Chapter 5: JEWS IN BRITISH SOCIETY (2)

The Jewish Image in Britain in the War

Commenting on the survival of medieval stereotypes in the modern world, Norman Cohn has stated that "myths do not necessarily disappear with the circumstances that first produced them. They sometimes acquire an autonomy, a vitality of their own, that carries them across the continents and down the centuries." The Jewish stereotype, it has been suggested, possesses a "massive durability" - the popular belief that Jewish evacuees would have horns would seem to illustrate the point. Nevertheless a dynamic factor is still present in the historical imagery of Jewry. Whilst some stereotypes disappeared or became insignificant over the course of time, others adapted to changing conditions (without necessarily becoming any less unfavourable) and new categories came into existence, though often not without reference to earlier images. In the Second World War it is possible to see this complex process at work in British society; to examine how the stereotypes of 'massive durability' stood up to powerful economic and social change and to evaluate the new imagery of Jewry that emerged from the tension of the war.

The source of much British thinking on Jews in the war predated even the medieval times and rested on the Bible itself. Yet even here there was a typically ambivalent attitude illustrated neatly by the novelist Dorothy Sayers. Sayers remarked that Jews underwent a transformation "in the blank pages between the Testaments: in the Old, they were 'good' people; in the New, they were 'bad'
people - it seemed doubtful whether they were really the same people". To a small section of the population admiration for Biblical Jews carried on to Modern Jews. Visiting a synagogue for the first time in 1942, Blanche Dugdale was moved to write in her diary "these are indeed The People of the Book....two thousand years seemed but as yesterday". Eleanor Rathbone's philosemitism had similar roots, being drawn by "the romance of the prophets". More common, however, was to contrast the "pure clean-cut Semite" (of which Jesus was a fine example) of the Old Testament with the modern Jew and his "sallow complexion, coarse black hair and beard....and distinctive hooked nose", as did the Headmaster of Marlborough School in a school religious text.

Sayers herself suffered from no such ambivalence, stating in the war that she was "hopelessly allergic to Old Testament characters". It is thus not surprising that Sayers' radio plays based on the life of Jesus, The Man Born to be King, showed a continuing hostility to New Testament Jews. Matthew is described as "as vulgar a little commercial Jew as ever walked Whitechapel" who behaves like an ancient black marketeer. Moreover, the plays were notable for the way in which Sayers portrayed the crucifixion. With an audience in the millions, this B.B.C. play (which was broadcast from November 1941 to October 1942 and repeated in Easter 1943), upset the Jewish community. The latter believed that the bloodthirsty Jewish demand for the death of Jesus, as depicted in The Man Born to be King, would create antisemitism.

Sayers' unsympathetic account - the Jewish mob chants
"Crucify! Crucify! Crucify! A'rrh, A'rrh, A'rrh" - highlights the fact that the charge of deicide against the Jews was still commonly being made nearly 2,000 years later. A reader of Tribune was shocked to hear a 5 year old tell a Jewish friend "you are a naughty girl - why did you kill our Jesus?" However, many other Jewish children suffered at school, especially at Easter, from this accusation. Nor was this a monopoly of the immature. After a broadcast in 1941 on Christian attitudes to Jews, W.W. Simpson was sent a variety of antisemitic letters, many from clergymen, some of whom attacked Jews for killing Christ. Similarly, a Mass-Observation survey just before the war found that several correspondents believed that Jews "must and will (always) be guilty" and that "they are now suffering for their actions". Many still believed that economic rather than religious reasons were more important in explaining modern antisemitism, but it would appear that, up to 1945, Christian attitudes to Jews had not significantly changed. W.W. Simpson, as secretary of the Council of Christians and Jews (C.C.J.) from its formation in 1941, believed that although some Christians were beginning to re-examine their approach to the subject in the war, the C.C.J. was still ahead of the time in being sympathetic to the Jewish religion. There was still widespread religious belief that Jews were responsible for antisemitism, even in its German form, and that this was somehow related to the Jewish responsibility for the Crucifixion, and for the subsequent refusal of Jews to recognise Jesus as the Messiah. Indeed, some went further, denying that Jesus was even a Jew - a Mass-Observer
being rebuked for even suggesting this for "He was the son of God apparently". Nevertheless philosemitism associated with the image of Jesus as a Jew did exist, one Jewish soldier having his bed made by a Welsh Methodist for this reason.

Despite, or even because of, its early Jewish origins, the early Church had become anti-Jewish and medieval anti-semitism was essentially Christian. Through the Gospels themselves, the Jew as Christ-killer was transformed into the Jew-Devil or anti-Christ. With such thinking, the Blood Libel myth was able to appear for the first time, in Norwich in 1144 and a century later in Lincoln where, due to "the cruel distortion by myth of reality", 19 Jews were hanged for the alleged ritual murder of a child. Yet, like the Christ-killing Jew, the Jew-Devil imagery was another medieval legacy that survived into the Second World War.

No new fresh cases of ritual murder accusations were made in Britain from the Lincoln case in 1255 until the 19th century. However, through Chaucer's "The Prioress's Tale" and 17th and 18th pamphleteers, the idea was kept alive in Britain. As the 19th century essayist, Charles Lamb, wrote "Old prejudices cling about me. I cannot shake off the story of Hugh of Lincoln". Chaucer's account of the latter was also converted into a popular 18th century ballad called "Sir Hugh" or "The Jew's Daughter". To quote Jennifer Westwood "old legends die hard" and the late 19th century witnessed a revival of the accusation in Britain, with the Ripper Murders not being free of this medieval charge. These continued sporadically
in the 1920s and 30s, when the charge was made by both respectable Catholics and the more marginal Arnold Leese. However, we need to keep a delicate sense of balance over the importance of blood libel accusation in Britain by the Second World War. On the one hand, one must agree with an Edgware vicar who in 1940 claimed that whilst antisemitism was widespread "most people had not heard of Ritual murders". Even the English oral tradition was not impervious to change and it is significant that 20th century versions of 'Sir Hugh' have been sanitised from antisemitism, if not ritual murder. Nevertheless, on the other hand, in the war itself occasional claims were made that Jews may have committed such crimes in the past, one even being made in the House of Lords. Also we have already seen how John Hooper Harvey managed to put the charge in a mainstream school history book, whilst the popular commentator, Douglas Reed, praised Chaucer's Hugh of Lincoln in 1942. By 1945 it was slowly being recognised that the ritual murder accusation was unrespectable - though it took until 1959 for a plaque of the incident at Lincoln to be removed from the Cathedral. Characters such as Harvey have kept the myth alive in post-war Britain, and it is thus understandable why objections have been made recently to satirical accounts of ritual murder in the magazine Punch. The charge is not so dead as to be regarded as a joke.

Neither should the blood libel be examined in isolation, for it is part of a wider imagery that suggests the essential evilness of Jewry. It has been noted how shechita was linked to ritual murder, and how the former was a result of "Jewish
Cruelty". Similarly, animal rights' groups specifically attacked the involvement of Jews in the fur trade, stating that the infliction of pain involved in the industry was essentially un-British. Medical groups also attacked vivisection and even vaccination as products of the inhuman Jewish mind. It is thus important to remember that whilst few believed explicitly in the Blood libel, or in the extremist Alexander Ratcliffe's idea that Jews were part of "the synagogue of Satan", Mass-Observation found that over 60% of the population "were convinced that Jews were in some way evil". The horned, fanged and bearded devil-Jew of Ratcliffe's propaganda was simply a more direct descendant of the medieval image than the more popular concept that Jewish evacuees were envisaged to have protruberances on their heads. The legacy of the middle ages had thus survived, albeit more commonly in a watered-down and confused form.

A parallel development can be found in another aspect of the Jew-devil link - the sexual fear of Jews. It has been perceptively pointed out that the antisemitism associated with Jewish White Slave traffickers at the turn of the century, with its suggestions of demonic Jewish influence, "represented a sexualization of the ritual-murder accusation". Moreover, it was a charge that continued in Britain in the Second World War (despite the total demise of this trade). Again we can see a process where only a few extremists and the occasional popular author actually raised the Jewish White Slave issue, but where fears of Jewish sexual power were much more widespread. The death of Freud in October 1939 brought forth comments
about his obsession with sex and his "unwholesome influence on the inter-war years". On a more personal level, a young Jewish refugee was told that the only reason she wanted to go to the city was for carnal purposes - "Man mad - you dirty Jew bitch!" Harold Nicolson assumed, without any evidence whatsoever, that a group of girls accompanying some American soldiers in 1944 were East End Jews. He commented in his diary "I am all for a little promiscuity. But nymphomania among East End Jewesses and for such large sums of money makes me sick". These series of leaps in imagination show how the process of distortion could occur, and how antisemitic sexual imagery could make its impact on even such an urbane and sexually liberated character as Nicolson.

The image was certainly one that continued in popular literature. In John G. Brandon's *Death in Duplicate* (1945) although Isaac Levant is a "dirty, greasy rat", he also had a "strange power over women", a predator who had teeth "like those of a man-eating denizen of the deep". In the hugely successful novel by Manning Coles, *Drink to Yesterday* (1940), it is not sensuality but sheer money-power that allow the "Jew-boy" to buy off two nice young Aryan girls who are simply "hungry". However, whilst the 'greasy Jew' is a threat to 'white' women in such novels, the Jewess, in typically ambivalent fashion, is often beautiful, possibly wicked, but totally acceptable to the Gentile. The war thus did little to break down these long held literary and attitudional sexual stereotypes, as is illustrated by the remarks of the daughter of a well-known novelist. Despite the persecution of Jews and a knowledge that she
was herself prejudiced, she could not help thinking of Jews as "Shylocks.... or else beautifully wicked Jewesses who are mistresses of millions of men.... the women never grow old and the men are never young".\textsuperscript{57} It is now necessary to turn to the first part of her equation - the "greedy old men huddled over their moneybags, and lending money at enormous interest".\textsuperscript{58} That is the less exotic, but more prevalent, legacy from the Middle Ages - the image of the Jew as usurer.

It is clear that even in the medieval period Jews by no means dominated moneylending, yet by "the twelfth century the words 'Jew' and 'usurer' had become almost synonymous".\textsuperscript{59} In Britain the usury issue was used as a pretext for the expulsion of the Jews in 1290.\textsuperscript{60} Yet despite the absence of Jewish moneylenders in Britain for the next four centuries, the image of usurer continued either in literature (of which Marlowe's Jew of Malta and Shakespeare's Shylock are only the best known examples of a common portrayal), the Church or in folk-tales.\textsuperscript{61} As a literary convention, the Shylock figure has been "persistent.... international (and) fairly static",\textsuperscript{62} and this seems to have been reflected in popular thinking. In Manchester in the 1880s, although Jews played only a minor role in money lending in the city, a local journalist, Walter Tomlinson, believed that the identification of Jews with extortionate usury was "extensively believed in".\textsuperscript{63} Indeed, the historian of British antisemitism has concluded that up to 1914 the image of the Jew as Shylock was one of the two dominant perceptions of Jewry, and one that was to continue in the inter-war period.\textsuperscript{64} Did this change in the Second World
War?

A study of the Shylock image in the war reveals the complex way in which stereotypes change during periods of economic and social upheaval. Firstly, we need to recognise the tremendous persistence of the image and of the cultural forces that promoted it. The depth of the antisemitic tradition in the area of usury was illustrated by Captain Ramsay's attempt to revive the Statute of Jewry of 1290 in the Commons at the end of the war. Ramsay's admiration for Edward I's campaign against Jewish extortion and exploitation was shared by the '27 July 1941 movement' - one that wanted this day, that of the expulsion of the Jews, to become a national holiday. However, outside the extremist world, the source of beliefs linking Jews to usury were more obvious. They stemmed largely from a childhood reading of the 'Merchant of Venice', written when hardly any Jews lived in England. A survey on the major influences affecting people's attitudes to Jews found that Shakespeare's play was one of the most important.

Nevertheless there was change, and the second point to note is that the Shylock image had altered from its original form. A satirical work on English attitudes to foreigners published in 1935 suggested that although "Jews...are undoubtedly very cunning and get the better of Christians... no one expects nowadays to come upon funny business with pounds of flesh". In literature it is rare to find an actual Jewish money-lender by the 1940s. What was more common was the offspring of Shylock's younger 'cousin' - Fagin or, more frequently, Shylock in modern garb, the Jewish financier. We have seen how fear of Jewish finance
permeated British society in the war, and the same image emerges in popular literature, reinforcing long-held stereotypes. So strong were these that they actually affected relations with ordinary Jews. A Jewish soldier reported in the war that "I had a most difficult job in explaining to one of my room mates that I (was) not an International Jewish Financier".

The all-powerful Jewish financier was not a new literary development in the war, indeed it was a stereotype that had been strongly rooted since the late 19th century, especially in authors such as John Buchan. What is interesting is how this figure continues into the war in the works of several popular novelists - regardless of Nazi persecution of Jews. Elizabeth Kyle's *The White Lady* (1941) has a Jewish financier, Julius Hermani, who was "not so much a man as an expression of power". As well as dominating single-handed "the commercial life of Central Europe", Hermani controlled the balance of European political power and he eventually organises a peasant revolution. How deeply this literary stereotype had become ingrained is illustrated by a review of this book in the liberal (and philosemitic) *Time and Tide*. The reviewer did not attack the portrayal of Hermani but commented merely that he was "a Jew financier", assuming that the journal's readers would know what this meant. In the work of Anthony Parsons, the hero, Sexton Blake, is pitted against a Jewish financier, Simon Levey, and the yellow peril in the form of Si Lung, a tea magnate. Levey, via an international currency swindle, is controlling both the Bank of England and the Bank of China. Interestingly, the
Jewish Peril is shown to be greater than the Yellow, for we later find out that Blake has only one enemy, for Si Lung is in fact Levey in disguise.79

We thus see the perpetuation of the international Jewish financier image but a third and final point about the development of the Shylock image needs to be made. It has been shown that the usurer stereotype was transformed into that of the financier, but there was also a positive change by the time of the war. By 1940 authors like John Buchan had studiously avoided using Jewish financiers in their stories,80 some theatres were beginning to treat Shylock sympathetically81 and it would seem that a Mass-Observer, who was starting to question her image of the Shylockian Jew, in the light of "Hitler and Streicher", was not alone.82 Even so, the belief that Jews were obsessed with money was still perceived by the British public to be the dominant Jewish trait in the war. In an opinion poll carried out in 1940, 38% of the comments on money-mindedness were connected to Jews.83 Exactly the same percentage of the sample saw Jews as predatory, statistics showing that Jews were not only linked to money, but were also, and because of this, perceived as a malevolent powerful force in British society.84

This was most blatantly portrayed in The Protocols of the Elders of Zion. It has been noted how The Britons circulated two editions of this document in the war, and how fascist and antisemitic groups referred to them increasingly throughout the conflict.85 However, it has also been shown how through such publicists as Douglas Reed, or the organ Truth, conspiracy ideas reached a wider public.86
It is now necessary to examine how widespread the image of the all-powerful Jew was across British society.

Writing in the late 1960s about the history of antisemitic conspiracy theories, James Parkes pointed out that "there was a time when it would have been unnecessary to explain what The Protocols are, for they were blazoned over the national press, and agonised discussions were held as to whether they were genuine or not". This was certainly true of the early 1920s, and although a change had taken place by 1939, it is remarkable how often The Protocols were discussed in the war. Excluding extremist sources, the authenticity of this document was the subject of lengthy correspondence in the Catholic World, The Scotsman and more briefly in the London Teacher.

Moreover, The Protocols found an outlet through the influence of the social credit movement. Professions such as medicine and the building trade, which were prone to resorting to money-lending, were susceptible to this ideology. Thus Medical World and the Builders' Merchants Journal contained antisemitic conspiracy ideas in the war. Adding to this picture was the British Israel movement. Whilst it is easy to dismiss as cranks the believers of the theory that Britons were the real descendants of the Chosen People, it is evident that in the war British Israelitism was extremely popular, to the extent of causing the government concern. Some of their literature merely suggested that modern Jews had no connection to those of the bible, but a significant section, headed by the prolific Basil Stewart, went further. They argued that The Protocols outlined how the real Chosen People had been
usurped by Ashkenaci (sic) modern Jews, who were "racially neither Jewish nor Semitic but mongrel breeds of minor Asiatic races". The sales of such pamphlets, according to George Orwell, were enormous.

When added to the fact that the Nazis were using The Protocols in their propaganda and, according to Goebbels, by 1943 devoting between 70 to 80% of their broadcasts to antisemitism, it is not surprising that Maurice Samuel could write in 1943 that "to-day the Protocols are embedded in the minds of millions as genuine revelations". Nevertheless, Mass-Observation surveys on Jews reveal that explicit reference to The Protocols was rare. The comment that "I always see the Jews as a huge octopus with its tentacles spread over the wealth of the world, and nothing but chopping will get those tentacles separated from the wealth" being an exception. Yet out of a sample of 68 replies in October 1940, 12 (17%) expressed concern over Jewish power in society, of whom 4 (5%) believed that Jews actually controlled Britain.

Thus the influence of The Protocols was more indirect, perhaps most popularly expressed in the 'Jews' War' argument, but also in the common belief that Jews controlled public opinion via the press, or culture via dance bands, comedy and the cinema. The latter was the most serious complaint, with Jewish finance, the alleged controller of the screen, being blamed for destroying the Christian Sabbath, or, in more Svengalian imagery, for "producing a type of robot mind". Ironically, the claim that "Jews' control of culture" - a "fact" according to the St.Helens
Reporter "which is accepted as naturally almost as night-fall and dawn",\textsuperscript{106} was being made at a time when Jewish influence over the cinema and theatre was declining rapidly.\textsuperscript{107} Yet in the distorting atmosphere of a society where the concept of Jewish power was almost taken for granted,\textsuperscript{108} where intelligent observers could seriously "never understand why world Jewry allowed Hitler to get away with (persecuting their brethren),"\textsuperscript{109} and where 12% of the population believed that there were more than 3 million Jews in Britain (and 42% could over-estimate the real figure of 400,000),\textsuperscript{110} one can understand how the mistaken belief that Jews culturally dominated Britain could become a prejudice, unchanging when exposed to new knowledge.\textsuperscript{111}

The concept of Jewish power was but another aspect of the legacy of medieval antisemitism, with the magical and demonic Jew transformed to meet the needs of modern society in the shape of the Learned Elder, the international Rothschild, or the Hollywood Mogul. There now remains, after having examined the image of the Jew as Christ-killer, Demon and world power, the need to consider the final aspect of the medieval contribution to modern antisemitism; the idea of the Jew as the perpetual alien.\textsuperscript{112} In the modern period a dual process operated whereby a durable stereotype of the Jew as foreigner was reinforced in both the late 19th century and the 1930s by a new influx of Jewish immigrants. Ironically, at both points the established Jewish community had become Anglicized. For this reason the new arrivals were often badly received by their co-religionists who feared that the alien Jewish image
was being given new ammunition. Nevertheless, old and new Jews were differentiated in Britain; as one satirist put it "Oriental Jews wear beards and occidental Jews wear diamonds". The former was portrayed in Warwick Deeping's *The Dark House* (1941) - described as a "Yid" who "cringed and whimpered", "it" had "a huge bowler hat, a long black overcoat almost down to its feet. It had a sallow face, and a hook nose, and a black retriever beard. It lisped." This was part of the 'Jew-boy' image, the Whitechapel Jew, whose other half had semi-contradictory features. His alter ego was just as physically unattractive and as oily but was not cringing but "flashy", "suave, well-dressed, financially successful and without scruple". The "Aldgate" Jew could simultaneously be very rude whilst "cringing to an extent that is almost indecent".

Having escaped from the East End to the more affluent pastures of North West London, the Jew-boy is transformed, but not beyond recognition. He may, or may not have lost his lisp en route, but in the process he had acquired even more diamonds for his podgy fingers, along with some bright plus-fours and patent leather shoes. The nouveau-riche Jew may have entered Hampstead but he was "of any nationality save English". Thus in Hugh Massingham's *The Harp and the Oak* (1945), a well-meaning Jewish doctor causes havoc in a country village because, despite his wealth, he was not "a real gentleman" but "like a showman at a fair, displaying the (pound) notes with expansive negligence". By "ram (ming) Semitism" down the villagers' throats, Dr. Abrahams becomes the hate figure and eventually an antisemitic riot occurs.
Massingham attacks both the excesses of village prejudice and the Jewish irritant in society - the "assimilated Jew" is still not an Englishman. 124

As the Jewish bourgeois was still in a way an alien, it enabled an attack to be made on materialism without it being an assault on wealth itself. In the war, the sin of being ostentatiously wealthy could be blamed on the Jews; many believing (quite falsely) that Jews predominated in all the expensive haunts of London. 125 The press pandered to such ideas, most notoriously in the case of Isaac Wolfson, the head of Great Universal Stores. Wolfson was portrayed in the Daily Express in 1943 as a tasteless, money-obsessed parvenu. Although his home had a great library (like a country gentleman's), he had no time to read the books. Indeed his home was not really English, it was more "like an ambitious Hollywood film set". 126 A similar assault was attempted on Leslie Hore-Belisha, emphasising both his ostentation and his Jewishness. 127

The alien Jew stereotype thus proved to be both persistent and malleable. In the 1930s, however, it gave birth to a new image, one created out of changing conditions but, as ever, with strong linkages to the past - the Jew as refugee. By the time of the war, the quantity of books depicting the plight of Jewish refugees was itself creating hostile comment, even from liberal elements within British society. 128 Tribune's Daniel George stated that he was "getting sick of them" 129 and Orwell remarked in 1940 that "for the time being we have heard enough about the concentration camps and the persecution of the Jews". 130 The refugee Jew image had thus arrived, but it is vital to stress
that this was not necessarily the positive or sympathetic happening as might at first be assumed. It is true that Britain prided itself on its supposed liberal and humanitarian history of allowing the oppressed to enter, and that the categorization 'refugee' itself implied less negative qualities than that of 'alien', but even the former term did not imply total innocence.131

However, in some of the literature of the war, a philosemitic image of refugees does emerge, most clearly seen in the works of Phyllis Bottome. Bottome, who along with her husband had worked "night and day to help refugees escaping from Hitler",132 portrayed Austrian and German Jews not just as victims, but as people. In Within the Cup (1943), the Austrian Jewish narrator, Rudolph, pointed out that "people think of refugees as unfortunate people who have lost their homes, suffered various painful experiences.... driven out of their country in a moneyless and embarrassing condition....but we are something quite different. We are human beings changed in essence".133 Similarly in Peter Mendelssohn's Across the Dark River, published just after the war, the narrator refers to an Austrian Jewish inn-keeper, Mr. Schapiro, who is being increasingly persecuted. Schapiro is described as being "just an ordinary man like myself. So what?"134

This seemingly obvious point was not grasped by other pro-refugee writers. Ada Jackson won the Greenwood Prize for poetry in 1943 with her "Behold the Jew", 19 pages of verse which likened persecuted Jews to "driven birds and badgers baited to their deaths and bulls that....bleed for strutting matadors....otters slain for wantonness".135 In
similar patronizing fashion Geoffrey Johnson compared "the world-wide-wandering Jew" to the "foxes and birds of the wild" both "seeking a hole to nestle in". Rebelling against this sort of approach, Phyliss Bottome's refugee concludes that "I am not like a bird. I am a man who loves a home, who has once had one, and been deeply rooted". Yet Jackson's furry mammalian imagery was more prevalent than that represented by Phyliss Bottome. In real life interaction the same was true - refugee adults receiving a muted welcome but "the children evoking pity". Those like Eleanor Rathbone, who were filled not with pity for the refugee but with "pleasure in his company", were comparatively rare. As the editor of an anthology on the Jews pointed out in 1945, "so long as they are looked on as one looks at freaks at a fair or animals in the zoo, the future of the Jews will be dark indeed".

