Part Two

Case Studies in Citizenship
4.0 The Influence of the New Right

Broad macro-level discussions of the influence of the new right, in whatever form, are interesting but ultimately inconclusive (for example, Barry et al. 1989). Some authors perceive variable new right influence across many policy areas (Flynn 1989, Ashford and Jordan 1993), others (Marsh and Rhodes 1992) emphasise that there were many other interests acting on the Thatcher Governments and care must be taken not to assign Thatcherism a causal influence in every instance of policy change.

Cockett (1994) has suggested that after the early 1980s the new right think-tanks declined in influence and 'ideological Thatcherism' came to an end. But this is problematic. Why should this be the case if the Thatcherite grouping had secured a powerful position within the Conservative Party and Government? And what then provides the explanation for further policy developments, particularly the apparent radicalism of the third term reforms? Cockett's concentration on what he terms the 'economic revolution' - the neoliberal economic, and particularly monetarist, agenda - neglects other strands and the continued development of new right ideas.

The new right themselves are, unsurprisingly, not taken to be wholly reliable when considering their own influence. The Adam Smith Institute's The First
Hundred (1989) purported to note one hundred of the ASI’s ideas which had been taken up by the Government during the 1980s. Milton Friedman (1977) claimed that new right ideas have become ‘dominant’ because of ‘brute experience’, the ‘obvious’ deficiencies of any other forms of social, political and economic organisation. Neither type of claim is sufficient. Yet without the new right, can a full picture of the movements in contemporary politics be developed?

There is little doubt that the new right has altered to some degree the content of contemporary political debate. In the field of welfare, for example, the new right has helped identify the issues thought important to reform. As George and Wilding (p.45, 1994) have commented: "..[a] valuable element in New Right social analysis is its breadth. It was the New Right, effectively, who brought key questions about state welfare to the forefront of public discussion. What is the impact of state welfare on behaviour? What are the implications of the extension of social rights without the parallel extension of obligations? How can state welfare be used to induce socially desirable behaviour?" The ‘underclass’, dependency and individual responsibility have become dominant themes (though the recurrence of similar debates throughout the history of social provision should not be neglected). But again, this is very general, and could be disputed. The new right could be characterised as purely reactive, picking up on changes in public opinion, or the impact of structural factors. Alone, such a perspective does
not secure the notion that the new right has been influential in shaping and constructing the debate on many aspects of political activity, indeed altering commonly-held views.

4.1 Role of the Case Studies

Instead, a more micro-level case needs to be made. The case studies presented here are meant to be illustrative as well as interpretative.

First, they are meant to investigate the influence of the new right, as far as possible, in key policy areas. Second, to investigate aspects of the nature of 'Thatcherism', discussed later [chapter nine]. Third, to illustrate the argument concerning the nature of new right conceptions of citizenship. Fourth, and relatedly, to illustrate the analysis of citizenship - as a site of conflict, as potentially regressive as well as progressive phenomenon [chapter three]. Fifth, to examine the influence of new right conceptions of citizenship in terms of actual policy change. Sixth, and as a corollary to this, to speculate on the importance of political ideas, theories and discourses.

They begin with the assumption that the new right think-tanks were important in some manner, since their work is noted, but not that they were necessarily influential or successful. Especially important to recognise is that the relationship between the think-tanks and Thatcherism was not necessarily direct, clearly identifiable or precise. Typical deficiencies in accounts of the role of ideology in public policy should be avoided. Freeden
(1990) warns against assuming the powerful role of individuals without locating them in the intersections between people and ideas, texts being taken as doctrines (particularly apt in the new right's 'pamphlet warfare') setting up clearly identifiable chains of causation, the imposition of authorial intention and the assumption of the basis of ideologies in elites. But, as he comments (p.24, ibid): "If politics is indeed the art of the possible, the range of the possible is the realm of ideology, and ideological innovators and distributors must be pursued for the vital clues they offer to our understanding of political choice, wherever such clues may be located."

Yet it would be ironic if having accepted that the think-tanks were significant because they fought to open-up previously dismissed or ignored policy options, we did not appreciate that policy-makers considered more alternatives subsequently. The think-tanks provided a maximum agenda from which the Thatcher Governments could choose, depending on administrative, political and economic convenience.

The first case study concerns the Education Reform Act (1988) [chapter five], the second the Community Charge [chapter six], the third 'workfare' programmes [chapter seven], and the fourth the Conservative notion of 'active citizenship' [chapter eight]. Hence three investigate policy changes, and one examines a predominantly rhetorical campaign.
Chapter Five

The Education Reform Act 1988

"Thus, in a society in which the attaining of social privileges depends more and more closely on possession of academic credentials, the school does not only have the function of ensuring discreet succession to a bourgeois estate which can no longer be transmitted directly and openly. This privileged instrument of the bourgeois sociodicy which confers on the privileged the supreme privilege of not seeing themselves as privileged manages the more easily to convince the disinherited that they owe their scholastic and social destiny to their lack of gifts or merits, because in matters of culture absolute dispossession excludes awareness of being dispossessed."¹

5.0 Introduction

"I would sum up the Bill's 169 pages in three words - standards, freedom and choice."²

A benign view of the Education Reform Act of 1988 (ERA) might suggest it contained measures to enhance citizenship in education: by encouraging more parental participation, enforcing greater public accountability, guaranteeing standards nationally, and extending choice. However, the ERA represents a project to control education, rather than further genuine citizenship.

¹ Bourdieu and Passeron (p.210, 1994).
² Kenneth Baker, Hansard, 1/12/87, col.780.
5.1 Policy Outline

The ERA was perhaps the most significant piece of education law making for England and Wales since the 1944 Education Act, unique in effecting both schools and higher education. Given this scope, this case study will be concerned only with the measures affecting secondary schooling. The reforms covered three main areas - Grant-Maintained schools, the National Curriculum, and Local Management of Schools.

5.1a Grant-Maintained Schools

Grant-maintained (GM) schools are funded not through local authorities but directly by central government. Any existing state secondary school would be able to become a GM school, if the governors, parents and the Secretary of State for Education agree. The GM school's governing body becomes responsible for the admissions policy of the school and its implementation (including for exclusion and appeals against non-admission), as well as owner of the school site, employer of the staff and responsible for all aspects of employment practice.

The value of the annual maintenance grant of each GM school is recovered by the government from the LEA (Local Education Authority) it opted-out of, and the cost of other grants (capital grants and 'special purpose' grants) to GM schools is covered by a reduction in the level of funding to LEAs generally.

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5.1b National Curriculum
After the 1944 Act, legal control of the curriculum in maintained schools was ascribed to LEAs; in practice they never exercised their powers over the curriculum, which effectively had become the responsibility of heads and their senior staff (though of course, the external examinations remained a strong influence in upper forms).

The ERA proposals for a National Curriculum (NC) concerned the years of compulsory schooling 5-16. The original proposals outlined the required 'foundation subjects' - ten compulsory subjects including the three core disciplines of Maths, English and Science, together with seven others: a modern foreign language, technology, history, geography, art, music, physical education. There would be statutory regulations covering the full ability range for the three core subjects at the ages of 7, 11, 14, and 16, and also attainment targets for the other foundation subjects. Further statutory regulations would prescribe programmes of study, setting a common content to the foundation subjects, and there would be externally set and moderated assessment tests for the foundation subjects. Further regulations require the dissemination of detailed information - concerning the curriculum, attainment targets, programmes of study and assessment results. In particular, aggregated assessment and examination results would be published each year for each age group, nationally, for each local authority and for each school.
The non-statutory School Curriculum Development Committee was to be replaced by a permanent statutory National Curriculum Council (NCC), to advise the Secretary of State and consult on his behalf, concerning the maintenance and updating of the NC. Subject Working Groups (WGs) were to be established for each foundation subject, to advise on attainment targets and programmes of study. The new Schools Examination and Assessment Council (SEAC) would advise on assessment and examinations. The legislation on the NC and assessment applies to all LEA and GM schools in England and Wales, while City Technology Colleges are required to adhere to the substance of the NC.

5.1c Local Management of Schools (LMS)

This was the delegation of financial responsibility from local authorities to schools (sometimes also referred to as 'Local Financial Management'). It was developed and refined over many years, by a series of steps taken at the start of each financial year. Prior to LMS, the level of funding of schools had been determined by decisions of the LEA Education Committees according to a variety of criteria (which were complex and subject to local factors such as lobbying and political considerations, and not always open to public scrutiny). Under LMS, the budget of each school is determined according to a formula that applies across the whole LEA, delegated to schools governing bodies. LEAs were obliged to draw up a scheme for LMS according to criteria laid down by government and submitted to the Secretary of State for
approval. LEAs have to publish details of their expenditure per pupil year by year and school by school for all their schools. Further, for all remaining LEA schools, authorities may not normally fix an admission limit for a school lower than its 'standard number' (of places, as defined by section 15 of the 1980 Education Act). 3

5.2 Interpretations of ERA

There are a number of existing (and often inter-related) interpretations of this policy change. It has been seen as representing the 'triumph' of the free-market right in education (Flude and Hammer 1990, Demaine 1988, Simon 1988). 4 The system would in effect be marketized. The diversity predicted would produce a hierarchy of schools (Bristol Polytechnic Education Study Group, in Bash and Coulby 1989). This would have divisive effects, to Ball (p.214, 1990): "..signalling the break-up of a national state education system." 5

3 The 1944 Act (echoed in the 1980 Act) in effect subordinated parental preference to the provision of efficient education and the efficient use of resources. This was replaced by the ERA (section 26).

4 Baker sometimes used neoliberal discourses: "..it will be for the parents to judge performance - not the producers but the consumers" (speech to North of England Education Conference, 6th January 1988, quoted p.66 Cultural Studies Birmingham 1991, see also his speech to Conservative Party Conference, The Guardian, 8th October 1986).

5 Unsurprisingly, Bob Dunn (Minister of State during the Act's passage) denied this: "..more and more specialized, differentiated schools" [could develop] "without any one being regarded as inferior to others" (Education 1988). But this appears to contradict the other Government justification for greater diversity: that clearer differences between schools would act as a greater incentive for more poorly-regarded schools to raise their standards.
Ball identifies in particular the LMS provisions as most significant, replacing the principle of equal access to education for all with the principle of differentiation in the market place. The ERA was predicted to lead to the re-introduction of selection (Whitty, in Bash and Coulby 1991). Since popular schools could not expand beyond their standard number, they would be tempted covertly to be selective, thereby boosting their assessment test scores, and further disadvantaging those unable to compete in this market. It would also make schools more 'business-like' with governors acting as boards of directors (Coopers and Lybrand 1988). Hence it represents the capture by neoliberals of conservative education, which it is suggested will make it difficult for Conservatives to develop any coherent plan for education in the future.

The ERA is not regarded as new in this sense, because the 'privatisation' of the system had been developing under the Thatcher Governments, via the use of public money to support education and training by private providers and the attempt to make the public sector behave more like the private sector (Whitty and Menter 1989). The ERA merely accelerated the trend, and

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6 This would create an inner city, working class and black 'educational underclass', hence (p.103, ibid): "...grant-maintained status seems to exemplify what is at the heart of contemporary Conservative ideology: schools operating in the open market (thus satisfying the liberal tendency), while the central state ensures the reproduction of a stratified society."
produced better rewards for schools able to compete well in the market. Within these conceptions, measures which further central control do so to reinforce the market. So for example, the NC enables testing which along with open enrolment and LMS, helps parents become consumers (Bash and Coulby 1991). State intervention was needed to protect the market from vested interests and restrictive practices, and support the appropriate sense of 'self-help', enterprise and 'common' national identity (Whitty, in Flude and Hammer 1990). Thus the marketization of the system is in part disguised. 7 Others suggest that although the reforms are significant, the marketization interpretation has to be moderated, since LEAs were retained and state education was still freely available (Fitz and Halpin 1991). A variant of the marketization interpretation suggests that the ERA represents an interim step towards a voucher system, by identifying individual school costs through devolved budgets, then per capita costs (Demaine 1988, Maclure 1988), and by shifting allocative decisions to consumers from officials (Raab, in Ashford and Jordan 1993). 8

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7 Hence allowing advocates to claim (Lawlor, p.9, 1988b): "It is not an attack on state education but on the monopoly of local authority-delivered education. It will make for greater flexibility in the state system and give parents a wider choice of schools. Indeed, it will strengthen state education by leading to more, better, state schools."

8 These interpretations are supported by the new right's recognition of the possible need for such an interim step (Seldon, p.45-54, 1986, Pirie, p.36, 1982, and interview with Sexton, Ball, p.88, 1990).
To some, the ERA represents a compromise between the new right factions, and so lacks internal coherence (Whitty 1990, Bash and Coulby 1991). This explains its centralising and decentralising, modernising and restorationist impulses. It seeks to satisfy economic liberalism and socially-conservative control (Dale 1990). Hence (Ranson, p.13, 1988): "Schools may be 'privatised' progressively but their reproduction of culture (the curriculum) will be nationalised (or anglicised)." Aside from its actual effects, the ERA can be seen as an attempt to reunify the new right alliance (Johnson 1989, Johnson, Cultural Studies Birmingham 1991).

Other interpretations may agree with some of the above, but suggest also that the ERA was designed to disable opposing forces. The new right had long complained about the 'producer capture' within education, and hence the ERA was meant to neutralise professional resistance from teachers and educational administrators (Johnson, CSB 1991, Hickox and Moore, in Flude and Hammer 1990). This was legitimated by criticising standards and evoking 'parent power'. Once the 'problem' of institutional and professional autonomy was resolved, the new right could force a return to the traditional version of liberal-humanist education, before progressivism and educationalism, that is teacher expertise and theory (Whitty ibid). Similarly, it has been suggested that the ERA represents part of the attack on local government,
whose role in education was unpopular with the right. The power is taken away from the former partners - teachers' organisations and LEAs - and given to governing bodies and the Secretary of State (Fitz and Halpin 1991). The NC and testing are needed to make sure the system does not degenerate into chaos (Troyna and Carrington 1990). Interest-group politics has been replaced by an audience of dispersed decision-makers - parents, governors and industry (Raab 1989).

These interpretations are partially correct, but do not grasp the overall project in education. To do so, it is necessary first to examine the way new right discourses set the form of the debate over education, and then their influence on the ERA policy process.

5.3 The New Right Project in Education

"It [Labour's education programme] attended to the machinery of reform - the comprehensive school - but not to its actual conditions of existence, its real practices and strategic social purposes. Fabian-like, it assumed that all these 'details' were best left to the experts and professionals. Believing ultimately in

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9 For example, the Centre for Policy Studies' Deputy Director of Studies argued: "The root of the problem is the LEA itself" (Lawlor 1988a). LEAs should be limited to merely distributing money to schools with their services put out to tender (Lawlor 1988b). Similarly (Thatcher, p.8, 1987): "There's no reason at all why local authorities should have a monopoly of free education. What principle suggests this is right?"

10 The idea that GM schools and LCS will free LEAs from detailed oversight of schools and allow them to manage the system as a whole is largely rhetorical when considered alongside the restrictions on local educational initiatives via the NC (Maclure 1988) and the reforms of local government finance [chapter six].
the neutrality of the state, Labour does seem to have subscribed to the erroneous view that 'Education should really be taken out of politics'. It is not an error Margaret Thatcher's government is likely to make." ¹¹

Though there had always been a strand of right-wing thought which disagreed with the post-war 'settlement', it was only in the late 1960s and early 1970s that a movement began to coalesce. ¹² A group of academics and political commentators began to give voice to concerns in the Black Papers, five of which were published between 1969 and 1977. These argued educational standards (especially numeracy and literacy) were declining, encouraged by indiscipline and mediocrity in part fostered by politically-motivated teachers teaching critical approaches. They formed the basis of a powerful symbolic crusade against 'schooling out of control' (Ball 1990). Yet these remained relatively marginal right-wing concerns until the mid-1970s, Callaghan's 'Great Educational Debate' and the subsequent (ineffectual) Green Paper from the Labour Government. ¹³ By the time of the 1979

¹¹ Hall, S., 'Education in Crisis', chapter one, p.3, Wolpe and Donald (1983).
¹³ Callaghan (p.333, 1976) denied that his speech was: "...a clarion call to the Black Paperites", but it assigned a credibility to their notion of crisis (as Brian Cox, co-editor of the Papers, noted, Mack, p.589, 1977).
General Election, the right-wing groupings had formed quite a tight network with distinctive education policies, influential both within the Conservative Party and beyond. It is worth examining this crucial period to understand better how the new right constructed the 'crisis in education', and eventually reaped its rewards (Neave 1989).

5.3a 'Voucherism'

However, before this, it is important to note that previous to this period the neoliberal right had a vision for education - that of 'voucherism'. The details of proposals for a voucher system differed widely\(^{14}\), but all derived from fundamental economic liberal principles.\(^{15}\) The idea of universal exits for all parents by distributing earmarked purchasing power in place of providing 'nil-priced schooling' (in the language of the new right), had been advocated by Friedman in 1955 and revised in 1962 (Friedman 1962). The so-called 'Friedman voucher' was taken up by some British writers. Peacock and Wiseman (1964) were the first economists in Britain to examine the separation of the supply of schools from its financing by the

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\(^{14}\) Maynard (p.26-34, 1975), suggests that there are eight main variants (also Seldon 1986). For three examples, see Barnes (Economic Affairs October, 1981), Peacock (Economic Affairs January 1983), and West (Economic Affairs October 1982).

\(^{15}\) Friedman and Friedman (p.191, 1980): "In schooling, the parents and child are the consumers, the teacher and school administrator the producers. Centralization in schooling has meant larger size units, a reduction of the ability of consumers to choose, and an increase in the power of the producers [whose] interests as teachers, as administrators, as union officials are different from their interests as parents and from the interests of the parents whose children they teach."
state by parents enabled in a free market by vouchers, grants or loans (also West 1965, Harris and Seldon 1963). The voucher was advocated subsequently by the pressure group Friends of the Education Voucher Experiment by Representative Regions (FEVER), founded in December 1974. The campaign for the introduction of a voucher system is an important subtext in the development of Thatcherite education policy.

5.3b The Educational New Right Forms

Though the originators of the Black Papers claimed to disapprove of political labels, they acted as a catalyst for the formation of a highly interconnected new right educational movement. There was the National Council for Educational Standards (NCES), the Conservative Philosophy Group, the 'Buckinghamites' (for an independent University of Buckingham), and groups lobbying for an assisted places scheme. Especially important were the networks around the Institute of Economic Affairs (IEA), since it was the most productive think-tank and a focus for voucherism. The IEA's Ralph Harris was a Black Paper writer and had an active interest in education, the IEA housed the National Council for Educational Standards and was the organisational base for the

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16 After support for a motion to promote parent-power through experimental vouchers was proposed at the September 1974 Conference of the National Council of Women. FEVER aimed to turn the academic and intellectual campaign for vouchers into a populist one (Seldon, p.13, 1986).

17 For example, Cox and Dyson (p.154, p.157-8, 1970).

18 Formed 1972, founder members included Brian Cox, Dyson, Boyson and Maude.
Buckingham campaign. Max Beloff, the principal of Buckingham, was chair of a Party advisory group on policy in the early 1980s. Mark Carlisle's personal advisor as Shadow Minister and as Secretary of State was the neoliberal Stuart Sexton, and Dr Rhodes Boyson, a Black Paper editor, was associated with neoliberals as early as 1967 (Seldon, p.13, 1986) and active in Conservative Party education policy-making by the mid-1970s. Boyson and Harris founded the Churchill Press/Constitutional Book Club. Boyson wrote two important texts - Right Turn (1970) and The Crisis in Education (1975), syntheses of Friedmanite 'freedom' and Black Paper 'excellence' and 'standards'.

5.3c The Educational New Right Advances

Though the Party had failed to construct a radical education agenda for the 1974 General Election, by the later half of the 1970s the distinctive Black Paper position (parental choice and educational standards) began to make significant connections within the Party (helped of course by the accession of Thatcher to the leadership). In particular, in 1980, the Centre for

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19 This ran 1969-79 (but was re-started in 1993 by John Raybould), to counter the 'undermining influence' on traditional educational values by progressives. It published preservationists including Tibor Szamuely, Russell Lewis, Anthony Dyson, as well as Harris and Boyson.

20 Brynin (1993) has criticised the 'myths' which legitimated the Thatcherite reforms - falling standards, indiscipline, failing schools (based on only one criteria), and interference from LEAs.

21 Indeed, to Knight (1990) the period 1975 to 1983 is distinct because the Party began to make educational policy in line with conservative philosophy (sound basic skills, selection at some age, choice of schools and academic excellence including the
Policy Study’s Education Study Group (CPSESG) was established, with Baroness Cox as Chairman and John Marks as Secretary. Cox, Marks and Fred Naylor (contributors to the Black Papers) had been associated with the NCES before joining the CPSESG. In 1982, the first major publication for the CPSESG proposed reforms for higher standards and ‘centres of excellence’ in particular subject areas, as well as vouchers (Cox and Marks 1982).

‘Excellence’, in education became the key discourse (incorporated into The Right Approach 1976), though the educational new right had also appeared to have nurtured and captured parental desire for choice and freedom. Boyson became especially valuable in being able to foster concern at the fate of intelligent working class children, and linking this to a general debate on social morality.22 Around this time, as a result of the campaign on standards, he appeared to anticipate the NC23, and propose a system of national testing.24

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22 Boyson (p.137, 1975): “We shall not improve the quality of education in this country until we return to a sense of purpose, continuity and authority in our general attitude to life and society.”

23 (p.141, 1975): “It is not difficult to draw up a basic curriculum occupying some 60-80 per cent of teaching time in the infant, primary and secondary schools. All that would be necessary is the stipulation of standards in numeracy and basic literacy, geographical, historical and scientific knowledge to be attained at various ages by the average child. Achievement could then be monitored by nationally set and marked examinations, or by HMIs [Her Majesty’s Inspectors].” Three years earlier he had
Particularly important in the development of policy for the 1979 General Election were John Ranelagh and Stuart Sexton. Sexton's ideas included proposals for minimum standards and a minimum curriculum, an independent inspectorate for all schools and schools of excellence with particular subject specialisms (see Sexton, 'Evolution by Choice', p.86-9 Cox and Boyson 1977). He combined both neoliberal and neoconservative influences - the market (via a voucher system) would resolve the problems in education, and parents would be the best guardians of standards (Knight, p.143, 1990).

5.3d 1979-83

Though slogans of parental choice and educational standards allowed a broad appeal and gathered up constituencies of dissatisfaction, once in office tensions were unavoidable. The first Thatcher administration did not focus its energies on education directly, but dealt with it by stealth - it aimed to reduce spending on education through various local fiscal controls and the reform of local government expenditure. The Education Act (1980) included the Assisted Places Scheme, for pupils to transfer from

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24 In the editorial to the fourth Black Paper (Cox and Boyson 1975).
25 Conservative Research Department Education Desk Officer, 1975-77, and Education Advisor to Conservative Opposition, 1975-9 respectively.
26 As Knight (p.113, 1990) notes, all of these proposals, with the exception of schools of excellence (implemented by Baker 1986-7) would be implemented by Carlisle and Joseph from 1979-86.
state schools to the private sector on a subsidised basis, required schools to publish their examination results, and the right for parents to appeal against the LEA’s school allocation for their children and to send children to schools across LEA boundaries. Though modest changes, this was the first time the system was opened up to the notion of consumer-driven parental choice.

Boyson was marginalised increasingly from 1979. It was suggested that the appointment of Mark Carlisle (resistant to the pro-voucher arguments of Boyson and others) as Education Secretary was a clear indication of Thatcher’s unwillingness to make radical experiments and desire to dilute the new right’s influence (Stephenson 1980). Despite this pause, Sexton was able to establish himself (as Carlisle’s Special Advisor) as a dominant force on the educational right. In September 1981, Carlisle was dismissed and replaced by Joseph, and Boyson was given greater prominence. Yet in general between 1981 and 1983 the radicalism of new right proposals ran up against the substantial legacies of public education (partnership, the role of LEAs and the autonomy of professionals).

It was during Joseph’s tenure as Secretary of State (1981-86) that ‘excellence’ really began to influence policy. ‘Sound knowledge’ was promoted, meaning traditional basic subjects plus business studies and technology, to the exclusion of peace studies, sociology and politics. Between September 1981 and
June 1983 Joseph launched a series of initiatives - more rigorous teacher training, pupil records, the transformation of the exam system - and pursued agreement on a national curriculum (Knight, p.156 1990). A 'curriculum common to all pupils' (for secondary schools) was advocated in the DES's *The School Curriculum* (DES 1981), but later retreated from.

In its place, the 'new selection' (differentiation on what was taught to different pupils) came to be preferred. This again derived from the new right. Brian Cox's (p.23, 1981) diagnosis of the 'crisis' demanded discrimination between good and bad, and this: "..involves selection, the choice of high standards, the rejection of the third-rate. Unless our school system reflects such hierarchies of value it will inevitably degenerate into relativism and impotence". Similarly, the NCES was reinforcing the case for selection (Cox, Marks and Pomian-Srzednicki 1983, also CPS 1981). Hence though Joseph did not pursue all of the new right's proposals, the main thrust of education policy was in keeping with its general philosophy.

The main division concerned the voucher, which came to cause a four-way split within the Party and the right - between LEA Tories, the 'wets', neoliberal voucherites and the Black Paper traditionalists.
Joseph's own plan was rejected. Beloff (chair of the Party policy group) argued that central government should accept more responsibility because LEAs were defying demands for more choice and higher standards. A report leaked to The Times revealed that vouchers were being considered for the 1983 manifesto, which lead to Beloff (an ex-Black Paperite) opposing the neoliberals with an essentially neoconservative report. As a result, the Party entered the 1983 General Election undecided.

5.3e 1983-87
This is a crucial period to understanding the genesis of the ERA, and can be divided into two main phases. The first was marked by division within the educational new right, particularly with neoliberal disappointment at the rejection of the voucher, though progress was made on a common curriculum. The second saw the new right unify to an extent, intensify campaigning and produce more flexible proposals for reform.

In the first phase, despite Joseph declaring the voucher dead, its advocates kept faith with the beneficial effects they claimed it would have on state

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27 Lord Tebbit has revealed that Joseph pressed for the introduction of a voucher system, but was defeated in Cabinet and was personally very disappointed (interview, The Makers of Modern Politics, 'Keith Joseph: Ideologist of the Right', BBC Radio 4, Sunday 14th May, 1995). Publicly, he admitted that the introduction of a properly-tested voucher system would be too costly and time-consuming (Hansard, House of Commons Debates, vol. 62, col. 290, written answers to questions, 22nd June, 1984).
education. Neoliberals and traditionalists re-grouped around their own ideas, by 1985 they were in direct rivalry. Boyson, who linked the right's campaigns and the Government, was dropped. This was seen as an attempt to free ministerial decisions from think-tanks and heal Party divisions.

Joseph seemed to neglect the neoliberal right, and ideas were developing around a national curriculum. Significantly, the pursuit of 'excellence' came to mean the pursuit of clear objectives. In his speech to the 1984 North of England Education Conference, Joseph called for a broad consensus regarding the definition of objectives for the curriculum for pupils aged 5-16, including content of subjects and objectives for attainment. Better Schools (March 1985) downplayed parental choice with only modest increases in representation on governing boards, and emphasised education as a national public service with the need to raise standards judged by modern (industrial training) rather than past demands. Though it offered no hope to neoliberals, it did propose a full basic curriculum in all primary schools and a 'balanced curriculum' in all secondary schools, including an understanding and knowledge of the values and traditions of British society. Hence it has come to be regarded as the missing link between the earlier new right campaigns and the later development of the ERA (Johnson, CSB 1991). But despite Joseph claiming at the 1984 Conservative Party conference: "We now have a
vision of what education is about"\(^{28}\), there is no
evidence at this stage of a broad Thatcherite
initiative in education being assembled (such as the
ERA package).\(^{29}\)

For this to happen, and for the neoliberal new right
in particular to regain the momentum, it took a second
phase. There were two main developments which re-
energised the new right project in education. First,
interest in the voucher, amongst the new right and
government, revived in 1985-6 (Seldon 1986).\(^{30}\) This was
helped by the appointment of Robert Dunn as Schools
Minister in June 1983. He was linked to the pro-
voucher new right by his earlier role as Parliamentary
Private Secretary to Boyson and member of the Carlton
Club (Knight, p.167, 1990). Second, new right
campaigning revived between 1984 and 1987, with a
plethora of think-tank reports and papers from groups

\(^{29}\) Though Knight (p.181, 1990) claims that during 1983-4 the Prime
Minister's Policy Unit was seriously considering IEA and CPS
proposals.

\(^{30}\) Whether the voucher was blocked for administrative or political
reasons is difficult to discover, since there are differing
claims made. Seldon (1986) argues it was merely 'political'
(meaning it was blocked by more powerful Cabinet members
including Thatcher), because the administrative objections were
either: "..secondary, implausible or unconvincing" (p.18, ibid),
and because Joseph had announced his intellectual interest
(letter from Joseph to FEVER, December 1981, quoted p.36, ibid).
But Nicholas Ridley (p.93, 1991): "Successive education
secretaries were asked by Margaret Thatcher to study it again;
they all came to the conclusion that it was undesirable. She
remained convinced of the need to find some variant of the scheme
which produced parental choice; indeed, just before she fell from
office she talked of finding a way of making the money follow the
pupil after she had won her fourth election. But she never
persuaded any of her secretaries of state to produce a workable
scheme."

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with overlapping memberships.\textsuperscript{31} This generated intensive debate within the Party, from which the authors of the 1987 manifesto, and what was to become the ERA, drew upon.

In 1984, Joseph re-emphasised the importance of differentiation within (comprehensive) schools and particularly in the context of a recent failure to reintroduce selection.\textsuperscript{32} In 1985, Thatcher let it be known that: “I would like to bring back what are called direct grant schools. We are looking at that”.\textsuperscript{33} Joseph admitted that the DES was considering the possibility of a limited experiment with the restoration of direct grant schools.\textsuperscript{34} Joseph and Patten pushed these ‘Crown schools’\textsuperscript{35} as an alternative to vouchers, which Thatcher had re-iterated an interest in. Bob Dunn also argued for direct grant schools, but criticised Joseph’s reliance on


\textsuperscript{32} “If it be so, as it is, that selection between schools is largely out, then I emphasise that there must be differentiation within schools”, interview, ‘Weekend World’ programme, ITV, reported Times Educational Supplement (TES), 17th February, 1984.

\textsuperscript{33} Reported TES, 19 July 1985.

\textsuperscript{34} Reported TES, 2 August 1985.

\textsuperscript{35} The first proposal for Crown Schools came in Cox (p.22, 1981). According to Pring (1986), the Crown schools proposal was promoted within the DES as an alternative to growing new right influence which was calling for the extension of the privatisation process to state education. Whether true or not, the Crown schools (primarily to serve inner city areas, as reported in The Times, 1st April 1986) which would act as opt-out centrally-controlled models of superior teaching to other LEA schools, or US-style magnet schools (Cox 1985), and the consideration given to funding a small number of direct grant primary schools, could be seen as precursors to CTCs and then GM schools.
management rather than the market. He argued the ideal destination of policy to be a system of independent schools accountable to parents, free to run their own affairs and budgets, achieved by diverse routes and in evolutionary steps.\(^{36}\) Dunn was a committed neoliberal, advised by Sexton.\(^{37}\) Johnson (ibid) speculates that with Oliver Letwin as well, who worked with Dunn and was education advisor to Joseph and Thatcher, Dunn was perhaps central to the formulating of a more practical neoliberal strategy for the Government.

Instead of splitting, as Beloff and the neoliberals did in 1983, the new right factions now unified. Arguments for the traditional curriculum and choice were combined (for example, Hillgate 1986, 1987, whose stance was traditionalist and anti-multiculturalist, but also anti-state pro-market). The new right tendency was now remarkably tightly-knit.\(^{38}\) Schemes from these groups proliferated, and by the end of 1986 a common approach was becoming apparent, including opting-out, open enrolment, financial deregulation\(^{39}\), the strengthening of parental involvement and model or

\(^{36}\) TES, 2nd August 1985. To Johnson (CSB 1991) this speech is the earliest example of flexible strategic thinking. Dunn took the logic of the voucher (the educational market) and suggested there were many ways to achieve it. Seldon (p.15, 1986) had always hoped that: "...the principle of the voucher would not, after all, be abandoned but would perhaps be incorporated, possibly under a different name, into education policy."

\(^{37}\) TES, 5th March 1985. Sexton was now in the IEA Education Unit.

\(^{38}\) See The Guardian, 30th December 1986.

\(^{39}\) Per capita funding would not only increase accountability to parents but also give teachers professional and financial independence without 'interference' from local government (Marks 1987, reiterating the Whose Schools? proposal that schools be funded by direct per capita grants).
'magnet' schools. The proliferation of proposals led to Patten and Joseph facing greater pressure from the right.

Neoliberals became more effective as they abandoned the dogmatic letter of the voucher scheme in favour of an array of free market strategies (Johnson, CSB 1991). For example, the Adam Smith Institute (ASI, Butler 1985) was putting forward proposals to short-circuit obstacles towards a voucher-like scheme; effective choice between state schools via open entry encouraging incentives for expansion and quality, greater independence for schools via governing bodies, and the direct funding of schools from the centre on children enrolled. To the ASI, the combined effect of these schools would be to create a market in education. 40 In 1986, an almost identical scheme to that suggested by the ASI was proposed by the 'No Turning Back' Group (some of the members of which - Christopher Chope, Michael Fallon, Robert Jones and Michael Forsyth - had links with the ASI). The Group extended its earlier proposals (Brown et al. 1985) including a scheme to allow parents and teachers to start their own schools with state support, by proposing governing bodies should have responsibility for administering schools and determining educational priorities, direct funding from central government, and open entry/enrolment (Brown et al. 1986). As with

40 The ASI's Education Study Group at this time included Digby Anderson, Baroness Cox, Professor Anthony Flew, Professor David Marsland, Lawrence Norcross, and James Pawsey MP.
the earlier ASI proposals, the direct voucher scheme was regarded as politically unrealistic and so unhelpful. Whose Schools? (Hillgate 1986) argued that schools should be owned by individual trusts, subject to open enrolment, the right to control their own admissions, and the publication of information relevant to parental choice.41 It also supported magnet schools, via the extension of the CTCs programme.

Kenneth Baker replaced Joseph in May 1986 - the team included Dunn, balanced by George Walden (a traditionalist on curriculum matters). One of Baker’s first acts was to dismiss Sexton (who in October 1986 was appointed Director of the IEA Education Unit), but the key is that the new right had provided more practical, incremental and politically plausible proposals for reform.

5.4 The ERA Policy Process

This pressure for reform is important to understanding the development of the ERA. The new right’s campaign continued through 1987 and 1988, as the ERA was being formulated. Sexton (1987), written in advance of the publication of the ERA proposals and based on a private paper prepared for Joseph, argued for vouchers, comparative testing, the publication of results, the abolition of teacher unions and fixed rates of pay, and the privatisation of LEA services. Though this meant the IEA was still committed to the

41 The Hillgate Group included Caroline Cox, Jessica Douglas-Home, John Marks, Laurence Norcross and Roger Scruton.
eventual introduction of a voucher scheme, for tactical reasons (in common with other new right groups) it had moved to embracing a gradualist approach: first to a framework that was consumer-led, then some variant of the voucher. Hillgate (1987), a response to the proposals and developing the earlier Whose Schools ?, was more neoconservative in wishing to constrain parental choice by the prescription of aspects of the curriculum against progressivism and egalitarianism (also Palmer 1986). While allowing minority groups to run their own schools they wanted to integrate them fully into the 'national' culture and political allegiance. The group bridged the gap between neoliberal and neoconservative agendas.42 For example, they argued that open enrolment and opting out were not just beneficial to make state education more responsive to its consumers', but could also be used as a force against progressivism. Other publications concentrated on the curriculum. Marenbon (1987) argued for simple imparted English teaching,

42 Sometimes this left them appearing contradictory. For example, while a national curriculum is "alien to the British educational tradition" (Hillgate, p.10, 1987) and "concentrates too much power in the hands of central government" (p.11, ibid), it could be used in the short-term to re-educate consumers freeing them from 'dependency' on professionals and in the long-term render the NC unnecessary. This appeared a slight shift from Hillgate (p.7, ibid): "We must first open schools to the demand for their product...Until this is done...the attempt to impose a national curriculum by law will be construed as yet another exercise in arbitrary state control." Sexton rejected the NC completely: "...the most effective national curriculum is that set by the market itself, that set by the consumers of the education service", (Sexton 1988d, also O'Keefe 1987, 1988, McCrum 1987, Flew, in Green 1991). For O'Keefe (p.105, 1987): "The school curriculum has to be denationalized."
Beattie (1987), Deuchar (1987) and Kedourie (1988), against the perceived denigration of facts in favour of empathy and evaluation in history, and Lawlor (1988c) had more generally suggested a simple core curricula of the three main subjects.

There are three Cabinet level accounts of the process. In Baker's (1993a) account, on his appointment Thatcher made no request for a fundamental overhaul of the education system. Thus Baker was not given the portfolio to enact already formulated proposals. He reveals that in July 1985, Joseph had proposed a scheme for a dozen government-maintained primary schools to be set up by charitable trusts or sponsored by entrepreneurs which would charge fees. In March 1986, the Cabinet's H Committee gave approval for a feasibility study, but (p. 162, ibid): "...by that time the scheme had become subsumed within a much wider discussion of radical options." As he states (p. 163, ibid): "There were..other ways of delivering those objectives dear to the heart of the voucher enthusiasts." He appeared to share the 'anti-producer' bias of the neoliberal educationalists (p. 177, ibid), and also a Black Paperite concern with a particular conception of 'standards' (p. 164, ibid): "The English

43 Baker (p.161, 1993): "I told her [Thatcher] that within six months I would bring forward proposals for a fundamental reform of the education system. Her reply was simply 'Get on with it'. Margaret did not mention vouchers, selection, the curriculum or any of the other matters on which I knew she held strong views and I did not press her to express them." Baker has suggested subsequently she was inchoate in her own mind, but felt that something should be done (interview, Barber 1996).
education system had lost its way in the 1960s." There was obviously some pressure to find an agenda for reform. Baker suggests that he was the catalyst for a coherent reform programme (p.164, ibid).

The first initiative in this regard was the creation of the City Technology Colleges (CTCs), designed to be testbeds for new teaching and management methods (p.178, ibid). On June 16th, Baker held meetings with senior officials, to put the ideas into policy proposals. On 23rd June, Thatcher green-lighted the announcement of 12-20 technical schools. By September, the full CTC proposals were agreed collectively by Cabinet. The significance of the initiative is born out by Baker (p.181, 187-8, ibid): "..CTCs would establish the way forward beyond the next election, since they embodied three new principles: a direct link between these schools and the DES; per capita funding; and a centrally determined curriculum..City Technology Colleges were the first challenges to the LEAs monopoly of free education. As prototypes, they laid the ground for the emergence of the grant-maintained schools..[they] incorporated many of the changes that I wanted to introduce into the whole system - parental choice, per capita funding, local managerial control, and independence from the LEA."44

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44 It has been suggested that the design of CTCs was influenced by the American experience of magnet schools (Finegold et al. 1993, especially Green, 'Magnet Schools, Choice, and the Politics of Policy Borrowing'). Baker visited New York to study magnet schools in 1987, as did Wandsworth LEA in 1989, and in 1990 HMI published a report on teaching and learning in New York schools. The difference, as Green suggests, was that the idea of magnets
CTCs running, having incorporated the essence of the reform package, was thought to be a more effective way to progress than focusing on per capita funding and getting obstructed by the DES.\textsuperscript{45} It is worth examining the development of the two main aspects of the ERA - GM schools and the NC - in more detail.

5.4a Grant-Maintained Schools

The notion of LEA-independent state schools had been suggested before\textsuperscript{46}, but it was only in this period, and after the introduction of CTCs, that the idea came to fruition. Baker (p.214, ibid): "Delegated budgets, per capita funding and open enrolment led to the possibility of schools becoming independent of the local education authority. This was the genesis of opting-out."\textsuperscript{47} What is also made clear is that the idea was attractive because it maintained the values in Britain was used primarily to legitimate reform, and was more concerned with choice than the American desire to demonstrate programmes for the social inclusion of minorities. In addition, Sir Cyril Taylor (CPS author and local government activist, see chapter four) was made Chairman of the CTCs Trust and advisor to the Secretary of State.

\textsuperscript{45} But, there was some disagreement; at a meeting with the PM on 25th September 1986 she stressed that the introduction of parental fees at a later stage should not be precluded, which Baker was unhappy at.

\textsuperscript{46} For example, Sexton, 'Education by Choice', Cox and Boyson (p.86-9, 1977).

\textsuperscript{47} Some commentators such as Flude and Hammer (1990) have also pointed here to the influence of the No Turning Back pamphlet, including a scheme to allow parents and teachers to start their own schools and receive money from the state for doing so (Brown et al. 1985). The proposals in the subsequent Save Our Schools (Brown et al. 1986) included newly-constituted school governing bodies which would have responsibility for administering schools and determining policy priorities, schools directly financed by central government, open enrolment, all as part of the incrementalist strategy for liberating consumer interests and establishing a form of internal market.
inherent in a voucher system, especially the pressure on schools to improve, via per capita funding (Baker, p.212-3, ibid). In December 1986, Baker proposed the idea of opting-out to Thatcher (who was attracted to it) and with it the parental ballot to trigger the process. Over Christmas 1986, Baker drew up a blueprint for change, and formally minuted the PM in February 1987.\(^48\) Thatcher wanted to quicken the pace of devolution, which would have spelt the end of the LEAs in months, and Baker disagreed. Thatcher (p.570, 592, 1993) herself suggests that Brian Griffiths was crucial in devising the elements of the ERA package in the process of writing the Manifesto, especially GM schools.\(^49\)

Hence GM schools developed outside the DES, though officials did provide the administrative detail that made them possible (Fitz and Halpin 1991, Maclure 1988). Hence despite the restriction of the 'policy loop', there were pragmatic compromises made (on the size of schools allowed to opt out, the funding of GM schools, parental ballots, unchanged admission policies to the regret of the IEA and No Turning Back Group, and the teaching of the NC in GM schools).\(^50\) One

\(^{48}\) Baker (p.479-482, 1993a) reprints this blueprint. It reveals that the ERA plans in their early stages were self-consciously divided up into centralising and decentralising measures.

\(^{49}\) Ridley (p.94, 1991) suggests that Baker was hesitant with the plan, and that it was Thatcher who pushed the education group further with its proposals.

\(^{50}\) Fitz and Halpin (1991) suggest the DES reduced the effects of GM policy on local authority planning by insisting that the policy only apply to schools with over 500 pupils (until this was changed, see DES 1990), effectively excluding the majority of primary schools from seeking GM status.
of the drafting committees within the Party for the manifesto recommended three specific proposals - devolution of more resources and management responsibility to individual schools, additional opportunities for parents to choose schools of their choice, and that schools should be allowed to opt-out of local authority control. The latter went forward as a simple idea, but there was some confusion as to how it might be realised, by Baker and Thatcher. Absent, noticeably, were any NC proposals, which may have been put forward by the DES, albeit supported by unidentified Conservative Party policy groups.

In the Conservative Party manifesto, The Next Moves Forward, the commitment to major changes in the education system was declared, including opting out. By the time of the 1987 Party Conference, Baker (1987) was preparing the way for the ERA by emphasising the 'indoctrination' and 'mediocrity' of many LEAs, who were said to encourage anti-family, anti-police, and anti-competitive values. Consultation was kept to a minimum, reflecting the growing confidence of the Government (in new powers for the Secretary of State and the abolition of the ILEA). The continued but muted power of the 'educational establishment' came in most of the successful amendments (with the exception

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51 At the press conference to launch the manifesto, on 19th May 1987, Thatcher said that if schools went GM they would be able to determine their admissions policy, but Baker (p.194-5, 1993a) emphasises: "It had been clearly agreed in the discussions between us that grant-maintained schools could not change their character..I suspect she was trying to keep open the option of fees and selection."
of the House of Lords vote against the arrangements for ballots on GM status) and the Church of England, universities and paternalistic peers who sought to protect the interests of children with special needs. Baker suggests (p.211, ibid) that the DES and its principal officials had to be slowly won round to the idea of allowing schools to become self-managed and independent of LEAs.52

Though during the passage of the Bill, Baker made reassurances that schools would have to retain their previous character and admissions policy. Thatcher's personal instincts have since been made clear (p.579, 1993), she was saddened by having to give the assurances during the 1987 Election campaign about not allowing selection and fee-paying to be extended with GM schools. The pace of opting out became a difference between Baker and Thatcher. She had suggested that she thought most schools would opt out, but Baker thought that parents (via the ballots) not government should decide the pace.53

52 Ridley (p.93-4, 1991), without evidence, claims: "I put forward the plan that was eventually adopted, which was to allow all schools eventually to opt out of local authority control and to be run by their governors. Margaret Thatcher liked the plan and eventually it was adopted, despite the unhappiness of Kenneth Baker's officials; he himself accepted it."

53 Further (p.220, Thatcher ibid): "The creation of grant-maintained schools, and the prospect of eventual large-scale opting out, did raise the whole question of whether the local education authorities should continue to exist. In discussions during 1986 and 1987, the Department of the Environment, led by Nick Ridley, wanted schools to be funded solely by a per capita grant to be topped up with fees. The Treasury was quite prepared to take on the funding of schools centrally. This would have been the nationalisation of the education service."
In order to promote opting out, the Grant-Maintained Schools Trust was established in August 1988 (not so independent of the DES or Conservative Party as it claimed to be\textsuperscript{54}), as well as a campaigning wing Choice in Education. In response to the initial low take-up of GM status, the Government decided to offer additional incentives; at the Conservative Party Conference 1990 Education Secretary John MacGregor announced four measures to facilitate opting out - the maximum level of transitional grant was doubled from £30,000 to £60,000, some special purpose grants and the formula allocation of capital grants were increased by fifty per cent, and the removal of the size limit on primary schools.\textsuperscript{55}

5.4b National Curriculum

As already noted, the Government’s interest in a national curriculum grew though the 1980s (Ball 1990, also Boyson 1995), partly as a result of the campaigns by the new right against educational progressivism and ‘indoctrination’. But, the 1986 Act still envisaged responsibility for determining and organising the curriculum as the headteacher’s, though with an

\textsuperscript{54} TES, 16th August 1988.  
\textsuperscript{55} As Rogers (1992) argues, there is no doubt that GM schools have been favourably treated - the main inducement lies in the allocation of capital grant for named projects, on which expenditure has been at a much higher rate compared with capital spending in the LEA sector. This has been admitted openly by John Major in a letter to Doug MacAvoy, General Secretary of the NUT: “We have made no secret of the fact that grant-maintained schools get preferential treatment in allocating grants to capital expenditure”, The Guardian, 7th August 1991.
increased role for the governors to whom the head would have to look for approval on curriculum matters.

