Masculinities, Music, Emotion and Affect

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The candidate confirms that the work submitted is his own and that appropriate credit has been given where reference has been made to the work of others.

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Abstract

Background: Gendered inequalities have historically been legitimated through the discursive enforcement of ‘natural’ sexual difference. One particular fallacy that has denied females a political voice, is that white, Western, males are more ‘naturally’ equipped for rational thought or strive for emotional suppression. In starting from the premise that this is always the case however, critical approaches to masculinities underestimate how adherence to the discursive ideal of rationality is mediated through emotional experience.

Purpose: Using concepts of ‘habitus’ and ‘affect’ this thesis challenges the assumption that the perceived rejection of emotions, is firstly how masculinities are constructed. Secondly, because ‘individual’ emotions are a prerequisite to social action, it foregrounds the importance of a nuanced understanding of male emotional narratives explicitly through music. Culturally, music consumption is overtly concerned with ‘individual’ emotional experience and group interaction. Therefore male domination of music production and consumption, stands at odds with discourses of ‘rationality’, offering a means of understanding socially patterned, male emotional experience.

Methods: A two-stage, mixed methods approach was undertaken, with males ranging from ages 16-64 participating. The first stage was an online survey and the final sample included 361 males, spanning various demographics. The second stage was a series of six, life-history case studies with participants selected from those who had completed the survey, based on the richness of data they provided and stratified by age.

Conclusions: Both survey and life-history accounts demonstrated a wealth of emotional experience. Whilst music was primarily used as a tool for emotional expression, it was also perceived to manage ‘undesirable’ emotions. Respondents’ emotional engagement with music differed over the course of their lives, in line with socially patterned expectations. This has implications for the notion of ‘learning to be affected’ through the construction of masculinities, indicating new ways of theorising about masculinities as social embodiment.
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Introduction

What absurd fellows you are, both of you! I wonder who it was who defined man as a rational animal. It was the most premature definition ever given. Man is many things, but he is not rational.

_Henry Wooton to Dorian Gray and Basil Hallward – The Picture of Dorian Gray_

(Wilde 1985 [1891]: 34)

When David Cameron, in response to Angela Eagle, mockingly told her to ‘calm down dear’, it provoked a justifiably hostile reception. This supposedly innocent statement, he claimed, was homage to a car insurance advert where a young woman, agitated by the lack of quality service she is receiving, is told (as opposed to asked) by the man voicing the advert to ‘calm down dear’; he has a sensible solution to her problem.

The advert’s initial content aside, what Cameron’s comment did was to belittle the arguments of a female MP on the basis that she was acting irrationally; letting her emotions get in the way. In doing so he invoked a host of unequal power relations and sexual stereotypes, which have historically denied women a voice in the political arena because it was often assumed that their actions, thoughts and opinions were too tied to their biological, reproductive capabilities. Men, by comparison, have often been presumed to have mastery over their emotions and thus accorded control over affairs requiring rational, dispassionate, reasonable action as the cornerstone of their legitimacy. What it reveals is that such discursive assumptions are still alive and well.

_Why Masculinities Matter_

There has been growing attention paid to the study of men, males, ‘masculinity’ and masculinities\(^1\) over the last forty years, as a direct result of theoretical, economic, social, cultural and political change, outlined in Chapter 1. These interventions have made it both increasingly clear that there are qualitatively different experiences by intersections of class, race, ethnicity, sexuality, sex and gender (Crenshaw 1991), and increasingly unclear as to what identity is (Bauman 2000a). In tandem with the gains made by feminist, LGBT and civil rights groups, there has also been what Faludi (1992) has referred to as a ‘backlash’ against feminism particularly due to a perceived erosion

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\(^1\) This is a purposeful distinction explained in more detail in Chapters 1 and 7.
of male power. This has manifested itself in the male-as-victim complex, symptomatic of the Promise Keepers (Donovan 1998), the Mythopoetic men’s movement in the USA (see Kimmel 1995) and the crisis of masculinity arguments (see Horrocks 1994; McDowell 2000). Whilst in the UK overall, there has been a narrowing of the pay gap between males and females, such broad measures tend to obscure the subtle ways in which some males at least, still retain privilege.

As also noted in Chapter 1, there has often been a necessary division between sex and gender when theorising male privilege; one that is retained throughout this thesis. Separating out the behaviour, practices and beliefs of certain groups of males, means that it is possible to accommodate the idea of masculinities as a social problem not irrevocably tied to the male sex (Halberstam 1998; 2012). Theories of masculinities, as opposed to theorising patriarchy, attempts to move away from sex role arguments that focus largely on reproduction of normative sexual behaviours and fail to explore resistance to these by males as well as females. Masculinities studies generally tend to note the fluidity of gendered practices and the impact of feminist thought on revisions to constructions and strategies of male privilege.

The concept of ‘hegemonic masculinity (Carrigan, Connell and Lee 1985; Connell 1987; Connell 1995; Connell and Messerschmidt 2005; Messerschmidt 2012) emerged as a means of explaining how some groups of men (importantly rather than males) maintain power over not only women, but also other men, and is still highly influential in studies of males and masculinities (Messerschmidt 2012) in Anglophone contexts (though in non-Anglophone countries there have been longer traditions of theorising on men; see Hearn, Nordberg, Andersson, Balkmar et al. 2012). By appropriating a Marxist framework however, at times there has been a tendency in studies of males and masculinities, to convert all forms of male power to economic privilege, obscuring more nuanced forms of discrimination, subordination and oppression. As Hearn (1987) demonstrates, ‘orthodox’ Marxism tends to emphasise human relationships to productive rather than reproductive labour and thus may have done little to challenge sexual inequality, despite looking to challenge economic inequality. Male privilege therefore is not necessarily synonymous with capitalism (Walby 1989) and Marxists can be misogynists.

Edwards (2006), with deference to how feminism has been characterised, has helpfully referred to a three wave approach in the development of studies of males and masculinities. The first wave he notes, was concerned with sex roles or the reproduction
of sexually differentiated behaviour through socialisation (2006: 2). The second, encompassing Connell’s work, focussed on how power was produced, reproduced and maintained by certain groups of men (ibid.). The third, taking cues from poststructuralism, appeared more focussed on questions of ‘normativity, performativity and sexuality’ (ibid.) and, I would add, how discursive knowledge around certain bodies and practices is produced (MacInnes 1998; Petersen 1998; 2004).

Whilst discrete boundaries cannot be easily drawn between the approaches, as already noted above rationality, as both discursive formation and structural legitimation, has historically provided certain groups of males with symbolic and material privileges (Seidler 1994; Connell 1995; Seidler 2006a; 2007; Forth 2008; Ezzell 2012). Simultaneously it has also been argued that Westernised identification with rationality as the suppression of emotions, leads to personal distress, discomfort and alienation (Seidler 1994; Berger, Levant, McMillan, Kelleher et al. 2005; Wong, Pituch and Rochlen 2006; Monaghan and Robertson 2012; Robertson and Monaghan 2012). However within sociological studies of males and masculinities, there has been little focus on how masculinities actually shape male emotions, and even less empirical work into how males construct emotional narratives (though for notable exceptions see Chapter 2). The aim throughout this thesis is not to provide a comprehensive critique of each wave that Edwards identifies. It is however, sympathetic to both second and third wave perspectives, drawing on elements of each in order to critique approaches which posit masculinities as exercises in emotional suppression or assume a singular concept of emotionality (see Fischer 1993).

In doing so it raises three ethical premises from the outset: the first is a well-documented argument that what is often labelled ‘natural’ sexual difference is socially ideological in character and contributes to global, national and interpersonal inequalities; rationality is not natural. The second is that rationality, construed singularly as the absence of emotions, is inextricable from emotional experience. The third is that a culturally parochial concept of what constitutes emotional experience, has been defined with reference to individual, female and often Othered bodies, which takes white, Western, ‘middle-class’ heterosexual, male experience as the normative point from which all others deviate. As such, a sociological, gender specific framework needs to be developed in order to become sensitive to emotions as socially constructed as well as individually experienced.
Why Music?

As Chapter 3 demonstrates, historically there have been concerns around how individuals listen to and use music. What is remarkable is that even today similar discursive strategies are invoked in the media to condemn certain music forms. What these concerns usually hinge on is the idea of music’s capacity to act as a transformative force, something which changes the individual. This has shaped academic interest in subcultures (Cohen 1972a; Cohen 1972b; Hebdige 1979) and approaches which suggest preference is linked to personality traits (Lewis 1991; Rentfrow and Gosling 2003; Pearson and Dollinger 2004; North, Desborough and Skarstein 2005; Chamorro-Premuzic and Furnham 2007; Miranda and Claes 2008). Media-led moral panics however have so often been focussed on the effect of a diverse range of musical genres on young males particularly. As Chapter 3 also indicates, males continue to dominate the contemporary market for music, both in terms of production and consumption, and participation and taste are significantly gendered.

Despite perception to the contrary, that musical taste is the antithesis of all that is considered instrumentally rational, the culture industry is only made possible because of its mechanistic structure, presenting codified labels as individual choice (Hesmondhalgh 2007). Music listening and consumption are ubiquitous however and occupy a privileged place in social consciousness, in the UK at least, because music is considered “the cultural material, par excellence of emotion” (Denora 2000: 46). Emotional discourses, presented as aesthetic choice, are not specific to one genre and are commercially lucrative (Adorno 1945; 1975; 1976; Adorno and Horkheimer 1997 [1947]; Adorno 2004; Illouz 2007). Belief in music’s emotional qualities is one of the primary reasons for the success of the music industry in contemporary society.

The traditional approach to musical sociology however focuses purely on music’s (homo)social function (see Frith 2002; DeNora 2003a). As Bourdieu (1984) noted, cultural participation and taste aids the reproduction of social inequalities, because shared tastes function as a form of social and cultural capital, helping to shape interactions between similar groups. In this way however, music becomes merely tokenistic and Bourdieusian inspired approaches to music ignore how aesthetic experience is actively negotiated as well as received. This argument is developed further in Chapter 3, however it is important to note that music’s aesthetic experience cannot be explained only with reference to social function and existing theoretical work on a sociology of music, informed largely by Bourdieu’s analysis in Distinction, is often
lacking (Prior 2011: 126-127). This thesis then, whilst retaining a strongly gendered focus, draws inspiration from the work of Theodor Adorno as a means of conceptualising listening practices (DeNora 2003a: 151).

Music, then, presents an important area of enquiry with regards to an exploration of masculinities and emotions for several reasons. Firstly, music is actively engaged with and consumed because it focuses overtly on emotional experience. This is at odds with the ‘rationality-as-emotional-repression’ position and challenges the notion that white, heterosexual, middle-class masculinities are necessarily based on the disavowal of emotional expression. Secondly, it is a means of getting males to talk about emotions without making the focus explicitly about emotions. Seeing only the ability to articulate specific emotions as indicative of emotional development is, as noted later, part of a cultural legacy that sees emotions as ‘feminised’; a much more sociologically nuanced view of emotions needs to be adopted. Thirdly, music is a multi-billion pound industry which according to Bennett et al. (2009: 46) is the most differentiating aspect of cultural participation and taste. It evokes a range of different attitudes and behaviours, emphasising the relational nature of beliefs, practices and therefore gender. Fourthly, music’s aesthetic experience is shaped by male performers and audiences; it is indicative of gendered practice and also biography. Thus it enables the location of structural and discursive influence within individual life histories, helping to theorise fluidity and change.

**Research Questions and Chapter Outline**

For the reasons outlined above, this thesis aims to explore primarily how masculinities shape male emotional use of music. In order to provide a sufficiently detailed response, there are several specific sub-questions which will be addressed throughout;

- What are the relationships between gendered practices and music preference?
- What are the different uses of music for males and how do these uses relate to

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2 The term ‘gendered practices’ rather than ‘gender’ has been used in order to acknowledge that gender is constructed and reproduced through the performance of historically contextual behaviours. Because the practices associated with genders change there is no intrinsically stable concept of ‘masculinity’; even individual understandings were subject to change therefore it is important to focus on behaviours which are indicative of gender (see Chapters 6 and 7). This was also done in order to avoid creating psychological gender and music correlates (explained in more depth in Chapters 3, 4 and 7) and to outline that there may be a disjunction (especially around emotional displays) between behaviour and ways of understanding that behaviour.
constructions of masculinities?

- How are males’ understanding of ‘emotionality’ and emotional experience reflected in their uses of music?
- How do emotions shape music use for males and what are the key factors which influence male emotional use of music?

The proceeding chapters are structured in such a way as to reflect how four, often disparate, areas of enquiry (gender, music, emotion and affect) can offer potentially new means of studying males and masculinities through a sociological framework.

Chapter 1 looks at the emergence of literature explicitly studying males and masculinities as objects of enquiry in their own right. It begins by noting feminist arguments around the distinction between sex and gender, before explaining the impact of feminist thought. It highlights some of the key social and economic changes over the course of the 20th Century which led to the development of studies of masculinities and then goes on to outline key theoretical arguments in the field. Connell’s concept of hegemonic masculinity is taken as a necessary starting point and his and Messerschmidt’s (2005: 851) critique that hegemonic masculinity lacks a sophisticated theory of ‘social embodiment’ is explored in relation to embodiment and rationality. A critique of Bourdieu’s (2001) concept of masculine habitus is then offered as a means of beginning to theorise the embodied aspects of male emotional experience.

Chapter 2 begins by discussing how emotions have characteristically been studied through psychological and physiological frameworks. These have tended to individualise and pathologise emotional responses and, using literature developed within a sociological framework, it notes the discursive patterning of emotional development as a prerequisite to social action (Thoits 1989; DeNora 2001). The chapter then moves on to explore how sociological and social psychological approaches have theorised emotions specifically in relation to gender, before proposing that Sedgwick’s (Sedgwick and Frank 1995; Sedgwick 2003) and Tomkins’(1962) work on affect offer new ways of exploring embodiment, emotions and masculinities.

Chapter 3 broadly notes the sexual division of music consumption before proceeding to discuss how the mass music industry arose. Noting how music’s success as a commodity rests on its status as sublime (Adorno 1945: 211), it moves to outline three discourses which have helped to link modern music to ‘emotionality’. Whilst providing an outline of subcultural and type-related explanations for music’s success, an Adornian critique is developed against a Bourdieusian analysis of music. Exploring how
belief in music’s emotional and affective capacities has been the source of moral panics in relation to the male body, the chapter concludes with a discussion as to the potential that music offers in relation to theories of masculinities.

Chapter 4 outlines the methods used to conduct analysis into the four areas (masculinities, music, emotion and affect). Whilst much sociological inquiry into all four has tended toward qualitative methods, both for pragmatic reasons of males perhaps being unwilling to explicitly discuss emotions, and for generating a large amount of different responses by multiple demographic differences, a two-stage, mixed methods approach, adopting both quantitative and qualitative methods is proposed. The benefits of using online surveys, as well as a considered rationale, are discussed, and the online survey structure, sample and analytic techniques are outlined. The advantages of using case studies to add depth to the study are noted, before a justification for the life history case study stage sample is outlined.

Chapter 5 indicates, from the online survey, what the broad trends in relation to gendered attitudes, emotions and listening were, as these were important in helping to shape the qualitative phase of the research project. Beginning with an analysis as to how ‘typical’ and ‘atypical’ gendered traits differed by multiple demographic variables, the chapter then looks at the most commonly provided reasons for listening to music and how music choice is connected to certain emotions, focusing primarily on differences between age groups amongst respondents in the sample. Through this it develops an analysis of what appear to be the most common reasons that music is both listened to and avoided, before exploring when music appears to take on particular significance in individual and collective lives, and where and with whom music was listened to.

Chapter 6 develops explanations for the key trends outlined in Chapter 5. Drawing qualitatively on both open-ended responses provided in the online survey, and fragments from the life history sessions, it starts by making a distinction between how ‘positive’ and ‘negative’ emotions are characterised. It then moves on to discuss music’s use not only as a tool for emotional stimulation but also emotional management, noting the consistencies with existing concepts of masculinist rationality. It looks at how respondents were physically affected by music they both liked and disliked, before suggesting how age particularly impacts on ‘learning to become affected’ (Latour 2004). Locating changes in listening to changes in individual biographies, the chapter finally makes a case for shifting focus in musical sociology away from largely exploring youth.
Chapter 7 outlines what a theoretical critique of habitus adds to Connell’s concept of hegemonic masculinity, especially around emotions as socially embodied. It then links emotion and affect to a gender specific concept of habitus, before critiquing Bourdieuian approaches to music. The chapter moves on to discuss the importance of age in studies of masculinities, making a case for a discussion of males as opposed to men, demonstrating how affective, subjective positions are shaped by aging. The chapter discusses whether overtly emotional uses of music necessarily represent a reworking of gendered power relations, before suggesting avenues for further investigation. It finally concludes by noting the limitations of the data and the problems generally of drawing universally representative conclusions from it.

The concluding chapter summarises how the research questions outlined above have been addressed. Firstly it notes how masculinities, as affective attachments to gendered practices, are shaped in relation to other imaginary subject positions, highlighting the importance especially of age over the life course, in shaping narratives around these practices. It then discusses how space, place and time shaped the shifting uses of music for respondents in the survey and in the life history accounts. This links music’s changing homosocial function to an analysis of transforming gendered practices by age. Whilst the chapter draws attention to a continued distinction between ‘positive’ and ‘negative’ emotions, linked in Chapter 2 to ‘femininity’, it suggests a critique of males’ own understanding of masculinities as emotional suppression. On this point, the chapter observes that emotions can be deployed as forms of power in their own right. Finally, the chapter anticipates the argument that music is just entertainment and makes the claim that music continues to have an impact on how masculinities come to be shaped. Far from being trivialised as entertainment, music has the potential to affect individuals, be affected by groups and, most importantly, to affect change.
Chapter 1: Males and Masculinities

Introduction

Studies of men, males, ‘masculinity’ and masculinities, originated from a variety of academic strands of thought, political discourse and economic and social change (Brittan 1989; Edwards 2006; Seidler 2006a). Whether actively defending a notion of ‘maleness’ as intertwined with ‘masculinity’ (Bly 1990; Farrell 1993; Thomas 1993) or attempting to expose and therefore challenge the socially constructed nature of masculine privilege (Pleck 1981; Brittan 1989; Connell 1995; Petersen 1998; Hearn 2004), discussion in the area has largely been driven by questions arising from gender studies (Halberstam 1998; Butler 1998b; Edwards 2006) and a combination of educational (Willis 1977; Mac an Ghaill 1994) and Marxist theory (Connell 1987; Hearn 1987). Providing a nuanced account of the operations of power within gender studies more broadly, Connell’s (1995) work on hegemonic masculinity continues to be influential in conceptualising how men exert and retain power through the structural appropriation of ‘masculine’ behaviour. Central to his hypothesis is the role that culture plays in reinforcing dominant stereotypes and therefore identification with gender specific behaviour.

Connell’s (1995) thesis has however attracted some serious criticism (Wetherell and Edley 1999; Demetriou 2001; Connell and Messerschmidt 2005; McCormack 2011b) and has often been used uncritically without evaluation (Demetriou 2001). This indicates broader shifts to understand masculinities not simply as ontological structures of power, but as diverse, subjective, lived experiences, fraught with insecurities and incoherence (Segal 1990; Seidler 1994; 2006a; Aboim 2010; Monaghan and Robertson 2012; Robertson and Monaghan 2012). Materialist-inspired approaches to gender have been commonly sidetracked in favour of more discursive, poststructuralist, frameworks (Alcoff 1988) which look to interrogate men’s experience of masculinities in contemporary society. This is not to deny the material privilege accorded to many males by fiat of sex, but an attempt to deconstruct the disjunction between representations, reality and the powerlessness that many men experience personally.

3 Connell’s work throughout will be referred to as ‘his’ or ‘her’ work depending on the publication date and his/her self identification as the time as either Robert or Raewyn.
This chapter begins by outlining the origins of literature surrounding both men and masculinities as areas of sociological enquiry in feminist thought. It firstly notes crucial distinctions between sex and gender, provides a summary of the critique of universalisms and then notes some key economic and social changes which brought the question of men to the forefront of academic study. It then proceeds to discuss some of the key theoretical debates in the area, including Connell’s (1995) work on hegemonic masculinity, thematising the area generally into issues of power, embodiment and rationality, discussing how the three are intertwined historically. It will provide a critique of these Enlightenment positions before finally exploring the potential to develop more nuanced theories of subjective masculinities utilising Bourdieu’s (1977; 1984; 2001) concepts of field and habitus.

**Studies of Men, Studies of Masculinities**

**Sex and Gender**

Men’s privilege has been historically legitimated by appeals to biological, and therefore perceivably unchangeable, ‘natural’ sexual differences; approaches frequently categorised under the umbrella of essentialism (Connell 1987; Connell 1995). In essentialist thought, sexual inequalities are attributed to natural, ‘in-built’, unconscious, drives. Thus female exclusion from public life is explained with reference often to their biological (natural) role as mothers, restricting participation in political, economic and social affairs. Males and females according to this perspective have different and largely mutually exclusive roles and, in a capitalist society, where power is tied to public participation, such arguments serve as tools of symbolic and physical exclusion (Pateman 1988). Though there is significant disagreement around whether capitalism is a precondition of patriarchy (see Hearn 1987; Walby 1989; Gottfried 1998).

How nature is prefigured in academic debate is central to theorising sexual inequality. De Beauvoir (1988 [1953]) for example demonstrated that the means by which the figurative role of the mother and carer were perpetuated, were enforced by social rather than biological mechanisms. She infamously asserted that;

One is not born a woman rather one becomes a woman. No biological, psychological or economic fate determines the figure that the human female presents in society; it is civilization as a whole that produces this creature,
intermediate between male and eunuch, which is described as feminine (1988 [1953]: 295)

Her thesis aimed at the delegitimation of essentialist and functionalist arguments which advocated, either explicitly or implicitly, that sexual differentiation occurred ‘naturally’ or that female subordination could be explained by reference to nature. Second wave feminist thought challenged natural sexual differentiation through the concept of patriarchy (rule by the father), outlining that the systems and structures of privilege by which men perpetuated this oppression (see Walby 1989; 1990), of which essentialist rhetoric was one particular strategy, were socially produced.

Whilst appearing to reject essentialism however, the concept of patriarchy has been accused of tying all men, as a singular group, to the category of the oppressor by fiat of their naturally occurring biological differences (Acker 1989). This is problematic in that it suggests firstly that all men have power over all women, regardless of dynamics of class, race, ethnicity, disability, sexuality or age (Crenshaw 1989; Gottfried 1998). Against this claim Hearn (2004) has suggested patriarchy or more accurately patriarchies do not ‘downplay differences among and between men in terms of age, class ethnicity and other differences’ (2004: 51). Indeed the initial concept suggested unequal distribution of power between males within a given household (Walby 1989: 214) and as Hearn contends; “just as within capitalism, certain capitalists will be powerless [or] may be killed off in the struggle for competition, so too are certain men within patriarchy” (Hearn 1987: 43 original italics).

However a concept of patriarchy indicates that sexual equality can only be achieved by the struggle of females against men (hooks 2004b: xvi). This is precariously underlined by the same static vision of ‘natural’ difference which perpetuates those inequalities (for a more comprehensive critique of patriarchy, see Acker 1989; Pollert 1996; Gottfried 1998). The framework of patriarchy particularly suggests that equality may primarily be achieved through sexual, economic parity but this is parity between two sexes. Whilst Hearn has argued that patriarchy is ‘realism not essentialism’ (Hearn 1987: 42), this does little to account for the relationship of lesbian, gay, bisexual, transsexual, transgender or queer actors to the functional element of heterosexual reproduction (Hines 2006; 2010; Taylor, Hines and Casey 2011). As discussed later, it is possible for women to perform a version of ‘masculinity’ without being men (Halberstam 1998; 2012) and for males to perform a version of ‘femininity’ without being female (Francis 2010).
In contrast, as Rubin (2006: 90-91) notes, distinguishing sex from gender allows for an alternative way of conceptualising sexual identities and inequalities. She argues that:

…any society will have some systematic ways to deal with sex, gender and babies. Such a system may be sexually egalitarian, at least in theory, or it may be 'gender stratified'...it is important - even in the face of a depressing history - to maintain a distinction between the human capacity and the necessity to create a sexual world, and the empirically oppressive ways in which sexual worlds have been organized. Patriarchy subsumes both meanings into the same term. Sex/gender system, on the other hand, is a neutral term which refers to the domain and indicates that oppression is not inevitable in that domain, but it is the product of the specific social relations which organize it.

The significance of this distinction is that it clearly separates a discussion of males as physiologically constituted subjects, from the socially expectant behaviour produced at contextually and culturally specific times and spaces. Whilst structural imbalances are enforced along the lines of ‘natural’ difference, it is not necessarily the behaviour of men as such which is problematic. It is the behaviour of some groups of men labouring under the misapprehension that their behaviour is explained by an enactment of ‘universal’ sexual difference which is at fault (this is explained later in the chapter).

There are some issues noted below with regard to the idea of sex / gender systems being neutral. However whilst work exploring sexual inequality began by identifying the trends associated with men or males, it is masculinities as the symbolic group practices as well as the structural benefits accorded to some men (explored later in the chapter), which are often the means by which some men maintain privilege (Pleck 1981; Ehrenreich 1983; Carrigan, Connell and Lee 1985; Connell 1987; West and Zimmerman 1987; Brittan 1989; Segal 1990; Jefferson 1994; Connell 1995; MacInnes 1998; Connell and Wood 2005; Connell 2011).

In essence, whilst gendered practices and the way in which actors embody such practices, have changed over the course of the last two thousand years (Skeggs 1997; Forth 2008), the genetic make-up of male and female subjects has changed little; thus there is very little natural about natural behaviour. Studies of masculinities, as opposed to of men, are therefore politically efficacious due to their attention to behaviour exhibited by males which, if not intrinsically hardwired into the body, can challenge and
rework the unequal distribution of symbolic, political and economic power. It is important to stress that the concepts of gender and sex are demarcated throughout this thesis.

This seemingly simple distinction, between sex and gender, is open to further contestation however. As Alcoff (1988) has noted, some cultural feminists (Daly 1978; Rich 1987) have tended to celebrate gendered traits historically associated with the female sex. In this case it is the devaluation of traits which women perform which is problematic, not the category of woman as such. However in affirming these traits as de facto positive, this may actually reproduce masculinist discourses around women’s ‘natural’ roles (Alcoff 1988: 410). In celebrating either women as mothers or carers, or emphasising fundamental differences between men and women, such accounts do little to challenge wider structural inequalities (for example women’s access to the workplace and economic parity because of their natural ability to give birth) and may present gender as irrevocably tied to biological sex, and therefore unable to change.

There are clear problems with this approach in that if the category of woman represents a qualitative difference from that of man, then men must be fundamentally different from women. The danger in overstating such differences is that categories of natural difference can be used as a justification for domination as well as demands for political recognition (see Fuss 1991). If however, as Laqueur (1992) has argued, the way sexual difference is understood, is constructed by professional discourses which themselves represent configurations of power (medicine, biology, history), then there can be no intrinsic differences to sex which justify economic or social inequalities.

Laqueur’s (1992) argument, broadly, notes that because the move from a one-sex to two-sex model was (and still is) informed by the limits of human understanding, then the way societies understand fundamental sexual difference and categorisation can be contested; sexual difference itself is therefore subject to change. It is then necessary to interrogate from where, and by whom, knowledge about natural difference originates from; the simple answer in the case of Western thought would be ‘white, wealthy men’.

Alcoff (1988) however demonstrates that whilst neither cultural nor radical feminists privilege biological reductionism, a belief either in the spiritual qualities of life-giving, as structuring experiences unique to all females (1988: 410) or that biological factors play no part in shaping qualitatively different social experiences for males and females (1988: 421), renders a comprehensive understanding as to how we should approach sex and gender problematic. This is particularly the case with males’
and females’ relationships to the material processes associated with reproduction (Hearn 1987).

Whilst accepting that human knowledge, as to what is categorised as sex, is fallible, partial and ideologically driven, this is not to say that there may not be physical and physiological differences which influence perception, reception and behaviours unique to the experience of a sex. The limits to gendered behaviour appear then to be structured by social relations around current understanding of the primacy that biology has over socially conditioned behaviours. Thus the way which males and females act are informed by discursive practices which are, for the most part, not linked to their physiologies, even if such differences have a material reality.

Whilst categories of male and female are malleable, inasmuch as how they have been understood in professional discourses has changed⁴, they present an impression of enduring coherence in Western societies, whereby the categories help to structure social realities. Patterns of behaviour, associated with the category of sex, are however minimal in comparison to socially influenced gendered practices in contemporary, Western, society (see Marion Young 1980). This thesis therefore acknowledges that there are some material differences between bodies that cannot be physically transformed by a shift in language. However this still accepts that human knowledge is always partial and frequently discursively committed to ideological imperatives. Therefore such differences in sexed bodies’ relationship to reproduction, for example, should not account for inequality of opportunity or income. This acknowledges the merits of both structuralist and poststructuralist critiques, but utilises an important distinction between sex and gender.

**Universality and Intersectionality**

Central to the above debates, is underlying agreement that the discursive sites of knowledge production around sexual difference often stem from a problematic, universalist conception of experience, based on the judgments of very specific groups of males (doctors, psychologists and biologists for example). On this point, proponents of patriarchy and sex/gender systems are in agreement. The contributions of second wave feminist sociologists challenged the assumption that male dominated disciplines could speak universally of truths (Holmwood 2001: 984). This is particularly the case where

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⁴ And in the sense that transexuality and queer identities further complicates biologically reductionist binaries of male and female.
the linguistic devices employed when ‘mankind’ or ‘man’ is referred to invoke certain power relations, denoting the historical, political and material privilege enjoyed by men of certain classes, ages, races, sexualities and dispositions.

Undoubtedly those disseminating professional knowledge were mainly men of privileged backgrounds who failed to acknowledge that when they spoke in terms of the whole, they were speaking of a distinct experience of that whole of which they were a constituent part. Feminist critiques have therefore pointed to the ‘malestream’ (O’Brien 1978; 1981) universality of the social as much as the ‘natural’ sciences, precisely because women were often marked by their total absence (Haraway 1988). At the same time, this critique extends to the fact that authors theorising the reality of social or biological experience often failed to recognise themselves as gendered subjects in their own right.

The challenge to scientific method, for example, based on a universalist conception of positivistic social laws, demonstrated that supposedly objective methodologies could be distorted to suit certain malestream ends (see Hartsock 1983; Longino 1987; 1989; Harding 1996; Oakley 1998). Similarly, although heavily critiqued, Chodorow’s (1978) insight that the reproduction of mothering through socially circumscribed sex roles was learned rather than innate, proved a challenge to essentialist notions of maternal instinct. If essentialism incurred its own biases in its objectivity then ‘nature’, which tied women to the home, could be legitimately contested. If there was nothing natural about male domination or power then this brought those men in positions of authority under increasing scrutiny to justify their legitimacy.

Feminism’s key influence in taking men and masculinities as objects of enquiry in their own right, has been firstly to make the situatedness of all forms of knowledge (Haraway 1988) clear. A gendered critique of universal truth and experience clearly exposes the interests of men in preserving their invisibility (Oakley 1998) and thus their universality. The notion of intersectionality (Crenshaw 1989; 1991), as a critique of many second wave feminist positions, has also been important in deconstructing universalisms. It captured the idea that even within social categories there could be inequalities in the production of knowledge. This is explained later in the chapter.

5 Positivism as an ‘objective’ science for example has often formulated attempts to predict, regulate and ‘natural’ processes. Feminist critiques have pointed to how medical knowledge around female bodies has been generated through patriarchal institutions and that rationality, the cornerstone of ‘objectivity’, has often been defined as the ability to transcend biological functions. The idea of women’s ‘inability’ to think ‘rationally’ has been intertwined with a history of women’s capacity to give birth and has therefore gendered inequalities in the production of knowledge. This is explained later in the chapter.
multiple factors by which hierarchies operated to guarantee certain privileges, emerging in response to theories of inequality which spoke only in broad terms of sexual difference or conceptualised inequality as purely economic (Combahee River Collective 1981; Brah 1997; Skeggs 1997; Hines 2010; Taylor, Hines and Casey 2011). To this end, race, ethnicity, age, class, disability and sexuality were also later added to a growing list of intersectional categories that formed a matrix of disadvantage and a more complex picture of sexual inequalities.

The accompanying shift from conceptualising social structure as a determining force, reinforcing unequal distribution of advantage from above, to theorising the body as a dynamic product of discourse (Foucault 1979), habitus (Bourdieu 1984; McNay 2000; Bourdieu 2001; Adkins and Skeggs 2004) or performance (West and Zimmerman 1987; Butler 1998b), thus stressing the intersectionality of bodies, has helped to move away from ‘traditional’ notions of sexual difference as either wholly restrictive or entirely capricious. By focussing on the lived experience of the actors involved in the reproduction of discourse, this allowed for a theoretical shift which hinted at the malleability of a social reality as seemingly congruent as sex.

Whilst there is unease over the divisive connotations of intersectionality taking precedence over sex (Zack 2005), or even gender over class as merely ‘identity politics’ (Žižek 2010), it remains largely accepted that those subject to multiple stigmas will inevitably be at a greater material and social disadvantage. Rendering the universal fallible thus contested what constituted normative social experience. Simultaneously, it also meant that, if inequality was understood to be more complex than hierarchies of class or sex or race or sexuality, then it was perfectly legitimate to note that in some situations men may experience inequality and stigma too; especially within analyses of sex and / or gender.

**Economic, Educational and Social Change**

The academic origins of men’s studies can be found in the 1970’s, developing from and alongside feminist thought and studies of men and masculinities begin to develop more comprehensively in the 1980s and 1990s. However this was in intertwined with economic and social change occurring over the course of the twentieth century (Hearn 1987; Seidler 1994). For some, the challenge presented by feminist

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6 Though Connell and Messerschmidt (2005: 831) point out that as early as the 1950s, Hacker (1957) was writing about the potential for a change in ‘masculinity’. 
thought, represented a positive attempt to break with a history of oppression and to deconstruct an ideal of ‘masculinity’ whose criteria many seemed unable to fulfil, unwilling to adopt, or ultimately, oppressed by (Pleck 1981; Carrigan, Connell and Lee 1985; Hearn 1987; Connell 1995; Pleck 1995; Hearn 2004). However as a backlash against economic and social gains made by feminism particularly (Faludi 1992; 1999; Edwards 2006), research into the nature of male identities also tended to bemoan a ‘crisis of masculinity’, perceiving white, heterosexual males as the victims of feminist oppression (Bly 1990; Murray 1990; Farrell 1993; Thomas 1993; Benatar 2012).

Central to the latter’s claims is the notion that male economic and political ubiquity is in decline and work, considered integral to men’s gendered identities (Segal 1990; Collinson and Hearn 1996; Connell 1998; Hearn 1999), has historically operated to guarantee men personal and political power through access to capital. Perceptions around women’s inability to work efficiently, have the same physical strength as men and develop caring (or maternal) instincts, coupled with the belief that males are more suited for rational (white collar) or manual (blue collar) work, traditionally excluded many women from many work places (Hearn 1987; Acker 1990; Britton 2000; Roper 2003; Connell 2009).

The Second World War, in the U.K. challenged such attitudes however. It proved a paradox in that women were seen as unable to display many of the physical attributes necessary to be a good soldier, however they were also needed to take the physically demanding, manual labour jobs previously accorded to men in order to keep the munitions factories running. In essence, whilst war often provides the most culturally visible markers of ‘masculinity’ (Connell 1995: 213), this display would have been futile without women working the ‘traditionally masculine’ manual labour jobs in order to support the narrative of the heroic soldier (Summerfield 1989).

In the aftermath of the Second World War, despite UK women working in the munitions factories to support the war effort, the male breadwinner model was systematized through social policy to ensure the economic viability of single earner households (Creighton 1999: 523). This was achieved by forcing women out of jobs which guaranteed some form of economic autonomy and also undoubtedly helped to shape the women’s liberation movement’s demands for equal rights and pay as they emerged throughout the 1960s and ‘70s (Mann 1992).

After the economic prosperity of the post-war years, with the freeing up of trade in the West and the increasing affluence of the youth market in these economies
(Bennett 2001), the economic recession of the late 1970’s and 1980’s impacted on ‘traditional’ notions of labour and male employment in the UK in several ways (Hakim 1992; McDowell 2000). Firstly, widespread economic recession led to high levels of unemployment. This was in contrast to the post-war period of relatively low unemployment where, despite protestations, the male breadwinner was still deemed economically viable and politically desirable (Creighton 1999). In the UK this was particularly the case with many blue collar industries (mines, steelworks and shipbuilding), which were closed or privatised and moved abroad in the 1980s. This led to higher levels of unemployment in sectors that involved manual labour and contributed to geographically and sexually disparate economic effects (Hakim 1992). It inevitably challenged notions of physical manual labour as important to sustaining the breadwinner model for certain men (Nayak 2003) and the shrinking of the UK’s public sector. The mobility of global capital, as a result of successive neoliberal governments (Harvey 2005), has also seen the reshaping of gendered economic power for many working class households particularly (Connell 1993: 618).

Male headed households after the Second World War were often supported by social policy which guaranteed the fiscal viability of single-wage earner families. New Labour’s post-1997 policy emphasis on dual earner households, in contrast, underpinned the changing economic structure caused by de-industrialisation. Their policies, including greater stress on fathers as carers as well as dual-earners, was guided by a distinctly economic imperative (Scourfield and Drakeford 2002; Kilkey 2006), which helped to further entrench unequal access to opportunities amongst those adhering to notions of the sole income earner. Where men in households are not the sole, main or even partial income earner, power in the form of an historic, economic monopoly has arguably declined.

Secondly, the growth of the tertiary sector as a lower paid, unskilled alternative to ‘traditional’ manual labour jobs provided an inconsistent substitute to manual labour’s ideological function. The service sector placed emphasis on skills incongruent with historic constructions of ‘masculinity’ (McDowell 2000: 204; Roberts 2011) due to stress on the ability to empathise, take on non-manual, sedentary labour and be deferent.

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7 Though it should be noted that in many families, especially those with young children, women are still more likely than men to take part time work or take on unpaid caring labour duties than men; both quantitatively and qualitatively (see Craig 2006). Women also still earn significantly less than men in similar occupations and 79% of the median, gross, annual male wage (ONS 2012: 4). It is therefore wrong to suggest that women’s entry into the labour market has totally destabilised male economic dominance.
to the customer. This challenged both the physicality of an embodied ‘masculinity’ and the importance of ‘manly’ work for the development of a coherent gender identity. Tertiary sector industries valorised those characteristics which had, until relatively recently, been considered an unproblematic component of women’s natural capabilities (see Roper 2003: 192). Invariably, there was a slow increase of women in the labour market from the 1960s onwards, both as a result of legislative gains and occupational shifts in many Western economies.

Alongside these economic changes, as Edwards (2006: 8-9) highlights, increasing media focus on the educational attainment gap between male and female children in schools has also been instrumental in developing theories of males and masculinities. Academic approaches attempted to understand why boys were ‘under-achieving’ in comparison to their female counterparts and the perceived discrimination against, or the failure of males in comparison to, females, has also contributed to the male-as-victim approaches.

Again, however, universalist assumptions of male under-achievement are demonstrably flawed. Against the backdrop of economic recession, Willis’ (1977) work Learning to Labour emphasised that working class male cultures prioritised certain versions of masculinities, which are not conducive to educational participation. Occupational opportunities he noted became shaped by notions around gendered identity and thus educational ‘failure’ was class as well as sex-specific; only some males were under achieving. Willis’ work, and latterly Mac an Gháill’s (1994), situated a plurality of masculinities within the context of schooling and thus preparation for work, demonstrating how adolescence and education came to reproduce a multiplicity of gendered expectations.

The broader scope of civil rights movements both in the U.K. and the U.S.A. also impacted on ‘traditional’ notions of male identity. The effect of the ‘69 Stonewall Riots, a rejection of a heterosexist ethos (Levine 1979; D'Emilio 1992: 91-93), proved a challenge to normative, Western, heterosexual male identity. These actions by a group of men who had, historically, often been regarded as possessing ‘feminine’ traits (Chauncey 1995; Plummer 1995) and were therefore assumed to be weaker, used physical violence directly against a heterosexist, ‘masculine’ institution (the police) asserting resistance against domination by the state.

Demands for economic and political legitimacy, freedom and equality, previously denied to homosexual men on the grounds that they were the pathological
inverts of normality (Weeks 1977a; 1977b; 1995), sparked by the gay liberation movement, challenged the essentialist assumptions of what ‘normal’ male identity was. If a male could perform ‘masculinity’ yet take another male as an object of desire, what was normal masculinity? Similarly as Halberstam (1998) notes, the unsettling effect on gendered assumptions by the visibility of ‘butch’ lesbians also undermines the naturalness of gender, instead presenting gender and sexuality in largely performative terms (see Butler 1998b).

There was also an increased visibility of gay and black men in the public sphere (Demetriou 2001), following black and gay civil rights movements, further undermining the ideological role of the ‘traditional’ white, heterosexual, male breadwinner (Crompton 2001) on which the universal, normative, male identity was premised. Thus these changes brought into question the seeming normality of universal identities generally (Connell 1987; Fuss 1991), which in turn challenged many of the generalised trends which the social sciences especially had also observed as universal. These changes, as previously noted, were both influenced by and in turn influenced sociological literature around masculinities.

Epistemological shifts did not develop in isolation either from academic or wider social changes, however both had the effect of questioning fundamental assumptions as to what was natural about male privilege and identity. As highlighted, such changes questioned certain assumptions about the naturalness and singularity of both males and masculinities. Similarly, if neither sex nor gender could legitimately explain economic, political or social power, then both were open to contestation. It is necessary then to turn to how masculinities have been characterised in sociological literature, before developing a conceptual analysis of key work in the area.

Key Themes in Sociological Theories of Masculinities

What is ‘Masculinity’, what are Masculinities?

Institutional and theoretical shifts characterised attempts to understand why males acted in certain ways. The move toward studying gendered behaviour as something not inevitably linked to biological imperatives was also paramount in taking both males and masculinities as objects of social enquiry (Ramazanoglu 1992). Despite resistance to what has been perceived often as a constructionist essentialism, or the idea that all behaviours can be explained by linguistic production, most theorists accept both
biological and social factors as informing gendered practice; where they differ is the extent to which biology and socialisation play significant parts. Whilst acknowledging the contributions made by the natural sciences to understanding sexual difference, for reasons of academic remit this thesis only explores emergent themes in studies of masculinities within the social sciences.

There is little consensus as to what ‘masculinity’ in sociological literature is. ‘Masculinity’ infers a singular, normative stance which, in the same way in which male experience cannot be considered universal, does not adequately cover the experience of multiple groups, or the ways in which men’s power is exercised. Thus it is often more appropriate to discuss what masculinities do. Accordingly, social science literature concerned with the subject of masculinities generally focuses on the behaviours that have been taken to be defining features of different types of ‘masculinity’ or, for the purpose of this thesis, masculinities.

Violence (Segal 1990; 1993; Kimmel 1996; Hearn 1998a; Kimmel and Mahler 2003; Kimmel 2007), economic, symbolic or political dominance (Connell 1995; Bourdieu 2001), sexuality (Simpson 1994; Plummer 2001), homosociality (Messner 2001; Flood 2008), a valorisation of rationality (Seidler 1994; Galasinski 2004; Seidler 2006a) and/or emotional repression or detachment (Stapley and Haviland 1989; Kring and Gordon 1998; Fischer and Manstead 2000; Wong, Pituch and Rochlen 2006; Ezzell 2012), control over the body (Petersen 1998) and distancing from, or repression of the discursively ‘feminine’ (McCormack and Anderson 2010; McCormack 2011a), have all been linked to constructions and performances of masculinities.

Masculinities should be viewed as a social problem (Connell 1993) inasmuch as they may be used to legitimise male material privilege (Carrigan, Connell and Lee 1985; Connell 1987; 1995), explain homophobia (Herek and Berrill 1992; Plummer 2001; Kimmel 2007; McCann, Minichello and Plummer 2009), provide false justifications for sexual inequalities (Hearn and Parkin 1983; Hearn 1987; Segal 1990), or are held up as unattainable ideals of manhood (Petersen 1998). On this last point, whether they are discursively constituted or structurally imposed, identification with the concept of masculinity is often argued to lead to distress (Messner 1997; Thompson 1997; Messner 2001; Bottamini and Ste-Marie 2006; Wong, Pituch and Rochlen 2006), manifesting itself in symbolic and / or physical violence, exploitation and insecurity (Seidler 1994; Galasinski 2004; hooks 2004b; Seidler 2006a).
The process by which certain behaviours come to be perceived as ‘masculine’ is complex. There is agreement however that knowledge as to what constitutes ideas around ‘masculinity’ and ‘masculine behaviour’ is influenced by structural change (Connell 1995; Hearn 1999) and historical discourse (Jefferson 1994; MacInnes 1998; Petersen 1998; 2004). Cultural context is therefore vital for understanding the importance attached to masculinities in any given time and space so it is first necessary then to understand how ‘masculinity’ in the West has been theorised in recent literature, as well as tracing Western masculinities’ various lineages, in order to further explore some of the aforementioned.

This thesis therefore argues that masculinities in the West are a series of concepts, values, norms and desires that are performed largely (though not exclusively) by those ascribed the sexual category of male (Segal 1990; Connell 1995; Petersen 1998; Kimmel and Messner 2001; Whitehead and Barrett 2001; Forth 2008). Masculinities are frameworks of power inasmuch as structural inequalities are maintained through individual and collective practice, manifest in symbolic practices of choice (discussed later in relation to the concept of habitus), performance and embodied experience. As already highlighted in the introduction this is a position sympathetic to both second and third wave positions in the study of male identities (Edwards 2006), which sees power as multidirectional and identities as fluid. However it is the durability of socially affective experience (discussed in depth in Chapter 2) which helps to ensure the impression of gendered stability.

Masculinities or femininities as a performance of, or identification with, gendered behaviours, should also be understood as separate from the biological reproductive organs by which male or female sexes are designated (Unger 1979; West and Zimmerman 1987; Butler 1998b; Rubin 2006). The performances which underpin structural inequalities, it is argued, are socially produced and have little, if any, roots in biological difference (Connell 1987: 71). Whilst Halberstam’s (1998) critique of the common conflation between ‘masculinity’ and the male sex is important, in view of much of the literature it appears too abstracted from patterns of privilege to deconstruct ‘masculinity’ in total isolation from the male body. This is apparent especially in light of theoretical discussion around structural or discursive influences, which encourage males to adhere to certain notions of ‘masculinity’ and ‘masculine’ behaviour. There is very little natural basis to ‘masculinity’ (Connell 1987; Jefferson 1994) but the
performance of certain behaviours, identified above, are undeniably shaped by constructions of sexual difference.

For these reasons, this thesis proceeds on the assumption that when authors discuss ‘masculinity’ and masculinities they refer to a collection behaviours which are most often, though not exclusively, attached to the male sex and are performed in a multitude of ways dependent on cultural context and intersections of socially circumscribed categories. In turning now to how masculinities have been characterised in the literature, around the themes of power, embodiment and reason, this chapter will then proceed to explore problematic concepts around the different themes emergent within sociological literature around masculinities.

**Masculinities as Power**

Whilst as already noted, there appears to be a divide between pro-feminist and anti-feminist undercurrents in the literature on masculinities, power is a key theme which runs throughout. Questions as to what power is, who has power and how power is exerted and (re)produced, are the central concerns of most key texts. To draw boundaries between various perspectives often misses similarities apparent in each and when analysed, a much closer theoretical allegiance to similar strands of thought is revealed; even if the political ends to which these theories are put differ enormously (see Kimmel 1995; Hearn 1998b; 2004).

The perceived decline in almost complete male economic and occupational dominance, since the early 1900s at any rate, represents a worrying erosion of men’s power for some. In this case power is defined by the material advantage that men enjoy as a result of the practices of masculinities. This may at first seem antithetical to those positions which advocate the deconstruction of hierarchies which subordinate women and ‘other’ males. However, for both, power is perceived in a largely Marxist fashion whereby capital, in whatever form it takes, is inevitably linked to economic power and exercised by the dominant on the less dominant. Indeed much theorising around masculinities is indebted to Marxist as much as feminist critique (Hearn 1987; Donaldson 1993; Hearn 1998b).

Connell’s (Carrigan, Connell and Lee 1985; Connell 1987; 1995) work has been influential in developing the field of inquiry into ‘masculinity’ as a form of social control and privilege which adopts this conceptualisation of power. His use of the Gramscian concept of hegemony, applied through the advocacy of hegemonic
masculinity, has been discussed at length and widely utilised (Donaldson 1993; Messerschmidt 1993; Renold 2001; Hearn 2004; Connell and Messerschmidt 2005; Emslie, Ridge, Ziebland and Hunt 2006; Beasley 2008; McCormack and Anderson 2010; McCormack 2011a; Hearn, Nordberg, Andersson et al. 2012; Messerschmidt 2012). The phrase hegemonic masculinity continues to dominate discussion as to how exactly ‘masculinity’ reproduces dominance not only over women, but over other men. Connell defines hegemonic masculinity as:

The configuration of gender practice which embodies the currently accepted answer to the problem of the legitimacy of patriarchy which guarantees (or is taken to guarantee) the dominant position of men and the subordination of women (1995: 77)

By highlighting the ‘problem of the legitimacy of patriarchy’, Connell critically examines and challenges how ‘masculinity’ is legitimated as something inextricable from patriarchy. Hegemony in this context refers to a reliance on representations of masculinities, which reinforce dominant normative positions of gender identity and seek to subordinate femininities and ‘marginal’ (1995: 80) and ‘subordinate’ (1995: 78) masculine positions. The reproduction of dominant forms of ‘masculinity’, as configurations of power, rely on cultural representations which correspond with institutional privilege (1995: 77) and the reproduction of inequalities therefore hinges on actions naturalised as ‘masculine’ through cultural representations (film, television, magazine) and institutional pressure.

Connell is keen to stress however that hegemonic masculinity is fluid, malleable and subject to change, but it is nevertheless this ‘currently accepted answer’, in whatever form it takes, which accords ‘masculinity’ material and symbolic privileges. His work is especially important for its attention to the interplay of other factors such as ethnicity, class and sexuality and their impact on gender, for explaining how other masculinities become subordinated or marginalised (ibid.). Thus, as with Gramsci’s original concept, power should be perceived as relational and through Connell’s addition of dominant, marginal, complicit and subordinate positions within the gender order, he adds a further layer of complexity to the sex / gender distinction already outlined.

Whilst the concept of hegemonic masculinity has been influential in explaining ‘masculinity’ as a set of power relations, linked to culture but inevitably tied to material privilege, as Demetriou (2001: 338) suggested “although numerous empirical researchers have made use of this concept, there has been almost no attempt to evaluate
its theoretical merit”. Whilst Connell and Messerschmidt (2005) and Messmerschmidt (2012) have offered subsequently detailed evaluations of the term, its uncritical use in studies of men is a valid critique; particularly where it is misapplied as a type or trait (Hearn, Nordberg, Andersson et al. 2012: 44). In fact, partially as a result of such misunderstandings there may be a case for returning to thinking critically about men rather than masculinities (see Hearn 2004).

However Demetriou’s most poignant critique is that there is an implicit external / internal hegemony in both Connell’s and Gramsci’s work, whereby the dominant groups (white, middle class men for Connell and the Bourgeoisie for Gramsci) coerce others through institutional constraint and economic inequality (external), but that the subordinated groups are also complicit in accepting and (relationally) constructing the dominant positions through interaction (internal). Demetriou critiques Connell for his valorisation of external over internal hegemony, claiming;

Whereas for Gramsci the process [of internal hegemony] is essentially a dialectical one that involves reciprocity and mutual interaction between the class that is leading and the groups that are led, Connell understands the process in a more elitist way where subordinate and marginalized masculinities have no effect on the construction of the hegemonic model. (2001: 345)

Connell’s discussion of marginal or subordinate masculinities, framed almost entirely in terms of economic and political power, often underplays the processes by which, in certain culturally specific contexts, marginal (black or working class) masculinities or subordinate (homosexual) masculinities may themselves carry “symbolic freight” (Connell 1995: 143). This neglects the role of so-called marginal masculinities in shaping dominant positions. For example, how images of black men, ‘effeminate’ men or homosexual men in popular media are read or even exalted at times, is too complex to be explained by linear hierarchies of dominant / marginal / subordinate. Whilst Connell hints at this in his discussion of black athletes in America, he does little to elucidate this relationship further (Demetriou 2001: 346), instead judging the lack of corresponding institutional power to be indicative of black men’s marginal status.

The breadth of Connell’s writing on masculinities cannot be sufficiently covered here (see Connell 1983; Carrigan, Connell and Lee 1985; Connell 1987; 1995; 1998; 2005; Connell and Messerschmidt 2005; Connell and Wood 2005; Connell 2006; 2008; 2009; 2011). What is important to note however is the way in which hegemonic
masculinity has been appropriated and arguably distorted to suggest a type of person rather than a series of configurations (Hearn 2004: 58) which secure male privilege. What is also important to retain is Connell’s fundamental insight that masculinities are relational, fluid and subject to both revision and reproduction.

**Masculinities as Embodiment**

The apparent lack of subjectivity is also a common critique of Connell’s (1995) concept of hegemonic masculinity (Jefferson 1994; MacInnes 1998; Petersen 1998; Wetherell and Edley 1999; Coles 2009; Aboim 2010) and is acknowledged in subsequent articles (Connell 2005; Connell and Messerschmidt 2005). However whilst hegemonic masculinity is still invoked as a staple explanation for male behaviour (see Renold 2001; Allen 2007; Johansson and Klinth 2008; Ashley 2010; Dempster 2011) the issue of subjectivity is still largely under-theorised within studies of masculinities generally.

Contrary to more structuralist accounts which theorise power as a hierarchy, Foucauldian inspired accounts have tended to theorise power as operating in a more polymorphous fashion in relation to masculinities (Mosse 1996; Petersen 1998; Garlick 2003). Foucault (1979) contends that wherever power is exercised in any form there is always resistance; thus resistance can also be a form of power. This has raised the question of whether masculinities necessarily assert dominance primarily in material terms. The focus instead, in line with Foucault’s analysis of discursive strategies, is to view power as a product of multiple, competing, discourses which can be, but are not always, tied to structural interests.

It is not then, as Foucault (1979: 100) argues, a case of “accepted discourse and excluded discourse, or between the dominant discourse and the dominated one; but as a multiplicity of discursive elements that can come into play in various strategies”. Crucially this means that beliefs about different male bodies, behaviours, naturalness, normalness and masculinities, are a product of competing sources of knowledge. Therefore the key to challenging male power is to deconstruct and reshape these sources of knowledge around masculinities as ‘natural’.

In *Female Masculinity* Halberstam (1998) critiques the frequent conflation of (male) sex with (masculine) gender, thus providing a general critique which can be applied to much of the previously discussed literature. Whilst she does not mention Connell specifically, her work is highly critical of theories of masculinities which,
although separating man from ‘masculinity’, explain ‘masculinity’ as a form of power but only as the exclusive property of the male body. Her semiotic analysis of butch / femme lesbian relationships and sexual / gender deviance, challenges the commonly held assumption that ‘masculinity’ only operates when attached to the sexual category of male. She accuses Smith’s (1996) work, which operates in a similarly structuralist fashion to Connell’s, of “a slightly old fashioned feminism that understands women as endlessly victimized within systems of male power”8 (Halberstam 1998: 17).

One of the key critiques of hegemonic masculinity, important for this thesis, is that as Connell and Messerschmidt (2005: 851) note, hegemonic masculinity lacks an adequate theory of ‘social embodiment’. Perhaps more precisely, there is a lack of understanding as to how masculinities, as embodied experiences shaped by social circumstance, can be reinterpreted and therefore reworked. Central to this question then is how the materiality of the body is treated in studies of masculinities.

As Halberstam (1998: 19) contends “studies in male masculinity are predictably not so interested in taking apart the patriarchal bonds between white maleness and privilege”. However some theorists have attempted to separate ‘masculinity’ from the male body through notions of discourse, whilst looking at how ‘masculinity’ has historically relied on the link to the male body for its legitimacy. What becomes apparent here is that masculinities are sets of practices which appear to naturalise male behaviour, but that this behaviour is embodied as deeply engrained experience, as well as cognitively performative (see West and Zimmerman 1987; Butler 1998b). It therefore becomes almost impossible to separate versions of ‘masculinity’ as a mode of power relations, from the male body, even if both are discursively constructed.

In a similar fashion to Laqueur, Petersen (1998: 42) asserts;

Although Western discourses of masculinity tend to take as given the materiality of the male body upon which a male gender is inscribed, the very materiality of the body can be seen to be an artefact of the modern discourses through which it is represented.

Power, in terms of which bodies matter, is certainly not, in his view, removed from structural forces and as he states;

8 This critique can also be extended to Connell’s (Connell 1995) conclusions around subordinated (p.78) and marginalized (p.79) masculinities because, as already noted, Connell’s categories seem to have no impact on dominant configurations of gender, underplaying the challenge to structural inequalities by ‘subordinated’ and ‘marginalized’ groups (Connell and Messersschmidt 2005).
Clearly some male bodies do matter more than others. It goes without saying that bodies have a different materiality in that they come in a large variety of shapes, colours and sizes...what is not widely recognised or acknowledged, however, is that this materiality is itself an effect of power (Petersen 1998: 42)

Developing a nuanced epistemology, Petersen attempts to explain why some male bodies matter more in certain contexts than others, looking towards cultural and paradigmatic shifts for explanation, but does not reject the importance of discursive conceptions of sex in the way different forms of power operate.

The question then turns to how power is exerted over the body and how discourses surrounding ethnicity, sexuality, class, gender relations or age affect masculinities. Petersen fully concedes that there are inequalities manifesting themselves in material and symbolic differences and that some bodies (discursively constructed though they may be) are contextually more powerful than others. This places the importance of historic context, squarely at the centre of how knowledge around different bodies is produced. Only through such an understanding can established patterns of power be challenged as contingent.

Utilising a Foucauldian genealogy, detailing paradigmatic shifts in the conceptualisation of the ‘ideal’ male body, Petersen (1998: 41-71) draws on feminist and queer studies to explain ‘masculinity’s’ performative yet discursively constituted nature. Through this, he demonstrates that it is subject to competing, contradictory, multi-faceted logics, which are produced and maintained through historically enforced discourse, rather than just through structural identification with cultural bearers of masculinity.

His work on racialised discourses accounts for differences in current perceptions of racialised masculinities, which may not simply be seen as hegemonic or marginal, suggesting that identification with culture is not unilateral. Knowledge then is produced through the dissemination of professional and public treatments surrounding masculinities, such as the ‘work ethic’ (Petersen 1998: 48) and the ‘natural sex drive’, in the psycho-sciences especially (1998: 57). These discourses however, although seemingly conflated with the male sex and inevitably linked to it, do not always operate (if they have ever operated) in harmony with male bodies.

Despite the merits of Petersen’s work there is, as outlined in the earlier discussion in relation to sex, a tendency toward constructionist determinism which,
whilst exposing the tenuous relationship between masculinities and power, reifies ‘masculinity’ as psychologically fixed practice. In favouring a Foucauldian conception of polylateral power, he ignores the intrapsychic contradictions (Wetherell and Edley 1999) that appear to motivate behaviour and questions of material privilege are sometimes lacking in how bodies come to be constructed. For example there is evidence to suggest that certainly in schools, young black males may suffer both structurally and psychologically from negative labelling in many respects (Sewell 1997; Connolly 1998), even if they may be valorised for their ‘masculine’ behaviour (Majors 2001).

Forth’s (2008) work detailing the evolution of Western masculinity, as a product of civilization, draws on notions of historical change as constructing certain, often contradictory, masculine ideals. In a similar vein to Petersen, he posits that, epistemologically, the ‘masculine’ body has been produced, explaining that behaviour (understood as gender) for both sexes, was medicalised during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries; this accounts for the common conflation of ‘masculinity’ with maleness. Forth’s work is similar to Petersen’s in many respects, but he further explores how ideals of ‘masculinity’ can be sustained in the face of parallel logics. His work on the evolution of manners in ‘civilized’ society draws heavily on Elias (1994) in questioning how white, heterosexual, middle class, ‘masculinity’ managed to reconcile power as strength, with symbolic blurring with effeminacy through the adoption of luxury and the cultural shift toward a more sedentary lifestyle. Forth attributes this to a balancing act, arguing that;

By the end of the eighteenth century the complexity of definitions of masculinity was such that no one man could hope to embody all the recommended qualities under the given conditions of modern civilization, with the greatest tension revolving around the contradictions between physical as opposed to moral or mental attributes (2008: 42)

‘Masculinity’ came to require the personal performance of multiple, often seemingly incompatible attributes; something which Petersen appears to underestimate. Notions of refinement, reified the emergent gentleman as an ideal type, both in cultural representation and popular consciousness, but undermined the ideas of physical strength and toughness as integral to ‘manliness’. Thus ‘masculinity’ in the eighteenth century is viewed by Forth as a precarious but powerful force, which resolved such contradictions
through maintaining the appearance of effortless control, including regulating posture, emotional display and manners;

…emotional displays were acceptable but must not be excessive, lest a man ‘become wholly effeminate, full of apprehension and the plaything of his imaginations and passions’.

The construction of the nation as a quasi-organic totality thus depended upon the reconstruction of manhood along corporeal as well as moral lines (2008: 47).

‘Masculinity’, according to Forth, was able to subsume the contradictory ‘masculine’ elements that the emergence of bourgeois society highlighted, by embodying power in a new way; as an external manifestation of internal moral fortitude.

**Rationality and Embodiment**

Petersen (1998) notes that the term ‘masculinity’ in English has a clear relation to the French *masculine* and the Latin *masculinus* which were taken simply to mean ‘male’. As he highlights, though both these terms can be located in the fourteenth century “the word ‘masculinity’ appeared only in the mid-eighteenth century...It appeared at that very moment in history when efforts were beginning to be made to define manhood and womanhood in terms of distinct bodily criteria” (1998: 42).

Forth (2008) however draws attention to the earlier distinction between sex and gender in historical discourse, noting that ‘masculinity’ came to mean something different from male behaviour. He demonstrates that whilst the German concept of *mannlich* “(an obvious cognate of the English word manly) was defined in robustly martial terms...during the 1780s these ideals were complemented by more ‘civic’ qualities like learnedness, seriousness, wisdom and gravity” (2008: 42). This indicates that it is not necessarily being male which can be taken as a guarantee of ‘masculinity’.

Both Petersen’s (1998) and Forth’s (2008) analyses of the fabricated ideal male body as a product of discursive power, hinge on an understanding of Cartesian duality; specifically in relation to how the body and mind are conceptualised as different and often opposing forces. Descartes’ influential *Meditations on First Philosophy*, or his notion of ‘cogito ergo sum’, stressed the fallibility of existence by virtue of existing,

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10 See Demetriou (2001) for discussion on ‘hybridization’ and Butler’s (1998b) work on ‘gender melancholia’.
indicating that it was only possible to know one’s own thoughts, and thus existence, through one’s mind. This had the effect of discursively separating the mind, with the brain as the organ most frequently linked to cognition, from the body in academic thought, culture and political rhetoric. In doing so, this privileged the transcendence of bodily instincts as fundamental to ethical human and therefore legitimately exercised power.

This view is symptomatic of an Enlightenment reading of Western masculinities and the Enlightenment, as a period of great significance for the development of the sexual sciences (Weeks 1977a; Foucault 1979; Weeks 1980; Sedgwick 1990; Weeks 2000), strove to expand comprehension of the human body along principles of rationality, logic, efficiency and reason (Wright Mills 1959; Kilminster 1998; Callinicos 2007). It is also during the Enlightenment that clear guidelines on conduct were established, tying ‘moral’ to rational behaviour (Bauman 1994), particularly with regards to disciplining sexual difference (Seidler 1994; Skeggs 1997).

‘Masculinity’, as a trait of the ‘healthy’ male body, therefore became discursively acquired through professional knowledge and concerted, rational effort. The belief that the universal, white, Western, male body was better equipped for certain activities due to physiological differences from women and other men, guarded the kind of material and political advantages discussed earlier, which have historically been the property of white, middle class men. Scientific discoveries of such ‘natural facts’ were accorded legitimacy because they were based on principles of rational, objective detachment from the object of enquiry. It was through the often (still) undisputed assertions of scientific facts that the natural capabilities of men and women were also established.

As Seidler (1994: 24) notes, in professional discourses “the only knowledge we [as the ‘lay’ person] can have of our bodies can be discounted as ‘subjective’ and ‘emotional’. It is personal and therefore inevitably partial. At most it yields opinion, but it can never deliver the supposed objectivity of knowledge”. He highlights the link between the masculinist ideal of autonomy and a Kantian conception of transcendental reason, which developed a link between objective, transcendental truth and improper knowledge through humans’ linguistic limitations. It is this appeal to ‘objectivity’ as something which can be impartial because it is not controlled by animal instincts, which is fundamental to understanding how reason was accorded its legitimacy.
The notion of ‘reasonable’ and rational thought as desirable, as Seidler again argues, has become so imbued within both sociological tradition and popular perspective that it is often uncritically reinforced. He states that “[a]s men we are so used to exercising control over reason and language that we barely recognise situations when we do this. We are so ready to offer solutions to that situation assuming that this is what we are being called on to do, that we rarely learn to listen” (Seidler 1994: 29). The discursively enforced belief that men were naturally more equipped for rational, detached thought, meant that reason and rationality were inevitably conferred as medical properties of those who espoused it; men of certain status who were likely to hold influential positions of power.

Vitally, the Enlightenment also had implications for how emotions came to be conceptualised as merely bodily reactions. As Barbalet (2001: 34) notes, the Cartesian subject could not take responsibility for their emotions, given that emotions were, Descartes argued “not things that persons do, but what their bodies do to them”; they could however make efforts to control them. Central to seeing reason as a disinterested force for social good then, was the disavowal of emotion as an irrational, impulsive, ‘uncivilized’ force for chaos; something that could and should be controlled.