However, the very fact that refugee Jews were human - with all the faults this naturally entailed - created problems for the poet Louis Macneice. Hoping that the experience of persecution would enrich the character of the Jews, Macneice was disappointed when he found that they remained ordinary people. Thus in his poem Refugees (1940), in the words of his biographer, "exiles flee to be themselves". Macneice described the refugees in uncomplimentary terms, referring to their "prune dark eyes, thick lips" or elsewhere as "hawk-like foreign faces the guttural sorrow of the refugees", "resigned Lazaruses who want another chance". The idea that the refugees simply wanted to go to America to start again anonymously disgusted Macneice who already hated the loss of individuality in the
modern mass world. Nevertheless, if the poetry of
Macneice or Ada Jackson denied the refugee Jew the freedom
to act as a human, their underlying feeling was one of sym-
pathy for the exiles. To others, perhaps the majority,
the refugee was not necessarily a victim.

The point is well-illustrated by a social survey in
October 1940. 47% of all comments concerning oppressed
people were directed towards the Jews, yet only 18% felt
Jews were deserving of sympathy. Such a dichotomy can
also be found in literature. Eunice Buckley's Family From
Vienna (1941) has a group of refugees who were a "paradox-
ical mixture of tragedy and arrogance, resignation and dis-
content", who have "a regrettable likeness to those of the
Jews caricatured in Nazi newspapers". In Sarah Campion's
Makishift (1940) the refugees are equally repulsive, one ad-
mitting "they're awful: we're awful, but we...live!" Lip
service is paid to the evilness of Nazi antisemitism, but
the refugee is not therefore seen as innocent. In Men in
the Same Boat (1943), an old German Jew escaping to America
rues the fact that if it had not been for the Nazis "he
would have been a successful man and made money....If it
were not for them the Jews would have become the secret
rulers of the earth, by controlling all the money markets".
The Manning Coles detective hero, Tommy Hambledon, is also
split between the need to destroy the Nazi racket in con-
fiscating Jews' property and the knowledge that the Jew
"had batten on the miseries of Germany in the bad years". This
approach explains why the Government was reluctant to
use Jewish persecution in its atrocity propaganda. "Horror",
pointed out a Ministry of Information memorandum in 1941,
“must be used very sparingly and must deal always with
treatment of indisputably innocent people. Not with violent
political opponents. And not with Jews”.¹⁵³

However, in a significant number of cases the refugee
Jew was not only unpleasant but actually seen as a threat
to British society. To explain how this could be believed
it is necessary to refer back to the Jew-alien image — the
Jew as an undesirable element who knows loyalty only to
himself. The refugee Jew could thus be a fifth columnist,
despite Nazi antisemitism. The spy scare gave the cheap
thriller in Britain a new lease of life,¹⁵⁴ and often a
Jewish character was present in these books. Tom Harrisson,
who studied such literature, found that "half worked in a
Jew somehow or other, and only in one case was the refer-
ence not unfavourable".¹⁵⁵ In the Black Cripple (1941),
Karl Mendel, "a swarthy, Jewish-looking man", was the Ges-
tapo chief in Britain, who "knows everything".¹⁵⁶ Andrew
Soutar also warned against alien refugee agents who "had
insinuated themselves into trusted positions".¹⁵⁷ Truth
was not isolated in warning against the "Refuspy".¹⁵⁸ The
novelist, Somerset Maugham, commented that "the Gestapo is
known to have had spies among refugees, and these have not
seldom been Jews".¹⁵⁹ A film 'Next of Kin',¹⁶⁰ and a radio
play 'Music for Miss Rogers',¹⁶¹ all contributed to an at-
mosphere where refugee Jews were not only disliked but
actively mistrusted.¹⁶² Without knowledge of this back-
ground image, it is impossible to understand the public
reaction to the refugees in the summer of 1940.¹⁶³ How-
ever, the impact of Nazi racialism had one positive impact
on the thriller genre; antisemitism revealed by a character
was often an indication of being an enemy agent—a technique paradoxically used by many authors who simultaneously attacked refugee Jews.

A brief examination of the situation in North-West London during the war reveals a close similarity between the Jewish refugee image, and the manner in which refugees were actually treated and regarded in an area of high refugee concentration. At the start of the war 15,000 aliens, the vast majority of whom were Jewish, lived in Hampstead, Golders Green and Hendon, and it is probable that the number increased throughout the conflict. However, in Hendon alone there were 145,000 people. The idea of an alien takeover in the area of what Douglas Reed called "St. Johanns Wood, Finchley Strasse and British West Hampstead" was far-fetched. Nevertheless, refugee Jews were prominent in the area, a fact that some locals appreciated—a Hampstead man commenting "I like them being here. For the first time London feels like a cosmopolitan city". Others expressed sympathy, admired their artistic talents or simply liked the refugees as people.

However, there was enormous hostility to alleged refugee behaviour in North West London. Refugees were supposed to have been rude and aggressive, especially in the local shops. It was a feeling supported by local papers—the Hampstead and Highgate Express, the Henden, Finchley and Golders Green Times and the Kilburn Times echoing the earlier hostility of all East End papers to the Eastern European newcomers. Despite close personal contact, local refugees were accused of being foreign agents, one sympathetic Hampstead resident writing that "I have
heard it said that one-half the refugees are dangerous elements - spies, Nazis and whatnot, who never ought to be allowed at liberty in this country". Internment was both urged and then welcomed in 1940. The Hampstead Express went as far as saying it was "a blessing in disguise" as it gave a chance to clear the area of refugees. Brief mention has already been made of the Hampstead petition movement which became a formal organization at the end of the war. The feeling it represented had been growing throughout the conflict, with several whispering campaigns against the refugees reported in 1943. Progressive elements in North-West London attacked the petition movement as antisemitic and Nazi-inspired, but over 2,000 residents supported the attempt to remove the 'aliens' from the area.

North-West London thus represented a microcosm of the whole refugee stereotype - admired by a few, pitied by many but disliked and feared by an even larger number. The heated feelings in Hampstead at the end of the war on a local scale, and the national reaction in the summer of 1940 show the need to take the hostility to Jewish refugees in Britain seriously. The 'new' image of refugees owed much to earlier hostile attitudes to Jews, and thus did not improve the position of Jews in society as a whole. The same could be said with even more conviction for the most dominant image of Jews in the war - one that was created in the conflict but owed much to practically every earlier Jewish stereotype, the Jew as black marketeer.

The identification of Jews and the black market in the war was almost as strong as that between Jews and
usury in the medieval period. Discussion of either topic usually brought in the other\textsuperscript{183} and, as has been illustrated, levels of domestic antisemitism were strongly correlated to the relative unpopularity of the black market.\textsuperscript{184}

In the introduction it was stated that to understand antisemitism one needs to examine four questions.\textsuperscript{185} Firstly, what was the prevalent Jewish image in society? Secondly, who was attacking the Jews? Thirdly, what was the social and economic background to the attacks, and finally what was the Jewish role in society? To explain why the Jewish black marketeer image became so prevalent we need to examine all these issues in turn to produce a total picture.

Firstly, the Jewish image. In many ways the Jewish and black marketeer stereotype coincided. The black marketeer was inevitably money-minded and unscrupulous in the way he made his fortune, corresponding neatly to the Shylock image.\textsuperscript{186} He was also foreign, dark and "evil-faced" and an internal threat to Britain. Again popular stereotypes of Jews could easily be applied to fit the role, especially as Jews were often linked to villainy in traditional British attitudes.\textsuperscript{187} The black marketeer was also seen as a power in society, and it comes as little surprise to find that it was popularly believed that Jews were "at the bottom of the conspiracy in almost every black market prosecution",\textsuperscript{188} with over 70% of the population believing that there was an organized black market.\textsuperscript{189} Even Jewish attempts to deal with the black market were viewed in a conspiratorial light, the \textit{Daily Mail} referring to "the black tribunals"\textsuperscript{190} asserting "a tremendous influence" and \textit{Truth} to a "racial Sanhedrin".\textsuperscript{191} Lastly, the black marketeer was closely
related to the war profiteer. In the 1914–18 conflict Jews had been accused of making money, while the boys were away fighting. The idea that the Second World War would help Jews could also easily be adapted to suggest that the war would financially benefit the Jewish community.

It was with the knowledge that the war was likely to bring about such accusations that the Jewish Chronicle warned its readers in September 1939 not to indulge in any profiteering. It believed that such activities would lead to the whole community being charged with misbehaviour.

In the same month, the Jewish Chronicle's fears were borne out with the B.J.P. launching an attack on aliens seeking to make their fortune out of the war. This brings us to the second question - who linked Jews to the black market?

It is not surprising that organized fascist and anti-semitic groups did their utmost to stress the Jewish involvement in the black market. This was done by literature, leaflet and whispering campaigns and letters to the press, of which J.B. Rothwell's was only the most infamous. Rothwell's letter also circulated as a leaflet and it was popularly received. Nevertheless extremist activities, although reinforcing the Jewish black marketeer stereotype, did not alone create the spontaneous public feeling on the issue. Even at the start of the war 'Beachcomber' of the Daily Express could write "Here lies the profiteer Kosteu-felstein, Called latterly Fitzwurren, There is some corner of an English field, That is for ever foreign".

Throughout the war this identification continued, present in radio plays, the House of Commons, popular
literature, comics even in a 'brainteaser', where contestants had to work out the prison sentences of Messrs. Abrams, Brody and Cohen. The Jewish black marketeer very nearly made an appearance in a Ministry of Food propaganda film. However, most important of all was the role of the press in promoting this stereotype. Major attacks were launched on Jewish involvement in black marketeering in papers ranging from Time and Tide and the Daily Mirror to the Spectator. Many had lengthy correspondence on the subject, where it was claimed that up to 90% of all offences were committed by Jews. Yet more vital than this was the selection of black market prosecutions chosen by the press. In May 1941, of 2,000 Ministry of Food cases, 40 were reported in the national press. Of these, 20, or 50%, were Jewish. Similarly in March 1942, The Grocer reported 48 cases, only 3 of which involved Jews, yet it was these 3 and only a few others that received national attention.

When the Jewish community accused the newspaper world of antisemitic bias in reporting the black market, vigorous denials were made. Nevertheless, it is hard to resist the conclusion that the press was pandering to popular taste on this matter. Home Intelligence commented in 1942 that "satisfaction is reported where (black market) activities and prosecutions can be traced to Jews". The press which, in Herbert Morrison's words, had not shown "any undue tenderness...to black market offenders" made the most of this Jewish unpopularity.

The Jewish image was suited to being converted into a black marketeer stereotype and it was one widely employed
across society in the war. However, these factors alone did not mean that the 'Jewish black marketeer' ogre was an inevitable occurrence. To explain why it came into prominence the precise economic and social background needs to be taken into consideration. It has been shown that the black market, which in reality was fairly insignificant, operated as a scapegoat mechanism; the Jews becoming a scapegoat within a scapegoat. When the press and public became bored with the subject in the latter part of the war it was not due to any decline in the black market, which paradoxically probably increased. With a decline in interest in the black market came a decline in domestic antisemitism associated with it — although the Jewish black marketeer did not disappear. Does this mean the Jewish role in the black market was irrelevant?

The answer is complex. On occasions, including several prominent court cases, a Jewish involvement was suggested where none existed. However, this must not disguise the fact that there was a significant Jewish involvement in the black market. A study of offences committed between April 1942 and May 1943 revealed that 10.9% of over 2,500 Board of Trade and Ministry of Food prosecutions were carried out by Jewish offenders. This proportion rises to 24% if the figures are limited to the five major trades where the black market occurred and to six of the major urban areas of Britain. Given that the Jewish population of Britain was less than 1% of the total, the figures at first sight seem alarming. However, another survey revealed that Jews owned up to 15% of firms in Britain, and that if the same trade and location factors
are imposed, a figure of 23% is obtained. In other words, the Jewish involvement in the black market was closely related to the proportion of Jews in the British economy. The pronounced Jewish presence in the black market reflected not a lack of business morality, which was so often assumed, but a stage in the socio-economic development of Anglo-Jewry, where small business ownership was common. The prominence of refugees in the black market can also be explained without reference to their alleged naturally ingrained dubious business practices. Involvement in the black market was largely due to the dire financial position of many of these foreign Jews in the war, added to their difficulty in understanding the complex rationing regulations. Even so, a Home Office survey in 1941 found that the alien Jewish involvement was only fractionally above what was statistically expected. On purely rational grounds, therefore, the British public was inaccurate in accusing Jews of undue involvement in the black market. However, in the real world of a British society fraught with domestic tensions, it is not surprising that the public was motivated more by emotion rather than cool statistical analysis. Although the Jewish black marketeer stereotype was principally generated by a scapegoat mechanism - and the Government participated in this - the Jewish involvement was relevant to the question. Real Jewish offenders confirmed past prejudices, and it would seem that some exceptionally bad cases in which Jews were involved generated particularly strong antisemitism.
Black market antisemitism was probably the most important element of British hostility to Jews in the war. Nevertheless, no Jewish black marketeers were ever physically assaulted, although there is evidence that Ministry of Food officials particularly sought out Jewish shopkeepers to prosecute and that the courts were more severe against Jewish offenders. Certainly some Jewish refugees received rough justice by being re-interned for petty war regulation crimes; in other words, Jewish myth was transformed once again into a real-world situation. Yet aside from the problems imposed on the Jewish community, the bogey of the Jewish black marketeer helped to raise morale in society as a whole, enabling a safe scapegoat to be used to deflect attention from the problems of rationing.

However, black market antisemitism must not be seen in isolation, for it nearly inevitably came packaged with another complaint, that Jews were escaping their military duties - taken together a diluted form of the Jews' War argument.

On pure statistical grounds there was again no basis for the Jewish war shirker image to come about. To explain its pervasive appeal one has, as usual, to examine the past Jewish stereotype. The most significant aspect in this respect was the combined image of the cowardly and non-physical Jew. According to a London headmaster, Jews were "naturally cowards", a view shared by much of the population. There were widespread accusations that the Jews were running away at the start of the war (rumours that were also made in the First World War), or joining the 'safe' civil defence units. As has been shown with the blitz, there were rumours that Jews were both fleeing
the city and crowding the tube shelters; even in government circles there were fears of an alien panic.238

Secondly there was the question of loyalty. The 1914-18 conflict had re-emphasised the alien quality of the Jewish immigrants. It would appear that memories of the Alien Military Service problem persisted into the Second World War. The belief that Jews were not actually entitled to fight for Britain was not uncommon; Elsie Janner was told that "I didn't know there were any Jews in the forces".239 More prevalent was the idea that Jews simply did not want to help the war effort, and apart from the army dodging issue, Jews were accused of avoiding firewatching duties,240 Jewish women of escaping war work,241 and young men of not being Bevin boys.242 Thirdly, there was the ever present conspiracy argument; Jews were said to be at the forefront of the military service ramp.243

The combined image of Jews as weak, cowardly, un-British and powerful were all strongly ingrained in the public mind. One should not expect the real presence of over 60,000 Jewish soldiers and their courageous behaviour to overcome these past prejudices. However, there was some positive change in the war. Despite quips about Jewish pawnbroker battalions,244 within the army, although anti-Semitism persisted, Jewish soldiers on the whole found that relationships improved once an initial hostility was overcome.245 Across society as a whole, some improvement can be detected as the war progressed. In early 1940, false accusations that there were very few Jews in the British Expeditionary Force were not contradicted,246 whereas four years later the same rumours concerning the Arnhem invasion
were widely condemned. In addition, the B.B.C. from 1943 did its utmost to stress the military contribution of Jews to the war effort. Louis Macneice in 1943 and J.B. Priestley in 1944 wrote plays with Jewish war heroes.

Yet these self-consciously positive attempts at stereotyping could not be said to represent the dominant Jewish image. With notable exceptions, the press ignored the Jewish background of soldiers such as Majors Wigram and Kisch. In literature, including Richard Hillary's classic war novel, The Last Enemy (1942), the Jew remains a cringing coward, as does the dance band musician, Jackie Kraus, in Geoffrey Cotterell's Then a Soldier (1944). Indeed, the persistence of the Jew-coward stereotype was amply illustrated by the Bethnal Green tube disaster and the Polish Jewish army question, both of which occurred towards the end of the war.

The local antisemitic impact of the disaster has already been examined. It is now necessary to examine why the canard of the Jewish panic gained national credence. A Board of Deputies report suggested that, within hours of the announcement of the disaster, antisemitic allegations were being heard as far away as the West Country. In Manchester a member of Toc H related how in a meeting of 12 professional people the Jewish slander developed. At 6 pm. all that was known was that the disaster had taken place in London; by 6.30 the Jews had been deemed "probably responsible". Forty minutes later the Jews "were definitely responsible" and after more discussion it was agreed that the Jews had "panicked blindly". Similar developments happened inside London and across the country.
The strength of the past Jewish image goes a long way to explain the speed with which the Bethnal Green rumour gathered pace. However, it is possible that earlier memories of a disaster in 1918, when 17 people died in a rush to an air raid shelter in the East End, were remembered. This alleged panic was again blamed on the Jews, an automatic reflex that operated throughout the Second World War. As with the black market, Jews were held to blame for behaviour that was seen as 'un-British'. The Bethnal Green accident also occurred at a bleak time in the war, and it is significant that an equally horrific incident in America at the same time was also blamed on the Jews.

Even after the government's denial of the Jewish panic explanation in April 1943, antisemitic rumours still persisted. The full-scale emergence of the Jews in the Polish Army question the following year showed that the cowardly Jew image continued unabated. The reasons for the desertion of over 200 out of 800 Jews in the Polish army were highly complex and will be dealt with in greater detail in the next chapter. However, it is clear that to a significant section of the War Office the main reason was not fear of antisemitism, or political reasons but "the approach of active operations". Although one Foreign Office official rejected the army shirker explanation, another remarked that Jews "have not shown themselves (to be) very good military material". It was fortunate for these Polish Jews that other questions of diplomatic relations saved them from the severe punishment that they would have received as deserters.
In conclusion, despite the heroic actions of Jews in the Allied Forces and in such instances as the Warsaw ghetto rising, the war did little to dispel the "timid" Jew image, one that was "compared unfavourably with the fighting reputation of the Arabs". One Mass-Observer was irritated by Jews in the war, not due to the black market, but because they would not fight back like the I.R.A., but preferred "to suffer". It must be suggested that not until the successes of the Israeli army in the post-war world has the cowardly Jewish image been put to rest.

One aspect of the Jewish stereotype that has not been examined so far is the important question of the Jewish self-image. Not surprisingly, the Jewish community was much concerned with its own image. In the tense 'Jew-conscious' atmosphere of the 1930s and 1940s it is understandable why there was a simultaneous tendency both to internalise Jewish stereotypes from the wider society, and to rebel against it with an alternative, defensive viewpoint. This dual process can be seen most clearly in an article in the Sunday Pictorial, October 1940 'I am a Jew, But - ' by Denis Myers, possibly one of the most blatant press attacks on the Jewish community in the war.

Myers started the article by claiming he was writing against all Jews and in this he could claim to have succeeded. The first attack was made on "the Jews who ran away", rich Jews who by "their intrigue, their trickery" had managed to escape the war to make their fortune in America. In accusing his own people of a lack of courage, Myers was not alone. Alfred Perles, a refugee, accepted that the Jews were naturally nervous, and the
Jewish Chronicle in constantly referring to the exploits of Jewish soldiers, at times appeared to be attempting to convince itself, as well as the non-Jewish population. There was an element of surprise in its blitz headline "London Jewry's Splendid Fortitude. Death Roll Slightly Above Average". Even the Board of Deputies' British Jewry in Battle and Blitz (1943), an impressive account of the Jewish war effort, did not impress Cecil Roth, because the record was "not by any means sensational".

Myers then went on to attacking ostentatious Jews taking over the English countryside, transforming it "to the babble and waving palms of an Eastern bazaar". Again Myers was not just reflecting general attitudes but also those of much of the Jewish community. A complaint about Jewish behaviour on the Great Western Railway, of loud talking, flaunting of rings and wealth and bad manners was accepted by the Jewish Chronicle without thought. Indeed, one of the major Anglo-Jewish novels of the war years, Richard Ullmann's The Kahns' Progress, portrayed a grotesque nouveau-riche Jewish family, whose older members know no social constraint. In attempting to buy a country estate the father provokes antisemitism. Only in abandoning Judaism and "rouge and lipstick... jewellery" and loud dresses, do the younger members of the family escape the real problem that Jews create in British society.

