IMAM SĀLIM B. RĀSHID AND THE IMAMATE REVIVAL IN OMAN
1331/1913 - 1338/1920

By
Saʻīd b. Muḥammad b. Saʻīd al-Ḥāshimy
(B.A., M. Phil.,)

Submitted in Accordance with the Requirements for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy
Under the supervision of the late Dr. M.J.L. Young and Dr. H. Sirriyeh

The University of Leeds
The Department of Modern Arabic Studies

Leeds: December, 1994

The candidate confirms that the work submitted is his own and that appropriate credit has been given where reference has been made to the work of others
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بسم الله الرحمن الرحيم

وقال الله ﷺ

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Abstract

The principal aim of this thesis is to assess the performance of Imam Sálim b. Ráshid and the Imamate revival in Oman during the second decade of the 20th century. It presents biographical information about Imam Sálim, with special reference to the military and political policies by which he established and consolidated his Imamate in the Interior Province, and his relations with the Sultan and the latter’s British supporters. An attempt is also made to explore the relationship between the Imam and the Omani tribes and to evaluate his administrative success. This thesis comprises eight chapters, and the introduction and conclusion. The introduction reviews the relevant literature on the topic. The first chapter describes the geographical setting and provides a historical background, relating to three principal matters: the rise of the Ibádíyyah and the development of the Imamate in Oman; the events in Oman after Sd. Sa‘íd’s death up to 1913; and the effects of the First World War. The second chapter seeks to give an account of the career of Imam Sálim’s life and the Imamate revival. The third chapter discusses the manner in which the Imam was elected, private and public allegiance (bay’ah) and the Imam’s aims and policy programme. Chapter Four deals with the Imam’s military operations and the spread of his authority over Oman. Chapter Five examines the attempts at negotiation between the Imam and the Sultan, and the role of the British Government and the local figures in this regard. Chapter Six is devoted to a discussion of the role of the tribes in support of Imam Sálim, and the extent of the Imam’s influence over these tribes. Chapter Seven assesses the Imam’s administrative machinery, including the political system, the bureaucracy, education policy, and financial apparatus. Chapter Eight examines the causes behind the assassination of Imam Sálim and the signing of the Treaty of al-Sib. In the conclusion, we present the findings of the research as they have emerged from the assessment of the course of events in Oman. We have said that the Omanis succeeded in reviving the Imamate and elected Imam Sálim al-Kharúsí who devoted his efforts to establish the foundations of the state, and peace prevailed in the country after the treaty of al-Sib in 1920.
Dedicated

to the

Imams, Sultans, Scholars, Authors, Qádis, Teachers, Soldiers, Shaykhs,
Farmers, Clerks, Weavers
and
all who devote their efforts for Oman
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Acknowledgments

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### Abbreviations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A.D =</td>
<td>Anno Domini.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A.H. =</td>
<td>Anno Hegirae</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adm.R.</td>
<td>Administration Report of Muscat</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b.=</td>
<td>Bin or Ibn</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B. =</td>
<td>Banú or Baní</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B.L. =</td>
<td>British Library.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F.O =</td>
<td>Foreign Office</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G.J. =</td>
<td>Geographical Journal.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>H.A =</td>
<td>Handbook of Arabia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I.O. =</td>
<td>India Office.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>K. =</td>
<td>Kitáb.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M.E.J. =</td>
<td>Middle East Journal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M.N. H. C. =</td>
<td>Ministry of National Heritage and Culture of Oman.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PAM =</td>
<td>The Political Agent at Muscat</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PRG =</td>
<td>Political Resident in the Persian Gulf.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R.O. I-VII =</td>
<td>Records of Oman (12 vols.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RDS 890 =</td>
<td>Records of the Department of State Relating to Internal Affairs of Asia: 1910-1929, Roll 890a on Oman</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S. =</td>
<td>section.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sd. =</td>
<td>for the title &quot;al-Sayyid&quot;.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sh. =</td>
<td>for the title &quot;al-Shaykh&quot;, as used by (a) 'ulamá’ (b) heads of tribes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SS. =</td>
<td>subsection.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Transliteration

The system followed here is that to be found in the *Encyclopedia of Islam*, with the following differences;

(a) [Jim ( ☞ )] = .J (instead of Ą)

(b) [Qaf ( ☜ )] = Q (instead of K)

(c) ['Ayn ( ☛ )] = ' (instead of c).

(d) [long vowel] = ā, ĩ, ū (instead of a, i, u)

(e) [al-Alif al-Maqṣūrah ( ☠ )] = ā (instead of ā), e.g., Nazwā, Jumādā, Julaḍā, etc.

(f) Diagrams have not been underlined. Arabic words and phrases in transliteration are in *italics*.

(g) The anglicized term 'Quranic' is not provided with diacritics.

Note:

(a) Dates have usually been given according to the Ḥijrah; where Christian dates are given they are divided from the Ḥijrī date by a stroke, e.g.1331/1913.

(b) Some well known place names such as Oman, Muscat, and Maṭrah, have been given their common English spelling. Also names derived from the above place names have not been transliterated, e.g. Omani, Omanis, etc.
A Note on Some Special Terms and Geographical and Personal Names

‘Aláyah and Sífálah: Arabic terms meaning "upper" and "lower" respectively, and used to refer to the two distinct areas frequently found in Omani towns. Generally, one section will be occupied by tribes belonging to ‘Adnání or Nizárí (Gháfirí) while the other quarter will be inhabited by Yamaní or Qahgání (Hináuí). In towns where this division occurs the wálí will often occupy a fort that is situated in a neutral position. Most of these forts are well placed, should there be need to separate the different factions. Prominent examples are in the town of Nazwà, where a broad Wádí divides the walled section, Izkí, and Samá’il. In the latter, the ‘Aláyah is separated from the Sífálah by several miles.

Al Bú Sa’íd: A distinction is made here between "Al Bú Sa’íd" which is a proper noun referring to the Omani royal family, and" al- Bú Sa’íd" which is an adjective referring to the al-Bú Sa’ídí tribe.

Muṭawī’ah: (Sig. Muṭawi’) literally means ‘one who submits or obeys’. Among the Ibádiyyah of Oman the term refers to more conspicuously devout believers who regarded it as their God-given duty both to inspire their co-religionists to strict observance of the proscriptive tenets of their faith and to castigate potential backsliders. One suspects, to judge from the record of their activities over the past century and a half, that their zeal was prompted less by theological abstractions than by simple bigotry.

Place-names: The following names which are frequently given incorrectly have been given in correct form throughout: e.g.,

- Bahlah = Bahlâ
- Barqa or Barkah = Barká’
- Oman Proper = Oman Interior (al-Dákhiliyyah)
- Nazwah or Nizwa = Nazwà

Sultanate: The term "Sultanate" is used here to refer to the entire Al Bú Sa’íd dynasty, as a matter of convenience, although the first Al Bú Sa’íd rulers were Imams, and the Sultan was first applied as a title by the British in the 1860s and not generally accepted in Oman until the beginning of the present century.

Tamímah: The Arabic term for a paramount Shaykh or a tribal leader who has control over all sections of his tribe and can count on their support in intertribal disputes. Not all tribes have tamímahs. The term is often technically defined as one who has the power to impose the death penalty on errant tribesmen. e.g. the tamímah of B. Gháfir, the tamímah of B. Hiná’ah, etc.
Zuhúr (manifestation): this term means the proclamation of the independent Imamate. In this case, the ruler of this Imamate is called Imam zuhúr.

Difá‘ (defence) this term denotes the obligatory duty in the absence of Imamate zuhúr when under attack or a suspicion of a sudden attack, the Ibáḍís must elect a leader to lead them in fighting their enemy. Such a leader is called Imam difá‘ “Imam defence”.

Shará‘ it means buying and selling. This term is used in Ibáḍí writings for the actions of sacrificing one’s life in the cause of God to attain Paradise.

Kitmán (secrecy) means hiding one’s beliefs. In this state the Ibáḍís keep their beliefs in secret to avoid suppression by their enemies.

Kufr Ni’mah (infidel ingrate) ingratitude for the blessings of God. This term is used in Ibáḍí writings for those Muslims who commit hypocritical grave sins, and who acknowledge the faith of Islam but do not practice it.

Waláyah is a religious duty which controls human emotions of love and hatred in accordance with Islamic teaching. It is used to convey the meanings; love fraternity, unity among the Ibáḍís and the duties related to these.

Bará‘ah expresses the converse of waláyah. It literally means to excommunicate. The two terms Waláyah and Bará‘ah were used by Ibáḍí scholars to indicate the attitude of the believers towards their fellow Muslims and towards the infidels.

‘Yál (‘iyál) the term ‘Yál means sons. In fact it must be “‘iyál”, but the common transliteration found in all sources is “‘Yál”.

Kummah (turban) a man’s headdress wound round the head. In the Ibáḍí tradition, the white Kummah is an insignia which the Imam must always wear.
INTRODUCTION

1) Structure of the Thesis

The subject of Omani contemporary history is considered, by many researchers, both Arabs and non-Arabs, to be a very important and fertile area of investigation. This great concern is partly due to the fact that Oman's political and social history was for many past centuries little known outside Oman, or even among its own inhabitants. The lack of adequate knowledge about Oman can be partly attributed to the fact that Oman is characterized by two special phenomena; the first is its endemic tribal conflicts and their effects on the ruling power; the second, the existence of the conservative Ibáḍi sect, which has a specific and clear ideology about rule. Another reason for the current interest in Oman's history is the importance of Oman in the domains of navigation and commerce, for which the country gained fame from ancient times.

For these reasons, we have embarked on this study to make a modest contribution to Omani local history in the period between 1913 and 1920. This period has a special importance in the history of Oman because the country witnessed tremendous economic, social and political developments in the early years of this century which led to the revival of the Ibáḍí Imamate in the Interior of Oman. This brought significant changes to the Omani political map, such that there came to exist in Oman two governments: an Ibáḍí Imamate in the Interior, in which a traditional Islamic system of rule prevailed, until the second half of 1950s, and the rule of Āl Bú Saʿíd dynasty in the coastal regions of the country.

This study focuses on Imam Sálím b. Ráshid al-Kharūṣí and the revival of the Ibáḍí Imamate. The object of this thesis is to deal with the biography of Imam Sálím, his military and political policies in establishing and consolidating his Imamate in the Interior Province, together with the type of relationship that existed between Imam Sálím, on the one hand and the Sultan supported by the British, on the other. We also discuss the
nature of the Imam's relationship with the Omani tribes, and the extent of his success in administering the affairs of his government.

The reason for focusing on the biography of this Imam lies in the necessity to address the local history of Oman and to show the important roles its Imams, 'ulamá' and notables played in the events which shaped Oman's political history over the course of time. These roles assumed a special significance in influencing the social and political struggles, which make these prominent personalities an integral part of historical events from which they cannot be divorced.

Our choice of this topic has been influenced by a number of considerations. First, the academic studies which have tackled the history of Oman have too often been characterized by generality and superficiality and are lacking in depth. Moreover, we believe there are conspicuous omissions in the study of the local history of Oman, with the exception of a few scattered articles on some specific subjects, e.g., a tribe or the Ibáḍí sect. These studies also exhibit a tendency to focus on the general appearance of Oman and its rulers, Āl Bú Sa‘íd dynasty, the extent of foreign influence on them and their foreign relations, more than on Oman's local history. It would seem that this may have been due to the fact that the main aim of such studies has been to introduce Oman to the outside world, and study the foreign influences which shaped the politics of the Omani rulers. This, in fact has led to criticism, and indeed discontent, from Omani readers who were dissatisfied with such studies because they give the non-Omani reader a blurred picture of Oman's history. This study aims to address these issues, to rectify some of the erroneous concepts and modestly to fill some of the gaps which have been left unaddressed in previous studies.

The second reason for our choice of the topic is the fact that an important success was achieved by the Omanis in reviving the Imamate in the 20th century, after a series of attempts at revival during the 19th century. The revival of the Imamate came as a response to the foreign influence on Oman's internal affairs, and its impact on restricting the slave trade and on the arms trade.

Finally, we have chosen this topic because we wished to gain knowledge about the legitimacy of the independence of the Imamate in Oman, which led to heated debate and
dispute in the 1950s and 1960s. The debate on the Imamate's independence involved a
difference in views in the interpretation of al-Sīb Treaty which was signed in 1920,
between Sultan Sd. Taymūr b. Faysal and Imam Muḥammad b. ‘Abdallāh al-Khalīf. The
terms of this treaty were rejected by Sultan Saʿīd b. Taymūr (ruled, 1932-70) on the
grounds that the treaty was not binding except for those who signed it.

This thesis is divided into eight chapters. The first chapter outlines the
geographical setting and historical background, including a discourse on the rise of the
Ibāḍiyyah and the development of the Imamate in Oman, the events in Oman after Sd.
Saʿīd's death up to 1913; and the effects of the First World War. The second chapter
seeks to give an account of the career of Imam Sālim's life and the Imamate revival. The
third chapter discusses the manner in which the Imam was elected, whether he in fact met
the required qualifications for the Imamate to be able to receive the private and public
allegiance (bay′ah). It also deals with the Imam's aims and policy programme as reflected
in his election speech and exchange of correspondence between him and others, which
were aimed at rallying support for the Imamate. The Imam's military operations and the
spread of his authority over Oman are the subject of the fourth chapter. Chapter Five
discusses the negotiation attempts between the Imam and the Sultans, and the role of the
British Government and the local figures in these negotiations. Chapter Six is devoted to
a discussion of the role of the tribes in support of Imam Sālim, and the extent of the
Imam's influence over these tribes. The main aim of Chapter Seven is to gain an
understanding of the Imam's administration, including his political system, the
administrative apparatus, education policy, and financial system. Chapter Eight examines
the causes of the assassination of Imam Sālim and the signing of the treaty of al-Sīb. We
conclude by giving a brief summary and highlighting the events covered during the period
from 1913 to 1920.
2) **Review of the Sources on the Topic**

In the course of our investigation, we have looked into the maximum possible number of sources, of both Omani and non-Omani origin, which are relevant to the subject of this study. In addition, we undertook several tours in Oman and the neighbouring Gulf States and Zanzibar, and visited some British libraries, in our efforts to investigate the sources of the study. We also conducted interviews with the ‘ulamā’ of Oman and the elderly, as well as with the sons of Imam Sálim and the descendants of some of the ‘ulamā’ and leaders who worked with the Imam. For convenience, the sources of the study are divided into two categories: Arabic and non-Arabic sources.

We have to emphasize that the researcher has in no way changed the texts and linguistic errors are left as they are in the original. The present writer has encountered many difficulties, and problematic names and dates, and extensive efforts have been made to trace their sources and to probe their implications. Nonetheless, in many instances it has proved very difficult indeed to know the third name of a person, or the precise date of death, let alone that of birth. Luckily, there are references to various names of the ‘ulamā’ in diverse sources, such as poems, biographies, letters, etc., and we were fortunate to find incidentally, complete names and dates, in an elegy, or written on the cover of a book which has nothing to do with the person in question.

a) **Arabic works:**

1. al- Sálimí, Muḥammad b. ‘Abdalláh (1314/1896-1406/1985). *Nahdat al-A‘yán bi Ḥurriyyat ‘Umán*. He is the son of the famous scholar Sh. ‘Abdalláh al-Sálimí, who played an important role in the revival of the Imamate in 1913. Sh. Muḥammad regularly accompanied his father wherever he went, writing and reading for him and leading him, since Sh. ‘Abdalláh was blind. Therefore, Sh. Muḥammad was close to Imam Sálim and served for the Imam as Wālī of al-Muṣayyib and of Nakhal during the reign of Imam al-Khalílī. He also took part in many of the Imam’s wars. He fled to Saudi Arabia after the collapse of the Imamate in 1957, and remained there until he finally returned to his country in 1970. His *Nahdat* covers the events of the period from 1913 until 1954. His work is an account of the history of two Imames, those of Imam al-Kharúsí and of Imam al-Khalílī. His work also includes important
biographies of men who became distinguished for the important roles they played in the fields of learning, literature, politics and leadership during this period. The present writer has drawn preponderantly on this source, in comparison with other sources. The contents of British documents largely conform with the information contained in this work.

2. al-Ḥārithī, Saʿīd b. Ḥamad (still alive). al-Luʾluʿ al-Ratib. His book is composed of narratives, many political and literary stories on diverse themes which the author narrates in praise of Imam Sālim and Imam Muḥammad, and a group of prominent 'ulamā' and leaders who became distinguished during the reigns of the two Imams. Sh. Saʿīd narrates these narratives and stories about three personalities: Sh. Muḥammad b. Sālim al-Ruqayshi (d. 1387/1967) who was Qāḍī to both Imams; his father Ḥamad b. Sulaymān al-Ḥārithī (d. 1389/1969); and his uncle Sh. ‘Abdallāh b. Sulaymān al-Ḥārithī (d. 1392/1972). Most of his narratives are about Sh. al-Ruqayshi, whom he accompanied for a considerable period of time when both of them were in prison in Muscat during the reign of Sultan Saʿīd b. Taymūr. Sh. Saʿīd was one of those who served the Imamate, and the last of his posts was as Wālī of al-Rustāq in 1957. The work has a historical and literary value because it includes narratives and accounts not mentioned in the work of Sh. Muḥammad al-Sālimī. However, the book is not divided into chapters and the narratives are scattered throughout the book. The book also lacks chronological sequence.

3. al-Siyābī, Sālim b. Ḥumūd (d. Dec .., 1993). He composed several books on history, genealogy (ansāb), fiqh, and thought. His important work on which we have drawn is the one entitled Isʿāf al-Aʿyān fi Ansāb Ahl ʿUmān, in which he presented an account of the tribes of Oman. This work greatly benefited us in our knowledge of the tribes, their leaders and 'ulamā'. The present writer compares this work with the work of Miles (the Countries and the Tribes) and of Lorimer (Gazetteer) who both devoted a large part of their respective books to the Omani tribes. The present writer benefited a good deal from the knowledge of this author, and personally interviewed him and gained useful insights from him on many problematic questions in the history of Oman.
4. The epistles: the present writer also consulted the short letters and reports which have been written in Arabic language relevant to the subject of investigation. Such letters and reports include ones like the report of Sultan Sd. Taymūr about the Imam's attack on Barkā' in 1914, which he sent to the Sultan of Zanzibar. They also include some of the accounts written by Sh. 'Abdalláh b. Imam Sálim about the karámat of his father. He depended in his account on some trustworthy men, as well as on the account of Sh. Sayf b. Saʻíd al-Maʻwál of the karámat of Imam Sálim and many others.

5. al-Khuṣaybī, Muḥammad b. Rásheid (d. 1991). Shaqā'iq al-Nu'mán. He is the son of Sh. Ráshid b. 'Uzayyīz, the Qādī of the Sultan. The author held important posts in the judiciary in Muscat for a long period of time, then became teacher in the Law Institute in Muscat until his death. His book gives valuable and important biographies of Omani poets. The present writer depended in many instances on this valuable work, which consists of three volumes and includes biographies of over 133 personalities, including ‘ulamā’, leaders and poets. It also includes some translations of works by the person praised.


7. There are also some of the Dīwāns of poetry by poets who emerged during this period. In these Dīwāns [Dawāwīn] there is frequent reference of praise or elegy for Imam Sálim, the commemoration of battles and other subjects. Examples of these Dīwāns are the Dīwān of Ibn Shikhán, by al-Salimi, Muḥammad b. Shikhán, the Dīwān of Sh. Manṣúr b. Nāṣir al-Fārisí, and the Dīwān of Sh. Abú Muslim al-Ruwáḥī and Others.

8. Personal communication (oral). The present writer was not content with the Omani sources referred to above, but conducted personal interviews and contacts more than once with some of the Omani ‘ulamā’, leaders and prominent figures, through a set of questions which he addressed to the persons contacted. These questions and queries inquired about the authenticity of certain facts or events, sought further information about Imam Sálim, or attempted to authenticite certain pieces of information, etc. The
names of these contacts are included in the bibliography, but some of them are omitted from the list deliberately to avoid unnecessary embarrassment.

Contemporary academic studies, on the other hand, which deal with the history of Oman during the period under study, can be listed as follows:

1. Qásim, J. Z. *al-Khalífi al-‘Arabí 1914 - 1945*. The author of this book tackled, in chapter 2 under the title "Inbi‘áth al-Ímah al-Ibádiyyah 1913-1920" pp. 384-421, the political and military aspects of the Imamate, with a special focus on the impediments in the tumbling efforts to reach a peace agreement, and the role of the British in this process. He based his work mostly on British documentary sources.

2. Shahdád, Ibráhím Muḥammad. *al-Síra‘ al-Dákhilí fí ‘Umán Khilál al-Qarn al-‘Ishrín, 1913-75*. Shahdád devoted the first and second chapters to the events of the period under discussion, pp. 25-116. He followed in his account his teacher Dr. Qásim, J. Z. However, he relied even more on British documents than Dr. Qásim did. He is more geared towards a national political history in which he adopted a new independent analytical approach. This new approach, however, makes his analyses and interpretations far removed from the realities of the situation.

3. al-Mashhadání, Khalíl Ibráhím. *al-Tátawwurát al-Síyásiyyah fí ‘Umán wa ‘Alágátihá al-Khárijiyyah 1913-1932*. His work is an M.A. thesis, submitted to the University of Baghdad in 1986. This work basically covers the reign of Sd. Taymúr (1913-32). The first and second chapters are devoted to the events of the period between 1913-20 (pp.55-110), in which he discusses the causes which prompted the revival of the Imamate, and the military expeditions of the Imam. This part also includes a discussion of the failed attempts to reach a peace agreement between the Imam and the Sultan. There finally follows an analysis of the reasons which led to al-Síb treaty.

b) **Non-Arabic works:**

The present writer has also made use of a number of books and documents of British origin, including:-

1. The Administration Reports by the Gulf Political Residency (PRG) and the Muscat Political Agency (PAM). These works contain year by year annual reports since 1873,
giving summaries of important events that were taking place in different places in the Gulf region, details of trade statistics, shipping activities and volumes of freight, aspects of the regional history, geography, tribes, economic matters etc.

2. **R/15/6 Political Agency Muscat (PAM) 1867-1951 (546 vols.).** The present writer has benefited greatly from these correspondences, especially the files: R/15/6/42-46, 48, 204 and 264. These reports and correspondences have been collected and published in a single book under the title: *Records of Oman 1867-1967*, and came in 12 vols.

3. **L/P&S/10 Department Papers: Political and Secret Separate file 1902-1931.** The most important files we have consulted are: L/P&S/10/397, 423, 425 and 426.

As for contemporary writings in English which deal with the history of Oman, we list the following:

1. Kelly, J. B. "Prevalence of Furies; Tribes, Politics and Religion in Oman and Trucial Oman" ; "Sultanate and Imamate in Oman"; and *Eastern Arabian Frontiers*. Most of what Dr. Kelly wrote was based on compilation from wide reading and knowledge. He based himself mainly on British archival documents and provided an enormous amount of factual detail. However, all his works supported the view of the Sultan.

2. Landen, R.G. *Oman since 1856: Disruptive Modernization in a Traditional Arab Society*. The author devoted his effort to study the events of Oman from 1862-1902. Then he followed, in brief summaries, the course of events in Oman until the 1950s, in the chapter entitled: "Epilogue: Oman in the 20th century" (pp. 388-426). This chapter is divided into two sections, under the titles: “Divided Oman- Sultanate and Imamate, 1913-55” (pp. 388-414), and “the Reunification of Oman under Moderate Rule” (pp. 414-426). In the first section, the author addressed general matters such as the military operations, and the failed peace attempts, all somewhat briefly. Then he gave an analysis of al-Sib treaty from the perspective of its legitimacy for the total independence of the Imam. His analysis is considered of a special value to this study.

3. Peterson, J.E. *Oman in the Twentieth Century*; and "The Revival of the Ibádí Imamate in Oman and the Threat to Muscat 1913-20". The first work addressed the general history of Oman from two angles: themes in Oman; and challenges to the Sultanate. He discussed several issues dealing with the Sultanate, and the difficulties that the Sultan
faced from the Imamate, as well as the associated administrative and economic problems. The second work is an article which was devoted to a study of the Imamate, the causes which led to its revival, and its military and political success until the Treaty of al-Sib.

4. Bannerman M. Graeme. *Unity and Disunity in Oman 1895-1920*. The author devoted this work to a study of the relationships within Omani society and traced the positions of the tribes and their influence on the political system. This work is a Ph.D. thesis, submitted to the University of Wisconsin in 1976.

5. Wilkinson, J. C. *Water and Tribal Settlement in South-East Arabia: A study of the Afláj of Oman; The Imamate tradition of Oman; "The Oman question"; "The Origins of the Omani State"; and "The Ibadi Imamah*. Dr. Wilkinson has written a number of books and articles on Oman and has spent more than 25 years studying Omani history and politics.

c) Other sources consulted:

A quick glimpse into the bibliography will reveal that there is a considerable number of books and articles which the present writer has consulted from both Arabic and non-Arabic sources, both published and unpublished. Some of these sources have been indispensable for the present study. Among these are the books written by Lorimer, Miles and D. Eickelman all in English, in addition to the works of Ibn Ruzayq, those of ʿAbdalláh al-Sálimí, of Qásim, J.Z. and other sources written in Arabic.
CHAPTER 2

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

This chapter deals with three principal matters: the rise of the Ibádiyyah and the development of the Imamate in Oman, the events in Oman after Sd. Sa'id's death up to the revival of the Imamate in 1913; and the effects of the First World War. As a preliminary to those matters it is important to describe the geographical setting and the population structure.

1) Geographical Setting and Population Structure

Oman occupies the south eastern part of the Arabian peninsula, extending from Sabkhat Maṭṭī in the North (the southern borders of al-Ḥasā) to Ḥaḍramawt in the South. Oman is effectively an island, surrounded on three sides by the Arabian Gulf, the Gulf of Oman and the Arabian Sea, and on the fourth by the Empty Quarter (al-Rub' al-Khali). At present time Oman had been divided into two states: the Sultanate of Oman and Sāḥil 'Umán (Coast of Oman) which is now known as the United Arab Emirates. The term "Sultanate of Muscat and Oman" which appears in the late 19th century in documents and agreements with foreign countries, is confusing. It appears to name two countries, Muscat and Oman. In fact Oman is the name of the whole country, while Muscat has been its capital since the 1780s. Muscat is merely a city, and not even the largest city in Oman. It was included in the name of the state merely as an indication of the city's fame and importance (1).

Oman has been traditionally divided into several provinces, and the political history of Oman has been to a great degree determined by its geography. Three geographical regions are found in Oman; the mountains, the coastal plain and the inland plains. Dominating Oman is the range of mountains beginning with Ra's Musandam at the entrance to the Arabian Gulf, sweeping south-eastwards to Ra's al-Ḥadd which divides the Gulf of Oman and the Arabian Sea. The area from Ra's Musandam to Dibá is called Ru'ūs al-Jibál (Musandam) and from this to Ra's al-Ḥadd is known as Ḥajar (Rock) of
Oman. Wádí Samá’il (Samá’il Gab) divided the Ḥajar into Western and Eastern Ḥajar.

The coastal plain from Dibá to near Muscat is split into two provinces, al-Shumayliyyah and the Bátinah. The former extends from Dibá to Khámat Maláḥah (north Shinás) and the latter from Khámat Maláḥah to al-Síf. The major towns of al-Shumayliyyah are, from north to south, Dibá, Khámr Fakkán, al-Fujayrah and Kalbá. The towns of the Bátinah, from north to south, are Shinás, Liwá, Suḥár, Şahám, al-Khábúrah, al-Suwayq, al-Muṣann‘ah, Barká’ and al-Síf. These towns are the main ports and markets for the corresponding towns on the other side of the mountains. Behind these provinces, and divided by Western Ḥajar, lie three provinces, Sír, Záhirah (Dháhirah) and al-Dákhiliyyah (Interior). The first begins from Sha‘im, (north of Ra’s al-Khaymah) to Dubai in the south, the second from Dubai in the north to Jabal al-Kúr in the south, and Interior from Jabal al-Kúr to Wádí Ḥilfín in the East. The important towns of Sír are Ra’s al-Khaymah, Umm al-Qaywayn, ‘Ajmán, Shárqah (Shárijah) and Dubai; of al-Záhirah, Buraymí, al-Qábil, and ‘Ibrí; and of Interior, Bahlä, al-Ḥamrá’, Nazwà, Manaḥ, Adam, Izkí and Samá’il. The important towns in the western Ḥajar are Yanqil, Rustáq, Nakhal, and al-‘Awábl. The towns of Eastern Ḥajar are Muscat, Qurayyát, Wádí Dimá, Wádí al-Ṭa‘iyyín, Wádí B. Khálid, Súr and Ra’s al-Ḥadd. Behind the Eastern Ḥajar are the provinces of al-Sharqiyyah and Ja‘lán. The former adjoins Interior, while the latter extends towards the sea. The major towns of the former are Ibrá’, al-Muḍaybí, Samad, Sinánw, al-Muḍayarab, al-Qábil, and Baḍiyyah. The towns of Ja‘lán are al-Kámil, al-Wáff, Bilád B. Bú Ḥasan, and Bilád B. Bú ‘Alí. Other provinces belonging to Oman are Musandam (2) in the Ru’us al-Jibál, Šuḥár (Dhofar) in the southern Oman, and Gawádir on the coast of Baluchistan. (during the period discussion).

The two sides of the mountain range are linked by passes joining the principal Wádí systems. All passes through the mountains are difficult. Three main passes link Oman’s coast with its inner provinces (see map passing below). The most important of these has been the central pass which runs from Muscat via Wádí Samá’il where it branches into two. One heads for Interior Province and the other for al-Sharqiyyah and Ja‘lán Provinces via the Wádí al-‘Aqq. The second passage runs from Šuḥár via the Wádí
al-Jizzì to al-Zahirah Province, and the third runs from Šír via the Wádí al-Fulayj to Ja'lán and al-Sharqiyyah.

The great majority of the inhabitants of Oman are of the Arab race. According to tribal tradition, they descend from the two Arabian stocks, the Qaḥṭánî (or Yamanî) and the ‘Adnâni (or Nizâri). Tradition says that the Arabs of Oman arrived in two waves as part of the general movement of Arabs into Oman. The first wave migrated from Yemen while the ‘Adnânis came into the area from the north and centre of Arabia. In the first half of the 18th century there arose in the course of a general civil war (1724-1728), two large factions, known as the Hinâwî and Ghâfirî which still exist. The former supported Sh. Khalaf b. Mubârák al-Hinâ’î, and the latter gathered under the banner of Imam Muhammad b. Nâsîr al-Ghâfirî. The Hinâwî consist of Qaḥṭánî tribes, while the Ghâfirî are mainly ‘Adnânî tribes. But some of these tribes are exceptions to the usual Hinâwî/Ghâfirî division, e.g. al-Ḥabûs and B. Ruwâḥah, which are both Hinâwî, although they are of ‘Adnânî and not Qaḥṭánî origin, while the B. Riyâm, the B. Kharûs and the Janabah, all Ghâfirî tribes, are of Qaḥṭánî, and not ‘Adnânî stock (see Ch. VI below).

There is a minority of inhabitants of Oman who are non-Arabs: Baluchis, Khojas, Baniáns, Zidjál, Africans and a variety of semi-Arabized Semitic peoples (3). The Khojas (Haidarabádí), known in Oman as Luwátiyyah, were British subjects who came to Oman after their native Indian states had come under British rulers. Baniáns or Hindu merchants came from India. They have been in Oman for hundreds of years. Because of their wealth, they have had considerable influence on the Sultan of Oman. This influence rested on economic power and their performance of many bureaucratic functions for the ruler of Oman (4). The Baluchi tribes are from the area known as Baluchistán- the coastal region on the Gulf of Oman divided between Iran and Pakistan. They have migrated to Oman since their area came under Omani domination (5). The geographical and tribal situation of Oman has been described by writers such as al-‘Awtabî, Miles, Lorimer, al-Siyábî, Kelly, and Anthony (6).
2) The Rise of the Ibāḍiyyah and the Development of the Imamate in Oman

This section will deal briefly with the rise and development of the Ibāḍī Imamate. The Ibāḍī question has been discussed by many writers, but there is no clear and coherent study on the subject. This may be owing to the political conditions which accompanied the rise of the Ibāḍīs. This section will illustrate the Ibāḍī characteristics which distinguish them from other Islamic sects. The Ibāḍī Imamate is here analysed and classified in a way which has not been attempted before. The purpose of this clarification is to understand the aims of the adherents of the Ibāḍī Imamate, and their desire for the establishment of a strong religious authority. This provides the basis for a better understanding of the revival of the Imamate in the 20th century.

a) The Rise of the Ibāḍiyyah

It is difficult to harmonise the accounts of Ibāḍī and non-Ibāḍī sources regarding the rise of the Ibāḍiyyah and their relations with their opponents (7). The Ibāḍiyyah is one of the earliest Islamic sects which was founded in the middle of the first century of the Hijrah. It took its name from ‘Abdallāh b. Ibāḍ al-Murrī al-Tamīmī who came into prominence in A.H. 60s. This name (Ibāḍiyyah) is applied to a Muslim group which is considered by some writers as a moderate branch of the Kharijite movement, while non-Ibāḍī Muslim scholars always tended to regard the Ibāḍīs as extreme Khārijites (8).

As a result of the civil war which occurred after the assassination of ‘Uthmān b. ‘Affān (23–35 A.H.), the Muslims as a whole were divided into those who supported ‘Uthmān, those who supported ‘Alī, and those who took up a neutral position (9).

The point of dissension among the differing groups in Islam during the first century of the Hijrah was essentially one: who should be the head of the ummah? (10). The difference of opinion was confined purely to this political matter. The Ibāḍiyyah acknowledged both the Caliphs Abū Bakr and ‘Umar and the first half of the third Caliph’s reign, but they would not recognize the legitimacy of the second half of the third Caliph’s reign and that of the fourth Caliph after his acceptance of the Arbitration with Mu‘āwiyah b. Abī Sufyān (11). The Ibāḍiyyah agreed with the position of the leaders of Ahl al-Nahrawān. Their view was that they should fight "al-fi‘atu al-Bāghiyah" (the supporters of Mu‘āwiyah) until they accepted the commands of God (12). After ‘Alī’s
acceptance of arbitration, the minority of his followers withdrew to Ḥarūrā', and then to al-Nahr, where they elected 'Abdallāh b. Wahhab al-Rāsibī as their Imam (13). This group was called al-Muḥākkimah, and their slogan was "lā ḥukma 'illa lillāh" which the Caliph 'Alī condemned as "a word of truth by which falsehood was intended" (14). But the Ibāḍī scholar, Abū Ubaydah later retorted: "since the Caliph 'Alī knew that their slogan expressed the truth, who informed him that falsehood was their intention?" (15).

After his failure to win over the Muḥākkimah, 'Alī attacked them and killed some 4000 men at the battle of Nahrawān (16). Non-Ibāḍī sources report that the Muḥākkimah 'went out' against the legal caliph (17). In fact, at this time the Muḥākkimah's aim was to avoid shedding Muslim blood, and not to oppose the Caliph 'Alī. Their view was simply that the powers and duties of the leader of the Muslims had been laid down by the Prophet through the Qur'ān and the Sunnah, and if such a leader failed to comply with them, it was the Muslim's duty to disassociate himself from him. 'Alī declared war against those who wanted the killers of the caliph 'Uthmān punished, and who rejected the caliphate of 'Alī. 'Alī defeated them at the Battle of the Camel in 36/656 (18), but some members of this group were in Damascus with the Wālī Muʿāwiyyah b. Abī Sufyān. This group were denounced as "al-fīʿatu al-Bāghiyah" by the supporters of 'Alī (19). At Šīffīn 'Alī encountered the Wālī Muʿāwiyyah and his followers in the A.H.36. Hostilities lasted until Ṣafar, 37/ July, 657, when it was agreed to submit to arbitration (20).

The group of 'Alī's supporters who rejected the arbitration, was called al-Muḥākkimah (21). The survivors of battle of Ḥarūrā escaped to Basrah, where they found protection from the B. Tamīm (22). This group of survivors was under the command of Abū Bilāl Mirdās b. 'Udayyah al-Tamīmī, and adopted the name al-Ḥarūriyyah. It lived in a state of concealment "kitmān" in Basrah (23). In consequence of Ḥuṣayn b. 'Alī b. Abī Ṭālib's killing, Abū Bilāl and his forty followers claiming to be the true Muslim "Shāfī′", left Basrah for Asik in Ahwāz, where the Wālī of Iraq, 'Ubayd Allāh b. Ziyād killed them in A.H.61 (24). With martyrdom, Abū Bilāl became a model for the Ibāḍiyah. 'Umrán b. Ḥaṭān succeeded Abū Bilāl (25). The period of 'Umrán was quiet and his adherents devoted themselves to political and religious studies. This period is somewhat obscure, and reports of secret assassinations which are
attributed to the Ḥarūrah are not necessarily reliable, since there were many other active opponents of the Umayyads (26).

After Madīnah was occupied by Yazíd b. Muʿawiyah in A.H. 62, most of the Ḥarūriyyah then moved from Basrah to Mecca to help ʿAbdallāh b. al-Zubayr, while a minority of them moved to Yamāmah (27). Ibn al-Zubayr, however rejected the Ḥarūriyyah's views, and they returned to Basrah, where 'Ubayd Allāh b. Ziyād imprisoned them (28).

After the leaders of Ḥarūriyyah were released, a dispute arose among them as to whether they should rebel against the Umayyads or continue their daʿwah in a state of kitman (29). The majority were in fervour of rebellion, and were supported by Nāfī’ b. al-Azraq, who left Basrah for al-Ahwáz, claiming that the Muslim community were all polytheists and their territory was Dār al-Ḥarb. His supporters were called al-Azāriqah (30), while those who preferred to continue their daʿwah in concealment were called al-Qaʿīdah (quietists) (31) and were led by ‘Umar b. Ḥaṭān, ʿAbdallāh b. Ibāḍ, and ʿAbdallāh b. al-Ṣaffār. The latter withdrew from al-Qaʿīdah and formed al-Ṣaffāriyyah sect in A.H.75 (32) and al-Qaʿīdah later became known as the Ibádiyyah. Thus it can be seen, that in its historical development, Ibádiyyah had respectively taken different names:
(a) First the Muḥākkimah which means those who rejected arbitration with Muʿawiyah b. Abī Sufyān. (b) The Ḥarūriyyah, referring to the Ḥarūrā’ village to which the Muḥākkimah retired after refusing of arbitration. (c) Al-Qaʿīdah, when Nāfī’ b. al-Azraq with his extremist ideas was dissociated from the Ḥarūriyyah by 64 A.H., and finally (d) Ibádiyyah, which referred to ʿAbdallāh b. Ibāḍ, when Ibn al-Ṣaffār separated from al-Qaʿīdah in 75 A.H.

The Najdāt, al-Azāriqah, and the Ṣaffāriyyah have been generally known by Sunnis and Shiʿites under the collective name of ”Khawārij”, (Khārijites, i.e. these who ‘go out' or ‘oppose’) and as such they were regarded as having broken away from Islamic principles. However, this fails to take account of the fact that the Ibádiyyah pursued a peaceful course, quite distinct from that of the other sects, and for this reason to consider them merely as “moderate”, as is done by non-Ibāḍi scholars, does not accurately reflect their separate status (33). Ibāḍi views are in fact quite distinct from
those of the Khārijites, who consider all other Muslims as infidels and polytheists, while the Ibādīs reject this and regard other Muslims as monotheists (Muwaḥḥidūn) and as kuffār niʿmah (34). The Ibādīs refused to kill women, and children or the injured, and did not pursue a routed enemy; and they refrained from looting (35).

‘Abdallāh b. Ibāḍ lived in Basrah during the second half of the first century of the Ḥijrah. He joined with his followers in helping Ibn al-Zubayr in the defence of Mecca. ‘Abdallāh openly refuted the views of opposing groups, including the extreme Khārijites (36). He was close to Jābir b. Zayid, and he followed his orders (37).

Jābir b. Zayid was born in Oman and lived in Basrah. He had a wide knowledge of the Qur’ān and the Sunnah. This made him a distinguished figure in his field. He was considered by the Ibāḍīyyah as the first Imam of their school during the first rise of the Ibādīs. Ibāḍī jurisprudence was essentially based on Jābir’s legal opinions.

In the 70s and 80s the Ibāḍī leaders were imprisoned by al-Ḥajjāj b. Yūsuf, the Wālī of Iraq, including Jābir and ‘Umran b. Ḥāṭān (38). The former was later expelled to Oman and the latter after refusing to lead the Ibāḍīyyah, left Basrah (39).

Some authorities state that the Ibāḍīyyah had friendly relations with the Umayyad regime during ‘Abd al-Malik b. Marwán’s reign (40). In fact all the Ibāḍī leaders were in prison at this time, except ‘Abdallāh b. Ibāḍ, who seems to have died shortly after he had explained his views in writing to ‘Abd al-Malik (41).

Abū ‘Ubaydah Muslim b. Abī Karīmah, and Abū Mawdūd Ḥājib b. Ḥafṣ al-Ṭā‘ī succeeded Jābir b. Zayid and ‘Abdallāh b. Ibāḍ (42). Abū ‘Ubaydah was also put in prison by al-Ḥajjāj. After his release in A.H. 95, he played an important part as a successful leader of the Ibāḍī movement. Abū ‘Ubaydah had been a slave of ‘Urwah b. ‘Udayyah, the brother of Abū Bilāl Mirdās, and he was blind (43). Consequently his role became that of Muftī and teacher to his followers, while Abū Mawdūd Ḥājib b. Ḥafṣ al-Ṭā‘ī became the political leader of the Ibāḍīyyah. Abū ‘Ubaydah established three types of council (Majlis) as follows (44):

1. A high council which discussed communal plans.
2. A general council for all members of the sect.
3. A special council for regular students intending to study the precepts of the Ibádí movement or to be trained for the Da‘wah.

The policy of Abú ‘Ubaydah was successful in training a large number of students who were sent out to North Africa, al-Ḥijáz, Yemen and Oman. These students were called a ‘ḥamalat al-‘ilm’ (45). As a result they established the Imamate in all the above areas except al-Ḥijáz. The first Ibádí Imamate was in Yemen in 129/746 when Ṭālib al-Ḥaqq was elected as Imam in the Ḥaḍramawt. His Imamate was extended to al-Ḥijáz in 130, but the Umayyad regime suppressed it in A.H.132 (46). In Oman Julandā b. Mas‘úd succeeded in establishing a second Imamate in 132, which lasted for two years. The third Imamate, in Tāhirt [Tiaret] in North Africa, was established in 160, and lasted until 296 when the Fāṭimid Caliphate suppressed it (47). Although the Ibádí Imamate in both Yemen and Oman failed to maintain themselves, Abú ‘Ubaydah continued his activities until the time of his death during the Caliphate of al-Manṣūr (48). His successor, al-Rabī‘ b. Ḥabīb persevered with these activities and in A.H.177 the Ibádiyyah established the second Imamate in Oman.

b) The Development of the Imamate in Oman

The discussion of this period will concentrate on the main stages of the Imamate before the Imamate of Sálim b. Ráshid al-Kharūṣī in 1913.

i. The first Imamate (132/749-134/751-2)

The Ibádí movement began in Basrah where its missionaries had been trained and then been sent abroad to places far away from the power centres of the Umayyad and ‘Abbasid Caliphs. These missionaries were known as the ‘ḥamalat al-‘ilm. They succeeded in the establishment of the first Imamate in Yemen, Oman, and North Africa.

The conflict between the Umayyad Caliphate and the first Ibádí Imamate in Yemen ultimately led to the collapse of the latter. But the Ibádiyyah succeeded in the establishment of their first Imamate in Oman in 132/749. As a result of the Umayyad collapse at the hands of the ‘Abbasids, Oman came under the rule of the latter. This in turn led to the dismissal of Ziyád b. al-Muhallab b. Abí Ṣufrah, as the Umayyad Wálīf in Oman, who was replaced by Junāḥ b. ‘Ubádah b. Qays al-Hiná’ī in 132. Shortly Junāḥ was deposed, and his son Muhammad was appointed in his place. During Muḥammad’s
period of office the Ibadiyah succeeded in the election of Julanda b. Mas'ud b. Jayfar al-Julandi as the first Imam of Oman (49).

Omani accounts state that Muhammad b. Junah was not against the establishment of the Ibadhi Imamate, in that there was no clash between him and the Ibadiyah. Instead he secretly countenanced them. This implies that he was impressed by the Imamate type of organisation which was essentially based on the principle of consultation (shura) and election (50). There are serious doubts about the year 132 (i.e., the year of the overthrow of the Umayyads) as being the date of Julanda's election. The turbulent events of this year raise the following question: how did Abu al-'Abbas al-Saffah manage to deal with all these events during the second half of the year 132? We do not know exactly how long Junah held his position and why he was dismissed, and similarly we have no information about how long it took Muhammad b. Junah to establish friendly relations with the Ibadiyah. These events needed some time to mature, and cannot have taken place within a few months. In addition Oman in itself was not a very important Wilayah for the Abbasids because it did not constitute any real danger to the Caliphate. The establishment of the first Imamate in Oman in that year is therefore unlikely, and there is a much stronger argument which suggests the year 134 as the date of the foundation of the first Ibadhi Imamate in Oman (51).

Imam Julanda was just, generous and pious. He was the first uncontested Imam of Oman, and greatly promoted the cause of the Ibadiyah (52). His Imamate continued until 134, when he was killed at the Battle of Julfar (Ra's al-Khaymah) which was fought between himself and Khazim b. Khuzaymah who had been sent by the Caliph, Abu al-'Abbas al-Saffah, in order to suppress the rebellion of the Saffariyah in Bahrain (al-Hasa) (53). Khazim defeated Shayban b. 'Abd al-'Aziz al-Yashkuri, the leader of the Saffariyah in Bahrain. The latter escaped to Oman, but the Imam refused to allow him to enter Oman. The Imam's troops encountered Shayban in Julfar in 134. The result of this battle was that Shayban and his followers were killed (54). Shortly after this, Khazim came to Oman searching for Shayban, not knowing that the latter had already been killed. During his interview with the Imam, he explained his aims as follows: "let their death and what they have suffered at your hands suffice. My only wish now is to be
able to inform the Caliph that you are obedient and loyal” (55). But the Imam vehemently rejected this proposal. Battle then ensued between the Imam and Kházim in Julfár in 134 A.H. The Imam was killed and his Imamate, which had lasted for two years and one month, collapsed (56).

ii. The Second Imamate (177/793-280/893)

After the death of Julandā, Oman came under the ‘Abbasid Caliphs, but their rule extended over the coastal towns of Oman only. Muḥammad b. Zā‘īdah b. Ja‘far al-Julandī, and Ráshid b. al-Nāzar al-Julandī succeeded in ruling inland, in the ‘Abbasid’s name (57). On the other hand, the Ibáḍî missionaries were still preaching their doctrines, and became very active after some Ibáḍis came to Oman from Basrah. The Ibádiyyah seized an opportunity when a conflict arose between Ráshid b. al-Nāzar and Ghassán b. Abd al-Malik. The latter was supported by the Ibáḍî leaders, such as Sh. Músâ b. Abī Jābir al-Izkawi, Muḥammad b. ‘Abdallāh, and Muḥammad b. al-Mu‘allá al-Kindī. These fought with Ráshid in al-Zāhirah Province in 177/793. Ráshid and his supporters were killed in this battle which was known as the Battle of al-Majázah (58).

The Ibádiyyah established a second Ibáḍî Imamate in Oman. They gave their allegiance to Muḥammad b. ‘Abdallāh b. ‘Affán as an Imam difā‘. After two years, he was deposed, and al-Wárit b. Ka‘b al-Kharúsī replaced him in 179/795 (59). Henceforth, the Ibádiyyah continued to elect their Imams until A.H.280. During this period eight Imams were elected one after another. At the end of 273, Imam al-Ṣalt b. Málīk was deposed by Sh. Músâ b. Músâ b. ‘Alī , and Ráshid b. al-Nāzar was elected as Imam. Ibn Ruzayq gives the reason as being that “Imam al-Ṣalt became very old and feeble, ... and the loyalty of people towards the Imamate was weakened” (60).

In consequence of this, a serious disturbance arose in Oman and the Omanis were divided in their opinions. Warfare broke out between the ex-Imam’s supporters and the Imam Ráshid. Several battles occurred between them. Among these were the battle of al-Rawdah in Tanūf, and the battle of Rustaq. Eventually Sh. Músâ b Músâ deserted the Imam Ráshid, and deposed him. Sh. Músâ then nominated ‘Azzán b. Tamīm al-Kharúsī as Imam in 277. The latter improved his relations with Sh. Músà and Imam al-Ṣalt’s supporters by dismissing all the adherents of Imam Ráshid. Sh. Músâ became chief Qádī
After one year Imam 'Azzán removed Sh. Músà from his position. Nevertheless the former suspected what might happen to him from Sh. Músà. He then sent a force against Sh. Músà who was killed and his supporters in Izkí were slain and robbed. This occurred on Sunday, 29th Sha'bán, 278/5th December, 891 (62). In consequence, conflict arose between Sh. Músà’s supporters (Nizáris) and Imam ‘Azzán who was supported by the Yamanis. The Nizári tribes nominated al-Ḥawáří b. 'Abdallah al-Ṣalútí (Yamaní origin) as Imam in Şuḥár in Shawwál, 278/January, 892 (63). The Imam al-Ḥawáří clashed with al-Ahyaf b. Ḥımḥám al-Hiná‘í, the commander of Imam ‘Azzán’s troops in the village of Majíz in the Bāţinah on Monday, 26th Shawwál, 278. The result of this battle was that Nizári party was defeated and its Imam was killed (64).


iii. Third Imamate (the "Weak" Imamate) (284/897-c.330s/940s)

Not long after this the people of Oman successfully established the third Imamate in Oman by killing the governor of Nazwà, Abî Aḥmad Bajayrah, in A.H.284. Their first Imam was Muḥammad b. al-Ḥasan al-Kharúṣí (284-285) and their last one was Rášhid b. al-Walíd al-Kindí (328-?) (68). Between those there were sixteen Imams. Al-Izkawí states that “the people set up 16 different Imams, and in each case failed to hold to keep the allegiance, which they had vowed” (69). The underlying reasons for this were the conflict between the Nizáří and Yamaní parties, the interference of the ‘Abbasid Caliphate in the affairs of Oman, and the occupation of the Qarmatians who attacked Oman during the Imamate of ‘Umar b. Muḥammad. The ‘Abbasid Caliphs restored their authority in Oman in about 330s/940s and this lasted until 407/1016 (70).
The outstanding Imam of this Imamate was Imam Sa‘īd b. ‘Abdallāh b. Muḥammad (320-328). He was praised by several ‘ulamā’, among these being, Abū Muḥammad ‘Abdallāh b. Muḥammad b. Abī al-Mundhir, and Abū Ibrāhīm, Muḥammad b. Sa‘īd. The former described him as follows: “we know of no Imam of the Muslims in Oman more excellent than Imam Sa‘īd, for he was an upright and learned Imam, and he died the death of a martyr. All these things were combined in him” (71). Abū Ibrāhīm added that “Imam Sa‘īd was superior to Julanda b. Mūsā‘īd [first Imam in Oman] for he was a just and righteous Imam, excelling the people of his times in learning, and he died a martyr withal” (72).

iv. The Fourth Imamate (the dual Imamate) (407/1016-c.560/1164)

After the Imamate of Rashīd b. al-Walīd, the office lapsed during the second half of the fourth century of the Ḥijrah. During this period Oman was dominated by the ‘Abbasid " supreme commanders" (the Buwayhids [945-1016]) (73). On the other hand, there was continuing conflict within leadership of the Omani ‘ulamā’ over the issue of willedah, and barā‘ah in relation to Sh. Mūsā b. Mūsā, Imam al-Ṣalt, and Imam Rashīd b. al-Nīzar (74). This conflict persisted until the emergence of Khalīf b. Shādhn b. Imam al-Ṣalt who was elected as Imam in 407/1016 (75). His first task was to get rid of the ‘Abbasid governor of the Buwayhids, but he died before he could achieve this. His successor Rashīd b. Sa‘īd, however, managed to expel them from Oman. Ibn Ruzayq notes that Imam Rashīd “walked in the good way of his predecessor and imitated him in his praiseworthy life”(76).

After the death of the Imam Rashīd, the Imamate was conferred on his son Ḥafṣ, who ruled Oman for some twenty years. Rashīd b. ‘Alī al-Kharūṣī then succeeded him. His Imamate persisted until his death in A.H.513 (77). His conduct was not approved by some Omanis but it was claimed that he declared his repentance in 474/1081(78). The people of Rustāq, however, were not convinced of his repentance. They accordingly elected ‘Āmir b. Rashīd b. al-Walīd al-Kharūṣī as Imam in Rustāq in 476/1083 (79).

Consequently, there were now two Imamates in Oman; one in Rustāq, and the other in Nazwā. The conflict between the two groups continued until the mid-sixth century of al-Ḥijrah, when the B. Nabhān overthrew the two Imamates, and established a
kingdom which was known as the first state of the B. Nabhán. Their rule was monarchical and dictatorial (80).

v. The Fifth Imamate (rule of an imam and of a king "malik" (809-964)

The first kingdom of the B. Nabhán lasted for more than 250 years. The history of this period is obscure. There are no documents on which one can rely for the analysis of cultural and political affairs during this period. Al-Sálimí ascribes the lack of recorded events in this period to “the dictatorial system of the rulers” (81). The B. Nabhán’s policy led ultimately to the revival of the Imamate in 809/1406 (82), when the people of Oman gave their allegiance to al-Ḥawáří b. Málík. But the rule of the B. Nabhán continued for another forty years (83). During this period four Imams were elected. But Sulaymán b. Sulaymán b. Muẓaffar al-Nabhání succeeded in regaining his authority by 850s A.H (84). Not long after this ‘Umar b. al-Khaṭṭáb al-Khalíl was re-elected as Imam. Subsequently he decided to confiscate the property of the B. Nabhán, and return it to the Bayt al-Mál. Henceforth, the practice of confiscation became a rule for the following Imams (85).

The date of the beginning of ‘Umar b. al-Khaṭṭáb’s Imamate is unknown. It may have been in 855 A.H. (86) when Sulaymán b. Sulaymán al-Nabhání overthrew his Imamate, but he was certainly re-elected in 885 A.H., (87) and after two years he issued a decree for the confiscation of the properties of the B. Nabhán, which were to be returned to the Bayt al-Mál. After his death in 894 A.H., the people elected six different Imams during just five years. This led to the revival of the B. Nabhán. Sulaymán b. Sulaymán al-Nabhání again seized power in 899 A.H. (88). But Sulaymán was killed by Muḥammad b. Ismá’īl in 906/1500 (89). An allegiance was then given to Muḥammad. Al-Izkawí states that “the Muslims were so pleased at this proof of his strength to do right and oppose wickedness, that they elected him Imam in the year 906 A.H.” (90).

During his rule the Portuguese occupied all the coastal towns of Oman, which had been under the domination of the Empire of Hurmuz since the rule of the first B. Nabhán. Henceforth, Muḥammad and his successors ruled only the interior part of Oman. There is no record of the struggle between the Imams and the Portuguese during the 10th/16th century until the Yaʿáribah dynasty appeared in 1034/1624. After Muḥammad’s death, allegiance was given to his son, Barakát in 936/1529. In 960s conflict broke out again
between the people of Oman. We find three Imams at the same time. This weakened the Imamate, and afterwards the B. Nabhn successfully re-established their rule, which lasted until 1034/1624 (91).

vi. The Sixth Imamate (Ya`aribah and Āl-Bū Sa`īd) (1034 - 1207 A.H.)

During the first quarter of the 11th/17th century Oman was divided into several small states ruled by leaders calling themselves Kings. There was a state of conflict between those rulers. This gave the Portuguese an opportunity to strengthen their position and control all the important Omani coastal cities. This situation led forty `ulamá` to meet in Rustáq in order to discuss the plight of Oman and they finally decided to elect Nāṣir b. Murshid al-Ya`rubf as Imam. His task was to re-unite the country and free Oman from Portuguese occupation. Imam Nāṣir was regarded as the founder of the Ya`aribah dynasty which lasted until 1156/1743. The rule of the Ya`aribah was hereditary and their rulers were nominated as Imams after their election (92).

Although the Ya`aribah had achieved a great success in the unification of Oman and the expelling of the Portuguese from the country, they had facilitated the Persian occupation in the latter part of their rule. But the Persians were driven out of Oman by Aḥmad b. Sa`īd al-Bū Sa`īd, who transferred the Imamate from the Ya`aribah dynasty to his own family. After the death of Aḥmad and his son Sa`īd, the term "Imamate" was no longer used (93).

vii. The Seventh Imamate (1285/1868-1287/1871)

In the third quarter of nineteenth century, Sd. `Azzán b. Qays b. `Azzán al-Bū Sa`īd revived the Imamate, which is known as the seventh Imamate (see section 3 c below).

viii. The Eighth Imamate (1331/1913-1377/1957)

This Imamate is the main subject of this study, which we are going to discuss in the following chapters.
3) **Oman 1856 -1913**

a) **Sd. Thuwaynī b. Saʿíd b. Sulṭān (1273/1856 - 1282/1866)**

Āl Bū Saʿíd dynasty replaced the Yaʿarībah's rule, when Aḥmad b. Saʿíd al-Bū Saʿídī was elected as Imam in 1162/1749, as a result of his leadership in first successfully resisting a Persian siege while Wālī of ʿUḥd. Imam Aḥmad's rule remained in al-Rustāq until his death in 1783. His son, Saʿíd succeeded him, but his power passed a year later to his son Ḥamad b. Saʿíd, who shifted the capital from al-Rustāq to Muscat. When Ḥamad died in 1792, his uncle Sd. Sulṭān b. Imam Aḥmad replaced him. The great ruler in this dynasty was Sd. Saʿíd b. Sulṭān (1804-1856), who extended his authority to East Africa in 1832, when he used Zanzibar as a second capital for his throne until his death in 1856. Coupland sums up Sd. Saʿíd b. Sulṭān's achievement as follows:

"He had made Oman a greater, wealthier, stronger state that it had been since Dark Ages; he had given it a new place in international relations; and a final achievement which makes him the central figure of the story told in this book he had recovered, unified, and extended the Arab dominion in East Africa and brought it back into close touch with life of the outer world" (94).

Sd. Saʿíd had been a great ruler and Oman was essentially an extension of Sd. Saʿíd's intelligence, energy and personality. After Sd. Saʿíd's death, his empire was divided into two principal possessions, Oman and Zanzibar. The former was ruled by his son Thuwaynī, and the latter by another son, Mājid b. Saʿíd.

Sd. Saʿíd had usually appointed his sons as his deputies over his provinces during his absences. Since 1833 Sd. Thuwaynī had been deputy over Oman while his brother Mājid b. Saʿíd had been appointed by his father over Zanzibar after the death of his son Sd. Khālid in 1854. Before his final departure from Oman to Zanzibar, Sd. Saʿíd had appointed his son Turkī as governor of ʿUḥd in 1856 (95).

During the latter half of the 19th century Oman suffered conflicts between the descendants of Sd. Saʿíd (d. 19th October 1856), resulting in tribal rebellions, an increasingly inefficient domestic political administration and finally a large increase in British involvement in Omani domestic affairs. In addition to this there were disturbed foreign relations with the Saudi and Iranian authorities. In the same period, Oman was ruled by five rulers. Four rulers held the title of Sultan and one of them was an Imam difāʿ in accordance with the Ibāḍī terminology.
Before we discuss events in Oman during the second half of the 19th century, the local power structure at that time requires to be analysed. It may be summarized as follows:

1. The governors of Rustaq and those in permanent opposition to the Sultan; Rustaq was ruled by the descendants of Sd. Qays b. Imam Aḥmad (see Family Tree: 8)

2. The continuous rivalry between the descendants of Sd. Saʿīd b. Sulṭān

3. The role of Sh. Śāliḥ b. ʿAlī b. Nāṣir al-Ḥārithī, the tamīmah of Ḥinawī faction

4. The role of Sh. Ḥumūd b. Saʿīd al-Jaḥāfī in opposing the rulers of Āl Bū Saʿīd

5. The role of Yāl Saʿīd in al-Baṭīnah Province in opposing the rulers of Āl Bū Saʿīd

6. The unrest of the tribes of Wāḍī Saʿīd (Ghaffīrī and Hinawī factions).

All these local powers threatened the government of Āl-Bū Saʿīd during the period. In November 1856 the news of the death of Sd. Saʿīd b. Sulṭān reached Oman, which spread throughout the country and Sd. Thuwaynī succeeded his father over Oman.

During the first four years of his reign, Sd. Thuwaynī faced the problem of the opposition of his brothers, Mājid in Zanzibar and Turki in Ṣuḥār. They refused to submit to his control and proclaimed their independence. In 1857, Sd. Muḥammad b. Sālim b. Sulṭān mediated between Sd. Thuwaynī and Sd. Mājid. The result of this mediation was that the latter agreed to pay $MT. 40,000 annually to Sd. Thuwaynī, but in the next year Sd. Mājid withheld payment (96), and refused to acknowledge his brother's sovereignty over Zanzibar. Some writers attribute this to the drop in the promised Zanzibar's customs receipt (97), but this would not have been enough for Sd. Mājid to sever his relations with his brother and plan to divide his father's empire into two states. Sd. Thuwaynī then equipped an expedition of ten ships carrying 2,500 troops to attack and dispossess his brother Sd. Mājid. On 11th February 1859, the expedition sailed for Zanzibar, but a steam frigate despatched by the Governor of Bombay, Lord Elphinstone, succeeded in overtaking Thuwaynī's squadron at Ra's al-Ḥadd (98). On reading the letter addressed to him by Lord Elphinstone, Sd. Thuwaynī agreed to submit the differences with his brother to the arbitration of the British Government, under the following conditions:
1. "That there shall be one consolidated state without any division, Zanzibar being subordinate to Muscat; and that the interests of the one shall be identified with those of the other, as during the time of our father and forefathers"

2. "his reference to a settlement effected by Muhammad b. Sálim between us, with the common consent of all parties, that he (Májid) should pay me annually a sum of forty thousand French Dollars (99). In the event of Oman being involved in any hostilities, Zanzibar shall afford assistance, as it has always been the practice for Zanzibar to assist Oman"

3. "that the property of the orphans shall be given up by him (Májid) and deposited with a trustworthy person, in whose custody all parties may feel satisfied that it will be safe"

4. "that Sd. Májid shall indemnify me for all the losses entailed upon me on account of the expense of despatching an army in consequence of his opposition and disobedience" (100).

It appears that Sd. Thuwaynî had no confidence in the arbitration of the British Government, because he felt that the British Political Agent at Zanzibar, Captain Rugby, was supporting his brother, and encouraging him to sever his relations with him (i.e. Thuwaynî), while Sd. Thuwaynî lacked this support and did not have good advisors (101). For this reason in March 1859, he sent his cousin Ħamad b. Sálim b. SulțÁn to Zanzibar, where Ħamad spent five months trying to persuade Sd. Májid to pay $MT. 40,000 in order to avoid the arbitration of the British, which threatened to divide their empire, but his attempt failed. Meanwhile, Sd. Májid encouraged his brother, Turkı, the ruler of ŞuħÁr, to attack Muscat. On 2nd April 1861, Lord Canning, the Viceroy of India, announced the terms of the arbitration, which were as follows:

1. That Sd. Májid should rule the Zanzibar and the African dominions.
2. That Sd. Májid should pay annually to Oman a subsidy of 40,000 Crowns (102)
3. That Sd. Májid should pay to Sd. Thuwaynî the arrears of subsidy for two years (103)

The arbitration of Lord Canning disappointed Sd. Thuwaynî's ambitions, but he nevertheless professed his contentment with the arbitration (104), because he found himself in difficult circumstances. His relations with Zanzibar were no more important than his problems in Oman (105) on the one hand, and on the other hand his brother Turkı at ŞuħÁr had already collected troops to attack Muscat, and the inhabitants of Nakhal had revolted and killed the Sultan's Wálî, Suwaylim b. Sálmín, while the tribe of 'YÁl Sa'id had captured the fort of al-Suwayq after the murder of Sd. Hilá l b. Muḥammad b. Imam Aḥmad, the ruler of al-Suwayq. Besides this there was the problem of ever-decreasing trade revenues and loss of most of Sd. Sa'id's warships and merchant vessels which had been captured by Sd. Májid (they were anchored at Zanzibar when their father died). These were the circumstances which obliged Sd. Thuwaynî to declare his acceptance of the arbitration of the Government of India. Whether in making his
arbitration, Lord Canning had intended to destroy Sd. Sa‘íd’s empire as a power to be reckoned with, or whether he had no such intention, such was the result. Omani history for the next decades degenerated into a record of dynastic struggles and betrayals (106).

After having settled his dispute with his brother Sd. Májid by arbitration, Sd. Thuwayníf turned to his difficulties with his domestic opponents. He prepared an expedition against Nakhal, but this failed. He then mustered an army against Ṣuḥár, where his brother Turkí refused to consider himself subject to his brother Thuwayníf. But before his departure, W.M. Pergelly (the new PAM) volunteered his mediation between the two brothers, who both accepted it (107). But this mediation was a failure, because Sd. Turkí suspected his brother Sd. Thuwayníf, who was accompanied by two hundred cavalry and one 12 pr. howitzer (108). Thereupon Sd. Thuwayníf arrested and imprisoned Sd. Turkí, and he moved to Ṣuḥár which he restored and his son Sálím was appointed its Wálı (he was 22 years old) (109).

The problems of Sd. Thuwayníf were too numerous for him. Not long after that the ‘Yál Sa’d captured the fort of al-Suwayq. The conflict between them began after Sd. Thuwayníf had revoked a zakát exemption that his father had forgiven the ‘Yál Sa’d. The ‘Yál Sa’d contacted Sd. Qays b. ‘Azzán at al-Rustáq, and they offered to submit to his rule (110). Sd. Qays agreed with the view of the ‘Yál Sa’d and travelled to al-Suwayq to discuss the matter with its Wálı, Sd. Hilál b. Muḥammad. But the latter refused to sever his relations with Sd. Thuwayníf and to join them. As a result of this argument both Qays and Hilál lost their lives (111). Then the ‘Yál Sa’d besieged the fort of al-Suwayq, where Sd. Hilál’s sister, Sayyidah Júkhah bint Muḥammad resisted for 18 days (112). She appealed for aid from her cousin, Sd. Thuwayníf who was occupied in Ṣuḥár. But the fort had fallen under the control of the ‘Yál Sa’d in December 1861. Therefore, one month later Sd. Thuwayníf moved toward al-Suwayq which he restored by negotiation with the ‘Yál Sa’d (113) on condition that Sd. Thuwayníf issued a new zakát exemption to them (114). According to al-Sálīmí’s account (115) when Sayyidah Júkhah asked aid from her cousin Sd. Thuwayníf, he delayed his assistance for her because he preferred the fort of al-Suwayq to be under the control of the ‘Yál Sa’d, as it would be easier to take it from them than from Sayyidah Júkhah, in order to bring the fort under his direct control.
In August 1865, hostilities were renewed between the Wahhabi and Sd. Thuwaynî. The former declared their support for Sd. 'Azzán b. Qays against Sd. Thuwaynî. They send an envoy to Muscat demanding that the annual tribute be increased to four times the customary. Sd. Thuwaynî refused their demand, and agreed to pay the ordinary annual tribute. Therefore the Wahhabi captured Sur. According to the local account the aims of the Wahhabi were to assist Sh. Nāṣir b. 'Alî al-Wahibî who differed with Sd. Thuwaynî, because the latter had appointed his brother Sh. Khulayfiyyîn b. 'Alî al-Wahibî as leader of the Al Wahibah. Sh. Nāṣir failed to get permission to discuss his position with Sd. Thuwaynî, and then decided to make trouble for Sd. Thuwaynî. He visited Buraynî for this purpose and accompanied the Wahhabi to Sur (116).

Sd. Thuwaynî then equipped an expedition against the Wahhabi. His brother Turki sailed to Sur, while he himself proceeded to Sur by the inland. In Badiyyah Sh. Nāṣir met Sd. Thuwaynî who forgave him on condition that he persuade the Wahhabi to withdraw from Sur (117). Sd. Thuwaynî succeeded in collecting a large number of troops from the Hinawi tribes of al-Sharqiyyah under the commander of Sh. Šālih b. 'Alî al-Hārithî, who was in Sur when the Wahhabi attacked it (118). Lorimer gives a different account of the cause of this raid and how it ended. He states that Sd. Thuwaynî 'bribed' the Wahhabi with payment of SMT. 16,000 rupees (119). In fact Sd. Thuwaynî at this time had a large number of troops, and it was not necessary to pay any bribe; their moneys were in the nature of an ordinary annual tribute.

After that, Sd. Thuwaynî sailed from Sur to Šuhrâr to assemble his troops to attack the Wahhabi who had raided Ṣaham in the Batinah and Manaḥ in Interior. But Sd. Thuwaynî was killed in the fort of Šuhrâr on 27th Ramadán 1282/3rd Feb. 1866 (120).

Sd. Thuwaynî's external relations were amicable. He obtained British recognition as Oman's Sultan, the Anglo-French declaration to respect the independence of the Sultanate of Oman, and finally the continuance of the Zanzibar subsidy. Besides this, he concluded two agreements with the British government: the first was for a British service of mail steamers and the second was for the carrying out of a British telegraph project. He held firm amidst disorder and was killed just as it appeared that Oman was about to enjoy a period of interior unity (121).
b) **Sd. Salim b. Thuwayni 1282 (1866-1285 /1868)

After his father's assassination in Ṣuhār, Sd. Sālim seized the apparatus of state. Although he denied the assassination of his father, all the records affirm it. This is not the place to discuss this accusation. It is sufficient here to note that Sd. Thuwayni was advancing to Ṣuhār to attack the Wahhābis at Buraymī, and that Sd. Sālim, when he became ruler, had the reputation of being very sympathetic towards Wahhābī religious teachings (122).

The first task of Sd. Sālim was to gain British recognition. He sent a letter to Colonel Pelly (the PRG) informing him of his father's death, and his taking over Oman, but Pelly ignored his letter and he started to embark the PAM, and other Europeans, and the valuables of British Indian merchants onto the Berenice. Sd. Sālim then commissioned Sd. Nāṣir b. 'Alî al-Bū Sa'īdī, Wālī of Muscat, and Sh. Ḥumayd b. Sa‘īd b. Khalfān to complain to the government of Bombay about the hostile attitude of Pelly. Apparently the envoys succeeded, because Pelly arrived at Muscat on 10th September 1866, to declare British acknowledgment of Sd. Sālim as Sultan of Oman (123). British recognition of a ruler of Oman was very important for the continuance of his rule. Pelly described its effects by stating that "the Arabs understand that recognition does not mean support. But they and our own subjects understand that without recognition restoration of a confidence in a trade which is largely in the hands of our Indians is impossible ... non-recognition implies to the Arab mind a latent wish on our part for change in the government and this impression begets a general doubt as to the future" (124). It is clear that the British would support in Oman only a ruler who would cooperate with them.

The first difficulty that faced Sd. Sālim was to come from his uncle Sd. Turkī, because Sd. Sālim had imprisoned him immediately after his father's death, but Pelly, who arrived in Ṣuhār at the end of February secured Sd. Turkī's release. During the year 1866 Sd. Turkī was absorbed in gaining supporters from the coast of Oman and al-Zāhirah Province, but he was unsuccessful in enlisting allies, because Pelly cautioned the Shaykhīs of these areas against abetting his proceedings, especially by sea (125).

Meanwhile, Sd. Turkī was supported by the B. 'Alî, who was in Yanqil in the Western Ḥajar, and from there he began his attack on his nephew's territories, but his
attacks failed to obtain any position for him (126). He then moved to al-Sharqiyyah and thence to Ja‘lán Province to raise troops from the Hináwi tribes. Sh. Šáliḥ unsuccessfully attempted to make a reconciliation between Sd. Turḱi and his nephew Sd. Sálim. Eventually, Pelly persuaded Sd. Turḱi to retire to India, because the latter found himself without Omani support (127).

These troubles had scarcely ended when Sd. Sálim began a quarrel with Sd. Ḥamad b. Sálim, Wálí of al-Muṣann‘ah. This quarrel alienated his supporters, who abandoned him. He faced major trouble from Sh. Šáliḥ and the leaders of the Hináwi faction, when he committed a prime blunder by seizing Sh. Šáliḥ in Barká‘ in late 1867. At the outset of his reign, he enjoyed friendly relations with both Sh. Sa‘íd b. Khalfán al-Khalíl and Sh. Šáliḥ b. ‘Alí al-Há’iríthi, who supported him. These relations were severed in late 1867, when Sd. Sálim attempted to arrest Sh. Šáliḥ in Barká‘. The reason for this was that the Shaykh had remained aloof from Sd. Turḱi, whom Sh. Šáliḥ's tribe supported, during the Shaykh's absence in Muscat with Sd. Sálim (128), even though later the Shaykh supported Sd. Turḱi when the latter attacked Muscat. This incident broke the alliance between Sd. Sálim and the Hináwi tribes. Sh. Šáliḥ contacted Sd. ‘Azzán b. Qays and Sh. Sa‘íd b. Khalfán al-Khalíl, with the aim of defeating Sd. Sálim. Sh. Sa‘íd b. Khalfán organized a coalition against Sd. Sálim. At the end of September 1868 Sh. Sa‘íd with his allies began their operation against Muscat. Before their attack, they demanded that Sd. Sálim declare his repentance, "i.e. he should return to his allegiance" (129). Sd. Sálim refused, and they then attacked Muscat, which fell into their hands. After three days of abortive negotiations between the two sides, Sd. Sálim left Oman for Bandar ‘Abbás on 9th October 1868 (130). In reality the terms of reconciliation between Sd. Sálim and his opponents were that Sd. Sálim should be Sultan, and that Sd. ‘Azzán should be his advisor, but Sd. Sálim preferred to give up his powers to them.

c) Imam ‘Azzán b. Qays (1285/1868-1287/1871)

In consequence of the general conclave in Muscat the only candidate was Sd. ‘Azzán who was supported by three religious dignitaries of Oman: Sh. Sa‘íd b. Khalfán, Sh. Šáliḥ b. ‘Alí and Sh. Muḥammad b. Sulayyim al-Gháríbí, the leading ‘ulamá’ of the ‘Yál Sa‘íd tribe. On Friday 22nd Jumádá II, 1285/10th October 1868, Sd. ‘Azzán was
elected as Imam of Oman on condition that he should obtain prior approval from the religious leaders before certain actions were taken. This type of allegiance (*bay'ah*) is called *bay'at difdá* (defence) in the traditional Ibaḍí regime (131).

The four important personages in the Imamate of Sd. ‘Azzán were Sh. Sa’íd b. Khalfán, who was appointed Wálf of Muscat and the chief Qádí (unofficially he was the chief religious, financial and political advisor); Sh. Śálih, an official in the government of Imam ‘Azzán (somewhat analogous to a secular prime minister); Sh. Muḥammad al-Gháríbí who became a Qádí; and fourthly his brother Ibráhím b. Qays. Power was now in the hands of a group of leaders, who modelled the apparatus of government on the pattern of the traditional Imamate to restore the Islamic community to what they considered its pristine state. They attacked prevailing religious practices and accused them of containing innovations and impurities. G. A. Atkinson (the PAM) was convinced that “‘Azzán’s position at Muscat was secure. Government should consider ‘Azzán as her solemnly elected Imam and not merely Sultan” (132).

There were six factors which assisted the accession to power of Imam ‘Azzán and his allies: first, the support of many Omanis, especially the Hináwí tribes; secondly, the dispute between the Gháfírí tribes and Sd. Sálim; thirdly the presence of leading personalities of the Ibaḍiyyah; fourthly the presence of some leaders from the Qays branch and the royal house; fifthly, the adherence of Hináwí faction leaders to the opposition cause after 1867; and finally the growing weakness and inefficiency in the camp of the descendants of Sd Sa’íd b. Sulṭán (133).

At the commencement of 1869 Imam ‘Azzán attacked the Siyábiyyín and B. Jábir tribes in Wádí Samá’il. He was successful and they submitted to him. Izkí and some towns in the Interior afterwards declared their submission to the Imam. In the Bájjah Province, Sd. Ḥamad b. Sálim, the Wálf of al-Muṣann‘ah, surrendered, and his properties were confiscated by Imam ‘Azzán. In the spring Sh. Muḥammad b. ‘Alí al-Na‘ífí, the leader of B. Na‘ím in Buraymí reached al-Suwayq and met Sh. Muḥammad al-Gháríbí, seeking his help to eject the garrison of the Wahhabís from Buraymí. Sh. al-Gháríbí took Sh. al-Na‘ífí to Imam ‘Azzán, who agreed to their plan, because the Wahhabí Amír in Buraymí threatened the Imam unless he paid tribute (134); besides, the
Imam received support from Pelly to attack the Wahhabí outpost of Buraymí (135). Moreover, the Imam had received an invitation from Sh. Záyid b. Khalífah to attack the Wahhabís. Before long, al-Buraymí fell to Imam ‘Azzán on 18th June, 1869. The last victory of the Imam in this year resulted in the submission of the B. Bú ‘Alf in Ja‘lán. The Imam captured and imprisoned their leader, Sh. Ráshid b. Sálím b. ‘Alf, who died in the Imam’s prison in the following year. The Imam appointed Sd. Sayf b. ‘Ámir b. Khalfán al-Bú Sa‘íd as Wálí of Ja‘lán. In the late autumn of the same year the Imam’s rule over Oman reached its peak. The year 1869 had been very successful for the Imam, but the following year was not (136).

Unfortunately, Imam ‘Azzán distrusted the Gháfirí tribes which supported him, and yet no Imamate in Oman could have endured without them (except when it represented a fusion of some powerful elements of both the Gháfirí and Hináwí tribes) (137). In June 1869 envoys of Sd. Májid, ruler of Zanzibar, reached Bombay to ask the British if they would raise any objection to his sending an expedition against ‘Azzán to reunite Oman under his rule. The British apparently agreed with Sd. Májid’s opinion, but when Imam ‘Azzán learned of it, he declared that he would send an expedition to Zanzibar at the end of 1869 (138).

In the late summer of 1869, Imam ‘Azzán received a warning letter from ‘Abdalláh b. Fáyál, ruler of the Wahhabí government in Riyadh, telling him that he was preparing himself to visit al-Buraymí with 20,000 men (139). In reply to this letter, Imam ‘Azzán raised a large force and marched to al-Buraymí, accompanying the brother of ‘Abdalláh, the Amir Su‘úd b. Fáyál, who was in dispute with his brother, but ‘Abdalláh b. Fáyál in fact never carried out his threat to "visit" al-Buraymí. The result of this expedition was that both the Gháfirí and Hináwí tribes’ relations with the Imam worsened, because of the extreme measures he took to raise revenue quickly. But these were necessary because the Bayt al-Mál was virtually empty.

The prime difficulty which faced the Imam’s government was money, and to increase it to the Bayt al-Mál was the responsibility of Sh. al-Khalífí, who had practically no business or financial training or experience (140). Sh. al-Khalífí issued a fatwá sanctioning the collection of money from the tribes in order to provide a fighting force.
The Imam also issued a fatwā in Dhú al-Ḥijjah 1285/May 1869 that all the properties of Āl Bú Saʿíd and their close relations and high ministers and commanders were to be appropriated for the Bayt al-Mál. This fatwā was supported by Sh. al-Khalilī and his followers, but Sh. Šāliḥ and Sh. Muhammad al-Ghāribī rejected it. Sh. al-Sālimī himself condemned this confiscation. Sh. al-Ghāribī felt that many of Sh. al-Khalilī’s extremist policies were unrealistic (141). The effect of the confiscation was too vast to be comprehended and acquiesced in by both members of Āl Bú Saʿíd and the Ghāfirī tribes, who were alienated from the action of the Imam’s council.

The tribes reacted angrily to this and gradually deserted. In September Sd. Turki appeared in Oman, seeking supporters against Imam ‘Azzán. Most of the tribes which were ill-disposed towards the Imam, joined Turkī’s forces, and Turkī was successful in Đank on 5th October 1870 against the Imam, who returned, defeated to Șuḥār and thence to Muscat on 10th November 1870. This victory strengthened the relations of Sd. Turkī with his supporters (142).

However, Sd. Turkī felt that his forces were not yet strong enough, because the Hināwī tribes had not yet made clear their position. He marched to al-Sharqiyyah and thence to Jaʿlān, where he was successful in collecting a large body of troops. In Şūr his troops were divided into two groups, the first taking the coast route towards Muscat, under the command of Sd. Sayf b. Sulaymān al-Bū Saʿīdī (143) and Sh. ‘Abdallāh b. Sālim b. ‘Alī, the tamīmah of B. Bū ‘Alī. The second went by the inland route to Muscat under the command of Sd. Turkī himself (144). At the end of January, 1871 Sd. Sayf attacked Imam ‘Azzán in Maṭraw, and in the outcome both the Imam and Sd. Sayf lost their lives. After four days Muscat fell, but Sh. al-Khalilī still resisted in the Jalālī fort in Muscat. Although Sd. Turkī was hindered by Sh. Šāliḥ and Sd. Fayṣal b. Ḩumūd b. ‘Azzán, he reached Muscat on the fourth or the fifth of February (145). Sh. al-Khalilī tried to get Sd. Ibrāhīm b. Qays to take ‘Azzán’s place as Imam and asked the British to guarantee Sd. Ibrāhīm’s rule in return for a yearly tribute of one-fourth of Muscat’s revenues, but Sd. Ibrāhīm immediately went to Șuḥār (146).

