell, J, 1987; McNeill, 1989; Gilbert, N, ed, 1993), perhaps including fieldwork and interviews with some of the controversy's principal protagonists. But the thesis is predominantly a theoretical one, though with a view to practical policy developments. Even so, it might have been possible to proceed upon the basis of conducting fieldwork with subjects in the Church of England, the Government, the Muslim community and others affected by the arguments of the thesis, in order to ascertain their views of the "entails" of the controversy and then to seek to distil an argument in relation to these viewpoints. However, whilst an ethnographic method working with a sample of individuals and organisations (Hammersley, 1992) might have been an appropriate option, the choice was made to proceed in terms of the methods indicated above.

Within the methods employed, in terms of systematic searches the research was limited to materials published in English, primarily in the UK and the USA, between
the publication of *The Satanic Verses* in London in September 1988 and the end of 1995, although the bibliography does contain some references up to as late as June 1996. It is recognised that this linguistic limitation to the English language inevitably means that some potentially important material which appeared in ethnic minority languages and has not been translated into English (in particular, materials appearing in Urdu and Arabic) cannot be referred to by the study. This is a constraint arising from the writer's lack of knowledge of these languages and it must be acknowledged that, in terms of the raw data of the thesis, this has some significance since many of the Muslim spokespeople in the controversy were expressing their views in a second or even third language in which they were not entirely at home. At the same time, however, English is the common language of public life in English society and in the UK as a whole. It is therefore the one in which the major public debates of the controversy were conducted, even if significant positions were taken and comments were made in minority languages. Whilst this disadvantaged some of the participants in these debates, English was the only language shared, in greater or lesser degrees of competence, by all the parties to the debates and so it was thought not inappropriate to restrict the data in this way.

A study has been made of *The Satanic Verses* itself, as well as of other principal publications in book, essay and journal article form written by Salman Rushdie (see bibliography) and an attempt has been made comprehensively to review the English language literature relevant to the controversy. An initial attempt (Weller, 1990e) to record and conduct some preliminary evaluation of the relevant literature was made at an early stage of the controversy's development and the results of the full bibliographical review are contained in the Bibliography which is presented as a contribution in its own right to the mapping of the controversy.

In the English language alone, the literature surrounding the events and arguments concerned with the controversy itself is vast and still growing at the time of writing. This literature includes reports of what happened as the controversy developed; analysis and debates around actual incidents in the controversy and their wider significance; and studies which have attempted to extrapolate the controversy's implications for a variety of contemporary and future aspects of the English social,
religious, cultural, legal and political life. All of these different kinds of literature are
drawn upon in the thesis, although each is used in a different way. The reportage of
journalists charting the controversy and reactions to it as it developed forms a
significant part of the raw data upon which the thesis draws. For the analytical and
evaluative sections of the thesis, however, this material moves more into the
background and the discussion is conducted utilising the published work of academics
in Religious Studies, Sociology and Race and Ethnic Relations, although also referring
to journalistic report and comment where this can evidence aspects of the more
theoretical discussion.

The controversy itself has generated an enormous amount of public debate in the mass
media, and particularly in the printed media. The sheer volume of this debate in the
newspapers alone can be seen in the extent of the Bibliography, even though the
newspapers included have been restricted in the ways explained below. In fact, it is
doubtful whether, in twentieth century England, any other single theme related to
religion has ever had such sustained coverage devoted to it by national newspapers
over so long a period.

For the purpose of the thesis, newspaper articles in the general English language press
have been studied as a key public forum in debate took place involving a wide variety
of participants and positions. Much of the coverage was, of necessity, somewhat
ephemeral reportage. Of course, no reportage is entirely objective. It reflects the heat
of the contemporary moment and the cut and thrust of existential debate, with the
selection and the tone of reports significantly contributing to any picture of events that
might be drawn from such sources.

It is also recognised that in some parts of the popular press, there is no consistent
attempt to separate comment from report. Therefore for pieces which are primarily
reports of incidents rather than comments upon them, the contents of the bibliography
have been limited to newspaper reports taken from the coverage provided by The
Guardian, The Independent, and The Times newspapers, with The Guardian and The
Independent being particularly drawn upon in the early period of the controversy when
coverage was at its most intense. Nevertheless, some pieces of reportage from the
tabloid press are also included for reference and bibliographical listing precisely because of the insight which they give into editorial stances.

Some of the newspaper coverage has also consisted of more reflective pieces. This includes the editorial columns of *The Guardian*, *The Independent* and *The Times* newspapers. But, even those newspaper pieces which sought to engage with the wider issues in a more reflective way were themselves largely contributions of the moment rather than being attempts to lay the basis for any more sustained reflection and analysis of the underlying questions posed for English society. However, as the debate continued and its potential ramifications became clearer, a new phase of the controversy was signalled as more reflective pieces on *The Satanic Verses* and the debates surrounding it began to appear in journals of different disciplines, from literary criticism (for example, Aravamudan, 1989; Dossa, 1989; Bader, 1992; Booker, 1991; Malik, 1996) through Religious Studies (Bennett, C, 1994; Bray, 1990; Chr$l_ysides, 1990; D'Costa, 1990) to political science (Boyle, 1990; Jones, 1990) as well as in magazines (see, for example, Impact International, 1988a; Gawith, 1989) of all kinds. Eventually books (for example, see Akhtar, S, 1989a; Anees, 1989; Appignanesi and Maitland, eds, 1989; Kabbani, 1989a; Ruthven, 1990; Ahsan and Kidwai, eds, 1991; Bowen, ed, 1992a; Brennan, 1990; Cohn-Sherbok 1990a; Weatherby, 1990; Easterman, 1992; Harrison, J, 1992) on the controversy began to be published. A study has therefore also been made of published English language books relating to the controversy as well as of relevant academic and professional journal articles which it has been possible to trace in the general public domain.

In addition, during May 1996, a search was made on the Internet for materials relating to the controversy. The internationalism of the Internet and its intimate connection with the free exchange of ideas means that there are a number of net sites where the Rushdie controversy itself (see, for example, Grewal 1996a; File Room, 1996; Cave, 1996d), and issues of central relevance to it, have been posted and discussion groups have been formed through which these issues are being explored. A record of these electronic resources has therefore also been included in the bibliography. Finally, it has been important to take particular account of confessionally-based understandings of the issues involved and therefore the Bibliography is supplemented with a selection
of English language articles taken from more confessionally-based and oriented publications taken from Muslim and Christian newspapers and magazines.

The sources for the key empirical data which record the contours of the Rushdie controversy itself have, in terms of their geographical reference, been restricted to England. However, when discussing the significance of the Rushdie controversy, some wider empirical and theoretical references are taken into consideration. For data beyond the controversy itself, the literature which has been reviewed in the research and is reflected in the contents of the Bibliography includes a selection of broader historical, theoretical and policy studies concerned with the nature of the establishment of the Church of England; debates surrounding its role and significance; and reflections upon the wider relationships between religion(s), state, society and culture. Such wider references are pursued by comparing and contrasting the patterns of established religion in England with actual examples of alternative models for the relationship between religion(s), state and society found in other parts of the world. A number of historical, theoretical and policy studies on immigration and on the post-war ethnic, cultural and religious diversity of England and the UK are also included in the Bibliography where these are clearly relevant to the controversy and its "entails".

e) Temporal and Geographical Parameters
The thesis operates within a set of basic temporal and geographical parameters which are integral to its argument. Geographically, its focus is primarily upon England rather than upon the whole of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland. Of course, the Rushdie controversy has also had effects and implications in other parts of the UK and for the UK as a whole within the wider setting of the European Union and whilst there are specificities of the controversy relating to England itself and to Englishness which will be noted due to its pre-eminent position in the UK, the fact that England has no independent political existence but is a part of the UK means that the significance of the controversy for England must always be seen in this setting. Thus the geographical parameters of the controversy are best described by the phrase England within the UK.
The main events in the controversy did take place in English towns and cities and although there are, strictly speaking, two forms of established religion in the UK, the role of the established Church of England is distinct and very much more significant for the UK state as a whole than that of the established Presbyterian Church of Scotland, with some writers even questioning whether the Church of Scotland can any longer properly be described as established (Buchanan, 1994: 3). The Church of Scotland clearly has a self-understanding of being a national Church (Hunter and Mackie, 1986). But the Church of England has a dominant significance within the constitution of the UK state in a way which reflects the historically dominant position of England (Nairn, 1981) within the union of nations and countries which comprise the contemporary social and political unit of the UK.

Temporally, the central argument of the thesis is primarily concerned with the contemporary period and with projections into the future of the theoretical and practical possibilities which arise from the contemporary conjunctions between the "entails" of the Rushdie controversy and a wide variety of factors relevant to the central argument of the thesis. However, in order to demonstrate the current nature and significance of the establishment of the Church of England, and to enter into some of the arguments about its validity, it is also important to undertake some historical study due to the established religion's deep historical roots in the evolution of English society and the UK state.

In terms of the data concerning the Salman Rushdie controversy itself, the thesis draws upon the period from the beginning of the controversy in Autumn 1988 through to the end of 1995. However, the emphasis is upon events in 1989, the first full year of the controversy which, it is argued, contains in microcosm many of the themes and debates which were to be played out more fully at a later stage. Of course, at the time of writing the controversy still continues and it is acknowledged that future developments in the controversy may have a significant bearing upon the argument of the thesis, either to reinforce its main contention, to weaken it, or to relativise its importance in relation to other "entails" of the controversy. Either the withdrawal from publication of The Satanic Verses; its issue in paperback in the UK; a successful assassination attempt upon Salman Rushdie; or his return to public life in the light of
a negotiated form of agreement with the Iranian Government, could all have a significant bearing upon some of the main points of contention.

However, whilst these questions are clearly of central existential importance to Salman Rushdie himself, the principal focus of this thesis is not upon the controversy itself, and it is only indirectly about its key figures. It is rather about the "entails" of the controversy which, it is argued, can be discerned within the contours and contents of the events and the debates as they has so far developed. The incompleteness of the controversy's development and therefore of all the implications which might be argued to flow from it, inevitably makes any thesis relating to the controversy provisional. But for the purposes of the thesis it is necessary to draw a line across a still moving picture in order to consider its implications as they are at the time of writing.

f) A Note on Terminology
A number of the key terms used within the thesis will be the subject of later discussion within the thesis itself since it is precisely their contested meanings which have a critical bearing upon some of the issues examined. "Culture," "religion," "pluralism" and "establishment" are words that are assigned a wide range of meanings in a variety of contexts. It is therefore, perhaps important at the outset, to try and indicate something of the range of meanings attached to these terms in popular, theological and sociological usage within Theology, Religious Studies, Sociology and Ethnic and Racial Studies, all of which are disciplinary fields relevant to this thesis.

"Establishment" is used in this thesis in the specific sense of a word indicating the kind of formal relationship currently existing between the state and the Church of England. Used in this way, the word "establishment" is a more precise description of the religion-state relationship that pertains in England than the often popularly used description "state church" which is, for example, more properly descriptive of the Lutheran Churches of Scandinavia than it is of the Church of England's distinctive relationship with the state. This predominant use of the word "establishment" in this thesis is to be distinguished from the wider, more popular usage of the term "the establishment" as referring to a group or layer within society which is perceived as having considerable power and influence and which is to be characterised by its multi-layered social, political and economic interconnections. There is, of course, a sense
in which established religion can also be a part of "the establishment" in this wider meaning of the word. This could particularly be thought to be the case when the social and educational profile of Church of England bishops is examined (Thompson, 1974), among whom a large proportion are public school and Oxbridge educated.

"Culture" is also a word which is used in a variety of ways. Amongst these usages is that of the anthropologist Clifford Geertz (1966: 89), who offers a definition of culture as, "an historically transmitted pattern of meanings embodied in symbols, a system of inherited conceptions expressed in symbolic forms by means of which men communicate, perpetuate and develop their knowledge about and attitudes toward life."

Within this thesis, the word "culture" is mainly used to describe the complex web of interconnected traditions, including art, knowledge, beliefs, morals and laws which are produced by, characterise and mould human life in society.

With respect to the words "state", "nation", "nation-state" and "nationalism", Walker Connor (1978: 54-55) points out that, "It would be difficult to name four words more essential to global politics than are state, nation, nation-state and nationalism. But despite their centrality, all four terms are shrouded in ambiguity due to their imprecise, inconsistent, and often totally erroneous usage." Etymologically, the word "nation" comes from the past participle of the verb nasci, to be born and the Latin noun natio which connoted breed or race. Connor (1978: 55) develops his argument to explain that, "One of the most common manifestations of terminological licence is the interutilisation of the words state and nation." This is very common in political discourse in England and the UK, where politicians very often invoke "the nation" when they are clearly addressing the whole of the UK, including its constituent national groupings. According to Connor, the concept of the state is "more easily definable as a political unit" whilst that of the nation is "a psychological bond." In the light of this, Connor (1978: 59) argues that a "nation-state" is a "territorial-political unit (a state) whose borders coincided or nearly coincided with the territorial distribution of a national group."

There are also many contested definitions of "religion." Etymologically, the English word "religion" derives from the Latin word religio which has a root meaning related to the idea of a "binding" together and which contains the sense of an organised
culture. Whilst the word has often been given a theistic reference, Buddhism and Jainism are examples of non-theistic religions and so, used in an inclusive sense, the meaning of "religion" is much less related to an ideational content than to a form of social belonging which is related to culture and in which people express their ultimate beliefs and values in ideas, rituals and symbols. Together with etymologically-derived definitions, however, other definitions exist which vary according to the disciplinary lenses through which the phenomenon of religion is seen. The sociologist Durkheim's definition of religion is (1915: 47) that of "a unified system of beliefs and practices relative to sacred things." The anthropologist Clifford Geertz's (1996: 90) definition sees religion as, "a (1) system of symbols which acts to (2) establish powerful, pervasive and long-lasting moods and motivations in men by (3) formulating conceptions of a general order of existence and (4) clothing these conceptions with such an aura of factuality that (5) the moods and motivations seem uniquely realistic."

In Protestant Christian theology, "religion" is generally argued to be ultimately distinguishable from "culture" although in particular contexts it may be acknowledged that "religion" and "culture" are closely connected. The implication of this general stance, however, is that those adopting it believe that culture modifies or, in extreme cases, corrupts, the pure nature of religion. The influential neo-orthodox theologian Karl Barth saw Christ as standing in judgement on culture and drew a sharp distinction between the Christian message and the culturally-shaped Christian religion. In our own day, the theologian and historian of religion Wilfred Cantwell Smith (1978) has rejected the usefulness of the idea of a "religion" altogether, arguing that what are today described as "religions" are, in fact, artificial intellectual constructs imposed upon the diverse experience of people of "personal faith" who live within what he calls "cumulative traditions."

However within Christianity, and in other religions, there are other, more positive, evaluations of the relationship between religion and culture. Indeed, in the Third World a whole theological movement known as "inculturation" (Shorter, 1988) has developed which seeks to express Christianity in specific and appropriate cultural forms rather than to try and detach it from culture in a supposedly "pure" form. Theologically, Don Cupitt (1974: 453) argues concerning Christianity in particular that
it always exists in a condition of tension with culture, explaining that, "Christianity is a religion ill at ease in time, always restless; seeking embodiment in a social order, but never able to settle down in any particular culture," contrasting (Cupitt, 1974: 454) this with tribal societies in which "The tribe is a complete universe which knows no other."

Among religious minorities in England "culture" and "religion" are sometimes used interchangeably to justify particular behaviours. For example, in a context in which members of a majority community might have used the word "religion" rather than "culture", people from within some of the minority communities can be heard to offer the explanation that, "We do such and such a thing because it is our culture." Hindus in particular often use the words "religion" and "culture" interchangeably regardless of whether they are living in a majority or a minority context - one's culture is one's religion and vice versa. Or, perhaps more accurately given the more corporate, societal nature of the Hindu tradition and way of life, the culture of one's people is the religion of one's people and vice versa. Clearly the two words are connected by related and interdependent realities even if they are, in principle, distinguishable and the nature of their relationship is evaluated differently both among and between the different religious traditions and within varied approaches to the study of religions.

The contemporary use of the concept of "pluralism" finds its origins in the work of John Furnivall (1939) which was concerned with sociological analysis of what, at the time, was the Dutch East Indies. That it is today used in a wide variety of ways was pointed out by David Nicholls as long ago as 1974 in his critical work, Three Varieties of Pluralism and has more recently been explored in the edited volume Religious Pluralism and Unbelief: Studies Critical and Comparative (Hamnett, ed, 1990). Some of the differences in the meaning and use of the term derive from its varied usage in different disciplinary fields. Sociologically, "pluralism" has often been used either as a descriptive term for a social pattern in which there is a variety of cultural and religious groups rather than a single one, and in terms of political theory it has been used with reference to a form and philosophy of political organisation within a society. In an essay exploring the various ideas of pluralism at work within British uses of the concept of "multi-culturalism", the researcher in ethnic relations
Harry Goulbourne (1991: 211) notes that since Nicholls wrote his 1974 essay, the meanings and usages of pluralism have multiplied even more so that, “There is, in short, a general tendency to employ the concept of pluralism to describe vastly different social and political conditions, as well as to express the aspirations of both dominant and dominated groups in contemporary societies.”

In usages within Christian Theology, “pluralism” sometimes signifies the sociological sense of the term as descriptive of the fact of religious plurality. But, more frequently, it indicates a particular interpretive stance which is taken with regard to the fact of such plurality. In this usage “pluralism” describes a mode of evaluating the salvific value and significance of religious traditions and communities other than one’s own. Such usage is, for example, found in Alan Race’s (1993) classical statement of the threefold options for Christian interpretation of the facticity of the theological significance of other than Christian religions. In his seminal work *Christians and Religious Pluralism*, Race advocates a model of “pluralism” as an alternative to the more traditional theological stances which he identifies as the “exclusivist” and “inclusivist” options.

One way of attempting to solve the terminological problems arising from such a variety of usage would be by distinguishing more rigidly between “plurality” as a purely descriptive word and “pluralism” as indicative of a mode of interpretation of the fact of plurality. This might be both grammatically attractive and feasible to advocate as a potentially viable project within the disciplinary fields of discourse of both Theology and Religious Studies. But it is probably not a viable option in the wider world of discourse in which “pluralism” has a fairly well established usage which implies the fact of plurality as well as an interpretation of that fact.

The variety of meanings, then, that are assigned to the key words “establishment”, “culture”, “religion”, “state”, “nation”, “nation-state”, “nationalism” and “pluralism”, both within and between various academic disciplines and in popular expression, necessitates care in analysing debates which utilise these concepts and discuss their social, cultural, political and religious significance so that such debates do not reinforce confusion rather than contribute to clarity.
g) The Argument in Brief
The central argument of this thesis is concerned with the structural and constitutional "entails" of the controversy that are posed for English society within the UK state. In the light of these "entails" considered in relation to established religion, an examination is made of possible alternative theoretical and practical patterns for conceptualising, symbolising and actualising the relationship between religion(s), state and society. As has already been noted, Clinton Bennett (1990a: 10) referred to what he characterised as the "even more crucial issues" of the Rushdie controversy beyond those concerned with the immediate debates around the book itself. An indication of what these "even more crucial issues" might be emerged in the statement from the officers of the Inter Faith Network (quoted in the Centre for the Study of Islam and Christian-Muslim Relations, 1989: 18-19) which spoke of the need for all concerned to develop "the appropriate social framework for our life together in a multi-faith society."

Such structural questioning is appropriate because of the apparently intractable nature of some of the issues thrown up by the controversy when examined within the current frameworks of English society and the UK state. The specific issues which belong to the controversy itself are highlighted in chapters 2 and 3 of the thesis. Chapter 2 delineates the contours of the controversy itself as it developed over the past eight years by focusing upon its "critical incidents." Chapter 3 explores a range of social and religious responses to the raw data of these "critical incidents." Arising out of both chapters, it is then argued that several clusters of issues can be distilled in relation to matters of wider social, religious, cultural, legal and political relevance.

As discrete issues of the kind explored in chapters 2 and 3, or even as clusters of issues of the kind discussed in chapter 4 it is possible, in principle, that some of these issues might be individually solvable within the current social, religious, cultural, legal and political frameworks of English society and the UK state. But it is the argument of this thesis that it is precisely the significance of the Rushdie controversy that it reveals that these clusters of issues are deeply interconnected with one another in a complex web. The difficulty of solving any individual issue within existing frameworks leads to consideration of the question as to whether this might be due to
the existence of an equally complex, comprehensive and interconnected social, religious and political nexus that lies at the heart of the current patterns and structures of English society within the UK state - namely, a constitutional nexus. It is the argument of this thesis that such a constitutional nexus exists in the constitutional establishment of the Church of England and its social, religious, cultural, legal and political implications for the culturally and religiously plural society of England, having consequences, as it does, at both deeply symbolic and very practical operational levels of the UK state and English society.

Such a nexus could well be what Muslims and people of other religious traditions have encountered in relation to other discrete issues which they have tried to progress, such as public funding for Muslim schools (Halstead, 1986) and issues around personal Muslim law and legislation on religious discrimination (UK Action Committee on Islamic Affairs, 1993). This thesis argues that the Rushdie controversy has brought this nexus into clearer focus than was previously possible although, as explored in the chapter 4, the inheritance of the establishment has deep historical roots, as do debates about it.

Having identified this constitutional nexus, it is furthermore argued that there is an urgent need to reflect on the significance of the “entails” of this controversy for this constitutional nexus in terms of the choices which, in the light of the controversy, it is argued now face English society, the UK state as a whole and, in differential ways, the religious communities within it. Bhikhu Parekh (1989a), has pointed out that, “A political crisis is like a magnifying mirror reflecting some of the deepest trends and tendencies developing in society. A wise nation meditates on it, and uses it as a means for self-knowledge. The Rushdie affair has raised issues likely to preoccupy us for a long time.”

The final chapter of the thesis therefore argues that, in conjunction with wider social, religious, cultural, legal and political developments, the Rushdie controversy presents the challenge of a “kairos” - a time of decision concerning the inherited constitutional pattern of established religion in England. It is not an explicit “kairos” of the kind that might occur in connection with the reform of the House of Lords; the reform or abolition of the monarchy; or the introduction of a written constitution in the context
of growing European Community integration. But it is argued that the controversy brings an "implicit kairos" which, if it is discerned and acted upon by the religious communities at this point in time, might enable a more measured, inclusive and evolutionary negotiation towards structural changes in the constitutional relationship, between religion(s), state and society than would be likely to be the case in any Government-initiated move towards change consequent upon a more obvious kind of constitutional crisis of the kind which might yet occur.

In reflecting on the meaning of the implicit "kairos" entailed within clusters of issues raised by the Rushdie controversy, chapter 5 explores a range of possibly more coherent and appropriate alternative models for expressing the relationship between religion(s), state and society in the contemporary secular and plural context of England than the current establishment of the Church of England. These alternatives include a secularising disestablishment; the development of an "extended" establishment of the Church of England to facilitate the social and political contributions of other religious traditions and communities; and the setting up, de novo, of a new National Religious Council. Finally, the thesis's own proposal is outlined for what it argues is a more theoretically adequate and practically feasible way forward than either continuing with the current establishment of the Church of England or replacing it with one of the three other identified possibilities for change.
Chapter 2
The Contours of the Controversy

a) Introduction
As an empirical study of the controversy’s raw data this chapter delineates the contours of the controversy between its inception in the Autumn of 1988 and the end of 1995. This is done to ensure that the later analytical and theoretical discussions are rooted in a detailed survey of the actual social, religious, cultural, legal and political events which shaped the controversy by highlighting some of the principal points of transition or “critical incidents” which focused new developments or debates related to the development of the controversy’s social, religious, cultural, legal and political significance, and this is done by concentrating particularly upon the events of 1989 as a microcosm of the issues within the controversy. The chapter does not set out to chronicle the controversy’s development in every detail, but to provide an overview of the events as they unfolded.

At this point in the thesis, then, the accent is primarily upon description with no sustained attempt to explore the debates surrounding these events or to analyse their wider significance. Exploration of the significance of these events and the debates surrounding them is begun in chapter 3 in which the actions and reactions of the key players in the controversy are recorded and their implications for the central argument of the thesis begin to be indicated. A more sustained analysis is then developed in chapter 4, leading into the conclusion of the thesis in chapter 5. In these later chapters, both the “critical incidents” of this chapter and the responses and reactions to these incidents that are recorded in chapter 3 are brought into interaction with the “entails” for the establishment of the Church of England that it is argued arise from five clusters of issues that can be identified within the controversy, leading to the consideration of alternative models for conceptualising, symbolising and actualising the relationships between religion(s), the state and society in England within the UK state.

This chapter begins with a section on “Salman Rushdie and The Satanic Verses” which, within the context of an outline of Salman Rushdie’s previous life and work,
describes the publication of the book that began the wide-ranging cluster of debates that the controversy as a whole has eventually become. The next section examines a range of the "Literary and Critical Responses" to the novel and to the controversy as it developed in the following years. The section on "From Lobbying to Book-Burning and Demonstrations" outlines the beginnings of Muslim campaigning against the book from its early days immediately following publication of the novel in 1988 through to the dramatic February 1989 public burning of a copy of *The Satanic Verses* in Bradford. The section on "The Political and Legal Arenas" shows how, parallel to street politics, the Muslim campaign was also conducted at the levels of the law and representative politics.

The section on "The Fatwa: Its International Context and Repercussions" charts the events surrounding the *fatwa* that was delivered by the late Iranian Shi'a Muslim leader, the Ayatollah Khomeini. The *fatwa* created a parallel focus of attention within the controversy alongside that of the book itself, and it led to Salman Rushdie's disappearance into protective hiding while the controversy continued. It also placed the domestic politics of controversy firmly within an international context. The final section on "The Continuing Controversy" takes up the story of the controversy as it has continued to unfold after the intense year of the *fatwa* until the end of 1995.

### b) Salman Rushdie and *The Satanic Verses*

Salman Rushdie was born in India on 19th June 1947 into an Anglophile Muslim business family. In 1961 he was sent from his home city of Bombay to Rugby School in England. At the end of the 1960s he returned to Cambridge and began theatre and advertising work, being responsible among other advertising slogans for the famous phrase "Naughty but nice."

In 1972 he wrote his first novel, *The Book of the Pir*, which was about a very successful Muslim holy person. His writing became identified with genres such as "Commonwealth Literature" and "Post-Colonial Literature" (Ashcroft, Griffiths and Tiffin, 1989) and his style of was associated with the approach to novel writing characterised as "magical realism" (Chisholm, 1993). His first published novel, *Grimus* (1975), was not very well received by the critics at the time of its publication, but it
has been revisited recently (Cundy, 1992) with a more positive evaluation. In 1981 Rushdie won the prestigious Booker Prize for literature with *Midnight's Children* (1980) which was concerned with a child, with powers of extra-sensory perception, who was born on Indian Independence Day (see Batty, 1987; Dayal, 1992; Hawes, 1993). His next book, *Shame* (1983a), was set in a fictional version of Pakistan (Ahmad, 1991).

With his outspoken attack on the Falklands War, racism and the Conservative Government in his broadcast piece on "The New Empire Within Britain" (1982b), Rushdie increasingly became associated with the political Left. In 1987 *The Jaguar Smile* was published giving his personal portrait of Sandinista ruled Nicaragua. In the same year, he divorced his first wife Clarissa. He later married the American novelist Marianne Wiggins.

When he came to publish *The Satanic Verses* Rushdie was a writer who was already not a stranger to controversy since the Booker Prize-winning *Midnight's Children*, which eventually also went on to win the accolade of the "Booker of Booker's" Prize (Ellison, 1993) had already been the focus of controversy with the former Indian Prime Minister Indira Gandhi, who had threatened to sue Rushdie over some of its contents. Rushdie was soon a writer who was being widely studied and written about (see bibliography by Grewal, 1996k and, for example, Dhawan, 1985; Brennan, 1990; Dhawan and Taneja, 1992; Harrison, J, 1992) and as someone enjoying critical acclaim could command an advance of around £850,000 for *The Satanic Verses* (Berger, J, 1989).

c) **Literary and Critical Responses**

*The Satanic Verses* was published in London on 26th September 1988 by Viking Penguin (for reviews, see Anon, 1989; Bentley, 1989; Enright, 1989). It is a story of migration and of exile, dealing with themes through fantasies that utilise historical elements (Aravamudan, 1989). As Parekh (1989e) says of Rushdie, "He fantasises and redefines real, recognisable men and women and does not create wholly new characters and images," thus observing an aspect of Rushdie's style which has been
remarked upon by many critics (Durix, 1985; Amanuddin, 1989). J.P. Stern (1989) described the style of *The Satanic Verses* as a special genre of "magical realism":

The complex structure of Mr. Rushdie's novel involves a huge panorama of myths known and unknown, air disasters spiralling in whirls of time and place, a seemingly inexhaustible supply of streams of consciousness, arcane references to Indian lore in contact or conflict with English customs, and direct as well as oblique references to the Koran, some of them clearly blasphemous and pornographic.

Thus the opening sentences of *The Satanic Verses* recall a sabotaged Indian airliner; Mahound recalls Muhammad; Bilal was a slave convert to Islam; pre-Islamic Mecca was known as Jahilia. The very title of the book, *The Satanic Verses*, recalls the two verses of the *Qur'an* which have been debated (Ahsan, 1982, 1988, 1991) among Muslims and Western scholars in terms of whether they were thought to have been of Satanic inspiration, and there are many other parallels and inferences. Several weeks before the publication of *The Satanic Verses* in India, Khushwant Singh, an Indian journalist and adviser to Penguin Books India, had read the book in typescript form and had telephoned Peter Mayer, the Chair of the Penguin Group, to discuss his concerns about it. Singh (quoted in *New Life*, 1989e) commented that, "I read the manuscript very carefully and I was positive it would cause a lot of trouble." According to Singh (quoted in Ruthven, 1991: 85) Peter Mayer was "quite appalled" at Singh's reaction to the book. It was also reported (*The Independent*, 1989ag) that, both before and after publication Rushdie was asked "what the now notorious Mahound chapter was supposed to mean" and that "He seemed curiously reluctant to explain." Rushdie (1989s) himself, however, claimed "this passage is a lie" and that any implication that he deceived Viking Penguin "is wholly unjustified."

In an interview with Shrabani Basu (1988), in the Indian publication, *Sunday*, Rushdie had rejected the suggestion that the book should be banned in India with the words, "it would be absurd to think that a book can cause riots. That's a strange sort of view of the world." But previously, in 1986, riots had broken out (Ruthven, 1991: 88) in Bangalore and Mysore following the publication in Bangalore's *Deccan Herald* of an English version of a short story by P.K.N. Namboordiri entitled *Muhammad the Idiot*, although it had been published without incident ten years earlier in the Malayam language. By the time the Bangalore and Mysore riots were over, sixteen people had been killed and dozens injured, with millions of rupees damage done to property.
Singh’s warnings were soon borne out too and this pattern was repeated in riots over *The Satanic Verses* in Bombay.

At the time of the publication of *The Satanic Verses*, India was experiencing an increasingly fraught situation of rising communal tensions and political instability. Following representations from the Muslim Members of Parliament, Syed Shahabuddin and Kurshid Alam Khan, on October 5th 1988 the then Indian Prime Minister, Rajiv Gandhi, banned *The Satanic Verses* in India, under Section 11 of the *Indian Customs Act*, for being offensive to Islam. The banning came after Muslim outrage about the book had increased following an interview with Madhur Jain (1988) in *India Today*, in which Rushdie told Madhu Jain that, “the image out of which the book grew was of the prophet going to the mountain and not being able to tell the difference between the angel and the devil.”

In December, the Iranian literary newspaper *Kayhan Farangi* published a review of *The Satanic Verses*, an edited version of which appeared in English in *The Independent* (1989e) newspaper. In this review it was pointed out that, “The Satanic Verses contains a number of false interpretations about Islam and gives wrong portrayals of the Koran and the Prophet Mohamed” and that, “Rushdie has fallen from the grace of a writer with a good knowledge of Islam to something like total moral degradation.” Compared to much that followed in the controversy, the review was relatively mild in tone, but it presciently commented that, “if Rushdie planned for a controversy to be created around his book....then here it is.”

Literary critics pointed out that part of the background to the controversy was perhaps the fact that the novel does not have a long tradition in Muslim cultures as a recognised literary form and there was therefore little tradition of understanding of, or sympathy for, the way in which the novel uses ideas. However, Rushdie was not the first Muslim author to have used satire in criticism of Islam. For example, the Egyptian winner of the Nobel Prize for literature in 1988, Nagib Mahfouz, had in 1956, written *Awlad Haratina (Children of Gebelawi)*. This was published in Arabic in The Lebanon. It presented Moses, Jesus and Mary as characters of the Cairo streets and portrayed the Old Testament God as dying and a 1959 serialisation of this book
in a Cairo newspaper had led to Mahfouz being threatened with arrest and trial because its allegorical approach to history was seen as undermining religion (Morris and Bulloch, 1989). Following the serialisation the book was banned in Egypt and remains banned today (Alrawi, 1989a).

Mahfouz commented (in Webb, W, 1989b) on his banning that, "What is between my novel and al-Azhar is a misunderstanding" going on to explain that, "It is a question of how to read a novel or a work of art. As they read it is not a novel but history." This was one of the issues between Muslim opponents of the book and Rushdie and the artistic community who insisted that it was fiction, not history. Of Rushdie, Mahfouz made the carefully crafted comment that he had not been able to read the book but had "heard that it is not rooted in scientific criticism of Islam, but is insolent in its treatment of these things. But we must accept the freedom of authors. Only this is not a small thing. Freedom is not to do what you want. There must be some rules, if only from conscience."

*The Satanic Verses* was shortlisted for the Booker Prize but, in late January 1989, it failed to win the £20,000 first prize in the Whitbread competition, being placed as runner up. In February and March 1989, the committee of the Nobel Prize for Literature was split over its evaluation of the book when, following the *fatwa*, the book's profile had been raised in such a way as to make it highly controversial. In an unprecedented protest (Burman, 1989) against the organisation's refusal to condemn the *fatwa* two members of the Stockholm Academy - Kerstin Ekman and Lars Gyllensten - withdrew from membership of the committee.

Initially, Viking Penguin apologised for the distress the novel had caused but stressed that the novel was a work of fiction. They therefore rejected calls for the inclusion of a statement in the book from Muslim critics (*New Life*, 1989b). This was one of the early Muslim demands prior to the escalation of the controversy into calls for the prosecution of the author and banning of the book which only later became the more common aims. At the end of January 1988, as Salman Rushdie prepared to set out on a three week promotional tour of the USA, to which fifty thousand copies of the book had been sent, Viking was reported (Roy and Wahhab, 1989) as saying of Rushdie
"We are concerned for his safety." This was in the context of seven bomb threats having been received at Viking Penguin's New York office and a telephone message which stated that five hundred thousand dollars would be offered for the assassination of Viking's President, Marvin Brown.

But it was the 14th January burning, in Bradford, of a copy of The Satanic Verses and the 14th February fatwa issued by Ayatollah Khomeini which sent shock-waves through the literary community and galvanised it into organising protests on Rushdie's behalf, seeing the Muslim campaign as a threat to freedom of expression. Anthony Burgess (1989) launched an attack upon the Muslim protest, evoking the book-burning of the Nazis and declaring that, "The Bradford Moslems are not within their moral rights in demonstrating such intolerance of the printed word. Britain, nominally a Christian country, has always accepted the presence of other faiths. But when these faiths indulge in barbarous rituals which contradict its humanitarian principles then secular opinion has to step in."

On 15th February, in response to the growing stream of protests by Muslims and following the 14th February announcement of the fatwa, Viking Penguin apologised through an anonymous spokesperson who explained in a statement (quoted in Murtagh, 1989a) that, "Neither we nor the author of this novel published the book with intent to offend. We are appalled at the tragic loss of life that has already occurred and deplore calls for further violence." This statement, however, came too late since by this time entrenched positions were already being taken by all sides in the debate. On the 16th February all Viking/Penguin books were banned by Iran.

On 15th February, Harold Pinter had led a delegation of publishers, literary agents and writers organised by himself and the editor of The New Statesman and Society, Stuart Weir. They delivered a letter of protest to the Prime Minister, Margaret Thatcher, which condemned the fatwa and supported Salman Rushdie and those involved in the publication stating (quoted in Mills, Lister and Morris, 1989b) that, "We defend their right to freedom of expression and stand in solidarity with them against state-incited acts of terrorism and all other forms of intimidation." Those endorsing the letter included Hanif Kureishi, himself of Muslim background and previously the subject of
Muslim demonstrations because of his portrayal of homosexuality in the Pakistani community in his film *My Beautiful Lauderette*. Kureishi stated that, "I feel deeply ashamed today. We have enough problems already without us being represented in the media as neo-fascists" (Mills, Lister and Morris, 1989a).

A range of organisations in the publishing world expressed concern about the fatwa and the general climate that was now surrounding the book. Mark LeFanu (quoted in Vulliamy, 1989b) of the Society of Authors saw "enormous implications" in the fatwa and stated that "One hopes that this sort of thing will not impair people's right to write as they wish, but I think it could." Clive Bradley (quoted in Vulliamy, 1989b), the Chief Executive of the Publisher's Association, said that "You cannot not publish a book because it will cause offence." Like Anthony Burgess, Louis Baum (quoted in Vulliamy, 1989b) the editor of *The Bookseller* magazine, invoked the spectre of Nazi totalitarianism and called for resistance to the fatwa as a means of testing "the best traditions of British publishing, as well as our profoundest western traditions" and a joint letter to *The Independent* (Ecclestone et al, 1989), signed by a range of representatives of professional and trade union organisations within the media, spoke of "Muslim fundamentalists" demanding "censorship by terror." The Booksellers' Association (quoted in Lister, 1989a) issued a statement warning that, "We have to assume that any UK bookseller that decides to sell the book in the future might be vulnerable. We deplore without reservation threats of violence. According to the laws of this land the book has done nothing illegal. Tolerance should be allowed in the expression of ideas. This is a complex issue," whilst the Arts Council (quoted in Lister, 1989a) described the fatwa as "intolerable", stating that it, believes absolutely in freedom of expression and believes that freedom should be defended to the utmost. The council also accepts that freedom of expression means the Islamic community should have the freedom to criticise Mr. Rushdie's book. It is, however, intolerable that there should be threats of physical violence against Mr. Rushdie and his publishers. The council urges on everyone the tolerance and understanding that are the hallmark of a free society.

International support for Rushdie and his publishers began to be organised from within the literary community. The freedom of expression campaign group Article 19 (quoted in Lister, 1989a) argued that, "Any denunciation of acts of the imagination by secular or religious authorities strikes at the very heart of freedom - the freedom to imagine."
As such, the order seeking Mr. Rushdie's death is the ultimate and most extreme form of censorship and must be universally condemned."

On 22nd February, eight hundred Dutch authors, artists, publishers and journalists called on the Dutch government to break diplomatic relations with Iran if the threat to Rushdie's life was not withdrawn (Murtagh, Tomforde and Brasier, 1989). On the same day, which was also the book's publication day in the USA, a coalition of the US branch of PEN, the Authors' Guild and Article 19 organised a meeting of writers in New York. Norman Mailer, Tom Wolfe and E.L Dochtrow attended a reading from the book on Broadway. Also on the same day, the National Writers' Union of America tried to deliver a letter of protest at the Iranian mission to the United Nations (Murtagh, Tomforde and Brasier, 1989). In addition, there were also protests concerning the country's three largest booksellers - Walden Books, B. Dalton, and Barnes & Noble - who would not keep the book on their shelves (Doyle, 1989b). In Austria, in March 1989, a statement by six thousand authors backed Rushdie (Traynor, 1989).

An International Committee for the Defence of Salman Rushdie was formed (Doyle, 1989b) with the active involvement of Harold Pinter, Margaret Drabble and Antonia Fraser. It had the support, among others, of the Society of Authors, the Publishers' Association and the National Union of Journalists. It aimed to gain one thousand names for a global petition calling on world leaders to denounce the threat against Rushdie and his publishers and this was eventually launched with twelve thousand signatures (Pallister, 1989c). It was initially published under the name of a World Statement and included fifty Muslim writers - from Pakistan, Bangladesh and India, as well as Britain (Lister, 1989d). The statement, supported among others by Graham Greene, Samuel Beckett and Harold Pinter, was printed in The Guardian on 2nd March 1989 and declared that,

On February 14th the Ayatollah Khomeini called on all Muslims to seek out and execute Salman Rushdie, the author of The Satanic Verses, and those involved in its publication worldwide.

We, the undersigned, insofar as we defend the right to freedom of opinion and expression as embodied in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, declare that we also are involved in the publication.
We are involved whether we approve the contents of the book or not. We appreciate the distress the book has aroused and deeply regret the loss of life associated with the ensuing conflict.

We call upon world opinion to support the right of all people to express their ideas and beliefs and to discuss their critics on the basis of mutual tolerance, free from censorship, intimidation and violence.

We request all world leaders to continue to repudiate the threats made against Salman Rushdie and those involved in the book's publication worldwide, and to take firm action to ensure that these threats are withdrawn.

The participation of Muslim writers in The World Statement had been prefigured by other support for Rushdie from among black and Asian authors in Britain, where more than eighty leading Asian artists, writers and academics, including Muslims among them (Ward, S, 1989b), had issued another statement defending Rushdie. This statement, which had also been published in The Guardian as an advertisement on 25th February, was headed Statement From Concerned Individuals of Asian Origin. Whilst supporting Rushdie, it had signalled a more nuanced approach to the whole affair within its wider context by declaring that,

We, the undersigned strongly deplore the burning of Salman Rushdie's book, The Satanic Verses, and the attempts underway to suppress its distribution: and we repudiate the death sentence on the author and his publishers.

We are appalled by the forms of protests which have already led to tragic loss of lives. Such agitation, directed at suppressing dissent, can offer succour only to those who wish to undo Britain's development towards a truly multi-cultural society.

It is in this context, also, that we are very disturbed by the ways in which these protests have been used by sections of the media in Britain to reinforce stereotypes concerning Muslims and other sections of the community.

We understand that religious sensibilities of many Muslims have been hurt by the publication of The Satanic Verses; however, without the right to dissent from established ways of thought and speech, a multi-cultural and free society is an impossibility.

Another group from within the minority communities called Black Voices in Defence of Salman Rushdie and The Satanic Verses was set up and supported by, among others, Hanif Qureshi and Homi Bhaba. Its statement (in Pallister, 1989a) tried to articulate the tension experienced by black intellectuals over the controversy:

We who have experienced forms of racial and cultural discrimination, and have engaged with its social effects, can only deplore the anti-Muslim statements and anti-Third World sentiments that have emerged in the escalation of
international tension. Such political positions are profoundly at odds with Salman Rushdie's own beliefs and the causes to which he has dedicated his entire writing life. Equally, we who have experienced the crippling orthodoxies and patriarchalism of our own communities, and have witnessed its attempts to stifle dissent and discussion, can never endorse demands for censorship and unquestioned conformity.

However, although the literary and artistic community was generally supportive of Rushdie this response was not uniform. In The Independent Magazine, Hugh Trevor-Roper (1989) stated that, whilst he agreed that Rushdie's life should be protected and that he could not support extension of the blasphemy laws either on grounds of "principle" nor "utility", he could also not extend sympathy to Rushdie because, "After all, he is well versed in Islamic ideas: he knew what he was doing and could foresee the consequences." Surprisingly, in view of his argument that Rushdie should be offered protection, Trevor-Roper went on to say, "I would not shed a tear if some British Muslims, deploring his manners, should waylay him in a dark street and seek to improve them."

Anne Devlin (1989) writing about a regular Birmingham Writers' Lunch hosted by David Lodge remarked that "the most telling point" made in their discussions of the controversy was that whilst published authors all have a platform, "the Muslims demonstrating have no platform" and that, "Street demonstrations are therefore a legitimate form of expression for people who wish to voice their opinions and have no other means of expression in public." At a seminar of the Writers' Guild of Great Britain in London, a "senior Penguin editor," who was reported (in Bowcott, 1989a) to have been speaking "in a personal capacity," admitted that "All of us regret the misery caused and the deaths that have occurred... If there were a way to keep the book in print and prevent further loss of life, and if the way to do that is print some form of apology, then maybe we should do that," although Mervyn Jones of the Campaign Against Censorship opposed this as a dangerous precedent and spoke of "a right to offend." Penguin did, in fact, take some decisive action in the withdrawal of the book when it retrieved and pulped some paperback copies that had been exported to Europe (Palling, 1989a) following the discovery of one of these in Naville's bookshop in Geneva.
In Spring 1989, *The Rushdie File*, a collection of articles and statements edited by Lisa Appignanesi (deputy director of the Institute for Contemporary Arts) and Sara Maitland (a journalist), was published by Fourth Estate. In the Preface to this book, Appignanesi and Maitland (1989: vii) point out that their book was originally intended to have been published by Collins but that “When the book was delivered ..... senior management at Collins found a variety of excuses for backing out of its publication.” Collins explained that they did not wish to exacerbate the situation for Penguin and their managing director also argued that the book was “not objective” although Sarah Maitland said that Collins had originally been enthusiastic about the book (Maitland, 1989). *The Rushdie File* book project had begun, under the original name of *The Rushdie Dossier*, following a 19th April Institute for Contemporary Arts conference addressing the issues raised by the controversy. In the light of Collins’ refusal to publish a spokesperson for the Institute was quoted (in *The Independent*, 1989p) as saying “It is deeply worrying that the Ayatollah’s threat seems to be having an effect on British publishing.” Maitland described this development as “a fine example of corporate spinelessness” commenting that, “There is fear at the root” (Maitland, 1989).

Even after the small new publishing company, Fourth Estate, offered to publish the text, Appignanesi and Maitland (1989, viiii) commented that, “We experienced a further delay when the printers who had originally accepted to print this book inexplicably refused to honour their agreement.” The printer was Richard Clay, the largest in Britain, who had actually printed *The Satanic Verses*. Six other British printers turned the job down before a Dutch printer was finally found. At the last minute, however, an anonymous local printer was found to carry out the printing (*The Independent*, 1989s).

The “fear at the root” identified by Maitland was also remarked upon by Ian McEwan in a letter (1989a) to the editor of *The Independent*. McEwan pointed out that when he appeared on BBC2’s *The Late Show* to discuss the Rushdie affair, three out of the six panellists had received threatening reminders that their views would be monitored, whilst other British writers had declined the invitation to defend *The Satanic Verses* “for fear of the consequences.” McEwan commented: “Intimidation, fear, self-censorship. This is the faint stench in the air.” This perception was confirmed by Fadia
Faqir, a writer who also appeared on The Late Show and who spoke of receiving "veiled warnings" about the monitoring of what she said. Peter Sissons, a newsreader for Channel 4, was put under 24-hour guard following threats received from a group calling itself the Guardians of the Islamic Revolution who accused him of having insulted Imam Khomeini during an interview with the Iranian chargé d'affaires in London (Lister, 1989e).

Another example of what Brenton (1989) called "the climate of fear that has settled over any discussion of Satanic Verses" can be seen in the story of the play, Iranian Nights (New Life, 1989s) which Brenton wrote together with Tariq Ali. The originally proposed title, "A Mullah's Night Out" was changed close to the end of the writing of the play (Brenton, 1989) after the National Theatre turned the play down. The play was then due to have been staged at the Royal Court Theatre for a run of eleven nights, starting on 19th April, and afterwards to be screened by Channel Four on 20th May. However, two actors withdrew, apparently because of concern for their lives. The play dealt with the issues raised by the Rushdie affair, but also with tyranny and Britain's responsibility for religious intolerance and divisions within the Muslim community (Billington, 1989). When the play eventually went ahead at the Royal Court, Ali and Brenton (1989) noted that "at least 40 per cent of our audiences at the Royal Court were Iranians, Asians, Arabs, Turks - people who do not normally go to the theatre" and that when four white women Muslim converts tried to interrupt, they were heckled by other Muslims in the audience.

Nevertheless, further evidence of "the climate of fear" referred to by Brenton appeared when, in order "not to give any pretext - even the slimmest - for anyone to take offence" (New Life, 1989n), Gareth Jones, writer of the BBC drama series Shalom, Salaam, decided to cut a scene which showed the Qur'an being handled impatiently. Then, in the run-up to the first anniversary of the publication of The Satanic Verses on 26th September, pressures were building upon Penguin both to scrap the book and to publish it as a paperback. Following the 13th September discovery of bombs in York, Peterborough, Nottingham and Guildford, The Bookseller (1989) wrote a "Commentary" column in The Guardian arguing that the paperback edition must go ahead since "A decision not to paperback could only be taken as an attempt at
appeasement." Against the background of these bombing attempts, and after the sale of two hundred thousand hardback copies, Penguin were still debating whether to move ahead with the paperback or not (O'Sullivan, J, 1989a).

d) From Lobbying to Book-Burning and Demonstrations
Unlike many debates over literary works, the debate about *The Satanic Verses* was clearly not going to be the preserve of the metropolitan literati. Contrary to Rushdie's (Sunday, 1988) assessment of the likely impact of his book, events in the world of international relations and street level politics proved that books such as *The Satanic Verses* can indeed have explosive effects.

The Muslim campaign against the book began with lobbying initiatives from a range of Muslim organisations. On 24th October 1988, the Islamic Society for the Promotion of Religious Tolerance (see Weller, ed, 1993: 404) held a seminar in London to discuss *The Satanic Verses* and Martin Scorsese's (1988) film *The Last Temptation of Christ*. The chairman of the Society, Hesham El-Essawy, had written a letter to Viking Penguin describing *The Satanic Verses* as "insulting in the extreme to everything that the Moslems hold sacred" in that it depicts "God as a balding man with dandruff, calls the prophet Abraham, the father of Jews, Christians and Moslems, a bastard, and views the prophet Muhammed with such contempt as has never been shown by any of the other enemies of the prophet" (quoted in The Jewish Chronicle, 1988). In this phase of the controversy, the goal of the campaign was, as explained in a letter to *The Guardian* (1989a) by El-Essawy, not a campaign for censorship but a campaign for: the publishers to issue an historical and factual erratum to be distributed with the book. This should come easy to the publishers if they look at the book as a work of fiction, and is certainly justified especially after Mr. Rushdie himself has admitted on television that he was discussing the life of the Prophet Muhammad and trying to break a few taboos.

to prevent the screening on several European television networks of the controversial film, *Death of a Princess*, a ‘faction’ documentary about a princess executed for adultery in Saudi Arabia. The Saudi chargé d'affaires (in Morris, 1989h) in London had called the film “an unprincipled attack on the religion of Islam and its 600 million people and on the way of life in Saudi Arabia, which is at the heart of the world of Islam.” The British Ambassador was expelled and the British Government feared losing billions of pounds worth of export contracts during the four months of the crisis, the solution to which involved an agreement to set up a joint cultural relations committee to prevent possible future “misunderstandings.”

In national political institutions the first signs of awareness of the strength of Muslim concern emerged when, on 1st December 1988, Ken Hargreaves, MP, moved an Early Day Motion in the Commons expressing regret for the distress caused to Muslims by the publication of *The Satanic Verses*. On 10th December, the Islamic Defence Council organised the first public rally in London. This was quickly followed by similar protest marches and rallies in other towns and cities. On the 19th December, a delegation of ambassadors from Muslim countries called on the Home Secretary to protest against *The Satanic Verses*. As later reported (in Bulloch, 1989a) one ambassador said “We told the Foreign Office that the book was offensive to Muslims and would be divisive in Britain's new multi-racial society....Events have proved us right, even without the intervention of Khomeini, which very few Muslims in this country take seriously.”

However, the peaceful lobbying methods of these organisations met with little success and evoked few signs of any sympathy on the part of either the publishers or the Government. During the first weeks of December protest marches began to emerge in Lancashire. *New Life* (1988d) reported on “A peaceful protest by 5,000 Muslims in Blackburn” which broke into scuffles when “Bookshops selling the book in town were picketed by angry mobs of young men.” A petition of 14,750 signatures was handed to the mayor, the central library and a leading bookshop manager calling for the banning of the book. There were also marches in Burnley and Hyndburn where a petition calling for banning was also handed in to the mayor. In Accrington marchers carried banners saying “Ban the filthy book” and “Muslims unite to banish filth.”
There was some Muslim discomfort about the disturbances associated with these early protests with, for example, Mr. Ishmail Lorgat of the Blackburn Action Committee on Islamic Affairs being quoted as apologising to bookshop owners, shoppers and the police (*New Life* 1988d). However, it was also reported that "The 10,000 strong Muslim community in Peterborough has threatened to take violent action against leading book stores if the books are not taken off the shelves."

In Bradford, the City Council appointed a reading panel of four staff to examine the book (Morris, M and Sharratt, 1989). Eventually, it was withdrawn from the library shelves and was made available only on request, with a warning sticker that it was offensive to Muslims (Wainwright, 1989b; Pithers, 1989b). The sticker (quoted in Targett, 1989) stated that,

> This book is a work of the imagination. It does not claim to be a contribution to historical knowledge. Nevertheless it has caused great offence to Muslims in our community. The library regrets this. However, in a free society, the public library has an over-riding duty to provide its readers with the books they may require in order to judge for themselves, subject only to the law of the land.

At this stage, though, despite mounting Muslim anger and the outbreaks of street protest in northern England, the general English public was largely unaware of the ferment which was brewing around the book. This, by and large, remained the case until the opening months of 1989, when the northern city of Bradford became the epicentre of the campaign (see Bowen, ed, 1992a; Bowen 1992d; Lewis, P, 1992).

The Muslim community in England is primarily composed of groups which originated in the subcontinental countries of India, Pakistan and Bangladesh (Robinson, 1988; Raza, 1992). In Bradford, most of the Muslims came from just sixteen villages in the Punjab, and had emigrated when a Pakistan government-sponsored hydroelectric power project flooded their area in the early 1960s (Barton, 1986). Family, community and political ties with the subcontinent are still very strong and, as a result, it was not long before news of Rushdie's Indian interviews and of the lobbying against the book by Indian Muslim MPs began to reach the British Muslim community and Bradford became the epicentre of the developing controversy (Bowen, 1992d).
Sher Azam, the Chair of Bradford's Council of Mosques (see Weller, ed, 1993: 419-420), explained to Malise Ruthven (1991: 84) that the book had first been heard of in Bradford when, "We received letters from Hizb-ul-Ulama in Blackburn at the end of September, enclosing extracts from two Indian magazines; we also received cuttings from a Bradford man who had read the articles in India." Portions of the book were translated into Urdu so that the local ulema could decide whether it was blasphemous. This they unanimously did, and concern began to grow within the community. A circular (quoted in Ruthven, 1991: 91) from Blackburn was soon issued urging people not to buy or read the novel and to "wherever possible gather in crowds and force these places not to sell such rubbish pleadingly." The circular concluded by urging imams to utilise the Friday mosque prayers to organise petitions to be sent to the Queen, the Prime Minister and the Home Office.

The Muslim magazine *Impact International* had devoted a special issue to Rushdie and *The Satanic Verses*, which contained a piece entitled "Quote, unquote Satanic Verses" (1988b). This collected together quotations from the book which were likely to be offensive to Muslims. These quotations were copied and, according to El-Essawy, were "circulated very widely" (Ezard, 1989b) throughout the Muslim community. But in addition to the activity which it generated among existing Muslim organisations, the controversy led to the creation of some new organisations formed to generate Muslim activity around the book. Nationally these included the Islamic Defence Council (1989) which took up a position against both the book and the *fatwa*. On 11th October 1988, the UK Action Committee on Islamic Affairs (see Weller, ed, 1993: 408) was founded, which has since developed a wider agenda of action with regard to Muslim concerns (UK Action Committee on Islamic Affairs, 1993).

Eventually it was in Bradford where the action took place that brought the debates around the book to wide and controversial public attention. This was on 14th January 1989, when Sayyid Abdul Quddus burned a copy of *The Satanic Verses* during a public demonstration against the book. Although this was the event which gained the media spotlight it was not, in fact, the first occasion on which a copy of the book had been burned. Already in December, outside Blackburn Town Hall, religious leaders (in *New Life*, 1988d) had called for the book to be burned as a distortion of Muslim
history and, six weeks prior to the Bradford burning, on 2nd December 1988, in a seven thousand strong demonstration in Bolton, a copy had actually been set alight. On that occasion, though, the burning of the book had been ignored, whereas in Bradford the media had been alerted about the incident in advance. As an explicitly arranged media event, the Bradford book-burning became a major stimulus to the development of the controversy.

The organisation of this by Bradford Muslims has to be understood against the background of growing frustration among Muslims at their apparent inability to achieve their goals or widely to publicise their case. For example, on 23rd December, the Attorney General had given the legal opinion that no action in law was possible against the publisher of *The Satanic Verses*. By contrast, two days after the Bradford book burning, W.H. Smith booksellers in the Bradford area withdrew *The Satanic Verses* from display on the shelves, although it remained on display and sale in Smith's outlets in other parts of the country.

Although successful in achieving such localised responses from booksellers and in drawing wider public attention to Muslim strength of feeling about *The Satanic Verses*, the actual symbolism of book-burning was double-edged in its effect. The vividly evocative title of one of the chapters of Richard Webster's (1990a) study of the controversy and its roots ("On Not Burning Your Enemy's Flag") underlined the ambiguous and contextual nature of the symbolism involved. In the living memory of European history book-burning is associated with Nazism and, writing in *The Daily Mail*, Anthony Burgess (1989) quoted Heinrich Heine's comment on the Nazi burning of books that "If you burn books you will soon be burning men and women," whilst acknowledging the fact that the law had ordered the burning of D.H. Lawrence's *The Rainbow* in 1916 and that the British customs authorities had burnt James Joyce's *Ulysses* in 1922.

Following the book-burning the Islamic Defence Council organised a meeting at the East London Mosque in which "Over a thousand Muslims" were reported (*New Life*, 1989b) to have participated. Rushdie's immediate response was to blame the trouble on an artificially organised campaign rather than a popular upsurge of Muslim opinion,
but Abdul Azad (1989) of The Muslim Educational Trust (see Weller, ed, 1993: 406) agreed that "The so-called campaign is a groundswell of grassroots opinion which needs no management." That there was also an upsurge of feeling was evidenced in Hyde Park, London, in a demonstration on the last weekend in January which *New Life* (1989d) reported to be eight thousand strong.

After the Ayatollah Khomeini's *fatwa*, the Muslim demonstrations in Britain continued and also intensified, with two thousand Muslims reported (Goodwin, 1989b) as demonstrating outside Manchester Town Hall and calling for the withdrawal of the book from the library. In Yorkshire, on 4th March, approximately two thousand Muslims organised by the South Yorkshire Muslim Action Committee marched in Sheffield, burning effigies and pictures of Salman Rushdie and calling for a ban on the book in Sheffield libraries. The libraries responded to this by inserting a warning slip that the book was offensive to Muslims. In Keighley, one thousand Muslims marched. At the end of March three thousand Muslims were reported as having demonstrated in Dewsbury, West Yorkshire and six hundred in Reading, Berkshire (Smith, 1989).

The British Muslim Action Front, organised by Abdul Hussain Chaudhary, mobilised support both in Britain and in Europe for what was intended to be the biggest demonstration in Britain this century, planned for Hyde Park in London on 27th May. It was planned that this demonstration should go to Parliament Square and Downing Street and that it would call upon Penguin to cease publication and to destroy all copies, as well as demanding an extension to the blasphemy laws in order to include Islam within their scope. It did not explicitly support Khomeini's *fatwa* which demonstration organiser Abdul Hussain Chaudhary was reported as saying "is a totally separate issue" (Rose, D, 1989a; Rose, D, 1989b; Schwartz, 1989c; Pallister, 1989b; Dalrymple, 1989a).

At the demonstration, police in riot dress intervened after Iranian and Iraqi factions fought and disputes flared between the demonstrators and around forty counter-demonstrators from Women Against Fundamentalism as well as with Nicholas Walter of the Rationalist Press Association and Barbara Smoker of the National Secular
Society. A Union Jack and an effigy of Rushdie was burned in Parliament Square. Banners were carried with the slogans "Rushdie burn," and "Kill the Bastard," accompanied by chants of "Rushdie die, Rushdie scum" (Shrimsley and Dawson, 1989; Vulliamy, 1989c; Walter, 1989c). The march ended in violent clashes and over one hundred arrests (Muslim News, 1989b). The British Muslim Action Front said further marches had not been ruled out, but a strike of Muslim businesses was also being considered (Reeves, P, 1989; New Life, 1989u). There were reports that the march had been funded by up to one million pounds sterling from the Iranian Office for Islamic Propaganda run by Ayatollah Ahmad Jannati, although Abdul Hussain Choudhary denied this (Bulloch and Darwish, 1989).

Local demonstrations continued, with a 17th June demonstration of around 3,000 in Bradford which broke into fighting between white and Asian youths, followed by generalised violence (Pithers, 1989c; New Life, 1989v). This coincided with an upsurge in white violence using "Rushdie" as a racial and ethnic taunt (Roy, 1989). A further demonstration was planned to take place in Dewsbury the following weekend, but Douglas Hurd agreed to a request from Kirklees Council to ban both the Muslim march and a counter demonstration being planned by National Front at which police intelligence had warned that there were plans to burn a copy of the Qur'an (Dalrymple, 1989c). The tensions in Bradford also grew, with gangs of white youths attacking isolated Muslim areas (Wainwright, 1989f).

On 17th June, during the Eid celebrations, the Bradford Council for Mosques launched a ten point plan of action (Muslim News, 1989d; New Life, 1989w). The plan included picketing Viking Penguin and bookshops and libraries who stocked the novel, a national day of action, and a protest march from Bradford to London. Meanwhile, the UK Action Committee on Islamic Affairs and the Muslim Action Front declared that they were awaiting the outcome of blasphemy court cases before organising further demonstrations (Schwartz, 1989e). At around the time of the anniversary of the hardback edition, the Bradford Council for Mosques announced that they were stepping up their campaigning after reports that Penguin was planning to issue the paperback version, a move which they condemned as an "act of greed and direct provocation" (Bowcott, 1989b).
Beginning on 30th September, the South African Muslim preacher, Ahmed Deedat, President of the Islamic Propagation Centre International in Birmingham (see Weller, ed, 1993: 403) organised a week-long speaking tour addressing meetings (Akhtar, H, 1989) in London as well as in Bradford, Blackburn, Leicester, Glasgow and Birmingham. His organisation stated that it neither supported nor denounced the fatwa (O'Sullivan, 1989b) but Deedat denounced Rushdie as having "made a monkey out of everybody" (Bowcott, 1989c; Akhtar, H, 1989). He also wrote a short booklet entitled 

*How Rushdie Fooled the West* (n.d.) which was published by the Islamic Propagation Centre. It quoted many of the abusive words used in *The Satanic Verses* and caused considerable controversy in Leicester Muslim community (*New Life*, 1989af) after it was distributed door-to-door to many houses in the Beaumont Leys area of the city.

e) The Political and Legal Arenas

In concert with continuing political activity at both the street and representative political levels, Muslim organisations attempted to utilise the law in their campaign against the book with the result that it, too, became one of the major terrains for the developing conflict. At the beginning of 1989, the Islamic Defence Council’s barrister, Mr. Ali Mohammed Azhar lodged papers with the Bow Street Magistrates’ Court with the intention of proving that Rushdie had infringed the blasphemy law and, if necessary, he vowed to take the case to the European Court (*New Life*, 1989d). It was also reported (*Daily Jang*, 1989) that an international lawyer, Sajid Qureshi, had been invited to the Middle East to discuss the basis upon which international legal proceedings might be commenced against Rushdie and his publishers. On 13th February, the Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, Sir David Hopkins, refused Muslim lawyers a summons against Rushdie and Viking Penguin for blasphemy and seditious libel (*The Independent*, 1989j).

On 27th February 1989, under the leadership of Teddy Taylor, Conservative MP for Southend, a delegation of British Muslims from the Islamic Defence Council visited John Patten, MP, the Minister of State at the Home Office, asking for equal treatment under the blasphemy law. Patten, however, explained that the government was not considering a change in the law (Brown and Morris, 1989) - in other words, it was intended neither to extend nor to abolish the current law. This was later confirmed
when the Home Secretary, Douglas Hurd, while addressing Muslims in Birmingham on 1st February, stated that there would not be any changes in the blasphemy law whilst he simultaneously urged British Muslims to join 'the mainstream.'

By the 3rd of March, the then Prime Minster, Margaret Thatcher and the Foreign Secretary, Sir Geoffrey Howe, were conceding that *The Satanic Verses* was "offensive" to Muslims. On 28th March 1989, a delegation of the Pakistani action committee against *The Satanic Verses*, the Tehrik Tahaffuzi-Namoos-i-Risalat, presented a memorandum to the Foreign Secretary seeking the banning of the book (Ahsan and Kidwai, eds, 1991: 16). On 1st April, the Muslim Institute held a conference in London on the Rushdie affair, at which its Director, Dr. Kalim Siddiqui, defended the *fatwa* and outlined his view of the wider political implications of the whole affair for Muslims in Britain.

In June, on the BBC programme *The World This Weekend*, Douglas Hurd (in Pithers, 1989c) said "I really do not think it would be sensible, in the middle of this dispute, to start proposing reviving and changing the blasphemy laws - I think that would give quite the wrong message" but on 19th June, the High Court gave the Muslim Action Front leave to challenge the 13th February Bow Street Magistrate's refusal to issue summonses to Rushdie and Viking Penguin for prosecution for blasphemous and seditious libel although the presiding judge, Mr. Justice Nolan, warned against the organisation of "counter-productive" demonstrations (Wynn Davies, P, 1989; Dyer, 1989; Muslim News, 1989e). The decision to allow an appeal was made in the light of a 1980 High Court ruling which stated that in a case where the existence of an offence is disputed, both sides should be heard before a decision is reached as to whether an offence does exist in English law. However, the Muslims were also warned the weight of legal authorities appeared to be strong on the side of those arguing that the current law of blasphemy was applicable only to Christianity. On 4th July, John Patten MP (1989a) wrote a letter to leading British Muslims entitled "Muslims in Britain Today" in which, amongst other things, he stated his view of the difficulties involved in extending legal protection beyond Anglican Christianity (Helm, 1989c).
At its conference on 11th September, the Union of Muslim Organisations stated that it viewed the continued publication of *The Satanic Verses* as the most important issue facing British Muslims. On the same day, the Conservative Member of Parliament, Neil Thorne, MP, called for the book to be withdrawn. On 16th December, the Association of Sunni Muslims underlined its determination to continue campaigning until the book was withdrawn and, as a sign of solidarity in their campaign against the novel, Muslims at mosques throughout the UK were called upon to raise their hands (Ahsan and Kidwai, 1991: 17).

f) The "Fatwa": Its International Context and Repercussions

It was the drama of the Bradford book-burning that had initially brought the controversy to the attention of the majority of English people and moved it firmly into the arena of the media. But it was the Ayatollah Khomeini's 14th February 1989 *fatwa* issued against Rushdie and those knowingly associated with the publication of *The Satanic Verses* which intensified the controversy's "lightening conductor" effect as it developed throughout the rest of 1989 and into 1990 and beyond. The *fatwa* was a sharp reminder that the controversy in the UK took place within, and was also profoundly affected by, a wider international context. Action and response therefore took place at an international diplomatic level as well as at national government level and local street level, with the issue of the *fatwa* affecting all of these levels simultaneously.