Undoubtedly, medicalised understandings of sexual difference shaped belief in the capacities of both sexes for rational thought and behaviour. Shildrick (1997) for example identifies how women were judged to be ‘more emotional’, because of their inability to regulate their ‘leaky’, ‘uncontrolled’ bodies (they were capable of having children and menstruated). She demonstrates that women were presumed to be more tied to their biologies than men and as emotions were perceived as biological facts (see Chapter 2). This had the effect of gendering and polarising both emotionality and rationality as ‘natural’ properties. Advances in biology and psychology may have firmly rejected archaic notions of the wandering womb (Showalter 1987) and hysteria, however it was only following the First World War that the latter term was first applied to men (Creed 1990: 130) and, as outlined in the introduction, still retains sexually pejorative undertones in colloquial terms.

Because emotions were perceived as uncontrolled responses, overt emotional expression was necessarily seen as a failure of autonomy and thus compromised a man’s ‘masculinity’. This was not to deny that men did not have emotion, merely that

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11 It was largely believed during Ancient Greek, Egyptian and Roman times that women suffered from hysteria because their wombs travelled around their bodies and that the closer to the brain the womb came, the more irrational, hysterical and emotional a woman would become (see Showalter 1987)
certain men were more equipped to control them. As Skeggs (1997) notes this autonomous ideal which is guaranteed by the individual’s ability to act rationally “stresses detachment from others, the ability either to coldly calculate the odds, unswayed by emotion or to pursue ends ultimately motivated by rational self-interest” (Skeggs 1997: 119).

A further discussion of bodily emotions characterised in contrast to rationality is taken up in Chapter 2, however it is important to stress that the mind / body, rational / emotional duality in much of the literature surrounding the creation and maintenance of masculinities, is a vital concept. This has historically been a key source of power for both men and masculinities (Hearn 1993; Putnam and Mumby 1993; Seidler 1994; Connell 1995; Galasinski 2004; Petersen 2004; Connell and Messerschmidt 2005; Connell and Wood 2005; Seidler 2006a); something that presents itself as objective and free from self-interest whilst guaranteeing the interests of those who invoke it.

**Masculinities as Emotional Attachments**

Masculinities in the West have then, in part, also been constructed linguistically through professional discourses, as well as economic, social and political restructuring. Particularly those surrounding rationality, stemming from Enlightenment philosophies which perceived certain emotions as the uncontrollable preserve of female (Wittig 1980; Irigaray 1985; Wittig 1985; de Beauvoir 1988 [1953]) and othered male bodies. Thus privileges accorded to the male sex are often presumed to be bound up with mastery over the emotional, uncontrolled, body which operates as a form of gendered capital (see Bridges 2009).

Feminist critiques of objective, scientific, methodology, as already noted, stem from the premise that rationality is gendered (Irigaray 1987; Longino 1987; 1989). Such work has often drawn the conclusion that the effect of knowledge produced through any claim to detached rational methodology, carries with it, an implicit masculinist bias. As Longino (1989) notes of Irigaray’s (1987) work; “[Irigaray argues that] the theories are held to be the product of masculine ways of knowing, that is rationality. If logic, objectivity and rationality produce such theories, then logic, rationality and objectivity must be at fault” (Longino 1989: 262). Whilst Irigaray draws attention to the unidentified bias’ inherent in much ‘objective’ enquiry, underlying her conflation of rationality with the male body, is that rationality and reason are what the male body
unconsciously or uncritically strives for. This has the unintended effect of reifying ‘masculinity’ as rationality.

The uncritical identification with cultural representations is something which the concept of hegemonic ‘masculinity’ has been critiqued for (Wetherell and Edley 1999) and which Wrong (1961) classically named the ‘oversocialized concept of man [sic] in sociology’; the notion whereby discursive or structural influences are merely accepted by individuals with little question. Clearly the growth in interest in men and masculinities refutes this. To expose masculinities as a series of practices of which domination and hierarchies are a component part, it is important to locate such idealistic constructions historically. Discursive strategies, which have medicalised rational knowing as the polar opposite of emotional feeling (Petersen 2004: 18), have accorded the male body with the privilege of ‘natural superiority’, whilst paradoxically stipulating men’s ability to transcend these natural instincts. Thus, there needs to be a more explicit understanding of how rationality or rational behaviour is understood and invoked by males on a personal level, as well as how professional discourses and institutional configurations have constructed rationality as desirable and oppositional to emotions.

There is a problem however with approaches that view men’s experience as intrinsically structured around dominant forms or practices of ‘masculinity’ or ‘masculine’ behaviour. Whilst Halberstam’s (1998) assertions that ‘masculinity’ can be seen as a form of power even when not attached to the male body, to see masculinities as only exercises of power that men adhere to creates further problems. The lack of power experienced by certain men individually (Seidler 1994: 108) in their daily lives, does not necessarily undermine the structural or discursive power that men enjoy as a result of what Connell (1995: 79) terms “the patriarchal dividend”. However the observation that many males do not personally feel that they benefit from ‘masculinity’, or feel oppressed by it, raises questions between men’s capacity to change and their inclination to do so (hooks 2004b). Theorists studying masculinities may demonstrate incongruence between male expectation and experience, but may often still largely insist on the uncritical adherence to those forms of behaviour which reproduce inequalities.

It is also incorrect to suggest, as Putnam and Mumby (1993: 59), Seidler (1994; 2006a; 2006b) and Ezzell (2012) seem to, that the denigration of emotionality by men is universal. As indicated toward the start of this chapter, the problem with such broad
generalisations in sociological literature is that they invoke the same problems of both classical sociology and unconsidered use of the term patriarchy. The reality does not apply to all males, in all contexts, nor necessarily often amongst those who are supposed to invoke emotional suppression as a form of power (see Segal 1990; Galasinski 2004; Petersen 2004; Allen 2007; Forrest 2010).

Hearn (1993: 152) on this point states that emotions are not always incompatible with ‘public patriarchy’. His analysis of emotions in organisations indicates that, far from men being ‘unemotional’, emotions, whilst physiologically experienced, function simultaneously as ‘ideological constructs’ (1993: 146). This is precisely what Adorno and Horkheimer (1997 [1947]: 85-86) identify in their critique of a totalizing Kantian rationality. The Enlightenment presented reason and rationality as liberating, whilst further entrenching inequalities precisely on the basis of disavowing all opposition to established ways of knowing as irrational; Enlightenment reason valorised emotional restraint but acted with disgust and anger at the unreasonable. Therefore as Jameson (2007: 237) notes the problem is “not reason in itself but its opposite number, the private term of the irrational, or irrationalism which is now enlarged to become the dumping ground for anything one wishes to exclude”.

Perceiving emotion in organisations as divided from supposed rational organisational or bureaucratic structures for example (see Putnam and Murphy’s 1993 discussion on this) is therefore an effect of power relations themselves (Petersen 2004: 3). Emotion’s discursive character entails the repression of certain emotional displays, under certain conditions, in certain contexts (Hearn 1993: 148), rather than a wholesale rejection of many emotions which may be entirely compatible with an organisational context. As Hearn states, “what is remarkable is not so much that men cry [in organisations], but that this crying itself is seen as remarkable” (1993: 143).

Nevertheless, there appears to be an insistence in much sociological literature between male desire to invoke ‘reason’ and inability to display emotion which tends to reproduces the assumption that masculinities will always inevitably be exercises in domination / subordination or that emotions are always progressive. This may deny any political agency on the part of males to do anything but reproduce masculinities (Connell and Messerschmidt 2005), reverting back to the same problems of the language of patriarchy that Rubin (2006) outlines. Rationality is often invoked to discursively legitimate male privilege through masculinities, but arguing this as at least a perceived reality of male experience (see Chapter 2), reifies the false polemic. This is
not to claim the obvious, that ‘men feel emotion too’, but to highlight the tendency of much sociological work around masculinities to reinforce a falsehood; that males always see emotion as incongruent with ‘masculinity’ or masculinities.

As a result of the shifts in gendered economic relations outlined earlier there is a divide in opinion as to males’ emotional lives. There are, on the one hand, those who argue greater demands are being made emotionally of males but that these demands have not been met (Giddens 1992; Wouters 1998; Scourfield and Drakeford 2002; Bauman 2003). On the other, there are those who argue that a perceived increase in male emotional attunement is a superficial reworking of a masculine aesthetic (for a discussion on rise of the ‘New Man’ and ‘New Lad’ see Edwards 1997; Gill 2003; Edwards 2006) which has done little to change the unequal distribution of power overall (Beynon 2002; Edwards 2006).

Both positions fail to articulate behaviour which could conceivably be understood as emotional despite its public inexpressiveness however (Hearn 1993). This is because they rely on the historic connotations of ‘emotionality’ understood as ‘feminised’ displays (Fischer 1993; Petersen 2004). This manifests itself in a lack of work geared specifically to exploring how males understand emotions sociologically, thus reproducing gendered ideas of what should be considered ‘emotional’. In much the same way that McRobbie and Garber (1975) noted, young females were absent from subcultural theory because of their absence from public spaces, male emotional cultures remain invisible to sociological analysis because of a focus on the public exhibition of certain emotional states, as indicative of emotional response.

As Seidler (2006a) notes of Connell (1987; 1995) “even if [it] is not Connell’s intention, his work can be used to legitimate both the devaluation of personal and emotional explorations for men and also a flight into abstract and universal theories that assume masculinities can be understood exclusively as relationships of power” (Seidler 2006a: 37). He goes on to state that “Connell ... leaves little space for men to explore emotionally the tensions between their experiences as men in various settings and socially defined masculinities” (2006a: 135). Seidler’s critique is clear; masculinities should not be understood entirely as relationships of power as this misses men’s emotional development which “can help shape moral experience and gendered identities” (2006a: xx).

This critique carries certain implications for understanding identifications with the cultural ideals associated with masculinities both as exercises of power and as
embodied emotional experiences. As DeNora (2001) argues, emotional involvement with social practice tends to influence social action. Therefore through exploring male understandings of emotionality as well as masculinities as an emotional attachment to gendered practices, this may help to transcend present limitations within studies of masculinities, providing new ways of deconstructing the privilege enacted through adherence to ideas of masculinities (see Chapter 2).

This thesis therefore seeks to develop a more comprehensive understanding of how masculinities shape male emotional experience and how, in certain circumstances, emotional understanding shapes attachment to conceptions of masculinities. The benefits of combining studies of masculinities with a sociology of emotions is more fully discussed in Chapter 2, however the underlying value, it is argued, is that understanding emotional identification with structural or discursive practice offers a more nuanced account of causality which rejects the structure / agency dichotomy. It is for this reason that the chapter now turns to a critique of Bourdieu’s concept of habitus as a means of addressing the above concerns.

**Habitus and Social Embodiment**

**Field and Habitus**

Present within even Seidler’s (1994; 2006a; 2007) critique of ‘masculinity’ and rationality as synonymous, remains a tendency to privilege ‘masculinity’ as a singular dominant ethos. His challenge to Connell’s (1987; 1995) concept of hegemonic masculinity is premised on Connell’s treatment of masculinities as only frameworks of power, however Seidler does little to elucidate the role that emotional experience plays in constructions of masculinities; particularly in the different ways in which emotional experience is negotiated by embodied subject position. As such, whilst a critique of ‘masculinity’ as a unilateral exercise of power is valid, there is little acknowledgment of the interplay between masculinities and how they come to be experienced as emotional attachments in opposition to perceived hegemonic imaginaries.

Adkins and Skeggs’ (2004) work provides a means of accommodating embodied, gendered subjectivity in relation to gender. They highlight how Bourdieu’s work specifically allows for the possibility of subjectivity within predefined institutional limitations, or how we can theorise “the linking of objective structures to subjective experience” (Adkins and Skeggs 2004: 21) whilst still firmly retaining a theory of
institutional power and privilege. Utilising Bourdieu’s (1977; 1984) concepts of field and habitus, they demonstrate how it is possible to develop a theory of bodies as products of institutional power relations manifested in a series of seemingly non-economic acts of symbolic violence (Adkins and Skeggs 2004: 22). They argue that “gender can be a form of cultural capital but only if it is symbolically legitimated” (2004: 24) and so the seemingly natural actions which males perform in their daily lives are conferred with power inasmuch as they represent the subjective embodiment of structures of power (legal, political, economic, cultural, symbolic).

The concept of intersecting fields in Bourdieu’s work allows for the possibility of different forms of subjectivities based on multiple social locations, thus different forms of embodied experience. Bourdieu’s notion of field is succinctly explained by Moi (1991: 1020-1021) as “a competitive system of social relations which functions according to its own specific logic or rules”. Whilst habitus as a concept should be properly attributed to Mauss (1973 [1935]), Bourdieu characterises it as a set of “durable, transposable dispositions that emerges out of a relation to wider objective structures of the social world” (1977: 72 original italics) which is shaped by, and co-constitutive of, the fields which social actors come into contact with.

In a similar way as Foucauldian notions of discourse often appear to operate in a perpetual feedback loop, reproducing and resisting multiple sites of knowledge production (Sedgwick 2003: 12), certain ways of being and knowing are legitimated across fields, where the symbolic gestures embodied in the habitus correspond to behaviour ‘appropriate’ to those fields (Bourdieu 1977; 1989). Where dislocation between habitus and field occurs, behaviours are frequently considered inappropriate, incorrect or, at worst, ‘deviant’. Thus economic, political, cultural, legal, medical and social fields when combined with discursive constructions of class, race, sex, sexuality, age and physical location, produce multiple subjective gender positions (Adkins and Skeggs 2004).

Central to the socially reproductive element in Bourdieu’s (2001) work specifically on masculinities, is the unconscious as well as conscious production of choice. He notes that:

[the] effect of symbolic domination (whether ethnic, gender, cultural or linguistic, etc.) is exerted not in the pure logic of knowing consciousness but through the schemes of perception, appreciation and action that are constitutive of habitus and which, below the level of decisions of
consciousness and the controls of the will, set up a cognitive relationship that is profoundly obscure to itself (Bourdieu 2001: 37).

This highlights that the embodiment of social structures, visible through our dispositions which come to be taken as signifiers of intersections of gender, ethnicity, age or class, occur before we are conscious of them occurring; this includes bodily reactions to social situations. As he notes;

The practical acts of knowledge and recognition...contribute to their own domination by tacitly accepting the limits imposed, often take the form of bodily emotions – shame, humiliation, timidity, anxiety, guilt – or passions and sentiments – love, admiration, respect (Bourdieu 2001: 38).

It is precisely the feelings of guilt, shame and anxiety which reproduce gendered behaviour. Thus gendered practices built on the discursive fallacy of rationality as emotional suppression are dependent on emotionally embodied responses; insecurity and feelings of personal anxiety emerge often as a direct result of adherence to conceptions of rationality. The question of embodiment and the social function of affect, for a theory of gendered practice, will also help to frame discussion in the next chapter.

As with a Gramscian notion of hegemony, according to Bourdieu the relationships between institutions and individuals in terms of group power differentials are constantly shifting. Nevertheless these relationships present themselves as stable precisely due to their relational character, whether in relation to intersections of classes, sexualities, genders, ages, races and ethnicities. The acceptance of certain representations of masculinities as legitimate, however, rests not only on the imposition of hierarchies (vertical / horizontal, formal / informal) but the perception of these hierarchies, shaped by habitus, within these various fields. It may be the case that certain forms of institutional power (legal, economic, political) are recognised and yet antinomical to the expression of power in local contexts. In this way, power can be conceptualised as different from both ‘free-flowing’ Foucauldian ideas of power and vertically hierarchical structuralisms.

Notions of habitus and cultural capital may be closer to Connell’s view of subordinate and marginalized masculinities than has been acknowledged. They can however provide a slightly more nuanced view of power as not always reducible to institutional power, tying together masculinities as forms of structural power
(institutional) and masculinities as embodied through a range of affective, emotional pressures (individual).

Coles (2009) specifically utilises Bourdieu’s (1984) concept of field and cultural capital in a critique of hegemonic masculinity, explaining that;

Indeed, hegemonic masculinity may have a marginal impact upon the lives of men who choose to disassociate themselves from the mainstream and operate in social milieux where their masculinity is dominant in relation to other men (Coles 2009: 31).

Whilst he is critical of hegemonic masculinity’s emphasis on a ‘mainstream’ masculinity, Coles does not discount its theoretical merits outright. For example, Connell’s work does draw attention to the relational nature of masculinities, presenting them as polymorphous. But, as Coles points out, to present masculinities as the domination of a singular group over others misses the complexity which produces, as he terms it, ‘multiple dominant masculinities’.

Coles’ article emphasises the earlier point that masculinities can only be presented as powerful in social and geographic context, with power exercised in relation to other practices, taken to be indicative of ‘coherent’ masculinities. Power is, in this case, not always exercised from the top down and practices associated with masculinities must be understood in the contexts in which they are enacted. What constitutes power in each situation varies and it is necessary to add that the performance of a ‘masculine’ habitus (Bourdieu 2001), entails recognition by those in physical proximity to these performances (Thorpe 2010: 181).

Bourdieu’s concept of habitus can therefore be used to accommodate the embodied experiences of different forms of masculinities as they occur (Coles 2009: 32), without negating the overarching structures of power, or individual / collective feelings of powerlessness. The use of it is not so much a robust critique of hegemony, but the ways in which hegemonic masculinity is often uncritically used as a disembodied typology rather than a configuration of gender practices (Hearn 2004; Connell and Messerschmidt 2005; Aboim 2010); particularly in those instances where there is not a full account of distinctions between internal and external hegemony (Demetriou 2001: 345).

In conceptualising habitus as the embodiment of institutional inequalities through gendered dispositions, it is possible to accommodate a variety of representations of masculine practices in different contexts, without losing sight of the institutional
power that some men hold over both women and other men on a national or global level. In this way, the ‘contradictions’ highlighted earlier in Forth’s (2008) work on the English gentleman, can be explained as a series of contextual relations between fields whereby symbolic practices become legitimated only under certain conditions; this is what Wetherell and Edley (1999) point to in their discussion of psycho-discursive practices. Again this may help to explain why some masculinities are more powerful than others in exerting structural influence, without reducing male experience of masculinities to power that males either do or do not personally feel. The point of habitus is that structural dynamics become an unconscious part of the individual’s daily routine entailing qualitatively different experiences and understanding.

**Embodiment, Gender and Habitus**

The primary value of habitus, as Illouz (2007: 100) states is that;

[Bourdieu puts] the body squarely at the center of social interaction…[he] suggests social experience is accumulated and displayed in the body. Thus physical attraction, far from being irrational or superficial, activates mechanisms of social similarity, precisely because the body is the repository of social experience.

It is necessary to add here that Bourdieu’s concept of habitus entails two mutually dependent components (Brubaker 1993; McNay 1999) by which gender is experienced; *hexis*, or bodily dispositions and actions which are interpreted by others (Lovell 2000: 12), and *doxa* or “the durability of the form of long-lasting dispositions of the mind” (Skeggs 1997: 8). This is what links social location and institutional privilege to personal expectation and helps move beyond disembodied theories of masculinities, which neglect the role of physiological, emotional, experience.

Physical attraction in the example above relies on the recognition of certain social similarities in order to guide unconscious emotional experience (*hexis*) and thought (*doxa*). It follows therefore that habitus, whereby motivations and desires operate below the level of the consciousness, is itself perpetually reinforced and renegotiated by socially emotional experience. Therefore, there can be little distinction between the social and biological functions of gender in producing affects in that habitus requires exposure to socially mediated concepts in order to become affected.

The use of habitus is important, inasmuch as it suggests the very materiality of the body is vital to gendered social reproduction (McNay 1999; Lovell 2000; McNay
2004; Coles 2009). It also suggests that there is an endurance of individual belief in
gendered practice, despite apparent contradictions between representation and practice
(though this may also be considered a feature of hegemonic masculinity; see Aboim
2010). The postructuralist critique of gender, indicating plurality and fluidity of
gendered identities, does not, as Coles (2009) notes, render habitus incongruent with the
existence of multiple subjectivities. In fact habitus may help to explain how different
masculine subjectivities assert and maintain privilege, despite seemingly contradictory
behaviours, whilst presenting the impression of stability, as it points to the importance
of geographic and social context for the validation of a variety of gendered practices and
the unconscious influence of symbolic cultural consumption influencing material
inequalities (Bourdieu 1989; 1990a; 1990b).

The notion of habitus is, in contrast to the influential concept of hegemonic
masculinity, a way of understanding the lived experience of gender (McNay 2000;
2004), in which males may feel an individual sense of powerlessness (Seidler 1994;
Seidler 2006a; 2006b), despite maintaining institutional privilege, precisely as a result
of, rather than in contrast to, those privileges. This can help move beyond the kind of
determinism which has been levelled at Connell (Wetherell and Edley 1999; Demetriou
2001), and his separation of ‘inner emotions from outer behaviours’ (Seidler 2006b: 106)
without rejecting his vital insights into the relational, often hierarchical nature of
masculinities.

However Bourdieu’s conception of both habitus, and especially masculine
habitus (Bourdieu 2001), should be treated cautiously for several reasons. The most
poignant critique is a stress on the kind of objectivist determinism that he claims that
habitus transcends (Bourdieu 1977; 1984; 1990b). Much as Demetriou (2001) critiques
Connell’s privileging of external over internal hegemony, in seeing hexas and doxa as
the internalisation of objective structures beyond individual will (Bourdieu 1977: 78-79),
Bourdieu accounts for social reproduction but not social transgressions and change
(King 2000; Lovell 2000). As Lovell (2000: 14) points out, Bourdieu is arguably more
concerned with the rule rather than the exception, however his reading of habitus
(unwittingly) undermines the capacity for individual reflection and thus the creation of
new ways of knowing. Individual choice to resist the logic of doxa, if choice is merely
the reflection of objective structures, therefore becomes an illusory bi-product of pre-
existent gender relations. In presenting the habitus as the embodiment of objective
institutions, in which only material relations are meaningful (Evens 1999), choice and agency become illusory.

Again, as with hegemony, the uncritical identification with cultural bearers of masculinities resembles Bourdieu’s notion of habitus as the ‘embodiment of objective institutions’, driving cultural choice and action based on the gendering of choice which reinforces these institutions (doxa). To this end, Bourdieu’s critique of objectivism through habitus “persistently reverts into a sophisticated form of objectivism” (King 2000: 418).

The durability of Bourdieu’s conception of habitus can be extended to a more general critique of the concept of habitus as a unitary entity (Bennett, Savage, Silva et al. 2009: 54), which appears to have a fixed end point. In Bourdieu’s reading, habitus becomes the unconscious, self-perpetuating, accumulation of dispositions, which makes gendered change difficult if not impossible. For example Bourdieu states;

If it is quite illusory to believe that symbolic violence can be overcome with the weapons of consciousness and will alone, this is because the effect and conditions of its efficacy are durably and deeply embedded in the body in the form of dispositions (2001: 39).

This should be read as a critique of feminist, consciousness-raising (2001: 40) and men’s groups’ attempts to affect wider social change, through the exposition of gender’s ideological, socially constructed nature. Whilst this is an important critique, in suggesting the durability of gendered behaviour on the basis that it is so firmly engrained in our habitus, Bourdieu ignores the fact that, as already demonstrated, there have been significant shifts in both sexual and gender relations, which have brought gender to the fore as an area of enquiry (including in his own work). The effect of consciousness-raising is not limited only to greater material equity between men and women but also to greater symbolic equity; Bourdieu’s concepts provide a blueprint for social reproduction but are weaker in accounting social change.

The introduction of gender problematises the concept of habitus, largely because Bourdieu’s earlier (1984) work failed to engage with important feminist critiques (Bennett, Savage, Silva et al. 2009: 214). His methodology in Distinction, important in extending the notion of habitus, focussed on observing economic relations between groups. His approach focussed on typically male headed households in the 1960s, whose views he took to be universally applicable of relationships between certain classes
(Bennett, Savage, Silva et al. 2009: 217). As Lovell (2000: 20) points out, for Bourdieu women tend to be treated as objects, as “repositories of value and of capital, who circulate between men” rather than being subjects in their own right and his (2001) work, *Masculine Domination* has attracted critique on the basis of a lazy transposition of habitus from class to gender, seemingly just on the basis of generalisations drawn from Kabyle society (Lovell 2000; Wallace 2003). This tends to ignore that gender in and of itself cannot be understood of as a field in its own right, rather it “carries different amounts of symbolic capital in different contexts” (Moi 1991: 1036). As outlined earlier economic inequalities do not translate directly onto gendered inequalities (Moi 1991; McNay 1999; Ashall 2002).

One of the most troubling arguments that Bourdieu presents in *Masculine Domination* is that women appear to be the main perpetrators of their own subordination (Wallace 2003). Shifting a focus from feminist, profeminist and critical men’s studies (Hearn 1998b; 2004) around male practices which limit female opportunity, Bourdieu argues that women are equally complicit in the symbolic practices which seek to marginalise them (Bourdieu 2001: 36-37). This is particularly the case in his discussion of *amor fati* (or ‘love of one’s destiny’). Women, in Bourdieu’s work, come to desire their own submission through the internalisation of ‘common-sense’ ways of doing and knowing (*doxa*). This leads to political apathy and ultimately to a reproduction of social inequality. Unlike Connell’s notion of complicit masculinities (1995: 79), Bourdieu’s approach appears to blame women for failing to challenge practices of masculine domination.

**Training Habitus**

Whilst Bourdieu’s use of habitus should be treated cautiously, Burkitt (2002) helps to illuminate the potential uses of slightly a different reading. Using Mauss’ (1973 [1935]) original conception Burkitt is concerned specifically with the question of whether (and if so how) ‘training’ can develop technologies of self (Foucault 1988), in order to change the habitus and thus ways of knowing and seeing (Burkitt 2002: 220). This takes up the central critique levelled at Bourdieu and exposes a claim made repeatedly throughout this thesis; that gendered identities are constantly shifting, influenced by unconscious as well as conscious intention. The problem is that as Bourdieu tends to conceive of fields as separate but ‘relatively homologous fields’ (Brubaker 1985: 748), habitus is often seen as a stable, unitary entity. It is necessary
then to look to notions of ‘practical theory’ as a way of thinking against Bourdieu’s habitus (King 2000).

It is important to note that whilst both ‘masculinity’ and masculinities are presented as distinct types of identity, habitus should never be considered as firmly fixed, either across the life course (Burkitt 2002: 229), nor at any particular moment in time (Coles 2009: 30). This is because, as habitus is not to be understood, as Bourdieu is often unfairly critiqued for, as simply unconscious, mechanistic habit (Burkitt 2002: 227-228). King’s (2000) distinction between practical theory and habitus is important; however this does not render the idea of habitus useless. Instead it is necessary to revise Bourdieu’s shortcomings and consider the habitus as an affect of practical theory. In the same vein as Butler’s notion of performativity (Butler 1998b), habitus should be understood as giving the impression of stability; as the repetition of utterances and performances which appear stable over time, precisely because of a widespread lack of introspection.

Habitus is not the precise formula of intersectional demographics, which generates a particular hierarchy of advantage or disadvantage. Whilst some dispositions clearly carry greater power in certain contexts, it is constantly shaped by experience and evolving / devolving relations, operating beneath the level of consciousness, which manifest themselves in ‘common sense’ practices but which allow for observation, introspection, reflexivity and re-evaluation. Thus what this thesis seeks to address is the historical context of certain discourses tied to masculinities as antithetical (rationality / emotion), in order to address Bourdieu’s frequent ahistoricity, present particularly in *Masculine Domination*, but explore the relationship of these discourses to the experience of males from particular social locations.

Whilst the body may be physically affected by social stimuli, it can be trained (Mauss 1973 [1935]; Brubaker 1993; Burkitt 2002), in the literal or figurative sense, to become sensitive or responsive to different surroundings (see a discussion of Latour 2004: in Chapter 2). Habitus cannot be conceived then as a completed project. It is necessary to grasp this in order to understand individual action as socially mediated, yet never wholly constrained by the logic of social. This is not to be confused with advocacy in favour of a crude behaviourism, but it does provide a key insight as to why certain gendered narratives exist, despite the evident impossibility of ideals.

For these reasons, this thesis makes the proposition that a revised concept of Bourdieu’s habitus reveals how gendered practice presents itself as cohesive elements of
stable types of identities despite constantly shifting. It is this interplay of fields with habitus which gives rise to the experience of masculinities as subjectively experienced within institutional frameworks which commonly present singular normative images of ‘masculinity’ across cultural and national borders. How these images are negotiated, is dependent on physical as well as social location and grounds a theoretical approach toward ‘masculinity’ firmly in men’s lived experience of practices of masculinities as relational entities.

**Summary**

This chapter has explored how studies of men and masculinities have been developed, owing theoretical allegiance to feminist literature and changing gender relations, as a result of economic and social shifts. It has shown how issues of power, embodiment and reason are interconnected and examined how, historically, rationality has conferred some male bodies and thus masculinities with power. However this power is often expressed as the dominance of one group over another and undermines the experiences of those groups of men who do not feel powerful despite having power socially. It also, as Seidler (2006) argues, fails to see masculinities as a set of social relations not always inevitably linked to power. This has tended to hamper an understanding of men’s emotional experiences, including emotional attachment to practices and concepts of masculinities.

Despite Seidler’s critique, it has also been demonstrated that presenting either dominant images of ‘masculinity’ or naturally antagonistic masculinities, misses subjective experience within ‘objective’ structures. Through a different reading of Bourdieu’s concepts of field, cultural capital and habitus it is, as Coles (2009) demonstrates, possible to accommodate the lived experiences of many men whilst still relating these to overarching inequalities of material, social and political advantage for men. These arguments set out the basic premise of this thesis. It will explore how emotionality is structured in relation to masculinities with a view to identifying how subjective masculinities shape this emotional experience. The second chapter proceeds by looking at how a sociology of emotions has been characterised so far, drawing attention to implicit gender biases within the literature before moving on to explain how and why, through a more gender specific sociology of emotions, social relations between masculinities and between masculinities and femininities can be better understood.
Chapter 2: Emotions and Affects

Introduction

As noted in the previous chapter, the valorisation of rationality as a form of power entails the devaluation of emotions as problematic for both social configurations of ‘masculinity’ and individual males. Whilst theories of masculinities have looked at embodiment there is however a lack of sociological work exploring how male emotional, affective experience, as embodied, is shaped by male experience of masculinities. The focus should be both on males’ perceptions of emotional experience and a discursive exploration of how what is considered ‘emotional’ is socially constructed, reproduced and enforced. In order to deconstruct such assumptions, it is necessary first to look at the epistemological sites of knowledge production around emotions.

This chapter begins with a brief overview of psychological perspectives on emotion, which have traditionally dominated inquiry into the topic, before moving on to discuss how the sociology of emotions emerged to provide new insights around how emotions are shaped socially. It will then proceed to discuss how emotionality has been characterised in relation to masculinities and conclude with a discussion as to how the sociology of emotions and recent work on affect, offer new insights into the relationship between masculinities as structurally enforced yet affectively negotiated.

The literature drawn on here has been selected to represent the different interpretations, as to what is meant by ‘emotionality’. As the preceding chapter demonstrates, the historical polarity between the rational and ‘emotional’, manifests itself in competing notions of ‘masculinity’, including the idea that a rejection of the feminine, on which masculinities are arguably predicated, inevitably means a rejection of emotional expressivity (Seidler 1994; Wong, Pituch and Rochlen 2006; Seidler 2006a; 2006b).

It is important to note that the historical link between rationality and masculinities has informed Western masculinities. However without a fuller consideration as to the broad range of phenomena which may properly be considered emotional responses or ‘emotionality’, there is a risk of underestimating gender as the passive production of the interplay of structures (Butler 1998a) or as capricious aesthetic choice (Bourdieu 2001: 103). As noted in the previous chapter, masculinities
themselves are emotional, affective, attachments to social structures and performances. Thus they have the capacity to change but often not the individual or collective will to initiate it. The way in which societies cling to discursively informed, notions of ‘natural’ sexual difference around emotions is then, this chapter argues, itself an emotional and affective commitment to gendered discourses.

**Emotions in the Social Sciences**

*The Psychological Problem with Emotion*

Understanding emotion has a distinctly psychological legacy (James 1884; Freud 1922a; 1922b; Erikson 1956). Precisely because of the idea that emotions interfered with the individual Cartesian subject’s rational intentions, the emergence of psychology as the study of the human mind has traditionally provided the discipline with the authority to discuss it. Emotions were presumed to originate from, or be contained within the individual, observable only in living subjects. Therefore psychology as an ‘objective’ framework appeared better placed than the ‘subjective’ understanding of the lay person to explain the machinations of emotional response (Despret 2004; Petersen 2004; Blackman 2008).

Emotions were initially posited as something separate from individual cognitive capabilities. The cognitive system, concerned with problem solving, memory recall and retention and skill development - or features associated with rational action - it was argued, was actually obstructed by emotional arousal (Boehner, DePaula, Dourish and Sengers 2007: 276). Anger, grief, sorrow, fear, love, joy or sadness for example were assumed to cloud the mind of the rational actor as they interfered with cognitive faculties. This is what Barbalet (2001: 33) labels the conventional approach, stressing an opposition between emotions and cognition, whereby the two perform different functions.

Psychological perspectives have classically chosen to focus on emotions in the context of being unconscious responses to stimuli and have attempted to document and control such undesirable emotions (Freud 1922b; Erikson 1968). Physiological accounts have explained emotions as changes in individuals’ central nervous, peripheral nervous and endocrine systems (Strongman 2003: 54) whereas cognitive accounts have tended to rely on individual appraisals to explain why different emotions occur at different times (Turner and Stets 2005: 9). Nevertheless, despite the various ways in which
emotions are measured in psychology, there are common characteristic tendencies which privilege the uniqueness of emotions as the preserve of the individual body (Petersen 2004).

Emotional measurement broadly divides into three different approaches in psychology (Strongman 2003; Niedenthal, Krauth-Gruber and Ric 2006); those who choose to study emotional responses from bodily or facial expressions as indicators of emotional states; those who choose to study the unobservable / discrete physiological responses to stimuli using instrumentation; and those more commonly from social psychology who choose empirical measures such as questionnaires, interviews and surveys to gauge feelings and attitudes. Each of these methodologies then reveals a theoretical bent in indicating how emotions are perceived. Whilst perhaps less so with the third case, emotions in much psychological research have been characterised as functions, or often dysfunctions, of the singular human body which can be ‘objectively’ measured.

A historic, discursive separation between emotions and cognition has coloured academic approaches to study both. Boehner et al. (2007) note, citing Dror (2001), “[the] notion of emotion as physiologically measurable and mathematically documentable in turn led to the idea that emotion is fundamentally a natural, biological fact, something objectively observable, definable, and containable” (Boehner, DePaula, Dourish et al. 2007: 277). The discursive separation of emotion from cognition and then subsequent adoption of rational, objective, scientific techniques to study emotion as linked to, but still distinct from cognition, has reinforced the idea of emotionality as something biologically hardwired into the individual; something which can only be studied objectively. Any personal motivation or feeling has to be discounted then in studying emotion from a psychological perspective, or as Blackman (2008: 25) puts it “the problem of social influence…has mutated within contemporary psychology into the problem of affective self-containment”.

The study of emotions however, as with the study of most areas laying any claim to scientific objectivity (Harding 1986; 1996; Tebes 2005), is frequently subjective and has relied strongly on the idea of a value-free rationality which is itself a discursive, gendered, ideological construct (see Chapter 1). By focussing on individuals, an understanding of emotionality as rooted in contemporary and historic social discourses is sidelined in favour of presenting emotions as objective facts which happen to the
individual rather than constructed by individuals; “not things that persons do, but what their bodies do to them” (Barbalet 2001: 34).

This particularly underestimates the gendered history of how certain emotions are either valorised or denigrated. For example Jansz and Timmers (2002) judge emotional dissonance as a state which compromises individuals’ identities, as causing individual feelings of unease, caused by the impossibility of emotional suppression in a rationalistic society. Yet they locate a conception of Western identity (as a singular concept) premised on a Cartesian privileging of rationality as emotional suppression but do not explore how such a belief is particularly gendered. Fischer and Jansz (1995) also note the animalistic conception of emotions, but do not locate this within a gender specific framework, ignoring how, under certain conditions, ‘negative’ emotions have beneficial outcomes. Timmers, Fischer and Manstead’s (1998) work does focus on sexual difference in emotional gender display, judging anger to be a means of affirming ‘masculine’ identity. However their explanation again is couched in terms of a singular gender identity, which under all conditions is compromised by the presence of any emotion. Thus in these perspectives rational behaviour is presumed as objectively defined and assumes a centrality in relation to a universal conception of identity.

By privileging physiological explanations especially, the social contexts in which emotions occur and the discursive connotations attached to ‘healthy’ and ‘unhealthy’ emotional displays are overlooked (Hearn 1993: 146). The same emotion may have appropriate and inappropriate connotations, depending on the context, and therefore has no a priori value. Undoubtedly, certain strands of psychology recognise the importance of patterns of behaviour between individuals as influenced by social factors (see Latane and Darley 1969; Ekman, Friesen and Ellsworth 1972; Milgram 1974; Bandura 1978; Gergen 1985 1996; Van Lange, Kruglanski and Higgins 2012) and Freudian inspired psychologists are not biologically reductionist. However I would suggest that psychology’s often case-by-case method of identifying emotions as a distinct component of the individual body and attempting to arrive at a normative solution of controlling them, proceeds from the same masculinist assumptions that emotions, as naturally occurring phenomena, can and should be regulated.\footnote{The notion of masculinities predicated on controlling nature was raised in the previous chapter, in relation to rationality and feminist critiques of science have observed that the idea of ‘objectivity’ is often considered a masculinist form of control (see Chapter 1). As Fischer (1993: 304) notes emotions in early 20th psychology were considered more ‘developed’ in females and “[were] generally equated with intellectual inferiority, irrationality, weakness and submissivity.”}
The Sociological Perspective

There is a general consensus within psychological and sociological studies that emotion has some physiological basis (Gordon 1981; Turner 1999; 2000; Strongman 2003; Turner and Stets 2005). However, debates surrounding individuals’ abilities to control, develop, manipulate and consciously appraise emotions, rest largely on whether, or how far, certain emotions are seen as biologically inherent. Understanding how far there are ‘natural’ sexual differences in emotional development has implications for social action, and therefore the extent to which masculinities can change. As Connell noted, despite his later vehement anti-essentialism; "... it is possible to say that there are some innate differences in temperament or ability between men and women. The hypothesis cannot be ruled out entirely. But if they exist, we can say quite confidently that they are not the basis of major social institutions" (1987: 71).

Bartky (1990), in contrast to innate differences, suggests that due to sufficiently different patterns of gendered socialisation, interaction and expectation “the feeling lives of men and women are not identical. But what needs to be asked about such emotional differences is not only their relationship to typical gendered traits or dispositions but...the way in which such attunements are disclosive of their subjects” (Bartky 1990: 85). It may well be the case then that whilst emotions retain a biological component - they are physiologically experienced (increased heart rate, blushing, sweating) - their development and exhibition as such, is dependent largely on social factors which shape their ‘naturalness’ as part of gendered routinisation. This is of particular importance to this thesis, especially in relation to the notion of habitus as an embodied relation of social intersections.

What is also important is a discursive focus on why supposedly ‘natural’ differences come to be seen as something to be prohibited and why emotion has come to be constructed as something to be controlled, especially for men, through historic links with certain bodies as effects of power (see Chapter 1). As Fischer (1993: 303) has argued “the general idea that women are more emotional than men tells us more about Western sex stereotypes than about women’s actual emotions”. Accordingly, the extent to which psychologists perceive biological imperatives to shape emotions, inevitably impacts on the ‘objective’ methods used to study emotion and the assumptions about male and female bodies.

Failing to engage with the question as to how emotions are collectively enforced and practiced, underestimates the cultural significance and discursive power of
emotionality. Approaches which look at the physiological roots of emotions have subsequently adopted more qualitative methods, with the increased link between cognition and emotion inevitably coinciding with wider societal change (feminist critiques of objectivity for example). However the benefit in understanding emotions, as “culturally grounded, dynamically experienced, and to some degree constructed in action and interaction” (Boehner, DePaula, Dourish et al. 2007: 276), is that it is possible to conceptualise emotional development and deployment as relational; irreducible to individual pathologies and therefore open to change (Petersen 2004: 3).

Literature focussing on a sociology of the emotions arose precisely out of the shift that sought to explain embodied social processes, in increasingly complex societies, in terms of structured social patterns. These take account of the shortcomings of those psychological accounts which fail to document the contextual nature of emotional display, perception, reception and formation (Gordon 1981; Kemper 1981; Thoits 1989; Petersen 2004; Turner and Stets 2005). Sociological accounts tend to view emotions as functions and / or products of interaction inasmuch as they derive their meaning from linguistic and social experience. For sociologists it is not so much the specific biological responses which should be explored, more how certain labels come to be attached to certain states and how these shape individuals’ qualitative experience of physiological response. This means accounting for the ways in which emotions are constructed as ‘positive’, ‘negative’, ‘desirable’ or ‘undesirable’ and invoked in a plethora of contexts.

Sociological accounts (unsurprisingly) have often been accused of underplaying the cross-societal consistencies of emotional states in favour of linguistic or cultural relativism (Kemper 1987), or of rejecting any of the insights that physiological and / or psychological accounts have to offer (Craib 1995). However a broader understanding of context in sociological accounts often provides a more thorough analysis of the value different cultures attach to certain emotions and, importantly, emotional displays. This allows a robust exploration not only of how emotions are shaped interpersonally but also why expression, suppression and repression occur in certain contexts.

Whilst the literature treating emotion as a sociological concept, gained favour in the 1970s (see Turner and Stets 2005), traces can be seen in Elias’ work on The Civilizing Process (1994) or even Durkheim’s (1933) work on social cohesion. Indeed Elias’ conception of the Western shift to perceiving ourselves as homo clausus, offers a key insight as to why psychological texts often underplay the social patterning and regulation of emotion – for fear that it compromises Western notions of individuality
Undoubtedly the Cartesian split coupled with a strong liberal tradition (Bauman 2000a: 30-31), has privileged individuality and the individual as a unit distinct from, rather than a product of society. What Elias’ work especially does is to locate how actors come to feel for not conforming to expectations or being denied opportunities, firmly within social processes. Society cultivates individual experience of social phenomena, thus understanding emotions as biological facts that happen to or emanate from individuals, relies on the social production of individuality.

Critical theorists have also located emotions as functionary to capitalist societies (Adorno 1976; Meštrović 1997; Adorno and Horkheimer 1997 [1947]; Adorno 2004; Illouz 2007), arguing that emotional response to culture is mediated, shaped by and often drives our relationship with capital, with exemplars (such as musical taste) shaped by market forces and technological determinism; emotional experience, in such a view is cultivated through the capitalist logic of desire.

To reiterate, the value in understanding emotions socially is how far transformations in the social will alter individual action (Thoits 1989: 328; DeNora 2001). It therefore asks how far actors can ‘choose’ to act differently or have different emotional responses to what they deem pleasurable or unpleasant. Drawing on the previous chapter this is the crux of using habitus as a conceptual tool, as it seeks to explore whether embodied physiological responses to practices of domination can be altered by those exercising it. Particularly if such practices invoke strong physiological responses due to the durability of social schemata (Bourdieu 2001: 38).

Psychological and sociological perspectives of emotions inevitably invoke the agency / structure debate, with such distinctions pertinent in ascertaining how far ‘society’ dictates appropriate emotional response. To see the argument as polarised between individual and society however, often fails to account for the importance of both individual experience (including physiological responses) and the role of the social in articulating an understanding of emotional experience. As Hearn (1993: 146) notes "while emotions may well be linked to relatively extreme mental and physical states, they are also social and ideological constructs ... for this reason, the search for a watertight definition of emotion(s) is likely to be misguided". To privilege either the domination of structure / discourse or the uniqueness of individual feeling, is therefore problematic for the problem of emotion.

How to define emotions as sociological phenomena is, as with a concise psychological definition, often difficult due to epistemological conflict within the
discipline. The primacy accorded to social structure for example over more interactionist-oriented accounts, will inevitably influence to what extent subjective understandings of emotion labels are shared within a society. Turner and Stets (2005) provide a useful, broad overview of existing sociological standpoints which look to explain emotions, dividing their summary into seven categories;

(1) dramaturgical and cultural theories, (2) ritual theories, (3) symbolic interactionist theories, (4) symbolic interactionist theories incorporating psychoanalytic ideas, (5) exchange theories, (6) structural theories, and (7) evolutionary theories (Turner and Stets 2005: 23).

Dramaturgical theories, advanced by theorists such as Thoits (1989), Gordon (1981) or Hochschild (1979; 1983), rely on the performance and production of emotion in a social context. This perspective proposes that emotional displays are social performances governed by institutionalised normative displays of behaviour, arguing that such displays can be externally and internally expressed but are still wholly shaped by social factors.

Hochschild (1979) for example illustrated that actors often suppress or cultivate emotional states in order to conform to socially appropriate expectations. This does not imply that emotional states are not internally experienced, however it does draw attention to situations where the ‘internal’ does not mirror the external expectation. Actors may either have to change the expression of such emotions or engage in emotion work whereby they seek to alter the way in which they feel about a situation. This has significant implications for masculinities whereby, as Forth (2008) argues, the comportment and demeanour of a ‘masculine’ performance and appropriate expression, carries great symbolic significance.

Ritual theories as the name implies, explore emotion as a ritualised set of encounters. Whilst similar to dramaturgical theories, these arguably differ in the respect that it is the repetition of emotional encounters which provide them with meaning rather than the totalizing institutional governance. Goffman’s notions of ‘role’ and ‘audience segregation’ (Goffman 1956: 269) for example posited that emotional states have a performative social as well as a personal dimension. Whilst there are different values attached to different emotional states, for different bodies, it is the way in which these states are exhibited and the audiences they are performed in front of, which firmly validates the appropriateness of the emotional response.
Goffman’s treatise on embarrassment, demonstrates how certain feelings and emotions occur dependent only on particular social contexts. Indeed embarrassment is, he argues, only powerful due to its culturally significant nature. It is the ‘misperforming’ of roles in front of audiences, at odds with the ritual, that therefore leads to embarrassment. In looking at the nature of homophobic abuse and ‘masculinity’ (see Kimmel 2007) external forces may work to arouse embarrassment at times of discontinuity between audience and role segregation. This suggests that certain discourses around ‘masculinity’ may be reinforced in some contexts but not in others. It also accommodates the possibility of emotional arousal as the interplay of gendered power relations, further complicating the traditional structure over agency debate.

**The Radical Perspective**

What is common throughout the other perspectives that Turner and Stets identify, is their insistence on the primacy of social relations in determining how emotions are not only articulated, but also felt and experienced (see Shott 1979; Gordon 1981). Studying emotional attachment, belief and impact may reveal more about the nature of causality in relation to group and individual action (DeNora 2001), however there is some scepticism about what is often perceived as constructionist determinism in the literature appropriating emotion as a purely sociological concept (see Kemper 1981; 1987; Craib 1995).

Kemper (1987: 265) for example attempts to provide evidence for the existence of certain ‘fundamental’ emotional states, which he terms primary emotions. By drawing on both sociological and physiological theory, Kemper undermines the notion of pure cultural relativism. Similarly Ekman, Friesen and Ellsworth (1972) construct arguments around the premise of six ‘basic emotions’, highlighting that “every [psychological] investigator [studying emotion] had obtained evidence for six emotions (happiness, surprise, fear, sadness, anger and disgust combined with contempt)” (Ekman 1992: 550). Facial expressions, Ekman et al. (1972) argue, are often a good means of demonstrating cross cultural emotional consistencies and they attempt to provide evidence linking facial expressions to basic emotions.

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13 Defined as “a complex organized response disposition to engage in certain classes of biologically adaptive behaviours ... characterized by a distinctive state of physiological arousal, a distinctive feeling, or affective, state, a distinctive state of receptivity to stimulation, and a distinctive pattern of expressive reactions” (Epstein 1984: 67 cited in Kemper 1987: 267)
Whilst in a later article Ekman (1992) questions whether facial expressions necessarily always correlate with what Western scientists understand to be certain emotional states, he outlines a further distinction between culturally specific facial expressions – the wink, the sarcastic look - and complex facial expressions designed to convey these six basic emotions. In this respect, maybe it is possible to accept the possibility of ‘hardwired’ emotional reactions to social situations, but recognise that the intensity with which these responses are felt and how they are suppressed or expressed, are mediated through social frameworks and therefore experienced differently as a result.

The key problem with the notion of basic emotions is arguably their conflation with the drive system however. As Tomkins (1962: 108) explained;

the classical problem of the freedom of the will has arisen not only from a confusion of the drives, a motivational system of little freedom, with the affects, a motivational system of great freedom, but also from the more general problem of the classical overly simplistic view of causality

Whilst a discussion of affects as a distinct component of emotions is included later, the will to understand emotions in terms of their biological predispositions is, as already stated, symptomatic of the Cartesian split whereby emotions are posited as the often ‘uncontrollable’ opposite of rational action.

As mentioned in the previous chapter, rationality and emotional suppression are often cited as influential in a historic construction of Western ‘masculinity’, thus responsible in parts for the way in which contemporary masculinities are practiced. Women are often configured by having a body and therefore susceptible to its unpredictable whims (Shildrick 1997), whereas men historically are characterised by their mastery of mind over body (Petersen 1998; 2004). Based on the work of William James (1884) however, there has been a gradual erosion of the view that emotions can even be physically separated from cognition. According to Turner and Stets (2005: 21), the assertion that emotional detachment can be connected to rational thought, is ‘simply wrong’ because “when certain areas of the cerebral cortex, particularly the prefrontal lobe, are disconnected from subcortical emotion centers of the brain, individuals have difficulty making decisions of any kind (2005: 21-22. my italics).

Emotions are therefore involved with those cognitive practices, which lead to what is labelled as rational action (Lazarus 1984; Damasio 1995; Barbalet 2001; Turner and Stets 2005). Thus cognitive practices initially seen as a separate area of
the brain, hampered by emotional response, appears characteristic of a Cartesian legacy rather than scientific ‘evidence’.

This is what Barbalet (2001: 38) has referred to as the ‘critical approach’ whereby “... rational calculation [separated from emotion] is in fact not possible for most social and interactive situations” (2001: 42). He notes that, according to this position, “... emotions can guide reason because they are tutored by experience” (2001: 43). Thus any rational goal, in the critical approach requires a series of emotional judgments in order to achieve it. Nevertheless this view still reproduces the discursive polarity between cognition and emotion as distinct (see also Seidler 2007); privileging cognition as the precursor to emotion (the cognitive identification of the goal and the conscious, instrumental use of emotions to achieve it).

Barbalet instead advocates a radical approach (2001: 45) which takes James’ (1879: 22) assertion that “... the feeling of rationality is constituted merely by the absence of any feeling of irrationality” as its starting point. Rationality and emotionality, Barbalet suggests, should be conceived of as mutually dependent on each other for their meaning and respective capabilities, as they are continuous and contingent. As he explains “the role of emotion in practical rationality...is to permit action which would be inhibited if it were to rely on logic or calculation alone” (2001: 49), therefore, unlike the critical approach, rational action is only made possible by emotions; emotions do not precede cognitive, goal oriented action or vice versa. This presents a challenge to ‘rational’ action as a real rather than discursive phenomenon and indicates a new focus for research into both males and masculinities.

**Emotions, Affects and Masculinities**

*Unreasonable Men?*

Barbalet’s distinction foregrounds the importance of both physiological, emotional responses to social stimuli, and cognition and emotion as mutually dependent and therefore inseparable. Whether feelings and emotions are provoked through consumption practices, violence, friendships, love, romance, sport or music, this relationship cannot be ignored. This illustrates again that masculinities must be understood as emotional attachments to and experiences of gendered practices.

Whilst his insights are significant however, in a throwaway comment Barbalet judges that it is too obvious to make the link between ‘reason and the male’ (2001: 56);
so obvious in fact that he fails to explore this and instead seems to advocate a universal identification with rationality, regardless of sex, age or experience. It is key for the purposes of this thesis particularly, to explain exactly why reason and rationality are valued over, or perceived as distinct from, emotion in terms of gendered historic discourse.

The implications of Barbalet’s approach nevertheless, should be made explicit in relation to rationality as a discursive strategy invoked to legitimate male privilege (see Chapter 1). If emotional detachment hampers the ability to make rational guided decisions, then the Cartesian binary which polarises rationality and emotion, as a scientific-objective rather than discursive-subjective dichotomy, collapses. This challenges the common perspective that masculinities encourage males to adopt rational, unemotional, performances and practices, questioning the semantic value of what can be considered rational and emotional. The common claim that Western masculinities encourage a suppression of the feminine through a rejection of emotionality (Seidler 1994; MacInnes 1998) is in need of further clarification as to what researchers mean by emotionality and how males frame their understanding of emotions through masculinities (Galasinski 2004).

It has been suggested that there have been increasing demands for both greater emotional empathy and display from males generally, since the 1970s (Messner 1993; MacInnes 1998; Rutherford 2003). As MacInnes (1998: 134-135) notes, the political aphorism of the personal is political has been used to demand significantly greater emotional reflexivity from males, turning attention from the preservation of bounded private selves, separated from the public, into political projects where the two cannot be extricated.

Jackson (1993: 202) has however observed that the tenacity with which sociologists have tended to publicly theorise sexuality, something once considered to be a matter of private concern, has increased dramatically and yet the desire to look at the ‘traditionally feminine’ preoccupation of love has not received the same interest. It is not merely the private nature of acts/identities/performances, in relation to emotion, which have attracted academic attention, but specifically certain forms which have been deemed worthy of serious analysis. Similarly, when inconsistencies between behaviour (emotional experience) and ideal (discursive construction of rationality) are exposed in sociological literature they are seldom developed further.
As both Petersen (1998; 2004) and Thompson (1997) rightly note, the sociology of emotions often obscures the gendered nature of emotional expression, tending to focus on the work that women rather than men have to perform in order to manage or affect emotional displays. In his discussion on masculinities and emotions, Petersen (1998: 93) highlights that “much of the writing [on emotions] engages uncritically with the concepts of intimacy and emotion, which are assumed to have universal applicability”. This is a critique he develops substantially in later work, noting that “ideas about emotions mirror changing views about the status of knowledge and truth” (Petersen 2004: 3). He draws particular focus to the way in which the fabrication of the ideal male body has been and continues to be constructed through discursive reliance on control and rationality in psychological enquiry.

Take for example Bottamini and Ste-Marie’s (2006) exploration as to how males identify with notions of the ideal body or try to manage a positive body image. Notions of anxiety or fear as influential are removed from the equation. Most of those who engaged in ‘resistance training’ in their study, whilst citing sexual desirability as an important reason, had entered into the activities due to being bullied or teased for their size when younger. These quite frank admissions of insecurity are often causally attributed to media images rather than explained in terms of emotional investment and the deep feelings of inadequacy which are component parts of their masculinities. Far from attempting to rationally discard feelings of self-doubt, the young men felt an emotional need to identify with the image currently connected with notions of rationality. The ideal male body is not just a passive product of discourse, but of collectively enforced and experienced fear, shame and desire to comply with these discourses.

As outlined in Chapter 1, much of the literature around masculinities presumes that the ‘lay’ perspective considers emotion and rationality to be necessarily separated. Certainly rationality and emotional suppression are often cited as influential in a historic construction of Western ‘masculinity’ as power. The valorisation of both Weberian and Kantian notions, in sociology especially, often serves to reinforce this distinction that reason (rationality) and emotion (nature) are distinct (Seidler 1994). In the literature documenting the construction of masculinities this has rightly had the effect of tracing notions of bodily control by the mind, to modernity, however this is a body without feeling, physiology or emotion.
It is clear from the preceding evidence that emotions cannot be taken out of the equation when considering what rationality is, means and does. Thus Seidler’s (1994: 144) assertion that “as men we conceive of ourselves as rational selves in a way that makes us distinctly uncomfortable with the emotional aspects of life”, whilst critical of rationality, also indicates a historically biased, parochial view of emotion as the opposite of rationality. Despite clearly demonstrating how an illusion of rationality has been discursively constructed, this presumes to speak for all males regardless of dynamics of class, ethnicity, age or sexuality. There is little consideration as to how, as men, emotional attachments to concepts of rationality are learnt through emotional experiences, or questions as to whether men are always at odds with how they are ‘supposed’ to express themselves. Whilst as already noted, arguably greater demands are being made of males emotionally, there is little attempt to theorise or explain socially mediated emotional understanding of masculinities in relation to the sociology of emotions and, vice versa, of emotions in the sociology of masculinities.

Seidler is not alone in his prominent focus on the discursive sites from which rationality originates, but it is precisely this theorising of masculinities as something that are uncritically identified with, based on conceptions of rationality rather than emotion, that needs to be re-examined (Petersen 1998: 91). Rational thought and emotional investment are inextricably bound up physiologically, thus rational decision making must be structured by emotionality; the two cannot be separated. There is a need to develop a more nuanced framework in order consider what we are looking towards when calls for greater emotional investment by men are made, given that we learn to be affected, emotionally, rationally, sensually, socially and physiologically by the world around us (Latour 2004). This chapter will now therefore critically explore, how male emotional experiences have been theorised within sociological and psychological literature, before proceeding to explore how work on affect and emotions can offer new insights.

**Approaches to Emotions and Masculinities**

Social psychological approaches have tackled the issue of emotional perception in relation to sexual differentiation specifically (Fischer 1993; Timmers, Fischer and Manstead 1998; Fischer and Manstead 2000; Zammuner 2000; Branney and White 2008; Brody and Hall 2010; Meyers-Levy and Zhu 2010); often looking at how males and females feel they should react in similar situations. In quantitative social psychological
studies it is generally found that women tend to be more overt in their public emotional displays than men (Fischer and Manstead 2000; Brody and Hall 2010), with gender specific rules conditioning when it is appropriate and who is allowed to convey certain emotions (Stapley and Haviland 1989; Lewis 2000). It may also be the case as Wong, Pituch and Rochlen (2006) observe, that men either suppress certain emotional displays, due to their adherence to dominant representations of ‘masculinity’ or that due to differential socialisation, have difficulty identifying and articulating emotional states (Berger, Levant, McMillan et al. 2005).

Fischer and Manstead (2000) for example found that women were almost always more likely than men to display emotion (through crying for example) across different cultures. This suggests that it is not, as the sociological perspective would dictate, predominantly ‘sex role’ beliefs within specific cultures that conditions men to reject a discursive construct of emotionality. This implies qualitatively different emotional experiences for males and females by virtue of their biological sex.

Fischer and Manstead’s methodology however (based on Scherer et al.’s ISEAR\textsuperscript{14} study) fails to account for differences in the way emotions are experienced personally as well as publicly expressed across cultures. Their insistence on a generic benchmark for how ‘individualistic’ a culture is or how much a culture conforms to ‘traditional’ sex role stereotyping may be inadequate for teasing out the understandings that males especially attach to emotions cross culturally. Such approaches often ask questions around gender in such a way that may end up eliciting some sex role stereotypes from respondents rather than interrogating them. Questions around frequency of crying during an allotted period of time, obviously cannot account for certain factors like deaths in the family, relationships ending, job loss or illness but they also make an implicit assumption that frequency and types of emotional display necessarily corresponds to a ‘level’ of emotionality.

As already noted, there is a common assumption of emotion in psychology as something which can be measured in terms of physiological arousal, ‘objective’ indicators or quantifiable metrics, which reproduces emotions links with ‘femininity’ (Till 2011: 440). Other approaches, through the pathologisation of depression, linked to

\textsuperscript{14}ISEAR was an ongoing worldwide project which, at the time of Fischer and Manstead’s article, had 2,917 University students, 1,616 female and 1,301 male. The database detailed 7 emotions. Countries were awarded scores based on Gender Empowerment Measure (GEM), Masculinity-Femininity (M-F) scale (Hofstede 1991) and Individualism Collectivism scale (I-C) by which they built a series of indices to establish a neutral benchmark with which to judge levels of emotionality against these covariate measures.
emotional suppression (Emslie, Ridge, Ziebland et al. 2006; Robertson 2007; Branney and White 2008), may frame emotions as incongruent with men’s everyday lives. However a narrow focus on ‘negative’ emotional displays (historically pathologised as afflictions endured by the female body) as a key indicator of emotionality, is problematic (Fischer 1993).

There is, even within similar strands of psychology, no undisputed evidence that emotional development can be attributed to sexual difference (Mayer 2009). It is therefore important to take a sociological focus for the reason that emotions cannot be treated objectively, as psychological perspectives tend toward. This is not a statement just on the notion that different social contexts arouse different emotions in different people, but also to make a case for the fact that a history of emotional discourse can obscure how gendered power relations work through the narrative of what is or is not considered emotional responses by those experiencing them.

Emotions, studied sociologically in relation to men or masculinities have also tended to look at ‘deviant’ (Katz 1988; Stanko 1994) or publicly violent exhibition (Schaff and Retzinger 2001). The focus in these cases rests on those moments where control ‘breaks down’, problematic for the reason outlined above, particularly as this ignores instances which may be driven by emotions but which may be conceived of socially as rational. Thus, as Bourdieu (2001) argues, what is commonly labelled courage often comes “from the fear of losing the respect or admiration of the group, of ’losing face’ in front of one’s ’mates’ and being relegated to the typically female category of ’wimps’, ’girlies’, ’fairies’ etc” (2001: 52). Courage, as the perceived suppression of fear, is motivated often by precisely that which it hopes to restrict.

It is necessary then to understand emotions as integral to masculinities and to adopt an explicit or semi sociological focus around how masculinities shape rather than prohibit male emotional experience. Authors have been keen to point out the psychological ‘costs’ of socially produced masculinities (Messner 1997), especially in relation to men’s emotional development (Thompson 1997; McNess 2008). Monaghan and Robertson’s (2012; 2012) recent articles outline the case for conceiving much more broadly how men understand their emotional lives from a sociological perspective, given the implications for men’s health (Davidson, Daly and Arber 2003; Emslie, Ridge, Ziebland et al. 2006; Branney and White 2008; Cleary 2012) and the impact on suicide rates (Robertson 2007: 95). However emotions may also be active strategies for maintaining (Hearn 1987; 1993; Allen 2007) as well as transforming (Hollway 1984;
Segal 1990; Hollway 1991; Duncombe and Marsden 1993; Seidler 1994; hooks 2004b; Seidler 2006a; 2007; White and Peretz 2009; Forrest 2010) masculinities. This is what makes understanding male emotional narratives and framing them socially, crucial (Galasinski 2004).

**Critical Perspectives on Emotions and Masculinities**

Seidler (1994; 2006a; 2006b; 2007), as one of the most vocal critics of male identification with ‘masculinity-as-emotional-repression’, argues that masculinities cannot be conceived of as only relations of power. To do so ignores both how practices of domination may be structured by emotional experience and also, as he claims in relation to Connell’s work especially; “tends to reproduce a distinction between women's ‘structural’ oppression and men's merely ‘personal’ pain that is too generalised and that fails to show how men's emotional lives are also structured through relations of power that work through differences of class, race, ethnicities and sexualities” (Seidler 2006b: 97). He is especially critical of Connell’s treatment of emotions within a framework of hegemonic masculinity as ‘merely personal’ or therapeutic (Seidler 2006a; 2007), which “leaves little space for men to explore emotionally the tensions between their experiences as men in various settings and socially defined masculinities” (2006a: 135).

However whilst Seidler talks about differences of class, race, ethnicities and sexualities, helping to shape emotions (Seidler 2006b), there is little empirical basis to his work in order to explore these intersections’ impact. Several more recent studies have adopted an empirical focus on this issue. For example White and Peretz’s (2009) article, explores emotions and ‘black masculinities’ and takes up some of these key issues empirically. They make a case for emotion work helping to negotiate black masculinities specifically, which in view of hegemonic masculinity contains tensions between “[avoiding] negative emotions (embarrassment and shame) and consequences (being bullied or ostracized by male peers) that arise when their masculinity is questioned” (2009: 407) and ‘proving one’s manhood’ (2009: 406), in the face of economic and social disenfranchisement.

Their piece looks at how emotions have been incorporated into the experience of two black men’s profeminist groups as a means of resistance to hegemonic representations, whilst avoiding stereotypes of black masculinities as premised on physical toughness (2009: 415). They critically engage with Hochschild’s (1990)
concepts of ‘feeling rules’ and ‘emotion work’ which they argue, help to deconstruct oppressive practices which have been used to both marginalise black men and are a source of conflict between black men and women.

Forrest’s (2010) empirical work provides a response to Jackson’s (1993) earlier critique as he focuses on young males’ emotional narratives in loving relationships. This poses significant methodological questions to existing research, on the issue of males’ emotional lives and he observes (perhaps optimistically) that;

a young man may no longer see emotional intimacy as a demand made on him by young women in order to obtain sex and a threat to their masculinity but as an opportunity for articulation and fulfilment of their desires, needs and anxieties (Forrest 2010: 208).

This is a similar position adopted by both Segal (1990) and Hollway (1984), whereby the type of emotional intimacy experienced in caring relationships of different kinds may actually help to destabilise masculinities as exercises in domination (see also hooks 2004b).

Hollway (1984) specifically notes that there are multiple emotional discourses involved in heterosexual intercourse which may be experienced by men as both simultaneously desirable and threatening. The naturalisation of the male sex drive (see Petersen 1998: 57), as she argues, exposes men to emotions which can be as disempowering as empowering (Hollway 1993). Masculinities often find currency in distancing themselves emotionally from sex with numerous partners (see Simpson 1994), but Forrest and Hollway both raise questions in respect to how feelings of vulnerability and emotional anxiety that relationships open up can be transformative. Therefore, in accord with White and Peretz (2009), emotions are taken to represent a progressive renegotiation of masculinities as more than just constructions of power.

Whilst highly critical of the idea of males as adhering to models of emotional suppression, these perspectives however still draw from three slightly problematic assumptions. Firstly there is a distinction between what men consider ‘normal’ and ‘abnormal’ emotions in relation to masculinities (with the abnormal often being the ones linked to ‘feminised’ display); secondly that emotions are neutral, naturally occurring phenomena; thirdly that emotions, by virtue of their gendered history, are inherently transformative to the project of deconstructing male strategies of domination (with the exception of Hollway). Again, drawing on Hearn’s (1993) work, emotions cannot be considered as de facto good or bad, as they themselves are dependent on
arrangements of power as well as physiological changes in the body. It is necessary then to be careful in seeing some emotional displays by males as inherently progressive, given that privileging emotions on the basis that they are stereotypically ‘unmasculine’ reifies emotions as typically ‘feminine’ (see Fischer 1993).