Eventually, the Imamate of Sd. ‘Azzán which had lasted two years, four months and fifteen days, fell. Imam ‘Azzán’s revival of the Imamate in the 19th century was a
great achievement, but he was deserted by those who in principle supported his aims (147). More immediate causes for the failure of the Imamate at that time are given by both al-Sálimí and Lorimer (148). Besides this, Imam ‘Azzán’s government failed in its faulty administration of finances and the Imam’s difficulties extended to his relations with his advisors and supporters (149).

d) Sd. Turkí b. Sa‘íd b. Sulțán (1287/1871-1305/1888)

Sd. Turkí reached Muscat in the first week of February, 1871. He began to negotiate with Sh. al-Khalílí, who refused to place himself under the protection of Sh. Záhir b. Hilál al-Hiná‘í (150). Pelly and Way (the PAM) succeeded in making peace between Sh. al-Khalílí and Sd. Turkí, and made agreement between them (151).

In spite of this guarantee, the agreement was not kept. Sh. al-Khalílí and his son, Muḥammad, died in the Mirání fort on 17th and 18th February respectively, from the effects of a severe illness (152). However, Sh. al-Sálimí states that Sh. al-Khalílí and his son were killed by Sd. Thuwayní b. Muḥammad, the former minister to Sd. Thuwayní, because he was afraid that Sd. Turkí might be intending to release Sh. al-Khalílí and his son (153). But Sd. Turkí had really imprisoned Sh. al-Khalílí and his son together with his advisor Sh. Náṣir b. Ráshid al-Ḥaráthí, because he had discovered that the Shaykh had sent money to Sd. Ibráhím b. Qays in Šuḥár to raise a force, and Sh. Náṣir was causing disaffection among the tribes in Muscat (154).

Another problem for Sd. Turkí was to come from Sd. Ibráhím b. Qays, who had come to power in Šuḥár and the whole Bátinah coast between Shináṣ and Muṣann‘ah, and refused to give his loyalty to Sd. Turkí, as did his cousin, Sd. Faysal b. Ḥumúd b. ‘Azzán who held Rustáq (155). During the year 1871 Sd. Turkí equipped no less than four expeditions against Sd. Ibráhím b. Qays in Šuḥár, but all of them failed to take Šuḥár, and Sd. Ibráhím in the following year restored Mijays and Shináṣ which he had lost in the previous year. In July 1873, Sd. Ibráhím surrendered Šuḥár to Sd. Turkí who was supported by B. Na‘ím, in return for which Sd. Ibráhím received a gift of $MT. 5000, and a pension of $MT. 100 a month. Sd. Turkí then appointed Sd. Badr b. Sayf b. Sulaymán al-Bá Sa‘íf (whose father had killed Imam ‘Azzán) as Wálf of Šuḥár (156).
By the end of 1873 Sd. Ibrâhîm had taken possession of the forts of al-Ḥazim and Rustâq from his cousin Fayṣal b. Ḥumûd b. ‘Azzân, and had made an alliance with ‘Yāl Sa‘d. In March he resumed his military operations against the Bâţinah towns, captured Muṣann‘ah on 6th March, but was unable to keep it and eventually declared his submission to Sd. Turki who allowed him to rule Rustâq at the close of 1874. After this Sd. Ibrâhîm made no trouble for Sd. Turki except for two raids; one was on 11th March 1882 against Muṣann‘ah, and the second in July 1887 against al-Suwayq (157).

Immediately, after Imam ‘Azzân’s death, Sd. Sâlim b. Thuwaynî came back to Oman from Qishim island, in order to overthrow his uncle, Sd. Turki. To this end, he contacted the tribal Shaykhs. The first contact was with Sd. Ibrâhîm in Ṣuhâr, whose sister he had married in 1871. Having gained supporters, he attacked Ṣûr in February 1872, but failed to achieve his aim. Then he went to Ja‘lân, and thence to Badiyyah, where he raised a force. The second and third attacks against Ṣûr and Qurayyât in September 1872 were unsuccessful. When he had lost hope of obtaining support, he found himself obliged to leave the country for India in December 1872, where he remained until his death in 1876 (158).

Sh. Šâliḥ b. ‘Alî decided to attack Muscat in August 1873 but failed to penetrate the Wâdî al-‘Aqq which was under the Ghâfirî tribes’ suzerainty. There seem to have been three reasons for the Shaykh’s opposition: the agreement for the suppression of the slave trade which Sd. Turki had signed with the British government in April 1873 (159); the retirement of Sd. Ibrâhîm from political life in January 1873; and finally, the desire to honour the agreement of 1871 between Sd. Turki and Sh. al-Khalîlî, whose tribe (B. Ruwâḥah) had succeeded in coming to a reconciliation with Sd. Turki on the following conditions:

1. That B. Ruwâḥah should be forgiven the blood on their hands, particularly that of Sd. Muḥammad b. Sa‘îd, the Wâlî of Barkâ’, whom they had murdered in the previous year;
2. That part of the landed property of the late al-Khalîlî, should be restored to his family;
3. That B. Ruwâḥah should receive the customary subsidies every year from Sd. Turki;
4. That Sh. Sulaymán b. ‘Umar, should receive a regular stipulated allowance (160).

In February 1873, warfare broke out in Wádí Samá’íl over disagreement concerning who controlled the confiscated estates (161). For the following two years the war continued between Sd. Turkí and the Gháfírí tribes, because the former had replaced the Gháfíris with the Hináwí tribes. Towards the end of 1873, Sd. Turkí fell victim to a chyluria which forced him to hobble about on crutches and which depressed his once high spirits. He continually suffered from this disease until 1875. This gave Sh. Šáliḥ an opportunity to exploit the situation, particularly following the news of Sd. Turkí’s death. At the beginning of 1874, Sh. Šáliḥ and his allies, Sh. Ūmmúd b. Sa’íd al-Jaḥáfí and Sh. Hilál b. Sa’íd al-Hajrí, moved to Muscat and took with them the son of the late Imam, Sd. Ūmmúd b. ‘Azzán, who was 12 years old, in order for him to be elected Imam of Oman. After they had occupied Maṭrāḥ, Sd. Turkí sent Sd. Badr b. Sayf to them, seeking peace. An agreement between them was signed on the 22nd January 1874 (162).

In May 1874, Sd. Turkí invited his brother Sd. ‘Abd al-‘Azíz to take over some of the burdens of government. The latter accepted his brother’s invitation under the conditions to which Sd. Turkí and the British government agreed (163). The first task of Sd. ‘Abd al-‘Azíz, who was deputizing for his brother, Sd. Turkí, was to be the conciliation between the people of the Wádí Samá’íl. He summoned them to visit Muscat, but the Gháfírí tribes gave a hostile reception to his invitation (164).

Sh. Šáliḥ responded to this summons and arrived in Muscat on 1st September 1875, to become a special advisor to Sd. ‘Abd al-‘Azíz, who found himself distracted by about 1200 tribesmen from the Hináwí tribes encamping in Muscat in order to support Sh. Šáliḥ, whose real aim was to elect the son of the late Imam. Eventually the ruler of Abú Dhabí, Sh. Záyid b. Khalífah successfully persuaded Sh. Šáliḥ to leave Muscat to return home (165).

The Gháfírí tribes, however, particularly the B. Riyám, B. Bú ‘Alí, and Janábah tribes, were concerned about the Hináwí tribes’ activities in Muscat. They declared war against Sd. ‘Abd al-‘Azíz and his supporters. The Wálí of Šuḥár, Sd. Badr, and the B. Na’ím supported the Gháfírí rebellion (166), but Sd. Turkí put right this matter by
dismissing his brother, Sd. ‘Abd al-‘Azíz, and by improving his relations with B. Gháfír.

Sd. Turki long suffered ill-health, including partial paralysis and a weak heart; he died a natural death on 3rd June 1888. He enjoyed a reputation for sound judgment in tribal affairs and for skill in the management of his Arab subjects. He conciliated the people and kept before his eyes the picture of an ideal sovereign (167).

It is clear that the latter part of Sd. Turki’s rule (1876-1888) was quieter than the earlier period. His relations with the Gháfírí tribes were friendly. There was no comparison between the rule and administration of Imam ‘Azzán and that of Sd. Turki. The former had announced a jihád against his enemies and imposed a tax to finance his troops, whereas the latter relied on winning the tribes’ loyalty and paid salaries to the Shaykhs. Persuasion and weapons could not always bring victory, but the money usually brought at least a temporary solution of problems, because the Omani tribes themselves were more concerned with their own independence. They opposed any attempt on the rulers’ part to impose their direct influence over them. Therefore the winning of the tribes’ loyalty, and persuading them to support the ruler in his decisions or local conflicts were essential elements of policy.

e) Sd. Faysal b. Turki b. Sa‘íd (1305/1888-1331/1913)

Sd. Faysal was twenty four-years old when he became Sultan after his father’s death in 1305/1888. He was the first ruler of the 19th century to assume power peacefully, and the third ruler of his dynasty. He ruled for more 25 years which were spent in subduing local rebellions and resisting foreign tutelage in Oman. His brothers Muḥammad and Fahd declared their allegiance to him, but his uncle Sd. ‘Abd al-‘Azíz refused to do so and intrigued with the tribesmen to overthrow his nephew. Sd. Faysal was born in 1864 and married, in 1881, his cousin Sayyidah ‘Aliyya, bint Sd. Thuwaynî b. Sa‘íd. He reputedly could neither read nor write, although he could sign his own name.

During the first twelve years of Sd. Faysal’s reign, he unsuccessfully tried to resist British interference. He lacked tribal support, although he courted Sh. Sáliḥ b. ‘Alf al-Ḥárithí and most of the Hináwî and Gháfírí tribes. He went so far as to use the title
Imam on his coins in the 1890s. Sh. al-Sálimí states that at his request, Sd. Faysal abolished the customs imposed on returning Omani pilgrims from 1313/1905 (168). The tribes gave their loyalty to their leaders, whose ambition was to obtain positions of power and to revive the Imamate in Oman, but the tribesmen lacked two things; religious and intellectual leaders and unity between the two factions.

After his succession, Sd. Faysal was successfully reconciled with Sh. Şálih, who had severed relations with Sd. ‘Abd al-‘Azíz, and most of the Shaykhs showed a spirit of loyalty. Sd. ‘Abd al-‘Azíz and Sd. Ibráhím b. Qays hardly troubled Sd. Faysal during the period from 1888 to 1890. Three months after Sd. Turki’s death, Sd. Ibráhím occupied al-‘Awábí, and in September, Sd. Faysal unsuccessfully attacked Sd. Ibráhím in Rustáq (169). Between April 1889 and March 1890, Sd. ‘Abd al-‘Azíz was very active in raising his followers against Sd. Faysal, but all his attempts failed. Therefore in March 1890, he decided to leave Oman, and sailed for Bombay where he lived until his death in 1907 (170).

During the first half of 1890s, Sd. Faysal’s rule was never seriously threatened by his opponents, because although the situation in Oman was very troubled, Sd. Faysal’s relations with Sd. Ibráhím and Sh. Şálih were friendly, and they were all engrossed in trying to bring about an accommodation between the tribes. In May 1891 Sd. Faysal successfully made a truce between the Gháfírí tribes of the Wádí Samá’il and the Hínáwí of al-Sharqiyyah, but this truce was broken by the Ḥábús tribe when it attacked the tribes of Wádí Samá’il. Again, Sd. Faysal made truce between them in al-Síb in January 1893. Sd. Ibráhím and Sh. Şálih also made peace between the Hínáwí and Gháfírí of Interior, al-Záhirah and Ja’lán during the years 1892-3 (171).

Sd. Faysal had neglected the affairs of Oman and been remiss in arbitrating tribal disputes. In reality, his policy was equally disastrous. This was due to the strength of the position of Sh. Şálih, and to the fact that the Hínáwí tribes were estranged from him. In 1894 relations between Sd. Faysal and Sh. Şálih became hostile. The reason for this was that the former cut off the Shaykh’s pension, and in the meantime he strengthened his relations with an other leader of the Ḥáríthí tribe, Sh. Sa‘íd b. Nášir al-Ḥáríthí, who was seeking to displace Sh. Şálih (172). On hearing this, Sh. Şálih tried to placate Sd. Faysal,
but his attempt was a failure. The Shaykh then decided to overthrow him. He first communicated with his allies and next with the Sultan of Zanzibar, Sd. Ḥamad b. Thuwaynī (173). Before any discussion of the Shaykh’s rebellion of 1895, the effect of Sd. Fayṣal’s relations with the British government on the history of Oman during the 1890s must be understood. Sd. Fayṣal early indicated his impatience with the British exercise of extensive influence in guiding the actions of the Omani government (174). He tried to limit it by dismissing his father’s staff, who supported the policy of the British government in Oman, and appointing a new staff, even while he attempted to court tribal loyalty, as mentioned above. In addition, he strengthened his relations with the French. On the other hand the British government postponed its recognition of Sd. Fayṣal as Sultan until his uncle, Sd. ʿAbd al-ʿAzīz, had left Oman for India in March, 1890, and they were preparing to make a new agreement with him, to be called a “Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation”, to replace of the Treaty of Commerce of 1839 (175) which was signed on 19th March, 1891 (176). Sd. Fayṣal was forced to sign this treaty, and in fact he had actually misunderstood its effects, since when he granted the French government a coaling station at Bandar al-Jaṣṣah in 1898, the British government considered this a violation of Sd. Fayṣal’s treaty of 1891. The British government sent Major Fagan (the PAM) Colonel Mead (the PRG) and Admiral Dongle (East India Station) to Oman in order to oblige Sd. Fayṣal to cancel the concession to the French in 1899. Sd. Fayṣal eventually agreed to this on 17th February 1899 (177).

As regards the relations of the Sultan of Zanzibar with Oman, Sd. Ḥamad b. Thuwaynī replaced his uncle ʿAlī b. Saʿīd b. Sulṭān in Zanzibar in March 1893. Sd. Ḥamad was born in Oman and his early years were spent there. His ambitions were to revive his grandfather’s empire by joining Oman to Zanzibar. He therefore welcomed any Omani visiting his country. Thus letters were exchanged between the Shaykhs of Oman and the Sultan of Zanzibar about this question. Sh. al-Mughifrī states that the minister of Sd. Ḥamad, Hilāl b. ʿĀmir al-Ḥārizī encouraged Sd. Ḥamad to take control of Oman (178). In February, 1894 the Omani mission arrived at Zanzibar, including Sh. ʿAbdallāh, the son of Sh. Ṣāliḥ b. ʿAlī, Sh. Ḥumūd b. Saʿīd al-Jahāfī, Sh. ʿĀmir b. Sālim al-Ḥasanī, and Muḥsin b. ʿĀmir al-Ḥārizī, the brother of the minister of Sd.
Their purpose was to offer the Sultanate of Oman to Sd. Ḥamad. In May they returned to Oman with three field-guns and 300 barrels of powder (179).

There were several reasons for the rebellion of 1895: the British interference in supporting Sd. Fayṣal; the encouragement of the Sultan of Zanzibar for the rebels; the increase of Sh. Ṣāliḥ's influence; Sd. Fayṣal's neglect of affairs in Oman; and the agreements of Sd. Fayṣal and his father with the British. In addition, Sd. Fayṣal had raised the customs rates on goods going to the interior in an attempt to increase his revenues.

As a result in December 1894, Sh. Ṣāliḥ b. ‘Alī sent his son, Sh. ‘Abdallāh, who was not more than 20 years old, to Nazwā in order to make peace between Sh. Badr b. Hilāl al-Hinā‘ī and Sh. Sulaymān b. Sayf al-Riyāmī. He brought about a truce for 6 months and then he wrote to Sd. Fayṣal for permission to visit him in Muscat to discuss the conditions arranged at Nazwā (180). On 11th February 1895, he arrived at Ruwi (5 miles from Maṭrāḥ), accompanied by Sh. Ḥumūd b. Saʿūd al-Jaḥāfī and Sh. Muḥsin b. ‘Āmir al-Ḥāriṯī. They interviewed Sd. Fayṣal and in the evening they were received with hospitality by Sd. Fayṣal, but on the morning of the next day they attacked Muscat and occupied Sd. Fayṣal's palace. Sd. Fayṣal and his family took refuge in the Ḥamūl fort while his brother, Sd. Muḥammad, barricaded himself in the Mfrānī fort.

Subsequently, the white banner of the Imamate was raised over Sd. Fayṣal's palace and Sd. Suʿūd b. ‘Azzān became the titular leader of the attackers. On 17th February, Sh. Muḥsin met Major Hayes Sadler (the PAM), to discuss the deposition of Sd. Fayṣal, and on the same day Sh. Ṣāliḥ and Sd. Suʿūd b. ‘Azzān reached Maṭrāḥ. Sd. Ḥumūd b. ‘Azzān also followed them on the 23th (181). Coincidentally, the B. Gháfir of al-Sharqīyyah under the command of Sh. ‘Abdallāh b. Sālim b. ‘Alī came to Muscat to support Sd. Fayṣal (182), who also received support from the B. Jābir. From 24th February the fighting appeared to favour Sd. Fayṣal's position (183).

Consequently, negotiations were opened with Sh. Ṣāliḥ, and on the 9th March the terms of peace were concluded, on condition that Sd. Fayṣal paid $M.T.12,000, to Sh. Ṣāliḥ, and to continue the allowances of Rustāq family, and on their side Sh. Ṣāliḥ's followers should leave Muscat that night (184). This rebellion was the last attempt to
overthrow Sd. Fayṣal in the 19th century. Sh. Šālih b. ‘Alí lost his life in a battle between the B. Ruwāhah and the B. Jábir in 1314/1896; and two years later Sd. Ibráhīm died in Rustáq, and Sh. Ḥumúd b. Saʿíd al-Jaháff followed them in 1899.

After 1895, Sd. Fayṣal began to strengthen his forts in Muscat and Maṭrah by new weapons and garrisons. He dismissed some advisors and appointed new ministers, e.g. Sd. Said b. Muḥammad, Sd. Badr b. Sayf, and Sulaymán b. Suwaylim. In fact, as a result of the events of 1895, Sd. Fayṣal was facing a financial crisis, but support came from the British government which advanced him a sum of $M.T. 60,000 in the Spring of 1895, and two years later he received the same courtesy again. His liabilities amounted $MT. 190,000 in 1898 and had jumped to $MT. 200,000 by 1903 (185).

Further results of the ending of tribal opposition after 1895, were difficulties between Sd. Fayṣal and France, on the one hand, and British interference in Oman, on the other. After 1895 the British influence became more evident than in any previous year during Sd. Fayṣal’s reign. This affected the Omani attitude, particularly that of those Omanis who were in Zanzibar (186). They secretly opposed the British policy and encouraged Sd. Fayṣal to pursue a policy of balance between France and Britain. On 8th November 1894 Ottavi, vice consul of France to Oman, arrived at Muscat. His arrival aggravated the situation between Sd. Fayṣal and the British government.

It should be noted that since 1844, Omani commercial ships, particularly those of the B. Bú ‘Alí, and Janabah, were using the French flag. The number of these ships amounted to thirteen in 1891 and rose to twenty-three in 1894, and after another three years they reached thirty-eight ships. By this process, the Omanis had managed to avoid the British searching of their dhows (187).

Difficulty arose between the French and British over Oman, which lasted until it was solved by the Hague Permanent Court in 1905, owing to the use by the B. Bú ‘Alí and the Janabah of the French flag during the 1890s and first decade of the present century. This had led them to disregard warnings from Sd. Fayṣal. He summoned them to Muscat, but they refused, and suggested negotiations should be through the vice consul of France. Sd. Fayṣal was opposed to this idea and eventually issued a decree on 25th June 1900, by which the use of foreign flags was prohibited (188).
On 17th February 1899, Sd. Faysal cancelled his grant of a coaling station at Bandar al-Jaṣṣah to the French, which he had given them in 1898. He also dismissed his minister Sd. Muḥammad b. ‘Azzán, and his secretary ‘Abd al-‘Azīz b. Muḥammad b. Saʿīd al-Ruwāḥī who were against British interference in Oman. Sd. Saʿīd b. Muḥammad was re-appointed to his previous position (189).

Nothing occurred to break the peace between Sd. Faysal and the ruler of Rustāq, until the death of Ibrāhīm b. Qays in 1316/1898. Dissension had occurred between Sd. Suʿūd, who replaced Sd. Ibrāhīm, and Sd. Saʿīd b. Ibrāhīm, the deceased son who was supported by Sd. Faysal. Sd. Suʿūd was murdered 1317/1899 and his brother, Ḫumūd b. ‘Azzán replaced him. The conflict continued between Sd. Ḫumūd and Sd. Saʿīd until the former abdicated in favour of Sd. Saʿīd, who himself was killed by the sons of Sd. Faysal b. Ḫumūd b. Qays in 1912 (190).

During the first decade of the 20th century, Oman faced a growing traffic in the importation of arms, which made Muscat a centre of the arms trade in the Middle East. Nevertheless Sd. Faysal improved his position in the interior during 1900-1907. His relations with Sh. ‘Isā who replaced his father in the tamtnah of the Ḥirth, were friendly, but in 1901 Sh. ‘Isā prevented the explorations of Captain Cox, who was proceeding to Wādī al-Fulayj in order to investigate a mining site for coal at the head of this Wādī. Towards the end of January, 1907 Sd. Faysal sent Sulaymān b. Suwaylim to interview Sh. ‘Isā b. Ṣāliḥ in al-Qābil, but when he returned through Wādī al-‘Aqq, he was struck by two shots fired from a cliff on the left bank, and killed on the spot (191). The (Adm.R) comments that "Sulaymān's influence was felt more or less in every part of the country which is to any extent subject to the rule of Sd. Faysal" (192). Sh. al-Sālimī states that in 1324/1906, he discussed the affairs of Oman and Imamate with Sd. Faysal. The latter promised him his reply should be given to Sulaymān during the latter's visit to Sh. ‘Isā, but Sh. al-Sālimī mentions nothing about the reply of Sd. Faysal (193). Nothing further occurred in Oman to break the peace between Sd. Faysal and Sh. ‘Isā until May 1913, when Sh. al-Sālimī and others elected Sālim b. Rāshid al-Kharūṣī as Imam of Oman. Not long after that, Sd. Faysal died on 4th Dhū al-Qi’dah, 1331/4th October, 1913 and his son, Sd. Taymūr, succeeded him.
In general, Sd. Fayṣal successfully surmounted his economic and political difficulties with the French and British, although he strongly disagreed with their policy towards Oman. At least he was able to balance the French against the British. For some years he had wanted to abdicate. His policies were opposed by the people: they resented his taxation, his abolition of the slave trade and his efforts to regulate the trade in arms (particularly after his building of a warehouse for this purpose in Muscat). In addition they resented his reliance on foreign support. But in spite of this, his pleasant manners and accessibility won him some popularity (194).

4) Impact of the First World War

At the time of the outbreak of the First World War the Turks had lost al-Ḥasá to Amir ʿAbd al-ʿAzīz Ibn Suʿúd in 1913 but they still controlled certain areas of Arabia, including the Yemen and Qatar, and the Amīr of Kuwaṭ recognized Ottoman suzerainty over his country. In Oman, the Imamate was revived, and Sālim b. Rāshid al-Khārūsī was elected as Imam in May 1913. Germany, France, and Britain all had positions of influence in the Arab countries. In the following we will summarize the effects of the Great War on events in Oman, and will consider the British role in preventing the spread of hostilities to Oman, the vacillating role of the French, and finally the German challenge to the British interests in the Middle East.

a) The British role

At the commencement of the present century, the British government feared that other European states might threaten its position in the Middle East. For this reason, it made certain agreements with these states and with the Arabs in order to limit the effect of their policies. In 1904 there was a general adjustment of political differences between Britain and France (195), and France acknowledged British interests in Oman and the Gulf. Three years later the British government reached an agreement with Russia, which wanted to improve its relations with Britain. This agreement settled their regions of influences in Central Asia and Persia (196). Although this arrangement did not mention British possessions in the Gulf, Russia was aware of the special interest of Britain, and both governments were at pains to avoid offending Germany.
Britain opposed the influence of both Germany and Turkey in the Gulf. It made a secret agreement with Germany in June, 1913, promising to support the building of a railway to Baghdad, in return for a German guarantee not to set up agency in any port of the Gulf (197). In 1913 an agreement was reached between Britain and Turkey regarding the boundaries of the Arabian Gulf states, but this treaty was never signed by the Sultan owing to the outbreak the First World War.

After entering the war, the Sultan declared a *jihad* against Britain, which had tried to prevent the issuing of this declaration, because a large number of Muslims were under British protection. Germany tried to profit from this by circulating the proclamation of the *jihad* throughout the Muslim world. In the meantime, Britain faced German propaganda, which spread through the region. British leaders moved to deal with this situation by trying to court Arab rulers. Lord Hardinge, the viceroy and Governor General of India, travelled to the Gulf in January 1915, in an attempt to counter this propaganda. He called the Arabian rulers to summon a conference in Kuwait to discuss events in the Gulf and declare their support for Britain. Some of the rulers excused themselves from this conference including Sd. Taymúr, the Amír ‘Abd al-‘Azíz, and Sh. Khaz‘al of Muḥammadah. On his way back to India in February, Lord Hardinge landed at Muscat, and discussed with Sd. Taymúr the situation in the interior of Oman. He urged Sd. Taymúr to make peace with his opponents, and excused himself from supporting him at this time because the British navy was distant from Muscat (198).

When Ibn Su‘úd had occupied al-Hasá in 1913, he had begun to threaten the Omani coastal rulers, but in December, 1915, the British government reached an agreement with him which was known as the Dárín or the Qaṭīf Treaty, restraining him from this policy. The British government also came to an understanding with ‘Abd al-‘Azíz not to attack the Oman Coast, to improve his relations with Sharif of the Mecca and to guarantee to subdue Sh. Fahd, the Shaykh of the ‘Anazah tribe which resided on the boundary between Iraq and Arabia, who had caused disturbances in the area by attacking caravans and ships (199).

In the Yemen the British government made a friendly agreement with Imam Muḥammad b. ‘Alí al-Idrísí of ‘Asír on 30th April, 1915 (200). This treaty was called the
Jízán Treaty. Imam Muḥammad afterwards declared war against Turkey, whose garrisons were in Sanʿá, Taʿizz and Lahj. The British government had thus succeeded in blocking all routes by which its enemies might affect events in Oman, and the Imamate of Oman remained in the interior, without any external contacts, except East Africa.

b) The French role

The French policy in Oman was ineffective during the war. France had played an important role in Omani affairs before the close of the 19th century and the first five years of the 20th century, but it had failed to make any gains because its policy aims were not clear, and it failed to compete with Britain. Sd. Fayṣal granted France a coaling station in Muscat in 1898, but in the following year he cancelled it. The reason for this was that the position of Britain had eclipsed that of France and the use of the French flag on dhows was no longer a protection. France had effectively abdicated its concerns in Oman and yielded to British influence in 1904. In 1915 it withdrew its consul from Muscat, while local Omani staff administered its consulate affairs (201).

c) The German role

At the beginning of the present century Germany began to rival Britain, France, and Russia in the Middle East. It signed a contract with Turkey to extend the railway from Istanbul to Baghdad. It faced opposition from Britain and France, but succeeded in coming to an agreement with Britain.

During the First World War the PAM reported that the Germans had distributed money in Oman. In fact when the Ottoman sultan declared a jihād, the Germans exploited it, and German propaganda stated that Germany and Turkey had won the war, and that the German emperor had became a Muslim, taking the name Ḥajjī Muḥammad Ghulūm (202). When Sd. Khalīfah b. Ḥārīb b. Thuwaynī, the Sultan of Zanzibar, declared war against Germany and Turkey, he justified this by claiming that the Turks had lost their right to call up Muslims for the jihād, because the Arabs' own interests were more closely connected with Britain, whether in East Africa or in the Arab Peninsula (203).

The German colony of Tanganyika had friendly relations with the Omani opposition against Britain, and its leaders took refuge there. Sd. Khālid b. Barghash b. Saʿīd who was deposed from his position as Sultan of Zanzibar by Britain in 1897, took
refuge in the German consulate in Zanzibar, and was under German protection until the British occupied Tanganyika in 1918. Sd. Khalid called upon his followers to support Germany and Turkey against Britain. After Sd. Khalid's defeat in 1897, the British government punished his supporters and confiscated all their property. Most of them returned to Oman (204).

The Omanis supported the Germans in East Africa and some began to return to Oman, joining the Imamate's troops against Sd. Taymúr and his allies. We understand from Sd. Khalífah's words that the calling of the *jihd* by the Ottoman Sultan had effectively reached the ears of Omanis in East Africa, and for this reason Sd. Khalífah felt the need to argue against it.

Before the war, German trade with Oman flourished. The following table gives the value of this trade between 1909 and 1914 in pounds sterling (205):

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Years</th>
<th>Exports</th>
<th>Imports</th>
<th>Arms trades</th>
<th>All Exports</th>
<th>All Imports</th>
<th>All Arms</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1909-10</td>
<td>00.000</td>
<td>25,000</td>
<td>21,450</td>
<td>277,600</td>
<td>553,700</td>
<td>101,850</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1910-11</td>
<td>00.000</td>
<td>22,000</td>
<td>20,250</td>
<td>271,050</td>
<td>394,500</td>
<td>060,100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1911-12</td>
<td>00.000</td>
<td>31,150</td>
<td>29,550</td>
<td>290,400</td>
<td>401,300</td>
<td>119,450</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1912-13</td>
<td>00.000</td>
<td>07,150</td>
<td>06,200</td>
<td>301,500</td>
<td>463,55</td>
<td>184,050</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1913-14</td>
<td>00.000</td>
<td>01,450</td>
<td>00.000</td>
<td>271,550</td>
<td>407,173</td>
<td>013,550</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Germany attempted to spread its propaganda inside Oman by sending out agents who travelled from East Africa to Oman. They landed in Šúr or Šaywí and thence proceeded into Oman through al-Sharqiyah. Part of the tribe of Sh. 'Isà b. Šáliḥ al-Ḥárithí in East Africa provided them with money and information concerning the movement of British troops in the world. German agents became very active in Oman, stirring up the Omanis against Sd. Taymúr. Many writers stated that Imam Sálim b. Ráshid al-Kharúṣí was affected by German propaganda, and hence refused to complete his negotiations with the Sultan, Sd. Taymúr, after September 1915. Sd. Khálid b. Barghash was active in encouraging the Omanis in East Africa and Oman against Britain.

From its side, Britain observed the movements of Omanis returning from abroad to Oman. In 1915 Britain received three reports from Šúr, Samá‘il, and Wádí Ma‘awil
stating that German agents were travelling throughout Oman, encouraging the Imam's followers to attack Muscat, and distributing money (206).

It is obvious that the Germans supported Omani opposition against both the Sultan of Oman and the British government, but it should not be understood from this that the revival of the Imamate had anything to do with the First World War, because it had been launched through a series of attempts made by the Ibaḍī ‘ulamā’ in order to revive the Imamate; but it undoubtedly benefited from the effects of the war.

It was reported that in 1914 Imam Sālim b. Rāshid addressed letters to Imam Yaḥyā of Yemen and to Sa‘īd Pāshā, the commander of the Turkish garrisons in Yemen, seeking their aid against the Sultan of Oman and the British government, but he received no reply, and he tried again in 1916. Their reply was received in 1917 by the Imam, stating that 10,000 men would be sent by sea to Oman (207). But this promise was never carried out. In March 1918 there were three Turkish agents travelling in Oman, and a further four Turks were arrested in the same month in Muscat by Sd. Nādīr b. Fāṣal.

In conclusion, it is clear that both Turkey and Germany had tried to support the Omani Imamate in its conflict with the Sultan of Oman and his alliance with Britain, but they failed to achieve their aims, because they were distant from events in Oman on the one hand, and the British closed all access to Oman on the other hand, even though some members of the Omani opposition managed to contact the Germans and Turks. Oman suffered adverse effects from the war in that there were socio-economic difficulties and civil conflict as a consequence of the blockade of trade between Omani ports and inland towns, and in addition there was an increase of prices and a dearth of hard currency. Furthermore, the spread of cholera during 1918 and 1919, in which Oman lost more than 20,000 people, may have been an indirect result of the war. In the difficult circumstances of the war Omani dhows took the opportunity to carry on trade activities between Oman and the outside world, particularly for the transport of commodities between East Africa and the Gulf in which they made great profits (208).
Endnotes

(1) Busch, Britain and the Persian Gulf. p. 12.
(3) Lorimer, Gazetteer vol. 8 pp. 1382- 1412; Bannerman, M.G. Unity and Disunity. p.6.
(5) Lorimer, op.cit. vol. 8 pp. 1614-17; Anthony, op.cit. pp. 15f.
(6) Miles, Countries, op.cit. pp. 422-38; Lorimer, op.cit. vol. 8 pp. 1614-17; al-`Awtabī, al-Ansāb; al-Siyāfī, Islāf al-A`yān.; Kelly, Britain, pp. 1-5. ; Anthony, op.cit. pp. 119f.
(7) Modern European scholars have made useful contributions in the field of Ibāḍī studies; see: Lewicki, T. Motylinski, P. Wilkinson, S.C. Schacht, and Smogrewski, Z.
(18) al-Ta`barī, op.cit. vol. IV; Bakhīt, op.cit. pp. 252-74; Khulayfāt, A. Nasha`t al-İhādiyyah. p.60.
(19) al-Qalḥātī, op.cit. fol. 9; al-Shammākhī, op.cit. p. 45.
(22) al-Barādī, op.cit. p. 167; al-Shammākhī, op.cit. p. 81; al-Dārijīnī, Tabaqat al-İhādiyyah fol. 92.
(23) al-Bīṣaywī, Abī Abī Ḥusayn. "al-Ḥujjāh ‘Alā ma`a Abīal-Sawāl". vol. II p. 84.
(26) Khulayfāt, op.cit. p. 70.
(30) al-Barādī, op.cit. p. 117; al-Ta`barī, op.cit. p. 568; Cf with note (29).
(31) Khulayfāt, op.cit. pp. 64-74.
(33) There were some non-Ibāḍīs who regarded Ibāḍīs as extreme Khārijites and heretics, see Ennami, p xvii.
(35) al-Baghdādī, op.cit. pp.86f; Ennami, op.cit. p. 133.
(37) al-Qalhâti, op.cit., fol. 224b; al-Shamâmâkhî, op.cit., p. 177.
(39) al-Shamâmâkhî, op.cit., p. 87; al-Bisâyîf, Mukhtasâr al-Bisâyîf, p.8; Hâshim, op.cit., p. 65.
(41) Khulayfât, op.cit., pp. 83f; al-Zarkalî gives the date of 'Abdallâh ibn 'Abd al-Malîk's death (83/705), but the reference on which he depended is not known, see his vol. 6 pp. 184-6.
(43) al-Darjînî, fol.9b; Hâshim, op.cit., p.78; Abû al-Faraj, al-Aghânî, vol. xx p. 78.
(46) For more detail about Ibbâdi Imamate in Yemen see al-Shamâmâkhî, al-Siyar; al-Balâdhrî, op.cit., vol ii; Abû al-Faraj, op.cit.; al-Ruqayshî, op.cit.; Ibn Khayyât, Ta'rikh Ibn Khayyât.
(47) For more detail about Ibbâdi Imamate in Algeria see: Abû Zakariyyâ, al-Siyar; al-Shamâmâkhî, op.cit.; Ibn 'Adhâfî, al-Bayân al-Maghrib.
(48) al-Shamâmâkhî, op.cit., p.91; al-Hârîthî, op.cit., p. 139; Ennami, op.cit. p. 91; Cf al-Darjînî; Abû Zakariyyâ op.cit.; and al-Barâdî, op.cit.
(50) al-Izkawf, op.cit., p. 12; Ibn Ruzayq, op.cit., p. 7; Hâshim, op.cit., p. 179.
(51) Badger, History, p. xiii; Phillips, op.cit., p.10.
(52) al-Izkawf, op.cit., p. 12; Ibn Ruzayq, op.cit., p. 7.
(54) al-Ruqayshî, op.cit., fol. 24b; al-Shamâmâkhî, op.cit., pp. 113f; al-Izkawf, op.cit., p. 12.
(58) Ibn Ruzayq, op.cit., p. 9; Hâshim, op.cit., p. 201.
(60) Ibn Ruzayq, op.cit., p. 19.
(64) Abû Qâhîn, op.cit., vol. 1 p. 139; al-'Awtabî, op.cit., fol. 194b; al-Izkawf, op.cit., p. 21.
(69) al-Izkawf, op.cit., p. 21.
(71) al-Izkawf, op.cit., pp. 25.
(73) al-Sâlimî A.H. op.cit., vol. 1 p. 283.
(76) Ibn Ruzayq, op.cit., p. 35.
(77) al-Izkawf, op.cit., p. 31; al-Siyâbî, op.cit., vol. 3. p. 59.
(79) al-Siyâbî, op.cit., vol. 3 pp. 60-1 & pp. 78f.
(80) al-Izkawf, op.cit., p.32; al-Siyâbî, op.cit., vol.3 pp. 101ff
(82) Ibn Ruzayq, op.cit., p. 48.
(84) al-Siyâbî, op.cit., vol. 3 pp. 126-7.
(85) al-Siyabi, op.cit. vol. 3 pp. 117-121.
(86) Ibn Ruzayq, op.cit. p. 40 note 1.
(87) al-Izkawi, op.cit. p. 32; al-Siyabi, op.cit. vol. 3 pp. 114f.
(88) al-Izkawi, op.cit. p. 34.
(89) Ibn Ruzayq, op.cit. p. 50.
(90) al-Izkawi, op.cit. p. 34; al-Siyabi, op.cit. vol. 3 pp. 126f.
(91) Ibn Ruzayq, op.cit. pp. 41ff; al-Siyabi, op.cit. vol. 3 pp. 150-187.
(92) For further information about the Ya'aribah Dynasty see Ibn Ruzayq op.cit.; al-Izkawi op.cit.; al-Salimi, Tubfot; al-Sayyár, Dawlat al-Ya'aribah; Bathunst, R.D. The Ya'rubi Dynasty of Oman.
(93) For further information about the Al Bá Sa'id family see Ibn Ruzayq op.cit.; al-Salimi, Tubfot
(98) (Records of Oman (R.O) p.90; Lorimer, op.cit. vol. I p. 470; Landen, Oman since 1856, p. 274.
(99) Sc. 40,000 Maria Theresa Dollars. The erroneous description of thus originally Austrian coin as "French" is still used in Arabia.
(100) (R.O) p. 91.
(102) This term was sometimes used for Maria Theresa Dollars.
(103) (R.O) p. 82 and p. 122.
(104) Lorimer, op.cit. vol. I p. 471.
(105) Landen, op.cit. p. 279.
(108) (R.O) p. 216.
(114) Landen, op.cit. p. 282.
(120) Lorimer, op.cit. vol. I p. 476.
(121) Landen, op.cit. p. 286.
(122) Landen, op.cit. p. 287; Phillips, op.cit. p. 139.
(124) Landen, op.cit. p. 201.
(126) al-Salīmī, A.H. op.cit. vol. II p. 236.
(129) al-Salīmī, A.H. op.cit. vol. II pp. 245f; Landen, op.cit. p. 292.
(130) al-Salīmī, A.H. op.cit. vol. II p. 246; Landen, op.cit. p. 293; Lorimer, op.cit. vol. I p. 482.
(132) Landen, op.cit. p. 294.
(133) Landen, op.cit. p. 295.
(135) Kelly, Britain. pp. 687f.
(138) Kelly, Britain. p. 688.
(140) Landen, op.cit. p. 308.

Lorimer states that the tribe of Sayf b. Sulaymán was al-Riyámí while al-Salimí states it was al-Bú Sa‘íd.

Lorimer, op.cit. vol. II p. 281; (R.O.I) p. 473.


Here one could mention for example; ‘Abd aI-'Azíz b. Qllá. p.47.

(RO.I) p. 475; Lorimer, op.cit. vol. I p. 492.

Landen, op.cit. p. 320.

See the terms of agreement in (R.O.I) p. 473. 

Precis of Muscat affairs 1869-72.

(R.O.I) p. 475; Telegraph from Major Way to Colonel Pelly on 19th Feb., 1871.


Lorimer, op.cit. vol. I pp. 491f.

Kelly Britain, p. 781 states that the person who killed Sh. al-Khalíl al-Mirání was Rajab al-Baluchi, the Commandant of Fort Mirání.

See Sd. ‘Abd al-'Azíz's conditions in (R.O.I) pp. 78f.


Aitchison, op.cit. vol. XI pp. 308f; Kelly, Britain, pp. 633f.

(R.O.I) p. 86; Landen, op.cit. p. 333.

See the terms of the agreement in (R.O.I) p. 61.

See Sd. ‘Abd al-'Azíz's conditions in (R.O.I) pp. 78f.

Lorimer, op.cit. vol. I p. 527.


Lorimer, op.cit. vol. I p. 518.

al-Salimí, A.H. op.cit. vol. II p. 313.


Landen, op.cit. p. 365.


Lorimer, op.cit. vol. I pp. 558-91; Landen, op.cit. p. 382.


(R.O.II) p. 18; (R.O.I) p. 665; (I.O.) R/15/6/37; (I.O) R/15/3/XXVII/2; Bannerman, op.cit. p. 47; Phillips, op.cit. p. 151.

(R.O.II) p. 669; (I.O.) R/15/6/37. The tribes which supported Sd. Fayshál in the 1895 rebellion were: Janábah, B. Bú 'Ali, B. Hasan, B. Hínáh, al-Hishm, B. Rásíb, B. 'Umar B. Riyám, B. 'Umár and Hajríyyín.


Landen, op.cit. p. 156.

Here one could mention for example; 'Abd al-'Azíz b. Muhammad b. Sa‘íd al-Ruwáští, Sh. Híláí b. 'Amir b. Sulán al-Háríthi who was ex-minister of Sd. Hamad b. Thuwáiní, ruler of Zanzíbar.

Lorimer, op.cit. vol I pp. 548ff and pp. 562-70; Busch, Britain, pp. 154-86; Peterson, Oman p. 47.

(R.O.II) R.1900-1) p. 16; Lorimer, op.cit. vol. I p. 563.


Knox laments Sd. Fayṣal in his report by saying that "he could never, at least so far as the writer could observe, find it in his heart to punish anybody... And moreover "the tribes of Oman had never any justification for their rebellious attitude towards a ruler who never troubled them with taxation nor oppressed them in any way." This, however, contradicts what we have mentioned above about Sd. Fayṣal's actions were justified and that was his divine right as a ruler to impose them. See (Ad. R,1913) p. 103.


Busch, Britain. Appendices: A, B and D. The report's figures on Muscat are given in S.M.T. which $1.11 = £ 1.

See the reports in (R.OIII) pp. 79ff.


(193) al-Sālimī, A.H. op.cit. vol. II p. 313.

(194) al-Sālimī, A.H. op.cit. vol. II p. 295 & p. 313; al-Sālimī, M.A. op.cit. p. 200; al-Sālimī, M. Dīwān; Lorimer, op.cit. vol.I p.586f ; Knox laments Sd. Fayṣal in his report by saying that "he could never, at least so far as the writer could observe, find it in his heart to punish anybody.. And moreover "the tribes of Oman had never any justification for their rebellious attitude towards a ruler who never troubled them with taxation nor oppressed them in any way." This, however, contradicts what we have mentioned above about Sd. Fayṣal. One reason for this is that Knox perhaps lacked any knowledge of how the people had felt at that time, or he might have thought that Sd. Fayṣal's actions were justified and that was his divine right as a ruler to impose them. See (Ad. R,1913) p. 103.


(203) al-Mughfīrī, op.cit. p. 475. The same opinion was expressed by the Sultan of Lahlī, see Jād, op.cit. p. 339.

(204) al-Mughfīrī, op.cit. pp. 388f.

(205) Busch, Britain. Appendices: A, B and D. The report's figures on Muscat are given in S.M.T. which $1.11 = £ 1.

(206) See the reports in (R.OIII) pp. 79ff.

(207) (Adm. R,1918) p. 47.

CHAPTER 11

THE EARLY LIFE OF IMAM SĀLIM

This chapter deals with the events of Imam Sālim's life and the Imamate revival.

1) Events of his Life

In this section we depend on unwritten material and personal interviews with the sons of Imam Sālim and some of the 'ulamā', in addition to Nahdat al-A'yān by Sh. Muhammad b. 'Abdallāh al-Sālimī.

Information about the Imam Sālim's life and his family before his election as an Imam is relatively scanty. What is known, is that he came from a family consisting of four boys and one girl, and he was born sometime in 1301/1883-4 in the village of Mashā'iq which is attached to al-Suwayq (1).

His full lineage was Sālim b. Rāshid b. Sulaymān b. 'Āmir b. 'Abdallāh b Mas'ūd b. Sālim b. Muḥammad b. Saʿīd b. Sālim b. Mas'ūd b. 'Azzān b. Mas'ūd b. Imam 'Azzān b. Tāmīm al-Khāruṭī (2). According to Sh. Khalīfān b. 'Uthmān al-Khāruṭī, however, the name 'Abdallāh should not appear as part of the Imam's pedigree (3) and this is also supported by Sh. Saʿīd b. Ǧamāl b. Khamīs al-Khāruṭī, the Shaykh of the village of Mashā'iq (4) who was interviewed by the present writer on Thursday 31st December, 1992. There is no evidence to support this claim, however, and we tend to believe that the name 'Abdallāh does form part of the Imam's pedigree because this is stated by his brother Muḥammad b. Rāshid (5) and the Imam's son.

As far as the ancestors of the Imam Sālim, enumerated above, are concerned, we know little of them other than their names, apart from Imam 'Azzān b. Tāmīm al-Khāruṭī, who was the last Imam of the second Ibaḍī Imamate.

The Imam's tribe (B. Khāruṭ) is one of the most famous tribes in Oman. It descends from Khāruṭ b. Shāfī b. Yaḥmud b. 'Abdallāh, and is of Azdī, Yamānī, and Qahtānī origin. It is of a Ghāfrī political orientation and belongs to the Ibaḍī sect. It has provided many Imams and famous 'ulamā' from medieval times to the present (6). It was
described by Major Chauncy, the PAM (Sept. 1949-Oct. 1958), as "a peaceful and comparatively civilized tribe in the centre of Oman" (7).

Imam Sálim had three brothers and one sister: Násir, Muḥammad, Āmīr and Miya. All of them died after him, while his father, Ráshid, died a few years before his election as Imam in 1331/1913. His mother was Salfmah bint Ráshid b. Muḥammad al-Kharūšī, and she died in the 1920s.

Imam Sálim was married to three wives. His first wife, Zayanah, was the daughter of Sh. ‘Abdallah b. Ḥumayd al-Sálimī. She died in c.1336/1916. She left him two boys: Sh. Yaḥyā (b.1331/1913) and Sh. ‘Abdallah (b.1336/1916). Then he married ‘Azzah bint Násir b. Muḥammad al-Ma‘waliyyah. She gave him a boy, Ya‘qūb. His third and last wife was Rayá bint Muḥammad b. Yaḥyā b. Khalfān al-Kharūšī. Thus, when the Imam died, he left three sons, Yaḥyā, ‘Abdallāh and Ya‘qūb. Two of them (Yaḥyā and ‘Abdallāh) are still living and the present writer was able to interview them.

We do not have enough information about how Imam Sálim spent his early life. What is certain, however, is that his early life was not different from that of his contemporaries in his village. When he reached school age he learned the basis of reading and writing at the hands of the village teachers, including his father who was probably a teacher himself (8). When he was in his teens, his father sent him together with his brother Násir to a school in al-‘Awābī town, which has a high concentration of his tribe. No information has survived concerning how many years he spent in al-‘Awābī, nor the names of his teachers. But he later moved with his brother to continue his studies in Rustáq (9) where he studied under Sh. Ráshid b. Sayf b. Sa‘īd al-Lamkí (1262/1845-1333/1914) (10) who was one of the most famous teachers in Rustáq at that time.

He left Rustáq for al-Sharqīyyah in c.1319/1901 when he was eighteen years old, to complete his studies with Sh. ‘Abdallāh b. Ḥumayd al-Sálimī who himself had studied with Sh. Ráshid at Rustáq in the 1880s. Muḥammad al-Sálimī, however, sheds some doubt on this and argues that Imam Sálim may have moved to al-Sharqīyyah when he was in his early teens, though it was not customary at that time to send children to distant lands, unless there was some indication that they would be able to look after themselves (11). When Imam Sálim and his brother Násir reached al-Qābil, an important town in al-
Sharqiyyah, and the headquarters of the Hirth tribe, they met the blind Sh. ‘Abdalláh al-Sálimí, who sat himself between them, and gently pulled their ears and said to his audience "one of these boys will become an ‘álim and the other will occupy a notable position"(12).

Imam Sálim stayed in al-Qábil for more than twelve years until his election as Imam. He spent all this time studying under Sh. ‘Abdalláh al-Sálimí and others, and he visited his parents only during the Summer. He refused to take any job or post, even though his tribe wanted him to become a teacher in Nakhal or al-‘Awáblí. He preferred to stay with Sh. ‘Abdalláh al-Sálimí, who later gave him his daughter in marriage.

On occasional visits to his village, Imam Sálim used to meet the ‘ulamá and notables, using these opportunities to increase his knowledge and exchange views with them. This should not be taken as meaning that he was the head of his clan, nor tamímah of the B. Khárúsí. There is no indication of his being famous, or having any desire to occupy a senior position before his election. He was clearly an ordinary man who wanted only to study and increase his knowledge. Major Chauncy, the PAM, claimed in 1951 that "Imam Sálim's son Yahyá is a tamímah of B. Khárúsí" (13). This unsubstantiated claim has led some writers to state that Sh. ‘Abdalláh al-Sálimí was strongly supported by his son-in-law Sh. Sálim b. Ráshid al-Khárúsí, who was according to them the tamímah of B. Khárúsí (14). However, Imam Sálim was not a leader in any sense and he never claimed the leadership of his folk. Even when he was elected, not a single person from the B. Khárúsí attended the occasion. He even said to the ‘ulamá, when chosen as Imam, "I did not come here to be elected, but to elect whomever you want to elect" (15).

Imam Sálim was of a medium height, of thin build, fair skinned and with thick eyebrows. He always had a smile on his face and spent most of his time either studying or praying in a group (Jamá’ah). Sh. Sa’íd b. Ḥamad al-Ḥárithí said that his father (Hamad) went into the Mosque one day and found Imam Sálim crying, and asked his uncle Sh. ‘Isá b. Šálíh al-Ḥárithí (who was sitting in the Mosque at the time) why Sálim b. Ráshid was crying. Sh. ‘Isá replied that he had missed the Jamá’ah praying (16). In another story, the man responsible for al-Qábil Mosque was quoted as having said, "I have never been into the Mosque without seeing Imam Sálim in the niche (mihráb )." (17)
Imam Sálim was pious and free from worldly ambitions. He was eloquent, knowledgeable, expert in the Shar‘ah, determined and he had no detractors. According to one story he was walking one day near the fort of Nazwà (the old traditional capital of the Ibádí) and he heard some soldiers singing and dancing. He shouted at them: behave yourselves in this place!. When the soldiers heard his commanding voice they became full of fear and became quiet (18). Another story told about the Imam was that he saw Sh. Sultán b. Maňşúr al-Ghufaylí, the tamimah of the Āl Wahbáh tribe, walking one day with his izâr touching the ground between his feet, and Imam Sálim shouted at him: pull up your izâr. Sh. Sultán pulled up his izâr without saying a word (19).

It appears from a number of sources (20) that Imam Sálim was financially in strained circumstances and depended entirely on his family during his studies in al-‘Awábí and Rustáq. He used to receive a bursary from the school funds generated from zakât, hibât and awqâf during his stay in al-Qábil. These sums, however, were not sufficient to keep him and the Shaykhs and ‘ulamá‘ used to compete to give him a helping hand by providing him with food. He often refused to accept these gifts, pretending that he had enough food to last him for some time. To overcome this obstacle people used to send to find out whether he really had food or not, and send him ready cooked meals instead of uncooked food. When the Imam discovered this he deceived his well-wishers by boiling water and pretending that he was cooking something for himself (21). In fact Imam Sálim depended on dates and water only as food, and sometimes he even went without food at all for several days, and spent many days fasting (22).

In general, Imam Sálim had attractive personal qualities and in many instances he showed fairness and scrupulosity in dealing with others. He was known for these characteristics among all Omani people, and he had many karâdât which were believed by all the ‘ulamá‘. Addressing his companions, Sh. ‘Abdalláh b. Ḥumayd al-Sálimí described Imam Sálim b. Ráshid as follows "I do not worry about you becoming ignorant when you have among you ‘Āmir b. Khamís, and I do not worry that you should grow weak when you have among you Sálim b. Ráshid" (23).

Imam Sálim died at the age of 37, having spent seven years of his life as Imam. He was elected Imam at thirty and was the first Imam of the Ibádí Imamate in the 20th
57

century. He was murdered by an individual with an obscure grudge in 1338/1920 in the 
village of al-Khaḍrā' in al-Sharqiyyah Province and buried there. Many poets composed 
elegies on him (24).

2) The Imamate Revival: the Eighth Imamate in the 20th Century

By the turn of the 20th century, the pace of events in Oman increased. The British 
government started to put pressure on Sd. Fayṣal b. Turkī, the Sultan of Muscat and 
Oman (1888-1913), to honour the agreements he had signed, especially those concerned 
with the slave trade and arms traffic. In return he was promised financial assistance to 
help him with his acute financial and debt difficulties. He agreed to the British demands 
and, as will be seen, this was reflected in the economic, social, and political life of the 
country. This was met with opposition from the Omani people, and Sd. Fayṣal was 
accused of abandoning Islamic traditions and falling a prey to foreign demands. This was 
exacerbated when he imposed heavy taxes on the inhabitants of Muscat and increased the 
custom duties on goods from the interior to the ports on the coast. More importantly, the 
Omani tribes looked upon the imposition of customs duties as impious, since it lacked the 
Prophet's sanction and upon slavery as a lawful buttress of their social and economic 
system. They objected to any control of the arms traffic and to the treaties with infidel 
powers which prevented the Government from interfering with the sale of tobacco and 
alcohol. They were anti-European and especially anti-British, since the British were most 
hostile to slave-traders and gun-runners; and also because the Hindu traders who were 
settled in their ports, to the great scandal of the faithful, were under British protection 
(25). G. Bell, commentating on the Imamate revival, points out that:

"to these foreign influences, to the reliance of the Sultans of Muscat on foreign naval and 
military power, and to their enforced submission to foreign requirements in the matter of the traffic 
in slaves and in arms, the modern unrest is due. The late Sultan, Sd. Fayṣal ibn Turki, saw in the 
suppression of the arms trade by the British government a distinct advantage to himself, since his 
rebellious subjects became unable to furnish themselves with weapons to use against him; but 
before his death the discontent which it had caused among the tribes had come to a head" (26).

Of all these problems, the slave trade and arms traffic were the most important 
factors in the Imamate revival. These two factors will be discussed in the light of four 
documents which represent correspondence between the Sultan of Muscat and Oman, the
British government and the Omani leaders. From these documents the direct and immediate causes of the Imamate revival can be discerned.

The first document is a letter from Sh. ‘Isà to Sd. Fayṣal, dated October, 1900 in which he complains that the Christians are letting free the slaves of the Muslims and that the owners of the slaves are complaining to him about this matter. Sh. ‘Isà reminds Sd. Fayṣal that he has written to him more than once but he has not received satisfactory replies from him. In the end, he demands that Sd. Fayṣal put an end to this practice, or else he will not be responsible for the actions of the slaves' owners against him and the British (27).

It appears that the Sultan did not respond to Sh. ‘Isà's demand and left the problem as it was. Sh. ‘Isà continued in vain to demand action in this matter, despite noticeable improvements in the relationship between Sh. ‘Isà and Sd. Fayṣal after 1906.

The second and third documents are two letters from Sd. Fayṣal to the British political authorities. The first is addressed to Sir Percy Cox, the PRG, dated 2nd Sha‘bán 1331/17th July 1913 and requesting military assistance to put down the revolt against the Imamate. He goes on to remind the PRG that the reasons behind the revolt are well known to the British government (28). The second letter is addressed to Major S.G. Knox, the PAM dated 27th Sha‘bán, 1331/1st August, 1913 and it is set out more clearly than the first letter. The contents of this letter are as follows:

"After compliments,— Today my son Ḥamad and Wálī Mozaffar [Muḍaffār] arrived and with them some of the Shaikhs of the B. Jābir returning from the Wādī Jayla [Jaylah] (30) and, as for the Shaikhs, your honour has seen them and has realized that there is no reliance to be placed on them; and likewise your honour is aware that my son Nādir is besieged in the fort of Sāmā’il with a few members of my family and of my dependents and that they are all in great danger from the rebels; and then, if Sāmā’il and Bidbid fall- for this calamity is considered likely to happen- there remains no protection for the trade of your subjects, any more, Maskat [Muscat] and Matrah will be in danger and never at rest; and all this sedition, as is plain from the notice which you have seen purporting to be from the pretended Imam, Šālim bin Rāshid al-Khurāṣ, is owing to the establishment of the warehouse and to the rules which we have made on the advice of the glorious Imperial Government. Now interested persons have falsely represented this arrangement as a device on the part of you and me to forbid to the tribes of Oman modern weapons and ammunition, so that we may press upon them, seeking to reduce them to slavery. Now, in these circumstances, I hope from my old and sincere friends, the British Government, help in this time of need and I ask from you the despatch of troops, according as the glorious Government shall see fit for raising the siege of the fort of Sāmā’il or its recapture, should necessity call for it, so that the rising may be quelled and peace be restored to my port and my country and to my merchants and yours from the machinations of interested persons and the troubling of the ignorant; and I shall keep the purport of this letter fully secret, until a reply reached [reaches] me from the glorious British government. Usual ending" (29).
Both letters implicitly show that the questions which aroused the Omani tribes and led to the revival of the Imamate were the result of British influence in Oman.

The fourth document is a petition by the Omanis presented by Sh. 'Isa and Sh. 'Abdalláh b. Ráshid al-Háshímí, the Imam's Qádí, to the PAM, who proposed to mediate between the Imam and the Sultan. Their representations were made in al-Sib on 4th Dhú al-Qi’dah, 1333/15th September, 1915 (31).

The document identifies fourteen demands which they made of the Sultan; if he agreed to them they would acquiesce in his rule over Muscat and Báţinah Province according to Shar‘ah law. Imam Salím confirmed these demands to the PAM in a letter dated 8th Dhú al-Qi’dah, 1333/ 19th September 1915 (32). As can be seen from the letters of Sd. Fáyṣal quoted above, he clearly sought the revival of the Imamate.

Two factors in particular can be seen as having been instrumental in the revival of the Imamate. The first of these was connected with the progressive abolition of the slave trade by the British government from the end of the first decade of the 19th century, and in this connection they had signed the following treaties with the rulers of Oman (33):

(a) the treaty of 1822; (b) the treaty of commerce, dated the 17th of December, 1839; (c) additional articles inserted into the treaty of commerce (1839), dated 1843; (d) the agreement of 1845 dated the 2nd of October 1845; (e) the treaty of 1873 dated the 1st of July 1873.

In fact these agreements were not carried out in their entirety in Oman until the last two decades of the 19th century, and as a result Britain introduced measures for the searching ships, especially the Omani ones. The Omanis, however, evaded confrontation with the British by flying French flags on the their ships, whether supported by the Sultan or not.

However, although the British had achieved some success in stopping the slave trade during the last decade of the 19th century and the following one, the inland trade had remained largely unaffected. The Sultan had refused British demands to shut down the house of the slave brokers and to issue a decree to this effect. This came in a letter to the PAM, dated 27th Rabî‘ II, 1308/12th December, 1890 (34). He explained this by saying that such an act would annoy the Omanis and give rise to conflict and trouble
which no one would welcome. This indicates that the Sultan was in close touch with the feelings of the Omani people and their sensitivities.

Nevertheless, although the slave trade during this period was on a small scale, the British demanded that the Sultan free all the slaves, including those classified by Lorimer as domestic slaves (35). The British started to interest themselves in individual cases of persons alleged to be slaves, demanding their manumission. In some cases they required slave owners to write undertakings not to oppress their slaves, and they threatened to free them if this was ignored (36). The following table shows that the total number of slaves handed over to the British Agency in Muscat was 1209, most of whom were freed between 1890-1919 (37):

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A detailed discussion of the slave trade as an international problem is beyond the scope of this study, but it should be pointed out that the humanitarian considerations which in the first place induced the British government to prohibit the slave trade, later were transformed into a means of acquiring political influence in various parts of the world.

It is in any case not out of place to note that the system of slavery as practiced in Oman at the end of the 19th century was not in general oppressive, as is evidenced by a number of European observers (38). Moreover, as at earlier periods of Islamic history, slaves were able to rise to the highest political position, as for example Sulaymán b.
Suwaylim b. Sálimín who was Wazír to Sd. Fayšal, and whose father and sons were Wálís (39).

A second factor in the Imamate revival was the establishment of the warehouse in Muscat in 1912. During the last decade of the 19th century and the first twelve years of the present century, the arms trade in the Gulf had greatly increased, with Muscat as the main centre for the trade. Britain had made extensive efforts to stop the trade in the Gulf, for fear that arms might reach the western borders of India, Afghanistan, and Central Asia. The sources of these arms were Belgium, Germany, France and Britain, whose arms sales in the Gulf increased after the decision at the Brussels conference to stop arms sale in Africa in 1890. To reduce further increases in arms trade in the Gulf, Britain concluded an agreement with the Shaykh of Bahrain in 1898, of Kuwait in 1900, and the Shaykhs of the Omani Coast in 1902. She failed, however, to persuade Sd. Fayšal to sign these agreements, but he did issue a decree in 1898, preventing Omani ships from exporting arms to India and Persia (40). He also agreed to a British demand to inspect these ships and to return any ships breaking this regulation back to Muscat (41).

Consequently, the legalization of the arms trade made Oman the main source and the largest exporter of arms to other countries in Asia and Africa by both sea and land. This gave the Omanis sufficient profits to offset their losses from the abolition of the slave trade. With the growth of trade in Muscat, a conference was held in Brussels to discuss the increase of arms sales in the city between 1908 and 1909 (42), but the conference failed to reach a decision because of France objections (43), and the failure of Britain to persuade France to stop arms exports to Muscat. The British then decided to use force to stop the trade by blockading the Gulf ports during the years between 1910 and 1912. This move proved to be successful, but after incurring heavy expenses (44).

As a next step, Britain tried to persuade Sd. Fayšal to sign an agreement to control this trade in arms. During the winter of 1911/1912 negotiations continued between Major Knox, the PRG, and the Sultan of Oman. The result of these negotiations was the establishment of a warehouse in Muscat where all imported arms and those in circulation internally were to be stored, starting from 1st September 1912. It was agreed also that the Sultan would be compensated for any losses that might arise as a result of
this measure (45). They also agreed on practical arrangements for how the arms were to enter and leave the warehouse. Each piece of equipment entering or leaving the warehouse was to bear the warehouse mark and a serial member. The reason for the arms regulation, according to Sd. Fayṣal’s notification was that:

"large quantities of arms and ammunition are at present stored without proper control in private buildings, distributed in this our town of Maskat [Muscat], and thus exposed to the risk of attack, robbery, or fire, we impressed by the serious menace to the safety of our capital arising therefrom, have resolved to remedy this state of affairs in accordance with the needs of the times and the requirement of our municipal administration, by the construction and the establishment of a special customs house, magazine, or arms warehouse for the storage of arms and ammunition under safe precautions" (46).

From the foregoing it is clear that the Sultan faced serious difficulties totally unrelated to his internal domestic policies, but the Sultan’s politics in relation to trade were very much influenced by what took place internationally (47). Being unaware of these forces, the tribesmen were dissatisfied with the way in which the Sultan dealt with the arms issue, especially since France at that time encouraged both the slave trade and the arms trade. As a result, the Omani merchants and others, including the French, strongly opposed the new measures, and protested to the Sultan about them. The reaction of the tribes was angry, and they wrote to the Sultan threatening to launch an attack on the capital. They feared that the new measures would prevent modern arms from reaching them in the hinterland. These fears were justified, in that some of the tribes (contrary to what some authorities assert) were poorly armed.

Landen, for example, says that the tribes had been acquiring stocks of new serviceable rifles and ammunition for some 20 years which implies that these tribes were heavily armed (48). This statement represents a considerable overestimate, because not all the Omanis had modern arms, and they were defeated in their first battle with the Sultan and British troops in 1915, despite the fact that the Imamate troops were estimated at about 3000 men (49). This victory was recorded by the British in the military museum at Bayt al-Falaj (the place where the battle took place) in a picture in which the Sultan and British troops were shown holding guns and the Imamate troops holding swords and spears.
Two conclusions are clear: the first is that the restriction on arms trade was seen by the tribes as a means of denying them access to modern weapons, and secondly the openness of the Sultan to foreign influence was seen by the tribes as meaning that he was totally under the control of foreign powers, to the neglect of Islamic traditions. The absence of positive influence by the tribes on the Sultan led to irreconcilable differences in opinions between them and a lack of understanding of his policies (50).

Other, economic, factors which led to the Imamate revival were: (a) the increase of import duty from the interior to the coast from 5% to 20%, imposed on the tribes which took part in the rebellion of the 1895; and (b) the imposition of a monthly tax of 20 Bayzah (Omani currency) (51) on every household in Muscat to provide medical services for the people (52).

The political factors include: (a) the conclusion of treaties with Britain which increased foreign influence in Oman's affairs and which led to a deterioration in the relationship between the tribes and the Sultan; (b) the failure of the Sultan to encourage reconciliation between the tribes, especially during the three years which preceded the rise of the Imamate. Warfare broke out between the tribes, and between them and the Sultan.

In Bá'nah Province, in 1910, warfare broke out in Suḥár against the Wálf, Sálim b. Sulaymán b. Suwaylim (d. 5th June, 1911) as a result of heavy taxes and the Wálf's ill-treatment to the inhabitants (53). This revolt was serious and the Sultan had to move by himself to put it down. Afterwards he pacified those who had suffered losses by paying financial compensation to the local notables for distribution to those concerned (54). In the following years, the conflict between the tribe of Ḥawásinah and the B. Khálid in al-Khábúrah was renewed, and left 200 dead. The Sultan sent his leader Sd. Badr b. Sayf b. Sulaymán al-Bú Saʿíd to make peace between the belligerents, but one year later (1912) the Ḥawásinah attacked the B. ʿUmar with heavy losses on both sides.

In al-Sharqiyah, the B. Bú Ḥasan attacked Śúr in 1911. The Sultan sent his son Sd. Nádir to Śúr, who imposed a fine of $MT. 2,000 on the attackers to compensate the inhabitants for their losses (55). In Jaʿlán, traditional hostilities between B. Bú ʿAlí and the B. Bú Ḥasan erupted (56). In March, 1912 Sd. Saʿfd b. Ibráhím, the ruler of Rustáq was killed by his cousins, Sd. Ibráhím b. Fayṣal b. Ḥumúd and Muḥammad b. Fayṣal.
b. Humúd who were killed immediately afterwards. This incident led to clashes between the supporters of the ruler's family and its opponents, until Sd. Ahmad b. Ibrahim (12 years old at that time), the brother of the former ruler, succeeded in controlling Rustáq with the help of the B. Gháfir.

The Administration Report of 1912 points out that there were rumours that the interior tribes intended to attack Muscat because of the arms traffic regulation by Sd. Fayşal. The report went on to say that the Sultan had received a number of threatening letters from the heads of the tribes, especially from Sh. 'Isà. These rumours, however, proved to be false (57).

Religious factors came into play with the Sultan's submission to foreign influence and the neglect of Islamic doctrine in allowing the import of alcohol and tobacco into the country, and the Sultan's inability to adopt the Shar'ah as the main source of jurisprudence. A second religious factor was the influence of Sh. 'Abdalláh b. Humayd al-Sálimí who won the support of the 'ulamá' and religious leaders for his call for the Imamate revival. Sh. al-Sálimí had many followers and students who were very keen to emulate his life and teachings (58).

The objectives of the Imamate were a return to the Shar'ah, reserve in dealing with foreigners and the provision of justice for Muslims, which was a goal pursued by the Ibádí 'ulamá' since the establishment of their first Imamate in A.H 132.

The essential elements in the re-establishment of the Imamate were: (a) the continuous and relentless efforts of Sh. al-Sálimí; (b) the support which Sh. al-Sálimí received from the Gháfírí faction and later from Hináfí faction; (c) the loyalty of the 'ulamá' to their beliefs and their desire to see them implemented; and (d) the weakness of the Sultan's influence in the interior region.

Sh. al-Sálimí (1283/1865-1332/1914) was born in al-Ḥawqayn village, a part of Rustáq domain, and he lost his sight when he was 12 years old. He was educated in Rustáq, and then he moved to al-Qábil in al-Sharqiyyah in 1308/1890 (59), where he studied under Sh. Ṣáliḥ b. 'Alf al-Ḥárithí (d. 1898). Sh. al-Sálimí became famous and attracted many students to his school from various regions in Oman. His countrywide
reputation and his zeal for Ibadí doctrine made him an outspoken critic and a natural leader in arousing the Omani tribesmen against foreign encroachments.

Sh. al-Sálimí observed that the affairs of Oman were deteriorating with internecine fighting between the tribes, and the Sultan was unable to do anything to stop it, owing to foreign influence, and lack of support on the part of the tribesmen. To combat this state of affairs, Sh. al-Sálimí concentrated on unifying Oman under an Imam, who would return to the basis of Islam.

In 1323/1905 Sh. al-Sálimí met Sd. Faysal and they discussed Oman's affairs. He demanded that the Sultan should unite Oman under his (the Sultan's) control and should rule it according to Islamic law. The Sultan rejected Sh. al-Sálimí’s conditions, suspecting his intentions, and believing that if he conceded his demands, his supporters would nominate his uncle Sd. 'Abd al-'Azíz (d. 1907) as Imam, as they had before with Sd. Sálim b. Thuwayní in 1868. In the following years, after his return from Hajj in the company of the Sultan's wife (60), Sh. al-Sálimí repeated his demands to the Sultan, who promised to send his answer with the Wálí, Sulaymán b. Suwaylim, when he went to al-Qábil, by the end of the year 1324/1906, to see Sh. 'Isá. The Sultan requested Sh. al-Sálimí to act as tutor to his son Sd. Taymúr and to establish a school in Muscat, but he refused the Sultan's offer (61). Sd. Taymúr was of a serious character and strongly inclined towards religious study, and in this he was encouraged by Sh. 'Isá b. Șaliḥ and his brother Sh. ‘Alf b. Șaliḥ who influenced Sd. Faysal in this matter. However, certain persons close to the Sultan persuaded him to give up his plan for the religious education of his son (62).

One Arab writer maintains that the main point of contention between Sd. Faysal and Sh. al-Sálimí was that Sd. Faysal claimed to be both Sultan and Imam (63), and this view is supported by the statement of American political Agent in 1912 that Sd. Faysal had in fact taken the title of Imam as well as that of Sultan (64). There are, however, no Omani sources which have anything to say on this matter, and it is likely that such allegations rested on no more than rumours.

There is no record of whether or not Sh. al-Sálimí ever received an answer from the Sultan during the Wálí's visit to al-Sharqiyah, but the result of this visit was that the
relationship between Sh. ‘Isà and the Sultan improved and this influenced the political activity of Sh. al-Sàlimf. Unfortunately, the Wàlf Sulaymán was killed in the Wàdí al-‘Aqq by the B. Gháfìr when he returned from al-Qàbil, and this diverted the Sultan’s attention by making him concentrate his efforts on punishing the killers of Sulaymán.

With the Wàlf Sulaymán’s death, the Sultan had lost one important figure who had assisted him in controlling many of the towns, especially in the Interior Province. One authority states that the decay in the Sultan’s government started with the death of one of its greatest leaders (sc. Sulaymán b. Suwaylim) (65), and he goes on to say that "much of Sultan Fàyal’s relative success in the years immediately preceding 1903 was due not so much to his own actions as to the energetic efforts undertaken on his behalf by Sulayman b. Suwaylim" (66).

Sh. al-Sàlimf’s efforts to revive the Imamate during the period 1325/1907 to 1329/1911 were not successful. He was let down by the tribal leaders, especially Sh. ‘Isà whom he requested to take the leadership in the struggle against the Sultan. Sh. ‘Isà, declined on the grounds that the time was not ripe for action (67).

Their efforts having failed Sh. al-Sàlimf decided in 1329/1911 to go on the pilgrimage, and then to tour North Africa to seek financial assistance from the Ibàdí communities there (68), but Sh. ‘Isà and other notables persuaded him to postpone this visit because they needed his presence. During 1330, Sh. al-Sàlimf visited the interior Province and met the heads of tribes of al-‘Abriyyín in al-Ḥamrá’ and the sons of Sh. Hilál b. Záhir al-Hiná’í in Bilád Sayt who promised to give him their support. Then he visited the village of Tanúf where Sh. Ḥimyar b. Náṣir b. Sayf al-Nabhání (1291/1874-1338/1920), the tamímah of B. Gháfìr faction, lived. Sh. al-Sàlimf discussed his ideas with him and he agreed to support him.

Here lies the importance of the role of the Gháfìr faction in adopting Sh. al-Sàlimf’s ideas. The main reason for B. Gháfìr support was the deterioration of the relationship between them and the Sultan. Sh. Ḥimyar and his tribe had suffered much from the Wàlf, Sulaymán b. Suwaylim, who had interfered in their internal affairs and encouraged their traditional enemies, the B. Ruwáḥah (a Hináwí faction), to encroach upon their lands (69). Sh. Ḥimyar controlled the whole of Jabal al-Akhḍar with its two
most important centres, Tanúf and Barkat al-Mawz. He promised to lend his support to Sh. al-Sálimí, both financially and morally (70). He also agreed to meet him the following year (Jumáda II, 1331/May, 1913) in Tanúf to elect an Imam (71). According to Landen, the main reasons which caused Sh. Ḥimyar to support the revival of the Imamate were: "the fears that this autonomy and the Ibádí faith were being threatened by increased foreign meddling in Oman (and they) undoubtedly caused Shaykh Ḥimyar to embrace the conservative programme" and moreover "the motives of the B. Riyám Shaykh were more conditioned by family ambitions than were those of the other founders of the 1913 Imamate" (72). This writer has, however, confused the issue of the Imamate revival and the interests of Sh. Ḥimyar's tribe. He maintains that it was not for religious reasons, or because of foreign interference, that Sh. Ḥimyar accepted the call for the revival of the Imamate, but that he acted for the interests of his tribe only. Certain Arab writers have perpetuated this view when discussing the role of Sh. Ḥimyar (73). The truth of the matter was that there was strong competition between the Hináwí and Gháfírí factions to take over the responsibility of the Imamate, and the Gháfírí faction had suffered from the pressure of Sultan Fayṣal who had encouraged the Hináwí faction against the Gháfírí faction. To some extent Sh. Ḥimyar's support for the Imamate was conditioned by the expectation that its establishment would alleviate this pressure. However, while it is true that the establishment of the Imamate would be in the interest of the B. Riyám, there are other indications that Sh. Ḥimyar's primary motive in supporting the Imamate was his religious condition. It must be pointed out that B. Riyám did not take part in the Sd. ʿAzzán's Imamate (1868-71), and had had to endure much animosity and loss of property. Thus it must be borne in mind that both political and religious factors influenced Sh. Ḥimyar.

After this, Sh. al-Sálimí wrote to his adherents informing them about what he had discussed with Sh. Ḥimyar, and of his next meeting with him. He stressed in his letters to them that what he had told them should be kept as a secret.

On hearing these news, Sh. ʿIsà, the tamímah of Hináwí faction, called the heads of his tribe and discussed Sh. al-Sálimí's ideas with them. They decided to try to persuade Sh. al-Sálimí not to continue the meeting with Sh. Ḥimyar (74). They tried to
discuss their views with Sh. al-Sálimí and to warn him against Sh. Himyar, who, they claimed, would hand him over to the Sultan, who had already decided to get rid of Sh. al-Sálimí, but the latter rejected their advice. The relationship between Sh. ‘Isà and Sh. Himyar was in general unfriendly and there had been repeated feuding between their tribes (75). Sh. al-Sálimí called his adherents together and discussed these matters with them. The result was unreserved support from these advisers for Sh. al-Sálimí’s ideas.

Accordingly he decided to go to Tanúf and proceed with the idea of electing an Imam. He left al-Qábil secretly for al-Muḍaybí on 2nd Jumádá II, 1331 in the company of (76):

1- Sh. Sálim b. Ráshid b. Sulaymán al-Kharúší
2- Sh. Ḥumúd b. Náṣir al-Mawlí
3- Sh. Sálim b. Náṣir al-Ḥubayshí
4- Sh. ‘Abdalláh b. Ráshid b. Šálíh al-Ḥáshímí
5- His son, Sh. Muḥammad b. ‘Abdalláh b. Ḥúmayd al-Sálimí

In al-Muḍaybí, they were joined by:

6- Sh. ‘Āmir b. Khamís al-Málikí
7- Sh. Sa‘íd b. ‘Abdalláh b. Khádim al-Ḥáshímí
8- Sh. ‘Āmir b. ‘Alí b. Ráshid al-Shaydáhí al-Ḥábsí
9- Sh. Ḥamad b. Musallam b. ‘Ubayd al-Ḥajrí
10- Sh. Sayf b. Ḥumayd wald al-Suwaygh al-Ḥáshímí.

The above were accompanied by three attendants only.

Sh. al-Sálimí left the village of al-Khabbah in al-Muḍaybí secretly on the 7th of Jumádá II, and reached Barkat al-Mawz on the following day, where they were welcomed by Sh. Ḥamdán b. Sulaymán b. Sayf al-Nabhání, the cousin of Sh. Himyar b. Náṣir. While Sh. al-Sálimí was on his way to Barkat al-Mawz he wrote to his adherents of Izki, telling them to meet him in Barkat al-Mawz. As a result, some sixty ‘ulamá’ led by Sh. Abú Zayd ‘Abdalláh b. Muḥammad al-Riyámi and Sh. Muḥammad b. Sálim b. Zahrán al-Ruqayshí met with him as requested.

At dawn on the 9th, Sh. al-Sálimí and his company left Barkat al-Mawz for Tanúf, which they reached on the following day, after receiving prior assurances from B.
Riyám of protection against attacks from Sd. Sayf b. Ḥamad al-Bú Saʿíd, the Sultan's Wálí of Nazwà. In Tanúf, all the 'ulamá' had a meeting with Sh Ḥimyar and decided to elect Sálim b. Ráshid b. Sulaymán al-Kharúṣí as an Imam and depose Sultan Fayṣal.

One factor which helped Sh. al-Sálimí and his men to revive the Imamate with such comparative ease was the fact that Sultan's control over his forts had weakened, owing to the undermining of his garrisons in Nazwà, Izkí, and Samá'il. In addition, most of his most loyal commanders, such as Sulaymán b. Suwaylim (d.1907), his son Sálim b. Sulaymán (d. 5th June,1911), and Badr b. Sayf b. Sulaymán al-Bú Saʿíd (d. 23rd February, 1913) had by this time all died.
Endnotes

(1) Mashá’iq derives its name from Sh. Muḥammad b. Shá’iq b. Abī al-Qāsim al-Khārūṣī, who was one of the ‘ulāmad’ of Nakhal. It is located in Bājinah Province about 20 Km from the western coast of the Gulf of Oman.

(2) The full name of the Imam is written on the inside cover, and repeated on the last page, of a manuscript given to the present writer by the son of the Imam Sālim Sh. Yahyā, when he visited him at his house on Wednesday 30th December, 1992, in the village of al-Waljah, attached to al-‘Awább.

(3) al-Sālimī, M.A. Nahdat. p. 167.

(4) Sh. Sa’id b. Jālamad al-Khānī is now the Qāli of Buraymi.


(6) Landen, Qull. Qii. p. 393; Anthony, Qull. Qii. pp. 54f.

(7) (R.O.I) p.cv.


(9) Most of the ‘ulāmad’ interviewed by the present writer, especially Sh. Ḥumūd b. ‘Abdallāh al-Rāshidī, the Qādi of Sanāw, and Sh. Sa’id b. Ḥamad al-Khārūṣī, the Qādi of Buraymi, agree that the age of Imam Sālim was not less than 18 years when he left for al-Sharqiyyah.


(11) Oral communication to the writer.

(12) Or. comm. p. 46.

(13) This point was mentioned by his brother Nāsir in his elegy.


(15) Grave, Life of Percy Cox. p. 86.

(16) Bell, G. op. cit. p. 21.

(17) Qull. Qii. 1914-42 p. 386; Landen, op. cit. p. 393.