Baker states that in a meeting with the PM on 23rd June 1986 he raised the idea of a national curriculum and Thatcher was 'encouraged'. On 18th September he secured support for delegating budgets to schools (p.190, 1993). The DES reportedly had 'sympathy' with the idea, and Baker was helped by Eric Bolton (then Senior Chief Inspector of Schools). Baker announced the idea of the NC on 'Weekend World' (television programme) on 7th December 1986.56

The plan was for a balanced curriculum of ten subjects covering ages five to sixteen, with achievement targets for each subject. Thatcher warned against the over-elaboration of the NC, and wanted to concentrate on the three core subjects of English, mathematics and science.57 This was the key debate between Thatcher and Baker. Baker warned that the concentration on three core subjects would give less prominence to a broader range of subjects (such as history, technology and

56 Baker (p.192, ibid) claims the NC had five objectives: "...first, set a standard of knowledge which would give a clear incentive for all our schools to catch up with the best...; second, provide teachers with detailed and precise objectives to support their work; third, provide parents with clear, accurate information about their child and their school; fourth, ensure continuity and avoid the duplication which many children suffered when moving from one school to another; and fifth, help teachers concentrate on the task of getting the best possible results from each individual child."

57 Baker (interview, Barber 1996): "Now on the curriculum she did have views, which as far as I could see cam from her hairdresser or it may have been her cleaner who lived in Lambeth, who was worried that her children were going to be educated by a lot of Trots."
languages). The wider dispute within Government was primarily between two factions. Lord Young, the Manpower Services Commission and the DTI were concerned with developing an enterprise culture, via a skill rather than just knowledge-based curriculum, while those associated with the Black Papers and the Hillgate Group were preoccupied with a return to standards and traditional subject-based learning. Tests at ages seven, eleven, fourteen (leading to the GCSE at sixteen) were announced at the Young Conservatives Conference in February 1987.

The ERA was thought to have set up a 'machinery of consensus' for the Secretary of State, with the working groups (WGs), the School Examinations and Assessment Council (SEAC) and the National Curriculum Council (NCC) being appointed by, and only advisory to, the Secretary of State. Further, the Secretary of State provided clear and extensive advice both before and during the process of establishing the Attainment Targets, Profile Components and Programmes of Study. Duncan Graham (1993) was appointed chairman and chief executive of the NCC by Baker from its inception in August 1988 (posts he held until his resignation in July 1991). According to Graham, the NCC was created against the wishes of the DES, but civil servants changed in attitude once they realised it could give them their first chance of real power over state education.

58 TES, 18th December 1987.
Conflict, often intense, did arise within and between the WGs, the NCC and the Secretary of State. Apparently clear political intentions encountered the complexity of implementation. Particularly revealing are the conflicts over two of the most contentious subject areas - English and History.

Baker appointed ex-Black Paperite Professor Brian Cox (Manchester University) chair of the WG to draw up the English curriculum. "The unspoken brief was to undo Kingman" (Graham, p.46, 1993), the previous 'too creative', modern and unstructured report on English teaching. But both Baker (p.191, 1993a) and Thatcher (p.593, 1993) were critical of the WG's report, especially on the teaching of grammar. Baker also thought the attainment targets for ages seven and eleven too vague, but welcomed the commitment to standard English. Baker asked the NCC to use the Cox report as the basis for wider consultation (Graham agreed with Baker on the criticisms of the teaching of English). The attainment targets were made more precise, to the resentment of Cox and the WG.

Political and ideological interference (including from the Prime Minister) was clearest and most heightened with History. Baker was sympathetic to the neoconservative attack on 'progressive' history and teaching methods, and according to Graham well-briefed from the right.59 However, he clashed with Thatcher.

59 "The programmes of study should have at the core the history of Britain, the record of its past and, in particular, its political, constitutional and cultural heritage" (Baker, The
The WG decided it would not be possible to have attainment targets based on facts. Early drafts of the curriculum were thought to be disappointing, since there was a lack of emphasis on facts and chronologies. Thatcher (p. 595, 1993) was especially critical of Baker's (December 1988) proposal for the teaching of history and the composition of the WG.60 Thatcher was appalled at the emphasis on interpretation rather than knowledge, as well as the insufficient weight given to British history. Despite the restrictive terms of reference that were set, the History WG eschewed 'patriotic history'. As well as advocating a broadly-based curriculum comprising British history, European and world history and thematic studies (including local history), the WG distanced itself from the new right's narrow conception of British culture by stressing that Britain could not be perceived as an undifferentiated mass.61 The new right countered that the process had

Times, 14th January 1989). Baker suggested this to the NC History Working Group (DES, p.15-16, 1989b). Similarly, Baker (p.206, 1993a): "The teaching of history was seen as doubly important because it conditions children's attitudes to their own country and often to politics. Margaret Thatcher saw history as a pageant of glorious events and significant developments, with our small country having given the world parliamentary democracy, an independent judiciary and a tradition of incorrupt administration. The British Empire had been a civilising influence on mankind."

60 In particular, Graham (p.64, 1993) thought Baker's choice of chair, Commander Michael Saunders Watson (former chairman of the Heritage Education Trust), was 'extraordinary' and 'eccentric'. Thought initially to be a 'right-wing amateur', he turned out to be a welcome surprise to history teachers.

61 "Individual people in these islands have much in common but they also have many individual characteristics specific to country, ethnic grouping, religion, gender and social class. We
been hijacked by the education establishment (for example, 'The History Debate', Lawlor 1995).

Thatcher's exasperation at the direction of the WG eventually made her go public in April 1990 after the new Education Secretary MacGregor had defended the final report of the History WG, though he too had earlier asked the WG to look again at ways of including essential historical knowledge in the attainment targets. The crisis which could have derailed the whole reform package came when Thatcher was clearly not going to approve the report, which provoked criticisms from the Opposition of direct political interference. Further, the WG expressed the fear that History was being taken over as a propaganda weapon (Graham, p.67, 1993). In a compromise, the report was published and MacGregor announced he would conduct his own investigation into History, largely by Nick Tate, the NCC's History officer, with Graham and MacGregor. Facts were not included in the attainment targets, but MacGregor was persuaded that they were integral to the course. MacGregor also excised much European and world history. Thatcher 'reluctantly' accepted the proposals.

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62 MacGregor, in response to the Working Group's Interim Report, said (on Thatcher's insistence) that he wanted 50 per cent more time devoted to British history in secondary schools compared to the just over a third envisaged for pupils aged 14-16 (The Observer 20th August 1989).

63 However, when Kenneth Clarke became Secretary of State he criticised the generally-accepted notion that history encompassed
In the summer and autumn of 1987, another area of dispute between Baker and Thatcher was over the time the NC would take up. Baker believed the prescribed curriculum should take up 80-85 per cent of teaching time, Thatcher 70 per cent. The issue came to a head at E (EP) committee on 28th October, with Baker arguing that the (his) broad-based curriculum (more than the three core subjects) was already being drafted into the ERA which was to be introduced in three weeks' time. Further conflict occurred over the question of the 'whole curriculum', which would include subjects such as the classics, economics, business studies, as well as personal and social education, health and careers. This was seen as of secondary importance to the priority of the ten core subjects by DES civil servants and ministers, but many members of the NCC wanted to consider it from the beginning (Graham, p.19-21, 1993). The establishment of working groups on the five themes identified by the NCC as essential to all education (citizenship, the environment, economic and industrial understanding, careers and health) and the publication of (non-statutory) guidance booklets, though thought
uncontentious caused criticism from the DES. Civil servants stressed that these were a 'dangerous distraction', funds were not available, and work on them would have to be delayed until 1993 when the NC was due to be fully implemented. But Baker and Graham came to agree on the usefulness of the themes, and the curriculum for 14-16 year-olds became an 'extended core', or the '70/30' solution. But Clarke reopened the issue of over-prescriptiveness after becoming Secretary of State, and the NCC rejected his 'advice' (children would only have to take mathematics, science and English to GCSE). There were also conflicts over assessment and testing.

It is clear that Thatcher (p.593, 1993) was very disappointed with the development of the curriculum - the original simplicity was lost, and she saw the influence of the teacher unions and the Inspectors become more prominent. Consequently, there is the need to differentiate the eventual form of the ERA and

65 Though as Graham (p.105, 1993) notes, the Home Office under David Waddington and John Patten, as well as MacGregor, seemed to be particularly worried about what the citizenship document would say, in terms of participation, and did not want it to turn into a piece of 'left propaganda' as some on the right thought the Speaker's Commission on Citizenship had.
66 Again, the Prime Minister was seen to intervene over the Task Group on Assessment and Testing Report's (TGAT 1987) recommendations. She feared it would lead to costly teaching apparatus, leave authority with teachers, and allow LEAs a major role in the implementation of the system.
67 (p.597, ibid): "There was no need for the national curriculum proposals and the testing which accompanied them to have developed as they did. Ken Baker paid too much attention to the DES, the HMI and progressive educational theorists in his appointments and early decisions; and once the bureaucratic momentum had begun it was difficult to stop."
its effects from the intended form. A process of curriculum proliferation occurred, especially obvious under the themes proposed by the NCC (NCC 1990b), which included education for citizenship, economic and industrial understanding, careers education health education and environmental education. The overcrowded curriculum points to the contradiction between the simplicity of Baker's model and the curriculum entitlement for all pupils 5-16, versus the complexity of the knowledge which schools, parents and employers want to be available. 

5.5 The ERA and Citizenship

Analysing the ERA reforms from the perspective of citizenship, in the sense of 'universal membership', focuses on two main areas. The first concerns equality, equal opportunity and selection within the new system, the second race, culture and national identity.

First, education has been seen as a crucial foundation for a more egalitarian society by the left, for two main reasons. It may increase the opportunities for children from less privileged backgrounds, and also act politically on them to increase their critical awareness of the society around them. Of course, as previously noted, it was this approach to education which the new right fought against, because: "If

68 Clarke later abandoned an 'entitlement curriculum' for 14-16, again complicating the curriculum, meaning the possibility of 14-16 being split into two-tiers, the high-status academic and the low-status vocational subjects.
equality in education is sought at the expense of quality, how can the poisons created help but filter down?"\(^{69}\)

Critics suggested (David, p.104, 1991): "...the effects of the educational reforms are likely to be to widen social differences between schools and therefore social inequalities."\(^{70}\) Gewirtz et al. (1993) suggested that the disciplining structure of the ERA's educational market has implications for the values and cultures which operate within schools. It would foster particular cultural forms and socio-psychological dispositions and marginalise others, most obviously the universalism and collectivism that in theory underpinned comprehensivism. Funding constraints threaten other aspects of comprehensivism because adequate mixed-ability teaching and the integration of children with special needs are expensive ways of organising learning. The process may work against the selection of children for whom English is a second language, who, along with less able children, will be more expensive to educate than children proficient in English. Test results will lead to a pressure to select students on ability, depending generally on the

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\(^{69}\) Keith Joseph, *The Times*, 21st October 1974. Hillgate (p.3-4, 1986): "...education is not an 'instrument' but an end in itself. To treat education as a means to an 'egalitarian society' is to destroy both the possibility of learning, and the only kind of equality that is either desired by parents or obtainable through school: equality of opportunity."

\(^{70}\) It is also worth noting that if the ERA does lead to a more divisive system, it will be easier for governments to satisfy the more influential constituency if middle-class services are clearly separated from those for weaker groups (Taylor-Gooby and Lawson 1993).
market position of the school. Hence the market introduced by the ERA is not an apolitical neutral mechanism of resource allocation, but a form of 'ordered competition' with particular social and economic goals embedded in it which erode social justice.

In particular, critics suggested the ERA would increase selection. Selection is seen by the left as an important defence of inequalities.71 During the passage of the Bill, Baker gave assurances that: "...grant-maintained schools will continue to form part of a local system serving local people. A school which becomes grant-maintained will retain its previous character."72 This 'character' (size, selection criteria and religious basis) was guaranteed for five years. However, these guarantees were not included in the Bill or Act but in a DES circular, which even then seemed to give only qualified support for the five-year period.73 Hence while in the short-term protecting existing selective provision (grammar schools opting-out), the long-term introduction of selection was left

71 Boudon (1974) argued that in societies structured by class and other inequalities the greater the variety of different routes through the education system, the greater the likelihood that differential class expectations (engendered from outside the education system) will structure student choices, and therefore educational opportunities will be structured along class lines. Of course, the new right disagrees, seeing selection as increasing equality of opportunity (Hillgate Group 1986).


73 DES (1988): "...the Secretary of State would not normally approve proposals for a change of character within five years of its acquiring grant-maintained status."
open. Consequently, fears of creeping selection persist. Monitoring is difficult, given that the only safeguards are the approval of admission arrangements by the Secretary of State and the ability of dissatisfied parents to refer to a supposedly independent appeals committee, established by, and including, the governors of the school in question (DES 1988). Meanwhile, LEAs will continue to have the duty to educate pupils rejected by or excluded from GM schools.

Further, Rogers (p.31, 1992) has suggested that the LMS reforms have: "...brought about a fundamental shift in the distribution of powers and responsibilities for the management of education service, away from the LEA to individual school level." The combination of formula funding (where each pupil has a cash value to the school) and open enrolment (where admission levels are restricted only by the capacity of schools) creates, in effect, a voucher scheme within the state sector. The proportion of LMS budget that can be allocated according to need (a maximum of 20 per cent) is not seen as sufficient to reflect the differences in circumstances of schools within an authority, hence (p.47, ibid): "...the whole system works against a school that is struggling with problems, and favours the already advantaged."

Second, with regard to race, culture and national identity, there are two ways in which critics see the ERA reforms acting divisively. The first concerns the content of the NC. Most obviously, it represents the
desire to control what is taught in schools, dismissing the professional common-curriculum approach favoured by part of the HMI, which reflects a genuine concern with the quality of the teaching process and the needs of individual children (Chitty 1989). Hence the focus on output and testing.

Kenneth Baker claimed: "I see the National Curriculum as a way of increasing our social coherence...The cohesive role of the national curriculum will provide our society with a greater sense of identity." Critics saw this attempted imposition of identity as a form of anti-multiculturalism - it was a 'nationalist curriculum' (Coulby, in Bash and Coulby 1991), its culturally specific character most detectable in four subject areas - English, Modern Foreign Languages, History and Religious Education (RE). It represents the 'curriculum of the dead' (Ball 1994) in its restorationism, an attempt to (re)inforce popular memory especially in the field of history. Without compromise or relativism, it signals its 'curricular fundamentalism'. In particular (Tomlinson, p.461, 1989): "...despite the presence in the education system of over half a million children and young people

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74 Consequently (Whitty, p.23, Flude and Hammer 1990): "...the exercise of choice and responsibility was to be denied to the majority of parents in the field of the curriculum, where (given the exclusion of independent schools from the legislative imposition of a national curriculum and a system of testing), only the wealthy would continue to have choice."

75 Speech at Manchester University, The Guardian, 16th September 1987. Also the NC: "...will be very helpful in holding together a multiracial and multicultural society", The Guardian, 17th August 1988.
perceived as racially or ethnically different to a white norm, there was no mention in the Act or race, ethnicity or even multicultural education", a reflection of the new right's 'educational nationalism' \(^7\). To Troyna and Carrington (p.96, 1990) the ERA represents the return to a 'colour-blind' perspective, but as Gillborn (1992) argues through the operation of the 'hidden curriculum', many black people are left in little doubt as to the second-class nature of the citizenship rights accorded their communities. Coulby (Bash and Coulby 1991) characterises the decision of the Modern Foreign Languages WG as revealing that schools may only teach 'black languages' if 'white languages' are taught first. Hence it is suggested that testing and assessment is likely to enhance and institutionalise the labelling of 'failure', especially the denigration of non-white groups. Further, the NC relates to the anti-egalitarian project of the ERA, revealing an overall model of the citizen as individual and nationalist, rather than social and internationalist (Cole, Clay and Hill 1991). Thus it seeks to provide a popular education within an ideological framework which is individualistic, competitive and racist. Its

\(^7\) See Gordon (1988), for a review of the new right's attack on multiculturalism, its argument that anti-racism is a form of racism (for example, Honeyford 1983, 1984, Palmer 1986) and that 'non-standard' language forms (that is, non-Standard English) encourage anti-authority behaviour (Honey 1983). Hence (Gordon, p.101, ibid): "The project of the New Right is to individualise the concept of racism, to detach it from the social arena and to relocate it in the realm of personal morality." 'Culture' replaces racism (also Seidel, in Levitas 1986).
notion of individual choice is, in an unequal society, heavily ideological.

The second relates to the structure of the system. Critics suggested it would lead to the social and racial polarisation of the 'best' (popular) schools against the others, where parents may see multi-racial schools as bad schools, as well as eroding LEA anti-racism strategies. It has also been alleged that the ERA (through GM schools) is a 'charter for racist parents' (Weekes 1987, and Hugill 1990). This has been denied (Lawlor 1988b).

In addition, citizenship itself has become a developing theme in the curriculum, though the analysis here suggests this is not where the real significance of the ERA's project in citizenship lies. However, it is right to note that because it presents British politics and society according to the pluralist model (assuming equality before the law and equal access to decision-making processes), it cannot be said to be politically neutral (Carr 1991). As such it constructs a particular discourse itself.

However, it must also be noted that in the process of eroding citizenship in education for some, the ERA used citizenship discourses and concepts to achieve

77 Fogelman (1991). It mainly appears under 'Personal and Social Education' (DES 1989c). It has also been referred to in Curriculum Guidance 3 (NCC 1990a), which outlines the content of citizenship education as knowledge about electoral procedures, local and national government, social civil and political entitlements, obligations and responsibilities, and the importance of participation.
its ends. First, it utilised highly structured forms of participation - the role of school governors\textsuperscript{78}, parental ballots for opting-out (Rogers 1992), and greater 'choice' for parents in choosing schools. These were useful for two reasons: they displaced forms of expert participation, and also attempted to use the interests of parents and governors with regard to individual schools to further the Government's strategic aims for the whole system (though there may be some unexpected results).\textsuperscript{79} Further, governors are not representative of the population as a whole, nor necessarily of the schools they govern (Brehony 1992), and initiatives in local participation have tended to preserve rather than alter existing power relations (Vincent 1993b). The left allowed these forms of participation to defeat its own visions for democratising schools.\textsuperscript{80} Second, the NC, ignoring its

\textsuperscript{78} The governing body of GM schools includes five parent governors, one or two teacher governors, the head teacher, and a majority of governors appointed by the existing governing body from members of the local community. The Education (No. 2) Act and the ERA changed significantly both the composition of school governing bodies and their functions, and under LMS governors became responsible for school budgets and many personnel matters.

\textsuperscript{79} Savage, Robins, Atkinson, (p.220, 1994): "It is not necessarily the case that these developments will lead in the direction the Government wished or anticipated. It may well be, for example, that increased parental power will work against the Government's wishes as was shown in 1993 in the reaction against tests for 14 year olds, where there was an alliance between Parent Teacher Associations, school governing bodies and the teaching unions against the Secretary of State's plans."

\textsuperscript{80} Hall (p.2, Wolpe and Donald 1983): "The right have temporarily defined the terms and won the struggle because they are willing to engage. For a brief period in the 1960s and 1970s the involvement of parents with the school was the left's most democratic trump card. The dismantling of this into 'parental choice' and its expropriation by the right is one of their most significant victories. They stole an idea designed to increase
biases, could be characterised as an 'entitlement curriculum', guaranteeing the content of teaching across all state schools.\textsuperscript{81} These reforms, then, could be seen as enhancing citizenship (and could be manipulated to do so), but in their present form have a very different purpose.

5.6 The ERA as a Mechanism of Control

This approach reveals the ERA to be a mechanism of control, but which cannot be captured by the either centralising or decentralising characterisations. The NC is undoubtedly centralising, GM schools and LMS decentralising, but more importantly, both decrease the scope for non-new right projects in education. It is a form of largely indirect social engineering (Whitty and Menter, p.60, 1989): "In moving education to the centre of contemporary politics the Government has revealed a grasp of both its structural and its ideological significance... Along with the media, education is a key route to the thoughts and values of people within nations." As a result (Ball, p.43, 1990): "...analytically, education is no longer separated off from other areas of social and economic policy. It is no longer a backwater of policy. It is

\textsuperscript{81} Simon (p.76, 1992): "..we must remember that the concept of a common curriculum for all - a set of structured experiences covering the main fields of knowledge and culture - was a major objective of the whole comprehensive reform movement of the 1960s and 1970s (and earlier)...it was necessary to combat the official ideology that children with different types of mind required basically different forms of education."
now in the mainstream of the political ideology and policies of Thatcherism."

The ERA represents a (Johnson, p.268, CSB 1991):
"...system of market provision, policed in the spirit of cultural absolutism [of] separated provision and pretended cultural unity." It intended to close down the spaces education offers to alternative social values and discourses. Hence the new right leads not freedom but a deepening coercive regulation of civil society. The 'educational market' is not the end in itself, but a route to this, and a powerful discourse to marginalise other concerns. It is a massive political experiment attempting to educate citizens in market practices and tie them into new right parameters of discourse (Cole et al. 1991).

Alongside the directives of the NC, then, GM schools (and their preferential financial treatment) also can be interpreted as increasing state control of education (Halpin, Power and Fitz 1993). While they are supposedly self-governing, their autonomy is strictly regulated (mediating government policy undiluted), and teachers are reoriented away from the a public service ethic into competitive self-

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82 Thus the NC also plays another role in providing the 'consumer quality tags' necessary for the 'market' (see Murphy's analysis of the simple 'market indicator' national assessment proposals, chapter 3, Flude and Hammer 1990).

83 Hence it is ironic that some conservative/new right educationalists have complained that subsequent Conservative reforms have been 'meddling' and dirigiste (Lawlor 1996).
interest. Hence (p.13, ibid): "The discursive trick played on them entails the proposition that educational reform is being done by their schools when, in reality, it is mostly being done to them." In this sense, they are genuine 'state schools' for the first time.

Given this characterisation of the general thrust of the educational new right, and the influence it had over the ERA, the differences between factions (for example, the neoliberal dislike of the NC) become less important, because they represent only differences on means to the same end - the reinforcement of the 'market society'. This is why suggesting that there were significant ideological contradictions within Thatcherite education reform which derived from different factions of the new right (Kenyon 1995), neglects the overall purpose of those reforms. The notion of the 'market society' is developed further [chapter nine].

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84 Hence the new right attack on existing forms of teacher training (Lawlor 1990) can be understood, as another part of the project to close down other projects in education. Other reforms have subsequently been made - greater emphasis on academic specialisms, and the Teacher Training Agency (established by the Education Act 1994).

85 These reforms were not concerned with efficiency as such, because in some respects they make running an efficient system more difficult. For example, LEAs face the problem of how they respond to the need to rationalise school provision at a time of falling secondary numbers and per capita-led financing, in the context of GM schools. They will not propose schools for closure if they suspect those schools will then try to opt-out, and unit costs will rise as more schools opt-out. In addition, given the problems in predicting provision needed, LEAs may have to maintain a large and expensive surplus capacity in schools.
This characterisation of the ERA's purpose is being born out by its effects. Research shows the replacement of comprehensivism and civic virtue in education by market values, producing a more socially-divisive and differentiated system.\textsuperscript{86} No schools can afford to ignore the local market, and are increasingly keen to attract enrolments from 'motivated' parents and 'able' children who are likely to enhance their relative position. Middle-class parents in particular are exploiting the market in education and bringing their social and cultural advantages to bear. And despite the Government's supposed desire for 'diversity', there is (Tomlinson, p.23, 1994): "...a greater 'dull uniformity' among schools as they sought to play safe, emulate 'popular' rivals and compete for the same desirable students." Fitz, Halpin and Power (1993) concur. Because opting-out only allows schools to innovate within strict limits, as well as the competition of the 'market', it has not led to the development of a plurality of distinctive and mould-breaking schools. Rather, it has tended to produce a 'reinvigorated traditionalism'. Hence (p.74, ibid): "...at the point of implementation, the GM schools policy confirms, rather than challenges, the assumption that extra resources are a necessary condition for school improvement, but in a way that articulates with traditional conceptions of

\textsuperscript{86} Ball, Bowe and Gewirtz, 'Market Forces and Parental Choice: Self-Interest and Competitive Advantage in Education', chapter one, Tomlinson (1994).
schooling which mimic the government's implicit view of what counts as 'good' education."

Further, it contributes little to improvements in parental participation, nor widens choice. In areas where GM status preserves selective education, it may lead to a restriction of choice for parents as a whole. It also has a considerable impact on some LEAs, particularly in the frustration of planning functions. Their research revealed that at the time, of 225 GM secondary schools, only 8 per cent served areas of 'social disadvantage', supporting the suspicion that GM policy is also keenly designed with a key electoral constituency - the middle classes' - interests at heart, and in doing so compounds previous educational inequalities. Often, expectations of 'choice' are unrealistic, leading to the rise in appeals.

Bush, Coleman and Glover (1993) reveal that a third of GM comprehensives in their survey were using covert selection methods, many grammar schools using GM status as an opportunity to raise entry requirements, and 'specialization' has encouraged a particular form of selection. Further exclusions have increased in all types of school, partly as a result of league tables. OFSTED's (p.6, 1993) report on the progress of GM schools revealed that there were significant differences emerging between the LEA and the GM sector in three main ways - the proportion of selective schools was four times greater in the GM sector (20 per cent as opposed to 4.5 per cent), the geographical spread was uneven (in over fifty LEAs there was no GM
school at all, but in others there were growing numbers), and before becoming GM some 40 of the schools (out of just below 300 at that time) had been the subject of recent proposals for reorganisation (a proportion much higher than for other maintained schools). Hence there is more division between schools, more selection, and pressure to opt-out if another school in the same area has. 87

5.7 The Post-ERA Reforms

Although the main focus here is the ERA, it is worth noting that the subsequent development of Conservative education policy reinforces this analysis. The main themes of reform have been extended - reinforcing the 'market society', marginalising other projects in education, and making it difficult for the left to propose reform without appearing to stand against 'freedom, standards and choice'.

The requirement that primary schools seeking GM status should have at least 300 pupils was withdrawn in late 1990, and the five-year embargo on proposing a change of character to a school was removed in 1991. The White Paper published in July 1992 (DfE 1992) proposed to allow schools to apply for a change of character at the same time as becoming GM where there were proposals from the LEA to reorganise education in the

87 Also (p.23, ibid): "Growing competition has led to vigorous marketing and LEA schools are now publicising their achievements more energetically than before. In some cases the production of publicity materials makes in roads into schools' resources, and marketing is making heavy demands on the time of senior management."
same area concerned, and to allow special schools to apply for GM status. It also increased the potential for central control further. The then new Secretary of State John Patten stated in the Paper that he wished to see GM status become the norm in secondary schooling and expected 60 per cent of schools to have opted out by 1995. GM schools were allowed to select a minority of pupils on the basis of ability and aptitude. In September 1995, the Prime Minister announced that he wanted church schools (4,032 voluntary schools) to be able to go GM without balloting parents. In a consultation paper in October this was included along with proposals for shortening statutory time limits for objections to opting-out, removing the requirement for ballots if the process could be 'unnecessarily stressful', and removing council-appointed governors. There were suggestions this would be first step to a manifesto pledge to take all schools out of LEA control. However, these measures were not included in the Nursery Education and Grant Maintained Schools Bill published in

88 It proposed the creation of a new statutory body, the Funding Agency for Schools (FAS), to be responsible for funding and auditing all GM schools, and in some circumstances for providing either alongside or independent of LEAs sufficient school places for an area. Hence LEAs will lose, incrementally, many of their statutory functions as the FAS assumes its planning powers. This was confirmed in the 1993 Education Act - another significant centralisation. If 75 per cent of secondary or primary school pupils in an area are educated in GM schools, the unaccountable (except to the Secretary of State) FAS effectively takes over all planning functions.

89 By October 1995, of about 24,500 schools, 1,081 in England were GM, 16 in Wales and one in Scotland. Momentum was greatest in academic year after 1992 election when 555 schools voted to opt-out in parental ballots.
January, prompting speculation that Gillian Shephard, the Education and Employment Secretary (the departments had been merged in 1995), had resisted the measures. There were reports of a developing rift between Shephard and the Prime Minister, given the latter's desire to increase the pace of reform (the nursery voucher scheme, GM schools, and the schools sports initiative). Shephard was seen to favour a focus on improving standards.

The issue of the over-prescriptive nature of the NC returned. In July 1991, the chairs of both the NCC (Graham) and SEAC (Philip Halsey) suddenly left their posts, and were replaced by, respectively, David Pascall, former member of Thatcher's Downing Street Policy Unit, and Lord Griffiths, former head of the Policy Unit and chairman of the CPS. The new appointments were more ideologically compatible with the Government's aims. Griffiths in particular shared the desire, continued by Major after Thatcher, to simplify the NC back to its original conception. In 1993 the NCC and SEAC were abolished and replaced by the School Curriculum and Assessment Authority (SCAA), under Sir Ron Dearing. Though Dearing was not a new right figure, the Dearing Report (1994) sought to simplify, and promised a moratorium on further detailed curriculum changes until 2000, representing a move away from the framework for an attainment target curriculum. Further, tests for five-year-olds were delayed until September 1998.
In the 1996 Education White Paper, the potential for selection was proposed to be increased in LEA (to 20 per cent), GM (to 50 per cent) and CTC schools (to 30 per cent), enabling in effect 'grammar school streams', and GM schools being allowed to open sixth forms and offer boarding places without formal approval. Yet there would be no more money for 'a grammar school in every town' (in Major's phrase), and a stated rejection to the re-introduction of the 'eleven-plus', implying this as a largely presentational project, at least for the time being. Proposals to grant all state schools greater devolved powers (up to 90 per cent of their budgets, leaving a further reduced role for LEAs) were left, possibly to wait until after the election. It appeared that these proposals were formulated to embarrass Labour rather than being based on research on what admissions policies work best, or a strong support for the policies amongst voters. However, in December 1996, the Government was defeated in committee stage in the Commons on the expansion of GM schools, and in January 1997 it appeared to lose the vote on the floor of the House. Despite the latter being a miscount, the clause was lost.

In December 1996 the Government published its white paper on education and training for 14-19 year-olds, including a proposal for paying state secondary schools by exam success and increasing competition between schools (DfE 1996). It was thought that a voucher system for post-16 education would be included
in the Conservative election manifesto, despite the difficulties the introduction of a voucher scheme for nursery education had encountered. Chris Woodhead, Chief Inspector and head of OFSTED, became increasingly visible and was accused of supporting the new right agenda.\textsuperscript{90}

Dearing's report on education and training for young people, publicised widely in spring 1996, suggested a national framework at four levels (GCSE, A Level, General National Vocational Qualifications renamed Applied A Levels, and National Vocational Qualifications), and applied and vocational courses open to 14-year-olds who were becoming disaffected with school. Though praised widely, there were some fears (particularly from local authorities) that the option of early school-leaving might in effect dismantle comprehensive education.\textsuperscript{91} Less surprisingly, it was supported strongly by the right, some of whom called for an end to compulsory education at 14.\textsuperscript{92} In February 1997, the Government announced plans for reform of the A-Level system - the increased use of AS

\textsuperscript{90} Woodhead (1996), in a pamphlet for the new right-wing think-tank Politea, questioned the need for LEAs. He had suggested previously that there were 15,000 incompetent teachers in schools, questioned the link between class size and quality of teaching, and campaigned on 'standards' against 'progressive teaching methods'.

\textsuperscript{91} 'Early School-Leaving Idea Dooms Comprehensives', The Guardian, 8th March 1996.

\textsuperscript{92} Lord Skidelsky, chairman of the Social Market Foundation ('Call to End Compulsory Education at 14', The Guardian, 21st June 1996) suggested a means-tested voucher scheme, and Alfred Sherman ('Why Raising the School Leaving Age was Wrong', The Guardian, Education, 12th March 1996).
exams, reduction in the number of boards, and exam league tables at seven and fourteen as well as eleven, sixteen and eighteen as part of the project for 'parent power'.

5.8 Summary

There are two apparent ironies to the educational new right. The first is that despite their desire to depoliticize education, they have highlighted its political importance. They may have lamented that (O'Hear, p.35, 1991): "Education is no longer seen as an end in itself, but rather as an instrument of social engineering." Yet their projects came to seem like efforts in social engineering themselves. The second is that despite claiming to be interested in 'standards, freedom and choice', their real project was to marginalise other projects in education, and secure their own for the 'market society'. Hence these are not ironies at all, once it is accepted that the new right's project to 'depoliticize' and promote 'standards, freedom and choice', were discourses to aid this fundamentally political project. In the terms of discourse analysis, the new right articulation represented the attempt to enforce a closed model, but this antagonism revealed the limits of objectivity with regard to education. As part of its project, the new right appropriated some popular-democratic interpellations, including those of citizenship, even though the results were corrosive of citizenship.
Because of the failure explicitly to implement a voucher scheme, and the persistence of a state-funded system, it is sometimes suggested that the new right has not achieved much influence in education. This interpretation of the ERA suggests the opposite. The purpose of the educational new right was not the means (vouchers, a national curriculum), but the end - reinforcing the 'market society' via education. Hence the ERA can be regarded as marking a fundamental breakthrough. Citizenship in education is turned from a public towards a private good (Englund 1994, Gutmann 1987). There is no necessary incoherence in the ERA. Though the previous educational settlement should not be regarded as a post-war golden age of citizenship in education (Ranson 1988), the ERA certainly represents its subversion.

93 For example, Cockett (p.308-9, 1994).
Chapter Six

The Community Charge

6.0 Introduction

The Community Charge (CC) was justified by the Government as an initiative designed to empower citizenship, in the form of greater public participation in and control over the mechanisms of local democracy, expenditure and services. It would abolish the supposed inequities of the rating system, make local councils more responsive and accountable to their electors, and provide 'badly needed protection' for business ratepayers via a uniform business rate. It was designed to solve the historically difficult problem of local government finance and democracy, and its relationship to central government. Aside from turning into the most notorious example of policy failure in contemporary domestic British politics, it also represents a valuable case study in Thatcherite citizenship.

6.1 Policy Outline

The Local Government Finance Act 1988 (LGFA) contained three main reforms - the change from domestic rates to a flat-rate Community Charge (with limited rebate system), the introduction of a uniform business rate, and change to the central government grant system. The charge element is the main focus here, though the cumulative effects of the two other reforms are noted.
6.2 Policy Process

To understand fully the development of the CC, it is necessary to place it within the context of previous attempts to reform local government finance, beginning in the 1970s.

After having proposed new structures for local authorities, the Heath Government set up a review of funding, which led to Peter Walker's Green Paper (DoE 1971). While this did not propose a new local tax, it did discuss a number of possible reforms. It recognised the deficiencies of rates (little relationship to ability to pay, and non-paying earners) and discussed briefly (and dismissed) the notion of a fixed surcharge for each earning non-householder - it would raise relatively little and be administratively costly.

6.2a The Layfield Report

In 1976 the Layfield Report recommended retaining domestic and business rates and introducing in addition a local income tax. Layfield (p.72, 1976) captured the inherent weakness of local accountability:

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1 This is an account which draws upon the most recent and authoritative study by Butler, Adonis and Travers (1994) as well as Crick and van Klaveren (1991), Stoker (1991), Thatcher (1993), Baker (1993a), Ridley (1991), Lawson (1992), and in particular, John Gibson's work (1987a, 1987b, 1988a, 1988b, 1989a, 1989b, 1990) which had been predicting since 1985 that a 'poll tax' would be a disaster in terms of political popularity and local government accountability.

2 The Layfield Committee was set up to review the whole issue of local government finance in the wake of the hostile response to rating revaluation, which as well as the 1974 structural reorganisation and redistributed local tax burdens led to large rate increases (30 per cent on average).
"Effective control of expenditure cannot be ensured in a system where local accountability has been seriously weakened, unless central accountability provides that control. Centralisation of expenditure decisions is the inevitable end to which a system depending on high and increasing grants, and associated with an inflexible and politically sensitive local tax, must lead. There is an alternative - namely to revive local accountability. Local councils would be responsible to their electorates for both the expenditure they incurred and the revenue they raised and, above all, for increases in either. It need not be incompatible with the government's proper concern over the totals of local expenditure."

Enlarging the share of local taxation in total local revenue - the alternative - was the only way to 'sustain a vital local democracy' (Layfield, p.300-1, 1976). Hence a local income tax was proposed. A flat-rate charge was not considered seriously as a replacement for the rating system (and only mentioned when the 'problem' of the earning non-householder was discussed, p.163, ibid). It was thought regressive, easy to evade payment of, administratively costly, and would not be justified by increased accountability. But there were no significant developments from the Report.³

³ The Government response was a weak Green Paper (DoE 1977), proposing only a move to capital valuation for domestic rates and the replacement of the 'needs' and 'resources' grant of the rate support grant with a single unitary grant (eventually realised in the 'block grant' reform in 1981), but neither were enacted because of the loss of the Parliamentary majority after 1977.
Within the Conservative Party, there was increasing disenchantment with the existing system of local taxation. As a result of the rise in council spending, rates raised less local revenue and central government grants more. The October 1974 manifesto had promised the abolition of domestic rates, and a local income tax was seen as the most plausible replacement. By 1979, the abolition commitment had been weakened because of the promise to reduce direct taxation. In 1975 a policy group chaired by Keith Speed was established, and Mrs Thatcher had made it clear that she preferred a local sales tax as the replacement.

After 1979, with Michael Heseltine as Secretary of State for the Environment, central government support for local authority spending was reduced, and successive initiatives were introduced to reduce local government spending. The new block grant system included penalties for authorities which spent over their 'grant-related expenditure'. But local authorities failed to cut spending to match cuts in their grants. This marked the beginning of the growth in intense conflict between central and local government. This was not wholly the result of the ideological imperatives of Thatcherism. Political reaction against the rates increased as they rose rapidly with local authority spending (and the rise of the 'new urban left' after 1981), decreasing central government grant and recession and unemployment. Pressure grew within the
Conservative Party to deliver on the 1974 pledge to abolish the rates.4

6.2b Alternatives to Domestic Rates

The Government's response was the Green Paper Alternatives to Domestic Rates in December 1981 (DoE 1981). Its significance here was its discussion of a flat-rate charge on the same basis as the familiar options of local income tax, sales tax and property taxes (Butler et al., p.29, 1994). It admitted a flat-rate charge was technically feasible, but hard to enforce. It was conscious of the negative connotations of using the electoral register as a basis for liability, but a new register would be expensive.5 It scored well on some of the Paper's criteria (perceptibility, close financial control and suitability for all tiers of government). Also, it recognised the important 'problem' of the earning non-householder from the start (Butler et al., p.32, ibid).6

At the same time, there were other outings for some form of flat-rate charge. In 1980 a Conservative Political Centre pamphlet (Heddle 1980) suggested a poll tax would enable a direct contribution to be

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4 For example, in December 1981 Sir Hugh Fraser's Rating System (Abolition) Bill, introduced under the 10 Minute Rule, gained support from all sides of the Party.
5 According to reports at the time, the Home Office was particularly effective in arguing against because of the civil liberties aspect (Robin Pauley, Financial Times, 17th December, 1981).
6 It noted (DoE, p.1, 1981): "...dissatisfaction with the way in which local people contributed to the cost of local services through the present system of domestic rates. Some domestic ratepayers believe that they pay too large a share of that cost, pointing out that other people who are not householders are not required to pay rates at all."
made by earning non-householders to the cost of local services, but be regressive, difficult to administer, and a low revenue-raiser. Sir John Grugeon (then leader of Kent County Council), who had been influential in Party policy groups during the 1970s, advocated a poll tax in a letter to the Financial Times in 1981 and proposed it (plus a rebate scheme and nationally set business rate) at the conference of the Rating and Valuers Association in Torquay, to improve accountability. Madsen Pirie (President of the Adam Smith Institute) wrote an article in The Daily Mail in October 1981 which proposed a flat-rate charge.

More comprehensively, Christopher Foster, Richard Jackman and Morris Perlman from the London School of Economics published Local Government Finance in a Unitary State (1980) gave greater intellectual respectability to a poll tax. This can be seen as the source of many of the arguments later used to justify the charge. The reason for the rising proportion of grant financing local expenditure was the reluctance to give local authorities any other tax source, combined with their rising expenditure. This reduced the price of local services to the

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8 Foster's ideas were known to DoE officials (Crick and Klaveren, p.412, 1991), and he was later invited to serve as an assessor to the key departmental studies team which produced the CC.
9 Also Jackman, chapter seven, 'Local Government Finance', in Loughlin et al. (1985) - lack of accountability was the main cause of high spending, and if local autonomy was to be revived, the extent of redistribution in local government services would need to be reduced, with local authorities charging for more services.
domestic ratepayer, and weakened the 'electoral discipline on expenditure'. Redistribution was an unsuitable activity for local government. The authors argued for the restoration of the 'benefit principle' - that people contribute according to the benefits received, as opposed to according to ability to pay - which had been eroded. The value of property was inadequate as a guide to the amount of services - benefits - received. Hence (p.165, ibid):

"One of the criteria for a good tax to finance local expenditure is that it should be a local tax and there should be a close link between the expenditure undertaken locally and the tax collected locally." Local citizens should be free to express preferences for higher (or lower) levels of service than in other locales, but without claim on the general taxpayer. To finance beneficial services (p.233, 1980): "The most efficient tax is a poll tax. The main disadvantage of such a tax is that it offends against common perceptions of equity while not as efficient as a specific charge." Ultimately, they proposed a local income tax as a full replacement for rates (rather than as in Layfield a partial replacement).¹⁰

The Treasury opposed a local income tax, Heseltine disliked a poll tax, and a sales tax was considered

¹⁰ Further, Foster and Jackman (1982) argued that weaknesses in local accountability (non-voting ratepayers especially local businesses, the variation in domestic marginal contribution, non-ratepaying voters, and disproportionate benefits) would disable attempts to reduce local authority expenditure. Some voters would vote rationally for higher rates. It was impossible both to protect those on low incomes from having to pay rates, and at the same time to have a financial discipline bearing upon low-income voters.
impractical. Hence despite the intention to reform, the rates proved resilient again. This led to rate-capping rather than abolition emerging as the 1983 Manifesto commitment. The newly-established Environment Committee of the House of Commons used the Green Paper as a basis for its own examination of the issue (Environment Committee, 1982), which again rejected a poll tax.

6.2c Rates

The Government's White Paper Rates (1983) rejected a flat-rate charge on the grounds that it would be difficult to enforce, expensive and complicated. Without a rebate scheme it would bear harshly on people with low incomes. It concluded that the rating system had to stay. Patrick Jenkin replaced Tom King as Secretary of State for the Environment after the 1983 General Election, in what became an increasingly fraught period. The Rates Act was passed in 1984 and rate limitation was imposed for the first time in the 1985-6 financial year. Local authority spending was still increasing, and expensive legal challenges were being brought by councils.

6.2d The Department of Environment Review

The summer of 1984 was the crucial starting-point for the charge as a serious option because of the state of local government (Butler et al., p.44, ibid). There was increasing resentment in local

\[11\] The 'anarchy' in local government included the running battle over plans to abolish the GLC and metropolitan county councils, embarrassment for Jenkin over the defeat of his paving bill to cancel the council's elections in 1985 in the
government and both main parties. Senior DoE officials decided there should be a detailed review of the grant system. On Sunday September 2nd in a Chequers meeting, and then at Number 10 on 27th September, Jenkin presented his case for a full departmental review of local government finance (announced at the Party conference of that year). There was likely to be greater internal and external pressure anyway for significant action on the rates.

The crisis over the revaluation in Scotland finally galvanised the Government into action. Revaluations that had been postponed in England in and Wales in 1978 and 1983 had by law to proceed in Scotland, and led to substantial increases in rates payable by households in larger owner-occupied homes and by some smaller businesses (this impacted on 'natural' Conservative supporters and produced a considerable outcry). It gave the review greater urgency, aided by the conversion of Willie Whitelaw and George Younger, Secretary of State for Scotland. This led to the Government announcing transitional relief for

House of Lords and the July 1984 financial settlement with Militant-dominated Liverpool council.

Lawson objected to a review, Keith Joseph and Nicholas Ridley supported one (Baker, p.114, 1993a). Jenkins had persuaded the Treasury against Lawson's wishes to abandon expenditure targets which had become inexplicable, but the Treasury still wanted to retain rates. Thatcher (p.646, 1993) was 'cautious' since it could raise unmeetable expectations, but after the Conference (Chequers, 28th October) was convinced of the inadequacies of rates (p.646, ibid).

In August, the Audit Commission (1984) published a critical report on the block grant redistribution system.

Peter Riddell pointed at the time to Whitelaw's key role in convincing the Prime Minister of the need to quicken the decision on reform, Financial Times, 28th March, 1985.
rate-payers in the short-term, and the abolition of domestic rates in the long-run. Having promised to abolish rates in Scotland, it became difficult to resist their abolition in England and Wales.

Ministerial control over the review was passed from Jenkin to two junior ministers, Kenneth Baker, Minister of State, and William Waldegrave, Parliamentary Under-Secretary. Terry Heiser, DoE permanent secretary after 1984, pushed for external experts as assessors. Lord Rothschild, Leonard Hoffman, Tom Wilson, and Christopher Foster were chosen (these were involved from November 1984 to August 1985). Foster, one of the authors of *Local Government Finance in a Unitary State*, was the only one with specialised knowledge of local government finance, and brought in knowledge of the feasibility of a poll tax and the importance of the 'accountability problem'. While he did not push immediately for a per capita tax, he was pivotal in providing justification for one.