Myers was also one of the first to suggest that Jews were profiteering in the war. The following year when the black market issue developed, the Board of Deputies' T.A.C. appears to have accepted the view that Jews were
particularly responsible. One member wrote that the anti-semitism associated with the black market was "to a great extent due to the conduct of the Jews", and another that food restrictions had "attracted many weak and wicked Jewish traders into the black market". Alleged Jewish sharp economic practice was accepted by the Board's Sidney Salomon, and the Jewish Chronicle launched a careers campaign against "the get-rich-quick-mania" in business.

Myers' final attack was on the refugee Jews, who in response to English generosity, "flaunt themselves, openly, aggravatingly, ungratefully". In language nearly identical to that of Douglas Reed, Myers suggested that "each corner of this English field on which they bred became forever Israel. They turned Golders Green into the Ringstrasse; they elbowed the interloping English out of the way; they spoke... the German or Czech of their native land abroad where they had been outcasts". Here Myers was on even firmer ground as far as the Jewish community was concerned. Through groups such as the Hampstead Vigilance Committee, the Board of Deputies tried to stop the "anti-social behaviour" of the refugees. Speaking in foreign languages was frowned upon and even the loyalty of the refugees was put into question. As will be shown, sections of the Jewish community, including the refugee organizations, did little to oppose mass internment in the summer of 1940.

What was unique about Myers' onslaught was the concentration of his attack. Whilst the individual allegations were part of the Jewish self-image, taken together
they were far too negative for the community to accept. Thus Neville Laski, who had launched many attacks on Jewish behaviour himself, was forced on the defensive. Laski replied in the *Sunday Pictorial* a week after Myers, writing about the Jewish war effort and charitable endeavours.

The final aspect of the Jewish self-image is the development of the Anglo-Jewish novel in the war. It has been suggested that until recent times Anglo-Jewish writers have attempted either to present Jews in a sympathetic light, as respectable Englishmen, or alternatively, to rebel against the emancipated bourgeois Jew ideal of the established community. In some respects all the Anglo-Jewish novels of the war were examples of the latter, although several had the aim of defending the Jewish community, or at least sections of it.

In the 1930s a new breed of Jewish writers came into prominence. Young, left-wing second generation East End Jews started to write about their surroundings. Simon Blumenfeld was the first to emerge, and his second book, *They Won't Let You Live*, was published soon after the start of the war. The bad West End Gentile capitalist, a money-lender, is contrasted to the good poor Jews and non-Jews of the East End. In the end both the Curries and the Rothsteins are united, but oppressed by the capitalist system, and forced to commit suicide. Similarly, in Burnett Sheridan's *King Sol*, published at the same time, East End Jews, blacks, Catholics and Chinese are united against fascism at Cable Street. Again the Jews are portrayed as good proletariats. In Willy Goldman's *East
End My Cradle (1940) the Cockney picture is harsher; Jews are selfish and Gentiles drunk, but ultimately the story is one of a local society unified by poverty, not just of "a poor Jewish family" but of "all the human family". However, in Richard Ullmann's The Kahn's Progress (1940) and to a lesser extent in Max Mundlak's Journey Into Morning (1941), the lifestyle of both working class and middle class Jewry is rejected as 'un-English', Jewish self-perceptions were thus formed from a mixture of the acceptance and rejection of Jewish stereotypes in wider society. It is now necessary to examine how important these Jewish stereotypes were in the major public forums in Britain during the war.

With the temporary demise of television, the most important influences on public opinion in the war were the press, the radio, the cinema and, to a lesser extent, literature and drama. Of all these the press was the most vital with regard to the Jewish image. Even so, Angus Calder has suggested that apart from Truth and the Catholic Herald "there was little overt antisemitism in British publications during the war". On a national level, if the National Review is added to this list, then Calder's statement is supportable, in so far as no other mainstream organs followed a consistently antisemitic policy in the war. However, on a local and provincial level the situation was less happy. Papers such as the Hackney Gazette, the Hampstead and Highgate Express and the Porth Gazette were continuously hostile in the war. Returning to the national scene, the Beaverbrook, Rothermere and Kemsley empires, whilst making token gestures of
friendliness to British Jews, simultaneously and consistently attacked refugee Jews; the Sunday Dispatch was particularly virulent.

If the British press had a commendable record as far as reporting the persecution of Jews in Europe was concerned, this cannot be said of its handling of the domestic black market question. It is difficult to evaluate how far newspapers were responsible for antisemitism associated with this issue. On the one hand, press reports were constantly given as justifications for antisemitism; on the other, the press was responding to what was seen as a more newsworthy aspect of such offences - a Jewish or alien name. That there was 'copy' in this during the war explains such ridiculous headlines as "Jew alleges robbery in Oxford field" or more blatantly, in regard to a conscientious objector, "The Jew".

The reinforcing, if not innovative, tendency of the press was also shown in its repeated discussion of the Jewish question. Hostile statements, either from journalists or in letters, were used to bolster antipathetical attitudes of a wider public. In this they operated in a similar manner to Douglas Reed, who also reached a large audience with his antisemitic writings. The press therefore kept alive a public outlet for discussion of Jewish matters, and helped to maintain the Jew-consciousness of the period. In the refugee and black market issues it was at the forefront of the feeling against Jews, but in neither case did it create, on its own, the original hostility.

Less of an impact on Jewish matters was made by the two other major popular mediums, the radio and the cinema.
In the case of the former, strict B.B.C. censorship ensured that hostility to the Jews on the radio was rare. A special effort was made to avoid news stories involving Jewish black marketeers, although an occasional mistake was made in this issue. Only 'The Man Born to be King' caused serious offence. Countering this, several Christian broadcasts were made attacking antisemitism (although they simultaneously attacked Jewish behaviour).

Throughout the 1930s the film industry had been thwarted by the British Board of Film Censors in its attempt to produce anti-Nazi films. As part of its appeasement policy the Board refused to allow any scenes involving persecution of Jews as "it undoubtedly comes definitely under the heading of political propaganda (sic)". With the war, this policy reversed, although certain towns like Brighton still refused to show the anti-Nazi film 'Professor Mamlock', as it would "enhance hatred against Germany". When this and other such films like 'Pastor Hall', 'The Great Dictator' and Louis Golding's 'Mr. Emmanuel' were actually shown, scenes of persecution, especially of Jews, were not always greeted with enthusiasm by the audience. Also, unlike America, the British film industry made few films in the war which referred to Nazi antisemitism. 'Mr. Emmanuel', the story of a Manchester Jew's discovery of Nazi antisemitism, was not produced until 1944. Moreover, whereas several American films emphasized the Jewish war effort, no such attempt was made in Britain. 'Hold Up Your Head, Comrade' (1942), a Ministry of Information propaganda film about the refugee Pioneer Corps, was the nearest approximation to this.
However, its impact was lessened because it could not show the alien volunteers in action against the Nazis.\textsuperscript{325} In addition, government sponsored films sympathetically portrayed Jews as bombed out evacuees\textsuperscript{326} and as East End Social Workers.\textsuperscript{327}

On the negative side, complaints were made about the portrayal of Jews in several religious biblical films.\textsuperscript{328} Alex Comfort also complained in 1944 of "the increasing anti-semitism of films" in Britain, with 'baddies' represented with a "facial character such as blackness, a moustache, or a Yid nose".\textsuperscript{329} One Mass-Observer suggested that one of the major influences on his attitude to Jews came from films, where Jews "are slimy, hooked nosed and twisting".\textsuperscript{330} Nevertheless, whilst the cinema in this way contributed to negative images of Jews, it does not seem to have been as important a factor as either literature or popular entertainment.

In 1945 George Orwell claimed that in Britain, since the rise of Nazi antisemitism, "anti-Jewish remarks are carefully eliminated from all classes of literature",\textsuperscript{331} and that "to put an unsympathetic Jewish character into a novel or short story came to be regarded as antisemitism".\textsuperscript{332} Doubt can be cast on both these statements. Turning to the second, whilst Roy Fuller's 'Fletcher', a story of a cowardly intellectual Jew, was attacked by Cedric Driver as "subtly antisemitic",\textsuperscript{333} similar characters such as Evelyn Waugh's Ambrose Silk, Richard Hillary's Neft and Geoffrey Cotterell's Jackie Kraus aroused no such comments in what were important war novels.\textsuperscript{334}

Referring to less serious works, Orwell claimed that
there was less antisemitism now "than there was thirty years' ago. In the minor novels of that date you find it taken for granted far oftener than you would nowadays that a Jew is an inferior or a figure of fun".\(^{335}\) Again Orwell over-simplified. Contemporary observers such as Tom Harrisson and Alex Comfort believed that antisemitism in thrillers and the like continued at a high level in the war, or even increased.\(^{336}\) The reason was supplied by Orwell himself in an article on Boys' Weeklies. Orwell commented on how little the stereotyped figures had changed, how the year could be 1910 or 1940 "but it is all the same".\(^{337}\) Thus whilst John G. Brandon made the occasional comment to indicate that his novels were now in a war-background, his general content of Jewish and Yellow perils differs little from that of Sax Rohmer's at the turn of the century.\(^{338}\) However, there were faint signs of change in this genre, shown in the works of the Manning Coles. In Drink to Yesterday (1940) in little more than half a page a Jew is introduced who is a war profiteer, an army shirker, physically repulsive and a sexual predator.\(^{339}\) However, its sequel, Pray Silence, published in the same year, reluctantly attacked the Nazis for their excessive antisemitism, and actually introduced a minor Jewish war hero.\(^{340}\)

Orwell can also be attacked for his belief that "after 1934 the 'Jew joke' disappeared as though by magic from postcards, periodicals and the music-hall stage".\(^{341}\) Yet again one is confronted with the "massive durability" of these stereotypes in these worlds, though occasionally indirect reference was made to German antisemitism. In a Donald McGill postcard a hooked nosed stereotyped Jew is
pictured in a nudist club: "The girls all took him for a Jew, This saucy old Barbarian, But since he joined the Nudist Club, They see that he's an 'Airy-Un'". In another war joke Cohen manages to sell Goering a left-handed tea service! However, generally one is struck by the lack of change in war jokes about Jews. Jews are portrayed as cowards, as money-obsessed, foreigners and twist-ers, with Jewish comedians often being the worst off-enders. Jewish jokes did not dominate music-hall humour, but neither did they disappear. In comics, mean Jews continued to be portrayed, especially by The Dandy. As an American comic executive stated in 1944, "We are interested in circulation primarily. Can you imagine a hero named Cohen?" In periodicals, anti-Jewish cartoons still appeared, Fenwick drawing one for London Opinion depicting Jews illicitly getting petrol. When accused of antisemitism he replied: "when I see these Jews going round still in large cars, in civilian clothes, it makes me long to do some really unpleasant cartoons". We thus see the continuation of antisemitic stereotypes but the real-isation that a degree of constraint was now necessary.

How much influence did these various literary and oral portrayals have on British attitudes to Jews? There is much evidence of the offence they caused to the Jewish commu-nity, but did they actually make an impact on general public thinking? With certain qualifications, it is possible to recognize an impact. Even with ethnic jokes, which are often assumed to be harmless and lacking any real malicious intent, a real influence can be found in the Jew-ish variety. A Mass-Observation survey on the way
attitudes to Jews were formed found that jokes were one important way antisemitic stereotypes were introduced to the public, and the N.C.C.L. was convinced that comics "were responsible for a lot of antisemitism amongst children". E.N.S.A. quips in the war, according to a Jewish sergeant, had "more than a passing effect" and music-hall portrayals of Jews, along with their accent, clothing and behaviour, were seen as typical of Jews as a whole. Orwell himself could not escape from his perception of Jews as "comic-paper cartoons". Popular literature also influenced attitudes to Jews, a (non-Jewish) soldier remarking at the end of the war that "so many people talk the same old claptrap because it is what they once read in some rag". It was these sources as much as the classic Shylock or Fagin characters that influenced the Jewish image in Britain.

However, whilst it is important to consider these printed aspects of a cultural tradition of hostility in Britain, it is possible that oral sources were even more important. Attitudes were often learned at an early age and were, in consequence, often hard to shake off. An East End Gentile related that from his earliest memories he was told "that a Jew is our natural enemy and must be treated as such". Another East Ender recalled how a 4 year old boy was told by his uncle that the Jews were evil, unclean and "certainly not British. He was teaching the boy antisemitism". In the case of fascists such as Oswald Mosley and the Duke of Bedford, one can trace a family history of antisemitism, yet the same process operated amongst the wider public. It was because the individual not only had to face the influence of literature, press, radio and other
forms of entertainment, but also of family and friends that Jewish stereotypes were so impervious to change. The Mass-Observer who could not stop himself making "rude jokes about Jews", although he was ashamed about it, was not a unique phenomenon. 364

In conclusion, the most remarkable aspect of the Jewish image in the war is the lack of change that took place, despite the background of Jewish persecution in Europe. Past Jewish stereotypes readjusted to the needs of war, most obviously with the black marketeer image. Even in the case of the Jewish refugee, past mindsets ensured that this would not be a totally favourable concept. Although six years of conflict involving intense mixing of Jew and non-Jew helped the reassessment of British attitudes to Jews, by 1945 the two basic Jewish images of Shylock and alien had still not been overcome. Even medieval libels such as the blood accusation occasionally surfaced in the war.

In studying the Jewish image, it has been vital to see that stereotypes did not exist in watertight 'mental' compartments, but actually impinged on the life of real Jews, directly or indirectly, positively and negatively. This process can be seen at its most important and clearest level in British government policy on Jewish matters, to which we must now turn.
Chapter 5: Footnotes


2. This phrase is that of E. Rosenberg, From Shylock to Svengali: Jewish Stereotypes in English Fiction (London, 1961), 13-14.


4. M.F. Modder, The Jew in the Literature of England (Philadelphia, 1944), vii, suggests that "the (literary) portrayal (of Jews) changes with the economic and social changes of each decade". Whilst allowing for the dynamic factor, it ignores the persistence of past imagery. See Rosenberg, op. cit., 13-15 for a critique of Modder.


11. Ibid., 'The Heirs to the Kingdom', 113-21. Broadcast on 8 March 1942. Matthew says "I'm not denying I've pulled off some pretty shady deals in my time. Took my rake-off on anything that went through my hands. That's how I made my pile". In a review in Tribune, 13 August 1943, James Taylor described the character of Matthew as 'delightful'.

12. For details of the play see the forward by J.W. Welsh, pp.10-15 and the comments of Asa Briggs in his The...
Briggs states that the plays were "an immediate success".

13. See the editorial in the Jewish Chronicle, 16 April 1943 and the complaint of the Board of Deputies to the B.B.C. of 14 August 1943 in B of D C6/10/7/1.


15. Tribune, 22 January 1943.

16. Naomi Grunfeld, who was evacuated to Campton, had an unhappy childhood in the local primary school, taunted regularly with the cry "You killed our Lord". She felt there was a direct link to being beaten up after Scripture lessons on the Crucifixion. The teacher was unsympathetic to her complaints. Interview with the author, 17 July 1984. See also Bernard Kops, The World is a Wedding (London, 1963), 35, Louis Heron, Growing Up Poor in London (London, 1973), 10; Emmanuel Litvinoff, Journey Through a Small Planet (Harmonds-worth, Middlesex, 1972).

17. Quoted in the Jewish Chronicle, 17 October 1941.


19. Ibid., DR 1182, 2118.

20. George Orwell could not accept that religious considerations came into modern antisemitism, pointing out that English Orthodox Jews were disliked less than unreligious European refugees. In Partisan Review, July - August 1943 and in the Observer, 30 January 1944 suggesting that he doubted if modern Europe cared enough to persecute people simply because they were not Christians. Some Mass-Observers agreed, one writing on the crucifixion that "I cannot imagine any sane Christian feeling antipathy today" - M - OA: DR 2059. Others believed that the crucifixion had "caused hatred for this class" and that the constant telling of the story to children had "a deleterious effect on their attitude towards the Jews" - M - OA: DR 2089 and 1264 respectively.


22. See the Jewish Chronicle, 17 October 1941 for a Christian explanation of German antisemitism being a response to Jewish bad behaviour. An article in the Christian News Letter no.80 (7 May 1941) 'The Nazi Creed' argued that Jewish profiteers were part of the background that led to despair in Germany. Issue no. 85 (11 June 1941) commented that the article had "met with great appreciation from our members". Dorothy Sayers was of the belief that Jews had missed their
historical moment and thus Jews were responsible for the maladies between Christians and Jews. James Parkes believed this was "the conventional Christian conception of the Jews". Letter to Victor Gollancz, 12 September 1943 in the Parkes Library 09.023.

23. In M - OA: TC Antisemitism Box 1 File G. See also comments in M - OA: DR 1230 June 1939 who denied that Christ was a Jew and believed that the Jewish persecution of Jesus meant Jews were justifiably persecuted now - "in fact the more Jews liquidated the better". Dorothy Sayers was criticised for not making Jesus more obviously a Jew, and the fact that her Mary in The Man Born to be King was stated as having a "slight Irish quality" added to this impression - pp.46.

24. Quoted by Basil Henriques, Fratres: Club Boys in Uniform (London, 1951), 143. I have already commented on Chaim Bermant's evacuee hosts treating him "as if I was a close relative of Jesus Christ". See chapter 3 p.264. Some Christians such as those in the Council of Christians and Jews were actively trying to stress the fact that Jesus was a Jew. See a report of W.W. Simpson's broadcast on the B.B.C. in the Jewish Chronicle, 20 June 1941 or the Sunday School Chronicle, 26 October 1944.

25. See Trachtenberg, op.cit., and N. Cohn, op.cit. passim.


27. Colin Holmes, 'The Ritual Murder Accusation in Britain', Ethnic & Racial Studies vol.4 no.3 (July 1981), 267 makes this point.

28. See Chaucer's Canterbury Tales. Holmes has details of 16th, 17th and 18th Century pamphlets which make the accusation. See ibid., note 13, p.281. For the Lamb quote see Malcolm Hay, Europe and the Jews (Boston, 1960), 126-7.


30. ibid., 200.


33. Holmes, op.cit., 272-9 and chapter 1 p.75 above.
34. Letter from Reverend Hutchinson to Sidney Salomon, October 1940 in B of D C15/3/19.

35. For example the folk-rock band Steeleye Span's version of "Little Sir Hugh", whilst retaining the ritual murder, does not mention Jews. On their album 'Commoners Crown'.

36. Arthur Day, a Catholic proselytizer in the East End could write on ritual murders, that there "may have been a few isolated cases of such child-murder committed in the Middle Ages by Jews addicted to black magic" in Our Friends the Jews (London, 1943), 49. A. Rugg-Gunn, in Osiris and Odin (London, 1940), 161 hinted that under the influence of 'alien' communism we may revert to the "Great Mother Cult" and "perhaps human sacrifice". Lord Hankeilou raised the question of Jewish ritual murder in the Lords in regard to the issue of libel. He ambiguously remarked that if an action was brought on a printing of the allegation "people would say 'Why are you so sensitive on this point, what have you got to conceal?'" Hansard HL vol.122 col.575, 14 April 1942.


38. Douglas Reed, All Our Tomorrows (London, 1942), 290.


40. A strip cartoon by Bernard Handelsman, 'The Golem' in Punch, 16 October 1985, brought forward complaints to the Board of Deputies, who in turn complained to the (Jewish) editor of Punch, Mr. Alan Coren. Henry Morris called the cartoon "offensive and insulting to Jewish people" whilst Mr. Coren replied that "the blood libel had been regarded as nonsense for so long that it was justified to use it as a background for black humour". The work of Holmes and myself suggests that Coren is being optimistic. For an account of Sunday School teachers still reviving the accusation see the Jewish Telegraph, 18 April 1986.

41. See chapter 4 p.328-31. A pamphlet Jewish Cruelty (Leeds, 1945) stated that "we ought to realise that of all civilised communities the Jews alone are guilty of baseless cruelty, their victims being animals... Jewish atrocities...are being perpetrated now in our very midst". Holmes, op.cit., 268 note 124 comments on the link of shechita, ritual murder and Jewish sadism.

42. See the debate in The Times, 12, 19 and 31 May 1944 and the comments of the Jewish Chronicle, 9 June 1944. Home Intelligence reported an opposition from the City to alien Jewish fur traders - INF 1/264 no.61 (29 July
43. F. Honigsbaum, The Division in British Medicine (London, 1978), 169 comments on the link between antivivisectionism and antisemitism. See also G. Fraser Mackenzie, Citizens versus Doctors (London, 1945), 45 and 'Question Master', The Evolutionists Brain Trust: What the BBB omitted (Edinburgh, 1943), 71 for a Jewish conspiracy theory of vaccination and p. 76 for a similar analysis of vivisection.

44. In the summer of 1940 a leaflet was circulating with a picture of a Jewish boot over Europe telling the British people to free themselves from "this Jewish peril, these anti-Christ... vipers of the Synagogue of Satanic Evil". Reported by the Daily Herald, 20 July 1940. This was anonymous but was similar to Ratcliffe's claim that Jews belonged to the Synagogue of Satan - Vanguard no. 315 (December 1943) and his Britain's Protest (Glasgow, 1944), 17. See also Cuthbert Reavely 'The Enemy Within' in The Patriot no. 1034 (4 December 1941) on "the tide of Satanism" and Action no. 206 (15 February 1940) article by Canute (Domville).

45. M - OA: TC Antisemitism Box 1 File G.

46. Sent in an antisemitic package to Doreen Idle in 1943. See letter to Elizabeth Allen, 20 May 1943 in NCCL 311/1. For the more vague Jews' Horn claim in the evacuation experience, see chapter 3 p. 260, 64 and this chapter p. 381. For another 'vaguer' example see the Perth Gazette, 19 December 1942, where a joke was told about a Jewish clothier who attempted to sell damp corduroy as moleskin. The customer complains that "there is a devil of a stink to them, isn't there?" The Jew interposed eagerly "Oh no, that's not the trousers, sir, that's me". The concept of the "foeter judaicus" is dealt with in Trachtenberg, op. cit., 48. Guy N. Pocock's The Slow and Sure Reading Book (London, n.d.), 50 dealt with popular misconceptions, including the one that "Jews stink". The Board of Deputies complained, but Dent, the publishers, said it was a common belief - J. M. Dent to Sidney Salomon, 11 May 1943 in B of D G8/2/2: H. Fisch, op. cit., 86-7 argues that the Jew-Devil figure appears in Shaw's Man and Superman and Graham Greene's Brighton Rock.