(19) al-Jārithi, Sa’id b. Ḥamad. op. cit. p. 40.

(20) Ibid. p. 43.

(21) Ibid. p. 42.

(22) Ibid. p. 42.

(23) Oral communication to the writer.


(25) Kelly, Britain. p. 412; Wilson, The Persian Gulf p. 214 ; for further information about the slave trade and their treatment in the West see:

- Goodell, W. Slavery and Anti slavery.

(26) Kelly, Britain. p. 412.

(27) (R.O.I) pp. 691f for both Arabic and English versions.

(28) (R.O.I) pp. 712f for both Arabic and English versions.

(29) (R.O.I) pp. 740f for both Arabic and English versions.

(30) Jaylah is a village located in Wāḍī B. Jābir, the branch of Wāḍī Samā’il.

(31) (R.O. III) pp. 120f for both Arabic and English versions.

(32) (R.O. III) pp. 123f for both Arabic and English versions.

(33) For more information see Saldanha, Précis on Slave Trade 1873-1905.


(35) Lorimer, op. cit. vol. iv p. 2512.

(36) Bid. pp. 2512f.

(37) (Adm. R. 1890-1919).

(38) Kelly, Britain. p. 412; Wilson, The Persian Gulf p. 214 ; for further information about the slave trade and their treatment in the West see:

- Goodell, W. Slavery and Anti slavery.

(39) Kelly, Britain. p. 412.

(40) Bannerman, Unity. p. 231.
For further information about the Brussels conference see F.O. 428/2: al-Mousawi, A History, pp. 252-64.


Jad, M. op.cit. p. 171.


F.O.428/9

al-Mousawi, op.cit. pp. 239-86.

Landen, op.cit. p.392.

Murphy, Soldiers, p. 136.


al-Mashhadānī, Khalīl ibn Imām, al-Ta'awwurāt al-Sīyāsīyyah fi 'Umān, p. 52.


(Adm. R. 1911) p. 81.


Peterson, "The revival of the Ibadhī Imamate" pp. 166f.

For further information about Sh. al-Sālimī, see: his Tuhfat al-A'yan vol. II; his Jawahir al-Nizām; al-Sālimī (his son) Nahdat al-A'yan; Ubaydli, A, "Abdullah al-Sālimi's role in the Ibadhī revival (1913-29)", Proceedings BRISMES, (10-13 July 1988).
CHAPTER 111

THE IMAM'S ELECTION AND HIS POLICY PROGRAMME

The main themes to be discussed in this chapter are the manner in which the Imam was elected, whether he in fact met the required qualifications for the Imamate, the private and public allegiance (bay'ah) and the Imam's aims and policy programme as derived from his election speech and exchange of correspondence between him and others with the purpose of rallying support for the Imamate. To begin with, however, it is necessary to understand the composition of the Imamate among the Ibádiyyah, as well as the types and qualifications of the Imam, and the role of the 'ulamá'.

1) Composition of the Imamate:

"Imamate" means a legitimate Islamic government inspired by the Qur'án and the Ḥadíth. It aims at individual happiness and the creation of an atmosphere in which individuals can live in accord with God’s commands (1).

The establishment of an Imamate was a matter of dispute. Al-Shahrastání notes that “the great dissension within the Islamic community (ummah) was in regard to the nature of the Imamate. At no time have the Muslims fought each other more regarding the implementation of any Islamic precept than over on the Imamate” (2). In the same way Abú Músá al-’Ash'arí says that “after the death of the Prophet, the Muslims differed in many respects. ... They divided into several groups with different religious ideas. ... after the death of Prophet, the first dispute among Muslims was about the Imamate” (3).

The dissension was focused on two main arguments: the first was that the Imamate is an obligation on the ummah. If they do not establish an Imamate, they will be held responsible to God (4). The second argument was that the Imamate is permissible (mubádh). In this case, Muslims are not subject to God’s punishment (5).

Both arguments have valid reasons in their support. In support of the first it is argued that (a) the Companions agreed on the establishment of an Imamate after the death of the Prophet; (b) the ummah needed someone to look after its social, economic and
political affairs. This can only be achieved through the legitimate election of an Imam. The second view was that the Imamate was not obligatory, but depended on peoples' needs in their transactions. Therefore, if people help each other and act according to their religious and political duties, they may not need any ruler (6). In his comment on this argument Ibn Khaldún points out that:

"the reason why they adopted such an opinion was that they (attempted to) escape the royal authority and its overbearing, domineering, and worldly ways. They had seen that the religious law was full of censure and blame for such things and for the people who practised them, and that it encouraged the desire to abolish them" (7).

The Ibádiyyah adopted the first viewpoint, which is the view of all Muslims, except some in the Mu'tazilite school and the Khárijites. According to al-Ṣá'íghi, the Imamate is an obligation (fard) (8). In the same sense, Abú al-Mú'thir says: "the Imamate is a part of God’s religion and it is a right which he exacts from his people" (9).

a) Types of Imamate

Owing to the adverse conditions under which the Ibádiyyah developed, two kinds of Imamate arose: those of kitmán (concealment), and zuhúr (appearance). There were also two other types of Imamate which might occur within this attenuating scheme: Imamate ḏifá' and Imamate ṣhirḍa. In the following we shall discuss each of them.

i. Imamate of Kitmán

We have already discussed (ch. I. 2.a), the reasons which led to the emergence of the Ibádiyyah in Basrah. This stage was called the Imamate of kitmán, because the Ibádiyyah was in a weak position. There are two preconditions for this type of Imamate: first, when the Ibádiyyah is in a weak position, and second, when it is under the control of tyrants or non-Ibádí rule (10). In this case Ibádí activities have to be limited to teaching and learning. Religious punishments cease, and taqiyah may be practised (11).

More specifically, the role of the Imams would be concentrated on teaching, guidance, orientation, organisation of the da’wah, collection of zakát, and issuing fatwas. In this stage there is no election of an Imam. But the Imam’s scholarly and leadership qualities allow him to act as head of the movement by his example. In case of suffering actual physical attack by an enemy, the Ibádiyyah must elect an Imam ḏifá’, but this Imamate ends with the end of the danger (12).
ii. The Imamate of Zuhûr (The full realization of an Ibâdî state)

The Imamate of the zuhûr is the Ibâdî goal. This means the establishment of an Islamic government according to the Qur'ân and the Sunnah. According to Ibâdî teaching “the Imamate of zuhûr is essential to Islamic government” (13). The Ibâdîyyah managed to establish zuhûr in Yemen (129/747), in Oman (132/749) and in Algeria (160/776). Subsequently the Imamate continued to exist in Oman as we have already seen (14). The Imam of this Imamate has been considered as an Imam zuhûr (15).

iii. Imam difâ‘ and Imam shirâ‘

When the Ibâdîyyah faces an enemy, Ibâdis are supposed to elect an Imam difâ‘ to defend the Imamate. He must be a learned man of high military capability. During the war period, he enjoys all the authority of an Imam zuhûr (16).

This kind of Imamate continues to exist until the end of the emergency. In case of success, the Imamate takes the name of Imamate of zuhûr, and an Imam difâ‘ can be re-elected as an Imam zuhûr. In the case of failure, the Imam difâ‘ reverts to the kitmán situation (17). The shirâ‘ Imamate has been explained by Abú al-‘Abbás Aḥmad b. Muḥammad b. Bakr in the following terms:

“The shirâ‘ agree that they sell themselves desiring God’s pleasure, and show no claim for ruling, but to end tyranny and revive righteousness. They must not revolt with less than forty men, they can complete the number with a woman. If their intention was not to return before ending falsity, they, therefore, must not return to their homes unless they ended falsehood or died. If they went out with the intention to return if they wanted they can return at any time. Their homes are their swords, so if they return to their original homes for any purpose, they must pray short prayers (qasr) and pray complete prayers during their revolt, even through they were far away from their original homes” (18).

The first person who was imam shirâ‘ was Abú Bilál Mirdás as a reaction to the injustice of ‘Ubayd Allah b. Ziyád (19).

b) Election of Imam

i. Qualifications of the Imam

An Imam kitmán does not need to be elected. His scientific and leadership capabilities qualify him to be Imam. His duties will focus on orientation, education, and giving fatwas. In other types of Imamate, the Imam must be elected according to conditions accepted by all Muslims. However, they rejected membership of Quraysh as
an essential condition (20). For the Ibâdiyyah, any Muslim can be Imam if he fulfills the following conditions, as explained by al-Šá‘ighf:

"The Imam must be a mature male of outstanding intelligence, not blind, deaf, senile, nor lacking limbs which would prevent him from taking part in the obligation of Jihâd, nor should he be a eunuch or emasculated. He must not be mad, nor feeble-minded, nor should he be envious, cowardly, mean, a liar, nor a man who fails to keep promises and agreements, nor possess any other characteristic that causes concern. He must be a man of great learning for without learning and perception how can he carry out his duties and interpret the laws aright and ensure that his subordinates do so?" (21).

The Ibâdiyyah agree with other Islamic sects in allowing the Imamate of a candidate preferred by the community over one who may have a superior theoretical claim. For the Ibâdi, there ought to be no more than one Imam in the one country at a time (22).

The process of election should be organized as expressed by al-Šá‘ighf:

"Upon the election to the Imamate of an Imam, at which ceremony are present the leading 'ulama', the most esteemed takes the Imam’s right hand and says: ‘We set you forward as Imam over ourselves and the Muslims provided you judge by Qur’ân and the Sunnah of His Prophet. peace be upon Him, and provided you order by what is universally recognized, prohibiting the disallowed and making evident the religion of God whom you worship, demanding what you find necessary for that purpose. If the Imam assents, the oath of allegiance is then required whereupon the election is confirmed. This declaration is for a difâ‘i Imam; if he is to be a shirâ‘ Imam the clause, ‘provided you Jihâd for the cause of God’ is added. Then all present, one by one, swear allegiance and they place the kummah on his head and the seal in his hand. The Khatib then pronounces the validity of the oath of allegiance and after the prescribed prayers, the Takbîr and Ta‘âkid says ‘No judgment/ government except God’s and no judgment by him who judges other than by what God has revealed; no obedience to him who revolts against God; there is no judgment except God’s without reserve and no disobedience to God’" (23).

If the election occurs in this way Muslims have the right to depose their Imam (24), but before doing so they must demand from him an explanation (‘udhr) and then ask him to formally repent (tawbah). If he does not, then it is the duty of Muslims to abandon him, and if necessary fight against him. For the Ibâdiyyah, there are three general conditions under which an Imam can be removed from his Imamate: mental and physical reasons; committing of sins; and the omission of his responsibility towards his followers. The ummah should respect and obey their Imam and support him (25).

The wilâyah and barâ’ah define the relationship between the ruler and ruled. In this context Muḥammad b. Músà al-Kindî says that “the wilâyah and barâ’ah are obligations in the Qur’ân. There is no excuse for a Muslim to ignore them” (26). The wilâyah appears in Ibâdi literature in several meanings, among which are the following:
(a) obligation to carry out God's command, (b) to love all Muslims who believe in God with heart and tongue (27).

The concept of *bard'ah* means the converse of *wilayah*. More specifically the terms *wilayah* and *bard'ah* were used by Ibadi scholars to express the attitude of believers towards their Muslim supporters and towards the unbelievers.

Between those two concepts is the concept of *wuquf*, which means that when a person is not qualified for *wilayah* or *bard'ah*, his situation may be considered as neutral. *wilayah* and *bard'ah* created a split not only between them and their opponents, but also among themselves. This conflict was inherited by following generations and led them to establish more than one Imamate at the same time.

ii. The role of the 'ulamâ'

There are two means by which the Imam can be installed: (a) by a recommendation from the previous Imam; (b) by "those who can loose and bind" (*Ahl al-Hall wa al-'Aqd*) (28). There is another argument that "the installation of the Imam can be by the resident 'ulamâ', and there is no quorum for such a decision" (29), but al-Mawardi insists that it is not possible to take a decision with less than five 'ulamâ' (30). Some, however, have argued that the number of 'ulamâ' should be no less than forty (31). The Ibâdiyyah agrees as regards the *Ahl al-Hall wa al-'Aqd*, but insisted that the decision should be taken by at least six 'ulamâ' (32).

The important prerogatives which the 'ulamâ' have enjoyed in Oman consist in their considerable legitimate power, through which they have controlled both politicians and people, to the extent that they have been able to depose Imams (33).

2) Imam Sâlim's Election

This section depends not only on written accounts but also on verbal accounts of the election given to the present writer by persons close to the participants, and as such they express a wide variety of opinions connected with the Imam's election, and his personal qualities.

The 'ulamâ' and leaders discussed for three days in Jumádá II, 3131, the establishment of the Imamate in Tanúf (34). Among those who attended this meeting
were Sh. Ḥimyar and the sons of Sh. Hilál b. Záhir b. Saʿíd al-Hináʿí, Muḥammad, ʿAbdalláh, ʿAlf and Khálíd, and his grandsons, Záhir b. Ḥußn b. Hilál b. Záhir and Sálim and Suʿúd b. Badr b. Hilál b. Záhir. Sh. Hilál was a descendant of Sh. Khalaf b. Muḥárak al-Hináʿí, after whom the Hináwí faction was named following his death in 1140/1728. Sh. Hilál became the leader of his tribe following the death of his cousin Sh. Saʿíd b. Muḥammad b. Saʿíd, and a commander of ʿWálf of Nazwá, Sd. Ḥamad b. Sayf b. ʿĀmir b. Khalfán al-Bú Saʿíd. In the 1880s he became the ruler of Nazwá and succeeded in expelling its ʿWálf who moved to Muscat where he stayed until his death in the early years of 1890s (35). In 1312/1894 Sh. Hilál was killed by the son of the former ʿWálf of Nazwá, Sayf b. Ḥamad b. Sayf who took control of Nazwá, and the sons of Hilál went back to their village, Bilád Sayt (36).

During their three-days meeting the ʿulamá' and leaders did not reach any agreement and were divided into those who supported the re-establishment of the Imamate and those who opposed it. The latter group argued that the political situation was not favourable because the Sultan's forces were surrounding them and they lacked the support of most of the Hináwí tribes, except the sons of Sh. Hilál and their adherents. They were more weakened by the fact Sh. Májid b. Khamís b. Ráshid al-ʿAbrí (1252/1836-1346/1927) and Sh. Muḥanná b. Ḥamad b. Muḥsin al-ʿAbrí, (1289/1872-1342/1923) the leader of the tribe of ʿAbriyyín, went back on their promise to attend the meeting. They put forward as excuses the prevailing conditions and the fear of failure (37).

The re-establishment of the Imamate needed more than just the support of the ʿulamá’. It needed in addition the total support and commitment of the tribes to make it viable and give it effect (38). In addition, Sh. Ḥimyar’s adherents advised that this was not an easy matter and pointed out that he did not have the support of any of the other leaders; moreover, Sh. al-Sálimí was a poor man with no following (39). However, Sh. al-Sálimí was able to set the fears of Sh. Ḥimyar at rest and to persuade him to rejoin the meeting after a long discussion (40).
In the afternoon of 12th Jumadā II, 1331, Sh. al-Sālimī asked those attending the meeting to choose one of the company as Imam, and he expressed his opinion that the choice of Imam should be confined to one of four men, who were:

(c) Sh. Abū Zayd ‘Abdallāh b. Muḥammad al-Riyanī (1301/1883-4-1364/1944)
(d) Sh. Sālim b. Rāshid b. Sulaymān al-Kharūsī (1301/1883-4-1338/1920)

Sh. Muḥammad and Sd. Hilāl did not, however, attend the meeting. The former was a grandson of a notable leader of the ‘ulama’, Sh. Saʿīd b. Khalfān al-Khalīlī, who had played a prominent role in the election of Sd. ‘Azzān in 1868. His father, ‘Abdallāh b. Saʿīd (1278/1861-1332/1914), was the leader of the B. Ruwāhah, and he enjoyed great respect in Wādī Samā’il over the Hināwī faction in their region. He was strongly opposed to the Imamate revival on the one hand because he would lose his position, and on the other, because the Imamate was supported by Sh. Ḥīmyar, who was an enemy to Sh. ‘Abdallāh. He was attacked by the poet of his tribe (Abū Muslim Nāṣir b. Sālim al-Ruwāhī), and he decided to live with the Sultan, but he met his death in an accident in Wādī al-Ḥawāsīn in Jumadā II, 1332. For this reason it was decided not to nominate his son Sh. Muḥammad.

Sd. Hilāl b. ‘Alī was a descendant of the Imam Saʿīd b. Imam Aḥmad, the founder of the Āl Bū Saʿīdī dynasty. He lived in Rustāq and was well-known for his generosity, fairness and humility (41). The status of Sh. Hilāl was one of the factors which favoured his nomination for the position of Imam, but his absence from the meeting reduced his chances of being elected.

The third person, Abū Zayd ‘Abdallāh al-Riyanī, was known for being a thrifty and harsh ruler and this united some of the ‘ulama’ against him later when he was acting as a Wālī and Qāḍī for Imam Sālim b. Rāshid and the Imam’s successor in Bahā. Moreover, he was from the tribe of Sh. Ḥīmyar, and these were all reasons for his not being elected Imam. Some ‘ulama’, indeed, thought that he was not a serious candidate at all and that the third candidate should be Sh. Āmīr al-Mālikī. The present writer
discussed this question with some of the 'ulamā', some of whom maintained that Sh. 'Āmir was in fact the third contender in the election. The meeting, however, elected Sh. Sālim b. Rāshid al-Kharūşí for a number of reasons which will be discussed below.

Unlike his predecessor's case, the election of the Imam Sālim of 1331/1913 took place peacefully and without staging a revolt against the Sultan. This Imamate was distinguished by the following features: only once before in the history of the Imamate in Oman had a bay'ah taken in this way, viz. the bay'ah of Nāṣir b. Murshid 1034/1624. Secondly, the 'ulamā' had not elected a member of the family of the ruler as their Imam in order to give them more unity, so as not to repeat what they had done in the case of the Imamate of 1868 (when they had elected Sd. 'Azzān b. Qays from the ruling family, whose rule had lasted only three years). Thirdly, this new Imamate relied heavily on the support of the Ghāfīrī faction under the leadership of Sh. Himyar. Fourthly, it constituted a revival of the role of the B. Kharūş (which had declined in importance from the first half of the 16th century) in the Imamate. It may also be noted that election was unusual in that it gave the 'ulamā' an opportunity to deliberate and exchange views freely before electing an Imam.

a) The reasons for election

The 'ulamā' and the leading men regarded as Ahl al-Hallwa al-'Aqd having failed to agree on whether to re-establish the Imamate or not, were asked directly by Sh. al-Sālimī to elect one of their number, and they accordingly chose Sh. Sālim b. Rāshid al-Kharūşí. The movement for the revival of the Imamate had started, as seen above, as a reaction to the policies of the Sultan, which were in general perceived as being contrary to the traditional interpretation of the Shart'ah. It is therefore not surprising that the meeting of the 'ulamā' who assembled to elect the Imam should have settled their choice on a figure who was prominently qualified to represent the values of the Shart'ah and the attitudes of the 'ulamā', and who moreover came from a family historically associated with the office of Imam.

In spite of some disagreement in the accounts of the election gathering, it is clear that narrow motives of tribal politics and personal interests were not reasons for the
election of Sh. Sálim, nor indeed was the desire for effective military leader among the motives of his electors.

Imam Sálim was seen as possessing all the Shurút al-Imam, or "conditions for the Imam" as these were traditionally understood (42). He was learned in religion and had spent his life in study, but he lacked experience in religious office which in this case was very important, because later this was used as an argument by his opponents that his learning was limited. This accusation is incorrect and irrelevant because he appointed competent advisers to help him in different fields (43), since the Imam was involved in the administrative business of the country economically, administratively, and financially, and he delegated the office of Muftí and religious laws to the judges. Moreover, he depended on consultation, and never took a decision without the approval of the 'ulamá', which had been one of the conditions of the election contract (44).

The second qualification of Imam Sálim was his probity. He had been known for his uprightness and moral integrity since he was a child. There are a number of accounts which are evidence of this (45), and these qualities were conspicuous throughout his rule.

The third requirement, that the Imam should have the ability "to carry out the punishments fixed by law and to go to war... and be able to assume responsibility for getting people to go to war" (46), was not in question, despite the fact that Imam Sálim lacked leadership experience. His knowledge of religion, the lives of the Companions of the Prophet and the history of Oman, gave him moral authority to shoulder the responsibilities of the leadership.

The fourth and last qualification, that of complete physical soundness and health, was not in question. Beside these formal qualifications he enjoyed the advantage of being a student and son-in-law of Sh. al-Sálimí, and he was a member of the B. Kharús, who had provided many Imams during earlier times.

In addition, it should be noted that there was a popular feeling in Imam Sálim's favour, which seems to have been encouraged by a story related by his brother Násir. This concerned a dream of Imam Sálim in which he had been greeted with the words "al-Salám 'alayka yd 'Imám al-Muslimín!", and which was repeated in a similar form in a
day time vision. Nasir had said to his brother that if this were true it should be made public, and it was in fact being widely circulated among people shortly afterwards (47).

b) The bay'ah al-khassah and the bay'ah al-'ammah

This section depends on the detailed account given by Sh. Muhammad al-Salimí, who was one of the persons who attended the swearing of allegiance to Imam Salim, together with his father Sh. al-Salimí, who was the moving spirit behind the meeting in Jumadá II, 1331 and which is included in his book Nahdat al-A'yan (48).

As described above, the 'ulamá' had chosen Salim b. Rashid as an Imam, but the eyewitness Sh. Muhammad al-Salimí, makes it clear that Imam Salim did not immediately accept this nomination, and that he refused it on the grounds that he was not fit to bear the responsibilities of the office, and that ordinary people were not ready for the full application of the provisions of the Shari'ah and the jihād. A heated debate and discussions then followed between the 'ulamá' and Imam Salim on the subject of his Imamate, but Salim refused to accept their nomination. He told them "I did not come here to be elected, but to elect whoever you want to elect as an Imam". The 'ulamá' on their part insisted on their demand and they refused to accept Salim's excuses. Sh. al-Salimí asked the 'ulamá' to bring Salim to the front, but he refused and he was then carried by force to the Shaykh (who was blind) and he tried to persuade him to accept the nomination on the grounds that all the ummah had agreed that he should be elected Imam, and he warned him that a refusal on his part would split the unity of the ummah, and that his punishment according to Islamic law would be death. Under this pressure, it appears that Imam Salim finally agreed to their demand, but on certain conditions, which Sh. al-Salimí refused to accept (49). In the tense circumstances of the meeting, Sh. al-Salimí issued a fatwâ that Imam Salim should be put to death (50), and even appointed one of his students, Abú Zayd 'Abdalláh al-Riyámi, to carry out the execution. At this point, Imam Salim appealed to the gathering, who, however, unanimously supported the Shaykh, and with tears in his eyes he submitted to the general will (51). Sh. Muhammad al-Salimí comments on Imam Salim's refusal by saying that he was probably afraid of not being able to carry out the responsibilities of the Imamate in a proper way and of being accused of being a failure. He states that the Imam Salim now put forward two
other conditions for his accepting election: first that he should be allowed to perform the Pilgrimage, and secondly that he should be allowed to visit his mother in his own village, and these were accepted.

Thus, before sunset on 12th Jumádá II, Imam Sálim was elected, and the first to give his allegiance after Sh. al-Sálimí was Sh. ‘Ámir b. Khamís al-Málikí, who placed the *kumma*h on his head and the signet-ring on his finger, according to Ibádí tradition. The terms of the contract of the *bay’ah* according to Sh. Muḥammad al-Sálimí were as following:

"We have given you our allegiance on condition that you obey God and His Prophet and that you work for the good of the people and against evil, and undertake the *jihád*, and that you pursue no course of action without consulting the *‘ulamá‘*. We have given you our allegiance to carry out God’s teaching, to establish the *Hudád*, to collect taxes, to oversee the Friday prayer, to assist the week and to aid the needy" (52).

Sh. ‘Ámir al-Málikí was followed by Abú Zayd ‘Abdalláh al-Riyámi in pledging allegiance and hoisting the white flag of the Imamate. Then the following people pledge their allegiance:

(1) Sh. Muḥammad b. ‘Abdalláh b. Ḥumayd al-Sálimí
(2) Sh. ‘Abdalláh b. Ráshíd b. Šáliḥ al-Háshimí
(5) Sh. ‘Ámir b. ‘Alí al- al-Ḥabsí
(6) Sh. Muḥammad b. Sálim b. Záhir al-Ruqayshí
(7) Sh. Ḥamad b. Musallam b. ‘Ubayd al-Ḥajrí
(8) Sh. Ḥimyar b. Nášir b. Sayf al-Nabhání
(10) Sh.‘Abdalláh b. Hilál b. Záhir al-Hiná’í

The form of allegiance (*bay’ah*) which was given was called *al-bay’ah al-kháṣṣah* which is that form which is carried out by a group of leading personalities. Sh.
Muhammad al-Salimi did not mention whether his father Sh. al-Salimi had pledged his allegiance to the Imam or not. He may simply have forgotten, or more probably his father was exempted because he was blind. Sh. al-Salimi had in fact given his allegiance to the Imam wholeheartedly, since he had spent most of his life struggling to revive the Imamate.

Sh. al-Salimi then approached Sh. Himyar to ask him not to betray him and to swear to support the Imamate. He also did the same thing with the sons of Sh. Hilál b. Zāhir, and then Sh. 'Āmir b. Khamīs al-Mālikī gave a speech followed by the Imam. They were followed by Sh. Abū Zayd ‘Abdallāh al-Riyāmī. Then the flags of the Imamate were hoisted and guns were fired announcing the revival of the Imamate. In the following day ordinary people gave their allegiance (bay'at al-'āmmah) to the Imam.

According to some authorities the bay'ah did not take place in the way just described (53). They describe the bay'ah as having been agreed between Sh. al-Salimi, Imam Sālim al-Kharūṣī, and Sh. Himyar, because they believe erroneously that Imam Sālim al-Kharūṣī represented a wholly independent party. However, the account given here is more likely to be correct, since it is supported by the local sources (54).

As mentioned above, an Ibāḍī Imamate may take only one of four forms. The question was put to Sh. al-Salimi and Sh.'Āmir al-Mālikī as to which category was the Imamate of Sālim, and their answer was that this Imamate was like that of the two Caliphs'Abū Bakr and ‘Umar b. al-Khaṭṭāb, i.e. Imamate zuhur.

One of the terms of the bay'ah contract was the requirement that the Imam should be a shirā' Imam because of the presence of the word "jihād" in the election contract. Discussing this point al-Sā'ighī explains that "if he (Imam) is to be a shirā' Imam, the stipulation that he (wages) jihād for the cause of God" (55) should be stated in the contract.

We have already referred to the statement of Sh. al-Salimi that such a condition implies a weak Imamate. In the contract of the bay'ah of Imam Sālim it is laid down that "...you pursue no course of action without consulting the 'ulamā'," and Sh. al-Salimi claims that this means that the Imamate of Sd. 'Azzān was a weak one, the point being that such a stipulation limits the freedom of action of the Imam owing to the various
demands and pressures of the 'ulamā'. Al-Darjīnī states that the Ibāḍī 'ulamā' in North Africa had sought the opinion of the Ibāḍī 'ulamā' in Oman about the stipulation imposed by Yazīd b. Fandīn (56) on Imam ‘Abd al-Wahhab b. ‘Abd al-Rahmān b. Rustum (171-190 A.H.), that he should do nothing without consulting the Shūrā council. The reply of the 'ulamā' in Oman to this question was that “this was not part of the Muslim tradition and that the Imamate is valid but the stipulation is invalid” (57). Imam Sālim’s contract states that, “I give you allegiance on the condition prescribed in the Qur’ān and the Sunnah of the Prophet Muḥammad”, but it imposes no other check upon the Imam other than obedience to the Sharī‘ah (ī Shurāt ‘alá al-Imam). Does this mean that the Imamate of Imam Sālim was a weak one?. The answer is definitely in the negative, if it is measured by its achievements. The present writer put this question to the ‘ulamā’ and others in Oman and from their answers and taking into account the efforts of Imam Sālim in establishing the Imamate during his rule of seven years, it is evident that this Imamate was not a weak one. On the contrary, the stability which his successor enjoyed was the result of the efforts of Imam Sālim.

It should be stressed that Imam Sālim’s decisions were taken in consultation with the ‘ulamā’. This collective decision-making was one of the main reasons which helped the Imamate to survive for over forty years. In this, it contrasted with the Imamate of Sh. ‘Azzān, which lasted for nearly three years, largely because it was based on the authority of one person, Sh. Sa‘īd b. Khalfān al-Khalīlī. This is one of the reasons why Sh. al-Sālimī described it as a ‘weak Imamate’ because of the stipulation that the Imam should not take any action without consulting the ‘ulamā’. Another factor was that in 1913 the Imamate had ceased to exist in Oman for over forty years and the people were not used to the rule of the sharī‘ah, which made it difficult for the Imam to rule according to this law.

3) Imam Sālim’s Aims and Programme

We have shown that the reasons which called for a revival of the Imamate, included the state of internal instability in Oman and the intensification of conflicts between the tribes, in addition to the Sultan’s complete submission to external pressures, and foreign interventions in Omani affairs such as the abolition of the slave trade, the
restrictions on arms' sales and the supervision of Omani ships. All of these factors combined to spur the call for a re-establishment of the Imamate.

The 'ulamā' in reaction, called for a return of the Imamate in order to deal with these problems. The final aims which the Imamate was expected to achieve were to work for the unity of the Omanis, to stop the fighting and internal conflicts between the tribes and to alleviate the oppression which they suffered at the hands of the Sultan's Wālis. All of these objectives would have been difficult to achieve unless the Sultan had been removed from power in the first place and replaced by a new leadership, free from tribal, political and religious fanaticism, so that it could then unite all the Omanis.

In this section, we will discuss the Imam's future plan as expressed in his electoral speech and through the speeches of his assistants, some of whom held the real reins of power among the people. We also come to know of his future plans through his correspondence with the chiefs of the tribes and others. It is noted that in fact the Imam lacked the necessary experience in matters of rule and political administration and in political and religious knowledge. This is because he had not held political or administrative roles, or official, or jurisdictional posts before. It is understandable, therefore, that he entrusted the administration of such matters as the preparation of his speeches, correspondence and other matters to those of his assistants who had knowledge about them. Therefore, it is evident that there was a true democratic system of governance, which guarded against ruling single-handedly, which often leads to authoritarian and dictatorial rule.

a) The Imam's election speech

After having received the allegiance of the people, Imam Sālim rose to deliver a speech for the people who came to congratulate him on his ascendancy to the Imamate. He delivered a short religious extempore speech in front of the audience, the tenor of which was that he demanded people's loyalty to God, the Prophet and the Imam (58). He said nothing about his future plans or his attitude towards his opponents, or of his intentions regarding a jihād. His address was in fact a sermon of a time-honoured kind.

The Imam stressed a number of important issues in his speech. He emphasized the importance of unity among all the Omanis, and exhorted them against the bad effects
of fragmentation and social strife. He also urged them to reject factionalism and tribalism, and advised them to adhere to the principles of Islam. He called on them to perform good deeds of charity and compassion, and to uphold the values of social equity through giving alms and zakát out of their wealth. He also stressed the importance of referring their disputes to religious courts, and not to take the law in their hands.

It is clear from the Imam's speech that his aim was to prepare the people psychologically to accept the principles of the Imamate. He laid emphasis on the issue of unity for the sake of cooperation, and the rejection of tribal factionalism which he saw as the real factor which devastated the Omani society. This is an undeniable truth, so much so that the hot issues in Oman and their far-reaching negative consequences can be rightly attributed to the rise of tribal politics and factionalism. Therefore, in order for the Omani society to rid itself of these ills, the Imam urged them to care for the poor and the needy, and to work for beneficence and social equity. And in a bid to foster this ideal, we see that the Imam subsequently apportioned a share of the zakát to be given out to the poor and needy in the country.

It is possible that because the Imam did not clearly set out the lines of his future policy in his first speech in front of the people, he seemed content to adopt what was contained in the speech of Sh. 'Ámir al-Málíkí before him, and the speech of Sh. Abú Zayd after him. By this, it seems, he wanted to give the opportunity for Ahl al-Ḥall wa al-'Aqd to share in his future plans.

b) Speeches of other important 'Álims

The importance of the 'ulamá' and chiefs of tribes was second only to that of the Imam. These were called Ahl al-Ḥall wa al-'Aqd who had elected Imam Sálim. Due to the power and influence of Ahl al-Ḥall wa al-'Aqd, the Imam gave the opportunity for two of the most influential figures who stood at the top of the hierarchy among the religious 'ulamá' in Oman, after Sh. Abdalláh al-Sálimí. These two figures were Sh. 'Ámir b. Khamís b. Mas‘úd al-Málíkí, and Sh. Abú Zayd 'Abdalláh b. Muhammad b. Ruzayq al-Riyámí, to whom reference has already been made, regarding their candidature for the Imamate leadership and the reasons which led to their unelectability.
Sh. 'Amir al-Málikí (1280/1863-1346/1927), was born in Wádí B. Khálid in al-Sharqíyyah Province, and died in Nazwà, the capital of the Imamate. He was an important and influential figure among the ‘ulama’. He had written several books in Islamic law. He was considered the second man after Sh. ‘Abdalláh al-Sálimf, and when the latter died, Sh. al-Málikí became president of the judiciary in the rein of Imam Sálim as well as in the rein of Imam Muhammad b. ‘Abdalláh al-Khálífí. He used to be deputy to both Imam Sálim and Imam Muhammad in Nazwà during their absence (59).

Shortly after the declaring of allegiance, Sh. ‘Amir al-Málikí delivered a rousing speech in which he congratulated those assembled to revive the Imamate which had lapsed for forty years, and urged them henceforth to obey the orders of the Imam. The main points of the speech were as follows (60): God had given the Muslims two gifts: the message of Prophet and a just Imam. Next, they now had a chance to achieve unity. They should support the Imam’s call to jihád. Finally he emphasized the benefits unity would bring.

Thus, Sh. ‘Amir laid down a general foundation for the new regime, which would undoubtedly require the support and sacrifice of the people. He did not neglect to warn the people of the consequences of laziness, deceit, going back on the bay’áh or rebelling against the Imam.

The second notable personality was Sh. Abú Zayd ‘Abdalláh b. Muhammad al-Ríyámi (1300/1883-1364/1944), who was born in Izkí and died in Bahlá. He belonged to the B. Ráshid, the part of the B. Riyám. Sh. Abú Zayd al-Ríyámi, like Sh. al-Málikí was also one of the influential figures among the ‘ulama’. He lived in Izkí, where he taught and held the post of a Qádíf on religious jurisdiction. He spent part of his life as a student to Sh. al-Sálimf. He was considered one of the prominent ‘ulama’ during this period. He had written a number of books on Islamic jurisdiction. He assumed the office of Imam’s Qádíf in Izkí, from where he was transferred in 1335/1917, to be the Wálí and Qádíf to the Bahlá. He continued in office for thirty years (61).

Sh. Abú Zayd gave a speech in which he indicated the main features of the future policy of the Imamate and called for a jihád against Sd. Faysal b. Turkí, the Sultan of Muscat and Oman (62). He urged the audience to take part in this jihád, enumerating its
benefits to their society and its rewards in the next life. He warned his audience against disunity and conflict, citing the disagreement between the Ghafiri and Hinawi factions in Oman and emphasizing that this was an act of Satan.

These speeches all emphasized the importance of the Imamate and the main aim of its revival, viz., the unity of Oman under one leadership and the putting aside of disagreements between the tribes, something which the Sultan had failed to bring about. Above all, the foremost objective of the Imamate was the establishment of Islamic law and the revival of Islamic traditions and values.

After the speeches were finished came the turn of the poets, who congratulated Imam Salim in their poems; others who had not had the chance to recite their poems in person had sent them to him in written form. These poems were later published in a book called Tahani al-Imam Salim b. Rashid al-Kharusi by Sh. Nasir b. Sulayman al-Lamki in Zanzibar in 1332/1914 (63).

One scribe had described the Imamate as "a pure religious revolution to re-establish the Ibad tradition but there was a nationalist current embodied in it" (62). He does not explain the nature of the nationalist movement nor against whom it was directed. It is well known that this revolution was against an Arab Muslim ruler of Omani descent. Oman was not under the occupation of a foreign power and there were no foreign troops on Omani soil at that time. One may conclude from a letter by Imam Salim to the PAM dated 9th Sha'ban, 1331/14th July, 1913 that the animosity was between the Omanis and their Sultan. In his letter Imam Salim states:

"As far as, Sd. Fayyal, [is concerned] the 'ulamâ' have risen against, [him] often times after his deprivation and deposition [from the Imamate]. And he refused to resign and has kept his seat this long time past by the road of violence and wrath and the Muslims were displeased with his Sultanate and his acts and you are a company of this Government (Britain). It is incumbent on you to refrain from the affairs of the Muslims, and it is necessary for you that you should not do us injury" (65).

This shows without any shadow of doubt that the animosity was not directed against a foreigner, but was against Sd. Fayyal, demanding his removal as their Sultan; they had offered to make him Imam, but he refused. This clearly shows that this Imamate was not in any way a nationalist movement.
Qásim goes on to say that Imam Sálim and the ‘ulamá‘ primarily wanted to establish an Ibádí Imamate on lines similar to those of the Imamate of ‘Azzán, that would have included greater Oman with its coastal and interior regions (66). A cursory look at this view reveals that Qásim contradicts himself in saying at one moment that the movement was not religious, and then that the main objective was to establish an Ibádí Imamate.

Another writer claims that the revival of the Imamate did not mean the establishment of another state inland, but it was no more than a tribal coalition, because the main tribal leaders were personal allies of Imam Sálim rather than of his followers (67). It must be remembered, however, that the main purpose of the Imamate revival was the establishment of justice according to Islamic laws and the revival of Islamic traditions. The Imamate was established on an ambiguous basis with the intention of forming a fully fledged state, especially since Qásim clearly states that Imam Sálim and the ‘ulamá‘ wanted to establish an Imamate that would include greater Oman. Moreover, the correspondence between the Imam and others clearly point to this and not to a tribal coalition.

The presence of strong tribal leaders as allies of the Imam had prevented the imposition of central authority upon the tribes and had helped to preserve the Omani identity from foreign influence. These leaders would be a valuable support to the Imamate as long as they remained loyal to the Imam, obeyed his orders and paid their zakát and that of their followers. The Imamate needs group feeling, at least in the early stage of its establishment, when it is in need of financial and military assistance.

It is important, therefore, to understand the attitude of these leaders towards the Imam, whether they were allies (ḥulafá‘) or merely followers (atbá‘). The following are the names of the main leaders during the Imamate of Imam Sálim (1913-1920):

1. Sh. Ḥimyar b. Násaír al-Nabhání (d.1338/1920)
2. The sons of Sh. Hilál b. Záhir al-Hiná‘f
3. Sh. Muhanná b. Ḥamad al-‘Abrí (d.1342/1924)
4. Sh. Násaír b. Ḥumayd al-Gháfírí (d. 1348/1928-9)
5. Sh. ‘Isá b. Šáliḥ al-Ḥárithí (d. 1365/1942)
All these persons gave their allegiance to Imam Sálim and declared their support for him, except Sh. Nášir b. Ḥumayd al-Gháfrí and Sd. Aḥmad b. Ibráhím al-Bú Sa‘ídí, who only gave their allegiance and did not join his military operations. In return, the Imam allowed them to rule their territories in the customary way under his leadership and when Sh. Nášir al-Gháfrí and Sd. Aḥmad b. Ibráhím behaved unreasonably and without consultation, he ordered his troops to depose them from their position.

If those leaders had been allies of the Imam, they could have imposed on him their opinions and their demands, but they were not, as the following stories indicate:

1. Sh. Sa‘íd b. Ḥamad al-Ḥárithí states that when Sh. Nášir al-Gháfrí was ousted from his post as a ruler of Bahlà, Imam Sálim ordered that the properties of his minister, Sulaymán b. ‘Abdalláh al-Maḥrúqí, who was guilty of the illegal imposition of taxes, should be confiscated and that he should put to death. Sulaymán fled Bahlà and remained in hiding for some time. He then decided to go to Sh. Ḥimyar and seek his help, but he refused to mediate between him and the Imam. Instead he told Sulaymán that he should talk to Sh. ‘Isà, who might have the courage to speak and mediate between Sulaymán and the Imam. Sh. ‘Isà on his part also refused to be involved and suggested that they should go together and see Sh. ‘Āmir al-Málikí. When they met Sh. ‘Āmir, however, he told them that "you are Amirs and more equipped to talk to the Imam". The Imam, however, accepted Sh. ‘Āmir’s mediation and forgave Sulaymán (68).

2. When the Imam conquered Nazwá, he met with its notables, among whom was Sh. Záhir b. Ghusn b. Hilál al-Hiná’í, who had committed a hadd offence. Sh. al-Sálimí at the time commented that "this is a test for us from God. Shall we carry out the hadd or punishment ourselves and our indispensable supporters, or forego what God has demanded?”. He then told Sh. Záhir that his offence was a hadd crime, and that he should not object to being punished. Sh. Záhir replied that he accepted the Shari‘ah punishment, and was given eighty lashes (69).
(3) The steady refusal of Imam Sálim to accept the genuine efforts of Sh. ‘Isà to make peace between him and the Sultan of Muscat did not change the attitude of Sh. ‘Isà towards the Imam, nor towards the Imamate.

These positions clearly demonstrate that these leaders were followers of the Imam, and they were not allies, at least during the rule of Imam Sálim.

c) The exchange of correspondence between the Imam and others

We have valuable primary evidence for the period in the form of the correspondence between Imam Sálim and the ‘ulamá’, Shaykhs, Sultan Sd. Fayşal and his sons and the PAM, including letters sent or received by the Imam himself or his adherents on his behalf. The analysis here is confined to the letters sent or received during the period Jumádá II/ May-Dhú al-Ḥijjah 1331/November 1913. Some of these letters are recorded in full, while others are merely mentioned as having provoked the Imam’s reply, which is then given.

On the election of a new Imam it was customary for him to send letters to all the tribal leaders informing them of the event, and asking them to be loyal to him and give him their support. Many tribal leaders, however, who are known to have responded to the Imam’s call, received no mention in the correspondence.

It can be seen from table below that the first letter sent by Imam Sálim was to Sh. Majid b. Khamís b. Ráshid al-‘Abrí (70) and Sh. Muhanná b. Ḥamad b. Muḥsin al-‘Abrí, the Shaykh of al-‘Abriyyín (71). The date of this letter was 13th Jumádá II, 1331, and it was written by Sh. ‘Āmir al-Málikí on the orders of the Imam. These two leaders had promised Sh. al-Sálimí to give him their support, but went back on their promise.

Sh. Májid was a well-known ‘álím who enjoyed a high position among Omanis. Most of the Wális of the Sultan used to seek his advice and listen to his opinion. He had a strong influence on his tribe and those in its neighbourhood. He was a Qádí in Bahlá during the Imamate of Sd. ‘Azzán (1868-71). He responded to the Imam’s letter, and immediately went to Tanúf and paid homage to the Imam. He was then about 79 years old. Next he wrote to the Wálí of Nazwà, Sd. Sayf b. Ḥamad, and to the Shaykhs of the ‘Aláyat of Nazwà, informing them of the Imamate revival and that he had given his allegiance to the Imam, and advised them that they should do the same thing (72).
Sh. Muhanna b. Ḥamad, however, did not come to the Imam at this time because he was not then in his home town. It was said that he was visiting Sh. Nāṣir b. Ḥumayd al-Gháfirí (73). When he returned home, the Imam was on the verge of attacking Nazwà, and when the news came in that the Imam had entered it, he wrote to him asking permission to go to meet him there. The latter, however, replied that Sh. Muhanna should stay where he was (74). It appears that the Imam was displeased with him for not giving his bay‘ah to him earlier on, and he thought that he had betrayed the Muslims by not fulfilling his promise to give him his full support (75).

One of the most important letters written by the Imam was one sent to the Sultan, Sd. Faysal, in which he defined the relationship between the two of them. Unfortunately, this letter is missing, but Sh. Muḥammad al-Sālimī has stated that it informed the Sultan what had been agreed between the ‘ulama‘ and leaders in Tanúf, and that he had been elected as the Imam of the Muslims. The letter called upon the Sultan to support the Muslims in rallying to the Imam and assuring him that he would have the same rights and obligations (76). This is contrary to Landen's assertion that the Imam declared that the Sultan was deposed, and that he was dissociated from the affairs of the Ibaḍís and deprived of any role in their realm, his decrees becoming null and void (77).

Landen bases his argument on the Imam's letter to Major Knox, the PAM, dated 9th Sha‘bán, 1331/ 14th July, 1913, and does not refer to the Imam’s letter under consideration. This other second letter states: "You know that the governance of Oman pertains to the ‘ulama‘ thereof from old time, and that every king opposed to the ‘ulama‘, is deprived of the government, separated from the affair of the Muslims, has no enjoyment (share) in their government and his orders has no validity" (78). Other writers have also quoted this opinion to characterize the behaviour of the Imam’s adherents towards the Sultan.

Three further important missing letters are those from Sh. al-Sālimī to Sh. ‘Isà (79). In the first letter dating 13th Jumádà II, 1331, Sh. al-Sālimī demanded from Sh. ‘Isà to give his bay‘ah and support the Imam. The second letter was dated on the 19th of the same month, in which he encouraged Sh. ‘Isà to hurry up to come and meet the Imam, and in the last letter dated the 2nd of Rajab, he blamed him for not replying to his
call to come and see the Imam, and reminded him that his neighbours, the tribe of al-Ḥajriyyín, had done so before him.

It must be pointed out that Sh. ‘Isà's political inclination was in favour of the Sultan and he was not a supporter of the Imamate revival. We have already seen that he had failed to reply to the calls made to him by Sh. al-Sálimí in this regard. Sh. ‘Isà was late to give his homage to the Imam, long after the conquering of Nazwâ and Izkí at the hands of the Imam and did not do so until 18th Rajab 1331, one month after the establishment of the Imamate, and after he had been subjected to considerable pressure from Sh. al-Sálimí and Sh. ‘Āmir al-Málkí (80). The purpose of Sh. ‘Isà in going to Izkí was to make peace between the Imam and the Sultan, but he was pressured into giving his bay’ah to the former (81). He remained, however, a good friend of the Sultan until the beginning of the 1915, when Imam Sálim decided to attack Muscat (82). This is in contrast to the views of some writers (83) who claim that Sh. ‘Isà had a big role in the Imamate revival and that he was the head of one of the groups calling for the overthrow of the Sultan.

Other letters sent by the Imam were addressed to the Wālī of the Sultan, and the tribes which remained loyal to the Sultan. One of these letters was sent to the Wālī of Nazwâ, Sd. Sayf b. Ḥamad al-Bú Sa‘ídí, in which he asked him to stay loyal to him and hand over the town to his authority. Sd. Sayf replied by saying that the town was under the rule of the Sultan and that he could not give it away without seeking the opinion of the Sultan, and he refused in his reply to give his allegiance to the Imam (84).

The Imam also sent a warning letter to Sd. Ḥumúd b. Ḥamad b. Hilál al-Bú Sa‘ídí, the Wālī of Šúr, asking him to withdraw his forces from Izkí. Sd. Ḥumúd was despatched by the Sultan to help his brother Sd. Su‘úd b. Ḥamad, the Wālī of Izkí, against the forces of the Imam. Sd. Su‘úd b. Ḥamad had secretly declared his loyalty to the Imam, but he did not announce this publicly because he feared the action of the Sultan’s forces (85).

The Imam also sent a letter to Sh. ‘Abdalláh b. Sa‘íd b. Khalfán al-Khalífí, and his son, Muḥammad, accusing them of cowardice for not allowing him and his forces to enter Samá’il by their village al-‘Aláyah (86).
When Sultan Sd. Faysal sent his son, Sd. Hamad, to help his besieged brother Sd. Nadjir in the fort of Samail, he sought the help of B. Jabin. This angered the Imam and he sent a letter to the leaders of the B. Jabin asking them either to drop their support for the Sultan and get rid of his son, or else he would send his army to attack them (87).

There are four letters by Sh. Himyar and Sh. 'Isa which were written to the Shaykhs of the Janabah and the B. Bu 'Ali in reply to their letters. In their letters to Himyar and Sh. 'Isa these Shaykhs had demanded that Sh. Himyar and Sh. 'Isa should withdraw their support from the Imam, but they replied that it was impossible for them to do that, and they even asked the Shaykhs of the Janabah and the B. Bu 'Ali either to remain neutral or give their support to the Imam (88). The following sums up the letter of Sh. Himyar to Sh. Muhammed b. Nasir, the taimmah of the B. Bu 'Ali: "I warn you and earnestly urge you not to fight the Muslims; if you accept my advice, this is all what I have" (89).

On having given his allegiance to Imam Salim, Sh. 'Isa wrote letters to the Sultan and his sons in which he said: "we arrived at the town of Izki on 17th Rajab to salute the Imam and in obedience to the commands of God" and that "we spoke to him about peace between him and the King [Sultan]. In everything good, we pray God for help" (90). This clearly demonstrates that Sh. 'Isa was intent on making peace between the Imam and the Sultan to avoid bloodshed, on the one hand, and to shut the door in the face of foreign intervention in favour of the Sultan, on the other.

During his stay in Samail, Imam Salim exchanged correspondence with Major Knox, the PAM. The latter became increasingly worried by the successes of the Imam, and as a result he sent a letter to him, Sh. 'Isa, Sh. al-Salimi and Sh. Himyar reminding them of the warning issued by Sd. Faysal to the Shaykhs of the tribes on 5th Jumada II, 1313, that the British government would not allow in future the tribes to attack Muscat and Marath, and "that in case the important interests of the subjects of the British government in these two towns [were threatened] ... the aforesaid government will not let anyone of them [tribes] to attack these towns" (91).

The Imam replied to Major Knox's letter after three days, on 9th Shawwal, 1331 / 14th July, 1913, explaining to him the purpose of the Imamate and its relationship with
Sd. Fayṣal. He emphasized to him that "the ordering of Oman belongs to the 'ulamā' thereof from old times and that every King [ruler] opposed to the 'ulamā', is deprived of the government, separated from the affairs of the Muslims, has no enjoyment (share) in their government and his orders have no validity". He then warned the British government to stop interfering in the Muslims' affairs: "It is incumbent on you (the British) to refrain from the affairs of the Muslims, and it is necessary for you that you should not do us injury" (92). This correspondence continued between the Imam and his leaders on the one hand, and the PAM, on the other. They all demanded from the British that they should withhold their support from the Sultan.

After the death of Sd. Fayṣal, and the coming to power of his son Sd. Taymūr, as his successor, there were moves to improve relations between the Sultan and the tribal leaders including Sh. ‘Isā. As a first step in this direction Sd. Taymūr had accepted the offer of Sh. Ḥamdān b. Záyid (1912-1922) the ruler of Abū Dhabi, who arrived at Muscat at the beginning of November, 1913 to mediate between the Imam and him. Sh. Ḥamdān started immediately by sending letters inviting Sh. ‘Isā and Sh. al-Ṣālimī to come for a meeting in al-Sīb town for this purpose, later in Dhū al-Ḥijjāh, 1331. But the mediation of Sh. Ḥamdān was unsuccessful.

The following are the most important letters to have been exchanged between the Imam and others during 1331/1913:-

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Letter from</th>
<th>Letter to</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Jumādā II</td>
<td>Imam Sālim</td>
<td>Mājīd b. Khamīs al-‘Abrī and Muhannā b. Ḥamad al-‘Abrī</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>do</td>
<td>do*</td>
<td>The Sultan, Sd. Fayṣal b. Turkī</td>
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<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>do</td>
<td>do</td>
<td>Sd. Sayf b. Ḥamad, Wālī Nazwā</td>
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<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>do</td>
<td>do</td>
<td>‘Abdallāh b. Aḥmad, the commander of the fort of Nazwā</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>do</td>
<td>do*</td>
<td>Nāṣir b. Ḥumayd al-Ghāfrī</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>do</td>
<td>al-Ṣālimī</td>
<td>Sd. ‘Isā b. Śāliḥ al-Ḥārithī</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>16th</td>
<td>Sh. Mājīd</td>
<td>Sayf b. Ḥamad, Wālī of Nazwā</td>
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</tbody>
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* This letter is merely mentioned.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>#</th>
<th>Period</th>
<th>Event</th>
<th>Leader</th>
<th>Notes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>17th</td>
<td>do</td>
<td>the people of Nazwá: Sh. 'Alí b. Náṣīr al-Kindí Sh. Sulaymán b. 'Abdalláh Sh. Muḥammad b. Sulaymán</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>c.13th -18th</td>
<td>Wálī of Nazwá *</td>
<td>Imam Sálim</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>19th</td>
<td>Sh. al-Sálimí *</td>
<td>Sh. 'Isā b. Ṣáliḥ al-Ḥārithí</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>22nd-29th</td>
<td>Sh. Muḥanná b. Hamad al-'Abrí</td>
<td>Imam Sálim</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>1st Rajab</td>
<td>Imam Sálim</td>
<td>Muḥanná b. Hamad al-'Abrí</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>2nd Rajab</td>
<td>Sh. al-Sálimí*</td>
<td>Sh. 'Isā b. Ṣáliḥ al-Ḥārithí</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>4th-7th</td>
<td>Sh. ‘Āmir al-Málkí *</td>
<td>Imam Sálim</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>10th</td>
<td>Sh. al-Sálimí</td>
<td>Sd. Nádir b. Fāyṣal</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>16</td>
<td>10th</td>
<td>Imam Sálim</td>
<td>Sd. Ḥumúd b. Hamad</td>
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<tr>
<td>17</td>
<td>19th</td>
<td>Sh. 'Isā al-Ḥārithí</td>
<td>Sd. Fāyṣal</td>
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<td>18</td>
<td>23th</td>
<td>do</td>
<td>Sd Fāyṣal</td>
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<td>19</td>
<td>do</td>
<td>do</td>
<td>Sd. Taymúr b. Fāyṣal</td>
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<td>20</td>
<td>do</td>
<td>do</td>
<td>Sd. Nádir b. Fāyṣal</td>
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<tr>
<td>21</td>
<td>N.D.</td>
<td>Sh. Muḥammád of B. Bú ‘Alí *</td>
<td>Sh. Ḥīmyar</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>22</td>
<td>25th</td>
<td>Sh. Ḥīmyar</td>
<td>Sh. Muḥammád of B. Bú ‘Alí</td>
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<tr>
<td>23</td>
<td>N.D.</td>
<td>Sh. Muḥammád, of B. Bú ‘Alí *</td>
<td>Sh. 'Isā b. Ṣáliḥ al-Ḥārithí</td>
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<td>24</td>
<td>25th</td>
<td>Sh. 'Isā b. Ṣáliḥ</td>
<td>Sh. Muḥammád of B. Bú ‘Alí</td>
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<tr>
<td>25</td>
<td>N.D.</td>
<td>Sh. ‘Abdalláh b. Sa`íd al-Khalífí *</td>
<td>Imam Sálim</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>26</td>
<td>2nd Rajab</td>
<td>Imam Sálim and Sh. al-Sálimí</td>
<td>Sh. 'Abdalláh b. Sa`íd al-Khalífí and his son, Muḥammad</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>27</td>
<td>27th</td>
<td>Imam</td>
<td>Shaykhs of village of Híl</td>
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<td>28</td>
<td>28th</td>
<td>Sh.al-Sálimí</td>
<td>Sd. Nádir b. Fāyṣal</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>29</td>
<td>Sha'báín</td>
<td>do *</td>
<td>Shaykhs of B. Jábir</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>30</td>
<td>2nd</td>
<td>Imam *</td>
<td>all Omanis in East Africa</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>31</td>
<td>N.D.</td>
<td>Shaykhs of Janabah *</td>
<td>Sh. Ḥīmyar</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>32</td>
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<td>Sh. Ḥīmyar</td>
<td>all Shaykhs of Janabah</td>
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<td>33</td>
<td>N.D.</td>
<td>Shaykhs of Janabah*</td>
<td>Sh. 'Isā</td>
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<td>34</td>
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<td>all Shaykhs of the Janabah</td>
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<td>35</td>
<td>6th</td>
<td>The PAM</td>
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<td>36</td>
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<td>37</td>
<td>16th</td>
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<td>Humayyid b. ‘Umar al-Híná'yí</td>
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<td>38</td>
<td>16th</td>
<td>Do</td>
<td>Sd. Hilál b. Muhammad</td>
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<td>39</td>
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<td>Do</td>
<td>Muzaffár b. Sulaymán</td>
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<td>19th</td>
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<td>Sd. Taymúr</td>
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<tr>
<td>42</td>
<td>22nd</td>
<td>Do</td>
<td>Sd. Taymúr</td>
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<td>43</td>
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<td>Imam Sálim</td>
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<td>Shawwál</td>
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<td>46</td>
<td>do</td>
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<td>47</td>
<td>5th Dhú al-Qi'dah</td>
<td>Sh. al-Sálimí</td>
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<td>48</td>
<td>7th</td>
<td>The PAM</td>
<td>Imam Sálim</td>
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<td>49</td>
<td>N.D.</td>
<td>Sd. Taymúr</td>
<td>all the Chiefs of Oman</td>
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<td>50</td>
<td>N.D.</td>
<td>Sh. ‘Isà b. Sáltíh*</td>
<td>Sd. Taymúr</td>
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<tr>
<td>51</td>
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<td>Do*</td>
<td>the PAM</td>
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<td>52</td>
<td>N.D.</td>
<td>Imam and al-Sálimí*</td>
<td>Sd. Taymúr</td>
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<tr>
<td>53</td>
<td>N.D</td>
<td>do*</td>
<td>the PAM</td>
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<td>54</td>
<td>Dhú al-Hijjah</td>
<td>Sh. Hamdán b. Záyid*</td>
<td>Sh. ‘Isà b. Sáltíh and Sh. al-Sálimí</td>
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<td>55</td>
<td>do</td>
<td>Sh. Hilál al-Hajrí</td>
<td>Sh. ‘Isà b. Sáltíh</td>
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<tr>
<td>56</td>
<td>do</td>
<td>Sh. Sálim al-Hasání*</td>
<td>Sh. ‘Isà b. Sáltíh</td>
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Some conclusion about the Imam’s policy programme can be drawn from his speeches and correspondence.

The first objective of the Imam was to unite the Omanis under his leadership, and to make Nazwà the capital of his Imamate. In order to achieve this aim, he called upon the Sultan and the chiefs of the tribes to submit to his authority. He also called upon the Sultan’s Wális, especially in the Interior Province, to surrender the forts to him. This is on the official level. As for the popular level, the Imam called upon the people to join him for the achievement of the set aims. The speed with which people responded to the Imam’s call was impressive, as was evident in Nazwà which on its fall was crowded with

* This letter is merely mentioned.
people coming from all towns and villages from those who responded to the *jihād* call, to those seeking justice and others who were motivated by a desire for material gains.

The second objective in the Imam's plans was to check foreign intervention in the internal affairs of Oman, especially that of the British. This is why we saw the flow of correspondence between him and the PAM, especially focusing on this issue.

This is not to imply that the Imam was inimical to the British. Indeed, he was conscious of the power of the British, especially of the British maritime power through the control of their navy over the seas; he therefore sought their collaboration and friendship. As the bulk of the Omani trade was with India, and it passed through the Indian Ocean, which was under the effective control of the British navy, the Imam was very conscious of the significance of the British power, and in a bid to win their friendship, he undertook to guarantee the safety of British subjects resident in Oman. This is evident in the Imam's friendly attitude towards the PAM, whom he described as a capable man, when the PAM presented to the Imam his initiative for reconciliation between him and the Sultan. The Imam's response was: "I see no objection to peace being arranged between myself and Sd. Taymūr, and you are a suitable and capable person to undertake the same" (93).

It is clear that the Imam's objection was not so much to the presence of foreigners in Oman, but to their interference in the internal affairs of the country. As a result, we see that the Imam did not ask the British, French or the Americans to leave the country, but that in many cases, he often consulted the French and the Americans on the principles of Christianity governing the declaration of war and the like.

The third objective in the Imam's agenda was to abate the internal conflicts between the Himwīf and the Ghāfīrī tribes. The Imam, therefore, stressed in his speeches this aim, either directly or indirectly. To be sure, the effects of these conflicts have been the cause of all problems in Oman, throughout its history. The Imam, conscious of the roots of the problem, directed many of his letters to the chiefs of the tribes urging them to observe the goal of unity and cohesion. The Imam thus sought the support of the two important leaders, Sh. Ḥimyar b. Nāṣīr al-Riyāmī, the *tamīmah* of the Ghāfīrī faction, and Sh. ‘Isā b. Ṣāliḥ al-Ḥārithī, the *tamīmah* of the Himwī faction. The former demanded
that as a condition, the Imam should not interfere in the affairs of the region under his control, in return for supplying the Imam with a thousand warriors, if asked to do so. The same also applied to Sh. 'Isa. However, the difference between the two leaders was that Sh. Himyar was a strong opponent of the Sultan and an invincible enemy, while Sh. 'Isa was a supporter of the Sultan. For that matter, the Imam preferred to leave his troops into several groups under their personal leader, so as to minimize friction and conflict between the tribes.

The fourth policy objective of the Imam was the application of Islamic Sharî'ah in civil matters, such as social equity, education, the upgrading and revival of interest in the observance of Islamic duties, mosques, and propagation of Islamic culture and books, the application of Sharî'ah principles, the attendance of the Jum'ah prayer, and others. All of these principles were relaxed previously, and now that the Imam sought a revival of the general Islamic principles, which was essentially the cause for the call for the Imamate. The Imam, therefore, emphasized these roles in his speech, and was corroborated in that by both Sh. al-Maliki and Sh. Abú Zayd al-Riyámi in their respective speeches. And in order to reinforce his position, the first thing that the Imam did was to perform the Jum’ah prayer in Nazwà on its fall. Sh. al-Sálimí remarked, commenting on that: "Thanks to God who gave us back our Jum’ah prayer " (94).

It is not our concern here to document all that had been achieved with regard to the revival of the spirit of Islam in the society. However, it is no exaggeration to state that the Imamate truly became a typical version of the Islamic state during the era of the first four caliphs in early Islam, in its idealism and adherence to the principles of the faith. For these reasons, the Imamate was enthusiastically welcomed by the ‘ulamā’ and the general public, who were under the control of the Imam. Those groups who opposed the Imamate included those who had lost their positions of political power or those who were hostile to the application of the Islamic laws and fearful of the possible extremism accompanying their application, such as the Imam’s Wālis in Rustāq and in Bahlà.

These, in sum, were the Imam's main objectives of the Imam's programme. In the following chapters we will see to what extent these four main objectives were implemented, and with what effects and consequences.
Endnotes

(5) al-Rayyis, *op.cit.* pp.131-34.
(9) Hāshim, *op.cit.* p. 298.
(11) al-Sa'ighi, *op.cit.* fol. 99v; Cf al-Shammākhī, *op.cit.*, fols. 16v-17r; al-Darjīnī, *op.cit.*, p. 82.
(15) al-Sa'ighi, *op.cit.* fol. 82r.
(16) ibid.
(22) al-Mawardi *op.cit.* p. 8; Ibn Hazīm, *al-Mahallā*, vol. 9 p. 363; al-Rayyis *op.cit.* pp. 228-34.
(28) al-Nawawī, *al-Miḥnāj*, vol. vii p. 120.
(31) al-Nawawī, *op.cit.*, vol. vii p. 120.
(33) The following are examples of some of the ‘ulamā‘ who took part in electing Imams;

a) Among the ‘ulamā‘ who elected al-Julandā (132/749-134/751-2) were Sh. ʿAbd al-Mawdād Hājīb al-Tālī, Sh. al-Rabī‘ b. Ḥābib, Sh. Shābīb b. ʿUṣayyah, and Sh. Khālif b. ʿAlī Bahri.


h) Among the 'ulamā' who elected Sālim b. Rāshid al-Khārūšī (1331/1913-1339/1920) were Sh. 'Abdallāh b. Humayd al-Sālimī and Sh. Ābu Sayd al-Riyāmī.

34 Anthony, op.cit., pp. 111f.
35 This family had inherited power in Nazwā (see family tree 5).
36 For further information See al-Sālimī, M.A. op.cit., pp. 96-99; Miles, "On the border of the Great Desert" in G1 vol. 36, no. 2 pp. 175-8; Peterson, Oman, p. 125f.
37 al-Sālimī, M.A. op.cit., p. 137.
38 It is interesting to note that this fact of Islamic political life is emphasized by Ibn Khaldūn in his Mughaddimah. See Ibn Khaldūn, op.cit., p. 391 and p. 414.
41 He was eulogized by al-Sālimī, Muhammad b. Shihkhān. (Dīwān of Ibn Shihkhān, p. 182) in a poem in which he described his various good qualities. He was also mentioned by al-Bū Saʾīdī, Ḥamād b. Sayf in his al-Mujāz, p. 57: "Ḥilāl and his brother Suʾūd are like two betting horses (meaning in generosity)".

42 See al-Mawardī al-ʾĀhkām al-Saltānīyyah for the qualifications of an Imam.
43 The present writer investigated this question by interviewing some of the 'ulamā', and it became evident to him from these interviews that Imam Sālim is considered one of the 'ulamā'. This was confirmed by Sh. Saʾīd b. Khalaf b. Muḥammad al-Khārūšī (the deputy general Mufti of the Sultanate of Oman), who had previously asked his teacher, Sh. Khalfān b. Jumayyīl al-Siyābī (d. 1972), about this matter and his answer was that Imam Sālim was an 'ālim.
44 Imam Sālim never issued a religious farwā, and apparently he used to depend for this on Sh. al-Sālimī and Sh. 'Āmir b. Khamīs al-Mālikī, who succeeded Sh. al-Sālimī as the judge of the Imam for fatwas and religious judgments. See al-Sālimī, M.A. op.cit., p. 398.
45 For example when he was young he used to go and collect dates from nearby date-groves and one day he found a part of a bough of a palm tree which had fallen on the ground. He took it to the owner of the palm tree, who told him that was unnecessary. Imam Sālim replied, "We collect those dates which have fallen naturally, but this one may have been due to some act of willful damage, and must be returned to the owner".
47 al-Ḥārithī, Saʾid, op.cit., p. 45.
49 Sh. Muḥammad al-Sālimī does not specify these in his book.
50 In his fatwā, Sh. al-Sālimī depended on 'Umar b. al-Khaṭṭāb's command that his chosen successor from the six nominees he had recommended should be put to death if he refused to accept the Imamate. According to Abū Yaʾqūb al-Waǧrājānī and Tīḫrūn b. ʾĪsā: "If all Muslims and those who loose and bind have agreed to elect a man as an Amir of the believers, and there was no one else among them better than he, he should be killed, if he refuses to accept their nomination". See Jāhlan 'Idān, al-Fīlār al-Siyāṣī ḫind al-ʾIbādīyyah, p. 193.
51 For further detail about this discussion see al-Sālimī, M.A. op.cit., pp. 137f; al-Ḥārithī, Saʾid, op.cit., p. 18.
52 al-Sālimī, M.A. op.cit., p. 152.
55 al-Sāʿīghī, op.cit., fol. 82r; 'Umar, al-Taʾrīkh al-ʾIsmāʿīlī, p. 17; Wilkinson, ʾIbādī Tradition, p. 539.
56 Yāzīd b. Fādnī was one of the 'ulamā' of Tāḥīr and one of its notables. He was appointed by Imam 'Abd al-Rahmān b. Rustam to the Shūrā council, because of his leadership and academic qualities. He got angry with Imam 'Abd al-Wahhāb because the latter did not appoint him to a high position, and revolted against him in A.H.171 and his followers were later-named the Nukkārīyya. See al-Darjūnī, op.cit., pp. 47-56; al-Shammākhī, al-Siyār pp. 146-54.
58 al-Sālimī, M.A. op.cit., pp. 155f.
59 al-Sālimī, M. A. op.cit., pp. 400f.
60 al-Sālimī, M.A. op.cit., pp. 153-5.
The poets on this occasion included:
1. Sh. 'Amir b. Khamis al-Malild (d. 1346/1927)
2. Sh. al-Murr b. Sálim al-Hatramá
3. Sh. 'Abd al-Rahmán b. Násir al-Riyámí
5. Sh. 'Abdalláh b. 'Amír b.-Azír
6. Sh. 'Amír b. Sulaymán al-'Abbádí
8. Sh. Abú Muslim Násír b. Sálim al-Ruwádí (d. 1338/1920 in Zanzibar)

(R.O II) pp.730f. for both Arabic and English versions.
Shahdád, M. Ibráhím. op.cit. p. 31; cf al-'Aqqád, op.cit. p. 10.
al-Háridhí, Sa'dí. op.cit. pp. 34f.
See letter in al-Sálimí, M.A. op.cit. p. 169.
al-'Abrí, Ibráhím, op.cit. p.130.
al-Sálimí, M.A. op.cit. p. 176.
We will discuss the role of Sh. Muhanná in conquering al-'Awádí when we discuss the military operations of the Imam (see ch. IV below).
al-Sálimí, M.A. op.cit. p. 168.
Landen, op.cit. p. 394.
(R.O II) p. 731.
al-Sálimí, M.A. op.cit. p 184.
For further information about Sh. 'Isá see: al-Sálimí, M.A. op.cit. pp. 74-90 ; ARAMCO, Oman, pp. 116-9; Peterson, Oman, pp. 119-22; Murphy "A sketch of the careers of Saleh b. Ali and his son Isa b. Saleh, the stormy petrels of Oman politics" in (LO) R/15/3/242.
al-Sálimí, M.A. op.cit. p. 227.
Qásím, op.cit. p. 386; al-'Aqqád, op.cit. p. 310; Landen, op.cit. p. 393; Shahdád, op.cit. p. 31.
al-Sálimí, M.A. op.cit. p. 171.
al-Sálimí, M.A. op.cit. p. 182.
(R.O II) p. 722.
al-Sálimí, M.A. op.cit. p. 192.
The full text of the badly translated letter is given in (R.O II) p.721.
(R.O II). pp. 723f.
(R.O II). pp. 718f.
(R.O II). pp. 730f from where the poor translation in taken.
al-Sálimí, M. A. op.cit. p. 112.
In this chapter it is proposed to discuss the military operations of the Imam and how he spread his authority over Oman. Traditionally, Oman is divided into a number of provinces whose boundaries cannot be defined with any exactness, but the mountainous range which stretches in the shape of a great crescent extending south eastwards from Ru’ús al-Jibál almost to Ra’s al-Ḥadd, forms an arbitrary divide between provinces. As the Imamate was established in the Interior Province, this area soon came under the complete control of the Imam. In addition to this region the Imam was also able to extend his dominion over al-Sharqiyah, and some parts of the Eastern and Western Hajar Provinces. The main aim of the Imamate was to control all parts of Oman but the prevailing economic, political, social, and military factors stood against achieving this aim. During the first year of his Imamate, Imam Sálim was able to establish his authority over all the Interior Province and in the following year he achieved some successes on the Western Hajar. This sweeping victory was mainly due to the religious enthusiasm and commitment of the Imam’s followers rather than to military factors. All the Imam’s direct military operations against the Sultan had ceased after his defeat in the Waṭayyah battle in January, 1915.

It must be mentioned here that the Imam and his followers were in the eyes of the Sultan and the British no more than hard revolutionaries. This is based on the view that anyone who revolts against an established regime is a revolutionary. By contrast the opposition considered itself a reformest group whose main aim was to establish justice in the country and in their view the Sultan was a ruler presiding over a defective non-Islamic government. Despite this view, however, we find that the tribesmen who supported the Imamate had great respect for the Sultan, both at the official and public levels.
After his election as an Imam, Imam Sālim announced his Imamate throughout Oman. He wrote to the principal Shaykhs of Oman, calling upon them to rise in defence of truth and to join all Muslims in the sacred duty of assisting the cause of the Imamate even if only through their prayers (1). The Imam’s main aim was the overthrow of the Sultan, and his government, and the spread of justice among people. For this reason he wrote to the Sultan and his Wālis asking them to declare their allegiance to him and to step down from government and when he received no response from them he declared war against them to ensure their obedience.

The territories which were annexed during the Imam’s military operations (2) can be divided into two main groups: the first group included those towns which were annexed without the need to resort to war, and the second included those towns which were annexed by force. Examples of the first group include: Manaḥ, al-Ḥamrā’, Bahlā and Adam in the Interior Province, ‘Ibrá, in al-Zāhirah, Rustáq in the Western Ḥajar, and some towns in al-Sharqiyyah Province like ‘Ibrá’, Samad, al-Muḍayrab, al-Qābil and Badiyyah. These towns declared their allegiance either because they failed to stand as an opposing force to the Imam’s army or because they accepted the Imam’s call to join the Imamate without the need to go to war. This bay’ah was completed either by sending one of the Imam’s assistants to these towns, or the tribal leaders from these towns came to the Imam of their own accord and declared their bay’ah to him. In this case the Imam usually allowed these leaders to rule their towns. Examples of the second group of towns were Nazwā, Izkī, Samá’il, Bidbid in the Interior Province and al-‘Awábī, Nakhal, and Wádí al-Ma’āwil in the Western Ḥajar Province.
1) The Occupation of Territories in the Interior Province

The first military action of the Imam was against Nazwa, because of its historical and religious importance to the Imamate. The Imam first wrote to its Wali, Sd. Sayf b. Hamad and its notables asking them to declare their allegiance to him. The same thing was also done by Sh. Majid b. Khamis al-‘Abrí who tried to persuade these people to give their bay’ah to the Imam (3). The reply of the Wali to these calls, however, was negative, and he explained his position in that he was the Sultan’s representative in the town and for this reason he could not give it up. This was, of course, understandable, since Sd. Sayf had been the Sultan’s Wali in Nazwa for almost sixteen years (4), and his family had inherited their position generation after generation since the 1830s. It was customary for the Sultan to station a garrison in each fort independent of the authority of the Wali to ensure that no Wali was capable of rebelling against him. These garrisons used to be formed from the Hadramis of Yemen, Najdis from the central Arabia, and the Baluchis, to ensure their neutrality.

Sd. Sayf sent to the Sultan informing him about the content of the Imam’s letter and asked for reinforcements. Most of his letters, however, did not reach the Sultan because the B. Riyám of Barakat al-Mawz cut the line of communication between him and the Sultan (5), and channelled all the letters to the Imam, who made use of the information contained in them. Despite the intercepting of the Wali’s letters the Sultan sent his slave, ‘Anbar, with 21 bags of rice, 3,000 rounds of ammunition, and $MT. 100 in cash to his Wali Sd. Sayf, but these were confiscated by the B. Riyám, and ‘Anbar was killed and two of his party were wounded (6).

One week after his election, Imam Salim launched an attack on Nazwa (see chart 1 below). Most of his troops were from the B. Riyám and some parts of the B. Hiráh, loyal to the sons of Sh. Hilál b. Záhir al-Hiná’í. The troops were divided into two battalions, one being under the joint leadership of himself and Sh. Himyar b. Nášir al-Nabhání, and the other being under the command of the sons of Sh. Hilál b. Záhir. The first battalion was given the task of attacking the ‘Aláyat of Nazwa, which was known by the name Samad al-Kindí, and contained the famous Bayt Sulayţ and the fort of Jami’ (Mosque) of Nazwa (7), leaving the second battalion to concentrate on its Safálah, which also
contained the famous castle and which was under the protection of the Sultan's garrison. The two parts of the town were separated by the Wāḍi of Kalbūh.

At the break of dawn on 20th Jumādā II/25th May, the Imam attacked al-Maddah (a suburb of ‘Aláyah) where the Wálf was resident. He was injured in the first attack on al-Maddah. He then retreated to his Mosque leaving his minister, Sh. Nāṣir b. Khamīs al-Sayfī, to fight the Imam's army. The fighting continued between the two sides until the Wálf committed suicide in the Mosque on 24th Jumādā II/31st May (9). It was later revealed in his will that he had preferred death to the humiliation of defeat (10). This was followed by the surrender of his followers, and the inhabitants of Nazwā, including the commander of the castle of Nazwā, ‘Abdallāh b. Aḥmad al-Ḥaḍramī who left for Muscat (11). Then, all the inhabitants gave their allegiance to the Imam (12), except Sd. Ḥarib b. Ḥamad al-Bū Saʿīdī, the brother of the Wálf, and five of his assistants who were jailed by the Imam for ten days and later released to leave for Muscat. The total number of those killed in the battle was fifty (13), five of whom were from the Imam’s side (14), and the total number captured by the Imam exceeded one thousand men (15). Among those killed was the Wálf, Sd. Sayf, who, fearing to fall into the hands of his enemies, committed suicide as already mentioned (16). One day before his suicide, the Wálf sent to the Imam asking him to pardon him and promised to surrender under the protection of Sh. ‘Āmir b. Khamīs al-Mālikī. The Imam responded to this request by sending Sh. ‘Āmir to him. Sd. Sayf, however, put forward three stipulations before giving himself up. He first demanded that the ownership of al-Ruwayashah orchard, which belonged to the Bayt al-Māl of Nazwā, be transferred to him; secondly, that the Mosque of Nazwā be his place of residence (17), and thirdly that all the munitions and financial resources of the Mosque should be put in his own name (18). After recording all munitions and armaments, Sh. ‘Āmir asked Sd. Sayf to give him until the following day to discuss these stipulations with the Imam, but Sd. Sayf did not wait for the Imam’s reply, and killed himself before Sh. ‘Āmir informed him of the Imam’s reaction (19). No evidence, however, is available on whether the Imam had accepted Sd. Sayf’s stipulations or not; what is certain is that he forgave him (20).
According to Sh. Muḥammad al-Sālimī the total cost of the war was paid by Sh. Ḥimyar b. Nāṣir al-Nabānī and the sons of Sh. Hilāl b. Zāhir al-Hinā’ī. The Imam and his close ‘ulamā’ on the other hand lost 3000 rounds of ammunition. Sh. Muḥammad al-Sālimī does not give the total financial losses, but he states that his father, Sh. al-Sālimī had $MT. 300 (three hundred) when he left al-Sharqiyyah and he had $MT. 20 (twenty) remaining when the Imam attacked Nazwā (21). It is almost certain that the ‘ulamā’ had some money for personal expenses. The soldiers’ expenses were usually met by the heads of the tribes, as customary at that time, but sometimes individuals took care of themselves from their own resources.

The fall of Nazwā had a number of consequences: first, Nazwā was declared the capital of the Imamate as it had been in the past; secondly, the victory increased the confidence of the Imam’s adherents which in turn created in them a spirit of self-denial and sacrifice, and thirdly, it influenced the Omani tribes and the Sultan. Immediately after the fall of Nazwā the tribes came to the town and declared their allegiance to the Imam. Among them were the following (22):

1- The Durū’ tribe whose Shaykh was Sh. Ḥumayd b. Khulayfīn al-Dur‘ī
2- Al-Ya‘qīb tribe whose Shaykh was Sh. Sulṭān b. Rāshid b. ‘Abdallāh al-Ya‘qūbī
3- Al-Ḥajriyyīn tribe of al-Sharqiyyah
4- A section of the Janabah tribes, inhabiting Adam, whose Shaykh was Sa’d b. Sa‘īd b. Nāṣir al-Jaḥāfī.
5- Al-Mahāriq tribe of Adam.

It is clear that the number of the Imam’s supporters had greatly increased and Nazwā became crowded with tribesmen willing to take part in the jihād. For this reason the Imam turned his intention to annexing Izkī next, following the announcement by the Wālī of Manaḥ (23), Sd. Sayf b. Sulṭān al-Bū Sa‘īdī, and his brother, Sd. Ḥumūd b. Sulṭān, the Shaykh of Manaḥ of their loyalty to him. The latter handed over their town to the Imam, who appointed Sh. Sālim b. Badr b. Hilāl b. Zāhir al-Hinā’ī as its Wālī, after the Sultan’s garrison had withdrawn from its fort.

On his part, Sd. Faysal confiscated the weapons and money of the sympathisers and supporters of the Imam, especially those who had recently arrived from abroad or had
property deposited with French merchants. It was estimated that the total amount confiscated in this manner was one lac of dollars (one lac or lakh = 100,000) (24). He also increased the taxes on imports and exports to and from inland. On the military side, he sent a force under the leadership of his two sons, Sd. Ḥamad and Sd. Nādir, to Nakhal and Samā’īl respectively in early June, 1913. The former was to assist the Wālī of al-‘Awābī while the latter was to help the Wālī of Izkī (25). This was followed by sending a second force under the command of Sd. Ḥumūd b. Ḥamad b. Hilāl al-Bū Sa‘īdī, the Wālī of Şūr, to support his brother, the Wālī of Izkī, Sd. Su‘ūd b. Ḥamad. The Sultan also sent messages to the tribes loyal to him, asking them to come to his aid and support him against the Imam (26). In addition, he wrote to the British government asking for military assistance to defend the capital, and to honour the undertaking of 1895, which has been mentioned earlier. He started preparing for the war by moving his valuables to the forts of Muscat (27), and he warned by drumbeat all the inhabitants of the suburbs that it was unsafe to stay outside the walls at night (28); any men without weapons and ammunition were supplied with them (29).

