GEOGRAPHY AND HISTORY
IN BOIOTIA C.550-335BC

SAMUEL DAVID GARTLAND

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The University of Leeds
Department of Classics
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The candidate confirms that the work submitted is his own and that appropriate credit has been given where reference has been made to the work of others.

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For Nicola and Nemea
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Abstract

The thesis discusses the relationship between geography and history in Boiotia between the middle of the sixth century and 335BC. The study is based on the belief that the history of Boiotia is rendered more intelligible when seen through the processes of geographic construction in which its inhabitants were involved.

After an introduction that outlines the theoretical basis of the work in postmodern geography, landscape phenomenology, and the Annales School of history, the thesis is divided into three principal parts. The first seeks to understand the physical environment of the region, as well as the natural and man-made changes that affected the region in the period before the sixth century. The chapter also discusses the ecology of the region as well as its demographic, economic, and cultural background. The second part investigates the objective, built environment and the physical aspects of the way in which individuals and communities shape and change the world around them. Aspects considered include the processes of delimiting borders, the effect of city-walls, watchtowers and sanctuaries on social and political dynamic of the region. The third part focuses on the subjective, imagined environment, which seeks to explore the way in which Boiotians (and those outside the area) interpreted the geography of the region. The final part of the thesis is an attempt to apply the ideas developed in the main body of the thesis to a specific event: the destruction of Thebes by Alexander the Great. The work is followed by an annex, which seeks to provide a broad diachronic overview of the history of Boiotia from 550-335BC.


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Introductory Chapter: The process of Boiotian history

Fig. 1.1: Boiotia on south-north projection.

He who is subjected to a field of visibility, and who knows it, assumes responsibility for the constraints of power; he makes them play spontaneously upon himself; he inscribes in himself the power relation in which he simultaneously plays both roles; he becomes the principle of his own subjection. Foucault (1991), 202-3.

Dwelling in a place inevitably alters the character of that place. It changes it, and therefore each generation has a different story and a different history to tell. Landscape acts as both figure and ground to the people who inhabit it. It is ground in the sense that it is the geological and topographic face of the earth that they inhabit and move across. It becomes figure in a process whereby it becomes part of one's self-understanding and self-knowledge, part of the way in which one's identity is mediated and constructed. Tilley (2010), 34-5.

Men and women make their own geography, but they do not make it as they please. The relationship between geography and history is intimate and reciprocal, spatial and temporal experience are intertwined. Their importance to one another has been recognised explicitly by historians since antiquity, and it is not the purpose of this thesis to argue for the primacy of geographical influence in historical narrative, but instead that geography is as implicit in history as history in geography; division between the two is undesirable and unnatural. This is particularly salient in a society where there is an intimate connection between 'urban' and 'rural' and the majority of the population have daily direct interaction with the land. It is hoped that through considering the actions and interactions of communities and individuals through a perspective rooted in the
land and landscape of the area under consideration, the diachronic spatial interactivity of that area will be more readily intelligible.

A second contention of this thesis is that the geography of a region is not something objective or unchanging, but instead subjective and deliberately and contingently ‘produced’ by those within and without the region. Geography is more than topography, hydrology and ecology; it is the way in which people perceive, structure and change their space and places, a reflexive experience of actor and stage. The mechanisms of spatial construction in a pre-industrial period may seem to be limited by the restrictions of engineering or pre-Cartesian cartography, but exercise of power and the manipulation of space are inseparable, and the most important maps are experiential and overlay the ‘objectivity’ of physical space. Through the study of a single coherent region it is possible to witness the use and effect of physical manipulation of space through architecture, routeways, and hydrological engineering, alongside the cultural production of space through myths, festivals, and socio-political relationships. Maps, on paper or in experience, are often made to mislead, and frequently impose on their subject a design that would be foreign to the lived experience of the area’s inhabitants. The maps used in this thesis are designed to orient the reader (and occasionally to disorient), not to suggest that communities conceived their world in polar-aligned satellite-view.

The opening quotation of this chapter is taken from Foucault’s work on prisons, which itself draws upon Bentham’s Panopticon, an institution designed to allow its controller to easily witness all that is going on around him. Foucault has contributed much to the rebalancing of spatial with temporal in historical narrative, and the idea that on assuming the position of a pan-opticist, one assumes power over that which is viewed, and cannot avoid being changed by that assumption of power is relevant for ancient Greek history and for those that study it. This is especially true when the controller has chosen his inmates and seems a germane starting point for the historian who seeks to explore history within a defined spatial and temporal parameter, where an object’s visibility in the historical record is fundamentally a trap. It is the historian’s choice as to

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1 Tilley (2004), 17. He develops the ideas of Merleau-Ponty, which consider that there is a fundamental unity between the perceiver and the perceived in all acts of perception that transcend a distinction between subject and object. The act of perceiving the world binds the subject with the world of which he or she is already a part.

2 Lefebvre as quoted in Soja (1989), 80. Lefebvre, in considering ‘representations of space’ sees this exercise of power finding ‘objective expression’ in monuments and towers etc. Lefebvre (1991), 33, 42.

3 Lefebvre (1991), 39; Morgan (2003), 164.
where and when they will study, it is also their choice how they relate themselves to that space, but they are still fundamentally subject to that field of vision, and in fusing history and geography it is impossible to take up a position of ‘seeing-all’ without being aware of the practical and subjective limitations of that artificial position and being changed by it.

The thesis will be based around the historical development of an area of ancient Central Greece, the geographic and chronological parameters of which are explained below. The general decision to marry the geo-historical approach to a particular area and period is made primarily in accordance with the author’s training and interest, and the methodology was developed in part through a successful Master’s dissertation on the geographic history of Chios. The choice was also made with a belief that the volume and type of information available in Boiotia is well suited to the aims of the thesis. The relations of power discerned in Boiotian space and praxis will be constructed, as much as possible, from the ground upward, and rather than wishing to mitigate apparent anomalies in the historical record, curiosity toward irregularity, uniqueness, and accident is promoted wherever and whenever possible.

To this end, the thesis has no set theoretical agenda, and freely borrows from many traditions that have considered the relationship between individuals, communities and their physical situation over an extended period of time. This necessarily touches on developments in many fields, especially those of geography but also of landscape phenomenology, sociology, political science and anthropology. Because of the lacunose surviving evidence, models that have been developed in other fields and more recent periods need to be adapted, and it is hoped that this work can contribute possibilities for innovation and improvement to the existing application of these ideas to ancient history. Conversely, the work of Tilley, a fragment of which makes up the second opening quote of this chapter, is largely based in the landscape experience of Neolithic societies. This work could be considered too ‘primitive’ to be applied to Greece in the sixth to fourth centuries and its relative wealth and diversity of evidence and sophisticated political and social structures. However, its method is designed to harness the understanding of the phenomenological discourse between people and the physical world that explains experiences relevant to ancient Greece, and offers exciting possibilities in its application⁴. Building on the pioneering work of Merleau-Ponty, it prioritises the lack of distinction between actor and landscape and the impossibility of one existing without

⁴ Morgan is one of the few Greek historians who has made use of Tilley, Morgan (2003), 170 n.3.
the other³. In a pattern of community development such as ancient Greece that emphasises the continuity between human and natural, this phenomenological perspective has much to offer⁶.

Marrying space and time; temporal palimpsests

The Annales School of geographic history, and especially the work of Lucien Febvre and Vidal de la Blache, did a great deal to distance geography from the influential ‘geographic determinism’ of Friedrich Ratzel in the early twentieth century, which believed that much of the character and history of societies was largely determined by the land and climate in which those societies existed. Though the influence of geographic ‘possibilism’ that the school propounded (that believed the physical environment offered broad parameters for societies, but did not determine their behaviour) has been generally positive for historical writing, it has been criticised for contributing to the dislocation of geography from the theoretical mainstream⁷. The most influential of the school’s students has been Braudel, who managed to escape the alleged theoretical redundancy of many of the school’s adherents⁸. His division of history into three major ‘rhythms’ of temporal extent is readily applicable to ancient history, particularly in areas away from the centres of evidence and traditional focus, and as such lends itself to work on Boiotia⁹. Though Braudel’s rhythms emphasise temporal patterns, he railed against event-based history (histoire événementielle), and at the heart of his work was an understanding of the way in which the physical world could condition experience and interactivity. However, even with a geographic foundation, constructing history primarily in temporal rhythms of varying extents can have the effect of dislocating spatial experience from the community and the individual. It envisions history as occurring through a combination of human and physical interactivity, which work on different time-scales, superimposed on one another. Braudel was a historian of possibility, setting parameters for action and interaction, and the limits of physical

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³ Tilley (2004), 2-10.
⁶ Ethington (2007), 481-483, delineates some of the possibilities of Casey’s radical phenomenology for the understanding of space and place in history alongside the work of Lefebvre.
⁷ The cornerstones of the annalist proponents of the ‘new geography’ were Febvre (1922) and Vidal de la Blache (1922). The impact of these works on the discipline of geography and its relationship to other disciplines is delineated at Soja (1989), 35-38.
⁸ Braudel was aware of the threat of theoretical isolation that accompanied Vidal de la Blache’s work on geographic possibilism; Braudel (1980), 51-2.
⁹ Its apogee in ancient history has thus far been Horden and Purcell (2000). Braudel’s work is significantly more subtle in its consideration of time than is generally considered, particularly in his appreciation that there are many overlapping rhythms and cycles rather than a simple three-layered temporal division; Braudel (1972) vol.2, 1238. Figure 1.1 is inspired by his south-north projection of the world map in the same volume, p.169, Figure 12.
possibilities. There are limits to human behaviour that are set by a combination of physical and human geography, but the interaction between the two, and the interaction between Braudelian cycles is where history is lived, and where the ‘spatial practices’ that are the outcome of the discourse between the subjective and objective landscape are formed.

Whilst Braudelian ‘possibilism’ and the model of geographic foundation is informative at a fundamental level therefore, its concept and use of ‘space’ needs to be refined in the light of the renaissance of theoretical and methodological innovation from post-modern geography and landscape phenomenology. In particular, the idea of ‘space’ and ‘place’ need to be firmly tied down to allow their rigorous and consistent application to Boiotia. The longue durée of Boiotia, the almost imperceptible rhythm of climate and physical landscape activity, had a significant effect on the construction of an historic geography of the occupants of the area, but the geography that the Boiotoi inscribed on the landscape had an equally powerful effect in manipulating these elements into a Boiotian space. A single area, large or small, can hold many divergent and conflicting temporal maps and rhythms upon/within it that can offer different historical narratives depending on the actor and the circumstance. It is through this landscape as ‘palimpsest’ that Boiotian space should be viewed. The layering of experience in this way is a social and a historical construct, and it is only through analysis of the construction of space that this experiential reality can be explored.

The distinction between place and space has been the focus of much research in modern geography. Originally distinguished by pioneers such as Tuan, the ideas have now entered common parlance in geography and to a lesser extent, history. It is necessary to be careful and precise when using either term, but space can be considered coextensive with nature, though it is not simply the totality of the physical environment. Any part of the physical environment that is invested with meaning can be termed a place, and it is the interaction between the two that produces space. Places are ‘collective phenomena, transformed by the sentient bodies that inhabit, know, or recognize them’. In ancient Boiotia, the places were poleis and komai, the temples and sanctuaries, the roads and boundary markers, the forts and the harbours. These

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10 Tuan (1977), 3-7, for paradigm setting opening to Space and Place.
12 In this sense Lefebvre considers the example of Greek temples mediating the relationship between nature and man, though his vocabulary is slightly different to that of Sack’s, Lefebvre (1991), 49.
13 Ethington (2007), 482.
places could not exist outside of space, but reciprocally, the space of Boiotia was conditioned at all times by the structure, interaction and perception of its places.

The criticisms made by post-modern geographers have been at the forefront of the deconstruction of the historicist domination of the narrative of the past. That the major criticism of this model was from Marxist geography is perhaps unsurprising. In his treatment of Hegelian dialectics, Marx removed much of the inherent spatiality in the analysis of history, and replaced it with the dialectic of production. Space was not absent from his work, but his followers prioritised the works that gave less prominence to the spatial aspects of historical interaction. Therefore, the re-invigoration of space in the construction of society was a natural rebalancing of the relationship of temporal and spatial in history. Henri Lefebvre, together with other leading theorists such as Edward Soja and David Harvey, have seen space as fundamental not just to appreciating the nature of historical experience but also as alive and dynamic, a product of forces of control and resistance, of the mind and experience as well as the physical and the planned. Though, like most of the work in the field, these theorists have focussed on the history of modernity, (and focussed on capitalism’s ability to survive by occupying and producing space) their work and ideas can be applied profitably to the ancient world.

In his seminal La Production de L’espace, Lefebvre emphasises that each society has its own spatial practices and needs to be understood in its own terms. Lefebvre’s ‘spatial triad’ of representations of space (conceived space of power, monuments and towers), spaces of representation (lived space structuring connections, networks, sense of location), and spatial practices (perceived space, fluid, dynamic, subjective) is complicated and deliberately minimal. In simple terms, the spatial triad is a heuristic device that serves to indicate the interactivity between the conceived and the perceived in the mediatory form of lived spatial practices. I hope to elucidate the relationship between the physical and the lived environment of Boiotia, exploring how the way the area was perceived and physically structured affected the spatial practices and interactions of the inhabitants of the area and their neighbours. The elements of the ‘spatial triad’ are reflexive and

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14 Soja (1989), 58.
15 Particularly against the prevailing work of the nineteenth and twentieth century historicists of which Bergson was the most prominent. For a useful insight into the perspective of the historicists on the relationship between time and space, see Bergson (1944), 337, quoted in Merrifield (2006), 27.
overlapping, affecting each other as they change. The way in which space is produced therefore has to be at the forefront of the construction of a geographic history of Boiotia.

With a scattered chronological basis for the evidence of Boiotian history in this period, the ideas of collective memory and lieux de mémoire become important. The former is the idea that relationships between communities are preserved in a fragmentary manner (deliberately or accidentally) and manipulated thereafter as a result. The latter, Pierre Nora’s idea of ‘sites of memory’, is particularly applicable to the ancient world, particularly when combined with phenomenological perspectives on landscape. These ideas help to articulate how space that has been produced by those in the near or distant past comes to be understood by later occupants of the same space. The preservation of meaning and event in geographic sites is a significant conduit of the memory of past experience and production of space. The way in which historical experience is preserved in the landscape and its effects on the subsequent occupants of the land is of paramount importance in ancient Boiotia.

The application of ideas of ’space’, their use and effects is not new in the study of the Classical world. The past generation of scholarship has gradually assimilated the work of geographers and historians working on modern periods. The potential of the application of concepts of space has been at the forefront of ancient history at least since the publication of The Corrupting Sea. The spatial arrangement and structure of communal sites of memory such as Olympia and Delphi have received excellent recent treatment, which demonstrates the possibilities of the application of spatial models especially in sites with a high density of epigraphy. Literature has not been unaffected, with analysis of tragedy leading to considerations of the relationship of insider/outsider understandings space and location and its political significance. The idea that ‘only insiders know the full meaning of a place’, and that localities can possess plural identities simultaneously which vary according to perspective, allows an insight into the way in

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17 Zerubavel (2003), 11-14, on the idea of relationships, particularly those between two communities over a long period of time creating their own plotlines and narratives which affect the form of future interactivity. A good example used by Zerubavel here is France and Germany after 1871, which behave with symbolic references to the past narrative of their relationship. Space and locations invested with historic memory become of particular importance in this analysis as well as foci of contest such as Alsace.

18 Nora (1989), for the outline of the idea.


20 Scott (2010), 12-28 for good summary of spatial scholarship so far. See also his forthcoming work on ‘Space and Society’ in the Cambridge University Press ‘Key Themes’ series.

21 See now Purves (2010).
which some Greeks were conceiving the spaces around them\textsuperscript{22}. This consideration sits neatly with both the pluralistic readings of space in ideas of group memory, the plural temporal rhythms of Braudel, and Hall’s use of ideas relating to emic/etic discourse and the influence of alterity\textsuperscript{23}. In the study of the structure and influence of space, many different theoretical schemes converge, and have the potential to revolutionise comprehension of Hellenic historical experience.

\textit{Epichoric history}

The study of areas away from traditional centres of Greek history, particularly Athens, has been a recurrent, if minority, feature of classical monographs for a long time, but has gathered pace in recent years through works such as Thomas Figueira’s \textit{Aigina}\textsuperscript{24}. This work demonstrated the possibilities of using archaeological evidence to shed light on areas that are relatively under-represented in documentary sources, but are clearly of great importance in wider Greek history. The focus on the techniques of this reconstruction has been a feature of recent scholarship, and the work of archaeologists and epigraphers (particularly in the Hellenistic period) have proved invaluable in constructing not just ‘histories’ of the places considered, but in capturing some of the historical perspective of the places\textsuperscript{25}. This work has been promoted especially by the Copenhagen Polis Centre in their determination to work through many of the unanswered questions and difficulties with the \textit{polis} world of ancient Greece\textsuperscript{26}. Most notably, the tacit equality of all communities (or at least those designated as poleis) has been given pseudo-empirical backing in the composition of the \textit{Inventory of Archaic and Classical Poleis}\textsuperscript{27}. In conjunction with the \textit{Barrington Atlas}\textsuperscript{28} this work has quickly assumed a place of significance in the study of Greek history, but it is yet to be proven whether their combined effect is to encourage more diverse geographical foci of enquiry and

\textsuperscript{22}von Reden (1998), 176-180, developed this idea through analysis of Oedipus at Colonus. This conception of space and place sits nicely with some of Ethington’s reflections on \textit{topoi} in Aristotle; Ethington (2007), 483.

\textsuperscript{23}von Reden (1998), 171-2, contests the argument originating in Thucydides about the possibility of separating one’s community from its geographical context; a polis is more than its citizens. This is a ‘political statement with its particular agenda’. Significantly, the conception of a community as divisible from its land is a product of the experience of crisis and exile.

\textsuperscript{24}Figueira (1981).

\textsuperscript{25}Particularly useful has been the renewed focus on the experience of navigating through the landscape or seas through the eyes of the ancient traveller in terms of their patterns and route-markers. For sea-based travel nowhere is this better achieved than in Constantakopoulou (2007). Though wide ranging in its focus, Ma’s work on Antiochus demonstrates the possibility of reconstruction of multiple perspectives in discourse through the use of epigraphy, especially in a period where the literary narrative is fragmentary, Ma (2000a).

\textsuperscript{26}Nielsen and Roy (1999).

\textsuperscript{27}Hansen and Nielsen (2004).

\textsuperscript{28}Talbert (2000).
endeavour. Though this development of an equal platform for all areas is positive, the tendency toward atomisation and polis-centrism still persists. This is despite the increasing amount of surface survey and other extensive archaeological work that suggests that the regions without a recognisable polis matrix are under-represented, and to some extent misunderstood. Interaction with landscape and creation of geography occurs in every part of a community’s area, and to an extent it does not matter whether that community is classed as a polis or not unless that designation had an active bearing on the historical experience of that community.

Boiotia was chosen as the locus of study principally because of its cohesiveness as a geographic area and, because of the lacunose nature of evidence, the profitability of viewing that area over a longer period of time. The applicability and validity of the idea of a ‘region’ to Greek history and to Boiotia has received useful attention recently. What principally drives the categorisation of Boiotia as a cohesive ‘region’ in this thesis is that its own narrative was one of ethnic and later political cohesion. Though many individual communities attempted to withstand various political arrangements and opposed one another in major events, the ethnus of the Boiotians endured throughout the period. That it survived through the vicissitudes of politics and war may indicate something about the malleability of the matrix of interaction that produced the ethnic group. They were bound together by a complex of interactivity and shared myths of migration believed to go back to the late Bronze Age, and the period following the focus of this thesis saw a florescence of cultural and political interactivity between the states.

The period between the two is exciting and dramatic as it falls between the less and more formal periods of political cohesion and witnesses a struggle between communities and groups with desire for both. However, despite this apparent general development toward political cohesiveness, applying ideas of ‘progress’ or teleological assessment would be a mistake, as there was nothing implicitly natural or pre-ordained about the path of development taken.

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29 Recent work on Thessaly provides a useful tonic, Morgan (2003) 18-24. McInerney (1999), explicitly attempts to build a model to bring Phokis as non-typical polis region back into the historical foreground 1-7. The recent work of Vlassopoulos (2007) has addressed the issues surrounding this polis-centrism in all of its aspects. See particularly 156-157, for traditions of mapping that fail to illustrate the relationship between asty and chora in poleis.

30 Vlassopoulos (2007), 166-8; Vlassopoulos (2011); Farinetti (2011), 3-10, for a clear definition and useful application of the idea of regions and micro-regions in Boiotia.

31 Roesch (1965), remains perhaps the best treatment of Hellenistic Boiotia. See also Crane (2001), who considers Plataian interactivity in a broad sweep and the reconciliation it enjoyed with Thebes in the long term.
The positioning (physically and socially) of Boiotia and its constituent communities in relation to the ‘other’ regions of Attika, Phokis and Thessaly was fundamental to the creation of Boiotia and the Boiotoi. The area was considered a cohesive entity by those from without, before, during and after the period under review. An important facet of this longevity of identity is that the geography described in the sources from the *Hymns* and the *Iliad* to the guides of Pausanias and the sources of Strabo all agree on the basic geographic parameters of the region. It is therefore a suitable area in which to study the interaction of geography and history, as the historical actors themselves, though often bitterly divided, agreed with those outside the area’s borders with where that region lay. This did not stop attempts at incursions from Thessaly, Phokis or Attika, nor did it stop Boiotia’s political incursions into liminal areas such as the Skourta Plain, northern Megarid, and the Oropeia. The paradox was that the close geographic interactivity with neighbours that shaped the ethnic identity of the Boiotoi was difficult to match with a cohesive political identity precisely because of the ability of communities outside the region to intervene in Boiotian affairs\(^\text{32}\). The interplay of geography and ethnicity in the conception of regional identity will be of central concern in this thesis.

Another reason for the choice of Boiotia as focus was the region’s unquestionable importance in most of the major events and patterns affecting Greek mainland history in the sixth, fifth and fourth centuries. Its position covering the breadth of central Greece north of Athens and ‘on three seas’ meant that it had natural interaction with many areas of the Hellenic world in this period. In the traditional foci of Hellenic history, the Persian Wars, the Peloponnesian War, and Spartan and Makedonian hegemonies, Boiotia’s geographic situation and military/political influence was crucial to the course of events, not to mention the period of Theban/Boiotian hegemony itself in the fourth century. However, largely through the predilections of the extant literature, Boiotia features often only at the climax of events, where its role is ill-defined and difficult to comprehend in the absence of suitable context. The modern indifference of scholarship to the region has mirrored this, preferring instead to see the polarised mainland of Athens and Sparta before the rise of Makedon. It has been left to a handful of scholars to promote the study of Boiotia, and argue for its importance to the study of

\(^{32}\) Hall (1997), 32-33, for the fundamental elements in constructing ethnic identity. The model of (phon) emic and (phon) etic discourse, or the perspective of insider and outsider is important in understanding Boiotia as a region, particularly given the linguistic/anthropological roots of the concept, and the importance of the Boiotian dialect in the region. For the application and problems of applying alterity and emic/etic discourse in ancient Greece, see Hall (1997), 18-19. Cf. Hall (2003).
Greek history. Through conceiving of the region’s history in its geographical foundations, it is possible to recover more of the meaning and context of the events in which Boiotia is implicated, and hence shed light on its importance and development. Though the work of Boiotian specialists implicitly supports Boiotia’s crucial position in wider Greek history, the study of Boiotia as a core element at all levels of Greek history has not yet been firmly established.

The relative modern indifference may also be explained by the subtlety of the political system in Boiotia and the plural nature of its power division. Where Athens stood astride Attika and Sparta over Lakonia, there was never an undisputed leader of Boiotia, and the political wrangling and organisation that accompanied the various attempts to solve the question of power allocation were complicated, and still perplex scholars to this day. Where the founding fathers of America had models of democratic governments in Athens and Rome, and the German elite of the late nineteenth and twentieth centuries had the warrior elite of Sparta to look toward for examples, Boiotia’s propensity toward moderate oligarchy was at neither end of the spectrum and therefore provided little romantic attraction\textsuperscript{33}. Neither did Boiotia have any historical kings or tyrants through which it could be categorised in the pattern of developments desired by historical conceptions of political progress\textsuperscript{34}. This lack of interest is slowly being overcome as new areas for study have been sought and with the improvement of the archaeological record allowing greater insight into the political existence of the area. Furthermore, the influence of Boiotian political arrangements on Athenian political theory has long been recognised and the federal organisation of Boiotia in the fifth century and beyond can be seen as the first functioning political arrangement of its kind, a sophisticated political solution to a complicated geo-historical inheritance\textsuperscript{35}.

\textsuperscript{33} For instance on Sparta, see Reichenich (2002), on Athenian influence on America see Richard (1995), and contrast the effect of the democratic tradition in the West in Roberts (1994).

\textsuperscript{34} Though of course Boiotia had many prominent mythological kings and tyrants such as Minyas, Thespios, Kadmos, Oedipus and Kreon. The general absence of historical tyranny from Boiotia is interesting but probably explicable in the conditions of peer-polity interaction that encouraged independence and broad land-based oligarchies as early as it is possible to reconstruct through literary evidence. Edwards’ reconstruction of Hesiod’s Askra suggests an egalitarian situation, Edwards (2004), 101-2. Boiotia seems to have been free from tyrants, but it was happy to deal with and encourage them, as for example in Sikyon. See below, n.627.

\textsuperscript{35} Cartledge (2000), 400 n.6, for an extended list of those who have analysed the federal structure of Boiotia from the Oxyrhynchus testimony. Cartledge also reflects upon the sophistication of the political organisation of the region: p. 405 and p. 411. Cf, below, Annex n.848. See also n.944 for the possible influence of the Boiotian system on the Athenian political changes in 411.
The last thirty years have witnessed a relative resurgence in Boiotian studies, underpinned by the development of extensive archaeological theory and practice. However, much of the best work attempting to give a global perspective on Boiotia has been epigraphically based and therefore focussed on the period after 335BC, and the monographs of Buck and Demand that deal with earlier periods are obsolete but have not been replaced\textsuperscript{36}. Focus has moved from the diachronic narrative of the region or of individual cities to the study of ethnicity and the mythical construction of the region\textsuperscript{37}. There have also been in the past criticisms that the study of Boiotia is too exclusive, a small group of experts that fail to share their findings in an accessible way with a broader audience\textsuperscript{38}. The confusing plethora of colloquiums and conferences from the 1970s onward are full of well-wrought findings that are rarely incorporated into the mainstream of Greek history. But for the historian tasked with putting together a picture of this area on a broad scale, there are now distinct advantages in Boiotia compared with many other areas. Fossey’s gazetteer of sites, now spectacularly updated (though in a significantly different format) by Farinetti gives a complete overview of the scholarship and archaeological data that have informed the energetic developments in Boiotian studies\textsuperscript{39}. Schachter’s \textit{Cults}, though itself in need of updating in light of new archaeological data, still provides a resolutely helpful starting point for attempting to understand the situation and function of the myriad cults and sanctuaries dotted through the area. These aids will also hopefully soon be joined by the republication of \textit{IG VII} overseen by Papazarkadas, a timely addition to Boiotian studies, and offering new horizons for Boiotian study, especially before the third century\textsuperscript{40}.

\textit{Periodisations}

A rigid periodisation is antithetical to the methodological approach of this thesis, but practical limitations have demanded a limited chronological span. The period reviewed will be loosely attached to two major spatial events recorded in the literary evidence for the region. The beginning of the period has been set to acknowledge and allow a range of evidence that is loosely attributed to or recorded around the middle of the sixth

\textsuperscript{36} Guillon (1948), Roesch (1965), Buck (1979), Demand (1982), Buck (1994).


\textsuperscript{38} See for instance, Osborne’s review of \textit{Boiotika}: Osborne (1991).

\textsuperscript{39} Fossey (1988), Farinetti (2011).

\textsuperscript{40} See \textit{Teiresias} 2011 2B, 42-44 for a commentary by Papazarkadas on the development of work toward \textit{IG VII}.
Symbolic movements of people and objects between communities such as the tripodophoric processions between the Parasopeian Thebageneis and Thebes, and between Thebes and Dodona, as well as many local processions such as the Daidala, seem well established, but only begin to feature in evidence at this point\textsuperscript{42}. The opening date of the thesis also predates by several decades the events related in Herodotus 6.108 which are best situated in 519BC\textsuperscript{43}. It is clear from this account and from archaeological evidence that there were important developments in Boiotian community interaction occurring before this one event, and the broad parameters are designed to give room to an analysis of the materials that can contribute to informing this picture. The event concluding the thesis is similar, offering parallels in its deliberate manipulation of intra-Boiotian boundaries, and the effect of extra-Boiotian big-powers. The destruction of Thebes by Alexander III in 335BC calls to mind the events of almost two centuries previously as the event offers a reflection on the importance of the management of geography not just by the Makedonians, but also the Boiotians who joined the Makedonians in destroying Thebes. Again, it is chosen as a moment that suggests the importance of relationships of community and the physical aspects of their interactivity.

The final chapter of the thesis avoids concluding with a narrative summary in order not to contradict the theoretical basis of the work (for the reader’s benefit a spatially focussed diachronic narrative will now form an annex to the main thesis). Instead, through investigation of a single event (the destruction of Thebes in 335BC), it is hoped the advantages of examining Boiotian history through space will be made clear. The dangers of prioritisation of the temporal over the spatial must be borne in mind at all times; this work is designed to investigate the space of Boiotia and how time is mapped upon it, rather than the other way around. Similarly, the division of geography into various defined spatial areas should be resisted. The compartmentalisation of geography into areas that can be studied independently of one another runs contrary to the spirit of this work. To respond to this practical problem, the thesis hopes to engage with the mentalities and perspectives of the communities and individuals of Boiotia and therefore to discuss many areas and networks that are important to understanding Boiotia itself. The manner in which identities were formed at community and regional level had a significant effect on the way in which Boiotia functioned and interacted historically with

\textsuperscript{41} Particularly the literary information that has proven difficult for historical use such as the HHI Apollo, HHI Hermes and the Aspis.

\textsuperscript{42} Thus allowing a reflection on the historic inheritance of the region and its contemporary effects.

\textsuperscript{43} See below, pp.82-86 for discussion of this passage.
other communities and regions. These identities were constructed by those within and without Boiotia through a variety of means, but they were always produced in, and through space.

The thesis is designed to highlight the perspective of individuals and communities and the reciprocity of identity and geography. To this end I have attempted, where possible, to avoid the use of the normal shorthand periodisation of Greek history. Though Boiotia took a full and important part in the events that normally characterise the change from Archaic to Classical to Hellenistic history, it would not have understood and experienced this phase change in the same way that Athens or any other polity did. Nor would any two communities in Boiotia have the same periodisation model. The purpose of this work is not to question directly the Athenocentric periodisation model, but to fully expose its obsolescence by demonstrating how diverse the perspective of spatially juxtaposed regions and communities could be. This is perhaps surprising given the ostensible similarity between the communities of Boiotia. For instance, the fortified centres of Thebes and Plataia lay less than eight miles apart and shared an ethnic and historic link that they believed to be of high antiquity, yet their views on how to interact with other communities and each other never came close to being similar. The events that each community experienced in this period would become part of the polis identity and mythology of both over the subsequent centuries. The creation and influence of collective memories and competing narratives provides a running theme throughout this thesis.

It is hoped that this work will offer a model for understanding ancient history though geography. The model used herein could be applied to other temporal and geographic frames. It is also hoped that this work will help contribute to a re-vivification of the contribution of ancient history to historical theory. The limitations of evidence in the ancient world compared with the modern should make the historian more inventive and curious, and the benefits of this situation can be most profitably harnessed in the construction of methods and theories that aid historical understanding more broadly.
Chapter 2: Settlement and Practicalities

Heraklitos B91 DK

2.I. Introduction

2.I.i. The geographic foreground

Research which covers a novel period of a fixed geographical area is often begun with an introduction on the area’s land and landscape. Having acquainted the reader with the physical details of the stage, the work can then venture on to explore the actors in the human history and events of the region. The land will go on to determine where battles occur, what resources are available for the local economy and trade, the relationship with neighbouring areas and so on. To continue without proper understanding of geography is an error in any period of history, and particularly in ancient Greece, where history is lacunose and the spatial focus of events can shift unevenly. Yet it is not the information that is problematic but the way in which it is used, or perhaps more precisely, the way in which it is perceived. The revision that needs to take place is to recognise the reciprocal agency of community and landscape. The geography (in its broadest sense) of the region needs to be understood as a discursive, negotiated product that can affect and be affected, and through this combination produce a lived experience that itself changes space. At any one moment there exists an objective physical geography that can be measured empirically, but alongside this a separate but non-dissociable imagined, subjective geography of individuals and communities that is the product of history, cultural memory and societal perception of self and others. The dialectic between the two produces space and also changes the experience of both geographies. Whether deliberate or not, changes in physical geography (eg. deforestation), will resonate in the imagined landscape, which will reciprocally inform interaction with the physical landscape in the future (eg. preservation/cultivation of sacred groves). Space is always in flux and always a product of accident and purpose.

If the centrality of geography to Greek history is accepted, developments in geographic theory must be applied in order to fully extend the possibilities of understanding the historical development of regions and periods through a geographic base. The work of
integrating these approaches into ancient history is under way and the development of this method will allow the importance of interactivity between community and landscape to be understood in greater detail and in more active terms. Though important geographic theorists such as Harvey, Lefebvre and Soja often develop their ideas in relation to very recent periods of history (as well as the future), the central focus of their work is on the process of the production of space and of the power relationships inherent in the creation. These ideas are of particular relevance to communities and individuals whose understanding of the world was intimately connected to the structure and use of the land. If a speech such as Isokrates’ Plataikos is evidence of the way in which contemporary Boiotians were thinking about their own space (though through an Athenian voice), temporality is matched by spatiality: The Plataians balance their temporal arguments (rights and wrongs of the past: 14.27, 14.34), with arguments based on historical space (alien vs. home territory: 14.54; situation of Boiotia in relation to Attika: 14.20; places of memory and commemoration lost and destroyed if Athenians remain inactive: 14.59), and imagined or mythical space (14.10, 14.53). There may be nothing unusual in this combination, but it allows an insight into the way in which the Boiotian communities could make claims against each other on the basis of their shared Weltanschauung. This rhetorical manifestation of the layering of time and space is paralleled in the physical commemoration of events that can only be understood in their spatial as well as temporal context. The example of the lion memorial at Chaironeia, probably constructed shortly after 316BC but commemorating the Theban war dead of 338BC, can be considered a response to the previous two hundred years of intra-Boiotian events, and demonstrating that there was an awareness and articulation of the spatiality of these events and a desire to change this space. The battle-site of Chaironeia becomes invested with meaning in a deliberate way that cements historical event into geographical place, thus affecting the space around the area until the present day.

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44 The best recent example of this is Thonemann (2011).
46 Ma (2008a), provides a good recent analysis of the monument. For a fuller consideration of the significance of the battle of Chaironeia and its historical context, see below, Chapter 5. There are some Boiotian manifestations of culture and competition that fuse an acute (and accurate) sense of temporality to a fixed geographic topos, such as the Plataian celebration of the Great Daidala only every 60 years (Paus. 9.3.1-7). For the significance of this, see below, Chapter 4.IV.i, pp.167-170, and Iversen (2007).
2.II. Geographic fundamentals of Boiotia

2.II.i. Change and stability in the Boiotian landscape

The historian of Boiotian landscape is fortunate both in its lack of major natural physical change and in that it is relatively little masked by modern human development\(^{47}\). Though in a tectonically active area, the major sites of the region appear relatively well preserved, geologically and architecturally. For instance, the fortifications at Siphai (Figure 2.1) or Askra are built in precipitous situations, but have survived in a manner impressive even to the modern visitor\(^{48}\). It is notoriously difficult to reconstruct historic climatic patterns in relatively small areas, but from vegetation records and the known natural products of ancient Boiotia, it is likely that the climate was not dissimilar to today\(^{49}\). Lake Kopais, at the centre of the region, is particularly important in tracking ecological changes in the area, as its deep layers of sediment permit analysis of pollen levels and projections of the type of ecology predominating in the region over a long period of time\(^{50}\). Perhaps the most significant and clear data that has emerged from these sediment cores is that the high levels of tree pollen detectable drop radically in a short period of prehistory (from c.3000BC), and by 1500BC the landscape of Boiotia had established the pattern of widespread agriculture and largely deforested land that

\(^{47}\) Other than prominent examples such as the quarrying and cement works that surround the ancient site of Aulis.

\(^{48}\) For detailed plans and analysis of Siphai, see Schwandner (1977).

\(^{49}\) The strongest evidence in favour of climatic change from c.3000-1500BC is the data from the sediment cores at Kopais that demonstrate that Kopais went from being a lake to a marsh. The causes for this change could have been climatic, changes in the geology of the basin, or human activity. Though Allen (1990), 181, prefers the latter, it is impossible to rule out a combination of all three causing the change on the basis of the current evidence. Knauss (1990); (cf. Allen (1997), for a variation of this view), sees the shift to the more arid climate of today coming at around 1500BC.

\(^{50}\) Tzedakis (1999).
characterised the period reviewed in this thesis\textsuperscript{31}. That the levels of pollen remained relatively static and never again rose to the previous peaks registers the permanence of human influence on the physical landscape\textsuperscript{32}. It is therefore probable that the major denudation of woodland occurred in the third and second millennium BC, and the landscape of the historical period, where large supplies of wood were difficult to come by, had been the situation in Boiotia for some time previously\textsuperscript{33}.

\textsuperscript{31} Bintliff (1993); Allen (1990), 178-180. The model of deforestation in this period was not limited to Boiotia, see Bottema and Woldring (1990) and Kaplan, Krumhardt, and Zimmerman (2009), though note Tzedakis (2000), 365, who argues that the Kopaic basin experienced natural oscillations of periods of high and low biomass because of its natural conditions, where areas further south show greater sustained losses of forest and biomass.

\textsuperscript{32} The proliferation of olives in the Mykenaian period is marked in the cores from Kopais: Bintliff (1993), 137. The topography of the Kopais basin itself restricts olive production because of the very low winter temperature (below -13\textdegree C): Rackham (1983), 296 with n.6 citing historical occurrences of major olive crop failures in the region because of this. It is possible that the increased olive pollen representation could be as a result of decreased cultivation, with the existing stock going wild, but given the inhospitable landscape, it is unlikely olives would have proliferated naturally in the area.

\textsuperscript{33} The core records do of course only give a record of the sediment that found its way into the Kopaic lakebed through tributaries or landing on the lake. It does not in itself exclude the possibility of areas somewhat removed from the lake, such as the Tanagraia, having been more heavily wooded. There is also the significant problem of prickly oak producing a large amount of pollen as a small tree and therefore it is difficult to assess the types of tree that covered the landscape; Bintliff (1993), 137.
Fig. 2.2: Panorama of Kopais Basin from the south.
The historic level of Lake Kopais has been the focus of much discussion in recent decades. The level at which Lake Kopais has most often been mapped and at which the *Barrington Atlas* projects it to be is likely to be too high, and gives little indication of the changes that occur as a result of changes in season or weather\(^{54}\). The significance of seemingly minor changes in the projected level of the lake, as well as the huge variation that could be experienced between a wet winter and a dry summer is starkly demonstrated when the various levels are juxtaposed\(^{55}\). For the communities of the Kopais, especially in the northwest, the difference in projection has huge ramifications. The fluctuations determined not just how much land would be accessible to the communities on its edges, but also the possibility of movement between different settlements. Additionally, the lake could have been a significant cause of the spread of disease, its retreat in the summer leaving little more than an extensive marshy area, and the possibility of malarial mosquito swarms is high\(^{56}\). The Mykenaian predecessors of the Boiotoi had drained the lake (See figure 2.2 for the modern, drained landscape of Lake Kopais) and regulated the general hydrology of the region through technologically advanced engineering works and protected them with a series of monumental fortifications\(^{57}\). The remnants of this work would have been apparent throughout the region in the historical period, though there is no clear indication of a desire to undertake similar work again until the period of Makedonian domination\(^{58}\).

2.II.ii. Ecology

As a result of the archaeological work that has been undertaken in the region in recent decades, Boiotia is unusually fortunate in having received significant focus on the state

\(^{54}\) Talbert (2000), Map 55 with *Directory*, p. 818, admits shortcomings and likely inaccuracy of projection.

\(^{55}\) Farinetti (2011), p.82, fig.10, projects the lake from a minimum of 92m above sea level to a maximum of 97m above sea level.


\(^{57}\) A gradual build up of sediment (following deforestation c.3000BC) and a rise in water level would have made the drainage work more pressing. The gradual silting of the lake would have also made it shallower and more prone to seasonal variations in level. See above, nn.49 and 51.

\(^{58}\) Strabo (9.2.18) reports the possible plans to repair the Mykenaian system by Alexander III and Krates of Chalkis. It is unlikely that the system completely ceased to function with the destruction of the Bronze Age palatial centres (though for doubts about the ‘palatial’ nature of the BA centre at Thebes, see Dakouri-Hild (2005), p.181) and the Boiotian migrations, and this is perhaps reflected in the language used by Strabo about ‘reopening’ old channels (ἀνακαθήτησιν τὰ ἐμφάνητα) rather than starting from scratch. Fuller consideration of the hydrology of the region and the attempts to manage it: below, Chapter 3.II.iii. See new work that considers the tunnel construction in the eastern Kopais to be the work of Krates: Koutsoyiannis and Angelakis (2007). It is interesting that Plutarch might have written a life of Krates (as recorded in the ‘Lamprias Catalogue’), which is not extant.
of its ancient ecology and soils. For instance, Rackham’s work on the ecology of Boiotia from the early eighties is still a touchstone for anyone trying to visualise the past landscape in terms of its coverage and types of plants. The land uncovered by the Kopais’ fluctuations was some of the most fertile in the Greek mainland. The depiction of ears of corn and (less frequently) horses on Orchomenian coinage and the stories linking them with a strong horse-rearing history supports the idea that this fertile extra land would have brought significant economic benefits to that community and region more widely. Theophrastos comments severally on the products of the Kopais and the adjacent areas, and Farinetti has analysed the general fertility and amount of good land in the area. Considering soil fertility also highlights the social importance of the productive upland plains between Attika and Boiotia such as the Skourta Plain around Panakton, and in combination with the strategically important routes through these plains explains why these areas were such a focus of competition.

Whilst it is difficult to assess how ecology would have affected the physical appearance of Boiotia, it does seem clear that the landscape would have been in general sparsely wooded and heavily farmed. There are a few historical instances where the supply of wood comes into focus: Hesiod had various types of wood with which to make his tools, the Persians built a stockade near Thebes in 480, the Thebans built a stockade against Agesilaos in the 370s, and in 429-7 the Spartans had to find enough wood to effectively fulfil their plans for besieging Plataia. There are suggestions that there were pockets of

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59 Rackham (1983) with the developments of Bintliff (1993), and see now Farinetti (2011), 51-2.
60 When the land was drained in the twentieth century there was 4 metres of peat on the lake bed before exposure oxidised it away: Rackham (1983), 297, with n.8.
61 For equestrianism in Boiotia including the myths regarding Orchomenian horsemen and Thebes, see below, n.186. Orchomenian coinage generally changes between ears of grain and horses: for horses, Head (1884), nos. 20, 25-29. The projection of the level of Lake Kopais in the Barrington Atlas and the population level implied by the Oxyrhynchus historian for Orchomenos are incompatible. For Orchomenos to support a population (including dependent komai) that could produce 1700 men and 170 cavalry for regular military service, it would have required much more territory than just a portion of the Kephissos valley. See nn.54-55, above.
62 Farinetti (2011), 53-5, ‘Soils and Land potential’ provides an overview, plus a general breakdown of each region throughout the work. For Theophrastos see below, pp.53-54 and nn.173-174. See also tabulation of territory sizes in Gonzalez (1996).
63 Munn and Zimmermann-Munn (1989). Fehvre (1925), 200, on the significance of upland plains and emphasising plurality of these areas in type.
64 Bintliff (1993), 141 (Table 1), estimates a maximum coverage of one sixth for woodland in Boiotia in the 5th-3rd century BC on a downward trend. The prominence of groves such as that of Androkrates on Kithairon: Plut. Aris. 11.7, ‘ἄλληι πυκνών καὶ συκώτων δέντρων παγεμέμηνον,’ perhaps suggests a landscape generally denuded of trees, though Meiggs (1982), 189-90, suggests there might have been lots of wood on Kithairon. The name of the ‘dryoskephalai’ pass over Kithairon, (Hdt. 9.39.1), might have been a reflection on the availability of wood here, and Thuc. 2.75-8 considers the availability of wood for the siege of Plataia by Sparta.
65 Persian stockade built with wood from Thebes: Hdt. 9.15.2. Cf. Meiggs (1982), 14 n.1, 158, and Hornblower (1991), 360. The Theban stockade against the Spartans has received particular attention, see
good timber on Mt. Kithairon as well as in the area around Mykalesos, but the areas of the greatest fertility, and especially the large plains around Orchomenos, Thebes and Tanagra are the most likely to have been generally treeless. This is significant in the implications for both inter-visibility of poleis, and the prominence of the pockets of woodland and sacred groves that remained in the landscape. Perhaps an instructive modern parallel from the region would be the grave tumulus of the Makedonians at Chaironeia. The marking of this site as well as that of the Theban dead with tall cypresses has made it ‘a modern as well as an ancient funeral site.

Fig. 2.3: Grave tumulus of the Makedonians in the Kephissos valley, view north-east from Chaironeian akropolis.

Hanson (1998), 82-3, for summary of some earlier sources, and Munn (1987). The stockade that met the Spartans in 378BC must have been an extensive construction, and if the palisade ran the whole length of the defences it would have required a lot of wood: Xen. Ages. 2.22.  
66 Hesiod, Works and Days, 435-6; Rackham (1983), 328: ‘very little woodland… even small groves were notable and were recorded’. Meiggs (1982), 125, considers that there might have been significant wood reserves on the slopes of Parnes in the 480s but that Athens chose not to use it as the effort of transporting the wood to the sea would be greater than importing the wood from elsewhere. Note also charcoal burners of Akharnai: Meiggs (1982), 189.  
67 The example of Onchestos is particularly important here, as an area of thick woodland at the limit of the Theban (Teneric) Plain. This is even more significant when it is considered that it is likely that this cult area had its roots in the Bronze Age, and perhaps survived the general denuding of the early Bronze-Age periods: see below, Chapter 4.III.iii, pp.163-165. For the significance of groves in Bronze-Age cult see Sourvinou-Inwood (1993).  
68 Ma (2008a), 81. From the accounts of nineteenth century travellers, it is clear that even without the covering of trees the mound was conspicuous in the flat river plain: Wyse (1871), 160.
Though a recent addition to the landscape, emphasising an already well-known historical place through the addition of trees creates a significant change in the space of the wider area (see Figure 2.3 for the view of the burial mound from Chaironeia). Here a parallel with the grove of Poseidon at Onchestos is pertinent as that site would have been visible from afar, and the cult was itself well known through its antiquity and its place in the Homeric Hymns. Figure 2.4 is a photograph taken from Onchestos over the Teneric Plain toward Thebes and demonstrates the view that would have greeted the traveller through Boiotia as they emerged from the sacred grove, as well as the site’s own visibility in the landscape (See also Figures, 4.5 and 4.6, below). How this use of wooded areas to denote a site of significance in the landscape, or a border area (or both) manifested itself in different sites in the region is clear only when we have documentary evidence. The mysterious site of Alalkomenai might also have had a grove of great antiquity, and provided the oak that was required to make the processional log for the Plataian festival of the Daidala. The procession is itself another good example of the way in which ecology can shape the movement and interactivity of communities. Collecting an oak from Alalkomenai would entail a regular renewal of relations not just between Plataia and Alalkomenai, but all of the communities that Plataian representatives would pass on the way to collect and return the oak.

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69 For HH Apollo and Hermes see below, Chapter 4.III.iii.
70 Pausanias is occasionally informative, but given the length of time between the period under review and his travels in Boiotia, combined with the changes in land use that have been registered in the surface survey work, it is likely that the level and areas of foresting had changed significantly. See also Birge (1994), for some issues regarding the restoration of trees in the landscape using Pausanias as source. The grove was still in place in Pausanias’ time: Paus. 9.26.5. Wyse (1871), 187, experienced crossing into the Teneric Plain without trees on the ridge by Onchestos and noted that ‘a view of Thebes burst upon us’, emphasising both the visual obstruction of the ridge, and also the openness of the ten miles of treeless plain toward the Kadmeia.
71 Alakomenai is a mysterious site before the third century (it is still unlocated, though it is most likely to have been located between Haliartos and Koroneia), but is important, and of high antiquity: Hom. Il. 4.8; Schachter (1981), 111-114.
73 Chaniotis (2002), 24, 34, 42, and below, Chapter 4.IV.i, for further discussion of this procession.
Fig. 2.4: View of the Teneric Plain from Onchestos ridge.
Wooded areas in a generally non-wooded context could have religious and spatial significance, but they are also of practical importance when considering major schemes such as the building of fleets, as the Boiotians might have undertaken in the 360s. The type of wood (and other materials) necessary would almost certainly not have been available in enough volume in Boiotia to furnish the ambition of Epameinondas to build ‘100 triremes’. We know from the experience of Athens that political relationships, especially with forest-rich areas such as Makedon and Cyprus, were often influenced by the need for timber. With this in mind, the contacts and relationships that Boiotian maintained during periods of alleged fleet-construction are worth analysing more closely.

2.II.iii. Demographics

The historical population of Boiotia is estimated to have peaked at 165,500 around 400BC. This is the highest estimate for any period and indicates the vibrancy of the landscape at this time. The number is by no means indisputable but it is not incompatible with what would be expected from a nominal fighting force of 12,100 hoplites and cavalry that is attested in the Oxyrhynchus account of the Boiotian federal

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74 Diod. Sic. 15.79.1; for the relationship of the Boiotians with the sea, see below Chapter 2.II.viii and pp.90-95. For a historical assessment of the trireme building scheme, especially noting all the other specialist materials required beyond timber, see Buckler (1980), 161-2.

75 See Meiggs (1982), especially 119-132, for the significance of wood supply for fleets and political relationships (though without any mention of the Boiotian fleet). See particularly pp.119-120, for Atheno-Makedonian relations.

76 The example of Alexander the Great and the Branchidai, manipulating the historical narrative of this group (via Kallisthenes) in order to exploit their sacred grove for ship building is instructive: Q. Curtius Rufus 7.5.34, with Panchenko (2002). See Schachter (forthcoming), and Gartland (2013), for a suggestion that Boiotia did not build all the ships itself, but built alliances with and commissioned ships from states in the northeast Aegean and Black Sea. Buckler and Beck (2008), 199-210, provide the best recent account.

77 Bintliff (2005), 5, with reference to Bintliff (1997). Beloch (1886) estimated a surprisingly similar 150,000-200,000 for the population. See Bintliff and Snodgrass (1985), 142, for the method behind these figures, calculated by the number of fighting men multiplied by five. The argument for the figures is estimated by combining the strength of the late 5th century military forces consisting of the federal requirements recorded in the Oxyrhynchus historian, plus another 11,000 light armed men (implied for instance at Delion). Much less likely are the 10,000 men needed for the 50 triremes postulated at the end of the Peloponnesian War. Though the Boiotians did contribute triremes, it is far from certain that the number was as high as fifty or that manpower would have been predominantly drawn from Boiotia itself. If this is held to be correct, the population figures could be lowered to c.115,500, (if no Boiotians were present on the ships) or more likely somewhere around 127,500 if the trireme numbers are lowered to 25 and the half the crew (100 per trireme) had been Boiotian. It is also possible that the light-armed troops could have doubled as sailors and minimised this figure. Hansen’s shotgun method offers useful parallels with estimates ranging from 125-250,000; Hansen (2006). A useful update to the shotgun method considers Boiotian poleis in detail: Hansen (2008). I would favour something around Bintliff’s estimate, and have used that as the basis for the calculations in the table below. Hansen’s figures for Tanagra and Thebes (pp.271-272) from the update correspond closely to the figures given for these poleis in Table 1.

78 The contrasts made with modern population figures and the peak of Ottoman population in the region are instructive: Hansen (2006), 88; Bintliff (2005), 9. Bintliff (p.6) suggests a peak Ottoman (16th century) population of 40,000.
The growth in population before this peak seems to have varied in pace across the region, but the general upward trend is likely to have been gradual. The high numbers, and the data initially emerging from the surface survey work led to claims that the land was ‘well beyond the limits of sustainability’ by the end of the fifth century, but that picture has been more recently questioned, and the debate is still open. The ‘carrying capacity’ of the land is likely to have been stretched at this peak of settlement but given Boiotia’s almost endemic involvement in large scale warfare throughout the period under review it is likely that any drop in population might as easily have been related to the degradations of that military activity and the major political changes of the later fourth century rather than the soil being unable to support the population any further. The clearest, and most often cited evidence for absolute population figures is provided by the Oxyrhynchus Historian.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Community</th>
<th>Representation in Koinon</th>
<th>Contribution to federal military</th>
<th>Population</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Thebes</td>
<td>2 Boiotarchoi (120 bouleutai)</td>
<td>2000 hoplites / 200 horse</td>
<td>30k</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Plataia)</td>
<td>2 (120)</td>
<td>2000 hoplites / 200 horse</td>
<td>30k</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Orchomenos</td>
<td>5/3 (100)</td>
<td>1666 hoplites / 166 horse</td>
<td>25k</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thespiai (with Thisbai and Eutresis)</td>
<td>2 (120)</td>
<td>2000 hoplites / 200 horse</td>
<td>30k</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tanagra</td>
<td>1 (60)</td>
<td>1000 hoplites / 100 horse</td>
<td>15k</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chaironeia/Hyettos/Haliartos/Lebadeia/Kopai/Akraiphia/Koroneia</td>
<td>1/3 (20) each = 7/3 (140) total.</td>
<td>333 hoplites / 33 horse (each) = 2333 hoplites / 233 horse total</td>
<td>5k (each) = 35k total</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Totals</td>
<td>11 (660)</td>
<td>11000 men / 1100 horse</td>
<td>165,000* based on Bintliff</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 1: Population of Boiotian communities (Based on Hell. Oxy. 16.3-4)

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79 Hell. Oxy. 19.3. The figures given at Pausanias 10.20.3 (10,000 infantry, 500 cavalry) for early third century Boiotia suggest a certain amount of demographic similarity with the fifth century.
80 Morgan (2003), 172-3, contrasts the gradual developments of Askra and Haliartos in the Iron Age with the relatively rapid growth of Thespiai in the fifth century. The one major historical caveat to this trend could be the sudden influx of slaves into Boiotia from Dekeleia during the final decade of the war: see below, n. 85.
81 Bintliff (2005), 10. Though see criticism of this idea in Shiel (2000). The volume of manure naturally suggests a significant number of manure producers (see below, n.163).
82 Shiel (2000), summarises the arguments. New analysis of the population in Lykurgan Athens suggests that the numbers of citizens in the late fourth century might not be significantly fewer than in the mid-fifth century: van Wees (2011). Up to half the entire area of Boiotia might have been under cultivation (with cereals, olive, and legume) in 4th century. Bintliff (1993), 139.
83 The Spartans successfully applied pressure on Theban food supplies in mid-370s, when Thebes had to appeal to Euboia for food supplies: Xen. Hell. 5.4.56. Deaths on the battlefield of Boiotians might have been only part of the way in which military activity had an impact on population numbers. The effect of mercenary service (for instance the Boiotians serving in the 10,000 and, the vast numbers who served with Pammenes and afterwards and the Orchomenians (serving with Alexander III) would have had an impact (For these mercenaries see IG VII 3206; Schachter (2007), 366 n.5). See Trundle (2004), 54-57, for potential impact of mercenary service on general population trends.
On a regional scale, the proportional representation system described demonstrates that size of population as well as extent and location of territory formed part of the Boiotians’ image of themselves as communities and the structure of the region as a whole. There is no indication of any kind of ‘census’ being undertaken, but the federal group’s having agreed to political participation on a broadly representative basis, and these figures therefore becoming formally acknowledged, would have had significant effects on the way in which each community compared itself with other communities in the region\textsuperscript{84}.

Producing estimates of population and of long term population trends in Boiotia is useful for historical analysis, but gradual demographic changes would not have been felt as keenly by the population of Boiotia as the large demographic ‘events’. We have a partial record of major demographic upheavals in the region, recorded in Table 2, that might have had some effect on the changing interaction of the communities involved. Events such as the influx of slaves via Dekeleia in the latter stages of the Peloponnesian War could have significantly altered the way in which some communities operated, even if the number was not the ‘πλέον ἡ δύο μυριάδες’ suggested by Thucydides\textsuperscript{85}. The movement of people in and out of an area can quickly mask the population peaks and troughs that might have occurred ‘naturally’ as a result of fluctuations of food supply, epidemic disease and the inherent carrying capacity of the land, but events such as synoikisms, major losses of people in battles, or city destructions have both numerical and psychological significance, regardless of the base demographics of a region. The experience of major demographic events has the potential to affect community interaction and land-use\textsuperscript{86}.

\textsuperscript{84} The ephebic lists from the third century and beyond present much clearer evidence of the management of the recruitment of the representative system of the federation: Roesch (1982), 339-354.

\textsuperscript{85} Thuc. 7.27; Hell.Oxy. 17.4. 20,000 should not be taken as an accurate figure, nor as an indication of how many might have made their way to Boiotia. It should instead be read as ‘a large number’. Any total is likely to have contained a large proportion of agricultural workers, Hanson (1992); Hanson (1998), 238. Amemiya (2007), 30, considers the problems of the figure given by Thucydides. Cf. Burford (1993), 213.

\textsuperscript{86} The biggest single losses known were the andrapodismoi at Chaireonoeia (446BC) and Thebes (Arr. Anab. 1.9.9-10), along with the 700 Thespian at Thermopylaie. Other events included 300 Thesians lost at Delion (Thuc. 4.96.3), 200 Thebans lost at Plataia (Hdt. 9.67), 180 Thebans killed at the beginning of the siege of Plataia (Thuc. 2.5.7) and the 200 Plataians executed after the end of the siege in 427 (Thuc. 3.68.5). These events would clearly have significant and long lasting effects, but the record of these major events dominates the lacunose record of smaller but presumably more regular losses (e.g. unspecified but perhaps significant Thespian losses at Nemea, Xen. Hell. 4.2.20), and therefore total population fluctuations are difficult to analyse in full.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Community</th>
<th>Source</th>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Event</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Thespiai/Plataia</td>
<td>Hdt. 8.50.2</td>
<td>480</td>
<td>Destruction (Both rebuilt following 479)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chaironeia</td>
<td>Thuc. 1.113.1</td>
<td>446</td>
<td>Andrapodismoi&lt;sup&gt;87&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thebes</td>
<td>&lt;i&gt;Hell. Oxy.&lt;/i&gt; 12.3</td>
<td>431</td>
<td>“Synoikism” of unwalled towns</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Orchomenos</td>
<td>Thuc. 3.87</td>
<td>427</td>
<td>Earthquake</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Plataia</td>
<td>Thuc. 3.68.2</td>
<td>427</td>
<td>Siege and destruction (Refounded 386)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mykalessos</td>
<td>Thuc. 7.29</td>
<td>414</td>
<td>Massacre of inhabitants and some physical destruction</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oropos</td>
<td>Diod. 14.17.2-3</td>
<td>401</td>
<td>Moved 7 stades inland</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Plataia</td>
<td>Paus. 9.1.6</td>
<td>373</td>
<td>Exile of population (Refounded/return 338)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thespiai</td>
<td>Xen. &lt;i&gt;Hell.&lt;/i&gt; 6.3.5</td>
<td>371</td>
<td>Destruction (‘ἀναφέσει’)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Paus. 9.14.2-4</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Orchomenos</td>
<td>Diod. 15.79.6</td>
<td>364</td>
<td>Andropodismos</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Aeschines 2.141</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Orchomenos/Koroneia</td>
<td>Dem. 19.112; 19.325</td>
<td>346</td>
<td>Andrapodismoi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thebes</td>
<td>Arrian 1.7ff (See below, Chapter 5)</td>
<td>335</td>
<td>Destruction/ Andrapodismos (Refounded 316)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<sup>87</sup> There have been important contributions to the understanding of the reality of andropodismoi recently, emphasising that the principal <i>andrapoda</i> were women and children: Gaca (2010); Gaca (2011). The actions against Orchomenos in 364 seems to fit Gaca’s model of an <i>andrapodismos</i> well, with the men being killed and the women and children made slaves. The <i>andrapodismoi</i> of Orchomenos and Koroneia in 346 described in Demosthenes are likely to have been of Phokian occupants.

Table 2: Major population events

There are several major lessons to be drawn from the pattern of events. First is the frequency of physical urban upheaval. There are many instances of destruction of all or part of an urban centre in the period. However, if a map of Boiotia in 520BC were to be viewed next to a map of c.335BC, the basic picture would be the same. None of the major settlements disappeared, though they might have been demographically changed through the various events. Yet the experience of these communities would all have been affected by the manner of destruction and rehabilitation of the urban centres. Figure 2.5 illustrates the widespread destruction and exile of communities in this period and emphasises how important the experience must have been to intra-Boiotian discourse in this period.
For individual communities, the major demographic events would have had a significant impact on the way in which they functioned socially and their use of the landscape if the community, as well as the way in which they perceived or remembered population change. The surface survey information from Boiotia, together with occasional insights into urban-rural dwelling patterns, suggests that despite the region’s large size, most of the inhabitants of Boiotia lived at this time in nucleated urban centres and travelled out to farm the land. This concentration could have had implications for decision-making, political organisation and the dynamics of inter-community relationships, especially given the relative frequency of urban destruction and population exile in Boiotia.

2.II.iv. Perspectives on the landscape of Boiotia

There are currently several strands of work being undertaken which seek to understand the geography of ancient Boiotia in different ways. The series of archaeological projects active in the region are continually contributing additional information for

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88 Pausanias’ description of the timidity of the Plataians in the early fourth century gathering in their city: Paus. 9.1.1; Bintliff (1993), 138, suggests up to 72% of Boiotians lived in urban situations and travelled out to work the land.
understanding the ancient landscape, and will be of great importance to Boiotian studies and Hellenic history more broadly. Boiotia has a long tradition of surface survey work and this is sporadically accompanied by more intensive work on sites such as Plataia and Gla. This perspective from the ‘ground up’ is enlightening and vitally important in comprehending the networks and existence of communities, but the Boiotian landscape must also be understood from the perspective of those who used, inhabited and travelled through the region. The information from the surface survey and traditional intensive site-based archaeology is not lifeless, but such techniques suggest more about broad-brush patterns of community habitation and land-use trends rather than individual experience. In Boiotia, the historian is fortunate in being able to supplement the archaeological evidence with a range of other ways of analysing the area.

Work such as Daniel Berman’s, which seeks to delimit the ‘mythical topography’ of Thebes and other parts of Boiotia, is stimulating and overdue, but its focus is on delineation of the cultural representation of the landscape, on the way in which landscape is presented, rather than the reality of lived experience. Because of the specialised focus of this approach, and the unavoidable limitations of evidence that predominantly focuses on Thebes, this approach can only form part of the information needed to construct the ‘lived spaces’ of Boiotia. Larson’s study of the formation of a common identity of the Boiotoi is part of a trend of renewed interest in ethnic groups that has placed Boiotia, with its complicated ethnic and political discourse, firmly in the van of new developments. Inhabitation of an area is not considered as important as myths of shared descent in defining ethnicity, but when an ethnic group’s descent is bound with a migratory tradition, as with the Boiotoi, the basis of that ethnicity is implicitly spatial. Understanding the ethnic geography of the Boiotoi and the mythical topography of Boiotia can further the understanding of historical development and interactivity in the area.

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89 The two major groups currently active in the region are the Boiotia Survey, and the Eastern Boeotia Archaeology Project. Pettigrew (2010), review of Bintliff, Howard, and Snodgrass (2007), places the three-decade long Boiotia Survey project neatly in its broad archaeological and methodological context.
90 Plataia: Konecny et al. (2012); Gla: Lane (2012).
91 Morgan (2003), 170-1, with emphasis on the experience of moving through a landscape and the relationships between communities and regions that would affect them. Kowalzig and Papalexandrou have both contributed important recent work concerning Boiotian processional movements: see below, n.184.
The relationship between the empiricism of the archaeological data and the analysis of the overtly subjective presentation of topography of the literary or religious/mythical landscape needs to be explored further, for it is in the combination of physical and experiential that the historical significance of the geography of ancient Boiotia can be found. When assessing a large physical area over an extended period of time the perspective of the individual should not be forgotten, as it is only through the experience of the individual that geography is produced. The changing physical landscape that can be discerned in the archaeological data and the many layers of identity produced through social practices and symbolic interaction only matter in the effect that they have on the individual, and through the individual to the experience and behaviour of the community. The reciprocity and reflexivity between geography and history, between spatial and temporal, is what will be at the heart of this thesis.

The attempt to comprehend the perspective of individuals in Boiotia is aided by the relatively good number of surviving literary works from the region. Hesiod, Pindar, and Korinna are the most prominent extant representatives of a rich creative tradition, and their work illuminates aspects of the conception of the landscape by Boiotoi themselves. This is of great importance, but none of these insiders had in mind the deliberate project of a Pausanias or a Strabo to document the settlements and culture of the region. We have therefore the problem of individuals, well apprised of the landscape no doubt, but in whose work a deliberate overview of the landscape does not feature. Instead therefore, it is necessary to look to the accounts of non-Boiotians (or a non-contemporary Boiotian, in the case of Plutarch) for perspectives that deliberately consider the Boiotian landscape.

Herodotus’ supposed anti-Boiotian bias in his account of the Persian Wars prompted Plutarch to compose a famous correctional polemic, but Herodotus never dwells on the landscape of Boiotia explicitly. He does however offer important information regarding the way in which the landscape influenced the relationships that would prove crucial to the divisions within Boiotia at the time of the interaction with the Persians. The events that Herodotus touches upon will be dealt with throughout the thesis, but the context of his composition must be borne in mind at all times. At the time of his work in the 430s and 420s, the relationship between Sparta, Athens and Boiotia was tumultuous;

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94 Pindar is important in understanding spatial links: below, Chapter 4.VI.ii. For the possibilities of discerning awareness of Boiotian landscape from Korinna, see Berman (2010) and Vergados (2012).
95 See below, Chapter 4.VI, for these individuals’ influence on Boiotian history.
particularly in regard to the situation of Plataia vis-à-vis all three. The account of events such as the alignment of Plataia with Athens in 519BC and the role of the Thebans at Thermopylae should be seen as a reflection of the events at the time of Herodotus’ composition, and therefore used with caution as evidence for events ‘as they happened’\(^\text{96}\).

Thucydides’ conception of Boiotian land is the most explicit and global of the surviving external accounts. He makes a link between the fertile land of Boiotia (1.2.3-4) and the poor land of Attika (1.2.5) as influencing long-term political trends.

The former outlines that fertile land is associated with movement, power contest and stasis, whilst poor soils are related to the static and autochthonous. Boiotia is presented, along with some other regions (including most of the Peloponnese) as the most fertile of land; whilst perhaps generally accurate, the depiction of Boiotia seems more designed to contrast the Athenian situation\(^\text{97}\). The reference to Boiotia’s fertility making it a target for outside powers prepares the reader for the various Athenian attempts to exert control over the area, both in the Pentakontaetia and the account of the Peloponnesian War itself\(^\text{98}\). The contrast between the regions is also emphasised in the context of colonisation. The tradition of Boiotia not being a leading player in colonial activity was current during Thucydides’ time, and he implicitly contrasts the widespread colonial influence of Athens with Boiotia as being a result of the landscape of the home region. This view of Boiotia’s lack of interaction with colonies (and the reason behind it) has been pervasive at least since Thucydides’ time and correlates with the broad contrast he is seeking to draw between the two regions\(^\text{99}\).

\(^{96}\) Schachter (1998), especially p.30, emphasises the influence of the experience of the early part of the Peloponnesian War on the way in which Herodotus chose to compose his work.

\(^{97}\) The same contrast between the much more fertile soil of Boiotia is made at Strabo 9.2.1: ‘ἀρετῆ μέντοι τῆς χώρας πάμπολο διαφέρει.’ Hansen (2006), 90, confirms the picture of Boiotia vs. Attica grain production with reference to nineteenth century agricultural output data.

\(^{98}\) It also anticipates his discussion of the migrations into Boiotia a few chapters later: Thuc. 1.12.

\(^{99}\) The theme of colonialism is picked up below, Chapter 2.III.iv. See also von Reden (1998), 177, for the interplay between autochthony and empire.
Thucydides’ account of Boiotia is also focussed on the implications of the fertility of the land for intra-Boiotian conflict. The idea of Thucydides using Boiotia as a model for stasis and its concomitant problems in the war has gathered support recently\textsuperscript{100}. Boiotia as the best model for group \textit{staseis} also features as part of an oft-quoted reflection attributed to Perikles, itself couched in terms of an ecological metaphor\textsuperscript{101}:

καὶ εἰς Βοιωτοὺς, δὴ ὁμοιὸι τοῖς πρίνοις τοὺς τε γὰρ πρίνους ὃς ἀυτῶν κατακόπτεσθαι, καὶ τοὺς Βοιωτούς πρὸς ἀλλήλους μαχομένους. Aristotle, \textit{Rhetoric} 1407a2-6.

Alongside this, the idea of those living in fertile areas being pushed out and taking refuge in ‘stable’ Athens must have been an indirect reference to the fate of the Plataians during the war\textsuperscript{102}. Thucydides’ conception of Boiotia was as a prize to be fought over and this is playd out in his important account of the migration of the Boiotoi into Boiotia, which seems to defer to the authority of the \textit{Catalogue of Ships} in clarifying the situation after the Trojan Wars\textsuperscript{103}:

 Barcliai te γάρ οἱ νῦν ἔξηκοστο ἠτει μετὰ Ἡλίου ἄλωσιν ἢς Ἀρνης ἀναστάντες ὑπὸ Θεσσαλῶν τὴν νῦν μὲν Βοιωτίαν, πρότερον δὲ Καδμηίδα γῆν καλομενὴν ὴκισαν (ἡν δὲ αὐτῶν καὶ ἀποδασμὸς πρότερον ἐν τῇ γῇ ταύτῃ, ἢφ' ἄν καὶ ἔς Ἡλίου ἑστράτευσαν) Thuc. 1.12.3

The general picture of a naturally fertile landscape also conforms to the picture from other contemporary Athenian sources, such as in Aristophanes \textit{Acharnians}, where the view from Athens is of a Boiotia that lies bountifully unravaged in contrast to the deprivations of the war landscape of Attika\textsuperscript{104}. Thucydides’ contact with Plataians who had fled Boiotia, and his exile early in the war, must have contributed to the formation of his view of the regions and their differences. He is, however, unique amongst the extant sources in attempting to explain the vulnerabilities and conflicts of Boiotia in terms of long term trends related to the region’s natural situation.

\textsuperscript{100} Price (2001), 103-126, 283-289.
\textsuperscript{101} Though Perikles’ use of tree metaphor was not restricted to Boiotia: Plu. \textit{Per.} 33.4, ‘Ἀλέγων ὡς δένδρα μὲν τιμηθέντα καὶ κοπέντα φύεται ταξέως, ἄνδρον δὲ διαφαρημένων ἀνάθες ταχεῖν οὐ ραδιόν ἔστι.’ There might have been a specific relevance for this metaphor given the prevalence of holm-oaks on the border between Attika and Boiotia. One of the principal passes between the two region was known as the ‘oaks-head’ pass: Hdt. 9.39.1.
\textsuperscript{102} Pelling (2000), 61 n.2, for collection of sources illuminating the Athenian perspective on the Plataian siege and exile and its subsequent place in Athenian memory.
\textsuperscript{103} Larson (2007), 52-64.
\textsuperscript{104} See discussion of Aristophanes’ portrayal of Boiotia below, Chapter 2.III.ii, pp.54-56.
Plutarch is most clearly aware among the extant Boiotian authors of the ‘big picture’ of Boiotian settlement and landscape and its importance for the region’s historical development. But as with Herodotus, Plutarch rarely reflects directly on the landscape, and therefore is useful only in a fragmentary manner. However, there are other accounts that touch on the landscape more directly. Pausanias explicitly sets out a scheme of discursive exploration of the region, and illuminates the landscape by visiting not only the urban nuclei but also the non-urban monuments and features that catch his attention. His antiquarianism is useful in that focus is directed toward sites that were not generally prominent in his own time. However, his focus is not so much on a full description of the region as on a presenting his version of Greece, a fantasy consisting of, ‘an enchanted past, of living myths and rituals whose apparent antiquity guaranteed their modern meanings, of ruins and monuments executed by the hallowed hands of the great’. Theophrastos in contrast, alights on Boiotia only when it fits into discussion on plants that grow there. Strabo too offers important information and has been indulged a commentary specifically on his Boiotian work, but is perhaps more important in his preservation of fragments of other authors who considered Boiotia rather than for original reflections on the landscape.

Alongside the ancient reflections on Boiotia, the modern travellers to the region, especially those that encountered the area in a pre-industrial form, can offer much useful information in the way in which the landscape was perceived and used. Perhaps because of its literary prominence, Boiotia received visits from many early travellers including Chandler, Dodwell, Leake, and Wyse. Their accounts illuminate the major routes between settlements and the state of the physical communities before widespread repopulation from the mid-nineteenth century onward. The work of these itinerant travellers was followed by the commentary on Pausanias of James Frazer, whose

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105 Plutarch occasionally gives direct insight into his knowledge of the Boiotian landscape, e.g. Sulla 20 (Though see Frazer (1898), v.5, 193, for inaccuracies in Plutarch’s accounts). Note also the recent work on Pindar, particularly, Kowalzig (2007), 372-5. See introduction to Georgiadou (1997), 8-9, for Plutarch’s relationship to Thebes and 27-8 for his knowledge of Boiotian sites in his Pelopidas. The area around Plutarch’s home in the Kephissos Valley seems to go through a gentrification from at least the second century onward with larger settlements: see Meyer (2008), 77-8, for good summary of works considering the situation of Chaironeia in Plutarch's time.


107 See below, n.162.

108 Strabo has often been denigrated for his relatively poor understanding of Boiotia, and those that seek to use his work or place it at the centre of focus find themselves chastised: Delaunois (1981).

109 Roller (1988). As the area between Athens and Thebes, South East Boiotia garnered more attention than elsewhere.
abundant knowledge of the geography of the area and explicit scheme of following and commenting on Pausanias is almost as useful as the *periegete’s* work itself in evoking the past landscape. His work is complemented by that of Philippson, whose exhaustive treatment is still the most comprehensive and detailed account of the geography and topographic features of the area. The approach taken by Frazer implicitly informed John Fossey’s comprehensive account of the settlement and demography of ancient Boiotia, and Farinetti’s treatment of the archaeological data gathered by the intensive and extensive work undertaken in Boiotia uses Philippson widely, including an appendix which treats this work directly. It is impossible to improve upon the work done by Farinetti in digesting the archaeological material from Boiotia, including the large amount of data produced by the surface survey teams currently active in the area. Though still a long way off, the progression toward a global understanding of Boiotian landscape through use of extensive surface survey archaeology is to be welcomed, and Boiotia’s prominent position in this field should help assure its place in the van of historical research in the coming decades. The work is being joined by the increasing focus upon the mythical and literary landscapes of Boiotia and Thebes, which neatly links current work to the stories that prompted the interest of the first early modern travellers to Boiotia.

2.II.v. *Travelling Boiotia: Routes and ‘lieux de passages’*

There has been no extensive survey of ancient routes in Boiotia, and there are very few clear survivals of major roads in the area. The landscape suggests and permits certain methods and directions of travel, but the political orientation of a community and its principal social and economic links would have been the strongest determinants of the way in which movement would have been conducted. Major physical and natural features such as Lake Kopais would have limited these options for discourse and here the importance of accurate modelling of Kopais fluctuations goes beyond the amount of usable territory that would have been gained by communities around its edge.

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110 Frazer is an invaluable witness to the discovery of the Bronze-Age drainage works of the Kopais, which occurred during the modern drainage of the lake. This must have focussed his thoughts on the effects of drainage and the effect this human action could have: Frazer (1898), 5.110-120.
111 Philippson (1951).
113 For instance: Martin (2005); Berman (2002).
114 Boiotia has only a handful of surviving clear indicators of roads such as wheel ruts and therefore a study such as has been brilliantly undertaken for Arkadia would be difficult: Marchand (2009). The best recent summary of the known ancient routes and those that are suggested by physical factors is Farinetti (2011), 45, fig.5.
115 See above, n.55.
level of the water in the lake and marshes would have determined many of the major
routes in the region, both for military and non-military purposes. Entrance via the
Kephissos valley was the easiest northern land route through the Greek mainland, and
the standard route used to traverse Boiotia from the northwest (see Figure 2.6, which
illustrates the narrowness of the entrance and valley)\(^{116}\).