For extremist examples see 'Question Master', op. cit., 34 and Vanguard no. 312 (September 1943) for claims that Jewish refugees spread venereal disease. A letter on this subject was sent to the Jewish Chronicle on 26 September 1940 from Gibson Warwick and not surprisingly not published. See B of D C6/9/1/3. On the more respectable front, James Agate, literary editor of the Daily Express wrote to Sidney Salomon on 5 December 1942 claiming that he would publish the fact that Jewish parasites controlled prostitution in his next book. In B of D C6/9/1/3 FS.

See The Lancet, 14 and 21 October 1939 and the Spectator vol. 173 (13 October 1944), and Weekly Review vol. 29 no. 25 (7 September 1939). I have already commented on how the Beaverbrook press talked in Svengalian terms of 'Jewish' psychoanalysis. See chapter 1 p. 81.

Quoted by Austin Stevens, The Dispossessed: German Refugees in Britain (London, 1975), 166-7.


J. G. Brandon, Death in Duplicate (London, 1945), 33-4, 68, 71, 79-80. Likewise in M. P. Shiel's Above All Else (London, 1943), 6 the Jew Surazal "has a snake's fascination for some of the other sex".

Manning Coles, Drink to Yesterday (London, 1984, reissue of 1940 edition), 106-7. It was, in the words of T. J. Binyon, "an immediate and immense success" - loc. cit., Introduction, viii. Four editions were printed by December 1940 and it was the Daily Mail's book of the month.

For other examples of the predator Jew see Sam Rubens in D. L. Murray's Enter Three Witches (London, 1942), 9 who watches the women "with an intentness that had a touch of the wolf in it" and the comments in Countess Barcynska (Oliver Sandys), Let the Storm Burst (Tibbret, Essex, 1941), 89. For the beautiful Jewess see W. C. McKenna, The Spy in Khaki (London, 1941), 175 which Rachel "a beautiful Jewish maiden" who has "her native good breeding" whilst her brother Jacob is a "Jew-boy" - p. 213. In John G. Brandon's Yellow Gods (London, 1940), 142 although Moss Endelsohn was a greasy-looking pavement dealer, his daughter was "a beautiful young girl of not more than twenty" - p. 232. E. Rosenberg, op. cit., 39, 239, contrasts Scott's "noble Jewess" with Maurier's Svengali.

These two sides of Jewish sexuality seem to have developed little since the 18th century in English literature. Roy Campbell, although a violent antisemite, had a half-Jewish wife. In his Broken Record (London, 1934) he compared the beauty of Jewish women to the ugliness of Jewish men. See A. Hamilton, The Appeal of Fascism (London, 1971), 273 for comment on this.
57. ibid.

58. See James Parkes, *The Conflict of the Church and the Synagogue* (London 1934) and his *The Jew in the Medieval Community* (London, 1938) for a general discussion of the Jewish role in the medieval economy. The quote is from Trachtenberg, *op. cit.*, 190.


62. For details of this organization see *Truth* no.3385 (25 July 1941). Other support for Edward I came from the *British Lion* vol.8 no.9 (November 1939); *Social Credit* vol.3 no.5 (14 October 1939) and from the fascists Jock Houston at Finsbury on 5 February 1940 in B of D 06/5/1/1 and Edward Godfrey in the *Acton Gazette*, 10 December 1943.

63. See much of Brandon's war work for Jewish fences —
for example, The Death in the Quarry (London, 1941); Yellow Gods (London, 1940); The Hand of Seeta (London, 1940); A Scream in Soho (London, 1940); Murder for a Million (London, 1942) and Anthony Parsons, 'The Mystery of the Stolen Despatches' in the Sexton Blake Library no.19 (March 1943).

71. See Holmes, op.cit., 112-3 for comment on this transformation.

72. See chapter 4, p.317.

73. Quoted by Basil Henriques, Fratres (London, 1951), 141.


76. ibid., 36, 111. Hermani is described as having "hidden, sleepy power" in his eyes - p.114. He would appear to be a direct descendant of the Jew in Buchan's Thirty Nine Steps.

77. T. Clare in Time and Tide vol.22 no.31 (2 August 1941). See also M.F. Shiel, op.cit., 110 for a similar character to Hermani.


79. ibid., 93-7. John G. Brandon also alternated between the Jewish and Yellow Peril, owing a great deal to the influence of Sax Rohmer. Brandon was also linked to the Sexton Blake stories. See Donald C. Ireland's comments in John M. Reilly (ed.) Twentieth Century Crime and Mystery Writers (London, 1980), 179-182.

80. See chapter 4 p.336.

81. See chapter 4 p.341.

82. In M - OA: TC Antisemitism Box 1 File G. The daughter of the author mentioned in note 57, whilst believing all Jewish men were like Shylock, was at least attempting to come to terms with the fact that she knew that in reality they were nothing like this - M - OA: FRA 12.

83. M - OA: FR 523B, October 1940 study on "allies". Similar results were found with a later study, carried out in March 1943 - M - OA: FR 1648.

84. M - OA: FR 523B. See also chapter 1 p.77 and chapter 4 p.310.

85. See chapter 2 passim. In addition an abridged version, published by A. Freeman (London, 1940) was produced.

86. See chapter 4, p. 311, 339.


88. See the comments in chapter 4, p. 308.

89. Catholic Herald, 8 September 1941 - 27 October 1944, 23 February - 16 March 1945; The Scotsman, 8 September 1941 - 19 September 1941 and The London Teacher no. 1085 and 6 (20 August and 17 September 1943). The London bookshop, Foyle's, stocked *The Protocols* in the war, despite Jewish complaints. See B of D G6/2/13(d).

90. See Medical World, 2, 9, 16, 23, 30 August and 6 and 13 September 1940 for social credit ideology and a discussion of *The Protocols*; Builders' Merchants' Journal no. 231 and 232 (August and September 1939) and The Patriot no. 914 (17 August 1939) for approval of this. Tomorrow was converted in 1944/5. F. Honigshaus, *The Division in British Medicine* (London, 1968), 275-6 deals with the medical profession's dependence on usury.


93. Basil Stewart, *Zionism - A Fallacy* (Worthing, 1944), 5 quoting the American racist, L. Stoddart. See also his *The Hidden Hand* (Worthing, 1940); and *The Truth About Israel and Judah* (Worthing, 1945). E. Walsh and Zara-Judah, *Who are the Jews?* (Rochester, 1939 (?)) contains conspiracy arguments. M - OA: FR 344 and 346 and B of D G6/5/17 (report of meeting in Tower Hill, 20 September 1939) indicate that the movement was also viciously antisemitic in its public meetings.

94. In 'Pamphlet Literature' in the *New Statesman* vol. 25 (9 January 1943).


97. M - OA: DR 5296 October 1940. In the same directive, DR 2375 believed that "the 'Jewish peril' is a nightmare affecting only old maids". However, DR 2609...
This survey also found that 38% of the sample believed Jews to be a problem. See M-OA: FR 523 B. The directive in March 1943 produced similar results. See especially DR 2804, 3449, 2829, 2675.

See chapter 1 p.74, chapter 2 passim, and chapter 4 p.342 for discussion of the success of this argument. Orwell in his essay 'Antisemitism in Britain', in the Contemporary Jewish Record, April 1945, commented that it had a certain amount of plausibility as the Jews would undoubtedly have benefited from an allied victory. R. Travers Herford in the Hibbert Journal, July 1944 noted that The Protocols were still around in the idea that the Jews had planned and caused the World War.

Truth throughout the war campaigned against the 'Jewish press' - see no.3306 (19 January 1940) for an editorial reference to "the Jew-controlled sink of Fleet Street" and nos.3561-3 (1-15 December 1944) for similar comments. However, Orwell also lapsed believing that Zionists were "a bunch of Wardour Street Jews who have a controlling influence over the British press". Quoted by T.R. Fyvel: George Orwell: A Personal Memoir (London, 1984), 140. Harold Nicolson shared Oswald Mosley's belief that the Daily Mirror was secretly Jewish-owned. See H. Nicolson (ed.) Harold Nicolson: Diaries and Letters 1939 - 45 (London, 1967), 469 diary entry for 13 June 1945 and Mosley's comments in his 18B interview, 22 July 1940 in HO 283/16/59. Viscount Camrose, British Newspapers and Their Controllers (London, 1947), vii debunks the idea. Although the Daily Herald was owned by Lord Southwood, who was Jewish by birth, it was controlled by the T.U.C. W. Armstrong (ed.) Cecil King: With Malice Toward None: A War Diary (London, 1970), 100, 277 and 314-5 deals with the allegations of secret ownership of the Mirror.

See Douglas Reed, A Prophet at Home (London, 1941), 48 for comments that the Jews were alienizing English life through the picture house and the radio. Truth no.3370 (11 April 1941) and the Catholic Herald, 2 January 1942 complained about Jewish comedians. To put this in perspective, only 1 Jewish artist, Issy Bonn, was in variety in London in 1943 - see the Jewish Chronicle, 8 October 1943. James Agate complained about the "young Yids on saxophones" to the Board of Deputies, 30 November 1942, in B or D 66/9/1/3. See also the Daily Express, 26 June 1941 and Geoffrey Cotterell's Then a Soldier (London, 1944) for Jackie Kraus, a money-minded, cowardly Jewish jazz-player from Wembley. For an earlier attack see H.S. Ashton, The Jew at Bay (London, 1933), 19.
102. See for example the Porth Gazette, 25 July 1942, 15 August 1942; the comments of W. H. Bush at the N.U.J. conference 1943 that "Jews have a stranglehold on cinemas and theatres" quoted in the Jewish Chronicle, 9 July 1943; and the St. Helens' Reporter, 7 May 1943.

103. Dr. Barnes, the Bishop of Birmingham, complained that Jewish entrepreneurs, who controlled cinemas and music halls, "do not realise what it means to us, and what it may mean to them, that our traditional Sunday should be destroyed". Quoted in the Jewish Chronicle, 4 April 1941. The Lord's Day Observance Society complained likewise the following year - see the Jewish Chronicle, 29 May 1942.

104. According to the Director of Education in St. Helens who talked of "the insidious influence of Jewish cinema". Quoted by the St. Helens' Reporter, 7 May 1943.

105. The statement of M - OA: DR 2386, October 1940. For other examples complaining of Jewish cultural influence see Lionel Lindsay, Addled Art (London, 1942), 14 for allegations that Jews were ruining modern art for "the calf of gold"; Douglas Reed, Insanity Fair (London, 1938), 422 and Ethel Mannin, Lucifer and the Child (London, 1945), 69 for cheap "Jewish" shops bringing down society.

106. Editorial, St. Helens' Reporter, 7 May 1943.

107. The general secretary of the Cinematographers' Exhibition Association doubted whether 5% of his membership was Jewish and stated that the earlier Jewish prominence in theatre owning had become insignificant by 1939. See the Jewish Chronicle, 4 April 1941. E. Betts, The Film Business: A History of British Cinema 1896 - 1972 (London, 1973), 87-90, 210 relates how Deutsch died in 1941 and how Rank gained control of Gaumont-British, another Jewish chain. Jeffrey Richards, The Age of the Dream Palace: Cinema and Society in Britain 1930-9 (London, 1984), 43 comments that "by the end of the war, J. Arthur Rank was the colossus of the British film industry and a new era had begun".

108. See chapter 4, p. 347 for details of how 9% of the population spontaneously referred to Jews as a threat to society.

109. M - OA: DR 1226 October 1940 and similarly DR 2858 March 1943, who wondered what International Jewry was doing to help its brethren. J. J. McCall in the Glasgow Daily Record, 28 May 1943 poked fun at the idea of the secret Jewish influence because he said, Jews would, if they had such power, rescue their European co-religionists.

110. 12% of the B.I.P.O. poll believed that there were
3 million or more Jews, 3% said 2 million or more, 7% said 1 million or more, 10% 800,000 or more.
Quoted by Ralph McCarthy in the News Chronicle, 1 April 1943.

111. I am using Gordon W. Allport's definition of prejudice here. See his The Nature of Prejudice (Reading, Mass., 1954), 9. Allport states that "prejudgments become prejudices only if they are not reversible when exposed to new knowledge".


113. T. Benson and B. Askwith, op. cit., 123.

114. Warwick Deeping, The Dark House (London, 1941), 2. For similar descriptions see A.F.O. Manning, Half-Valdez (London, 1939), 35 & 210 for the description of Cohen - "a greasy little Jew-boy, who has difficulties with the letter 'S'". E. Rosenberg, op. cit., 87 and passim comments on the strange habit of portraying lisping Jews which was not based on any real linguistic idiosyncrasy.

115. Mass-Observation's survey on Jews in 1939 found that the 'Jew-boy' image was a common perception. He was physically repellent, twisting, unclean, with an "adenoid accent"; - M - OA: TC Antisemitism Box 1 Files B and G and FR A 12. A Bristol man in 1943 summed up this approach stating that "no-one was as coarse and as blatant as the East End Jew" - M - OA: FR 1669 L. See also Harry Price, Search for Truth (London, 1942), 194.

116. Thus Cohen in Half-Valdez, 35 was "at once shabbily and flashily dressed".

117. A girl clerk quoted by M - OA: TC Antisemitism Box 1 File B. John G. Brandon delighted in descriptions of Aldgate Jews. Practically all his war novels contained unfavourable descriptions, perhaps the worst being in Mr. Pennington Sees Red (London, 1942), 11-12. Isadore Lazarus is described as "Semitic - short, extremely fat...He wore five large diamond rings divided amongst his ten fingers...His hair was very black and very thick...It fairly exuded grease of some unpleasing variety". He had sleepy eyes and a lower lip that was "rather like an over-ripe plum".

118. T. Benson & B. Askwith, op. cit., 124. Mass-Observation found that the flash East End Jew did not really exist, non-Jews being more ostentatious in Stepney. In M- OA: TC Antisemitism Box 1 File F.

119. In Helen Ashton's Tadpole Hall (London, 1941), 8 a
Jewish lawyer does not even overcome this defect. His voice is both "gutteral and lisping".


121. See John G. Brandon, Yellow Gods (London, 1940), 142 or Sarah Campion, Makeshift (London, 1940), 132.

122. Massingham, op. cit., 111 and 115.

123. ibid., 168 and 244 for the riot.

124. The squire in the village believed that when the Jewish couple first arrive that there would be trouble because "the Jew will do the wrong thing or the right thing in the wrong way" - ibid., 79. He is, of course, proved correct. Harold Pollins believes that the book was simply an attack on anti-semitism, but this seems to miss the other side of Massingham's argument. See Pollins' article 'Sociological Aspects of Anglo-Jewish Literature' in the Jewish Journal of Sociology vol.19 no.9 (June 1960), 27-8.

125. See for example J. H. Mallon in the Spectator vol.168 (6 February 1942); M - OA: DR 1393, 3003, 3005, 3250; New Statesman vol.25 (27 March 1943) letter from Eugenie Fordham; and a letter from A. Lane to Parkes, 27 January 1944 when the editor of Penguin books attacked "the manner in which the prosperity of the more fortunate members is demonstrated in theatres and restaurants...together with their general appearance of opulence". In the Parkes papers - 07. 006.005; and E. Hulton, editor of Picture Post in J. J. Lynx (ed.), The Future of the Jews (London, 1945), 56. In 1941 the Economic League carried out a survey into anti-semitism and blamed the Jews for creating "the present hostility to them". It commented on the proportion of young Jews in the Café de Paris in London. Later a survey found that Jews did not frequent these establishments in any great numbers. See B of D G6/10/26 for the report and B of D G6/2/136 for its refutation. For similar allegations see INF 1/292 no.78 (23 - 30 March 1942) and no.135 (27 April - 4 May 1943).

126. The Daily Express, 13 November 1943 article by Douglas Wirth. The headline was "See my London flat: I spent £30,000 in decorations". Hannen Swaffer commented in World Press News, 25 November 1943 that "the plain truth is that if Isaac Wolfson had been a Duke instead of a Jew all the things the Daily Express says about his possessions sneeringly would become ecstatic praise of his culture and lineage". The Board of Deputies complained to Newspaper World about the article but in the issue of 29 January 1944, the editor of the Express denied that the fact that
Wolfson was Jewish was relevant. It is relevant to note that Wolfson's picture in the original article was taken in front of a portrait of a rabbi, and that in Stephen Aris's words, Wolfson lived "comfortably but considering his wealth by no means lavishly". In The Jews in Business (London, 1973), 113-6. Aris believed the article was "disastrous" as did the Jewish Chronicle, 19 November 1943. The latter stated that he was portrayed "flaunting his extensive wealth in a manner that could not fail to be regarded as revolting by any person with any trace of a knowledge of decent behaviour". Wolfson wrote in the same issue that he had not agreed to publish the article.

127. In early 1942 a popular illustrated weekly did an article on Hore-Belisha referring to him as "the full-lipped, prominent nosed Israel (sic) Hore-Belisha" and showing some tasteless ornaments in his home. Only a personal intervention to Lord Southwood stopped publication of this article. See the Crozier interviews, 20 February 1942 in the John Rylands' Library.

128. Frances Burdett, reviewing Anna Reiner's The Wall, a story about Nazi persecution of Jews, dismissed it as "another of these books" in the Catholic Herald, 13 October 1939.

129. Tribune, 9 January 1942. See his similar comments in Tribune, 10 April 1942.

130. In Tribune, 23 August 1940. This contrasts with his favourable review of such a play in Time and Tide vol. 21 no.33 (17 August 1940).

131. For a study of British ambivalence to earlier refugees see Bernard Porter, The Refugee Question in Mid-Victorian Politics (Cambridge, 1979).


133. Phyliss Bottome, Within the Cup (London, 1943), 11. See also her short story, 'Security' in Masks and Faces (London, 1940), 81-93 and the comments in Formidable to Tyrants (London, 1941), 86 on the refugees in a shelter - "here was humanity - internationally at peace". And her article 'Antisemitism - a neurosis' in Christians and Jews, October 1945.


137. Within the Cup, op.cit., 281

138. Jackson referred to an old Jew as "a timid mouse" - op.cit., 205.

140. Mary Stocks, op.cit., 323.


144. ibid., 'British Museum Reading Room' (July 1939), 160-1.

145. ibid., 'Refugees', 181.

146. See also the comments in his war-journals published as The Strings Are False: An Unfinished Autobiography (London, 1965), 18-19, and 199, and the comments of Terence Brown, op.cit., 55.

147. There is little doubting Jackson's gushing sympathy and her hope that "men" would "awake to brotherhood and the Jew come to his own" - op.cit., 214. For Macneice's philosemitism see below p.407.

148. W - OA: FR 523 B.

149. Eunice Buckley, Family From Vienna (London, 1941), 149 and 255. Daniel George obviously enjoyed the unpleasant descriptions commenting that there was a different refugee book "not looking for a fresh crop of sympathy". In Tribune, 9 January 1942. See E. Mannin, Rolling in the Dew (London, 1944), 42-3 for similar descriptions.

150. Sarah Campion, Makeshift (London, 1940), 105-6. One refugee is described as "slobbering uncontrollably over her last piece of kranzkuchen".

151. J.D. Beresford and E. Wynne-Tyson, Men in the Same Boat (London, 1943), 31-2. Appropriately, he drowns when the ship is torpedoed because of his gold-filled belt - p.33.


153. In a memorandum 'What Have I Got to Lose Even if Germany Wins?' 25 July 1941 in INF 1/251 pt.2. See chapter 6 p.499-503 for more discussion of this matter. The Western Morning News, 21 February 1944 contained a letter from 'Englishman' complaining that he was sick of hearing how great the Jews were.

154. A point made by Tom Harrisson in Lilliput quoted in W - OA: FR 1035, 8 January 1942.
155. Tom Harrisson, 'War Books', Horizon vol. 4 no. 24 (December 1941).

156. Richard Keverne, The Black Cripple (London, 1941), 16, 66 and 204.


158. Poem in Truth no. 3293 (20 October 1939).

159. Article on the Fifth Column in the Sunday Chronicle, 26 January 1941.

160. See the letter in Time and Tide vol. 23 no. 30 (25 July 1942) referring to this film, and how it impressed upon the writer the need to be careful. In it, a refugee in Britain is seen as trustworthy, but under Nazi blackmail her loyalty to Britain disappears.

161. 'Music for Miss Rogers', broadcast on 9 December 1944 included a Jewish refugee spy. See the Jewish Chronicle, 15 December 1944 for details.

162. Other literature casting doubt on refugee loyalty includes 'E7', Hitler's Spy Ring (London, 1940), 161 and 192; Colonel V.K. Kaledin's The Moscow-Berlin Secret Services (London, 1940), 39 which claimed that German Jews were acting as spies everywhere; M.C. McKenna, The Spy in Khaki (London, 1941), 198-9 and Hugh Massingham, Ripe for Shaking (London, 1944), 188-9.

163. See chapter 6 for a full description of internment.


165. Particularly Andrew Soutar. See the works referred to in notes 157 and 164.

166. See the Hampstead and Highgate Express, 6 October 1939, and letter of R. Savage in ibid., 10 May 1940 who claimed there were 18,000 foreigners in the area. Paul Emden estimated that there were 190,000 Jews in 'Greater North West London' by the early 1950s - A.J.R. Information, September 1953. The Hampstead Express, 29 October 1943 claimed that one quarter of its 80,000 population were refugees.

167. Figure quoted by Howard Brotz, 'An Analysis of Social Stratification within Jewish Society' (Ph.D., L.S.E., 1951), 94a.

168. Douglas Reed, A Prophet at Home, 23. See D. Myers
in the Sunday Pictorial, 6 October 1940 for similar descriptions. A letter in the Hampstead and Highgate Express, 26 April 1940 from Raymond Savage called for a 'Hampstead for the British' movement and referred to its nickname, 'Abrahampstead'. Overestimating the Jewish refugee population was common. A Mass-Observer on being told there were only 50,000 refugees in Britain in 1939 remarking "they must be all in Hampstead" - M - OA: TC Antisemitism Box 1 File G and James Agate replying likewise about Swiss Cottage - letter to Sidney Salomon, 30 November 1942 in B of D O6/9/1/3 FS.