In White and Peretz’s work, the idea that black men have to actively work to deconstruct masculinities by engaging in subverting ‘normal’ feeling rules assumes a narrow remit of emotionality as premised on the feminisation of emotion. Whilst they state that “social scientists have focused on the more cognitive aspects of identity (e.g., schemata and discourses) rather than the emotions that underlie identity shifts and transformations” (2009: 404), they present emotional work simply as engagement with a profeminist ideal which tends to privilege ‘stereotypical’ female emotional expression (Illouz 2007). Emotions frequently help to structure performance; therefore it is not enough to call for the transformative potential of emotions given that feelings and emotions can be a source of oppression (anger, disgust, intolerance).

Galasinski’s (2004) linguistic analysis focuses explicitly on emotions and masculinities and how “emotions construct masculinities and ... [what] the discursive strategies [are] which are used by men when they talk about their emotional experience” (2004: 23). In contrast to Seidler’s (1994) approach, he illustrates a wide range of emotional narratives that men employ in their everyday lives. This includes everything from anxieties for failing to conform to expectations, worries about aging, unemployment, fatherhood or relationships generally, to what he calls, his ‘lived model of masculinity’ (Galasinski 2004: 144) whereby men construct their masculinities around a range of emotional states which have commonly been configured as ‘negative’. However the men he interviews (of different ages) do not necessarily see these emotions as a sign of weakness or ‘abnormal’.

For Forrest’s respondents, emotional investment in ‘serious’ relationships does not seem to be a conscious way of renegotiating identities, rather it seems that emotional commitment is part of their identities. He points to greater emotional intuition as instances where “gendered identities are being actively renegotiated” (Forrest 2010:

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15 Whilst Galasinski’s respondents seem open to discussing their emotions it would appear that it is predominantly the older respondents who are more articulate about the topic. As demonstrated in Chapters 5, 6 and 7, teasing out younger men’s attitudes on the subject may have proven more difficult. Also in adopting a linguistic focus Galasinski tends to make an argument for the paramount importance of language when studying emotions which misses nonverbal communication. If emotional repression really is a key defining feature in how (some) men perceive themselves, then it should be questioned whether asking them about their feelings given in an interview format is always appropriate (see Chapter 4).
however the boys assertions that maturity is bound up with emotionality leads one to conclude that “[you] can’t know yourself as a person what kind of man you are, unless you share yourself” (2010: 213). This might indicate that far from ‘renegotiation’, emotions are congruent with sense of ‘masculinity’. As Segal (1990) and Duncombe and Marsden (1993) highlight, emotions have also historically been enmeshed with experiences of fathering and partnering. Therefore arguing that feminism especially has forced a recent renegotiation of men’s emotional lives is incorrect.

On this point, Allen’s (2007) work notes that emotional narratives in relationships, whilst portrayed as the antithesis of hegemonic masculinity due to a stress on emotional sensitivity, dependency and caring (2007: 137), may actually be compatible with hegemonic masculinity. Love can be a source of masculine domination (Lovell 2000; Wallace 2003) given that ‘loving relationships’ have historically had an ideological effect (Illouz 1998; Ahmed 2004; Illouz 2007; Ahmed 2010a) of presenting themselves as the prerequisite for stable, heteronormative arrangements (Rich 1980). Against Seidler’s critique, these perspectives indicate that emotions themselves can also be part of a broader hegemonic strategy (this is a point I return to in Chapter 7). Emotional expressivity may not necessarily transform gender relations (see Edwards 2006: discussion of the ‘new man’).

**Cause and Affect**

The approaches outlined above therefore suggest that characterising what emotions are, and how they are studied in relation to masculinities, should be done cautiously. Emotions must be understood as discursively constructed (Hearn 1993; Petersen 2004) but properly considered within a structural framework (Hearn 1987; 1993; Allen 2007). They help structure socially gendered identities and actions because they are individually experienced (Thoits 1989), however they cannot be reduced to individual feelings of security or insecurity (Hearn 2004), or to normative conceptions of emotionality (Fischer 1993).

In order to understand how masculine subjectivities shape men’s emotional experiences, certain binary frameworks should be rejected. To argue that our environment shapes our emotions or that our emotions shape our environment is to reproduce a false polemic; both are equally true. It is interaction that shapes our emotions and how our emotions are shaped that allows interaction. As Elias (1991) suggests, we are already the products of our societies’ histories long before we are
conscious of our interaction with these histories, However as we enter into a society, it is in turn altered by our presence (1991: 20). Emotions develop in tandem with how our bodies are understood by others and how we come to understand them; gendered, sexed or classified both by the societies we inhabit and by direct interaction. How we understand our bodies and surroundings is shaped by our emotional experiences and impulses which in turn interact with collectively enforced, discursive productions of knowledge – specifically around gendered behaviour. Again, this is the appeal of Bourdieu’s notion of habitus.

By viewing the body as a corporeal, tangible, finished entity, to be worked on by institutions or ‘incomplete’ normative definitions of which it is a component part, there are limitations to understanding human experience as a reflexive and profoundly emotional phenomenon. Craib’s (1995) assessment of the literature, positing human emotion as a sociological rather than psychological field of inquiry highlights some of the problems sociology has with dealing with emotion. Epistemologically, sociology still often divides understanding between subject and object (Latour 2004), between body and mind or personal and public; psychology often between consciousness and unconsciousness or cognition and emotion.

These distinctions are arguably difficult to transcend due to operations of institutional and discursive power, but nevertheless should be questioned in order to theorise masculinities or masculine subjectivities. Sociology’s stress on the primacy of subject / object social relations may also undermine the unconscious, affective, impact of experience. The ‘affective turn’ is a direct response to the over deterministic nature of existing theories of gender, which attempts to counter the ‘oversocialised concept of man’ (Wrong 1961) and the oversocialised body as a finished product.

This is where it is necessary to problematise emotion further by adding the notion of affect. Affect and emotion are closely linked but as Thoits (1989: 318) notes; “emotions can be distinguished from feelings, moods, and sentiments ... the term *feelings* includes the experience of physical drive states (e.g. hunger, pain, fatigue) as well as emotional states. *Affects* refer to positive and negative evaluations (liking/disliking) of an object, behavior, or idea: affects also have intensity and activity dimensions”. Both emotions and moods both have affects, however to ‘be affected’ is an instant, unconscious and intensely physiological experience. Due to this intensity dimension, it is possible to experience embarrassment only socially (Goffman 1956) but be affected by it before even consciously evaluating what about the situation is
embarrassing and attaching the appropriate linguistic understanding. Actions are therefore shaped and affected by numerous social situations before there is time to consciously appraise motivations and to question what emotion is being felt. This has important implications for research into ‘masculinity’ due to the causal nature of the affective system in aiding ‘choice’.

William James’ (1890) ‘problem of personality’ has been recovered in recent years in an attempt to theorise affect within the social sciences, not as an unintended consequence of meaningful social action, but as physiologically embodied through social experience which can transform social action (Latour 2004; Blackman 2008). The merits of theories of affect are primarily that they transcend the limitations of adherence to biological, psychological or sociological accounts, whilst extending their respective merits.

Widely regarded as one of the first proponents of a theory of affect (Sedgwick and Frank 1995; Sedgwick 2003), Tomkins (1962: 6) builds a case against Freudian psychoanalysis inasmuch as action, shaped by affective response, is perceived to be a secondary function of the drive system. Far from our actions being dictated largely by a fixed, unconscious self, our abilities (and sometimes our intention) to consciously relive uncomfortable moments, awkward situations or traumatic memories, presents a problem for a psychoanalysis, which deals primarily in repression. The affective system is a consciously experienced, but only semi-consciously stimulated, component of the individual’s psyche which, in Tomkins’ view, is activated precisely at those moments of intense feeling.

Basing many of her insights on this notion of a reflexive, constantly evolving, affective system, Sedgwick’s (2003) work on affect and performativity, develops a hermeneutic understanding of human behaviour that is neither socially constructed nor individually privileged. Through this, she avoids the kind of constructionist determinism commonly associated with sociological treatises of emotion. Whilst she accepts physiological arousal, linked to feeling anger, joy or sorrow, she also draws attention to how these situations as socially mediated phenomena, relying on subjective appraisal.

Sedgwick argues for understanding the affective system as a finite number of affects varying in intensity over time, suggesting that whilst there may be a limited number of ‘core’ emotions the intensity with which these are felt gives rise to qualitatively different responses, reactions and receptions which differ completely. Her
treatment of the concept of shame as an affective device that relies implicitly on social understanding offers a further understanding (2003: 36-38). Shame as a “powerful affect” she argues, creates as well as undermines identities and her discussion of how experiences of shame are incorporated into and built around categories, draws inspiration from both Foucault (1979) and Tomkins (1962). This implicates an identity around notions of difference and discourse whilst retaining the physiological affect of social perception.

The notion of shame as a performative expectation also echoes Butler (1998b), with both theorists highlighting that affect can be both conscious and unconscious processes reliant on a learnt distinction of difference. To perform gender ‘incorrectly’ under the gaze (imagined or otherwise) of those who are perceived to perform gender ‘correctly’, invokes affective responses. This affective response may in turn lead to an individual either transforming a performance immediately or seeking to minimise the response in a future situation by transforming their behaviour generally. This has direct implications for the role of homosociality in relation to the performance of masculinities (see Chapters 6 and 7).

The commitment to minimising some affective impacts and emotional responses therefore shapes gendered expectations. It is not enough to suggest that the constant reinforcement of ‘natural’ sexual difference leads to gendered behaviour; it is commonly the affective impact of shame at being caught in the act of behavioural transgression which limits or shapes future action. On the other hand the performance that produces shame will not always be regarded as the same in every context and in some cases lead to affirming identities based around the affective impact of shame. Social subjectivities must then be factored in to account for variations in behaviour.

The multi-faceted nature of identity as a product of the perception of difference relies on seemingly congruent social categories which are able to impact on the affective system and the interplay between bodies with their own affective behaviours. To this end Latour’s (2004) article to this end uses the example of the ‘malettes à odeurs’ to illustrate the point that “to have a body is to learn to be affected” (2004: 205). He discusses how actors working in the perfume industry train their bodies to become sensitive to variations of smell but that this process is both physiological and social. In Latour’s view we acquire a body through experience of difference, thus the body does not prefigure the social. He makes explicit that there is no object / subject without linguistic expression (a conceptual divide he strongly critiques), however he notes that
affective response through articulations “may easily proliferate without ceasing to register differences. On the contrary, the more contrasts you add, the more differences and mediations you become sensible to” (Latour 2004: 211).

Affect, as referred to here, should be understood as a series of semi-conscious, physiologically intense experiences, linked to emotions, which are mediated through social experience and help to structure individual practice. The affective system has a material basis in human physiology; however how those physiological reactions are experienced is utterly dependent on a combination of context, socialisation and structural-discursive influence. This is where the primacy of ‘social embodiment’ in relation to masculinities should be linked to habitus. It is through the registering of different social experiences, which are physiologically experienced, that males learn to be affected by and affect others through masculinities. As such, peer-judgments, which as a concept of habitus notes are themselves a by-product of multiple social factors and institutional pressures, involve the interplay of complex emotional and affective responses, which in turn shape social action and reproduce adherence to or aversion to gendered practices. This includes the experience of a discursive focus on rationality as the ‘absence of any feeling of irrationality’.

Theories of affect provide a new analytical framework which moves beyond the mind / body, nature / culture dualisms, inherent in many theories of masculinities. Latour’s comments have important implications for how males learn to become affected whilst accommodating the possibility of pleasure from gendered practice. Bodies are affected by and in turn affect others, but these physiological affects are often shaped by exterior social factors. Building on concepts of hegemony, habitus and performativity, this framework may help us to “enter the realm of causality ... [but] offer a complex view of causality because the affects belong simultaneously to both sides of the causal relationship” (Hardt 2007: ix). The methodological remit of sociology is limited in its study of affective impact as physiological, however the social impact of affective action within groups, by or on actors, carries important implications.

**Masculinities and Affect**

As Tomkins (1962) argues, we cannot look to becoming affected as a completely unconscious process, as psychoanalysis and also Bourdieu’s notion of habitus tend toward. Tomkins’ critique of a Freudian analysis of trauma in his introductory remarks prove crucial to understanding the problematisation of the affective system as both
conscious and unconscious. In a discussion on the plausibility of freedom, thus implicating agency, based on experience, he states that;

The conventional concept of causality, which generated the pseudo problem of the freedom of the will, assumed that the relationship between events was essentially two valued, either determinate or capricious ... We feel, however, that this controversy concerns man’s degrees of freedom rather than the determinateness of his behaviour ... Two men both aged sixty, one of whom is healthy and the other dying of cancer, are equally determined in their life span, but one has more degrees of freedom than the other (Tomkins 1962: 109-110).

This example highlights perfectly the complexity of how to conceptualise ‘freedom’ not as an individual choice in the truest sense, nor as entirely structurally constrained, but mediated through both.

As influential as Tomkins’ definition is, again a discursive focus is essential in exploring what constitutes ‘positive’ and ‘negative’ affects; something Tomkins fails to evaluate in terms of subjective social location or subjectivities. Whilst his work can be used, as Sedgwick (2003) has, to challenge normative assumptions of gender, his adherence to psychological explanations may hinder a thorough understanding of the role subjectivity plays in determining how humans learn to be affected. Chiefly what the institutional processes are which develop this learning and above all, who has power to affect or be affected.

The value in understanding masculinities as emotional, affective attachments is twofold. Firstly it engages with the question as to how far emotion is shaped by culture, as in Connell’s (1995) still pervasive argument, and asks whether masculinities can be transformed through culture. If studies which proceed from the assumption that a belief in normative ‘masculinity’ is a social problem (as should be the case) then emotional attachment to the ideal and the practices this entails need to be examined with a greater emphasis on the emotional and affective dynamics.

Secondly, understanding masculinities in this way enables us to question just how far males actually believe in and practice ‘emotional suppression’ and rational choice. It is not enough to simply ‘eradicate’ so-called individual problems as the notion of eradication is itself a product of modernist discourse (Seidler 1994) which serves to reproduce the distinction between emotion and reason and between mind and body. This reinforces the falsehood that males are ‘unemotional’, leading to problems if or when
emotion ‘management’ ceases to function and obscuring a wider understanding as to what exactly is meant by emotionality (Fischer 1993).

Seidler’s (2006a: xix) call for a framework that is “... able to imagine [masculinities as] complex relationships of power and vulnerability, authority and love, equality and recognition” echoes Frosh’s (1995: 230) observations that males are still vulnerable precisely because any investment in the belief “that masculinity is built on emptiness, including a disavowal of the capacity to link with others in a mode of reciprocal neediness and intimacy” necessarily alienates those engaged with it, leading to stress, anxiety, depression and in extreme cases, suicide (Cleary 2012). As social scientists, seeking to confirm suspicions that ‘men express emotion differently and are therefore less emotional’, increasingly adds to an exhaustive body of literature which, despite documenting the constructivist nature of gendered behaviour, unwittingly tends to reinforce it.

At the same time personal feelings of powerlessness do not have to equate with a lack of social, economic and material advantage (Hearn 1987; Kimmel 1995; Hearn 2004), thus a structural and discursive focus is also required. If emotional repression really is currently the key to how males believe that masculinities should be enacted, then new means need to be developed whereby personal accounts are combined with a grasp of material, economic, social, political and historic factors. Petersen’s (1998) assertion that the sociology of emotions is too gender aspecific is astute, however the sociological literature around masculinities can learn from methods employed around emotions and affect.

By developing methodological frameworks which are also sensitive to sexual differences in emotional display and articulation, we can begin to theorise how behaviour is structured by emotional identification with masculinities. This will enable a more robust theory of sexual differentiation which can explain patterns of behaviour, not only in terms of institutional pressures or discursive practices, but how actors respond to these, how they negotiate these practices and how they alter their behaviour not as passive recipients of structural codes but as emotionally gendered participants.

Whilst sociology can learn from some social psychological work on gender and emotions, the lack of rigorous attention to linguistic differences in emotion labels, outlined by Galasinksi (2004), needs to be addressed to reinterpret emotions and affects through a gender specific framework. Not solely as the external pressure of social
institutions, but as an emotional investment in a socially mediated, transformative project; neither fully conscious nor unconscious.

Whether male emotional ‘repression’ is perceived as a product of emotion work (Hochschild 1979) or deep acting (Hochschild 1983), a sociological study of the relationship of masculinity to emotion can expose how performances are incongruent with gendered hegemonies, subjectivities or identities. Believing in, identifying with, or performing ‘masculinity’, is a lived, emotionally influenced experience, which is shaped by social factors but which allows for the possibility of subjective interpretation. In understanding emotion as linked to causality and social action, shaped by institutional, structural and interpersonal pressures, research may bring to light those situations where dislocation between material power and experience occurs and thus challenge notions of dominant discourses. Certainly as a male sociologist theorising masculinities, it is even more pertinent to avoid the masculinist bias in seeking to prove and reprove rationality as a disembodied force which dominates ‘lay’ perspectives.

The value of understanding masculinities and emotions sociologically is that humans are necessarily subject to a vast range of influences which affect their reactions to social stimuli. Sociological studies of masculinities recognise the importance of patterned behaviour on masculinities but tend to overstate the extent to which conceptions of rationality are an ideal for many men. Often Connell’s self-critiqued (Connell and Messerschmidt 2005) concept of hegemonic masculinity (Connell 1995) is uncritically used to explain behaviour with no consideration as to the emotional investment that men attach to their belief system.

Summary

This chapter has explored how emotions have been conceptualised in the social sciences in relation to masculinities. In drawing attention to the way in which a reliance on the separation between cognition and emotion has characterised attempts to study it, this chapter has suggested that a more gender specific understanding of emotionality and masculinities as emotional, affective attachments should be developed. The implications of this are that masculinities can be studied as shaped by structural pressures and as commitments to specific components of these structures.

A sociological study of masculinities’ relationships to emotion can expose whether internal and external performances are incongruent with gendered subjectivities. However literature focusing specifically on how masculinities mediate male experience
is still arguably largely limited. This is particularly because there is still a frequent separation of emotions as ‘personal’ or therapeutic (Seidler 2006a) as opposed to intertwined with structural and discursive factors (Hearn 1993), despite adopting a social focus.

There have been significant contributions toward demonstrating that men develop an understanding of their own emotional lives (Segal 1990; Galasinski 2004; Allen 2007; White and Peretz 2009; Forrest 2010). This refutes the idea that masculinities encourage men to ‘be unemotional’. However there is a danger that men’s individual feelings of powerlessness and emotional anxieties (Farrell 1993; Thomas 1993; Robertson 2007; Branne and White 2008) are taken at face-value, undermining the structural advantage that certain men still retain despite these interpretations (Connell 1995). There is also still a reliance on a narrow conception of what constitutes emotionality, which may actually reinforce rather than challenge gendered discourse.

Using Tomkins’ (1962) and Sedgwick’s (2003) treatises of affect, it is possible to theorise gendered emotional and affective development as both discursively social and individually experienced. Latour’s (2004) notion of ‘learning to become affected’ also adds significantly to a debate around how masculinities shape male emotional narratives as an integral part of masculinities, rather than a fundamental reworking of them. Through an amalgamation of literature around gender, the sociology of emotions and affect, it is possible to suggest new avenues for renegotiation as well as reproduction of masculinities. These may take account of habitus, hegemony and performativity but in doing so provide sufficient levels of complexity for developing ‘social embodiment’ (Connell and Messerschmidt 2005).

The subsequent chapter demonstrates how interaction with music, as “arguably the cultural material par excellence of emotion” (Denora 2000: 46) is an important tool for exploring the themes developed in the preceding two chapters. Musical experience, much like gendered identity, is a lived, emotionally influenced phenomenon, which is shaped by social factors but which is heavily influenced by subjective interpretation. Whilst justifiably complicated, the value of understanding emotion and affective experience as linked to causality and social action, shaped by institutional, structural and interactive encounters may bring to light those situations where dislocation between material power and experience occurs and challenge notions of dominant discourses of rationality.
Chapter 3: Masculinities, Mass Markets and Music

Introduction

This chapter locates the roots of mass music from the 19th century onwards, in relation to technological and cultural change. For the reasons outlined below, it can be argued that far from being a matter of individual taste, music preference is often a product of the ‘authority of numbers’ (Davis 2008a) which reinforces (gendered) hegemony and cultivates desire. Central to mass music’s success as a commodity however has been the discursive perception of music’s use as a ‘tool’ for individual emotional expression. The importance of music as indicative of cultural value is reflected in the ubiquity of music consumption, as well as the increase in demand for music over the course of the nineteenth, twentieth and twenty-first centuries. Secondly academic research on music as often integral to identity foregrounds its social function in group interaction. In this way it has often been implicitly linked to dynamics of gendered practice due to a frequent focus on homosociality; especially amongst young males.

The intertwining of the mass music market with notions of male sexuality, control, authority, consumption and production, are also often cited as problematic by feminists and cultural theorists. It is argued that cultural representations often feed directly back into gendered expectations, thus reproducing unequal distribution of power (Frith and McRobbie 1978; Tuchman 1979; Lawrence and Joyner 1991; Arnett 2002; Leonard 2007). This is something that is central to Connell’s (1995) notion of hegemonic masculinity and Bourdieu’s concept of habitus. Due to the frequent conflation of the male body with ‘masculinity’ (see Chapter 1) and the ways in which cultural representations work to secure institutional privilege (Connell 1995), the ways in which males have come to dominate music in terms of production and consumption may therefore impact on identitarian discourses surrounding certain music.

The mass music market is however not unilateral in its effects. Often the performative aspects of music challenge normative gender assumptions (Butler 1998b; Halberstam 2007; Brill 2008; Peters 2010). The affectation of bodily hexis (see Wissinger 2007) for example can be a means of exposing and challenging hegemonic practices and the emphasis on music as tool for ‘connecting with’ or expressing...
emotional states (Denora 2000) also has particular relevance in relation to destabilising gendered assumptions around masculinities.

This chapter will first look at the current state of the market for mass music in the West. It will then move on to demonstrate how this market was created and explore how music, as a tool for emotional expression, has been constructed as desirable. Next it will present some alternative perspectives on the role of music taste in shaping identities before providing a critique of Bourdieusian-inspired accounts of ‘types’ of listeners. The chapter will finally conclude with an explanation as to why a focus on music’s historical relationship to the male body raises several interesting questions around the notion of masculinity-as-emotional-suppression argument.

The work of Theodor Adorno, whilst often unpopular due to his extensive critique of music’s privileged status as individual preference (Adorno 1945; 1975; 1976; 1981; Adorno and Horkheimer 1997 [1947]; Adorno 2004) provides one of the most comprehensive critiques of both music’s social character and aesthetic potential (Paddison 1982; DeNora 2003a; Watson 2011). This is especially the case when exploring music’s commodified relationship to rationality and embodiment. For these reasons his work is referred to frequently throughout this chapter.

Music, Males and Markets

The Modern Market for Music

In 2010 in the UK, the music recording industry generated £8,23.8 million (BPI 2011: 8). Approximately £9.9 billion was spent worldwide on music (2011: 86), with roughly 8.8% of global sales made in the UK (c. £1.8 billion); the fourth largest market for music in the world behind the US, Japan and Germany (ibid.). The growth in illegal downloads has had an impact on these revenues over the past 10 years. With the advent of broadband, increasing bandwidths, growing internet penetration (which stands at over 74% of individuals in the UK16) and the proliferation of file sharing software since Napster first launched in 1999, there has been a slow decline in revenue generated by CD sales, both nationally and globally. The Jupiter research body set up to examine the impact of illegal downloads in the UK estimated that between 2001-2012 “online music piracy [may] cost the UK music industry £1.6bn” (IFPI 2009).

16 Ofcom (2011: 3).
Nevertheless, from 2003 “a legal digital music market [was] created from scratch ... with consumers now able to shop around more than 500 legal services” (IFPI 2008: 6), with growth in digital music sales demonstrating an oppositional trend to that of CD sales as the market expands to create demand and develop legal frameworks to police and prosecute those who download music ‘illegally’. Again in 2010 98.7% of all single sales were made online (BPI 2011: 11), though physical formats still accounted for 72.6% of all industry revenue (2011: 8).

Technological innovation is frequently at the forefront of a capitalist mode of production and, whilst there is no consensus on the extent of the impact illegal downloads have had on music industry revenues, it is clear that stakeholders are looking to recoup ‘lost’ earnings. The download chart for example, launched in 2005 saw sales in digital music tripling globally from 2004 to 2005 (BPI 2006) and maintaining a substantial year on year increase. 32% of all record company revenues globally, in 2011, were generated through digital music sales, up from 29% in 2010 (IFPI 2012: 6).

Whilst ostensibly music sales are decreasing, this is not to say that music is any less important now, as the growth in MP3 player sales has demonstrated (Henderson 2009). From 2001 to 2008 the iPod, as the market leader, alone sold roughly 60 million units (Beer 2008: 74) and an estimated 350 million from 2001 to 2012 (Kingsley-Hughes 2012). Whilst sales in iPods have declined in the past 3 years as with the displacement of other technological mediums this decline has been coupled with a rise in smartphone sales (ibid.).

Free, legal online content also exists today and is a quick and easy source of access for both the publication of music for bands and the ability to listen to music for individuals. There are numerous services which offer music online today such as Vevo, YouTube, mFlow, iTunes, Spotify, Locker Plus, Zune, Amazon, Sony’s Music Unlimited, Shazam, which in many cases provide access to music for billions of listeners worldwide. In 2010 it was estimated that 5.5 billion videos globally were watched online in February. This includes non-music content, though a study by Nielsen found that “57% of 26,644 respondents across 53 countries [had] watched music videos online” (BPI 2011: 57).

On British TV in 2010, music channels generated £104m of multichannel broadcasters’ revenue (Ofcom 2011: 121) and 17% of TV viewing was done on music channels (2011: 128). Sky currently has over 30 channels dedicated to playing predominantly music, a significant increase since MTV was first aired in 1981, and
even free-to-view services offer a minimum of two (predominantly) music channels. In 2005, aided by sponsorship deals with online providers, the UK Live 8 concert reached an estimated 10 million viewers in the UK and had the potential to reach up to 81% of the world’s population (BPI 2006: 95).

89.8% of the British population aged 15 and over also listen to the radio (Rajar.co.uk 2012) on a weekly basis with commercial UK radio generating just over £136.4 million in quarter 1 of 2012 (RAB.co.uk 2012). Again, commercial radio sales have been hit by economic recession, increasing internet ad spend - thus forcing marketing budgets to be split between the two mediums – and the popularity of online music sources. Unsurprisingly, with the growth in new online music sources, it is generally those aged 45+ who listen to the most radio, with the average listening time standing at around 20.1 hours a week (Ofcom 2011: 157). Amongst those aged 15-24, the group most likely to engage with online content, this only stands at 11.6% of total weekly listening hours (2011: 163).

**Gender and the Musical Economy**

There are four major record label conglomerates who released over 80% of all the albums and singles bought in the UK and similar percentages globally. As of 2010, in the UK, The Universal Music Group accounted for 33.3% of all albums sold, Sony Music (formally Sony BMG) 21.0%, EMI 14.1% and the Warner Music Group 13.7%\(^1\). The percentages of market share in other countries are comparable and globally each own numerous subsidiary labels under their respective corporate umbrellas. All but 2 of the 50 highest selling albums globally, in 2008 were recorded or published by one of these companies (IFPI 2008) and amongst these conglomerates, all presidents, at the time of writing, are all white males\(^2\).

As consumers, just under two thirds of total music sales and 69.4% of all online music purchases in the UK in 2010, were made by male consumers (BPI 2011: 72) and 64.4% of music sold in specialist retailers, rather than supermarkets, was bought by men (ibid.). Whilst male and female consumers were equally as likely to have bought at least one album in the last year (2011: 78), males have been consistently much more likely to buy albums than females across physical and digital mediums (BPI 2006; 2009: 71;

\(^1\) BPI 2011: 54
\(^2\) As of 10th May 2012: UMG – Mike Dungan; Warner Music Group – Stephen Cooper; Sony Music – Edgar Berger; EMI – Roger Faxon
Males were however only marginally more likely to have bought physical CD singles, which have been in decline since the 1980s (Liebowitz 2003). In terms of digital singles, male consumers accounted for 71.1% of all digital single sales (BPI 2011: 74). On average, from 2003 to 2008, males also spent roughly twenty pounds more per year on albums than females (BPI 2011: 78) and, contrary to popular belief, it is 30-50 year old males who account for the largest market share of music bought each year (2011: 75).

Males are clearly influential in consumption and regulation of music as a commodity. This is a deliberately crude generalisation but it is one made in awareness of an obscured history of female composers (see McClary 1991; Born 1992) and often neglected sexual dynamics in academic analyses of music consumption (McRobbie and Garber 1975; McRobbie 1991; Thornton 1995; Leonard 2007). Whilst the data presented above should not be read as ‘fact’ as it clearly fails to account for non-commercial music consumption amongst other things, it does however sketch an outline of some broader structural regularities. Firstly that the sexual composition of organisations and hierarchies often genders their operation (Hearn and Parkin 1983; Acker 1990; Connell 1998; Connell and Wood 2005); the music industry is no exception (see Leonard 2007; Ashley 2010). This means that the way in which music is marketed and ultimately consumed, relies in part on the beliefs, values and desires of those making decisions about music’s dissemination.

Secondly it is important to stress the role of cultural representations (Connell 1995; Horrocks 1995) and patterns of taste (Bourdieu 1984; Bauman 2000a; 2011) in shaping practices of domination and exclusion (Bourdieu 2001: 42, 92-93). On these points, Straw (1997) has convincingly argued that the ‘connoisseurship’ of record collecting, as a largely male preserve, is an important tool for homosocial bonding. Notions of authenticity (Frith and Goodwin 2004; Washburne and Derno 2004) are also important for ‘masculine’ identities premised on patterns of consumption (Edwards 1997; Beynon 2002; Edwards 2006). Cohen’s (1991) work demonstrating how rock music’s production is spatially exclusionary, or Clawson’s (1999) work on adolescent bands as symbolic to young male identities, similarly attest to the notion that making music is heavily geared toward perpetuating certain ‘malestream’ aesthetics. As Fonarow (2005) has also noted, this extends to audiences at gigs whereby the physical organization of space at venues is constructed along heavily gendered lines, particularly in relation to ‘moshpits’.
In terms of sales by genre, again distinctions between ‘authentic’ rock music and ‘inauthentic’ pop music (Frith and Goodwin 2004; Jarman-Ivens 2007: 3) are heavily sexed, with males in 2010 accounting for 67.8% of all rock sales, 55.3% of ‘urban’ sales, 69.6% of ‘jazz/blues’ sales, 65.9% of dance sales, 66.8% of classical sales and 65.1% of country sales (BPI 2011: 76) and 55.2% of pop sales. Clearly sexual differentiation plays a part in not only music consumption but the types of music that are consumed. In order to understand why this is the case, it is first necessary to locate the growth of mass music historically. This will also help to outline how a gendered focus on music may reveal more about how masculinities are constructed through emotional and affective processes.

The Structure of the Music Industry

Music as Commodity

A history of music taste, in Western societies, is inevitably bound up with the history of the mass market (Adorno 1945; 1975; 1976; Adorno and Horkheimer 1997 [1947]; Cvetkovski 2007). The term ‘popular music’ only began to find resonance in its contemporary usage, during the 18th and 19th centuries alongside the growth in what Wikström (2009) has termed the ‘copyright industry’, due to a previous lack of a market for it (Attali 1985). Musicologically, the features characteristic of popular music also appeared in the Viennese waltz in the 18th century and the English music halls of the 19th centuries (Frith 2002; Scott 2008); periods of rapid industrialisation.

The industrial revolution, aided by technological innovation and political upheaval, facilitated several key social changes, which distinguished the modern, capitalist society from the pre-modern, feudal one (Nisbet 1993) integral to the growth of a culture industry. These included the geographic shift towards the city, the creation of the middle classes with a disposable income and access to mass-produced commodities and, importantly, cultural shifts in how social life was organised (Giddens 1990). The English music hall in the 1800’s for example permitted a unique form of social life (Frith 2002; Scott 2008), impossible in pre-industrial, agrarian societies. Musical events as a means of making money encouraged entrepreneurial individuals to admit large numbers of people to music halls for a reduced admission (Frith 2002: 30-36) under the guise of economies-of-scale, made possible partially by the mass

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19 This includes rap, hip hop, r’n’b, grime, dubstep.
migration toward cities during the industrial revolution and permitting new forms of social interaction (ibid.). Those wealthy enough to own and promote the venues (predominantly, if not entirely exclusively, male) were able to provide a space where the emergent middle classes, could spend their newly created surplus income on music as a form of entertainment. It is here that the distinction between ‘elite’ and ‘mass’ culture (Bourdieu 1984; Bauman 2011) was rendered.

Mass culture, as the aggregate consumption of large number of individuals, can be linked directly to the music halls in Britain as it gave rise to many of the features associated with popular music today, as well as drawing distinctions between the male ‘star’ and the supporting female singers (Scott 2008: 21). Far from being the spontaneous taste of large groups however, the music played in the music halls relied on a range of new musicological gimmicks to attract audiences. The catchy ‘sing-along’ refrains, illicit, bawdy, references to sex (2008: 80-81), a focus on simple lyrics to which the majority could relate and shorter songs, removed the need for formal training in order to derive pleasure from it; formal training is not seen as a prerequisite to listening to ‘popular’ music (in Green 2002: 3, 15-16, 99). The halls themselves were also supported by promotional marketing tactics, such as adverts in city papers or on street posters to create attention and undoubtedly, rather than responding to demand; the owners of the halls were able to stimulate a demand to fulfil.

Since the phonograph was invented in 1877 the production, consumption and indeed distribution of music has proliferated (Chapelle and Garofalo 1977). Those with enough disposable income could afford to listen to music in their homes rather than venturing to the music halls. The ‘individualisation’ of music taste is more evident from this point onwards, as is the tension between music as a mass phenomena and a matter of personal preference. Music as a commodity was born out of the shift to a capitalist mode of production in that sheet music, records, cassettes, CDs and MP3s, as well as the hardware required to play each format, could not have existed without mass production and mass consumption. The production of recorded music for sale is a vital shift from listening to music in public. By enabling consumers to listen to music in their homes (without being able to play the music on an instrument as with sheet music), music taste became defined as much by what was bought as much as by what was listened to.
The term ‘popular music’ however, whilst denoting popularity by virtue of its democratic ubiquity, should not be treated unproblematically as such. For this reason Adorno proposes characterising the culture industry as distinct from mass culture; …in order to exclude from the outset the interpretation agreeable to its advocates: that [mass culture] is a matter of something like a culture that arises spontaneously from the masses themselves, the contemporary form of popular art…to the detriment of both it forces together the spheres of high and low art, separated for thousands of years (Adorno 1975: 13).

‘Mass culture’ did not spring from a simultaneous collective will. The technological and legal infrastructure with which to support widespread music consumption could not have existed without the Statute of Anne, passed in 1710 (Wikström 2009: 18), which guaranteed financial reimbursement for intellectual ‘property’. The exponential growth in the supply of and demand for music, also depended on social changes and advances in communication, technology and logistical distribution (Chapelle and Garofalo 1977). The mechanization of production, both in literal and figurative senses, have made mass consumption of musical goods possible whilst at the same time maintained the perception that musical taste is the antithesis of mechanization (Adorno and Horkheimer 1997 [1947]: 137).

Whilst the growth in radio as a commodity was again heavily influenced by rapidly expanding pre (1920’s) and post (1950’s) Second World War economies (Peterson and Berger 1975; Chapelle and Garofalo 1977), radio shows became structured to support record sales (Peterson 1990). Unsurprisingly, it was during the 1920s and ‘50s, periods which were hugely significant for Western, capitalist economic expansion, which did much to shape the way that music was to be perceived as a commodity-influenced identity.

These changes guaranteed a market, in the literal sense, for music as a consumer good and accordingly shaped how the industries were structured in order to return profit. Cvetkovski’s (2007) analysis of the music industry’s vertically integrated corporate structure (2007: 61-77) demonstrates how, in Hesmondhalgh’s words the ‘star system’ (Hesmondhalgh 2007: 23) “minimise[s] the dangers of misses” (ibid.) in an industry where consumer taste, whilst influenced by saturation, does not always guarantee sales. One method for example that Hesmondhalgh discusses as a means of ‘minimising misses’, is the idea of genre labels as a tool of ‘formatting’ (ibid.). The music industry by branding certain aesthetic choices as ‘rap’, ‘metal’, ‘punk’ or ‘jazz’ encourages a
selectivity, whereby sales can be increased by ascribing broadly shared understandings of musical genres or categories. This confers certain music tastes with an ‘authority of experts and numbers’ and removing the anxieties associated with ever increasing levels of ‘choice’ (Davis 2008a: 74).

Adorno and Horkheimer (1997 [1947]) have conceptualised this shift as the fusion of ‘culture with entertainment’ (1997 [1947]: 143) and undoubtedly music consumption in modern societies, in both its experiential and commodity form, is different to pre-modern societies (Adorno 2004). As Bauman (2011) highlights, as a result of the above changes, the word ‘culture’ shifted meaning significantly, from something concerned with ‘elite’ or ‘superior’ art, to something with which to construct shared identities, based largely around the liberal conception of freedom as freedom of choice (Bauman 2000a: 31-33); substituting ‘traditional’ group formations for identitarianism, oriented around mass cultural consumption.

Firstly, ‘popular music’ requires no formalised training to listen to, hence why it is presumed accessible to everyone. Whilst there are undoubtedly rules to writing songs, using a ‘pop formula’ (Hesmondhalgh 2007), though these rules are not necessarily formally recognised as such by listeners. To write, perform or listen to popular music, requires little conscious appreciation of musicological structure. It is this ubiquity which is of the utmost importance in how music is perceived as spontaneous and importantly democratic choice. This has invariably shaped the belief that culture, and importantly music, has to be instantly pleasurable or enjoyable in order to be ‘worthwhile’(Adorno 1976; Negus 1999; Adorno 2004).

Secondly, music functions as a commodity inasmuch as industries have emerged in order to regulate dissemination and consumption. Music can (theoretically) be bought and sold which relies on creating the perception that music, as an intangible asset, can be ‘owned’ and that companies as well as composers can justifiably exploit music consumption for capital gain because they provide a service (Attali 1985; Negus 1999; Cvetkovski 2007; Hesmondhalgh 2007). Though as Wikström (2009: 21) notes, rarely do consumers ‘own’ music, rather they own a representation, copy, example “... or a right to listen to the sound recording within certain carefully defined restrictions”.

Social, economic and technological change undoubtedly structured the perception of music as a good to be consumed. At the same time music is, for many, perceived as a personal choice, undertaken freely and independent of marketing, consumer trends or peer influence. Yet if this were truly the case the music industry
would cease to exist as an industry precisely because it could not generate profit. This explains industry measures to curb illegal downloading, crystallized recently in the controversy generated by the Stop Piracy (SOPA) and Protect Intellectual Property (PIPA) Acts, as well as the outright censorship of the sites like the Pirate Bay which, according to the British Phonographic Institute, “undermine investment in new British artists” (BBC.co.uk 2012). The question is however, how music especially has come to occupy such omnipresence (Bennett 2001: 1), both financially through global markets and interpersonally, through often impassioned defence of personal musical tastes.

**Emotional Capitalism**

As Illouz (2007) highlights, despite common perceptions aligned with a Weberian tradition, that capitalism has led to coldness, callousness and unfeeling (2007: 1), it has, on the contrary, encouraged the formation of an “intensely specialized emotional culture” (2007: 4). Whilst her characterization of emotions as simply ‘inner energy’ is problematic for reasons already outlined in Chapters 1 and 2, she demonstrates clearly how capitalism’s relationship to identities has become mediated through the narrative of emotional attunement which aims to perpetuate consumer desire in attempting to better understand the self. Bauman (2000a), on a similar point, notes that the perpetual promise of affective fulfilment (desire) but not its full realisation is precisely what sustains consumerist society (2000a 28-29); this entails a constant search for new means of developing identity through consumption.

This is the paradox that Adorno has directly addressed; the myth of novelty as endless difference created out of the sense of continuity (Jameson 2007: 18-19). Beginning from the premise that modern music has adopted the form of commodity, Adorno (1945: 211) asserts that “Bach in his day was considered, and considered himself, an artisan, although his music functioned as art. Today music is considered ethereal and sublime, although it actually functions as a commodity”. This highlights that, despite music’s consumption as rooted in the logic of the mass market, the practice of consuming music requires at the very least the perception that it is personally desirable. From this point, it is first necessary to ask then what particular appeal music holds in social as well as individual consciousness.

Psychological approaches have tried to document this appeal as rooted in physiological arousal (Zimny and Weidenfeller 1963; Smith and Curnow 1966; Thompson, Schellenberg and Husain 2001; Krumhans 2002; Rickard 2004; Meyers-
Levy and Zhu 2010). As noted in Chapters 1 and 2, this is also how emotions have been
discursively characterised in psychology; embodied, ‘natural’, immediate responses to
stimuli. Panskeep (1995) for example explains that physiological responses explain
musical ‘chills’, observing that females feel ‘more’ chills than males (1995: 171). As is
most notably the case with the ‘Mozart Effect’, research has also focussed on how
music encourages learning due to ‘positive’ physiological stimulation (Nantais and
Schellenberg 1999; Thompson, Schellenberg and Husain 2001). Music’s function then
is often perceived as an emotional stimulant (Denora 2000; 2001).

As with physiological approaches to emotions, there are some largely
unquestioned assumptions as to the social implications of what constitutes ‘powerful’ or
‘uplifting’ music. These are treated as objective terms with little appreciation as to the
social dimensions of culturally shared musical appreciation. That ‘stimulating’ music is
often classical, may say as much about the elevated status that classical as a culturally
prescribed format denotes, as its musical qualities in stimulating response (Adorno
2004). The context in which the music is heard and the respondents’ preferences also
undoubtedly affect the results.

Again, this is succinctly highlighted by Adorno’s critique of using ‘objective’
measures as a framework for interpreting subjective phenomena. As he writes;

experiments may tell us about degrees of the intensity of the reaction; they
will hardly reach its quality. The literal, perhaps physiological and thus
measurable, effects which a specific music exerts are far from identical with the
esthetic [sic] experience of a work of art as such (Adorno 1976: 4 my italics)

What is also important to note is that psychological interest in music’s physiological
affects (and there is no denial that these exist), in no small part must stem from the idea
that music is perceived as “arguably the cultural material par excellence of emotion”
(Denora 2000: 46). If males are prevalent in the consumption and dissemination of
music, and music is widely used because it is overtly, discursively connected to
emotional stimulation, then this proves a challenge to the idea of masculinity-as-
emotional-suppression; precisely because music’s success as a commodity rests on its
perception as emotional stimulation.

As stated in the last chapter, it is a fallacy to suggest that males exercise
emotional repression; emotions make cognitive action possible and vice versa (Barbalet
2001). What needs to be accounted for then is what is discursively constituted as
‘appropriate’ and ‘inappropriate’ emotional expression in which circumstances, given
that physiological responses may conceivably motivate the inhibition of certain displays and the direction of certain action (see Hearn 1987: 140-141). The notion of music listening for pleasure is, arguably, congruent with ‘rational’ action\(^\text{20}\) for example (Adorno and Horkheimer 1997 [1947]: 105-106), because it is productive in the sense of motivating consumer choice and proving a compensatory measure for labour (1997 [1947]: 137), thus pleasure and joy are compatible with Western conception of ‘masculinity’ as premised on rationality.

It is however the ‘unproductive’ emotions evoked through music which Adorno (1976) contributes further to a discussion of. In *Introduction to the Sociology of Music* he outlines six typologies of listening behaviour, amenable to an analysis of modern music’s relationship to masculinities. Whilst his ‘cultural consumers’\(^\text{21}\) and ‘entertainment listeners’\(^\text{22}\) have specifically gendered qualities, of particular interest to this thesis are his comments on the ‘emotional listener’. This is one whom Adorno characterises as:

\[
\text{…one defined not by the relation to the specific quality of what is heard, but by its own mentality, grown independent of the object… His relation to music is less rigid and indirect than the culture consumer’s, but in another respect it is even farther removed from perception: to him, the relation becomes crucial for triggering instinctual stirrings otherwise tamed or repressed by the norms of civilization. Often music becomes a source of irrationality whereby a man inexorably harnessed to the bustle of rationalistic self preservation will be enabled to keep having feelings at all} (1976: 8 my italics)
\]

He also notes that this behaviour is less common in Germany than in ‘Anglo Saxon’ countries where;

\[^{20}\text{the masters introduce the notion of enjoyment as something rational, as a tribute paid to a not yet wholly contained nature; at the same time they try to decontaminate it for their own use, to retain it in their higher form of culture” (Adorno and Horkheimer 1997 [1947]: 105-6)\]

\[^{21}\text{“the culture consumer is a copious, sometimes a voracious listener, well informed, a collector of records. He respects music as a cultural asset, often as something a man must know for the sake of his own social standing … for the spontaneous and direct standing to music, the faculty of simultaneously experiencing and comprehending its structure, it substitutes hoarding as much musical information as possible, notably about biographical data and about the merits of interpreters, a subject for hours of inane discussion” (Adorno 1976: 6-7)\]

\[^{22}\text{“The quantitatively most significant of all the types is certainly the listener to whom music is entertainment and no more… The structure of this sort of listening is like that of smoking. We define it more in our discipline of turning the radio off than by the pleasure we feel, however modestly whilst it is playing” (Adorno 1976: 14-15)\]
…the stricter pressures of civilization necessitate evasions into uncontrollably introverted realms of civilization…At times such people may use music as a vessel into which they pour their own anguished and, according to psychoanalytical theory ‘free flowing’ emotions; at other times they will identify with the music, drawing from it the emotions they miss in themselves (1976: 8-9)

This links to some of the data, presented later in Chapters 5 and 6, whereby music acts as a tool for private emotional catharsis precisely because of the demands for public emotional suppression are frequently incongruous with experience. This echoes one of this thesis’ central arguments more generally; rationality as a discursive assumption is oppressive both socially and personally for those under the (false) assumption of rationality as pure cognition and the ‘internal’ and ‘external’ suppression of emotion. Though this should not be understood as cognitive, or even as Fischer and Jansz (2002) argue emotional, dissonance, as this indicates a stable, universalist conception of both rationality and identity. The point is that insecurity, fear and anxiety are not an abhorrence of male identity but, given the impossibility of separating cognition from emotion, the inevitable prerequisite of masculinities as men’s social power.

**Emotional Discourse in Modern Music**

The categorisation of listening ‘types’ should be problematised for several reasons already alluded to in Chapters 1 and 2 and explained in depth later in this chapter. Firstly, it is possible to span all six of Adorno’s ‘types’ (culture consumer, entertainment listener, emotional listener, expert, resentment listener, good listener), therefore they should not be taken to represent discrete categories. Secondly, the argument that modernity transforms listening into a drive purely for gratification, because this is rational (Adorno and Horkheimer 1997 [1947]: 6-7), simplifies the desire to deliberately evoke ‘negative’ emotions, explored further in Chapter 6. Thirdly, the acquisition of a rational, ‘compositorial habitus’, which Adorno advocates (1976: 67), is itself a specific kind of affective, emotional training (see the points on Brubaker in Chapter 1).

Adorno also underplays certain early and pre-modern discourses related to music, in his assessment of the emotional listener. The ‘instinctual stirrings’ he attributes to this type have long been considered problematic for the male body, precisely on the basis that music produces physiological arousal and thus compromises it (Gibson 2009; Leach 2009). It cannot be, therefore, that the culture industry creates the emotional listener.
More that it exploits such discourses through perpetuation of self-help and emotional attunement as ‘healthy’ (Illouz 2007: 43: 108) and desirable.

Modern music’s emotionally connotative aspects, can be linked largely to three discourses. The first is a longstanding belief that music induces uncontrollable physiological change. This, as Gibson (2009: 59-60) notes, led even 17th century doctors to fear for the arousing of melancholia in men through music. Earlier still, Castiglione’s influential 16th century ‘masculinity instruction manual’ (Forth 2008), observes that; “music is indeed well suited to women, and perhaps also to others who have the appearance of men, but not to real men; for the latter ought not to render their minds effeminate and afraid of death” (Castiglione 1959 [1561]: 74 my italics). The conflation of music with femininity (Taylor Jay 2009), emotion with music, and femininity with emotion also attest to this.

The second is the impossible discursive ideal of rationality as the suppression of emotion (see Chapter 1). As already highlighted in relation to Illouz’s (2007) work, the narrative of individualistic ‘self-help’ as ‘healthy’, serves an integral function of capitalist society. This can be connected to the increasing politicization of emotional life, notably through feminist assertions that the ‘personal is political’ (MacInnes 1998: 136-138), and the prevailing liberal tradition which emphasises individuals taking responsibility for their actions, including better understanding their own emotional lives. Music then becomes an important tool for emotional ‘self-help’.

The third is a history of mass music rooted in the saleability of colonial discourses around ‘black’ primality and ‘black’ culture to ‘white’ audiences. As Adorno’s emotional listener suggests music is seen as a means of escape from the oppressive nature of instrumentally rational, capitalist societies. As Forth (2008: 227) notes on this;

Just as the African American influence on jazz and rock music enhanced the ‘primitive’ liberation that such musical forms and their culture offered, so too does the embrace of ‘gangsta’ culture by white youths provide an imaginative connection with ‘savagery’ that peddles catharsis while reinforcing blatantly sexist and homophobic sentiments and deeds.

The term ‘rock ‘n’ roll’ itself was initially a ‘blues euphemism for sex’ (Cvetkovski 2007: 62). It is therefore unsurprising to see that the process of othering black music, which gave rock ‘n’ roll and latterly rock music its sexualised connotations (Frith and McRobbie 1978), became a source of moral controversy at precisely the time it also became a lucrative product. Primarily, the controversy hinged on rock n roll’s popularity
with a newly expanding youth market, (Peterson 1990) because of its ‘illicit’ (Bennett 2001) content. Stylistically, lyrically and sonically, rock ‘n’ roll was geared to promoting the idea of a white appropriation of black sexuality, where during significant economic expansion in the 1950’s, “disposable income for the working class meant that the youth especially could ‘invest’ in recreational activity” (Cvetkovski 2007: 61).

Rock ‘n’ roll is of particular importance to modern ‘popular’ music given its domination in the 1950s, a time when “major record companies [became] the economic gatekeepers as far as popular music was concerned” (Cvetkovski 2007: 60). As Peterson (1990) points out, there had actually been a decline in record sales from 1948 to 1949, with growth in sales after this period, much less than expected. It was only the advent of rock ‘n’ roll which helped halt this decline. From 1954 onwards, “every year for the rest of the decade sales grew rapidly so that the total value of records sold in 1959 was well over double what it had been in 1954” (Peterson 1990: 105).

The fears around embodied ‘contamination’ which prevailed in early blues and jazz, as well as rock ‘n’ roll, are still persistent in debates around rap music today (see Pinn 1996; Yousman 2003; Weitzer and Kubrin 2009). It is unsurprising then that the culture industry has continued to glamorise certain racist aesthetics (hooks 2004a; Conrad, Dixon and Zhang 2009; White and Peretz 2009: 415). Both blues and jazz were often perceived as primal music forms (McClary and Walser 1994) which can be linked to essentialist discourses around the ‘black’ male body (Frith 2002: 127) as both ‘butch’ and, simultaneously, blurred with the feminine through a presumed “enjoyment of physicality, bodily awareness, emotional expressiveness, and a greater sense of community” (Segal 1993: 636). In fact as Scott (2008) notes, black musicians in America the 1800s often had to ‘black up’ to be considered ‘authentic’ enough to play music, originally derived from African polyrhythms (2008: 163-164).

Adorno’s common depiction as a musical misanthrope also rests largely on his essays concerning jazz (Gracyk 1992; Harding 1995), based occasionally on critics’ own essentialist conflation of jazz with ‘black culture’, deemed elitist (Thompson 2010: 37), ill-informed (Gracyk 1992) or even racist at worst (Andrae 1979). Adorno’s particular emphasis on the expression of immediate gratification through emotion, something divorced from considered appreciation, as a key characteristic of ‘popular’
music, seems to also rest on discourses concerning black ‘primality’ (Adorno 1981: 127) 23.

Whilst a full musicological analysis of Adorno’s views on jazz cannot be undertaken, both for reasons of expertise and time (for a detailed analysis see Paddison 1982; Witkin 2000; Thompson 2010), Watson (2011) has suggested that the type of jazz to which Adorno referred was not avant garde, freeform jazz24, but ‘big band’ and ‘swing’; ‘jazz’ produced for commercial audiences in the ‘30s and ‘40s (see also Paddison 1982: 209-210). Adorno recognised qualitative differences in types of jazz as early as 1936 (Witkin 2000: 158-159), nevertheless in his essays he tends to unfairly conflate ‘jazz’ with ‘popular’ music (Gracyk 1992: 527).

‘Bottom Up’ Perspectives

The Subcultural Response

Whilst Adorno (and Gramsci) foregrounded the significance of culture as an ideological tool of control, subcultural theory, particularly with regards to music ‘subcultures’, claimed that identities premised on shared values could operate as resistance to capitalist hegemony (Jefferson and Hall 1993). From a subcultural perspective, especially in the work of the Birmingham CCCS, there has been a tendency to see the political importance of music, framed often in terms of class or ethnicity as active opposition to the kind of capitalist hegemony that Adorno particularly underscores (Cohen 1972b; Hebdige 1979).

Such accounts have been critiqued for failing to include a sufficient gender dynamic however (McRobbie and Garber 1975; McRobbie 1991; Muggleton 2005), arguably due to their neo-Marxist focus on public participation and production, extending to an implicit Gramscian notion of hegemony (Muggleton 2005: 209). This tends to emphasise class in relation to spectacular style in public spheres, as indicative of ‘subcultures’, rendering some female subcultures invisible. Nevertheless, it is

23 In response to accusations that Adorno was a racist and this is why he disliked jazz, it is worth noting that he was in fact critical of the culture industry’s fetishistic tendencies to sell ‘jazz’ as a commodity by marketing it as a ‘primitivist’ withdrawal from bourgeois society (Witkin 2000: 156). There are certain parallels with rap music because as hooks (2004a: 57-58) notes whilst misogyny features strongly in rap, it is the ‘white male dominated patriarchal infrastructure’ of the culture industry which profits. Certain prevailing discourses around ‘black’ masculinities are still therefore perpetuated by ‘white’ audiences.

24 Something Adorno refers to directly in his discussion of the avant garde in Introduction to the Sociology of Music.
important to note that gendered exclusionary practices, especially around music, have often led to ‘subcultural’ theories inadvertently becoming theories of young male group dynamics.

What is also important to note is that music has a social function on a smaller group level in developing a sense of individual identity; even if this process of individualisation inevitably becomes a ‘fate rather than a choice’ (Bauman 2000a: 34). Subcultural style in the appropriation of standards of dress also has implications in relation to notions of gender as performance (Butler 1998b; 1999), precisely because it arguably can subvert certain normative assumptions around gendered power relations (Auslander 2006; Brill 2008; Branch 2012; Downes 2012) and again, as is particularly the case with music, certain ways of relating to and interacting with, others.

If music ‘subcultures’ represent the rejection of dominant, homogenous conceptions of identity, then the performance of subcultural style by young males particularly, may indicate a way of conceiving of masculinities as not only forms of power, incapable of doing anything but reproduce themselves (see Chapter 1). Wissinger’s (2007) analysis of the modelling industry, for example, outlines the link between affect and technological change, which, in this way, is directly applicable to subcultural performance. She argues that the model (much like the literal or figurative performer) was born out of technoscientific advancement and social change and requires the “manipulat[ion of] affect or feeling by acting, engaging and connecting with themselves and others, with the goal of stimulating and projecting a feeling of vitality and aliveness” (2007: 235). A theory of affect has seldom been used in examining how, through technological change (namely, in the case of this thesis, the growth of a mass music industry), males use the concept of shame in a similarly transformative way.

Music in the performative sense may also offer the ability to allow men to renegotiate masculinities. Connell’s exemplar of the embodiment of hegemonic practices often centres on sport which provides a ‘continuous display of men’s bodies in motion’ (Connell 1995: 54); the symbolic and material link between, control, strength, power and dominance between the male body and masculinities are clear. However the impact of shame for failing to conform to contextually specific body forms, may manifest itself in active strategies to destabilise such assumptions (for example ‘heroin chic’ as a means of undermining embodied masculinities - Pete Doherty, Lou Reed, Bowie, Iggy Pop). This suggests alternative means with which to reject the importance
of acceptance of and adherence to, normative definitions of masculinity (Auslander 2006; Halberstam 2007; Brill 2008). In affecting, and in turn being affected by performances of non-hegemonic practices, this destabilises many of the normative assumptions around the ‘natural’ male body.

Music tastes are a bi-product of cultural and technological change, yet music ‘subcultures’, events and tastes are collective practices in which actors are constantly engaged; both physically and symbolically (Wood, Duffy and Smith 2007). Therefore within such dynamics there is potential for shifting patterns of behaviour as well as stylistic presentation. The music industry is structured in such a way as to create demand for musical commodities however the shift to perceiving music-as-emotion has, dialectically, both depersonalised and personalised music tastes.

Music tastes should also not be understood as the sole dictation of taste by major record labels for commercial gain. As Jameson (2007: 107) highlights, the culture industry thesis does not necessarily provide an analysis of culture as such, but of cultural production. The two are inevitably related but Adorno’s analysis, unlike Gramsci, does not fully develop a full account of culture’s role in maintaining hegemonic representations (Jameson 2007: 230).

The relationship between performers, promoters and labels is also such that it is often the interaction between individuals at the ‘micro and meso’ levels which feed into the marketing strategies of major record labels (Strachan 2007). Whilst there is undoubtedly a good deal of uniformity in musical production, there is also widespread reaction against the mass music industry, documented in biographical material, as informed by a moral or ethical ethos (Young 2006), which requires an explicit understanding of its mechanisms. If the music industry is deliberately ideological, then many are aware of its function. Whilst technological innovation has created a society of music consumers, it has also enabled several sites of resistance to consumerist hegemony.

‘Indies’ (independent record labels not owned by major record conglomerates) and ‘DIY’ labels (micro level individuals or small groups who finance and promote record releases) are heavily influential in how certain music forms are perceived and a ‘subcultural’ identification with their aesthetics (see Blush 2001; Greenwald 2003; Young 2006). These labels often work to promote bands on a local level, with a significantly lower proportion of profits (if any at all) going back to the labels themselves. Bands who sign to such labels are given more of a percentage of any
earnings and consumers of such material are often aware of the ethical and moral values behind these labels, encouraging consumer affiliation on this basis (Hesmondhalgh 1998). Authenticity is a complex, subjective, phenomena that influences music taste (Moore 2002; Frith and Goodwin 2004) and, importantly, affective enjoyment. It causes groups to react against the perceived homogeneity of mass culture and to learn to become affected (see Chapter 2) by different aesthetic qualities, given that it is linguistically dependent on arrangements of power (Adorno 2003). Whilst it is undeniable that the means of recording, production and distribution are the preserve of the major labels quantitatively, smaller organisations are formed around notions of creativity that are often geared only towards non-utilitarian (Thornton 1995: 11-13) or political (Hesmondhalgh 1998; Strachan 2007) goals.

The interaction between capital and power invariably works at a structural level in producing and reproducing discourses surrounding music. However there is a danger in reducing the creation of, or passion for, music solely to the passive manipulation of taste by capitalist dogma. Often what defines music taste is a perceived rejection of mass culture as the adoption of it (Arnett 1995; Cagle 1995; Thornton 1995). There is a need to make explicit the role of structure in the music industry, in order to realise that it is a matter of social patterning rather than unique individual taste, however a rejection of a mainstream, even as an imaginary entity (Andersen 2006), is an important part of the creation of a sense of coherent identities.

‘Types’ and Habitus

Some psychological approaches have tried to link music preference to ‘types’ of personality, often in conjunction with the types of physiological arousal that music evokes (Lewis 1991; Rentfrow and Gosling 2003; Pearson and Dollinger 2004; Rickard 2004; North, Desborough and Skarstein 2005; Chamorro-Premuzic and Furnham 2007; Miranda and Claes 2008). There is, implicit in these accounts, an assumption that music choice is made by the individual, on the basis of a desire to elicit emotions and that certain types of people are more predisposed toward certain emotional states. That different music produces different physiological responses in people based on their exposure to different types of music, demonstrates that music’s aesthetic qualities cannot be taken as a given and are subject to complex social mediations.

Bourdieu’s (1984) notion of cultural capital has similarly been employed (Thornton 1995; Brill 2008; Branch 2012), and therefore by extension habitus, to explain how
notions of authenticity, standards of dress and hierarchies, in relation to music ‘subcultures’ are dependent on the collective practices of individuals engaged in the music scenes. Thornton’s (1995) work has been most closely aligned with the notion of ‘subcultural capital’, or the accumulation of specific forms of knowledge, standards of dress and dispositions (hexis) in order to structure informal hierarchies within groups. Branch (2012) similarly explores how Bourdieu’s analysis can help explain aesthetic choices on the basis of class location, specifically in relation to glam rock fans. He demonstrates particularly how certain aesthetics acquire middle or working class audiences and how this intersects with educational capital.

Bourdieu’s (1984) analysis of consumption in Distinction, almost exclusively along the lines of class, draws attention to the way in which seemingly ‘trivial’ cultural practices carry a symbolic dimension, which translate to material inequalities. This is precisely what makes Bourdieu’s work vital for analysing gender (Moi 1991: 1020). In fact musical tastes are integral to Bourdieu’s argument of taste’s social function as he definitively states that;

…nothing more clearly affirms one’s ‘class’, nothing more infallibly classifies, than tastes in music. This is of course because, by virtue of the rarity of conditions for acquiring the corresponding dispositions, there is no more ‘classificatory’ practice than concert-going or playing a noble instrument” (Bourdieu 1984: 18)

The ability to discern between ‘good’ and ‘bad’ music, which are commonly seen as individual preference or subcultural membership, are then indicative of and help to reproduce social location. As Davis (2008a: 84) notes, for Bourdieu

[the petite bourgeoisie's] location within the social space is uncertain and insecure, perceived as too well-versed in both economic and cultural capital to be part of the working class, yet too lacking in all forms of capital, specifically social and symbolic capital, to secure their location as part of the bourgeoisie ... this impacts upon the subjective adjustment of habitus to positions within a given field, thus influencing the connection between class location and practical action.

‘High’ art’s consumption by the petite bourgeoisie is regarded by the proletariat as pretentious and by the bourgeoisie as crude attempts to buy sophistication (Davis 2008: 85). Thus this is how distinctions in relation to musical taste are often shaped: “as asserted purely negatively by the refusal of other tastes” (Bourdieu 1984: 56). Music
tastes then help shape peer groups and informal networks (social capital), as well as limiting or enabling social mobility because individuals ‘choose’ not to associate with people with different tastes.

Thus what constitutes authenticity must be a dialogue between the dissemination of music taste from ‘above’ and the negotiation of style from ‘below’. Again this is the value of Bourdieu’s use of habitus in identifying how structures operate at the level of personal agency. To this end, performativity (Butler 1998b: [1990]) is also important in exploring how, if not why, some actors identify (at least conceptually) with different music subcultures or genres. Because in response to music oriented identities actors are often performing a musical aesthetic, this relies a great deal on existing modes of knowledge as to how some subcultures are ‘supposed’ to look. The ability to know about and discuss, musical influences and taste are also key to access subcultural capital (Thornton 1995; Straw 1997; Frith 2002) and often this knowledge is validated more by the immediate group, rather than the structure of the industry. Even if arguably there is a malignant agenda working behind personal tastes, as Hesmondhalgh (2007) points out, personal taste, as a commodity, is still often unpredictable.

**The Problem of Musical Types**

Despite music listening’s dynamic elements, approaches which stress ‘subculture’, type or genre, draw neat distinctions between groups which are easily critiqued by a closer inspection of methodological assumptions. For example, fixed-choice categories of ‘pop’ and ‘rock’, may be less meaningful for respondents than they are for the researchers imposing the categories. Problems occur also in taking ‘subcultural’ assumptions (that ‘subcultures’ or music tastes represent discrete listening patterns and codes of behaviour), at face value. Someone who enjoys ‘pop’ and ‘metal’, ‘country’ and ‘classical’, or ‘jazz’ and ‘drum ‘n’ bass’, proves particularly problematic to quantitative categorisation in relation to ‘personality types’. This is a problem more generally of approaches which construct taxonomical or ontological positions.

There is also evidence of what has been termed cultural omnivorousness in relation to cultural participation and taste (Peterson 1992; Peterson and Kern 1996; Warde, Wright and Gayo-Cal 2007; Bauman 2011), which emphasises the blurring of discrete genre labels. As already noted, such labels often constitute marketing strategies rather than concrete understandings (Hesmondhalgh 2007: 23), thus how fans are conceptualised as different from non-fans can be a taken-for-granted judgment made by
researchers rather than respondents. On the other hand, those who seek to link types of music to directly causal explanations for changes in behaviour, such as violence, aggression or sexual promiscuity (Lawrence and Joyner 1991; Arnett 2002; North, Desborough and Skarstein 2005; Brown 2006), rely on questionable methodological assumptions which seem geared to deliberately reinforce, rather than evaluate media stereotypes. By categorising types in this way it is possible to misunderstand listeners’ experiences of music. As demonstrated in both Chapter 5 and 6, rarely do tastes stay the same over the life-course, and genre labels come to encompass ever-increasing stylistic differences (Lady Gaga’s pop vs. Elvis pop).

The term ‘subculture’ is particularly problematic because it implies resistance to, or distance from, capitalist hegemony (Muggleton 2005) or a culturally homogenous mainstream. There is firstly some doubt as to which ‘subcultures’ can reflect a ‘minority’ culture given that there are so many of them (Bennett 1999; 2005); the problem is one of where the infinite numbers of ‘subcultures’ end and the majoritarian ‘mainstream’ begins. Secondly, subcultures are equally as profitable as an imaginary mainstream because they generate revenue for the culture industry through the appropriation of ‘subcultural style’ (Moore 2005).