During the Imam’s stay at Nazwā the financial resources of the Imamate greatly increased, mainly as a result of confiscating the properties of the Wālī of Nazwā, together with what was already in the Bayt al-Māl plus the supplies sent by the Sultan to his Wālī in Nazwā.

According to the British records, Sd. Fayṣal tried to send reinforcements of arms and provisions to Nazwā, but communications had fallen into the hands of the Imam’s followers, and as a result these reinforcements never reached their destination (30). All these factors, in addition to the invitation of the Wālī of Izkī, Sd. Su‘ūd b. Ḥamad b. Hilāl al-Bū Sa‘īdī to surrender the town to him, helped the Imam make the decision to proceed to Izkī.

First, the Imam sent a force composed mainly from al-Ḥajriyyīn tribe under the command of Sh. ‘Āmir b. Khamīs al-Mālikī to Izkī to arrange its takeover. On reaching Izkī, Sh. ‘Āmir used the Mosque of Izkī in the Yaman section as his headquarters (31). The Wālī, Sd. Su‘ūd and Sh. ‘Āmir soon proceeded to hand over the town peacefully to the Imam without the need to fight with the Sultan’s garrison which was occupying the
fort. They agreed to concert a plan to get rid of this garrison which was reinforced by a new force under the command of the Wālī’s brother, Sd. Ḥumūd b. Ḥamad who left the town on the same day as Sh. ‘Āmir’s arrival. On the other side Sh. ‘Abdallāh b. Sa‘īd b. Khalfān al-Khalīfī, the *tamīmah* of B. Ruwāḥah, played a role in reinforcing Izkī by suggesting the transfer of the gunners stationed in the fort of Samā’il to it, but his attempts were turned down by Sd. Nādīr b. Faysal on the grounds that Samā’il was strategically more important than Izkī, and that the Imam might attack Samā’il before Izkī.

The plan put forward by Sh. ‘Āmir and the Wālī to get rid of the Sultan’s garrison involved the invitation of the B. Rāshid (the inhabitants of the village of al-Qaryatayn) (32) to come and join him in the fort and its surrounding places to pretend that they wanted to defend the town against a possible attack by the Imam (33), and when Sd. Su‘ūd b. Ḥamad left of the fort to meet the Imam, the B. Rāshid would then attack the garrison, and force them to come out of the fort.

On receiving the details of the plan, the Imam marched to Izkī on 9th Rajab, 1331/13th June, 1913, accompanied by a large number of tribesmen. This illustrates the resentment of the tribes of the Interior Province towards the Sultan and his actions, and particularly his neglect of tribal affairs. On the following day the Imam arrived to Izkī (34), and on the same day Sd. Ḥumūd b. Ḥamad returned to Izkī, accompanied by Sh. ‘Alī b. ‘Abdallāh b. Sa‘īd al-Khalīfī, and Sh. Sulṭān b. Manṣūr b. Nāṣir al-Ghufaylī al-Wahībī. On hearing of the Imam’s arrival in the town, Sd. Ḥumūd stationed his forces in the village of Saddī (35). In the meantime, Sh. ‘Abdallāh b. Sa‘īd b. Khalfān tried to persuade Sd. Nādīr in Samā’il to march with his force to Izkī, but this attempt had failed, because Sd. Nādīr had received orders from his father not to do anything outside Samā’il (36). The Imam sent a warning to Sd. Ḥumūd telling him to leave Saddī or else prepare for war, and since the latter had little force with which to fight the Imam, he preferred to retreat to Samā’il. Sh. ‘Alī b. ‘Abdallāh, and Sh. Sulṭān b. Manṣūr, on the other hand, waited in Saddī for Sh. ‘Isā b. Śālīḥ al-Ḥārithī to arrive.

On 12th Rajab/17 June, the Wālī of Izkī, Sd. Su‘ūd, came out of the fort to meet the Imam, and at the same time the B. Rāshid, the supporters of the Wālī, asked the
commander of the garrison, 'Awād al-Ḥadramī (37) to withdraw his forces from the fort. He agreed to their demand and retreated to Samā'il.

Not all the people of Izkī, however, gave their bay'ah to the Imam, especially the B. Ruwāḥah (Ḥināwī faction), who demanded from the Imam a delay until the arrival of Sh. 'Isā, and Sh. 'Abdallāh b. Sa'id b. Khalfān al-Khalīfī, because they could take any decision without consulting them. The Imam had previously sent Sh. 'Āmir al-Mālikī to their Shaykh, Sh. Ḥamīd b. Sayf b. Ḥāmid al-Ruwāḥī who was controlling Bayt Qārūt, a well fortified position belonging to the B. Riyām (Ghāfīrī faction), which had been confiscated from them by Sulaymān b. Suwaylim (d. 1907) (38).

During this period the Imam awaited the arrival of Sh. 'Isā who left his place on 15th Rajab, 1331, and Sh. al-Sālimī prepared a big reception party for him. According to Sh. 'Abd al-Raḥmān b. Nāṣir al-Riyāmī, he was asked by Sh. al-Sālimī to compose a poem to welcome Sh. 'Isā. This he did and the poem was recited during the bay'ah of Sh. 'Isā (39). This implies that Sh. al-Sālimī was very anxious for Sh. 'Isā to join the Imamate to give it coherence and unity by bringing together the Ḥināwī and Ghāfīrī factions particularly, up to that moment the Ḥināwī had been reluctant to join the Imamate.

On 17th Rajab/ 22nd June, Sh. 'Isā arrived at Izkī. In his company were his brother, ‘Alī b. Ṣāliḥ, Ḥamḍūn and Ḥamād b. Ḥumayd b. ‘Abdallāh al-Ḥarīthī, Sālim b. ‘Umayr b. Ḥanḍal al-Ḥarīthī and Sh. Muḥsin b. ‘Āmir b. Sulṭān al-Ḥarīthī (40). The Imam sent Sh. al-Sālimī and Sh. ‘Āmir al-Mālikī to Sh. 'Isā at his residence in the Yaman quarter of the town to persuade him to give his bay'ah to him. He finally gave him bay'ah, and he then went to meet him at the Ḥabīb Mosque where he and the notables of his tribe also gave their allegiance to the Imam. Sh. al-Sālimī then gave a welcoming speech to Sh. 'Isā in which he called upon Muslims to adhere to the teaching of the Qur'ān and the Sunnah (41).

The adherence of Sh. 'Isā to the Imamate had given it power and coherence and he became one of its symbols. This in turn made other tribes join. Two days later Sh. Ḥamīd b. Sayf al-Ruwāḥī declared his bay'ah and handed over all the important military positions to the Imam, including Bayt Qārūt (42). Soon after this Sh. 'Isā started a move to make peace between the Imam and the Sultan, on condition that the former should not go further
than Izki, and leave Wadí Samá’il to the Sultan. A long discussion between the Imam and Sh. ‘Isà then followed, with the former refusing to accept this proposal. Sh. Muḥammad al-Sálimí states that hostility was on the point of erupting between the two sides, had it not been for the interference of the Shaykhs of the Ḥajriyyín tribe who persuaded Sh. ‘Isà to drop his proposal at least for the time being (43). In fact Sh. ‘Isà was under considerable pressure from the tamímah of the B. Ruwáḥah and Sh. ‘Alí b. ‘Abdalláh al-Khalíf, who encouraged him to use his influence on the Imam to stop him from proceeding to Wadí Samá’il, but Sh. ‘Alí’s attempts were unsuccessful. He wrote a letter to Sd. Nádir in which he mentioned that "I met Sh. ‘Isà b. Ẓáliḥ at Izki with thirty men, and the latter was ready to mediate, but the Imam and Sh. al-Sálimí refused to listen to any talk of peace and told him to desist from such effort" (44). The persistence of the Imam and his followers in attempting the overthrow of the Sultan, and their refusal to accept any mediation, had forced Sh. ‘Isà to accept unwillingly the status quo, making use of any opportunity to ask the Imam to make peace with the Sultan.

After taking control of Izki, the Imam turned his attention to the strategic Wadí Samá’il which is the only passage connecting the coastal and inland towns (45). Before leaving Izki, he appointed Sh. Ḥamdán b. Sulaymán b. Sayf al-Riyámí as Wálì of Izki, and Sh. Abú Zayd ‘Abdalláh al-Riyámí as its Qádí. He marched to Samá’il, 56 Km. east of Izki, on 26th Rajab/1st July, passing through Qárút, and Hňl village (46) on Wadí the B. Járír (47). Before reaching Hňl, the Imam wrote to its Shaykhs informing them of his arrival and that he would like to meet them (48). During his stay at Hňl, the Imam wrote a second letter to Sd. Nádir: "we have informed you that all who are around you are against you, and perhaps the truth of my saying has became clear to you, and also the disinterestedness of my advice. Then, if your desire is safety in both worlds, enter into what the Muslims have entered, and, if your desire is for this world’s goods only, then look out for yourself a way of escape before you are surrounded" (49).

It appears that the Imam had chosen to go through Wadí B. Járír for two reasons: the presence of the B. Járír (who were of the Gháfírí faction), and the fact that the Imam had received a letter from Sh. ‘Abdalláh b. Sa’íd al-Khalíf requesting him not to enter Samá’il from ‘Aláyah. In addition, there was a rumour that the B. Ruwáḥah who were
accompanying the Imam had refused to allow the B. Riyám to enter Wádí Samá’il, because of the fear that they might take their revenge on the B. Ruwáḫah, the inhabitants of the Wádí (50). This was the opinion of both the Imam and the B. Riyám, who believed that if the B. Ruwáḫah entered the Wádí they would encounter no difficulties from the people of their own tribe inhabiting the Wádí, especially since their leaders were in the company of the Imam and Sh. ‘Isá and Sh. Ḥámid b. Sayf al-Ruwáḫí.

Sh. ‘Abdalláh b. Sa‘íd al-Khalífí had played a significant role in this plan. He held a meeting with Sh. Sulṭán b. Manṣúr, the Shaykh of Āl Wahífah to discuss the possible reaction of the Imam before he started marching towards Samá’il. It was decided during this meeting that Sh. ‘Abdalláh should send his son Sh. ‘Alí, and Sh. Sulṭán b. Manṣúr to Izkí to meet Sh. ‘Isá to persuade the Imam not to proceed further and not to attack Samá’il. Sh. ‘Isá had, however, failed to do this, and this forced Sh. ‘Abdalláh al-Khalífí to write directly to the Imam asking him to go through Wádí B. Jábir. The Imam’s response to Sh. ‘Abdalláh’s request was as follows: "your letter has reached us, barring access to your town. Perhaps you desire to find favour with your Sultan or with the Bedouins of Āl Wahífah. We could never believe that of you.... We are obliged to come into the town with truth, not with violence" (51).

It must be emphasized that the Āl Wahífah were at that time supporters of the Sultan, and they were brought to Samá’il by Sd. Nádir to defend the town against the Imam. However, after Sh. ‘Isá b. Šáliḥ al-Ḥárití gave his bay’ah to the Imam, they withdrew from Samá’il and retreated back to their homeland (52). Naturally this withdrawal affected the position in Samá’il of Sd. Nádir who wrote to his father Sd. Fayṣal explaining the situation to him. He went on to say in one of his letters that "all these people including the inhabitants of Samá’il are traitors" (53). Sd. Nádir was, however, no more than expressing a fact, and this was why the Imam reminded him that all the inhabitant of the Wádí were against him. However, the B. Jábir and the Siyábiyyín tribe did not give their bay’ah to the Imam, nor did they show any support for the Sultan and preferred to remain neutral. Bannerman observes that no tribal leader at that time was able to resist the wishes of his own tribesmen (54).
Sd. Nádir had arrived to Samá’il early in June (see above) with a force consisting of 2,000 men (55), all of them from Āl Wahífah. Because of the strategic and economic importance of the passage, the Sultan sent further reinforcement to Samá’il by the end of the same month, consisting of 500 men from Shuḥūḥ of Khaṣab, and 600 men from Šūr and Ja’lán, among whom were Janabah, al-Hishm, B. Rásib, and the B. Bú ‘Alí. They arrived at Bidbid on 24th Rajáb/29th June under the command of Sh. Muḥammad b. Náṣir b. ‘Abdalláh Āl Ḥumúdah, a nephew of the Amir of Ja’lán, Sh. ‘Alí b. ‘Abdalláh b. Sálim Āl Ḥumúdah (56), and accompanied by Sd. Muḥammad b. Badr b. Sayf al-Bú Sa’ídí, the Wálí of Khaṣab. Sd. Nádir was planning to put a force from Šúr and Ja’lán at the entrance of the Wádí al-‘Aqq, and the remaining force from Shuḥūḥ in the fort of Bidbid, but after the withdrawal of the latter to Nakhal to help the Sultan’s garrison at al-‘Awábí, he was forced to change his plan, especially after he received orders from his father “that he should not allow the B. Bú ‘Alí to advance beyond that place (Bidbid). This was because if they went on to Samá’il, there would be a danger of them being cut off by a force advancing down the Wádí al-‘Aqq” (57).

The Shaykhs of the Janabah and the B. Bú ‘Alí wrote to Sh. Ḥimyar and Sh. ‘Isà informing them that they would be coming to Bidbid as subjects of the Sultan, and asked them to desist from helping the Imam. They warned them that the consequence of this involved their personal safety and that of their followers. But Sh. Ḥimyar and Sh. ‘Isà not only rejected these demands, but also warned them against shedding Muslim blood; they also informed them that a delegation from the tribes of the Sharqiyyah Province had met the Imam, requesting the appointment of a leader over them to attack Ja’lán (58).

On receiving no reply from Sd. Nádir, the Imam finally decided to attack Samá’il. He divided his troops into two groups: the first group was under the joint command of the Imam himself and Sh. ‘Isà, and was to attack Samá’il through ‘Alányah, while the other group was under the command of Sh. Ḥimyar who was to attack Samá’il through the Safálah. The Imam chose the Ibráhímiyyah village (about one mile above the fort of Samá’il) as his camp while the Jibflát was chosen as a camp for Sh. Ḥimyar. No fighting took place between the Imam’s troops and the inhabitants of the Wádí Samá’il, except around the fort (the area of the Bazaar and around the house of Sh. Ráshid b. ‘Uzayyiz al-
Khuṣaybí, the Sultan’s secretary), before finally besieging the fort of Samá‘íl. Sixteen men were killed in the first day (four of them being from the Imam's side) with an unspecified number of injured on both sides (59). During the first three days the B. Bú ‘Alí and Janabah, were at Bidbid trying to help Sd. Nádir, but their attempt was unsuccessful, because they were opposed by Sh. Ḥimyar and his force, and they then decided to leave for Muscat on 1st Sha‘bán/6th July thus leaving all the roads leading to the coast and the capital without any protection. The Imam seized this opportunity to send part of his troops to besiege Bidbid, which was without proper defences. There are several reasons for the retreat of the B. Bú ‘Alí from Bidbid: they had probably been influenced by what was said in the letters of Sh. Ḥimyar and Sh. ‘Isà to them; the B. Bú ‘Alí probably believed that their traditional enemies, the B. Bú Ḥasan, had attacked their territories in their absence as mentioned by Sh. Ḥimyar in his letter to the Janabah, especially since Sh. Sa‘íd b. Ṣāliḥ al-Sunaydí, the leader of Sinadah section of the B. Bú ‘Alí was a friend of the B. Bú Ḥasan (60); moreover they were expecting some of their followers to come to them. The Sultan exploited this situation by sending to Sh. Ḥamad b. ‘Abdalláh al-Sharqí, the leader of the Sharqiyyín tribe in Fujayrah, to seek his help. Sh. Ḥamad responded to this request by coming to Shuḥár with 500 men of his men (61), to replace the B. Bú ‘Alí, but after his meeting with Shuḥūh on their way to their home territory, he changed his mind and returned home.

The siege of the fort of Samá‘íl continued for about a month, despite the fact that the number of defending soldiers did not exceed ninety men (62). During this period the Imam exchanged correspondence with the PAM, who warned him in his first letter not to allow the tribes to attack Matrah and Muscat, because of the British interest in these two towns. The Imam’s reply to the PAM was that his conflict was only with the Sultan; he had no quarrel with the British, and he asked him not to support the Sultan. The PAM, however, was determined to defend the two towns and on 9th July/4th Sha‘bán, a wing of 250 men from the 2nd Rajput under the command of Lt. Colonel Smith landed at Matrah, justifying this measure as a response to a request from the Sultan (63).
On hearing of the landing of British troops, the Imam wrote to the PAM demanding an explanation of the purpose of this force, giving his personal assurances to the PAM that their interests would not be violated. The PAM replied as follows:

"your letter dated 29th Sa'bán, 1331 A.H., has reached me and you mention therein that a part of our soldiers had landed in vicinity of Maskat (Muscat), and you ask the reason thereof. Now we answer you about this that British soldiers have landed for the protection of Maskat and Ma'trah, according to the warning contained in the notice of his Highness, the Sultan dated the 5th of Jumādā II, 1313, which I repeated to you in my letter dated the 6th of Sha'bán, 1331 A.H., and in my letter to your companions" (64).

After the B. Bú 'Alí, Janabah, Shuḩūh, and al-Sharqiyyín had withdrawn their support for the Sultan, it seems that he had faced some serious crisis which had led him to seek the support of the British to defend his capital. In the meantime daily reports from Samá'il to the Sultan were indicating the desire of the tribes loyal to him to attack the Imam's troops which did not exceed 2,000 men. In response to these calls the Sultan collected a force from the various tribes loyal to him and moved with this force from Muscat to al-Sīf on 15th July, in order to be nearer to the battlefield in Wādí Samá'il. A prominent figure in these efforts was Sh. Su'úd b. 'Alí b. Jabr al-Jabri, the most important Gháfir leader in Samá'il (65). He was a staunch supporter of the Sultan, and provided him with detailed information about the Imam's force and tribes supporting him. He wrote in one of his letters to the Sultan urging him to be quick in sending help to Sd. Nádir: "Oh, Master! if you have help for Sd. Nádir (your son), be speedy with it. Beware of delay! This is no time for delay" (66). This close and intimate relation between Sh. Su'úd and the Sultan aroused the suspicions of the Imam and also annoyed Sh. Su'úd who wrote to the Sultan complaining:

"... letters constantly come to me, sometimes they ask for cartridges and sometimes they demand that I should go with them, and sometimes they demand my allegiance (to the Imam) and sometimes your messenger goes through me to Sd. Nádir. They (the Imam's supporters) do not leave a single arrow untouched from their quiver, but by God's grace nothing of all this penetrates my ears" (67).

On reaching al-Sīf, the Sultan dispatched his son Ḥamad, Hilál b. Muḥammad b. Náṣir al-Sammár, the Wálí of Barká', Muẓaffar b. Sulaymán, the Wálí of al-Khábūrah, and Sh. Khamís b. Sa'id b. Sāliḥ al-Sunaydí (the leader of the Sunadah, section of the B. Bú 'Alí tribe) with 200 men to Samá'il to see whether it was possible to send the force which he had collected to the town and to test the willingness of the tribes which had remained neutral to join this force (68). Sd. Ḥamad and his company could reach as far as
the Wādī of the B. Jābir, where they stayed for about two weeks and discussed the Sultan's plan with the B. Jābir. Failing to enter Samā’īl, Ḥamad launched an unsuccessful attack on Bidbid to the great annoyance of the Imam who wrote to the B. Jābir warning them that they should expel Sd. Ḥamad from their territory. As a result Sd. Ḥamad left the Wādī of the B. Jābir and went back to Muscat (69). In the mean time the Sultan returned from al-Sīb to Muscat on 22nd July, leaving his force under the command of his other son, Sd. Taymūr, who left al-Sīb for al-Khawḑ (15 Km. south of al-Sīb), to persuade its inhabitants to join him in the attack against the Imam. The people of al-Khawḑ, however, refused, and asked the Imam to come to their help, who sent a force under the command of Sh. ‘Isā. The latter wrote to his former friend Sd. Taymūr asking him to leave al-Khawḑ, because he did not want to fight him. Sd. Taymūr responded to Sh. ‘Isā's request by withdrawing his force, and returning to al-Sīb.

Despite the fall of Bidbid into the hands of the Imam (discussed below) the destruction of the fort of Samā’īl, and the unsuccessful attempts by Sd. Ḥamad and Sd. Taymūr in getting aid through to Samā’īl, the Imam failed to capture the fort. This failure led Sh. ‘Abdalláh b. Sa‘īd al-Khalīf to offer his mediation between the Imam and the besieged Sd. Nádir. Both Sd. Nádir and the Imam agreed to this mediation. Sd. ‘Abdalláh then entered the fort, and tried to persuade Sd. Nádir to leave the fort. After lengthy discussions Sd. Nádir and Sh. ‘Abdalláh agreed that the control of the fort should be put into the hands of Sh. ‘Abdalláh for 15 days, after which the fort would be handed over to the Imam, assuming Sd. Nádir had failed to come back with military assistance. Knowing the difficulty of meeting this condition, the Imam was quick to accept Sd. Náṣir's demand. He also agreed to allow Sd. Nádir to carry out all his military equipment with him out of the fort (70).

Accordingly, on the night of 28th Sha’bān, 1331/1st-2nd August, 1913 Sd. Nádir left the fort with 12 men of the royal family in his company. Among them were Sd. Ḥumūd b. Ḥamad, Wālī of Šūr, and Sd. Ḥumūd b. Imam ‘Azzán. This was in addition to the remnants of his army. To stop any skirmishes between Sd. Nádir’s men and the Imam’s army, Sh. ‘Abdalláh and his son ‘Alí b. ‘Abdalláh provided an escort for Sd. Nádir and his men up to al-Khawḑ, while ‘Abdalláh’s other son, Sh. Muḥammad (who
was elected an Imam after the murder of the Imam Sálim in 1920), replaced Sd. Nádir at the fort of Samá’il as agreed.

As soon as Sh. ‘Abdalláh and Sd. Nádir reached al-Khawḍ, they heard the news that the Imam had taken control of the fort, and that Sh. Muḥammad had withdrawn from it. This manoeuvring on the part of the Imam was pointless because even if Sd. Nádir had been able to bring up support, he would not have been allowed back in the fort. The acceptance of the above condition by the Imam was simply to convince Sh. ‘Abdalláh and Sd. Nádir that he was sincere during the negotiation of the terms of the deal. Nonetheless, it appears that the Imam’s decision to take over the fort was somewhat hasty. He should have fulfilled the terms of the agreement, because in either case he would have been able to overrun the fort.

The Imam’s actions, however, angered Sh. ‘Abdalláh, who considered the Imam’s move as evidence of a personal disappointment in him. To correct his mistake and to please Sh. ‘Abdalláh, the Imam decided to leave the fort until the 15 days were over and to allow the force of Sh. ‘Abdalláh to re-occupy it during this period (71). This period finished on 13th Ramadán, and Sh. ‘Abdalláh handed the fort over to the Imam (72), because Sd. Nádir did not return to Samá’il according to the terms of agreement.

At the commencement of the year 1334, the Imam returned from al-Sharqiyyah to Nazwá where he stayed for a short time and then left to the Wádí al-Ma‘áwil. Soon after leaving Nazwá, his deputy, Sh. ‘Āmir al-Málikí, discovered that some notables of Nazwá had written to Sh. Náṣir b. Ḥumayd b. Ráshid al-Gháfirí, the ruler of Bahlā, asking him to capture Nazwá. Sh. ‘Āmir immediately arrested three of these conspirators (73). These men tried to exploit (a) the dispute between the Imam and Sh. ‘Isá who was of the opinion of making peace with the Sultan in order to allow the Omani people to improve their deteriorating living conditions and (b) the frequent absence of the Imam from Nazwá.

For many reasons Sh. Náṣir b. Humayd wanted to relinquish his relations with the Imam. He even paid a secret visit to the Sultan in Jumáda II, 1334/ April, 1916 to discuss with him his plan to occupy Nazwá. The Sultan probably accepted his ideas and gave him military assistance for that purpose (74). On returning to his home, Sh. Náṣir came up with a plan to occupy the Manaḥ first and then Nazwá, but before doing so he paid a visit
to the Imam (75) who knew about the intentions of Sh. Nāṣir. The Imam decided to dismiss the Shaykh from his position as a ruler of Bahlā (76), and as a precautionary measure he sent first a military force to the Manāḥ and then he wrote to his followers asking them to come to Nazwā to support his decision of expelling Sh. Nāṣir (77).

When Sh Nāṣir knew about the determination of the Imam to oust him from his post, he wrote to his followers in al-Ẓāhirah Province to come to his aid. He also sent to the Sultan for help, who responded by dispatching a force under the command of Muẓaffar b. Sulaymān, the Wālī of the Khābūrah, to support him. In a tactical manoeuvre, the Imam allowed some men of his force to return back to their homes, which made Sh. Nāṣir think that he had dropped the idea of dismissing him and consequently he too relieved some of his men and reduced his force. Soon after knowing about this move, the Imam marched to Bahlā on 13th Rajab, 1334/15th May 1916, which he reached in the evening of the same day, accompanied by Sh. Ḥimyar (see chart 2 below). He took advantage of the bad weather that night and entered the town very easily, but failed to capture the fort which he besieged for about forty days. The besiege ended after mediation from Sh. ‘Isā (78) who succeeded in persuading Sh. Nāṣir to withdraw with his troops from Bahlā to Jabrīn (Yabrīn) on 23th Sha‘bān, 1334/24th June 1916 (79).
Chart (1) Imam Sálim's military operations during the 1331/1913
Chart (2) Imam Sálim’s military operations during the 1334/1916 and 1335/1917
2) The Occupation of Territories in the Western Hajar Province

During the Imam's stay at Izki (June 1913), al-'Awábí was occupied by Sh. Muhanná b. Hamad al-'Abrí (80) (see chart 3 below). As mentioned above, Sh. Muhanná had asked the Imam to let him join his army in the attack on Nazwá, but the Imam refused his request because of Sh. Muhanná's delay in giving his bay‘áh to him. The relationship between Sh. Muhanná and the Wálf of Nazwá, Sd. Sayf, was friendly, and he did not want to disturb his relations with the Wálf. He supported the Wálf in 1324/1906 in his dispute with Sh. Hamdán b. Sulaymán al-Nabhání, who was controlling the ‘Aláyat of Nazwá. That is why he was careful not to give his bay‘áh immediately to the Imam until he was sure of the strength of support for the Imam. Sh. Ibráhím al-'Abrí states that Sh. Muhanná later recognized his mistake and tried to think of some way of getting himself out of this situation and improving his standing with the Imam (81). He found the opportunity to do this when Sh. Májid al-'Abrí, the deputy of the Imam in Nazwá, proposed to him that he should capture al-'Awábí (82). Accordingly, he proceeded with his army to al-'Awábí, but it seems that the revolt had already started in the town under the leadership of the Imam's brother, Sh. Náṣir al-Kharúsí, before he reached it. This is because the Sultan had sent his son Sd. Hamad to Nakhal to help the Sultan's force in the fort of al-'Awábí early in June of that year. However, Sd. Hámad did not go directly to the 'Awábí, but stayed at Nakhal and asked its inhabitants to join his troops, who refused to fight their fellow brothers and sons of their tribe in the 'Awábí (83).

Most of the inhabitants of al-'Awábí were from B. Kharús and al-'Abriyyín, with the political affairs of the town under the control of the latter tribe. Sh. Muhanná had previously captured al-'Awábí when it was under the control of Sd. Sa‘íd b. Ibráhím b. Qays the ruler of Rustáq (1903-1912) (84), and handed it over to the Sultan who appointed a Wálf over it and stationed there a garrison of 30 men under the command of al-Sharíf 'Abdalláh b. Sálim al-Ḥāḍramí, in 1901 (85). When Sh. Muhanná attacked al-'Awábí, the inhabitants surrendered immediately (except the fort under the control of al-Sharíf 'Abdalláh, who resisted for several days and later declared his surrender in the third week of Rajab, 1331/ June, 1913) (86).
Chart (3) Sh. Muhannà al-‘Abri’s campaign against al-‘Awâbi in Rajab, 1331/June, 1913
It must be pointed out that Sh. Nāṣir b. Rāshid al-Kharūṣi, who was a teacher in the town, had played an important role in preparing the inhabitants of the town for the Imam's rule. After the surrender of al-Sharīf and the withdrawal of his forces to Muscat (87), the inhabitants declared their loyalty to the Imam. Sh. Muhannā and the notables went to Samá’īl where the Imam was and gave their bay‘ah.

Al-Mushhadānī claims that after the fall of Izkí Imam Sālim proceeded to al-‘Awābī, whose inhabitants gave their allegiance to him (88). This contradicts those historians mentioned above who believe that the Imam did not go to al-‘Awābī, nor had any knowledge about Sh. Muhannā’s activities there. The Imam could only have gone there by one of two routes: either through Wádī Samá’īl or through Wádī Tanūf across the Jabal al-Akhḍar. Neither of these two routes were usable because the first was under the control of the Sultan, while the second route was far away and required that he should return to Tanūf first, which he did not do. It seems that al-Mushhadānī lacked any knowledge of the geographical position of al-‘Awābī, and probably thought that it was situated near Izkí.

Before the attack on Samá’īl by the Imam, Bidbid was occupied by the B. Bū ‘Alī and the Janabah, who replaced the Shuḥūh tribe which was withdrawn by Sd. Ḥamad b. Fāyṣal to assist the commander of al-‘Awābī garrison. The B. Bū ‘Alī and the Janabah, however, later retreated to Muscat three days (2nd Sha‘bān/7th July) after the attack on Samá’īl. The fort thus became defenceless except for a small defence force consisting of 12 men under the command of the sons of Sh. Sālim b. Sa‘īd al-Aghbarī (89). For this reason the Imam sent Sh. ‘Īsā b. Ṣalih with 200 men to besiege the fort of Bidbid. This force was joined by 90 other men from Izkí and Āl Wahībah under the leadership of Sh. Ḥamad b. Sūltān b. Sa‘īd al-Wahībī (90).

Sh. ‘Īsā besieged the fort until the arrival of Sd. Ḥamad b. Fāyṣal at the Wādī of B. Jābir on 21st July. He was then sent to al-Khawād to stop the advancing force of Sd. Taṣmūr b. Fāyṣal and was replaced by Sh. ‘Alī b. Hilāl b. Zāhir al-Hinā‘ī. Soon after that the latter was attacked by Sd. Ḥamad, but the attempt was unsuccessful and Sd Ḥamad was forced to retreat to the Wādī of the B. Jābir (91). This action made Sh. ‘Alī increase his pressure on the fort until the commander of the Sultan's garrison there finally
surrendered it on 25th Sha'bán/ 30th July. By this time Bidbid had fallen in to the hands of the Imam, and three days later Sd. Nádir left the fort of Samá‘il.

By winning the forts of Bidbid and Samá‘il, the Imam had achieved a great victory over the Sultan. These two forts represent two of the strategic and politically significant cities which have great importance in linking the interior of Oman with its coast. Had it not been for the lack of awareness of the tribes of this area of the importance of this pass, it would not have been possible for the tribes of the interior to attack Muscat at all. Cox, the Political Resident at the Gulf (PRG), claimed that the Sultan without Samá‘il would have been reduced to a mere Shaykh of Muscat (92).

After the fall of Samá‘il Sh. ‘Isà and Sh. Himyar left the town for Rustáq and Bahlà respectively. The mission of the former was to ask Sd. Aḥmad b. Ibráhim, the ruler of Rustáq, to declare his allegiance to the Imam. Sh. ‘Isà succeeded in doing this and he accompanied him to Samá‘il to met the Imam on 19th Ramaḍán/22nd August. He gave his bay'ah to the Imam who agreed to let him continue as ruler of Rustáq. Sh. Himyar on the other hand had also succeeded in his mission by winning the support of Sh. Náṣir b. Ḥumayd b. Ráshid al-Gháfírí, the ruler of Bahlà, to the Imam's side. The latter pledged his loyalty to the Imam in Samá‘il on 26th Ramaḍán/ 29th August.

Both Sh. ‘Isà and Sh. Himyar were influential figures among their respective tribes and by choosing them as his messengers, the Imam was able to muster the support of the Hínáwí and Gháfírí tribes as well as the support of Sd. Aḥmad, the ruler of Rustáq and Sh Náṣir, the ruler of Bahlà. Thus, he was able to spread his influence directly or indirectly, over a wider area of Oman.

Between August, 1913 and March of the following year, the Imam conducted no military operations whatsoever. This was mainly due to the death of the Sultan Fayṣal, who died on 4th Dhú al-Qi‘dah, 1331/ 4th October, 1913, and the coming to power of his elder son, Sd. Taymúr (1305/1887-1385/1965) (93), who showed some signs of reconciliation by inviting his former friend Sh. ‘Isà calling on him to make peace between him and the Imam (94). As a result military operations on all sides had ceased and the Imam took this opportunity to call upon the tribes of al-Sharqiyyah to give him their allegiance. He dispatched for this purpose Sh. al-Sálímí, Sh. Himyar, and Sd. Su‘úd b.
Hamad b. Hilal, who succeeded in winning over the subjects of al-Sharuj, and al-Rawashid in the Wadi ‘Indam, and the people of Samad al-Shan. The three leaders were also able to win the loyalty of al-Masàkirah and al-Hishim (96).

Sh. Himyar and Sd. Su’ud continued their tour and visited Sh. ‘Alî b. Abdallah b. Sālim Āl Ḥumūdah, the leader of the B. Bū ‘Alî, for the same purpose. It appears, however, that Sh. Himyar failed to win the support of Sh. ‘Alî, but succeeded in persuading him to remain neutral in the struggle between the Imam and the Sultan (89). The Janabah refused to meet him.

In Dhū al-Ḥijjah, 1331/ November, 1913, Sh. Ḥamdán b. Zāyid the ruler of Abu Dhabi (1912-1922) arrived at Muscat and wrote to Sh. ‘Isā and Sh. al-Sālimī, telling them that he came to make peace between the Sultan and the Imam, and that he would like to discuss the matter with them. Sh. ‘Isā and Sh. al-Sālimī were in al-Sharqiyyah at that time while the Imam was still in Samā’il. They responded to Sh. Ḥamdán’s request (97).

The Imam, however, refused the mediation of Sh. Ḥamdán by immediately sending Sh. ‘Āmir al-Mālikī to meet Sh. ‘Isā in al-Sīf and informing him of his disapproval of the proposed reconciliation. It must be pointed out that the meeting between Sh. ‘Isā and Sh. Ḥamdán at al-Sīf was convened without obtaining the consent of the Imam. The talks between Sh. ‘Isā and Sh. Ḥamdán continued, and the latter proposed to Sh. ‘Isā that he should meet the Sultan. Despite strong opposition from his adherents, Sh. ‘Isā met the Sultan in Muscat on 10th Muḥarram, 1332/9th December, 1913 and discussed with him the terms of reconciliation even though the Sultan was fully aware of the Imam’s opposition to such moves. The two men had agreed that Sh. ‘Isā should discuss these terms with the Imam in the hope that he might change his mind and agree to them (98). Sh. ‘Isā returned and discussed the terms with the Imam as agreed but the Imam refused to give him an immediate answer before consulting his Ṣhūrā Council, scheduled to meet at Nazwa later in the year. However, it refused all the terms reached by Sh. ‘Isā and the Sultan to achieve reconciliation (99).

The Imam remained in Samā’il until 30th Muḥarram, 1332/29th December, 1913 after which he left for Nazwa, after appointing Sd. Su’ud b. Ḥamad b. Hilal as Wālī of Samā’il. During this month he received a delegation from al Mā’awil tribe led by Sh. Sayf
b. Sálim al-Ma‘wálí and other notables of that tribe, among them being: Sh. Sayf b. Sa‘íd b. Sayf, Ḥamad b. Sa‘íd, Sa‘íd b. Khalfán and Sa‘íd b. Ḥamad b. Sayf. The purpose of this delegation was to meet the Imam and give allegiance to him and to urge him to expel the Wálí of the Sultan from their region. The Imam agreed to this demand and promised to see to it at a later date.

One month after the Imam’s arrival at Nazwá, Sh. al-Sálimí died in Tanúf (100). Following his death the Imam called a meeting of ‘ulamá’ towards the end of Rabí‘ I, 1332/February, 1914 to choose a successor to Sh. al-Sálimí. It was agreed on two things: (a) to appoint Sh. ‘Āmir al-Málikí as a successor to Sh. al-Sálimí to run the religious and administrative affairs of the Imamate (101), and (b) to extend the Imam’s authority over Nakhal and Wádí al-Ma‘wálí. The latter decision was taken to (i) fulfill the promise made by the Imam to the notables of al-Ma‘wálí tribe in his meeting with them, and more importantly (ii) to counter any damage that the death of Sh. al-Sálimí might have done to the morale of his forces, especially by the Sultan and his supporters (102).

To achieve the second objective the Imam moved with his troops at the beginning of Rabí‘ II, to occupy Nakhal and Wádí al-Ma‘wálí (see chart 4 below). He divided them into two groups: one was put under the command of Sh. ‘Isá, its task being to use the Wádí Samá’il and settle in Fanjá for counter any possible attack by the Sultan, and one under the command of the Imam, with the aim of crossing the Jabal al-Akhdár via Tanúf. The Imam left Nazwá to al-‘Awábí where he was welcomed by its people. Then he moved to Wádí al-Ma‘wálí which he entered via Muslimát (103). Its people pledged their allegiance, except for its Shaykh and Wálí Sh. Sulaymán b. Naṣír b. Muḥammad al-Ma’wálí (104). Later he was persuaded by his people to surrender the fort to the Imam. By doing so the Wádí al-Ma‘wálí fell in the hands of the Imam at the second half of Rabí‘ II without the need to resort to war (105).

The people of Nakhal then declared their loyalty to the Imam who sought the help of Sh. Himyar to address the inhabitants. They were mostly of Gháfírí political orientation. He persuaded them to give their allegiance. The only person who refused was the town’s Wálí, Sh. Aḥmad b. Thunayyán b. Sálim al-Ḥarráṣí, who asked Sh. Himyar to give him sometime to consult the Sultan about this matter (106). The Wálí’s demand was
granted and he wrote to the Sultan who replied: "if you don't have the power to fight, do whatever you like" (107). Accordingly Sh. Aḥmad asked Sh. Ḥimyar to allow him and his forces a safe passage out of the town and thus Nakhal fell at the end of Rabī' II/March, 1914. The Imam then issued a decree confiscating the property of Sd. Muḥammad b. Aḥmad b. Nāṣir al-Bū Saʿīdī, the Wālī of Maṭrah, and that of Sh. Rāshid b. ʿUzayyīz al-Khuṣaybī, the secretary of the Sultan in Nakhal (108).

As a response to the fall of Nakhal, the Sultan collected an ill-trained, heterogeneous force in order to counteract any possible attack by the Imam in Barkā'. The Imam expected that the Sultan would attack the Wādī al-Maʿawil or Nakhal and accordingly he divided his troops into three groups: the first group was under the leadership of Sh. ‘Īsā who was stationed at Fanjá, the second was in Ḥibrá village (109) and the third group was under the Imam's personal command stationed in Nakhal. This confrontation continued until 13th Jumāḍā II, when false news (110) reached the Imam that the Sultan's soldiers had attacked the Wādī al-Maʿawil (112). On hearing this the Imam ordered his army to advance towards Barkā' (113), where it met strong resistance from the Sultan's army and was stopped from entering the fort (see chart 4 below). However, the Imam was able to occupy the fort of Nuʿmān, a few miles west of Barkā’, and his followers occupied the house of Sulaymān b. Suwaylim. The fighting lasted for three days (13th, 14th, and 15th) and it ended in the Sultan's favour and the retreat of the Imam to Nakhal. This victory was brought about after the British ship H.M.S. Fox, at the request of the Sultan, bombarded the Imam's troops (113). The Imam lost in this campaign Sh. Sayf b. Saʿīd b. Sālim al-Maʿwālī, and Sh. Sulaymān b. Ḥamad al-Maʿwālī and an unspecified number of his people.

During the Imam's attack on Barkā', the B. Baṭtāsh, who had previously declared their loyalty to the Imam in 1331/1913, succeeded in attacking and occupying Qurayyāt. This forced the Sultan to send H.M.S. Dartmouth to repossess the town, which succeeded in expelling the attackers (114).
Chart (4) Imam Sālim’s military operations during the 1332/1914
Following his defeat at Barká', the Imam retreated to Nazwà, where he stayed until the end of the year 1914. It appears that he became convinced that his only hope for securing victory against the Sultan and his British allies was to get military assistance from abroad. Relying on the local human resources was not enough to achieve this goal because his men lacked the necessary modern weapons. He wrote to Imam Yahyà of Yaman and to the Turkish Wálí there Sa‘íd Páshá, asking for their assistance (115), but he received no reply. In the meantime he also wrote to the PAM asking him for an explanation of the involvement of British warships in his conflict with the Sultan, and of their bombardment of his troops without any prior warning something which constituted according to him a violation of the friendly spirit and previous correspondence between them (116).

Having received no response from the Imam Yahyà, Sa‘íd Páshá, and the British Representative at Muscat, the Imam called his Shúrâ council for a meeting to discuss the final bid to attack Muscat. The direct reason for this move was the success achieved by the B. Battásh, who had successfully attacked the British garrison at Ruwi, seizing some of their rifles while some of them attacked Qurayyát (117). Another reason for attacking Muscat at this particular time was to exploit British involvement in the First World War and the consequent withdrawal of British troops and ships from Muscat during the summer months of 1914 (118). During the meeting the Imam proposed that they attack Muscat and expel the Sultan and his British allies, but the council rejected this. Two main views were expressed:

(1) The occupation of Muscat and the expulsion of the Sultan represented one of the priorities of the Imamate. This was the view of the Imam.

(2) Other people, including Sh. ‘Isà, thought that it was inadvisable to enter into a fight with the Sultan or annex any part of his domain for two reasons: (a) the Sultan was supported by the British forces, and (b) the economic situation of the interior of Oman was weak and would not allow a sustained campaign.

The meeting broke up without reaching agreement, and it was left to the Imam to do what he thought was best. After the meeting messengers he travelled throughout Oman trying to gather the views of the tribes. It seems that most of the tribes backed Sh. ‘Isà’s view of the inadvisability of attacking Muscat. This would have made the Imam drop the
idea of attacking Muscat, had it not been for the British landing of additional forces at Maqrah. British sources state that "on 16th November, 1914, 6 companies of 95 Russell's Infantry arrived at Maqrah, which had the immediate effect of breaking up the concentration of the Imam's followers " (119). For this reason the Imam decided to attack Muscat, and in his letters to his followers he fixed mid- Ṣafar, 1333/ beginning of January, 1915 as the starting date for the mustering of his army at Fanjá. It was said that Sh. 'Isa had disagreed with the Imam over the expenses of the planned attack and refused to co-operate with him over this issue unless the question of funds was resolved (120).

The Imam solved this difficulty when he received some assistance from the Omanis resident in the East Africa. In addition the German agent in Tanganyika actively encouraged the Omanis to revolt against the Sultan and the British. We can not exclude the possibility that they may also have helped the Imam financially for this purpose. The opposition of Sh. 'Isa and his followers to war against the Sultan also suffered a set-back following Turkey's decision to enter the Great War on the side of the Germans against Britain and the jihad propaganda of the Ottoman Sultan which was supported also by the Germans. These factors forced Sh. 'Isa to drop his opposition to the Imam and reinstate his position (121).

After 'Id al-Adhá, 1332, the Imam left Nazwà for the Wádi al-Má'áwil to recruit men to attack Muscat (122). He succeeded in enlisting 400 men and marched with them to Bidbid, which they reached on 15th Ṣafar, 1333/ 2nd January, 1915 (123). The following day he was joined by Sh. 'Isà and Sh. Himyar, and the total number of his troops according to British sources reached 3,000 men (124). On 19th Ṣafar/6th January the Imam left Bidbid for Fanjá and two days later reached Bawshar (see chart 5 below).

The Sultan seemed not to be moved by these threats of attack on his seat of government. His military position was well secured by the presence of a British contingent of 950 men and comprising the 102nd K.E.O. Grenadiers were under the command of Colonel S.M. Edwards and the 95th Russell's Infantry was commanded by Major F.F. Major. The headquarters of the former was at Bayt al-Falaj and that of the latter was at Ruwi (125). In addition there were 500 men of al-'Awámir tribe especially reported by the Sultan for the defence of Muscat against any possible attack by the Imam.
or the B. Baṭṭāsh. Moreover, there were two small pickets to protect Maṭrāḥ in the event of the Imam's army overrunning the town and holding hostage the British infantry there. One of these pickets was stationed on the hills west of Dār Sayt and the other was on Murtafraṭ al-'Aynār behind the Eastern hills of Dār Sayt on the West of Maṭrāḥ (126). The Sultan also decided to put a sea force under his command opposite Dār Sayt and Waṭayyah to bombard any attacking force from this coastal position.

Two days after his arrival at Bawshar, the Imam ordered his troops to march to Waṭayyah and before the sun set on 10th January some of his army under the command of Sh. ‘Alī b. Šāliḥ al-Ḥārithi, the brother of Sh. ‘Isā, reached the village. The remaining part of the army had reached the village at night, while some could not reach their destination until the following morning.

On reaching Waṭayyah, Sh. ‘Alī immediately decided to attack the British garrison stationed at the Eastern Heights of the village and he succeeded in expelling the 95th Russell's Infantry from its position and occupied the surrounding mountains overlooking the Bayt al-Falaj and Ruwi. At midnight, and with the full moon of the 24 of Šafar/11th January he continued his march forward and occupied Dār Sayt. On the following morning the Imam's army rushed from Waṭayyah and climbed the heights overlooking the Bayt al-Falaj. The British, however, were able to regroup and they succeeded in recapturing their former position and in cutting the line of communication between Sh. ‘Alī and the Imam. A fierce battle then commenced between the two sides which lasted until midday. Before daybreak the whole line from Ruwi on the left flank of Jabal to Dār Sayt was engaged in this battle. According to Bannerman by the morning of 11th of January several positions had been lost by the 102nd K.E.O. and the British situation became critical, with many skirmishes and hand to hand fighting (127). The ensuing pressure forced the Imam's army to retreat in disorder to Waṭayyah with some considerable loss of life and many injuries (128). Sh. ‘Alī and his force, on the other hand, retreated to the hills surrounding the Dār Sayt and stayed there until nightfall before they finally retreated to Waṭayyah owing to shortages in ammunition, food and water (129).
During all this time the Imam lacked any knowledge of the whereabouts of the divisions of his army and had no plan how to salvage the situation. This lack of coordination together with the haste of his army leaders in conducting this campaign, were the main reasons for his defeat (130). The total losses among his army were 186 killed and 141 injured. The British on the other hand lost 7 rank and file and 15 wounded. Among the latter was Captain Coat from the 102nd K.E.O., who died later (131). Sh. Muhammad al-Salimi blamed Sh. 'Alf b. Šalih for occupying the hills surrounding the Waṭayyah before the army preparations were completed and for being deceived by the big size of the army (132). Sh. Muḥammad al-Salimi gives 52 men killed, and he ignores the total number of the wounded, but he further puts forward the point that the Sultan's authorities looked after their wounded better, and after they had recuperated, they were returned to their homes (133).

The following table shows the names of the tribes and approximate numbers of
those killed or wounded on the night of 10th-11th of January, 1915 according to British sources (134):

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Tribes</th>
<th>Leaders</th>
<th>Killed</th>
<th>Wounded</th>
<th>Remark</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>B. Riyám</td>
<td>1- Imam Sālim</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>No. 3 killed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2- Sh. Ḥimyar</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>No. 4 wounded</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3- ‘Alī b. Ḥumayd</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>4- Zuhayr b. Sa‘īd</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hīrth</td>
<td>1- Sh. ‘Īsā b. Ẓāliḥ</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>No. 2 wounded</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2- Sh. ‘Alī b. Ẓāliḥ</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>No. 4 killed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3- Sh. Muḥammad b. ‘Īsā</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>No. 5 wounded and later died</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>4- Ḥamdān b. Sulaymān</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>5- Muḥammad b. Sulaymān</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ḥajriyyīn</td>
<td>1- Sa‘īd b Sayf b. Muḥammad</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>22</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2-‘Āmīr b. Muḥammad</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rahbiyyīn</td>
<td>Sh. Sulṭān b. Sālim</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nadābiyyīn</td>
<td>Muḥsin b. Zahrān</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ḥūbūs</td>
<td>1-‘Alī b. Ḥamad</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>16</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2-‘Abdallāh b. Sālim</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3- Mālik b. Sayf</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>‘Awāmir*</td>
<td>1-Ḥumūd b. Ḥāshim</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>10</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2- sons of Muḥammad b. Sayf</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B. Baṭṭāsh</td>
<td>Sh. Sulṭān b. Muḥammad</td>
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<tr>
<td>B. Ruwāḥah</td>
<td>1- Sh. Muḥammad al-Khalīf</td>
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<td>Sh. Sayf b. ‘Alī</td>
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<tr>
<td>al-Siyābiyyīn</td>
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<td>Sh. Hilāl b. Ḥamad</td>
<td>3</td>
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<tr>
<td>B. Jābir</td>
<td>Sh. Zahrān b. Sa‘īd</td>
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<tr>
<td>al-Ḥadārim</td>
<td>(1) Muḥammad b. Sālim</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>No. 1 wounded and later died</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Miscellaneous</td>
<td></td>
<td>57</td>
<td>43</td>
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Total ................................ 186 141

* This part of ‘Awāmir lives in the Interior, and supported the Imam.
On hearing of the Imam’s attack on the British at Bayt al-Falaj, the B. Baṭṭāsh came to his help, but on reaching Waṭayyah, they found that he and his troops had already left. They then decided to attack Ruwi and al-Qurm, and they returned to their land after taking sheep and goats belonging to the British garrison (135).

The Imam's defeated army returned to Samā’il with mutual recriminations. In this elation, the Sultan thought of recapturing the Wādī Samā’il by trying to persuade the British to press on the Imam’s retreating army. He was encouraged in this by the actions of the Ghāfirī tribes at this Wādī, who did not want to be under the Imam's domination (136). The British, however, turned down the Sultan's request because they did not want to go too far into the Interior of Oman where they had no interests. This was expressed in a letter by the PAM to the Sultan in which he indicated that:

"with the knowledge that our accepted policy is one of non-intervention in the hinterland and that His Highness's proposal was fraught with dangers greater than any advantages that might be expected to follow, I informed His Highness that I could give him no assurance whatever in this matter which also demanded a reference to my government" (137).

These views of the PAM were in total agreement with the British government's view of non-intervention in Oman's hinterland.

On reaching Samā’il, the Imam held an urgent meeting with his followers to discuss the reasons behind his military defeat by the Sultan and what should be done in future. It was agreed to suspend all military activities against the Sultan.

In the meantime, Sh. Sulṭān b. Muḥammad b. ‘Alī al-Na‘īmī, the ruler of the Buraymī, offered to mediate between the Sultan and the Imam. He arrived in Muscat for this purpose and asked the Sultan for a ten days truce in hostilities between him and the Imam. The Sultan granted Sh. al-Na‘īmī this. Sh. al-Na‘īmī then wrote to the Imam explaining to him his initiative, and insisted in his letter to him that if he did not receive any response within ten days from sending his letter to him, the Sultan would try to recapture Samā’il. The Imam was desperate, and needed this mediation for the fear that the victorious British army might advance and occupy the Wādī of Samā’il. This was in addition to the low morale among his men following their defeat. For this reason, the Imam immediately agreed to Sh. al-Na‘īmī's offer, delegating Sh. ‘Isā to represent him in these talks. Sh. ‘Isā arrived at al-Sīb where he met Sh. al-Na‘īmī, accompanied by Sd.
Nádir b. Fáyṣal during the second half of January, 1915 (138). However, nothing was accomplished in these talks and as a result, Sh. al-Naʿímí was forced to write to the Shaykh of the B. Gháfír of the Wádí Samáʿīl, asking them to come and meet him at al-Sīb to discuss the situation and to assess their willingness to cooperate with the Sultan (139). Some of these Shaykhs responded positively to Sh. al-Naʿímí's call and met him at al-Sīb on 9th Rabiʿ I, 1333/26 January, 1915. Among them were: Sh. Saʿíd b. Ráshid al-Hadábi, Sh. Saʿíd b. Ráshid b. Muḥammad al-Jábirī, Sh. Muḥammad b. Saʿíd b. ‘Umar al-Jábirī, and Sh. Ḥumayd b. Málīk al-Jábirī. Others responded by sending their apologies for not being able to meet Sh. al-Naʿímí at al-Sīb because of the pressures exerted upon them by the Imam (140). Sh. al-Naʿímí was not put off by the failure of his talks with Sh. ‘Isá. He tried once again to put life into his initiative by writing a number of letters to Sh. Ḥimyar asking him to meet him in al-Sīb. Sh. Ḥimyar, however, apologised for Sh. al-Naʿímí for not being able to come and see him at al-Sīb. Instead he suggested that they should meet at Samáʿīl. Failing to achieve any success in his effort to end the dispute, Sh. al-Naʿímí finally left al-Sīb (141).

The Imam returned to Nazwā where he stayed for a few months, and then left it for Nakhal to suppress the revolt of the people of Tāww (142) against him who were supported by Sd. Muḥammad b. Hilál b. Saʿíd al-Bú Saʿídí, the Wálī of al-Sīb (143). The fighting between the Imam's force and this group finally ended with the people of Tāww declaring their loyalty to the Imam after the mediation of Sh. Ḥimyar (144).

Following the defeat of the Imam's forces in the Bayt al-Falaj, and his pressure on them, the B. Gháfír of the Wádí Samáʿīl asked the Sultan to hasten to recapture their Wádí. They encouraged him to take the opportunity of the disarray of the Imam's forces to do so.

The Sultan wanted to reclaim the Wádí Samáʿīl (see above), but he lacked the necessary force and his British allies refused to help him. The British position was made clear during the visit of the viceroy of India, Lord Hardinge, to Muscat on 11th February 1915. He tried to convince the Sultan that even if normal conditions were restored, troubles would break out anew and that the best solution to the problem would be through negotiation and reconciliation. The Sultan, however, took no notice of this and prepared a
campaign against the B. Baṯāsh. He formed an army consisting of four divisions, under the command of his brother Sd. Nādir b. Faysal, Sd. Muḥammad b. Aḥmad b. Nāṣir, the Wālī of Maṯrāḥ, Sd. Ḥumūd b. Ḥamad b. Hilāl, the Wālī of Ṣūr, and his minister Sh. Rāshid b. ‘Uzayyiz. Using this force the Sultan was able to reclaim the area of the B. Baṯāsh, and to dismiss the Wālī of the Imam, Sh. Aḥmad b. Salīm b. al-Murr al-‘Arīfī, from his post. The Sultan's forces then moved to al-Šīb in an effort to restore Samāʾīl.

Those gains by the Sultan's forces forced the Imam to revise his plans. He reacted by sending a force under the command of Sh. ‘Alī b. Ṣāliḥ to Fanjá to counter any attack from the Sultan's army which was expected to reach the Wādī Samāʾīl at the beginning of Sha’bān, 1333/June 1915. He also sent messages to Sd. Suʿūd b. Ḥamad b. Hilāl, the Wālī Samāʾīl, and Sh. Sūlṭān b. Sālim b. Ḥasan al-Raḥabī, asking them to cooperate and help Sh. ‘Alī b. Ṣāliḥ in his mission. In the meantime he sent to Sh. ‘Isā and Sh. Ḥimyar informing them about the situation and asking them to come to his aid. He recruited some men by himself from the Wādī al-Maʿāwil and moved with them to Samāʾīl on 14th Ramaḍān /27July (145).

On reaching al-Šīb the Sultan despatched a force under the command of Sh. Rāshid b. ‘Uzayyiz to test the resolve of the Imam's force. They were able to report that the Imam had collected a formidable force; they returned to their base after one of its leaders, Sh. Saʿūd b. Aḥmad al-Jābirī, was captured by the Imam and later executed for espionage (146).

The Imam stayed for a whole month in Samāʾīl expecting the Sultan to attack him, but nothing took place. He then wrote to the B. Ghāfir (B. Jābir and al-Siyābiyyīn) asking them to declare their loyalty to him under threat of his declaring war against them. The response of these two tribes was negative and the Imam immediately started to put his threat of a campaign against them into action. The Shaykhs of the Masākirah tribe (147) offered to mediate between the Imam and those tribes. The offer of mediation was accepted and the two tribes later agreed to give their loyalty to the Imam who imprisoned their Shaykhs except the Shaykh of al-Siyābiyyīn, Sh. Muḥsin b. Zahrān b. Muḥsin who fled the area to Muscat (148).
In Dhú al-Qi’dah, 1333 the Imam visited al-Sharqiyyah Province in an effort to persuade some of the tribes there to declared their loyalty to him. He visited Samad al-Shán, Sanáw, and Badiyyah. In Samad he received the loyalty of the leaders of Āl Wahšbah, among them were (149):

2. Sh.‘Alí b. Sulṭán al-Ghufaylí
3. Sh. Su’úd b. Muḥammad al-Ghufaylí
4. Sh. Sa’íd b. Ráshid al-Jaḥáfí
5. Sh. Wanay b. Sulṭán al-Jaḥáfí
6. Sh. Sálim b. Ḥumūd al-Jaḥáfí (150)

It was rumoured that the main purpose of the Imam's visit to al-Sharqiyyah was to attack Šúr, and all local tribes joined him except the B. Bú Ḥasan (Hináwfi) and the Janabah (Gháfírī) who opposed him (151). In fact that the Imam was very willing to bring the town of Šúr under his control, but his plan may have been put off by the offer of the PAM to mediate between him and the Sultan (152).

After that the Imam returned to the Wádí al-Ma’áwil from Bahlà, and Sh. 'Isà visited Sd. Aḥmad b. Ibráhím at Rustáq at the beginning of Shawwál. The purpose of this visit was to tell him that the Imam was not happy about his administration of the town, and that the people of Rustáq had complained to the Imam about him many times before. Sd. Aḥmad explained his position and accepted the criticisms against him on the basis that the human being is prone to make good and bad things, and correcting one's position is in itself a good practice (153). Sh. 'Isà then suggested to Sd. Aḥmad to meet the Imam to improve his image in his eyes and clear any misunderstanding between them. This meeting took place in Dhú al-Qi’dah, 1334/ September, 1916, the result of which was the improvement of the relations between the two men (154). But these friendly relations were broken by renewed complaints against Sd. Aḥmad from the people of Rustáq. For these reasons the Imam decided to dismiss Sd. Aḥmad from his post as ruler of Rustáq and when he consulted his Shúrā council, they all agreed to his decision, except Sh. 'Isà, who remained unconvinced that these complaints were good enough to warrant the dismissal of Sd. Aḥmad from his post (156).
On 22nd Jumâdâ I, 1335/ 25th March, 1917 the Imam left Nazwâ to Rustáq to depose its ruler Sd. Âhmâd b. Ibrâhîm, but before reaching it he sent a letter to him asking him to leave the town peacefully (see chart 2 above). According to Sh. Muḥammad al-Sâlimî, Sd. Âhmâd rejected the Imam’s request to leave the town because he found it hard to give up his rule and to leave the place where he was born and brought up. For this reason he decided to resist the decision to sack him by barricading himself and a few of his followers inside the fort after he had been betrayed by his allies (157). As we mentioned earlier in chapter I, Sd. Âhmâd had inherited the rule of Rustáq from his ancestors, who had held power since the 1830s. Throughout this period the central authority had failed to confiscate power from his family which remained an influential force in the area for decades.

Faced with Sd. Âhmâd’s refusal to leave Rustáq, the Imam finally declared war against him by besieging the town for a period of five months, despite the effort of al-Sâyyidah Aṣâlah bint Ibrâhîm, the sister of Sd. Âhmâd, to break the siege against her brother by asking the assistance of the Sultan. The latter responded to the situation by sending a force under the command of his brother, Sd. Ḥamâd b. Fayṣâl, and accompanied by Sd. Muḥammad b. Ḥamâd b. Hilâl, the Wâlî of Ṣuḥâr, Muẓaffâr b. Sulaymán, the Wâlî of Khâbûrah, Sh. Sulâ tán b. Muḥammad al-Na’îmî, the ruler of Buraymî, and Sh. Khalâf b. Sanân b. Ghuṣn al-‘Alawi, the Shaykh of Yanqîl, to help the besieged ruler (158). It must be pointed out that al-Sâyyidah Aṣâlah was in control of the fort of al-Ḥazîm which she captured from her brother Sd. Âhmâd in Shawwâl 1334/August, 1916 after she felt that her brother was inclined to support the Imam. She also feared that she might lose the rule of her ancestors and their authority over the region (159). The siege of Rustáq ended after Sh. Ḥimyâr had mediated between the belligerents. It was agreed that Sd. Âhmâd should leave the fort with all his force and in return to leave al-Ḥazîm (160) on 23rd Shawwâl 1335/13th August, 1917 (161).

This brought the rule of the family of Âhmâd in Rustáq to an end after more than eighty five years of power. Two years later Sd. Âhmâd tried to restore Rustáq from his exile, but failed in his attempt and as a result the Imam decided to expel him from the Ḥazim in Sha‘bân, 1338 (162). This problem was solved only after mediation by Sh. ‘Alî
b. Hilál b. Záhir, on condition that Sd. Aḥmad should leave for Báţinah and the fort of al-Ḥazim should be controlled by the sons of his brother, Sd. Saʻid b. Ibráhím, who were in the custody of their aunt, al-Sayyidah Aṣfalah bint Ibráhím. But two months later the Imam was assassinated in his sleep and Sd Aḥmad took the opportunity to regain Rustáq once more, though he did not stay for long, because the Imam's successor, Imam Muḥammad b. ʻAbdalláh, succeeded in forcing him out.
Endnotes

(1) (R.O. II) p. 734.
(2) By the term town is meant the largest and most important settlement which represents a centre for a group of villages surrounding it. In Oman it is called Wilayah, and its governor is called Wali. Towns vary in the number of villages in their domain. For example, Nazwa has 43 villages, Izki 50 villages, Samaki 46, and Bidbid 41 villages, with the total number of villages in the Interior Province reaching 256, centred in 8 Wilayahs. See Murshid pp. 113-136.
(3) al-Salimi, M. A. op. cit. p. 168.
(4) (R.O. II) p. 734.
(5) al-Salimi, M. A. op. cit. pp. 171f.
(6) (R.O. II) p. 734.
(7) For further information about Nazwa see Lorimer, op. cit. vol. 8 pp. 1364f.
(8) al-Salimi, M. A. op. cit. p. 177; (R.O. II) p. 711.
(9) Bannerman, op. cit. p. 259, claims that the main reason for the fall the town was the treachery of its inhabitants.
(11) Bannerman, op. cit. p. 253 states that the Sultan's garrison in Nazwa was under the command of the Wali. This is incorrect, because this garrison was usually out of the control of the Wali. See al-Salimi, M.A. op. cit. p. 178.
(12) al-Mashhadani, op. cit. p. 61 states that the inhabitants of Nazwa had responded to the call of the Imam to give their bay'ah to him. The present writer disagrees with this view, because people of Nazwa, specially the inhabitants of al-Safalah, had defended the town when the Imam attacked. Moreover, the war had raged on for seven days and finally, the total number of these captures exceeded one thousand persons. This view is not supported by any sources.
(13) Bannerman, op. cit. p.259 states that the number of those killed was 12 men. This number in fact represents the number of those killed in the first attack. See (R.O II) p. 711.
(14) al-Salimi, M.A. op. cit. p. 179.
(15) al-Mashhadan, op. cit. p.61 states that the total number of those killed was only 25 persons. This total, however, is too low and probably it represents the number of those killed in the first attack.
(16) (R.O. II) p. 734.
(17) The fort of Mosque was built by Sh. Hilal b. Zahir al-Hinawi during his control over Nazwa.
(18) al-Salimi, M. A. op. cit. p. 177.
(19) Lughat al-'Arab, vol. III part. 4 (Oct. 1913) p. 223, states that the Imam gave the Wali of Nazwa safe passage if he surrendered himself. The Wali asked the Imam to give him one hour to think. When the Imam accepted his request, he committed suicide.
(20) al-Salimi, M. A. op. cit. p. 177.
(21) al-Salimi, M. A. op. cit. p. 172.
(22) al-Salimi, M. A. op. cit. pp. 179f.
(23) Manah is situated twelve miles South-East of Nazwa, and most of its inhabitants were from al-BuSa'id tribe. The power centre of the Wilayah was in the village of al-Fayqayn. See Lorimer, op. cit., vol. 8 p. 115; Murshid al-Wilayah, p. 123.
(24) (R.O. II) p. 734.
(26) For further information about the tribes which supported the Sultan at this stage, see Bannerman op. cit. pp 272ff.
(27) al-Mushhadânî, op. cit. p. 33.
(29) (LO) R15/135/42; Bannerman, op. cit. p. 267.
(30) (R.O. II) p. 734.
(31) Izki is an important town in the interior, situated on Wad Hilfin and it is divided into two sections: the Yaman section and Nizir section. The former is inhabited by the Hindawi faction (B. Ruwâbah, al-Dârîmâh and al-Manádirîhâh), and the latter by the Ghâfîrî faction (B. Riyâm). See Lorimer, op. cit. vol. 7 p. 882; Wilkinson, water pp. 208-38; Anthony, op. cit. pp. 48f; Murshid al-Wilayah pp. 131f.
(32) The Qaryatayn lies south of Izki. Its inhabitants, beside the B. Rashid were al-'Awâmîr tribe. See: Lorimer op. cit. vol.8. p. 1374; Murshid al-Wilayah, p. 122.
(33) al-Salimi, M. A. op. cit. p. 187.
(34) Izki is situated 36 miles Eastern of Nazwa.
Saddi is only one mile away from Izki, it is located on Wadi Qant, a tributary of Wadi 'Indam, and most of its inhabitants were from B. Ruwāţah. See Lorimer, op.cit. vol.8 p. 1374; Murshid p. 121.

(R.O. II) p. 734.

(36) al-Mughfrī states on p. 401 that ‘Awaḍ al-Ḫaḍramī was a supporter of Sd. Khālid b. Barghash the Sultan of Zanzibar, but after the overthrow of Sd. Khālid by the British government in 1314/1897, all the supporters of Sd. Khālid including ‘Awaḍ were purged.

(37) (R.O. II) p. 1374; Murshid p. 121.


(39) al-Sālimī, M. A. op.cit. p. 183.

(40) al-Sālimī, M. A. op.cit. p. 184.

(41) Qūrūt is a village situated on the left bank of Wādī Ḥifṣīn about four miles above Izki and had date palm groves estimated by Lorimer in 1906 at 30,000 trees. See Lorimer op.cit. vol. 8 p. 1374; Murshid al-Wilāyāt p. 121.

(42) al-Sālimī, M. A. op.cit. p. 184.

(R.O. II) p. 719.

(45) Handbook of Arabia (H. A.) pp. 259f.

(46) Lorimer, op.cit. vol. 7 p. 889.

(47) Wādī B. Jābir is situated in Western Hajar and it is the only tributary of Wādī Samā’il on the West. The two Wādīs meet at al-Multaqa village, see Lorimer, op.cit. vol. 7 pp. 889f.

(48) See a letter in (R.O. II) p. 722.

(49) See a letter in (R.O. II) p. 722.

(R.O. II) p. 719.

(51) See a letter in (R.O. II) p. 722.

(52) Sh. Ḥimyar pointed out in his letter to Sh. Muḥammad b. Nāṣir Āl Ḥumūdah that the reason why Āl Wahibah left Samā’il was that they were convinced of the manifestation of Islamic rule. See a letter in (R.O. II) p. 722.

(53) See a letter in (R.O. II) p. 719.

(54) Bannerman, op.cit. p. 266.

(55) Murphy op.cit. p.130; Bannerman, op.cit. p.263.


Murphy, op.cit. p. 130.

(57) See the letters of Sh. Ḥimyar and Sh. ‘Īsā in (R.O. II) pp. 721-3.

(58) See Sh. Ḥimyar’s letter in (R.O. II) p. 720.

(59) Bannerman, op.cit. p.720.

(R.O. II) p. 720.

(60) Bannerman, op.cit. pp. 49-54.

(61) See the Imam’s letters (both in Arabic and English) in (R.O. II) pp. 740f and the PAM’s letters (both in Arabic and English) in (R.O. II) pp. 744f.


(63) See the Imam’s letters (both in Arabic and English) in (R.O. II) pp. 740f and the PAM’s letters (both in Arabic and English) in (R.O. II) pp. 744f.

(64) Further information about Sh. Sū’ūd’s family can be obtained from al-Hāshimy, S.M. The Relations pp. 120-5.

(65) See Sh. Sū’ūd’s letter in (R.O. II) p. 728.


(67) For further information about the Ghāfirī tribes loyal to the Sultan in Wādī Samā’il see: Bannerman, op.cit. p. 267.

(68) See the letters from Sh. Muḥsin b. Sū’ūd al-Jābrī to the Sd. Hamad and Muẓaffar in which he requests from them to leave the Wādī B. Jābir in (I.O.) R/15/6/42.

(69) al-Sālimī, M. A. op.cit. p. 190.

(70) al-Sālimī, M. A. op.cit. p. 190.

(71) See a letter of Sh. Muḥammad b. ‘Abdallāh al-Khalīfī to his father dated 3rd of Ramaḍān, 1331. The present writer was able to obtain a copy of this document and it is contained in Appendix 8.

(72) Sh. ‘Abdallāh on leaving the fort left public life and stayed at his home. He later wrote to the Sultan expressing his wish to live in Muscat. His request was granted and he left Samā’il early in Muḥarram 1332, but he was killed by a stray bullet on Jumāḍā II, 1332/ May 1913, when he was visiting Sh. Sayf b. Muḥammad al-Ḥuwṣānī at the Wādī al-Ḥawāsinah.


(74) (Adm. R. 1916) p. 65 in this report the PAM mentions that Sh. Nāṣir had received presents of money, rice and arms from the Sultan.

Sh. Nāṣir descends from Imam Muhammad b. Nāṣir al-Ghafīrī (1724-1728), and his family was a tamīmah of the B. Ghafīrī faction. In 1860s his family, however, lost its position with the death of his father and grandfather. As a result Sh. Nāṣir and his brothers were put under the custody of their slave 'Ubayd b. Surūr, and Sh. Muḥsin b. Zahrān al-ʻAbrī. Accordingly they were deposed from the ruler of Bahla by Sh. Muḥammad b. Ṭāhir b. Ṭāhir, but they regained their position in Bahla after the death of the Imam ʻĀzzān in 1871. But they lost their leadership of the B. Ghafīrī which fell to the hands of Sh. Ḥimyar b. Nāṣir al-Nabhānī. For more information about this family see al-Sālimī, A.H. op.cit., pp. 261f; al-ʻAbrī, op.cit., pp. 147ff.

For more information about the mediation of Sh. ʻĪsā see al-Sālimī, M.A. op.cit., p. 241f.

Sh. Muḥammad succeeded his father Ḥamad b. Muḥsin b. Zahrān al-ʻAbrī as Shaykh of his tribe in 1317/1998. his tribe was of a Nizārī origin and a Ghafīrī political orientation, living in different regions of the Western Hajar Province and the Zāhirīrah province. Miles estimated the total number of this tribe in 1880 at 8,000 persons. Sh. Muhannā was on 17th Rajab/22nd June, which is the same date of the arrival of Murthy, op.cit., p. 6. 500. Miles described al-ʻAbriyyīn by saying that "they are generally well-behaved and peaceful tribe". For further information about this tribe See al-ʻAbrī, Ibrāhim. Tabṣīrat al-Muṭābirīn.; Miles's account in (Adm. R.1880); Lorimer, op.cit., vol. 6 p. 16.

The fort was also known by Bayt al-ʻAwabī and it was previously known by the name of Bayt Suwānī after the ʻAwabī itself, the old name of the town. See al-Sālimī, M.A. op.cit., p. 376.

There is disagreement as to when the ʻAwabī fell to the Sultan. Lorimer, op.cit., vol. 6. p. 186 gives the date as 1900. This was also confirmed by the (Adm. R. 1900-1) p. 15.

The fort was also known by Bayt al-ʻAwabī and it was previously known by the name of Bayt Suwānī after the ʻAwabī itself, the old name of the town. See al-Sālimī, M.A. op.cit., p. 376.

There is disagreement as to when the ʻAwabī fell to the Sultan. Lorimer, op.cit., p. 125 mentions that the town had fallen at the end of the Rajab, while al-Sālimī, M.A. op.cit., p.185 gives the date as 17th Rajab/22nd June, which is the same date of the arrival of Sh. Ṣād b. ʻĀlī b. Ḥātimmī by saying that "they are generally well-behaved and peaceful tribe". For further information about this tribe See al-ʻAbrī, Ibrāhim. Tabṣīrat al-Muṭābirīn.; Miles's account in (Adm. R.1880); Lorimer, op.cit., vol. 6 p. 16.

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side”. It was reported later that Sh. ‘Isà had said this reply was in total agreement to what I (Sh. ‘Isà) had in mind.

(99) Al-Mashhdádist (op.cit, p. 78) states that Sh. ‘Isà met the Imam at Nazwà and after the Imam’s refusal to accept reconciliation, he sent Sh. Hámíd b. Sayf al-Ruwádhí to Sh. Hámán b. Abú Dhabi who was in al-Záhirah Province, informing him of the Imam’s refusal. This narration, however, is incorrect because Sh. ‘Isà did not go to Nazwà but instead he went from Sáma’il to his land at al-Sharqiyah and that Sh. Hámíd b. Sayf al-Ruwádhí was sent to Sh. ‘Isà and not to Hámán b. Záyid, see al-Sálimí, M. A. op.cit, p. 219.

(100) Sh. al-Sálimí died on 5th Rabi’ I, 1332/1st February, 1914.

(101) al-Sálimí, M.A. op.cit, p. 222.

(102) al-Ḥaráthi, Sa’íd. op.cit, p. 32.

(103) Lorimer, op.cit, vol. 8 p. 1114.

(104) Sh. Sulaymán used to rule three villages in the Wádí al-Má’áwil including, al-Wásiçt, Iffí and Muslimá, See (R.O IV) p. 641.

(105) al-Sálimí, M.A. op.cit, p. 222 states that Sh. Ḥámád b. Sa’íd b. Ahmad al-Má’awlí had paid all the expenses of the Imam’s troops during this campaign.

(106) Sh. Ahmad b. Thunayyán was supported in his action by Sd. Ḥárib b. Ḥámád b. Sayf, the brother of previous Wálí of Nazwà See (R.O II), p. 30.

(107) al-Sálimí, M.A. op.cit, p. 123.

(108) al-Sálimí, M.A. op.cit, p. 219.

(109) Lorimer, op.cit, vol. 8 p. 1114.

(110) What happened was that Sh. Ḥámád b. Hilád al-Sa’ídí, the Shaykh of ‘Yál Sa’íd, wanted to mediate between the Imam and the Sultan. He went to Nakhal in the company of his men to see the Imam, and offer his mediation. On seeing Sh. Ḥámád and his men, the Imam’s followers thought that those were the Sultan’s troops.

(111) al-Sálimí, M.A. op.cit, p. 226.

(112) This narration is based on al-Sálimí’s account (op.cit, p. 226) of events, but it seems that the reasons for the Imam’s desire to occupy Barka’ were totally different, as pointed out by al-Ḥaráthi, Sa’íd. op.cit, pp. 221, who states that the Imam’s reason for this move was the encouragement of the Shaykhs of al-Ḥajríyín tribe to the Imam to capture Barká’. This account of events is supported by the Sultan’s letter to the PAM, dated 12th Jumádá I, (the night of 13th Jumádá I) in which he demanded him to send H.M.S. Fox to his aid. He also mentioned in this letter that the enemy was near Barká’. In another letter to the Sultan, he mentioned, that the attack on Barká’ took place on the morning of 13th Jumádá I. This proves that the Imam was well prepared to attack Barká’, but he did not give the final order for the army to march and the news of his attack was no more than rumour. He was in a position to halt this operation when he knew of the news, because he had ample time to do so.

(113) al-Sálimí, M.A. op.cit, p. 227; al-Ḥaráthi, Sa’íd. op.cit, p. 23; (R.O II) p. 30.

(114) al-Sálimí, M.A. op.cit, pp. 234f; (R.O II) p. 30.

(115) (Adm. R. 1918) p. 47.

(116) See the Imam’s letter to PAM, dated on 16th Jumádá I, in (L.O) R15/6/43.

(117) (R.O II) p. 46.

(118) (L.O) R15/2/29/2; Bannerman, op.cit, p. 303.

(119) (R.O II) p. 47.

(120) (R.O II) p. 47.

(121) See reports from Súr, Sáma’il, and the Wádí al-Má’áwil about the role of the German Agents in Oman during this period in (R.O III) pp. 79-81.

(122) He appointed the Qádí Sh. Sulaymán b. Muḥammad b. Aḥmad al-Kindí (d. 1337/1019) as a Wálí of Nazwà.


(124) (R.O III) p. 49; Murphy, op.cit, p. 136.

(125) (R.O III) p. 49.

(126) Murphy, op.cit, p. 135; al-Mousawi, op.cit, p. 296.

(127) Bannerman, op.cit, p. 3307.

(128) For further information about this battle, see Murphy, op.cit, pp. 135f; (R.O III) pp. 36-56.

(129) al-Sálimí, M.A. op.cit, p. 129.

(130) al-Ḥaráthi, Sa’íd. (op.cit, p. 227) states that the British army dug ditches which they covered with grass, a factor which caused many of the Imam’s soldiers fall in these ditches; among them were his uncle, Sh. Muḥammad b. Sulaymán b. Ḥumayd.

(131) The 102nd K.E.O. Grenadiers relieved the 2nd Ruijput in November, 1914.

(132) al-Sálimí, M.A. op.cit, p. 228.
The Imam ordered the arrest of Sh. Ahmad b. Thunayyán al-Harrási. See about this the letter from Sd. Ahmad b. Ibráhím to Sd. Ḥumúd b. ‘Azzán dated 2nd Jumádá II, 1333/17th April 1914 in (I.O.) R/15/6/45.

Sh. Salim is the son of Sh. Ḥumúd b. Sā‘íd b. Ráshíd al-Ja‘áfí who played a great role in the political events during the second half of the 19th century.
CHAPTER 1

THE IMAM'S REGIONAL RELATIONS AND THE ROLE OF THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT

In this chapter it is proposed to discuss the political relationship of the Imam with Sd. Fayṣal and his son, Sd. Taymūr. We will also shed light on the British role. At the same time, there were some influential local figures who played an important role in bridging the divergent views between the Imam and the Sultan and consequently in ending the hostilities by peaceful means. These efforts, which were exerted by such local figures, were by no means less than those worked out by official personalities. It is customary to ascribe to official efforts all possible achievements. However, if we accept the argument that local figures had laid the actual foundation for the success achieved by the official bodies, we cannot ignore the role of these local figures. This chapter will discuss the five attempts made to conclude a peace agreement between the Imam and the Sultan.

1) The Initiative of Sh. ‘Isa b. Sāliḥ al-Ḥarīthi.

After having been elected for the Imamate, Imam Sālim sent to the Sultan, Sd. Fayṣal, telling him of this, and invited the Sultan to pay homage to him. However, the Sultan ignored the calls of the Imam, and instead, sought to reinforce his position by enforcing his garrisons with further provisions, in anticipation of a possible attack by the Imam. But the latter did not wait to hear the Sultan's reply. He, on his part, declared war against Nazwā, which surrendered immediately. Following the fall of Nazwā, other towns fell, one after the other, under his hands, as described above.

On the other hand there had been exchange of correspondence between the Sultan and the tribal leaders about their attitude toward the Imam, among them, Sh. ‘Isa b. Sāliḥ al-Ḥarīthi who waited a whole month before finally giving his support to the Imam, who was eager to have Sh. ‘Isa join him. This hesitation on the part of Sh. ‘Isa was partly because some of his tribe declared their support for the Imam, in contrast to Sh. ‘Isa and
his hesitant stance (1). Sh. 'Isa's hesitation has been described by some writers to have "prompted him to wait and see how the new born authority was received" (2).

However, the truth is that Sh. 'Isa's political inclinations were disposed towards the Sultan, while those of the tribes were inclined towards the Imam. Sh. 'Isa, though, was finally forced to compromise his position by giving his support to the Imam for fear of losing his political influence among his tribes. He wrote to the Sultan informing him about his intention and his position regarding the Imam. He says:

"There is nothing in your country [i.e., news] that would necessitate communications except the arrival of a messenger from the Imam, and before this, another messenger came insisting on our going to him. Last night I read his letter and therein he pressed me, and God says 'listen to the inviter of God'! So we have determined to obey him, like Muslims, so that we may be of those who are saved ... And what has happened, O King [Sultan], is a matter which is supernatural: the tribes from the east to the west of the country are drawn [to him] while the Imam is in Nazwah [Nazwâ]. There was nothing except his real piety and the exhibition of miracles which, we do not think, will lead to what you hear and see. God knows best where he sends his message"(3)

He also wrote to the secretary of the Sultan, Sh. Râshid b. ‘Uzayyiz, explaining to him the circumstances which prompted him to support the Imam:

"We had arranged the 15th of the present month (Rajab) as a fortunate day for proceeding to the presence of the Imam, after letters and messengers had constantly come inviting us to go to him. We did not see any escape from answering to one who calls in God's name and have made preparation to go to him with the blessing of God and to help him....And see! Oh Abû Râshid this wonderful strange affair, how the Shaykhs of al-Dahirah [al-Zahirah] and the Shaykhs of Oman are serving this Imam without hope of gain and the grace is to God and the forts are calling out "come! come" (4).