The lake not only determined where a group of people could travel, but as importantly,
when and how. The high level of the lake and the Kephissos River in winter would have
made travel into Boiotia more difficult via this route\(^{117}\). In summer, the lake dried out to
an extent, possibly allowing a greater breadth of terrain to be used for travelling, but the
marshy and malarial nature of the swampy summer Kopais might have provided its
own hazards\(^{118}\). The most notable areas affected or narrowed by the Kopais were the
route from Lebadeia to Haliartos/Onchestos as well as the route north from the Teneric
plain to Akraiaphia, Kopai and Hyetts. The Mykenaian dam at Akraiaphia was
maintained into the historical period in order to regulate this disruption and fluctuation
(see Figure 4.3)\(^{119}\). The route along the north shore of the Kopais between Orchomenos
and Kopai would have been less affected by the fluctuations because of its position
raised above the level of the lake in mountainous terrain, but for the same reason the
route was less easily used by large groups of people\(^{120}\). Figure 2.7 illustrates the
narrowness of the main highway from south-east to north-west Boiotia, with the line of
the modern highway close to the ancient road, whereas the route of the railway was only
facilitated by the modern drainage of the lake.

\(^{116}\) A lieu de passage: Ma (2008a), 72.

\(^{117}\) Pritchett (1985), 153 n.20, for a good collection of sources on the levels and fluctuations of Kopais and
the differences between winter and summer routes experienced by various travellers.

\(^{118}\) There is no clear evidence that Kopais and the many other marshy areas in Boiotia encouraged the
spread of diseases, but it has long been assumed that this was the case, and evidence from later periods
indicates malaria was a particular problem in Boiotia before the drainage of Lake Kopais: Jones (1909),
26, reflects that Orchomenos’ legendary wealth must have come in a period before the area became a

\(^{119}\) For the importance of the dam in guarding against Lake Kopais in the historical period and its
probable Mykenaian origin, see Farinetti (2011), 137. The possible use of the dam to facilitate routes is
paralleled by the Mykenaian dam at Thisbai, see below Chapter 3.II.iii, pp.79-81.

\(^{120}\) The defeat of a Spartan force at Tegyra in 375 is instructive as it demonstrates the difficulties of the
routes around the Kopais caused by fluctuations in water level (here at the river Melas) and also the links
between Orchomenos and the mountains that join Lokris with Boiotia: Plut. Pol. 16.2-4; Buckler and Beck
Fig. 2.6: Kephissos valley entrance (from Panopeus)
Fig. 2.7: South Kopais routes. (The route of the modern highway is marked in red, the railway in orange.)
Elsewhere, the routes used to traverse Boiotia were similarly affected by a combination of human and physical factors. The mountains of Boiotia are its most distinctive and distinguishing features, and they also had a role of great importance in conditioning the possibilities and perspectives of the inhabitants of the region. The extant literary sources are particularly informative with regard to the passes between south-eastern Boiotia and the areas to its south. The Kithairon-Parnes range which stretches from the Korinthian Gulf to the Euboian straits helped to structure the division between Boiotia, Attika, Euboia and the Megarid, but it also contained a number of upland plains that would play important roles in the development of the relationship between these areas. Instead therefore of simple routes that traversed the mountains from one side to the other, there were a series of routes on either side of the range that led to fertile areas such as the Skourta Plain, from which there were several further routes onward\textsuperscript{121}. The plurality of these access points helped to create a fluid political environment when the regions were in conflict, and emphasises the importance of the settlements south of the River Asopos and those such as Panakton and Eleutherai which held strategic positions near the passes or overlooking the plains. The significance of the upland plains between Attika and Boiotia for providing a liminal forum for interactivity has not been ignored\textsuperscript{122}, and Figure 2.8 neatly illustrates the possibilities of movement into a range of areas that control of the Skourta Plain could offer.

\textsuperscript{121} Hammond (1954).
\textsuperscript{122} Munn (1989); Tandy (1997), 120, for possibility of border markets between Attika and Boiotia.
Fig. 2.8: Skourta Plain viewed from the walls of Panakton (facing NE) with routes into Attika and Boiotia marked.
There is far less information available regarding the links between Boiotian communities in other mountainous areas such as in the area north of Kopais and the Helikon massif. It is clear from traditions that seem to date back to the Mykenaian period, that Orchomenos had a link with Larymna through the mountains, and this link must have been one that was most influenced by the situation of the drainage of Lake Kopais. Elsewhere, the strength of the links between Koroneia, Askra and Thisbai is little attested despite these three communities having mountain passes that join in a fertile upland plain\textsuperscript{123}. The Zagora Pass that linked Askra with Koroneia and Thisbai through the Helikon \textit{massif} (Figure 2.9) must have been an important route for local inhabitants, and was capacious enough that it was feared it could have been used by the Phokians in the Third Sacred War (see below, Figures 3.13 and 6.3). The mountains that divided Boiotia from Phokis and in the north from Lokris seem to have been more effective at stymieing contact away from the main routes in and out of the regions, but without further information, it is difficult to grasp how frequented these minor routes were. Even when there is an event of great historical significance that holds as much narrative attention as the battle of Leuktra, the focus given to movements of groups can prove difficult to disentangle; the route of the Spartans from Phokis into Boiotia is a matter of some contention\textsuperscript{124}. What can be discerned from the early modern travellers is that if travelling in small groups or as an individual the options for traversing the area, to avoid difficult terrain or conditions, were much greater than when travelling in large numbers\textsuperscript{125}.

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\textsuperscript{123} Note also the possible road over the Thisbai dam: below, Chapter 3.II.iii, pp.79-81 with Figure 3.4.

\textsuperscript{124} Buck (1994), 113, for summary of movements before battle of Leuktra and modern debate over the routes of this.

\textsuperscript{125} Use of Zagora pass to west of Valley of the Muses: Pritchett (1985), 138-165, ‘Routes over Helikon’. Cf. below, n.570 for threat posed by possible Phokian use of the pass in the Third Sacred War.
2.II.vi Caves and katavothras in the cultural landscape
The geologic foundation of the Boiotian landscape provided the physical basis for the major divisions created in the historical period. The division of the Kopaic from the Teneric Plain, of Attika from Boiotia largely pinned to the Kithairon/Parnes range, and of Boiotia from Phokis and Lokris were also conditioned by mountainous geology. But geology also conditioned the introversion of places in the Boiotian landscape. The many oracles that existed in Boiotia tended toward a chthonic character, and some, such as Trophonios at Lebadeia and Apollo Ptoios at Akraiphia, developed and artificially expanded their access to underground space to allow for consultation (the ‘grotto’ at Akraiphia is depicted in Figure 2.10)\(^\text{126}\). It seems likely that this chthonic tradition was established early and the most securely attested colonial foundation involving Boiotians, at Herakleia Pontika, seems to demonstrate the Boiotian affinity with caves, with a large cavern found being quickly connected with Herakles’ descent into the underworld, and this site would later have an oracle of its own\(^\text{127}\). Thebes itself might have had up to five oracles, which have been seen as possibly marking an earlier and a later stage of development from local/chthonic to Olympian in character\(^\text{128}\). If correct, this

\(^{126}\)For the artificial grotto at Ptoön see Ustinova (2009), 113.
\(^{127}\)Ustinova (2009), 71, n.124, and n.126, for sources relating to this, though ignoring the Boiotian element in the colony.
\(^{128}\)Symeonoglou (1985), 210. However, many of them, such as the Theban oracle of Amphiarao might either have been misunderstood (Schachter (1981), 22), or existed at a later period. More work needs to be done on this issue, but given this doubt, only the securely attested and dated Theban oracle of Apollo Ismenios is included in the table of oracles below.
emphasises that the proclivity toward oracles in the region was a dynamic process and in many respects an organic reaction to the land.

Fig. 2.10: Grotto beneath temple of Apollo Ptoios at Akraiphia

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Deity</th>
<th>Place</th>
<th>Situation</th>
<th>Primary</th>
<th>Secondary</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Apollo (Ismenios)</td>
<td>Thebes</td>
<td>Oracle divined by bunt offerings</td>
<td>Hdt. 8.134, Paus 9.11.7</td>
<td>Schachter (1981), 81-82.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Apollo</td>
<td>Tegyra</td>
<td>Spring/Mountain</td>
<td>Plut. Mor. 412B-D 414A</td>
<td>Schachter (1981), 75.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nymphs</td>
<td>Kithairon</td>
<td>Cave/grotto</td>
<td>Plut. Arist. 11, Paus. 9.3.5.</td>
<td>Schachter (1986), 86.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Praxidikai/Teiresias</td>
<td>Haliartia</td>
<td>Spring/Mountain</td>
<td>Paus. 9.33.1 HH Apollo: 244-277</td>
<td>Schachter (1994b), 38-39, 60-62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trophonios</td>
<td>Lebadeia</td>
<td>Cave/chamber</td>
<td>Hdt. 1.46-50; Paus. 9.39.4</td>
<td>Schachter (1994b), 79-84.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 3: Oracles of Boiotia

Having caves in a landscape does not of itself produce oracles, but their profusion and easy access allowed the inhabitants (with their inherited cultural predilections) to colonise and adapt the subterranean spaces for use as mantic centres. Similarly, the geological influence on the hydrology of the region, and the memory (and physical

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129 Philippson (1939), 11-30.
remains) of the water management system that had existed in the Bronze Age, encouraged the belief that power and control of geology were linked. The motif of Herakles and his blocking of the katavothras that helped to drain Lake Kopais in order to disinherit the Orchomenians from their best horse-rearing land is a myth born from the competition between communities, but also an understanding of the effect that the caves could have on a landscape. The Great Katavothra, the principal natural shaft utilised for the Mykeneian drainage of Lake Kopais is depicted in Figure 2.11.

Fig. 2.11: Great katavothra in north-east Kopais (modern Agios Ioannis)

2.II.vii. Inter-visibility and inter-audibility
Consideration of routes between communities and settlements naturally leads to the consideration of location of communities in the general physical topography of the region. In a period before industrial noise and light pollution, the effect of being able to see and hear one another, whether friend or enemy, should not be overlooked. The importance of inter-visibility or its absence is clearly evidenced by events such as the capture of Plataia in 373BC, and the fortification schemes of both Attika and Boiotia in the fourth century show a clear and sophisticated awareness of lines of sight and sound and the ability to relay messages across distances quickly. The appreciation of these facets of landscape and community is also clearly demonstrated in the fourth century work of Aeneas Tacticus, who lingers on aspects of city planning and defence such as how to condition an enemy’s response by making your city appear stronger than it is

130 Polyaeus 1.3.5; Diod. Sic. 4.18.7. (Frazer (1898) v.5, 194-195, noting principal Bronze-Age katavothras blocked by fallen rocks.
131 Pausanias, 9.1.6 with below, n.318, and Chapter 3.III.ii, pp.102-103; Farinetti has usefully married the known fortifications of Boiotia with viewshed analysis to give at least a partial reconstruction of the overall scheme: Farinetti (2011), 256, fig.31; Ober (1985), for Attika.
through visual tricks. Whilst inter-visibility and audibility has been assessed in the context of deliberate systems of fortification and territorial vantage, the basic relationship between the communities before this elaborate (and largely fourth century) visual system should be considered in any analysis of interaction of community development and the environment.

A good example of the importance of understanding visibility is the situation of Thebes. Though the site was a prominent Mykenaian citadel, it does not occupy the pronounced elevation from its surrounding landscape that the sites of Athens, Argos, Mykenai or even Orchomenos enjoy. Unless approaching from the northern part of the Teneric plain itself, the Kadmeia is largely invisible (Figures 2.12 and 2.13 illustrate this position). This is particularly important as none of Thebes’ nearest large neighbours could see the city and therefore its movement of men. This is repeatedly shown to be of great importance, particularly in the often hostile centres of Plataia and Thespiai.

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132 Ain. Tact. 40.4-7. Aineias’ identity is still a mystery, but it is likely he would have had interaction with the Boiotian invasions of the Peloponnese in the 360s. Whitehead (1990), 8-13.

133 Another excellent example is the deliberate manipulation of military response by use of visibility is the invasion of Agesilaos in 377: Agesilaos calls for a market in Thespiai to greet him as he arrives in 377BC. Leaking this knowledge to the Thebans, he then can see their military preparations as he descends over Kithairon near Plataia, before using this knowledge to attack Thebes where it is not expecting (Xen. Hell. 5.4.48-49, cf. Munn (1987), 122). Cf. Plu. Pel. 15.1-2.
Inter-visibility is one facet of Boiotian interactivity where an objective basis for the ancient situation can be easily reconstructed through techniques such as viewshed analysis, but its experiential effects are more difficult to appreciate. If the general principal that visibility can affect the behaviour of a community is accepted, this should be appreciated in the both broad sweep of community interactivity as well as in individual circumstances and events. The influence of being able to see one another, a common experience in the juxtaposed communities of Boiotia, will become apparent throughout the following chapters. The effect of being able to see Thebes from the sanctuary of Ptoios, or Kopai from Orchomenos, or Haliartos from Askra manifested itself in subtle ways throughout Boiotian history, but it is crucial to understanding the experience of community and landscape. As important is the invisibility of communities that are close together such as Thespiai and Thebes or Thisbai and Koroneia (Figure 2.14 is taken from the mountain route that joins Koroneia to Thisbai). Visibility and inter-visibility provides a good example of the way in which physical and human geography interact and overlap, and the mechanisms devised for overcoming or benefiting from being seen or unseen will form a strand running throughout the discussion of the nature and outcome of the inter-state dynamic in the region.
Ephoros reflected on Boiotia as ‘naturally suited to hegemony’ particularly because of its situation on ‘three seas’. The failure to capitalise on these natural advantages was considered a result of internal division, as well as general stupidity and reliance on unique individuals such as Epameinondas. Recent work has concurred with Ephoros regarding the potential of the area and that Boiotia did indeed have good harbours on the Korinthian Gulf, and the eastern and northern parts of the region, together with a well-established relationship with harbours further north such as Skroponeri (Figure 2.15) and Larymna, the latter not usually considered part of ethnic Boiotia.

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134 Wallace (1979), 9-13, weighs this ancient summary in favour of the geo-political divisions within the region.
135 Farinetti (2011), 49. The issue of Larymna is difficult as it only emerges in the documentary record from time to time. It might, like Aigosthena, have been under Boiotian control only at certain periods of its history: Cooper (2000). The incident reported in Polybius (20.5.7-11) where a Boiotian patrol picks up a Hellenistic monarch’s ship in Larymna is significant, see below, n.307. With fortifications protecting it from incursions from the Tanagraia, Salganeos (and with it Anthedon) could be made into a stronghold of its own, as in 313BC when Polemaios (nephew of Antigonus) constructed the Aniforitis Wall to block the pass to the Mykalessos. See Diod. Sic. 19.77.4 with Bakhuizen (1970), 66-8 and discussion at 105-111. See also Hanson (1998), 84. For situation of the wall and the plain it protected, see Figure 3.11.
The marine links of Boiotian communities were determined by the wider patterns of the seas into which the region connected. Most famous perhaps is the Euripos, the fluctuations of which have been the focus of authors since antiquity, and the short span of which makes Euboia almost ‘part of Boiotia’. Despite a strong and variable current, the crossing from Aulis to Chalkis was not generally troublesome, and links between Boiotia and Euboia were often close. This complicates the picture a little when attempting to analyse Boiotian links, as the probability of Boiotian goods making the short crossing of the channel (and from the late fifth century via the bridge) make the use of Euboian ports and trade routes probable. However, Aulis is the best natural harbour in the northern part of the Euboian strait (See below, Figures 4.11-12), and was a focus of naval gatherings from an early period.

136 Morton (2001), 45, n.107, for a collection of ancient sources demonstrating an ancient familiarity with the fluctuations of the Euripos.
137 Strabo 9.2.2. ‘προστιθεὶ τε ὅτι καὶ τὴν ἑβοιον τρόπον τινά μέρος αὐτῆς πεποίηκεν ὁ Εὐρίπος οὕτω στενός ῥήν καὶ γεφύρως συνεξευγεμένος πρὸς αὐτὴν διπλέθρῳ.’ Euboia is geologically part of Boiotia and was considered by Ion of Chios (quoted in Strabo 1.3.19), to have been physically linked at some point to the mainland.
138 Even the ‘sea hating’ Hesiod had no qualms about crossing from Aulis to Euboia, Constantakopoulou (2007), 224. Though Hesiod had a good knowledge of winds, there is a definite sense of fear in his consideration of sailing, Works and Days 663-677 with Morton (2001), 256, 270. Apollo crosses here in the HII Apollo 222-224. Cf. n.572, on sailing as possible metaphor in Hesiod.
139 Diod. Sic. 13.47.4 (411BC). See Chapter 3.I.iii, pp.95-98, for the geo-political implications of the construction of the bridge.
140 The high mountains of northern Euboia protected the straits from the Etesian winds. This made the whole route suitable for launching expeditions to the north Aegean and Aulis as a good harbour for assembling these expeditions: Morton (2001), 103 n.55. The gathering for the Trojan expedition is the most famous of these events. Significantly, the description of winds in Homer and especially Aeschylus are
Though the Euripos changed its direction of flow many times a day, the easiest direction of travel in the Aegean more widely is anti-clockwise\textsuperscript{141}, so a Boiotian wishing to travel to the Black Sea would more easily go south using the Aegean island chain rather than north via Makedon and Thasos\textsuperscript{142}. This has significance when attempting to understand Boiotia’s connection with the main streams of colonisation, as they would have been sidelined from the great movement of the states of south-west Anatolia such as Miletos, and on the periphery of movements from prominent mainland colonisers such as Korinth and Megara. However, it does suggest that when Boiotians were involved in a foundation such as Herakleia Pontika, (undertaken in conjunction with Megara), it would necessarily have been a proactive initiative\textsuperscript{143}.

For the south-western harbours of Boiotia, Kreusis (below, Figure 3.9), Siphai (Figure 2.17), Domvreina Bay, and Chorsiai (Figure 2.16) the Korinthian Gulf offered a range accurate, and are demonstrations of genuine knowledge rather than generalised narrative. See Aesch. Agamemnon 191ff., 1416ff., with Morton (2001), 129.

\textsuperscript{141} Heikell (2007), 318-321, for modern consideration of the Euripos fluctuations and the difficulties for sailing (passing through the Euripos under sail is no longer permitted, p.320). The general trend toward anti-clockwise current movement in the Aegean and Mediterranean is because of topography and evaporation: Morton (2001), 38-9.

\textsuperscript{142} The route taken from Aulis is not clearly stated, but it is likely that the fleet would have crossed the Aegean via the island chain to the south of Euboia before heading north up the coast of Asia Minor. This is the route that Agesilaos took from Aulis in 396BC: Xen. Hell. 3.4.4. For the carefulness of the Trojan expedition in choosing its sailing routes see Morton (2001), 175 (citing Nestor’s staged journey back from Troy). The accurate representations of seafaring in Homeric epic reinforce the idea of Aulis being an important and capacious harbour from an early period.

\textsuperscript{143} See below, n.205 for sources for foundation of Herakleia mentioning Boiotians.
of possible links and relationships\textsuperscript{144}. The many instances of interaction with Sikyon serve to illustrate the possibility of strong cross-gulf links and also that relationships across oceanic routes have a different structure compared with land-based divisions\textsuperscript{145}. Despite no literary tradition connecting Boiotians to Magna Graecia, there is some evidence for links to the colonies in southern Italy\textsuperscript{146}. This would indicate that Boiotians had an informal connection to the routes of this colonisation, explicable because of these gulf routes that might have been continued from trade routes of high antiquity\textsuperscript{147}. Hesiod’s knowledge and consideration of winds and correct sailing times also denote an interest in and understanding of the perils and possibilities of the sea from an inhabitant of Boiotia whose easiest access to the sea would have been provided by the harbours of Siphai or Kreusis\textsuperscript{148}.

![Fig. 2.17: Siphai Harbour from passes south of Thisbai](image)

The relationship of the Boiotians with the seas around them seems uneven and determined by broad historical developments. The dangers of seaborne attack were often apparent in the period under review, even at urban centres relatively removed from the coast such as Mykalessos\textsuperscript{149}. There were many Boiotian community centres

\textsuperscript{144} The narrowest direct crossing of the gulf (from Chorsiai) to Sikyon is just over seventeen miles. See Bonnier (2010), 114-116, for importance of relationship between Gulf harbours and Boiotian hinterland.

\textsuperscript{145} There is perhaps a parallel with the case of Miletos here, whose links to the interior would have been significantly more difficult to traverse than the sea routes to Chios or the Hellespont: Brinkmann (1971). The parallel would be a resident of Thisbai finding the journey to Sikyon quicker than that to Athens. The link across the Korinthian Gulf was of early importance: see Chapter 4.VIII.i, n.627.

\textsuperscript{146} Roller (1994).

\textsuperscript{147} Heurtley (1923).

\textsuperscript{148} See Chapter 4.VI.i. Rosen (1990), suggests that this imagery might have been related to Hesiod’s relationship to Homeric poetry or a pattern common in poetry from his ancestral home in Asia Minor.

\textsuperscript{149} See summary of threats against Boiotia from sea: below, Table 4.
near the sea, but the highest concentration of population was always inland\textsuperscript{150}. This might have been encouraged by the power (and threat) of maritime neighbours such as Korinth and Athens, and the synoikism at Thebes in the early years of the Peloponnesian War actually withdrew many of those living by or near the sea further inland\textsuperscript{151}. This mindset is also perhaps recognizable in the movement of the centre of Oropos away from the sea when that community came under Theban control at the very end of the fifth century\textsuperscript{152}. It was only with the deliberate activities of the fourth century under the direction of Epameinondas and others that the Boiotians constructed the infrastructure necessary to provide security to its coastal towns without the need for evacuation\textsuperscript{153}. Following the conclusion of major Boiotian operations in the Aegean in the late 360s, the region returned largely to its land-based outlook, though the continuing potential for the use of the sea by Boiotian communities is proven by an attempt by the nephew of Antigonus Monophthalmos to use the natural situation of a harbour such as Anthedon (Figure 2.18) to effectively build a small-scale power base through cutting themselves off from the interior\textsuperscript{154}.

\begin{figure}[h]
\centering
\includegraphics[width=\textwidth]{Anthedonia_map}
\caption{View of Anthedonia from the north-west.}
\end{figure}

\textsuperscript{150} There was never, for instance, the pressure to move any community toward the sea, nor was there any large community near enough to the sea to envisage any ‘long-wall’ building, as occurred at Megara, Korinth and Athens (for Athens, see Conwell (2008)).
\textsuperscript{151} Hell. Oxy. 12.3. Depicted below, Figure 3.17.
\textsuperscript{152} Diod. Sic. 14.17.2-3.
\textsuperscript{153} Vulnerable coastal communities such as Aulis were evacuated to Thebes in the Peloponnesian War: see below, Chapter 3.III.iv. For the post-Leuktra fortification scheme, see below, Chapter 3.III.v.
\textsuperscript{154} As in the example of Polemaios, see n.135. Salganeos and Anthedon enjoyed easy links via the sea and a coastal road to Chalkis, and it is likely that much of their interaction was with Euboea rather than exclusively with the interior of Boiotia because of the relative ease of communications: Fossey (1988), 251.
2.III. Boiotian economies

2.III.i. Background
The standard view of Boiotia is of a fertile and productive area of Greece that could plentifully supply both its population and a large contingent of livestock and horses with food. Because of this it had little need to take part in colonisation, which, with the exception of Herakleia Pontika, it eschewed in its entirety. The landed aristocracy that was established in the wake of the early Iron Age migrations was wealthy, settled and produced stable oligarchies. Even if the Boiotians had desired to export goods, they were culturally retarded, producing inferior pottery, and compared to their urbane neighbours to the south in Attika, intellectually moribund. The desire to avoid economic interaction unless absolutely necessary is present in the cautious mercantilism of Hesiod, and also the early aristocratic prohibition of trade and manual work in Thebes and Thespiae reported by Aristotle and in other sources155.

Though this view is still prevalent among many scholars, very little of this traditional picture of the broad development of the Boiotian economy stands up to much scrutiny. The influence of Finleyism still pervades the orthodoxy of economic analysis in mainland Greece and even those critical of this categorise Boiotia as a self-sufficient region that had little need or desire to involve itself in wide-scale trade156. This may be true when compared to the examples of Athens, Mytilene or Chios, but the evidence suggests that Boiotian produce was renowned outside of the region, and this formulation also partially ignores the likely vibrant internal market157.

For instance, the numismatic evidence from Boiotia, long thought to be a political symbol, is now considered to demonstrate economic processes and interaction158. The colonial activity, though not comparable to the great colonisers, seems to have been undertaken on a private basis and is therefore difficult to quantify159. The fame of Boiotian material goods outside of the region is clear in Athenian literature. The movement and export of Boiotian creative goods (poetry, music, philosophy) is well

156 Vlassopoulos (2007), 161, classes the communities of Boiotia in his ‘first type’; largely self-sufficient non-economically interactive communities. Though this is obviously reductive it perhaps typifies the myopia he is attempting to counter.
158 See below, Chapter 4.V.i, and forthcoming treatment of funding of Boiotian fleet in 360s BC: Gartland (2013).
159 See below, Chapter 2.III.iv.
attested. Criticisms of the stable oligarchies having no need for trade (and those passages citing prohibitions on trade and manual work) can be questioned for their representiveness for Boiotia in the historical period\textsuperscript{160}. For instance, the large and varied sanctuaries in the region, which were famous throughout Greece and hosted visitors from many places outside Boiotia, would have had significant economic impact on the inhabitants of the area around them\textsuperscript{161}. This rapid and cursory response is designed to counter the tone rather than the specifics of the argument, but a fuller overview of Boiotian economic interactivity, without any preconceptions guiding the discussion, is overdue.

2.III.ii. Boiotian trade and products
The difficulties of calculating productivity of the land are well known, and we have little specific information about the way in which the land of Boiotia was used\textsuperscript{162}. This is particularly salient given that horses were bred plentifully, pigs were an animal closely associated with the region and oxen would have necessarily been a large part of the agricultural system\textsuperscript{163}. Hesiod gives early information regarding the way in which farming was undertaken in his Askran situation, but his purpose is not primarily to impart detailed information regarding types of crop and animals\textsuperscript{164}. We are given some more specific information in Theophrastos concerning the grain in the region that gives a sense of the fertility of the land, and the uses made of this.

\textsuperscript{160} Epstein (2010). The Athenians, though inhabiting a great trading city, can be seen in similar ways. See also Manieri (2009), 33-58, for useful summary of Boiotian musical festivals.

\textsuperscript{161} In the Hellenistic period, the oracular shrines were being deliberately developed in order to get as much money from the visitors as possible. This is clear from Pausanias’ experience at Lebadeia (9.39.3-14) with Gordon (2006). Probably also discuss here the economic significance of shrines and cults. Especially in light of Bonnechere’s contention that the oracle at Trophonios in Pausanias’ time had significant continuity with earlier periods of its existence: Bonnechere (2003). The understanding of both internal and external movements can be seen in the establishment of the festival of the Basilica at Lebadeia. Schachter (1994b), 112. Work on specificity of financial regulation at the Amphiaraios: Petropoulou (1981). Success of Akrainia in attracting dedications is suggested by large number of kouroi dedicated from many states: Ducat (1971), 451.

\textsuperscript{162} Isager and Skydsgaard (1992), 26, in reference to Theophrastos’ focus on plants rather than on agriculture. Note traditions of land division at Thebes under the direction of the Bacchic lawgiver Philolaos: Arist. Pol. 1274 a30-b6.

\textsuperscript{163} The name of the region, as that of Euboia, is probably related to oxen. The myth of the region being named after an eponymous founder has long since dispelled: see Chapter 4.II.ii, n.444. For pigs and the tradition of ‘Boiotian Swine’, see Cartledge (2000). The large amount of manure used by Thespiai in the fourth century BC must have been produced by local livestock: Snodgrass (1990), 125.

\textsuperscript{164} Hesiod does not, for instance, differentiate between barley and wheat, and he only obliquely mentions the use of certain draught animals: see Edwards (2004), 141-150, and other sources including Tandy (1997), 208-214. Hesiod Theog. 23 implies that sheep were kept in the Valley of the Muses at least at this early period. The upland areas of Boiotia would have been well suited to this pastoralism cf. Soph. O.T. 1133-39; and traditions of common grazing on Panakton: Thuc. 5.42.1.
Theophrastos Hist. Plant. 8.4.5 (on types of wheat)

The passage gives a general impression that it is not just extent but quality of agricultural land that Boiotia benefits from. The generality of the broad term of ‘Boiotian’ wheat hides what must have been significant local differences in productivity and varities of wheat adapted to local microclimates. However, the use of such a general term by a specialist fourth-century observer also confirms the views of those such as Thucydides and Strabo that made similar broad observations about the Boiotian landscape as one of abundance and fertility, especially vis-à-vis Attika.

Alongside Theophrastos, many have attempted to reconstruct some aspects of Boiotian rural life through other references to the animals and plants of the region. One of the most popular has been the passage in Aristophanes Acharnians in which an overtly stereotyped Boiotian travels to Athens in order to try and sell some of the delicacies that have been in short supply in Athens.

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165 Given Theophrastos’ general focus on the Kopaic area, it could be inferred he is here speaking of the best of the wheat of the region. See Wallace (1979), 8-9, for a useful digest of the relative agricultural production of Attika and Boiotia for 1966. The information broadly corresponds to the ancient situation with Boiotia being more wheat focussed, and Attika producing more olives and grapes. Hansen (2006), 90, also has useful notes on productivity figures.

166 Specifically, it is likely that the heaviest of wheat was produced in Boiotia on the lacustrine soils of the Kopaic Plain, sown as the lake receded in spring: Michell (1940), 55.

167 See above, Chapter 2.II.iv, pp.32-34.

168 Though nominally ‘Boiotian’, the character is clearly differentiated as a Theban by his oaths to Herakles and Iolaos (see n.562, below). Larson (2007), 150-161 outlines the interchangability of ‘Boiotia’ and ‘Thebes’ for those outside the region.
The animals mentioned have been identified with modern species by Jose Pascual Gonzalez, some of which can still be found in Central Greece. It is significant for Athenian views of Thebes and Boiotia that the products offered by the Boiotian are 'wild' products, a product of Boiotian (largely Kopaic) wilderness, rather than of Boiotian craft. This passage can therefore be read as a reflection of Athenian jealousy of the access to wild spaces that has been denied them through the territorial restrictions of the Peloponnesian War. Alongside this literary perspective, exciting progress is also being made in regard to dietary information retrieved from osteological remains, focussing on Theban cemeteries used in the fifth and fourth centuries, and using Aristophanes for corroboratory evidence.

Though the Boiotian’s products are markers of wilderness, auloi and auletai are heavily associated with Thebes, especially in the later fourth century when the polis became synonymous with virtuosity and innovation on the instrument. It has been questioned whether the reeds available from the extensive marshlands of Lake Kopais played a role in this, but given the sophistication of the knowledge of the cycles and growing patterns of the reed, it is likely it was an important factor. It certainly cannot have hurt the

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169 Gonzalez (2010).
170 Though both ψιθως (rush-mats) and θρυαλλίδας (lamp wicks) are 'processed', they are both principally products of Lake Kopais (Plantago crassifolia can be used for lamp wicks and thrives in brackish water in modern Greece) rather than of Boiotian craftsmen.
171 Vika, Aravantinos, and Richards (2009). The remains from Thebes suggest the inhabitants of the fifth century were eating a lot of fish from Lake Kopais. There have also been interesting developments from epigraphic discoveries of the post-Alexander period in lists of fish found in Akraiaphia: Lytle (2010).
173 Any questions concerning the link between the production of reeds at Kopais and this Theban specialism are answered by the work of Wilson (2007) and especially now Wilson (2010). He suggests in the latter that the social cohesion of the federation was underpinned by the production of reeds, given the musical centrality of the pan-Boiotian cults and festivals. I would agree that the detail in Theophrastos (Hist. Plant. 4.11.2), does seem to imply a close interest in the fluctuations of the Kopais and its effect on the reed, but given the quality of the reeds produced in the region, the economic importance of this
professionalization of aulos-playing in Thebes to have had a ready supply of excellent material nearby for the complicated process of making good reed mouthpieces\textsuperscript{174}. Significantly, the famous aulos player and innovator, Pronomos, received a statue on the Kadmeia at Thebes\textsuperscript{175}. His career, illustrious and honoured at home, but choosing to ply his trade in Athens where he died and was buried, is telling. Pronomos’ most famous pupil, Alkibiades, is said to have rejected the aulos as something to be left to the Thebans\textsuperscript{176}. It seems clear that Pronomos was part of a much wider school of auletkai and other musicians from Thebes and Boiotia who plied their trade away from their home region\textsuperscript{177}. With the knowledge of prominent artists in other areas, (such as Pindar) travelling widely and working for commissions probably even more widely dispersed geographically, the stereotype of a Theban being accompanied by aulos players could stand in lieu of a much wider economy of Theban musical export and performance\textsuperscript{178}.

Despite archaeological finds producing large quantities of pottery from the various sanctuaries in Boiotia, the region has never had a high reputation in regard to the quality of its ceramic output. There does not (as in Athens or Korinth) seem to have been the development of a large industry of production, explicable perhaps because of the major settlements being situated inland, and the influence of their near neighbours and their dominance of the export of pottery. Internally however, production seems to have flourished, most famously in the production of figurines. The ‘Tanagras’, as they became known in the late nineteenth century, seem to have been produced widely in Boiotia and neighbouring areas, and mark a distinctive style and character of Boiotian culture\textsuperscript{179}. With the vast collection of kouroi at Ptoön and the Kabeirion-ware of that

174 Demand (1982), 87, n.4, collects the main sources for Boiotian reeds. Theophrastos Hist. Plant. 4.10.1ff. implicitly acknowledges the uniqueness of the habitat of Lake Kopais and explicitly (4.11.8) that the best reeds for making auloi are found around its marshy edges, Pindar confirms the Melas as the source of the best reeds: Pindar, Paeans fr. 70 (Maehler).

175 Significantly, the only other statue of a fourth-century Theban to grace the Kadmeia was that of Epameinondas, himself an accomplished aulos player: Athenaeus The Deipnosophists 184e.

176 Plat. Alk.2.5. It is interesting that Alkibiades accepted a Theban as a teacher given that his father had been killed in an ambush near Koroneia, probably led by Theban rebels in 446BC, Plat. Alk.1.1.

177 Wilson (2007) 146 n.25. There is also the case of a Boiotian aulos player in Ephesus: Rogers (1994). Plato also chooses to a Theban as his example of an aulos teacher in Protagoras (318C). There might also be significance in the fact that Herakleia on the Black Sea, a colony with well attested Boiotian influence, had itself a strong tradition with the aulos: West (1994), 37 n.117.

178 Wilson (2010). Significantly, Wilson builds on a point made previously by Roesch (1982), 444-447, regarding the epigraphic register of Theban ἀοληθια in Athens: When they are commemorated in Athens, Theban musicians are termed Thebaioi, elsewhere they are termed Boiotoi. This might suggest a particular economic benefit to this differentiation between Boiotoi and Thebaioi.

179 The finds of the figurines have been widespread in Boiotia, notably at sites such as the Thespian Polyandron (424BC). For the sources and provenance of the figurines see Higgins (1986), 64-5. Note also major new work on the figurines: Jeammet (2010)
sanctuary outside Thebes, the Boiotians have good early examples of large-scale production of artefacts for local use and consumption, again driven by religion\textsuperscript{180}. The economic effect of this production is difficult to assess, but of greater importance is that the materials were locally available (the attractive mica-flecked clay of the Tanagran/Theban area is a particularly good material to work with\textsuperscript{181}) and that there were distinctive schools of production within the region. New work on the figurines and other products of Boiotian artisans could yet shed new light on the significance of the pottery for the region. It is enough to say here that this conforms with other information about Boiotia being not ‘backward’ or necessarily so agriculturally focussed that they do not get involved with trade and industry, but instead that the market might have been internal between communities within Boiotia, which provided a large and receptive market for a distinctive Boiotian style\textsuperscript{182}.

Whilst there is positive information regarding the materials used for some of Boiotia’s artistic output, the sources of metals used in Boiotia are not entirely clear. There are iron deposits in the mountains north of the Kopais basin, but in most of the rest of the region there are few deposits of metals of any kind\textsuperscript{183}. This brings into particular focus the use of precious and non-precious metals in Boiotia and the significance for outward interaction. The picture of Boiotia standing aloof from the main trends of colonisation could be partially correct, but their involvement in some foundations seems very likely, and this might have provided the mercantile links necessary for the production of large volumes of silver coinage, bronze tripods and various weaponry for which the region was known\textsuperscript{184}. There has been no analysis done on the provenance of the silver used for

\textsuperscript{180} See above, n.161, on dedications of kouroi at the sanctuary of Apollo Ptoios.
\textsuperscript{181} Higgins (1986), 65-70. The clays were variable in colour but of a good quality. Their composition seems to have varied over the four centuries when the figurines were produced, suggesting that different sources of clay were used, presumably either through exhaustion of supply from one source or through technical preference. Either of these explanations confirms the picture of a developed and highly productive industry.
\textsuperscript{182} The collection of essays in Jeammet (2010) now provides a good general overview of the figurines. See also Ure (1934). The terracottas provide a unique insight into the everyday of Boiotian life, from haircutting to cheese-grating. As a parallel to the latter see the Plataians meeting at the cheese market whilst in exile in Attika: Lysias 23.5-6.
\textsuperscript{183} Étienne and Knoepfler (1976), 201-2.
\textsuperscript{184} Larson (2007), 103-6 summarises weaponry sources. Papalexandrou (2008), provides useful information on the tradition of the manufacture and use of tripods in Boiotia. Tripods do appear prominently elsewhere in Boiotian cult, notably the many dedications at Ptoön and also in the tradition of Herakles competing for the tripod with Apollo at Delphi: Kowalzig (2007), 141 with n.29. Theban stater from mid-fifth century with Herakles stealing the delphic tripod: Head (1884), 71, no. 36. Kowalzig (2007), gives the best outline of the annual Tripodophoria, which involved the dedication of a tripod from Boiotia at Dodona. See especially pp.331-6 and pp.350-2.
coins, but the early and close historical links with Aigina would probably have allowed early access to a wide range of materials and coin-making techniques\textsuperscript{185}.

\subsection*{2.III.iii. Horses and Chariots}

The large plains and fertile agricultural land of Boiotia made it a good place for the breeding of horses. The early literary sources concerning Boiotian myth contain many references to horses that provide a general view of an area used to a large equestrian presence. The mythical conflict between Orchomenos and Thebes has episodes involving horse rustling, cavalry engagements and chariot breaking, and many of these traditions were bound into sanctuaries and cult that promulgated the influence of this discourse\textsuperscript{186}. The account of the site of Tilphousa (west of Haliartos) being unsuitable for a shrine because of the constant noise and interruption of horses is an excellent example of the tradition of an early Boiotia heavily populated by horses:

\begin{quote}
πημανεῖε σ’ αἰεὶ κτύπος ἵππων ὕκειάων
ἀρδόμενοι τ’ οὐρῆς ἔμῶν ἵππων ἀπὸ πηγέων:
ἐνθα τις ἄνθρωπον βουλήσεται εἰσοράσθαι
ἀρματά τ’ εὐποίητα καὶ ὕκυπόδων κτύπον ἵππων
ἡ νηόν τε μέγαν καὶ κτήματα πόλλ’ ἐνεόντα.’
\textit{HH to Apollo} 262-6
\end{quote}

Though caution is to be urged when attempting to equate any of this evidence to historical ‘cavalry’, the possession of horses was early a feature of Boiotian life. There is archaeological evidence of Bronze Age use of horses in the region, and it is likely that the Boiotian migrants continued the practice of keeping horses, especially because of their Thessalian heritage and that region’s strong traditions of horsemanship\textsuperscript{187}. Other evidence such as pottery and numismatics also confirms at least the belief in a strong relationship with horses; emerging into the historical period the coins of Tanagra quickly assume an equestrian reverse that is retained for a long time\textsuperscript{188}.

\begin{flushright}
\textsuperscript{185} Link with Aigina discussed below, n.626. See also n.549.
\textsuperscript{186} See Paus. 9.26.1 (with Schachter (1986), 12-13) for the cult of Herakles Hippodetes (‘horse-binder’) in the Teneric Plain toward Onchestos. For Orchomenian horse rustling, see Buck (1979), 59-60, particularly focussing on the figure of Erginus of Orchomenos. See also discussion below in Chapter 3.IV.ii, pp.130-131.
\textsuperscript{187} Various sources attest strong private traditions of horse rearing: Krasilnikoff (2002), n.53.
\textsuperscript{188} Schachter (1958).
\end{flushright}
Perhaps most informative, though still in a general sense, is the prominence and general priority of Boiotian cavalry in the literary sources. Given Thessalian relationships with the Peisistratids, and a possible sixth century position whereby their northern neighbours at least exerted some political influence over parts of the region, the necessity of maintaining a formal cavalry force might early have presented itself. Certainly by the battle of Plataia, the Thebans appear as an organised and experienced cavalry force and, officially at least, every Boiotian division of the federal arrangement of 446 onward was expected to provide a hundred horsemen for the federal army. Whether or not they were the most effective or well trained of forces, the basic number of cavalry that the region was expected to produce is testament to both the basic fertility of the land, and the decisions made by the communities that lived in the landscape concerning its use. That the numbers concerned in the Oxyrhynchus Historian’s breakdown of league forces are broadly correct is supported by the reported numbers of cavalry on campaign in Boiotian actions in the fifth and fourth centuries. The statutory nature of the cavalry force of the region is striking as compared to the often ad hoc equestrian contingents of Boiotia’s southern mainland neighbours. In this respect, the landscape and traditions of Boiotia sit more comfortably when viewed in parallel with its neighbours to the north, particularly Makedon and Thessaly.

There are suggestions also that horses and light cavalry were part of everyday Boiotian life, rather than necessarily having to be formally called up en masse for campaigns. When Mykalessos was ransacked by an Athenian-led Thrakian force in 414, despite the attack being made at dawn, Theban equestrian reinforcements were on hand quickly enough to intercept and kill the Thrakians, who had presumably staged the attack so as to avoid military engagement. A rough parallel to this incident was the rapid response to Agesilaos’ sacrifices at Aulis, which demonstrates the capability (again from Thebes) of federal equestrian forces to quickly reach and disrupt hostile activity without

189 Xen. *Hell.* 6.4.10-11, for a good contrast between the priority given to cavalry in Boiotia as compared with Sparta.
190 The historicity of a battle of Keressos is doubtful, but the Thessalian domination of Phokis is much more clearly attested: McInerney (1999), 173-8. For a positivistic reconstruction of Boiotian-Thessalian relations in the sixth century, see Buck (1979), 107-117.
192 The political implications of these decisions are suggested in Arist. *Pol.* 1297b 20-24; 1289b 35-41. *Ath. pol.* 24.3 with Rhodes (1981), 303-304, suggests Athens increased its cavalry to around 1000 in the mid-fifth century and was determined to maintain this level in the fourth century. The number and timing suggest it was an attempt to match the numbers of cavalry produced by the federal Boiotia.
193 Thuc. 4.93.3 is perhaps most striking in its relation of a thousand cavalry present at Delion, at a time when all major Boiotian communities contributed to the forces.
194 Thuc. 7.30. For twenty cavalry to have been lost in this engagement implies there must have been a sizeable force ready for deployment in Thebes.
requiring a full call-up of cavalry. The importance of horses in promoting a cohesive Boiotian discourse is nowhere explicit in the sources, but the ability to move from an area such as Thebes to Aulis or to Chaironeia at speed must have had both a practical and strategic effect on the way in which the ‘region’ could function and was perceived. Horses seem to have been a part of the landscape of Boiotia at least from the migrations of the early Iron Age, and in several clear instances, the speed of quickly available equestrian forces is shown to maintain cohesiveness of the region through the forceful statement of territorial authority.

The earliest extant information concerning Boiotia conveys a familiarity not only with horses, but also with chariots. Given that the area had a powerful late Bronze-Age settlement, and a continued high cavalry production into the Iron Age, it is perhaps not surprising that chariots seem to have been associated strongly with Boiotia. The Homeric Hymns to Apollo and Hermes, and other myths associated with Boiotia preserve a memory of both horses and use of chariots, and material remains support this. The curious custom regarding chariots at the sanctuary of Poseidon at Onchestos is an important tradition and discussed more fully below, but the image we get from Pindar and Sophocles is one of chariots being thought of as a central product of the Boiotian landscape as conceived in literary terms. In Euripides’ Suppliants, the battle is fought between Athens and Thebes with four-horse chariots and cavalry on both sides. The association of Boiotia (and Chalkis) with chariots might previously have been recognised through the erection of the celebratory quadriga on the acropolis at Athens to celebrate the victory over Boiotia in 507BC.

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195 Xen. Hell. 3.4.3-4, for disruption of Agesilaos at Aulis. Boiotians threatening on the borders of Attika: Andok. De Myst. 45. Given that speed was of critical importance, the surprise seizure of Plataia in 373 would make more tactical sense if led by cavalry, see above Chapter 2.II.vii. Attack on Attika with cavalry via Plataia and the Megarid in 424: Thuc. 4.72.1. The capture of the ship in the early Hellenistic period by a Boiotian cavalry patrol at Larymna is part of this, see n.307.

196 Aravantinos (1995), 620, for equestrian and chariot finds at Mykenaian ‘Arsenal’ on Kadmeia.

197 Below, Chapter 4.III.iii, pp.163-165.

198 Aravantinos (1995), 620, for equestrian and chariot finds at Mykenaian ‘Arsenal’ on Kadmeia.

199 IG I3 501 = Fornara (1983) no.42; Herodotus. 5.77.3-4. The construction of a celebratory quadriga (an aristocratic symbol) with the profits of the victory as well as the memorialisation of the shackles of the Boiotian and Chalkidian prisoners (and their charred preservation, having been damaged in the Persian Wars), demonstrates the crucial importance of this victory to the identity of Athens as a democracy.
There are also suggestions from the accounts of Boiotians at war in the fifth and fourth century that there is deliberate archaisation of their forces in order to connect with the memory and myths relating to charioteers. In Diodorus, the unexpected presence of Boiotian charioteers at the battle of Delion has generally been accepted as fact or explained away in oblique terms. However, it seems very likely that Diodorus is, in a blurring of mythology and history, taking part of the Euripidean narrative of ‘mythical’ Delion, and putting it in his historical narrative. This seems a plausible explanation of Diodorus’ account, but it ignores the general archaism of Boiotian military nomenclature and imagery in use elsewhere around this time. Depictions of charioteers make up a significant number of representations on Boiotian gravestones in the fifth and fourth century, and when one considers that there have been no finds of material evidence implying the use of chariots in historical warfare anywhere in Boiotia, the imagery is surely significant. This is especially the case when it is noted that the most illustrious and mysterious of Boiotian military groups, the Sacred Band, seems to have borrowed its own nomenclature from the language of charioteers.

Linked to the Boiotian association with chariots is the ‘Boiotian’ shield. The symbol of the shield in Boiotian coinage has always been a focus of scholarship on the region and there have been many attempts to explain its use. The most likely is that the shield is a proud regional reference to the shield of Ajax in the Iliad (7.222), made by a native of Hyettos with an unusual amount of (presumably) Boiotian hides. The agricultural fertility of the region that allowed for the production of large surpluses necessary to feed horses, also allowed the Boiotian landscape to support herds of cattle. The significance of this link should not be over-emphasised, however, as the emblem was likely to have been chosen principally for its similarity to the Aiginetan turtle, the state on whose weight standard the Boiotian cities based their coins.

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201 Cf. Figueira (2006), for Spartan infantry named *hippeis*.
203 See below, Chapter 4.V.i, with n.549.
2.III.iv. Colonisation

No Boiotian community ever seems to have been a leading agent in colonisation. However, there have been suggestions that Boiotian individuals did play an important role in many colonies, and there is direct evidence linking Boiotians to some of the settlements in the Black Sea and Sicily\(^{204}\). The idea of land pressure being the main reason for colonisation has been debunked to a large extent, yet the idea of a fertile and spacious Boiotia being the major reason for a lack of colonisation still persists. For the purposes of the current work, it is necessary not only to discern whether the Boiotians might have taken part in more colonisation efforts than previously thought, but what this says about the relationship of the communities to the region itself and how this determines the delimitation of space.

Fig. 2.19: Map of early Boiotian Aegean links

With only one clearly attributed colony at Herakleia Pontika (probably a combination of Megara and south Boiotia\(^{205}\)) this picture seems to have been borne out in practice, especially when legislation against trade might have been a political manifestation of this relationship\(^{206}\). Also, the geo-demographic situation definitely indicates that there was

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\(^{204}\) See below, n.208.

\(^{205}\) Burstein (1976), 15-18; Paus. 5.26.7; Suda s.v. Ἑρακλείδης Εὔφρονος; Ap. Rhod. 2.846; Ps.-Skymnos 1016-1017 (Diller); Ephoros fr.44b. Though the natural sailing route from Megara would not have taken them by the harbours of Eastern Boiotia (see Figure 2.19), the symbolic significance for a Megarian expedition to have the opportunity to embark from Aulis for a foundation beyond the Pontus might not have been missed.

\(^{206}\) See above, n.155. The historicity of this legislation is doubted, but its appearance in the traditions of the fourth century is nevertheless significant.
not a land shortage until at least the end of the fifth century\textsuperscript{207}. If the situation across Boiotia was this simple, it would be striking evidence for a determined connection to the land and environment, eschewing broadening the connectivity of the region in favour of enjoying their own prosperity.

Predictably, when looking at both the catalysts for colonisation and the detail of the colonies that were founded, the picture is not so straightforward. The model of colonisation as produced from land pressure has been contested for some time, and if opportunities abroad rather than pressures at home are examined, Boiotia seems well placed to engage in the broad sweep of colonial expansion. With access to the main trans-Aegean routes in the east and to the Korinthian Gulf in the south-west, the region was positioned on the fringes of the major colonisers. Though there is little evidence to suggest state-sponsored colonialism, the possibilities for Boiotians would have been apparent early, and there is clear Boiotian character in the toponyms and cults of some Black Sea and West Greek colonies\textsuperscript{208}. That Hesiod’s father might have come from Kyme\textsuperscript{209} would only add to the idea that Boiotia took part in the general mêlée of population movement that took place before the historical period (see Figure. 2.19). It is likely that the picture will be improved though archaeological work undertaken in the Black Sea region, but there is little more that can be pressed out of the literary sources regarding Boiotian colonists. It does seem clear that they took little formal part in organising the colonies and movements, and that it was done on an individual basis, rather than on a state-wide or managed on a large scale. Furthermore, the sites that are most prominently linked with colonies (Anthedon, Hyria, Aulis, Tanagra (Graia), Thebes) are largely eastern and southern Boiotian communities that would fit with their position closer to the main colonising movements, especially the activity of the Euboians in the Italian colonies.

In the context of early links with seafaring, it is worth noting briefly here the tradition of Orchomenian membership of the Kalaurian amphiktiony. The evidence for the amphiktiony is notoriously slight, resting principally on the account of Strabo of the membership of the amphiktiony and a Hellenistic inscription\textsuperscript{210}. The inclusion of

\textsuperscript{207} Though there might have been spare land in Boiotia until the end of the fifth century (see above, Capter 2.II.iii), the type of land and the conditions under which it was available is not clear.


\textsuperscript{209} See below, n.573.

\textsuperscript{210} Str. 8.6.14; IG IV 842.
Minyan Orchomenos in a maritime cultic network has also proved problematic for those seeking to restore the historical context of the network (because of its distance from the sea, but also from the other members, see Figure 2.20), but most recent accounts accept Strabo’s stated membership of the amphiktiony211:

Fig. 2.20: Map of Kalaurian Amphiktiony

The best dating of the amphiktiony places it in the early seventh century, and given the clear movement of people in and out of Boiotia in the eighth, seventh and sixth centuries, there is nothing fundamentally wrong with considering the amphiktiony a genuine historic construction rather than a Hellenistic invention212. There is now an extensive project overseen by the Swedish Institute at Athens that is providing large amounts of new data, but as yet nothing conclusive about the amphiktiony and its membership213. The evidence from Kalauria is not robust enough to support any strong conclusions, but the possibility of a link between Orchomenos and the Amphiktiony

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211 For instance: Breglia (2005); Constantakopoulou (2007), 29-37; Forrest (2000), 284, based particularly on the strong Attic influence on early Orchomenian pottery.
212 Kelley (1966), for the calculations and permutations of dating the amphiktiony.
213 Wells, Penttinen, and Billot (2004); Pakkanen (2008); Penttinen and Wells (2010).
serves as a reminder both of possible Boiotian maritime interaction and the possibility of individual communities making cultic links outside of the ethnic group.

Despite this attempt at a slight revision of the prevailing orthodoxy of a Boiotia that stood aloof from the major patterns of overseas expansion, the evidence does not permit a paradigmatic change in the evaluation of the interaction of Boiotian communities in this sphere. The tradition of southern Boiotia playing a major role in the foundation of Herakleia is strong, and together with the onomastic evidence linking the Boiotia with many colonial areas, it seems impossible there were not Boiotian individuals involved in, and exerting influence on the character of other foundations. Boiotia was almost unrivalled in its associations with core Hellenic myth, and it might have been that even if the Boiotian contingent was small in a new foundation, the desire to appear ‘Greek’ would suggest the use of Boiotian cult types and onomastics for mapping a definitively mainland identity onto the colonial space. The transmission of the Aiolic dialect to some areas of the eastern Aegean (most notably Lesbos) could also indicate involvement in early (post Bronze Age) movements.

However, it is clear that in relation to landscape, the communities of the Boiotian preserved traditions of immigration that were more important to regional identity than any emigration that took place. The migration of the Boiotoi from Thessaly was succeeded by waves of other migrants, certainly from Asia Minor (bringing Hesiod’s family and other Aiolic migrants back to the mainland, and cultic and social elements such as the Kabeirioi and the Kadmeioi) and perhaps further migration from elsewhere on the mainland. Where emigration took some Boiotian elements abroad, the very idea of ‘Boiotia’ itself would have been a product of these layers of immigration.

Between the end of the Mykenaian period and the sixth century, there was clearly a significant amount of movement of individuals and groups in and out of Boiotia. The

214 Though of course, much of the wealth that accrued to the Mykenaian centre at Orchomenos (e.g. Hom. II. 9. 379) must necessarily have come from interaction with the sea, it is difficult to argue for the Kalaurian interaction of the Orchomenians being a result of the maritime links of the Mykenaian period; for the opposing view: Breglia (2005), 30.

215 Hall (1997), 156, 165, on Aiolic dialect in Lesbos. cf. Rose (2008); Parker (2008). It is worth considering what role the Lesbians (located much more centrally on the major colonising routes) could have played in transmitting early Boiotian elements to colonies.

216 See discussion of development of Kabeiron, below, Chapter 4.IV.iii, pp.181-182. For Hesiod’s family’s origins, see below, Chapter 4.VLI, n.573.

217 The possible processes of interaction between migrants and natives, and of changes in identity is suggested in Hdt. 1.57-8.
land of Boiotia was generally good and there was space to allow a variety of people to settle and add distinctive elements to the area. The structure of social interaction was underpinned by dialect as well as the belief in a tradition of a migration of the Boiotoi from a Thessalian homeland. The availability of land did not however deter individuals and small groups from wishing to become involved in colony foundation, where the high antiquity and cultural prominence of Boiotia made traditions from that region an obvious choice for mapping the social framework of new foundations. Before the beginning of the period under review therefore, there had been a vibrant exchange of people entering and leaving Boiotia, and in so doing creating a unique social group, that used the pseudo-historical migratory traditions of part of the group to underpin a sense of shared geography, and create ‘Boiotia’.218

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218 These ideas are discussed in more detail below, Chapter 4.II.
2.IV. Summary
The interactivity of human and physical landscapes was vital to the production of historical Boiotia. The inhabitants of the region were involved in a reciprocal relationship with the land that was informed by the natural resources and capacity of that land together with the way in which it had been used by previous generations of inhabitants. The region was fertile and productive, containing the large plains suitable for arable use around Thebes and Orchomenos as well as much upland grazing. The region could not easily support olives, but could support forests when allowed to by its inhabitants. There were, however, few sources of metal with which to make chariots or coinage, and this might have been one of the principal drivers of interaction with areas further afield. This interaction was also promoted by the leisure afforded by the fertile land to the elite, who developed renowned schools of poetry and music and exported these skills abroad. The physical landscape also promoted probably the greatest proliferation of mantic centres anywhere in the Greek world.

The way in which the physical aspects of Boiotia affected intra-Boiotian community definition as well as the definition of the region against its neighbours will be the focus of Chapter 3. Perhaps a suitable way to conclude this discussion is Pausanias’ relation of the disappearance of the chariot of Amphiarao:

εξῆς δὲ πόλεων ἑρείπια ἐστὶν Ἄρματος καὶ Μυκαλησοῦ: καὶ τῇ μὲν τῷ ὄνομα ἐγένετο ἀφανισθέντος, ὡς οἱ Ταναγραῖοι φασίν, ἐνταῦθα Ἀμφιαράω τοῦ Ἄρματος καὶ οὐχ ὅπου λέγουσιν οἱ Θῆβαιοι: Μυκαλησόν δὲ ὤμολογούσιν ὄνομαθήναι, διότι ἡ βοῦς ἐνταῦθα ἐμυκήσατο ἢ Κάδμον καὶ τὸν σὺν αὐτῷ στρατόν ἄγουσα ἐς Θῆβας.  
Paus. 9.19.4210

The source is late, but in this short passage the relationship of mythical chariots and livestock with the foundation of communities and sanctuaries is made. The chthonic aspect of many Boiotian sanctuaries and oracles is striking, and the Amphiarao is just one example of the phenomenon.220

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219 Cf. Str. 8.134 for transfer of oracle from Thebes to Oropos.
220 Other traditions of this ‘swallowing’ in Euripides Suppliants. 1.502, 906.
Chapter 3: Borders and Barriers

3.I. Introduction
Boiotia was situated in a physical area. This area had many elements that were principally determined by nature and natural forces, but also physical changes made over many generations and centuries by the inhabitants of the area. To understand historical community interaction and the cohesiveness of Boiotia as a region, the human changes to the physical environment must be evaluated. Analysing this physical, conceived space allows Boiotian geography to be better understood because the way in which a community structures its physical space (through roads, habitation/land use patterns, dams etc.) is strong evidence for its relationship with the natural world, and also its relationship with other communities. The processes of producing conceived space also demonstrate the ability to command the physical environment, and the desire to structure and produce a particular geography suited to that community (borders, fortifications, non-urban sanctuaries etc.). It is important to understand that by the sixth century, Boiotia was an area of Greece that had been heavily changed by human action over many centuries, and it had already many layers of conceived space in and with which to interact. The response to the landscape bequeathed to the Boiotoi by nature and by previous generations, as well as the mapping of their own vision of the landscape, is the central focus of this chapter.

3.I.i. Grenze, fins, marca; the language of division
Boiotia is a defined geographic area. The correspondence between the most recent maps of the area (modern Βοιωτία) and those articulating the ancient boundaries of the area are strikingly similar. The changes in landscape through weather, climate, man and tectonic activity, have not been enough to dislodge the traditional demarcation of the area. But this resemblance is only superficial, and owes a great deal to the reconstitution of perceived ancient boundaries in modern Greece. The mountainous areas to the west, north and south and the seas to the east have lent themselves to those historians who have wanted to see a discrete territory, bounded on all sides by physical barriers. It is not the purpose of this work to deny the practical influence of topography, but instead

221 The desire to return to the ancient model can be seen in the reversion to ancient place names in Boiotia (sometimes incorrectly, as in Parasopian Erythrai (which is ancient Ηύσια). In Fossey’s catalogue he documents the changing toponyms of the last fifty years, set against the backdrop of the increasing Hellenisation of the arvantine inhabitants of the region in the last century: Fossey (1988), 486-90. In a mirror of ancient fluctuation, Plataia has just been returned to the administrative region of Boiotia having been officially part of Attika until the local government reforms of 2011.
to understand that a mountain need not play the role of barrier any more than a river that of separator.

In the twenty-first century, there are few difficulties in picturing the world as a series of subdivided landmasses with a matrix of lines demarcating the various district, state, regional and continental boundaries. With satellite data added to that of several centuries of intensive surveying work in the employ of political and military executives, the propensity toward a fixed geographical perspective (if not tacit geographic determinism) is still prevalent even amongst today’s elite\(^{222}\). The partitioning of Africa and North America in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, as well as the reconfiguring of states after the first and second world wars have left the indelible imprint of these ‘lines in the sand’ on the consciousness of both the inhabitants of the affected localities and on the historian trained to think in terms of post-Cartesian cartography\(^{223}\). However, the fusion of political and geographic boundaries is more a product of the nineteenth century’s imperialistic positivism than it is of any ‘natural boundaries’\(^{224}\). In fact, the global perspective facilitated by modern technology evidences not the deterministic nature of geography, but instead the plurality and diversity of state arrangements\(^{225}\).

Ancient Greece provides a particularly difficult area from which to move away from this inclination toward ordering cartographic division in such a fashion, with nuanced and precise understanding of divisions hampered by fragmentary survival of evidence\(^{226}\). For the historian trying to reconstruct ancient geography, the attraction toward nucleated settlement in primary literary sources leaves the physical features of the chora to provide (literal and figurative) relief to the difficulties of border definition outside of the asty. Whilst it is undeniable that natural features of the landscape were often used to mark the divisions between communities, the use of such features was rarely simple or incontrovertible. For any natural feature (river, ridge etc.) to be used as a social division inherently invests that feature with meaning it did not previously possess, thereafter

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\(^{222}\) Kearns (2009), 7-9.

\(^{223}\) The problem of integrating traditional migratory cattle routes that cross the boundary of the newly formed South and North Sudan is an active case in point.

\(^{224}\) Though the sophisticated and deliberate political reorganisation of Attika under Kleisthenes used natural features for some of its boundaries: Langdon (1985).

\(^{225}\) Horden and Purcell (2000), 23-4. The Barrington Atlas (Talbert (2000), is an odd fusion of modern cartography and ancient geography and fails to indicate the plurality of arrangements and networks, and the fluidity of diachronic arrangements that are as important as simple location.

\(^{226}\) It is noticeable that work on the articulation of borders and the production of space has not yet attracted the same level of sensitivity and insight as religious experience or political discourse.
potentially functioning as a historic landmark of past relationships. Similarly, the
physical demarcation of territorial relationships, for instance, in the construction
and situation of explicit dividers such as fortifications, rural sanctuaries or horoi, firstly
manifest a relationship but thereafter affect the way in which the landscape is used and
perceived. If the aim therefore is comprehension of the lived experience and through
that a greater understanding of the historical development of a region, the foundation
for enquiry should be in exploring the construction and experience of different
geographies. Only through a re-alignment of perspective away from the urban nuclei of
communities is it possible for a more holistic examination of historical experience to take
place.\footnote{227}

3.Ii. Communities and the terminology of limits
In ancient history, the terms ‘border’ and ‘boundary’ are often used interchangeably
without much consideration to differentiating between the two. In this work, ‘boundary’
will be used to denote a simple ‘line’ of division, rarely explicit in Greek community
relationships, but applicable not just to political limits but also religious tēmevνη and
other demarcations which could be recognised in this simple fashion\footnote{228}. This simplicity
confers on boundaries the particular power of being able to be transgressed in a clear
and apparent manner. ‘Border’ can be similar to a boundary, but will be used in areas
where the division is less definite, and instead of a boundary line, it is often an area in
itself. This term follows Anderson’s ‘narrow zone’ of demarcation that still allows some
room for fluctuation and negotiation\footnote{229}. In this sense, it embodies the historical idea of
The Borders of England and Scotland, but it would also be applicable in the ancient world
to areas such as the Skourta Plain, disputed throughout antiquity between Attika and
Boiotia, whilst at certain periods falling under the jurisdiction of one or the other\footnote{230}. The
use of ‘frontier’ is less prevalent in the Hellenic side of Classical history compared to the
study of Rome, but presents its own problems in terms of a specific inheritance and

\footnote{227} Though maps, and the idea of maps, clearly excited curiosity in the period under review, the often
cited examples from Herodotus and Aristophanes indicate that cartography was an intellectual
distraction, rather than a common and practical social tool: Branscome (2010). For a more traditional
view of the Hellenic conception of geography, see Dilke (1985), 21–38. For the most recent general survey
of the relationship between mapping and general spatial awareness in the ancient world, Brodersen
(2004).

\footnote{228} Ober (2006), 454–455 with n.22, suggests a range of things that could have constituted Solonian horoi.

\footnote{229} Anderson (1996), 9f. The land that lay between the horoi, ‘μεθόριον’, is used by Thucydides to describe
the area between Attika and Boiotia, and is the best parallel to the concept of borders here: Thuc. 2.18.1–
2: ‘ή γὰρ Οἰλίνη οὔσα ἐν μεθόριοι τῆς Ἀττικῆς καὶ Βοιωτίας ἐπετείχετο’. Cf. Thuc. 2.27, 4.46. cf. Ober
by an inscribed horos.

\footnote{230} Munn (1989). For the economic importance of liminal space and borderlands, see Forbes (1996), 74–
76; though admittedly this does not pay much attention to the issue of disputed lands between
communities, it does address the economic problems of use and ownership.
application\textsuperscript{231}. ‘Frontier’ is a term rooted in the military, and in more recent periods has been conceived of as a line between two states or as ‘moving zone of settlement’ into the interior of continent or new territory\textsuperscript{232}. When applied to the ancient world, with its inherent lack of sophisticated state machinery, the term is necessarily a less precise concept, and it is necessary that the term not be applied to natural features\textsuperscript{233}. Here I would like to suggest that the word is returned to its roots, and is used as a technical term to denote a military ‘facing’ of one state toward another.

3.1.iii. The limits of ‘Boiotia’
In a recent work on the history of the concept of the polis, Vlassopoulos urged a comprehensive reconsideration of the way in which community boundaries are defined and understood\textsuperscript{234}. This is all the more pressing when a major project such as the \textit{Inventory of Archaic and Classical Poleis} acknowledges the importance of the extra-urban landscape but fails to incorporate it in a productive manner into its delineation of communities. The \textit{Inventory} classifies the size of territory as part of the information of all poleis, but the extent of territory is irrelevant if its context (topography, resources, neighbours) is not firmly established. The ‘polis’ is a concept that is useful to a point, but restricts rather than encourages creative conception of the real historical experience of Hellenic communities. Even (or especially) where the poleis of Boiotia display ‘model’ characteristics, the effect that the concept of ‘polis’ has had in terms of understanding relationships has been restrictive, undermining the fluidity and diachronic malleability of relationships. It is impossible, and indeed undesirable, to produce an exact map of internal and external boundaries and borders throughout the period under consideration. Such a construction would only serve to mislead and ultimately produce a cartography that the inhabitants of the region would not have recognised. Similarly, though the ‘settlement chambers’ reconstructed from surface survey data in Boiotia give a vital insight into the way in which the land could have been settled\textsuperscript{235}, they offer only a small glimpse of the possibilities of community definition and boundary formation. Landscape and territory were produced through competition, use and performance, not through mapping, and at all times there would have been a plurality of ‘mappings’ and perceptions of geography from a range of different perspectives. The best alternative is to examine the evidence for the methods and situations of community division in an

\textsuperscript{232} Anderson (1996), 9.
\textsuperscript{233} Horden and Purcell (2000), 24.
\textsuperscript{234} Vlassopoulos (2007), 1-10 and 63-67.
\textsuperscript{235} Farinetti (2011), 5-6.
attempt to understand the way in which individuals and communities articulated and altered their relationship to the land and to each other.

The most common modern depiction of division in ancient Boiotia is the separation of communities’ territories by way of lines on an aerial view map. This method certainly has value and is preferable to the representation of the communities as merely dots on a map. But there are significant problems with this model; it does not leave unclaimed areas, areas of wilderness, which would be accessible by more than one community (or none). Nor does it allow for representation of relationships of a different kind, for instance the political linking of Chaireneia, Kopai and Akraiphia in the first federation. It represents the landscape as one defined by division and therefore fails to represent the social, cultural and temporal connectivity that is an equally important aspect of experienced space. This is particularly salient in the case of Boiotia where hydrology and its rhythms help orchestrate the relationships between communities on a seasonal as well as a longer-term basis. But there is a need to appreciate the way in which communities orientate themselves in the landscape and toward each other that goes beyond an understanding of the size and location of territory. A further problem is the uniform representation of the limits of a community without considering questions such as which areas and relationships are considered central to a community’s own identity, where the military strength is physically assembled, and whether there are areas where, because of previous events, there is sensitivity toward incursion. Not all divisions are equal.

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236 Buck (1979), and Fossey (1988), use this style of presentation throughout.
237 The recent criticism of the ubiquitous ‘nodal’ representation of the ancient Greek communities in maps acting to reinforce the primacy of the polis form was overdue: Vlassopoulos (2007), 156.
238 Though an attempt at this using a nodal perspective to demonstrate the non-contiguous political relationships in Boiotia has been sketched at McKechnie and Kern (1988), 156.
239 This may be a problem that can be addressed by the development of computer based geographical information systems (GIS) that are capable of rendering diachronic changes in boundaries and community relationships in a way that conveys more details and subtlety than can be expressed in traditional methods. For a brief insight into the latest developments in this area, see Bailey and Schick (2009). GIS is increasingly being employed, particularly in archaeological work: Bevan and Conolly (2002); for Boiotia, Farinetti (2011). Cf. Richardson (2009), and the work of the HESTIA project: Barker et al. (2010).
240 Anderson (1996), 6-7, emphasises the way in which the Swiss and French towns on the borders ‘turn’ toward their own country and turn their back on neighbouring states.
3.II. Landscape parameters

3.II.i. The construction of division
The construction and maintenance of divisions in Boiotia is discernable in settlement patterns and chambers as well as city walls, forts, towers and horoi, but context and location are as important as form. Areas at the margins of community and region emphasise the importance of understanding the creation and retention of liminality in interstate discourse. This was particularly the case in Boiotia with its contentious ethnic borders with Attika and Phokis as well as the rhythm of seasonal fluctuations in the Kopais basin. Within Boiotia, the differences between the situation of communities and the resulting differences in their perspective must also be taken into account. For instance, the articulation of relationships on a small scale for those communities directly bordering communities outside the region (such as Chaironceia with Panopeus) might have been different from the experience of a community which is dealing principally only with communities of the same ethnos (Haliartos). Similarly, the construction of borders and the conception of networks might have differed for communities situated by the sea (Siphai), or in an isolated mountain area (Hyettos), compared with those in the middle of the lowland plains. When accompanied by a clear grasp of how and where people lived, the articulation of dynamics between communities can provide a wealth of information on the reciprocal shaping of community and landscape. This applies to internal Boiotian discourse as well as to the relationship of the region as a whole with neighbouring regions. The following sub-sections are designed to elucidate several of the major themes in both aspects of Boiotian border discourse.

3.II.ii. ‘Empty’ borders
The surface survey work that has been undertaken in Boiotia is fundamental to comprehending the articulation of the relationship between the inhabitants of the area and the physical environment. As well as emphasising the vibrancy of human activity in the landscape, the evidence from the surveys has served to emphasise the diversity of border relationships that would have existed in the period under review. For the definition of local borders, the cases of Askra, Thespiai and Haliartos are particularly interesting in that their intercourse might have been characterised a zone of inactivity.

241 Snodgrass (1990), 129, displays the distribution of sites found in the first five years of surface survey work in the region of Askra. The noticeably empty area in the centre of the figure is the indicator of the proposed ‘empty’ border. Bintliff (1996), 197, records Snodgrass’ suggestion of a possible early defensive
The acropolis of Haliartos is visible from the acropolis of Askra, and the upper regions of the natural pyramid of the latter would have been visible to the inhabitants of Haliartos (Figures 3.1-2).

This heightens the significance of the possibility of an ‘empty’ border area. There would have been less need for a tower here because of the inter-visibility of the akropolis of Haliartos and Askra. There is no indication that there was any epigraphic regulation of the boundary between the various states in the vicinity, and though the topography of the area perhaps suggests a practical boundary (confirmed by the site survey work done in the area\textsuperscript{242}), this is not a mountain-top, and the land is not useless. As the border between Kopai and Akraiphia was later defined by the erection or carving of an inscription, so the boundary here might have been just as clearly defined by the very absence of anything\textsuperscript{243}. With the busy settlement pattern of the rest of the area, the

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\textsuperscript{242} See walking distance analysis in Farinetti (2011), 153, fig.7, which confirms that the area between Haliartos and Askra is easily accessible by both. Snodgrass (1990), 129.

\textsuperscript{243} There are very few extant inscriptions that offer any information about the processes of Boiotian arbitration of borders, especially in the period under review. SEG 30 440, a boundary stone between Akraiphia and Kopai, from the late sixth/early fifth century, is one of the few clear early examples, though there are references to horoi in literary sources: below, n.280. cf. Ober (1995), 109, for consideration of the movement of territorial limits versus established boundary markers. The rupestral inscription indicating the boundary between Akraiphia and Kopai (IG VII 2792, SEG 36 441), is probably best placed c.315BC: (Lauffer (1986), 136).
possible line of the boundary between Haliartos and Askra is conspicuous by its silence in the survey register. This idea of a ‘no-man’s land’, or perhaps more appropriately a notion of shared land/pasturage, is not unique in Boiotia, and particularly on the true ‘borders’ this zone of inactivity would serve as the liminal and unclaimed space that could allow competing claims to pass by without violence.

A border that is marked by a conspicuous absence of human construction might have been one of the more common demarcations between communities. The borders between communities would not necessarily have to be marked because those who existed in the landscape would have understood them implicitly (and, perhaps, there had been no need for arbitration, therefore not necessitating horoi). The relationship between individuals/communities and their landscape was intimate but often mute in the literary narratives and epigraphic register. The value of the work of the surface survey teams in Boiotia is therefore heightened when they elicit these patterns of life that because of their very familiarity have gone undocumented elsewhere. It is of course possible that there might have been an epigraphic marker of the borders between Haliartos and Askra that is not extant, but with the conspicuous absence of other human

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244 Roesch (1965), 39 and 52, anticipated the findings of the surface survey work with his assertion that the Thespian epigraphy found beyond this line could well have been moved.
245 The ‘empty’ zone between Askra and Haliartos may encourage an inclination towards viewing Askra’s interactions as predominantly based on an east-west rather than a north-south axis. There might be a paralell of this situation of a shared liminal area in the dispute over Panakton in the Skourta Plain in the Peloponnesian War: Thuc. 5.42.
features, the division would surely have been understood and implicit to those that were part of the process of community formation and definition. The information from survey work has allowed construction of settlement chamber maps, which combine the evidence of surface survey sherd densities and the idea that the majority of the population in Boiotian communities resided in urban nuclei and travelled out to work on the land\textsuperscript{246}. The time taken to travel out from these urban centres creates radii of direct influence from settlement to settlement. The maps produced from known settlements display pleasing regularity of lack of overlap, suggesting that most borders between communities would have been ‘naturally’ formed through use of the land\textsuperscript{247}.

\textit{3.II.iii. Fluid boundaries; hydrology in division}

Fresh water was fundamental to the development of Greek mainland communities in all periods of history\textsuperscript{248}. The rainfall and river systems of many regions of Greece could be unpredictable and liable to large fluctuations, leaving open the possibility of drought and famine and the political and social changes that could result. Though Boiotia was far from the worst supplied of areas in terms of water, the seasonal and local variations could provide inequalities of supply, which would have fed into the wider matrix of community interaction, be it competitive or cooperative. As an area often defined in historical terms by its interior geography, Boiotia’s relationship to the sea is sometimes overlooked, even though they took part regularly in the major naval conflicts from the Peloponnesian War onwards. But even when there were no Boiotian warships active, the relationship between Boiotian communities and the practicalities and perception of the sea would have been of central everyday importance\textsuperscript{249}. In analysing how the inland and oceanic hydrology of the region affected discourse and production of space, it is necessary to go beyond basic environmental considerations and look instead at the way in which water informed the delineation of divisions.