As Adorno and Horkheimer (1997 [1947]) argue consumption practices tend to produce a ‘pseudo individuality’, given that music’s relationship to the consumer remains the same regardless of whether they are buying ‘rock’, ‘metal’, ‘rap’, ‘jazz’, ‘classical’ or ‘pop’. There is a tendency in many postmodernist accounts of music preference to see ‘subcultural’ affiliation as pure democratic choice, celebrating consumerism as a progressive force for resistance to the problem of constructing identities along the lines of consumption (Blackman 2005; Hesmondhalgh 2005; Watson 2011). Subcultures then may end up reinforcing rather than undermining supposedly dominant values and homogenising tendencies; this is something Hebdige fully recognised in his (1979) analysis of punk, whereby ‘resistance’ is eventually co-opted back into hegemonic configurations of power.

On the other hand, Bourdieu’s analysis of music particularly is in danger of reifying the symbolic dimensions of material inequalities that he seeks to critique and

25 “Marked differentiations such as those of A and B films, or of stories in magazines in different price ranges, depend not so much on subject matter as classifying, organizing, and labelling consumers. Something is provided for all so that none may escape; the distinctions are emphasized and extended” (Adorno, T. and Horkheimer, M. 1997 [1947]: 123).
therefore reducing music solely to its socially reproductive functions (Frith 2002: 251). As outlined in Chapter 1, this is a particular problem of Bourdieu’s use of habitus. To link musical taste purely to class, gender, sex or race, understates both the fluidity of musical taste throughout the individual life-course and its aesthetic potential (Prior 2011: 131). In seeing choice, determined by habitus, as only the unconscious manifestation of social structures Bourdieu provides little possibility of anything but the reproduction of class or gender ‘roles’ through musical taste.

For these reasons whilst a concept of habitus is central to this thesis, a Bourdieusian sociology of music has been avoided. What Adorno particularly has to offer over Bourdieu’s approach to music, is the contention that it has the capacity to be transformative and even revolutionary (Watson 2011); to change our ways of relating to the world and to shape our experience and understanding it (DeNora 2001; 2003a). Adorno’s focus on both music’s aesthetic potential and its structural limitations offer a new framework for the revised concept of habitus suggested in Chapter 1.

Despite common interpretations of Adorno as a cultural snob, he does not prioritise ‘serious’ music over other forms because it is de facto bourgeois. Adorno even goes so far as to challenge the lack of material constraints on bourgeois avant garde composers as producing pseudo notions of ‘individual creativity’ (1976: 185-6), noting that the culture industry destroys the seriousness of both ‘high’ and ‘low’ art (Adorno 1975: 13). These are not value judgments on ‘good’ and ‘bad’ art however on the basis of their respective locations. As Jameson notes, for Adorno “all art is great art; there are no degrees in the aesthetic experience or even partial, promising, middling, incomplete aesthetic experience; there is only the thing itself, or else its absence” (Jameson 2007: 132)26.

On class differences in musical taste Adorno also argues that;

the non-objective and nonconceptual character of music balks at tangible classifications and identifications between its various dimensions, on the one hand, and classes and strata on the other…The more puzzling the relation of music and classes, the more convenient its dispatch by labelling (Adorno 1976: 55).

Genre labels do not correspond neatly with ever-increasing abstract categories of class (Frith 2002) any more than they do with sex. Whilst as already demonstrated certain

26 Though Adorno does distinguish between the ‘cultural’ that makes pretensions to being art as ‘non-art’ and proper art (Jameson 2007: 132).
industry classifications have a greater skew, quantitatively, in consumption by males (jazz, classical, rock), these patterns should not be treated as reflecting the demands of types or social groups. As illustrated later, using open-ended questions highlights how similar meanings, emotion labels and memories can be attached to a variety of genres, based on varieties in individual and social biographies, thus there can be no ‘objective’ meaning given to different music or different physiological responses.

As Adorno indicates on class and taste, even if we did find links between ‘highbrow’ music for the upper classes and ‘lowbrow’ music for the lower classes (as Bourdieu concludes), this in itself would be fruitless because distinctions in taste; [are] already are more reflective of the supply planned according to strata and offered for sale by the culture industry than they are indicative of any class significance of musical phenomena (Adorno 1976: 60)

This is in contrast to Bourdieu who distinguishes between ‘pure’ and ‘barbarous’ tastes (Bourdieu 1984: 30) on the basis of formalised strategies of appreciation and social location, arguing “there is such a thing as bad taste…and persons of refinement know this instinctively. For those who do not, rules are needed” (Bourdieu 1984: 68). His comments may be read as sardonic, however it is clear in Distinction that ‘highbrow’ and ‘lowbrow’ forms are accepted as such by Bourdieu’s own ideas around class consensus.

With regards to his categorisation of music listening, methodologically Bourdieu unwittingly imposes the same class bias that he seeks to critique. Thus when he judges that The Well-Tempered Clavier is ‘highbrow’ and Blue Danube ‘lowbrow’, or a ‘noble instrument’ is ‘noble’, this stems from his own imposition of a limited number of musical choices in his survey. Therefore his (albeit correct) assumption that Blue Danube will be more instantly recognisable to everyone has, already contained within it, an a priori assumption that widely heard music is more affiliated to the working classes and therefore ‘lower’ by virtue of their lack of specific knowledge.

This oversight can be partially explained by the notion that as Bourdieu tends to conceive of fields as separate but ‘relatively homologous’ (Brubaker 1985: 748). He sees the cultural field as integrated, yet within this field music listening is far more ubiquitous (Denora 2000) than other forms of cultural consumption and participation (Bennett, Savage, Silva et al. 2009). Certainly listening to music encompasses a wider range of physical locations, situations and functions than other forms of cultural consumption. As such, music tastes and listening practices may not map neatly onto
broad social categories (Savage 2006). Whilst there may be class distinctions with regards to classical listening, in Bourdieu’s work, highbrow music tastes, gallery visits, the opera and film choices fit together easily in his multiple correspondence analysis. However in Bennett et al.’s (2009) application of Distinction’s methods to British society, these things do not neatly correspond on the basis of class, sex, ethnicity or race (2009: 251)

Some Questions on Male Music Consumption

Getting ‘too’ Emotional

So far it has been demonstrated that music’s perceived emotional content and its links to ‘subcultural’ performance, pose some fundamental questions around male consumption of music. It is important to note also that musical aesthetics and musical ‘subcultural’ participation are frequently invoked as scapegoats to explain ‘deviant’ behaviour. Often these explanations have an implicit discursive assumption that it is music’s emotional content which is responsible for inducing such behaviour. As will be shown below aggressive, angry or violent music is condemned whilst simultaneously ‘self-indulgent’, depressing and melancholic music is belittled.

What is interesting is that it is often males and masculinities at the heart of these polemics. Take for example the media’s focus on: emo boys in skinny jeans ‘gender bending’ (Greenwald 2003; ABC4 2007) as symptomatic of ‘masculinity’ in crisis (Williams 2007); the concerns with US working class, ‘black’, rap music’s impact on, ‘British, white, middle class’ society (Churcher 1992; Edwardes 2000; Philips 2000; Lea 2006); the link between ‘melancholic’ bands, suicide and self-harm (Smith 1995); the Twisted Sister video nasty trial, during the 1980s (Pareles 1985); the Satanism of black metal or goth, implicated in the Columbine shootings (O’Hagan 2000; Cloonan 2002: 126) or the Jodi Jones murder (NME.co.uk 2004); the machismo associated with ‘lad rock’ and Brit pop (Carrington 1998; Wheaton 2003: 195); the violence of the

Aside from reservations around the idea of a middle class habitus (see Chapter 7), Bennett et al. (2008) suggest that the situation in the UK is markedly different from that of 1960s France in that “since the working class are not marked by a distinctive set of cultural practices there is no need for the middle classes to define their own culture in relation to it” (2008: 251). Their analysis instead yielded greater variance in the range of cultural consumption within socio-occupational groups and they note that according to their data, class differences are drawn along the lines of participation rather than the types of cultural commodities consumed (2008: 252).
mods and rockers (Cohen 1972b); or fears around increasing sexual permissiveness for those exposed to jazz, blues or rock and roll (Arnett 2002).

Such assumptions, around modern music’s transformative effects, are not modern however. Aristotle for example foregrounded the importance of musical education, believing that music itself could “function as a means for the purification of such excessive feelings as exalted excitement or strong feelings of pity or fear” (Stamou 2002: 10). In the Middle Ages, the Catholic Church forbade playing the tri-tone, characteristic of much contemporary metal, due to the belief that it could summon the devil (Kahn-Harris 2007). This finds resonance in the notion of ‘metal’ corrupting young men, turning them to evil and leading them in the most extreme circumstances to murder, church burning and Satanism (Bogue 2004: 109).

Similarly, in the 9th Century in England, there were fears around music’s ‘feminising’ effects on the male body (Leach 2009: 24) in monasteries. In the 17th Century medicalised, professional discourses also concluded that music listening could compromise ‘masculinity’ through the inducement of ‘melancholia’ (Gibson 2009: 44: 52). It should be explicit by now that the idea of music’s ‘feminising effects’ is closely related to the idea that music produces embodied reactions and music has been ‘feminised’ because of its links to ‘uncontrollable’ emotions and thus the feminised body (Armstrong 2008: 377; de Boise 2012a).

Regardless of music’s antiquated connection to physiological or theological maladies, there is still an underlying belief in music consumption as something which emanates from ‘outside’ the individual which is taken in and fundamentally transforms a (predominantly young) male into something that he is not ‘supposed’ to be. The so-called crisis of masculinity thesis has been critiqued as insufficient (Carrigan, Connell and Lee 1985; Horrocks 1994), and no more so than here in explaining this relationship given that it is one that has persisted since at least the 9th century in Britain. ‘Masculinity’, since its inception, has frequently been in crisis (Forth 2008: 3-5).

As already outlined, the idea that music contains emotions or that it may lead to the ‘arousing of passions’ has a historically complex relationship to the male body, and thus masculinities as a series of beliefs inscribed on the male body. Whilst music’s role as a consumer good may be marketed as supra-social or sublime, it is important to note that music’s affective capacity has historically been, and still is, considered problematic.

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28 A musicological term, known as the Diabolus in Musica where three tones are played at the same time. This is believed to have been the ‘devil’s music’ because of its ‘sinister’ sound.
in terms of male identities. Yet on an individual level, using music precisely for these reasons is often considered desirable (see Chapters 5 and 6).

All of these debates have been centred to a large extent around young males producing or consuming music. Partially this may be casually attributed to the fact that males have largely dominated the production of music (just as they have dominated most areas of public consumption), over hundreds of years. However if masculinities dictated that males assume public emotional ‘control’ (see Chapters 1 and 2), then this fails to account for why males still largely dominate musical consumption and production which is explicitly and overtly concerned with emotional experience.

Whilst feminist musicologists have revealed that female composers and musicians were more influential than the musicological canon often concedes (McClary 1991), the image of the composer as male still persists, continuing to reproduce discourses around some music forms as ‘masculine’ whilst at the same time, as indicated above, music consumption is considered problematically ‘feminine’. As Green (1993: 200-221) notes; unlike the sciences, girls opt for music courses at 14+ in far greater numbers than boys, and they achieve significantly higher grades ... A similar level of educational success and endeavour has marked the history of girls’ school-based music education in the West since its beginnings in the 19th century ... to a still quite surprising extent today, women's representation among the ranks of highly valued and professional practitioners fulfilling almost any role within the classical, popular, rock or jazz fields has always fallen far short of men's.

Historically, the idea of the male composer as genius or ‘master’ has gendered classical music (Armstrong 2008: 377). Serious classical music was considered to require a depth of knowledge and education which the rational, dispassionate, objectivity as the assumed property of the white, middle-class, heterosexual male body could provide (Petersen 1998). The initial prohibition of females from musical education could be cited as one such reason why religious, and latterly, classical music especially earned masculinist connotations and was able to subsume such contradictions. Notions of rationality, as a benchmark of a normative ‘masculinity’ (Seidler 1994; Forth 2008) are often joined to classical music as a form of high-artisanship in the West (Adorno 1945),

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29 This is not to say that young females are not implicated, however such media coverage largely centres on young males. One of the most covered, rare exceptions to the stress on violence related to females influenced by music consumption, was the murder of a nun by three female Marilyn Manson fans in Chiavenna, Italy in 2000.
which has often symbolically and physically excluded women (Bernstein 1986; McClary 1991). The religious connotations of (musical) creation and the initial purpose of music notation can also be linked. Thus whilst physically exclusive access to musical education may have informed how music has frequently come to be seen as ‘masculine’, theological discourses have also operated to reinforce gendered perceptions of music.

This view alone however is not enough to explain heavily sexed patterns of consumption in contemporary music. Most music forms in the West are largely male dominated, both in terms of production (Frith and McRobbie 1978; Green 1993; Clawson 1999; Armstrong 2008) and consumption (Straw 1997; BPI 2006; 2009; 2011). Thus if music consumption is engaged with to elicit or connected to emotional responses, these arguments do not necessarily explain why such sexually differentiated patterns of consumption persist.

Straw (1997) offers a link between record collecting and connoisseurship, making concise points about records as artefacts which carry special symbolic significance for homosocial interaction. The accumulation and articulation of knowledge in male peer groups, through seemingly effortless expertise, helps to enforce the individual’s social standing. This is because the display of intricate knowledge demonstrates mastery and control over a situation (1997: 7) imbuing the ‘expert’ with a level of authority and power. Straw does not deny that women have equivalent collections, but does point to the fact that men frequently tend to form relationships almost exclusively around such objects; cars, records, books, DVDs or football stickers. He stresses however that knowledge acquisition must be perceived to be effortless even if it often requires a great deal of effort to be perceived as such (1997: 9). In this respect, perhaps music consumption can be linked to a central tenet of the Cartesian ideal where effortless accumulation of knowledge links to men’s capabilities for reason. This would mean that emotional response is seen as secondary to the act of collecting and accumulating knowledge.

It could also be suggested that deploying what is seen as ‘superior’ knowledge has been a form of power (Foucault 1979) historically linked to an Enlightenment conception of ‘masculinity’ (see Chapter 1). Males collect things as a way of exerting control over a situation (1997: 7) imbuing the ‘expert’ with a level of authority and power.

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\(30\) In addition to women’s exclusion from education, as Mann (1992) points out many females were excluded from joining the trade guilds until at least the 19th Century. This would have made it difficult to find work as travelling musicians due to the vagrancy laws and women would also have found it difficult to be financially compensated for any work as musicians.
expertise and this expertise, which equates to someone being seen as having good taste, being a better judge of music or having a better record collection, becomes a tool for defining power relations. The more highly an individual’s opinion is regarded in matters of taste within a group, the more influence that individual has over the group. As Thornton (1995) argues against the Birmingham CCCS\textsuperscript{31}, subcultures are not egalitarian constructs and subcultural capital implicitly constructs hierarchies based around shared tastes.

\textbf{Why Music Matters}

The consumption / knowledge argument, whilst persuasive, conveniently overlooks the emotional component in music consumption however. Much as with Bourdieu’s reduction of music to social function, this view obscures the fact that historically, consuming music has been conceived as problematic for males precisely because of its links with emotionality. The idea of music ‘invading’ the body and transforming ‘normal’ people into deviants is still, from the evidence of media led perspectives, very much a concern.

Many authors have focussed on other aspects of consumption and mass culture, such as sport, in relation to masculinities (see Messner 1990; Schact 1996; Majors 2001; Robertson 2003; Wheaton 2003; Bridges 2009; Thorpe 2010). Sport allows for, as Connell notes, a visual ‘continuous display of men’s bodies in motion’ (Connell 1995: 54) and he questions the same discourses of embodied emotionality (1995: 62), linked here to music. Thus he either indirectly critiques the Cartesian model of disembodied, rational masculinity. The question is then what a gender-specific, sociological focus on music has to offer over musicological, social psychological and physiological accounts of music or gendered accounts of other consumption practices.

As Bennett et al. (2009: 46-48) state, from their comprehensive, empirically driven research:

Musical taste is by far the most powerful differentiating feature [when taking into account dynamics of participation in and preference for different types of leisure activities] ... television, eating out, and sport by contrast differentiate relatively little.

\textsuperscript{31} Centre for Contemporary Cultural Studies
Whilst they noted very few differences in participation and consumption by sex, Bennett et al’s research only included eight genre labels\(^{32}\) and eight individual pieces\(^{33}\). This is a particularly problematic aspect of Bourdieusian analysis for the reasons outlined already in relation to listening types. The data presented at the start of the chapter in relation to sexual differentiation by record sales, as well as other authors’ contributions throughout, indicate both male dominance as a driving force in relation to the culture industry, as well as the importance of reproducing hierarchies around such distinctions to exclude others\(^{34}\).

In noting the prominent role of male production and consumption of music this is not to underplay the contributions of female artists and composers (see Bernstein 1986; McClary 1991; Halberstam 1998), nor the occasionally gender affirmative politics of musical subcultures (see McRobbie and Garber 1975; Thornton 1995; Brill 2008; Peters 2010; Downes 2012). This is rather an attempt to critique accounts which emphasise only the performative aspects of male spectacular style, through musical subcultures, as destabilising ‘masculinity’, whilst rejecting accounts which reduce music purely to social reproduction, thus overlooking its aesthetic and transformative potential.

Often style does little to challenge the overall exploitative structure of the culture industry and it is worth noting that sex-exclusionary practices still exist despite music’s portrayal as a ‘democratic’ space for emotional expression. Whilst the performative aspects of ‘subcultures’ are important, because many of the existing subcultural accounts of music render its social function as sex-neutral, subcultural accounts should be treated with caution. On the other hand, those accounts which note the dynamics of female participation should similarly be looking to the overall structure of the music industry in order to question why it is still dominated by certain malestream trends. As already demonstrated in relation to Straw’s (1997) work, even supposedly ‘neutral’ spatially organized practices serve to reinforce sex-exclusionary practices.

\(^{32}\) Rock; modern jazz; world music; classical music (including opera); country and western; electronic dance music; heavy metal; urban (including hip hop and R&B).

\(^{33}\) Wonderwall by Oasis; Stan by Eminem; 4 Seasons by Vivaldi; Einstein on the Beach by P Glass; Symphony No5 by Mahler; Kind of Blue by Miles Davis; Oops I did it again by Britney Spears; Chicago by Frank Sinatra.

\(^{34}\) The original dataset (Cultural Participation and Social Exclusion: a Critical Investigation, 2003-2005) was downloaded via the Economic and Social Data Service. When Chi Square tests were applied to whether or not respondents liked certain genres, there were statistically significant differences by sex (p<=.05) with respect to heavy metal (p=.000), electronic dance music (p=.000) and urban (p=.009) variables.
Continued male dominated music consumption and production raises several explicit antinomies between ‘masculine’ representations and practice. Music as the most ubiquitous form of cultural consumption makes the fallacy of rationality-as-emotional-suppression visible, precisely because music is so overtly concerned with emotionality. As noted in Chapters 5 and 6 music is frequently consciously engaged with to elicit emotional responses, which vary in intensity and effect. This is why Adorno’s concept of the emotional listener holds some relevance. It is because rationality has been separated from emotion in popular consciousness, that music becomes a tool for the exploration of what could be termed ‘male’ emotional life. Yet it is the perpetuation of the narrative that investment in emotional goods is a compensatory measure for rationalised life, that continues to reproduce a false polarity between rational public life and emotional ‘inner’ life.

Much of the work around music which utilises a Bourdieusian framework looks only at the social function accorded to practices (Prior 2008; 2011), including engagement with culture. Yet as Bauman (2011) argues of culture and Watson (2011) of music, both have been and can be a force for change; for the re-evaluation of ‘taken-for-granted’ assumptions about self and identity. The idea that a young male is ‘taken in’ by a type of music whose aesthetic he has no part in creating is false. As Frith (2002: 34) argues, it is the aesthetic that helps to structure taste and taste which helps structure the aesthetic, the two are inseparable.

Music has the power to affect, to arouse emotions and to link memories with intangible feelings beyond the most sophisticated analyses of psychologists, sociologists, biologists or musicologists. This is where Adorno’s method surpasses sociological, philosophical or musicological centric critiques as he combines elements of all three. Far from dispassionately collecting for the sake of it, Adorno recognised that music consumption becomes an affective experience whereby people learn to be affected by music and in its various aesthetic guises. Music appeals because it is connected with peers, with images, with certain lifestyles but invariably also because it is connected to certain events \(^{35}\) and mediated through emotional responses \(^{36}\); this is what renders music’s commodity form so effective.

\(^{35}\) “[the regressive listener] can neither escape impotence nor decide between the offerings where everything is so completely identical that preference in fact depends merely on biographical details of the situation in which things are heard” (Adorno 2004: 30).

\(^{36}\) “In the commodity fetishists of the new model, in the ‘sado-masochistic character’, in those receptive to today’s mass art, the same thing shows itself in many ways. The masochistic mass culture is the
The affective dimension of music, or the intensity with which music both intentionally and unintentionally provokes strong feelings, is a learned process and through which we engage in by registering differences (Latour 2004). What makes music good, powerful, angry, aggressive, melancholic, sad, happy, joyous, depressing or elative, is a relational process tied to subjective experience as much as to culturally applied labels. This again is why exploring the affectivities of music presents a blatant exposition of the Cartesian dialectic. Music does not cause males to act in certain predefined ways; it is indicative of how subjective masculinities are shaped and a means with which males can come to understand their own emotional lives. Listening habits are not symptomatic only of demographics; music constructs actors (Frith 1987: 137) and actors’ emotional and affective responses to music are heavily influenced by gendered experience.

This last point is of particular importance with regards to discussion around age and shifting habitus, explored in more depth later. Often youth is taken as a key marker of musical participation (McRobbie and Garber 1975; Frith 1981; Jefferson and Hall 1993; Bennett 1999; Bennett 2002; Yousman 2003; Blackman 2005; Medovoi 2005; Muggleton 2005; Laughey 2006; Ashley 2010; Peters 2010) and many studies emphasise the importance of music for young males particularly. Yet this is problematically assumed to be a given about the way in which music participation works, with little clarification (Bennett 1999; Hesmondhalgh 2005). As indicated at the start of the chapter, males aged between 30 and 50 in the UK are the largest consumers of music, yet this is rarely, if at all, explained sociologically. The focus tends toward younger males who are the most visible bearers of subcultural style. Changing aesthetic judgments may be indicative of shifting values which can help explain how events shape masculinities as fluid constructions.

In studies of masculinities, the focus on young males as indicative of the practices associated with ‘masculinity’ (Solomon and Szwabo 1994; McDowell 2000; Allen 2007; Flood 2008; Forrest 2010; Dempster 2011) underplays the changing nature of masculinities over individual biographies as well as epochs. It also emphasises the importance of youth when, in terms of social and economic power, these groups may be less involved in the exercise of control / domination over other groups (Connell 2005).

necessary manifestation of almighty production itself. When the feelings seize on exchange value it is no mystical transubstantiation. It corresponds to the prisoner who loves his cell because he has been left nothing else to love” (Adorno 2004: 40).
A fuller discussion of age in relation to music and masculinities has however been deliberately reserved until after presenting the data in Chapters 5 and 6.

**Summary**

In summary, this chapter has demonstrated how the market for mass music developed to perpetuate a belief in music tastes as individual choice, heavily influenced by mass music’s historic links with emotionality. This does not deny the fact that music is felt, experienced and enjoyed as an emotional stimulus as this is how consumer demand is often propagated. Yet whilst physiological arguments can often document individual responses to different pieces of music, this does little to demonstrate how music’s affective capabilities are mediated through social categories of class, sex, location and age.

Despite the exploitative nature of the music industry, that consumers often go to great lengths to distance themselves from commercial music forms and that it is the record companies which ‘feed off’ the participation of these communities, indicates an asymmetrically reciprocal relationship. There are problems then with the culture industry argument inasmuch as taste is not simply supply-led and both subcultural and musical aesthetics are shaped by those involved in consumption practices.

Whilst arguments about the gendered nature of male creativity and consumption account for some aspects of the sexually differentiated nature of music sales even today, these fail to explain the issue of masculinities constructed in opposition to emotionality. This is one significant drawback with Bourdieu’s conception of habitus, with regards to music taste. As noted in Chapter 2 the culturally embedded idea in Western societies, that emotions are individually differentiated is problematic. This has shaped the idea of different types of people liking different music on the basis of intrinsic variations.

As Adorno notes however in his characterisation of the emotional listener, most rationally organised societies appear to be incompatible with human experience. This may offer a new means of explaining music’s continued unequal levels of consumption and production by males, as males are more likely to adhere to the fallacy of public rationality as the discursive opposite of emotionality. Far from shaping masculine subjectivities around the repression of emotion, music represents a means of connecting an understanding of emotionality to experiences, feelings, events and discourses.

Moral panics concerning music’s ‘effeminising’ effects are not new. Yet they continue to problematise the notion of stable, coherent gender identities. Music as
performative, affective and concerned with emotionality provides a means with which to explore some of the themes already highlighted in the previous two chapters. Similarly, because music consumption is so ubiquitous and often, with regard to young males, is judged to present a different representation of ‘masculinity’, it allows for questions around not only how far homosocial influences shape taste, but also whether shifting tastes are indicative of certain shifts in attitudes toward gender. The next chapter details the method used in this thesis by which the social and individual affects of music were explored, retaining a sociological focus on shifting identities without completely rejecting the influence of structural pressures on individual habitus and the importance of individual biographies.
Chapter 4: Methodology

Introduction

Sociological research exploring music, gender, emotion and affect, as separate areas of enquiry, has tended to rely on qualitative research methods in order to explain the use, value and interpretation of each. The methodological limitations of sociology’s ability to study the intensity of, or meaning attached to, what is often presumed physiological arousal (see Chapters 2 and 3) are evident. Whilst sociology lacks the physical instruments of enquiry required to conduct this type of research however, physiological arousal alone does not explain how some music, practices, behaviours and emotions become socially coded as ‘desirable’ or ‘undesirable’, nor the quality of emotional experience (Adorno 1976: 4). Thus it speaks more about emotions as if they are only individually experienced, physiological epiphenomena, ignoring both discursive gendering and differentiation in the types of emotions exhibited by different social groups. As the previous chapter indicated, the mass market for music is only able to function, dependent on a large scale emotional investment in shared values (namely belief in music as emotion) and a belief in the uniqueness of taste (genre formatting).

What sociology has to offer is an understanding of the broader context in which interactions with music, emotion, affect or gender occur and / or are produced. It is important to look at each of these areas not just as ‘objectively’ experienced, but examine how actors construct meaning around these concepts. This does not mean however that qualitative approaches alone will necessarily yield a deeper insight. This chapter opposes the claim that it is only ‘traditionally’ qualitative methods, which can illuminate subjective, emotional experience.

The chapter begins firstly by critiquing methods already used in studies of music, emotion and gender. Noting some of the problems with single-strategy qualitative or quantitative only approaches, it then goes on to explain the benefits of adopting a mixed methods approach for the purposes of this thesis. It details a twofold research design, incorporating firstly an online, quantitative survey and subsequent life-history, case study sessions. Explaining the rationale behind this sequence, the sampling decisions and quantitative methodology are outlined before the chapter concludes by noting how survey data shaped the outline of the life-history sessions.
Issues in Research Design

Existing Qualitative Research

Sociological research into the four areas discussed so far (gender, music, emotion and affect), has tended towards qualitative methodologies as the most effective means of studying subjectively experienced, social phenomena. When looking at what masculinities are there is commonly a discursive focus both on reading ‘texts’ (Connell 1987; Connell 1995; Petersen 1998; Benwell 2004; Rogers 2005; Forth 2008) or conducting in-depth studies which sample small groups of men (Messner 1990; Connell 1995; Schact 1996; Messner 2001; Robertson 2003; Kimmel 2008; Ashley 2010; Forrest 2010; McCormack and Anderson 2010; McCormack 2011a). When looking at music, sociological focus is often on the subjective experience of groups (McRobbie and Garber 1975; Green 1993; Thornton 1995; Clawson 1999; Green 2002), due to the importance of contextual, cultural, demographic, spatial and individual variations in shaping the way music is listened to and used (Frith 2002; Wood, Duffy and Smith 2007).

With regards to sociological studies of emotion, due to differing interpretations of taste, emotion or affect, either when looking at emotions generally or emotions ‘in’ music, it is how actors understand and articulate these concepts which is considered of interest (Hochschild 1983; Clark 1987; Collins 1996; Denora 2000; White and Peretz 2009). In viewing emotions, in the phenomenological tradition, as “primarily dependent on definitions of the situation, emotion vocabularies, and emotional beliefs, which vary across time and location” (Thoits 1989: 319), it is difficult to envisage how using quantitative methods, whereby respondents cannot necessarily qualify their statements, capture the intensity dimensions of both feelings and affects.

There have also been a number of psychological studies conducted into the impact of music in terms of emotional, physiological arousal (Zimny and Weidentfeller 1963; Smith and Curnow 1966; Thompson, Schellenberg and Husain 2001; Krumhans 2002; Rickard 2004). Lacking the instrumentation and, perhaps more importantly, the expertise to use the instrumentation however, sociologists often begin from the premise that the methodological limitations of sociological inquiry often mean that subjective phenomena can often only be understood through actors’ descriptions. As Seidman (2006) notes “for those interested in interviewing as a method of research perhaps the most telling argument ... centers on the significance of language to inquiry with human
beings ... At the very heart of what it means to be human is the ability of people to symbolize their experience through language" (2006: 8). For sociologists it is difficult and often undesirable to frame emotion in terms of its physiological affects.

There are however several implications in using an exclusively qualitative approach for the purposes of this project which should be addressed. Firstly there is a frequent assumption that interviews generate ‘more honest data’ (Mason 1996: 40; Bechofer and Patterson 2000: 69). Questions of what is meant by, and how honest data can be judged, are difficult to define. As the interview format is often governed by “rules outside of the phenomena studied” (Bechofer and Patterson 2000: 69), given the setting’s artificial nature, it should be questioned whether respondents necessarily provide more honest answers when put face-to-face with a researcher (de Boise 2012b: 56).

For the purposes of this study if, as already argued, males’ inability to communicate emotional experience (Seidler 1994; Pleck 1995; Thompson 1997; Wong, Pituch and Rochlen 2006; Seidler 2006a) have led to assumptions that they are, to put it crudely, ‘unemotional’, then using only qualitative face-to-face methods may not have yielded the most honest responses. In line with Hochschild’s (1983) notion of feeling rules and Wong, Pituch and Rochlen’s (2006) notion of restrictive emotionality related to alexithymia (Berger, Levant, McMillan et al. 2005), it may have been likely that social expectation, and thus context around masculinities, shape males’ inability or desire not to articulate certain emotions. This may even be amplified in an artificial setting such as an interview.

As Johnson and Onwuegbuzie (2004: 15-16) state, “ ... the conduct of the fully objective and value free research is a myth, even though the regulatory ideal of objectivity can be a useful one” (my italics). It is important to note that the ideal of impartiality, through collecting data anonymously, is also a pragmatic means of collecting sensitive data and minimising researcher bias. If used unreflexively, face-to-face methods may actually reproduce a phenomenological critique of positivism, confirming the researcher’s own assumptions (Onwuegbuzie and Leech 2007: 235-236). Non face-to-face methodologies can afford researchers distance which may help to uncover events or feelings that face-to-face methods may not. Whilst Galasinski (2004: 2), in his comprehensive, qualitative study into emotions and ‘masculinity’, did find that in such a setting “men not only talk about their emotional experiences, but also relate them to men in general and masculinity”, all his male respondents were older than 40.
This may have meant that they were more comfortable discussing certain topics than younger males (see Chapter 7).

The critique often levelled at naturalism or positivism, commonly associated with quantitative methods, is that phallo, ethno or heterocentric accounts clearly ignore the experiences of large segments of the populations when looking at society (see Oakley 1998: 708-709). Present within certain ‘objective’ methodologies are also masculinist notions of what constitutes ‘objectivity’ (see Harding 1986; Longino 1987; Harding 1996; Usher 1997). This is justifiably why research attempting to explore gender has often shied away from quantitative methods. Whilst this is a consideration however, qualitative sampling decisions can be made on often arbitrary grounds, reducing the ability to explore subjective differences within a broader population.

The issue of sampling is also a particular concern for this project, given that the topics of enquiry (males, Western ‘masculinity’, music or emotions) are applicable to a sizable chunk of the national and global population. Decisions on qualitative sampling frames especially, are sometimes made on the basis of researcher assumptions around ethnicity, sexuality, sex, age, socioeconomic factors, taste, culture or (in the case of music) ‘subculture’. This is not to say that quantitative methodologies do not impose their own categories of measurement or classification, or make a claim to a flawed positivist conception of generalisation (see Stake 1978; Kirk and Miller 1986; Berg 1998; Schofield 2002), only to note that the purpose of broad classificatory measures are employed in both quantitative and qualitative research.

**Existing Quantitative Research**

Social psychological analyses have more commonly used quantitative methods to study the areas already outlined. With regard to gender, this may be in an attempt to relate gendered behaviours to sex (Bem 1974; Holt and Ellis 1998) or attempting to test certain sex-based, widely held assumptions (Stapley and Haviland 1989; Fischer and Manstead 2000). Emotion and gender are similarly often researched by matching sexes to categorical emotion labels (for example happy, sad, excited) or behaviour, taken to be indicative of emotional states (Kring and Gordon 1998; Fischer and Manstead 2000; Zammunner 2000; Brody and Hall 2010). With regards to music, social psychological attempts to quantitatively link music to attitudes, beliefs, values or personality types are also evident (Lawrence and Joyner 1991; North and Hargreaves 1999; North, Hargreaves and O’Neill 2000; Chamorro-Premuzic and Furnham 2007; Miranda and
Claes 2008; Lonsdale and North 2011). As noted in the previous chapter however, such assumptions around the discrete nature of types or ‘subcultures’ are problematic for several reasons.

For the purposes of quantitative analysis, it is often preferable to narrow respondent’s options in order to conduct meaningful statistical analysis (Oppenheim 2005: 114-115). Quantitative methodologies then, often only allow for a limited range of possible responses to very specific questions. In order to minimise researcher bias, respondents are frequently asked exactly the same question in exactly the same way, as open-ended questions arguably introduce ‘another layer of measurement error’ (Gorard 2004: 104) in analysis. This is what has traditionally rendered quantitative methods inappropriate to capture subjective interpretation, because researchers or respondents cannot always ask for clarification.

Using fixed-choice questions relies on the assumption of shared understanding amongst respondents and between respondents and researcher. This approach however may unwittingly impose the researcher’s own assumptions about the phenomena on the respondent. Similarly the ethnographic critique is often that respondents understand fixed choice questions in different ways (Hammersley 1990: 597), undermining the ideal of impartiality which often drives the initial rationale in favour of quantitative methods. This cannot be simply countered by using open-ended questions, as in quantitative research this type of data analysis relies heavily on the researcher interpreting the respondents’ statements. On the other hand, by listing too many categories to choose from, research designs may frustrate or confuse the respondent leading to a reduction in data quality.

In seeking to establish ‘levels’ or ‘types’ of feeling, when studying emotion or behaviour, quantitative measures arguably ignore the mutability of language (see Galasinski 2004: 4-5) and the cultural contingency of gender (Till 2011). This alone however does not necessarily mean that whilst categories are mutable (and this project makes no claim to the universality of structures or language), that the concepts associated with these categories have no resonance to those from similar social locations. If this does not perceptibly occur for a minority of respondents on an individual basis, then it must have resonance for the way in which legal, social, cultural, political and economic fields influence the possibilities, opportunities and decisions based on these aforementioned classifications (Bourdieu 1977; 1984; 1989).
A Bourdieusian framework would suggest that behaviour, attitude and choice often operate beneath the level of conscious reflection (Bourdieu 1977: 79). It is therefore difficult to start from social practice and establish motivation at the level of consciousness (Throop and Murphy 2002: 187). Those who fall into different demographic categories will often have different attitudes based on a combination of ethnic, gendered, sexual, occupational and age related factors, without realising that their choices are socially rather than individually patterned (however for a critique of Bourdieu's practice see McRobbie 2002).

If choices present themselves as individual but are influenced by the overlapping of social, cultural and economic fields, then a purely phenomenological, interpretivist, methodology alone may fail to grasp the social dimensions in which these beliefs are informed. It is not necessarily taking individual motives at face value then, but looking at these choices in a wider, relational context too. Fields help to construct a social reality and as such unconsciously present many individual decisions, of which music taste is perhaps contentiously a prime example, as unique ‘choices’ (Bourdieu 1984; Bauman 2000a; Davis 2008a). There are certain material or discursive factors influencing decisions which respondents are either not aware of or do not question because they seem so obvious that their motivation requires no clarification.

As argued in Chapter 1, male conceptions of masculinities are seldom fixed, yet this is often how relations between actors are shaped, as if there is some historical and contemporaneous essence of ‘masculinity’ that remains unchanged. Throughout the preceding chapters it has been argued that discourses present social classifications as stable facets of a more complete identity, but identity itself is never fixed as such. This is why, despite differing interpretations as to how respondents understand categories employed in quantitative research, that demographic categories and emotion labels carry shared understandings. That respondents understand labels slightly differently is therefore not a problem for a research strategy which makes no claim to complete positivist objectivity because those from similar social locations will have similar interpretations.

Finally there is a common misconception that quantitative approaches are primarily deductive and therefore more prone to selective use of data to ‘prove hypotheses’. Testing a pre-existent hypothesis often relies on the ‘gold standard’ of naturalistic test

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37 Habitus, Bourdieu’s argues, means that ‘actions and works are the product of a modus operandi of which he is not the producer and has no conscious mastery’ (Bourdieu 1977: 79).
and control groups, which has historically ignored how the hypothesis is formulated, or the criteria by which samples are selected and formed (Urry and Keat 1975: 65-68). This method is particularly problematic in the social sciences for reasons already outlined: definition of populations or groups, researcher bias and respondent agency. Whilst most sociological research makes implicit assumptions about the phenomena it studies, the conflation of quantitative methodologies with testing whether a hypothesis is ‘true’ or ‘false’, overlooks the practical uses of generating large amounts of data before inductively making observations. The population studied should be much broader in quantitative methodologies therefore evidence can be used to generate questions or hypotheses, rather than the reverse being true.

Mixed Methods

A key critique of the positivist method is rightly that the same laws applicable to ‘natural’ forces cannot (and should not) be observed in the social world in the same way (Kemp and Holmwood 2003). This is largely due to the researcher’s proximity to the social (Papineau 1979), ethical judgments on the reduction of human experience to numerical value (Bauman 2000b) and a rejection of simplistic models of causality (Sayer 1992; Bhaskar 1997). Nevertheless, an anti-positivist method need not reject the idea of regularities between groups (Holmwood 2001; Kemp and Holmwood 2003) in favour of an ‘extreme Protagorean relativism’ (Winch 1964: 308). Such an approach ignores all evidence to the contrary that gendered and sexual inequalities persist, despite the mutability of language and arguable caprice of agency.

In addition, there are several pragmatic factors which made a quantitative-only or qualitative-only approach inadequate to investigate male, emotional use of music. In summation these were: the broad nature of the topic affecting sampling decisions; literature suggesting men’s difficulty in articulating emotional experience face-to-face; minimising analysis and sampling bias through induction; problematic claims to quantitative objectivity; and the ability to capture subjective experience. For these reasons, a two-stage, mixed methods approach was taken in order to counteract the problems already outlined.

Whilst there is no consensus as to what form a mixed methods design must take, it is generally agreed that it involves adopting a combination of qualitative and quantitative approaches (Collins, Onwuegbuzie and Jiao 2007: 267). Mixed methods research therefore seeks to move beyond bipartisan conflicts over the ‘right type’ of method.
within the social sciences (Collins, Onwuegbuzie and Jiao 2007; Tashakkori and Creswell 2007; Teddlie and Tashakkori 2009). Through the combination of both quantitative and qualitative approaches, a mixed methods design aims to provide a better understanding than if quantitative or qualitative methodologies are used by themselves (Creswell and Plano Clark 2007: 7). The first stage of the research strategy used here therefore involved conducting an online, quantitative survey from which trends were inductively generated for qualitative exploration. The second stage was a series of six life history case studies with respondents who had provided permission to be contacted in the survey.

As with quantitative and qualitative-only methods, mixed methods research is arguably a distinctive paradigm in and of itself, rather than a combination of mutually incompatible methods (Johnson and Onwuegbuzie 2004). Mixed methods research designs therefore also carry their own potential problems and a key critique of mixed methods is that a mixing of different types of data is not necessarily conducive to a better understanding. Data integration is made significantly more difficult because combining methods means that the data is analysing different phenomena and providing different types of information (Creswell and Plano Clark 2007: 7). Combining two or more types of data collection also entails the advantages, but also may encompass the limitations of each methodology used (Johnson, Onwuegbuzie and Turner 2007: 127-128). Nevertheless, for the reasons outlined above, a mixed methods approach was adopted bearing this particular concern in mind.

The Quantitative Stage

Online Surveys

There are several practical reasons why an online quantitative survey was used over other quantitative methods. The main advantage being that, in comparison to paper, telephone or face-to-face research, it is quicker to collate data and much cheaper than paper or telephone surveys (Couper 2000; Vehovar, Manfreda and Batagelj 2001; Vehovar and Lozar Manfreda 2008; Lobe and Vehovar 2009). This increases the ability to generate a greater number of responses. Online data capture also speeds up distribution and coding time significantly. The open ended responses generated from the survey did not require lengthy transcription, allowing more open-ended questions to be included in the survey itself without reducing data quality. The survey links were
emailed to gatekeepers at various institutions and whilst there was still an element of sorting data into a usable SPSS format, data required much less manual entry in order to begin analysis. This reduced the error associated with self-completion quantitative research.

Where designs use quota or purposive sampling frameworks, the way that data are captured in web based surveys also allow for constant monitoring. This theoretically increases the possibility of achieving appropriate sub-group sample sizes. It was initially proposed that a minimum of 30 respondents in each sub group, based on a combination of three factors (age, race, SEG), in order to make significant comparisons between groups (Balnaves and Caputi 2001: 94), which could be monitored on an ongoing basis.

If, as already argued, males often have difficulty articulating their feelings and emotions, respondents may have been unable or unwilling to articulate feelings or emotions in an interview setting. One of the primary benefits of using web or mail surveys is that respondents are more likely to discuss potentially embarrassing or sensitive issues (Fricker, Galesic, Tourangeau and Yan 2005; Reddy, Fleming, Howells, Rabenhorst et al. 2006; DiNitto, Busch-Armendariz, Bender, Woo et al. 2008; Chang and Krosnick 2009). The distance that online methods afford, also arguably leads to more honest and open responses when discussing sensitive issues that face to face methods may have difficulty ascertaining.

Evidence also suggests that one of the most significant advantages, to using web based surveys over other methods, is the generation of better quality data. According to Verhovar and Manfreda (2008), in comparison to other methods, when quality of response in web surveys has been measured\(^\text{38}\), generally it yields ‘lower measurement errors’ (see also Kwak and Radler 2002; Fricker, Galesic, Tourangeau et al. 2005; Chang and Krosnick 2009).

There are however still significant problems with online coverage (Couper 2000). Conducting online research in Britain today still only potentially reaches c.74% of the total British population, despite increasing penetration rates over the past ten years. Ofcom’s (2011) report estimated that in 2011, 74% of households had broadband access (2011: 193). However only 56% of those classified as socioeconomic groups ‘D’ and ‘E’ had access to the internet at home in comparison to 90% of those in groups ‘A’

\[^{38}\)... including item (question) non response, acquiescence, non-differentiation, and length of answers to open ended responses” (Vehovar and Lozar Manfreda 2008: 185)
and ‘B’ (2011: 209). That those from lower socioeconomic backgrounds are less likely to have the internet at home, limits the possibility of these groups taking part in online surveys.

Couper (2000) identified that, in the United States, the demographic profile of online populations differed from that of the general population, something corroborated by DiNitto et al. (2008). As Duffy et al. (2005: 624) highlight “online panels tend to achieve samples that are more educated and active”, thus it is largely demographic skews in the online population which could account for attitudinal differences in online surveys (Terhanian and Bremer 2001). Web-based surveys may therefore be inappropriate or unsuccessful for contacting certain groups, though it should be noted that for reasons of cost and time, this research project did not intend to use probability sampling methods in order to generate a nationally representative sample of the British male population.

As is the case with most quantitative methods, web surveys are therefore highly self-selecting. This does not necessarily mean however that probability sampling, using mail or telephone surveys will guarantee a less biased sample at the end of the project. What it does mean is that using web based surveys immediately excludes the possibility of reaching certain people (the homeless, economically disadvantaged or elderly for example) and greatly reduces the chances of certain groups taking part.

In many comparative studies of online over other forms, web based surveys did tend to produce lower rates of response than other methods (Weible and Wallace 1998; Cook, Heath and Thompson 2000; Crawford, Couper and Lamais 2001; Vehovar, Manfreda and Batagelj 2001; Kwak and Radler 2002; Shih and Fan 2008). Lozar Manfreda et al. (2008) estimate responses to be between 6-15% lower than other forms (Vehovar and Lozar Manfreda 2008: 184-185). Whilst market research agencies are able to achieve large numbers of responses quickly, by using online panel agencies, individual researchers or groups who do not have significant levels of funding, may find response rates to be a problem. However due to issues primarily of cost and time, online surveys were deemed the most appropriate method for generating a large response from multiple groups.

**The Survey**

The project was informed by the British Sociological Association’s ethical guidelines (BSA 2002). It was important to bear in mind that respondents may have
been discussing particularly sensitive and potentially distressing issues. As the guidelines highlight “decisions made on the basis of research may have effects on individuals as members of a group, even if individual research participants are protected by confidentiality and anonymity” (ibid.). Respondents at both stages had to opt in to the research in order to participate, so full consent was obtained and it was made clear that they were free to leave the research at any stage, with no obligation to continue. The quantitative survey included an explicit statement, at the start (see Appendix 1), detailing the research’s purpose as well as the guarantee that respondents’ answers were completely anonymous and that they will not be contacted in any subsequent follow ups regarding the project, if they did not supply an email address. Ethical approval was also obtained from the ethics committee at the University of Leeds before research was conducted in order to minimise any effects of the research on respondents.

A subscription was purchased for Survey Monkey©, a reputable, widely used online survey company, allowing integrated survey design, capture and storage in one place. Additional SSL encryption was also purchased in order to securely download the final dataset. Once exported, all data were stored on the University of Leeds’ password protected server. No one else had access to the data and it was never taken off campus.

The survey was between 10 and 15 minutes long and included 22 questions. Of these 22 questions, 5 were 3 box open ended questions and 3 were 7 point scale grids with 16, 17 and 9 different attributes respectively (see Appendix 1). The attributes included at each grid question were focussed on: gendered attributes and attitudes; emotion labels around favourite music; and particular events or periods music was particularly important. The attributes at the gendered perception (Appendix 1 Q9) and emotion label (Appendix 1 Q16) fixed-response questions, were derived from an extensive literature review which looked at how other authors exploring either masculinities (see Chapter 1) or emotions (see Chapter 2) characterised their respective areas.

After piloting the survey on a group of 10 respondents, based on feedback the survey was shortened, some extraneous questions were removed and question wording was altered slightly in places. The survey was launched in early October and closed in early February, with key gatekeepers emailed a link to the survey, at several points throughout, to distribute around their organisations or via mailing lists. The email was
sent from a university email address to a variety of organizations\textsuperscript{39}, many with pre-existing contact databases to ensure the widest possible distribution, and the University of Leeds logo was included on the first page of the survey.

Certain organisations were targeted deliberately in an attempt to produce greater numbers of some demographic characteristics than would be found in the general or online British populations (BME and LGBT groups specifically). As the project was more concerned with obtaining responses from a wide range of different demographic groups, probability sampling or proportional national representation was not sought. The survey itself was designed using an online survey software tool and distributed as a link in an email and a progress indicator bar was included as a means of encouraging respondents to participate (Crawford, Couper and Lamais 2001).

Whilst respondents had to answer all but one of the grid questions in order to proceed, ‘rather not say’, ‘not applicable’ and ‘don’t know’ options were included and at most of the fixed-choice questions and respondents had to type in at least 1 box at the 3 box open questions. Open ended questions were asked on certain topics, before fixed choice questions on similar issues were posed. This acted as a ‘validity check’ and was a deliberate attempt to minimise the bias associated with imposing categories or meanings on respondents. Grid questions were always directly preceded by open ended questions. This may have meant decreasing response numbers due to lapses in respondent interest; however for the sake of methodological rigour it was deemed necessary to order the survey in this way.

\textbf{Survey Question Layout}

There were broadly six different areas that the survey covered: demographics; attitudes toward gendered practices; reasons for listening to favourite music; where and with whom respondents listened to music; reasons for disliking music; and other types of interaction with music. Demographic questions were firstly included in order to explore whether there were statistically significant differences in music uses based on social location. Whilst undoubtedly socio-economic and ethnic categories are fallible it should be stressed again that this survey made no claims to value free objectivity. How

\textsuperscript{39} Snowballed via facebook groups, pages and societies; 138 Football clubs (contacted to send to mailing lists); 277 University central undergraduate admin departments; 87 University societies (LGBTQ, Asian, Afro-Caribbean and international); 103 Post 16 colleges; 428 Local council admin and HR departments; 4 Central government departments; 10 Large organisation HR departments; 6 Local online music forums; 3 national LGBT organisations; 55 Music magazines.
respondents understood their categorical membership may not have been identical but there would still have been significant similarities in social location.

In order to adequately account for the impact that formal music training may have had on interaction with music, respondents were also asked whether they had had any formal musical training or musical education over the age of 16 (the end of compulsory schooling in the U.K. currently). A question was also included as to the different types of interaction respondents may have had with music (Q23 Appendix 1) in order to see how many of the sample were listeners only, as opposed to composers or performers.

Rather than including fixed-response questions around the type of music that respondents listened to or disliked, open-ended questions were included on: why respondents listened to music generally; what music respondents considered their ‘favourites’; how respondents’ favourite pieces of music made them feel when they listened to it; which music they disliked; and why they disliked certain types of music. The questions were deliberately left open-ended for two reasons: firstly to explore how respondents, when given the choice, categorised their favourite music, and how such categorisations compared to music they disliked. As noted here and in Chapter 3, there are problems with approaches which focus on type (Moore 2002; Sandywell and Beer 2005), thus the research design aimed to avoid imposing arbitrary genre or personality categorisations on respondents. Secondly this was also undertaken for a pragmatic reason of trying to avoid imposing the assumption that emotional response is the main reason for listening to music.

It was necessary to look not only at why respondents liked music, but also why they disliked certain types of music. This reveals more about aesthetic judgments which, as noted in Chapter 3 and later in Chapters 5, 6 and 7, indicates the relational nature of masculinities as certain unconscious forms of social schemata. That respondents made strong, subjective judgments about music often on the basis of stereotypical attitudes often indicates discursive strategies which perpetuate symbolic violence. Again as noted in the previous chapter, this is a key aspect of both habitus and hegemony for as Bourdieu notes, tastes are often asserted in the refusal of other tastes (1984: 56) as much as in the affirmation of one’s own.

The grid question on gendered behaviour (Q9 Appendix 1) was designed to explore potential differences by multiple demographics, toward behaviour deemed ‘typically’ or ‘atypically’ gender specific, from sociological literature on masculinities
indicated in Chapter 1. This was to investigate how demographic intersections shaped attitudes toward certain gendered practices. It also aimed to explore whether demographics appeared to impact more on music uses, or whether attitudes toward gendered behaviour were actually more closely related to aesthetic judgments and music uses.

In order to explore not only music’s social but also its subjective uses, questions were included around when music had been particularly important in individuals’ lives (Q18 and Q19 Appendix 1) and where and with whom respondents listened to music most often (Q17 Appendix 1). The latter was designed to investigate how far music’s social function differed and how music was used, by multiple demographic factors. The former two questions aimed to look at whether music was important at periods of emotional stress and change. This was in order to explore how music may be used to help males to respond to certain situations, which may inevitably bring a range of different emotions into play.

**Survey Sample Structure**

Whilst both male and female respondents completed the survey, only males were included in analysis. As identified in Chapter 1, Halberstam (1998: 19) notes that studies of masculinities often conflate maleness with ‘masculinity’. Whilst ‘masculinity’ is not specific to a singular male body however, it is the historical conflation between sex and gender which has seemingly naturalised masculinities, leading to inequalities between men and women and between groups of men (Petersen 1998: 42). Because rationality has been separated discursively from emotion, has historically legitimised male privilege, it was necessary to explore how males specifically understood emotionality (see Chapters 1 & 2). For this reason, analysis was focussed only on males who completed the survey.

The final sample consisted of 361 male respondents ranging from the ages of 16-64. There were larger numbers of respondents aged between 20-24 and 25-35 than other age groups (Fig. 1. Appendix 2), partially due to the methods used to recruit respondents (a large number accessed the survey from university mailing lists and many from online music chat rooms or forums). However as was also acknowledged at the start of this chapter, the most ‘technologically savvy’, suggesting younger respondents, generate the highest level of responses generally from online methods (Shih and Fan 2008: 259). Most respondents judged themselves to be financially independent of their
parents and of those who were not financially independent, three quarters were still in full time education (Fig. 3d. Appendix 2). Just under half of the sample were full-time students (Fig. 3b. Appendix 2), with the majority of the rest from intermediate or junior occupations (Fig. 3a. Appendix 2). In terms of regional variations, there was a variety of spread across the UK (Fig. 5a. Appendix 2).

Despite deliberately targeting Afro-Caribbean and Asian music organisations, societies and groups around the country, as well as colleges in areas of high black, minority and ethnic populations, 82.8% the sample identified as white British (Fig. 2. Appendix 2). The fact that fewer university students in Britain are from ‘non-White’ demographics generally (Reay, David and Ball 2005) may also have contributed to lower levels of response from ‘non-White’ respondents, if university students are often the most likely to respond to online surveys (see Crawford, Couper and Lamais 2001). 83.9% of the sample also identified as heterosexual (Fig. 4a. Appendix 2). Whilst there were enough respondents who identified as homosexual to make some comparisons between hetero and homosexual groups statistically robust, there were not enough who identified as bisexual or ‘other’ to enable further comparisons.

Though it was left to respondents to decide what constituted formal training, 73.7% of the total sample judged that they had not had formal musical education (Fig. 6. Appendix 2) and those aged 16-24 were significantly more likely to have had formal training than other age groups (Fig. 3. Appendix 3). Whilst exact percentages of the national population who have received any sort of formal musical education are unobtainable, this figure appears to be much higher than would be expected in the UK population. Nevertheless, those who had formal music education were similar in their responses generally. As acknowledged later, musical training may understandably have contributed to a greater appreciation of musicological structure and style, however those who had been musically schooled differed very little in their attitudes toward other behaviours and practices.

**Survey Data Analysis**

Once the cut-off date was reached, only respondents who had completed each compulsory question were included in analysis. The file was exported into a PASW 17 format and each 7 point Likert scale question around emotions, ‘masculine’ attributes and significant points where music had been important were then grouped into low

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40 Identified from 2001 Census data.
(rated 1-3), medium (4) and high (5-7). Every substantive fixed-choice question was systematically cross tabulated by each demographic question, using Chi Square tests to determine statistically significant differences (p<.05) between demographic variables. Whilst quantitative social psychological experiments often use one-way or multiple analysis of variance (ANOVA or MANOVA) tests, there are arguably several issues with using these methods with categorical variables, which may lead to spurious analysis (Jaeger 2007: 435).

Analysing the impact of demographic variables in isolation from each other in this way is clearly problematic as certain groups overlap in their membership. Whilst the lack of statistically significant differences across some variables meant that it was possible to discount the influence of different demographics on some gendered attitudes (and importantly note the similarities), multinomial regression was used to determine the best predictor of outcomes where statistically significant differences (p<=.05) occurred across multiple variables41. This indicated generally that age group was a better predictor of outcomes than if other variables were included in the model (see Fig. 15. Appendix 3). This approach should not be confused with attempts to create types or taxonomies of masculinities however as this implies a coherence of identity which, as argued in Chapter 1 and demonstrated in Chapters 6 and 7, is not the case. It was used as an analytical tool in addition to crosstabulation in order to ascertain which demographic factors yielded the biggest difference in types of response.

Word frequency queries were run in Nvivo 9, on each open-ended question, to determine the most appropriate codeframes around the types of music people liked and disliked based on the most commonly used words. These questions were then manually coded into groups, based firstly on exact wording and then derivatives of those words (excluding obvious grammatical features such as prepositions, articles). As noted in Chapter 3, there is a problem with linking personality types, either on the basis of either demographic or attitudinal similarities, to ‘subcultural’ notions of genre as meaningful categories. Whilst it was noted whether respondents mentioned genres, individual musicians, composers or individual pieces, the qualitative differences between different ‘subgenres’ are impossible to capture through coding in this way and, as argued in Chapter 3, not necessarily reflective of actual musicological difference. Bourdieu’s work on music in Distinction has been critiqued on this basis (Bennett, Savage, Silva et al. 2009: 76-78). Given the arbitrary and reductive nature of genre categorisations,

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41 Musical education, whether respondents were full time students, sexuality, region, age
judgments around why respondents liked certain music were considered of more importance than linking genres or emotion labels to behaviours. Nevertheless, certain aesthetic judgments appeared to be linked to the perception of certain genres, particularly around rap, pop, metal and dance (see Chapter 6), which is why it was important to at least explore.

The depth of response at the open-ended questions meant that answers were lengthy and not easily amenable to singular codes. It was necessary then to group these answers around themes and often two or three codes were contained within each respondent’s answer. Again Chi Square tests were used to identify statistically significant differences between demographic groups based on these codes. It should be noted again that whilst this does not deny the researcher’s own subjectivity in coding this data, a concerted effort was made to systematically group responses based on similarities of language arising from the data. This is in opposition to devising an a priori codeframe before exploring the data, which may have biased the types of trends which appeared. These combined findings were then subsequently used to determine the structure of the qualitative stage of research.

**Life History Case Studies**

**The Case for Life History Case Studies**

The main issues with using a predominantly quantitative approach for this study were, as already noted, that meanings, motivations and attitudes attached to behaviour could not be directly explained by inferential statistics. Whilst those using quantitative methods may often confuse correlation with directly causal relationships (Goldthorpe 2001; Gorard 2004: 147-148), this does not mean however that no relationship exists. Only that the naturalist view of causality as singular causes being an absolute precondition to an effect, which can be deduced by eliminating one factor at a time (Kemp and Holmwood 2003), should be rejected (see Papineau 1979: 50-52).

It was anticipated, but not expected, that trends based on differences in combinations of demographic categories would emerge from the survey analysis. One of the benefits of using a mixed methods approach was that it can often be used as means of conducting pragmatic (Howe 1988; Onwuegbuzie and Leech 2005), reflexive research. This meant enabling sampling decisions at the second stage to be undertaken only after exploratory inductive analysis was conducted. In the event that analysis
yielded no statistically significant differences the aims of the qualitative stage could therefore have changed significantly, as this would have been worthy of exploration itself. Conducting case study research after the initial quantitative phase therefore also allowed sample composition to be derived from broader observations.

Based on the survey data, there were significant differences in both gendered and listening practices, primarily by age (see Chapter 5). This is also supported by Bennett et al.’s (2009) recent, much larger mixed methods study where, despite accounting for multiple demographic variables, age proved the most significant factor in dividing music taste and participation (2009: 82). In terms of my survey, age was significantly more linked to ‘negative’ emotions, ‘masculine’ attributes and events that respondents connected to music, than sexuality, occupation, music education or region (see Chapter 5). For this reason, and due to time constraints as a result of the amount and depth of data generated, it was proposed that a singular respondent from each age category (6 in total) in the survey and who had provided consent to be contacted, would be interviewed.

Because differences in age appeared to be the most important in terms of both behaviour and relationship to music, a life history approach was chosen in order to map changes in individual biographies over time (Bertaux 1981: 6-7; Coles and Knowles 2001). This illustrates the case made in Chapter 1 around a revised conception of ‘masculine habitus’ (Bourdieu 2001). If habitus is shaped by the overlapping of social fields and never remains fixed, then the question is how best to explore this as an ongoing process, without fully rejecting, as Bourdieu often does (McRobbie 2002), individual understandings of motivation. Yet it is still important to locate these explanations within broader social structural and discursive influences. Life histories help to ascertain if, how and why changes occur in individual biographies, mapping these on to wider influence. Life histories are not only useful as detailed expositions of particular biographies, but also as a useful tool for connecting the ‘abstract to the concrete’ (Ferrarotti 1981: 21). This is both for stimulating discussion with respondents and providing researchers with concrete examples.

Case studies offer a tool for what (Gluckman 2006: 15) has referred to as apt illustration. Findings drawn from case studies in this sense can be typical of populations but not generalizable, in the positivist sense, to every given case (Stake 1978; Denzin 1983). Gluckman (2006) argues that in his research, individual cases were used as “apt and appropriate case[s] to illustrate specific customs, principles of organization, social
relationships etc” (2006: 16). As Blaikie (2010: 190) highlights, *apt illustration* allows for “a more complex collection of connected events that occur within a limited time span, and which demonstrate the operation of general principles of social organization”. This enables researchers to connect individual to group experience (Neuman 2003: 33).

**Life History Case Study Sample Selection and Analysis**

As with social research generally, the survey sample was self-selecting. Using non-probability sampling methods there were several attempts to generate a robust number of respondents from a variety of ethnic, socio-economic and age groups, however, as with many quantitative surveys (outlined earlier), the sample identified predominantly as ‘white British’ and from SEG’s B and C1. As already stated, this made statistically robust analysis, based on multiple demographic variables, difficult and presented three options with regards to the structure of the qualitative sample.

The first was to look only at groups who were underrepresented at the quantitative stage (by SEG and ethnicity) as a means of exploring whether attitudes were necessarily different from some of the observed trends. This could then be compared to open-ended answers at the first stage given by other respondents. The second option was to look only at those on whom the quantitative generalisations had been based. As Creswell and Clark (2007: 62) note, this is the classic triangulation design, collating “different but complementary data on the same topic” (Morse 1991: 122). The purpose of which is to “bring together the differing strengths and nonoverlapping weaknesses of quantitative methods ... with those of qualitative methods” (Creswell and Plano Clark 2007: 62). The third option was to carry out qualitative interviews with both those present and absent in the quantitative dataset and amalgamate findings in different ways, dependent on the analysis group.

Precisely because the aim of the qualitative stage in this study was to illustrate emergent trends from the sample population in greater depth, it would have made data from C2DE SEG’s, and other ‘non-White’ ethnic groups, difficult to integrate. According to a Bourdieusian notion of sociological reflexivity (Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992), there were also significant ethical questions about what assumptions may be made based on racial, ethnic and socioeconomic factors, which were not observed in the quantitative data.

Six respondents from the survey, who identified as white British and from socio economic groups B or C1, were therefore selected on the basis of both prior consent,
and the richness and depth of the response provided at the open-ended questions. Respondents who mentioned interesting or exceptional events, or who provided rich, in-depth, detailed and comprehensive answers (as opposed to one word responses), were contacted first. This was due to both pragmatic reasons of data collection and also to explore the potential link between some extreme events (deaths in the family or breakups for example) to broader temporal experiences and shifts in listening behaviour. The open-ended answers respondents provided in the survey were used as a means of stimulating and structuring the discussion around the topic. Respondents were asked to clarify why they mentioned certain events and what they meant by the answers they gave, whilst also being free to discuss any other important issues as they saw fit (see Appendix 5). The sessions were a minimum of an hour each though typically they ranged between 1 and 2 hours.

The selected approach, whilst leaving the study open to accusations of ethnocentrism, did not propose to make any claims to a representation of universal male experience. This would have been impossible in the time frame given the plurality of demographic factors to be taken into consideration. It is also a value-oriented reluctance to reproduce certain ethnocentric assumptions around musical genres linked to certain types or groups (see Chapter 3) and phallocentric claims to universal experience. Most importantly, it is white, middle class males who have historically laid claim to the authority of rationality (see Chapters 1 & 2 for discussion). It follows therefore that the narratives from these backgrounds, provided around emotional experience as the discursive opposite of rationality, would be the most insightful to explore the masculinist fallacy (see Chapter 2). Whilst demographic factors were assumed to shape subjective experience, therefore treated as indicative of subjective masculinities, the aims of using a mixed methods approach were clear: to explore trends arising from the quantitative data and to expand on these using case studies which examined the role of music in men’s lives.

Having already fully completed the online survey, respondents were given a brief summary of what the interview entailed. Case studies were anonymised and data was stored on a digital recording device on a password secured server. Data were never exported over an open network and, apart from in transportation to the office, any field notes and electronic data capture devices, were stored inside a locked filing cabinet on University of Leeds premises. Written consent was also obtained from the respondents
prior to and after the interviews, in line again with BSA (2002) guidelines, to make sure that they understood the purposes and uses of the data.

The interviews were semi-structured around respondents’ answers about the feelings music provoked, their music likes and dislikes and when music had been important, but also around their own individual and musical biographies. The purpose of structuring the interview around these areas was to get respondents to talk about what music meant to them whilst specifically avoiding talking about emotions or ‘masculinity’ directly. This was for two reasons: firstly respondents often willingly volunteered information about both emotional states and ‘masculinity’, but the project tried to avoid biasing responses in favour of discussing music’s emotional connection per se as much as possible. Secondly, as highlighted earlier, discussion around emotions directly may have made some respondents uncomfortable, thus closing down discussion. Talking about music in relation to certain events, feelings or moods, was an indirect way of relating the ‘abstract with the concrete’.

Once all the interviews were complete, data were fully transcribed into Nvivo 9 and the open-responses from the quantitative stage were added to this dataset. Coding was carried out thematically, from both observations made at the quantitative stage and from new observations arising from the qualitative data. Firstly word frequency queries were again run on each of the case studies individually, and then collectively on all the case studies and the open-ended responses, highlighting the most commonly used and similar words, within and between case studies. After this each of the case studies was examined individually and then larger fragments of text were added into each of the nodes, adding any extra from additional themes or discursive sentiments expressed by respondents. This approach allowed for a full systematic observation of a large amount of data, grouping the themes into 21 specific tree nodes in total.