As has already been noted, on 5th October, the Indian Government had banned *The Satanic Verses*. This was followed by a range of Muslim organisations seeking to bring about its banning worldwide. On 11th October, the World Assembly of Muslim Youth, based in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia and representing over five hundred Muslim youth organisations throughout the world, had condemned the book and demanded a global ban on it. On 5th November, the General Secretariat of the Organisation of the Islamic Conference, which links forty-six Muslim countries, asked those states in membership with it to take strong action against both the author and the publisher if they failed to withdraw the book. On that same day, Bangladesh banned *The Satanic Verses*, followed on 22nd November by the Sudan; on 24th November by the Republic of South Africa; and on 14th December by Sri Lanka. On 28th December, Oman
blacklisted Penguin followed, on 15th February, by Iran (Ahsan and Kidwai, 1991: 11-14). Sheikh Zahram Ibrahim of the Regent’s Park Mosque in London was quoted (New Life, 1989d) as saying that “We want governments to ban any book seller or outlet which handles any Penguin book. We are asking for anybody affiliated to the company to be deported and shops closed down.”

The book’s international impact was far-reaching. In Pakistan, where Rushdie’s family continued to live, daily demonstrations were held against the book (Rashid, 1989) and Pakistani government Ministers claimed that the opposition, led by the Islamic Democratic Alliance, was “using the affair directly to undermine the government and democracy.” On 12th February 1989, in urban centres throughout Pakistan, demonstrations were held against the book. In Islamabad, ten people were reported killed and over one hundred were reported injured during disturbances about the book which took place outside the US Embassy. In India, on 13th February, a Muslim demonstrator was reported killed and more than one hundred injured in Srinagar (Murtagh, 1989b). On 27th February in further demonstrations in India, one Muslim was reported killed and seven people injured (Brown and Morris, 1989). In the USA, on 28th February, in attacks thought to be linked to the controversy, two bookshops in Berkeley, California were bombed as was the office of the Riverdale Press, the headquarters of a New York weekly that had endorsed the book (Bulloch and Brown, 1989).

Despite this turmoil very few people in England or the UK outside of the Muslim community were really aware of the book’s international impact. Even after the impetus given to the controversy by the Bradford book-burning it would appear that the campaign was having little effect with an editorial in the Asian newspaper New Life (1989c) expressing the opinion that, “It is now becoming increasingly clear that the wrath of these Muslim representatives....will be ignored into oblivion.” However, on 14th February 1989, events took a turn which ensured that the issue not only remained alive but intensified when Iran’s spiritual leader, the late Ayatollah Khomeini, issued a fatwa in which he pronounced (quoted in Ruthven, 1991: 112) that Salman Rushdie was to be viewed as an apostate to Islam and should be punished by death:
I would like to inform all the intrepid Muslims in the world that the author of the book entitled *The Satanic Verses*, which has been compiled, printed and published in opposition to Islam, the Prophet and the Qur'an, as well as those publishers who were aware of its contents, have been declared madhur el dam. I call on all zealous Muslims to execute them quickly, wherever they find them, so that no one will dare to insult Islam again. Whoever is killed in this path will be regarded as a martyr....

Only three weeks prior to the *fatwa* Khomeini had stated that a sentence of death would be appropriate for the producers of an Iranian television programme in which one of the women on the programme, when asked their opinion of Fatima, the revered daughter of the Prophet, had stated that she preferred a more contemporary role model, suggesting the star of a highly popular Japanese soap opera. The *fatwa* on Rushdie and those associated with the publication of *The Satanic Verses* was Khomeini’s first public intervention in the Rushdie affair. A *Financial Times* (1989) editorial suggested, "It may be doubted whether Ayatollah Khomeini actively seeks a confrontation with Britain: the timing of his statement suggests that he was reacting as much to the deaths of demonstrators in Pakistan as to Mr. Rushdie’s book itself."

In the light of the critical review of *The Satanic Verses* noted in the section above on "Literary and Critical Responses", and which had three months previously appeared in the Iranian cultural weekly *Kayhan Farangi*, there is evidence to support *The Financial Times'* interpretation. Khomeini and the ruling group in Iran would almost certainly have been aware of this review and of the book itself and yet no action had been taken and no statements were issued prior to February 1989.

From a secular, political perspective, the *fatwa* amounted to what *The Financial Times* (1989) editorial described as “a direct incitement to murder a British subject (or subjects) resident in Britain.” However, a *fatwa* is not, as it was sometimes reported to be, an order. An anonymous London-based Iranian was quoted (in Mills, Lister and Morris, 1989f) as arguing that “Such things are still a matter for individual conscience.” In other words, as the Iranian authorities later insisted, Khomeini spoke not as a Head of State but as a mujtahid, one of those who, in Shi'a Islam, is qualified to interpret Islamic law. However, if Rushdie were judged to have committed *fitna* or sedition, then the sentence would indeed be death. Khomeini's first statement, then, though understood by many as a verdict, was actually an opinion, albeit an authoritative one for Shi'a Muslims in particular. In a Channel Four interview on
17.2.89 (quoted in Ezard and Pick, 1989) Mr. Mohammad Akhundzadeh Basti, the Iranian chargé d'affaires in London, stated that the *fatwa* was "a religious command, not a political command" and that it was "an opinion, a purely religious statement."

There were other indications, too, that at least sections of the Iranian leadership did not wish to let events spin out of control. In a sermon at Tehran University's prayer ground, President Ali Khamenei (in Ezard and Pick, 1989; Bulloch, Morris and Usborne, 1989), reaffirmed of Rushdie that, "This is a wretched man, who has no choice but to die", but went on to say that "of course he may repent and say I made a blunder and apologise to Muslims and the Imam. Then it is possible that people will pardon him." The British chargé d'affaires, Nicholas Browne, had a two hour meeting with the Iranian Deputy Foreign Minister, Mohammad Javad Larijani at which it was several times underlined that the Ayatollah Khomeini's *fatwa* had been pronounced in his religious capacity rather than as head of the Iranian State and in a sermon at Friday prayers on 24th February, Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, whilst supporting the *fatwa* added "If any Muslim carried out his duty, this cannot have any link with the Islamic Republic of Iran" (quoted in Morris, 1989g). However, after Rushdie's expression of regret and diplomatic moves in the European Community, Khomeini reiterated the *fatwa* (Hirst, 1989b) in a way which appeared to be a verdict, perhaps because Rushdie's expressions of regret subsequent to the first *fatwa* were taken as being tantamount to an admission of guilt.

Although a part of the minority Shi'a branch of Islam, Khomeini's anti-colonial radicalism (see Moin, 1994: 64-94) was also appealing to many Sunni Muslims. The anonymous source quoted in Mills, Lister and Morris (1989f) also pointed out that, Khomeini's *fatwa* had now "put other religious leaders on the spot." Writing in *The Independent*, Harvey Morris (1989a) noted that Iran "can now claim to have taken the lead in a matter of primary concern to all Muslims, both Shi'a and Sunni, Iranian and non-Iranian." The *fatwa* has therefore to to be seen in the context of the struggle that was taking place within Islam in terms of the tension between the revolutionary version of Islam espoused by Khomeini and the Iranian radicals and what Khomeini sometimes described as "American Islam," by which he meant what he criticised as the depoliticised version of Islam found in Saudi Arabia and other Gulf States. King
Fahd ibn Abdul Aziz has the honour of the title "Keeper of the Holy Places" of Islam but, in 1987, more than four hundred people had been killed in violence between Saudi Arabian police and Iranian Shi'a pilgrims in Mecca, and as Harvey Morris (1989d) pointed out, there is "intense and sometimes violent rivalry between the Iranian ayatollahs and Saudi Arabia for the hearts and minds of the Muslim people." This was borne out by the Khomeini's last will, most recently revised in December 1987 only months after the Iranian pilgrims had died in Mecca, which cursed Saudi Arabia's Saud family as "traitors to God's great shrine" who publicise "the anti-Koranic, totally baseless and superstitious faith of Wahhabism" (Reuter, 1989d).

Within Iran itself, after the Iran-Iraq war débâcle, those identified in the West as "pragmatists," such as the Speaker of the Parliament Hashemi Rafsanjani, had been making some headway in their arguments for the development of more pragmatic international relations and in this internal context the fatwa could be interpreted as bringing pressure to bear upon such moves. However, after a visit to Tehran the Lebanese Shi'a Muslim leader Sheikh Mohammed Hussein Fadlallah insisted that Khomeini's fatwa was not the result of radical counter-pressures. Fadlallah (in Flint, 1989) said that, "There was no political dispute over this. Rushdie harmed Islam in a very flagrant way. We respond with dialogue to those who differ with us on an intellectual level. We do not enjoy the spirit of dialogue with those who insult our sacred symbols." He added that the fatwa had functioned as a kind of shock tactic in that "The West moved to publish this book in all Western countries without concern for Muslim feelings...Imam Khomeini's stand was important to control this plot."

Nevertheless, whether or not it was the original intention behind the fatwa, Khomeini clearly did use the affair to attack revisionists in Iran. In an hour long broadcast on 22nd February, Khomeini (quoted in Morris, 1989f) argued that,

Those who still continue to believe that we must embark on revisions in our politics, principles and diplomacy and that we have blundered and must not repeat previous mistakes; those who still believe that extremist slogans of war will cause the West and East to be pessimistic about us and that ultimately all this has led to the country's isolation; those who believe that if we act in a pragmatic way they will reciprocate and will mutually respect the nation, Islam and Muslims - to them this is an example.
The *fatwa* must also be seen in the context of the wider history of relations between Iran and the West generally. Relations between Iran and Britain, in particular, had been poisoned since the forced closure of the British Embassy in Tehran in 1979, in the wake of the Iranian Revolution and the upsurge of popular anti-Western activity. These relations had then deteriorated still further with the April 1980 armed takeover of the Iranian embassy in London and the subsequent SAS storming of the embassy, and Britain together with the USA viewed Iran as a leading exporter of international terrorism. But the history of mistrust had deeper roots even than these events. Iran saw Britain as historically untrustworthy and guilty of interference in Iranian internal affairs. Britain was seen as “the Little Satan” alongside the powerful “Great Satan” of the USA (Morris, 1989e). *The Satanic Verses* were therefore understood as yet another chapter in the history of British involvement in Persian affairs which began with the British Empire's strategic interest in protecting Northern India from the Czarist Empire’s expansionist southern drive; Britain’s involvement in setting up the Pahlavi dynasty; its occupation of the country during the Second World War; and its part in overthrowing Prime Minister Mohammad Mossadeq in 1953.

On February 15th 1989, a day of mourning about the book announced by the Iranian Prime Minister Mir-Hossein Mousavi, a thousand Iranian demonstrators pelted the British embassy in Tehran chanting “Death to Britain” and “Death to America” whilst the three diplomats and four support staff, including the chargé d'affaires, Mr. Nick Browne, tried to establish contact with senior Iranian officials. Iranian Revolutionary Guards undertook to kill Rushdie (Pick, 1989a). A senior Iranian cleric, Hassani Sanei, offered a reward of one million dollars, later raised to three million, for any foreigner who (quoted in Pick, 1989a) kills “this mercenary of colonialism”, to be paid from his Fifth of Khordad Foundation (originally set up to care for people killed in anti-American demonstrations on 5th June 1963).

The Tehran daily newspaper *Jomhuri Eslami (Islamic Republic)* did criticise this financial reward as diverting attention from what it called “the sanctity” of the *fatwa* (Morris, 1989b) and in retaliation, the British publisher Robert Maxwell, offered six million dollars “not for death but for anyone who will civilise the barbaric beast” by getting him to publicly recite the commandments ‘Thou shalt not kill’ and ‘Thou shalt
not bear false witness" (quoted in Weasal, 1989a). The controversy was thus beginning to poison the gradual restoration of normal diplomatic relations upon which Iran and the British Foreign Minister, Sir Geoffrey Howe, had agreed during 1988.

Although the initial diplomatic reaction to the fatwa was relatively low-key with a Foreign Office spokesperson (quoted in Murtagh, 1989a) saying only that the Ayatollah's words "were a matter for serious concern," the incremental movement that had previously taken place towards normalisation was frozen. One factor which undoubtedly contributed to the initially muted response of the British Government was concern about how these events might complicate the diplomatic position with regard to Roger Cooper, a British businessman who had been held in prison in Tehran, on suspicion of spying, without charge or trial for three years. Following the fatwa, the Iranian Information Ministry (quoted in The Financial Times, 1989) had issued statements to the effect that Cooper had been given "a heavy sentence" for spying and also that his "final judgement" was still under consideration. Another concern was that a stronger response might also jeopardise the efforts being made to release the British and Irish hostages held in the Lebanon - Terry Waite, John McCarthy and Brian Keenan. Indeed, Sheikh Fadlallah warned that diplomatic attacks on Iran might lead to Iran freezing its good offices over the hostages, and this was confirmed by the Archbishop of Canterbury who explained that, in the wake of the fatwa and reactions to it, "Communications have become much more difficult" (The Independent, 1989a).

On 26th February there had been anti-Rushdie and anti-British demonstrations in Beirut and the Bekaa Valley (Flint, 1989b) and soon after this, the British embassy warned British citizens to leave The Lebanon (Flint and Simmonds, 1989). The Islamic Jihad for the Liberation of Palestine, which held three American hostages kidnapped from Beirut University College (Alan Steen, Jesse Turner and Robert Polhill), warned that they would take vengeance on any institution judged to be insulting the Prophet or Islam (Morris and van der Leeuw, 1989). On 26th February a statement (quoted in Flint, 1989b) from the Revolutionary Muslim Forces (claiming to speak for Islamic Jihad, for Islamic Jihad for the Liberation of Palestine and for the Revolutionary Justice Organisation) explicitly linked the position of the hostages with the Rushdie controversy by stating that, "The fate of the hostages in Lebanon awaits
the decision of Imam Khomeini" and also claimed that a group in The Lebanon had
been commissioned to kill Rushdie before March 15th. In Damascus, Ahmed Jibril,
the leader of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine-General Command,
vowed to kill Rushdie (Reuter, 1989a; Thurgood, 1989b). In Libya, Colonel Muammar
Gadafy (in Ezard, 1989d) supported Iran's positions on the Rushdie controversy
declaring that, "Islam does not forgive apostasy." By 9th March, there were reports
in the Spanish Efe news agency (in Murtagh and Walker, 1989) that a seven strong
hit squad had been assembled in Madrid and had set out to rendezvous with suppliers
in Britain, France and Germany, although the Spanish interior ministry, the German
Government and British police said that they had no knowledge of this (The Guardian,
1989h).

Although Ian Gelderd (in Cook, 1989a) of the Institute for the Study of Terrorism
acknowledged that a lone individual might try to kill Rushdie, he judged the most
likely threat to Rushdie's life to be from an armed cell amongst the radical supporters
(either among students or people on visitors' visas) of Khomeini in Britain. The
possibility of an organised attempt on Rushdie's life was consistent with a previous
history of such activity in Britain. For example, in 1986, a Kensington video shop that
sold anti-Khomeini literature and videos had been bombed, killing an Iranian exile and
injuring thirteen other people. In July 1987, the Guardians of the Islamic Revolution
had exploded a car bomb injuring Mr. Amir Hussein Amir-Parviz, the London-based
representative for the exiled pro-monarchy National Movement for Iranian Resistance
and, in October 1987, the Iranian oppositionists, Mr. Mohammed Ali Tavakoli-Nabavi
and his son, Noureddin, were shot dead at their Wembley flat in London.

In contrast to the British Government's initially low-key response, a European
Community Foreign Ministers' meeting revealed an increasingly strong and united
European feeling (Usborne, 1989a) about the fatwa. Therefore, on February 20th, in
concert with other European Community countries, whilst stopping short of completely
cutting diplomatic relations, Sir Geoffrey Howe withdrew all accredited British
diplomats from Tehran (Usborne, 1989a; Morris, 1989e) and expelled from Britain the
Iranian chargé d'affaires and Iran's one other accredited diplomat (Brown, Bulloch,
Haeri and Barwick, 1989). Iran responded by recalling its European Community
ambassadors and chargé d'affaires for consultations. The European Community statement (quoted in Usborne, Morris and Barwick, 1989) condemned "incitement to murder" as an "unacceptable violation of the most elementary principles and obligations that govern relations among sovereign states." Strengthened by this support, Sir Geoffrey Howe (in Goodwin, 1989) stated in the House of Commons that, "Before normal relations can be restored, Iran must meet her obligations, in particular by renouncing the use or threat of violence against citizens of other countries."

The Dutch Foreign Minister, Hans van der Broek cancelled a visit to Tehran as a result of the "totally unacceptable call for international terrorism". Outside the EC, Sweden also recalled its ambassador (Brown, Bulloch, Haeri and Barwick, 1989) and the Austrian President Kurt Waldheim rejected the death threats, but also criticised the book for insulting Islam (Johnson, 1989). The Soviet Union stated that it had no plans for publication. The chair of the Soviet State Publishing Committee, Mikhail Nenashev, explained that whilst Soviet policy allowed criticism of religion it prohibited work that would be offensive to religious or national feelings. On 26th February, after Sir Geoffrey Howe sent a letter asking the Soviet Foreign Minister, Eduard Shevardnaze, to exert any pressure that he could concerning the fatwa (Hirst, 1989c). Shevardnadze met with Khomeini in the context of Khomeini's attempt at a spiritual outreach to President Gorbachev (The Independent, 1989h) and the affair was not raised at their meeting, but it was discussed with Iranian ministers (Bulloch and Brown, 1989). A commentary in Tass critiqued the western press for presenting the issues in simplistic terms (Cornwell, N, 1989) and the Soviet Union sought to broker a solution (Pick, 1989d).

Elsewhere outside of Europe and the Islamic world, Mr. Otto Jelinek, the Revenue Minister of Canada, was put under guard after he received death threats following his refusal to ban The Satanic Verses (Hirst, 1989b). The Japanese Foreign Minister, Mr. Sosuke Uno, whilst stating that what he called "incitement to murder" could not be tolerated also said "We believe that the proper considerations should have been given to the Islamic people" by Rushdie, implying the book should not have been written in the way in which it was (Martineau, 1989). Japan, in fact, was the only leading non-Communist country to retain its ambassador in Iran (McCarthy, 1989b). In Hong
Kong, Muslims put adverts in English-language newspapers calling for the book to be banned in Hong Kong and, on 26th February, 1,500 Muslims demonstrated at a protest service.

In Iran, on 23rd February, 115 of the 270 members of the Majlis (Iranian Parliament), called for a break in diplomatic relations with Britain (Morris and van der Leeuw, 1989) and on 25th February, Iran cancelled a British trade fair which had been planned to take place in Tehran, hitting hopes of British industrial involvement in Iran's post-war reconstruction (Elliott, 1989). On February 28th, the Iranian Parliament voted (Hirst, 1989d) to break ties with Britain if the British Government did not change its position within a week.

In response, on the 2nd March, Britain turned down a proposed meeting with Iranian officials to "explain the background" to the Majlis resolution arguing that nothing would be gained from such a meeting without the fatwa being lifted (Pick, 1989c). In a BBC World Service interview on the same day, however, Sir Geoffrey Howe (in Bulloch, 1989b) stated that he wished to emphasise that, "we are not upholding the right of freedom to speak because we like the book, because we agree with the book. The British Government, the British people don't have any affection for the book. The book is extremely critical, rude about us. It compares Britain with Hitler's Germany." This statement, which was followed by Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher's comments (in Pick, 1989d) that she understood that Muslims were "deeply offended" by the book, led to an editorial expression of concern in The Guardian (1989e), entitled "Rude as in rudimentary" and one in The Independent, entitled "A false sympathy with Islam" (1989i). On March 7th, Iran went ahead and cut diplomatic relations (Simmons, 1989) and following this a number of Iranians were expelled from Britain on security grounds (Flint and Simmons, 1989).

Paralleling these international diplomatic upheavals, the street-level demonstrations and violence associated with the book continued throughout the world, with violence being initiated both by protestors and against them. In Bombay, on 24th February 1989, following Friday prayers, the police opened fire on a procession of thousands of Muslims who had defied a ban on gatherings, and at least ten people were reported
as killed and around fifty injured (Bose and Hoyland, 1989; Allen-Mills, 1989). On the same day an effigy of Rushdie was burned outside the British High Commission in New Delhi, with protestors demanding an immediate ban on *The Satanic Verses*. On 26th February, there was a bomb attack on the British Council library in Karachi, Pakistan, which killed a Pakistani security guard (Hirst and Flint, 1989) and resulted in closure of the office (Brown and Morris, 1989). On the same day, between eight and ten thousand Muslims protested in New York chanting "Death to Rushdie" and burning an effigy of him (Martineau, 1989). In India, on 26th February, Muslim organisations called for a strike by businesses in protest at the shooting of Muslim demonstrators in Bombay (Martineau, 1989).

Governments throughout the Muslim world began to respond by banning the book in the light of the *fatwa* and diplomatic activity by international Muslim organisations. At the level of international diplomacy, Iran called upon the Organisation of the Islamic Conference to convene an emergency meeting. The Chair of the Conference, the Kuwaiti minister Suleiman Majid al-Shaheen, opposed this on the practical grounds of short notice. However, the Saudi Arabian sponsored World Muslim League condemned Rushdie as a "heretic and a renegade" who should be tried by "the relevant courts" (Brown and Morris, 1989). Although Khomeini's *fatwa* was not endorsed, it was declared that, in the absence of justice from the British legal system, Rushdie could be tried in absentia for the crime of *Zandaqa* (Martin, P, 1989), which carries the death penalty. On the 1st March 1989, Kenya banned *The Satanic Verses*. In the Comoros Islands off East Africa, foreign newspapers containing extracts were ritually destroyed by order of the interior ministry (Sheridan and Kelsey, 1989). This was followed on 7th March by Thailand banning the book; on 13th March by Tanzania; and on 14th March by Singapore.

With an Anglican Bishop, David Hand, as Chief Censor of its Censorship Board (*The Church Times*, 1989d), Papua New Guinea banned the book from importation. On 16th March, the Organisation of the Islamic Conference did meet and considered the affair. Whilst not endorsing the *fatwa*, it passed a resolution calling for the banning of Penguin publications in forty-five Muslim countries in protest at Penguin's refusal to withdraw the book (Traynor, 1989). This was in response to representations from
Hojatoleslam Mohammad Ali Tashkiri from the Iranian Islamic Guidance Ministry who stated that, "Our focus is the colonialist, atheist challenge to holy Islam as represented by the apostate, Salman Rushdie" (Morris, H, 1989j). In significantly different tones, Saudi Arabia's Prince Saud al-Faisal, as spokesperson of the Foreign Ministers' meeting of the Conference explained that "We are interested in creating channels of understanding, believing that there exists a diversity of culture and beliefs in the world, that the true knowledge of each other's beliefs and respect for each other's beliefs is a cardinal cornerstone in relations between countries" (Morris, 1989k). On 22nd March, Poland decided not to publish *The Satanic Verses* and on 15th June, Venezuela banned it. At its meetings in Cairo between 31st July and 4th August, the 19th Islamic Foreign Ministers' Conference adopted a mandatory resolution, calling upon its member states to take all necessary steps, including economic sanctions, against Penguin and its holding company, Pearson.

In Britain, the Murabitun European Muslim Movement, which claims between two and five thousand members in Europe and South Africa aligned itself with the *fatwa* but tried to distance itself from its carrying out in the UK, with Mr. Mahmud Lund explaining that, "The clear distinction here is that Rushdie is legally sentenced to death within the guidelines of Islam but he lives in a land where he cannot be legally punished in this way" (Murtagh, 1989e). In the context of such statements, debate began to open up on possible legal action against Muslims in the UK who supported the *fatwa*. The West Yorkshire Police consulted the Crown Prosecution Service to see if the statement of Quddus, the Bradford book-burner and supporter of the *fatwa*, amounted to incitement (Murtagh, 1989d). This is a common law offence to "persuade, encourage or command another person to commit an offence", and it is punishable by an unlimited fine or imprisonment. If a murder is carried out, an inciter becomes liable to prosecution as an accessory to murder and therefore faces the possibility of life imprisonment.

Recordings and newspaper cuttings together with statements by Quddus had been sent to the Crown Prosecution Service. Quddus (quoted in Murtagh, 1989a) had stated that, "I totally agree with what Ayatollah Khomeini has said in public. Every Muslim blames Salman Rushdie. If any Muslim will get a chance, he won't avoid it and should
not. Why not? He has tortured every Muslim. Why should people be brutally murdered and lose their lives and Salman Rushdie not pay?" However, the Crown Prosecution Service concluded that there was not currently enough direct evidence for a charge to be brought, emphasising the factor of "public interest" in its decision (Rice, 1989). In October 1989, following a Manchester Town Hall meeting at which Kalim Siddiqui asked for a vote on whether Rushdie should die, a report was being considered for transmission to the Crown Prosecution Service (The Independent, 1989ah) and a judge ordered the BBC to hand over its film of the events (New Life, 1989ah). That violent deaths connected with the controversy could indeed occur in Europe as well as in other parts of the world was illustrated by the 29th March shooting to death of Abdullah Al Ahdal, the Director of the Islamic Centre and spiritual leader of Belgium's Muslim community and his aide, Salem el-Behir (Wolf, 1989; Usborne, 1989b). This occurred after Mr. Ahdal had, in a radio interview on 20th February, refused to call for the book to be banned in Belgium.

Publishers abroad began to express concern, with the German publisher Keipenheuer & Witsch of Cologne postponing plans for an Autumn publication in German. The publishers (quoted in Ezard and Pick, 1989) who were planning to bring out a Danish edition said they had received "scary threats". Nevertheless, in London, Penguin stated that a paperback print run of 125,000 copies would be in the shops by September (Mills, Lister and Morris 1989c). El-Essawy described this as provocative, especially after Penguin confirmed that there were no plans to put a disclaimer in the book. An American edition was published on 22nd February. In Italy, there was a fire in Padua at a bookshop owned by The Satanic Verses' Italian publishing company, Mondadori (Sheridan and Kelsey, 1989). In England, it was reported that publishers were, in general, reluctant to be quoted as expressing an opinion (Targett, 1989). In Germany, a consortium of fifty publishers was formed to publish the book (Traynor, 1989) which finally came out in the middle of October (Bailey, 1989).

Violent reactions had continued, with bomb attacks on a British cultural centre and the vice-consul's car in Ankara, Turkey (United Press Institute, 1989a). Back in Britain, a Dillon's bookshop in Gower Street and Collet's Penguin bookstore in Charing Cross Road in London were firebombed, apparently because they stocked the book (Boseley,
1989; *The Independent*, 1989l, *New Life*, 1989p). Collets said it was likely that their Charing Cross Road shop would cease stocking the book, the staff having previously decided to stock it but not display it. Their international bookshop had already ceased to stock it following death threats to staff at Foyle's which had also subsequently decided to withdraw it. On May 13th, an arson attack on the Penguin Bookshop in the King's Road, Chelsea was suspected as being linked with the Rushdie affair. British diplomats in Europe were given extra security measures after a number were named in a death list sent to the Foreign Office from a group called the Defenders of Islamic Purity (Sharrock, 1989b; UPI, 1989b).

But there were also violent attacks upon Muslims. The office of the Bradford Council for Mosques was broken into and suffered vandalism and Sher Azam of the Council of Mosques experienced threatening phone calls and anonymous mail threats (Roy, 1989). A firebomb was thrown at the Regent's Park Mosque and Islamic Cultural Centre complex (see Weller, ed, 1993: 403) in London and hit a wall in its residential area causing minor damage, but hurting no one (Pithers, 1989). In May, a Cypriot born British citizen, Hratch Tchaderjian, was jailed for three years after pleading guilty to the bombing which he said had been carried out as a gesture in support of Salman Rushdie (*The Independent*, 1989q). In a burglary at the Council of Mosques offices in Bradford, paint was poured onto a typewriter and the message "Leave Salman Rushdie alone - or else" was left, and El-Essawy received three anonymous death threats (Shahin, 1989b).

On June 3rd 1989 Ayatollah Khomeini died, aged eighty-six, but it was predicted that the *fatwa* would nevertheless stand (Milne, 1989a, Bulloch, 1989). President Ali Khamenei, aged forty-nine, was nominated to become Leader of the Revolution by the eighty-three member Assembly of Experts (Plommer, 1989). On the 5th June, amidst the mourning of crowds of two million people in Tehran, eight people were reported killed and hundreds injured in the crush and heat (Rose, 1989c). After the funeral, Rafsanjani stated the position that the *fatwa* cannot be withdrawn (Thurgood, 1989a) and this was reiterated in Moscow on 22nd June (Steele, 1989). On 16th June, three more Iranians, two students and a businessman, were expelled from Britain on security
grounds taking the total number of expulsions to twenty, out of the approximately 25,000 strong Iranian community in Britain (Associated Press, 1989).

On 13th August, Maulana Ziyaul Qasmi, the convenor of the International Islamic Mission initially appeared to encourage Muslims to abduct Rushdie to an Islamic country, but then stated that Muslims should not take the law into their own hands (Pallister, 1989d). However, attacks on bookshops in Britain resumed in the run-up to the first anniversary of The Satanic Verses' publication. On 3rd September Liberty's of Regent Street in London was lightly damaged by a bomb and a woman sustained serious leg injuries, with another woman and two men being treated for shock. An anonymous warning had been received connecting the blast to The Satanic Verses. A spokesperson for the shop said that they did not currently stock the book, although a Penguin shop had been inside the store until two months prior to the blast (Bunting, 1989b). The Booksellers' Association responded that, "This crude attempt to intimidate booksellers from stocking books is contemptible" (Dalyrymple, 1989d) and El-Essawy declared "We would like to express our utter condemnation for those who commit acts like this in the name of Islam. They are putting to shame the good name of our religion, and the great majority of Muslim people would grieve for those who have been injured in this senseless attack."

The Liberty's attack was followed, on 13th September, by an explosion at a Penguin bookshop at Coppergate in York (Wainwright, 1989i, Kirby and Wahhab, 1989). Police warnings to nine other forces with Penguin bookshops in their areas resulted in homemade bombs being defused in Guildford, Peterborough and Nottingham (Ezard, 1989). Sher Azam made it clear that, "We condemn this action and this is not part of our strategy" (Wainwright, 1989i). However, these attacks at around the time of the first anniversary of publication, appeared to be aimed at bringing pressure to bear on Penguin not to publish a paperback. They highlighted the around two million pounds that had been spent by the company over the past year on security measures following threatening letters posted to the home addresses of Viking-Penguin board members. In the light of this, Sir Robert Lusty, formerly of Hutchinson, suggested that a consortium of publishers should print the paperback (The Independent, 1989ag), although other publishers proved reluctant to become involved.
It was reported (*The Independent*, 1989ad) that among booksellers as well as publishers, opinions were becoming increasingly divided over *The Satanic Verses*. Fewer than half of the four hundred booksellers who replied to a survey gave their backing to Penguin, with forty per cent stating they would not stock the book. On 13th October, the trade journal *The Publishers Weekly* came out with an editorial which, whilst acknowledging that "members of the PW staff could not agree on a common position." nevertheless concluded:

> In the end, however, it seems to us that, as a sober decision taken on the purely economic merits of the case - the question of freedom of expression no longer being at issue - Penguin would be well advised to consider honour satisfied at this point, and to do its best to resume a normal life: without a paperback.

Even so, it was reported (*The Independent*, 1989ag) that Penguin’s Chief Executive, Peter Mayer, seemed "determined to go ahead" with publishing a paperback, although *The Satanic Verses* was by this time known among some senior Penguin staff as "that damned book".

In an interview with *The Tehran Times* towards the end of August the Iranian Deputy Foreign Minister, Mr. Mahmoud Vaezi, had said that leaving aside the question of the fatwa, relationships with the UK could be mended if it could convince the Iranian Parliament that its Government would "respect Islamic principles and values." At the time, the British Foreign Office response was to state that "If Iran wants to improve relations it is for her to make the first move. We do want normal relations, but we will not accept Iranian intervention in our internal affairs" (Hirst, 1989g).

**g) The Continuing Controversy**

Vigils, protests, lobbying and campaigning continued. Between 8th-12th January 1990, a five day vigil of Muslim representatives from all over Britain was held outside the London offices of Viking Penguin and a letter to the company was published, setting out Muslim demands. On 21st January, a gathering of 200 Muslim leaders organised by the International Muslims Organisation resolved to campaign against the book. On 3rd February, the winter conference of the Union of Muslim Organisations (see Weller, ed, 1993: 409) held in Gwent, Wales, resolved to campaign for the extension of the blasphemy laws to cover Islam. On 16th February, the UK Action Committee on Islamic Affairs organised a Solidarity Day of Prayer and Dedication in memory of
the Muslims who had been killed in February of the previous year during the protests against the book held in Islamabad, Bombay and Srinagar.

On 27th February 1990, in the High Court, Counsel for the British Muslim Action Front argued the case for the equality of Islam before the law and applied for a summons against Viking Penguin for causing public disorder. On the 9th April, giving judgement on this case, the Queen's Bench Divisional Court dismissed the application for summonses under Section 4(1) of the Public Order Act 1986. In the meantime, Lord Hutchinson and Lord Harris urged that British Muslims be prosecuted for their protests over The Satanic Verses.

On 10th April, the British Muslim Action Front sought leave to appeal to the House of Lords on the question of protection for Islam under the current blasphemy laws. On 28th April, speaking on BBC Radio 4, Rushdie expressed surprise that no Muslim had been prosecuted for threats against him (Ahsan and Kidwai, 1991: 19-20). On 25th May, the High Court refused the Muslims leave to appeal to the House of Lords against the judgement that the law of blasphemy applies only to Christianity. On 16th July, the Muslim Institute held a conference in London on the affair. On 2nd August 1990, the Foreign Secretary, Douglas Hurd, in an intended gesture of conciliation towards Iran, reiterated Britain's respect for Islam. By 28th September, 1990, Iran and Britain had again resumed diplomatic relations, although the agreement made no mention of the fatwa which, on 10th February 1990, had been re-affirmed by the Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, Iran's new supreme leader. By 3rd January 1991, the Home Office Minister, Mrs. Angela Rumbold, was meeting with a delegation of the UK Action Committee on Islamic Affairs and speaking of the Government's attempt to "find a way forward" in terms of legal provisions to protect religious sensitivities. However, nothing specific was proposed either at the time or since then.

The fatwa clearly continued to have reverberations beyond the Rushdie controversy itself. It was reported (Ahmed and O'Neill, 1990) that a school project on Iran was ended in the context of concerns arising from the fatwa. It also continued to have a wider effect upon the publishing world. Even as late as 11th February 1991, the Oxford University Press decided no longer to proceed with plans to include a passage
from Rushdie's *Midnight's Children* in a book on teaching the English language, on the grounds that it might have been viewed as offensive to Muslims.

Rushdie's essay *In Good Faith* (1990n) was his first developed attempt to respond to Muslim criticisms in a considered way, although the Muslim commentators Ahsan and Kidwai (1991: 18), evaluated it as "a long, malicious piece." In *In Good Faith*, Rushdie stated that he had never regarded himself as a Muslim. In late 1990 and early 1991, a series of somewhat confusing events took place in which Rushdie initially appeared to have reached some form of rapprochement with a group of Muslim leaders. On the 24th December 1990, Rushdie announced that he had embraced Islam and adopted a new position as a Muslim. It was stated that this had been done in the presence of the Egyptian Minister for Awqaf and a number of other Egyptian officials. As a part of his embrace of Islam, Rushdie stated that he would not publish a paperback edition of *The Satanic Verses* or permit its translation into additional languages "while any risk of further offence exists" (Ahsan and Kidwai, 1991: 21).

British Muslim leaders gave a cautious welcome to these reports whilst, at the same time, calling for the withdrawal of the hardback version of the book. However, on 26th December, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei restated the fatwa and even stressed its irrevocable nature. Shaikh Jamal Manna of the Islamic Cultural Centre, London, who was present at the meeting with Rushdie, stated that the book was offensive and called for the withdrawal of the hardback version. The UK Action Committee on Islamic Affairs pointed out that, from their perspective, Rushdie had not dealt with what they saw as the central issue - namely the book's withdrawal, which they saw as a "religious duty" for Rushdie as evidence of a genuine penitence for the offence it had caused.

On 28th December, in an article in *The Times* entitled "Why I have embraced Islam" Rushdie (1990s) tried to explain his reasons for this apparently dramatic turn of events. He stated that the Egyptian scholars did not find his book offensive and that totally to withdraw the book would be to betray his readers since it was not intended as a deliberate insult to Islam. On 29th December, the UK Action Committee on Islamic Affairs gave a press conference at the Islamic Cultural Centre in Regent's
Park, London, at which they stated that they believed Rushdie's reported "embrace" of Islam was a ploy to get him "off the hook" and that he gave no serious evidence that his conversion was genuine. They therefore vowed to continue their campaign until the book was totally withdrawn, an unqualified apology was offered to Muslims, and payment for damages was made to an Islamic charity.

On 31st December, on the BBC Radio 4's Sunday programme, Rushdie claimed to have been blessed by the Egyptian officials and scholars he had met with and to have an invitation to meet with Shaikh Gad el-Haq Ali Gad el-Haq, the Grand Shaikh of al-Azhar in Cairo who, at the beginning of the controversy had said the book contained "lies and figments of the imagination" (in Murtagh, 1989b). Rushdie also sought to justify and reaffirm his conversion (Bennett, W, 1990; Boggan, 1990). However, on 1st January 1990, an Egyptian Government spokesperson said that Rushdie's claim to have an invitation to visit Egypt was "absolutely without foundation" (in Ahsan and Kidwai, 1991: 23).

These developments caused considerable confusion and some dispute amongst Rushdie's erstwhile supporters, with some believing that he had revealed himself to be an opportunist. On 4th January, Francis Bennion (quoted in Ahsan and Kidwai, 1991: 23) dissociated himself from Rushdie saying that he was "not worth defending." Several other members of the Committee for the Defence of Salman Rushdie were also reported to have become angered, including the playwright Arnold Wesker. Their reactions to this were particularly interesting in the light of El-Essawy's Open Letter to Rushdie (in Ezard, 1989d) which had commented that Rushdie's fellow-writers who were supporting him "to the last drop of their ink" seemed to be the ones who were, "driving you into a position of enforced martyrdom. For them, freedom of expression has become a fetish. To them that alone is sacred."

In a 6th January phone-in programme on London's Sunrise Radio (Ahsan and Kidwai, 1991: 24), Rushdie insisted that the hardback version of the book "should remain around as the basis of a serious analysis and discussion" and, in a 17th January interview with Akbar Ahmed (1990a) in The Guardian, he stated that he wanted to meet with the UK Action Committee on Islamic Affairs "to talk about it."
Sunrise Radio interview Rushdie had also offered to contribute money to a fund "if a fund were set up" for the families of those who had been killed in protests against The Satanic Verses. Later, however, Rushdie recanted on this embrace of Islam, pleading the pressures upon him which came about through the experience of isolation.

A bizarre twist occurred in August 1990 when a Pakistani video film (Barker, D, 1990a; 1990b) called International Guerillas, which featured Rushdie as a drunk and a murderer of Muslims featuring a hunt for Rushdie was initially banned (Akhtar and Kennedy, 1990; Akhtar, K, 1990) from distribution by the British Board of Film Censors, an action which appeared to Muslims that a "double standard was being applied" (Times, 1990) until Rushdie himself supported the lifting of the ban (Hornsell, 1990).

Rushdie also began publishing again. Haroun and the Sea of Stories (1990) was written for his son (for reviews see, for example, Applebaum, 1991; Blishen, 1990; Donoghue, 1990; Lurie, 1990. For articles see Aji, 1995; Coppola, 1991; Fenton, 1991a; Flower, 1991; Durix, 1993) and manages to retain a lightness of spirit despite the lifestyle Rushdie has been forced to adopt. Imaginary Homelands: Essays and Criticism, 1981-1991 (1991) published a collection of Rushdie's short pieces over the past decade (for reviews see, for example, Kanga, 1991). This was followed by his book on The Wizard of Oz (for reviews see, for example, Lahr, 1992) and by East, West a collection of stories on the theme suggested by its title (for reviews, see Bhabha, 1994; Blythe, 1994).

His book The Moor's Last Sigh (1995) caused some uproar in India among Hindu nationalists (Lees and Fowler, 1995), but it was shortlisted for Rushdie to win the Booker Prize for a second time (for reviews, see for example, Bradbury, 1995; Kemp, 1995a). However, although he was a favourite (Alberge, 1995) to win, he was not successful (Alberge and Wilkins, 1995; Ellison, 1996).

In latter years, Rushdie has gradually began to emerge again into public life with a number of appearances at public events such as lectures, book-signings and conferences and there has been increasing evidence (Binyon, 1995a) to suggest that
the specifically political and diplomatic dimensions of the controversy might find a mutually agreed resolution in terms of the relationship between Iran and Britain. Whilst the fatwa cannot be withdrawn, and this has proved to be a sticking-point in the negotiations between the European Union and Iran (Bremner, 1995; Black, 1995b), the Iranian Government has increasingly been communicating the message that, as a state, it would not seek to implement the fatwa. This might eventually allow for some relaxation of the security measures surrounding Salman Rushdie. It would not, however, represent a solution to the fundamental issues raised, but only a modus vivendi in international relations and some of their domestic consequences since it is likely that the possibility of an individual seeking to carry out the fatwa will never completely vanish.
Chapter 3
The Controversy: Actions and Reactions

a) Introduction
After chapter 2's presentation of the "contours" and "critical incidents" of the controversy, this chapter continues to present some of the raw data of the controversy, but by moving on from the events themselves to begin to highlight some of the wider and more extended debates to which the events of controversy gave rise and by pointing forwards to the five clusters of issues which are identified from the controversy as having "entails" for the future of established religion in England.

The chapter begins with a section which delineates the principal "Muslim Concerns" surrounding the publication of The Satanic Verses. These include discussion of the nature of the offence perceived in the novel, including Muslim fears concerning anti-Islamic conspiracies. The section on "The Spectrum of Muslim Responses", in contrast to the simplistic and stereotypical portrayal of the Muslim community found in much of the media, highlights the range of Muslim responses to their commonly shared sense of moral and religious offence. This is followed by a section examining "Rushdie's Reactions" to the Muslim concerns.

In the section on "Political Reactions and Muslim Powerlessness", the Muslim community's position of relative social and political marginalisation is explored in the light of their inability to secure a prosecution under the terms of either race relations legislation or the blasphemy laws. The section on "Media and Social Reactions" draws upon evidence taken from the editorialising of the popular and quality press, reports of specific Muslim and general public positions, as well as opinion polls and letters to the editors of the quality press, in order to locate the controversy in a wider social context.

Another section examines "Reactions in the Church of England", as expressed by its official leaders both nationally and locally. These are examined in terms of statements issued, actions taken and meetings arranged with the local level responses focusing upon what transpired in the Diocese of Bradford at the geographical heart of the controversy. By examining the reactions to the controversy and the actions taken from
within the established Church of England the thesis attempts to ensure that its later analysis of the "entails" of the controversy for the appropriateness or otherwise of the current establishment of religion in England is not conducted at a purely theoretical level, but also takes account of the historically evidenced role of that Church within the controversy itself.

An overview is then provided of "Other Christian Reactions" of individual clerics and theologians, but also including those from the non-established Christian Churches in England. Having outlined this variety of Muslim and Christian positions, another section gives some examples of "Reactions Among Other than Christian and Muslim Communities" including Hindu, Sikh and Buddhist reactions, followed by a section on "Reactions from Inter-Faith and Cross-Community Organisations" which outlines the positions adopted within the controversy by national and local inter-religious and cross-community bodies incorporating both secular and religious people.

Finally, the concluding section on "The Issues Distilled", draws out from the data recorded in both this and the previous chapter, the five clusters of issues which this thesis identifies as arising from the Rushdie controversy which are argued to have "entails" for the current constitutional arrangements that define the relationships between religion(s), state and society in England within the UK. In doing so, it points forwards to the detailed discussion and analysis of these clusters of issues which is conducted in chapter 4 and the summation of the argument of the thesis in chapter 5.

b) Muslim concerns
In order to understand what lies at the heart of the Muslim protests that led to the Rushdie controversy, it is necessary to go beyond media comment on "Muslim fundamentalists" in order to uncover and discuss the roots of Muslim concerns. The roots of these concerns must be understood before any proper understanding of the particular and varied Muslim responses to the controversy (as explored in the next section of this chapter) can be gained, and also before any adequate analysis of the "entails" of the controversy can be undertaken.

Shabbir Akhtar (1989b) argued that an evaluation of The Satanic Verses as blasphemous should, for the Muslim conscience, be an uncontroversial matter and that,
“Anyone who fails to be offended by Rushdie’s book ipso facto ceases to be a Muslim.” Whilst Akhtar’s attempt to argue that this outrage is a necessary consequence of Muslim belief and identity might be viewed as an overstatement, there is little doubt that outrage was widespread within the community. Midgley and Ward (1989) reported that, “Communal outrage transcends age, sex, education and geography. It embraces the devout, regular Mosque attender and the less strict, relatively Westernised Muslims.”

But it was the vehemence and drama of this Muslim outrage which was difficult for many of a secular outlook to understand. As Hugh Hebert (1989a) observed, “the central puzzle the Rushdie affair sets for the liberal mind is how reasonable men and women can be so incensed by a work of the imagination, a fiction, that his book is burned and its author is put in genuine fear of his life.” Zaki Badawi (in Martin, P, 1989), the head of the Muslim College (see Weller, ed, 1993: 405) in Ealing and Chair of the Imams and Mosques Council UK (see Weller, ed, 1993: 402), tried to explain to readers of *The Guardian* newspaper the nature of the offence as perceived by Muslims by making the startling analogy that,

> What he has written is far worse to Muslims than if he’s raped one’s own daughter. It’s an assault on every Muslim’s inner being. Muslims see Muhammad as an ideal on whom to fashion our lives and conduct, and the Prophet is internalised into every Muslim heart. It’s like a knife being dug into you - or being raped yourself.

In trying to convey the sense of shock and outrage which they experienced through the novel’s publication Muslims often utilised sexual imagery. The Tanzanian Muslim scholar Ali Mazrui (1989a: 3) recalled that when he was in Pakistan he had heard the book compared to child abuse in reverse: “It’s as if Rushdie had composed a brilliant poem about the private parts of his parents, and then gone to the market place to recite that poem to the applause of strangers, who invariably laughed at the jokes he cracks about his parents’ genitalia - and he’s taking money for doing it.”

This dramatic imagery highlights the depth of Muslim reaction to the contents of *The Satanic Verses* which often proved difficult for Westerners to understand. Reflecting on this as a Muslim from the Arab world, the Syrian writer Rana Kabbani says that, “The Salman Rushdie affair has brought home to me the immense, perhaps unbridgeable, gulf between the world I belong to and the West”, although Kabbani
(1989a:1) had also noted that, "No one should suppose that Islam and the Occident coexisted amicably until Rushdie came along to sour the relationship. On the contrary, there has been tension between them since the seventh century when Islam emerged as a political and ideological power able to challenge Christianity."

Many social commentators, historians and theologians, Christian, Muslim and secular, have traced the history and reflected on the contemporary significance of the centuries of tension and often outright conflict between Islam and the West/Christendom (Daniels, 1960, 1967; Said, 1978; Webster, 1990a; Armstrong, 1990; Hussain, F, 1990). This tension has its roots in the military conflicts and religious expansionisms of the religions' respective spheres of influence, including the initial rapid spread of the Islamic Empire that had threatened to engulf European Christendom by military conquest and the later brutality of the European Christian Crusades to the Holy Land followed, in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, by the colonialism of the European powers in the Arabic heartlands of Islam. During this latter period and in decolonisation of the second half of the century, Muslims had responded to this ancient antagonism by means of either attempts at modernisation or by means of Islamic resistance to all non-Muslim ideologies, whether of culture or religion, of capitalism or of socialism (Cantwell Smith, 1957; Ruthven, 1984). More recently, this Islamic resistance has also led opposition to the nationalism which created the modern nation states in which European-educated and oriented élites were installed and maintained in political power with the support of either the communist East or the capitalist West.

At the 27th May 1989 anti-Satanic Verses Muslim demonstration in Westminster, London, Sahbir Khan of Nottingham was quoted (in Vulliamy, 1989c) as saying: "You have people here who may not have prayed for years, but the Rushdie book has brought them together to their religion" and that "these young people have been brought up in Britain, and they are reacting against your system. It is more than the book now, it is about the West and Islam." Kabbani (1989a: 2) commented that, "Muslims understand that history can determine present emotions because that is how they feel themselves. Unlike Westerners, they are, for the most part, too poor and insecure to afford the luxury of individual feelings: instead their reactions to events
are strongly shaped by communal memories.” Thus, even where a strongly religious vision of the world is absent, the sense of Islam as a locus of cultural belonging and pride can be a strongly communal one. This communal sense contrasts strongly with western individualism and these communal memories are highly sensitive to the fund of derogatory images of Islam that can be found within the Western and Christian traditions. The two main sets of images used in Christian apologetic in relation to Islam have been those which attacked the person of the Prophet Muhammad with allegations about his sexual proclivity and those which alleged that his message was a Satanically-inspired deception. It was these two images that Muslim critics of Rushdie argued were deliberately reprised in the imagery of *The Satanic Verses*.

For the prophet character in *The Satanic Verses*, Rushdie (1988: 93) used the epithet “Mahound”, which he describes as the “devil’s synonym” and which had also been used in medieval Christian apologetic attacks upon Islam. Rushdie (1988: 366) says of Mahound that “after his wife’s death Mahound was no angel” and that his beard turned “half-white” in a year because he slept with so many women. Sarah Maitland (1990a: 124-125) has pointed out that the sexually explicit nature of the novel was one of main reasons adduced by Muslims for the intensity of their rage. Rushdie’s implied criticism of the position of Muslim women was deeply resented (Lister, 1989c) - the whorehouse is given the name of “the Hijab”, the name of the covering garment worn by Muslim women today. In addition, the whores of the “the Hijab” were said to have assumed the names of the Prophet’s wives in order to attract three hundred per cent more business and the women of “the Hijab” appoint Baal, a poet, as a make-believe husband to provide them, in turn, with sexual services. As the book says (Rushdie 1988: 381): “When the news got around Jahilia that the whores of The Curtain had each assumed the identity of one of Mahound’s wives, the clandestine excitement of the city’s males was intense.”

In Islam, Muhammad’s family is *Ahl-al-Bait* (*people of the house*) and his wives *azwaj-e-mutahhoreh* (*pure/spousal*). Rushdie, however, transformed the Muslim imagery of “the Hijab” and the wives of the Prophet from something connected with honour, modesty and purity into its opposite. According to Muslim revert Gai Eaton (quoted in Ezard, 1989a), this had caused “equivalent offence to presenting the Virgin
Mary as a whore." Furthermore, when Rushdie wrote that "on many days a line of men curled round the innermost courtyard of the brothel, rotating around its centrally positioned Fountain of Love, much as pilgrims rotated for other reasons around the ancient Black Stone", he linked his transformed hijab imagery with imagery drawn from the hajj in which pilgrims circle the Ka'aba in Mecca.

From a Muslim perspective, this was not perceived to be dissent or a critique of Islam but was experienced simply to be insulting. Eaton comments (in Ezard, 1989a) that, "Salman Rushdie, who was brought up in Islam, knows exactly where to put the needle in. Western readers very often don't see this." He explained that the general portrayal of the prophet figure in the novel had provoked "more outrage than I have ever known." El-Essawy argued (in Schwarz, 1989a) that, "The book isn't a danger to our religion, which has suffered far worse attacks. The danger is in the insults to believers which read as if they are deliberate. Insults like that generate anger in a community that already feels unpopular in Britain because of its religion." Kalim Siddiqui said (in Young, H, 1989) that, "This is going to run and run. It is a matter, if you like, of honour."

In the context of South Asian Muslim tradition izzat is a key idea. Wilson (1978: 31) explains that this is a "multi-faceted" concept which can be translated as "honour, self-respect and sometimes plain male ego" (Wilson, 1978: 5). It is strongly connected with sexuality and a family's izzat is usually perceived as being particularly located in its female members. Where izzat is transgressed and besmirched, then other family members feel both a great collective shame and a responsibility to uphold or reinstate that which has been threatened. In many ways, then, the basic reaction of the predominantly South Asian Muslim community in England to the Rushdie controversy can be understood as related to communal izzat. Coupled with this is the minority experience and psychological insecurity found among many South Asian Muslims (Hardy, P, 1972; Gandhi, 1987) as compared with Arabic-speaking Muslims for whom Islam is the predominant cultural heritage. Finally, the particular outrage and hurt over perceived insults to the Prophet, whilst shared by Muslims of many ethnic and cultural backgrounds, needs to be especially understood in the context of the comparatively high personal status accorded to the Prophet in some of the movements within South
Asian Islam, particularly among the Barelwis. Significantly, as long ago as the 1940s, in the context of comment upon South Asian Islam in particular, Wilfred Cantwell Smith (1946: 235) noted that, "Muslims will allow attacks upon Allah: there are atheists and atheistic publications, and rationalistic societies, but to disparage Muhammad will provoke from the most 'liberal' section of the community a fanaticism of blazing vehemence."

Although at popular street level it was the perceived diminution of the Prophet, the sexual language, and issues of communal honour that were amongst the strongest motivating factors for protest, for those who could read it in an intellectualised way The Satanic Verses was also more troubling at a fundamental philosophical and theological level due to Rushdie's association of claims to revelation with the postmodern condition of general doubt and moral relativism. On this, Shabbir Akhtar (1989b) comments that, "Rushdie's attack on the authoritative integrity of a fallible Koran is part of a larger indictment of Islam as a faith which routinely confuses good with evil, divine with diabolical imperative" and (in Hebert, 1989a) that, "The book does actually revive the medieval idea that nothing can explain the phenomenal success of Islam in the world other than the work of the Devil."

For example, Rushdie describes Mahound as a "Businessman" doing "deals" with the archangel in which the archangel was "obliging" by reducing the original forty prayers a day to five obligatory prayers in what was summarised as being a "revelation of convenience." Mahound's revelations are described as "spouting rules about every damn thing. If a man farts let him turn his face to the wind...which sexual positions had received divine sanction, so that they learned that sodomy and the missionary position were approved" (Rushdie, 1988: 363). In the face of such wounds to their deepest sensibilities and in the light of what they have perceived as an attack on the whole basis of their religious identity and commitment as a community already disadvantaged in terms of ethnicity, the Muslim community has felt that the majority English society and the UK state has responded with, at best, mere sympathy, more often with indifference, and all too often with outright hostility. Parekh (1989e) points out that Muslims are reacting because they "feel belittled and demeaned in their own
and others' eyes, provoked and challenged to a fight both by the language and by the 'outrageous liberties' taken with their collective sacred heritage."

The sense of the holy in which Muslim concerns are rooted has become something which is difficult for many within the secular and humanist traditions to understand. Its centrality within the Rushdie affair thus underscores one of the clusters of issues which arise from the controversy, namely, that concerned with the role of religion in the relationship between secularisation, religious belief and plurality. This cluster of issues in turn connects with the problem of mutual incomprehension in terms of value systems within a plural society and, at the level of the societal response to such varied values, to the relationships between law, ethics and plurality.

c) The Spectrum of Muslim Responses

Together with understanding the sense of outrage and its roots shared by many Muslims, in order to assess the "entails" of the controversy for a plural society it is also necessary to examine the range of responses to the controversy that are found among Muslim organisations and individuals in England. As noted in the introduction to this chapter, these responses were not as uniform as has sometimes been suggested. In an article in *The Independent*, commenting on a day in which Muslims gathered in London to demonstrate an apparent unity, Sarah Helm (1989a) acknowledged that whilst "There has been strong and unified criticism about the lack of a public platform for Muslims in Britain and the unfairness of a law which outlaws blasphemy against Christianity but not other religions", nevertheless, "behind the public statements, the Muslim community is not as one over the book. While most practising Muslims would agree that it insults Islam, there are profound disagreements about the response." She also noted that, "The most virulent protests have been sparked among the most deprived communities."

In the context of the long history of strained Christian-Muslim relations and the effects of modern colonialism upon the Muslim psyche, there are widespread ideas within the community which explain *The Satanic Verses* as the product of an anti-Islamic conspiracy (Qureshi and Khan, 1989). In Iran, Rafsanjani told the Majlis that Imam Khomeini had acted not just because of the book itself but because it focused a "well-calculated and extensive plot against Islam" (Morris, 1989a). After the fatwa, on 20th
February, Mehdi Karrubi (in Morris, H, and Haeri, S, 1989a), a leading radical and the Deputy Speaker of the Majlis had claimed that, "World infidelity rears authors like Salman Rushdie to write slanders against Islam and spreads their treacherous writing around the world."

More darkly, this conspiracy theme linked with the undercurrent of anti-semitism which is to be found among some Muslims and which is connected with Muslim support for the Palestinian struggle against the State of Israel. For example, some Muslims thought it no coincidence that the Chief Executive of the Penguin publishing house is Peter Mayer, the son of Jewish refugees from Nazi Europe (The Independent, 1989ag). In a 22nd February address to the students and instructors of religious seminaries which was broadcast on Tehran Radio and reproduced in The Guardian in an edited and abbreviated form under the title, "A challenge to the world-devourers," Khomeini (1989) said of the Western powers' defence of Rushdie that, "The issue for them is not that of defending an individual, the issue for them is to support an anti-Islamic current, masterminded by those institutions - belonging to Zionism, Britain and the USA - which, through their ignorance and hate, have placed themselves against the Islamic world." Furthermore, Khomeini argued that it was within the will of God that The Satanic Verses should have been published at this time so that "the world of conceit, of arrogance and of barbarism, would bare its true face in its long-held enmity to Islam."

In the UK, in a 1989 article on "Islamic fundamentals" in The Jewish Chronicle, Jenni Frazer noted that over the previous eighteen months, the Board of Deputies of British Jews (see Weller, ed, 1993: 330) had referred to the Attorney General eighty-seven cases of hatred against Jews found in Muslim magazines and leaflets. On a global scale, Ronald Nettler (in Frazer, 1989), Fellow in Muslim-Jewish Relations at the Oxford Centre for Postgraduate Hebrew Studies (see Weller, ed, 1993: 336) notes that, "Islam today, especially in its fundamentalist form, sees its struggle with the Jews as a cosmic and fateful war." Sheikh Fadlallah (in Flint, 1989a) confirmed the existence and influence of this strand of thinking when he explained, after his visit to Tehran that, "Rushdie's case is distinguished by the conviction of our Iranian brothers that Jewish elements are using him to work against Islam."
In England, Kalim Siddiqui (in Maddocks, 1989) stated on ITV's Hypotheticals programme that the Rushdie book was the product of an anti-Islamic literary conspiracy and after 27th May demonstration in London wrote (quoted in Helm, 1989b) to the Prime Minister arguing that, "In Muslim perception, British policies towards Islam during the colonial period form an essential backdrop to your government's handling of this affair." By contrast, Zaki Badawi (in Martin, P, 1989) described as a "pretence", the view that "Rushdie is part of a great conspiracy, a fifth column to undermine Islam, with the book's publishers spearheading a Zionist imperialist conspiracy against the Islamic world."

El-Essawy said (in Schwartz, 1989a) of the book-burning that, "It was a human response, not a religious one" acknowledging (in Roy and Wahhab, 1989) that, "It has awakened the sleeping demons of racialism in so many." Whilst the banning of the book was on the agenda on a number of Muslim organisations, with respect to the burning of The Satanic Verses and attempts to have it banned, El-Essawy claimed in a letter to The Guardian (1989a) that, "We are certainly not a book-banning, or a book-burning Society, we are a Society devoted to promoting tolerance through promoting understanding. We have certainly been active in trying to moderate the understandable response by the Muslims." In fact, although in many respects taking a different stance from El-Essawy, even Kalim Siddiqui underlined in a letter to The Guardian (1989a) that, "I did not call for the banning of The Satanic Verses, only for its voluntary withdrawal by the author and his publishers in the interests of social harmony and peace."

With regard to the fatwa, there was also diversity of views among Muslim leaders. As has already briefly been noted in the previous chapter, at an October 21st meeting of around three hundred Muslims in Manchester Town Hall organised to celebrate the birth of the Prophet Muhammed, there were reports (Morris, M, 1989) of chants of "death to Rushdie" following an address from Kalim Siddiqui. Subsequently, Siddiqui (quoted in Morris, M, 1989) said, "The Muslim community had overwhelmingly endorsed the death sentence passed on Rushdie by the late Imam Khomeini. That fatwa (religious edict), which is according to the Divine Law of Islam, will remain valid until executed." Interviewed by Hugo Young (1989a) following the Manchester
meeting, Siddiqui denied inciting murder but also said "I cannot take responsibility for the behaviour of every one of the two million Muslims in this country." In fact, after Khomeini's death in June 1989, Siddiqui maintained that, although the fatwa would stand, Rushdie could come out of hiding if he stopped publication and donated money to a trust for relatives of those killed in the Indian and Pakistani demonstrations against the book. If that happened, then Siddiqui (quoted in Morris, H, 1989) claimed that he would take it upon himself to "go round the British Muslim community to persuade people that the matter should rest there."

But even apart from the possibility of Rushdie's repentance, there were alternative Muslim responses to the fatwa. As Aziz Al-Azmeh observed (1989b), in the days following the fatwa:

> It is now evident that some Muslim leaders in Britain have been genuinely alarmed by the excesses of the past three days. It is hoped that this alarm will enhance the sense of reality which is inseparable from any sense of responsibility. Fundamental to this reality is the reality of difference, as of the distinction between outrage and the desire to annihilate books by banning them or authors by murdering them.

Some Muslims, such as the former pop star Cat Stevens, now known by the Muslim name of Yusuf Islam, initially believed that spending money and effort on campaigning "could only serve to increase the possibility of boosting sales of the book" (Islam, 1989). Paul Martin (1989), in interviewing Zaki Badawi in February 1989, reported that "more than four months" previously Badawi had sent a "secret memorandum" to all mosques and imams, appealing for a "low key" response to the book and its publishers, coupled with a boycott of purchases. Iqbal Sacranie (quoted in Shahin, 1989a) of the UK Action Committee on Islamic Affairs pointed out that, "Not a single Muslim leader of any influence has come out and supported Ayatollah Khomeini's edict, but an impression has been created as if the entire Muslim community is thirsting for Rushdie's blood....How can the British Muslim community be held responsible for what an Iranian religious leader says?" Dr. Mughram Al-Ghamdi (in Shahin, 1989a) of the Regent's Park Mosque and Chair of the UK Action Committee on Islamic Affairs was reported as guardedly saying, "We have learnt over the years to treat media reports with a good deal of scepticism. We do not know what the Ayatullah has actually said." However, he also went on to state that, "we are a
minority in this country and we intend to fully abide by the law. We are not above the law. We do not condone violence of any kind by anybody under any pretext" commenting that, "Islamic laws do not apply here and even in Islamic countries it is not for individuals to take the law in their hands." Al-Ghamdi spoke of the campaign having been "hijacked by mischief-makers."

El-Essawy (quoted in Schwarz, 1989a) felt that the worst scenarios had been averted, "We had all these calls from our people - some had shaved their heads and pledged to kill him. Of course they are extremists on the fringe, but our people warned us: if we don't do something someone will kill him and it will rebound on the whole community." Following the fatwa, El-Essawy said (in Cook, S, 1989a), "We regret very much the decision of Khomeini, and anyone who carried it out would be guilty of murder, as stated in the Koran." He also declared (quoted in Shahin, 1989a) that, "Threats like this or any violent response is not the correct religious response. It is a very dangerous development and will give Rushdie sympathy that he does not deserve." His own belief was that a disclaimer stating that the book was fictional, that it was not intended to offend, and that it misrepresented Islam, could still resolve the situation.

With respect to the threat to Rushdie's life, Zaki Badawi (in Martin, P, 1989) described the global Muslim reaction as "very stupid" and recounted that in Nigeria he had sheltered Christian Iboos from slaughter and affirmed that, "I would do the same for Rushdie or any persecuted person." A statement (quoted in Murtagh, 1989d) from the Imams and Mosques Council said, "Acts of violence or incitement to violence are a violation of the law and can lead to tragic consequences...However great the provocation and however deep our feelings of hurt and anger, we must refrain and oppose any action that might lead to a breach of the law." As a Sunni rather than a Shi'a Muslim, Badawi (in Martin, P, 1989) pointed out that, in any case, no individual Muslim has the power to sentence Rushdie to death and that, "I must state with all the authority under my command that anyone who seeks or incites anyone to kill Rushdie is committing a crime against God and the Islamic Sharia'h. It is not acceptable to try someone in their absence."
Badawi argued that even if someone is sentenced to death under Sharia'h only Islamically appointed authorities could legally carry this out, and that death would not even be a certain penalty since, "The Prophet himself tolerated many people who left Islamic beliefs but were not considered dangerous to the fabric of the state. Those who were put to death were killed because of rebellion, not because of their beliefs" (Martin, P, 1989). Furthermore, Badawi stressed that even convicted apostates had opportunities to repent - many scholars arguing for three days reconsideration in prison and others for even longer, in some cases up to a lifetime. He therefore concluded that, "Putting an apostate to death stems from tradition, not from the Koran itself." In similar vein, the Rector of al-Azhar, the leading seat of Sunni Muslim learning, issued a statement (in Bulloch, 1989a) in which he attacked the book, but also stressed the need for toleration and moderation, whilst Dr. Tantawi (in Alrawi, 1989a), the Mufti of Egypt, stated that no Muslim can be killed without a trial.

Islam traditionally distinguishes between Dar al-Islam in which Sharia'h applies and Dar al-Harb, where it does not protect Muslims. This traditional distinction represents the classical Islamic way of dealing with the issues which arise from Muslims living in a non-Islamic society such as the plural society of England. But the Ayatollah Khomeini was a Twelver Shi'a and therefore could not be seen as automatically speaking for the majority Sunni Muslims. Islamic juridical interpretation takes into account the Hadith as well as the Qur'an, and Shi'a and Sunni Muslims differ as to which Hadith they accept as authoritative as well as over the relative significance attached to particular Hadith. Within Shi'a Islam there were those who saw Khomeini as the promised Hidden Imam of Twelver Shi'ism, the Twelfth Imam having been believed to have gone into hiding in 874CE, with his awaited reappearance being of eschatological significance. However, Yapp (1989) also points out that prior to the Iranian Revolution, even the Shi'a Ayatollah Shariat-Madari thought that Khomeini was claiming a degree of authority beyond the appropriate limits. Yapp therefore concluded with respect to the fatwa that, even among Shi'as, "It would be open to another Shi'a to go to another mujtahid and perhaps obtain a different opinion. Or a Sunni could go to a mufti of one of the four Schools of Sunni Islam. Of course these might agree with Khomeini, in which case there would be what is called a consensus."
Yapp (1989) stressed that even with a consensus, a mujtahid's opinion on a point of law "remains an opinion even when it is regarded as authoritative. Before it can be applied to a case under Islamic criminal law, there must be a trial under proper procedures." Therefore Yapp argued that, "It must be possible for a Muslim to have a different, valid opinion to which Rushdie could appeal." In fact, the Ayatollah Mehdi Rouhani (quoted in Shahin, 1989a), an exiled Shi'a leader, said of the fatwa that, "Khomeini's order lacked theological credibility and was aimed at inciting divisions and extremism within the Islamic world. Rushdie has committed a grave error in attacking the sentiments of millions of Muslims. But it is not right to call for his death." However, whilst such alternative views were to be found within the Muslim community, Yapp pointed out that, for Rushdie himself, an appeal to an alternative Muslim view would actually weaken "the most fundamental of all Rushdie's protections" which was that of being under the terms of English and not Muslim law.