\textsuperscript{246} See above, n.88.
\textsuperscript{247} This may also demonstrate the importance of non-polis hamlets and komai in the landscape, extending control of territory as a satellite of the main urban centre. See above, n.236, for the work of Farinetti on the settlement chambers of Boiotia.
\textsuperscript{248} An excellent work on water management is Crouch (1993). For the importance of water in the ancient world more broadly, see Purcell (1996).
\textsuperscript{249} The east coast of Boiotia would have been influenced by the presumably regular sight of Athenian warships throughout the fifth century. That use of the visibility of maritime power for affecting relationships is demonstrated by episodes such as the Spartans’ slow patrol up the east coast of Attika, stopping outside key demes such as Thorikos: Thuc. 8.95.
Lake Kopais

Undeniably the most important hydrological feature of the interior of Boiotia was Lake Kopais. The lake held many mythical and historical associations, variously positive and negative depending on the perspective of the different communities (for instance the blocking of katavothras by Herakles in the wars against Orchomenos²⁵₀), and the lake affected the pattern of relationships inside and outside of Boiotia. The memory that the lake had been drained in the Mykenaian period might only have served to emphasise the profound effect that communities could have on the area, and how man could enter into a discourse with the environment as an agent able to change physical space in a significant way²⁵¹. Even today, the visitor to Boiotia is able to appreciate a small measure of the influence that the lake would have had on links between communities because the major road system of the area still skirts around the majority of the former lake’s perimeter²⁵². For sites such as Haliartos or Kopai, hard against the high water level of the lake, high summer, and the probable land bridges that presumably accompanied the seasonal drop in water level, might have presented a situation that emphasised the shared territory of the area rather than its divisions. Some of the land next to both of those poleis would have been revealed to allow grazing and other productive opportunities. But at times when the water was highest, in winter and spring, the lake would have been an implicit divider, emphasising partition and the different situation of the settlement.

In studies of the ancient world the nature of the boundaries within large hydrological features is nowhere well treated. There was seldom the necessity (or opportunity) for dividing great lakes such as those of northern Italy into political areas. Indeed, the ocean was formally regulated only very recently²⁵₃. But Kopais had the unusual aspect of being very shallow for a lake of its size, and because of the nature of the polje in which it formed it was relatively circular in formation²⁵₄. The lake is surrounded by settlements,

²⁵₀ See above, Chapter 2.II.vi.
²⁵¹ For drainage of lake see Chapter 2.II.i, p.20 with image of modern drained Kopais (Figure 2.2).
²⁵₂ The preservation of the rich farmland is particularly noticeable as the old lakebed is largely free from any major new settlements or link-roads between the major communities. Frazer (1898) v.5, 112, for the fertility of this land before drainage.
²⁵₃ The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea only came into force formally in 1994, though it did replace earlier international agreements and tacit understandings. For more on the historical development of this see Churchill and Lowe (1999), 13-22.
²⁵₄ Farinetti (2008), 1-2, gives a good description and breakdown of karstic geology formed by the dissolution of rock in natural water, and poljes: large, closed geological depression that often form in karstic areas and are drained by katavothras. See also Clandenon (2009), for the relationship of karstic geology and myths in the Argolis. Allen (1990), outlines the gradual change from being a genuine lake to being a marshy, seasonal lake. Cf. Above, Chapter 2.II.i, p.20, for the information on the projections of the size of Kopais.
many of which would have been only a few metres from its edge. This suggests that Kopais was a benefactor to communities living nearby, and the history of the lake in all periods is of the communities around it maximizing these possible benefits\textsuperscript{255}. If the communities derived benefit from the lake, this then begs the question of division of this benefit and the boundaries of the lake. The revelation of land each summer would have suggested the same territorial behaviour that would be expected on \textit{terra firma}, even if the heaviness of the exposed periacustrine soils would have rendered many routes impassable. But if in winter, a canoe full of Kopaians were to sail up to the walls of Haliartos and begin to fish on land that in summer is used by farmers from Haliartos, it would have been palpably (and very visibly from the acropolis of Haliartos) an aggressive act, an act of power definition comparable to any other unsolicited boundary crossing.

![Map of BA Kopais with marked sites.](image)

**Fig. 3.3: Fortification sites of BA Kopais**

The lake provided some of the most prized products of the region, and the possibility of gaining environmental control over this resource is a recurring theme of the area when there is an authority able and willing to marshal a large amount of manpower to achieve

\textsuperscript{255} With the lake’s probable role as a reservoir for the spread of malaria and other diseases ever present, the benefits to the population that lived around its edge of the lake must have been considered greater than any health problems or general difficulties caused by insects from the lake. See above, n.56, for the possibility of malaria. It may be significant that all of the settlements closest to the edges of the lake (Haliartos, Kopai, Orchomenos) had been in place in the Mykenaian period when the lake had been drained. See settlement patterns outlined by Farinetti (2011), 225.
The Bronze-Age system of fortifications that seems to have been constructed and maintained to protect the wider hydrological regulation of the Kopaic basin would have played a significant role in emphasising the division between the Kopaic and Teneric plains. The defensive system (Figure 3.3) not only demonstrates the use of significant resources, it also suggests that there were threats from the southeast, and the Bronze-Age community based on the Kadmeia is the most likely source of these threats. The militarisation of the Kopaic Plain was combined with the engineering work that allowed its environmental management. This partnership of land and politics, and its physical and mythological remains in the Boiotian landscape suggested the possibilities of spatial manipulation to subsequent occupants of the land. That Alexander III's Chalkidian engineer, Krates, envisaged the restoration of the drainage works, demonstrates both that the Bronze-Age drainage works were still visible and their purpose still comprehensible in the fourth century.

**Thisbai Dam**

The Mykenaian dam that split the *polje* of the Thisbai basin in two was designed to regulate the water inundation that would have otherwise left a large part of the land unusable. The mole ran almost directly south from the foot of the acropolis of Thisbai. In doing so, the dam had a significant secondary feature of being one of the best-engineered (and widest) known roads in Boiotia, and provided a link to the large natural harbour of Domvreina bay. Thisbai was a noted Mykenaian site which might have been a fulcrum for technology transfer between the Korinthian Gulf and the interior of Central Greece in the Bronze Age and this position would have necessitated and benefitted from the building of such a link.

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256 Alexander might have ordered the draining of the Lake (Strabo 9.2.18: possibly failing because of stasis, see above n.58). French and English teams in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries completed the drainage system which is used today. See Wallace (1979), 76-78, for commentary on both of these events.

257 Myths relating to Herakles and katavothras: above, Chapter 2.II.vi. Also, the sanctuary of Poseidon Onchestos displays strong continuity of settlement from the Bronze Age into the historical period, and whether there was continuity of cult or not, the site’s position on the ridge that divided the two plains would have made it a natural liminal forum between the two areas. See fuller treatment of this below: Chapter 4.III.iii, pp.163-165.

258 Frazer (1898), v.5, 112-3, makes it clear that the land of the Kopais was used extensively when seasonally dry. The nature and effect of regular hydrological fluctuation is largely alien to Mediterranean ‘solar cities’ which do not have to exist in accordance with the rhythm of the tide (and hence the moon): Lefebvre (1996), 232ff.
Fig. 3.4: Thisbai, view to the south from akropolis with possible route of dam marked.
The sedimentary records indicate that the reservoir was engineered to rest on the eastern half of the dam (the left hand side of the line marked on Figure 3.4). The decision to engineer the reservoir on that side of the dam would most likely have been driven by topographical and agricultural concerns, but it would have had the additional effect of creating an engineered plain of exclusion, being hemmed in from the north by mountains, and from the south by the sea. There is little indication of animosity between Thespiai and Thisbai in the historical period, but the two communities are some distance apart, and the possible maintenance of the reservoir from the Bronze Age (when Thisbai would perhaps not have been politically as dependent on Thespiai) would have had significant implications for community self-perception\textsuperscript{259}. If the dam had a Mykenaian basis and was maintained (and perhaps improved) in later periods, this would also have offered a model to the rest of Boiotia of the possibilities of renovating and maintaining the engineering work of their Bronze Age predecessors\textsuperscript{260}. The fourth century fortifications (marked on Figure 3.4) would have emphasised the defensive aspect of the reservoir, with anybody entering the area from the east being faced with water and walls.

\textit{Rivers}

The rivers of Boiotia today appear only as minor streams by European standards, channelled and heavily exploited for agriculture and many of them diverted to the sea through Lakes Hylas and Paralimni to avoid the reformation of Lake Kopais. For the most part this was the situation in antiquity (as in most of mainland Greece). Whereas elsewhere in the ancient world there were attempts at least to delimit areas of influence by way of rivers, none of the rivers in Boiotia would have presented themselves as a natural divider of communities\textsuperscript{261}. However, though the division of the area has much more often followed the mountains and the sea than the rivers of the region, the rivers

\textsuperscript{259} Paus. 9.32.3. The mole would not only serve as a reminder of the transformative possibilities of human landscape manipulation, but also of the inheritance of antiquity and the ancestral construction of space. Farinetti (2011), 168-169, on difficulty of managing the hydrology of the Domvreina valley for Thisbai. Though it seems likely, given Thisbai’s antiquity as a settlement, that some regulation of the basin must have taken place in the Bronze Age (Fossey (1988), 182), it is possible that the dam itself was constructed in the fourth or third centuries: Hope-Simpson and Hagel (2006), 222. Knauss (1992), outlines the evidence for both Bronze Age and later attempts at regulating the hydrology of the area.

\textsuperscript{260} The dam at Thisbai was paralleled by that of Akraiphia in being a probable Mykenaian construction that was preserved into the historical period, see above, n.119.

\textsuperscript{261} Egypt and the Nile is the most famous example of a river divider, but even that great river did not delimit the political boundaries of the Kingdom, but rather its most famous defensive line. This is implicitly Herodotus’ conception of the division as he criticises those geographers who use the Nile as a simple dividing line, Hdt. 2.16f. The Lagids continued the system of withdrawal and defence that proved so effective for the various incumbents of Egyptian power against the Achaemenids. The Roman attempts to use the Danube or the Rhine as a division were never successful (especially given the propensity of those rivers to freeze in winter: Isaac (1990), 372-418, on frontiers in general, 408, on the Danube).
could play a significant role in perception of divisions, even if not a physical barrier to communities and movement.

**Asopos**

The Asopos was linked intrinsically with the mythology of the Boiotians\(^{262}\). The river itself was probably more affluent than today, but not hugely so\(^{263}\). There are several bridges known from antiquity along its course, but its role was primarily that of an agricultural facilitator rather than military divider. In the sixth century the boundaries between the states surrounding the river are unclear, with no epigraphy or other physical signifiers existing. However, the river does emerge into the political spotlight in 519BC, and the incident helps to understand the formation of boundaries in Boiotia, and also the power relationships between the states.

Piezýchomenoi ὑπὸ Θηβαίων οἱ Πλαταιεῖς ἑδίδοσαν πρῶτα παρατυχοῦσιν Κλεομενέτει τῇ τῷ Ἀναζάνδριδε ως Λακεδαιμονίοισι ορφας αὐτοῦς. οἱ δὲ οὐ δεκάμενοι ἔλεγον σφι τάδε· “ἡμεῖς μὲν ἔκαστέρω τε οἰκέομεν, καὶ ὑμῖν τοιῆς τις γίνοιτ’ ἐν ἐπικούριᾳ ψυχρῇ· φθαίτε γὰρ αὐν πολλάκις ἐξανδραποδισθέντες ἢ τινα πυθόσαι ἡμῶν. συμβουλεύομεν δὲ υμῖν δοῦναι ὡμέας αὐτοῦς Ἀθηναίοις, πλησιοχώροις τε ἀνδράσι καὶ τιμωρεῖεν ἐσόις οὐ κακοῖσι.” ταῦτα συνεβούλευσαν οἱ Λακεδαιμόνιοι οὐ κατὰ τὴν εὐνοίαν ὑπὸ τῶν Πλαταιῶν ὡς βουλόμενοι τοὺς Ἀθηναίους ἔχειν πόνους συνεστώτας Βοιωτοῦς. Λακεδαιμόνιοι μὲν νῦν Πλαταιαῖοι ταῦτα συνεβούλευσαν, οἱ δὲ οὐκ ἠπίστησαν, ἀλλ’ Ἀθηναίων ἑκά τειντίν τοῖς δυσδεκα τειδίκη τειδίκη ἰκέται ζόμενοι ἐπὶ τὸν βωμὸν ἑδίδοσαν ορφας αὐτοῦς. Θηβαίοι δὲ πυθόμενοι ταῦτα ἐστρατεύοντο ἐπὶ τοὺς Πλαταιάς, Ἀθηναῖοι δὲ σφὶ ἔβοθιεν. μελλόντων δὲ συνάπτειν μάχην Κορίνθιοι οὗ περείδουν, παρατυχόντες δὲ καὶ καταλλάξαντες ἐπιπεφύσάντων ἀμφοτέρων ὄμφασαν τὴν γύρην ἐπὶ τοιᾶδε. θα δὲ σημάδιος τῶν σου βουλωμένους ἐς Βοιωτοῦς τελέειν. Κορίνθιοι μὲν δὴ ταῦτα γνώντες ἀπαλλάσσοντο. Ἀθηναῖοι δὲ ἀπεδωκαντο βοιωτοὶ, ἐπιδέμενοι δὲ ἐσωθθοῦσαν τῇ μάχῃ. ὑπερβάντες δε οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι τοὺς οἱ Κορίνθιοι ἔθηκαν Πλαταιεῦς εἶναι ὀφέν, τοῦτος ύπερβάντες τὸν Ἀσωπόν αὐτὸν ἐποιήσαντο ὑφὸν Θηβαίοις πρὸς Πλαταιάς εἶναι καὶ Ὕσιᾶς.

**Hdt. 6.108.2-6**

The Boioti’s own traditions had them situated in their communities and locations from the time of their migrations from Thessaly\(^{264}\). Plataia and Thebes were two of the settlements with the greatest claim to antiquity, both in mythological and in

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\(^{262}\) Paus. 9.1.1-2: myths relating to Asopos (and Helikon) as early king of Plataia. For Asopos as a god see Brewster (1997), 50-1. See Knopfler (2000), for relationship of Asopos and Oropos.

\(^{263}\) Farinetti (2011), 179; Thuc. 2.5.1f. (Dem. 59.99) suggests that when the river was in spate it could cause some difficulty to those trying to cross the river. The landscape of Boiotia is littered with torrent beds that with heavy rain can become difficult to traverse, and the context of the passage in Thucydides emphasises that it had been an overnight rainfall that had caused the problem and not a seasonal or more general variation that meant that the Asopos was difficult to traverse. Ain. Tact. 8.1, suggests widening rivers that are not difficult to cross wider in order to hinder enemy operations.

\(^{264}\) Though with some memory of a gradual progression of settlement: below, Chapter 4.II.ii.
archaeological terms\textsuperscript{265}. The arbitration of borders over half a millennium after the two groups believed themselves to have occupied their respective centres, is perhaps most interesting for the implications of the role of human agency in the formation of boundaries. That they could still engage in on-going discourse after this length of time indicates a plurality in the interpretations of shared history, and the ability to affect the physical limits of communities through the exercise of power, even within an ethnic group. Also, that the communities believed their physical situations to be of high antiquity might imply that the Theban desire was not to increase its own territory at the expense of Plataia, but instead that the action came as part of a change in the regional outlook of Thebes.

The incident also has wider significance, particularly with reference to the big-power narrative leading up to the Persian Wars\textsuperscript{266}. Here it provides rare information regarding the process of arbitration concerning a specific geographic area, and it is immediately striking that the Asopos was not the first choice for a boundary between Thebes and Plataia. This is important in its suggestion that when contested borders were arbitrated, the most prominent natural features were not necessarily used as dividers. The fact that the new boundary was at first to be set south of the river has led some commentators to suggest that the original settlement was favourable to Thebes (See figure 2.13, above, for the best view of the landscape between Plataia and Thebes). If one looks simply at the position of Thebes (and the walking times from the polis centre) then the river seems like a good fit with its position for a boundary\textsuperscript{267}. The language of Herodotus suggests that Thebes was not attempting to annex more territory directly for itself, but instead for ‘Boiotia’\textsuperscript{268}. It might be that Thebes simply wanted to persuade Plataia to not align with Athens, and the settlement was itself a compromise settlement designed to placate Thebes at the loss of such a vital settlement for Boiotian security\textsuperscript{269}.

\textsuperscript{266} Hammond (1992); Schachter (1998); Larson (2007), 168-172. Though Larson’s general concerns about the possible retrojection of later Boiotian federal arrangements are constructive, she does not question the fundamental validity of Herodotus’ account of the events of 519BC.
\textsuperscript{267} Farinetti (2011), 189, demonstrates that although the centre of ancient Plataia is closer to the (modern) Asopos than Thebes, a straight line between the urban centres of both communities shows that the part of the river closest to both on this intersection was equidistant between them (around eighty minutes walking time from both, confirmed by author’s experience).
\textsuperscript{268} Larson (2007), 129-163, on the use of the ethnic and political term ‘Boiotia’ is important here.
\textsuperscript{269} The use of ἡλέειν in the passage is troublesome and it is possible its use as a political term might have been affected by the more formal federal situation that existed in Boiotia when Herodotus was composing his work. See Bakhuizen (1994), 309-316. Waanders (1983), 111, suggests ‘to be counted amongst’ (compare Schachter (2000), 13-14, who reflects on the term in relation to the Daidala). The infinitive is used in two other places in Herodotus, both used to denote ‘belonging’ to an ethnic group: Hdt. 2.51.2,
The attack on the Athenians following the arbitration need not necessarily be linked specifically to the arbitration itself but to the Athenians’ involvement more generally. The relationship between the Thebans and the Peisistratids seems to have been particularly close up until this point, and the act of possessing Plataia rather than the arbitration itself might have been the cause of the attack\textsuperscript{270}. Whilst the two are clearly not dissociable, the sudden souring of the relationship would have been exacerbated by the subsequent ‘Athenian’ boundary of the Asopos. Similar in some senses to rupestral rather than free standing boundary markers, the Asopos was a bulwark of man rather than of nature, but as a natural feature it had the advantage of permanency, it could not be ‘picked up or pushed aside’\textsuperscript{271}. What began as a man-made political division attached to a geographic feature was re-enforced by the military division between the Persian and Greek troops in 479BC. This division was again focussed on the Asopos, though the practicalities of the division depended as much on the position of the Persian stockade as the river itself\textsuperscript{272}. Because of Plataia’s spatial and symbolic role in the victory over the Persians, and Thebes’ notorious medism, the dividing line between ‘right’ and ‘wrong’ could have no clearer symbol than this relatively minor river.

The effect of visibility must also be considered here. From the Kadmeia the Asopos is not visible, and the line of hills directly to the south of Thebes actually obstructs the view of the river for some distance from the city (Figure 2.12). From the site of Plataia however, as for all of the Parasopian communities straddling the north side of the Kithairon range, the Asopos is very visible, and is today surrounded by the apparent fertility of irrigated farmland (Figure 2.13). The effect of the original demarcation of the boundary between Thebes and Plataia, assuming it was some way south of the Asopos, would have therefore been a much greater visible slight to Plataia than a boon to Thebes\textsuperscript{273}.

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\textsuperscript{270} Theban aid to Peisistratos: Hdt. 1.61.3; \textit{Ath. pol.} 15.2; Buck (1979), 107-8; Schachter (1989), 82-83.


\textsuperscript{272} The river would not provide much resistance to attacks from either side. The ability of the Persians to cause so many problems at the passes of Kithairon bear testament to the ease of the crossing; Hdt. 9.38-9 (Contrast Parmenio’s concerns at the River Granikos, \textit{Arr. Anab.} 1.13.3-5).

\textsuperscript{273} There has been much new work from Plataia in recent years which has focussed much more upon the landscape around the urban centre and has begun to give a more holistic picture of the community: Aravantinos, Konecny, and Marchese (2003); Konecny et al. (2008).
The event was significant in the development of relations between Boiotia and Attika, and Thebes and Athens more particularly. There is some early evidence for the sharing of a border sanctuary on Mount Parnes but the real counter-definition, the reciprocal articulation of community, is something that is accelerated at the end of the sixth century. The two regions had seen gradual population growth and had progressively filled their territories throughout the proceeding centuries. The borders of each now began to overlap, beginning an extended period of animosity that would see areas such as the Skourta Plain, Eleutherai, and the Oropeia change hands many times.

It is worth departing from the Asopos briefly to fully explore the significance of its role in community relationships. In the 520s the idea of ‘Athenian’ diplomatic policy is not dissociable from Peisistratid policy. The relationship between the Thebans and Peisistratos is again thrown into some relief by the actions of the latter, but the Plataian entrance into the Peisistratid aegis evinces a sophisticated and symbolic awareness of action in spatial terms. Firstly, the reference to the Plataians coming as suppliants to the altar of the twelve gods is significant as it demonstrates that the Plataians were aware of the dynamics of power in Athens and were making a grandiose gesture toward this power. The altar was a recent construction; perhaps best placed in 522/1, as part of the tyranny’s deliberate attempt to monumentalize the urban centre of Athens. The site was in the centre of the agora, and would provide the point from which distances were measured to the centre of Athens. This deliberate and overt Peisistratid manipulation of political space was enhanced and validated by the Plataians seeking succour there. The account has them actually sit by the altar (ικέται ἵνα τινα ττων βωμῶν), a symbolic representation of the link of periphery and the centre they were hoping to politically embody, and a skilful (and successful) attempt to elicit Athenian (Peisistratid) reciprocal action. There is no account of debate or hesitancy about the Athenian decision, and the context of the incident indicates this would have clearly been a move against Thebes, rather than simply toward the Plataians. The move is

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274 For demographic and settlement trends: Bintliff and Snodgrass (1985); Osborne (2009), 66-75. The early shared sanctuary on mount Parnes between Attika and Boiotia are discussed by van den Eijnde (2010). The period from 519-424, if seen through Theban eyes, is a period bounded (literally and figuratively) by the conflict with Attika.

275 Lavelle (2004), makes the point implicitly at p.7 and pp.13-15.

276 The relationship between the Peisistratids and Boiotia was close for much of the sixth century (see above, n.270), and prominent Plataians might have been aware of the dynamics in Athens at the time.

277 For the dating and construction of the altar see Crosby (1949); Thompson (1952); Gadbery (1992). See also Meiggs and Lewis (1988), no.11.

278 Badian (1993), 109-123. Badian’s view that the Plataians’ effectively handed themselves over as slaves to the Athenians is too strong, and the evidence from burial mounds at Marathon on which he bases much of his reconstruction is inconclusive. A shorter, but more nuanced consideration of the symbolic
heightened in significance when considered alongside the later move of Eleutherai from the geographical periphery of Attika to the political centre of Athens by way of the movement of the cult of Dionysus that might have been a catalyst for the foundation of the City Dionysia\textsuperscript{279}.

One of the only mentions of \textit{horoi} in Boiotia in this period in literary sources also appears in relation to the discourse between Athens and Plataia. Another example of the spatial aspect to Plataian dependency is in the events immediately preceding the battle of Plataia in 479BC when the Plataians symbolically removed their boundary stones, to make themselves ‘part’ of Attika\textsuperscript{280}. This interesting passage has much to contribute to discussions of the relationship. Firstly it demonstrates that the land of Plataia and Athens was recognised as contiguous, but had a set boundary, and that it was preserved (at least in normal times) by the physical markers over which the Plataians had some control. Secondly, the act confirms the desire of Plataia to actively employ spatial awareness and performance in the politics of dependency, confirming the position it had manufactured in 519 and in 490 by participation at the battle of Marathon. The very existence of a marker of the boundary between Plataia and Athens indicates that there was discussion/arbitration concerning the positioning of the border, and that Plataia had some desire to maintain its territorial independence from Attika.

\textit{Kephissos}

The Kephissos was the other major river in ancient Boiotia and poses particular problems to the historian in that its course has probably changed a great deal since antiquity\textsuperscript{281}. The river flowed into Boiotia from the northwest portion of the valley in which Chaironeia was situated, and the valley’s most renowned quality was that it was the gateway to and from Boiotia; the route that almost all invaders of or through the area employed (see Figure 2.6, above, for image of valley entrance seen from Panopeus)\textsuperscript{282}. Depending on where the river flowed and at what time Boiotia was entered, the river could act as a guide to movement, even if not regularly a bulwark against movement in certain directions. Lake Kopais was also known as the Kephissian

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{enumerate}
\item For the Boiotian fortification of Eleutherai and its significance for the relationship between Attika and Boiotia, see below, Chapter 3.III.v, with Figure 3.18, showing the plain below the akropolis fortification.
\item Plut. \textit{Arist.} 11.8.
\item The river’s current course is not helpful in discerning its ancient path: Farinetti (2011), 104.
\item It is notable that both Chaironeia and Panopeus display early and sophisticated fortification that were maintained throughout the historical periods: Fossey (1988), 375-379.
\end{enumerate}
\end{footnotesize}
Lake, reflecting the primary importance of the water brought by the river to the existence of the lake. The alternative name prompts consideration of the lake as merely a reservoir for the river before it finds its way to the sea via subterranean channels. The Bronze Age settlement at Orchomenos had controlled and diverted the river through engineering in order to open up the floor of Kopais for their benefit, and the memory of this manipulation, combined with its constant re-filling of the lake must have had an effect on the latter Orchomenians, given that so much of their land depended upon the level of the lake. This awareness of the supply and management of water would have been emphasised from the upper parts of Orchomenos, where it would have been possible to see the river Kephissos in the majority of its Boiotian course as well as the entirety of Lake Kopais (Figures 3.5 and 3.6).

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Fig. 3.5: View E. from Orchomenos akropolis over the draineld Lake Kopais.

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283 The alternative names (Kopais/Kephissos) have connotations of changing relationships and perception of the lake’s provenance and role; it would make more sense for the Kephissian Lake to be an older title, reflecting the necessities of diverting its flow to reclaim the land. The relation to Kopai would have been more pronounced in times when the lake was at a larger extent, given the names connotations of ‘oars’. Strabo’s account of the fear of Kopai being swallowed up emphasises this proximity, Strabo. 9.2.18. For the other name for Kopais, Leukonis, see Steph. Byz. s.v. Kōpai. This name appears in the Hesiodic Ehoiai (fr. 28, 70.9) as a son of Athamas. Athamas was a legendary king of Orchomenos and therefore links the lake to the community in genealogical terms.
Natural features do not delimit the borders in the Kephissos valley and the River Kephissos played a similar role to that of Asopus, in that its principal role was facilitator of irrigation rather than promoter of social division\textsuperscript{284}. Only one major Boiotian settlement (Chaironeia) occupied the valley through which the river flowed, and in broad terms the most important division for this community would have been that between itself and Panopeus, rather than between itself and Orchomenos\textsuperscript{285}. It is unclear how much of a role the river played in the relationship between Orchomenos and Chaironeia, but their combined control of the Kephissos Valley was an obvious concern for the architects of a Boiotian ‘federal’ geography. The evidence for the detailed operation of the Boiotian league is related to the situation in 395BC (\textit{Hell.Oxy.} 16), and the account of Thucydides (4.76) regarding the political link between Chaironeia and Orchomenos in 424 is traditionally cited as a discrepancy between the situation in 395 and this earlier period\textsuperscript{286}. With the paucity of information it is possible to offer diverse explanations as to what provoked the political separation of the two communities, but it is likely that it is a relatively simple change made along geographic lines following an incident that would cause central Boiotian authorities to be suspicious.

\textsuperscript{284} McInerney (1999), 60, n.49, picks up on the possibility of the division between Panopeus and Chaironeia being naturally demarcated by a tributary of the river from early accounts.

\textsuperscript{285} Pausanias’ account (9.24.1) of the division between Chaironeia and Panopeus based around what seems to be a Bronze-Age tomb and treasure (Frazer (1898) v.5, 110f.), is impossible to date as a tradition. However, it is still useful because it is an example of the kind of narrative that would surely have been an intrinsic part of many border definitions between smaller communities in earlier periods. Cf. Schachter (1981), 199 n.1. See also Nagy (1990), 143. Cf. Watkins (2001), 164, n.11; Arafat (1992).

\textsuperscript{286} With Hornblower (1991), \textit{ad loc}. See also Hellanicus \textit{FrHist} 4 fr. 81, for the relationship as explicitly ‘syntelic’ The deliberate break of local syntelic relationships is significant for the later pattern of Theban domination. See below, n.556, and \textit{Annex}, pp.277-281.
of the Kephissos corridor guardians, Orchomenos and Chaironeia. This event was probably the planned revolt of late 424 in which federal action was taken against Orchomenos for its part in the conspiracy287. A straight comparison between the likely arrangement before and after 424 demonstrates several key features of geography and dependency in Boiotia.

The political arrangement of the Boiotia before the change was made on the basis of population size plus geographic location. The decision to break apart the unit of Chaironeia and Orchomenos, without reducing the representation of either, is a significant indicator of the regional thought of the federation. Instead of punitive action (Orchomenos/Chaironeia being destroyed or losing its representation on the council), the mode of redress is to change geographic orientation whilst ensuring the security of the borders of the region as a whole (See Figure 3.7 for geography of units and above, Table 1 for the demographic basis of the organisation). The reaction to the related anti-federal conspiracy in Thespiai, where the walls were destroyed but council representation was unaffected, also suggests that control and conditioning of space was as important as the intricacies of political arrangement288.

287 Thuc. 4.76.3.
288 For the destruction of the walls in 423 and control of walling more generally, see below, Chapter 3.III.iii, with n.360.
The one mention of a significant effect of a fluctuation of the river level is immediately before the battle of Chaironeia in 338BC\(^{289}\). This fluctuation affected the course and location of the battle and it is a sobering reminder of the paucity of information when it comes to such apparently ‘freak’ events\(^{290}\). Though the communities near the river would have derived direct benefits from the river, in broad historical terms, the river valley and its facilitation of the movement of large numbers of people in and out of Boiotia from northern Greece would have been the most significant aspect of this region for the majority of Boiotians. The seasonal and local meteorological variations that would have changed the river’s course and flow would have affected both Chaironeia and Orchomenos. The site of both communities (slightly removed and elevated from the bottom of the river valley) was militarily defensive, but might also have been a precautionary measure against the threat posed by the flooding of the river.

**Seas**

The consideration of the sea as an integral part of territory plays little role in recent research, save where important for trade or thalassocracy. Of greater moment for the majority of communities situated by the sea would surely have been the direct social and economic possibilities afforded to them. It is denying the main function of these sites if their boundaries are considered only in terms of the land, but the difficulty is to explain how to articulate the territorial aspects of the sea for a community. Constantakopoulou recently advanced the understanding of the sea in ancient Greek history with her study of the network patterns of the wider Greek world, and issues surrounding a pre-modern conception of the sea\(^{291}\). What she also expressed is that for those who live near the sea and use it regularly for transport and economic benefit, the land is only a part of the equation. In order to begin to understand what this means for the conception of boundaries and borders for the communities situated by the seas, it is necessary to account as fully as possible for both the geographical situation of the site and of the human elements; the links and interactions between these would play an important part in the development and character of these sites\(^{292}\).

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\(^{290}\) The obvious parallel is the increase in the level of the Asopos at the beginning of the Peloponnesian War, see above n.267.


\(^{292}\) The situation of the Boiotian communities by the sea and the networks implied by elements such as wind direction and prevailing currents are discussed above, in the context of Boiotian attitudes to the sea in general: Above, Chapter 2.II.viii.
When viewed as a whole through the period under consideration, Boiotia was a region for which the sea brought more military threat than opportunity. Through the fifth century, there were many attempted incursions into the hinterland of the towns next to the sea by invaders, some of them more successful than others. With the emergence of a strong, confident and successful centralised power in the fourth century, many coastal communities were fortified. This fortification was dramatic and imposing. At Anthedon and Siphai, there are visible remains of protective moles running out to the sea (Figure 3.8 for Anthedon). Their construction was patently a practical act, and they might well have replaced similar earlier constructions. But the rebuilding of the moles that occurred with the fortification of the sites is of symbolic as well as practical importance. It might well have been the implicit understanding of the change in space brought about by this federal building scheme that led Ephoros to consider Boiotia the best-placed region for exercising hegemony over Greece. The difficulty Boiotia had in relation to this was that the southern ports in particular had poor links to the interior, whilst the distance between the two nearest ports on either coast, Kreusis and Delion, was some 31 miles as the crow flies, and further in practical terms. The settlement patterns of the interior conspired with the natural setting of the inlets to push the harbour towns to the margins of the territory. It is telling that the largest town in Boiotia demographically (Thebes) was correspondingly one of the furthest from the sea.

293 Though Anthedon suffered also from difficult communications with the centre particularly as a result of the mountains to its south and west and seems to have been in general very isolated. The possibility of the region being effectively broken off from the rest of Boiotia was exploited in 313BC when Antigonos’ nephew fortified the pass and for a short period operated independently from the region of Anthedon and Salganeos. See Bakhuizen (1970), 103-140, and Georges (1986), 47, n.71, for a longer term view of the importance of this area.

294 The large costs associated with the construction of near-simultaneous large-scale building works would have necessarily been a matter for federal resources. For wider considerations of the fortification building scheme see below, Chapter 3.III.v.

295 See Heurtley (1923) for discussion of possible Bronze-Age overland trade routes from the southern harbours to the eastern harbours. Though Pettigrew (2011), has recently emphasised that the diolkos at Korinth was not used as a crossing point for ships as much as previously surmised there was still a major difference between the overland trade routes of Boiotia and the isthmus of Korinth (only 3.5 miles across).

296 Thebes is second only to Orchomenos of the major settlements in terms of distance from the sea (Orchomenos is 17.5 miles to Larymna, Thebes is 13 miles to Kreusis and 12 miles to Aigosthena, though over Kithairon), though it does admittedly have excellent routes linking it to Aulis. Though it has been argued that Thebes benefitted from its location in the Mykenaian period at the hub of trade routes, the continuation of settlement in this location had more to do with the agricultural fertility of the Teneric Plain than the possibility of garnering wealth through trade. The impossibility of long walls or any protective fortification linking the major communities with coastal communities is paralleled by other major communities such as Sparta and Gythion. However, the coastal communities of Boiotia were communities in their own right, and not simply ‘harbours’ for the major inland communities of Boiotia.
In a region where the major settlements were concentrated inland, and the communities near the sea had economies based largely on fishing, building extensive harbour moles would have had greater importance than for a large, wealthy trading community\textsuperscript{297}. They denote a relationship with the sea characterized by knowledge of natural inhospitality and human danger. Harbours are an expensive and elaborate feature that demonstrate a desire to permanently affect the relationship between land and sea.

Farming would have played an important role in the life of the communities at Aulis, Kreusis, Siphai and Chorsiai (see Figures 2.16-17, 3.9 for views of farmland and harbours)\textsuperscript{298}, but the location of the settlements located by the sea should, as with their

\textsuperscript{297} Purcell (1995), 134-135, and Dalby (1995), 408, both quote Pseudo-Dikaiarchos (Muller), 104 and Herakleides Kretikos On the cities of Greece, 23-4, as evidence of the poverty of Anthedon: given his caustic and irreverent take on the rest of Boiotia however, Herakleides should not be considered a reliable witness to Boiotian society. For the best dedicated overview of Anthedon, see Schlæger, Blackman, and Schaefer (1968). Cf. n.494, on possible links between Anthedon and Akraiphia.

\textsuperscript{298} See Farinetti (2011), for a detailed breakdown of all of the land in territory of each of these communities (p.164 for Kreusis, p.176 for southwest areas, p.221 for Aulis). Fossey (1988), 263, claims that Anthedon had little farming, but this is largely based on the testimony of Herakleides (23-4). Given that Anthedon is relatively isolated, and the unpredictability of the sea (and supply of fish Gallant (1985), 40-44 (cf. Mylona (2008)), it is likely that the available farmland and possibilities for mountain grazing were used for more than viticulture.
land-borne counterparts, be considered as a mid-point of territory\textsuperscript{299}. The construction of a harbour becomes central to the relationship; it physically embodies a desire to mediate the fluctuation and dangers of the sea so it can form a stable part of a community. A settlement with a harbour wall has taken an instrumental role in ordering its relationship with the natural world. What is important for the concept of boundaries in Boiotia is that the fourth century constructions, being patently a product of a wealthy central agency, were deliberately used to alter the relationship between centre and periphery, as well as land and sea. By building the moles, Boiotia had re-articulated its relationship with the sea, and the broad territorial rhythms associated therein.

The evidence for the importance of territory in the relationship between land and sea is more pronounced in the period of the Makedonian monarchs, where power was often paraded at a distance with great ships, but the erecting of a harbour mole, especially at a time of military hegemony, must have had the effect of stating a claim of greater possession of the sea\textsuperscript{300}. Any ships travelling from Aigosthena and Pagai into the Korinthian Gulf would have had an excellent view of the strength of the new

\textsuperscript{299} Chorsiai offers an alternative position to that of its neighbouring southern harbours, situated on a rocky akropolis some distance removed from the bay at modern Paralia: Fossey (1988), 187.

\textsuperscript{300} Though with very different intentions from usual harbour moles, Alexander would rapidly alter the traditional praxis of land and sea, or mainland and island, with the building of the great mole to Tyre: Arr. \textit{Anab.} 2.18ff.
fortifications along the three southern harbours, and these might have acted as a catalyst for their own impressive fortifications. Harbours can open up an area to the influence of trade, but as with urban fortification they can also be a defensive feature, with a restrictive influence, and this fits better with the aims of the federal constructions at the harbours.

The desire to restrict access to the hinterland would have been a natural response to the vulnerability of attack from the sea or threats to control of its harbours that Boiotia experienced over a prolonged period, and especially from the outset of the Peloponnesian War to the battle of Leuktra. The table below illustrates some of the major examples of this.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Location/Event</th>
<th>Source</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>490</td>
<td>Persian looting of Tanagraia</td>
<td>Hdt. 6.118</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>457</td>
<td>Athenian blockade of Korinthian Gulf</td>
<td>Thuc. 1.107.3; Diod. 11.80.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>426</td>
<td>Athenian Attack on Tanagra from sea</td>
<td>Thuc. 3.91</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>424</td>
<td>Athenian Attack at Delion and Siphai</td>
<td>Thuc. 4.89</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>414</td>
<td>Thrakian Attack at Mykalessos</td>
<td>Thuc. 7.29f.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>395</td>
<td>Agesilaos’ landing at Aulis</td>
<td>Xen. Hell. 3.4.4; Plut. Ages. 6.4-6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>371</td>
<td>Spartan seizure of Kreusis</td>
<td>Xen. Hell. 6.4.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>270s</td>
<td>Capture of royal ship at Larymna</td>
<td>Polybius 20.5.7-11</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 4: Sea-borne attacks against Boiotia c.490-371BC

The majority of the events fall around an important period in Boiotian development between the beginning of the Peloponnesian War and the victory over the Spartans in 371BC. The Third Sacred War, which began in 355, was conducted entirely on land.

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301 The impressive walls of Pagai and Aigosthena are notoriously difficult to place in historical context. Most considerations of their construction date them to the period after the southern Boiotian ports were fortified, but with the opaque nature of their history, and the fact that Aigosthena was definitely part of the Boiotian confederacy later on, it might be that they were of Boiotian design. Cooper (2000), 158-162, 181-3, for support of this view, who dates both between 371 and the 340s. See below, n.399 for how this might have fitted into the wider pattern of Boiotian fourth-century fortification.

302 For an excellent analysis of the role of the ‘port of trade’ in Greek cities: Möller (2000), 8-26, especially 19ff.

303 The awareness of the vulnerability of the Tanagraia to attack from Euboia seems to have manifested itself in cult practices that claim high antiquity: Paus. 9.22.2 with below, nn.545, 551.

304 Though the blockade was designed to impair Spartan movement, the geographic ramifications for Boiotia of Athens being able to cut its link with the Peloponnese would not have been insignificant.

305 The attack at Delion was made led by Hippokrates over land, but the likelihood of some assistance by sea is highly probable, given the ability of Athenians to escape by a number of harbours following the battle: Thuc. 4.96.7; Plut. de Genio Soc 581d-e.
and the threat of interference from harbours therefore sits squarely between the federal arrangement of the Boiotians following the expulsion of the Athenians, and the beginning of the brief hegemony over mainland Greece that probably witnessed also the construction of a sizable fleet\textsuperscript{306}. The Boiotians turned a series of weak points into a potential basis of a wide hegemony and the monumental fortification programme of the southern ports should be seen in light of this awareness of vulnerability\textsuperscript{307}.

\textit{Euripos Bridge}

Bridges are perhaps one of the most forceful instruments used to change the way in which a landscape is used and perceived\textsuperscript{308}. The bridge that was constructed over the Euripos in 411BC has several layers of relevance for this period. There is little detailed evidence for the bridge either archaeologically or in the literary sources. The sole reference to the construction of the bridge is however, intriguing:

\begin{verbatim}
συγκαταθημένων δὲ τῶν Βοιωτῶν διὰ τὸ κάκεινος συμφέρειν τὴν Εὔβοιαν εἶναι τοῖς μὲν ἄλλοις νῦσσον, ἐκατότερὸς δ’ ἦπερον· δύστερ οἱ πόλεις ἀπάσι πρὸς τὴν διάχωσιν ἐπερρόσθησαν καὶ πρὸς ἄλληλας ἡμιλλόντο· οὐ γὰρ μόνον τοῖς πολίταις ἐξεύρει πανδημεῖ προσέταξαν, ἀλλὰ καὶ τοῖς παροικοῦσι ξένοις, ὥστε διὰ τὸ πλῆθος τὸν τοῖς ἔργος προσιόντων τὴν πρόθεσιν ταχέως λαβεῖν συντέλειαν. τὴς μὲν οὖν Εὔβοιας κυτεσκευάσθη τὸ χώμα κατὰ τὴν Χαλκίδα, τῆς δὲ Βοιωτίας πλησίον Αὐλίδος· ἐνταῦθα γὰρ ὁ μεταξὺ τόπος ἦν στενότατος…. ὁ γὰρ διέκπλους ἀπελευθή μιὰ νη. ὑκοδόμησαν δὲ καὶ πύργους ύψηλους ἐπ’ ἀμφοτέρων τῶν ἄκρων, καὶ ξυλίνας τοῖς διάρροις ἐπέστησαν γεφύρας.
Diodorus Siculus 13.47.4-5
\end{verbatim}

That this incident has not been explored more often in modern literature is inexplicable, given the effect that it must have had on the relationship not just between Chalkis and eastern Boiotia, but also of Euboea and Boiotia more generally and particularly the relationship of Euboea with Attika. The various stages in the bridge’s development through history have been excellently treated by Bakhuizen (the old bridge now occupies the original site: Figure 3.10)\textsuperscript{309}, but the significance of the bridge for the way in which it affected the perception and use of the landscape have not been so fully investigated. This is especially important when viewed from the perspective of Athens against whom the act was deliberately aimed.

\textsuperscript{306} Buckler and Beck (2008), 188-198.
\textsuperscript{307} The last reference in the table to Larymna in the 270s is significant in that Larymna was a new harbour that the Boiotians had deliberately taken into the federal arrangement and here used canny diplomacy to secure for themselves advantageous terms with a Hellenistic king. See above, n.195, for this event as part of pattern of equestrianism in Boiotia.
\textsuperscript{308} Dennis (2008), 4-28.
\textsuperscript{309} Bakhuizen (1970), 48-64.
The Athenians were undergoing a tumultuous period, and it is as part of the full-scale revolt of Euboia that the bridge was constructed. That the approach was made by the Euboians and not by the Boiotians would augment this by emphasising the direction of connection; here is not a deliberate Boiotian policy of aggrandizement and capitalisation. This is a Euboian initiative designed to stave off the worst excesses of Athenian domination. Because of the timing of the construction, the understanding must be that the bridge would not have been tolerated by the Athenians, and thus was designed to stymie the possibility of control in the future. The Chalkidians were effectively allying themselves with the premier land force of the period, harnessing the unique possibility of their situation in order to prevent future Athenian control by the sea. The bridge would have stood not only as a practical symbol of cross-Euripos cooperation and connection, but also as a manifestation of having overcome Athenian power.

Fig. 3.10: Euripos bridge on the site of original bridge (the channel has been artificially narrowed).

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*The event, though not perhaps posing a terminal threat to Athens, would have had major implications for Athens, especially in combination with the fortification of Dekeleia. Thucydides 8.95 gives a sense of how important Euboia was felt to be: Εὐβοια γάρ αὐτοίς ἀποκεκλημένης τῆς Ἀττικῆς πάντα ἦν*. Livestock moved there from Attika: Thuc. 2.14.1. cf. Moreno (2007), 77-123.
Fig. 3.11: Panorama of area west of Euripos
The effects of the Euripos bridge are difficult to discern with the paucity of primary sources, but there might be evidence through archaeology or cultural exchange that could yet allow greater insight into the implications of this significant change in the landscape. Figure 3.11 illustrates how closely linked Boiotia and Chalkis are physically, and the fortifications described at either end of the bridge denote the militarised background to its construction, and the early (Athenian) threat to its construction/survival:

‘Θηραμένης δ’ ὑπ’ Ἀθηναίων ἀποσταλεῖς μετὰ νεὼν τριάκοντα τὸ μὲν πρῶτον ἐπεχείρησε κωλύειν τοὺς ἐπὶ τῶν ἔργων, πολλοῦ δὲ πλήθους στρατιωτῶν συμπαρόντος τοῖς κατασκευάζοντι τὰ χώματα ταύτης μὲν τῆς ἐπιβολῆς ἀπέστη, τὸν δὲ πλοῦν ἐπὶ τῶν νῆσων ἐποίησατο.’
Diod. 13.47.6

The construction of fortifications and towers was a particularly powerful tool in the armoury of those wishing to redesign or re-orientate the physical spaces of Boiotia. As the bridge would have changed the way in which the inhabitants of an area perceived their landscape, so would the position and visibility of towers, forts and city walls. The following sections investigate the position and form of the various military constructions in the Boiotian landscape and more importantly, how these might have affected the lives of the inhabitants of the region and the discourse between communities.
3.III. Construction and authority

3.III.i. Watch towers and forts

There is no evidence for localized inter-community pitched battle in Boiotia after the early sixth century, but despite this, friction and hostility toward one another dominates the orthodox narrative of the centuries following these early conflicts\(^{311}\). If the literary testimonies were taken away, what evidence would there be for this hostile outlook, and does it hold up to the converse accounts of the strong resonance of the Boiotian ethnic outlook in areas such as language and festivals? One way in which the academic division between poleis and landscape has been bridged (if incompletely) has been through the study of the manner of construction and positioning of watchtowers and forts. The construction of any fortification inescapably militarises the landscape for anyone living in or travelling through the area\(^{312}\). There are however differences in the type and purpose of military outposts that would have affected the production and experience of space in different ways.

The practicalities of what a fort or a tower is for, and what it is capable of doing is seldom considered in narrative Boiotian history, or even in wider Greek history\(^{313}\). Towers can be grouped together with forts in being military installations usually geographically removed from the major centres of settlement. Forts and towers vary hugely in size and position, and the complexity of the systems conceived and constructed can take enormous industry to understand\(^{314}\). A watchtower is very different from a fort in several key regards, especially when considering them in conjunction with the communities that they serve. Watchtowers are small, and though a not inconsiderable effort must be made to quarry stone and transport it to often isolated and precipitous situations, they are fundamentally a smaller undertaking than a fort. They require fewer people to man them, which for a smaller community would be significant demographically and economically (it is likely they would be supplied from their home community rather than being a resident garrison), and they do not require the same level of engineering of the land that a construction such as a fort would require.

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\(^{311}\) That is, not involving another ‘big’ power. For the earlier examples of conflict see, Larson (2007), 182-186 and Buck (1979), 100 n.106, and 123ff.

\(^{312}\) Ma (2000b), 341.

\(^{313}\) Exceptions are Munn (1993), 19, 25-33; Lawrence (1979), 187-197.

A watchtower differs in its agency from that of a fort because it contributes to conditioning martial relationships without the threat of direct intervention. A single tower has the effective independent military capacity of almost nil, since they cannot house enough men to counter any but the smallest of incursions, and the possibility of a small group rapidly traversing the land of an enemy near a watchtower was relatively easily achieved, especially when on horseback\textsuperscript{315}. They are useful for the historian in that they demarcate both possible borders and diachronic adjustments in the perception and orientation of communities. They might be placed at the very line of a boundary to look into a neighbouring territory\textsuperscript{316}. They can also be used at the perimeters of border areas to marshal the activity of that area in favour of the possessor of the tower. That these towers could play an important role in affecting the course of historical events in Boiotia is indisputable, and their very existence suggests the importance of surveillance and control of what is visible\textsuperscript{317}. That a polis of any size bearing the general threat of incursion and conflict in mind would post lookouts is not in doubt, but for this function to take a robust physical form rather than \textit{ad hoc} scouting indicates a degree of constancy in territorial perception\textsuperscript{318}. The building of a tower implies a relationship between the authority that sponsors it and the land, and to a desire to change that relationship.

Forts are not widely employed away from the urban centres in Boiotia, probably because of the very full coverage of the landscape by settlement nuclei. However, the fourth-century constructions in south-west Boiotia could be seen as an example of forts, though they are themselves technically city walls. The size and type of walls employed in Eleutherai, Siphai, Thisbai and Chorsiai are more elaborate than would be expected for communities of their magnitude, and might be best viewed as somewhere between garrison forts of federal Boiotia and city-walls defending the communities themselves\textsuperscript{319}. The best-known example of a border fort from Boiotia is at Panakton\textsuperscript{320}. The fort itself had a circuit of 480m and was the source of much friction between Athens and Boiotia.

\textsuperscript{315} Munn (1993), 25-7.
\textsuperscript{316} Mazi tower on the border between Attika and Boiotia: Camp (1991), 199-202. Oinoc had a height of 12m: Lawrence (1979), 187-197.
\textsuperscript{317} Hanson (1998), 95-96, on the example of the 370s in particular.
\textsuperscript{318} In Boiotia we have an important example of a lookout not being posted, (The capture of Plataia by Thebes in 373BC: Paus. 9.1.6, ἡ μηδὲ ὀχοπός ἐτέκακο υπὸ τῶν Πλαταίων) implying the often \textit{ad hoc} nature of surveillance. Aineias Tacticus discusses lookouts in several places and the need for the contingency of speed should signalling fail. In his conception of signalling and the protection of the \textit{chora}, his interest is more focussed upon the the human rather than the architectural features of a system: Aineias Tacticus 6.1-6.7, with Whitehead (1990), 50-51.
\textsuperscript{319} The fortifications at Kreusis are probably also part of this scheme, but the remains are less easily dated: Fossey (1988), 159-160.
\textsuperscript{320} Munn and Zimmermann-Munn (1986); Munn and Zimmermann-Munn (1989), 73-77.
over the period under review. The fort was situated at the fringes of a large fertile plain, which was itself devoid of major settlement. It would have acted as the effective controller of the Skourta Plain in the absence of any permanent community from either bordering area, and because of that situation, control of the fort would have been vital for control of this large area that not only provided extensive pasturage but access to some of the best routes from Boiotia to Attika. In this context it is possible to understand why the Boiotians are so reluctant to give back the fort to the Athenians intact in 421BC. The effect of the installation would have been to militarise the supposed neutral area, and to be a natural base for exerting influence over the important land when need arose. Here again the permanence of physical military installation is emphasised; even when Attika and Boiotia were at peace with one another, the fort and its garrison would have been an agent in the landscape, militarising the space and acting as an agent in the landscape in favour of the authority that controlled the installation.

Fig. 3.12: Mavrovouni fortress

The Mavrovouni fortress, situated in the hills above Siphai and between Thisbai and Thespiai, is another intriguing piece of evidence in understanding the Boiotian perception of their own landscape. The large fortification is difficult to date, but it has

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321 Thuc. 5.3.5; 5.42, (Panakton taken and later dismantled by Boiotians in Peloponnesian War), and Munn (1993), 7.
322 Also cf. above, n.317. See also the example of Oinoe early in the Peloponnesian War, which serves as a secure refuge for the Athenian inhabitants of the area, but does little to stop Archidamos acting as he wishes in the surrounding area: Thuc. 2.18-19; Krentz (2007), 168.
been most convincingly placed in the period of Spartan occupation of western Boiotia in the 370s\textsuperscript{323}. The need to construct a fort in an uninhabited area rather than basing forces at an existing centre (Sparta controlled nearby Thespiae at the time) is evidence that the Spartans were attempting to form a different alignment of territory rather than simply to dominate existing Boiotian settlements. After being evicted from the Kadmeia in 379, the Spartans sometimes struggled to control the passes at Kithairon, and the fort seems to have been designed to allow the Spartans free control of the western side of Boiotia, including the option to use the key ports to the southwest\textsuperscript{324}. After the victory at Leuktra, the fortress was appropriated by the Thebans as a part of the new federal system of fortification, and a recognizable Boiotian style tower built within the walls of the much less well-constructed Spartan fort\textsuperscript{325}. The spatial reconfiguration had symbolic as well as practical value, and the process of stamping older militarised space with this newer, aesthetically regular and imposing style of fortification might have been used elsewhere\textsuperscript{326}.

3.III.ii. City walls

The work of the surface survey teams in Boiotia over the last three decades has illuminated the landscape in many ways, and should lead to the desertion of the ‘island-polis’ conception of settlement, especially prevalent in the conception of fortified urban settlements\textsuperscript{327}. It is important to understand that ‘fortified’ does not necessarily mean that the community was concentrated more densely. The situation of farmsteads and houses quite close to the walls of urban centres in Boiotia is evidence of continued occupation of the areas outside the walls, even when daily transport would have been possible to access the land\textsuperscript{328}. An example of the opposite arrangement of land-access can be seen in the narrative of the capture of Plataia by Thebes in the 370s. The Plataians use their walls to remain immune from Theban threat, and only when they

\textsuperscript{323} Tomlinson and Fossey (1970), 256-260; Schwandner (1977), 518-19.
\textsuperscript{324} The Thebans in 335 reach the isthmus at Korinth with difficulty by sea, (probably via Kreusis). It must be assumed that the Makedonians (or Thespians/Plataians loyal to Makedon) had taken control of this fort. (Dinarchos 1.18)
\textsuperscript{325} The tower was almost certainly part of the same Boiotian post-Leuktra building scheme as Eleutherai: Tomlinson and Fossey (1970), 260-261; Camp (1991), 197-199.
\textsuperscript{326} Askra is an obvious candidate, with its akropolis walls dated from the eighth to the fourth centuries, and then the ‘compartment’ style tower (the same as at Mavrovouni and Eleutherai etc.) being built within the perimeter of the old fortification: Fossey (1988), 143. Cf. below, Chapter 3.III.v for the post-Leuktra fortification system and n.991 for ‘compartment’ towers.
\textsuperscript{327} Lawrence (1979), 112.
\textsuperscript{328} Thespiae has been particularly noted in this respect, Bintliff, Howard, and Snodgrass (2007), 173f.
know that they are not going to be threatened by their powerful neighbour do the
farmers venture to the furthest of the lands of their polis:\n\(\text{καὶ ἐς τοὺς ἀγροὺς, ὅπωσι ἀπωτέρω τοῦ ἀστεως ἤσαν, οὐδὲ ἐς τούτους ἀνὰ πᾶσαν}
ὑρχοντο τὴν ἡμέραν, ἀλλὰ— ἠπίσταντο γάρ τοὺς Θηβαίους—πανδημεὶ καὶ ἄμα ἐπὶ
πλείον εἰώθεσαν βουλεύεθαι—παρεφύλασσον τὰς ἐκκλησίας αὐτῶν, καὶ ἐν τῷ
τοσοῦτῳ καθ' ἡσυχίαν ἐφεώρων τὰ ἐαυτῶν καὶ οἱ ἔσχατοι γεωργοῦντες.\)
Paus. 9.1.5

This passage is evidence not just of the way in which the Plataians conducted themselves
in response to their distrust of the Thebans, but also of the importance of inter-visibility
in marshalling community discourse. It is not possible to see far beyond the Asopos
southwards from the centre of ancient Plataia, and from the steep but accessible slopes
above Plataia it is still difficult to see the Kadmeia itself:330.

Walls are the most obvious statements of division in the historical record. Their size and
design give them an unmatched tendency to remain at least partially preserved \textit{in situ}
and make them unavoidably attractive to the historian, especially in an area such as
Boiotia which is so often frustratingly absent from the literary sources. Using walls as
evidence for reconstruction of the past is however notoriously difficult, exacerbated by
the general Greek preference for walls unadorned with specific information about their
construction:331. Unadorned does not of course imply the aesthetics of the walls were
unconsidered. On the contrary, it has been argued that a civic enceinte is a \textit{sine qua non}
of the polis, the most explicitly civic of all constructions, and it is invested with the same
care over design and symbolism as other large civic buildings:332. Especially in the
period before the development of sophisticated siege engines, walls could offer
protection against outside interference:333. Even in the period of the great Makedonian
siege trains, wall construction flourished amongst the Greek communities, defying the

\[329\] For more on this see above, n.318. The development and level of habitation of the intra-mural area of
Plataia is a matter of current debate, and very important for the demographic estimates: \textit{Arch.Rep.} (2011),
14, with Hansen (2008), 269-270. See also Thuc. 2.5, for a close parallel.
\[330\] See image of view over Plataia to Thebes (Figure 2.13, above) for detail of this.
\[331\] Though see major exceptions, such as the Kononian wall of Athens: Rhodes and Osborne (2003) no.9.
And see the Islamic walls of the late first millennium for examples of the opposite phenomenon Blair
(2000).
\[333\] Though not, of course, from the peril of internal discord and stasis, which meant that walls had two
faces 'janus-like', monitoring and offering protection against threats from within and without: Whitehead
traditional perspective of the ‘decline of the polis’ and implying an entirely different model of inter-polis articulation\textsuperscript{334}.

City walls regulate community perception. Their height and extent, which often accentuate the natural defensive topography of settlements, make them visually imposing and must have had a significant impact on the way in which individuals and communities interacted with one another\textsuperscript{335}. That impact would naturally be bound up with explicit military considerations, but there was the expression of a relationship of division and exclusion, as well as civic prosperity and pride. The divisive aspect of a wall is naturally physical, but it is also psychological. The Plataians were not physically separated from the rest of Boiotia: individuals and families owned and worked land that would have rested against that of Thebans, Thespians, other Parasopeians and possibly Tanagrans, as well as probably that of the ‘liminal’ communities to the south, such as Eleutherai, over the passes of Kithairon. But owing to their walls, they were able to resist military strength and remain apart from the group. Because of historical circumstance and a continuous desire to remain outside of formal political integration with the other communities of Boiotia, the walls would come to symbolize this ‘otherness’. In this sense, the walls of Plataia, visible from the territory of nearly all of those major communities mentioned above, would have marked a break in the territorial continuity of Boiotia, a human construction altering the way in which the landscape could be perceived. The destruction of the Plataian walls was therefore a condition of the practical unification of Boiotia, and after the failure to bring Plataia into the political federation peacefully at the beginning of the Peloponnesian War, the destruction of the walls was actively sought\textsuperscript{336}. The possible divisiveness of Thespiai was also mitigated by the destruction of that community’s walls in 423\textsuperscript{337}. That walls could

\textsuperscript{334} Ma (2000b), 339-343; Camp (2000), 50.

\textsuperscript{335} The desire of the Athenians to erect the walls immediately following 479 to change the parameters of discourse with the Spartans is evidence of the conscious appreciation of this Thuc. 1.90.2ff. The importance of the appearance of defensive strength could be as important as actual defensive strength: Aineias Tacticus 40.4-7.

\textsuperscript{336} Buck (1994), 11, is correct to emphasise that the mission against Plataia was a Boiotian federal activity and not simply Thebes wishing to bring Plataia into its own community, exactly resembling the actions of Thebes in 519 and exemplifying excellently the symbolic as well as the practical value of Plataia to the cause of Boiotian unity. This idea is developed further below, Annex, ‘The federal conception of Boiotian geography’, pp.251-252.

\textsuperscript{337} See below, n.360, and Buck (1994), 18-20. Also see account of Mykalessian walls below for possible Theban agency in their disrepair, below, ‘Standard and aesthetics of walling’, pp.112-118.
also signify unity and solidarity in Boiotia is not in doubt, but even when walls had been built with that aim, a change in circumstance could render them divisive again.\(^{338}\)

The inhabitants of Boiotia in the sixth, fifth and fourth centuries would have been aware of the legacy of Mykenaian fortification of their land, both through physical remains and because of the descriptions of their sites in the epic cycles.\(^{339}\) Many communities made use of their Mykenaian fortifications, the very existence of which might have encouraged continuity of habitation from the Bronze Age to the historical period.\(^{340}\) These fortifications and defence-works had a symbolic importance and significance because of their antiquity and the myths that were attached to them, but their preservation and re-use clearly demonstrates their practical value. The inheritance of these physical remains by an ethnic group whose own narrative had them migrating into the area after the Bronze Age produced a cleavage between the imagined space of the ethnic migrations and the physical space of the urban centre of the community. Fundamentally, it was clear that the physical aspects of the landscape predated the migration of the Boiotoi and this division provoked communities to re-fashion their mythology into a hybrid, which allowed local and regional space to run parallel to one another in a narrative sense.\(^{341}\)

The division of various types of fortification into different categories (towers, garrison forts, acropolis fortification, *Fluchtberg*, city-walls) reflects the importance of understanding agency in their building and function. A corporate decision to build a systemised defensive network (as I will argue below for the Boiotian system of the mid-fourth century) is very different from that of a single community deciding to gird its urban centre. The construction of city walls was a serious undertaking for any community, and the physical and economic resources as well as the time and manpower required were significant. The distinction between city walls that encircle an area large

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\(^{338}\) Chorsiai’s walls were almost certainly part of the Boiotian federal building programme of the second quarter of the fourth century: Cooper (2000), 190. Following their capture and use by the Phokians in the sacred war (McInerney (1999), 216), they were demolished by federal forces (Diodorus 16.58, 60; Fossey (1988), 191). Conversely, the walls of Panopeus, which the Boiotians wanted destroyed after the Sacred War, were rebuilt by Boiotians and Athenians only a few years later to help counter the threat of an invasion of the Kephissos Valley by Philip: Paus. 10.3.1-3 with Camp (2000), 45. Cf. *Hell.Oxy.* 18.5, which is suggestive of the strength of Panopeus’ walls in 395 BC when the Boiotians manage to take the προστάται of Panopeus (i.e. presumably the valley bottom, and the same φιλή καὶ συμμαχίδι χώρα (Plut. *Lys.* 29.3) that Lysander would soon after be buried in).

\(^{339}\) Hope-Simpson and Lazenby (1970), 19-37, for analysis of Boiotian sites with fortifications in the *Iliad.* Buck (1979), 33-44, give a brief overview of the Mykenaian material known until that point.

\(^{340}\) Thebes most notably, but many other communities such as Tegyra, Kopai, Haliartos and probably Orchomenos benefitted directly from the remains of the Bronze Age Fossey (1988); 277f. and 367f.

\(^{341}\) Further discussion of this idea, below, Chapter 4.II.i, pp.139-145.
enough to hold a community, and a small fortress designed as a stronghold in times of crisis (a ‘Fluchtberg’) is an important one, especially when analysing communities’ relationship with one another and the sociology of their interaction. To comprehend the social importance of the erection of these enceintes and the statement of identity that this entails, the development of Boiotian walls must be seen in its totality in the region as well as in the context of the development of fortifications elsewhere. Through viewing the development of walls in this broader context it is clear that the evidence from fortifications can play a valuable role in understanding community relationships. Boiotian history is better understood when the physical statements of discourse are placed beside the more obviously expressive examples from the literary and epigraphic record.

Though the relationship between urban centre and surrounding environs is at the heart of understanding Greek community interaction, the physical form and location of the asty is also an important agent in determining the nature of divisions between communities. That walls can have agency in their own right has been a feature of fortification literature for some time, and a conscious articulation of this might have characterized the major building projects of the fourth century in Boiotia\textsuperscript{342}. What is important for understanding division and demarcation is the way in which walls would affect community and individual life. The most heavily populated poleis in Boiotia were all fortified in their entirety at some point in the period under review. Sites such as Thebes, Haliartos, and Kopai capitalized on the remnants of Mykenaian foundations to augment their walls, whereas Tanagra underwent significant walling programmes early in the period that has led to the belief that this polis aspired to the hegemony of Boiotia\textsuperscript{343}. That walls should indicate a desire of a community to politically aggrandise itself is perhaps paradoxical considering their overtly defensive purpose, but this relationship was paralleled in the Mykenaian period. It enshrines the notion of invulnerability at the heart of rule, and in both the periods of relative dominance within Boiotia (Mykenaian Orchomenos and Thebes, and fourth-century Thebes) fortification and defence works played a crucial role in representing power and ordering the mode of interaction between communities.

\textsuperscript{342} For significance of ‘seven-gated’ Thebes, see below, n.620.

\textsuperscript{343} For a more sober view of the loose nature of any Boiotian organisation before 446BC see Larson (2007), 184-188. The possibility of Tanagran hegemony at some point between 479 and 457 is impossible to rule out conclusively, but the numismatic evidence often employed to support the hegemony (Fowler (1957)) is very weak and the urban fortification of Tanagra was not definitely constructed in this period.
3.III.iii. Territory, walls and control.

The suggestion that Tanagra could have exercised hegemony over Boiotia in the second quarter of the fifth century is likely to be misconceived, but it demonstrates the belief that a community wishing to exercise power over others necessarily requires defensive security for its own community. That defensive security is also at the heart of the ability of a community to act independently (or at least permit a degree of freedom from outside interference) is also widely attested; a situation that is more formally presented in fourth-century political thought and the dialogue between poleis and the monarchs of the post-Alexander period. There are several good examples from Boiotia that explicitly raise the issue of political possibility being linked to the physical aspects of the city, and through an exploration of these examples, a picture of the effect of walls on the relationship of community and wider region can be understood.

It is necessary to consider what effect urban enceintes would have had on the conception of boundaries and division of surrounding communities. The relationship between the location of Thespiai and the surrounding communities needs to be examined in light of the changing situation and fortification at the site and in its chora\textsuperscript{345}. Hesiod’s testimony is important in understanding the relationship between Thespiai and Askra in the seventh century. The argument over whether Askra (or Thespiai) was at this point a polis, or a ‘proto-polis’ is not important in understanding the conditioning of the individual experience. As will be shown in the case of Pindar and Korinna as well as Hesiod, the experience and perspective of the individual, when it can be discerned, is vital to understanding the discourse between communities and the land they inhabit\textsuperscript{346}.

Askra is situated at the eastern end of the Valley of the Muses, and its acropolis was built on top of a large natural pyramid from which the most commanding views of Boiotia are to be found.

\textsuperscript{344} Aristotle Politics 1326b-1327a; Rhetoric 1360a; Plato Laws 778d-e. See McNicoll (1997), 212-3 (written by N.P.Milner) for consideration of this in the Hellenistic period. To be free of garrisons would remain an important signifier in the relationship between ruler and polis (and the idea of autonomia) for several centuries.

\textsuperscript{345} The destruction of possible fortification remains in the late nineteenth century provides particular difficulty in assessing fortifications at Thespiai, particularly before the fifth century. Though destroyed in 479, the community refounded its urban centre in its traditional position, not well suited to defence. Schachter (1996), 105 on stupidity of Thespiai’s location, and pp.114-115 on destruction and re-foundation in 480-479. Surface survey settlement data summarised: Bintliff, Howard, and Snodgrass (2007), 129-143. Hdt. 8.75.1 indicates that Thespiai took on new members of the community following the Persian destruction. See table of city destructions/movements, above, Table 2.

\textsuperscript{346} The perspective of individual Boiotians is discussed below, Chapter 4.VI.
The pressure exerted by the *basilees* at Thespiai was felt by Hesiod as an individual (and within his family) though they were situated some distance to the east of his land (see Figure 3.13 for view from Askra toward Thespiai). The relationship between Thespiai and Askra is one fraught with the problems of lacunose evidence throughout the historical period, but survey work in the area has emphasised that Askra need not have been dependent on any other community on account of the size of its population, nor because of its geographical position\(^{347}\). The nucleation of the Thespian territory and then the construction of walls would have been an event that would have reinforced that community’s own defensive capabilities, but also have acted as an effective bulwark against the Askrans, limiting their unmolested routes to the minor roads over the north and south of their territory\(^{348}\). Despite the absence of formal political structures of dependency, one community was able to create an atmosphere of inferiority in another through the actions of individuals and the manipulation of its physical position in the landscape\(^{349}\). Hesiod’s relation of the individual experience of political dependence (or something approaching it) is an early marker of the way in which dependence or independence can be felt as well as formally expressed.

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\(^{347}\) Though Bintliff (1996), 196-197, emphasises the pressure that would have been exerted by the relationship with the larger Thespiai, this need not necessarily have determined a subordinate status.

\(^{348}\) The Zagora pass, which provided the best route to the west of Askra would have allowed members of the community to reach the western Kopaic Plain, but the amount of use this route received is problematic, see Chapter 2.II.v, p.41 with Figure 2.9.

\(^{349}\) Later traditions would hold that Thespiai would go on to destroy Askra: summarised at Edwards (2004), 171, n.13.
Chaironeia, in north-western Boiotia, might never have been the demographically largest or most politically powerful of Boiotian poleis but was a larger community than Askra, and its situation at the head of the Boiotian section of the Kephissos valley was of vital importance to the city, as well as to the area as a whole. Together with its neighbouring Phokian polis Panopeus, the communities were situated on the southern slopes of the wide valley floor, and both had a long history of fortification. Despite Pausanias’ famous description of the later un-polis like Panopeus, he does not dismiss the strength of Panopeus’ walls. At the head of this valley, the walls had a strong role to play in the articulation of relationships between areas and individuals. There might have been some ‘dead’ land between the two poleis but both were situated in a position that enabled them to watch and guard the northwest passes into the area. Their orientation was informed by their position in wider geographical matrices, and can be compared to other ancient sites and constructions, situated at the head of important transport/invasion routes. That both had a long tradition of heavy fortification (whilst not premier poleis in their own right) should inform a perspective on the rhythms of discourse at this boundary, as a route for movement and as a dividing line between one region and another.

Walls as harbour of alternatives

Throughout the period 550-335BC, walls in Boiotia allowed the articulation of difference; an alternative articulation of power, territory, and political/societal.

350 The actions of Tolmides related at Thuc. 1.113, that would lead to the end of Athenian control in most of Boiotia seem to have been directed largely at reasserting Athenian control over Chaironeia, indicating the territorial and strategic importance of the site. The route taken on the (desired) return to Athens makes it clear that Orchomenos was not targeted in this maneuver; the consequence of this was the Athenian defeat. That Tolmides did not attempt to attack Orchomenos in the same way, despite having a large contingent under his control, is probably proof of Orchomenian walls at this time.

351 Panopeus’ name is suggestive of its key position with excellent visibility at the head of the Kephissos valley as it opens out to the West. From Panopeus, any invasion from the north would have been plainly visible well in advance, though because of their locations nestled in the first hills at the south of the valley, neither can see the other from the major areas of settlement or akropolis. Chaironeia was probably fortified in its entirety by the sixth century: Fossey (1988), 378.

352 Paus. 10.4.1f., indicating both the primary function of the site in Pausanias’ period as a military post, and also testament to the strength of the legacy of walling at the site. This passage also contains an instructive comment on borders as essential for a polis. Contra, Alcock (1995), 325-6, who rejects Pausanias as useful for the period under review in this work.

353 It may also be worth considering the Boiotian experience with Herakleia-in-Trachis and the divisive issue of the control of the settlement there between Boiotia and Sparta in the Peloponnesian War: see Buck (1994), 15-6, and Hornblower (2010), 130. That Boiotia in its central position in the Greek mainland would be aware of the importance of guarding major transit routes is implicit in the general scheme of its ‘big-power’ relationships. Cf. below, Chapter 5, pp.211-215.

354 See Fossey (1986), 63-65, for Panopeus.

355 See above, n.350.
orientation. The Athenian relationship with Plataia from 519BC onward, the
democratic intrigues of the Delion campaign, and the occupation of several Boiotian
cities from 457BC to 446BC exemplify this relationship between walls and the
surrounding area. Though the arrangement of this decade is not easily discernible in
political terms, it seems that the Athenians used client elites in the Boiotian cities to
maintain a tacit alignment with Athens, and control of fortifications was necessary for
the exercise of hegemony. Athens would not necessarily need to destroy the fortifications
to exert control, but given the distance between Athens and Boiotia, it would be difficult
to respond quickly enough to prevent a political change/coup resulting in a walled city
being used against Athens. The pattern was probably dictated by the nature of the
rule of Athens, and the security of the walls in question; Athens seems to have planned
to use Chaironoeia as a border fortress for itself but destroyed the walls of Tanagra,
because Attika and the Tanagraia were contiguous, and any required intervention
would have been able to reach that site more quickly from Attika than Chaironoeia.

In Thucydides’ account of the Athenian defeat at Koroneia, which ended its hegemony
in Boiotia, Orchomenos seems (as it would in several other episodes of upheaval in this
period) to have occupied a position of harbour for political alternative. Though the
evidence is unclear, it is difficult to imagine that Orchomenos was not walled at this
time, and because of this it acted as a rallying site for exiles from a number of
communities with grievances against Athens. It was by the use of friendly factions
within the communities of Boiotia that Athens would later make its attempts to gain a
larger foothold in central Greece, most ambitiously at Thespiai in 424BC.

357 That the Athenians were concerned with control of walls of opposing communities is evidenced by
their actions in 457 and the destruction of the Tanagran walls: Thuc.1.108.3. The threat of cavalry would
have been of particular concern to the Athenians, given that the order they had interrupted in the area
had been largely oligarchic, and therefore more likely to have been supported by cavalry. For the role of
cavalry more generally in the society and arrangement of Boiotia, see above, Chapter 2.III.iii.
358 None of the accounts of Tolmides’ campaign (Thuc. 1.113; Diod. Sic. 12.6; Plut. Per.18.2-3) give a
great deal of detail with regard to the nature of the encounter, though Diodorus’ account does make
much more sense of the ensuing Athenian withdrawal from Boiotia (particularly the role of hostages in the
withdrawal of Athenian forces from Boiotia, in parallel to the importance and ransoming of the Boiotian
and Chalkidian prisoners in 507: Aravantinos (2006), 375-6) For further consideration of this passage, see
n.199. Because of the tumultuous history of excavations at the site, Orchomenos’ early history of
fortification is not as clear as it might be: Fossey (1988), 352; Sarri (2010) has now begun to address the
failure to publish the early excavations properly.
359 Euboians and Lokrians: Thuc. 1.113.2.
360 The destruction of Thespian walls in 423BC (Thuc. 4.133, emphasising the long-term importance to
Thebes of destroying the walls), and the ability of the Thebans to re-order the political status of the
community when necessary (for instance 414BC): Thuc. 6.95.2, with Buck (1994), 22, and IG I' 72
(honorary decree for a Thespian involved in events of 414BC). This would probably therefore have
altered the border dynamic between Thespiai and Askra. The exiles from this reorganisation made the
Orchomenos and Makedon would use the fortifications of Thebes, Plataia, Thespiai and Orchomenos to their political advantage. There is therefore a pattern throughout the fifth and fourth centuries of the hegemonic power using the agency of walls to try and manipulate Boiotia. Athens, Sparta, Thebes and Makedon all used a combination of garrisons, sympathetic factions and the construction/destruction of walls to exercise power in the region.

The Spartans understood the importance of walls and Agesilaos was particularly aware of the importance of use and control of landscape in the articulation of power. His sacrifice at Aulis and his grand entrances into Boiotia using the major Kithairon pass bear testament to his awareness of the importance of demonstrating power and therefore changing the perception of control of space. With this in mind it is worth investigating the Spartan investment of the Kadmeia in 382BC. The act effectively inverted the relationship of walls and territory. Previously the Thebans had exercised their power using the walls as a key component of diplomacy. With this inversion those involved in expelling the Spartans had to work from outside of the area, exiled by the walls that had previously given them security. The statement attributed to Epameinondas to the effect that he would like to have the Propylaia transferred to the Kadmeia confirms the (predictable) centrality of the site to the Theban concept of their own geography. The statement is particularly significant as it comes after the occupation of the Kadmeia by the Spartans, which would have naturally engendered an atmosphere of vulnerability at that site. After 379, Thebes began to assert itself more forcefully throughout Boiotia and constructed the most integrated geography of the region’s history, just as the Spartan occupation of the Athenian acropolis in 511 would supply the catalyst for the vibrant response and political reforms of Attika under Kleisthenes.

A generation after this event, Philip II’s Makedonians would use the walls of the Kadmeia in a very similar fashion after the victory at Chaironeia. The Thebans responded by attempting to recapture the Kadmeia in an act that must have reminded

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361 See above, n.317, for Spartan actions in the 370s, and also discussion of construction of the bridge over the Euripos in 411BC, above, pp.95-98.
362 Xen. *Hell.* 5.3.25; Diod. Sic. 15.20.2; Plut. *Pel.* 5.2-3. Hack (1978), provides an instructive background to the intricacies of the period between the King’s Peace and the seizing of the Kadmeia. The seizure of the Kadmeia provoked the exile of a group of important Theban leaders who would form the core of the force that reclaimed the citadel three years later.
363 Aeschines 2.105.
the community of how Spartan occupation was overcome. Alexander III’s response to this change in discourse would lead to the complete destruction of Thebes364.