However, Sh. 'Isa met with the Imam in Izkí on 17th Rajab 1331 and gave his allegiance to the Imam after a long discussion with a view to mediating between the Imam and the Sultan. He immediately began his mediatory mission. His view was that the Imam should be content with the territories and towns he had captured and abandon his plans of attacking the Wâdí of Samâ’il; also, that he should work for a permanent peace settlement between him and the Sultan. Sh. 'Isa was supported in this stance by the B. Ruwâḥah, who controlled the upper part of the Wâdí of Samâ’il.

We do not know for certain whether this initiative was Sh. 'Isa's own accord or was entrusted to him by the Sultan. However, his proposal was rejected by both the Imam and Sh. 'Abdallah b. Ḥumayd al-Sâlimî. They also prevented him from spreading the news about this proposal in public, lest it stir confusion among their subjects. In spite of all that, according to Sh. Muḥammad al-Sâlimî, the Imam's rejection of Sh. 'Isa's proposal caused some tension in the relationship between the two men, as well as between
their followers. This state of tension was somewhat eased by the intervention of the Shaykhs of the tribe of Ḣajriyyín in an effort to mediate between the Imam and the Shaykh. The mediators proposed to Sh. ‘Isà that he postpone the discussion of a possible reconciliation for a later date.

Unfortunately, this proposal came at an untimely period, when the militancy of the Imam's followers was at its height, and the spirit for war and fighting was prevailing among them. Moreover, Sh. ‘Isà lost part of his support of the Hináwí tribes, especially the B. Hiná’ah. In addition, it is to be noted that the Imamate is largely an issue to be decided by the ‘ulamá’ whose primary concern was to depose the Sultan. Also, his reluctant support for the Imam lost him a good deal of the respect and esteem among the ‘ulamá’ which he had commanded previously as the son of a renowned religious leader. Furthermore, the Imam was unhappy with the attitude of Sh. ‘Abdalláh b. Sa’úd b. Khalfán al-Khalíf, the Shaykh of the B. Ruwáḥah, who was loyal to the Sultan and strongly opposed to the Imam (5).

But as his letters to the Sultan indicate, Sh. ‘Isà was evidently forced into an ambivalent position whereby on the one hand he acquiesced to support the Imam, while on the other hand, he kept in correspondence with the Sultan. His regular correspondence with the Sultan was meant as a reassurance that he wanted to maintain his relationship with the Sultan. Sh. ‘Isà was lucky to find an indirect support from a prominent notable in the lower part of Samá’il, Sh. Su’úd b. ‘Alí b. Jabr al-Jabrí, who played an instrumental role in strengthening Sh. ‘Isà's position by rallying support for him from different quarters, from the Janabah and B. Bú ‘Alí as well as from the Sultan.

Under the circumstances of the siege of the fort, there emerged two views. There were those who saw that the Imam should go for peace and reconciliation, while others upheld a continuation of the war. In this environment, the Imam issued a memorandum stating his stipulations for a peace deal as follows:

"In the name of God, the merciful, the compassionate"

"Let anyone who meets with this letter know that many people have constantly been asking the Imam of the Muslims to abstain from fighting the Sultan Faysal b. Turkı, in Maskat (Muscat) and Maqar and they are flattering him (Faysal) in the hope that he will obtain what he demands, but he will not obtain abstention from the Imam except he grants conditions and among them are:

1- The agreement in the matter of arms between the Sultan and the Christians must be broken.
2- That the Wādī of Samá’il, Nakhal and Sur should belong to the Imam exclusively."
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3-The reduction of Customs duties in all the ports to the rates that were in force in the time of the Imam ‘Azzān, may God pity him.

4-And that the Sultan and his sons should promote good and prohibit evil to the best of their ability.

Now, if the Sultan grants these conditions in full, we hope from the Imam that he will desist from fighting. And his brother, Nāṣīr b. Rāshid wrote it with his own hand" (6).

Although this memorandum was undated, the British records report that it was brought by Sh. Rāshid b. ‘Uzayyiz, the Sultan's secretary to the PAM on 26th July, 1913. It is generally believed that this memorandum was the one referred to by Sd.  Ḥamad b. Fayşal in the letter which he sent to his father the Sultan on 20th Sha‘bān 1331/25th July 1913, and which was sent with his messenger, Sulaymān b. ‘Alī al-‘Āmīrī to al-Sīb, and then to Muscat (7).

The Imam held complete control over the fort of Samā’il. After that the call for peace was at its strongest among the local tribal chiefs, especially among the tribes of the Wādí of Samā’il. The chiefs wrote to the Sultan urging him either to go for peace or for war. One of them was Sh. ‘Abdallāh b. Sa‘īd al-Khalīlī who wrote to the Sultan and his sons asking them to empower Sh. ‘Isā to monitor the peace process. In one of his letters which he wrote to Sd. Nādīr b. Fayşal on 30th Sha‘bān 1331 after he had discussed this matter with Sh. ‘Isā, he says, "We went to your town of Khod (al-Khawḍ) and conferred with your servant, the young ‘Isā, about an understanding between our master and his subject, and asked him to help us in that, and we found him well-disposed" (8).

He concluded his letter stating that he was awaiting a reply from the Sultan. However, it is evident that he did not receive any response, either from Sd. Nādīr, nor from the Sultan. The latter, though, commented on Sh. ‘Abdallāh al-Khalīlī’s letter, "This letter has reached me and I have not replied to it; and what conciliation can be expected from this poor weak man, when the territories of Muscat have been snatched away?" (9).

The Sultan, it seemed, was sceptical about local chiefs' loyalty to him, and that he thought they lacked the necessary power leverage to press on the Imam and his followers. These ineffective pressures on the Imam came at a time when he was actually planning a military attack on Muscat.

On 11th July 1913/6th Sha‘bān 1331 Major Knox (the PAM) wrote warning letters to the four chiefs of the Imamate reminding them of the notice issued by the Sultan, Fayşal on 5th Jumādā II, 1313 which warned that: "the British Government would not tolerate the
tribes launching attacks on Muscat and Matrah under any circumstances" (10). This was in view of the British Government interests therein.

The PAM sent an ultimatum two days after the disembarkation of the 2nd Rajputs in Matrah under the command of Lt Colonel Smith who camped at Bayt al-Falaj. He also made a plan to send troops to al-Sib and then to Samail in the event the Sultan asked for reinforcements. But the Sultan rejected the PAM's plan when it was presented to him in al-Sib on 15th July 1913. The PAM, though, was not put off by the Sultan's rejection of his plan. He attempted to persuade the Sultan to accept his plan on two more occasions, but his persistence somewhat angered the Sultan. The event prompted the Sultan to ask the PAM not to interfere with these affairs henceforth. The PAM confessed that: "the Sultan asked the political (PAM) to return that evening (15th July 1913) to Muscat, as the signs of open sympathy and friendship that existed between the Sultan and the British representative were misunderstood and objected to by his troops and the Omani up country and militated against the Sultan's channels of quelling the rising himself" (11).

It was clear that the Sultan did not want to see the British influence extend beyond Muscat. He preferred the British protection to be confined mainly to the cities of Muscat and Matrah. This was because the Sultan did not want to be seen by his subjects as nursing a friendly relationship with the British, lest this would alienate the Omani tribes. His ultimate goal was to win the tribes' support without having to resort to the help of foreign force. Foreign interference was, in his view, the primary cause that instigated the Imamate in the first place.

The Imam replied to the PAM's letter of 11th July, explaining the purpose of the re-establishment of the Imamate, and at the same time asking him not to give support to the Sultan (12) on the grand that it was an exclusively internal affair between the Sultan and his subjects. The PAM welcomed the Imam's letter and described it as extremely polite in tone. He not only welcomed this letter, but also wrote to the Imam asking him not to harass British subjects. The Imam was taken in by the friendly and positive attitude of the PAM, and in response wrote a letter in which he undertook not to molest British subjects: "Your letter reached us and you mention that your subjects should not be molested in their persons or property. There is no intention of interfering with you or your subjects. But the
intention is the establishment of justice" (13). At the end of his letter, the Imam expressed his concern over British troops being sent to Bayt al-Falaj, in spite of his firm promise not to interfere with British subjects in the area. He also asked the PAM for an explanation of the British move of sending troops to Bayt al-Falaj. The PAM in his reply to the Imam repeated what he had already said about the British intention in sending troops, which was to protect Muscat and its vicinity (14).

In the period between August and September 1913 a succession of secret delegated talks were going on between the Sultan and the Imam. These were meant as a conduit to elicit a response to the Imam's terms of conciliation.

Available sources give us no clues on the Sultan's and the British reaction to the Imam's terms of conciliation. However, a report by the British naval Commander in Chief on 9th September 1913/ 7th Shawwâl 1331 states that: "yesterday [8th] the Imam sent to the Sultan requesting the presence in Samá'il of an ambassador to discuss terms of peace. The Sultan's delegate left yesterday for Samá'il, and some sort of peace agreement is expected to be signed in the course of this week" (15).

Unfortunately, these efforts did not materialize, and we have no good knowledge about these talks and the people who conducted them. As a result of the failure of these talks, the Imam wrote to the PAM explaining to him the purpose of the re-establishment of the Imamate, and also "... therefore requested and hoped of your government that her troops will be moved from the Bayt al-Falaj and entirely removed early. If these were brought for the protection of your subjects, then we undertake the responsibility of protecting their lives and property" (16).

From the Imam's letter, it was obvious that the Imam and his assistants had no prejudice against the British. This was because they deeply recognized the importance of maintaining a friendly relationship with Britain for their mutual interests. This stance was reaffirmed by the Imam's letter to the PAM, mentioned above, in which he states:

"We do not think that your Government, which is well-known for her diplomacy and considerate treatment, will prefer one individual to two millions of Arabs and will dash their friendship and love which is greater for her than for any other Government against the wall as useless. The Arab community thinks her above that and that she is far too noble to suffer such a thing from which your Government will reap nothing, but loss of lives and flowing of gutters of blood on the surface of the earth" (17)
But the PAM ignored the Imam's request to withdrawing the British troops and pointed out that his Government was based on justice and peace and would want to see these prevail in Oman between the Sultan and his subjects. It is noteworthy to mention that Sd. Fayṣal, the Sultan of Muscat and Oman died on 4th October, 1913.

Following the death of the Sultan, the Imam, Sh. al-Sālīmī, and Sh. 'Isā each wrote a letter to Sd. Taymūr b. Fayṣal, successor to the deceased Sultan, in which they urged him to adopt the Shari‘ah laws, to abide by the teachings of Islam and to work for the prevalence of peace and justice. They also wrote to the PAM requesting that they be left alone to administer their own affairs and to settle their disputes with their Sultan (18).

The PAM, as it appears, interpreted the views of the Imamate's leaders as a sign of weakness among the Imam and his leaders, and that they were now looking for peace and conciliation (19). In fact, the Imam and his followers did not wish to anger either the Sultan or the British, but he requested the establishment of justice in Sultan's administration, and the withdrawal of the British troops from Oman. This was by no means a sign of weakness, as the PAM understood it. This leads us to another interpretation, that the Imam did not wish to oppose the Sultan, insofar as the latter adhered to the Shari‘ah in his administration of rule.

This explains to us the preparedness of Sd. Fayṣal not to resort to the use of force against his opponents. He also rejected the British assistance (except in protection of Muscat and Māṭrah), and their advice and plans to attack the Imam's followers. We believe that had it not been for the treaties between him and the British Government on arms trafficking and slave trading, he would have yielded to the pressures from the Imam. But for fear of Oman going under British rule, he refused to agree with the Imam. This fear of a British occupation of Oman was precisely what Sh. 'Isā had cautioned about and had prompted him to persuade the Imam to seek a conciliation with the Sultan.

Immediately on his ascendancy to the throne, Sd. Taymūr initiated a number of policy reforms, which included the reorganization of customs duties, and the permission of public smoking and drinking. Prohibitive orders included the prohibition of prostitution and bribery. Local authorities in Muscat and Māṭrah received warning against taking bribes, and generally, a high level of justice was promised. All of these policy reforms
were intended principally to give the Omanis the impression that the Sultan was in favour of justice and public order and against corruption (20).

It was said that the Sultan in fact was inspired in these reforms by a deference to the wishes of Sh. al-Sālimī (21). Not only that, but the Sultan wrote letters to all the principal chiefs of Oman including Sh. ‘Isā, informing them of his assumption of Oman, giving assurances of a just and equitable rule and his desire to reform the administration of the country at large (22).

Not long afterwards, the Sultan received many friendly reply letters from the chiefs, expressing their loyalty to him. Among those who wrote in reply and expressed loyalty were (23):

1- Sh. Ḥamad b. Hilāl b. Ḥamad al-Sa‘dī
2- Sh. Ḥamad b. Sa‘īd b. Ḥammād al-Ruwāḥī
3- Sh. ‘Abdallāh b. Sa‘īd b. Khalīf al-Khalīf
4- Sh. Ḥumayd b. ‘Umayr al-Hinā‘ī
8- Sh. ‘Isā b. Ṣāliḥ al-Ḥārithī.

The PAM mentions that Sh. ‘Isā’s letter had been extremely friendly to the Sultan, who pinned his hope in Sh. ‘Isā to conduct the mediation process (24). But the process of mediation and conciliation was halted by Sh. Ḥimyar b. Nāṣir’s call for the tribes of Sūr to support the Imam or to remain neutral.

In conclusion it should be said that Sh. ‘Isā’s efforts for conciliation between the Imam and the Sultan were not successful for several reasons. First, the Imam's followers' optimism for a quick and easy victory made them militant and hard-line enough to try to overthrow the Sultan. Secondly, many of the tribes headsmen's acquiescence to the Imam's leadership was rather ambivalent, because they feared loss of their political influence among their tribes. Thirdly, the Sultan was supported by the British; and finally, it had been difficult to negotiate the terms and conditions of a conciliation between the Sultan and the Imam, because these were irreconcilable as each of the two parties stuck to
their position. To these we should add the untimely death of the Sultan, Sd. Fayṣal, who saw only about four months and a half of the Imamate period.

2) The Initiative of Sh. Ḥamdán b. Záyid of Abú Zabí

At the beginning of November 1913 Sh. Ḥamdán b. Záyid b. Khalīfah, the ruler of Abú Zabí (1912-1922) arrived at Muscat, accompanied by forty of his men. The purpose of his visit was to achieve two aims; first, to pay his condolences to Sultan Sd. Taymürr on the death of his father; and second, to offer his help for mediation between the Sultan and the Imam.

Following his talks with the Sultan, Sd. Taymür, Sh. Ḥamdán obtained the Sultan's approval to go ahead with his plan for mediation with a view of eventual conciliation. On the basis of the Sultan's approval, Sh. Ḥamdán wrote to the leaders of the Imamate informing them of the purpose of his visit and the efforts he was undertaking to bring about peace and reconciliation between the Sultan and the Imam. He designated the town of al-Sīb to be the meeting place for the leaders after the ‘Id al-Aḍḥà (25).

Sh. Ḥamdán’s efforts received a further impetus from two letters written by two prominent tribal leaders: Sh. Hilāl b. Sa‘id al-Ḥajrí, one of the leaders of the Ḥajríyyín tribe, and Sālim b. ‘Āmir al-Ḥasaní, a leader of B. Bū Ḥasan. Both exhorted Sh. ‘Īsā to accept Sh. Ḥamdán’s call, and asked him to use his influence to press on the Imam to go for conciliation with the Sultan. They also warned him of the grave risks that might arise from the reluctance to accept peace, such as the outbreak of a civil war and social, strife (26). Their two letters went on to warn that "if matters are not straightened soon all the Hináwí tribes will march out to fight against the Imam and his Gháfírī partisans" (27).

After having received Sh. Ḥamdán’s letter, Sh. ‘Īsā convened a meeting at al-Qābil, attended by Sh. al-Sālimí and Sh. ‘Āmir b. Khamís al-Málikí and others, in which they discussed Sh. Ḥamdán’s call for peace. The result of this meeting was that they agreed to meet Sh. Ḥamdán in order to bridge the gap of conflict between the Imam and the Sultan, and also to get to know about the latter’s point of view.

After the ‘Id al-Aḍḥà, the three leaders, Sh. ‘Īsā, Sh. al-Sālimí and Sh. al-Málikí left al-Sharqiyyah to meet Sh. Ḥamdán at al-Sīb. On their way, they agreed among
themselves that Sh. al-Sálimí and Sh. al-Málikí should head for Samá’il to convey to the Imam what plans they had for peace. The Imam speedily refused their call for peace, and instead, called for a meeting to discuss this call. The result of the meeting was that they supported the Imam’s stance in his refusal to meet Sh. Ḥamdán. Accordingly, the Imam sent Sh. al-Málikí to al-Síb to inform Sh. ‘Isá of what the Imam had decided, while at the same time giving Sh. ‘Isá the freedom of choice to negotiate with Sh. Ḥamdán on his personal accord, without the Imam having to be responsible if talks failed (28).

We have no clear evidence on the reasons which led the Imam to reject this initiative before it was discussed. However, as it appears, Sh. Ḥamdán did not send a letter directly to the Imam probably because he did not recognize the Imam. Another reason was that Sh. ‘Isá did not get prior permission from the Imam for negotiation of peace.

Sh. Ḥamdán b. Záyid reached al-Síb on 18th November accompanied by certain Shaykhs of al-Hawásinah and those of the B. Bú Ḥasan and Sh. Ráshid b. ‘Uzayyíz. A few days later, Sh. ‘Isá arrived, accompanied by his brother and some of the dignitaries of his men (29). Sh. Ḥamdán was hopeful that a good number of the Omani chiefs would respond to his call, but only a few responded, among them Sh. ‘Isá and Sh. Aḥmad b. Muḥammad b. Hilál al-Yaḥyá’í, one of the Shaykhs of al-Ẓáhirah, while the remaining leaders (e.g. Sh. Ḥimyar, the sons of Sh. Hilál b. Záhir, Sh. Nāṣir b. Ḥumayd b. Ráshid al-Gháfírī, and Sh. Muhánná b. Ḥamad al-‘Abru) (30) all accepted Sh. Ḥamdán’s call, but when they arrived at Samá’il proceeding on their way to meet Sh. Ḥamdán in al-Síb, were intercepted by the Imam, who prevented them from proceeding.

Immediately afterwards, negotiations started, which actually marked the first serious attempt of negotiations for peace between the Sultan and the Omanis on this matter. These talks and discussions lasted until 9th December 1913. The talks centred around the Imam’s terms for conciliation which he presented in July 1913. They agreed on the following terms:

1. That the Imam would maintain control over the Interior towns of Oman.
2. That the Imam should surrender the fort of Bidbid and Samá’il to the Sultan.
3. That both sides should respect each other’s interests.
4. That both sides should ensure freedom of movement for all Omaniis in all territories.
5. That the Sultan should refrain from surrendering any of Omani land to Britain.
6. That the Sultan should not harbour any elements dissident to the Imam.
7. That the Sultan should endeavour not to take any action that may harm the Omaniis.
8. That the Sultan should abide by the *Sharī'ah*, promote the Islamic principles of righteousness and maintain justice.
9. That the Sultan should reduce the import tax to 5% along all Sultan's ports.
10. That the Sultan should cancel taxes on domestic produce going to his territories, such as pomegranates and dates.
11. That there should be on exemption from examination of personal baggage passing the on check-point at Şūr (31).

The terms of this treaty included some religious, economic, security and political issues. Some of these issues were dealt with by the Imam at times, the Sultan at others, and jointly by both of them at yet other times.

It is obvious from the treaty that it reinforced the existing status quo and that Sh. Ḥamdán was striving to strike a balance between the stipulations of the Imam and the demands of the Sultan. He suggested that the Imam should return the forts of Bidbid and Samá’il to the Sultan (term 2), which was the only main demand of the Sultan. In return the Sultan should approve the Imam's control in the Interior (term 1). Sh. Ḥamdán also avoided committing the Sultan to abdicate his agreements with the British Government about the trade of arms and slaves. The abdication of the Sultan from his agreements with the British was the principal demand of the Imam. Sh. Ḥamdán, therefore, sought to commit the Sultan to a solemn undertaking that he would not surrender any part of the land to the British (term 5), and to exempt passenger bags passing through the port of Şūr from examination.

Sh. 'Isà, on his part, agreed on all points except the one stipulating that the Imam return the forts of the Bidbid and the Samá’il to the Sultan (32), on which point he expressed reservations, based on his firm conviction that the Imam would not accept this condition.
This treaty, as it were, was presented to the Sultan first for approval. Sh. Ḥamdán and Sh. ʿIsà, both went to see the Sultan, Sd. Taymûr, in Muscat on 10th Muḥarram 1332/ 9th December 1913 and to present him with its terms. The Sultan agreed, unconditionally to the terms included in the treaty. However, the Sultan’s approval of the treaty, we believe, did not come from a firm conviction in the terms, but from his firm belief that the Imam would reject them. He also tried to know Sh. ʿIsà’s point of view when he asked about the latter’s position in case the Omanis rejected the terms of the treaty. Sh. ʿIsà replied that he would stand with justice and rightness (33). There prevailed a degree of peace during a two-months truce which was intended as an interim period to enable the parties concerned to discuss the terms of the treaty (34).

Sh. ʿIsà then returned to Samāʿil, where the Imam was (35) to present to him the results of his negotiations. The Imam postponed the discussion of the terms of the treaty until he had convened a meeting with his aides in Nazwà in Ẓafar 1332/January 1914. Sh. ʿIsà felt that the Imam was unappreciative of his efforts, felt somewhat disappointed and returned home with an uneasy feeling.

In less than a month, the Imam sent an envoy, Sh. Ḥāmid b. Sayf al-Ruwáḥí to Sh. ʿIsà, informing him that the meeting had unanimously rejected the terms of the treaty. Not only that, but Sh. ʿIsà was accused of weakening the Imam and of supporting the Sultan and standing against the Omani people (36). Sh. ʿIsà was in fact, clear of such accusations, and had worked hard for peace, motivated by a strong desire to see peace and justice prevail among the Omanis and to see an end to the hostilities.

As a result of the Imam’s refusal, Sh. ʿIsà wrote to Sh. Ḥamdán informing him of his disappointment with the refusal of the Imam of the terms of the treaty, and of the failure of his efforts. On the Imam’s refusal, there ensued a state of confusion and apprehension among the adherents of Sh. ʿIsà. The Sultan wisely seized on this opportunity of confusion by sending to the Hináwí tribes inviting them to abandon the Imam and come and join him (37). According to British sources, Sultan Sd. Taymûr succeeded in diverting some of the Interior Hináwí tribes to his support (38), but these sources did not mention specific tribes by name. The fact is that none of the Interior Hináwí tribes withdrew their support from the Imam. It is more likely that the Hináwí of
the Batinah Province may be the ones referred to by these sources. These latter tribes were holding a middle position between the Imam and the Sultan. However, when it became clear to them that the Imam and his followers were not serious about conciliation, they opted to support the Sultan, who had agreed on some of the Imam’s claims and made some changes to ameliorate his rule, as mentioned above.

Hence, Sh. Hamdán b. Záyid’s initiative failed mainly because the Imam was wary of Sh. Hamdán’s mediation; secondly, the Imam was of the belief that the seizures of the forts of Bidbid and Samá’il should not, as a matter of religious principle, be returned to the Sultan.

3) The Initiative of Sh. Sultan al-Na’ímí, the Shaykh of al-Buraymí

The attempts at mediation for a political conciliation came to a halt pending the 1914 because the Imamate lost one of its prominent religious leaders, Sh. al-Sálímí (5th Rabi’ I, 1332/1st February 1914), who was directing all its affairs. As a result, the Imam was able to achieve some successes by annexing both the Nakhal and Wádí al-Ma’áwil. It also widened the gap of conflict as a result of the British intervention to protect Barká’ and Qurrayyát in April 1914.

The Imam denounced the British intervention and their support to the Sultan in Barká’. He wrote to the PAM denouncing the British entering war without prior warring, as he also asked for explanations which led the British Government to retract their promise between the PAM and the Imam the preceding year as mentioned earlier. The Imam also wrote to the American Consul in Muscat asking for information on the general Christian rules on the issue of war (39). Although Sh. ‘Isá did not actively participate in the early successes which the Imamate achieved in 1914, he nevertheless wrote to the Sultan expressing his alarm, as well as that of the Omanis, over the British interference in Omani internal affairs (40).

The PAM ignored the Imam’s letter, which led the latter to seek international support, from Imam Yahyà of Yemen and Sa’íd Páshà, the Turkish commander in Yemen. The Sultan, on his part, imposed taxes on domestic produce during the summer of 1914 (41).
Following the defeat of the Imam at al-Watayyah in January 1915, letters poured from some of the tribes' headsmen expressing loyalty and support to the Sultan. Also some of the tribes of al-Siyyaayin and the B. Jäbir (42) sent two corps to al-Sib, intended to support the Sultan (43).

As for the leaders of the Imamate, they all dispersed and each returned to their homelands. Meanwhile, Sh. Sultan b. Muhammed b. ‘Alí al-Na’ímf emerged on the scene of events. The latter presented himself to the Sultan, offering his assistance to mediate for conciliation. The Sultan blessed Sh. al-Na’ímf’s initiative for conciliation. He then wrote to the Imam proposing the terms of peace and stating that he had been able to persuade the Sultan not to advance into the Interior for ten days. He also asked for a reply from the Imam within ten days, and warned him that if a reply was not received within that period, he would be sure of the Sultan's advance into the Interior, to Wā’di Samā’il (44). It is evident that the Imam was anxious to consider Sh. al-Na’ímf’s initiative for peace, and he accepted to meet Sh. al-Na’ímf accordingly. Not only that, but he also suggested that a meeting should be held at al-Sib for this purpose (45).

Unfortunately, however, we do not know precisely the details about this meeting or even whether it was actually convened. Al-Salimi for example, mentioned that Sh. ‘Isa met Sh. al-Na’ímf at al-Sib (46), but he did not specify a definite time for this meeting. Some of the Arab writers mentioned that it was held at the end of 1914 (47), whereas British sources state that some delegates were sent to a meeting between 17th and 25th January 1915, but these British sources did not mention whether this meeting was actually convened or not. However, these sources mention that Sd. Nādir b. Fayṣal, the brother of the Sultan, accompanied Sh. al-Na’ímf when the latter went for the meeting at al-Sib, and the Sultan followed them there, to be at close quarters of the meeting, though he did not disembark from his yacht on the sea (48).

In spite of all these apparent statements about the meeting between the representatives of both the Sultan and the Imam, we believe that no such meeting ever took place on January 1915. Our belief is based on the following premises: first Sh. ‘Isa left Samá’il on 28th Safar 1333/ 15th January 1915 for home, immediately after a meeting was held between the Imam and his leaders in Samá’il, after their defeat at al-Watayyah, and
he did not return to al-Sīb during this period; secondly, there had been a number of deaths among his close kin; thirdly, the PAM confirmed that Sh. ‘Isā collected some weaponry with the intention of launching an attack on Muscat, the Sultan’s seat.

Following the failure of this expected meeting, Sh. al-Nā‘īmī made a fresh attempt and wrote to the chiefs of the B. Gháfir, in Wádí Samá’il area, asking them to come for a meeting at al-Sīb on 9th Rabī’ I, 1333/26th January 1915 (49). The tribes’ headsmen accepted his call (50). However, they were checked short by a strong warning issued from the Imam and Sh. Ḥimyar not to go on to meet Sh. al-Nā‘īmī. In spite of the Imam’s warning, the chiefs formed a delegation (51), comprising the following four Shaykhs to meet Sh. al-Nā‘īmī at al-Sīb:

4. Sh. Sa‘īd b. Ráshid al-Hadábí (Hináwí tribes in Fanjá)

This delegation convened a meeting at al-Sīb in the period between 1st and 6th February 1915. In this meeting, a strong commitment of support of the Sultan was reaffirmed if and when the Sultan would come with a force to attack the fort of Samá’il. The delegation also proposed to Sh. al-Nā‘īmī to contact Sh. Ḥimyar to discuss with him the possibility of peace. Sh. al-Nā‘īmī favoured this proposal and sent to Sh. Ḥimyar for a meeting. The latter immediately agreed to meet Sh. al-Nā‘īmī. The PAM commented on Sh. Ḥimyar’s acceptance: "on 7th February 1915, Sh. Ḥimyar wrote a friendly letter to the emissary [Sh. al-Nā‘īmī], accepting his invitation to meet him for an exchange of views" (52). In another letter from Sh. Ḥimyar to Sh. al-Nā‘īmī in which he apologised that he would not be able to meet Sh. al-Nā‘īmī in al-Sīb (53), and he proposed Samá’il to be the meeting place instead of al-Sīb, and telling him that "when you [Sh. al-Nā‘īmī] hear about our arrival there [Samá’il] we wish you may come there or send a messenger on your behalf who should suffice". Sh. al-Nā‘īmī welcomed the above mentioned letter, but apologised that he would not be able to go to Samá’il, and instead would send a representative to the meeting.
On 14th February Sh. Ḥimyar arrived at Samā‘il, while Sh. al-Na‘īmf moved out from Muscat to al-Sīb on the 17th of that same month. He then immediately sent his representative, Sh. ‘Abdallāh b. ‘Alī, accompanied by Sh. Muḥammad b. Humayd. However, on the arrival of Sh. al-Na‘īmf’s representative, Sh. Ḥimyar blankly refused to meet them. And even worse, he completely rejected Sh. al-Na‘īmf’s mediation. It is more likely that the abrupt change in Sh. Ḥimyar’s attitude was in line with the Imam’s refusal of Sh. al-Na‘īmf’s mediation. Besides, the Shaykhs of the B. Ghāfr ignored the Imam’s warning not to meet Sh. al-Na‘īmf at al-Sīb. In spite of this tension, the chiefs of the B. Ghāfr succeeded in convincing Sh. Ḥimyar to respond to Sh. al-Na‘īmf’s call. Sh. Ḥimyar was thus being persuaded, and eventually agreed to his people’s pressures. He wrote a reply letter to Sh. al-Na‘īmf, in which he incorporated a number of demands as necessary conditions for his acceptance of conciliation. These demands can be summarized as follows:-

1. All grievances and wrongs existing with regard to the coast towns to be redressed.
2. Removal of additional taxes, customs and dues. They were to remain the same as in the time of Imam ‘Azzān., and Sd. Turkī b. Sa‘īd.
3. The Imam to appoint his own Qādis in all the coastal towns.
4. Half of the customs revenue to go to the Imam and half to the Sultan.
5. The Christians to be removed from the trade routes, and free intercourse to be allowed to the inhabitants of Oman for the purpose of trade or for earning their livelihood.
6. The sons of the Sultan, Sd. Fāṣal, to interview the Imam.
7. The wounded Omanis who were undergoing treatment in the hospital to be immediately released and sent under escort to Bidbid.
8. Amnesty for the people of Bawshar who were suffering most from the closing of trade routes to Muscat and Maṭrāḥ (54).

Sh. Ḥimyar concluded his letter by referring to the conditions on which he would accept the peace deal. He insisted that the Sultan should have full knowledge of these conditions and give his complete consent to them. The Sultan’s consent then had to be fully entrusted to and enacted by Sh. al-Na‘īmf.
It is clear from these conditions of Sh. Ḥimyar that they were in fact worded with the full knowledge of the Imam. He categorically refused to enter into any peace negotiation without a prior approval of these conditions. Sh. al-Na‘fmi sent these demands to the Sultan, who accepted them and approved of their discussion, except terms 4, 5 and 6, which the Imam would not accept. As a result, the peace talks failed, as did the previous ones.

4) The Initiative of Colonel Benn in 1915/1333

Following the visit of Lord Hardinge (1858-1944), Viceroy and Governor-General of India to Muscat on 11th February 1915, on his way back to India from the Gulf, Benn, the PAM, (55) was active pressing forward his mediation between the Imam and the Sultan. Before embarking on Benn's role, it is worthwhile first, to shed some light on the view of the Viceroy, concerning the internal affairs of Oman.

In chapter I, we have already referred to the purpose of the Viceroy's visit to the Gulf, which was to obtain get a first hand knowledge of the position of the Shaykhs of the Gulf states with regard to the politics of the First World War. Sultan Taymūr apologised for not being able to attend the meeting that was convened in Kuwait on this issue. Accordingly, the Viceroy decided to visit Muscat so that he could appreciate more closely the situation inside Oman. Before having met the Sultan, the Viceroy called Benn, the PAM, for a meeting. The latter briefed the Viceroy of the general state inside Oman, and especially about the on-going conflict, the defeat of the Imam and the ensuing events (56). The Viceroy made the following remarks:

1. That the time had now come when the Sultan must be given clearly to understand that a British garrison, which involved considerable expenses to the British Government, could not be maintained indefinitely in Muscat;

2. That the Sultan must see to it that an understanding with his opponents was arrived at and normal conditions restored as soon as possible;

3. That the Political Agent might act as intermediary between the Sultan and the rebel leaders and an understanding be arrived at on the basis of fixed tribal allowances for the chiefs (57).
It was evident that the Viceroy was anxious that the Sultan should reach a reasonable agreement with his subjects. That was especially so when the Viceroy emphasized the role of the British military support, which he described as being not intended to remain permanently in Muscat to protect the Sultan. It was certain that the Viceroy also assessed the letters of the Imamate leaders written to the PAM in October 1913, in which they expressed their belief that the British Government would not sacrifice its credibility for the sake of one person. Besides, the Imam had undertaken to ensure the safety of the British subjects and their property in the area under his control. In addition, the Viceroy was afraid of the Imam’s call for the *jihād*, which would inevitably coincide with the Ottoman call. Ironically, the British were negotiating with the Sharīf Ḥusayn of the Hijāz to call for the *jihād* against the Ottoman Turks. All of these circumstances led the Viceroy to realize the necessity of the Sultan coming to terms with his opponents.

The Viceroy then asked the PAM about his view with regard to the point he had made earlier, and inquired whether it was possible to reduce the British garrison in Muscat to its former smaller size. The PAM (58) welcomed the Viceroy’s suggestion. It was evident that the PAM was in favour of conciliation, which would also be welcomed by the Sultan and the French. This latest development was not in accord with the British earlier policy, which was essentially to avoid any direct contact with the rebel leaders for fear of arousing suspicions from both the Sultan and the French. The PAM, however, was of the view that it was impossible to effect a conciliation with the Imamate leaders for two obvious reasons:

1. The rebels held the key to the situation through the possession of the Sama’il fort, and valley and while thus holding the trump card, they would probably see no advantage in coming to terms. They were at present defiant.

2. The bestowal of tribal allowances might not prove attractive to the Arab leaders. Religious scruples might preclude the Imam from accepting such an allowance while the other two chiefs (Sh. ‘Isà and Sh. Ḥimyar) enjoyed good income from their present positions (59).

Moreover, the PAM was reserved about the reduction of the British forces in Muscat, explaining that the ships of the British Navy used to lie in the sea close by such that they
could be called at short notice. This was no longer possible under the circumstances of the War which summoned the navy away from the region (60).

The Viceroy strongly saw the necessity of conciliation between the Sultan and his opponents, and therefore insisted on a solution that would be acceptable to both parties. He met the Sultan and addressed him in the following terms: "we wish to see these disturbances at an end, and Muscat restored to its normal position of peace." He added that "the time has now arrived when a serious effort must be made to bring about an understanding with the rebel leaders as the location of the British garrison in Muscat could not be indefinitely continued and you (Sultan) must clearly understand this" (61).

The Sultan himself tried to convince the Viceroy that conciliation with the Imam was impossible and that the Imam would declare the jihād (62). In the end, the Viceroy succeeded in persuading the Sultan to accept the proposed mediation of the PAM (63).

On 9th April 1915, the PAM sent letters to the Imam, Sh. 'Isa and Sh. Ḥimyar. His intention behind this dispatch was to ascertain their views and the terms on which they would be prepared to accept a reconciliation (64). Ten days later, the PAM received the Imam's reply, in which (65) he expressed his approval provided that he needed to consult with other 'ulamā' and leaders. Sh. Ḥimyar also replied that he suggested sending a representative to the Interior to discuss matters with them (66). Sh.'Isa, however, was slow in replying, though he apologised for the delay of his reply (67).

Thus, it appeared that the Imam and his leaders accepted the principle of negotiation under British supervision. This was indicative of positive signs of moderation in their attitudes, contrary to the generally held view which saw the Imam's acceptance of peace as a sign of weakness in the position of the Sultan and the British. This view also saw the proposal as coming as a surprise to the Imam and his followers, such that it aroused some suspicions and apprehensions among the Imam's ranks (68).

Before the Imam came to a final decision on whether to resume negotiations or not, the other chiefs of the Imamate sent a messenger to the PAM to ascertain his view and also to explain the general Omani view about the reconciliation process, especially that they had failed on a previous occasion to make such a deal (69). The messenger was Sh. Ḥumayd
b. Sa‘íd b. Shunayyin al-Fulaytí, who lived in the village of Wásíq in Wádí Ma‘áwil, and who played an instrumental role in the success of the proposed meeting.

Sh. al-Fulaytí interviewed the PAM on 29th May 1915. Bell reported that their conversation elicited as follows:

1. The people as a whole welcomed British intervention, but were anxious to know what they expected to gain.
2. The Sultan was not really anxious for a reconciliation, but was moved by a wish to please the British.
3. The Sultan did not conform to Muslim faith and was regarded as a heretic.
4. Peace could only be agreed to be on the following terms:
   i. Full recognition of the Sharī‘ah law, as practised by the Imam in substitution for the present unjust system of dealing with civil and criminal cases. There was to be no favouritism towards people connected with the palace.
   ii. Removal of British troops and of the land blockade of imports into the Interior.
   iii. Full settlement of the financial claims of the tribes of the Interior.
   iv. Importation of wine, spirits and tobacco to be prohibited.
   v. The Sultan to be regarded as ruler of Oman, but the Imam to administer the country according to the Sharī‘ah, either personally or through a representative at Muscat.
   vi. Free purchase of arms and ammunition to be allowed (70).

On examination of these terms, which were apparently concordant with the Imam's earlier demands, it becomes clear that they could not have come from somebody who had no connection with the Imamate, as the PAM was content to claim. The PAM claimed that the messenger, Sh. al-Fulaytí, denied having any authorization to speak on behalf of the Imam's side (71). Sh. al-Fulaytí, as it appeared, denied that he was delegated by or speaking on behalf of the Imam's party, but was sent by the Imam's Qādī, Sh. ‘Abdalláh b. Ráshid b. Śálih al-Háshimí.

The PAM refused to discuss this matter except with the Imam or his representative. But eventually, Sh. al-Fulaytí (72) was informed in general terms what demands could not be considered:
1. Any demand that implied the non-recognition of the Sultan's legitimate rights in Muscat and the Interior of Oman;

2. Any demand that implied the contravention of Treaty rights between Great Britain and Oman, in which connection we [the PAM] recognized no one but the Sultan;

3. Any demand that might injure or hamper British interests or their trade with Oman;

4. Any demand for the discontinuance of the existing arms and warehouse arrangements (73).

On 21 Rajab 1333/4th June 1915 Sh. al-Fulaytí left Muscat for al-'Awábí where the Imam was, in order to present the PAM's condition to the Imam and Sh. ‘Abdalláh al-Háshimí, the Qádí of Imam. The former refused to listen to whatever he had to say. The latter, although accepted in principle these conditions, nevertheless denounced the PAM's insistence on retaining them. Sh. al-Háshimí wrote to the PAM in order to ascertain the PAM's view directly from him. He wrote on 5th Sha'bán 1333/18th June 1915, saying: "Sh. Ḥumayd b. Sa‘íd brought a message to us from you to the effect that you desire to negotiate for peace and prevent bloodshed and do good for all men, and in reply I inform you that a Muslim will never agree to be led astray from the path of the Prophet. If the message which Sh. Ḥumayd has brought is correct, then it behoves us to ask you for certain conditions both of a religious and of a worldly nature" (74). Sh. al-Háshimí then complained about the PAM's letter with regard to the following:

1. The stopping of the trade in slaves and other commodities, which was inconsonant with Islamic law.

2. The British claim to command the sea which is common to all.

3. That the British were interfering in the affairs of the Sultans of Oman and supporting them in matters contrary to their religion.

4. That the people of Oman were suffering from the fall in the value of Dollar and the increase in the price of food and cloth.

5. The general complaint against the British from the stand-point of Islam, for permitting the forbidden, such as the sale of wine and tobacco, and forbidding the permitted, such as the trade in arms and slaves (75).
Sh. al-Hashimf concluded his letter by stating that if the PAM agreed to the conditions set out in his letter, and which were demanded by their religious beliefs, then he would agree and would do everything in his capacity to get the approval of his party and to bring about final peace. But Sh. al-Hashimf warned that if the PAM worked only for his government's interests and to force a peace deal, then they would reject that and "shall ask God's help"; implying war. Sh. al-Hashimf then explained that he wrote that letter to the PAM only to clear himself of the blame of not replying on the proposals.

Before going into the British view on Sh. al-Hashimf's letter, it is worth while trying to understand the Omanis' public view on the conciliation process. The following letter, sent by the son of Sh. al-Hashimf to his father written on 15th Jumádá I, 1333/31st March 1915, shows us the Omanis' desperation and desire for peace and stability:

"I beg of our leaders who are wise and who are capable of being of one mind and one opinion, with the help of one another according to Islamic law and religion, to stop the bloodshed of Muslims without delay. You are able to negotiate for peace and God will unite all hearts together. I cannot offer advice to the heads of the people, but you have influence with them and with the Imam. They will listen to you and accept what you propose. I hope that all of you will try to induce Shaykh 'Isa b. Salih to propose terms of peace and not harm the people on the coast of Oman. You know that the coast of Oman is under the protection of the British. Can Omani people fight with the British? The guns fire shells like rain. Can we hope for success in such circumstances? Perhaps these words will arouse you and induce you to think about saving yourselves and others. This is my humble advice to my religious brethren and to my people" (76).

This letter clearly shows the extent to which the Omanis had grown weary of the continuing strife, and were desperate for peace and stability.

After having received Sh. al-Hashimf's letter, Benn (the PAM) dispatched a short message to the Imam reminding him of his promise to give his view and also informed him of his receipt of some letters from Sh. al-Fulayf and al-Hashimf containing his views. But the message indicated that it was impossible for the PAM to accept any peace or place confidence in these letters if the Imam did not endorse them in the first place (77). Benn also replied to Sh. al-Hashimf and Sh. al-Fulayf, telling them it was impossible to take action upon a letter not coming from the Imam himself. This was because, firstly their letter was not undersigned by the Imam nor sealed; secondly, that the PAM had been promised by the Imam that he would reply to his letter (78). It appeared that the PAM declined to go into negotiations until the Imam personally informed him of his view.

Sh. al-Hashimf and Sh. al-Fulayf both received the PAM's reply with some condemnation and surprise. They wrote three letters to him in response, on 14th and 15th
Ramaḍān/27th and 28th July, 1915. For the importance of Sh. al-Ḥāshimī’s letter dated 14th Ramaḍān, of the contents of which he briefed the Imam and because of the importance of this letter for the prospects of peace, here are some extracts of this letter:

“When I received your letter of 16th July, 1915/2nd Ramaḍān, 1333, which was a reply to mine, I took it to the Imam and those who were with him and then we sent the letter to Sh. ’Isā b. Ṣāliḥ on the advice of the Imam and his friends, and we have sent a copy of that letter to Sh. Ḥimmār b. Nāṣir and to Sh. ʿĀmir b. Khamīs and their friends. The reply will come to you from the Imam, (and it will be written) in the presence of above mentioned Shaykhs. You should be prepared to receive it; and (you will be able) to distinguish those conditions which are capable of acceptance by us and those which are not. And you should not consider our demands as extraordinary or be surprised at the terms we ask” (79).

Sh. al-Ḥāshimī asked a number of questions, which were in fact not intended for information but as exclamations and complaints. He complained of the British Government’s actions, expressing himself as one asking who has the right to:

1. Stop us from taking back our escaped slaves?
2. Prevent us from prohibiting the things which are forbidden by God such as wine and tobacco?, and stop us passing orders prescribed by our religion?
3. Stop us from dealing in rifles, ammunition, gunpowder, and weapons?
4. Stop us from sending our rifles by sea? and stop our trade abroad?
5. Stop us from setting the right path of our religion and made demands of our leaders?
6. Stop us passing orders according to our Shari‘ah against the Sultan when he acts contrary, and oppose us whenever we come to punish him who trespasses our faith?

And Sh. al-Ḥāshimī continued:

“I write to you to be a wise man and of good understanding and the representative of the British Government. I ask you is it fair to call upon the Imam to agree to conditions which are of no interest or profit to him? Or to ask him to accept only such terms as you want while at the same time unlawful things are permitted to continue in Muscat? if you wish Oman to remain under the rule of Sd. Taymūr, then he must follow and obey Islam and conduct all his affairs according to Islamic law by his close relations and friends and by the public equally both high and low. The Sultan must accept and permit the Deputy of the Imam to live with him in Muscat to see that the orders of Islamic law are carried out. The Deputy will give or withhold permission according to that law and protect the rights of the subjects. If Sd. Taymūr agree to all this then the Imam and his followers will be bound not to oppose him in any way either in his Court or his buildings or any defence works belonging to him.

Sh. al-Ḥāshimī then put forward the following conditions:-

1. Every slave should be given back to his master.
2. The dealing in arms should be permitted.
3. Everything pertaining to arms should be allowed.
4. No rules except Islamic rules should be permitted.
He concluded by giving the PAM choice between two options, saying that:

"If you intend to exercise your authority over both sides viz., over the Imam's people and Sd. Taymur's as well, then (I say) this will never be permitted by our religious; for we do not ask for worldly thing; was ask only for the recognition of Islamic law and of the right to 'bid and forbid' according to the Sharī'ah of Islam. If you agree with us then all will be well. We await your reply to appoint a day on which the leaders of Oman will be summoned".

Sh. al-Fulaytī's second letter to the PAM following Sh. al-Hāshimī's letter in one days' time confirmed that the latter was written by order from the Imam (80). The letter asked for a prompt reply:

"Now if you consider the reply will be acceptable to the British Government please let me know by the bearer of this as we, Imam, Sh. 'Isā and Sh. Ḥimyar have agreed to meet in Samā'il. I and Sh. al-Hāshimī await your reply and on its receipt. We shall go to Samā'il in order to consult the above mentioned persons" (81)

A month later, the PAM received a letter from the Imam, signed by him and by the rest of his leaders; Sh. 'Isā, Sh. Ḥimyar and Sh. al-Hāshimī, conveying their approval of his mediation. This letter reads as follows:

"Your former letters have reached me and I have learnt their contents. I see no objection to peace being arranged between myself and Sd. Taymūr and you are a suitable and capable person to undertake the same. But negotiation by correspondence at this distance is impossible.

A meeting to discuss what you have mentioned in your letter and what your messenger Sh. Ḥumayd b. Sa'īd has also mentioned might if you wish be arranged, and if you agree to this suggestion we should of course send a trustworthy man to represent us. The date may be fixed by you. We expect a reply by this messenger Sh. Ḥumayd b. Sa'īd al-Fulaytī" (82).

The PAM, Benn welcomed the Imam's letter, and sent, on 5th September/25th Shawwāl, a letter to the Imam and each of his leaders, including Sh. al-Hāshimī and al-Fulaytī, in which he decided that the meeting would be convened on Friday, 8th September/28th Shawwāl at al-Sīb (83). He also undertook to guarantee their safety on their way to al-Sīb and during negotiations (84).

The exchange of correspondence between the PAM and the Imamate continued for a long period, about five months. Needless to say, the process of peace would naturally require a great deal of consultation and contact between the various factions. Eventually, though, the PAM succeeded in eliciting the Imam's approval for a meeting. The latter, in the end, welcomed the PAM's mediation, but needed time to get his leaders’ final consent. The reasons that led to this delay in the peace process were numerous. First, the Imam needed time to consult his followers; second, it coincided with the harvest time for the Omanis who were busy harvesting their crops. Besides, Sultan Sd. Taymūr, instead of handling his problem with the B. Baṭāsh diplomatically, used force against them in July
1915. This complicated the situation even further. He was also preparing for a campaign against the Wádí Samá’il. As a result of all these complications, it is possible to find justification for the Imamate’s long delay in accepting the peace mediation, contrary to the view that they were suspicious of the British PAM’s mediation initiative (85). It was even possible to assume that it was in the Imamate’s interest and in their favour to back up the PAM’s initiative, in view of the British strong influence over the Sultan, such that they could force him to accept the conditions of peace.

It was decided by the PAM, that the meeting should take place on 8th September, 1915. However, the PAM was receiving Sir Mark Sykes who was visiting Muscat, and therefore wrote to the Imam informing him of a change of date of the meeting, to take place on 10th September (86). It appears that neither letter was received by the Imam, because the letters were sent to Wádí al-Ma’áwil, while the Imam was in Wádí ‘Indám in al-Sharqiyyah at the time.

When the PAM arrived at al-Sib on 10th September, he was received by Sh. al-Fulayfly, who informed him that the Imam had no prior knowledge of the date of the meeting and therefore was unlikely to attend. On the evening of the same day, the PAM received a letter from the Imam confirming that he had not received his previous letters concerning the date of the meeting, and suggested 5th or 6th Dhu’al-Qi’dah/14th or 15th September (87).

It was said that the Imam's postponement of the day of the meeting was due to a murder incident which took place in al-Khaburah. The murder was that of Sh. Khalaf b. Sinán al-‘Alawi, the Shaykh of the important Hináwi tribe, by his cousin (88). The present writer refutes this story. First, Sh. Khalaf had no relationship with the Imamate, but he was a supporter of the Sultan and fought with the Sultan against the B. Batáash in July 1915, just a month before negotiations, and also against the Imam in al-Rustáq in 1917. Secondly, Sh. Muḥammad al-Sálimí states that Sh. Khalaf's murder took place on the night of 10th Ramaḍán 1344/night of 23/24 March 1926 (89). Accordingly, the story that Sh. Khalaf's murder was a cause of the Imam's delay in attending the proposed meeting with the PAM, on the fixed day of 10th September, was incorrect. The truth about the matter is that the Imam did not receive the PAM's letters in time (90).
On the changed date of the meeting proposed by the Imam on Wednesday, 15th September 1915 Sh. 'Isà arrived at al-Sib, accompanied by an armed following of about 200 men and the following Shaykhs (91):

1. Sh. ‘Alî b. Şâlih al-Ḥârithî, the brother of Sh.'Isà.
2. Sh. ‘Abdallâh b. Râshid b. Şâlih al-Ḥâshîmî, the Qâdî of the Imam.
3. Sh. Ḥumayd b. Sa‘îd al-Fulayîf, the messenger between the two conflicting parties.
5. Sh. Ḥamad b. Musallam al-Nâdabî, the Shaykh of the Nadâbiyyîn.

The PAM, Benn arrived on the same day accompanied by Captain E. Palmer, R.N. commander of H.M.S. “Dalhousie”, Lt Grey, R.I.M., and Lt Johnson, commander of the 126th Baluchistan Infantry, and a personal guard of 10 men of the latter regiment (92).

At the negotiation table, the PAM opened the discussions, welcomed those present and explained that the purpose of the meeting was to be a channel through which they could achieve the British Government's desire to see peace and stability prevail in Oman between the Sultan and his subjects. After that, Sh. 'Isà showed a letter from the Imam authorizing him to speak on behalf of the Imam (93), and presented a written petition which requested the British Government to take careful consideration of the conflict between them and the Sultan, and to force the Sultan to maintain justice in Oman (94).

The following table shows the demands contained in the petition, the discussions that followed, the Sultan's remarks and the PAM's modification thereon (95):
(a) In their written petition

We pray that the British Government will make careful inquiry into the matters (under dispute) between us and the Sultan in accordance with justice and that (they will also see that) justice is maintained in the Sultan's kingdom for the future, viz., in Muscat and all the coast towns belonging to Muscat.

(b) Verbally with modifications

The cause of all this misunderstanding and unrest in Oman is the misgovernment prevailing in Muscat and the misconduct of its Ruler. In consequence, blood has been shed in Oman, murders have been committed and the murderers and other offenders are given asylum by the Sultan in Muscat. No rules or laws are observed in Muscat. The authorities make their own rules and decide cases according to their own fancy. Partiality and favouritism are rife. This is contrary to all religious laws.

The Sultan may hold himself bound by his own religious views, but we demand that justice should be done according to Shar’ah.

Owing to all this bloodshed and misgovernment in Muscat and our inability to obtain justice from the Sultan we were compelled to appoint the present Imam.

1) That the Sultan's subjects may be compelled to observe all religious duties and be prohibited from committing all unlawful acts.

Sultan to guarantee the enforcement of Shar’ah forthwith in Muscat and Oman and to apply it to all Arab and other subject of the Sultan in settlement of their cases. Sultan to appoint a Qāḍī in Muscat and we suggest one of the following men whose duty it will be to see that the Shar’ah law is properly administered there. viz.:-

(a) Sh. Sa‘īd b. Nāṣir al-Kindī.
(b) Sh. Sulaymān b. Ḥamad al-Kindī.
(c) Sh. ‘Āmir b. Khamīs al-Mālikī.
(d) Sh. Muḥammad b. ‘Abdallāh al-Khalīfī.

The Sultan's rejoinder and remarks thereon

These are mere excuses put forward by the Imam to try and justify his own irregular conduct and his usurpation of the rights and privileges of the Sultan of Oman, myself. Blood has only been shed in fighting with him-my enemy. The methods of administering justice are the same today as they were in the time of my forefathers and a Sharī’ah Court exists.

Justice is administered not only in Muscat and the coast towns but throughout Oman according to Sharī’ah and Islamic law is invariably observed. A Qāḍī for this purpose already exists in Muscat namely Sh. Sa‘īd b. Nāṣir al-Kindī, the man who the Imam now wishes to appoint.

I refuse to allow Sh. ‘Āmir al-Mālikī, Wālī of Nazwā, or Muḥammad al-Khalīfī to be appointed as Qāḍī in Muscat; but have no objection to either of the other two.
2) That the enhanced export and import dues (knowledge) in the Interior may be withdrawn.

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<tr>
<th>Interior</th>
<th>In addition to an extra 10% on account of zakāt now levied by the Sultan, charges $1 on every bag of rice which leaves al-Sib and other coast towns for the interior. This should be removed.</th>
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| 3) That all murderers and offenders, who are now given an asylum by the Sultan in Muscat, may be returned to us (for punishment) according to the law of God. | An impartial and proper inquiry should be held according to Sharī'ah, into the murders committed in Oman and justice done. The following are the murders and offences complained of:-

(a) Ḥamad b. Sultan, Shaykh of the Wahibah, murdered one of the Ḥurūfī tribe living in Farq (Nazwa district). This man is now living in al-Sib under the Sultan's protection. The murder was committed last Ramadān (July-August).

(b) Sayf b. Nāṣir al-Ruwāhī with some 12 companions murdered 2 men of the B. Riyām about one year ago. Sayf is now in al-Sib.

(c) Sa'dallāh al-'Aqrāb, a slave of the B. Kharūs, killed one Kharūfī man and fled to the Sultan who gave him a reward and rifles to return and commit another murder. But the Imam intercepted him and killed him.

(d) Sulaymān b. Ḥamad al-Ḥurūfī and Sulaymān b. Zubayr al-Kharūfī, killed one Kharūfī in Surūr by name Yahyā b. Sulaymān. The above murderers also killed two more men in Ruḏah, viz., Khalfān b. Sulaymān al-Ḥadābī, and Latyaf b. Ḥamad al-Qāsmi. Both murders committed about 3 or 4 months ago. Murderers are in either Muscat or in al-Sib under the Sultan's protection. |

When the Imam and rebels make peace with me all enhanced taxes and zakāt will be withdrawn. I have recently received the submission of the B. Baṯāš tribe who also paid the enhanced zakār, but since their surrender I have exempted them from this payment.

I admit that all the men mentioned were killed. It was not murder. The men who killed them were my "Askaris" and were deputed by me to kill anyone who sided with the Imam, who is my enemy and who has raised the country in rebellion against me and usurped my rights as ruler of Oman. I decline to deliver the "murderers" to the Imam for punishment even if and after peace is made between us.

The Imam's men have killed my men also.

(a) Admitted Sh. Ḥamad b. Sulṭān "Askri" of mine.

(b) Admitted, Sayf b. Nāṣir.

(c) This man was one of the Imam's people. He killed a Kharūfī and fled here to me hoping for a reward, but I expelled him.

(d) These two men were the Imam's men. They came and tried to enlist in my "Nizām" I suspected them as being spied and told them that as a proof of their sincerity they should go back and kill one of the Imam's men and return. They did this and I enlisted them. Admitted, but justified for the reasons given above.
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<td>4) That we may be allowed to purchase arms and ammunition so that our arms may not (through want of ammunition) remain as useless things.</td>
<td>The sale to us of arms and ammunition according to the Rules and Regulations of the Arms Warehouse should be permitted. We admit that only men of good character should be permitted to purchase arms and ammunition.</td>
<td>Agreed</td>
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<td>5) That we may be granted allowances (lit. help) to enable us to enforce our orders and punish those people of Oman who commit offences. (We would explain that) we cannot enforce our orders without such assistance.</td>
<td>Allowances should be paid to the Imam, Sh. ‘Isà, and Sh. Ḥimyar and should equal in amount the sum paid annually to the Sultan as subsidy as compensation for losses suffered by him owing to the stoppage of the arms traffic (Rs. 8,333-5-5 per mensem)</td>
<td>I cannot agree to this</td>
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<td>6) That the Chiefs of tribes may also be granted allowances according to the usual custom.</td>
<td>Same view as above</td>
<td>No fixed allowances have ever been paid to tribal Chiefs. It has been the custom to make periodical payments--more or less regularly--to certain Chiefs of tribes in the interior--but nothing fixed. I am prepared to continue this practice when peace is made--but I absolutely decline to pay any allowance to the Imam. A bullet is what he deserves. Sh. ‘Isà would be perhaps among the favoured Chiefs and perhaps Sh. Ḥimyar, but the latter has never received such payments hitherto.</td>
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<td>7) That the Sultan may do away with his &quot;Nizám&quot; (the new troops recently raised by the Sultan) together with the Band. Although such things are the custom of the Turkish Government (according to our views) they are unlawful. None of the Sultan's ancestors had a &quot;Nizám&quot; and a Band; and the Sultan is forbidden by his religion to allow such things.</td>
<td>The &quot;Nizám&quot; and Band are quite contrary to the Shari'ah law, and we insist on the latter being absolutely done away; but as regards the &quot;Nizám&quot; in no case should men be forcibly enlisted in it.</td>
<td>This is a childish request and I absolutely decline to agree to it. Enlistment in my Band is purely voluntary.</td>
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<td>8) That the Sultan may be called upon to remove all the unjust and corrupt Wális and Qa'dís whom he has appointed and sent to the towns.</td>
<td>The Qa'dís and Wális appointed by the Sultan should administer justice according to Shari'ah only.</td>
<td>I am quite willing to agree to this. I will appoint and pay any Qa'dí the Imam suggests except the 2 men mentioned at (1) (c) and (d) above.</td>
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<td>9) That the Sultan will not give protection to Omani slaves who escape from their masters when the latter want them back.</td>
<td>Slaves who come for manumission certificate to be returned to their masters, provided it can be proved to the satisfaction of the British Consul that they have not been ill-treated and that there is no intention to sell them. The Sultan to give assurance that they will not be ill-treated in future or sold.</td>
<td>I leave this to the British Government to decide. The practice already exists. I cannot agree to take any responsibility in respect of the slaves of men not known to me or in a general way.</td>
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<td>Number</td>
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<td>10)</td>
<td>That the Sultan may be called upon to release the following persons who have been imprisoned by him: &lt;br&gt; (a) the son of Sh. Sa'id b. Nāṣir al-Kindī &lt;br&gt; (b) the son of Sh. al-Ṭaywānī &lt;br&gt; (c) Khalfān b. Sarḥān al-Muhrajī and his son. &lt;br&gt; (d) A slave of Sh. 'Isā b. Ṣāliḥ &lt;br&gt; (e) the people of the village of al-Khawāṣ. &lt;br&gt; (f) the people of Raḥbiyyīn. &lt;br&gt; (g) the camels of the slave of Shuhūl</td>
<td>Nil...........&lt;br&gt; These men all arrested by my orders in pursuance of my campaign of coercion against the Imam. I decline to release any of them— even after peace is concluded; but I agree that in future after peace is concluded such cases and also those of murder should be referred to the Shari'ah Court for decision, or handed over to the Imam to deal with.</td>
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<td>11)</td>
<td>That the Sultan may be called upon to refer every kind of dispute to Sharī'ah.</td>
<td>Our request refers only to disputes among Arab and other subjects of the Sultan. The practice already exists in Muscat.</td>
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<td>12)</td>
<td>That the Sultan will issue orders prohibiting the dealing in wines and tobacco and smoking in the public Islamic bazaars. And the dealers in the above commodities should be forbidden to do so.</td>
<td>This applies to Arab and other subjects of the Sultan only. Those who are permitted by their religion to drink and smoke may do so. My subjects do not trade in wines and tobacco. The subjects of foreign nations do. This question should be deferred until after peace is concluded when I will give a more definite reply.</td>
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<td>13)</td>
<td>That the Sultan will exempt the 'Ayyāl [Yāl] Sa'd from payment of duty and zakāt as they have never paid the same hitherto.</td>
<td>The 'Ayyāl [Yāl] Sa'd, should be exempt from payment of zakāt and 'Ashūr as in the days of Sd. Sa'id. Sd. Faysal was the first to try and levy this duty on them. Agreed to</td>
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<td>14)</td>
<td>That the personal baggage of travellers from India and Zanzibar arriving at Şūr may be exempted from examination according to old custom.</td>
<td>The examination of the personal baggage of arrivals from India and Zanzibar at Şūr is made the excuse for looting such people of their private property. We do not object to having merchandise examined for customs duty. Sd. Taymūr promised to have the practice complained of discontinued, but he has forgotten about it. Smuggling is very prevalent at Şūr and this examination of baggage is necessary and justified by the circumstances. I deny the charge that it is made the opportunity for looting private property of travellers.</td>
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The Sultan put forward two conditions as necessary prerequisites for his final approval of reconciliation which are follows:

1. Absolute subordination of the Imam to the Sultan as Ruler of Oman. If and when he was assured of his loyalty and allegiance to him, he would be prepared to consider his appointment as his Deputy in the Hinterland, exclusive of the Samā’īl district.
2. Immediate and unconditional surrender to the Sultan of the district of Samā’īl within the boundaries defined by him and including the forts of Bidbid and Samā’īl reserve to himself the exclusive right as Ruler of Oman to collect all taxes and dues within the said boundaries.

The responses of the Imam's representative were as follows:

1. As regards (1), the Imam and his followers refused to recognize his authority or they saw that they were called upon by the *Shari‘ah* principles to depose him. Therefore, had it not been for the British support, the Sultan would have since long been deposed.
2. As regards (2) it was incumbent upon them not to hand back any place that the Imam had captured by the imperative of the *Shari‘ah*, and hold firm to its teachings. Accordingly, the Sultan must carry out the reforms in his administration and implement their earlier demands (96).

Sh. ‘Isā suggested that the Sultan be called upon to introduce those reforms at once and that he be placed on probation for 6 months. If after the expire of that period there were no grounds for complaint, then the question of allowing him to occupy the Wādī Samā’īl as the Imam's deputy might be considered.

In the end, the PAM claimed that Sh. ‘Isā offered to surrender the forts of Bidbid and Samā’īl to the British government to be taken over by the Sultan on condition that the Sultan be persuaded to carry out the necessary reforms. But that if that condition was not met, then the British Government would have to consider the desirability of taking them away from the Sultan, and handing them over to the Imam (97). This offer from Sh. ‘Isā was, however, overruled by Sh. al-Hāshimī and all the other Shaykhs present, who maintained that such a measure would be contrary to the principles if the *Shari‘ah*. Sh. ‘Isā eventually sided with their view.
The PAM also claimed that Sh. ‘Isà afterwards confided to him, during the absence of his other associates, that there was only one way out of this situation, and that was not to raise the issue of the forts "as long as the Imam is alive" by which he meant to imply that it was not difficult to defer this issue of surrendering the forts (98).

Eventually, the meeting failed, in view of each party's insistence on its stance. The Imam stuck to his condition of the illegitimacy of surrendering the forts (99), while the Sultan on his part also insisted on his condition of surrendering the forts to his authority (100). The PAM held the Imam responsible for the failure of the negotiations, as also partly attributed the failure of talks to Sh. al-Háshimí and the brother of Sh. ‘Isà, both of whom "maintained a most sullen and contentious demeanour throughout the proceedings" (101). The PAM, Benn, wrote to his higher authorities suggesting, as a solution to these difficulties, that one of three courses of action be taken (102):

1. Either the Sultan must agree to set his house in order in accordance with the Imam's religious views and by the introduction of such reforms as may be deemed reasonable, endeavour to give some proof of his desire to conform to the doctrines of the Qur'án as interpreted by the Imam, in return for which the latter would acknowledge the Sultan's supremacy and surrender the forts; or

2. The Sultan must, when negotiations were abandoned, carry out his determination to reduce the Imam to submission and obtain possession of the forts by force of arms; or

3. Allowances, sufficiently large to be attractive and guaranteed by the British Government, must be offered to the Imam, Sh. ‘Isà and Sh. Himyar to induce them to surrender the forts to them for disposal as they wished.

5) The Initiative of Haworth and Wingate (1918-1920)

The peace talks stagnated following the failure of the PAM efforts, as a result of Benn's departure from Muscat after a month of the end of the negotiation. Benn was succeeded by no less than six British Political Agents over Muscat within the span of the year following his transfer. The very frequent and ad hoc nature of the succession to the agency of so many representatives within the short period of only one year placed them in
a position wherein they were unable to understand properly the general situation in Oman, and therefore was not conducive to peace negotiations. These agents were (103):

1. Major H. Stawart, C. I. E., I. A.
2. Lit Colonel C. Ducat, I.A.
6. Major L. B. H. Haworth, I.A.

Major Haworth, (the PAM) held charge of the agency on 8th November, 1916. Between the years 1916 and 1919, he did not hold any communications with the Imamate leaders. However, Haworth was anxious to offer his intervention to mediate between the Sultan and the Imam.

During the whole of 1917, the PAM, Haworth embarked on a dedicated effort of correspondence with his government, trying to persuade his higher authority to intervene for a permanent settlement of the Omani conflict. In this dedicated effort, he employed all means possible, and was coincidentally helped by two events in the internal development of affairs. The first was that of the Imam's siege of al-Rustáq, its eventual fall at the hands of the Imam and the escape of its ruler, Sd. Aḥmad b. Ibrāhīm. The second was a letter from the Sultan to the British Government asking for military support. As a result of these developments, and helped by them, Haworth compiled a lengthy report and sent it to the PRG on 9th May 1917. From this report, here is a summary of some of its points:

1. He compared the regime of government of the Sultan with that of the Imam, describing the Imam's regime of government as good, whereas that of the Sultan otherwise. He added that he had never heard a good word from any one regarding the Sultan's government and his Wālis, and added "it is not then surprising that the Imam's government is preferred by those who live under it" (104).

2. He gave a historical background of the Imamate and the Sultanate in Oman, in which he concluded with final conviction stating that "my object in giving the above history is to show that it will not be possible to suppress an ideal which has existed for so many years by a simple effort of force, any more than it has proved possible in Ireland" (105).
Apparently, the PAM implicitly favoured the Imamate regime of government, and felt that it was incumbent on the British Government not to ignore this system which had had a long standing tradition in this region. Accordingly, his view was that an ideal solution to the conflict would be to work for a compromise between the Sultanate and the Imamate, which was the essential necessity of reconciliation between the two. His view was that "conciliation is the more necessary since, from the point of view of their history and their religion, right is on their side: while it would be difficult today to deny the right of a people to depose its ruler badly " (106).

The PAM was not content with that, but even admitted that British policy which depended on supporting the Sultan alone, and ignoring the other party, was bound to engender popular animosity towards the British. The general public might well rise against British policy in the country (107). The PAM was of the opinion that the Omani question should be postponed until after the Great War, but also admitted that the course of events was rapidly deteriorating.

3. The PAM was convinced that if the tribes were to be persuaded to an agreement, and the Sultan to effect reforms, it was necessary to bring some British influence to bear. Therefore, the PAM's report went to great length in criticising the financial and administration system of the Sultan's Government, maintaining that had it not been for British aid and support, the Sultan's government would have collapsed long before. For these reasons, he suggested the improvement of the system of government by direct British intervention (108).

The PAM then went on to explain the details of such a project in many of his letters to his higher authorities. As a result of these efforts, a certain measure of the reforms were implemented, not along the lines of his proposals, but by means of a loan directed to reform the financial administration. The Sultan entrusted the implementation of such a reform to Egyptian experts, who started work in October, 1918. The other part of the reforms concerning administration was delayed until October 1920, the time when a council of ministers was appointed.

4. In the end, the PAM presented his suggestions for mediation in the Omani conflict on the bases of the terms of conciliation set out in the meeting that was convened in al-Sib on
15th September 1915. However, before embarking on this task, the PAM asked his higher authorities’ permission to go ahead with his mediation efforts (109).

The PAM's comprehensive report also incorporated the draft letter which he was intended to send to the leaders of the Imamate (110). It went to great length to explain the details and procedures on which the coming negotiations could be conducted.

A week after writing his report, the PAM sent a letter to the PRG, in which he mentioned that he had received a messenger from Sh. ‘Isà, asking for a meeting. He commented on Sh. ‘Isà’s letter of request for a meeting that there must have occurred a split between Sh. ‘Isà and the Imam (111). The PAM went on to claim that Sh. Isà's emissary was one of Zanzibari origin, who had possessions of gardens in the Interior of Oman which it was difficult for him to reach and claimed that it was this man who had persuaded Sh. ‘Isà to meet the PAM at Qurayyat (112). The PAM concluded his letter by stating: "I do not think that there can be peace in Oman except through British mediation. The Sultan's star seems to be in the ascendant, but the fact does not in any way alter the situation, there can be no permanency of peace except through us" (113). It was evident that the PAM had a strong desire to mediate between the Sultan and the Imam, and his secret reports were replete of this concern. The PRG, on the other hand, supported the PAM's view in a message cabled to Government of India (114).

In order to understand the Sultan's point of view and his inclination to resolve the conflict with his opponents by force, the following is a letter sent from him to the PRG, seeking assistance from the British:

"I beg to address the high government [British] through you about the present situation which has been brought about again between me and my rebellious subjects of Oman, and of which you are aware. Their acts are producing evil results in the interior of my country and I fear that an unsatisfactory state of affairs will be produced if this situation continues between me and my subjects. Undoubtedly the High Government knows that what I state in my letter is a brief account because I report verbally what happens to your Political Agent here; and "a man who is present sees what an absent person cannot see". We have always enjoyed the good offices and assistance of the High Government and they have been "more widely known than a fire on the hill". But I trust that they will afford me such an assistance that I can put an end to this trouble to the relief of both parties.

Now, in truth, the hopes of the rebels have no limit. Since the last month up to now they have attacked my cousin, the Chief of Rustaq, who always helped them whenever they rose in rebellion, and was counted as one of them. They were not satisfied with this, however, but intend to turn him out of his place and capital and he found himself besieged one morning in the fort of Rustaq. He sent to me for help and I took action to prevent the rebels gaining possession of the place. They made misrepresentation to the other clans who were favourable to me and struck terror into their hearts in different ways.

I now write to request the Government to afford me help so that I may be able to adopt a different policy with the rebels, contrary to the past. The Government and I should act together to
put an end to the disturbances created by the rebels. I promise to the Government that if the rebels are crushed by me with the assistance of the Government troops or some war material to disperse their men and destroy their fortifications, power will break down and there will be eternal peace in Oman.

I know the Government is very busy in these days, but I cannot help fearing the evil consequences of the growth of this trouble, and the losses which will be incurred by the Government and me and which will continue without any result. Therefore I say that what I have stated is an easy work if the Government helps me.

I have forgiven them more than once and granted (money) to them, but they have become more and more rebellious. They believe that what they are doing is connected with the religion and that they are fighting me and the Government for religion, and have impressed this belief on the minds of the peoples. In brief, it is in the interest of the Government, myself, the merchants and the people to bring this situation to an end" (115).

The PRG’s reply to the Sultan indicated that he regretted the adverse developments in Oman, that the Sultan’s letter would be closely considered and sent to the Government of India for action, and finally, that the British policy was not to take any action in the inland of Oman (116). The PAM commented on the Sultan’s letter saying:

"I have allowed the above letter to go as he wrote it thinking it would be better to let him express what was in his mind only censoring one passage, the meaning of which did not seem clear. I am becoming doubtful if it is necessary to give the Sultan control over the whole of Oman and I have already shown in previous letters that he has never had such control with a view to our own policy than with reference to the Sultan” (117).

As it appears, the PAM was intent to distort the image of the Sultan to the British view, and his view was that Britain should assume complete control over Muscat, convinced that the Omanis would welcome the British. This was conveyed to him by the messenger of Sh. ‘Isa, already mentioned above, "pointing out that the British are a just race who interfere with no man's religion and that the Omanis cannot fight the British who could destroy them with a few aeroplanes if they wished to do so even as they have driven the Germans out of East Africa” (118).

It was too optimistic to expect the Omanis to accept British control. However, the truth is that the Omanis welcomed British presence not as dominant overlords, but as partners in trade, because the Omanis were aware of the British fleet control over the Indian Ocean, through which passed all of their trade with the far East, Africa and the Gulf. In order to strengthen his position, the PAM tried to persuade his higher authorities of the futility of assisting the Sultan and in fact interfered with those efforts that had already begun in this direction (119).

In spite of all his persistence, the PAM was not given permission to meet Sh. ‘Isa. Having failed in his efforts to get a go-ahead through correspondence, he decided to go to India personally to explain his point of view more closely. He hoped that after his
visit to India, he would be in a better position to meet Sh. 'Isà, and with a more clear view about the situation.

At the commencement of 1918, there was some correspondence between Sh. 'Isà and the Sultan. The former sent a number of friendly letters to the Sultan requesting him to release four men prisoners and asking him to resume the negotiations and a change of his terms (120). However, it is not clear what changes in the conditions and terms of peace were being suggested. Qásim claims that the Sultan agreed to the release of the prisoners, in exchange for the handing over of the gardens which the Imam had confiscated from his subjects inland (121).

There was clearly a narrowing of the divide between the Sultan and the Imamate leader, but the narrowing was unfortunately disturbed by Sd. Ḥumúd b. Hilál, the Wálí of Șúr, who killed one of the Imam's Wális, Sh. Aḥmad b. Sálim al-'Uraymí, during his visit to Șúr on 21st Jumádá 11, 1336/13th April 1918 (122). As a result, disturbances ensued in Șúr, and rumours circulated that the Imam was preparing an attack on Șúr or Yanqil or al-Buraymí which were under the Sultan. Therefore, this incident impeded the on-going efforts exerted by Sh. 'Isà and the PAM and checked short the Sultan's positive response to these efforts.

By the end of the Great War, the British Government sought to resolve the Omani conflict. Therefore it instructed its agent at Muscat to contact the Imamate leaders for resumption of the peace talks. Consequently, the PAM wrote letters on 5th March 1919, carried by Sh. Ḥumayd b. Saʿíd al-Fulaytí to the Imamate leaders, Sh. 'Isà, Sh. Himyar, and Sh. Náṣir al-Kharúší, the Imam's brother, the Wálí of al-Rustáq. Because the PAM's letter contained exhortations and attempts at persuasion, we cite some of its contents:

"It is some time since I have written to you, now that the war is over I had intended to address to you and inform you with reference to it and our general intention in these parts of the world. As you will know, thanks be to God, Great Britain and her Allies have defeated their enemies who have all surrendered and we are now in occupation of Germany, Austria, Bulgaría and Turkey. Germany has surrendered her fleet, the most of which is interned in England and Germany itself is in a condition of revolution and famine. In Turkey we have occupied Constantinople and as you know Baghdad has been for a long time in our hands. We are now establishing an Arab Government in that place and will place the whole of Iraq in the hands of an Arab Government and we will not allow the Turkish Government to have any connection with it.

In the Hijáz our friend and ally Sheriff Ḥusayn is all powerful and has taken the title of King of Hijáz. Under the terms of armistice which we allowed the Turks, Madinah has been surrendered by them and is now in the hands of the King of Hijáz. In Yemen Saʿíd Pasha has surrendered and is now a prisoner in our hands. And the truth of all this will undoubtedly reach you from other sources very soon and the time of the Hajj will show it to those who may doubt."
I am especially writing to tell you that it is our intention to assist in the establishment of the Arab Government in all Arab places to govern according to their own customs. Now they are freed from the tyranny of the Turk there is every hope that they will be able to develop on good Arab lines. Now that we have the time and opportunity to attend to Oman it is necessary that I should attempt to explain to you our position towards Oman so that you will be able to understand our point of view. Muscat is one of the ports used by our ships on the way to Bushier and Basrah. It is essential for the purposes of the trade of the world that ports should be in a condition of safety and peace. If the government of the country is upset and fighting, then the port becomes unsafe and there is no harbour for ships which are passing and no safety and the cargo from them if it is landed, is in danger.

In Oman there was always fighting and trouble, especially when one Imam there or a Sultan died and another was elected. We used to make an alliance with one ruler and immediately we had done so we found he was being attacked by some other claimant to the throne. In these circumstances, as you are aware, we were forced in 1895 to make a declaration to all the Shaykhs of Oman that we would support in the ports the Sultan who was in power and with whom we had made alliance and in this way we have supported Sultans Turkf, Faysal and Taymür. It is for this reason that I have wished to meet you to discuss with you what can be done to improve matters, for in such a matter it is only by discussion that either side can understand the other and see if it is possible to meet each others' views.

It has never been known that we should injure anyone unjustly but how can we act other than we have acted if you do not come to a discussion with us or show any desire for friendly intercourse. We have no wish to force upon people a government which is bad or which is against their customs. And it is at this time that I hear of some talk of a desire to attack Sur. I do not know if this is true but God forbid that it should be, for this would bring the Omanis into conflict with us once more and for two years I have been endeavouring to make this impossible and I write to you to say: do not do this thing if it has arisen in the minds of any of you that it should be done, for this will cause loss to you and we do not wish to harm you. On the contrary, for if we wished we could sent aeroplanes which would destroy your towns and your forts and you surely do not think you could fight against us. We have 500,000 men in Iraq whom we no longer require there and a few thousand of these would be sufficient to take the whole of Oman if we wished to do it.

Sd. Taymür, unlike you has always attempted to be on friendly terms with us and you will see that the ruler who has sea ports will always have the power to put taxes upon the goods coming from the Interior and you will be unable to do anything and we have control of the sea, if you desire to be at enmity with us, why should we allow rice and wheat to be sold to you or clothing and why should we allow you to sell your dates as all your trade is with our countries? But if you are friendly with us and discuss matters, that we can assist you as we are now assisting Sd. Taymür. But if you go against us then the consequences are on your head and not on ours as I have said before and how can we be friends with those who will not be friends with us.

I would ask that you would explain this to your brother (123) the Imam and let him see that the present condition cannot go on for even and that communication with us cannot do you any harm, but good, while refusal to communicate with us makes it impossible for us to help you and therefore must result in harm to you and I have written to Sh. Himyar also like this"(124).

It is said that the PAM was threatening the Omani chiefs as a signal to show British power and its victory in the Great War, and to emphasize that they would not be able to withstand British military strength if they refused to cooperate with the British (125). The Omani chiefs, in fact, were well aware of the British power and influence in the world politics, as they also had had a long contact with the British for over a century. For these reasons, the Omanis could not underestimate British power.

However, in spite of the signs of the PAM's brandishing of British military strength, the Imamate leaders paid little attention to his warning, as usual. They continued their preparations for peace. The Imam, for his part, called for a meeting to be convened in Samá'il on April 1919 to discuss the PAM's proposals. Sh. ‘Isà also wrote to the PAM,
welcoming his view, but also expressed his desire to meet the PAM at al-Sīb before the Imam's meeting at Samā'il (126).

After having discussed the PAM's proposal at Samā'il, Sh. ‘Isā wrote to the PAM, telling him of their final acceptance of negotiations. The latter arranged for a meeting at al-Sīb in May 1919, but this meeting did not take place because of the death of the brother of Sh. ‘Isā, Sh. ‘Alī b. Ṣāliḥ on 5th Shawwāl 1337/ 6th May 1919, and another date was fixed for the meeting to be held on 14th September 1919 (127).