The divergence of views among national and international Muslim figures was mirrored at local level in the Muslim population centres of England and the UK. An editorial in The Independent (1989c) newspaper entitled "Limits to Mutual Tolerance" commented that, "As our survey today demonstrates, a great many ordinary British Muslims, including, alarmingly, young people born and educated in this country, are willing to condone the call to assassinate the unfortunate author." In October of 1989, a Harris poll for the BBC television programme Public Eye found that four out of five Muslim respondents wanted some action taken against Salman Rushdie with almost thirty per cent supporting the fatwa (Independent, 1989af) rising to forty-five per cent of Muslims under twenty (Johnson, D, 1989).

Shahin (1989b) reported that ordinary Muslims in Brick Lane in East London, constantly expressed incomprehension about why their campaign seemed to have received so little sympathy since even Ibrahim (Abraham), who is honoured in common by Muslims, Jews and Christians was vilified as a "bastard." In Bradford, many Muslims were reported (Wainwright, 1989a; Midgley, S, 1989) as endorsing Quddus' support for the fatwa, although one sixteen year old girl dissented. Sultan Shahin (1989d), reporting on a visit to test the views of the ordinary citizens of
Bradford noted that "The average Muslim on the street is definitely aggrieved" although there were actually even "some Muslims who think Salman Rushdie is a Sufi saint."

In Birmingham the picture appeared more varied. Richard Smith (1989b) reported in The Independent that in a Moseley mosque the words: "Muslims declare holy war on the book and are ready to kill" were written across its noticeboard and he quoted a whole succession of worshippers who saw it as their religious duty to kill Rushdie. However, whilst united in their sense of outrage and offence about the novel, the Birmingham Central Mosque (see Weller, ed, 1993: 456-457) was divided on the issue of the fatwa. Mr. Akbar Khan, the supervisor of the mosque day centre was quoted (in Hoyland, 1989b) as saying "I think he should be killed as an example to others to pay respect to religion. Nobody can save him. I would be prepared to kill him." However, Dr. Mohammed Naseem, the Chair of the Birmingham Mosque Trust, said of Khomeini's fatwa: "I cannot share his view, but I can understand why he is saying that...I do not think writing something is a matter for the death penalty."

These contrasting positions underline the fact that, whilst the sense of outrage was shared, Muslims drew very different conclusions with respect to the implications of the controversy and the appropriate action to be taken in pursuit of their goals. However, in closing this section, in order to gain a grounded understanding of the locus of these varied Muslim responses, an interesting Open Letter to Salman Rushdie by one Abdul Ali (1989) of the East End of London was sent to New Life, in which he pointed out that although Rushdie has been praised by the intelligensia as an anti-racist, "If we leave your world of magical fantasy and look at the day to day realities of our people, then since the publication of your book, racist attacks have increased dramatically - and they are carried out in your name." Abdul Ali pointed to the firebombing of a mosque in London, to the vandalisation of a mosque in Darnall in Sheffield, and to those white youths who now chant "Rushdie, Rushdie" instead of "Paki, Paki". The letter concluded that "Unlike you, Mr. Rushdie, we ordinary working class Muslims have no hiding place from the violence meted out to us," thus locating the issues that arise from the controversy in a grounded social and political context in which the already existing minority and disadvantaged position of Muslims in
England was exacerbated by a controversy which has real social and political consequences and is not merely a matter of polite literary debate. Indeed, in the same issue of *New Life* as Abdul Ali's letter, there was an article reporting on the death of fourteen-year-old Tahir Akram, who died of a ruptured neck artery after four white youths in a car fired shots into the air during an anti-Rushdie demonstration, in Oldham, Lancashire.

d) Rushdie's Reactions

As has already been noted, Salman Rushdie initially reacted to the news of the banning of his novel in India with words (in Basu, 1988) which, with the benefit of hindsight, seem highly ironic: "it would be absurd to think that a book can cause riots. That's a strange sort of view of the world." On 12th October 1988, following the Indian Prime Minister's banning of *The Satanic Verses*, Salman Rushdie delivered an *Open Letter* to Rajiv Gandhi (Rushdie, 1989q) via the Indian Ambassador in London. In this letter, Rushdie questioned the Muslim Member of Parliament Shahabuddin's argument that no civilised society would allow the publication of such a book and turned that argument on its head to claim that, "The question raised by the book's banning is precisely whether India, by behaving in this......fashion, can any more lay claim to the title of a civilised society." He saw the banning of his book as evidence that "it's the fundamentalists who now control the political agenda in India" arguing that "the real issue is who gets the Moslem vote." Rushdie also deployed, for the first time, his argument that the book was not "a direct attack on Islam" stating that "I have admitted no such thing, and deny it strongly." He then went on to say that "the book is not actually about Islam, but about migration, metamorphosis, divided selves, love, death, London and Bombay" and that it "deals with a prophet - who is not called Mohammed - living in a highly fantasticated city."

Following the Bradford book-burning, Rushdie was quoted (*New Life*, 1989a) as saying, "If these pressure groups decide to ban the book, it will not be long before other groups decide which authors' books ought to be published." He maintained that "Living in a free society I cannot accept being told there are things that are off limits." In critique, Bhikhu Parekh observed (1989e) that "It was a pity that for months Rushdie contemptuously dismissed the protests of the Muslims...His book was about
them, and he owed them an obligation to understand their feelings, to explain his position, to argue with them, to do all in his power to mollify and hopefully win them over to his point of view.” Parekh argued that, “When a creative writer, conducting imaginative experiments and daring to think the unthinkable outrages, hurts or provokes others, he should be challenged, criticised, asked to explain himself and made to suffer his peers’ criticism and the anger of hurt sensibilities.”

It is reported (in Ezard, 1989d) that, at the beginning of February, El-Essawy met Rushdie on a train and put to him the idea of inserting an historical disclaimer into the novel as “a way to bring peace in this dispute.” According to El Essawy, Rushdie’s reaction was “You want me to apologise. I will not apologise. Go away or I will fetch the guard.” Later, El-Essawy wrote an Open Letter to Rushdie, delivered through Viking Penguin, in which he referred to this incident stating that “The half-apology that you later offered was quickly accepted by this society and myself as a full one” but that by then it was too late. In this Open Letter El-Essawy said to Rushdie that “I do not think that it will make you happy to stay where you are and watch people die” and appealed to him as copyright holder to stop the book’s further publication. In this he was supported by Norman Lewis (1989), one of the signatories to the World Statement of the International Committee for the Defence of Salman Rushdie and his Publishers who, despite continuing to uphold the principle of free speech and publication, explained in a letter to the editor that, “in view of the continuing loss of life, and the rising tide of racial conflict provoked by the book” he now thought “it would add to the stature of both the author and publishers if it were now to be voluntarily withdrawn.”

Salman Rushdie went into hiding under police protection the day after the fatwa (Murtagh, 1989a). Initially he was with his then wife Marianne Wiggins who was reported as saying that he was terrified by the fatwa and that “The best thing for him to do now is to stay in hiding with a Special Branch man at his side.” It was later reported (Ezard and Pick, 1989) that Rushdie and Wiggins were under twenty-four hour guard from at least six officers at a cost of around £150,000 a year. He was housed in “safe houses” operated by Special Branch and MI5 and moved every few weeks (Lister, 1989g). As early as 16th February, “experts on Islam and terrorism”
were being quoted (Mills, Lister and Morris, 1989d) as saying that Rushdie may need protection for the rest of his life.

On 21st February a telephone message claiming to come from the Guardians of the Islamic Revolution warned international news agencies in London that it might attack British targets if Rushdie did not come out of hiding (Usborne, Morris and Barwick, 1989). On 3rd August 1989, what appears to have been two bombs, which were perhaps being primed, went off in the Beverley House Hotel in Sussex Gardens, Paddington, London. The previously unknown Organisation of the Mujahadeen of Islam claimed responsibility stating that it was an operation against Salman Rushdie (Kirby, 1989).

Rushdie himself remained defiant and on BBC Radio 4 claimed that “It is not true that this book is a blasphemy against Islam.” In a 14th February interview on Channel 4’s Bandung File, a transcript of which appeared in The Guardian on the following day, Rushdie declared that “It's very simple in this country. If you don't want to read a book, you don't have to read it.” He also stated that “It seems to me that nothing I can do can destroy Islam” and “The fact that I would not call myself a religious person doesn't mean that I can reject the importance of Islam in my life.” He acknowledged that most of the dream sequences in the book “start from an historical or quasi-historical basis” but explained that in writing the book he had been saying to himself “Let's take the themes I'm interested in and fantasise them and fabulate them and all that.” With regard to the central theme of the book Rushdie says, “Basically, there's two questions that the book seeks to answer. When an idea comes into the world, it's faced with two big tests: when you're weak, do you compromise; when you're strong, are you tolerant?”

As already noted, in a sermon in Tehran during Friday prayers on 17th February President Ali Khamenei (in Ezard and Pick, 1989) suggested that if Rushdie repented and apologised to Muslims and to the Imam, then it was possible that the people would pardon him. On the 18th February, Rushdie (in Appignanesi and Maitland, 1989: 120) issued a statement in which he said,

As author of The Satanic Verses I recognise that Moslems in many parts of the world are genuinely distressed by the publication of my novel. I profoundly
regret the distress that publication has occasioned to the sincere followers of Islam. Living as we do in a world of many faiths this experience has served to remind us that we must all be conscious of the sensibilities of others.

Whilst this was a conciliatory move, it was not precisely the apology for the book which President Khamenei had been looking for, but was in fact a statement of regret about the way in which Muslims had taken offence at the book. In addition, Rushdie did not offer to withdraw the book or make any other tangible concession. The Iranian authorities made it clear that his statement had fallen short of the public repentance required for a pardon and, on 19th February, Khomeini (in Appignanesi and Maitland, 1989: 122) renewed the *fatwa*, declaring that "Even if Salman Rushdie repents and became the most pious man of time, it is incumbent upon every Muslim to employ everything he has got, his life and his wealth, to send him to hell."

Midgley and Ward's (1989) interviews with ordinary Muslims in Southall, Spitalfields, Moseley and Bradford "threw up contradictory interpretations as to whether Islamic law allows Mr. Rushdie to apologise and save his life or whether the time for forgiveness if past." On 26th February, the Bradford Council for Mosques issued a statement (in Bowcott, 1989a) saying that "The Council of Mosques reaffirms its stand on the withdrawal from circulation of *The Satanic Verses* and its continued campaign until such time as the publishers agree to withdraw the book with an apology to all Muslims."

Following Rushdie's disappearance from public view the controversy rumbled on continuously issuing, in ways which have been indicated in the previous chapter, into bursts of activity and sharp debate at "critical incidents" in its progress. Rushdie's own next public comment came after Sir Geoffrey Howe criticised *The Satanic Verses*, following which Rushdie made a ten minute telephone call to the office of the Liberal Democrat Leader, Paddy Ashdown, MP, in which he thanked Mr. Ashdown for his support and "expressed some concern about Sir Geoffrey's comments on radio which seemed to indicate some distancing from the book by the British Government" (Pick, 1989d).

After this, Rushdie maintained a period of withdrawal from media comment, only emerging in June with legal threats against *The Mail on Sunday* for publishing
a three page article under the headline "Salman Rushdie - speaking for the first time," an American interview which was, in fact, given long before the fatwa and in which Rushdie had attacked the "crazy literalism" of Muslim fundamentalists. Rushdie said via a literary agent that "The Mail on Sunday's claim that I have broken my silence and given them a new interview is wholly false and in the present situation highly irresponsible. What they have published is a lurid and sensationalised account of an interview that took place long before the Iranian death threat" (in Dalrymple, 1989b). It was only at a 19th July press conference of the International Committee for the Defence of Salman Rushdie and His Publishers, that Rushdie actually made his own first public statement since going into hiding in February, in which statement he claimed to have received messages of support from Muslims which might indicate the possibility of reconciliation (Pallister, 1989c).

On 25th August a press statement issued by Marianne Wiggins' publishers, Secker and Warburg announced that she and Salman Rushdie had been living apart for a month from around about the time of the publication of her latest novel, Herself in Love (Nettleton, 1989; Cohen, N, 1989b) at the end of July. On 1st September, Granta published a three verse poem by Rushdie, entitled 6th March 1989, in which he attacked his critics and this poem, too, was subject to a banning call from Sher Azam. In late September, New Life (1989ae) reported that Rushdie had threatened to sue Penguin for breach of contract if they did not soon publish the paperback edition.

e) Political Reactions and Muslim Powerlessness

The form which Muslim protests took against The Satanic Verses have to be understood in the context of the political powerlessness experienced by Muslims within English society and the UK state. Mohammed Ajeeb who, in 1985, had been appointed as Bradford's first Asian and Muslim Lord Mayor pointed out (in Glover, 1989) there had been years of political frustration and oppression for Bradford Muslims and that "Muslims feel totally ignored by this society. They cannot attack this book in the courts because the blasphemy law only covers Christianity. They talk and write letters and are ignored - and so their frustrations erupt." The controversy thus both illustrated and underlined the lack of political representation felt by Muslims.
In the absence of a Muslim MP in a mainstream political party or an effective Muslim minority party, Muslim concerns have been identified with a handful of non-Muslim MPs who have taken a particular interest in their case. Chief amongst these has been Keith Vaz, the Labour MP for Leicester East. As a practising Roman Catholic, Vaz (see *New Life*, 1988a) had previously taken a stand against the film, *The Last Temptation of Christ*. In the context of the Rushdie controversy, Vaz defended the Muslim community as having "acted with great diplomacy and calm" pointing out with regard to the famous book-burning incident that, in 1988, six MPs had burned a copy of the 1988 *Immigration Act* on the steps of the Home Office without such an hysterical media reaction (Vaz, 1989a).

Following an article in the traditional left-wing Labour newspaper *Tribune* (reproduced in *New Life* 14.4.89 under the title "Godless Labour") Vaz was strongly criticised by the newspaper which suggested he might be deselected (Smith, M, 1989) over the issue, although in the face of this criticism, the chair of Vaz's constituency party said that Vaz had the support of party members (*New Life*, 19891). In his article, Vaz (1989b) had argued of the Labour Party that they are "The party that will support every black issue everywhere in the world except those that are sitting on our doorstep" declaring that "We have got ourselves into a terrible mess over this issue, because we don't understand it, and we do not understand the nature of the hurt of a section of our community." He was reported (Bevins, 1989b) as saying that if the issue of racism is on our own doorstep, "Then the issue becomes embarrassing. It becomes distasteful. It becomes uncivilised. It becomes regrettable. Burning books. Burning effigies. You can support us at election time. You can join us. But please don't come to us if you want support from us. Don't come to us if you are affronted and afraid. Keep away."

The Bradford Labour MPs were in an electorally exposed position, with Pat Wall and Bob Cryer, in particular, having comparatively small majorities. Pat Wall, the Bradford North MP, who had once been closely linked with the Militant Tendency said (in Barker, D, 1989a) of *The Satanic Verses* that "I don't like it very much. I found it confusing. I don't think it has got any continuity and I find the language pretty offensive - perhaps I am old-fashioned in that." He presented concern for the
fifteen per cent Muslim vote in his constituency as a principled socialist position whilst condemning Khomeini's "extreme language" and his "monstrous regime of murder and torture." In a letter to The Guardian Max Madden (1989), the Labour MP for Bradford West pointed out that "in multi-racial, multi-cultural, multi-faith Britain we must understand that freedom of speech is pretty meaningless in a society where substantial ethnic minorities and religious minorities feel their views are not adequately understood or represented." Madden suggested to Viking Penguin that Rushdie might agree to a short statement of Muslim critique of the book being placed in the book or in bookshops stocking the book with the ultimate aim of creating, "circumstances where Muslims have some effective way of presenting and explaining their views to the public" rather than the media "just filming the marches and the book burning." He also urged Rushdie to debate with Muslim critics on national television and he tabled an amendment to a Parliamentary motion seeking time to debate the issues involved in the controversy, including the issue of the reform or repeal of the blasphemy laws.

However, together with Bob Cryer, MP for Bradford South, neither Madden nor Wall supported calls for the banning of the book. They therefore faced calls from Sher Azam to "do the honourable thing and resign" in order to fight by-elections on the issue in what were marginal seats (Wainwright, 1989c), where Bob Cryer had a majority of only 309 and Pat Wall a majority of 1,633. Following a March 1989 conference of Muslims in Bradford, Sher Azam (in Smith, M, 1989) stated that, whilst traditionally the majority of working class Asian Muslims have voted for the Labour Party which they had seen as most likely to defend the interests of immigrants and minorities, Muslims would now "switch our vote" if the Labour Party would not help.

So far as the wider local scene of Bradford was concerned, the Conservative Bradford Council leader, Eric Pickles (quote in Wainwright, 1989b), said the predominant non-Muslim reaction was "puzzlement rather than anger." Yasmin Alibhai (quoted in Chartres, 1989) reported that "Salman Rushdie" had become a term of abuse in Bradford school playgrounds. The Monday Club distributed leaflets entitled Civil War in Bradford? which demanded an immediate end to immigration and Frank Kelly, the Secretary of the local branch, saw the Muslim talk of violence as the result of years
of “craven surrender” to Muslim demands by the local authority, and denounced the book’s withdrawal from Bradford library shelves. Current and past controversies connected in Bradford when former Drummond School headmaster and contributor to *The Salisbury Review* was warned off from giving a planned lecture on “The Rushdie Affair” to a private supper party of members of the Pudsey Conservative Association organised in the premises of the Bradford Golf Club (Cusick, 1989).

The positions taken by national politicians in both Conservative and Labour Parliamentary parties was quite varied. As early as 11th December 1988, Ken Hargreaves MP had moved an early day motion in the House of Commons, expressing regret for the distress caused to Muslims by the publication of *The Satanic Verses*. Following the December 1988 demonstrations against the book, Blackburn Labour MP Jack Straw had requested the Lord Chancellor to extend the terms of the blasphemy laws beyond Christianity. As has already been noted, on the Conservative side Sir Teddy Taylor, the Southend Conservative MP, had led a delegation of the Islamic Defence Council to see John Patten at the Home Office on the issue of extending the blasphemy law. In relation to this he (in Brown and Morris, 1989) had argued that, “What we are simply pressing for is that something should be done and that the Government should accept that these people have a very reasonable grievance.” Neil Thorn, the Conservative MP for Ilford South, a constituency with around ten thousand Muslims, agreed to present a petition to Parliament calling for the book to be withdrawn (Cohen and Kelsey, 1989).

On the 10th May the Union of Muslim Organisations, with the assistance of Gary Waller MP, arranged a meeting at the House of Commons for Conservative Members of Parliament. Tim Yeo MP, Neil Thorne MP and Hugo Summerson MP attended and Gary Waller supported an amendment to the *Public Order Act* to include incitement to religious hatred as an offence (*Muslim News*, 1989c). By contrast, on the Tory right-wing, following the May 27th 1989 Westminster march, John Stokes, MP (in Reeves, P, 1989) for Halesowen and Stourbridge was reported as saying, “I cannot understand why they allow immigrants to parade and riot in large numbers outside the Houses of Parliament or anywhere else. No other nation would be so supinely tolerant.
The British public will not stand for this disgraceful behaviour. Those who settle here must obey our laws and customs.”

Among Labour MPs nationally, the pattern of response was much more varied than that of the Bradford Labour MPs’ and their attempts at conciliation of Muslim concerns. For example, Salman Rushdie’s own constituency (Islington South and Finsbury) MP, Chris Smith, put down an early day motion urging the Home Secretary to ensure Rushdie’s safety (Murtagh, 1989d). This was also signed by Michael Foot MP, the former leader of the Labour Party and  by Mark Fisher, the Shadow Arts spokesperson. Following the *fatwa*, in the Commons debate on the recall of diplomats from Tehran, Smith (in Goodwin, 1989a) argued that “freedom is not only one of the elements of democratic society, but is the best guarantee that we have of the free and full development of individual cultures and religions, including the Muslim community in this country.”

Michael Foot (1989a) developed his ideas in an article entitled “Historical Rushdie” in which he defended Rushdie’s book from the charge of stirring up trouble and pointed to the historical record of religious killings. Foot spoke of “the Jonathan Swifts, the Voltaires, the Salman Rushdies who knew that if such insanities were to be stopped, they must be mocked in the name of a common human decency with a claim to take precedence over any religion.” In a statement to the House of Commons on 21st February the Labour Leader, Neil Kinnock, defended Rushdie’s right to publish when he said that “Mr. Rushdie is free, under the law of this free country, to publish, and no power has the right to menace or oppress his liberty to do so.” Later, towards the end of July he referred (in *New Life*, 1989x) to having met with Rushdie a few months previously at a social event.

When, with the assistance of Keith Vaz MP, the Union of Muslim Organisations organised a meeting for Labour Members of Parliament. Only Keith Vaz and Jim Marshall MP (also from Leicester) from the Commons attended, with Lords Bonham-Carter and Buckmaster from the Lords (*Muslim News*, 1989c). By June, however, Alf Lomas, MEP (1989) for London North East was calling on the publishers and author not to publish further copies as “the best way to try to resolve the present difficulties.” Eventually, Alistair Darling, the Labour Party Race Relations spokesperson wrote a
letter asking Viking Penguin not to publish a paperback version of the novel. The leader of the black caucus in the House of Commons, Bernie Grant (MP for Tottenham) took the position that “The book has allowed racists to almost legitimise their attacks on Muslim people” (in Bevins, 1989b) although the Labour Party Black sections outside the Commons disagreed with Grant’s position that the book should be withdrawn. A rough note of a meeting between Kinnock and Bernie Grant MP on the subject of the controversy explained Kinnock’s position as being that “religion is liberty” (New Life, 1989x).

The absolutism of Kinnock’s defence of freedom and Foot’s secularist attack upon religion contrasted with the position taken by the Labour Party Deputy Leader, Roy Hattersley (1989), who wrote an article in The Independent entitled “The racism of asserting that ‘they’ must behave like ‘us’.” In this piece, Hattersley defended Rushdie’s rights as an author, stating they were “absolute and ought to be inalienable” but he also made clear that “The proposition that Muslims are welcome in Britain if, and only if, they stop behaving like Muslims is incompatible with the principles of a free society.” Hattersley also critiqued the writer Fay Weldon’s (1989: 32) defence of the “uniculturalist” vision of the USA which, he argued, has never corresponded with reality. Michael Foot (1989c) responded with a letter to the editor of The Independent in which he said the right to burn books should not be conceded since, “If these absolute claims are conceded afresh to religious authorities, it will be all the harder to regain the firm ground of principle on which our comparative freedom from intolerance in this country has been based - much to the advantage of ethnic or religious minorities of every kind.” As a convinced secularist, Foot identified the essential problem not as racism but as “the bigotry inherent in all religions which must be constantly curbed in the name of our common humanity.”

Hattersley’s line was echoed by the Labour MP, Gerald Kaufman (1989) who, in an article in The Independent entitled “So-called liberals for whom some are more tolerable than others” defended general liberal positions with regard to freedom of expression. But at the same time he stated clearly that, “What I cannot accept is the implication that it is somehow anti-democratic and un-British for Mr. Rushdie’s writings to be the object of criticism on religious, as distinct from literary grounds”
and that Pakistanis and Bangladeshis, by asserting themselves in "fashions not immediately regarded as attractive to conventional notions...are regarded as having crossed some kind of line that they ought to stay meekly on the other side of."

The generally low level of representative political support for the Muslim position can be seen from a May 1989 survey of MP's views conducted by the Bradford Council for Mosques to which ninety-six per cent of Conservatives and eighty-eight per cent of Labour MPs did not respond - therefore leaving only a total of fifty out of the six hundred and fifty MPs of all parties who did respond (Sherif and Mirza, 1989). In analysing the positions of those who did respond, positive responses were categorised as "strong" (support Muslim demands for withdrawal of the book, or have tabled or supported motions on Muslim concerns), "mild" (change to legislation, either extending blasphemy law or under the Public Order Act) or "some" support (understand book's offensiveness but no action proposed). Ten MPs (three Conservative, five Labour, one Social & Liberal Democrat and one Social Democrat) were classified as "strong supporters", including Keith Hargreaves (Hyndburn), Gerard Vaughan (Reading East) and Neil Thorne (Ilford South) among the Conservatives; John Reid (Motherwell North), Tom Cox (Tooting), Max Madden (Bradford West), Keith Vaz (Leicester East) and Bernie Grant (Tottenham) among Labour, with the Social and Liberal Democrat David Alton (Mossley Hill) and the Social Democrat John Cartwright (Woolwich).

Eleven MPs (four Conservative, six Labour, one Social & Liberal Democrat) were classified as "mild supporters"; and fourteen MPs were seen as offering "some" support (five Conservatives, eight Labour and one "Other"), whilst twelve MPs upheld the absolute right to free speech. These latter included Norman Tebbit (Chingford) and Sydney Chapman (Epping Forest) among the Conservatives and Bob Cryer (Bradford South), Win Griffiths (Bridgend), Neil Kinnock (Islwyn), Tony Benn (Chesterfield), Brian Sedgemore (Hackney and Shoreditch), Joan Lester (Eccles); Tony Worthington (Clydbank and Milngavie), Robert Hughes (Aberdeen North) and Calum MacDonald (Western Isles) among Labour, together with Rosie Barnes of the Social Democrats.

Max Madden (in Bevins, 1989b), commented on the opening months of the controversy that "This has been the loneliest 12 months of my political life" and that,
"There has been a frightening degree of intolerance which has been expressed to me by some within the Labour Party - thankfully, a very small number" (Bevins, 1989a). He argued of the controversy that "It is about a symbolic controversy in which lots of other Muslim fears and anxieties and aspirations are tied up....It's all about how Britain is going to develop as a multi-racial, multi-faith country. If it is to develop in that way, then it is absolutely vital that it be on the basis of a secular society where all religions are respected."

In the political reactions to the controversy and the Muslim concerns within it, then, the debates among representative politicians underlined the cluster of issues arising from the controversy that are concerned with the relationship between ethnicity, nationhood, plurality and religion; the relationships between religion, freedom and the law; and those concerned with the role of religion in a secularising and plural society. In their varied reactions, the positions taken up by elected politicians reflected more general social reactions and it is to these reactions which the next section now turns.

f) Media and Social Reactions
Editorial comment in the major national newspapers provides one indication of the range of general social responses to the controversy among significant sectors of the non-Muslim general public. A large proportion of such columns was full of outrage against Islam, especially in the editorial and political comment of the popular press. In Muslim perception this was simply consistent with a long history of misrepresentation and animosity towards Islam. El-Essawy (1989a) commented in a letter to The Guardian that Muslims "see the siding of the press with Rushdie as misinformed and in the tradition of the general contempt with which the press treats Islam and Muslims" and Shabbir Akhtar's (1989b) Guardian article defending fundamentalism as intellectually respectable declared that, "there can be no doubt concerning the media's endorsement of an operative veto on any exploration of the intellectual grounds for fundamentalist options in religion."

Reflecting on the role of the media in controversy, Parekh (1989e) pointed out that until the copy of The Satanic Verses was burned in Bradford "no national newspaper published the offending passages, invited Muslim spokesmen to write about the book, or made a sympathetic attempt to read it with their eyes. Liberal opinion came down
on Muslims like a ton of bricks, ridiculing them and asking if such barbarians
deserved to be citizens of 'civilised' society." Summarising what he judged to be the
poor reporting of the Rushdie affair Parekh (1989a) argued that,
The influence of racism and anti-Muslim feeling should not be underestimated.
The bulk of influential public opinion in Britain tends to dismiss most Muslims
as fundamentalists and fundamentalism as a new form of barbarism. Thus they
are infantised, ridiculed as illiterate peasants preferring the sleep of superstition
to liberal light, and placed outside the pale of civilised discourse.

An example of such writing can be found in Peter Cliff's (1989) piece for The People
entitled "20 ways to spot a mad mullah". This piece includes such observations of the
Muslim community as: "Teenagers are not allowed to marry for love. One 16-year-old
Bradford schoolgirl won a fight to stay in council care rather than return to Pakistan
for an arranged marriage"; "Beating children for not learning the Koran properly is
part of the fanatics' creed. Sheffield police closed a mosque because the religious
instructor beat his children so savagely"; "Some Muslim leaders have boasted that
Islam will eventually wipe out Western culture and 'take over the world'." In similar
vein, following the Ayatollah Khomeini's fatwa, under the title of "They can't be
allowed to get away with murder," The Star (1989) lashed out:

Isn't the world getting sick of the ranting that pours non-stop from the
disgusting foam-flecked lips of the Ayatollah Khomeini? Clearly this Muslim
cleric is stark raving mad. And more dangerous than a rabid dog. Surely the
tragedy is that millions of his misguided followers believe every word of
hatred he hisses from those yellow stained teeth. The terrifying thing is not
that a lot of these crackpots actually live here among us in Britain, but that we
are actually becoming frightened of them. The whole thing is crazy. And it has
to stop.

Khomeini himself occasioned a lot of lurid description. Even more cultured
commentators on the controversy, such as the Nigerian novelist and film-maker Wole
Soyinka (1989) referred to Khomeini as "a sick and dangerous man" whilst the
journalist Peter Jenkins (1989a) spoke of Khomeini as "the geriatric prophet in Qom"
whilst referring to the book-burners as the "Bradford bigots" and Arnold Wesker
(1989a) described Khomeini as "a bigoted, medieval throwback." The editorial
columns of newspapers such as The Guardian and The Independent were more
measured but sentiments not too dissimilar from those expressed by The Star could
nevertheless be found, albeit expressed in more moderate language. The Independent's
(1989c) editorial "Limits to Mutual Tolerance" stated categorically that "Islam is not
a tolerant religion and makes no pretence of being so." The Independent (1989d) followed this up with an editorial entitled "Too tolerant for too long", which complained that the governments of Britain's European Community partners had reacted "more rapidly and more firmly than the British government." It praised the Archbishop of Canterbury's statement on the fatwa, going on to say that "It is for those who lead Britain's Muslims to respond with tolerance and maturity to the Archbishop's direct appeal and to ensure that their zealots obey the law of the land - not the dictates of a bloodthirsty medieval bigot."

In "British law for Britain's Muslims," The Independent's (1989f) editorial called upon the Home Secretary to prosecute Muslims who supported the fatwa, stating that "It is clear that some Muslim leaders in this country do not understand their obligation to obey the law of the land." The editorial commented that "So far, because of the profound emotion felt by Muslims, it seems to have been decided that to try to enforce the law would make matters worse." Whilst acknowledging the arguments for this position, the editorial went on to warn that "If the belief spreads that Muslims enjoy a privileged position compared with anyone else, incalculable harm will result."

When Viking was rumoured to be considering postponing or even abandoning its original plans for an Autumn launch of the paperback version of The Satanic Verses, The Independent (1989g) editorial entitled "Viking Must Stand Firm", urged the publishers not to make "any concession which represented a surrender to pressure." It argued that, "It is an illusion of cultivated liberal opinion - a category which embraces most publishers - that fellow human beings are at heart reasonable and can be won over by compromises. Religious fundamentalists are at heart unreasonable; it is in their nature to believe that the end justifies the means." Interestingly, however, the editorial also stated that "The insertion of some words of explanation and/or regret by the author" would not represent the kind of "significant concession" that they would wish Viking to steer clear of. However, an editorial (The Independent, 1989i) entitled "A false sympathy with Islam" described Sir Geoffrey Howe's expression of concern about The Satanic Verses as "bogus" and remarked that, "Even if his comment about the national attitude to the contents of Salman Rushdie's book had been more accurate he had no business making it." The July editorial (The Independent, 1989z)
"Dangers of the Muslim Campaign" supported John Patten's call for integration warning that if Muslims ignore this "they are likely to turn educated, as well as popular, sentiment against them."

Within the non-Muslim Asian press there were also those who voiced their concerns about the Muslim campaign. For example, the 17th February editorial of *New Life* (1989e) which began with the statement that "Age has not mellowed the Ayatullah. Nor has it made him any wiser." The editorial went on to describe him as "the Iranian fire-eater" and a "99-year-old religious leader who may have forced many to develop admiration for Satan." Whilst acknowledging that Muslims "have a right to demand that the book be banned", another *New Life* (1989c) pointed out "people of other faiths and the increasing band of non-religious people in this country and in other parts of the world have a right too. The right to read and be exposed to intellectual analysis of the world's religions, as Salman Rushdie's book clearly is."

The correspondence columns of newspapers also contained letters from individuals of Muslim background who criticised Khomeini's *fatwa*. One example of such criticism can be found in the letter written by Zebunissa Rizwi (1989) of Bradford to the editor of *The Independent*. In this, she confessed that "speaking up in the current climate is not easy, even for secular-minded Muslims." Such Muslims, Rizwi says, have "lives that are characterised by schizophrenia: we understand the faith of our families but we cannot accept it." Rizwi stated that "As an individual born into Islam, I denounce unreservedly the revolting book-burning by fanatical Muslims in Bradford, and abhor the ayatollah's cynical death-threats."

In Bradford, the local newspaper the *Bradford Telegraph and Argus*, which had given advance notice of the planned book-burning, tried to maintain coverage and provide a forum for the expression of community anger. But it also had its own security concerns in the context of controversy since, because of its ownership by Westminster Press it was commercially linked with Viking Penguin through the holding company Pearson and it had therefore posted a security guard on duty at the entrance to its buildings (Barker, P, 1989). On the whole, whilst there were exceptions, editorial and journalistic comment in both the popular and the quality press supported Rushdie and attacked the Muslims' protests. Interestingly, however, this did not always coincide
with the general public view of the issues involved since, on 8th May 1990, a Gallup poll published in *The Daily Telegraph* indicated that a majority of respondents thought that Rushdie should apologise for the offence caused by the novel.

There were press pieces which did try to move on beyond simplistic dichotomies. For example *The Guardian's* (1989c) editorial "Beyond the threat" tried to examine some of the wider issues arising from the Rushdie controversy in the light of Douglas Hurd's speech at the Birmingham Central Mosque. It pointed out that reduced to a tabloid front-page headline the central thrust of Douglas Hurd's speech meant "Behave like British, or don't live here." The editorial went on to explore the controversy's ambiguity in terms of support for a principle of freedom which does not, at the same time, wish to give succour to racist sentiments. In this, it reflected the approach of the heterogenous campaigning group, Voices for Salman Rushdie (1989), which consisted of forty-five diverse individuals including Tony Benn MP, Gita Saghal, Hanif Kureishi, Hilary Wainwright and eighteen organisations, who issued an Open Letter in which they explained that, "We are a number of diverse individuals and groups" who both "support Rushdie's right to publish" and who "reject the attempts of both fundamentalists and racists to use this affair to promote their own ends." Significantly for the argument of this thesis, their statement concluded with what they saw as some of the wider implications for the relationship between religion and state that they had identified in connection with the controversy:

> We believe that as long as any religion is given a privileged position by the state, the right to dissent, and indeed the right to freedom of worship, is undermined. We call for the abolition of all blasphemy laws, the end of state aid to religious education, and the disestablishment of the Church of England as necessary preconditions for the development in Britain of a genuinely pluralist, democratic society.

It is the argument of this thesis that the nexus of the issues identified by the controversy is indeed to be found in the existence of a privileged established religion and that the "entails" of the controversy call for a re-evaluation of this establishment. However, in arguing this case it is important to take account of the responses and actions of the current established Church within the controversy, and it is therefore these actual responses and actions with which the next section is concerned.
Responses to the controversy have come from Christians in all traditions and also from ecumenical bodies. But, in view of the argument of this thesis, the actual responses of the Church of England are of particular interest. Robert Runcie (1989), the Archbishop of Canterbury and Primate of the Church of England at the time of the outbreak of the Rushdie controversy, issued a statement soon after the Ayatollah's fatwa. In this, Runcie clearly stated that, "Only the utterly insensitive can fail to see that the publication of Salman Rushdie's book has deeply offended Muslims both here and throughout the world. I understand their feelings and I firmly believe that offence to the religious beliefs of the followers of Islam or any other faith is quite as wrong as offence to the religious beliefs of Christians." Runcie then went on to condemn "incitement to murder or any other violence from any source whatsoever" declaring that he could "no more accept such incitement from those who claim to speak in the name of Islam than...from anyone who claims to speak in the name of Christianity." He also appealed to Muslim leaders in Britain to "urge their followers to have regard to the expression of profound regret that Salman Rushdie has issued...and to contain their anger within the bounds of the law."

Both in 1981 and 1985, the Archbishop had supported proposals to extend the offences of blasphemy and blasphemous libel in order to include religious traditions other than Christianity. These proposals had been made by a Working Group (General Synod, 1981) established to advise him on the Law Commission's (1981) consultative working paper on the blasphemy laws, the work of which had later been extended to include consideration of the Law Commission's (1985) final recommendations. The Working Group's own final recommendations were published in the General Synod (1988) report on Offences Against Religion and Public Worship. However, in the context of the Rushdie controversy, Runcie did not explicitly call for the equalisation of the blasphemy laws, although Sandra Barwick (1989a), writing in The Independent, believed his statement "implicitly" did this.

As the controversy developed further, Lambeth Palace's involvement built upon its liaison with the Anglican Diocese of Bradford and its Bishop, Rt. Revd. Roy Williamson. The Bradford Diocese had, for a number of years, been served by a
Bishop's Chaplain appointed with a specific brief for race and community relations. The postholder during the time of the controversy was Philip Lewis (1994a), a former Church Missionary Society missionary and author of the book *Islamic Britain: Religion, Politics and Identity Among British Muslims*, and a number of articles and reviews on the Rushdie controversy (see Lewis, 1989, 1990a, 1990b, 1990c) and the Muslim community in Bradford (1994b).

During the week in which the *fatwa* was pronounced, whilst letting it be known that he found the *fatwa* "abhorrent," the Bishop of Bradford brought forward an already planned private meeting of representatives of the Muslim, Christian, Hindu and Jewish traditions in order to address the issues raised by the affair (Church Times, 1989a). The Bishop reported that at this meeting Muslim leaders had emphasised their respect for British law. The blasphemy law and legal position of minorities was discussed and, in a joint statement (in Hardy, B, 1989), all the representatives said they understood Muslim outrage at a publication "which seemed to rejoice in irreverent and scurrilous comments about the most revered figures in the Islamic tradition." Muslim leaders endorsed plans for a "city forum" for the exchange of views which was to be co-ordinated by the Bishop of Bradford although Liaquat Hussain, Secretary of the Council of Mosques, had warned that religious leaders could not control the expression of feelings at street level (Wainwright, 1989b).

In the wake of the violence that followed the 17th June demonstrations in Bradford, the Bishop (in *The Independent*, 1989v) called for a "serious reappraisal" of some of the Muslim community's approaches in the light of "rising anger and fear" in Bradford. He (in Wainwright, 1989e) stated that he now believed that "There is a real chance that these protests may be counter-productive and serve only to isolate the Muslim community." In response, a statement issued by the Council of Mosques (in Buck, 1989) countered that "Muslims do not have access to the higher seats of power, and the majority community and its institutions are defiant of our needs and aspirations," whilst Sher Azam pointed out that the Bishop had not referred to the peaceful Muslim demonstrations over the past eighteen months and argued that the Bishop "does not fully recognise what it is like for a minority with no privilege or position of power which the majority take for granted." In these ways the religious
powerlessness and disadvantage of the Muslim community were contrasted with the privileged access to political decision-making and the machinery of the state enjoyed by the established Church of England.

In Manchester, the Church of England Bishop of Manchester, the Rt. Revd. Stanley Booth-Clibborn and some other Church leaders met together with Muslims for an "exchange of ideas" out of which it was agreed that the question of changes to the blasphemy laws would be put on the agenda of a forthcoming Northern Church Leaders' Conference. Eventually, the Bishop of Manchester (Church Times, 1989d) called for abolition saying, "It must go. It is outdated and it must go. It is hopeless to have a law which simply protects one religion, and in particular the Established Church...The real debate is about whether it should be replaced. My own view is that it should not." Among other Anglican Bishops, Rt. Revd. John Taylor (in Schwarz, 1989b), the Bishop of St. Alban's and a member of the Archbishop of Canterbury's commission on the blasphemy law called for the withdrawal of the book "because of the social harm that had been caused to the people of Britain."

At a national level the Archbishop of Canterbury asked Muslims to meet him at Lambeth Palace. At this meeting it was agreed that a joint Anglican-Muslim working party should be set up to examine the legal issues involved in the protection of religious sensibilities in contemporary British society. The Lambeth Palace official charged with setting up this working group, Mr. John Lyttle, became a centre of controversy when he intervened to call for the postponement of The Blasphemer's Banquet television programme. This was due to be presented by the controversial poet Tony Harrison and was scheduled for broadcast on BBC 1 on 31st July (Wilmott, 1989; Brown, A, 1989a; Hebert, 1989b) as a part of Byline, the personal view documentary series. Mr. Lyttle's intervention was made on the grounds of the programme's potentially inflammatory nature in relation to Muslim belief, in particular with regard to the late Ayatollah Khomeini. When they learned about the nature of the programme, the owners of the restaurant featured in it expressed concerns about the use of their restaurant and they planned to sue the BBC for giving inadequate information on how the film would be used (New Life, 1989y). However, an Independent (1989aa) editorial referred to Lyttle's intervention as "a weasal-worded
request" and contrasted it with the Archbishop of Canterbury's earlier statement in July that the hands of fundamentalists of all religions were "stained with blood."

The BBC turned down his request and the programme was broadcast (Henry, G, 1989). As broadcast, it was set in a Bradford tandoori restaurant to which guests, including Rushdie, Voltaire, Molière and Byron - all of whom had been accused of blasphemy - were invited. It included images of Shi'a Muslims, which taken out of the context of a proper understanding of Shi'a Islam could only be perceived as lurid confirmations of the kind of stereotypes of Iranian Islam already noted in connection with The Star's editorialising on Ayatollah Khomeini's fatwa. The British Muslim Action Front (quoted in Ward, S, 1989c) commented that, "It appears to us that the BBC is quite insensitive and arrogant in their attitude to a large section of the community," whilst eight British Muslim leaders meeting the Archbishop on the day of the broadcast thanked him for his support. The Bishop of Bradford (quoted in Wainwright, 1989h) regretted that instead of showing pictures of smiling Muslim children he was familiar with, the programme had focused on "revolting scenes of Muslim fanatics teaching their children to hit their heads until they bled." Bishop Michael Nazir-Ali (1989b) described the film as "an exercise in polemics and as an apology for the creed of secular humanism."

Commenting on these Church of England interventions, the religious affairs correspondent of The Independent, Andrew Brown (1989c), noted that "Bishops and archbishops seem to be popping up all over the place to defend the feelings of the Muslim communities." Brown viewed this as odd since he argued that Islam and Christianity were theologically at odds and that Anglican "sensibilities" are highly tentative in contrast with the certainties of Islam. Brown reflected that one way of trying to understand this apparently strange rapprochement would be to proceed on the basis that "it is essential to ignore what people are saying if you wish to understand their motives: merely to ask whom they are trying to please and what they are trying to protect."

Brown acknowledged that due to its established status the Church of England "in its parish network has an unrivalled intelligence-gathering capability." He speculated that inviting Muslims to Lambeth Palace may be something which "squares with the
practice of the British establishment through the ages", namely, that "there is no better and more effective way of disarming a potential book-burner than to take him to tea at Lambeth Palace and draw him into the endless Anglican conversation." Summarising his reflections on the role of the Church of England in the controversy, Brown concluded that "The integration of Muslims into whatever British society will become as a result may seem a curious service for the established Church to attempt for the nation. No one else, though, seems to be offering very loudly to do it."

Brown's reflections on the actual role of the Church of England in the controversy seem to suggest that if the current form of the establishment needs to be changed, then one possible way forward (which will be examined in more detail in chapter 5) would be for the Church of England to "stretch" its role to that of a functionally "extended establishment," offering some degree of indirect representation to Muslims and other religious minorities in a similar way to which, in recent years, it has offered a channel for the expression of ecumenical Christian concerns through its Bishops in the House of Lords.

h) Other Christian Reactions
The Church Times (1989b) editorial on "Islam and Modernity" began with the words "Many Christians will have found their mind divided over the fierce Muslim reaction to Salman Rushdie and his novel The Satanic Verses." Liberal and radical Christians of all denominational traditions certainly found themselves slightly bewildered at what was happening in the Rushdie controversy and torn between conflicting solidarities. On the one hand, they wished to stand with the largely minority ethnic Muslim communities against the torrents of media abuse and outbreaks of physical violence which afflicted the Muslims in the days following the book-burning in Bradford and the Ayatollah Khomeini's fatwa. However, they could not agree that The Satanic Verses should be censored or its publisher or author prosecuted for blasphemy. They also felt solidarity with Salman Rushdie as an author who had been forced to live in hiding under armed guard, and who had been prominent in the anti-racist movement of the 1980s with his searing indictments of racism in the UK.

The clearest articulation of this radical and liberal Christian perspective can be found in the response of the former British Council of Churches to the issues involved in the
controversy. Its statement (British Council of Churches, 1989) focused on the three aspects of the controversy’s impact: the impact upon inter-faith relations, community relations and international relations. The statement notes that the British Council of Churches had been "greatly encouraged by the increasing co-operation between the different faith communities in Britain in many areas of shared concern." This was, perhaps, a tangential reference to the Faith Alliance for Human Rights and Racial Justice which the BCC’s Community and Race Relations Unit and Committee for Relations with People of Other Faiths staff had been instrumental in setting up and had resulted in The Manifesto for Human Rights and Racial Justice signed by a number of religious leaders from various traditions and endorsed by a range of national and local religious organisations. But, at the same time, precisely because of this encouragement, the statement also expressed "grave concern at the damaging effect on inter-faith and community relations of the controversy." In wording which attempted to express sympathy for the Muslim feelings, without endorsing the Muslim judgement on the book, the British Council of Churches went on to declare that, "We recognise something of the deep pain and hurt experienced by the British Muslim community because it believes that the Prophet of Islam has been dishonoured." But the central note of the statement was an expression of hope that "the difficulties created by this matter will act as a spur to further development of understanding, respect and common purpose, rather than the opposite."

Among Roman Catholic Christian responses, the Vatican newspaper, L'Osservatore Romano carried an unsigned article on 4th March, condemning The Satanic Verses as blasphemous (Sheridan and Kelsey, 1989). A Roman Catholic correspondent to The Independent, Father Kit Cunningham (1989) argued that, maybe, "it requires the Muslims these days to tell those in the West of the reality of God, the brevity of life and the sinfulness of man."

Among the responses from within the Free Church traditions of England, there was a distinctive response by The Unitarian and Free Christian Churches which drew upon its own experience of religious discrimination and social and political exclusion due to its advocacy of freedom of thought. Its own theologically-grounded arguments for
freedom of conscience were the basis of the declaration on the controversy issued by the Council of its General Assembly (1989) which stated that:

Unitarians have a long history of promoting inter-faith understanding at international and national levels and are frequently to be found as active members of local inter-faith groups. They are keenly aware of the distress felt when artistic expressions are believed to be offensive by particular communities, but believe that the extension of the law into religious disputes exacerbates tensions rather than resolving them. The abolition of criminal blasphemy rather than its extension to cover non-Christian groups is the preferred course.

Among the Christian responses were also those of individual theologians working within the various Christian traditions. These include Keith Ward (1989a), an Anglican who was at the time Professor of History and Philosophy of Religion at King's College in London and Chair of the World Congress of Faiths (see Braybrooke, 1996) and is now Regius Professor of Divinity at the University of Oxford, and who wrote a piece entitled "The violent gifts of modern Islam." In this article, whilst pointing to the "great and tolerant cultures" which developed under the rule of what is "a great and noble faith," Ward commented that, "We seem to see in the modern world the sad spectacle of the decadence of Islam." Furthermore, he posed the question concerning Islam in Britain: "Can it make a positive contribution to social harmony and human well-being?" giving the answer that, "At the moment it does not seem so."

By contrast, Bishop Lesslie Newbigin saw the Muslim passion over *The Satanic Verses* as posing a theological critique to Christian lukewarmness. In a letter to *The Independent*, Bishop Newbigin (1989) pointed out that, "Blasphemy has become a meaningless concept in contemporary British society because it is not seriously believed that God exists." He developed this further by suggesting that,

Christians in this country have become accustomed to hearing their faith blasphemed. They are not permitted to respond as the Ayatollah has done, because the centre of their faith is at the point where the Lord himself accepted death on a charge of blasphemy. Whether the silence of contemporary Christians in the face of blasphemy is due to an understanding of their faith, or to indifference, only God can judge.

In conclusion, Newbigin noted that "The present controversy could lead to enmity against the Muslims in Britain. That would be tragic. It could, on the other hand, provide an opportunity for Christians to consider how seriously they believe what they profess." Akhtar (1989a: 99) made the sharp observation that "Christian tolerance
may well be a virtue inspired by love for justice and forbearance. Yet too often it is found only in lands and epochs where the faith is dead or dying...Could the real motives be indifference and apathy, themselves rooted in a loss of faith?” concluding that, “The continual blasphemies against the Christian faith have totally undermined it.”

Commenting on what he saw as Christianity's corrosion by tolerance Shabbir Akhtar (1989b) pointed out that, “Many writers often condescendingly imply that Muslims should become as tolerant as modern Christians”, but “Any faith which compromises its internal temper of militant wrath is destined for the dustbin of history, for it can no longer preserve its faithful heritage in the face of corrosive influences.” In New Life, a correspondent to the editor, Derek Beshara (1989), describing himself as “a former Christian who has been progressively drawn towards Islam for some time” also argued that the Western world needed to understand that “Muslims value their faith a great deal more devotedly than do Christians.”

i) Reactions From Other Than Christian and Muslim Communities

Alongside the Anglican, Roman Catholic, Free Church, Orthodox, Pentecostal and Black-led varieties of Christianity and Muslims (as the largest religious minority), there are also significant numbers of Hindus, Sikhs, Jews and Buddhists together with smaller minorities of Bahá'ís, Jains and Zoroastrians. Writing in The Independent's Faith and Reason column, David Goldberg (1989) suggested that “the religious implications of the Rushdie affair deserve more thoughtful consideration than they have received so far.”

Like Christianity, Judaism shares common “Abrahamic” roots with Islam. As Jenni Frazer (1989) noted in a Jewish Chronicle article commenting on Jewish-Muslim relations in the context of the Rushdie controversy “For Anglo-Jewry, there is renewed consideration of the often strained relations between the two communities - where the dominant feature of their relations is conflict, rather than contact, and the shadow of the Middle East is a constant factor.” In this connection it has already been noted that, in a number of Muslim statements about the controversy dark hints could be found, suggesting that powerful global forces and interests were at work behind Rushdie -
hints that seemed to point in the direction of a conspiracy theory in which Zionism played a prominent part.

In the context of the controversy, however, a number of leading Jews expressed feelings of solidarity with the Muslims in the face of the distorted treatment that Muslims felt they were receiving from the media. This is perhaps not surprising coming from a community which has itself suffered stigmatisation from the wider society and a large proportion of whose members had also originally arrived as poor immigrants. Muslims writing about the controversy have themselves seen parallels with the Jewish experience. Some have even gone so far as to argue that Muslims have taken the place of the Jews in European demonology, in the context of which they have expressed fears that the enmity against Islam they believe to be focused through the Rushdie controversy could lead to Muslims becoming the victims of a new Holocaust in Europe. For example, in reflecting on the Muslim position in Europe Shabbir Akhtar (1989b) has said, dramatically, "The next time there are gas chambers in Europe, there is no doubt concerning who'll be inside them." This kind of perception was reinforced by some of the reactions to Muslims which emerged during the Gulf War and, in the light of revelations about the concentration camps for Bosnian Muslims and campaigns of ethnic cleansing in Bosnia-Herzegovina, in the eyes of many Muslims it has been proved to be not too far from the truth (Kabbani, 1992).

As early as October 1988, the Chief Rabbi, Sir (now Lord) Immanuel Jacobovits, (quoted in The Jewish Chronicle, 1988) expressed strong sympathy for the wounded feelings of Muslim believers. His letter to the Islamic Society for the Promotion of Religious Tolerance's conference on The Satanic Verses and Martin Scorsese's film The Last Temptation of Christ stated that he "deprecates not only the falsification of established historical records but the offence caused to religious convictions and susceptibilities of countless citizens." Jacobovits argued that "In a civilised society we should generate respect for other people's religious beliefs and not tolerate a form of denigration and ridicule which can only breed resentment to the point of hatred and strife." He (1989) repeated his position in a letter to The Times in which he stated that, "I stand by my view that the book should not have been published" whilst also
expressing outrage at what he called “the murderous threat against the book’s author.” This position was further restated in a letter to *The Jewish Chronicle* (3.3.89) from Shimon Cohen, the Executive Officer of the Office of the Chief Rabbinate (see Weller, ed, 1993: 331).

It is noteworthy that considerable controversy in the columns and correspondence of *The Jewish Chronicle* surrounded the Chief Rabbi’s stance on this issue, thus suggesting that it did not entirely reflect a consensus within the community (Josephs and Rocker, 1989). A letter from David Nathan (1989) spoke of “The readiness with which leading rabbis who should be deeply conscious of the consequences of intolerance are ready to discard fundamental liberties in pursuit of spurious peace is dismaying and disturbing.” Revd. Lesslie Hardman’s (1989) letter reminded the readers of the *Jewish Chronicle* of the call for the fatwa of Rabbi Dr. Louis Jacobs which had been issued twenty years previously when his book *We Have Reason to Believe* was denounced in an Orthodox Jewish newsletter. Rabbi Dr. Sidney Brichto, Executive vice-President and director of the Union of Liberal and Progressive Synagogues (see Weller, ed, 1993: 339) stated (1989) that “Lord Jacobovits himself expresses a personal opinion, one assumes, and not that of a Chief Rabbi used to speaking for the community as a whole”. Brichto said of the Chief Rabbi that, in calling for banning he has “performed a disservice to the Jewish community.” In Israel, Rabbi Avraham Ravitz of the Degel Hatorah Party also condemned Rushdie (Kessel, Y, 1989) whilst Rabbi Avraham Shapira, Ashkenazi Chief Rabbi of Israel, said the book should not be published in Israel in any language (in Josephs and Rocker, 1989).

With regard to the *fatwa*, (in *The Jewish Chronicle*, 1989a) Rabbi Rodney Mariner, the Convenor of the Reform Synagogues of Great Britain (see Weller, ed, 1993: 337) called the threat to Rushdie “an obscenity”, whilst Dayan Isaac Berge of the London Beth Din (see Weller, ed, 1993: 330) thought it “highly irresponsible.” Rabbi Dr. Jeffrey Cohen of the Stanmore Synagogue spoke of “a dividing line between the blessing of free speech on the one hand and the pernicious effects of blatant misrepresentation of racial and religious ideas and values on the other,” warning that “Fabrication and distortion of history can cause great emotional damage and real hurt to a race, religion or nation, which cannot retaliate in kind. We Jews sympathise with
the outrage felt by the Moslems, but our response would definitely not be to over-react by calling for the author's execution."

A group of leading Jewish writers including Arnold Wesker, Harold Pinter, Bernice Rubens, Frederic Raphael, Bernard Kops and Jon Silkin issued a statement opposing the extension of the blasphemy laws on the grounds that this would "involve an undesirable restriction on our precious freedom of inquiry and expression and an equally undesirable encouragement of dangerous fanaticism in our pluralist society" (*The Jewish Chronicle*, 1989c). But alternative views to those of the Chief Rabbi were not only expressed on the Reform and Liberal wings of Judaism. Rabbi Dr. Normon Solomon (in Josephs and Rocker, 1989), an Orthodox Jew and a leading Jewish proponent of inter-faith dialogue, held that the blasphemy law was a thing of the past which should not be resuscitated.

The Chief Rabbi (1989) clarified that he had not advocated an extension of the blasphemy laws, arguing that "What should concern us are not religious offences but socially intolerable conduct calculated or likely to incite revulsion or violence, by holding up religious beliefs to scurrilous contempt, or by encouraging murder." Reflecting on the complex issues involved, Chaim Bermant (1989b) pointed out that whilst the Jews had suffered the burning of Talmuds there had been Jewish offences too. In 1233, the Montpellian Jewish authorities denounced Maimonides' *Guide to the Perplexed* to the Dominicans, who later burned it; in 1624, Uriel da Costa, a Jewish philosopher from the Netherlands, had his work burned by the Jewish community; and in 1656 Spinoza was excommunicated and had an attempt made against his life. In the light of this history Bermant described the Chief Rabbi's position as "the authentic Jewish voice of authentic Jewish intolerance." However, the Chief Rabbi's office said they had received more favourable responses than opposing ones and that they had received "no protest from any organisation, be it Jewish or non-Jewish" (*The Jewish Chronicle*, 1989b).

On a symbolic level the Bradford book-burning had been highly problematic for Jews. In a *Jewish Chronicle* article entitled "Bradford burning evokes unhappy memories", Chaim Bermant (1989a) argued that "if the anti-Rushdie campaign has led to a backlash of anti-Moslem feelings - which it has - then Moslems have only themselves
to blame," pointing out that the Bradford conflagration "evoked painful memories of what book-burning led to in Nazi Germany." Bermant went on to state that,

This may be an indelicate point to make by someone who is himself an immigrant, but it has to be made: the Moslems are abusing the very freedoms which have led them to seek, and obtain, a home in Britain. They are making things difficult for themselves; they are making things impossible for prospective immigrants, especially from the Moslem world.

However, in a letter to The Jewish Chronicle responding to Bermant, Ibrahim Hewitt (1989a) of the Islamic Organisation for Media Monitoring argued that "The book-burning episode provoked much hypocritical double-talk" and asked "isn't it worth reflecting that it was precisely because the authors of antisemitic books were allowed the sort of 'freedom' that Rushdie apologists scream for today that the Nazis were able to whip up book-burning mobs so easily."

The Jews are, of course, the religious minority with the longest historical presence in Britain. However, there are other religious minorities too. Representatives of these religions have not had such a public profile in their contributions to the controversy as have Christians, Muslims and Jews. Nevertheless, their reactions are also important within the total context of a religiously plural society. Among Sikhs and Hindus it was reported that, in Bradford, a joint meeting between Hindu representatives of the Hindu Vishwa Parishad and the Federation of Bradford Sikh Organisations (Weller, ed, 1993: 539) had called for a change to the current blasphemy legislation. Mohinder Singh Chana (in New Life, 1989j), the General Secretary of the Federation said "The current position clearly illustrates that the present legal position needs reviewing, to take into account the presence of other religions in Britain."

One of the few pieces of sustained published argument to come from organisations or individuals of other than Christian, Jewish or Muslim religious tradition appeared in a statement issued by the Friends of the Western Buddhist Order (see Weller, ed, 1993: 90), which opposed the extension of the blasphemy laws. Significantly, its argument was advanced on clearly religious grounds and so could not simply be dismissed as an expression of secularised religious sentiment. The FWBO's press release (quoted in Commission for Racial Equality, 1990d: 88-89) stated that, "Buddhists do not want the protection of any such law. Moreover, we would prefer that the blasphemy laws be scrapped altogether and removed from the statute books,
as we consider them to be an impediment to our freedom of expression as Buddhists.” The FWBO press release went on to express the concern that if the blasphemy laws were extended, then “Buddhism itself may be deemed by some to be blasphemous and it would seem to be impossible to frame laws for the ‘protection’ of the theistic religions which do not by their very nature have this effect upon non-theistic religions.” Finally, the statement concluded that, “to respond with anger to a disparagement of one’s religious beliefs is entirely un-Buddhistic, indeed, from a Buddhist standpoint, profoundly irreligious. We as Buddhists therefore expressly reject any attempt to bring the rule of law, and therefore ultimately the application of force and coercion, to bear upon our religious beliefs.”

In fact, Dharmachari Kulananda (in Nowell, 1989) of the FWBO went further that this and, in continuity with an argument advanced in the context of the Gay News trial by the Venerable Sangharakshita (1978), the founder of the FWBO, noted that “There are people...whose freedom of action is inhibited by unconscious belief in a vengeful God” and that there are therefore “occasions on which engaging in an act of blasphemy helps someone to rid himself or herself of this unconscious belief.” The positions taken by the FWBO thus connect with the cluster of issues concerned with the law and, significantly for the argument of this thesis, in 1978 Sangharakshita had drawn the conclusion from this that, “There should be a complete separation of Church and State. The Church of England should be disestablished.”

j) Reactions From Inter-Faith and Cross-Community Organisations

Together with the positions taken by religious organisations and leaders within individual religious traditions a number of inter-faith organisations (Braybrooke, 1980, 1992) took up stances in relation to the issues involved in the controversy. The Inter Faith Network for the United Kingdom (see Weller 1988b, 1993b, 1994b), a national framework for inter-faith co-operation and communication set up in 1987, found itself, in the days following the fatwa of the Ayatollah Khomeini, in the position of having to make some public response.
As an umbrella organisation which, at the time, linked some sixty or so other organisations and groups involved in inter-faith relations at local and national level the Network had not, until then, entered the public arena by means of issuing press releases. Indeed, until this point it had no mechanisms in place for speaking at short notice on behalf of its affiliated organisations. In addition, the difficulties involved in producing a statement were obvious in a body whose membership included both Muslim organisations and the Friends of the Western Buddhist Order and their divergent views on the issues at stake in the controversy as revealed in the earlier sections of this chapter. However, such was the seriousness of the issues involved that a statement was issued by the officers of The Inter Faith Network (1989), full text of which is reproduced here for its balanced and nuanced treatment of the issues involved:

*The Satanic Verses* contains passages which were bound to cause deep offence to Muslims. There have been peaceful protests from them about the book for many months and inevitably a sense of frustration has developed as time has passed. In this country the Muslim community is a minority. They are naturally concerned about attacks upon the integrity of their faith and its misrepresentation. Like others, they are also concerned at attitudes in a society which does not always appear sympathetic to religious values in the community or in family life.

As in the case of other religious faiths, there is no single individual (here or abroad) who has the authority to speak for all Muslims. But in Britain, senior leaders of the community have at all times insisted that Muslim protests should avoid violence and should strictly observe the requirements of our laws. We wholly endorse this view.

There is, in this country, a long and deeply cherished tradition of freedom of expression. It is not an absolute right: there is, for example, the law of libel. Freedom of expression creates a corresponding responsibility in the way in which this freedom is exercised. A tension faces us all between freedom, responsibility and the law: this is particularly true in relation to what is sacred in our lives.

Within the faith communities themselves, there are differences of view about the appropriateness or practicality of legal sanctions against blasphemy and in protection of religious sensitivities. But there will be general agreement that if there is protection provided by the law it should apply to all religious communities.

There are difficult and divisive issues here which require more considered public debate in a calmer atmosphere as we develop the appropriate social framework for our life together in a multi-faith society. This will take
patience, tolerance and commitment as we forge a shared vision of such a society.

As an individual, one of the co-Chairs of the Network, the Anglican Bishop, Jim Thompson of Stepney, called explicitly for a reassessment, in the context of a multi-faith society, of the blasphemy laws' applicability only to Christianity (Pallister, 1989a). The Inter Faith Network followed up its officers' statement by holding two jointly sponsored seminars with the Commission for Racial Equality. The first (Commission for Racial Equality, 1990d) was at Regent's College, London on 14th September 1989. According to the letters of invitation to this event, its purpose was to consider "the appropriateness (and practicality) of legal sanctions (including the law of blasphemy) or voluntary 'codes of conduct' to protect religious sensibilities in a multi-faith society, together with some of the more general questions of freedom of expression, personal responsibility and social values which arise in this field." The very involved description of the seminar's purpose reflects the complexity and sensitivity of the issues involved in the controversy and the way in which it was felt to be important not to make any prior assumptions about how the issues should be approached, other than a common willingness to share in exploration together with people from a wide range of religious perspectives and professional disciplines. A second seminar organised by the Inter Faith Network (1991b) and Commission for Racial Equality took place at the latter's offices on 24th October 1990, at which possible alternative legal provisions for the protection of religious sensibilities were examined.

Another national inter-faith organisation which made a statement on the controversy was the UK and Ireland Chapter of the World Conference on Religion and Peace. The officers of the WCRP (1989) wrote a letter to *The Times* in which they put the controversy in its wider setting and then went beyond the Network officers' statement with respect to the issue of the scope of the blasphemy laws, expressing the hope that, "inequalities in that law will be redressed and that all minority religions will be fully protected."

The controversy both caused and revealed significant underlying tensions in inter-faith relations. For some involved in such groups, it has been a very discouraging and depressing experience. However, it must also be said that, at least in the future all who
are involved in inter-faith relations will recognise what a serious challenge is entailed in this. Those who are fully committed to the project of building a multi-faith society will no longer be able to talk glibly about its potential. Serious participants in such a social and theological project and in inter-faith dialogue now all know that major issues are involved - issues which can become literally matters of life and death.

In terms of cross-community bodies involving both religious and secular people, the Commission for Racial Equality issued a statement (quoted in Shahin, 1989b) in which it expressed understanding for “the hurt and pain caused to deeply held religious beliefs of Muslims”, but also concern about “the harmful effect this whole controversy may have on race relations,” condemning the fatwa as “monstrous” and arguing that “there are peaceful and constructive ways of resolving such disagreements” since “Tolerance is demanded of us all in a pluralist society and those who identify with extremism on any side undermine the harmony so many are committed to achieve.”

It should be noted that much of the public inter-religious and community debate has been conducted among males. This is, of course, not surprising since most public spokespersons for religious and ethnic community organisations are male. However, it does mean that only half of the religious debate is usually brought into the public sphere and recorded. The one significant exception to this has been the activities of women from various religious and ethnic backgrounds gathered in the group Women Against Fundamentalism (Agrawal, 1989). The group was launched on 6th May 1989 and included Southall Black Sisters, Brent Asian Women’s Refuge, the Iranian Women’s Organisation in Britain and Irish Women (Ahuja, 1989; Connolly, 1991). Women Against Fundamentalism is not a religious group although it includes women from a range of religious and cultural backgrounds who have attempted to pursue an independent line from that of the male spokespeople of their communities. Hannana Siddiqui (quoted in Wolffe, ed, 1994: 282-284) recounts that,

On 27th May 1989 when the Muslim fundamentalists marched through Central London against Rushdie, I was not there as a part of their demonstration, but as a part of the counter picket organised by Women Against Fundamentalism....When I saw thousands of angry Asian male faces, it reminded me of...a culture and religion which intertwine to sanction and reinforce male power and domination...I shared this battleground with other women from diverse religious backgrounds. But we were all doubters and dissenters...I do not want men and mullahs to build my future. I want to create
my own future in a world where women can choose to live as they please. I want a secular state without blasphemy laws which impose religious censorship. I support Salman Rushdie's right to write *The Satanic Verses* because his right to doubt and dissent is also my right to doubt and dissent.