Mason (1994) notes how in a study on kinship networks, she divided analysis into groups of ‘descriptive’ and ‘conceptual’ categories. The former were a list of “substantive topics in which we were interested” (1994: 91) and the latter were more directly concerned with “teasing out aspects of kin relationships relevant to our research questions” (1994: 92). The overarching topic of enquiry here was concerned with exploring how masculinities shaped male emotional use of music. This, as outlined, is due to the historical contradiction between masculinities as forms of ‘rational control’ and music’s dominion over different types of emotional expression. Yet due to an anti-positivist approach, there was a deliberate resistance to formulating research questions
to be answered. Instead statistical differences, as well as the life history respondents’ open ended answers, helped locate individual perspectives within broader sample trends. As the quantitative trends shaped the structure of the life-history sessions, there could be little division between ‘descriptive’ and ‘conceptual’ categorisation in the qualitative analysis because life experiences may have varied considerably.

The purpose of the quantitative stage was essentially inductive which, as Blaikie (2010: 84) notes is “to establish descriptions of characteristics and patterns” whereas the qualitative stage was “to describe and understand social life in terms of social actors’ meanings and motives” (ibid.), or abduction. Whilst the quantitative trends shaped the qualitative sessions, as already argued discovering intention is not necessarily the best means of establishing the regularities of discourses, structures or concepts which continue to perpetuate themselves as ‘truth’. Blaikie therefore introduces a third type of research aim here, in the form of ‘retroduction’. This type of approach is concerned with exploring underlying discourses and structures which inform attitudes (ibid.). Whilst these distinctions carry their own epistemological positions, it should be suggested that a critical mixed methods approach is aimed at collapsing the often arbitrary distinctions between intention, action and structure. It is through such an approach that it is possible to attempt to move beyond the divide outlined in Chapters 1 and 2, highlighted by Seidler (2006b: 97) as the contrast between men’s structural domination and ‘merely personal pain’.

**Summary**

This chapter has demonstrated that using either a quantitative or qualitative only strategies for conducting social research, into masculinities and emotions is problematic for several reasons. Whilst this is a value judgment on the nature and purpose of sociological research, it has been argued that mixed methods research represents a pragmatic approach to empirical work, which seeks to minimise the methodological problems of both. A central claim here is that quantitative methods do not necessarily endorse positivistic determinism. Whilst the utmost effort must be made to acknowledge the partiality of the claims derived from quantitative datasets, regularities in attitudes on the basis of shared characteristics, can be used inductively to address qualitative sampling bias. Quantitative methods also do not exclude gathering large amounts of qualitative data.
Despite the limitations of online methods, the distance they afford the researcher, the speed of data collection and management and the significant reduction in both human error and bias, are important for the purpose of this project. At the same time, the obvious limitations of conducting survey research meant that often patterns could be observed rather than understood. Life histories allowed for the clarification of certain answers at the quantitative stage amongst a selection of respondents who were demographically, typical of the age groups in the dataset. This also allowed both respondent and researcher to reflect on how changes over time may be linked to masculine habitus as an ongoing process. Through integrating the two types of data it is hoped that the approaches will lead to a deeper comprehension of the processes involved in linking ‘masculine’ subjectivities to the emotional affects of music. The proceeding two chapters will now outline firstly the survey findings and secondly data from the life histories, before providing an integrated analysis.
Chapter 5: Quantitative Analysis

Introduction

This chapter outlines general trends in emotional use of music from the quantitative stage of research, in order to frame the qualitative analysis and discussion in the subsequent chapters. In analysing how five different demographic variables (age, sexuality, region, student status and formal musical education) demonstrate statistically significant relationships to gendered attitudes, emotions connected to music, aesthetic choice and spatial listening behaviours, it intends to show how different subjective masculinities may impact on male use of music. The purpose of this chapter is not to provide definitive explanations but, as outlined in Chapter 4, to identify potential regularities and patterns based on similarities of social location.

Beginning with an analysis of some overall trends and differences in ‘typical’ and ‘atypical’ gendered attitudes (identified from the literature in Chapter 1), the chapter moves on to discuss how different types of interaction with music vary by musical education and age. It then outlines the most common descriptions and emotion labels linked to both music preference and aversion, identifying how certain attitudes to music relate to aesthetic judgments around the quality of different types of music. The chapter finally details how life-stage and individual biographies, invariably shaped by social structures and values, impact on the ways in which music is heard, used and listened to.

It is worth reiterating that the use of survey data in this chapter makes no claim to positivist objectivity. In analysing the data in a systematic and thematic fashion it details key trends which helped to shape, and are developed further at, the qualitative stage. The survey was structured in a way as to avoid imposing fixed-choices on respondents (see Chapter 4) and to allow broad trends to ‘fall out’ of commonalities in respondents’ language and from existing research into the four areas already outlined in Chapters 1, 2 and 3. Nevertheless, the impossibility and undesirability of establishing objective categories should be made clear from the outset (see Chapter 3).
Gendered Practice and Performance

Belief and Behaviour

It is important firstly to look at differences and similarities in terms of male participation or belief in the importance of behaviour deemed to be ‘masculine’. As Butler (1998b) argues, the repetition of performance is central to cultural configurations of gender. Gendered performativity suggests the mutability of agential, gendered practice, but it also implies a separation between public performances and subjective understanding of these performances. Earlier it was suggested that much emphasis in masculinities studies is placed on the way men talk or act publicly as indicative of masculinities, rather than the way they understand these acts. It is necessary to question then whether performance necessarily mirrors investment in the performance.

Studying gender from the point of being only performative however perhaps overlooks the reproduction of masculinities not only through acts but a belief in the naturalness of the act and the extent to which socially patterned behaviour is framed as individual ‘choice’ (see McNay 2000). It is how males act out masculinities, as the seemingly ‘natural’ state, which makes Bourdieu’s (1984) notion of habitus persuasive when studying gender. The embodiment of gendered behaviours in the habitus accounts for the notion of individual ‘choice’, in its most capricious sense, as the unconscious manifestation of institutions, structures and organizations, gendered by the very presence of those bodies to which genders are attached (see Acker 1990; Britton 2000). As Bourdieu (2001: 24) notes:

The formative process, Bildung in the full sense, which brings about this social construction of the body only very partially takes the form of explicit and express pedagogic action. It is to a large extent the automatic, agentless effect of a physical and social order entirely organized in accordance with the androcentric principle (which explains the extreme strength of its hold). Inscribed in the things of the world, the masculine order also inscribes itself in bodies through the tacit injunctions that are implied in the routines of the division of labour or of collective or private rituals.

To look at what actors believe to be important is therefore indicative of how social location shapes subjectivities. This is central firstly in questioning whether there is a separation between investment and performance and secondly in providing insight into how performance and investment are co-constitutive.
Whilst as demonstrated in Chapter 1, masculinities are multiple and contingent (Aboim 2010), the survey aimed at exploring how certain attributes which have been discursively and structurally linked to masculinities were shaped. This was particularly with a view to ascertaining whether ideas around practice shaped different music uses and whether these uses were patterned by demographic factors, integral to a conception of ‘masculine habitus’.

Fig. 1a.\(^\text{42}\) demonstrates that overall respondents were most likely to rate love and physical intimacy as more important than all other attributes. These are characteristically considered atypically ‘masculine’ due to a stress on dependency (Seidler 1994: 149) and connection to ‘uncontrolled’ emotion (Allen 2007). Sex was also rated highly overall, yet there appears to be a rejection of more ‘traditional’ masculine behaviours such as strength and ‘being considered physically tough’ rated as less important amongst the total sample. What is also worthy of note is that ‘showing emotions publicly’ was rated extremely low, whilst ‘being considered sensitive’ was almost three times as likely to be rated between 5-7. As noted in Chapter 1, a stress on love and a rejection of physical violence alone does not necessarily represent a move toward what Giddens (1992) would call the ‘pure relationship’ (a relationship entered into for its own sake) or a more egalitarian form of ‘masculinity’ because as Allen (2007: 148) demonstrates, the appearance of sensitivity can actually be deployed as a form of capital in heterosexual relationships (see also Duncombe and Marsden 1993; Wouters 1998; Ahmed 2010b).

There are several caveats to highlight here. The fact that some gendered attributes are rated low does not mean that they are not important. Firstly this may be a comparative judgment on their relative standing in relation to the other attributes. Secondly, whilst personally ‘traditional’ practices may be perceived as less important, their importance within homosocial peer groups for example might be unconsciously invoked more frequently than is consciously appraised (Messner 2001; Flood 2008; Dempster 2011). Importantly, as noted in Chapter 4 there is also a socio-economic sample bias toward B and C1 SEGs. Historically middle class men have placed less emphasis on ‘physical strength’ and ‘toughness’ as integral to constructions of ‘masculinity’ (Petersen 1998; Forth 2008) and this is particularly less of a requirement of white collar occupations than manual labour jobs. Given that ‘being considered

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\(^{42}\) All data and figures reported in this Chapter, unless stated otherwise, are found in Appendix 3.

\(^{43}\) Though Segal (1990), Hollway (1984) and Forrest (2010) have all provided contrary evidence.
physically fit’ is still rated highly by half the sample, it may still be possible that the rational disciplining mechanisms, characteristic of a belief in the Cartesian subject, still come into play for many of the middle class respondents through comportment (Skeggs 1997; Adkins and Skeggs 2004).

Age, Heteronormativity and Homosociality

The limitations of the survey sample meant that it was not statistically possible to explore how socio-economic factors may shape attitudes to gendered practice. However respondents who did not identify as heterosexual (gay, bisexual or ‘other’) were significantly less likely to rate ‘sex’, ‘playing sport’ and ‘watching sport’ from 5-7 (Fig. 1b.). There were also some regional variations, with significantly more Welsh males (43.8%) rating ‘being able to take care of myself if it came to a fight’, and Scottish males (17.5%) rating ‘showing emotions publicly’ between 5-7 (Fig. 1b.).

With regards to behaviours and practices, there were significant differences by age in how highly ‘love’, ‘sex’, ‘male friends’ and ‘watching sport’ were rated. As Fig. 2 demonstrates, when asked about the importance of sex, those aged 16-19 rated ‘sex’ well below the average, whereas 25-40 year olds were more likely to rate sex from 5-7 (Fig. 1b.). The idea that many young men become sexually active around the legal age of sexual consent (16), with the act of losing virginity signallng a symbolic passage to ‘manhood’ and therefore being considered of significant importance in the construction of masculinities (Connell 1995: 53), makes the comparatively low rate of importance around sex for 16-19 year olds surprising.

Connell’s (1995) appropriation of Rich’s (1980) notion of compulsory heterosexuality suggests that in order for masculinities to be publicly legitimated as forms of power, there needs to be a ‘disciplining to heterosexuality’ (Connell 1995: 4). Similarly Rogers (2005) identifies that the ability to get sex must be perceived as effortless in order to articulate a version of ‘masculinity’ underpinned by heteronormativity (2005: 184-5), something corroborated often through homosocial interaction (Simpson 1994; Thomson 1999; Flood 2008; Richardson 2010). This is why particularly amongst the younger male respondents, especially 16-19 year olds, who rated the importance of both male and female friends highly, that sex may be considered less important than other age groups is surprising.

Assuming that many respondents were sexually active, data here suggests that either that younger respondents did not admit to heterosexual sex as being important, in
order to justify the effortlessness of sexual activity, or may indicate that they are coerced by heteronormative frameworks into making sex appear publicly more important than they actually believe it to be. Despite stereotypes around promiscuity at university as integral to male identities for example, as Flood (2008: 346) notes of respondents in his study of homosociality and sexuality; “[respondents claimed that] at university, there is less pressure from other males to have sex, that one’s level of sexual experience now matters less, or that they are less sensitive to such pressure”.

For young males, for whom heteronormativity is often assumed to be a vital compulsory component, there may be a more marked separation between presentation and practice (see Chapter 6 for further discussion). Male university students (typically aged 18-21) have been argued to publicly conform more to ‘typically masculine’, heteronormative, practices (Kimmel 2008; Dempster 2011). It actually appears here to be either equally or less important for full time students in comparison with other demographic groups. To this end, there were no statistically significant differences based on whether respondents were full time students or not in relation to how highly ‘sex’ was rated (Fig. 1b.).

What Fig.2. demonstrates is that ‘male friends’ were rated as the most important between the ages of 20-24 and show a marked decline after this age. This is in accord with research which has demonstrated the importance of homosociality in the validation of gendered practice for younger males particularly (Kimmel and Mahler 2003; Allen 2007; Flood 2008; Forrest 2010; Richardson 2010; Dempster 2011). Whilst a fuller discussion of this is taken up later in Chapter 6, specifically in relation to respondents’ own life histories, the role of homosocial interaction in shaping gendered discourse and practice (O’Donnell and Sharpe 2000: 38-39) should also be considered as vital in shaping habitus.

The purpose of these questions was to look at the relational nature of many of the behaviours, attitudes and practices that masculinities theorists have perceived as important to constructing masculinities. Whilst it reveals a good deal of similarity in attitudes which may be due to the overall similarities in respondents’ social locations (see Chapter 4). There appear to be different priorities around certain gendered attitudes based on categories of sexuality but also predominantly age. In taking masculinities not as stable internal essences, but a repetition of practices, beliefs and behaviours shaped by social and physical locations, there are several implications here.
Firstly there is a challenge to seeing a belief in heteronormativity as a compulsory component of all masculine subjectivities. Whilst it is worth noting that heterosexual respondents were significantly more likely to rate sex as important than homosexual respondents (72.3% rated 5-7 compared to 63.6%), data here indicate a comparative lack of belief in the importance of sex for both younger and older males privately; even if publicly this may not be voiced. Secondly there is a need to explore whether masculinities always equate loving relationships, something in which emotions are heavily invested, with dependency and therefore a renunciation of autonomy. The ideal of a loving relationship based on sexual equality, as indicated earlier in Chapter 2, is something that younger males particularly may strive for, thus undermining the idea of masculinities based entirely on subordination (Hollway 1984; 1993). There is evidence here to suggest that how relationships are conceptualised is dependent on age and thus through experiential differences (Segal 1990; Duncombe and Marsden 1993).

Again, the purpose of asking which gendered behaviours and practices were perceived as important was not to make a claim to objective benchmarks about ‘masculine’ behaviour or to create metric types, as such approaches psychologise gender as fixed (Till 2011). Its purpose was to encourage respondents to reflect on their priorities. The fact that all respondents were presented with the same attributes, and yet there are clear trends based on age and sexuality, indicates similar values by demographic. This offers a chance to explore the relational nature of these subjective masculine constructions further. That a respondent can judge how important they consider watching sport in relation to having sex along an abstract scale does not necessarily compare like-for-like but it does give an indication of what is considered to be important.

Music Education and Interaction

Within the total sample, 26.3% were currently studying music within an educational institution or had received some kind of formal / classical music training over the age of 16 (Fig. 6. Appendix 2). Whilst it was open to interpretation, as to what constituted formal training there were again statistically significant differences by age ($p= .000$), with over 50% of 16-19 and 32% of 20-24 year olds, having received some formal training (Fig. 3). This may have been partially because both those who had an active interest in the survey topic (Holland and Christian 2009) and university students more generally, as with other online methods (see Crawford, Couper and Lamais 2001;
were more likely to complete the survey (see Chapter 4). Thus amongst the younger age groups music students may have been especially receptive to finishing the survey. Those in full time education were significantly more likely to say that they had been formally trained \((p = .001)\) which would indicate this to be the case.

Overall, 88.1\% of respondents rated ‘listening to music’ from 5-7 on the same scale as the previous attitude statements, highlighting the above assumption that most respondents were likely to have an interest in the subject\(^{44}\). As Fig. 4 shows there were no statistically significant differences by age or music education, in relation to how important respondents considered ‘listening to music’, though unsurprisingly those who had received formal music education showed significant differences in how highly they rated the importance of playing music \((p = .000)\).

Those who had been given formal training in music differed little in their attitudes to the gendered attitude statements already identified, with the exception of playing music (as above) and watching sport (Fig. 1b.), potentially as a result of the age trends identified above. This suggests firstly that whilst there may have been a disproportionate amount of people who produced or performed music included in the survey, this had a marginal impact as to how important listening to music was rated between those who had received formal training and those who had not.

Whilst there was a greater skew toward the younger age groups in terms of those who have received formal education/training, the lack of any significant differences for most of the gendered attributes, based on formal music education, indicates a similarity in attitudes to gendered practices. This is important as it suggests that those who have had formal music training were not entirely different in their attitudes toward gendered practices. As noted throughout, contemporary music’s conflation with ‘emotionality’ may lead to a conclusion that those males more actively engaged with music do so out of a rejection of the kind of emotional inexpressivity theorists often associate with ‘dominant’ ideologies of masculinities (Seidler 1994; 2006a; 2007). The lack of significant differences between these two groups on many of the gendered importance statements, suggests that this may not be the case. In addition, whilst most respondents rated ‘listening to music’ highly, there were significant differences in responses to other attributes based on other demographic variables.

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\(^{44}\) Respondents were deliberately not asked questions about music prior to the grid question around attitudes, though the introductory paragraph did outline that the survey was concerned with music tastes to encourage participation.
Q23 (Appendix 1) focussed on the different types of interaction that respondents had with regards to musical production, performance creation and composition. This is important because as Armstrong (2008) has noted;

... there are numerous parallels between this ideological construction of technology as a masculine domain and the construction of music composition...this ideology is reproduced by linking creativity to the mental (the mind) which Citron (1993: 52) argues has naturalised male’s ‘appropriation of creativity’.

As highlighted in Chapter 3, both music consumption and production are arguably the historic preserve of what Armstrong slightly problematically calls ‘the masculine domain’. Nevertheless, her emphasis makes an important distinction on the different uses of music in reproducing gendered discourses. Less than half (40%) claimed that they did not play any musical instrument or compose music of any kind (see Fig.5b.) and again this would indicate that the majority of respondents had an active interest in both listening to and making music. There were significant age differences in the types of interaction respondents had with music production and composition by both formal education (see Fig. 5a) and age, with respondents between 36-64 more likely to say that they did not play a musical instrument or compose music of any kind (see Fig. 5b.). Unsurprisingly, as Fig. 5a also shows, those who had received formal music education were also significantly more likely to have interacted with music production and performance in most ways, with the exception of ‘composing music on a laptop using software but cannot read or write music’.

**Uses of Music**

*Feelings and Emotions*

Whilst just over a quarter of respondents had received formal training, that just over 60% interacted with music production or performance in other ways suggests that formal musical training was not seen as a necessary precondition in order to create music for many. This would mean that a significant number of those who play, compose or sing are self-taught and whilst the numbers of those who compose or play music declines amongst the older age groups, there is a sense that music creation played an important role for a number of respondents. It is important then to move on to the specific context of *listening* to music.
Questions 11-16 (see Appendix 1) in the survey focused specifically on reasons for listening to music. Respondents were asked two open-ended questions regarding the reasons they chose to listen to music generally and then about how specific pieces of music which they considered their favourites made them feel. They were then subsequently asked a fixed-response scale question around how the music they chose to listen to made them feel, again using a scale of 1-7. Amongst the open-ended responses given as to why people chose to listen to the music they did (Q11 Appendix 1), ‘creating / maintaining a mood, emotion, feeling or expression’ was the most commonly mentioned (see Fig. 6a.). ‘Pleasure, enjoyment or a love of music generally’ featured highly, as did listening to music for relaxation. This supports the premise that music is often seen as “arguably the cultural material par excellence of emotion” (DeNora 2001: 46) or something which is engaged with primarily to stimulate emotional or physiological change (Krumhans 2002; Rickard 2004; Lonsdale and North 2011: 113).

As Fig. 6b shows, there were very few significant differences between demographic groups in the most commonly provided reasons for listening, though non-students were significantly more likely to mention emotion or ‘creating or maintaining a mood or emotion’ as a reason for listening to music generally. That emotions were mentioned at comparatively similar levels across the three open ended responses, for most demographic groups, suggests that a key motivator for listening practices is its perceived ability to create an emotional impact.

Both in concurrence with and opposition to the earlier treatise of Adorno (see Chapter 3), it is clear that music does not generally seem to be used, at least amongst this sample, primarily as a form of entertainment. This is in opposition to Adorno and Horkheimer’s (1997 [1947]: 143) conceptualisation of modern music as the fusion of ‘culture with entertainment’, though it does support the notion of music’s consumptive function as something akin to the ‘sublime’ (Adorno 1945: 211) and his conception of the emotional listener.

Fig. 7a demonstrates that in reference to specific music that respondents designated their favourites, those emotions often termed ‘positive’ are the most commonly mentioned (see Chapter 3). Over three times as many respondents mentioned ‘happy, content or fulfilled’ as mentioned ‘sad, melancholy or depressed’. There were again some noticeable significant differences amongst different age groups, in terms of those who mentioned ‘nostalgia’, with 25-35 (37.5%) and 36-40 (36%) year olds much more likely than others to mention this. Also those who had no formal music training (40.2%)
were significantly more likely than those who had, to mention feeling ‘energised’ or ‘energetic’ by their music choices (see Fig. 7b.).

The data indicate two things. Firstly that without presenting respondents with any indication as to the research’s core focus (emotions), respondents mentioned that they listen to music because of its emotionally connotative aspects. This lends weight to the argument of a conscious desire to stimulate or maintain feelings and emotional states. Secondly, the majority of respondents either consciously or unconsciously preferred music which was connected to ‘positive’ emotions such as happiness. As noted in Chapters 2 and 3, the drive toward pleasure through cultural consumption, is entirely congruent with an Enlightenment conception of rationality. This is largely because ‘positive’ emotions are ‘productive’. Referring back to Hearn (1993) then, it is not that emotions per se are incongruous with masculinities; it is how certain emotions are discursively framed that needs to be explored.

When asked later in the survey, from a list of pre-determined variables, how the music respondents chose to listen to made them feel, there were again significant variations by age and formal music education. Whilst Fig 8a. corroborates the assertion that ‘positive’ emotions are most closely linked to music preference overall, Fig. 8b. and Fig. 8c outline several differences in relation to ‘negative’ emotions; particularly that those aged between 16 and 25 were significantly more likely to rate ‘angry’, ‘lonely’, ‘depressed’ ‘sad’ and ‘aggressive’ between 5-7 on the scale.

Aggression and anger especially have been connected to young males’ adherence to institutionalised forms of masculinities (Stanko 1994; Kindlon and Thompson 1999; O'Donnell and Sharpe 2000; Oransky and Marecek 2009) and moral panics as linked to the performance of gender by young males (Cohen 1972b; Kimmel and Mahler 2003; Seidler 2006b). Social psychological analyses of adolescence have also explained this in terms of ‘identity crisis’ as a result of anxiety caused by the disjuncture between childhood and adulthood (Erikson 1968; Menard 1995). It is however the differences between age groups in feelings and emotions which, as observed in Chapter 3, have been considered ‘unhealthy’ to the male body because of their historically discursive links with ‘femininity’ (sadness, depression and loneliness) that are of particular interest.

20-24 year olds were also significantly more likely to rate both ‘lonely’ and conversely ‘less alone’ from 5-7 (see Fig. 8c.) in relation to the music they chose to listen to. As outlined further in Chapter 6, music often appears to perform a dual
function for some younger males in this respect; being listened to both to elicit and to counteract feelings of anger, loneliness, depression and sadness. Contrary to the notion again of rational, unemotional masculinities, music appears to be actively engaged with as a means of eliciting or shaping emotional response (this is elaborated further in Chapter 6).

**Aesthetic Subjectivity**

As Bourdieu (1984: 56) argues, taste’s social function is often defined as much through a rejection of other tastes as it is by affirmation of one’s own. This is a crucial component of his concept of habitus in relation to social reproduction therefore it was also important to explore why respondents chose not to listen to, as well as why they listened to certain music (Q12 Appendix 1). As highlighted in Chapters 3 and 4, there are problems with categorising people by the types of music they enjoy listening to. For reasons already outlined, open-ended questions were included in this survey to explore specific music tastes, and the wording of the question deliberately was designed to explore whether the majority located their taste in ‘subcultural’ assumptions of genre affiliation (see Chapter 3).

What data obtained illustrates is that, when given the choice, respondents more often than not mentioned specific artists or pieces rather than types when listing their favourite music, rendering meaningful statistical analysis of types difficult. Fig. 10a shows that less than half of all respondents referred to a genre or type when asked about their favourite type of music, across all three choices. Instead they were more likely to refer to bands, groups or individual pieces of music.

In line with Bourdieu’s above point however, when asked what music they disliked respondents were far more likely to refer to type or genre rather than specific pieces. Whilst only 46.8% of all respondents referred to a genre when asked about their favourite music, in contrast 91.5% amongst those who said they disliked any music (see Fig.10b) made reference to genres when asked what music they actively disliked. This may feasibly have been because respondents were well-versed in the nuanced differences of their own tastes, but not the stylistic or musicological differences of music which they disliked or chose to avoid.

This is why genre analysis was both able to be conducted on, and preferable to, exploring musical dislikes as opposed to likes. Given that there were broader references to genre in musical dislikes, respondents’ reasons for disliking certain forms appear to
be based on the same level of stylistic judgment applied with reference to their own music tastes. Therefore when asked to provide reasons for their aversion to certain styles, these appeared premised more on stereotypes and generalisations than intricate knowledge of the genres (see Chapter 6). The reasons for disliking certain genres then appear based more on preconceptions as to that music’s aesthetic qualities, derived in no small part from its relationship to audience demographic, cultural participation and marketing (through music videos for example).

These statements (illustrated further in Chapter 6) therefore revealed certain beliefs around practices and representations associated with other musical aesthetics and thus subjectivities. As noted in Chapter 3, a fetishisation of black masculinities in rap music (Yousman 2003; Conrad, Dixon and Zhang 2009; Weitzer and Kubrin 2009) and jazz (Witkin 2000: 156) commodifies primality in relation to the black male body, as a sales mechanism (hooks 2004a: 57-58); this has also historically been a source of moral panic surrounding music’s influence on ‘healthy’ white, middle class male bodies. However it underlines certain racialised assumptions about what certain aspects of black culture [sic] are, thus emphasising the symbolic and relational aspects of power. This is Connell’s (Carrigan, Connell and Lee 1985; Connell 1995; 1998; Connell and Wood 2005) key insight with regards to the idea of ‘marginal masculinities’.

Overall, 82.8% of all respondents claimed that there were some forms or pieces of music which they disliked and 2.2% said they were unsure. Of these two groups combined, (N=307), 47.6% mentioned ‘pop’, ‘X factor’, ‘boy’ or ‘girl bands’ or ‘chart music’ (see Fig. 9a.) as music they would ‘avoid listening to if they could help it’. Of the other most commonly mentioned styles, there were also significant differences again most commonly with age (see Fig. 9b.). As Fig. 9c shows, those aged 16-19 were significantly more likely to mention ‘rap’, ‘hip-hop’ or ‘grime’ (31.8% of total age group) and ‘thrash’ or ‘metal’ (38.6% of total age group) and those aged 41-50 were significantly more likely to mention ‘pop’, ‘X factor’, ‘boy/girl bands’ or ‘chart music’ (59.4% of total age group) as music which they disliked. Those aged between 36–40 significantly more likely to mention R’n’B (28% of total age group).

The reason most frequently given for disliking certain music was that it was ‘manufactured’, ‘commercial’ or ‘artificial’ (see Fig. 11a.). There was then a clear dislike of music which openly functions as commodity, which is unsurprising given that shows like the ‘X Factor’ and ‘chart’ music were mentioned, without prompting, at the previous question. According to Frith and Goodwin (2004), the construction of
authenticity in fan discourse has often led to a rejection of ‘inauthentic’ music. As noted in Chapter 3 also, pop’s frequent conflation with ‘feminised’ music (Green 1993; Armstrong 2008; Ashley 2010) because of its marketing toward female audiences, is itself a gendered discourse, reflected in music sales. Again, this gendering of taste is completely congruent with a rejection of the ‘feminine’, cited as important in constructing masculine identities in Chapter 1.

However just over 10% of the total sample disliked music because it ‘lacked emotion’ or ‘soul’ and only 5% mentioned that they disliked music because it was ‘depressing’ or ‘sad’. What this demonstrates again is that there is not a widespread rejection of music because it is closely linked with ‘emotionality’ as such. Whilst the limitations of quantitative analysis mean that it is difficult to clarify exactly what is meant by ‘artificial’ or ‘manufactured’, as highlighted in Chapter 6 this is often taken to mean music that has no emotion behind it. This was significantly more likely (see Fig.11b.) to be the case for 41-50 year olds (28.1% of total age group) who were also likely to mention pop music as a music type that they would avoid listening to. As already demonstrated, one of music’s primary uses is perceived to be emotional stimulation, thus music which perceivably lacks this quality may be rejected on these grounds.

There were also statistically significant relationships between reasons for disliking music and the types of music respondents mentioned disliking. As Figs. 11c and 11d show, those who mentioned ‘pop, X Factor, boy or girl bands or chart music’, were significantly more likely than those who did not mention these to say that they disliked music which was ‘manufactured, commercial or artificial’, that lacked ‘emotion or soul’, or that lacked ‘creativity or originality’. The lack of authenticity in what is commonly considered pop music is explored in more detail in Chapter 6, however some of the comments made around ‘rap, hip-hop and grime’ are also interesting in relation to the idea of subjective masculinities.

Again, whilst specific reasons are qualitatively detailed in Chapter 6, it is interesting to note that those who disliked ‘rap, hip-hop or grime’ were likely to mention lyrics as a reason they disliked some music types, and there was a frequent perception of ‘rap, hip-hop or grime’ lyrics as sexist or misogynistic. There were also significantly more respondents who mentioned ‘metal, thrash or hardcore’ and ‘rap, hip-hop or grime’ who also said they disliked music which was ‘aggressive or violent’ (see Fig. 11c / 11d), but this was not always explicitly concerned with lyrical content.
Space, Place and Time

Music and Biography

As argued in Chapter 3 individuals do not just passively receive music. Instead they are often active participants in musical creation and the shaping of certain aesthetic connotations associated with certain music styles. It is not only exposure to music through broader societal and cultural influence that shapes taste or aesthetic judgment but also personal biographies and circumstance. This proves a significant corrective to Bourdieu’s reduction of music solely to social function (Frith 2002; Prior 2011; Watson 2011) and feeds into a wider critique of habitus (see Chapters 1 and 3) as the active as well as unconscious negotiation of taste.

As Wood, Duffy and Smith (2007) argue, music appreciation is mediated through space, place and time. The act of listening to music in one context (a live venue for example) alters the experience of a piece of music in terms of its affects and the linguistic features and discursive strategies used to articulate such affects. Whilst listening to music in physical spaces are often heavily gendered (Cohen 1991; Clawson 1999; Fonarow 2005; Donze 2010) it is also a matter of locating individual biographies within social regularities, which may help in understanding the issue of gendered subjectivity.

When asked at what points in their lives music was particularly important (see Q18 and Q19 Appendix 1), 37.8% of the total sample at the open-ended question, mentioned either ‘adolescence or teenage years’. The second most common response was that it was important in developing a sense of identity or being part of a social group (see Fig. 12.). Listening to music during periods of personal stress, illness or bereavement also featured strongly (this is also explored further in Chapter 6). It is also important to note that, at this question, there were no statistically significant differences by any of the demographic categories. This suggests a consistency of certain beliefs about the importance and uses of music at various points in life-stage, despite differences even within individual biographies.

Whilst at Q11 ‘nostalgia’ was not cited primarily as a reason that most people chose to engage with music generally, when asked specifically about why they listened to their favourite music choices, earlier in the survey (Q13-15), 28% of all respondents

45 Durkheim’s (1995 [1912]) concept of ‘collective effervescence’ recognised early on that physical gatherings tended to induce heightened feelings and emotions as a result of shared experience.
mentioned ‘nostalgia’ (Fig. 7a.); this was more common amongst those aged between 25 and 40 (Fig. 7c.). Life-stage appeared generally crucial to how music was linked to certain periods and it is clear in connecting music to experience, that attitudes and beliefs become negotiated and renegotiated (i.e. how music is listened to or heard, dependent on events connected with certain pieces).

When presented with another grid of fixed-choice questions as to how important music was at specific points, ‘meeting new friends’ and ‘meeting a new partner’ came out most strongly overall (see Fig. 13a.). However events which could be conceived of as emotionally stressful, such as ‘breaking up with a partner’, ‘moving to university’, ‘moving to a new place’ and ‘death of a friend or family member’, were also likely to be rated from 5-7, indicating music’s use at periods of significant change, likely to be commonly experienced by most people.

There were again significant differences in response at this question, most strongly by age and whether or not the respondents were students or not (Fig. 13b.). Age undoubtedly shaped music’s connection to specific events, due to obvious differences in life-stage between groups. For example, as Fig. 13c demonstrates, those aged under 35 were significantly less likely to rate ‘birth of a child’ from 5-7, and much more likely to state that this was not applicable, than those aged 36 and over. This is presumably because they or their friends / family were less likely to have had a child. Those aged between 25 and 40 were more likely to rate ‘starting a new job’ from 5-7 than all other age groups and the same was true of both meeting and also breaking up with a partner. ‘Going to university for the first time’ was rated much higher by those aged under 25 and by students (unsurprisingly), who would have fairly recently have gone to, or recently left university, as was ‘moving to a new place, town or city’. ‘Death of a friend or family member’ was significantly higher amongst those aged 16-19 and 51-64 year olds.

Those aged over 40 were also significantly less likely than those aged under, to state that music had been particularly important in ‘meeting new friends’ (Fig. 13c.). Again the importance of homosocial networks in constructing gendered identities has already been highlighted as have the ‘subcultural’ and cultural capital arguments that music’s commodity form has specific reproductive functions. As Bauman (2000a) argues, in the absence of clear ‘traditional’ structures of class, identities in consumerist societies are often oriented around practices of consumption. As he suggests, “modern society exists in its incessant activity of ‘individualizing’, as the activities of individuals consist in the
daily reshaping and renegotiating of the network of mutual entanglements called ‘society’” (2000a: 31). Similarly as Straw (1997) argues specifically about record collecting, men frequently construct identities through such consumption practices, though other studies have also noted the importance of homosocial validation in terms of subcultural capital (Willis 1977; Hebdige 1979; Jefferson and Hall 1993; Thornton 1995).

One of the most widely discussed aspects of music interaction is its seeming utility in constructing group dynamics around shared meaning (Hebdige 1979). North, Hargreaves and O’Neill (2000) make this point explicitly in relation to adolescence, arguing that “if adolescents listen to so much music, it is not unreasonable to suspect that an expressed preference for a particular style may carry an implicit message to other adolescents regarding a range of attitudes and values” (2000: 258). Their work suggests that, for younger music consumers, music consumption leads to the formation of groups around perception of similar personalities based on music taste. It is important then that adolescence is spontaneously mentioned as particularly memorable, in relation to music, in a significant amount of responses across all ages (see Fig. 13c.). Given that during adolescence young people come to rely on peer groups to validate choices around consumption practices, behaviour and in the case of young males, shape a masculine habitus, music subcultures often become the focus of much academic study and media moral panic alike (see Chapter 3).

It should be noted however that North, Hargreaves and O’Neill (2000) overlook data indicating that it is those aged between 20 and 40, specifically males, who consistently spend the most on music (BPI 2006; 2009; 2011). By focussing on ‘subcultural’ assumptions of personality, critiqued in Chapter 3, they tend to imply significance of music for adolescents only. Such research designs appear based on media led interpretations of personality linked to problematic behaviour and objective musical traits rather than evaluate music’s experiential and aesthetic qualities. It also seems to suggest that youth is a ‘normal’ period of transition in which psychosocial development becomes fixed, as opposed to part of a broader, non-linear process of continual shift.

As noted at the start of the chapter, those aged between 20 and 24 were more likely to rate ‘male friends’ from 5-7 at Q9. It is widely accepted that homosocial networks tend to have significance for younger males, particularly in relation to shaping conceptions of gender and the importance of, and ability to sustain, a wide homosocial
network tends to decrease with age (Adams 1994; Davidson, Daly and Arber 2003). However in seeing music’s role in relation to adolescence as a period of ‘finding oneself’, as admittedly respondents tended to (see Fig.12.), there is a danger in presenting identity as a stable construct to be realised.

No doubt music’s ‘subcultural’ pretensions are a part of explaining why music is publicly important to young males. Despite respondents’ common perceptions that music was about discovering what type of person they were (see Chapter 6 for specific quotes on this theme) however, what the data indicate is that music appreciation and the physical experience of music listening differs by age. It is not then that music shapes who people become, but that music tastes reflect certain material and cultural constraints (Bourdieu’s fundamental insight) in a constant process of becoming (Grosz 2004; Blackman 2008: 25).

**Circumstance and Space**

The direct influence of peer groups on music choice for younger males particularly is again noted in more detail in Chapter 6. However it is the context in which particular pieces of music take on significance that is important to explore. As already stated, changing music tastes and aesthetic judgments are indicative of changes in individual circumstance, which themselves are often shaped by social expectations and which come to produce, reproduce and diversify gendered experience (for example marriage as individual choice which relies on structural, social convention). What certain pieces of music mean to respondents as fifteen year olds invariably alter with experience and are dependent on circumstances or events connected to that music. However, whilst music’s importance changes, this does not necessarily mean its importance diminishes. As indicated at the start of the chapter, there were no statistically significant differences by age in how important listening to music was rated. What appears to diminish is often the (homo)social and perceived group oriented functions of music consumption. This is important in relation to the revised concept of habitus suggested in Chapter 1 and to the notion of learning to be affected proposed in Chapter 2.

On this point, Q17 (Appendix 1) was designed to explore how space and circumstance were affected by, and are indicative of, music’s social and individual uses. When asked where and with whom respondents listened to music most often, the most commonly selected answer was ‘alone in the bedroom’ (Fig. 14a.). This indicates, as argued in Chapter 3, that music occupies a privileged status because of its perception as
individual taste. The second most commonly selected option overall was ‘in bars with friends / housemates’, emphasising its antinomical social function.

Few respondents overall selected listening to music in bars or clubs alone, and respondents were generally more likely to listen to music alone or with friends or housemates than with partners. Whilst it is safe to assume that not all respondents had partners, as Fig. 14b. demonstrates even amongst the 62% who mentioned listening with partners at any of the places, 98.2% of these mentioned that they listened alone and 89.7% listened with friends or housemates; almost identical percentages to those who did not have partners. This indicates that whilst music often has a social function, that this does not necessarily extend to shared tastes in relationships.

Where and who respondents listened to music with varied significantly by age and by whether respondents were students or not (Fig. 14c). 40.9% of 16-19 year olds said they listened with friends / housemates in their bedrooms, in comparison to none of the 36-40 or 41-50 year olds and only 2.1% of 51-60 year olds (Fig. 14d.). 75.7% of all those aged under 36 listened with friends at clubs compared to only 23.9% of those aged over 35, and 53.7% of those under 36 listened with friends in the car compared to only 28.6% of those aged 36 and over. As Fig. 14e. shows, there was an almost linear decline in the number of respondents who mentioned listening with friends, and an inversely linear rise in the number of respondents who mentioned listening with partners by age. This again emphasises both music’s social function tool for younger males and indicates that life-stage (older respondents were more likely to be married or have partners) shapes musical engagement.

Many respondents aged over 25 appeared were likely to have partners and were also more likely to listen with their partners in different rooms of their houses (Fig. 14d.). They were significantly less likely to listen to music in their bedrooms alone also. As indicated in Chapter 6, statistically significant differences between younger and older age groups, in terms of where and whom they listened to music with, can often be explained with reference to work and family commitments. Those aged over 25 were significantly more likely to listen with their partners in the kitchen or lounge and those aged 36 and over were significantly more likely to listen with their partners in the dining room as well (Fig. 14d.). As discussed in Chapter 6, these commitments impacted on engagement in many of the same homosocial activities important to younger males and decreased leisure time due to occupational obligations and familial commitments contributed heavily.
Also as already highlighted those aged 36 and over, rated ‘male friends’ as comparatively less important at Q9 than those aged under 36. Again, this may be explained with reference to life-stage and surroundings shaping the perceived importance of practices associated with gender. Many of listening behaviours then are based on individual circumstance – the fact respondents have a dining room obviously affects how much they listen to music in it – but there are shifting listening patterns both inside and outside house based on age, suggesting shifting priorities.

41-50 year olds were also significantly more likely to listen to music with other members of their family in the kitchen, lounge or dining room (Fig. 14d.). As this age group are most likely to have children, it stands to reason that typically, when noting that they listened with ‘other members of my family’, they meant children and partners rather than siblings. This may explain why as Fig. 14c. demonstrates there were no clearly significant differences between age groups with regards to whether respondents listened with family members or not; due to a lack of specificity as to which members of the family respondents were referring to.

What is interesting is that those who were likely to have their own families were also likely to listen to music away from their families. Whilst respondents over 36 especially tended to listen in kitchens, dining rooms and lounges with partners and members of their family generally, almost six times as many respondents who said they listened in a shed or garage and with their partner anywhere, listened to music alone as listened with their partners in these places (Fig. 14f.). In the total sample, 36-50 year olds were the most likely to listen in these spaces alone. The kitchen, lounge and dining room areas may be considered ‘feminised’ spaces due to historical links with domestic labour segregation. Thus it is telling then there are higher levels of those who listen frequently with their families also listening away from their families in sheds or garages. Men constructing spaces of relative autonomy, distinct from lounges and kitchens, may demonstrate the perceived necessity for creating and maintaining male spaces amongst men.

Siegelbaum (2009: 16) on this point notes the bonding exercises occurring in sheds and garages between men over technology, in Soviet Russia and in Australia, groups for men, under the name Men’s Sheds, have been established in order to offer men mental and physical health related advice and support (Morgan, Hayes, Williamson and Ford 2007). It is significant then that amongst those with families or partners music preference may perhaps become a different way of asserting similar freedoms of choice.
that are bound up with the homosocial uses of music amongst younger males. Music appears to be important at all ages, despite perceptions that is comparatively less so for older age groups; it is the reasons that music is considered important which differ considerably. There is no way to tell, from the quantitative data, whether older age groups listened to different music dependent on who they were with, which may strengthen some of the premises here; however this is something to be explored in greater depth through the qualitative stage.

Summary

This chapter set out to identify the key trends arising from the survey data in order to both outline commonalities between different demographic groups and to frame discussion in the next chapter. In breaking down many of the qualitative responses into numeric data, as with most quantitative strategies, this chapter can only outline possible explanations for behaviour. Many of the open-ended responses, coded post-hoc, have been included verbatim in Chapter 6 in addition to the life-history case studies, to illustrate some of the main trends here further.

Whilst the sample has obvious ethnocentric and socio occupational centric biases, many of the observations around age here help to begin to explore how subjective masculine constructions are enacted based on circumstance due to life-stage. The findings here indicate foremost that age is a key dynamic in influencing certain attitudes, beliefs and practices, associated with masculinities. If masculinities are a combination of the repetition of performances but also the identification with, or belief in, these practices which constitute performance, there are several important themes which emerge: the importance of memory and music; the significance of how males listen to music in different locations with different people; how males use music as both emotional catharsis and stimulation; distinguishing between the importance of music’s homosocial function and the importance of music in a broader respect; and how value judgments around musical aesthetics indicate the relational nature of gender.

What an analysis of age indicates primarily is the fluidity of masculinities in relation to music over the life course. Circumstance and shifting social locations shape interaction with music and belief around the importance of certain behaviours which adds to the concept of habitus (Bourdieu 1984; 2001), Adorno’s (1976) concept of emotional listener and the idea of learning to become (Latour 2004) or anticipating (Ahmed 2010a) affectivity. Younger males for example are far more likely to listen to
music to encourage forms of arousal that are often construed as ‘negative’ (sadness, anger, aggression, depression) whereas older males may listen to music which discourages these feelings (calming, pleasure). Both are attempts at emotional regulation which when viewed in terms of Cartesian dialectics pose some problem for the concept of a singular ‘masculinity’ based on management and expression of emotionality. It is necessary then to explore these themes based on an understanding of masculinities as precarious, partial truths, explaining the importance of music as a result of belief in its transformative, affective and emotive capacities.
Chapter 6: Qualitative Analysis

Introduction

Having identified key trends in the quantitative data, this chapter will now qualitatively explore potential motivations for engagement with music, in both open ended survey questions and life history case studies. Beginning by detailing how music and emotions were discussed specifically by my respondents, it will move on to demonstrate how a theory of affect links to aesthetic judgments, specifically around the idea that aesthetics have the capability to transform the corporeal. After noting the reasons for shifting attitudes to music by age, dependent on both social and physiological factors, it will finally outline how this relates to a notion of masculine habitus as a series of circumstantial and affective experiences.

This chapter demonstrates that the process by which some males articulate their experiences of music, suggests a much more complex understanding of emotionality as related to ‘masculinity’ than is common in much of the literature discussed in Chapters 1 and 2. Utilising concepts of habitus and affect, through music it is argued that historical discourses around masculinities, as premised on rationality in opposition to emotion, can be nuanced to explain the connection between the two, not as polarised but as intertwined and ultimately, complementary. In addition, this chapter retains a specific focus on changes in perception over the life course in order to demonstrate how masculinities can be understood as fluid constructions and how subjective positions shape engagement with music and ultimately, gendered experience.

There is a combination of qualitative, open-ended responses from survey data and selected fragments from the life-history case study transcriptions included throughout. Whilst the data are not directly comparable, survey responses have been included as a means of illustrating the wider presence of discourses ascertained during the life-history sessions. They also help to frame some of the quantitative trends outlined in the previous Chapter which shaped the structure of the life history sessions in the first place. Where data are supplied from the online survey, demographic variables are listed alongside the quotations in order of age, socio-economic group, ethnicity and sexuality. Where data refer to the life-histories, only respondents’ first names have been provided. Brief background details on each of the people interviewed can be found in Appendix 4.
Emotions ‘in’ Music

‘Positive’ and ‘Negative’ Emotions

As indicated in the previous chapter, one of the primary reasons respondents gave in the survey for listening to music generally, and specifically to their favourite pieces of music, was either that they believed that music generated emotions or they believed music encouraged certain feelings or moods. This supports DeNora’s (2000: 46) assertion that “music is the cultural material *par excellence* of emotion”. Take for example the following answers verbatim at Q11 (Appendix 1);

“I like the emotions listening to music triggers” (resp. 914; 20-24, student, white British, homosexual)

“Enjoying the feeling and emotions obtained from music” (resp. 189; 20-24, student, white British, heterosexual)

“To find similar emotion to how you’re feeling at a present moment” (resp. 339; 20-24, student, white British, heterosexual)

“Physical/emotional need” (resp. 479; 36-40, intermediate, white other, heterosexual)

“Variety of emotions expressed can provide empathy or escapism” (resp. 556; 20-24, student, white British, heterosexual)

“Music is the language of the soul; it speaks to your emotions” (resp. 716; 20-24, student, white British, heterosexual)

“Emotional stimulus” (resp. 752; 20-24, student, white British, heterosexual)

“To help express your emotions, like one big soundtrack to your life” (resp. 380; 16-19, junior, white British, heterosexual)

As highlighted in Chapter 5, the same sentiments were also expressed when respondents were asked how their specific favourite pieces or types of music made them feel (Q13-15 Appendix 1). Similarly, when asked the reasons for disliking some music, lack of emotion was one of the main reasons respondents disliked specific pieces or genres;

“Manufactured or faked emotion” (resp. 474; 41-50, skilled manual worker, white British, heterosexual)
“It's just plain boring, dull and predictable. Has no humanity or true emotion in it” (resp. 475; 20-24, student, white British, homosexual).

“Lack of any real emotion” (resp. 752; 20-24, student, white British, heterosexual)

“I find the above genres embarrassing, ungratifying and emotionally less than expressive” (resp. 15; 25-35, junior, white British, heterosexual)

“I have no tolerance for faked displays of emotion” (resp. 159; 25-35, intermediate, white British, heterosexual)

“Doesn’t relate to any emotions that I feel” (resp. 339; 20-24, student, white British, heterosexual)

“[It’s] emotionally manipulative” (resp.279; 41-50; junior; white British; heterosexual)

“A lack to feeling or ‘grounding’ in real emotions” (resp.478; 41-50; intermediate; white other; heterosexual)

“A lack of feeling / soul” (resp. 835; 41-50; junior; white British; heterosexual)

This dislike of ‘inauthentic’ or staged emotion featured prominently among all age groups (though with significantly higher levels amongst 41-50 year olds – see Chapter 5) and there appears to be a common belief then that music is needed to express emotion rather than be used primarily for some as a form of entertainment. Music listening practices seem here to be often consciously rather than unconsciously driven by a desire to engage with or stimulate emotion. Thus whilst it is argued that men have historically adhered to rational behaviour as an imaginary rather than real opposite of emotional behaviour, (see Chapters 1 and 2), what is clear here is that listening behaviour is shaped by a desire for emotional stimulation or engagement, which functions directly at the level of consciousness.

It is not enough however just to note that music is believed to evoke or contain emotions. Instead it is necessary to distinguish between the different types of circumstances in which certain emotions are considered desirable or undesirable (Hearn 1993; Galasinski 2004) and the type of language used (see Chapters 1 and 2). Whilst music was often listened to because of its privileged status as an emotional tool, it was used to stimulate what respondents of all ages saw as a variety of different emotional
states. Throughout, respondents tended to make a scale distinction between ‘positive’ (happiness, excitement, contentedness) at one polar extreme and ‘negative’ emotions (sadness, misery, depression) at the other. For example;

“Overwhelmed with emotion, ranges from sadness to elation, depending on my mood”. (resp 412; 20-24, student, white British, heterosexual)

“Everything! from happy to sad” (resp 512; 20-24, student, white British, heterosexual)

“Happy that so much emotion can be conveyed in a song but slightly sad at the content” (resp. 910; 25-35, intermediate, white British, heterosexual)

“Contented but sad due to the personal memories of who I used to listen with”. (resp. 314; 51-64, intermediate, white British, heterosexual)

“Makes me sad about a friend who died a while ago but at the same time makes me feel like I can face anything”. (resp. 21; 25-35, intermediate, white British, heterosexual)

“I love singing along to it but also feel sadness as the song and its accompanying video remind me that we are all ageing and there is a limit to how long we'll live” (resp. 144; 25-35, intermediate, white British, heterosexual)

“Rather than specifics, I will say [dislike] anything that serves to lower the spirits, make me sad or depressed. I see no point in seeking to pursue these emotions” (resp. 162; 25-35, higher, white British, heterosexual).

The same pieces of music were often used to evoke what some saw as contradictory emotions along a dichotomous scale, but use varied dependent on the context and the circumstance. It was therefore not just that respondents had certain pieces of music for certain emotions, but that the emotions the music was connected to changed with time, feeling and experience. Dave articulated this succinctly in reference to the breakup of a relationship about one of his favourite pieces of music;

DAVE: I think the mood influence[d] [my choice of music]…I think that's one of the good things about it, it's easy to be positive you know with a range of songs, whereas a sad emotion might only have one song associated with it, you know, like a pinprick, I don't know ... so you might use it in either way as a mood influencer.
The use of the phrase ‘either way’ highlights the notion of oppositional, yet not always incompatible emotions related to uses of the same type of music.

As Chapter 5 demonstrates however, the most frequently used words in relation to how specific choices of music made respondents feel, were happy or happiness suggesting that attempts to elicit so-called ‘positive’ emotions were the most common. This fits with theorists who have suggested that listening behaviour is often oriented toward the maximisation of positive emotional arousal (Krumhans 2002; Rickard 2004: see Chapter 3). As noted in the last chapter, feeling ‘negative’ emotions as a result of music was much more likely to be the case amongst younger respondents, though there were frequent responses which made reference to sadness, depression and misery, across all age groups.

In the survey, sadness was often freely given as a feeling evoked through specific music choices. It was also very rarely a reason that respondents disliked music (i.e. because it was ‘too sad’ or ‘depressing’; see Chapter 5). During the course of the case studies however, respondents often seemed self-deprecating and even uncomfortable when discussing listening to music in order to evoke ‘negative’ emotions. The discussion almost always framed sadness, misery and depression pejoratively, with respondents keen to excuse behaviour when they were listening to music just to feel ‘sorry for themselves’;

ROB: music influences my, my philosophy when we're talking ... as stupid as it sounds, sometimes it can almost make you want to talk about something ... and someone might say 'oh this is a bit depressing, turn it off' but ... Some of it may be, but I guess, it's like a sometimes it's a release, you know?

JOEL: ... that's my shameful piece of music...Because it's not really cool....I was about 15 and I was a little bit of an emo skater kid back then and I don't know I just, I used to listen to it when I was angry or like, depressed or my mum had pissed me off or something [laughs] and I thought I'd just stick it on and sit there feeling sorry for myself... the people that I hang around with now would laugh at me if they knew I was into Evanescence [laughs].

TOM: there's definitely times when I put that on [Chopin’s Nocturnes] if I want to feel kind of, a bit emotional...I think there are times when I like to feel, not sad, but, just ummm, I think the emotion that, that triggers is just,
I'm trying to think of adjectives that aren't negative, because it's not a negative thing, but it's ... emotionally more powerful than a happy kind of upbeat thing [giving up]. I can't express it. It's nice to feel moved, even if it doesn't put a smile on your face (emphases added).

Tom’s comments here are particularly revealing. He associates sadness with negativity and is careful to distance the desire to feel ‘moved’ from the desire to feel sad. Similarly Joel became embarrassed by music that allowed him to ‘sit there and feel sorry’ for himself, hiding this from his (male) peer group. This was an interesting difference in the way emotion was discussed using the two methodologies, which may have been partially explained by the presence of a researcher looking to discuss emotions quite openly (see Chapter 4 for further discussion). However, even in the survey, few stated that the desire to feel sad was a primary conscious motivation for listening to music, even if they judged that, that was how music actually made them feel.

**Emotional Management**

As stated in Chapter 3, Adorno and Horkheimer (1997 [1947]: 105-106) note that the drive toward pleasure, implying ‘positive’ emotional experience, is entirely congruous with a theory of instrumental Enlightenment rationality. The desire to maximise pleasure as a function of the Culture Industry, provides an unconsciously coercive impetus to consume music. As also noted in Chapter 3 Adorno’s (1976) emotional listener “considers music as a means to an end, pertaining to the economy of his own drives. He does not give himself up to the thing, which cannot reward him with feelings either; instead, he refunctions it into a medium of pure projection” (Adorno 1976: 9).

There are however two prominent discourses at work here. The first, already alluded to, is a discourse of emotional stimulation, whereby music is used because it is believed to provoke certain emotional states. The second is a discourse of emotional management. In this case, rather than music being central to encouraging feelings or emotions, listening practices relate to a desire to release or control certain pre-existent states, often caused by events beyond respondents’ control. This is particularly the case with regards to ‘negative’ emotions which, as already suggested, tended to be defined pejoratively.

The notion of emotional management was apparent in the responses generated through the survey when respondents were asked to list specific points at which music
was important. Whilst relationship breakups featured heavily, the topic of death specifically drew some particularly illustrative statements, in relation to this idea, from different age groups in the survey;

“When my friend died. Helped me get to grips with my emotions a bit. My friend committed suicide so it was a confusing mish mash of feelings. Listening to music that elicited different emotions (sad/angry/happy/nostalgic etc) helped me to almost ‘organise’ how I felt so I could come to terms with it”. (resp.21; 25-35, intermediate, white British, heterosexual).

“When my best friend died in the summer of 1999. I was all over the place, and music helped a little”. (resp. 31; 25-35, intermediate, white Irish, heterosexual).

“When my Grandmother died I put on a De La Soul CD to put me in a better emotional state before I went to her funeral. I knew she would have wanted me and everyone else there to have a good time” (resp. 257; 16-19, student, white British, heterosexual).

“When my granddad died I was in so much shock I couldn't deal with his death being so close to the man as well, days went by where I hadn't talked to anybody I was in a constant state of shock, it was all until my gran had given me some of his records and I played them and spent the whole night crying, the music was a release and helped me to accept he had gone and his records are nostalgic of our time together when he was alive” (resp. 496; 20-24, student, white British, homosexual).

The public difficulty in expressing emotions that men experience as a result of bereavement, has been documented (Thompson 1994; Thompson 1997; McNess 2008; van den Hoonoord 2010). However there is also a socio-technical language of emotional management here, particularly amongst younger respondents, which is congruous with a discursively middle class notion of masculinist rationality (see Chapters 1 and 2). Music is associated with helping to evoke a better emotional state, organise or ‘deal with’ emotions and the emotions to be managed were almost always related to sadness, depression, grief and misery, with such associated affects needing to be minimised.
Management of ‘negative’ emotions was summed up by Rob who, when asked why he would deliberately choose to listen to something that made him feel sad, stated that;

ROB: …maybe to kind of, heighten a particular emotion and then release it. You know like that kind of, yeah catharsis, that sort of thing… any kind of emotion you feel, you need to release it. You can't just keep it and I think music helps you to kind of, release my emotions in a much more, not controlled way but [it] helps that release.

Joel observed that when his brother was put into a coma after a near fatal car crash, he started listening to some of his brother’s music in private, as a way of ‘dealing with the emotion’. He used music precisely because he wasn’t visibly upset about his brother leading to people thinking that he did not care. It was interesting to note then that after his brother’s recovery, he stopped listening to the specific track altogether;

JOEL: At that time, I listened to a lot of Tracy Chapman at that time, [laughing] funnily enough *Fast Car*…he [my brother] got me into listening to that, and I really struggled dealing with how I was feeling and I just kind of denied it and you know people were 'oh you don't care' and all this sort of stuff because I wasn't showing any emotion, but listening to the music, listening to the music that he listened to, helped me, just helped me for some reason … [when he came out of the coma] I certainly didn't listen to Tracy Chapman anymore and I think it was because, I think I'd dealt with it. It was done [laughs].

The same was true of Tom who, after his older sister’s death at a young age, started listening to her music as a means of remembering her;

TOM: …there was a lot of her music in the years following [her death] I would make myself like. Again in the same way that you'd make yourself like music to fit in with a social norm or whatever, it was like 'I should like this for her memory’ kind of thing, I should like this because she liked this and that's good’, so there's a lot of music that fit that, kind of, I wouldn't naturally have been listening to at that time…so there's Portishead, *Dummy*, which is an album that definitely fits that and that's an album interestingly that fits it in a few ways, because I bought her that album not long before she died, I knew she listened to it and liked it but the album itself is quite
an emotional, quite a sad album anyway, so it fits the emotion of loss and
remembrance anyway, so that works on both those levels
In line with Seidler’s (1994) notion of ‘eradication’ then, music also seems to function
to manage or remove discursively undesirable emotions as well as to evoke desirable
ones. As highlighted by Thompson (1997), when dealing with loss men often employ
different coping strategies from women that preclude the exhibition of public displays
of grief.

Whilst Adorno’s intention in his description of the emotional listener, seems to
be more focussed on the euphoric and uplifting affects associated with music, the need
to “identify with the music, drawing from it the emotions they miss in themselves”
(Adorno 1976: 8-9), proves a compelling argument for how some males cope with
emotionally traumatic events individually. Whilst it is not that they ‘miss the emotions
in themselves’, as this reflects the parochially masculinist view of emotions as simply
inner life, there still appears to be the belief that both showing as well as feeling
‘negative’ emotions is something to be controlled.

The intention of using the methodology employed here was precisely to explore
this potential disjuncture between the public performance and private belief. Whilst
grief and sadness are often defined in the pejorative sense, there is still a grieving
process at work. There are contradictions then in the sense that masculinities do not
necessarily rely on emotional suppression \textit{per se}, rather only a public emotional
suppression of certain emotions, which have been historically linked to irrationality and
thus femininity, at certain times and places (see Hearn 1987; 1993; Wong, Pituch and
Rochlen 2006).

This is the contradiction outlined in Chapter 3. Music is listened to in order to
elicit emotional responses, and it is denigrated if the respondent has no emotional
connection to it, or it is deemed emotionally inauthentic. Yet it also functions to control
and remove the unpredictability of certain emotions, which might render themselves
either publicly visible or personally undesirable. Through this contradiction then, we
can start to locate the impossibility of normative masculinities in gendered experience.
Musical Affects

Emotional Affects

Throughout the case studies, music’s perceived capacity for influencing emotion was explained with reference to culturally recognised musicological features. This was mainly the case with lyrics where respondents could relate to sentiments linked to certain emotions and feelings;

JOEL: Well because I was pissed off and down at the time and...the lyrics kind of reflected where I was, so it felt like somebody understood, and I was insistent that no one outside of my world didn't... I think it was both because the music really reflects what's being said. It's really down tempo and the lyrics are like sad [laughs]...It's just really sad, a really sad song.

ROB: I listened to that because it was, just I guess, how I sort of felt at that time and I think ... well the lyrics 'heads will roll' reflected...stuff that had happened

However emotions were also explained as relating to culturally recognised techniques, timbre or structural components;

IAN: ...it's this kind of languidness, it's beautiful. I think that's, that's what kind of gets me more than anything and it makes me feel, nice...I like strange chord changes and things like that, so yeah, it's that and also to some extent that kind of sound of it as well. It's that old recorded sound, it's that feel of things. It's always been the feel of things for me. I can't be much more explanatory [laughs]! 'Oh yeah the feel of it' [self-deprecatingly]!

JOEL: ... [The song is] really upbeat. I don't know really, it just makes me want to, the tempo of it, it just makes me want to dance and go for it... I thought 'this is amazing’...immediately I loved it, because it just made me want to get up and dance.

TOM: [about classical music] I think it's sustained notes and sustained [long pause]...I don't know musical terms. Like in popular music you've got the standard kind of 2 / 3 minute track designed to appeal to people in short bursts of time on a radio and not to necessarily hold attention for that
long whereas with classical music, you've got the obviously, opportunity to hold the note for 30 seconds or whatever

In most of the case studies, music’s capacity to influence emotion was often linked to scientific or physiological explanations, indicating the historic-cultural discursive separation between emotions and cognition in Western psychology and biology (Boehner, DePaula, Dourish et al. 2007). For example, in reference to why respondents believed that certain music was ‘more emotionally powerful’, the following reasons were given;

DAVE: That's quite indefinable isn't it? But I guess the, it's quite, heavy use of percussion [and] choral kind of voices, which can be very uplifting ... that choral sound is used in religion a lot you know and it's, religion is about mood influence you know. For me, like I'm not religious at all but I can see other people have their moods affected in a positive way so you know, there's some kind of link in the brain, that sound and the uplift I would say....You know, it has to be an evolved thing.

ROB: if you've got a target to meet, like classical music can you know, studies have shown it can relax people and it's better listening to classical music if you're trying to focus, or in schools and stuff, rather than when you're revising to like rock and stuff… Sometimes I listen to music and I'll not be able to sleep. It's strange because it has that, it has that effect; you can't sleep. It makes, inside, it makes you, I don't know, it releases, it makes your emotions flow.

TOM: …the genre, upbeat rock music with quite a bit of virtuoso guitar in it, tends to hit my buttons in terms of endorphins or whatever it is. It just seems to work.

TOM:…[about classical music] it just gets the hairs on the back of your neck, you know, kind of sensation in a way that I suppose classical singing, in the same way it's holding that one note and there's maybe something about resonance, you know the physics idea that every object has a resonance at which if the frequency of the air moving past that object moves at a certain frequency then that object will kind of start shaking or whatever, so maybe there's something to do with the human ears, the appearance of a certain resonance or something like that.
JOHN: When I first heard it I just thought 'this is wonderful, it was one of those moments where... it was just that sort of [gasps] moments, when you're totally drawn in...something about the girl's voice had locked in and the words were piling up and the story was developing and I'd got heart in the mouth, you know, what's going to happen next [puts on the track]? ... I get goosebumps. Still.

As has already been argued however, the historical link between music and biology, and between biology and emotions, is itself a series of socially enforced discourses (see Chapters 1, 2 & 3). In seeing emotional reactions as justified by the physiological, emotional responses to music can be seen as unconscious, involuntary reactions, whereby the immediacy of the impulse cannot be ignored, but can be controlled (see Chapter 2). If it is the music, rather than individual interaction, which 'makes your emotions flow', then individuals cannot be held accountable for their initial reactions to it. There was a perception however amongst my respondents that they can (cognitively) choose whether or not to indulge those reactions based on a socially coded knowledge of what constitutes emotionally expressive or repressive music.

This type of justification still renders emotional listening practices partially compatible with a mistaken belief in the Cartesian subject, central to masculinist rationality, that rational action is the control of an emotion (mind over body). Rather than perceiving emotions as the necessary prerequisite of rational action (James 1879; 1884; Damasio 1995; Barbalet 2001; Turner and Stets 2005) this is compatible with Seidler’s (1994; 2006a; 2006b) critique of approaches which link emotions with a rational, ‘Protestant conception of human action’ (Seidler 2007: 18).

Respondents adopted these methods of justifying what they saw as the unanticipated and involuntary effects of music, though as is often the case with music, it may have been difficult to articulate reasons which did not relate to culturally recognised linguistic scripts (see Barthes 1977). Few made reference to being primarily influenced in their taste by peer groups, perceiving music as a personal, often solitary activity. However it was clear that what was often perceived as an individual, biological reaction required both an appreciation of the culturally stylistic features which encouraged emotional responses to music, and an understanding of how it related to a particular context.

Nevertheless a focus on embodied reactions to music reveals more about socially gendered discourses than studies which focus solely on music’s social function
permit. Frith’s (2002) critique of Bourdieu is useful in this respect as he notes that “[for Bourdieu] aesthetic response can only be understood by reference to the social organization of taste which patterns people’s lifestyles” (2002: 36). In contrast, as Adorno (1976) noted, the problems of relying solely on psychological experimentation is that “the verbal expression itself is already prefiltered and its value for a knowledge of primary reactions is thus doubly questionable” (1976: 4).

When exploring music’s perceived emotional impact, the embodied affects of certain stimuli cannot be ignored, any more than it is feasible to assert that biology alone explains social interaction. This supports the case made in Chapter 2 that sociologies of emotions and theories of affect can prove a counterweight to overly constructionist modes of thinking, especially in relation to the malleability of identities. The fact that shame or embarrassment have powerful affects (Goffman 1956; Sedgwick 2003) which cannot be easily overcome simply by choosing to act differently, are testament to this. Again, this illustrates a point made in greater depth in Chapter 1, in relation to a revised concept of habitus; social identities and behaviours may be fluid, but they are often invoked and experienced as if they retain some form of internal essence (Butler 1998a; 1998b; 1999).

As Thoits (1989: 318) has observed, there is a key difference between emotions and affects (see Chapter 2). Affects have an intensity dimension to them which are not necessarily easily recalled because they are often unconscious, brief and difficult to articulate. This is a necessary distinction, as whilst the two are invariably linked, the immediacy of an affect precedes the registering of a socially coded emotion label. To avoid what makes one sad requires becoming affected, before registering the notion of sadness as connected to certain affects, and deeming it publicly incongruous with certain beliefs.