*Standard and aesthetics of walling*

![Fig. 3.14: Thisbai, fourth century walls.](image)

The material used for the construction of the walls of the communities of Boiotia is drawn uniformly from local sources and is invariably the characteristic medium grey limestone of the region (see Figures 3.14-15 for some examples of this). The visible remains of fortification in Boiotia appear to the visitor as imposing and defensively strong whether at the fourth century fortifications like Siphai or Thisbai (pictured above), the fortifications at Tanagra (sixth/fifth centuries), or the Mykenaian remains such as at Gla. It is a problem of evidence for the historian that those fortifications constructed in the most robust manner survive in better condition, and this model of survival can lead to unrealistic expectations of the general quality of construction throughout an area or period365.

364 Note also the rebuilding of the walls of other Boiotian poleis either by Philip or Alexander: below, Chapter 5, ‘Prologue’.

365 Lawrence (1979), 208f., considers the development of walls from a wooden to a stone basis, and from less developed early designs to the refined style that makes up the earliest survivals from the historical period. There are many variables associated with survival/preservation of walls in terms of natural events, and subsequent re-use of fortifications in later periods.
There are, however, a couple of examples of walling in the period under review that might not have been in such good condition. The siege of Plataia from 429-427BC was an important and extended operation that informed polis interaction in Boiotia for a long time following the event. Though the walls of the polis were strong enough to forestall the Spartan/Boiotian attack on its fortifications in the short term, no siege engines of the type developed in the fourth century and widely employed by the Syracusans and Alexander III were brought to bear on the walls. But there is a suggestion that the battlements of the Plataian walls were less solid than might be expected of a town hoping to be able to resist outside intervention. If the walls were weak, it was clearly not the decisive factor in the capture of the town, as it held out for a long period under sustained pressure. Instead, this example provides a contrast to many of the other examples of very strong walling to be found in Boiotia, particularly

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366 There are indications of innovation in siege warfare by the Boiotians in the early stages of the Peloponnesian War, with Delion also seeing a new kind of fire based weapon used against the makeshift walls: Thuc. 4.100. On the crudity of siege warfare in the mid-fifth century see Ducrey (1986), 167f. For the development of siege warfare of the fourth century, see Marsden (1969), 48ff. On the specifics of the siege of Plataia see Hornblower (1991), 357f.

367 Thuc. 3.23.2, with Winter (1971), 132 n.25, and 139 n.43.

368 The length of time dedicated to succeeding in the siege is evidence of the importance of removing Plataia’s walls for wider Boiotian and therefore Spartan aims.
those of the fourth century federal fortification system. These walls were built in difficult topographical situations in an elaborate and imposing manner and the high level of survival today is testament to the strength of their construction. These examples of robust fortification bring to mind the other prominent passage in Thucydides that highlights the poor quality of Boiotian walling, the attack on Mykalessos in 414BC:

Caution needs to be employed when applying this passage as historical evidence, as there is clearly an emotional overtone to Thucydides’ reporting of the massacre. The literary aspects to this passage, particularly in its relationship to the destruction of Melos and the perceived corruption of Athens by concerns over money and a lust for victory have been well explored in recent years. However, the basic facts of the event are not disputed. Thucydides is careful to emphasise that the event did not spell the end of Mykalessos as a civic entity, but the demographic effects on a community of middle size would have been long felt.

The massacre of the inhabitants of Mykalessos is illustrative of several aspects of walling and territorial relationships in Boiotia. Firstly, the fact that the walls were ‘in a state of disrepair’ needs some explaining. Mykalessos was in a key situation both in regard to the main roads to the coastal centres but also as the nearest town to the premier pass to Salganeus, Anthedon and Chalkis. The pass itself would later be walled, but given the importance of the situation of the community it is not surprising to find walls here. By the same considerations it is surprising that the walls were in a state of disrepair,

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369 Cooper (2000) picks up on the technical innovation of the fourth-century Boiotian walls, making them clearly designed for ‘big power’ conflict, rather than just for smaller scale local wars, but Camp (2000), 43, notes that the walls of Thisbai would have been suitable for big power conflict c.360s but not Hellenistic siege warfare, therefore dating it to the period before Makedonian warfare. Ma (2000b), 337-9, on local vs. large-scale warfare and fortifications in post-Alexander period.

370 Bosworth (1993), 42-3, puts the events at Mykalessos in a useful narrative context in relation to the incidents at Skione and Melos. Cf. below, n.375.

371 Thuc. 7.30.3.

372 The archaeological evidence from Mykalessos is little help in the identification or dating of the walls. There has been little work in the area in recent years, but the Eastern Boiotia Survey team is working in the vicinity and may shed some more light on the area. For the original excavations: Burrows and Ure (1907, 1909; Ure (1934).
especially given the on-going conflict between Boiotia and Attika at this time. Mykalessos was not one of the towns that joined in the *synoikismos* with Thebes at the beginning of the Peloponnesian War, nor does it seem to have been depleted in terms of population, if Thucydides’ description of the community can be extrapolated from\(^{373}\). It could in fact be the case that the *synoikismos* was not a movement restricted to a move toward Thebes but instead that Mykalessos might have undergone its own enlargement as a local walled centre. In its important location at the join of the routes from Anthedon and Aulis (Figure 3.16), Mykalessos would have been the stronghold for those who chose to remain in the region. If this is the case, the possible explanations for the reason why the walls were in such disrepair are even more perplexing\(^{374}\).

![Fig. 3.16: View of routes to Aulis and Chalkis from akropolis of Mykalessos](image)

The first option is that the walls were in a state of disrepair because of neglect caused by a feeling of security (ἀδελφός). This explanation chimes closely to the suggestion of ‘πεπτωκότος’ of Thucydides and seems to be implicitly accepted by most scholars. This is very possible, given the gradual strengthening of Boiotia’s position with regard to Athens from 424BC onwards. If the population were so numerous as to have more than one school, and to be worth targeting by the Thrakians (under Athenian leadership) it is less likely that they would have left themselves undefended, especially when considering that most of the surrounding communities had evacuated to Thebes, thus leaving them

\(^{373}\) Although Thucydides describes Mykalessos as ‘not a large polis’ (οὐδὲν οὐ μεγάλη: 7.29.3), he does say that the largest (διὰ τοῦ μέγιστον) of the boys’ schools was attacked (7.29.5), implying that there was at least more than one. Cf. Hornblower (2008), 599. For the synoikismos into Thebes see below, Chapter 3.3.IV.

\(^{374}\) That it had walls at all evidences its vulnerable position and one-time desire to protect itself. Having walls and not maintaining them in a major period of conflict seems perhaps less likely than the alternative of Theban/federal interference with walling, especially given the rapidity of assistance when the attack began. See below, and Buck (1994), 19.
as the principal target for a profitable raid in the area, and mitigating their distance from the sea.

An alternative option for the state of disrepair of Mykalessian defences might have been the actions of a central power. Thebes had erected its walls in the period up to the beginning of the Peloponnesian War and ushered in a general ‘synoikismos’ in 431BC. In 427BC the walls of Plataia were pulled down and in 423BC the Thebans demanded the Thespian walls be pulled down in response to a reported democratic coup.

There is no record of any instability in Mykalessos, or of any interference from the centre, but it is one possible explanation of an important, well-populated centre (especially after the evacuation of the smaller unwalled communities), failing to maintain its walls. If it had been Thucydides’ intention to heighten the sense of misfortune at the hands of Athenian mismanagement then to have the Thebans partly responsible would have been an unnecessary distraction.

If this reconstruction were the case, it could also help explain why the Mykalessians chose to remain outside of the synoikismos with Thebes. The towns that did join in the move to the centre are said to be ‘without a wall’ and move for purposes of security. If this had been a premier consideration for moving into the haven of Thebes, Mykalessos’ choice to remain outside of the union might well have been predicated upon adequate fortification of the settlement. It is certainly possible that the walls of a settlement could deteriorate rapidly given inattention and poor initial construction, but the attack on the Mykalessians was not that of a full army and if they had felt confident of the walls capable of offering security against the Athenians in 431BC, then the standard of the walls would not have been a problem in 414 without the pro-activity of an agent wishing to dismantle the walls for its own purposes. Given the Theban proclivity toward wall destruction, and the emphasis of the strength of their own walls as a haven for many Boiotian communities, it would not be surprising if the Thebans, probably with a federal mandate, dismantled part of the Mykalessian walls in order to allow the type of intervention that took place at Thespiai shortly before this incident.

It is also notable that the Athenian leader knew to target Mykalessos. If it had been well walled, the attack would have been very risky, especially in light of the fate of the Thrakians once the Theban cavalry appeared. For the appropriate end (in narrative terms) to the Thrakians: Kallet (2001), 140-146; Hornblower (2008), 599. A lesser-known tradition hinted in a scholiast on Aristophanes Clouds 133, is that the Thebans themselves were pushed out of their city by Thrakians. Cf. prescience of Aristophanes Acharnians, 159-160, for possibility of Thrakians attacking ‘all of Boiotia’ for a small amount of money.

See above, n.360, for discussion of events of 424/3BC.

Cf. above, n.360.
argument, it also seems unlikely that the Mykalessians would have let their walls fall into disrepair because of complacency about their geographical situation and the attendant vulnerability to attack, being less than four miles from Aulis and the sea (though the sea was not visible (see Figure 3.16). Though this is a considerable distance for an inland raid, it is not very far if the commander has knowledge of the ground, and if there are no other communities to hinder the advance or retreat.  

Whatever the causes of the poor defences of Mykalessos, the Theban response to the attack was fast and effective; emphasising the power and importance of federal resources in the same manner as the walls had done at the outset of war. The actions of the federal forces from a base in Thebes with regard to Mykalessos were part of a progression of acts that would cement Thebes’ position at the heart of Boiotia in terms of the rhythms of polis security and authority. Thebes was the geographical focus from which the invasions of 426BC and 424BC had been stymied, and the victory at Delion had been won on a liminal frontier and here the possibility of a quick response to a surprise outside threat is illustrated. They would go on to help prize Oropos from Athens in 411BC and build the bridge over the Euripos in the same year. This would be followed by an intervention that was strikingly similar to Mykalessos at Aulis in 396BC, when a serious statement of ownership of power over territory was made against Agesilaos. The value of the security offered at the outset of the Peloponnesian War by the Thebans in their large outer walls was confirmed by the attack on Mykalessos, and might have strengthened belief in the necessity of intra-Boiotian cooperation. The security offered by the large ‘federal’ walls of Thebes might have gone some way to promoting the centralised system that was coordinated following the victory at Leuktra.  

The standard of walling elsewhere in Boiotia at the time of the Peloponnesian War is unknown. The incidents at Plataia and Mykalessos illustrate two major points; first, that just because a city has a wall does not mean that all walls are of equal quality, and

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378 Aulis had been evacuated in 431: below, Chapter 3.III.iv for discussion of Synoikism of 431BC.
379 Thebes is only around thirteen miles from Mykalessos, mainly along the main Thebes to Chalkis highway. The cavalry could have been in touch with the community within the hour, especially if there was a signalling system that detected the Thrakinas when they landed. Schachter (forthcoming) suggests Megálo Vounó above Aulis as a likely site for a watchtower.
380 It should be noted that although Mykalessos was not one of the towns that received the new ‘federal’ fortifications, there was both the development of Aulis as a major naval centre, and a sophisticated signalling system in the area. For this see Fossey’s case for the situation of the fourth-century naval base centred on Skroponeri, and concurrent reconstruction of tower systems: Fossey (1979), with criticism at Buckler and Beck (2008), 187-188.
second, that siege equipment and tactics in the fifth century were generally poorly adapted to destroying walls. The siege of Plataia took two years and the attack on Mykalessos was successful probably only because of its shock value. The impact of the attack on Mykalessos would have had severe demographic repercussions on that community, but it emphasised the need for high quality, well maintained fortifications. The walls that would be erected across the region in the fourth century would not only be monumentally strong but they would also be of uniform aesthetic character, and a tribute to the lessons learned at both places.

3.III.iv. The ‘synoikism’ of Thebes

Mykalessos’ exposure to that attack of the Thrakians was emphasised because it was one of the few settlements in the eastern part of Boiotia not to join in the general movement into the walls at Thebes at the beginning of the Peloponnesian War described by the Oxyrhynchus Historian:

ἐπέδοσαν δὲ οἱ Θηβαῖοι πολὺ πρὸς εὐδαιμονίαν ὀλόκληρον... εὐθέως ώς ὁ πολεμὸς τοῖς Ἀθηναῖοις συνέστη καὶ τοῖς λακεδαιμονίοις ἀρξαμένων γὰρ ἀνταίρειν τῶν Ἀθηναίων τῇ Βοιωτίᾳ συνωκιζόθησαν εἰς αὐτὰς ὀς τ’ ἔξ Εὐριθρῶν καὶ Σκαφών καὶ Σκύλου καὶ Αῦλιδος καὶ Σχινίου καὶ Ποτνίων καὶ πολλῶν ἐτέρων τοιούτων χωρίων, ἀ τείχος οὐκ ἔχοντα διπλασίας ἐποίησον τὰς θῆβας.381

*Hell. Oxy.* 17.3 382

These lines are open to plural readings, dependent upon the interpretation of the concerns of the author of *Hellenica Oxyrhynchia* and the contingencies of the archaeological evidence outlined above. The historical context within the rest of his account of Boiotian affairs has led all estimations of this occurrence to be placed during or after 447/6 BC. There is no time from that date onward that would make sense until 431 BC and the outbreak of the Peloponnesian War. The other possible occurrence of the Athenians ‘moving against’ Boiotia had occurred a decade previously with the battles of Tanagra and Oinyphya. However, 437 BC does not lend itself as a date both because of the context of the account and because the absorption of the communities

381 Though technically this event could be termed a synoikism, the event should be considered in different terms to the more polite ‘living together’ that the few secondary accounts conceive. See below and Demand (1990), 83-85. The commentary of Bruce (1967), 114, implies that there was a choice in the move for the smaller communities, whilst McKechnie and Kern (1988) prefer the ambivalent ‘were gathered into Thebes’.

382 The reconstruction of the text follows McKechnie and Kern (1988). The numbering system of passages from *Hell. Oxy* follows this edition of the text rather than the traditional system that puts this passage at 12.3.
‘τείχος οὐκ ἔχοντα’, would require the agency not only of a physically and politically secure Thebes, but also of an insecure set of smaller towns. It is extremely unlikely that Athens would have encouraged the ‘increase’ of power of Thebes by allowing this absorption. The dates within the Peloponnesian war have far greater attraction. Moggi suggested the Athenian invasions of Boiotia in either 426 or 424BC as possible dates for the description of Athens ‘beginning to move against’ (‘ἀρξαμένων...ἀνταίρειν’), but whilst this fits well with that aspect of the text, it fails to correspond to the broader historical context of Boiotia profiting as soon as the war began. It is also more probable that Thucydides would have mentioned the synoikism if it had occurred as a result of one of the Athenian strategies to attack Boiotia employed during the Peloponnesian War, which he describes in reasonable detail\textsuperscript{383}.

![Fig. 3.17: Synoikism of Thebes (c.431BC)](image)

The most likely timing for the move is therefore at the beginning of the Peloponnesian War. The passage specifically states that as soon (εὐθέως) as the war between Athens and Sparta had begun Thebes advanced greatly toward prosperity. The language is clear, and the practicalities of the movement are understandable. Straight away, when the war began, the smaller communities without walls from quite a large area (Figure 3.17) took refuge within the Theban lower walls. Whether the lower walls would have

\textsuperscript{383} Moggi (1976). Cf. Demand (1990), 84 n.54. See above, Table 4 with n.305.
been in a finished state at this time or whether they continued to be augmented throughout the following years is unclear, but if the synoikism took place at the outset of war there are consequent implications for the way in which Boiotia saw its role in the war, and for the siege of Plataia.

If the synoikism were dated to 431BC, this would necessitate that the construction of the large lower walls of Thebes be dated previous to this in order for the walls to be able to house the migrants. It was by far the most ambitious civic fortification program of any of the Boiotian communities, and it would have played a significant symbolic role in Thebes being able to claim centrality in Boiotian community interaction. Its importance would be tied also to its visibility in the landscape; even when not in use its potential as a defensive harbour for population hugely in excess of Thebes’ own needs would have been a statement of Thebes’ position in the region. In a similar manner to the Plataian walls marking the division of that polis from the rest of Boiotia, the lower walls of Thebes had a geographical effect that reached far beyond their physical limits. They effectively manipulated the landscape; this was no more a purely defensive stronghold for the community of Thebes, but a statement of ambition to be the stronghold of a much wider area. It is the possibility of wall building becoming part of the discourse between Thebes and Athens that led Keramopoullos to date the beginning of the walls construction at 506BC. Though the high dating for the walls is not convincing, the context that led to it (that of Athenian-Boiotian interaction and alterity), is just as germane for the period following 446BC when the new Boiotian federal entity was emerging from the Athenian control. Where the Kadmeian walls of the Bronze Age denoted a strong city of antiquity, the lower walls embodied the dynamism and ambition of Thebes following the defeat of Tolmides.

The ‘synoikism’ should therefore be placed at the beginning of the Peloponnesian War, by when the majority of the lower circuit of Thebes would have been constructed. That this new influx of inhabitants which ‘doubled’ the size of the city would have not have played a part in further augmentation of the walls of their new home is unlikely.

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384 The dating of the walls is more fully addressed in Annex, pp.267-272.
385 Or any of the Greek poleis: The size of Thebes’ walls, enclosing some 328ha are best discussed in Symeonoglou (1985), 118ff. (for map see his fig. 3.6 on p.115).
387 Symeonoglou (1985), 121-2, suggests that such a large project would have required federal organisation.
particularly given that the basis of their move was a desire for security. It is once again Athens who, as in 519BC, played a major role in ordering the space of Boiotia. Their actions led to a new basis of polity interaction where centrism was key to avoiding incursions from the outside. The Thebans had physically moved communities from the outer areas of Boiotia in order to secure their safety. They forged a system that would embed the centrality of Thebes in the heart of a new system, despite the formal federal structure of the Boiotian koinon. This explanation makes sense of the ethnic, linguistic, and numismatic evidence extant from the period.

This survey of the more prominent implications of walling in Boiotia goes some way to demonstrating the effect that civic military construction can have on the relationships between communities and how much the historian can learn from studying literary evidence alongside the physical remains. The construction of walls was an arduous undertaking, and the powerful desire to erect large-scale defences gives a telling insight into the nature of inter-state discourse in this period. The control of walls appears to have been a central feature of the Orchomenian domination of the Kopaic basin in the Mykenaian period, and in the fifth and fourth centuries Thebes, and the federal agency based there, used walls in order to make bold statements of power. Its own lower walls were larger than was necessary for their own defence, permitting the site’s position in the Peloponnesian War as a refuge for all Boiotia. At the same time it exerted power over the walls of others in order to prevent bases of opposition from being established. The experiences of Athenian domination of Boiotia from 457-446BC and Spartan influence from 395-371 demonstrated the importance of the control of fortification in the landscape, and the lessons from both would be employed in order to strengthen the union of Boiotian communities under a federal organisation based at Thebes.

3.III.v. The fortification system of the fourth century
The above discussion of city walls was designed to emphasise the personality of walls and their role in articulating the character of a city. It is desirable to understand the Boiotian federal walling system of the second and third quarters of the fourth century in

Doubling the population of Thebes is likely to be an overestimation: Bruce (1967), 114. However, the number of people living within the walls of Thebes might have been relatively small at this point and thus a gradual influx of ‘Thebans’ as well as individuals from other communities might easily have doubled the population over the course of the Peloponnesian war, cf. Symeonoglou (1985), 122. This is especially the case when the number of slaves that will have accrued to Thebes from Dekeleia is taken into account. For population estimates generally, see above, Table 1. For the population of Thebes see Symeonoglou (1985), 204, fig.6.1, who charts the influx coming in the twenty years from 446 onwards and not beginning in 431.
the same way. The walls built in the system had a military purpose as well as being a statement of regional identity. The Boiotian walls, particularly in the south, are aesthetically recognizable as a homogenous group, which is an important element in their design. The contrast between the solid and elegant ashlar straight-faced walls and the Athenian round towers must have been noticeable if not deliberately symbolic, particularly in the places where the space between the two areas was most compressed, such as the area between Oinoe and Eleutherai. The difference would have been exaggerated because it is likely that those in charge of constructing the Boiotian fortification system after Leuktra were also involved in constructing the system of fortification in Attika in the early fourth century. The strategic lessons of the Attic system and the possibility of structuring regional identity through militarisation of landscape were applied to southern Boiotia to create a genuine frontier between the two regions.

Concern with the fortification and political manipulation of the liminal area of Oinoe and Eleutherai has been a feature of scholarship in recent decades. The fundamental difficulty is caused by an inherently disputed landscape, rich in agricultural land and with several settlements at its margins, known for fluctuations in political control. The particular difficulty of the area around Eleutherai and Oinoe is that the physical evidence outweighs the corresponding literary and epigraphic evidence for the historical situation of the area. The work on Eleutherai and Oinoe leans persuasively toward the designation of the former as a Boiotian fortification in the form in which it is now visible. This would leave Oinoe and the debated Mazi tower (See Figure 3.18) as Athenian outposts, thus characterizing the area (at least in the period in which the fortifications were erected) as one of close interaction of two large powers. The case for the fortress at Eleutherai being a Boiotian construction is made on the basis of building techniques and the design of the fort corresponding to Boiotian types of the same period.

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389 Demosthenes the Boiotian acts as a contractor in the rebuilding of the walls of the Peiraicus IG II² 1647: Rhodes and Osborne (2003), no.9. More widespread involvement in the construction of the walls by Boiotians: Xen. Hell. 4.8.10; Nepos. 9.4.5; Diod. Sic. 14.85.3 (‘500 Thebans’). The suggestion of Boiotian technical competency in walling is made most forcefully by Cooper (2000), 184-188: p.188 ‘Boiotians were supreme in fortification construction from 395-338 B.C.E.’

390 Ober (1985), 111-129. Ober (1995), 112 with n.41: Oinoe might have been founded after the establishment of the Kleisthenic demic system and integrated into it afterwards.

391 A pattern repeated on the Attic-Boiotian borders such as in the neighbouring Skourta Plain and the Oropeia. For a summary of the many transitions of control between Attika and Boiotia over Oropos, see Buck (1994), 123-126. For Panakton, see Annex, nn.915-916.

392 Cooper (1986), 195, for the original statement of this view.
much more closely than to that of Athenian types\textsuperscript{393}. The construction of the Mazi tower in the plain, next to the main road into the Megarid, would have been largely redundant if both Oinoe and Eleutherai were Athenian. Instead it seems to mark the limit of Athenian influence and stand opposed to the major territorial statement of the fortress at Eleutherai\textsuperscript{394}.

Though Ober’s thoughts of a systematic fortification system articulated throughout Attica and conceived as a single plan might have undergone much revision since their initial statement, the general idea of articulation of identity and state boundaries through fortification is not moribund\textsuperscript{395}. An authority taking a holistic approach to the fortification of territory seems particularly applicable to Boiotia in its widespread building programme following the victory at Leuktra. Control of Eleutherai, and land access over Kithairon would have been an important factor in the freedom of Boiotian forces to interact with the Megarid and the Peloponnese following Sparta’s demise in Boiotia. But more importantly, in terms of articulation of borders, the fortification scheme presented a ‘regional’ face of Boiotia. The fortification at Eleutherai was part of the system of forts built in this period in a strikingly similar way. The design of the scheme and the aesthetic similarity of the construction go beyond mere defensive capability and into a different area of expressive architecture. The lessons of incidents such as the fifth-century wrangling over Panakton on the Skourta Plain had been learned, and the most effective ‘boundary marker’ was this monumental fortification\textsuperscript{396}. It would also have been a response to the use of Kithairon as the ‘prestige’ route into Boiotia by the Spartans in the 370s when they were sure of their power and control of large parts of the region\textsuperscript{397}. Figure 3.18 shows the view from Eleutherai to the routes into the Megarid, and by fortifying Eleutherai in such a grand manner, a statement was made both of permanency and of the power to control and order space (see below, Figure 6.2, for the physical relationship between the pass and the fort that still

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{393} Camp (1991), 200, also notes the inscription on a kantharos in Boiotian dialect at the site (SEG 35 36), as well as other possible Boiotian kantharoi sherds found there. Ober supports the designation of Eleutherai as Athenian, but even in his own works, Ober (1987), 577f., seems to suggest that the similarities between Siphai, Messene and Gyphtokastro (Eleutherai) suggest construction at the same date, which would make little sense if they were not all Boiotian.
  \item \textsuperscript{394} Camp (1991), 199-202.
  \item \textsuperscript{395} Cooper (2000), 162-163, n.21 and n.22.
  \item \textsuperscript{396} Ober (1995), 113.
  \item \textsuperscript{397} The importance of this route via Eleutherai is emphasised by Agesilaos’ determination to secure it each time before he crosses the mountain (Xen. Hell. 5.4.36). When Kleombrotos fails to secure the passes, he does not invade (Xen. Hell. 5.4.59). Even worse is the humiliating crossing that Spartan forces were forced to make via the road from Kreusis to Aigosthena (Xen. Hell. 5.4.16-18, paralleled at Xen. Hell. 6.4.25). The reproach of Kleombrotos’ friends about his inability to command the passes of Kithairon might be apocryphal, but it does serve to emphasise the significance of territorial display (Xen. Hell. 6.4.5).
dominates it). The practicalities (time and manpower) of building such an elaborate fortification in a historically contested area would have taken a degree of security that might only have been guaranteed by the acquiescence of the major mainland powers or their inability to intervene. The defeat of Sparta at Leuktra and the Thebes/Athens alliance that was still in place in 371BC would have provided the ideal conditions to construct a fortification that marked a determination to secure Eleutherai in the medium to long-term.

The timing of the fortification, directly after the end of significant Spartan involvement in Boiotia, is significant. This wasn’t merely a watchtower designed to act as a warning system against invasions, it was a permanent military foundation, acting as both a manifestation of strength and longevity in a liminal area that had been the route used for many invasions of Boiotia. In conjunction with the contemporary constructions in the southern harbours, the move can be seen as a deliberate articulation of federal boundaries in response to the threats of the Spartans from 395-371, and as such, the aesthetics of the sites should be considered as a deliberate articulation of Boiotian federal identity.
Fig. 3.18: View S. from Eleutherai towards the Megarid
The fortification at Eleutherai was only one part of a much more extensive system after the victory at Leuktra, the major parts of which are depicted in Figure 3.19. A series of aesthetically similar fortifications were constructed at Siphai, Thisbai, and Chorsai, effectively protecting the entirety of Boiotia’s Korinthian Gulf access. Kreusis, as the most militarily useful harbour, already had some sort of defensive construction in the 370s, and the stationing of twelve triremes there at a time when Sparta controlled both Plataia and Thespiai would indicate a belief that this fortification provided some security against land based attack. These constructions present a formidable and strikingly similar appearance and must have been designed as part of a systematic plan. The correspondence between the dating of these fortifications, and Boiotia’s broad hegemony at the same time are contributors to this systematic portrayal of a ‘foreign policy’.

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398 Kleombrotos’ capture of the triremes demonstrates that this confidence was unfounded: Xen. *Hell.* 6.4.3 with Burn (1949), 321-322. On Kreusis’ position in the gulf see Freitag (2000), 164-171. For site more generally see Fossey (1988), 157-163.

399 That the fortifications of Pagai and Aigosthena could also have been part of this system is a far more controversial claim (made most recently by Cooper (2000) 158-162). The dating of the fortifications is problematic in historical and archaeological terms, but with further investigation/excavation of the sites it may be possible to expand this concept further. Cf. Farinetti (2011), 177-178, for importance of the Gulf of Korinth to Boiotia.
The federal building scheme was designed to bring the defensive limits of Boiotia into line with its ethnic boundaries. In many respects this scheme was designed to create a Boiotian frontier: a formal and forthright militarisation of the ethnic boundaries, especially where communities faced towards previously hostile areas such as the Korinthian Gulf and Attika. The new constructions were not just explicitly military, however, and the scheme reached its apotheosis with the festival (or expansion) of Zeus Basileus at Lebadeia, which was probably arranged to celebrate the victory at Leuktra. The victory was commemorated with a monument on the battlefield, but the choice of site for the festival (and later temple) was considered and significant. On the route to Delphi, the site was intervisible with the centre of Orchomenos, Sparta’s longest standing ally in Boiotia (since 395BC), and the greatest losers from the Spartan defeat within the region. The new festival was the first act in a new scheme to ensure regional security against the type of threat used by powers outside the region in the past. A new ethnic-political landscape that was a conscious product of historical experience was deliberately articulated through a militarisation of landscape directed from Thebes, of which the Kadmeia itself was a central node. The building scheme was primarily practical, a defence against incursions from the south, but it also made a symbolic statement against Plataia, Thespiai and Orchomenos, which were all either destroyed or reduced in some way in the period from 373 onwards.

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401 Xen. Hell. 3.5.6.
402 Territorial visibility from the Kadmeia itself is poor, but it is surrounded by points from which signals could be sent and received, with the Kadmeia acting as a hub for communications in the region. This idea will be developed further in a work in preparation for submission to the Annual of the British School at Athens.
403 See Table 2, above.
3. IV. Sanctuaries

3. IV.i. Religious spaces in the landscape

Religious centres articulate the relationship between human and divine; they also tend, in their physical location, to embody a relationship of a community to its landscape and hence of one community to another. Sanctuaries which lie at the margins of a community illuminate an aspect of man’s relationship to wilderness, but can also be seen as an instrument of the early development of the polis and its systematisation of control of territory. The sanctuary enshrines relations between community and land, and the community that constructs the sanctuary can imbue the site with community-specific symbolism and (physical and religious) decoration. The temenos of the site is a boundary that marks the division between mortal and the divine through partition of space; the transgression of this divide was the cause for several of the most famous of arguments of the Boiotians with outsiders, particularly those at Delion and Aulis.

The combination of spatial division and articulation of community identity is best demonstrated by three major Boiotian shrines: Alalkomenai, Athena Itonia (near Koroneia) and Poseidon at Onchestos. These sites have in common a situation in liminal and disputed territory. All three are situated close to Lake Kopais, and Alalkomenai and Athena Itonia were situated hard against the lake’s highest boundaries (see Figure 3.20). The seasonally variable level of Lake Kopais might have caused some difficulties in border regulation that could have been combated by the mediation of space that these shrines provided. Onchestos, though not quite so close to the water, was situated on a ridge that separated the Teneric and Kopaic Plains, therefore effectively at the crossroads of Boiotia as a whole, physically and symbolically marking a point of important geo-historical division. They shared a position on the major transit routes through Boiotia from north to south that would have brought a large traffic of internal and external travellers through the shrines. Again, it is the mediating influence of these sites that would have been brought to the fore, and the way in which

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405 See Hornblower (1996), 309-311, note on Thuc. 4.97.2-4, for instructive examples of the temenos as boundary and transgressions at Delion. See n.195 for Agesilaos’ provocative actions at Aulis.
406 See above, n.55, for the fluctuation of Lake Kopais.
407 This ridge/crossroads situation is typical of Thessalian cults of Poseidon: Schachter (1986), 212. Cf. below, n.516. Onchestos’ position as federal political centre in the reformed Boiotian federation after the destruction of Thebes demonstrates the importance of its liminal position in the region as a whole: see below, Chapter 5, ‘Epilogue’.
408 In this Lebadeia and the oracle of Trophonios would have also been involved, being on the major route to Delphi even today. The examples of Trophonios and Ptoon are also important in the revenues that they could potentially bring to their communities (in this case Lebadeia and Akrainia respectively), this aspect of the sanctuaries is discussed above, p.53, n.161.
they were managed together with the articulation and expression of cult performed in those centres would have informed wider community interaction.

Fig. 3.20: Major cult sites of Boiotia

The area of eastern Boiotia around Oropos changed hands often between Euboia, Boiotia, and Athens. Many battles were fought there against the Athenians and, alongside the control of the shrines and economically productive territory, the area was key to access between Euboia and Boiotia. The Athenians recognised this and as part of the Delion campaign of 424 BC, sought to fortify the sanctuary at Delion for military purposes. The site was part of a three-sided attack, with Chaironeia and Siphai in the plan, and as such was considered more for its strategic than religious value. However, the location of a religious site in such a militarily important position mirrors the location of Onchestos and Athena Itonia. That the Athenian plan was permanent fortification is suggested in Thucydides’ account. The Athenians were attempting to turn a religious boundary into a territorial frontier. In situations where the control of an area fluctuated between two areas such as in the Oropeian sanctuaries and possibly in Ptoön and Thebes, the sanctuary could itself stand as a marker of the loss of power.

Sanctuaries mediated several different types of division, but the sites chosen for the mediation of this relationship were often liminal areas, marking a relationship with

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409 Oropos revolted with Euboia in 411: Thuc. 8.60.1.
410 The plans outlined at Thuc. 4.77, imply this. The manner of the Athenian investment of the site, involving makeshift fortification and the construction of towers, confirms this.
411 This therefore makes it a different proposition to the situation thirty years later at Aulis, but the combination of religious boundaries and territorial infringement is clear in the rhetoric of the Boiotians: Thuc. 4.97.2f. There might have been implications in the fortification of a religious site for military purposes for the relationship of religious boundaries and those of man-made bulwarks.
412 See reinscription of decree from Amphaiarion on change from accepting Boiotian coinage to ‘any legal currency’, probably denoting the separation of the Oropeia from Boiotia in 386 rather than the proliferation of mints in Boiotia: Petropoulou (1981), 49 line 22.
communities and the land as well as the divine. Through this, the religious centres placed at key interchanges of both internal and external discourse garnered further import and wealth and became even more prominent centres. The coincidence of religious centres and major battles is therefore to be expected, and as with battle-sites, the historical events experienced at the religious sites would be bound in a matrix of political and mythological borders to command new and diverse meanings to the communities that used them.

3.IV.ii. ‘Αρειως ὁρχήστραν: Battle-sites and community experience

Battle-sites might be predominantly determined by contested landscapes and military strategy, but once invested with meaning by a community or communities, they can themselves become instrumental in affecting the space and history around them. The perception of a community or wider area is conditioned by its experience of land and territory, and the transition from the ‘non-site’ to battle-site is historically significant beyond the immediate ramifications of the battle itself. This idea is relevant to the shaping of the boundaries of many communities in Boiotia, because it provides an insight into the conscious and deliberate process of the human agency in producing space and divisions in response to a specific event. There were many battles fought in Boiotia from the mid-sixth century down to the destruction of Thebes by Alexander in 335BC, but the vast majority were fought by Boiotian communities against forces from outside of the region, rather than against one another directly. However, an early example of the phenomenon of the way battle-sites could inform the formation of sanctuaries and territorial definition is the commemoration of the expulsion of Minyan forces from the Teneric Plain by Herakles. The sanctuary of Herakles Hippodetes was positioned in the western margins of the Teneric Plain. Its construction as a deliberate marker of the extent of Theban territory is supported by its location close to the main road from Thebes to northern Boiotia and also its close proximity to the sanctuary of Poseidon Onchestos, which itself marked the mythical divide between Theban and

\[\text{\footnotesize 413} \text{ Not all shrines are a marker of division and separatism, however. The shrine of Artemis Hymnia was shared between Orchomenos and Mantinea; Paus. 8.13.2; de Polignac (1995), 37 (in Arkadia rather than Boiotia as de Polignac claims); Cole (2004), 195, n.115. There is some evidence of early border shrines on Mt. Parnes that were shared between Boiotia and Attika, perhaps suggesting that in the eighth century, the liminal area between the two emerging groups was a focus of shared and convivial worship; van den Eijnde (2010). In later periods the position and control of border sanctuaries would be a matter of serious disagreement between the two regions.}\]

\[\text{\footnotesize 414} \text{ Plutarch, Maelitus, 21.2.}\]

\[\text{\footnotesize 415} \text{ This is not to deny the various degrees of violation undertaken throughout the period by one city against another, but a pitched battle is a different experience for a community from an apparently bloodless coup such as the Theban capture of Plataia in 373: See Chapter 2.II.vii for this event.}\]
Minyan territory\textsuperscript{416}. Here, a mythical place of battle/victory that helped to define Theban territory was commemorated with a sanctuary that maintained the memory of this battle whilst at the same time being designed to affect the experience of Boiotian geography in a physical sense.

The battle of Plataia of 479BC is one of the most famous and also one of the best documented of these events. The Spartans wanted the area around the city to remain inviolable and there are suggestions that Plataia made political capital out of maintaining the site in the period until the community’s destruction in the Peloponnesian War\textsuperscript{417}. Though the evidence suggests the formation of the major festival of the pan-Hellenic Eleutheria with events and games is probably a Hellenistic construct, the deliberate use of a historical event for changing the use and perception of space is clear\textsuperscript{418}. The battle at Plataia was unusual both in the size of forces involved and its consciousness of the wider world. That the site was located in Plataia’s territory was in a sense fortunate for that community, though of course conditioned by geographical influences that would lead other great battles to be fought in the Boiotian plains. The immediate significance of the event for Boiotian geography is lessened if the Eleutheria was founded only in the late fourth century, but even then, it exemplifies the possibilities of harnessing episodes that occurred in a certain location to affect the way in which that location functions and is perceived in later periods\textsuperscript{419}.

Delion was another site conditioned by battle and discussion in both ancient and modern accounts focuses on its liminal situation and the effect of conflict in the area for Boiotian territorial integrity. In 457 the Athenians were successful in controlling Boiotia after a decisive military victory near Tanagra\textsuperscript{420}, and in 426\textsuperscript{421} and 424\textsuperscript{422} they made attempts at exerting influence over Boiotia by use of the eastern routes around the Oropeia. In 426 the Athenians were unable to secure a major success and withdrew, which might have provoked the repeat invasion of 424. That the plan of all three invasions was long-term influence in the region is clear from the details given by

\textsuperscript{416} Schachter (1986), 13 n.3.
\textsuperscript{417} See below, Chapter 4.IV.ii for discussion of Eleutheria, and especially n.524, for the fifth century incarnation of the festival.
\textsuperscript{418} Hammond (1992), 145.
\textsuperscript{419} Bauslaugh (1991).
\textsuperscript{420} Twice, in the vicinity of Tanagra: Thuc.1.108.
\textsuperscript{421} A raid launched from Oropos, then in Athenian hands, that looks remarkably similar to the raid on Mykalessos 13 years later: Thuc. 3.91.3-5.
\textsuperscript{422} Thuc. 4.89f.
Thucydides\textsuperscript{423}. Delion was seen as a point from which pressure could be applied on the region, in conjunction with several other vulnerable border areas, such as Chaironeia and Siphai. The significance of the victory of the Boiotian forces at Delion is conditioned by this context: not only were forces drawn from all Boiotian districts defeating a full-strength Athenian force alone in pitched battle, they were doing it in a place which had been used previously by the Athenians to exert territorial influence on the Boiotians. The victory and subsequent repossession of the sanctuary at Delion would have been of huge practical and symbolic significance to the Boiotians\textsuperscript{424}. With victory at Delion and by pre-empting the planned attacks at Siphai and Chaironeia the federal contingent had won a decisive battle in the ability to articulate their own borders and dictate their own territorial integrity.

A further example may be the defeat of the Athenian forces under Tolmides in 446 at Koroneia\textsuperscript{425}. Koroneia would often find itself at the heart of interaction in the area, because of its position with regard to Lake Kopais, but also because of its position on the crossroads between the main route from southern to northern Boiotia (and Greece) and the route to Thisbai and the Korinthian Gulf\textsuperscript{426}. The significance of this battle-site as a symbolic place associated with Boiotian freedom might have played a part in the development of the sanctuary of Athena Itonia into a major, pan-Boiotian sanctuary\textsuperscript{427}. The victories of 446 and 424 were very different in scale, but could be represented in a similar manner: a defeat of an aggressive major power. The victory of 446BC must have served to emphasise to the inhabitants of this community as well as to the others in Boiotia, that their physical situation within Boiotia was important in embodying the physical cohesiveness of the region.

\textsuperscript{423} Thuc. 4.76f.
\textsuperscript{424} Demand (1982), 42f., makes a good case for the significance of this battle for Boiotian self-perception.
\textsuperscript{425} See above, n.350, and below n.491
\textsuperscript{426} Koroneia’s strategic importance is exemplified in both 395 (Annex, n.854) and 353BC (Diod. Sic. 16.35.3; Ephoros fr. 94a) when Sparta and Phokis (both of whom also controlled Orchomenos) wished also to control Koroneia.
\textsuperscript{427} See Chapter 4.III.ii, pp.163-164, for Athena Itonia in relation to other pan-Boiotian sanctuaries. The celebration of the Pamboiotia festival at Athena Itonia is only securely attested from the third century onward, but the festival might have existed in some form in the fifth century (Annex, n.882). The victory over the Athenians was commemorated with a trophy: Plut. Ages. 19.2.
3.V. Closing thoughts: borders as historical palimpsests

This chapter has largely been focussed upon the creation and maintenance of borders and boundaries by the communities within Boiotia. The lacunose evidence is clearly problematic and the greatest weight has necessarily been given to those events that garnered the most attention in the ancient sources. It would of course be a boon to historical study to have epigraphic demarcation of every division in Boiotia found in situ, but more important is to explore the way in which borders and boundaries were configured with regard to one another as well as to the land.

The areas bordering Boiotia were a significant influence on the way in which the communities within Boiotia shaped themselves politically and physically. The propensity for the Boiotian towns situated toward the perimeter to ‘face outward' and harness their physical location in order to affect the relationships between Boiotian communities has been well documented. Plataia was perhaps the most stubborn (and successful) of all communities in their refusal to align themselves politically with Boiotia, and Plataia’s walls might have physically manifested the political divisions within the region. At certain periods the idea of a Boiotian political area to match its ethnic unity was compromised. The Phokians, exercising power from the north and west, held the areas up to Tilphousian (See Annex, Figure 6.3). The Spartans, having to sustain their rule by contingents from the south and by way of the Korinthian Gulf, attempted to form a hegemony over the region founded upon a broadly western policy, with the short lived occupation of the Kadmeia an expansive high-point. The Athenians, perhaps the most successful of all in controlling Boiotia, were able to exert pressure broadly in line with their position to the south-east of Boiotia. In the period 457-446 the Athenians exercised a control over the majority of Boiotian states, and it is therefore instructive to look at their aims in 424 in the Delion campaign as a well-informed and sophisticated plan to exert territorial domination.

The Athenians planned to attack via the Oropeia, the Korinthian Gulf, and via Phokis and Chaironeia. When the period 519-335 is viewed as a whole, this seems remarkably astute. Previous incursions into Boiotia had all used the entrance points that the

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428 See above, n.240, for Swiss and French border towns ‘facing inward'. The examples of Orchomenos and Plataia above are the most frequently noted, but the role of Tanagra as a ‘border town’ has recently been examined: Ma (2008b), 196-199, on Tanagra. Thespiai also had easy links to the Korinthian Gulf if required and the attempted interference of Athens with Thespiai in 426 and 424 can be attributed to this ease of access from without. Therefore, all of the largest poleis in Boiotia other than Thebes were located in a position from which they could receive assistance from outside the region, a factor that would be significant in the (lack of) development of political homogeneity in the region.
Athenians attempted to exploit in a single attack. The view of the Athenian commanders was that even if they did not strike a decisive blow, they could gradually exert greater influence if they held the three areas of invasion (See Annex, Figure 6.1). Therein lies the crux of Boiotian relations to bordering geographical areas. The fortification programme of the 360s was designed to emphasise power and strength at the borders, and act as a symbol of unity and federal territorial permanence.

The same understanding of the relationship between geographic and social change lay behind Boiotian involvement in the foundation of Messene and Megalopolis, and the fortification of Mantinea. The foundations and fortifications were designed to act as a bulwark against future Spartan incursions northwards, and were built in the new style of fortification that would characterise so much of the building programme in Boiotia itself. There were also several other prominent instances of interference beyond the borders of Boiotia designed to galvanise the territorial stability of Boiotia. Perhaps the most famous of these was the fortification of Dekeleia in the Peloponnesian War. This joint venture with Sparta would form the basis for profitable raids of Attika, but it also acted as an effective Boiotian base within Attika. The base remained until the end of the war but not beyond, perhaps implying that Boiotia had little thought of employing direct control over areas beyond what it considered as its ethnic limits. Boiotia was a key partner for Sparta in this venture because of its proximity to Attika, and this spatial relationship would have effectively made Dekeleia part of the Boiotian territory for the duration of the occupation, with a constant stream of men and goods going back and forth over Parnes. There might not have been sophisticated cartography, but the relationship between land and community was well appreciated in the actions of both individual communities and federal forces when acting in unison.

Finally, every community in Boiotia had a different conception of their position in regard to other communities, and also to what ‘Boiotia’ as a physical entity was. Perspectives were informed by location, but also by the way that the communities structured their territory. Some divisions were loosely defined borders and some were

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429 Foundations and fortifications and the traditions around them are best summarised by Buckler (1980), 86-87 (Messene); 107-109 (Megalopolis and Mantinea).
431 This is certainly the view of some recent scholars working on the character of Boiotian imperialism, but this ignores the argument of the Thebans for the destruction of Athens in 404 (Xen. Hell. 2.2.19-20), refused by Sparta. As with the destruction of Thebes in 335BC, this would have been a monumental act of boundary definition and territoriality, even if the Boiotians had not directly profited from the removal of the Athenian asty.
closely monitored boundaries; most divisions (in all societies) are experiential and therefore difficult to recover without personal testimony. That is why the small personal insights, in the words of Hesiod, or the actions of Agesilaos or Epameinondas, are important reminders of the diversity of forms that divisions could take. Hesiod experienced the power of a neighbouring community by social domination, whilst Agesilaos and Epameinondas understood that geography could be produced through deliberate action and reaction. The physical manifestation of divisions and spatial relations between groups continued to affect and inform interactivity after the catalyst for the construction had ceased to be active. From one generation to the next, a palimpsest of military and non-military landscape was inherited, altered, and then bequeathed to the next group. Divisions between communities and between regions were therefore a mixture of accident and deliberate manipulation and many of these divisions were informed by and connected to the physical landscape.
Chapter 4: Boiotian Geographic Poesis

4.I. Introduction

4.I.i. Changing interpretations of landscape
When attempting to understand the geography of ancient Boiotia, there are several distinct advantages over many other areas of Greece. The landscape has not been altered significantly by tectonic or hydrological activity, and the predominantly agricultural economy of the region throughout history has left a landscape that is both easily accessible and plainly visible. But the basic physical make-up of the region is only part of the equation. If the physical aspects of the ancient landscape (both natural and man-made) are studied alongside the historical ‘events’, the likely outcome is a form of tacit geographical determinism, where landscape prompts historical event. The previous chapter dealt with conceived space and the physical articulation and modification of the landscape. This chapter will deal with perceived space, the cultural and subjective aspects of the relationship between communities and landscape. The landscape would have been alive with symbolic and historical narratives, a palimpsest of associations and memory too complicated to ever permit full recovery. But where information allows the historian an insight into the richness of the symbolic landscape, it must be placed in its wider context as much as possible in order to discern its possible effects on the communities and inhabitants of the region. To comprehend the activity of the Boiotians in the historical period, it is therefore necessary to understand both sides of this symbolic reciprocity between man and the physical world. Physical geography (both ‘natural’ and that more clearly influenced/created by humans) undeniably affected the actions of the region’s inhabitants, but their conception of that landscape could be as influential in determining behaviour and interaction.

When trying to delineate the spatial imagination of ancient communities, it is difficult to adopt approaches to individual or communal mentalities similar to those profitably applied in more recent periods, because of the lack of detailed evidence. There are also dangers in applying anthropological models that hope to discern ‘meaning’ from associations with nature. A middle way must be drawn in which the actions of the inhabitants of the region can be placed alongside the often complex cultural concepts and matrices developed over long periods. There are several sets of evidence that can be

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432 Levi-Strauss wrote on Thebes and the Theban cycle, but his views have been largely dismissed. A good summary of his work on Thebes and early criticism is Carroll (1978); see also Dee (1979).
assessed in order to produce a scheme of the Boiotians’ own perception of their landscape. The situation and articulation of cult, the ‘events’ of significance for different communities and groups, traditions of movement, descent, foundation and autochthony, as well as festivals and the products of culture, can all help inform us of the way in which space is being perceived. The body of evidence from Boiotia is not unusual in a Hellenic context in its fragmentary preservation, but there is enough to allow a degree of reconstruction over the period. It is possible to compose a history of Boiotia by combining an understanding of the physical landscape with the political activity of the communities, but to do so without reference to the way in which the Boiotians perceived, and therefore changed their geography, would be to ignore an element as important as the course of the Asopos, the strength of the walls of Chaironeia, or the location of the easiest passes over Kithairon.

4.Ii. Geographical lineage; the arrivals of the Boiotoi

To comprehend the perceived space of Boiotia it is necessary to explore the way in which the Boiotians understood their own situation in the landscape; how and where competing and negotiable narratives of myth and history located communities in their physical context. This view will necessarily be informed by sources from outside of Boiotia, which themselves subsequently became agents in creating perceptions and experience of landscape within Boiotia. The ‘view from the ground’ that archaeology provides is as important and perhaps as fragmentary as the literary narratives, but discerning the movement and interactivity of ideas, culture and people can help to elucidate the dynamic that must be present to create places and geographical cohesion. It is from intensive work on Boiotian shrines and settlement centres that much of the important information will be taken, and by combining the narrative of landscape with the occupation pattern and material culture, it is possible to understand the role of space in the experience of the communities and how it affected that experience.

When dealing with the Boiotians’ scheme of their history in the landscape, several issues need to remain at the forefront of the discussion. The first is a need not to attempt a deterministic or homogeneous picture of the Boiotians’ own view of their past433. Though there were shared myths of descent and movements that were necessarily

433 Zeitlin (1990), 152-153, argues for the ‘circularity’ of time within the mythic cycle, with direct reference to Thebes. More recently the dangers of chronological rationalisation have been emphasised with regard to the double foundation of Thebes: Berman (2004).
present at the centre of the ethnic consciousness of the Boiotoi, there was not a need for each of the communities therein to share the same myths regarding their own settlement in the area\textsuperscript{434}. As will be demonstrated, this can be an idiosyncratic and capricious understanding of the past, and does not necessarily have to fit with the meta-narrative that binds the ethnos as a whole together. As long as a broad ethnic framework is adhered to, Thespiai’s foundation myths need not necessarily conform to the Thebans’ foundation myths, any more than Thebans would necessarily support those of Hyettos. Each could be a statement of historical situation, open to change and manipulation. The one significant caveat is that the individual myths could be used to articulate power relationships within the wider ethnic matrix and thereby alter it.

\textsuperscript{434} The importance of shared myths of descent has been discussed by Hall (1997), 26, and Nielsen (1999), 18, 32-36. In Hall’s model, the myth of shared descent is the most important aspect of ethnic identity, more so than language and inhabitation of the same area.
4.II. Boiotianicity

4.II.i. Introduction
The picture provided by the extant material of Boiotian history between the end of the Bronze Age and the late sixth century is inherently complicated, lacunose and confused. There have been few attempts at reconstructing a coherent chronology of the region in this period, and those that have are generally faintly drawn and hung on a handful of ‘events’. That this confused picture of Boiotian history before the sixth century was prevalent also in the ancient world is attested by Thucydides’ attempt to reconcile several variants of Boiotian migration/foundation myths into a single picture.

However, the formation of a coherent narrative progression from c.1100BC-600BC is neither possible nor necessarily requisite for the current work. It is more important to comprehend the inherent plurality of narratives that the landscape could accommodate. In the historical period, few areas in the Greek world could offer such a rich, diverse and well-known mythological inheritance as Boiotia, and any attempt to reconcile all variant narratives from inside and outside of Boiotia is likely to fail. Instead, it is salient to understand what the myths and narratives that were current in the period suggest about the way in which the Boiotians were conceiving and shaping their own landscape.

4.II.ii. Migrations and ancestors
A natural place to begin a discussion of the Boiotians’ own conception of their place in the land is with their eponymous ancestor Boiotos himself. Recent analysis of Boiotos’ mythological family tree suggests that links between the figure and the important cult sites and eponymous founders of the various Boiotian settlements are a late development, perhaps in the sixth or fifth century. Considering the supposed antiquity of many of the Boiotian cult-sites this late articulation may initially seem surprising, but would stem from the same pattern of discourse and alterity that gradually formed a ‘Boiotian’ identity, and would later more forcefully affect the desire to bring about political homogeneity of the area. A common mythic background is regarded as a sine qua non to the cohesiveness of an ethnic group; that the genealogy of Boiotos reconciled the mythology of communities throughout the region and even

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435 Despite the large improvement in our evidence, there have been few attempts to reconstruct this period in any coherent fashion since Buck, (1979), 75-84, ‘Coming of the Boiotoi’. Perhaps more helpful is work such as that by Edwards and Tandy on reconstructing the context of Hesiod’s situation and experiences: Edwards (2004); Tandy (1997), 203-227.
436 Thuc.1.12.3 with discussion above, p.33-34.
438 See above, n.434.
accommodated ‘Minyan’ Orchomenos is strong evidence for the ethnic cohesiveness of the region in this period\textsuperscript{439}. The genealogy of Boiotos has strong links to Thessaly, the migratory homeland of the Boiotoi, and through Boiotos’ mother Arne, alludes directly to the shared social and geographic starting point of the Boiotoi\textsuperscript{440}. The spatial movement becomes enshrined in genealogy so that the tradition of \textit{ethnos}/group founder and migration from a fixed geographic locus reinforce one another and reify the communality of descent, entitlement to territory and broad geographical comprehension within the group\textsuperscript{441}. In the early historical period, with neighbours to the north, west and south often hostile and expansionist, there was a need to strengthen the coherence around a sacred and physical geography, and this acted as a catalyst to further cohesion on a foundation of a pre-existing shared linguistic, cultural and religious background. From the way in which communities interacted with Thessaly, Sparta, Athens and Makedon it is apparent that the lack of a cohesive political system meant that those hostile to Boiotia could attempt to control the area piecemeal by applying to the particular desires of individual communities. Given the social cohesion around an ethnic identity in the period under review, it is inconceivable that the ‘Boiotians’ before the sixth century did not already have many shared myths and narratives of their past. That this early common identity would have informed the role of the region in the epic cycles in which Boiotia featured so prominently is to be expected. This is the case even if the continuity of settlement and habitation from the Bronze Age required to link the region to the epic cycle is often implicitly contradicted by the foundation myths of individual communities themselves. There were semblances of a common heritage previous to these specific external influences, but only through geographical/territorial pressures would there have been a need to articulate, in a more ordered fashion, the past as well as contemporary relationships between the various communities\textsuperscript{442}.

Having seen the eponymous hero of the Boiotians migrating and settling the land in one tradition, an instructive example of how plural narratives of a place can interact and

\textsuperscript{439} West (1985), 181, Fowler (1998), and Larson (2007), 27-8, use the \textit{Ehoiai} predominantly for reconstructing the ethnic genealogy of the region at this time, with Athamas and his son Minyas making up another branch of the family descended from Aiolos.

\textsuperscript{440} Boiotos was descended from Aiolos, linking the Boiotoi with Thessaly and placing them on an equal footing with the Ionians, Dorians and the Achaeans: Larson (2007), 27-29.


\textsuperscript{442} Hall (2003), on alterity and the pressures of \textit{emic} (insider) and \textit{etic} (outsider) discourse: Cf. above, Chapter 1 ‘Epichoric History’, n.32.
overlap is to consider how the traditions regarding Kadmos and Thebes (the most famous of the Boiotian community founding myths), can be reconciled to it\textsuperscript{443}. That the names of groups usually precede the naming of a founding/eponymous hero and not vice-versa is well established, and with both the Boiotoi and the Kadmeioi this is the case\textsuperscript{444}. The Theban claim to autochthony on the basis of the myths surrounding the foundation of the city by Kadmos is an important motif, particularly in relation to Athenian claims to autochthony in the fifth century\textsuperscript{445}. In order to understand the significance of the Kadmeian foundation myth for the relationship of the Thebans with their land, it is worth therefore examining the major central features of the narrative\textsuperscript{446}.

The significant (and most consistent) parts of the story for Theban self-perception as well as the perception of Thebes from outside were:

i) That Kadmos had come from the East: specifically, from Phoenicia\textsuperscript{447}.

ii) That he had been to Delphi for advice\textsuperscript{448} and been told to follow a cow and to found a city where it lay down\textsuperscript{449}.

iii) Having been led to the site for the new city, he then had to kill a serpent guarding a water source near the city\textsuperscript{450}. When the teeth of the dragon were

\textsuperscript{443} Thebes' foundation had plural narratives, including many variants of the Kadmos myth: Edwards (1979), 17-44. That the Boiotian migratory myths emphasise points of entry (Chaironeia and Orchomenos particularly), and stop short of Thebes and Tanagra has received attention recently in Kowalzig (2007), 358-60, with n.67, for the basic narrative tradition of the migration. The tradition current in Herodotus (5.57-58) that Thebes and Tanagra had been settled by Phoenicians, might explain their absence from narratives regarding the progression of Boiotos, but to be part of the ethnos those communities must have had a part in the narrative of the region’s settlement by the Boiotoi.

\textsuperscript{444} Kadmeioi appear in Homer, but Kadmos only appears in relation to his own family, and not specifically to Thebes (Hom. Od. 5.333), making it likely that as with Boiotos and Boiotoi, the ethnic group was formed first: West (1997), 448-450; Berman (2004), 17.

\textsuperscript{445} See below, Chapter 4.VII.i.

\textsuperscript{446} See Roller (1989), nos.25-30 (p.45-47) on traditions of Gephyrioi and Tanagra. Roller suggests that the most prominent early reference to ‘Gephyrioi’ (Hdt. 5.57.1), might have been informed by Hekataios and that a link with Eastern/Kadmeian populations movements and memory is likely.

\textsuperscript{447} Euripides marks Kadmos specifically as Tyrian, perhaps making the tradition more persuasive as a result; Mastronarde (1994), 143, on Pho. 1.5-6. See Edwards (1979), 45-64, for a longer discussion of the sources for Kadmos’ origins.

\textsuperscript{448} The relationship between Delphi and Boiotia is important in many respects but in this instance there is in place an important contest as to the higher antiquity, cf. below, Chapter 4.III.iii, 160-162. For consideration of other ideas of the relationship between the Hymn to Apollo and the Aspis see Janko (1982), 127.

\textsuperscript{449} Mirroring perhaps his pursuit of the bull (Zeus) that had abducted Europa. City foundation following an animal guide is not an uncommon tradition: West (1985), 448, n.30, following Edwards (1979), 42, 155.

\textsuperscript{450} Harte (2011), provides a good recent treatment of the relationship between saint figures and wells, which offer an interesting parallel to Kadmos and the source of water for his new city.
sown in the soil, the ‘Spartoi’ sprang forth and under provocation from Kadmos proceeded to fight each other until only a few were left alive.\(^{451}\)

These three principal elements are suggestive of a symbolic origin (the ‘East’), the relationship of the city with agriculture (the cow) and the land around it with its population (the tradition of autochthony). Though the association of Kadmeians with Thebes has a long heritage, the many variants of the Kadmos narrative and probable changes before its first crystallisation in the fifth century make it advisable not to make too much of these symbols. However they do still illustrate the way in which communities could make sense of their own position geographically as well as socially.\(^{452}\)

There is no mention of Boiotos in the Kadmos narratives, and there seems to be no attempt to reconcile the two traditions elsewhere. The two traditions had important but non-competing claims for Thebes, allowing the community to locate itself in different strands of social and geographic interaction at the same time.

The other tradition of the foundation of Thebes, by Amphion and Zethos, also has a high antiquity but is entirely independent from both Boiotos and Kadmos in its formation.\(^{453}\) As with the Kadmeian narratives, the fuller extant accounts of the traditions of Amphion and Zethos are from the fifth century and later,\(^{454}\) but it is significant that in the earliest accounts the focus is on the role of Amphion and Zethos in building the walls of the new community:

\[\text{"τὴν δὲ μὲτ’ Ἀντιόπην ἠδόν, Ἀσωποῖο θύγατρα, ἢ δὴ καὶ Δίως εὐχετ’ ἐν ἄγκοινησιν ἰαῦσαι, καὶ ρ’ ἔτεκεν δύο παιδ’, Ἀμφιονά τε Ζήθον τε, οἱ πρώτοι Θήβης ἔδος ἔκτισαν ἑπταπύλοιο, πύργωσάν τ’ ἐπεῖ οὐ μὲν ἀπύργωτόν γ’ ἐδύναντο ναεμέν εὐρύχορον Θήβην, κρατερῶ περ ἔδσε.}\]

\[\text{Hom.} \text{Od. 11.260-265}\]

\(^{451}\) The main import here for relationship to the land is that a certain Spartonos was leader of the 446 victory (Plu. Ages. 19). He is unlikely to have been an Orchomenian (that city had been captured by exiles rather than harbouring them: Buck (1979), 150) and the most likely designation is therefore Theban (see \textit{RE}: Sparton (4). The name appears in the \textit{LGPN} only in this example. The myth of the men of dragon’s teeth is obviously current in the mid fifth century, e.g. \textit{Antigone} 1115-24 (produced close to the defeat of Tolmides). Vian (1963), 158-171, for discussion of representation of Spartoi in general. Schachter (1985), illustrates that Kadmos and the Spartoi seem to have been a source of fascination for fifth-century Athens, perhaps more so than in Thebes itself.

\(^{452}\) Much information from Thebes indicates the strong links that the site had with the east throughout much of its history, including the cylinder seals found on the Kadmeia, the traditions relating to the re-introduction of writing through Thebes (\textit{Hdt.} 5.58.1), as well as cult introductions such as the Kabeirioi, which seem to be eastern in origin. Discussion in West (1997), 58; Bernal (1991), 497-512; Vian (1963), 54-56 (on tradition of introduction of writing). See below, Chapter 4.IV.iii, for further discussion of the Kabeirion.

\(^{453}\) Berman (2004), 2.

\(^{454}\) See Hurst (2000), 65, for summary of sources.
The city is founded by being walled with the seven gates, with explicit reference to the broad spaces (ἐσορόχοι) of Thebes necessitating this significant defensive construction, however strong its inhabitants. The description of Thebes’ location within the Teneric Plain is accurate, with the Kadmeia being one of the only points of defensive strength within the plain.

Many later accounts of the ‘foundation’ of the city by Amphion and Zethos, would consider it a re-foundation, with the city already existing when they arrive. This implication led many of the later prose narratives to attempt to place the foundation of Kadmos and the re-foundation of Amphion and Zethos in a chronological or a spatial order. However, the two traditions are distinct and it seems likely that the origins of Amphion and Zethos predated the Kadmeian narrative. The walls that they build are considered important enough to the integrity of the community that the act is deemed appropriate for founders. The existence of plural and mutually exclusive narratives of migration and foundation in Boiotia clearly exercised the desire of ancient compilers of myth and history to synthesise accounts. The sequencing of Kadmos/Amphion-Zethos is paralleled by the account of Thucydides of the Boiotian migrations around the time of the Trojan Wars.

In an attempt to outline the post-Trojan migratory tradition of the Boiotoi whilst at the same time demonstrating his knowledge of the Catalogue of Ships and its large Boiotian contingent, Thucydides lingers inelegantly in his narrative. Of greatest salience is

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455 An obvious historical parallel is Brasidas’ role as ‘founder’ of Amphipolis, which had been founded only thirteen years previous to his arrival by Hagnon the Athenian (Thuc. 4.102.3 (437BC); Thuc. 5.11.1 (424BC)). Epaimonidas’ relationship to the foundation of Messene was based on his nucleation and fortification of the Messenians: Larighi (2008), 217.

456 E.g. Apollodoros for chronology (3.5.2-6: placing Amphion and Zethos two generations after Kadmos), and Aeschylus Seven Against Thebes for spatial (locating one foundations in the citadel (Kadmos), and one in the lower city (Amphion/Zethos): Berman (2004).

457 Berman (2004), 19, places the cultural setting for Amphion and Zethos in the Mykenaian period

458 The construction of Thebes’ walls to the sound of music (Hes. fr. 182 M-W) is also an early theme, and this element to the story must have been in the mind of the Thebans when the walls of Athens were destroyed to the sound of music in 404 (Xen. Hell. 2.2.23), and the story would have been in the mind of those present at the destruction of the walls of Thebes themselves (though no music is attested in the sources). The construction of the walls of Thebes to music corresponds nicely to the general fame of the city for musical ability. The fragments of the Antiope of Euripides suggest further interest in Amphion, Zethos and Theban Walls in late fifth century Athens: Webster (1967), 205-211.

459 Thuc. 1.12.3: quoted above, Chapter 2.II.iv.

460 Larson (2007), 52-64, is the best recent work on this. Without trying to unnecessarily ‘factualise’ the account of a second migration following the Trojan Wars, it is worth bearing in mind the archaeological evidence from surface survey of a general depopulation of the region in the late Bronze Age, see e.g. Bintliff 1997. As with Hesiod’s family, the availability of fertile land attracted migrants into Boiotia over an extended period in the early Iron Age and the influence of this is discernible in the mixed inheritance
that the Boiotian settlement position (and prominence) in the *Catalogue of Ships* was familiar enough to Thucydides’ audience that he was forced to acknowledge the Homeric scheme in order to demonstrate that he was not ignorant of the Boiotians’ pre-Trojan expedition occupation of the landscape. Thucydides’ narrative offers an insight into the issues that surrounded the conversion of plural and overlapping accounts of history and myth into a diachronic and sensible synthesis. The issue here is not whether the *Catalogue of Ships* is historically accurate, but the way in which it portrayed the regions and how that might have affected (or been affected by) the Boiotians of the seventh to the fifth centuries. Although the later migrations of the Boiotoi were acknowledged, they ‘joined’ those Boiotoi that were already there. Whether this is historical or not is unimportant compared with its significance for understanding the tripartite relationship between a migratory group, the fertile natural landscape, and the physical and cultural Mykenaian remnants of the area.

The parallels between the ‘double’ foundation of Thebes (Kadmos/Amphion-Zethos and Boiotian migration) and the ‘double’ migration to Boiotia (preserved in Thucydides) are not connected in tradition but they insist on a comparison. Both are likely products of the heavy influence of previous occupation of the region, and particularly its major Bronze-Age centres. Whilst retaining myths of foundation or arrival that give a particular narrative, both pairs of narratives permit a certain continuity with the past that might otherwise not be possible. There would have been significant symbolic capital in being able to link oneself with the tradition of the monumental remains of the Bronze Age and of the mythological cycles preserving some elements of the situation of this period. In Boiotia, the cohesiveness of the ethnic group had as a central feature the migratory traditions binding them together in a shared origin and experience of

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461 For which, see Hornblower (1991), ad.loc. The prominence of the Boiotian contingent in the *Catalogue of Ships* might have been because of a tradition of Boiotian catalogue poetry Kirk (1985), 178-9. Less likely, it might have been because the Catalogue begins at Aulis and the gathering of the contingent and that Catalogues tend toward becoming briefer as they go on: West (2011), 113-114.

462 Thucydides’ explicit aim: Thuc. 1.21.

463 Thucydides also makes an attempt at integrating the Homeric Kadmeioi in his narrative (underlining the Kadmeioi but not Kadmos’ position in the *Odyssey*), as the group that preceded the Boiotoi in occupying what is now Boiotia (τὴν νότιον μὲν Βοιωτίαν). The idea of joining those already in position might well be historically accurate, given that the destruction of the Bronze Age centres in Boiotia comes before that of the site of Troy: Symeonoglou (1985), 66-70. Of greater moment however, is the idea that the ‘new’ migrants, whether they joined pioneers or not, began to link themselves within the physical matrices that survived in the landscape and preserved something of the structure of the Mykenaian communities. The link to the land and its memories was an important facet of the migrants’ relationship with their new surroundings from the outset. There might have been a genuine geographic logic that underpinned the selection of sites for occupation, suggested by the work on settlement chambers of the Leiden archaeological team. See above, n.236.
colonisation of Boiotia. In Thebes, the narrative of Amphion and Zethos was maintained alongside that of Kadmos because it gave the Thebans a link with the physical aspects of their landscape that they inherited from the Mykenaian period. Kadmos gave them the complementary distinction of an autochthonous, exotic, and divinely inspired community origin. In both cases, the migratory tradition (Kadmos and Boiotos) was central to group cohesion (Theban and Boiotian), but the landscape (physical and cultural) which had been colonised had historical value too great to go unclaimed in the identity of the community. This very active production of space was a response to the palimpsest of illustrious history that had preceded the migratory groups. The resultant mythic landscape was confusing to its later audience only when synthesis or rationalisation was desired, and the mythical time which permitted the co-existence of parallel narratives was substituted for the linear, pseudo-historic, temporal reconstruction.

4.II.iii. Linguistics and reference to the past

The Boiotian dialect, especially as preserved in inscriptions, might have appeared archaic in form and it has been argued that the dialect of epigraphy was deliberately conservative in order to evoke Boiotia’s own high antiquity and premier place in Greek thought. Whether the archaisms were deliberate or not, the language of Boiotian epigraphy can be seen to reflect the narratives of group origins and relationship to the land in several ways. The act of inscribing or writing in Boiotian dialect is implicitly an act of ethnic significance, but it can also be regarded as a geographic signifier. If an

464 The probability of an historical migration of the Boiotoi from Thessaly is high, and most work that seeks to look for this link emphasises the linguistic and cultic links with the Thessalians, see for instance Schachter (1996), 111. In the light of increasingly sophisticated work on the nature and antiquity of Boiotian cults and the relationship to their migration centres, the central source (Hom. Il. 2.507) should be considered a symbolic or mis-transposed location, part of the same problem of the Boiotian claim to have inhabited the region before their migration there: see Chapter 4.II.iv, and Hornblower (1991), 38-39. ‘Arne’ as a historical site in Boiotia most likely never existed. The position of Arne in the Boiotian section of the Catalogue of Ships, and the suggestions in the Ehoiai (D’Alessio (2005a)) have provided much fodder for discussion and whilst it is theoretically possible that there was an historical Arne that was swallowed by the rising Lake Kopais, for this to have happened it would have been very early in the Boiotians’ own traditions of migration, as both the migration and the collapse of the Mykenaian power systems that oversaw the regulation of the hydrological works around the Kopais would be dated to the same period. It is just as likely to be a confusion of migration myths and inherited place names. On Boiotian Arne: Kirk (1985), 194; West (1985), 102-3; Kowalzig (2007), 348-9. Though the Thessalian link looks strong, there do not appear to have been any metropolitan associations with Arne or any other community in Thessaly for practical purposes in the historical period. A useful parallel of this mixing of populations might be that of Hdt.1.57-8.

465 Larson (2007), 120, particularly emphasising the ‘epicising’ nature of Boiotian dialect in several inscriptions, pp.123-127.

466 Language does not necessarily imply ethnic identity, but Boiotian as a sub-dialect within Aiolic is an identifiable feature of the Boiotian ethnos: Hall (1997), 163-5; Larson (2007), 111-113.
inscription in the Boiotian dialect brings to mind the high antiquity of the region then the relationship to space, both in the contemporary ethnos and the past colonisation of the region by migrating Boiotoi, would also be brought to mind. The Homeric geography of Boiotia (with a few exceptions) conformed largely to the settlements of the sixth century, and thus any reference made to Boiotia’s place in the Catalogue of Ships, also implicitly referred to the high antiquity of the settlement of the land by the Boiotoi, and each community’s settled place within the landscape. The tradition of the migration from Thessaly was a key part of ethnic homogeneity for the Boiotoi and the use of a type of Aiolic dialect would have aided this, linking the group to their fellow Aiolic speakers in Thessaly, and reinforcing the perceived historicity of the migration. The careful use of dialect to convey a sense of the history of group identity was not unique to Boiotia, but the use is more nuanced than simply a desire to evoke historical Boiotia’s relationship to Homeric antiquity.

The archaic aspect of Boiotian custom and practices might not have been restricted to letter and word forms. Though there is no evidence for the use of chariots in warfare in Boiotia in the period under review, Boiotian grave reliefs are littered with depictions of chariots and the sacred band took their names from chariot fighters, implying a desire to connect with, and in some regards invent, their own antiquity. The place of horses and chariots in Boiotian society has been discussed above in more detail, but it is unsurprising to see a desire of groups and individuals to link themselves to the perceived illustrious past of chariot warfare. The preservation of dialect and reference to the early period of Boiotian occupation of the landscape could have provided a sense of social

467 Such as importantly, Arne’s presence, see above, n.464. Notable omissions are Chaironeia and Tanagra, both of which have a continuity of occupation from the Bronze Age to the historical period. For these, see Fossey (1988) 375-382, 43-48; Farinetti (2011), 104-105, 217-218.

468 It is the land, importantly, that plays the most prominent role in the Catalogue. The role of Boiotian members of the Trojan expedition is minimal compared to the apparent wealth of numbers provided, emphasising the prosperity of the communities rather than the greatness of its individuals. This is certainly evidence for a late Boiotian interpolation, wishing to make the most of Boitia’s situation, but the belief that the land of Boiotia was inherently and unchangingly fertile and prosperous in numbers of both men and communities is important. Larson (2007), 35-40, collects the information for the record of the Boiotians in the Trojan War.

469 There may be a parallel with Thucydides’ desire to refer both to the tradition of migration in Boiotia and the settlement of the region as outlined in the Catalogue of Ships. The use of the Aiolic dialect would itself have been a clear link with Thessaly: Hall (1997), 162-163. See the important recent contributions on the general tradition of the Aiolic migrations Parker (2008) and its linguistic aspects Rose (2008).

470 Nielsen (1999), 37-8, on use of strongly dialectical inscriptions long into the Hellenistic period. It also corresponds to broader patterns of Boiots using their Bronze Age inheritance either for practical purposes (in the re-use of Mykenaian walling) or in their manipulation of individual foundation myths in order to assimilate themselves with a landscape that the migration narrative of the Boiotoi explicitly distanced them from.

471 See above, Chapter 2.III.ii, n.202. The use of archaic terminology has its parallels in modern armies, such as the British retention of Dragoon and Hussar regiments which now operate in armoured vehicles.
stability against the backdrop of intra-Boiotian conflict and competition in the early historical period\textsuperscript{472}. The use of a dialect that appeared to be of high antiquity and corresponded to elements of Homeric Greek would conform to a general tendency of Boiotian myth and culture that seeks to highlight a long history and attachment to a set geographic position.

Though the \textit{Catalogue of Ships} generally corresponds to the known historical geography of the region in the time of the \textit{Iliad}'s composition, there are several key communities whose situation and description in or absence from the \textit{Catalogue} is important in marking the way in which the historical landscape interacted with the mythical. Most prominent is the distinction of ‘Minyan’ Orchomenos as separate from the communities termed ‘Boiotian’. The historicity of a wealthy and influential Bronze Age community at Orchomenos is not in doubt, but given the supposed homogeneity of the Boiotians in the historical period as an ethnic group (and Orchomenos’ participation in the Boiotian leagues), the transition from Minyan independence (and wealth) to Boiotian (relative) conformity needs explanation\textsuperscript{473}.

The distinction in the \textit{Catalogue of Ships} between the \textit{Minyoi} and the \textit{Boiotoi} is no doubt significant and the exceptionalism of Orchomenos is emphasised throughout the historical period in the representation of the community, and its own actions in relation to the rest of Boiotia. The Minyan/Boiotian separation is a product of the inheritance of the geography of the region before the Boiotian migrations. In the late Bronze Age Orchomenos clearly held a dominant position over much of what would later be historical Boiotia (particularly the Kopaic Plain), and whilst there seems little suggestion that Orchomenos did not adhere to the normative behaviour of the Boiotian ethnos, the wish to link the historical community with the physical and mythical associations of the site might have encouraged the preservation of the epithet from both within and without the area\textsuperscript{474}. Larson seeks to trace the reworking of the genealogy of Boiotos in order to demonstrate that the admission of Minyas into the genealogy both legitimises the independent tradition of Minyan Orchomenos, and fits him into the scheme of Boiotian genealogy, subservient to Boiotos\textsuperscript{475}. Also, the \textit{Catalogue}'s description of a contingent

\begin{footnotesize}
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\item \textsuperscript{472} Larson (2007), 111-127.
\item \textsuperscript{473} For legendary wealth see Hom. \textit{Il.} 9.381. cf. below, \textit{Annex}, n.784.
\item \textsuperscript{474} Another example of this exceptionalism may be the position of Orchomenos within the Kalaurian amphiktyony. Chapter 2.III.i, pp.71-72.
\item \textsuperscript{475} Larson (2007), 28.
\end{itemize}
\end{footnotesize}
from Ἑπιγόνοι 476, rather than Thebes proper, could be an overt reference to the events of the Epigonoi and the destruction of Thebes in the period preceding the Trojan expedition 477. From the archaeological evidence, there was a destruction of Thebes, in line with the destruction of Bronze Age palace sites more generally around thirteenth century. However, the archaeological evidence also suggests that in times of relative depopulation, the Kadmeia remained the centre of habitation, and it is only in relatively high population periods that the area beneath the citadel was occupied 478.