Pragna Patel (Whyte, A, 1989) of the group explained that "We thought long and hard about whether to picket the anti-Rushdie demonstration. We did not want to be seen standing side by side with racists. But we felt that on this issue we could not prevaricate. If we are not to raise these things, who would?" Women Against Fundamentalism have struggled against an undifferentiated view of their communities. Together with supporting Rushdie's right to publish they opposed the extension of the blasphemy laws, separate religious schools, state aid for Religious Education and Christian assemblies in schools.

The controversy has therefore sharpened the challenges involved both in inter-religious relations and in questions concerning the necessary reorganisation of society to take fuller account of the present diversity of religious belief and practice amongst its citizenry. But it has also underlined the problems of dealing with the diversity within, as well as between, communities. This diversity is found in the varied responses and strategies proposed by different Muslim organisations and in gender and other differences within communities such as those highlighted by Women Against Fundamentalism.

**k) The Issues Distilled**

Having in the previous chapter surveyed the contours of the controversy, and having in this chapter examined some of the actions and reactions that are interwoven within those contours, whilst beginning to indicate some of the ways in which these focus a range of issues, it is now possible systematically to identify the clusters of "entails" which the thesis argues arise from the controversy and both focus and contribute to wider contemporary debates on religious and cultural diversity in England and the UK. From this point onwards, therefore, the thesis will group these "entails" into five clusters of issues. The clusters are concerned with: issues of social integration and identity in the relationships between ethnicity, nationhood, religion and plurality; issues around the role of religion in the relationships between secularisation, religious beliefs and plurality; issues of culture, in terms of the relationships between values,
art, education and plurality; issues of law, in terms of the relationships between law, ethics and plurality; and issues of politics, in terms of the relationships between politics, the constitution and plurality.

It is argued that these clusters of issues reflect the debates at the heart of the Rushdie controversy and that, in doing so, they act as a microcosm of wider questions that are already being debated concerning the nature of English society within the UK state in respect to the place of the various religious communities and traditions within this state and society. The conjunction between issues focused by the controversy and the wider debates around these issues is explored in the final two chapters of the thesis. This conjunction gives rise to fundamental questions which include: What is the relationship between religions, nationhood and the state in England and the UK? How far can various religions co-exist in a society of many religions within a wider context in which secular, if not explicitly secularist, visions and values hold considerable power? What is the relationship between cultural and religious identity and social integration? What is the 'glue' which holds together heterogenous societies? How far, and on what basis, can the concerns and values of minority cultural and religious communities be recognised and incorporated within the legal systems of the society? Or how far does such recognition entail radical changes being made to that system if more than lip-service is to be paid to meeting them? To what extent is it correct to call England and the UK either a 'Christian' country, a 'secular society' or a 'multi-faith society'? How adequately are the concerns of religious minorities represented by the mainstream political parties and what are the possibilities for the development of religiously-based political organisations such as the Islamic Party of Great Britain?

The argument of this thesis is that all these questions find their nexus in a central question which, until now, has not received adequate consideration in the context of the religiously and culturally plural configuration of contemporary society. This question concerns whether there could be alternative symbols and structures that might more adequately and appropriately embody the religious and cultural diversities of contemporary English society and express the relationship between the religions, the
UK state and English society than can the current symbols and structures of the established Church of England.

Therefore, in the light of the clusters of issues arising from the Rushdie controversy, the question will be asked as to whether the continuing establishment of the Church of England is an expression of social and religious privilege or if it is defendable as an appropriate way of bringing religious concerns to bear upon the life of the country? The question will also be asked as to whether there might be alternative symbolic and operational means to this end which are both conceivable and practical and which would not result in the marginalisation and privatisation of religious concerns and perspectives and would be of benefit both to the religious communities and the society as a whole.

It is to the detailed consideration of these questions that the thesis now turns, beginning with an exploration of the inheritance and some of the contemporary consequences of the currently established form of religion.
Chapter 4:
Established Religion, the Controversy and the Issues

a) Introduction
This chapter begins from the five clusters of issues that were identified at the end of chapter 3 as arising from the raw material of the controversy. These social, religious, cultural, legal and political “entails” of the controversy are now brought into conjunction with the inheritance and contemporary implications of the establishment of the Church of England which this thesis argues forms a nexus for the clusters of issues. An initial examination is then made of the interaction between these “entails” and this inheritance with respect to the contemporary pattern of relationships between religion(s), English society and the United Kingdom state and, finally, some comparison is made with alternative constitutional patterns for these relationships.

To many among the ethnic and religious majorities in England, the Salman Rushdie controversy burst unexpectedly upon the late twentieth century as something of a throwback (Pearce, E, 1990) to an age which was thought to be long passed in England at least, if not in other parts of the world. As Tony Benn (1989) remarked, “Now, all of a sudden, arguments which had almost disappeared into the mists of time have come into sharp focus and are hotly contested across the world, involving diplomatic relations, trade arrangements and stretching into the heart of religious communities where people of different religious convictions have to live side by side.” However, neither the controversy itself, nor what this thesis argues are its “entails” for the established Church of England, exist in a contemporary vacuum shorn of historical context. They are integrally connected with changes in the ethnic, cultural and religious composition of English society which can be traced back for at least a century, but which have been dramatically accelerated in the post-war period by New Commonwealth immigration. These changing contexts will be explored in the last chapter of the thesis in the section on “The Changing Cultural, Religious and Political Kaleidoscope.”

The current chapter, however, begins with a section on “Established Religion: The Inheritance”, which examines something of the much longer social, religious, cultural, legal and political history of establishment as a means for giving expression to the
relationships between the socially and numerically dominant Christian religion(s), state and society in Christendom generally and England more specifically. In terms of the historical period which it covers, this is also a history of something of the English response to the challenges arising from religious plurality - albeit a limited plurality in the sense that most of the diversities with which this history is concerned were varieties of Christianity rather than today's much wider pluralism although, of course, the presence of a Jewish community has always posed questions concerning plurality that go beyond plurality within Christendom. The section on "A Constitutional Nexus of Religion, State and Society" then highlights the contemporary significance of the inheritance of established religion by exploring its current constitutional position and the social, religious, cultural, legal and political privileges, anomalies and disadvantages which flow from this.

The five clusters of social, religious, cultural, legal and political issues which were identified as "entails" of the controversy are then, in turn, explored. The section on "The Controversy and its Social Entails: The End of the 'Corpus Christianum'" begins to explore the "entails" of the controversy for established religion in terms of the cluster of social issues concerned with the theologically and sociologically contested concepts of ethnicity, nationhood, religion and plurality. The section on "The Controversy and its Religious Entails: The Challenge to the 'Corpus Saecularum'" explores the cluster of religious issues concerned with secularisation, religious belief and plurality. The section on "The Controversy and its Cultural Entails: Particular and Common Cultures and Values in a Multi-Religious Society" explores the cluster of cultural issues concerned with values, symbolism, art and plurality. The section on "The Controversy and its Legal Entails: Individuals and Communities in Legal Perspective" explores the cluster of legal issues concerned with the relationships between law, ethics, sexuality, religion and plurality. The section on "The Controversy and its Political Entails: Representation and Participation in a Plural Society" explores the cluster of issues concerned with politics, social policy and plurality.

As additional background for the thesis' concluding consideration of whether the inherited establishment pattern of the relationship between religion(s), state and society is any longer adequate to contemporary English social, religious, cultural, legal and
political realities, the section on "Some Alternative Constitutional Patterns" discusses a selection of other patterns for these relationships which have been and/or are being evolved in other times and other places.

b) Established Religion: The Inheritance
The establishment of religion in England has deep historical roots. This section of the chapter will identify the seeds from which it developed during the evolution of Constantinian Christendom which in turn led, in the medieval period, to the development of an understanding of a particularly close relationship between religion(s), state and society. The history of establishment in England is then traced utilising Colin Buchanan's (1994) classification of eras within the history of establishment into what he calls the five "phases of Establishment." The roots of the establishment are examined in relation to the period of English history in which they took hold, following what Buchanan (1994: 11) called the "nationalisation" of the Catholic Church in England with the monarch as its Head and, later, as its Supreme Governor. The section then examines the hiatus in this arrangement which took place during the English Revolution, and the attempts which were made to reinstate it after the restoration of the monarchy. The rise of Dissent and its challenge to religious disadvantage in the eighteenth, and especially nineteenth century is then explored, leading into a consideration of some relevant internal Church of England developments in the twentieth century.

A fundamental change in the relationship between Church and State occurred when the Roman Emperor Constantine adopted Christianity (Kee, 1982). Through the Edict of Milan of 313CE Christianity became a tolerated religion instead of a previously marginalised and often persecuted one. By 392CE, when the Emperor Theodosius forbade all public and private pagan worship under pain of death, Christianity had become the only tolerated religion. The Church historian Adrian Hastings (1991b) suggests that the relationship between the Empire and the Church became characterised historically either by "monism" (as in the developing Caesaro-Papism of Eastern Christendom) or "dualism" (as in the struggles between the Holy Roman Emperor and the Popes over their overlapping spheres of influence in Western Christendom). In the West, from the eighth century onwards, monarchs were anointed
and priestly vestments began to be used as the symbol of sovereignty. At the same
time, the Popes wore a tiara symbolising secular power. With the collapse of the
Carolingian Empire, Pope Gregory VII claimed precedence as senior vicar of Christ
over the Emperor, identified as the junior vicar. However, the underlying tensions
remained and a struggle for supremacy continued until, in England, this was resolved
by King Henry VIII's break with Papal jurisdiction over dynastic issues related to
marriage and the royal succession.

Since that time, this relationship has developed through a variety of phases. As Wolffe
(1994: 90) notes, "It is widely perceived that the relations between church and state
are one of the most unchanging and traditional features of English life. In reality,
however, during the four and a half centuries since the Reformation, the constitutional
situation of the Church of England, like that of the monarchy, has altered profoundly." In
his polemical work against the establishment of the Church of England the
Anglican Bishop, Colin Buchanan (1994: 11) identifies what he calls five "phases of
Establishment". Buchanan's particular characterisations of these periods are, of course,
indicative of his own particular evaluation of the significance of establishment, but his
division of history into these periods is arguably helpful for understanding its changing
contours even if one disagrees with the evaluations implied in his characterisation of
them.

Buchanan's (1994: 11-19) first "phase", which he characterises as "the nationalised
monopoly," consists of the years between King Henry VIII's break with the Papacy
and the Glorious Revolution (1534-1689) during which King Henry assumed the title
and role, initially of Head, and later of Supreme Governor, of the Church in England.
This was followed by King Edward VIth imposing the first English Prayer Book in
1549. In the reign of Queen Elizabeth I, external political and military threats from
France and Spain meant that, increasingly, an identification was made between
membership in the Church of England, Englishness and loyalty to the Crown. Thus
Catholics loyal to the Papacy were suspected of being potentially, if not actually,
disloyal to monarch and country.

Under the 1593 Elizabethan Act of Uniformity, which was directed against "seditious
and disloyal persons", absence from established worship for one month, or presence
at a conventicle, brought liability to imprisonment and non-submission within three months could result in banishment from the realm. In the Elizabethan period, "Erastianism" developed within the Anglican Church in which the Church-state relationship was seen primarily in pragmatic terms. As a protest against this, the "Puritan" movement pursued the agenda of the Protestant Reformation. Puritan opposition to Erastianism fused with Continental Anabaptist influences and, with the foundation of the Congregational and Baptist movements, resulted in the emergence of Free Church (Payne, 1951) ecclesiological forms. The Anabaptist movement was a diverse movement of the Radical Reformation originating in sixteenth century Switzerland, Austria, Germany and the Low Countries, and brought a particularly significant ecclesiological challenge to the inherited relationships between Church and State. Anabaptists argued not only that the Catholic Church was corrupt but also that state churches were ipso facto corrupt since they entailed alliance with the world, force and social ranking, all of which the majority of Anabaptists eschewed whilst advocating unrestricted religious liberty (Bender, 1955).

The outbreak of the English Civil War, culminating in the 1649 execution of King Charles I, marked a radical disjuncture in the previous pattern of relationships between religion(s), state and society. Barrie White (1983: 31), a Church historian of the 17th century states that, "The Revolution made uncertain the simple age-old situation where Church and State were linked by one unquestioned partnership in which the Church supplied the cement of a common faith and the divine validation of the accustomed forms of society. This was gone by 1646, gone never to return."

The Interregnum was a time of Millenarian expectation with the emergence of radical religious movements such as the Quakers, the Fifth Monarchists and the Levellers. The historian Christopher Hill (1975) gives a flavour of this period in his classic book, *The World Turned Upside Down*, the title of which reflects a widespread contemporary perception of the times. The 1643 *Solemn League and Covenant* had committed England to a Presbyterian Church settlement. However, the Fifth Monarchists tried to build temporal government based upon the rule of the saints as interpreted through the apocalyptic prophecies of Daniel, chapter 2. In the 1649 *Agreement of the People* the Levellers had demanded a limited freedom of conscience,
tempered by a pragmatism which excluded Anglicans and Catholics as being potentially seditious. With the new order of the Protectorate, the Jews, who had been expelled from England in 1290 returned in 1652 when Oliver Cromwell allowed them to settle in London. At the same time, clergy of Presbyterian or Independent views, or those tolerant of these views, replaced hardline Episcopalians in the parishes. But they all continued to receive the traditional tithes. Therefore, whilst the traditional connection of state and episcopate had been broken, a link remained between state and religion.

Oliver Cromwell died in 1658 and in 1659 his brother Richard Cromwell withdrew into private life. On 25th April 1660 a Royalist Parliament met and adopted Charles II's *Breda Declaration* bringing about the restoration of the monarchy. Among other conditions of the Restoration, the Declaration promised a qualified liberty of conscience stating that, "we do declare a liberty to tender consciences, and that no man shall be disquieted or called into question, for differences of opinion in matters of religion which do not disturb the general peace of the Kingdom." Not all were assured of this, however, and in 1661 the Fifth Monarchist, Thomas Venner, led an uprising which resulted in a wave of arrests of Dissenters and the introduction of the Clarendon Codes, restricting the practice of non-established Christianity. Complementing his judgement quoted earlier in respect of the English Revolution's role in shattering the previously symbiotic relationship between Church and State, White (1983: 94) comments of the Restoration that,

there was a strong conviction, held by many, both high and low in churchmanship and high and low in society, that there should be one church and one church only in the land to provide cement and stability for a deeply disturbed society...there was a sense that the multiplicity of sects which had developed in the 1640s and 1650s had contributed to the unsetlement of society because so many of them also seemed to promote political instability.

In this mood of support for religious conformity, the *Corporation Act* of 1661 required public officials to swear oaths of royal allegiance and supremacy as defences against the threat of rebellion. On pain of dismissal from office, these oaths required disavowal of the Presbyterian *Solemn League and Covenant*. Appointments or elections to public office remained valid only if Holy Communion was taken according to the rites of the Church of England within one year of election or appointment. Parliament accepted a revised *Book of Common Prayer* and, on 19th
May, 1662, an Act of Uniformity was passed forcing around one thousand clergy out of their livings along with the approximately seven hundred who had already been forced to resign after the Restoration. The close connection between royalty, the Church of England and the state was thereby re-established.

In 1644, in the aftermath of the abortive Yorkshire Plot, the first Conventicle Act was passed making it illegal for more than five people over the age of sixteen (other than members of the same household) to meet together for worship except according to the formularies of The Book of Common Prayer. The restrictions upon Dissent continued with the Five Mile Act of 1665, which required Dissenters to take an oath accepting the ecclesiastical-political status quo, failing which they were forbidden to live within five miles of their place of ministry and were also forbidden to keep a school.

A more severe Conventicle Act became law in 1670, although in 1672 the King issued a Declaration of Indulgence for Dissenters (to practice in public) and Catholics (to practice in private). However, this concession became part of the emerging conflict of powers between Crown and Parliament and Parliament retaliated with the Test Act of 1673 which required public officials to receive the Lord's Supper at a parish church. That this Act was originally directed against a fear of Catholic sedition can be seen from its full name which was, An Act for preventing dangers which may happen from popish recusants. However, it also caught Dissenters within its terms because, although the Commons passed a Bill for the Ease of Protestant Dissenters, this was opposed by the Church of England bishops in the Lords and parliament was prorogued before the Bill could become law.

1678-1681 was the period of the "Popish Plot" and a rise in pressure against Catholics which resulted in 1678 in their exclusion from Parliament. On the 6th February, Charles' Roman Catholic brother, James II, ascended to the throne. The unsuccessful Monmouth Rebellion broke out, with the Bloody Assizes clamping down on Dissent. On 10th March 1686, King James issued a pardon to all imprisoned for religion. From November onwards, for fifty shillings, a family licence of Nonconformity could be bought. On 4th April 1687, James issued a first Declaration of Indulgence. This was followed, on 27th April 1688, by a second in which James declared that he would work for toleration established by law. On 10th July 1688, a Catholic heir was born.
The so-called "Glorious Revolution" followed in which Anglicans, fearful of Roman Catholic supremacy, sought the political support of the Dissenters whose influence and practice they had hitherto tried to restrict. James fled the country and William of Orange was enthroned. Following this, however, Dissenting hopes were dashed as Anglicans re-asserted their supremacy. The Glorious Revolution ushered in the period characterised by Buchanan (1994: 19-23) as "the era of privilege" which lasted until the Reform Parliament of 1830. White (1983: 132) comments on this period that, despite Dissenting support for the Glorious Revolution:

Anglican treatment of Dissent over the thirty-five years down to the accession of George I (and even for several generations after that) was that of a body, even while growing less concerned for unanimity over doctrinal detail, which was consistently concerned for its own monopoly of all the political power it could preserve. In addition to this, no doubt, there was the sense that Dissent had been responsible for republican revolution and that society could only be safe if there were one church in the land to give the country its cement of faith, worship, and discipline.

In the ensuing years Nonconformist Christians, Roman Catholics and Jews alike suffered civil disabilities and social exclusions as a result of their refusal to conform to established religion. This was despite the passage of the Toleration Act of 1689 which ended the worst discrimination. Although the Toleration Act is often held up as an example of progressive legislation its full title was actually An Act for exempting their Majesties' Protestant subjects dissenting from the Church of England from the penalties of certain laws. It was limited to Trinitarian Protestants adhering to the 39 articles of the Church of England (excepting articles 34, 35 and 36 on the tradition of the Church, public reading of the second Book of Homilies and episcopal ordination, together with infant baptism for Baptists). Tithes remained, as did a sacramental test for public office and the requirement to take the oaths of supremacy and allegiance for the licensing of religious meeting places. The Act therefore produced legal toleration for some categories of Christians rather than religious liberty for all. Unitarians were excluded from its terms and Roman Catholics remained unable to be teachers, only had limited rights of ownership of land, and were liable to be penalised for not attending the Church of England parish church.

The eighteenth century was, in many ways, a period of relative religious indifference. During this century John Locke argued for a broadly comprehensive national Church
with the widest possible toleration (excepting Deists and Catholics). A number of restrictions upon Nonconformist and Roman Catholic religious practice were lifted (Barlow, 1962) as when the *Indemnity Act* was passed in 1727, and in 1778 the *Catholic Relief Act* which repealed the *1700 Act for the Further Preventing of the Growth of Popery*. In 1779, the *Dissenters' Relief Act* repealed the need to subscribe to most of the 39 articles. In 1791, the *Roman Catholic Relief Act* allowed lay Catholics to hold some public offices and to become teachers, as well as allowing Roman Catholic places of worship to be licensed. Nevertheless, the 1812 *Places of Religious Worship Act* continued earlier legislative restrictions on Nonconformist ministers, allowing them to teach and preach only upon making a declaration in front of a Justice of the Peace. The Act also confirmed that it was an offence to teach or preach in any premises with the doors locked or without the occupier's consent.

However the Nonconformists, in particular, kept up the pressure on the Church of England's privileged status. In 1702, the General Body of the Three Denominations was formed to promote religious equality before the law. In 1732, the Protestant Dissenting Deputies of churches in the London area was formed (Manning, 1952) to work for the repeal of the *Test Act* and *Corporation Acts*. The Protestant Society for the Protection of Religious Liberty was founded in 1811 and worked with the Dissenting Deputies to secure the repeal of the *Conventicle Act* and the *Five Mile Act*. The Religious Freedom Society was founded in 1839, the English Voluntary Church Association and the Anti-Church Rates Conference in 1834, and the Church Rates Abolition Society in 1836. The most significant among these groups was the Liberation Society, more properly known by its full formal name of the Society for the Liberation of Religion from State Patronage and Control. This was originally founded in 1844 as The British Anti-State Church Association, becoming the Liberation Society in 1853.

Commenting on these developments Robilliard (1984: ix) pointed out that, "The early story of the struggle for religious liberty is one of sects establishing an identity of their own, with their members being freed from the obligation of supporting a faith they did not hold. From the struggle for existence we pass to the struggle for equality, in many important fields, with the Established Church." In 1812, the *Conventicle Act*
and the *Five Mile Act* were repealed. In 1813, Unitarians were given the same privileges as other Protestant Nonconformists and, in 1828, the *Test Act* and the *Corporation Act* were modified. Following this, Dissenting Protestants, upon taking a civil or court appointment, needed only to affirm (quoted in Sparkes, 1973: 84) that:

I A.B, do solemnly and sincerely, in the presence of God, profess, testify and declare upon the true faith of a Christian, that I will never exercise any power, authority or influence I may possess by virtue of the office of.....to injure or weaken the Protestant Church, as it is by law established in England, or to disturb the said Church, in the possession of any rights or any privileges to which the such Church, or the said Bishops and clergy, are or may be by law entitled.

Significantly, the phrase “upon the true faith of a Christian” had not been part of the originally proposed legislation, but had been inserted in the House of Lords on the motion of the Bishop of Llandaff. Its continuing disqualification of Jews, Deists and atheists highlights the limits of the toleration that had been achieved and it was only later in the nineteenth century that these groups saw significant progress in overcoming their social and legal disadvantages.

But it was in the Reform Parliament from 1830 onwards that significant social, political and religious openings were made for non-Anglicans. This marks the beginning of Buchanan's (1994: 23-32) third phase of the establishment which he characterises as one of “Church self-discovery”. It is, however, at least arguable that the principal cause of these changes was not so much an internal Anglican dynamic of re-evaluation but rather a result of a conjunction of forces connected with industrialisation, the introduction of a widening electoral mandate, and the numerical growth and political significance of Nonconformist Christianity. In this context, the religious Census of 1851 (Barley et al, 1987) was of enormous symbolic and psychological significance. It demonstrated that the Church of England was no longer the Church of the vast majority of people of England. Only slightly over half of the people worshipping on a Sunday were recorded as worshipping in the established Church of England, whilst the relative strength of Nonconformist Christianity was underlined. But, even more radically than this, the Census produced evidence that a large proportion of people were completely unchurched and thus called into question the identity of England as a Christian country.
In the meantime, both Nonconformist and Catholic disabilities began, progressively, to be dismantled. From the time of the Elizabethan settlement onwards, Roman Catholics had been seen by the Anglican establishment as a political as well as a religious threat. Many Nonconformists, whilst sharing their disabilities with Roman Catholics, nevertheless concurred with this Anglican perception and some Nonconformists specifically excluded Roman Catholics from their more general arguments for religious freedom and civil rights. In nineteenth century English society the progress of Roman Catholic emancipation was thus a central measure of religious toleration and of the social integration of diversities of religious identity, belief and practice. Under the terms of the 1829 Roman Catholic Relief Act, Catholics were re-admitted to Parliament. This followed the Roman Catholic O'Connell's inability to take his seat after his 1828 election to the Parliamentary seat of Clare in Ireland. The 1832 Roman Catholic Charities Act allowed Roman Catholics to hold property for charitable, educational or religious purposes on the same basis as Nonconformists. At the same time, Catholics were forbidden to hold the post of Regent, Lord Chancellor or Lord Lieutenant of Ireland. It was also made illegal for a Catholic to interfere in the Church of England and for a member of the Jesuit order to enter the country without a licence from the Secretary of State.

By 1836, Nonconformists no longer had to get married in a church of the established Church of England. The remaining provisions of the Test Act and the Corporation Act were repealed in 1844. In 1846, the Religious Disabilities Act removed the last restrictions on Nonconformists; allowed Jews the same rights with respect to education, charities and property; and removed all former laws restricting Roman Catholics, with the exception of the new ones created in the 1829 Roman Catholic Relief Act. In 1850, Roman Catholic Dioceses were re-established in England although the 1851 Ecclesiastical Titles Act made it an offence for anyone to be called an Archbishop, Bishop or Dean of an area with Church of England functionaries of that kind and name.

In 1853, the Braintree Rates case established that a parish could not, against the wishes of its voters, set rates for the financial support of the Church of England. The 1855 Liberty of Worship Act allowed congregations of more than twenty people to
meet in private homes or (occasionally) in other buildings not having certification as places of worship. In 1855, the Places of Worship Registration Act put in place a system for the registration of places of worship, to which certain benefits were attached. In 1858, the Jews' Relief Act established for Jews the same civil rights that had been granted to Catholics in 1829 (including the taking of seats in Parliament) except that it was specifically an offence for a Jew to advise the Crown on any appointment to offices in the Church of England.

In 1854 the Oxford University Act abolished religious tests for matriculation for the award of the BA degree, though not for higher degrees, and in 1856 the Cambridge University Act followed suit. In 1867 the Test Abolition Act abolished the oath of the Crown's supremacy in ecclesiastical matters for certain public offices and Catholics were allowed to become Lord Chancellors of Ireland. In 1868, Church rates were abolished following Gladstone's election victory gained with Nonconformist support. In 1871, the University Tests Act removed religious tests for all degrees except Divinity and tests were also removed for official University posts with the exception of the Professorship of Divinity. In 1880, the Government removed the right of established Church priests to conduct a funeral and allowed any Christian service at the graveside.

The role, significance and form of oaths also brought into focus questions concerning the more general relationships between religion and the instruments of the state. Since 1749, Quakers had been allowed to affirm, rather than swear an oath and, in 1833, Joseph Pease, a newly-elected Quaker MP, was allowed to take his Parliamentary seat on the basis of an affirmation rather than an oath. In 1854, this right was generally extended, but it still excluded atheists. Between 1850-1855, the atheist Charles Bradlaugh was not allowed to take his seat by oath or affirmation despite being elected four times, until eventual agreement was reached in 1885. Prior to this, the 1868 Promissory Oaths Act, the 1871 Promissory Oaths Act, the 1869 Evidence Further Amendment Act, the 1870 Evidence Amendment Act and the 1880 Oaths Act made some provision for oaths or affirmations to be made without reference to religious beliefs.
Towards the end of the century not only the removal of religious disabilities, but also the possibility of the disestablishment of the Church of England came onto the political agenda. In May 1871, following the 1869 Irish Church Act's disestablishment of the Irish Church, the Congregationalist Member of Parliament Edward Miall introduced his first motion calling for disestablishment of the Church of England. Although Free Church leaders continued thereafter to press for disestablishment, in many ways this motion represented the peak of Nonconformist agitation. It is arguable (see Bebbington, 1982: 30) that the ensuing relative decline of the cause of disestablishment came about as the individual civil disabilities were progressively removed from Nonconformist Christians, thus removing the material basis for the sense of felt injustice and ameliorating the urgency and force of the criticism.

Whilst this was clearly a factor, it should also be noted that, for many in the Free Church tradition, disestablishment was primarily a theological and ecclesiological imperative rather than just an issue of social equality. Therefore, tensions and conflicts remained even with the progress of social equality and, at the end of the nineteenth and the beginning of the twentieth century, the ongoing conflict coalesced around issues concerning the relationships between Church and state in the emerging national education system (Murphy, 1971). The launch of a Nonconformist campaign of civil disobedience against payment for what was perceived to be a privileged role of the established Church in this system became the last great struggle between Nonconformists, the established Church and the state, with significant numbers of Nonconformist members and ministers being imprisoned for non-payment of rates on the principle that public money should not support denominational teaching.

The end of this phase of establishment, however, saw changes in the governance of the established Church. During the 1913 House of Lords debate on disestablishment of the Church in Wales, Archbishop Cosmo Lang of York (quoted in Lamont 1989: 185) argued that,

The question before us is whether just there in that inward region of the national life where anything that can be called its unity and character is expressed, there is not to be this witness to some ultimate sanction to which the nation looks, some ultimate ideal it proposes. It is in our judgement a very serious thing for a state to take out of that corporate heart of its life any acknowledgement at all of its concern with religion.
However, the *Welsh Church Act* was passed in 1914 and in 1920 the Anglican Church was disestablished in Wales. Section 5 of the 1920 *Government of Ireland Act* stated that no Northern Ireland law should be enacted "so as neither directly or indirectly to establish or endow any religion, or prohibit or restrict the free exercise thereof." In Scotland, the 1921 *Church of Scotland Act* freed the Presbyterian Church of Scotland from all vestiges of Parliamentary control, whilst the Church continued to maintain its links with the Crown and in its role as the Scottish national Church. In England, in 1919, the National Assembly of the Church of England (the Church Assembly) was brought into being as a forum for lay discussion of Church of England matters which, up until that time had been discussed in Parliament. This continued to exist alongside the historic Convocations of York and of Canterbury in which the clergy were represented, and in 1920 the *Enabling Act* recognised the role of the Assembly.

Despite the introduction of this measure of self-government, in 1927-28 a major Church-State controversy broke out over proposed changes to the Prayer Book. Parliament's refusal to ratify the Assembly's proposals in this regard underlined the Assembly's continuing dependence upon Parliament for approval of the Measures which it passed. It was perhaps this controversy, more than any other, which opened up internal Church of England questioning concerning the implications of establishment for the Church of England itself in respect of its own life and mission. Thus the fourth of Buchanan's (1994: 33-45) phases of the establishment (1920-70) is characterised by him as, "the era of growing incredibility," being a time in which the old certainties were questioned both by a rapidly changing wider society and from within the established Church itself.

Following the Second World War renewed concern about the implications of establishment was aroused when, following the death of Archbishop William Temple in 1944, Bishop George Bell of Chichester was passed over for appointments to the sees of Canterbury and London. This was thought to have been connected with Bell's criticism of the carpet bombing of German cities and thus underlined questions concerning political, rather than spiritual, considerations in episcopal appointments. In the immediate aftermath of the Second World War many of the traditions of English life were brought into question. In his book, *The Claims of the Church of*
England (1947: 196) the Archbishop of York, Cyril Garbett, argued that whilst, "At the moment Parliament has no desire to exercise active control over the Church or gratuitously to interfere in its concerns" the Church "should not acquiesce any longer in a relationship with the State which might suddenly prove to be inconsistent in practice as well as in principle with religious freedom." He did not, however, argue for an immediate Church-initiated disestablishment, but proposed four major reforms.

The programme of reforms consisted of: a formula for the Crown assenting to changes of worship without Parliamentary approval needing to be sought; the introduction of really spiritual Courts from which appeal to Civil Courts would only be appropriate in terms of the justice of the process adopted by the spiritual courts; the right for the Church to be consulted in the appointment of bishops and Archbishops; and the Convocations to receive power to pass Canons. In Garbett's view, such reforms would, "vindicate the freedom of the Church" but would also "retain its connection with the state." He concluded with the observation that, "If however the Church cannot agree to these reforms or, if Parliament after due consideration refuses to accept them, then Disestablishment and Disendowment will be unavoidable." In his later book Church and State in England, and in the light of the little progress made on these matters, Garbett (1950: 140) spoke of his "grave heart-searching and discomfort" and his sense that disestablishment might, as a last option, become necessary.

In the 1960s, a number of the reforms advocated by Garbett were achieved. In 1963, the Ecclesiastical Jurisdiction Measure transferred legal disputes over the doctrine and ritual of the Church of England away from the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council to a new Court of Ecclesiastical Causes Reserved. In 1965, the Prayer Book (Alternative Services Measure) gave the Convocations and the House of Laity of the Church Assembly the authority to allow experimental services, a change which was highly symbolic for the relations between Church and State in the light of the 1927-28 Prayer Book dispute.

The fifth and final (1970-present) of Buchanan's phases of establishment was characterised by Buchanan (1994: 45-59) as "the end of pretence" and began with the Queen's inauguration of the General Synod in November 1970, following the 1969 Synodical Government Measure. In 1974, although opposed by a minority of
Conservative MPs who wanted to maintain Parliamentary control, the *Worship and Doctrine Measure* gave the Synod permanent control over matters of worship. In 1976, the then Labour Prime Minister James (now Lord) Callaghan, agreed to delegate a large proportion of the process of appointing bishops and Archbishops to a Crown Appointments Commission appointed by the General Synod. The principle was that the Commission would suggest two names to the Prime Minister who could choose either or neither. The Prime Minister's ultimate choice remained, however, due to the need for political influence over who could take up the reserved episcopal seats in the House of Lords and, in 1984, the House of Commons rejected a Measure for further reforms in the appointment procedures for bishops.

Although there were social consequences associated with both establishment and disestablishment, it was the potential of the state's control over aspects of the inner life of the Church of England which have usually lain at the heart of 19th century and 20th century debate between Nonconformists and Anglicans over establishment. A classical 19th century defence of establishment was offered by William Ewart Gladstone who, although he was in many respects a political hero of Nonconformity (Bebbington, 1975), entered politics in the 1830s as a defender of the Church of England, believing that the state had the right to recognise and endow the Church - to establish it. In 1838, he published his book on *The State and Its Relations with the Church* in which he considered several arguments for establishment, which can be summarised as: "It is written; it is natural; it is expedient; it is customary." Gladstone dismissed the argument from custom, but supported that from nature. He thought that, like a parent, the state had a moral duty to educate those whom it was charged with responsibility for in what it sees as theological truth. However, Gladstone eventually abandoned this position on the basis that the party system in Parliament meant that the vote of a few irreligious people could decide matters and he published his modified views in *Church Principles Considered in Their Results* (1840).

In contrast with Gladstone's positions were those of the Honourable and Revd. Wriothesley Noel who, as a prominent Anglican and brother of the Earl of Gainsborough, left the Anglican Church in 1848 in order to join the Baptists due to convictions concerning establishment and the practice of infant baptism (Bebbington,
1971-2). Noel presented a classical Nonconformist position on establishment which he had begun moving towards following an 1843 series of lectures given by Dr. Chalmers of Edinburgh who, whilst maintaining that establishment is not in principle wrong, had argued that the Scottish establishment had become inimical to true religion and had led an Evangelical secession from the Church of Scotland. Noel wrote *The Case of the Free Church of Scotland* (1844) which was sympathetic to Chalmers. In his *The Catholic Claims: A Letter to the Lord Bishop of Cashel* (1845) he moved to a position of leaving open the question of whether establishment could ever be justified, but argued for the Church of Ireland to be disestablished due to a majority of the Irish population not being Anglican. In 1848, Noel rushed through a book explaining his secession from the Church of England and the first edition of his *Essay on the Union of Church and State* was sold out on the day of publication.

Bebbington (1971-2: 398) claims that “Noel's book was the classic Baptist presentation of the disestablishment cause in the nineteenth century” and evidence for this is that it was still being quoted fifty years later in the Liberation Society's handbook, *The Case for Disestablishment*. Noel argued that Scripture is clearly not for establishment and appended a list of the evils of the establishment, thus engaging with the argument from expediency. But he didn't really engage with the Tory argument about establishment being good for social and political order. His position was primarily theological and ecclesiological and he was wary of political involvement, despite allowing part of his book to be reprinted in tract form by the Liberation Society in the context of the Irish disestablishment debate.

In the twentieth century, despite the strong Baptist history of opposition to the establishment of religion, it is significant that, in more recent times, some Baptist leaders have spoken out in defence of establishment. Whilst the establishment can occasionally still be seen as an intra-Christian ecumenical impediment, Wolfe (1994: 93) observes that, "the Roman Catholics and the Free Churches appeared to regard it as an impertinence to press the point. Indeed, there seemed a readiness to accept the establishment of the Church of England as a means to exercise a particular kind of ministry to the nation, on behalf of the wider Christian Church."
Among Free Church Christians, an article from the early sixties which was concerned with the question of how far people in the Free Church traditions needed to take the 1662 Church settlement into account in the context of contemporary ecumenical Christian relations, Stephen Orchard (1960-61: 126), then a Congregationalist and now an ordained minister of the United Reformed Church and General Secretary of the Christian Education Movement, posed the question, "would we really welcome the disestablishment of the Church of England? Would we be wise if we did? Do we really consider that the severance of an official relationship between church and state would benefit the influence of the gospel on the life of our people as a nation?" Orchard (1960-61: 126) argued that these issues should be "put in a new setting - not in the setting of an argument within Christendom - the setting in which all our present ecclesiology arose - but in the setting of a world which does not know who is the source of true life; in short, in a missionary setting." More recently, Bernard Thoroughgood (1988: 47) of the United Reformed Church argued that, "The responsibility of the national church is never self-preservation but a continuous watchman's role to alert the nation on behalf of those who can only raise a small voice themselves" although he had also to acknowledge the gap between aspiration and reality in this respect when he noted that "Past history is not happy at this point." Arguments for the retention of a minimal establishment on the basis of the Church of England fulfilling a particular ministry to the nation are also advanced by the Roman Catholic Church historian, Adrian Hastings (1991b).

One of the consequences of establishment is indeed that the Church of England is deeply involved in the warp and woof of national life in terms of both civil society and the structures of the state. Those in favour of establishment often argue that disestablishment would ecclesiologically undermine the open orientation and national range of the Church of England, based as that is upon its parochial structure of care for all within the parish and the wide availability of the occasional offices of baptism, marriage and funerals. There is a concern that disestablishment would reduce the Church of England to a 'sect' ministering only to its own congregations rather than to society at large and render society socially and politically secularised, especially in a society ruled by only lightly regulated market forces and in which many of the traditional solidarities and moralities had been weakened by market liberalism.
However, in the light of the example of the Church of Scotland, it is clear that there is no necessary connection between avoiding sectarianism and remaining an established Church. Even though the Church of Scotland is not established in the sense that the Church of England is, it maintains a national orientation in its life and work and, although the parochial system is not based upon legal requirements, the Church of Scotland nevertheless pledges itself to make provision on a national basis since it still understands itself as a national Church. However, as the questions posed by Orchard about any replacement model of the relationship between Church and society suggest, the other side of an advocacy of disestablishment is a necessary re-examination by the Church of how it relates to the wider society including its political and social structures, and by the state and the wider society of how they wish to encompass and relate to the organised religious sectors of society.

Alongside external critiques and support for the establishment, there has also been increasing internal debate within the Church of England upon the nature and principle of this form of being the Church in the world. Wolfe (1994: 93) notes that, "in striking contrast to the situation in the later nineteenth century, the debate about disestablishment in the later twentieth century - such as it was - was very much an internal Anglican affair." There have been four major internal Anglican reports on the relationship between Church and State and a number of others on aspects of Canon Law and the appointment of Bishops which are also significantly affected by the established status of the Church of England. The major reports were the Selbourne Commission's Report of the Archbishops' Committee on Church and State (1916); the Cecil Commission's Report of the Archbishops' Commission on the Relations Between Church and State (1935); the Moberley Commission's Church and State: Being the Report of a Commission Appointed by the Church Assembly in June 1949 (1952); and, finally, the Chadwick Commission produced Church and State (1970).

Each of these Anglican reports advocated some modification to the forms of relationship pertaining at the time, but none advocated disestablishment. In fact, until Church and State 1970 there was no fundamental dissent from establishment. In this latter report, however, two Commission members - Valerie Pitt and Peter Cornwell - recorded their dissenting view and Peter Cornwell (1983) later went on to write a
forceful Christian theological critique of establishment in his book, *Church and Nation*. Much of the self-criticism of the Church of England's established status has come from within its Anglo-Catholic and Evangelical wings. Among the Anglo-Catholics, early critiques arose within the context of the Oxford Movement. Keble preached his Assizes Sermon on 14th July 1833; Newman began his famous *Tracts for the Times* in September 1834. Most of the concerns of the Tractarians arose in the context of a lack of apostolic freedom for the Church to determine its own principles and practices. In other words, they were protesting against Erastianism. As far as Evangelicals have been concerned, whilst some have strongly criticised establishment (as on the grounds of its tendency to promote Erastianism), others have been found amongst its staunchest defenders. This has been because of their concern to preserve what they believe should be the Protestant character of the Church of England against a perceived threat of Romanisation were the Church to be cut free from the constraints of Parliament and the Governorship of the monarch. It has therefore been this concern that has often led to a tactical rapprochement between Evangelicals and Erastians in upholding the establishment.

Among the recent leaders of the Church of England, three previous Archbishops of Canterbury (William Temple, 1942-44; Michael Ramsey, 1961-74; and Robert Runcie, 1980-91) all hinted at the possible coming of disestablishment, Donald Coggan (1974-80), Geoffrey Fisher (1945-61), and all the last three Archbishops of York (Donald Coggan, 1961-74; Stuart Blanche, 1975-83; and John Habgood, 1983-1995) supported its continuance and the present Archbishop of Canterbury, George Carey (1994: 4-5) has spoken of the significance of the establishment of the Church of England in terms of,

the continuing existence, within the stewardship of the Church of England, of a commitment to God and the spiritual dimension in the central institutions of our national life. There may be more than one opinion about how far these are symbolic rather than real and actual, but they are there nonetheless. Monarchs are crowned in the setting of a communion service by the Archbishop of Canterbury; each day's business in both Houses of Parliament begins with prayers; bishops still contribute to the debates and legislative programme of the nation in the House of Lords.

It is therefore to the present significance of the “symbolic” and “real” connections between the established Church and the state that the next section of this chapter turns.
In doing so, it acts as a bridge between the historical inheritance of establishment examined in this section and the five further sections of the chapter which examine the clusters of issues identified within the Rushdie controversy which, when considered in conjunction with wider social, religious, cultural, legal and political developments, are argued to have "entails" for the establishment of the Church of England.

c) A Constitutional Nexus of Religion, State and Society

The Scottish critic of the establishment of the Church of England, Stewart Lamont (1989: 177), argues that, "The British Constitution has never been formulated as a single written document, but the bond of the Church of England with the Crown and the parliament of England is clearly spelt out." Lamont (1989: 183) argues that this bond still hangs upon "three pegs", namely, "the appointment of bishops, parliamentary oversight of the Prayer Book; and the position of the sovereign."

This section explores each of these "pegs" in greater detail, showing how the connection between established religion and monarchy puts established religion at the heart of the constitution in terms of the relationship that it maintains between the Supreme Governor of the Church of England and the Head of State of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland; how the maintenance of the Prime Minister's involvement in the appointment of bishops underlines the political significance of their reserved places in the House of Lords; and how Parliamentary control over the Prayer Book is a reminder that, although the Church of England's General Synod is able to regulate much of its own affairs, it actually has a devolved rather than an independent power.

But the section also goes on to argue that the constitutional significance of the establishment is of much wider symbolic and operational effect than Lamont's "pegs" might on a superficial reading suggest, since it is not only at the constitutionally defined points of interaction between the Church of England and the State that its establishment is of import. The "pegs" upon which it hangs have given it a place of both privilege and constraint in the wider structures of the state and the society. Therefore the significance of establishment also extends at the symbolic, structural and operational levels to embrace: aspects of the English legal system; the network of
institutionalised public access and presence found in chaplaincies in English public life and public institutions; and the English educational system. It is because of all these factors that this thesis argues that establishment is at the intersection of the usually unidentified but actually interconnected nexus of social, religious, cultural, legal and political life which lies at the heart of much of the unwritten constitution of the country and that it is the symbolic and operational significance of this nexus which has been encountered in the clusters of issues thrown up by the Rushdie controversy.

In the absence of a written Constitution, the monarchy has been the reference point within the British state which is intended to transcend the parties of politics in a bond of common and foundational loyalty and this is one of the qualities of the monarchy which is lauded among the traditionalist supporters of the institution. The Crown's historical connection with religion is also seen by its defenders as positing a more ultimately transcendent significance for its role. For example, the 15.2.52 report of *The Times* (quoted in Wolffe, ed, 1993: 172-173) on the death of King George VI spoke of "the subtle connexion between the Throne and the faith of Englishmen;" of "the ancient partnership between the Church and State which has played so mighty a part in the making of England;" and of its view that, constitutionally, "The spiritual and temporal headships" of the Crown are "aspects of the same sovereignty". It noted that, "the sentiments evoked by the death and accession of monarchs have a quality which it is not impiety to call religious" and that,

It may be that modern theologians, rightly alert against the danger of allowing secular emotion to pass for religious belief, have lost their sense of the value of temporal loyalty as one approach to the understanding of religious truth. In this way, and always in the zealous practice of their faith, the Kings and Queens of England still play an indispensable part in the nation's spiritual life.

The preface to the *Thirty Nine Articles of Religion of the Church of England* declares of royalty that "We are Supreme Governor of the Church of England." The relationship between the monarchy and the Church of England is expressed by the monarch's title of "Defender of the Faith", the sovereign remaining the "Supreme Governor" of the Church of England. The monarch has a priest of the Church of England as Chaplain. At the monarch's coronation, the charge to the monarch is given by the Archbishop of Canterbury, by whom the monarch's vows are also received. Under the *Act of Settlement* of 1700/1, on taking the throne the monarch must declare
adherence to the Protestant faith and commitment to upholding the Protestant succession to the throne, and the Act of Succession still prevents anyone with a claim to the throne from embracing the Roman Catholic tradition of Christianity. Due to the Roman Catholic position on the bringing up of children of mixed marriages, there would be problems in any mixed marriage with an heir to the throne since the Act of Settlement states that anyone coming to the throne must be in communion with the Church of England. In 1980, "apparently with the Queen's permission" (Robilliard, 1984: 89), a Private Members' Motion was introduced in order to change this law on the basis that the status quo was, "discriminatory, offensive and insulting to the Catholic community of the United Kingdom," but the Bill was withdrawn, apparently in part due to Orange opposition from both Northern Ireland and Scotland.

As well as these constraints, the monarch has the power to give assent to all Church of England legislation, is the patron of many ecclesiastical livings, and appoints bishops and Archbishops on the advice of the Prime Minister. In contemporary protocol, the Archbishop of Canterbury is the highest ranking person in the state outside of the royal family, and the Archbishop of York also outranks the Prime Minister. These two Archbishops, together with the Bishops of Durham, London and Winchester and twenty-one of the most senior bishops in the Church of England have seats as "Lords Spiritual" in the second chamber of Parliament, the House of Lords. Leading figures in other Christian confessions and religious traditions have been appointed to the House of Lords - for example, the Church of Scotland minister Lord MacLeod of Fuinary; the Methodist, Lord Soper; and Lord Jacobovits, the former Chief Rabbi. But their appointments have been on a purely individual basis in contrast with the constitutional entrenchment of places for Church of England bishops.

With the evolution of a constitutional monarchy, the monarch's constitutional supremacy over the Church of England is exercised mainly through Parliament. The 1928 Prayer Book controversy was only the most dramatic expression of the remaining Parliamentary control over the affairs of the Church of England. Although many legislative matters have effectively been devolved to the General Synod for their initial formulation, the Crown-in-Parliament and the Crown can still overturn a decision of Synod. The Synod can pass both Canons and Measures. Canons concern Church
matters which used to be passed by the Convocations of Canterbury and York. Now, under the *1974 Church of England (Worship and Doctrine) Measure*, they can be formulated by the General Synod without need of submission to Parliament although they do require Royal Assent to become law. A Measure "is a law, about a Church matter, that applies to the entire Church and will also, where necessary, bind others as well, because it has the force of an Act of Parliament and may even repeal or amend an Act dealing with an ecclesiastical matter" (Robilliard, 1984: 85). For a Measure to come into force the Synod's Legislative Committee must submit it to Parliament's Ecclesiastical Committee which consists of fifteen members of the House of Commons and fifteen of the Lords. The Ecclesiastical Committee may then decide whether to put a Measure before Parliament. Before being submitted for Royal Assent, the Measure must be passed without any amendment by both Houses of Parliament and this is by no means a certainty. For example, in 1975 the *Incumbents (Vacation of Benefices) Measure* was rejected by the Commons on the grounds that it was proposed that hearings be held in private and that incumbents would not always have a right to put their case.

The Church of England is now the only Church in the UK which is established in the sense of Parliament's continuing constitutional potential for control over its internal life. The Church of Scotland, whilst retaining a special relationship with the Crown, is free to regulate its own internal life. In addition, the Church of England has a special position with respect to both common and statute law. In respect of common law this has already been alluded to, and will be further explored later in this chapter in terms of the debates around the laws of blasphemy and blasphemous libel which were at the heart of the Rushdie controversy. But quite apart from the particular issues surrounding blasphemy laws, there is also a contrast between the position of the Church of England and that of other religious bodies, both Christian and of other religious traditions, which can only resort to the ordinary civil law of contract to enforce their rules. The Church of England, however, has its own courts of law in which the Chancellor of the Diocese (a lawyer) sits as a judge and of which, since the *1863 Ecclesiastical Jurisdiction Measure*, all members (except the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council) must be in communion with the Church of England. The ecclesiastical law administered by these courts is still regarded as part of the general
law of England and, according to Section 81 of the *Ecclesiastical Jurisdiction Measure (No. 1)* 1964, witnesses, whether members of the Church of England or not, may be subpoenaed to appear before these courts. The ecclesiastical courts may also grant legal aid under the *Ecclesiastical Jurisdiction (Legal Aid) Rules* of 1966. They may have court costs enforced by order of the county court (Section 11, *Faculty Jurisdiction Measure (No. 3)*, 1964) and they may order documents to be produced (Section 81, *Ecclesiastical Jurisdiction Measure (No. 1)*, 1964). Thus, non-Anglican Christians and people of other than Christian religious traditions can, in principle, all be called to attend a Church of England court under the terms of ecclesiastical law.

Today the ecclesiastical courts deal primarily with faculty jurisdictions, which are concerned with proposed alterations to the fabric of a church or graveyard, as well as with the discipline of the clergy. Consistory courts also have jurisdiction over rights of patronage and under the 1838 *Pluralities Act*. On proposed alterations to fabric, objections can be brought from any parishioners whether or not they are members of the Church of England, even after local authority planning permission has been granted. Appeals on faculty cases only rarely go to Privy Council and where they concern doctrine, ritual or ceremonial, they are heard by the Court of Ecclesiastical Causes Reserved. With regard to discipline of the clergy, there is a complex system of investigations, hearings and possible outcomes. From 1833 onwards the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council has acted as the final court of appeal in Church matters. The principle that clergy cannot be deprived of office except after due legal process is seen as upholding the spiritual freedom of clergy. On such ‘reserved’ matters, theologians sit with lawyers or judges, but Bishops and Archbishops have power effectively to end all penalties of the ecclesiastical courts, as does the royal prerogative of mercy.

Because of the Church of England's established status and the role of its ecclesiastical law as public law, there are a whole range of both constraints and options available to parishioners by virtue of their being geographically in a parish, whatever their personal or family religious tradition or lack of it. For example, all parishioners within a Church of England Diocese have certain rights of attendance at a public service in the Cathedral of the Diocese. In fact, these rights were, until quite recently, based
upon continuing legal obligations since, as Robilliard (1984: 98) points out, “Until 1969 there was a theoretical legal obligation on all parishioners (with certain exceptions for dissenters) to attend their parish church each Sunday.” Until recently, there was also an obligation on priests to baptise any children resident in the parish if they were presented for baptism. Now, unless the child is seriously ill, clergy can object although an appeal against such a decision can made to the bishop. Residents of the parish also have a right to be married in their parish church after lawful publication of the bans of marriage, except where one party has been divorced. People have a right to be buried in the churchyard of their parish or the parish in which they die.

As well as privileges and rights, there are also a range of extant anomalies and disabilities connected with the continued establishment of the Church of England. For example, in contrast to the entrenched privilege of the Bishops in the House of Lords, the 1870 Clerical Disabilities Act debars Church of England (as well as Roman Catholic, Orthodox and Church of Scotland) clergy from becoming parliamentary candidates, although they may become members of the European Parliament or of local councils, Roman Catholic priests having also been debarred under section 9 of the 1829 Roman Catholic Relief Act. Such restrictions were built upon the 1801 House of Commons (Clergy Disqualification) Act which stated (quoted in Robilliard 1984: 91) that “no person having been ordained to the office of priest or deacon...is or shall be capable of being elected to serve in Parliament as a member of the House of Commons.” Before 1662, clergy in Convocation taxed themselves and therefore had no need to be in the Commons. Church of England clergy were originally debarred from the Commons because, as well as having the twenty-six seats for bishops in the House of Lords, the Convocations of York and Canterbury had once also been entitled to seats in Parliament.

Legal debate continues about how far the position of Lord Chancellor of England is actually open to people of all religious traditions. Gladstone had attempted to remove these doubts with a Bill in 1891, but this failed to become law, as did a proposed 1926 amendment to the Catholic Relief Act. The 1974 Lord Chancellor (Tenure of Office and Discharge of Ecclesiastical Functions) Act finally removed these doubts
in respect of non-Anglican Christians. A Roman Catholic may now hold the post of Lord Chancellor although, in such a case, any ecclesiastical functions (eg. the appointment of some members of the Church courts) must be carried out by the Prime Minister or other Minister of the Crown. However, Robilliard (1984: 203) suggests that, “Even now the position is not fully free from doubt as the view has been put forward that there may be some difficulty in a non-Christian (eg. a Jew or a Muslim) holding the office.”

Together with these continuing anomalies and its continuing special position in the relation to the machinery of the state, the historical and social positioning of the established Church means that it also has an institutionalised presence in, and therefore access to, a wide range of social institutions. It is this presence and access which gives significant operational effect to the Church of England’s formal constitutional position. For example, the Church of England often has an institutionalised role in local public life, such as in civic chaplaincies. There are also chaplaincies in the prison and health services, the armed forces, education and other institutions. Whilst other Christian denominations and religious traditions may often also have chaplaincies, the Church of England presence is usually built structurally into the institutions concerned in a way which is not generally the case with regard to the other Christian denominations and, even less so, with respect to the other than Christian religious traditions.

A current research project on “The Church of England and Other Faith Communities in a Multi-Faith Society” being conducted in the Department of Sociology of the University of Warwick is demonstrating (Beckford and Gilliat, 1995: 59-64) that some Anglican chaplaincies in the health and prison services are using the relative privilege of their inherited position to open up new spaces and opportunities for the ministries of other religious traditions within these institutions. However, such openings are still largely dependent upon the goodwill of the individuals who happen to be in post. In structural terms, chaplaincies continue clearly to demonstrate the entrenched position of established religion, particularly when they are in those sectors which are close to the machinery and instruments of the state as, for example, in the Prison Service and the Armed Services. Under Section 7(1) and (4) of the 1952 Prison Act, all prisons have Anglican chaplains. In the Royal Navy Chaplains’ section, there are
One of the most important ways in which establishment has woven the Church of England into the warp and woof of national life in England is the way in which, as a consequence of its inherited established status, the Church of England continues to have an entrenched role in the maintained education system. This includes its role in being responsible for voluntary aided and controlled schools within the framework of the so-called “dual system” of publicly maintained education in England. Whilst there are also Roman Catholic and Jewish voluntary aided schools and the Church of England’s role in this part of the publicly-funded education system is therefore not exclusively connected with its contemporary status of establishment, the historical roots of this role can be found in its established status. More directly and currently relevant to the connection between the Church of England’s established status and its role in the public educational system of England and Wales is its special position, enshrined in statute, within the composition of the Agreed Syllabus conferences which formulate the locally agreed Religious Education syllabi.

Although the School Curriculum and Assessment Authority has drawn up some model syllabi for the local teaching of Religious Education, it is the local Agreed Syllabus Conferences which formally determine their precise shape at a local level. In an Agreed Syllabus Conference, there are four component Committees which work on the syllabus and which must all, both separately and collectively, agree to its content. One of these four bodies is composed exclusively of representatives of Church of England, one of local authority nominees, one of professional teachers and one of other religious bodies, including both non-established Christian denominations and religious traditions other than Christianity. The Church of England also has its own entrenched representation on the Standing Advisory Councils for Religious Education which were made obligatory for Local Education Authorities under the terms of the 1988 Education Reform Act in order to monitor the local provision of Religious Education and the arrangements for collective worship, and have powers to grant or
withhold the "determinations" which can release individual schools from the generally binding obligations concerning the nature of the majority of acts of collective worship. They are currently composed of "persons appointed by the authority" to represent:

(a) such Christian and other religious denominations as, in the opinion of the authority, will appropriately reflect the principal religious traditions of the area;
(b) except in the case of an area in Wales, the Church of England;
(c) such associations representing teachers as, in the opinion of the authority, ought, having regard to the circumstances of the area, to be represented; and;
(d) the authority

However, despite these continuing entrenchments of privilege, in a number of respects the position of the established Church of England still remains fundamentally different from other European models of establishment understood as "recognition" by and "incorporation" in the state (Nielsen, 1995: 100-110). For example, the position of the Roman Catholic Church in countries of the Catholic Concordat and the more properly designated "state Churches" in Scandinavian countries (Glebe-Moller, 1984; Harmati, ed, 1984), where clergy technically have the status and office of civil servants, is in many respects quite different. It is also different to Switzerland, where the relationship with the state is devolved to the level of the Canton and from countries such as Germany which have much more of a mixed economy in religious life, but where the state operates a Kirchensteuer which is organised on the basis of contributors needing to opt-out of payments to the Churches rather than opt into them, the product of which is then distributed by the state on the basis of Church membership.

Since the abolition of tithes and Church rates in England, there is no significant direct income to the Church of England from public funds. Although it has received considerable money from endowments and properties that have been donated over the centuries, the Church Commissioners made substantial losses in the property crash of the late 1980s and early 1990s and this source of income is therefore now less significant than previously. The Church of England now relies much more on the gifts and bequests of its own active members and fees for the provision of its occasional offices. There are some limited sources of public funds available as, for example, under Section 214 of the 1972 Local Government Act where, in England, local authorities have powers to contribute to the maintenance of burial grounds and, under Section 137 may make grants to charities within their areas. But these opportunities
are also, in principle, open to other Churches, as are also the provisions of the
Redundant Churches and Other Religious Buildings Act 1969 which empower central
government to make grants to the Redundant Churches Fund for the maintenance of
churches of historic or architectural interest.

In ways distinctive of the inherited English settlement between religion(s), state and
society, then, the implications of the establishment are woven into the social, cultural,
religious, legal and political fabric of England. The reflection upon the establishment
of the current Archbishop of Canterbury, George Carey (1994: 4-5), quoted at the end
of the last section of this chapter, noted that with respect to the institutionalised
implications of the establishment there will be differences of opinion on how far these
might be what he called “symbolic” rather than “real and actual.” This chapter has
noticed some “actual” implications but, in addition, it is arguable that where
constitutional matters are concerned, the “symbolic” is as “real and actual” in its
effects as the operationalisation of governmental and legal machinery which embodies
the symbolism. It is because the current establishment has both symbolic and
operational significance that it can truly be described as a constitutional nexus at the
heart of national life.

Examined in isolation, some of the implications of the inheritance of establishment
discussed above may appear to be only rather quaint historical quirks but, in the
context of a religiously plural society, those to do with education, law and the
machinery of government certainly lie at the heart of national life and have substantial
consequences for people of other than the established religious traditions.
Cumulatively they both reflect and give effect to the role of the establishment of the
Church of England as an important nexus in the relationship of religion(s), state and
society at the heart of the unwritten constitution of the country. This thesis argues that
it is this inherited constitutional nexus that the Muslim community and the wider
society has confronted in the tangled web of the clusters of issues focused by the
Rushdie controversy and it is to these clusters of issues, examined in conjunction with
the inheritance and current significance of establishment and wider social trends and
developments, to which this chapter now turns.
d) The Controversy and Its Social Entails: The End of the "Corpus Christianum"

This section begins the task of bringing the clusters of issues identified with the controversy into conjunction with the constitutional nexus in the relationship between religion(s), state and society which the previous section argued was the current significance of the inheritance and continuation of the establishment of the Church of England. It argues that the social entails of the Rushdie controversy highlight and give additional impetus to the problematics involved in the kind of inherited relationship between religion(s) and nationhood that is given expression by the form of established religion in England. In so doing, it lays the groundwork for an argument that, for the health of both the Christian Church, the other religious communities and the wider English society and the state of the UK, the currently established connection between Englishness, the UK state and Anglican Christianity needs at least to be reformed, if not replaced, and that alternative ways forward need to be envisioned that are more appropriate for a culturally and religiously plural society.

It does this by arguing that the controversy has given new impetus to the issues which have been involved in longer-standing debates surrounding the contested relationship between religious and other kinds of personal and social identity, including questions of national identity. In doing so, it acknowledges some continuity with issues that were addressed in the nineteenth century (and earlier) debates, but sets its arguments within the new context of a contemporary society composed of ever-wider pluralities of religious belief and practice. It re-opens, in the European context, questions concerning the basis upon which individuals find a corporate identity, focusing the tensions between national identities and universal religious belonging and, in so doing, it connects with wider contemporary questions concerning the viability of the nation-state in the context of contemporary globalisation (Balibar and Wallerstein, eds, 1992).

One articulate and consistent Anglican contemporary supporter of establishment who has posited a connection between the establishment and Englishness has been the former Archbishop of York, John Habgood. His most developed arguments are found in Church and Nation in a Secular Age (1983). Here, Habgood (1983: 109) does not argue that England is a Christian nation, but he does claim that, "One inevitable
consequence of the disestablishment would be the alienation of large numbers of people whose residual allegiance to the Church of England is bound up with the perception that in some obscure way it represents 'England.' This argument was consistent with that of the Chadwick Commission (1970: 65) which had previously stated the opinion that, "The people of England still want to feel that religion has a place in the land to which they can turn on the all too rare occasions when they think they need it; and they are not likely to be pleased by legislation which might suggest that the English people as a whole were going unChristian."

Christopher Lamb (1985: 13), now the Church of England's adviser on Inter-Faith Relations, pointed out as early as the mid nineteen eighties that a plural society poses questions for people of all faiths and none in that, "For the first time in centuries Western Christians - indeed all people of whatever faith or none - are being compelled to make the difficult distinction between faith and culture." For some, to be forced self-consciously to wrestle with issues surrounding the relationship of religion and culture is almost to call into question both religion and culture, so close has the relationship between them been. Europe inherited from medieval Christianity a model of the "corpus Christianum" in which Church and society were coterminous and which involved, in various forms, a fusion of political and religious realities into a synthesis in which a religious monopoly provided a legitimation for the rules and in turn received their protection. In his polemical book Constantine Versus Christ: The Triumph of Ideology, Alistair Kee (1982) argued that this transformed Christianity into an imperial religion, the opposite of that which its founder intended.

Those who conceived of the "corpus Christianum" could only see a synthesis in which church and society numerically coincided. The classical argument for the English Church-state settlement in terms of the relationship between religion and nationhood was advanced by the Anglican theologian Roger Hooker in Book 8 of his Laws of Ecclesiastical Polity in which he argued that, "We hold that seeing there is not any man of the Church of England but the same is also a member of the Commonwealth; nor any member of the Commonwealth which is not also of the Church of England." This argument stood in a tradition which identified religious diversity with the dangers of anarchy and a threat to national unity. For example, Edwin Sandys (in McGrath,
1967: 1), Archbishop of York under Queen Elizabeth I, had argued that religious plurality would be dangerous to the body politic:

This liberty, that men may openly profess diversity of religion must needs be dangerous to the Commonwealth. What stirs diversity of religion hath raised in nations and kingdoms the histories are so many and plain, and in our times insuch sort have told you, that with further proof I need not trouble your ears. One God, one King, one profession, is fit for one monarchy and commonwealth. Let conformity and unity in religion be provided for; and it shall be as a wall of defence unto this realm.

Thomas Arnold, in his Principles of Church Reform (quoted in Jackson and Rogan (eds), 1962: 166), whilst upholding what he called "the noble, the divine theory that the Christian nation of England was the Church of England," argued that this settlement could and should be "stretched" to include others. Significantly, though, he excluded Roman Catholics on political grounds and he also explicitly excluded people of other than Christian religious traditions. Arnold (in Jackson and Rogan, eds, 1962: 167) argued that if there is no Christian majority then "Christians have no right as such to press the establishment of their religion to the prejudice of the civil rights of others"; that if there is an equal distribution of religions, then this would "be a reason why such a nation should separate itself in two, and the Christian and Heathen portions of it form each a state distinct from the other," but when the majority of a country are Christian then the state may "justly become a Church" and "the Heathen part of the population ought to be excluded from the legislature and encouraged, if it be possible, to emigrate to other countries, if they complain of not participating in the full rights of citizenship."

In the context of the Rushdie controversy there have been interesting secularised echoes of the main lines of Arnold's argument when, for example, John Townend (quoted in Wintour, 1989), MP for Bridlington, stated that "England must be reconquered for the English" and argued that, "When Muslims say they cannot live in a country when Salman Rushdie is free to express his views, they should be told they have the answer in their own hands - go back from whence you came." Townend went on to complain of what had happened to "this green and pleasant land" due to immigration and what he called "the pernicious doctrine of multi-culturalism," arguing with respect to the latter that, "The British people were never consulted as to whether they would change from being a homogenous society to a multi-racial society."
Whilst issues around skin pigmentation or "colour" have often informed street level racism, "culture" has often been more significant to the more sophisticated critics of the multi-cultural society than has colour. For example, in the early 1970s, Enoch Powell MP was primarily concerned with what he viewed as the potential erosion of the English "way of life" rather than with differentiating people on the basis of "colour." In addition, the Conservative journal *The Salisbury Review* attempted to rehabilitate the concept of "nationhood" in the context of debate about the pluralist society. Positing this concept as the basis for social unity, they argued that the presence of large numbers of minorities with non-Christian cultures and religions was fundamentally subversive of the nation and that ideas of multi-culturalism and religious and cultural pluralism were alien constructs resulting from a flawed sociology. In contemporary times, and within the political mainstream, Lord Tebbit (Aitken, 1990) suggested that minorities would find his now famous "cricket test" difficult to pass on the basis that their real loyalties lay elsewhere rather than in England.

As might have been predicted, politicians and social commentators within this tradition have claimed that the Rushdie controversy has proved them to have been right all along about the dangers of New Commonwealth immigration. After the publication of *The Satanic Verses* such questioning of multi-culturalism as a viable basis for social cohesion in a plural society was not only limited to the political tendency of which Townend is a representative example. The politically liberal columnist, Jill Tweedie (1989), in an article on "Xenophobia as a survival mechanism" was also an example of such questioning when she observed that, "the builders working down the road" kept on uncomprehendingly asking of the Rushdie controversy, "What's it all about?" In the light of this she argued that "unease and fear of strangers" should not be seen as "a manifestation of racial sin", but as a "survival mechanism" and a "genetic superglue" which she argued was an "essential prerequisite for identity, cohesion, defence and, ultimately, existence itself."