As outlined in Chapters 1 and 2, taking both Bourdieu’s (1977; 1984; 1990b; 2001) notion of habitus and Sedgwick’s (Sedgwick and Frank 1995; Sedgwick 2003) use of affect, masculinities’ embodiment can be seen as socially constructed, in more than just the sense that their bodies are often inscribed with the historical hallmarks of discipline and rationality (Petersen 1998). Habitus, whereby motivations and desires operate below the level of the consciousness, is itself perpetually reinforced and renegotiated by socially affective experience (see Chapters 2 and 7). Therefore, there can be little distinction between the social and biological functions of music in
producing affects; music appreciation requires exposure to socially mediated concepts in order to become unconsciously affected (Latour 2004).

The response to some music was thus explained precisely in terms of these physical affects. This was either in the participation of live music events or in the instant, unanticipated reaction to certain songs:

JOHN: [I found] an environment where I could actually sing out loud and to get the, *there's a rush, because you fill your lungs with air and it's emotional* and it's really, so I really enjoyed that, the chorus singing as they used to call it.

DAVE: Music does that thing to you that is very difficult to explain how it will just *make you want to move*. And move in a certain way and dance you know right?

TOM: [music] takes me away from the mundane realities of commuting or the work that I'm having to do, I think just relaxing, it probably *slows my blood pressure* a little bit and it takes the tension and stress away a little bit.

Around the issue of personal illness, some survey respondents also placed emphasis on music’s ability to help overcome the physical effect of illness;

“When struggling with depression during high school” (resp. 526; 16-19, student, white British, heterosexual)

“Mahler's Resurrection was very important when I was severely ill. I didn't feel alone with it. It empathised and then *gave me great encouragement*.
The meaning behind each moment seems to fit my illness so well” (resp. 556; 20-24, student, white British, heterosexual)

“*Without wanting to complain unreasonably*, listening to Edith Piaf and thinking about her life *makes me forget about my illness* I am living with” (resp. 378; 20-24, student, white other, heterosexual)

“I became seriously ill when I was in year10 at school, I ended up spending 3 weeks in hospital and a further 8 weeks recovering at home, my mum had bought me an old school mp3 and I filled it with my CD collection I spent a lot of time making up dance routines in my bedroom and singing along to songs it *helped me* gain stamina and keep me moving instead of laying in bed all day” (resp. 496; 20-24, student, white British, homosexual)

To focus primarily on music’s social function then obscures many of the reasons that
individuals engage with a particular aesthetic, as well as the role of the body in social experience. The affective pleasure of listening to music which is understood to be powerful, sad, uplifting, or depressing is both embodied and social at the same time. That music affects, or is perceived to affect, a physical response, means that there is both a conscious and unconscious element to listening practices. Whilst such practices are based on value judgments of cultural goods’ authenticity (Bourdieu 1984; Moore 2002; Frith and Goodwin 2004), they are all the more powerful because it is embodied and felt, on both rational and irrational levels. Thus the separation between social, biological and individual factors collapses.

**Aesthetic and Affect**

If affects are shaped by both social and individual experience, then this a particularly useful tool of analysis with regards to music, because as Latour (2004) has noted, it is through the registering of difference that we become sensitive to how we are affected by certain stimuli. Music’s culturally coded structural or stylistic features, or what Barthes (1977: 295) has referred to as the *pheno song*, clearly had either real or imagined affects for many in this study and its ‘powerful’ affects, were often related to images, which respondents had some connection to.

In this way music was often connected with a filmic narrative. Here it was linked to adverts, scenery or a specific time and place;

ROB: think for this one [*Tarnation*] that, once again as stupid as this is going to sound, it was the Impulse advert, it was the concept ... because it was about people who ... you meet somebody and ... you share that brief moment and then you don't see that person again ... it appeals to my own idealised sort of, you know when you meet someone and that kind of attraction I guess.

TOM: the first time that I heard [Chopin] was the film The Pianist ... I was sitting in the cinema and it just blew me away, the use of the music with the bleak scenery and stuff... that piece of music is pretty low ... pretty sad and emotional and I don't think there's any two ways about that, you play it to anyone and they'd probably have similar responses

IAN: I just associate [being a teenager], and seeing certain post punk type bands. I suppose like Joy Division with travelling to Northern cities, …I associate it with getting on trains, like 1970s / 1980s trains, grubby, British
trains and going off into the North and Sheffield and places like this, and the
environment, I tend to associate it more in my mind with kind of
winteryness.

Music’s nostalgic use is noted later however it is important to note here that the
connection of sound with image or narrative was often perceived to make music’s
affects more powerful. In line with Bull’s (2000) use of Bauman’s conception of the
‘aesthetics of urban looking’ (Bauman 1993; Bull 2000: 87), as Tom highlights, both the
bleak imagery and the subject matter of The Pianist amplified emotion of the music that
he associated with it. Similarly the aesthetic of bleak, wintry Northern cities, for Ian
fitted well with Joy Division’s music. Again, it is only through social exposure to certain
aesthetics that “the physiological experience of [an affect] intersects with the physicality
of place” (Probyn 2004a: 330) and is affectively incorporated into a socially embodied
habitus.

With regard to aesthetic judgment, respondents made clear distinctions between
‘serious’ and ‘popular’ music’s emotional affects. Emotional stimulation and release
appeared to be derived from a wide variety of music types and, whilst classical music
listeners tended to be more technically competent in their descriptions, respondents
appeared to believe that their choice of music was the most authentic. Quantitatively the
most disliked music forms by far, in order, were: pop; metal; and rap. Music being
boring was the most commonly cited reason for disliking music and the other most
common reasons for disliking some types of music were that they often lacked emotion,
as already highlighted, but also creativity, talent or originality:

“Cheryl Cole - lacking substance, manufactured” (resp. 133; 20-24, student,
white British, heterosexual)

“Radio 1 style poprock - overproduced and uninspired focus grouped music
lacks any of the things that I want from it” (resp. 137; 20-24, student, white
British, prefer not to say)

“Pop music is mostly boring and manufactured, sounds the same” (resp. 140;
20-24, student, white British, homosexual)

“Anything played on BBC Radio 1 between 7am and 7pm - Being able to
discern the complete lack of passion or love which has gone into it and
seeing that it is crass commercial wanksticks” (resp. 183; 20-24, student,
white British, homosexual)
“Manufactured' contemporary pop music - lack of emotional input = zero desire to listen” (resp. 224; 25-35, self-employed, white British, heterosexual)

“Actively dislike most all modern pop music. The type of stuff that’s all over the TV, R&B type stuff, boy groups, chart music, Xfactor etc – lack of any real emotion” (resp. 752; 20-24, student, white British, heterosexual)

“Modern music – lack of emotion” (resp. 872; 51-64, intermediate, white British, heterosexual)

“I prefer artists to be noticed for their talent rather than because some silly screaming girls voted for them in a phone in competition” (resp. 664; 25-35; junior; white British, heterosexual).

Pop music especially was distinguished most commonly on the basis of being inauthentic or lacking any ‘substance behind it’, often due to a perception that it was commodity rather than art.

Again, as noted in the previous chapter there was a significant relationship between those who disliked music which was judged inauthentic and those who specifically said they disliked pop music. This may be explained by reference to ‘pop’ as a culturally denigrated music form, due to its symbolic blurring with femininity (Green 1993; Armstrong 2008; Ashley 2010). The last quote above is particularly telling in this respect as it conflates ‘pop music’ with a lack of authenticity due to its perceived female audience or, ‘silly screaming girls’. As outlined in Chapter 3 what the BPI considers ‘pop’ is also almost equally likely, quantitatively speaking, to be consumed by women as by men unlike most other music genres.

There was a strong affective commitment not only to the music that respondents liked but also the music they disliked in the case studies. Particularly noticeable were repeated references to what respondents categorised as ‘R’n’B’ and ‘rap / hip hop’. These criticisms hinged on a conception either of authenticity or lack of emotion in the music, however there was also a marked emphasis on an overtly sexualised aesthetic as a reason for disliking it;

DAVE: I find it very pretentious for a start … it's all kind of false ... it can be quite demeaning to women at times too. I just find it all a bit kind of lame. It's very manufactured these days and I don't like that at all ... it's kind of a male orientated sound. I find it a bit smarmy and I guess kind of not like my character.
IAN: I grew up on a lot of black music ... but what it seems to me now is that it's become THE commercial sound, that pop R&B thing and, I find I don't like the kind of sexual aspects of it. I don't like this kind of 'in-your-face' kind of utterly, and I think this is an age thing, this utterly ridiculous, throwing shapes sort of thing to it. Also I don't like the way it seems to be increasing, and now I've got kids, positioned towards them. I've got a ten year old daughter and there's bits of it, she's not too bad actually, but there's bits of it that I'm kind of like [pulling a disgusted face] 'oh no'.

ROB: No it's just rap [that I dislike]. I don't know what it's about. I guess it's just the whole idea of rap is sort of, brings up ideas of, this is probably very stereotypical, but it just reminds me of that sort of American sort of gangster. I just don't like listening to it, partly because I guess what it stands for... a lot of the lyrics, well the one's that we're talking about, has some relation to drugs or some relation to sex... It gives me no emotion or makes me [sic] feel any emotion or anything... well it does make me feel emotion, it makes me feel irritated and annoyed [laughs].

As noted in Chapter 5, there was a significant relationship between those who disliked ‘rap, hip hop or grime’ and those who disliked music more generally because of the lyrics. The survey demonstrated that (largely white British respondents), saw ‘rap, hip hop or grime’ as music which was concerned with misogyny or with excessive sexual permissiveness;

“Fake hip-hop bragging about bitches and guns (unlike real hip-hop which I enjoy)”  (resp. 157; 25-35, junior, white British, heterosexual)

“I find R’n’B and Hip-Hop to be not very intelligent music. The lyrics and music are all so repetitive and not very inventive and only ever cover subjects like love, sex and money”.  (resp. 359; 20-24, student, white British, heterosexual)

“Misogynistic / anti-social lyrics”  (resp. 492; 20-24, occupation unknown, white British, heterosexual)

“I love hip hop, there are some really talented individuals and groups out there using interesting beats and writing intelligent, innovative lyrics, but the whole gangster rap scene bores and annoys me - 'bitch' this and 'hate the police' that”  (resp. 21; 20-24, intermediate, white British, heterosexual)
“Has no emotional language, focuses only on various scenarios that deserve a lot of respect and stereotypes that all men care about is sex and that all women are sex objects ignoring that everyone is a person, also that it’s all about being ‘cool’ and selfish and not caring about others” (resp. 386; 20-24, student, white British, heterosexual)

Disidentification with this aesthetic was premised on a dislike of music styles which were deemed overtly sexualised or too concerned with aggressive male sexuality. Perhaps not so coincidentally all of the respondents above listed themselves as white British and heterosexual. Chapter 3 highlighted that the moral panics that surrounded jazz, blues, rock ‘n’ roll have also been applied to ‘rap’ and ‘hip hop’ (Yousman 2003; Weitzer and Kubrin 2009) and certainly the above ‘types’ happened to be styles of music that have been connected aesthetically to primality, historically associated with the black male body (Segal 1993; Petersen 1998; Witkin 2000; Forth 2008).

Ian’s comments on the previous page are interesting in that he deems current R’n’B to be overly sexualised in comparison to the black music he grew up listening to, yet the same debates have been ongoing about R’n’B’s sexually connotative aesthetic, regardless of the particular epoch (Arnett 2002). There is an explicit disavowal of music which is perceived to be misogynistic, concerned with sex (as opposed to love) and macho (concerned with ‘gangsta posturing’ and ‘throwing shapes’). Thus where the aesthetic is incongruous with respondents’ conceptions of identity – as Dave says; ‘not like my character’ - there is the generation of ‘negative’ affects based on a conception of a lack of authenticity, emotion or appropriate subject matter.

In this way, we can see habitus as the embodied, affective performance of a certain type of masculinity, which provokes hostility against, as well as attachment to, certain practices, values and attitudes. As Bourdieu (2001: 53) highlights, masculine habitus is relational between males as well as in opposition to femininity. Masculinities then are frequently experienced in opposition to the idea of other masculinities rather than specific individuals (Connell 1995; Demetriou 2001). As Rob points out, his views are based on generalisations or stereotypes of rap music as he doesn’t listen to rap, because he knows he will not like it. As Weitzer and Kubrin (2009) clearly demonstrate, this is a frequent problem for studies which claim that rap specifically is misogynistic. The multiplicity of readings associated with cultural scripts mean that a singular interpretation of an aesthetic is problematic (Medovoi 1992; 2005). It is interesting to
see then that in the absence of concrete examples, stereotypes around certain historical discourses of ‘black culture’ are invoked.

The point is not that there are overtly racist sentiments in relation to other identities or bodies. It is that such aesthetic judgments are premised on an implicit racialising of black masculinities as overly embodied (Petersen 1998). Thus how respondents are affected ‘positively’ or ‘negatively’ by music which carries connotations, perceived as different to respondents’ own subjectivities, appear to be shaped by intersections of socio-economic location, age and ethnicity.

**Age, Habitus and Subjectivities**

**Age and Change**

As a dynamic, the importance of age is often taken as a given in discussions of masculinities (see Chapter 1). Attention is too often focussed on the way in which young males particularly construct or perform behaviours as indicative of dominant gendered discourses (Connell 2005), often rendering older masculinities invisible (see Thompson 1994; van den Hoonoord 2010). This is especially the case in relation to music (see Chapter 3) and has the effect of presenting masculinities, as in Solomon and Szwabó’s (1994) work, as reified extensions of self, which remain psychologically stable from youth. The stability of which, it could be suggested, is itself a form of Cartesianism.

In contrast, the key demographic accounting for the majority of differences in attitudes to both music and behaviour, as outlined in the last chapter, was age. This indicates that age must play a crucial role in how masculinities are embodied, constructed and performed. Whilst quantitative analysis was able to make preliminary inferences as to why this was, through qualitative analysis it was possible to explore some of the explanations for these differences.

Tomkins’ (1962: 108) critique of Freud’s subordination of the affective system to the drives extends to the interlinking age with habitus and affect. Tomkins noted that affects are often subject to change dependent on experience, and asserted that affect often structures behaviour in a way that deterministic theories of drives negate. If, as already noted, we learn to become sensitive to or affected by exposure through the registering of difference (Latour 2004) as well as the recognition of similarity, by extension age must therefore be a key influence in how we are affected. This is because
with age, individuals are continually exposed to different situations, experiences and others’ socially circumscribed expectations. As noted in Chapter 2, the social construction of certain emotions does not deny their physiological effects. It is however, like a theory of affect, exposure to different social situations which partially shape display, expression and feeling (see Hochschild 1979), which will invariably change with age.

During the case studies, what became apparent was that shifting preferences were heavily dependent on respondents’ circumstances. Respondents either by explicit admission or otherwise, rarely had static music tastes over the course of their lifetime. These changes were commonly explained in reference to technological developments, with the growth in online services and MP3 players receiving special mention. More commonly however, changes in individual circumstance, shaped by social expectation, were directly linked to shifts in listening practices. The changing importance of homosociality featured prominently with regards to these shifts during the case studies and respondents often described the first time they actively started looking for music themselves, occurring between the ages of 11-15 in each case study. This was mainly through exposure to same age peer groups at secondary schools and a pressure to fit in with other people’s tastes, as well as developing an awareness of chart music;

JOEL: I think it used to be far more sociable for me, listening to music was always done with friends. So I guess that's why it was about the scene, because I'd only want to hang around with people who wanted to listen to my sort of music or, I had to listen to whatever sort of music my friends were listening to because, when I was a skater boy and I used to go skating a lot it, we'd just have music playing all the time. So I guess that informed what sort of stuff I listened to.

TOM: I think, growing up, until you're maybe 21 or whatever, I think, a lot of what you think you are is based on how you see yourself compared to your peers, so a lot of the music you think you like, you don't like, you just like because some cool kids like it or whatever, you know, you're constantly trying to fit in with these norms and errmmm ... make sure your social status is high through, whatever you can and subconsciously music's quite a big part in that

IAN: I suppose the only thing is, is that when you're younger it's much more social so you know you'd have parties at friend's houses, you'd go see
bands ... Hanging round with people who liked the same music and going to clubs and venues to see live things and going to clubs to hear new romantic nights, which always tended to be a dreadful term, and at parties where you'd take records round, so you'd play the stuff that you were into.

The importance of homosociality for young males has been documented implicitly and explicitly in relation to both gender (Willis 1977; Thomson 1999; Medovoi 2005) and music (Cohen 1972b; Medovoi 1992; Straw 1997; Laughey 2006; Donze 2010). Whilst the attribution of personality type to genre has obvious limitations (see Chapter 3 for discussion), as noted in the previous chapter North and Hargreaves (1999) provide compelling empirical evidence for Frith’s (1981: 90) argument that “music operates as a 'badge' which guides adolescents' social cognitions”. In this way, music’s homosocial function is consistent with the argument that masculinities are corroborated through same-sex group interaction (Schact 1996; Thomson 1999; Robertson 2003; Flood 2008).

The traditional subcultural approach to music tastes however, in line with feminist critiques of malestream accounts of subculture (McRobbie and Garber 1975; McRobbie 1991), also makes apparent that studies focussing on homosocial public use of music may miss continued emotional or aesthetic importance which does not directly relate to public engagement. In direct contrast to the frequent assumption that music is more important for younger people, there was the perception in all the case studies, and in the survey, that music was the most important and personal tastes were expressing a more authentic self, at the point of interview;

ROB: …I think you're developing more emotionally and physically and in all aspects. I don't know. Yeah I think music is more significant, for me, as I get older it's gotten more significant.

IAN: It's really, it becomes more important…It's to do with, all kinds of odd stuff to do with getting older and feeling older to be honest and, kind of seeing my children growing up and getting into their music including bits of stuff that, you know, that they've heard of mine which they like, but mostly theirs but also it makes you think about you and so on, but also it makes you, it's a nostalgia thing.

DAVE: I think it's probably more important now…I think I've learnt more about my reaction to music, so like the mood thing I never would've thought about before but I think that I actively do now…it's taken on maybe a little bit more importance in my life
TOM: in terms of how much time I devote to music that might not have changed, but in terms of priorities of, if I had to save things from a burning building or whatever, music would be quite a high priority now, whereas I don't think it would've been in the past, and I think it's not going to diminish in importance as I get older. I think it's going to get more important.

This is the crux of habitus. Expectations, opinions and tastes are the embodiment of social relations, which shift with wider social changes but also individual interaction with these relations. Yet they are experienced as if they are the most complete at the very point of experience, giving the impression of stability. Whilst professional discourses perhaps assert the impossibility of knowing the self (Illouz 2007: 42-43), respondents here often made reference to discovering themselves through music. This process of discovery implies a previous partiality of the self, from which they no longer suffer;

IAN:…music for me has always been about me and my identity and I see music very much as defining me and my identity…it's that teenager thing of growing up and finding yourself.

TOM: I think that's just part of discovering yourself a little bit.

*Discovering* myself in my teenage years (resp. 205; 25-35, intermediate, white British, heterosexual)

16-17, discovering 'new' bands, *forming an identity* (resp. 635; 25-35, junior, white British, prefer not to say)

Perhaps establishing shared taste as well as *individual identity* (resp. 224; 25-35, self-employed, white British, heterosexual)

Growing up as a teenager for a sense of place and identity (resp. 298; 25-35, junior, white British, homosexual)

Teenage years - certain types of music helped *shape my identity then, and in terms of what I am today* (resp. 613; 41-50, intermediate, white British, heterosexual)

As a teenager and student *finding my own identity* (resp. 670; 25-35, intermediate, white British, heterosexual)

Teen years - *establishing identity* - sense of belonging (resp. 912; 25-35, intermediate, white British, heterosexual)
Music listening became a more solitary act for many respondents both publicly and domestically as they got older. However there was also a distancing of respondents’ music tastes from their peers during the case studies. In most cases, respondents claimed that they ‘went along’ with music that their peers liked whilst having their own private tastes which they hid;

TOM: certainly for myself, over the last 5/10 years or something, you kind of realise that, you place less importance on your social status and things like that and you start to [be] maybe more analytical in the things that you like and why you like them, and maybe discover that you like music or books or whatever because you like them, not for these other reasons.

IAN: There was that kind of social thing, but I'd always go home and listen to [other] things ... [At parties they played things] like Bunnymen or U2, I've never liked U2, I've always hated U2...[I was] always going home to listen to [other music], almost as a respite from that.

Hiding music tastes from peer groups during adolescence particularly, indicates the importance of homosocial validation for younger males. What is interesting is that whilst respondents were clearly influenced by peer groups, they also felt that it was only with age that they could assert independence and the desire for autonomy that has been closely linked to masculine identities (Seidler 1994; Connell 1995). They only felt free to express the true self after public validation of taste became less important with age.

The notion that respondents were less publicly homosocial as they aged, may go some way to highlighting the findings in the previous chapter as to why young males particularly listen to music which elicits feelings of sadness. As noted earlier, a discourse of emotional management rests on the notion of public inhibition of emotional displays. Underlining this is a tacit understanding that some displays (negative emotional displays for example), are publicly undesirable. If younger respondents felt more pressure to validate tastes and behaviours to their peers, and if homosociality is more intense for younger males, as John and Ian noted, due to lesser familial commitments, then this would explain the observation in the previous chapter that younger respondents would be more likely to choose listen to music that made them sad; in order to aid emotional management.

Clearly the perceived importance of respondents’ teenage years cannot be ignored, both in becoming affected by peer groups and increased access to music technologically and economically (Bennett 2001: 7-11). However music consumption is also believed to
be a means of discovering or forming a complete identity, it was only on reflection that respondents failed to ‘know themselves’ previously. In this way, music consumption could be seen as a means of reconciling Freudian and Cartesian subjects, whereby respondents continually come to discover or know themselves through emotional connections to cultural goods.

**Circumstance and Change**

Nevertheless, whilst respondents referred to the stability of identity, it was clear that as circumstances changed, engagement with music, music tastes and the way respondents felt they were affected by music also changed. As outlined in the previous chapter, public engagement with music clearly changed with age, with gig attendance and listening with friends declining significantly later in life. During the case studies, this was explained in often pragmatic terms with reference to having kids, living with partners, taking on full-time work, having less energy or being unable to relate to a particular time where music helped.

John, Tom, Joel and Ian, for example, saw their partners as either less into music or less into ‘credible’ music;

IAN: [long pause] ... my wife doesn't like the same things that I like. She hardly ever listens to music herself ... she still likes to hear things, but she's got other things going on, I don't think music is as important.

SDB: So why do you tend to go to [gigs] alone?

JOHN: Well because [my current wife] doesn't like it much. Well she doesn't, well she's not that enthusiastic, not that much

JOEL: [My fiancée] doesn't really listen to any contemporary music. She doesn't listen to anything new. She only likes it if she knows the words which means she can't like anything that's new because she doesn't know the words. It's really weird, so she listens to a lot older music like, errrrmm Beatles, which I love the Beatles, but she listens to errrrmm, I forget his name, James Taylor. I can't stand James Taylor [laughs].

TOM: [My partner and I] have fairly different tastes, she's into the pop stuff, she likes Take That which, I don't mind if she wants to have that on while
we're driving or something, but we don't really share much taste in music so yeah there's not really that much scope for [listening with her], it's pretty much always solitary unless I'm driving with friends.

This made listening at home difficult and was cited as the main reason that respondents stopped listening to music, in purely quantitative terms, as much as they used to. In Dave’s case, after the breakdown of a long-term relationship, he actively used music as a way of dealing with the emotional stress it caused (see earlier in the chapter) but also as a way of meeting people. This suggests that it is circumstance related to age, rather than age itself, which becomes a central explanation in public and personal engagement with music;

DAVE: when I broke up with her in 2005 I was earning quite a lot more money and I had to pay for everything about the house and all, but I still had more spare cash and more spare time, so I started going out to gigs a lot more, so that was the time when music pushed itself forward again…[I] became more social and as a result, or as part of. I'm not sure, probably completely interweaved with it was the desire to go out and want to see more live music.

As Chapter 5 demonstrated, where and whom respondents listened to music with differed by age. Those aged over 24 were often significantly less likely to listen in most places with friends, thus emphasising that music’s (often homo)social function declined with age, but there was also declining public listening. For the respondents who had young children, requiring time and attention, again pragmatism played an important role in declining public engagement;

IAN: With kids you can't just put some music on, the minute you put some music on, if they happen to be elsewhere doing something else, they'll come in and say 'I want to watch telly' and it's like [sighs] 'okay'…what I've found, what I'm finding is with my parents and my wife's parents is that there's an interesting perspective because you're kids and you grow up into teenagers and then you grow up into adults and as you get old, older, you start becoming more ‘teenagery’ again. Because what happens is that say in about 6 years time, the children will grow up and start to do their own thing, so therefore it'll revert back to me and my wife and therefore we'll find ourselves being free again
SDB: How old were you when you started noticing changes in music, or listening to stuff that you hadn't previously listened to?

JOHN: Well in a big way, when the children arrived, because that was, yeah I mean when I started work and got immersed in work, ummm, life was too busy to really pay attention…but then radio improved a lot and being at home doing, you know working at home late at night and listening to people like Andy Kershaw and John Peel on mainstream radio, well I'd listened to John Peel on pirate radio and then as part of an adult routine of work

JOHN: [About playing in bands] my [first] wife said 'it's me or the guitar' and I sold the guitar. Because imagine teaching, and playing three gigs a week. It's not very sensible really….when you're going family wise it doesn't work. It's not to do with male / female, it just doesn't work. Playing live just takes up so much time, you know. Even going to gigs takes up a lot of time but playing at gigs takes even longer

In many ways, it has been argued that men’s withdrawal into the domestic sphere to act as carers or providers, undermines many of the core tenets of a normative ‘masculinity’ (see Segal 1990: 45-46). However, as argued in Chapter 1, seeing ‘masculinity’ as a singular, coherent entity is clearly mistaken. There is an irrevocable link here, as Ian asserts, between family life, changing listening practices and shifting gendered behaviour. As respondents circumstances changed, so too did how they listened to music. This was not a process of feminisation, rather a re-designation of spaces which, whilst admittedly more difficult, still emphasised the value of personal autonomy and freedom. In many respects, respondents saw themselves as freer once they stopped being influenced primarily by their peer groups.

**Circumstance and Affect**

What also became apparent was that respondents learnt to become affected by music through exposure to different styles, in and by, circumstance. As highlighted earlier, the aesthetic importance of music respondents disliked were just as important as the music they liked. Thus the commonly invoked ‘involuntary’ reaction to certain songs therefore relied on exposure to peer group judgments, identification with an appropriate aesthetic and the context in which the music was heard. Again as Latour (2004) demonstrates, learning to be affected is dependent on the mutual reinforcement
of social and physiological experience. In this way, as respondents noted, through listening with others, music came to take on certain unanticipated affects.

For Tom, the ability to physically hear certain parts of songs and to take pleasure from it came from learning to recognise bass lines from a friend;

TOM: I don't have the understanding that, if I'm talking to a musician, I don't have the vocabulary and the understanding to get across what I'm trying to say ... that has changed, that has evolved, my knowledge has grown, and I think that'll change a little bit, the way I see music. I'll appreciate the different elements and an example of that was I used to live with a bass player and he would kind of whatever music we were listening to, or if we were in a pub or at a gig or whatever, he used to be pointing out, how important the bass line was or the different bass lines and then after a while, I did appreciate that for the next couple of years, I was appreciating songs with more interesting bass lines.

Again here it was learning to physically register sounds, through exposure to social influences, in order to take pleasure from it. For Dave, listening to Pink Floyd records with friends, combined with the physical experience of LSD, taught him how to appreciate ‘cerebral’ music;

DAVE: Pink Floyd for example...it's a really kind of cerebral album. I just enjoy it and I like to listen to it ... the same way as you might like a Rioja over a Merlot ... the Wall is just proper out there isn't it? It's quite synthesized in places and of course it tells a story as well. You know, you kind of get carried along by it and it would influence your [LSD] trip.

The metaphor of the physical sensation of taste, combined with the social experience of music is important in looking at how music functions as more than simply a ‘badge to guide cognition’ (Frith 1981; North, Hargreaves and O'Neill 2000); the experience becomes embodied through the social. For John, it was the experience of community offered by folk clubs, as well as the aesthetic that added to the affective experience

JOHN: Well the feeling of being together with lots of other people, feeling that this was the right place to be and feeling, you know confident and looked after. Yeah so, meeting the songs again in late teens, when the family was not quite the bee's knees, you know family life by that age isn't quite so great, but when put alongside beer and a bit of leftwing politics, it's both exciting but also it's okay because you get to sing these nice songs.
For Joel returning to Christianity after renouncing his faith, completely changed not only the music he listened to, but also the way that music affected him;

JOEL: There's a sense of unity in worship ... at times it's a bit like karaoke I guess [laughs] because you've got the words and you're all singing along but there's a sense of unity. It's not like 'there's the band oh look at the band they're amazing', but it's like 'we're all doing this together and it's not for us, it's for God'...I listen to secular music for personal reasons and for my own benefit, not for anything else, whereas even when I listen to Christian music in my car I still feel like I'm part of a bigger thing and I feel like that, there's other people out there that are doing the same thing and they are joining together.

For Joel, it was a return to being in a Christian community that changed both the meaning and significance of music and he frequently distinguished secular from Christian music. This allowed him to feel physically affected by a linking of music to the social experience of spirituality.

With regards to the notion of masculinities as embodied, the waning affects of music which requires sustained physical energy to enjoy is also indicative of the continually shifting habitus. In reference to dance music, Dave and Tom both believed that their tastes had changed as a direct result of having less energy due to age;

DAVE: …in the last few years I've really got less and less into dance music, probably from about 5 years ago ... not having the youthful energy of wanting to dance all night is probably changing my taste in music

SDB: What is it specifically that you don't like about hardcore dance music?
TOM: ... I think the energy levels required to take it. You can't just listen to it, you can't just have it on and be passive with it, I think you have to be active with, controlling how much is getting into your ears for a start because it'll damage your ears....You're dancing, the music's there to facilitate that, which is great if that's what you want to do but I think I'd rather…appreciate the music in itself now

The affective pleasure derived from the corporeal or embodied experience of certain types of music, clearly declined for both Dave and Tom as they got older. The desire Tom expresses to be more ‘passive’ with listening particularly highlights that it is the embodied as well as social experience of music which changes with age. Again, the
habit as the expression of social relations, inscribed on the body, is dependent on affective experience, for which the very materiality of the body is vital.

This links back to the initial argument presented in Chapters 1 and 2; namely that masculinities are emotionally affective attachments to socially generated discourses, such as rationality. However whilst gendered discourses present themselves as stable, the impossibility of maintaining a coherent conception of a singular, normative ‘masculinity’, is rendered as such, not only through social but also physiological factors (such as aging). This does not present a crisis of masculinity however because as already argued in the first chapter, ‘masculinity’ as a coherent, normative belief system has always been in flux; reliant on multiple seemingly contradictory practices and performances. Whilst aging does not necessarily disrupt power relations (Hearn 1995: 102), there is a re-working of gender configurations in line especially with issues of material embodiment (Spector-Mersel 2006; Mann 2007; Ribeiro, Paúl and Nogueira 2007).

John summarises why his music tastes changed by referring similarly to ‘natural’ cultural processes;

JOHN: I think change is the natural state and stasis has to be explained. I don't think you need to explain change, it just happens, that's life. I puzzle, I really puzzle at people who keep listening to the same music all their lives. That really I find extraordinary. Why would you want to keep listening to the same thing? How can you? I mean I do like to revisit Bob Dylan songs, but sometimes it’s ten years between, it's a long time and then you can really hear it differently again.

The notion of change as the natural state in relation to music tastes also rests partially on the culture industry’s drive toward novelty as reinvention (Adorno 1975; 1981; Adorno and Horkheimer 1997 [1947]; Adorno 2004). What this argument misses however is that with age, change is often related to a withdrawal from the accumulation of ‘new’ cultural goods and from the definition of identity through music consumption practices. Hence the reason why older males are often absent from ‘subcultural’ accounts of music consumption. Change in this instance often inhibits the ability, but not necessarily the desire, to participate in many practices associated with youth and music listening.

**Affect, Music and Memory**

Changing circumstance means that the way in which music is used and comes to
affect, change as well. This is particularly relevant to the concept of nostalgic use of music. Whilst respondents may come to connect certain music with certain affects, affective intensity will inevitably diminish over time (Sedgwick 2003: 36-38). As Frith (2002) has clearly demonstrated, music listening is a dynamic process, whereby the context will influence how music is heard and thus how it is affectively experienced. Nostalgic use of music therefore comes to affectively connect music and memory over a lengthy period;

IAN: it's a kind of two way process, it's that, all that kind of music…. It's the most important thing to me. It really is the stuff that has shifted me through the years and like I say, I can map out developments and feelings and changes in my life, with music, I can very closely identify that so the two things to talk about shaping my identity, it's one and the same thing.

TOM: I dislike pretty much all forms of dance music now but ... I still have a bit of nostalgia for trancey, late 90's trance music, if I hear that on the radio I'll be like 'oh yeah' have a little chuckle to myself but still turn it off. Nostalgic music listening is concerned with a new experience of an old cultural good, in many ways antithetical to the market logic of the culture industry. Listening to music is a processing of *reliving* rather than living the experience. The affective response often therefore changes as music comes to take on a different meaning.

This was the case with romantic relationships. The reasons for connecting certain tracks to events may have been an initial discourse of emotional management however, like some accounts of death, latterly its significance changed, either taking on a pleasure of remembrance or becoming divorced from the original context;

ROB: I heard it and I liked it but now it has more meaning because once again, it was the person I was with at the time. Now when I listen to it, it just makes me think of good, like, good times, or it makes me laugh…even now when I listen to it I almost feel the kind of awkwardness from when [starts laughing] from when I look back on what happened, but I also think about the time that we did spend together

TOM: I don't know if it was a breakup but there was an album that I associated with kind of, not quite being in love but relationships and being about a specific girl or whatever and how I felt about her…which was quite sombre and emotional music… [it] kind of fitted the sad, emotional state…I
think if I listened to that now, I don't know if that would have the same kind of, specific link with that time.

DAVE: …when I had an 'unpleasant time' breaking up with a girl a few years ago…Put *Funeral* on, play it loud yeah? Always made me feel better…I don't continue to associate it still with that one memory, although it was useful back then in that way. Arcade Fire is definitely on the general jukebox for selection as required, not for any particular situation you know?

As already discussed, memories of loved ones particularly in death also changed the meaning of music. However relationships between respondents and parents, and respondents and their children, drew some interesting open ended statements, indicating music’s affective capacity to connect memory with people and places;

“Helping and watching my own children learn their music and, gradually to perform and compose too” (resp. 8; 51-64, Intermediate, white British, heterosexual).

“When my dad was seriously ill in hospital” (resp. 40; 25-35, student, white British, heterosexual)

“Birth - how to educate your child about the world through music” (resp. 174; 25-35, occupation unknown, white British, prefer not to say).

Growing up listening to music with the old man (resp. 199; 25-35, higher, white British, heterosexual).

Becoming a Dad and passing on my tastes to my little girl (resp. 217; 25-35, self employed, white British, heterosexual)

Child - dad singing (resp. 270; 51-64, intermediate, white British, heterosexual)

On having children - discovering their appreciation of music even from a very early age (41-50, student, white British, heterosexual)

Hearing my son play songs he had composed himself on his guitar which again made me feel proud (resp. 314; 51-64. Intermediate, white British, heterosexual);
In the Steppes of Central Asia by Borodin first piece of music my son performed with an adult orchestra (resp. 318; 51-64, junior, white British, heterosexual)

With children - sharing my music with them, learning from their likes. (resp. 471; 41-50, intermediate, white British, heterosexual);

When I was a teenager: I didn't particularly use music to associate or distance myself from my peers, but I loved discovering new music, spending my money on CDs and learning from my two elder brothers and my Dad about music and bands and so forth (resp.595; 25-35, student, white British, heterosexual)

SDB: Do you think the importance of music has changed for you at all?
IAN: … It's to do with, all kinds of odd stuff to do with getting older and feeling older to be honest and, kind of seeing my children growing up and getting into their music including bits of stuff that ... you know ... that they've heard of mine which they like

JOHN: It was getting re-interested through, this is where the boys come in, getting re-interested and realising that there was lots of really lively music to be seen, which I didn't realise there was, there was all this really good music and you didn't hear it on the radio often.

The relationships between fathers and sons emerge particularly strongly here. The emotional distance maintained by fathers in typical analyses tend to form the basis of many Westernised normative assumptions around the role of the father (see Donaldson 1993; Creighton 1999; Hobson 2002). This ‘role’ has occupied particular locations of social and economic importance historically and the concept has been constructed symbolically, and often structurally (Segal 1990; Crompton 2001), in opposition to the ‘feminised’ care of children. However music here seems to occupy a common ground between siblings and fathers / sons, partially because, as it has been demonstrated throughout, music taste tends to occupy a variety of symbolically significant purposes for males generally; these significances vary by age and therefore circumstance.
Summary

The uses of music displayed here complicate conceptions of masculinities based on an active disavowal or misunderstanding of emotions. Whilst in some respects, as has been argued, music for entertainment or pleasure is arguably congruous with a culturally specific version of rationality, there was also a desire to listen to music which encouraged ‘negative’ emotions; either as a way of ‘eradicating’ pre-existent states or through a perceived necessity of emotional release. This suggests a much more complex understanding of male emotional lives as structured through masculinities, rather than in opposition to them, than existing empirical research concedes.

However the expression of ‘negative’ emotions appeared linked to solitary rather than public listening practices, indicating that respondents’ use of music was consistent with the public inhibition of certain emotional displays, even if there was also recognition of a need for emotional release. Respondents tended to view emotions as primarily unanticipated, biological reactions and had difficulty in relating their own preference to social factors, seeing their tastes as facets of their identity. The historically discursive separation between emotional and rational behaviour appears then to still have a particular ideological function to how emotions are treated when they do arise.

What a theory of affect adds in relation to listening practices and to the debate around masculinities generally, is that socially embodied experience (Connell and Messerschmidt 2005) shapes both aesthetic judgments, and therefore the physical experience of, certain practices. In the discussion around rap and R’n’B outlined earlier, affective judgments indicated the relational nature of gendered practices in opposition to other imaginary subject positions (anger or disgust for R’n’B for example). Thus how respondents came to be affected was dependent on the perceived aesthetic qualities of the music, derived from socially constructed stereotypes and inkeeping with their own ideas around gendered practice.

What became apparent during qualitative analysis was that aesthetic judgments as to why respondents would both choose to listen and avoid certain forms of music were also made in discursive reference to emotional authenticity, credibility and relatability. That the embodied response to music was dependent on exposure to peer and cultural judgment but also to a desire for emotive content, clearly underlines the complexity of subjective masculinities as both socially produced, yet affectively experienced. This also suggests that discourses around emotional authenticity may be a way of excluding others, implying that expecting males to be ‘more’ emotional does not
necessarily represent a re-working of power relations (this is developed further in Chapter 7). Music’s emotional content was also linked to discovery of the self as more authentic as respondents aged, than the self respondents presented in front of peers when they were younger (no matter what the age). Whilst arguably then narratives of emotional listening indicate a ‘softening of masculinity’ (McCormack and Anderson 2010), they may also pose a more nuanced version of emotional mastery (Petersen 2004: 130-131).

The significance of and meaning attached to music changed, demonstrating the fluidity of gendered identities over the life course and the malleability of the habitus as affective experience. As a more nuanced conception of hegemony this stresses the particular importance of biography as well as structure, in the performance of gendered habitus. It was also interesting to note that respondents in all the case studies believed music’s importance increased rather than declined with age. This stands in opposition to research which tends to focus on the importance of music for adolescents only; though the perceived importance of homosocial networks for younger males particularly may explain how music was used as a means of catharsis particularly (this is also developed further in the next chapter).

Tastes changed alongside circumstance and, in addition to the decreasing importance of homosociality and changing familial relationships, there was also the perception that increasing age was a physical barrier to the enjoyment of certain music forms. In acknowledging the importance of embodied materiality as crucial to different forms of interaction, respondents were clearly aware of the impossibility of maintaining a stable conception of ‘masculinity’. This conscious reflection particularly offers a new means of moving past metaphors of men understanding their bodies as machines in future research around masculinities, emotions and embodiment. The final substantive chapter therefore now turns to a synthesis of the empirical data. Providing a theoretical and methodological exposition of habitus, affect, music and age, it aims to demonstrate possible developments for further research into males and masculinities, noting some practical limitations of the thesis.
Chapter 7: Masculinities, Music, Emotion and Affect

Introduction

This chapter looks to explore how, in light of the empirical evidence presented in Chapters 5 and 6, a theory of masculine habitus (Bourdieu 2001) can be revised in order to incorporate the importance of embodied, emotional and affective experience. Through this it is argued that Connell’s (1987; 1995) still pervasive insights can be approached differently in order to move beyond the notion of hegemony as a type of ‘masculinity’ (Connell and Messerschmidt 2005). By including a greater emphasis on masculinities as ‘socially embodied’ (ibid.), fluid and intersecting with multiple, overlapping fields (Coles 2009), it is possible to conceptualise different ways of understanding masculinities.

Beginning first with an exploration of habitus in relation to hegemonic masculinity the chapter moves on to outline how habitus can be linked to affect in order to place embodiment squarely at the centre of research concerning masculinities. The rejection of bodily limits (see Chapter 2) has historically guaranteed privileges accorded to rationality, and the idea of the body as the passive recipient of social influence has tended to be reproduced in studies of masculinities. This is precisely why it is necessary to look to the transformative potential of affect for destabilising gender assumptions.

The chapter then makes a case for incorporating age and ageing in studies of masculinities, especially in light of notions of constantly shifting habitus. It looks to problematise the idea that youth is either emblematic of, or represents an uninterrupted progression toward, male adulthood. It then makes a case for analysing music in relation to gender without relying solely on a Bourdieusian ‘objective’ sociological approach, before outlining why Adorno is particularly useful in providing answers to the disjunction between the ideals of rationality and emotionality in male use of music. It finally concludes with some reflections on the assumptions which can be drawn from the empirical work and by detailing the importance of rethinking the nature of rationality in relation to the male body.
Theoretical Contributions

Habitus and Hegemony

Hearn (2004) raises the importance of what he terms Critical Studies on Men (CSM), as something distinct from men’s studies. He notes that there is a danger in studying men and masculinities of re-shifting the focus from women ‘back to men’ (2004: 50) or for redressing power imbalances back in favour of sociological analysis of men (see Traister 2000); this is clearly a concern with any approach which attempts to deconstruct male privilege (see Chapter 1). Hearn states that there are three primary problems with a continued insistence on hegemonic masculinity. The first is a frequent failure to make distinctions between institutions, representations and practices. The second is the connection between dominant and dominating practices; the third is the need to hang on to ‘masculinity’ as opposed to analysing men’s practices (Hearn 2004: 58). The critiques offered of hegemonic masculinity (Donaldson 1993; Wetherell and Edley 1999; Demetriou 2001; Connell and Messerschmidt 2005; McCormack and Anderson 2010; McCormack 2011a; 2011b) indicate that there is a substantial reason for thinking critically about the practices of men rather than masculinities.

It is possible to see that there are two prominent reasons for continuing to focus critically on masculinities rather than just on men. Firstly the concept of patriarchy, integral to an analysis of men, does undermine the complex means by which males, rather than just men, often assert dominance. The idea of ‘boys becoming men’ presumes a linear progression from youth to adulthood which veers close to a heavily-critiqued concept of socialisation into sex roles. Conceptions around identity are constantly in flux and therefore the strategies by which certain practices are legitimated shift with age as well as social processes. The importance of this is that it foregrounds constant social and individual change as well as reproduction, enabling an analysis of male emotional attunement as dialectically progressive and regressive.

Secondly as argued in Chapter 1, patriarchy is often problematic in that it is often underlined with a static vision of sexual difference (Alcoff 1988). Whilst Hearn (2004) clearly stresses the constructed nature of knowledge around such bodies (and as noted in Chapter 1, this thesis has few contentions with this assertion) perhaps for political efficacy above anything else, it is important to stress that gendered practices are separable from and impact on, the materiality of bodies (see Halberstam 1998) but that bodies have a materiality to them. Physiologies are important for social experience (as
in the case of becoming affected) but social experience is not determined by physiologies. This is precisely why Connell and Messerschmidt (2005) acknowledge the need for a theory of social embodiment in reworking the concept of hegemonic masculinity.

As noted in Chapter 1, the concept of hegemonic masculinity still continues to be uncritically applied to thinking around males, men, ‘masculinity’ and masculinities. This is despite rigorous critique which emphasises several limitations of the concept (Wetherell and Edley 1999; Demetriou 2001; Connell and Messerschmidt 2005; Messerschmidt 2012). No doubt the concept is still vital inasmuch as it stresses the relational nature of masculinities, the link between representation and institutional privilege, the enactment of what Bourdieu (1989) refers to as symbolic violence and the fluidity of configurations of strategic domination.

Burawoy (2012) advocates a move beyond both Bourdieu’s concept of habitus and Gramsci’s (1971) notion of hegemony on the basis that, whilst Bourdieu appears too pessimistic in the durability of social schemata, Gramsci’s optimism ignores the processes of ‘mystification’ entailed in the maintenance of privilege (Burawoy 2012: 189). As Brubaker (1985) has suggested, Bourdieu’s work owes a theoretical allegiance to Durkheim (1985: 747), though Burawoy attempts to demonstrate similarities with Parsonian functionalism (Burawoy 2012: 191), entailing a characterisation of Bourdieu’s habitus as ‘unknowing unconscious adaptation to the world’ (ibid.). This is however too dismissive of the potential of habitus, especially when enacted as a form of social theory (Brubaker 1993), which itself requires the fundamental reworking of doxa in order to challenge pre-established modes of thinking.

As outlined in Chapter 1 and 3 however, Bourdieu’s specific reading of habitus is problematic for many reasons, the first two of which are also applicable to Connell’s account of hegemony. Namely the almost sole focus on social reproduction as opposed to resistance; the disenfranchisement of subordinate and marginal groups in relation to dominant power structures; the lack of a gendered dynamic; the focus on the durability of both hexas and doxa; and, in Masculine Domination, the controversial over-emphasis on the role of the dominated as perpetrators of their own subordination.

Nevertheless there are several key critiques of hegemony that a revised notion of habitus is better able to address. Firstly Connell and Messerschmidt’s (2005) critique that hegemonic masculinity is often misapplied as a type is also a valid critique of the way habitus has been used to indicate types of people. The most common application of
Bourdieu’s notion is through the deployment of choice pertaining to cultural capital (see Thornton 1995), emphasising habitus as a socially reproductive force, in this case, for gender identities. Unlike the way in which hegemonic masculinity is applied however, habitus does not necessarily assume ‘dominant’ representations. As outlined in Chapter 1, the existence of multiple fields gives rise to regularities and similarities, but not identical behaviour, challenging Burawoy’s conception of habitus as unknowing unconscious adaptation. As Burkitt (2002: 227-228) notes;

habitus cannot be mechanical for two other reasons: firstly, all selves are constituted by a range of different habits, some of which may clash with or contradict some of the others: and, secondly, within contemporary societies there is a massive variety of customs, so that each situation may call for a subtly different performance of acts.

Secondly, the idea of hegemonic masculinity often appears to be psychically fixed or ‘realised’ in individual lives, through passive identification with cultural representations. Whilst Connell’s (1995) account of hegemonic masculinity suggests fluidity of change by time period, there is not an explicit account of how change occurs over individual biographies and how this is linked to social expectations appropriate to age (discussed later). Connell and Messerschmidt (2005) point to Wetherell and Edley’s (1999: 353) critique of ‘ambiguity’ whereby there are multiple psycho-discursive practices employed, and competing representations and strategies are invoked at different points. As outlined in Chapter 1, and through data presented in Chapter 7, this is exactly what notions of habitus and field adds to a theory of intersubjectivity (Coles 2009); though this should not be understood, as Coles seems to indicate, as coherent types of dominant masculinities.

Connell and Messerschmidt also note that one of the main limitations of the way in which hegemonic masculinity has been used is that there is often a lack of an adequate theory of ‘social embodiment’. They argue it is;

... important not only that masculinities be understood as embodied but also that the interweaving of embodiment and social context be addressed (2005: 851).

This is where the notion of habitus offers a dynamic account of embodiment not as a fixed entity but as something which is shaped and reshaped by individual experience as well as regulated structural influence. As noted in Chapter 1, there is a distinction to be
made between Bourdieu’s use of habitus (as opposed to Mauss’ or Burkitt’s – see Chapter 1) and his application of practical theory, which stresses the dynamic interplay of strategic ‘game playing’ (Bourdieu 1990a: 52; King 2000: 422).

Bourdieu’s division of hexis (comportment, disposition) and doxa (the means by which structural, material and cultural constraints come to shape ways of thinking) is no doubt also problematic in that it appears to separate cognition from embodiment (much as the Cartesian view critiqued throughout). Nevertheless what it emphasises is the different ways in which domination can be exercised through symbolic, material (body shape and size), cultural and individual factors.

This thesis has therefore explored both the disciplining of male emotional bodily presentation (hexis) and also the motivations attached to thought (doxa), from which embodied, emotional experiences are inextricable (Barbalet 2001; DeNora 2001). This moves beyond perceiving emotions as merely bodily reactions shaped by the social, which reifies certain assumptions of emotions as tied to gendered physiologies. Instead it has looked properly at the discursive nature [sic] of gendered social embodiment; something which Bourdieu’s explicit focus on the body as a ‘repository of social experience’ (Illouz 2007: 100) allows for a more complex picture of.

To this end, this thesis also notes that age is a thoroughly dynamic, embodied process entailing both cultural expectation (marriage and children) and material change (aging). In this way a focus on age as a category of social embodiment transcends additive conceptions of intersectionality. It is not, as Chapter 6 demonstrates, simply a case of a ‘growing’ or ‘diminishing’ sense of gendered identity, but that with age, certain material constraints and opportunities become less or more integral to the enactment of certain strategies associated with masculinities. Thus there is no singular, normative ‘masculinity’ to deviate from, only the shifting of social habitus.

**Habitus and Affect**

Central to a theory of embodiment is how affective experience is shaped by, and in turn, shapes social interaction. Whilst Bourdieu’s habitus can be linked to affect (see Chapter 2), as Probyn (2004b: 232) highlights, he has an uneasy relationship to both emotion and affect as embodied traits. This, it could be suggested, may be characterised by a general sociological disdain for anything resembling biological essentialism. As noted in Chapter 1, Bourdieu (2001) specifically states that the effect of social doxa is that emotions (in which he incorrectly includes shame as an emotion rather than an
affect) lead to the reproduction of gendered behaviour (2001: 38). However there is, in his work a typically sociological attitude toward emotional development as the passive mimesis of social structure (again, a valid critique of hegemonic masculinity).

Conceding that, physiologically, emotions and affects are necessary to human social development, means that sociologists have to acknowledge that social action is in part shaped by biological response. The tendential resistance, as critiques of cultural feminists also note (McNay 1999; 2000; 2004), is toward a constructionist determinism (Kemper 1981), whereby the materiality of emotions can be transformed by adequate socialisation, if not sheer will alone (Seidler 2006b: 106). This reflects precisely the notion of using cognition / rational thought to inhibit emotions that feminists have often sought to critique (see Chapter 2).

This type of approach is also particularly problematic for a sociological theory of male emotions if, as has been argued, social constructions alone shape surface and deep acting (Hochschild 1979). If this were the case then males would fail to develop what are understood to be the historically biased view of emotions, as their practices are ingrained so firmly within an imaginary discourse of rationality and/or emotional repression. Yet the data presented in Chapters 5 and 6, and in previous studies (Thompson 1997; Galasinski 2004; Allen 2007; White and Peretz 2009; Forrest 2010), demonstrate clear emotional narratives to the contrary.

On the other hand, in accepting the diametrically opposed argument - that all emotional development is the natural prerequisite of every human body - then sociological insights become precariously placed to reassert biological essentialism. As argued earlier, even ‘natural’ categories such as sex cannot be explained with reference to a priori unmediated biological differences (Connell 1983; Laqueur 1992), let alone socially enforced gendered practice.

Studies of masculinities have equally failed to develop a sophisticated account of embodied experience (Monaghan and Robertson 2012; Robertson and Monaghan 2012), or at least one which moves beyond the unconscious passive / conscious rational, training and disciplining of the corporeal (sport, bodybuilding, athletic prowess). As Forth (2008: 28) notes however; "[e]quating masculinity with rationality or self-control thus fails to account for the ways in which men have also relied upon irrationality and a loss of control as signs of male 'freedom'". Perhaps ironically, the observation that males suppress their emotional lives has invariably led to its exclusion from critical treatise in relation to the male body (see Chapter 2).
This is precisely what a theory of affect adds to the concept of habitus. Social interaction shapes the ‘rules of the game’ and provides actors with a feel for it (Bourdieu 1990a). Thus the deployment of tacit knowledge (Bourdieu 1989: 14), whether concerned with appropriate gendered practice, cultural consumption or both, relies on meeting the expectations of others. This is clearly shaped by historical process and yet there is a disjunction between competing, idealised representations of restrictive emotionality (Berger, Levant, McMillan et al. 2005; Wong, Pituch and Rochlen 2006) and the way in which males are individually affected by social and psychological factors; including failing to adhere to idealised representations of rationality. However the affective system is trained to a certain extent through an individual’s life, by their social surroundings, precisely because it is a malleable ‘motivational system of great freedom’ (Tomkins 1962: 108).

This is where notions of affect transcend Bourdieu’s particular problems of ‘disembodiment’ (McNay 1999). The affective system encourages a frequently unconscious, unanticipated, but overall, physiologically experienced response to social stimuli; it shapes individual action but it is shaped by an individual’s surroundings. This does not mean however that it will entail exactly the same response as another based on shared group habitus. As Brubaker (1993: 213) notes "habitus ... can engender an infinite variety of practices 'thanks to analogical transfers of schemes' from one task to another ... It is the habitus that determines the kinds of problems that are posed, [and] the kinds of explanations that are offered". Yet it is precisely because of the expectation of others that actors frequently act in ways that are incongruous with how they are affected.

Again, Goffman’s (1956) notions of the slippage between audience and role segregation is useful here as it seems to imply Bourdieu’s notion of a ‘feel for the game’ based on social expectation which does not always fit with the situation. Shame is thus a powerful affect (Sedgwick and Frank 1995; Probyn 2004b) inasmuch as a disjunction between feeling and expectation is retained, thus challenging perceptions of the self as a unitary concept.

In the same way, as noted in Chapter 1, it is possible to train the habitus to adhere to gender specific display rules (not crying publicly) and yet still be affected by that which goes against an individual’s socially informed doxa (experiencing anxiety, feelings of isolation or hurt). In this way, gendered practices are often acknowledged as flawed and yet it is the perception of expectation, or as Ahmed puts it ‘the anticipation
of affect’ (Ahmed 2010a), which seeks to inhibit practices which may be deemed ‘subversive’ to immediate social situations. Affect therefore is both reproductive and transformative.

The crucial point here is that affects, and therefore emotions, are malleable; structuring and structured by gendered practice. This presents opportunities in order to theorise masculinities in new ways, but also particular problems from a sociological point of view. Because affects are characterised by intensity and are subject to change they are not always amenable to conscious or ‘accurate’ interpretation. Therefore qualitative interviews are unlikely to capture the processes by which ‘any affect may [take] any object’ (Tomkins 1962: 347). In addition, as argued in Chapter 4 if it is articulation rather than experience which is difficult for some males (Kindlon and Thompson 1999; Berger, Levant, McMillan et al. 2005), then linguistic approaches may prove inadequate. On the other hand, treating affects as biological facts resorts to many of the same gendered assumptions outlined in Chapters 1 and 2 and methodological critiques of positivism (see Chapter 4).

Perhaps it should be suggested that accurate measurement, either through linguistic or experimental deduction is itself an undesirable impossibility, as far as a theory of affect is concerned. As Sedgwick’s (2003) work demonstrates, affects cannot be reduced to either linguistic constructions or to physiological objects; both are equally important and the person recalling affects is liable to experience them differently almost instantaneously. As Chapter 6 highlighted, the types of memories, feelings and emotions connected even with the same piece of music changed substantially over time. Therefore any research into masculinities utilising affect should focus on the perception of affect.

This is one particular benefit of ‘telling and retelling stories’ (Probyn 2004b: 330) especially with reference to music. As already argued, discussing specific pieces of music connected to life-histories drew some rich narratives which framing discussion explicitly around emotions may not have. In addition to the substantive content of the case study sessions, respondents’ intonation, facial expressions and gestures conveyed affectivities which could not be documented but provided a sense of the strength of feeling. As already noted however, whilst respondents seemed to be openly comfortable discussing ‘positive’ emotions, they appeared less so in discussing ‘negative’ emotions (see Chapter 6) which themselves carried unconsciously affective strategies (averting the gaze for example when discussing breakups, loss or grief, or nervous laughter). The
role of non-verbal as well as verbal communication is something which should be developed in further research into research taking the affectively constituted nature of masculinities into account.

Masculinities may often present themselves as rational and ‘unemotional’ and yet males learn to be affected, and are affected, by experience of masculinities; thus rationality as discursively constructed as the suppression of emotion, is in large part motivated by affective emotional attachments to a certain performance of habitus. This is a concept of habitus which embodies its own contradictions (feeling afraid of showing emotion; ashamed of a lack of emotional empathy) as integral to its formation.

**Against Genre and Type: Bourdieu vs. Adorno**

A notably absent feature of Bourdieu’s concept of habitus throughout this thesis has been its role in influencing musical taste. This is however a deliberate attempt to counteract some misappropriations of Bourdieusian theory as well as to demonstrate how habitus can be used to conceptualise fluidity of individual biographies as well as of social relations. As already demonstrated what a concept of affect adds to habitus is precisely the idea that affect entails that habitus is a state of becoming rather than arriving (Grosz 2004), thus as Blackman (2008: 30) notes;

[William James’] ‘problem of personality’ referred to what we might term our aliveness – our capacity to live and to affect and be affected such that we neither have a static continuity nor are we continually in movement. The problem she argues is that in linking affective experience to socially circumscribed categories, social psychologists, inspired by the early Vitalist movement, came to develop types of identities which failed to grasp the shifting nature of social relations (2008: 35).

Conversely, by documenting affectivities as the property of the bounded self; “one is in danger of disavowing those [social] distinctions which produce difference as inferiority, couched in relational terms, such as the simple, the involuntary, the emotional, the instinctual and, of course, the feminine” (2008: 35). The negation of gendered power imbalances, in the most absurd cases, has led to ‘male-as-victim’ arguments (Bly 1990; Farrell 1993; Thomas 1993; Benatar 2012) on the basis of individual feelings of disempowerment alone. The question then is how to understand intersubjectivity or multiplicities as affective, whilst recognising institutional privilege and without resorting to biological, psychological or sociological determinisms.
This links to an important critique of habitus in relation to music taste. Social psychological and sociological accounts have argued that listening practices are indicative of personality types or subcultural values. Whilst already outlined in Chapters 3 and 4, it is worth reiterating that in categorising types of individuals or emotions as linked to types of music, there are discrete boundaries drawn, which aim to anticipate exactly what types of people use different music. As already noted, this tends to reduce music to a functionary object, obscuring its mediation through individual experience and potential.

Such approaches also ignore, in the context of music listening, how discursive connotations come to shape certain musical aesthetics and thus how similar pieces evoke different emotions in those of the similar social locations. As noted in Chapters 5 and 6, that rap is seen as aggressive or over-sexualised, in many ways essentialises both its social and musicological characteristics. The data presented in Chapter 5 demonstrated that respondents resorted to genres when they disliked as opposed to liked music, which suggests that genre approaches are perhaps explained as much by analytic bias as by gender correlates.

As also demonstrated in both Chapter 5 and 6, rarely do tastes stay the same over the life-course, and genre labels come to encompass ever-increasing stylistic differences. When given the option, respondents were specific about their own tastes and tended not to refer to genre labels. This emphasises that, in relation to musical types, the sole arbiter of genre distinctions is often the researcher. Respondents however were far more likely to refer to genres in relation to music they disliked, resorting to stereotypes around other subjective tastes which did indicate how subjective identities were exercised in relation to others (Connell’s and Bourdieu’s fundamental insights).

Whilst as argued in Chapter 3, the performative aspects of music taste (dress often being the primary focus) have implications for subjectivity, they do not in-of-themselves represent a destabilising of gender relations. The culture industry functions to promote the illusion of individual consumer choice as a prerequisite of identity (Bauman 2000a), whilst at the same time retaining the same relationship of consumption to capital (Jameson 1991; 2007); subcultural capital is easily converted to actual capital (Moore 2005). In the same way, ‘subcultures’ or ‘neo-tribes’ are often divisive and exclusionary (Clawson 1999; Davies 2001) and do very little to disrupt broader gender relations. The spatial organisation of audience participation at gigs (Fonarow 2005; Donze 2010), or even where the venues are situated (Cohen 1991), serves as a perceived
barrier for many female participants for example, indicating that despite queering styles of dress (Auslander 2006; Brill 2008; Peters 2010),
sexual divisions often remain intact.

Again, the comments about ‘rap’ and ‘hip hop’, indicated in Chapter 6, presented implicitly historic discourses, on the grounds of ill-informed reference to type. It is necessary therefore to interrogate how certain musicological features reinforce social organisation of taste. This is precisely what Adorno’s analysis adds to a traditional sociological critique (DeNora 2003a). Aesthetic judgments can be taken as indicative of social relations, cultural commodities shape social relations, yet the experience of music is not easily relegated to pure social function (Prior 2008; 2011). Conversely, the individual experience of music is not easily explained without reference to broader social factors. As Ilouz (2007: 108) argues,

... as Adorno has so powerfully suggested…disparate institutions are tightly linked together in a process of commodification of selfhood…It is this progressive fusion of the market repertoires and languages of the self during the twentieth century which I have called ‘emotional capitalism’.

It is important then to retain a focus on how those involved in consumption practices understand their experience of it (what makes an individual piece of music good in a respondents’ opinion), precisely because aesthetic experience can transform doxa. Yet at the same time it is also necessary to explore how similar sentiments are expressed amongst those of similar demographics, based on a historic, discursive notion of music as a tool for releasing individual emotions; as with Adorno, “thinking art as both aesthetic and anti-aesthetic” (Jameson 2007: 131). Bourdieusian theorists often fail to make the kind of value judgments which is required to radicalise Bourdieu’s insights (Watson 2011: 106) and extend them beyond function or social reproduction.

It should however be noted that Adorno’s emphasis on creative labour as productive, implies an inadvertent bias associated with the “masculinization of creativity” (Biddle and Gibson 2009: 12). His work certainly derives its standards from art as a product of the society in which it is produced\(^4\), however he overlooks the structural inequalities which prohibited female composers from achieving the status of Beethoven, Mozart or Schoenberg. This ignores particularly why the musicological canon retains a focus on aesthetic experience defined largely by, and through the works of, male composers. Similarly, he appears to denigrate gratificatory pleasures associated with the body

\(^4\) In his discussion of the Hegelian concept of Aufhebung for example.
It is necessary to suggest then, as Watson argues:

The point is not to adopt Adorno's prejudices, but to make judgments based on his devastating critique of moribund classicism. At a time when iPod/downloading has created a culture of atomistic listening to isolated 'tracks', his insistence on context - the need for segues and interrupts to counter musical positivism - suggests avenues for intervention (Watson 2011: 183).

**Males, Masculinities and Music**

**Age and Experience**

What is also largely absent from both Adorno and Bourdieu’s work is how age, as a quintessentially embodied process, intersects with music listening. This is where Bennett et al. (2009) provide an important corrective to Bourdieu with regards to music consumption patterns, noting that age, rather than sex seems to account for largest variation in music taste. What this thesis demonstrates is that a focus on youth, favoured by subcultural theorists (McRobbie and Garber 1975; Hebdige 1979; McRobbie 1991; Thornton 1995; Bennett 2002; Medovoi 2005; Laughey 2006), tends to focus exclusively on the social function of music as a commodity. This does little to understand emotional attachment to its perceived aesthetic qualities and strips it of any transformative potential. It also does nothing to illustrate the private uses of music amongst those age groups who stop participating as much in public music listening.

Central to this thesis is the claim that age and life-stage shape constructions, practices and lived experience of gender. Accordingly, throughout the term males has been used instead of men. Aside from the obvious problems of cultural relativity in defining when boys become men and how adolescents fit into this divide, the term has been used in a deliberate attempt to avoid some issues in studies of masculinities. Firstly men rather than males are often posited as the social problem. This is owing to the appropriation of Marxist terminology for the explanation of gendered inequality and the relative economic and political standing of older, more affluent men. Young males
however are far more likely to embody and enact *actual* rather than symbolic violence than middle aged or older men\(^{47}\).

An almost direct causal link between symbolic violence (Bourdieu 1977; 1989; 2001) and physical violence is commonly assumed, however referring to men neglects the role of age in learning gendered practices from peer groups and direct experience of gender-reproducing institutions such as education (Willis 1977). As Jewkes (2005) noted in her study on male prisoners, the term fratriarchy (rule by the brother) is a perhaps more sufficiently complex means by which to describe power relations between males than patriarchy (implying rule by men, rather than males). The reduction of masculinities as power to men thus implies that only economic advantage can be considered ‘real’ power. As argued in Chapter 1, this is a particularly strong critique of Connell’s (1995) use of hegemony (Connell and Messerschmidt 2005; Seidler 2006a; 2007).

Secondly, discussing males rather than men highlights that relationships between males of similar economic, racial, sexual and geographical locations, and the practices associated with masculinities, may be significantly different according to age cohort. This statement is not contentious itself, but it further complicates both the case for the ‘hegemony of men’ (Hearn 2004) and the way in which symbolic domination manifests itself both internally and externally (Demetriou 2001). Undoubtedly Connell recognised that in his (1995) framework, age may help configure ‘subordinated’ practices (see also Russell 2007), for example the lack of economic autonomy for teenagers and of ability to embody traits of hegemony in older men through sporting activities. Nevertheless, given that young males are often the focus of moral panics (Cohen 1972b), moralising rhetoric (Mann 1992) and punitive social policy, designed to restrict certain forms of behaviour, assuming an unproblematic relationship between males of the same social group overlooks different strategies of domination ‘internal to the gender order’ (Demetriou 2001).