The terms of reference of the review were local government finance and structure (at first) with the aim of increasing accountability. Two ideas guided it: if local electors were informed of the true cost of their local authority (which the complexities of responsibility at the present stopped), they would

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15 There were also several DoE officials - Roger Bright, John Smith, David Lewis - and other civil servants - Jill Rutter from the Treasury, and Don Brereton from the DHSS, and Peter Owen, Heiser's Under-Secretary. They worked under Anthony Mayer, an assistant secretary. David King (1984) an academic economist from Stirling University was appointed to work with DoE officials from February 1987.
seek to influence its spending decisions through the ballot-box, and if all electors received a bill, accountability would work properly (the spectre of the earning non-householder again). According to Baker (p.116-7, 1993a): "The review group identified three main possibilities for reform: to change the structure of local government; to increase central control by the Treasury; or to design a system that would improve local accountability. They opted for the last proposal, and from this the community charge developed. All the possible ways of raising money locally were looked at."

Another aspect of the accountability question was of particular concern to Foster - inconsistencies caused by the grant system and non-domestic contributions to the rates. The review accepted his earlier proposal - setting local authorities' grant entitlements each year and nationally fixing a uniform non-domestic rate. This would make sure the full impact of marginal changes in local authority spending would be reflected in the local taxation system (Foster and Jackman 1982).

Each of the main alternatives to rates came to be unacceptable. Politically, it was not possible to have reduced national income tax and then introduce a local income tax, and the others (property and sales taxes) would not have satisfied the accountability criteria. Given the review's decision to focus on promoting accountability, to make sure

16 Butler et al. (p.51, ibid), also Thatcher (p.644, 1993), Baker (p.115, 1993a).
the full marginal effect of changes in a council's spending should fall on local taxpayers, and solve the problem of voting non-payers (Butler et al., p.58, ibid), then (Crick and van Klaveren, p.405, ibid): "Christopher Foster apparently told Waldegrave that...the poll tax was probably what they were looking for."\textsuperscript{17}

By the end of 1984, a per capita tax was considered but only as a supplement to the rates. By March 1985 it moved to being a possible replacement (Butler et al., p.56, ibid). Partly this was justified because the nature of local services had changed, from being provided primarily for properties, to people and personal services (Baker, p.118, 1993a, Ridley, p.120, 1991).

By January 1985, three clear policies had emerged: the (Foster-Jackman) national non-domestic rate/fixed grants, a poll tax as supplement to rates, and the creation of unitary authorities. They were all seen to promote accountability.\textsuperscript{18}

\textsuperscript{17} Also, the prospect of a normal rating revaluation threatened. By completion, the revaluation gap would have been fourteen years: "Margaret was also clear about the dangers of revaluation, and at one early meeting she said, 'We can't have a revaluation in England, it would wipe us out'" (Baker, p.116, ibid).

\textsuperscript{18} The system would force local authorities to make public decisions to increase the charge figure each year, rather than revenue rising automatically each year with inflation and growth, as with a sales or income tax: "It was this aspect that most appealed to Oliver Letwin and John Redwood, the two members of the Downing Street Policy Unit who acted as go-betweens with the Waldegrave team and the Prime Minister" (Crick and van Klaveren, p.406, ibid). Redwood was 'rather sceptical', Letwin 'extremely keen', and kept chivvying the Prime Minister.
even with Thatcher’s approval was not inevitable. Lawson was the most notable opponent. While he accepted the national non-domestic rate, he rejected the charge on political grounds - he thought that it would have disastrous effects, and preferred a reformed rating system (Lawson 1992). Baker now took personal charge of the project.

The Scottish Conservative conference May 1985 was dominated by the rates question and the amount of relief available for the revaluation (Kelly 1989). Younger announced reform plans for Scotland in his speech. After this public commitment, the first Cabinet committee met on 20th May. In September 1985, Baker replaced Jenkin as Secretary of State, Waldegrave from Under-Secretary to Minister of State, which reinforced progress. By autumn 1985, it remained only for the Cabinet committee to approve a specific reform of the rating system, and Baker was anxious to have it agreed by the Party conference. At the Cabinet committee meetings on 23rd September and 3rd October, Baker won endorsement. The charge would start at £50 per person in the first year and run in parallel with a reformed property tax (with the poll tax element raising 70 per cent of local income), but Lawson managed to retain Treasury capping. Baker and the DoE felt this would undermine local accountability (Butler et al., p.85, ibid).

on the same day as the Chequers meeting stated 'Poll tax plan to ease rates', 31st March, 1985.

21 The Treasury was proposing instead that central government should take over responsibility for financing education. Its concern was that the charge would give local government a tax base which weakened Treasury control (Baker, p.125, 1993a). But Lawson’s objections were dismissed.
The next major development was the meeting at Chequers, on 31st March 1985. Soon after a limited airing of the study team's ideas at the Capital Hotel on 3rd February, they had decided for an (either partial or full) poll tax. At Chequers, the plan was for the charge and a modernised property tax to replace domestic rates, with the charge element to gradually take an increased share (it was estimated that £140 per adult would be enough to fully replace domestic rates). Here, rather inaccurately given the work of the review, it was said that the charge was born (Thatcher, p.648, 1993). Though concerned about the number of gainers and losers, she was attracted to the discipline it would impose on local authorities (Baker, p.122, 1993a). They would be severely restrained by their own electors using comparisons between areas, and Conservative authorities would gain electorally (Ridley, p.15, 33, 1988). The unpopularity and visibility of such a regressive tax (now dubbed 'resident's charge') would be used to work for central government's aims. Local authorities would have to use it in order to spend beyond their centrally-determined allocations.

Waldegrave was the first to be convinced that a simple poll tax was the best answer. But progress

19 Nearly half of the Cabinet were there (Whitelaw, Jenkin, Younger, Nicholas Edwards (Welsh Secretary), Douglas Hurd (Northern Ireland Secretary), Leon Brittan (Home Secretary), Peter Rees (Chief Secretary to the Treasury), and Lord Young (Minister without Portfolio), Party Chairman John Gummer and junior Scottish Office Minister Michael Ancram.

20 Baker (p.118-9, 1993a) however still envisaged that it would come in at a low level (£50) and run alongside rates for a period of up to ten years ('dual-running'). The Sunday Times
It was agreed to publish a Green Paper in the new year. Younger pushed for Scottish legislation before the 1987 General Election, and wanted to take out the property element. Baker decided to wait for England and Wales (p.125, 1993a). Drafts of the Green Paper circulated in autumn 1985 (‘community charge’ was now used). During October and November, it became clear that the introduction of a new property tax just to raise 3 per cent of local tax income would be expensive and unpopular, so rates should be kept and gradually phased out, with a safety-net to limit transfers between north and south in the first years. The Green Paper was approved by Cabinet committee E(LF) on 12th December, 1985.

6.2e Paying for Local Government

On January 9th 1986, for the first time the full Cabinet discussed and approved formally the reforms. The Green Paper was published on 28th January 1986. There were four main parts. The centrepiece was the replacement of domestic rates. Non-domestic rates levied by local authorities on commercial and industrial properties were to be replaced by a National Non-Domestic Rate (NNDR), set each year by the government, collected on the basis of a single common rate poundage, and reallocated to local authorities by central government on the basis of their adult populations. The introduction of the NNDR was to be accompanied by a revaluation of all commercial and industrial properties. There was to be a new system of central government support to
local authorities, with Revenue Support Grant (RSG) replacing the Rate Support Grant, allocated on the basis of Standard Spending Assessments (SSAs).²² Last, there was a new system of capital spending controls, giving government the power to make credits approvals to local authorities to cover their capital spending needs (but taking into account capital receipts available to local authorities).²³

The paper gave three main reasons for abandoning the existing system - the malfunctioning of the grant system, the extent to which local authorities' marginal spending was funded by non-domestic ratepayers, and the mismatch between those who were entitled to vote in local elections, those who benefited from local services and those who paid domestic rates. The existing sources of local authority income - non-domestic rates, domestic rates and central government grant - encouraged weak accountability. It was impossible for local electors to relate what they paid to the services provided, and consequently authorities would increase spending on services for the voting domestic ratepayer

²² SSAs are the assessment of spending that would be required to provide a common standard of service across all authorities, determined by the government in the light of economic and other circumstances. The assessment is built around separate major service blocks and is refined for each authority by a formula containing factors reflecting the physical, social and demographic characteristics of the local authority and relevant to the costs of providing the service concerned.

²³ This measure was later blamed for causing higher capital spending by local authorities in 1989/90 in order to spend their receipts before the new system was introduced in April 1990.
largely at the expense of the non-voting, non-domestic ratepayer (DoE, paragraph 1.32, 1986). The reforms would (DoE, p.9, ibid):

"...guarantee the continued existence of a healthy system of local government. It should reduce the tension between central Government and local authorities. In the longer term it should help to ensure that services are provided more efficiently. And it strengthens the link between the local authority and those who live in the areas."  

Local domestic taxes were judged according to three criteria - technical adequacy, fairness and (most importantly) local democratic accountability. The familiar alternatives - rates, local income tax and local sales tax - failed to spread the burden of local taxation more widely, and provide a clear link between changes in expenditure and the local tax bill. The new system would ensure (p.vii, ibid):

"...local electors know what the costs of their services are, so that armed with this knowledge they can influence the spending decisions of their...

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24 More prescient commentators noted faulty logic. Gibson (p.44-5, 1990): "The Green Paper is guilty of making assertions about voting behaviour and presenting them as truths..The assertions amount to maintaining both (i) that non-ratepayers are at least as, and probably more, active voters in local elections as full ratepayers and (ii) that the 60% of the local electorate who literally make no direct rate payment put much greater emphasis on their zero direct payment of a rates bill than on the rate bill paid in their household." Not only does this appear not to provide any reason why local authority spending does not just keep rising and rising, but it is empirically deficient (Miller, p.232, 1988): "Almost universally it is rich taxpayers who turn out to vote more readily than poor non-taxpayers." Rate changes did have an important role in local elections (1988). The Widdicombe Committee (paragraph 2.78, 1986a) found that 94 per cent of all electors thought of themselves as rate-payers.
councils through the ballot-box." Everybody would pay regardless of income, but a system of rebates for the less well-off would continue.\(^{25}\)

There was a long period of consultation (January to October 1987). Local authorities reacted unfavourably, most favoured the retention of domestic rates. The Queen’s Speech in autumn 1986 announced Scottish legislation for that session, the Bill was brought forward and enacted in time for the General Election. In May 1986, Baker was moved to Education and Science, and replaced by Nicholas Ridley (from Transport).\(^{26}\) Towards the end of 1986, the transition time was cut down from ten years to four, a compromise between Ridley’s argument for three and the Treasury’s for five, but this can be seen as logical given the supposed advantages in accountability. In Scotland, where Malcolm Rifkind had replaced Younger as Scottish Secretary, officials became increasingly worried about implementation problems (and derived ‘solutions’ which were used in England and Wales, Baker, p.127, 1993a). The Abolition of Domestic Rates Etc.

\(^{25}\) Everybody would pay at least 20 per cent but benefits would be raised in line with the average cost of this minimum 20 per cent figure. The reason for this figure was that: "...Norman Fowler had already decided that his Housing Benefit changes would require every ratepayer to contribute at least 20 per cent towards local rates, thus scrapping the 100 per cent rebate" (Baker, p.121, 1993a). It was decided later against Baker’s wishes (p.127, ibid) that 20 per cent would be levied on students.

\(^{26}\) Four months after Ridley’s appointment, the junior ministers changed. Waldegrave was replaced by Rhodes Boyson as local government minister (replaced later by Michael Howard), and Christopher Chope made under-secretary. After 1987, Charles Brearly and Neil Summerton became civil servants in charge of legislation and implementation.
(Scotland) Bill was the last major measure introduced into Parliament before the 1987 Election (it received its House of Commons second reading on 9th December). Two significant Government amendments were made. The phasing-in period (April 1989 to March 1992) was scrapped - it would now come into force in April 1989. Further, individuals, rather than the head of the household, became liable for their own tax.

Officials at the DoE were urging an end to the (administratively complex) dual running, and Ridley realised it would diminish accountability (Butler et al., p.108, ibid). Heiser and Brearly pushed for an immediate change-over, Ridley agreed. The Cabinet committee agreed to a transitional period of four years and an initial charge of £100 (announced months later, on 30th July 1987). But the 1987 Party Conference reopened the issue - there was overwhelming support for the new tax, and some calls for its immediate introduction. In Cabinet committee, Howard and Ridley pushed this, while Lawson argued against. Thatcher sided with Ridley. On 17th November 1987, Ridley announced that the charge would be introduced in most places without dual running, except in areas spending £130 or more per head above needs assessment where there would be

27 Baker (p.129, 1993a) reveals that Gerry Malone, one of the most vocal speakers against dual-running at the Conference: "...now says he was encouraged to do this not by Ministers in the Department of the Environment but by Leon Brittan. Nick Ridley, shortly before his death, strenuously denied that he had arranged the intervention. However, Nigel Lawson was in no doubt whatsoever, and he believes that the Conference debate was rigged."
four years of transition, as well as changes to the safety net (many Conservatives felt these would effectively subsidise 'high spending' Labour authorities).

6.2f Legislation

The Local Government Bill for England and Wales was presented to Parliament on 16th December 1987. The second reading of the Bill on 16th and 17th December 1987, saw the beginning of the long Parliamentary battle (Raison, p.156-9, 1990). The focus of objections was the flat-rate charge. There was an attempt by over 40 Conservatives to obtain a debate on an instruction to the standing committee on the Bill that it should examine the desirability of linking the charge to the ability to pay (this was ruled out of order). The Bill was defended along familiar lines, particularly the linkage between those using, paying and voting for local services. 17 Conservatives voted against the Government, more abstained. The Bill went into Standing Committee, guided by Howard, then back to the floor of the House for the Report stage. There, on 18th April, there was the battle over the Mates amendment.

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28 A scheme had been evolved in conjunction with the Chartered Institute of Public Finance and Accountancy by which the charge should be levied at different rates for different bands of income.


30 This was a new banded scheme made possible by the recent Budget. For those who did not pay income tax, the rate would be half the normal level (they would also still be eligible for rebates). Those on the standard rate of tax would pay the standard charge rate, and those on the higher rate would pay 50 per cent above the standard charge. The Government began to argue (bizarrely) in its defence, against the principle of the local fairness and accountability of the charge, that the new
Just before the debate Ridley announced more generous rebates, claiming they would reach 9 million people, a blow to Treasury attempts to reduce housing benefit. The Government defeated the Mates amendment by more than it had gained at the Second Reading (36 Conservatives voted for the amendment). In the Lords (at report stage), dual running was finally done away with by a Government amendment (on 30th June 1988). The Government obtained its Bill in essentially the form it wanted, and the Local Government Finance Bill received Royal Assent on 29th July, 1988.

During summer 1989, three factors exacerbated tensions - Conservative backbenchers became increasingly angry about the safety nets, rising inflation was undercutting the local government financial settlement, and the first detailed predictions of the effects of the charge on key marginal voters and households were made (Butler et al., p.137, ibid). This increased pressure on the Treasury for more money - the package announced on 19th July 1988 included additional local authority grants of £2bn. Immediately after the July settlement, Chris Patten replaced Ridley as Environment Secretary and David Hunt replaced Gummer as local government minister. Apparently, Patten realised immediately that the level of grant for local government for 1990-1 was too low and that

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31 The Government had obtained a Second Reading by 341 voted to 269, and defeated the Mates amendment by 320 to 295.
estimated charge levels were not realistic (he demanded an additional £2bn), but this brought him into conflict with Lawson. Patten eventually got £1.2bn over three years, but realised disaster could not be averted.

In November 1989, ministers made an announcement of what each local authority should levy if keeping to the SSA set by government. The average charge per head in England and Wales was estimated to be £278. The aim was to put pressure on local authorities to meet this target. But in early 1990 local authorities began to announce intended charges. Labour-controlled authorities were on average 36 per cent above, Conservative-controlled 31 per cent above. The party political advantage was largely blown. Many Conservative councillors complained that their SSAs were gross underestimates. Only 3 out of 39 county councils in England were able to set budgets at or below Government guidelines despite the majority of such authorities being under Conservative control. The impact of their precepts pushed up bills sent out by many district councils. Remedial measures were adopted - the phasing-in system for local authority revenue support was altered, and in October 1989 a scheme of transitional relief to households was announced. In addition to the established rebate system, this provided further help to some low-income households.
who faced a major increase in their bills compared to the rates. 32

6.2g Implementation (1990 Onwards)

There were five main stages to the disastrous implementation (Stoker 1991). First, local authorities proved themselves willing to challenge Government spending guidelines in the run-up to the 1990/1 fiscal year. 33 The Government lost the propaganda battle, especially with regard to the administrative costs of reform which it had miscalculated. 34 It received the blame because it had directed public attention towards the £278 figure whilst at the same time introducing a grant settlement which guaranteed that nearly all local authorities would fail to achieve it. Public opinion polls signalled the increasing unpopularity of the reform. Small businesses protested against substantial increases due to the revaluation accompanying introduction of the NNDR. Transitional measures were adopted. The Secretary of State for the Environment's response to higher charges set by local authorities was to invoke powers contained in the LGFA to cap the charges of twenty authorities

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32 Baker (p.135, 1993a): "The problem was that every £1bn of extra grant would only reduce individual community charge bills by about £30. 'We had created a monster whose appetite was insatiable.' The Downing Street Policy Unit considered more rebates, taking education expenditure out of local government, and large increases in central government grants, but these were rejected by then Treasury Chief Secretary John Major (Butler et al., p.147, ibid).

33 Ridley attacked Lawson for failing to provide sufficient central funds to underwrite the first year of implementation ('Lawson Killed My Baby', The Times, 27th March, p.16.).

34 This was unforgivable given the Government's huge media campaign for the charge (Deacon and Golding 1994, Golding 1992).
who he felt were overspending (defined by a formula as authorities whose budget exceeded its SSA by 12.5 per cent and £75 per adult). None of these were under Conservative control, although a number of Conservative authorities had exceeded targets by more than capped authorities. At a cabinet meeting on 5th April, Thatcher apparently proposed universal capping for all local authorities, but Patten and Major opposed this and pointed to practical difficulties (Baker, p.137, ibid). Capping amounted to an admission that one rationale of reform - that it would impose sufficient restraints on local authority expenditure to make central government intervention unnecessary - had failed. In mid-April, Patten created two committees of ministers and civil servants from the Treasury and DoE in order to examine options for reform. They considered universal capping, a more generous rebate system, and giving the Audit Commission the power to limit local authority spending. A Cabinet committee was set up to discuss the proposals from these committees, which Thatcher chaired.\footnote{This committee included Patten, Hunt, Major, John McGregor (Education Secretary), David Waddington (Home Secretary), Malcolm Rifkind (Scottish Secretary), and Peter Walker (Welsh Secretary) (Butler et al., p.160, ibid).}

Second, the May 1990 Local Elections were disastrous. In some cases, the increased participation worked to the Government's advantage - Wandsworth and Westminster increased their Conservative majorities - but generally the 1990
results confirmed the charge's massive electoral liability.\textsuperscript{36}

Third, further damage limitations exercises were launched. Patten, Secretary of State for the Environment, was privately highly critical of the political consequences of the charge, but led the damage limitation exercise aided by Michael Portillo, who was appointed to oversee the review and replace Hunt as local government minister. The Prime Minister was not prepared to abolish or radically restructure it, and the administrative costs were against these. In July 1990, additional Government support (approximately £3 billion) was provided to underwrite local authority spending, the cost of the inter-authority safety-net and increased general funding to local authorities (implicitly accepting the actual budgets of councils in 1990/1 as a baseline, despite the previous criticisms of high spending in the first year), which would hopefully help down the increases in charges for 1991/2. In addition there were a range of measures aimed at easing the burden on particular groups and individuals. Around £30 million was available through an extended and enhanced system of transitional relief, increased benefits to low-

\textsuperscript{36} Ivor Crewe (1990) wrote at the time: "The tax does appear to have increased local accountability, making the elections the most genuinely local in living memory. Turnout exceeded 50 per cent, equalling the post-war record. Swings varied markedly between and within regions." Similarly, The Economist (12th May, 1990): "Judged by its first outing in England and Wales the poll tax could yet achieve the principal aim for which it was designed..It does look likely that the poll tax was taken by a sizeable number of voters as a reliable guide to the efficiency and competence of the local council."
income households which faced massive increases in the changeover, and local authorities were required to present their bills in a way that made clear how much of the charge was due to each tier of local government. The financial discipline the reform was supposed to impose, and the direct relationship between paying for and receiving a service, was undermined further. The Government now claimed that one in four charge-payers would have some reduction in the amount to pay. Political survival was paramount.

Fourth, problems of collection from April 1990 onwards proved considerable. Many local authorities faced considerable non-payment, especially charge-capped authorities with particular problems. Last, in the wake of Thatcher’s fall from the leadership the death of the CC was announced on 21st March 1991. Heseltine, as the new Secretary of State for the Environment, adopted two new strategies. In the short-term, he sought additional money to cushion the impact in the financial year 1991/2, via additional targeted funds being found. In January 1991 the Government announced a revised system of relief (the ‘Community Charge reduction scheme’), again targeting primarily households particularly hit by the transition. Local authorities were to be forced to use the extra grant to reduce proposed bills by approximately £140 per head, but it emerged that those in receipt of benefit under the reduction scheme would not receive the full £140 discount. This was rushed through Parliament and created administrative chaos. In the long-term, to maintain
the charge was no longer a viable option. In a parallel announcement to abolition, spending responsibility for further education and sixth form colleges was taken away from local authorities, seen to indicate the Government's need to shift more of the burden from local to central government (this removed £2.2 billion from local authority budgets). In May 1991, legislation was introduced to extend capping powers to all local authorities including those with budgets of less than £15 million.

6.3 The Community Charge and the New Right

The above account of the policy process does not appear to reveal any noticeable new right influence, and this is supported by the other analyses.37 It is the case that the significant new right publications arguing for a poll tax were not published until the DoE review was under way, and the above account of the development of the charge shows that other factors were important in forcing a reform of local government finance to be made. However, the new right did contribute to the case for change.

Mason (1985) in an Adam Smith Institute study argued that the rating system encouraged fiscal

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37 Crick and van Klaveren (1991), Butler et al. (1994), and Stoker (1991), for whom the new right supplied only 'ideological window dressing'. However, Butler et al. (p.72, ibid) also suggest confusingly: "...is not to say that the pro-poll tax lobby was unimportant, still less that the motivation of Whitelaw and the others was unideological. All the ministers involved agreed on the same overriding priority: to reduce the rates burden on Tory supporters quickly, and to do so without increasing income tax. The poll tax appeared the ideal vehicle for the job, and the fact that it did owed much to the popularisation of the idea in Tory circles by the ASI and others."
irresponsibility. This increased urban dereliction and unemployment by driving out industry and commerce to less highly-rated areas. Hence (p.22-3, ibid): "...a per capita tax [£180 per head] has such manifest advantages that it merits more serious consideration than it has, to date, been given. It shares the burden equally. It is directly related to the council which levies it. Its yield is clearly predictable. In addition, a per capita tax would have the enormous advantage over all other forms of taxes, in that it would involve everyone in paying for the services they had chosen through the ballot box. The two-thirds of voters who currently enjoy immunity from the consequences of their electoral actions would no longer be able to exploit the ratepaying minority." Again, the issue of non-paying voters was central (p.44, ibid): "...these proposals provide the basis on which a substantial measure of autonomy could be restored to local government in the secure knowledge that the non-voting ratepayer could no longer be penalised to pay for the profligacy of ambitious or partisan local politicians.."

In April of the same year, Forsyth (1985) in a Conservative Political Centre pamphlet (which obviously drew on Mason, and Foster and Jackman)39

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38 An earlier ASI study - Omega Report, Local Government Policy, published August 1983 (Mason was among the contributors) had referred to a 'simple per capita tax' and proposed new powers for local referendum on rate reductions, compulsory competitive tendering, the abolition of the GLC and six metropolitan county councils, new transport authorities, and direct central funding of education and police forces.

39 Indeed, Crick and van Klaveren (p.407, 1991) claim that Mason 'drafted' Forsyth's pamphlet.
reiterated the familiar arguments for a flat-rate charge. Also, Taylor (1985) in a Centre for Policy Studies pamphlet argued the case for a 'residents tax' on all adults (alongside rates), producing a greater incentive to vote and awareness of the costs of local government. Commercial ratepayers should be given a second vote in local elections, and the block grant phased-out, allowing cuts in income tax. All these arguments were remarkably similar to those used by the review team and the Government, and derivative of Foster and Jackman's analysis.

However, a broader discussion is needed to show how the CC was influenced profoundly by the new right. The charge was highly ideological. This does not seek to deny political contingency, since the reform process could easily have been derailed at many points. But the new right constructed the purpose

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40 Taylor was GLC Deputy Opposition Leader and member of the Advisory Panel to Baker, then Minister for Local Government.
41 Gibson (p.41-2, 1990): "The Green Paper can be interpreted as taking the earlier analysis of Foster and Jackman of discrepancies between the marginal cost of services provided and the cost of or benefits received from services...to its logical conclusion. Fundamentally, it was such discrepancies which led to weaknesses in local accountability according to both Foster and Jackman and the Green Paper."
42 These included: the scepticism of two of the four outside 'assessors' in the DoE review (Wilson and Hoffman), Lawson's continued rejection, the May 1985 CIPFA report analysing its distributional impact (Hale 1985), Gibson's research (1987b, 1990), the rejection garnered during in 'consultation' period, worries over implementation at the Scottish Office, a leading member of the Institute of Revenues, Rating and Revaluation warning of the extra costs (Longden 1986), CIPFA's (1986) hostile official response, the campaign in Parliament by Conservative backbenchers to modify it (beginning with Sir George Young's group of sceptics, Heseltine's ominous warnings of the 'Tory tax', Sir Brandon Rhys-Williams' committee stage attempts to reduce the weight of local spending it would have to bear by nationalising expenditure of education, police fire and civil defence, the Mates amendment, the repeated self-
of the reforms in local government, and more specifically the need for some mechanism which would solve its 'problems' of accountability, representation, and the role of local government.

First, the new right constructed a general macro level picture of local government and its relationship to central government concerns. Public expenditure had to be reduced, and many of the services provided by local government were on the front-line. Local 'overspending' was merely a symptom of the general deficiencies of the social democratic welfare state. Consequently it encouraged the maximisation of local choice, accountability and fiscal management, welcoming variation in choice and standards (King, chapter 10, 'The New Right, the New Left and Local Government', Stewart and Stoker 1989). It draws on the 'Tiebout hypothesis' (1956), which suggests that for each unit of local government there is a natural 'optimum community size' pertaining to the efficient allocation of services toward which all should strive. The size will be achieved as a consequence of individual consumers searching to find which community suits their needs best. Such ('voice', and particularly 'exit') rational behaviour forces local government to be cost-efficient in its provision of services and to maintain a prosperous (low-tax) local economy. Whether or not an accurate analysis of local citizenship, as King notes politically this is delusion over charge levels, and the experience in Scotland of early stages of implementation.
appealing to the new right because it promotes inter-regional inequality by imposing costs on local authorities who pursue redistributive policies. Local government becomes concerned with liberal political economic allocative efficiency, not social justice.43

This vision for local government can be seen in much new right literature. Nicholas Ridley (1988) sketched out the 'enabling not providing' local authority, achieved by the privatisation of assets, the introduction of 'market discipline' into service delivery, and the encouragement of private and voluntary services. The new right identified correctly how local democracy was illusory because local autonomy was limited severely by its reliance on central grants and ineffectively accountable local tax system of its own (Seldon et al. 1980). Public choice-derived analysis claimed to show the 'disproportionate' influence of pressure groups (Pirie, p.11, Butler and Pirie 1981): "Each service provided creates its class of beneficiaries which sees itself as a distinct interest groups and will campaign for its privileges. The taxpayer and ratepayer, by contrast, are a more amorphous mass, not acting as a self-conscious interest group."

Charging for local services would increase efficiency, erode the influence of interest groups,

43 Peterson (p.37, 1981): "..efficiency in local government promotes city [capital] interests. [The] closer any locality moves toward this ideal match between taxes and services, the more attractive its land becomes. It is thus in the interest of local government to operate as efficiently as possible. Operating efficiently hardly means operating as to enhance equality."
reduce the dependence on central government, and so revitalise local democracy (Harris and Seldon 1976, Institute of Economic Affairs' evidence to the Layfield Committee).

This type of local government would stop the 'threat' from the local left. This form of local 'democracy' would not allow a platform for citizens on broader issues of social and political inequality, only efficient provision of services (MacGregor 1988). Many moves were made in stripping away the direct functions of local authorities. The charge was to be the central mechanism to secure this vision.

Other studies, most notably Foster, Jackman and Perlman (1980) and Foster and Jackman (1982) took up new right priorities with regard to local government and provided more complete diagnoses. The particular construction of the problems of local government—the weakening of electoral discipline on expenditure, inefficient provision of services, and irresponsibility of the earning non-householder—were given intellectual respectability beyond the taint of polemicism. They came to dominate the Government's thinking. But only the new right,

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44 Another CPS pamphlet by David Regan (1987) identified the local left with four principal characteristics— a readiness to flout the law, involvement in issues well beyond the responsibilities of local government, a politicisation of career officials, and use of local government as an instrument of radical social engineering.

45 In particular there was sustained lobbying activity by the Adam Smith Institute and Conservative MPs Michael Forsyth and Christopher Chope for privatising/contracting-out local government services. The Local Government, Planning and Land Act 1980, and Local Government Acts in 1988 and 1992 have all extended compulsory competitive tendering.
having constructed the problem of local government, had the will and imagination to seek to solve it. Part of this imagination was provided by the insights of public choice analysis, which had emphasised that orthodox democratic arrangements were very poor predictors of citizens' preferences.\textsuperscript{46}

Second, and more specifically, these new right-constructed principles and assumptions were incorporated into the work of the review from 1984-5 which eventually developed the charge. They aimed to find a way to increase local accountability. They were guided by this notion of the weakness of local accountability and the importance of all local electors receiving a tax bill for its enhancement (here again, the earning non-householder was a problem). They also thought it important that increases in marginal spending would be reflected in bills. They rejected a redistributive role for local government, implicitly accepted Tieboutian 'local efficiency' and its behavioural assumptions with regard to local electors. This was to be the force which would make the whole mechanism act downwards on local expenditure. Otherwise, the reform makes no sense. Other options for local taxation were rejected because they contradicted Thatcherite-new right ideology, by either granting local authorities too much (especially fiscal) autonomy and threatening to raise general tax levels. Indeed, the

\textsuperscript{46} Dunleavy and O'Leary (p.98, 1987): "They profess to be mystified that liberal democracies have experimented so little with alternative arrangements." Also Waldegrave (1993).
review team came to think of themselves as a kind of think-tank (Butler et al., p.214, ibid), 'thinking the unthinkable' became possible outside the traditional policy-making processes, particularly with the exclusion for ideological reasons of local government representatives ('producer interests').

The extent to which construction of concepts was important can be seen with reference to 'accountability'. The Government claimed that the charge empowered citizens by enhancing the democratic accountability of local authorities to the wishes of local tax-payers. But this accountability, the key to the reform, had a specific and overriding focus - the mobilisation of electors around the issue of 'paying for local services'. This was premised on market concepts, particularly that there should be a close relationship between paying and receiving. Further, the accountability mechanism was not neutral. There was a gearing effect. All marginal spending (above centrally assessed needs) was to fall on the charge, and because it was designed originally to constitute on average twenty-five per cent of average revenue income, the system of accountability was geared. An increase in spending of for example one per cent would lead to an increase in the charge of four per cent.\(^{47}\) The effect was even worse for those with rebates.\(^{48}\)

\(^{47}\) Stewart and Stoker (p.3, 1988): "That is not genuine local accountability, but distorted accountability designed to produce the answer that the Government wants." Similarly, Bellamy (p.32, 1994): "...the accountability arrived at by the government was not so much that of local authorities to
Ironically though, given the central importance of this conception of accountability, in operation it was highly defective. Because of the complexities of all the reforms, 1990 charge bills bore no obvious relationship to 1989 rates bills. An average of three-quarters of revenue income was still derived from central sources (NNDR and RSG). With both of these undergoing year-on-year changes, accountability was further eroded. Further, there remained a high level of confusion and ignorance as to the charge, and local government in general. As a result, only central government got called to account.

Third, during the legislative process and implementation, these principles shaped key decisions. The central concept of accountability inherent in the charge influenced practical decisions. The move from dual-running, for example, was a logical decision, given that clear and immediate accountability was the aim of the reform. This, with other amendments, made the charge more radical than in the form first proposed.

citizens, as that of citizens to the Treasury for the financial costs of the policies they enacted. The extent to which the charge was aimed at empowering citizens was distinctly limited, therefore."

48 Since Income Support covered only 20% of the average charge, individuals living in authorities with higher than average charges made a net payment from their own income (from sources other than the Income Support allocated for that purpose). This was exacerbated by the large gap which developed between actual CC levels and the Government's planned average, which were included in the uprating of scales in advance of CC levels being known.

49 For example, Thatcher: "...the transition period is flatly contradictory to the basic philosophy, so we have got to find a way through" (Daily Express, 7th September, 1989, p.9).
but more in keeping with its underlying principles. As a result, the charge is inconceivable without the new right. It represented the opportunity for the Government to achieve its national new right aims via local 'citizenship' and 'accountability'.

6.4 The Community Charge and Citizenship

6.4a Accountability and Participation

However distorted the accountability mechanism at the heart of the reform was (and all forms of representation are to some extent designed for specific purposes), it depended crucially on the mobilisation of local electors. In this sense, it manipulated citizenship. As suggested, citizenship is a concept, not a theory, and can be appropriated for different ideological ends in different particular contexts. In this case, a limited form of citizenship was intended to produce selected strategic effects. But it was still a genuine form of 'accountability', in the sense that all forms of accountability are ideologically-loaded. The operating system would have enhanced a form of citizenship, but one which would have deliberately marginalised others. Further, it was not inconceivable that the mechanism, in making an explicit link between local expenditure and electors' responsibility, could in some areas have produced demands for greater spending.

In a sense, the charge widened local citizenship by reformulating the linkage between voting and paying
for local services.\textsuperscript{50} However, in another respect it narrowed it significantly. Despite Government assurances, the charge deterred many people from registering to vote (one study has estimated around 600,000).\textsuperscript{51} This represents a considerable erosion of citizenship.

6.4b Poverty

Flat-rate charges neglect that both patterns of use and benefit vary with income. The distorted accountability of the charge ignored deliberately that the poor were harder hit by any reduction in local spending, but also by significant increases in bills. Further, this was likely to be exacerbated in deprived areas. Yet the Government claimed continually that it was less regressive than the rates.\textsuperscript{52} Gibson (chapter five, 1990) and Bramley et

\textsuperscript{50} Thatcher (p.661, 1993): "For the first time a government had declared that anyone who could reasonably afford to do so should at least pay something towards the upkeep of the facilities and the provision of the services from which they benefited. A whole class of people - an 'underclass' if you will - had been dragged back into the ranks of responsible society and asked to become not just dependants but citizens."

\textsuperscript{51} Smith and McLean (p.240, 1994), on the assumption that evaders were from social groups disproportionately unlikely to vote Conservative, suggested that but for deregistration the Conservatives would not have an overall majority in 1993 given subsequent by-election losses. It has been Thatcher's personal contention that a million Labour supporters had failed to register (The Sunday Telegraph, 12th April 1992). Over the three year period between 1988 and 1991, the proportion of adults who registered from those eligible to vote fell from 97.9 per cent to 95.6 per cent, with the decline evident particularly amongst young people who had just attained the right to vote (Population Trends, 64, 1991).

\textsuperscript{52} DoE (para. 3.37, 1986): "...at the lowest income levels, householders would face lower average bills with a full community charge than with domestic rates." Ridley (p.127, 1991): "If the standard tax or charge is set at quite a high level, and generous rebates are provided for those with lower incomes, the desired result can be achieved...rebated poll
al. (1989) have shown that the charge actually had the effect of increasing substantially the relative benefit shares of upper income groups and lowering that of poorer groups, thereby providing an incentive for the inefficient underprovision of local authority services. The Government assumed an over-optimistic take-up rate for rebates, and did not include the additional redistribution in favour of higher income households which would follow the removal of safety nets. The charge introduced a substantial inequity between taxpayers in different areas because of different non-collection rates and because tax rates were necessarily higher in high needs areas for equal improvements in services than in lower need areas. One further aspect of the poverty exacerbated by the introduction of the charge was racial. Since the main factors determining whether a household would be worse off would be the size of the household, its area and the type of housing occupied, and that ethnic minorities were worse-off in all three respects, it would disadvantage them to an even greater degree (ALA 1988). These effects on deregistration and lower-income groups further consolidated the 'underclass' 

taxes are the only form of local taxation that can be related to ability to pay."

53 Further, Esam and Oppenheim (1989) noted that the regressive effects were exacerbated by the 1988 Social Security Act. Both shared the principle of means-testing ('targeting'), the supposed empowerment of individuals and the reduction of state expenditure. Both narrowed the notion of 'need' (whatever actual conditions), and hence widened the divide between the 'self-reliant' and 'responsible' citizen who relied on private provision, and the 'state dependent'.

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(MacGregor 1991). Given this context, high levels of non-payment were unsurprising.\footnote{54}

6.5 Thatcherism and Local Government

"...local government found itself embroiled not only in arguments about public expenditure but also in a wider debate about the appropriate role of the state."\footnote{55}

The Thatcher Governments presided over many changes in local government, of which the charge was only the most notable. Previous measures had reduced successively the autonomy of local government. Inevitably then, the charge has come to be seen as the next measure to further undermine it, if not destroy it in effect altogether. However, the above account of the development of the policy, the new right's conception of local government, and the charge's use of citizenship concepts to achieve its ends, suggest a slightly different analysis. It was not meant to destroy local government, but transform it in line with greater strategic purposes.

\footnote{54}{It has been suggested that liberal conceptions of political obligation, undermined by the tendency to stress the individualistic moral autonomy of agents, were inadequate as reasons to pay the charge (Bellamy 1994). The liberal-individualist reasoning behind the tax weakened the appeals to obligation to non-payers, and further it is claimed that since the charge did not align properly with the public choice model which Bellamy sees as being its ethos, its mechanisms did not reflect accurately individual rational voter choices, dissent was possible through this perspective as well (though as Bellamy admits, this 'probably wasn't' the motivation for non-payment for most of the dissenters).}

\footnote{55}{Gyford (p.90, chapter four, 'The Politicisation of Local Government', Loughlin et al. 1985). This came from the rise of local socialism as well as the new right.}
Local government became a key problematic area for Thatcherism. The Conservatives had an organisational dilemma in that to restructure public expenditure patterns (more resources to defence, law and order, social security, less to housing, education, social services) they had to restrict expenditure in areas not directly under central government control (Travers 1986). From the mid-1980s the Government’s concern about local government became further-reaching in its implications, beyond public expenditure restraint to a broader attempt at restructuring (Stewart and Stoker 1989). It has fragmented local institutions, by-passed directly-elected local authorities (and consequently political representation, control and accountability), via organisations such as urban development corporations, TECs, and HATs. 'Efficiency' was to exert a continuous downward pressure on the system. The relationship between units of local governance was disrupted. Yet despite successes in steadily undermining the functions and autonomy of local authorities, the Government was

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56 Other measures included the imposition of cash limits (particularly public sector pay restraint), the systematic reduction of subsidies to local public services (especially housing and public transport), increased charges for services (particularly council house rents and public transport fares), and the erosion of functions (such as the removal of housing benefit administration from local authorities in 1982, GM schools and others), the growth of single-purpose non-elected bodies (such as Urban Development Corporations), and contracting-out services (Edgell and Duke, chapter five, 'Central-Local Government Relations', 1991).

57 This is seen as an embryonic form of a new system of 'government by contract' (Mather 1988).

58 The revamped Audit Commission forcing 'efficiency savings' can be seen as an attempt to provide a countervailing force to
exasperated that the problem of 'excessive' local authority spending had not been solved. In this sense, there was not enough obtrusive intervention earlier on such a scale which dealt effectively with the issue.

The principal attraction of the charge to its converts was that it offered the possibility of ending such obtrusive intervention, breaking with the draining repetitive cycle of legislation, while retaining a specific form of central control. But it should not be characterised simply as 'centralising' in line with previous measures. It was a new kind of policy approach, which selectively undermined the sphere of local autonomy while simultaneously capitalising on a revitalised form of accountability via local participation. Hence although the charge has been shown to be highly ideological, it was also meant to be more flexible and less explicitly dogmatic than the previous measures of the early to mid-1980s.

The broader strategic aims of Thatcherism in which local government became caught-up are analysed later [chapter nine]. But the consequences for local

the 'budget maximising tendencies' of local authorities (Stoker 1991).

59 As Ridley wrote (p.13, 1988): "...what is clear..is that the more effectively and efficiently local authorities operate in providing services in an accountable way, responsive to needs of their local communities and competing effectively with other providers where that is relevant, the less need there is likely to be for central government and detailed control..Conversely, where local responsibility breaks down there is inevitably stronger pressure for central intervention." Also Rhodes (chapter three, 'Changing Intergovernmental Relations', Cloke 1992), the charge represented a break from the failed 'bureaucratic command' governing code.
democracy can be noted here. It had to be made compatible with the ‘flexible’ economic structures, the two-tier welfare system and the ‘enterprise culture’ (Stewart and Stoker 1989). Of course, the charge did reduce significantly local financial discretion, and the national uniform business rate in effect halved the local tax-base immediately. But it is not sufficient to regard the charge and other reforms as merely representing the Government’s desire to cut back public expenditure or roll back the state. Rather, it should be seen as a device to limit the scope of local democracy, alter the behaviour of local electors and representatives, and make local government a pillar of the ‘market society’ rather than a threat to it.60

A too-benign image of ‘local democracy’ should be avoided. However, it is also important within this argument to understand the way in which it contained the potential to threaten the market society, as a resource for local pluralism and communal responsibility for the relief of poverty.61 Local government, ideally, is a training ground for citizenship.62 This represents the ‘localist’ approach, which must logically resist unwarranted intervention from central government. But of course,

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60 Indeed, in this conception, given Municipal Toryism’s historically consistent strategy for the protection of ‘propertied interests’, the new right-led Thatcherite approach to local government can be seen to be within the tradition though certain strategies changed (Butcher et al. 1990).
61 Bains Committee (para 2.12, 1972): “Local government is not, in our view, limited to the narrow provision of services. It has within its purview the overall economic, cultural, and physical well-being of that community.”
local government's position is undermined by its lack of explicit authority within the British constitution, which forces it to justify itself as efficient and productive (Widdicombe 1986a). Its role in enhancing citizenship is necessarily made secondary.

This makes the community charge (MacGregor, p. 34, 1991): "...a powerful illustration and symbol of Thatcherite social policy. It encapsulated the key choices faced by contemporary British society and politics. As financial and administrative instruments, the new rules defied all the conventional principles of good taxation and good public administration. Rather they were an instrument of policy, a tool of social engineering, aimed at altering social relationships, ideas and values."

The charge's purpose was to asphyxiate a particular vision of local democracy as many alternative centres of power and ideas. Of course, it failed in implementation, but this analysis may also show how it has broadly succeeded in that purpose. First, local fiscal autonomy has been substantially eroded. Second, there are no other significant

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Sexual politics was used to depict projects for local autonomy as 'extremist' and 'dangerous', representing the 'homosexualization of local government autonomy' (Smith 1994).

One legacy of the charge was that the share of local government expenditure that was met out of locally-raised revenue had increased, hence if rates were reintroduced they would be higher than previously. Yet if parts of local government expenditure were removed and borne by central government, they would have to be funded out of increased taxation or cuts elsewhere. The Government's solution was to increase central government grants so as to reduce the charge by £140, the additional burden on central government met by an
competing strategies for local government (as there appeared to be in the first half of the 1980s). The charge may have collapsed, but the market society has been reinforced.\(^{65}\)

6.6 Summary

Local democracy has never realised the ideal of 'participatory education', but at times it retained the potential as an alternative source of power (Butcher et al., p.15, 1990):

"If elected local authorities were as useless as some of their critics have alleged, there would be little point in bothering to weaken or destroy them. It is because they do provide some kind of check on the far-reaching plans of the Thatcher Government to transform the whole character of Britain's political economy, culture and society, and because their elective character gives them a degree of legitimacy in asserting and maintaining an alternative approach to public intervention, that the government has taken them on."

The charge, a limited form of radical statecraft, represented a wholly new attempt to restructure local government, and disable this threat. Despite

\(^{65}\) Butler et al. (p.4, ibid), the impotence of opponents: "...flowed, in large measure, from...their inability to offer a convincing alternative vision of the function and funding of local government to the one set out by the Thatcher government."
its often ad hoc and contingent development, it was guided by principles constructed highly ideologically by the new right. It failed as a measure because people concentrated on its regressive aspects rather than attempting to use the mechanism as the Government intended. Its perceptibility, thought a strength by its formulators, turned out to be a weakness, its flexibility turned into inflexibility. It attempted selectively to use citizens' mobilisation around the issue of 'paying for local services', for broader strategic ends. Its implicit vision of the future was the production of 'popular', low spending high 'efficiency' local authorities, restrained by calculating local citizens. Hence paradoxically, citizenship in this form of limited and directed participation was designed to produce largely passive local government and local citizens, rather than local autonomy, democracy, innovation and policy-making initiatives.
Chapter Seven

'Workfare'

7.0 Introduction

Thatcherite social security policy has been characterised as a steady move away from the supposed ideal welfare state of universal benefits founded on 'common citizenship' towards a minimal selective market-oriented 'subsistence'-level system (Flynn 1989, Alcock 1989b). Social security has been on the front-line of the effort to reduce the state. Yet initially, legislation was of a piecemeal nature, and frustrated by general macroeconomic problems (particularly rises in unemployment).