This short description of the relationship between the mythical and early historical version of the Boiotian landscape helps to understand the Boiotians’ own view of their land in the historical period. There was physical continuity of many settlements and a large population, as well as no direct references to any one community being predominant; all are equal under the ‘Boiotian’ umbrella (except non-Boiotian Orchomenos). The absence from the catalogue of a ‘lead’ city (unlike Athens within Attika) is evidence for a late composition in that it probably reflects the nascent political realities of the two regions that had diverged along demic and multi-polis lines by the sixth century. The lack of a lead community of Boiotia must also have been a boon to the federal development of the region. Thebes and Orchomenos, despite their apparent Bronze Age power, did not have a tradition of monopolistic domination on which to draw to legitimise later rule. In the narrative, the whole region was prosperous because of the land and the ethnos; though there were traditions of Thebes and Orchomenos as wealthy and clearly powerful in epic, there was no narrative of prosperity in unity under a single authority, since the ethnos fulfilled that role, and in the migration traditions there was also no predominant community. Even had the Catalogue been complete fabrication and Boiotia an uninhabited landscape in the late Bronze Age, then the articulation of this situation in literature would still have had significant ramifications for the Boiotians’ self-perception. As it was, they had not only a rich mythological inheritance but also outstanding physical relics of the late Bronze Age in the human engineering of the area. The Boiotians were the guardians of a fertile area rich in the physical remains of its history and very prominent in the principal Greek cultural texts.

476 Hom. Il. 2.505, best translated as ‘Under-Thebes’: Kirk (1985), 193-4. The archaeological evidence together with the description in the Catalogue suggests that in the early Iron Age, a previously vacant part of the northern part of the Kadmeia was occupied, an area that could be easily fortified using the surviving fortifications and other Mykenaian buildings. Symeonoglou (1985), 60-3.

477 Hom. Il. 4.406.

4.II.iv. Narratives of origin, geographic determinism and production of space

Despite Thucydides’ simplification of the schema, the origins of the Boiotoi and Boiotia, both factual and mythical, are unclear. There are several different narratives that interweave and compete with one another, complicated by the myths of individual settlements myths such as that of Thebes and Kadmos or Minyas and the Orchomenians. It is instructive to the historian that there is not a clear and coherent picture of origins and that even the idea of a migration and resettlement causes problems when strewn amongst the competing narratives of the Boiotian landscape. What is therefore important to take forward into the rest of the discussion is that the foundation myths and traditions of Boiotia were not records of actual development, but neither were they trying to be. They were instead documents of a community of settlements attempting to make sense of their geographic situation, independently and in relation to one another, in the historical period. This could obviously lead to claims of geographic determinism: the communities merely making the narrative of their past fit with their situation in the present that has been determined more by geography than by history.

However, without denying the influence of geography on the past and continued occupation of individual settlement sites and development of what became known as Boiotia, there are important caveats that allow for a more nuanced reading of the development. The settlements recognise their inheritance in relation to the land, and not necessarily to direct ancestral lineage. This would explain not only the confused picture of migrations before and after the Trojan War, but also the preservation of other narratives such as Kadmos in Thebes. These are more than geographic narratives, they are part of a process designed to fix the past fame of the landscape to the community that now inhabited the same physical space. The land is the natural conduit for this because it is the only constant in the relationship between the social groups. The process of locating one’s community within its physical surroundings has two major objectives: to articulate the situation of the community in relation to the other communities within the same ethnos, and to locate the community within the inherited space as constructed by previous occupants of the land. When a group migrated into an area that had a rich mythological and physical inheritance, the immigrants desired to assimilate this, and the product is a rich but often confusing palimpsest of history and myth that created the perceived spaces of the Boiotian communities. The perceived space was appropriated as

479 Paus.9.36.4; a poorly preserved tradition.
it had been physically, and acted as a conduit for the incoming Boioioi to be able to lay claim to the landscape that had been prosperous and famous before it became ‘Boiotia’.
4. III. Religion and Landscape

4. III. i. Reciprocity in landscape and cult
The idea of a physical ‘Boiotia’ is premised fundamentally on its ethnic cohesion. Because of the inherent malleability of ethnic identity, any attempt to delineate a physical Boiotia has therefore been subsequently imprecise in both ancient conception and modern reconstructions. However, if the way in which Boiotian ethnicity and the idea of shared community are constructed is understood, this can allow much clearer appreciation of the way in which geographical Boiotia would have been perceived by its inhabitants. Subscription to a common myth of descent and inheritance was fundamental to Boiotian ethnicity, and the way in which these myths reflect some of the territorial/migratory conceptions of the Boiotian communities is important. Alongside these it is necessary to look at how the religious practices of the various communities affected and manifested the communal inheritance of the region, particularly in the physical articulation of cult in the landscape. The placing and activity of cult sites, particularly the pan-Boiotian sites and the major sanctuaries overseen by a single community, can be assessed to help understand the reciprocal effect of the geographical and sacred landscape.

To emphasise the complicated but fundamental way in which geography, religion and ethnicity inform one another, and the importance of human agency in their balance, it is worth alighting briefly on the traditions linking Boiotia to Dodona in the sixth century and later. Kowalzig has recently examined the tradition of the ‘Tripodophoria’ in a comprehensive treatment, and this thesis cannot add anything to her findings in relation to the tradition and its celebration. However, whilst she treats the tradition in its context of ritual performance and its significance for the ethnic and migratory traditions of the region, the aspect that is most relevant here is the deliberate use of long-distance connections in order to assert a perceived historical geography of the Boiotoi. The beginning and end points of such a ritual tradition have great significance, and Thebes’ position as the place of commencement is important. Thebes did not have an important role in the migration narrative of Boiotos, whose journey from Thessaly stops short of southeast Boiotia in extant versions. A central role in a religious tradition that linked the Boiotoi firmly in a pre-migratory landscape indicates Thebes’ position as agent in Boiotian identity. The Tripodophoria allowed Thebes to symbolically renew its

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481 See above, n.443 for a possible explanation of this absence.
relationship with Dodona, but through its implicit Boiotian significance, also renewed its bond with the other Boiotoi. This would have been especially pronounced by the processional movement through the Boiotian landscape, visibly demonstrating to the other communities of the ethnos the spatial connectivity of high antiquity between Thebes and Dodona. 

4.III.ii. Extra-polis cult

The nature and location of extra-urban cult sites has been a particular focus of scholarship since the publication of de Polignac’s paradigmatic work on Greek sanctuaries. Though this view has undergone significant criticism and modification since its publication, the principle of the close and important relationship between territorially peripheral religious sites and the urban centre of a community is undeniable. However, because of the history of excavations in Boiotia, the extra-urban sanctuary has often been much more diligently excavated and recorded than its urban counterpart. Added to this is the testimony of Pausanias, which is particularly good on the details of many Boiotian religious sites that do not appear in other historical works or the archaeological record. Conclusions based upon cult sites and religious practises in Boiotia must therefore err on the side of caution, and take especial care not to generalise.

It is worth recognising that none of the major Boiotian inter-state sanctuaries were situated in the areas between Boiotia and other regions, and significantly, Poseidon Onchestos, Apollo Ptoios, and Athena Itonia are physically distant from any of the larger communities. These sites were able to develop into Pan-Boiotian sanctuaries precisely because they were focal points for neutral discourse between Boiotian communities and benefited in social stature and physical adornment as a result of this role as places of social exchange. These sites were of a notably high antiquity, and are worth examining in turn in order to illuminate their position and effect on the landscape.

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482 Presumably travelling past and visible to many of the major Boiotian poleis. Kowalzig (2007), 379 on other fifth-century appropriations of ritual activity of the Boiotoi by Thebes.
484 There are also discrepancies within the coverage of the major extra-urban sanctuaries: for instance, the sanctuary of Apollo Ptoios, the Amphiparaon and the sanctuary of the Valley of the Muses have received far more archaeological attention than the sites at Onchestos or Athena Itonia.
485 The Amphiparaon could be classed as an exception, but, whilst being a sanctuary of great import and fame in the late fourth century and beyond, it was not a traditional centre for Boiotian ethnic discourse.
486 An obvious parallel would be the Panionion of the Ionian dodekapolis.
487 These sanctuaries are discussed in Schachter and fuller treatment of the evidence associated with these centres can be found there. Schachter (1981), 52-73 (Ptoön), 117-127 (Athena Itonia); Schachter (1986),
Athena Itonia

The location of Athena Itonia has not been decisively settled, but there are strong candidates not far north of the akropolis of Koroneia. Whilst Koroneia was slightly withdrawn from the main road passing between southern and northern Boiotia, the sanctuary would have been very close to it and unavoidable to anyone using this route. As is also the case with Onchestos, the history of the sanctuary of Athena Itonia is dominated by Hellenistic evidence and much of their later roles as federal centres was determined by the re-arrangement of the Boiotian koinon following the re-foundation of Thebes by Kassander. Though the later evidence from both centres cannot be directly transposed back to the earlier periods, the prominence of the sites in the third century and beyond is indicative of the way in which the Boiotians of this period viewed these sites and their relationship to the landscape. The geographic liminality of the sites, situated far enough away from any of the major poleis of the region to be acceptable to all, would clearly have been a factor in the decision for federal centres of politics (Onchestos) and cult (Athena Itonia). The sanctuaries had come to prominence as result of internal Boiotian political relationships, and their situation on major trans-Hellenic routes to urban centres and sanctuaries.

207-221 (Poseidon Onchestos). They have recently received excellent treatment at the hands of Kowalzig (2007), 360-371.

488Pritchett (1969), 85-89. The exact location is not of concern here, insomuch as the general area is clear and of arguably greater import than the specific location.
Fig. 4.1: View north from akropolis of Koroneia, (the Ionian was located somewhere in between the akropolis and the main highway)
From figure 4.1, it is clear that the sanctuary of Athena Itonia would have been heavily patronised by those using the main highway that skirted the Kopais on its southern littoral, and also that it lay at the junction of that highway and the routes to the interior of Boiotia (to Hippotai, Thisbai, and Askra). The sanctuary, lying on the flat land adjacent to Lake Kopais, is likely to have been conspicuous in the landscape and visible from some distance away. The area would have been under the control of Orchomenos in the Bronze Age, and perhaps for some of the period down until the sixth century also. By the historical period, however, Koroneia seems to have been largely independent of both Orchomenos and Thebes, and the possibility of an increasingly federal and pan-Boiotian character of the sanctuary might have been part of this independence.

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Apollo Ptoios

The relationship of the sanctuary of Apollo Ptoios to Akraiphia could be seen as roughly similar to that of Koroneia with Athena Itonia and Haliartos with Onchestos. All three were small or medium sized communities asserting some sort of control over a major local sanctuary that hosted festivals and (at some point) games. All three were physically distant from their sanctuaries, but not far enough to be a logistical problem. The major difference with the sanctuary of Apollo Ptoios, however, seems to have been its deliberate construction by Akraiphia in the seventh century. Whereas Athena Itonia and Poseidon Onchestos had temples that were almost certainly built on sites that had been in use since the Bronze Age, the site of Apollo Ptoios was a new creation, away from the normal major routes of Greek or even Boiotian travel. The sanctuary quickly

489 These same routes brought the Spartans to the sanctuary in 395BC. Pritchett (1969), 93, makes a parallel with Xerxes' progression and Agesilaos' route back from Asia via Thessaly and Thermopylae (Xen. Hell. 4.2.8).

490 The victory dedication of Orchomenos over Koroneia from Olympia (SEG 11 1205,) is not securely attested in meaning or date. Jeffrey and Johnston (1990), (95 no.11) dates it on the basis of letter-forms to the third quarter of the sixth century. A dating around this period for the dedication would place it as an important indicator of Orchomenian objectives and relationships in this period, when Thebes might also have been expanding its reach to the north. The control, or at least acquiescence of Koroneia would have been vital to Orchomenos' ability to reach into southern Boiotia and beyond precisely because of its crucial location controlling both east-west and north-south transport routes. If the stories of sixth-century Thessalian domination of Boiotia and the possible battle of Keressos have any credibility (the questionable tradition stems from Plutarch's contradictory accounts of Herodotus in de malignatate. 33 and Camillus 19.2), this action of Orchomenos has much to recommend it as evidence of this same pattern of interaction between northern and southern Boiotia, and of mainland Greece more widely.

491 The victory over Tolmides in 446 was celebrated here with a trophy: Plut. Ages. 19.2.

492 Schachter (1981), 54-55, outlines the evidence which suggests cult activity was underway in the area in the eighth century, but from the end of the seventh century, there is a much clearer and more prominent cult of Apollo.
grew to prominence however, and would have been a major part of Akraiphian cultural, as well as economic life.\textsuperscript{493}

A major facet in this development that has often been overlooked is that the sanctuary was accessible from the sea. The inscribed lists of fish available at Akraiphia that have recently been discovered help illuminate what must have been a close relationship with the communities on the coast.\textsuperscript{494} The routes to the coast are not via major roads, but together with the speed of sea-travel, they would have offered a much quicker route than overland travel from anywhere south of Tanagra.\textsuperscript{495} The sanctuary, which might look incongruously placed when compared with Athena Itonia or Onchestos in terms of combining pan-Hellenic and internal Boiotian routes, is less dissimilar and far more attractive as a dedicatory centre when sea-travel and routes from the coast are factored in. Figure 4.2 is a panorama from north of the sanctuary and illustrates the general situation of the centre, and its links with the lakes and route to Anthedon.

\textsuperscript{493} The development of the cult of the Hero Ptoios at Kastraki alongside the sanctuary of Apollo Ptoios has encouraged reconstructions of social rivalry or division between the two sites. Schachter’s overview and simple explanation of prosperity and pluralism is to be preferred: Schachter (1981), 56-58.

\textsuperscript{494} Lytle (2010), 277, argues that Akraiphia’s likely supply of fish would have been from Anthedon. This might have been the case, but the harbour of Anthedon is over 20km from Akraiphia, whereas the harbour of Larymna is 13km away and that of Salganeos only 11km away (though via a very difficult route), a significant difference where the transport of fresh seafood is involved.

\textsuperscript{495} Athenian dedications at the sanctuary are known from the sixth century: IG I\textsuperscript{3} 1469, and IG I\textsuperscript{3} 1470 with Schachter (1994a).
Fig. 4.2: View south-west over Sanctuary of Apollo Ptoios and the routes to Lakes and Anthedon.
Fig. 4.3: Panorama from akropolis of Akrathia to Karditsa Bay and line of dam.
Though the site of the sanctuary was new, Akraiphia inherited important Mykenaian engineering, particularly the dam that defended the bay of Karditsa (Akraiphia’s only major agricultural area) from Lake Kopais’ fluctuations (marked in Figure 4.3). Suggesting any relationship between the two can be no more than conjecture with the limitations of the current evidence, but it is tempting to see the two major building projects as parts of the same pattern of community definition and territorial conditioning. The dam simultaneously creates a division (from Kopais) and a facilitator of access (a road on the dam).\textsuperscript{496} At the same time the sanctuary was being developed at the eastern end of Akraiphia’s territory, the dam and a boundary inscription with neighbouring Kopai were articulating both territory and the prosperity that the sanctuary brought.\textsuperscript{497} The importance of the sanctuary to Boiotia as its main dedicatory centre is indicated by the probable desire to dedicate a tithe from the spoils of Dekeleia at the site in 404.\textsuperscript{498}

\textit{Poseidon Onchestos}

There has been much work on the sanctuary of Onchestos in recent years that has considered its role in the \textit{Homeric Hymns}\textsuperscript{499}, but there has been little discussion of its physical location and place in Boiotia more widely. The literary descriptions of the site would have secured belief in the antiquity of the sanctuary, and its conspicuous location between the Teneric and Kopaic Plains and wooded covering would, similarly to Athena Itonia, have made it a visible and geographically important site. There is little evidence that Thebes ever controlled the site, and Haliartos definitely claimed affiliation with, if not control of, the sanctuary at various points throughout the period.\textsuperscript{500} The sanctuary acted as the formal political centre of Boiotia in the Hellenistic period; with the rearrangement in the wake of the re-foundation of Thebes, the use of Onchestos as

\textsuperscript{496} See parallel use of dam at Thisbai: above, Chapter 3.II.iii, pp.87-89.

\textsuperscript{497} SEG 30 440, with discussion, above, n.243. See also, above, n.161, for large number of dedications in the seventh, sixth and fifth centuries at the site.

\textsuperscript{498} Particularly significant given the fractious situation between Sparta and Boiotia at the time: Xen. \textit{Hell.} 3.5.5 and Buck (1994), 25 n.76. Note also some of the refugee Thebans choosing to flee to Akraiphia in 335BC:

\textsuperscript{499} See below, Chapter 4.III.iii, pp.163-165.

\textsuperscript{500} Schachter posits that the building of a temple, perhaps the first at the site, around 600BC would have had to been the work of a community given its size (Schachter (1986), 214-215). This point is emphasised when the probable existence of the first federal koinon is to be down-dated to the mid fifth century. Schachter’s view is that either Thebes or Haliartos could have overseen such a construction, but that Haliartos is to be preferred on the grounds of its later numismatic and other associations. I agree that Thebes did not lay claim to the site, as it early seems to have symbolically drawn its territorial terminus at the edges of the Teneric Plain (cf. Herakles Hippodetes, above, n.186). The building of the temple could therefore be seen as a reaction against Theban expansion known to have been taking place at this time, and reinforcing the boundary between Teneric and Kopaic Plains that would have been already tacitly recognised because of the antiquity and situation of the site.
federal capital (with Itonia as the religious centre) illustrates its geographic centrality in the mind of the Boiotians; when consciously choosing the site, its accessibility, distance from major power centres, and antiquity must have informed the decision.

4.III.iii. Homeric Hymns
Alongside Hesiod and the extant Homeric epics, the *HH Apollo* and *Hermes* are the earliest extant works which touch upon the mythical and physical geography of Boiotia. The appearance of any part of Boiotia in these works is generally brief, but there are a few important issues that have relevance for understanding the relationship between the inhabitants and the land of Boiotia in the sixth to fourth centuries. The first of these is the relationship between the landscape of Boiotia and that of the wider Greek sacred landscape. In the *Homeric Hymn to Apollo*, Apollo’s path to Krisa is described and there is a particular reference to his passing over Thebes,

\[\text{Θήβης δ’ εἰσαφίκανες ἐδος καταειμένον ὄλη’}
\[\text{οὐ γὰρ πώ τις ἔναες βροτῶν ἱερή ἐνι Θήβῃ,}
\[\text{οὐδ’ ἄρα πώ τότε γ’ ᾳαν ᾱταμπτοί ὦδὲ κέλευθοι}
\[\text{Θήβης ἰμ’ πεδίον πυρηνόρον, ἀλ’ ἔχεν ὄλη’}

*HH Apollo* 225-228

The passage echoes the narrative of Kadmos’ foundation, in implicitly placing Delphi in a position of seniority over, as yet unformed, Thebes. Together, the two accounts reinforce Delphi’s greater antiquity, and also that Thebes’ foundation was given divine sanction from the sanctuary. Even in the ethereal chronology of mythical narrative, Delphi (or Apollo), is unlikely to have ordered Kadmos to build a city in the Teneric Plain, as any placement of Kadmos would had to have come far earlier than the Trojan wars. Delphi, whenever it became a premier sanctuary of the Greeks, did not have

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501 The provenance of the hymns has been the source of much debate ever since the Alexandrian scholars de-classified them as definitively Homeric: Richardson (2010), 1-4, for a good recent summary. That there could have been significant Boiotian influence on their composition is likely given the specificity of the geography of the works, which seem to be linguistically west Boiotian or Phokian; Janko (1982), 127-128. However, as with the *Catalogue of Ships*, which is itself a possible Boiotian interpolation in the *Iliad*, there is the difficulty of discerning diachronic change in the *Hymns* and when additions were made (Though probably too precise: Janko’s confidence (p.132) in a strict dating of the Hymn to 585BC is a rare example of definitive dating). It is enough here to point to the debate in the literature and to be aware of the changes that could have been made to the work over time.

502 See above discussion and the work of Edwards (1979), 184-185, in particular.
the requisite authority for such an exchange any time before the eighth century.503 Instead, there is here mythological give and take. Thebes, with its generally acknowledged high antiquity and famous history has given way to the religious authority invested in Delphi in the later period.504 Allied to this could also be the increasing prevalence of the Olympian Gods in Boiotian cult, either joining or usurping the ‘traditional’ local deities and cult figures.505 That Thebes would allow its known antiquity to be harnessed by Delphi in this way had the reciprocal effect of establishing its foundation in the highest echelon of divine patronage.506 It should also be remembered that whenever Kadmos is placed mythologically, his presence in Thebes is likely to have been an Iron Age interpolation and exchanges such as this would allow ‘those now called’ Thebans to trade on the antiquity of their physical site in order to make an important mythological link.

Aside from any basis in mythological politics, the explicitly physical description of the site of future Thebes is worth discussion. The description of Thebes as ‘cloaked in forest’ (καταειμένον ὤλη) is clearly designed to indicate its undeveloped and uninhabited position at this time.507 From around 1500BC onward Thebes is likely to have been largely denuded of forest, and therefore the suggestion that the landscape at the time of Apollo’s journey had not been heavily engineered or heavily farmed would therefore have the effect of archaising the landscape for any audience familiar with the area.508 That there are no roads or tracks (ἄταρπιτοι οὐδὲ κέλευθοι) in the area around Thebes is a natural continuation of the idea of an undeveloped site, but must have been deliberately chosen as a literary juxtaposition to the contemporary reality of Thebes as the centrepoint of roads in the region as well as more broadly in mainland Greece of

503 Site of Delphi uninhabited in early Iron Age and no evidence for sanctuary activity before c.800: Morgan (1990), 106, 148.
504 Even if only the Catalogue’s treatment of Thebes is taken into account, the city has a long antiquity as it has already had time to grow and be destroyed by the time of the Trojan expedition. Cf. above, n.476.
505 As witnessed most clearly at Ptoon, but also Apollo Ismenios at Thebes. For the process see Kowalzig (2007), 364-372.
506 Chappell (2006), 334, warns against attempting to construct any firm historical framework from the HH to Apollo and/or the Aspis.
507 Meiggs (1982), 378-9, on significance of trees for sacred groves. It might have been enough just to say that Thebes had not yet been built, but the idea of a forested Thebes, which in reality had a long and visible history of colossal engineering and a legendary fortification, fundamentally undermines the idea of any human interference. For similar effects in later literature: Ovid Fasti 1.234 with Frazer (1929) ad.loc. where he compares later sources with similar reflections: Virgil Aen. 8.314; Propertius, 5.1.1, Tibullus 2.5.23-38. As well as Fasti 5.93 and 639-642.
508 See above, n.51.
which the Hymn’s audience would have been aware. The wheat-bearing plain (πεδίον πυρηνόρον) parallels the description of the wider region in the Catalogue by emphasising the agricultural fertility of the land but implicitly acknowledges historical reality for the first time. In its short physical description of Thebes therefore, the Hymn deliberately picks upon the known (contemporary) physical attributes of the city and implies that the audience of the hymn would have understood the contradiction. Historical Thebes was un-forested, heavily farmed, traversed by many roads with an urban centre that had a long history of monumental engineering. The hymn knows and undermines the reality of the situation at Thebes in order to buttress the seniority of Delphi.

Another aspect of the landscape that is touched upon in the Hymn to Apollo is the routes through the region that feature in the wider geography of Greece. Where the Iliad, in describing the gathering at Aulis of contingents for the expedition to Troy, gave first

509 The historical interconnectedness of the site in all periods is not in doubt, and therefore both in mythological/literary terms and in practical reality, the central location of Thebes would have been a familiar idea, and one that is deliberately undermined here. Apollo’s own route might have been a broad parallel to the route that one would have taken to Delphi if coming from Chalkis or Attika and promotes the suggestion that the Hymn could function as a mythical tour guide. When travelling through Boiotia en route to Delphi one passed near Thebes (unavoidably), and should the lines of the hymn be remembered, the effect of the populous and heavily developed site of the city would have emphasised the antiquity of Delphi and the antiquity of both sites. It has been posited by Janko (1982), 127 (building on the ideas of Guillou) amongst others that the tradition preserved here is part of a competitive poetical encounter between north-western and south-eastern Boiotians, whose response, the Aspis, counters some of the Hymn to Apollo’s rhetoric.

510 Uninhabited and undeveloped Thebes emphasises Onchestos’ seniority and the idea of a religious network preceding the civic. The agricultural fertility of the land is reinforced elsewhere in the HH Apollo, where Onchestos and Haliartos are called ‘grassy’ (l.88 and l.143), and Apollo is warned about the problems of founding a shrine in Boiotia because of all the interruptions of horses and chariots (262-271). See Teffeteller (2001), 162 and n.22 for Pindar’s references to chariot racing at Onchestos.
place to the many Boiotian parties joining the expedition, the hymns give a picture of a
landscape in the process of formation but ‘naturally’ situated in a providential position,
vis-à-vis other major destinations. That Apollo passes over Thebes on his way to Delphi
is a tacit indicator of the former’s physical position in relation to the Pan-Hellenic
sanctuary, and probably written with an appreciation of the necessity of passing through
Boiotia en route to Delphi if travelling from the Aegean or the southern mainland (see
Figure 4.4). The subsequent description of Onchestos is also very much in this vein,
though the length of time spent describing the site is far greater than that spent on
Thebes and serves a different purpose. The ritual of sending an empty chariot over the
ridge of the alsos at Onchestos is worth recalling in full here:

'Οχιστὸν δ’ ίξες, Ποσιδήνων ἀγλαὸν ἄλος;
ἐνδά νεοδήμη πώλος ἀναπνεύει ἀγάμηνος περ
ἐλκων ἄρματα καλά χαμαί δ’ ἐλατήρι ἀγαθός περ
ἐκ δήρου θορών ὄδουν ἔρχεται οἵ δε τέως μὲν
κείν’ ὥρα κροτέουσι ἀνακτορίην ἀριστέτες.
εἰ δὲ κεν ἄρματ’ ἀγήσιν ἐν ἄλσεὶ δενδρίνετι,
ἵππους μὲν κομέουσι, τὰ δὲ κλίναντες ἐὼσιν
ὡς γὰρ τὰ πρώτισθ’ ὀσίη γένεθ’ οἳ δὲ ἀνακτὶ
ἐυχονται, δίφρον δὲ θεόδ τότε μούρα φυλάσσει.

HH to Apollo 230-239

This cannot be a practical description of how to traverse the pass as has been suggested
in the past511. Instead a reading of some sort of ritual at the sanctuary of Poseidon at
Onchestos has been generally preferred. Recent commentary on this passage has
revivified the contentious suggestion that is a description of a genuine remnant of
Mykenaian tradition512. Whether or not this is the case, of greater importance is that the
passage emphasises the sanctuary as a point of transition, and that division between
Teneric and Kopaic Plains was most prominently defined in the Mykenaian period513.
Onchestos is placed on the ridge of low hills that divide the two major basins of the
region, and was a symbolic dividing line between the Orchomenian (Kopaic) side of

511 This passage, largely unconsidered since Schachter’s analysis in Schachter (1976) 102-114 (and
subsequently Schachter (1986), 219, has recently received more attention.Tefeteller (2001), 160-161,
updates Schachter’s account, criticising particularly the idea that one would necessarily have to disembark
one’s chariot to travel over the Steni Pass.

512 The potential importance of the linear B tablets from Pylos to the understanding of the cult at
Onchestos has been recently underlined in a paper by Palaima (2009), which seeks to draw parallels
between the worship of Poseidon at Pylos and that of Onchestos, emphasising the possible Mykenaian
roots to the worship at the site. The lack of a temple at the site until the late 6th century (Schachter (1986),
211, summarising the archaeological work there) is not surprising given the importance of the alsos itself in

513 See above, Chapter 3.II.iii, p.77-79, for discussion of Mykenaian fortification system and division
between Kopaic and Teneric Plain.
Boiotia, and the Theban (Teneric) (see Figures 4.5-6 and 2.4). The placement of a major sanctuary on this site is itself a signifier of the borders of the area\textsuperscript{514}, but the symbolic aspects of the cult ritual that have been linked with prohibitions regarding riding through the sacred grove make more sense in a wider geographic context. Moving from the Theban-dominated Teneric Plain to the Kopais Plain through the conspicuous hilltop site and grove was a political and mythological transfer through a liminal area. The grove itself would have been conspicuous in the denuded landscape around it\textsuperscript{515}, and the marking of a transition between one region and another through a symbolic act and the geographical disorientation of the grove might have had as much to do with the mythological landscape of Boiotia as anything specific to the cult of Poseidon\textsuperscript{516}. One emerging at the other side of the grove having remounted would symbolically re-begin their journey in a new ‘landscape’. The traveller’s having to perform such an act amplifies the distinct liminality of the position of Onchestos.

\textbf{Fig. 4.5}: View north-west to Onchestos ridge from near Kabeirion (Mt. Parnassos visible in background).

\textsuperscript{514} Especially when placed in the context of other major sanctuaries which occupied liminal sites, such as Athena Itonia. The two sanctuaries would be the central nodes of the third Boiotian federation: see below, Chapter 5 ‘Epilogue’, p.240.

\textsuperscript{515} The nearest extensive woodland might have been on Helikon or at Rhitsona. For the situation of woodland more generally in Boiotia, see above, n.51. See above, n.510 for grassy surroundings of Onchestos. As a reminder of its proximity to Kopais, there is also a reference to a ‘bellowing’ Λῆψης at Onchestos as part of the omens before the destruction of Thebes in 335BC: Diod. Sic. 17.10.4.

\textsuperscript{516} Schachter (1986), 212 outlines cult sites of Poseidon occupying prominent positions on passes and heights in Thessaly (The river Onchestos also flowed near Krannon), which might have been significant given the high antiquity of Poseidon Onchestos and the migration myths. For the relationship between Thessaly, Boiotia, Dodona, and migrations myths, see Kowalzig (2007), 341-352.
The probable Mykenaian background to the cult and the alsos itself could have acted as reminder of the geographical divisions of that period. There are later myths that record the expulsion of the Orchomenians from the Teneric Plain and the traditional major division between Orchomenian and Theban power would have been the ridge on which Onchestos is situated. The grove might therefore have benefited from its placement as a neutral area between major powers, a position that contributed to its later position as the federal meeting place of the Boiotians. Together with the myths associated with the rivalry between Thebes and Orchomenos, the geo-political division manifested in the grove at Onchestos could have acted as a political boon to Thebes, as for much of the historical period its influence superseded the Mykenaian limits of its power. The traditions of the rivalry between Orchomenos and Thebes were prominent in the early historical period and beyond, and it must have been patent that Thebes’ power and influence spread further in relation to Orchomenos than it had done in myth. The location of sanctuaries with high antiquity and a prominent position in myth could act as symbolic thresholds of influence and power that would affect the perception of inter-community relationships in later periods.

517 For the myths relating to Herakles and Orchomenian horsemen near Onchestos; see above, n.186.
4.IV. Festivals and the land

4.IV.i. Processions and symbolic routes

Following the discussion of some of the most important sanctuaries, it is germane to acknowledge the differences in the types of religious practice in the landscape of Boiotia. Whilst urban and extra-urban sanctuaries could provide places for offerings, processions and processional ways were important features of many religious landscapes in Greece518.

Processions have an important role in the creation of geography. They link together places directly, and the movement between one locus and another also affects the space through which the procession passes. The expectation of procession is also an important facet of this: as processions tend to be often repeated communal events, the ability, or inability to perform the ritualised progression through a space which has itself gathered meaning, can be as important as actually reaching the terminus of the procession519.

The combination of repetition and collective memory of the procession/route and its meaning could be placed alongside the idea of a lieu de mémoire and termed a route of memory or a voie de mémoire. The popularity of Alkibiades for restoring the procession to Eleusis is an example of the power and social importance of this traditional movement through space520. The repetition of any extra-urban festival, even without the Rabelaisian pageantry of the procession to the Eleusinian mysteries, is likely to have encouraged the development of ritual communal progression through the landscape. This is especially the case for those processions that encouraged participation from several communities, creating symbolic connections for the communities taking part.

Though detailed evidence for the ritualisation and symbolism of the routes of processions in Boiotia is lacking, the routes themselves can be inferred and offer useful information about the way in which communities would have perceived their own landscape and that of others.

Thebes’ processional relationships demonstrate the variety of distances and social significance that religious movements in a landscape can take. There are the local processions to the Ismenion (the Daphnephoria) and slightly further afield to the Kabeirion, there is the historical/political procession of the Thebageneis from their

518 Bearing in mind that most ‘early roads’ are processional ways; for a comparative picture from Arkadia and an insight into the difficulties of reconstructing road networks, see Pikoulas (1999).
520 Plut. Alk. 34.3-7.
homeland in the borders between Athens and Boiotia into Thebes, and there is the much longer-distance, annual Tripodophoria to Dodona. These are probably just a small selection of the ritual processions of a single community, but they demonstrate a rich matrix of time and space.

Similarly, the relatively well-documented festivals of the Daidala at Plataia contain several important movements through the landscape that would have affected the way in which the Plataians perceived their landscape and were perceived by others in relation to it. Figure 4.7 illustrates the place of both processions in the landscape and the territorial focus of the Great Daidala.

Fig. 4.7: Map of the Plataian Daidala and Great Daidala.

δρυμός ἦστιν ἄλλακομενῶν οὓς πάρρωμα μέγιστα τῶν ἐν Βοιωτίᾳ στελέχη δρυῶν ἦστιν ἐνταῦθα. ἐς τοῦτον οἱ Πλαταιείς ἀρικόμενοι τὸν δρυόν προτίθενται μοίρας κρεών ἐφθῶν... ταύτην μὲν ἰδία οἱ Πλαταιείς ἐορτήν ἄγουσι, Δαίδαλα μικρὰ ὄνομαζοντες Δαιδάλων δὲ ἐορτήν τῶν μεγάλων καὶ Βοιωτοὶ σφροι συνεορτάζουσι, δι’ ἐξηκοστοῦ δὲ ἄγουσιν ἔτους ἐκλεπέν γὰρ τοσοῦτον χρόνον τὴν ἐορτήν φασίν, ἡνίκα οἱ Πλαταιεῖς ἐφευγον. Ξάνα δὲ τεσσαρεσκαίδεα ἔτοιμα σφρισίν ἦστι κατ’ ἐνιαυτὸν ἐκαστὸν

p521 For the processions of the Thebageneis and Tripodophora, see Papalexandrou (2008), and, above, n.184.
The journey to collect a sacred oak from Alalkomenai (9.3.4) would necessitate movement through a large stretch of Boiotia and link the festival of the Daidala to a site of great antiquity in Boiotian geography. The need is clearly not purely practical, as Mt. Kithairon is likely to have been one of the few places in Boiotia to have reserves of timber. The likely route to Alalkomenai would have taken the Plataian representatives through Theban (and/or Thespian), Haliartan and Koroneian territory, as well as past the shrines of the Kabeirioi, Poseidon Onchestos, the Tilphoussian and (perhaps) Athena Itonia. Alalkomenos himself was a mythical king of Orchomenos and thus this ritual movement of apparently high antiquity would also implicitly have linked the festival into the symbolic landscape of Orchomenos and north-west Boiotia.

The procession from the Asopos to Kithairon (9.3.7) is clearly territorial, with those features marking the traditional northern and southern extent of Plataian territory. This procession, as part of the Great Daidala, matches that of the little Daidala in that it is a demonstration of Plataia’s position in Boiotian space. Plataians ritually travelling through the Boiotian landscape or Boiotians being led through the Plataian landscape (9.3.6) are both manifestations of a desire to create an imagined Plataian space for both the local communities and the ethnic region. Figure 4.8 illustrates how the fire on the peak of Kithairon (9.3.8) could have been visible across the majority of Boiotia in favourable conditions, and because of this emphasised the symbolic power of the festival as well as Plataia’s position in Boiotian space.

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522 See above, n. 71, for the antiquity and possible location of Alalkomenai.
523 See above Chapter 2.II.ii.
Fig. 4.8: Panorama looking north from the peak of Mt. Kithairon.
In the greater and lesser Daidala, there is a broad parallel to the Theban processional relationships outlined above. There is the movement within one’s own territory (Asopos to Kithairon), the longer-distance movement displaying and performing antiquity and ethnic identity (Alalkomenai), and the movement of members of other communities into space managed by Plataians (the festival of the Great Daidala). The development of the Daidala and the Great Daidala provide examples of a pre-existing cultic tradition that is conditioned by the prevailing social networks, but also changed by historical event. It is important to explore the relationship between event and religious further as it is one of the clearest manifestations of the mapping of historical experience in space.

4.IV.ii. Historical event and religious geography
The different movements associated with festivals demonstrate the variety of effects the formal and informal processions associated with cult activity could have. Though festivals such as the Daidala have a high antiquity that might even have been the continuation of a Bronze Age celebration, there were incidents that were of such importance to the communities that experienced them that they were built in to the network of cults and landscape and became important geographical agents in their own right. Two of the great battles to be fought on Boiotian soil provoked just such festivals in their honour. The Eleutheria festival at Plataia referred to the victory over the Persians in 479BC and the ‘inviolability’ promise that was made by the allied Greek forces after the battle. The Basileia festival at Lebadeia was organised to celebrate the victory over the Spartans at Leuktra in 371BC. While both seem at first examination to be simple celebratory reactions to large and unusual events in Boiotian territory, a closer comparison of the two leads to interesting differences to emerge.

The Eleutheria as a major interstate festival, like so many important cults and associations in Boiotia, came into being in its developed form in the fourth or third century, long after the battle of Plataia itself. Though based on a probable historic...
‘oath’ sworn after the battle as a marker in the relationship between Plataia and Thebes, there is no evidence for an athletic agon until the Hellenistic period. This would fit well with the general re-establishment of Plataian cult and civic identity following its re-foundation by Philip and Alexander, which was itself a product of its historical enmity with Thebes and the desire of the Makedonians to appeal to the idea of ‘liberating’ the Greeks. Plataia had a turbulent history in the fifth and fourth centuries, and for much of the period was officially non-existent. The infiltration of the polis, which marked the beginning of hostilities in Boiotia in 431 BC, was almost certainly conducted by a federal force (rather than a ‘Theban’ one) invited to establish ‘Boiotian’ control over the polis on the eve of the celebration of the Daidala. As a result of this act and the subsequent exile of the Plataians, this festival was thereafter symbolically celebrated every six decades. This deliberate use of celebratory chronology had the effect of cementing into the historical memory of the region the attempt by the Thebans to permanently change the geopolitical dynamic of southern Boiotia. In this context, therefore, the ‘creation’ of a festival to mark the battle and the oath of Plataia is no great surprise, marking at the same time Plataia’s historic fame (as a battlefield and contributor in the cause of Hellenic liberty) and its physical relationship with Thebes. The creation/development of the festival of the Eleutheria should be seen as part of a pattern of developments in the period after 335 BC when the position of sanctuaries at key points of movement were augmented with major festivals and enlarged sanctuaries; including Athena Itonia, Trophonios, and Poseidon Onchestos.

(though see argument made recently for late sixth century foundation by Federico (2008), and Archisilaos at Lebadeia (Paus.9.39.3), the parading of the Mykenaian sceptre at Chaireneia (Paus. 9.40.11-12), and the Orchomenian link to the Kalaurian amphitheatry (Above, Chapter 2.III.iv, pp.64-65).

525 For an overview of the Eleutheria festival, the sources and the likely dating, see Rigsby (1996), 49-51, esp. n.25. From the claims of the Plataians’ to have been tending the graves of the fallen Spartans from the battle of 479 BC it is clear that even without a large festival, the Plataians were themselves actively promoting the memorialisation of events that offered them territorially ‘special’ status. The theme of the battle is also referred to in Isokrates Plataikos (14.61) in relation to the Plataians’ wish to have their city restored by the Athenians in 373 BC. Though this evidence is difficult to use to inform historical narrative, it allows a clearer view of the longer-term trend of the battle to inform Plataian discourse. In 427 BC, 373 BC and 338 BC (see n.527, below), the battle is clearly playing a role in the presentation of Plataian territorial claims. For more reflection on the link between the offerings and Thucydides and Isokrates, see Boedeker (2001b), 150-1, especially nn.14-15.

526 A theme that would become a leitmotif of relations between Makedonian monarchs and poleis in the Hellenistic period, prominently portrayed in the relationship through epigraphy from 311 BC onward: Welles (1934), no.1 12.

527 For an overview of the Eleutheria festival, the sources and the likely dating, see Rigsby (1996), 49-51, esp. n.25. From the claims of the Plataians’ to have been tending the graves of the fallen Spartans from the battle of 479 BC it is clear that even without a large festival, the Plataians were themselves actively promoting the memorialisation of events that offered them territorially ‘special’ status. The theme of the battle is also referred to in Isokrates Plataikos (14.61) in relation to the Plataians’ wish to have their city restored by the Athenians in 373 BC. Though this evidence is difficult to use to inform historical narrative, it allows a clearer view of the longer-term trend of the battle to inform Plataian discourse. In 427 BC, 373 BC and 338 BC (see n.527, below), the battle is clearly playing a role in the presentation of Plataian territorial claims. For more reflection on the link between the offerings and Thucydides and Isokrates, see Boedeker (2001b), 150-1, especially nn.14-15.

528 For a dating of restoration of Plataia by the Makedonians, see below, Chapter 5, pp.228, with n.752.

529 Buck (1994), 11.

530 Iversen (2007), 393-396.

531 For the Plataians’ role at Marathon see below, Annex, pp.242-243. For the physical ‘opening up’ of the polis with the removal of boundary stones in 479, see above, p.86 n.280.

532 For those that travelled and participated in the Eleutheria, the act of travelling to the site could itself be considered an act of pilgrimage, reflecting the similar journey of ancestors who took part in the campaign.
Though the development of major festivals at all of these sites was probably a post-335BC phenomenon, the Eleutheria needs to be considered here as its roots are clearly in the fifth century and it demonstrates the contingent diachronic change that can occur within a single lieu de mémoire.

The celebration of the festival of Zeus Basileia at Lebadeia seems to have been an almost immediate response to the victory at Leuktra and says much about the geographical dynamic of Boiotia after the battle. The games were founded in Lebadeia rather than at the site of the battle itself because of a desire to publicise the victory as widely as possible, and Lebadeia’s situation on the main route to Delphi guaranteed the highest number of visitors. The situation was also an aggressive location when considering the relationship between Thebes and Orchomenos, the latter of which had been allied to Sparta since 395BC. Considering the destruction of Orchomenos in 364BC, the direction of federal policy seems to have been firmly directed toward engineering control of the north-west area of the region. The choice of Lebadeia for the celebration was dictated by geographical concerns rather than the specifics of the battle itself. The location was chosen to increase the fame of the battle as well as to make a geo-political point to Orchomenos (clearly visible from Lebadeia: Figure 4.9), which without Spartan aid could no longer secure control over territory beyond its immediate surroundings.

Fig. 4.9: View north-east from Lebadeia toward Orchomenos (from temple of Zeus Basileus).

533 Diod. Sic. 15.53.4, for the initiation of the festival of Zeus Basileia at Lebadeia as Epameinondas’ idea. For a summary of the sources see Schachter (1994b), 109-10. See above, Chapter 3.III.v, p.126-127.
534 Orchomenos was occupied by the Phokians as a strategic position in the Third Sacred War, but reduced again by the Thebans in 346BC. For more on this, see above, Table 2 with n.86, and McInerney (1999), 211-216.
Both the Basileia and the Eleutheria were deliberate constructions reacting to a specific historical event. Both were designed to emphasise the magnificence of the event that they referred to, and the political implications of that event. These examples serve to illustrate the way in which landscape can be manipulated through the agency of individuals or communities in order to ‘produce’ space. In comparison to festivals, myth, and genealogical constructions which can appear as organic developments, the deliberate and immediate use of historical event to enact memory in the landscape allows an insight into the contemporary process of the production of space. The events were effectively playing a supporting role to wider historical and political trends that could then be manifested on the physical landscape by way of deliberate manipulation and celebration. In both instances, events that had been determined by a combination of geography, history and fortune contributed to the creation of subjective geography (the perceived spaces) of the inhabitants of the region.

4. IV. iii. Local sanctuaries: Urban and rural
The lack of thorough extensive excavation of cult sites in Boiotia leaves the historian with an imbalance of evidence in favour of those sites that have garnered more attention (or more diligent publication). This provides a problem for attempting to understand the role of rural sanctuaries in the landscape and their relationship with urban centres. Of fundamental import when considering the religious landscape of Boiotia is to remember that it would have been littered with sites at varying distances removed from urban centres, and recovery of the ‘religious landscape’ of rural Boiotia is impossible. It is therefore necessary to examine information from smaller and more rural sanctuaries in order to understand how some communities in the region were interacting with their surroundings, and if possible, what the character of these sanctuaries was. That the relationship between asty and chora is mediated by the sanctuaries and cults that inhabited the countryside has been central to discussion of community life at least since de Polignac’s work, and is important in understanding the relationship of geography and historical development in Boiotia.

535 Though see above and particularly the recent work on Pindar, especially Kowalzig (2007), and D’Alessio (2005b) on the Catalogue of Women.
536 Archaeology from Orchomenos is infamous in its lack of publication: Fossey (1988), 352. Another extreme was exemplified by the work at Haliartos, where the work focussed so much on the apparent temple complex, that little note was taken of other finds: Austin (1925) and Austin (1931) again with Fossey’s notes on the site (pp.304-305).
The Kabeirion near Thebes is one of the best excavated and historically most prominent ‘local’ cult sites, and the development of the sanctuary is an instructive case in understanding the way in which sanctuaries operated and could inform and reflect the relationship of community, geography and politics. There has been an uncommon amount of archaeological attention at the site, prompted by the fame of ‘Kabeirion Ware’ and its continued flourishing for many centuries beyond the period under review here, and this allows an unusual insight into the physical development of the sanctuary from the Geometric period onward. Schachter suggests that the early period is characterised by a very small site, probably only in use by a couple of families, who might have brought the cult with them from Asia Minor. The rural nature of the site (secreted in a small cleft in the southern part of the Teneric Plain: Figure 4.10) is emphasised by the early offerings being dominated by small votive bulls. There was a significant shift in the form of the sanctuary in the middle of the sixth century, probably linked to the growing size and influence of Thebes in the region, and this trend toward expansion and formalisation of the site continued through the fifth century. It was the middle of this century that seems to have witnessed the development of the black-figured Kabeirion-ware pottery. This pottery allows an insight into the form of the

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537 The best guide to the major excavations is still Schachter (1986), 66, with the chronological progression of the site outlined pp. 73-88 (down to 400AD).
538 Schachter suggests there may be a link with the arrival of the Kadmeioi: Schachter (1986), 97 n.4.
539 But not, as Schachter posits, to do with the formal formation of the first ‘league’. Schachter (1986), 98.
celebration of the mysteries celebrated at the site. Significantly, major rebuilding took place, which like the later walling scheme of the fourth century looks like the agency of a wealthy and confident central power asserting its influence.

The archaeological and literary sources produce a picture of a sanctuary, which though rural (but only 5.5km or so from Thebes), and agricultural in character early on, develops into part of the urban sphere of influence and reciprocal prosperity. The site suffers several interruptions in its developments that seem to be linked to politics at Thebes. In the period 382-379 (the occupation of the Kadmeia by Spartans) and then from 335 (the destruction of Thebes by Alexander) until 316BC (the re-foundation of Thebes by Kassander) there are marked breaks in incised votive potsherds and in the production of certain types of pottery respectively.

The close relationship between changes at the Kabeirion and historical events at Thebes is instructive in that the sanctuary seems to develop gradually and organically and is not from the outset a major cult centre for the community. Neither does the site occupy a border area, being firmly within Thebes’ territory. The site’s presence in the chora of Thebes is exploited by that community when circumstances and resources allow; the celebrations at the Kabeirion sanctuary, in whatever form they took, played an important role in the festival calendar of the community, and (as with Eleusis and Athens) emphasised the relationship of a large urban centre with its surrounding territory.

There were many other examples of the articulation of spatial relationships between community, landscape and cult that reflected a community’s wider situation in Boiotian geography. One of the most prominent is the temple of Artemis at Aulis, which lay near the principal harbour of Aulis (see Figures 4.11-14), where, for the community as well as for visitors to the area, the sanctuary would have highlighted the importance of the site in Greek culture. The sacrifices to Artemis made at Aulis in various guises from Homer to the Athenian dramatists were located in this fixed, well known, and active settlement.

540 Schachter (1986), 101-104.
541 Schachter (1986), 99, suggests this as a possibility alongside the increased prosperity of the private individuals attending the site. It is likely that the two would have gone hand in hand, with the state perhaps front-loading the rebuilding and extension of the site in order to accommodate the now federal audience for the mysteries. The development of Kabeirion-ware in the middle of the fifth century may itself indicate an increasing market for goods produced at or near the site.
542 The bond between Thebes and the Kabeirion is emphasised by the punishment of the Macedonians who entered the sanctuary after the destruction of Thebes in 335: Paus. 9.25.10.
Such a clear geography (the harbours and the sanctuary of Artemis) would have acted as a site where the mythological past and the historic present could be viscerally connected. The sanctuary would probably have been visible from the sea in the narrow channel between Euboia and Boiotia onto which Aulis opens, and would have been a constant reminder of Boiotia’s prominent role in Hellenic history. This ease of access coupled with being a site of great symbolism attracted Agesilaos to attempt to conduct sacrifices at the site in 396BC. A similar case has recently been made for Tanagra’s position as ‘border town’, on the front line of the discourse between Athens and Boiotia, being reflected in its close association with Hermes as god of travellers and frontiers. In both cases the development and continued significance of the cult might have been strongly influenced by the geographical situation of these communities in their wider context.

543 The ‘most famous harbor in Greece’ might have been used by Thebes to make important symbolic exchanges in the 360s: Schachter (forthcoming).
544 See above, nn.142 and 195.
Fig. 4.11
(above):
Panorama W. from Aulis akropolis.

Fig. 4.12
(below): View S. over Makro Vathy (Aulis).
4.V. Internal discourse

4.V.i. Numismatics
There is no information for numismatic production in Boiotia other than the coins themselves. No mints have been conclusively found in archaeological work, nor is there any mention in literary sources of coins or the minting of money. The region has no native sources of silver and there has been no analysis done to locate the origin of the silver from its material composition. Despite all of this, the information from coinage has had a profound influence on the conception of Boiotian history from the sixth to the fourth century. Barclay Head’s periodisation of coinage has been a central pillar of the division between periods of political plurality and the monopolisation of power by one or other community that has dominated most diachronic historical narratives. Especially pronounced has been the desire to locate the beginning of Boiotian federalism and the political koinon through the information provided by the coins. Though in the fourth century there are issues that relate to the annual magistrates of the koinon, this did not preclude the production of other coins in Thebes and in other communities at the same time. The koinon required coinage for some of its official functions, but at no time is there any firm evidence that any community attempted to monopolise coinage, or restrict its production.

It is possible to say that there is a common identity represented in the coinage through the shared use of the shield emblem. That the shield is used almost uniformly throughout the ethnic region for a century and half from the late sixth century is significant and attests at least to the perception of a common area where it is useful to have a recognisable coinage for transactions. This does not necessarily translate to ethnic identity being visible in the coinage, but its use suggests a regional awareness and a desire on the part of the minting communities to acknowledge their position within an area that shared social bonds and (probably) the majority of their economic activity.

The issues of Chalkis with a Boiotian shield and of Tanagra with a Chalkidian wheel attest the economic/geographic aspect of the coinage of the region over the ethnic and

546 Developed in two principal works: Head (1881) and Head (1884).
547 Buck (1979), 111.
548 Hepworth (1998), is the best account of the magistrates’ coinage of the fourth century.
549 Larson (2007), 78-109, provides a good recent summary of earlier ideas regarding the shield emblem, though her own argument for the shield as a reference to that of Ajax described in the Iliad (7.222), is made too forcefully. Cf. Kuhr (2006), 370, n.15, with reiteration of argument in favour of the shield as a reference to Herakles, again, based on Head. The shield might have had a specific origin as a symbol, but the greatest impetus for its design was probably a simple desire to differentiate it from the Aiginitan coinage on which it was based in weight, without veering too far from its general design.
political. The use of the Boiotian shield is primarily a mark of the geographic origin of the coinage and its principal area of use.

4.V.ii. Herakles

The most common reference made on coins from the mid-fifth century until the destruction of Thebes was to Herakles\(^550\). He appears in many guises, especially on Theban coins, but though his association was strongest with Thebes, Figure 4.13 illustrates the widespread nature of his cult in Boiotia.

![Map of Boiotia with stars indicating cultic centres of Herakles.](image)

Fig. 4.13: Cultic centres of Herakles in Boiotia.

Herakles’ ubiquity within Boiotia seems to have been the product of his supplanting of other local cult figures throughout the region\(^551\). Schachter outlined a geographic bifurcation in the character of the cultic Herakles in Boiotia. In broad terms the southern ‘Herakles’ seems to have played the role of ephebe or elite young fighter, often leading groups of similar young men in successful battles against the Orchomenians or Thessalians. In western Boiotia (particularly around Helikon), ‘Herakles’ seems to have

\(^{550}\) CNG *Triton* IX (10.01.2006), 413-6, 420-425, 521-530 (bronze coinage).

\(^{551}\) Schachter (1986), 1-37 for survey of cults of Herakles in Boiotia. The supplanting of the figure of ‘Charops’ by Herakles might have occurred in Thespiai, Koroneia and Thespiai. The chthonic aspect of these cults is contrasted by his Theban position as *promachos*, which is also the role taken by Hermes at Tanagra in a similar displacement of previous cult (see above, n.545.)
supplanted chthonic deities, often associated with underground powers. The two meet in Thespiai where traces of both ‘Herakles’ can be found. That Herakles should have so successfully supplanted local cult is not in itself surprising, but it is surprising that Thebes should be able to shape and monopolise his birth and early life in their community. The arguments using the various strands of Boiotian genealogical and epic poetry contained in works such as the Aspis admit the possibility that the association of Herakles with many of the deeds which involved Thebes against the northern Boiotians might have been quite a late development, thereby supplanting another figure in myth as well as cult. In the historical period, despite the geographical diversity of his cult, Herakles had his major worship at Thebes and was celebrated in an athletic competition in the vicinity of the lower city. Though the widespread depiction and celebration of Herakles' episodic life was relatively unaffected by his 'birth' at Thebes, the fact that the community managed to lay claim to such an important pan-Hellenic figure as Theban-born could only amplify Thebes' already prominent position in Hellenic cultural thought.

The significance of the idea of Herakles as the archetypal young warrior and defender of Thebes/Boiotia is vividly illustrated in the accounts of actions before the battle of Leuktra:

ος δ’ ἔπαιμενώνδας ὅρων τοῦς στρατιώτας δεισιδαιμονοῦντας ἐπὶ τοῖς γεγονόσι σημείοις, ἐφιλοτιμεῖτο διὰ τῆς ἱδίας ἐπινοίας καὶ στρατηγίας μεταθείναι τὰς τοῦ πλῆθους εὐλαβείας, διὸπερ τινῶν προσφάτως παραγεγονότων ἐκ Θηβῶν ἢπεισεν εἰπεῖν, ὅτι τὰ κατὰ τὸν νεῶν τοῦ Ἡρακλέους ὅπλα παραδόξως ἀφανῆ γέγονε καὶ λόγος ἐν τοῖς Θήβαις διαδέδοται ὡς τῶν ἱρῶν τῶν ἄρχαιων ἀνειληφῶντος αὐτὰ καὶ βοηθεῖν τοῖς Βοιωτοῖς ἀπεληλυθότων. Ἀλλον δὲ κατέστησαν ὡς ἀπὸ Θροφωνίου προσφάτως ἀναβηθότα καὶ λέγοντα, διότι προστέταχεν ὁ θεὸς αὐτοῖς, ὅταν ἐν Λεύκτρος νικήσωσιν, ἀγώνα τιθέει Δίῳ βασιλεῖ στεφανίτην· ἀφ’ οὗ δὴ Βοιωτοὶ ταύτην ποιοῦσι τὴν πανήγυριν ἐν Λεβαδείᾳ.

Diod. 15.53.4

ἐκ δὲ τοῦ Ἡρακλέου καὶ τὰ ὅπλα ἔφασαν ἀφανῆ εἶναι, ὡς τοῦ Ἡρακλέους εἰς τὴν μάχην ἐξωρμημένου. οὐ μὲν δὴ τινὲς λέγουσιν ὡς ταῦτα πάντα τεχνάσματα ἤν τῶν προστηκτῶν.

Xen. Hell. 6.4.7

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552 Schachter (1986), 20.
553 Schachter (1986), 16-17 who argues for Iolaos as the figure supplanted by Herakles promachos. This is demonstrated perhaps most clearly in the celebration of Herakles’ main festival in Thbes in the sanctuary of Iolaos, just inside the northern lower walls: Schachter (1986), 27-28. D’Alessio (2005a), 199-201 argues that there might have been attempts in the Megalai Ehoiai to give all the communities in Boiotia links to Herakles through his sons (Schachter (1986), 16 n.1, considers this a contrivance to tie up loose ends).
The symbolism of Herakles taking up weapons and joining the Boiotian forces at this geographically decisive moment is of great importance. The battle was clearly going to be significant and was fought in the area that lay between the zone that Sparta had largely monopolised since 386BC, and that which the Thebans and their syntelic communities had been gradually gaining control of\textsuperscript{556}. The comparison with Herakles driving out the Orchomenians from the Teneric Plain and Onchestos is likely to have been in the minds of those Thebans present at the battle, and therefore the symbolic manipulation of Herakles’ role as guardian \textit{promachos} was exploited. Theban-born Herakles stood not just for the energetic militarism of Thebes, but also for Thebes as a geographic agent, and Epaminondas’ decision to celebrate the victory with a festival at Lebadeia was designed to demonstrate Theban spatial power within Boiotia\textsuperscript{557}.

Herakles taking up arms against the Spartans would have been an especially symbolic image given the strong Spartan link with the hero\textsuperscript{558}. Despite the apparent monopolisation of the tradition of his birth at Thebes, Herakles was a resolutely pan-Hellenic figure, and outside of Boiotia the traditions link him most strongly with the Peloponnese and particularly the Argolid. His Peloponnesian ancestry is probably the reason why his sons’ arrival in the Peloponnese is referred to as a return, a feature that would be strange if Herakles’ Theban birth had been an overriding concern, and perhaps confirming the relatively late mythical appropriation of Herakles’ birth by Thebes. Boiotia possessed no monopoly over Herakleian imagery, through the depiction of Herakles \textit{Drakonopnigon} might have become popular following the Theban mints of this image in the fifth century\textsuperscript{559}. Given the plurality of narratives and episodic nature of Herakles’ life, it is moot to wonder whether he would generally have been considered ‘Theban’ in any meaningful sense, but in Athenian traditions, the relationship with Boiotia informed their view and depiction of Herakles in art and literature. A strong case has been made for the influence of current political events involving Thebes and Athens

\textsuperscript{556} See Beck (2000) on syntelia of the 370s.

\textsuperscript{557} See above, n.533 for the festival. Herakles (\textit{Drakonopnigon}, ‘the snake-strangler’) would be used as the symbol for the electrum coinage of Thebes, which was probably used to fund the Aegean fleet in the 360s: Gartland (2013).

\textsuperscript{558} Malkin (1994), 94-95, 234-235. Sparta founded the colony of Herakleia Trachinia in the fifth century much to chagrin of their Boiotian allies: Buck (1994), 15. Luraghi (2008), 231-2 highlights significance of Thebes/Herakles in Peloponnesian relations, particularly in the Heraklid royal lineage of Argos, emphasised (or created) by the erection of the statues of the descendants of Herakles at Delphi in the fourth century.

\textsuperscript{559} For instance the Aegean \textbf{ΣΥΝ}’ coinage alliance of the end of the fifth century: Karwiese (1980).
(such as the battle of Delion) and the depiction of Herakles in Athenian literature\textsuperscript{560}. However, the depiction was deliberately more complicated, and in Euripides’ \textit{Herakles} is torn between negative and positive portrayal of Herakles, paralleled with the depiction of Thebes itself\textsuperscript{561}. If Herakles was a definitively ‘Theban’ hero by the late fifth century, this shift could reflect the relationship between the two communities, even though the play itself is not set in Thebes\textsuperscript{562}.

\textsuperscript{560} Demand (1982), 3 n.6, particularly noting depiction of Herakles in \textit{Alcestis} and \textit{Frogs}. See also earlier discussion of the \textit{Suppliants}: above, Chapter 2.III.iii, pp.67-68. 

\textsuperscript{561} Bernadini (2000), focuses on this complexity, whilst Cerri (2000), 262-263, suggests that Herakles’ portrayal is fundamentally about Athens, not Thebes.

\textsuperscript{562} Cf. Aristophanes \textit{Ach.} 1.860: the salutation involving Herakles might have been a distinctive indicator of Boiotian identity. Olson (2002), 286, sees the greeting as part of a series of indicators denoting the provenance of the new character.
4.VI. Figures with landscape

4.VI.i. Hesiod: Askran perspectives

The ancient historian is generally at a disadvantage in terms of being able to reconstruct individual worldviews. It is only for relatively recent historical periods that it has been successfully attempted. But whilst in Boiotia there will never be Ginzburg’s Menocchio from which to unpick an individual mentalité, there are a few figures whose work has survived in enough detail to be able to discern an experience of the Boiotian landscape. What is known about Hesiod is that his father almost certainly came from Asia Minor, he possessed land on the hills around Mt. Helikon, and most importantly, the quality of his verse composition prompted renown in his lifetime and the preservation of his works to the present day. The debate over the historical Hesiod as opposed to the literary persona ‘Hesiod’ is likely to be unresolved barring the discovery of any further evidence. But there has been an increasing awareness of the possibilities of recreating a perspective on the world from this early period that we cannot discern from anywhere else.

Hesiod probably inhabited his corner of Boiotia in the seventh century, and there are instructive suggestions in his work that give an unusual insight into the perspective of a moderately wealthy (albeit exceptionally gifted) individual. If Edwards’ construction of Hesiod’s experience is correct, then the perspective of a nominally ordinary farmer in the middle of Boiotia in this early period could be quite broad. There are ideas of the way in which the community was defined and its homogeneity as well as the broader recognition of a greater power, beyond their control, as exercised by the basilees at Thespiai. The relationship between Thespiai and Askra is one fraught with the problems of lacunose evidence throughout the historical period, but it should be emphasised that Askra need not have been dependent on any other community on

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563 Ginzburg (1980), is an archetype for reconstructing individual Weltanschauung.
564 Though the methodological insight of Ginzburg’s *The Cheese and the Worms* cannot be applied to Central Greece in this period, it is instructive nonetheless in demonstrating that ‘ordinary’ people could have extraordinary and unexpected world views, and though the subtleties amongst individual inhabitants of the region are rarely discernable, the historian of this period must always guard against over generalisation of the ‘common perspective’ of a community.
565 See below, n.573
569 The issue of who the basilees were has been discussed most usefully by Edwards (2004), 64-73, and Tandy (1997), 208-14.
account of the size of its population, nor because of its geographical position. There is no sure evidence linking Askra to the use of the port of Kreusis, but it would be its easiest (and closest) outlet to the Korinthian Gulf. However, though Askrans might have made use of the opportunities provided by the Gulf, it has been suggested that Hesiod is following an Ionian tradition in offering advice on seafaring, and the experiences which he relates could well have been those of his father rather than his own. The experience described in *Works and Days* accords better with the difficulties of sea travel in the Aegean (his father was from Kyme) than with Hesiod’s nearest available harbours in the Korinthian Gulf. The personal experience of the sea evinced in the poems is very limited indeed and though a trip to Euboea is a significant journey for a subsistence farmer, the difficulties of the uniqueness of Hesiod’s talent are apparent again as he claimed victory at those games for which the journey was made.

Hesiod provides a voice rooted in the rhythms and function of the landscape itself, and though earlier than the period under review he has the advantage of being firmly attached to a specific locale. He records valuable information about the farmer’s year, early Boiotian attitudes to seafaring, and relationships toward other communities. The fame and popularity of Hesiod’s work exercised a significant effect on the later geography of the region around his Askran home. The founding of the sanctuary of the Muses in the valley that linked Askra to Thespiai probably occurred a little after Hesiod’s own time, but his creative work was the catalyst for this and can be used as

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570 Though at first the situation of Askra may seem to be determined by the access to the east end of the Valley of the Muses, it actually controls the best and fastest pass to the interior of Boeotia (see above, Figures 2.9 and 3.13); Pritchett (1985), 148-151. Kallet-Marx (1989), 310-311, argues for the strategic importance of the Zagora Pass and that during the Third Sacred War it could have carried a large local force (from the Phokian-held Koroneia) and was therefore a significant threat. Askra has been treated in some detail by recent archaeological work: Bintliff (1996).

571 The suggestion of the use of this harbour comes almost solely from the inference of later evidence regarding Thespiai and Kreusis. If relations with Thespiai were difficult, then the likelihood of an easy passage through Thespian territory to the sea is a matter that needs to be addressed. Heurtley (1923); Tandy (1997), 212-214.

572 West (1978), 313. It is important to understand that Hesiod’s references to seafaring can be both practical and poetic: Rosen (1990), 100.

573 Though see the possibilities of Hesiod’s ‘father’ being merely a literary device: Clay (2003), 180 n.11. Hesiod marks *Works and Days* with personal reflections and as such might have been part of the early poetic tradition of ‘sealing’ the work as one’s own. The parallel to Theognis in this respect was made by Ford (1985), 85.

574 Askra is as central in Boiotia as it is possible to be, and a site from which the largest amount of territory is visible from any part of Boiotia, see above, Figure 3.1. The tradition of Hesiod as a ‘Boiotian man’ is attested early, as is his attachment to the Valley of the Muses. See Bacchylides 5.191-194 and Larson (2007), 156.
evidence for the possibility of genuine geographic change based on perception of space in Boiotia.\footnote{For Hesiod’s influence on the development of the Valley of the Muses as sanctuary see Schachter (1996), 99-101; Hardie (2006). There is similar example of the influence that literature could have on the geography of the region with Alexander’s reverence for and preservation of the house of Pindar, see below Chapter 5, with n.732.}

4.VI.ii. Pindar\footnote{The approach taken to Pindar’s work here is simplistic and biographical. More room than is available here would be needed to properly discuss the important interpretation of poetic work as a spatial construct in its own right: for instance, Martin (2007).}
Pindar’s life would have been contemporaneous with some of the major events at the beginning of the period under review, and as a Theban citizen, his work must be assessed for historical inferences as well as cultural and artistic value.\footnote{Pindar’s life has traditionally been roughly sketched to c.520-443BC. The exact parameters are not vital, given that the life is clearly long and precise historical detail is not extant. The problems of trying to reconstruct historical events from Pindar have long been recognised: for one instance succinctly put by Lefkowitz (1991), 132, (regarding 480-479), ‘he tells us nothing of his own feelings about Thebes and its role in the war. There is no reference to any specific battle or particular death.’ Pindar did not have a ‘historical’ view in mind in the epinikian odes, even allegorically, but wrote for patrons and their audiences.} From the sixth-century Boiotian traditions of genealogical and pseudo-political poetry (\textit{HH Apollo, Aspis, Catalogue of Women}) there is clearly a culture of informing poetical composition with current political and social concerns. Given that Pindar was a Theban writing mainly in the first half of the fifth century, a particularly turbulent time to be a Boiotian, his work cannot have been unaffected by his place of birth.\footnote{Despite the lack of clear historical or autobiographical detail, a case has been made for Pindar as poetic and cultic ‘patriot’, attempting to claim for Thebes the Dionysian dithyramb (Hardie (2000), and of Athens’ mystery cult of Demeter: Wilson (2003), 171ff. Fearn’s view that the former as more likely than the latter is probably correct, Fearn (2007), 170, n.25, and 222, n.175: Though Pindar is writing in conventional literary Doric, this is no reason to doubt a strong personal fealty to Thebes and Boiotia.} In this period, Attika and Boiotia were contesting borders, Thebes was attempting to stop communities on the peripheries allying themselves with outside powers, and most significantly of all, the political and social pressures of the Persian Wars caused significant problems for the Thebans in particular. The most prominent (and accessible) of the mainland medisers, Thebes seems to have borne the brunt of the anger of the allied Greeks at the close of the war following the battle of Plataia.\footnote{Hdt. 9.86-9.88. Note explicitly spatial language of Hdt. 9.87.2: ‘νῦν ὁν ἦμέων εἶναι γῆ ἢ Βοιωτίῃ πλέος μὴ ἀναπλήσῃ’.} The unusual circumstances of the invasion and Pindar’s elite background make it most likely that Pindar was in Thebes during 480-479. Given later (successful) attempts to clear the charge of medism from Thebes by arguing that it had been controlled by a narrow 	extit{dunasteia} when the decisions were made, it would have been understandable if Pindar had written more explicitly concerning these
events\textsuperscript{580}. As it was, Pindar wrote for a wide variety of clients throughout the Greek world, betraying a cosmopolitan outlook and probably his own wide travels\textsuperscript{581}.

Pindar’s network of patrons across the Greek World indicates the breadth of contact that an elite Theban could enjoy, whether through aristocratic links or contact made at festivals and other public events. It is also an important marker of the extent of his fame during his own lifetime\textsuperscript{582}. That he was a Theban writing victory odes at this politically sensitive time is important given that this period was also a time when Hellenic identity was being formed in response to various ‘others’\textsuperscript{583}. This is important from both perspectives: firstly that Pindar as a Theban would be willing to write for clients across the political spectrum from broad geographical backgrounds, despite their having hugely divergent roles in the victories over the Persians (and Carthaginians), and secondly that those clients would want a Theban poet writing their victory odes\textsuperscript{584}. For instance, writing for Hieron of Syracuse shortly after 480BC would indicate that Pindar held no strong objection to celebrating those who had fought ‘against the barbarian’ in verse, and that Hieron was more interested in commissioning the best poetry available rather than being concerned about previous political loyalties\textsuperscript{585}. As with his link with the Makedonian royal house (see below), it might also have been the case that despite the recent nadir of Thebes as ‘Greek’ community, the inheritance and prominent place in the myths and history of the Greeks outweighed any compunction about hiring a Theban, especially for those considered to be on the margins of the Greek world such as Syracuse and Makedon.

That Pindar’s career and experiences differ to those that might be expected of a Theban in this period is sobering for those trying to write the history of Greek communities. Whilst Hesiod seems rooted to his Askran home despite his creative gifts, Pindar is not similarly confined to his home area. As an individual case he demonstrates that, particularly in the higher echelons of the community, there was wide and frequent

\textsuperscript{580} It is difficult to critically assess Theban medism given that the evidence is contained largely in Herodotus, and the response to his work by Plutarch, as well as the speeches in the Plataian debate at Thebes. For a summary of all of these sources see Finley (1958) and most convincingly apologetic for the Thebans: Demand (1982), 20-27.

\textsuperscript{581} Morgan (2007), 217, Diagram 1.

\textsuperscript{582} Pindar (and Simonides) clearly ‘classics’ in Greece already by mid-fifth century: Carey (2007), 210.

\textsuperscript{583} Pindar’s non-epinikian works should not be overlooked, especially for their Boiotian significance: Kurke (2007) (focussing particularly on Pindar fr. 94b; Kowalzig (2007).

\textsuperscript{584} This suggests that they considered commissioning ‘Pindar’ first, rather than a ‘Theban’.

\textsuperscript{585} Hieron: Olympian 1, and Pythian 2 (c. 476 and 475BC). Note also the fragment of a dithyramb, reflecting on the glory of the Athenian victory at Artemision: Plutarch fr.77 (quoted in Plut. Them. 8.2).
contact far away from one’s home community. Considering how ‘Theban’ Pindar might have been in a patriotic sense is attractive, as it would provide a foundation for applying his work in historical reconstruction. However, it is not the correct manner in which to approach the relationship between individual and home community in this period, given the fluidity of elite relationships and the changing notion of community/polis identity. Particularly in a period where local (Theban), regional (Boiotian) and global (Hellenic) identities are all being formed to different rhythms and conditioned by major historical events, attempting to decipher the character of Pindar’s ‘nationalism’ is a likely to be a forlorn task. This is especially because of the fragmentary preservation of Pindar’s non-epinikian works, which have a greater representation of Boiotian, and particularly Theban, subjects.

Korinna has been generally overlooked in comparison with Hesiod and Pindar. Her work is entirely preserved in fragments, and much of the biographical information concerning her is confused both in chronology and in substance. What survives of her work is of significance to the current thesis however, as it touches upon the linguistics, internal politics and collective identity of Boiotia, set firmly in the territory with recognisable physical locales. There are traditions linking her as a contemporary to Pindar, but her language and style has often had strong advocates for a third century dating. The most recent assessment of the fragments however, has revised that dating upward, and places it in the third quarter of the fourth century. If this dating is correct the work acquires a new significance, providing a voice from south-east Boiotia in the tumultuous period around the Makedonian incursions and the destruction of Thebes. However, there is not the space here to delve into her work in enough detail, nor is her biographical information complete enough to be able to ‘situate’ her in the same manner as Hesiod and Pindar.

4.VI.iii. Poetic parallels after death
Hesiod and Pindar, though largely unrelated in geographical situation and period, were similar in several respects when considering the Boiotian landscape. Perhaps most striking is that after their deaths, both poets continued to have an effect on the landscape

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586 Mitchell (1997), 1-21, recognises this fluidity and plurality in the relationships in which individuals partook. Plato gives a sense of this interchange at an elite level continuing in the later fifth and fourth centuries: e.g. the prominence of the Thebans Simmias and Kebes in the Phaedo.
587 Maehler (1989), for collection of fragments.
in which they were based. Hesiod’s work would lead to the creation of the sanctuary and theatre at the Valley of the Muses, and his bones were removed to Orchomenos as a prized trophy. Hesiod’s work was therefore active in shaping the concept of landscape both in his native area and in subsequently Orchomenos. Pindar’s work did not produce such a dramatic change on a single area but was responsible for mediating relationships of return in his own community and far beyond. The fame of his work during his lifetime and afterward would have had a re-doubling effect on the central place that Thebes would have already occupied in the minds of many non-locals when thinking of Boiotia. After his death it would be his house that stood as a relic to his fame and the deliberately spectacular act of leaving the poet’s house intact when razing the rest of Thebes was a striking acknowledgement not only of Alexander III’s personal respect for Pindar but also for the magnitude of Pindar’s own fame in the wider world.

As a figure for whom fame was not based on artistic prowess, it may be worth considering Epameinondas in comparison to the Nachleben of Hesiod and Pindar. In life, Epameinondas had arguably the greatest effect on the Boiotian landscape of any individual in the period under review. He commanded the successful expulsion of the Spartans from Boiotia, probably had a significant role in the capture of Plataia and the uprooting of Thespiai (and possibly Orchomenos) and is credited with overseeing the monumental fortification and building scheme in the region, as well as taking Boiotian

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590 The date of this is not clear, but given Hesiod’s early date and the possible movement of some Askrans to Orchomenos when pressured by Thespiai, it might have come before the establishment of the sanctuary and festivals in his home valley. Janko (1982), 132 n.60, identifies a date previous to Aristotle’s time (where traditions regarding a connection between Askra and Orchomenos were developing) and probably earlier than this for the tradition of this movement. Pindar’s tomb did not want for attention either; Pausanias was shown it on his tour around the city (9.23), confirming the enduring strength of Pindar’s association with Thebes. Perhaps the most intriguing instance of bones as significant relics of mythical/historical value is that of Amphion and Zethos. The bones of these legendary founders of Thebes had an effect on the earth around them that made it irresistibly fertile and socially significant: Pausanias 9.17.3 with Tzavela-Evjen (1992). The best account of the Amphieion itself is Spyropoulou (1981). Especially good are the maps e.g. on pp.190-191 which illustrate the original form of the zigurat which lies beneath the Amphieion. The destruction of Askra by Thespiai (Plu. Mor. Fr.82; Arist. Fr. 580 (Gigon)) has been placed in a seventh (Buck 1979), 98, and in a fourth-century historical context (Snodgrass (1985), 94, ‘a short lived episode’).

591 This would have been further emphasised by the coincidence of Pindar’s death with the organisation of the first true confederaity based at Thebes, thus forming a continuum of focus upon Thebes as at the centre of Boiotian culture/power. The suggestion of Kowalzig (2007) (see above, n.105) and (implicitly) in Kurke (2007) is that Pindar was actively involved in the manipulation and reconfiguration of Theban and Boiotian myth.