Thirdly, as already outlined, with age and experience come redefinitions of both affective commitment to masculinities and changing importance of a variety of practices linked to representations of ‘masculinity’ (Thompson 1994; Spector-Mersel 2006; Mann 2007; Ribeiro, Paúl and Nogueira 2007; van den Hoonaard 2010; Ezzell

\[^{47}\text{Though Connell (1993) has pointed to the ‘officer classes’ in the military to demonstrate the historic link between and ‘middle class masculinity’ and violence have similarly highlighted that whilst middle class men may not fight in wars physically, in occupying the high-ranking positions in politics or the military, they are often ‘indirectly’ responsible for much military violence.}\]
This is both due to the social demands of patriarchal societies (marriage, children, and ‘gainful’ employment) and the physiological effects of aging. Including age as part of the focus on masculinities highlights the contingent nature of embodiment and how learning to be affected by social experience (Latour 2004) is a perpetual process. The repeated claims to knowing oneself, highlighted in the previous chapter, amongst different age groups is a testament to this process of affective identities as a process of becoming rather than arriving.

Whilst, as Connell (2005) points out, youth is often uncritically linked to the reproduction of masculinities, the importance of homosociality, especially during adolescence, in shaping certain beliefs cannot be underestimated. Unlike some authors (Erikson 1968; Solomon and Szwabo 1994), this contention does not presume that ‘psycho discursive’ practices (Wetherell and Edley 1999) become fixed during adolescence or youth, yet for the purposes of training habitus, prolonged, intensive exposure to same sex group dynamics clearly informs gendered discourse (O'Donnell and Sharpe 2000: 38-39). In addition, one of the most important reasons for an age specific focus here is the changing role that homosociality plays in shaping both performances of ‘restrictive emotionality’ and the training of habitus based on the affective expectations of others (see Chapter 6).

As noted by those focusing specifically on masculinities, for young men homosociality plays a particularly important role in the validation of gendered practice (Kimmel and Mahler 2003; Allen 2007; Flood 2008; Forrest 2010; Dempster 2011). As Davidson, Daly and Arber (2003) highlight, evidence seems to suggest that with age women tend to maintain a ‘larger, neighbourhood-based network of friends and support systems’ (2003: 83), than men who ‘tend to have employment-based friendships which are more likely to be reduced or lost on retirement’ (ibid.). Whilst occupational homosocial networks retain importance long before retirement (Solomon and Szwabo 1994), familial obligation alters the amount of time dedicated to, if not the individual importance of homosociality for constructions of masculinities (Segal 1990; 1993).

The public validation of both hexis (the physical management of embodied, emotional displays) and doxa (liking the right kinds of music) were indicated in the previous chapter. The importance of peer groups became particularly important when respondents provided insights into what they saw as the important role that youth played in shaping tastes. Notions of hiding music preference from peers, and using music as an individual, private tool for ‘dealing with’ emotions however seems to hint at a
dislocation often between what respondents saw as the authentic self and the self presented to others.

The repeated assertion that it was only after intensive peer networks became less important, that respondents were more able to ‘be themselves’, demonstrates both a belief in masculine autonomy yet conversely a desire to reject homosocial influence. This bears striking similarities to Goffman’s (1969) distinction between sincere and cynical performances, whereby displays of emotional suppression and the private use of music, became strategic acts in order to present identities as coherent to peers; to provide the impression of stability.

What Chapter 5 demonstrates is that younger cohorts appear more likely to listen to music which they feel expressed ‘negative’ emotions than older cohorts. As highlighted in Chapter 6, this was frequently connected to fears around public displays of such emotions due to a greater importance placed on homosocial peer groups during youth. This was seen frequently as the opposition to a personal need to evoke or manage such emotions. Whilst Seidler (2006b: 97) observes that the separation of public / private performance in studies of masculinities leads to a perpetuation of “women's 'structural' oppression and men's merely 'personal' pain”, it is difficult to reject the perceived importance of this dichotomy, during youth, for those who participated in this research.

Partially such a disjunction has been explained both psychologically and sociologically with reference to youth as a period of crisis (Erikson 1968) or anomie (see Menard 1995), whereby adolescents occupy a liminal space between childhood and adulthood. Kindlon and Thompson (1999: 4) attribute boys particular difficulty in both expressing and experiencing ‘negative’ emotions, to gender specific patterns of socialisation. They lay the blame squarely at the feet of a culture which is “railroading boys into lives of isolation, shame and anger” (Kindlon and Thompson 1999: 4), arguing for a greater ‘emotional education’ “as much from his father and other men as from his mother and other women” (1999: 7). However the argument that only adolescence / youth causes such tensions is a functionalist myth which commits the same fallacies of sex role theory. Such positions conceive fulfilment of patriarchal obligations (marriage, children or employment) as a stable end point where as it has been demonstrated that identities and emotions are in flux, both throughout the life course and with discursive shifts (Petersen 2004).
Embodied, Emotional Uses of Music

The music industry at present appeals to largely male audiences to (see Chapter 3). For those whom Adorno terms a ‘culture consumer’ (1976: 6-7), someone who “respects music as a cultural asset, often as something a man must know for the sake of his own social standing” (ibid.), exchanging musical knowledge as commodity, is demonstrably important for both male homosocial bonding (Straw 1997) and gendered exclusionary practices (Cohen 1991; Clawson 1999; Leonard 2007). For these reasons, gender is a necessary analytic framework to understand the culture industry’s workings, though it should be noted that this is not, in any way an attempt to reassert the often male-centric fallacy of inherent male creativity.

Adorno unsurprisingly obscures a gendered analysis of music, due in part to his modernist conception of aesthetic critique (Born 1987: 56) and his denigration of corporeal pleasure (McCrary 1991: 28), which as Chapter 1 demonstrated, has been discursively ‘feminised’ by modernist thinking. Whilst Adorno notes that material factors restrict access to training, his focus on ‘genuine’ artistic creativity, he generally undermines the discursive, symbolic barriers to sexual differentiation in producing and learning to objectively appreciate music. Nevertheless, he makes some important insights around the uses of music the culture industry promotes, which can be adapted to a specifically gendered focus.

As highlighted throughout this thesis however, there is a problem in seeing males as simply ‘unemotional’, given that music consumption is demonstrably so influenced by the notion of evoking emotion. This is where Adorno’s (1976) concept of the emotional listener offers an important, if somewhat flawed analysis (see Chapter 3) of music’s privileged status in relation to masculinities. The notion that a culture which privileges rationality as the discursive opposite of emotionality, invariably accentuates consumption practices as a form of emotional catharsis, provides one such explanation for engagement with music as overtly concerned with emotion. Though as Bauman (2000a: 28) argues, following Adorno, the promise of fulfilment (emotional catharsis) rather than the reality is often what music delivers (Adorno 1997 [1970]: 240).

As outlined in Chapter 3 however, the discursive focus on music’s relationship to the male body, mediated through emotions, is pre-modern in character (Castiglione 1959 [1561]; Borgerding 2001; Leach 2009). Therefore, as also noted in Chapter 3, this does not adequately explain the emergence of the emotional listener as a correlate of Cartesian rationality. What Chapter 5 and 6 show, again, is that it is not emotion per se
which in incongruent with masculinities (Hearn 1993), it is the way in which ‘unproductive’ (see Chapter 2) emotions are framed (due to historic links with femininity), that are important to explore.

The empirical data presented demonstrates that music was linked to both emotional management and stimulus; emotional experience should come to be understood in terms of both practices in relation to masculinities. Music became a means of evoking ‘positive’ or managing predominantly ‘negative’ emotions. This is entirely congruous with notions of Enlightenment rationality (Adorno and Horkheimer 1997 [1947]) which link to discourses surrounding Western masculinities (Seidler 1994; Petersen 1998; Seidler 2007). To label ‘positive’ and ‘negative’ emotions as such is not a value judgment; purposefully this distinction notes that respondents tended to frame sadness, grief, melancholy, anger and (what some of them saw as) self-pity as such.

It was however (in line with Adorno’s conception of the emotional listener) the way in which a desired public repression of such ‘negative’ emotions, led to private listening uses of music connected to specific events or people, which proved a paradox. In Chapter 6 for example, Joel listened to Tracy Chapman and Tom listened to Portishead, due to the connection with their respective siblings who had been injured or had died. This music was deliberately listened to, to evoke, and as a means of ‘dealing with’, sadness and grief. Without wishing to appeal to the problematic distinction between public and private it was, in their individual biographies, the rejection then of public displays of emotions implying weakness which they consciously sought to control. How music’s emotional affects are displayed publicly, does not necessarily correlate with how it is used in private; thus even for the individual, gendered identity involves multiple competing practices (Wetherell and Edley 1999).

Those who participated in both the survey and life history sessions articulated clear understandings of how their emotional lives connected with music. As demonstrated in Chapter 6, there was an acknowledgement that one of music’s main attractions was the embodied reaction to certain pieces, though this was very much linked to purely individual choice. Respondents saw music either shaping a complete identity (singular), or their reaction to music being a result of its unexplainable physiological reaction on the individual body. What became clear however was that, as already noted in relation to age, respondents became more sensitive to different musicological features dependent on exposure and circumstance; how they became affected was dependent on social influence.
The insistence on music’s capacity to affect however was often perceived as unpredictable in many ways. This fails to link conventional cultural motifs to reasons why respondents became affected only by certain musicological structures, rhythms and aesthetic choices. Music’s physiological response (‘you can’t explain why, it just gives you goosebumps’) in this way indicated a historicising tendency toward emotion as only embodied and therefore emotions as uncontrollable, primal impulses. Nevertheless, what this indicates is that masculinities are constructed through affective, emotional corporeal experience, especially in their discursive belief in emotional suppression. Again, drawing on Wetherell and Edley (1999), there are then multiple competing facets of seemingly singular identities, whereby acts are strategically legitimated with reference to competing discourses. Again, this indicates the importance of Bourdieusian subjectivity, not as an intersection of demographics comprising a type, but as a series of semi-reflexive acts, game playing and structurally influenced choices.

**Contribution to Methods**

This thesis has sought to provide a sociological, gender-specific analysis of male emotional uses of music. As outlined in Chapters 2, 3 and 4, in relation to music and emotions, there are problems with both sociological and psychological approaches which demonstrate tendencies toward quantitatively imposing categories of genre or personality types, to treat ‘subcultures’ as discrete, politically-motivated, social entities or to rely on problematic sex-role stereotypes which emphasise display, rather than perception. Similarly, there is a lack of empirical sociological research around how masculinities and emotions intersect (see Chapter 2).

For the reasons already highlighted at the beginning of the chapter, more attention in studies of masculinities needs to be focussed on social embodiment. Undoubtedly as emotions are embodied responses to social situations, which to a large extent shape action (Shott 1979; Thoits 1989; Collins 1993; DeNora 2001; Heise 2007), this makes understanding how males interact with emotions of the utmost importance.

Often the methods chosen to study gender, music or emotions, do not necessarily question the assumptions that researchers are making about the discursive nature of the phenomena under investigation. This may lead to the imposition of one of the following positions: music genres as objectively shared understandings; emotions as biological facts; or ‘masculinity’ (rather than masculinities) as a fixed, objective set of characteristics. Qualitative research strategies, commonly used to study subjective
phenomena, also do not necessarily capture respondents interpretations any more than quantitative strategies can honestly claim total, impartial objectivity (see Chapter 4). For these reasons the research design adopted here was shaped by a synthesis of sociological positions, including interpretivism, pragmatism, constructionism, critical realism and Bourdieusian reflexivity.

Perhaps one of the more surprising aspects of the research design, given its critique of rationality, is its reliance on what may appear to be a positivist inspired methodology. The use of quantitative methods have historically been linked to patriarchal, masculinist, notions of science (Harding 1986; Longino 1987; Harding 1996; Tebes 2005), which place the observation of trends, regularities and, importantly, control at the heart of enquiry. It should be noted however that quantitative methods do not necessarily equate to masculinist, deductive, scientific reasoning any more than qualitative methodologies amount to gender or sex neutral methods.

Aside from the practical reasons of using web based surveys (see Chapter 4) the gathering of large amounts of different qualitative data helped to bridge the sometimes arbitrary distinction between purely qualitative and quantitative methods of social research (Howe 1988; de Boise 2012b). The logic followed that a combination of respondents open ended responses and quantitative trends, based on statistically significant differences, would help to shape the life history sessions. The structure of the research design made no claim to objectivist detachment and fully recognised the role of the researcher at all stages; from the assumptions made in designing the questionnaire, to the interpretation of data in shaping the types of areas covered in the life history sessions. One of the key critiques that feminist theory (and masculinities studies) has to offer is that the male researcher is a gendered, sexed subject in themselves and thus should be aware of their positionality in relation to the research. Likewise, Bourdieusian notions of reflexivity, as outlined in Chapter 4, are important in helping to minimise the imposition of the researcher’s own biases on respondents48.

Firstly, rather than using an exclusively qualitative approach, this thesis was heavily informed by a quantitative, online survey; this was both for pragmatic and epistemological reasons concerned with gender-specific research into emotions. As noted in Chapter 2, males’ difficulty or discomfort in articulating their understanding of emotions can lead to the perception that they do not have emotional lives, or develop qualitatively different emotional lives than females (for a critique see Bartky 1990; 48 Even if Bourdieu’s actual practice did not always follow these guidelines (see McRobbie 2002).
Fischer 1993). The first point is clearly untrue and the second is widely contested, which is why retaining distance between the researcher and respondent was important (pragmatism). The survey generated lengthy, rich narratives, indicating that respondents had a clear awareness of how music intersected with their emotional lives.

Secondly, as discussed in Chapter 4, using quantitative methods does not denote a return to masculinist positivism which seeks to produce numeric, objective ‘facts’. A critical realist inspired approach may look for statistical regularities (induction) but this is by no means a claim to the totality of structure or of universal laws that positivism traditionally advocated (Bauman 1994; Bauman 2000b). It does however allow for informed qualitative sampling decisions and focus, to be undertaken based on the emergence of larger trends or significant differences between groups. In leaving many of the questions deliberately open-ended in the survey, before asking fixed-choice responses around specific areas, this allowed for respondents’ answers to shape the way in which the qualitative stage was structured. As noted in Chapter 5, the fact that, when given the opportunity, the majority of respondents chose not to classify their music tastes by genre, is a challenge to ‘subcultural’ and some social psychological and sociological approaches to researching music and identities.

Using a mixed-methods strategy allowed for clarification of individual respondents’ answers at the qualitative stage, which could help explain quantitative group differences, exceptional circumstances or broader inductive trends. Part of the problem of Bourdieu’s (1984) account is that he locates taste as dictated by class membership. This reduces all music to its social function (Frith 2002; Prior 2008; 2011), removing individual experience, agency and reflexive choice. The methods used here, in semi-musicological fashion, explored reasons for music’s social and individual appeal, linked not only to how it shaped (largely) homosocial interaction but why certain stylistic or aesthetic.

Whilst respondents’ interpretations were important, their answers were not always taken at ‘face value’ as constituting reality. The use of both quantitative and qualitative methods demonstrated that there were numerous similarities in interpretations and uses, despite music’s privileged status as individual choice. Often respondents were not aware of the discourses they were invoking and occasionally, during the life histories, were not conscious of their motivations until they were asked.

Most importantly, in rejecting ‘subcultural’ or genre / type approaches, the methodology used here did not start from the premise that either; music was only
important to young males, or that genre preference represented fixed types of identity. This particularly revealed an interesting split in terms of how respondents categorised music they disliked in terms of genre, but music they liked with reference to specific pieces, bands, musicians or composers much more (see Chapter 5).

In outlining quantitative differences between age groups before qualitatively exploring respondents’ explanations, this allowed for an exploration of changes in listening behaviours over time. It was clear from the life-histories that respondents’ listening practices altered in many ways but that this did not represent a declining importance as such. As highlighted in Chapter 3 also, it is not younger males who are the most active purchasers of music. To conduct genre analysis without questioning the assumptions that such a research strategy entails, often reinforces rather than evaluates stereotypes around ‘types’ of people or ‘types’ of music.

**Rethinking Rationality or Reconstituting Hegemony?**

*‘Emotionality’ as Hegemony?*

Throughout, this thesis has identified a fundamental flaw in the masculinity-as-emotional-suppression argument. It has noted that males do have an understanding of their own emotional lives which, whilst as Seidler (1994; 2006a; 2006b; 2007) generalises they may be uncomfortable with, is often a discomfort expressed in the presence of peers (and most probably sociological researchers). The question remains then, given the historic and contemporary unease around male use of music, due to its links to emotionality (see Chapter 3), whether emotional attunement through music, presents a potential challenge to rationality as a form of power (see Chapter 1).

Allen (2007) directly raises the question of whether the adoption of ‘previously subordinated, romantic masculinity’ represents a significant shift in gender relations. She explores how young males’ ideas around romantic relationships are an important means of corroborating masculine identities (see also Forrest 2010). Its applicability here is that what should make ‘romantic masculinity’ subordinate she argues; “is its association with the feminine and the constitution of romance as something women have greater investment in…[because it] implies the possession of attributes associated with femininity such as emotional attachment, care, and sensitivity” (Allen 2007: 137).

Her article however demonstrates clear associations between masculinities, romance and emotional intimacy for young males, indicating that emotional attunement is part of,
rather than antithetical to, young masculinities. Her explanation for this is couched in terms of hegemonic versus non-hegemonic forms of ‘masculinity’ and, with reference to Demetriou’s (2001) discussion of hybridization, she concludes that “hegemonic masculinity has appropriated and reconfigured a previously subordinated romantic masculinity” (Allen 2007: 148).

As has already been pointed out however, the insistence on hegemony as a type rather than a series of configurations is misleading (Hearn 2004; Connell and Messerschmidt 2005). There are also two key issues that Allen omits in her discussion; firstly there is no comparative research on older males in order to ascertain whether these narratives are specific to young males and thus whether this represents appropriation or continuity. Galasinski’s (2004) empirical work would seem to suggest the importance of emotional narratives for older men and, as demonstrated in Chapter 5, romantic relationships were important in shaping emotional music use across most age groups. Not only this, but there were no statistically significant differences around how highly romance, love and physical intimacy were rated by males of all ages in my research.

Secondly, the idea of a ‘previously subordinated romantic masculinity’ seems to suggest prior absence of romantic narratives as a source of power (see Wouters 1998; Illouz 2007; Ahmed 2010a; 2010b). The conflation of the romantic type with configurations of romanticism undermines both the transient nature of age or experience, and the inherent contradictions of any, if not all, universalist notions of normative masculinities. Whilst in this thesis, the importance that respondents attached to certain gendered attributes differed by cohort (see Chapter 5), respondents engagement with certain practices, activities and beliefs also altered over their respective life histories (see Chapter 6).

It should be emphasised however that whilst respondents’ attitudes shifted with age, this did not represent a wholesale rejection of gender configurations with age. What Chapters 5 and 6 also demonstrate is that focus on public social participation only emphasises the visible performances of masculinities, overlooking other less visible continuities and revisions to identities (Davidson, Daly and Arber 2003). The limits of the quantitative data however, meant that it was not possible to explore the attitudes of those over the age of retirement. More empirical work is needed in this respect in order to further develop the notion of masculinities as continually shifting.
What Allen does highlight is that masculinities may have multiple rather than singular strategies, of which emotional attunement itself may be one such strategy of symbolic violence. In opposition to McCormack’s (McCormack and Anderson 2010; McCormack 2011a; 2011b) insights on ‘declining’ homophobia, a renegotiation of masculinities may not necessarily indicate that “the near-total absence of discursive marginalisation and physical domination means that the social mechanisms that produce a hegemonic form of masculinity are not present” (McCormack 2011a: 352). It may indicate instead (as Connell’s initial concept makes explicit), that the strategies are fluid.

As noted in Chapters 5 and 6, emotional authenticity was considered important in music preference and there was a rejection of music which demonstrated no or little emotional authenticity. This also happened to be music which has been arguably, discursively ‘feminised’ in many ways (namely chart and pop music), leading one survey respondent to categorise contemporary pop music as ‘silly girls screaming’. In this way, ‘real’ emotion becomes counterposed to fake ‘feminine’ hysteria (‘silly girls’ screaming or ‘too girly’); emotional authenticity becomes a discursive arrangement of power relations (Adorno 2003).

As Connell has already noted, physical toughness, often seen as the antipode of sensitivity and emotionality, may be a visible but not necessarily economically or politically powerful exercise of power (Connell 1995: 77). This is where Bourdieu’s notion of symbolic violence compliments Connell’s insights. It is not, Bourdieu argues, physical domination which guarantees privilege but the means by which the repressed are symbolically excluded (Bourdieu 2001). The truly powerful do not necessarily undertake the direct physical violence which legitimates the excise of power, at least not in their immediate daily lives (Connell 1998; Connell and Messerschmidt 2005; Connell and Wood 2005), even if they invoke masculinist narratives of toughness (Higate and Hopton 2005: 443).

The fact that the sample generated through the online survey were largely from white British, higher socio-economic backgrounds, may say more about middle class masculinities than more egalitarian gender relations. As Segal (1990) notes middle class men have often been characterised as more sensitive, caring and compassionate than ‘hardened’ versions of working class masculinities. The same complications which proclaimed the ‘new man’, who was ‘sensitive and tough at the same time’, or the metrosexual (Simpson 1994), as moves toward gender equality also apply here. This is again, as outlined in the very first chapter, a problem of universalist conceptions of
‘masculinity’ as a singular ethos and, as Edwards (2006) clearly demonstrates, the ‘new man’ did little to change overarching sexual inequalities despite its presentation as such (see also Connell 1993).

**Between Subjectivities and Stereotypes**

Masculinities enacted through emotional use of music then, are not necessarily progressive in the sense that they challenge currently accepted strategies of exclusion (as opposed to Connell’s notion of the ‘currently accepted answer to the legitimation of the problem of patriarchy’). As already noted, the rejection of inauthentic music based on a lack of emotion contained within is arguably heavily gendered (Leonard 2007). The symbolic denigration of ‘feminised’ music is something McRobbie and Garber (1975) noted in their discussion of ‘teeny boppers’ and which Davies (2001: 302) makes explicit in relation to how female artists are discussed in the British rock press.

As Chapters 5 and 6 demonstrated, respondents also tended to denigrate music which had historical connections with ‘black culture’. Perhaps inadvertently, some tended to caricature music which they disliked as overly sexualised or misogynistic, with very little qualification. This is revealing inasmuch as it demonstrated the relationality of respondents own sense of identities. Given that, as outlined in Chapter 3, a particular focus on the black male body has been used to discursively link certain forms of music to raw emotions, as the ‘uncivilized’ property of the human body, the ethnocentric nature of the data is in accord with Connell’s fundamental insight that gender is exercised in relation to others. As Bourdieu (1984: 56) also notes “when they have to be justified, [tastes] are asserted purely negatively by the refusal of other tastes”, regardless of whether they are imaginary; this is key to social reproduction.

Strong sentiments against ‘rap’, ‘hip hop’, ‘grime’ and ‘R&B’ were expressed in Chapters 5 and 6; music often perceived as black culture. As Weitzer and Kubrin (2009) note, rap especially has been connected to the backlash against feminism (Collins 2000) and is often presented as legitimating physical violence (Weitzer and Kubrin 2009: 17-18). They also highlight that rap music is not always overtly misogynistic, but is often perceived as such with vague reference to stereotypical beliefs. Such discourses in music are often presented at odds with the rational, white, middle class male (Forth 2008: 227) and undoubtedly this can be linked to both a racial and class oriented related othering of certain social aesthetics or assumptions about musical content.
Respondents aged 16-24 were generally more likely to rate so-called ‘negative’ emotions higher than other age groups, in response to how the music they chose to listen to made them feel. Whilst overall respondents were unlikely to rate anger or aggression as highly as ‘positive’ emotions, significantly more people who disliked ‘thrash’, ‘hardcore punk’ or ‘metal’ also disliked music because it was aggressive or angry. This indicates similarly subjective judgments around music which, as indicated in Chapter 3, is often the focus of media moral panics.

As already suggested, the idea that ‘positive’ emotions are more closely related to music listening than ‘negative’ emotions, is largely in accord with both Illouz’s (2007) notion of emotional capitalism and Adorno and Horkheimer’s (1997 [1947]) explanation for the success of the culture industry and thus instrumental rationality (see Chapter 2). It could also be inferred then that the reason for disliking aggressive and angry music is due to its discursive blurring with ‘unproductive’, destructive and ‘irrational’ emotional states. Again, such judgments are often made on the basis of stereotypes around the types of people, as well as attention to culturally prescribed musicological characteristics. There is here a rejection of musical styles, and therefore imaginary types, which emphasise certain emotional states and behaviours which, as Forth (2008: 42) demonstrates, have historically been rejected by a specific version of ‘civic middle-class masculinity’.

As Ahmed (2010a) has also argued, the idea of becoming affected also does not always rely on direct social experience. She has suggested that actually there is an anticipation of being affected by certain events and circumstances, which causes actors to attempt to minimise, or avoid altogether, certain stimuli which may bring about adverse affects. Respondents perceptions of what they disliked appear often based on the idea that certain music has no effect or may have produced a ‘negative’ affective response.

To reiterate, value judgments about certain music types are also indicative of the relational nature of the social relations which constitute masculinities. However this is not to say that those who exercise judgments around other imagined subjectivities, based on stereotypes, necessarily constitute a coherent group or type themselves, any more than those they are making judgments about. Younger respondents were more likely to rate ‘negative’ emotions higher, but they were also more likely to list a wider variety of different genres and types that they disliked. This indicates a plurality of positions regardless of certain shared demographic characteristics. Whilst undoubtedly
the importance of analysing the types of music that respondents disliked reveals plurality of attitudes, quantitative analysis also outlines certain pervasive regularities, emphasising multiple strategies of symbolic exclusion. It is therefore, not accurate to suggest that by rendering the impossibility of emotional suppression explicit, that this in and of itself presents a wholesale challenge to gendered privilege.

**Empirical Limitations**

Empirically there are several caveats around the limitations of these findings which should be made explicit. The study’s main limitations are primarily that the sample generated throughout fieldwork is ethnocentric, predominantly heterocentric and organised around very definite occupational and socio-economic demographic groupings. This was not a deliberate attempt to exclude other demographic groups. Concerted efforts were made to recruit those from socio-economic groups C2-E and those who identified as ‘non-White’ and ‘non-heterosexual’. Quantitatively however the data presented here makes attempts to draw nationally representative generalisations impossible.

Whilst positivistic conceptions of generalisation were undesirable (see Chapter 4), given the cost and scale that achieving a full cross section of multiple, intersecting demographics would have involved, it is important to note that these findings cannot and should not be taken as an all-encompassing theory of masculinities. It makes no claim to the totality of social systems of male experience for many of the reasons already outlined in Chapters 1 and 4.

No doubt there are very specific class dynamics to both quantitative and qualitative respondents’ attitudes in Chapters 5 and 6. The importance that respondents attached to the role of father as carer (see Chapter 6), as opposed to sole breadwinner, has been linked in the U.K. to economic visions of middle class men (Scourfield and Drakeford 2002; Kilkey 2006). The politics of the emotionally nurturing, intimate father as the ‘good father’ has been clearly linked to middle class gender identities / performances (Segal 1990; Mann and Roseneil 1994; Hobson 2002; Johansson and Klinth 2008). It may be that certain emotional narratives are the manifestation of similar habitus, on the basis of class, which shape gendered narratives. As already outlined, Allen (2007) has suggested that subordinated strategies also become strategies of reinforcing domination.

What it does demonstrate however is that there are contradictions in contemporary understandings of rationality that have historically been attached to white, middle class,
male, bodies; taken arguably to be the most dominant archetype in Connell’s (1995) concept of hegemonic masculinity. The conception of rationality based on emotional disavowal which has historically accorded these groups privilege has then, either shifted significantly or been underestimated. This is due to a lack of empirical, sociological research focussing specifically on how males construct narratives around emotional experience in line with, rather in contrast to, masculinities.

Those who were more interested in music were potentially also more likely to respond to the survey and provide consent for participation in the life history sessions. The survey therefore does not give a full representation of subjective experience of either music or masculinities and may overstate the importance of music in challenging certain gendered assumptions. Whilst as argued in Chapter 3, music consumption and listening practices represent one of the most ubiquitous and historically diverse facets of the Culture Industry, the intensity and articulation that respondents displayed may have been amplified given the self-selecting nature of most social research methods.

What is more difficult to ascertain is whether this contradiction represents a shift in gender relations or merely the ‘commodification of emotionality’ (Illouz 2007), which posits emotional experience as a prerequisite for the expansion of capital. In this way, continuing unequal levels of consumption of emotional goods, such as music, by sex, may merely reflect continuing economic inequalities in society. Developing affective attachments to consumption patterns in this way, does little to disrupt power relations (Edwards 1997; Beynon 2002; Gill 2003; Edwards 2006). Again, as already highlighted, this could be a mainstreaming of certain practices rather than a fundamental resistance to configurations of power. Even if this is the case however, this thesis highlights music’s history in relation to the male body, including current methods of marketing music on the grounds that it is concerned so overtly with selling emotion. These stand at odds with theories of masculine rationality as a culturally omnipresent ideal which justifies male privilege.

Music was chosen due to its perceived relevance to a larger section of the population, however it was also clear that not everyone surveyed used music for managing or evoking emotional responses. Whilst only a few respondents in the survey explicitly said that music did ‘not affect them in any way’, entertainment also featured as a primary motivation for listening to music. This is in line with both Seidler’s (2006b) and Adorno and Horkheimer’s (1997 [1947]) treatises of Enlightenment rationality; pleasure is a physiological response but the maximisation of pleasure is always posited
as a rational endeavour (Krumhans 2002; Rickard 2004). As already outlined here, and in Chapter 6, such arguments do not however fit neatly with the complexities of different music uses and generalisations which are often casually made on the basis of normative conceptions of class, gender, sex, age, ethnicity or race should be treated very carefully.

**Summary**

What this chapter has suggested is a way of envisioning masculinities as both frameworks of power and affective attachments to those frameworks, which persist because of the deeply engrained relationship of affect to habitus. For the purposes of exploring gender, both habitus and affect provide a new means of theorising masculinities as exercises in ‘social embodiment’ (Connell and Messerschmidt 2005: 851). This approach stresses, as detailed in Chapter 2, that emotions are individual, physiological reactions but that they (and their associated affects) are mediated through structural and discursive forces, often finding resonance through linguistic expression (Seidler 2007). Indeed their intensely affective experience is often a primary result of their socially embodied nature. Thus individual choice and action are inextricable from social reproduction.

Affect however can be transformative as well as reproductive. This is fundamentally what Bourdieu’s notion of habitus and Connell’s concept of hegemonic masculinity lacks. Similarly it is important to account for age, not as an additive category of an ever-increasing list of intersectionalities, but as a fundamentally physiological process which greatly impacts on how males become affected (Latour 2004). This invariably shapes the discursive strategies by which they perform masculinities but also often leads to a fundamental reworking of many key beliefs.

What is clear is that many of those who participated in this research have clear conceptions of their own emotional lives. The methods outlined in Chapter 4 as a pragmatic means of exploring the topic, demonstrate that the assertion that males uncritically identify with rationality as emotional suppression is flawed (see Hearn 1993; Galasinski 2004). The reasons most commonly provided for disliking certain music was that there was either no emotional connection to it or that it evoked negative emotions. This however may be seen as a strategy in of itself in symbolically excluding certain groups. Despite Allen’s (2007) discussion of emotions in male relationships relying on a concept of ‘romantic masculinity’ as a type, she foregrounds a direct challenge to
profeminist arguments which suggest that emotional attunement is necessarily a progressive reworking of ‘masculinity’.

As Illouz (2007: 36, 58) has demonstrated, one of the impacts of second wave feminism was to facilitate a better understanding of self through emotions. However in seeing all emotions as *de facto* ‘unmasculine’, this veers precariously close to essentialising the binary opposition between emotions and rationality; a position critiqued throughout. As demonstrated in this and the previous chapter, the symbolic exclusion of music on the grounds that it demonstrated perceivably inauthentic emotions is also a means of reinforcing gendered power relations. Similarly seeing rap and hip hop as concerned more with sex than ‘true’ emotion invokes a range of problematic historical discourses around the black male body. To this end, the trends and patterns reflected in the course of this project may also be reflective of the sample’s ethnocentric and socioeconomic skew. Therefore it is important to reject the idea that this research can be generalised, in the positivistic sense, to an all encompassing theory of masculinities. Nevertheless, it does provide a new framework of exploring masculinities which attempts to move beyond the ‘only frameworks of power’ or the ‘only individual feelings’ dichotomy.
Conclusions

What this thesis set out to do was to demonstrate how subjective masculinities shape male emotional use of music. This was because, as Chapter 1 illustrated, social theorists have often tended to argue that one way men maintain privilege is through emotional suppression. This is problematic in no small part because it assumes a discursively masculinist view of what constitutes ‘emotionality’ (see Chapter 2), as well as a normative view of ‘masculinity’. Yet as Chapter 3 argued, music’s ubiquity is due to its emotional content and continues to be dominated by males in terms of production and consumption.

In order to address the research question outlined above, four specific sub-questions were identified in the introductory chapter. These were;

- What are the relationships between gendered practices and music preference?
- What are the different uses of music for males and how do these uses relate to constructions of masculinities?
- How are males’ understanding of ‘emotionality’ and emotional experience reflected in their uses of music?
- How do emotions shape music use for males and what are the key factors which influence male emotional use of music?

In order to provide a sufficiently detailed response, this chapter begins by taking each of the component questions in turn, grouping the findings into three main themes, (due to overlap between the third and fourth questions): the relationship between music and masculinities; general music uses; emotional uses of music. The chapter then outlines some benefits of using a concept of habitus for theorising masculinities, before concluding by re-stating why music is a particularly important means of engaging with the plurality of behaviours indicative of masculinities and thus male privilege.

Relationships between Gendered Practice and Music Preference

Chapter 5 highlighted that, when given the choice, respondents did not tend to state their music preferences in terms of genre. Instead many mentioned individual pieces or artists rather than specific genres. This contradicts many of the typology / taxonomy or subcultural approaches to music use identified in Chapter 3, demonstrating
that male use of music cannot be explained just in terms of personality correlates (North and Hargreaves 1999; North, Hargreaves and O'Neill 2000; Pearson and Dollinger 2004; Lonsdale and North 2011) or social psychological notions of sex role traits. Even where respondents appeared similar in their attitudes toward gendered behaviours, these were not predictors of music preference and therefore could not be attributed to types of masculinities.

However when respondents were asked about music they disliked, Chapters 5 and 6 showed that they were more likely to make reference to genres than when listing their own preferences. As suggested in Chapter 3, habitus is constructed as much in the disavowal of other tastes as in the affirmation of its own (Bourdieu 1984: 56), due to intersections of social positioning (Davis 2008a: 83). It was important to note then that data indicated a frequent rejection of other subjectivities which were seen as too misogynistic (rap and hip hop), over-sexualised (R’n’B), aggressive (metal) or not authentic enough (pop). Such beliefs have historically discursive precedents in the rejection of ‘other’ bodies (see Chapter 3) and it appears as if there is a persistent class dynamic in constructing affective relationships toward ‘other’ musics.

Chapter 5 also demonstrated that there were statistically significant relationships between the motivations for disliking music and the types of music which respondents perceived themselves to dislike 49. As argued in Chapter 7 the fact that respondents tended to reject music which they had little interest in, because they believed that they would dislike it, suggested that strong affective commitments to certain aesthetics or practices continue to be defined in relation to others (Carrigan, Connell and Lee 1985; Connell 1995; Hearn 2004; Connell 2005; Hearn, Nordberg, Andersson et al. 2012), whether real or perceived, relying often on uninformed discursive strategies to support these claims.

There were significant differences in how music was used and viewed by demographic factors. These could be primarily attributed to age (see Chapter 5) with the declining importance in music’s homosocial function one of the most noticeable trends. Chapter 6 especially demonstrated that changing music use over time could be explained as a result of the importance attached to music’s homosocial function; particularly around the perceived incompatibility of public performance and private

49 It is worth noting that the phrase ‘perceived themselves to dislike’ is deliberately worded as such because respondents often did not listen to the music they claimed to dislike. Their perceptions were to a certain extent based on the anticipation of being affected in different ways (Ahmed 2010), indicative of value judgments around types of music and bodies (see Chapters 3, 5 and 7).
feeling due to the intensity of homosocial relationships at a younger age (see Chapter 7). A belief therefore in managing public performance through musical use is still consistent with a notion of the Cartesian subject because it relies on a conception of being able to regulate emotions through cognition alone (Seidler 2007). As outlined in Chapters 1 and 2, this is symptomatic of a mistaken belief that emotions and cognition are separate, according privilege to the latter.

As respondents’ circumstances changed, for example as they married, moved in with partners or had families, so too did the significance and effects of music on respondents. Therefore despite music’s clear (homo)social function (Straw 1997; Leonard 2007), its affectivity is shaped by individual as well as social circumstance. In focussing only on music’s social function, the transformative potential of music is often marginalised (Frith 2002; Watson 2011). Utilising a ‘post-Bourdieuian’ analysis of music (Prior 2011: 130) is important for understanding how music’s aesthetic qualities may be revolutionary as well as reproductive. Thus there was also a sense that respondents engaged in a process of discovering themselves, through music’s aesthetic sensibilities and it was a commonly acknowledged belief that the music itself had changed respondents in a variety of different ways, including developing respondents’ emotional lives (see Chapter 6). The decline in music’s use in explicitly public contexts should not, therefore, necessarily be taken as a marker of music’s declining importance.

Overall from the survey data, ‘love’, ‘physical intimacy’, ‘sex’ and ‘male friends’ were rated the highest of all the gendered attributes and ‘typically’ masculine behaviours, such as ‘being considered tough’ and ‘being considered physically strong’ appeared less important. As already highlighted in Chapters 5 and 7, placing more emphasis on love and physical intimacy than physical domination are compatible with a history of middle class masculinities particularly (Segal 1990; Petersen 1998; Forth 2008) and this does not in and of itself suggest that respondents were enacting ‘softer’ or more egalitarian forms of gendered practice. It was significant that ‘showing emotions publicly’ was ranked the second lowest attribute in terms of importance. This indicates that despite a clear desire to engage with music for its emotional content, in line with a Cartesian view of ‘masculinity’, many respondents may still have been uncomfortable with the idea of publicly expressing emotions. This is corroborated by some of the data presented in Chapter 7 whereby respondents explained how they used music privately to ‘deal with’ emotions that they could not publicly express.
Gendered attributes did not necessarily predict the reasons provided for music preference in the survey data (see Chapter 5) and the strongest differences in terms of the importance attached to gendered behaviours were attributed to differences in age. As Chapter 7 noted however, there may also be a specifically middle class dynamic to these general trends. Given that respondents were from similar socio-economic groups, the dynamic of age particularly complicates the idea of masculinities as a passive identification with an unchanging ‘masculine self concept’ (Solomon and Szwabo 1994: 45).

As already observed, the importance of male friends was significantly higher amongst younger respondents. However most striking was perhaps the observation that sex seemed to be less important to younger respondents (see Chapter 5). There were also significant differences in that full time students rated sex lower than non students, supporting Flood’s (2008: 346) observation that universities may be perceived as less intensively ‘policed’ in many respects, than schools. This again may indicate that it is homosocial rather than heteronormative configurations which are important to the means by which masculinities are shaped and reshaped through the locus of habitus and field.

**Music’s Uses**

The affective fluidity of gender was reflected in music’s socio-temporal and spatial dynamics (Wood, Duffy and Smith 2007). Where, when and how respondents listened to music changed over the course of their lives reflecting changing circumstances. As already noted, age had a significant impact particularly on music’s publicly social function. This was primarily expressed in the way that respondents felt less need to listen to music simply because their peers enjoyed it (see Chapter 6) and acknowledged that they placed less emphasis on building friendships around music. This may have explained why younger respondents particularly (in the survey data), were more likely to listen to music in most places with friends as well as in public places more generally. Respondents’ teenage or adolescent years were most commonly cited as the period when music was particularly significant (see Fig 12. Appendix 3).

Older respondents with partners or families were more likely to listen alone than with their partners or families (see Chapter 5). This was often explained with reference to only being able to listen to *their* music when family members were not present or their families being ‘less into’ music (see Chapter 6). In the latter case a distinction
between good and bad music was often invoked, as was the narrative that music listening was a solitary act because it was firmly a part of the individual’s identity. Older respondents were also significantly more likely to listen to music in sheds and garages, spaces which may be considered symbolically ‘masculinised’ due to the connotative aspects of technology and labour (Morgan, Hayes, Williamson et al. 2007; Siegelbaum 2009). Aside from being more likely to own property than younger respondents, this also signified the declining social aspect of music and, again, the above point that music became seen as more personal with age precisely because it was perceived as less influenced by peers (see Chapter 6).

However, despite the perception of personal choice alone, the life history case studies’ music preferences also changed over time, in line with what was succinctly described as ‘the energy required to take it’ (see Chapter 6). There was often an acknowledgement that embodiment and music were fundamentally intertwined and that the process of aging, as well as the discursive judgments outlined above, were reflected in the corporeal habitus. For example the type of music integral to clubs or discos became less important with age as the clubs themselves became less important for respondents.

Thus the affective pleasure of certain types of music changed in line with respondents social experience as they learnt to become affected in different ways (Latour 2004). This also means that specific motivations for listening to even the same pieces of music also changed over the course of the case studies’ lifetimes, indicating the malleability of affective experience and the affective system (Tomkins 1962; Sedgwick 2003). This demonstrates shifting affective attachments to gendered practices over time, foregrounding the importance of embodiment in gendered practice.

Unsurprisingly then, there were also significant age differences in the open ended survey responses around listening to music for nostalgic purposes and even more around when music had been particularly significant. In Chapter 6 it was demonstrated how all the respondents connected certain music with memories but that these initial connections were not predictors of the affective response over time. For example John and Ian both found it painful to listen to music which reminded them of their parents, whereas Tom and Joel actively engaged with music which reminded them of their siblings in order to immerse themselves in that experience. However with the latter two cases, after Tom’s sister’s death and Joel’s brother’s near-fatal car crash, the music stopped assuming the same significance.
Whilst ‘relaxation’, ‘background noise’ and ‘pleasure’ also featured highly as a motivation for listening to music (see Fig 6a Appendix 3 and Chapter 5), entertainment by comparison was mentioned less frequently. Predominantly however respondents chose to listen to music because it elicited or maintained an emotional response, mood or feeling. This finding supports the case made in the introductory chapter; that music is viewed as “the cultural material par excellence of emotion” (Denora 2000: 46), challenging the idea that males (especially those who may be considered culturally middle class) necessarily understand masculinities as adherence to the idea of the Cartesian subject. That a significant minority cited emotions as a primary motivator for specific musical preference, despite similar attitudes toward gendered attributes, indicates this to be the case.

As highlighted in Chapter 2 men’s emotional lives have been addressed (Hollway 1984; Hearn 1987; Segal 1990; Hollway 1991; Duncombe and Marsden 1993; Hearn 1993; Seidler 1994; Thompson 1997; Galasinski 2004; Seidler 2006a; Allen 2007; Seidler 2007; Branney and White 2008; White and Peretz 2009; Forrest 2010; Monaghan and Robertson 2012; Robertson and Monaghan 2012). What was important to note during this research however, was that there were qualitative differences in the way that emotions were discussed and that these demonstrated how masculinities are consciously negotiated through, rather than in opposition to, emotions. This highlights the call, made at the end of Chapter 2, for a gender-specific framework in addressing the social construction of emotion and affect.

**Key Factors Influencing Male Emotional Use of Music**

The way in which emotions were discussed by the life history respondents, in relation to music, revealed two prevailing discourses; one of emotional management or catharsis and one of emotional stimulation. This offers a corrective to the concept of emotionality understood as only ‘feminised’ display (Fischer 1993) and, in the survey, ‘positive’ emotions and feelings (happiness, joy, pleasure, excitement) were the most highly rated motivations for choosing to listen to music. By comparison, sadness, depression, anger and aggression were rated much lower. As outlined in Chapters 5, 6 and 7, the idea of music listening encouraging ‘positive’ emotions is congruous with an Enlightenment model of ‘masculinity’ because these may be considered productive. As also explained in Chapters 1 and 2, the desire to repress so-called ‘negative’ emotions can be linked to medical histories of the female body and rationality as the ‘natural’

My research suggests that this is too simplistic a view of how emotional experience and masculinities intersect. Firstly there were significant differences by age in the survey responses and ‘negative’ emotions were significantly more likely to be rated highly by younger than older respondents (see Chapter 5). As detailed above homosocial interaction was judged to be more intense by respondents when they were younger. This explained the perceived separation of public and private music tastes. The examples of how Tom and Joel dealt with grief privately when they were younger, in response to specific events, exemplifies this. This challenges both the idea that all males (as opposed to men) identify with the Cartesian model of emotional restraint and secondly the idea that there is an inevitably linear progression from youth to adulthood. Chapter 7 addressed this latter point specifically, noting that those from ostensibly similar socio-economic, racial and ethnic backgrounds may not necessarily share the same beliefs around gender; thus age needs to be a much more prominent feature in studies of masculinities, particularly around issues of embodiment.

Respondents’ emotional use of music at different points in their lives was also reflected in both social and individual circumstances. As indicated in Chapter 2, many authors have talked about men’s responses to grief, loss and emotional anxiety through focussing on the dominant notion that males are not ‘supposed’ to outwardly exhibit emotion. It is important to note that death was a commonly mentioned occurrence where respondents used music to help them cope (see Chapters 5 and 6). This was reflected in the life history narratives presented in Chapter 6, whereby respondents used music as a way of coping with the ‘negative’ emotions associated with loss (for a thorough discussion of men's coping strategies in response to death see Thompson 1997; McNess 2008). As Joel claimed he ‘really struggled dealing with how [he] was feeling’ after his brother’s car crash and music ‘helped him’. Similarly, a few survey respondents claimed that music ‘helped me get to grips with my emotions’ after the death of a friend or that it ‘was a release and helped me’ in relation to illness. In this respect music became cathartic which, again, is compatible with a vision of the Cartesian body; of rationally discarding ‘unproductive’ affects and emotions (Seidler 1994; 2007).

However whilst there was overwhelmingly a stress on ‘positive’ emotions, ‘negative’ emotions were not always defined pejoratively. Chapter 6 illustrated that, particularly in relation to grief or anxiety, there was a simultaneous desire to elicit and
to control emotions which may have been painful. There were also concerted efforts by all the life history case studies to engage in music which provoked feelings of sadness or, as Tom put, it ‘the desire to feel moved, even if it doesn’t put a smile on your face’. Whilst this has been partially explained with reference to the stress placed on homosociality amongst younger males, it is equally plausible that affective pleasure is also derived from engagement with ‘negative’ or ‘unproductive’ emotions. Adorno’s (1976) comments on the emotional listener offer some insight as to why, in rationalist, capitalist societies, introverted listening practices are a means of dealing with the kinds of demands for suppression, which are incongruous with human experience (see Chapters 3, 5 and 7).

On this point, what was also important to note is that there were judgments around authentic and inauthentic emotional content in music, in both the survey and the life history case studies. This was explained in Chapter 7 a means of excluding certain aesthetic subjectivities and music types, because they were perceived not to express ‘authentic’ emotions. This is why subcultural gender politics are not necessarily reconfigurations of gendered power relations, because they may be used to reject ‘inauthentic’ subjectivities. In this respect, the emotional use of music became a strategy for excluding others and this was particularly the case in relation to ‘pop’ music which, as outlined at the start of Chapter 3 is one of the only music genres which attracts similarly equal percentages of sales from both males and females. In this way, discourses of authenticity around emotional lives become a means of asserting power (Allen 2007), especially in the production of knowledge around what is and is not authentically emotional (Adorno 2003) 50. This suggests that even a deliberate engagement with ‘negative’ emotions may be seen as an effect of masculinities as configurations of power as well as a potentially transformative process; in other words, even ‘unproductive’ emotions are reproductive.

**Masculinities, Habitus and Male Emotional Use of Music**

One of the problems in making a claim to masculinities as emotional affectivities is that, as highlighted in Chapters 1 and 2, masculinities may come to be interpreted as only personal feelings of powerlessness or insecurity. Seidler’s (1994; 2006a; 2006b; 2007) sustained critique, that conceptualising masculinities as only

50 “In many cases the distinction between ... authentic and inauthentic, lies with the arbitrariness of definition, without in the least implying the relativity of truth ... Whatever is authentic in this concept also becomes so only under the perspective of something which is different from it” (Adorno 2003: 100-101).
frameworks of power leads to misunderstanding men’s emotional lives, is important. However such a position veers too close to shifting the focus ‘back to men’ (Hearn 2004: 50). This undermines continued economic and occupational inequalities, the political and educational privilege of certain males, aggregately high rates of violence committed by males against females and males, homophobia and misogyny, amongst other issues.

This thesis proposes that individual feelings of powerlessness and emotional anxiety, based on analysis of many of the respondents studied during this project, actually stem from the type of structural and discursive power that men enjoy. There can be no division then between ‘women’s structural versus men’s merely personal pain’ (Seidler 2006b: 97) because men’s personal pain is structurally and discursively reproduced. This goes some way to explaining, as noted in Chapters 5 and 6, why music was especially important to many of the respondents who took part in this research. It was because a public performance was fraught with inconsistencies that many retreated into using music to explore grief or sadness privately. Such behaviour is structurally sanctioned by the culture industry, as Adorno’s (1976) concept of emotional listening indicates, and is an inevitable part of privilege. Thus emotional experience (even affectively painful experience) is not incongruous with masculinities; it is an essential component.

What this thesis also suggests is that even ‘negative’ emotions, historically, discursively ‘feminised’ (see Chapters 1 and 2) can be deployed as a form of power. As demonstrated in Chapters 6 and 7, discourses of authenticity may be used to marginalise certain imaginary subject positions; for example, fans of ‘girly’ music (see Chapter 6). The stress on authenticity in music may be a means of deploying homosocial capital (Thornton 1995; Straw 1997; Moore 2002; Frith and Goodwin 2004; Washburne and Derno 2004) but what is also interesting is that there is a distinctly gendered dynamic to how emotion is constructed as authentic or inauthentic; something achieved at the exclusion of others.

Seeing all emotions as inherently transformative because they have a historically discursive relationship to the female body is problematic for two reasons: firstly it essentialises emotions as ‘feminine’; secondly it fails to account for how the divide between authentic and inauthentic emotions is itself bound up with gender-discursive practices. Again drawing on Illouz’s (2007) notion of emotional capitalism and Allen’s

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51 As noted in Chapter 1, Hearn (1987: 43) suggested that “just as within capitalism, certain capitalists will be powerless [or] may be killed off in the struggle for competition, so too are certain men within patriarchy”. 
(2007) concept of romantic masculinities has been useful in articulating this.

What an analysis of male emotional use of music has also illustrated is that habitus is best understood as a series of affective attachments to gendered practice. Through this conceptualization it is possible to reject a dualistic model of emotions as either biological impulse or socially linguistic constructions (see Chapter 2). This reading of habitus helps to challenge taxonomies of masculinities or static conceptions of gender, accommodating the potential for change as well as social reproduction (see Chapter 7). The uncritical identification with social structures and the difficulty in accounting for social change as well as reproduction, is something that Connell and Messerschmidt have critiqued the initial approach to ‘marginal masculinities’ for (2005: 848). This also extends to Bourdieu’s understanding of habitus (McNay 1999; Lovell 2000; Ashall 2002; McNay 2004). In the same way as hegemonic masculinity cannot be considered a type of person however, habitus should not be understood as a type of social category either (i.e. there is no middle class habitus or masculine habitus) or as unconsciously enacted habit (Moi 1991: 1022; Burkitt 2002: 227-228).

Calling rationality a discursive fallacy does little to change gender relations. What this thesis has demonstrated however is that masculinities clearly shape male emotional development and, in this case their emotional use of music, in multiple and complex ways. It is incorrect to say then, that Western masculinities encourage emotional suppression or repression. Through exposure to peer judgments or to circumstantial shifts, the types of emotions respondents connected with certain music and certain practices, diminished or increased over time. Due to the discursive gendering of some emotions however there were some that respondents were less willing to demonstrate in public in socially expectant ways (see Hearn 1987; 1993). However attempts to suppress what are considered ‘feminised’ displays, as Bourdieu (2001: 52) has noted, may be shaped by discursively ‘feminised’ emotions in the first place.

The figure of the Cartesian subject still has some resonance then and Enlightenment conceptions of rationality, as the perceived suppression of ‘negative’ emotions, are still adopted as a component of masculinities. However it is possible to demonstrate clearly how masculinities stand at odds with patterns of affective consumption and personal emotional narratives illustrated through the different uses of music. A profeminist, poststructuralist, gender-specific approach to understanding emotions, employed in this thesis within a sociological framework, highlights these
incompatibilities and demonstrates the impossibility of understanding masculinities as exercises in emotional suppression.

In utilising an online survey, which afforded the benefit of anonymity, my approach tried to look for broader structural regularities and linguistic similarities in respondents’ uses of music, before exploring these regularities through illustrative case studies. The survey was structured in such a way so as not to impose fixed meanings on respondents where possible and proceeded from the assumption that emotions should not be conceptualised as biological ‘facts’. Unlike social psychological approaches outlined in Chapter 2, it also meant understanding that emotional displays are not necessarily indicative of emotional lives. Developing a flexible, mixed methods approach, the qualitative stage allowed the emphasis to be on what was not explicitly said as much as what respondents perceived their motivations to be.

As noted in Chapters 4 and 7 however, theorising affect in the social sciences is difficult due to a stress on verbal cues. Future research into exploring masculinities as affectivities could expand on the approach outlined here to include a greater focus on non-verbal reactions. Potentially, a research design which enabled covert observation or visual methods, for example filming participants and observing how they react to music in different contexts, would offer some new insights into the semi-conscious dimension of affective impact.

‘It’s Only Music’

Culture, according to Gramsci’s notion of hegemony, serves an ideological function by perpetuating narratives around difference through cultural representations, making certain traits, bodies and behaviours appear ‘normal’ and/or ‘natural’. As already noted of hegemonic masculinity, when gendered representations correspond to institutional power, they aid in the reproduction of ‘masculine domination’. However also according to Gramsci, culture is also a means of articulating counter-hegemonic strategies, a position adopted through ‘subcultural’ accounts of music. In this respect music may be seen as ‘dialectically pragmatic’ (Demetriou 2001: 345) insofar as it constructs identities in relation to others (hip hop and jazz as too sexualised for certain white, middle class males) and enforces practices of symbolic exclusion (pop music’s manufactured emotion because it is perceived to have largely female audiences).

Adopting a Bourdieusian approach, as outlined in Chapter 3, is insufficient for fully explaining the affective impact of music on masculinities. In focusing solely on
music’s social function, as both Bourdieusian and Gramscian approaches do, it ignores how music is reflective of cultures but also actually acts as a catalyst for change (DeNora 2001; 2003a). As Denora (2001: 17) states “music may influence how people compose their bodies, how they conduct themselves, how they experience the passage of time, how they feel…about themselves, about others, and about situations”. In accepting that music has an emotionally affective impact however, and in seeing emotions and affective response as inseparable from cognitive / social action, it is possible to argue that music will impact on social and individual identities in a variety of ways.

It is vital to note that individual aesthetic experience is indicative of, and mediated through social identities. This is precisely why Adorno’s approach to musical sociology was favoured over an analysis of genre differences which, as Chapter 5 demonstrated, did not necessarily resonate with music preference. To trivialise music as ‘just entertainment’ or a tokenistic manifestation of unconscious social practice, not only fails to connect with its importance in shaping emotional management and stimulus (see Chapter 6), but it also strips it of any radical potential (Watson 2011). Adorno’s explicitly critical analysis of music, not as discrete categories, but as both socially coded and subjectively aesthetic (Jameson 2007) specifically allows a means of connecting gender to emotional and affective experience.

What is original about this piece of research is that it focuses explicitly on male emotional narratives through music, whilst retaining a firmly constructionist understanding of emotions and gender as shaped by affectively experienced biographical, as well as structural, shifts. It has employed quantitative methods, first to inductively observe structural trends (see Chapter 4) before carrying out in-depth qualitative analysis to illuminate these trends. Whilst using quantitative methods however, it has retained an ethically profeminist stance throughout in contending that male privilege, retained in part by the concept of emotional suppression, is a discursive fallacy. This is exemplified particularly well through the multiple ways in which masculinities are constructed in relation to specific musical histories. This thesis has therefore offered a new means of theorising gendered uses of music sociologically, which moves beyond music’s sole function in social production and reproduction.

Music’s potential for destabilising gendered domination should be located in self-reflexive, affective listening practices. Whilst the performance of ‘subcultural’ style is often taken as a focus or a marker of shifting gender relations, as noted in Chapter 3
subcultural performances may end up reinforcing those gendered practices and do very little to challenge the heteronormative, exploitative nature of the music industry. As argued here, it was only by breaking away from forming exclusionary groups based around shared genre categories that respondents actually felt freer in exploring their emotional lives. The stress on homosocial networks which are crucial in the reproduction of masculinities were experienced in many cases as restricting rather than allowing respondents freedom of expression. Thus the conformity of style and practice on which male dominated, musical subcultures rely, do not challenge gender relations.

Music stands apart from other cultural forms, in the respect that it has an enduring, complex, historic relationship to the male body (Stamou 2002; Gibson 2009; Leach 2009) and continues to be ubiquitously valorised primarily because of its connection to emotionality (see Chapter 3). Music taste is also indicative of social location and whilst it should not be treated objectively, as Bourdieu tends toward in Distinction, it can be used to demonstrate how constantly shifting habitus creates new and diminishes old affectivities.

Using music to raise the question of rationality as a discursively constructed, yet emotionally experienced phenomenon, is important given that it occupies a special place in both social and individual consciousness, in Western capitalist societies at least. Music is often particularly gendered in terms of audience, content, production and distribution, and aesthetic. Whilst it is necessary to be careful about making gendered aesthetic judgments, music’s ability to straddle both aesthetic and sociological focus and processes make it a useful means of thinking through male interaction with emotion. It is through wider engagement with life histories, that the shifts in attitudes over time, especially in the physiological and discursive impact of emotions connected, become apparent. What this provides is a clear means of understanding the fluidity of masculinities not only as structures of power or individual feelings of powerlessness, but as structures of affective attachments to socially patterned practices.

Expanding on the theoretical and methodological frameworks outlined throughout, there are several issues which could feed into future research. As noted there needs to be a more definite focus on what is meant by calls for men to be more emotionally articulate (hooks 2004b). This means widening definitions of emotion and affect in sociological research and not necessarily assuming that emotions represent a re-working of gender relations. Throughout this research I have referred to ‘positive’ and ‘negative’ emotions to convey how they were characterised in the literature and by
respondents. However looking specifically at the productive affects of ‘negative’ emotions in transforming rather than undermining masculinities can be developed further. This is what Probyn’s (2004a; 2004b) and Sedgwick’s (2003) analyses can contribute to an analysis of masculinities specifically.

Shifting focus away from the homosocial function or performance of music, as both ‘subcultural’ and gender theorists have tended toward, also offers new ways of conceptualising music sociologically; especially in understanding culture’s role in relation to gender. This is what a particular reading of Adorno offers in relation to music (DeNora 2003a). Framing emotions as integral to masculinities have potential benefits for men’s health (Robertson 2007; Branney and White 2008; Robertson and Monaghan 2012) and existing programmes such as Music in Prisons (Musicinprisons.org.uk 2012) look at how music can offer help in extreme cases of emotional abuse. There is certainly scope for looking at how music use is indicative of social or individual issues. This may be particularly the case with younger males who, as demonstrated in Chapters 5 and 6, tended more to use music as a means of ‘dealing’ with emotions (see also Kindlon and Thompson 1999; Oransky and Marecek 2009).

Finally, in demonstrating that masculinities and emotions can be better understood through reflexively questioning musical life-histories however, this is not, as Seidler critiques Connell for, a case for help in the therapeutic sense. It should be made apparent that this project does not suggest music is about ‘eradicating’ emotions. Rather it is a question of engaging with music as a fundamental aspect of day-to-day life which offers a means to understand those emotions, in an effort to transform the way future research understands the intersections between masculinities, males and emotions.

52 Founded in 1995, the website states that “Music in Prisons provides positive learning experiences that can act as a vital catalyst in the process of rehabilitation and the development of the life skills needed for prisoners to become valuable members of their communities” (Musicinprisons.org.uk 2012). The projects the scheme sets up aims to use music to direct and ‘rehabilitate’ those who have suffered from a variety of issues leading up to their incarceration.
Appendix 1

Thank you for taking part in this survey which is being conducted as part of a doctoral research project at the University of Leeds, about music tastes and attitudes. The survey should take around 10 minutes to complete. Any information you provide is strictly confidential and will not be passed to any third parties.

1. Sex
   - Male
   - Female

2. Age
   - Under 16
   - 16-19
   - 20-24
   - 25-35
   - 36-40
   - 41-50
   - 51-64
   - 65+

3. What is your current occupation? PLEASE PICK ONE ONLY
   (If you have been unemployed for less than 6 months, please think back to the last job before that)
   - Higher managerial, administrative, professional (e.g. Chief executive, senior civil servant, surgeon)
   - Intermediate managerial, administrative, professional (e.g. bank manager, teacher)
   - Supervisory, clerical, junior managerial (e.g. shop floor supervisor, bank clerk, sales person)
   - Skilled manual worker (e.g. plumber, carpenter)
   - Semi-skilled and unskilled manual workers (e.g. assembly line worker, refuse collector, messenger)
   - Casual labourer with no fixed term contract
   - Student in full time education
4. Are you financially dependent on your parents and/or living in a house owned by your parents?
- Yes
- No

5. And what are your parents’ current occupations? PLEASE PICK AS MANY AS APPLY (If a parent has been unemployed for less than 6 months, please think back to the last job before that)
- Higher managerial, administrative, professional (e.g. Chief executive, senior civil servant, surgeon)
- Intermediate managerial, administrative, professional (e.g. bank manager, teacher)
- Supervisory, clerical, junior managerial (e.g. shop floor supervisor, bank clerk, sales person)
- Skilled manual worker (e.g. plumber, carpenter)
- Semi-skilled and unskilled manual workers (e.g. assembly line worker, refuse collector, messenger)
- Casual labourer with no fixed term contract
- Student in full time education
- Unemployed for longer than 6 months
- Retired but living off a private pension
- Retired but living off a state pension only
- Don't know

7. How would you describe your ethnicity?

8. And of the following categories, which would you say is closest to how you would describe yourself? PLEASE PICK ONE ONLY
White / White British
White Irish
White Other
Asian / Asian British
Indian
Pakistani
Bangladeshi
Asian Other
Black / Black British
Black Caribbean
Black African
Black Other
Other (not mentioned above)

9. On a scale of 1 to 7 (7 being the most important and 1 being the least important), how important are the following things to you?

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<th>4</th>
<th>5</th>
<th>6</th>
<th>7 (Most)</th>
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<tr>
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<td>Being thought of as tough by other people</td>
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<td>Listening to music</td>
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<td>Female friends</td>
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<td>Playing / writing music</td>
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<td>Being thought of as sensitive by other people</td>
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<td>Being able to take care of myself if it comes to a fight</td>
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<td>Being seen as physically strong</td>
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<tr>
<td>Sex</td>
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<tr>
<td>Being seen as physically fit / healthy</td>
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<tr>
<td>Physical intimacy</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
10. Are you currently studying music within an educational institution or have you received any formal / classical music training over the age of 16?

☐ Yes
☐ No

11. What, if you had to choose, would you say are the main reasons you listen to music generally? Please list up to 3 reasons (think about the situations, places or times where you listen to music in most often and why you do this)

Reason 1.

Reason 2.

Reason 3.

12. Please list three of your favourite types or pieces of music that you have ever heard. This could be 3 pieces of music, or a mixture of bands, tracks and genres

Choice 1.

Choice 2.

Choice 3.

13. How does your first choice make you feel when you listen to it?


14. How does your second choice make you feel when you listen to it?


15. How does your third choice make you feel when you listen to it?


16. On a scale of 1-7 (7 being the most and 1 being the least), from the following, how does the music that you choose to listen to, make you feel?

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<th>1 (Least)</th>
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<th>4</th>
<th>5</th>
<th>6</th>
<th>7 (Most)</th>
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<tr>
<td>Sad</td>
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<td>Pleased</td>
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<td>Pumped up</td>
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<td>Afraid</td>
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<td>Depressed</td>
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<td>Excited</td>
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<td>Satisfied</td>
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<td>Less Alone</td>
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<td>Happy</td>
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<tr>
<td>Nostalgic</td>
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<td>Aggressive</td>
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<td>Joy</td>
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</table>
17. Where and with whom do you listen to music most often? PICK AS MANY AS APPLY

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Alone</th>
<th>With Friends / Housemates</th>
<th>With my Partner</th>
<th>With other Members of my family</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bedroom</td>
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<td>Special music room</td>
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<td>Kitchen</td>
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<td>Lounge</td>
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<td>The shed / garage</td>
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<td>The garden</td>
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<tr>
<td>Dining room</td>
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<tr>
<td>At club nights</td>
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<tr>
<td>At gigs</td>
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<tr>
<td>In bars</td>
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<tr>
<td>In the car</td>
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<tr>
<td>Gym / exercising outside</td>
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<tr>
<td>Other (please specify)</td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

18. When, in your lifetime, do you think music has been particularly important for you?
19. How important, would you say on a scale of 1-7 (7 being the most important and 1 being the least important), music is or has been for you in the following situations:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Event</th>
<th>1 (Least)</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>4</th>
<th>5</th>
<th>6</th>
<th>7 (Most)</th>
<th>N/A</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Breaking up with a partner</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Meeting a new partner</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Death of a friend or family member</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Birth of a child</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Starting a new job</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Going to university for the first time</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Meeting new friends</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moving to a new place (town, city, house)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Memories of parents or siblings</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

20. Is there any music that you particularly dislike?

- Yes  (go Q21)
- No   (go to Q22)

21. What music / tracks / bands / genres, if you had the choice, would you avoid listening to if you could help it? Please list up to 3 pieces of music / genres / tracks / bands as you feel appropriate

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Choice 1.</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Choice 2.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Choice 3.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
22. What, if you had to choose, would you say are the main reasons you don’t like some types of music? Please list up to 3 reasons

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Reason 1.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Reason 2.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Reason 3.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

23. Which, if any, of the following apply to you? PLEASE PICK AS MANY AS APPLY

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Description</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>I do not play any musical instrument or compose music of any kind</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I play a musical instrument in or sing for an orchestra</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I play a musical instrument or sing in a band / group which is organised by someone besides me or my band members</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I play a musical instrument or sing in a band which is organised by myself and / or my band members</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I compose written music using notation</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I can read and / or write notated music, but do not compose music</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I compose music on a laptop, computer, using software but cannot read or write music</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

24. Which of the following UK regions do you currently live in?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>North East</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North West</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yorkshire and the Humber</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>East Midlands</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>West Midlands</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>East of England</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>London</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South East</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South West</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wales</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Scotland</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Northern Ireland</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Country (please specify)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
25. How would you define your sexuality from the following list?