In a BBC2 *Public Eye* report entitled "Breaking Away From Britain", the journalist Peter Taylor (in Johnson, 1989) concluded that the effect of the Rushdie controversy has been that, "Progress to multi-cultural harmony has now been stopped dead in its
tracks." Even more starkly, the novelist Fay Weldon (1989a: 31) has declared "Our attempt at multi-culturalism is dead. The Rushdie affair demonstrates it." Weldon's stark statement of obituary upon the social project of multi-culturalism in Britain resonates with the more mildly expressed anxieties of liberal opinion, articulated even by Lord Jenkins (1989a), the former Labour Home Secretary and political architect of British race relations legislation, who commented in the light of the Rushdie controversy that, "In retrospect we might have been more cautious about allowing the creation in the 1950s of substantial Muslim communities here." In view of Jenkins' original advocacy of the idea of "integration" (which will be explored further in the final chapter) rather than "assimilation," this admission is highly significant and underlines just how deeply the Rushdie controversy has raised profound questions and issues. Despite the variety of their provenance and expression, such critiques all tend to assume a view of society which expects that, ideally, it should be homogenous, an assumption which, in turn, is rooted in the inherited pattern of relationships between religion(s), state and society that were explored at the beginning of this chapter.

As argued by Benedict Anderson (1983) modern ideas of nationhood have been evolved around ethnicity (see "Note on Terminology" in chapter one). Ethnic diversity can, and often does, pose very obvious challenges to the concept of the nation state, as can clearly be seen in the recent European examples of the disintegration of ethnically diverse states. There are arguably, however, reasonably successful historical examples of how diverse ethnic belongings can be incorporated within the greater whole of loyalty to a unitary state and its institutions. As Fay Weldon (1989: 32) suggests, the United States of America's melting-pot model of integrating diversity has achieved some success. Even if, in actual historical practice, it is often difficult to achieve, ethnicity is in principle capable of such an accommodation. But whilst there is evidence for successful integration by means of relativising ethnic identities, perhaps religious identities might not be so easily relativised within overarching national identities. The Anglican Bishop Jim Thompson (1989) argued that Fay Weldon's advocacy of the "one flag" uniculturalist vision of the USA does not work with respect to the challenges posed by pluralities of religion "because when God is robbed of specific revelation and given a national identity, religion becomes a propaganda tool, or bland lowest common denominator which will not touch the soul of a child."
In historical reality, religions have tended either to lay the foundation for building a social order, as in a theocracy, or to sacralise a pre-existing order with a degree of religious legitimation. But in relation to religion the question has to be asked as to whether there might be something about its absoluteness of commitment, its international character and its transcendent referents that, in the final analysis, suggests it is not fully compatible with national identity? In the course of constructing his theory of nation-states as "imagined communities", Anderson (1983) has suggested that the nation state was a competitive concept secularising previous ideas of primary belonging that were defined mainly in religious terms. Is there, then, perhaps a fundamental sense in which religions cannot allow the state to claim an ultimate value since this would be a usurpation of a loyalty which, in the perspective of religious traditions, should only be offered to that which is unconditioned and infinite? Perhaps, in principle at least, those religious traditions which will finally not allow themselves to be completely privatised are ultimately more difficult fully to incorporate into a common bond within national and state identities than are ethnicities.

Ethnicity is the subject of a substantial social scientific theoretical literature (Baca, 1991). The literature of Religious Studies, Sociology and Race and Ethnic Studies contains a number of discussions about the relationship between religion and ethnicity and their relative primacy (Glazer, Nathan and Moynihan, 1975; Abramson, 1979; Horowitz, 1985; Knott, 1986a, 1986b; Driedge, 1989; Beckerlegge, 1991; Kerr, D, ed, 1992a, 1992b; Barot, 1993b). But in the context of 20th century globalisation processes ( Featherstone, ed, 1990) and widespread migration, there has been a significant resurgence in the idea of religion as a primary identifying marker associated with culture, leading to what is often identified as "communalism." Writing in 1974, but perhaps with even more relevance today, in an essay on "Communalism and the Social Structure of Religion," Trevor Ling (1974: 59) stated that, "Among the dangers to the peace of the world today religious communalism might appear to rank as one of the more serious." Ling drew upon the leitmotif of Wilfred Cantwell Smith's The Meaning and End of Religion (1978), which protested against the reification of what Cantwell Smith prefers to identify as "cumulative traditions" into entities such as "Hinduism" and "Christianity," arguing (1974:61) that "The fact that such terms have been invented and have gained currency is no guarantee that they refer to real
objective recognisable entities, each possessing a sufficiently high degree of internal unity to justify the degree of external differentiation which the terms imply." Ling furthermore argued (1974: 66) that such constructions of sharply defined religious identities "arise out of concealed quasi-nationalisms, and they advance concealed quasi-nationalistic causes."

Parsons concludes his essay on religion and politics in Britain since 1945 (1994c: 154) with a warning that without an effort on the part of religious leaders and politicians, political parties and religious groups to "understand the subtleties and complexities of the interactions to which their various commitments give rise" then, "the alternative is the reduction of increasingly complex issues to the convenient slogans of competing religious-cum-political pressure groups - a bleak and unhappy prospect indeed." The sharpness of the boundaries between these "imagined belongings" and their relative importance can vary according to circumstance, with more settled and affluent environments tending to promote more finely differentiated components of identity with threatening and poverty-stricken environments tending towards the simplification of identity.

The claimed primacy of religious identity over national loyalty among Muslims is precisely what both the secular commentators and authorities have found difficult about the Rushdie controversy. This is clearly illustrated by (Brown, 1989) Douglas Hurd's (New Life, 1989g) speech in Birmingham Central Mosque on Race Relations and the Rule of Law (1989a; 1989b) and by John Patten's (1989a; 1989b) letter to a number of leading British Muslims, released to the press under the title of Muslims in Britain Today, together with Patten's (1989c) even sharper letter to members of the Home Office Advisory Council on Race Relations entitled On Being British.

Douglas Hurd's speech had been planned prior to the fatwa, but was given special force by the context in which it was delivered. In the speech, Hurd argued for greater integration in the light of the needs of the generation of Asians born in Britain and that no ethnic or religious minority would develop if it cut itself off from the mainstream of social life. Hurd (The Guardian, 25.2.89) argued that "British Muslims are entitled to speak out in defence of their religious faith and to protest against a book which they believe denigrates and insults the Prophet of Islam" but also that,
"None of us can choose to obey some laws and ignore others. It is the law which permits freedom of worship for religious minorities and which allows you to seek converts from other religions." Hurd underlined that, "Respect for the rule of law is a fundamental principle for which this nation stands. So are freedom of speech and expression and a toleration of different opinions. We can sometimes argue about how these principles should be interpreted. But we are entitled to expect everyone in this country to respect these ideals."

A New Life editorial entitled "Misfired Message" (1989g) commented that this speech "had clearly back-fired", confirming racist stereotypes and belittling the attempts made by the Muslim community to become an integral part of British society. Muslim leaders reacted strongly to the speech which they felt was, as Iqbal Sacranie (in Shahin, 1989c) put it, "a wholly unwarranted provocation to Muslims" since the only violence connected with the Rushdie controversy that had, up to that point, occurred in the UK was to Muslim property, as in the fire bombing of Regent's Park Mosque. Melanie Phillips (1989a) commented on the speech that its sub-text was "the British horror of separateness."

Both of John Patten's letters raised questions about the relationship between a universal loyalty to a religious tradition and community and a particular loyalty to a civic society and state. In On Being British, Patten (1989c) states that "Being British means exactly what it says. One cannot be British on one's own exclusive terms or on a selective basis. Nor is there room for dual loyalties where those loyalties openly contradict one another." The popular way of translating and transmitting such carefully crafted sentiments can be seen from the Daily Mail report on Patten's letter underneath the headline "Here is how to be a true blue Briton" and which began with a paragraph stating that, "Minority ethnic groups were given a lesson yesterday on how to be British" (Deans, 1989).

Hurd and Patten's themes were continually stressed by Government ministers in the following months. In an April 15th speech to Anglo-Asian Conservatives in Coventry, Timothy Renton (in Knewstub, 1989) urged more integration, arguing that South Asians should "learn the norms and customs of British life." In May, Renton (in New Life, 1989r) in addressing a Reading meeting of the Southern constituencies of the
One Nation Forum, an organisation for Asian Tories, brought Eid greetings to Muslims but again argued for "greater integration" which he stated "need not undermine our separate traditions. Integration is not the same as assimilation."

Any religion which makes a universal claim and has an international membership brings with it an inevitable tension between nation-state formations and the universal community of that faith. This is all the more so the case where a community of faith has a focus on an external geographical centre or centres. Historically, this tension has been a significant part of the Jewish experience in England (Cooper and Morrison, 1991; Kushner, ed, 1992) and it is sometimes resurrected today as part of anti-Jewish agitation in connection with questions concerning the relationship of Diaspora Jewry to the ideology of Zionism and the State of Israel. On the basis of a Jewish history which is experienced at recognising majority sub-texts directed towards minorities, Rabbi Jonathan Magonet (in Rocker: 1989c) charged Mr. Patten with "ethnic bullying" and "scaremongering." Magonet noted that, "When you talk about dual loyalties to a minority group, what you are really telling them is: 'Stay in line and don't make waves because we don't really trust you'" and that "you're also sending a message to the wider community saying, 'Don't trust them because they have other loyalties.'"

In Christianity, the tension between belonging to a universal community of faith and belonging to a particular civil community has also been historically and theologically present. Theologically, the fifth chapter of the early Christian Epistle of Diognetus illustrates clearly that this tension is entailed in the Christian religion when it says of Christians that, "They dwell in their own fatherlands but as if sojourners in them, they share all things as citizens and suffer all things as strangers. Every foreign country is their fatherland and every fatherland is a foreign country." With the emergence of Constantinian Christianity this tension was often obscured in European history, although it was this "dualism" that could still be seen in the medieval struggle between the Papacy and the Emperor in Western Christianity. However, the tensions were again obscured due to the post-Reformation development of so-called "national Churches", of which the Church of England has been one specific example.

With the rise of nationalisms and the fragmentation of Western Christendom in the Reformation period, it is not surprising that the basic ideas of Constantinianism took
on nationalistic forms in the shape of state or national churches. As Klassen (1981:22) makes clear, the Protestant Reformation did not fundamentally challenge this arrangement since in clearing the way for the ascendency of the government over the Church, the Lutheran Reformation was "simply reversing the Roman claim that the Church should have primacy over the Government" and "the symbiotic tie between the two remained in place." Thus the Catholic ideal of Christendom harmoniously ruled by Pope and Emperor had been replaced by the Lutheran pattern of *cuius regio, eius religio* or the 'nationalised religion' of the Elizabethan English settlement.

In Reformation Northern Europe, Roman Catholicism was therefore opposed by the Protestant governmental "powers that be" not simply on the grounds of theological doctrine. Roman Catholics were also perceived to pose an extra-territorial threat to the precursor formations of the modern nation states. This was because of Roman Catholic loyalty to a Church which extended across national boundaries and which tied Roman Catholics in a relationship with the diplomatic power and influence of the Papacy. In modern times, similar fears concerning the relationship between religious groups and external powers have also been seen in parts of the world such as China, where religions or ideologies other than Christianity are in the ascendency and the Christian community, founded by externally-based missionary organisations, has often perceived as being too much under the influence of foreign powers.

It is similar fears that have been at work in the Rushdie controversy where anxieties about Muslims being "the enemy within" have been reinforced by concerns about the influence bought by the oil wealth of Muslim countries and the development of Islamist radicalism. Whereas in Europe both Protestant and Catholic Churches have seen a gradual acceleration in the degree of separation of spheres between Church and State (although post-Communism, in Orthodox Europe, this process has been to some extent reversed), in Islam the ideal of a universal *ummah* integrating religion, law and politics is still a strong and vibrant idea, especially for those Muslims inspired by the ideologies of Qutub (Tripp, 1994) and Maududi (Nasr, 1994). The language and imagery implicit in the name of the Muslim Parliament, founded by Kalim Siddiqi of the Muslim Institute, has stirred fears of Muslim claims to an alternative and separate sphere of sovereignty within the UK.
As David Hirst pointed out (1989a), although national and Islamic motives have often coincided, for Khomeini "the very idea of nationhood is ..... at bottom a secular Western perversion, and if it comes to a conflict of interest between the ‘national’ interest, as conventionally defined, and the higher, cosmic interest of Islam, he will always choose the latter." Indeed, in contrast to the widespread secular perception, from an Islamic perspective it can cogently be argued that the formation of the modern nation-states and the operation of modern secular ideologies have led to just as much, if not more, human suffering than have states founded upon religion. The phenomenon of the secular nation-state can hardly be uncritically glorified in a century which has seen it give birth to Nazism and the gas chambers and Stalinism and the gulags.

Seen in this light, the basis of the nation-state can understandably seem no less dangerous than religious fanaticism. The Muslim critique of the nation-state in fact poses important questions to English society and the British state in which Muslim values interrogate the adequacy of secular ideologies where religions and religious concerns are relegated to the private margins of society. In the context of the Rushdie controversy, the Christian theologian Lesslie Newbigin underlined some of the questions marks which, from within religious perspectives, can be placed against the nation-state. He points out that (1990: 13), with the 20th century apotheosis of the nation-state, "The symbols of sacredness now clustered the nation. Blasphemy against God became a meaningless idea; but treason against the state becomes the ultimate crime. Men who die in defence of their religion are ignorant fundamentalists; men who die in defence of their nation are heroes." Haider Reeve (1989), an indigenous English convert to Islam, states that the fatwa "does not signify a declaration of war; it is an overlap of two totally different systems", since Britain "is unfamiliar with the concept of temporal authority being vested in religious bodies. It is a while since pope held sway over king in Europe" and, "Iran...in accordance with the principles of Islam does not in theory recognise the concept of nation-states. Religious and temporal authority are combined in one leadership."

It is, of course, particularly in the light of the Ayatollah Khomeini’s fatwa and the apparent eagerness of some Muslims to execute that fatwa for themselves
that the Muslim position became particularly vulnerable to charges about lack of civil loyalty, since Muslims who actively or tacitly supported this course of action appeared to be appealing not so much to the tension between a universal religious community and a particular nation-state, as to the right of the Iranian state to interfere in the internal affairs of the British state. Philip Lewis (1990a: 34) has pointed out, "Muslims in Britain have still to work out a pattern of relationship with the wider Muslim community - Ummah - which does not suggest that their agenda is being dictated by external Muslim powers." Such suspicions were further reinforced during the Gulf War over Kuwait in which Muslims were suspected by many of being potentially, if not actually, disloyal (Benn, 1992; Calcutt, 1990).

Wars have historically exposed the tensions between national and universal forms of Christianity. During the First World War, both sides of the conflict enthusiastically invoked the same God on their side. Nevertheless, the tension between the universal Church and a national community has also emerged during times of warfare. In the Second World War, Bishop Bell of Chichester was accused by some of being a traitor when he called for friendly contacts with German Christians and opposed the carpet bombing of German cities. Following the Falklands/Malvinas war in 1982, contacts with Argentinian Christians and Church leaders were maintained through the global ecumenical organisation, the World Council of Churches, and a controversy broke out when Archbishop Runcie refused to allow the service marking the end of the conflict to be a triumphalist celebration.

There is evidence that, whilst affirming their international community in the Ummah, Muslims are beginning to recognise the force of critiques about their relationship with external political powers. For example, in his background paper to a national Muslim conference of 29th April 1990, called by the Bradford Council for Mosques, Asaf Hussain (in Lewis, 1990: 34), author of Beyond Islamic Fundamentalism (1992) argued forcibly that, "foreign funding produces foreign mouth-pieces which do not address the problems confronting the Muslim community in Britain." By contrast with a Muslim stance that finds its points of reference outside of the country, Badawi (in Martin, 1989) pointed out that, "Muslims who have come to live in Britain have come to a tacit concordat to obey British law. Only if the secular authorities prevent them
carrying out their individual Islamic duties - like praying - does our teaching allow them to disobey."

Nevertheless, by demanding recognition primarily on the basis of religious identity, Muslims have been posing fundamental questions to English society. In a cultural milieu in which ethnicity, nationality, class and lifestyle have been seen as the major determining factors of individual and corporate identity, for a group to define itself primarily in terms of religious identity represents a major break with the prevailing social ethos. It is therefore perhaps not surprising that secular people of good will were somewhat taken aback to find that many Muslims are insisting that they do not want to be dealt with as an "ethnic minority group" or in terms of "race relations" considerations. Thus, one of the questions now put on the agenda by the Rushdie controversy is whether the "corpus Christianum," de jure represented by the continuation of the establishment in England has now been replaced de facto by a "corpus Saecularum" which perhaps, like the "corpus Christianum," can only conceive of its modification or removal as leading to anarchy and chaos.

e) The Controversy and Its Religious Entails: The Challenge to the "Corpus Saecularum"

It is the argument of this section that, in addition to the connections between religion and nationhood, the entails of the Rushdie controversy also highlight and give additional impetus to the debates around issues around the effects of secularisation for the relationship between religion(s), state and society. It considers the challenges posed to the place of religious belief and practice through the de-centring, de-absolutising, secularisation and privatisation of religion in the modern and postmodern contexts. In doing so, it lays the groundwork for an argument that, contrary to the position of some defenders of the current form of establishment, the reform or replacement of the establishment of a single religion need not necessarily imply the acceptance of secularism as a national dogma. In doing so, the argument of this thesis parts company with a secularist critique of the "corpus Christianum" which seeks to replace the formal, constitutional establishment of Anglican Christianity with an ideologically established secularism.
The section questions the often too easy moral superiority of secularist critics of religion concerning the beneficial effects of secularisation processes. It also challenges superficial understandings of the nature of the secularisation process, both in terms of an understanding of secularisation as the general decline of religiosity and as the privatisation process which removes religion from the public sphere. In contrast, it demonstrates how the Rushdie controversy highlights the vigour of a religiosity’s public impact even where it has no socially sanctioned means of influence. As Parsons (1994: 17) comments,

> It was the Rushdie affair .... that stood as the most compelling and potent symbol of the resurgence and continuing relevance of questions about the claims and status of religion in late twentieth-century Britain. This was not only because it raised so many complex and demanding questions about the relationships between race, ethnicity and religion, but also because of the particular concept and issue that lay at the heart of the matter. The allegation against Rushdie was one of blasphemy: a quintessentially and fundamentally religious accusation.

The section then goes on to consider the way in which, in the context of globalisation, religion has re-emerged into public life as one of the key variants of a new identity politics. Finally it underlines both the problems and the challenges of a mixed society composed of both religious believers and people with a secular approach to life and argues that the Rushdie controversy signals that both will need to engage in a re-evaluation of the other and of their respective contributions to the wider society of which they are a part if there is to be a viable future for a plural society in England and the UK.

John Berger (1989) argued that, if Rushdie “is not caught in a chain of events of which he has completely lost control” then he might ask his publishers to prevent the publication of further editions for the sake of the innocent in the controversy, “Otherwise a unique 20th century Holy War, with its terrifying righteousness on both sides, may be on the point of breaking out sporadically but repeatedly.” Berger’s concern relates to the tensions between religious and a secular worldview that the controversy has highlighted. In connection with this tension, Tariq Modood (1990: 160) has made what Davie (1994: 65) describes as a “hard-hitting, indeed almost shocking statement” to the effect that,

> ‘the Rushdie affair’ is not about the life of Salman Rushdie nor freedom of expression, let alone about Islamic fundamentalism or book-burning or Iranian
interference in British affairs. The issue is one of the rights of non-European religious and cultural minorities in the context of a secular hegemony. Is the Enlightenment big enough to legitimise the existence of pre-Enlightenment religious enthusiasm or can it only exist by suffocating all who fail to be overawed by its intellectual brilliance and vision of man?

In European history, the Enlightenment signifies that process by which religious beliefs have been relativised in relation to the elevation of individual subjectivity and the emancipation of social structures from religious control. Matthew Hoffman (1989) speculated that the Rushdie affair may prove to be just a chapter in a Muslim recapitulation of the history of Christianity, in which it will eventually adopt the values of the west....Ironically, it may find that it has taken on the principles of the same spirit of individualism that defeated a once triumphalist Christianity. Despite great setbacks, the values crystallised in the Enlightenment continue, in the modern phrase, to set the agenda.

It is often argued that it has been the rise of the secular spirit, and its adoption by states and societies, which has enabled some degree of religious co-existence and has overcome the inheritance of religious absolutism. In the judgement of post-Enlightenment secular liberals, religions have been responsible for an enormous amount of bloodshed and human suffering and the The Satanic Verses controversy is only the latest episode to confirm that religions should be marginalised from public life. As Professor Meghnad Desai (1989) of the London School of Economics commented in a brief letter to The Independent, referring to Marx's famous dictum on religion, "Opium of the people did he say? It is much more lethal." In a letter to The Independent Arnold Wesker (1989a) argued that, "Believers must not be allowed to imagine their beliefs are the only credentials for moral authority. Too much evil, stupidity, primitive behaviour, destruction of the good and beautiful has been perpetrated in the name of one divinity or another." There is undoubtedly considerable truth in the argument that the rise of the secular spirit in philosophy and art coincided with the rise of religious toleration, and the argument that a secular state can better deal with the plural nature of modern societies than the inheritance of establishment is a powerful one which needs to be considered.

However, the precise definition of a secular state is not uncontested. In his article on "Religion in a Secular State: Problems and Possibilities within the Nigerian Context", Ade Dopamu (1994: 179) advances "a concept of the secular state as one where one
or a combination of the following is prevalent”, namely:

(a) A state where religion is suppressed
(b) A state where religion is not given official recognition
(c) A state where the government is neutral in religious matters
(d) A state where there is freedom of worship
(e) A state where no religion is officially imposed on the people or where there is no state religion
(f) A state where advancing science and technology have limited the sphere of influence of religion
(g) A state where there is a waning of institutional religion or where fewer people regularly attend religious services
(h) A state where there is separation of religious from political, legal, economic or other institutions.

How far a secular state can actually allow the full participation and contribution of religions depends upon the question of what is meant by secular in the context of a particular society and state and this will be explored, with particular reference to France, India and the USA, in more detail in the final section of this chapter. As will be seen in that section of the chapter, the idea of a secular state may imply the exclusion of religions from the public sphere; the creation of an arena in which religious participation is not ruled out, but in which religious communalisms are to be challenged; or may be the product of religious motivations leading to the constitutional entrenchment of disestablishment and religious freedom. A secular state may, therefore, not necessarily entail non-religious or anti-religious presuppositions. In the case of the Free Church tradition in the life of England, commitment to disestablishment sprang from a positive and profound religious motivation. In particular, it was informed by an ecclesiology which saw the Church as a free fellowship of believers under Jesus as Lord rather than as the nation at prayer according to forms of worship authorised and imposed by Parliament and/or the monarch. Such an approach is qualitatively different than the concessionary approach of mere toleration adopted by some religious majorities, or the approach of superiority to religions adopted by secularists. However, it was the combination of these theological and ecclesiological principles with the existential experience of social disadvantage which gave the nineteenth century disestablishment movement its passion and its power (Mackintosh, 1972). However, as the nineteenth century progressed, the specifically religious motivations of the Liberation Society declined and secularists took a more prominent part in its affairs. Where once its meetings had begun and ended in prayer, by the 1880s, this was no longer so (Bebbington 1982: 27).
Combined with the growing secular influence within the disestablishment movement of the 19th century, the gradual removal of disadvantages from Nonconformist Christians led to a shift in the nature of Free Church protests about the establishment. These began to be made not so much on the basis of what was increasingly coming to be seen as the secular principle of separation of Church and state, but rather on the basis of the injustice of Free Church exclusion from official religious activities within the state. As Bebbington (1982: 29) pointed out, the growth of this new approach was "evident in the eagerness of Nonconformists to play a part in state ceremonial." As an example of this Bebbington remarked that, instead of protests being made against any involvement of the ministers of the established Churches in the service marking the Diamond Jubilee of Queen Victoria, Nonconformists protests made were about the Free Church leaders merely being allocated places on the steps outside St. Paul's Cathedral. In other words, the Free Church critique had begun to shift from a disestablishmentarian demand for social and religious transformation to a demand for accommodation within the existing system of established religion.

As the secular spirit became more predominant in national life, it is interesting that, in contrast to the early nineteenth century Free Church position which tended to see all establishments of religion as on principle abrogations of the law of Christ, an increasing number of 20th century Free Church leaders began to see some value in establishment as a defence against the tides of secularism. An example of this new spirit can be seen as early as 1948 in H. Martin's Baptist Quarterly article on "Protestantism and the State" (1948-49: 316) in which he put forward the position that, "The recognition of the Church of England by the state as the focus and expression on 'state occasions' of the national spirit represents something real and valuable in our national life."

Christian theological and ecclesiological awareness of the challenges posed by secularity intensified in the 1960s. Some theologians, influenced by contemporary interpretations of Dietrich Bonhoeffer's ideas of "religionless Christianity" and Harvey Cox's book The Secular City (1965), sought to incorporate the secular as part of the inner meaning of the Christian Gospel. However, for many other Christians the secular became seen as more of a threat, and certainly as something about which there was
more concern than the continuance of established religion. What is signified by the concept of secularisation has clearly brought something distinctively and significantly challenging to all religions (Gilbert, 1980, 1994). However, an enormous amount has been written about the nature and meaning of the process identified as "secularisation" and the meanings associated with this are neither unified nor uncontested (Foster, 1972; Martin, D, 1978; Dobbelare, 1981; Dobbelare, 1984; Bruce, 1992; Barker, Beckford and Dobbelare, eds, 1993). The sociologist of religion, Bryan Wilson (1966: 14), characterises secularisation as "the process whereby religious thinking, practice and institutions lose social significance." Another definition, also from within the sociology of religion, comes from Peter Berger who defines (1969: 107) secularisation as "the process by which sectors of society and culture are removed from the domination of religious institutions and symbols." Both of these definitions have in common a position concerning the role of religion in the public sphere rather than an argument, as often popularly presented, especially from the 1960s onwards, concerning a decline in religious belief and practice.

Christian orthodoxy has certainly declined (Abrams, Gerard and Timms, eds, 1985; Ashford and Timms, 1992; Barker, Halman and Vloet, nd). However, a large proportion of the population still share many "folk beliefs" related to Christianity and the significance of this should not be underestimated. Together with participation in the institutions of "particular religions", in considering the relationship between religion and secularity it is also important to take account of the phenomenon of what Jones and Richey (1974) call "general religion". This concept was originally developed in the USA out of reflection on Thomas Luckmann's (1967: 27) essay on "The Invisible Religion", in which he critiqued the assumption often found in the secularisation debate, "that church and religion are identical." David Hay's (1982, 1990) work on religious experience also argues that such experiences are far wider than what is suggested by statistics on religious membership and participation or by affirmations of religiously orthodox beliefs. The concepts of "folk religion" and "implicit religion" (Bailey, E, 1983, 1989) have also been used to delineate these areas of religious life.
From an analysis of variety of discussions of this kind of religiosity, Wolffe (1993: 309) identifies four distinct categories for this general area of religious life namely, "conventional religion", "civil religion", "common religion" and "invisible religion." By "conventional religion" he refers to occasional participation in the festivals and life cycle rituals found in organised, particular religions. By "common religion" he refers to generalised beliefs in the supernatural and folk traditions and popular astrology. By "invisible religion" he refers to what is sometimes also called "surrogate religion" - in other words, those things which, though devoid of supernatural referents, give people meaning in life and which can range from following a football team to forms of nationalism. By "civil religion" he (1993: 310) refers to "the use of religious forms and language in public life, especially in the ceremonial associated with the monarchy." Wolffe (1993: 310) underlines that "these categories should not be understood as separating out definable groups of people, but rather as exploring a variety of ways in which a single individual not regularly involved in a religious organisation could nevertheless be 'religious'.” What all these concepts therefore have in common is that issues related to religion can still surface even where individuals do not have a very strong connection with a specific religious tradition.

The arrival of the relatively new migrant and minority ethnic communities and the religious traditions associated with them have brought new configurations to the previous intra-Christian and Christian-secular debates on establishment. As Parsons points out (1994: 10), "the factors involved in the interaction between these traditions and the predominant religious and cultural traditions of recent and contemporary Britain are immensely complex." As a consequence, in their interaction with both Christianity and secularity, Parsons (1994: 11) argued that,

The responses may be in the direction of adaptation, adjustment, assimilation or accommodation; or they may be in the direction of reassertion, renewed vigour, restated distinctiveness or resistance. But whichever the direction of the response, there will have been change; for even the fiercest reassertions of distinctive and traditional identity will have been given new dimensions precisely by virtue of the new context and challenge which has produced the 'return' to tradition.

For the time being, the religious traditions of minority ethnic communities are proving to have a considerable resilience to the secular challenge whilst playing a critical social role in terms of the reinforcement of identity in a minority context. But these
traditions are also increasingly being used as a resource not only in the definition and protection of self-identity, but also as critiques of the dominant social patterns of the wider society. For example, in the context of the controversy and the challenges which he perceived that it poses to western societies, Kalim Siddiqui (in Young, 1989a) talked of "the filth of western culture." He claimed that "Rampant secularism is going to destroy mankind" and alleged that "Christians have surrendered to the onrush of secular civilisation."

Some Christian defenders of establishment, such as Habgood, would agree with the central point of such a critique if not with its form of expression. Habgood argues that, in the light of what happened in many European countries once Church and state were separated, it would be wise to keep at least one religious expression at the heart of the life of the state, both because of its moral utility in contrast to a purely secular state, but also because he argues that societies with dominant and recognised religious traditions offer better possibilities for the affirmation of religious values in general, and for the creation of wider social space for all religious traditions (including religious minorities), than do those societies which do not have such dominant traditions. Habgood (1989b) argued that, "At present the existence of officially-recognised Christian holy days as part of our general culture brings to public awareness the need for other faiths to be given space for their own observances within their own communities" and that epitomised by the establishment of the Church of England "is that of a major cultural influence, Christianity, tolerating and affirming sub-cultures, while providing the general religious environment in which they can be accepted and understood."

At first sight this argument might seem to have some validity in the light of the experience of those societies in Europe where national and state religions were removed from public life and an attempt was made to replace them with a communist ideology which sought to severely restrict the freedom of expression and organisation available to other ideologies and belief. Perhaps precisely because the state can have such a tendency to claim absolute power for itself and its political values, it could be argued that the presence of an established religion at least provides an institutionalised sign and reminder that the state is not the only significant reality, that it does not
represent the only form of authority, and that the authority which it does have is not absolute.

Examples of such creative possibilities for established religion can be seen in the actual role of the Church of England at the time of heightened Cold War tensions following the decision to deploy Cruise and Pershing missiles in Western Europe when the report, *The Church and the Bomb* was issued; during the social ravages of monetarism and the uprisings/riots of the inner cities when the *Faith in the City* report was published; and at a time of national and Government triumphalism in the wake of the Falklands/Malvinas war when Robert Runcie, the Archbishop of Canterbury and a former tank commander in the army, insisted on a service of memorial rather than of celebration. At this service, Runcie declared that God must never be claimed for any nation and spoke of war as springing from loyalty being offered to a God-substitute. It is because of examples such as these that people such as Laurence Targett (in Kessel, 1989a) can assert that "Christianity is, for us in Britain, the central possibility for a larger view of our civil life, so the central task must be the rediscovery of the Anglican tradition."

However, in the wider European context of which England and the UK state is increasingly a part, examples from the Eastern and Central parts of Europe should also be considered. Here, as the communist parties lost their grip on power and the possibilities for religious freedom and the public influence of religions have expanded, questions have remained as to at whose expense these developments have occurred. What are the implications for minority religious communities in those countries where majorities are once again able to give expression to what can all too easily become an explosive mix of religious and national/ethnic consciousness, with all the violence and social upheaval that this has already brought to the peoples of the former Yugoslavia and in the conflicts in Nagorno-Karabakh, Chechenia and other parts of the former Soviet Union?

Of course, the former Yugoslavia, Chechenia and Nagorno-Karabakh are not England. It was the past suppression of continuing and underlying tensions which gave these conflicts much of their vehemence once the lid was taken off the built-up pressure. But, in the context of the UK as a whole, there is long and bitter experience of
sectarian conflict in the North of Ireland, sustained by a potent mixture of religious and national factors. In the setting of an increasingly integrating Europe, the conflicts in the Eastern parts of Europe should give cause for careful reflection, concerned as they are with Muslim religious and cultural minorities. In England and in the rest of Europe there can often be an uncomfortable overlap between religious and racial prejudice which, given particular social conditions, and coupled with the maintenance of a social structure which reinforces the sense of Muslims as essentially not part of the "us" of European culture and religion, could lead to serious conflicts in western Europe, including in England and the UK state.

The Rushdie controversy reinforces the arguments of those such as Vincent Cable (1994) who, in his Demos pamphlet *The World's New Fissures: Identities in Crisis*, identified the religious and the cultural as key variants of the new identity politics through which contemporary global and social fissures are given expression. As a consequence, with the end of ideological Cold War between capitalism and communism (Dickstein, 1993), political analysts such as Samuel Huntington (1993) see the next global conflict as being along the fault lines of civilisations defined in terms of culture and religion rather than political ideology and Huntington suggests that the Christendom/Islamic fault line is one of the most critical of these.

One of the implications of the rise of this "identity politics" is that religion, consigned by secular post-Enlightenment liberalism and Marxism to the sphere of the private, the marginal and the superstructural, once again makes its appearance in the public sphere in the guise of chosen corporate and personal identities (Beyer, 1990; Casanova, 1994), with the space for their resurgence having been created by the currents of postmodernity and its elevation of identity, even though the forms in which such identities are sometimes expressed can run counter to postmodernity's relativist philosophical presuppositions (Inayatullah, 1990).

A letter written to *New Life* by a correspondent (Saxena, 1989b) in the context of the Rushdie controversy very clearly supports Tariq Modood's contention that the "race relations industry" has not taken sufficient account of cultural and religious distinctiveness in the self-understanding of minority communities, especially among South Asians when it states of Asians in Britain that, "It is culture (governed by
religion), not colour, that is important to us. Salman Rushdie, the secular atheist, has touched a raw nerve in a section of the Asian population, and their response - in most cases justifiable and lawful - has brought about ill-feeling against them."

In the statements of political and philosophical liberals and postmodernists who do not wish to take account of religious identity, is there perhaps more than just a hint of the kind of position which fails to see its own tendency to absolutise its assumptions and which therefore cannot acknowledge its own weaknesses? Are the secular reactions to the controversy perhaps secularised versions of the kind of crusading Christian anti-Islam sentiment which Richard Webster (1990) has warned against in his study of blasphemy within the historical triangle of relationships between Islam, Christianity and Judaism? As Bishop Jim Thompson (1989) pointed out,

It is a sober fact that Muslims in east London have been made homeless, harassed, discriminated against, even murdered, and their voice was not heard, but when their religion took the stage, everyone reacted. Their faith threatened the secular consensus which, whilst allowing religion to potter on, does not want it to interfere with life.

Whatever one's judgement on the precise relationship between religion, ethnicity and other significant factors in identity such as social class, the Rushdie controversy has made it clear that, in the context of a growing assertion of Islamic identity, unless "the powers that be" learn to deal with people as they are defining themselves, including in religious terms, then social disintegration could be a real and significant danger.

At the same time, the secular inheritance is a central and significant feature of English society and the British state and Muslims need more thoroughly to address a range of questions about the role of the secular in a non-Islamic society. As Lewis (1990: 34) points out, it is not without significance that, in the Urdu language, there is no exact equivalent for the word "secular." In addition, the terms which are used to translate the English language concept into Urdu mean "irreligious" in a sense of the word which conveys overtones of immorality. Shabbir Akhtar, in A Faith For All Seasons (1990e), begins the task of a serious Muslim engagement with the secular. But it is clear that if the construction and sustenance of a multi-cultural society containing a plurality of values and beliefs is to remain a viable project, then a commitment to creative dialogue rather than a fundamental antagonism between religious and secular people is an essential component of this and the question of what socio-religious
structural arrangements might retard or facilitate this dialogue is one of the "entails" of the controversy.

As a part of this dialogue, religious people, and in particular Muslims, will need to learn not to be so ready to equate secular with irreligious in the moral sense and secular people to learn not to make a simplistic equation between Islam and fundamentalism. Fuentes (1989) argues that, if The Satanic Verses were understood properly, then "Salman Rushdie has done the true religious spirit a service by brilliantly imagining the tensions and complements that it establishes with the secular spirit." Here Fuentes is arguing for a dialogue with religious perspectives to which the secular artistic spirit can positively contribute. The difficulty is that often the methodology of the novel - of exploratory tentativeness, of unfinishedness, of fragmentary and contradictory truths - all too easily becomes an epistemology which liberal intellectuals demand that dialogue partners must sign up to as a pre-condition of dialogue.

This is precisely what the Church of England Bishop Michael Nazir-Ali warned against when he (1989h) argued that, "A more tolerant Islam must be fundamentally Islamic. Though it must relate to Enlightenment ideas, it cannot grow out of them" and that, "In the recent debate on the place of Islam in Western societies, it has often been assumed that Islam is facing the challenge of contemporary issues for the first time. This may be true of some issues, but it is not true of others." At the same time, as Badawi (in Martin, 1989) observes of the Muslim position in the controversy, "Even our friends are reacting with despair and disgust, fearing a narrow-minded return to the Middle Ages. Race Relations have been set back 20 years - and I shudder to think what would happen if Rushdie were killed." Therefore to many outside of the Muslim community, the Rushdie controversy appears to be a replay of the conflicts of earlier European centuries between the secular Enlightenment and what is perceived to be religious obscurantism or extremism, whilst from within the Muslim community, the challenge of the secular is often perceived as threatening to the wider public role of religion.

Although questioning the adequacy to the contemporary realities of English life of the current form of establishment, this thesis would wish to retain the sense that
religion(s) should have a rightful place in public life and should not be relegated to the private sphere. The integrity of religions demands that they do not betray their inheritance of making truth-claims that relate to the public sphere. Whilst a religion will often be personal, to attempt to make it only applicable in a "private" sphere is to undermine its integrity, certainly with regard to Islam and fundamentally for Christianity, too, despite the influence of secularisation. Therefore, in a society which is committed to finding ways forward that conceptualise and actualise structures which enable the full contribution and participation of all its members, it is likely that the classical social scientific and modern distinction between the "public" and "private" domains will have at least to be modified. It is to the issues posed by this classical distinction and its connection with the existence of a plurality of values in English society and the UK state that the next section of the chapter now turns.

f) The Controversy and its Cultural Entails: Particular and Common Cultures and Values in a Multi-Religious Society

It is the argument of this section of the chapter that the "entails" of the Rushdie controversy that were focused in the clash between the religious and artistic cultures form part of a wider set of problematics concerned with the existence and social management of a plurality of values in a single society and the section therefore explores the "unwritten agreements" on the basis of which civic society operates. Having outlined the different value presuppositions of the protagonists within the controversy, the section goes on to ask how far it really is possible or desirable to combine diverse cultures and values within a common social framework, both from the perspective of a majority in the society and from the perspective of minority communities such as the Muslim community. It rejects as utopian the possibility of identifying, in any directly translatable social and political way, a range of common core values. However, it does argue for the possibility of reaching agreement on some commonly accepted "rules for the game." As a means for enabling the full participation of variety of particular religious communities and traditions together with those of no religious commitment in the wider common enterprise of the social and political life of English society and the UK state, it advocates an approach based upon what it characterises as "values outcomes negotiation."
In an article on the Muslim community written in the early days of the controversy, Sarah Helm (1989a) points out that "Muslims are in a state of hiatus, with little consensus about how far to integrate, how far to withstand the dilution of their faith and codes of conduct by British culture." This is despite the fact that many of the Muslim organisations reflect Indian subcontinental forms of Islam that were evolved specifically on the basis of differing responses to a non-Islamic environment of minority Muslim communities under British colonial rule (Andrews, 1996; Robinson, F, 1988). Helm (1989a) observes that up until now "The debate over how far Muslims should compromise their values has been fiercest in education" but that, "The Rushdie affair shows it spreading to broader cultural and legal questions" and that, "The issue is being watched by Home Office race relations advisors who see it as a potential source for increasing conflict."

The controversy has therefore opened up to debate the possibilities for, and limits to, negotiation between radically different cultural understandings and values. In some ways all of the questions with which the controversy are concerned relate to the area of the unwritten assumptions that hold a society in balance or cause it to collapse. These are not the publically explicit codes of law enshrined in legal systems, but are to do with the area of values and presuppositions which inform both the broader cultures and the particular ethical, political and legal stances taken by individuals, groups and societies. For Muslims, and for some other observers of the controversy, it is critical that these values are fundamentally religious whilst for others, cohesion in a plural society requires a strongly secular social framework to enable it to work.

In the course of his advocacy of the possible development of aspects of the blasphemy legislation that are concerned with preserving the fabric of society, Habgood (1989a) commented that, "Implicit in this is the belief that stable societies contain a sacral element, and that it is unwise to allow this sense of sacredness to be undermined by scurrilous attack." In similar vein, Lesslie Newbigin (1990) also pointed out that the blasphemy laws were not originally designed to protect the Christian religion but were "an acknowledgement of the fact that since God is the author and sustainer of our being, to blaspheme him is to inject poison into public life, a poison with more deadly long-term effects than anything offered by the drug merchants."
Habgood (1986) has argued in support of the continuing establishment of the Church of England on the basis that this does not, as has sometimes been alleged, necessarily entail Christian triumphalism or arrogance. Rather, he believes that establishment is concerned with "the way in which societies work and the unwritten agreements which are needed to hold them together." Such "unwritten agreements" are to do with the realm of what is often described as "civic society", the health of which is widely argued to be a prerequisite for a successfully functioning democratic society. It is this sphere of "unwritten agreements" to which the Chief Rabbi, Jonathan Sacks, also refers in his book *The Persistence of Faith* (1991: 26-27) in which he argues that, as well as a physical ecology, we also inhabit a moral ecology, that network of beliefs, relationships and virtue within which we think, act and discover meaning. For the greater part of human history it has had a religious foundation. But for the past two centuries, in societies like Britain, that basis of belief has been profoundly eroded. And we know too much about ecological systems to suppose that you can remove an element and leave the rest unchanged. There is, if you like, a God-shaped hole in our ozone layer. And it is time that we thought about moral ecology too.

The idea of a "moral ecology" is a suggestive one which argues that the values and structures of social life, like the elements of the physical ecology, are either being maintained in balance or are being eroded. The elements of such an ecology exist even if we have not been aware of them and only gradually become so through the symptoms of an ecology which has been thrown out of balance. In contrast to a relatively homogenous society, within a plural society the elements of this ecology and the balances between them are also contested. Rushdie (1990c), in his piece "In Good Faith", has argued for the literary characteristics of the novel as being the form par excellence that expresses and allows people to experience the competing values of the modern and postmodern worlds. This is also very much in line with Carlos Fuentes' (1989) view that, "In the novel, realities that are normally separated can meet, establishing a dialogic encounter, a meeting with the other" and that the novel is therefore a "privileged arena" which can be instrumental in "bringing together, in tension and dialogue, not only opposing characters, but also different historical ages, social levels, civilisation and other, dawning realities of human life."

Fuentes (1989) furthermore argues that these very characteristics of the novel are "born of the very fact that we do not understand one another any longer, because
unitary, orthodox language has broken down." In the light of this he argues that, "Impose a unitary language: you kill the novel, but you also kill the society.... Fiction is but the expression of the cultural, personal and spiritual diversity of mankind." This is a view of the novel form which, of course, has epistemological implications and connects with the fact that, unlike in the 1960s, we are currently in an era in which the old certainties of modernism are also giving way, at least among the philosophical and cultural elites, to a postmodernism of shifting identities, values and approaches, in which the temporary and the provisional are celebrated over and against the traditional objective certainties of both religion and of the modernist, scientific worldview.

Mikhail Bakhtin (1981) has described the contemporary age as being one of "competitive languages." W.L. Webb (1989), speaking of what he characterised as the "two tracks of Islamic fundamentalism, and existential, post-Christian modernism" reflects that, "The wonder is....that their collision didn't occur before now." In his piece entitled "Two books and two notions of the sacred", John Berger (1989) tried to unpack this current version of the religious-secular clash in terms of both religious and secular people having a sense of the sacred, but locating it in different ways. Concerning the Qur'an and The Satanic Verses, Berger argued that,

The two books at this moment represent two notions of the sacred. The Koran is a sacred book in the most traditional and profound sense of the term, a text dictated to the Prophet by the Archangel Gabriel, an emissary of the One and Only God. Rushdie's book has become a sacred cause to the European world because it represents the artist's right to freedom of expression. In Europe, as has been pointed out before, art has replaced religion.

Newbigin (1990: 17) argues that, for most of human history, religion has provided the integrative symbols of ultimate meaning within which the diversities of life were enabled to find their coherence, and that, "To acknowledge that ultimate symbol, to reverence the sacred, was the precondition for knowledge and understanding. If that is destroyed, things fall apart." The phrase "things fall apart" evokes the poetry of W.B. Yeats in which the early twentieth century experience of "things fall apart, the centre cannot hold" is reflected. In the Rushdie controversy there is a perception on both sides of the debate, albeit in radically different ways, of "things falling apart."
At a number of levels - political, moral and economic - the perception of "things falling apart" is precisely how many Muslims (and also many people of other religious traditions) perceive a Europe in which knowledge, religion, morality and social organisation have become fragmented and are not understood to be part of an organic whole, nor are they related to an objective and externally existing truth. In this perspective, postmodernist relativism is precisely both a symptom and a cause of "things falling apart." By contrast, Islam posits a world of objective truths rooted in the perfect revelation of the Qur'an which is concerned for the whole of life, including corporate as well as personal existence. For Muslims, God's revelation provides a context and a foundation for all human knowledge, religion, morality and social organisation.

As a critique of this approach from within a Muslim culture and civilisation, the Egyptian playwright Kalim Alrawi (1989b) points out that, "Islam, in its practice once a tolerant faith, is now the culture of the Book that bears no rivals" and that, within this, the Qur'an is "the ultimate text." Alrawi therefore argues, by implication, that "all other texts are, in one way or another, either commentaries on it, making its mysteries more accessible and promoting its values, or else they are hubristic" and concludes by lamenting that if this trend within Islam continues then, "Our minds will then be neatly gift wrapped in the pages of the one true text, whose duplication and recitation will be our sole creative outlet."

For many western secular people, the originally religious "centre" of Christendom was replaced by one or another ideology, with Marxism as a particularly powerful force in the earlier part of the century. Today this ideology has also lost its hold as centripetal forces have destroyed it in the wake of the collapse of the Communist regimes in the former Soviet Union and Eastern and Central Europe, whilst China appears to be taking a capitalist pathway in all but name. For many today, the postmodernist celebration of non-centredness (Jameson, 1991) and relativism is all that is left. This relativism is what is celebrated in the novels of Rushdie, where figures in stories metamorphise and the categories of "good" and "evil" appear ambiguous. Western liberals are also concerned about "things falling apart", although their perceptions of the constituents of the moral ozone layer are profoundly different. They
are focused upon the sense of threat, embodied in the Bradford book-burning and the Ayatollah Khomeini's *fatwa*, which absolutist religious understandings of Muslim values appear to pose to the social projects of liberalism and multi-culturalism. But in western liberal thought, individual subjectivity has sometimes been elevated so far that, as Martin Hoffman points (1989) out, "The idea of the free individual whose moral worth is tampered with if he is not allowed to express himself freely, to exercise freedom of conscience, and to learn from others' criticism is, in fact, a quasi-religious construction. It is a religion without god: it puts man at the centre of the moral universe" and for Hoffman, the ideas of truth winning out in the market-place of ideas is one of "the great postulates of secular humanism." In contrast, Shabbir Akhtar (1989d), in his provocative piece entitled, "The Liberal Inquisition" argues that "Both Muslims and their liberal opponents should now shun the dramatic dogmatism of former days and ask themselves: is freedom of speech a negotiable value? Is it a contestable concept? Does the secular clergy have the right to canonise freedom of speech as an absolute value overriding all others?"

Philip Roth once famously distinguished between reactions to literature in the communist and the capitalist countries on the basis that in totalitarianism "everything matters and nothing goes," whereas in liberal democracy, "nothing matters and everything goes." Webb (1989) argues that it would be a mistake to reduce the affair, "to a simple neo-Victorian opposition between our light and their darkness." Instead of this, he suggests, "Try seeing the Rushdie affair, pre-Khomeini, for example, as a test case between a culture which knows the price of everything and the value of nothing, where the best lack all conviction, and the passionate intensity of people who do believe no price is too high to pay for obedience to the will of Allah as interpreted by his Imam."

In the light of the Rushdie controversy, Fuentes comments that, "*The Satanic Verses* have pushed the 'nothing goes' of intolerance right out into the public squares of indifference. Suddenly, we all realise that everything matters, whether it goes or not." Modern societies have tried to build themselves on the basis of separating the technical from the moral, the public from the personal, and this has been classically analysed in the sociological distinction between the public and private spheres
With regard to its application to understanding a society with a plurality of cultures, John Rex's (1985; 1987) seminal essay, *The Concept of a Multicultural Society* argues for a way forward based upon this classical distinction. But the controversy challenges this separation and, in a conference paper presented on "Research on Muslims and the Rushdie affair" (Rex, 1990) as well as in his (Rex, 1991) paper on "The political Sociology of a Multi-Cultural Society," Rex himself recognised such a challenge as one of the major entails of the Rushdie controversy. Further implications of this will be explored in more detail in the closing chapter of the thesis.

It is the recognition that religion has a concern with the public sphere which has led to the initiation of a search for common values in a plural society. People of various faiths who participate in inter-faith meetings and events can often be found expressing general statements about holding values in common and about common moral and ethical commitment. For example, the statement that "we all believe in the family, don't we?", can be uttered as a rhetorical question expecting an affirmative answer. But is it actually true? Do people of all religious traditions believe in the family? Or at least, do they all believe in it in the same way or share the same idea about how the family they affirm is to be defined? The *Statement on Inter-Religious Relations* (1991a) issued by the Inter Faith Network for the United Kingdom is an example of a multi-faith affirmation of some commonality in values. In the context of the wider British society of which the various religious traditions are a part, the statement (1991a: paragraph 4) speaks of "a recognition of the extent to which we share a range of common values and ideals which can contribute to a wider sense of community in our society." However, interestingly, when it goes on to indicate what these are, it turns to an essentially negative means of fleshing out the meaning of the common ideals of which it speaks (1991a: paragraph 4),

in their varied ways they all point to the value of human, animal and natural life, and to a Reality which infinitely transcends all that we can see, touch, smell, taste and hear. We hold in common ideals of compassion, service, justice, peace, and concern for the environment. We also believe that popularity, money and power should never be accepted as the sole determining factors in individual or social life. We acknowledge that many of those who are without a religious commitment also uphold these ideals.
In recent years there have been other attempts to identify common values, most notably in the _Projekt Weltethos_ with which the Swiss Roman Catholic theologian Hans Küng (1990) has been associated and which led to the _Declaration Towards a World Ethic_ (Küng and Kuschel, eds, 1993) at the 1994 Chicago Parliament of World Religions. The extent to which it has achieved this has been questioned (Race, 1995) from a number of angles in terms of how universalistic or partial its scope really is and yet it has found an echo among many (Küng, 1996).

In relation to the historical actualisation of values which might be thought to be held in common, both the Inter Faith Network's _Statement on Inter-Religious Relations_ and the Parliament's _Declaration Towards a Global Ethic_ acknowledge that there is actually often very considerable debate and indeed disagreement among people of different religious traditions and, indeed, as well as among people within a single religious tradition. As the _Statement on Inter-Religious Relations_ (1991a: paragraph 4) puts it, "Both within and between our communities there are significant differences in the ways in which we translate these values and ideals into ethical judgements concerning specific personal and social issues."

In this context it might be helpful to try and differentiate between "values" and "ethics." Values is a word which is frequently appealed to but rarely defined. Popularly speaking, the notion of values tends to be invoked by self-confident individuals or institutions with reference to what they perceive as self-evident truths and from which others are usually judged to have fallen away, or else it is used in such a "woolly" way as to be virtually evacuated of content, becoming so elastic as to have any and, therefore, no meaning. An alternative way of understanding values is to see them as the fundamental assumptions which lie behind ethics, with ethics being the outworkings of values in conditioned historical circumstances. Or, in other terminology, as Jay Newman (1982: 68) argues, "transcultural values are essentially _ends_, and people in different political or ethnic groups disagree as to what the appropriate _means_ to these ends are." If values are understood and differentiated from ethics in the sense suggested above, or ethical "ends" from ethical "means" as proposed by Newman, then different groups could be encouraged to bring their fundamental and possibly absolute convictions or ethical "ends" signalled by the word
"values" into a process of social "negotiation" out of which could emerge some practical and historically conditioned judgements on appropriate and effective "means" - in other words, some agreed basis for deciding how to proceed in particular circumstances.

The possibility of provisionally agreeing some commonly worked out and accepted "rules of the game" for negotiating difference seems perhaps to offer a more hopeful way forward than a very uncertain search for a supposedly pre-existent but yet-to-be-discovered set of common values which extend beyond the basic preconditions for their existence. Kessel argues (1989a) that "basic pre-conditioning values which are integrally implied by the meaning of a plural society as necessary are, "the notion of a peaceable community, one that renounces force against the innocent as a basis for settling disputes among its members. Negotiation among parties holding honest differences of opinion thus becomes the process by which members of a secular moral community affirm their mutual respect." Kessel (1989b) believes that, in this respect, society could learn a lot from the evolution from what he calls "medical ethics as a moral lingua franca".

Negotiation is of the essence of a democratic polity and in this context, it is worth reflecting on the distinction to be drawn between consensus and co-operation. Horowitz (1967: 269) argues that, "Consensus stands for agreement internally, ie. in terms of shared perspectives, agreements on the rules of association and action, a common set of norms and values. Co-operation for its part makes no demands on role uniformity but only on procedural rules. Co-operation concerns the settlement of a problem in terms which make possible the continuation of differences and even fundamental disagreements." Ling (1974: 72) argues that, "Consensus is agreement on the content of behaviour, while co-operation necessitates agreement only on the form of behaviour."

A set of "common values" would require a degree of consensus which the Rushdie controversy has made clear does not exist. In the light of the values clashes between autonomy and heteronomy, sacred and secular, objective and absolute, and subjective and provisional epistemologies revealed by the Rushdie controversy the question has to be considered as to whether the quest for common values is too idealistic and does
not take sufficient account of the distinctive nature of traditions. In contrast to those who seek for commonalities, there are those within pluralist societies who advocate a more "separatist" or "parallelist" solution to the challenges posed by social and religious plurality. For example, in the light of the controversy Shabbir Akhtar (1989b) comments that, "Those Muslims who find it intolerable to live in a United Kingdom contaminated with the Rushdie virus need to seriously consider the Islamic alternatives of emigration (hijrah) to the House of Islam or a declaration of holy war (jihad) on the House of Rejection".

Whilst co-operation does not require consensus, but rather agreement on some "commonly accepted practices and procedures," it nevertheless has to be recognised that to shift the emphasis from common values to "commonly accepted practices and procedures" is not to avoid difficulties. Some within religious traditions might fear that such a process would inevitably involve an attempt to water-down their non-negotiable values. How does negotiation, with its implicit assumption of the possibility of compromise, relate to the absolute claims which are often made by people within the religious traditions? Are not values, by definition, non-negotiable? Does not the very idea of "negotiation" prevent the participation of those who make absolute claims, because it presupposes that there are no absolutes?

In response to such concerns, it can be argued that what are viewed as being negotiable are what might be termed "values outcomes" rather than the values themselves. In such an understanding the focus of the negotiation is shifted from the values themselves, which for many may indeed be the non-negotiable presuppositions of the particular and distinctive position which they bring to the wider, common forum. Instead, the focus of negotiation moves to debate about "values outcomes" among people with varied convictions and perspectives who must live together in a very diverse society.

Therefore, rather than speaking of "values negotiation" it might be better to use the rather more clumsy, but perhaps more accurate term of "values outcomes negotiation". Here the focus of what is to be negotiated is not centred on the diverse and yet underlying values which individuals and communities hold as non-negotiable, but shifts to a process in which people with diverse convictions and perspectives commit
themselves to "holding the ring" for finding what are the most generally acceptable negotiated outcomes of their values for discerning ways of living together in a plural society.

When the possibilities for contribution to the common debate are denied, then it is inevitable that such people as Kalim Siddiqui (in Sharrock, 1989a) will argue that, "A sustained, well-thought-out and controlled campaign, that might also include symbolic breaking of the law and manipulation of the political process, may well be required if the British Muslim community is to secure its proper place in British society." It is in the wider political process and the expression given to this by the development of law that the "commonly accepted rules" are evolved, and it is therefore to these further two clusters of issues identified within the controversy that the following sections of the thesis now turn. As we do so, however, it is important for Muslims and people of other minority religious traditions to note, with Webb (1989), that if religions retain some recognised place in the common sphere,

the thing about reality is that it's largely a construct of power. In the past we used to send out gunboats to readjust the view in parts of the world where other notions of reality had started to obtrude on ours. But in the precarious democracy of today's melting-pot world that's not such a straightforward operation. We have a rough theory of co-existence, of course, whose rules are followed when more dangerous games can't be got away with, but it's tended to depend fairly heavily on other political constructs like the Berlin Wall. No one quite knows how it works when the protagonists, close neighbours in fact, turn to look at each other with a wild surmise and discover their dismaying proximity and incompatibility.

Reflecting upon the issues which the Rushdie controversy raises for the negotiation between pluralities of cultures and values, Parekh (1989e) suggests that just as "We have taken centuries to learn how to explore sexuality in literature without becoming either puritanical or pornographic" so "religion calls for extremely delicate and sensitive handling." In fact, he argues that it "requires a greater degree of sensitivity." In this connection, Parekh suggests (1989e) an understanding of what religious people mean by the sacred which might also be accessible to secular people:

By sacred, I mean that which is beyond utilitarian consideration and has an intrinsic or non-instrumental significance, which transcends and links up individuals with something greater than themselves and gives their lives depth and meaning. The holy represents sacredness anchored in, and defined in, terms of divine principle. Religion is the realm of the holy par excellence, but it does not exhaust sacredness. Even the atheist regards certain relationships,
activities, experiences, life and fellow-human beings as sacred. Broadly speaking, holiness is a religious category, sacredness a spiritual category; and respect a moral category.

Only if these shifts of understanding occur on the part of both secular and religious people will the negotiated development of social structures which enable creative partnerships between Muslims, other religious people and secular people become a real possibility. For the moment, however, the controversy embodies the clash of these worldviews and El-Essawy observed to Walter Schwartz (in Schwartz, 1989e) that, "If other writers now think twice about penning deliberate insults to a major religion in Britain, then we’ve already won.” To some extent at least, this is arguably an accurate observation on one consequence of the controversy in that, from the perspective of those who uphold the reality of the sacred as a sphere to be preserved from abuse, the controversy has meant that in future other writers and publishers are likely to be much more cautious, especially when dealing with stories or images which relate to Islam. On the other hand, the supporters of The Satanic Verses might also argue that the book has not been withdrawn from circulation and, indeed, has been translated and distributed in many parts of the world, thus vindicating the commitment to freedom of expression and publication.

However, beyond claimed victories on either side of the debate, the need for dialogue remains. Jonathan Sacks argues (1991: 68) that, “In a society of plurality and change, there may be no detailed moral consensus that can be inscribed on tablets of stone. But there can and must be a continuing conversation, joined by as many voices as possible, on what makes our society a collective enterprise: a community that embraces many communities.” In a democratic society, it is the process of evolving law which gives important social frameworks and sanctions to this dialogic collective enterprise.

g) The Controversy and Its Legal Entails: Individuals and Communities in Legal Perspective

This section of the chapter begins by examining the contrasting approaches to the role of law found within the Islamic vision and the legal history and contemporary practice of European societies. The section then argues that the debates around the blasphemy laws occasioned by the Rushdie controversy have coalesced into a much wider and
longer tradition of debates about the relationships between religion, law, society, the individual, artistic and creative freedom, and that it has highlighted these debates with reference to the particular challenges which arise from the highly plural nature of contemporary society. Especially through an examination of the history of debates around, and interpretations of, the blasphemy law, the section examines the special place that is accorded to established religion in the law. Finally, it argues that consideration of legal provisions against religious discrimination might more appropriately replace what is argued to be the currently unbalanced protection given to the rites and doctrines of the Church of England.

Referring to a July 1989 meeting of the Union of Muslim Organisations with Douglas Hurd and John Patten, John Davison et al (1989) point out that, "The official government line is that ministers are anxious to maintain a 'constructive dialogue' with Muslim leaders and listen to grievances. But privately, they are known to be worried about the breadth of the issues now being thrown up by the Rushdie affair." Davison et al (1989) also go on to argue that, "The Rushdie affair has acted as a catalyst and a rallying point for an increasingly militant community that is demanding the right to a separate lifestyle governed by its own laws."

In Muslim understanding religion and law are not separate entities concerned with separate spheres since Sharia'h is the unified and holistic path in which Muslims should live (Al-Abdin, 1995). Thus Muslims aspire to live in a society in which individual and corporate existence is fully integrated as a seamless Islamic whole (Berque, ed, 1978; Ferdinand and Mozaffari, eds, 1988; Khuri, 1990). At the same time, when living outside of the sphere where Islam is predominant, Muslims will seek for as much community autonomy as possible to enable as full an actualisation of all the dimensions of faith (Speelman, 1995). Indeed, the idea of spheres of limited community autonomy within a wider whole is precisely the classical way (Breiner, 1995; Atabani, 1995; Wessels, 1995) in which predominantly Muslim societies have sought to accommodate the existence of non-Muslim minorities in their midst as will be explored in a little more detail in the closing section of this chapter.

In the European and English situation in which the Rushdie conflict arose, the relationship between religion and the law has always been problematic (Mitchell,
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1967; Berman, 1974; Blom-Cooper, 1976; Dunstan, 1981). In the context of the Constantinian religion-state settlement there were originally both secular and ecclesiastical courts and, as English law evolved into a unified system, it did so on the basis of integrating aspects of ecclesiastical law into the developing common and statute law. This inheritance manifested itself particularly in respect of laws governing matters of personal and sexual morality. Consequently, in the 1960s with the impact of secularisation upon prevailing patterns of belief and morality, there was much debate about the relationship between religious belief and public law as, for example, in the debates on sexuality following the 1957 Wolfenden Report recommended the decriminalisation of private homosexual activity between consenting adults (Davies, C, 1989).

These debates led to a string of legislative changes at the interface between personal, religious and public moralities. In 1967, the Abortion Act legalised abortion if two doctors agreed that the operation was justifiable on grounds of psychological or medical health. Also in 1967, the Sexual Offences Act decriminalised homosexual activity in private between consenting adults (with some exceptions including, for example, serving members of the armed forces). In 1969, the Divorce Reform Act removed the idea of “matrimonial offence” as the only ground for divorce, offering the alternative concept of “irretrievable breakdown.”

The locus of conflict over the relationship between religion and the law has very often been at the interface of religion, state and sexuality, with debates between positions advocating moral and social arguments in favour of some degree of censorship and artistic claims to complete creative freedom. For example, in 1960, Penguin Books were prosecuted under the Obscene Publications Act for publishing a full version of D.H. Lawrence’s book, Lady Chatterley’s Lover. Following Penguin Books’ acquittal the boundaries of censorship began to roll back. In 1968, theatre censorship was abolished and cinema censorship was liberalised with local authorities managing the licensing system in their areas. This, however, resulted in some varied decisions in different local authority areas as, for example, in 1979 when the film The Life of Brian (of Nazareth) which contained jokes about the crucifixion was banned in some local areas and screened in others.
In the context of the Rushdie controversy it has already been noted that, on 24th October, the Islamic Society for the Promotion of Religious Tolerance held a conference to discuss *The Satanic Verses* in conjunction with Martin Scorsese's film of Nikos Kazantzakis' 1985 novel, *The Last Temptation of Christ*, which had already been opposed in North America by an alliance of Conservative Protestants and Roman Catholics who had opposed the screening of the film on the grounds that it was blasphemous in its portrayal of Jesus fantasising about a sexual relationship with Mary Magdalene. In the UK, it was reported that a number of Muslim groups supported those Christians who called for its banning (*New Life*, 1988b). As has already been noted, the Leicester MP Keith Vaz, later also to play a prominent part in the campaign against *The Satanic Verses*, had opposed screening of the film. Arising from this conference, the Islamic Society for the Promotion of Tolerance originally aimed to get an historical note of correction inserted in the novel, distinguishing it from historical fact, but failure to achieve this or other similar measures proposed by other Muslim organisations eventually led to the emergence of calls for the prosecution of the novel's author and publishers under the terms of the blasphemy laws.

In 1949, Lord Denning (1949: 46) had said of the blasphemy law that, "The reason for this law was because it was thought that a denial of Christianity was liable to shake the fabric of society, which was itself founded on the Christian religion. There is no such danger to society now and the offence of blasphemy is a dead letter," a perception which was confirmed by the disbandment, in 1959, of the Society for the Abolition of the Blasphemy Laws. In England and Wales, the laws of blasphemy (Balcombe, 1990) and blasphemous libel (Buxton, 1978) are not part of statute law enacted by Parliament, but arise from the history in which, before the restoration of the monarchy, offences against morality and religion were in the jurisdiction of ecclesiastical courts and the Court of Star Chamber. It was following a 1676 case against one Taylor who declared that "Jesus Christ was a bastard, an imposter and a cheat" that common law was used against blasphemy. As part of the common law inheritance, interpreted in its application by custom and case-law in which blasphemy in books became, broadly speaking, defined as something concerned with the publication of scurrilous, offensive or abusive matter concerning God, Christ, the Christian religion, the Bible or a sacred subject whilst the offence of blasphemous
libel appears to have related specifically to attack upon the tenets of the Church of England. The Blasphemy Act of 1697 disqualified from "Ecclesiastical, Civil or Military" office anyone who had been brought up in or professed faith in Christianity and who then denied its truth, the inspiration of the Bible or Trinitarian doctrine, or who advocated polytheism. The provision relating to Trinitarian belief was abolished in the 18th century, but the rest of the Act remained on the statute book until, on the advice of the Law Commission, the 1967 Criminal Law Act removed it.

Publication of Tom Paine's book The Age of Reason was continually subject to prosecution, but in the 19th century case against one Richard Carslile, Robilliard (1984: 26) points out that it was decided that, "it was possible to discuss religious topics provided that this was done with respect and moderation - it must not be mere scoffing at the subject", thus beginning the distinction which increasingly came to be made between blasphemy and the temperate questioning of orthodoxy. The likelihood of inducing shock, plus the undermining of the foundations of morality were usually adduced as grounds for prosecution. For example, the journal The Freethinker was prosecuted three times for its attacks on Christianity, but Lord Coleridge held that, provided "the decencies of controversy are observed", the fundamentals of Christianity could be attacked, adducing as evidence the recent changes in the law relating to Jews and other religious minorities. At this time, this was a considerably debated viewpoint, but eventually it became the accepted interpretation. After the 1911 conviction of Smith, the then Attorney-General, Sir John Simon, argued for ending the special protection accorded to the Church of England and also that opinions on religious topics should only be prosecuted if they were put forward in an indecent or obscene way (see Robilliard, 1984: 30). Concern for civil disorder resulting from blasphemy therefore became linked to the manner of expression of ideas rather than to ideas themselves.