592 Pindar’s house stood just outside the Nestian gates, very close to the spring of Dirke just west of the Kadmeia: Paus. 9.25.3. See Symeonoglou (1985), 140-141 for estimate at approximate location, and the possible fondness of Pindar for his home being evident in his poetry. See below, Chapter 5, p.221.

593 See Table 2, above for summary of destructions. The destruction of Orchomenos is explicitly denied in the account of Pausanias 9.15.3.
influence to its greatest limits in the Peloponnese and Aegean. His contemporary fame was great, and his influence extended to the historiographical sphere, with Plutarch probably using Epameinondas as the exemplar for his Lives, and he was celebrated with a statue on the Kadmeia alongside Pronomos. Both statues were probably re-erected after Kassander’s restoration of Thebes in 316BC. Pausanias’ account of the statue includes an inscription:

ήμετέρας βουλαίς Σπάρτη μὲν ἐκείρατο δόξαν,  
Μεσσηνή δ’ ιερὴ τέκνα χρόνω δέχεται·  
Θήβης δ’ ὅπλοισιν Μεγάλη πόλις ἑστεφάνωται,  
αὐτόνομος δ’ Ἑλλάς πᾶσ’ ἐν ἑλευθερίῃ.  
Paus. 9.15.6

The epigram emphasises the impact that Epameinondas had on the whole of Greece and brings to mind the two most famous episodes of his career: the victory at Leuktra and the foundation of Messene. In both, the influence of Thebes is emphasised, and indicate that Epamionondas helped to bring about a profound change in Theban ability and desire to alter the experience of space for its own benefit, including the creation or reorganization of the festival of Zeus Basileus at Lebadeia. Though the epigram could have been inscribed before 335 and re-erected with the statue, the final line’s focus on autonomia and eleutheria looks distinctly post-Alexandrian and might have been connected with the re-foundation of the city by Kassander. Similarly to Pindar, Epameinondas had undergone a transformation into a figure that represented the best of ‘Thebes’ in a city that was trying to reclaim its position following its destruction in 335BC.

Epameinondas, Pindar and Hesiod are fundamentally different figures in Boiotian history, but they all had an effect on the way in which geography was created and perceived. Hesiod was firmly rooted as an Askran, settled as a farmer and concerned with the land and myths surrounding him. Pindar could perhaps be considered more ‘Boiotian’, because he had grown up in a period where ‘Boiotia’ was a much firmer

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595 Paus. 9.12.6; Wilson (2007), 141. Significantly, there were also two statues of Epameinondas in Messene: Paus. 4.31.10 and 4.32.1 (along with statues of Herakles and Thebes). See also Luraghi (2008), 216-217, 231-232, 278 for importance of Herakles to Thebes and relations with Peloponnesian communities.
596 Perhaps to celebrate the victory at Leuktra: Schachter (1994b), 109-10.
597 cf. Arr. Anab. 1.7.2.
598 See below, Chapter 5, ‘Epilogue’.
concept than it would have been to Hesiod. However, his work was less rooted directly in the landscape and more concerned with the subjective geography of patrons and cultic networks in Boiotia and beyond. Epameinondas had a different, strategic overview of Boiotia, and used the uniquely powerful position of Thebes in the 370s and 360s to change the way in which Boiotia and its neighbours were physically structured. The three perspectives are not comparable, but they can complement one another. Hesiod, Pindar and Epameinondas are the most prominent individuals that provide a window on the personal relationship with the landscape and provide tantalising insights into the Weltanschauung of historical Boiotians. The three continued to affect the way in which the inhabitants of Boiotia saw themselves and those outside the region following their deaths, and offer a rare glimpse into the effect that an individual can have on the perceived space of a region, even (or especially) after their death.
4.VII. Wider conceptions of Boiotian landscape

4.VII.i. The Theban Cycle

Boiotia was arguably unparalleled in its mythological/cultural prominence in the Greek mind and of primary significance was the Theban cycle of epic poems that placed that city and to a lesser extent its Boiotian context in the permanent consciousness of Greek thought. The position at the head of the mythological pack no doubt arises from the same Bronze Age prominence that promoted the region to premier position in the Iliad's Catalogue of ships. However, though Thebes was by no means the only site of significance in Bronze-Age Boiotia, there is no comparable tradition for any other Boiotian polis. It is clear from later traditions that many Boiotian poleis laid claim to rich mythological ancestry, yet none could compete with the position of Thebes. The roots of this are no doubt as intractable as discovering the progenitor of the epics themselves, but it is probable that the same processes that left Thebes with overlapping traditions (Kadmos and Boiotos etc.) also bequeathed to the occupants of the site a mythological importance attached more to the physical situation than to the population that inhabits it. A community such as Thebes was situated in space that had been shaped by previous inhabitants of the site whilst at the same time being in a social-geographic matrix unique to the Boiotoi. Thebes had physical and cultural assets that the new inhabitants (and subsequent groups of immigrants) wished to lay claim to, whilst Thebes as a community of the Boiotoi was articulated through cultural activity and shared, historicising narratives of migration. The discourse between the two is of fundamental importance in any attempt to understand the polyvalent geography of Boiotian communities. The relationship of the Theban and wider Boiotian community of the fifth and fourth centuries to this past is nowhere fully illuminated, and it has been noted recently that the Theban epic cycle could be presented as un-complimentary for the community. It may afford the site a certain prominence but that prominence is born of a mythological inheritance of stasis and bloodshed.

599 Cingano (2000).
600 For which, see above, Chapter 4.II.iii.
601 Nilsson (1932), 130, considered the lack of Orchomenian myth curious. The epic fragments relating to the Minyans were probably not part of a separate epic poem as such, but traditions survive in fragments: West (2003), 34-5, 268-275.
602 See above, Chapter 4.II.ii for possible post-Boiotoi migrations into Thebes. That the Kadmeians themselves might have ‘become’ Boiotian though not part of the migration of the Boiotoi is another facet of this complex discourse between historical event, mythical narratives, and spatial location.
Though it is difficult to point to specific examples of Boiotia’s place in the mythological cycles of the Greeks having specific effects on the way in which communities from outside of the region interacted with Boiotia, there are many instances where mythological and pseudo-historic materials are used to further relationships or embody a particular narrative that the community wants to effect\textsuperscript{604}. There seems to have been little hesitation or reluctance to act on the part of the Athenians or Spartans in their dealings with Boiotia in the fifth and fourth centuries on account of the epic heritage of the region, and it is perhaps instructive that it seems more of an issue for the Makedonians for whom the idea of acting and proving themselves ‘Hellenic’ was of greater concern\textsuperscript{605}. The Spartans and Athenians may not have been as prominent in the epic cycles as Thebes, but they clearly enjoyed a position of prominence and centrality in the Hellenic world that gave them a legitimacy to represent the ‘Hellenic’ perspective and much more flexibility than Makedon in political and military strategy when dealing with a city with the antiquity of Thebes\textsuperscript{606}.

4.VII.ii. Athens and Boiotia
Attika and Boiotia were separated by a long and contested border, and after developing early in the historical period, this juxtaposition pervasively informed the culture and society of both areas. Unlike Sparta, whose campaigns against Attika could be known about well in advance of their arrival, Boiotia was close enough that an attack could be made at any time from several different points of entry. The awareness and fear of this was utilised by both parties; the attacks of 507/6BC seem to have been made via several points skirting the main Athenian territory\textsuperscript{607}, and moments of internal crisis such as in 415BC give a glimpse of the anxiety that the geographical proximity could promote\textsuperscript{608}.

\textit{Ανδόκιδης de myst. 45 (cf. Thuc.6.61 with Pelling (2000) 24-25, 29; Hornblower (2008), 454. One could imagine that the use of the visibility of massing so close to Athens could be a political tool, and be used by Athens in turn to affect Boiotia. Cf. also Arist. \textit{Ach.} 1022-3 for oxen stolen by Boiotians from Phyle suggesting an awareness of the vulnerability of Attika to Boiotian incursions before Delion and Dekeleia.}

\textsuperscript{604} The most obvious example where myth might have had an effect is the destruction of Thebes in 335BC, see below, Chapter 5.

\textsuperscript{605} Though the case for not destroying Athens in 404 partly rested on the antiquity and fame of the city, Powell (2006), prefers Sparta’s fear of Lysander’s individual power as primary motivator together with the possibility of Boiotian expansion into an empty Attika.

\textsuperscript{606} Easterling (2005), 57, with n.40.

\textsuperscript{607} The new evidence from the kioniskos find at Thebes implies this: Aravantinos (2006) and Berti (2010). Cf. n.199 for importance of this victory to Athens.

\textsuperscript{608} Andokides de myst. 45 (cf. Thuc.6.61 with Pelling (2000) 24-25, 29; Hornblower (2008), 454. One could imagine that the use of the visibility of massing so close to Athens could be a political tool, and be used by Athens in turn to affect Boiotia. Cf. also Arist. \textit{Ach.} 1022-3 for oxen stolen by Boiotians from Phyle suggesting an awareness of the vulnerability of Attika to Boiotian incursions before Delion and Dekeleia.
The awareness of the closeness of the Boiotians in this account might have been emphasised by the experience of the Boiotian/Spartan occupation of Dekeleia in the years between the events and their relation by Andokides\textsuperscript{609}, but there were other famous contemporary events that emphasised the closeness of the regions. When the Plataians escape during the opening stages of the Peloponnesian War, they anticipate being able to be in the relative safety of Athenian territory (if not actually the city itself) by daybreak, and later the Spartans could attempt to march overnight from Thespiai to Peiraeus\textsuperscript{610}. Bearing this geographical basis in mind when viewing the interaction from either side helps understand the relationship in a psychological as well as practical sense. The control of the passes over Kithairon that Plataia and Eleutherai permitted helps understand the fierce competition for these sites between Boiotian and Athens; indeed, it can be argued that if Panakton, Dekeleia, and Delion are included alongside Plataia, control of the routes from Attika to Boiotia was fundamental to the course of the Peloponnesian War. Though there were areas that oscillated between Boiotia and Attika, none of the Kleisthenic demes ever became part of Boiotia, and no Boiotian community ever became a deme of Athens. However, in the two centuries before the destruction of Thebes it had not been uncommon for Boiotian communities to come within Athenian domain, whether Eleutherai, Plataia and other Parasopeian communities from the late sixth century onward, Orchomenos and Akraiphia in the \textit{arche}, or less subserviently, Thebes in the second naval league\textsuperscript{611}. From the mid-sixth century until the destruction of Thebes in 335BC, Athens’ greatest fear is the threat of a hostile Boiotia, and particularly Thebes. Throughout the period Athens understood and wished to dampen the potential of Theban power for its own security\textsuperscript{612}.

\textsuperscript{609} The use of \textit{εξεστρατευμένοι} leaves it open as to whether the force was rumoured to include cavalry, but presumably in a situation of panic, Boiotian cavalry massing on the borders, and the speed with which they could have reached the urban centre must have been feared.

\textsuperscript{610} This audacious attempt of Spartan forces under Sphodrias famously fell short (Munn (1993), 145-6 and more recently Parker (2007)), but the important feature of this and the Plataian escape was that it was believed that the two areas were close enough that you could successfully undertake surprise attacks or escapes. For a parallel, if abortive attempt on the Peiraeus in the Peloponnesian War by Brasidas, see Thucydides 2.93-94.

\textsuperscript{611} Orchomenos’ situation as tributary of the Delian League in 452BC has not been uncontroversial, but is broadly convincing: see \textit{IG} I\textsuperscript{P} 260.IX.9, with D.M.Lewis’, restoration in Lewis et al. (1992), 116 n.72, (with Akraiphia in 453). Schachter (2004), 331 n.8, provides strong criticism and perspective on this view. For Thebes in the Second Athenian Naval Confederacy, see below, \textit{Annex}, p.282; Buckler and Beck (2008), 81-84.

\textsuperscript{612} The clearest examples of this are in 519BC with the alliance with Plataia (Hdt.6.108), the hegemony over Boiotia 457-446 (Thuc.1.108), and the repeated attempts to invade in the early years of the Peloponnesian War (see above, Table 4). The cool reception of news of Theban victory at Leuktra indicates this sentiment also (below, n.992). This view of Athens only changes when a bigger threat, that of Makedon, appears and this causes the shift of position of the early 330s: see below, Chapter 5, pp.207-208, for this extraordinary rapprochement.
4.VII.iii. Drama and the relationship between Athens and Boiotia

It seems probable that the association in Athens of Dionysus with the main dramatic festivals and the theatre came about through the annexation of Eleutherai in around 507BC. The symbolism of centre and periphery had been played out by the Plataians a decade or so earlier when they had asked to become part of the Athenian state by supplicating themselves at the newly founded altar of the twelve gods in the centre of the agora. Here, the Athenians made the transition between centre and periphery with the transfer of the cult statue of Dionysus Eleutherios from the border community to the heart of Athens. As with all Boiotian communities that acted in concert with Athens through the period, Eleutherai never seems to have become a deme in any formal sense, and the vulnerability of the site allied to a dating after the Kleisthenic reforms would explain this. Eleutherai changed hands back and forth through the subsequent period, and with the border areas of the Skourta Plain and the Oropeia, formed the main part of contested liminal boundary of Boiotia and Attika. The removal of a cult statue and its role in developing one of the central features of Athenian public culture should not be ignored. The continuing development of theatre from the tyranny to the democracy was not assured, and the effect of the cult introduction from Eleutherai would have been significant in this period where Boiotia and Attika had met physically and were now articulating identities that would form the respective regional outlooks for the next two centuries.

Since Zeitlin’s work on Thebes as ‘other’ two decades ago, it has been fashionable to see Thebes in the role of ‘laboratory’ for Athenian ideas on society and politics; at best inert and at worst a community that demonstrates the various perils of mismanaged polities. The picture is of course more nuanced than this, and when one takes into account the intimate knowledge that the tragedians had of the landscape of Boiotia, their works take on different meaning. Easterling and Rehm perhaps capture the atmosphere of the Athenian portrayals of Boiotian landscape better in criticising the

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614 See above, pp.85-86.
615 Knoepfler has long led the study of the Oropeia and its position between Boiotia, Euboia and Attika: e.g. Knoepfler (2002).
616 The basic range of control is significant. Athens had played a key role in dictating the limits of Theban power in 519 BC and with control of Eleutherai commanded an area some 37km from its centre whereas Thebes was officially limited to a few kilometres south of its centre at the river Asopus.
618 The extent of the knowledge of the landscape is not clear, but it would appear as though Aeschylus and Euripides definitely had an intimate knowledge of the topography, whether from first hand or from intermediaries; for Euripides’ understanding of Theban topography see Diggle (1994), 81-2.
laboratory view, and suggesting instead that the division between the actual site of Thebes and a reflective space of ‘Thebes’ is subtly made by the tragedians in their use of language. There are deliberate references to places and monuments, and though this is all within the bounds of adding colour and depth to their work, the setting in Boiotia or ‘Thebes’ becomes more realistic and physical than many have given it credit for. The landscape described is neither inert nor inaccurate and the Athenian tragedies set in Thebes and its surroundings would have perpetuated its position as one of the most physically familiar of Greek communities. This prominence does not mean that the Athenian portrayals of the events in Thebes become any more positive as a result, and despite the arguments emphasising the subtleties of the portrayal, it is hard to deny that for the audience of the plays, the often negative atmosphere around Thebes in the work would been at least partly fashioned by the contemporary political situation between Attika and Boiotia.

In Sophocles, there is a concern with the boundaries and limits of Boiotia, and with the movement of people in and out of Boiotia. When questioned on how Oedipus had been found, Sophocles’ shepherd illuminates the landscape of Kithairon with a telling reflection on migratory pastoralism:

Oedipus: σὲ πρῶτ’ ἐρωτῶ, τὸν Κορίνθιον ξένον, ἢ τὸν δὲ φράξεις;
Messenger: τοῦτον, ὃν περὶ ἔσσοράς.
Oedipus: οὗτος σοῦ, πρέασθε, δεῦρο μοι φῶνει βλέπων ὅσ’ ἂν σ’ ἐρωτῶ. Λαῖτον ποτ’ ἧσθα σuplicate;
Servant: ἢ δούλος σῶκ ὡνιτός, ἀλλ’ οἶκοι τραφεῖς.
Oedipus: ἔργον μεριμνῶν ποίον ἢ βίον τίνα;
Servant: ποίμναις τὰ πλεῖστα τοῦ βίου συνειπόμην.
Oedipus: χώρος μάλιστα πρὸς τίσι ξύναυλος ὄν; Servant: ἢν μὲν Κιθαιρών, ἢν δὲ πρόσχωρος τόπος.
Sophocles OT. 1119-1127.

The liminality and lack of fixed boundaries is emphasised by the question of the ‘frontiers’ in another of Sophocles’ works:

619 Rehm (2002), 217-218, sees Thebes not as an ‘other’ or as an ‘anti’ Athens, but as an extension of Athens itself. Easterling (2005), 54-66, similarly counters Zeitlin’s view of a sterile Thebes by discerning differences between Thebes as specific place, and Thebes standing for community/polis in general terms. Cf. Taplin (1999). The charges levelled at Thebes as reasons for its destruction in 335 make clear that whatever the design of those writing the tragedies, the use of ‘Thebes’ in Athenian drama would have negative consequences for the real city of Thebes: Justin 11.3.11, quoted in Chapter 5, p.235.

620 Berman (2002), discusses the significance and symbolism of ‘seven-gated’ Thebes as a famous and easily recognisable (but fictional) physical attribute of the city.

621 See above, n.560.
Sophocles OC 784-786.

Oedipus is here reacting against what he considers an Athenian attempt to use him as a bulwark against the problems of Thebes. This mythological example demonstrates the Athenian fear of Thebes and its proximity, and together with the way in which the Boiotian landscape is represented in Aeschylus suggests that the tragedians had the physical Boiotia in mind, and especially the position of that region in relation to their own. The question of the dramatist’s specific knowledge of Theban topography is somewhat irrelevant in the light of the plays being regularly set in the very real physical location of Thebes.

Anxiety over borders seems to have been systematised in the training and myths of the Athenian ephebes. Though much of the detailed information is relatively late in the period under review (and continues even later) there is clearly an awareness and pattern of articulation of Athenian landscape toward the Boiotian borders. The work of Ober on the Athenian fortification system has been attacked in recent years, but the general points about the advanced territorial philosophy behind the system are still salient.

When this archaeological evidence of the intricate and well-planned defence system of the fourth century is placed beside the work done by Vidal-Naquet and others on the ephebic myths, there is a clear pattern of reflection on the Athenian side of the boundaries about their societal and physical relationship to Boiotia. The most striking motif is perhaps that of the ‘Black hunter’. The ephebic ideal of a single combat between Xanthos, king of Boiotia, and Melanthos as ephebe on the borders of the two areas is probably fourth-century in its transmitted form, but the idea of this combat is reflected in much earlier physical evidence about the way in which Athens ‘policed’ its

622 See above, n.456, for the use of different physical elements of Thebes in relation to the different foundation myths. Plutarch Thesaurus 29.4-5 preserves a tradition of Adrastus’ burial of those that had fallen at Thebes being split between Eleusis and Eleutherai. cf. Mills (1997), 231. See below, Annex, n.914, for further examples of possible Athenian fear of the Boiotians, particularly in the context of the Peloponnesian War.

623 Ober (1985). For a broader consideration of this work and its critics see above, n.314. The switch from proposed destruction of Athens at the end of the Peloponnesian War to aiding the restoration of the democracy is informative as to the variety of views in Boiotia at this time. For political factionalism in Boiotia at this time, see Buck (1994), 12-14.
borders. The memorialisation of an ideal in this form is informative of how literary and pseudo-mythological constructs could inform the geographical conception of land and territory on the Athenian side of the relationship. Unfortunately there is little literary reflection on the relationship preserved from the Boiotian side, and their view of the situation has to be inferred through a combination of their actions and less direct reflection in literary sources.

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625 Vidal-Naquet (1986), 109, for the possibility that the Athenian ephebic festival of the Apatouria was held at Panakton. If this was the case, it would mark a particularly physical embodiment of the ephebic model of contesting boundaries and animosity to Boiotia.
4.VIII. Memory and Landscape

4.VIII.i. Myth and cult as agents and indicators of geography

This chapter has explored some of the factors behind the way people and communities experienced and perceived the landscape of Boiotia. Having established some of the major themes of this perception, it is necessary to illuminate these with specific examples from the period that demonstrate deliberate use of myth/cult designed to shape community and individual discourse. Though the *perceived space* of Boiotia would have been the product of many generations’ experiences, a shorter series of events can help to demonstrate the way in which geography is made by history and its manipulation. In the late sixth century Thebes’ influence on the important border areas between Attika and Boiotia had been effectively undermined by Athens: in 519BC with its support of Plataia, and in 507/6 when a wider alliance of Boiotian communities with the Chalkidians was defeated by the Athenians. The majority of Boiotian communities found themselves on the losing side in the Persian Wars and then were defeated again by Athens in 457BC. It is only from 446BC onward that Thebes and Boiotia had a period of success politically and on the battlefield and the Boiotian, and particularly the Theban, perspective appears more forcefully and more positively in the literary sources.

Thebes was no stranger to narrative flexibility, attempting to bring Aigina into the alliance against Athens in 504BC by way of appealing to shared history and situation.626 Earlier in the century, Thebes had also symbolically contributed to a reorganisation of Sikyon by way of a gift of sacred remains in order to fit a mythological narrative.627 Despite the upheaval of the Persian Wars, the use of symbolic acts and social

626 Hdt. 5.77-81. Larson (2007), 83. For a more critical take on this event (with a suggestion of Herodotean invention and anti-Aiginian sentiment) see Burnett (2005), 26-8. Burnett also emphasises that the suggestion of a loan of the cult statues (if genuine) would have been no minor act as the Aiakid statues were the most valuable cult figures in Aigina. For the perspective of Aigina in these events, see Figueira (1993), 53-55. Though this appeal to a shared heritage was made by Thebes, the differences in the societies of Thebes and Aigina at this time cannot be overstated, with Aigina’s outlook and wide range of trading contacts providing an entirely different perspective on its position in relation to Attika and mainland Greece generally.

627 Hdt. 5.67. Thebes here openly counters a Delphic response to Kleisthenes’ request to change things in Sikyon. As Macan (1895), 207-209, notes, this anti-Argive move was rooted firmly in epic tradition. Bones and their movement were important in this period and beyond; the movement of Hesiod’s bones to Orchomenos (above, n.590 for discussion of this complicated tradition) is paralleled by Sparta’s collection of the bones of Orestes (Hdt. 1.67-8), Teisamenos (Paus. 7.1.8) and Leonidas (Paus. 3.14). Kimon returned Theseus’ bones to Athens (Plut. *Kim*, 8.5f), and Sparta looted and quickly returned the bones of Alkmene from Haliartos in 382 (Plut. *Mor.* 577c. cf. Plut. *Lys.* 28.5). Thebes itself claimed the bones of Hektor (Paus. 9.18.5), and the bones of the legendary musician Linos were returned by Philip after being looted by Macedonians following the battle of Chaironeia: Paus. 9.29.8-9. See McCauley (1999); Leahy (1955); Rohde (1925), 143 n.35. Griffin (1982), 50, suggests that the move of Orestes to Sparta was directly inspired by the move of Adrastus to Sikyon. Cf. Mayor (2000), 113.
reconfiguration is continued in the return of a statue from Delos to Delion in 470 BC\textsuperscript{628}. The issue is not the return of the statue in itself, but that the Thebans were acting on behalf of a temple in Delion rather than claiming something that had been taken from Thebes\textsuperscript{629}. The act of travelling to the mid-Aegean to return a statue to another part of Boiotia must have had significance internally, especially given its inclusion in Herodotus’ narrative. Though these prominent examples stand isolated, chronologically disparate and only concern Thebes, they stand for what must have been a much wider and more common use of symbolic acts to make and remake social relationships within the ethnus of the Boiotoi.

Herodotus’ portrayal of the Thebans in the events of 480-79 BC betrays anti-Theban bias that reflects the pro-Athenian and Spartan role in the war, and their feted defence of the mainland\textsuperscript{630}. However, by the end of the fifth century, Thebans seems to be confident in asserting that during the wars they were ruled by a narrow oligarchy and that it had been against the wishes of the people that they had fought with the Persians. There is truth and untruth in the mythos\textsuperscript{631}, but it is not until the latter half of the fifth century that this narrative seems to stick, and thereafter until the destruction of Thebes, this motif fades and the stigma of medism is rarely mentioned in extant sources\textsuperscript{632}. The manipulation of narrative may not have been as distinct or as rapid as the movement of bones or erection of statues, but the victory was important for Boiotia’s role in the spatial politics of Greece. Once the medism had been successfully mitigated, building and maintaining relationships would be easier. For instance, the Athenian concern with the situation of Boiotia vis-a-vis Sparta perhaps led to the retention of the Boiotian

\textsuperscript{628} Hdt. 6.118. \\
\textsuperscript{629} See Scott (2005), ad.loc. His explanation of the event (that the statue was probably looted by a Persian who was subsequently forced by Persian royal protocol regarding booty to drop it off on the way home at a natural resting place of Delos) makes sense, especially as Delos was on the central Aegean trade routes that the departing Persians would have used to return to Asia Minor. \\
\textsuperscript{630} The focus on the Kadmeians as Easterners had been a focus of Athenian cultural output, perhaps most notably the representation in the Phoenissai. For more on the anti-Theban/eastern atmosphere see above, n. 452. \\
\textsuperscript{631} Thebes and Thespiai were both represented at Thermopylae and the Thebans ‘mark of the king’ was perhaps scarring from the battle (above, n. 580). Though geographically compromised and with little choice but to surrender to the Persians, the alliance provided a useful opportunity to fight some old battles, and the actions of the Thebans in the final engagements at Plataia betray their hatred of the Athenians as probably greater than that they ever held toward the Persians (Hdt. 9.67). With little active contact with the Black Sea and Aegean, Thebes could be forgiven for not having the same sentiment as the Athenians toward the Persians, and the damage done to communities such as Thespiai and Haliartos bears testament to the ‘Thebans’ necessary choice. \\
\textsuperscript{632} The destruction of communities such as Plataia, Thespiai, and Haliartos must have made the subsequent apologetic narrative of being ruled by a dunasteia (Thuc. 3.62) all the more important for Thebes for its re-integration into the geography of the region. The narrative response of Orchomenos, which seems to have enjoyed the company of the Persians as much as the Thebans (Hdt. 9.16), is not extant.
influence on the amphiktiony at Delphi, a position that emphasised the perceived ancient prominence of the region and symbolically important in emphasising Thebes’ greekness.

4.VIII.ii. Contested areas and reconstruction
A feature of Boiotian community interaction from the Persian Wars until 335BC was the possibility (and relative frequency) of destruction and exile. Most of the major communities in Boiotia were exiled or had their urban centres destroyed in this period, and the continuity with which the communities interacted following their reconstruction and repopulation is striking. Perhaps the most striking example is that of Thespiai, whose loss of 700 men at Thermopylai, destruction of their city by the Persians later the same year and significant losses at Delion did not seem to significantly affect their attitude towards other Boiotian communities, preferring to ally themselves against Thebes and with powers such as Sparta and Athens whose power was remote.

Similarly, Plataia endured destruction of their urban centre and exile from their land at least twice in this period and yet maintained their stance toward Thebes. It could therefore be argued that Thebes, in its central position and relatively consistent attitude toward the communities around it, acted as the conductor of the pattern and tenor of inter-community discourse. There is little evidence that prominent Thebans ever thought about Thebes in isolation from the rest of Boiotia, and as Thebes maintained its view of the way in which Boiotian landscape should be ordered and homogeneity encouraged, so those it wished to persuade of this reacted according to the prevailing mood/political inclination of the time. It might have been a product of Thebes’ central location and ability to intervene militarily across a wide area that the main recourse for the communities responding to Theban activity was to ally themselves with outside powers, and both Thespiai and Plataia (along with Orchomenos) took an active and prominent role in the Makedonian led destruction of Thebes in 335BC, allowing them for the first time to take a leading role in ordering the space of the region. Though this broad pattern may be explicable through events and geographic framework with

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633 Plut. Them. 20.3-4. The concern of the Athenians to retain Boiotian participation could well have fed into the ability of the Thebans and other medising Boiotians to rehabilitate themselves in the ensuing period.
634 See above, Table 2. McKechnie (1989) and Demand (1990) on destruction re-founding and movement of cities and Mackil (2004) on alternatives to destruction. It is perhaps no coincidence that all three of these authors have worked extensively on Boiotia.
635 Particularly interesting as in 479BC to repopulate the city they took on new members (Hdt. 8.75.1).
636 Diod. Sic. 17.13.5-6 is the fullest account of this and names Thespians, Orchomenians and Plataians and ‘others hostile to the Thebans’. Justin (11.3.8) adds Phokians to the list, and Arr. Anab. 1.8.8, has Phokians and Plataians only. The event and the sources are more fully covered in Chapter 5.
regard to the wider area, there are instances where there seems to be a deliberate symbolism in the relationship. One prominent example is that of the Plataian escape from the siege at the beginning of the Peloponnesian War.

Though this passage at first reads as a practical measure adopted by the Plataians, it has been noticed as an odd and perhaps significant detail in Thucydides’ narrative. Thucydides could have heard this detail either in an account from the Plataians who escaped to Athens, or later, living in exile as he did near the site where the Plataians had been resettled. That they would wish to mention this (or fabricate it) is significant, and the natural reference that the Plataians would have been making was to Jason’s exile and return, which was to be signalled by a portent of ‘monosandalism’. The story and symbol of being shod on a single foot was current at the time, being used by Pindar and by Thessaly earlier in the fifth century as a reverse to many of Larissa’s coins.

Whilst the soil around Plataia could be very heavy following significant rainfall, deploying differentiated traction on either foot makes little practical sense. Even if it had been the product of local understanding of traction in wet Plataian soil, or out of the necessity of supply of shoes in the besieged city, the inclusion of the detail suggests that those recounting the episode wanted this element to be included. When Thucydides’ narrative was being read or retold afterward, whatever the root of the one-shoed Plataian escape, it would be understood as a reference to Jason. Though his story is of ephebic significance, it is also symbolic of being wrongly displaced and destined to return.

Pelling (2000, 72, favours the former, placing Thucydides in the city to hear the accounts of the Plataians’ escape and their arrangements with regard to citizenship. Cf. Osborne (1981-1983) Vol.I D1 (p.28). Pelling also cites Thucydides’ treatment of the ‘monosandalism’ as a rationalisation of the account that would have been given, which he sees as an act designed to placate the gods of the underworld, p.79 with nn.60-61. He puts the events of the siege in a much better broad strategic setting than most have at pp. 80-81. See also parallel treatment of Plataian refugees in 373: Isok. 14.51-2; Diod. Sic. 15.46.6.

Pindar *Pythian* 4. 95-96. Examples of coins of Larissa featuring the sandal of Jason appear from c.500-c.440BC: *Nomos AG*, Auction 4 (10.05.2011), Lot 1095; Lot 1124.

Grundy (1894), 49-50.

The question of the Athenian citizenship granted to the Plataians is still a matter of some contention Pelling (2000), 74-77; Canevaro (2010).
That the Plataians were not ill-disposed toward such deliberate displays of territorial symbolism is emphasised by the idea that the federal *lochos* that entered Plataia by invitation at the beginning of the Peloponnesian War was doing so on the eve of the major Plataian festival of the Daidala\(^{641}\). The party that invited in the federal force had considered the symbolic significance of their actions in a visual and symbolic manner, as well as the simple practicality of military/political control. The attempt to make both Plataia and the festival part of the federation misfired spectacularly and the subsequent extended siege ended with the destruction of much of the city. When the Plataians did return and were able to celebrate the Daidala under their own control again, they memorialised the experience of exile by celebrating a new incarnation of the festival alongside the old. The Great Daidala was convened at sixty-year intervals, signifying the combined total length of their exiles from Boiotia\(^{642}\). Both the narrative of escape in 427BC and the creation of the Great Daidala demonstrate the symbolism of exile and the way in which the experience of this could be highlighted and then preserved in a territorial sense.

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\(^{641}\) Iversen (2007), 393-396.

\(^{642}\) See Pausanias, 9.3.3-9, and Edmunds (1984), 71ff. Iversen (2007), 401-405, on this calculation.
4.IX. Conclusions and wider considerations
Considering Boiotia in terms of **perceived space** demonstrates that in many ways, a historical Boiotia never existed, or if it did, it was intrinsically polyvalent and a product of innumerable different perceptions. The physical landscape acted as both a reservoir and conduit for action, the memory of action, and the possibility and expectation of future action, and as such affected the manner in which those who lived within the communities of Boiotia behaved toward one another. As is clear from Thucydides’ account, ‘Boiotia’ was not thought to have existed before the post-Trojan migrations, but its coherence by the sixth century and its strength down until the third and second centuries demonstrates a considerable achievement in the construction of regional space. Perhaps the most important strand in the cohesion of the region is the narrative of the migration of Boiotos from Thessaly at the head of the Boiotoi. This narrative helped to unify the region without a tradition of a dominant community, whilst also explaining the use of Aeolic dialect, profusion of oracles and processional cult, proclivity toward equestrianism, and explaining the relationship between the pre-Boiotian tribes that inhabited the region by way of mythological genealogy and retention of individual community epithets. The most important discourse in informing the pattern of perceived spaces in the region, that of reconciling the mythological prominence of the area with its historical situation, is enunciated most clearly in the complex and subtle layering of Theban foundation myth. The foundation of the city by Kadmos, Amphion and Zethos, as well as (presumably) Boiotos, allows the retention of the inheritance of many backgrounds in the one **topos** of Thebes, whilst allowing it to play a full role as a ‘Boiotian’ polis.

Though much of the regional **perceived space** was conditioned and articulated in the period immediately preceding the chronological parameters of this thesis, the deliberate creation of links between event/moment and specific **place** continued to inform and re-form Boiotian geography throughout the sixth, fifth and fourth centuries. Battlefields and sites of commemoration provide the most enduring evidence of this, with places such as Delion, Leuktra/Lebadeia, and Plataia (several times over) experiencing a re-articulation of their position and role within the region. The most famous single instance of the phenomena of historical event and physical place was the destruction of Thebes by Alexander in 335BC. The ‘unimaginable treasure’ that was looted from the city could be an analogy for the riches that Thebes’ possessed in terms of site memory and as a palimpsest of historical and mythological experience643.

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Chapter 5: Deixis

σίκτρόν γὰρ πόλιν ὤδ’ ὠγυγίαν
Αίδη προϊῆχαι, δορός ἄχραν
δουλίαν ψαφαρῆ σποδῶ
ὑπ’ ἀνδρὸς ἄχατοι θεόθεν
περιθομέναν ἄτιμως,
tὰς δὲ κεχειρωμένας ἄγεσθαι,
ἐξ ἐνας τε καὶ παλαιὰς
ιππηδόν πλοκάμων, περι-

Aeschylus, Septem 321-332

Lift not thy spear against the Muses Bowre,
The great Emathian Conqueror bid spare
The house of Pindarus, when Temple and Towre
Went to the ground: And the repeated air
Of sad Electra's Poet had the power
To save th' Athenian Walls from ruine bare.
Milton, Sonnet 8, 9-14

‘Events are the ephemera of history; they pass across its stage like fireflies, hardly glimpsed before they settle back into darkness and as often as not into oblivion. Every event, however brief, has to be sure a contribution to make, lights up some dark corner or even some wide vista of history.’
Braudel (1972), Volume II, p.901

Introduction
The thesis has laid out a theoretical background, a human and environmental background, an analysis of the physical manipulation of this environment, and an analysis of the way in which individuals and communities perceived ancient Boiotia.

At the centre of this approach is the belief that the construction of a narrative, of one event following on from another in diachronic form, is not possible in Boiotia at a sufficient level of granularity to be worthwhile, nor is it particularly useful in understanding the way in which history is experienced by the ‘participants’ in it.

Instead, the idea that understanding historical experience through spatial rather than temporal context can offer greater insight into lived experience is preferred, because history cannot exist outside of space644. Considering an event primarily in spatial terms

644 See discussion of time collapsing into space in historical terms: above, n.19.
allows a more nuanced and polyvalent view of the experience of history and the reciprocity between the physical environment and human society. Rather than constructing a summary narrative of the period 550-335BC (which will now form an annex to the main thesis), an experiential history of Alexander’s destruction of Thebes will be outlined, allowing the possibilities of the approach developed in the thesis to be explored in more detail.

The destruction of Thebes was chosen as the subject for this approach as it is the best-documented single event in Boiotian history and offers an outstanding opportunity to understand the participants’ actions as well as their perspectives and reflections. The destruction is also one of the most famous events in Boiotian history, and the contemplation of ancient authors on the causes and significance of the event would continue into later periods, including in Milton’s sonnet that opened this chapter. The event was chosen as a terminus for the thesis because it marks the coincidence of a significant physical and social change in the region and a fundamental change in the way in which Boiotian communities perceived and ordered their space and was a remaking both of the geography of Boiotia and of mainland Greece more broadly. When viewed from the mid-sixth century, when the geographic dynamic of the Boiotian ethnos begins to be historically visible, the destruction of the largest community of the Boiotoi by most of its major ethnic counterparts is intriguing, and begs elucidation.

To allow a part of the history of Boiotia to be explored in spatial terms and in a single event, the discussion will begin and conclude with some important information from before and after the destruction of Thebes to orientate the reader. The main part of the discussion will then be focused upon the interpretation and historic and geographic significance of Alexander’s invasion of Boiotia and the destruction of Thebes in October 335. This will be divided into two halves: movement through the landscape, and physical and perceptual changes brought about by the actions of the participants. Though this approach is itself an artificial division of lived space, it will demonstrate an alternative mode of analysing a well-known event. This will allow histoire événementielle to be seen as an intimate part of longer-term historical patterns rather than being dissociable from it. The destruction of Thebes bears all the marks of accident and spontaneity that characterises événements, as well as the focus on individuals, which critics of the short-term claim distracts from the patterns of the longer timeframe. But the behaviour and attitude of the participants in the event, and the space in which the event
occurs are a product of the long term, and therefore the short term can be reconciled with the longer term to provide a richer interpretation of both historical rhythms. The landscape is a historical palimpsest, a reservoir of experience, symbolism and meaning: it is impossible to truly destroy a place invested with as much attention and energy as Thebes.

Prologue
The Third Sacred War is often considered to have provided the conditions to allow Philip II to extend his influence into Central Greece, but it also marked a realignment of the focus of Boiotian activity away from the southern mainland. This more faithfully represents the broader relationship of Boiotia with Greece more widely, with all but the Parasopeian communities having more interaction with Makedon, Lokris, Phokis, and Thessaly, the perceived migratory homeland of the Boiotoi. The period between 519 and 362BC, which saw Boiotia drawn into the major geographic struggles to its south (which were the focus of the extant literature), sometimes masked a continuation of the involvement of Boiotia in the affairs of northern mainland Greece. After 371 Thebes had supervised a new fortification system that protected the south and west of the region. With Sparta subdued by the Boiotian geographical rearrangement in the Peloponnese, and Athens occupied with the (Theban-provoked) Social War in the Aegean, Boiotia could intervene in the affairs of Phokis and northern Greece without fear of attack from the south. The fragility of Boiotia’s hegemonic position quickly became apparent however, manifested in both territorial losses and financial desperation because of the Sacred War that necessitated the involvement of Makedon to rectify.

Proxeny decrees for Makedonian: (SEG 34 355), and perhaps an Olynthian: Vlachogianni (2010).

Fortification system of the fourth century, see above, Chapter 3.III.v.

It had been interference in Phokian/Lokrian matters that had allowed Sparta to become more involved in Boiotia in 395: Hell.Oxy. 18.5, with Buck (1994), 35-36. Rusicka (1998), 67-69 and Heskel (1997), 157, both suggest Theban exploits precipitated the Social War. Arr. Anab. 7.9.4, has Alexander reflect on the domination of Makedon by Thebes, and the fear that was felt of Thebes before Philip came to power. For rearrangement of Spartan landscape by Boiotia see Cooper (2000), 176-177. For the Boiotian role in ending Athenian dominance of the Aegean in the 360s, see Gartland (2013).

Symptomatic of the financial difficulties that Boiotia faced was the mercenary service offered to Persia on at least three occasions between 355 and 344BC: Diod. Sic. 16.34.1; 16.40.1-2; 16.44.2. Sending thousands of men abroad at a time when the Phokians were threatening the borders of the region emphasised the problems that Boiotia had in maintaining an army in the field for long periods.
Makedon’s subsequent threat to the borders of Boiotia provoked an unprecedented response in the behaviour of Athens and Thebes. An Athenian army travelled across Boiotia (for the first time since Tolmides’ force had made its outward journey to Chaironeia in 446BC649), and was invited within the walls of Thebes650. The cooperation of Attika and Boiotia in constructing a defensive network against Makedon using sites in Phokis was also novel, and demonstrates that both regions were aware of the territorial danger that Philip could pose should he be able to use Phokis as a base from which to attack651. The actions of Athens may at first seem out of place given the experience of the previous two centuries of historical interaction with Boiotia, which had been premised on keeping a physical and/or political buffer between the two regions. The earnestness of the Athenian support for the Boiotians is a product of the realisation of the danger posed to both regions, but especially of the impossibility of defending Attika should the Boiotians fight with or be defeated by Philip652. The Athenians had attempted to keep Makedon at bay by use of their superior navy, but as had been proven in the Peloponnesian War, Boiotia was too close to keep at a distance using naval superiority653. It was therefore the proximity of Boiotia to Attika, (and its possible strategic use by Makedon) which was at this point a more potent threat than the Boiotians themselves, and prompted the Athenian desire to cooperate with its neighbour654. Similarly, Thebes’ traditional hostility towards Athens was a product of its geographic vulnerability to Athens, but this hostility was set aside because of the greater threat that the invasion of the region via the Kephissos Valley posed655.

Despite its fame, the battle of Chaironeia is poorly documented and much that has become standard in modern accounts of the battle is based upon a few opaque remarks in the primary sources656. For instance, it is not clear how many, or even who, fought on

649 See above, nn.350, 358, 491.
650 Hyperides 137r-136v, with Carey et al. (2008); Dem. 18.215.
651 Though note individual Boiotians working on restoration of Athenian walls in 393 and probably on Attika’s defensive system more widely: above, n.389.
653 For discussion of this entrance to the region see above, Chapter 2.II.v.
654 Diod. Sic. 16.47.3; 17.4.6. The Athenian territorial fear of Boiotia had a long history: See above, 4.VII.ii-iii.
656 Criticisms in Buckler and Beck (2008), 254-258, and Hammond and Griffith (1979), 596-603.
either side. However, the victory of Philip is certain, as are the principal ramifications of defeat for Boiotian geography. Philip understood Boiotia well after his time as hostage in Thebes, and the nature of his reorganisation of the Boiotian landscape betrays the timing of his imprisonment. He had witnessed the systematic strengthening of Thebes through fortification and the destruction of other communities, and must have heard about the (then recent) Spartan occupation of the Kadmeia. His actions systematically reversed these changes, which were themselves conceived of long experience of the strategic landscape of the region, by rebuilding (or at least giving licence to rebuild) all communities destroyed by Thebes, and garrisoning the strategically (and symbolically) pivotal Kadmeia. He also broke the link between Oropos and Thebes, a situation that had stood since 366. The major difference between the occupation of the Kadmeia as compared with the acropolis at Athens or Akrokorinth is that as well as being its ritual focus, it was Thebes’ main centre of occupation. The same policy of restricting Thebes whilst rebuilding and strengthening the peripheries of the region (particularly Plataia, Thespiai and Orchomenos) was pursued by Sparta in the early fourth century. Sparta and Persia had attempted to use universal peace treaties to reinforce the political atomisation of Boiotian communities, and the same division was presumably achieved by Philip’s foundation of the League of Korinth.

Following Philip’s death in 336BC, Alexander toured Greece to reassert Makedonian control of the mainland. This would probably have been only his second visit to Boiotia, and his first time traversing the route from Makedon to Thebes unmolested. The account of this journey illustrates Alexander’s use of symbolic bonds with communities, as well as his own appreciation of the danger that Thebes posed, even

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637 Thebes and Boiotia are used interchangeably in the accounts, and given that Plataia, Thespiai, and Orchomenos might not have been in formal existence at this point, it could have been that Thebans led all other available Boiotians to Chaironeia and hence there is no differentiation in the sources.

638 From 368-365: Diod. Sic. 15.67.4, 16.2.2-3; Plut. Pel. 26.4-6; Justin 6.9.7, 7.5.1-3.

639 It is contested whether Oropos returned to Athens in 338 or 335. See Rhodes and Osborne (2003), 372. See below, n.975. The movement of a community from one jurisdiction to another was a type of dictated geographic rearrangement that would become more common in the period of Alexander’s reign and the Hellenistic monarchies that followed.

640 Suggestions of Philip’s hubris toward Thebes (and regret after this) in several narratives: e.g. Diod. Sic. 16.87 (celebrating the victory at Chaironeia in ungentlemanly fashion); Paus. 9.29.8-9 (the return of the bones of the mythical musician Linus to Thebes, which had been looted in 338; see above n.627).

641 See below, nn.904, 966, for the Spartan refortification of sites destroyed by Thebes.

642 For Persian behaviour toward Boiotia in 480 see below, n.826. For Sparta in 386BC, see below, Annex pp.273-274. It is nowhere stated clearly that Boiotian communities had to swear individually as members of the League of Korinth, but given the threat that Thebes/Boiotia had posed until 338, the federal representation of the region is unlikely to have survived beyond the battle of Chaironeia. For the League of Korinth, see Rhodes and Osborne (2003), no.76 with discussion. Cf. Eckstein (2006), 41.

643 Herakles and Thessaly: Diod. Sic. 17.4.1
with a garrison in place\textsuperscript{664}. In a rehearsal for 335, Thebes was at the forefront of a possible general rebellion against the new king, but submitted when Alexander appeared quickly from Makedon\textsuperscript{665}. Alexander’s return to Greece emphasised the physical situation of Boiotia as the first of the major powers in Central and Southern Greece which is reached on the invasion route from the north. As in 480, there was confusion about the course of action to take and Thebes was first to have to decide whether to submit or to resist\textsuperscript{666}. As with the Persian invasion, Thebes submitted, but when a further opportunity for resistance presented itself in October 335, the Thebans decided to take it.

335
The main literary sources for the destruction of Alexander by Thebes are well known. Arrian, Diodorus, Quintus Curtius Rufus, and Plutarch all give direct accounts of Alexander’s campaign against the city, and are supplemented by a host of minor pieces of information from other sources such as Justin and the Athenian forensic speeches of the period\textsuperscript{667}. The fullest account, given by Arrian, is clouded both by the likely political prejudice of Ptolemy as well as the position of the destruction in Arrian’s broad narrative scheme\textsuperscript{668}. Given the temporal distance between the events and most of the extant literary sources, it is prudent not to become distracted by the detail of events, especially when recorded only by a single source. Unfortunately, any archaeological evidence for the destruction is largely concealed beneath the modern town, and cannot offer much information to partner the literary testimony\textsuperscript{669}.

\textsuperscript{664} Forced marches to Kadmeia: Diod. Sic. 17.4.1-6.
\textsuperscript{665} Diod. Sic. 17.3.1-5. The inscription at Trophonios for ‘king’ Amyntas (\textit{IG} VII 3055 = \textit{SEG} 44 414.7-8 and the proxeny decrees at Oropos for two Makedonians (\textit{IG} VII 4250-1, one likely to be the same Amyntas as at Trophonios) are most convincingly placed between the battle of Chaireoneia and the destruction of Thebes: Rhodes and Osborne (2003), 370-373. Cf. Worthington (2003) for discussion of these with contention that Alexander’s destruction of Thebes might have been motivated by the Theban tradition of supporting contenders to the Makedonian throne.
\textsuperscript{666} For Theban actions in 480, see above, n.580.
\textsuperscript{667} For instance, Justin 11.3-4. and Deinarchos \textit{Ag.Demosthenes} 24. Other Athenian speeches touch on the destruction of Thebes indirectly, such as Demades 1.26. Perhaps surprisingly, the destruction of Thebes has not been a major focus for Boiotian specialists. The most extensive modern treatment of the event is Gullath (1982), 60-85, and the events are also well treated by Hammond and Walbank (1988), 56-66, and Worthington (2003).
\textsuperscript{668} Hurst (1989).
\textsuperscript{669} There is a pause in building at the Kabeirion in the second half of the fourth century which has been associated with Makedonian destruction of Thebes: Schachter (1986), 103. See also above, n.542.
In broad terms, the pattern of events in 335 was as follows:

- Theban exiles returned from Athens and persuaded the city to rebel on rumours of Alexander’s death in Illyria.
- On news of the Theban revolt Alexander travelled at speed to Boiotia in 13 days (in the last five days he covered c.145 miles from Pellina in Thessaly to Onchestos\textsuperscript{670}).
- The Makedonians paused at Onchestos.
- The Makedonians moved to near the enclosure of Iolaus (directly north of the Kadmeia) where they were attacked by Thebans.
- Next day the Makedonian camp moved to south of Thebes.
- Makedonians forced their way into city, general massacre of inhabitants.
- The surviving Thebans fled to Athens and Akraiphia.
- Decision taken by allied Greeks\textsuperscript{671} to raze Thebes.
- Thebes is left depopulated and destroyed, except for a Makedonian garrison.

This outline is meant to provide an overview of the major stages of the event. The following discussion of the destruction of Thebes is designed to provide a spatial/experiential account of the perspectives of the participants, their own interests and desires, and particularly the way in which different individuals and communities behaved in relation to the space around them. Their behaviour suggests a keen awareness of the past and a desire to deliberately affect the geography of the region for the future. Though the sources are relatively detailed compared with most of Boiotian history, this delineation through space can help to elucidate the behaviours of the participants and their significance even further. The historical palimpsest of the Boiotian landscape affects and is affected by this monumental event, and this is reflected in the second part of the survey, which deals with the changes to space brought about by the destruction, particularly focussing on physical changes to the landscape. It is important not to look too far in advance of the event as the temptation of hindsight is great, and the problems of the time between the events and the extant literary sources has to be dealt with carefully.

\textsuperscript{670} Arr. \textit{Anab.} 1.7.5. From Pelina to Chaironeia is around 85 miles as the crow flies, but 145 miles if the standard routes for traversing Thessaly and Phokis were used. 

\textsuperscript{671} Alternatively those states who took part in the destruction of Thebes (Arr. \textit{Anab.} 1.9.9), or a formal decision of the \textit{synedrion} (Diod. Sic. 17.14.4). Cf. above, n.636, and below, nn.681, 727.
Movement

Movement inherently refers to space, and when that space has been produced in part by other movements on the same or a similar course, the new movement enters an entrenched geographic rhythm along what could be termed a route of memory or a *voie de mémoire* 672. Even if the participants are ignorant of the geography they are entering into, they will affect and reshape that geography 673. However, when they are aware of the patterns that have produced the space of a region (for instance in the repetition of a religious procession, such as the Daidala), the interaction with that space becomes symbolically as well as physically significant 674. In the destruction of Thebes there are few movements and routes whose symbolic significance would not have been understood by most of the parties involved. This awareness of perceived space informed the discourse of the participants and should form part of any reconstruction of the event.

Theban return

The revolt of Thebes in 335BC was precipitated by the return from Athens of the Theban leaders exiled in 338 by Philip 675. This has an immediate parallel in the return of the group of Thebans led by Pelopidas from an exile of a similar duration in Athens to free the Kadmeia in 379BC 676 as well as the defeat of the Athenian *strategos* Tolmides in 446 by Theban exiles based at Orchomenos 677. In both cases the end of the progression from exile to restoration of control over Thebes (or Boiotia) was a victory over the occupiers by killing and subsequent ransom of prisoners. In 335BC the return of the exiles ended in the killing of two members of the Makedonian garrison, but not in its ransom and expulsion, marking an abortive form of the traditional pattern of recovery of the Kadmeia 678. Failing to win an immediate victory provoked an attempt to besiege the Kadmeia, and, as in the myths relating to the Argive invasion as well as the siege of 479, taking control of the Mykenaian stronghold proved difficult 679. Athens sent weapons to the besiegers presumably because any Theban arsenal that had not been

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672 Cf. discussion above, Chapter 4.IV.i, p.166.
673 The Thrakian attack on Mykalessos changed both *perceived* and *conceived* space: below, pp.114-118.
674 Procession to Alalkomenai from Plataia: Chapter 4.IV.i, pp.167-170.
675 Arr. *Anab.* 1.7.1-3.
677 See above, n.350 and n.358.
678 Arr. *Anab.* 1.7.1.
679 Hdt. 9.86.2 for Theban walls withstandng allied Greek army (these were the walls of the Kadmeia rather than the lower walls. See below, *Annex* pp.253-257). Diod. Sic. 17.8.7: strengthening of Kadmeia’s walls by Makedonian garrison.
deployed at Chaironeia was stored on the Kadmeia\textsuperscript{680}. That these weapons were supplied with Persian funding highlights the possibility of an interesting cross-current between 479 and 335 whereby in both cases Thebes fought with Persian support, but the position of Makedon had changed. The return of Theban exiles also had its parallel in the Plataian and Thespian returns from Athens to their land and the symbolic discourse that they employed to mark the restoration of their community\textsuperscript{681} and the arming and return from exile was an obvious reciprocation of the Theban aid to the Athenian exiles led by Thrasyboulos in 403\textsuperscript{682}. There was therefore a regular process of return from exile and restoration of community autonomy between Attika and Boiotia, and an expectation that a successful return could be expected as part of a set pattern of circumstances fulfilled through the repetition of movement from a place of exile (Athens) to rightful homeland (Thebes)\textsuperscript{683}. Travelling a \textit{voie de mémoire} would not in itself make the scheme more likely to succeed, but the reception that the exiles would receive having traversed symbolic space would be more favourable as a result\textsuperscript{684}.

\textit{Alexander’s invasion}

Alexander’s route from Makedon to Thebes in 335 is not attested in detail in the sources, but his rapid march into central Greece after his father’s death the year before is recorded in reasonable detail in Diodorus and it can be assumed that if moving at high speed with a large force, he would have taken the same route. The route is significant for the response of the communities in Boiotia to Alexander’s approach, as well as for the actions and attitude of Alexander himself.

\textsuperscript{680} Diod. Sic. 17.8.3-4: Thebans besieging Kadmeia some time before the Makedonians arrive. Athenians (Demosthenes) supplying weapons: 17.8.5. Perhaps funded by Persia: Nawotka (2010), 101. Depriving Thebes of weapons has a mythological precedent, which is particularly significant because Herakles leads the resistance against it: Diod. Sic. 4.10.4 (4.10.5: Orchomenians advancing toward Thebes).

\textsuperscript{681} Above, Chapter 4.VIII.ii. Patterson (2010), 91 n.28, who argues it was not the \textit{synedrion} but a small group of Boiotians manipulated by Alexander to ensure destruction of Thebes. Cf. below, n.727.


\textsuperscript{683} The first such event could be said to be the supplication of the Plataians at the altar of the twelve gods in Athens in 519 in reaction to pressure from Thebes: see above, Chapter 3.II.iii, ‘Asopos’. The use made of Leipsydron by the Alkmeonidai (Hdt. 5.62.2) also fits into this pattern. Alexander would make an exception of Thebes in his exiles decree (Plut. \textit{Mar.} 221a with Worthington (1990), 194 n.3), indicating that he maintained his belief that Thebes’ absence from the landscape was important, despite the tradition of him having made accommodations to individual Thebans: Plut. \textit{Alex.} 13.3.

\textsuperscript{684} The positive reception of exiles returning to Thebes: Arr. \textit{Anab.} 1.7.1-3. The belief in the relationship between spaces associated with historical event and portents for the future is well illustrated by the signs of forthcoming Theban destruction at Diod. Sic. 17.10.2-6.
The first area Alexander would have passed through was Thessaly, the loyalty of which had been reaffirmed the previous year through reference to the Heraklid links between the Makedonian royal house and the Thessalian elite, which makes it clear that his relationship to Herakles was of symbolic value at this point\(^{685}\). Arrian records that in 335 Alexander was within the ‘πυλῶν’ before anyone knew he was on the move\(^{686}\). Though it has been suggested that these ‘gates’ might not have been Thermopylai but those near Herakleia (which Philip took in 339BC), there would have been no reason for Alexander to avoid Thermopylai and the best route southwards. Thebes had resisted the Persian invasion by the same route in 480, and attempted to stop Philip’s invasion in 339BC\(^{687}\). As with Agesilaos and his desire to be seen using the easiest route of the passes of Eleutherai in the 370s, Alexander could demonstrate his ability to use the premier route without being challenged by any hostile force\(^{688}\).

\(^{685}\) See above, n.663, for Alexander’s use of Herakleian symbolism. See discussion below for the prominence of Herakles in the Theban geography of the destruction of 335BC.

\(^{686}\) Arr. Anab. 1.7.5.

\(^{687}\) Seizure of Nikaia by Thebes in 339. Following suspicion of Thebans: Demosthenes 11.4. cf. Demosthenes 6.22; Harding (2006), 224-228. The situation of Nikaia east of Thermopylai is similar to that of Herakleia just to the west of the hot gates that caused so much friction between Sparta and Boiotia. Cf. above, n.353 and n.558.

\(^{688}\) For the desire of Agesilaos and the Spartans to control the routes into Boiotia: above, nn.133, 397.
Entering Phokis, Alexander would have picked up allies there and progressed into Boiotia by way of the *lieu de passage* of the north-west Kephissos valley (see above, Figure 2.6)\(^{689}\). Presumably the majority of the Makedonians travelling with Alexander would have fought at the battle of Chaironeia and returning to the site would have emphasised the danger that Thebes posed to the new king. After passing the debris and burial mound of the Makedonians, they would have come to the newly refounded Orchomenos, and picked up further allies with important local knowledge\(^{690}\). The reconstitution of the community at Orchomenos, which was presumably beginning to take shape again, was a visible and highly symbolic geographic change brought about by Philip’s victory at Chaironeia and a demonstration of a determination to undermine Thebes’ power\(^{691}\). The Makedonians would next have moved near to Lebadeia, where Thebes celebrated its victory over Sparta (and Orchomenos), and subsequent regional hegemony from 371 onward\(^{692}\), and the sanctuary of Trophonios, which might have recently celebrated the visit of a rival to Alexander, ‘king’ Amyntas of Makedon\(^{693}\). The growing army then reached Koroneia where Alexander would have passed the sanctuary of Athena Itonia, the commemorative space of victory over Athens in 446, which as such had a strong affiliation with a corporate Boiotia and the first federation\(^{694}\). Alexander and his army would have been funnelled into the same narrow corridor between the mountains and Lake Kopais as all large groups in the past had been, along the south shore of Lake Kopais and past the shrine of Tilphoussian Apollo\(^{695}\). Only fourteen years previously, most of the land to the west of Haliartos had been occupied by the Phokians\(^{696}\), and the strategic importance of this corridor would have been particularly apparent to the king as shortly afterward his force passed through Haliartos where the Spartan invasion sixty years previously had been halted and Lysander killed\(^{697}\). The king and his force would then have climbed the ridge at Onchestos where a view of the Kadmeia would have ‘burst upon’ Alexander and his army\(^{698}\).

\(^{689}\) See above, n.116.

\(^{690}\) Orchomenos was an important strategic base, from where Phokis had recently based a serious threat in the Sacred War (above, n. 534), and had also been used in the past (e.g. in 446BC) as a stronghold against invaders (above, n.350).

\(^{691}\) Symbolically, Orchomenos embodied an alternative political centre to Thebes, and was a convenient location from which to police the Kopais basin: cf. above, Chapter 3.II.iii, p.77-79.

\(^{692}\) Above, n.533.

\(^{693}\) Above, n.665.

\(^{694}\) Plut. *Ages.* 19.2, with above, n.350 and n.491, for celebration of victory over Tolmides at this site.

\(^{695}\) *HII Apollo*, 262-6. Discussed above, Chapter 2.III.iii.

\(^{696}\) For more detail of Phokian incursions see below, *Annex*, p.286-288 with Figure 6.3, and Buckler (1989), 101-104.

\(^{697}\) See below, nn.899, 961.

\(^{698}\) See above, Chapter 2.II.ii, with n.70.
Alexander’s unexpectedly quick arrival at Onchestos betrays an intimate knowledge of the use of the landscape on both sides\(^{699}\). The expectation that Thebes would know about any movement from north of Thermopylai and be able to prepare is born of centuries of interactivity with and proactivity against Makedon, Thessaly and Phokis. That Alexander could get to Onchestos without the Thebans knowing he had set off suggests both a fundamental Theban misreading of the political situation, and also the complete breakdown in traditional surveillance and information systems\(^{700}\). A movement can only be unexpectedly fast in comparison with other similar movements, and the Thebans would have had an excellent knowledge of the distances from Makedon as well as the route by which the journey would be made. The impact of the swift arrival of a Makedonian force would have been exaggerated by the intervisibility between Thebes and Onchestos. No force in the historical period had ever reached so far in an invasion from the north without the acquiescence of Thebes and the effect would have been more pronounced on the Thebans and their supporters because of this. Only the Thessalians and the Minyans had ever crossed this far with invasion forces from the north, and the ‘memories’ of both these invasions would have been especially prominent given that both groups were present in Alexander’s army\(^{701}\). The pause at Onchestos indicated in Arrian is likely to have been from an awareness of the visibility of the ridge and the desire of Alexander to bring Thebes to terms rather than fight\(^{702}\). The shrine of Poseidon Onchestos was the product of early divisions in Boiotia, and by pausing at the liminal threshold between the two, he acknowledged the boundary and then transgressed it by passing from the Kopaic into the Teneric Plain\(^{703}\).

Alexander’s progress through the Teneric Plain would have been visually striking for those within the walls at Thebes. He passed the large cult centre of Herakles Hippodetes, an important place of traditional Theban territorial definition, where the hero’s role in defeating the Orchomenians and pushing them back into the Kopaic Plain from the

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\(^{699}\) Arr. *Anab.* 1.7.5; ἄνελπτως (Alexander arrived ‘suddenly’ from Thebes); Diod. Sic. 17.8.9. Compare Philip’s ‘sudden’ (ἐξαφθονῆς) movements in Dem. 4.17.

\(^{700}\) The system of communication might have been taken over by the Makedonians, given the speed of the reaction to Theban revolt: below, n.721.

\(^{701}\) Diod. Sic. 4.10.5, gives an account of the mythical last invasion of the Minyans. For the perhaps similarly mythical Thessalian domination of Boiotia and their defeat at Keressos, see below, *Annex* pp.233-234.

\(^{702}\) As he had done successfully in 336; see above. Note the parallel with Plutarch’s description of the king considering the effect of his appearance might have before the walls of Athens: Plut. *Alex.* 11.3. Because of Alexander’s fast move from Thessaly to Boiotia, his forces would have also appreciated this pause to regroup, and perhaps add more local allies.

\(^{703}\) As the mounting and dismounting ritual at the shrine could have symbolically signified. Chapter 4.III.iii, pp.163-165.
ridge at Onchestos was celebrated\(^{704}\). He then encamped close to the site of the sanctuary of Iolaos (which was inside the lower walls), where the principal agon of the Thebans for Herakles was celebrated annually\(^{705}\), before travelling around to the southern side of the city. Alexander could not escape being enveloped in Herakleian sites and here his forces encamped near to the Herakleion, which was the major Theban cult centre of Herakles in the fourth century, and was symbolically prominent in the victory at Leuktra and therefore the beginning of Theban hegemony over mainland Greece\(^{706}\). This kind of movement around an urban centre as a display of power was reminiscent of the way in which Agesilaos attempted to manipulate landscape and exert pressure on Thebes in the 370s, after the Kadmeia had been recovered from the Spartans, and this method had already proved successful for Alexander in his previous journey to Thebes in late 336\(^{707}\). Alexander’s choice of location for his forces on the south side of Thebes would have been strategic. From here he had access to all the resources of the Parasopeia, and the Plataians and Thespians would presumably be very well disposed toward the Makedonians, having been permitted to return to their land by Philip three years previously. The hills that separate the Parasopeia and the Teneric Plain would also have given Alexander a commanding view of Thebes and it would have been the closest point to the Kadmeia, allowing easier communication with the Makedonian garrison that still resisted the besieging Thebans.

Choosing the south side on which to locate his forces also located Alexander in a symbolic position he could not have been unaware of. The situation almost exactly replicated that of 479BC with a large ‘Greek’ force basing itself around Plataia, and the Thebans resisting in their city. Given Alexander’s claims to both pan-Hellenism and to be retaliating for the misdeeds of the Persian Wars, taking the position of the Greeks in a re-enactment of the 479 positions demonstrated geographic awareness. For the Plataians, who were acutely aware of the history of their relationship with Thebes, the occupation of the land between themselves and Thebes must have caused reflection on the territorial fear and fragility that had been the principal feature of the relationship between the two communities since at least 519BC\(^{708}\). Alexander’s mythical ancestry also became a symbolic issue here, as the most important battle in the seizure of Thebes.

\(^{704}\) See above, n.186; The sanctuary would have been difficult to ignore if it enclosed four hectares: Schachter (1986), 12-13. For Herakles in the wars against Orchomenos, see above, n.130.

\(^{705}\) See above, n.553.

\(^{706}\) See above, Chapter 4.V.ii, with n.555.

\(^{707}\) Diod. Sic. 17.4.4. See above, n.83, for examples of effective Spartan pressure on Theban territory.

\(^{708}\) See above, n.525.
was fought in front of the Elektrai gate, just behind and above which were the revered remains of Herakles’ birthplace.⁷⁰⁹ Though the sources praise the determined (but forlorn) Theban resistance in the face of the Makedonian attack, the fall of the city is presented as reasonably straightforward, the key moment being the ability of the garrison of the Kadmeia to work in concert with the Makedonians outside the lower walls.⁷¹⁰ There followed a tumultuous and confused period of destruction and general mêlée where different groups with differing designs managed to gain entry to the city. The Phokians and the Boiotians (at least some Orchomenians, Thespians and Plataians, but perhaps a wider coalition of other Boiotoi) were able to force their way into the urban centre of Thebes, as Thebans had done with all of their own communities.⁷¹¹ Their part in the destruction of the city can therefore be seen as a collection of aggrieved parties responding (as they saw it) to the rough treatment of the Thebans in the past, and a desire to correct at least a century and a half of destruction directed from Thebes. There was also a contingent of Thrakians amongst Alexander’s army, and their barbaric entrance into a Boiotian community setting echoes the infamous Athenian-led Thrakian group that plundered Mykalessos in 414BC that was forestalled by the quick actions of the Theban cavalry.⁷¹² That cavalry had been one of the principal agents enforcing the regional homogeneity of the past generation, and with the sack of the city in progress, the cavalry from within the city walls ‘flooded out’ into the Teneric Plain, trampling those in the city.⁷¹³ The speed and quality of the cavalry had long allowed Thebes to behave as if it were the physical centre of Boiotia, and their evacuation of the city embodies the dislocation of Thebes from this central space that had been created by historical action. The association of the Boiotoi with horses and horsemanship was informed by their ancestral link to northern Greece, and to have Makedonian and Thessalian forces now pushing the Theban cavalry from

⁷⁰⁹ Arr. Anab. 1.8.5-6; Paus. 9.11.1-3.
⁷¹⁰ Arr. Anab. 1.8.6; Plut. Alex. 11.5; Diod. Sic. 17.12.4-5.
⁷¹¹ See above, Table 1, Chapter 2.II.iii, for summary of destructions of communities. Demosthenes 19.65 narrates the physical annihilation of Phokis by Boiotia in Third Sacred War.
⁷¹² Above, Chapter 2.III.iii, p.60; Chapter 3.III.iii, n.375. Plut. Mor. 260B, for Thrakian mistreatment of the Theban Timokleia. It may be significant that the Thrakians’ behaviour toward Timokleia is unfavourably compared with the clemency of Alexander (who pardons her murder of her attacker), given the desire of the Makedonians to distinguish themselves from the other northern groups on the geographic and cultural borders of what is considered ‘Greek’. The killing of invaders of Thebes by women has a parallel in Pelopidas’ cross-dressing liberation of the Kadmeia in 379: Plut. Pel. 11.
⁷¹³ Arr. Anab. 1.8.7; Diod. Sic. 17.12.5. The description of the trampling of many people by the escaping Theban cavalry is deliberately emotive and recalls Achilles’ horses riding over the carnage of the massacre in Iliad 20.498.
their own city in panic into the Teneric Plain was a historical watershed\textsuperscript{714}. The community which had been most pro-active in attempting to shape Boiotian geography in the past two centuries, and a principal instrument of that influence (the cavalry) had been broken apart by a combination of communities who had all suffered in some way because of this influence.

The horsemen were only part of those who escaped from Thebes; even if the large figure of 36,000 killed and captured is correct (Diod. 17.14.1), this would still have left a significant number of Theban citizens unaccounted for, especially if many of the total were slaves of the Thebans that resided in the city\textsuperscript{715}. The two principal destinations are said to have been Akraiphia and Athens\textsuperscript{716}. Akraiphia would be the logical destination given the position of the Makedonians to the south of Thebes, together with its mountainous topography and minor position in the political scheme, meaning it would be less of a target for further reprisals from Alexander. From Thebes to Akraiphia was a well-worn road of just over ten miles and would have taken only a few hours on foot, and less than an hour on a horse in flight. To Athens was further, but the link between exile in Boiotia and movement to Athens had a long history, and the actions and experience of the Thebans who made their way to Athens must have been informed by retracing the steps of so many refugees previous to themselves\textsuperscript{717}. The Athenians might have witnessed the spectacle of a large number of refugee Thebans arriving at the city, replacing the Plataians who would only recently have departed to re-found their own community. They made a special request to Alexander to be a recognised haven for refugee Thebans, echoing the unusual entry of Athenians into Thebes immediately before 338BC\textsuperscript{718}.

\textsuperscript{714} Thebes retained a link with Dodona through the annual Tripodophoria that emphasised the Thessalian heritage of the Boiotoi as well as allowing a regular symbolic procession of the migration of the Boiotoi: see above, Chapter 4.IV.i.

\textsuperscript{715} Freed slaves, resident foreigners and ‘refugees’ make up part of Thebes’ defence force: Diod. Sic. 17.11.2.

\textsuperscript{716} Thebans arriving hotfoot into Athens: Arr. \textit{Anab.} 1.10.2; Plut. \textit{Alex.} 13.1; Diod. Sic. 17.15.4 (Athens designated as official refuge for Thebans). Akraiphia: Paus. 9.23.5.

\textsuperscript{717} Parallel to other flights: to Athens- Plataians (427, 373: above, n.637), Thespians (414: above n.360, with Panagopoulos (1989), 278-279) Thebans (382: above, n.362); to Thebes: Athenians (404: above, n.682).

\textsuperscript{718} Diod. Sic. 17.15.3-4.
Change

Movements were informed by and occurred within a pre-existing physical and symbolic space, but that space was affected by the events of 335, and the accounts of the events also indicate some of the spatial changes that had already occurred since the victory of the Makedonians at the Battle of Chaironeia.

It would not have been possible for Alexander to pass through the traditional invasion route into Boiotia unnoticed by the Thebans before 338BC. As indicated in the sources, the Thebans did not know Alexander had passed through the gates until he reached Onchestos, the implication being they understood the route Alexander would take and would expect to have information of this ahead of Alexander. Before 338 an elaborate system of watchtowers, forts, scouts and cavalry patrols would have conveyed the information of any hostile force back to Thebes. Though it might not have made any difference to the Theban response to Alexander, the invasion demonstrates that the geographical structure of Boiotia that had been in place since at least the expulsion of the Athenians in 446BC was not in operation any longer. The breakdown of communication systems since 338 emphasises some major changes in the way in which Boiotia functioned as a region. The re-foundation of Orchomenos, and the probable Makedonian garrison in Chaironeia opened the route into Boiotia in a way that had been combated explicitly in the first federation. Moreover, the loss of control of the Kadmeia meant that the Makedonians had taken the most important node in the system of intervisibility that had been used by Thebes to police Boiotia, especially since 371. This system of visibility and militarisation of landscape might have been taken over by the Makedonians, or it might have been left vacant, but the change in the management of the landscape would have affected every community in Boiotia, particularly Plataia, Thespiai and Orchomenos, whose re-establishment coincided with the change in the militarisation of the landscape.

Destruction

Thebes’ vast outer walls were thinly defended or undermanned at the time of Alexander’s capture of the city. Arrian’s description of the poorly defended walls and

719 Chapter 3.III.v for discussion of Theban systemisation of territorial control after 371BC.
720 The rearrangements of 424: Above, pp.88-89 with Figure 3.7.
721 Chapter 3.III.v, the system began in earnest after Leuktra. The importance of the Kadmeia as a centre of communication is suggested by the speed at which Alexander receives news of the Theban revolt against Makedonian control of the city.
722 Arr. Anab. 1.8.5; Diod. Sic. 17.11.2. Cf. below, n.750 on non-citizens being posted on walls.
the following account of the merciless killing of the inhabitants of Thebes are also reminiscent of the depiction of the attack on Mycalesos by the Thracians in the fifth century. The killing that occurred once Alexander’s forces had broken into the lower city is described as being led by the Boiotians and Phokians. When viewed from the beginning of the historical record in the sixth century, it seems extraordinary that such a visceral act could have been committed within the ethnos. Though the historians seek to explain it in terms of Thebes’ past misdemeanours, the massacre runs counter to the way in which Thebes had controlled and destroyed other communities in the intervening period. The destructions, exiles and political rearrangements overseen by Thebes had always been strategic, designed primarily to gain control over, rather than eradicate, populations. The first wave of intra-Boiotoi destruction in 335 concentrated on the inhabitants of Thebes. The second would focus on the physical aspects of the community.

After victory over Thebes was secured, Alexander made sure that the decision to raze Thebes was made in concert, emulating the allies in 479BC. The amount of manpower and time it would have taken to destroy Thebes in its entirety would not have been available to Alexander before he set off to Asia, and thus this democratic aspect of the fate of the city was a practical necessity. It allowed Alexander to portray himself as fulfilling the desire of the Greeks after the battle of Plataia in 479, and not to take personal responsibility for the destruction of this most ancient and firmly Hellenic of cities. Given the size of Thebes and its long history of largely unbroken prosperity and lack of physical upheaval, it is likely that any destruction of the city (especially the Kadmeia) was partial, even considering the ferocity of the various groups

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723 Above, Chapter 3.III.iii, n.375.
724 Arr. Anab. 1.8.8; Diod. Sic. 17.13.5; Justin 11.3.8; Plut. Alex. 11.5.
725 Diod. Sic. 17.13.6.
726 See for instance the way in which the Plataian urban center, and then the land was redistributed on short-term leases (Thuc. 3.68.3) and the non-violent way in which the Plataian citizens were dealt with in 373: above Chapter 2.II.vii for this ‘bloodless’ event, and also n.637 for the symbolic exile of Plataians. The andrapodismoi in Orchomenos and Koroneia at the end of the Third Sacred War might have been directed against the Phokians rather than Boiotoi: see above, Table 2 with n.87.
727 Diodorus (17.14.1-4) indicates the synedrion of the Greeks made the decision, Arr. Anab. 1.9.9, suggests it was made by just those who took part in the seizing of Thebes. It is likely that Alexander convened those likely to be in favour of destroying Thebes (Plataia, Orchomenos, Thespiai, Phokis) and then informed the synedrion of the decision for general approval: Arr. Anab. 1.10.1.
728 Alexander would have invaded Boiotia in 335 with a lean invasion force, necessitated by the rapidity of his initial move from Makedon on news of Thebes’ revolt.
729 Hdt. 9.86-87.
730 The clause in the Athenian ‘oath of Plataia’ relating to the destruction of Thebes reflects this alignment. Rhodes and Osborne (2003) no.88.1.32-33, suggest that it might reflect a change made after 335BC.
attacking it. Perhaps the most famous detail regarding the destruction of Thebes was that Pindar’s house was left standing amongst the razed city. The preservation of the large property on the west slope of the Kadmeia was designed to affect the way in which the historical space, and its link with Makedon, was perceived. Though the broader spatial reconfiguration of resettlement and Thebes’ destruction would be enacted for the benefit of neighbouring Boiotians, by stipulating that Pindar’s house should not be destroyed, Alexander made sure that the space was distinctively Makedonian, and demonstrated a concern with production of space on a local scale. Alexander’ actions were purportedly in memory of Pindar’s celebration of Alexander I of Makedon, and this respect for the most revered of historical pan-Hellenic poets must somehow have been designed to offset the immense damage done by destroying not only one of the oldest and most famous of Greek cities, but also the place of birth of Herakles and therefore a direct link with Alexander’s best claim to Greek ancestry. In comparison with the vote of other Greeks to destroy the city, Alexander’s preservation looks like one made out of restraint and respect, as well as demonstrating his ultimate power over even the small detail of spatial change.