However, since the mid-1980s a more strategic reform process may be seen to have been followed. According to Wikeley (1989), the four main tactics used to reduce the role of unemployment benefit have been the extension of means-testing, the stigmatisation of the unemployed, the extension of disqualifications from benefit, and measures which promote 'industrial discipline' against strike action. As a result, the role of unemployment benefit has been reduced steadily, to the point when two-thirds of the unemployed rely on income support. It has been suggested by critics that there has been an abandonment of the 'social insurance' principle in favour of the 'social assistance' principle.
Current debate on social security has come to concern the development of 'workfare'. These are programmes for 'work' which are imposed on benefit recipients as a condition of receiving those benefits. Various schemes have been proposed over the last twenty years, almost exclusively from the (new) right. However, elements of workfare have already been introduced to Britain since the mid-1980s, in the form of 'trainingfare' (the term used by Jones 1996, first deployed by Howell 1991), that is under the guise of training schemes.

7.1 Policy Outline

The move towards such schemes has been made under numerous pieces of complex legislation.

In 1980, the Rayner report questioned the status of unemployment as a separate benefit, but noted the political difficulties which would occur if it was abolished immediately. The Social Security Act (no. 2) 1980 resulted in the first direct cuts in the levels of benefits since the 1930s. It severed the link between pension levels and wage levels and cut short-term National Insurance benefits by uprating them below the level of price inflation. The creation of Statutory Sick Pay transferred the support for short-term sickness and disability to private employers. In 1982 the earnings-related supplement was abolished and social security taxed. A simple registering system for benefit was abolished, and a (lax at first) test for availability for work was introduced. In 1983,
temporary training schemes, such as the six month Youth Opportunities Programme, were replaced by the Youth Training Scheme (YTS), designed as a one year permanent bridge between school and work for all school leavers and the first British universal training scheme.\(^1\) It was extended to two years in 1986. It was a right to training for 16- and 17-year-olds.\(^2\) From the end of 1983, Norman Fowler, Secretary of State for Health and Social Security, announced a series of reviews on various aspects of social security (pensions, Housing Benefit, benefits for children and young people, and Supplementary Benefit).\(^3\) Neither the evidence submitted nor the reports (except one) of the reviews were published, but in mid-1985 the Government published a Green Paper for the reform of social security.

The Social Security Act 1986 introduced a tighter and more detailed availability for work questionnaire, and 'Restart' interviews every six months.\(^4\) Generally, the

\(^1\) Jones (1986) characterises this period, 1982-86, as the 'new training initiative', but his periodisation of the Conservative reforms may imply a greater strategic coherence than actually existed, particularly in the early to mid-1980s.

\(^2\) YTS was replaced by Youth Training (YT) in 1990, linked organisationally to Employment Training.

\(^3\) Fowler claimed these reviews: "..constitute the most substantial examination of the social security system since the Beveridge Report 40 years ago." (Hansard, 2nd April, 1984, col.252-60).

\(^4\) Hill (p.247, Savage et al. 1994): "The 1980 changes [Social Security Act 1980] may perhaps, with the benefit of hindsight, be described as a victory for welfare rights. Whilst it did involve the elimination of some kinds of discretionary payments it did enshrine in regulations rights to many others. In contrast, the 1986 Act can therefore be seen as a backlash against that victory, with rights to additional single payments largely eliminated. The success of welfare rights 'take up' campaigns in
aim was to divert claimants to 'training' programmes. YTS was extended to two years, and the Job Training Scheme introduced. Against industrial action, the maximum period of 'voluntary unemployed' disqualification from benefit was raised from 6 to 13 weeks.\footnote{A subsequent report (Joseph Rowntree Foundation 1994) claimed that almost half (46 percent) of the poorest (20 per cent) of households, especially the unemployed and people without children, were made worse off by the reforms between 1986-8. They were supposed to focus state help on 'those in need'.} It renamed Supplementary Benefit as 'Income Support', introduced a structure which discriminated much less elaborately between different categories of claimants, replaced specific additions to individuals' weekly benefits by a uniform structure of premiums, abolished entitlements to single payments and replaced it with a discretionary cash-limited Social Fund (providing most - 70 per cent - of its assistance through loans reclaimable from weekly benefits).\footnote{There are many research studies on the operation of the discretionary Social Fund since 1988 which conclude critically (for example Becker and Silburn 1990).} Further, the Employment Secretary commissioned a study of workfare in America [7.2].

The Social Security Act 1988 tightened the eligibility rules (requiring two tax years contribution, not any one year), and incentives to contract out of SERPS, with incentive paid out from the public National Insurance Fund. The former measure made it especially difficult for women to return to work. In addition, means-tested unemployment benefit for occupational
pensioners was extended to 55 year-olds and older. Further, the maximum period of ‘voluntary unemployed’ disqualification raised again to 26 weeks.

It was suggested that recipients should be actively seeking employment, not just available for work. This was probably the first time the aim of extracting an activity from recipients in exchange for benefits was achieved. Young people (under 18 years) had to participate in a training scheme, refusal leading to loss of benefits.\(^7\) From 1988 onwards, benefits were linked more clearly to training allowances (£15 per week ‘bridging allowance’, for a maximum of eight weeks) while young persons waited for a training place. In the face of mounting criticism, the Government introduced means-tested ‘severe hardship’ payments.

The Employment Act 1988 extended disqualification from benefit to those not participating in or withdrawing from training schemes ‘without good cause’ (the scheme did not have to be ‘suitable’ for the claimant anymore). The statutory framework necessary for proto-workfare schemes was, to some commentators, thus put in place. Additionally, income support for unemployed 16-18 year olds was abolished, and a YTS place made mandatory.

\(^7\) This was estimated to have deprived 90,000 young people from claiming benefit (Jones and Wallace, p.61, 1992). The report of the Social Services Committee on the 1988 social security reforms revealed a 10 per cent fall in income support claimants immediately after the introduction of the Act, due to losses in eligibility.
The MSC was abolished in 1988. This facilitated the integration of training programmes with benefits. ET (see below) was to be administrated by Training and Enterprise Councils (TECs). About ninety per cent of a TEC's budget is linked to the number of trainee weeks delivered, while ten per cent is related to output, measured in terms of 'positive outcomes' into which trainees enter after they leave training. Positive outcomes are defined to include employment, full time education or further full-time training three months after training.

The Social Security Act 1989 enshrined the 'actively seeking work' rule. It required unemployed persons to provide evidence at their Restart interviews that they were 'seeking employment actively', by producing evidence such as letters and records of telephone calls. The 'employment not suitable' rule was abolished - the emphasis became the duty to find work, even if at a lower wage or in another area. The then Minister for Social Security Nicholas Scott stated: "...surely the unemployed person has a duty, as his part of the contract, not to sit passively waiting for a job to turn up but to take active steps to seek work." The Restart programme provided an interview for all people unemployed for six months, often followed by attendance on an 'Options' course or participation in a 'Job Club'. Claimants unable to demonstrate this were in danger of having their benefit suspended for

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one or two weeks. Similarly, people who had been unemployed for two or more years and refused to attend an Options course stood to lose a proportion of their benefit for a period equivalent to the length of the course. Young people who refused places on Youth Training might lose their right to receive income support. In addition, the Social Fund budget was frozen.

In 1990, under an amendment to Regulation 22 of the 1987 Income Support (General) Regulations effective from December 17, 1990, if a claimant failed to attend the whole or part of a Restart Course (normally lasting a week) the claimant advisor was able to reduce the income support payment by up to 40 per cent. In July, training courses became compulsory for those unemployed for two years or more and who rejected offers of help at their Restart interview. In May 1990, Youth Training replaced the YTS scheme. Most 16 and 17 year olds could not get Income Support, and instead the Government guaranteed a place on YT (if unemployed, it could be the only way to get an income).

Employment Training (ET) combined the existing training programmes of the MSC and targeted the long-term unemployed many of whom had never worked, and

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9 The harshest clause in the Social Security Bill, which became the Act of 1989, was abandoned by the Government. It proposed denying unemployed people their benefits if they turned down a job of less than twenty-four hours a week. But the Act did reduce the time that a claimant could hold out for terms and conditions similar to his or her last job to thirteen weeks.
middle-aged people made redundant. Participants had to attend twelve-month training courses, after which they entered work. ET replaced the Job Training Scheme, Voluntary Projects Programme and the Opportunities Training Programme.

Youth Training and Employment Training schemes provided primary on the job training for 360,000 and 230,000 people respectively at any one time. Claimants for unemployment benefits must provide proof of involuntary unemployment, demonstrate availability for work, must not refuse to take a suitable job opening, and must not have lost their job through misconduct. After the Social Security Act 1986, those unemployed for more than six months had to attend Restart interviews at Jobcentres, and demonstrate their availability to work. From autumn 1990, Restart courses became compulsory for claimants who have either been unemployed for two years or rejected offers of help at their Restart interview. 'Back to work' plans are agreed with all people signing on as unemployed. There is a systematic following-up and reinterviewing of people who do not take a place on an employment or training programme when they had agreed to do so. An 'advisory interview' takes place after 13

10 (King, p.170, 1995): "ET was fostered by the changes in the social security rules in Acts passed in 1985, 1986, 1988, and 1989, themselves complemented by changes in the Employment Act of 1989. The amendments retain the basic distinction between contributory based benefits (paid for fifty-two weeks and requiring an additional thirteen weeks to requalify) and means-tested non-contributory income support (previously called supplementary benefits) consolidated in the post-war Labour administration."
weeks of unemployment with selected clients who are unable to find work when their skills are in demand locally.\textsuperscript{11}

7.2 American Versions of Workfare

The United States has been seen as the source of workfare.\textsuperscript{12} Burton (1987), the commissioned study, noted the high costs associated typically with the programmes (suggesting that full workfare could cost £850 million in Britain). Walker (1991) examined how the American experience could help the debate in Britain. Workfare did not assume a single form, and the compulsory work-for-benefit model (a feature in the rhetoric of conservative American politicians) is but one element in the plethora of work-welfare schemes that have been tried with varying degrees of success.\textsuperscript{13} He suggests (p. 47, ibid): "...where

\textsuperscript{11} In addition the Training Agency experimented with 'action credit', a system in which the long-term unemployed take temporary jobs while continuing to receive benefit and seek permanent employment. They earn the rate for the job but earnings in excess of income support levels are retained and paid (together with accrued interest) only when the recipient begins permanent employment. Temporary employment can last up to nine months at which point, if permanent employment has not been secured, earnings are paid and benefit reassessed, using an enhanced disregard. 'Excess' payments of income support are then clawed back by reducing future benefit income. Participation in the scheme was voluntary.

\textsuperscript{12} For example, King (1995). He notes (footnote 78, p. 284-5, ibid): "That [Norman] Fowler was aware of and studied American schemes is widely known. The Employment Secretary visited several United States' schemes, including the trumpeted Massachusetts ET Choices program [sic], which he examined in Boston in February 1988."

\textsuperscript{13} However, it should be noted that American workfare has many variants because schemes have had many different goals as well as institutional foundations, and sometimes have developed as compromises between those who wish to reduce the role of government and bolster individual self-reliance and those who
[workfare] does exist it would appear possible to enforce the mandatory components. The majority of participants in the work programmes appear to accept the nature of the social contract inherent in workfare although many opine that employers gain most from the system [but]...the employment and financial gains for workfare participants are small...[mandatory] workfare does not generate greater returns to the taxpayer than other forms of work-welfare programmes. The justification for workfare derives from a set of moral values not from financial expediency." Hence it is suggested workfare works best as an ideology. There appears to be relatively little support for more authoritarian forms of workfare among politicians and administrators at local level, either because of recognition of the limited real work options available or the difficulties of enforcement. 'True' workfare, that type where welfare recipients are required to perform unpaid work with a useful purpose (but not to the cost of 'regular' workers) in exchange for benefit, account for only a relatively small number of schemes. Many variants are possible (p.22, ibid), often depending on assumptions about the job readiness of individuals.

7.3 The New Right and Workfare

Workfare arises out of, among other things, a concern for the duties of citizenship and in particular of would prefer to take forward the values of the Great Society programmes, against the background of a pervasive antipathy towards welfare and overriding commitment to the work ethic.
those who receive from the state/community in the form of highly-visible welfare benefits. As such, neoconservatives have been the main proponents of workfare and related schemes.

7.3a The Problematic Nature of Workfare

Given the arguments criticising the state welfare system from both the neoliberal [2.5c] and neoconservative [2.4a] new right, radical proposals for reform are thought necessary. This is why workfare becomes such an option.

Often, it is assumed that workfare is a divisive issue for the new right, despite being having been promoted by sections of it. For neoliberals there is the problem of the cost of such schemes and the level of government intervention necessary, and for neoconservatives, if workfare programmes are targetted at single mothers, how they may effect the social duty of raising children and the presumed 'proper role' of women within the household. In particular, having spread the notion of the incompetence of state intervention, the new right, especially neoliberals, would seem to have to suggest that implementing mandatory workfare would be beyond the state (Novak 1987a). The state as the 'employer of the last resort' appears to jar with the neoliberal vision for the state.

There are two main reasons why a workfare programme would be expensive. First, if real work is being done, then the rates of return to labour are likely to be
higher than the current level of unemployment benefit. Second, the work itself will have to be organised, involving direct government intervention, or state resources granted to other bodies to do so. Either way, it is likely to be more expensive than paying unemployment benefit through an existing bureaucratic system. Further, if workfare or learnfare was designed to include groups such as single parents the programmes would be likely to be even more expensive. The state would have to provide child day-care facilities, or fund others to do so privately.

As a result, Mead (p. 68, 1986) suggested that workfare represents 'big government conservatism', not a policy to cut back assistance but change the character of the help given. To critics as well, the illogicality would seem clear (Hoover and Plant, p. 74, 1989): "A state which gears its policies to the maintenance of certain values will be a long way from the limited government prefigured by Adam Smith and his individualist conservative followers. It is not a path that would attract the advocation of a neutral stance regarding economic behaviour as well as social and personal behaviour in a wider context."

7.3b Workfare as a New Right Project

Despite these difficulties, it also might be suggested that the new right might unite around aspects of a workfare programme.14

14 Genuine libertarians may be excluded here [2.6]. Workfare schemes contravene both a minimal role for the state, especially
First, neoliberals should not only be regarded as proposing low rates of welfare benefit, that is basing their reforms on financial incentives. They have also reinforced the notion of a clear work requirement. As some neoliberals have recognised, the error in the financial incentives approach is that it seeks to 'persuade' people to work but it does not require them to. To work effectively, intolerably low basic welfare payments would be necessary.\textsuperscript{15} Instead, it is thought that a person should get welfare only if he or she qualifies for it by being incapable of self-support. If a person can earn part of what they need, they have an obligation to work to that extent.\textsuperscript{16}

Second, a 'successful' workfare programme, from the neoconservative perspective, would satisfy the neoliberal end of former benefit recipients entering low-paid or part-time employment.

Third, the common interests shared by different strands of the new right are complimented by shared ideological aspects. 'Liberal-conservatism' \textsuperscript{[2.8]}, for example, particularly in its British hybrid, has been concerned with individual morality and codes of

\begin{quote}
\textsuperscript{15} Indeed, Friedman (p.157, 1980) has admitted since that a negative income tax is not possible.
\end{quote}

\begin{quote}
\textsuperscript{16} For example, Minford (1983, 1984) proposed that as well as an increased financial incentive to work (a 'benefit cap' restricting unemployment benefit at 70 per cent of the previous in-work income), payment of benefit be contingent on accepting a job from a 'workfare pool' if no other work is found by the claimant within a specified time limit.
\end{quote}

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behaviour as well as limiting state intervention. As noted, it has claimed that there is a particular set of moral values or personal responsibilities which individuals should acquire. In particular, they should leave behind 'statism', and orientate themselves towards market and civil society-based 'independence'. Such an element of the new right might be more prone to investigate workfare schemes than isolated pure neoliberal or neoconservative strands.

Fourth, as has been suggested, the new right may be characterised as a project in citizenship which paid great attention to discursive construction. In particular, it may be regarded as a project for a closed 'discursive order', for the 'market society' [3.11, 9.8d]. If this is accepted, the highly-interventionist nature of the new right is recognised. An important aspect of the new right project is attempting to construct the forms of understanding of citizenship, and banish others. An important aspect to this has been shown to be the discursive construction of the centrality of 'work' to citizenship.

As a consequence, it is possible that part of this project will include an important role for the state in 'supporting' and 'nurturing' these forms of citizenship. The value of the 'dependency' theory in this project is the distinction which can then be drawn between poverty caused by insufficient revenue and poverty caused by 'unacceptable' or 'inappropriate' individual behaviour. Hence projects in workfare, connected to the new right project, may
be regarded as initiatives in 'surveillance', social discipline and order. Typically, as proposed, they are not structured and funded in such ways in which they might be accepted as genuinely useful re-training for the unemployed, or confidence-enhancing measures. They are re-integrative in terms of discourses (the centrality of 'productive work' to 'genuine citizenship') more than they might be actually re-integrating in terms of enabling citizens into well-paid challenging work.

Of course, some elements within the new right, particularly some 'purer' forms of neoliberalism, will reject the efficacy of workfare for basic reasons (especially cost and the level of state intervention involved). However, it is suggested here that other elements have returned to the issue of workfare because it represents a possibly valuable reform in the project for the 'market society'. The new right's arguments for forms of workfare are worth exploring in more depth.

7.3c Compulsion in Beveridge

First, it has been suggested by elements of the British new right that Beveridge himself recommended a work test (Green, D.G. 1987, Howell 1991) and felt that the state, in providing welfare, is entitled to require certain forms of behaviour in return by recipients (Willetts et al. 1987). They have tried to

17 Beveridge (para.130, 1942): "Men and women in receipt of unemployment benefit cannot be allowed to hold out indefinitely
characterise Beveridge as a non-egalitarian non-redistributionist (Davies 1986).\(^\text{18}\)

7.3d Plans for Workfare

Second, the new right has proposed specific plans for workfare or related schemes. As has been noted, Lawrence Mead (1986) is probably the most well-known proponent of workfare programmes which seek to 'set the standards' for recipients [2.4a]. He suggests, such is the importance of work (p.47, 1988): "..what could citizenship mean if it does not, first of all, expect the dependent to do more to help themselves? Those who merely make demands on others are not fully citizens." The New Consensus (1987b) report argued that all able recipients of welfare should be enrolled for work of the type to which they are used or in their present place of residence if there is work they could do available at the standard wage for that work. Men and women who have been unemployed for a certain period should be required as a condition of continued benefit to attend work or a training centre. The period after which attendance should be required should not be the same at all times and for all persons. It might be extended in times of high unemployment and reduced in times of good employment; six months for adults would perhaps be a reasonable average period of benefit without conditions. But for young persons who have not yet the habit of continuous work the period should be shorter; for boys and girls there should ideally be no unconditional benefit at all; their enforced abstention from work should be made an occasion of further training."

\(^{18}\) Parker (p.29, 1984) in a Social Affairs Unit pamphlet agrees, but: "It is not however feasible to try and impose a Beveridge style work test now. A work requirement only makes sense if there are jobs to go to. That is why Beveridge included full employment as one of the basic assumptions to his Plan. What he did not foresee was that the unemployment benefit he proposed (flat rate with dependency additions tailored to meet the basic needs of families large and small) would act as a floor for wages, and eventually price British goods and British workers out of world markets. Experience now shows that the Beveridge Plan, with or without the work test, contained the seeds of its own destruction."
in work, or duration-limited education, or short-term training programmes in return for collecting welfare benefits. Hence (p.113, ibid): "an effort to work by recipients is worthwhile if it establishes throughout society the essential notion that an individual's benefits are conditioned upon the meeting of social obligations." As a result, it is supposed that the poor will be treated with the same dignity and respect as other citizens. The community can best help the needy by including them in its own productive activities, and treating them with the 'same dignity'. Novak (1987b) even proposes that single mothers on welfare should be put on workfare programmes.

In Britain, Conservative MP Ralph Howell has been one of the most prominent supporters of a form of workfare. Howell (1991) in an Adam Smith Institute pamphlet draws on the Swedish 'employment principle', and argues that there is a consensus of opinion in Britain that people receiving unemployment benefit should 'give something back' to the community in return for the 'help' (though a simple 'work for benefits' programme might meet a great deal of political opposition). A politically feasible approach, according to Howell, must go beyond the workfare principle and provide real jobs, at realistic wages well above the basic unemployment rate (hence he presumes it could be introduced as a voluntary scheme). He suggests such a scheme would also inculcate good work habits as well as new work skills. Relief work as a last resort against youth
unemployment, as in Sweden, might also be a practicable programme for Britain and would prevent many school leavers from being drawn into the dependency culture. Michael Heseltine (1987) suggested that welfare recipients should engage in paid work or further training as a condition of obtaining benefits.

The SAU study *From Cradle to Grave* (Segalman and Marsland 1989) discussed with approval the Swiss system of welfare in which locally-based workers (acting social workers and sources of social security) work with welfare claimants to draw up individual contracts specifying what the claimant and the social worker will do to restore the claimant to independence. For Britain, Segalman and Marsland proposed the abolition of national rates of relief and the localisation of welfare. This would enhance accountability, reciprocity and social obligation. Again, they focussed on the importance of work to 'citizenship' (p.33, ibid): "The sense of being a productive participant in society promotes the individual's investment in community life, promotion of social order and fulfilment of the norm of reciprocity. It keeps the person in touch with both material and social reality. Without work, one has no tie to the community except perhaps as a low-valued dependent. Our freedom to be ourselves depends on our work." Most citizens see welfare as temporary aid, but the welfare bureaucracy was accused of constructing longer-term recipient assumptions and hence a 'welfare apartheid'
7.4 The Institutional and Ideological Roots of British 'Work-Welfare'

The most incisive studies of the rise of workfare-type programmes in Britain have been made by Desmond King (1992, 1993, 1995, King and Ward 1992). King argues that 'work-welfare' programmes have failed to serve the needs of many citizens, especially those at the margin of the labour market. From King's perspective, the resilience of liberal tenets (especially narrow 'independence') and the inadequacies of these programmes is primarily a result of their political origins and the way in which they were institutionalised. They emphasise the punitive experience of receiving public assistance while failing simultaneously to equip participants for effective entry into the labour market. They prioritise the exclusion of the 'undeserving' from public assistance, distinguishing them from 'worthy' recipients, and imposing work-requirements on beneficiaries.

To King, the defining feature of British and American work-welfare programmes has been the integration of the receipt of benefits initially with placement and subsequently with the discharge of either work or

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19 King uses the term 'work-welfare' to describe three different types of government policy for the unemployed - placement policies to marry jobseekers with vacancies, training schemes intended to augment skills, and workfare programmes imposed upon jobseekers as a condition of receiving benefits. It is the last type, 'proper' or full workfare, that this chapter is concerned with primarily.
training activities, which has created an organisational bias towards the monitoring of labour and away from the enhancement of work opportunities. The 'work-test' administered through labour exchanges distributing benefits had its precursor in the 'workhouse test' of genuine impoverishment (the 1834 reform established the principle of 'less eligibility' for receipt of assistance). The integration of job placement with the administration of unemployment insurance through labour exchanges resulted in institutional patterns harmful to placement and training. It reinforced the focus upon excluding undeserving applicants. Historically, labour has lacked the resources to modify the institutionalisation of work-welfare. The system has emphasised divisions within the workforce, hierarchies based on power in the labour market derived from skills (possessed disproportionately by white males) and being in work. The the relief image and work-test legacy of the 1930s was not eroded by war. The employment service has remained principally the reserve of the unemployed. The 'genuinely seeking work' requirement (introduced in 1921) undermined further the exchanges' placement role and politicised them. This is the root of the emphasis on 'abuse' within the system. Consequently, this is important to understand why the right-wing offensive of punitive workfare programmes has been made possible and why other radical initiatives have failed.

7.5 Aspects of Thatcherite Workfare
There is, of course, a natural bias against the introduction of a workfare programme, given its probable cost and political controversy. Typically, the more prosperous a state is, and so the more able to fund a costly mandatory workfare programme, the less willing it will be to do so and instead be more content to rely on unconditional benefits. Yet significant progress towards such a system has been made in Britain.

The Conservative reforms towards workfare had to be incremental, given some perceived public, as well as trade union and Manpower Services Commission resistance. After the 1987 General Election victory, the Government was in the right position to proceed. In particular, training policy entailed integrating it with social security schemes and minimising costs. The first move was to revert to the familiar integration of placement and benefit activities (in the form of JobCentres), with the ongoing consequences for the former. There are some important aspects of Thatcherite workfare which should be brought out.

7.5a 'Deserving' and 'Undeserving'

The first is that the system as it has developed has been focused on identifying the 'deserving' and 'undeserving' benefit recipients/poor. This is difficult to construct in simple terms, so the new right and Government have tended to rely on the notion of 'actively seeking work', and most importantly that there is a significant section of citizens who are
resisting doing so. Of course, these discourses have a long history (Ditch 1989).

The Government has drawn on other new right discourses in order to reinforce this message. The February 1988 Employment Training White Paper, for example, emphasised the three characteristics of the unemployed: low motivation and the erosion of labour market incentives by state benefits, as well as skills inadequacies. One of the driving concerns running through the reforms of the 1980s, and intensified with the acceleration of the strategy in the third term, was the fear of 'abuse' of the system by this section of citizens. Hence, as Minister for Social Security Nicholas Scott suggested: "The principle at the heart of the [Social Security Act 1989] is that the State rightly accepts a duty to provide benefit for the unemployed under an insurance scheme...the State is entitled in return to expect individuals to take the trouble to actively seek work...Both the Government and claimants can be active." 20

By the end of the 1980s, the benefit system was organised to distinguish between 'deserving' and 'undeserving' applicants. This is why King regards the reforms as representing above all a reversion to the basic principles of liberal work-welfare - they emphasise excluding the 'undeserving' and use discourses associated with citizenship (rights linked

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to duties) as justification. It is seen as a return to the 'genuinely seeking work' policy of the 1920s.

7.5b The Voluntariness of British Programmes

The Government have been coy about the 'policing' aspects of the programmes, particularly their voluntariness.\(^{21}\) When Employment Secretary Norman Fowler argued that benefits would be withdrawn only on the basis of a range of evidence (refusal of jobs and places on training programmes) and denied that Restart interviews constituted a form of compulsion.\(^{22}\) But as King (p.171, 185, 1995) has argued: "Despite the government's denials, the linkage of training and benefits has moved in a work-welfare direction...ET has been linked with the distribution of social security benefits, and it enables the government to dovetail training programs [sic] with social security benefits to create a work-welfare program not dissimilar to American compulsory workfare programs." The 1988

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\(^{21}\) For example, with regard to the 1987 Social Security Bill, the then Under Secretary of State for Health and Social Security Michael Portillo argued: "I entirely rebut the..repeated allegation about compulsion. It is true that we are withdrawing income support from 16 and 17-year-olds who have left school, are not in work and have not taken up a YTS place, but the choices for young people are still there. They can stay at school. They can go to college. They can, if they are lucky, take a job. Or they can take the YTS place that is on offer to them. I persist in saying, therefore, that there is no compulsion. We are talking about the guaranteed option of a place on a YTS and the response of the Government and the taxpayer to that new situation." 1st December 1987, Hansard Parliamentary Debates, House of Commons Official Report, Standing Committee E, col. 313. Also Finn and Ball (1991).

\(^{22}\) Parliamentary Debates, Hansard Official Report House of Commons Standing Committee F, 21st January, 1988, col. 639. But, according to the Unemployment Unit, the scheme was originally to be compulsory (Working Brief, November 1989).
Social Security Act makes participation in a YTS scheme virtually compulsory since refusal to participate or leaving a scheme without 'good cause' can result in the loss of benefits. Further, the entitlement to supplementary benefits for 16-18 year-olds who have been guaranteed a YTS place was removed. Part II of the Employment Act (1988) disqualifies from receipt of benefits persons withdrawing from training schemes without 'good cause'. In the post-ET period, the switch to the system of income support (under which claimants receive a basic rate of benefit to meet regular weekly needs with premiums added for families, single parents, pensioners, the long-term sick and those with disabilities) complements those measures requiring participation in the Youth Training programme and disqualifying from unemployment benefits for six months those persons leaving a job voluntarily (King, p.170, 1995).

Further, the reintegration of Jobcentre placement work (including Restart interviews) with unemployment benefit offices, effected by returning the former to the Department of Employment in 1988, enables them to perform a traditional work-test role. In this sense they have resumed their historic policing function, certainly felt by claimants.23

23 "The experience of compulsory Restart interviews has shown that the interview programme has had little success in placing people into jobs and that a significant minority of claimants have experienced 'creeping compulsion' to participate in schemes or otherwise leave the unemployment register." Working Brief, Unemployment Unit, August/September, 1991, p.5.
7.5c Marginalising Political Conflict

In other respects, the reforms to the system help circumvent the governing problems encountered previously. TECs are unthreatening devolved authorities, unelected and dominated if need be by the centre, comparable with GM schools [chapter five] or the new right ideal of local government [chapter six].

King (p.239-40, 1992) has also suggested that TECs represent another example of the American influence on Thatcherite policy, because they are modelled on the American Private Industry Councils. Further, it should be remembered that the whole concern with youth, and the riots and civil disturbances of the early 1980s in particular, were the starting-point for the Thatcherite initiatives in the form of training schemes and educational reforms of the mid-1980s (Finn 1987). The fear of a disaffected, potentially massively destructive, youth must have provoked many of the initiatives of the era.

7.5d Comparison with America

Yet it is not necessary to see the reforms so far as being weaker versions of American workfare. Since as has been noted, American schemes very rarely embody 'pure' workfare, British programmes now may be seen to go beyond them in terms of compulsion. Walker (p.25, 49, 1991) suggests: "In some respects the current combination of employment and social security policies

places Britain further along the road towards workfare than many states in America. Moreover, it is not without significance that responsibilities for training and benefit administration, separated in the mid-1970s, have been reunited in the formation of Employment Service. Many of the schemes which have been experimented with locally in the United States are available nationally in Britain." This might surprise the neoliberal sceptics who had presumed that the state could not manage such programmes.

The sheer scale of Employment and Youth Training schemes may work against the individualised interventions which have been shown to be so important in the United States (for example, in monitoring cases and outcomes). Further, an important difference between the two countries has been that whereas in the United States the main target for such programmes has been women, in Britain it has been unemployed males and young single people. But, again, if the projects for workfare are regarded as, at least in part, as elements in projects for the market society, the practical effect of such programmes is in a sense less important for their proposers than the discursive effect. They identify and marginalise groups of citizens in order to reinforce particular discourses about behaviour and 'citizenship'. In an environment of greater 'flexibility' in the labour market, it has been thought necessary to impose stricter controls on non-participants, in order that they will accept the same structure of inequalities and 'rules'.

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These are deliberately narrow. For example, the evaluative criteria used of TECs - 'positive outcomes' - do not appear to include measures of the quality of either the training or the employment obtained, the well-being of participants, the nature of the link between the training provided and the employment actually gained, or the stability of the employment entered. They have reduced the cost of 'training' the young, well below the cost of a 'full' workfare programme, favouring low-cost low-grade training, and necessarily discriminating against those with special needs.

7.5 Influence of the New Right

As has been suggested, new right discourses have dominated the debate over welfare, and in particular benefits for the unemployed. Though 'concern' over the 'motivations' of the economically inactive were always part of the discourse of the right, from the mid-1970s onwards discourses on 'dependency', the 'work-shy' and the supposed behavioural deficiencies of the unemployed increased.

As a result, the changes to the social security system in general, and to unemployment benefits in particular, are thought to have been informed significantly by new right arguments for minimal state welfare, low-wage employment and individual and work-based protection (Alcock 1989a, Wikeley 1989, Bradshaw in Marsh and Rhodes 1992). King (1995), of course,

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regards the enactment of work-welfare programmes in Britain as a triumph for the new right, despite being mediated by the problem of unemployment and the legacy of the post-war framework. It is thought that there have been four new right-inspired elements of the Governments training objectives: the weakening of the trade unions and the apprenticeship system, the linking the receipt of unemployment benefit with participation in training or work activity, the advantaging of employer preferences in the implementation of training programmes, and the minimising of government intervention to acting only in response to unemployment (King 1993). Hence the Conservatives have effected a strategic shift away from a national tripartite regime to a local, employer-dominated neoliberal training one.

7.5f Thatcherite Workfare and Citizenship

In terms of citizenship, then, the conclusion is that the Thatcherite workfare reforms have been detrimental. They have been marginalising and stigmatising. In particular, their effect on the young unemployed has been negative. Because leading to an increased reliance on parents, it has been noted that (Jones and Wallace p.78, 1992): "While claiming to remove state control from the lives of young people,

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26 And further sees (p.169, ibid), in the presence of Cay Stratton, former assistant secretary of economic affairs for employment and training in Massachusetts, in the Department of Employment in London, the considerable influence of American programmes. Stratton designed the British ET programme which integrates the receipt of benefits and training.
the 'New Right' are in practice increasing the state control of family relationships (and of course continuing to maintain power over the young if only indirectly via their parents)." Increasingly, young people are left in an intermediate status between economic dependence and independence.

7.6 Workfare and Citizenship

Inevitably, there exists the danger of over-theorising the development of workfare programmes. Many of these initiatives may have been driven by the short-term political need to reduce numbers on the unemployment register. However, it should also be noted that the Government began to realise it had greater leeway in reforming the system by the third term, after winning elections with historically high levels of official unemployment. And, as examinations of the remarkable consistencies in such complex legislation imply, the system emerging is more coherent in terms of its aims than it has been for some decades.

A full national workfare system would alter substantially the nature of the rights and duties of citizenship in one of the most important, if not central, areas of welfare. The Thatcher Government's work-welfare has been marginalising for the already-marginalised, thus undermining 'universal membership'. But whether the latter was ever established is worth criticising.

7.6a Post-War Citizenship and Beveridge
The reliance on Beveridge as the enshrinement of post-war citizenship is problematic. Beveridge was significant because he saw social welfare as related to ideas about good citizenship, in the sense of a particular vision of political and social behaviour—economic independence, moral virtue, self-discipline, active participation in the polity (Harris, 'Beveridge's Social and Political Thought', chapter three, Hills et al. 1994). He desired to protect and nurture the ethic of private citizenship, not to replace it with mechanistic state provision—hence the emphasis on the contributory principle, the citizen as 'contributory participant', which is of course potentially exclusionary given the emphasis on contribution. The assumption that there was a viable and agreeable citizenship of work before 1979 which has then been eroded steadily is too crude. But, as in education and local government, this notion sometimes seems to be implicit in left reactions to the reforms, and workfare in general.

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28 Glennerster and Evans ('Beveridge and His Assumptive Worlds: The Incompatibilities of a Flawed Design', chapter five, Hills et al. 1994, p.58): "At the heart of Beveridge's thinking was a contradictory struggle between his deep desire to cover everything and everyone without a means test and his choice of method, contributory insurance through employment. He wished to give security to all, but to base this security, apart from family allowances, on participation in the labour market. Why did Beveridge not choose a citizenship basis for benefits?"
7.6b The Left's Response to Workfare

The left has tended to oppose workfare in principle and practice. It has been concerned more with the creation of 'full employment' and the protection of the full array of 'rights' associated with the welfare state. A typical response has been to denounce workfare programmes for being inherently inequitable and hypocritical. They are regarded as increasing the regulation of the poor on grounds of 'moral values' in the context of laissez-faire for the more fortunate (Hoover and Plant 1989). It is thought even worse that it is the notion of 'citizenship' (obligations) which is used as a cover for this imposition of unfair restrictions on rights to welfare, indeed to support the notion that benefit recipients in effect 'give-up' their rights (King 1995, Pixley 1993). Further, it is thought that workfare does not even make sense in new right terms. If 'jobs' are to be provided or at least funded by the state via workfare programmes, these are not then jobs acquired in the normal labour market. They are forms of 'make-work' for those who would otherwise be unemployed. They cannot then enhance 'independence' or self-esteem, because they do not avoid the taint of 'parasitism', the very notion that the new right has popularised (Elster 1988). Without suitable macroeconomic conditions, workfare programmes designed to re-skill and re-moralise the unemployed are doubly hypocritical. Workfare against a background of persistently high unemployment is an unjust policy against the poor and the unemployed (Plant 1992,
Walker 1991). Compulsion is likely to hamper the development of more effective welfare-to-work measures, in which genuine work is offered (Finn 1996).

7.6c The Problem of the Left and Obligations

The left has problems in dealing convincingly with obligations [explored further in chapter eight]. It tends to be somewhat squeamish about them. The preference found towards 'general obligations' belies a reticence over details and enforcement. Understandably, it has prioritised rights.

Left arguments which deny the legitimacy of imposed or enforced obligations are example of this. But if obligations are thought important to citizenship, and citizens resist them, on what grounds might they not be enforced (accepting of course that the degree of their enforcement does not reduce citizenship to a status of servitude)? And if some obligations are enforced (such as taxes), why not more specific ones?

A too-benign conception of citizenship, it has been suggested, may blinker the left to regressive uses of the discourse [chapter three], as here. Thatcherite versions of workfare, 'legitimated' with reference to discourses of citizenship on 'duties' and 'obligations', are regressive. But this does not mean

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29 For example Pixley (1993) attempts to construct a difference between 'duties' and 'freely assumed obligations'. 'Proper' obligations involve choice, which in turn must rely on the availability of full rights and employment opportunities. Workfare then devalues genuine voluntary work.
that more progressive schemes might not be possible. It is conceivable that workfare might be justifiable from the perspective of discourses of citizenship. Whether it is useful in practical terms for the unemployed is a different matter, dependent on context. Hence the theoretical citizenship justification for workfare may be at odds with the practical citizenship one. This may be the case with regard to the developing workfare system described here.

7.6d Why Not Workfare?

Both left and right tend to agree on the importance of work for citizenship (only post-industrial theorists might disagree). The context of the type of welfare state system into which the workfare programme is incorporated is important. In a 'full' welfare state, workfare may be accepted more happily than in a welfare state moving to a more punitive and limited position, as in Britain. But if workfare programmes could be designed and developed which did re-skill and re-integrate the unemployed into the kinds of jobs they found appropriate, they would seem to be the embodiment of measures to enhance citizenship rather than undermine it.

7.7 Further Reforms

The notion that a workfare system was being introduced incrementally has been vindicated by more recent measures. An expression of interest in workfare has, as with the educational voucher, become a symbol
useful for bolstering an image of Thatcherite ideological 'purity'. It is supposed to prove that they are willing to solve the problem of the 'abuse' of the welfare system. For example, John Major suggested in a speech to the Carlton Club in 1993 (p.34, 1993): "Increasingly, I wonder whether paying unemployment benefit, without offering or requiring any activity in return, serves unemployed people or society well." Yet underlying this teasing of the right, such a system is being established.

The deliberate shift away from earlier initiatives has continued. The number of places for Youth Training fell between March 1988 and 1993 from 389,224 to 274,000, a cut in the budget of £1.5 billion in real terms.30 Employment Action was established in 1991 - enabling work experience on projects on benefit plus £10, targeted at the six month unemployed. The claimant interviewer process was intensified in this period, with five compulsory interviews.

Under Gillian Shephard, Secretary of State for Employment, in August 1992 a review was undertaken of government spending on anti-unemployment programmes to sharpen the linkage between receipt of benefits and return to employment. Apparently, workfare was rejected, but it was reported that Shephard considered a merger of ET and Employment Action to create community work projects, imposed on the unemployed. Perhaps not unrelatedly, in March 1993 the Government

30 Hansard, 2nd December, 1994, col.931, written answers.
announced a Community Action programme for the unemployed (benefit plus £10 for 60,000 people who wish to work part-time).

On 20th November 1992 Sir Ralph Howell put forward a Private Member’s Bill on his proposals, which was defeated. This was the first Parliamentary debate on workfare. But during 1993 and 1994, against the background of a high public sector borrowing requirement and pressure to reduce expenditure, there was a new wave of (new right) attacks on the social security system - in particular, invalidity benefits, universal schemes, and benefits to unmarried mothers. At the 1993 Conservative Party annual conference there were many attacks on single-parent families, and support shown for American schemes which penalised mothers on welfare who had additional children. Howell himself helped develop a scheme in his North Norfolk constituency, followed by other regional workfare-type pilot schemes such as 'Workwise' and '1-2-1' for those falling through the Restart net.

In the 1993 Budget, it was announced that the 'Job Seeker's Allowance' (JSA) would be introduced from

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31 Hansard, 20th November 1992. In the debate, David Willetts MP suggested difficulties with Howell's scheme, including planning, the state's role in the labour market, cost, and the issue of compulsion. Patrick McLoughlin, Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Employment, denied that the Government had plans to introduce a compulsory workfare scheme, preferring training or education for young people. It was suggested that compulsory workfare would unbalance the wage market.

32 For example, 'No Turning Back' Group (1993), which proposed incremental reforms including cutting unemployment benefit from one year to six months, leading to private sector programmes for the long-term unemployed and a 'whole person' benefit.
April 1996 onwards instead of unemployment benefit and income-support payments, and available for six months on a contributory basis rather than one year. After six months, the payment would become means-tested. The assessment of benefit allowance would be tightened further by the 'job seeker's agreement'. Citizens receiving benefits would enter into a 'contract' in which they agree to a personal work plan to try to find work as a condition of the payment. The JSA was outlined in the Queen's Speech (16th November 1994).

At the 1994 Conservative Party Conference, Social Security Secretary Peter Lilley announced a 'back to work bonus' scheme, designed to 'encourage' 150,000 unemployed into part-time jobs by offering them up to £1,000. People who work part-time while claiming the new JSA or income support would build up an entitlement bonus. During 1994 there had been other reports that harsher benefit regimes were to be introduced, and even that a full workfare scheme would be included in the JSA legislation. However, though significant, the latter turned out to be plans to

33 'New benefits crackdown on jobless', The Guardian, 7th June, 1994, based on a verified leaked memo from the Department of Employment, an agreement between the Secretary of State for Employment and the Chief Executive of the Employment Service, it was suggested that tougher new guidelines would be introduced quietly to test the availability for work of claimants for hard-to-fill vacancies. New instructions in August 1994 issued to benefit offices from the Department of Employment duly doubled each Jobcentre's target for the number of people to have their benefit stopped for failing actively to seek work, in total 135,000 people (also House of Commons Official Report, Standing Committee B, 24th January, 1995, col.4.) Further, 'Jobless face 'work or no dole' Bill', The Observer, 31st July, 1994.
pilot workfare schemes directed at those out of work for more than two years, rather than a uniform national scheme. The schemes would be run by the Employment Advisory Service instead of local authorities.

The Jobseekers' Bill was issued on 2nd December 1994, introduced jointly by Peter Lilley and Michael Portillo (Employment Secretary) but without the specific regulations for 'actively seeking work'. It did however include an emphasis on claimant's 'behaviour' (appearance, manner) if it was thought to militate against them finding work, in the form of a 'formal direction' rather than the previous scope for employment officers to 'recommend'. Further, they would have the power to insist that 'such work is undertaken as a means of improving the claimant's prospects of being employed'. An additional leaked brief confirmed the use of penalties (up to six months long) for quitting jobs or being dismissed without 'good cause', failing to attend interviews and courses, and breaking a direction from employment staff.34 The Unemployment Unit reported at the time that benefit cuts had been imposed on 40,000 people between April and December 1994, and the Citizens' Advice Bureaux (1994) criticised training schemes for being exclusionary, inappropriate and of low-quality.

Michael Portillo denied again that the JSA represented workfare: "To describe that [JSA Bill] as 'workfare' strikes me as loose talk. To me, 'workfare' means that the state will be the employer of the last resort, committing itself to provide work for any who are without it. That implies a bigger role for the state than I am willing to contemplate...[but claimants] must demonstrate their willingness to work. That can include being required to take work that is offered to them on penalty of losing their benefit; if that spells workfare to some, so be it."\(^35\) At the same time, the Opposition suggested that the measures could result in 250,000 people having their benefit reduced.

The JSA Bill received its second reading on 11th January 1995 by 304 votes to 269.\(^36\) In Committee stage (Standing Committee B) during January and February 1995, many criticisms were made of the development of employment and benefit legislation (House of Commons Official Reports 1995).\(^37\)

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\(^35\) Hansard, 10th January, 1995, col.52-3.

\(^36\) One of the most persistent critics of the Bill, and the Government’s general attitude to the unemployed, was Alan Howarth, Conservative MP (and subsequent defector to the Labour Party). One significant criticism of the Bill he made was its granting of powers to the Government outside the deliberation of Parliament (on the amount of the JSA, the specific regulations concerning 'actively seeking work' and correct behaviour of claimants). He found its stress on obligations of claimants 'profoundly illiberal'.

\(^37\) It was suggested by Ian McCartney (MP for Makerfield) that in the first six months of 1994, more than one out of seven people referred to a Workwise pilot scheme (10,000 are participating) have had their income support cut by 40 percent for up to four weeks (either for non-attendance or completion), see HoC Official Reports, Standing Committee B, 28th February, col.654. Alan Howarth had suggested earlier in the debate over the second
Peter Lilley mooted in a speech to the Social Market Foundation on 9th January 1995 local variations in benefits by devolving responsibility, noting the example of Switzerland. Legislation for the JSA would for the first time allow variation in national benefit rules and rates. With the measures planned (incapacity benefit, JSA) Lilley hoped to save £4 billion by the end of the decade.38 During the same period, the Employment Select Committee (ESC) examined the issue of workfare schemes. Greville Janner QC, a Labour MP, was chair of the Committee but it also included Sir Ralph Howell, long-time proponent of workfare. The ESC had known that ministers disapproved of workfare-scale intervention. On 25th October 1994 the ESC questioned Michael Portillo, then Secretary of State for Employment (from July 1994 to July 1995), who argued that he did not want the state to be the ‘employer of last resort’ (also ESC 23rd May 1995).