The offences had evolved over the years with respect to their meaning and the burden of proof required for conviction. The debates around the definition of what constitutes the offences of blasphemy and blasphemous libel underline the fact that the history of these common law offences has been very varied. Originally, objective statements and actions were considered sufficient for conviction, but as time went on, the
presence of subjective elements had increasingly been thought to be necessary in order to secure a conviction. At the beginning of the century there were a series of cases concerning one J.W. Gott who, in 1911, was given a four months prison sentence for blasphemy; in 1916, fourteen days hard labour for profanity; in 1917, six weeks for blasphemy; and in 1918, two months for a breach of a *Defence of the Realm Order* and the persistent sale and distribution of anti-Christian leaflets. At a trial, Judge Avory (in Robilliard, 1984: 31) guided the jury to ask the question “if a person of strong religious feelings had stopped to read this pamphlet whether his instinct might not have been to go up to the man who was selling it and give him a thrashing.” Gott was sentenced to nine months hard labour, with the Court of Appeal determining that the test for blasphemy should be that “it must be offensive to any one in sympathy with the Christian religion, whether he be a strong Christian, or a lukewarm Christian, or merely a person sympathising with their ideals.” After this case, however, the blasphemy laws fell into disuse, leading to Lord Denning’s conclusion that they had, by the late 1940s, become a dead letter.

However, in the 1970s an attempt was made to revive the laws, beginning with Mary Whitehouse’s 1972 complaint to the Director of Public Prosecutions about an episode of *Till Death Do Us Part* in which irreverent remarks were made about the Virgin Birth. The Director of Public Prosecutions thought a blasphemy prosecution unlikely to succeed, but the National Viewers and Listeners Association had received legal advice that it would be possible to bring a common law prosecution for blasphemy although the provocation of extreme anger would need to be proved. Then, in 1976, Jens Jorgen Thorsen proposed making a film in Britain which would have shown Jesus in explicit sexual activity with John the Baptist, Mary Magdelene and a Palestinian girl of today. The Archbishop of Canterbury said he would consider invoking the blasphemy law, but in the end the film was never made.

It was, however, the cases of *R v. Lemon* and *R v. Gay News*, brought as successful test case private prosecutions by Mrs. Mary Whitehouse (see *All England Law Reports* [1979] 1 All ER, pp. 898-928) which finally revived the use of these laws. The cases concerned the publication of a poem by Professor James Kirkup entitled, “The love that dares to speak its name.” This portrayed the centurion in attendance at the
crucifixion of Jesus as having had homosexual fantasies about him. As in the later controversy over *The Satanic Verses*, this was an instance in which religious and sexual themes were interwoven. Significantly, the issue of subjective intention was not allowed as a defence and unlike in the case of Gott, it no longer appeared to be necessary to prove a likely breach of the peace. The jury convicted the editor and the paper of blasphemy, with a fine being imposed upon the paper and a suspended sentence on the editor.

There was an appeal to the Court of Appeal but this was rejected. A further appeal to the House of Lords was rejected by three votes to two. Whilst the Lords Diplock and Edmund-Davies had felt that demonstration of a "specific intention" to blaspheme was necessary for conviction, Viscount Dilhorne, Lord Russell of Killowen and Lord Scarman took the opposite view, arguing that it was only necessary to show an intention to publish blasphemous material. Lord Scarman declared that allowing intent as a defence is "no way forward for a successful plural society." He also adduced support for the blasphemy laws in Article 9 of the European Convention of Human Rights, and expressed the view that the blasphemy laws should be extended to cover other religions as well as Christianity.

Historically, the laws provided for the prosecution of blasphemy and of blasphemous libel in relation to Christian religion in general and, in particular, to the rites and formularies of the Church of England. The 1838 Gathercole case clarified that attacks on Judaism, Islam, or other Christian denominations outside of Established Christianity were not covered by the law although, later in the 19th century, the Lords Macauley and Campbell had argued that blasphemy could apply to other religious traditions as well as to Christianity (see Robilliard, 1984: 36). Writing prior to the revival of the issue in *The Satanic Verses* controversy, Robilliard (1984: 36) commented that,

The Gay News trial was a clash between two pressure groups of the late twentieth century. It will be remembered that at first instance the defence argued that blasphemy no longer existed and since then there has been a widespread debate on whether there is a place for such an offence and if so what its ambit should be. A secondary debate has centred around the technical difficulties of the current law coupled with the difficulties of finding an acceptable formula by which to draft a new law, should it be thought expedient to continue the offence in a modified form or indeed (as Lord Scarman hopes) in an extended form.
As argued within the previous section of this chapter which explored the issues of values within a plural society, in an evolving multi-cultural and multi-faith society the approach taken by the law is critical (Poulter, 1990b). There are a number of fundamental options here (Wilson, 1990). It is possible to have traditions of law applying rigorously to all, devolved or partially devolved systems of law applicable to particular communities (Allott, 1990), or the current approach of English law which proceeds by establishing exceptions within general rules (Bradney, 1993). Examples of this tradition (see Poulter, 1986, 1990a) in English law include the Slaughterhouses Act and the Slaughter of Poultry Act in which Shechita and dbah slaughter are made permissable for Jews and Muslims, respectively. On the basis of such examples, Bishop Michael Nazir-Ali (1989) has argued that,

> in England there is a strong Common Law tradition. Surely this can be developed in such a way that it both safeguards cultural identity and protects individuals from the tyranny of the group? Muslims have the right to campaign peacefully for the development of this tradition in ways which are consonant with the Shariah. At the same time they must recognise the fact that this tradition already has certain values inherent in it and also that other groups and individuals in society are trying to influence its development.

These wider debates on the relationship between religion, values, law, society and the individual have been given impetus through the Rushdie controversy's highlighting of the specific issue of the blasphemy laws. It was the Rushdie controversy which, as Wolfe (1994: 101) put it, “threw the issues into stark relief.” Of course, even if Lord Scarman’s recommendations had been adopted and the terms of the blasphemy laws had been explicitly extended to include other than Christian religious traditions, it is by no means certain that there could have been a successful prosecution in the context of the Rushdie controversy. This is because it is possible that not only would it have been necessary to prove that the book had caused outrage (which could relatively easily have been done) but also (as distinct from the original crimes of blasphemy and blasphemous libel, but in line with how these had increasingly become interpreted), that such outrage was intentionally caused.

When, through the Rushdie controversy, it became clear that the current terms of reference for the blasphemy laws did not include Islam, the extension of these laws to include Islam and other religions became one of the central demands of the Muslim campaigns and Muslim leaders called for a change to the current position (see
Barwick, 1989b). Whilst at least Church of England Christians have a legal right to seek redress in the Courts when they feel their faith is being maligned, Muslims have been denied this recourse to law whilst simultaneously they were being criticised for having resorted to symbolic book-burnings and street demonstrations because other possibilities seemed closed to them. At the time of writing, however, the common law provisions remain, neither abolished nor reformed. As such, they are a continuing expression of the enshrined privilege in the structures of the state and of society for one section of one religious community as well as being a reminder of the exclusion of others.

The Home Office made it clear that the Government was not intending to extend the scope of the blasphemy laws. Sir Geoffrey Howe (quoted in The Guardian, 1989) said that, "The more one contemplates that....the more one shrinks from it", whilst commenting that, "The need now is to evolve a balance, in a multi-cultural, instant-communications world, between respect for religion and the freedom of expression which is entrenched in the laws of most countries." A Church Times editorial (1989a) argued that the Home Office's decision was, in this respect, "well judged" on the basis that, "Defining blasphemy for legal purposes would be as difficult as defining religion itself; and if a Bill were ever drawn up and passed, the writs would be endless." Habgood (1989a) agreed with this but thought that, "if there has to be an alternative" then the development of the aspect of the law which deals with "the shaking of the fabric of society when widespread sensibilities are offended" might prove to be the best way forward. Habgood also argued that this would allow distinctions to be made between religions since, in his view, "not all contribute to the cohesiveness of society." In this idea,

The test of blasphemy, thus interpreted, would relate not just to the degree of offence felt by individuals, but to the place within the society of the religious body in question, this to include such factors as extensiveness, public commitment, and common concern with other religious bodies for social stability.

A number of commentators have argued that the simple abolition of existing legislation without replacement would, in the words of Habgood's letter to The Times (1989a), "signal, however inadvertently, that in the last resort our society holds nothing sacred, apart from the freedom of writers to write whatever they like."
Following a 1989 religious leaders' meeting in Bradford convened by the Bishop of Bradford, Revd. John Nicholson (in Hardy, 1989), North-East Area Baptist Superintendent said, "We concurred in asking whether there are to be no constraints on freedom of expression. If the answer is no, then should there not be legal redress for non-Christians when material is published they consider blasphemous?"

In contrast, critics of blasphemy legislation, such as Nicholas Walter (1989a) of the Rationalist Press Association pointed out that, in fact, "the blasphemy law doesn't work. It has been used in this country for three centuries, but in every single case the main practical effect has been not the suppression but the increased circulation of the offending material." Paul O'Higgins (1989), Professor of Law at King's College, London argued that, "Today, the crime of blasphemy is an historical accident consisting of the residue of a crime which in its original form should have no place in the 20th century."

In the tradition of such opposition to the blasphemy laws there have long been attempts to abolish them. In 1886, Professor Courtney Kenny introduced a Bill to abolish the law of blasphemy, following the conviction for blasphemy of Foote, the editor of The Freethinker, although his proposals would, nevertheless, still have retained some measure of protection against unwarranted attack upon religions. On 12th April, 1898, Charles Bradlaugh, MP for Northampton, introduced a bill seeking the end of the blasphemy laws. Other Bills were introduced in 1890, 1894, 1914, 1922, 1930, and 1936 but all such attempts were unsuccessful including when, just prior to the Gay News case, there was a further attempt on 23rd February 1978 to abolish the law without replacement on the grounds that it was outdated; that particular groups should not be privileged in law; and that if material was offensive it could be dealt with under obscenity laws. Significantly for the argument of this thesis, this latter attempt at abolition was rejected on the basis that England, its institutions and monarchy were still basically Christian and that the law needed to give expression to this because repeal could give a signal that would unlock the floodgates of attacks upon religion. During the Rushdie controversy, on 12th April 1989, the centenary of Charles Bradlaugh’s bill for the repeal of statutory blasphemy laws, Tony Benn, MP presented to the House of Commons the first formal reading of a Private
Member's Bill entitled The Religious Prosecutions (Abolition) Bill (Hughes, 1989; New Life, 1989q; The Church Times, 1989e) which was again unsuccessful although supported by MPs of all parties including Sir David Steel and Sir Ian Gilmour (see Benn, 1989).

The journalist Peter Jenkins (1989b) argued that free speech is not only the freedom of writers but is "at the foundation of liberty and everything we mean when we speak of democracy" and also that, "Nor is free speech required to be protected from itself in the way that religions have claimed protection from free speech." The Committee Against the Blasphemy Law (1989), with supporters such as Bernard Crick, David Edgar, Glenda Jackson, Dennis Potter, Jill Tweedie and others, opposed the Muslim campaign to extend the law on the grounds that, "this would involve an undesirable restriction in our precious freedom of inquiry and expression and an equally undesirable encouragement of dangerous fanaticism in our pluralist society." In a letter to The Independent this position was also supported by a group of "scholars of South Asia" (Chapman et al, 1989). Among the general public, a survey of 1,792 people over the age of fifteen questioned by the Public Attitude Survey (see The Independent, 10.10.89) suggested that one in three people would like the blasphemy law scrapped altogether, with an equal proportion wanting it extended to cover other religious traditions, whilst seven per cent believed it should remain solely related to Christianity. Perhaps not surprisingly, most atheists were in favour of abolishing the laws whilst nearly all Muslims wanted it extended to cover Islam.

The Rushdie controversy has thus reprised, sharpened and given practical relevance to the issues which were debated by the Law Commissioners in their reviews of the offences in the early 1980s as part of their ongoing programme to review common law and in the context of renewed public debate (Blom-Cooper, 1981) on the laws following the Gay News case. In 1981, the Commission had published its Working Paper No. 79 on Offences Against Religion and Public Worship in which the history of the common law offences were outlined and issues surrounding the desirability and practicability of creating new statutory offences were examined. The Commission saw four possible justifications for such law. First, as a response to a crime against God - for which penal sanctions were not thought to be appropriate today. Second, for the
protection of society from damaging views, but this was judged to run counter to the interests of free speech. Third, for the protection of religious sensibilities, as in the 1981 *Indecent Displays (Control) Act*'s protection for offended sensibilities with regard to the portrayal of sex. The fourth argument was one for the protection of public order which it was felt could generally be dealt with under Public Order legislation. The Law Commission (1981: paragraph 7.15) also argued that, in the context of "overwhelming social pressures, ...the general presumption in favour of freedom of speech both as to matter and manner may require modification either for the benefit of particular members of society or for the benefit of society as a whole." It identified incitement to racial hatred as such an issue but, at that time, judged that the likely social dangers to result from attacks upon religion were not so great.

As alternatives to the blasphemy laws, the Commission (Law Commission, 1981: paragraph 8.3-4) considered the possibility of introducing offences of "publishing insulting matter likely to provoke a breach of the peace by outraging the religious convictions of others"; "incitement to religious hatred" (1981: paragraph 8.5) and "publicly insulting the feelings of religious believers." On balance, if it were thought expedient to have a law at all, then the Commissioners (1981: paragraph 8.15) favoured the first of these options, qualified by the necessity to prove intent and allowing a valid defence in the instance of attacks upon "particular religious sects." In this context, since the Christian religion could no longer be assumed to be the given religion, the issue of defining religion would need to be addressed. The Commissioners (1981: paragraph 8.17-22) therefore argued that, if offences of this kind were to be introduced then, by a small margin, they favoured the adoption for this purpose, too, of the list of those religions recognised as such by the Registrar-General for the purpose of registration as places of worship.

Writing in 1984, Robilliard (1984: 40) felt that the Commission's views would "find general favour with established...opinion" although he argued that it could have given some consideration to the possibility of legislation against "group libel" (1984: 10). Robilliard also noted that the Law Commission did not consider a possible distinction between "restricted" and "prohibited" material as the Williams Committee on Obscenity and Film Censorship had proposed. Robilliard (1984: 41) concluded that,
"Whatever happens, many will be unhappy." He also noted that if the old law lingers on "there will be many cases of religious vilification that it will not reach" and that, "any defendant prosecuted under it may expect considerable sympathy given the castigation the offence has generally received." Both judgements were to prove prescient with regard to Salman Rushdie, Viking Penguin and publication of The Satanic Verses.

In 1985, after receiving submissions on this Working Paper from many different organisations, the Commission published its Report No. 145 entitled Criminal Law Offences Against Religion and Public Worship. By a majority of three Commissioners to two the Report recommended abolition of the common law offences of blasphemy and blasphemous libel without replacement by statute law, on the grounds that, "where members of society have a multiplicity of faiths or none at all it is invidious to single out that religion [the Church of England], albeit in England the established religion, for protection." However, the two outvoted Commissioners felt so strongly that a new statutory offence should be enacted and extended to other religions that they produced a minority Note of Dissent which also appears in the Report. In this, they advocated the enactment of a new offence which "would penalise anyone who published grossly abusive or insulting material relating to religion with the purpose of outraging religious feelings." These dissenters included Lord Scarman, who later played such a significant role in race and community relations with his Committee of Enquiry into the disturbances of the summer of 1981 (Scarman, 1982).

As Wolffe (1994: 101) says, "The problem, in a nutshell, was whether the law should treat England as a secular society in which religion had no special protection; or as a multi-religious one in which all faiths were accorded some legal recognition." Debates about the blasphemy laws therefore link intimately with the debates about secularisation, secularity and secularism as well as with issues of religious, cultural and values plurality that have been explored earlier in this chapter. John Vincent (Vincent, 1989), Professor of History at Bristol University, in arguing that protection should be given to Islam under blasphemy legislation commented in respect of the Law Commission's arguments for and against that, "The balance is still a fine one. The arguments have not changed, but the sociology has" citing the significantly changed
composition of English society which will be explored in some detail in the closing chapter of this thesis.

It has already been noted that, as part of their response to the controversy, the Inter Faith Network for the UK and the Commission for Racial Equality jointly organised two seminars. Among the papers at the first conference was a presentation by Professor Keith Ward which was of particular interest because, as well as being at that time chair of the inter-faith organisation, the World Congress of Faiths, he had previously been a member of a working party which had been appointed by the Archbishop of Canterbury to report (1985) on the Law Commission proposals with regard to the blasphemy law. As a member of that working party Professor Ward had supported the extension of the blasphemy laws to include other than Christian religions. In the seminar, however, Ward (1990) explained that he had since changed his mind on this issue. Part of the argument for his new position was theological - that yesterday's heresy often becomes today's orthodoxy and that yesterday's heretics are often later proclaimed as prophets. From a specifically Christian perspective he also noted that Jesus was crucified, at least in part, on a charge of blasphemy and so it would be peculiar for a religion based on one who was accused of being a blasphemer to invoke legal sanctions against blasphemy.

However, in the end, in discussion within the seminar, Professor Ward (Commission for Racial Equality, 1990d: 52) commented with respect to the Archbishop's Working Party that, "while its members did not want legal protection for themselves on a personal basis, they did not think it would be right simply to surrender it." This off-the-cuff response perfectly epitomises the contradictory position in which members of an established Church can find themselves when they resist the implications of an argument not because of logic, but because of historical inheritance. It highlights the way in which, in the context of the Rushdie controversy, the debates around the blasphemy laws connect with the established status of the Church of England.

As we have already noted in chapter 3, following a 31st July 1989 meeting between the Archbishop of Canterbury, the Archbishop of York, the Bishop of Bradford, Phillip Lewis (the Bishop of Bradford's Adviser on Inter-Faith Relations) and Revd. Graham James, the Archbishop's chaplain, together with eight leading Muslims, a joint
six person working group was set up with Muslim representatives to explore the law in relation to the protection of religious sensibilities. A Church Times editorial on "Talking to Islam" (1989i) commented that, "the law is a weapon of doubtful usefulness against blasphemy; yet, if the group were to say so, the disappointment of a failure at the outset would be intense and damaging." However, Habgood (quoted in Brown, 1989b) expressed the opinion that the group "will not really talk about an extension of the blasphemy laws, because everybody recognises that this wouldn't work" but that an amendment to the Public Order Act on provisions for incitement to religious hatred might be of benefit.

Speaking of the significance of this working group, John Lyttle, the Archbishop of Canterbury's Secretary for Public Affairs said that, whilst "These discussions will be - will have to be - ecumenical later" nevertheless, "at the first stage", they wanted to respond to Muslims' expectations of the Church of England because, "Muslims, like other minority religious groups, tend to look to the Established Church" (in The Church Times 1989h). The Church Times' (1989i) editorial on "Talking to Islam" saw this meeting as a part of the increasing rapprochment between Christianity and Islam, in which Christians will be called upon not to react in a knee-jerk way to fears of "syncretism" but "will be obliged instead to consider carefully how wide is the area of agreement, between all those who acknowledge the transcendent, and how wide the area of disagreement." The editorial concluded that "Anglicanism, with its tradition of comprehending differences and its special position in the English State, is well placed to begin the work."

By contrast, James Fenton (1989a) argued that those who wish to legislate to protect feelings were "sentimentalists" and that with regard to the blasphemy laws, "A part of the problem is that Anglicanism....has allowed itself the luxury of legislated respect. The Church has hung on to the trappings of State....The State Church, in its decay, wishes to remain a State Church, even though it knows it must share the actual state with other religious denominations." From within the minority communities, Philip Kleinman (1989) argued against the Chief Rabbi's proposals for the extension of blasphemy legislation on the grounds that "For the one-time Christian monopoly of published opinion, the Chief Rabbi apparently wants to substitute an ecumenical cartel
in which purveyors of all brands of religious nonsense will be protected from criticism."

Having failed to make progress by means of the blasphemy laws, Muslim attention shifted to the use to which other legal instruments might be put with respect to the matters at stake in the Rushdie controversy. In considering both the issues and the other potential legal instruments, Melanie Phillips (1989a) argued that, "There is a significant difference between curtailing free expression so as not to give offence and doing so to protect the civil rights or physical safety of minority communities. That's why the blasphemy law is wrong but the Race Relations Act or Public Order Act are right."

The question of the Race Relations Act in relation to religion will be discussed in greater detail in the last chapter of the thesis but the historic interpretation of sedition is perhaps the closest provision which English law makes to that of incitement to religious hatred. Robilliard (1984: 8) explains that, "Sedition, as now constituted, consists of the intentional publication of words of a seditious nature with an intention to cause violence through that publication." Usually this has been interpreted in relation to the Government, but historically it has also included disaffection against the established Church. Its scope has sometimes also covered the production of ill-will and hostility between different groups, on the basis of which it has been possible for non-established religions to be protected where civil disturbance might be the outcome of an attack upon them. In recent times, however, in the use of this law there has been a requirement to establish an actual intention of creating violence. The Law Commission Working Paper No. 72 (1981: 43-44) expressed doubt as to whether the scope of the modern law of sedition could be extended beyond protection of the state and its bodies and, as Robilliard (1984: 9) points out, "Under the law of sedition a prosecution will only be contemplated in the most extreme of circumstances."

Others have tried to invoke the law on defamatory libel as a way forward. However, an attempted amendment to what was finally passed as the Defamation Act 1952 failed to extend it to groups characterised by "race, creed or colour." This was also not successful since, historically, defamation has been viewed as applicable only to individuals, although Jewish organisations have often argued for a "group libel" law
on the pattern of "class actions" allowable within United States law (see Robilliard 1984: 10).

A further alternative approach would be based upon the application of international law (Capotori, 1979). In the absence of a written constitution there are no written constitutional guarantees in English law with respect to religion, but the UK Government is a signatory to the European Convention on Human Rights which provides a channel of appeal beyond UK law and can also affect the interpretation of national law. With respect to religion, the Convention includes Article 9 which states that:

(1) Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion; this right includes freedom to change his religion or belief and freedom, either alone or in community with others and in public or private, to manifest his religion or belief, in worship, teaching, practice and observance.

(2) Freedom to manifest one's religion or beliefs shall be subject only to such limitations as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society in the interests of public order, health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.

Article 14 also provides that all the rights of the Convention shall be guaranteed to all without religious discrimination. In addition, subject only to the proviso in Article 9 of the European Convention, Article 18(2) of the 1976 Covenant on Civil and Political Rights provides that, together with a general upholding of religious freedom, "No one shall be subject to coercion which would impair his freedom to have or to adopt a religion or belief of his choice." Furthermore, Article 18(4) declares that, "The States Parties to the present Covenant undertake to have respect for the liberty of parents and, when applicable, legal guardians to ensure the religious and moral education of their children in conformity with their own convictions" whilst Article 20(2) goes on to prohibit incitement to religious hatred, although the British Government entered a reservation on this article.

The United Nations' Universal Declaration of Human Rights states, in Article 18, that "Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion; this right includes freedom to change his religion or belief; and freedom, either alone or in community with others and in public or private, to manifest his religion or belief in
teaching, practice, worship and observance" and there is now also a new Convention for the Elimination of all Forms of Religious Intolerance which could have relevance to these questions. Such international Covenants of rights might therefore offer useful higher level models to clarify the issues in British law and practice which are involved in the tensions between religious freedom and social integration. Of course, this is not to argue that issues of the kind highlighted in the Rushdie controversy can be solved in this way as the role of law in a global multi-cultural context is fraught with increasing complexities (Bozeman, 1971). As in the case of the United States, where we have seen that a tension exists between the two clauses of the Constitution which relate to religion, so also in any legal provisions that are evolved in England in the light of international law, tensions would inevitably remain in the application of such laws relating to religion, due to the different possible interpretations of the balancing clauses contained within international law. Robilliard (1984: xi) comments that one consequence of the absence of a written national constitution or a Bill of Rights in the UK is that, "it is likely that the legal results of such conflicts will be somewhat confused - a confusion which may be added to where the judge takes a restrictive view of the liberty (toleration) or an expansive one (full human right)."

The debates over the blasphemy laws were the most visible and explicit point of the overlap between issues arising from the controversy and established religion. Although abolition of these laws could, in principle, take place without disestablishment, for such abolition to be not just an expression of "negative" justice or equality, but also to give expression to a new understanding of a wider social polity within which all religions would have a recognised place in the public sphere, any such change would need to take place in the context of the wider constitutional changes which this thesis argues are entailed by the Rushdie controversy. But for this to be a possibility of practical politics, issues concerning representation and participation in a plural society need to be examined.

h) The Controversy and Its Political Entails: Operational and Symbolic Representation and Participation in a Plural Society

It is the argument of this section that the Rushdie controversy has dramatically highlighted and given further impetus to issues surrounding both the exclusion and the
operational and symbolic representation and participation of minorities, in this case religious minorities (of whom many are also cultural and ethnic minorities), within the democratic systems and processes of the state. In the case of Muslims, they have traditionally sought representation of their interests and concerns through the Labour Party but the section demonstrates how now, in the light of the lack of progress achieved in the Rushdie controversy and the perceived lack of sympathy for the Muslim cause on the part of many Labour MPs, Muslims have also begun to turn to independent political campaigning on an Islamic basis. The achievement of some degree of localised Muslim political influence is contrasted with their lack of channels of influence in the institutionalised arenas of national politics at the operational level of politics and the state. At the symbolic level, the ambiguity of the monarchy for the role of religions within the political and constitutional system is explored, recognising both the monarchy's central connection with the role of established religion at the heart of the state but also, during the reign of the current monarch, the tendencies of the monarchy to find inclusive ways of recognising the role and contribution of other than Christian religious traditions.

In exploring these issues, this section moves the thesis towards the development of arguments that will be brought to a conclusion in chapter 5: namely, that the entails of the Rushdie controversy, brought into conjunction with wider relevant social, religious, cultural, legal and political trends and developments, both signal and contribute to a kairos in the current arrangements for the relationships between religion(s), state and society in England within the UK state. Gerald Parsons (1994: 152) has drawn attention to the fact that, during the 1980s and early 1990s a succession of issues steadily served to pose the question, "how will the modern British state cope with the issues raised by the development of an increasingly thoroughly religiously plural society?" In particular, how will British governments and political parties respond to a variety of religious minorities (including ardently and assertively Christian minorities) who insist on taking religiously distinctive claims upon life, morality and conduct more seriously than the majority of the modern British population, and who also insist, moreover, upon seeking to translate such claims into social and political realities.

At the operational level of politics, the majority of the Muslim community in the UK have traditionally looked to the Labour Party to represent their interests and aspirations as members of minority ethnic communities suffering from racism and
discrimination on the basis of skin pigmentation and ethnicity. But there has been an increasing sense that the party was failing to support their specific interests as Muslims as, for example, in the widespread Labour reluctance to support public funding for Muslim voluntary aided schools. In the context of the Rushdie controversy, this perception of Labour indifference to Muslim concerns was heightened when the then Labour Party Leader, Neil Kinnock (reported in New Life, 1989x) met with Salman Rushdie at a “social occasion at the house of a mutual friend” and defended his right to publish. Outside of the Bradford epicentre of the controversy where, due to electoral demographics, the local Labour MPs had little choice but to try and accommodate Muslim concerns, it was left to Labour’s then only Asian Member of Parliament, Keith Vaz, to come out firmly in support of the Muslim community’s case. Vaz argued (1989b) that, “The issue goes far beyond anything that we imagined. It will mark a turning point for the way in which the community sees the Labour Party”. Dr. Michael Le Lohe (quoted in Davison et al, 1989), a politics lecturer at Bradford University and a Labour Party member, corroborated this view of the controversy when he concluded that, “It could cause the Labour party terrible problems. I think this will become a long-term constitutional problem for the Labour Party.”

In July of 1989 The Islamic Charter was issued and distributed through the mosques. In this Charter, Muslims were urged not to vote for any candidate who did not support them in the Rushdie issue. Sher Azam (quoted in Davison et al, 1989) explained that, “In the past large numbers of Muslims have supported the Labour Party; we are now saying we shall not support any political party that does not support us.” Michael le Lohe (in White, 1989) calculated that ten or more Parliamentary seats were at risk from such a tactic and it is increasingly clear that Muslims have significant influence and power in some local politics and at the level of some Parliamentary constituencies. An editorial in The Independent (18.2.89) pointed out that, “Already Labour councillors and members of parliament in places with a high proportion of Muslims find it expedient to express an understanding of practices and values which they would be tempted to denounce as reactionary if embraced by the Anglican church.”
The increasing dissatisfaction with Labour and frustration at lack of progress on the Rushdie controversy resulted in independent Muslim candidates standing in local elections in May 1989. However, no independent Muslim candidate managed to unseat a Labour councillor and, despite the general dissatisfaction with the Labour Party nationally, the divided evaluations of this approach can be illustrated by what happened in local elections in the Leicester area (New Life, 1989o) where two Muslim independent candidates - Mr. Ibrahim Bayat and Mr. Ismail Mullah - ran, respectively, for a city council byelection and the May 4th 1989 County Council election. Jacob Khan, chair of the Leicestershire Pakistani Association, supported these moves, whilst Mohammed Butt, chair of the Pakistan Welfare Association, argued that the issue should be pursued within existing parties, thus representing the bifurcation of Muslim approaches to politics that was highlighted by the controversy.

On 13th September 1989, with the publication of its Manifesto *The Way Ahead*, the Islamic Party of Great Britain was launched at the Regent's Park Mosque in London (Wahhab, 1989d). The Manifesto states that the party's aim is to provide "effective, adequate representation of Islamic principles in the UK" and to "present a viable political, economic and social alternative to the British people" (1989f). The party is led by an English convert to Islam, Daud Musa Pidcock and its secretary is Mustaqim Bleher, a German convert. At the party's launch, six of the twelve speakers were white converts to Islam or, as Muslims would prefer it to be expressed, "reverts." Its launch underlined the extent of the challenge which religious plurality was beginning to pose to existing political parties in terms of the adequacy of the representation they have been providing for the concerns of cultural and religious minorities.

*A Muslim News* (1989f) editorial argued that the launch of the Islamic Party of Great Britain "is the result of dissatisfaction amongst Muslims with the traditional parties", although an editorial in *New Life* (1989ac) had observed that "it is doubtful if this party will be able to win the support and confidence of even a fraction of Muslims." Maulana Abdur Rahim, director of the Sparkbrook Islamic Centre (see Weller, ed, 1993: 463) in Birmingham, gave the opinion that, "I don't think an Islamic party is appropriate" and that, "It's not in the best interests of the Muslim community to have a segregated political party". Zaki Badawi commented on the party's leaders that,
"Few have any roots in the community, a Muslim in Birmingham told me that it would be the Screaming Lord Such party number 2" and other Asian Muslim leaders also expressed scepticism and/or concern (New Life, 1989ad). However, the Muslim News (1989f) editorial claimed that, whilst "as expected there has been some opposition by some leaders of Muslim organisations and councillors" nevertheless the party "has been cautiously welcomed by the majority of the Muslim community as an alternative to the existing political parties." The editorial pointed out that in a Huddersfield local by-election in the Paddock Ward in May, an independent Muslim candidate had taken 5.3% of the total vote and 60% of the Muslim votes.

Therefore whilst Muslims have been beginning to exert some influence upon local political representation, at the national level they (like Hindus, Sikhs and Jains) are clearly marginal to the political mainstream. Wolffe (1994: 96) writes of the more recently established non-Christian groups that, "Although they did not face any constitutional obstacles to election to parliament, unlike Roman Catholics and Jews in the early nineteenth century, they remained underrepresented or even unrepresented."

At the time of writing there is currently no Muslim Member of Parliament and thus no directly sympathetic channel of direct representation for Muslim concerns. Furthermore, despite a number of attempts to create a generally acceptable umbrella body to provide a unified focus for Muslim political lobbying and mobilisation at a national level there has, as yet, been no real success. One attempt to organise a representative Muslim body along the lines of the Board of Deputies of British Jews (see Weller, ed, 1993: 330) has been The Muslim Parliament (see Weller, ed, 1993: 406), sponsored by the London-based Muslim Institute (see Weller, ed, 1993: 406), founded by Dr. Kalim Siddiqui. The vision of such a Parliament self-consciously modelled itself on the pattern of the Board of Deputies of British Jews. However, the adequacy of its representation of the Muslim community as a whole in England and the UK has been keenly contested within the community. Specifically, a number of critics have raised the question of how far it represents the ordinary working-class Muslims who form the majority of the community in such centres of British Islam as Bradford.
In contrast to the marginalised position of Muslims within the national political arena, the Church of England has access to the corridors of power through the role of its bishops in the House of Lords. Concerning this role, Michael Ramsey (1974: 181) specifically regretted that the Chadwick Commission had not probed into the question of "the value and importance of the bishops' contemporary role in the House of Lords." In the recent long years of Conservative Party ascendancy, the political significance of the Bishops in the upper House of Parliament has been enhanced since the House of Lords can modify legislation and it has sometimes seemed to be the only place where the Government's political will could be challenged. The Bishops in the House of Lords have therefore often acted as channels for the expression of the concerns of those whose voices might not otherwise have been heard, as in the debates around the clauses of the *Education Reform Act* that were concerned with Religious Education and collective worship.

However, structural questions about the appointment and role of the Bishops remain since the need for the broad political acceptability of those who might one day sit in the Lords means that, as in the creation of life peerages, the Prime Minister of the day always has the ultimate say in the appointment of all Diocesan Bishops. Although the Prime Minister's role in this has been modified in recent times, it is known that in 1987 the current Bishop of Bath and Wells, Bishop Jim Thompson, was blocked by Mrs. Thatcher from moving from Stepney to be the new Bishop of Birmingham. Lamont (1989: 195) notes that, "In the present circumstances it is unlikely that there could be a form of disestablishment which would free the Church of England from parliamentary control of doctrine and appointments and would allow it twenty-six ex-officio seats for bishops in the upper chamber."

Interestingly, the Chadwick Report (1970) recommended that, "leading members of other Communions, besides the Bishops of the Church of England, should be invited to sit in the House of Lords." In individual cases this has occurred, as in 1988 when the then Chief Rabbi, Immanuel Jakobovits, was made a member of the House of Lords under Mrs. Thatcher's Government after he set out an alternative social vision to the Church of England's *Faith in the City* report, the conclusions of which he had critiqued as having some clear political bias. But there has been no structural change
to the composition of the "Lords Spiritual", nor has there been any wider significant political reform of the House of Lords which would inevitably entail a re-examination of the role of the bishops, although such a re-examination does form a part of current Labour and Social and Liberal Democratic Party policy.

As Wolffe (1994: 94) notes, "the continued presence of the bishops in the Lords, and a sense that the Church of England remained at least on the fringes of mainstream power structures, distinguished it from other religious organisations which were prone to see themselves more as outsiders, seeking to influence the political process through a pressure-group kind of activity." Wolffe notes (1994: 94-95) that, with respect to Christian attempts to influence the political process, this kind of activity could be quite effective due to a "tendency for Christian commitment, or at least sympathy, to be proportionately more widespread among MPs than in society at large." In respect of the other than Christian traditions, Wolffe also noted (1994: 96) that, "the Jews, who had acquired the right to sit in Parliament in 1858, had formed institutions and connections that gave them effective political influence" and that, "Indeed, the proportion of Jewish MPs in the later twentieth century was substantially greater than their proportion in the population as a whole" although Geoffrey Alderman (1983: 153, 174-175) has contended that, "most Jewish MPs consider themselves as politicians who happen to be Jewish rather than as Jewish politicians."

Therefore, in summary, Wolffe (1994: 96) comments that, "around the core of formal ties between the Church of England and the state was a wider circle of Christian and Jewish influence, not recognised constitutionally, but politically quite significant." In confirmation of Wolffe's observation about informal Jewish networks of influence within public and political life, a number of Muslim critics have emphasised the contrast with their own experience of campaigning against *The Satanic Verses* by pointing out the success which Jewish opposition had to the staging, at the Royal Court Theatre, of Jim Allen's play, *Perdition*. Whilst the Jewish commentator Chaim Bermant (1989a) argued that the cases were different since "Allen's work was not a novel, but purported to be a reconstruction of recent events which touched on the personal experience of countless people still living, and which was a blatant piece of anti-Zionist propaganda," Ibrahim Hewitt of the Islamic Organisation for Media
Monitoring, in a letter to The Jewish Chronicle (10.2.89), argued that Chaim Bermant had failed to see the parallels with the play *Perdition* and that, “unfortunately, we do not have sympathetic newspapers in which to air our views. Hence demonstrations provide the only legal opportunities to express their dissatisfaction.” It was therefore precisely the lack of either the formal constitutional connections which would have given protection through the blasphemy laws together with the lack of Muslim informal networks of political influence comparable to the Jewish and wider Christian circles of influence noted by Wolfe that, in the context of Rushdie controversy, has underlined current Muslim political and constitutional impotence.

Having considered the operational level of politics in terms of both formal and informal representation, it is now important to examine the integrative symbolisation of political and constitutional life that is found in the monarchy through which the relationship between religion and politics in England is mediated as a consequence of the monarch being both Supreme Governor of the established Church and Head of State. As a consequence of this connection, as late as the Silver Jubilee of Queen Elizabeth, little recognition was given to a role in the celebratory events even for other Christian groups, let alone for representatives of other than Christian religious traditions, although the marriage of the Prince of Wales did, for the first time since the 1688 Revolution, involve a Roman Catholic clergyman - the Archbishop of Westminster. Although, on the face it, the monarchy therefore merely reinforces the current constitutional exclusion, as religious people, of Muslims and people of other than Christian religious traditions, its contemporary role is, in reality, more ambiguous. For example, prior to her Coronation, the Queen had asked for all peoples of the Commonwealth, “whatever your religion may be,” to pray for her even though the actual Coronation service was highly Anglican and Christian in content. The Queen is Patron of the national Council of Christians and Jews. The Duke of Edinburgh is Patron of the International Sacred Literature Trust. In 1966, a multi-faith Commonwealth Day celebration consisting of readings from the sacred literature of the participating religions had been held at St. Martin-in-the-Fields and was attended by the Queen although in the following year, controversy was provoked over a Commonwealth Day multi-faith service planned to take place at Westminster Abbey (Dunstan, 1967: 290).
The Commonwealth Christmas Day addresses of the monarch have also been in an inclusive tradition. They were started by King George VI and, as Wolfe (1993: 319) notes, "The linking of the broadcasts to a major Christian festival was important, contrasting with the tendency of other heads of state to link their utterances to days of national rather than religious reference." Although linked with the Christmas festival, these addresses have connected moral, spiritual and ethical values to more general religious reference points rather than to specific confessional beliefs. As Head of the Commonwealth, the Monarch clearly acts as Head of a multi-faith and multi-national community and so, in 1982, the Queen was attacked by Enoch Powell MP because of her appeal to the various religious traditions of the Commonwealth in her Christmas address in which she recalled the spirit of the recent Commonwealth Games in Brisbane and noted that (The Daily Telegraph, 28.12.82),

Until this century most racial and religious groups remained concentrated in their homelands but today almost every country of the Commonwealth has become multi-racial and multi-religious. This change has not been without its difficulties, but I believe that for those with a sense of tolerance the arrival and proximity of different races and religions have provided a much better chance for each to appreciate the value of others. At this time of year, Christians celebrate the birth of their Saviour, but no longer in an exclusive way. We hope that our greetings at Christmas to all people of religious conviction and goodwill will be received with the same understanding that we try to show in receiving the greetings of other religious groups at their special seasons.

Enoch Powell, a devout Anglican (although disclaiming any explicit connection between his Christian commitment and his political views, believing them to belong to distinct spheres), criticised the religious inclusiveness of this address from the standpoint of a staunch defender of the established nature of the Church of England. This was consistent with his earlier stance as Member of Parliament for Wolverhampton and a member of Edward Heath's Cabinet, when he (1977: 74-82) had argued strongly and consistently that New Commonwealth immigration would eventually undermine his notion of British identity and character on the basis of culture (including religion) rather than skin pigmentation.

It is perhaps helpful to consider the ambiguity of the monarchy in the relationships between established and other religion, politics and the constitution in terms of the category of "civil religion" (Wolfe, 1993: 317-328). As defined by Mirsky (1980: 1250-1251) "civil religions" have "an essentially political, non-sacral character" and
"Though not sacral itself, a civil religion draws on the various sacral religious traditions of a society....A civil religion gathers and expresses the most deeply felt ideals and attitudes of a society's life. By drawing on the form and language of sacral religion it achieves a special resonance and power."

In the republican United States of America civil religion is much more understood in terms of the connection between a nation's understanding of itself and its destiny (see Piérard and Linder, 1998: 22-23) and in its forward-looking orientation is associated with national self-confidence. The UK, by contrast, has been in decline from being a world power in its past to being one member state of the European Union, and the institution of the monarchy is currently under serious question in a way in which the Constitution of the United States has never been, despite the low level of confidence in the Presidency and in the elected representatives of the people. English 'civil religion' has focused not on a sense of corporate divinely legitimated forward-looking mission, but has been connected with backward looking events such as Remembrance Day and with an individual (the monarch) and an institution (the monarchy) which are rooted in the past and are connected through the person of the monarch as Head of State and Supreme Governor of the Church of England, as a nationally-recognised religion that attempts to have an integrative role within society. As Wolfe (1993: 318) observes, "Much of the language of American civil religion has been bound up with the exaltation of the republican ideal, but in Britain the monarchy has not so much been idealised in the abstract as idolised in the individual." The problem with this, of course, is that when the individualised idols are seen to have feet of clay, then the symbolic value of the institution is also undermined.

Examined against this political and constitutional background, it is possible to see how all of the identified social, religious, cultural, legal and political "entails" of the controversy feed into the particular constitutional settlement in England and the UK state, within which the establishment of the Church of England plays an important symbolic, structural and operational role. By contrast with this, Muslims protesting against The Satanic Verses have found it impossible effectively to pursue their case through legal and political means. It is this recognition which, in the final chapter, will lead to a consideration of whether or not there might be alternative and more
appropriate constitutional models for symbolising, structuring and operationalising the relationships between religion(s), state and society in England and the UK. In moving towards this consideration, the final section of this chapter presents a brief examination of a range of alternative historical patterns for defining these constitutional relationships which have been evolved in other societies and states.

### i) Some Alternative Constitutional Patterns

The chapter has so far outlined the historical inheritance and contemporary consequences of the establishment of the Church of England, and has explored some of the ways in which the “entails” of the Rushdie controversy for the establishment of the Church of England interact with the wider social, religious, cultural, legal and political inheritance and contemporary debates. This final section of the chapter discusses a range of alternative historical and contemporary patterns for symbolising and operationalising the relationships between religion(s), state and society in order that the options which they present might also inform reflection on the current position and future possibilities for change in respect of established religion in England.

It is not being claimed that the patterns examined are exhaustive of all historical or theoretical possibilities. Also, each pattern outlined here has a variety of subtle variants and it is not intended to explore all the patterns in great detail. The different historical, social and religious contexts in which they have evolved mean that it is unlikely that any of these alternatives will be completely or even partially directly applicable options in England. But, as patterns which have been and/or are being historically actualised, they highlight alternatives to the current establishment of the Church of England. Examining not just theoretical possibilities but actualised ones together with their strengths and weaknesses might highlight important practical lessons when, in the light of the controversy, envisioning possible alternatives for England. These patterns might therefore contribute towards not only theoretical but also practical imaginings of different possible futures for the relationship between religion(s), state and society in England.

In those parts of the world such as in the Middle East, where religion is not assigned purely to the private sphere in a strict separation of religion and politics, the image of a mosaic is sometimes invoked as more appropriate for a plural society than that
of a melting pot. The classical expression of this kind of pattern was the "millet system" of the Ottoman Empire which has been built upon in other Muslim approaches to the relationship between religion(s), state and society. This is an historical pattern that has often been held up by Muslims as an example of the Islamic accommodation of plurality (Atabani, 1995) of beliefs which is judged to have been relatively successful within the boundaries of the predominantly Muslim societies in which it has operated. In the mosaic pattern, each community forms a part of a greater pattern, but its own distinctiveness remains clear and the boundaries which distinguish it from other communities generally remain sharp, the system being based on the notion of "treaties" between Islamic and other communities. In such a system the Christian and Jewish communities were granted a limited degree of autonomy within which they were allowed to manage their own religious and educational affairs and personal status issues such as marriage (Braude and Lewis, eds, 1982a, 1982b).

Of course, there was often a gap between ideal and reality and Christians and Jews were often treated by the state and the majority population as inferior members of the Islamic empires (Ma'oz, 1978). In the 19th century Ottoman Empire reforms officially granted Christians and Jews equality within the political community, but those who insisted on their legal rights of emancipation were often bitterly opposed. It is also the case that, within the Islamic Empires non-Sunni Muslims, such as the Shi'as, Ismailis, 'Alawis and Druzes, were often even more strongly opposed since they were viewed as being unorthodox or, at best heterodox. They were therefore seen as more of a threat to the unity of the ummah than religious traditions and communities that were completely distinct from the household of Islam. However, as Moshe Ma'oz (1978: 116-117) pointed out in his essay on "Islamic-Arabism versus Pluralism: The Failure of Intergroup Accommodation in the Middle East": "unlike most Christians and Jews, the heterodox-Islamic groups were by and large armed and resided in remote or impassable areas, and thus were able to resist Orthodox-Muslim subjection and to protect their political and religious autonomy." Where they could not do this, Ma'oz (1978: 117) explains that they "chose to adopt the old taqiyya method - ie. to act and behave outwardly as Sunni Muslims in order to avoid persecution." By contrast, Christian communities (except in the case of The Lebanon) have, in recent times, suffered considerable social and demographic pressure population attrition in their key
geographical strongholds in Syria, Turkey and other similar countries where the ancient Christian Churches have been struggling to maintain a social foothold (Wessels, 1995).

The weakness of this traditional mosaic model is that it admits of little movement or change. Whilst the model might be able to claim some success among geographically settled populations it is questionable how adequate it is in the context of globalised population movements and the highly mixed societies (Laszlo, ed, 1993) which result from such migration and globalisation. Nevertheless, there is in Europe a contemporary version of this kind of pattern, albeit with Muslims in the minority rather than majority position and this can be found in Spain (Abumalham, 1996). Peter Antes (1994: 49-50) draws attention to the not widely known Acuerdo de Cooperacion del Estado Espanol con las Comision islamica de España, which is an agreement between the Spanish state and its Islamic communities (and is similar to other treaties of a similar kind established with both Protestant Christian and Jewish communities). This guarantees a range of rights for Muslims such as civil recognition of religious marriages and the declaration of mosques as inviolable. Antes (1994: 50) comments that, “The treaty is the most comprehensive recognition of Muslim rights signed in Europe so far.” It is therefore, perhaps, a contemporary example of what Muslims might realistically hope for within the European context in terms of an adaptation of the mosaic-type pattern.

A second alternative pattern in the relationships between religion(s), state and society is that of the separation between religion and the state, coupled with a strong social religiositas. This is based upon a social ideal of a cultural ‘melting pot’ and is found pre-eminently in the United States of America, where it is combined with a constitutional guarantee of religious freedom and a separation between religion and state. Both prior to and upon American independence there was a variety of practice with regard to both the free exercise and establishment of religion. Roger Williams, who had been driven out of the Massachusetts theocracy, founded the colony of Providence Plantations which upheld freedom for all including non-believers. The Roman Catholic Lord Baltimore’s Maryland colony had a high degree of freedom as did the Quaker William Penn’s Pennsylvania. However, the Articles of Confederation
did not enforce either separation or liberty and, initially, these remained a matter for the individual states of the young Republic.

Anglo-Saxon Protestants dominated the fifty-six signatories of the *American Declaration of Independence* and in respect of the Anglicans and Presbyterians among them Lamont (1989: 58) comments that "The remarkable factor was that these men broke with tradition and created for the first time a system which made religion free from state intervention." One of the traditional explanations for the eventual development of the non-establishment of religion in the USA is that the number and variety of churches made establishment impractical. For some, such as Benjamin Franklin, this was indeed a key pragmatic argument. But James Madison advocated the non-establishment of religion on the basis of a conviction that the highest religion is based on the voluntary principle. Franklin Littell (1966) has argued that the roots of the American way of dealing with both cultural and religious plurality are found in the history of the emigrants to the New World.

In the 1786 Virginian *Act for Establishing Religious Freedom*, promoted by Thomas Jefferson and James Madison, it was stated that,

> Be it enacted by the General Assembly, That no man shall be compelled to frequent or support any religious worship, place of ministry whatsoever, nor shall be enforced, restrained, molested, or burthened in his body or goods, nor shall otherwise suffer on account of his religious opinions or belief; but that all men shall be free to profess, and by argument to maintain, their opinion in matters of religion; and that the same shall in no wise diminish, enlarge, or affect their civil capabilities (quoted in Lamont 1989: 58).

It was further declared that "the rights hereby asserted are of the natural rights of mankind, and that if any act shall be hereafter passed to repeal the present, or to narrow its operation, such act will be an infringement of natural right." This was not, therefore, the granting of a grudging toleration arising out of political expediency, but the recognition of a pre-existing, natural, human right and it led to the *First Amendment to the United States Constitution*, signed on 17th September 1789, which stated that, "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the exercise thereof." The amendment became known as "The Jeffersonian Wall" after Thomas Jefferson, in 1802, referred to the amendment as "a wall separating church from state."
Considerable debate has taken place in the USA concerning the balance between the "no establishment" and the "free exercise" clauses of the constitution. The debate about the nature of the Jeffersonian "wall" between those who have held that the constitution implies what is identified as a strict "separationist" position and, on the other hand, the "accommodationists" is revealed in the ongoing tensions between the "Free Exercise" and the "Establishment" clauses of the constitution which have been explored by a number of writers (Abraham, 1980; Baker, J, 1981; Pfeffer, 1986; Choper, 1969; Pfeffer, 1980). Some constitutional experts see one clause as a prior condition of the other. Where what Pfeffer calls a "dualistic" rather than a "unitary" view of the Amendment is adopted one clause effectively becomes superior (Pfeffer, 1980: 568) and Schwarz argues (1968: 692) that "The Supreme Court has usually decided religion cases on the basis of one clause or the other without explicitly recognising the potential conflict between them."

Following the Second World War, the Supreme Court took what became known as a more Jeffersonian view of the need for a "wall" between religion and state and, in the 1960s, secularists had morning prayer banned in schools. This issue has since become a national cause célèbre and, as a result of a reaction by religious people, the Supreme Court began to distinguish between an allowable indirect support for "pupil welfare" of those attending religious schools and what came to be known as direct "parochial" help (see Choper, 1963 & 1968). What Murphy (1990) calls "the key modern case" in the debate over the constitutional provisions for religion was that of Lemon v. Kurtzman (1971). This involved the states of Rhode Island and Pennsylvania giving financial support to secular materials and teachers in non-public schools, which was eventually found to be unconstitutional. The case established that religion should neither be inhibited nor advanced nor should government become excessively entangled with religion and that it should maintain its secular purpose. These principles have become the basis of a tripartite hermeneutic for the First Amendment provisions.

Pfeffer (1980: 564) argues that, "Notwithstanding instances of apparent conflict, separation guarantees freedom and freedom requires separation" and (Pfeffer 1980: 583) that "the Court will continue to find ways to decide such cases without definitely
adjudicating which clause is superior and which subordinate, or which must be preserved and which sacrificed." However, he (1980: 583) also argues that the clause which becomes superior is usually the Free Exercise clause with the Establishment clause becoming "instrumental" of the commitment to freedom. The case of Wisconsin v. Yoder (see Riga, 1977) set forward three principles of "free exercise" to balance the "establishment" principles of Lemon. These principles concerned whether the belief was legitimately religious and the activity restricted by a state was pervasively religious; whether the state action burdens or inhibits free exercise; and whether it is justified by a compelling state interest which requires these rather than less restrictive means.

In the USA, whilst there are no prayers in public schools, there is a strong current of civil religion: there are prayers in legislatures; there are courtroom oaths and swearings-in; there are the national holidays of Thanksgiving and Memorial Day; there are rituals associated with the American flag and with the pledge of allegiance to a "Nation under God"; there is the national motto of "In God We Trust"; and the investiture of Presidents who often also appeal to God-language in a way that is much more rare among British politicians. Mirsky (1986: 1240) has explained civic religion as a necessary response of a disestablished society, arguing that "Its abiding presence seems to speak to some curious need for religious symbols and rhetoric in a seemingly disestablished republic." Others have critiqued the phenomenon either theologically or politically. Theologically, it can be seen as confused and inchoate. Politically, as a binding myth it is exclusive of those who do not generate or share in the myths. Whilst acknowledging the force of these critiques, Mirksy nevertheless concludes (1986: 1255) that "We can guardedly say that a self-conscious and critically reflective civil religion can play a positive role in cementing the communal symbolic life of American society." The notion of a "civil religion", when more explicitly constructed than in this North American sense, is examined in greater detail below as a completely distinct and alternative model for defining the relationships between religion(s), state and society.

In the light of the problematics posed by the Rushdie controversy, the English writer Fay Weldon (1989: 32) eulogised the United States model of "uni-culturalism" and the
"melting pot" as a better solution to the issues of a plural society highlighted in the Rushdie controversy than that of the British approach of "multi-culturalism." This "melting-pot" understanding of a plural society has been developed within a "managerial" approach to integration characterised by Goulbourne (1991: 216) as a "groupist interpretation of politics" since Goulbourne points out that although the Founding Fathers of the American Republic rejected monarchy as a principle of unity they also saw that in its "parties", democracy carried the seeds of its own weakness. Therefore, they argued that there was a need to balance sectional interests and thus to "manage" groups within a democracy.

In this approach, therefore, the point of unity from which to "manage" the conflicting groups is found outside the groups themselves and their conflicts, in this case in the notion of a shared Americanness. As Weldon (1989: 32) pointed out, the melting pot for immigrant groups and their resultant value clashes is dealt with by privatising these values so that whatever happens in private, in public "the one flag is saluted, the one God worshipped, the one nation acknowledged." Of course, Weldon's reference to God in this context underlines the ambiguity of the American system in which, whilst particular religions are separated from the state by privatisation, the religiosity of civil society is an important part of the public and political culture.

Referring to the Rushdie controversy, President Bush (in Bulloch and Brown, 1989) supported the EC position and condemned the fatwa saying that, "However offensive the book may be, inciting murder and offering rewards for its perpetration, are deeply offensive against the norms of civilised behaviour" and appealed to the American traditions of free speech in the wake of attacks upon bookshops and newspapers, arguing that, "This country was founded on the principles of free speech and religious tolerance. I want to make it absolutely clear the United States will not tolerate any assault on these rights." Anyone carrying out violence or intimidation would be "prosecuted to the maximum." However, it was also reported by Alex Brummer (1989) that "Congress believe that....the Administration failed to speak up strongly enough against the constitutional threat to First Amendment rights of freedom of speech held so strongly in the USA." Brummer noted former President Jimmy Carter's expression of concern about the content of The Satanic Verses and commented that the affair was
one "in which American religiosity - as symbolised by the return to fundamentalism in many - has come into direct confrontation with First Amendment rights." Thus the controversy embodied the constitutional tensions explored earlier in this section.

A third pattern in the relationship between religion(s), state and society is the separation of religion and state within a secular ethos understood in anti-clerical, rationalist and individual human rights terms as in France. This tradition is based on the inheritance of the French Revolution with its dethronement of God and its establishment of the individual citizenship principles of Liberty, Equality and Fraternity. This is part of the strong French tradition of laïcité, a word which cannot fully be translated into English but which approximates to "secular." French society and politics is organised on the basis of the strong conviction that matters of religion are matters for the private sphere alone and, traditionally, French Republicanism has been opposed to any "contamination" of the public sphere by religion.

This revolutionary republican tradition also went on to influence the socialist movements that emerged in the 19th century and, in Marxist dialectical materialism, reached its apotheosis when Communist parties in the former Eastern bloc countries governed on the basis of an ideology which sought to keep religion purely within the private sphere. There were, however, significant variations in this, from the militant atheism of Enver Hoxher's Albania, through the more ambiguous relationships between the Romanian Orthodox Church and Ceaucescu's Romania, through the stance of "critical solidarity" adopted by the Churches in the former German Democratic Republic, to religion's continuance as a social force of some significance in Poland.

But in France itself, during the controversy one hundred and forty French writers circulated a petition (Marnham, 1989) stating that, "We have paid a sufficiently high price for our freedom of self-expression and publication, and for the right to deploy irony against powerful dogmas." It pointed out that, "Literature's role as a critic of society is one of the guarantees of everyone's freedom" and therefore "For these reasons, and because intolerance is a symptom of another age, we express our absolute solidarity with Salman Rushdie and with those who publish him." President Francois Mitterand (in Murtagh, Tomforde and Brasler, 1989) was reported to have stated to his ministers that, "All dogmatism which through violence undermines freedom of
thought and the right to free expression is, in my view, absolute evil. The moral and spiritual progress of humanity is linked to the recoil of all fanaticisms."

Commenting on the Rushdie controversy as it developed in France, Patrick Marnham (1989b) pointed out that "The conflicting messages from the Cardinal and the President reflect the way in which the controversy over the threat to Salman Rushdie has, during the past week, gradually been translated into French terms" with a group of left-wing intellectuals likening the fatwa to bomb attacks carried out by Catholic traditionalists on some Paris cinemas that showed Martin Scorsese's film *The Last Temptation of Christ*. Cardinal Albert Decourtray, the Archbishop of Lyons and President of the French Bishops' Conference, attacked the publication of *The Satanic Verses* and paralleled the situation for the Muslims in respect of *The Satanic Verses* with Christian offence at the film *The Last Temptation of Christ* when his stand against this film had been supported by French Muslim leaders. Decourtney stated (in Marnham, 1989b) that:

> Once again the faith of believers is insulted. Yesterday it was Christians who were offended by a film which disfigured the face of Christ. Today it is the Muslims by this book about the Prophet...Leaving aside fanatical reactions, which are in themselves an offence against God, I express my solidarity with all those who endure this pain in the spirit of dignity and prayer.

On 26th February, around a thousand Muslims marched in Paris and the Federation of French Muslims issued a statement against the French government's failure to ban the book (Martineau, 1989). A spokesperson (Murtagh, 1989d) for Christian Bourgois publishers (part of the Presses de la Cité group) in France said that "We are concerned about what will happen and be said if we publish it" and eventually, they decided to "suspend" publication (Marnham, 1989). The French Publishers' Association organised a meeting to explore the possibility of a joint publication by all publishing companies but eventually failed to reach an agreement on this (Marnham, 1989). Finally, though, one week after suspending publication, Christian Bourgois publishers announced that publication would, after all, go ahead (Morris and van der Leeuw, 1989) and this was eventually published on 19th July. This edition of sixty-five thousand copies of the book sold out in a week and a French court rejected an appeal from nine Muslim groups to have the edition seized (Lister, 1989g). Marnham concluded about the Rushdie controversy that "The current controversy, like the previous one, is now
taking its place as part of France's hallowed battle between Christians and freethinkers.”

The fourth pattern in the relationship between religion(s), society and state is also based on an understanding of the state as secular, but contrasts in several important respects with the model exemplified by France and can be illustrated by the example of India. In India, the secular nature of the state has not been understood as being in opposition to any role of religion in public life but rather, as a defence against the threats posed by religious communalism. Articles 15, 16 and 25 of the Constitution of the Republic of India (1949) uphold religious freedom. In 1947, amidst the horrific violence between communities, itself reflected in Salman Rushdie's earlier novel Midnight's Children, the Indian state was divided on the basis of religion into India and East and West Pakistan, with East Pakistan later becoming the independent state of Bangladesh. As the Indian Christian theologian and former Director of the World Council of Churches' Sub-Unit on Dialogue with People of Living Faiths and Ideologies, Stanley Samartha (1991: 48), notes:

With the tragic memories of partition still fresh in the minds of people India opted for a socialist, democratic and secular state. There has been an enormous amount of discussion on the content and character of the 'secular' state in India. So many different interpretations are given that it is almost impossible to define it. It is enough to say that the secular state in India, sensitive to the lurking violence beneath the surface of a multi-religious society, seeks to be impartial in its dealings with different religious communities, particularly its religious and ethnic minorities.

The term "communalism" was first used by British colonists to describe the situation in colonies such as India and Malaysia where religious minorities existed alongside a majority. There is evidence that the colonists specifically played the communal card of highlighting and solidifying religious differences in order to "divide and rule". Gwilym Beckerlegge's (1991) New Community article shows how this operated in colonial India and how its consequences continue today in respect of the patterns of relationships between the various communities and between the state and these communities.

In his book Communal Violence in India (1987), P.R. Rajagopal records that in the 1950s, three hundred and eighty-one communal riots took place, which resulted in one hundred and fifty-three people being killed; in the 1960s there were two thousand,
six hundred and eighty-nine riots with three thousand, two hundred and forty-six killed; in the 1970s there were two thousand, six hundred and eight riots with one thousand, one hundred and eight people killed; and, for the first five years alone of the 1980s, there were two thousand, seven hundred and seventy-one riots with two thousand, seven hundred and seventy-two people killed. Therefore, as Samartha (1991: 50) says, "Probably no other single factor has so strongly militated against the role of religion in public life in independent India as the charge of communalism. The horrors of communal violence make a mockery of the principle of tolerance."

Bipan Chandra's analysis of communalism, in his article on "Communalism: the way out" (1986), argues that communalism arises in three stages. First of all, he states that common beliefs are identified with common economic, political and cultural interests; secondly, these interests are then seen as being different from those of other religions; and finally, different interests are seen to be not only different, but also antagonistic.

Achin Vanaik, in his New Left Review article on "Reflections on communalism and nationalism in India" acknowledges the problems involved in defining the principle of secularism (1992: 43) but points out that:

Notwithstanding the enduring problems of precise definition, the term 'secular' does possess an agreed core meaning: state neutrality with regard to religion. In a multireligious society like that of India this can mean either a fundamental separation of the state from religious activity and affiliation, or state impartiality on all issues relating to the religious interests of the different communities.

Vanaik’s view (1992: 43) is that, "In practice, 'Indian secularism' has been a mixture of the two: an unsatisfactory attempt to reconcile what some consider to be essentially incompatible approaches." He also reports upon an attempted “third position” (1992: 44), which he argues has largely been part of academic rather than activist or popular debate, and which he characterises as encouraging "the use of 'authentic' resources of faith to create a socio-political culture with a more deeply-rooted and genuine tolerance of diversity and pluralism than 'Western secularism' can ever generate. Religion itself is to be the key resource in the struggle against communalism."

Samartha might be taken as an exponent of this “third position" criticised by Vanaik when he (Samartha, 1991: 48) argues that, "during the past four decades the secular
state, fearful of all religions, has failed to provide creative space for religions to make any serious contribution to the moral life of the nation." Vanaik (1991: 56) also argues that the communalisation and politicisation of religion should clearly be differentiated from the political dimensions of religion, a distinction that he believes a fearful secularism has not properly understood:

To say that politics and religion should be kept separate is understandable, especially at a time like ours. But what it really should mean is that politicians should not use religions for short-term political ends and religious leaders should not use politicians for narrowly communal gains. But surely every religion has a social and public dimension. To say that religions should be a private affair is to misunderstand both religion and politics.

Samartha's vision of the role of religions is one in which, "In an age dominated by science and secularism one of the tasks of genuinely religious people is to draw attention to the Mystery of transcendence, a centre of values, a source of meaning, an object of loyalty beyond the smaller loyalties to one's particular caste, language or religion."

A fifth pattern in the relationships between religion(s), state and society is that of a state-sponsored socio-religious ideology which might be characterised by a "strong" usage of Robert Bellah's (see Bellah 1967, 1975 and Bellah and Hammond, 1980) term, "civil religion." As has been seen in examining the pattern of relationships in the USA, in its weak form "civil religion" is a concept which reflects the fact that despite the formal, constitutional separation of Church and state, popular national themes can nevertheless take on a religious aura and legitimation. Piérand and Linder (1988: 22-23) have defined "civil religion" in the American sense of the word, as: "the widespread acceptance by a people of perceived religio-political traits regarding their nation's history and destiny. It relates their society to the realm of absolute meaning, enables them to look at their political community in a special sense, and provides the vision which ties the nation together as an integrated whole." As Mirsky argues (1986: 1249), civil religion is part of "long-term societal responses to problems that were generated by the advent of modernity", including the fragmentation of organic social unity and the need for new means of cohesion.

It is precisely the role of civil religion in providing social cohesion which means that it can be found in stronger forms, especially in the context of the needs for post-
independence nation-building in plural South-East Asian societies (Harmati, 1986; Latuihamallo, 1982) such as Malaysia and Indonesia. Malaysia, which has a Chinese population of around fifty per cent, has sought to provide both symbolic and operational social cohesion by means of the **Rukunegara** (Pillars of the State) and Indonesia, which has the largest concentration of Muslims in the world, has attempted to do this by means of the **Pancasila** (Five Pillars). In contrast to the millenarian Protestant flavour of American civil religion, **Rukunegara** and **Pancasila** speak directly from and to the religiously plural nature of the societies which they seek to bind together. As Justus van der Kroef (1978: 160) points out: "A formal religious element is usually present in these symbols, an element cast in such broad terms as to accommodate presumably most religious groups in the nation."

The Indonesian **Pancasila** (Hutagalung, 1986) was originally proposed against the background of the Indonesian **Declaration of Independence** by Sukarno on 17th August 1945. Many Indonesian Muslims had argued for Indonesia to become an Islamic state (Dijk, 1984; Johns, 1987), but Indonesian secularists had strenuously opposed this, and some Indonesian Christians had threatened to form separate Christian states, a heritage of conflict which still continues today in the contemporary struggles over East Timor. In its definitive Constitutional form, the **Pancasila** consisted of the following five principles: Belief in One Deity, Humanism or Internationalism, National Unity of Indonesia or Nationalism, Democracy or Rule by Consent, Social Justice or Social Prosperity.

In the period following the first elections in 1955, tensions developed between the religious and ethnic groups and the secular Communist Party grew in strength. Between 1959 and 1965, the religious principle of the **Pancasila** became relatively weakened. However, following the failed communist coup and General Suharto's assumption of power on 11th March 1966, his "New Order" was proclaimed with the **Pancasila** and the 1945 Constitution as its foundations. In this period, the role of religion was emphasised as an important resource in opposition to Communism which was perceived to be in alliance with atheism and secularism, as well as against calls from among the Muslim majority for a more confessionally-based Islamic State. As Karel Steenbrink (1993: 227) has commented,
From the beginning the New Order government also actively supported religious activities: religious lessons in government schools were intensified, the costs of building new mosques were met by the government and a programme for the publication of holy books, not only the Qur'an and the Bible, but also parts of the Vedic scriptures, was carried out.

The 1945 Constitution referred to religion in two respects, within Article 29 stating that: "1. The State will be based upon [belief in] the One, Almighty God, 2. The State will guarantee to all citizens the freedom to adhere to their religion and fulfil their religious duties according to their religion and faith." Generally, the religions of Islam, Protestant Christianity, Roman Catholic Christianity, Buddhism and Hinduism have been recognised within the structures of the Department of Religion (with Confucianism also briefly recognised in the early 1960s). For a period, the so-called *kepercayaan* (other religious groups) also had a recognised role.