<p>| | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Heterosexual</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Homosexual</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bisexual</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

26. If you are interested in taking part in a paid face to face follow up to this research, please write your email address in the box below. All email addresses are strictly confidential and are stored on a password protected server.

Thank you for taking part in this project
Appendix 2

**Fig. 1. Age**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Age Range</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>16-19</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>12.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20-24</td>
<td>101</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25-35</td>
<td>112</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>36-40</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>6.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>41-50</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>8.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>51-64</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>361</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Fig. 2. And of the following categories, which would you say is closest to how you would describe yourself? PLEASE PICK ONE ONLY**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>White British</td>
<td>299</td>
<td>82.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>White Irish</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>3.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>White Other</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>8.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asian British</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>1.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indian</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pakistani</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asian Other</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Black British</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Black Caribbean</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other (not mentioned)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>361</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Fig. 3a. What is your current occupation? PLEASE PICK ONE ONLY (If you have been unemployed for less than 6 months, please think back to the last job before that)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Occupation</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Higher management, administrative, professional</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>3.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intermediate managerial, administrative, professional</td>
<td>104</td>
<td>28.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Supervisory, clerical, junior managerial</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>16.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Skilled manual labourer</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>1.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Semi skilled / unskilled manual</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Casual labourer (no fixed term contract)</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Student in full time education</td>
<td>163</td>
<td>45.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Self employed</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unemployed for longer than 6 months</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Retired private pension</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Don’t know</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>361</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
**Fig. 3b.** Student status grouped

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Student in full time education</td>
<td>163</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not student in full time education</td>
<td>198</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>361</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Fig. 3c.** Are you financially dependent on your parents and / or living in a house owned by your parents?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>97</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>264</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>361</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Fig. 3d.** Number of students who are financially dependent on or living with their parents

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Student in full time education</td>
<td>75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not student in full time education</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>97</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Fig. 4a.** How would you define your sexuality from the following list?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Heterosexual</td>
<td>303</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Homosexual</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bisexual</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prefer not to say</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>361</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Fig. 4b.** Sexuality grouped

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Heterosexual</td>
<td>303</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non Heterosexual</td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prefer not to Say</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>361</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
**Fig. 5a. Which of the following UK regions do you currently live in?**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Non UK Resident</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>3.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North East</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North West</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>4.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yorkshire and the Humber</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>17.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>East Midlands</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>7.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>West Midlands</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>6.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>East of England</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>8.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>London</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>7.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South East</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>13.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South West</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>10.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wales</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>8.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Scotland</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>11.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Don’t Know</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>361</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Fig. 5b. Regions grouped**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Non UK / Don’t Know</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>3.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North England</td>
<td>81</td>
<td>22.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Midlands and East</td>
<td>81</td>
<td>22.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>London and South</td>
<td>113</td>
<td>31.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wales</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>8.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Scotland</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>11.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>361</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Fig. 6. Are you currently studying music within an educational institution or have you received any formal / classical music training over the age of 16?**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Training Type</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Received formal training after age of 16</td>
<td>95</td>
<td>26.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Did not receive formal training after age of 16</td>
<td>266</td>
<td>73.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>361</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Appendix 3

Fig. 1a. On a scale of 1 to 7 (7 being the most important and 1 being the least important), how important are the following things to you? % of respondents who rated each attribute

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>(n=361)</th>
<th>Love</th>
<th>Physical Intimacy</th>
<th>Sex</th>
<th>Male Friends</th>
<th>Female Friends</th>
<th>Romance</th>
<th>Being Considered Physically Fit</th>
<th>Being Considered Sensitive</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Low (1-3)</td>
<td>10.0</td>
<td>12.5</td>
<td>14.4</td>
<td>13.6</td>
<td>17.7</td>
<td>20.8</td>
<td>29.6</td>
<td>34.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medium (4)</td>
<td>6.9</td>
<td>14.7</td>
<td>14.7</td>
<td>16.9</td>
<td>16.9</td>
<td>16.1</td>
<td>20.2</td>
<td>25.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High (5-7)</td>
<td>83.1</td>
<td>72.9</td>
<td>70.9</td>
<td>69.5</td>
<td>65.4</td>
<td>63.2</td>
<td>50.1</td>
<td>39.9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Watching Sport</th>
<th>Playing Sport</th>
<th>Able to take care in a fight</th>
<th>Drinking</th>
<th>Being Considered Physically Strong</th>
<th>Showing Emotions Publicly</th>
<th>Being Considered Tough</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Low (1-3)</td>
<td>46.3</td>
<td>52.4</td>
<td>48.5</td>
<td>48.8</td>
<td>59.0</td>
<td>60.1</td>
<td>78.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medium (4)</td>
<td>15.5</td>
<td>13.9</td>
<td>18.6</td>
<td>19.7</td>
<td>21.3</td>
<td>26.3</td>
<td>11.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High (5-7)</td>
<td>38.2</td>
<td>33.8</td>
<td>33.0</td>
<td>31.6</td>
<td>19.7</td>
<td>13.6</td>
<td>10.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Fig. 1b. On a scale of 1 to 7 (7 being the most important and 1 being the least important), how important are the following things to you?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>p values</th>
<th>Age</th>
<th>Sexuality</th>
<th>U.K. Region</th>
<th>Student or not</th>
<th>Music Education</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Love</td>
<td>.032*</td>
<td>.190</td>
<td>.967</td>
<td>.095</td>
<td>.433</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Male Friends</td>
<td>.001*</td>
<td>.297</td>
<td>.365</td>
<td>.001*</td>
<td>.287</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sex</td>
<td>.001*</td>
<td>.031*</td>
<td>.817</td>
<td>.209</td>
<td>.524</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Watching Sport</td>
<td>.001*</td>
<td>.000**</td>
<td>.904</td>
<td>.000**</td>
<td>.001*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Listening to Music</td>
<td>.887</td>
<td>.325</td>
<td>.445</td>
<td>.163</td>
<td>.212</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Physical Intimacy</td>
<td>.183</td>
<td>.181</td>
<td>.461</td>
<td>.831</td>
<td>.836</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female Friends</td>
<td>.156</td>
<td>.346</td>
<td>.692</td>
<td>.039*</td>
<td>.299</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Romance</td>
<td>.129</td>
<td>.101</td>
<td>.987</td>
<td>.288</td>
<td>.706</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Playing Music</td>
<td>.603</td>
<td>.677</td>
<td>.282</td>
<td>.088</td>
<td>.000**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Being Considered Physically Fit</td>
<td>.222</td>
<td>.895</td>
<td>.447</td>
<td>.853</td>
<td>.234</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Being Considered Sensitive</td>
<td>.083</td>
<td>.289</td>
<td>.762</td>
<td>.236</td>
<td>.152</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Playing Sport</td>
<td>.062</td>
<td>.002</td>
<td>.504</td>
<td>.114</td>
<td>.198</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Able to take care in a fight</td>
<td>.089</td>
<td>.660</td>
<td>.041*</td>
<td>.170</td>
<td>.051</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Drinking</td>
<td>.162</td>
<td>.966</td>
<td>.697</td>
<td>.396</td>
<td>.203</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Being Considered Physically Strong</td>
<td>.448</td>
<td>.591</td>
<td>.897</td>
<td>.778</td>
<td>.040*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Showing Emotions Publicly</td>
<td>.766</td>
<td>.580</td>
<td>.031*</td>
<td>.834</td>
<td>.530</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Being Considered Tough</td>
<td>.758</td>
<td>.599</td>
<td>.584</td>
<td>.417</td>
<td>.336</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: ** indicates significance at p<=.001. * indicates significance at p<=.050
**Fig. 2** On a scale of 1 to 7 (7 being the most important and 1 being the least important), how important are the following things to you? % within age group who rated each attribute from 5-7

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Age</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>16-19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Love</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>High (5-7)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>82</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Male Friends</td>
<td>High (5-7)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sex</td>
<td>High (5-7)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Watching Sport</td>
<td>High (5-7)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Count</td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Fig. 3.** Are you currently studying music within an educational institution or have you received any formal / classical music training over the age of 16? % within age group

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Age</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>16-19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Received formal training</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Did not receive formal training</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Count</td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Fig. 4.** On a scale of 1 to 7 (7 being the most important and 1 being the least important), how important are the following things to you?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>p value</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Age</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Listening to Music</td>
<td>.887</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Playing Music</td>
<td>.603</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: ** indicates significance at p=.001. * indicates significance at p=.050
**Fig. 5a.** Which, if any, of the following apply to you? PLEASE PICK AS MANY AS APPLY

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Age</th>
<th>Sexuality</th>
<th>Region</th>
<th>Student</th>
<th>Music Education</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>I do not play any musical instrument or compose music of any kind</td>
<td>.007*</td>
<td>.675</td>
<td>.167</td>
<td>.005*</td>
<td>.000**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I play a musical instrument or sing in a band which is organised by myself and/or my band members</td>
<td>.091</td>
<td>.632</td>
<td>.325</td>
<td>.067</td>
<td>.000*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I can read and/or write notated music, but do not compose music</td>
<td>.460</td>
<td>.113</td>
<td>.034*</td>
<td>.146</td>
<td>.000**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I play a musical instrument in or sing for an orchestra</td>
<td>.034*</td>
<td>.000**</td>
<td>.003*</td>
<td>.155</td>
<td>.000**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I compose written music using notation</td>
<td>.000**</td>
<td>.056</td>
<td>.000**</td>
<td>.000**</td>
<td>.000**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I compose music on a laptop, computer, using software but cannot read or write music</td>
<td>.147</td>
<td>.637</td>
<td>.209</td>
<td>.070</td>
<td>.722</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I play a musical instrument or sing in a band/group which is organised by someone besides me or my band members</td>
<td>.248</td>
<td>.030*</td>
<td>.000**</td>
<td>.663</td>
<td>.000**</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: ** indicates significance at p<.001. * indicates significance at p<.050
### Fig. 5b. Which, if any, of the following apply to you? PLEASE PICK AS MANY AS APPLY. % within age group

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Activity</th>
<th>16-19</th>
<th>20-24</th>
<th>25-35</th>
<th>36-40</th>
<th>41-50</th>
<th>51-64</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>I do not play any musical instrument or compose music of any kind</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I play a musical instrument or sing in a band which is organised by myself and / or my band members</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I can read and / or write notated music, but do not compose music</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I play a musical instrument in or sing for an orchestra</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I compose written music using notation</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>07</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>09</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I compose music on a laptop, computer, using software but cannot read or write music</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>08</td>
<td>03</td>
<td>09</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I play a musical instrument or sing in a band / group which is organised by someone besides me or my band members</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>06</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Count: 44 101 112 25 32 47 361

### Fig. 6a. What, if you had to choose, would you say are the main reasons you listen to music generally? Please list up to 3 reasons (think about the situations, places or times where you listen to music in most often and why you do this) – OPEN. % of total sample

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Reason</th>
<th>Specified creating or maintaining emotion / feeling / mood as a reason</th>
<th>Specified relaxation / chilling out as a reason</th>
<th>Specified background noise / relieve boredom / listening to music where another activity has been specifically mentioned</th>
<th>Specified pleasure / enjoyment / like or love music general as a reason</th>
<th>Specified entertainment / fun as a reason</th>
<th>Listen to music generally for nostalgic reasons (e.g. memories of growing up)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>% of total sample (n=361)</td>
<td>42.4</td>
<td>41.8</td>
<td>39.6</td>
<td>31.9</td>
<td>13.0</td>
<td>6.1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Fig. 6b. What, if you had to choose, would you say are the main reasons you listen to music generally? Please list up to 3 reasons (think about the situations, places or times where you listen to music in most often and why you do this) – OPEN

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Reason</th>
<th>Age</th>
<th>Sexuality</th>
<th>U.K. Region</th>
<th>Student</th>
<th>Music Education</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Specified creating or maintaining emotion / feeling / mood as a reason</td>
<td>.109</td>
<td>.468</td>
<td>.250</td>
<td>.006*</td>
<td>.366</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Specified relaxation / chilling out as a reason</td>
<td>.262</td>
<td>.310</td>
<td>.041*</td>
<td>.135</td>
<td>.507</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Listen to music generally for background noise / relieve boredom /</td>
<td>.355</td>
<td>.133</td>
<td>.881</td>
<td>.926</td>
<td>.105</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>listening to music where another activity has been specifically</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>mentioned</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Specified pleasure / enjoyment / like or love music general as a</td>
<td>.268</td>
<td>.133</td>
<td>.759</td>
<td>.638</td>
<td>.562</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>reason</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Specified entertainment / fun as a reason</td>
<td>.364</td>
<td>.739</td>
<td>.173</td>
<td>.485</td>
<td>.400</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Listen to music for nostalgic reasons</td>
<td>.307</td>
<td>.541</td>
<td>.599</td>
<td>.680</td>
<td>.916</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: ** indicates significance at p=<.001. * indicates significance at p=<.050

Fig. 7a. How does your first / second / third choice make you feel when you listen to it? – COMBINED. % of total sample

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Feeling / emotion</th>
<th>% of total sample (n=361)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Happy / content / related / fulfilled</td>
<td>41.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Empowered / strong / confident / assertive</td>
<td>36.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Energetic / energised / active / dancing</td>
<td>36.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nostalgic for people, places or times / nostalgic for aesthetic</td>
<td>28.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Emotional generally / alive / overwhelmed / uplifted</td>
<td>21.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Excited / euphoric / alive / overwhelmed / uplifted</td>
<td>13.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sad / melancholy / depressed</td>
<td>13.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
**Fig. 7b.** How does your first / second / third choice make you feel when you listen to it? COMBINED – OPEN

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Age</th>
<th>Sexuality</th>
<th>U.K. Region</th>
<th>Student</th>
<th>Music Education</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Happy / content / elated / fulfilled</td>
<td>.251</td>
<td>.989</td>
<td>.056</td>
<td>.413</td>
<td>.365</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Empowered / strong / confident / assertive</td>
<td>.239</td>
<td>.306</td>
<td>.087</td>
<td>.295</td>
<td>.325</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Energetic / energised / active / dancing mentioned / motivated</td>
<td>.187</td>
<td>.673</td>
<td>.406</td>
<td>.467</td>
<td>.005*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nostalgic for people, places or times / nostalgic for aesthetic</td>
<td>.041*</td>
<td>.435</td>
<td>.111</td>
<td>.187</td>
<td>.341</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Emotional generally</td>
<td>.933</td>
<td>.333</td>
<td>.609</td>
<td>.475</td>
<td>.473</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Excited / euphoric / alive / overwhelmed / uplifted</td>
<td>.795</td>
<td>.646</td>
<td>.081</td>
<td>.286</td>
<td>.170</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sad / melancholy / depressed</td>
<td>.098</td>
<td>.298</td>
<td>.274</td>
<td>.679</td>
<td>.354</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: ** indicates significance at p=<.001. * indicates significance at p=<.050

**Fig. 7c** How does your first / second / third choice make you feel when you listen to it? COMBINED - OPEN % within age group

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Age</th>
<th>16-19</th>
<th>20-24</th>
<th>25-35</th>
<th>36-40</th>
<th>41-50</th>
<th>51-64</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Listen to music specifically because it makes me nostalgic for people, places or times / nostalgic for aesthetic</td>
<td>13.64</td>
<td>24.75</td>
<td>37.50</td>
<td>36.00</td>
<td>21.88</td>
<td>25.53</td>
<td>27.98</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Count</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>101</td>
<td>112</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>361</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Fig. 8a.** On a scale of 1-7 (7 being the most and 1 being the least), from the following, how does the music that you choose to listen to, make you feel? % of respondents who answered (n=358)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>happy</th>
<th>joy</th>
<th>pleased</th>
<th>excited</th>
<th>sexy</th>
<th>nostalgic</th>
<th>satisfied</th>
<th>pumped</th>
<th>love</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Low (1-3)</td>
<td>8.1</td>
<td>8.4</td>
<td>10.1</td>
<td>13.7</td>
<td>18.4</td>
<td>20.1</td>
<td>17.5</td>
<td>23.5</td>
<td>31.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medium (4)</td>
<td>8.7</td>
<td>11.1</td>
<td>12.0</td>
<td>11.5</td>
<td>12.6</td>
<td>11.4</td>
<td>16.4</td>
<td>14.6</td>
<td>16.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High (5-7)</td>
<td>83.2</td>
<td>80.5</td>
<td>77.9</td>
<td>74.9</td>
<td>69.0</td>
<td>68.5</td>
<td>66.0</td>
<td>61.9</td>
<td>51.4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>less alone</th>
<th>sad</th>
<th>calm</th>
<th>lonely</th>
<th>depressed</th>
<th>aggressive</th>
<th>angry</th>
<th>afraid</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Low (1-3)</td>
<td>44.7</td>
<td>52.5</td>
<td>65.8</td>
<td>70.6</td>
<td>72.9</td>
<td>73.5</td>
<td>77.7</td>
<td>88.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medium (4)</td>
<td>12.8</td>
<td>16.5</td>
<td>12.9</td>
<td>8.4</td>
<td>9.5</td>
<td>9.2</td>
<td>7.0</td>
<td>5.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High (5-7)</td>
<td>42.5</td>
<td>31.0</td>
<td>21.3</td>
<td>21.0</td>
<td>17.6</td>
<td>17.3</td>
<td>15.4</td>
<td>6.1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Fig. 8b. On a scale of 1-7 (7 being the most and 1 being the least), from the following, how does the music that you choose to listen to, make you feel?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Age</th>
<th>Sexuality</th>
<th>U.K. Region</th>
<th>Student</th>
<th>Music Education</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Happy</strong></td>
<td>.446</td>
<td>.927</td>
<td>.087</td>
<td>.943</td>
<td>.223</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Joy</strong></td>
<td>.703</td>
<td>.054</td>
<td>.179</td>
<td>.929</td>
<td>.552</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Pleased</strong></td>
<td>.053</td>
<td>.013*</td>
<td>.210</td>
<td>.243</td>
<td>.335</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Excited</strong></td>
<td>.311</td>
<td>.207</td>
<td>.373</td>
<td>.617</td>
<td>.154</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Sexy</strong></td>
<td>.735</td>
<td>.922</td>
<td>.288</td>
<td>.843</td>
<td>.817</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Nostalgic</strong></td>
<td>.449</td>
<td>.116</td>
<td>.198</td>
<td>.684</td>
<td>.496</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Satisfied</strong></td>
<td>.139</td>
<td>.766</td>
<td>.255</td>
<td>.725</td>
<td>.166</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Pumped up</strong></td>
<td>.000**</td>
<td>.731</td>
<td>.761</td>
<td>.030*</td>
<td>.134</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Love</strong></td>
<td>.684</td>
<td>.992</td>
<td>.56</td>
<td>.258</td>
<td>.153</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Less alone</strong></td>
<td>.022*</td>
<td>.196</td>
<td>.95</td>
<td>.021*</td>
<td>.152</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Sad</strong></td>
<td>.025*</td>
<td>.129</td>
<td>.026*</td>
<td>.000**</td>
<td>.023*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Calm</strong></td>
<td>.645</td>
<td>.092</td>
<td>.624</td>
<td>.395</td>
<td>.735</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Lonely</strong></td>
<td>.007**</td>
<td>.915</td>
<td>.523</td>
<td>.012*</td>
<td>.073</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Depressed</strong></td>
<td>.000**</td>
<td>.259</td>
<td>.698</td>
<td>.000**</td>
<td>.016*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Agressive</strong></td>
<td>.041*</td>
<td>.973</td>
<td>.634</td>
<td>.499</td>
<td>.141</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Angry</strong></td>
<td>.002**</td>
<td>.572</td>
<td>.705</td>
<td>.019*</td>
<td>.083</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Afraid</strong></td>
<td>.478</td>
<td>.16</td>
<td>.223</td>
<td>.22</td>
<td>.035*</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: ** indicates significance at p=<.001. * indicates significance at p=<.050
### Fig. 8c. On a scale of 1-7 (7 being the most and 1 being the least), from the following, how does the music that you choose to listen to, make you feel? % of respondents who answered in each age group (n=358)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Age</th>
<th>16-19</th>
<th>20-24</th>
<th>25-35</th>
<th>36-40</th>
<th>41-50</th>
<th>51-64</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Happy</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High (5-7)</td>
<td>75.00</td>
<td>89.00</td>
<td>81.30</td>
<td>84.00</td>
<td>77.40</td>
<td>87.00</td>
<td>83.20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Joy</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High (5-7)</td>
<td>79.10</td>
<td>85.00</td>
<td>74.10</td>
<td>80.00</td>
<td>84.40</td>
<td>85.10</td>
<td>80.50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pleased</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High (5-7)</td>
<td>68.20</td>
<td>80.00</td>
<td>71.20</td>
<td>80.00</td>
<td>84.40</td>
<td>93.50</td>
<td>77.90</td>
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<tr>
<td>Excited</td>
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<tr>
<td>High (5-7)</td>
<td>70.50</td>
<td>83.00</td>
<td>72.30</td>
<td>76.00</td>
<td>62.50</td>
<td>75.60</td>
<td>74.90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sexy</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>High (5-7)</td>
<td>16.30</td>
<td>27.00</td>
<td>21.40</td>
<td>20.00</td>
<td>12.50</td>
<td>20.00</td>
<td>21.30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nostalgic</td>
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<tr>
<td>High (5-7)</td>
<td>59.10</td>
<td>71.00</td>
<td>72.30</td>
<td>76.00</td>
<td>59.40</td>
<td>65.20</td>
<td>68.50</td>
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<tr>
<td>Satisfied</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>High (5-7)</td>
<td>61.40</td>
<td>76.00</td>
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<td>60.00</td>
<td>56.30</td>
<td>78.30</td>
<td>66.00</td>
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<tr>
<td>Pumped up</td>
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<tr>
<td>High (5-7)</td>
<td>68.20</td>
<td>77.00</td>
<td>56.30</td>
<td>75.00</td>
<td>48.40</td>
<td>39.10</td>
<td>61.90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Love</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High (5-7)</td>
<td>55.80</td>
<td>57.00</td>
<td>50.90</td>
<td>44.00</td>
<td>34.40</td>
<td>52.30</td>
<td>51.40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Less alone</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>High (5-7)</td>
<td>41.90</td>
<td>55.00</td>
<td>38.40</td>
<td>48.00</td>
<td>28.10</td>
<td>32.60</td>
<td>42.50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sad</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High (5-7)</td>
<td>27.90</td>
<td>42.00</td>
<td>25.00</td>
<td>24.00</td>
<td>25.00</td>
<td>32.60</td>
<td>31.00</td>
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<tr>
<td>Calm</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>High (5-7)</td>
<td>63.60</td>
<td>75.00</td>
<td>63.10</td>
<td>72.00</td>
<td>65.60</td>
<td>76.10</td>
<td>69.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lonely</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High (5-7)</td>
<td>20.90</td>
<td>33.00</td>
<td>17.10</td>
<td>12.00</td>
<td>18.80</td>
<td>10.90</td>
<td>21.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Depressed</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High (5-7)</td>
<td>20.90</td>
<td>26.00</td>
<td>15.20</td>
<td>8.00</td>
<td>12.50</td>
<td>10.90</td>
<td>17.60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aggressive</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High (5-7)</td>
<td>23.30</td>
<td>25.00</td>
<td>17.00</td>
<td>12.00</td>
<td>12.50</td>
<td>2.20</td>
<td>17.30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Angry</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High (5-7)</td>
<td>23.30</td>
<td>23.00</td>
<td>16.10</td>
<td>4.00</td>
<td>3.10</td>
<td>4.30</td>
<td>15.40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Afraid</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High (5-7)</td>
<td>9.30</td>
<td>9.00</td>
<td>5.40</td>
<td>4.00</td>
<td>3.10</td>
<td>2.20</td>
<td>6.10</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Count**

|     | 44   | 100  | 112  | 25   | 32   | 45   | 358  |

### Fig. 9a. What music / tracks / bands / genres, if you had the choice, would you avoid listening to if you could help it? Please list up to 3 pieces of music / genres / tracks / bands as you feel appropriate - OPEN

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Pop / X Factor / boy or girl bands / chart music mentioned</th>
<th>Dance / techno / drum n bass mentioned</th>
<th>Rap / hip hop / grime mentioned</th>
<th>Metal / thrash mentioned</th>
<th>R’n’B mentioned</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>% of total sample (n=361)</td>
<td>40.4</td>
<td>25.2</td>
<td>24.7</td>
<td>18.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% of those who said they disliked any music or 'not sure' (n=307)</td>
<td>47.6</td>
<td>29.6</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>21.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
**Fig. 9b.** What music / tracks / bands / genres, if you had the choice, would you avoid listening to if you could help it? Please list up to 3 pieces of music / genres / tracks / bands as you feel appropriate - OPEN

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Music Category</th>
<th>p value</th>
<th>Age</th>
<th>Sexuality</th>
<th>U.K. Region</th>
<th>Student</th>
<th>Music Education</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Dance / techno / drum n bass mentioned</td>
<td>.213</td>
<td>.190</td>
<td>.467</td>
<td>.049*</td>
<td>.592</td>
<td>.474</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rap / hip hop / grime mentioned</td>
<td>.008**</td>
<td>.058</td>
<td>.021*</td>
<td>.349</td>
<td>.474</td>
<td>.416</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Metal / thrash mentioned</td>
<td>.000**</td>
<td>.045*</td>
<td>.568</td>
<td>.000**</td>
<td>.416</td>
<td>.823</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R'n'B mentioned</td>
<td>.008**</td>
<td>.685</td>
<td>.325</td>
<td>.576</td>
<td>.823</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: ** indicates significance at p=<.001  * indicates significance at p=<.050

**Fig. 9c.** What music / tracks / bands / genres, if you had the choice, would you avoid listening to if you could help it? Please list up to 3 pieces of music / genres / tracks / bands as you feel appropriate - OPEN

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Music Category</th>
<th>Age</th>
<th>Sexuality</th>
<th>U.K. Region</th>
<th>Student</th>
<th>Music Education</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Pop / X Factor / boy or girl bands / chart music mentioned</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dance / techno / drum n bass mentioned</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rap / hip hop / grime mentioned</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Metal / thrash mentioned</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R'n'B mentioned</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Count</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>101</td>
<td>112</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Fig. 10a.** Please list three of your favourite types or pieces of music that you have ever heard. This could be 3 pieces of music, or a mixture of bands, tracks and genres (% of total sample)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Mentioned band or group (not orchestra or symphony)</th>
<th>Mentioned individual piece</th>
<th>Mentioned genre</th>
<th>Mentioned individual artist</th>
<th>Mentioned composer</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>% of total sample (n=361)</td>
<td>63.4</td>
<td>53.5</td>
<td>46.8</td>
<td>39.1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
**Fig. 10b.** What music / tracks / bands / genres, if you had the choice, would you avoid listening to if you could help it? Please list up to 3 pieces of music / genres / tracks / bands as you feel appropriate

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Mentioned genre</th>
<th>Mentioned band or group (not orchestra or symphony)</th>
<th>Mentioned individual artist</th>
<th>Mentioned composer</th>
<th>Mentioned individual piece</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>% of total sample (n=361)</td>
<td>77.8</td>
<td>11.9</td>
<td>10.8</td>
<td>1.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% who said they disliked any type of music or 'not sure' (n=307)</td>
<td>91.5</td>
<td>14.0</td>
<td>12.7</td>
<td>1.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Fig. 11a.** What, if you had to choose, would you say are the main reasons you don’t like some types of music?
- **OPEN**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Reason</th>
<th>Manufactured / commercial / artificial</th>
<th>Boring / repetitive</th>
<th>Lacks creativity / originality</th>
<th>Lacks emotion / feeling / or soul</th>
<th>Because of lyrics</th>
<th>Aggressive / violent</th>
<th>Depressing / sad</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>% of total sample (n=361)</td>
<td>21.6</td>
<td>18.3</td>
<td>15.8</td>
<td>13.3</td>
<td>11.6</td>
<td>5.3</td>
<td>4.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% of those who said they disliked any music or 'not sure' (n=307)</td>
<td>25.4</td>
<td>21.5</td>
<td>18.6</td>
<td>15.6</td>
<td>13.7</td>
<td>6.2</td>
<td>4.9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Fig. 11b.** What, if you had to choose, would you say are the main reasons you don’t like some types of music?
- **OPEN**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Reason</th>
<th>Age</th>
<th>Sexuality</th>
<th>U.K. Region</th>
<th>Student</th>
<th>Music Education</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Manufactured / commercial / artificial</td>
<td>.043*</td>
<td>.069</td>
<td>.535</td>
<td>.18</td>
<td>.058</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Boring / repetitive</td>
<td>.017*</td>
<td>.519</td>
<td>.845</td>
<td>.049*</td>
<td>.040*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lacks creativity / originality</td>
<td>.134</td>
<td>.663</td>
<td>.412</td>
<td>.714</td>
<td>.512</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lacks emotion / feeling / or soul</td>
<td>.733</td>
<td>.112</td>
<td>.759</td>
<td>.405</td>
<td>.201</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Because of lyrics</td>
<td>.119</td>
<td>.575</td>
<td>.488</td>
<td>.046*</td>
<td>.444</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aggressive / violent</td>
<td>.658</td>
<td>.639</td>
<td>.65</td>
<td>.784</td>
<td>1.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Depressing / sad</td>
<td>.362</td>
<td>.224</td>
<td>.328</td>
<td>.087</td>
<td>.975</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: ** indicates significance at p=<.001. * indicates significance at p=<.050
Fig. 11c. What music / tracks / bands / genres, if you had the choice, would you avoid listening to if you could help it? Please list up to 3 pieces of music / genres / tracks / bands as you feel appropriate - OPEN; What, if you had to choose, would you say are the main reasons you don’t like some types of music? Please list up to 3 reasons - OPEN (% amongst those who mentioned specific music type)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Pop / X Factor / boy or girl bands / chart music mentioned</th>
<th>Dance / techno / drum n bass mentioned</th>
<th>Rap / hip hop / grime mentioned</th>
<th>Metal / thrash mentioned</th>
<th>R’n’B mentioned</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Manufactured / commercial / artificial</td>
<td>43.2</td>
<td>20.9</td>
<td>20.2</td>
<td>13.6</td>
<td>38.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Boring / repetitive</td>
<td>19.2</td>
<td>26.4</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>15.2</td>
<td>27.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lacks creativity / originality</td>
<td>25.3</td>
<td>24.2</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>16.7</td>
<td>21.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lacks emotion / feeling / or soul</td>
<td>22.6</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>19.1</td>
<td>9.1</td>
<td>14.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Because of lyrics</td>
<td>10.3</td>
<td>8.8</td>
<td>22.5</td>
<td>13.6</td>
<td>12.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aggressive / violent</td>
<td>4.1</td>
<td>9.9</td>
<td>10.1</td>
<td>16.7</td>
<td>4.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Depressing / sad</td>
<td>3.4</td>
<td>3.3</td>
<td>3.4</td>
<td>6.1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Count: 146 91 89 66 47

Fig. 11d. What music / tracks / bands / genres, if you had the choice, would you avoid listening to if you could help it? Please list up to 3 pieces of music / genres / tracks / bands as you feel appropriate - OPEN; What, if you had to choose, would you say are the main reasons you don’t like some types of music? Please list up to 3 reasons - OPEN

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Pop / X Factor / boy or girl bands / chart music mentioned</th>
<th>Dance / techno / drum n bass mentioned</th>
<th>Rap / hip hop / grime mentioned</th>
<th>Metal / thrash mentioned</th>
<th>R’n’B mentioned</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Manufactured / commercial / artificial</td>
<td>.000**</td>
<td>.845</td>
<td>.715</td>
<td>.082</td>
<td>.003*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Boring / repetitive</td>
<td>.717</td>
<td>.021*</td>
<td>.932</td>
<td>.467</td>
<td>.075</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lacks creativity / originality</td>
<td>.000**</td>
<td>.011</td>
<td>.514</td>
<td>.829</td>
<td>.269</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lacks emotion / feeling / or soul</td>
<td>.000**</td>
<td>.453</td>
<td>.063</td>
<td>.260</td>
<td>.729</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Because of lyrics</td>
<td>.507</td>
<td>.328</td>
<td>.000**</td>
<td>.575</td>
<td>.795</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aggressive / violent</td>
<td>.419</td>
<td>.022</td>
<td>.018*</td>
<td>.000**</td>
<td>.740</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Depressing / sad</td>
<td>.567</td>
<td>.635</td>
<td>.669</td>
<td>.391</td>
<td>.126</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: ** indicates significance at p=<.001. * indicates significance at p=<.050
**Fig. 12.** When, in your lifetime, do you think music has been particularly important for you? – OPEN. % of total sample

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>% of total sample (n=361)</th>
<th>Adolescence / Teenage Years Mentioned</th>
<th>Sense of identity / social group mentioned</th>
<th>Personal stress or illness mentioned</th>
<th>Breakups / divorces or relationship problems mentioned</th>
<th>University mentioned</th>
<th>Deaths mentioned</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>38</td>
<td>27.4</td>
<td>18.3</td>
<td>17.2</td>
<td>13.3</td>
<td>10.8</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Fig. 13a.** How important, would you say on a scale of 1-7 (7 being the most important and 1 being the least important), music is or has been for you in the following situations? % total sample

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Meeting new friends</th>
<th>Meeting a new partner</th>
<th>Breakup with a partner</th>
<th>Going to university</th>
<th>Memories of parents or siblings</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Low (1-3)</td>
<td>26.6</td>
<td>24.4</td>
<td>25.8</td>
<td>24.1</td>
<td>27.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medium (4)</td>
<td>12.2</td>
<td>9.7</td>
<td>5.8</td>
<td>10.2</td>
<td>12.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High (5-7)</td>
<td>57.6</td>
<td>56.0</td>
<td>52.6</td>
<td>52.1</td>
<td>51.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>3.6</td>
<td>10.0</td>
<td>15.8</td>
<td>13.6</td>
<td>8.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Death of a friend or family member</th>
<th>Moving to a new place (town, city or house)</th>
<th>Starting a new job</th>
<th>Birth of a child</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Low (1-3)</td>
<td>24.1</td>
<td>31.3</td>
<td>55.1</td>
<td>29.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medium (4)</td>
<td>9.4</td>
<td>9.1</td>
<td>8.6</td>
<td>4.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High (5-7)</td>
<td>47.4</td>
<td>43.8</td>
<td>19.4</td>
<td>16.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>19.1</td>
<td>15.8</td>
<td>16.9</td>
<td>49.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
**Fig. 13b.** How important, would you say on a scale of 1-7 (7 being the most important and 1 being the least important), music is or has been for you in the following situations?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Event</th>
<th>Age</th>
<th>Sexuality</th>
<th>U.K. Region</th>
<th>Student</th>
<th>Music Education</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Meeting new friends</td>
<td>.036*</td>
<td>.004*</td>
<td>.907</td>
<td>.093</td>
<td>.548</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Meeting a new partner</td>
<td>.003*</td>
<td>147</td>
<td>.604</td>
<td>.044*</td>
<td>.228</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Breakup with a partner</td>
<td>.321</td>
<td>177</td>
<td>.745</td>
<td>.039*</td>
<td>.292</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Going to university</td>
<td>.003*</td>
<td>.313</td>
<td>.888</td>
<td>.006*</td>
<td>.432</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Memories of parents or siblings</td>
<td>.692</td>
<td>.348</td>
<td>.330</td>
<td>.749</td>
<td>.651</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Death of a friend or family member</td>
<td>.037*</td>
<td>.591</td>
<td>.086</td>
<td>.012*</td>
<td>.845</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moving to a new place (town, city or house)</td>
<td>.001*</td>
<td>.585</td>
<td>.584</td>
<td>.002*</td>
<td>.268</td>
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<td>Starting a new job</td>
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<td>.916</td>
<td>.301</td>
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<td>.756</td>
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<tr>
<td>Birth of a child</td>
<td>.000**</td>
<td>.175</td>
<td>.569</td>
<td>.000**</td>
<td>.807</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: ** indicates significance at p=<.001. * indicates significance at p=<.050
Fig. 13c. How important, would you say on a scale of 1-7 (7 being the most important and 1 being the least important), music is or has been for you in the following situations? % rated 5-7 and ‘not applicable’ within age group

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Situation</th>
<th>Age</th>
<th>16-19</th>
<th>20-24</th>
<th>25-35</th>
<th>36-40</th>
<th>41-50</th>
<th>51-64</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Meeting new friends</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>61.36</td>
<td>65.35</td>
<td>59.82</td>
<td>64.00</td>
<td>34.38</td>
<td>44.68</td>
<td>57.62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>2.97</td>
<td>3.57</td>
<td>4.00</td>
<td>3.13</td>
<td>8.51</td>
<td>3.60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Meeting a new partner</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>54.55</td>
<td>54.46</td>
<td>60.71</td>
<td>68.00</td>
<td>53.13</td>
<td>44.68</td>
<td>55.96</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>13.64</td>
<td>11.88</td>
<td>8.04</td>
<td>4.00</td>
<td>6.25</td>
<td>12.77</td>
<td>9.97</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Breakup with a partner</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>50.00</td>
<td>53.47</td>
<td>58.93</td>
<td>64.00</td>
<td>50.00</td>
<td>34.04</td>
<td>52.63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>25.00</td>
<td>21.78</td>
<td>11.61</td>
<td>8.00</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>19.15</td>
<td>15.79</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Going to university</td>
<td>High</td>
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<td>66.34</td>
<td>50.89</td>
<td>52.00</td>
<td>31.25</td>
<td>29.79</td>
<td>52.08</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
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<td>7.92</td>
<td>15.18</td>
<td>16.00</td>
<td>18.75</td>
<td>21.28</td>
<td>13.57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Memories of parents or siblings</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>52.27</td>
<td>51.49</td>
<td>57.14</td>
<td>32.00</td>
<td>46.88</td>
<td>53.19</td>
<td>51.80</td>
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<tr>
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<td>6.82</td>
<td>8.91</td>
<td>5.36</td>
<td>20.00</td>
<td>6.25</td>
<td>8.51</td>
<td>8.03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Death of a friend or family member</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>59.09</td>
<td>40.59</td>
<td>49.11</td>
<td>40.00</td>
<td>40.63</td>
<td>55.32</td>
<td>47.37</td>
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<tr>
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<td>N/A</td>
<td>22.73</td>
<td>26.73</td>
<td>18.75</td>
<td>20.00</td>
<td>9.38</td>
<td>6.38</td>
<td>19.11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moving to a new place (town, city or house)</td>
<td>High</td>
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<td>52.48</td>
<td>42.86</td>
<td>40.00</td>
<td>34.38</td>
<td>23.40</td>
<td>43.77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>15.91</td>
<td>19.80</td>
<td>15.18</td>
<td>16.00</td>
<td>3.13</td>
<td>17.02</td>
<td>15.79</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Starting a new job</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>27.27</td>
<td>22.77</td>
<td>18.75</td>
<td>20.00</td>
<td>15.63</td>
<td>8.51</td>
<td>19.39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>27.27</td>
<td>21.78</td>
<td>13.39</td>
<td>8.00</td>
<td>18.75</td>
<td>8.51</td>
<td>16.90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Birth of a child</td>
<td>High</td>
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<td>6.93</td>
<td>13.39</td>
<td>40.00</td>
<td>21.88</td>
<td>31.91</td>
<td>16.34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>56.82</td>
<td>68.32</td>
<td>55.36</td>
<td>36.00</td>
<td>28.13</td>
<td>6.38</td>
<td>49.03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Count</td>
<td></td>
<td>44</td>
<td>101</td>
<td>112</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>361</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Fig. 14a. Where and with whom do you listen to music most often? PICK AS MANY AS APPLY

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Location/Activity</th>
<th>Alone</th>
<th>With friends/housemates</th>
<th>Alone</th>
<th>With my partner</th>
<th>Alone</th>
<th>With other members of my family</th>
<th>Alone</th>
<th>With friends/housemates</th>
<th>Alone</th>
<th>With my partner</th>
<th>Alone</th>
<th>With other members of my family</th>
<th>Alone</th>
<th>With friends/housemates</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Listen in this way (%)</td>
<td>74.8</td>
<td>73.7</td>
<td>70.9</td>
<td>65.4</td>
<td>59.6</td>
<td>59.6</td>
<td>54.3</td>
<td>49.3</td>
<td>48.5</td>
<td>46.8</td>
<td>43.2</td>
<td>42.7</td>
<td>40.7</td>
<td>38.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Listen in this way (%)</td>
<td>32.4</td>
<td>31.6</td>
<td>29.4</td>
<td>28.3</td>
<td>27.4</td>
<td>26.9</td>
<td>26.0</td>
<td>25.8</td>
<td>25.8</td>
<td>24.9</td>
<td>24.1</td>
<td>22.2</td>
<td>21.3</td>
<td>19.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Listen in this way (%)</td>
<td>15.2</td>
<td>8.9</td>
<td>8.9</td>
<td>8.9</td>
<td>7.8</td>
<td>7.8</td>
<td>5.8</td>
<td>4.7</td>
<td>3.3</td>
<td>2.8</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
**Fig. 14b.** Where and with whom do you listen to music most often? PICK AS MANY AS APPLY. % who mentioned listening alone/ with partner / with friends or housemates

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Who listened to music with</th>
<th>Listened alone anywhere</th>
<th>Listened with a partner anywhere</th>
<th>Did not mention listening with a partner</th>
<th>Listened with friends or housemates anywhere</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Listened alone anywhere</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>98.2</td>
<td>98.5</td>
<td>98.8</td>
<td>98.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Listened with a partner anywhere</td>
<td>62.0</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>62.2</td>
<td>62.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Did not mention listening with a partner anywhere</td>
<td>66.7</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>60.5</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Listened with friends or housemates anywhere</td>
<td>89.9</td>
<td>89.7</td>
<td>89.1</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>89.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Count</td>
<td>355</td>
<td>224</td>
<td>137</td>
<td>323</td>
<td>361</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Fig. 14c.** Where and with whom do you listen to music most often? PICK AS MANY AS APPLY.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Age</th>
<th>Sexuality</th>
<th>U.K. Region</th>
<th>Student</th>
<th>Music Education</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Listened alone anywhere</td>
<td>.045*</td>
<td>.190</td>
<td>.389</td>
<td>.025*</td>
<td>.588</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Listened with a partner anywhere</td>
<td>.000**</td>
<td>.023*</td>
<td>.436</td>
<td>.000**</td>
<td>.087</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Listened with friends or housemates anywhere</td>
<td>.000**</td>
<td>.639</td>
<td>.602</td>
<td>.002</td>
<td>.119</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Listened with family members anywhere</td>
<td>.170</td>
<td>.342</td>
<td>.614</td>
<td>.013*</td>
<td>.126</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: ** indicates significance at p=<.001. * indicates significance at p=<.050
**Fig. 14d.** Where and with whom do you listen to music most often? PICK AS MANY AS APPLY. % within age group

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Room</th>
<th>16-19</th>
<th>20-24</th>
<th>25-35</th>
<th>36-40</th>
<th>41-50</th>
<th>51-64</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bedroom - Alone</td>
<td>95.5</td>
<td>94.1</td>
<td>67.9</td>
<td>52.0</td>
<td>65.6</td>
<td>48.9</td>
<td>74.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bedroom- With friends</td>
<td>40.9</td>
<td>30.7</td>
<td>17.9</td>
<td>.0</td>
<td>.0</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>19.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bedroom - With partner</td>
<td>34.1</td>
<td>36.6</td>
<td>43.8</td>
<td>44.0</td>
<td>34.4</td>
<td>29.8</td>
<td>38.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bedroom - With other members of my family</td>
<td>6.8</td>
<td>8.9</td>
<td>7.1</td>
<td>.0</td>
<td>.0</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>5.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Special Music Room - Alone</td>
<td>38.6</td>
<td>26.7</td>
<td>28.6</td>
<td>28.0</td>
<td>25.0</td>
<td>23.4</td>
<td>28.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Special music room - With friend(s) / housemates</td>
<td>36.4</td>
<td>17.8</td>
<td>16.1</td>
<td>8.0</td>
<td>15.6</td>
<td>8.5</td>
<td>17.5</td>
</tr>
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<td>Special music room - With my partner</td>
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<td>7.9</td>
<td>9.8</td>
<td>4.0</td>
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<td>17.0</td>
<td>8.9</td>
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<td>Special music room - With other members of my family</td>
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<td>5.0</td>
<td>4.5</td>
<td>.0</td>
<td>3.1</td>
<td>6.4</td>
<td>4.7</td>
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<tr>
<td>Kitchen - Alone</td>
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<td>58.4</td>
<td>63.4</td>
<td>60.0</td>
<td>62.5</td>
<td>57.4</td>
<td>59.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kitchen - With friend(s) / housemates</td>
<td>31.8</td>
<td>42.6</td>
<td>35.7</td>
<td>12.0</td>
<td>28.1</td>
<td>10.6</td>
<td>31.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kitchen - With my partner</td>
<td>15.9</td>
<td>23.8</td>
<td>40.2</td>
<td>56.0</td>
<td>40.6</td>
<td>29.8</td>
<td>32.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kitchen - With other members of my family</td>
<td>20.5</td>
<td>30.7</td>
<td>23.2</td>
<td>16.0</td>
<td>31.3</td>
<td>21.3</td>
<td>24.9</td>
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<tr>
<td>Lounge - Alone</td>
<td>43.2</td>
<td>50.5</td>
<td>61.6</td>
<td>64.0</td>
<td>56.3</td>
<td>48.9</td>
<td>54.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lounge - With friend(s) / housemates</td>
<td>61.4</td>
<td>52.5</td>
<td>59.8</td>
<td>32.0</td>
<td>28.1</td>
<td>23.4</td>
<td>48.5</td>
</tr>
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<td>Lounge - With my partner</td>
<td>25.0</td>
<td>25.7</td>
<td>49.1</td>
<td>60.0</td>
<td>40.6</td>
<td>57.4</td>
<td>40.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lounge - With other members of my family</td>
<td>34.1</td>
<td>29.7</td>
<td>33.0</td>
<td>28.0</td>
<td>40.6</td>
<td>31.9</td>
<td>32.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The shed / garage - Alone</td>
<td>20.5</td>
<td>21.8</td>
<td>17.0</td>
<td>40.0</td>
<td>34.4</td>
<td>19.1</td>
<td>22.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The shed / garage - With friend(s) / housemates</td>
<td>15.9</td>
<td>9.9</td>
<td>5.4</td>
<td>8.0</td>
<td>6.3</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>7.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The shed / garage - With my partner</td>
<td>4.5</td>
<td>4.0</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>.0</td>
<td>.0</td>
<td>4.3</td>
<td>2.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The shed / garage - With other members of my family</td>
<td>9.1</td>
<td>4.0</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>.0</td>
<td>3.1</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>3.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The garden - Alone</td>
<td>40.9</td>
<td>31.7</td>
<td>37.5</td>
<td>20.0</td>
<td>40.6</td>
<td>31.9</td>
<td>34.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The garden - With friend(s) / housemates</td>
<td>31.8</td>
<td>32.7</td>
<td>33.0</td>
<td>8.0</td>
<td>18.8</td>
<td>10.6</td>
<td>26.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The garden - With my partner</td>
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<td>15.8</td>
<td>24.1</td>
<td>20.0</td>
<td>21.9</td>
<td>23.4</td>
<td>19.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The garden - With other members of my family</td>
<td>22.7</td>
<td>19.8</td>
<td>16.1</td>
<td>4.0</td>
<td>9.4</td>
<td>8.5</td>
<td>15.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dining room - Alone</td>
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<td>25.0</td>
<td>32.0</td>
<td>28.1</td>
<td>25.5</td>
<td>29.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dining room - With friend(s) / housemates</td>
<td>22.7</td>
<td>35.6</td>
<td>25.9</td>
<td>16.0</td>
<td>21.9</td>
<td>14.9</td>
<td>25.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dining room - With my partner</td>
<td>9.1</td>
<td>21.8</td>
<td>25.9</td>
<td>40.0</td>
<td>34.4</td>
<td>48.9</td>
<td>27.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dining room - With other members of my family</td>
<td>22.7</td>
<td>31.7</td>
<td>21.4</td>
<td>12.0</td>
<td>28.1</td>
<td>19.1</td>
<td>24.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>At club nights - Alone</td>
<td>6.8</td>
<td>11.9</td>
<td>10.7</td>
<td>8.0</td>
<td>9.4</td>
<td>.0</td>
<td>8.9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

251
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Activity</th>
<th>16-19</th>
<th>20-24</th>
<th>25-35</th>
<th>36-40</th>
<th>41-50</th>
<th>51-64</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>At club nights - With friend(s) / housemates</td>
<td>77.3</td>
<td>80.2</td>
<td>69.6</td>
<td>32.0</td>
<td>31.3</td>
<td>8.5</td>
<td>59.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>At club nights - With my partner</td>
<td>20.5</td>
<td>25.7</td>
<td>40.2</td>
<td>16.0</td>
<td>15.6</td>
<td>8.5</td>
<td>25.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>At club nights - With other members of my family</td>
<td>2.3</td>
<td>10.9</td>
<td>10.7</td>
<td>8.0</td>
<td>.0</td>
<td>4.3</td>
<td>7.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>At gigs - Alone</td>
<td>18.2</td>
<td>26.7</td>
<td>31.3</td>
<td>20.0</td>
<td>28.1</td>
<td>21.3</td>
<td>26.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>At gigs - With friend(s) / housemates</td>
<td>75.0</td>
<td>76.2</td>
<td>78.6</td>
<td>72.0</td>
<td>78.1</td>
<td>31.9</td>
<td>70.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>At gigs - With my partner</td>
<td>22.7</td>
<td>33.7</td>
<td>55.4</td>
<td>48.0</td>
<td>56.3</td>
<td>38.3</td>
<td>42.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>At gigs - With other members of my family</td>
<td>18.2</td>
<td>19.8</td>
<td>24.1</td>
<td>12.0</td>
<td>18.8</td>
<td>27.7</td>
<td>21.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In bars - Alone</td>
<td>9.1</td>
<td>18.8</td>
<td>13.4</td>
<td>16.0</td>
<td>6.3</td>
<td>23.4</td>
<td>15.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In bars - With friend(s) / housemates</td>
<td>77.3</td>
<td>84.2</td>
<td>81.3</td>
<td>68.0</td>
<td>65.6</td>
<td>38.3</td>
<td>73.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In bars - With my partner</td>
<td>22.7</td>
<td>35.6</td>
<td>53.6</td>
<td>36.0</td>
<td>34.4</td>
<td>29.8</td>
<td>38.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In bars - With other members of my family</td>
<td>4.5</td>
<td>18.8</td>
<td>24.1</td>
<td>12.0</td>
<td>6.3</td>
<td>12.8</td>
<td>16.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In the car - Alone</td>
<td>61.4</td>
<td>61.4</td>
<td>67.0</td>
<td>64.0</td>
<td>81.3</td>
<td>63.8</td>
<td>65.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In the car - With friend(s) / housemates</td>
<td>50.0</td>
<td>59.4</td>
<td>51.8</td>
<td>24.0</td>
<td>40.6</td>
<td>21.3</td>
<td>46.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In the car - With my partner</td>
<td>27.3</td>
<td>32.7</td>
<td>54.5</td>
<td>52.0</td>
<td>46.9</td>
<td>46.8</td>
<td>43.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In the car - With other members of my family</td>
<td>40.9</td>
<td>44.6</td>
<td>32.1</td>
<td>28.0</td>
<td>40.6</td>
<td>29.8</td>
<td>36.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gym / exercising outside - Alone</td>
<td>59.1</td>
<td>52.5</td>
<td>58.0</td>
<td>48.0</td>
<td>37.5</td>
<td>21.3</td>
<td>49.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gym / exercising outside - With friend(s) / housemates</td>
<td>11.4</td>
<td>11.9</td>
<td>8.0</td>
<td>8.0</td>
<td>6.3</td>
<td>4.3</td>
<td>8.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gym / exercising outside - With my partner</td>
<td>2.3</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>2.7</td>
<td>4.0</td>
<td>3.1</td>
<td>.0</td>
<td>2.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gym / exercising outside - With other members of my family</td>
<td>.0</td>
<td>4.0</td>
<td>.9</td>
<td>.0</td>
<td>.0</td>
<td>.0</td>
<td>1.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Count</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>101</td>
<td>112</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>361</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
**Fig. 14e.** Where and with whom do you listen to music most often? PICK AS MANY AS APPLY. % within age group

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Age</th>
<th>16-19</th>
<th>20-24</th>
<th>25-35</th>
<th>36-40</th>
<th>41-50</th>
<th>51-64</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Listened alone anywhere</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>99.1</td>
<td>92.0</td>
<td>96.9</td>
<td>95.7</td>
<td>98.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Listened with a partner anywhere</td>
<td>38.6</td>
<td>50.5</td>
<td>71.4</td>
<td>72.0</td>
<td>68.8</td>
<td>76.6</td>
<td>62.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Listened with friends or housemates anywhere</td>
<td>97.7</td>
<td>94.1</td>
<td>95.5</td>
<td>80.0</td>
<td>84.4</td>
<td>66.0</td>
<td>89.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Listened with family members anywhere</td>
<td>63.6</td>
<td>62.4</td>
<td>49.1</td>
<td>44.0</td>
<td>62.5</td>
<td>48.9</td>
<td>55.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Count</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>101</td>
<td>112</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>361</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Fig. 14f.** Where and with whom do you listen to music most often? PICK AS MANY AS APPLY. % who listened with partner / family members AND listened in sheds / garage

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Who listened to music with</th>
<th>Mentioned listening in the shed / garage AND listening with partner</th>
<th>Mentioned listening in the shed / garage AND listening with family</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Listened in shed / garage alone</td>
<td>89.4</td>
<td>90.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Listen in shed with partner</td>
<td>15.2</td>
<td>10.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Listen in shed with family</td>
<td>10.6</td>
<td>18.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Listen in dining room with family members</td>
<td>45.5</td>
<td>59.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Listen in dining room with partner</td>
<td>56.10</td>
<td>39.40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Count</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>66</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Fig. 15. Multinomial logistic regression on Likert variables with more than contributing factor

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Nagerkelke values for model (pseudo R square)</th>
<th>Model 1 (just age)</th>
<th>Model 2 (just music education)</th>
<th>Model 3 (age; music education)</th>
<th>Model 4 (age; music education; student)</th>
<th>Model 5 (age; music education; student; sexuality; region)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Gender attributes - Sex</td>
<td>0.094**</td>
<td>0.004</td>
<td>0.094</td>
<td>0.094</td>
<td>0.094</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender attributes - Male Friends</td>
<td>0.097**</td>
<td>0.009</td>
<td>0.097</td>
<td>0.097</td>
<td>0.097</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender attributes - Watching Sport</td>
<td>0.092**</td>
<td>0.047**</td>
<td>0.119**</td>
<td>0.119**</td>
<td>0.172**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Feel about music - pumped</td>
<td>0.103**</td>
<td>0.015</td>
<td>0.103</td>
<td>0.103</td>
<td>0.103</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Feel about music - less alone</td>
<td>0.065**</td>
<td>0.012</td>
<td>0.065</td>
<td>0.065</td>
<td>0.065</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Feel about music - sad</td>
<td>0.063**</td>
<td>0.023</td>
<td>0.083**</td>
<td>0.106**</td>
<td>0.160**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Feel about music - lonely</td>
<td>0.075**</td>
<td>0.018</td>
<td>0.075</td>
<td>0.075</td>
<td>0.075</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Feel about music - depressed</td>
<td>0.128**</td>
<td>0.028</td>
<td>0.128</td>
<td>0.128</td>
<td>0.128</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Feel about music - angry</td>
<td>0.116**</td>
<td>0.018</td>
<td>0.116</td>
<td>0.116</td>
<td>0.116</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Music dislike - Rap / hip hop / grime</td>
<td>0.067**</td>
<td>0.002</td>
<td>0.067</td>
<td>0.067</td>
<td>0.139**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>mentioned</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Music dislike - Metal / thrash mentioned</td>
<td>0.100**</td>
<td>0.003</td>
<td>0.100</td>
<td>0.100</td>
<td>0.100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reason dislike - boring / repetitive</td>
<td>0.059**</td>
<td>0.018</td>
<td>0.059</td>
<td>0.059</td>
<td>0.059</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>When music import - Meeting new friends</td>
<td>0.083**</td>
<td>0.007</td>
<td>0.083</td>
<td>0.083</td>
<td>0.123**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>When music import - Meeting a new partner</td>
<td>0.054</td>
<td>0.011</td>
<td>0.054</td>
<td>0.054</td>
<td>0.054</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>When music import - Going to university</td>
<td>0.100**</td>
<td>0.009</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>0.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>When music import - Death of a friend or</td>
<td>0.075**</td>
<td>0.002</td>
<td>0.075</td>
<td>0.075</td>
<td>0.145**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>family member</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>When music import - Moving to a new place</td>
<td>0.111**</td>
<td>0.012</td>
<td>0.111</td>
<td>0.111</td>
<td>0.111</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(town, city or house)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>When music import - Starting a new job</td>
<td>0.111**</td>
<td>0.004</td>
<td>0.111</td>
<td>0.111</td>
<td>0.111</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>When music import - Birth of a child</td>
<td>0.220**</td>
<td>0.003</td>
<td>0.22</td>
<td>0.22</td>
<td>0.22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Where listen - Listened alone anywhere</td>
<td>0.180</td>
<td>0.006</td>
<td>0.180</td>
<td>0.180</td>
<td>0.180</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Where listen - Listened with a partner</td>
<td>0.095**</td>
<td>0.011</td>
<td>0.095</td>
<td>0.095</td>
<td>0.095</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>anywhere</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Where listen - Listened with friends</td>
<td>0.183**</td>
<td>0.015</td>
<td>0.183</td>
<td>0.183</td>
<td>0.183</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>anywhere</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: ** indicates improved likelihood ratio in the model with the addition of demographic variables.
Appendix 4

Rob

Rob was a nineteen year old student, studying psychology at a University in Scotland, although he was originally from the North East of England. He listed his ethnicity as ‘White British’ in the survey though unlike the other respondents, chose not to state his sexuality in the survey. During the course of the session he openly admitted to being gay which made some of the particular musical life-history events unique in the context of this project, especially in relation to ‘coming out’.

Joel

Joel was a 24 year old recent university graduate, born in and currently living in Yorkshire. He also identified as ‘White British’. At the time of interview he was working full-time in retail but was getting married a couple of months after the interview. Joel’s father had died when he was younger and he lived at home with his mother, he also had two older brothers who were both living away from home. Joel was a devout Christian who was raised as such, but had lost his faith when his brother was put into a life-threatening coma after a car accident. His reconversion to Christianity at the age of nineteen led to him attending a Christian university and he was moving to work for the church as a missionary.

Tom

Tom was a 28 year old, working full-time for a publishing company also in Yorkshire, after having recently completed a master’s degree in translation. He was living in a newly purchased house with his long-term girlfriend, identified as ‘White British’ and was born in the North East of England. His parents were still married and his father was a qualified surgeon. His older sister died at the age of 18 and his responses to some of the survey questions appeared particularly interesting and informative around exceptional circumstances.

Dave

Dave was a 39 year old engineer, working full-time for a reputable engineering firm which supplied engines and parts to Formula 1 racing teams. At the time of interview he was single and living alone in a house he owned in the Midlands, though he was originally from Lancashire / Northumbria. He had been in a long-term relationship for roughly 15 years and was living with his partner up until roughly 5 years previously. He identified as ‘White British’, had one younger brother and his parents were both still alive.
**Ian**

Ian was a 50 year-old lecturer in graphic design at a university in the East of England. He had gone to university as a mature student and grew up on a council estate in Lincolnshire; something he referred to occasionally throughout the conversation and had a picture of the house he grew up in on the wall of his office. He was married and had two young daughters, was an only child himself and his father had died a couple of years previously, though his mother was still alive.

**John**

John was a retired 64 year old who had up until recently worked at a large library, developing a computerised cataloguing system, though he had worked a number of different jobs over his lifetime including teaching and administration. He was twice married and had three grown sons from his first marriage and two grown stepsons from his second marriage. His own father had died but his mother was still alive. He and his partner lived in the South West of England, though he had grown up in the Midlands and been actively part of a folk scene there and at university. He took an active interest in playing music still and he occasionally wrote reviews for independent music magazines, blogs and websites.
Appendix 5

Qualitative ‘Music Life History’ Questions

Introduction

I’m from the University of Leeds conducting research into different uses of music. Following on from the survey answers you gave, back in December / January, I wanted to speak to you a bit more about your music tastes. The purpose of this interview is just to look at how you listen to music and give a bit more detail on the different times and places where you *have* listened to music.

You don’t have to answer anything you aren’t comfortable with and are completely free to stop the interview at any time.

The Role of Music – 20 minutes

- In the survey, you mention that
  1. INSERT CHOICE 1 FROM SURVEY
  2. INSERT CHOICE 2 FROM SURVEY
  3. INSERT CHOICE 3 FROM SURVEY

Were three of your favourite pieces of music you had ever heard.

- For each one, I want you to tell me briefly why you would say that those were your favourites.
  - When did you first hear it / start listening to each?
  - Can you give me either one or a few memories that you have listening about each?
• Is there any music you’ve heard since the survey that might replace any of these answers?

• You also mentioned that you disliked listening to, or would avoid listening to
  
  1. INSERT DISLIKE 1 FROM SURVEY
  2. INSERT DISLIKE 2 FROM SURVEY
  3. INSERT DISLIKE 3 FROM SURVEY

• What do you mean by this? What is it about this music that you dislike?

• Is there any music which you used to like that you dislike now? Or vice versa, is there any music that you used to dislike but that you quite like now?
  
  o [IF YES] What music?
  
  o Why did your feelings about the music change do you think? Why did you start dis/liking it?

• Can you describe a few situations for me, of how music fits in to your day-to-day life at the moment?
  
  o For what reasons do you tend to listen to music most often now?
  
  o Why do you choose to listen to music in the situations you’ve just mentioned?

• Where and with whom do you usually listen to music?
  
  1. Why those places and those people?

• Do you think you could live in a world without music?
  
  o [IF YES] What is more important than music to you? [IF ‘EVERYTHING’] What specifically?
  
  o [IF NO] If you had to, what would you give up in order to keep music in your life?
Strength of Feeling – 10 minutes

- You mentioned also in the survey that the music you choose to listen to makes you feel
  1. INSERT FEELING 1 FROM SURVEY
  2. INSERT FEELING 2 FROM SURVEY
  3. INSERT FEELING 3 FROM SURVEY

- What do you mean by each of these things?
- Do you consciously listen to music to make you feel the things you mentioned?
  o [IF YES] Why do you choose to make yourself feel this way?
  o [IF NO] What’s going through your head when you choose what to listen to?

- Can you give me a few examples of situations, around how you listen to music in your day to day life, where you would listen to music in order to feel the ways you mention
- If you had to sum up how you felt about music generally, what would you say? [PROMPT AFTER]

What do you get from music that say, [ASK WHAT THEY ENJOY DOING] you don’t get from [PREVIOUS RESP.]?

Music when younger – 20 minutes

- If someone asked you, ‘what music do you remember listening to when you were a kid’, what would you say? By a kid let’s say up to about 11-12; before you left primary school.
• Are there any particular pieces of music that stick out in your head, from when you were a kid?
  o What songs / pieces of music?
  o What do they remind you of?

• What kinds of music did your parent(s) / guardian(s) listen to when you were younger, if you remember?

• Did you listen the same music as them, when you were younger, through choice?

• How much of an influence do you think they had on your music tastes?
  o Why do you think / in what ways did they influence you?

• Do you have any brothers or sisters?
  o [IF YES] Older or younger? What did they listen to?
  o Did they have an influence on your music tastes do you think?
    ▪ [IF YES] How, or in what ways, did they have an influence?
    ▪ [IF NO] Why not? What sort of music were they into and what did you think of it?

• What in your life, do you think, has had the biggest impact on the way you listen to music?
  o Why do you think?
  o How has this impacted on either what you listen to or the way you listen?

• When would you say that you started actively finding out about music for yourself?
  o What age roughly?
  o What else was going on in your life at that age?

• Has the way that you listened to music change as you’ve gotten older?
  o [IF YES] Could you explain in what ways?
  o [BOTH YES AND IF NO] Why do you think that is?
• Has the *importance* of music in your life changed?
  
  o [IF YES] In what ways and why do you think?
  
  o [IF NO] Why not do you think?

• Do you think you’re always going to feel the same way about music as you do now?
  
  o Why / why not?

Significant Events – 10 minutes

• You put in the survey that music was particularly significant when,

  1. INSERT SIG EVENT 1 FROM SURVEY
  2. INSERT SIG EVENT 2 FROM SURVEY
  3. INSERT SIG EVENT 3 FROM SURVEY

• Which songs / genres / bands particularly remind you of those times?
  
  o Can you say a little bit about what about the music made music it significant?
  
  o How did you *use* music at each of these points?

• Why do you think that, that each of these pieces sticks out for you?

• How did it make you feel at the time and how does it make you feel now?

• Do you still listen to these pieces?
  
  o [IF YES] Have your reasons changed do you think? If so, in what way?
  
  o [IF NO] Why don’t you listen anymore?

• Are there any other times when music has been particularly important for you or people close to you?
  
  o What were they?

Thank and close interview
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