The zeal with which the non-Makedonian participants are reported to have taken part in the destruction of the walls of Thebes is important in the exoneration of Alexander in the destruction of the city, but the pattern of previous destructions in Boiotia meant that this event was informed by the manner of Theban manipulation of other communities’ physical structure. Thebes had been implicated in the destruction of Thespiai, Plataia and Athens in 480, and it had been party to the destruction of Plataia in 427BC and destroyed that city again in 373BC. In 371 it dispersed the inhabitants of Thespiai, and in the 360s it had enforced something similar at Orchomenos, which with

731 The destruction and looting of the city is said to have provided a very large sum of wealth (Diod. Sic. 17.14.1), and the treasure of Timokleia, with her collection of gold and silver, might not have been simply a narrative device, but indicative of the wealth of the prominent families of Thebes: Plut. Mor. 260B; Plut. Alex. 12.
732 Pindar’s house: Arr. Anab. 1.9.10; Plut. Alex. 11.6; Aelian 13.7; Pliny, 7.109.
733 Solinus 9.13; Dio Chrysostom, 2.33. Slowikowski (1989), argues that Alexander’s love of athletes (and Pindar’s celebration of them) might have influenced Alexander’s decision. For the argument that it was as a result of Alexander’s reverence for Ammon (given Pindar’s possible role in Ammon’s introduction to Greece) Paus. 9.16.1, with Moggi and Osanna (2010, 300-301). It seems most likely that it was part of the preservation of property and people linked to Makedonian benefactors: Plut. Alex. 11.6; Arr. Anab. 1.9.9-10. Worthington (2003), makes the further point that it was Pindar’s support of legitimate Makedonian monarchy that he was keen to demonstrate in the face of Theban support of contenders to the Makedonian throne. Discussion of Pindar in Chapter 4.VI.ii, above.
734 See above, n.685, and p.216-217.
735 Echoing the presentation of the respectful treatment of Timokleia: see above, n.731.
736 See above, Chapter 3.III.iii and n.711.
737 Chapter 2.II.vii, for discussion of importance of intervisibility in Boiotia.
Chaironeia was reduced again in the 340s. In the Third Sacred War Thebes had seriously damaged or destroyed many Phokian communities and had often destroyed fortifications erected by other Boiotian communities and manipulated the landscape physically so as to be able to dominate and monitor other parts of Boiotia. In 404BC Thebans had taken part in the demolition of Athenian long-walls and the walls of the Peiraeus as a symbolic act marking the end of that city’s hegemony though its rule of the sea. Thebes was one of a group of states that would have liked to destroy the city in its totality, echoing the desire of the allied Greeks to destroy Thebes in 479. The walls of the Kadmeia were Thebes’ most famous physical characteristic, and the lower walls of the city were a marker of Thebes’ recent predominance. To destroy either of these would have been (literally) a monumental achievement, and a marker of a change in the landscape not experienced for a thousand years. To do so at liberty over an extended period of time must have had a profound effect on those taking part, especially those neighbouring Boiotians who would subsequently inhabit this refashioned landscape.

The way in which the destruction of Thebes is presented in the literary sources suggests a general unease about the destruction of the city and a desire to justify it in relation to the many pasts of the site. All sources mention Thebes’ relationship with Persia in the Persian Wars, and Arrian cites Thebes’ vote for the destruction of Athens in 404 as well as the seizure and destruction of Plataia in 431-427. Justin adds to these recent charges all of Thebes’ ancient infamy which had filled the stages of theatres, and states that the allies had resolved to destroy Thebes in 479 anyway and were now seeing that resolution through:

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738 Xen. Hell. 2.2.19. Cf. Chapter 3.III.ii. They also appropriated and redesigned fortifications used against them such as the Mavrovouni fortress above Kreusis: see above, n.325.
740 The reciprocal symbolism of the destruction of Athens and Thebes will feature in Steinbock (forthcoming). The destruction of the Athenian walls was accompanied by the playing of pipes, and though there is not indication of music accompanying the destruction of Thebes, the Boiotians would have understood the symbolism of dismantling the most famous walls in Greece. See Annex, n.936.
741 Chapter 3.III.iv for account of Synoikism into Thebes’ lower walls at outset of Peloponnesian War. Annex pp.253-257 for a more detailed discussion of the dating of these walls.
742 The redistribution of land to the allies of Alexander: 1.9.9; Diod. Sic. 18.11.3-4. cf. Deinarchos Ag.Demosthenes 24 with below, n.754.
743 Arr. Anab. 1.9.6-8; Diod. Sic. 17.14.2-4.
744 Justin 11.3.11. The misreading might be Justin’s own, but the ephelic oath might have informed later accounts. See above, n.730 for discussion of ‘Oath of Plataia’, and Chapter 4.VII.iii for discussion of the significance of the portrayals of Boiotia in drama for its historical interaction. There is a neat balance here (reflected in Milton’s verse) whereby Athens is preserved by Alexander on its past benefactions to Greece, where Thebes is condemned for its past behaviour, both with special focus on the Persian Wars: cf. Spartan preservation of Athens in 404: Xen. Hell. 2.2.20, with n.621, above.
Justin 11.3.11

Though a late and often unreliable synthesiser, Justin’s reflections demonstrate clearly that whether or not ‘Thebes’ was to some extent an imaginary/experiential (perceived) city in Athenian theatre, it was not dissociated from the ‘real’ (conceived) Thebes, and the two could be conflated because they occupied the same actual (lived) space. The passage from Aeschylus’ Septem that opened this chapter was written 130 years prior to Alexander’s destruction of Thebes, but the language and description is strikingly similar to the description found in the extant histories. The mythological and literary accounts of attacks on Thebes would have been familiar to all participants in 335, and their actions therefore fall somewhere between perceived and conceived space: there is no doubt that both during the event and in its later presentation, the imagined history of Thebes affected its ‘real’ historical experience and consequently contributed to a major change in Theban and Boiotian space. It is one of the clearest examples of imagined geography having a physical effect on a place, and in this provides an excellent example of the dialectic between subjective and objective geography outlined by Lefebvre, the product of which is lived space.

The destruction of Thebes and the division of its lands amongst the allies was balanced by the refortification of Plataia and Orchomenos (and probably Thespiai). This refortification would presumably be a continuation of the resettlement begun under Philip, and might have received a significant injection of resources from the wealth and physical remains of Thebes, a reservoir of materials, and a quarry of good building materials. For discussion of the relationship between the ‘real’ polis of Thebes and its ‘imagined’ counterpart, see Chapter 4.VII.ii-iii.

If Aeschylus affected the way in which the destruction of Thebes was reported, it would mark a parallel to the relationship between dramatic and historical narratives seen in Euripides’ and Diodorus’ account of the battle of Delion: above, n.200.

Diod. Sic. 19.52.2, which relates the causes of Kassander’s re-foundation of Thebes, cites both its ‘μόνον’ and its ‘πράξεις’ as reasons for re-foundation, reflecting the historical justification as well as the mythical causes of its destruction given in Justin 11.3.1. This combination would produce the new space of Thebes after its re-foundation.

Exactly the same poleis that had their defences strengthened by Sparta in the early fourth century; see below, Annex pp.292. The refortification might also have brought to mind the ‘safety’ offered by the Makedonians to Boiotian communities in the Persian Wars (Hdt. 8.34).
Thebes' lower walls were one of the longest enceintes ever built, and to have been able to resist the Makedonian army must have been in reasonable order. The destruction of (or freedom to destroy) these walls would have given the communities nearby an almost limitless supply of building materials. This would have presumably benefited Plataia and Thespiai particularly because of their proximity to the site, with Plataia rebuilding after thirty-five years of exile, and Thespiai wishing to re-establish itself having been subdued since 371. This redistribution of land and resources would have changed the way Boiotia functioned: the region had been radically altered by the removal of Thebes, and each of the neighbouring communities (now with augmented territory) would have perceived their place in the geography of Boiotia very differently than previously. The justification for destroying Thebes rested on its past behaviour, especially given the ramshackle defence of the walls: Arr. Anab. 1.8.5 (walls undefended); Diod. Sic. 17.11.2 (walls manned by non-Thebans); Diod. Sic. 17.12.3 (key gate left unmanned by guards). The physical landscape was being manipulated in line with its perceived (and changing) symbolic significance. Thebes was stripped back leaving a skeleton of cultic areas as well as the preservation of the buildings associated with support of Makedonian rule. The physical resources would have made their way into structures of other communities, as well as being reused in 316 when the city was re-founded.

Pliny, *NH*, 34.8, for an example of the redistribution of the wealth of Thebes, an unusually well travelled chandelier looted from Thebes and dedicated by Alexander at Kyme. Especially given the ramshackle defence of the walls: Arr. Anab. 1.8.5 (walls undefended); Diod. Sic. 17.11.2 (walls manned by non-Thebans); Diod. Sic. 17.12.3 (key gate left unmanned by guards). Plut. Arist. 11.9. Destruction of Thespiai: Xen. *Hell.* 6.3.5; Paus. 9.14.2-4. The nature of this destruction has been clouded somewhat by the persistence of ‘Thespians’ in the epigraphic record (*IG* IV2.1 94.a.6, and Moretti (1953), no.26), but the continuation of those designated as Thespians would not be surprising even had the urban center of Thespiai been destroyed.

Arr. Anab. 1.9.10 (League’s decision to rebuild Plataia and Orchomenos in 335); Plut. *Alex.* 34.2; Plut. Arist. 11.9.

Demades 1.26: ‘νῦν δ’ εἶναι οἰκόπεδον πόλεως καὶ λείψανα κακῶν ταῖς τῶν ἐχθρῶν χερσὶν εἰς ἐδαφὸς ἀχθεῖται’. See also above, n.732.

Deinarchos *Ag.* *Demosthenes* 24, emphasises that the site of Thebes is being ‘ἀφοίτα καὶ σπείρεται’, presumably referring to the urban centre rather than the land that had been previously farmed. His use of ‘ἀνήρπασται’ to describe the fate of Thebes might also imply the physical implication of being ‘taken’ from the land. Diod. Sic. 19.53, for the refoundation of Thebes by Kassander.
Alexander’s experience of traversing the southern reaches of Lake Kopais together with the Orchomenian and Kopais dwellers in his entourage led him to order the re-establishment of the Bronze Age system for draining the lake\textsuperscript{755}. Though the turbulence of the period after Alexander’s death prohibited the scheme’s completion, restoring a large amount of fertile lacustrine land to the Kopais communities would have been designed to reinforce the destruction of Thebes by strengthening the rest of Boiotia. If the Orchomenians had persuaded Philip and Alexander of the merits of restoring their community, why not restore the basis of its great Bronze-Age wealth and prosperity? It would also have served Alexander’s desire to compete with Herakles in a space where Herakles had pushed back the Orchomenians and blocked the drainage channels of Lake Kopais\textsuperscript{756}. He would also be emulating the actions of his father, whose own supervision of drainage near Philippi could have been inspired by his time in Boiotia\textsuperscript{757}. Both Thebes’ destruction and the drainage of Lake Kopais would have freed up large amounts of excellent land for redistribution to the communities nearby, creating two productive (and loyal) areas that would have closely mirrored the Mykenaian division of the area into Teneric and Kopais zones\textsuperscript{758}, and attests Alexander’s commitment to widespread restructuring of the Boiotian landscape beyond the destruction of Thebes.

Elsewhere, Oropos had been transferred to Athenian control in 338 and remained in that situation despite Alexander’s enmity toward Athens\textsuperscript{759}. Thebes had been destroyed as an urban centre, the Kadmeia garrisoned, and its lands had been distributed amongst other communities. The other major communities of Boiotia had all been resettled refortified and probably benefitted materially. However, if one were to look at Boiotia in terms of location and size of settlements in 550 and in 330, the only major difference would be the absence of Thebes. Though the fortifications remained at places such as Siphai or Chorsiai, the landscape that had previously been ordered by the military dominance of fourth-century Thebes was now allowed to return to the social subdivisions that were broadly the same as they had been in the late sixth century. With the

\textsuperscript{755} Importantly, repair and unblock the hydrological engineering system rather than completely restart it: above, n.58.
\textsuperscript{756} Above, pp.48-49, with n.130. Bosworth (1996), 98, 182-3, discusses Alexander’s later desire to compete with Herakles.
\textsuperscript{757} Theophrastos, Hist.Plant. 5.14.6; Pliny, Natural History,17.30; Horden and Purcell (2000), 248. The destruction of Olynthos and the redistribution of land by Philip was also a parallel of the destruction of Thebes, already made in antiquity: Hegesias of Magnesia FGH 142 T 3 (with discussion at Worthington (2008) 78-80). Athens also took exiles from Olynthos, as with Thebes in 335. In both the Teneric and Kopais Plains therefore, Alexander was able to compete with Herakles and his father.
\textsuperscript{758} The situation of Boiotia in the Bronze Age is discussed above, Chapter 3.II.iii, ‘Kephissos’.
\textsuperscript{759} Diod. Sic. 17.15.5: presumably one of the Athenian requests to Alexander after the destruction of Thebes would have been to keep (or take) control of Oropos.
destruction of Thebes came perhaps a region more genuinely balanced between its communities than it had been for a long period.

The physical similarity of the region over a long period is remarkable, but it obscures the dramatic social and historical changes that took place in the two centuries before 335. The settlements were in the same place, but the inhabitants and their perspectives had been irreversibly informed by their experience of the landscape. This experience would have been implicit in the perspective of the inhabitants and their behaviour, but with the destruction of Thebes and the patronage of the Makedonians came a memorialisation of historical experience of the landscape that was manifested in physical and social structure. The social reconstruction of the space of Boiotia without Thebes placed a special emphasis on the reasons for Thebes’ absence from the landscape. The city had ceased to exist in built form, but as with the destructions of Orchomenos, Thespiai, and Plataia, the memory and resonance of community persisted in the perceived space of the region; Thebes’ physical deconstruction left a gap in the physical landscape of Boiotia, but ‘Thebes’ continued to play an important role in conditioning Boiotian geography.

The emphasis on the social reconstruction brings the discussion of the destruction of Thebes to its conclusion. The most important aspect of the destruction for the geography of Boiotia was perhaps not the physical, but the social change. The Theban population had been seriously damaged, and those that avoided being killed or sold into slavery had to endure two decades of exile. The period from 338 to 335 was as much about transfers of population as it was about physical changes. The first act of the seizing of Thebes was massacre rather than physical destruction. To take control of the means to produce space, those that produce it must be eradicated. When the Thebans had been killed or had fled, then the decision was made to destroy the physical city. This added permanence to the settlement and demonstrates a determination to deconstruct the site’s physical role within the region. When the reconstruction of Thebes was permitted by Kassander two decades later, there would have been few Thebans remaining who would personally remember Thebes’ period as hegemon of Greece, and the combination of amalgamating disparate elements of the old community with new members brought in to bolster numbers (as had happened elsewhere in Boiotian history760) would have required the reformation of Theban-ness. The regional federality

760 Thespiai after 479: above, n.345.
that had been cultivated in Thebes’ absence as well as the open hostility to the re-
foundation would inform the perceived position of the new Thebes, as well as its
physical relocation in this changed landscape.\footnote{Hostility from Boiotians, but not Greece more widely: Diod. Sic. 18.11.4-5.}

**Summary**

In simple terms, an important, large and heavily populated polis was purged of its
inhabitants and then physically dismantled by a Makedonian army and its allies. The
polis would be rebuilt less than two decades later and take a prominent place in the
region again. But the event did not occur in a landscape only important for its tactical
and strategic implications. Whether planned, accidental, or spontaneous, every act
occurred in space that was a many-layered palimpsest of history and imagination, and a
deliberate attempt to destroy the physical aspects of such a rich human environment
only contributed another layer to the palimpsest. This event permitted new
interpretations of and perspectives on Thebes, and changed the way in which the
history of the city previous to 335 could be understood. For the twenty-first century
historian, the value of reading such an event through space is that it allows an event that
became masked historiographically by its own importance to be understood in
contemporary terms, and without the (redundant) creation of a detailed diachronic
narrative leading up to the event. The destruction of Thebes may appear as a ‘firefly in
the dark’, but through the use of a spatial interpretation of the events, it is possible to
light up the wide vista of Boiotian geographic history, and tap into temporal rhythms
that may otherwise be ignored.
Epilogue
It is necessary to break down Alexander’s campaign against Thebes in this manner because the effect of Boiotian geography on the historical experience of the destruction is separate from the effect of the historical experience on the subsequent restructuring and re-imagining of the Boiotian landscape. In an event of the magnitude of Thebes’ destruction, the detail of *histoire événementielle* is important to understand because that detail becomes amplified in the subsequent articulation of geography and historical experience of the region. The desire has been to emphasise the reflexivity and reciprocity of historical event, long-term experience and production of space. The destruction of Thebes was a product of the spaces that existed in 335, but the geographic effects of the destruction of Thebes can only be fully witnessed with the manner of reflection of the inhabitants of Boiotia after the event and the response to the re-foundation of Thebes.

In 316 Thebes had to remake its place in a landscape fundamentally altered in its absence, and under the pressures of the discourse between the Diadochi in the post-Alexander period. The cultic centres that Alexander had passed in his route to Thebes now became the principal foci of the regional cohesion of Boiotia. The central locations of the sanctuaries of Poseidon Onchestos and Athena Itonia at Koroneia promoted them as suitable centres on which to build a new, genuinely federal Boiotia. The memory of the negative aspects of the concentration of military, political and religious power in Thebes before 335 encouraged the development of cults and festivals not tied too closely to any single large community, and the construction of a genuinely federal, balanced geography. The liminal space of Onchestos became the meeting place of the federal council, and the Itonion became the most important federal sanctuary and home to the Pamboiotia festival. Other major cult centres such as the Sanctuary of the Muses on Mt. Helikon, and festivals such as the Great Daidala and Eleutheria at Plataia were established as major intra-Boiotian and inter-state celebrations, the latter two examples emphasising the spatial reconfiguration that had allowed Plataia to be re-established from 338 onwards and then to cement its key symbolic place in both Boiotian and broader Hellenic discourse. Though the absence of Thebes was not of particularly long duration compared to some of the other communities in Boiotia, its re-foundation took place in this changed landscape, and together with the disparate

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762 Appropriation (or invention) of the Tripodophoria: above, Chapter 4.III.i, pp.151-152.
763 Which might have existed in some form earlier. See above, n.427.
764 See above, pp.167-173, for the Great Daidala and Eleutheria.
locations of Thebans in exile meant that the re-establishment would not simply resurrect the city in its previous form\textsuperscript{765}. The re-foundation had been resisted by many in Boiotia, but did have support more widely in Greece\textsuperscript{766}. The subscription to the re-foundation of Thebes reveals a wide range of states that wished to contribute to Thebes' resurrection, and once the Hellenistic monarchs overcame their initial aversion to the restoration of the city that Alexander had destroyed, Thebes became a site of competitive reconstruction and dedication\textsuperscript{767}.

The refounded city would have inherited many of the cult sites and significant physical remnants of the old community. The restoration was part of a broader attempt to place Thebes in this new landscape\textsuperscript{768}. In restoring Thebes Kassander himself was deliberately countering the actions of Alexander and the desire to reconstruct the conceived and perceived spaces of Thebes in the Boiotian landscape prompted other physical changes. The battle of Chaironeia was commemorated with the erection of the Lion monument there in the period after 316, and a new cult of Hektor was probably introduced at some point in this period, emphasising Thebes' Eastern origins of high antiquity\textsuperscript{769}. The monument and the cult are symbolic of opposition to Philip and Alexander respectively, and are an important insight into the way that Theban space was being rearticulated in reference to different historical rhythms. Statues to Epameinondas and Pronomos were re-erected on the Kadmeia and the new community quickly became involved in the political apparatus of the new (third) Boiotian federation\textsuperscript{770}. From Pausanias' account of traversing Thebes, it is possible that the later borders of Thebes and the surrounding

\textsuperscript{765} Berman (2010), 62, on Tanagran assertiveness after 335BC.

\textsuperscript{766} Resistance: Diod. Sic. 18.11.4-5, but acquiescence: 19.54.1. Little is known about the relationships between poleis in Boiotia in the absence of Thebes, but Strabo (9.2.18) suggests there might have been enough conflict to stop work on draining Lake Kopais.

\textsuperscript{767} Diod. Sic. 19.54.2, specifies Athens as helping to rebuild the larger part of the walls, and other Greeks, from mainland Greece, Sicily and Italy helping to rebuild buildings. IG VII 2419 (Harding (1985), no.131), has Eretrians, Koans, Melians and Aiginians contribute as well as Samothrace (Schachter (1986), 80) and several ‘kings’ who might have included Philokles (of Sidon), Demetrios Poliorketes and Lysimachos. Cf. SEG 31 502.

\textsuperscript{768} Mirroring the attempts of previous migrations into Thebes to make sense of the physical landscape: above, Chapter 4.II.ii, p.141-145.

\textsuperscript{769} The lion monument of 338 makes a direct reference to the lions set up for the Thesopian dead after the battles of Thermopylae and Delion (Ma (2008a), 85-86) in the process rehabilitating the Thebans and emphasising that their defeat at Chaironeia was in the cause of fighting a threat to both Greece (Thermopylae) and Boiotia (Delion). The bones of Hektor were recovered from the Troad, possibly in 316BC, and taken to Thebes, perhaps masking an earlier cult to another ‘Hektor’: see above, n.524 and n.627. (Schachter (1981), 234, ingeniously reconstructs the list of donors to the rebuilding of Thebes to include Ophryneion in the Troad, where there was a known grove of Hektor (Strabo 13.1.29), and suggests these bones could have been part of the donation of that community to a city (Thebes) which had suffered like Troy. The transfer of the bones was particularly important for Theban reconstruction as Alexander had famously visited Ilion and prayed to Priam as a descendent of Neoptolemos: Arr. Anab. 1.11.7-8.

\textsuperscript{770} For discussion of these statues see above: nn.175, 595.
communities were not dissimilar to those established in the sixth and fifth centuries, but the opportunities provided for individuals from the re-established communities of Orchomenos and Plataia for accruing wealth in the period after 335BC must have significantly altered the social dynamic within Boiotia.

Orchomenian cavalry joined Alexander’s Asian expedition (above, Chapter 2.II.iii, n.83), and an individual Plataian made a monumental contribution of ‘1000 yoke’ of oxen to the building of the theatre of Dionysos and the Panathenaic Stadium of the Lykurgan building programme: Rhodes and Osborne (2003), no. 94. This was probably a product of the availability of Theban land: Diod. Sic. 18.11.4, explicitly states that other Boiotians profited significantly from the destruction of Thebes.
Conclusion

This thesis presents an investigation into some aspects of Boiotian geographic history. It also develops an approach with which to look at history in a holistic manner, appreciating the behaviour of individuals and groups through the space around them, and the effect that this behaviour has on the space and those who subsequently inhabit it. In ancient Greece it was difficult to dissociate oneself or a group from its place of origin, and when there was movement, the narrative of this spatial change (such as the migration of the Boiotoi) would inform the way in which the colonised space would be viewed, and affect many aspects of the social dynamic of the group. The many examples of exile and return from Boiotia demonstrate a vital robustness to the connection between the Boiotoi and Boiotia: groups are socially broken apart by stasis and outside compulsion, their communities physically dismantled and garrisons installed, but they are always repopulated and reinvigorated as quickly as possible. The desire for Plataians to inhabit Plataia, Orchomenians to re-found Orchomenos, or Thebans to re-establish their settlement on and around the Kadmeia, attests to the strength of the desire to inhabit familiar and ancestral space. Boiotia was a physical environment in Central Greece occupied by the Boiotoi; without them, it would just have been a collection of natural and man-made features without memory or meaning.

It is impossible for Boiotian history to occur outside Boiotian space. This space was made up of the defensibility of the fortifications at Tanagra and Eleutherai, the restricted routes and high-yielding land offered by Lake Kopais’ fluctuations, as much as it was made up of the magic soil of the Ampheion, the processional route of the Daidala, or the ‘Seven Gates’ of Thebes. The combination of the physical and the perceptual, of conceived and perceived spaces, produced the networks and connections that were fundamental in forming a sense of location in the inhabitants, and it is this which should be at the heart of attempting to understand historical experience. Men and women make their own geography, but the landscape acts as a conduit for the past and allows polyvalent and plural histories to exist in a single physical space. In Boiotia the landscape was alive with many pasts, and the events of the sixth, fifth and fourth centuries interacted with these to form new and ever richer geographies.
Annex: Diachronic overview

Introduction
Extant evidence for Boiotian history in the period between 550 and 335 BC is not even in detail and does not provide a coherent narrative. There are almost certainly many major events (especially internally) of which there is no surviving record, a theory given support by the discovery of vital information on Boiotian history such as that preserved in the *Hellenica Oxyrhynchia*. This is perhaps why monographs treating earlier Boiotian history tend to have focussed on shorter periods with concomitant focus on the detail of the ‘events’ of that period. The purpose of this thesis, in using a geographical foundation, has been to permit the reconstruction of the interactivity and development of the region over a longer period and without the need to artificially reconstruct a historical narrative. It is important to focus on both the processes of the creation of Boiotian geography as well as its historical outcomes. However, where the final chapter of the main body of the thesis addressed a single event in a geographical/experiential manner, it is still useful to lay out the information discussed in the thesis in a more traditional, diachronic format. Whilst the approach taken in the last chapter of the thesis is considered the preferable way in which to reconstruct Boiotian history, the detail of the following narrative is still informed by the spatial model of historical experience outlined in previous chapters. Though the discussion will follow a broadly diachronic formula, the effect and reception of major events is as uneven as the sources that inform their occurrence.

In the following summary narrative, it has been necessary to segment the general period into three shorter durations in order to allow coherent discussion and succinct summation of each. The periodisation is attached to the major political changes in Boiotia and though these political changes would have some effect on the landscape, they are not watersheds for spatial analysis, nor do they necessarily mark changes in the way in which the land is perceived. The choice of political changes (446, 386) for the divisions within the narrative permits the discussion to remain fluid, and to illustrate the discourse between deliberate short-term social/political designs and the slower changes and patterns in the reciprocal relationship between communities and geography.
550-446BC: Ethnos to federation

The Boiotoi migrated from Thessaly into the region that would become known as Boiotia; this spatial link was remembered and deliberately preserved. The Boiotoi brought military customs, cults, and the Aiolic dialect with them from Thessaly. Where the sites that they occupied had an illustrious history of their own, narratives of migration and cults became hybrid or plural to incorporate these. However, despite the ethnic links that Boiotia and Thessaly shared, the default relationship between the two regions seems to have been competitive and hostile. Given the more reliably attested Thessalian involvement in Phokis during the sixth century, it is possible that the influence extended to Boiotia in some form at this time. The belief in a battle of Keressos that freed Boiotia of Thessalian control has been given more credence than it might otherwise require because it is recorded in several places in Plutarch and therefore could be considered an event that is part of ‘Boiotian’ memory. Though it is likely there is a historical kernel to Thessalian influence in Boiotia, the event looks very similar to the other events that ‘liberated’ Boiotia, the victory over the Athenians at Koroneia in 446BC and over the Spartans at Leuktra in 371BC. The attitude of Boiotia to Thessaly is better represented by the tradition of the Tripodophoria that indicates a strong desire to assert both a shared (high) antiquity and a differentiated present. Though little precise information is available for this relationship in the sixth century, the continuation of cultic interaction that suggests a competitive relationship, and the propagation of the memory of events such as Keressos and the First Sacred War (whether historical or not) suggest Boiotian identity in the process of formation. Active

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772 Schachter (1967), identified a type of cult, especially prominent around the Kopais that looks as if it might have Thessalian roots translated onto the Boiotian landscape. For other Thessalian links see above, pp.65 72-73, Chapter 4.III.i.

773 The memory of the link with Thessaly was preserved in the narrative of shared migration and in the figure of their eponymous founder, Boiotos: above, Chapter 4.II.ii.

774 Plutarch de Hdt. Mal 33; Mor. 866 E; Cam. 19, discussed by Buck (1979), 108-110 (see also above, n.190). Plutarch clearly believed in the historicity of the Thessalian dominance of Boiotia, but his chronology for the battle is famously erratic, ranging from 571 to the 480s. Given the Thessalian relationship with Phokis, it is likely that any Thessalian influence in Boiotia should be dated to the middle of the sixth century. Buck’s deterministic stance of a Thessalian invasion of 520/519 is undoubtedly ingenious in its tapestry of sources but too ready to find an exact historic moment for the battle. Keressos should be seen as a symbolic memory rather than an event that can be recovered in any historical sense. Even the site itself has not been definitively located; for the most recent suggestion see Bintliff, Howard, and Snodgrass (2007).

775 Sordi (1993); Schachter (1996), 111-113. The suspicion that the memory of the Thessalian defeat at Keressos is influenced by the battle of Leuktra is heightened by Paus. 9.14.2-4, which seems to suggest that memory of Thessalian domination of the landscape and the fourth-century Spartan influence in the region were symbolically paired in narrative tradition.

776 For the Tripodophoria see above, Chapter 4.III.i.
hostility toward Thessaly and military engagement are significant more in the continued transmission of the tradition rather than any historical event\textsuperscript{777}.

The period between 550-519 saw the continuation of creative traditions in Boiotia that demonstrate a close relationship with the land, its antiquity and the mythological-geographic narratives associated with it. Though over a century previous to this period, the work of Hesiod is the earliest extant in this tradition and his work emphasises the need to understand the way in which the land was used and the perspective from different communities within the region; Hesiod’s Askra is principally articulated in its relationship with its immediate surroundings rather than its position within any broader geography\textsuperscript{778}. His personal family history also demonstrates the significance of smaller scale migration in Boiotia following the major population movements of the early Iron Age, and migration into Boiotia would have a significant influence on the society of the region at least down to the sixth century\textsuperscript{779}. The creative literary tradition of Boiotia was firmly tied to the regional geography and the antiquity of settlement. The prominence of the region in the Catalogue of Ships politicised the geography of community situation, prominently enshrining the tradition of migration and antiquity of settlement. Later works, such as the Aspis, HH Hermes, and particularly the HH to Apollo, again embody an antique political geography, with the shrine of Poseidon Onchestos dividing the traditional Mykenaian zones of Orchomenian and Theban control, and the relationship between Thebes and Delphi was the subject of specific focus\textsuperscript{780}. Given the fractious relationship between much of Boiotia and Athens for most of the period 519-335BC, it is worth considering that in the period immediately before 519 it seems to have been relatively good. The Peisistratids received support from Thebes, and prominent Athenians dedicated at Ptoön\textsuperscript{781}. There is also increasing evidence of early and continuing sharing of cult sites on Mount Parnes, and customs marking the early

\textsuperscript{777} The historicity of First Sacred War is a similar concern to Boiotian specialists: McInerney (1999), 165-172, does a good job at attempting to shed the ‘embellishments’ of the many variant accounts of the war in literary tradition to find a genuine tradition of local conflict and widespread hostility toward Delphi, but the matter remains open.

\textsuperscript{778} Above, Chapter 4.VI.i.

\textsuperscript{779} Above, Chapter 2.III.iv.

\textsuperscript{780} Chapter 4.III.iii, p.160-162.

\textsuperscript{781} Theban help for Peisistratos: Hdt. 1.61 and Ath. pol.15. For the probable dating of dedications of the Alkmeonids at Ptoön in the period of Peisistratid domination in Athens: Ducat (1971), 242-51. The significance of these two sources is that Boiotia was not politically unified and had no tradition of acting in unison toward its neighbours. This is even more apparent in the dedication of Hippias at the sanctuary: Ducat (1973), 66 and Ducat (1971), 251-8, which could have been before or after the incident of 519BC reported in Hdt. 6.108.
geographic divide between the two regions. As Attika and Boiotia expanded demographically and territorially down to the sixth century BC, the pressure on that geographic divide was increased, leaving it as a political frontier that would act as an indicator of relative strength for many of the major interactions on the Greek mainland in the succeeding decades and centuries.

**Sixth century**

The five centuries that had elapsed since it was believed that the Boiotoi initially colonised the region that became known as Boiotia, had provided a rich and diverse inheritance and a deliberate flexibility in the use of antiquity, myth and geography to encourage different modes of interaction between the communities and landscape of the area. As well as possible conflicts with Thessaly and Phokis, there were also traditions suggesting intra-Boiotian conflict was endemic from an early period. This intra-Boiotian conflict to some extent mirrored rivalries that had existed in the area before the migration of the Boiotoi, and because of this became attached to the pre-migration narrative. Thebes and Orchomenos had been the pre-eminent Mykenaian sites in the region, but there was no special ethnic connection between the two sites in that period. The migrating Boiotoi appropriated Mykenaian sites and inherited some of their history, particularly when marked by physical structures in the landscape. The issue of the preservation of the epithet *Minyoi* is bound into this, and the Orchomenian exceptionalism in the historic period is a combination of being able to refer to this remembered division of a pre-Boiotian period and their geographic position in relation to the rest of what became Boiotia. Orchomenos was set in an excellent position in regard to the Kopais basin and the remnants of the major hydraulic works and fortification system that drained and controlled the basin respectively were a lasting mark of that tradition. Orchomenos’ relative power was far greater in the narratives of high antiquity than it was in the historical period, and because of this it deliberately

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782 See above, n.274.
783 Possible late foundation of Oinoe and Panakton as boundary markers: above, nn.389, 391.
784 They are often considered together as Bronze Age centres because of their general proximity and the later Boiotian identity of the region, but there is nothing implicit in the evidence from either site to suggest they had any closer relationship than say, Mykenai and Pylos. The reference in the *Iliad* to the wealth of Orchomenos and ‘Egyptian Thebes’ seems to be an attempt to deliberately break this bond of the two communities, with the original tradition naming the Boiotian Thebes. Hom. *Iliad* 9.391-2.
785 For instance see discussion of the remains of fortification and hydrological engineering around Lake Kopais that informed later social divisions and land-use patterns: Chapter 2.II.i and 3.II.iii.
786 See chapter 3.II.iii for the various uses and influences that these hydraulic works had in the historical period.
tapped in to traditions that lent the community greater historic influence than it might otherwise have had.

The relationship between Bronze Age and historical Boiotia has been confused to some extent by sixth century records of conflicts that demonstrate Orchomenian victories over local rivals, celebrated in dedications at Olympia. Whilst the dedications suggest that Orchomenos is still locally significant, historians have sometimes been too keen to construct a narrative of continuous prominence running directly from Mykenaian Orchomenos to historical Orchomenos by way of these few dedications. When combined with Boiotian myths concerning Herakles and wars against the Minyoi, the narrative is attractive but cannot be sustained by the evidence. In the period under review Orchomenos never independently threatened the pre-eminence of Thebes in the region.

The ethnos was maintained through shared cults, language and migration myths, but was also an inherently malleable construct and underwent constant renegotiation and articulation, especially in the early part of the period under review. The victories of Thebes at Hyettos, and Orchomenos at Koroneia demonstrate the possibility of accommodation of local conflict within the ethnos. A slightly different mode of intra-Boiotian negotiation of power came in the form of border settlements. The earliest epigraphic register of this in Boiotia is the sixth century boundary marker between Akraiphia and Kopai. One of the wealthiest of votive centres, Apollo Ptoios attracted visitors from many areas and it is significant that Akraiphia was maintaining a Mykenaian dam against Lake Kopais and articulating local boundaries at around the same time as the sanctuary itself became a major dedicatory centre. Similarly, Thisbai maintained a Mykenaian dam that served as a hydrological regulator, a road to the sea, and a divider from the east of Boiotia. Haliartos oversaw the construction of a temple at Onchestos in the early sixth-century, marking the division between Teneric

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787 Above, n.490.
788 Buck (1979), 98-101 provides the most uncritical example of this, but it is an implicit feature of much of the work on Orchomenos.
789 In 446 Orchomenos was given a similar representation in the league as Thebes, Thespiae, and Plataia: Table 1. The arrangement of the districts of 446BC was loosely based on demographic size, implying that Orchomenos might have been on its own a larger community than Plataia or Thespiae. A significant difficulty in assessing the possible population of Orchomenos is the extent of Lake Kopais in the period, recent estimates of which place it significantly lower than previous estimates (therefore permitting Orchomenos more land); see Chapter 2.II.i, p.20.
790 See above, n.243.
792 Above, Chapter 3.II.iii, pp.79-81.
and Kopaic Plains, but also its own division from Thebes\textsuperscript{793}. The situation was undoubtedly more complex than this brief recapitulation suggests, but the early part of the period under review seems to have been a time of negotiation between communities (peacefully or otherwise) about divisions of the land, and also between individual communities and their relationship to their own landscape and its history. There does not seem to be a notion of political cohesiveness or balance, despite the supposed high antiquity of the traditions of shared migration and ethnicity.

The picture of a non-unified ethnic area of Boiotia has often been contrasted to the changes occurring to the southeast in Attika, where the demic system would largely subsume local agency to the political centre without entirely destroying it\textsuperscript{794}. A central reason why Boiotia did not develop along the same lines as Athens in the sixth century can be attributed to its internal narratives and strength of independent identity. There was not an undisputed leader of the migrations from Thessaly, and even the Mykenaian narratives that the communities mapped themselves on to had an identity split between the dual Mykenaian centres at Thebes and Orchomenos. Neither in the narratives of the \textit{ethnos}, nor in the geography of the region was there anything to bind the region together beneath a single authority in the same manner as Attika\textsuperscript{795}. Communities preserved and developed individual traditions that implicitly remembered independent activity and a lack of outside control. In Attika this pattern of discourse was not as strong, and the internal narrative of the region permitted a certain degree of political cohesion from an early period. It is important to understand this anarchic inheritance because any narrative of Boiotia in the period from 550-335 is a reflection of this deeply imbedded reality of an ethnos rooted in a fixed geographic settlement pattern with no hierarchical tradition that permitted easy unification\textsuperscript{796}.

The political divide between Attika and Boiotia was not solely responsible for the long border from Kithairon in the west to Parnes and the Oropeia in the east. The division had developed along ethnic lines at an earlier period, and it was only in the political manipulation of these ethnicities that the divide became symbolically wider. The importance of the divide was in its liminality and the tacit flexibility of the settlements

\textsuperscript{793} See above, n.500.

\textsuperscript{794} von Reden (1998), provides a highly stimulating investigation of this through portrayals of Attic territorial unity in Athenian literature.

\textsuperscript{795} Theseus is an important narrative figure in this unity in Attika and Thucydides implicitly praises him for impact: Thuc. 2.14-15.

\textsuperscript{796} No lead community in Boiotian myth history, above, pp.158-159.
and areas along the borders that at various times could belong to either area. Neither Boiotia nor Attika had a compelling narrative with which to justify and cement their control around areas such as Eleutherai, the Skourta Plain or the Eretrian-speaking Oropeia. As the two regions ‘filled out’ their territories and the land available became more valued because of demographic pressure they came into contact with each other more often, with particular pressure on the liminal areas around the Kithairon-Parnes mountain line. The Parasopeia was the focus of the first event recorded in any detail that clearly demonstrates this regional competition.

519: Polis vs. Ethnic boundaries

Herodotus’ account of Plataia placing itself under the aegis of Athens is an important moment in Boiotian history. It establishes many of the themes that would characterise the following two centuries and exemplifies the tendency toward political separatism of the communities lying closer to non-Boiotian neighbours that fuelled the geographic history of the ensuing period. The terms used by Herodotus in his account have not been uncontroversial, and often make up the basis of arguments that contend the existence of some form of Boiotian federal political organisation in the sixth century.

The account does not, however, refer to a political alliance between Thebes and Plataia, but instead to a geographic bond. Though elsewhere Herodotus does conflate the later Boiotian political confederation with developments at earlier points, here the desires of Thebes seem to be to bring Plataia into some form of geographic alliance to match the ethnic bond between the two states. There is nowhere in the passage a suggestion of a political league or federation. The settlement of the dispute is entirely geographic, with the arbitration eventually settling on a clear natural feature (the River Asopos) to act as the boundary.

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797 See below, n.955.
798 6.108, quoted above, Chapter 3.II.iii.
799 The debate is on-going with the most recent contributions tending to favour the absence of a political ‘league’ until after the defeat of the Athenians at Koroneia in 446BC. See for instance Larson (2007),184-188. The old conception of the first League beginning at some point in the late sixth century is tied principally to numismatic evidence and the mention of ‘Boiotarchs’ in Herodotus. The most cogent proponents for this have been Buck (1979) (141-142), and Demand (1982), (18-20), who are amongst the most uncritical of the numismatic evidence.
800 The use of τελεστιν is important here as it would be used by Plataia itself in the creation of the great Daidala in c.335 to refer to the pan-Boiotian nature of the cult: see above, n.269.
801 For hydrological features acting as boundaries, see Chapter 3.II.iii.
The events of 519BC\textsuperscript{802} were about geographic cohesiveness and the growing pressure that had been building between the regions of Attika and Boiotia. It would still be a decade before Kleisthenes helped Athens to build a cohesive and structured political identity, but the Peisistratids were producing a tacit geographic cohesiveness of Attika focussed around Athens itself\textsuperscript{803}. This spatial awareness is articulated by the construction of the altar of the Twelve Gods in 521/520 BC in the Agora to mark the official centre of the city, and it was to this forming geographic consciousness that the Plataians appealed. By placing themselves at the centre of Athens in a religious sense they fulfil de Polignac’s model of ritualistic centre-periphery behaviour\textsuperscript{804}. Not only did Athens acquiesce to this request, they also sent a military force into Boiotia to act on the Plataians’ behalf, and set the new boundaries after defeating Theban forces\textsuperscript{805}. This relationship between geography and the exercise of power would be fundamental to the relationship between Boiotia and Attika. The possibility that the political and ethnic geography of Boiotia might not correspond would have significant consequences throughout the next two centuries\textsuperscript{806}.

The decision of Plataia to move itself into the Athenian orbit, whilst remaining a part of the Boiotian ethnic group, demonstrates the problems of matching ethnic, political and physical boundaries. It marks also the desire of Thebes to secure for itself the use of the passes to its south, and by extension, influence over the liminal areas around Eleutherai and Panakton. Plataia was the best situated of the major Boiotian communities to control the passes over Kithairon\textsuperscript{807}, and as Thebes had recently achieved some sort of victory over Hyettos in the north, it may now have been attempting to secure its freedom of movement to the south\textsuperscript{808}. This touches upon another of the factors that contributed to the centrifugal tendencies of discourse in Boiotia: the physical centrality of Thebes. Its position meant that in order for it to act beyond its core territory of the Teneric Plain, Thebes had to control the routes out of its own territory, or it could be

\textsuperscript{802} Thuc. 3.68, is the strongest evidence for the dating of these events.
\textsuperscript{803} The Peisistratids witnessed the vulnerability of Attika to attacks from the border areas with Boiotia with Leipsydron a probable base for the Alkmoneid attack, though this was after the seizure of Plataia cf. Buck (1979), 114, and Hdt.5.62.2.
\textsuperscript{804} de Polignac (1995) and discussion above, pp.85-86.
\textsuperscript{805} The importance of an act, especially a battle in defining divisions between communities, is a recurrent feature of Boiotian interaction over the next two centuries. The ‘fixed’ natural feature on which to place the memory of this encounter is of great importance in later history, as the Plataians are able to refer to this ‘immutable’ boundary. Each time Plataia is restored it has the Asopos as its boundary with Thebes.
\textsuperscript{806} The possibility that the events of 519 were affected by the later interpretation of the interaction by Herodotus’ sources is likely. The general pattern of events should however be accepted, given the situation that is visible in Herodotus in 506 and in 480-79BC.
\textsuperscript{807} Along with neighbouring Hysiai, which is likely to have been part of the settlement.
\textsuperscript{808} See above tabulation of early military encounters for details of this event.
isolated. The actions of the Korinthians and Spartans in the events of 519 also betray the geographic awareness of the Peloponnese and a desire to keep the ethnic area of Boiotia that dominated central Greece a fragmented and divisible area.  

The issues that had driven the dispute over Plataia were at the forefront of events again thirteen years later in 506BC. The political upheaval accompanying the fall of the Peisistratids had also witnessed the end of Thessalian influence in Central Greece. The same liminal areas that had been the focus of the dispute in 519BC were again at the heart of events as the Boiotians moved into northern Athenian territory, expecting to connect with Spartan and Korinthian forces. The recent discovery of a Theban dedication relating to the campaign allows much greater insight into the spatial narrative of the campaign. Herodotus gives a limited account, suggesting that Boiotian aims were only to join up with the southern forces. This archaeological evidence suggests that the Boiotians were concerned with controlling the Parnes-Kithairon line, securing the settlements to the south of the region including Attic demes at Oinoe and Phyle. The desire of Boiotia to effect agency over this zone was a response to the politicisation of Athenian territory that had occurred with the Kleisthenic reforms and intended to dislocate the fledgling central authority of Athens over this new landscape.

The discovery of this Theban account of the events (and the willingness to commemorate them in some way) contributes to the more general scheme of the events of 506. The link with Chalkis in tandem with control of areas south of Parnes foreshadows the similar events of 413-11BC when the fortification of Dekeleia was accompanied with the seizure of Oropos and the construction of the first bridge over the Euripos. In 506, the Athenians concluded decisive victories and the defeat of Chalkidian and Boiotian forces in quick succession was a watershed for the Athenian democracy and one celebrated not only with great pomp, but preserved thereafter, with the shackles (charred in the Persian sack of the city) of the Boiotian and Chalkidian prisoners displayed behind the Propylaia (in Herodotus’ time), where a dedication of a quadriga celebrating the same battle also stood.

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809 The position of the Korinthians at Hdt.6.108.5 as arbitrators mirrors the position of Philoloas the Bacchiad as arbitrator of Theban affairs, for whom see above, n.162.  
810 McInerney (1999), 177-8 emphasises the importance to Phokian identity of Thessalian aggression in the late sixth/ early fifth century.  
811 Aravantinos (2006); Berti (2010).  
812 Hdt. 5.77.3-4. See n.199.
The ransomed Boiotian prisoners (perhaps numbering up to 700\textsuperscript{813}) returned home and quickly set about attempting to again assert some authority over the Athenians. This rapid response might have been prompted by the fate of their allies the Chalkidians, whose land had been divided into cleruchies and occupied by Athenian settlers\textsuperscript{814}. In 504 they were once more defeated by the Athenians but managed to bring in the Aiginitans, whose efforts might have helped avoid Boiotia suffering the same fate as Chalkis\textsuperscript{815}. The attempt to encircle the fledgling democracy by bringing in Aigina attests to considerable awareness of wider geography in Boiotian diplomatic dealings\textsuperscript{816}. The continuing link with Aigina in this period is suggested by the manner of the development of coinage in Boiotia and by Pindar’s relationship with the area in the subsequent decades\textsuperscript{817}. The initial sending of cult statues to Boiotia by Aigina would not be seen as a slight; Thebes had contributed similar symbolic aid to Sikyon when Kleisthenes had wished to re-order the political situation there. The conflict between Aigina and Athens seems to have involved strong cultic exchanges, and the transfer of their most valuable cult statues from Aigina to Boiotia was a significant act. The desire to re-order the geo-political situation with the support of revered relics has parallels in Boiotian history\textsuperscript{818}.

The events of 506-4 mirrored the events of 519 closely, with concerted Boiotian attempts to change the structure of its geographic agency particularly focused on the borders with Attika. It is also a precursor to the events of 457BC when the Athenians fought a battle with Spartans and Boiotians in an area very close to the battle in 506BC and again emerged victorious. One of the lasting effects of the victory in 506 was the accession of Eleutherai to Athens\textsuperscript{819}. That the Boiotians wished to exercise control along the border regions had been made clear by 519 and 506 and control of Eleutherai on the other side of the main crossing points of Kithairon would guarantee the ability to

\textsuperscript{813} Buck (1979), 131. The ransoming of prisoners would be a feature of Athenian Boiotian relations, with the reverse situation prompting the end of Athenian control of the region in 446BC: See above, n.358.

\textsuperscript{814} See later notes on importance of Euboia for Athens, especially in relation to events of the revolt and bridge building in 411: above, n.310.

\textsuperscript{815} It is not clear where the second battle took place against the Athenians, but given the location of conflict in 519, 506 and 457, it is likely it was in the region between Tanagra and Oropos.

\textsuperscript{816} It is likely there were links between Boiotia and Aigina before this event, and it is possible that Aigina helped supply the silver for the earliest Boiotian coinage. The distinctive Boiotian shield obverse, used throughout Boiotia for the majority of its history before the second century was based on the Aiginian turtle: see above, n.549.

\textsuperscript{817} See above, n.626 and Burnett (2005), 12-28.

\textsuperscript{818} See above, Chapter 4.VIII.i.

\textsuperscript{819} See Connor (1989), on the dating.
move freely into Attika and the Megarid. Another similarity between 506 and 519 is in the importance of ritual and cult. The transmission of the cult of Dionysus from Eleutherai to Athens helped to establish the festival of the City Dionysia; the Plataians had supplicated themselves at the new centre of Athens geographically, and Eleutherai now contributed a cult that was used to turn the Peisistratid innovation of dramatic performances in to a specifically democratic and centrally urban event. Though Eleutherai was less remote than Plataia, it too was not enrolled in the nascent deme system, perhaps acknowledging the community’s liminal status between Attika and Boiotia.

The line of contested space between Boiotia and Attika had been the focus of major engagement for the period from 519-506BC and the focus of activity along this line continued into the fifth century. The participation of Plataia at the battle of Marathon is a direct consequence of these previous events. The landing points of the Persian forces, at Eretria and Marathon neatly enclose Boiotia to the south whilst avoiding the region, but given the proximity of the events, the significance of the expedition could not have been lost on the communities of the region, even had Plataia not been involved. With Plataian involvement the Athenian control of the liminal areas would have been emphasised since the Plataians’ likely route would have taken them via a similar route to the Boiotian attack on Attika in 506. It is likely that there was some Persian activity in the region of Boiotia directly opposite Eretria, including some looting and territorial raids. The mechanism by which the Plataians were asked to join the Athenians at Marathon is not attested in Herodotus, but the automatic response and assistance suggests a regular and friendly contact. With Eleutherai under Athenian control, the routes to Athens would have been easily accessible for interchange between the two areas. The significance of Plataian involvement in a victory that would become a central event for the Athenian state is difficult to quantify, but the exceptionalism of being the only other community to fight with the Athenians at Marathon exercised its own agency in the ensuing conflicts in 479, 431-427, and 373 as well as in the restoration of the city after 335. The question of whether Plataia was subject to Athens or allied with it has

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820 Above, Chapter 4.VII.iii.
821 There has been little discussion of Eleutherai’s accession recently, though it has often occupied scholarship in the past. Two of the best treatments are Badian (1993) and Hammond (2000). Salamis could be considered a parallel, being an important territorial possession, but never enrolled in the deme system. See above (n.390) for Ober’s treatment of position of Oinoe, which may offer a useful nearby example.
822 The geographic situation would suggest it, and the deposit of the statue of Apollo from Delion at Delos on the journey back to Asia Minor by Datis is probably an instance of unacceptable plunder. The recovery of the statue only took place two decades later: Hdt. 6.118.
been a pre-occupation of scholars; the importance for Boiotian geographic history, is that the exceptionalism that was rooted in the events of 519 had been continued in 506BC and affirmed in 490BC. The Plataians shared a burial mound with slaves that had fought on the Athenian side at Marathon and the negative demographic impact of the battle might have prompted the Plataians to seek greater territorial integration with the Athenians in order to secure its own political independence from the rest of Boiotia.

480-79
The Persian invasion of 480-79 placed an unusual strain on Boiotia in contemporary politics and the importance of this period in shaping community narratives is also reflected in the extant evidence. Boiotia was particularly affected by the Persian Wars because of its physical centrality to many of the key events. In 479, the Teneric Plain and the Parasopoeia provided the best landscape for Persian forces to operate in, and to supply themselves from. As with many mainland Greek states the invasion would leave an indelible mark on their conception of their own society and values. In Boiotia, the ramifications for later history would probably have been less pronounced had not the geographical focus of the conflict between Hellenes and Barbarians been focussed so clearly on Boiotian land.

The Boiotian landscape was changed by the Persian invasion of 480-79BC in physical terms, and also in the way it was perceived. There were large demographic losses at Thermopylae and the battle of Plataia, and Thespiae and Plataia had their urban centres destroyed after their citizens had fled to the Peloponnesese. The vulnerability of the region to attack from the northwest through the Kephissos valley was emphasised for the first time since Thessalian control of Phokis ended. That the central Boiotian communities were aware of this threat is attested by their presence at Thermopylae, and the medism of Thebes after the Persian victory there was a consequence as irresistible as Philip’s imposition of a garrison on the Kadmeia in 338BC after the defeat at Chaironeia. The two leading Boiotian communities that did not medise were Thespiae and Plataia. Thespiae had just lost the majority of its fighting force at Thermopylae, and the Plataians could not hope to escape Persian retribution, given their

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823 Hammond was particularly interested in the relationship between Plataia and Athens, and discussed the status of the Plataians in relation to the manner of their burial on the plain of Marathon: Hammond (1992); Hammond (2000).
824 Hdt. 8.50.2.
825 Hdt. 7.202: 700 from Thespiae, and 400 from Thebes.
involvement in the battle of Marathon. The Boiotoi would never be as prominently divided as in 479, split on either side of one of the largest battles ever fought in Greece.

The period of Persian occupation of Boiotia displayed an ease of the Boiotian elite with their Persian counterparts. The oracles of Boiotia were toured and the Orchomenians and Thebans attended a large banquet to celebrate the new alliance.[826] The boundary that had been established by the Athenians and the Plataians in 519 at the River Asopos was the focus of activity, adding the boundary between medisers and non-medisers to this division between Thebes and Plataia. The Persians established a stockade near the Kadmeia, which demonstrated the strategic advantages of a large defensive construction in the Teneric Plain. Similarly, Persian ambushes of the supply trains crossing Kithairon near Eleutherai suggest the implementation of Theban tactical knowledge of the physical routes of the region developed especially over the previous three decades; the same tactics would be used to resist the Spartan invasions of the 370s, which similarly used Plataia as a strategic base.[827] Finally, the Plataians, who had been playing a conspicuously prominent role in the negotiations that led to the battle on their soil, theatrically used the physicality of boundary separation by removing boundary stones to ‘make themselves’ part of Athens.[828]

After 479

The physical aspects of the Persian invasion must have been a stark reminder of the divisions of the Wars for some period after the forces had retreated through Thessaly. The encampment of the Persians, their stockade and use of the land, and the damage and debris of such a large battle must have been visible for many years after the event. These aspects were less indelible than the memorialisation of the landscape that accompanied the resettlement and reconstruction of Thespiai and Plataia.[829] The oath of Plataia and the annual celebration of the battle were used as a symbolic bulwark against aggression that would prove effective at least until 431BC.[830] Thebes’ urban centre did not suffer directly from the campaign, and they were made only to surrender

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[827] Control of the passes above Plataia on Mt. Kithairon was key in the 370s: above, pp.123-124.
[828] In order to fulfill a Delphic prophecy: see above, n.280.
[829] Boedeker (2001b). The reconstruction of the Plataian landscape was soon both practical and heavily symbolic, with cenotaphs contracted for states who did not fight at the battle: Hdt. 9.85.3. If the ‘Oath of Plataia’ is genuine, Plataia would also have left its burned temples as memorials. They had the legacy of the battle to encompass in their rebuilding, and especially the care of the tombs of the dead. Pausanias (10.35.2) suggests that temples in the vicinity of Haliarts were burned by the Persians.
[830] The celebration of the Eleutheria is not uncontroversial before the better attested festival of the Hellenistic period: See above, n.524.
the leaders of the medising faction. The community had however lost a large number of its leading men, and judging by the narrative of late in the century, was scarred by the experience of its medism.

However, the orthodox tradition relating to a relative decline in Theban power in the period from 479-457, and a loss of the leadership of Boiotia is more a product of the dearth of evidence than of any positive evidence in favour of that situation. The ethno-geographic region of Boiotia had no formal political leader, and the period after 479BC did not witness the re-ordering of the region toward Tanagran hegemony. It is likely the relative quietness of the Thebans in the sources is a result of wariness of pursuing too actively the policy of aggression toward Athens it had followed in 519, 506, 504 and 479 given their defeat in all of these encounters. The Plataian relationship with Athens must have been strengthened, and the inviolability of Plataian landscape would have brought the fear of a general reaction and pan-Hellenic conflagration should any attempt at bringing Plataia into closer alliance with the rest of Boiotia succeed. Orchomenos continued to issue its own coins, and Chalkis attempted to align itself with the Boiotian economic zone with issues of coins with the Boiotian shield obverse. The demographic and territorial changes that had taken place as a result of 480-79 would have ushered in a period of reconstruction and re-evaluation; the pattern of interaction that had led to the split in communities in response to the Persian Wars was entirely in line with the geo-politics of the previous period.

The Thebans returned a cult statue to Delion from Delos in 470. This was a significant act and displays a deliberate attempt to redress some of the territorial violation of the Persian campaigns. Other than this event, however, Boiotia is almost entirely absent from literary sources until 457. Skipping a generation is of course a problem in reconstructing the interaction of geography and history in the region. However, when the Boiotians again find themselves in conflict with Athens in 457BC, the events are familiar, closely resembling 519BC though on a larger scale and with

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831 The question of the ‘humbling’ of Thebes after the Persian Wars has been used to argue for the eclipse of Theban power in the period 479-457BC, in combination with Tanagran coins from the period: Fowler (1957). The use of numismatic evidence to support this is intrinsically flawed because of an out-dated conception of the political implications of early Boiotian coinage. Without the backing of numismatic evidence and the idea of a political federation existing previous to 480, there is little to recommend the idea of a morally compromised Thebes ceding control of the region to Tanagra.

832 Schachter has tentatively suggested the possibility of Theban membership of the Delian League in the immediate aftermath of 479: Schachter (2004), 351, n.8.

833 Head (1884), lvi, for link between early Tanagran and Chalkidian coinage.

834 See above, n.822.
more open hostility between the major powers. Archaeological evidence supports the broad continuity and continued vibrancy of the region in the second quarter of the fifth century. Other than the major reconstruction at Thespiai and Plataia there is continued augmentation of cult centres such as the Kabeirion at Thebes and Apollo Ptoios at Akraiphia. The work of Pindar is in accordance with this picture and his work has been scrutinised for references to Theban medism and the atmosphere around the Persian Wars in Boiotia, but there is little that can be definitely linked to the conflict. He continues to work for patrons around the Greek world including those hostile to Thebes such as Athens, and writes about the Greek victories against the Persians.

The battles of Tanagra and Oinophyta in 457 were in accordance with the patterns of interaction established in the sixth century but in combination with an increasing Athenian predominance on the mainland. The alliance with Argos in 459/58BC and the firm control of the Aegean had left Athens looking northward on the mainland for further expansion of its control. Plataia still offered a way into Boiotia, but with hostility in Thebes and Tanagra it would be difficult for Athens to move men to the north and the important inland areas of Thessaly and Makedon. The possibility of reducing Spartan fighting capability by catching them in the region was also difficult to resist and Athens raised a full levy (πανδημεῖ Thuc. 1.107.5) to fight at Tanagra in 457BC. The withdrawal of the Spartans closely echoes their reluctance to intervene in 519BC and their failure to appear for the battle of 506BC and could be framed in reference to the policy of balancing Attika and Boiotia that is cited as a principal reason for their behaviour in 519BC and in 404BC (in not destroying Athens). This policy failed, and Athens gained control of Boiotia in some form. The period of 457-446 in Boiotian history is largely absent from the literary record, save for passing anecdotal references in later sources, which might refer to the failure of the reorganised Boiotian communities to adapt to democratic life in this period. The information from coins, which is often cited in favour of a decade-long numismatic plurality, has been misunderstood and misapplied: the mints could have been in operation at any point after 479. This would

835 Thuc. 1.108.
836 See above, Chapter 4.III.ii, pp.155-159, and Chapter 4.IV.iii, p.175.
837 See above, Chapter 4.VI.ii.
838 'πανδημεῖ': Thuc. 1.107.5. The celebration of the victory of the Spartans in a Peloponnesian context, where the epigraphic record has a victory over the Argives and their allies, is particularly instructive with regard to perspective and viewpoint: Paus. 5.10.4.
839 See above, n.605.
840 1.108.3 'καὶ μάχη ἐν Οἰνωφύτοις τοῦ Βοιωτοῦ νικήσαντες τῆς τε χώρας ἔκρατησαν τῆς Βοιωτίας καὶ Φοικίδος'.
841 Ps.-Xen Arch. Pol. 3.11.
fit far better with the idea of Boiotian coinage reflecting an economic zone rather than a political area and reflect an economically prosperous period, rather than the enthusiastic coin production caused by democratic liberty\textsuperscript{842}.

The archaeological evidence leaves no trace of Athenian domination of the region between 457-446. Perhaps the most significant event to affect the physical structure of the region is the partial destruction of the Tanagran walls in 457. This occurred as a direct result of the battle fought in the vicinity of the community, but it was symbolic of a wider Athenian desire to control political affiliation within urban centres. There have been few modern attempts to explain how the defeat of Boiotian forces in 457 achieved Athenian control of the region in practice, but the solution must have been political rather than military\textsuperscript{843}. It is unlikely that Athens interfered with the fortifications in every community, but the weakness of the Athenian geographic position in terms of being able to directly control the more remote areas of Boiotia is demonstrated by Tolmides’ defeat in 446. This defeat was not catastrophic in military terms for Athens but was a symbolic defeat by ‘exiles’ who had found safety in Orchomenos, the second most remote community from Athens\textsuperscript{844}.

\textit{Summary}

The period from 550 to 446BC witnessed the crystallisation of Boiotia in its ethnic form. As the communities of the region grew, the idea of Boiotia as a shared interpretation of a common history became stronger, but at the same time, the connection with the land, and especially with the monuments of a pre-Boiotian settlement, continued to have an influence on the individual identities of communities.

\textsuperscript{842} See above, Chapter 4.V.i, for early coinage as economic rather than political. That Tolmides’ force was dealing with problems in the other most remote community, Chaireneia, further emphasises the point. The Athenian naval strength would offer little to the control of northwest Boiotia because of the distances and terrain involved in traversing either from the Korinthian Gulf or from Anthedon/Larymna. This difficulty and distance from the sea may explain the possible entry of Orchomenos in the Delian league’s membership; Orchomenos was probably not the only member of the league from Boiotia (the whole region might have been) but the significance of its membership might have been chosen as something to highlight in Athens (especially with both states’ membership of the Kalaurian amphiktiony: see above, n.611.

\textsuperscript{843} The taking of hostages, as elsewhere in Boiotian-Attic relations is likely to have played a part (see, for instance, above n.358).

\textsuperscript{844} The nature of Athenian rule is nowhere clearly attested, but the assertion of P.-\textsuperscript{Xen.} \textit{Ath. Pol.} 3.11, concerning the Athenians supporting the ‘best men’ (in Boiotia and elsewhere) regardless of political inclination fits well with Athenian policy elsewhere in the Delian League. Against this is the evidence from Aristotle, but this is written over a century later in the context of making a point about badly run democracies. \textit{Arist. Pol.} 1302b 29-32, with Buck (1979), 148 n.38. See Demand (1982), 34, for an attempt to reconcile Diodorus’ statement (11.83.2) that all Boiotia ‘except Thebes’ was controlled by Athens after 457, with Thucydides’ account (1.108) of all Boiotia being controlled.
Though the relationship of the Boiotoi with Thessaly was instrumental in creating an ethnic identity for the region, perhaps the most important relationship for Boiotia as a whole in this period was with Athens and Attika. This was as a result of the geo-demographic expansion of both areas in the preceding period, and the pressure this exerted on the traditionally liminal and negotiable borders between the areas. The political homogeneity of Attika encouraged by the Peisistratids and continued under the nascent democracy provided an antagonist to Boiotia. Most of the evidence we have from the region prior to the mid-sixth century is concerned with Boiotians forming a cultural identity distinct from any strong political identity. This would continue to be true of the region as a whole, but as the individual communities became exposed to wider peer-polis interactivity, they would cement political identities independent of their ethnic loyalties. This division would become stronger as the period progressed, and the attempt by Thebes to influence Plataia in 519BC demonstrates the methods with which the communities could assert their independence within the region, even if it meant submitting themselves to an-extra Boiotian power.

The Boiotian communities that were physically juxtaposed with Attika must have had a different experience of the peer-polity interactivity than did the areas that bordered on Phokis or Lokris, whose political development was less strongly polis-centric and more similar to the development that Boiotia had undergone to this point, based around ethnic and cultic links. However, the deliberate interactions of the Thebans with Aigina, Chalkis and Sikyon as well as the possible relationship of Orchomenos with the Kalaurian amphiktiony demonstrate that the interactivity was not merely passive, and that ‘natural’ geographic situation could be bypassed in favour of politically profitable links.

The period can be seen as a one of developing political identities of communities that wished to delimit themselves physically and politically from their neighbours whilst continuing to adhere and subscribe to the central ethnic bonds of the region. It also involved conflict with areas bordering or exerting influence on areas bordering Boiotia. From the memory of the end of Thessalian influence with the battle of Keressos to the divisions caused by the Persian Wars and the political domination of the Athenians after 457BC, the political separatism of the ethnic unit would provide a significant invitation

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to outside influence in the region. As these major conflicts became cemented in the geography of the region through sites of commemoration, festivals and community memory, the elements of future interaction were also being constructed. The ambush of a force of Athenians in 446BC was not a significant watershed in the geography or physical settlement of Boiotia, but it was a symbolic change in the cohesion of Boiotia and its relationship with Attika. There is no clear evidence whether the exiles in Orchomenos had a coherent plan in 446 for the physical and political re-ordering of the region, but the response and actions in the following decades refer directly to the past experience of the dangers that political separatism of communities such as Plataia could pose. This response was articulated in the combination of political and geographic units within the region in a sophisticated representative federal structure. The political concept might have emerged fully mapped from the exiles’ time in Orchomenos, but the physical re-ordering of the region would be a gradual and piecemeal scheme that would take another century to realise.
446-386BC: Federation to atomisation

From the account of concerted actions with Euboia and Lokris in 446, it would appear that the rebellion against Athenian rule was well planned and made in concert with exiles from neighbouring areas\(^\text{849}\). The combination with Euboia against Athens is familiar from the late sixth century, and would again be significant in similar circumstances in 411BC when the revolt of the island was made into a physical rejection of Athenian control by the construction of the first bridge across the Euripos\(^\text{850}\). The involvement of areas other than Boiotia also suggests that the ‘badly run democracies’ that Aristotle mentions might have been part of a wider political dissatisfaction rather than a positive coalescence of Boiotian communities in a desire for a federal and self-governing Boiotia.

There is also a significant parallel in the use of hostages in 446BC as a potent method of war\(^\text{851}\). The Athenians celebrated the capture of Boiotian and Chalkidian prisoners in 506 for a long period afterwards, with the prominent use of the fetters used on Boiotian and Chalkidian prisoners erected on the Propylaia\(^\text{852}\). In 446, the Boiotians turned a military victory into a major political watershed by the ransoming of prisoners in exchange for Athenian evacuation of the region. There is no record of the shackles of the Athenian prisoners being displayed in celebration at the sanctuary of Athena Itonia at Koroneia, but the sanctuary itself might have hosted a new festival to celebrate the events\(^\text{853}\). The physical correspondence between the cult centre and the battle must have made it a natural focus for commemoration, and would have been emphasised by the battle heralding the formation of the first Boiotian political federation. The victory marks an important dividing point in Boiotian-Athenian relations. This is the last time that the Athenians would enjoy widespread control of the region, and marks the beginning of a succession of Boiotian political and military victories over their previously dominant southern neighbours\(^\text{854}\).

\(^{849}\) Thuc. 1.113.
\(^{850}\) For the construction of the bridge, see above, pp.95-98.
\(^{851}\) Thuc. 1.113.3: ‘καὶ τὴν Βοιωτιάν ἔξελικτον Ἀθηναίοι πᾶσαν, σπονδᾶς ποιησάμενοι ἑω’ ὁ τοὺς άνδρας κομιοῦνται.’
\(^{852}\) See above, n.199.
\(^{853}\) See below, n.882.
\(^{854}\) The significance of the battle for Boiotian regional belief is emphasised by Thucydides in his account of the battle of Delion (4.92.6), and in the deliberately provocative celebration of a victory at Koroneia in 395 in the same space as the victory monument to 446 at Athena Itonia: Plut. Ages. 19.2.
The federal conception of Boiotian geography

The federal political organisation conceived in 446 marks a significant development in the relationship between the territory of individual communities and the geography of Boiotia as a whole. The previously ethnic basis for the ‘geography’ of the Boiotoi was now marked in a formal and inclusive recognition of the constituent members of the ethnic group which had the effect of delimiting the boundaries of ‘Boiotia’ with other areas, as well as intra-Boiotian community divisions. This new geography was structured in a sophisticated and considered manner in order to bring about proportional representation of the relative populations of the communities.

The place of Plataia within this is curious. If the community had been closely linked to Athens since 519BC it might at first seem odd that they were officially given two seats on the council (in conjunction with their near neighbours) rather than omitted altogether (as was the model after the destruction of the polis in 373BC). The standard explanations of Plataia’s inclusion in the representative political settlement following Koroneia have emphasised the desire of Thebes to make sure of numerical predominance in the federal council. This might have been the ultimate effect, but given the peaceful attempt to bring Plataia into the federation in 431, it seems unlikely to have been the principal motivation. The inclusion of Plataia was a key facet in the reconstruction of a Boiotian political geography following the decade of Athenian rule in the region. Plataia was allocated two seats in the federal council because of the desire to create a link between ethnic and political geography. The description given by the Oxyrhynchus Historian is of the seats allocated to the Plataians being exercised for them by Thebes, rather than appropriating them permanently, and this accords well with the impermanent nature of the resettlement of Plataian land in 427BC. Even if Plataia’s link with Athens had been cut after 446BC (and there is no evidence that it was) then the Plataians may well still have chosen not to be part of the ‘political’ Boiotia.

855 The dating of the political situation outlined in Hell.Oxy. 16.1-4 is not clear, but given the Plataian inclusion in the scheme with its two seats (including the Parasopelia) the league scheme must have been devised in the period between the end of Athenian political control of the region and the outbreak of hostilities at Plataia in 431BC. The same general argument applies to the walls of lower Thebes that housed the ‘synoikism’ of 431BC.
856 See above, Table 1.
857 The federal nature of the event is attested by the presence of Boiotarchs and a lochos of the Boiotian army, see Buck (1994), 11.
858 It is also worth noting that the land was not subsumed within Theban land, but leased out on ten-year leases, implying an acknowledgement of temporary nature of the settlement: Thuc. 3.68.3. See below, n.896.
The inclusion of Plataia in the federation was therefore a deliberate attempt by those who conceived the scheme to map the political geography of the region on to the ethnic geography. Though the Plataians had no common desire to become part of the nascent organisation, their part in ‘Boiotia’ was acknowledged by their inclusion in the scheme. This model therefore supposes the scheme as a long-term design to structure and regulate Boiotia in its entirety in a common political arrangement. The federal arrangement had officially acknowledged the independent political existence of many communities, but brought this independence under the control of a representative federal council. The inclusion of every Boiotian community signals that the design was not a short-term political-military alliance but a longer term plan to unite the region in a federal bond. That Plataia continued to celebrate the festival commemorating the battle of 479 (and therefore its implicit political division of Boiotia) would have been a significant symbol of the history of Boiotian disunity. The recognition that the settlement was geographic rather than based on a specific set of individuals or faction came in the continuance of Plataia’s position in the council after 427 when its original population had been exiled or killed.

Synoikisms 446-431
The first formal political federation of the Boiotians recognised the need for representation for all parts of Boiotia if there was to be stability and security. The conceptual framework of the new political arrangement was mapped on to the landscape in many ways that were designed to encourage the idea of cohesion and commonality. The most visible of these manifestations would have been the fortification that was constructed around Thebes in the period 446-431BC. The model of Athens must have been in the thoughts of the architects of Boiotian political unity with the fortifications of each polis being large enough by 431BC to accommodate the majority of those threatened by the outbreak of war. Exactly how and when the walls of lower Thebes were constructed is not clear from the archaeological evidence, but the walls were large enough by 431 to allow the city to ‘double in size’. The walls were probably not entirely novel in 446BC, but their improvement and enlargement would have been a symbol of the centrality of Thebes, and the shared risks and opportunities

459 The same was true of the Great Daidala, one of the most important pan-Boiotian festivals; see chapter 4.IV.i pp.167-170.
460 See above, Chapter 3.III.iv, for further discussion of the lower walls and the synoikism of 431BC. Despite improvements in the archaeological evidence from the wall, there is still little that is known of their construction, despite their use in 431BC.
that now faced the tacitly unified Boiotia. The Persians had built a stockade large enough to protect themselves in 479 BC in the vicinity of Thebes. These models of interaction were now combined in the structure of the lower walls of Thebes. The symbolic basis of this construction is underlined when the strength of the Kadmeia’s own fortifications were considerable in this period\footnote{That the allies had not been able to sack the city after the battle of Plataia in 479 speaks volumes as to the strength of the defences.}. Thebes did not need the lower wall to protect its own citizens.

\textit{Dating of the walls of Thebes}

The fortifications of the Kadmeia are generally thought to have been in use from their construction in the Bronze Age through to beyond our period with various modifications and improvements over time\footnote{Symeonoglou (1985), 118.}. The ‘lower’ walls that would form a very large outer defence work for Thebes are the subject of much greater debate and are of greater consequence when understanding the borders and significance of Thebes as centre-point\footnote{Though the debate can hardly determine ‘current’, there is no settled view on the matter, and there has been no comprehensive re-evaluation of the archaeological evidence since Symeonoglou’s work of the mid-1980s.}. Though the evidence for this lower wall is not well preserved, in strict terms, the archaeological evidence set out by Keramopoulllos and Symeonoglou points to Archaic or Classical construction. Keramopoulllos opts for a high dating of the walls, corresponding to the beginning of hostilities between Thebes and Athens at the end of the sixth century\footnote{Keramopoulllos (1917), 296-8. Demand (1982), 31f. supports this view.}. Symeonoglou supports a much lower dating, probably at some point following the end of Athenian occupation in 446 BC\footnote{Symeonoglou (1985), 118-122.}. The archaeological evidence is perhaps slightly in favour of the latter view\footnote{Symeonoglou (1985), 120 thinks that the precision of the work is more indicative of Classical rather than Archaic work.}, but given the poor preservation of the wall it is impossible to get a good view of the construction and therefore to generalise on the basis of the better-preserved parts of the wall is in danger of circular argument\footnote{Fortification building style is a notoriously difficult way to establish a chronological fix without other secure evidence. Cf. Munn with a salient consideration on the temptations and difficulties of using walls for the construction of history. Munn (1993) 32-33.}. It is necessary to evaluate the main textual evidence for the existence of the walls in order to better orientate the archaeological evidence.
The first possible reference we have to an outer wall is that of Herodotus in the account of the encampment of Mardonios in book nine.

Macan sought to explain this passage in terms of recalculation of numbers and How and Wells proposed a re-reading of Herodotus’ text to mean ‘using the Kadmeia as a base’ rather than to encamp the whole army within the walls. This seems to be bending the language employed; it is the whole army that will be moved inside the walls of Thebes. If there was at least a rough circuit of the city at this time, the idea of withdrawing the army would be much more clearly understandable. It is however preferable to understand the passage more generally in the framework of similar passages from Greek and Near-Eastern antecedents, in which the passage is understood as a literary and not a historical device. Even the walls at their greatest extent in 335BC would only have been able to hold 100,000 men. The early existence of the walls is made even more unlikely when it is considered that if the lower wall had been present in 480/79BC it would have been an unnecessary burden for the Persians to construct their own encampment if the more defensible walls of Thebes had been available to them.

The next episode in which the lower walls come into focus is in the episode immediately preceding the battle of Tanagra in 457BC. The evidence again seems clear:

The Spartans here are clearly augmenting the circuit walls that already exist. The difficulty is the testimony of Diodorus, whose chronology of the battles of 457 is though Herodotus is writing much later, if the lower walls had only been a recent construction, he would surely not have put in such a passage in confusion.

Flower and Marincola (2002), 181.

Symeonoglou suggests that the circuit (at its maximum extent) would have enclosed an area of 328 hectares, ‘enough to accommodate 100,000 people’, 118. Assuming the figures for the Persian army were 100,000-200,000, the idea of moving the forces to the circuit wall could have been a proposition deliberately posed to be countenanced but dismissed.