As well as the Government's Department of Religion, a Council of Consultation between religious communities (*Badan Konsultasi antar Umat Beragama*) was founded, and when Alamsyah Ratu Peruriraneegra was Minister of Religious Affairs (1978-1982) he launched a large interfaith dialogue programme (1979-80). Around twenty books were published covering the proceedings of the meetings in which socially co-operative possibilities were stressed within the terms of the *Pancasila*. However, after reviewing the *Pancasila's* usefulness for what he called "intergroup accommodation", Justus van der Kroef (1978: 160) concludes, "If its propagation was and is intended as a means of mutually adjusting divergent interest groups, then *Pantjasila* cannot be said to have been an unqualified success."

Indonesia has the largest Muslim population in the world, with ninety per cent of its one hundred and seventy-five million population following Islam (Basteiner, ed, 1984). *The Satanic Verses* was not available in bookshops, although the government did not immediately ban it (Bulloch, 1989a) until 13th March. Lukman Harun, the Vice-Chair of the Muhamadiyah Islamic organisation in Indonesia asked an Independent newspaper reporter if he could borrow a copy of the book and commented on the *fatwa* that, "The Iranians are going their way, but in Indonesia we are different" (quoted in McCarthy, 1989a).
In Malaysia, in the context of the Rushdie controversy, Terry McCarthy (1989b) reported from Kuala Lumpur that there had only been a small demonstration in Eastern Malaysia after a Friday mosque service. *The Satanic Verses* was banned from entering the country, including for the purposes of research (Martineau, 1989), with penalties for contravening the ban of up to three years' imprisonment (McCarthy, 1989b) and eventually, in Kuala Lumpur, a bomb was set off outside the British Council Language Centre, injuring four people, although nobody claimed responsibility for it (Associated Press, 1989a).

In Malaysia, the *Rukunegara* also consists of five principles which have both interesting overlaps with, and divergences from, the Indonesian *Pancasila*. The five principles are: Belief in God, Loyalty to King and Country, Support for the Constitution, Devotion to the Law (or Rule of Law), Proper Conduct and Moral Behaviour. Malaysian official explanations of this doctrine stress that it is intended to promote national unity among the differing ethnic and religious groups. But, as Justus van der Kroef (1978: 161) again comments:

> Like *Rukunegara*, *Pantjasila* is perhaps best viewed...as an appeal to a national identity still in *status nascendi*, and the obvious artificiality that clings to such symbols should be considered in terms of the pervasive competitive claims on individual and group loyalties in the heterogenous Southeast Asian world. It is as if someone dedicated to the establishment of a new nation carefully considered the divergent but primary appeals of ethnicity, race, language, religion or even social class all around, and found that these appeals frequently are expressed in or experienced through a distinctive value terminology for the individual.

Because of this air of artificiality, a number of religious believers of all traditions have been profoundly suspicious of the *Pancasila* and the *Rukengara* as possibly being motivated by attempts to form a new, syncretistic religion. Perhaps especially for Muslims in Indonesia, the *Pancasila*’s echoes of the Five Pillars of Islam have given rise to concerns and suspicions about whether the state was prioritising the *Pancasila* over Islam. *Pancasila* and *Rukungara* are clearly ideologies with political ends, which raises the question of the relationship between ultimate (religious) and penultimate (political) aims. Justus van der Croeff (1978: 161) concludes that, "If Democratic adjustments among groups, in a word 'Democratic pluralism', is to mean anything in Southeast Asia, it would seem to have to rest on a maturing, though not always necessarily explicitly formulated, mutual acceptance of these new relationships."
A sixth pattern in the relationship between religion(s), state and society can be found in the Netherlands where, historically, a policy has been followed known as *Verzuiling*, (Dobbelaere, 1988b), often translated into English by means of the none too elegant neologism, "pillarisation". The beginnings of this policy lay in the origins of the country itself which emerged out of a revolt, inspired by Calvinist Christianity, against Spanish Roman Catholic rule. This resulted in the establishment of a Calvinist state with a number of Roman Catholic enclaves. In the newly independent state the Dutch Reformed Church was the only officially recognised Church. The worshipping life of Protestant dissenters, Jews and Roman Catholics was tolerated, but initially they were excluded from holding public office.

In his book on Dutch Society, Goudsblom (1967:18) pointed out that the commercial interests of the Dutch burghers and merchants modified the zealotry of the Calvinists with the result that a Dutch society of "varied religious composition" came into being. Originally, the Dutch state was a Republic but, in 1813, after the period of Napoleonic domination, it became a monarchy. Since 1848, its monarchy has played a similar constitutional role to the monarchy in Britain and Goudsblom (1967: 71-73) notes that: "religious diversity has remained a pervasive determinant of social and cultural distinctions, giving rise to the curious phenomenon of 'bloc' formation known as *verzuiling*." Commenting on its potential relevance for religious plurality in the UK, Ahmed Andrews describes this 'pillarisation' (1994: 127) in the following terms:

At its most fully developed the structure of *verzuiling* enabled a person to live their whole life within their confessional or secular bloc. Once born into the system it has been possible to be educated in one particular bloc from school to University: join a confessional or non-confessional trade union or professional body and be employed within the same bloc. Marriage within the bloc was also the general rule. In addition, one could read a newspaper published within one's bloc and even receive television and radio broadcasts put out by the confessional or secular segment of society to which one belonged. Finally one's social and sporting activities were catered for within the bloc, owing to each having its own sports and social clubs.

Conflicts between the 'blocs' have generally been managed within the overall framework of the system and Andrews judges that the system has basically been successful in terms of its promotion of social and political stability. In Andrews' (1994: 127) evaluation, "Its success is, I believe, due to two factors. Firstly, the *verzuiling* structure arose in a society which was already clear about its national
identity to which all groups had an attachment, unlike India or Pakistan, for example, where attachment to one's state or ethnic region often appears to be stronger than attachment to the nation. Secondly, all blocs have equal access to resources." Initially, state-funded education was an area in which verzulling did not operate fully. In the late nineteenth and early twentieth century, after a campaign which saw the Orthodox Calvinist and Roman Catholic blocs co-operating in opposition to the secular Liberal Protestants, the principle was established that the state could support denominationally-based schools to the same extent as non-denominational schools.

Like Christopher Bagley (n.d.; 1971) before him (who undertook comparative work on race relations in the Netherlands and the UK), Ahmed Andrews believes that this model may have something to offer the United Kingdom. He (1994: 127) notes that while "At first sight this segmentation of Dutch society might appear to lead to social instability" and although "it is not as strong as it was in the 1960s," nevertheless, it is still a "useful illustration of how a segmented society, a plural society, has met the needs of various conflicting groups and achieved a stability based, since the late 1800s, on equal treatment for all." At the same time, the wider form of Dutch political representation is noted (1994: 127) as having played a significant part in this achievement since, "Proportional representation has meant that groups have had to co-operate to form a government and reach accommodations with each other." Andrews, though, believes that the "pillarisation" approach could be a "useful model" for inter-faith consideration in the United Kingdom. However, questions perhaps need to be asked about the extent which this structure has, in fact, accommodated new Muslim migrants in the Netherlands (Bagley, 1971; Shahid and van Koningsveld, 1996; Feirabend and Rath, 1996; Beck, 1996). In addition, there is also the fact that in the Netherlands itself the idea is today subject to considerable debate (Gowricham and Mungra, 1996) and some are arguing that it is a relic of a previous age.

There are, of course, other variants on these basic patterns which can be found both historically and in the contemporary world. In addition, all the models reflect very different social, religious, cultural, legal and political contexts from those that have pertained in England within the UK. Because of both the diversity of patterns and the different approaches found within these patterns, considerable care needs to be taken
in making comparisons between these patterns and none of them can simply be reproduced as viable alternatives to the current English model of the establishment of the Church of England. Nevertheless, an awareness of this range of alternative patterns can be useful in considering options that might be appropriate and feasible within the English context and it is to a detailed consideration of the question of the "entails" of the Rushdie controversy for the current and future pattern of established religion in England that the next, and concluding, chapter of the thesis now turns.
Chapter 5: Towards a New Socio-Religious Contract

a) Introduction
Chapter 4 discussed the five clusters of issues that were identified from the controversy as having "entails" of fundamental constitutional significance for the future of established religion in England and within the United Kingdom state. This chapter draws together the threads of the argument thus far to a conclusion by setting discussion of these clusters of social, religious, cultural, legal and political "entails" of the controversy in an integrative context of what the chapter argues is a theological and political "kairos" for the future of the current establishment of religion in England.

The chapter begins with a section on "The Changing Cultural, Religious and Political Kaleidoscope" which examines the cultural and religious diversity of English society within the UK state in terms of the inheritance of different national traditions and the impact of migratory movements of minorities into the country, especially in terms of the post-Second World War changes consequent upon New Commonwealth immigration and the development of settled minority communities. The section on "Plurality: Public Policies and Community Responses" explores some of the key debates which have emerged concerning appropriate ways to manage a plural society as well as a range of community responses to these policies, in order that consideration of the specific "entails" of the Rushdie controversy for potentially alternative patterns for symbolising, structuring and operationalising the relationships between religion(s), state and society can be set within the wider context of policy and community responses to the challenges of plurality.

The section on "The Kairos of the Controversy and the Establishment" analyses the controversy's specific and profound significance for the future development of Britain as a multi-cultural and multi-faith society in terms of the current and possible options for change in the future patterns of the relationship(s) between religion, state and society in England. It does this by setting these options within an analytical framework drawn from negotiation theory which, it is argued, is particularly illuminating of the current kairos that it is "entailed" for established religion in the clusters of issues arising from the Rushdie controversy. The section on "Towards a New Way Forward"
proposes what it argues is a more theoretically adequate and practically appropriate way forward than either the current establishment of the Church of England, or the alternatives of: a secularising disestablishment; an "extended" establishment facilitating the contribution and participation of other religious traditions; or the de novo setting up of a National Religious Council.

In doing so this penultimate section uses some language, concepts and insights drawn from "negotiation theory." These are utilised because it is argued that the way forward must involve negotiation between religious believers of different faiths and their organisations, and between religious and secular people and religious and secular organisations. Such negotiation, whilst involving specifically religious factors, also takes place in organisational and social contexts and therefore it is not inappropriate to utilise "negotiation theory" in this setting. Indeed, it is argued that it is precisely the use of this theory from outside the ordinary literature of the study of religions which might offer fresh insights into the issues and dynamics involved in considering a change from the current establishment of the Church of England. The "Conclusion" then draws together the threads of the thesis into a final statement of its argument.

At this point it is important to restate what was set out in the section of the first chapter entitled "The Research Question." As that section concluded, this thesis is not arguing that disestablishment will be a necessary historical and social consequence of the Rushdie controversy in the sense of a deterministically inevitable future. It is, however, arguing that the conjunction which the argument of this thesis creates between the "entails" of the controversy and wider relevant social, religious, cultural, legal and political trends and debates does, at least implicitly, signal the arrival of a "kairos."

The Greek word "kairos" has very particular overtones. Colin Brown (1978: 834) explains that, "The presence of two etymological groups, associated respectively with chronos and kairos for the concept of time, suggests that the Greeks distinguished individual periods of points of time which can be affected by human decision (kairos) from the stream of time, whose progress is independent of any possible human influence (chronos)." Furthermore, as Brown (1978: 833) elucidates the meaning of the word "kairos," it is one which "characterises a critical situation, one which demands
a decision.... Positively it implies opportunity...or advantage; negatively, danger." It is therefore a point in time in which alternative possibilities clarify themselves and a clear decision is called for.

The thesis argues that a careful examination of the "entails" of the Rushdie controversy presents a "kairos" for the current constitutional nexus which the establishment of the Church of England represents. At the same time, it is not a "kairos" of the kind that all will recognise since it is implicit within the controversy rather than being an explicit constitutional crisis of the kind which would be involved in problems concerned with the succession to the Throne or the abolition of the House of Lords. Nevertheless, it is argued that the current pattern of establishment cannot continue indefinitely without at least some modification. The central issue at stake is the possibility of identifying an appropriate response to the "kairos" implicit in the Rushdie controversy that could enable the setting in motion of a maturation of public debate and negotiations on the initiation of evolutionary structural changes which, if they could take place now, might anticipate some of the decisions which might later have to be forced in the context of a future, more explicit "kairos" brought about by a generally recognisable constitutional crisis.

b) The Changing Cultural, Religious and Political Kaleidoscope

As Parekh (1989a) has stated, "The Rushdie affair has raised issues likely to preoccupy us for a long time" and that with respect to such a political crisis, "a wise nation meditates on it and uses it as a means for self-knowledge." One of the most significant aspects of such self-knowledge is the need for an understanding of the radical changes to the composition of English society which have occurred over the past fifty years. It is also argued that the arrival of this new diversity has underscored the longstanding degree of cultural and religious diversity that was already present in the various component parts of the UK state.

This section therefore attempts to paint an overall picture of the cultural and religious plurality of England within the UK, in order that the public policies and community responses deriving from engagement with this plurality (and especially the central question of this thesis concerned with the relationships between religion(s), state and society) can be explored contextually. The section therefore proceeds by examining
the varied profile of the Christian community and then goes on to outline the contours of the other religious communities, with a particular emphasis on the Muslim community.

The period following the Second World War is commonly regarded as a critical moment of discontinuity in English life. Hopes for the renewal of the role of Christianity in post-war reconstruction were soon followed in the 1960s by a decline in Christian self-confidence in the face of the perceived secularisation of national life. Although the Church of England remains as the established religion in England, it is no longer the numerically predominant religious tradition. The last and only official religious census conducted in England (see Barley et al, 1987), which took place in 1851, already confirmed the relative numeric strength of the Free Churches and Roman Catholic Church. Indeed, in the context of rising Nonconformist agitation for disestablishment of the Church of England, it is thought that the political threat that such statistics posed to the establishment might have been one of the reasons why no further Government census of religions took place, although an English Church census (Brierley, 1991) has been conducted by the voluntary Christian research organisation MARC Europe.

In the 20th century, the 1970 Chadwick Report on Church and State claimed a nominal Church of England affiliation as high as sixty-seven and a half per cent, although Valerie Pitt, a dissenting member of the Committee, offered a critique of such figures (Church and State, 1970: 72-74, 107-108). When considered in terms of active participation through the indicator of Church attendance, the 1989 English Church Census (Brierley, 1991: 35) noted that only thirty-one per cent of the ten per cent of the total population that were in church on the census Sunday were Anglicans. In other words, active identifiers with the Church of England are only three point one per cent of the English population. At the same time, it is important to take account of the phenomenon of what Grace Davie (1994) calls “believing without belonging” (Davie, 1990b) in the “ordinary God” (Davie, 1990a) of folk Christianity, and of what Wolffe (1994) calls “the religions of the silent majority.” In this connection a 1974 survey by Medhurst and Moysen (1988: 142) claimed to show that forty-one point six per cent of English people identified in some way with the Church of England.
Nevertheless, the inherited distribution and current composition of the Christian community is itself increasingly diverse and complex (see Brierley, 1991; Gerloff, 1992; Weller, ed, 1993: 158-162; Brierley, ed, 1996). This diversity is, first of all, rooted in the varied histories and religious traditions of the UK as a multi-national state. Although there is a popular perception of the role of the Church of England that is reflected in the Times (8.7.80) leader-writer's description of the Church of England as "the British National Church," this perception is constitutionally incorrect. Within the various parts of the UK there are a range of different arrangements for defining the relationships between religious bodies, the state and society. This variety reflects the fact that the UK and its Christian religious traditions are themselves embodiments of the national diversity (Jenkins, D, 1975) found in the three nations of England, Wales and Scotland, as well as among people of the province of Northern Ireland.

Although England, Wales and Scotland have shared a monarch and a political system, since the 1603 accession of James Stuart to the English Crown as James I of England and the union of the Parliaments in 1707, Scotland has in many ways remained distinct in terms of its systems of law and education, and this distinctiveness has also applied in matters of religion (Asponwall, 1982; Brown, Callum, 1987). The Presbyterian Church of Scotland has been the established Church in Scotland and has had a strong historical role as a national Church (Hunter & Mackie, 1986), reinforcing the specifically Scottish aspects of life within the UK (Bisset, 1989). Indeed, in the absence of devolved political representation in Scotland, because the Kirk is governed by a hierarchy of elected clerical and lay Kirk sessions, Presbyteries, Synods and the General Assembly, it is sometimes seen as a surrogate Scottish parliament. The Scottish form of establishment no longer places special legal restrictions upon the Church of Scotland's self-government, nor does the British Prime Minister or Secretary of State for Scotland have any role in the appointment of its leadership. It does, however, maintain a formal link with the Crown which is symbolised each May by the Lord High Commissioner's presence in Edinburgh at the Church's General Assembly.

Whilst Scotland has also had a substantial presence of Roman Catholics and Episcopalians in Scotland, Roman Catholicism has often been identified with Irishness
and Episcopalianism with Englishness. Even as late as the mid-1980s it could still be written (Bisset, 1986: 3) that “To be a Scot is to be a Presbyterian, even though that designation may say more of cultural identity than religious persuasion.” In recent times, Scottish Christians (see Hunter and Mackie, 1986) have had to wrestle with the implications of the presence of other than Christian religious communities, although Wolfe (1994: 107) notes that “Scotland and Wales differ from England and resemble each other both in respect of relatively higher levels of Christian religious membership and practice and in the small scale of non-Christian religious communities.”

Wales has little constitutional distinctiveness, but it does have a vigorous ancient language and culture, revived during the 1960s through the campaigns of Cymdeithas yr Iaith Gymraeg (the Welsh Language Society). In terms of religion, following the 1920 disestablishment of what is now known as the Church in Wales (Bell, P, 1969), there is currently no established form of religion. Unlike Scotland there has not been a single religious focus for national identity, but the multiplicity of non-conformist Free Churches have played a significant role in Wales’ social, political and cultural life. They were at the forefront of nineteenth century agitation for disestablishment in Wales and they have played a major role in preserving and promoting the use of the Welsh language. Since disestablishment, the Church in Wales has also become more attuned to nationalist feeling (Jones, R, 1992). For example, in a November 1988 broadcast sermon in Westminster Abbey on the 400th anniversary of the translation of the Bible into the Welsh language, Archbishop Williams (quoted in Rhys, 1991: 63) undergirded Welshness with an appeal to Christianity, declaring that, “the Bible and the Welsh language, the culture of Wales and her identity were welded together. If that were to cease, we would have ceased to be this particular, unique, Christian people.”

The Northern Irish Province was created in 1920 out of six of the nine counties of the ancient Province of Ulster in response to Unionist opposition to Irish independence. Until 1972, when direct rule from Westminster was introduced, the Province had its own Parliament at Stormont. Direct rule followed the violent conflict which ensued in the wake of the Civil Rights movement on behalf of the Roman Catholic and nationalist minority and against property disenfranchisement in local government and
widespread discrimination in employment. In the ensuing conflict, the Irish Republican Army (IRA) and, later, the Provisional IRA (PIRA), have sought to bring an end to British rule using the bomb and bullet as weapons. In recent times, the republican party Sinn Fein and the nationalist Social Democratic and Labour Party have adopted a political strategy in support of a "peace process" which, in the context of the Downing Street Declaration of the British and Irish Governments, led to an eighteen months ceasefire by the PIRA and the Loyalist paramilitary organisations, until the PIRA resumption of armed conflict in February 1996, followed by the current attempts of the British and Irish Governments to initiate all-party talks on the future.

Wolffe (1994: 108) notes that, "Northern Ireland, in common with the Republic of Ireland, has consistently had much higher levels of religious participation and professed belief than have prevailed on the British mainland." Religion has clearly been a dimension (McSweeney, 1989; Badham, 1990; Comerford, Cullen and Hill, 1990) of what are known as The Troubles. The majority in the North has been concerned about the marginalised position of Protestants in the Republic of Ireland. The continuing demographic decline of Southern Protestants reinforced Northern Protestant fears about their potential position in a united Ireland especially in the light of the Roman Catholic Church's originally special position within the constitution of the Republic, as a result of which its teachings shaped legislation in areas of personal, social and, especially sexual morality (Fulton, 1987). However, in 1972 the "special position" clause of the Irish Republic's constitution was abolished. Nevertheless, with respect to the strand of Unionism which supports or sympathises with Ian Paisley's Free Presbyterian Church and the Democratic Unionist Party, Steve Bruce (1986: 265) points out that, "Unionism is about avoiding becoming a subordinate minority in a Catholic state. Avoiding becoming a Catholic means remaining a Protestant."

In Northern Ireland there has been no officially established form of religion, with the episcopal Church of Ireland having been disestablished in 1871 (Bell, P, 1987). Although the Roman Catholic population is the largest single religious group, it is outnumbered two to one by the combined Protestant groupings of which the Presbyterians (organised in a number of different denominations) are the largest. Protestantism and the Orange Order have been closely related, if not identified, and
the Protestant social and political ascendency over Roman Catholic Christianity has been a part of the basis for the separate political unit of Northern Ireland. At the same time, the Roman Catholic community in the North has been closely identified with broad nationalist aspirations. For example, although the PIRA has often been condemned by the Catholic hierarchy, in 1978 the former Roman Catholic Archbishop (later Cardinal) Tomas O'Fiach explicitly called for British withdrawal from the north. Wolfe (1994: 117) comments that the conflicts of Ireland might "seem to suggest that the prospects for accommodation between wholly different religious creeds were bleak indeed" and (Wolfe 1994: 118) concludes that, "The unresolved ambivalences of a multi-national and multi-religious Britain in which institutional links remain between the state and particular religious groups are both an intriguing historical paradox and a challenging contemporary dilemma."

Issues related to political unity and diversity within the UK have, over recent years, grown in significance. Nairn's (1977) book on The Break-Up of Britain: Crisis and Neo-Nationalism begins with a chapter entitled "The Twilight of the British State." Since the UK's accession to the European Community, and particularly since its signature of the Maastricht Treaty, these questions are increasingly having to be seen within the wider political context of European Union integration. Within the framework of European regionalisation and subsidiarity, the question of English self-identity, which has so long been buried in a "Greater Britishness", is once again emerging. In this context, religion still appears to be a residual factor in terms of Protestant fears about what might happen to British, and especially English, identity in a continent that has a Roman Catholic majority and a transnational institutional framework which many of its founders saw as an expression of their Catholic lay commitment to the vision of a united Christendom.

However, alongside the revival of Roman Catholicism and the multiplication of denominations within the inheritance of the historically Dissenting Protestant traditions, the migration, settlement and development of new Christian communities has further diversified the profile of Christianity in England. For example, although the Orthodox Christian community remains numerically small, in the earlier part of the century it was strengthened by Russian emigrés following the Bolshevik
Revolution in Russia and by economic migration from Greece and refugee migration from Cyprus. The most numerically significant Christian migrant communities are those originating in Africa and the Caribbean. A significant proportion of migrants from African, and especially West African countries, brought with them the forms of indigenous Christian life developed in the African Independent Churches, such as the Cherubim and Seraphim traditions (Omoyajowo, 1982). Many Caribbean Christian migrants were, in their home countries, members of one of the traditional Christian denominations. But following their widespread experience of racism within these Churches in England (Wilkinson, 1993), black Christians began to form independent congregations where they could practice Christianity in a way in which they could draw upon the strength and integrity of their own Christian experience and leadership, free of the racism which they experienced within the older ecclesial communities. A number of the congregations formed by black Christians have grouped together to form denominations of their own (Gerloff, 1992), whilst others have linked up with international movements based abroad, particularly in the USA. In recent years, Churches in this sector of Christianity have also begun to organise umbrella bodies to represent their interests in the wider Christian ecumenical scene (see Weller, ed, 1993: 169-172) and in the process have become involved, together with the Roman Catholic Church, in the new "ecumenical instruments" which were formed in Britain and Ireland at the end of the 1980s.

Into this pre-existing ethnic and national complexity, now set within the broader context of the European Union, have come additional layers of ethnic, cultural and religious complexity arising from New Commonwealth immigration. In relation to these cultural and religious pluralities beyond the Christian and European traditions, of the four nations which comprise the UK, England has the broadest and most numerous variety of religious communities, followed by Scotland and Wales, and then by Northern Ireland (Ryan, M, 1996). In all four nations, the widest diversity of religions is to be found in cities, metropolitan boroughs and some towns. Due to the differing patterns of migration and settlement, some parts of England have a more pronounced multi-faith character than others. The cosmopolitan nature of London means that religious as well as ethnic and linguistic diversity is at its widest there. Seaports such as Liverpool, Cardiff and London often have the oldest minority
religious communities because trade led to the settlement of seafarers from other countries (Fryer, 1984; Visram, 1986) and to the establishment of some degree of community, including religious life. Particular local communities often have a considerable degree of homogeneity in respect of a number of factors including religion, ethnicity and national origins. However, whilst there is obviously a close relationship between them, it has already been argued that religion and ethnicity are not identical.

In considering the size of the other than Christian religious communities and the extent of their religious activity there are currently no entirely reliable statistics on the size of religious communities (see Weller, ed, 1993: 21-22, 39-40). Outside of Northern Ireland there is no religious question in the decennial, compulsory national census (Barley et al, 1987). The figures which exist are either supplied from within the communities themselves or are based upon extrapolations from ethnicity data (Ballard and Kalra, 1994). In both cases, there are significant methodological problems affecting the validity, reliability and comparability of the resulting figures. Comparisons across religions are even more problematic given the varied criteria of membership and practice which are adopted in the collection of the data.

Nevertheless, despite this lack of precise statistical information on religious affiliation in England and in the UK as a whole, it is clear that there has been a significant change in the cultural and religious composition of the population. Christians still form the largest group of religious believers, but this is now followed by Muslims; then by Hindus, Jews and Sikhs; then Buddhists; then Bahá'ís, Jains and Zoroastrians; and finally, by a range of other communities and groups. The multi-faith directory of religious life and organisation in the UK, Religions in the UK (Weller, ed, 1993: 40) gives as figures which are "arrived at on the basis of wide consultation" and that would seem to be figures that would "attract the broadest consensus of opinion," a set of community membership figures (as distinct from the even more problematic question of active membership) which are of the following order: Christians 37,600,000; Muslims 1,500,000; Hindus, 400,000; Sikhs, 400,000; Jews, 300,000; Buddhists, 130,000; Jains, 30,000; Bahá'ís, 6,000; and Zoroastrians, 6,000.
In terms of a community presence, the Jewish community (Campbell, 1994) has had a long history in which, prior to an enforced absence between their expulsion by Edward I and their return during the period of the Commonwealth, Jews had been in England for many centuries. Between 1881 and 1914, the community was strengthened by a combination of economic migration in the face of restricted social and economic possibilities and escape from the anti-Jewish pogroms occurring within the Russian Empire. This was followed, from 1933 onwards, by arrival of escapees from Nazi persecution and the Holocaust in Germany and other Nazi-occupied European countries.

From the times of the Roman conquest onwards (Fryer, 1984), there have always been individuals of various other religions who have come to these islands, and especially to England, as visitors and residents. Zoroastrians began to settle in England during the nineteenth century, with the majority being of Indian origin and known as Parsees. In more recent years the Zoroastrian presence has also developed as a result of refugee movements arising from the Iranian revolution. The Parsee Zoroastrians are the longest established of the minority religious communities originating in the Indian subcontinent and were the first to have made a community impact on the social and political life of the UK (Hinnells, 1996), with the first elected Asian Members of Parliament (Fryer, 1984) coming from their community as early as the nineteenth century.

Small numbers of Hindus have, for centuries, visited and worked here, but it was in the 1950s and 1960s that significant numbers settled and a community began to be established (Bowen, ed, 1981; King, 1984; Kanitkar and Jackson, 1982; Burghardt, 1987; Knott, 1989). Some migrated directly from India. Others came as economic migrants or refugees as a consequence of Africanisation policies within the newly-independent East African states to which they had previously migrated, whilst a number also came as part of the migratory movements from those Caribbean countries in which significant South Asian-origin communities are to be found, particularly Trinidad (Vertovec, 1994). The Sikh community (Helweg, 1986; Cole, 0, 1989) in England and the UK is the largest Sikh community outside of India. The majority of Sikhs migrants came directly from the Punjab in India, although a
significant group also came via earlier settlement in the former British colonies in East Africa and other parts of the world. Most Jains can trace their historical and ethnic origins back to the Gujarat area of India. Some migrated directly from India in the 1950s. Others came in the 1970s and 1980s as a result of the Africanisation policies being carried out in countries such as Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda where they or their forbears had previously settled.

Buddhism in England emerged from a combination of indigenous adoption (Almond, P, 1988; Green, 1989) and migratory and refugee movements of Buddhists into England (Humphries, 1968; Oliver, 1979; Batchelor, 1994). Most of the ethnic traditions and doctrinal schools of Buddhism (Weller, 1993, ed: 84-86) are to be found in England. Bahá'ís have been present in England since 1899 and some of the early formative history of the Bahá'í religion took place in London where Shoghi Effendi (1897-1957), who became Guardian of the Faith and Interpreter of Scripture, lived for some time (see Bahá'í International Community, 1992; Weller, ed, 1993: 55-72). In addition to these world religious traditions, there are also a plethora of contemporary pagan groupings (Crowley, 1994; Harvey and Hardman, 1996) and a range of the so-called "New Religious Movements" (Barker, E, 1982, 1990).

The Muslim community in England and the UK (Badawi, 1981; Joly and Nielsen, 1985; Wahhab, 1989; Christie, 1990; Nielsen, 1992: 39-59; Raza, 1992) is, of course, the community which has been at the centre of the Rushdie controversy and will therefore be described here in a little more detail. It is the largest (Anwar, 1993) and most diverse religious minority in the UK and includes a growing number of white converts (or as Muslims would prefer to refer to them, "reverts" since human beings are understood originally to have been naturally Muslim and therefore taking up the practice of Islam is to be seen as a reversion to the natural state of human beings). Approximately two thirds of Muslims in the UK have ancestral origins in the Indo-Pakistan sub-continent, having come to Britain either directly or via earlier migrations to East Africa. The vast majority of the remaining one third have ethnic and national origins in countries such as Cyprus, Malaysia, Iran and the Arab world. Some of the early Muslim communities were established in the nineteenth century by Muslim seafarers and traders from the Middle East who began to settle around the
major UK ports such as Liverpool and Cardiff, and the Yemenis in North-East England.

Islam is claiming a growing number of white British converts, but its community profile in England is predominantly that of people of South Asian or Arab descent. The consequence of this is that many Muslims, in common with Hindus, Sikhs, Jains and others originally of South Asian or African descent, have had to contend with discrimination on the basis of their racial or ethnic origins, quite apart from any conflicts over religious matters. Such discrimination starts with differential treatment at the point of entry to the country as compared with that accorded to white immigrants from Canada, Australia, New Zealand, Zimbabwe or South Africa. This has caused considerable heartache to those families whose husbands and fathers came to Britain in the late 1950s and early 1960s only to find that, when their wives and children sought to join them in the 1970s and 1980s, they were faced with many bureaucratic obstacles and delays from a system which seemed to many of them as if it were specifically designed to limit the number of black entrants.

From the early days of settlement onwards, research reports (for example, Rose et al, 1969) have established the discrimination and disadvantage experienced by members of the minority communities as ethnically defined. Since the majority of people within minority religious traditions in England are also members of migrant minority ethnic communities they have had to contend with differential treatment on the basis of their ethnic and migratory status as well as their cultural and religious heritage. At the same time, in contrast to many other European Union countries, the majority who settled in England and the UK either had, or were entitled to take up, British citizenship. There is undoubtedly a gap between the formal, legal position and the personal and social realities of experienced discrimination and disadvantage. Nevertheless, the formal and legal position of such groups has put them in both a psychologically and politically stronger position upon which to build their own organisations and engage in community development in comparison with their second or third generation counterparts in many other European countries who still retain the status of migrant rather than citizen, with all of its accompanying legal and psychological consequences.
In this respect, minority communities in England and the UK have been in a stronger position than, for example, second or third generation Turkish Muslim Gastarbeiter living in the Federal Republic of Germany (see Nielsen, 1992: 23-38) where the principle of "blood" descent operates in the assignment of nationality and where other minority communities are still predominantly seen as "guests" rather than as an integral part of the societies in which they are set. In Germany, for example, so-called Aussiedler from the former Soviet Union who have only tenuous historical connections with the contemporary German state can apply for citizenship by right, whilst it remains very difficult for the settled Turkish minority to become German citizens (Habermas, 1994: 135-148).

It is therefore within this complex and multi-layered national, ethnic and religious diversity of contemporary England and the UK and the policies and mechanisms evolved by the state to deal with this diversity, together with community responses to these policies and mechanisms, that the special constitutional position of the Church of England is to be located and the "entails" of the Rushdie controversy for its present and future role are to be debated.

c) Plurality: Public Policies and Community Responses
The national, ethnic and religious diversities outlined in the previous section of the chapter have led to policy debates and developments about the appropriate social and political structures and mechanisms for dealing with such diversity within the United Kingdom state and English society. There has also been a range of community responses to these initiatives. It is to the examination of these debates, developments and responses that this section of the chapter now turns.

Despite the high degree of religious and cultural diversity in England and the UK it is noted by Wolffe (1994: 98) that, "the controversies that arose only slowly came to be seen as having a religious dimension. A survey of the literature on race relations published between the 1960s and the 1980s reveals very few references, other than the superficial or incidental, either to the religions of minority groups or to the activity of the Christian Churches." Initially, like other immigrants from South Asia, East Africa and the Caribbean, the early Muslim immigrants had primarily to be concerned with the basic economic issues of finding somewhere to live and getting a job by
which they could send remittances back to families in their home countries. In this phase of settlement, ethnic associations flourished rather than groups organised on a distinctively religious basis, resulting in nationally-related forms of organisation centred around groupings orientated on the country from which migration had originally taken place, as in the creation of Pakistani Welfare Societies, Barbadian groups etc.

The initial social and political responses to these changes have also tended to operate at the level of the economic and employment issues which they either raised or reinforced. However, the implications of such changes have been much further-reaching although they were not always clearly foreseen during the periods in which these migrations were encouraged. When New Commonwealth immigration was at its peak, it was often assumed by both the authorities and the migrants themselves that their migration would not be permanent. As previously noted, individuals of South Asian origin had, in fact, been visitors to, and residents within Britain, for a number of centuries (Visram, 1986). Some localised communities had also been founded but it was after the Second World War that a significant number of military personnel from the colonies remained in Britain. In the period of post-war reconstruction their presence was supplemented when Commonwealth labour was recruited from the Indian subcontinent and the Caribbean. Initially, the migrants were predominantly male and came with the intention of making enough money to send generous remittances home whilst, at the same time, building up sufficient capital to return home themselves later on. But the combination of economic and personal hardship and the tightening restrictions on immigration following the Commonwealth Immigrants Act of 1962 resulted in males increasingly being joined by spouses and children, thus laying the basis for the development of the social, cultural and religious communities and institutions which would maintain and reproduce their religious traditions and communities.

At this point, temples, Gurdwaras and mosques began to be established. By the end of the 1970s, mosques and Islamic centres became an increasingly established part of community life, and in doing so, the process began to reflect and to institutionalise the two principal religious traditions within the Muslim community - the Sunni and the
Shi'a - and the variety of movements (see Raza 1992; Andrews, 1994; Greaves, 1996) that are historically and organisationally rooted in Indian subcontinental forms of Muslim organisation (Robinson, 1988) such as the Barelwis, Deobandis, Tablighi Jamaat, Ahle-Hadith and Jamaat-i-Islami, each of which have their own emphases, networks, structures and organisations (Raza, 1992).

As it became clear that the migration was of a more permanent nature the earliest Government policy responses to this plurality can be categorised as attempts at social absorption or "assimilation" (see Rose et al, 1969). Later, and in the light of the American Civil Rights movement, the then Labour Home Secretary, Roy (now Lord) Jenkins introduced the first Race Relations Act 1965 and the National Committee for Commonwealth Immigrants and the Race Relations Board (later replaced by the Community Relations Commission and then the Commission for Racial Equality) were set up with the twin responsibilities for public education and legal investigation of cases brought under the Act. Jenkins set the scene for bi-partisan Government policy by staking out an approach based upon the policy goal of 'integration' rather than 'assimilation'. He argued (1967: 267) that, "I do not think that we need in this country a melting-pot, which will turn everybody out in a common mould, as one of a series of someone's misplaced vision of the stereotyped Englishman."

As an alternative to the melting pot of "assimilation" as the means for creating social unity, Jenkins proposed the goal of "integration" which he defined as, "equal opportunity, coupled with cultural diversity, in an atmosphere of mutual tolerance." Ever since the mid-1960s, this ideal of multi-culturalism has been the officially-sanctioned aspiration of the UK state and has formed the basis of a general political consensus underlying the equal opportunity policies of central and local government and other significant social institutions. On the basis of this policy, significant social institutions have engaged in concerted attempts at positive action to address the needs of those citizens who, in semi-official terms, are known as the "ethnic minorities." Various mechanisms were established to fund the community development of groups defined in this way and to fund the public and voluntary services available to them and these mechanisms thus reinforced such modes of self-definition.
Whilst some sections of the minority communities welcomed the promotion of 'integration', others saw this policy as an attempt to co-opt and blunt the cutting edge of a distinctive potential social role that could be played by minority ethnic groups (Sivanandan, 1982) in the transformation of British society within a post-colonial context. By the early nineteen eighties, significant numbers of African-Caribbean and Asian youth took up positions based upon the ideology of 'Black' unity with 'Black' understood as a political colour in response to the common experience of racism expressed primarily in socio-economic terms rather than in relation to personal prejudice concerning a shade of skin pigmentation.

By the middle of the decade, however, the emphasis was shifting much more to cultural issues and an 'Asian' identity began to emerge more strongly out of the undifferentiated 'Black' political identity. This eventually led to a further diversification into plural ethnicities on the basis of cultural self-identification which, in turn, opened up the possibility of religious identification once more becoming an important personal and social signifier. Finally, people of often disparate national, ethnic and linguistic backgrounds began to coalesce into the nascent outlines of emergent national minority religious communities. In recent times, such hesitant signs of movement can be seen in the Muslim community's search for national organisational structures that could provide community representation, public profile, political strength and internal community sustenance in what is perceived, and often experienced, as a hostile environment. In this context the Rushdie controversy has given additional impetus to the development of national Muslim organisations pursuing the interests of the community in the wider social and political arena with the foundation, for example, of the UK Action Committee on Islamic Affairs and the Muslim Parliament.

However, initially, as has already been noted, religion was only rarely considered in terms of the implications of the new plurality. One example of the relative invisibility of these issues in this earlier period can be seen from an examination of the Bishop of Winchester's intervention in the General Synod's 1977 debate (reported in Wolffe, 1993: 193) on the British Council of Churches' (1976) Community and Race Relations Unit's Report on The New Black Presence in Britain. This report was extremely sharp
in its analysis of the challenges posed to the Church by a racially plural society, but Bishop Taylor felt that the report did not give proper attention to the issues arising from religious plurality. In the debate which followed his intervention, Bishop Taylor argued that, "The existence of religious minorities presents us with both problems and opportunities which are distinct from those that arise from the presence of racial and cultural minorities, and should not be lost sight of or evaded." He therefore tabled an amendment to the Bishop of Truro's original proposal "That this Synod recognises that the emergence of a multi-racial and multi-cultural society lays upon the Church the duty to use the opportunity for the enrichment of our national and personal life," substituting the new words "a society which comprises different racial, cultural and religious groups," for the original words "multi-racial and multi-cultural society," thus explicitly referring to religious, as well as racial and cultural diversity.

Recent history, and pre-eminently the Rushdie controversy itself have evidenced the prescience of Taylor's intervention. For example, by contrast with Wolffe's observation concerning the relative absence of religion in literature on migration during the 1960s to 1980s, Parsons (1994: 15) notes that articles appearing during the 1980s and 1990s in the Commission for Racial Equality journal *New Community* reveal a "steadily increasing recognition of the relevance of religious themes and issues in the discussion of race relations in recent and contemporary Britain." This reflects the increasing differentiation of personal and social identities on the basis of religion, a dramatic example of which occurred following the Indian Government's Operation Blue Star against the Khalistani separatist movement during which Sikhs felt that the Golden Temple was profaned. Following this, many formerly secularised Sikhs rediscovered their Sikh identity and radicalised young members of the International Sikh Youth Federation won many of the annual management committee elections in the Gurdwaras, displacing the older leadership (see Singh Tatla, 1993: 96-109).

In the Rushdie controversy radicalised South Asian youth of Muslim background began to identify themselves primarily as Muslims. Parekh (1989e) argues that the experience of immigrants puts them in "a highly ambiguous relationship with the sacred" in which at one extreme there is "total cynicism" and at the other, there is a
"retreat to the familiar certainty of the past" in which "The meaning of life is deemed to be permanently and incorrigibly revealed in a sacred text, a body of rituals, or a pool of inherited or inviolable traditions," pointing out that these traditions are "uniquely the immigrant's own in a society that has stripped him or her of all else."

Religious traditions which are associated with migrant groups can therefore function in a highly significant way among migrant and minority groups and conscious religious identification has remained a significant factor within ethnic identity (see Houtart, ed, 1979; Modood, Beishon and Virdee, 1994: 45-63). With respect to the Muslim community, Parekh (1989e) points out that Rushdie's book was the focus for "the inescapable conflict" between Rushdie's "quest for personal autonomy" and the "vast majority of Muslims" who lead "individually heteronomous lives within an autonomous group." By demanding recognition primarily on the basis of religious identity Muslims, in particular, have been posing fundamental questions to UK society. In a cultural milieu in which ethnicity, nationality, class and lifestyle have been seen as the major determining factors of individual and corporate identity, for individuals to define themselves primarily in terms of religious identity and, furthermore, for these individuals to give a primacy to their corporate rather than personal identity, represents a major break with the prevailing social ethos.

What Parekh (1989e) has called the "magnifying mirror" of the Rushdie controversy has highlighted within the English and wider UK contexts what are, arguably, broader global developments towards heightened religious self-awareness and self-definition. For example, Vincent Cable (1994) identifies the rise of "identity politics" as one expression of the new contemporary fissures in the world which he argues are replacing the old political polarities in the wake of their collapse or of relativisation. Such religious self-identification can have double-edged consequences. On the one hand, particular groups define themselves primarily in terms of personal and/or community identity rather than, for example, of social class. On the other hand, the wider society begins to respond by recognising such self-identification and, in so doing, reinforces these identities. But this reinforcement also occurs when societies and groups within them reject such means of identification since this very rejection can serve to underline even more the distinctive self-identification of those whose self-
understanding is rejected in this way. Thus, the "entails" of the Rushdie controversy for the cluster of issues concerned with the relationships between religion, ethnicity and nationhood are underlined, as are the "entails" of the controversy that are concerned with the relationships between religion and secularity.

Much of the legislation and social policy that is designed to deal with social identities based upon ethnicity does not sit easily with the rise of religious self-definition. The original Race Relations legislation made no provision for religion as was made clear in the case of *Ealing London Borough Council v. Race Relations Board* in which three Law Lords (in Robilliard, 194: 2) explicitly stated that religion was not included in the terms of the Act. Lord Kilbrandon's justification for this was that there was a contrast between "colour, race or ethnic or national origins" and religion. Of colour, ethnic and national origins he argued that, "They are in the nature of inherited features which cannot be changed, as religion, politics and nationality can be changed, more or less at will." Of course, this judgement reflected both an individual and an individualistic view of religion which would be likely to be contested, especially by many members of minority religious traditions where religious belonging is often related to group rather than individual identities, a fact which has again been underlined by the Rushdie affair which, as was noted by Parekh, has contrasted autonomous Western value systems with (at least an apparently) heteronomous Muslim experience within an autonomous community.

However, despite the direct exclusion of religion from the *Race Relations Act*, the House of Lords' decision in the 1983 case of *Mandela v. Dowell Lee* established the principle of taking a common religion into account as one of the contributing definitions of shared ethnicity found among "racial groups" as defined in the terms of the *Race Relations Act*. Robilliard (1984: 3) commented on this case that, "this may prove one of the most important cases decided on religious liberty in the last decade." In his decision on the case, Lord Frazer of Tullybelton made clear that the Act cannot apply to religious groups as such, even though "ethnic" was judged to have a wider meaning than simply racial. His definition saw two essential factors for consideration as evidence of ethnicity, namely,

\[(1)\quad\text{a long shared history, of which the group is conscious as distinguishing it from other groups, and the memory of which it keeps alive;}\]
(2) a cultural tradition of its own, including family and social customs and manners, often but not necessarily associated with religious observance.

But the judgement (in Robilliard, 1984: 5) also addressed five additional factors of relevance to the definition of ethnicity under the terms of the Act:

(1) either a common geographical origin, or descent from a small number of common ancestors;
(2) a common language, not necessarily peculiar to the group;
(3) a common literature, peculiar to the group;
(4) a common religion different from that of neighbouring groups or from the general community surrounding it;
(5) being a minority or being an oppressed or dominant group.

Sikhs were therefore judged to be an ethnic group in the meaning of the Act and it appears that Jews are covered too, as an ethno-religious group. However, Catholics and Muslims as such are not protected since they are part of universal, global religious traditions and communities. Thus, the Muslim observances of an English revert would not appear to be covered by the Act although Muslims who are also members of minority ethnic groups might be covered under the processes and procedures relating to "indirect discrimination." Therefore, as Robilliard (1984: 5) points out, "The religious customs of a Muslim from Saudi Arabia may be protected not because he is a Muslim (universal religion) but because of his ethnic origins of which Muslim customs are a manifestation."

No legal provision currently exists in England for the prosecution of incitement to religious hatred. As long ago as 1936, an unsuccessful attempt was made to insert such a provision into the Public Order Act and the crime of incitement to racial hatred under the 1965 Race Relations Act does not include religion (Dickey, 1972). In the special conditions which have pertained in Northern Ireland, the Prevention of Incitement to Hatred Act (Northern Ireland) 1970 makes it an offence if, with the intent to stir up hatred against, or rouse the fear of, any section of the public in Northern Ireland on the grounds of religious belief, colour, race or ethnic or national origins, a person "(a) publishes or distributes written or other matter which is threatening, abusive or insulting, or (b) uses words of a similar nature in any public place or in any public meeting" (quoted in Robilliard, 1984: 7). Therefore, although its provisions have only rarely been used, the scope of this law is not only concerned with incitement directed to, or against, religious groups but is also concerned with incitement against any group when such incitement is carried out on religious grounds.
It is the lack, in England, of legal instruments for the protection of religious sensibilities and groups which, especially in the light of the Rushdie controversy, has led to Muslim calls (UK Action Committee on Islamic Affairs, 1993; An-Nisa Society, 1993) for legislation to be passed addressing specifically religious discrimination and identity. The inability of Muslims to appeal to any legal instrument through which to advance their case during the Rushdie controversy has highlighted this issue, and especially so for the argument of this thesis, in so far as it contrasts with both the legal protection offered to Anglican Christianity in the blasphemy laws and the widespread custom and practice which undergirds so much Christian life in England. In its recent review of Race Relations legislation, the Commission for Racial Equality (1992) advocated Government consideration of legislation which would bring the situation in England, Scotland and Wales into line with that in Northern Ireland, but the Government appears to have been reluctant to consider making any such legislative changes whilst also, as has already been noted, remaining opposed to making any changes to the current blasphemy laws either by way of abolition or reform.

With regard to the greater religious plurality that immigration has brought, then, the Rushdie controversy has uncovered and focused debate in terms of the social, religious, cultural, legal and political clusters of issues thrown up by the controversy and has led to questions concerning the theoretical coherence and practical feasibility of achieving the compatibility of both the "cultural diversity" and the "mutual tolerance" elements within Jenkins' vision of an "integrated" multi-cultural and pluralist society. As has already been noted Jenkins (1989) himself has, in the light of the Rushdie controversy, admitted the existence of such a question.

The seriousness of the issues thrown up by the Rushdie controversy have been such that an increasing number of people, even amongst those well-disposed to Muslims and Islam, have become very disenchanted with the feasibility of the multi-cultural vision. Significant sectors of the majority ethnic groupings of British society have always challenged and questioned the ideal of a multi-cultural and plural society. But even amongst those who had previously upheld such a vision, the Rushdie affair has represented a sort of "loss of innocence" in their commitment. Fay Weldon (1989c)
speaks for these when she asks, "In the name of Freedom of Belief we dwell contentedly (or thought we did) in our multi-cultural, multi-racial society: it doesn't work, but who dares say so?"

At the very least, the controversy has certainly uncovered a good deal of superficial glibness which was sometimes to be found concerning the opportunities presented by a multi-cultural society. The controversy has challenged as inadequate any incantational invocation of the concepts of multi-culturalism and pluralism which refuses to face up to the very real and difficult problematics that are posed for these ideals by the diversity of values and visions that are present within British society. As Tariq Ali (in Lawson, 1989) has pointed out, the liberal belief in "positive images" with respect to other ethnic groups has been confused by the Rushdie affair. Fay Weldon (in Lister, 1989) has commented upon this aspect of the controversy to the effect that, "Suddenly people are very confused when the ones who have been declared the victims in our society start behaving like the persecutors. What is happening is that the victims in our society are changing, and it takes time for the Left and others to get used to these changing circumstances."

Examining the Rushdie controversy from a liberal, individualist perspective, The Independent editorial "Limits to mutual tolerance" (1989) referred to Roy Jenkins' multi-culturalist policies and noted that, "Roy Jenkins' philosophy was predicated on the expectation that the minorities would also demonstrate tolerance, and the implicit belief that all manifestations of cultural diversity would be benign. It is becoming disturbingly apparent that this is not the case." In the light of the Rushdie controversy the question has to be asked as to whether such a vision is also merely a "utopia" in the popular sense of the word "utopianism", meaning a political aspiration that is disconnected from the social conditions which would make it an option as a real social project or whether it remains a realisable vision. If the possibility of pluralism is still to be affirmed, then those who advocate it will not be able to get away with superficiality or utopianism again (Hulmes, 1992). They must now demonstrate that they are facing up to the very real, complex and serious issues which are involved in such a project (MacIntyre, 1978). In particular, they will need to address how to set about the negotiation and evolution of new social, religious, cultural, legal and
political frameworks on the basis of agreed rules, within which people living by
different and sometimes radically conflicting values and expressions of ultimate
concern can co-exist, and even in the absence of consensus not only co-exist, but also
coop-erate.

The questions involved here have already been to some extent explored in the 1985
Swann Report, *Education for All: The Report of the Committee of Enquiry into the
Education of Children from Ethnic Minority Groups* since education always has been
a key terrain and flashpoint for clashes related to varying value perspectives,
concerned as it is with social reproduction and acting as it does in an arena in which
the public and the private and familial values overlap and sometimes conflict.
Although the Swann Report centred on education, its reflections on pluralism in that
context have far wider reference and significance. The report set out its vision of the
multi-cultural society and pluralism in the following terms (1985: 7):

> a multi-racial society such as ours would in fact function most effectively and
> harmoniously on the basis of a pluralism which enables, expects and
> encourages members of all ethnic groups, both minority and majority, to
> participate fully in the shaping of the society as a whole within a framework
> of commonly accepted values, practices and procedures, whilst also allowing
> and, where necessary, assisting the ethnic minority communities in maintaining
> their distinct ethnic identities within this common framework.

Swann's vision of pluralism therefore ruled out both assimilationism of values by the
majority and separatism by the minorities. The ideal enunciated by the Swann Report
(1985: 6) is one of a society which is "both socially cohesive and culturally diverse",
with this diversity being set within a national consensus based on "common aims,
attributes and values" (Swann 1985: 7) in which a balance is sought between support
for the distinctive elements of the cultures of all ethnic groups and the acceptance by
all of a set of shared values.

However helpful Swann's vision of pluralism might be argued to be in clarifying the
issues involved, it can be critiqued from a number of angles. Firstly, one difficulty
with the Swann Report is that it simply states (whether as fact or as aspiration is not
entirely clear) that such a pluralism is based upon "a set of shared values" without
indicating what these values are or might be. The Rushdie controversy reveals the
sharp value clashes which actually exist within society and therefore poses the
question of whether this kind of pluralism is merely wishful thinking. Another vulnerability of Swann's approach is examined in Goulbourne's (1991: 214) discussion of the varieties of pluralism, in which he argues that, “whilst the spirit of Swann should be welcomed...the uncritical celebration of pluralism, which Swann reflected, cannot be wholly acceptable to those who wish to contribute to, or sanction, the emergence of a just, fairer and non- or anti-racist society in post-imperial Britain.” In the light of "Note on Terminology" in the "Introduction" to this thesis which pointed out the difficulty of delineating and distinguishing between various meanings of the word "pluralism", it is significant that Goulbourne (1991: 215) argued that, "A major difficulty here is that the statement of the new pluralism, which Swann reflects, compresses two distinct pluralist traditions in social science", the one relating to issues concerned with political pluralism and the other concerned with the social and culturally diversities found within plural societies.

Of particular importance in the context of the argument of this thesis is the observation that Swann's version of pluralism appears to be an essentially secular model and, as a result, some of the sharpest critiques of the Swann Report came from the Muslim community. There was concern that the report tended to treat Muslims as an ethnic group whereas they understood themselves to be a multi-ethnic and essentially religious group. Therefore a joint statement (1986) from the Islamic Academy (see Weller, ed, 1993: 402-403) in Cambridge and the Islamic Cultural Centre in London (see Weller, ed, 1993: 403) criticised the report for its "extremely secular philosophical basis" and Syed Ali Ashraf of the Islamic Academy in Cambridge (in Halstead: 1986) pointed out with respect to the members of the Committee that, "Because of their secular outlook they wanted to ignore the religious dicta and went to the extent of regarding religion as a cultural phenomenon and nothing more than that. Their integrational pluralism is based on this secular approach to religion and all religious communities."

These examples from the world of education show how diverse understandings of pluralism can result in the adoption of very different theoretical positions and the pursuit of different practical outcomes. If this is true with regard to the concept of pluralism, which often functions as a marker of a value commitment as much as a
social scientific concept, it is *a fortiori* true with respect to the other values some of which, like the concept of pluralism itself, might seem to be held in common whilst others will appear to be directly oppositional in their import and consequences.

The fundamental nature of the issues posed by the controversy can be illustrated from the identification, by commentators on both the political left and right, of the way in which the Rushdie controversy has sharply focused the difficult issues involved in the construction of a plural society. From the perspective of the political right, John Vincent (1989) warned in the light of the Rushdie controversy that, “We are at risk of becoming a pluralist society which will not practice pluralism, especially where religion is concerned. Our élites, multi-culturalist in theory, neither share nor approve that sense of sacredness which Islamic Britain has, but our indigenous culture largely lacks.” Vincent (1989) argued that, “The secular consensus is on its high horse at the moment” and that this consensus is “Bossy and intolerant of all differing views.” From a different political and religious standpoint, Melanie Phillips (1989a) also argues that, “We are a society which is terrified of pluralism. Much so-called multi-culturalism lightly camouflages a desperate tendency towards homogeneity, towards making everyone the same.”

With respect to the spokespeople of secular Britain, John Torode (1989) observes that the Rushdie affair has had two effects. On one side, “It has rendered untenable the simplistic belief that members of all ethnic minorities are part of one undifferentiated “black” mass, supposedly united in making progressive demands, stemming from the economic and social disadvantages they suffer.” On the other hand, “it has splintered the liberal establishment” between the “absolutists, such as Fay Weldon and Harold Pinter” and the “pragmatists who feel that freedom of expression is not an absolute good.”

From a Muslim perspective, too, the Rushdie controversy has called into question the ideal of a pluralistic and multi-cultural society. This is because of the failure, as Muslims perceive it, of the wider society to take meaningful action to uphold the dignity of their Muslim identity and religion. By allowing initial publication and continued distribution of a book which they felt offended fundamentally against their deepest concerns, the Muslim community felt betrayed, hurt and rejected. The sense
of betrayal was especially acute in relation to the role of those supporters of Salman Rushdie among the political, social and religious liberals who had previously expressed their support for the ideal of a multi-cultural and multi-faith society and who now took sides with Rushdie rather than with the Muslim community. Amit Roy (1989) noted that, "For Muslims, young and old, the government's commitment to a multi-cultural, multi-faith society is being judged by whether The Satanic Verses is banned and the law of blasphemy extended to include Islam" and Rana Kabbani (1989) concluded that, "In Britain, Rushdie's book brought into the open the frustrations of a Muslim minority for whom the much-vaunted multicultural society was a sham." She argued that, as highlighted by the Rushdie controversy, the Muslim community feels that its rights and legitimate expectations are not adequately being addressed and therefore that, "Faced by the entrenched majority community, still overwhelmingly Christian in law and institutions if not in belief, Muslims felt powerless and unprotected." It is therefore to an examination of the "entails" of the clusters of issues raised by the controversy for a society "still overwhelmingly Christian in law and institutions if not in belief" that the following section turns.

d) The Kairos of the Controversy and the Establishment

With the exception of debates around the blasphemy law, the public debates around the Rushdie controversy itself were not generally conducted with explicit reference to established religion. But it is the specific argument of this thesis that the "entails" of the controversy have uncovered the extent and significance of the interconnected nexus at the heart of English life which the establishment of religion represents; that the extent and significance of this can be found at the symbolic, structural and operational levels of the constitution; and that, as a consequence its significance permeates large swathes of social, religious, cultural, legal and political life in England.

That the significance of the controversy may entail a "kairos" for the future of general multi-cultural and multi-religious life in England is illustrated by statements from the political, religious, cultural and academic sectors of English life. The politician Keith Vaz (1989b) argued that, "The words that were written by Rushdie are as profound for different reasons as Enoch Powell's were 21 years ago, and their consequences will
be as long-lasting." A correspondent (Palmer, R, 1989) to The Church Times commented that, "The Satanic Verses will now go down in history as a book which has had as much impact, in its own way, as did Darwin's Origin of the Species in 1859" since it has "brought to a head the fact that there is a sizeable and increasingly vocal Muslim community in this country which is no longer willing to be quiescent."
The playwright Howard Brenton (1989), challenging what he identifies as "the English solution" of letting silence fall over the issue argued that, "The problem won't go away. If this is not resolved we could have a cultural and racial crisis on our hands which could poison national life for decades." In The Church Times, Douglas Brown (1989) commented that, "We are living through an episode of exceptional significance in the history of thought, ideas, ethics, morals, politics." Finally, Bhikhu Parekh (1989a) pointed out that "A political crisis is like a magnifying mirror reflecting some of the deepest trends and tendencies developing in society. A wise nation meditates on it, and uses it as a means for self-knowledge. The Rushdie affair has raised issues likely to preoccupy us for a long time."

It is the extensiveness and interconnectedness of the controversy's ramifications across the whole range of the identified clusters of social, religious, cultural, legal and political life arising from the controversy that sharply underlines the difficulties of wrestling with the value clashes of the kind it has involved from within an approach based on purely incremental changes to the current constitutional arrangements. As Parsons (1994c:154) has noted with respect to the challenges of religious pluralism in general:

it is certain that the political-religious issues raised by religious pluralism and the competing rights and claims of religious groups and individuals will make increasing demands upon the attention of British politicians and political parties in the coming years. This being so, it is appropriate for us to ask whether the political culture of Britain is equipped to handle such matters in an informed and thoughtful way.

It is the particular argument of this thesis that the "entails" of the Rushdie controversy do not only bring about a "kairos" in terms of public policy more generally but also entail a specific, albeit largely implicit, "kairos" for the future of established religion in England. Very few Christian statements or extended considerations of the establishment have located questions about it within the new multi-faith social and religious setting in any systematic way. For example, Buchanan only fleetingly
mentions this issue, seeing the question of establishment primarily in intra-Christian theological and ecclesiological terms.

As was noted and explored in chapter 4, the inheritance of established religion means that there are a whole range of constitutional ways in which the symbolic, structural and operational significance of the establishment of the Church of England is given expression and these constitutional features also result in an even wider range of consequences that flow from this establishment: namely, in the connection of Englishness and Anglicanism; in the continuance of blasphemy laws which protect only Christians and, more specifically, the rites and doctrines of the Church of England; in the existence of entrenched political representation for the Church of England through the Bishops in House of Lords; in its voluntary aided and controlled schools; in its privileged weighting in the groups that constitute Agreed Syllabus Conferences and Standing Advisory Councils on Religious Education; and in its institutionalised chaplaincies in the prison, hospital and armed services. By contrast, Muslims and members of other than Christian religious traditions, as well as the newer Churches of predominantly black membership and leadership (MacRobert, 1989; Gerloff, 1992) are largely excluded from this kind of access and presence. The Christian Churches in general, and the established Church of England in particular, have a position of privileged access to the many English institutions and to the British state which is not, in reality, available to other religions even if they are theoretically not debarred.

Stewart Lamont (1989: 190) comments on the continuation of the current establishment that, "it has always seemed to me as a Scot, somewhat strange that English Christians both within and outside the Church of England have not challenged the established position before now. The answer may be that there has been no crisis to focus the issue." This thesis suggests that the intractability and complexity of the issues which the Rushdie controversy poses indicate that, at least at an implicit level, a "kairos" is now implied in respect of the relationship between the various religions of English society and between the religions and the wider society and the state of which they are a part. By examining in turn the social, religious, cultural, legal and political entails of the controversy, the thesis has demonstrated that, in each case, these
threads are interwoven with each other within the fabric of the controversy as a whole. Furthermore, it is argued that the analytical unravelling of these interconnected threads leads to the discernment of an unwritten, but nevertheless very real constitutional nexus at the heart of English society and the UK state which is symbolically represented, structurally embodied and to some extent operationalised through the establishment of the Church of England.

As was noted in chapter 4, there have previously been vigorous social and theological debates about the adequacy and appropriateness of established religion which reached their peak in the nineteenth century. During most of the twentieth century, however, apart from during the Prayer Book crisis, there has been a tendency on the part of both supporters and critics of establishment to downplay its significance. The entails of the Rushdie controversy have shown that the continuing establishment of the Church of England is not the irrelevant matter of ecclesiastical and political archaeology which some have sought to portray it as. It is, rather, a symbolic expression of the complicated nexus of the social, religious, cultural, legal and political strands which make up the ethos and constitution of England within the UK state as it has existed since the restoration of the monarchy. Peter Hennessy's (1995) book sub-titled Unearthing the British Constitution has, as its main title, The Hidden Wiring. It is the argument of this thesis that analysis of the Rushdie controversy reveals that the establishment of the Church of England continues to be a significant part of that "hidden wiring."

Having identified the establishment as highly significant rather than a cosmetic piece of political archaeology, by reason of the same analysis there is also a need to proceed with caution in respect of any unravelling of its "hidden wiring." In discussing the question of disestablishment Michael Ramsey (1974: 176) pointed out that "Disestablishment is itself a negative formula. It says what should be discarded. It would be better to ask quo tendimus?" There is considerable practical and theoretical wisdom in initially posing questions rather than advocating programmes in connection with any movement towards social, religious, cultural, legal and political change in respect of established religion. At one level the posing of questions is a more tentative exercise than the advancement of theses and proposals. But at another level it is also
a radical and challenging exercise, since inherent within questions is the implication that the way things currently are, however natural or right they may seem, is not the only possible way for them to be. At the same time, even the way in which questions are posed is itself suggestive of possible answers, at least to the extent of establishing implied boundaries for the range of answers that are conceived of as being possible. To enable an analysis of the theoretical coherence and practical applicability of both the current position and the possible options for change, some ideas and concepts from a social contextualist (Kramer and Messick, 1995) approach to “negotiation theory” are utilised later in this chapter and these ideas and concepts underline the importance of all those affected being able to play a part in the common exercise of negotiating a future way forward.

The eventual making of definite proposals (and even more so the undertaking of concrete actions) are crucially important to the development of what John Rex calls Britain’s “emergent pluralism.” But in the context of the fragility of the emergence of this pluralism, whilst analysing and weighing up options it is also importance to continue to pose questions which, by their very nature, invite and stimulate everyone to give consideration to the issues which they raise and thereby stimulate participation in a common enterprise rather than closing off areas of discussion. Parsons (1994: 19) argues that, in our pluralist society, we need constantly to ask questions about:

how far any of us can go in any particular direction without throwing out something vital to the preservation of a viable balance in British society between the interests of a variety of particular religious groups, the interests of dissenting groups and individuals within them, the concerns of those who stand outside and claim the right to criticise all religions, and the well-being, coherence and creative co-existence of the community of communities that is Britain at the end of the twentieth century.

The currents of history signalled by the Rushdie controversy have underlined the importance of people of all religions and none summoning the imagination to engage in dialogue about alternative ways of ensuring that the plurality of religious people and traditions in contemporary English society and the UK state can play their rightful part in the construction of an inclusive society and state.

The development of negotiation theory has been an area in which perspectives have been brought to bear from a wide range of disciplines including anthropology,
sociology, social psychology, political science and behavioural economics, each of which has resulted in a particular theorisation along structural, psychological, cognitive or normative lines. The social contextualist approach to negotiation theory draws upon all of these insights but argues (Kramer and Messick, 1995: ix) for taking into full account "the impact of the social and organisational environments" of negotiation. It also argues for "conceptualising individuals as fundamentally and essentially social decision-makers." Within such a social contextualist approach Samuelson and Messick's (1995: 48-68) essay on "Let's Make Some New Rules: Social Factors That Make Freedom Unattractive" offers some important considerations and analytical tools that could have considerable relevance to the decisions which this thesis argues need to be made in the light of kairos for the current establishment of religion that is entailed in the Rushdie controversy. Samuelson and Messick (1995: 63) point out that there are a number of key factors which make agreement on change difficult,

First, any change in a social institution will involve transition costs. Replacing the status quo with any alternative system will generally involve costs that simply maintaining the status quo avoids. Such transition costs tend to add to the attractiveness of what is relative to what might be. Second, people are generally familiar with the properties of the status quo, whereas the qualities of an alternative system may only be guessed at. There is, in short, less uncertainty about the status quo than about rival systems. Risk aversion would therefore cause one to view competing systems somewhat less favourably, even if the status quo's deficiencies were clear. Better to have a system whose flaws are known than one that might bring unpleasant surprises.

This argument is consistent with the observation offered by the majority of the Chadwick Commission (1970: 65) for the retention of the Church-State link in broadly its current form. The majority of the members of the Commission concluded that,

We have not recommended a total severing of the historic links; first because we think such a proposal to be impractical in the present state of opinion; and second because even if such a programme was practicable, most of us would not like it, though we should not shrink from it if the state decided it to be either wise or politically necessary. The people of this country value various features of our polity, and will not favour too much tampering.

Because the establishment of the Church of England is so deeply embedded in English society and the structures of the UK state, there is a comforting familiarity about the known quantity of the current constitutional arrangement, even with all its recognised flaws. The possibility that change might create more problems than it solves means that a readiness to undergo it requires the overcoming of a considerable degree of
"risk aversion." In such circumstances, Samuelson and Messick (1995: 93) argue that transition costs and risks of unfamiliarity will have to be compensated for if structural change is to occur. Other dimensions of evaluation must promise sufficient benefits to make the change worthwhile. We propose that the dimensions of evaluation will include at least the following four: efficiency, fairness, freedom and self-interest.