169. Quoted in a Mass-Observation survey, March 1943, M - OA: TC Politics Box 1 File K.

170. See M - OA: FR 174 survey on Cricklewood and its attitude to refugees. Half found the refugees 'dissatisfying'. The Hampstead Express, 17 May 1940 has details of a Refugee Friendship Committee.

171. A report from the Council for Austrian refugees in the Hampstead Express, 19 January 1940 stated that "we are lucky to have with us now in Hampstead some of the foremost musicians of Venice, refugees from Nazi terror".

172. M - OA: TC Politics Box 1 File K found a young girl who found the refugees "charming", and another who "liked them in some ways better than English people". Freda Hallgarten had found little sympathy up until moving to Hampstead Garden Suburb, where the people there "made up for everything else" and "made us feel at home" - Imperial War Museum refugee tape no.4494. See also Dr. K.E. Hinrichevs, no.3789 loc.cit.

173. See the Jewish Chronicle, 10 March 1939, 16 February 1940 and 19 April 1940; letter from L. de Jong of London NW8 in the News Chronicle, 5 April 1943; E. Fordham in New Statesman vol.25 (27 February 1943); the Hampstead Express, 26 April 1940 where Raymond Savage commented that "the alien Jews are steadily ruining Hampstead, they clutter up the pavements and jostle you in the shops. Their manners are abominable and their behaviour incredibly bad". The same paper, 26 June 1942 has details of a court case where a non-Jew remarked that "I wish you had left your dirty Jewish habits behind you when you came to this country". Mass-Observations N.W. London alien survey (see note 169 and 172) found that shopkeepers were bitterly anti-German Jewish. One Swiss Cottage dairy owner remarking that he'd "like to kick them out of his shop". A local clergyman, Canon Tatlow, stated that Golders Green antisemitism "all originates as a result of the bad manners of the Jewish women in the local shops". Quoted by W.W. Simpson in a letter to Brotman, 2 July 1943 in B of D C15/3/21.

174. Tribune, 31 May 1940 commented on "a quiet, steady
nasty anti-foreigner and sometimes even anti-Jewish campaign" and named the Henden, Finchley and Golders Green Times as one of the culprits. However, the Hampstead Express was also at the forefront of the campaign - see the comments of its columnist, 'Heathman', in the issues of 24 May 1940; 14 June 1940, 10 September 1943 and 29 October 1943; and also the Kilburn Times, 12 May 1944 - 16 June 1944.  

175. See chapter 3 p. 247-8.  

176. See M - OA: FR 174 and the comments of a 40 year old female from Cricklewood that 50% were probably spies. In M - OA: FR 84. Dr. H. Enoch commented on the suspicion of his neighbours. See his 'Journal' at the Imperial War Museum, Department of Manuscripts. Lewis Namier, Conflicts (London, 1942), 164-5 reported a Colonel talking about his German Jewish neighbour: "when the first Hun lands in this island, I shall shoot the Jew out of hand". Dr. R. Friendenthal commented how Hampstead hostility to German Jews helped him to get a 'B' category in June 1940 - I.W.M. refugee tapes no. 3963.  

177. D.G. Hutchinson in the Hampstead Express, 15 March 1940.  

178. ibid. 'Rounding up aliens' by Heathman, 24 May 1940. The same issue commented on how the internment of all aliens was advocated by the Hampstead British Legion and "welcomed with cheers".  

179. Hampstead Express, 24 May 1940.  

180. See chapter 4 p. 345.  

181. The Jewish Chronicle, 19 February 1943 reported such a whispering campaign in Hampstead. Refugees faced severe housing discrimination. See the Daily Worker, 2 December 1940, Time and Tide vol. 23 no. 8 (21 February 1942) and the Jewish Chronicle, 20 November 1942. This would appear to have intensified in 1944 as the local housing crisis became more urgent - see the letters in the Hampstead Express, 7 July 1944. H. Shipham reported antisemitic wall-chalkings in regard to housing - the Hampstead Express, 20 July 1945. In the Kilburn Times, 9 June 1944 two vicars advocated limiting the Jewish population of the area to 1% of the total. The Council of Christians and Jews' press report, November 1943 commented on the growing feeling in Hampstead - Parkes papers 15.022, as does NCCL 45/2.  

182. See Hampstead Express, 12 October 1945 and Hampstead Borough Council Minutes vol. 84-5 (25 October 1945) for a (passed) motion attacking the petition for "fostering inhuman racial hatred".

184. See chapter 4 p.343-4.

185. See the introduction, p.11.

186. See chapter 5 p.385-8.


188. INF 1/292 no.120 (12 - 19 January 1943) New Statesman vol.29 (20 January 1945) commented on the conspiracy theory and antisemitism associated with popular beliefs concerning the black market.


190. Daily Mail, 28 February 1942. Not surprisingly, Douglas Reed was interested in this description. See All Our Tomorrows, 114.

191. Truth no.3417 (1 March 1942) or The Patriot no.1049 (19 March 1942).

(15 February 1940) commented on how blatant Jewish profiteers "abounded" in the last war.


194. **Action no.186** (23 September 1939) and no.188 (5 October 1939). See also chapter 2 p.135.


196. See the **Jewish Chronicle**, 16 July 1943 and **Daily Express**, 17 October 1939 also quoted by **Action no.190** (19 October 1939) and James Agate, *Ego 4* (London, 1940), 131.

197. **Daily Express**, 17 October 1939 also quoted by Activity no.190 (19 October 1939) and James Agate, *Ego 4* (London, 1940), 131.

198. Myfanwy Haycock's 'Black Magic' broadcast on 22 May 1943 included a Jewish black marketeer who was "oily". See the Board of Deputies complaint, 25 May 1943 in C6/10/7/1 pt.2 and script in B.B.C. Written Archives 'Children's Hour Tapes: 1926-1953.

199. Beverly Baxter attacked particular Jewish black marketers and then stated that there were "British born Jewish people in (the black market) to far too great an extent" - **Hansard HC** vol.376 col.600, 3 March 1942. See also Sir H. Morris-Jones in **Hansard HC** vol.376 col.694, 20 November 1941.

200. Bernard Newman's *Black Market* (London, 1942) passim. has Jewish refugees controlling the market, acting as Stooges for the Nazis!


202. **Hospital Saving Association's Contributor** vol.5 no.2 (November 1942) 'Abe See?'

203. The Ministry of Information abandoned the most likely Ministry of Food Film on the Black Market because of its antisemitism - **Home Planning Committee**, 2 October 1941 in **INF 1/251 Pt.5.**
Cassandra in the Daily Mirror, 17 June 1941 attacked Jewish involvement in the black market claiming they were "running a blackguardly food racket".

'Janus' in The Spectator vol.170 (2 April 1943) referred to a substantial section of the Jewish community having a black record as regards the black market. For other examples of the press attacking Jewish blackmarketeers see the Bolton Standard, 27 March 1942, Porth Gazette, 19 June 1943, Daily Mail, 28 February 1942; Sunday Dispatch, 12 December 1943; Hampstead and Highgate Express, 14 June 1940.

By J.H. Mallon in The Spectator, vol.168 (6 February 1942). See the same journal vol.170 (2 - 16 April 1943); Tribune, 27 March and 10 April 1942; New Statesman vol.25 (20 June 1942 - 25 July 1942); News Chronicle, 1 April - 5 April 1943 for other discussions on the black market question.

Figures quoted by the Monthly Bulletin of the T.A.C. vol.1 no.11 (August 1941).


Newspaper World, 11 April 1942; Daily Express, 21 January 1944; and East London Advertiser, 1 August 1942 all denied bias.

INF 1/292 no.73 (16 - 23 February 1942).

Hansard HC vol.39 col.2286-7, 8 July 1943.

With headlines such as the Daily Express's 'Black Market Food Hidden in Synagogue' quoted by the Jewish Chronicle, 17 July 1942; 'German Jew on Food Charge', Leicester Mercury; 'He Stole for Black Market. Approached by Jews', Daily Dispatch, 18 April 1942.

See chapter 4 p.343.

Arnold Levy, This I Recall: 1939-45 (London, 1947), 183-4 comments how the black market "even ceased to be 'copy' for the newspapers towards the latter part of the war". Even the News of the World, which had earlier been as sensationalist as any of the papers on the question (see the issue of 22 August 1943), admitted on 4 March 1945 that there had not really been a menace to the rationing system. An indication of an increasing black market in clothing from 1942 to 1944 is provided in E.L. Hargreaves and N.M. Gowing, Civil Industry and Trade (London, 1952), 328.

See chapter 4 p.344 and INF 1/292 nos.135-191 (27 April 1941 - 31 May 1944) show a declining antisem-
itism. Brendan Bracken of the Ministry of Information believed that this was due to the subsidence of feeling about the black market. See his comments in December 1943 in B of D C6/10/27. There is no reason to suppose that Jewish black marketeers became any less numerous. Indeed, if the clothing industry was more prone to such activities in the last years of the war, one would have expected the Jewish participation to have gone up.

217. See the allegations concerning Covent Garden from Dr. Sutherland in the Catholic Herald, 16 July 1941. When informed that he was totally wrong, Sutherland replied "So what!" - ibid., 15 August 1941. In a court case in 1943 in Liverpool, the defendants claimed an East End Jewish connection - see World News and Views, 28 August 1943 for critical comment. B of D C6/10/43/2 file 1 and the Jewish Chronicle, 30 May 1941 have other examples where a supposed Jewish connection was brought in as a 'red herring'.

218. The enquiry, carried out by the Board of Deputies, T.A.C. in 1943, with government co-operation, entitled 'An Enquiry into the occupational distribution of Jews in trade and industry in Great Britain, and a comparative examination of offences committed by Jewish and non-Jewish traders' can be found in B of D C6/10/43/2 file 2.

219. ibid., the six areas were London, Manchester, South Wales, Newcastle, Leeds and Sheffield and the five trades - furniture, footwear, textiles, furs and jewellery.

220. 385,000 according to the Jewish Year Book 1940 (London, 1940), 334.


222. In the popular Old Moore's Dream Book under 'J', the reader was given the title 'Jew': "To see or have business dealings with them of any kind, indicates that you will be deceived. Someone will get the better of you", quoted by the Daily Worker, 27 April 1943. Dictionary use of the verb "to Jew", even present in the Oxford English dictionary caused offence to the Jewish community. See the J.D.C. minutes, 2 March 1942, in B of D C6/2/6. Even a Jewish apologist such as W.W. Simpson accepted the idea of Jewish sharp-practice. See his Jews and Christians Today (London, 1940), 26-7.

223. Barry Kosmin suggests that for the 1930s and after "the small trader was the dominant Jewish image of these years". In Sandra Wallman (ed.) Ethnicity at Work (London, 1977), 46-9. See also H. Pollins, Economic History of the Jews in England (London, 1982), 150-1, 200, 217. In the wholesale clothing
trade up to 75% of black market offences were committed by Jews, figures that did not surprise a Board of Trade official because that aspect of the textile business "was almost entirely Jewish in its constituency". Council of Christians and Jews, executive minutes, 10th meeting, 5 August 1942, Appendix B. James Parkes, Antisemitism (London, 1963), 126 makes the same point.

224. Herbert Loebl, 'Government-Financed Factories and the Establishment of Industries by Refugees in the Special Areas of the North of England 1937 - 1961' (University of Durham, M.Phil., 1978), 147 and 156 comments on the struggle in the war to survive, especially with the problem of internment.

225. The file 'Revocation of Naturalization for black market offences' is in HO 213/14. Of 5,000 Ministry of Food prosecutions examined, only 4% were seen to be alien-Jewish. In a more limited study of Board of Trade offences a higher figure of 10% was obtained.

226. Even the generally sympathetic Professor Hill could not be convinced that Jewish numbers were not unduly high. See his letter to W.W. Simpson, 5 June 1942 in B of D C15/3/21, and similarly Oliver Harvey - J. Harvey (ed.) The Diplomatic Diaries of Oliver Harvey 1941 - 5 (London, 1978), 27-8 diary entry 7 August 1941. A Mass-Observable was not impressed by Jewish denials on the B.B.C. "The Black market" she remarked "is largely Jewish. This is not prejudice" - M - OA: D 1313, March 1943.

227. See chapter 6 p.468.

228. INF 1/292 no.52 (22 - 29 September 1941) on black markets reported that "recent disclosures are said to have intensified acute and bitter anti-Jewish feeling". Hansard HC vol.379 col.799, 28 April 1942; vol.378 col.598, 3 March 1942 and the Daily Mirror, 17 June 1941 give illustrations of major Jewish offences.

229. Bernard Wasserstein, Britain and the Jews of Europe 1939 - 1945 (Oxford, 1979), 119-120 comments on the centrality of the black market question as far as war antisemitism was concerned, as does Norman Longmate, How We Lived Then (London, 1971), 152.

230. Ivan Greenberg, editor of the Jewish Chronicle wrote to Selig Brodetsky, 22 February 1943, claiming that it had been born out of many impartial observations that "Jews are penalised with a ferocity which is seldom shown toward non-Jewish offenders in the same kind of cases" - Anglo-Jewish archive, AJ3. The T.A.C. report (see note 218) suggested that this was the case for several East London Courts. The comments of magistrates quoted by the East End News, 27 June 1941 "you people don't care how much you sabotage the
country's efforts to conserve food as long as you line your own pockets" and 11 November 1941 in regard to Jewish gaming offenders "black marketeers, I suppose, trying to make a bit more", suggest that Greenberg's fears were well-grounded. There is also more tendentious evidence that Ministry of Food agents-provocateurs deliberately sought out Jewish offenders. The T.A.C. complained to the Ministry in May 1941 about this (B of D C6/2/6 Folder 1) as did the Jewish Chronicle, 31 July 1942 and the Mayor of Stepney - East End Observer, 31 July 1942. The President of the Board of Trade, Hugh Dalton, appeared to be prejudiced against East End Jewish offenders - see the Dalton Diaries vol.1 no.26, 3 November 1942 in the Dalton papers.

231. The government's Council on Aliens, 61st meeting, 5 April 1944 has details of Polish Jews still interned at this late stage in the war because of various petty offences. It contains a case of a German Jew who had lost two businesses because of the defence regulations, who had then lost all his belongings on the Arandora Star, who was reinterned for a petty coupons offence. All in FO 371/42786 W 5555. See also HO 215/126 Gen.2/4/3 for details of other 'Jewish criminal' refugees' internment. Suspicion of being a black marketeer could also lead to internment - see Dr. H. Enoch's 'Journal', 209 in the I.W.M. Department of Manuscripts.

232. I. McLaine, Ministry of Morale: Home Front Morale and the Ministry of Information (London, 1979), 116-7 points out that there is no direct relationship between morale and antisemitism. He therefore suggests that the latter is not a good measure of the former. I would argue, however, that if various forms of antisemitism are analysed, light can be shed on the morale question. I will develop this point further in the conclusion.

233. For brief details see the Board of Deputies, Anglo-Jewry in Battle and Blitz (London, 1943). Due partly to its age structure, Anglo-Jewry was, as in the First World War, over-represented in the fighting forces. Jews were in no way conspicuous as Conscientious Objectors - see Rachel Barker, Conscience, Government and War (London, 1982), 38.

234. M - OA: D 5375 January 1943. A Mass-Observation report on foreigners in October 1940 found that none regarded Jews as brave, and although Italians dominated a section on cowardice with 75% of remarks, Jews were also singled out by 7% of the sample - M - OA FR 523B. Some put this down to their 'eastern' character which made them naturally nervous - see M - OA: DR 3323.

235. See chapter 3 p.257 and INF 1/264 no.33 (24 June 1940).
Jews were accused of panicking to the safe areas of Reading and Maidenhead - the East London Observer, 29 January and 10 February 1917.

See chapter 3 p.234. H.W. Snow, a member of the Stepney Auxiliary Ambulance Service, heard a music-hall wisecrack at the start of the war on the L.D.V. - the Local Defence Volunteers (Home Guard) - L.D.V. standing for "I live down Vitechapel" according to the comic. 'In Wartime London' Imperial War Museum, Second World War diaries.

See the comments of the Secretary of State, John Anderson in CAB. 65/7 WM 133 22 May 1940.

Elsie Janner, Barnett Janner: A Personal Portrait (London, 1984), 74. For similar sentiments see News Chronicle, 6 October 1944 - "the Jews are lucky - they don't fight" and INF 1/292 no.87 (27 May - 2 June 1942) "they rob us while we fight for them".

INF 1/292 no.36 (3 - 10 June 1941) says this was widely believed in Merseyside. The Sheffield Star, 10 June 1944 has a joke on this subject.

INF 1/292 no.59 (10 - 17 November 1941) reported "a good deal of feeling" that Jewish girls were finding some method of escaping war-work. Bernard Kops, op. cit., 101 commented on his sister's work as an agriculture worker. "Who ever heard of it? A Yiddisher landgirl?"

INF 1/292, no.199 (18 - 25 July 1944) suggested that the public felt Jews had avoided the ballot for the mines. See The Bradian, March 1944 for one example of a Jewish Bevin boy.

See The Star, 4 June 1940 and the Daily Mail, 29 June 1940 for conspiracy-style reporting of a case involving 10 men, most of whom were Jewish. J.B. Rothwell in the Daily Dispatch, 6 February 1943 and numerous Home Intelligence reports - INF 1/292 no.86 (18 - 26 May 1942); no.98 (11 - 17 August 1942); no.115 (8 - 15 December 1942) and no.120 (12 - 19 January 1943) refer to Jews avoiding the call-up in terms of Jewish power.

In a B.B.C. Variety Show 'The Two Leslies', 10 January 1942. Told that there was neither a pawnbrokers battalion nor a Jewish navy the conscripted Jew replied "Vell, I can vait!" In B of D 66/10/7/1 file 1. H.A. Wilson, East Window (London, 1946), 70 has a similar war joke, and Blighty no.76 (29 March 1941) and no.72 (1 March 1941) has cartoons with a similar message. See Israel Cohen, Contemporary Jewry (London, 1950), 221-42 for the Jewish war effort.
245. B. Henriques, op. cit., 139 and 142-4; R. O'Brien 'The Establishment of a Jewish Minority in Leeds', 304; News Chronicle, 1 April 1943 and The Spectator vol.168 (6 February 1942) provide evidence of continuing antisemitism in the army.

246. It was claimed that only 243 out of 200,000 of the B.E.F. was Jewish - see the Evening News, 28 December 1939 and Skene Catling, Vanguard to Victory (London, 1940), 136. Action no.200 (4 January 1940) and the Social Creditor vol.3 no.17 (6 January 1940) gleefully reported these figures, despite the Jewish Chronicle's claim in the issue of 5 January 1940, that at least 1,000 Jews were serving unregistered.

247. See particularly the Daily Express, 20 October 1944 'Arnhem Lie is Nailed' and the debate in the Yorkshire Observer in October 1944.

248. See the note by the Director-General, 17 November 1943 on reporting achievements by Jews, "particularly in connection with the war effort". Thus on the 9 pm. News on 5 May 1943 the successful exploits of a young Jewish officer in the First Army were stressed - all in B.B.C. Written Archives R34/277.

249. Macneice's attempt, 'Zero Hour', was broadcast on the B.B.C. on 3 May 1943 and featured Isaac Cohen, a private in the Eight Army in Africa. Details in B.B.C. Written Archive Microfilm 1944 and the Jewish Chronicle, 7 May 1943. J.B. Priestley's Desert Highway (London, 1944) included a Sergeant Joseph, a brave soldier, who is used to counteract the image of the Jewish black marketeer - p.8. The play on radio and in the theatre was a success - see the Jewish Chronicle, 2 April 1944. Priestley also wrote the script of the film 'The Foreman Went to France (1942), an Ealing comedy that included a cheerful cockney soldier, Maurice Finklestein. Finally, a Yiddish play, 'The King of Lampedusa', based on the true story of how Sergeant Pilot Cohen made an Italian controlled island surrender to him enjoyed a successful run in the Grand Palais Theatre, Commercial Road, attracting many non-Jews. See the East London Advertiser, 4 February 1944.

250. The Jewish Chronicle, 26 February 1943 and Harold Pollins in Tribune, 3 March 1944 pointed out this problem. Orwell in his essay on antisemitism in the Contemporary Jewish Record, April 1945 believed it was due to the fact that it was not necessary to flatter the Jews. Moreover, as the Jewish war effort was not getting enough recognition, the man on the street believed Jews to be exceptionally clever at dodging military service. For exceptions see the East End Observer, 9 April 1943; the Daily Herald, 2 February 1944 and the Daily Worker, 15 and 19 April 1943; The Spectator vol.168 (23 April 1943).
251. This featured Neft, a clever young Jew who had been a pork butcher and was apt to complain. Neft had been hospitalised because of a motor-bike crash, the other characters having been shot down from their planes. A character reminds him that "some of us had been fighting the war with real bullets" — (London, 1950 ed.), 218.

252. Geoffrey Cotterrell, op. cit. Kraus attempts to hide in Ireland (p.262) but when he finally gets involved in the action, he is still nervous — p.279. Other examples of cowardly Jews can be found in Roy Fuller's 'Fletcher' in D. Val Baker's Little Review Anthology (London, 1944), 93-7; Helen Ashton's Tadpole Hall (London, 1941), 233. Evelyn Waugh's Put Out More Flags (London, 1942) has Ambrose Silk, an effeminate left-wing Jew who avoids fighting by joining the Ministry of Information. For non-fiction see Noel Baker, Trans-Siberian (London, 1942), 112 and Douglas Reed, All Our Tomorrows, 297.


254. B of D 06/7/3/2 'Antisemitism and the war', 1945.


256. M - OA: D 54/12, 4 and 5 March 1943 and D 54/46, 5 March relate how it had spread to Beckenham and the Home Counties. INF 1/292 no.127 (2 - 9 March 1943) also report widespread belief.