On 14th September 1919, Sh. ‘Isā and Haworth, the PAM, arrived at al-Sīb. The former was accompanied by 14 of the Shaykhs, most of them from his people of the Hināwī tribes and an additional 280 armed men as guards. The meeting was delayed to the 15th in order to await the arrival of Sh. Saʿūd b. Nāṣir b. ‘Abdallāh al-Kindī (1268/1851-1355/1936) to whom an envoy had been sent to ask him to attend the meeting (128). Sh. al-Kindī was an ʿdīm and who lived at al-Mutahadāmat village (now al-ʿĀmirāt) which is under the Sultan’s control.

Haworth and Sh. ‘Isā met in the afternoon on 15th September, in the house of Sh. Muḥammad b. Ṭahm al-Bū Saʿūdī, the Wālī of Maṭrah. The meeting was also attended by both Sh. al-Kindī, and a translator of the British Agency. Both parties discussed the situation most comprehensively.

At first, the meting discussed the PAM’s proposal that there should be a division of power between the Sultan and the Imam for a united Oman, in which the Sultan assumed temporal power and the Imam spiritual leadership. Therefore, the Sultan should appoint Sh. ‘Isā as his representative in the territories under the Imam’s control, viz., Samā’il, Nakhal, and Bidbid, and also the coastal towns under the Sultan’s control. On the other side, the Imam should appoint Sh. al-Kindī to be his representative. The Imam or his representative should be consulted on the posts of Qādīs, and get their approval before the Qādīs could be appointed. Also a council for Oman notables should be appointed to assist in decisions regarding the appointments of Wālīs, and in the running of the country’s financial affairs (129).

The meeting was called off for a short interval during which Sh. ‘Isā and Sh. al-Kindī discussed the PAM’s proposal with the 14 Shaykhs of his followers waiting outside
the hall of the meeting. During these discussions, the Shaykhs rejected this proposal on the grounds that such a dualism of a temporal and spiritual authority had no precedent in Islamic tradition (130).

Evidently, these Shaykhs could not comprehend the possibilities of peace offered by these proposals, and see that formula was more conducive to the peace efforts and could form a basis on which all Omanis could agree. In fact, these could be seen as a form of democratic participation, as there could be formed a council to supervise the financial and administrative matters in the Sultan's government. In addition, there was ample chance for appointing the best cadres to the posts of Wālis and Qādis.

After the rejection of the PAM's proposal by the Shaykhs, the PAM presented another proposal, based this time on the prevailing state of affairs. We do not need to go into the details of what these new proposals were or how they were discussed. However, they finally agreed on the new proposals, which include the following terms, some of which were to be carried out by the Sultan and others by the Imam (131):

1. On the Sultan's part to guarantee:
   a. Freedom of entry for Omanis into Muscat and Maṭraḥ.
   b. Reduction of the coastal tax on all goods to 5%.
   c. Return of Omani fugitives from justice.
   d. Release of prisoners.

2. On the Omani part to guarantee:
   a. Non-interference with the Sultan's government and cessation of hostilities with him in the future.
   b. Freedom to trade and travel in Oman and the safety of travellers.
   c. Return of fugitives from the Sultan's justice.
   d. Settlement of the claims of traders and others against Omanis.
   e. Return of two valuable gardens of the Sultan's subjects seized by the Imam.

It is clear from the terms of this agreement that it was inclined towards the Imam's side and weakened the Sultan's position as regards his demands for the handing over of the forts of Bidbid and Samá’il, and recognition of his sway as Sultan over Oman. As we have seen earlier, these two conditions were responsible for the failure of the peace talks
in September 1915. Another observation about this agreement is the problematic demand for the return to the Sultan of the gardens which had been confiscated by the Imam.

If we compare the terms of this latter agreement with the first proposal which called for a measure of participation in government, we can see that the first proposal offered a better chance of rule, as there could be participation and implementation of financial and administrative reforms. The latter agreement offered no such concessions, and indeed made no provisions against external intervention, in case it happened.

Sh. 'Isà left al-Sib on 17th September, for Nazwà, in order to inform the Imam of the terms of the new agreement. He then left for his home town, giving the Imam ample time to consider the agreement.

The Imam rejected the term which demanded that he return the gardens to the Sultan. It is important to note here that there was a split in the Imam's ranks concerning the issue of the handover of the gardens. The majority of the prominent leadership within the Imam's party were in favour of the return of gardens, if the Imam himself agreed to it. However, another group of his following, mainly from among Mutawwi'ah, were opposed to any handover of the gardens, on the assumption that this would be anti-religious.

However, the new PAM, Wingate, who succeeded Haworth on 15th October 1919, authorized Sh. al-Kindî to follow up the implementation of the terms of the agreement with the Imam (132). Wingate considered that Sh. al-Kindî was the only personality capable of over-coming religious prejudices and could convince the Imam of the necessity of giving back the gardens to the Sultan. Wingate's view was that there could be no peace without the handing back of the confiscated property of the gardens (133). In November 1919, Sh. al-Kindî went to Nazwà to get back the gardens from the Imam, but was not able to do so as a result of the Imam's refusal to hand them over. After that, Sh. al-Kindî tried to persuade the influential elements with the 'ulama' in the Imam's party to see the potential benefits of coming to terms with the Sultan for the purposes of peace. His efforts, however, were also unsuccessful in this direction. Consequently he left Nazwà for al-Qâbil in January 1920 to discuss the matter with Sh. 'Isà so that the latter could use his influence to press on the Imam to accept peace.
Sh. ‘Isà called for a general meeting of the Shaykhs in Nazwà to discuss with the Imam the possibilities of peace. This meeting was held on 28th Jumádà II, 1338/18th February 1920. The results of the meeting were, however, disappointing for those who were in favour of a final peace settlement (134).

According to the PAM's view the main causes of the refusal of the Imam were as follows:
1. Intense ignorance and the paramount influence for the timebeing of Mutáwi‘ah.
2. Over-confidence and bad management on the part of Sh. ‘Isà.
3. Belief on the part of the more powerful and intelligent Omanis that the British were only supporting the Sultan in a half-hearted manner as the British had continually stopped him from imposing restrictions on them and had openly admitted his bad government (135).

The PAM was of the opinion that the rule of religion (that of the Imam) is short-lived, personal and pays no consideration to the issues of public policy and interests and is more inclined to extremism and intolerance (136). These views of the PAM could not be justified and indeed conflicted with the view of one of his predecessors, who described the rule of the Imam as being better than that of the Sultan in many respects.

It appears that the PAM was not happy with the attitude of the Imamate leadership, therefore describing them in such strong terms. Not only that, but he even went further to suggest to the Sultan that he suppress the Omanis in the following ways:
1. increase the tax on dates from 5% to 25%, as a temporary and punitive measure openly directed against the Omanis;
2. increase the tax on pomegranates from 35% to 50%, especially directed against Sh. Ḥimyar b. Nāṣir;
3. forbid the export of coffee to the Omanis (137).

The last measure, the banning of coffee exports to the Omanis, according to the PAM's would be the most effective one. The PAM went on to explain the details of how to carry out these measures, and in order to convince his government of his plan, stated that these new measures would be implemented with no extra expenses to be assumed by the British Government (138).
The PAM emphasized the importance of supporting the Sultan in order to reinforce his position, to reaffirm his power and authority among the Omanis, so that they could feel that the Sultan had enough power and authority to press on them. He reassured his government of the possible Omani reaction to such measures, and stated that "the Omanis have no offensive power, for the very simple reason that they have no cartridges for their rifles" (139).

These measures were to be implemented in May 1920 and the Sultan even warned that they would be implemented by force, if need be. In consequence, a torrent of letters poured on the PAM, inquiring about the PAM's position with regard to these measures. His response to these questioning letters was that the British Government supported its efforts of mediation for peace. Moreover, as the Omanis had refused the terms, the British Government decided to support the Sultan and had no further interest in the matter (140).

Britain, in an effort to display its powers and to salvage its image, invited the Sultan for a visit to India to be accompanied by the PAM, on March 1920. At the same time, the British and the Sultan's fleets increased their presence in the coastal ports of Oman, and the fleets put down the rebellion of Sh. Mas'úd b. Zumayṭ al-Sa'df, who refused to comply with the declared measures.

The Imam on his part lost one of his important assistants, Sh. Ḥimyar b. Nāṣir on 7th Jumādā II 1338/27th February 1920. He also launched an attack on al-Ḥazim, but failed to captured it. A few months later, the Imam himself was murdered in July 1920. With his death, the course of events took a different shape, which will be discussed later.
Endnotes

(2) Landen, op.cit. p. 394.
(3) See his letters in (I.O) L/P&S/10/397.
(4) See his letters in (I.O) L/P&S/10/397.
(5) See Ch. III.
(6) See this memorandum in (R.O. II) p. 738.
(8) See his letter of 5th Aug. 1913 in the Muscat Affairs in L/P&S/10/397.
(9) See his letter of 5th Aug. 1913 in the Muscat Affairs in L/P&S/10/397.
(10) See the Imam's letter in (R.O.II) p. 730.
(11) See the Imam's letter in (R.O.III) p. 27.
(12) See his letters in (1.0) L/P&S/10/397.
(13) See his letters in (1.0) L/P&S/10/397.
(14) See this memorandum in (R.O. II) p. 738.
(16) See his letter of 5th Aug. 1913 in the Muscat Affairs in L/P&S/10/397.
(17) See his letter of 5th Aug. 1913 in the Muscat Affairs in L/P&S/10/397.
(18) See the Imam's letter in (R.O.II) p. 746 & p. 750, for both Arabic and English versions.
(19) See his letter of 5th Aug. 1913 in the Muscat Affairs in L/P&S/10/397.
(20) See his letter of 5th Aug. 1913 in the Muscat Affairs in L/P&S/10/397.
(21) See the Imam's letter in (R.O.II) pp. 730f for both Arabic and English versions.
(22) See the Imam's letter in (R.O.II) pp. 742f for both Arabic and English versions.
(23) See his letters in (1.0) L/P&S/10/397.
(24) See the Imam's letter in (R.O.II) pp. 744f for both Arabic and English versions.
(25) See the Imam's letter in (R.O.II) pp. 746 & p. 750, for both Arabic and English versions.
(26) See the Imam's letter in (R.O.II) pp. 746 & p. 750, for both Arabic and English versions.
(27) See the Imam's letter in (1.0) L/P&S/10/397 for both Arabic and English versions.
(28) See the Imam's letter in (1.0) L/P&S/10/397.
(29) See the Imam's letter in (1.0) L/P&S/10/397 for both Arabic and English versions.
(30) See the Imam's letter in (1.0) L/P&S/10/397 for both Arabic and English versions.
(31) See the Imam's letter in (1.0) L/P&S/10/397 for both Arabic and English versions.
(32) See the Imam's letter in (1.0) L/P&S/10/397 for both Arabic and English versions.
(33) See the Imam's letter in (1.0) L/P&S/10/397 for both Arabic and English versions.
(34) See the Imam's letter in (1.0) L/P&S/10/397 for both Arabic and English versions.
(35) See the Imam's letter in (1.0) L/P&S/10/397 for both Arabic and English versions.
(36) See the Imam's letter in (1.0) L/P&S/10/397 for both Arabic and English versions.
(37) See the Imam's letter in (1.0) L/P&S/10/397 for both Arabic and English versions.
(38) See the Imam's letter in (1.0) L/P&S/10/397 for both Arabic and English versions.
(39) See the Imam's letter in (1.0) L/P&S/10/397 for both Arabic and English versions.
(40) See the Imam's letter in (1.0) L/P&S/10/397 for both Arabic and English versions.
(41) See the Imam's letter in (1.0) L/P&S/10/397 for both Arabic and English versions.
5. Sh. Sálim b. Muhammad al-Siyábi
9. The sons of Sh. ‘Azíz b. Ráshid al-Jábrí
10. Sh. Sa‘úd b. Ráshid al-Hádábí (Hínáwí)

(51) For further details about exchange of correspondence between the B. Jábr, the Imam, Sh. al-Ná‘ímí, and the Sultan see (L.O.) R 15/6/45.

(52) See the PAM’s report to PRG on 1st March 1915 in (L.O.) L/P&S/10/397.

(53) See Sh. Himyár’s letter in the PAM’s report to PRG on 1st March 1915 in (L.O.) L/P&S/10/397.

(54) See Sh. Himyár’s letter in (L.O.) R 15/1/435 p. 278

(55) Colonel Benn, R.A.E. held the post of the Imam’s representative and his escort during the period of negotiation. Safety letters dated on 25th Ashúrát Shawwál 1333/5th September 1915 in (R.O.III) p. 61.

(56) See the Imam’s letter to the PAM in (R.O.III) pp. 65f for both Arabic and English versions.

(57) See Sh. Himyár’s letter to the PAM in (R.O.III) pp. 67f for both Arabic and English versions.

(58) See Sh. ‘Isá’s letter to the PAM in (R.O.III) pp. 79 & 84 for both Arabic and English versions.


(60) The Imam stated that Sh. al-Fulaytí was sent by them to make known their views regarding terms of peace and to ascertain how far these were likely to be accepted by the British, see (R.O.III) p. 87.

(61) Bell, op. cit. pp. 23f.

(62) Concurrently, with these talks, Sh. al-Ná‘ímí was also engaged in similar talks.

(63) Bell, op. cit. p. 22.

(64) (Adm. R. 1914) p. 41.

(65) See the Imam’s letter to the PAM in (R.O.III) pp. 65f for both Arabic and English versions.

(66) See Sh. Himyár’s letter to the PAM in (R.O.III) pp. 67f for both Arabic and English versions.

(67) The Imam stated that Sh. al-Fulaytí was sent by them to make known their views regarding terms of peace and to ascertain how far these were likely to be accepted by the British, see (R.O.III) p. 87.

(68) Bell, op. cit. pp. 23f.

(69) (R.O.III) p. 87.

(70) Shahdád, (op. cit. p. 68) states that the PAM’s conditions were included in his letters to the Imam and his leaders, dated 9th April 1915. This is incorrect, because they had not been sent in a message, but were verbally communicated by the PAM to Sh. al-Fulaytí during his interview with him on 20th May 1915, see the PAM’s letter in (R.O.III) pp. 62f for both Arabic and English versions.

(71) (R.O.III) p. 83; Bell, op. cit. p. 24.

(72) See Sh. al-Háshímí’s letter in (R.O.III) pp. 89-91 & pp. 95f, for both Arabic and English versions.

(73) (R.O.III) p. 89; Bell, op. cit. p. 25.

(74) See Sh. al-Háshímí’s letter in (R.O.III) pp. 91, Sh. al-Háshímí enclosed this letter in his letter to the PAM, on 5th Sha‘bán.

(75) (R.O.III) p. 88.

(76) See the PAM’s reply to Sh. al-Háshímí and al-Fulaytí in (R.O.III) pp. 100f.

(77) See Sh. al-Háshímí’s letter in (R.O.III) pp. 104-7 for Arabic and English versions.

(78) See Sh. al-Fulaytí’s letter in (R.O.III) pp. 108f for Arabic and English versions.


(80) See the Imam’s letter in (R.O.III) pp. 111f for Arabic and English versions.

(81) See the Imam’s letter in (R.O.III) pp. 112f for Arabic and English versions.


(83) See the Imam’s letter of 28th Shawwáhl in (L.O.) R 15/6/46 pp. 36f for Arabic and English versions.

(84) See the PAM’s Report of 28th Sep. 1915 in (L.O.) R 15/6/46, p. 63.

(85) al-Sálim, M.A. op. cit. p. 385.
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(90) See the Imam's letter of 28th Shawwal in (I.O.) R15/6/46 pp. 36f for Arabic and English versions.


(93) See the Imam's letter of 2nd Dhi al-Qi'dah, 1333 to the PAM in (R.O.III) p. 119.

(94) See this petition in (R.O.III) pp. 120f, for Arabic and English versions.

(95) See the PAM's Report of 28th Sep. 1915 in (I.O.) R15/6/46.


(99) See the Imam's letter of 8th Dhi al-Qi'dah 1333 in (R.O.III) p. 123.

(100) See this petition in (I.O.) R15/6/46.


(103) See the Imam's letter of 8th Dhi al-Qi'dah 1333 in (R.O.III) p. 119.

(104) See this petition in (I.O.) R15/6/46.

(105) See the Imam's letter of 8th Dhi al-Qi'dah 1333 in (R.O.III) p. 119.

(106) See this petition in (I.O.) R15/6/46.


(110) See the Imam's letter of 8th Dhi al-Qi'dah 1333 in (R.O.III) p. 119.

(111) See this petition in (I.O.) R15/6/46.

(112) See the Imam's letter of 8th Dhi al-Qi'dah 1333 in (R.O.III) p. 119.

(113) See this petition in (I.O.) R15/6/46.

(114) See the Imam's letter of 8th Dhi al-Qi'dah 1333 in (R.O.III) p. 119.

(115) See this petition in (I.O.) R15/6/46.

(116) See the Imam's letter of 8th Dhi al-Qi'dah 1333 in (R.O.III) p. 119.

(117) See this petition in (I.O.) R15/6/46.

(118) See the Imam's letter of 8th Dhi al-Qi'dah 1333 in (R.O.III) p. 119.

(119) See this petition in (I.O.) R15/6/46.

(120) See the Imam's letter of 8th Dhi al-Qi'dah 1333 in (R.O.III) p. 119.

(121) See this petition in (I.O.) R15/6/46.

(122) See the Imam's letter of 8th Dhi al-Qi'dah 1333 in (R.O.III) p. 119.

(123) See this petition in (I.O.) R15/6/46.

(124) See the Imam's letter of 8th Dhi al-Qi'dah 1333 in (R.O.III) p. 119.

(125) See the Imam's letter of 8th Dhi al-Qi'dah 1333 in (R.O.III) p. 119.

(126) See the Imam's letter of 8th Dhi al-Qi'dah 1333 in (R.O.III) p. 119.

(127) See the Imam's letter of 8th Dhi al-Qi'dah 1333 in (R.O.III) p. 119.

(128) See the Imam's letter of 8th Dhi al-Qi'dah 1333 in (R.O.III) p. 119.

(129) See the Imam's letter of 8th Dhi al-Qi'dah 1333 in (R.O.III) p. 119.

(130) See the Imam's letter of 8th Dhi al-Qi'dah 1333 in (R.O.III) p. 119.

(131) See the Imam's letter of 8th Dhi al-Qi'dah 1333 in (R.O.III) p. 119.

(132) See the Imam's letter of 8th Dhi al-Qi'dah 1333 in (R.O.III) p. 119.

(133) See the Imam's letter of 8th Dhi al-Qi'dah 1333 in (R.O.III) p. 119.

(134) See the Imam's letter of 8th Dhi al-Qi'dah 1333 in (R.O.III) p. 119.

(135) See the Imam's letter of 8th Dhi al-Qi'dah 1333 in (R.O.III) p. 119.

(136) See the Imam's letter of 8th Dhi al-Qi'dah 1333 in (R.O.III) p. 119.

(137) See the Imam's letter of 8th Dhi al-Qi'dah 1333 in (R.O.III) p. 119.

(138) See the Imam's letter of 8th Dhi al-Qi'dah 1333 in (R.O.III) p. 119.

(139) See the Imam's letter of 8th Dhi al-Qi'dah 1333 in (R.O.III) p. 119.

(140) See the Imam's letter of 8th Dhi al-Qi'dah 1333 in (R.O.III) p. 119.
CHAPTER VI

THE IMAM AND THE OMANI TRIBES

This chapter will discuss the role of the tribes in support of Imam Sálím, and the extent of the Imam’s influence over these tribes. It will also discuss the degree of cohesion between these tribes. To understand this situation, and the character of these tribes and their political role, it is important, first, to shed light on the general demographic structure of the Omani population.

1) The Demographic Structure

The exact figures of the Omani population are difficult to obtain, or are not existent, especially for the period that we are now documenting. Some attempts, however, have been made by three authors, covering widely different periods. These attempts tried to give us various estimates of the numbers of tribesmen, varying from one tribe to another. The following table shows examples of these variations, according to the estimates given by the three different authors (1):

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Nos</th>
<th>Names of the Tribes</th>
<th>Estimates of Miles (1881)</th>
<th>Estimates of Lorimer (1908)</th>
<th>Estimates of Chauncy (1951)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>al-‘Awámir</td>
<td>12,000</td>
<td>10,000</td>
<td>3,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>al-Habúṣ</td>
<td>20,000</td>
<td>7,000</td>
<td>6,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>al-Ḥajríyyín</td>
<td>13,000</td>
<td>5,500</td>
<td>2,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Jábir (Banú)</td>
<td>30,000</td>
<td>25,000</td>
<td>5,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>al-Janabah</td>
<td>28,000</td>
<td>12,000</td>
<td>10,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Kharúṣ (Banú)</td>
<td>14,000</td>
<td>4,000</td>
<td>2,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>al-Ma‘áwil</td>
<td>13,000</td>
<td>8,000</td>
<td>3,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Na‘ím (Banú)</td>
<td>16,000</td>
<td>5,400</td>
<td>2,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Sa‘d (‘Yál)</td>
<td>60,000</td>
<td>13,000</td>
<td>10,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>Sa‘íd (Āl Bú)</td>
<td>20,000</td>
<td>6,000</td>
<td>2,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>‘Umar (Banú)</td>
<td>13,000</td>
<td>11,000</td>
<td>1,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>Wahífah (Āl)</td>
<td>30,000</td>
<td>13,000</td>
<td>5,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
It is clear from the table that there are great variations in the estimates of tribe population numbers. It is possible to attribute these variations to the inaccuracy of estimates, and to the fact that these estimates were based on guesses rather than on a proper census, especially those of Miles’ estimate. The fact that these were no more than guess estimates can be seen from the great discrepancies between them. For example there are great discrepancies in the estimation of the ‘Yál Sa’d tribe between that of Miles, which about was 60,000, and those of Lorimer and Chauncy which were 13,000 and 10,000 respectively.

The population of the Omani tribes can be studied according to the following criteria:

a) **Origin of tribes:**

The Omani population comprises diverse ethnic groups, of Arabic and non-Arabic origin. The majority, though, are descended from Arabic origins: Southern Arabs and Northern Arabs. These origins have in historical time divided into two groups, and are known under various names (2), those of the Southern origin being called Qaḥṭānī or Yamanī, and those of Northern, ‘Adnání or Ma’adī or Nasári. The Qaḥṭānī were the earliest to settle in Oman. These are divided into several divisions, such as Qudã‘ah, Azd, and Tayyi, and ’Adnaní. The second wave of settlers were the ‘Adnání group. The ‘Adnání were also divided into many subgroups, such as B. Tamúrn, ’Abs, Dhubyán, B. Súmah, ’Abd al-Qays, ...etc. There were about 170 of these tribes, and another 15 tribes whose origins can be traced to India, Persia or Africa. Those of African origin were predominantly descendants of former slaves and vassals (Mawáfí) who got their freedom at various times. Some of the Mawáfí are also known as at Bayásirah. These were affiliated to the major Omani tribes under various denominations. e.g. the Khuṣaybí, the ‘Ubaydán, the Jadíd, and the Jámi‘í (3).

b) **Tribal political affiliations**

It is to be noted that animosity is a deep-rooted ancient phenomenon that has characterized the relationship between the Qaḥṭāní and ‘Adnání throughout history. This historical animosity somewhat eased during the era of the Prophet Muḥammad and the four caliphs after him but re-emerged again during the Umayyad Caliphate and continued
until the present century. The animosity also extended to the Arabs of Oman. It began in 280 A.H. when the ‘Adnániyyah sought the support of the ‘Abbasid Caliph, al-Mu’tadid against their Qahţání rivals (4).

The Omanis entered into three bloody inter-tribal wars, the last of which took place during the 1720s, and acquired the name of the Hináwi-Gháfirí tribal conflict. This term commonly used among the Omani people during the last three centuries, and accordingly, the tribes were divided according to their interests and politics (5).

The majority of the Hináwi tribes are descended from the Qahţání, and, on the other hand, the Gháfirí are descended from the ‘Adnáni. The number of the tribes which belong to the Hináwi faction is about 88, while those under the Gháfirí faction number 82. In fact the number of Qahţání tribes is 91, and that of the ‘Adnáni, 79. This is because some of the Qahţání tribes supported the Gháfirí faction, and vice-versa. The reason for this anomaly can be attributed to internal rivalries within each ethnic or tribal group of the same origin, which led some of the competing rivals to seek support and join the other different faction (6). The following table illustrates some of these instances:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No</th>
<th>Hináwi tribes of ‘Adnáni origin</th>
<th>Gháfirí tribes of Qahţání origin</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Sa’d (‘Yál)</td>
<td>Kharúş (Banú)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Ruwáhah (Banú)</td>
<td>al-‘Abríyyín</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>al-Habús</td>
<td>al-Naabáhinah</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Wahbah (Ál)</td>
<td>al-Yá’aqíb</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>‘Adí (Banú)</td>
<td>al-Ya’áribah</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>al-Masháfirah</td>
<td>Rásíb (Banú)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>al-‘Awámir</td>
<td>al-Raḥbiyyín</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>al-Harásís</td>
<td>al-Masákiráh</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>al-Zawáhir</td>
<td>‘Alí (Banú Bú)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>al-Hadádíbah</td>
<td>al-Janabah</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>Wahíb (Banú)</td>
<td>Riyám (Banú)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>Khálid (Banú)</td>
<td>‘Arábah (Banú)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>al-Mashárifah</td>
<td>al-Fawárís</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td></td>
<td>al-Na’ím (Banú)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td></td>
<td>al-Sawálím</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16</td>
<td></td>
<td>al-Nadábiyyín</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17</td>
<td></td>
<td>al-Hadárím</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Tribes and tribal politics have played a powerful role in Oman’s history. The table below shows the major tribes which have influenced events in Oman during the period with which we are dealing (7):

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Provinces</th>
<th>Ghafiri Faction</th>
<th>Hinawi Faction</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>al-Batinah</td>
<td>B. ‘Umar, al-Mazawi</td>
<td>al- Hawasinah, Āl Khamis,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>al-Bū Rāshid, ‘Yāl Sa’d, al-Mawālik</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eastern Ḥajar</td>
<td>B. Jābir, al-Siyābiyyin</td>
<td>B. Baṭṭash, al-Mashārifah</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ja’lán</td>
<td>B. Bū ‘Alī, B. Rāsib, al-Hishm</td>
<td>B. Bū Ḥasan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>al-Dakhiliyyah</td>
<td>al-‘Abriyyin, al-Kunūd,</td>
<td>al-‘Awāmir</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>al-Nadābiyyin, al-Rahbiyyin,</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>al-Nizāriyyin, B. Riyām,</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>B. Shukayil, al-Mahārīq</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>al-Sharqiyyah</td>
<td>al-Ḥasrūt, al-Ḥikmān, al-Janabah,</td>
<td>al-Ḥabūs, al-Ḥarth, al-Ḥajriyyin,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>al-Mahārīq, al-Masākīrah</td>
<td>Āl Wahibah</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>western Ḥajar</td>
<td>B. Ḥarrās, B. Jābir, B.Qatab, B.</td>
<td>B. ‘Alī, B. Ḥassān, al-Ma‘āwil,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Kharūṣ, B. Kulayb, B. Riyām,</td>
<td>al-Mawālik, al-Mayāyiḥah</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>al-Munāfīl al-Mazari</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zāhirah (Dhahirah)</td>
<td>B. Ghafir, B. Qatab, B. Na‘īm,</td>
<td>al-Manādhira, B. Šārikh,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>al-Ya‘āqīb, al-Durū</td>
<td>al-Zawāhir</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**c) Size of tribes**

Comparison between the sizes of the Omani tribes are based on the estimates given by Miles, Lorimer, and Chauncy. We have seen that the tribes vary in size considerably from one to the other, and from author to author. This is only naturally understandable in a context of such diverse ethno-tribal groups. The following table shows the size of different tribes (8):

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Size</th>
<th>Hinawi tribes</th>
<th>Ghafiri tribes</th>
<th>Other tribes</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Over...... 7, 000</td>
<td>Very large</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5,000 to 7, 000</td>
<td>Large</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1,000 to 5,000</td>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Less...... 1, 000</td>
<td>Small</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>107</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td>88</td>
<td>82</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>185</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
It is clear from the table that the Hináwf and the Ghafírí tribes were approximately equal in size and the balance of power between them. It is for this reason that the length of a particular ruler in power depends on the ability of the ruler to maintain the balance between these two main factions. If, for any reason, this balance is upset, the length that a regime (or ruler) stays in power is usually very short. An example of the shortness of a ruler’s regime of power, was the short Imamate of ‘Azzán b. Qays (1868-1871), which did not last more than two years. Conversely, an example of a longer regimes depending on maintaining the balance, was the Imamate of Sálím b. Ráshid (1913-1920) and his successor Imam Muḥammad b. ‘Abdalláh al-Khalífí (1920-1954). Here are some examples of the five major tribes in Oman whose members numbered over 7,000, and which effected influence on Omani politics:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No</th>
<th>Hináwf tribes</th>
<th>Ghafírí tribes</th>
<th>Other tribes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Ḥawásínah</td>
<td>al-Hishm</td>
<td>al-‘Ajám</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Ruwáḥah</td>
<td>Jābir (Banú)</td>
<td>Bayásirah</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Sa’d (‘Yál)</td>
<td>al-Janabah</td>
<td>al-Fawáris</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Shuhúdh</td>
<td>Riyám (Banú)</td>
<td>al-Zijdál</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Wahibah (Āl)</td>
<td>‘Umar (Banú)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

These tribes left an impact on the course of events in the country. This impact varied from one tribe to the other in accordance with the nature of the event itself. For example, al-Shuhúdh and al-Hishm were two big tribes, but had no influence on the internal course of events or in the conflict which was going on during the period under study, except to a very limited extent. In addition, they had had no political influence, as other tribes did, such as the Nabáhinah, and the ‘Hírth tribes (9).

d) Spatial distribution of tribes

The distribution of the tribes is given here on a spatial basis, according to the habitat of the tribe or its territories, social and cultural institutions. It is not based on the level of development or degree of modernization of the tribal system of settlement. In spatial geographic terms, the distribution of the tribes can be based on two broad categories: the desert inhabitants (Badú) and the urban dwellers (Ḥáдар).
It is easy in Oman to distinguish between two different modes of life according to the type of settlement of each tribe. There are those Bedouin tribes who live in the desert and employ herding and animal husbandry. Some sections of these tribes also practise fishing. Examples of this are the tribes of Janabah, al-Ḥikmán, and Ḥarásís. These are essentially Bedouin tribes, but many of their members also practise fishing. Another example is the tribe of al-ʿAwámir, which is also a Bedouin tribe, some of whose branches also live in the towns, and the tribe members practise farming and trade (10).

i. **Settled (Ḥādar)**

The majority of the Omani tribes live in the towns and villages, whether these are coastal or mountainous, or settlements near oases. The tribes usually base their settlement on the availability of water, either in a Wádí (valley) or from underground water. Underground water is exploited through the technique called a Falaj (pl. Aflaj) or Jázirah (11). And in order to preserve their territorial economic resources, each tribe has its own region or Dár, which usually is named after the tribe’s name, as are the resources therein, such as the names of Wádí B. Ruwáḥah after B. Ruwáḥah. The same appears to Wádí al-Ḥawásínah, Wádí B. Kharúṣ, Wádí B. Gháfir, or Jadat al-Ḥarásf, Buldán al-Ḥábús, Barr al-Ḥikmán, Ramlt Āl Wahfbah ... etc (12).

This tradition of extending the name of the tribe to designate other resources in the tribe’s Dár, includes not only names of Wádis, but also other aspects of the community resources such as water resources (wells or oases), products, even mountains ...etc. It is important to note that each tribe recognizes other tribes’ rights of property over their resources and the frontier between the different tribes’ Dárs. When and if two groups of settlers belonging to two different tribes come to co-exist in a town or city, conflict usually develops between them, and the town settlement will usually have to be divided into two settlement divisions: ‘Aláyah and Safálah. Conflict and rivalry therefore, can be transferred to town settlement, as for example in the case of the town of Samá’il whose Safálah division is occupied by the Gháfírī tribe and whose ‘Aláyah is occupied by the Hináwí tribes. This is so also in Ibrá’ whose Safálah division is occupied by Hináwí (al-Ḥírth) while its ‘Aláyah is occupied by the Gháfírī (al-Masákírah) (13).
Rarely, in fact, do we find a town in the interior of Oman which does not have this division, especially in areas of water availability as in the lower valley areas, such as Nazwà, Bahlà, Samá’il, Izkí, etc. (14).

It is also important to note the existence of boundaries demarcating the frontiers of each tribal region or Dár from its neighbours. And for security purposes, each tribe would have its own fort or tower to secure the safety of its towns. Sometimes the towns are secured against possible incursions by enemies by walls such as those of Bahlà and Muscat. The important forts to be found are those in Nazwà, Bahlà, Rustáq, Şuḥár, etc. (see illustrations below).

ii. Badú (Bedouin)

The Badú (singular: Badawi) are nomadic groups who inhabit the desert. Their life is characterized by constant movements with their herds of animals in search of pasture and water. Therefore, they are not settled in one particular place, but have some areas, where they camp in their seasonal movements, and therefore have two seasonal settlement places, those in Winter and others in Summer. This is not to say that the desert is an open-access land, free for everybody or every tribe. There are certain rules and conventions agreed upon by the desert nomadic communities which regulate ownership of resources and right of access to these resources. These rules are subject to the general codes of practice and community values. They recognize that each tribe has its own territorial land area in which the tribe members move freely with their animals (15). The region would usually be named after the name of the tribe, as for example, Ramlat Wahibah, Barr al-Ḥikmán, Ḥamrá’ al-Durú’. The main Badú tribes are as follows (16):

1) ‘Awámir are a Badú tribe, though some of its sections live in towns.
2) al-Durú’ are a large Badú tribe, except for the few who had settled in the Tan’im.
3) Āl Wahibah are a large Badú tribe, who inhabit the Southern part of al-Sharqiyyah.
4) al-Janabah are a big Badú tribe. Some of them are Ḥaḑr, who live in Şūr.
5) al-Ḥikmán are a small Badú tribe, and inhabit al-Sharqiyyah and also Maşřrah island.
6) al-Harásís are another Badú tribe. Their main centre is Marbát in Southern Oman.
7) al-‘Afár are a small Badú tribe, who are allied with Āl Wahibah
8) Āl Khumays are also a small Badú tribe, who are allied with al-Durú’.
9) Āl ‘Amr are a Badú tribe, forming an alliance with Āl Wahībah.

10) Āl Fazārī are a small Badú tribe, allied with Āl Wahībah and also with al-Durú‘.

11) The B. Na‘ím are predominantly a Ḥāḍar tribe, but some of them are Badū.

12) The B. Ka‘ab are mainly a Ḥāḍar tribe, but some of them are Badū.

13) The B. Qatab are mainly a Ḥāḍar tribe, but some of them are Badū.

These are the major Badú tribes inhabiting the desert. However, after the discoveries and expansion of the oil industry, many of the members of the these tribes have been tempted to settle down as they have taken up jobs in the new opportunities open to them. As a result, many have abandoned the traditional tents made of woollen mats, and instead live in settlements made up of permanent houses and buildings, although essentially they have maintained the traditional values and customs that they inherited from the desert culture.

e) Religion of tribes

The entire population of Oman are Muslims, except a very small minority groups called Banián, who follow the Hindu religion. This group came and settled in Oman a few centuries ago, under the protection of the British. The rest of the population follow three main Islamic religious sects: Ibāḍi, Sunni, and Shi‘ite. The main tribes which adhere to the Ibāḍi sect are Āl Bū Sa‘īd, al-Ḥīrīth, B. Jābir, B. Riyām, al-Ḥabūs, B. Ruwābah, ‘Yāl Sa‘d, and al-Ḥajriyyīn, etc, ḥāl of which inhabit the centre of Oman, while the peripheries are inhabited mainly by tribes adhering to the Sunni sect. The following table shows the tribes adherent to the Sunni sect (17):

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>The Tribe</th>
<th>Political affiliation</th>
<th>Origin</th>
<th>Area</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Shuhūḥ</td>
<td>Hinawī</td>
<td>Qahānī</td>
<td>Musandam</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ka‘ab (Banū)</td>
<td>Ghāfirī</td>
<td>Qahānī</td>
<td>Dhāhirah</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Qatab (Banū)</td>
<td>Ghāfirī</td>
<td>Qahānī</td>
<td>Dhāhirah</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>al-Janabah</td>
<td>Ghāfirī</td>
<td>Qahānī</td>
<td>al-Sharqiyyah</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>al-Durú‘</td>
<td>Ghāfirī</td>
<td>‘Adnānī</td>
<td>Dhāhirah</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rásib (Banū)</td>
<td>Ghāfirī</td>
<td>Qahānī</td>
<td>Ja‘lán</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>al-Harāsīs</td>
<td>Hinawī</td>
<td>Qahānī</td>
<td>al-Sharqiyyah</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>‘Alī (Banū Bū)</td>
<td>Ghāfirī</td>
<td>Qahānī</td>
<td>Ja‘lán</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shayādī</td>
<td>Hinawī</td>
<td>Qahānī</td>
<td>Batinah</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The following table shows the tribes adherent to the Ibāḍī sect, though they also have some Sunnis among their members (18):

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>The Tribe</th>
<th>Political affiliation</th>
<th>Origin</th>
<th>Area</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Āl 'Azīz</td>
<td>Ghafīrī</td>
<td>'Adnānī</td>
<td>Dhāhirah</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Burayk ('Yāl)</td>
<td>Hināwī</td>
<td>'Adnānī</td>
<td>Bāṭinah</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>al-Hishm</td>
<td>Ghafīrī</td>
<td>'Adnānī</td>
<td>Ja'īlān</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>al-Mazārī</td>
<td>Ghafīrī</td>
<td>'Adnānī</td>
<td>Bāṭinah/Dhāhirah</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sa'īd (Banū)</td>
<td>Hināwī</td>
<td>Qaḥṭānī</td>
<td>Bāṭinah</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Washāhāt</td>
<td>Hināwī</td>
<td>'Adnānī</td>
<td>Dhāhirah</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>al-'Abru'yyān</td>
<td>Ghafīrī</td>
<td>Qaḥṭānī</td>
<td>Western Hajar</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>al-Ya'āqīb</td>
<td>Ghafīrī</td>
<td>Qaḥṭānī</td>
<td>Dhāhirah</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

It is clear from the table that the concentration of the majority of the Sunni tribes is in the provinces of the Dhāhirah, Bāṭinah, Ja'īlān, and Şūr. In addition, the area of Dhofar is predominantly inhabited by Sunni tribes, which do not appear in this study, because these tribes were not directly involved in the events taking place in Oman at the time.

However, there are some smaller groups belonging to the Shi'ite sect. These include the tribes of the Zidjāl, al-Baḥā'irīn, al-'Ajmān, al-Duwāṭiyyah, some of the Za'āb tribe, and some of the Baluchis. Some factions of the latter, which live in al-Dhāhirah province, adhere to the Ibāḍī.

In broad general terms, it is possible to say that the complex events and conflicts throughout Omani political history cannot be attributed to ethnic origins or religious
affiliations. One is inclined to think that the accommodating flexibility of the Ibádí sect has largely saved the country from much religious controversy and the potential conflicts therein.

2) **Tribal Political Relations with the Imam**

The Omani tribes continued to play an influential role in Omani politics throughout its history, motivated by religious or national considerations or both. Therefore, the foundation of the Ibádí Imamate drew much of its support from these tribes. Peterson, for example, observes the close relationship between the Imamate and the tribes: “the formalisation of a supra-tribe system under the institution of the Imamate, with all its inherent tendencies towards anarchy and instability, has provided the philosophical basis for the background of much of Omani history” (19).

It is therefore evident that the tribal system has given continuity to the general balance of power, as they entered into alliances with one another against other tribal alliances. This balance of power has also greatly influenced state power as well as the Imamate authority. As a result, the rivalries and conflicts between the Arabs of the North and those of South was reflected in the tribal alliances throughout the 18th century, which led to the emergence of what has come to be known as the Hináwfi and Gháfírī division or conflict. This division has created the two main political formations which continued to maintain the general balance of power or status-quo in the country (20).

Consequently, it would not be possible for an elected Imam to continue in power without the support of these two tribal confederations, as indicated above. This is clear from the attempts in the 19th and 20th centuries to elect an Imam, such as the election of Sd. Ḣumúd b. ‘Azzán in 1846, and that of Sh. Ṣáliḥ b. ‘Alíf in 1895. The Gháfírī tribes were opposed to all these attempts for reviving the Imamate. The Imamate of Sd. ‘Azzán did not last for long because he antagonized the Gháfírī tribes. This was in contrast with 1913 when there was a close balance between the Hináwís and Gháfíris and both gave support to a joint candidate who was elected as an Imam and remained in his position for 40 years.
a) **Tribes' allegiance to Imam Sálim**

The meeting, which was held at Tanúf in May 1913, between the B. Gháfír, under the leadership of Sh. Ḥimyar b. Náṣir al-Nabhání, the *tamímah* of the B. Riyám and the Shaykhs of the B. Híná’ah, agreed to the revival of the Imamate. Among those who attended the meeting were seventy-five ‘ulamá’ under the leadership of Sh. ‘Abdalláh b. Ḥumayd al-Sálímí. They then elected Sh. Sálím b. Ráshíd al-Khárúshí as Imam. Sh. Ḥimyar and the sons of Sh. Hilál b. Záhir of the B. Híná’ah supported the Imam materially and morally. It was in the terms of this agreement that the two parties paid the expenses of the military operation which captured Nazwá, Izkí, and Samá’il, because, typically, each Shaykh would pay the expenses of his men.

Following the fall of Nazwá, the Kunúd gave their *bay’ah* to the Imam, followed by the residents of Nazwá, and Manaḥ. The Wálí and Shaykh of the latter town, one of Āl Bú Saʿíd, proclaimed the town’s allegiance to the Imam, including the Ḥaḍárim tribe. These proclamations of allegiance to the Imam had in fact been preceded by similar moves on the part of Sh. Májid b. Khamís al-‘Abrí and his party of his tribe. Sh. Májid was a respected figure among his people for his religious standing (21), as he also commanded the respect of the other tribes inhabiting the Interior. Although, Sh. Májid’s *bay’ah* came a little later, the delay was due to factors related to the military operations of Imam Sálim mentioned earlier (see Ch. IV).

After having been captured by the Imam, Nazwá was crowded with people who congregated from all regions to support the Imam. As a result of the Imam’s flow of correspondence with the chiefs of Oman, a number of those chiefs came to Nazwá. Among them was Sh. Ḥumayd b. Khulayfín al-Dur’í, who paid homage to the Imam (22). In the same week (on 2nd Rajab, 1331/7th June, 1913) the Shaykh of al-Ḥajríyyín came and declared his allegiance to the Imam, and two days later Sh. Sultan b. Ráshíd al-Yaʾqúbí, the ruler of ‘Ibrí in Dháhirah province, followed suit. He was followed by Sh. Sa’d b. Saʿíd b. Sultan al-Junaybí, one of the Shaykhs of the Janabah tribe, the Majá’ilah *fakhir*, who inhabit the area around Adam, whose centre is ‘Izz. Sh. Saʿíd’s arrival coincided with the arrival Shaykh of al-Maháriq. Both of them declared their *bay’ah* to the Imam (23).
It is important to note that after the fall of Nazwà, the numbers of the Imam’s supporters increased significantly. This is clear from a further influx of supporters, such as Sd. Su‘úd b. Hamad b. Hilál al-Bú Sa‘ídî, the Wálí of Izkí, who declared his bay‘ah to the Imam. During his stay in Izkí, the Imam received the allegiance of al-Ḥirth, B. Ráshid, and B. Ruwáḥah. This tribe was an important Hináwí tribe, which was under the power of Sh. ‘Isà b. Ṣâlīh al-Ḥářithí, the tamímah of Hináwí faction (24).

In Samá’il, the Imam first received the homage of Sh. Muḥanná al-‘Abrí, the chief of al-‘Abríyyín, and the chiefs of the B. Kharús. Both Sh. ‘Isà and Sh. Ḥimyar succeeded in persuading Sd. Aḥmad b. Ibráhím, the ruler of Rustáq, and Sh. Násír b. Ḥumayd b. Ráshid al-Gháfirí, the ruler of Bahlà to declare their allegiance to the Imam in Ramadán, 1331 (25). This support enabled the Imam to reinforce his powers over the tribes and give him more motive to obtain his aims.

It is noticeable that the Imam adopted the policy of appointing his assistants as Wálís over the towns which fell in his hands, or those which declared allegiance to him, with the exception of Rustáq and Bahlà, the affairs of which were left to their former Wálís. The reason for this move was that these Wálís had been responsible for the affairs and general welfare of their subjects, and nobody had complained against them. The Imam also saw that in view of the commanding power and leadership of Sd. Aḥmad b. Ibráhím and Sh. Násír al-Gháfirí among the tribes, it was necessary to seek their support, despite his general control over their towns. However, the Imam sought control over the two towns when signs of independence and secession became evident on the part of these two leaders. Therefore, in Dhú al-Qi‘dah 1331, the Imam delegated Sh. al-Sálimí, Sh. Ḥimyar and Sd. Hilál b. Ḥamad al-Bú Sa‘ídî to go to the tribes of al-Sharqíyyah to rally their support for the Imamate. The Imam's delegation succeeded in rallying the loyalty of the following tribes (26):

1. al-Sharúj and al-Ruwáshid in Wádí ‘Indám
2. al-Ḥábús in Samad al-Shán
3. Masákírah and al-Ḥirth in 'Ibrá’.
4. al-Hishm in al-Kámil.
Sh. Ḥimyar, also succeeded in neutralizing the B. Bú ‘Alī in the struggle between the Imam and the Sultan. At the commencement of the 1332, the Imam received a mission from Wādī al-Ma‘āwil, under the leadership of Sh. Sayf b. Sālim b. Sayf al-Ma‘wālī (who was later killed in the attack by the Imam’s forces on Barkā’ in Rabī‘ II, 1332), accompanied by Sh. Ḥamad b. Sa‘īd al-Ma‘wālī, Sa‘īd b. Khalfān al-Ma‘wālī, Su‘ūd b. Ḥamad b. Sayf al-Ma‘wālī and Sh. Rāshid b. Nabān al-Ma‘wālī. The aim of this mission was to declare their support for the Imam. It is necessary, however, to point out here that this mission was composed of factions of the tribes while the Shaykh of al-Ma‘āwil tribe, Sh. Sulaymān b. Nāṣir al-Ma‘wālī, opposed the Imam, and maintained his loyalty to the Sultan. But Sh. Sulaymān later feigned to give his loyalty to the Imam. After the Imam’s abortive attack on Barkā’, he reneged on his promise of loyalty to the Imam. This, in turn, prompted the Imam to kill him, which consequently led to many secret killings (27). As a result of these secret killings, a number of important notables lost their lives, including a number of ‘ulamā‘ (28).

As for the B. Ḥarrās, who submitted to Sh. Ḥimyar, they had actually paid allegiance to the Imam. Their allegiance, however, was no more than a temporary truce on their part. The fact is that they were discontented with the Imam, especially after he had killed their Shaykh, Aḥmad b. Thunayyān b. Khalfān b. Sālim al-Ḥarrāsī. They created difficulties for the Imam and his successor.

The B. Jābir and al-Siyābiyyūn refused to declare their allegiance to the Imam before 1915, but following the Imam’s defeat at al-Waṭayyah, the Imam warned them to declare their allegiance, because they made forceful claims on the Sultan demanding the capture of Samā‘īl. They did not respond to the Imam’s warning, but when he again threatened to use force against them, they declared their allegiance to the Imam through the mediation of the Shaykhs of al-Masākirah tribes (29). Thus the B. Jābir and al-Siyābiyyūn submitted to the Imam’s authority completely, although unwillingly, as had to al-Ma‘āwil and the B. Harrās before them.

At the end of 1915, the Imam decided to secure the loyalty of the tribes of al-Sharqiyyah. He went there with his forces for this purpose. In Samad al-Shān, he
received the allegiance of the Āl Wahbī Shaykhs. Prominent among these Shaykhs were Sh. Sultān b. Maḥsūr b. Naṣir and Sh. Sālim b. Ḥumūd b. Saʿīd al-Jaḥāfī.

To sum up, Imam Sālim had called upon all the tribes of Oman to pay allegiance to him. Some of these responded positively and supported him, some openly opposed him, while others such as those of ‘Yāl Saʿd, the B. Naʿfīḥ, and the B. Bū ʿAlī, remained neutral. As for those tribes which declared their allegiance to him, they were not all equal in their commitment and loyalty. This is clear from the stance of such tribes as al-Yaʿqībī, the B. Ghāfīr and the Badū tribes of al-Durū and Āl Wahbīh. In addition, the followers of Sh. Naṣir b. Ḥumayd al-Ghāfīrī and Sd. Aḥmad b. Ibrāhīm did not join in the Imam’s military operations. It is also clear that some of the tribes submitted to the Imam out of fear and not conviction, such as a part of al-Maʿāwil, the B. Ḥarrās, the B. Jābir and al-Siyābiyyīn, who were forced to pay allegiance to the Imam under coercion. Therefore, many of the subsequent difficulties and rebellions that the Imam had to face came from these discontented tribes.

b) Imam’s dominance over the tribes

It is clear from the previous discussion that the loyalty of the various tribes to the Imam varied from tribe to tribe. This in turn had its effects on the Imam’s authority over these tribes. Therefore, it is not possible to describe the Imam’s authority over the tribes as being complete. The Imam’s authority can best be described as being incomplete, in that only some of the tribes submitted to the Imam’s authority completely. This made it possible for the Imam’s government to interfere in all tribal affairs, both trivial and important and the members of the loyal tribes dedicated every effort to protect the Imam, and helped him implement his political, economic and administrative programmes. There were other tribes who gave their support to the Imam without actively taking part in his programme. The support of the latter group of tribes was only a matter of convenience they offered only lip service and a pretence under which to protect and maintain their independent authority.
i. The Imam's complete control over tribes

As it has been pointed out, the Imam's authority over the tribes varied from complete loyalty to only a tacit form of acceptance. In this section, we shall try to give an account of the tribes which gave the Imam their complete and unambiguous loyalty, which allowed the Imam to enforce his economic and administrative programmes. These can be divided into two main groups; the Ghafiri tribes and the Hinawi tribes. This will help us understand the effect of these two tribes on the programmes of the Imam during his rule, and the reasons which induced them to support the Imam.

1. The tribes of the Ghafiri

a) The B. Riyám

The B. Riyám (sing. Riyámi) are one of the most important tribes. They are of Qahtání origin and belong to the Ghafiri political faction. In religious affiliation, they adhere to the Ibádí sect. Their tamimah was Sh. Ḥimyar b. Násir al-Nabhání (1281/1861-1338/1920). The tribe is divided into several fakhdhs. These include: B. Nabhán. B. Tawbah, B. Ruqaydh, al-‘Uzúr, al-Ṣaqqár, al-Sarjí, al-Jawámíd and al-Fahd (30).

In this tribe we find that there have been three ‘ulamá’, who have been of influence in the recent history of the Imamate of Imam Sálim, beside also three leaders. The ‘ulamá’ were Sh. Abú Zayd ‘Abdalláh al-Riyámi, Sh. Muḥammad b. Sálim al-Ruqayshí and Sh. Násir b. ‘Ámir b. Mas‘úd al-Riyámi. These prominent personalities were active supporters of the Imam, and served with him in the judiciary and as Wális. They also played an important role in rallying their tribe’s support for the Imam. They also formed an important part of the consultative council. Among the most prominent political leaders of this tribe, in addition to their tamimah, Sh. Ḥimyar, were Sh Ḥamdán b. Sulaymán b. Sayf al-Nabhání, ‘Alí b. Ḥamad al-Tuwbí and Sayf b. Zahrán al-Fahdí.

The tribe under Sh. Ḥimyar supported the Imam. It was one of the important pillars on which the Imamate depended, both materially and morally. The reason behind this unparalleled support was the long-standing hostility between the tribe and the Sultan, Sd. Fayṣal, because the latter had declared war against them for a long period of time, and imposed an embargo on their import and export trade, as well as supporting their
enemies, the B. Ruwáhah. For all these reasons, the B. Riyám had suffered a great deal under the Sultan’s bad treatment, which led them to harass their neighbours. In the face of these pressures from the Sultan, they were quick to support Sh. al-Sálimí’s call for the revival of the Imamate. It is understandable, then, that the seat of the tribe, the town of Tanúf, witnessed the first elected Imamate in the present century. The tribe actively joined in the Imam’s political, economic and military programmes. It was also important to stress the role of Sh. Ḥimyar in rallying the support of many of the leaderships of the Gháfírí tribes for the Imam such as that of Sh. Náṣír b. Ḥumayd al-Gháfírí. He also succeeded in neutralizing B. Bú ‘Alí’s support for the Sultan against the Imam. On the other hand, the B. Ḥarrás gave allegiance to the Imam through Sh. Ḥimyar. His valuable support included the extension of aid for the Imam in facing the many difficulties which the B. Gháfír caused to the Imam. Sh. Ḥimyar strongly denounced the B. Gháfír’s position of hostility to the Imam. This tribe continued as a dangerous foe and enemy to the Sultan for a long time. Even now, the son of Sh. Ḥimyar, Sh. Sulaymán, is in asylum in Saudi Arabia.

The strong support of the tribe to the Imamate under the leadership of Sh. Ḥimyar, and the strength and power of the tribe, both in human and material resources, had significant positive effects in consolidating the Imam’s power and authority, thus enabling him to achieve great successes. No wonder, then, that both the Sultan, Sd. Fáyṣal, and his son, Sd. Táymúr, imposed, as punishment, excessive taxes on the produce of this tribe.

b) al-‘Abriyyín

al-‘Abriyyín (sing. ‘Abrí) are the second most important tribe. They are of Qáḥání origin, and like the B. Riyám, belong to the Gháfírí political faction, and in religious affiliation, adhere to the Ibiḍí, although a small minority of them are Sunni. Sh. Muhánná b. Ḥámad b. Muḥsin was the leader of the tribe whose headquarters was at al-Ḥámrá’ on the Southern slopes of Jabal al-Akhḍar (31).

Among al-‘Abriyyín there appeared very famous personalities who played a significant role in the events in Oman in the course of its history. Most prominent among these famous men were Sh. Májíd b. Khamís b. Ráshid al-‘Abrí (1836-8-1927) and Sh.
Ibráhim b. Sa‘íd b. Muḥṣin al-‘Abrí (d. 1975). Sh. Májíd, as mentioned above, played a very influential role. He was the son of a distinguished ‘alim, known by the name Dhú al-Ghabrá’, Khamís b. Ráshid.

Sh. Májíd’s proclamation of allegiance to the Imam had a very significant effect on the tribes of the Interior, and especially on the ‘ulamá’ and religious men among these tribes. This immediate effect was felt among the people of al-Ḥamrá’, Bahlā and Nazwā, and of course among his own tribesmen. Sh. Májíd’s bay‘ah to the Imam had wide positive effects on the tribes, due to his high religious and social standing. He was the reference point in Islamic jurisdiction and law. He also advised on religious and legal matters, assumed the office of the Qādī and taught in a school which he had established in his locality; many of his students later became Qādis. Immediately after his allegiance, he wrote to the Wálī of Nazwā, Sd. Sayf b. Ḥamad b. ‘Ámir al-‘Bu Ṣa‘íd, and the Shaykhs of al-Kunúd tribes in Nazwā also, urging them to declare their bay‘ah and support for the Imam. Many of the Qādis emulated his position and came to support the Imam, including those Qādis who served with the Sultan. As a result of his important role, Sh. Májíd became the first deputy for the Imam in Nazwā for a brief period, after which he was relived from his position because he lost his sight at this stage (32). After that he returned to his place (al-Ḥamrá’) where he resumed teaching. But this did not mean that he had given up participation in the political affairs of the country. In this respect he still participated in many of the events, such as his opposition to Sh. al-Sálīmī in his fatwá concerning the abrogation of awqāf allotted to the service of graveyards.

Al-‘Abriyyín continued to play a very important role in support of the Imam all throughout his rule, under the leadership of Sh. Muḥanná b. Ḥamad. This support was unconditional for most of his programme. This is in spite of the fact that the Imam imposed his complete control over the tribe, and only conceded to Sh. Muḥanná to continue running the affairs of the tribe from his headquarters in al-Ḥamrá’. This was in tribute to the Shaykh for his bright record in supporting the Imamate.
c) The B. Kharūš

The third important tribe standing behind the Imamate was the B. Kharūš (sing. Kharūšī). They are of Qaḥṭānī descent. Politically, they belong to the Ghafīrī faction, and in religious affiliation, they were of the Ibāḍī sect. This tribe was very close to the B. Riyām. From amongst the members of this tribe came about twenty three Imams. The first of their Imams was Imam Muḥammad b. ‘Abdallah b. ‘Affān (177/763-180/769), and the last one was Imam Muḥammad b. ‘Abdallāh al-Khalīlī (1338/1920- 1374/1954). The B. Kharūš had al-‘Awābi as their headquarters although some of them lived in Nakhal, Wādí al-Ma‘āwil and al-Rustāq (33).

It has been suggested that the B. Kharūš lacked the strong political leadership that was capable of uniting their different fakhdhs under one strong central tribal political authority (34). The reason for the apparent fragmentation of the tribe was due to the fact that many of its clans and fakhdhs had, at one stage or another, some member of their kin who actually was elected Imam. Therefore, many of the big families of the tribe would have claims to the Imamate leadership. For that reason, the tribe’s record was clean on the level of inter-tribal conflicts and wars, for the tribe had no animosities and hostilities with their neighbours, and therefore it has been described as a peaceful tribe (35).

Naturally, nobody from this tribe came to give bay‘ah to Imam Sālim. However, when they came to know of him, they hurried to give their homage and support to him, especially, when the Imam’s brother was teaching in al-‘Awābi, where he rallied support for the Imam. Following these developments, the B. Kharūš even contemplated driving the Wālī of the Sultan and his garrison out of the fort. For all that, when they got support from al-‘Abriyyīn, as mentioned earlier, they increased their support for their Imam and reinforced his position. In this regard, Sh. Nāṣir b. Rāshid al-Kharūšī, the brother of Imam Sālim, played a significant role in the success of his brother the Imam. As a result of that, many of the ‘ulama’ and leaders did not agree with his ideas and his hastiness in tackling many important matters. An example of the criticisms levelled against him was that by Sh. Majid b. Khamīs al-‘Abruī, who criticized him for extremism in implementing the Islamic laws and his harshness against transgressors. He was also described as being ill-tempered and impatient, personal traits which negatively affected many of his attitudes
and thinking. Due to these shortcomings in his personality, which ill-qualified him for leadership, Imam Muḥammad b. Ṭāǚallāḥ al-Khalīf soon dismissed him in the same year that his brother, Imam Sālim died, but gave him some unimportant responsibilities in some minor provinces, which he accepted reluctantly. Twenty years later, the rift between him and the Imam grew wider, which finally led him to seek refuge with the Sultan, who appointed him as Qāḍī to al-Suwayq.

The importance of this tribe derived not only from the fact that it provided the majority of the Ibāḍī Imams, or from its dedication to the general cause of the Islamic religion, but, more importantly, from the fact that the tribe had no difficulties with their neighbouring tribes. Moreover, the tribe cannot be placed on parity with those tribes who were experienced in the politics of tribal warfare and had many rivalries and conflicts with their neighbours, such as al-ʻAbriyyín and al-Siyābiyyín.

The three tribes just mentioned were the major Ghāfirí tribes which supported the Imam truly and unambiguously and continued their support for the Imam in every respect and everywhere. It follows that the Imam depended greatly on their support, together with that of the Hináwī tribes, to which subject we turn hereafter.

The following Ghāfirí tribes, on the other hand, came in the second place to the former in their support for the Imam, and the Imam did not accord them much importance. The most important among these tribes were:

d) al-Maḥārīq

Al-Maḥārīq(sing. Maḥrūq) are of ʻAdnānī descent. Politically, they belong to the Ghāfirí, and they adhere to the Ibāḍī sect. Their region is around Adam, which is their headquarters. The importance of the tribe is that it participated in most of the Imam's military operations after it paid its allegiance to him in Nazwā as we have seen earlier. However, its military participation was in a small force of men, compared with other tribes. The reason for that, we assume, is that it was under threat from Āl Wahībah and al-Janabah, who did not support the Imam. Therefore, these latter tribes were opposed to the former's support to and participation in the Imam's military operations. However, the Imam, in the end, brought al-Maḥārīq's land under his control and entrusted the administration of their affairs to his appointed Wālis (36).
e) al-Masákírah

Al-Masákírah (sing. Maskirá) are of Qaḥtání origin; in politics, they are Gháfírī, and in religion, they are Ibádí. Their headquarters was ‘Aláyat of ’Ibrá‘ in al-Sharqiyyah Province (37). The heads of the tribe were Sh. Násaḥr b. Sulaymán and Sh. Sayf b. ‘Alí b. ‘Āmir al-Maskírî (d. 1355/1936), who played an important role in the politics of Zanzibar towards the turn of the century which led to his release from prison and his consequent expulsion from Zanzibar to Oman. Sh. Sayf then continued to support Imam Sálím and his successors, as he also assumed high office responsibilities in the Imamate (38). In this stance, he was followed in similar manner by his sons and his grandsons. Now, one of his grandsons is a close ally of Imam Ghálíb b. ‘Alí b. Záhir al-Híná‘í and Sh. Sulaymán b. /license:himyar al-Nabhání in Saudi Arabia.

Al-Masákírah actively joined in the Imam’s military operations, as they also played an important role in persuading the Shaykhs of the B. Jábír and al-Siyábiyyín to pay allegiance to the Imam.

f) al-Kunúd

Al-Kunúd (sing. Kindí) are of Qaḥtání descent; in politics they are Gháfírī and their faith is the Ibádí sect. Their main stronghold is ‘Aláyat Nazwá, but some of them can also be found in several towns in Oman (39).

The tribe had at the beginning rejected the call of the Imam and that of Sh. Májíd b. Khamís al-‘Abrí. However, following the fall of Nazwá to the Imam, they paid their bay‘ah to the Imam. The tribe is famed for the big number of ‘ulamá‘ and Qádí from among its members, much more than for its military power. Therefore, the role that their ‘ulamá‘ played was more important and conspicuous than its military role. Among the tribe’s prominent ‘ulamá‘ was Sh. Sulaymán b. Ahmad b. ‘Abdalláh al-Kindí (1293/1880-1337/1919), who assumed the office of Qádí of Nazwá until his death (40). There was also Sh. Sa‘íd b. Násaḥr b. ‘Abdalláh al-Kindí (1268/1851-1355/1936), who played an important role in the negotiations which we have mentioned earlier (41). There were also among them the Qádis Sulaymán b. Sálím and Ḥumúd b. Záhir, who taught in Nazwá and other learned men who served the Imamate by their knowledge and learning much more than others. This is not to suggest that they did not support the Imam actively in
more practical matters, but they played a more important role in matters of administration than in other domains.

g) The B. Shukayl

The B. Shukayl (sing. Shukaylf) are of Qahtání origin. Politically, they belong to the Gháfírí faction, and in religious affiliation, they are Ibádí. Sayfam is their central town; besides they also have other towns like Bahlâ and ‘Ibri in al-Záhirah Province (41).

The B. Shukayl were previously under the rule of the Wáli of Bahlâ, Sh. Náṣir b. Ḥumayd al-Gháfírí. When he was removed from his office in 1916, they quickly turned to the ranks of the Imam, and supported his Wáli in Bahlâ, and helped in the implementation of his policies. Their active participation was made clear during the reign of Imam al-Khalfî (1920-1954). This is not to suggest that they did not support Imam Sálim, but that they did not take part in his military operations because there were no major military activities after that date, with the exception of the attack of the Imam on al-Rustáq and al-Ḥazim. In addition, the Imam himself did not in fact want their participation in this attack, in view of their relationship with the B. Gháfír, who supported Sd. Aḥmad b. Ibráhîm.

The Imam’s policy was to choose for his military activities those tribes whose territories were secure from the raids of rival tribes. This was to guard against counter-attacks or incursions from rival tribes, and therefore, he took care in selecting the type of tribes who met this criterion.

h) al-Nadábiyyín and al-Raḥbiyyin

Al-Nadábiyyín (sing. Nadábi) and al-Raḥbiyyín (sing. Raḥbi) are both of Qahtání descent (43). They are Gháfírí in political orientation, and Ibádí in religious affiliation (44). Their ranges are in the Wádí Samá’il and Wádí al-‘Aqq. They are very close allies of al-Siyábiyyín and the B. Jábir. They declared their bay‘ah to the Imam immediately when the Imam arrived at Samá’il. Their tamímah was Sh. Su‘úd b. ‘Alí b. Jabr al-Jabrí, but they abandoned him when he refused to support the Imam. Sh. Su‘úd, the head of all the Gháfírí tribes in Wádí Samá’il, was initially reluctant to show either support or opposition to the Imam, preferring instead to abstain and confine himself to his homestead. This is in spite of the fact that he exchanged letters with the Sultan and others
on the situation, although without results. On the other hand, the head of al-Raḥbiyyfn, Sh. Sūltān b. Sālim b. Ḥasan, and Sh. Ḥumayd b. Musallam, the Shaykh of al-Nadābiyyfn, all supported the Imam, while the other Ghāfirf tribes in this area were unwilling to support the Imam or otherwise.

From the above one can readily see the inconsistency in the position of the Ghāfirfs, between those who supported the Imam and those who opposed him. As a consequence, suspicion became rampant among them, which made it easy for the Imam to gain time to tackle each tribe separately, or to brandish the threat of the use of force, as we will see later.

It should be noted that the B. Ruwāḥah had played a crucial role in convincing these two tribes to join the Imam. As a result, there followed no objection on their part to the Imam’s plan.

i) The B. Jābir, al-Siyābiyyfn and the B. Ḥarrāṣ

The B. Jābir (sing. Jābrī), al-Siyābiyyfn (sing. Siyābī), and the B. Ḥarrāṣ (sing. Ḥarrāṣī), are all of ‘Adnānī origin (45). Politically, they belong to the Ghāfirī faction (46), and in religious affiliation they adhere to the Ibāḍī sect. Both the B. Jābir and al-Siyābiyyfn inhabit Wādī Samā‘īl, while the B. Ḥarrāṣ inhabit the region of Nakhal in Wādī the B. Kharūṣ (47).

It is important to note that the Imam had control and authority over these tribes, although they then did not take part in the Imam’s military operations nor in the administration; with the exception of some few individuals who participated in view of their policy, like Sh. Khalfān b. Jumayyil al-Siyābī (d. 1972), who made his opposition clear. As a result, secret assassinations were rife among the B. Ḥarrāṣ, as we have explained earlier. As for the B. Jābir, although they did not support the Imam, they succumbed to the reality of the situation despite being the biggest of the Omani tribes in number.

Before concluding this part, it is necessary to point out that there were some of the Ghāfirī tribes which did actually join the Imam, but these were very small in size and numbers. These were al-Ya‘āribah (48) and al-Ḥaḍārim (49). It is also noteworthy that these latter two tribes had no specific land or territory, but were divided in many of the
towns and villages in Oman in various places. For this reason we only occasionally encounter a famous name of an ‘álim, a leader, or a Wálí from amongst their members. The tribes also seem to have been very small in size. Lorimer, for example, estimated the number of population of al-Ya‘áribah about 800 souls (50), scattered in various places. Nonetheless, al-Ya‘áribah had once played a very significant role in the history of Oman as the dynasty that ruled over the country, between 1624 and 1744.

It becomes clear from the above presentation that the Gháfírí tribes differed in their support and contribution to the Imamate from one tribe to the other, corresponding to each tribe’s own convictions about the revival of the Imamate, and the conditions specific to each one of them. As a result of these variations, we see that the support of the B. Riyám, al-‘Abriyyún and the B. Kharúş to the Imamate was greater compared to the relatively smaller role of the tribes of al-Maḥáríq, al-Masákirah, al-Nadábiyyín and al-Raḥbiyyín. This was due either to their remoteness from the scene of conflict, as for example in the case of the first two, i.e. al-Maḥáríq and al-Masákirah; or to the smallness of the size of the tribe, as in the case of the latter two, al-Nadábiyyín and al-Raḥbiyyín. It was necessary, therefore, for the Imam to exercise his control over them, and for that purpose, he entrusted many of their leaders with responsibilities of administration and participation in the running of the affairs of their respective tribes.

Other Gháfírí tribes openly opposed the Imam, which left the Imam with no choice but to subject them by force, and in the end they succumbed to the reality of the situation and submitted, without actually taking an active role in the Imam’s activities. On the contrary, they in fact caused him many problems. These tribes included the B. Jábir, al-Siyábiyyín and the B. Ḥarrás.

i. The tribes of the Hináwí

As explained above, the Gháfírí tribes played an active role in support of the Imamate. The role of the Hináwí tribes, on the other hand, was no less significant in supporting the Imamate. The contribution of the Hináwí tribes was influenced by their proximity or remoteness from the scene of events, and the manner in which they influenced the course of events and their developments. In this part, we will discuss in
brief terms the identity of these tribes, and the extent of their contribution in support of
the Imam.

a) The B. Hiná’ah

The B. Hiná’ah (sing. Hiná’i) are of Qahtání origin. As regards political and
religious inclinations, they belong to the Hinawi faction and Ibaḍi sect respectively. Their
main homestead was Bilád Sayt. The Hinawis as a distinct political grouping formed
in Oman in the 1720s, and derived their name from this tribe (51). The present-day tamfnah
of the B. Hiná’ah is a line of succession which began with the assumption of the tamfnah
by Sh. Hilal b. Záhir al-Hiná’i in the late 19th century, who successfully won the
 tamfnah away from his cousin, Sh. Sa’id b. Muḥammad al-Hiná’i (52).

Sh. Hilal, thus, formed his own independent state and made Nazwà his capital. Many of the tribes submitted to his authority for fear of his aggression. He erected in Nazwà some fortifications to secure himself from incursions. Apparently, he was doing all that in the name of the Sultan. However, his motivations for independence led the Sultan to dismiss him. The Sultan sent out a force, under the command of Sulaymán b. Suwaylim and Sh. ‘Abdalláh b. Sa’id al-Khalíl, to support Sd. Sayf b. Ḥamad al-Bú Sa’idlí. This force succeeded in smashing Sh. Hilal, who was killed in the fight and Nazwà fell once again to the Sultan's forces 1312/1894. Sh. Badr succeeded his father, but two years later, Badr was also killed by the B. Shukayl.

The position of the tribe was weakened after the death of Sh. Badr, and no successor to Badr was found among the Sh. Hilál’s sons, who were all young at the time. As a result of this general weakness, the tribe suffered a great deal from their enemies, especially from the Sultan’s Wálí of Nazwà, Sd. Sayf b. Ḥamad. Consequently, when the Imamate came, the sons of Sh. Hilál found in it the opportunity that would relieve them from the oppression which they had long suffered and to avenge the death of their father and brother. It followed that Sh. al-Sálimí invited them to support the revival of the Imamate, which they readily did. From then onwards, we see that the four remaining sons of Sh. Hilál, together with their three nephews, Záhir b. Ghuṣn b. Hilál, and Sálim and Su’úd b. Badr b. Hilál, all hurried to support the position of Sh. Ḥimyar b. Náṣir al-Nabhání to convene the bay‘ah for Imam Sálim. Then the tribe
exerted great efforts in support of the Imamate. As a result of its strong support, the tribe lost many of its members in the course of defending the Imamate. The sons of Sh. Hilál also occupied many of the high ranking positions in the Imam's government, until today. One of his grandsons, Sh. Ghálib b. ‘Alí b. Hilál, was indeed chosen by Imam al-Khálífí to stand for the Imamate after the latter's death in 1954. Imam Ghálib is still alive, and lives in asylum in Saudi Arabia.

b) al-Ḥajríyyín

Al-Ḥajríyyín (sing. Ḥajrí) are of Qahtání origin, Hináwí in political inclination and Ibádí in religious affiliation. The tribe inhabit Badiyyah, in al-Sharqíyyah Province (53). They took part in the Imam's activities. The prominent Shaykhs of the tribe, namely, Sh. Musallam b. ‘Ubayd al-Ḥajrí and Sh. Āmír b. Khamís al-Málikí (54) played an important role in support of the Imam, in spite of the fact that some of the other Shaykhs of the tribes did not give the bay’ah to the Imam. As we have seen earlier, Sh. Hilál b. Sa’íd al-Ḥajrí had supported Sh. Ḥamdání b. Zúyid in his efforts with Sh. ‘Isá to strike a reconciliation between the Imam and the Sultan. It seemed likely that Sh. Hilál had been forsaken by his supporters, as both Sh. ‘Abdalláh b. Sa’íd al-Khálífí and Sh. Muhsín b. Zahrán al-Siyábí, had eventually forsake the tribe and fled to join the Sultan. The Imam on his part had come to learn about this internal conflict, as a result of which he appointed a Wálí over the area of the Ḥajríyyín, a man from Āl Bú Sa’íd called Sd. Hilál b. ‘Alí b. Badr al-Bú Sa’ídí, who commanded great respect in the Omani political circles. He carefully managed to secure his position by neutralizing and appeasing the discontent of those opposed to him, thereby avoiding any further problems.

In fact, Ḥajríyyín had supported the Imam, in spite of the fact that they remained aloof from the issue of conflict and rivalries between the two parties. However, this is not to underestimate their role in support of the Imamate. They can be more safely placed at the level of the B. Hiná’ah and the B. Ruwáhah in that, first, the number of those who participated were small and second, they lacked a strong independent unifying leadership. This made them a subordinated group, usually allying themselves with Sh. ‘Isá, even though they did not see eye to eye with him on many issues, especially, what they
thought were his inclinations towards the Sultan, and that he was more inclined towards peace than wars. These inclinations put him in a position of doubt and suspicion.

c) The B. Ruwáḥah

The B. Ruwáḥah (sing. Ruwáḥf) are of ‘Adnání descent. They are Hináwí in their political inclinations and Ibádí in religious affiliation. They occupy a Wádí which is named after the name of the tribe, viz. Wádí B. Ruwáḥah, which extends from Izkí to the Samá’il and contains about thirty villages. They are also found in Samá’il, Wádí Muḥram and Wádí ‘Indám. They are divided into several fakháhs, each of which has its own Shaykh (55). Their tamímah is a descendant of Sh. Sa‘íd b. Khalfán b. Aḥmad al-Khalílí (d. 1871).

When the Imam captured Izkí, Sh. Ḥámíd b. Sayf b. Aḥmad al-Ruwáḥf refused to declare his allegiance to him without he first consulting and obtaining the approval of Sh. ‘Isá b. Ṣáliḥ al-Ḥáríthí, and their tamímah, Sh. ‘Abdalláh al-Khalílí. Consequently, after Sh. ‘Isá’s proclamation of allegiance to the Imam in Rajab, 1331, Sh. Ḥámíd then followed suit and agreed to the bay’ah without the need of consulting Sh. al-Khalílí.

Sh. Ḥámíd and his men then accompanied the Imam to Samá’il which was the headquarters of their tamímah, Sh. al-Khalílí, who denounced the attack, but eventually had to reconcile himself to the reality of the situation and submit to the Imam. However, he did not stay for long, but fled to Muscat, leaving the leadership of the tribe to his son Sh. Muḥammad b. ‘Abdalláh, who was fully content with the Imamate and succeeded Imam Sálím after the latter’s death in 1920.

The B. Ruwáḥah participated actively in the Imamate because they were in the very centre of events (in Wádí Samá’il). They then continued to support the successor of Imam Sálím, and their Shaykh, Imam al-Khalílí, for about 34 years.

d) al-Hadádibah

Al-Hadádibah (sing. Hadábf), are of the Qaḥtání origin. They are Hináwí in politics and Ibádí in religion (56). They joined the Imam, but that section of the tribe under the leadership of Sh. Sa‘íd b. Ráshid al-Hadábf opposed the Imam in many situations. Therefore, he was the only one among the Hináwí tribes who met with Sh. Súltán b. Muḥammad al-‘Imrí, who called the people of Wádí Samá’il for a meeting
with him at al-Sib in February, 1915. The aim of this call was to support the Sultan, if he succeeded in reaching Wádí Samá’il. However, the tribe was small in size compared to those of the B. Jábir, al-Siyábiyyín and the B. Ruwáhah. The region's strategic position was in fact the cause of the whole conflict between the Sultan and the Imam. The tribe occupied the strategic middle centre of Oman. This was the cause of the conflict, as both the Sultan and the Imam wanted to extend their control over this strategically important area.

c) al-Ma’áwil

Al-Ma’áwil (sing. Ma’wálf) are a Qahtání tribe whose members are Hináwi in politics and Ibádí in religion. They inhabit the Wádí that derives its name from that of the tribe, viz., Wádí al-Ma’áwil (57). Their leader, Sh. Sulaymán b. Náṣir b. Muḥammad, first refused to declare his allegiance, but his followers persuaded him to give the Imam his homage. After months later, he reneged on his allegiance. This cost him his life. As a result, secret assassinations became rife in the ranks of the ‘ulamá who supported the Imam, as we have mentioned earlier. Their participation, therefore, was mainly confined to individual initiatives, motivated either by religious zeal or by material self-interest. In other words, they did not join collectively under the leadership of their Shaykh, but under the protection of the Imam and with his instructions. For all these reasons, the tribe’s contribution was small, due mainly to its lack of conviction in the Imamate, an attitude which was similar to that of their neighbours, the B. Ḥarrás and the B. Jábir.

f) al-Ḥírth

Al-Ḥírth (sing. Ḥírithí) are of Qahtání origin. In politics, they belong to the Hináwi, and they are Ibádí in their faith. Their headquarters was al-Qábil (58). Their tamímah was Sh. ‘Isá b. Šálih, who was also the tamímah of the Hináwi factions. Sh. ‘Isá was a very well respected figure in Oman from all the Hináwi, inheriting this high social standing from his father, who played a very prominent role in the second half of 19th century.

We have seen that the tribe did not give the bay’ah to the Imam at the beginning. Not only that, but Sh. ‘Isá even tried to dissuade Sh. al-Sálimí from reviving the issue of the Imamate. As a result of this, Sh. al-Sálimí went out of al-Qábil under cover until he
reached Tanuf, as mentioned earlier. He then refused to give his *bay'ah* until the fall of Izki in to the hands of the Imam, after which he realised that he would lose his political position and influence among the tribes if he continued to refuse to support the Imam.

It is possible that the B. Ruwáḥah had played a role in consulting Sh. ‘Isà in order to save the tribe from coming into conflict with the B. Riyám, their traditional enemies. For this reason, Sh. ‘Isà decided to support the Imam and joined in all his military operations. Sh. ‘Isà’s role in support of the Imamate was crucial, although he always hoped that peace and conciliation would prevail between the Imam and the Sultan. His role in persuading the Hináiwi tribes to support the Imam was also great, as for example, in the cases of Sd. Ahmad b. Ibráhím and Āl Wahābah, who retracted their support of the Sultan, when they knew of Sh. ‘Isà’s support for the Imam.

g) al-Ḥabús

Al-Ḥabús (sing. Ḥabš) are of ʿAdnání origin. Politically, they belong to the Hináiwi, and they are Ibádí in their sect. They inhabit al-Sharqiyah in a region named after the tribal name, as Buldán al-Ḥabús; their mainstay was al-Muḍaybí. They are divided into several *fakhdds*, about fifteen in all. They supported the Imam and joined in many of his military operations. The Imam had complete control over the tribe (59).

h) al-Ḍu Suʿíd

Āl Ḍu Suʿíd (sing. al-Ḍu Suʿíd) are of Qaḥṭání origin, Hináiwi in politics and Ibádí in religion. To this tribe belongs the Omani ruling family. The tribe is widely scattered all over Oman, to such an extent that members of them can be found everywhere in the country. Their main concentration is in al-Sharqiyah. Some of them supported the Imam and many of their members joined the Imam and his successor. Among those who supported the Imam were Sd. Suʿúd b. Ḥamad b. Ḥilál, and Ḥilál b. ‘Alí b. Badr, who assumed the office of Wálí of the Imam. The first among them to become Wálí of Samad al-Shán was Sd. Sálim b. Suʿíd (60).

i) al-ʿAwámir

Al-ʿAwámir (sing. ʿĀmīr) are of ʿAdnání origin. Politically, they belong to the Hináiwi faction, and religiously, they are divided between the Ibádí and Sunni (61).
The tribe is big and extends from Dhofar in the South to al-Buraymi in the North. Some sections of the tribe are Ḥadār, who live in the interior province, also in Muscat and al-Báṭinah in al-Sīb. They are divided into several fakhdhs. However, that section of them who supported the Imam lived around Izkí. These joined the Imam very actively and submitted completely to him and implemented his political and administrative programmes during his reign and that of his successor.