On 22nd November 1994, Anne Widdicombe denied that workfare was on the Government’s agenda, though it should be noted that the form she defined it in was as a ‘large-scale national compulsory scheme’. On 17th January 1995, in front of the ESC Peter Lilley admitted that there have been no cost studies of workfare schemes. The ESC also questioned (on 22nd November 1994) Professor Dennis Snower, who had

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38 'Lilley 'returning to Poor Law' with benefits shift', The Guardian, 10th January, 1995.
proposed schemes whereby employers would be paid part of the benefit in the form of an 'employment voucher', and Professor Richard Layard, who had proposed tax rebates for companies for hiring the long-term unemployed (which he claimed would end long-term unemployment). Howell suggested that while the Government's Workstart trial scheme (£60 per week to employers for hiring the long-term unemployed) was not workfare, it could be a route towards it.

In addition, in April 1995 the ESC travelled to the United States to examine workfare programmes. In particular they tried to examine the relationship between low unemployment and workfare, but found that any American programmes tended to have as their primary aim the reduction of the welfare budget rather than the reduction of unemployment. They had great difficulty in actually finding any genuine workfare programmes and were told that of the 15 million people in the United States on some welfare benefits, only 15,000 (less than one per cent) could be said to be on workfare programmes. The closer to proper workfare the schemes they found, the more administratively expensive they tended to be.

Howell himself gave evidence to the ESC on 16th May 1995, explaining his own proposals and describing himself as a 'hard-line capitalist'. The reception from the other ESC members was mixed. Harry Greenway

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39 This was covered in a television documentary, Scrutiny - The Way to Work, BBC 2, 18/7/95.
(Conservative) doubted the coherence of the schemes while Warren Hawkesley (Conservative) agreed with the idea of compulsion. The ESC’s report was published in May 1996. In July 1995 Howell had introduced a ‘Right to Work’ Bill based on his ideas (supported only by Frank Field); the ESC report supported this plan to give everyone of working age the right to earn their own living via the extension of ‘Workstart’ schemes - voluntary involvement in work programmes earning up to £120 a week. In July 1996, Howell introduced a second ‘Right to Work’ Bill, which found greater cross-party support.

The implementation of the JSA was delayed six months from April 1996 to October 1996, blamed on the development of computer systems and staff training programmes. But the halving of the duration of entitlement to unemployment benefit went ahead from April 1996 - it was predicted that 70,000 would get no benefit at all, 95,000 would have to switch to the means-tested JSA and 85,000 would get less money as they are realigned to lower income support rates. Peter Lilley, Social Security Secretary, noted that the JSA would give the Government the opportunity to pilot schemes, and raised the possibility of devolving responsibility for aspects of social security to localities (1995).

In July 1995 the Department of Employment was abolished and its duties divided between the Department of Education and the Department of Trade and Industry. Gillian Shephard became Secretary of
State for Education and Employment. The new department took over Employment's responsibility for training schemes, including those run by TECs, as well as continuing the current role of the DfE.

In October 1995, at the Conservative Party Conference there were briefings that John Major would announce a gradual move to a form of workfare in his end of conference address. Instead he referred merely to the need for 'discipline' for the unemployed, and the 'contract for work' idea in the JSA. However the JSA continued to attract criticism as unfair and counter-productive - aside from its regulatory advances, it cuts entitlement to unemployment benefit while putting up National Insurance premiums, and also by pushing people into a reliance on means-tested benefits creates further dependency.

Again, in October 1996, the extension of 'workfare' was trailed in advance of the Conservative Party Conference. Major announced the extension of 'Project Work' in a speech to Conservative election agents, then being tested in two pilot schemes (Hull and Medway and Maidstone), to a second phase targeting twenty unemployment 'blackspots' and up to 100,000 jobless. Under the scheme the long-term unemployed must undergo thirteen weeks of special job training,

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40 'Major set to back gradual move toward workfare', The Guardian, 12th October, 1995. Shephard was quoted as saying (ibid): "We are certainly looking at a wide range of approaches which examine the relationship between requiring activity for benefit, encouraging people to work while they are on benefit, but most of all encouraging people out of unemployment back into employment."
provided by private voluntary charitable organisations, or lose benefit, followed by thirteen weeks of job experience, for which claimants receive an extra £10 a week on top of their normal benefit. This was announced formally on 8th November 1996 - a £100 million 'nationwide' plan extended Project Work to twenty-nine areas for all applicants aged eighteen to fifty who have been unemployed for two years (two-thirds of the long-term registered unemployed in Britain). This has of course met criticisms that it does not create any good jobs or opportunities to use skills productively, but merely seems concerned to scare off 'bogus' benefit recipients. This is reinforced by the announcement of a Social Security Fraud Bill in the Queen's Speech (October 1996), allowing cross-checking of benefit claims, tax returns and VAT receipts, an inspectorate to monitor local authorities' attempts to reduce fraud, and greater penalties for false claimants. Concern was raised by civil liberties groups at the first measure in particular, given that the Data Protection Act had to be modified to allow the pooling of information necessary. The JSA replaced unemployment benefit and income support on 7th October 1996, the biggest change to the unemployment system since 1948.

7.8 Summary
The unemployed are probably the least generously treated of social security recipients, indeed (Ditch, p.36, ibid): "Nowhere is the principle of 'less eligibility' more vividly displayed than in the
treatment of the unemployed with long-term needs but short-term rates of support." There may be strong public support for other aspects of state welfare (education, the National Health Service, old-age pensions), but far less for policies designed for those considered capable of active work - the 'able-bodied beneficiary'. This has been reflected in the reality of provision, rather than Marshallian-derived ideals of the welfare state. Forms of exclusion have been kept alive, even extended. Some have emphasised the general disciplinary nature of social security systems as a mechanism of 'surveillance' which has been extended by the reforms discussed (Dean 1991).

The fact that workfare has become thought an issue of importance illustrates in part the influence of the new right on the welfare debate, because it is regarded as the 'only solution' to the problem of the lack of obligations amongst the poor. That workfare may be justified by citizenship does not deny that the general citizenship of many under the Thatcher Governments was eroded. Poverty and inequality has increased (Walker and Walker 1987, Social Security Committee 1991, Becker 1991), and the 'poverty trap' is as persistent as ever (CMSC 1996). It is the case

41 Gordon ('Forms of Exclusion: Citizenship, Race and Poverty', chapter seven, Becker 1991) has noted how black people seeking welfare benefits encounter barriers additional to those faced by claimants in general. Entitlement has become tied increasingly to immigration status, creating a class of black people who are lawfully resident in the country who have fewer rights than others. The effect is the questioning of status (and so of citizenship) of black people, even those born or long settled in Britain. Also Oppenheim (1990).
that poverty (Golding, p.xi, 1986): "...is most comprehensively understood as a condition of partial citizenship." Poverty and insecurity may have been increased by unemployment, a deregulated labour market, and harsher social security benefits, making the focus on the supposed 'behavioural deficiencies' of the unemployed appear examples of political cynicism (Millar, 'Bearing the Cost', chapter three, Becker 1991). In particular, the rights and obligations of young people have been effected (negatively) by the reforms. Citizenship has been denied them (Jones and Wallace 1992). Further, given the more difficult eligibility requirements, it has been noted (Dean, p.199, 1991): "It is no longer an answer to claim that social security claimants must assert themselves as citizens, when they must thereby define and defend themselves as the victims of poverty."

It is in this political environment - what has been called the 'revolution of reducing expectations' (Lister 1991) - that workfare has become an issue. In this context, the emphasis on 'duties', 'obligations' and 'reciprocity' (particularly as part of the 'actively seeking work' regime) in justifying reforms in unemployment legislation represents the use of aspects of citizenship in order to erode the

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42 N.S. Harris (1989) blames the Beveridge Report for constructing an ambiguous status for young people, as employed or dependent on parents, workers or students, which provided later the opportunity for their independent benefits to be removed.
'universal membership', or general status of citizenship, of the poor. The reduction in the numbers of officially unemployed as a result of such schemes is of course one desired end, but should not be thought the only end.

The ideological project of narrowing eligibility for unemployment benefit is an erosion of an unconditional right of citizenship, but not necessarily citizenship in general. Obligations have been enhanced. The overall balance of citizenship has shifted, the overall effect may be regressive.

Developments in Britain towards workfare programmes may reflect the 'free economy/strong state' model. As King (p.197, 1995) argues: "It is ironic that the construction of neoliberal work-welfare programs [sic] necessitates extensive state intervention both to police more rigorously benefit claims and to address the inadequacies of market-based training schemes." To King, the liberal institutional biases in British work-welfare programmes, in particular the distinction between 'deserving' and 'undeserving' recipients, and contributory and noncontributory programmes, are selective and stigmatising distinctions. The developments of the 1980s, especially in the third Thatcher term, compound them. Like citizenship itself, the status and role of workfare is dependent on political, economic and social context, and particularly what strategic aim it is supposed to achieve. If workfare schemes justified in the language of citizenship represent in effect the undermining of
the citizenship of the poor, this signifies the contentious and problematic nature of citizenship itself.
Chapter Eight

Conservative 'Active Citizenship'

"This imposing and difficult ideal ['active citizenship'] becomes an ideology whenever we are told that we are already citizens, men at or near our very best, and that our country is a nation of citizens. We should all be more active, patriotic orators tell us, but they manage to say this without ever suggesting that we are so inactive as to render our citizenship inauthentic or the ideal suspect. They proceed to deduce our obligations (to participate, to obey, to fight, and so on) from that ideal. This is a mystification of the worst sort, but it might be that it serves a useful purpose: it keeps the ideal uppermost in our consciousness. Ideology is the social element within which ideals survive, and this may well be true even when the ideology is perfectly hypocritical. For if hypocrisy is the tribute that vice pays to virtue, then it serves at least to sustain the social recognition of virtue."

8.0 Introduction

During third-term Thatcherism, the idea of 'active citizenship' was referred to by a number of leading Conservative figures. Though dismissed as a brief rhetorical fashion, and however superficial in its original formulation, it was significant in two respects. First, though many criticisms were made of the Conservative conception of active citizenship,
it was one of the factors which reawakened interest in broader issues around citizenship. Second, it highlighted certain aspects of the Thatcherite and new right project, and the weaknesses of some of the left’s counter-arguments.

8.1 The Rhetoric of Conservative Active Citizenship

A series of articles and speeches during 1988-1990 highlighted active citizenship. The most prominent figure involved was Douglas Hurd, then Home Secretary. On 5th February 1988 Hurd marked the bicentenary of the birth of Robert Peel by a speech to the Peel Society Dinner on the theme of citizenship at his Staffordshire birthplace. Since the speech attempted a reconstruction of Tory doctrine and consciously echoed Peel’s essay on the same task in the same place, the address was inevitably dubbed the 'second Tamworth Manifesto'.

Hurd recalled the social cohesion supposedly enjoyed in that age and suggested: "We have to find, as the Victorians found, techniques and instruments which reach the parts of our society which will always be beyond the scope of statutory schemes. I believe that the inspiring and enlisting of the active citizen in all walks of life is the key." He feared that: "The fruits of economic success could turn sour unless we can bring back greater social cohesion to our country. Social cohesion is quite different from social equality: indeed the two are ultimately incompatible. But social cohesion

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alongside the creation of wealth through private enterprise: these are the two conditions of our future progress."³

Social cohesion could be fostered by 'active citizenship': "...the active businessman can help to stimulate the arts or to create employment in discouraged areas. The active citizen can make sense of a Neighbourhood Watch scheme or a crime prevention panel. The active parent will under our reforms have much greater opportunities in shaping the education of his or her child." To Hurd active citizenship involved: "...the free acceptance by individuals of voluntary obligations to the community of which they are members..freedom will flourish where citizens accept responsibility."⁴

Later, in April, in an article in the New Statesman magazine Hurd (1988) suggested that: "The Conservative Party is moving forward from its justified concern with the motor of wealth creation towards a 'redefinition of how the individual citizen, business and voluntary group can use resources and leisure to help the community. As we expand the scope for such voluntary acts of citizenship, the left is still stuck with the bureaucratic definition of citizenship as something to which we are compelled by the state."

Denying a Hobbesian mentality to the Government's policies, he claimed: "Underpinning our social policy are three traditions - the diffusion of

⁴ Riddell (p.171-2, op cit).
power, civic obligation and voluntary service - which are central to Conservative philosophy, and rooted in British (particularly English) History. The diffusion of power is a bulwark against despotism and corruption, and the key to active and responsible citizenship. Men and women are social beings. But the left’s picture of a society dominated by the relationship between citizen and state is a pallid image of reality. Men have affection and allegiance for many collective organisations - from a soccer club to a choral society, or even a political party. But the strongest loyalties are to family, neighbourhood and nation."

Hurd revived the idea of the importance of intermediate associations (Burke’s ‘little platoons’), which he identified not with local government (bureaucratic and remote) but school governing bodies, tenant’s co-operatives, housing associations, neighbourhood watch schemes and charities. These provided opportunity for ‘voluntary acts of citizenship’, contrasted with the left’s ‘bureaucratic definition of citizenship as something to which we are compelled by the state’. He suggested the thrust of policy was to shift power outwards, away from the ‘corporatist battalions’ to the ‘small platoons’. Anticipating criticism of centralisation with regard to local government, Hurd claimed: "...we have no grand design, no Code Napoleon to govern local endeavour. The nature of local organisations will vary according to the functions which they perform: governing bodies,
tenants’ co-operatives, housing associations, neighbourhood watch schemes. Our approach is pragmatic, seeking to nurture effective forms of community organisation more local and more responsive to particular circumstance than local councils."

Responsibilities should be democratised as well as rights: “In previous centuries, when full political rights were enjoyed by few, the tradition of social obligation acted as a restraining and civilising influence upon the powerful minority. It was essentially aristocratic. Now that we have universal suffrage, general prosperity, and much greater equality of opportunity, we need to encourage the notion that civic responsibilities, too, are the property of all. They have been democratised. Compulsion by the state implies not fulfilment, but the absence or failure of personal responsibility.”

Lastly, Hurd claimed active citizenship was intimately linked to the Thatcherite economic reform programme:

“A social policy founded upon ideals of responsible and active citizenship is compatible with free market economic policies. Private property is the natural bulwark of liberty, because it ensures that economic power is not entirely concentrated in the hands of the state. It also buttresses personal responsibility, by harnessing man’s acquisitive instinct to the demands of stewardship...emphasis on private property and the encouragement of private
wealth is necessary if the community as a whole is to prosper. Those qualities of enterprise and initiative, which are essential for the generation of material wealth, are also needed to build a family, a neighbourhood, or a nation which is able to draw on the respect, loyalty and affection of its members."

Junior Home Office Minister John Patten (1988a) added his voice in September 1988: "The active citizen is someone making more than a solely economic contribution to his or her community; nothing more or less. It is about tapping a reservoir of talent and energy and enabling it to flourish outside both the public and the private sectors - a third force which has an enormous and vital contribution to make." Later, in December, he defended the Government's quest for active citizenship (1988b): "After 40 years, during which it was often fashionable to exclude or decry individual action in the mistaken belief that

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5 In September 1989 Hurd (1989) provided further definition: "Active citizenship is the free acceptance by individuals of voluntary obligations to the community of which they are members. It cannot be conjured up by legislation or by political speeches - although both can help. It arises from traditions of civic obligation and voluntary service which are central to the thinking of this Government and rooted in our history. The need to foster responsible citizenship is obvious. Freedom can only flourish within a community where shared values, common loyalties and mutual obligations provide a framework of order and self-discipline. Otherwise, liberty can quickly degenerate into narrow self-interest and licence. The idea of active citizenship is a necessary complement to that of the enterprise culture. Public service may once have been the duty of an elite, but today it is the responsibility of all who have time or money to spare. Modern capitalism has democratised he ownership of property, and we are now witnessing the democratisation of responsible citizenship."
government always knows best, we have come to recognize that there is much more room for active citizens to play a part, and sometimes a more effective part than can be played by the state."

He referred to the increasingly familiar examples of Neighbourhood Watch schemes, churches and youth clubs, community help groups and the Samaritans. But he dismissed the idea that active citizenship amounted to creating a 'politicised class': "That argument fundamentally misunderstands the active citizen. The active citizen can be defined as someone who cares, but who gives expression to their caring in a quantifiable way. There is nothing to stop a carer also being a campaigner. But the corollary is that my definition does not include those whose only aim is to cause a stir. Simply to shout one's views from the nearest rooftop does not qualify one for the active list, nor does it suffice to make caring noises without acting on them. The truth is that the active citizens know who, and what, they are. We can all recognise one when we see one, and we all have an intuitive feeling for what active citizenship involves."

Kenneth Baker (p.95, 1993) in an address to the Bow Group in 1987 argued that: "I do not think there is any reason to apologise for the increased scope we have given for what might be called acquisitive individualism. However, I do recognise that there is another side to the coin of economic individualism. That other side is social responsibility. Those who succeed have obligations above and beyond that of
celebrating their own success...we all live together in families, groups and communities. The responsible individual does not believe that his involvement with others is limited only to paying taxes and that’s an end to the matter. The responsible individual is a concerned citizen, an active citizen, who by bringing his individual skills into play within a community role enhances the life of that community." Baker offered a vision of the 'community of individuals'. Government should pass power from the hub of the wheel towards the rim by, for example, encouraging parents and local communities to take greater responsibility in running schools.  

Chris Patten in Marxism Today (February 1991) suggested: "There is a feeling that while we need to continue to apply some of the economic lessons that we’ve been attempting to learn in the 1980s, there’s also a feeling that we need to be more explicit about the social responsibilities that should go with successful individualism. We have to emphasise both the importance of the collective and the community and the need to find ways of using market mechanisms to run community services more

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6 Ironically, in the week Thatcher spoke to the Conservative Party conference, it was announced that Baker in his role as Education Secretary had cancelled Citizenship as a GCSE subject (which had in the previous year attracted 5,000 candidates). This was part of a move to reduce the number of subjects that attracted 'few' candidates, but the timing seemed unfortunate. The apologia was that education for citizenship was supposed to run through the entire curriculum. However, in February 1990 Education Secretary John MacGregor prompted reports that 'Schools urged to teach ideal of active citizenship' (The Independent, 17th February, p.2).
effectively without appearing in the process to devalue those services."

Conservative active citizenship produced reactions from the other major parties claiming citizenship as their own. It also provoked debate within academia and the media, and seemed to come at a pertinent juncture - the Charter 88 pressure group was launched in November 1988, the all-party Speaker's Commission on Citizenship was established in the same month, education and 'education for citizenship' in the wake of the Education Reform Act were prominent political issues, as were levels of crime, unemployment, social inequality and disorder. Citizenship seemed, for a time at least, to have a particular purchase on a wide range of political and social debates, and appeared to offer some neglected solutions.

Though seen by some commentators at the time as a coded distancing from Thatcherite economism back to a more traditional Conservative 'One Nationism' by former supposed Heathites (Baker, Patten, Hurd), active citizenship should rather be seen as one aspect of the broader Thatcherite agenda [chapter

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7 The Speaker's Commission on Citizenship Report, published in 1990, had little discernible public impact. The main recommendations of the 33-member commission were that citizenship should play an important role in all years of education (including proposals that every school governing body should develop a strategy for citizenship across the curriculum, and that citizenship skills should be included in records of achievement), the law relating to legal rights, duties and entitlements be reviewed, a new honours system for citizenship, and a Royal Commission on citizenship to consider new legislation. In one sense it mirrored Conservative active citizenship in (what it thought was a novel move) seeing the voluntary capacity of citizenship as an extra fourth dimension to be added to civil, political and social rights.
nine]. There was no implication that this emphasis on active citizenship should be at the expense of active market participation and should be accompanied by a reversal of 'liberalising' reforms (privatisation, deregulation, contracting-out). Rather, its proponents claimed it was highly complimentary to those reforms. Further, Thatcherism's apologists argued that active citizenship merely reiterated themes of social responsibility and duty that had been articulated earlier, often by Thatcher herself.

8.2 Thatcherism's Moral Agenda

Active citizenship was one theme present in a period of Thatcherism when senior Conservative figures sought to reassert the project on the 'moral high ground'. It was becoming clear that Thatcherism had caused a decisive shift in the economic 'climate of opinion' (also indicated by the concurrent Labour Party Policy Review), yet its social values were not thought to be wholly accepted. Labour under Neil Kinnock had been appearing to gain ground by attacking the amorality (indeed, immorality) of Thatcherism, and its role in creating a more selfish and divided society. In 1987, Thatcher had made some unsurprising remarks in an interview (the ubiquitous 'there is no such thing as society'), which were used to further characterise her policies as socially-destructive. The debate over active

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8 In context, the views she expressed were hardly original or substantive: "I think we've been through a period where too many people have been given to understand that if they have a problem, it's the government's job to cope with it. 'I have a problem, I'll get a grant.' 'I'm homeless, the government must
citizenship, social responsibilities and self-reliance became the dominant issue towards the end of May 1988.

Thatcher gave an address to the General Assembly of the Church of Scotland in Edinburgh (May 21st), trailed heavily as an important statement of her beliefs. She located her personal duty in Christianity, and denied that the motivation for wealth creation was wrong or immoral: "...any set of social and economic arrangements which is not founded on the acceptance of individual responsibility will do nothing but harm." There was some role for the state in providing health and education, but not to the extent that it eroded or removed personal responsibility. She declared: "When you have finished as a taxpayer, you have not finished as a citizen." She called for a greater role for private charity in health care, in line with 'Victorian practice'.

Although Hurd had been referring to his notion of active citizenship some months earlier, he returned...
to it in the political storm created by Thatcher's Edinburgh address. He argued that he saw the active citizen, 'enriched' by the prosperity of the Thatcher era and involved in his local community, as the key to achieving the social and political objectives of the third term. He stressed: "I do think that we need to emphasise more than we did at the beginning that individualism is not just a narrow or selfish thing. The reason why we put stress on individual achievement is not just so that we can pile up individual mountains of wealth but so that the country is a more decent place. We have got to say to people who are doing quite well: 'Look, there is a community to which you belong. Be an active citizen within it'."\(^\text{12}\)

One week after her address to the Church of Scotland, Thatcher spoke to the Conservative Women's Conference in London (May 25th). She made a traditional defence of 'the family', self-reliance, self-respect and 'good neighbourliness', as well as attacking socialist divisiveness and its role in undermining these values.\(^\text{13}\) Her speech to the Conservative Party Conference of that year continued the citizenship theme, spun before and after as a strong rebuke to Labour's criticism of the

\(^{12}\) 'Hurd joins in Tory drive on moral debate', p.1, The Times, May 23rd, 1988. At the time opinion was divided as to the purpose of Hurd's intervention: "Although Labour immediately seized on Mr Hurd's remarks as a coded attack on the Prime Minister, Tory MPs believed he was giving voice to her growing belief that more people must begin to exercise the personal responsibility that goes with her brand of economic freedom."

\(^{13}\) 'Thatcher champions the family', p.1, and speech, p.12, The Times, 26th May, 1988.
Thatcherite agenda as regarding 'just me and now'.

Personal effort, she emphasised, enhanced rather than undermined the community, and greater responsibility gave more dignity to the individual and more strength to the community.

8.3 The (Centre) Left's Response

There were two main criticisms made of Conservative active citizenship. The first related to its anti-state welfare nature, the second to its anti-political nature.

First, active citizenship, however desirable voluntary work and civil associations, was seen as unrealistic for many citizens. Involvement in such activities takes resources, time, and some degree of knowledge and previous experience. It was unrealistic to expect the already disadvantaged, for whom these would be in short supply, to be able to be active citizens as much as more advantaged individuals. But if they were not expected to, and the active citizenship message was meant only for

14 'Thatcher to stress role of citizens', The Sunday Times, 9th October 1988. After the speech, it was suggested (Jacques 1988): "The idea of the active citizen received, as of last Friday, the modern-day Conservative equivalent of the papal blessing, otherwise known as the public endorsement of Margaret Thatcher. It is no longer the personal fiefdom of Douglas Hurd, the home secretary. It is official. And it heralds the latest attempt by the government to break out of its defensive position in the debate on morality and social behaviour." Similarly (Marquand 1988b): "No doubt, political expediency provides part of the explanation. The [1988] budget had a peculiarly shameless quality about it, shocking to many Tory voters, as well as to non-Tories. Having been caught robbing the poor-box, ministers with good political antennae recognise that a spell of moral earnestness is now in order. Besides, Hurd and Baker both want to succeed to the leadership. Both know that they cannot do so as Thatcherites."

those with such resources (with more disadvantaged
groups being the intended beneficiaries of active
citizenship), then it was a highly divisive idea. It
exacerbated the implicit demarcation between full
citizens and recipient citizens, by identifying the
importance of direct social assistance to some and
seeking to make them more reliant on the
unguaranteed voluntary activities of other
citizens.\(^\text{16}\) Hence it was felt (Lister, p.19, 1990):
"...that the government regards the poor as the
objects, not the subjects of active citizenship."
The Conservative active conception of citizenship
was (Hall and Held, p.16, 1989b): "...detached from
its modern roots in institutional reform, in the
welfare state and community struggles and
rearticulated with the more Victorian concept of
charity, philanthropy and self-help." It was a
vision of the old vertical society - citizenship
confined to a prosperous and 'beneficent', minority -
not the universal citizenship one.\(^\text{17}\) It was seen to
reveal Thatcherism's self-imposed impotence in
dealing with its own social effects: 'government
makes' the policies, the active citizens take over

\(^\text{16}\) Skillen (p.57, chapter four, Milligan and Miller 1992):
"...Hurd's 'active citizens' are a minority with, as he puts it
'time and money to spare'. Having elevated, albeit briefly,
the notion of 'active citizenship' to being a key stone in the
Tory edifice, a fundamental ideal of political life, it
emerges that active citizenship is a minor decoration, limited
in its spheres of action and restricted in practice to those
with 'time and money to spare'. Unless with have now a two or
three-tier concept of citizenship, it is difficult to see all
this as a new 'definition of citizenship', or to see how we
could have a 'social policy founded upon ideals of active and
responsible citizenship'."

\(^\text{17}\) Jacques (1988). Similarly, Mouffe (1988) argued that it
represented a privatised view of citizenship, a revival of the
feelings of noblesse-oblige and moral duty among the rich.
bandaging the casualties' (Ascherson 1988). It did not relate to the modern conception of citizenship at all (Oliver, p.34, 1991): "No attention was paid to the citizen's rights, or to the obligations of the state to the citizen in providing protection for civil, political and social rights. Nor was there recognition of the importance of the 'private' side of the life of the individual and the need for this to be free from undue burdens which remove from people the opportunity for self-fulfilment."

Conservative active citizenship was so inflammatory because it was thought to imply a state of non-citizenship for many.  

Raban (1989) expresses the most virulent critical deconstruction of Thatcher's Church of Scotland speech. It reversed the sense that governments have to help educate the people on the increasing complexity of contemporary society, economics and politics, to go beyond the 'language of the breakfast table'. It was in addition, in linking Thatcherite individualism with 'Christianity', an implicit warning to the Church to 'back-off' from a

18 Marquand (1988b): "It is easy to spot weaknesses in their alternative. Their new Tory communitarianism has a strong whiff of the Lady Bountiful about it. Their responsible citizens sound suspiciously like paternalistic local businessmen, and their communities like extensions of the Rotary Club. Though they use the language of citizenship, they seem deaf to the notions of popular participation and equal rights without which that language is empty rhetoric. They are not merely deaf, but hostile, to its distributional implications. The old socialist cry, 'damn your charity, we want justice', means nothing to them. They do not see that a community cannot be fashioned out of a series of altruistic spasms: that a sense of community depends upon a sense that the burdens and proceeds of community action are fairly shared."
political role, that her Government was in control. Hence (p.71-2):

"For 100 years, governments of every colour were committed to enlarging the language of citizenship. Now Mrs Thatcher's government is committed to closing it. It is a narrow and exclusive dialect, this language in which we are governed: it bolsters the sense of community enjoyed by those who use it and repels outsiders who aren't members of the family and in on the code. As a language, it has real integrity, precisely because it derives from the natural vocabulary, the social outlook, the settled habits of mind of one person, the Prime Minister herself. All the words fit, all the pieties and prejudices interlock. In its ceremonially, religiose form, as here, it has the unpleasant ring of a new and pertly unctuous thieves' slang."

Second, Conservative active citizenship was thought fundamentally anti-political. Though it appeared to draw on themes from the civic republican tradition of citizenship (Marquand, p.340, 1991): "...in terms of that tradition...the Hurdian 'active citizen' is an incomplete, even deformed, creature." It did not embrace the important tasks fundamental to the tradition, especially the supreme civic duty of taking part in government. Rather, it was less citizenship and more a part of the 'English tradition of voluntary service'. It was a response to the increasingly fragmented society, and an attempt to fill the breach between the new right's economics (centred on utility-maximising hedonism)
and morality (a critique of permissive hedonism), by creating a moral justification for the market order. The active citizen was designed to supply the public goods (civility, honesty, mutual trust, community) which the market itself could not, to take the strain in the new right's project to privatise public purposes as well as public institutions. Hence praise for 'doing good for others', but only in a private capacity. It was regarded as revealing the behavioural assumptions of Thatcherism: action for all is altruistic, but self-interest is economic (Quicke 1992).

Active citizenship revealed Thatcherism's distrust of mechanisms of political accountability (Oliver 1991). Alongside the corrosive effects of the market, it was meant to make people feel like citizens (Norman, in Milligan and Miller 1992). But the favoured 'little platoons' were ones which confer virtually no power at all - they were markedly non-political. Hence it represented the attempt to divorce citizenship from politics. It was a spoiling operation, citizenship as conscription to the state, so diverting attention from 'real' citizenship demands, especially constitutional reform: "Active citizenship is not simply an evasion of the undemocratic realities of

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19 Instead, Norman suggested the appropriate vehicles for active citizenship should be those mediating institutions which provide individuals with a point of entry into political life (political parties, trade unions, protest groups and campaigning organisations), and also to try to create institutions of participatory democracy (p.47, ibid): "...the problem of active citizenship is the problem of how to achieve participatory democracy."
today, it is a provocation: an attempt to seize the initiative on citizenship so that citizenship can burn" (Barnett 1989). These anti-welfare and anti-political aspects of the active citizen were seen to be mutually-supporting (Andrews, p.215, 1991), reinforcing the 'enterprise culture' but as a moral and socially cohesive community.

Hence although active citizenship could have been dismissed as merely a superficial speech-filler, it served as a flash-point for many on the (centre) left because it was seen to encapsulate Thatcherism's perceived erosion of social rights and devaluation of public political participation. Thatcherite citizenship was a hypocrisy. But, in addition it was suggested that it was symbolic of a crisis for Thatcherism - its theoretical and practical inability to deal coherently with its own socially-divisive legacy (Mulgan, in Andrews 1991). Responsibility was instead a public and social, rather than only individual, concept.

These criticisms were in many respects justified. Conservative active citizenship was an anaemic caricature compared to the deeper and richer themes to be found amongst the long history of ideas of citizenship. In the political context of the perceived erosion of communities, social cohesion, rights and local democracy, it seemed darkly ironic. However, these reactions were somewhat misguided and

20 Paddy Ashdown (1989), leader of the then Social and Liberal Democrats, criticised Hurd for neglecting major constitutional reform: "Active but not too active might be the slogan from Mr Hurd. But a democratic citizenship cuts both ways."
representative of the left's detachment from the political culture.

8.4 Active Citizenship and the Left's Detachment

The Conservative conception of active citizenship may have seemed weak. The left's alternative vision of active citizenship was in some respects weaker. It tended to involve a concentration on vastly increased broader and deeper political participation (and related constitutional reforms), enabled in part by a full array of civil, political and most importantly social rights [chapter one]. Liberal and conservative 'reservations' with regard to a primacy for political participation helped convince proponents of participatory politics on the left that only they can envisage the 'true' conception of citizenship, even that universal citizenship depends on the project to achieve participatory democracy. However attractive this notion of participative democracy might be, it has been suggested that it is highly problematic [3.5c]. In particular, the simplifying tendencies of communitarianism, most prominently, the desire to re-unify a fragmenting society under the rubric of 'politics', as if that were inevitably unifying, are unhelpful given the demands of pluralism.

The left fell into the trap set by Conservative active citizenship. However superficial, there are two initial senses in which it outflanked the left. First, it was useful in seeking to consolidate part of Thatcherism's electoral constituency, linking citizenship with private property and also a certain
‘apolitical’ smugness. Hence (Ignatieff, chapter two, ‘Citizenship and Moral Narcissism’, Andrews 1991, p.27): "The active citizen is an idea deployed defensively: to lumber Labour as the party of state tutelage and to rebut the persistent and damaging charge that Conservatism is the party of greed and selfishness. The active citizen is also an image meant to take the party on the offensive, to give Conservatism an ideological hold on just about everyone’s wishful best image of themselves: as the good neighbour, the concerned and active member of the community."

Second, it represented an intervention into the issue of individual behaviour and ‘responsible’ citizenship. These were constructed deliberately narrowly. There was no question of generating debate as to whether dissent, for example non-payment of the poll tax, represented responsible citizenship for the greater good of the community. But nevertheless, in presentational terms this was advantageous to the Thatcherite project. The right captured (a certain construction of) active citizenship and its link to individual behaviour, and was then able to deploy it further for its own purposes. For example, it could be related closely to the need for specific welfare recipients to fulfil certain obligations (as in the case of workfare), local citizens to behave ‘responsibly’ (and pay their poll tax however unjust they thought it), and parents to become involved in restructuring the education system by becoming school governors (encouraged by the Education Reform Act). But just
because Conservative active citizenship placed a very particular construction on 'responsible citizenship', did not mean that some form of responsible citizenship was unimportant. Of course, the left did not think this. But in its reaction to active citizenship, it was made to appear to by concentrating on 'more important' issues such as political participation, constitutional reform, and social welfare rights. As suggested (Kymlicka and Norman, p.361, 1994): "Many people on the left have tried to bypass the issue of responsible citizenship by 'dissolving [it] into that of democracy itself', which in turn has led to the 'advocacy of collective decision-making as a resolution to all the problems of citizenship. Unfortunately, this faith in the educative function of participation seems overly optimistic." It was no surprise then that the Conservative counter-blow was that the left was amoral, that it did not care about individual responsibility and its effect on social relations. Active citizenship exploited the left's exposure on the issue of duties, and its reliance on 'general obligations' (fulfilled through taxation). Active citizenship allowed the emphasis to be placed on citizenship as a status earned (by whatever form of participation) as well as given.

Further, in allowing itself to be characterised as unconcerned with individual responsibility and social morality, the left failed to appreciate the interest in these matters which important contributors to its thought have had. To take one aspect of this question, in its reaction to
Conservative active citizenship, the left appeared to reinforce a dichotomy between individual responsibility and welfare rights to which important historical proponents of welfare rights did not hold. The key purpose underlying Beveridge’s ‘liberal-collectivist’ reforms, for example, was the maximisation of individual responsibility and the maintenance of the conditions of social independence (Cutler et al. 1986, Hills et al. 1994) [3.5b].

The implication that non-political active citizenship was somehow secondary (or even superficial) compared to political participation was an error. The left complained that Conservative active citizenship represented a ‘privatised’ conception, that inclusion enabled by welfare was to become increasingly dependent on the private actions of benign individuals. However, while justifiable, it also revealed the left’s unease with the nature of the private sphere. The ‘public’ and ‘political’ was seen to cast into shadow the ‘private’ and ‘non-political’. Hence it was thought ‘citizenship is nothing if it is not public’ (Marquand 1989). This was an understandable effort of resistance against the ‘privatisation of citizenship’, but ineffective in helping the left engage positively with supposedly ‘private’ forms of citizenship.

These emphases derive naturally from the inherent need for the left to seek to reorder social relations in the public sphere, and the influence of the communitarian tradition in idealising the
'political state'. But there is nothing inherently anti-progressive or corrosive of citizenship about private non-political activity, as would be more generally acknowledged (Macedo, 'Capitalism, Citizen and Community, Turner and Hamilton 1995a, p.122-3): "For purposes of passing judgement about the 'communal' character of people's involvements, one must consider the purposes, motives, and membership criteria of voluntary associations before simply writing them off as 'private'. If voluntary association is important for promoting a self-reliant, energetic citizenry, then we should be willing to accept some inefficiency in the delivery of some public benefits for the sake of providing opportunities for the exercise of the capacity for spontaneous action." This reinforces the need for contextual rather than abstracted analysis.

Further, what might be dismissed as private and non-political participation is often the sphere in which women have found it easiest to act as 'citizens' and participate 'informally', as opposed to the often exclusionary public political sphere (Orloff 1993). This is relevant especially with regard to the inheritance of history in which women were barred from access to formal political structures.

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21 Nisbet, 'Citizenship: Two Traditions', Turner and Hamilton (1995a), p.12: "Insensibly the idea spread that what could be justified only in terms of private property, voluntary association, occupation or profession - of, in short, the private-social sector - was inherently inferior as a value to what manifestly sprang from the political state with its undoubted consecration to a public conceived for legal and administrative purposes as but a vast association of individuals - all equal, homogeneous, and motivated alike by conjoined self-interest and rationality."
Emphasising the public sphere seemingly 'at the expense' of the private may further disadvantage groups already under-represented in the public.

But the full significance of these errors can be appreciated only with reference to a particular characterisation of the dominant political culture [3.10]. Conservative active citizenship picked up on the emphasis on market-based 'self-reliance' in the political culture, assumptions which concur with 'liberal virtue theory' [3.5c] about responsible social behaviour, (self) discipline and 'manners', and the value of non-political civic public-mindedness. As such, it appropriated the 'religion of public civility'. Thus while the left's criticisms might be valid - Conservative active citizenship may be divisory - it illustrates how citizenship is not necessarily progressive but may promote further exclusion.

Hence the root of the left's uneasy thrashing about in reaction to Conservative active citizenship - it seemed to represent a form of social participation (in non-political civil associations) which concurred with commonly accepted meanings of citizenship, but also was designed to undermine the central idea of citizenship, that of 'universal membership'. This created the dilemma of having to reconcile how a legitimate form of (non-political) citizenship could act against the wholly benign and emancipatory ideal of citizenship. The dilemma only existed because of the left's too-simple thinking on citizenship.
8.5 The Strength of Conservative Active Citizenship

"...the sense of being self-reliant, of playing a role within the family, of owning one's own property, of paying one's own way are all part of the spiritual ballast which maintains responsible citizenship."22

Though it may be that ordinary citizens want greater power and responsibility over their own lives, but this does not necessarily make them more supportive of the participatory project. The route to that power is more likely to be seen as deriving from greater resources gained through the market, if possible, rather than through politically-active citizenship.

Consequently, the discursive efficacy of Conservative active citizenship can be appreciated. In a predominantly liberal-capitalist society, (non-political) unpaid or non-instrumental activity holds a unique position. Because it is not regarded as the primary form of work (paid labour), it is granted a certain 'moral specialness'. Given this analysis, Hurd and others were correct to argue, though of course from a very different standpoint, that active citizenship as Conservatives defined it was the necessary complement to the 'enterprise culture', and that traditions of voluntary service were rooted deeply in common sense understandings of what it is to be a 'good citizen'.

22 Margaret Thatcher, quoted Independent on Sunday, 6th May, 1990.
Further, the strategic efficacy of Conservative active citizenship can be appreciated. It sought to undermine the priority of state welfare provision. This would be exacerbated if the fragmentation of local government institutions meant local governance became significantly controlled by the kind of upper and middle-class 'active citizens' envisaged by the Government (Kearns 1995). Hence Conservative active citizenship represented another example of the regressive use of citizenship for strategic ends (in particular by harnessing the present inequalities of participation).

Voluntary work in the community, involvement in local projects, even unorganised help for friends and neighbours, all are seen to feed into one of the common sense definitions of 'good citizenship'. Of course, citizenship is not reducible to this. Alone, the 'citizenship of contribution' is inadequate as a foundation for 'universal membership' (Finlayson, p.411, 1994): "...the various sectors of voluntarism, while they offer freedom, flexibility, and choice, cannot guarantee uniformity and comprehensiveness. They may well embody the citizenship of contribution, and contribution can be offered to statutory bodies; they may well advise on statutory welfare rights; but they cannot implement the citizenship of entitlement."

In its 'rediscovery' of citizenship, the left saw an opportunity to defend state welfare provision and further the vision of radical democratisation in all areas of social life. Thatcherism saw an opportunity
to undermine collective provision and reinforce the 'market society'. However, Conservative active citizenship could also be characterised as a rather mundane (and certainly not disagreeable) idea: people should help others in their communities. T.H. Marshall himself called it a 'lively sense of responsibility' in the community. The left's reaction to this revealed its disengagement from the dominant political culture. In seeking, rightly, to go beyond this (on its own) weak conception, the left exposed the faultlines in its own thinking.

Citizenship in theory should not ignore citizenship in practice. This means in particular the majority who do not act as citizens in the manner properly thought of by participatory theorists, but who nevertheless are full and active members of their communities in the course of their daily lives (MacKian 1995). Concentration on political citizens reinforces inequalities already present. Ironically, the left in criticising Conservative active citizenship, also reiterated its focus on the minority of political citizens.

8.6 Summary

Conservative active citizenship was an example of 'liberal-conservatism' [2.8], the development of conservative ideas in the wake of the new right and in particular the project to reassert the efficacy of 'free markets'. As Conservatives claimed, active citizenship was the compliment to the 'free market'. It was useful to outflank and expose left thinking,

23 Turner and Hamilton (p.36, 1995b).
as supposedly neglectful of individual responsibility and morality. In addition, it was designed to reinforce the 'market society' - conservative active citizens were not to question politically the parameters of the social order. Given the left's detachment from the dominant political culture, Thatcherism was allowed greater scope for manoeuvre and freedom to appropriate discourses associated with it.
PART THREE

POLITICAL PROJECTS IN CITIZENSHIP -
THATCHERISM AND THE 'NEW POLITICS' OF THE LEFT
Chapter Nine

Thatcherism - The Subversion of Citizenship in the 'Market Society'

9.0 Introduction

A common assumption held by Thatcherism's critics is that Thatcherism neglected citizenship. Rather, this chapter suggests that Thatcherism can be shown to have sought to appropriate citizenship for its broader strategic purposes.

There is already an established debate concerning Thatcherism, indeed (Jessop et al., p.5, 1988): "Thatcherism seems to have acquired almost as many meanings as there are people who mention it." This is unsurprising, given that ascribing or denying an underlying purpose to Thatcherism has become a key discussion. First, necessarily because of Thatcherism's dominance over the electoral and ideological agenda in the last two decades. Second, because any interpretation will both depend on other methodological arguments and indicate a more general analysis of the development of post-war British politics, economics and society.

Because of this, the argument here proceeds incrementally. First, previous theorisations of Thatcherism are drawn upon to suggest the need for a 'multi-theoretic' approach, in ten respects [9.1-9.10]. It is suggested that no single theorisation of Thatcherism is complete, but many have elements which point to some important aspect of Thatcherism. The scope for analysis under Thatcherism is so broad
that it deserves a degree of methodological pluralism in order to be accommodated. Approaches to Thatcherism are separated initially into 'sceptical' and 'non-sceptical' types, which divide on whether Thatcherism may be regarded as constituting a purposeful coherent political project [9.1]. While the sceptical reservations are helpful in resisting exaggeration, only the non-sceptical approaches provide richer opportunities for analysis. However, such an approach should still incorporate policy case studies [9.2], which contrary to the typical expectation may allow a greater appreciation of how ideologically-driven Thatcherism was [9.3]. The apparent inconsistency of Thatcherism in some respects may be regarded as symptomatic of its ideological project rather than its lack of radicalism [9.4]. Different routes were experimented with towards the same radical end [9.5]. This purpose is understood best by more developed theorisations [9.6], especially those which while drawing on Marxist analysis develop a more complex and flexible understanding of Thatcherism. Again, this is not to deny more practical matters such as Thatcherism's immediate electoral basis, an awareness of which should be incorporated [9.7]. But at the same time, it is necessary to recognise the extent to which Thatcherism constructed that support by maximising its use of discourses [9.8]. These different forms of analysis may be reconciled to produce a general but multi-faceted interpretation, here centred around the notion of the 'market society', a rigid constructed social order.
These considerations are necessary in order to understand Thatcherism's relationship to citizenship. The notion of Thatcherism as merely a 'Two Nations' strategy ignores its supposedly integrationist aspirations [9.9]. Thatcherism used citizenship discourses, drawn from the new right, for its own project of the 'market society', which can be illustrated by the case studies [9.10].

Second, Thatcherism's relationship to earlier forms of British Conservative politics is explored [9.11]. Following the above analysis, it is suggested that the division between Thatcherism and previous Conservative regimes tends to be overdrawn. Thatcherism was forced to operate in a different context from other regimes, but nonetheless could be regarded as equally concerned to secure a stable governing project for conservatism.

9.1 Between Scepticism and Non-Scepticism

In the broadest sense, there are two approaches to Thatcherism. 'Sceptical' characterisations seek to provide what they see as a useful corrective to 'exaggerated' accounts of Thatcherism's impact, by pointing to its incoherence, contingency, and non-ideological sources of policy change. They argue against Thatcherite 'exceptionalism', questioning the validity of the term 'Thatcherism' itself. Some approach Thatcherism as 'personality', referring particularly to Thatcher's own domination of government and policy. Thatcherism's project becomes in effect her agenda. To Jenkins (1987), Thatcherism is more usefully regarded as a 'style', whereas
Riddell (p.7, 1983) suggests it is an 'instinct', a series of moral values (hard work, family responsibility, duty and patriotism) and an approach to leadership with some ideological elements, rather than an ideology itself.

'Non-sceptical' approaches (discussed later) do not analyse Thatcherism uncritically, nor necessarily grant it too much coherence, but do seek to appreciate in different ways the significance of its purpose and impact which sceptical approaches may neglect. These go beyond descriptions of Thatcherism which identify certain recurring themes (the market, reversing decline, 'Victorian values', strong leadership), and draw on political, political economic and sociological methodologies in order to theorise why Thatcherism was significant. They recognise that in some form Thatcherism was a purposeful political project organised to confront identified 'problems' in the Britain of the 1960s and 1970s.