258. See Beaumont, op. cit., 86 and note 234 above.

259. In November 1942 a fire in a nightclub in Boston killed 500 people and the Jews were blamed. See G.W. Allport, op. cit., 258 for details. Allport claims the rumour was due to a need to find an outlet for the anger at the disaster; this anger needing a "personal victim, and....now". This would also seem to fit the Bethnal Green disaster.

260. Herbert Morrison told the Commons that it was neither a Jewish or fascist inspired panic, although he refused to publish the official report. See Hansard HC vol.388 col.786-88, 8 April 1943. However, a week later Home Intelligence reported that the antisemitic rumours were persisting — INF 1/292 (6 - 13 April 1943). An editorial in the St. Helens' and District
Reporter, 7 May 1943 may have been indirectly referring to the disaster when it suggested that Jews controlled all "profitable concerns they can get into, (while) Christians get killed in the crush".

261. R. Ainsztein, 'Polish Antisemitism in War-Time Britain', Wiener Library Bulletin vol. 13 no. 5-6 (1959) has brief details.

262. War Office memo., 5 March 1944 in FO 371/39480 C 3121. A minute from A. Wilkinson of the War Office to R. Makins at the Foreign Office, 6 May 1940, reveals a similar attitude, suggesting that any Polish antisemitism was justified. In FO 371/24481 C 6231. B. Wasserstein, op. cit., 123-7 has other details about British and Polish officials who believed the Polish Jews were "of little military use", or that they were "shirkers".

263. W. Harrison minute, 4 March 1944 in FO 371/39480 C 3121.

264. F. Roberts minute, 23 February 1944 in FO 371/39480 C 2643.

265. The quote is from a Home Intelligence report in Manchester, January 1942 in B of D B5/3/6. A. Sharf, The British Press and Jews Under Nazi Rule (London, 1964), 114-5 comments on the lack of attention given to the ghetto uprising. He concludes that "the picture of the Jewish fighter....was not understood in its full significance".

266. M - OA: DR 1362, March 1943. See also Sharf, op. cit., 114.

267. Denis Myers, 'I am a Jew, But -', Sunday Pictorial, 6 October 1940. Colin Holmes in his brief survey of British antisemitism from 1939 - 1979 finds room to mention this article - Jewish Chronicle, 14 September 1979.

268. Myers, op. cit.


270. See the Jewish Chronicle, 12 January 1940 and editorial comment in the issue of 22 August 1941.


273. Myers, op. cit.

274. A Jewish East End student who was evacuated to Taunton found herself embarrassed by the conspicuous Jews in the town. See M - OA: DR 2479 October 1940.

275. Jewish Chronicle, 15 November 1940 and 29 November 1940. Letter rejecting this approach.
276. Richard Ullmann, *The Kahn's Progress* (London, 1940). Ansel Kahn, the father, has a prominent nose and "heavy-lidded eyes, full lips" - p.12. He is a dealer in properties who attempts to buy a country estate. The mother is also stereotyped "flash(ing) the diamonds on her podgy fingers" - p.78.

277. ibid., 216.

278. The Jewish son, David, suggests "Judaism could be a most splendid thing, if only it weren't for the Jews", p.197 and his non-Jewish friend, Glory, crudely suggests the liberal emancipation contract: "How much better off the Jews in Germany would have been - if they'd never existed" - p.198. Eventually the two pair off, David rejecting "the old fetiches. I say that they're obsolete" - p.340. Frances Burdett in the *Catholic Herald*, 1 March 1940 enjoyed the novel, and accepted 'the nouveau riche vulgar Hampstead Jew' image without question, as did the *Tablet* no.3204 (27 January 1940). For more critical comment see the *Jewish Chronicle*, 22 March 1940.

279. Myers, op. cit. He stated that "there are the Jews who have seen a 'good thing' in war. The little trader, no less than the armament king, has pencilled 'war-tax' to the credit of his private account - and the debit of his soul".


283. A *Jewish Chronicle* Careers Advice Bureau was launched - see issue of 9 August 1940 and Neville Laski, *Jewish Rights and Wrongs* (London, 1939), 123 and 140-1 for similar attacks on business morality and overcrowding in professions.

284. Myers, op. cit.


286. See the report of the Aliens Committee and the need to get rid of the internal causes of antisemitism in B of D C2/2/6.

287. At a meeting in June 1940, Mrs. Petrie, the Board of Deputies Public Relations Officer, told the refugees to report each other for suspicious behaviour.
288. See chapter 7 p.562-3.

289. The Jewish Chronicle, 11 October 1940 attacked the article. See also a letter to Sidney Salomon, 20 October 1940 in B of D C15/3/19 File 1.

290. See his Jewish Rights and Wrongs and comments in the Jewish Chronicle, 23 June 1939.


295. They Won't Let You Live, 74.

296. ibid., 228-37.


299. Although Ansel Kahn is a second generation Jew or as he says "We're not East-Enders, or foreigners" (p.152), he is still unassimilated and will remain so if he maintains his "old fetishes" - p.340 in Ullman, op.cit.

300. Max Mundlak, Journey Into Morning (London, 1941). Although the ghetto world of pre-1914 East End Jewry is called "a real democracy" - p.24, the novel soon rejects this life, but also attacks Stamford Hill and Hampstead Jewry for its materialism - pp.115-6 and 202. The book made little impact, despite a favourable review in Time and Tide vol.22 no.22 (31 May 1941) by T. Clare. The fascist leader, A.K. Chesterton, was impressed by its

301. A. Calder, op.cit., 499.

302. See the National Review no.701 (July 1941); no.700 (June 1941); no.713 (July 1942); no.743 (January 1945).

303. A point made by the Censorship Department, Report on Jewry no.3 pt.11 March - December 1941 in HO 213/953.

304. See chapter three p.247 for the Hackney Gazette; and chapter 5 p.398-9 the Hampstead and Highgate Express. The Porth Gazette, 16 December 1939 launched an attack on the loyalty of the Jews of this Rhondda valley town, and this continued in the issues of 13 January 1940, 13 April 1940, 25 July 1942, 15 August 1942, 19 December 1942, 2 January 1943 and 19 June 1943.

305. See for example the Daily Mail, 17 June 1944 'The little doctor'. The Daily Express, 9 April 1943 'The Jews' in response to the Bethnal Green disaster suggested that "the Jews on this occasion, as during the blitzes, behaved as other London citizens behaved".

306. C.C. Salway, a refugee worker, writing to Sidney Salomon, 1 September 1943, singled out particularly the Sunday Dispatch "as one of the few (papers) I have been unable to induce to take a reasonable view of the refugee position". In B of D C15/3/20. The Dispatch and the other papers hostile to refugees will be examined in more depth in the next chapter.

307. See A. Sharf, op.cit., 100. He concludes that their record was good considering the shortages of newsprint and space in the war.

308. See INF 1/292 no.78 (23 - 30 March 1942); no.80 (6 April - 13 April 1942); no.81 (13 - 20 April 1942); no.121 (19 - 26 January 1943); no.122 (26 January - 2 February 1943); and no.151 (17 - 24 August 1943). The Rev. T.B.S. Thomson remarked that on trains and buses in Glasgow "one hears very decent church-going businessmen reading their newspapers and saying 'Oh, there's the Jews again'" - Glasgow Herald, 21 May 1942.

309. Sir Robert Waley Cohen made this suggestion to the newspaper world: "I suppose it means more to your readers to be told that Mr.Luneberger has done something wrong than that Mr.Smith has". Several newspaper men objected and pointed out that selection of cases depended purely on news value - Newspaper World, 11 April 1942. As more Jewish names were chosen it would seem that Cohen's allegations had some truth.

311. Quoted by Postal and Telegraphic Censorship March - December 1941 in HO 213/953. The press reaction to the Bethnal Green disaster, and Morrison's denial of a Jewish panic also reveals the newsworthiness of the term 'Jew'. Headlines such as the Hackney Gazette, 9 April 1943 'Not caused by Jewish panic' (the paper already knew the real cause of the disaster - see the issue of 8 March 1943) or the Evening Star, 8 April 1943 'Shelter: Jewish Panic Denied' or the Daily Herald, 9 April 1943 'Not caused by Jewish panic', all stress the Jewish link (ignoring the fascist correction).

312. See chapter 4, p.339-5 for comment on these discussions. Sharf, op.cit., 197-8 comments how these frequent debates became the forum for hostile attitudes to be voiced.

313. W - OA: DR 2512, 3356, 3003, March 1943 comment on how recent New Statesman letters reinforced their own and other people's tendencies. Hamilton Fyfe, op.cit., 216-7 entry for 23 May 1942 was similarly influenced by The Spectator's correspondence. The Daily Dispatch letter served as a justification for many complaints against Jews - see W - OA: FR 1648. However, a confirmed anti-semite, W - OAL D5296, 29 March 1943, was not impressed with a generally sympathetic debate in the News Chronicle, preferring to turn to Douglas Reed's latest book to confirm his prejudices.

314. See chapter 4, p.339.

315. Holmes, op.cit., 201 comments that the Board of Deputies was given the chance to examine any programmes on the B.B.C. of interest to the Jewish population. An official of the B.B.C. wrote to the Board on the 5 May 1944 stating that "you may be certain that anything which might be regarded as derogatory to or adding to the difficulties of the Jewish race would be repugnant to the B.B.C" in C6/10/7/1.

316. On 30 April 1942 the B.B.C. News broke its own guidelines and used (Jewish) names in a particularly bad quota offence. After this mistake the B.B.C. produced a memo from A. Ryan, 4 May 1942, which stated that "we must be very careful in future about these names". However, on the 19 June 1942 a news feature referred to a "Jewish refugee" who had been fined £4 for a minor offence. Another Board of Deputies complaint led the B.B.C. to read "the Riot Act". All in B.B.C. W.A.C. R28/20. See also the Jewish Chronicle, 26 June 1942. Earlier in April 1942 a set of black market sketches on the B.B.C. "never in one instance gave the impression that Jews were in any way connected with it".
317. See this chapter p.379-80. Another Christian programme 'Lift Up Your Hearts', broadcast on 28 March 1945, stressed the role of Jewish leaders and "the howling Jewish mob" and was "in very bad taste" according to W.W. Simpson — in B.B.C. W.A.C. R34/277.

318. A B.B.C. memo of 31 March 1942 suggested that such broadcasts must discuss both sides so that the discussion did not appear to be "cooked". In B.B.C. W.A.C. R34/277. Thus W.W. Simpson's broadcast on 15 June 1941 'The Christian attitude to the Jews', referred to bad Jews and stated "Don't be afraid. I'm not trying to dodge the issue". Script in the Parkes papers, 16.7.15. Another Simpson broadcast referred to the 'Jewish black sheep', 18 October 1942 in Greenberg papers AJ 110/4. Finally, a broadcast by Dr. M. Nicklem brought criticism from the Jewish Chronicle, 20 April 1945.


321. Richards, op.cit., 42 and James C. Robertson, 'British Film Censorship Goes to War', Historical Journal of Film, Radio and Television vol.2 no.1 (1982), 49-64 deal with the change of policy. The quote is from the Brighton and Hove Watch Committee, reported by the Daily Express, 8 November 1939.

322. A Mass-Observation report on such films showed that they were not popular, despite some being good films. In U-OA: FR 1&72. Similarly, Chaplin's speech at the end of the 'Great Dictator' was not enjoyed, the audience preferred the earlier slapstick and did not enjoy its pro-Jewish line. In U-OA: FR 764. It has already been commented on that 'Mr. Emmanuel' created a near-riot in an East End cinema (see chapter 3 p. 255-6), and a showing of Professor Marnlock was rejected by some in the Finchley Road Orpheum Cinema as "Jewish muck". Report from N. Kaizer to E. Allen, 26 October 1943 in N.C.C.L. 43/4.

323. K.H.W. Short, op.cit., 147 comments that until Mr. Emmanuel "the movie industry continued the silence
until almost the very end of the war" on Nazi anti-semitism. The film was not very successful; see *Time and Tide* vol. 25 no. 37 (9 September 1944) and *Tribune*, 29 September 1944 for critical comment. Other British efforts were 'Pimpernal Smith' (1941) where a professor helps Jews to escape from Germany - see E. Betts, op. cit., 195 for details - and Frank Launder and Sidney Gilliat's 'The Rake's Progress' (1945), which touched briefly on Nazi antisemitism in Vienna.

324. See Short, op. cit., 156-8 for details of American efforts. The Board of Deputies Defence section suggested such action throughout the war through its film section. By March 1945 nothing had been done. See B of D C6/10/19.1. The Jewish Chronicle, 1 October 1943 believed it would be unwise to do this as it would only emphasize the separateness of Jews in Britain. Only with a Jewish army, the Chronicle argued, would the public be impressed by the Jews' war effort.

325. See Iain Hamilton, Koestler: A Biography (London, 1982), 77 for details of this film which Koestler and Basil Wright co-directed. Norman Bentwich, Wanderer in War 1939-45 (London, 1946), 28 comments on its limiting factor. The British Film Institute has a synopsis of the film. A film project, the 'Refugees War Effort in Britain', was abandoned in September 1942 due to the "change in political situation". See INF 1/199 for details.

326. 'Living with Strangers' (1941), which depicted Mrs. Jacobs from Stepney moving to the country as her home was destroyed. Details in INF 6/446.

327. 'Religion and the People' (1940). This had a section on British Jews featuring Miriam Moses and her work at The Brady Girls' Club and Settlement. Details in INF 6/431.

328. Complaints in the J.D.C. Film Section, May 1942 in B of D C6/10/19.1 and also in B of D E1/51.


330. W - OA: TC Antisemitism Box 1 File G.


332. 'Antisemitism in Britain'.

333. In *Tribune*, 18 February 1944. Fuller was greatly upset by this accusation. See his letter to Orwell, 14 March 1944 in the Orwell archive, Box 6 in
University College, London. Orwell had written to Fuller on 7 March 1944 saying he did not regard the story as antisemitic but in "my own experience it is almost impossible to mention Jews in print, either favourably or unfavourably, without getting into trouble". S. Orwell and I. Angus, op.cit., vol.111, p. 104-5.

334. In Evelyn Waugh's Put Out More Flags, Richard Hillary, The Last Enemy, and Geoffrey Cotterell, Then A Soldier, respectively.

335. In a letter to Partisan Review, July - August 1943.

336. Harrisson in Horizon vol.4 no.24 (December 1941), 420-1 found that of cheap war novels "nearly half worked in a Jew somehow or other, and only in one case was the reference not unfavourable". Comfort, referring to the increasing antisemitism of films, stated that this was "paralleled very closely in the novel". In D. Val Baker, op.cit., 15809.

337. 'Boys' Weeklies' in S. Orwell and I. Angus, op.cit., vol.1 p.473.

338. For example, in his Death in Duplicate (London, 1945), 79 Isaac Levant "was firmly convinced that the best, and only the best was good enough....war or no war". D.C. Ireland in John M. Reilly, op.cit., 182 comments on the Sax Rohmer influence.

339. Republished in 1984 by J.M. Dent (London) - see p. 106-7 of this book. Alan Brien in the New Statesman, 13 July 1984 comments with surprise that this was one of the best sellers of 1940.


341. Orwell, 'Antisemitism in Britain'.

342. M - OA: Brian Ball postcard collection, no.137. See also the antisemitic comments of George Studley, a post-card artist interviewed by Mass-Observation, 18 March 1940. In M - OA: TC 253/A. Orwell in Horizon, September 1941 writing about the 'Art of Donald McGill', commented on the complete absence of anti-Jewish postcards in the last few years.

343. M - OA: TC Jokes Box 1, File B joke dated 8 October 1944. London Opinion vol.3 no.15 (January 1941) has a joke about astrologers predicting that Hitler will die on a Jewish holiday - "well, in any case they'll make it one".

344. For Jews as cowards in jokes see National Review no. 701 (July 1941). Orwell in S. Orwell and I. Angus,
op. cit., vol. 2 p. 377, 21 October 1940 was told by a friend that the joke going around London was "that it was wrong to print these (blitz) notices in English". On the B.B.C., 8 May 1944 a Miss Edwards mimicked a Jewish mother telling her soldier son "Don't forget don't fight" - quoted in letter to B.B.C. 5 June 1944 in B of D C6/10/7/1. Blighty, no. 72 (1 March 1941) and no. 76 (29 March 1941) has cartoons about pawnbroker Jews in the army. Cecil Hunt's Laughing Gas (London, 1940), 25 and 88 and W. McLoughlin and John Cameron, Time to Laugh (London, 1940) have jokes about money-minded Jews, whilst A Basinful of Fun, a bi-monthly adult comic, had jokes about Jewish fire-raisers and sellers of illegal goods - quoted by the Jewish Chronicle, 17 December 1943. M - OA: FRA 12 has a joke about returning Great Britain to the Empire and a similar joke was made on the B.B.C. in April 1945 concerning Golders Green. See B of D C6/2/136. See also Bud Planagan, My Crazy Life (London, 1961), 179-80.

345. A letter to the Jewish Chronicle, 1 December 1939 complained of a Jewish comedian and his "Ikey, Ikey, want to buy a vatch" humour. A similar complaint about ENSA shows, where comedians drew caricatures of Jews with a large hooked nose and bowler hat remarked that "Jewish comedians are the worst culprits". 22 June 1944 in B of D C6/2/13m. Orwell in S. Orwell and I. Angus, op. cit., vol. 2, 450 diary entry for 17 October 1940 reported a 'Jew joke' in a music-hall told by a Jew.

346. C.K. Cullen in the East End News, 30 April 1943 commented on the large number of anti-Jewish 'jokes', and Norman Longmate, If Britain Had Fallen (London, 1978), 201 suggests that "many circulated during the war".

347. See The Dandy no. 102 (11 November 1939); no. 158 (7 December 1940); no. 215 (30 May 1942); no. 243 (26 June 1943); no. 271 (22 July 1944) and Radio Fun no. 266 (13 November 1943) and no. 272 (25 December 1943) and the Radio Fun Annual 1944 (London, 1944), 17-20. The Beano, at least for 1944, seemed to be free of such Jewish stereotypes.


349. London Opinion, June 1944.

350. In a letter to Tom Driberg quoted by Reynolds News, 25 June 1944. See also the Jewish Chronicle, 30 June 1944.

351. See the Jewish Chronicle, 1 December 1939; 17 December 1943; B of D C6/9/1/3 F5, 31 March 1942 about Sexton Blake novels, B of D C6/2/13a letter.
of 26 August 1943 and C6/2/13b 28 November 1943 about comics and N.C.C.L. 45/2 and 311 concerning The Dandy.

352. C. Davies, 'Ethnic Jokes, Moral Values and Social Boundaries', British Journal of Sociology vol. XXXIII no. 3 (September 1982), 383-403 concludes that ethnic jokes serve a positive purpose in helping to delineate complex boundaries in society. He also argues that hostility is not "a significant factor in the genesis of ethnic jokes in general", although he possibly excludes "anti-Semitic jokes". See his 'Ethnic Jokes and Social Change: The Case of the Welsh', Immigrants and Minorities vol. 4 no. 1 (March 1985), 46. In a comment on Jews and humour, Spike Milligan believes that one can "poke fun without malice", quoted by the Jewish Chronicle, 30 August 1985. Chaim Bermant has a similar position - see the Jewish Chronicle, 25 October 1985. However, Bob Monkhouse believes that "you can't do ethnic jokes about grasping Jews" anymore - the Daily Mail, 2 July 1985. That has not stopped Monkhouse himself from making such gags. The Manchester Evening News, 8 October 1985 has a debate about whether 'ethnic' jokes are racist, Patrick Redmond concluding "people's behaviour... is too often conditioned by racially prejudiced attitudes" in this matter. The case of Maxwell Knight, a leading MI5 figure in the war would tend to confirm the latter analysis. Knight's attitude to Jews "stemmed", in the words of his biographer, "from common English prejudice and a fear of the unknown". Knight, he adds, "often made anti-Semitic jokes". See A. Masters, The Man Who Was M: The Life of Maxwell Knight (Oxford, 1984), 70.

353. M - OA: TC Antisemitism File C (Children) and G (Adults).

354. B. Allen letter, 13 July 1943 in N.C.C.L. 311/1. See also her It Shall Not Happen Here (London, 1943), 24.


356. M - OA: TC Antisemitism File G indicates that the 'Oikey Jew' or 'Ikey' suggested "a Jewish face, fleshy nose, red about the nostrils with a pendent dewdrop and a thick lipped mouth which utters adenoidal sounds", and that this was a common perception. Sidney Salomon complained to the B.B.C., 3 February 1942 that comedians with Jewish names talk "with a ridiculous foreign accent", which was both unnecessary and unrealistic". B of D C6/10/7/1.


358. Quoted by B. Henriques, op.cit., 140. C. Cockburn,
op. cit., 4-10 argues that such literature does make a large impact on its reader, including attitudes to Jews. Richard Usborne, *Clubland Heroes* (London, 1953), 3-4 confirms this point from personal experience.

359. A survey by Mass-Observation, 'First Impressions of Jews', shows the importance of these two characters, although the sympathetic 'Rebecca' gets one mention. In M - OA: TC Antisemitism Box 1 File G.

360. In an important essay Alan Lee analyses where working class images of Jews emerge from. He suggests that pictorial images were important, but does not mention oral traditions. In Ken Lunn (ed.), *Hosts, Immigrants and Minorities: Historical Responses to Newcomers in British Society 1870 - 1914* (Folkstone, 1980), 107-133.

The survey quoted in note 359 illustrates that family influence was vital. Without making allowance for this it is hard to explain how a five year old could blame "Jews for having all the food leaving none for Christians". Quoted by the J.D.C. North London Committee in B of D C6/3/2/8. M - OA: TC Antisemitism Box 1 File C and D reveal some remarkable misconceptions by children. One suggested that Jews were a "nusens (sic) blowing up places...another name which the jews have is Irish". Others show clear parental influence: "I think they are rich and mother thinks they are sly", or another, who believed that Jews had stolen the jobs whilst the 'English' had fought in the last war.

361. Quoted by Henriques, op. cit., 139.


363. Mosley's grandfather was at the forefront of the campaign against Jewish emancipation, and Mosley discussed the antisemitic background of his childhood in his 18B interview, 22 July 1940 in HO 283/16/25-6. N. Mosley appears to have acquired his father's attitudes in his early life. See his *Beyond the Pole: Sir Oswald Mosley 1933 - 1980* (London, 1983), 187.