In conclusion, it has to be stressed that the Imam had laid his complete control and authority over the above tribes in that he appointed his Wális, Qádis and zakár collectors over these tribes. It has to be noted also that all of these tribes are settled Ḥadār tribes and practised agriculture. The submission of these tribes to the Imam was complete, with the exception of al Maʿáwil whose submission to the Imam and involvement with his activities was weak and only by individual initiative. This was in contrast to the other tribes like the B. Ruwáḥah and al-Ḥirth whose involvement was whole-hearted and unanimous. This also applies to some of the fakhdhs from al-Hadādibah, the inhabitants of Fanjá, who submitted to the Imam, but opposed him on many issues and therefore were inclined more towards the Sultan than the Imam.

ii. The Imam's incomplete control over tribes

This section deals with the relationship between the Imam and those tribes over which he had only partial control. These are the tribes which, on the one hand, accepted the Imamate, but on the other hand, the Imam exercised no direct authority over them. They supported the Imam and sent some of their men when asked to do so in order to participate in the Imam's military operations. They also referred their disputes and legal problems to the Imam's courts. Some of these tribes were not settled, but were Badú who were in constant movement.
1. The tribes of the Ghafiri

a) al-Janabah

Al-Janabah (sing. Junaybî) are Qahtânî. They belong to the Ghafiri political faction, and they adhere to the Sunni sect. They are mainly Badû, but some of them are Ḥadîr. Their range was in three main areas (i) around Adam, (ii) Ṣûr, and (iii) Maṣîrah. They are divided into five main fakhdhs: al-‘Arámá, al-Fawárîs, al-Ghâyâliyyîn, al-Makhânah, and al-Majá’îlîh. The first four fakhdhs live in Ṣûr and extend Westwards along the shores. Al-Majá’îlah, on the other hand, inhabit the area around Adam and Masîrah. Their tamîmah was in the Majá’îlah fakhd, who was Sh. Yásir b. Ḥumûd b. Sulţán al-Majay-‘alîf, whose headquarters is ‘Izz. In Ṣûr, it was Sh. Muḥammad b. Mubárák al-Mukhaynî. We have seen that it was Sh. Sa’îd b. Sa’îd b. Sulţán al-Majay-‘alîf, who gave the bay’ah to the Imam. Sh. Sa’îd was cousin to Yásir who took over the leadership of the tribe after Sa’îd. Al-Majá’îlah is the only fakhd of the tribe who gave the bay’ah to the Imam, while the other fakhdhs of the tribe rejected the Imamate (62).

We also indicated that Sh. Ḥimyar had called upon the people of Ṣûr to come to a meeting, or to send their representative to him during his tour in al-Sharqiyyah between October and November 1913, to discuss their loyalties, but they rejected his call, and instead sent to the Sultan informing him of the event. The Sultan, on his part, sent a force to protect them against any possible attacks that Sh. Ḥimyar might launch against them. Initially, they had allied themselves with the B. Bú ‘Alî in support of the Sultan and sent a force of men which reached Bidbid. However, after three days of the Imam’s attack on Samá’il, they were forced to withdraw. Not only that, but they even went to threaten al-Maḥârîq in Adam.

The Majá’îlah, on the other hand, supported the Imam and were committed to his programme, obeying his instructions and rule, and also paid the zakát to him. However, they lacked organisation in view of the fact that they were Badû and they did not get involved in the administration and rule, except during the reign of Imam al-Khalîlî, who greatly depended on them. As a result, we find the name of Sh. Yásir repeatedly mentioned in respect of many of the responsibilities and events that occurred during the time of Imam al-Khalîlî,
b) al-Durú'

Al-Durú' (sing. Dur') are 'Adnání Badú tribes. They belong to the Gháfirí faction. Religiously, they are divided between Ibádí and Sunni. They inhabit the area of Southern al-Záhirah, and their headquarters is Tan'im. They are divided into twenty four fakhřís (63). Al-Durú' gave their bay'ah to the Imam in Nazwa, under the leadership of Sh. Ḥumayd b. Khulayfín b. Sayf b. Násir. However, their involvement in the events in Oman was very little at this period. In fact, we did not find any sources which would indicate their participation in the Imamate, which suggests that the Imam was not able to exert complete control over them.

It seems that the Imam's call on them for support was intended to win more followers, or at least to neutralise them, for fear that they might join his enemies, as did Āl Wahfbah, who joined the Sultan. From all these developments, it becomes clear that the Imam did not interfere in the tribe’s affairs and was not able to enforce his programme on them. Therefore, he left the situation of the tribe as it was before. However, they were able to refer their legal problems to the Imam’s law courts, if they so wished.

c) al-Ya’áqíb

Al-Ya’áqíb (sing. Ya’qúbí) are of Qaḥtání, and in politics, they belong to the Gháfirí faction. They adhere to Sunni and some of them Ibádí sect. Their centre is 'Ibrí in al-Záhirah Province (64). Their tam(mah was Sh. Sulṭán b. Muḥammad b. 'Abdalláh al-Ya’qúbí (d. 1342/1924). Sh. Sulṭán responded to the Imam’s call and gave the bay’ah to the Imam, who then appointed him ruler over his people as he used to be. From our investigation, we have come to realise that neither the Shaykh nor his tribe actually took part in the Imam’s wars. The Imam issued instructions to them demanding that they participate in the wars, but they did not. Nevertheless, the relationship between the Shaykh and the Imam continued unimpaired throughout the latter’s reign.

It is possible to assume that the Imam’s friendly attitude towards them was due to his strategy of securing the Imamate from the Western borders, a friendly al-Ya’áqíb would provide that security. This is particularly important because the ruler of Abú Dhabi was a supporter of the Sultan, especially when the latter became active with the ruler of Dubai in raising an army from al-Buraymí to support the Sultan. Al-Ya’áqíb, therefore,
would be an important ally to the Imam in securing his Western flank. Nevertheless, the Imam was not able to exert complete control over them until the end of 1940.

This, in general, was the position of the three Ghafirf tribes over which the Imam failed to exercise complete control, partly because they were remote from the centre of the Imamate, and partly because these were primarily Badu tribes, used to a style of life characterized by constant movement and unamenable to discipline and organized living. Therefore, their contribution was very little in the events of the Imamate, with the exception of some members from the Janabah. There is no evidence to suggest that the Imam collected the zakāt from these tribes.

2. The tribes of the Hināwī

a) Āl Wahībah

Āl Wahībah (sing. Wahībī) are of ‘Adnānī origin. They belong to the Hināwī faction, and adhere to the Ibāḍī sect. They live, together with al-Ḥabūs, in Buldān al-Ḥabūs, particularly in Sanāw and Sudayrah. They are divided into eight fakhdhs (65). Āl Wahībah were first supporters of the Sultan, but when Sh. ‘Isā proclaimed his support for the Imam, they abandoned their support for the Sultan and returned to their homeland. They then continued monitoring the situation until the end of 1333/1915, when the Imam visited Samad al-Shán and there met with the dignitaries of the tribe and they gave their allegiance. No doubt Sh. ‘Isā influenced them to give the bay‘ah to the Imam. This was also due to the pressure that they faced from their neighbours. As a result of these pressures, they finally agreed to declare their allegiance to the Imam. Here are some of their prominent Shaykhs, who met the Imam to give their support:


5. Sh. Sálim b. Ḥumúd b. Sa‘íd b. Ráshid al-Jaḥáffí, son of Sh. Ḥumúd b. Sa‘íd (d. 1898), who played a significant part in the events which occurred in the second half of 19th century. The tamīmah of Āl Wahšbah was Sh. Súltán, who relinquished the leadership of the tribe as a result of old age and was replaced by his son, Sh. Ḥumúd b. Súltán, aided by Sh. Ḥumúd b. Sálim b. Ḥumúd al-Jaḥáffí. Āl Wahšbah were not particularly favoured by the Imam, and although they obeyed his rules, they rejected them on many occasions. Therefore, when the Imam went to meet them in 1920, he was killed on the way to them. We will discuss this incident in some detail later in (Ch. VIII).

b) al-Ḥarásís

Al-Ḥarásís (sing. Ḥarsúsí) are of Qaḥtání origin. They belong to the Hináwí political faction, and adhere to the Sunni sect. They live in Jaddat al-Ḥarásí, which extends to the lands of al-Durú‘ and Āl Wahšbah. Their language belongs to the branch of the modern non-Arabic dialects of Southern Arabia. They declared their bay‘ah to the Imam, but there is no idea exactly when this happened. They also did not take part in the Imam’s wars, nor did he impose any forms of payments or tributes on them.

All of these tribes are Badú, and although in principle they gave the bay‘ah to the Imam, he was not able to exert complete control over them. As we have tried to explain, this lack of complete control, was party due to the Bedouin nomadic life of these tribes, who were unsettled and unamenable to discipline and organization and lacked religious zeal. Many of them were also Sunnis, like al-Durú‘, al-Janabah and al-Ḥarásís. For all these reasons, the position of the Imam among these tribes was generally weak. However, they were also careful enough not to antagonize the Imam or challenge his power, as did the rulers of Bahlā and Rustáq, whom, as a result, the Imam dismissed from their position. The same could be said about Āl Wahšbah, who posed a challenge which the Imam had to face when a conflict arose between them and al-‘Abriyyín. The Imam sent his instructions to Āl Wahšbah regarding this conflict, which Āl Wahšbah refused to obey. As a result, the Imam advanced towards them to make them obey his orders, but met with his death on his way to them before completing what he had intended to do, as we will see later.
Endnotes

(1) Miles, “Note on the Tribes of Oman”; Lorimer, op.cit. vols. 6, 7 & 8 pp. q.v.; Chauncy, “Notes the Tribes of Sultanate of Muscat and Oman”.
(2) Miles, The Countries and Tribes. p. 418.
(3) Lorimer, op.cit. vol. 6 p. 2965; Wilkinson, “Bayásirah ” pp. 75-85; Carter, Tribes. pp. 118f.
(4) al-Izkawi, Annals of Oman. p. 27.
(5) Lorimer, op.cit. vol. 8 p. 1389ff.
(6) al-Siyabi, Is'af. p. passim; Miles, op.cit. pp. 418-38; Lorimer, op.cit. vols. 6, 7 & 8 p. q.v.
(10) Gabriel, T. ‘Rural Change in Oman”; Thesiger, “The Badi of Southern Arabia”.
(11) The Jázirah system consists of a pair of yoked bullocks or donkeys which draw water from inside the well by a bucket to the surface, repeatedly. See Wilkinson, Water and Tribal Settlement. p. 78
(12) Lorimer, op.cit. vols. 6, 7 & 8 pp. q.v.; Anthony, op.cit. p. q.v.
(17) Ibid.
(18) Ibid.
(19) Peterson, Oman. p. 110.
(20) Peterson, Oman. p. 112.
(21) al-Sálimí, M.A. op.cit. p. 375.
(22) al-Sálimí, M.A. op.cit. p. 180.
(24) al-Sálimí, M.A. op.cit. pp. 182ff.
(25) al-Sálimí, M.A. op.cit. pp. 196f.
(26) al-Sálimí, M.A. op.cit. pp. 215f.
(27) al-Sálimí, M.A. op.cit. p. 224.
(28) Among the ‘ulamá’, who were killed in this secret killing were: Sh. ‘Abd al-Rahmán b. Khamís b. Já’dí al-Kharúf and his son, Sh. Sayf b. Ahmad al-Kindí, the Qádí of Nakhal and his wife, Sh. Muhammad b. ‘Abdalláh al-Sálimí, and Sh. Sa‘íd b. Sálim al-‘Arafátí and his son.
(29) Sh. Muḥsin b. Zahrán al-Siyábí, the Shaykh of al-Siyábijyín, refused to declare his allegiance. Therefore, he escaped to Muscat, where he lived until Imam Sálim’s death.
(30) For further detail about the B. Riyám see Miles, The Countries. p.434; Lorimer, op.cit. vol. 8 pp. 1593f; Peterson, Oman pp. 123-5.
(31) For further detail about al-Abriyyín see Miles, op.cit. p. 428; Lorimer, op.cit. vol. 6 p. 16; Wilkinson, Arab settlement. pp. 156ff.
(33) For further detail about the B. Kharús see Miles, op.cit. p. 430; Lorimer, op.cit. vol. 7 p. 1027; al-Siyábí, Is'af. pp. 111f; ARAMCO, ‘Umán. p. 144f.
(34) Interview with Sh. Sa‘íd b. Ḥamád al-Kharúfí
(35) Chauncy, “Notes the Tribes of Sultanate of Muscat and Oman” p. q v (B. Kharús).
(36) For further detail about al-Maháríq see Miles, op.cit. p. 431; Lorimer, op.cit. vol. 8 p. 1396; al-Siyábí, Is'af. pp. 63f; ARAMCO, ‘Umán, p. 161f.
(37) For further detail about al-Masákíra see Miles, op.cit. p. 432; Lorimer, op.cit. vol. 8 p. 1178; al-Siyábí, Is'af. pp. 122f.
(38) al-Sálimí, M.A. op.cit. pp. 404f.
(39) For further detail about al-Kumúd see Miles, op.cit. p. 430; Lorimer, op.cit. vol. 8 p. 1041.
(40) al-Sálimí, M.A. op.cit. p. 254.
(41) al-Sálimí, M.A. op.cit. p. 403.
For further detail about al-Nadāḥiyīn see Miles, op.cit. pp. 432f; Lorimer, op.cit. vol. 8 p. 1364.

For further detail about al-Raḥḥiyīn, see Miles, op.cit. p. 434; Lorimer, op.cit. vol. 8 p. 1572f; al-Siyābī, Isⱽ af. p. 145.

For further detail about the B. Jābir, see Miles, op.cit. p. 428; Lorimer, op.cit. vol. 7 pp. 885-9; al-Siyābī, Isⱽ af. p. 48.

For further detail about al-Siyāḥiyīn, see Miles, op.cit. p. 436; Lorimer, op.cit. vol. 8 p. 1834; al-Siyābī, Isⱽ af. p. 40.

For further detail about the B. Ḥarrāṣ, see Miles, op.cit. p. 426; Lorimer, op.cit. vol. 7 p. 642; al-Siyābī, Isⱽ af. p. 46.

For further detail about al-Yaʿaribah, see Miles, op.cit. p. 437; Bathunst, The Yaʿrubī Dynasty of Oman; al-Siyābī, Isⱽ af. pp. 119f; Anthony, op.cit. p. 123.

For further detail about the B. Ruwaḥah, see Miles, op.cit. pp. 434f; Lorimer, op.cit. vol. 7 p. 1614; ARAMCO, op.cit. pp. 150f; Anthony, op.cit. p. 91; Peterson, op.cit. pp. 128f.

For further detail about al-Hadādibah, see Miles, op.cit. p. 427; Lorimer, op.cit. vol. 8 p. 1402; al-Siyābī, Isⱽ af. p. 158.

For further detail about al-Maʿāwil, see Miles, op.cit. pp. 430f; Lorimer, op.cit. vol. 8 p. 1113; al-Siyābī, Isⱽ af. p. 106.

For further detail about al-Maʿāmir, see Miles, op.cit. pp. 426f; Lorimer, op.cit. vol. 7 pp. 740-3; ARAMCO, op.cit. pp. 140f; Anthony, op.cit. pp. 142f; Peterson, op.cit. pp. 119f.

For further detail about al-Ḥubūs, see Miles, op.cit. p. 426; Lorimer, op.cit. vol. 7 pp. 494-6; ARAMCO, op.cit. p. 130; Mandaville, "al-Hubūs" EI-2 vol. iii p. 537.

For further detail about Āl Bū Saʿīd, see Miles, op.cit. p. 435; Lorimer, op.cit. vol. 8 pp. 1647f; ARAMCO, op.cit. pp. 154f; Anthony, op.cit. pp. 92f.

For further detail about al-ʿAwāmr, see Miles, op.cit. p. 422; Lorimer, op.cit. vol. 6 pp. 186ff; ARAMCO, op.cit. pp. 159f; Headly, "Awāmr" EI-2 vol. i p. 759.

For further detail about al-Janahah, see Miles, op.cit. p. 429; Lorimer, op.cit. vol. 6 pp. 903ff; ARAMCO, op.cit. pp. 131f; Renz, "al-Djanahah" EI-2 vol. ii p. 40.

For further detail about al-Durūt, see Miles, op.cit. p. 424; Lorimer, op.cit. vol. 6 pp. 360; ARAMCO, op.cit. pp. 140f; Matthews, "al-Durūt" EI-2 vol. ii pp. 630f; Peterson, op.cit. pp. 129f.

For further detail about al-Yaʿaqūb, see Miles, op.cit. pp. 437; ARAMCO, op.cit. p. 170; Anthony, op.cit. p. 123.

For further detail about Āl Wahībah, see Miles, op.cit. p. 437; Lorimer, op.cit. vol. 8 pp. 1921-5; ARAMCO, op.cit. pp. 165-8; Anthony, op.cit. p. 120.

CHAPTER VII

THE IMAM'S LOCAL ADMINISTRATION

The main aim of this chapter is to gain an understanding of the Imamate of Imam Sālim b. Ráshid al-Kharūṣī and the extent of his success or otherwise in administering the affairs of his government in its various branches. It deals with the state institutions and the functioning of such institutions. These are the political system, the administrative system, education, and the economic and financial system.

1) The Political System

The main themes to be dealt with in this section are the power of Imam Sālim’s government and the role of the Consultative Council which assisted the Imam in important matters and decision making. On top of the political hierarchy sat the Imam.

a) Imam

One of the basic principles of the Ibaḍī faith is that the Imamate is not a necessity, but that when circumstances arise which demand its revival, the post is elective and not hereditary. For most of its existence, Oman has been ruled by Imams as mentioned above (Ch. I. S. 1), but during the 19th century, few of the rulers have had the necessary religious qualifications to fill the post. For that reason, the Imamate system is considered the most suitable system of rule in Oman because of the nature of the demographic composition of the country, which makes unity difficult in the absence of the Imamate system. In addition, this rather heterogeneous demographic composition is further complicated by the fact that each ethnic or religious group held fast to its inherited traditions which are saturated with Islam. As such, in political conventions, tribal conviction confers on the Imam the people’s undivided loyalty and allegiance much more than any ruler can exercise over them.

Ex-officio, the Imam is both head of the state and government. His duties are to organize the administration, to command the army, to appoint officials, to implement Islamic laws and to lead the Friday prayer.
The election of Imam Sálim came as a result of the need of the Omani society for the Imam. The factors which engendered such a need were tackled in Ch. II. S. 2. This convergence of factors include a religious resurgence among tribesmen and notables of the Interior, inspired in part by a weakened Āl Bú Sa‘íd, perceived as compromised by British domination.

Therefore, the Imam set out a programme designed to achieve the aims for which the Imamate had been revived. For that reason, the Imam immediately after his election embarked on a reorganization of his administration, and he wrote to all the chiefs of tribes calling upon them for his support in order to complete his mission.

As for the provinces, the Imam delegated the responsibility of administration to his Wális, Qádis and Army Generals. However, he decreed that all important cases and issues be referred to him. He closely supervised the behaviour of his Wális and Qádis, and used to hold them accountable for all matters, big or small. We have seen that he used to attend seminars held to resolve controversial and difficult matters, whether among the general public or between the ‘ulamá’, or the officials. As an example, he held a meeting in Nazwà, aimed to resolve a case of religious controversy between Sh. al-Sálimí and Sh. Májid b. Khamís al-‘Abrí in 1332/1914. The Imam was generally blamed for his rigidity such that he never retracted from a decision passed by the ‘ulamá’, such as the issue of the confiscation of the property of Sh. Ráshid b. ‘Uzayyiz al-Khuṣaybí (d.1347/1928) and the property of Sh. ‘Abdalláh b. Sulaymán al-Maḥrúqí.

Considering these things mentioned above, an important question arises: was Imam Sálim able to achieve all that he aspired for in the organization of his Imamate?. To be sure, the answer is in the negative. The reason for this failure can be traced to a multiplicity of causes, the most important of which was the continuation of war with the Sultan who was supported by the British, and the diminution of economic resources. Did he, however, achieve social justice, the stability of law and order, and the prevalence of security? The answer to this question is in the affirmative ; and the PAM’s (Haworth) report of 9th May 1917 attests to the fact. The Report says of the government of the Imam that “justice is obtainable, and the only complaints heard are due to the fact that it is strict... The Hindu (British Subjects) community inform me [PAM] that the government
of the Imam is good and that if the rule of the Wális in the districts was not good, it was at any rate very much better than the conditions of affairs at Masqat [Muscat], and at Matrah [Maṭrah] under the Sultan himself" (1).

The testimony of the PAM and Hindus who were working in trade and who were not Muslims as a matter of course, all testify that the Imam system of government was better. Imam Sálím himself had surrounded himself by a great number of consultants and ‘ulamá’ and entrusted many of them with the responsibilities of running the affairs of his government. However, the Imam was a firm and tough leader, who led his armies personally, and carried out such punishments for big offences as the death penalty, the rajm (stoning to death), and the amputation of arms of those who committed theft offences. On 29th Shawwál 1331, the Imam personally carried out the execution of the penalty of rajm on Su’ dah bint Sálím al-‘Ámiriyah, who admitted committing ziná (adultery) in Samá’il (2). He also ordered in person the execution of the death penalty on Sa’ íd b. Aḥmad al-Jábirí who was accused of spying for the Sultan (3). He also ordered the death of Muḥammad b. Bakhít al-Salámi who was a high-way vagabond, as well as the order of death of both Sh. Sulaymán b. Náṣir al-Ma‘wálí and Sh. Ahmad b. Thunayyán al-Ḥarráší. Thus, the Imam was a stern character, which made many of the leaders fear him. Mention has already been made (Ch. II. S. 1) of some aspects of his personality. It was said that Sh. Sulṭán b. Manṣúr al-Ghufayláf did not dare to meet the Imam alone for fear of him (4). It is also said that Sh. Ḥimyar and Sh. ‘Isā refused a request from Sulaymán b. ‘Abdalláh al-Maḥrúqí asking them to intervene with the Imam to pardon him (5).

As a result of the Imam’s strictness and sternness, he was obeyed by the subjects, and some of the tribes submitted to his authority, as we have mentioned earlier. This does not mean, however, that Imam Sálím ruled over the people entirely single-handedly as an authoritarian dictator, but that he was governed in all his actions by what was decided by his ‘ulamá’ around him, not necessarily taking decisions by way of general meetings. In actual fact, the government of the Imam lacked the necessary institutional set-up of the modern state, and the system of governance which he followed was a traditional rudimentary one that goes back to the system of political organisation found in the early
days of the Islamic State. It is also probable that his system of government owed its origins to what the Omanis had conventionally agreed upon. The pre-occupation of the Imam with his wars and his concentration on how to requisition supplies for his armies, together with his responsibility for dealing with people’s judicial and security problems, all combined to diminish the development of a fully-fledged institutional political system for state organisation.

b) The Consultative Council

When Imam Sálim was elected as Imam, a condition of the bay’ah as Imam was that the Imam should not pass an important decision without the prior consultation of the ‘ulamá’ who were in the position of Ahl al-Ḫallwa al’Aqd (Ch. III. S.2). According to this condition, Imam Sálim was bound to consult the ‘ulamá’ and the chiefs of the tribes. Therefore, we may consider this body as a consultative council for the Imam, or a body of close advisors to the Imam. The council had as its members the prominent ‘ulamá’ and notables, and the chiefs of the tribes. The ‘ulamá’ were entrusted with carrying out matters relating to religious and judiciary law, whereas the focus of responsibility of the remainder of the council were those relating to military and administrative matters.

i. ‘Ulamá’

The ‘ulamá’ played an important role in reviving the Imamate in 1913, and the government of the Imam witnessed a big number of them, the majority of whom were former students of Sh. al-Sálimí, and Sh. Ṣáliḥ b. ‘Alí al-Ḫáritih (d.1314/1896) and Sh. Ráshid b. Sayf b. Ráshid al-Lamkí (d.1333/1915). These ‘ulamá’ concentrated their efforts on the service of the Imamate and many of them assumed important offices in it. The Imam used to rely on them in the resolution of his administrative and political problems. He also used to consult them in all matters, small or big, either on a collective group basis or on individual personal level. This implied that he either called for a general meeting of the ‘ulamá’ and their counterparts of the chiefs of the tribes to discuss a specific issue, or that he counselled with a few of them, without the need of calling for a general meting. In the following, it is noteworthy to give a listing of the ‘ulamá’ on whose shoulders, the Imamate of Imam Sálim could be said to have primarily rested:-
1. Sh. ‘Abdallah b. Ḥumayd al-Salimi (d. 1332/1914). He was the driving force behind the revival of the Imamate in 1913, as mentioned in some detail earlier. He was blind, nonetheless, he was given the office of president of Qādis of Imam Sālim, and was the main dynamic force for the Imamate. He wrote twenty-six books, in addition to his fatwas and letters in correspondence with the men of his time (6).

2. Sh. ‘Amir b. Khamis b. Mas‘úd al-Malikí (d. 1346/1927). He was the second personality in the government of Imam Sālim. Sh. al-Malikí was one of the key figures on whom the Imamate had rested. An indication of the importance of his standing is that in 1332/1914 he replaced his tutor, Sh. al-Salimi as head of the Qādis, and sometimes he assumed the role of deputy of Imam Sālim in Nazwā. He also gave lessons and lectures, and under him were graduated many of the ‘ulamā’ and Qādis who contributed significantly to the services of the government of al-Khalīf and the government of the Sultan (7).

3. Sh. Abú Zayd ‘Abdalláh b. Muḥammad b. Ruzayq al-Riyámi (d. 1364/1945). He was the third in rank after Sh. al-Salimi and al-Malikí. He gave his famous speech on the occasion when Imam Sālim was elected, in which he detailed the programme of the Imam (see Ch. III). He assumed the office of the Imam’s Qāḍī in Izkí, and then was transferred as Wālī and Qāḍī of Bahlā in 1334/1916 (8).


5. Sh. Nāṣir b. Ráshid b. Sulaymán al-Kharūsí (d. 1363/1943). He was the brother of Imam Sālim. He greatly supported the Imam, and was one of the closes and most influential figures to the Imam, such that the Imam rarely decided on an important issue without his prior consultation. He assumed the responsibilities of administration in the Western Ḥajar Province (al-Rustáq, al-‘Awábi, Nakhal and Wádī al-Ma‘wil) (10).

6. Sh. Muḥammad b. ‘Abdalláh al-Khalīfí (d. 1373/1954). He was one of the most prominent ‘ulamā’ who combined the mastery of learning and the art of politics. He was the tamímah of the B. Ruwáḥah. He became Imam after Imam Sālim’s death (11).
7. Sh. ‘Abdalláh b. Ráshíd b. Šáliḥ al-Háshimí. He was one of the figures who were most dedicated to the support of Imam Sálim. He played an important role in the mediation efforts for a conciliation between the Imam and the Sultan.

8. Sh. Nášir b. ‘Āmir b. Sulaymán al-Riyámí (d.1336/1918). He was one of the notables of the B. Riyám. He supported the Imam, who appointed him as Qádý for Izkí (12).

In addition to that, there was also another group of the ‘ulamá‘ who permanently accompanied the Imam in all his moves, and in turn the Imam continuously sought their advice. These close advisers and consultants to the Imam included:

1. Sh. Sulaymán b. Muḥammad b. Aḥmad al-Kindí (d.1337/1918). He lived in Muscat exiled from Nazwá, and thence he returned at the time of the appearance of Imam Sálim, who appointed him as Qádý in Nazwá (13).

2. Sd. Su‘úd b. Ḥamad b. Hilál al-Bú Sa‘ídq (d. 1337/1918). He was one of the descendants of the founders of the State of Āl Bú Sa‘ídq. He was the Sultan’s Wálí to Izkí, yet he preferred to give his support to the Imam. He was a pious and ascetic man, who assumed the office as Wálí of Samá‘íl, then of Nazwá. The Imam entrusted him with the responsibilities of the Imamate when the Imam went out for war (14).

3. Sh. ‘Abdalláh b. ‘Āmir al-‘Azrí (d.1358/1939). He was one of the prominent ‘ulamá‘, whom the Imam appointed Qádý to Ibrá’, then transferred to Nazwá in 1337/1919. He was deputy to the Imam in Nazwá and the head Qádý therein after Sh. ‘Āmir al-Málikí resigned his post (15).

4. Sh. Muḥammad b. Ḥumúd b. Šáliḥ al-Šawwáff (d. 1364/1944). He was one of ‘ulamá‘ known for his asceticism, who remained closely by the side of the Imam for a long period of time.

5. Sh. Sálim b. Ḥamad b. Sa‘íd al-Baráshídí (d. 1371/1951) was one of the ascetic ‘ulamá‘, and Qádý who accompanied the Imam for a long period of time and received his learning at the hands of the Imam.

ii. Shaykhs

The other members of the Consultative Council were the important chiefs of the tribes who emerged under Imam Sálim’s Imamate and who became important allies and supporters to the Imam. These were:
1. Sh. Ḥimyar b. Nāṣir b. Sayf al-Nabhání (d. 1338/1920), the tamīmah of the B. Ghāfir faction. He supported the Imamate materially and morally, as we have mentioned above (16).

2. Sh. ‘Isā b. Ṣāliḥ b. ‘Alī al-Ḥārithí (1365/1946), the tamīmah of Hināwī faction. He was considered the second important pillar of the Imamate. He was not only a political and military leader, but was also one of the ‘ulamā’ as he contributed to writing, and had written some books in matters of fiqh. In his religious views he differed from the two Imams, Imam Sālim and Imam Muḥammad al-Khalīf (17).

3. The sons of Sh. Hilál b. Záhir al-Hiná‘, viz.: Sh. ‘Abdalláh, Sh. Khálid, Sh. ‘Alī and Sh. Muḥammad b. Hilál, and their nephews, Sh. Záhir b. Ghuṣn b. Hilál and Sh. Sálim and Sh. Su‘úd b. Badr b. Hilál. Sh. ‘Abdalláh and his brother Sh. ‘Alī were in the forefront of the Shaykhs who accepted the Imamate and supported the Imam materially and morally, and for that reason the Imam continued to give them deep and special respect (18).

4. Sh. Muhanná b. Ḥamad al-‘Abrí (d.1342/1924). He was the chief of his tribe. He greatly supported the Imamate and devoted his efforts to this purpose (19).

5. Sh. Sayf b. ‘Alī b. ‘Āmir al-Maskirí (d. 1355/1936) was one of the dignitaries of the Masákiráh tribe, who lived in Zanzibar in the service of Sultan Barghash b. Sa‘íd (1870-88). However, the British expelled him from there after having confiscated his property because he was a supporter of Sd. Khálid b. Barghash b. Sa‘íd in 1314/1896. He then returned to Oman and remained by the side of the Imam and became one of the Imam’s companions (20).

6. Sh. Ḥámíd b. Sayf b. Ṭāhir al-Ruwání, was one of the chiefs of his tribe. His headquarters were in Izki. He was very close to the Imam.

7. Sh. Ḥumayd b. Musallam al-Nadábí. He was one of chiefs of his tribe. His habitation was in Surúr in Wádí Samá’il.

8. Sh. Ḥamdán b. Sulaymán b. Sayf al-Nabhání, the cousin of Sh. Ḥimyar b. Nāṣir. Sh. Ḥamdán’s headquarters was Barkat al-Mawz. He supported the Imam, who appointed him as Wálí of Izki.
These were the members of the Consultative Council whose mission it was to give advice and guidance to the Imam and to help him implement the programme of the Imamate; not only that, but also to exert a supervisory role over the Imam lest he get derailed from the right track, as they also had the right to sack the Imam if he acted contrary to the principles of the *Sharrah*. However, an important question arises: did this Council have a formal constitutional character? i.e. did it have a real existence actually affecting the decision-making process, or was it merely a formal nominal institution without real actual powers?

In answering this question, one can say that the council was no doubt a nominal institution, lacking in constitutional powers, holding meetings only when it was asked to do so, and not necessarily all of its members attended when it did. In fact the name given to the council was not the Imam’s coinage or choice. He preferred to call it *ansār* (helpers or followers), such that when he needed advice, he would say “I will consult the *ansār*”, and for that matter, the Imam used to convene his meetings according to this conception. Accordingly, the Imam did not call for general meetings of the council, but he called for meetings according to the dictates and the expediency of the situation at hand. Following are some examples of such meetings:

1. The Imam called for a meeting in Nazwà in Ṣafar 1332 to discuss the conditions laid down by Sh. Ḥamdán b. Záyid for the conciliation between the Sultan and the Imam through the mediation of Sh. ‘Isà.

2. The Imam called for a meeting in Nazwà in Dhu al-Qi’dah 1332 to discuss the war against the Sultan. As a result, the Imam attacked Muscat in Ṣafar 1333.

3. When the Imam received the PAM’s letter in which he proposed his mediation for reconciliation, the Imam’s answer to the PAM was that the issue required consultation with the *ansār* (21).

4. The Imam called for a council meeting to elect a successor to Sh. al-Sálimî to the post of head of Qādis.

5. The Imam called for a meeting to settle the *fiqh* controversy that arose between Sh. al-Sálimî and Sh. Májid al-‘Abrî (22).
There were other calls for similar meetings, either from the Imam himself or from other leaders, to decide on issues requiring a collective decision.

It is noticeable that the Imam rarely took decisions unilaterally, without the prior consultation of the ‘ulamā’ and leaders, and he, therefore, remained for the most part bound by the decisions of the Council. However, this general role did not hold uniformly, and the Imam did sometimes act otherwise, as for example when he opposed some ‘ulamā’ whose collective decisions on certain matters conflicted with that generally upheld by the ‘ulamā’. Examples of such opposition were those in which the Imam’s views conflicted with that of Sh. ‘Isā on many political and military matters. He also opposed some of his Qādis on the issue of applying the Ḡarṭah punishment of flogging on a woman who bore a child outside marriage. The Imam was generally held to be inclined to take the view generally held by the majority of the public opinion. An example of this was that incident when the leaders and ‘ulamā’ wanted to postpone the attack on Muscat, which was decided upon to take place in January 1915. However, the opinion of the majority of the people, who desired immediate attack, was adopted.

It is noteworthy to add that one characteristic of the members of Council was that they generally respected the views of the Imam, even if his views were different from theirs or contrary to their desires, in spite of the fact that there existed no clear-cut system of organisation governing the process of decision-making, either through a majority or minority rule, nor in the way deliberations and discussions were conducted. Nonetheless, the Council adopted a system of presenting the issues which needed to be discussed by the Imam or one of the members, then the Council decided from among such issues the ones which most urgently called for discussion, according to their importance.
2) The Administrative System

a) Wālis and Qādis

Oman is naturally divided into several provinces, each of which is in turn divided into a number of Wilāyāt (sin. Wilayah), each Wilayah administered by a Wālī who runs the affairs of his Wilayah, as far as the maintenance of security and the enforcement of Shari‘ah are concerned. The Wālī acts on behalf of the Imam or the Sultan. Moreover, each Wilayah is also headed by a Qādī who is responsible for judicial matters, Shari‘ah and fatwas, and all that concern religious law, such as marriage, divorce, inheritance and guardianship of orphans. This is a system accepted and generally agreed upon since the early days of Islam. Imam Sālim, as may be expected, followed this system virtually unchanged, save that he very often combined the two posts of Wālī and Qādī in one and the same person. Examples of such combination were the appointments of Sh. Sultān b. Muḥammad al-Ḥabsī, Wālī and Qādī of al-Muḍaybī; Sh. Abú Zayd al-Riyāmī at Bahlā; Sh. ‘Abdalláh b. Ghábish al-Nawfālī at Ibrá’; Sh. Sayf b. Ḥamad al-Aghbarī at Wādī Dimá wa al-Ta‘iyyīn and Sh. Muḥammad b. Sālim al-Ruqayshī at Izkī.

It is noteworthy to observe that Imam Sālim did not resort to such combination unless he was very sure that the person chosen was a capable and trustworthy man who could administer the Wilayah, both politically and religiously. There was yet another important determining factor, which was the cutting down of expenditures.

The Imam used to consult his advisors when he wanted to appoint a person, asking their opinions concerning the candidate for posts before issuing the decree of appointment. The decrees which the Imam used to issue for the appointment of Wālis fell into two types: either authorizing him with unlimited powers, or giving him restricted powers. Sh. Muḥammad al-Sālimī has preserved for us in his Nahḍat al-‘Ayān two documents as examples of appointment decrees; the first was for the appointment of Sh. Muḥammad al-Ruqayshī on 25th Sha‘bán 1335 (23), and the second was that of the appointment of the author himself, Sh. Muḥammad al-Sālimī as Wālī on al-Muḍaybī, dated 28th Rajab 1337 (24). The appointment decree of Sh. Muḥammad al-Ruqayshī reads as follows:
This is the authorization of the Imam al-Muslimín, Sálim b. Ráshid al-Kharüs to his 'Āmil (Wálî) Muhammad b. Sálim b. Záhir al-Ruqayshlí on Izki and its surroundings (25), thereon acting on our [Imam] behalf in the observance of the right (Amr bi al-Ma'nîf) and forbidding sinfulness (Nahf 'An al-Munkar); on the observance and maintenance of justice, siding with the aggrieved against the aggressor in fairness and justice, maintaining justice for the weak against the powerful by force of law, and to advise in his Wilâyah such as did Muhammad (prayer and peace be upon him) to advise his Ummah, to punish the criminal, as did the 'Āmil of the early Imams before him punish the transgressor without leniency in the matter, to collect zakáát from those of the rich able to pay it, and to levy it according as to the Imam may see to, and apportioning the part due for Bayt al-Mâl, according to the ideal set by the predecessors, the implementation and execution of the Imam's instructions, setting such rules as the Imam sees as general codes adapted to the basic principles of the Qur'án and the Sunnah, and Ijmá'. He should seek, and refer all problematic difficult matters to the 'ulamá'. This as a decree, affirmed, and authorized. Written under his instruction by his 'āmil Abu Zayd 'Abdallah b. Muhammad b. Ruzayq al-Riyání, by his hand on the day of 25th Sha'bán 1335 (26).

It is evident that the Imam specified many powers for his Wálî, and clearly laid down for him the programme of policy and action according to the Shartáh, though restricting his powers in matters relating to the ways of expending the zakáát, and expending moneys from the Bayt al-Mâl, in which he forbade him to act independently without the Imam's approval.

From this decree, it is evident that the Shartáh had to be carried out according to three sources: the Qur'án, the Sunnah and Ijmá' (consensus of opinion); and the Imam forbade using the ra'j (interpretation) and qiyás (analogy) as means of legislation, but that he used to ask the Qádî to refer important matters to the 'ulamá' in order to take a collective opinion on such matters. This was also clear in the letter which the Imam sent to Sh. Abú Zayd al-Riyání, the Qádî of Bahlâ exhorting him against the use of ra'j.

Other appointment decrees used essentially the same language. However, this did not mean that the Imam gave his Qádis or Wálís unlimited absolute powers without referring to him, but that the Imam constantly supervised the conduct and performance of his administration, and received all too open-heâtedly, complaints raised against his officials and penalised them, such as he did with Sh. Abú Zayd (27).

The responsibilities of the Wálî were to act on behalf of the Imam in the Wiláyah, implement the Imam's instructions in carrying the people into the right track of Islam,
capture criminals and bringing them to justice, and maintain law, order and general security. Sometimes, the Wālf also undertook the levying of the zakāt and the waqf of the Bayt al-Māl, and other the administrative, political and economic responsibilities.

The Qāḍī, on the other hand, was responsible for religious and social matters, such as the settlement of disputes, supervision of waqfs, appointment of guardians to orphans, performance of fatwas, and concluding marriage contracts. He also undertook teaching, as did Sh. Mājīd al-‘Abrī, Sh. ‘Āmir al-Mālkī, Sh. Abū Zayd, Sh. Abū ‘Ubayd Ḥamad al-Sulaymī, and Sh. Nāṣir al-Kharūṣī, and many others. A Qāḍī candidate had to have certain qualities to qualify for the post. These included justice and commanding complete knowledge of the Qur’ān and Sunnah, knowledge of the interpretation of the Salaf as premise for consensus, and ability to exercise his own judgement in controversial matters.

Routine work was performed in barzah or public reception, attended by both the Wālf and Qāḍī in the same place and with a big congregation of other people. The barzah, was usually conducted in two sessions. The first session ended at the zuhr prayer time; the other covered the time between the ‘āsr and maghrib prayers.

In the proceeding chapters, we have seen how the Imam came to extend his control and authority over certain regions in Oman which numbered about 17 Wilāyahs, distributed as follows:-


The Imam appointed Wālis and Qāḍis over those Wilāyahs, since these came under his effective authority. The following table gives the names of the Wilāyah and their respective Wālis:-
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Wilāyāt</th>
<th>Wālf</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Adm</td>
<td>Sd. Zahrán b. Mubáarak b. Āhmad al-Bū Sa‘īdī (d. 1354/1935)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>al-‘Awábī</td>
<td>Sh. Násaır b. Ráshid b. Sulaymán al-Khārūsī (d. 1362/1943)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Sh. Sa‘īd b. Ḥamad al-Khārūsī</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Sd. Muḥammad b. Sulaymán b. Ḥamad al-Bū Sa‘īdī (d. 1353/1934)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bahlā</td>
<td>Sh. Násaır b. Ḥumayd b. Ráshid al-Ghāfīrī (d. 1348/1929)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Sh. Abū Zayd ‘Abdallāh b. Muḥammad al-Riyyāmī (d.1364/1944)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bidbid</td>
<td>.............................................................</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dimā Wa Wādí</td>
<td>Sh. Sayf b. Ḥamad b. Shīkhán al-Aghbarī (d. 1380/1960)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>al-Tā‘īyyín</td>
<td>.............................................................</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>al-Ḥamrā‘</td>
<td>Sh. Muḥáná b. Ḥamad b. Muḥsin al-‘Abrī (d. 1342/1923)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Sh. ‘Abdallāh b. Ghābīsh al-Nawfāfī (d.1339/1921)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Izkī</td>
<td>Sh. Ḥamdán b. Sulaymán b.Sayf al-Nabhānī</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Sh. Sh. Muḥammad b. Sālim al-Ruqayyshī (d.1387/1967)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Sh. Āhmad b. Sulaym b. al-Murr al-‘Urāymī (d. 1336/1918)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Sh. Sulṭān b. Muḥammad b. Rashíd al-Ḥāsāf</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Sh. Muḥammad b. ‘Abdallāh al-Sālimī (d. 1406/1986)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Sh.Sulaymán b.Sanán b. Ghusn al-‘Alawī (d. 1356/1937)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Sh. Su‘ūd b. Ḥumayd b. Khulayfīn (d.1373/1953)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nakhal</td>
<td>Sh. Násaır b. Ráshid b. Sulaymán al-Khārūsī</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Sh. Sayf b. Háshim al-Riyyāmī</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nazwā</td>
<td>Sh. Májīd b. Khamís al-‘Abrī (deputy of the Imam in 1913-14)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Sh. ‘Āmir b. Khamís al-Mālikī, (deputy of the Imam)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Sd. Su‘ūd b. Ḥamad b. Hilál al-Bū Sa‘īdī (deputy of the Imam)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Sh. ‘Abdallāh b. ‘Āmir al-‘Azrī (deputy of the Imam in 1920)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>al-Qāibli</td>
<td>Sh. ‘Isā b. Sālih b. ‘Alī al-Ḥarīthī (d. 1365/1946)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>al-Rustāq</td>
<td>Sd. Āhmad b. Ibrāhīm al-Bū Sa‘īdī (d. 1401/1981)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Sh. Násaır b. Ráshid b. Sulaymán al-Khārūsī</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Samā‘īl</td>
<td>Sd. Su‘ūd b. Ḥamad b. Hilál al-Bū Sa‘īdī (d. 1337/1918)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Sh. Muḥammad b. Ráshid al-Khārūsī</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
As for the Qādīs of the Imam, the following table gives their names against their respective Wilāyah:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Wilāyah</th>
<th>Qādīs</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sh. Zahrán b. Mubárak b. Aḥmad al-Bū Saʿīdī (d. 1354/1935)</td>
<td>Adm</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sh. Naṣīr b. Rashíd b. Sulaymán al-Khurṣī (d. 1362/1943)</td>
<td>al-ʿAwābī</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sh.ʿAbdalláh b. Ghábish al-Nawfál (d. 1339/1920)</td>
<td>Badiyyah</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sh. Abū Zayd ʿAbdalláh b. Muḥammad al-Riyámí (d.1364/1944)</td>
<td>Bahlā</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sh. Sálim b. Furaysh b. Saʿīd al-Shámisī</td>
<td>Bidbid</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sh. Majíd b. Khamís b. Ráshid al-ʿAbri (d. 1346/1927)</td>
<td>al-Ḥamrá′</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sh. Sulaymán b. Sanán b. Ghusn al-ʿAlawī (d. 1356/1937)</td>
<td>ʿIbrá′</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sh.ʿAbdalláh b. Ghábish al-Nawfál (d. 1339/1920)</td>
<td>Sh. ʿAbdalláh b. ʿĀmir al-ʿAzrí (1358/1939)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sh. Sulaymán b. Hámíd b. Jamr al-Barashídū</td>
<td>Sh. ʿAbdalláh b. ʿĀmir al-ʿAzrí</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sh. Abú Zayd ʿAbdalláh al-Riyámí</td>
<td>Izkí</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sh. Zahrán b. Mubárak b. Aḥmad al-Bū Saʿīdī (d. 1354/1935)</td>
<td>Manaḥ</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sh. Qaswar b. Ḥumūd b. Hāshil al-Ráshíd (d.1360/1941)</td>
<td>al-Muḍaybí</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sh. Sayf b. Aḥmad b. Sulaymán al-Kindī (d. 1337/1919)</td>
<td>Nakhal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sh. Majíd b. Khamís al-ʿAbri</td>
<td>Nazwā</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sh. ʿĀmir b. Khamís al-Ṭālib</td>
<td>Sh. ʿĀmir b. Khamís al-Ṭālib</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sh. Sálim b. Ḥamad b. Saʿīd al-Barashídū (d. 1371/1951)</td>
<td>Sh. Sulaymán b. Muḥammad b. Aḥmad al-Kindī (d. 1337/1919)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sh. ʿAbdalláh b. ʿĀmir al-ʿAzrí</td>
<td>Sh. ʿAbdalláh b. ʿĀmir al-ʿAzrí</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sh. ʿIsā b. ʿŚāliḥ al-Ḥārithī (d. 1365/1946)</td>
<td>al-Qābil</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sh. Sálim b. Muḥammad al-Ḥārithī</td>
<td>Sh. Sálim b. Muḥammad al-Ḥārithī</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sh. Ráshíd b. Sayf b. Ráshíd al-Lamkī (d. 1333/1915)</td>
<td>al-Rustáq</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sh. Saʿīd b. ʿŚāliḥ b. Ráshíd al-ʿAbri (d. 1340/1921)</td>
<td>Sh. Saʿīd b. ʿŚāliḥ b. Ráshíd al-ʿAbri (d. 1340/1921)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sh. Abú ʿUbayd Ḥamad b. ʿUbayd al-Sulaymí (d. 1390/1970)</td>
<td>Samáʿil</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sh. ʿAlī b. Nāṣir al-Yahmadí</td>
<td>Wádí al-Maʿāwil</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The name of the same Wālī may appear in more than one Wilāyah, the reason being that these Wālis may have been transferred from one Wilāyah to the other.
However, this explanation does not apply to Nazwà and al-Muṣaybî. In the former case, the Wálî was in the position of the Imam’s deputy and the head of Qâdis at the same time, such as Sh. ʿAmir al-Mâlikî and Sh. ʿAbdallâh al-ʿAzrî. The latter Wilâyah was the largest of all in Oman, and had three centres, al-Muṣaybî, Samad and Sanâw; the Imam appointed a Wâlî for each district, and they conjointly administered the Wilâyah (28).

We also see that the names of more than one Qâdis appear in more than one Wilâyah. This does not mean that the Imam appointed two Qâdis in the same Wilâyah, but that one Qâdis worked in the Wilâyah and then transferred to another with the exception of Nazwà where there was more than one Qâdis. This is why we see the repetition of names, as for example the name of Sd. ZahraN al-Bû Saʿîdî, Qâdis of Adam, who had also worked in Manaḥ, as he was also one of the Wâlîs who assumed office of Wâlî of Adm.

However, there are some Qâdis whose Wilâyât we do not know. It is likely that this group of Qâdis were closely attached to the Imam and were responsible for reviewing big and important cases and acting as Qâdis of Appeal. These Qâdis were as follows:-

1. Sh. Muḥammad b. ʿAbdallâh al-Khalîfî (who became Imam after Imam Sâlim’s death).
2. Sh. ʿAbdallâh b. Râshid b. Ṣâliḥ al-Ḥāshîmî.

It is important to note that Sh. al-Sâlimî was first Qâdis to the Imam, and when he died on 5th Rabîʿ I, 1332, the Imam called for a general meeting to appoint a general Qâdis as successor to Sh. al-Sâlimî, and Sh. ʿAmir b. Khamîs al-Mâlikî was elected to become the chief of Qâdis to the Imamate, and acted as Imam’s deputy in Nazwà, as may be seen from the tables above. When Sh. al-Mâlikî fell from the Imam’s favour, towards the latter days of Imam’s reign, Sh. al-Mâlikî’s position was held by Sh. ʿAbdallâh b. ʿAmir al-ʿAzrî. Moreover, towards the latter days of the Imam there were many men who were qualified to assume the office of Qâdis as a result of the Imam’s concern for education and learning, as we will show below. At this time, the Imam surrounded himself with a
big number of the 'ulamā' who declined to assume the office of Qādis, and preferred to work in education instead, like the scholar Khalfán b. Jumayyil al-Siyábí, Sh. Muḥammad b. Shīkhán al-Salīm and Sh. Ḥāmid b. Nāṣir al-Nazawī.

b) Clerks and Officialdom

One of the requirements of state administration was an efficient clerical pool to help the Wālī or Qādis or the Imam himself in the operation of record writing and keeping. As mentioned above, the Imam adopted a simple system of administration, and accordingly, there were no offices to keep records and documents, except on a very limited scale, especially pertaining to financial matters. The clerical pool comprised different types of clerks, i.e. clerks of letters, clerks of the judiciary, clerks of the zakāt, clerks of the market, clerks of the awqāf, clerks of Bayt al-Māl, and clerks of the Aflāj. These clerks were either permanent employees who received regular salaries, or worked on a temporary basis, as clerks of the zakāt who receive their fixed assigned share from the zakāt they collected. These usually formed a large group, largely composed from the village people who had a thorough knowledge of the people and their properties and how to collect the zakāt. In addition to these, the Imam had special clerks who collected the zakāt after it had been levied from the rich, and then deposited it in Bayt al-Māl.

Government letters clerks, on the other hand, were found in all government Wilāyát, helping the Wālī in issuing government letters. As for the Imam’s letters and his decrees of appointment of Wālis and Qādis, all those letters which came to us were written under his direct instructions, bearing the following names:

1. Sh. al-Mālik.
4. Sh. Muḥammad al-Khalifí
5. Sh. Muḥammad al-Ṣawwáffí
6. Sh. Maṣūr al-Fārisí
7. Sh. ‘Isá b. Ṣāliḥ al-Ḥārití
Such letters, issued under the instruction of the Imam, usually ended with the phrase: "written by (the hand of...........). The Imam of Muslims certified it to be true with his own hand".

It remains to be explained why the Imam used to ask his advisors to write such letters. There can be two reasons for this. The first is that the Imam wanted indirectly to let them know of the contents of such letters, of course after their consultation. The second reason is that these advisers were learned people who were versed in the art of writing. However, over and above these considerations, the present researcher observes that the Imam's letters can generally be arranged under two subjects: the first are the letters dealing with important matters such as the political letters which were usually written by Sh. al-Salimí, Sh. al-Málikí, Sh. al-Khalífí and the Imam's brother, Sh. Násír for their wording. The other type of the letters was written by anyone present from among those whose names are mentioned above, though a certain hierarchy can be discerned, as for example, Sh. Abú Zayd came first before Sh. Muḥammad al-Khalífí, and Sh. al-Khalífí was before the rest.

As for the clerks of Wális and Qádis, they specialised in writing contracts, applications and complaints between people, nafāqáṭ, and inheritance wills, etc., to the extent that each Wáli and Qádi had at least one clerk or more as needs demanded.

In fact, we lack knowledge of the names of those who formed the clerical pool, due to the fact that there existed no offices set especially for them, through in our close investigation into this matter, we met an old man of over 90 years of age named Ghusn b. Shámis al-Sayfí, who told us that his father, then his brother, had been responsible for the collection of the zakát during Imam Sálim's reign and his successor (29). This man narrated that he had always accompanied his father. We also asked him some further questions concerning the tradition of inheriting the post of clerks, upon which we came to the conclusion that there apparently existed no school which instructed young men in the arts of administration and economics, and that fathers instructed and initiated their sons in the field of his specialisation from early childhood, consequently they gained practical knowledge without the need for theoretical instruction. This process largely explains the
phenomenon of inheriting posts in the field of Afláj, zakát collection, or other fields of administration and practical life.

The Imam used to issue decrees when appointing his officials, in which he clearly specified the duties and responsibilities for the Wálí deputies and other officials. And it is useful that Sh Muḥammad al-Sálimí has preserved us in his Nahḍah, the Imam’s decree on the author’s appointment as Wálí in conjunction with Sh. Sulaymán b. Sanán al-‘Alawi in which he mentioned:

1. The author’s appointment as Wálí on al-Muḍaybí
3. Sh. Faḍil b. Su‘úd al-Sálimí
6. The salaries of his above staff.

The Imam also used to appoint some knowledgeable men to supervise the awqáf, either private or public, i.e. mosques, Bayt al-M ál, the guest houses, the grave-yards, etc. For instance, he assigned to Sh. Khalfán b. Jumayyil al-Siyábí, in his early days the responsibility of supervising the awqáf of the village of Símá’, one of the villages of Izkí and Sh. Násir b. Mus‘úd al-Ma‘marí as the awqáf of ’Ibrá’. Similarly, he appointed Ibráhím b. Muḥammad al-Sayffí to be responsible for the Bayt al-M ál in Nazwá.

It was a necessary pre-requisite for those who assumed these offices to command a good knowledge of religious matters, as well as the knowledge of reading and writing, as a matter of course. Moreover, the clerks of the Wálí and Qádí in addition to the aforementioned knowledge, needed a further qualification, namely good “penmanship”.

c) **Regular Defence Forces**

i. **The Army**

At the beginning, the Ibáḍiyyah created and organized an army, but from the second Imamate, they refused to establish a professional army. Their argument was based on two considerations: (a) the Imam should not be able to use the army against the people; (b) it was the responsibility of the Ummah to defend the community and its religion (30).
These ideas had led to the defeat of Ibadī Imamates by their opponents. In the modern age the Ibadīyyah realized the necessity of organizing the army in order to defend the country. This was clear in the policy of the Ya'āribah Imamate who faced Portuguese colonialism.

Imam Sālim, it should be emphasized, did not build a regular army, but he relied on tribesmen loyal to him, on consideration that everybody is responsible for defending his country and the principles of the Imamate. Therefore the Imam was keen to mobilise his followers, appealing to their religious sentiment and zeal. It might have been more appropriate for the Imam to have built a regular army, especially since he was facing the strong regular army of the Sultan supported and equipped by the British. For his lack of such a regular army, the Imam sought military help from the Imam of Yemen and the Turkish leader there. It is difficult to find a convincing explanation why the Imam did not build his own regular army. The only possible explanation that could be found is that the Imam relied on the tribes who were not used to military discipline and order and did not take the army as a professional career, but fought wars in their traditional way of military organisation. When war was over, every one returned to his homeland and resumed his usual work. But this is not to suggest that the Imam did not have a permanent stand-by force. There are, in fact, some stories which relate that there were some people who spent longer periods of time closely attached to the Imam and called themselves Shurā', and considered themselves as Murābiṭūn in the cause of God (31).

It should be also said that the Imam relied greatly on the followers of Sh. Ḥimyar b. Ṣāfir al-Nabhání, the tamīmah of the B. Ghāfīr, who at some stage undertook to provide some thousand men, should circumstances demand. Similarly, the Imam received help from Sh. ‘Isa al-Ḥārithī and the sons of Sh. Ḥilāl b. Zāhir al-Hinā’ī. As such, the largest army ever which was thus being built for the Imam was the one deployed at al-Watayyah battle in January, 1915, numbering about three thousand men. In comparison, the Imam’s army at the fall of Nazwā, is not precisely known in number, but all indicators suggest that it was large enough, on evidence that the captives from the army of Sd. Sayf b. Ḥamad, the Wālī of Nazwā, numbered a thousand captives (32). This large number of captives from the rival army testifies implicitly that the Imam’s army was much
larger in numbers. On the other hand, his troops at the time when he seized Samá'īl numbered two thousand men (33).

From what has been said above, it can be inferred that the Imam did not have a regular standing army, but he relied on the tribes to provide him with men to defend the country and religion, and they were socially obliged to do so, and were motivated by religious and national considerations. At the same time, there had always been a small force who voluntarily remained around the Imam and called themselves “al-Shuráh” or “al-Murábiyín”, who surrounded the Imam, taking turns in duty for a specific time. This was a voluntary action and not an official duty. The Imam took the advantage of using this stand-by force in emergency situations in patrolling the inlets and outlets leading in and out of the main towns. It helped the Imam until the time came when he was able to raise a sufficiently large army. However, this small force which was attached to the Imam varied in numbers, such that at times it reached about 400 men, but never fell below 100 men at any one time.

ii. Police and Body-guards (‘Askar)

Both the police and bodyguard personnel are called “‘Askar”. However, the duties of each of the two differed in significant respects. The police were responsible for guarding public places, such as the forts, the markets, and the strategic sites, as well as the resolution and settlement of disputes which occurred among the people. The police also helped the Wális and Qádis in implementing the laws, capture of thieves and criminals, execution of punitive penalties, enforcement of reward and punishment, management of prisons, etc. On the other hand, the duties of the body-guard was confined to the Imam’s personal safety, and it was the responsibility of the Wális to see to their rest and comfort, night and day.

There were some other differences between the two institutions. The ‘Askar, on the one hand, was found in every Wiláyah, and the headman of the ‘Askar was known as “‘Aqíd al-‘Askar”. We have seen that the Imam appointed Háshim b. Ráshid as head of ‘Askar in al-Muḍaybf. The ‘Askar, as a regular force, had fixed salaries, as mentioned in the decree of appointment of Sh. Muḥammad al-Sálímí, which clearly specified the
salaries of the ‘Askar. There were $MT. five per month for the ‘Askarí and $MT. 12 for the ‘Aqíd.

The Imam’s body-guards were ‘Abdalláh b. Muḥammad al-Ma‘wafi and his brother, Málīk b. Muḥammad and Sálīm b. Bashayr, the servant of the Imam himself. This latter was the Imam’s bodyguard when he was killed in the village of al-Khaḍrá’. The other body-guard, besides Sálīm b. Bashayr, was a man from al-Khaḍrá’.

From this account, we conclude that there was a police or ‘Askar institution besides the Imam’s personal body-guard, and that they received fixed monthly salaries, and that they were responsible for maintaining the general law and order in public places, patrolling over government buildings and managing the prisons. The size of the ‘Askar force in the towns was usually decided according to the importance of the town and the size of its population, in addition to the extent of loyalty of the inhabitants to the Imam.

3) Education

Imam Sálīm showed special concern for education. The evidence attesting to such a big concern for education was that the Imam built schools and encouraged fathers to send their children to schools. Every village or town had at least one school in which students learnt the basic principles of reading and writing, and in which the learning of the Qur’án formed the basis of the whole learning process.

Quranic schools were a necessary step toward becoming educated. These schools were located in specially built places, though at some times of the year were held simply in an open space under a tree. A typical class contained anything from twenty to fifty students, varying in age from six to fourteen. The teacher (Mu’allim) usually gave each student a verse or set of verses to read for the day and recite in front of the students. There were no formal levels of education in Quranic schools (34).

The education at the village-school level ended when the student had completed learning the Qur’án, and had knowledge of the principles of performing the prayers, and the fasting of Ramaḍán, besides commanding reading and writing skills. Then, those of the students who still had the desire for further learning, for higher education, went to schools in big towns in their respective Wiláyah, such as Nazwà, al-Rustáq, Samá’il, al-Qábil, al-Muṣaybí, etc., where a student received adequate academic education which
qualified him to become a Qāḍī or a teacher in these schools. Teaching was considered the most important profession at that time, in view of the state’s need for such qualifications.

Imam Sālim also had great concern for higher education, to the extent that he facilitated the means for such education for both students and teachers alike, in terms of food, drink and housing. For these purposes, he brought teachers from the villages to the towns, and gave them fixed salaries, while the students were given free accommodation in students’ hostels, in which the basic needs were provided. It needs to be recognized that higher education would naturally require a learned professional class of ‘ulama‘ and Qādis who were well versed in learning, usually in one specialist subject or more, such as nahw (grammar), sarf (conjugation), fiqh (Islamic jurisprudence), etc.

In general, possession of a culturally valued cognitive style (35), “a set of basic, deeply interiorized master-putters” of language and thought on the basis of which other learning was subsequently acquired, distinguished men of learning as a social category from other persons (36).

In general, possession of a culturally valued cognitive style (35), according to Eickelman, “a set of basic, jurisprudence, biographies, interpretation (tafsîr) of the Qur’ân and the Ḥadîth. In addition to these basic subjects, the students were also instructed in arithmetic, astronomy, geography, history and poetry (37).

In sum, it could be said that the Imam laid strong foundations of education in his state, and encouraged students to acquire learning. In his enthusiasm and great efforts to promote education, Imam Sālim was no doubt influenced by the letter of Sh. Abû Muslim Nâṣir b. Sâlim al-Ruwâḥî (d. 1920 in Zanzibar), which he sent to the Imam on 13 Rabî‘ II, 1333, in seventeen pages in which he proposed to Imam Sâlim to encourage education, even if this meant forcing those in charge of government to do so (pp. 9-10). Sh. Abû Muslim went on to explain why he so strongly encouraged education, as he also asked him to set up a publishing house to publish books about Oman, in order to facilitate and propagate knowledge (38).

It seems that this letter found its way to the Imam’s heart and therefore he did encourage education, and brought cartographers to copy books when it was not possible
to print them at that time, as he lacked the necessary financial means, as we have mentioned above.

Because of the Imam’s strong commitment to and encouragement of education, we see in the decade following his death a good number of learned ‘ulamā’ who formed the necessary cadres on whom the education and training of the government personnel of Imam al-Khalīlī ultimately depended. Also the Sultan, Šd. Sa‘īd b. Taymūr (r. 1932-1970) came to depend on these cadres in the judiciary and the administration. It was obvious that each one of the ‘ulamā’ undertook to educate, guide and instruct a number of students and prepare them for the future assumption of such posts (39).

It would be difficult to say with any certainty, how many Qādis got their education and learning under the Qādis of the Imam and in his schools. The following table gives the names of some of the teachers who assumed education posts in the main centres:-

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Wilayah</th>
<th>Mu’allim (Teacher)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>al-‘Awabí</td>
<td>Sh. Nāṣir b. Rāshid b. Sulaymán al-Kharúsí</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bahlà</td>
<td>Sh. Abū Zayd ‘Abdallāh b. Muḥammad al-Riyāmī</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bidbid</td>
<td>Sh. Sālim b. Furaysh b. Sālim al-Shámisī</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>al-Ḥamrá’</td>
<td>Sh. Mājīd b. Khamīs al-‘Abrī</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Sh. al-Murr b. Sālim b. Sa‘īd al-Ḥadramī (d. 1336/1917-8)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Izkī</td>
<td>Sh. Nāṣir b. ‘Āmir b. Sulaymán al-Riyāmī (d. 1336/1917-8)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Sh. Muḥammad b. Sālim b. Zāhir al-Ruqayshī</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Sh. Sa‘īd b. ‘Abdallāh b. Nāṣir al-Mahrūq (d. 1336/1917-8)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>al-Muḍaybí</td>
<td>Sh. Su‘ūd b. Ḥumayd b. Khulayfīn (d. 1373/1953)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nakhal</td>
<td>Sh. Khalfān b. Jumayyl al-Siyābī (d. 1392/1972)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nazwā</td>
<td>Sh. Ḥamīd b. Nāṣir al-Nazwā</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Sh. ‘Āmir b. Khamīs al-Mālikī</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Sh. Sālim b. Sayf b. Sulaymán al- Bū Sa‘īdī (d. 1395?/1975)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Sh. Sulaymán b. Sālim al-Kindī</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Sh. ‘Abdallāh b. ‘Āmir al-‘Azrī</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>al-Rustāq</td>
<td>Sh. Rāshid b. Sayf b. Rāshid al-Lamkī (d. 1333/1915)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Sh. Muḥammad b. Shīkhān al-Sālimī (d. 1346/1928)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Samā’il</td>
<td>Sh. Abū ‘Ubayd Ḥamad b. ‘Ubayd al-Salīmī (d. 1390/1971)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Sh. Muḥsin b. Musallam al-Ramaḍānī</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
In general, it is evident that Imam Sálim laid the foundations for education in Oman during his reign. We see that old schools were rehabilitated by means of financial allocations from the awqáf money earmarked for education, and books were made available for them by means of copying and printing them, as also sometimes students themselves were asked to copy them in return for a small sum of money. The students themselves became active and motivated to copy books. Consequently, we see that places like Nazwà, Bahlâ, Samá’il, al-Rustáq became important centres of education in Oman.

4) The Economic and Financial System

The main themes in this section are to understand the Imam’s sources of revenue, and the manner in which the government financial resources accruing from the revenue were expanded on the government expenditure and as salaries to the government’s personnel. It needs to be noted that at this time, the financial situation in Oman had deteriorated precipitously since the death of Sd. Sa’íd b. Sulţán (d. 1856). This was in spite of the fact that Oman had become at the time “a first-rate Asiatic maritime power” (40). In addition, Imam Sálim’s government had no access to the Omani ports, since these were under the Sultan’s control.

The situation had been compounded by the fact that the Indian Ocean and its surroundings came under the control of the British navy, who extended their Maritime military power and exercised such power over all navigation and vessels passing though it. The British thus became the self-appointed sea masters, patrolling the Indian Ocean waters, policing and investigating all navigation activities, sometimes under the banner of stamping out the slave trade, at others under the pretence of checking arms trafficking. This British subversive role in the Indian Ocean waters naturally weakened the flow of the Omani trade. Moreover, the relative state of stability in Oman which had not been witnessed in the second half of the 19th century due to the many revolts, most importantly those of 1878, 1884 and 1895, was an additional factor which further contributed to the general state of decline.

Another important factor was that trade was mostly held in the hands of non-Omanis (Banián and luwátiyya) (41) who exercised complete control over trade activities
and channels and were very sensitive to international prices, especially when Oman was in a currency crisis in the late 19th century (42) which deeply affected them.

From the above account we want to try to answer the questions: were the Imam’s territories affected by this general weakness of the Omani economic crisis, and were they affected by the fluctuations in the international economic environment and prices?

In answering these questions, Landen has confirmed, and it was corroborated by Speece, that Oman was much affected generally, but that adverse effects were much less felt in the regions of the Interior (43). Speece observes that “to be sure, the Interior was relatively immune from the situation on the coast. Its economy was still based upon subsistence agriculture, which was affected very little by the international economic system” (44).

This statement by Speece contains some truth, if we recognize that as a rule agriculture was the backbone of the Interior Omani economy. However, it is not the whole truth, since Oman in its long history has thrived in wealth and prosperity through its trade across the seas. But, during the period under discussion, outside trade had been hit by recession, if not total collapse. On the other hand, the main source of income for the people of the Interior was agricultural products, which in turn were affected by the imposition of high taxes levied by the Sultan. This last resort represented the card which the Sultan used to pressurise the Imam and his followers.

a) Revenues

Before discussing the sources of income for Bayt al-Mál, for Imam Sálim, it is necessary first to state that Imam Sálim and his followers, at the time of their first meeting in Tanúf, the centre of Sh. Ḥimyar al-Nabhání, had only a sum of $M.T. 300, in the possession of Sh. al-Sálimí, who borrowed it from Matar b. Ḥumúdah al-Ḥajrí, a man from Badiyyah (45).

As we have seen earlier, Sh. Ḥimyar al-Nabhání undertook to provide the Imam’s army with some thousand armed men at his own expense. By the fall of Nazwà and Manaḥ, the Imam took hold of the Bayt al-Mál in both towns, in addition to the properties confiscated, that is those of the Wálí of Nazwà, Sd. Sayf b. Ḥamad, and the properties of the Sultan found in Manaḥ and Nazwà. Among the properties of Bayt al-Mál were the
gardens of Ruwayshah and the properties of Bayt Sulayṭ (46). Thus, once a town or village was surrendered to the Imam, the properties of Bayt al-Mál were surrendered, too (47). The properties of Bayt al-Mál came from the following sources:

i. Waqf (pl. Wuqūfāt or Awqāf)

These included lands, estates and gardens, which were the properties of Bayt al-Mál (48), and were registered to it either through direct personal bequests from charitable individuals, or through purchase for Bayt al-Mál, under which came awqāf like mosques, schools, grave-yards. There were also awqāf concerning road maintenance, Ramaḍān breakfast, and the copy of books. Besides these forms, Eickelman also mentions, “... for one village near Hamra [al-Ḥamrā’], the provision of coffee to every male villager in the guest house at mid-morning” (49).

The Shari‘ah regulations and laws about how to expend the revenues coming from these awqāf had always been clear. Nonetheless, there were some breaches by Imam Sálim, in that he earmarked some of these resources to be expended on the preparations of the army. Mention has already been made in this context of the conflict that arose between Sh. Májíd al-‘Abrí and Sh. al-Sálimí concerning the awqāf of the grave-yards. The conflict arose when Sh. al-Sálimí proposed the sale of these awqāf in order to cover the government expenditures, a proposal rejected and opposed by Sh. Májíd on grounds that it was not permissible to reallocate the revenues of awqāf to projects other than what they had been set to serve.

ii. Zakát

Zakát is the basis of Islamic fiscal policy. It is one of the five Pillars of Islam, the others being belief in one God and that Muḥammad is the prophet of God, prayer, the fast of Ramaḍān, and pilgrimage to Mecca. In each category of wealth, zakát is paid by the people whose holdings exceed a certain minimum called nişāb (50).

The types of property and wealth on which zakát is payable when reaching the Nişāb (certain level) are:-

1. Zakát on animals (camels, cattle, sheep, goats)
2. Zakát on money (paper notes, coin money)
3. Zakát on precious metals (gold, silver, etc.)
4. Zakát on trade
5. Zakát on fruits (dates, peaches, fruits, etc.)
6. Zakát on grains (rice, wheat, barley, etc.)

iii. Taxes

Taxes are different from the zakát with respect to the religious status of the former and also in quantity. Taxes are impositions from the state in return for providing services to the people and the maintenance of public utilities. The quantities of taxes depend on the types and quality of services provided.

Taxes were collected from commercial and estate enterprises, and on trading activities in the markets, on factories, sometimes on roads and also on cafés and restaurants etc. Taxes were estimated between 5% and 10%. However, during the reign of Imam Sálím, taxes were restricted to commercial enterprises, to commodities traded in the markets, whether these be food products, or fabrics or other.

iv. Şadaqát (alms) and Hibát (gifts)

In addition to the aforementioned sources of revenue for Bayt al-Mál, there were also the şadaqát and hibát which were donated by charitable individuals at will and of their own accord, with the intention of helping the State meet its obligations. These individual contributions were usually sums of liquid money or in kind. This form of revenue was conspicuous during the reign of Imam Sálím, as Bayt al-Mál was in chronic deficit in its resources.

It is informative that Sh. Muḥammad al-Sálímí provided us with two examples of donations; the first was that of Sh. Ḥamad b. Saʿíd b. Aḥmad al-Maʿwáli who undertook from his own resources the entire expenses of preparations of the army which attacked Wádí al-Maʿáwil in 1332/1914 (51). The other example of donation was that of Sh. Muḥammad b. Ṭálib b. Muḥammad al-Ḥaráṣí (d. 1335/1917), who in his own capacity undertook the expense of preparing the army which attacked al-Rustáq in 1335/1917 (52). There was, however, another type, exemplified by some charitable individuals who donated sums of money to the Imam. This is understood from Sh. Saʿíd b. Ḥamad al-Ḥárithí’s account that his father Ḥamad b. Sulaymán and his uncle, Muḥammad b. Sulaymán (53) both met Imam Sálím who offered them grapes, and asked them to eat
them, and he told them that, "it was not from Bayt al-Mál, but from the bounty of some
brothers who gave us some Daráhím (54) with which we brought these grapes"(55).

These were the sources of the Bayt al-Mál during the reign of Imam Sálim. It
should be noted that each Wiláyah had its Bayt al-Mál, and that the revenues levied from
all centres, were collected in Nazwà, the capital of the Imamate, from which cumulative
total funds were allocated and expended on the various state departments according to
need. However, sometimes the Imam might find it more appropriate to leave the revenue
of individual Wiláyah under the discretionary dispensation of their respective Wálí, who
also exercised supervision and control over the awqáf. We should also mention that the
financial director in Nazwà, during Imam Sálim’s reign was Sh. Ibráhím b. Muḥammad
al-Sayfí, while Sh. Manṣúr b. Násîr al-Fárisí was director during Imam Muḥammad’s
Imamate.

As for the situation in the Wiláyah, we find that Sh. Abú Zayd al-Riyámí was
given extraordinary powers in the dispensation of Bayt al-Mál moneys; Sh. Muḥammad
al-Ruqayshí, on the other hand, was entrusted with supervising the Bayt al-Mál in Izkí on
grounds of his being the Wálí, though he was not given permission to dispense with the
Bayt al-Mál resources and money without the Imam’s prior approval. In al-Muđaybí, it
was Sh. Muḥammad b. Saʿíd al-Jábrí who was in charge of the zakát collection, but the
awqáf remained in the hands of the Wálí himself, who in his capacity paid the salaries of
his staff from this revenue. With regard to the rest of the Wiláyah, the Imam used to
appoint one of his staff for collection of the zakát and supervision over the awqáf
personnel in the village and towns. This did not apply to the Wiláyah which were
controlled by their leader, i.e. al-Ḥamrá’, al-Qábil, al-Rustáq, Jabal al-Akhðar and Bahlá
(56).

It has to be acknowledged that, circumscribed by our present state of knowledge,
there are a number of questions about the revenues of the Bayt al-Mál which still cannot
be fully answered. Nothing is known, for example, about how much was the Bayt al-Mál
share from the zakát or from the awqáf, or what was the share of each Wiláyah from this
revenue, or whether the expenditures actually exceeded revenues, etc. We address the
answers to these and similar questions in the following sections.
b) **Expenditures**

Routinely, the *Bayt al-Mál* resources were gathered in the capital of the Imamate, or in the main centres of the Wiláyah, in order to enable the Imam or his deputy to supervise these revenues. These revenues were set in accordance with the needs of the state. Generally, the money of the *Bayt al-Mál* was spent by the Imam or his representative on public purposes, i.e. defence, *jihád*, and promoting educational and religious institutions. This was in addition to other social services, such as those for orphans, the poor, the elderly, students, and the staff of the state.

However, we lack knowledge about the actual revenue available to *Bayt al-Mál*, which is necessary for an understanding of the nature and composition of the expenditures, in spite of the fact that Sh. Muḥammad al-Sālimí mentions that military expenditures spent on the preparations of the army which captured Samá‘îl, amounted to $MT. 50,000 and 50,000 rounds of ammunition (57). This, of course, did not include the amounts of money paid by Sh. Ḫimyar al-Nabáhání and Sh. ‘Iṣá al-Ḥaríthí to their own recruits. It should be pointed out that this sum of money appears too large for the Imamate’s financial position at the time, and is obviously indicative that there had been open to the Imamate wider options and alternative means of financial resources, especially of *Bayt al-Mál* in Nazwá where ammunition was also collected. All these resources were collected within the span of only two months from the time of the Imam was elected.

It is possible here to include in *Bayt al-Mál* resources the properties which were been confiscated by the Imam, which included the properties of each of:-

4. Sh. Ráshíd b. ‘Uzayyiz al-Khúṣaybí (d. 1347/1928), the Sultan’s Qáḍí
5. Sh. Sulaymán b. ‘Abdalláh al-Mahríqí, Minister to Sh. Náṣir b. Ḥumayd al-Gháfirí

In fact, we lack knowledge about the exact amount of the Imam’s revenue from the *zakát* and *awqáf*, due to the absence of records about this revenue. However, if we shed light on the Sultan’s revenue from some of the Wiláyah in the year 1906-1907, now
under the Imam, we find that the revenue of these Wiláyát from the zakát and awqáf was small. The following table illustrates this according to Lorimer’s accounts (58):

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Distract</th>
<th>Zakát</th>
<th>Annual value from date-groves and cultivated land</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bidbid</td>
<td>Nil</td>
<td>2, 500</td>
<td>2, 500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Izkí</td>
<td>1, 600</td>
<td>Nil</td>
<td>1, 600</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manah</td>
<td>0, 400</td>
<td>Nil</td>
<td>0, 400</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nakhal</td>
<td>1, 200</td>
<td>1, 000</td>
<td>2, 200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nazwà</td>
<td>3, 000</td>
<td>2, 000</td>
<td>5, 000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Samá’íl</td>
<td>2, 400</td>
<td>2, 000</td>
<td>4, 400</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>8, 600</strong></td>
<td><strong>7, 500</strong></td>
<td><strong>16, 100</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The table shows that Samá’íl and Nazwà were the leading towns which had the capacity to feed Bayt al-Mál with a stable revenue.

It is by no means coincidental that the expenditures of the Imamate greatly exceeded its revenue, and the Imam frequently was forced to borrow in order to cover the costs of his administration. In one instance he delegated Sh. Muḥammad b. Naṣīr al-Kharūṣī to seek a loan from one of the wealthy men, in order to balance his financial deficit (59).

Traditionally, the Imam used to have employees who aided him in the administration of the various government departments. These naturally needed fixed salaries to be paid to them, in addition to the expenditures on the preparations of the army, the salaries paid to the police and the guards and the expenditures on development reforms and rehabilitation programmes. However, the Imam and some of his prominent advisors like Sh. al-Málikí, Sh. Abú Zayd al-Riyámí and Sh. al-Ruqayshí did not have fixed salaries, but were given from Bayt al-Mál amounts sufficient to meet their essential needs and their families for one day only. This also applied to the Imam’s visitors and students, as well as to each of the following Shaykhs who also did not have fixed salaries: Sh. Ḥimyar, Sh. ‘Isā, Sh. Muḥanna al-‘Afrí, Sh. Naṣīr al-Gháfirí and Sd. Aḥmad b. Ibráhím. These did not have salaries because the Imam did not interfere with the affairs of
Bayt al-Mál under their supervision, and for that matter they were responsible for the spending on their followers in time of war.

We have already mentioned that the Imam charged Sh. Abú Zayd to supervise the Bayt al-Mál in Bahlâ. Sh. Abú Zayd lived frugally most of his life, and the cost of half a Rāf [Pound] of meat from Bayt al-Mál sufficed for the needs of his household (60). As for the rest of the personnel of the Imamate, i.e. the Wālis, Qādis, ‘Askarī and clerks were given fixed salaries, which did not exceed $MT. 50 a month. The following table shows the salaries given to some of the employees:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No</th>
<th>Position</th>
<th>Salary</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Wālīf</td>
<td>Between $MT. 30 to 50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Qādīf</td>
<td>Between $MT. 30 to 50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Clerk</td>
<td>$MT. 15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Mu‘allim (teacher)</td>
<td>$MT. 30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>‘Aqīd al-‘Askar</td>
<td>$MT. 12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>‘Askarī</td>
<td>Between $MT. 5 to 6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

There were also the zakāt collectors, the supervisory staff over the awqāf, the markets and the Aflāj, who received their pay as a percentage, which ranged between 2.5% and 10%, of the amounts they collected from their respective missions.

In hindsight, it should be mentioned that at that time, the cost of living was generally low, and that the salaries given, in spite of the fact that they were relatively low, were nonetheless sufficient to meet the living expenses of an employee and his family. And as for the currency, the dollar ($MT) was extremely scarce, and rarely found in circulation; possibly, a person may have possessed only one dollar. Sh. Sa‘īd al-Ḥārithī cited as an example that Sa‘īd b. Jum‘ah al-Masri was appointed guard of one of the towers in al-Muḍayrib (61) in return for a payment of only $MT. one per month, and this amount was sufficient to support him and his brothers (62). Another example, mentioned by Sh. Sayf b. Sa‘īd al-Ma‘waf was that Imam Sālim earmarked to Sd. Su‘ūd b. Ḥamad al-Bū Sa‘īdī a monthly salary of $MT.50. Sd. Su‘ūd was Wālī of Samā‘il, and one day he went to meet the Imam in al-‘Awābī and asked him to reduce his salary to $MT. 30, on grounds that $MT. 30 was sufficient to support him and his family, and therefore, the excess was unnecessary. The Imam refused at first to curtail the salary, but when
convinced of the actual needs of the Wáli' and his family, approved of the cut in the Wáli' s salary (63). The tenor of this story is that Sd. Su'ád no doubt felt that he received a salary much bigger than what he actually spent, and as a result preferred to cut down on his salary to come in step with the rest. Moreover, he was well aware of the difficulties of Bayt al-Mál and its chronic deficits. Similar actions can also be found elsewhere, for example, as when Imam Muhammad al-Khalíl sold all his properties in Samá'il for the sake of Bayt al-Mál and in order to meet part of the government expenditures.

Thus, in spite of the apparent deficit in Bayt al-Mál which the Imam faced, he was able to go ahead with his reform programme and could find the resources to expend on the development projects, the maintenance of fortresses and towers, the rehabilitation of al-Aflaj and the properties of Bayt al-Mál.