Such a recognition is important, and sceptical approaches, in to some degree dismissing the notion that there was any broader strategic purpose to Thatcherism, may neglect the evidence from policy change under Thatcherism which points to recurring motivations for reform. Consequently, the reservations of sceptical approaches should be incorporated within the more theoretically-informed accounts offered by non-sceptical approaches. What then is the evidence from selected examples of policy change?
9.2. Integrating Case Studies

The first thing to note is that there is not necessarily a dichotomy between a case study approach to Thatcherism and an appreciation of its ideological purposes, as Marsh and Rhodes' (1992) characterisation of Thatcherism as a regime of inconsistent policy implementation implies. Of course, 'uni-dimensional' explanations are inadequate, and any interpretation should incorporate all three dimensions (political, economic, ideological), the precise relation between which will vary between policies (Marsh 1995a). However, such an approach does not preclude an appreciation of how ideological Thatcherism was, not only in terms of output of discourses but also as subject to ideological and discursive inputs (primarily but not exclusively from the new right). Rather, the case studies force a critical understanding of the significance of the influence of the new right, without implying any simple translation between thinkers, think-tanks and policy. Marsh has suggested that (p.611, 1995a): "the Conservatives used New Right ideology as a tool with which to forward their political ends - and these ends were electorally, rather than ideologically, driven." While noting the contingencies and competing pressures acting on the policy-making process, the case studies reveal how the new right defined both broadly and specifically many of the 'problems', then offered reform strategies. They also show how ideological influences on policy-making can produce
inconsistency, rather than the consistency assumed by sceptical approaches to Thatcherism (the dichotomy between ideology and political calculation tends to be overdrawn). As the case study chapters noted, many examinations of the policy process undervalue the influence of the new right because they do not appreciate fully the impact of its framing of the policy area (others perhaps neglect the contingencies of the policy-making process).

The Education Reform Act [chapter five] is a valuable case study in that it reveals both the significant extent of the new right's influence while also noting its frustration at the pace and nature of reform under Thatcherism. From the Black Papers onwards, the new right was crucial in shaping the debate on British education, and identifying the 'problems' - the structure of the system (particularly centring on the comprehensive ideal), the corrupting influence of organised interests, and its link to wider social and economic problems - the decline in 'authority' and 'standards', and lack of entrepreneurial aspirations. The new right thus re-energised and re-ideologised state education as a key area for Thatcherism, and then provided reform strategies. Yet it was reliant on capturing key political actors, and given the complexity and scope of the reform package was disappointed with some developments' particularly the over-elaboration and pluralism of the national curriculum, and the initial limits to selection. In the context of the reforms, citizenship themes were appropriated - greater participation in school governing, the
appearance of increased school autonomy, greater diversity of opportunity within the system, and the reinforcement of rights to a guaranteed national curriculum.

The Community Charge [chapter six] has tended to be seen as a highly ideological reform, 'ideological' used as a euphemism for reckless and electorally naive. The new right's concern with public expenditure made local government a key area of reform, and its specific (public choice-influenced) identification of the problem afflicting local government - lack of effective mechanisms of 'accountability' - set the key principle which framed the policy-making process. But this process was spurred on both by the failure of previous reforms, and a specific series of events which produced mounting political pressure for a resolution. It is impossible to imagine the policy being developed in the form it was without both the highly ideologically-loaded discourses the new right brought to bear, and particular political developments and key decisions (particularly the desire to break from the previous failed pattern of reform). Its implicit definition of local citizenship, criticised by opponents, was an appropriation of certain citizenship themes - participation, obligation and 'universality'.

Successive reforms developing a workfare system [chapter seven] also suggest the influence of the new right in framing the debate around welfare recipients, particularly the problem of 'dependency'.
and the supposed need to reduce the size of the welfare state. More specifically, the new right pressed for specific reforms which enforced the obligations of recipients, in line with a conception of impressing on them the modes of behaviour of 'proper' ('productive') 'autonomous' and 'responsible' citizens. Again, it utilised highly ideological conceptions to further the reform agenda. But progress was gradual, dependent on resistance encountered, the success of previous schemes, and the efficacy of political actors. It has sought to reshape progressively the citizenship of obligations and social rights by appropriation.

Contrary to Marsh and Rhodes, then, Thatcherism did not merely develop trends but created them as well. It is important to appreciate the innovatory nature of Thatcherite strategy and conceptualise how it represented a decisive break with the earlier post-war era. The case studies are not representative of all aspects of Thatcherism, but do contribute to an understanding of its ideological aspects and may be incorporated into a more theoretically-informed account which suggests a common purpose linking them.

9.3 Thatcherism and Ideology

Underlying the argument presented here is a sense of how dominant the new right has been in defining the agenda of politics over the last twenty years. This suggests an approach which appreciates 'climates of opinion' (Kavanagh 1987, 1990). This type of interpretation rests largely on the assumption of
the end of 'consensus politics', that the generally accepted view of what constituted viable economic and political solutions changed. The climate of opinion - an outlook or set of assumptions about policy largely taken for granted - is thought to have altered. Thatcherism was thus a return to individualism after a period of collectivism, located in the breakdown of the previous form of political assumptions. These conceptions are inviting but problematic because of their temptation to descriptiveness. Kavanagh (and similar commentators) do not help in identifying the causes of the changed tide within a broader theorisation. Instead, Thatcherism is seen to have emerged from the conjunction of a number of circumstances. Kavanagh (p.21, 1990) identifies continued relative economic decline, the defeat of the Conservative Party in the two general elections of 1974, the collapse of incomes policies in 1974 and 1979, spiralling inflation, unpopular strikes culminating in the 'Winter of Discontent', and the electoral problems of both main parties.

Rather, the case study to theory movement allows the recognition that, often, climates of opinion move from the micro-level up, or at least from specific problems to general ideologies. The state education system is seen as failing, local government as unresponsive, welfare recipients treated softly. These become linked into a developing macro-level discourse. The integration of case studies with discourse theory [9.8] reveals how the climate of opinion was shifted consciously and deliberately,
and a new climate constructed. But it does not deny that political actors can then come to assume that, after the dominance of a new climate has been established, only certain ideas and policies are 'viable'. Hopefully the value of the notion of climates of opinion can be retained while not resting solely on macro-level foundations.

Some characterisations of Thatcherism privilege the ideological aspect. Letwin (1992) sees Thatcherism as moral project encouraging 'vigorous virtues', those supposedly at the core of English 'national character', whose neglect in favour of 'softer' values (sympathy, humility, gentleness) led to increasing decadence and dependence. Thatcherism tried to encourage a certain way of life, rather than implement a theory indifferent to the particular circumstances of time and place, and represents the legitimate expression of the English Conservative tradition of 'limited politics' by which the state withdraws from making decisions which could be made by individuals for themselves. Thatcherism had to be radical to remove the obstacles to the moral and cultural revolution needed. Consequently, Letwin is able to suggest both that Thatcherism was coherent but not an ideology.

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1 Kenneth Minogue has suggested similarly that Thatcherism was the education of Conservatives to rid themselves of 'bourgeois guilt' for social inequalities that had made them susceptible to social democratic arguments, 'The Emergence of the New Right', Skidelsky (1988), also Minogue and Biddiss (1987). Of course, such approaches are problematic because they connect with much wider controversies over English history, the historical roots of the British crisis, and the pre-modern form of the British state (Gamble 1993).
This is itself a highly ideological interpretation, but weakened by its non-economic approach.

Similarly distinctive is Bulpitt’s (1986) ‘centre autonomy’ thesis. Thatcherism as seen as a project in party political statecraft, and a continuation of traditional Conservative statecraft (competent government and winning elections), rather than being primarily ideological. Its apparent radicalism was designed only to re-establish Conservative statecraft in new circumstances, particularly insulating ‘high politics’ from popular influences by conceding ground in ‘low politics’ (initially via monetarism). Though this approach has a refreshingly political-realist attack, it is unable to accommodate either the ideological aspect of Thatcherism or the different strategies employed by the Thatcher Governments as revealed in the case study policy areas. The latter are contradictory to the centre-autonomy thesis in that they reveal Thatcherism’s desire to engage strategically in low politics areas in order to consolidate its project. Indeed, third-term Thatcherism appeared to rally itself against the lack of progress in such areas. More generally, such accounts do not provide a convincing analysis of the economic crisis but deal mainly with its political symptoms, as with all primarily political or state-centred approaches.

9.4 Incorporating Contradiction

Sceptical characterisations of Thatcherism tend to rely on differing levels of contradiction to deny it was a purposeful political project. However, the
example of the poll tax has suggested the extent to which there were differing reform strategies within a highly contingent policy-making process, but cognoscent with the same ideological aim, using different modes of interpellation to other reforms. Hence (Jessop et al., p.9, 1988): "..in assessing the coherence of strategy, we should not require logical consistency out of time and place but simply consider how far different elements fit together over time and in different areas in pursuing the primary strategic goals." The emphasis on coherence can exclude further analysis as to the nature and purpose of political projects, exacerbated in Thatcherism's case since it drew on both neoliberal and neoconservative discourses and agendas.²

Unlike many much-heralded political projects, particularly those who have pledged to modernise Britain and reverse its seemingly perpetual decline, Thatcherism regained its purpose and coherence after periods of flux and incoherence. Again, more informed theorisations are needed to articulate the relations between apparently contradictory elements

² But (Hay, p.44, 1992): "..the criteria that a potentially dominant ideology must satisfy are not those of unity or even consistency, but rather that the ideology is easily articulated and comprehended, and that it justifies the strategic policy objectives necessary to secure the structural determinants of a new hegemonic settlement. The ad hoc nature of New Right ideology, combining neo-liberalism and neo-conservatism in a flexible relationship satisfies both criteria since either ideological base can be used to justify a particular policy objective. Thus, ironically, it is the very contradictions and inconsistencies of New Right ideology which ultimately stem from the synthesis of neo-liberalism and neo-conservatism that give Thatcherism the visage of a unified political project driven on by an albeit twin-desire for 'liberty' and 'moral authoritarianism'."
within Thatcherism (for example the 'free economy' and the 'strong state' projects).

9.5 Thatcherism as a Developing Project

Further, it is obvious that political projects may develop, however ideologically-informed they are. The best appreciation of this is found in Jessop et. al.'s (1988) work on Thatcherism, or 'many Thatcherisms'. It is examined 'historically' rather than seeking to define a consistent set of policies which ran through all three governments. The changing 'strategic line' was never developed fully in a manner consistent with desired goals, but represented a complex and continuing process adjusting as strategic interaction proceeded. They distinguish three main stages (p.18, 1988): a, the development of Thatcherism as a social movement defined by its opposition to the post-war settlement and the policies being pursued to sustain it; b, the period of consolidation culminating in the first effective control by Thatcherite forces of the Conservative Party, the Cabinet and the political agenda; and c, the period of 'consolidated Thatcherism' in which this control has been (re)deployed to pursue a long-term transformation of British society. Rather than conjunctural manoeuvres, this involved striking deeper structural roots to try to ensure the survival of the Thatcherite project beyond short-term policy failures and fluctuations in support. It tried to 'Thatcherize' the civil service and administration, reduce the independence of the media and educational
institutions, create new channels of representation, and to consolidate a new social base through a fundamental recomposition of class forces rather than merely exploiting temporary disaffections and discontents. The last two elements are illustrated particularly by the case studies, and their close relation discussed further in relation to the 'politics of support' [9.7]. The limited but significant emergence of citizenship, and selective deployment of participation, duties and responsibility, was an important strand in this third term project.

Interpretations of Thatcherism should appreciate its ability for 'political learning' and 'lesson-learning' (Rose 1991), the taking of a series of incremental steps to achieve a totality of innovation, possible only because it was goal-oriented, partisan and purposeful (Moon 1993). It cannot therefore be understood fully in terms of policy inheritance, adaption or consensus politics. Ferdinand Mount (1988) suggests Thatcherism is a 'survivor regime', a type which though lacking detailed initial plans are able to renew continually political purpose and learn from experience. Sceptical characterisations which recognise this are unable to appreciate the ideological inputs and hegemonic purpose which fuel such renewal, and reduce it to Thatcher's 'personal will' (for example Riddell, p.11, 1991). These are apparent in the case studies of the education, poll tax and workfare reforms, all seemingly deadlocked policy areas. Thatcher's personal will did not activate extensive
reform programmes, but responded to a gathering (and new right-led) agenda for reform within its overall strategic aims. Despite the need to be wary of exaggerated new right claims to influence, there is some credibility to the notion that Thatcherism employed a 'micropolitical' strategy, seeking out the next possible incremental step concurrent with the real world of interest group politics, and that (Pirie, p.269, 1988): "In several cases the success of the policy has led to the victory of the idea rather than the other way around."

9.6 Political, Economic and Social Context

"Marxist intellectuals in Britain appear to have 'Thatcherism' on the brain."³ Purpose is only granted in full to Thatcherism's project by richer theorisations. There are two broad types. First, orthodox Marxist approaches, which tend to depict Thatcherism as a barely-concealed class strategy. They suggest that the left's political response, if deflected by interpretations of Thatcherism born of the 'new revisionism', would neglect this fundamental fact. There is thought to be no strong evidence of Thatcherism's appeal for a large part of the working class, but rather their alienation from the Labour Party. Given the nature of ruling class elites, Thatcherism's 'class war conservatism' is thus regarded as hardly unsurprising and certainly not novel.

Hence, Thatcherism was seen as representative of a new stage in the political and economic crisis of British capitalism. Thatcherism was a class response to the strength and militancy of the working class by the dominant sections of the capitalist class (Glyn and Harrison 1980), or the mobilisation of the lower-middle class strata (King and Nugent 1979). Even its economic 'irrationality' (damage to the British economy) can be explained as a politically rational strategy for 'capital', rather capital based on foreign investment and linked to the Party (Ross 1983, also Ingham 1984), or a rejection of the interests of British capital (Overbeek 1989). Indeed, the crisis offered an opportunity for economic and social reconstruction. For Nairn (1981), Thatcherism was a blatant attempt to use the recession to hasten and complete the dominance of (international) finance capital and the multinational sector, the resulting de-industrialisation representing Southern English hegemony freed from the 'archaic burden' of industry and trade unions. However, in some accounts, the complexities of the political project are reduced to the 'politics of greed', a new national philosophy 4

4 As Gamble (p.190-1, 1988) has noted, although the former interpretation of Thatcherism has been the more influential, it is problematic. It claims that the interests of banking capital dominated the coalition of interests supporting Thatcherism, and so the coalition would fragment, and that monetarism was unsuited to the complex task of managing an advanced capitalist economy. But, capital in fact protested very little under Thatcherism, and monetarism did express the logic of the growing financial and commercial integration of the modern economy.
based not on altruism but the eager and unfettered pursuit of self-interest (Loney 1986).

This is Marxism as the 'theory of the obvious' (Hall, p.165, 1988). They do provide a meaning to the Thatcherite project from its economic and social context, but fail in establishing it as a political project because they do not grant primacy to the political (both the party political demands on Thatcherism and its political autonomy). They do not provide scope for further analysis (for example via case studies) given their deterministic characterisation of Thatcherism. In the 'general accumulation strategy' Marxist approach (Overbeek 1989), the political critique is missing - if the social bases of Thatcherism lay in the petty bourgeoisie and small capital, it surely would have required the Governments to make compromises and concessions to them in order to retain office. Of course, a more general 'logic of capital' approach, accepting specific national forms deriving from the peculiarities of individual social formations, avoids this (for example, Clarke 1987, Green, P. 1987). But again it cannot provide any account of how political and ideological struggle modifies the timing of restructuring and also limits its effectiveness, and attributes a singular and unique logic to capital, particularly making comparative and historical analysis difficult (Jessop et al, p.37, 1988). In general such approaches tend to homogenise Thatcherism.
Second, more complex theorisations are provided by Gamble, Hall, Jessop and Hay. Gamble (1988) suggests Thatcherism was a political project aimed at restoring the conditions (electoral, ideological and economic) for the Conservative Party to resume its leading role in British politics, especially via the restoration of the domestic and international authority of the British state and the reversal of Britain's economic decline. It was located in 'crisis', but the hegemony of British capital and the ruling class was never in doubt. The world system was the single most important reason for the 'new politics' - the exhaustion of the old regime of accumulation (Fordism, and the decline in the position of the United States), and the increasingly interdependent world economy. The world recession of the 1970s revealed the inadequacy of national accumulation strategies, stabilisation and industrial policies. Thatcherism was an attempt to reassert Conservative Party hegemony, though perhaps not a new hegemony itself.

The 'Free Economy/Strong State' term has become widely used, but often far too loosely. It does not refer merely to the two most apparent schools within the new right (neoliberal free economy, neoconservative strong state), but rather the authoritarian aspects of both. It brings out the policing and disciplinary measures needed for the

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5 Hall has admitted that his discourse-theoretical approach was not intended as a general theorisation of Thatcherism, and Hay's work develops criticisms of Hall, so both are dealt with in the context of the value of discursive approaches [9.8].
free economy and social reconstruction envisaged by Thatcherism to encourage an 'enterprise culture' and 'popular capitalism', and explains its centralist tendency and the need for a strong state. Thatcherism had to block the extension of equal civil, political and social rights to all citizens, in the course of restructuring, so that the costs of restructuring could be loaded more easily onto vulnerable groups.

Thatcherism characterised as a political project with hegemonic goals is valuable because it recognises that economic needs and structures are represented politically, yet avoids the implication that it was a wholly coherent project. The relation between the political project and the structural constraints acting upon it is crucial, though constraints are not just economic but also political and ideological (Marsh 1994, Gamble 1994).

Jessop et al. (1988, 1990, also Jessop 1989) suggest that Thatcherism was an attempt to restructure the Keynesian welfare state and the British economy towards a post-Fordist economy based on finance capital, highly flexible, non-unionised, and divided into a highly skilled paid core and low skilled low paid peripheral workforce. It used (rather than merely being the political 'shell' for) increasing social and geographical polarisations in order to construct a politically exclusionary 'Two Nations' strategy. This required breaking the power of the unions and shaking out Britain's traditional manufacturing industries. However, this strategy was
flawed because of the conflicts within British society and the fundamental weaknesses of the British economy. It was then primarily a productivist phenomenon, founded on the notion that the (Jessop et al., 1984, p.51):

"...productive be rewarded through the market for their contribution to production (or at least to the provision of profitable goods and services)...[whereas] the parasitic must suffer for their failure to contribute adequately (if at all) to the market (with little regard to the question of whether they are 'deserving' or otherwise)."

In addition, Jessop et al. emphasise the external element in interpreting Thatcherism - the prioritisation of the City as an international finance centre and Britain's place in an expensive Atlantic Alliance system. Thatcherism favoured interests with an international orientation, since the Gaullist option of economic restructuring was not available because there was no significant bloc of domestic British capital which might provide the base for such a strategy. \(^6\) But this meant that Thatcherism enjoyed an extraordinary level of decisional autonomy in policy formation and implementation.

\(^6\) Cloke (1992) notes similarly that characterising Thatcherism as a new 'national' regeneration strategy is problematic, since it made no real concessions to British capital (p.134, ibid): "...one of the most dramatic components of Thatcherism's economic agenda was its open recognition - even proclamation - that the interests of the British state are no longer synonymous with the interests of explicitly domestic capital, but with capital operating in Britain and the operations of British capital overseas."
Though Jessop et al. do not appreciate the development of Thatcherism within Conservative governing traditions as much as Gamble, they do integrate Thatcherism's political strategy (and necessary consciousness of the 'politics of support') and link it to its desire for hegemony based around a new accumulation strategy. They appreciate that, for example, in the short to medium term, the strategies for the welfare state were not intended to produce serious changes in the economic prospects of the 'second nation' (the more marginalised), but to consolidate political support for the general parameters of the neoliberal accumulation strategy and popular-capitalist hegemonic project. The creation of a new social base around popular capitalism rather than the welfare state, and a neoliberal state form, were designed to end the electoral decline of the Party. Similarly, Thatcherism's 'politics of power' (the internationalisation of the economy) sought to achieve a significant class-based redistribution of income and wealth towards the 'privileged nation'. This reminds us of the necessity of appreciating the more short-term electoral foundations of support which before all else had to underpin the Thatcherite project.

7 For example (p.144, 1988): "The primacy of the political class struggle in Thatcherite policy is often astonishing. Whereas the Labour government tended to subordinate political strategy to economic crisis management, the Thatcher governments have often treated economic policy as a subfield for the politics of hegemony. The general rationale seems to be that if the government can modify the balance of forces in the short term, it will gain sufficient time to restructure society, and to allow a market-generated recovery."
9.7 Thatcherism's 'Politics of Support'

Thatcherism should still be seen as a domestic political project in need at optimum times of winning traditional bases of support, in particular by marshalling electoral constituencies. Consideration of the practical politics of support should not necessarily be regarded as incompatible with higher level theorisation. Indeed, the strategy for the 'reconstruction of civil society' begun by Thatcherism should be seen as both connected to a theorisation of the broader ideological, political and economic (hegemonic) aims of Thatcherism, and its desire to construct and maintain its electoral constituency. In a dominant political project such as Thatcherism, the two are closely related. Inevitably, Thatcherism pursued some policies which were directed at the middle classes to consolidate support, attract the 'affluent working class', and lock them into reforms. But Thatcherism also seemed to be particularly effective in the demobilisation of its opponents by their political divisions, especially by the construction of policies which would give the other parties, particularly Labour, difficulties.

This is apparent in the case of the Education Reform Act and subsequent reforms. Increased parent-governor participation, 'privileged' grant-maintained status, the supposed 'fiscal autonomy' of local management of schools, were designed to marshal and consolidate a key Thatcherite constituency, and to dissect comprehensivism, other
organised interests, the 'egalitarian threat' and its link to a collectivist education project. The project of expanding 'choice' within the sector allied with the guaranteed enforcement of the national curriculum was formulated consciously, much to the dissatisfaction of some elements of the educational new right, to prove attractive to the same groups captured initially by wider home ownership, individual shareholding, private pensions provision, and other popular capitalism initiatives. Further, radical moves beyond the Conservative education reform agenda of the ERA and related reforms have been continually hedged by consideration of the politics of support.

The Community Charge has been regarded as a case study of political failure, the end-result of a policy-making process ignorant of the practical issues of effective implementation and the politics of support. However, a close consideration of its development reveals it was not blind to these issues at all, but rather was formulated to resolve the problems in implementation and support which previous strategies for local government had grappled with unsuccessfully. The Charge was designed as a mechanism which would dictate efficiency without central government intervention, highlight isolate and disable local socialism, and so reinforce Conservative localised hegemony. It did not fail in aspiration, but in the complexities and contingencies of its tortured implementation. For this reason, rather than in its initial conception, it eroded the Conservatives electoral constituency,
but its failure was far from inevitable. As the analysis brought out, there were key decisions around formulation and implementation which undermined the mechanism's effective operation.

The development of workfare programmes and other social security reforms were legitimated publicly in terms of clamping-down on the 'feckless' and helping the productive. 'Active citizenship' was an important and related concept reinforcing this. This was an electorally valuable discourse in the general context of the economic, social and cultural crisis Thatcherism identified itself as being able to resolve. Resistance to the reforms was as a consequence deflected by linking it to support for the 'workshy'. Hence the purpose of such reforms was never merely (or primarily) to deal with the problem of the 'unproductive', but to lock-in coalitions of support against them in the context of the 'work society'.

9.8 Thatcherism as Discourse

Consideration of the politics of support alone does not capture the theoretical mechanics of the politics of Thatcherism. 'Interests' are not given rational facts, but must be discursively constructed. Any multitheoretic analysis of Thatcherism must then include an important role for discourse analysis. It further allows the appreciation of how a particular discourse - citizenship - was appropriated by Thatcherism.

9.8a Hall - Thatcherism as 'Authoritarian Populism'
One of the most well-known theorisations of Thatcherism drew on discourse theory. Stuart Hall and Martin Jacques (1983, and Hall 1988), popularised the notion of 'Thatcherism', and defined it as a hegemonic project.\(^8\) Thatcherism was seen to appreciate that the disorientation of British politics and the state's crisis of legitimacy in the mid-1970s provided a set of opportunities and spaces for a new politics. As an ideological project Thatcherism operated on several different levels, especially attempting to establish a new 'common sense' which contradicted many long-established assumptions (particularly about the responsibilities of government). Rather than simply being 'reactionary', Thatcherism was characterised as a modernising project, adjusting to new realities and reforming (or removing) 'failed' institutions.

As Hall summarises (p.2, 1988): "..Thatcherism's economic strategy is set against the relative decline and comparative 'backwardness' of the British economy and the state.. Politically, Thatcherism is related to the recomposition and 'fragmentation' of the historic relations of representation between classes and parties; the shifting boundaries between state and civil society, 'public' and 'private'; the emergence of new arenas

\(^8\) By 'hegemony', Hall means (p.7, 1988): "..the struggle to contest and disorganise an existing political formation; the taking of the 'leading position' (on however minority a basis) over a number of different spheres of society at once - economy, civil society, intellectual and moral life, culture; the conduct of a wide and differentiated type of struggle; the winning of a strategic measure of popular consent; and, thus, the securing of a social authority sufficiently deep to conform society into a new historic project."
of contestation, new sites of social antagonism, new social movements, and new social subjects and political identities in contemporary society. Ideologically, Thatcherism is seen as forging new discursive articulations between the liberal discourses of the 'free market'...and organic conservative themes...Its reworking of these different repertoires of 'Englishness' constantly repositions both individual subjects and 'the people' as a whole. Culturally, the project of Thatcherism is defined as a form of 'regressive modernisation' - the attempt to 'educate' and discipline society into a particularly regressive version of modernity..." 

The value of Hall's interpretation has been to suggest, without relying on reductionist class analysis, that the effectiveness of Thatcherism rested on its ability to articulate different social and economic interests within its political project. It examined how economic crises and political processes are constructed discursively and how they are lived out (though there are 'conditions of existence' constraints on discourses).9 Thatcherism constituted a field of deliberately inter-related discourses, in the context of the 'crisis' which was not given but was a field of struggle itself.

In terms of content, Thatcherism represents the articulation of two seemingly contradictory sets of

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9 Hall cites the influence of Laclau's work, for example in recognising that there is no inevitable link between class origin and political ideas (p.6, 1988). This broadly follows Politics and Ideology in Marxist Theory, rather than Hegemony and Socialist Strategy.
"Thatcherite populism is a particularly rich mix. It combines the resonant themes of organic Toryism - nation, family, duty, authority, standards, traditionalism - with the aggressive themes of a revived neoliberalism - self-interest, competitive individualism, anti-statism."

Its populism was key in enabling it to take the offensive in establishing moral and ideological leadership which could create a new historic bloc of finance capital, the skilled working and middle class. But Hall described this populism as authoritarian because it was not designed to increase popular participation and democratic control but reduce it. It paraded as addressing the genuine concerns of the people while restoring strong leadership. Indeed, it founded its rule 'from above' in the popular fears expressed 'from below'.

Its radicalism connected with radical-popular sentiments, but turned them around, absorbing and neutralising them, hence a 'populist unity'. The left was presented as part of the power bloc, enmeshed in the state apparatus and riddled with bureaucracy. As Hall (p. 51, 1988) stated:

"...the actual experience which working people have had of the corporatist state has not been a powerful incentive to further support for increases in its scope. Whether in the growing dole queues or in the waiting-rooms of an over-burdened National Health Service, the corporatist state is increasingly experienced by them not as a benefice but as a powerful bureaucratic imposition on 'the people'. The state has been present to them, less as a
welfare or redistributive agency, and more as the 'state of monopoly capital'. And since Labour has foregrounded the requirements of monopoly capital above all others, what is it that can be said to be 'false' about this consciousness?"

All this does not mean, claims Hall, that Thatcherism achieved hegemony, but was a hegemonic project which tried continuously to secure itself and recognised that political, moral and intellectual leadership must be coupled with economic dominance in order to restructure the social formation.

Hall’s characterisation is attractive because it appreciates how the new right was able gain such a purchase on the problems of the 1960s and 1970s, and advance on the political culture, particularly sections of the working class (it is this of course which disgruntles more orthodox Marxist critics). It captures the hegemonic aspirations of Thatcherism, though the pursuit of hegemony should not be restricted to the ideological sphere, but extended to embrace political calculation aimed at winning and maintaining support and managing the state and economic performance (as in Gamble’s analysis).

9.8b Criticisms of Hall’s Analysis

The question of 'ideologism' became the focus of criticism from many commentators, most prominently Jessop et al. (1984, 1985). They claimed that authoritarian populism was rather marginal compared to the 'dual crisis of the state', of parliamentarism and corporatism, and the continuing
structural crisis of the British economy. Its over-extension mystified the real sources of support for Thatcherism. There was always a considerable working class Conservative vote, which Thatcherism in common with past Conservative regimes failed to organise politically. Hall overstated Thatcherism’s strength and understated its pragmatism.

Hall (1985, p.150-60, 1988) contended that he always perceived of Thatcherism as highly contradictory and sought to show how Thatcherism managed to unify the contradictory strands in its discourse and to condense subject-positions. It was never meant to present Thatcherism exclusively as an ideological phenomenon. Hall’s purpose in focusing on politics and ideology was (p.3, 1988): “..to make a more general point about the need to develop a theoretical and political language on the left which rigorously avoids the temptations to economism, reductionism or teleological forms of argument.” It was a rallying cry against the relatively thin state of political and ideological analysis on the left and the failure of the Labour Party to establish itself as a leading cultural force in civil society.

Hay (1992) extended the critique of Hall by suggesting his direct application of Gramsci’s conception of hegemony led him necessarily to conceive of it only at the level of the bourgeois-proletarian class struggle, the logical conclusion of which is that Thatcherism represents not only a crisis of social democracy but of capitalism itself. Yet at no time did the crisis constitute a
potentially pathological threat to the capitalist mode of production, and the primary challenge to the Keynesian welfare state came from the new right. Rather, hegemony operates at various levels of abstraction from macro (class hegemony), meso (electoral hegemony), to micro (localised hegemony, the active consent of a micro-population to an ideological 'common sense' pertaining to a particular form of social interaction reproduced within a specific locale). The post-war settlement compromised its meso-level principle of equality at the micro-level because of its accommodation to the status quo. Thatcherism was involved in a crisis of electoral hegemony constructed and articulated within the confines imposed by bourgeois hegemony. Any attempt to restructure the state by a democratic political party (inevitably agents within civil society accepting the dominant bourgeois ideology) in order to provide the material basis for a new hegemonic project logically cannot constitute a challenge to the dominant bourgeois ideology.

Second, it was suggested that Hall failed to appreciate the structural determination of hegemony through an overemphasis on the discursive roles played by the media and politics in the ideological struggle for hegemony, the materialisation of ideology. This is the ways in which the institutions of civil society mould peoples’ lives and the way in which the material rewards accruing to sections of civil society structure individuals’ susceptibility and response to political ideologies. Hay’s theoretical perspective is formulated within a
critical realist epistemology in which actuality is constituted through the combination of real processes (such as social and political outcomes) which are indeterminate within any one structural system. Political choice is curtailed by the structural determinants of political society, constituting the constraints imposed by the existing economic relations and the administrative and legal structures of the state. These set the framework in which electoral hegemony is won, defining the limits of the penetration of the state of the institutions of civil society, and thus the capacity of the state to mould individuals' material experience. Material rewards are used to certain micro-populations within civil society to render individuals more susceptible to the moral and ideological justifications offered in the legitimation of such benefits, hence (p.42, ibid): “To become potentially hegemonic, a Thatcherite ideology must articulate and ‘resonate’ with the material experience of civil society.” The state must not only successfully penetrate civil society’s institutions, but also construct the material conditions in which they operate, producing a high degree of fit between the material lived experience of individuals within civil society and the dominant ideology. Hay (1996) has suggested consequently a new periodization of Thatcherism, and, rightly, that it has meant a ‘rolling-rightwards’ of the state rather than a ‘rolling-back’. Thatcherism is seen as a regressive and primarily neoliberal project camouflaged by a rhetoric of moral conservatism.
There is one other criticism of Hall's approach, concerning its implicit conception of 'democracy'. Thatcherism was regarded as authoritarian populist because its mobilisation (a 'popular' movement against the power bloc for national unity around the free-market programme) cannot be 'democratic'. But as with the new right, the stick with which Thatcherism is beaten is the too vague and illusory one of some form of participatory democracy.

9.8c Discourse Analysis Within a Multi-Theoretic Approach

Since Hall's analysis is self-consciously partial, and Hay's additions useful, it seems that the insights offered into Thatcherism by discourse theory are valuable but limited. Most importantly such an approach lacks an explicit political economy of advanced industrial societies, and its role in relation to other approaches must be designated. This has been attempted by Bertramsen, Thomsen and Torfing (1991), who integrate discourse theory, regulation theory, and strategic-relational approaches to state analysis, and so blur the lines of demarcation between state, economy and society. Since discourse analysis operates at a more general and abstract level than the other two approaches, it serves as a central point of reference and emphasises the primacy of the 'political' without being allocated the universal master theory. Each theory represents different vantage points on the same 'whole'.
Following Jessop, state, economy and society should be analysed as institutional orders whose substantive unity is never pre-given, but created by the political struggles which take place within and outside them. Intra-social relations are shaped by a hegemonic project advancing a national-popular programme capable of articulating a specific form of the state with a particular accumulation strategy and a stable social base. But the social formation is 'open-ended' because it is subverted constantly by a constitutive outside which prevents its closure.

Discourse theory has focused mainly on the precariousness and fluidity of ideological formations and social identities within civil society but paid little attention to the enduring fixity of rules, norms and resources sedimented to varying degrees in particular forms of state apparatuses and political economy (nor the discursive construction of 'the economy' and 'the state' themselves). Regulation theory can appreciate the dynamic processes through which the 'determined autonomy' of the state itself becomes an object of regulation and the capitalist economy politically constituted, organised and reproduced in a relatively stable manner. The capitalist system survives because tensions are regulated by specific institutional forms, societal norms and networks of strategic conduct (but which cannot be explained by their functionality for capitalist accumulation). Yet on its own, regulation theory tends to marginalise political agency. Strategic-relational
state analysis can compensate by stressing the importance of political forces as well as the centrality of the state to the dynamic of modern societies (for example, the way in which a particular regulatory ensemble is the outcome of political interventions conducted by political agents). Jessop (1990) has conceived of the state as a non-unified and decentred ensemble, characterised by a particular strategic selectivity which is itself an outcome of the political struggles between various social agents.

The combination of approaches allows an understanding of societal processes of economic regulation as hegemonic practices, but such practices cannot in any simple way be reduced to economic logics or only one logic of capital accumulation. Economic policy becomes a subfield for the politics of societal hegemony. The achievement and sustenance of state power presupposes a broad political strategy which transcends narrow economic-corporate interests, and the purpose of different economic state interventions cannot be taken for granted. When the arena for analysis is defined as a particular historical bloc, the integration of these perspectives becomes necessary to gain a complete picture of advanced industrial societies and their intra-social relations. Hence (Bertramsen et al., p.205, 1991): "The complementary problems of the three perspectives can be compensated for by stressing their complementary advantages. Thus, discourse analysis provides a much needed account of hegemony, strategic-relational state analysis offers
a valuable account of the selectivity inscribed in societal institutions and regulation theory breaks new ground with its account of the political structuration of economic life in particular, and societal reproduction in general."

Discourse theory has facilitated the analysis of new right and Thatcherite discourses on citizenship, and the recognition that the apparently progressive citizenship discourse could be appropriated by the right for regressive ends. The case studies have shown in part how this was achieved. The above type of multitheoretic approach can help analyse why.

9.8d The 'Market Society'

However, it must be emphasised that discourse theory is not overwhelmed by the addition of other supposedly more concrete forms of analysis within a multitheoretic explanation, but retained as central to understanding the Thatcherite project. As has been suggested, the new right can be regarded as a theoretical project for a rigid social order [3.11]. Thatcherism can be seen as the political project seeking to impose such an order and supported by the new right's discursive order, though not characterised simply as the direct translation of new right ideas into policy given the other demands on Thatcherism which have been noted. The end of this project is what is meant here by the term the 'market society'.

This may be fleshed out with reference to Karl Polanyi's The Great Transformation (1944), a somewhat neglected work which is apposite
particularly in the context of the revival of economic liberalism. Polanyi developed a critique of economic liberalism both as a political creed and as an account of the nature of industrial society. He took seriously the role of culture and ethics, given his roots in anthropology, which were neglected in the neoclassical orthodoxy and Marxist counter-arguments. He criticised the disembending under capitalism of economic activity from people's social relations. His dispute with economic liberalism focused on the issue of whether primacy should be accorded to the economic over the social and political. He argued a market economy can only exist in a 'market society'. The 'self-regulating' market system is a myth. He traced the historical development of that society, arguing that the consequences of the market economy for human welfare were so extreme that they generated political movements which demanded change and led eventually to the successful imposition of regulation and control. To Polanyi, modern industrial society, despite the relative newness of the free market, remains in continuity with the great social orders of the past. It continues to protect itself against the forces which undermine its social solidarity and

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10 As Laclau (p.57, 1990) has suggested similarly: "The objective nature of the laws of the market, their operation outside the will and awareness of the producers, constituted an intelligible principle of social functioning..., but one which, like all pre-capitalist mechanisms of social reproduction, escaped the conscious intervention of the agents and did not therefore give space to alternative possibilities. It is with the transition to...organized capitalism' that the element of conscious regulation - and thus an eminently political regulation - begins to take on a new centrality." Also Baum (1996).
threaten to distort its relationship to the natural environment. He suggested that in the long-term the 'self-regulating' market economy and democracy are irreconcilable. Either the market will give way to a more co-operative social economy, or if the market remains in force it will depend increasingly on authoritarian protective rule. Polanyi rejected neither markets nor industrialisation. What he expected was that the emergence of a counter-movement would lead to a retrieval of a sense of social solidarity and create conditions in which markets and industries serve, rather than destroy, human community. This is the need to re-embed the economy - a participatory, decentralised industrial economy.

The value of Polanyi's approach lies in the recognition that market societies are not natural, but are made, and made primarily by states. The 'free market' is an institutional structure which does not emerge spontaneously from an inherent proclivity but is planned and state-sponsored. 'Homo Economicus' is a product of the market society and not the other way around. A market society is not merely one in which resistance to the market principle is disabled through legislation or in which the free market project is politically hegemonic, but one in which most institutions and the everyday orientation of social actors are brought into line with the principles of the market: 'individualism', 'competition', 'self-interest'. These are not givens, but social constructs - hence the conceivable link between Polanyi's thesis and
discourse theory. The market subject not only lends ideological support to these principles, but comes to embody the new order in everyday action. It is possible to embody this ethic without lending it explicit intellectual support. Most importantly, in constructing a political order in which occurs, the autonomy of the supposedly irrevocable 'free market' is protected. In other words, the operations and consequences of the market are accepted in exactly the manner in which the new right, and the neoliberal new right in particular, would wish - uncritically.

This suggests that regulation theory's concentration on the explicit restrictive mechanisms by which the state ensures capitalist reproduction should be joined by discourse theory's awareness of the way in which market subjects are constructed and market principles and understandings conveyed. A multi-theoretic approach then has the potential to identify not just the economic but also the political and social (behavioural) parameters of market activity. Hence the importance of both substantive legislative and institutional reforms made under Thatcherism, and accompanying discursive strategies, both examined in the case studies. Polanyi developed his thesis in the age of the supposedly irreversible advance of collectivism at the expense of economic liberalism, but it appears increasingly pertinent in the counter-age of the resurgence of 'liberal market utopianism'. The counter-movement in the contemporary era has come from the right, not the left.
Thatcherism acted in many dimensions and on many fronts, in terms of discursive strategies. But there were linking themes which were used, across different areas of policy. Two examples are noted here, both of which are relevant to 'citizenship' as constructed under Thatcherism.

9.8e 'Enterprise Culture'

The 'enterprise culture' was a significant collection of discourses deployed by Thatcherism (Keat and Abercrombie 1991). The first main aspect of the 'enterprise culture' is its intervention in terms of values. The acquisition and exercise of 'enterprising' qualities must be encouraged, and by implication, tendencies which are deemed to hinder, let alone challenge, such qualities must be neutralised or reversed. Hence the importance, though ultimately the fallacy, of the new right's (historical) arguments that such 'qualities' are 'natural', even distinctively British or English (Clarke, Macfarland, Letwin). This is the basis on which notions of 'self-reliance' and 'independence' are constructed, as well as supposed opposites contrasted, such as the 'dependency culture'. In particular, 'responsibility' is defined in a specific manner, in this sense in direct fiscal terms (the conservative 'active citizenship' sense of 'responsibility' is seen as complimentary to this). These discourses are not concerned simply with how citizens act, but how they see the behaviour of themselves and other citizens - a form of 'cultural engineering'. This is not especially
innovatory in terms of an analysis, after all, the proponents of the 'enterprise culture' themselves such as David Young spoke frequently of the importance of focusing on the transformation of the culture and psychology of citizens (Morris, 'Freeing the Spirit of Enterprise', chapter one, Selden, 'The Rhetoric of Enterprise', chapter three, ibid). As with many aspects of Thatcherism, this project was most advanced in the third term.

The second main aspect of the 'enterprise culture' was that public institutions must be remodelled along the lines of commercial enterprises, or at least a model presumed to approximate them.

9.8f 'The New Autonomy' of Institutions

An analysis, drawing on Polanyi's insights, into Thatcherite public sector reforms has been made by Scott (1996), who shows how the movement to devolve powers from the centre should not blind analysts to the role such institutions have played in greater social regulation. Especially important to the constitution of the economic subject is the structure of rewards through which the social order seeks to assure its maintenance and reproduction, which guarantees a degree of predictability at the level of social action (this reflects the point made earlier by Hay). Scott sees the devolved budget and cost/service centre reforms (such as those in health and education) as the organisational embodiment of the political beliefs of the Thatcher era. The new worker serves his employer not through loyalty but through initiative motivated by the inducements
Hierarchical control is maintained by changing actors' orientations and ethic through altering the environment through which they act. The 'new autonomy' is real but its beneficiaries find themselves in shifting opportunity structures within which they do not have direct control. Combined with other factors inhibiting collective action, their newly won autonomy is unlikely to translate into effective control. This is the underlying source of stability of both social and hierarchical relations within such internal markets. As in traditional organisations, agents have little influence over strategy, but they nevertheless shoulder a greater direct responsibility for success or failure. Under these conditions agents are no longer servants of but paradoxically entrepreneurs for an institution. Hence while responsibility becomes devolved, power shifts to the centre. Elites are freed from the necessity of continual participation in the flow of commands on a routine daily basis, enabling them to focus on the development of strategies whose implementation they do not have to supervise directly. In this limited sense only, a characterisation of Thatcherism as 'centre autonomy' (Bulpitt) is correct, but it fails to grasp the purpose of the project.

9.8g Case Studies as Projects for the 'Market Society'

The case studies are valuable in illustrating this analysis. The Education Reform Act, and grant-
maintained schools in particular, illustrate the nature of the new autonomy, effectively re-orientating actors by altering the structure of their environment (more generally achieved by local management of schools). The national curriculum is the explicit mechanism for central control, but the developing structure itself is more revealing as to how direct central intervention appears to be restrained while hierarchical control is strengthened significantly. Previously established discursive strategies can be seen as crucial for the legitimation of the reform project - identifying the widespread 'problems' with state education and their sources (in the structure, ideology, and interests of that system), and impressing how an agenda based on (a very restrictively defined conception of) 'choice' and 'standards' would resolve these problems.

The Community Charge was a mechanism designed to end a failed pattern of explicit central government intervention, while achieving simultaneously the centre's strategic aims by establishing a mechanism of rewards shaping the environment of local democracy. But the construction of interests was not inevitable or solely material. Thatcherite discourses were crucial in establishing the 'problem' with local government, and the necessity of the reform programme. They demanded progress towards the 'popular' 'efficient' limited contracting local authority, made 'accountable' by the selective fiscal-oriented participation of local citizens.
The new autonomy witnessed in the education and local government reforms used citizenship as a reforming principle to reinforce the principles of the 'free economy' and the 'strong state'. Workfare and active citizenship used citizenship as a reforming principle for exactly the same ends, defining the nature of the 'productive citizen' and his proper mode of behaviour. Hence all four case studies represent elements of the attempted Thatcherite construction of the economic subject and the reinforcement of the economic, social and political parameters of the market society.

Scott may be too deterministic in that he neglects that the design and reform of such structures is also subject to political struggle and contingency, but the value of such an analysis is that it cuts through the crude dichotomy between market and bureaucracy-state and enables theorisation of how such reforms are about 'control'.11 Here, the Free Economy/Strong State summary of Thatcherism can be extended to analyse policy change, the state is crucial in constructing the parameters for the free economy. This shows how inadequate theorisations of

11 As Scott states (p.104 ibid): "The importation of new management models from the private into the public sector provides one clue to the central paradox of contemporary British life. At a time when the ideological underpinning of the new utopian project appears to be crumbling, its power over our lives grows." Because of the translation of the pattern of belief into habitual behaviour and institutional arrangements, the 'accelerated Thatcherism of the institutions' can continue without Thatcherism as a popular and populist political ideology. The new right's ideology becomes a seemingly neutral organisational technique. This is the reason why such reforms have been so difficult for the opposition to challenge.
Thatcherism as merely a deregulatory capital project are (ironically, they too subscribe to the idea that the ‘free market utopia’ is somewhat autonomous and self-regulating). It reconciles the genuinely emancipatory effects of markets with an analysis of how the market order is constructed by constituting new subjects in positive and routine everyday ways, even amongst those agents who do not lend it support at a political or ideological level. As with Polanyi’s analysis, this represents both a methodological and political advance, since it challenges (neo-) liberalism’s self-image.

The notion of the ‘dominant political culture’ has been outlined previously [3.10]. Thatcherism’s advantage in this culture was significant, but it was given that advantage in part by the inadequacy of the left’s theory. Hence it was allowed to appropriate many discourses for its own strategic ends.

With the methodologies outlined here, this political culture may be theorised more fully. The relative stability of the characterisations of the meanings of ‘freedom’, ‘liberty’ and ‘rights’ in this culture represents their significantly sedimented nature. They are quite fixed discursively, given their relation to structural constraints, and the discursive effort that has been spent on making them so. But the insights from discourse analysis and Polanyi reveal in addition that they are constructs all the same, secured deliberately by states seeking
to bring social action and institutions into line with market principles.