That there are "transition costs" which might make movement from the current constitutional settlement difficult can clearly be seen from the fact that even during the radical reforming years of the Thatcher government in which many traditional institutions were radically shaken up, and despite the Church-State tensions (Baker, D, 1991) over a range of social issues, as well as conflict on the form of the Falklands War commemoration, it nevertheless remained the case that disestablishment did not appear on the Government's agenda of practical politics. As Wolffe (1994: 93) observes: "the majority of both church leaders and of Parliament seemed happy - or at least not unhappy - with the status quo. They had no desire to face the distraction and conflict that would almost certainly have resulted from any serious attempt to achieve radical change."

It is the argument of this section of the thesis that the Rushdie controversy has brought about an implicit "kairos" in which a shift might have begun to occur in the evaluation of the "transition costs" involved in changing from the current model of symbolising, structuring and operationalising the relationship between religion(s), state and society rather than remaining with the current model. Arising from reflection on the possible relevance of the six alternative patterns for these relationships explored at the end of chapter 4, this thesis identifies three alternative options for change in England. Each of these options has its variants and each have their protagonists and critics as well as their strengths and weaknesses in comparison with the current model. They are the model of a secularising disestablishment; the model of an "extended" establishment, facilitating the contributions of other religious traditions; and the model of a de novo foundation of a National Religious Council. In considering each of these models Samuelson and Messick's concept of "risk aversion" and their suggested analytical tools for evaluating "transitional costs" will be utilised.

The first possible model of change is to disestablish the Church of England without any form of replacement on the basis that, in a contemporary English society
composed of people of many religious traditions and none, the current arrangements are both unjust in their privileging of one part of one religious tradition and anachronistic in a secularising society. As already noted, there have already been a number of recent initiatives in this direction including Tony Benn's 1988 Private Member's Bill known as The English Church Bill. This was a very brief Bill for ceasing the legal establishment of the Church of England which would also have barred the monarch or the monarch's ministers from making future appointments to ecclesiastical office. In May 1991, Benn also proposed a Commonwealth of Britain Bill. This sought to give a written constitutional basis to UK political life and included a section on "Religious Freedom" in which the Church of England was to be disestablished, the laws of blasphemy abolished, and equality before the law of all persons of all faiths was to be enacted. In March 1993, the Social and Liberal Democrat MP, Simon Hughes, also introduced a Private Member's Bill for disestablishment. In the context of a wider series of similar proposals such as the Institute of Public Policy Research's proposals for A Written Constitution of the United Kingdom (1991) as well as the overwhelming support for disestablishment (Linton and Schwarz, 1990) from the 1990 Liberal Democrat Conference, these initiatives can be seen as not being so idiosyncratic as, at the time, they appeared to many to be. In many respects, these proposals echo the laïcité pattern of the French form of the secular state, advocating disestablishment by the state, without providing a continued public role for religion to play a different part in symbolising, structuring and operationalising of the constitution.

A second possible model of change is, in principle, to retain the current Anglican establishment but to extend its comprehensiveness by means of the Church of England acting as a facilitator for a wide range of religious communities and traditions, thus enabling them to bring their religious traditions and concerns to bear indirectly upon political and institutional processes. This would be similar to the way in which, in recent years, the Church of England has acted as conduit for the expression of ecumenical Christian concerns through the Church of England bishops in the House of Lords. In the context of the Rushdie controversy and as an advocate and defender of the Anglican establishment, Habgood (1989b) has argued that, "Marriage laws, the role of women in society, education, food laws, the relationship between religious law
and civil law in general...all these and more are profoundly dependent upon whether there is a dominant tradition with respected sub-cultures, and also dependent upon which tradition it is that predominates." In the context of the Rushdie controversy, it has already been noted how *The Independent*'s religious correspondent, Andrew Brown, commented on the role of the Archbishop of Canterbury's staff in interceding with the BBC over Tony Harrison's Blasphemer's Banquet broadcast to the effect that the Church of England appeared to have found a potential new role as a facilitator of communication between the Muslim community and secular organisations.

A third possible model of change is the radical option proposed by Lamont, which he claims "would simply be to give institutional form to a process which has been gathering force over the years." Specifically, Lamont (1989: 204) proposed that Parliament should,

set up a National Religious Council for the United Kingdom. Assuming that it is the democratic will to retain Christianity as the historic faith of the nation (and I believe that any poll would back such a view), then the majority of places on this Council would go to the Christian Churches....It would have places for the principal non-Christian faiths such as Islam, Judaism and Sikhism and could act as a liaison body between parliament and the religious bodies.

He proposed that such a body should be "consultative" but that it could "carve out an influential role for itself by organising assemblies on subjects of common concern to those of religious faith." It many respects, Lamont's proposal echoes the *Pancasila* and *Rukunagara* patterns for the public role of religions as found, respectively, in Indonesia and Malaysia. The proposal also shared both their positive potential and their inherent difficulties, especially in relation to their perceived artificiality and suspicions concerning their syncretistic tendencies.

In using Samuelson and Messick's "dimensions of evaluation" to inform consideration of the "transition costs" of these three options for change we need to examine, in turn, what each of these "dimensions of evaluation" signify for Samuelson and Messick so that the concepts can then be used in evaluating the debates around the entails for established religion which this thesis argues arise from the Rushdie controversy. As we have seen above, the first "dimension of evaluation" which Samuelson and Messick have identified for informing consideration of the "transition costs" of change
is concerned with "efficiency." This is defined by Samuelson and Messick (1995: 63-64) in terms of "the extent to which an allocation system can provide satisfactory levels of a resource to a group without without depleting the resource." In the case of religion, the "resource" could be argued to be the social significance of established religion, in its symbolic, structural and operational senses, whilst the potential for "depleting the resource" arises from the secularisation, privatisation and marginalisation of religion. It is precisely because of concerns about perceived dangers of secularisation that many Christians support the continuation of the Church of England’s establishment. For example, a leading political proponent of Establishment, Michael Alison MP, the Second Estates Commissioner (reported in Buchanan 1994: 74) contended, in a discussion with Bishop Colin Buchanan, that "The state in all Western societies now is becoming increasingly secularised, increasingly the victim of pressure groups of every sort from every side. I think that the State needs the support and interaction with the Church more than ever before in our history."

Such concerns are also shared by people outside of the Christian tradition. For example, Tariq Modood (1992: 59-60), in an article on "Minorities, Faith and Citizenship" argued that, "Where secularism is already the dominant ideology and the national church is marginal, it is dishonest to suggest that religious equality and the empowerment of the new minority faiths begins with a critique of establishment." In relation to agitation for protection under the blasphemy laws and for the public funding of Muslim schools Modood (1992:59) emphasises that, "On these issues Muslims have conspicuously not argued that their rights depend upon the dispossession of Christian privileges." In relation to the establishment of the Church of England, Modood (1992:59) concludes that: "The minimal nature of the Anglican establishment, its relative openness to other denominations and faiths seeking public space and the fact that its very existence is an ongoing acknowledgement of the public character of religion are all reasons why it may seem far less intimidating to minority faiths than a triumphal secularism."

In fact, Modood (1992:59) goes so far as to claim that, "as far as I know there is not a single statement by any minority faith community in favour of disestablishment". Intriguingly, it is indeed the case that many within the religious minorities have given
pragmatic support to the establishment because of their concern about the potential "depletion of the resource" of the public symbolic and operational influence of religion if a secularising disestablishment were undertaken. For example, Jewish leaders, including the previous Chief Rabbi, Lord Jacobovits, and the current Chief Rabbi, Dr. Jonathan Sacks, have spoken in support of the continued establishment of the Church of England as signifying an affirmation of values which go beyond the secular. In his 1990 Reith Lectures, Sacks argued (1991: 97-98) that minorities ought to support the Church of England as a national institution, commenting that, "It might seem paradoxical that one who speaks from within the Jewish tradition should seek to support institutions that are intrinsically Christian. But there is no paradox...each of the many faiths that constitute culturally plural Britain is diminished by a weakening of the faith of the majority." He (Sacks, 1991: 97) argues that "Pluralism does not require the secularisation of public culture" and states that, in his view, disestablishment would "have the effect of signalling a further dissociation between religion and public culture and would intensify the dangers of a collapse in our moral ecology."

The second of Samuelson and Messick’s "dimensions of evaluation" for assessing the "transition costs" involved in any negotiated change is that of "fairness" (1995: 64), understood in terms of "the degree to which distribution of the resource satisfies the principles of equality or equity." In principle, it is fairly clear that the establishment of the Church of England does not facilitate a "distribution of the resource" (ie. the symbolic and operational social significance of religion) in an "equal" way. However, precise mathematical equality may not be either desirable or just. In a society with a Christian inheritance and comparatively large numbers of Christian believers, such an historical inheritance and numeric balance might need to be taken into full account in order to arrive at a contextual and balanced understanding of "equity" rather than formal "equality." Therefore if, for example, Lamont's proposed National Religious Council were to offer any possibility of a way forward, then instead of a mathematical equality of places within it, in order to ensure equity it might need to build weighted representation into its structures.
Samuelson and Messick’s third “dimension of evaluation” is “freedom” (1995: 64). This is defined in terms of “the extent to which a system permits individuals to make resource use decisions for themselves.” This criterion therefore relates to the proper autonomy of each group within a plural society. Arguably, this criterion is of relevance to the possible model of an “extended establishment.” On the surface at least, this model might seem to offer the possibility of functional evolutionary change whilst keeping the establishment of the Church of England formally in place. In reflecting on the intellectual coherence and practical viability of a multi-cultural and pluralist society Habgood (1988) notes that, “On the face of it to envisage a society of equal but different cultures and faiths might seem no more problematic than to accept a variety of competing supermarket chains”, but he went on to question whether the concept of a multi-faith society is either an accurate description or a coherent and desirable social goal on the basis that, “A true multi-cultural, multi-faith society without a predominant tradition would either have to live with total confusion in many essential aspects of its life or, more likely, move swiftly towards complete secularism.” He therefore argued for the Church of England to function in a mediating role, facilitating minority contributions whilst upholding the broader framework of values within which these minority contributions could be received. Such an approach could be argued to be consistent with what many see as an English tradition of adapting existing polity rather than radically changing it.

However, a characteristic of contemporary consciousness is what Berger, Berger and Kellner (1974: 63-82) have called the “pluralisation of social life-worlds” and it is therefore questionable whether the Church of England can, in fact, operate effectively in this role. In addition, is there not at least a hint of a religionised version of the “white man’s burden” in such a justification for the continuation of the establishment? Might not the line of argument supporting this case be more than faintly reminiscent of the paternalistic arguments that were once used in order to justify the continuing colonial arrangements through which white people retained political and economic power and influence, with freedom to contribute on their own terms denied to those upon whose behalf (at least ostensibly) the paternalism was exercised?
Historically, as we have seen, many arguments in favour of the establishment of the Church of England have been made on the basis that England is a fundamentally Christian society. Even Free Church and Roman Catholic arguments advanced against establishment have assumed that, in some way, a basic Christianerness would be reflected in any alternative arrangements which might replace the establishment. However, whilst Christianity is still the majority religious tradition in Britain, a population in the order of a million and a half Muslims (Anwar, 1993) represents a significant proportion of the population, whilst many other people follow other religious traditions and still others live by values and ideals which are not expressed by belonging to a particular religious community. Are all these others expected to shelter under "the Church of England's burden" as a new apologia for establishment? Or has the Rushdie controversy signalled that the time has come for a fresh examination of whether or not the current arrangement is indeed any longer appropriate in a society composed of people of many religions and none?

The final "dimension of evaluation" identified by Samuelson and Messick is that of "self-interest" (1995: 64), defined in terms of "one's own view of how one's own resource status would be affected by an allocation system." Involved in such an evaluation might be issues both of pragmatism and principle. For currently excluded groups who want a greater degree of access to public life, the machinery of the state and the networks of society, a contextual judgement needs to be made concerning which "allocation system" - the current establishment or one or the other of its possible replacement models - is likely to deliver an improvement in their "resource status." In this context, Modood is correct in noting that, at least at the level of official community leadership, there are those from within minority communities who (in line with the Free Church leaders of the 19th century who wanted to be present at Queen Victoria's Jubilee inside Westminster Abbey, rather than only having places on the steps outside) see sharing in the ethos of the current "allocation system" of the establishment as the best way of increasing the "resource status" of their traditions.

However, despite such voices in favour of the establishment that are found within the minority religious communities, Modood (1992b:59) has overstated the case when he comments that "there is not a single statement by any minority faith organisation in
There are, for example, clear Buddhist statements urging disestablishment. In the aftermath of the *Gay News* trial when the Venerable Sagharakshita, the leader of the Friends of the Western Buddhist Order (FWBO) published a pamphlet arguing for the potential importance of what he called "therapeutic blasphemy." Sagharakshita (1978: 24) also called for the abolition of the blasphemy laws and the disestablishment of the Church of England. He argued that "There should be complete separation of Church and State. The Church of England should be disestablished" and that "the sovereign should not be required to be a member of the Anglican communion - or indeed to belong to any Christian denomination, or even to any religion, at all. Reference to the Deity should be expunged from the National Anthem."

In the context of the Rushdie controversy, the FWBO (in Commission for Racial Equality, 1990d: 88) again made clear that, in respect of the blasphemy laws, "We do not want the protection of any such law. Moreover, we would prefer that the blasphemy laws be scrapped altogether and removed from the statute books, as we consider them to be an impediment to our freedom of expression as Buddhists." But in addition to this explicit kind of opposition to the establishment, it is questionable how far the statements of spokespeople who support the establishment of the Church of England actually do reflect the grassroots perspectives within their communities. As has already been noted, there are certainly those, such as Women Against Fundamentalism, who argue explicitly against establishment and who point out that the official leadership of their communities is rooted in discrimination on the basis of gender.

The factor of "self-interest" is also an important one in respect of the role of the established Church of England in its own consideration of, and reflection upon the possibility of change to its established status. Superficially, "self-interest" might seem to require Anglican support for establishment since Anglicans benefit from the "resource allocation" benefits that are associated with establishment. Nevertheless, with regard to a purely pragmatic understanding of "self-interest" within the Church of England, Martin (1948-49: 314), in an article reflecting on "Protestantism and the State," argued that "The truth is that the attitude of Anglicans to the state has always
been decided practically, as is the English way, in relation to historical developments and never in accordance with a consistent doctrine." This observation is confirmed in the conclusion of the *Church and State 1970* report in which its majority authors state that they would not shrink from disestablishment if the State wanted it. This may be Erastianism of the worst sort, but it might also be an indication of an ecclesiological pragmatism that takes the social and historical context into theological account, thus allowing the recognition of when an historical "kairos" might have arrived. As long ago as 1947, Cyril Garbett (in Wolffe, ed, 1993: 216) argued that, “The Church is drifting towards disaster if it allows year after year to pass without making a determined and sustained attempt to readjust a position inherited from ages when the Church and the Nation were one, but which now in a time of rapid change has become fraught with danger.” There are, therefore, dimensions of “self-interest” which might call for reform or adjustment of the form of the current arrangements in anticipation of the danger of potential loss of what the form seeks to preserve should changes be initiated by the state prior to the Church’s recognition of the need for change.

However, whilst there are “straightforward” views of “self-interest”, it is also arguable that the “self-interest” of a religious group and its “own view” of its “resource status” can be considered on different grounds than those which apply in other organisations. For example, in terms of the obvious criteria for “self-interest” Lamont’s (1989: 196) observation that, “The erosion of religious belief by secular forces may be tempting many Christians to cling to establishment as a last straw lest the church blow away entirely in the wind of change” clearly has validity. But it is also the case that, for religious organisations, “self-interest” can be judged as relating not only to apparent success in terms of observable and enumeratable “penultimate goals”, but can also be considered in terms of the “ultimate” goals of their religious traditions. Thus Lamont’s judgement of the attempt to hold onto establishment as a “last straw” in the face of the “wind of change” is that it is “is not only dishonest to the secular majority but cowardly and unchristian in its vision.” In his article on “A Concept of Christian Evangelism in a Secular Society”, E.G. Ernst (1973: 148) argues that: “the process of planning and structuring the life of Christianity in a society that does not assure or guarantee a Christian existence is part of the sociological essence of evangelism” and,
from a different theological standpoint, Don Cupitt (1974: 459) states:

Our argument suggests that it is neither practicable nor desirable to try to entrench Christianity in social structures in the future, in the way that was attempted in the past. No nostalgia, then, for Christendom. That kind of social embodiment of religion was never an entirely satisfactory expression of Christianity, for it reconciled faith and society at an unconscious and basically subChristian level.

Since the Churches, and especially the Church of England itself, do indeed benefit from a relatively high "resource status" in the current "resource allocation" system, the recognition that a religious vision can lead to different perspectives on "self-interest" is particularly important in considering the self-analysis which would need to occur among the Churches for there to be any possibility of ending the current establishment on the basis of mutual agreement among the relevant parties. However, Buchanan (1993: 103) warns that, in their justifications for the current establishment, "Anglicans have got so used to double-think in their apologias that it needs outsiders to blow the distorted thinking aside" and it is in this context that intra-Christian debate becomes significant. In contemporary theological reflection and from a background of "established" German Lutheranism, Jürgen Moltmann (1978: 117) argues that,

Whatever forms the free churches in England, America, and then, since the beginning of the 19th century also in Germany have developed (there are, of course, dangers, mistakes and wrong developments enough here too), the future of the church of Christ lies in principle on this wing of the Reformation because the widely unknown and uninhabited territory of the congregation is found here.

Historically, the Free Churches have been the major source of the religious critique of established religion and, as we have seen, in the nineteenth century they waged vigorous political and religious campaigns for disestablishment. Although, as has been seen in chapter 4, some of this campaign was rooted in the social disadvantage experienced by Nonconformist Christians, for many it was also a matter of theological principle, rooted in their understanding of the nature of the Church and of Christian identity. In *The Social Teaching of the Christian Churches* Ernst Troeltsch (1931: 656) argued that, "The essential meaning of the Free Church system...is the destruction of the medieval and early Protestant idea of a social order welded together by one uniform State Church, and of one infallible authority with a uniform control of the whole civilisation." The ecclesiology of this wing of the Reformation are those of the "sect" as defined by Weber, which include the characteristics of voluntary
membership, self-government and moral discipline. Troeltsch argues that the opposite “Church-type” of ecclesiology (which is typified by the Church of England) aims to suffuse society with grace. Ling (1974: 71) comments that, “the national churches or State religions of Europe are all alike examples of the religious organisation that approximates in its structure to a social system” and that they embody the “consensus of coercion” (1974: 71). At the opposite end of the spectrum from this is the voluntary consensus of the “sect-type” religious organisations which proceed on the basis of the their differentiation from the rest of society. The danger of this pattern is that, because it is based upon the commonality of beliefs among insiders, it can result in a tight drawing of boundaries against the outside world. Its benefit is that, in the social sphere, this form of Church organisation implies institutional structures which support the social conditions that enable a genuine and free encounter to take place with others, both believers and non-believers, who are also affirmed in their freedom.

There are therefore theological resources available within the convergent ecumenical Christian tradition which could enable the Church of England to make a transition from its established status on the basis of a re-evaluation of “self-interest” in terms of a fully theological vision rather than just the pragmatic calculation of potential costs and benefits. For Michael Ramsey (1974: 176) the critical questions about establishment and disestablishment were, “What is it that the Church should do and be different from what it does and is at the present? If the doing of it calls for the altering of the parts, or the whole, of the state relationship, then we should be ready to pay the price.” In Ramsey’s view, there was clearly an argument for considering disestablishment in the light of internal theological imperatives as well as in the light of sociological factors alone.

It is with these points in mind that the thesis now begins to form some judgements about what are the most theoretically appropriate and practically feasible ways forward. Samuelson and Messick’s (1995: 65) analysis of the factors and dynamics involved in the negotiation of change concludes that what is involved in making a choice between alternative systems is what they call “a multiattribute utility problem.” In other words, the “dimensions of evaluation” that have been considered above are not evaluated in isolation but as a complex and unified whole. As explained by
Samuelson and Messick (1995: 64), "the attractiveness of each allocation system is represented by its weighted average, and group members compare overall attractiveness measures of the different systems in order to make choices or comparative evaluations of two or more systems." This is because the individual "dimensions of evaluation" are not always correlated and, depending on the circumstances, a different relative importance can be attached to each individual dimension. It is the recognition of such complexity which leads to an understanding of why what might abstractly appear to be the logic of a set of factors (as in what this thesis argues are the entailments arising from the Rushdie controversy) does not always command the support even of those who should, in purely logical or self-interested terms, be expected to support certain conclusions (in other words, why many minority religious leaders do not support disestablishment). Samuelson and Messick (1995: 64), in fact, point to "two systematic factors" which influence perceptions of the "allocation systems" and which determine a group's formulation of the "overall attractiveness measures" for analysing a possible change. The two factors which they identify are the "relative importance attached to the dimensions" and the "experience subjects have had with the system."

It is the factor of the "relative importance attached to the dimensions" which, in the context of the entailments of the Rushdie controversy for established religion in England, gives rise to a potential mismatch between Muslims and secularists. Both recognise the inequality and inequity of the current arrangements, but they are likely to give a different relative weighting to the functions of "fairness" and "efficiency." Secularists are likely to be attracted to a solution (disestablishment without replacement) that is based on a high evaluation of "fairness" which Muslims might find less attractive on the grounds of concerns about "efficiency" because of the danger that, through such an option, the "resource" of the symbolic and operational public influence of religion might be "depleted." The second systematic factor identified by Samuelson and Messick as influencing "overall attractiveness measures" is the "experience subjects have had with the system." This thesis argues that the Rushdie controversy is of such potential importance because the "systematic factor" concerned with the previously existing balance of the "relative importance attached to the dimensions" might well, through the Rushdie controversy, have been set in a new context as a result of the
"experience subjects have had with the system."

Analysed in the light of such negotiation theory, then, an argument can be made that the legacy of the Rushdie controversy has the potential for tipping the balance of evaluation towards recognition of the need for change. It might well be the case that, in the light of the factors underlined by the Rushdie controversy, there could now be more widespread questioning of whether the pattern of establishment as a means of signalling the public relevance of religious belief and practice is actually understood as those who advocate it would ideally wish it to be seen. Is there not at least a serious question about how far the existence of the current establishment or even proposals for its "extension" prevent the exploration and discovery of new and more appropriate patterns and symbols? This could certainly be argued to be the case in terms of Muslim evaluations of the "transition costs" of moving from the current position, since the Rushdie controversy has underlined in experientially sharp examples the multiple and interconnected ways in which the current "allocation system" of the Anglican establishment disadvantages Muslims. As was demonstrated in chapter four, these disadvantages include notions of Islam as a "foreign" religion and Muslims as potentially disloyal "fifth-columnists"; the equation of Islam with fundamentalism and the sidelining of religious perspectives on public life; the cultural relativism and alternative scale of values held by the artistic and cultural élite of English society; the entrenched privilege of the legal protection accorded to the Christian religion and the lack of any equivalent protection for the beliefs and feelings of Muslims; and finally, despite their participation in the political system, the impotence of Muslims to bring about their desired results as a consequence of their lack of direct representation and the marginalisation of their concerns by the majority of political activitists and representatives in the mainstream political parties.

For others than Muslims, the controversy may also have shifted the significance attributed to the arguments involved in it. For secularists who wish to support the continued participation of Muslims in English society, the Rushdie controversy has brought some, albeit in many cases grudging, recognition that Muslims are not going to privatise their religious beliefs and values in order to fit in with the wider society. If "assimilation" to secularism is not going to work, then perhaps institutional
mechanisms for the "integration" of religions on the basis of their own self-understanding need to be considered. Similarly, for Christians, their appreciation of the sharpness of the issues involved in a plural, multi-faith society has been emphasised by the Rushdie controversy which has underlined an increasing recognition that a commitment to such a society is likely to entail a more self-critical evaluation of the role of the Church in a multi-faith context. This includes some recognition that it may involve embracing some changes which are not, apparently, in the "self-interest" of the Churches at least as understood in the narrower and more straightforward sense of "self-interest."

Arguably, there is therefore now a convergence of factors which create an implicit historical "*kairos*" in the symbolic, structural and operational relationships between religion(s), state and society in England within the UK. In religious life there is growing self-questioning within the Church of England and a growing self-confidence among minority religious communities. In political life there is some convergence between Labour and Social and Liberal Democrat proposals for constitutional reform; and there are major problems within the Royal Family coupled with a growing discussion of the republican option. These factors, in conjunction with the "entails" of the five clusters of issues identified within the controversy, mean that the controversy entails a "*kairos*" for establishment in which the Christian Churches can themselves take an initiative on the basis of active discernment of the "*kairos*" rather than proceeding on a purely reactive basis.

Stewart Lamont is the only commentator identified by this research who has made an explicit connection between the Rushdie affair and the issue of established religion. In *Church and State: Uneasy Alliances*, Lamont (1989: 205) observes that the Rushdie controversy "will not be the last clash of culture and religious freedom which we will see in Britain. It is better by far to plan ahead of such events and enunciate the framework of tolerance and democracy which must be applied to any church/state bond rather than be forced to decide the issue over controversial cases."

e) **Towards a New Way Forward**
Pocock (1973) suggests that the first major step in all political thought is to search for
basic metaphors which are used to explain our political existence to others and to ourselves. In the light of the argument above, this penultimate section of the thesis now considers the current establishment and three alternative models for change. These are considered in the light of the use of Samuelson and Messick's analytical tools, the use of which has been explored above, but also in the light of arguments by Marc Luyckx of the European Community Forward Studies Unit concerning the potential of various "social cosmologies" for the future of Europe.

The basic argument of the thesis is that the "entails" of the Rushdie controversy, demonstrate that the current establishment of religion is inadequate to the contemporary religiously and culturally plural nature of English society and that the need for change is clearly required. The "revolutionary" option of creating a National Religious Council or similar structure as proposed by Lamont is briefly considered, but whatever its logic as a theoretically coherent position, it is rejected as being an unlikely practical outcome. The option of the more "evolutionary" model of an "extended establishment" is then considered as an approach that is consistent with the characteristic way in which English law has accommodated religious plurality. This model is eventually rejected, as is the model of a secularising disestablishment. Finally, an alternative evolutionary way forward is explored by means of a number of discussions which build up to a proposal for the creation of multi-faith and religious-secular "shadow structures" at all levels of society as the means for laying the basis of a new, wider and more appropriate socio-religious contract than the current establishment of Anglican Christianity.

Marc Luyckx (1994) has suggested that there are three possible social cosmologies - the "agrarian," the "scientific-industrial" and the "post-industrial." In terms of the relationship between religion and society, the "agrarian" cosmology can be seen as being associated with the "establishment" of religion. It is based on the assumption of a society in which organic unities - Weber's Gemeinschaften - and pyramidal hierarchies operate. The "scientific-industrial" cosmology is associated with the "secularist" project of modernity (Giddens, 1990, 1991) in which, within the context of the transformation of Gemeinschaften into Gesellschaften, the previously existing organic unities are broken up leading to the characteristic compartmentalisation,
increased specialisation and fragmentation of modernity which has affected both religion and other social and organisational forms, and has therefore either initiated or reinforced movements for the separation of religion and politics and religion and the state.

Luyckx argues that, in contrast to both the "agrarian" and the "scientific-industrial" models, a "post-industrial" model, characterised by the image of a roundtable, is the only theoretically adequate and socially viable model for the contemporary and future plural Europe. Luyckx argues that the project of the nation state was an attempt to address the question of how to achieve cohesion in the context of the breakdown of the previously existing organic unities on the basis of the "scientific-industrial" model. But he argues that this model is ultimately incompatible with the lifestyles of "agrarian," post-modern communities which continue to exist even in Europe, not least through migration of communities with Third World and often rural origins. This is because the "scientific-industrial" model cannot really allow room for contributions to social debate and evolution, made in their own terms, from "agrarian" and pre-modern forms of cultural and religious life. As Bender (1955: 83) has argued, the increasing acceptance of religious toleration often came about for pragmatic political reasons involved in the search for social unity rather than on the basis of any theological or ideological convictions. Because of this, it resulted in an accommodation of pre-modern religious traditions only upon the basis of relativising and privatising their fundamental beliefs:

the victory for toleration in the seventeenth, eighteenth and nineteenth centuries was to a large degree not due to the will of the dominant Christian Churches, Catholic or Protestant, but to the will of rulers exhausted by religious wars and determined to find a basis for peace in the European community which would transcend the warring religious parties; or to the growing rationalism, secularism and materialism of the politically ever more powerful upper middle class, which placed religion low on the scale of cultural values and, in the words of Frederick the Great, was quite willing to have everyone be 'saved after his own fashion.'

It is arguable that English society and the UK state is not fully a modern state in the sense which Luyckx elucidates. Unlike many other European societies, the radical social and political disjunction of English history took place in the 17th century, at a point much earlier than the modernising revolutions of France and then of the rest of the European continent in the 19th and early 20th centuries. As a result, following the
restoration of the monarchy, many of the pre-modern elements of society were reinstated. It can thus be argued that, with its constitutional monarchy and the operation of its hereditary principle for a large proportion of political representation in the upper House of Parliament, English society and the UK state have never fully become a modern society. The continuance of the establishment of the Church of England is one expression of this pre-modern continuity in English and UK polity. As a consequence, in contrast to the situation in much of continental Europe where some of the major issues are concerned with the challenge of integrating pre-modern social forms into modern social and political structures, in England and the UK the challenges are concerned with how far pre-modern constitutional and political forms can be “stretched” to accommodate both pre-modern and modern aspirations. The constitutional settlement therefore already embodies considerable tensions between secular and religious presuppositions and the proposal for an “extended establishment” would be an attempt to “stretch” its raison d’être still further by trying to incorporate an enlarged national comprehensiveness within its parameters. Looked at in this light, the basic models for the relationship between religion(s), state and society explored earlier in this chapter begin to be clarified. By contrast with both “agrarian,” pre-modern and “scientific-industrial,” modern models, Luyckx believes that “post-industrial,” postmodern models can incorporate aspects of both the modern and the pre-modern models since, in conditions of increasing postmodernity, the compartmentalisation of the modern model is less effective as an integrative model and therefore the time once more becomes ripe for the possibility of religions taking an active social role, although now on a different basis than the pre-modern integrative role that (mainly) single religious traditions had in “agrarian” societies. In postmodern societies, religions can contribute to a social project as plural participants alongside one another and secular traditions, participating in “roundtable” or “kaleidoscopic” structures which could embody new forms of relationship between religion(s), state and society.

It is recognised that on a purely logical and theoretical level the implicit entails of the Rushdie controversy could translate directly into the kind of “revolutionary” change of socio-religious contract as in Lamont’s proposal for establishing a National Religious Council in place of the current establishment. The creation of such a
Council could, in principle, be an expression of Luyckx's "roundtable" model. But it is questionable how effective such a creation might be and of how far it might be perceived as a purely artificial creation. Such a model could very easily run into the difficulties associated with the Malaysian Rukenagara and the Indonesian Pancasila systems in which the religious communities themselves become suspicious of the basis on which such a structure is set up. The "risk aversion" factors and the "transition costs" of such a model are very high and it is therefore unlikely that a comprehensive blueprint for a new "socio-religious contract" could simply be proposed, command a consensus and be implemented. Apart from any debates at the level of principle, at the level of implementation this proposal would require not only revolutionary change in the wider society but also rapid evolution of appropriate representative structures and channels among the minority religious communities. The question of legitimate representation has been one of the difficult issues involved in the formation of local Agreed Syllabus Conferences and Standing Advisory Councils on Religious Education on the basis of taking into account the religious demographics of the relevant local authority area. If this is problematic at local level, it would be even more so at national level.

This is a problem which affects all more inclusive models for symbolising, structuring and operationalising the relationships between religion(s), state and society. But it would be particularly exposed as a problem in Lamont's proposal for the de novo formation of a National Religious Council. Not all religious traditions are in anything like a position in which they would be able to elect representatives that carried the support of a consensus of their communities with them. There are some communities which might be in this position - for example, the Christian community could be reasonably effectively and comprehensively represented by the Council of Churches for Britain and Ireland which, unlike its predecessor body the British Council of Churches, now embraces all the traditional Churches in the United Kingdom, including the Roman Catholic Church, and also a number of umbrella organisations representing the predominantly black-membership and black-led Churches (see Weller, ed, 1993: 166-167). With regard to the Jewish community, the Board of Deputies of British Jews (see Weller, ed, 1993: 330), founded in 1760, is an organisation which is accepted as broadly representative of the Jewish community and acts on behalf of
Jews of all religious traditions as well as representatives of secular and cultural Jewish organisations. The Bahá'í community is represented by a single national body - the Bahá'í Community of the United Kingdom (see Weller, ed, 1993: 55), and the Zoroastrian community by the Zoroastrian Trust Funds of Europe (Incorporated) (see Weller, ed, 1993: 580), which is also broadly accepted within the community as being representative.

However, beyond the Christian, Jewish, Bahá'í and Zoroastrian traditions, the picture is more problematic. Amongst Buddhists, the Buddhist Society (see Weller, ed, 1993: 89) has historically been generally recognised among Buddhists as a national point of contact and information for Buddhist traditions in the UK, although there is now also the new Network of Buddhist Organisations. With regard to the Hindu community, on a national level the National Council of Hindu Temples (see Weller, ed, 1993: 243) and the UK branch of Vishwa Hindu Parishad (see Weller, ed, 1993: 243-244) have acted in co-ordinating and representative roles. More recently, an attempt has been made to draw all the major national Hindu umbrella organisations into a single organised Hindu voice which has resulted in the establishment of a National Hindu Council, but many Hindus still identify primarily with their jati or sampradaya organisations. There is currently no single national Sikh representative organisation, but there is a recently founded Network of Sikh Organisations. Many individual Jains and Jain organisations identify with either Jain Samaj Europe (see Weller, ed, 1993: 304) or the Institute of Jainology (see Weller, ed, 1993: 303-304).

With respect to Muslims, who form the largest religious minority and the community which was at the heart of the Rushdie controversy, there is no single umbrella organisation which is generally recognised by Muslims as their main national representative organisation and there is a considerable degree of organisational fragmentation. A variety of general umbrella organisations operate at national level including the Imams and Mosques Council (UK); the Union of Muslim Organisations (see Weller, ed, 1993: 402); and the Muslim Parliament of Great Britain (see Weller, ed, 1993: 406). Some of these organisations have overlapping memberships emphasising the fluidity of contemporary Muslim community organisations. In more recent times, a range of national organisations have been founded with specific aims
and objectives concerned with education. These include the Muslim Education Co-Ordinating Council (see Weller, ed, 1993: 405), the Muslim Educational Forum (see Weller, ed, 1993: 405-406) and the Muslim Educational Trust (see Weller, ed, 1996: 406). There are also new organisations concerned with legal issues affecting the community, such as the UK Action Committee on Islamic Affairs (see Weller, ed, 1993: 408) which, as has been noted earlier, was specifically founded in the context of the Rushdie controversy. There are also a number of local and regional Muslim organisations which play a significant role in their own geographical area, such as the Lancashire Council of Mosques (see Weller, ed, 1993: 438), some of which have also impinged upon a national stage, as for example, the Bradford Council of Mosques (see Weller, ed, 1993: 419-420) which has been very prominent in the Rushdie controversy. But cutting across all of these organisational forms developed in England and the UK are the structurally looser, but perhaps actually more significant, networks associated with South Asian-originated Muslim movements, other international Muslim groupings and Sufi Orders.

Muslims are highly aware of their lack of national representative structures and the difficulties which this creates for them as a community and for others who seek to consult and liaise with them. But, in addition to those communities in which there are serious and acknowledged difficulties of representation, particularly on a national level, even in those communities in which the representation issues are apparently more straightforward they are not, in fact, so simple. The Council of Churches for Britain and Ireland does not include the fast-growing "house churches" within its membership and many Evangelical Christians and local congregations do not identify with it. The Board of Deputies of British Jews can be seen by sectors within the Jewish community as too "establishment" in the general sense. There are also questions of gender and representation, raised by such groups as Women Against Fundamentalism, which cut across all religious communities. Women Against Fundamentalism point out that even communities containing strong pre-modern elements are no longer purely undifferentiated unities since, in the context of the modern and postmodern worlds, they also reflect diversities of interest on the basis of a whole range of personal and social factors. One of the dangers of the word 'community' used with regard to those identified with these traditions is that it implies
both stable and homogenous entities while communities are, in reality, neither stable
nor homogenous but are symbolically constructed (Cohen, 1995) and may be
constructed in ways which are exclusive of the interests of some members and, in
particular, of women (Ali, 1992).

Therefore, any reformed or newly evolved arrangements for the relationships between
religion(s), state and society that are proposed to take account of current patterns of
plurality will need to take account of the elasticity and plasticity (Knott, 1991, 1992b)
of current and possible future configurations and reconfigurations both within
individual communities and between such communities and the wider social
community if such arrangements are not to run the danger of becoming reified in ways
detached from the diverse grassroots reality within their respective constituencies.
Therefore, it is the judgement of this thesis that the foundation, de novo, of a National
Religious Council would be premature. Although Lamont (1989: 204) argues that his
proposal would “simply be to give institutional form to a process which has been
gathering pace over the years” it is argued here that, in this respect, he allows his
commitment to such a vision to obscure his judgement concerning the extent to which
this is true, since many of the religious communities are not yet in a position to be
represented in the way which would be required. Of course, it could be a byproduct
of the necessity to be represented in such a way that representative channels might be
created, although such a byproduct could, in itself, underline the issues involved in
questions concerned with legitimacy of representation in the light of the potential
tension between bureaucratic structures created for the sake of liaison with the
Government and relationships with the grassroots in a community. It is also the case
that, outside of the context of a broader social and political upheaval of
constitutionally revolutionary proportions, the de novo creation of such a Council is,
in practice, unlikely to happen since the “dimensions of evaluation” explored in the
previous section are so complex for all the interested parties that the “risk aversion”
to this option will not be overcome.

In the light of the connection between establishment and the monarchy, it is likely that
any actual disestablishment and replacement of the Church of England’s constitutional
position and role will occur only in the context of wider constitutional change. There
is currently a considerable degree of popular concern about the monarchy in its present form although, at the same time, it has a significant reservoir of support (Chaudhary, 1996) which would make its complete abolition unlikely, at least during the reign of the present monarch. However, following the death of Queen Elizabeth II, a modification is quite possible since the external (social and political) and internal (Royal Family) conditions for change are increasingly coinciding. As Cannadine (1983) argues, the "invention of tradition" is one of the strengths of the monarchy which, in recent times, has already transformed itself into a "Royal Family," although it is precisely this image which is now the critical focus in the need for change in the light of royal divorces and marital difficulties and questions associated with the succession.

In the meantime, pending any wider constitutional upheaval it is argued that it is more likely that evolutionary rather than revolutionary change will offer the best possibility of a new way forward. This would be consistent with the classical response of British theology, ecclesiology and social policy alike to new challenges. This has more often been one of pragmatic and incremental "evolutionary" change within existing parameters rather than of rethinking the entire system in a "revolutionary" way according to foundational ideals, as has occurred in societies with written constitutions. One example of this characteristic approach to change is the way in which the English legal system has accommodated difference by proceeding on the basis of religious exemptions from general law rather than by trying to formulate comprehensive provisions for religions. Thus Sikhs are exempted from the 1973 regulations concerning the wearing of motorcycle helmets through the Motor-cycle Crash Helmets (Religious Exemption) Act of 1976 and Jews and Muslims are exempt from general conditions with regard to the slaughter of animals by means of the Slaughterhouses Act (see Poulter 1989b; 1990a; 1990b). In terms of the symbolic function, structural position and operational role of religion(s) in English public life, a comparable approach to the evolutionary development of the English law might suggest the option for change of an "extended" establishment offers the best possible way forward, by opening up the existing channels of the established Church of England to act in a more facilitative role enabling the contribution to public life of people and organisations of other religious traditions.
On the basis of its role in the controversy, it can be argued that the Church of England has shown how an "open" version of establishment could develop pragmatically appropriate channels of communication and consultation within a plural society. Commenting on the role of Bishop Roy Williamson in Bradford, Wolffe (1994: 102) suggests that this and other interventions illustrate "one prognosis for the establishment" in which there were "indications that there was potential for the established Church of England to find a new role in a multi-cultural society, as a bridge between the mutual incomprehensions of secular liberalism and minority religious conviction." It has been noted that there is some support for such a model from among spokespeople of minority religious traditions and communities. However, also noted have been the serious difficulties which attend such an option in terms of the extent to which it would be more broadly acceptable within the minority communities as a whole, rather than just among national spokespeople; the criticism that it is a "neo-colonial" religious model; and finally the problem that, in "stretching" this essentially pre-modern model still further, the religious-secular tensions inherent within it could no longer be accommodated. Thus it is far from clear that secular opinion would welcome such a role for the Church of England. The Rushdie controversy has signalled the significance and importance of the secular strand of English life as well as of that of Muslim believers and any new constitutional settlement on the role of religion has to take full account of the secular sectors of society. In terms of groups linked to religious and cultural traditions but sitting in a critical relationship with them, Women Against Fundamentalism (Connolly, 1995) and its journal of the same name has taken a clear position in favour of disestablishment which is also argued for by two of its leading members, Gita Saghal and Nira Yuval-Davis (1992: 11-14), in the introduction to their book Refusing Holy Orders.

A more explicit "kairos" than that of the Rushdie controversy, such as a crisis involving the heart of the constitutional nexus itself (for example, in connection with monarchy and the succession) rather than one which only has "entails" for that nexus, might accelerate the need for change (Boseley, 1995). Interestingly, in Jonathan Dimbleby's television portrait of Prince Charles, the Prince stated that he would be much more comfortable with the title "Defender of Faith" rather than the traditional title "Defender of the Faith" (Bellos, 1994; Wilson, K, 1995: 38-41), thus opening up
the possibility of an "extended establishment" from the side of the monarchy. As we have already seen Prince Charles' sensitivity to a multi-faith society is not new or unique within the Royal Family, and this opens up intriguing possibilities since it indicates on the part of Prince Charles some considerable reflection on the nature of the monarchy's role in relation to religion in a plural and multi-faith society.

However, even if this possibility were welcomed and embraced both within the Church of England and among other than Christian religious communities and secular people the likelihood of its occurrence needs to be seen in the context of increasing evidence of a change in public mood concerning the future of the monarchy, at the levels of both popular (Cyberpages International Inc, 1996) as well as political and constitutional debate (Martin, G, 1991; Barnett, ed, 1994; Bates, 1994; Bogdanor, 1995; Champion, 1994; Cannadine, 1995). There are many current indications of crisis within the House of Windsor coupled with increasing questioning of the monarchy from both outside and inside the Royal Family as indicated in the The Guardian's series of articles in January 1995, under the title of "New Republic," which brought together a variety of perspectives on the implications of a possible constitutional shift to republicanism. In comparison with the situation twenty or thirty years ago when republicanism was often viewed as a somewhat eccentric pre-occupation, during the 1990s it has become an increasingly debated and espoused option. These developments indicate that within a secularising and heterogenous society the present form of the monarchy's previously integrative role embodying the constitutional nexus in the relationship between established religion, state and society might not remain viable beyond the death of Queen Elizabeth II, even in the kind of modified form suggested by Prince Charles. The death of the present monarch may well bring about an explicit "kairos" that this thesis argues has been implicitly focused by the "entails" of the Rushdie controversy for the future of established religion in England.

In 1953, Queen Elizabeth II of England and Elizabeth I of Scotland was crowned by anointing with oil, as a symbol of the sacral nature of her office; she was invested with the orb and sceptre; she was presented with a Bible; she took an oath to uphold the laws of God; and she was blessed by the Archbishop of Canterbury. The forty year gap since the last Coronation makes public expectations of a future Coronation
difficult to judge but even in the mid-1950s, although the monarchy had considerable mystique (Black, P, 1953), the significance of the Coronation had been the subject of sharp controversy. Whilst Shils and Young (1953: 67-70) argued that the coronation was an event which affirmed the basic values of society, Birnbaum (1955: 15-16) critiqued a high view of the Queen's office on the basis that it was out of step with the contemporary social reality. In more recent years, Bocock (1985: 215-218) has developed an even sharper critique and by the early 1990s, in the light of the secularisation of society, it was already being suggested (Martin, 1991) that a non-religious coronation might be devised for the next monarch on the grounds that a religious service would be inappropriate in a "multicultural and secular society."

Whilst it is arguable that the sequence of royal weddings did, to some extent, revivify the connections between religion and the monarchy, the transformation of the monarchy into the Royal Family is precisely what has brought about the seeds of the institution's current malaise. The events surrounding the marital behaviour and separation of Prince Andrew, Duke of York and Sarah Ferguson, Duchess of York as well as the divorce of Princess Anne, the Princess Royal from Captain Mark Phillips and her later remarriage in the Church of Scotland have contributed to the contemporary malaise of the monarchy. As Wolfe (1994: 324) notes "the more critical views of the royal family emerging by the 1990s in the light of their all too human failures and limitations seem to reflect a shift from a spiritual and idealised perception of monarchy to a functional and utilitarian one, weakening the religious significance of the coronation rite and other royal rituals." Of particular significance in the context of the establishment of the Church of England have been the marital difficulties of the heir to the throne, Prince Charles (Culf, 1994). The Prince's acknowledgement of his adultery with Mrs. Camilla Parker-Bowles and the lengthy separation between himself and Princess Diana, accompanied by books telling both sides of the unhappy marriage eventually resulted in the initiation of divorce proceedings. These developments have raised particular questions about the future monarch's role as Supreme Governor of the Church of England as well as constitutional questions of a more general kind which have been explored by Archdeacon of York, the Venerable George Austin, in his recent book *Affairs of State: Leadership, Religion and Society* (1995).
The connection between personal and constitutional issues in the case of Prince Charles is what distinguishes the potential of the current crisis in the monarchy from the one which surrounded the abdication of Edward VIII (Machin, G, 1991). As Lamont (1989: 190) noted, the abdication crisis of Edward VIII involved "the person of the king rather than the status of the church." This is because contemporary questioning around the role of the monarchy should also be evaluated in the light of the wider context provided by debates concerning the desirability or otherwise of a written Constitution that have been moving ever-more firmly onto the social and political agenda. A written Constitution is a part of the political agenda of Charter 88. The Liberal Party has supported the introduction of such a Constitution and the Labour Party, under the leadership of Tony Blair, is now arguing for a constitutional review. Within the framework of the European Union it seems that the question of a written Constitution will become ever-more important, particularly if the nexus of monarchy, established religion and the state ceases to play as central a role in the near future as it has in the past. The weakness of a written constitution is that it can trap society into a backwards-looking appeal to abstract principles rather than allowing it to adapt pragmatically to changing circumstances which is often presented as having been the strength of the English constitutional tradition since the English Revolution and the restoration of the monarchy. Its strength is the clarity with which it expresses the basic values and self-understanding of a society and the openness of debate which is possible concerning its terms rather than the fuzzy mystique of a constitution based upon unwritten convention and tradition.

Therefore, in respect of the current marital issues in the Royal Family, there could be a merging of personal, religious and wider constitutional issues focussed by the succession. If such a crisis occurred, in the context of the wider moves towards constitutional reform in terms of republicanism and a written constitution, it is likely that secularists would attempt to impose a "modern" solution by means of a secularising disestablishment. Such a disestablishment, whilst having the advantage of appearing clear and straightforward, as in the French model of the secular state, would offer no means for integration of the kind of issues highlighted by the Rushdie conflict.
Ironically, the *Church and State* Report of the Chadwick Commission explicitly stated (1970: 65) with regard to a possible "total severing of the historic links" that, "whilst most of us would not like it", nevertheless "we should not shrink from it if the state decided it to be either wise or politically necessary," thus adopting a position which owes more to Erastian pragmatism than to theological principle. Peter Cornwell has pointed out that the disestablishment of the Anglican Churches in Wales and Ireland was something that was brought about by political decision from outside of the Church and that, in contrast to these politically-initiated disestablishments what he (Cornwell, 1989: 103) advocates is "something different, a demand for disestablishment by the Church of England itself." Buchanan (1994: 196-208) also argues that an internal Church of England initiation of moves towards disestablishment would be preferable to it's external imposition because an internally motivated disestablishment would underline the Church's spiritual freedom.

Lamont's (1989: 196) review of the relationship between Church and state concludes that, "The case for disestablishment is now both historical and constitutional, statistical and equitable, moral and theological - but it is also practical and political on the basis that it is better to make the change willingly from strength, and from faith in the future, than unwillingly from weakness." Through inter-religious dialogue among the various religious traditions and communities present in England and the UK, and with the contribution of an ecumenical Christian dialogue within the Christian Churches, a willingness to face the implicit "kairos" now, prior to the necessity of dealing with any post hoc consequences of wider constitutional upheaval, would allow English society, the UK state and the Christian Churches to draw upon their own traditions in facing the implications of such a "kairos" in a more organically evolutionary way than would be possible in the context of an explicit constitutional upheaval. These traditions would, crucially, include the theological and ecclesiological resources of the English Free Church tradition concerning the origins of which, in his *Protestantism and Progress: A Historical Study of the Relationship of Protestantism to the Modern World*, Ernst Troeltsch has said:

> Out of this mighty episode remained the idea of separation of church and state, the toleration of various churches alongside each other, the principle of voluntarism in the establishment of denominations, freedom of conviction and thought in all matters of religion and Weltanschaung...Here is the end of the
medieval culture concept, for the beginning of the modern individual, none-
ecclesiastical culture now steps in to replace the old state-church compulsory
structure. It is at first a purely religious idea, which then becomes secularised
and overlaid with the rationalistic, sceptical and utilitarian idea of toleration.
On the continent it was given a purely rationalistic foundation, but its roots are
in the English revolution. In its religious power it prepared the way for modern
freedom.

The ability to draw upon such traditions, albeit in a modified form as a result of
eccumenical convergence overcoming the weakness of the Free Church model in its
tendency to withdraw from society rather than to take responsibility within it, would
enable the development of "round-table" and "kaleidoscopic" thinking and structures
which could therefore be based on religious as well as modern secular vision of the
world. In the postmodern vision of the roundtable, both a religious vision of this sort
and a secular vision can meet, creating the conditions for dialogue which facilitate
both of their contributions. In his analysis of pluralism the current Chief Rabbi,
Jonathan Sacks (1991: 68), indicates that such dialogue implies,

significant restraints on all sides. For Christians it involves allowing other
voices to share in the conversation. For people of other faiths it means coming
to terms with a national culture. For secularists, it means acknowledging the
force of commitments that must, to them, seem irrational. For everyone, it
means settling for less than we would seek if everyone were like us, and
searching for more than our merely sectional interests. In short, for the
common good.

English society and the UK state has one of the most diverse patterns of religious life
in contemporary Europe. Alongside the Anglican, Roman Catholic, Free Church,
Pentecostal and Black-led Christian Churches, there are also significant minorities of
Muslims, Jews, Hindus, Sikhs and Buddhists, together with smaller groupings of
Pagans, Jains, Zoroastrians, Bahá'ís and others. The complexity of the cultural and
religious diversity (Badham, 1994; Ballard, 1994a; Bruce, 1995; Davie, 1994) which
this represents demands that people of all religions and none contribute to ongoing
dialogue about a new "socio-religious contract". Pending any intensification of the
monarchy's crisis, it is likely that it will only be by patiently living with the questions,
coupled with a continuing commitment to critical analysis and dialogue, that the
explosion of fundamental questions concerning values and visions which are focused
in the Rushdie controversy might eventually yield the contours of how a new
"socio-religious contract" might evolve.
Bishop John Taylor pointed out (quoted in Wolffe, 1993: 193), as long ago as the 1970s, that, "our society does not merely contain individuals who reflect these differences but communities that will go on embodying those differences in their corporate consciousness." The significance and importance of Bishop Taylor's prophetic insight and foresight concerning the location of religious identity has to be recognised as having been borne out in the Rushdie controversy, since Muslims have pursued their campaign not as an agglomeration of atomised modern and postmodern individuals, but in terms of group rights. At the same time, one of the social dangers of this "groupist" approach is that it can falsely construct unified communities out of collections of individuals who, in reality, have deep cleavages amongst them. Thus Hannana Siddiqui (in Wolffe, 1993: 283) of Southall Black Sisters argues that, "The fundamentalists are supported by the state, the multiculturalist, and the liberal anti-racist lobby. The only demands they listen to are those defined by conservative, religious, male leaders" and women's denial of human rights is allowed because "it is all a part of a culture and religion which must be tolerated." It is for this reason that some have advocated the more "individualist" and "integrationist" approaches that have been attempted in France on the basis of the French political doctrine of 'laïcité'.

It is the argument of this thesis, though, that a more balanced position is required between a reified communitarian approach and a highly individualist one. It is unlikely that for the foreseeable future English society and the UK state will be composed purely of atomised post-modern individuals. For a significant number of people, group identities will continue, and for some these will be integrative identities of the religious kind which relativise all other identities. This means that the "powers that be" will have to learn to deal with religious communities such as the Muslim community in the terms in which they define themselves and will therefore need to evolve channels to facilitate communication and consultation which make dialogue with such groups possible.

In contrast to the "individualist" approach in France and the more "managerial" version of the "groupist" approach which can be found in the United States of America, a possible outline for the future of evolution of religious and cultural
plurality in England and the UK involves drawing upon the British “political” tradition of pluralism of which Harold Laski (1921) was one of the chief modern theorists, although the tradition itself can be traced back to the political philosophy of Thomas Hobbes and John Locke. Laski identified the conflict brought about by a plurality of groups, some of which have interests antipathetic to those of the state, as an important dimension of a healthy democratic life in the context of the powerful modern nation-state. The contrast with the North American model is that in this vision it is only through the conflicts of the groups and not from some “managerial” or “national interest” point outside of them, that any potential social unity might arise. This model differs from the current constitutional settlement focused in a monarchy which aims to provide a focus of unity above and beyond the conflicts by arguing that conflict is positively necessary for a convergence into what Rex (1985) calls an “emergent pluralism” and concerning which he paints a picture in which, “The new social order of the multi-cultural society is an emergent one which will result from the dialogue and conflict between cultures” and that “minority communities may at any one time conflict with and challenge the existing order as have communities based upon social class in the past.”

Difficult and possibly intractable issues for a pluralist society have been revealed by the Rushdie controversy, especially when recognising the “rights” of various groups as human rights, these rights come into conflict with one another. This is because there are rights which are recognised as belonging to people because of their membership of particular ethnic groups; there are religious rights; there are gender rights; and there are rights pertaining to sexual orientation. When claims within this plurality of rights conflict with one another, the question of how the resulting clash is to be dealt with raises the further question of whether or not there are explicit or implicit “hierarchies of rights” and, if so, how are the relative positions in this “pecking order” decided? If an “emergent pluralism” of the kind identified by Rex is left to a negotiating process in which the free play of forces alone is allowed to determine the outcome, then “deregulation” in religion might represent as many potential dangers as the dismantling of health and safety regulations in industry. To this extent, a policy of “emergent pluralism” needs a complementary “managerial pluralism” for its effective and just implementation, without which the less powerful
groupings could only be incorporated into a pluralism established on the terms of the more powerful. At the same time, if a “managerial pluralism” is required this once again raises the question of shared values. Without some means of identifying, clarifying, symbolising and operationalising shared values, at least at the level of shared “rules for the game”, then whilst “managerial pluralism” might claim an apparent “neutrality”, it could actually embody a highly value-laden, dominant notion of pluralism.

That there are clear dangers in this conflictual model, then, has been underlined by the passions unleashed in the Rushdie controversy. But Rex suggests that it is at least possible that, just as civic society has found ways of creatively incorporating class struggle, so it might prove possible to positively integrate value struggles between majority and minority communities. To succeed, this thesis argues that for such an incorporation properly to take place, there will need to be a concurrent re-examination and adaptation of both the religious and secular inheritances within any re-evaluation of the current constitutional nexus of religion, state and society represented by the establishment of the Church of England. For the conflicts of “emergent pluralism” to have the potential of being creative rather than anarchically destructive they do need to take place within an agreed arena. A possible image for this “emergent” model of pluralism is neither the “melting pot” of the American model nor the “mosaic” of the millet system, but that of the “kaleidoscope”. In a kaleidoscope of pluralism the constantly changing patterns formed by different elements continue to retain their distinctiveness and yet appear in different relationship with one another at different times, but their relationship is ordered, with clear boundaries, rather than being either syncretistic or chaotic.

The commonly accepted sociological and secularist model of society as set out, for example, in Ross Kessel’s (1989) piece arguing that “Pluralism requires a secular public ethic,” seeks to maintain a clear distinction between the “public” and the “private” spheres as a means of managing a plural society. But it should be noted that the definitions of the boundaries between the “public” and the “private” are themselves political definitions and therefore subject to challenge. In the latter part of the twentieth century the classically sharp definitions of these boundaries have already
been challenged by the force of the women's movement's advocacy of the slogan "the personal is the political." Just as feminist theory critiqued the assignment of women's experience to only the private sphere, so the Rushdie controversy demonstrates the extent to which religion, too, will no longer accept an assigned privatisation. This means that in contrast to the distinction between "public" and "private", a helpful way forward to a new socio-religious contract might be to distinguish between "common" and "particular" cultures. At first sight, this could appear to be a merely semantic adjustment but, unlike the conceptualisation of public and private, its advantage is that it enables the particular religions to be true to themselves in terms of their wider than personal reference and not to be ruled out of a contribution to, and participation in, the "common" sphere.

On the basis of such an understanding and approach it would be possible to avoid the social marginalisation of religion feared by supporters of the establishment as the likely consequence of an essentially negative move of disestablishment which would confirm and accelerate the confinement of religion to a private sphere. In the approach advocated here, "particular cultures" would refer to the cultures of families and ethnic and religious groups which tend to be more fixed and enduring (though also subject to the process of change due to their interaction with the wider social environment) whilst "common culture" would represent not the external imposition of a set of dominant values or of a religious tradition, but an emergent pragmatic and corporate product resulting from a process of negotiation governed by agreed practices and procedures. It would thus represent an understanding reached at any given point in time which has a degree of stability but which, at the same time, is always subject to revision as part of the flux of public and democratic dialogue in a plural society. By taking seriously the contribution to a relatively more fluid wider society of the relatively more fixed particular cultures (including the religions) the result might not be the chaos of a society in which once traditional binding symbolisms have been removed leaving only the clash of parties in a "naked public square" (Neuhaus, 1984) but a dialogue in which the stability of the "particular" and the fluidity of the "common" achieve some measure of balance through common commitment to the process of dialogue.
There are a large and increasing number of voluntary sector initiatives from within the religious communities which are creating institutional structures for the pursuance of the kind of dialogue that it is argued above is necessary to realise the goal of a just pluralistic society. There are also a range of voluntary sector organisations not organised on the basis of common religious membership which are also developing structures and channels of communication to enable the full participation of people of all religious traditions. It will be important for such voluntary sector initiatives to continue to develop at both local and national levels as expressions of "emergent pluralism" from below, since it is precisely the untidiness and inconsistency of these structures that is their strength since they enable a range of participation and representation which would probably be unrealistic within more formalised and official structures. These structures of "emergent pluralism" are therefore important complementary initiatives to the structures for "managerial pluralism" of the religions that already exist in bodies such as Agreed Syllabus Conferences and Standing Advisory Councils on Religious Education. But together with the continued development of voluntary-sector led initiatives, if there is to be any real change in the symbolising, structuring and operationalising of the wider relationships between religion(s), state and society, then the structures of the state have themselves to become fully involved in this process, together with religious and secular voluntary sector partners. As the Inter Faith Network for the UK's Statement on Inter-Religious Relations argues (1991, paragraph 3), "We need to find ways of more adequately reflecting both our common citizenship and our religious diversity in the framework of our national life." It is therefore necessary to encourage a commitment of the local and national state to the negotiated evolution of official structures which facilitate such dialogue.

Whilst some religious traditions have certainly felt marginalised in respect of Government initiatives on education which have only sought to canvass Christian opinion there are already some examples of multi-faith structures, networks and working relationships beginning to emerge as a result of encouragement by the structures of the state as well as the basis of voluntary sector organisation. Interestingly, although Conservative Government ministers have often attacked what they have perceived as a truculent Church for dabbling in politics, the former Home
Secretary, Douglas Hurd (quoted in Lamont 1989: 182-183), when addressing a General Synod fringe meeting during this period and that of the Rushdie controversy, stated in a more measured way:

We need to work together in church and state, to rebuild moral standards and values which should form the sure foundation of a cohesive and united nation. We shall sometimes differ on individual issues... but if we are to restore cohesion and acceptable standards of behaviour we need to look to the churches - and here I include religious leaders of other faiths in Britain - to speak and insist and insist again on the individual standards which are the foundations of a healthy society.

Lamont (1989: 183) comments that, "There is nothing here that suggests a special or exclusive relationship between the Church of England - which Mr Hurd was addressing - and that state. Indeed, it specifically includes the role of other religious leaders." One interesting example of a Government-initiated religious consultative body with multi-faith composition is the Inner Cities Religious Council, located within the Department of the Environment. This was created as a unique body within Government, as part of Government's response to the issues raised by the Church of England's Faith in the City report and it is concerned with engaging the potential contribution of religious communities to urban regeneration.

Although at the level of national Government planning and Parliamentary debate the areas of Religious Education and collective worship have generally been an example of the marginalisation of religious minority concerns and perspectives, the work of the intermittently convened Agreed Syllabus Conferences and the permanent Standing Advisory Councils for Religious Education (SACREs) at local authority level have been positive examples of structures which incorporate multi-faith and secular representation and interests together with the local state and thus provide one example of how such a more inclusive approach could work.

SACREs thus give institutional form within a common structure at the level of the local state, to the diverse interests of local government, secular professionals and the range of local religious traditions and thus give hope for the possibility that, given the evolution of appropriate structures, the negotiation of wider interests than those of Religious Education and collective worship might also be feasible. The current structure of these bodies does institutionalise the privileged position of the
established Church of England and they thus reflect the historical inheritance of establishment. But the basic structural principle upon which they are organised enshrines the need for agreement to be reached among all the component parts of the religious, professional and political representation and therefore provides a possible model which has demonstrated its feasibility in the extremely sensitive area of the religious education of children and young people. Agreed Syllabus Conferences and SACREs are therefore a model in terms of the possibility of engaging in successful "values outcomes negotiations" with respect to the extremely sensitive area of teaching about the religions.

A combination, then, of such bodies founded and legitimated by the state and a vigorous and continued development of voluntary sector initiated local inter-faith councils offers the most constructive way forward. These could run parallel to the establishment of the Church of England, initially as complementary and eventually, by establishing their legitimacy and utility, as alternative ways of symbolising, structuring and operationalising the relationships between religion(s), state and society. As currently real and functioning, albeit untidy structures, they could thus indicate an alternative way forward to the options for change of a secularising disestablishment; an "extended" establishment; and the creation of a completely new National Religious Council. Such multi-faith and religious-secular "shadow structures" should be negotiated at every level of society. By their very existence and operation they would fundamentally challenge the existing structures of the establishment whilst, in the interim, working with them in order to bring change in an evolutionary way.

In the light of the above, if the transition of the succession went smoothly and Prince Charles, in his new role as King Charles III, were to pursue the idea of "Defender of Faith", then the developments suggested here would mean that the practical outworkings of such an idea would not need to take place in an experiential and institutional vacuum, but would have some precedent and experience upon which to draw, thus enabling a more organically rooted transition to take place. The development and operation of such "shadow structures" could also ensure that in any state-initiated disestablishment brought about by further constitutional upheavals around the monarchy, religious concerns and perspectives would not be so much in
danger of becoming totally marginalised because working alternatives would already be in place which could serve as models for the development of a new and wider-ranging socio-religious contract at the national political and constitutional levels.

f) Conclusion
As Bhikhu Parekh (1989e) comments, reflecting on the Rushdie controversy, "It is only from such a painful ordeal that new truths, including new tools of exploring them, are born." The Rushdie controversy has certainly been a "painful ordeal" for those directly involved in it, but also for English society as a whole. The United Kingdom state, English society, the established Church of England, other Christian Churches, the organisations of other religious traditions and secular groups and individuals all need to consider whether any new structural and institutional tools might be necessary for exploring the new truths that have emerged from the "painful ordeal" of the Rushdie controversy.

For people of no religious traditions, there is a need to recognise something of the sense of the sacred felt by religious believers and that one cannot lightly trample over this without running the risk of provoking a destructive backlash. There is also the need for secularists and humanists to recognise that religions cannot accept a total privatisation of the range and scope of their religious vision. For the Christian Churches in general and the Church of England in particular, the controversy has brought particularly sharp challenges which have questioned their currently privileged role and position within society. At the same time, Parekh (1990e) argues that, "A dialogue is only possible in a climate of mutual toleration, free from intimidation and threats." In this context, the Muslim community needs to recognise that the form of some of the protests that emerged from within the community have been damaging to the possibilities of bringing about the kind of structural changes which they wish to occur.

For people of all religious traditions and communities and none, the central challenge of the controversy is to identify the structures which might be blocking the further development of a communicative praxis and to envision alternative stuctures which might enable ongoing "values outcomes negotiations" which could lead to the historical actualisation of the contributions of all to a "common culture" on the basis
of the non-negotiable visions, ideals and values of “particular cultures,” including the religious traditions and communities, as well as the perspectives of secularity.

It is the argument of this thesis that as an “entail” of the clusters of issues posed by the Rushdie controversy, the currently established form of religion is far more central than many have realised, having significance at the level of national symbolic self-understanding, and in terms of the the structural forms and the operational channels through which the relationships between religion(s), state and society are expressed. It is also argued that there is a strong case for change implicit within the "kairos" of the controversy. However, it is also recognised that due to the embedded nature of the current inheritance, consideration of the possibilities for change suffers from risk aversion, even where experience confirms the inequity and inefficiency of current arrangements. Any way forward towards reform or replacement of the current arrangements is therefore only likely to make headway in the context of the evolution, over a period of time, of multi-faith structures and processes interacting with social and political life at all levels, so that the benefits of such structures for all participants might be seen to outweigh the risks involved, thus enabling all parties to move towards the possibility of negotiating new, overall national and constitutional arrangements. Indeed, the construction of such multi-layered structures would be consistent with the evolutionary tendency of constitutional change in England and the UK.

Such an approach has the advantage of enabling the "piloting" of alternatives so that the choices which this thesis argues are entailed can be made in relation to practically functioning alternatives rather than necessitating a choice between the currently known establishment and a set of purely theoretical alternatives. Such "piloting" of actually operative alternatives would create complementary structures to the current establishment whilst also creating the potential for eventually replacing it. As a result, if there were any more dramatic unravelling of the current constitutional nexus brought about through governmental initiative in the context of an explicit constitutional and political "kairos" of the kind that might occur upon the death of Queen Elizabeth II, then some ready-made components that might contribute to the negotiation of viable new socio-religious contract would already be in place, thus
ameliorating the dangers of a purely state imposed and probably secularising disestablishment of the kind feared by advocates and defenders of the establishment. In the meantime, the negotiated evolution of both "emergent" and "managerial" forms of multi-faith and secular-religious "shadow structures" at all levels of society would open up to the possibility of change the archaic and romanticised notions of the present arrangements that are critiqued by secularists, and would address the inequity and inadequacy of the current constitutional nexus which this thesis argues has been revealed in an analysis of the "entails" of the Rushdie controversy.
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