In fact, very little is known about the Imam’s efforts in the areas of development and reconstruction and what we know, comes to us from the account of Sh. Muhammad al-Sálimí, who provides us with a list of the projects which were implemented by Sh. Abú Zayd, who for thirty years was Wáli' of Bahlà, on behalf of both Imam Sálim and his successor. Among his deeds, were his efforts to build defensive bulwarks to defend Bahlà, as he rebuilt the wall of Bahlà and fortress of Jabrín, spending some $MT. 70,000 on the rebuilding of the wall. He also spent some $MT. 140,000 on the renovation of al-Mahyúl branch of the Falaj al-Juz’ayn, and about thirty wells were dug as a security measure to provide for time of drought. Not only that, but he also paid considerable attention to making sure that Bayt al-Mál and awqáf property were well invested. Furthermore, he organized the plantation of some 7000 date-palms to add to Bayt al-Mál property, of which 500 were of the valuable Khaláṣ variety (64).

From the above account, it is evident that the resources of Bayt al-Mál under Imam Sálim were meagre in relation to the large government expenditures. This state of stringency forced the Imam frequently to adopt austerity measures for himself personally, as well as for his prominent advisors. In addition to such measures, he also from time to time resorted to borrowing from merchants and wealthier individuals. It needs to be emphasized that the army and military spending took the major portion of the government
budget, in view of the many wars which the Imam launched and which continued throughout the seven years of his reign.

From what we have said in this chapter, it can be seen that the Imam's institutional set-up consisted of a political system composed of the Imam himself, a consultative council and the Wālis of the Wilāyah. A civil system existed for education, military affairs and finance, in addition to a judicial system. Imam Sālim followed, in his political system, the traditional model based on the early Islamic State dictated by the society's needs and the circumstantial constraints of the period. He did not attempt to invent a new system for his administration. In the first six years of his rule, he concentrated his efforts on promoting a rule based on the Islamic Shūrā systems, whereas the last year of his reign was characterized by increasing authoritarianism and concentration of powers in his hands. He gave a great deal of his concern and efforts to the promotion of education and economic affairs, as he encouraged education and restored many of Bayt al-Māl properties and appointed supervisors for them. However, he was faced by many difficult problems, notably the general weakness of the economy as a consequence of his continued wars with the Sultan and the tribes throughout his reign, which lasted for seven years.
Endnotes

(1) (J. O.) I/P&S/10/426 p. 12.
(2) al-Sālīmī, M. A. op.cit. p.199.
(3) al-Sālīmī, M. A. op.cit. p. 231.
(4) Interview with Sh. Ḥumūd b. 'Abdallāh al-Rāshidī, and in Saʿīd al-Ḥārithī, al-Lu'lu'. p. 42.
(5) Saʿīd al-Ḥārithī, al-Lu'lu', p. 34.
(6) For further information about Sh. al-Sālīmī, his books and his students, see al-Sālīmī, M.A. op.cit. pp. 99ff.
(7) For further information about Sh. al-Mālikī, his books and his students, see al-Sālīmī, M.A. op.cit. pp. 398ff.
(8) For further information about Sh. Abū Zayd al-Riyāmī, his books and his students, see al-Sālīmī, M.A. op.cit. pp. 420ff.
(9) For further information about Sh. Muḥammad al-Ruqayshī, his books and his students, see al-Khūṣayfī, Muḥammad b. Ṣāḥib, Shaqūqā al-Nu'mān, vol. iii pp. 254ff.
(10) For further information about Sh. Naṣīr b. Ṣāḥib al-Khāruṣī and his students, see al-Sālīmī, M.A. op.cit. p. 414.
(11) For further information about Imam Muḥammad al-Khaṣfī, and his students, see al-Sālīmī, M.A. op.cit. pp. 323ff; ARAMCO, op.cit. pp. 105-110.
(12) For further information about Sh. Naṣīr al-Riyāmī, see al-Sālīmī, M.A. op.cit. pp. 252f.
(13) For further information about Sh. Sulaymān b. Muḥammad al-Kindī and his books, see al-Sālīmī, M.A. op.cit. pp. 254f.
(14) For further information about Sd. Suʿūd al-Bū Saʿīdī, see al-Sālīmī, M.A. op.cit. pp. 254.
(15) For further information about Sh. 'Abdallāh al-'Azrī, see al-Sālīmī, M.A. op.cit. pp. 411ff.
(16) For further information about Sh. Ḥimyar al-Riyāmī, see al-Sālīmī, M.A. op.cit. pp. 92ff.
(17) For further information about Sh. 'Īsā b. Śāliḥ al-Ḥārithī, and his books, see al-Sālīmī, M.A. op.cit. pp. 78ff; ARAMCO, op.cit. pp. 116ff.
(18) For further information about the sons of Sh. Ḥilāl, see al-Sālīmī, M.A. op.cit. pp. 96ff.
(19) For further information about Sh. Muḥannā al-ʿAbrī, see al-Sālīmī, M.A. op.cit. pp. 375ff.
(20) For further information about Sh. Sayf al-Masḵīrī, see al-Sālīmī, M.A. op.cit. p. 404.
(21) See the Imam’s letter to the PAM dated on 4th Jumādā II, 1333/20th April, 1915 in (J.O.) R15/6/45.
(22) al-Sālīmī, M.A. op.cit. p. 219, p. 222 and p. 290.
(23) al-Sālīmī, M.A. op.cit. p. 267.
(24) al-Sālīmī, M.A. op.cit. pp. 267f.
(25) There are about 30 villages belonging to Izkī, i.e. Ṣādnī, Qaryatayn, Ṣāqrūt, Ṣāymā', Ṣāfī... etc.
(26) See Sh. al-Ruqayshī’s appointment decree in al-Sālīmī, M.A. op.cit. p. 267.
(31) Sh. Sayf b. Saʿīd al-Maʿwīfī states in his papers that Sh. Ḥamād b. Saʿīd b. Ḥamād al-Maʿwīfī was from the Murabītūn of Nazwā.
(32) al-Sālīmī, M.A. op.cit. p. 179.
(38) Sh. Abū Muslim was one of the Omani ‘ulāma’ who lived in Zanzibar, and wrote many books, and he was the founder of “al-Najāḥ” weekly in Zanzibar.
(39) For examples of these students include:
1. Students instructed and graduated at the hands of Sh. al-Mālikī:
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2. Students instructed and graduated at the hands of Sh. Mājid al-‘Abbī
   a) Sh. al-Mufīt Ibrāhīm b. Sa‘īd b. Muḥsin al-‘Abbī (d. 1395/1975)
   b) Sh. al-Qāḍī Sa‘īd b. Šāliḥ b. Rāshid al-‘Abbī (d. 1340/1922)
   c) Sh. al-Qāḍī Muḥammad b. Sālim b. Badr al-‘Abbī
d) Sh. al-Qāḍī Thābit b. Surūr b. ʿĀhmad al-Ghaffarī

3. Students instructed and graduated at the hands of Sh. Nāṣir al-Kharūsī:
   a) Sh. al-Qāḍī Khalfān b. ‘Uthmān b. Khāmis al-Kharūsī
   b) Sh. al-Qāḍī ‘Abdallāh b. Muḥammad b. ‘Alī al-Kharūsī
   c) Sh. al-Qāḍī Sayf b. Ḥamād al-Kharūsī
   d) Sh. al-Qāḍī Sulaymān b. Nāṣir al-Dhuḥli

(40) Landen, Oman, p. 114.
(41) For further information about Baniān and their activity in Muscat, see Calvin, Sayyid, pp. 99-139; Wellsted, Travels in Oman, vol. i pp. 18-21.
(43) Landen, op. cit., p. 130.
(45) al-Sālimī, M.A. op. cit., p. 172.
(46) al-Sālimī, M.A. op. cit., pp. 177f.
(49) Eickelman, “From Theocracy to Monarchy”. p. 8.
(51) al-Sālimī, M.A. op. cit., p. 222.
(52) al-Sālimī, M.A. op. cit., p. 247.
(53) Sh. Muḥammad b. Sulaymān al-Hārīthī was killed in the Battle of al-Waṣayyah in 1333/1915, while his brother Ḥmād b. Sulaymān died in 1389/1969.
(54) Dirham(pl. Darāhīm) is a traditional unit of currency in Arabia, the Arabic word being derived from the ancient Greek coin, drachma. See Anthony, op. cit., p. 30.
(56) During an interview with Sh. Ghuṣn b. Shāmis al-Sayfī (over 90 years of age), in Nazwa, on 26th May, 1994, he told the present writer that both his father Shāmis and his brother were among the staff responsible for the collection of the zakāt from the Wilāyāts during the reigns of both Imam Sālim and his successor Imam Muḥammad.
(57) al-Sālimī, M.A. op. cit., pp. 195.
(60) al-Sālimī, M.A. op. cit., p. 422.
(61) For further detail about al-Muḍayrib, see Lorimer, op. cit., vol. 8 p. 1764; H.A. p. 276.
(63) The papers of Sh. Sayf b. Sa‘īd al-Mawāli, pp. 7f.
(64) al-Sālimī, M.A. op. cit., p. 422.
CHAPTER VIII


The aim of this chapter is to explore the mysterious cause which led to the assassination of Imam Sālim, and the turbulent political situation which followed and which eventually led to a permanent conciliation between the sultanate and Imamate. This peace settlement lasted for thirty four years. The chapter also discusses the effects of the conciliation on the Omanis in terms of peace, security, and economic and social stability.

1) The Death of the Imam

Before going through the events of the Imam’s death, it is necessary first to take a look at the political situation inside Oman on the eve of his death.

Since the beginning of 1338/1920, signs of weakness on the Imam’s political authority were already apparent. His grip of power over the tribes was weakening, and those tribes further away from the centre of the Imam’s political power, became increasingly vocal in voicing their discontent, their individual independence and indifference to the Imam’s authority. This was partly due to the fact that the Imam at this time was under the influence and tainted advice of the hard-line Islamic clergy (mutáwi‘ah) after having lost the best of his former politically shrewd advisors who had had a remarkable influence on his political and administrative successes. Among these invaluable advisors was Sd. Su‘úd b. Ḥamad al-Bú Sa‘ídî whom the Imam lost early in 1337. He also lost Sh. al-Qâdí Sulaymán b. Muḥammad al-Kindî, the Qâdí of Nazwá who died on the night of 14th Ṣafar 1337/16th November 1918, as a result of a cholera outbreak which swept through Oman in that year (1), claimed over 20,000 Omanis, hit the inland Provinces particularly hard, and prompted Imam Sālim to designate a special day of prayer (2). In the same year, the Imam also lost yet another very important personality with the death of Sh. ‘Alî b. Ṣāliḥ al-Ḥārithî, brother of Sh. ‘Isà, on Sha’bán,
1337/May 1919. Sh. 'Alí was indeed the tough military and militant hand of Sh. 'Isá and a strong supporter of the Imam, as we have seen his role in the battle of al-Waṭayyah (3).

The most important personality whom Imam Sálím lost was Sh. ʿĀmir b. Khamís al-Málikí, who resigned his position as Qáḍí of the Imam and general managing director for the Imamate. The reasons for his resignation were the accusations directed against him by some of the Muáwi'ah close to the Imam and by some students. These accusations alleged corruption in the use of money from Bayt al-Mál directed by Sh. al-Málikí (4). It was apparent that the Imam’s power weakened greatly after the resignation of Sh. al-Málikí. The major trouble for the Imam was the loss of his staunchest supporter, Sh. ʿJimyar b. Náṣir al-Nabháni, the tamímah of the B. Gháfir and the most powerful chieftain of the B. Riyám, who died on Friday 7th Jumádá II, 1338/27th February 1920 (5). Wingate, the PAM, described him by saying: “Hamyar [Jimyar] had been the sword arm while Sh. ʿIsá had been the brains of the Omani rule” (6).

Yet another important factor behind the weakening of the Imam’s position was the general decline of the economy as a result of the imposition by Sultan Sd. Taymúr, of exorbitant taxes on the agricultural produce of the Interior Provinces, especially after the Imam did not permit Sh Saʿíd b. Náṣir al-Kindí and Sh. ʿIsá to ratify, in February 1920, the terms which had been put for negotiation on 15th September, 1919.

Another factor was the Imam’s insistence on retaining the confiscated gardens and estates and his refusal to hand these properties back to their owners, contrary to the opinion of most of the tribal leaders, who saw that the return of these properties to their owners would gain support for the Imamate. The Imam’s refusal, therefore, caused a feeling of discontent among the important leaders of the tribes. Also the conduct of the Imam’s brother created problems with the enemies of the Imamate. Therefore, by the middle of 1338/1920, the Imam’s policy became a confidential affair between him, his brother, Sh. Náṣir and a few of the Muáwi’ah. This attitude on the part of the Imam prejudiced the leaders of the tribes, whose sentiments varied between spite, denunciation and silence. Wingate says, commenting on these affairs: “He [the Imam] and his brother in whose hands all power was, began to lose grounds and a definite reaction against the puritanical fanaticism of the Imam and exactions of his brother set in” (7).
The position of the tribes in relation to the Imamate became apparent when the Imam called them for a meeting to discuss the issue of punishment of Sd. Ahmad b. Ibrahim, the ruler of al-Hazim. This incident came as a result of the Imam’s acquiescence to his brother’s request. The story was that the Imam’s brother, Sh. Nasir, who was Wali of al-Rustaq, instigated a conflict with Sd. Ahmad and with the Shaykhs of the B. Ghafir, who supported Sd. Ahmad. The tribes declined the Imam’s call (8), which impelled the Imam to force their compliance (9). This brought the Imam strong criticism from Sh. Majid b. Khamis al-‘Abrf. However, the tribes which agreed to go to war, either due to consent or coercion, were not free from treason. This explains why those in siege of Sd. Ahmad and his followers let the besieged out of the fort more than once, to obtain provisions of food and water from the neighbouring towns (10). Also the B. Harras returned home after having counselled with Sd. Ahmad and adopted his point of view.

It is more likely that the B. Harras were convinced of the credibility of Sd. Ahmad, and that Sh. Nasir was creating conditions of tension in order to get rid of Sd. Ahmad and control over al-Hazim. There is also further evidence concerning Sh. Nasir, such that the Imam al-Khalili immediately dismissed him from al-Rustaq as Wali because the tribes were discontented and dissatisfied with his attitude.

In the summer of 1338/1920, the Sultan decided to impose taxes on the produce of the provinces under the control of the Imam. The Sultan raised the new taxes to 25% on all dates and 50% on pomegranates, instead of the customary 5% (11). These new taxes were imposed by force, and a strong feeling of rage and discontent was thus created, especially since the Sultan explained that the reason for his decision to impose and increase these taxes was the Imam’s refusal to give back the confiscated gardens to their owners. This annoyed Sh. ‘Isa, which led him to write his letter to the PAM on 29th July, 1920 inquiring about the British government’s position with regard to this issue. It was a surprise to Sh. ‘Isa when he received the answer of the PAM informing him of his government’s support of the Sultan, and that this position will not be altered unless the confiscated properties are handed back to their owners (12).
This clear message deeply affected Sh. ‘Isà. The general feeling of anger and discontent towards the Imam increased with his insistence on retaining the confiscated gardens in order to appease those of his followers who were economically deprived. The PAM commented on this situation when he said that “this letter dispelled any remaining doubts the Omanis may have had, realising the attitude of the Imam and of his brother” (13).

Our objective in giving the above introduction is to understand the situation surrounding the internal affairs inside Oman which immediately preceded the Imam’s assassination. This state of affairs can best be described as a rise in the influence of the Sultan and a decline in the power of the Imam. The Imam, during this stage, spent the two months of Sha‘bán and Ramaḍán, 1338, in al-Rustáq in siege of al-Ḥazím, as already mentioned. The siege of al-Ḥazím ended in a conciliation between the Imam and Sd. Aḥmad and between the Imam and the Gháfír tribe. The supporters of Sd. Ahmad were under the leadership of Sh. Nāṣir b. Rāshid al-Gháfír. After that, the Imam returned to his capital, Nazwā, where he spent the month of Shawwāl.

At the beginning of Dhú al-Qi‘dah, 1338, the Imam decided to go to al-Mudaybí in order to hold talks with the Āl Wahífah who refused to abide by a judgement he had made against them in a case won for al-‘Abriyyín (14). Therefore, after having appointed Sh. ‘Abdalláh b. ‘Āmir al-‘Azrí as his deputy, the Imam departed towards al-Mudaybí to discuss the matter with the Āl Wahífah. On his way, the Imam passed through Izkí, then spent the night in the wilderness, near the village of al-Khaṣra’ Banú Difá’ (15), on the night of Wednesday 5th Dhú al-Qi‘dah, 1338/ 21st July 1920. At their camp site, the Imam’s party was joined by a bedouin man called Abú Bisrah Sultayn Wald al-Tawbál al-Fażárí al-Wahídá. The Beduí claimed that he was looking for a stray camel he had lost. Then, after five hours, and just before midnight on the that night, Abú Bisrah secretly crept, unnoticed by the guards, towards the Imam, who was then asleep on his back and covered with a white garb, shot him with a gun and fled under cover of the night. The shot hit the Imam on the mouth. He was covered in blood and his cohorts bewailed the calamity, they could not then believe that the aim of the man who had joined them on the eve of that night was to kill the Imam (16). The Imam was dead. His party stayed in the
place until the morning, and decided to bury him in the spot where he was killed. To this
day, his grave can still be seen at the foot of a mountain to the east of Khaḍrà’ Banú
Difá’.

This is the story of the death of Imam Sálim b. Ráshid al-Kharūṣí (17). However,
an important question remains to be asked about the reasons and motives which led Abú
Bisrah to murder the Imam: whether he had a personal grievance against the Imam, or he
was merely an agent pushed to commit the assassination on behalf of another party. It
would be instructive to shed light on these reasons and motives from the diverse stories
about this subject, bearing in mind that Abú Bisrah himself was killed secretly without a
trial, or knowing the reasons which led him to kill the Imam.

In the conflicting stories about the assassination of the Imam, the reasons behind
the killing are generally shrouded with obscurity and mystery. One of the stories, given
by Sh. Muhanná b. Khalfán al-Kharūṣí, maintains that Abú Bisrah was accused of theft
of a camel, and that he was wanted to appear before court for justice (18). Sh.
Muḥammad al-Sálimí, on his part, mentions this story, but does not give the accusation
against Abú Bisrah (19). Both Sh. Muhanná al-Kharūṣí and Sh. Muḥammad al-Sálimí
confirmed that Abú Bisrah was pushed by his people to kill the Imam (20). Another story
is given in the British sources, which claim that the tribes were involved in the killing of
the Imam. These British sources depend on many accounts and state that:

"the real reason of his [Imam's] death, which was confirmed from many sources, was that the
tribes were practically in open revolt against his rule and that of his brother, which was a
combination of utter religious combined with shameless selfishness and oppression and a complete
disregard of politics or government, all of which in addition to their inherent disadvantages were
resulting in all sorts of trying restrictions from the Sultan's government, which they were
powerless to resist, culminating in the penal zakát" (21).

There is some suspicion attached to the Omani sources which reported that this
man was wanted for justice, in that case, it would have been well known to all people that
he disobeyed the Imam. The immediate question which could be raised is: did not the
Imam's guards and his companions know about the man and his animosity to the Imam,
especially since one of the Imam's guards was a man from the village of Khaḍrà’ Banú
Difá’, the village in which the Imam was murdered? Second, the murderer was not a stranger to this area, and he was obviously well acquainted with the Imam’s movements, and even his camp. This is because the village people knew about the coming of the Imam through their area, such that when the Imam’s companions heard the shot, they thought it was a shot fired by the village people as a welcome signal to the Imam, as was the common custom in receiving high-ranking guests (22). All this leads to the conclusion that the Imam’s guards could have connived with Abú Bisrah. A British source refers to such a possible connivance in that “the immediate cause of his murder was stated to have been an insult to one of his guards” (23). Another account was given by Sd. Muḥammad b. Aḥmad b. Su‘úd al-Bú Sa‘íf. It states that the two guards on duty suspected Abú Bisrah’s story and motive and therefore needed to be more cautious of him, but that in fact they fell asleep (24). However conflicting the accounts about the Imam’s murder may be, both those which maintained that the murderer was personally motivated and those who suggest he acted out of incitement from his tribe, exploit the state of generalised discontent which was prevalent among the tribes against the attitude of the Imam and his close circle.

The implication of the other tribes in the murder of the Imam is arbitrary and not supported by evidence. The tribe to which Abú Bisrah belonged refused to accept the rules issued by the Imam against them, so it was reasonable to suspect that they influenced the man and encouraged him to kill the Imam. The main purpose of the Imam’s visit to their area was indeed to put an end to their disobedience, either by persuasion or coercion. As for the claim that all the tribes were implicated in the murder on the grounds that they were discontented with the Imam’s attitude, it is unlikely that they would have influenced the murderer. This is not simply because he was of another tribe, but, more significantly, because they were seen to adopt a quite different strategy of protest. These tribes expressed their anger and discontent by silence and by civil disobedience, if we can so describe it. For example, Sh.‘Isà refused very firmly to accept anything from the confiscated properties, and stood firm, even to the extent of disputing the whole issue of confiscations (25). However, he was careful not to put himself at risk. For that reason, Sh. ‘Āmir al-Málikí answered him in a reply essay entitled “Gḥdýat al-
And in more than one instance, we find that he did not participate in the Imam’s wars against Sd. Ḍhāmād b. Ibrāhīm, since he saw it as being better and more helpful for the Imam to leave Sd. Ḍhāmād as ruler of al-Rustāq, and therefore he did not take part in the war.

As for the tribe of the murderer, Āl Wahībah, we cannot rule out its involvement in the murder act, through in an indirect way, for a number of reasons mentioned earlier. Another reason which can be added these already mentioned, is that one of the Shaykhs of this tribe, named Sh. Ḥamad b. Sultān b. Sa‘īd al-Wahībf (26), had been wanted by the Imam for justice, because he was accused of having killed a man from B. Ḥarrās tribe in the village of Farq, one of the villages of Nazwà, and had fled to Muscat where he was given refuge and protection. That was in Ramādān 1333/ July-August 1915. Sh. Ḥamad afterwards took al-Sīḥ as his permanent abode for fear of punishment, which according to the Shari‘ah, is the death penalty (27). It is therefore likely that Sh. Ḥamad played a covert role in the Imam’s murder in order to get rid of him, and hence incited one of his tribesmen to carry out the murder act.

These, therefore, were the causes which led to the loss of the Imam’s life. It is more probable that the murder of the Imam was an exclusively Omani affair (involving the Imam’s supporters) either because of personal prejudices and jealousies, or as a consequence of the general suffering and hardship which the Omanis were experiencing as a result of the Imam’s rigidity and his refusal to accept peace and conciliation (28). Qāsim attributes the causes to the Imam himself and his brother, Sh. Nāṣir, both of whom represented, in Qāsim’s view “the extreme in authoritarianism and indifference to the welfare and interests of the general public” (29).

It is important to note here that the supporters of the Imamate did not direct any accusation either against the Sultan or to the British, with regard to the murder of the Imam. From this it can be understood that the leaders of Oman and its ‘ulamā’ were of the view that the reasons and motivation behind the Imam’s murder did not come from outside. For them, the murder act was an exclusively Omani affair. On the other hand, the murder act conspicuously raised the status of the Sultan in the eyes of the Omanis. With this new
momentum, they pressed the new Imam to speed up the negotiation process and to reach a reconciliation with the Sultan.

The measure which the new Imam Sh. Muhammad al-Khalīfī took in order to bring the murderer to justice was the passing of the death penalty on him. In order to ensure that the offender was brought to justice, the new Imam also imprisoned the Shaykhs of Al Wahibah, the tribe to which the murderer belonged, in order to force them to hand over the offender for execution. However, the imprisonment of the Shaykhs did not lead to a positive result. As a result, the Imam took another decision, this time in terms of reward, and declared a huge bounty for whoever brought the murderer to justice, dead or alive.

At any rate, a year from the death of Imam Sālim, a man from al-Janabah tribe called Maktūm b. Hamūsh al-Junaybf, was able to kill the murderer, Abū Bisrah (30) in the neighbourhood of ‘Ibrī in the Province of al-Dhāhirah (31). Thus, Abū Bisrah al-Fazārī was dead and with him too died the secrets surrounding his true motivations for the murder of the Imam. This does not imply that we have doubts about the murderer. Our doubts focus on the true causes and motivation which underlay the decision for the murder action.

The situation after the Imam’s assassination was indeed very confused, in that the supporters of the Imam received the news of the murder with strong detestation and sadness. Others, however, were happy with the news, and soon declared their allegiance to the Sultan. Sh. ‘Isā b. Sāliḥ captured this confused state of affairs and general mood in his letter which he dispatched to the PAM on 16th Dhū al-Qi‘dah 1338 in which he said, after having informed him of the general situation in Oman, and the new Imam, that “then the affairs were tired and thanks God that the tribes returned to their former conditions after they were about to make bloodshed and rob properties, and the grace and glory is for God” ((32).

British sources reported that a great number of the Shaykhs of the tribes and of the main towns declared their allegiance to the Sultan, and that the government of the Sultan welcomed this support, and issued a general amnesty for these Shaykhs and others who wished to submit to the Sultan’s authority. Not only that, but the Sultan also sent
delegations headed by the Qāḍī of Muscat, Sh. Rásḥid b. ʿUzayyīz al-Khuṣaybī, to Samáʿil to hold talks with the Shaykhs of the Wādī Samáʿil on the issue (33).

It can also be understood from Sh. Muḥammad al-Sālimī’s account that the Sultan himself was personally involved in these communications with the tribes, asking for their support and submission, and warning against the consequences if they refused to support him and opted for a new Imam (34).

Unfortunately, however, we have not a single piece of evidence available to us about the names of these Shaykhs, either those who wrote to the Sultan, or those whom the Sultan approached or wrote to. However, it can be understood from the context of the account, that the Shaykhs denoted by the text were those of Wādī Samáʿil. The British sources, nonetheless, mentioned that the Wālī of al-ʿAwābī fled from his position, and also Sd. Aḥmad b. Ibrāhīm prepared an expedition on al-Rustāq, which soon fell into his hands (35).

A week later after the Imam’s assassination, the ‘ulamāʾ and the leaders of tribes gathered to elect a new Imam. They elected the learned man, Sh. Muḥammad b. ʿAbdallāh al-Khalīfī, the tamīmah of the B. Ruwāḥah, as Imam. The difficult mission entrusted to him at these critical times included the re-capture of al-Rustāq and the reaching of a conciliation agreement for peace with the Sultan on grounds that the Imam was actively rallying the tribal Shaykhs to his support and declaring a general amnesty.

Two days after his election as Imam, Muḥammad al-Khalīfī travelled to Samáʿil which was the object of both parties, the Sultan and the Imam. But the Imam succeeded in reaching it 24 hours before the Sultan’s marching force, and the tribes naturally followed the Imam (36).

Imam Sālim’s death, in fact, paved the way for a reconciliation between the Imamate and the Sultanate. The immediate outcome was the signing of the Treaty of al-Sīb in September, 1920 between Imam Muḥammad al-Khalīfī and Sultan Sd. Taỳmūr. The future implication of the Treaty is that it laid the foundation for the future co-existence between the Imamate and the Sultanate based on peace, which brought general peace and stability to Oman for over 34 years, until the death of Imam al-Khalīfī in May, 1954. Then in December, 1954, the Sultan, Sd. Saʿīd b. Taỳmūr decided to get rid of the
Imamate and its political influence, due to several factors, important among which was the Imamate's aspiration and attempts to forge foreign relations, the concessions for the oil industry, and the general support which the Sultan, Sd. Sa‘īd, received from many of the Omani tribes.

2) The Treaty of al-Sib

At this time, voices were becoming louder among the tribes calling for conciliation with the Sultan. Thus they asked the new Imam, Sh. Muḥammad b. ‘Abdollāh al-Khalīlī, to put an end to the suffering of the Omanis, for example by lifting economic pressures and hardships associated with the oppressive taxation system, and putting an end to the high prices which adversely affected the standards of living. Under these pressures, the Omanis were gripped with feelings of disappointment and disillusion after having spent seven solid years in continuous warfare with the Sultan, and they had not achieved the aims for which the Imamate had been revived in the first place, especially since the British strongly supported the Sultan, while the Imamate lacked the necessary trained regular army, not to mention their lack of modern weapons.

At any rate, Imam Muḥammad al-Khalīlī was persuaded of the necessity of putting an end to this long enmity with the Sultan and the associated suffering and hardships of the population. In this, he entrusted Sh. ‘Īsā al-Ḥārithī to resume his communications and efforts for the resumption of peace talks, which had been suspended since the previous year by Wingate, the PAM. The Imam, however, postponed the resumption of the peace efforts until he had settled his problems with Sd. Āḥmad b. Ibrāhīm who took control of al-Rustāq. Thus, two days after Imam Muḥammad was elected, Sh. ‘Īsā wrote a letter to the PAM, in which he told him of the general situation inside Oman, and the general desire to resume talks. He sent his letter to the PAM with the famous scholar Sh. Sa‘īd b. Nāṣir al-Kindī (37).

The PAM approved the resumption of the talks, but put foreword some conditions, first insisting on the handing back of the confiscated gardens to their owners. He also said that he would go to India for a period of a month (38). During the first half of August, 1920 Sh. ‘Īsā was busy with the question of al-Rustāq, for Sd. Āḥmad b.
Ibráhím agreed to leave al-Rustáq and returned to al-Ḥazim. At the same time, communications were continued between him and the PAM through Sh. Sa‘íd al-Kindí, especially concerning the issue of the return of the confiscated gardens, which the Imam agreed to return to their owners. Sh. ‘Isá’s letter on these issues came as follows: “that the Imam, after having counselled with his leaders, is willing to return the gardens to their owners out of respect for the great British government” (39).

Sh. ‘Isá proposed in the above letter that the talks should be resumed after the ‘Īd al-Aḍḥá and that the talks should be held either in al-Sīb or Samá’il. Wingate, the PAM agreed to the proposed time and place, while he was in India during this time. The PAM asked his deputy at Muscat to confirm to Sh. ‘Isá that the talks would be held after 15th September 1920.

Finally, the meeting was convened at al-Sīb between 11-13 Muḥarram, 1339/24-26 September, 1920. Wingate arrived at al-Sīb on the afternoon of 23rd September accompanied by Captain Pearson, commander of the 117th detachment at Maṭrāḥ; Captain Memor, M.O.; and the consul Frugoman, while Sh. ‘Isá awaited the PAM at al-Khawād for 20 days, arriving at the place of the meeting on the morning of 24th September, accompanied by over twenty Omani Shaykhs and three hundred camelmen (40).

An hour later the meeting started between Sh. ‘Isá and Wingate. During the meeting, which lasted for two hours, the discussion was centred on introductions and the working out of the meeting agenda. Wingate stressed his main question which was about the authorization and legal status and role of Sh. ‘Isá. The PAM expressed his main concern about Sh. ‘Isá’s legal or authorized status in these words: “it will be remembered in this connection at that at our last meeting [referring to the meeting of 15 Sep., 1919] he [Sh. ‘Isá] was not fully authorized” (41).

However, no sooner did the PAM expressed his concern, then Sh. ‘Isá and his companions clarified the matter and confusion, and confirmed that he had the full authorization of the Imam. The PAM, after having been assured of the legally authorized status of Sh. ‘Isá, put forward another condition which was: “it was agreed that the terms, if agreed, would be signed by him [Sh. ‘Isá] and the other Shaykhs present in my
(PAM’s] presence, and that they would then take the document away and obtain the signature of the Imam and of any other Shaykhs whom I [the PAM] may name’” (42).

Sh. ‘Isà and the rest of the Shaykhs then present agreed to these conditions of the PAM. It should be noted that these conditions had several implications. The PAM, for example, stressed the conditionality of obtaining the Imam’s approval and the seriousness of the conciliations, being well aware that Sh. ‘Isà and the Shaykhs then present would not endorse any thing without the approval of the Imam. Secondly, the PAM wanted to have a proof in his hands to use against them in case the Imam refused to accept the peace deal. Thirdly, he also insisted on obtaining the signature on the document of some influential leaders who did not attend the meeting, like Sh. Sulaymán b. Ḥimyar and the sons of Sh. Hilál b. Záhir.

In the afternoon, another meeting was convened and was restricted to Sh. ‘Isà, Sh. Sa‘íd al-Kindí and Wingate and his translator. In this meeting, Sh. ‘Isà presented twelve points for discussion, which were as follows:

1. That the independence of Oman should be recognized.
2. That the zakat should be reduced to 5 per cent.
3. That the Omanis should be free and safe in the Sultan’s territory.
4. That the British Government should not help the Sultan.
5. That nothing should be done against the Imamate’s religion.
6. That passports should not be needed for Omanis.
7. That the Omanis should be allowed to purchase cartridges.
8. That the Sultan should subsidize the Omanis.
9. That all documents such as passports, etc., from the Imam should be countersigned by the Political Agent and not by the Sultan.
10. That Sh. Ráshid b. ‘Uzayyiz al-Khuṣaybí should not be allowed in Oman.
11. That Sh. Sa‘íd b. Náṣir al-Kindí should be guaranteed safety in the Sultan’s territory.
12. That the Sultan should return fugitives from Imam’s justice (43).

In return for that, Sh. ‘Isà promised to abide by the following two points:

1. Not to attack the Sultan’s territory or to interfere in his Government.
2. To allow freedom of trade and travel in Oman (44).
The PAM refused to accept Sh. 'Isa’s offer, although he agreed to three of the conditions, Nos.: 2, 3 and 12 and firmly refused to agree to the rest of the conditions, on the grounds that they were unreasonable and contrary to reason (45). The PAM, in the end, succeeded in persuading Sh. 'Isa to withdraw the rest of the conditions. For example regarding the first condition he said: “they [the Omanis] had got practical independence, what else did they want?” (46). And regarding point No. 4 he said: “if we were mediating in an agreement, they could rely on our not backing the other side unless they flagrantly broke it” (47).

It is clear that the PAM was an evasive, deft diplomat who wanted to see this agreement as a binding contract between the ruler and his subjects, without at the sometime forcing the Sultan to acknowledge the Imam or his independence. At the same time, it was meant to be understood that the PAM was implicitly working towards legitimising and consolidating the Sultan’s authority over the whole of Oman. Surprisingly enough, Sh. Isà did not take notice of this trend of events in his dealings with the PAM, who tried to cover his inclinations throughout the talks. At the end of the talks, they both agreed on a number of conditions, which came in the following order:

The Sultan’s Government would:-

1. Reduce the zakāt on all goods coming into the coastal towns to 5 per cent.
2. Guarantee safety and freedom for Omanis in the coastal towns.
3. Remove all restrictions on the entry of Omanis into Muscat and Maṭraḥ.
4. Return fugitives from Omani justice and not interfere in their internal affairs.

The Omanis would:-

1. Remain in peace with the Sultan, not attack the coast and not interfere with his Government.
2. Permit freedom of trade and travel in Oman and guarantee the safety of travellers.
3. Would return and not protect fugitives from the Sultan’s justice.
4. Would hear the claims of traders and others against Omanis according to Shari‘ah.(48)

The following day all the Shaykhs accompanying Sh. ‘Isa came and signed the document. However, a problem arose regarding the signing of Sh. ‘Isa, due to his insistence that the agreement should be between the Sultan and the Imam. The PAM,
however, rejected this formula, and tried to persuade the present Shaykhs to his view. The problem was resolved by regarding the agreement as being between Sultan Sd. Taymūr's government and Sh. 'Isā on behalf of the Omani people. The document was issued in two copies in Arabic; each party took a copy to sign it and returned it, signed, to the other party, through the PAM.

On 8th October, the agreement was officially ratified and declared to have been set in force. Imam Muḥammad al-Khalīf had ratified it on 28th September 1920, together with a number of Shaykhs. As a result, taxes were lowered and returned to their former levels of 5% on all produce from the inland. All prisoners were released, restrictions on travelling removed and free movements between the interior and coastal areas were restored to their former status, as before May 1913. Each of the two parties retained a copy of the document. Following is the wording of the copy found with the Sultan:

"In the name of God the compassionate, the merciful"

"This is what has been agreed upon in the settlement between the Government of Sultan, Saiyid Taimur bin Faisal and Shaikh Isa bin Salah bin Ali al-Harthi on behalf of the Omanis who sign their name here through the mediation of Mr. Wingate, I.C.S., Political Agent and His Britannic Majesty’s consul, Muscat, who is authorised by his Government in this respect to be a mediator between them. The conditions are stated as follows. Four of them concern the Government of the Sultan and four of them concern the Omanis. What concern the Omanis are those:-

First: On all commodities brought from Oman of all kinds to Muscat, Matrah, Sur and all the coast towns nothing more should be taken than 5 per cent.

Secondly: For all the Omanis there should be safety and freedom in all the coast towns.

Thirdly: All restrictions on entry to and exit from Muscat, Matrah and all the coast towns should be removed.

Fourthly: The Sultan’s Government should not protect criminals who flee from the justice of the Omanis and they may be returned to them if asked for and that the Sultan’s Government should not interfere in their internal affairs.

The four which concern the Government of the Sultan are stated as follows:-

Firstly: All the tribes and Shaikhs should remain in peace and amity with the government of the Sultan and that they should not attack the coast towns and should not interfere in his government.

Secondly: All travellers to Oman on their lawful business should be free and there should be no restrictions on trade and travellers should be safe.

Thirdly: All criminals and evil men who flee to them should be turned out and should not be protected."
Fourthly: The claims of merchants and others against the Omanis should be heard and decided as is just according to the Sharah (Shar‘iah).

Written at Sib on the eleventh day of Moharram, one thousand three hundred and thirty nine Hijrah, corresponding to twenty fifth day of September, one thousand nine hundred and twenty.

I have completed what was completed by Shaikh Isa bin Salah on my behalf in these conditions. Written by Imam al-Muslamin Mohammad bin Abdullah with his own hand.

I on behalf of the Imam al-Muslamin Mohammad bin Abdullah al-Khalili and on my own behalf agree to the conditions written here with the authorisation of Imam al-Muslamin. Written by Isa bin Salah with his own hand.

(Signed) Sulaiman bin Hamyar an-Nabhani (with his own hand).
(Signed) Zahair bin Ghusn al-Hinawi (with his own hand).
(Signed) Mohsin bin Zahran as-Siyabi (with his own hand).
(Signed) Hamaid bin Mussullam an-Nidabi (with his own hand).
(Signed) Sayf bin Salim b. Amir al-Habasi (with his own hand).
(Signed) Khalaf bin Nasir bin Mohammad al-Maawali (with his own hand).

Thumb impression of Mohammad bin Sultan bin Mansur al-Wahaibi (with his own hand).
(Signed) Mohammad bin Saif bin Said al-Jabri (with his own hand).
(Signed) Sultan bin Salim ar-Rabhi (with his own hand).
(Signed) Khalfan bin Mohammad bin Sulaiman bin-Hidabi (with his own hand).
(Signed) Thani bin Harith al-Jabri (with his own hand).
( (Signed) Hamdan bin Sulaiman bin Saif an-Nabhani (with his own hand).
(Signed) Muhanna bin Hamad bin Mohsin al-Ibri (with his own hand).
(Signed) Nasir bin Hamaid bin Rashid al-Ghasiri (with his own hand), and his son Mohammad bin Nasir (with his own hand).
(Signed) Abdullah bin Hilal bin Zaher al-Hánai (with his own hand).

This official document of agreement was brought to me which is the best sort of settlement between Shaikh Isa bin Salah on our behalf as written above and the government of Sultan Saiyid Taimur through the mediation of Mr. Wingate, I.C.S., His Britannic Majesty’s Consul at Muscat, as is written also with special authorisation. I write these lines with my own hand and thank God for it. Written by Sayf bin Ali bin Amir Al- MASKARI with his own hand” (49).

As for the document found with the Imam, it read as follows:

"In the name of God the compassionate, the merciful"

"This is what has been agreed upon in the settlement between the Government of Sultan, Saiyid Taimur bin Faisal and Shaikh Isa bin Salah bin Ali al-Harbi on behalf of the Omanis who sign their name here through the mediation of Mr. Wingate, I.C.S., Political Agent and His Britannic Majesty’s consul, Muscat, who is authorised by his Government in this respect to be a mediator between them. The conditions are stated as follows. Four of them concern the Government of the Sultan and four of them concern the Omanis. What concern the Omanis are those:-
First: On all commodities brought from Oman of all kinds to Muscat, Matrah, Sur and all the coast towns nothing more should be taken than 5 per cent.

Secondly: For all the Omanis there should be safety and freedom in all the coast towns.

Thirdly: All restrictions on entry to and exit from Muscat, Matrah and all the coast towns should be removed.

Fourthly: The Sultan’s Government should not protect criminals who flee from the justice of the Omanis and that may be returned to them if asked for and that the Sultan’s Government should not interfere in their internal affairs.

The four which concern the Government of the Sultan are stated as follows:-

Firstly: All the tribes and Shaikhs should remain in peace and amity with the government of the Sultan and that they should not attack the coast towns and should not interfere in his government.

Secondly: All travellers to Oman on their lawful business should be free and there should be no restrictions on trade and travellers should be safe.

Thirdly: All criminals and evil men who flee to them should be turned out and should not be protected.

Fourthly: The claims of merchants and others against the Omanis should be heard and decided as is just according to the Sharah [Shari'ah].

Written at Sib on the eleventh day of Moharram, one thousand three hundred and thirty nine Hijrah, corresponding to twenty fifth day of September, one thousand nine hundred and twenty. Seals signature of Taimur (H. H. the Sultan Muscat and Oman) (signed) Mohammad bin Ahmad, with his hand, on behalf of the Sultan” (50).

Evidently, the importance of this document has been its focus on addressing the deterioration in the economic situation, and the restoration of peace and stability between the interior and coastal areas. In fact, it restored the political situation of Oman to the state which had prevailed during the 13th-17th centuries, when the coastal areas of Oman were under the authority of the Kingdom of Hurmuz (51) (in 13th, 14th and 15th centuries) and then came under Portuguese authority (1507-1650), while the interior of Oman continued to be ruled by an elected Imam or a King (52).

The agreement itself was covered in mystery and confusion, but it meant the two governments were totally independent of one another. The supporters of the Imamate interpreted it in this way when they used the al-Sib agreement as evidence of Oman’s independence, involving various foreign powers in long debates in the United Nations Assembly in New York throughout the 1950s and 1960s (53).
The agreement did not specify the sovereignty rights of the Sultan, nor did it contain a statement on the independence of the Interior of Oman from the Sultanate. It also did not explain the right of the Sultan or the Omanis to establish foreign diplomatic relations (54). We have already seen how the PAM evaded any mention of these points, in spite of the fact that it was Sh. 'Isa who presented them for discussion, and the PAM refused to accept the agreement to be between the Sultan and the Imam, as we have already mentioned. Therefore, the agreement came to be between the Sultan's government and Sh. 'Isà on behalf of the Omanis. As a result, a long dispute ensued in interpreting the agreement. Some have understood it to have provided for an Interior independent from the Coast (55), while others interpreted it to be an expression of an entirely domestic matter similar to the agreements which the Turkish Sultan signed with his subjects (56).

Here, we do not intend to discuss the legal implications of the agreement (57), because the legal considerations lie outside the scope of our present study. However, we need to make clear that the reasons for divergence of views in interpretation of the Treaty of al-Sib can be subsumed in two points. The first is that the terms of the treaty itself ignored the political and legitimate status of the Imamate, and only emphasized the peaceful co-existence, freedom of movement and trade, and the handing of criminals between the two parties. The second point is the Sultan’s open disapproval of the Imamate itself. This is evident in the fact that the Treaty did not include the name of the Imam or Imamate, and that the agreement in fact was between the government of the Sultan (not the Sultan himself), and Sh. ‘Isà b. Šâliḥ al-Ḥārithî, on behalf of the Omanis (not on behalf of the Imam). For these reasons, each party interpreted the treaty in its text, its implementation and in its implications, in its own way, according to its interests.

We also want here to point out the basis on which the agreement was founded. A fundamental fact was that the two states were independent from one another, and they did not form a large state, as was made clear in many statements, including the following letter from Rea, the PAM to Sh. ‘Isà dated 8th March 1922, which says:

"The Government of His Highness, the Sultan Taimur [Taymûr] ibn Faysal has notified me about events happening in Sur to the effect that a man from Oman has killed a soldier of the Sultan in Sur. This is to inform your Excellency that this act is aggression on the part of Oman along the
borders of the state of Muscat and an abrogation of treaty obligations... It is the duty of Omani authorities to seize the murderer and punish him so that no similar acts may happened in the future” (58).

Captain G.J. Eccles, the commander of the Muscat Levy Corps (1924-26) described the authority of the Sultan as follows: “The Sultan in reality has authority only of Muscat and a stretch of coast to the north and south, which can be intimidated by a British gun-boat” and he admitted that the Treaty of al-Sib is “virtual acknowledgment of the Independence of the Imamate” (59). Another writer, Thesiger, says:

“we were now entering territory which is effectively administered by the Imam. Mohammed Ibn Abdullah, who is recognized as ruler of inner Oman by all the settled tribes .... His representative are to be found in every group of villages, where they administer justice and collect taxes... the Bedouin do... recognize the Imam as their over-lord and the expression ‘God lengthen the life of the Imam’ is frequently heard amongst them and sincerely meant, since by affording them a tribunal and by composing their differences he has brought to them security and justice. Here a man can walk unarmed and leave his camels unattended without fear that he will be robbed” (60).

Consequently, it is clear that the Sultanate and Imamate were independent from each other since this treaty, and the British government herself fully recognized the Imamate of Oman. This division continued until 1954, when Imam Mohammed died. On the death of the Imam, the Omanis elected Sh. Ghalib b. ‘Alf b. Hilal al-Hinawi as Imam of Oman, while Sd. Taymur bequeathed the rule to his son Sd. Sa’id in 1932.

Here in this context, we are concerned with the aspects of peace and stability which the terms of al-Sib treaty helped to create over a period of 35 years since it came into force. During this period, the living conditions of all the Omanis improved remarkably, in addition to the freedom of movement for the populations across all areas and regions, such that there were no restrictions or boundaries separating the regions, one from the other. As for the role of the Sultan, he was able to effect many significant reforms in his administration. He reorganized the duties department and set up a ministerial Council to administer the country’s affairs. He also laid the foundations for a national military institution with a standing army, composed of Arab and non-Arab elements.
Endnotes

(1) al-Salmi, M. A. Nahdat. p. 254.
(3) al-Salmi, M. A. op.cit. p. 74.
(4) al-Salmi, M. A. op.cit. p. 399.
(5) al-Salmi, M. A. op.cit. p. 94.
(9) al-Salmi, M. A. op.cit. p. 261.
(10) al-Salmi, M. A. op.cit. p. 94; (L.O) R15/6/204: Report from the PAM to civil commissioner, Baghdad dated 4th June 1920.
(11) Landen, op.cit. p. 403.
(14) Interview with Sh. al-Qatif Humud b. 'Abdallah al-Rashidi.
(15) For the location of village of al-Khadra 'Band Diif', see Lorimer, Gazetteer, vol. 8 p. 1373.
(16) al-Salmi, M. A. op.cit. p. 363; Sh. Muhanna al-Kharusi's account.
(17) There was a poem composed by Sh. Abi Muslim al-Ruwahi, and sent to the Imam who received it in the month of Shawwal, 1338. In the poem, Sh. al-Ruwahi mentioned how the Imam was murdered and gave a description of his murderer. The poem was found in his saddle-bag when he was killed. See the poem in al-Salmi, M. A. op.cit. pp. 261f.
(18) Sh. Muhanna al-Kharusi's account.
(19) al-Salmi, M. A. op.cit. p. 262.
(20) al-Salmi, M. A. op.cit. p. 262; Sh. Muhanna al-Kharusi's account.
(21) (L.O R 15/6/264: confidential report no. 2052, dated 14th Oct., 1920 from PAM to PRG.
(22) Sh. Muhanna al-Kharusi's account.
(23) (L.O R 15/6/264: confidential report no. 2052, dated 14th Oct., 1920 from PAM to PRG.
(24) Sd. Muhammad b. Ahmad al-Bu Sa'id's comments on the account of Sh. Muhanna al-Kharusi.
(25) al-Salmi, M. A. op.cit. p. 75.
(27) See the PAM's report of 28th Sep., 1915 in (L.O) R15/6/46: Appendix "c".
(28) Shadad, op.cit. p. 97.
(29) Qasim, al-Khaliji 1914-45. p. 413.
(30) Sd. Muhammad b. Ahmad al-Bu Sa'id states that Imam Muhammad al-Khilifi assigned an annual cash prize for Maktum which he continued to receive until his death.
(31) Sh. Muhanna al-Kharusi was of the opinion that the man who killed Abu Bisrah was Sulaytin b. Salmi b. Musallam al-Junaybi, a man from the village of 'Izz.
(32) See Sh. 'Isa's letter to the PAM in (L.O) R15/6/204.
(33) (L.O) R15/6/204: Telegram from the PAM to PRG no. 1636 dated on 26th July 1920.
(34) al-Salmi, M.A. op.cit. p. 343.
(35) L.O.R15/6/204: Telegram from the PAM to PRG no. 1636 dated on 26th July 1920.
(37) See Sh. 'Isa's letter to Wingate in (Adm. R. 1920)
(38) (L.O) R15/6/264: The PAM's report to PRG, no. 2052, dated 14th Oct., 1920.
(39) Telegram no. 1817 dated 2nd Sep., 1920 from PAM to PRG in L.O R115/6/204.
(45) Shadad, op.cit. p. 152.
The Treaty of al-Sib was written and signed in Arabic. The copies in English were translated by Wingate, the PAM, for information. The English copies are found in (I.O.) R15/6/264: The PAM’s report to PRG, no. 2052, dated 14th Oct., 1920. Other English texts are to be found in R/15/3/204 and R/15/3/337; (Adm. R. 1920), p. 54f; Landen, op.cit. pp. 403-404n; al-Baharna, H. The Legal Status of the Arabian Gulf States, pp. 315f; Arab Information Centre, The Question of Oman: An Analysis of the British Oman Dispute; Peterson, Oman, pp. 174f; New York Times, August 12, 1957; et al. al-Sálimí M.A. op.cit. pp. 345-9; al-Mashhadáni, op.cit. pp. 164-6.

The Portuguese conquered the Kingdom of Hurmuz in 1508, and the capital of the Kingdom was in Hurmuz Island, located in the Strait of the Arabian Gulf. The Kingdom of Hurmuz occupied vast areas on both two shores of the Gulf, including the coastal area of Oman.

Ibid.; Sh. Muhammad al-Sálimí does not mention the signature of the Sultan, Sd. Taymúr, nor of Sd. Muhammad b. Ahmad, but mentions the signature of Wingate, the PAM, see his Nahdát p. 345.

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CONCLUSIONS

Although this study has focused on the biography of Imam Sálim b. Ráshid al-Kharúší, it is in reality a study of Omani local history during the period 1913–1920. This period has been characterized by the significant revival of the Imamate in the Interior of Oman after a long series of past revival attempts by Omani leaders and ‘ulamá’ during the 19th century. This revival was caused by a variety of factors; first and most important was the internal tribal conflict between the Hináwí and Gháfirí tribes and its grave impact on the security, social and economic situation. The Sultan, Sd. Fayšal, had neither the ability nor the interest to put an end to these conflicts, which did not negatively affect his power position. Furthermore, the Sultan was under strong British influence. In line with British demands, the Sultan banned the slave trade and imposed limitations on trade in weapons, despite strong opposition from Omani tribes. He became particularly apathetic to these tribes’ reaction to his policies after the death of strong leaders, like Sh. Šáliḥ b. ‘Alí al-Ḫárithí and Ḥumúd b. Sa‘íd al-Jaḫáfí. In return, the British extended loans to the Sultan on easy terms, which helped him maintain his rule. Moreover, and related to the above, the Sultan refused to agree to the demands of Omanis (‘ulamá’ and leaders) which including a ban on the sale of tobacco and alcohol in Omani markets, continuation of the slave trade and putting an end to corruption and heavy taxation. The Omanis also demanded a general improvement of the Sultan’s administration and the modification of his rule to conform with the Šari‘ah law. Finally, under these conditions a very strong personality called Sh. ‘Abdalláh b. Ḥumayd al-Sálimí emerged and succeeded in rallying ‘ulamá’ and tribal leaders around him to revive the concept of Imamate and its application in Oman: Sh. al-Sálimí convinced his supporters that through the institution of Imamate many of their demands would be met, i.e. independence from external influence, an end to tribal conflict, maintenance of internal security and stability, improvement of living conditions and a return to Islamic teaching.

In the context of highlighting Omani history, we have investigated the roles of many important Omani figures, including ‘ulamá’ and leaders, because of their important
position in the Omani society. Many of these ‘ulamā’ and tribal leaders had great impact on the course of political events and subsequent political developments. Also these important figures played influential roles in the Imamate of Imam Sālim al-Kharūṣī, in various respects. This undertaking has not been an easy one. Many difficulties were encountered, and it has been necessary to examine problematic names and dates, and to make extensive and lengthy efforts to trace their sources and to probe their implications.

We have also sought to shed light on the origins of the Ibāḍiyah sect, how it was established, its main principles and its relationship with al-Khawārij. The study has arrived at the conclusion that the Ibāḍi movement emerged first in Basrah then extended to Yemen, Oman, and North Africa. During its historical development it took different names: al-Muḥakkimah (A.H.37-38), al-Ḥarūriyyah (A. H. 38-65), al-Qa‘īdah (A.H. 65-75), and Ibāḍiyah (after, A.H.75). Since its emergence, Ibāḍiyah remained faithful to its Islamic opinions relating to creed and political order. The outcome of the Ibāḍi idea was the establishment of first Imamates in Yemen and Oman, both of which lasted two years. In 160/776 another Imamate was established in Algeria, and in 177/792, the Imamate was successfully re-established in Oman. During the following centuries the Imamate in Oman alternated between emergence and disappearance. The historical development of the Ibāḍi Imamate was classified under the following names: first Imamate, second Imamate, third Imamate, etc.

In the modern age, the Imamate took another form of organisation essentially based on heritage, with a formal election of Imam. This clearly appeared during the rule of the Ya‘aribah and Āl Bú Sa‘īd. The instability and discontinuity of the Imamate in Oman resulted from religious and tribal divisions and foreign intervention. These factors contributed to the emergence of weak Imams, and the existence of more than one Imamate at the same time. In spite of the difficult religious and political problems which faced the Ibāḍiyah throughout its history, the movement managed to protect itself and defend its Islamic doctrine. This means that the Ibāḍiyah adhered strictly to its own religious and political ideas regarding non-Ibāḍi Muslims in Oman and elsewhere.

An important conclusion to be drawn is that the Ibāḍiyah sect is a different group altogether from al-Khawārij. Each group is ideologically and politically different from the
other. However, what had bound both groups together -- and this has been a source of much confusion for many writers -- is that both the Ibádíyyah and al-Khawárij were traditional enemies of the Umayyads and the 'Abbasids.

This naturally leads us to another conclusion; throughout Omani history, there has never been a conflict between the Omani people on sectarian grounds, for such conflicts have always been on a political and tribal basis. That is mainly because the majority of Omani tribes were Ibádí, while a few others were Sunni. Most Sunni tribes became Sunni peacefully, without compulsion, responding to Wahhábí preaching during the early 19th century. Because of the peaceful manner in which different sects were introduced into Oman, we find that some members of the same tribes were Ibádí and others Sunni, e.g., al-Ya‘áqíb, al-‘Abriyyín, al-Hishm. Tribal members were united against enemies and were not disunited by different sectarian loyalties. Moreover, in many cases Omani rulers, who were Ibádí, received strong support from Sunnis in their struggle against their enemies.

Some examples were given and discussed which show that the source of conflicts in Oman was not ethnicity. The two large factions in Oman were the Hináwí (88 tribes) and Gháfirí (82 tribes). Both parties had supporters among the ‘Adnání and Qaḥtání. This study has shown that that a substantial number of tribes of ‘Adnání origin supported the Hináwí faction (13 tribes) which relies on the Qaḥtání tribes as a major base of political support, while on the other hand a substantial number of Qaḥtání tribes (17 tribes) supported the Gháfirí faction which is mainly supported by ‘Adnání tribes. Tribal conflict in Oman, one can infer, was not caused by sectarian or ethnic loyalties.

However, the bulk of the thesis has been concerned with the biography of Imam Sálim al-Kharúfí. We have traced the course of Imam’s life, concentrating, in particular, on the period of his Imamate. In short, the Imam was born in 1301/1883-4 in village of Mashá‘q, one of the villages of the Wiláyat of al-Suwayq in the Báţinah Province. He was one of four children in his father’s family. He received his basic education in his village and completed his learning at al-‘Awábí, al-Rustáq, and al-Qábil, and devoted ten solid years before he was elected Imam, as student to Sh. al-Sálimí who gave him his
daughter, Zayánah, in marriage. Imam Sálím was one of Sh. al-Salími’s close circle. In 1331/1913 he was elected as Imam in Tanúf.

We have discussed the manner in which the bay‘ah was established for Imam Sálím, the qualifications which he commanded, and the speeches delivered on the occasion, which specified the Imam’s future programmes. Mention has been made that there had been four characters who were eligible candidates for the Imam’s post. These were Sh. Muḥammad b. ‘Abdalláh al-Khalíli, Sh. Abú Zayd al-Riyámi, Sd. Hilál b. ‘Alí al-Bú Sa‘ídí, and Imam Sálím al-Kharúṣí. The study has explained the causes which prevented the election of the other three candidates and brought about the unanimous election of Imam Sálím for the post of Imam.

Imam Sálím assumed the responsibilities of his office immediately from the day of his election when he proclaimed the Imamate and wrote several letters to the leaders of Oman and its ‘ulamá’, as well as to Sultan Fayșal and his Wális, in which he called on all of them to rally for his bay‘ah and to submit to his authority. We have examined this correspondence, as well as the speeches made by the Imam and other prominent personalities, in order to shed light on the main features of Imam Sálím’s policy programme.

We have discussed the political and military relations between the Imam and the Sultan. It has become apparent from this relationship that the Imam was able to achieve remarkable military successes during the summer months of the 1913. We have seen that the Interior had fell into the hands of the Imam and other Wiláyát of al-Sharqiyah and al-Dháhirah, such as al-Muḍaybí, Badiyyah, Ibrá’, ‘Abrí, and al-Rustáq, declared their allegiance to him. In the first few months of the following year, the Imam succeeded in bringing under his authority both Nakhal and Wádí al-Ma’áwil. After these successes, the Imam directed his attention to the control of the coastal towns. However, his attempts to seize and annex Barká’ in April 1914, and Muscat in January 1915 both failed, which compelled him to amend his plans, and remain distanced from these coastal towns throughout the period of his reign.

On the political side, the study has highlighted the attempts to bring about a reconciliation between the Imam and the Sultan. These efforts were initiated by Sh. ‘Isá
b. Ṣāliḥ al-Ḥārithī soon after the proclamation of the Imamate. He was either tacitly encouraged by the Sultan to pursue his efforts at conciliation, or made them on his own initiative, encouraged by the support of the Shaykhs of the Wādí Samā’il. Another peace initiative was conducted by Sh. Ḥamdán b. Ẓāyid, the ruler of Abū Dhabi in November 1913, and another initiative by Sh. Sūltān b. Muhammad al-Na‘īmī, the ruler of al-Buraymī in January-February 1915. We have seen that both attempts failed as a result of the Imam's rejection of their terms. Then came the two peace initiatives by the British PAM in September, 1915 and September, 1919, both of which also failed. The terms of the 1915 peace effort postulated that the Imam should hand back the region of Wādí Samā’il to the Sultan. In the 1919 peace initiative, the Sultan's primary condition for peace was that the Imam should return the gardens he had confiscated to their owners, but conceded this point, in exchange for the return of Wādí Samā’il. However, as has been pointed out, the Imam rejected all these terms, apparently because he was hopeful of much greater concessions from the Sultan. Thus, the Sultan on his part, imposed heavy taxes on the produce of the Interior, which finally led to widespread confusion and discontent among the Omanis, who under the pressure and hardships, became openly critical of the Imam's policies and attitude, especially in the last year of his reign.

The study has paid particular attention to the relationship between the Imam and the Omani tribes; it explored the dimensions of this relationship, in terms of profiles of the tribes involved and the extent to which they influenced the Imam's policies. The tribes have been classified on political and geographical bases. We have tried to explain that some of these tribes completely submitted to the Imam's unrivalled authority, while other tribes, such as Ya‘áqūb, al-Durūṭ, al-Hishm and Āl Wahībah, only declared their loyalty, which the Imam accepted. The study has tried to give short profiles of each tribe, its importance for the Imamate, as well as a brief account of some of the most prominent of its members who gained fame during the period under discussion.

In discussing the Imam's local administration we have shown that he had adopted a traditional Islamic system of government. At the top of the hierarchy in this system, stood the Imam as the head of state, who was responsible for duties such as the Salāt al-Jum‘ah (the Friday prayer), the organisation and leadership of the army and the
appointment of government employees. The Imam was aided in such duties by a nominal council composed of a number of ‘ulamā’ and leaders, which met when important issues arose. This council was called the Consultative Council.

The study has also pointed out that the Imam, for a long period, suffered from the general weakness of the economy as a result of the meagreness of the sources of government revenue coming into Bayt al-Māl, compounded by large increases of expenditure in many different fields, such as on the Imam’s many military operations.

The study has also brought to light fresh information about many important figures who played significant roles in the Imamate of Imam Sālim, and who assumed posts such as Qādis, Wālis, teachers and clerks, together with a mention of the places where they worked and the offices they had assumed.

However, for every epoch, there is an end, and the end of the Imam’s era came on his assassination in 1338/1920 at the hands of a Bedouin Arab called Abū Bisrah Wald al-Tawbaltī from Āl Wahībah tribe, a Bedouin tribe with many branches. It is apparent from our assessment of the causes and motivations which led Abū Bisrah to carry out the act of assassination, that he fell prey to the instigations and insinuations of malefactors from his own tribe. However, the true causes and the authentic motivation for the assassination remained a mystery and were buried with the assassin himself, who was killed after a year, as was evident from his disappearance in the al-Dhāhirah Province. As a result of the death of Imam Sālim, a peace agreement became possible in 1920 between his successor, Imam Muḥammad b. ‘Abdallāh al-Khalīfī and Sultan Sd. Taymūr b. Fayṣal (1913-1932). This peace agreement came to be known as the Treaty of al-Sīb. According to the terms of the treaty, Oman was divided into two political divisions, independent of one another. This situation continued to be effective and characterized the Omani internal political situation until the death of Imam Muḥammad al-Khalīfī. After that Sultan Sd. Saʿīd b. Taymūr (1932-1970) refused to abide by the terms of the treaty, since, in his view, it made no claims regarding its continuity, and therefore, it was valid and binding only for those who signed it. The Sultan, moreover, did not approve of the new Imam. For these reasons, there ensued a lengthy debate on the interpretation of the terms of the Treaty of al-Sīb in the 1950s and 1960s, in the corridors of the United
Nations. This long debate ended with the inauguration of a new era in 1970, under the leadership of Sultan Qabús b. Sa‘íd.

In this thesis, we have attempted to correct some of the misconceptions regarding Omani history during the period under discussion. Most writers have wrongly cited names of places, personalities and events. This has been demonstrated in the thesis by consulting original Omani sources. Some examples of these errors are Nizwà, Bahlà as Bahlah, Mashá‘if as Mashá‘iq, etc. Also Imam Sálim b. Ráshid al-Kharúṣí has been cited as Ráshid al-Kharúṣí and Sh. Ḥimyar b. Náṣir al-Nabhání as Ḥumayd b. Náṣir al-Nabhání. Moreover, some Arab studies suggest that the Imam was a leader of a political party before he was chosen as Imam, which we have shown to be untrue. Another example of misconception is that some considered the revival of the Imamate as a result of a coalition between tribal parties, but the thesis, on the basis of documentary evidence, has established that the revival of the Imamate was based on religious law.

In sum, we have presented a basic and documented account of this important period in the modern history of the Ibádí Imamate and thus made a modest contribution towards filling the gap in the literature on this period.
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| R/15/6/244, Notes on tribes and Shaykhs of Oman 8th Mar 1950-20th Dec 1950. |
| R/15/6/264, Relations of the Sultan with the tribes of Oman; Treaty of al-Sf 1920 (1920-34) |

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(iv) United States

(v) Zanzibar
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(2) Sd. Huumûd b. 'Alî b. Nâşir al-Bu Sa'idî, Adviser Judge at the Ministry of Justice, Awqaf and Islamic Affairs.

(3) Sd. Muhammâd b. Aḥmad al-Bu Sa'idî, adviser to His Majesty Sulûn Qâbûs b. Sa'id.

(4) Sh. al-Qâ'îbî 'Abdallâh b. Imam Sâlim al-Kharûfî (formerly, Qâ'îbî of al-Rustâq)

(5) Sh. al-Qâ'îbî Aḥmad b. Muhammâd b. Sâlim b. Zâhir al-Ruqayshî (formerly, Qâ'îbî of 'Ibrî)

(6) Sh. 'Alî b. Jabr b. Su'ûd b. 'Alî al-Jabrî


(8) Sh. al-Qâ'îbî Muhammâd b. Shâmis al-Baṭţâshî, Appellate Judge at the Ministry of Justice, Awqaf and Islamic Affairs.

(9) Sh. al-Qâ'îbî Nâşir b. Râshid al-Mundhirî, Appellate Judge at the Ministry of Justice, Awqaf and Islamic Affairs.

(10) Sh. al-Qâ'îbî Sa'id b. Hâmad b. Khamîs al-Kharûfî (formerly, Qâ'îbî of Buraymî)


(13) Sh. Sâlim b. Huumûd al-Siyyâbî (died on 28th Dece. 1993)

(14) Sh. Sulaymân b. Khalâf al-Kharûfî, at the office of the adviser to H. M. Qâbûs b. Sa'id

(15) Sh. Sulûn b. Sulaymân b. Ḥimyar b. Nâşir al-Nabhânî

(16) Sh. al-Qâ'îbî Su'ûd b. Sulaymân al-Kindî (formerly, Qâ'îbî of Nazwâ)

(17) Sh. Yahyâ b. 'Abdallâh b. Sulaymân b. 'Abdallâh b. Sa'dallah al-Nabhânî

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Muḥammad Ṭālib

Hilal

See below (7)

Saʿīd (d. 1811)

Saʿīd (d. 1821)

Saʿīd (1781-1856)

Sayf (d. 1785)

Sayf (d. 1785)

Qays (d. 1808)

See below (8)

Azzān (d. 1814)

Sālim (d. 1821)

Hamad (d. 1816)

Māḥid

Barqhash

Khalīfah

‘Abd al-‘Azīz

‘Alī

Turki

Thuwaynī

Other

RZ 1856-70

RZ 1870-88

RZ 1888-90

(1850-1907)

RZ 1890-3

RO 1871-88

RO 1856-66

RO 1866-68

Khalīfah

‘Abdallāh

‘Alī

Jamshīd

Muḥammad (b. 1860)

Fayṣal

Muḥammad (b. 1860)

Hārib

Sālim RO 1866-68

Khalīfah RZ 1911-1963

‘Abdallāh RZ 1963-4

Jamshīd RZ 1964 (one year only)

Fayṣal RO 1888-1913

Muḥammad (b. 1860)

RZ 1913-32

Shahāb

Muḥammad Others

Saʿīd RO 1932-70

H.M. Qābūs RO 1970—
(b. 1940)

Nādir (1887-1971)

Hamad (b. 1893)

Humūd (1895-1949)

Taymūr

Shahāb

Muḥammad

RZ 1870-88

1890-3

RO 1866-68

1911-1963

1963-4

1964 (one year only)

1850-1907

1890-3

1913-32

1970—
(b. 1940)

b. = born
d. = died
RZ = ruled Zanzibar
RO = ruled Oman
(2) Abbreviated descendants of Imam Sálim b. Ráshid

Ráshid b. Sulaymán b. ʿAmir b. ʿAbbaláh b. Masʿúd al-Kharúṣí

- Násir (d. 1362/1944)
- Muḥammad
- Sálim (Imam) (1301/1884-1338/1920)
- ʿAmir
- Mayyá

Daughter Yaḥyá (b. 1913)
Son (b. c. 1920)
ʿAbdalláh (b. 1917)
Yaʿqúb (b. 1918)
Daughter (b. c. 1920)

(3) Abbreviated descendant

Ṣáliḥ b. ʿAlí b. Násir b. Ṭsá b. Ṣáliḥ al-Ḥárithí (1250/1834-1314/1896)

- ʿAbdalláh (d. 1312/1895)
- Ṣáliḥ (d. 1365/1946)
- Ahmad (d. 1322/1904)
- ʿAlí (d. 1337/1919)

- ʿAlí
- ʿAbdalláh
- Muḥammad
- Ṣáliḥ
- Ibráhím
- Násir

(1316/1898-1366/1947)

Ahmad
(4) Abbreviated descendants of Sh. Himyar b. Nasir

Sayf b. Himyar b. Muhammad b. 'Abdallah b. Sulayman al-Nabhani

Nasir (d. 1294/1877)

Himyar (1291/1874-1338/1920)

Sultana

Sulayman (b. c. 1905- exile in Saudi Arabia)

Himyar (d. 1890s)

Marash (d. 1306/1889)

Muhammad (d. 1306/1889)

Sayf (d. 1316/1899)

Hamdan

Su'ud (d. c. 1900s)

Himyar

Su'ud

Hari

Talib

Kholid

Mansur

9 daughters

(5) Abbreviated descendants of the sons of Sh. Hilal b. Zahir

Hilal b. Zahir b. Muhammad b. Sa'id al-Hina'i (d. 1312/1894)

Ghushn (d. before his father)

'Abdallah

Ali

Kholid

Badr (d. 1314/1896)

Zahir

Udai

Ghab (Imam)

Talib

Su'ud

Salim
(6) Abbreviated descendants of Sd. Sayf b. Ḥamad Wāli of Nazwā

- Ḥamad b. Sayf b. ʿAmir b. Khalfān al-Bū Saʿīdī
  - Sayf (wāli Nazwā) (d. 1331/1913)
    - daughter
      - Married Suʿūd b. Ḥamad b. Hilāl
    - ʿAzzā (d. 1992)
      - Thurayyā
        - Hilāl (d. 1993)
      - Married Suʿūd b. Ḥārīb

(7) Abbreviated descendants of Sd. Suʿūd b. Ḥamad al-Bū Saʿīdī

- Ḥamad b. Hilāl b. Muḥammad b. Imam ʿAbd al-Bū Saʿīdī
  - Muhammad (d. 1877)
  - Badr (d. 1904)
  - Suʿūd (1880-1917)
    - Asfālāh
      - ʿAmmud (d. 1883)
    - Hilāl
      - Ahmad
        - Badr
          - Ibrāhīm
    - Muḥammad
      - The Advisor of H. M. Qābūs b. Saʿīd
        - the Sultan of Oman

(8) Abbreviated descendants of ruler of al-Rustāq

- ʿAzzān b. Qays b. Imam ʿAbd al-Bū Saʿīdī (d. 1814)
  - Qays (d. 1861)
    - Humūd (d. 1850)
      - Ibrāhīm (d. 1899)
        - Shumūn (d. 1846)
          - Ḥilāl (d. 1880)
            - Faysal (d. 1910)
              - Sayf (d. 1849)
            - Imam ʿAzzān (d. 1871)
              - Ibrāhīm (d. 1912)
                - Muḥammad (d. 1912)
  - Suʿūd (1869-1899)
    - Qays (1864-1926)
      - Humūd (b. 1862-?)
    - ʿAmmud (1877-1912)
      - Ahmad (1894-1991)
(9) The table shows the list of Viceroy’s, PRG and PAM’s names since, 1900 until 1923

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>The Year</th>
<th>Viceroy of India</th>
<th>Political Residents in Persian Gulf</th>
<th>Political Agent at Muscat</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1900</td>
<td>- Lord Curzon</td>
<td>- Maj. M.J. Meade</td>
<td>- Capt. P.Z. Cox</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>- Lt.Col. C.A.Kemball</td>
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<td>1901</td>
<td>- Lord Curzon</td>
<td>- Capt. P.Z. Cox</td>
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<td>- Lord Curzon</td>
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<td>- Capt. P.Z. Cox</td>
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<td>1904</td>
<td>- Lord Curzon</td>
<td>- Capt. P.Z. Cox</td>
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<td>- Lord Amptill</td>
<td>- Capt. W.G. Gray</td>
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<td>1905</td>
<td>- Lord Curzon</td>
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<td>1906</td>
<td>- Lord Minto</td>
<td>- Capt. W.G. Gray</td>
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<td>- Capt. N.Scott</td>
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<td>1907</td>
<td>- Lord Minto</td>
<td>- Capt. F. McConaghey</td>
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<td>1908</td>
<td>- Lord Minto</td>
<td>- Mr. R.E. Holland</td>
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<td>1909</td>
<td>- Lord Minto</td>
<td>- Mr. R.E. Holland</td>
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<td>1910</td>
<td>- Sir C. Hardinge</td>
<td>- Maj. A.P. Trevor</td>
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<td>1911</td>
<td>- Sir C. Hardinge</td>
<td>- Maj. S.G. Knox</td>
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<td>- Sir C. Hardinge</td>
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<td>- Sir C. Hardinge</td>
<td>- Maj. A.P. Trevor</td>
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<td>- Sir C. Hardinge</td>
<td>- Maj. S.G. Knox</td>
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<td>- Lt. Col. R.A. Benn</td>
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<td>1915</td>
<td>- Sir C. Hardinge</td>
<td>- Maj. S.G. Knox</td>
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<td>- Maj. H. Stewart</td>
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<td>1916</td>
<td>- Lord Chelmsford</td>
<td>- Sir Percy Cox</td>
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<td>- Maj. A.P. Trevor</td>
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<td>- Lord Chelmsford</td>
<td>- Maj. A.P. Trevor</td>
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<td>- Maj. J.H. Bill</td>
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<td>1918</td>
<td>- Lord Chelmsford</td>
<td>- Maj. J.H. Bill</td>
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<td>- Lord Chelmsford</td>
<td>- Maj. C.H. Gabriel</td>
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<td>- Lt.Col. A.P.Trevor</td>
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<td>1920</td>
<td>- Lord Chelmsford</td>
<td>- His Excel.Sir P. Cox</td>
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<td>- Lt Col. Sir A. Wilson</td>
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<tr>
<td>1921</td>
<td>- Lord Reading</td>
<td>- Lt. Col. A.P.Trevor</td>
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<td>1922</td>
<td>- Lord Reading</td>
<td>- Lt. Col. A.P.Trevor</td>
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<tr>
<td>1923</td>
<td>- Lord Reading</td>
<td>- Lt. Col. A.P.Trevor</td>
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3 A letter from PAM to Sh. ‘Isa, dated 6th Sha’bán 1331/11th July 1913

(The same letter was also sent to the Imam, Sh. al-Salimi and Sh. Himyar)
A letter from Imam Sálim to PAM, dated 9th Sha'bán 1331/14th July 1913
5 A letter from Sultan Faysal to PAM, dated 27th Sha`bán 1331/1st August 1913
A letter from Imam Salim to PAM, dated 29th Sha'ban 1331/3rd August 1913
7 A letter from PAM to Imam Sálim, dated 1st Ramadán 1331/5th August 1913
A letter from Imam Salim and his the Chiefs to PAM, dated 30th Shawwal 1331/2nd October 1913
No. 16 8th April 1915

I am pleased to inform you that I have received a copy of the letter which you have sent to me. I would like to make a few observations on the matter you have raised.

Firstly, I would like to congratulate you on your efforts to improve the situation. However, I believe that we need to take a more practical approach to achieve lasting peace.

Secondly, I think it is important that we all work together towards a common goal. This will require a willingness to compromise and a commitment to dialogue.

I am confident that with these steps, we can make progress towards a more stable and prosperous future.

Yours sincerely,

[Signature]

Permanent Agent
A letter from Imam Sālim to PAM, dated 4th Jumādā II, 1333/ 20th April 1915

A letter from Imam Sālim to PAM, dated 2nd Dhū al-Qi‘dah 1333/ 13th Sep. 1915
A letter from PAM to Sh. ‘Isà, dated 15th Jumádá II, 1333/30th April 1915
(The same letter was also sent to the Imam, Sh. al-Sálimí and Sh. Ḣimyár)
13 A letter from Imam Sálim to PAM, dated 15th Shawwál 1333/27th August 1915
Letter from P.A. Mascat to Imam Salim bin Rashid al Kharusi in reply to his of 15th Shawal.

No. 51 Dated 28th August 1915

A letter from PAM to Imam Sālim, dated 16th Shawwāl, 1333/28th August 1915
PETITION presented by Sheikh Isa bin Saleh, representative of Imam, Salim bin Rashid al Kharussi, to the Political Agent Muscat at SIB, on 15th September 1915.

15 Demands of Imam Salim, presented to the PAM at al-Sib on 6th Dhú al-Qi’dah 1333/15th Sep. 1915
17) Proclamation Issued by the Sultan regarding arms and ammunition 1898 and 1912

I
Proclamation by the Sultan of Muscat forbidding the export of arms and ammunition to India and Persia, 13th January, 1898

Be it known to such of our subjects as see this that, whereas the British and Persian Governments have represented to us that are desirous of preventing introduction of arms and ammunition into India and Persia, and that there is reason to think that many are exported from Muscat and taken to those two above-named countries, we have resolved to join them and to assist them as far as it lies in our power in suppressing this trade in arms and ammunition between Muscat and India and Persia. We therefore warn (our subjects) that all the arms and ammunition sent to those two countries will be confiscated and those engaged in this trade will be punished, as the introduction of arms and ammunition into India and Persia is prohibited by the Governments of those two countries and therefore illegal.

In future our Muscat flag will be no protection to vessels carrying the said arms and ammunition from our dominions to India and Persia.

II
Proclamation by the Sultan of Muscat granting British and Persian vessels of war the right to search Muscat vessels for arms, dated 13th January, 1898

Be it known to all who see it this we have given permission to British and Persian vessels of war to search vessels carrying their and our flags in our territorial waters, and to confiscate all arms and ammunition in them, if those arms and ammunition are intended for Indian and Persian ports, and if they are the property of British, Persian or Muscat subjects.

We have also given permission to those vessels of war to search Muscat vessels in Indian and Persian waters suspected to contain arms and ammunition for Indian and Persian ports, and to confiscated the said arms and ammunition.

III
Notification issued by the Sultan of Muscat establishing a bonded warehouse for arms and ammunition, dated 4th June, 1912

Whereas large quantities of arms and ammunition are at present stored without proper control in private buildings, distributed in this our town of Mascot, and thus exposed to the risk of attack, robbery or fire, we, impressed by the serious menace to the safety of our capital arising therefrom, have resolved to remedy this state of affairs, in accordance with the needs of the times and the requirements of our municipal administration, by the construction and establishment of a special customs house magazine or arms warehouse for the storage of arms and ammunition under safe precautions. It is proposed to introduce this warehouse arrangement from on or about 1st September next. It will be conducted on the following general lines:-

Firstly, On or after 1st September all arms and ammunition or parts thereof imported into my territories will be taken direct from the steamer to the special arms warehouse, to the control of which a special Superintendent will be appointed by us.

Secondly, Similarly all arms-dealers in my territories will be required to deposit stocks remaining in their hands on 1st September in the said warehouse. Any trader offending against this regulation will, in addition to other penalties, render all future consignments of arms and ammunition arriving in his name liable to confiscation, unless and until he complies with this regulation in full.

Thirdly, No arms will be allowed to issue from the warehouse until duty has been fully paid thereon to the Customs Superintendent in the usual way.

Fourthly, The withdrawal of arms from the warehouse will be regulated by the issue of special licenses prepared by the Superintendent and countersigned by myself.

Fifthly, Such licenses will not be granted to traders but only to approved individual purchasers or their duly authorised agents on the production of satisfactory proof that the number, quantity and destination of arms, ammunition, etc., to be withdrawn from the warehouse are free from justifiable objection.

Sixthly, All arms issuing from the warehouse will be marked with a special warehouse mark and serial number.

Seventhly, Special rules will be drawn up providing for and regulating the issue to approved traders of sample stock for exhibition in their shops.

Eighthly, Rules providing for the collection of arms warehouse charges, on stocks therein deposited, will be drawn up on the analogy of the present Customs House Regulations for the levy of such fees on general merchandise.

Ninthy, Special rules will be drawn up governing the transfer between traders' stocks deposited in the arms warehouse.

Tenthly, Special relaxations will be arranged for in favour of flint-locks, muzzle-loading gun powder and caps in reasonable quantities.

Lastly, Detailed rules embodying the above principles are under preparation and will be published in due course for the further information of all concerned.
18) A letter from Sh. Muhammad b. ‘Abdallāh al-Khalīfī to his father, dated 3rd Ramadān, 1331/7th August, 1913
20) List of Assistance from Zanzibar to some Notables of al-Qābil in Oman, dated 25th Rabī' 1, 1331/13th April, 1913