Previous characterisations of Thatcherite discourses have tended to homogenise them, trying to construct one broad discourse which can then be summed up in a single phrase. But a multi-theoretic approach mitigates against this. The use of case studies shows discourses alter between policy areas, though there may be common themes. The politics of support can show why the some targets of discourses were more strategically important than others. The introduction of forms of political economic analysis can show why particular policy areas were thought important for reform, and how such reforms linked to the broader accumulation project, hence how discourses may have been deployed for specific ideological purposes. For example, as the examination of the conservative active citizenship discourse noted, the left's reaction to its apparent hypocrisy neglected its strategic purpose within the Thatcherite project - the hegemonic capture of the themes of civil society. Of course it was in contradiction to other aspects of Thatcherism, both its discourses and reforms. Active citizenship used a different discourse on obligation, for example, than that used in the education reforms, poll tax or workfare, because the target audience of the interpellation was different as was the intended effect. Instead, the key aspect to be caught is the purpose of the project.

9.9 'Two Nations'?
However different discourses were deployed for strategically selective effects, the notion of Thatcherism as a purposeful political project does demand an overall coherence of purpose, which must imply what Thatcherite citizenship was. A popular conception of that purpose has been provided by Jessop et al. (1988), who present Thatcherism as a 'Two Nations' strategy. This aimed to break 'One Nationism' and recompose the Conservative vote. Two Nations attempted the unification of 'good citizens' and 'hardworkers' (productive) against a contained and subordinate nation, and particularly 'parasitic' citizens. The main elements of this strategy were four: an explicit rejection of Keynesian welfare state integration; the presentation of divisions on a single vertical cleavage and in terms of blunt dichotomies; the recomposition of the Conservative working class in a privatised instrumentalist direction via the market; and state intervention to ensure greater production. Its main thrust was to

12 Of course, it should be noted that welfare provided through occupational and fiscal channels and through the subsidising of 'private' markets is often ignored, especially in discussions of citizenship (Harrison 1991).
13 Gamble (1988) also suggests the shift away from One Nation Toryism with its conception of unification of a nation composed of many different interests and classes through a common citizenship and a common loyalty to an ideal of nationhood, as a central thrust of Thatcherism (particularly as an electoral strategy). Krieger (1986) termed Thatcherism a 'de-integrative strategy' which capitalised on a political environment in which a large percentage of voters were liable to reject the premises of social democracy. It could no longer consolidate a political base when an economic downturn exacerbated differences among its own constituency, but Thatcherism could 'resolve' the tensions with strategies for economic growth which exacerbated class, race and gender divisions, which consciously rejected the welfarist
benefit those who belonged to the productive core of the market economy through state benefits and the rewards of the market, in contrast to those seen as marginal to the market economy who would experience deteriorating economic conditions and reduced social welfare. This was supposedly consciously different from a One Nation project which involves an inclusive and expansive conception of the social and political community and in intent tries to transcend differences and to share necessary sacrifices and benefits.

Thatcherism was divisory, in many respects, but not necessarily in such crude terms. Yet the conception of political projects as One/Two Nation is somewhat unsophisticated as the end result of a complex theorisation of Thatcherism, and retains echoes of the deterministic approaches the authors consciously seek to supersede. Just as Jessop et al. have admitted to assuming initially connections between 'flexibility', post-Fordist accumulation strategies and Thatcherism, so the danger with the Two Nations thesis is that it assumes relations between discourses, actual strategies and reforms, and social and economic effects. It suggests a rather crude divide between One Nation Conservatism and Two Nation Thatcherism. The former is accepted uncritically, as a marginally different form of integrative norms of the post-war era. See also Offe's (1987) narrowing of the 'parameters of sameness'.

Smith (1994) with regard to sexuality: Thatcherism tended to avoid simple attacks on a fixed 'enemy', but employed differentiations (for example, between 'good homosexuals' and 'dangerous queerness').
social democratic integrationist politics. Given Jessop et al.'s proclaimed sensitivity to context and changing historical conditions, this is problematic. It does not really examine what has changed and what remains in Conservative discourse and strategy, between regimes which have operated at different times and under different conditions.

Thatcherism did after all have its own One Nation discourse, which may be summarised as 'one nation under property rights and nationalism', just as One Nation Conservatism did. It appeared very much conscious of rhetorical strategies to affirm its one nationism, the 'national interest', threats to the nation, and so on. Of course, this is a naive reading of political rhetoric, but discourses cannot be rejected or accepted at will because of the normative inclination that some are used to mask other strategies, while some refer to the 'truth' of any project. Presumably Two Nations is not meant to suggest that Thatcherism sought to undermine its governing project by creating an unpolicable second nation, and so it must at least imply limits to the deliberate marginalisation of the unprivileged. Yet as the examination of new right conceptions of citizenship shows, other forms of social integration were proposed (through the market, and civil society), and an analysis of Thatcherism such as Hall's shows how it appeared to offer radical forms of inclusiveness as well which exploited the exhaustion of social democracy.
Jessop et al. point to the strategic use of the productive/parasitic discursive dichotomy. But, the characterisation of the dominant political culture suggests that this dichotomy is a highly sedimented discourse. The culture has always been primarily productivist, in terms of the importance of an individual's relation to the market and its benefits. This is why Thatcherism's 'economic realism' was relatively easy to construct and deploy, and difficult to resist and counter.

In this context, the rejection of Keynesian welfare state integration must be examined. Jessop et al. suggest this is a key justification for Thatcherism being characterised as a Two Nations strategy. But the form of integration assumed under post-war regimes is contentious. Inequality persisted, though lessened, and truly effective mechanisms for political participation were not advanced during this era.\(^{15}\)

It also seems to neglect previous Conservative appeals to sectional interests. Jessop et al. suggest that there is a fundamental difference between Thatcherism and preceding conservative regimes as the former 'consciously' uses these appeals as part of its general hegemonic strategy. But given the significant change of economic, political and social contexts, particularly the

\(^{15}\) Jessop et al. (p.177, 1988) suggest that Thatcherism's vision of individual participation in the market under popular capitalism via atomised consumption allowed it to claim to speak for 'the people' while eroding simultaneously those 'remaining representative structures with any real power', but it is never clear which structures they are referring to.
conditions of the 1970s, the unchanging 'consciousness' qualification to the One/Two Nations dimension is inadequate. Jessop et al. do not indicate what must be taken as evidence of a conscious Two Nations strategy, which implies this is really an interpretation of the social effects of Thatcherism, rather than having been theorised properly into their account of Thatcherite strategy.

The lack of recognition here of established Conservative governing techniques is crucial. Conservative regimes, in the context of mass democracy, have always been conscious of the need to recompose the 'conservative working class' in a privatised instrumentalist direction via the market. Conservative regimes which have 'failed' have done so in this regard. Thatcherism's 'popular capitalism' and the policies associated with it (individual shareholding, council house sales, property-owning, private welfare and pension provision) were astute examples, but the concept can also be seen as a recurring element in Conservative statecraft.

Further, the actual extent to which Thatcherism destroyed Keynesian welfare state integration is a compound of assumptions. For example, it is important to examine to what extent Thatcherite reforms have eroded citizenship rights both formally and effectively, especially rights to welfare services, benefits and so on, and to what extent these served practically as forms of integration, or, in the context of the dominant political
culture, actually dis-integration. The social experience of welfare recipients may be regarded as the prime example of the latter.

Thatcherite citizenship should not be reduced to the Two Nations thesis. It seems like an attempt to claim Thatcherism could not appropriate citizenship given the supposed direct contradiction between a divisory two nations and the 'universality' of citizenship. The absence of a critical theorisation of citizenship is the inadequate basis upon which the implication of the Two Nations thesis is made - that Thatcherism's discourses on 'freedom' and 'opportunity' were only the illusory overlay for the real class project - seems a return to the inflexibility of orthodox Marxist accounts. To suggest this is not to deny the regressive effects of Thatcherism. There have been widening divisions in wealth and increases in absolute poverty, erosions of liberties under law, and of sexual, political, and moral freedoms, and a lack of progress (even regression) on political rights, accountability and open government. These are all aspects of the expansion of The Coercive State (Hillyard and Percy-Smith 1988, Index on Censorship 1995). Decision-making has become even more exclusive, participation further marginalised, rights eroded, information restricted, and the state's role expanded to intervene in more areas of people's lives.

The case studies illustrate this. The structure the Education Reform Act has initiated is divisory, and
its narrow selectionism will effect adversely those already disadvantaged within the system. As the scope of the meaning of 'education' is restricted, within the structural constraints of the system and the confines of the national curriculum and testing, social, economic and cultural biases may effect the progress of oft-neglected groups. The Community Charge impoverished the already disadvantaged, both directly and by forcing reductions in local services, and would have done so increasingly if it had survived. It seriously limited the scope of purpose of local democracy. As present schemes are organised, workfare will not lead to the reintegration of benefit recipients into mainstream work society on a non-stigmatised and properly-resourced basis, especially not in the context of increased poverty, insecurity, and absence of adequately paid full-time employment.

Yet, these developments make it more important to understand how and why a supposedly progressive notion such as citizenship can be appropriated by the right for a regime which has, in sum, eroded citizenship for many. If it is to be taken seriously, and if progress towards universal citizenship is to be achieved, then this is crucial. It is hardly marginal to the question of Thatcherism. Again, the Free Economy/Strong State characterisation of Thatcherism is fundamental in understanding how important it was to the political project to control the social effects of the neoliberal political-economic programme.
9.10 Thatcherism as a Project in Citizenship

"What I am desperately trying to do is to create one nation, with everyone being a man of property, or having the opportunity to be a man of property."\(^{16}\)

Thatcherism was a purposeful (though not wholly coherent or homogenous) political project to restore Conservative Party hegemony born of the 'crisis' of the 1970s. As Gamble has suggested, this crisis concerned the decline of the Party, the exhaustion of the previous regime of accumulation and British economic decline, and the decline in the authority of the British state. However internationalist Thatcherism appeared oriented (in terms of capital), its focus was specifically on the British state, economy and society, and was often itself prey to transnational forces and developments.

It was of course a capitalist-oriented regime, but cannot merely be reduced to a single economic logic - a multi-theoretic approach resists this. It certainly was a productivist phenomenon, but in a broader and more significant sense than that suggested by Jessop et al. A multi-theoretic approach allows investigation from many angles of Thatcherism's attempt to construct a market society and the reconstitution of social action within it, rather than merely to deregulate a market economy. Economic policy becomes a subfield for the politics of societal hegemony, and the project Thatcherism set out on was broader than the political response

\(^{16}\) Margaret Thatcher, interview with Hugo Young, February 1983 (Holmes, p.210, 1985).
to narrow economic-corporate interests alone. Once this fundamental insight is recognised, the value of a plurality of approaches is appreciated. They are necessary to capture all the different aspects of such a significant project.

Thatcherism helped construct a significant change in the climate of opinion, often from micro-level foundations, effectively seizing on discontents, and there was some real basis to these discontents. It consequently both helped construct, and exploited to optimum effect, the sense that collectivism was exhausted. Though periods of pragmatism and confusion can be identified, this should not detract from the theorisation of its project but reinforce the primacy of political constraints and contingencies which occurred while it attempted to achieve its aims. Some of the apparently contradictory policy developments under Thatcherism had their source in changing strategies to achieve relatively stable ends.

In short, Thatcherism was a highly ideological project, both in terms of influences upon it and its role in constructing discourses to legitimate its actions and disarm its opponents. This was apparent in its general strategies, and specific reform programmes, however incoherent they may have appeared at certain stages. The focus here has been on the most developed phase of Thatcherism, though it has still been important to recognise the limits of its reforms in many areas.
Thatcherite discourses concerned neoliberal and neoconservative themes, but it was keen to appropriate useful discourses from other strands of thought. The discursive analysis of Thatcherism shows why some earlier but limited characterisations (for example, Letwin’s ‘vigorous virtues’), can still have a role, since they describe elements of Thatcherite discourses. It deployed selectively discourses for particular effects (though of course not always successfully), and was highly conscious of the politics of support, the construction and consolidation of alliances of interest thought necessary to its own electoral-winning constituency, which it tried to incorporate into its reforms.

Within this project, citizenship was appropriated. The reformulated conceptualisation of citizenship reveals its complex and contradictory role in social inclusion and exclusion. It has shown citizenship as a concept (or rather bundle of concepts with an ethical core) rather than as a theory, and its potential for use in political strategies. Thatcherism developed a varied, contingent, but powerful notion of citizenship and its usage, at many times outflanking the left’s supposed ‘monopoly’.

Drawing on Hay’s disaggregation of levels of hegemonic struggle, the case studies have illustrated Thatcherite operations at the micro-level - localised hegemony, the search for the active consent of a micro-population to an ideological ‘common sense’ pertaining to a
particular form of social interaction reproduced within a specific locale. One of the reasons why these reforms have been so problematic for the opposition has been their strategic use of citizenship (participation, duties, obligation, rights) in order to achieve Thatcherite ideological goals. The difference between citizenship discourse and Thatcherite ideology has been maintained through the recognition that discourses can be used ideologically and directionally [3.8e].

In addition Thatcherism appeared particularly astute with regard to the varying degrees of sedimentation of discourses, that is, politically aware as to what social understandings and perceptions could be changed with effort, and which probably could not. This seems especially true in relation to the dominant political culture described, which Thatcherism, aided by the absence of the left, capitalised on.

Thatcherism exploited the non-progressive aspects of citizenship (its exclusiveness, localism, and individualism),downgraded political participation where it threatened the project, used it selectively where it assisted it. As with the new right, Thatcherism used the faulty discursive construction of citizenship, most prominently the divide (tension) between civil, political and social rights, and its weak relationship in legitimating social democratic institutions (such as comprehensive schools, local 'democratic' participation, unemployment benefit and the welfare
state). So the notion that Thatcherism's only dynamic in relation to citizenship was a retreat from social rights to civil rights is misleading. Indeed, the case studies reveal that in many respects the explicit abolition of social rights under Thatcherism was limited, though the project's ends were largely achieved.

Of course, the aims of Thatcherism were very different from the ethical ideal at the heart of citizenship, 'universal membership'. The coercive and authoritarian dimension (the underlying dynamic) of Thatcherism can be captured in two ways - the regulatory mechanisms including legislation which actually secured explicit authoritarian rules, and the broader project of seeking to establish the market society by bringing into line institutions and the everyday orientation of social actors with the principles of the market.

Only this strand of the multi-theoretic approach can grasp a crucial part of Thatcherism's politics of support without the danger of universalising its appeal (the criticism made of Hall's conception). This is because it both appreciates the potential meso (electoral) level appeal of Thatcherism, and the more particular efforts to construct micro (localised) appeal. Both of course are not limited to discursive strategies, but incorporate also the deliberate construction of material rewards. It forces an understanding of how Thatcherism's project was designed to go well beyond its explicit supporters, to secure the new order in everyday
The relative success of Thatcherism is shown in the conversion of its political opponents to parts of its agenda, particularly the dominance of market principles.

In terms of the political, social, cultural and economic effects of Thatcherism, 'Two Nations' is correct in broad terms, but this cannot serve as a general summation of the purpose of Thatcherism as a political project. As with 'Free Economy/Strong State', or 'Conservative Capitalism' (Hoover and Plant 1989), it is descriptive of important elements of Thatcherism's agenda. But its purpose was the reconstruction of the market society, kind of 'great market retransformation'. Only this captures its hegemonic aspirations, and hence its significance.

This is not a full analysis of Thatcherism based on a multi-theoretic approach, particularly its forms of regulation and state strategy, but a broad outline. It suggests that the research agenda on Thatcherism is far from exhausted.

9.11 Thatcherism and Conservatism

This argument may be extended to suggest how Thatcherism may relate to contemporary British conservative politics. It was a recurring subtext to

17 This kind of analysis undermines the critique that Thatcherism was a 'crusade that failed' (Crewe 1989) in the contest over values. Reliance on orthodox polling data alone does not reveal the significant sedimentation of market principles particularly amongst those who do not identify specifically with Thatcherism as a party political agenda, or acknowledge that hegemony does not depend on the explicit and unequivocal expression of support for specific initiatives. The key is the apparent absence or exhaustion of alternatives, hence 'agreement' with Thatcherism.
Thatcherism as to whether it represented 'authentic' conservative traditions or a largely 'foreign' (and therefore supposedly destructive) political project. Defences of Thatcherism as a return to the 'true' Conservative tradition were mounted from the late-1970s onwards.18 But of course these had a specific political purpose: to reassure the Party that a project regarded as alien to its traditions was not being foisted upon it, and often to point implicitly or otherwise to the inadequacy of post-war conservatism. Such arguments tended consequently towards simplicity, and an over-reliance on Thatcherism's conservative rhetoric. But the alternative - under-theorised Thatcherite exceptionalism - has been unhelpful by neglecting the continuities between the Thatcher Governments and previous Conservative regimes. Hopefully a multi-theoretic approach of the type outlined here can avoid both dangers, retaining a conception of the significance of Thatcherism while linking it to some strands of conservative thought and discourse, and some established governing principles.

As suggested, the characterisation of Thatcherism as a Two Nations strategy, and hence a distinct break from previous One Nation Conservative regimes, is unhelpful. Part of the reason for the electoral success of the Conservative Party has been its discourses of citizenship - the importance of the nation, family, duty, patriotism, unity, and the

naturalness of hierarchy - while in the post-war 'settlement' appearing to link this with support for the institutions and policies associated with social democratic citizenship (particularly the social rights to welfare). This has encouraged the notion that such regimes could be associated with one nationism because they appeared conscious of the importance of social integration, and how it was a supporting foundation for their governing project. Yet therein lies the danger of a too benign characterisation of pre-Thatcherite Conservative one nationism. Such strategies were part of an overall governing project, rather than governing projects being subsumed into one nationism ideology, which seems to equate to some level of social cohesion. 'One Nation' was of course also a useful strategy in highlighting the supposedly (class) 'divisive' nature of the Labour Party.

Some aspects of conservative thought and discourse remained in Thatcherism. In particular, Thatcherism retained traditional conservative discourses on the nation, family and duty. Thatcherism, as with previous Conservative regimes, was in some sense of protean ideology, taking opponents ideas and adapting them (Evans and Taylor 1996). This has been conservatism's traditional response to the dilemma of introducing a popular element in order to legitimise social, political and economic inequality without challenging the status quo or admitting citizens directly into the governing process. Thatcherite discourse appeared as much concerned with maintaining one nation as previous conservative
regimes had, if not more so, yet in a more fundamental manner. It integrated one nationalism into a nationalistic and liberal economic discourse. This can only be contextualised when Thatcherism is seen as a political project to reinforce the market society. In this sense, the One Nation/Two Nations dichotomy obscures the purpose of Thatcherism. It was more seriously engaged in a one nation project than other post-war Conservative regimes ever had been - all citizens integrated into or rather observing the behavioural modes of the market society, and conscious of its rules, norms, limits and procedures. No previous Conservative regime had the ambition, chance or need to follow such a project, and so genuine comparisons between Thatcherism and previous Conservative regimes are difficult. As Gamble (p.237, 1988) suggested: "The kind of task which Thatcherism has been called on to perform is an unusual one in the history of Conservatism. British Conservatives have generally been used to operating within an established hegemony. Attempting to dismantle and discredit institutions, structures and policies which once carried the full authority of the state is not normally characteristic of Conservatives...But understood as statecraft, aimed at determining the Conservative party interest and restoring the freedom of action and the authority of the party in government, Thatcherism is placed firmly in the most central Conservative tradition of all."

A general common strategic thread runs through all post-war (and previous) Conservative regimes - forms
of material and discursive social integration for
the sake of the Conservative governing project. So
while Thatcherism was an important rupture, it was
primarily one which may be defined with reference to
its ambitions for the market society, rather than
with traditional Conservative governing codes. This
is why suggesting all Conservative regimes are only
after 'power' neglects important qualifications
(Davies 1995). As has been suggested, the key
Conservative ideas of the twentieth century have
been the protection of property and the extension of
property ownership, the first more than the second
(Ramsden 1996).

This was why Thatcherism's interventions were in
many ways deeper and more profound than One Nation
conservatism's ever were.

Following insights from discourse analysis, they had
to be. As suggested [3.8], the political
rearticulation of 'the social' (or at least the
established social) has become more necessary in the
context of the increasing dislocation of structure
under contemporary capitalism. More and more areas
of social must become the product of political forms
of reconstruction and regulation. This needs to be
multi-faceted, and both explains why Thatcherism
sought hegemony in many different spheres and why
orthodox Marxist explanations depending on a
simplistic one-dimensional notion of 'crisis' are
inadequate. The latter often neglect the political
construction of power, whereas Thatcherism could not
afford to. The constant production of 'social myths'
is more crucial in an era under the combined effects of commodification, bureaucratic rationalisation and the increasingly complex forms of the division of labour, given the inability to rest on inherited 'objective' institutional forms, according to Laclau and Mouffe. This explains finally why Thatcherism was 'ideological' as well, since as Laclau stated, the ideological would consist of those discursive forms through which a society tries to institute itself as such on the basis of closure - the fixation of meaning, and the attempt to institute 'society' (or a particular discursive construction of it, anyway).

Further, the integration of a case study approach into the multi-theoretic analysis shows some similar lines of policy development between Thatcherism and previous Conservative (and non-Conservative) regimes. These were noted in the case studies. For example, new right educationalists had to seek to influence policy-making largely within established Conservative education circles, and those who did so most successfully were more attuned to the preoccupations and consistent themes of those circles than others. Witness the success of the neoconservative-led pressure for more rigorous definition of the curriculum particularly in areas such as History and English, and the neoliberal-led failure of the campaigns for the introduction of a voucher system.

If one claims that Thatcherism lies within the 'traditional' conservative principles and concerns,
then obviously any explanation as to why conservatism and the Party seem to be in crisis cannot be based on Thatcherite exceptionalism. Rather, the likelihood is that any defence of Thatcherism as authentic conservatism will also point to any deviations away from Thatcherism since 1990 as root cause of those difficulties, as indeed the pro-Thatcherite right has. But there appears to be a growing sense in which despite the apparent dominance of Thatcherism over British politics and the electoral resurgence of the Party from the end of the 1970s, the present Conservative difficulties are in part a result of its legacy.

The obvious paradox of this is that conservative discourses on citizenship retain, despite the contemporary problems of Conservative strategy, powerful and influential - witness their accommodation by the 'New' Labour Party, and the debilitating impact of Thatcherism on 'progressive' conservatism. The market society has been reinforced, but Conservative Party hegemony appears to be in doubt. There are a number of current notions as to why this might be. To take one, John Gray (chapter nineteen, 'Conservatism, individualism and the political thought of the New Right', 1993a) has with increasingly greater urgency argued that the new right has neglected the 'cultural inheritance' needed as the foundation of the capitalist order, in part because of their debts to the rationalist tradition of classical liberalism. The dangerous and unrealisable utopian project of the minimal or neutral state has ignored the
necessity of a common culture. The new right transmitted to conservatism an abstract rationalism and legalism that occludes serious theorising of the conditions under which market capitalist institutions have for centuries enjoyed an almost unchallenged hegemony in Britain and the United States, particularly its cultural foundations. For Gray this has trapped the Conservative Party in an ideological 'end-game'.

This type of argument, while pointing to contributing factors in the Party's current problems, must in addition appreciate the role of the new right in saving the Party's electoral fortunes and enabling it to establish a dominance in the 1980s. The question of the 1990s has yet to be answered fully. But if it is the case that the current fissures within the Party relate ultimately to differences over how to deal with the Thatcherism's legacy, then there can in a sense be only one logical future direction for the Party based on the characterisation of Thatcherism presented here: to continue with the 'Thatcherisation' of the state, civil society and public life.

The notion that because Thatcherism promoted 'individualism' it has undermined the Conservative's governing project is too simple. The electorate's rejection of the Party, did not occur because the market society is in any way in doubt, or the project of Thatcherism in this regard has failed. The market principles have been re-established, and
any other social values are marginal. 'Market individualism', 'competition' and 'self-interest', along with Thatcherite 'economic realism', are virtually hegemonic. The irony is that at the time that the Conservative Party should be establishing comfortably its governing hegemony on such firm foundations, it is undergoing a serious crisis of confidence.

9.12 Summary

A multi-theoretic approach to Thatcherism reveals an unfinished and important agenda for research, and may help construct a characterisation of it as a political project centring on the construction of the social, economic and political parameters of the market society. Further, developing this analysis, Thatcherism may be regarded as a serious project in One Nation Conservatism in the sense that it drew on discourses of citizenship which appeared to offer forms of 'universal membership'. Its underlying emphasis was one of control and regulation, in order both to re-establish the dominance of the Conservative Party and the market order. The case studies illustrate this project, revealing the influence of new right discourses and how they were translated into policies which were to entrench further the values and forms of behaviour associated with the market.
Chapter Ten

Reversing the Subversion of Citizenship -
Citizenship in the 'New Politics' of the Left

"We may become the makers of our fate when we have ceased to pose as its prophets."


10.0 Introduction

This chapter draws out the implications of the previous arguments, about the nature of citizenship, the new right and Thatcherism, and the case study reforms, for left politics.

From what has been suggested so far, there would seem to be a tension in prescribing any reformulated model of citizenship for the left. First, from the recognition of the new right's powerful discourses, and their important appropriation of the interests of the 'private' spheres of the market as well as civil society, any new left politics of citizenship would seem to demand simple clear discourses, which might be used to legitimate certain progressive policy change. Yet, from the methodological approaches used, particularly those of discursive analysis and post-essentialism, the emphasis would seem to be on the recognition of complexity in all its forms, indeed perhaps the impossibility of making any firm defensible statements about society.

However, far from being irreconcilable, it will be suggested that these two needs are inter-dependent,
and that with regards to post-essentialist approaches, the suggestion is not that it is possible to ever formulate a post-essentialist model of citizenship, but that the key is rather a continual awareness of what happens and what is lost when we essentialize.

First, it is suggested that given the arguments already presented, the contemporary era may be regarded as one marked by the 'crisis of politics', in the sense of genuine macro-social choice of what type of society citizens might want to live in [10.1]. As often remarked, this does not seem to be a particular era of 'big ideas', but rather the dominance of one - the (supposedly) 'free market'. This represents some kind of victory for the ideas associated with the new right.

However, some ideas outlining the potential shape of a re-energised progressive politics are noted, which will ask important questions of long-assumed concepts such as citizenship [10.2]. In particular, though drawing on radical theoretical developments, it is suggested that such a politics will be practical, incremental and pragmatic rather than ideological in the more established sense, especially in seeking to recognise the reality of 'lived experience'. It will also attempt to appropriate concepts from the right, just as the new right sought to do from progressive politics, for the purpose of practical measures to improve ordinary living and working conditions, and to protect the integrity of the individual [10.3].
recognition of social complexity can support a form of politics which concentrates on simple public discourses, because it appreciates that the dominant public discourses may be too strong to be challenged head-on. Instead they may need to be accepted insofar as political struggle will be waged within their parameters. This is particularly the case regards liberal discourses, and even those associated with the market.

This will make demands on citizenship theory, particularly in emphasising a more critical, material and contextual approach [10.5]. The emerging model which best satisfies these demands is citizenship focused around individual autonomy, rather than political participation [10.6]. This might be regarded as a 'second-wave' of progressive thinking around citizenship since its re-emergence as a theme of some public and academic interest since the late 1980s, the 'first wave' represented by the kinds of approaches which did not quite break from many of the problems of the orthodox social democratic conceptions of citizenship [1.9a] despite appearing more 'individualistic'. Whether this model will recognise adequately the ethical ideal of 'universal membership' [10.7], the recurring problem of universality [10.8], the importance of economic citizenship [10.9], the need to reconcile such a project with the market [10.10], and the value of 'social capital' [10.12], is examined. In this sense, the underlying question is whether this model represents too sharp a break from previous progressive thinking, or from a genuinely
progressive politics altogether. Last, in keeping with the emphasis on practicality, this semi-formed model is applied to the areas of welfare and education, to speculate on what kinds of policies it might imply [10.13].

10.1 The Left's 'Crisis of Politics'

The case has been made for the influence and importance of new right and Thatcherite projects in citizenship. New right conceptions of citizenship hit the left in areas where it was weakest - its conception of socialist 'freedom', and poor relationship with the dominant political culture. The new right sought to claim civil society and the private sphere for themselves. Neoconservatives were allowed to appropriate 'concern' with changes effecting the family, education and the discipline of children, the primacy of work, threats to public order, personal and private morality, the dysfunctional effects of the welfare state. Neoliberals were allowed to appropriate discourses on unleashing individual diversity and entrepreneurial opportunity. Hence the new right was able to combine 'social morality' with individual (market) gain and self-interest. This circumvented the commonly-assumed divide between 'citizens' and 'consumers'. On the whole people do not want to choose between being 'good parents' by sending their children to good schools, for example, and 'good citizens' by sending them to the nearest, but deficient, state school. The new right told them that being a good citizen was being a good consumer.
This has exacerbated difficulties for the left in constructing a coherent, modern and effective political project of its own. John Dunn (p.122, 1993) has suggested, not a little pessimistically, that the contemporary political environment is characterised by: "..the effective disappearance of any systematic, or even widely credited, conception of how, for many generations to come (or even for ever) it [capitalism] could stand in any danger of being replaced by anything more edifying or less dismaying. What has been deleted from the human future, almost inadvertently but still with remarkable decisiveness, is any form of reasonable and relatively concrete social and political hope."

This is true in part. For many on the left, it does seem that there is a contemporary 'crisis of politics', of genuine human choice, autonomy and freedom. It would appear that (Miliband, R., p.188, 1994): "The liberation from capital is nowhere on the agenda of politics."

In the terminology of the present argument, it is the idea of the 'market society' which has achieved an overwhelming dominance, and with it what has been termed by another theorist 'Anglo-American citizenship theory' (Somers 1995a, 1995b), basically the paradigm of Western liberalism and especially the way in which 'freedom' is defined as autonomy from the state. This is quite different to the idea of the overwhelming dominance of 'the market', and does not suggest the non-existence of many forms of dissent, or the huge social and economic problems which afflict Western liberal-democratic capitalist
societies. Rather, it represents the effective hegemony of a particular vision of how people should behave, and the environment (‘order’) in which they do so. Of course, there are people who disagree profoundly with it, but they are marginal and made marginal. Some would suggest dispiritingly that because of the nature of modern societies (particularly the nature of the state, large corporations and the media), the possibility of meaningful citizenship has been lost. ¹

These arguments raise profound questions of left politics, in particular its conception of citizenship, the ‘dominant political culture’ and the market society, and how the left should accommodate itself to them. Should citizenship be public and political, or private and non-political? Can it deal with ‘privatism’? What should be its guiding ideas - ‘freedom’ and ‘liberty’, or ‘social justice’? These areas of fundamental rethinking depend also on the critical evaluation of the limits of traditional democratic socialism, indeed, the problematic relationship between socialism and democracy itself (Mclellan and Sayers 1991).

This chapter explores some respects, both theoretical and practical, in which the left may be attempting to resist and even reverse the atrophy of politics. The first point of optimism for the left

¹ Laski (1928). Habermas (p.11, 1992): “Only if such an interplay between institutionalised processes of opinion and will formation and those informal networks of public communication occurs can citizenship today mean more than the aggregation of prepolitical individual interests and the passive enjoyment of rights bestowed upon the individual by the paternalistic authority of the state.”
emerges, somewhat ironically, from the new right. The new right demonstrated that radical initiatives can achieve degrees of ‘success’ (on their own terms). Of course, it had many (structural) factors in its favour which the left does not have. Yet initially, the new right thought the ‘consensus’ too strong to be challenged at its fundamentals, and was cautious in many areas, before it made significant ground (often from the micro-level). A key factor in its success was its discursive programme - its construction of the ‘crisis’ of contemporary politics, and its constant and broad public process of discursive appeal (Hall, p.188, 1988): “[The new right]...actually do believe that you have to struggle to implant the notion of the market; and that, if you talk about it well enough, effectively and persuasively enough, you can touch people’s understanding of how they live and work, and make a new kind of sense about what’s wrong with society and what to do about it.” Further, the new right has forced the left to think again about what it is to be ‘radical’, how political power may be used effectively, how the state may act as a barrier to freedom, and the importance of capturing the discourses of liberalism. It is in this context of the ‘crisis of politics’ that parts of the left have begun to think anew about citizenship.

10.2 The ‘New Politics’

“The politics of citizenship, in sum, throws us into the deep end of some very profound, general, theoretical concerns about politics as well as
posing a set of complex organisational issues. To think it through - a project only just beginning - we need to attend to both dimensions. The elements of equality and universality associated with the idea of 'the citizen', and the diverse and particular requirements of different groups which have to be met if they are to enjoy 'free and equal' status, demand that the Left clarify, more profoundly than it has so far, both the principles of the politics of citizenship and their institutional requirements. What is at stake is nothing less than reformulating socialism to take better account of 'citizenship' and the conditions and limits this imposes on state action and political strategy.\(^2\)

It is not an original suggestion that in the face of the new right's project over the last twenty years, the left in many respects has frozen, and retreated into the conservative comforts of its established ways of thinking. As Panitch (p.41-2, 1986) suggested, the new right attack:

"...should not have become the occasion for a knee-jerk defence of the Keynesian welfare state with all its ambiguities and constricted reforms, but rather treated as the occasion for proposing - for insisting on - the fundamental restructuring of the state and its relationship to society so that the communities it is supposed to serve and the people who labour for it together have great involvement in the public domain. rather than leave the issue at

\(^2\) Hall and Held (p.188, 1989a).
'less state' versus 'more state', socialists must recognize that popular antipathy to the state can also be addressed in terms of speaking of a different kind of state."

This kind of critical approach to previously assumed and accepted ideas is the crucial starting-point of the 'new politics'. According to Laclau (1990, also Laclau and Mouffe 1985), despite this 'crisis of politics', the contemporary era represents an opportunity for the left because of the structural dislocations caused by developments in capitalism, revealing increasingly the historicity of being, and hence the purely human and discursive nature of truth. This was in part the context which led to the purpose of Thatcherism and the new right - the necessarily political discursive re-imposition of the 'market society'. But it also opens up new opportunities for a radical politics, because of the new liberty gained in relation to the object and from an understanding of the socially constructed nature of any objectivity. Hence (p.56, 1990): "The more dislocated is the ground on which capitalism operates, the less it can rely on a framework of stable social and political relations and the more central this political moment of hegemonic construction will be; but for that very reason, the more extensive the range of alternative political possibilities opposed to capitalist hegemonization will also be."

They define the project for the left as the construction of radical and plural democracy (p.xiv,
1990): "..the radicality of a politics will not result from the emergence of a subject that can embody the universal, but from the expansion and multiplication of fragmentary, partial and limited subjects who enter the collective decision-making process." Hence (Laclau, p.16, 1996): "Incompletion and provisionality belong to the essence of democracy." The unbridgeable gulf between the universal and the particular, and the impossibility of finding a location for the universal, makes democratic interaction achievable. In other words, a new type of thinking for the left, based not on homogenised and universal thought and conceptions of social systems (Lent, 'For a Radical Democracy', chapter four, Wilks 1993). Radical democracy is conceived as a general principle, rather than as an ideology.

Of course, this so-called 'new politics', or process of left transformation, began with the rise of the new left in the 1960s, but might be seen to have been left uncompleted. It was in part, with the challenge from radical feminist and environmental agendas, a recognition that left politics had become statist, anti-individualist and monolithic, and included a desire to reassert humanist traditions including liberation and agency (OUSDG 1989). The rise of the new right, in its radicalism and discourses on anti-statism and individualism, came to force the left into a primarily defensive position.
But as has been suggested, the left is not free to embark on this re-thinking as it wishes, just as the new right could not merely proclaim the new order it envisioned. If it is to move forward, it will develop an awareness of the limits of the initially achievable, including the 'sedimented' nature of much social discourse. This may include understanding how the market and institutions of civil society mould people's lives and the ways in which the material rewards accruing to sections of civil society structure individuals' susceptibility and responses to political ideologies. The new left may be more concerned to resonate with 'lived experience', while seeking also to construct the material conditions of lived experience. After all, people will not accept the left's discursive definitions if some form of 'reality' does not accord with them. For example, they will not consider political participation and state-provided 'social rights' enhance their citizenship if they find them exclusionary, unreactive and disabling when dealing with them. As Hindess (p.48, 1987) has stated: "The claim that British social policy underlies a broad equality of status could be advanced only at the cost of ignoring the organisational forms in which its goods and services are provided." An awareness of the economic as well as the political and social parameters of the market society, within which the left must operate, may lead to some forms of profitable appropriation of seemingly 'unfriendly' discourses.
An example might be the notion of the 'underclass'. The left has tended to reject the term as an inherently regressive construction, because it identifies a particular group and suggests their behavioural and psychological attributes are part-cause of their poverty. It neglects, deliberately, social and structural conditions, thus undercutting assistance for them and justifying more authoritarian methods to 'police' them. Yet to attempt to ignore the notion of the 'underclass' might be a great mistake, since the idea of a dependency-prone, often criminal and problematic underclass has been used to drive the debate over welfare, and construct its parameters. It would be another case of ceding a concept with some 'reality' over to the right, and vacating the battleground.

Rather, the left might seek to use the concept. First, it represents the failure of 'one nationism' and social cohesion, and thus represents an opportunity. It refers to a group cut-off from the 'mainstream' values, attitudes, motivations and actions of the rest of society. Hence it could form the basis of a project to highlight the ways in which such people are marginalised, and legitimate the design of welfare programmes to avoid this. It would emphasise social re-integration, and the benefits of this in terms of a safer, freer, more efficient society. It might then be linked to other strategies for greater social integration and cohesion.
Second, individual behaviour and 'life values' may be regarded as of wider political importance. The left might find it useful to develop a 'politics of conduct' to counter the right, because the better society must be based in part on the 'responsible' individual behaviour of citizens. This would be part of its positive accommodation with the private sphere, regarding private relations as legitimate demonstrations of identities, values and concerns, even though they may not be recognisably 'socialist'.

The left's evacuation of the 'politics of identity', a key element in citizenship, was helpful to the new right's project. As Hall (p.192, 1988) suggested: "Now the astonishing political fact that people can be colonised by the right has in part to do with the fact that there is no alternative vision of what or who people are. On the left and in the labour movement, we have lost our sense of history..Freedom of speech, assembly and the franchise, the things amongst others that we took to the high seas to defend, have only been won in our society as a result of the prolonged struggle of working people. That is what democracy actually is. But how is it represented in popular history? As the gift of the rulers. Somehow, democracy 'came'." The left has tended to rely on a rather conservative version of social development, to its own detriment (Elliott 1993). This might even be reflected in Marshall's thesis. Hence according to Hall, the key practical, theoretical and moral issue for the left is the 'struggle for popular identities'. The contemporary
political battleground might be regarded as being one of citizenship.

A key aspect of such a simple, clear and effective left 'common sense' might be, rather than the utopian aspiration for complex intellectual public discourse of the type idealised in communitarianism, instead an appropriation of 'private' liberal-individualism, the dominant but broad social ethic.

10.3 The Purpose of the Left

"Economic liberty implies, not that all men shall initiate, plan, direct, manage or administer but the absence of such economic inequalities as can be used as a means of economic constraint." ולא

In general terms, it has been suggested that the left concentrate on (Selbourne, p.233, 1985): "..the principal political battle of our age: that for the rearguard protection of the physical and mental integrity of the individual person, and of his or her fundamental rights as a human being. Indeed, the paradox of all left paradoxes is that such concerns could ever have come to be regarded as peripheral or merely 'liberal' matters." These urgently-needed rights against oppression go beyond mere rights of possession. Western societies have reached a point where they depend for their continued existence on systems of production fundamentally at odds with their deepest moral precepts. As Gamble (p.185, 1996) has suggested: "Prominent among these moral precepts are notions of the sanctity and moral equality of each individual. The first is associated

3 Tawney (p.186, 1952).
with the ideas of individual conscience and individual autonomy, the second with the idea that if individuals are considered to be equally worthy of respect, they should have equal rights. The joining of these two notions makes egalitarianism inseparable from individualism, and helps explain why it has always been so difficult to confine liberty to negative liberty. Realisation of the principle of moral equality always involves positive liberty as well, not merely the protection of a sphere for each individual, but the creation of conditions in which individuals can fully enjoy such a sphere and develop their full potential.”

If the contemporary left has a purpose it is to improve the living and working conditions of ordinary people, via consciously designed social, economic and political reform. It has found it unhelpful to confuse associated concepts such as 'collective ownership', 'equality', 'social justice', participation or social cohesion with this end, or to assume that there is a generally shared life-style which can be identified as the single criterion of citizenship.

10.3a The Problem of Socialist 'Freedom'

"Everything is what it is: liberty is liberty, not equality or fairness or justice or culture, or human happiness or a quiet conscience."4

If this analysis is correct, one of the ironies of the left is that despite seeking to make 'liberal' ideas real, particularly liberal freedom, it has

failed to articulate a viable conception of freedom itself, or at least one which keyed into ordinary citizens' less abstract desire to live comfortably and safely within the kind of communities they want. Political freedoms, and rights to political participation, are important, but tend to be seen as means to this form of freedom, instead of ends or 'goods' in themselves. A left project in the appropriation of apparently hostile conceptions of 'freedom' may then be thought necessary.

The neoliberal new right tended to use a Hayekian definition of freedom - the 'absence of dependence on the will of another'. Hayek's (p.20, 1960) essentials of liberty for any person were: "..if he is subject to the same laws as all his fellow citizens, if he is immune from arbitrary confinement and free to choose his work, and if he is able to own and acquire property, no other men or group of men can coerce him to do their bidding." Liberty for the individual, he suggested, can exist without 'political liberty' - participation by citizens in the choice of their government, in the process of legislation, and in control of the administration.

It is the exclusive reliance on this negative conception of liberty which is problematic, not the use of the Hayekian definition as a starting-point. Though this new right foundation is a narrow one, a left version may go beyond it by establishing strong links between political liberty, social rights and individual autonomy. What it should not continue to do is seek to convince people that 'freedom' has
been increased when restrictions are placed on the 'rights' associated with the market (particularly rights to property ownership), because it has tended to fail in doing so. A loss of liberty may be compensated for by an increase in equality, or another value, but only equality has been increased, not another version of 'freedom'.\textsuperscript{5} In this sense, Berlin is virtually correct. It is not that there are not other meanings to concepts such as 'freedom', but in the context of the dominant political culture and the pervasiveness of liberal discourse, alternative meanings are so marginal as to become largely ineffective for a radical political project. Further, if it is the case that 'consumer freedom' has replaced work as the focal link between systematic reproduction, social integration and individual action, and individual freedom is constituted in the main as the freedom of the consumer (Bauman 1988b), then the left may seek to engage more profitably with this conception of freedom.

Thus the new left project tends to seek to demonstrate its recognition of the value of each person's life within the community. This seeks to outflank the new right, and highlight its failures. Society depends on individuals forming and pursuing their own understandings of the good. This is why the left's attempts to 'appropriate', or show it is

\textsuperscript{5} This is the typical problem with socialist conceptions of freedom, the forced confusion between 'freedom' and 'equality' (for example, Hattersley 1987). Of course it is crucial for the left that they are linked, but they may also be in conflict.
friendly to, such forms of behaviour, is as the right has shown such a key battle. Individual human development, indeed citizenship, rather than the remaking of human nature or the envisioning of the theoretical parameters of a 'brave new world', has become the fundamental issue for the left. This borrows a little in stance from the conservative disposition in this regard; there is no 'ultimate liberation' for all people, and no perfect rationally-designed environment in which they can be liberated. Forms of social integration, crucial for any meaningful citizenship, are not seen necessarily to be dependent on total equality of status, but are too complex and fluid to be reliant on only one determinant. They are dependent on self-respect and a recognition of one's social ability and worth, as well as the social, cultural, as well as economic, resources to act. 'Empowerment' can be political, economic, cultural and social, and inter-related. The confidence to act positively, and the resources to enable it, does not respect these boundaries, but grows in each.

10.4 'Generative Politics'

The left may be finding it more profitable to replace its tendency towards 'blueprint politics' with 'generative politics' (Giddens, 'Brave New World: The New Context of Politics', chapter one, Miliband, D., 1994). The former rests on a politics of 'end-states', an essentially static conception in which political competition is defined by competing blueprints for the future. Socialism is seen as an
end and not a process. But it is often in danger of ignoring social, political and economic realities, and the experience of everyday action. The latter tries to see politics as a process, the politics of a constant and continuing re-application of a set of values to changing circumstances. Hence (Miliband, D., p. 6, 1994): "Generative politics is above all committed to the creation, development and sustenance of economic opportunities and social commitments in the context of the plural reality in which we live."\(^6\)

As Giddens (p. 32, ibid) describes its outline, it seeks to achieve desired outcomes through providing conditions for social mobilisation and engagement, create circumstances in which active trust can be built and sustained, accord autonomy via specific programmes, encourage ethical principles of action, and decentralise political power (though this may enhance the greater legitimacy of the centre, beyond a 'zero-sum' conception).\(^7\) It is a defence of the

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\(^6\) See also Mulgan (1994). Similarly, Escudero ('Reinventing Politics', chapter eleven, Miliband, D., 1994) proposes six principles for social democratic thinking: it should avoid dogmatically-idealised closed systems of thought and ends (tolerance, pluralism and consensus must be guides), renounce any notions of historical progress (p. 240, ibid: "..public policies should not be seeking to make provision for mass collective public participation, but to devise new instruments for accessible, normalised individual control"), base its appeal on individuals, their rights, duties and potentialities (the dominant cultural reference point), 'de-bureaucratise' politics via flexibility and innovation, ensure the transparency of public institutions, and incorporate the democratic means as part of its message.

\(^7\) Though it implies a more radical socialist politics and a greater emphasis on political participation, Wainwright's (1994) argument for a 'new left' has some similarities with the form of politics presented here. It draws on a radically-broadened Hayekian model of the dispersed nature of knowledge
political domain, but appears consciously material in that it recognises the importance of material conditions and organisational frameworks for the life-political decisions taken by individuals and groups. It is consciously not a panacea. There are always new (and old) political problems and contradictions.