Writing in 1941 about Balliol he stated "the people... are ghastly; stiff with Jews".

Lily Joseph, a Jewish evacuee, comments how her host, despite wanting to adopt her, could not help making antisemitic jokes. In Spitalfield Books, Where's Your Horns? (London, 1979), 49.
CHAPTER 6

The British Government and the Jews

The attitude of the State is perhaps the most vital factor affecting the well-being of a religious or racial minority. For the Jews this has been particularly true. In modern history the severest antisemitism, in late Tsarist Russia and Hitlerite Germany, has been state-sponsored. In medieval Britain, as elsewhere across Europe, the Jewish community depended on the protection of the state. When this was removed, either because popular opinion was excessively hostile, or the Jews were no longer of economic value to the government, expulsion could quickly follow as in England in 1290.

By the Second World War this medieval relationship between Jews and the State had changed beyond recognition. Illustrating the point, Sir Alexander Maxwell commented on a scheme of 1941, whereby the government made arrangements for the maintenance of Jewish refugees in Britain, as one "which will reverse the historic practice by which governments have borrowed money from the Jews and will introduce a new procedure by which the Government will lend some money to the Jews!" Nevertheless if the 'Court Jew' world had disappeared, the British government had still a vital role to play in Jewish matters at home and abroad.

It must be suggested that all the government departments would have been a lot happier had there been no Jewish aspect to complicate domestic and foreign questions which were already difficult. Yet Jews and antisemitism were factors that could not be ignored in the
war. The manner in which the British government approached issues ranging from the providing of kosher cheese to the rescue of European Jewry reveals much about the strengths and weaknesses of a liberal democratic state. In the discussion that follows we will examine how the government approached Jewish matters. It will be necessary to analyse whether elements of antisemitism, or indeed philosemitism, explain state policy. However, the state will not be viewed in isolation, for it will also be important to examine how far the government responded to public opinion on Jewish matters.

In 1943 the Board of Deputies suggested that the British authorities had maltreated Jews in Tripoli. The accusation brought forth a violent denial from the Foreign Office. An official replied "His Majesty's Government does not discriminate against Jews (indeed, rather the reverse)". In other words, it was unthinkable that the government or the British people could in any way be antisemitic, for this was against the principles of liberal democracy. However, in private the various government departments feared what they saw as increasing domestic antisemitism. Nevertheless this was not publicly admitted to be the case. In official government statements it was assumed that the British public, as well as the state, was free of antisemitism. Was there a similar policy as regards Jewish religious matters in Britain?

As will be shown later, a vital aspect of government policy on European Jewry was to deny consistently that Jews were in any way a separate entity. As one official put it:
"Jews must be treated as nationals of existing states and are not to be regarded as having a distinct Jewish nationality." To do otherwise would "perpetuate the very Nazi doctrine which we are determined to stamp out". Jews were simply foreign nationals of a different religion. In this the British government was at least consistent in its treatment of its own Jewish citizens. Whilst in theory the emancipation 'contract' might have encouraged the state to weaken Jewish religious bonds, in practice the particular war-needs of the Anglo-Jewish community were either granted, or given serious attention, by the government.

The most obvious and important requirement of Jews in Britain was for special food. According to the Ministry of Food, Kosher meat was an "extraordinary knotty problem". This was due to differences in pricing and weighing techniques compared to normal meat. Apart from the problems it created with the rationing system, there were also strong protests from the public. Some believed that they were "required to eat fat pork for the ration when they know that the best quality beef is going to the Jews". Nevertheless, according to a Ministry of Food memorandum in December 1943, it was "the policy ... to provide, so far as the supply position permits, Kosher meat for those Jews who want it".

In other food matters, the Ministry was equally as helpful. Despite the shortage of vegetable oil, Jews were allowed to swap their bacon coupons for margarine, and matzos for Passover was exempt from regulations concerning biscuits. As a result of pressure from Sir Robert Waley Cohen, and the sympathy of Lord Woolton, the Minister of
Food, arrangements were made (at considerable costs in terms of bureaucracy) to alleviate any hardships that might have occurred for observant Jews. Only in one area, that of Kosher cheese, were these difficulties not overcome. Although a petty matter, the Ministry of Food's response on the subject is revealing about wider governmental attitudes on Jewish matters.

Only a section of the orthodox Jewish community, estimated by officials as at most 10,000 people, actually required Kosher cheese. However, with pressure from Waley Cohen, the Ministry of Food again attempted to satisfy this minority demand. According to the Ministry, "very considerable administrative difficulties" were created by this problem, yet this was not why the project was finally abandoned. The seemingly bizarre reason given by the Ministry of Food for its refusal to give Jews Kosher cheese, was that the product was "very delicious". In the words of an official "other things being equal", the Jewish community should have Kosher cheese. However, unlike Kosher meat "other things (were) not equal". Whereas Kosher meat could be hidden from the public through distribution by Jewish butchers, this was not possible with cheese. The Ministry's policy was "as a matter of principle ... to avoid ever giving a concession to Jews as such and labelling them". The Ministry became convinced that the distribution of Kosher cheese would lead to serious antisemitism, it would create jealousies and accusations of "favoured treatment being meted out to Jews". The problem became "a terrible one" to the Ministry and
Waley Cohen was politely turned down after 2 years' struggle. The government thus spent an enormous amount of administrative and scientific time in the war, trying to ensure that a small section of the Anglo-Jewish community did not suffer too harshly from the food regulations. Yet when faced with a situation where it could have been accused of favouritism towards the Jews, it quickly reversed its policies. Government consideration for Jewish dietary needs had thus a strong limiting factor.

No such restrictions were imposed on the Jews' right to practice their own religion. Indeed, the government allowed and even encouraged the public presentation of the Jewish religious point of view. In 1941 the Ministry of Information approved the establishment of a Jewish section of its own Religious Division. However, there was a strong proviso that it would "be concerned only with religious questions and (would) not touch political problems" (by which was meant either Zionism or solutions to antisemitism). A monthly periodical, the Jewish Bulletin, was financed which ran until the end of the war. The BBC followed a similar pattern, for although Jews, along with other religions that denied the deity of Jesus, were not officially allowed broadcasts, unofficially two religious programmes were allowed every year - usually given by the Chief Rabbi. The BBC allowed these out of a "great sympathy to Jewish listeners". Judaism also featured in a Ministry of Information film 'Religion and the People' (1940). It featured a service held at the Great Synagogue in the City of London, where attention was particularly drawn to the prayer for the Royal Family.
This was an attempt to show the patriotism of the Anglo-Jewish community. 21

The other great issue of government policy that affected the Jewish minority was related to education. By 1939 the majority of Jewish children were receiving their education in non-denominational schools. Under the 1902 Education Act the state paid for secular but not religious education in voluntary Jewish schools. 22 However, in the war a major rethink of the Education system resulted in the Butler Act of 1944, one that was to make a large impact on Jewish education in Britain. Butler found that his major problem over the proposed legislation was Catholic opposition. 23 Nevertheless he felt it necessary to consult the Jewish community about its educational requirements, despite it further complicating his task. 24 Butler, sympathetic to Jewish needs, told the Chief Rabbi that he aimed "to be as helpful as he (could) ... in the matter of promoting religious instruction for Jewish children for whom Jewish schools were not available". 25 With, in addition, increased state aid for its voluntary schools, the Jewish community was pleased with both the attention that Butler had accorded it, and with the opportunities the new Act created. 26

Overall, therefore, in strictly religious matters, Anglo-Jewry found the government both sympathetic and supportive. Only when the state believed that antisemitism may have resulted from such a policy, was its helpfulness put into doubt. In the course of the war, however, domestic antisemitism became a major preoccupation of the government, and its attitude to this subject must now be examined.
Throughout the war the government used all its sources of information to monitor levels of antisemitism in Britain. It was viewed as a weapon of the enemy, an "extremist activity" which must be avoided at all costs. Jewish and left-wing anti-fascist organizations were in full agreement with this analysis. Yet paradoxically when these groups pressurised the government to use its resources to attack domestic antisemitism, it refused. A close examination of why this was the case again reveals government ambivalence on the Jewish question.

The first priority of the government was to avoid the creation of antisemitism. In the words of a Foreign Office official, antisemitism "always affords a good opportunity for enemy propaganda and it is therefore to our own interest to discourage it at all points". This was a policy that was to be a mixed blessing for the Jewish community. The major aim of the government was to ensure that latent antisemitism in Britain did not become politically organized. Yet simultaneous with this was the constant fear of being identified with the Jews as a whole, for in the government's policy anything that supported the idea of a Jews' War was to be avoided. Hence the Foreign Office's refusal to have a Jewish propaganda Minister in the shape of Leslie Hore-Belisha. Taken together, these policies ensured on the one hand that the government would refuse to launch a blatantly pro-Jewish or anti-antisemitic campaign. On the other, the government would attempt to appease what it saw as the potentially antisemitic British public.
The latter side of the equation can be seen most clearly in Ministry of Food policy on the rationing week. Up to July 1942 changes in rationing were announced on Sunday, coming into operation the following day. There were complaints, especially from the National Federation of Grocers, that this system benefited Sunday traders — hence the Jews — and was therefore leading to antisemitism. Due to this pressure the rationing week was changed to begin on Sunday. Yet the National Federation of Grocers now claimed that Jewish traders were gaining from being open on the first day of the 'week', and were "creaming off the new points and coupons". The Ministry of Food was again ready to appease any antisemitic sentiment by changing the rationing week. The Jewish community was also willing for this to take place. However, after investigating the issue, the Ministry found that shop-keepers were not gaining from being open on Sundays, nor was there any serious antisemitism being created. It therefore decided not to change the rationing week. Nevertheless what is interesting about the question is how Herman Kent, the secretary of the National Federation of Grocers, attempted to exploit the government's fear of antisemitism. It was a tactic that worked once and would have worked a second time had there been any real antisemitism to appease.

The other aspect of government policy — its refusal to directly combat antisemitism — is well-illustrated with the black market question. In 1942 and 1943 the Board of Deputies criticised the Ministry of Information for merely measuring antisemitism, stating that it was "not sufficient to receive reports as to whether antisemitism had increased or not". The Board wanted the government particularly
to counter the allegations about Jews and the black market, especially in the latter part of 1943 when it had the results of its own survey, disproving the canard. Brendan Bracken, the Minister involved, refused to make use of the Board's figures believing that the public would not accept them. However, unbeknown to the Board of Deputies, the Home Office had carried out a similar enquiry at the end of 1941.

It was launched by Herbert Morrison in response to demands from two antisemitic Conservative M.P.'s. The latter wanted naturalization to be revoked in the case of alien-born subjects who had been convicted of war regulation offences. Morrison seems to have shared these sentiments, minuting that he was "furious" about these people breaking the law. Despite complaints from his civil servants, the investigation was carried out, with disappointing results for Morrison. Alien Jews were not found to be the principal offenders. However, rather than publish the figures, which would have dampened the real public antagonism to Jews, Morrison refused further action. Indeed a year later, when news of the report had apparently leaked out, a left-wing campaign to secure the release of the survey was also unsuccessful. The most the government would do on the question was to ensure that the BBC, or other official agencies, did not publicize the misdeeds of Jewish black market offenders, and unofficially, to tell the press to do likewise.

Neither would the government allow any official discussion or attacks on antisemitism. The subject was banned from the popular Brains' Trust and efforts to
air the subject on other BBC programmes were constantly thwarted. Even though the Ministry of Information shared the Board of Deputies view, that antisemitism was a sign of low morale, it refused to acknowledge publicly that the problem existed. In Brendan Bracken's words, any attempt to issue denials of antisemitic allegations would do "more harm than good". This was a philosophy based on the government's mistrust of both the British people and the Jewish minority, and a general fear that the government would be seen as pro-Jewish.

A similar attitude can be found in the question of making antisemitism a libel offence. The matter arose in 1943 in response to Alexander Ratcliffe's pamphlet *The Truth About the Jews*. This pamphlet, apart from containing the usual antisemitic attacks, also denied that any Jews were being killed by the Nazis. A senior Home Office official, Frank Newsam, felt that its sentiments were dangerous and could lead to serious antisemitism. It would at least create "animosity towards one section of His Majesty's subjects". However, Herbert Morrison did not follow Newsam in wanting a libel law against antisemitism. In Morrison's view, any attempt by the government to protect the Jewish population would "have an effect contrary to that intended". To summarise, the refusal of the government to officially recognise that the Jewish community was anything other than a religious minority meant that logically it could not give Jews special treatment, apart from over purely ritual matters. As antisemitism, by its very nature, singled out Jews, it could not therefore, as a rule, be dealt with by the government.
Occasionally however, the government's embarrassment about the existence of antisemitism in Britain could work to the advantage of the Jewish community. The question of Polish Army antisemitism, which came to a climax in 1944, has already been touched upon. Considering the widespread and profound hostility to Jews in Poland, it is not surprising that accusations of antisemitism against Polish soldiers in Britain were made from the start of the war. These continued from 1941 to the beginning of 1943, in which period 17 Jews deserted from the Polish Army. There is little doubt that this antisemitism was of a serious nature, causing real distress to the Jewish soldiers. It was reinforced by a Polish paper Jestem Polakiem, which was believed to have been provided with newsprint by the Catholic Herald. It was also supported by other right-wing British Catholics and antisemites.

In the latter part of 1943 and the first half of 1944 the matter came to a head. Over 200 Jewish soldiers deserted and the British government was forced into action. Why it happened at that stage is complicated. The War Office and certain Foreign Office officials believed it to be due to Jewish cowardice on the eve of battle; the Catholic Herald, the Polish Ambassador and Winston Churchill believed it was part of a left-wing "conspiracy to malign Poles"; and left-wingers believed it was due to increased Polish and fascist attacks on Jewish soldiers (including death threats). The last two analyses in combination probably give the real explanation. The Polish Jewish soldiers were generally sympathetic to the
Soviet cause, and there is little doubt that the Communist Party and some fellow-travellers wished to stress the antisemitism of the Poles to discredit their government-in-exile, especially at a time of a serious split in Soviet-Polish relations. However, there is also strong evidence that the introduction of pro-German Poles, captured by the British in Tunisia, into the Polish Army seriously increased the level of its antisemitism. There were violent incidents and much of the sympathy and agitation on behalf of the Polish Jews was of a genuine and not of an opportunist nature.

The most startling aspect of this affair was the manner in which the War Office, which made no secret of its hostility to the Polish Jewish deserters, allowed the transfer of these men to the Pioneer Corps in record time. Tom Driberg, the left-wing Labour M.P. at the forefront of the campaign on behalf of the deserters, believed the War Office decision was largely due to public pressure. The reality was far more complex. What the government wanted to avoid was any discussion on the subject whatsoever, for it believed the subject could discredit the Polish government in both Russian and British eyes. The government realised that to admit having an antisemitic ally on British soil would have been disastrous from a propaganda point of view. Therefore the War Office reluctantly agreed to the transfer due to "serious political considerations". In addition, the Home Office was, as ever, wary of an increase in antisemitism, which it believed the Poles might spread to Britain. It was a fear not without foundation.
It also wanted to encourage harmonious Polish-Jewish relations so that in the post-war world Jews would be happy to return to Poland, again removing antisemitic potential from British soil. In the case of the Jews in the Polish Army, the British government's fear and embarrassment concerning antisemitism worked to the advantage of the Jewish community, whose response to the issue will be examined later. As has been shown, this was not always the case - the government's inability to confront the issue of domestic antisemitism directly revealed the limitations of a liberal democracy. However, the state had to confront an even more serious 'foreign' question in the war - its treatment of refugees, most of whom were Jewish and of enemy origin. More than any other issue this was to reveal the strengths and weaknesses of British tolerance and intolerance. In addition it illustrates the relationship between governmental action and public opinion on Jewish matters.

It has been suggested that mid 19th century British goodwill to refugees depended on two factors - the lack of a severe threat to the well-being of society and the support of public opinion. In the self-confident Victorian era the latter was an assumed fact - asylum for refugees was part of the dominant liberal philosophy. At the turn of the century, with the loss of this confidence and an increasingly hostile public, asylum came under increasing threat. With the 1905 Aliens Act "what once (had) been impossible now became normal, right became privilege". Nevertheless "liberalism", as an almost self-contained concept, did not totally disappear as a
factor in the complex equation that determined policy
towards refugees. Neither did the other earlier elements
- the perceived threat to society and public opinion. All
three aspects combined in the Second World War, their
various strengths dictating refugee policy at any given
time.

Bernard Wasserstein has portrayed Britain's refugee
policy "as an alloy of the elements of xenophobic
restrictionism and liberal hospitality traditional (at
different periods) in British politics". 79 However, it
is also important to stress that these two elements have
existed simultaneously - whilst their relative power has
varied they have both constantly existed. Unless this is
recognised it becomes impossible to explain the violent
changes that took place in the treatment of refugees in
the war. In what follows, no attempt will be made to give
a detailed account of the mechanics of the government's
internment policy, for this has been dealt with adequately
elsewhere. 80 Rather it will trace the pattern of
tolerance and intolerance and will examine how far a
'Jewish' factor influenced government policy.

Government policy on refugees in the Second World War
owed much on the administrative side to the experience
gained in the earlier conflict. 81 Even so, the fact
that the enemy aliens were of a different nature to those
in the Great War did make an impact on the initial treatment
of the refugees, especially at the start of the war. On 4
September 1939, Sir John Anderson the Home Secretary made
this point stating that "a large proportion of the Germans and Austrians at present in this country are refugees and there will ... be a general desire to avoid treating as enemies those who are friendly to the country which has offered them asylum". At this point the government was following a self-consciously liberal policy which it exploited for propaganda purposes. The BBC was encouraged to report a tribunal to decide the status of an alien. This would show, in the words of the Home Office, "British justice at work". By differentiating between the treatment of the refugees in a democracy and in a dictatorship the government hoped to impress world public opinion, especially in America.

Although a system of tribunals to categorise the aliens into three groups - Class 'A' "whose loyalty and reliability the tribunals doubted," Class 'B' "of whose loyalty the tribunals were not absolutely certain" and Class 'C' "of whom there was no doubt" - was instigated, refugee organizations were impressed by the sympathetic manner in which they were carried out. The public, as John Anderson's biographer has pointed out, were at this stage generally contented with government precautions. Whilst Norman Bentwich was exaggerating when he stated that "the current of humanity ran strong and warm in England like a Gulf Stream", it was true to say, as one observer did in October 1939, that "the spy mania of the last war is not so far being repeated in this one". If there was any concern over the refugees, it was linked mainly to fear about jobs rather than security matters.
However, it is vital to emphasise that even in this 'liberal' period, a strain of hostility continued against the refugees. Some of this hostility was of an antisemitic nature. This antisemitism came most blatantly from the B.U.F. and their campaign against the "refujews". However, more respectable far-right journals such as Truth, Empire Record and the National Review continued an opposition to alien Jews, which in the case of the latter had its origins in the pre-1914 era. It is also important to note that the Kemsley, Beaverbrook and Rothermere press empires also maintained their hostility to the refugees, which had been a feature of the 1930's. In the Daily Mail in October 1939, G. Ward Price warned of the danger "of the aliens in our midst". To Ward Price, Jewish refugees were simply enemy agents in disguise, and he attacked the tribunals for not dealing severely enough with them.

Ward Price may have been correct in believing that overall the tribunals were being sympathetic to the aliens, yet even in this 'humane' period problems were arising. In some ways the very liberality of the government's approach caused difficulties, for the almost casual approach of the tribunals, and the lack of firm guidelines allowed personal prejudices and local confusion to produce inconsistent results. Over 1600 male aliens were put into Category B, representing 10% of all those examined by 1 January 1940. These were generally arbitrary decisions that were to become vitally important in the summer of 1940. Already over 200 aliens had been interned, the most surprising feature of this being the inclusion of many Jewish refugees in the 'A' category. Why leading
Jewish anti-Nazis such as Eugen Spier, Ewald Stern, Jurgen Kuczynsky and Alec Natan were interned at this early stage will remain a mystery until the relevant Home Office papers are released. However, it must be suggested that in the conspiratorial world of the security forces, being Jewish and anti-Nazi was no proof of loyalty to the British cause. Stern seems to have been interned merely because MI5 were interested in him as the Gestapo had expelled him from Germany. The Security forces had been in the forefront of the campaign to link Jews with international bolshevism in the post-war world, and it does not seem that their views had totally changed in the Hitlerite period. Maxwell Knight, in charge of MI5's spying network in the war could distrust an agent simply because she had a Jewish lover. Knight's biographer claims that his antisemitism sprang from "a fear of the unknown".

Nevertheless in the first few months of the war liberal elements were strong enough to force those hostile to the refugees into relative impotence. The threat to British Security was seen as minimal and public opinion was relatively indifferent, if not sympathetic, to the alien question. Britain could still congratulate itself on the success of its liberal treatment of the victims of Nazi persecution. By early 1940, however, the balance appears to have been moving slowly away from the dominant tolerant position. In January 1940 right-wing Sunday papers such as the Sunday Express, Dispatch and Pictorial were increasing the concentration of their attacks on the refugees, and starting to demand a policy of mass internment.
Accusations of spying and sabotage were made, the *Sunday Pictorial* commenting on how few aliens had been interned. It warned that "the public is worried" - an attempted self-fulfilling prophecy. The press campaign gained momentum in February 1940 as the phoney war period came to an end. The Home Secretary wrote at the start of March that "the newspapers are working up feeling about aliens. I shall have to do something about it". At this stage Anderson was more concerned about public hysteria than any real threat posed by the refugees. However, by March 1940 one element in ensuring liberal treatment of refugees - the goodwill of the public - was coming under increasing attack, due to the campaign of the "less reputable papers".