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868 Though Herodotus is writing much later, if the lower walls had only been a recent construction, he would surely not have put in such a passage in confusion.
869 Cf. Hdt. 9.58, 9.66-68, 9.86-87, for references to defensibility of Thebes.
870 Flower and Marincola (2002), 181.
871 Symeonoglou suggests that the circuit (at its maximum extent) would have enclosed an area of 328 hectares, ‘enough to accommodate 100,000 people’, 118. Assuming the figures for the Persian army were 100,000-200,000, the idea of moving the forces to the circuit wall could have been a proposition deliberately posed to be countenanced but dismissed.
notoriously confused. Buck criticized any attempt for using this evidence to understand Boiotian relationships in 457BC claiming that Ephoros’ account forms a ‘neat parallel and piquant contrast, but one that is totally without foundation’. Whilst there have been attempts at a rehabilitation of this passage in recent years, employing this as a source for dating the construction of the walls would be reckless.

The possibility of a long-term gradual development of the outer walls of Thebes has not been looked at seriously since Keramopoullos’ work in 1917. Symeonoglou does not believe work on this scale could have been undertaken either in the sixth century, or without the aid of the minor states that would later be housed within the walls. The literary evidence is never entirely clear, and the reported actions of the Greeks against the Thebans at the end of the Plataia campaign of 479BC do not shed any light on the matter (whether they were outside the outer walls or outside the Kadmeia). But then Thucydides is entirely silent with regard to the outer walls and to the synoikism, an omission that may be more explicable had the walls long been in existence before this event. The archaeological evidence is inconclusive so perhaps the best way to reconcile all of the accounts, and to answer the problems of purpose and resources for construction is to argue for a gradual development of the walls over a period beginning with the liberation of Boiotian towns from Athenian hegemony in 446BC. Though Thebes might have been attempting to bring Plataia into some sort of alliance it was not trying to physically move or merge the Plataians in 519BC into its own city. Though the walls could well have begun here, or at the time of the battle with the Athenians in 507/6 as Keramopoullos suggests, the argument would be one made ex nihilo. Given the Athenians’ own deliberate and pro-active policy regarding walls in 457BC it is also to be expected that they would not have tolerated a structure that would have symbolized at least the possibility of a unified Boiotia.

There is nothing in the archaeological record that strictly precludes an argument of sixth-century construction, but there is no firm evidence in any evidence for construction before 446BC, and the reality of the political situation would probably...
have militated against such walls surviving\textsuperscript{877}. Instead it is better to see them as a post Athenian construct, probably against the possibility of Athenian domination of Boiotia occurring again. The lower walls of Thebes therefore had to be constructed in the period after 446BC. The walls came to be part of an extensive militarisation of the landscape, and were taken at their full extent by Alexander and razed in 335BC, never seemingly to be restored to the same extent\textsuperscript{878}.

The construction of the largest fortification of any Greek community was significant in itself, but the symbolic ‘haven of Boiotia’ that Thebes was coming to represent physically was galvanised by the centralisation of the institutions of government in that city\textsuperscript{879}. As Demand contends, the centrality of Thebes might have been a natural reason behind the situation of the council and probably treasury on the Kadmeia, but we have alternative models from the Hellenistic period, where the federal council met at Onchestos and from the modern period where the regional directorate is based at Lebadeia\textsuperscript{880}. It has been asked also why Orchomenos did not house the federal bodies of rule, given its importance in the victory over the Athenians. Orchomenos is not physically central to Boiotia, and the exiles were probably led by Thebans\textsuperscript{881}. The events of Koroneia were celebrated at the sanctuary of Athena Itonia, which was already an important cult centre and by the third century at the latest was home to the most important pan-Boiotian games\textsuperscript{882}. The situation of the treasury at Thebes would be made even more significant if the historicity membership of the Delian league of Orchomenos and Akraiphia could be firmly established. The mirror of the Athenian move of the federal treasury to the Akropolis would be this construction of a federal treasury on the Kadmeia\textsuperscript{883}. The transmission of the tribute-paying subjects of Athens to

\textsuperscript{877} Or being destroyed without an account of such a significant act in extant literary sources.

\textsuperscript{878} Arr. \textit{Anab.} 1.9.9.

\textsuperscript{879} For estimations of the size of the fortifications, see Symeonoglou (1985), 118, 328ha. Hansen uses the figure of 500ha. to estimate Theban population in his shotgun method: Hansen (2006).

\textsuperscript{880} Demand (1982), 11-12. Onchestos was a symbolically central site that, because of its Mykenaian inheritance, physically embodied the legendary split between Orchomenos and Thebes see above, Chapter 4.III.iii, pp.163-165.

\textsuperscript{881} Larsen was the strongest proponent of the idea of Orchomenian rule after 446BC: Larsen (1960); the idea has recently been given new impetus by Larson (2007). The draining of Lake Kopais would have strengthened Orchomenos’ position in the Bronze Age, but it was only through the large system of forts that it was able to maintain control of the area. Chapter 3.II.iii, pp.77-79.

\textsuperscript{882} Schachter (1981), 123-124, hesitantly favours the Pamboiotia being initiated in the second quarter of the third century. Larson (2007), 187-88 offers an insightful reading of the military dedication at the sanctuary as the first to be set up by the Boiotians in common. Only two others would follow, at Leuktra and at Chaireneia. This company emphasises the scale of the victory for the ethnos, and it is probably important in making the transition from ethnic/ cultic to political/military.

\textsuperscript{883} Perhaps an early parallel to the later call by Epameinondas to ‘move the Propylaia to the Kadmeia’. If it could be proved conclusively that there was a federal treasury in the period after 446 it would be significant. It is likely that there was some kind of monetary centre at Thebes, given the predominance of
the federal contributions of a Boiotian confederacy would have been powerfully symbolic, especially if this system was implemented quickly after the victory at Koroneia.

**Numismatics and Cults**

The numismatic evidence from the period after 446 has often been used to reinforce the notion of Theban political dominance with issues from that city being usually cited as the only coins from the period between 446 and 386BC. This orthodoxy has been flatly contradicted by the discovery of Tanagran issues in Nemea dating to around 420BC and probable Orchomenian mints of later in the fifth century\(^{884}\). The centralisation of the treasury in Thebes would explain the general dominance of Theban coinage, especially the larger denominations, but there is no straightforward or immutable link between politics and numismatics in Boiotia. The argument that the first political federation began in 446BC breaks the chronological correspondence between the production of coinage and political federation, and the idea of a ‘Boiotian economic area’ of which the Chalkidians were occasionally a part fits the numismatics of the region much better\(^{885}\). It is likely therefore that the reorganisation following the expulsion of the Athenians involved the necessity of minting for federal purposes at Thebes, but without the prohibition against other communities minting\(^{886}\). There is the strong possibility that throughout the period 446-386 there were mints that operated occasionally and produced small numbers of coins for local use, as well as the recurrent possibility from the period before 457BC that a central mint was used to produce many different types of coinage for different communities. The finite chronological parameters that previously had the numismatic chronology neatly linked to the political situation must be abandoned, and in its place an appreciation of the pluralism of numismatic production in Boiotia realised. The major change after 446BC was that coinage for federal purposes was produced at Thebes with predominantly Theban designs.

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\(^{884}\) See above, Chapter 4.V.i, Knapp and Mac Isaac (2005), p. 82, *Catalogue* no. 218, indicating Tanagran minting in the second half of the fifth century and n.274 which suggests continuation of Tanagran minting down to 338BC.

\(^{885}\) See above, Chapter 4.V.i, and for the Chalkidian/Tanagran issues, Head (1884), lvi.

\(^{886}\) *Hell.Oxy.* 16.4 suggests that there might have been a federal payment for council service, but the phrasing is unclear: See McKechnie and Kern (1988), 159-160.
The political restructuring after 446BC therefore involved the manipulation of centre and periphery in several ways, and would have altered the way in which Boiotians saw the structure of their physical landscape and relationship to one another. The evidence from surface survey suggests that more land was being used for agriculture in this period, and at an increasingly intense level\textsuperscript{887}. The population increase that this suggests is also matched by the expansion of cult centres such as the Kabeirion at Thebes, the sanctuary of Apollo Ptoios at Akraiaphia and at Athena Itonia at Koroneia\textsuperscript{888}. With the architecture and institutions of the koinon would have come the increase in deliberate movement of individuals and groups from periphery to the new political centre in Boiotia. This would have meant that there were more people (and money) coming in to Thebes, but also passing through the cult centres of the region. This would have been the case more in those sanctuaries that lay on the main transit routes of the region such as at Koroneia or Onchestos. The continued development of Theban cultic and festival sites in this period has to be seen alongside the large lower walls that would have encompassed many important sites and helped bind together the cultic landscape of the centre of Thebes with the places where the new political institutions had their home in a fortified environment which would have had even greater significance following the synoikism of 431BC.

\textit{431}  
The developments of the period after 446 led directly to the first event that appears in any detail since the expulsion of Athenian influence in 446BC. The arrival of a \textit{lochos} of the federal Boiotian forces in 431BC with a design to bring Plataia into the federal organisation of the Boiotians is natural enough when considered alongside the broad political centralisation following the victory at Koroneia. Plataia had stood apart from the rest of the region that had to a greater degree coalesced into a geo-political unit. The attempt to bring the polis peacefully into the federation is accompanied by the construction of a federal landscape through geographic and physical reordering. Plataia had been allocated its portion of representation on the federal council, and was now being invited to take up its full place as a member of geographic Boiotia. The significance of the timing on the eve of Plataia's most important festival has been overlooked until recently\textsuperscript{889}. The plan was to rectify the problems caused by the alliance

\textsuperscript{887} Chapter 2.II.iii. p.25-27.  
\textsuperscript{888} Chapter 4.III.ii.  
\textsuperscript{889} Iversen (2007), 393-396.
of Plataia with Athens in 519BC and repatriate Plataia into political Boiotia. The possibility that Plataia would stand aloof or actively aid Athens in an outbreak of conflict would undermine much of the work towards homogenisation of the region that had taken place in direct reference to countering the possibility of Athenian hegemony. That the Boiotians failed to heed their Plataian allies’ advice and kill the opposition party demonstrates the consensual nature of the federation that was attempting to be built.

The attempt to bring Plataia into the council in 431BC was accompanied by the physical synoikism of the smaller and undefended towns in the region into the walls of Thebes. The fortifications of Plataia gave it security from the coercion of the federal forces.

The synoikism of the smaller towns into Thebes significantly increased its population. The symbolic defence that Thebes offered is directly paralleled by developments in Athens at the same time. The movement of groups from the various towns is a tacit acknowledgement of Theban centrality and the defensive power that had been offered as a result of the construction of the lower wall circuit. The construction of the wall was deliberately linked to the federal program and in 431 embodied the centrality that it had been symbolically designed to represent. It is significant that all of the evacuated towns that synoikised with Thebes would have been threatened by Athens; no towns from the northwest of the region took part in the synoikism. Because of the extant literary sources from Athens there has been a great deal of focus on the homogeneity of the political situation in Attika especially when placed under the pressures of the Peloponnesian War. The feeling of ‘leaving one’s own polis behind’ by moving to the urban centre must have been paralleled by the Boiotians, given that they had only formally been in a political relationship for fifteen years at most. The significance of the synoikism must be understood on a personal level: how many people lived in Thebes for how long is not clear, but the possibility of residing in Thebes had now been established and the interpersonal contact between Thebans and the other communities must have

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890 Thuc. 2.2-3, stresses the reasonable conduct of the force that entered Plataia, and its unwillingness to resort to the violence that was urged by the Plataian faction that had invited them within the walls.
891 Hell.Oxy. 17.3, with discussion in Chapter 3.III.iv.
892 The walls of Plataia were able to withstand the Spartan/Boiotian siege at the beginning of the Peloponnesian War, despite some indications of frailty: see above, p.113-114.
893 See n.388.
894 This might have been partly because of the greater prominence of fortification in the north-west of the region with most of the areas developing fortifications in the sixth or early fifth century. It might also be as a result of any smaller unwalled communities being close enough to take shelter in the larger fortified centres if necessary, as well as being less directly threatened by Athens.
been strengthened. This is worth bearing in mind especially when the war ended and the communities that had fed Thebes’ enlargement were presumably repopulated. The act of migrating from periphery to centre and the power and safety of that centre was becoming firmly established as a principal of Boiotian political and social existence.

The Boiotian experience of the Peloponnesian War was in part therefore one of continuing geographic cohesion encouraged by the physical manifestation of a federal political landscape. The experience was however complicated and constantly changing in its effects. The events of the war offered many different possibilities to the region as a whole and to the individual communities within it. The federal geography that had begun to take root was threatened from many different areas. The victory over the Plataians in 427 (with Sparta) guaranteed the safety of the passes over Kithairon and ‘Plataian’ participation in the federal council. This completion of the region in ethnic, political and geographic terms was greatly threatened in the next three years, and the success of the Plataian siege might have actually prompted Athens to make a greater effort to threaten Boiotia as a whole.

It is of central relevance to this event that the land of the Plataians was not given a permanent settlement, but the urban centre was first loaned to Megarians and then the land was leased out on medium terms (decade long) leases to Thebans and loyal Plataians (Thuc. 3.68.3). To give the urban centre of Plataia to Megarians exemplifies the victory as one not just of the unity of Boiotia, but also of the Boiotians against Attika, given the severe hostility of Athens toward Megara at this time. Buck (1994), 15, has used the later refusal of the Athenian request to have Plataia ‘restored’ to it by Thebes as proof that in a Boiotian federal context, Plataia continued to exist as part of the ethnic community, represented by those inhabiting the land and the rump of Plataians who had not fled (Thuc. 5.17.2: Plataia had ‘voluntarily’ joined). This distinction betrays the view of the federal council in Thebes, as it is not only the individuals, but also the geographic site that informs the idea of ‘Plataia’. The celebration of festivals such as the Daidala in 425BC under federal rather than Plataian control is suggested by the construction of a new large hotel building for visitors to the festival discussed in Fossey (1988), 107-109. The period when the legitimate citizenship of Plataia did not oversee the celebration of the festival was commemorated in the foundation of the ‘Great’ Daidala after the restoration of the polis by Philip/Alexander: see above, Chapter 4 .IV.ii, and Iversen (2007).

The Athenian attack against Tanagra in 426BC (Thuc. 3.91.4-6) is a strange event and seems to have had limited effects in terms of the course of the Peloponnesian War. It involved a large proportion of Athens’ available military forces, and the occupation of Delion as part of a planned encircling of Boiotia might have been a more developed form of this combined attack by land and by sea. Thucydides might also have had this event in mind when narrating the raid on Mykalessos some thirteen years later. For the awareness of the threat from the sea, see above Chapter 3, Table 4. The importance of the control of Plataia for campaigns to the south was demonstrated in 424 with the force sent to join with Brasidas against Megara: Thuc. 4.72. The attack of the Boiotian cavalry ‘surprised’ the Athenians, and demonstrates the speed of action into the Megarid with which the Boiotians could now act. The gathering at Plataia and the desire to keep Megara out of Athenian control were matched in the leasing of Plataian land to some Megarians after the end of the siege in 427BC. Hornblower (1996), ad.loc, discusses the mythical relationship between Megara and its possible foundation by an Onkhestian, suggesting that Thucydides had this in mind when constructing this passage.
The establishment of a Spartan settlement at Herakleia near Thermopylae roughly coincided with the end of the siege of Plataea in 427BC. The Boiotian council might have completed its plan of 446BC by bringing Plataea into the federal unit but Sparta, by founding a colony in the strategically vital area north of Boiotia, could directly threaten the region from north and south simultaneously if it wished, and would do exactly that in the fourth century. The defeat at Thermopylae in 480BC had been the last act of resistance for most of Boiotia against Persia and the symbolism of the simultaneous opening of both of the routes that the allied Greeks and the Persians took would not have been lost on Boiotians in terms of their wider strategic vulnerability to Sparta.

In 424 the Athenians deliberately targeted the geographical unity of Boiotia in a planned concentric attack on the region that exposed the fragility of the new federal organisation (Figure 6.1). Simultaneous moves from the Kephissos valley, Korinthian Gulf and through the Tanagraia and southeast were planned to break apart the federal forces and hopefully detach individual communities thereby isolating Thebes in the centre. The plan did not succeed and its failure actually galvanised Theban centrality, displaying how effective forces based there (especially cavalry) could be in repelling outside attacks.

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898 The founding of the colony is discussed at Thuc. 3.92. See Hornblower (1991), ad.loc, for Thucydides’ reflections on the motivations for the colony and the possibility that Thucydides had the wrangling over the site of the early fourth century in mind. See also Thuc. 4.78.1, with Malkin (1994), 219-35.
899 Most famously in the attack of Lysander (from Phokis) and Pausanias (from the south) in 395BC: Xen. Hell. 3.5.6, Diod. Sic. 14.81.1, Plut. Lys. 28.2.
900 A parallel could be drawn with the construction of the ‘Phokian Wall’ at Thermopylae that is known mainly from its role in the battle of Thermopylae (Hdt. 7.215). Excavations in the area have failed to determine any stylistic or chronological fit for the wall as yet, but the idea of the wall has been surmised to be related to the wish to redirect cavalry passage through the narrow pass, and hence a direct move against Thessaly as Herodotus suggests: McInerney (1999), 174-5. The comprehension of Phokis and Boiotia of the importance of the pass in terms of its basic strategic value as well as its relation to specific threats is instructive for later developments, including the wrangling over the control of Herakleia, and policy toward Philip II: above, Chapter 5, p.224.
901 Thuc. 3.9.4-6, for an earlier plan to attack Boiotia from the east in 426/5. The use of cavalry can be considered an important facet of the drive for physical unity of the region. See above, Chapter 2.III.iii, p.65.
Fig. 6.1: Planned Athenian attacks on Boiotia 424BC.

The significance for Athens of the loss of Plataia as an ally is also clear with the routes over Kithairon not contemplated for an attack, and the more difficult landing at Siphai attempted\textsuperscript{902}. The failure of the Athenian offensive is part of the wider pattern of increasing dominance of Boiotian forces over those of Attika\textsuperscript{903}. The possibility of Thespian democrats intriguing with Athens as part of the plan also led to the destruction of a part of Thespiai’s walls in order to permit access to the urban centre when it was needed to reaffirm Thespiai’s participation in the koinon\textsuperscript{904}. The damage done to the walls of Thespiai needs to be seen in relation to the similar actions of the Athenians against Tanagra in 457BC, and by Sparta against Plataia in 427BC. In conjunction with the construction of the large Theban lower enceinte, there was a clear and direct link between control of fortification and political control of a community. The scenario was played out in 423, where a Boiotian federal force left its safe, extensive system of walls at

\textsuperscript{902} The inability to control the passes over Kithairon would force the Spartans use of Korinthian Gulf harbours in the fourth century (see above, n.397), for the commitment of Boiotians to the security of Megara earlier in the year, see n.896.

\textsuperscript{903} Thuc. 4.89.

\textsuperscript{904} Agesilaos, when securing control of Thespiai in the fourth century made sure of restoring the walls against Thebes at the earliest opportunity (Xen. \textit{Hell.} 5.4.41). It is likely that given the general cooperation between Sparta and Boiotia in the Peloponnesian War and especially because of the aid given by Sparta against Plataia that the Spartan commanders of later periods would have been aware of the importance of Thespian walls (or lack thereof) in determining Theban policy in the west of Boiotia.
Thebes in order to destroy part of Thespiai’s walls and assert federal political control. In the fourth century the relationship between fortification and political (dis)unity is more systematically employed by the Spartans in Boiotia, and subsequently by the Thebans in Boiotia and the Peloponnese.

**Delion**

The victory of Boiotia over Athens at Delion in 424BC was as significant to the continuation of the federal program as had been the victory of Koroneia. The similarities between the battle of Delion and that of Oinophyta and Tanagra are clear, and defeat at Delion could have been disastrous for political cohesion, and therefore for Boiotia’s role in the rest of the Peloponnesian War. That Sparta had just marched its main force under Brasidas toward Thrace through Boiotia emphasises the similarity between this battle and the second encounter in 457 when the Spartans had left for the Peloponnese. As would be the case at Leuktra, the Boiotians could clearly identify that they had defeated their greatest enemy at full strength in pitched battle, and as with the later battle, the victory effectively vanquished the most dangerous territorial threat to the region. The battle was fought in the liminal area in between Oropos and Tanagra, and after the battle, the effective borders of Boiotia encroached even further onto Attika.

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905 Thuc. 4.133, with above, n.360.
906 See below for discussion of this.
907 The battle of Koroneia is brought into the foreground by Thucydides in his account of the battle of Delion in the speeches of Pagondas (Thuc. 4.92). Whether the Boiotians present at the battle made the connection in this explicit way is less important than the construction of the theme in Thucydides and its later influence.
908 Contrast the victory of the Athenians in the same area in 426, where only a small number of Boiotians fought against a full Athenian levy: Thuc. 3.91.4-6.
909 Thuc. 4.78-79.
910 After the encounter in the Megarid, the Athenians might have considered this the best opportunity to isolate the Boiotians from Sparta.
911 There is perhaps also some similarity in the delayed recovery of the dead in both battles. At Delion, the cause seems to be more sacred than military. For the significance of the Boiotian bartering over recovery of the dead see Hornblower (1996), *ad. loc.* on Thuc. 4.98.2, where references to parallels/possible influence on tragic depictions of non-burial are also discussed. The Polyandrion at Thespiai demonstrates that the demographic damage done to the various Boiotian contingents was not even (4.96.3 and *IG VII* 1888, for the destruction of the Thespian contingent on the left). The Thespian loss in this battle is important in the broader situation regarding its proclivity toward democratic intrigue and destruction of its walling. This would have been emphasised by the relatively small losses of the Thebans. Lewis’ (Lewis et al. (1992), 425-6) view that the victory would have restored Theban self-esteem after the Persian Wars is too simplistic and fails to appreciate the intra-Boiotian dynamic, and the independent history of battles against Athens.
912 The liminality of the area was the focus of much of the discussion before and after the battle, especially as it contained the sanctuary of Delion; Thuc. 4.91-2 and 4.98. The idea of ‘spear-won land’ rare in this period, seems to be a feature of the dispute here, see Thuc. 4.98.8 and Hornblower (1996), *ad. loc.*
The battle proved that political unification of Boiotia could bring major military benefits to the region as a whole. At Delion they fought for the first time wholly united and had defeated the Athenians, who had deliberately played on the separatist tendencies of the region in previous encounters. The Boiotians at Delion are made to refer to the battle of Koroneia by Thucydides in order to rouse the will to fight against the Athenians. The victory brought even greater strength to Thebes as the central power in Boiotia, and from 424 onwards the Boiotians would pursue regional cohesion with renewed vigour. The fear that the Boiotian victory engendered in Athens is clear in Thucydides, but also in the work of the dramatists, and the physical closeness of Boiotia was never as keenly felt as in the period after Delion, and the panic that could be engendered by reports of ‘Boiotians on the borders’ is clear in Andokides.

The pattern of the early part of the Peloponnesian War is repeated in the turbulent period around 419BC with the position of Boiotia lying at the centre of the peace negotiations between Sparta and Athens. Boiotia’s strong position is exemplified by their surrendering of Panakton to Athens, only after they had destroyed it. This act was deliberately provocative and marked the control over liminal areas that had been felt in Boiotia since the victory at Delion. Panakton stood astride the Skourta Plain, an area that traditionally had been shared between trans-migratory pastoralists. The denial of control by Boiotia is part of the wider pattern that had seen the area around Delion and the Parasopeia removed from Athenian control. The pattern would continue with the accession of Eleutherai to the Boiotian fold at some point in this period. Boiotia acting as a coherent geographic unit meant that the borders it shared with its neighbours were more easily protected and far greater resources were allocated to their defence. The bitterness that ensued from the peace settlement and its concomitant demonstration of the relative strength of Boiotia vis-a-vis Sparta might have encouraged Boiotia to take

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913 Thespiai’s domestic position was compromised by its significant losses at the battle: Thuc. 4.133.1.
914 Aristophanes’ account of the possibility of a flame from Boiotia setting the Peiraeus on fire in the Acharnians precedes this event, but is symbolic of a wider territorial fear following the destruction of Plataia (l.920ff. with l.1023 for Boiotian raids). For Euripides’ mythologizing of the battle, perhaps emphasising its psychological impact see Bowie (1997), 45-56, and Chapter 4.VII.ii-iii.
915 See the useful discussion of the composition of this passage of the war: Hornblower (1996), on Thuc. 5.40.1 ad.loc. Thucydides implies (5.39.2-3) that Boiotia held a significant number of Athenians prisoner, an interesting situation given the history of prisoners between the two regions, notably in 506BC and 446BC, being ransomed for considerable financial and political gain: see above, n.358.
916 There is no evidence of occupation of the site before the fifth century: Munn (1989), 242-244. The fortification was rebuilt and in the fourth century was garrisoned by Athens: Dem. 54.3 (cf. Dem. 19.326).
917 See Thuc. 5.42 with above, n.164.
918 A suggestion of John Camp: see above, n.393.
control of Herakleia in 419BC. The assertion of control over Herakleia and the destruction of Panakton were part of the pattern of discourse that had developed between Sparta and Boiotia since 427BC. The displeasure of the Boiotians with the authority of Sparta would be a consistent feature of relations until the Peace of 386BC.

**Dekeleia**

The fortification and garrison of Dekeleia in 413BC was not a Boiotian initiative but it conformed to the way in which the region’s own territory had been used against it. Leading up to the fortification there had been further unrest in Thespiai that had been dealt with by federal forces by means of the access provided by the partly destroyed walls of the polis. A more troubling event was the raid on Mykalessos by a group of Athenian-led Thrakian mercenaries in 414BC, which Thucydides made infamous. The walls were in disrepair probably because of the strength of the Theban enceinte. The situation and the response of the federal forces proved that Thebes’ position was best suited to preserving the security of the region and they arrived on the scene quickly. It is likely that Thucydides exaggerated the destruction of Mykalessos to suit his own literary scheme; in geographic terms, however, Thebes had cemented its position as the natural location for Boiotian forces to be situated, following its successful interventions in the attempted encircling in 424.

When Dekeleia was fortified, therefore, the federal commanders of Boiotia would have had the territorial threat that Athens had traditionally posed as a model. It was the first time that Boiotia had had a garrison within Attika, and from the accounts it seems likely that the region provided the majority of the forces for the garrison, because of the ease of access from Boiotia. The wealth of Attika (slaves and other property) began to filter...
back to Boiotia and must have had a significant impact on the domestic situation.\(^{926}\) The use of Dekeleia effectively cut the link of Athens with its usual overland supply route from Euboea and Oropos, and this fissure was widened in 411 when Euboea revolted, Boiotia liberated Oropos from Athenian control, and most significantly, a bridge was built over the Euripos for the first time. As Athens had worked for the previous century to disrupt the cohesiveness and functioning of Boiotia, now Boiotia was the principal actor in disrupting the territory of the Athenians on the mainland.

*The end stages of the war*

The final stages of the Peloponnesian War offered a diversity of experience that had a significant impact on a generation of Boiotians. No longer threatened by the Athenians, the Boiotians took the command of some of the most important positions in the allied forces, both on the mainland at Dekeleia and at sea, with Theban commanders present at Arginousai and Aegospotami.\(^{928}\) Boiotia is well represented in the *Catalogue of Ships*, but until the Peloponnesian War there is no record of a Boiotian navy of any kind. During the war, however, there had been an increasing desire by the Spartans to get Boiotia to provide forces at sea and they commissioned 25 triremes from the region, the same number as Sparta itself would supply.\(^{929}\) With the loss of Plataia, there was a realisation on both sides of the Boiotian-Attika border that the sea routes provided an alternative to the passes of Kithairon.\(^{930}\) This is something that Thespian exiles seem to have been hoping to harness when intriguing with the Athenians over a planned landing at Siphai in 424BC. This landing took place but whilst the harbour is good for ships, Siphai is typical of many Boiotian harbours in offering any hostile force landing at the harbour no easy route to reach the plains of Boiotia. As long as the defenders were prepared, seaborne attack would be difficult.\(^{931}\) The Athenians overcame this difficulty at Mykalessos by landing a small and secret force and attacking at dawn to enable as much damage to be done as possible before reinforcements could be brought up to

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\(^{926}\) Hunt (1998), 112-3. The natural wealth of Boiotia that is envied by Athens in the *Acharnians*; above, Chapter 2.III.ii.

\(^{927}\) See discussion above, Chapter 3.II.iii, pp.95-98.

\(^{928}\) Diod. Sic. 13.98.4, 13.99.5-6

\(^{929}\) Thuc. 8.3.2. cf. Thuc. 8.5.2. They also contributed a contingent of 300 hoplites at Syracuse, (Thuc.7.19.3) which were presumably transported in Boiotian vessels. Other examples of Boiotian naval expertise before the naval programme: Xen. *Hell.* 5.4.46; 6.4.3. Salmon (1978) 191-196 with note on Carthaginian proxenos at Buckler and Beck (2008), 206 n.29.

\(^{930}\) For the attack on Tanagra by sea in 426BC see above n.897.

\(^{931}\) Thuc. 4.89.
defend the town. In general, therefore, the Peloponnesian War saw the development of an awareness of the dangers and possibilities of the sea in Boiotia. The building of the bridge across the Euripos is perhaps the most striking statement of the desire to undermine the possibilities of Athenian control of the sea, effectively making Euboia, in Diodorus' conception, a 'part of Boiotia'. As part of a series of events that included the fortification of Dekeleia and the revolt of Oropos from Athens, the bridge was a physical manifestation of the successful dislocation of the areas to the northeast of Athens that were paramount to its prosperity. The desire to check the residual influence of the sea on politics was also behind the move of Oropos a mile further in land in 401 BC.

Through excellent management and a desire to change the geography of the region to conform to the boundaries of the ethnos, Boiotia had emerged from the Peloponnesian War in a strong and effectively unified position. Financially it was probably the greatest beneficiary of the Athenian defeat, with the spoils from Dekeleia funnelled into the region. They had become increasingly assertive and with control of fortifications, the destruction of Plataia, a major victory at the battle of Delion, and a general control of the traditional border areas with Athens, the region was prosperous and well controlled. The pushing back of the line of control between Boiotia and Attika had begun in 446 and in 404 reached the walls of Athens. The Boiotians took great pleasure in dismantling the long walls of Athens. This was a clear sign of victory and in stark contrast to the massive enceinte that now surrounded and protected Thebes. The Boiotians advocated the complete destruction of Athens, whilst the Spartans, reverting to the position of 519 and 457BC, reflected that the two areas could act as bulwarks against one another’s ambitions and chose to leave Athens in a weakened, but fundamentally undamaged state. The natural geographical conclusion to forty years of victory had been denied the Boiotians, and marked the beginning of the conflict proper between Sparta and Boiotia. Athens would never again threaten Boiotia on land.

932 If the existence of a watchtower at Aulis (probably the prominent Megálo Vounó, as suggested as a likely site by Schachter (forthcoming)) is correct, the relative success of the raid is testament to the understanding of the landscape of the attackers.
933 See above, n.310, for the damage done to Athenian interests by the revolt of Euboia.
935 Parke (1932), provides a useful discussion of the possible influx of money and property into Boiotia following the investment of Dekeleia in 413BC.
936 The destruction of the Athenian fortifications was accompanied by pipers; an intriguing parallel to the musically accompaniment to the mythical construction of Thebes’ walls: above, n.458.
937 See above, n.605 for reasoning behind Spartan decision.
Disunited over the resolution of war, the divisions over Panakton, Heracleia and the tithe demanded by the Boiotians at the end of the war to dedicate to Ptoön Apollo rendered cooperation between the two regions impossible. Their combined geopolitical aim of subduing Athens had been achieved and they now stood in opposition to one another. The experience of working together for much of the period and especially the experience of the Spartans in Boiotia would be invaluable for the next thirty-three years of hostility and conflict between the two regions. The Boiotians for their part had had the novel experience of fighting outside of Boiotia itself for an extended period of time and had learned much about the stresses and tensions that could be applied to the region from outside. The prominent role in the victory over Athens would encourage Boiotia to continue to assert its role more vigorously, as it had begun to do in the War, but the confidence and clear military power of the region would now make it a primary focus of activity for the next thirty years.

404-386

The Thebans, along with the Korinthians are reported by Xenophon to have desired the ‘wiping out’ of the Athenians at the end of the War. The exact meaning of this design is not clear, and Xenophon’s vocabulary here should probably not be stressed too much in order to provide a clear meaning, but perhaps the best idea would be to look at the treatment of the Plataians in 427BC. With this parallel in mind it is likely the Korinthians and Thebans had an idea of reducing not just the physical aspects of the city, but its population as well. The eventual design of the Spartans was to bring about a physical change to Athens and Attika by restricting the fleet and destroying the long walls, but not to evict or do any further damage to the population. The major division between the designs of the Spartans and the Boiotians was one of scale and permanence. The eventual settlement was therefore more closely paralleled by the treatment of Thespiae during the Peloponnesian War, where its walls were slighted and its political situation was made to conform to that of the league. The Spartans had claimed leadership and the spoils of war in dictating the terms of the peace. The Boiotians responded with the symbolic (though no doubt financially significant) claim to a tithe for

938 Debate over which Boiotian sanctuary of Apollo received the tithe: Demand (1982), 44, and Buck (1979), 25.
939 Xen. Hell. 2.2.19-20. The motivation and effects of this for Boiotian internal politics is outlined by Buck (1994), 25. There are parallels with the possibilities for destroying Thebes in 479 and 335, as well as the United States’ Morgenthau plan for Germany after World War II, which would have returned it to a bucolic state.
940 Though there seems to be no provision for the retention of the important islands of Skyros, Imbros and Lemnos, which would be retained in the Peace of 386: Xen. Hell. 5.1.31.
Apollo, and then an immediate political shift against the arrangement favoured by the Spartans in Athens. This response is characterised in blunt geographic terms by the support offered to the Athenian democratic exiles that were using as their base the mountains on the border between northern Attika and southeast Boiotia. The success of these exiles, especially in fulfilling their objectives from a base located in the border areas between the two areas, can be seen as a natural continuation of the pattern of discourse that had been developing for the previous century whereby political change was begun from border areas. The success of the democrats under Thrasyboulos in moving from Thebes to Phyle and then to Munychia brings to mind the earlier attempts of Thebes and Boiotia to influence Athenian affairs, especially the campaign of 506BC, which also went via Phyle.

In its political alignment with Athens against Sparta in the period between the end of the Peloponnesian War and the Peace of Antalkidas, Boiotia continued its interest in the internal affairs of Attika, which had developed from 431 onward. Boiotians had been present at the demolition of Athenian walls in 404BC, but by the middle of the 390s there were Boiotians actively involved in helping restore the walls of the Athenians. Perhaps more importantly, Boiotians might have been retained from this and continued to work on the development of an Athenian fortification system that was designed to defend Attika more widely against the types of warfare that had been employed against the territory in the Peloponnesian war. The expertise of Boiotian builders who were employed in the extension and development of Theban walls, would have been refined on a grander strategic scale in the early decades of the fourth century, and these builders would return to help construct Boiotia’s own federal building scheme from the 370s onward.

941 Hell.Oxy. 17.1; Justin 59.8. Buck (1994), 26, usefully puts this information in the context of Boiotian political factions more generally.
942 Similar to the movement of Boiotian exiles from Orchomenos to Thebes and the establishment of the first federation in 446BC: see above, n.451.
943 It would also have played into the fear of the border areas that is palpable in Andokides, Aristophanes, and Tragedy: see above, Chapter 4.VII.ii-iii. Xen. Hell, 4.2.4. Munn (1993), 9, outlines the defensive significance of Phyle on the Thebes-Athens routes, and suggests that the site was un-fortified until the fourth century. If so, the inclusion of the site in the Athenian defensive system highlights its importance and the perceived threat from Boiotia in that period.
944 The influence of the post 446 Boiotian constitution is clearly of great influence in the Athenian political upheavel in 411: Ath. pol. 30.
945 Rhodes and Osborne (2003), no.9.
946 Cooper (2000), 184-188.
The reduction of Athens and the subsequent political affiliation between the two regions affected the major geographic dynamic that had come to dominate Boiotia over the previous century and a half. One of the major physical changes that had occurred was the construction of the bridge across the Euripos. This link between Chalkis and Boiotia may not have had any great effect on local trade given the short distances involved across the strait, but the social and military effects must have been significant. The change that might have been effected by the construction of the Bridge on the east coast harbours was emphasised by the intervention in Oropos and the movement of the community further inland. Though this move was relatively small (seven stades) it is, especially together with the construction of the bridge, evidence of a deliberate focus of the authorities in Boiotia on the east coast, and its relationship to the sea. The bridge was designed to undermine the possibility of control by sea of the relationship between Boiotia and Euboea. The movement of Oropos inland in 401BC was designed similarly, especially as it came in the immediate aftermath of the failure to destroy Athens, and the restoration of the democracy. The desire to physically alienate old centres of political loyalty (in this case Oropian-Athenian) from their traditional connections would have been borne of the experiences in Peloponnesian War. Though Boiotia might have been tacitly aligned with Athens within a short period of time after 404BC, the desire to strengthen the geographic gains made from the War seems to have been a preoccupation of the policy of Boiotian political architects. The control of Oropos was part of a renewed focus on the Parnes-Kithairon boundary that saw Oinoe (for a short period), and perhaps Eleutherai return to Boiotian control;
This is important in marking the end of a purely ethnic basis of the political organisation. Though Oropos could be said to mark an important geographical part of the region (and certainly strategically of great import) it was at best a region that contained Boiotian elements. It did not subscribe to the key facets of Boiotian ethnicity in terms of belief in a shared history and eponymous founder, and nor did it share in the language and common festivals of the region. Given the changes in Plataia it might have been relatively simple for the league to allocate a seat to Oropos in order to ingrain the new relationship and cement the expansion of Boiotian territory. However, as Athens had not made Plataia and Eleutherai into demes, there was no attempt to make these areas formal political members of the region in terms of geographical unit. Instead, the citizenship of Thebes was extended to Oropos, therefore allowing Oropos representation within the council through Thebes. There was a desire to extend Boiotian borders into the Oropeia without adding the area as an independent member of the council. This model of syntelia seems to have only been applied to Oropos at this time. In the 370s however, it would be a model adopted more widely by Thebes as it sought to engender a different type of geographic agency.

Some constituent communities of the fifth-century Boiotian council began to move away from the federation after the cessation of hostility toward Attika. The Spartans had experience of helping Boiotia to overcome its separatist tendencies with action against Plataia in the Peloponnesian War but also in action designed in some respects to limit its potential political agency, such as the founding of Herakleia and the failure to destroy

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955 The dialect of the region was Eretrian: Wilamowitz-Moellendorff (1886), 97-103. There might have been some festivals celebrated within (or very near and connected with) the Oropeia that were Boiotian by their nature (such as the festival of Apollo Delia at Dilesi: Schachter (1981), 44-45).

956 It had similarly not become an Attic deme despite being contiguous with Athenian territory and an Athenian dependency for most of the fifth century.
Athens. Spartan commanders must have also been aware of the many intrigues in Chaironeia, Orchomenos, Thespiai, and Siphai, where parties within the communities, or exiles from without, wished to alter the political situation. It is a natural extension of the knowledge of the Boiotian landscape as well as the desire to maintain its lack of cohesion that prompted Sparta began to engineer the political fragmentation of the region. With Boiotia’s failure to follow Spartan leadership after 404, Sparta emphasised the divisions of the region through the deliberate application of geographic pressure. Lysander’s dislocation of Orchomenos from the federation in 395 came in tandem with the alliance with Phokis to effectively build a threat to the region on the north-western side to counter the friendly relationship with Attika in the southeast. The production of Orchomenian coinage, which had traditionally been used as a statement of independent identity, was probably re-invigorated at this point.

Sparta had witnessed and encouraged the growth of Boiotian power in the period from 446 onward, and Boiotian forces had proved essential to the victory in the Peloponnesian War. As a region, Boiotia had the largest number of hoplites of any Greek state and the largest cavalry south of Thessaly, and Sparta wished to deny Boiotia any scope for wider geo-political agency following the defeat of Athens. When Boiotia (unexpectedly) made an ally of the re-founded Athenian democracy, undermining the geographical stability of Central Greece that Sparta had encouraged in the past century and a half, the Spartans found other methods of controlling Boiotia. The passive aggression of Agesilaos at Aulis was complemented in approach by Lysander’s ‘spears raised or levelled’ march across Boiotia, and the wrangling over control of Herakleia that continued the theme and highlighted the importance of the foundation to both

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957 The discussion of Price (2001), 103-26, 283-289, considers that for Thucydides, Boiotia provided an excellent model for understanding stasis.
958 The strength of this new relationship is related in Rhodes and Osborne (2003) no.6, with the defensive alliance made for ‘all time’. The clause about the sea also denotes that Boiotia, whilst probably not itself at this point a naval power of any size was considering the dangers posed by the sea; the timing of this is especially important given Agesilaos’ aggressive act on Aulis. See Gonzalez (2007), for useful narrative chronology.
959 The difficulties of debating numismatic production are discussed in Chapter 4.V.i. The argument that the production of all cities except Thebes had ended in 446 has been definitively undermined with the discovery of Tanagran coins of the period from the 420s and 410s, and even if Orchomenos had relied on Theban federal production in the period after 446, it is likely that they would have begun their new mints with their alignment with Sparta after 396BC. Their deliberate political exceptionalism becomes more pronounced as the region coalesces in the period after the occupation of the Kadmeia, and can therefore be cited as a deliberate element of Spartan, anti-Boiotian federal policy.
960 Specifically stipulated by Thucydides as reason for Spartan support against Plataia: Thuc. 3.68.4, Thebans ‘ὡς Ελίμους’ to Sparta.
regions. The Spartans pursued a policy that left Boiotia surrounded; when this failed in a broad context, they began to work on the division of Boiotia internally. The Boiotian determination to overcome the restrictions that were being imposed by the Spartans manifests itself in the politics of the period, and its increasingly robust actions to display its independence including its aiding of Athenian exiles, the rebuilding of walls in Athens and eventually the open hostility toward Sparta from 396 onward. However, the desire for certain communities to remain independent of a federal political authority remained strong, and the opportunities for this independence provided by the Spartans in their activity in Boiotia from 396 onward were taken. The threat of effective Boiotian resistance to Sparta’s interference had to be overcome through the use of Big Power politics in the form of the Peace of Antalkidas.

The Spartans’ attempts at forcing a pitched battle at Koroneia in 395BC met with mixed success and the burial of Lysander at Panopeus rather than in Boiotia may contribute to the idea that Sparta’s focus was on controlling Boiotia’s north-western entrances. It is the case that Sparta was forced by the Boiotian-Athenian alliance to focus its efforts in the west of Boiotia, but the overall policy was to restrict Boiotian geographical agency in general. As with the victory over Athens in the Peloponnesian War, Sparta could not achieve its desire to restrict a large regional enemy without the aid of Persia. The deliberate atomisation of the region in 386 with the King’s Peace is an acknowledgment that even with the loss of a community the size of Orchomenos, Boiotia still posed a significant threat on the mainland. Its alliance with Athens, and their now shared geo-political outlook, would bring further dangers to Sparta in the succeeding decades.

There is not room here to discuss the intricacies of the political groupings and effect of ideology in Boiotia in the period after the Peloponnesian War and especially between 395 and 386. The competing factions within Boiotia and within individual communities had clearly played a role in many of the major incidents of the Peloponnesian War (the entry of Plataia in 431, the planned Athenian attack in 424), and continued to dictate short-term policy in the early fourth century. The influence of ideology and political

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961 Lysander’s march north across Boiotia, recounted at Plut. Lys. 22, is not securely dated, but it is likely to be in the period between 404 and his death in 395. The threat demonstrates how important Boiotia was in allowing Sparta access and influence in Northern Greece, and would lead to the policy of garrisoning a corridor from Kithairon to the Kephissos valley from 386 onward.

962 The attack on Koroneia had a great deal in common with the Athenian attacks on Boiotia in the 420s: Gonzalez (2007), 41 and Buck (1993).
alliances across the region will be the focus of future work, with special focus on the testimony of the *Hellenica Oxyrhynchia* in which is contained the best information for the individuals and groups involved, and their outlook.\(^{963}\)

**Summary**
The period 446-386 began with the formal institutional construction of a political federation based upon the ethnic geography of the Boiotoi. This structure was conceived in opposition to the Athenian hegemony of the region and sought to deliberately overcome the traditional territorial fragility that had allowed Athenian influence in the Parasoeia at least since 519BC. The council that was formed as a representative body was the first official recognition of the limits of Boiotia, and the scheme that was used was little changed until the third century. This involved incorporating areas such as Orchomenos and Plataia that had previously proven most willing to pursue political alternatives to closer Boiotian co-operation. The reservation of places for Plataia on this council throughout the period down to the Peace of 386BC acknowledges the desire of those constructing the project to speak as one Boiotia, and not to ossify the situation at any one moment.

As with the period before this new political arrangement there were many attempts to break apart the unity of the Boiotians, most notably from the Athens, whose territory was most threatened by any unity, but also in similar fashion by the Spartans. This was especially the case when Athens and Boiotia ended hostilities and signed an alliance after the Peloponnesian War. The design used by Sparta was fundamentally the same as the Athenian, and hoped to use the openness of the region’s borders to launch simultaneous attacks. The battle of Koroneia in 395 was indecisive, but the Spartans had achieved a significant (and lasting) victory in detaching Orchomenos from the political koinon. In similar fashion to Athens with Plataia, the Spartans would use Orchomenos as a guard of a route into the region and as a base for further encroachments. The parallels are not perfect, but the routes over Kithairon and the route through the Kephissos valley were similar in the threat they posed to any Boiotian unity. With positive relations between the Boiotian League and Athens generally assured in the three decades following the end of the Peloponnesian War, the military focus would be on Kithairon, the southwest harbours and the northwest entrances to the region.

\(^{963}\) Schachter (2004), is the best example to date of use that can be made of the information from the Oxyrhynchus Historian in this sphere.
Internally, Boiotia experienced a period of significant prosperity. Not only had they managed largely to come together and manage federal resources of men and money to achieve long term military aims, they had also taken significant wealth away from Attika, especially after the establishment of the base at Dekeleia. The trend in the fifth century was of increasingly intensive land use in Boiotia, and the slaves and physical wealth that flowed into the region from 413 onward would have had the effect of continuing this general trend by providing the necessary manpower. On a local scale, sites such as the Kabeirion near Thebes underwent significant expansion, in this case perhaps because of the federal organisation being centred upon Thebes. This political centrality was confirmed in physical terms by the construction of a massive lower enceinte that provided protection for the smaller towns of the region from 431 onward. The ability of federal forces to act effectively and quickly from Thebes is proven in many episodes including the countering of Athenian attacks in 426 and 424, the relatively swift response to the attack on Mykalessos in 414 and the response to Agesilaos’ symbolic arrival at Aulis in 396BC. Thebes also demonstrated its geographic dominance over Plataia and Thespiai with the reduction of Plataia and the management of Thespian walls in 424 and 414 to maintain the political status quo. The experience of the Peloponnesian War would also make the traditionally land-based perspective of the major Boiotian communities consider the dangers, and later the possibilities, of the sea. Encouraged by Sparta to develop a naval presence, the Boiotians would make an alliance with the Athenians in 396/5 with the sea as part of the division of influence, and the increasing awareness and willingness of Thebes to become engaged with the military aspects of the sea continues through the next few decades.

Boiotia in 446 had officially enshrined its geo-political homogeneity and though the unity of the region was fragile, it ushered in a period of military success and economic prosperity. The dangers posed by the unity had long been recognised by both Athens and Sparta, and thus the reduction of Athens caused Sparta to act more energetically to counter the threat posed to its own fragile hegemony of the Greek mainland. The failure to be able to achieve a significant victory over Boiotia provoked recourse to ‘Big Power’ diplomacy, the result of which was official atomisation of the region. Many Boiotians in 386 clearly embraced independence, but there were others, especially those at the centre of the old federation at Thebes, that had witnessed the

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964 See above, Chapter 2.II.iii.
965 Rhodes and Osborne (2003), no.6.
possibilities of unity and understood the benefits of this for the geographic security of the region and its agency in the wider world.

386-335BC: Antalkidas to Alexander
The Persian-sponsored general peace of 386BC was further recognition of Boiotia’s importance for the stability not just of mainland Greece but also over a much wider region including the Aegean and Asia Minor. It is generally recognised that the autonomy clause of the treaty was designed with Boiotia as the principal target, and the breakup of the bulwark of central Greece was a major achievement of Spartan policy. However, they had been unable to achieve this settlement through force of arms, despite the presence of both Lysander and Agesilaos in the region. Also, despite the continuous engagements of the period 395-386 and the dislocation of Orchomenos, Boiotia remained a reservoir of wealth and significant military manpower. The political settlement arbitrated by the Spartans was a preliminary to the physical division and rearrangement of the region that the Spartans took pains to enact in the period after 386BC. The Plataians were resettled in their old location, returning from Athens and elsewhere, and together with Thespiai and Orchomenos, were overseen by Spartan garrisons, while Plataia and Thespiai were refortified. The political atomisation therefore quickly became physical atomisation, and to achieve this Sparta and its allies dedicated a large portion of their time and attention to Boiotia in the period between 386 and 371BC. Boiotia had been the overriding object of the peace of 386BC and it was afterward the consuming focus of Sparta’s physical engagement in the Greek mainland.

There are similarities between the period of Athenian hegemony 457-446BC and that of Sparta 386-371BC in the way in which both conceived of the region as a whole. Both understood that the management of routes into Boiotia was essential to maintain control over it; the expedition of Tolmides, the defeat of which led to the end of Athenian control in Boiotia, was designed to bring Chaironeia and the northwest routes into the region under Athenian control. Similarly, the Spartans struggled increasingly to manage to be able to get into Boiotia through the routes over Kithairon, and the battle of Leuktra was a result of the restriction of Spartan geographical freedom by the Thebans. However, though the broad geographic importance of Boiotia was recognised by both along with the most effective ways of stymieing the cohesion and political unity

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966 Paus. 9.1.6, Xen. *Hell.* 5.4.41
967 See above, p.247.
of the region, the parallels between the two periods of external hegemony should not be over-stressed.

**Peace of 386**

The peace of 386 encouraged community independence and the loss of central authority in Boiotia. The Oropeia was dislocated from whatever ties had bound it to the league, and seems to have later voluntarily entered into a new relationship with Athens. The Peace might also have promoted the development of coinage in Plataia and Thespiai, two communities that had never minted before. Both of these used the Boiotian shield, accepting both the ethnic symbol and the economic ‘zone’ that this had always implied. Orchomenos, probably under Spartan encouragement, pursued a deliberately subversive minting policy of mimicking the ‘official’ federal coinage of Thebes, but replacing the magistrate’s name with some indication of Orchomenian provenance. The fortifications of Plataia, Thespiai and Orchomenos were restored or improved by the Spartans. In 382, the natural progression of Spartan interest in the region was reached when the Kadmeia was seized and garrisoned. The size of the garrison force and the nature of the harmosts that ruled there are a matter of debate, but the most important change was that the Spartans had bypassed the strength of the lower walls of Thebes. The Kadmeia proved itself an equivalent of the Akropolis in its defensibility, and the Spartans must have had a reasonably total territorial control of Boiotia at this point.

However, the parallels with the Spartan occupation of the Athenian akropolis in the late sixth century would also manifest themselves in the nature of the dissolution of Spartan control. Boiotian exiles received Athenian support and a small band effected the destruction of the garrison on the Kadmeia in 379BC. As with the Boiotian aid to the Athenians in 403BC, this event would re-energise friendly relations between the two areas and lead to Theban membership of the Second Athenian Naval Confederacy. The expulsion of the Spartans from the Kadmeia would mark a pattern of events that would

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968 Isok. 14.20, 14.37. It would revert back to Theban control in 366 (Xen. *Hell.* 7.4.1; Diod. Sic. 15.76.1) and then again to Athenian control in 338 or 335; see above, n.659.
969 Knoepfler (1981), argued that the sixth and fifth century coinage traditionally attributed to Pharai, is likely instead to have been Thespian. This case remains inconclusive.
970 Xen. *Hell.* 5.2.25-31; Diod. Sic. 15.20.
lead to Sparta itself being threatened by Boiotian forces. Sparta had gained control of the majority of Boiotia through the collusion of the local communities and geographic pressure rather than through pitched battle, and the liberation of the Kadmeia marked a radical change in the way in which the political geography of the region was envisioned by those in Thebes. Thereafter, instead of attempting (as in 446) to create a pan-Boiotian political organ, Thebes would construct a matrix of individual syntelai with other communities on a case-by-case basis, recognising the political atomisation of the previous century and a half. This had been in large part engendered by the experience of Spartan and Athenian interference in the region, and based on traditional patterns of local political bonds in response to the question of how to integrate a non-ethnic Boiotian area (Oropos) into the federal unit. The situation between 379 and 371 meant that this process could only be undertaken piecemeal, and this characterised the political arrangement of Boiotia after 379 in the same way in which the sudden and total evacuation by Athens in 446 had conditioned a federation that encompassed all Boiotian communities on a proportionally equal footing.

The first notable diplomatic move following the end of Spartan control of the Kadmeia was for the Thebans to subscribe to the Second Athenian Naval Confederacy, a move unthinkable before 403BC and a strong manifestation of the change in the Theban relationship with the sea brought about by the experience of naval command in the Peloponnesian War, coupled with the continuous threats posed to Boiotia by external threats made via the sea. The membership was voluntary and Thebes made this agreement independently of Boiotia; a considerable move for a community so far from the sea, and unable at the time to guarantee free access to its closest ports on the southwestern seaboard because of Spartan control of Plataia and Thespiai. The act can be seen as a response to the Spartan areas of control in the west and northwest and a desire to counter any attempts to dislocate areas east and southeast of Thebes, including the links to Attika via the Tanagraia. The records of the Second Naval Confederacy show Thebes to be a key member, and this expansion of interaction with the sea would continue until Thebes competed with Athens for control of the Aegean in the 360s.

The importance of Thebes in the confederacy displays also that Athenian concerns were

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972 A situation that parallels the Athenian defeat at Koroneia being followed by the territorial threat of Boiotians in Attika (at Dekeleia) in the Peloponnesian War.
973 See above, p.284.
974 Rhodes and Osborne (2003), no.22, 1.94, for prominence of Thebes (and Chios) in the formal stipulation of League organization.
still focussed upon guaranteeing defence against Sparta on land, and therefore its ability to act in the Aegean.

The internal policy that dominated the period from 379-362 can be called Theban rather than Boiotian in the respect that the atomisation of Boiotia in 386 and the occupation of the Kadmeia had caused Theban designs to differ from those of much of the rest of the region (especially the west and northwest) to a considerable degree. The same overall design had been preserved from the ethnic geographical vision of 446BC, but the failure to achieve cohesion that could resist the physical atomisation exacted by the Spartans had caused policy to be revised. The new design was to recreate a federal council, but to closely fuse the communities together through syntelia rather than through simple representation on a federal council. In geographic terms this change marked another distinction in broad internal perspective. The period from 550-446 was marked by an understanding of ethnic geography centred on a historical tradition of migration and early collective regionalisation marked in works such as the *Iliad*, the *HH to Apollo* and *Hermes* and the *Aspis*, as well as through cultic relations such as the Tripodophoria. The political dimension of this including recognising the breakdown of sections of the geography of the region into compartments, had failed to secure lasting political cohesiveness to match the geographic area. The policy of 446BC had proved a failure because that model of representation was too static in its geographic segmentation of the ethnic region and preserved local interests and loyalties. The pragmatic solution was to preserve certain elements of the 446BC system, but use *syntelai* and shared citizenship as a way to allow ‘Boiotia’ to act as a region despite the changes in membership of its participants.

After 386 Sparta used the physical manipulation of the Boiotian landscape to reinforce the symbolic political atomisation of the Boiotian federation that they had achieved with the Peace. In the 370s there was a concerted effort by Thebes to overturn this geographic dominance: control of Kithairon and its passes was re-established, and the stationing of twelve triremes at Kreusis demonstrates a desire to influence crossings in

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975 Note also the significance for the relationship between Oropos, Athens and Thebes of the resistance of Oropos to Theban control in mid-370s in favour of Athens and the eventual return of Oropos to Thebes in 366 at the beginning of the Boiotian naval programme. For a brief but useful survey of the relationship between Athens, Thebes (and Oropos) see Buckler (2000). The same concerns dictated the terms of the partially extant treaty between Boiotian and Athens in 396/5BC: see above, n.958.

the Gulf of Korinth. The combination of control of Kithairon and the Gulf harbours would have made Spartan involvement in the region very difficult. It was the destruction of Plataia in 373BC that would strengthen Theban control of the southern part of the region and force the battle of Leuktra. Thebes also attempted to increase the likelihood of the political fusion of the region by moving to a more democratic form of government, deliberately offering an alternative to Sparta, and perhaps attempting a deliberately more Attic style of democratic regional inclusiveness.

The battle of Leuktra was not an inevitable Spartan defeat, and the knowledge of the landscape of both sides was proven effective, with the Spartan circumvention of Helikon wrong-footing Epameinondas. The latter had however engineered a situation whereby Spartan control of the region was threatened if they did not achieve a victory in a pitched battle. The tactical ability of Epameinondas is undoubted but he had learned much of his technique from the Spartans themselves. The victory was achieved against the background of the traditional disunity, with Epameinondas dismissing the Thespian contingent from the main Boiotian force. Despite this, the victory at Leuktra seems to have been relatively easily won, and in an intimate reflection of the Spartan policy towards Boiotia, the Spartan bodies were left to be collected last in order to demonstrate the individual damage to one community, and symbolically dislocate them from their vital allies. That Sparta had risked such a large proportion of its citizen manpower in Boiotia is reflective of the level of effort and resources that Sparta had had to employ in order to hold a precarious control over the region. The desire of the Boiotian commanders to demonstrate the size of their victory by leaving the Spartan dead to be claimed until last was part of the grander scheme of geographical reordering that would now take place. Using a spectacle such as this to demonstrate power and the scale of victory is reminiscent of Spartan actions in Boiotia, and victory at Leuktra would see wholesale changes to Boiotia’s internal arrangement and relationship

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977 Xen. *Hell.* 4.4.3. The fortification system that came to dominate the design of the 360s federalism and expansion of Boiotian power might already have been underway at this point. The stationing of 12 triremes at Kreusis would presumably not have been the sum total of Boiotian naval capacity at this time.
978 The Spartans had also fortified Mavrovouni, a key point in the control of the Korinthian Gulf harbours: see above, Chapter 3.III.i, pp.107-108.
979 The attraction of democratic factions within Boiotia toward Athens had been the cause of much of the stasis and intrigue in the region in the Peloponnesian War.
982 Paus. 9.13.8.
983 See above, n.911.
with other regions that had many similarities with the way in which Sparta had used the Boiotian landscape.

The confused use of ‘Thebes’ and ‘Boiotia’ (which is a problem in all periods) is particularly pronounced from the 370s onwards. This is because Thebes itself wished to blur this, and change the manner in which the region cohered. Where the fifth-century federation was a balanced representative oligarchy where independent community identity was preserved, the syntelic league built by Thebes after 379 mitigated the differences between communities and attempted to make all Boiotoi equal members of a democracy based at Thebes. The structure of the second federation, took much of its structure from the previous incarnation of federalism, such as the officers of Boiotia, the Boiotarchoi, but this should not however the large differences between the arrangement of 446-386 and 379.

*After Leuktra*

The victory at Leuktra was only the second to be celebrated with a ‘Boiotian’ dedication, following that at Koroneia. That neither had been fought with the full contingent of Boiotian communities increased the significance that they were subsequently celebrated as ‘pan-Boiotian’ victories. As the victory over Athens had heralded the construction of a new political order, so Leuktra marked a change in the physical ordering of the region and its communities. The victory monument in the plain of the battle itself was accompanied by a new (or augmented) festival at Lebadeia.

The location of this festival was designed to advertise the magnitude of the victory to as large an audience *en route* to Delphi as possible; it was also deliberately situated in the heartland of Spartan support and was a visible manifestation of the change in the geographic situation of power following the battle. After the victory a building scheme to protect the borders of the region against outside interference was conceived and swiftly constructed. The scheme was born of the experience of hegemony exercised by an external power, and with the removal of that hegemony, an attempt was made to engender a mentality of cohesion and a politicisation of the ethnos. This latter attempt placed a much greater emphasis on the manipulation of the physical environment; this was a reflection of the nature of Spartan rule that had been designed with the physical

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985 Plut. Ages. 19.2; above, n.427.
987 It is significant that this building was joined by the Treasury at Delphi that was paid for with the proceeds of the victory of Leuktra. See Buckler and Beck (2008), 216 for sources and discussion of possible date of this.
manipulation and exercise of power as its first priority. The earlier hegemony of Athens seems to have been less concerned with affecting the physical dynamic of the region than with affecting the political mentality. Both hegemonies were met with a response that matched the character of the hegemonies, and both had major victories in battles on which to build the new vision.

The federal building scheme was designed to produce a recognisable regional aesthetic. It was probably designed and undertaken by the same Boiotian artisans who had helped Athens to build the federal fortification scheme across Attika. The lessons from this scheme were not just in the complex understanding of the lines of sight and sound of the region masterfully joined up using the new system of forts and towers, it also understood the aesthetic qualities of the Athenian system. Whilst the Athenian constructions were broadly similar in technique, the Boiotian system was technologically more advanced, adapted to the development of catapults in the previous decades, and also easily distinguished from the Athenian fortification system in appearance. Where the Athenian system generally employed round towers, the Boiotian was based upon square towers of the type best illustrated at Eleutherai.

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988 The efforts that were made to match political changes with physical alterations to the landscape were largely focussed on Thebes with the construction of the apparatus of the federal council and the lower enceinte.
989 See above, p.122 n.389.
990 Discussed by Ober (1985) and above, Chapter 3.III.v.
991 For best technical description of these Boiotian ‘compartment’ towers, see Camp (1991), 187-202.
The situation of such a major fortification was as a result of the conjunction of the influence of Athens and Sparta at this point. The passes over Kithairon had been a contended area for the entirety of Spartan rule, and the successful defence of the passes near Eleutherai had been vital to denying Sparta free rein in Boiotia. Athens controlled much of the plain near Eleutherai and had held control of the region for much of the previous centuries, which together with the control of Plataia caused the Boiotians considerable strategic problems. The construction of the massive fort at Eleutherai in the distinctive ashlar form that would grace much of the region in the following years stood therefore as a statement of permanence against the invaders from the south, most recently Sparta, and against the towers and forts of the Athenians, that stood easily visible within half a mile of the Eleutherai fortification (Figure 6.2 and 3.18). The forts at Kreusis, Siphai and Chorsiai were designed to physically represent the central authority now in control of the landscape of Boiotia; none of these settlements was large enough to furnish such extensive and uniform work from their own resources. The development of the

992 The cool reception at Athens given to the Boiotian herald who brought the news of the defeat of Sparta at Leuktra (Xen. Hell. 6.4.19-20) is indicative of the changes in relationship between the major powers being contingent on the relative strength of one another, and an awareness of the Athenians that Boiotia would now be free to move in and out of the Megarid at will.
fortification of these harbours was probably shortly followed by the development of the shipbuilding facilities at Aulis that would be a base of the major naval construction of the mid 360s993. The rapid building of such a large number of fortifications might have been inspired by the remnants of the Mykenaian period which were visible all around the Teneric and Kopaic Plains, and marked a sophisticated understanding of the relationship between the landscape and the manipulation and control of that landscape through construction and a cohesive vision of geographic management994.

The idea of spatial manipulation through change in physical construction was taken beyond the borders of Boiotia from 370 onward in a series of invasions that would significantly alter the spatial interaction of mainland Greece. The fortification of Messene under Epameinondas’ direction was in the same style as the fortifications in Boiotia and stands as effectively an extension of the internal Boiotian scheme995. This connection also inversely makes the internal building scheme one of imperial ambition, the aesthetic of which stood against Sparta in its most vulnerable area. The desire to restrict Sparta rather than necessarily to destroy it is clear from Epameinondas’ progress through the Peloponnese in the 360s down to 362 with his death996. The foundation of Megalopolis was inspired by, if not overseen by the Boiotians, and the general pattern of territorial restriction matched the effective Spartan policy of the 380s and 370s in Boiotia997. The scheme marked the success over both of its mainland rivals in the period since 446BC and with relative security assured on the mainland, it is unsurprising that the Boiotians continued the developments at sea that had been pursued federally since at least 431BC and by the Thebans with deliberate purpose since 378BC.

Boiotian harbours were naturally good and capacious, but they had poor inland connections998. Aulis provided a notable exception, and it is here that the naval building scheme of the 360s would have been based999. The scheme is likely to have been linked to an inundation of financial resources from Persia, and thus should be placed after

993 The best case for Aulis as base for the federal naval programme is made by Buckler and Beck (2008), 198.
994 This might also have inspired Philip’s draining of Philippi: see above, n.757.
995 See above, n.393.
996 Buckler (1980), 210-213, with n.48, emphasises that Epameinondas’ attack on Sparta (Xen. Hell. 7.5.10; Aineias Taticus 2.2; Diod. Sic. 15.83.2-3; Plut. Ge. 34.5; Plut. Mor. 346C; Justin 6.7.1-4; Polyainos 2.3.10) was designed to draw Sparta and its allies into a pitched battle, rather than destroy the city.
997 See above, n.429, for foundation of Megalopolis, Messene, and Mantineia.
998 Chapter 2.II.viii.
999 Buckler and Beck (2008), 180-198, for overview of Boiotian harbours and argument for Aulis as the strongest candidate for the naval base of the 360s.
Pelopidas’ embassy to Susa in 367BC\textsuperscript{1000}. The creation of an Aegean fleet was designed to combat the increasing Aegean power of Athens and should be considered a parallel to the process of undermining the geographic base of Spartan power in the Peloponnese. The scheme was undertaken with strategic partners down the west coast of Anatolia and the need to acquire the necessary materials to construct the fleet also brought the Boiotians into contact with Karthage, Makedon, the Bosphoros and the Black Sea\textsuperscript{1001}. Both in the Persian court and in contact with the Aegean states, the lack of a tradition of hegemonic ambition played into their favour as they were seen as a change from the familiar choice between Sparta and Athens, and they did not come seeking an empire\textsuperscript{1002}. The scheme’s rapid success is suggested by its short existence, borne out in the Social War, which diverted Athenian attention and men away from the mainland. It is tempting to attribute the generally fluid political situation in the Aegean from the end of the 360s until the 330s as proof of the long-term success of Thebes’ plan to undermine the basis of Athenian power\textsuperscript{1003}.

The 360s marked the first period where the Boiotians were both strong enough internally and faced a weakened Athens and Sparta that allowed them to operate beyond their own borders for the first time. The process had been a gradual one, with all of the elements of the so-called hegemony of the 360s being part of long-term development of the techniques of territorial power on both land and sea. The death of Epameinondas in 362BC at the battle of Mantinea was no doubt a large blow to the efficacy of the Boiotian forces, but his death was not catastrophic for Boiotia or Thebes. The battle was a victory for the Boiotians and they continued to take an active role in the Peloponnese over the next couple of years fulfilling the long-term goal of restricting Spartan power permanently. It would be instead the renewed threat from the northwest, which Boiotia’s hegemony might have helped provoke, that would cause the retreat from the Peloponnese and a significant threat to Boiotia’s territorial integrity.

\textsuperscript{1000} Buckler (1980), 262, for a good tabulation of the complicated chronology of the 360s For the suggestion of Persian funding of the Boiotian fleet: pp. 155-6, 160-1, based on Carrata Thomas (1952) 23-4.

\textsuperscript{1001} The natural resources of Boiotia could provide some of the materials for the fleet, but most would need to have been imported, see above, p.25 n.74.

\textsuperscript{1002} The possibilities of the two being fused in the representation of Herakles the snake strangler on the coinage of the period which might have been made from electrum with the Persian king’s gold is intriguing: see author’s forthcoming investigation of this: Gartland (2013). The use of the Boiotian loyalty to Persia in the wars of 480/79 seems to have been openly employed for the first time in the embassy of Pelopidas at this juncture (Xen. Hell. 7.1.34), something that can only have helped the cause of the Boiotians. This diplomatic use of medism was used against the Thebans in the post mortem of 335BC: Diod. Sic. 17.14.2.

\textsuperscript{1003} See above, n.647.
Boiotia, under Theban direction, had realised a kind of geographical cohesion though the use of physical change of the landscape, most notably in the form of community destruction and change, and the visible control of the landscape through a massive federal fortification scheme. The last destruction of a community before the Sacred War with Phokis came in c.364BC when federal forces reduced Orchomenos. The desire to secure the ability to pass to Northern Greece via the Kephissos Valley was understandable as a product of the need for Boiotia to interact more with its northern neighbours, both to procure necessary materials for shipbuilding, but also because of the rise of powerful individuals such as Jason and Alexander of Pharai and eventually Philip II of Makedon. The destruction of Orchomenos marked this design; where before the community had been allowed to remain as a bastion of alternative political arrangement (since 395BC) because the focus of most of Boiotia was to the south, it could now no longer be permitted to control the important routes into the region from the north-east.

The situation of Phokis had been of concern to the Boiotians actively since the outbreak of the Korinthian War in 395BC and now looked to be an increasingly threatening neighbour. Boiotian success had brought them a great deal of influence over the sanctuary at Delphi, and the desire to control the sanctuary led them into open conflict with the Phokians. The causes of the war are not simple, but in essence the dispute between Phokis and Delphi became part of the wider matrix of Big Power interaction with the situation of Thebes’ relationship with Thessaly, Alexander of Pharai and Athens playing a part in the build up to the conflict. The initial catalyst seems to have been the exile of a small number of Delphians, but the general pattern of the period is for Thebes to attempt to cement its position (and that of Sparta) by way of communal treaty. The grant of promanteia for Thebes at Delphi is indicative of the change in

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1004 Diod. Sic. 15.79.6; Aeschines 2.141, and Table 2, above.
1005 It appears that Orchomenos was not entirely destroyed and deserted, despite the reported severity of the Theban settlement there (IG IV 2.1 94.a.8; Hansen in Hansen and Nielsen (2004), p.447, suggests a resettlement by Thebes, presumably similar to that of Plataia in 427BC).
1006 Buckler and Beck (2008), 213-223.
1007 Buckler (1989), 19 n.1. The exile of these men and the lease of the exiles’ property look very similar to the arrangement of the property of the Plataian exiles in 427BC (IG II 2.109), especially as they end up in Athens. Cf. Diod. Sic. 18.11.4, for prosperity that the redistributed land of the Thebans offered neighbouring communities.
1008 Thebes’ failure or lack of desire to build a formal alliance system to parallel the Peloponnesian or Delian League has been the focus of scholarship for some time: Buckler and Beck (2008), 165-179. The direction of Boiotian efforts against Sparta is evident from the indictment of Sparta in 357BC (Diod. Sic. 16.23.2-3) and the claim of 500 talents for the seizure of the Kadmeia. This would be later doubled to 1000 talents.
Boiotian attention in this region as it gradually wound up operations in the Peloponnese and the Aegean after Epameinondas’ death.\footnote{The list of donors to Thebes in the Sacred War is instructive in confirming Thebes’ success at defining itself as the protector of Delphi. See Diod. Sic. 16.25.1, 28.3-29.1 with Buckler (1989), 28.}

The war that ensued was long and damaging. As Figure 6.3 illustrates, the policies that had proven effective at subduing Boiotia internally were now demonstrated to have weakened its defensive capabilities considerably, with Orchomenos, Chorsiai and most of the southern littoral of the Kopais up to Tilphousa all being taken by the Phokians at various points, though Thebes itself was not seriously threatened. The Phokians were beaten by the mid-340s, but the legacy of the conflict was to have blurred the borders between Makedon and Central Greece. The course of the Third Sacred War is not clear and various attempts have been made to reconcile Diodorus’ sketchy chronology with other sources. Buckler has made the best attempts at piecing the chronology together.
from a Boiotian perspective, and the threat to Boiotia was very great indeed\textsuperscript{1010}. The conflict was different to those against Sparta and Athens, as only a few years previous to the Third Sacred War, the effective political cohesion of Boiotia had been finally achieved through destruction, exile and fortification. The Phokian threat was of a purely military kind and not a complicated political game to ensure Boiotia remained subdued\textsuperscript{1011}.

The victory over Phokis was an impressive achievement, but it was taxing in resources and manpower. The fortification scheme was renewed, and the same pattern of ashlar fortifications was erected now in areas that had been threatened by Phokis. Over the course of a century, the Boiotians had overcome threats from Athens and the Aegean, from Sparta and the Peloponnese and now from Phokis and Thessaly in the north-west. It was well fortified and well populated. It did not have great financial wealth, but the picture at the end of the 340s was anything but bleak. It was the capability and designs of Philip and Alexander that would eventually overcome Boiotia, using perhaps the very techniques of its own military ascendancy that Philip could have learned whilst in Thebes\textsuperscript{1012}.

The situation after the defeat at Chaironeia in 338BC was very similar to that after the seizure of the Kadmeia in 382BC. The League of Korinth was constituted and reflected a similar determined atomisation and supposed equality as under the peace of Antalkidas. The hegemon was Makedon rather than the combination of Persia/Sparta, but the effect for the region as a whole was not dissimilar. The Kadmeia was garrisoned, and it seems as though Philip began some sort of process of restoring the exiles to their communities. Both through historic precedent and through his own experience at Thebes in the tumultuous period in which he was hostage there (the early part of the 360s) Philip would have understood the geographic power dynamic in the region and that the easiest method of controlling the region was to centre a force at the citadel of

\textsuperscript{1010} The Third Sacred War's chronology is complicated, but the best attempt at breaking it down is Buckler (1989) Buckler and Beck (2008). McInerney (1999), 205-226 gives some useful insight from a Phokian perspective.

\textsuperscript{1011} The various points at which the Phokians made incursions into Boiotia demonstrate that though the Kephissos valley was the point of easiest transmission between Phokis and Boiotia, the border between the two regions was much longer and more permeable than had been apparent previously. The defences of both regions were designed to protect the areas where the largest forces could be mustered, and smaller raids and local knowledge could be used to overcome these. This knowledge must have been part of the reason behind the fortification of seemingly distant centres such as Chorsiai, though this fortification did not stop the Phokians taking the site.

\textsuperscript{1012} See above, Chapter 5, pp.217-218.
Thebes and then encourage independence amongst the outlying communities. The strategy would have been galvanised by the advice of the Athenian embassies that recommended ὅτι τὰς Ὀλυμπίαν καὶ Ἱλίου δίκαιον ἡγούμην εἶναι, καὶ μὴ τὴν Βοιωτίαν Ὀλυμπίαν Ὀλυμπίας. 1013 The issue of Thebes and its relationship to the rest of Boiotia was more openly discussed because of the nature of that relationship after the changes of the 370s and the destruction of Plataia and Orchomenos and the dislocation of Thespiai. The difference between 379 and 335 however was that the ‘big power’ was not distant but near and ready to act. Persian forces posed no active threat to Thebes in 379, but in 335 Alexander reacted to a significant rebellion by Thebes by the city’s total destruction. It is of little surprise given the history of destructions and exiles that the situation was not permanent, and within two decades, Thebes had been rebuilt.

Summary
The destruction of Thebes was never unavoidable, nor was it predictable, but the atomisation that followed the Peace of 386BC together with the occupation of the Kadmeia and the dislocation of several traditional enemies of Thebes by Sparta encouraged the forging of a new method of regional cohesion that would eventually leave Boiotia weakened and exposed. Before the victory at Leuktra, war against ‘Boiotia’ had never been successfully made, as when the attempts of Athens in 426 and 424 or Sparta in 395 were made they were either defeated or produced fragmentation that satisfied their overall design of weakening Boiotia. In the period after Leuktra however, Thebes and its allies in the region constructed a political unity that was based upon the supremacy of Thebes as a centre with a series of fortifications designed to discourage any attack on the region. This system was significantly damaged by the Third Sacred War and had the added effect of bringing Philip into the orbit of Thebes. Even after 346, the Boiotians showed resilience, refortified centres taken by Phokis and probably extended the fortification system to encompass Aigosthena and Pagai. The battle of Chaironeia was similar in its effect to that of Tanagra in 457BC but the Makedonians had much greater resources to employ and had much wider designs than keeping a neighbouring region quiet. Thebes had increased the efficiency of its political control of the region in the 370s and 360s at the expense of the effectiveness of its military

1013 Aeschines 2.119-120. This statement seems to be a good understanding of the change that had occurred since 379 and is not inaccurate in describing the geo-political effect of that change. Cf. Markle (1974). There is a lot of material in the Athenian orators that can be assessed for the way in which they discuss the structure of Boiotian geography and the way in which the different communities (and Athens) perceive it. This will require a longer treatment than is possible here, and the author intends this as a focus of future work.
resources. It would take the resources of a Makedonian king to defeat Thebes and also restore the other communities of the region. Under Makedonian control after 338, the region was physically renewed and in the third century presented a much more vibrant and dynamic federal interactivity than in the fourth century after 379BC.
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