It might be said that this politics seems conservative, even 'regressive', but to its proponents this is not necessarily the case. Generative politics echoes Laclau and Mouffe's suggestions for the form of 'radical democracy' (p.82, 1990): "Society, then, is ultimately unrepresentable: any representation - and thus any space - is an attempt to constitute society, not to state what it is..this final incompleteness of the social is the main source of our political hope in the contemporary world: only it can assure the conditions for a radical democracy." Again, it rejects the 'authoritarianism' of end-states politics. 'Truth' is pragmatic and in this sense becomes properly democratic (p.173, 1990): "..to the recognition that we ourselves are the exclusive creators of our world, and the ones who have a radical and untransferable responsibility towards it." It is a politics of 'emancipations' rather than 'Emancipation', more democratic in its respect for specificity. The growing fragmentation of social actors and social struggles, is more difficult to manipulate and disregard. It also connects with a

to support a socialist but anti-social engineering approach for a greater variety of forms of popular self-government.
citizenship based around individual autonomy and individual responsibility, to support the fragmentation of struggles.

This is a defence of politics as an activity that is wider than the narrow liberal conception, but narrower than the all-embracing participatory vision. It tends towards being practical and realistic. It is clear that politics seen as a process rather than the battle between end-states encourages a greater consciousness of process, of the everyday realities of peoples' lives and the decisions they make. It is this awareness which is important for left political strategy as well as citizenship theory.

10.5 Critical Demands on Citizenship Theory

This implies the move towards what may be summarised as a critical, material and contextual approach to citizenship; critical because the effects of citizenship or constituent elements are not assumed, and may be regressive; material because the actual effects of citizenship are often in material consequences; and contextual because no overall macro-operation of citizenship is assumed. Most importantly, it seeks to go beyond the conception of unitary macro-social principles contesting ground from each other (for example, 'class' versus 'citizenship'). There is no immanent logic in social relations or concepts. Therefore, re-conceptualisations of citizenship which do seek a general definition of its nature are thought misguided. Citizenship may in different ways
facilitate a genuine integration and amelioration of conditions which construct or reinforce forms of exclusion, and it retains the ability to be used effectively by many reformist groups in the struggle for their own social inclusion and entitlement. However, it also may fail to promote genuine social integration, or further enable social, political and economic structures, practices and allocative decisions which promote exclusion. In the foundations for a new conception of citizenship, the progressive potential of citizenship is retained within a critically-informed account. Citizenship is then a less reliable concept than the left has tended to assume previously, but still valuable.

A contextual conception does not mean only the study of localised spaces, physical settings for social interaction, or any illustrative empirical study, though these are important as part of this approach. Rather, it is meant to be (Thrift, 'Light Out of Darkness', p.25-6, Cloke 1992): "...the pivot of a theory of social agency, showing the way in which 'people', understood as 'cultural artefacts', consist of a series of dialogical personas constituted in and by particular settings, and in turn constituting these settings." Further, as Mouffe (p.13, 1993) suggests: "Radical democracy demands that we acknowledge difference - the particular, the multiple, the heterogeneous - in effect, everything that had been excluded by the concept of Man in the abstract. Universalism is not

8 Also Gilbert (1992).
rejected but particularised; what is needed is a new kind of articulation between the universal and the particular."

This may be thought to imply profound problems for citizenship (Clarke, p.42, 1996): "The politics of the particular rather than the politics of the universal has become a major characteristic of the politics of our time. As citizenship, from its inception, has been concerned with the general or universal, it seems irrelevant to the particularities generated by this life politics."

But this need not suggest the redundancy of the idea, rather its reformulation. As Thrift states (p.28, ibid): "...in Britain now, the chief imperative is to find out how, why, with what and where people belong: what their economic, social and cultural resources are and how they wield them. This is a necessary first step to establishing a new notion of collectivity, one which is not associated with uniformity and subordination but is 'active, demanding and creative'..

These demand a 'differentiated' conception of citizenship. Such a conception has a difficult relationship with the idea of universality. It might be that the tension between universalism and particularism is inherent in citizenship (Beiner, p.12, 1995). Yet citizenship theory has tended to be too abstract. 'Universal membership' may be an ethic at the heart of citizenship; but it is not now thought of as an inevitable end. Such a reformulated conception tends to recognise how citizenship is
struggled over, and how gains necessarily are contingent. Citizenship helps establish 'areas of contestation' (Giddens) over inequality and exclusion.

The criticisms made of Marshall's thesis tend to be kept in mind when reformulating the framework for a critical conception of citizenship. It cannot be over-optimistic about the progressive consequences for citizenship against forms of inequality, or assume that the universalisation of social services may act as the basis of a common experience and hence promote 'class fusion'. Citizenship rights, it is recognised, do not lead necessarily to social cohesion. Indeed (Ignatieff, p.69, Beiner 1995): "If the idea of citizenship is in crisis today, it is precisely because experience has not validated the post-war civic ideal that public goods would extend civic solidarity." The rights associated with citizenship are then seen as complex and separate entitlements and opportunities, rather than a homogenous guarantee of citizenship status which will be used by all citizens in the same ways. The extent to which they actually 'free' individuals becomes a focus for analysis rather than assumption, particularly within the wider social, economic and political context. As Hindess (p.5, 1987) notes, underlying much previous left thinking and a whole tradition of social administration research, deriving from Fabianism, is the notion that: "...it must seem that the only real obstacles to the eradication of poverty and a more egalitarian society are the government's lack of knowledge of
social conditions, on the one hand, and its lack of political will, on the other."

This form of approach to citizenship from sections of the contemporary left has a number of other implications, which should be noted briefly. First, it has led to a renewed interest in the difficult problem of obligations. Its typical vagueness in this area has been recognised as a weak point for criticism from the right. In response some figures have concentrated on the importance of fulfilling duties, and a more widespread 'principle of duty' (Selbourne 1994). Yet for the new left project of citizenship, 'individualism' may be characterised more positively and need not be a corrupting social phenomenon. While the fulfilment of social obligations (of whatever kind) may represent a genuine strengthening of citizenship, duties cannot and should not always be correlated directly to rights, because pressure will tend to focus on the more explicit rights (for example, benefits and the 'problem' of the unemployed) while duties should be related to all citizens.

Second, given the primacy of the private sphere, the left is learning not to be seen to downgrade voluntarism, the 'citizenship of contribution'. It is an important part of 'social capital' [10.12], and should not necessarily be replaced by state welfare because of the universalist ideology of citizenship. The sense of social duty cannot afford to be dissipated. The answer, as Marshall (p. 80, 1950) suggested: "...lies in the development of more
limited loyalties, to the local community and especially to the working group." This may mean greater local disparities, but also the enhancement of citizenship. This is another example of the need to go beyond the left's assumptions of synergy between its cherished ideas.

Third, the reliance on vague notions of participation is regarded as increasingly problematic. Parts of the left seem to imagine participatory politics as a field of rationality, but (to borrow from conservative, and particularly Michael Oakeshott's insights), human behaviour is always highly conditional, steeped in traditions, cultural, and open-ended. Hence (Anderson, p.43, Miliband, D., 1994): "The danger of conceiving democratic life as a dialogue is that we may forget that its primary reality remains strife..Gender equality cannot be realised without lifting the economic handicap from maternity; work cannot be assured to all who seek it without infringing the prerogatives of corporate investment; electoral democracy cannot be deepened without treading on the interests of established parties; peace cannot be assured without altering the hierarchy of nuclear security. It is a mistake to imagine that there is a quick route to universal goals, to which all can rally without loss." Like the new right, the left seeks to use mobilisation in limited forms, to support reforms, and further strategic ends. This is one sense in which the left's use of citizenship is unavoidably material, one of the 'multiple structures of control' (Mulgan 1994), including the
market. Though the new right sought ultimately to disable politics, in the sense of alternative social, economic and cultural choice, this part of the left is choosing to react by resisting the temptation to totalize politics. It is thought that some part of political liberty should include the potential of freedom from politics itself.

10.6 Citizenship as Individual Autonomy

David Held (1989, 1994, 1995) has begun to suggest a framework for citizenship based around 'individual autonomy'. The complexity of modern citizenship is underestimated if it is conceptualised only in relation to 'class' and 'capitalism', since it must appreciate the many ways in which the full participation of individuals in the community has been restricted, and so incorporate many different forms of social exclusion, stratification and marginalisation. Citizenship itself, in the way groups struggle for autonomy against various forms of hierarchy, is a medium of social conflict.

Instead, a 'free and equal' citizenship should be founded on the creation of 'equal autonomy' and a 'common structure of action', which addresses 'illegitimate' asymmetries of power and opportunity. This may mean that systematically disadvantaged citizens be treated unequally in order that they might become equally free. The 'principle of autonomy' means that people should enjoy equal rights and obligations, be free and equal in the determination of their own lives, so long as they do not use this to negate the rights of others.
Though rooted in individual autonomy, this conception has important structural implications. 'Nautonomic' structures (in which asymmetrical life-chances are systematically generated) restrict participation, and limit democracy to a privileged domain. The purpose of such an approach is the creation of equal participative opportunities (rather than 'equality'), so allowing citizens the free and equal determination of the conditions of their own association. Held suggests this has two main implications - that people should be self-determining, and that democratic government should be 'limited government' (government which upholds a legally-circumscribed structure of power).

Though valuable this framework for citizenship must also appreciate the impact the wider consequences of capitalist relations have on inclusion and exclusion, and the nature of the construction of the 'market society'. Methodologically, this opens up many forms of analysis - political economy, discourse, and the incorporation of feminist (and other) critiques of 'universality', which would allow a greater understanding of how individual autonomy is restricted.

This approach may be helped by the incorporation of some similar arguments made by Michael Walzer in his Spheres of Justice (1983), in which he seeks to formulate an environment for equality which is consistent with liberty. He does not derive individual rights from any theory of common humanity, but from shared conceptions of social
goods which are admittedly local and particular. But more significantly, the principles of justice are themselves pluralistic in form (p.6, ibid): "..that different social goods ought to be distributed for different reasons, in accordance with different procedures, by different agents; and that all these differences derive from different understandings of the social goods themselves - the inevitable product of historical and cultural particularism."

10.7 'Universal Membership'

Citizenship as individual autonomy may appear rather a spare conception compared to the seemingly rich accounts of political membership offered by communitarians, and to be in tension with the ethical ideal within citizenship, that of 'universal membership'. Yet it offers a clearer route by which to re-think citizenship. Given that social integration is more fluid and complex than citizenship theory has tended to take account of, there is no theoretical contradiction between universal membership and individual autonomy, if the former is conceptualised in a more realistic manner, as an uncapturable web of individual forms of participation which develop and reinforce a sense of genuine social inclusion. The individual's own 'social' is enhanced, not a pre-set theoretical model of a preferred ideal of 'proper' public participation. Indeed, such individual participation may not appear very social at all, and may consist primarily of 'private' autonomous (or close social group) activities and pursuits. The problem in
exhorting a particular form of participation is that it ignores new types of civil associations (Putnam 1995), for example those which may combine small-group participation with large-scale advocacy, such as community service and self-help groups. This is another reason why such an approach should not necessarily be seen as 'conservative'. The 'Balkanisation of interests' is a real social phenomenon, and while such associations may often neglect class and race factors, the principle of autonomy is supposed to act progressively to temper these hindrances on participation. In many respects, this might be seen to call for an active civil society rather than a political community, as commonly conceived. Hence (Walzer, p.106, 1992): "Join the association of your choice is not a slogan to rally political militants, and yet that is what civil society requires."

10.8 Resolving the Problem of Universality

As has been suggested: "The risk associated with current feminist writing is that in the (necessary) critique of gender neutrality, some feminists may give up on any notion of universal humanity, and therefore lose what gives equality its power." There is the fear that some forms of a 'politics of difference' such as I.M. Young's, tend to create fixed and oppositional categories which can result

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in another version of the suppression of difference (Aziz 1992).

A suggested way out of this dilemma is a process of synthesis beyond 'equality versus difference' (Lister 1993, 1995), a: "..politics which neither denies nor capitulates to the particularity of group difference" (Phillips, p.5, 1993). Of course, there may not only be important differences and needs between gender groups with regard to citizenship, but also within them (similarly with ethnic groups), according to wealth, social position, varying self-identity, and other important factors. Equality and difference are not thought to be necessarily incompatible. The very notion of political equality implies differences to be discounted so that, despite them, people are treated as equals for a specific purpose. The use of them as dichotomous is in itself a construction which disguises relations of subordination. Indeed (Sassoon, p.97, 'Equality and Difference: The Emergence of a New Concept of Citizenship', chapter seven, Mclellan and Sayers 1991): 'Disarticulating and making concrete the abstract concept of the individual helps us to recognise something else: viewed from one facet or another of our identity or our subjectivity, we each belong to a partial group, we are each an 'other', whatever our race, gender, nationality.' A recognition of complexity reasserts the importance of the specific and the concrete.

Yet this does not imply that a reformulated conception of left citizenship must be at the
expense of a gendered analysis of the power of relations which still underpin constructed categories and hence serve to perpetuate women's 'exile' as a group from full citizenship. Ironically, the emphasis on the role of active participation to bring women's concerns into the public arena can neglect the value of individual (particularly social/welfare) rights, the 'informal' participation women are involved in regularly, and the structural constraints upon them in particular contexts which hinder such idealistic participation. Hopefully, this appreciates the validity of the critiques of universalism while retaining the power of the idea of universal equality.

10.9 Economic Citizenship

More critical discussions of citizenship have tended to highlight the neglect, within reformist models, of substantive economic rights of citizenship, alongside civil, political and social rights. A model of citizenship as individual autonomy, far from necessarily being prey to the same lack of economic analysis which has tended to afflict social liberalism and reformism, may reinforce the importance of political economy. Genuine individual autonomy will demand a multiplicity of detailed reforms, always contingent and developing, to ensure resources and opportunities for participation. This

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10 So, for example, gender relations can be introduced into the typical gender-blind 'power resources'-type studies of social rights/welfare states (Orloff 1993).
is regarded as the real test of the progressiveness of citizenship. This may be part of developing 'egalitarian individualism' approaches. These seek to discover how property rights and ownership may be made to work for an egalitarian project. The alternative, as suggested, is to attempt to resist, and fail doing so, the link between individual property and effective citizenship. This demands a theoretical change of conception, and then further examination of the mechanisms by which this might be furthered.

10.10 Citizenship and 'the Market'

"There is a central need now to rethink the idea of citizenship in a more individualistic age. This will require bringing ideas about citizenship into a clearer relationship with the market."¹¹

The scope of aspirations for political participation has been criticised previously. Some parts of the left are moving away from the notion, rooted in some aspects of citizenship theory, that individuals can only express themselves fully as members of a 'unified political community'. They are seeking to link strategies for citizenship with 'economic rationality', rather than weaker notions of 'social compassion', and in doing so are investigating accommodations with 'the market'.

As suggested, many have found social analysis based on macro terms alone (such as the 'state', the 'market', 'civil society') to be unhelpful. Such

¹¹ Hoover and Plant (p.282, 1989).
distinctions can be made, but too often mask extremely complex sets of conditions. The problem is attributing to them one specific principle of operation and effect. As has been suggested, this has afflicted citizenship theory, in the conception of the constant and inherent clash between the principles of the 'market' (individual, amoral, inegalitarian) against those of 'citizenship' (moral, cohesive, egalitarian). This represents the 'essentialisation' of the market and citizenship, which is present in many forms of analysis (Hindess 1987). It is unhelpful to think of a single logic of welfare which opposes the 'market'. In terms of welfare, it ignores different forms of provision, social stratification, individual behaviour, market benefits, side-effects, and many aspects of the actual provision of social rights.

Markets operate under specific institutional conditions, which vary considerably in terms of who the market actors are and the resources available to them, the legislative regulation and other forms of administrative and political controls, customary and other informal constraints on acceptable behaviour, linkages with and spill-overs into other markets engaging different actors and controls. The form of analysis developed along these lines derives from Polanyi. Hence the consequences of market allocation are not thought able to be determined independently of what those conditions are. It is worth noting briefly some related projects to integrate markets into left politics.
10.11 'Market Socialism'

Social democratic parties have of course sought ways of seeming to accommodate the market, but as suggested the foundations of these attempts were never as secure as supposed. More recently, attempts have been made to construct more explicitly the possible relationship between the market and socialist goals.¹²

'Market socialism' has gained much attention by reviving a neglected aspect of social democracy - the socialisation of ownership - while retaining the market mechanism as a means of providing most goods and services. Often, it is based on the recognition that it has been politically disastrous to allow the new right to equate the free society with their version of capitalism, hence its possible value within the argument presented here. The 'pure' model of market socialism entails that all productive enterprises are constituted as democratically-controlled workers' co-operatives, profits distributed as income within the co-operative.

Nove's *The Economics of Feasible Socialism* (1983) argued that a socialist market is necessary for pluralism as well as efficiency. He proposed the social ownership of all the major means of production, and makes banks and other credit institutions subject to central planning, with reserve powers of central co-ordination. But it would be 'commodified', though not necessarily

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¹² It has of course been argued by critics that 'market socialism' is an oxymoron, for example McNally (1993).
determined by the market, since democratic votes would decide the boundary between the commercial market sectors and those where goods and services were provided free.

Miller (1990, also Le Grand and Estrin 1989) examines the details of such a system, including a limited central state. Only market socialism combines effectively the market, state, and community, given existing value-commitments - freedom, justice and democracy. As Plant ('Socialism, Markets and End States', chapter three, Le Grand and Estrin 1989) has suggested, given that market socialists accept in effect a large part of the liberal argument - that citizens on the whole should be left to determine their own idea of the 'good' - that market socialism requires greater equality 'at the beginning', in order to secure effective choice. As Plant (p.73, ibid) states: "If socialism is to be allied to increasing liberty and freedom of choice, it should not seek to impose a particular pattern of community on society, but rather accept the diversity of community forms which will emerge as the result of people exercising their own choice. You cannot on the one hand seek to empower people and then restrict in an artificial way the choices open to them in pursuit of some ill-defined concept of community." But it does require a theory of distributive justice that may be drawn upon in order to work out detailed mechanisms by which all citizens may act effectively in particular markets, and hence an important role for the central state.
Archer (1995) claims that 'economic democracy' - labour-managed enterprises - may be advanced progressively by labour movements engaging in trade-offs between wage restraint and incremental increases in control. But all such projects have to face the difficulties of the present environment, particularly the power of (international) financial capital.

Pierson (1995) in a valuable analysis, identifies three main problems with market socialist models - their failure to specify adequately the forms of social ownership, to envisage a political regime which is congruent with both their programme for social ownership and democratic legitimacy, and especially the political feasibility of such projects in the context of socialism's contemporary difficulties. He notes that such models tend to remain worker's socialism, whereas most of the time many citizens are consumers, or even denied access to the labour market.

Perhaps more politically cautious, even 'micro-political', but potentially radical approaches are necessary. For example, as Gamble and Kelly (1996) have noted, given that most working people are now owners, either directly or through their pension funds, the real challenge for a 'stakeholder' vision is to show how ownership and property rights can be made to work for an egalitarian project.

Though a proper analysis of these approaches is outside the scope of this discussion, they may prove a promising basis for an explicit left accommodation
with markets. Individual autonomy founded on 'market' participation and ownership, may be more productive than trying to link citizenship with fuller political participation. Of course, it would be hoped that greater individual autonomy might lead to an enhanced sense of political efficacy, but this cannot be assumed or relied upon. However, markets alone, however reconfigured, will not provide the kind of social order needed. Non-market relations between citizens are crucial, and the left cannot rely on illusory notions of 'community' and social solidarity.

10.12 'Social Capital'

"It is only where the individual has choice, and its inherent responsibility, that he has occasion to affirm existing values, to contribute to their further growth, and to earn moral credit. Obedience has moral value only where it is a matter of choice and not of coercion."

'Social capital' has too-rarely been appreciated by either left or right. The character of civic life is connected closely to economic progress, growth and institutional performance. This has been argued persuasively by Robert Putnam's Making Democracy Work (1993), a study of varying civic traditions in contemporary Italy. Vibrant social networks and norms of civic engagement, an active public-spirited citizenry, egalitarian ('horizontal') political relations and a social fabric of trust and cooperation, explain institutional success better than

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other factors. Areas without such values and traditions are more prone to corruption, low participation, and authoritarian government. Stronger community seems to allow citizens in the more civic areas to be more liberal. The success of democratic government then depends on the degree to which the environment in which it operates approximates the ideal of a 'civic community', essentially the communitarian vision of 'civic humanism'. Both states and markets operate more effectively in civic settings. Hence there is thought a correlation between social cohesion, political harmony, and good government.

The appreciation of 'social capital' is a more helpful approach than that which merely longs for a nostalgic illusion of bygone 'community', and seeks to impose some likeness of it (which of course has the opposite effect intended by destroying social capital). This is why this conception of social capital is very different from the often authoritarian emphasis of neoconservatives, with regard to the 'traditional family', 'social discipline', and 'hierarchy'.

It hopes to retain the individual within community, since it is the individual which invests in the social capital, and renews it, as well as relying on it. Personal security and autonomy reinforces collective participation. Attempts to encourage the development of social capital must be non-authoritarian and non-coercive if they are to succeed - this applies also

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to progressively-intended policies which erode local social capital. Social capital may be liberal in the best sense of the word, where community may not.

The other value of this approach is that it dissects the failure of the new right, without relying on weak (in the context of the political culture) notions of 'social compassion'. On the theoretical level, the new right is inadequate. Neoliberalism cannot in its cruder forms appreciate 'social capital'. Neoconservatism is too-authoritarian for it, and is incapable in most forms to incorporate modern individuality. Further, this type of analysis reverses the new right assumption that stronger interest groups mean a weaker economy, as government is restrained in its decision-making by their threats while being expanded because of their demands. Rather, 'strong society' can mean strong economy and state. This may dissect the right's most important asset in the dominant political culture, its reputation for effective economic marshalling of the productive aspects of the market society, by showing the importance of social capital to economic efficiency. Social capital is not merely a nice addition to a project for citizenship - markets are tolerable only if embedded within a strong civil society, which may challenge the influence of concentrations of private power.

As has been suggested, the new right project has concerned forms of social control, under which social capital must by definition be eroded. Social capital is too unpredictable to be encouraged as
part of this project. Such an approach highlights the practical waste and inefficiency of the new right and Thatcherism, and may examine the effects of 'free markets' on this capital, which might be both positive and negative. As Giddens (1994) has suggested, the radical nature of the neoliberal project may mean that the left is now positioned to represent a conserving force against those which have ravaged communities. Yet (p.9, ibid): "In a post-traditional society, the conserving of tradition cannot sustain the sense it once had, as the relatively unreflective preservation of the past." If it is thought that civil society is collapsing, social capital is crucial for its rebuilding (Foundation for Civil Society 1996).

Social capital appears to offer a foundation for a left approach to find ways in which vibrant civic association may be encouraged, without restricting individual autonomy. In contrast to the new right project, as characterised here, the purpose of new left citizenship characterises itself as genuinely plural (Hirst, p.14, 1994): "Citizens need a political community that will enable them to be different, and not one that exhorts them to be the same." By necessity, this shape for a left politics of citizenship is theoretical. Some of its practical implications need to be brought out.

10.13 Welfare and Education

10.13a Welfare

The defence of adequate state-assisted welfare provision is crucial for this left project of
individual autonomy. But the key principle, in the context of the dominant political culture, is the explicit acceptance by welfare systems of the primacy of market appropriation, and consequently the design of welfare programmes in line with this. This suggests in reverse that the practical operation of welfare services needs to inform citizenship theory, or how the citizenship of individual autonomy may be extended.

For example, the assumption within much citizenship theory that 'equality' can be the result of welfare provision ignores many practical difficulties. First, if the provision of welfare services does not rely on price as a distributive mechanism, welfare providers rely on other means of regulating what might otherwise be an excess demand for the limited goods and services at their disposal. The use of non-price allocative mechanisms might not imply equality of access to the services provided, even when those mechanisms have been introduced in the name of equality. Second, social welfare provision operates through particular policy instruments, and these may have consequences further than their purely allocative effects (for example, favouring certain patterns of domestic relations). Consequently, new thinking on welfare tends to emphasise greater flexibility of provision, focusing on how to enable clearer principles of greater individual autonomy and personal responsibility rather than a vague form of 'equality' reliant on a supposedly developed sense of welfare mutuality. In particular, if citizens hold the norm that they
should be 'independent' (self-supporting), the issue is to find ways in which the state might provide them with means of subsistence without violating their self-respect (Moon 1988b), while in addition generating at least some sense of mutual obligation for the 'citizen-stranger' (Culpitt 1992). If individual autonomy is thought a sharper principle for welfare design, this is important because support for left programmes may only be sustained if goals are defined and their accomplishment demonstrated clearly (Osborne and Gaebler 1993).

One approach which might be examined is that which has been most recently rephrased by Hirst (1994) - 'associative democracy'. This is a project for 'thick welfare' but 'thin collectivism', via voluntary and democratically self-governing associations, within a common framework of regulatory rules. This appears to cohere with the model of citizenship outlined here (p.14, ibid): "The only way radical ideas will gain ground is by arguing for new types of institutions and in doing so for a constituency that goes way beyond the left. To respond to the changed conjecture we need political ideas that can cope with decentralisation, that are not utopian about the prospects for such change, and that do not confuse decentralisation with participatory democracy. Only thus can we hope to promote non-collectivist means of ensuring a well-governed and adequately serviced society, open to the aspirations of diverse social groups." This reflects the movement by some sections of the left to value the role of the voluntary sector more.
Participation in welfare provision has come to be a prominent concern because of the failings of the bureaucratic model - too large, impersonal and inaccessible to the ordinary citizen. This has developed from the 1960s, but was not a new concern, being inherent in the ideals of the voluntary sector itself (Finlayson, p.305-8, 1994). The new left is concerned that the 'citizenship of entitlement' is designed to enhance the 'citizenship of contribution'.

Probably the most incisive thinker on welfare on the contemporary left is Frank Field (1993). Most recently (1995, 1996, also 'Reforming the Welfare State', chapter nine, Radice 1996), he has proposed the establishment of a National Insurance Corporation, a Private Pension Corporation, and the re-modelling of the present income support system into a pro-active agency. Field assumes that self-interest is the strongest human characteristic, though the reforms are intended to create a strong foundation for welfare provision. Families need to be able to add to their household income without fear of losing entitlement, by comprehensive coverage of insurance benefits (rather than the

15 But it should be noted that the criticism of the welfare state made by voluntary organisations is different from the new right attack, concerned with extending the opportunities for choice within the welfare state and developing partnership between private and public provision, including advocacy and community-based provision. To supporters of voluntary provision, its aims are the same as that of the ideals of the welfare state - a collective sense of responsibility for dignity, health, security, freedom, and fair life chances for all, and they have been equally critical of attempts to merely shift responsibility for provision on to the voluntary sector (see Finlayson, p.386-7, 1994).
Predominantly contribution-based schemes do seem the most obvious way in which welfare can run along market lines, and hence gain the 'legitimacy' of any other commercial transaction. The more firmly social rights are based on market principles, the more durable they have proven to be. The benefits for insurance contributors, 'sanctioned' by the market, the ones which the great mass of the middle-class thinks it has paid for and will not relinquish, are those that have proven most resistant to erosion.

Whether this is counter to the idea of citizenship (membership and need alone create entitlement) is a difficult question, but one which must be faced by the left instead of a cosy reliance on universalism. The danger in contribution-based schemes is of course that they may draw the boundaries around citizenship in a more exclusionary

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16 The National Insurance Corporation responsible for this range of benefits would be based on the friendly society principle, owned and run by employees and employers (the government's role would be limited to the size of Exchequer contributions to the scheme). Hence it takes the idea of universalism and enforces it on the private rather than public sector (everyone at work will have to be in a company or a private scheme, and contributions for both employers and employees would be compulsory). A National Pensions Savings Scheme would be established as a cheap form of pensions saving, and only those on very low pay would need their insurance and pension contributions supplemented. Those outside the labour market would need contributions from the Exchequer paid to the National Insurance Fund and their private pension. The 'pro-active' income support system would require every claimant below retirement age and not long-term sick and disabled to draw up a career plan, and be able to turn their income support payments into educational maintenance allowances.

17 Beveridge was certainly aware of this problem in his deliberations, see Baldwin, chapter four, 'Beveridge in the Longue Durée', Hills et al. (1994).
manner. The majority of the population is assumed to share the characteristics of contributory citizenship, but in a way Beveridge could not have foreseen, much poverty has been caused increasingly by conditions that social insurance cannot cope with, for people who have never been and are unlikely to become regular contributory members of social insurance (the permanently unemployed, single mothers, the 'underclass'). It is these tensions which thinkers such as Field are attempting to deal with.

10.13b Education

Education has tended to be identified by the left as a key area of reform for a more socially just, equal and cohesive society. Yet parts of the left have recognised that it may be overloaded in terms of social objectives. The right has discovered that education is a difficult area in which to model reforms to achieve certain social and political ends, as the development of the National Curriculum and the relatively slow take-off of Grant-Maintained schools reveals. Sections of the left have noted that regarding education as a vehicle for social cohesion is problematic, given that it is crucial in addition in terms of personal (even 'consumerist') aspirations for individual advancement which may not necessarily concur with social cohesion. As a result, some progressives have sought to capture the discourses on 'standards', 'quality', and 'opportunity' as the new right did, while addressing the continued failure of the British education
system to educate and skill adequately the 'bottom half' of pupils.

This suggests that the status of Grant-Maintained (GM) schools might be reformed, rather than abolished. Given the dominance of market-based discourses, there is a strong link assumed between exclusiveness and 'quality', and 'consumers' of education have tended to exchange information to form the commonly-known local hierarchy of schools (often to the detriment of comprehensive schools). The role of LEAs might be enhanced by establishing a duty for them to act as 'advocates' for and representatives of parents and pupils, that for example they are treated fairly in school admissions and holding schools accountable if they are not.

While the National Curriculum (NC) generated much criticism from left educationalists during its formation, it retains a progressive potential. It could be regarded as an 'entitlement curriculum', in part why it remains disliked by some elements of the neoliberal educational new right, who felt that the curriculum had been 'nationalised'. Its development indicates how it might be broadened from its initially narrow foundations, particularly via cross-curricula themes. The Dearing Report changes altered the NC, but promised a moratorium on further detailed curriculum changes until the year 2000. Though in the short-term this will be adhered to, much could be changed in the testing and assessment criteria. In the context of the dominant political culture, these market-type indicators tend to prove
popular. Value-added criteria might be added to produce a fairer picture of a school's performance. Other innovations have been suggested, including agreed contracts between parents, pupils and teachers (Barber 1996b for example, proposes a rigorous 'Individual Learning Promise').

Most schools have enjoyed the semi-independence that Local Management of Schools (LMS) has brought. A layer of bureaucracy has been removed, and greater decision-making autonomy created for heads. It might be useful for the left to investigate how the structures in place might be reformed in their details for more egalitarian ends, including greater scope for local educational initiatives. There could be increased accountability for the new educational quangos, opportunities for governors (a potentially powerful political lobby) to co-ordinate their decisions and attempts through such co-ordination to utilise them as a force for progressive change, methods developed in which school planning can move beyond short-term annual crises to long-term stability and development.

But the most important current educational issue the left faces is that of selection. This is a complex and involved area, and contains a number of issues - not only the potentially inegalitarian consequences of selection, but the divisive academic-practical separation it has reinforced and the substantial increase in expulsions of 'problem' pupils which its growth has encouraged. However, some associated with the left have begun to suggest that the problem is
that the debate on selection has been caught up with the confusion between mixed ability teaching and comprehensive education. Comprehensives need not, and largely do not, pursue a policy of mixed ability teaching. Comprehensives are compatible with the moulding of teaching to meet individual children’s skills and problems. This the general problem of the confusion between the method of teaching and the type of institution, which is partly the fault of the pro-comprehensive lobby (Innes 1996).

The main argument repeated against selection is that it labels some children failures, but it is asked how much sympathy are the parents of 'more talented' children reasonably supposed to have with this? This allows the new right to claim that left educational policy would be a levelling-down process. The idea remains that selection helps 'brighter' children, and hence the structure of the debate tends to create a political constituency for selection. Instead, the strongest argument against selection is that it harms almost all children by preventing proper mixed ability teaching - interchangeable streaming by subject. It prevents the recognition of the variety of areas in which children can excel by lumping all areas of the curriculum together, and the differing rates at which children develop which needs easy interchange between ability groups. Usually, further selection harms those children at the lower half of a selective school, who do not benefit from the traditional definitions of academic success and may
suffer in terms of confidence and motivation from being in the position they find themselves.

Pollard (1995) has called for the left to think again about selection, given the difficulties of comprehensive schools, and argued that selection by ability could represent the apotheosis of socialist meritocracy. It would be fairer and more honest than the implicit selection currently present, as well as the 'selection by wealth' of private schools (the real social engineering present in British education). The key is selection within a system where all the choices available are of high quality schooling of one form or another (as in Germany and many other European countries), rather than the form of selection apparently envisaged by the right which benefits only those suited to an academic education. Selection at fourteen (perhaps with another opportunity for transfer at sixteen), following Will Hutton, might be the solution to connect retaining middle-class support for state education, excellence, and opportunities for all.

The other education idea strongly associated with the new right - the voucher - might usefully be reconsidered by the left. The new right claimed that the purpose of the voucher was not only choice, but genuine choice for parents from backgrounds usually denied it. Such choice would not depend on political astuteness or familiarity with the system, but resemble effective market choices (in which all classes are necessarily familiar). Le Grand for example has proposed that vouchers be given
according to area of residence, with higher value vouchers going to families in poorer areas.

10. 13c 'New' Labour - New Politics?

Some of these themes might be somewhat familiar, given that there are some similarities between these suggestions and the rhetoric which has surrounded 'New' Labour before its victory in the General Election in May 1997. Though there were suggestions that under Tony Blair, Labour was developing a communitarian approach, it might more usefully be regarded as a recognition that in terms of the prevailing political culture, older social democratic and progressive discourses had become unhelpful, and a more liberal-individualist yet hopefully still progressive model of citizenship would be more politically successful.

The notion that Labour had been influenced heavily by communitarian ideas, or even the 'authoritarian' movement in Conservative (especially law and order) policy, might be replaced by a recognition that its rhetoric and initial policy proposals mirror the arguments of 'liberal virtue theory' as described previously. It certainly was not seen to represent a civic republican or politically-participatory model of citizenship. Its ideas on welfare indicated a move away from collectivist solutions, to a 'pro-active' welfare state more demanding of recipients. Similarly, in education it was regarded as moving to appropriate the issue of standards rather than debates on structure, and retreating over a universal rejection of selection where it was
already operating. Indeed, in a broader sense, the 'New' Labour project for election might be regarded as a bold move to appropriate discourses which had come to be associated with the new right, as this analysis has suggested is necessary for the left. Government, especially the demands of working through detailed reforms in education and welfare which do enhance progressive notions of genuine individual freedom, is likely to demand even bolder thinking.

The significance of Labour's landslide victory is yet to be judged more properly, given that it is too early to refer to a coming era of radical progressive reform which sweeps away the dominance of new right ideas. It is difficult to disentangle the electorate's rejection of a divided and inefficient Conservative Government, from any hunger they might have for a new progressive project. If the argument here is followed, the result may be seen to represent the electorate's recognition of 'New' Labour's acceptance of the dominance of new right ideas, and particularly those associated with the market, rather than the rejection of those ideas. The electorate may also desire a slightly more progressive manoeuvring within the parameters of the 'market society'. Whether the tensions between a progressive project and the market society are too great to defuse or resolve will be the story of the next decade in British politics.

10.14 Summary
In the difficulties left politics has encountered over the last twenty years in particular, it has been suggested that the idea of citizenship should become a valuable organising principle. There is much sense in this, since it is a concept which appears both to unite questions of rights, democratic participation and social cohesion, and which could determine more clearly the goals of progressive politics. But, as the arguments presented in previous chapters have attempted to reveal, there are significant difficulties with both of these hopes. In short, citizenship has limits as the organising principle for the left. Given that it is a concept, rather than a theory, the left should not assume it has any special relationship with citizenship. It too has to work through carefully the concept of citizenship, and seek out its implications.

As a loosely defined, vague hope, the concept of citizenship is debilitating of left thought and action. If assumed, because ‘realised’ in institutions rather than individuals, it will not become the central idea of a popular left, but a weight on its imagination and radicalism. It should be retained as an ethical principle - universal membership, or to T.H. Marshall, the ‘basic human equality of membership’. But a critical, material and contextual approach to citizenship is needed if this is to be more than moral narcissism. Citizenship should be made to relate to the project to improve the lives of ordinary working people and increase their opportunities for individual
autonomy, rather than trying to bring their experience into line with an ideal of citizenship. Citizenship as individual autonomy represents only an outline of what is thought a more critical and profitable approach to 'getting under the skin' of 'private' liberal-individualism, the foundation for the construction of a new left 'common sense'. For many, this will seem to be a project born of defeatism, a lack of confidence in established socialist and progressive ideas and values, and an 'epistemic conservatism' (Miliband, R., p.5, 1994) accepting the right's arguments as to the limits of social reform and renewal. Yet to its proponents, who may be more willing to recognise the extent of the right's influence on contemporary politics, this may be a more productive route to universal membership, and its radical implications are wider than the left has tended to grasp.
Chapter Eleven

Conclusion - Citizenship and Politics

11.0 Summary

This study has concerned the conceptions of citizenship constructed by the new right, their impact on aspects of policy change under Thatcherism, and how as a consequence parts of the left are beginning to reformulate their understandings of citizenship. It has suggested that a more valuable appreciation of the significance of new right conceptions of citizenship may be developed by: first, noting the disengagement of the left from areas of what has been termed the 'dominant political culture' and the right's appropriation of them; and second, identifying aspects of the concept of citizenship which suggest that much of the left has been mistaken in regarding citizenship as a homogenous, unproblematic and inherently progressive phenomenon (or alternatively merely as a liberal-capitalist 'con-trick'). These arguments have been illustrated in three case studies of policy change under Thatcherism. While not being necessarily representative of all aspects of Thatcherism, they have suggested that the Thatcher regime in part used the idea of citizenship to design and legitimate some reforms, whose consequences have been divisory and inegalitarian. Hence there is an important paradox underlying contemporary politics. The new right (and Thatcherism) can be seen to have developed powerful discourses on citizenship, which should not be
dismissed as somehow 'illegitimate' in theoretical terms (especially in the context of the dominant political culture), but whose social effects can be seen to have undermined citizenship as 'universal membership' in terms of social cohesion and individual autonomy for many people. Less apparent than these important practical consequences, but no less significant, the new right can be regarded as seeking to restrict the autonomy of politics, or more specifically the autonomy of alternative political projects which might challenge the 'free market', its values, structures and institutions.

This argument is now repeated in more depth. First, it was suggested that there are four key aspects which frame an exploration of the contemporary meaning of 'citizenship' - the 'reformist debate', 'modern' citizenship, the two main political-philosophical traditions of citizenship, and the concepts related to citizenship such as rights, duties and social cohesion [chapter one]. Contemporary understandings of citizenship, that is, in the 'dominant political culture' rather than as conceived of by the left, are that it has a close and not necessarily conflictual relationship with capitalism, that it is 'liberal' rather than 'communitarian', and that it is not necessarily a unitary concept given the array of ideas and values associated with it [chapter three]. The new right's discourses on citizenship [chapter two] have captured this more effectively than the left's have tended to. It is correct to recognise that the effects of the new right's ideas and policies are
divisory, inegalitarian and lack a proper regard for full political and civil freedoms. However, a more critical understanding of citizenship, its paradoxes and complexities, suggests that the new right does represent a powerful and important project in citizenship with more scope and reach than tends to be appreciated. It offered apparently attractive forms of 'universal membership', utilised the tensions within the concept of citizenship, and appropriated the liberal discourses associated with citizenship. The tensions within the new right project should not be ignored, but the over-arching purpose of that project should be appreciated as well.

The new right's, and subsequently Thatcherism's, strength in this regard has led to the 'subversion of citizenship' - discourses in citizenship have been used to undermine 'universal membership', the ethical ideal at the heart of the concept. This was illustrated in a number of case studies [chapters four-eight]. In addition, they suggested that there was a strong underlying emphasis on 'control' under the Thatcher regime, in the sense of designing and implementing structures which delimit alternative values and understandings. As a result, Thatcherism itself, like the new right, may be characterised as a project in 'closure', for the 'market society' [chapter nine]. The new right has suggested, in a critique directed particularly at Marxism, that theoretical authoritarianism tends to result in actual political authoritarianism. The same criticism may be directed back at the new right, and
evidenced to some degree under the Thatcher regime. Yet despite this 'authoritarian' thrust in the structure as well as the content of the arguments of the new right, its opponents should recognise also the forms of 'freedoms' it did appear to represent given that they drew on prominent conceptions within the 'dominant political culture'. In particular, these centred around 'private' individual accumulation in the market, and the conceptions and values which flow from them.

In response, it was noted that parts of the left are attempting to find ways in which they may advance the project of 'universal membership' founded on a conception of citizenship as 'individual autonomy' within the dominant political culture [chapter ten]. Initially, the left (in its social democratic formulation) neglected political participation, but in the more recent rephrasing of citizenship has at times over-emphasised it. This has been ill-conceived, especially since it has not addressed key problems with the social democratic model, but rather has obscured them. In order to seek to resolve them, the left will have to accept a more critical, material and contextual conception of citizenship.

The apparent 'crisis of politics' and this 'new' progressive project of individual autonomy may appear to be contradictory. First, how, if there is a restriction on any alternative political projects, can any such project succeed? The most rational response would be a form of politics which
recognises the problem of capital, and seeks its abolition - an orthodox Marxist position. Second, if there is a crisis of politics, would not a better strategy be to face this head-on, and seek to compose a project which argued foremost for a radically-expanded political sphere and participation? It has been the suggestion of this argument that the crisis of politics, and the need for a progressive project focused on individual autonomy, are closely-related. At this moment it is difficult to conceive of a practical alternative to a more pragmatic, genuinely pluralist left project, one in which it is demonstrably clear that the left is seeking to expand ordinary citizens' opportunities for social (rather than necessarily political) participation in ways which might not help the left's traditional over-arching political project for greater equality and collective solidarity. In the wake of the new right, only a 'new' left appears to be attempting to deal critically with problems in the social democratic account, often in ways which will alarm other parts of the left (no doubt as the new right alarmed more traditional parts of the right). Citizenship may become a guiding theme for a new generation of progressive politics, but most profitably only if a greater understanding of its problematic as well as attractive characteristics is developed. Following Michael Oakeshott's suggestion at the beginning of this study, without this knowledge, and allied to a better appreciation of actual forms of social
behaviour, progressives may not be able to make use of whatever else they may have learned.

11.1 The Dilemma of 'Politics'

However critical one might be of the concept of 'citizenship', it may also be true that: "There is probably no other idea in human history which combines the aspirations of man's need for equality and man's desire for liberty as does that of citizenship."\(^1\) Else why analyse it?

There is a subtext to such an analysis which seems relevant to any exploration of citizenship - the question of the nature and scope of 'politics' itself. There is, in the simplest of regards, a basic divide between thinkers. Citizenship brings this out most sharply.

The first tends to argue that:

"...the political figure of Being, being a citizen, which is apparently one of the most partial and specific modes of Being, turns out to be fundamental; for where a full, rich concept of citizenship is lacking politics is absent, in abeyance, hiding, side-tracked, or even suppressed. Where citizenship and politics are absent the project of Being human is itself side-tracked."\(^2\)

It is a challenging, inspirational vision. The form of discourse theory drawn-upon here compliments this, since 'politics' itself is regarded as the resistance to 'closure', the denial of 'radical

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\(^2\) Clarke (p.3, 1994).
democracy'. Hence, in some form, politics bounds and defines everyday life and 'common sense' understandings. Politics is primary.

The second claims to deny the centrality of politics and its value to 'everyday life'. Politics is a threat to established orders, assumptions, and accepted ways of doing things. As a consequence, attempts are made to deflect and marginalise it, or more specifically to marginalise the political projects which may be seen to expand the 'political'. There is no better contemporary example than the new right. It is an anti-political political project. It seeks to construct a 'culture of containment', as brought out by discourse analysis in particular, to in effect 'close down' politics.

As with all simple dichotomies, the 'solution' may lie in a third option, a fusion between the two. Hence (Crick, p.125, 1962):

"Politics, then, the liberal is right, is a limited activity. But he is wrong to think that these limits can be expressed precisely in any general rule; such rules are themselves political attempts to compromise and conciliate rival forces in a particular time and circumstance. Politics cannot embrace everything; but nothing can be exempted from politics entirely."

As suggested here, the (constructed) dominant political culture, while contested, contains an anti-political tendency within it. As human beings, it is difficult to resist the pervasiveness of
commonly-understood meanings and perceptions. It is draining to be 'political', in the critical sense, in everyday life. Thus political theory is crucial to 'decoding' the social world, but might have to play a limited explicit role in any project which seeks to alter society.

This is the double movement apparent with regard to 'politics' for the left, and the implicit theme running through this study. One expands 'politics', the other suggests limits.

The new right may be regarded as manipulating this problem more effectively than the left. At points during the post-war period the left was concerned about democratic participation, but this bore little fruit in terms of the Labour Party or many practical measures. Exacerbated by common perceptions of Eastern European and Russian state socialism, this allowed the new right to portray socialism as intrinsically inimical to democracy, and to argue that only by abandoning 'socialism' could popular power and control be achieved. The nature of the new right itself suggests the struggle to construct and reinforce the 'market society', and the primacy of the 'political' in methodological terms. As has been suggested before, the new right has had a broader conception of politics than the left has often had, despite being a fundamentally anti-political project.

11.2 Conclusion

The left should stand for a genuine plurality, linked to individual autonomy and enhanced 'social'
participation - even a freedom beyond its own preferences for politics or idealised models of a future society. In the wake of the apparent collapse of other visions of the left (particularly communism and social democracy), what other potential route exists for a popular new left politics?
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