In April 1940 any restraints that might have operated in the press world disappeared. The *Sunday Dispatch*, at the forefront of the campaign, proudly announced its intolerance: "(we) offer no apologies to namby-pamby humanists for having been the first to voice these demands (for mass internment)." In April 1940 these "namby-pamby humanists" were still offering strong resistance to the anti-refugee movement, Sir Norman Angell commenting that it "plays completely the game of Hitler and Goebbels". The public had also to be convinced. Although a Mass-Observation report on the 'Fifth Column', at the end of April, revealed that the press was an important influence on those who wanted mass internment, interestingly, another survey indicated that the press campaign had not yet percolated through to the masses. Only one in a
hundred interviewees "spontaneously suggested that refugees should be interned en masse". Anti-refugee feeling was widespread yet it was "predominantly for economic and financial reasons".

Public opinion, as was the case with the British fascists, turned violently against the refugee aliens immediately after the fall of Holland in the middle of May. In a couple of days antisemitic anti-alien talk "gushed up into the open (and) became the currency of respectable talk". In May 1940 opposition to internment melted away - the previously pro-refugee Manchester Guardian, Spectator, Time and Tide, Daily Herald, and even the Jewish Chronicle, all supported government measures on aliens. Only just over 1% of the public felt the actions taken were too strong - in such an atmosphere both the left-wing Tribune and New Statesman decided to keep silent on the issue. The independent 'liberal factor' as a barrier against antisemitic forces had simply disappeared - almost overnight.

By mid-May the government had responded by interning all male Germans and Austrians of ages 16-60 in certain protected areas. In the latter half of the month this was expanded to cover all Category 'B' aliens, and by 11 June 1940 Category 'C' aliens were added, making a policy of mass internment complete. At the peak 27,000 enemy aliens were interned, with over 7000 sent overseas. Why did this happen?

As with the internment of the British fascists, the basic reason for alien internment was the change in the military situation. By the end of May 1940 invasion was
a strong possibility and the country was in a period of crisis. On its own however, this factor does not explain the extent and direction of alien internment, for it should not be assumed that mass internment was inevitable. Indeed, as late as 24 May 1940, the Cabinet rejected a request by the War Office "for the internment of all enemy aliens". Furthermore, when the decision was taken several weeks later, it was against the wishes of the Home Secretary John Anderson.

It is vital therefore to weigh the various forces involved in the issue, and to examine how important any Jewish factors were in the ultimate decision. The military and security forces were strongly on the side of those who wanted wholesale alien internment. To the War Office and MI5, the refugees "were simply enemy aliens", who needed to be locked away for the safety of the realm. Writing to the Foreign Minister in February 1941, Herbert Morrison stated that "one of the main reasons for the policy of a general internment ... was the insistence by MI5 that they were unable to give any information" about the aliens. The security forces claimed this was due to lack of resources. However, tribunals had investigated all the refugees by January 1940, and it is hard to resist the conclusion that the military and security forces "shared the prejudices of enemy aliens expressed in the press campaign in the spring of 1940". Contemporaries, including H.G. Wells, Kingsley Martin and F. Lafitte, and some modern commentators have gone even further. They have suggested that there was in fact a conspiracy
between the popular right-wing (and former appeasement) press and sections of the military forces, which played up the alien threat to divert attention from the real homegrown Fifth Column. It is perhaps better to explain the frantic desire for alien internment from these sources as a climax to an anti-Jewish refugee campaign that had its roots in the 1930's. These military, security and press groups had never trusted German or Austrian Jewish refugees. Therefore one does not need to be conspiratorially minded to understand that the military crisis in the summer of 1940 merely gave an opportunity to transform previous hostility to refugees into restrictive policy.

However, until the Dunkirk evacuation and the fall of France, at the end of May and early June, the Cabinet could resist these pressures, and maintain its policy "not to undertake mass internment". Nevertheless, the new Prime Minister, Winston Churchill, had already been converted to the War Office/MI5 position by mid-May. At this stage, the only major governmental force against internment came from the Home Secretary, Anderson. As an individual, Anderson consistently deplored a policy of general internment. However, as an important Cabinet member, he was willing to be dictated to by the arguments of the security forces and also the mood of public opinion. The government was closely watching popular and press reactions to aliens. It does not seem that the government simply used popular demands for internment as "a red herring", as has recently been suggested. The mood of the public in late May and June was becoming ugly and the Cabinet's
desire to implement internment to protect the refugees from an anti-alien/antisemitic reaction appears to have been genuine. Public opinion was thus an important factor in the process of decision making on internment. However, in refugee matters it was not just a negative factor. John Anderson was aware that widespread internment would be welcomed "in many quarters", but he was worried about a sharp re-reaction against it once the threat of invasion had passed. Concern about such liberal niceties was wiped away in early June. Yet what is revealing is how Anderson made no effort to calm down the Fifth column fear, despite being urged to do so by the Ministry of Information's Home Morale Emergency Committee. Indeed the government did the reverse, allowing the British minister at the Hague, Sir Neville Bland, to make an alarmist broadcast on the BBC. Bland stated his belief that refugee fifth columnists had been responsible for the collapse of Holland, and told the public to suspect anyone of German and Austrian connections.

To summarise: the military crisis in the summer of 1940 allowed the intelligence forces to demand mass internment. Public opinion, inflamed by a lengthy press campaign, and finally by government propaganda, shared this demand as the crisis intensified. At this point liberal opposition to internment disappeared in an alarming manner. As far as the Jewish aspect was concerned, although the aliens were not interned because they were Jewish, neither was their Jewishness irrelevant. Despite the fact that the vast majority of the aliens were refugee Jews, the security forces were not convinced of their disloyalty
to Nazi Germany - partly as a result of a long-held distrust of Jews as a whole. Similarly, the press campaigns of the Rothermere, Kemsley and Beaverbrook empires against the aliens were not free of antisemitism, nor was hostile public opinion from the latter half of May 1940. The severe crisis of the summer of 1940 allowed previously unrespectable antisemitism to come to the fore and influence policy. The British government, people and press were shown to be vulnerable to intolerance, a reminder of the dangers of relying on the bulwarks of British liberalism and decency as permanent barriers against antisemitism. After the fall of Holland, as Mass-Observation reported, it was suddenly "quite the done thing" to publicly express antisemitic sentiment. 143

Nevertheless as soon as mass internment had been carried out, a policy of reversing it was put into action, as liberal forces reestablished themselves in alien matters. After having demanded some form of internment in May 1940, the Manchester Guardian then published 54 editorials attacking government policy on aliens by the end of 1940.144 The Daily Herald at the start of July also reversed its earlier demands, and ridiculed the waste and stupidity of mass internment.145 With the fear of invasion fast fading in July 1940, liberal public opinion reasserted itself.146 This was aided by the revulsion caused by the loss of life on the Arandora Star, a ship transporting Italian and German internees to Canada.147 The drowning of over 650 aliens on the Arandora Star helped to focus criticism from what Home Intelligence referred to as "middle class intellectual circles".148 Nevertheless polls carried out
in mid-July found that 55% of the public according to Mass-Observation, 149 and 43% to BIPO, 150 still demanded the internment of all aliens. Even so, Mass-Observation believed that the violent feeling against the aliens of late May and June was now to be found only in a small minority of the population. 151 By early August anti-alien sentiment had declined even further, with only 33% wanting mass-internment and 15% suggesting that no aliens at all should be interned. 152

On a parliamentary level, Eleanor Rathbone, who had refrained from attacking the government in June 1940 - owing to the mood of the country - launched a powerful attack on internment in the Commons on 10 July 1940. 153 With the security threat diminishing and public opinion losing its ferocity, a White Paper was produced at the end of July specifying categories of release. 154 By November 1940 over 7000 aliens were freed with another 2000 released by the end of the year. 155 However, two major problems still faced the refugees who were still interned - the camp conditions and the government's inconsistent release policy.

Concerning the first, the two immediate difficulties were the physical conditions (especially in the temporary transit camps such as the notorious Warth Mills near Bury), 156 and the indiscriminate mixing of pro-Nazi and anti-Nazi/Jewish aliens in the camps. The former improved at a greater speed than the latter, the releases and deportations allowing a more settled and humanitarian system. 157 However, the mixing of hostile groups was not sorted out
until the middle of 1941, revealing how the government was reluctant to differentiate between different types of enemy aliens. Nevertheless after six months to a year, the Isle of Man camps became more in keeping with the holiday atmosphere of their setting. Married camps were created and restrictions were generally lax. Yet for those remaining there was still the lack of that essential ingredient, freedom, and the stigma that went with being a long-term internee.

The government's release policy was as erratic as the manner in which it had rounded up the aliens. Although there were 18 categories under which internees could apply for release in the July 1940 White Paper (to which was added a nineteenth - political refugees - in August), the system was still a lottery. Releases, which appeared to be random decisions, had the effect of unsettling those still interned. Those in category 'C' could apply to join the Auxiliary Pioneer Corps. By January 1941 over 4000 aliens had been accepted into this non-combative section of the army. However, others refused to join the Pioneer Corps, believing that they were being forced unfairly into 'buying' their freedom.

Generally the government's policy, pursued by the new Home Secretary Herbert Morrison from October 1940, was to release the aliens within a restrictive framework that catered for the prejudices of both the Security forces and public opinion. In November 1940 Morrison was aware that "the vocal elements of public opinion (were) in favour of a more liberal policy". Yet this was not seen as important, for what was necessary was to appease the then
silent part of the public who might, at a later date, again demand restriction. 165 As will be shown, Morrison's philosophy was always to satisfy the lowest sentiments of public opinion on matters Jewish or alien. Morrison was also unwilling to oppose the views of the Security forces who continually demanded that there should be no relaxation of the internment policy. 166 Indeed, Morrison shared the view of the Joint Intelligence Committee that "the ruling factor must always be the security and military needs of the country" - a view that even Churchill had rejected by the end of 1940. 167

Two rival committees, the Council on Aliens and the Asquith Committee, were set up by the government to deal with the problems of mass internment. 168 Designed to be complementary, with the former concentrating on alien morale through improving camp conditions, and the latter with release policy, the two in fact were mutually incompatible. 169 Lord Lytton, as chairman of the Council on Aliens, realized that morale could be maintained only by a liberal release policy, which MI5 were obstructing. Contrary to this, the Asquith Committee refused to question the judgement of the Security Forces who, it admitted, distrusted "a large number of the internees ... especially the refugees who constitute 80% of the Germans and Austrians in internment". 170 Encountering what Churchill himself admitted was the "witch-finding activities of MI5", Lord Lytton resigned in January 1941. 171 However, with its painfully slow but continuous release policy, the numbers interned dropped to under 9000 by August 1941, of which 6000 were in Canada or Australia. 172 A year later less than
a thousand were interned on British soil, and by 1944 overseas internment had effectively ended. Only a few refugees were left in the Isle of Man - some of whom had been reinterned for minor criminal offences.

What, then, was the overall impact of internment? To the infirm and elderly refugees, the camps, especially in their early days, did create serious physical difficulties. These included many long resident East End Polish Jews who had never been naturalised. Nevertheless the major problem was more psychological, especially to those refugees who had suffered in the German concentration camps during the 1930's. Needing security, instead they were given more barbed wire to face. Although not common, suicides did occur, a sober qualifying factor to the tendency to view internment, a generation later, in almost nostalgic terms. Although many did accept internment as a necessary temporary measure, others were embittered by the slur on their loyalty - a factor that encouraged some refugees to leave for America after the war. Although Inspector Cuthbert at the Rushen camp was sympathetic to the refugees, his predecessor, Dame Joanna Cruickshank, was not. Cruickshank had difficulties, according to several internees, in "grasping the differences between German Jews and Nazis" - an analysis with which the Home Office agreed. One Manx lady felt "the ones she could trust were real Germans and not German Jews", a philosophy shared by the Army commander of the Dunera, the ship transporting the internees to Australia. He contrasted the "honest" Nazi Germans with the German and Austrian Jews who could "only be described as subversive ... they are
definitely not to be trusted in word or deed". 182 Not surprisingly, given this attitude, some of the worst abuses of the whole internment experience took place on the Dunera. 183

It was the nightmare quality of being a victim who was still distrusted that caused the greatest hardship of internment. As one refugee worker put it: "these men are more deeply hurt by being treated as 'enemies' than by anything else of all the ignominies and harshness they have suffered." 184 By 1941 camp conditions had become excellent, indeed a few refugees actually requested to remain interned. 185 However, the policy of mass internment and its slow reversal is one for which the government can be justifiably criticised.

After the crisis in the summer of 1940, public opinion on the refugees returned to the economic, rather than the security, threat of the refugees. In the height of the blitz anti-alien fifth column feeling returned briefly. 186 Indeed allegations that the refugees were spies continued sporadically until the end of the war. 187 Nevertheless such beliefs were overshadowed by concern that refugees were taking jobs that belonged to the British serviceman. 188 Yet again, government policy was to appease such sentiment.

The Home Office appears to have taken a sympathetic view of the needs of the refugees to find suitable work. However, it refused to take on the powerful resistance to alien employment from many sections of British society. This was possibly strongest in the British Medical Association, whose secretary, Dr G.C. Anderson, was described by the Home Office as "a violent anti-alien". 189 At the
start of the war Dr Anderson objected to the use of refugees doctors in the war effort. He used the threat of violent opposition from the medical profession if these aliens were allowed to settle and profit, while "Britishers" were away fighting. 190 At this point, although the Home Office regarded Dr Anderson's position as unreasonable, it bowed to the fear of anti-alienism. 191 "Refugees should be allowed to volunteer for military service", in the view of Sir Alexander Maxwell, Permanent Under Secretary at the Home Office, "otherwise there may be an outcry that the refugees are getting soft jobs while the British youth is being conscripted". 192 As the war progressed and a dire shortage of specialist skills developed, work restrictions were lifted on the refugees. 193 Nevertheless the Home Office was anxious that as many as possible of the refugees should leave after the war. As one official wrote in 1944 "we do not want an outcry during demobilisation that foreigners have taken the jobs of the British soldiers - which incidentally might lead to a revival of the antisemitism fermented by the B.U.F. with consequent disorders". 194 Herbert Morrison was particularly concerned about this sentiment, stating that he was "sure there will be trouble if all possible refugees do not go after the war". 195 The Home Office even refused to consider naturalisation for the industrialists who had created thousands of jobs in the special estates of South Wales and the North East. There was pressure on this matter due to a desire to ensure that these industrialists would stay permanently in Britain, but the Home Office refused to
commit itself. At the end of the war it stated that "the primary consideration which influences (it) is that nothing shall be done which carries with it an implication or may be used as an argument for permanent residence in this country". In individual cases the Home Office could pursue a more liberal policy, but in general they were willing to comply with any pressure from trade unions or the Ministry of Labour to restrict the refugees. As a Board of Trade official wrote after the war "they (the Home Office) are almost pathologically anxious to have full powers to 'tie up' any foreigner who wishes to do anything at all in this country". Although the later years of the war brought greater job opportunities for the refugees, they also saw an increase in their insecurity about their own future in Britain. It was an insecurity that appears to have been well justified.

Overall, government policy concerning the refugees in Britain was an outcome of a liberal stance from the Home Office - which acknowledged both the problems and the contribution of the refugees in the war - being tempered by an obsessive desire to appease anti-alien sentiment - either from the public, the trade unions or the security forces. The result was that the Home Office, which had expected to intern only "a small proportion of the total", ended up administering the reverse policy. In the issue of alien employment, the Home Office refused to consider naturalisation for refugee industrialists whom it had, a decade earlier, actively recruited from Nazi Germany. That there was actually a refugee problem to consider, with up to 250,000 present in Britain in the
middle of the war, shows the strength of liberalism in Britain. That many of these refugees ended up interned, or denied the right to settle or work permanently, shows its limitations. It also reveals the power of British anti-alien/antisemitic sentiment.

However, during the war years the British government not only had to consider Jewish refugees on its own soil, it also had to deal with the plight of European Jewry. It was not a prospect that it welcomed, indeed the government did its utmost to avoid facing the problem. However, the sheer dimension of the European Jewish tragedy, and the centrality of antisemitism to the Nazi regime forced some sort of response from the British government. The study of the Allied response to the Holocaust has recently become a growth industry. These historical works give detailed accounts of the workings of governmental and Jewish bodies in regard to events in Europe, therefore it will not be necessary to re-cover this ground. What will be attempted, is an evaluation of the importance of a Jewish factor (including antisemitism) in government thinking on helping the Jews of Europe, and to examine in detail the relationship between government and public opinion on this matter.

The most direct way open for the government to help European Jewry was to allow refugees entry onto British soil. Excluding those foreigners who came to Britain as members of the Allied Forces (including some Jews - as with the Polish troops), over 70,000 refugees arrived in Britain during the Second World War. However, out of the latter total, the Jewish proportion was "quite small",
probably amounting to only several thousands. Of these it is not unfair to say that they found refuge in Britain despite, rather than because of, government policy. Although it is true that no refugee was refused entry after reaching British shores (despite a boat carrying 40 refugee children being fired upon in Cornwall), it also remains that the government made no effort to help such Jews reach Britain.

Why was this the case? From 3 September 1939, the government made all pre-war visas granted to refugees invalid. Moreover, the War Cabinet Committee on the Refugee Problem agreed not to differentiate between refugees and German nationals in regard to entry to the United Kingdom. Occasional exemptions were made, but the general policy was to refuse any admission. This was based firstly on security grounds. The government believed that any refugees arriving after the start of the war would have needed the approval of the Germans. There were thus fears that these refugees could be enemy agents. As with the fifth column scare, this fear turned out to be totally groundless. However, it was used to great effect by the Colonial Office to refuse Jews entry into Palestine. The head of its Middle East Department, H.F. Downie, went further, believing that illegal immigration into Palestine was "a conspiracy", facilitated by the Gestapo and the Jewish Agency. Downie himself wrote that he regretted "that the Jews are not on the other side in this war". R.T. Latham, of the Foreign Office, was convinced that Downie regarded "the Jews as no less our enemies than the
Germans" and that he tried to link the two by "secret and evil bonds". If this was the case, then it is more than possible that Downie was influenced by The Patriot, the violently antisemitic and pro-Arab weekly, which was putting forward such a view in the war. The 'spy' argument was revived in early 1942 against allowing the refugee ship the Struma entry to Palestine, with the net result that the vessel sank in the Black Sea, leaving only one survivor. Whilst Foreign Office officials generally came to doubt the refugee-spy argument, the Colonial Office persisted in it. It was a reflection of the latter's distrust of Jewish refugees, and its belief in Nazi-Zionist collaboration.

The other basis for a restrictive war refugee policy was due to the government's concern over public opinion. More than any other issue, government fear of domestic antisemitism ensured that any measures for helping European Jews to escape to Britain would be highly limited. As early as December 1939 it was decided that Jews still in Germany could not be "admitted here as refugees" because if any were given permission "we are bound to receive a flood of applications". Only very exceptional cases were to be considered "in order to keep the numbers small".

In early April 1940 the reasons why such an influx was seen to be unwelcome were made explicit. K. T. Latham was concerned that the Jewish refugees in Belgium and Holland were creating dangerous antisemitism in these countries, and that if they could leave for Britain or Palestine it would be "a set back to local Nazis". Another Foreign Office official disagreed, stating that "I am inclined
to think that the danger of antisemitism in this country is as great as in Holland and Belgium". What all officials were agreed upon was that National Socialism had gained many supporters merely by exploiting antisemitism. When Herbert Morrison became Home Secretary in October 1940, the domestic antisemitism argument became even more powerful against the entry of Jewish refugees in the war.

It has already been noted that Morrison was adamant that the refugees already in Britain should be removed as soon as possible after the war, and he was equally anxious to avoid any new Jewish refugees adding to the problem. In October 1942, with news of the fast deteriorating situation of European Jewry spreading to Britain, Morrison was forced to meet a pro-refugee deputation. He told them that although "the general body of public opinion in this country was humanitarian and deeply sympathetic of the plight of the refugees ... there was also a body of opinion which was potentially antisemitic". Morrison warned them "not to ignore the existence of this feeling". The immediate subject under discussion was whether any help could be given to Jewish refugees in unoccupied France. Sir Herbert Emerson suggested up to a 1000 visas should be issued to these Jews. However, Morrison wanted to restrict it to children and the elderly with relatives in Britain, estimating it would save 300-350 people. This was soon changed to children with parents in Britain, limiting the number to not more than 20. By November 1942 the issue became academic as the Germans occupied the area administered by the Vichy government, ending any possibility of the refugees reaching Britain.
It is important to note the refusal of Morrison to consider allowing, as he told the Cabinet Committee on the Reception and Accommodation of Jewish Refugees in its first meeting in December 1942, more than "a limited number of refugees, say from 1000 to 2000" into Britain. "There were", according to Morrison, "already 100,000 refugees, mainly Jews, in this country" and "there was considerable antisemitism under the surface in this country. If there were any substantial increase in the number of Jewish refugees ... we should be in for serious trouble". 230 It was a warning to be repeated many times by Morrison and his government colleagues, 231 especially in the Bermuda Conference on Refugees in April 1943. 232 Were the fears that anything other than a "token entry of Jews" 233 would provoke serious antisemitism justified?

Many liberal-minded people in Britain thought this was not the case. Rumours that the government had refused 2000 Vichy Jewish children on these grounds were regarded as "a slander against the British people". 234 Realising that Morrison was so concerned about domestic reactions, pro-refugee personalities, such as Victor Gollancz and Eleanor Rathbone, set about mobilizing public opinion in support of a more liberal policy in rescuing the Jews of Europe. Through Gollancz's hugely popular Let My People Go and pamphlets issued by the newly formed National Committee for Rescue from Nazi Terror, considerable pressure was put on the government to change its policies. 235

In February 1943 the National Committee commissioned the British Institute of Public Opinion to carry out a poll on whether the British government should help any Jewish
refugees who could get away. The outcome was that 76% of the sample felt they should. Only 13% were against giving succour, some giving antisemitic reasons for their opposition. However, the poll also revealed that only 55% wanted "as many as can come" to be let in. Fewer than 10% wanted those arriving to be received indefinitely. The poll therefore showed strong public sympathy to the refugees plight, but also limitations on the amount of hospitality that should be given to them.

Mass-Observations surveys on Jews also confirm that there was much sympathy for the Jews of Europe, although this was often followed by indications of personal hostility to Jews. Harold Nicolson was not alone in disliking Jews, yet doing his utmost to help European Jewry. On the whole, the Mass-Observation survey in March 1943 reveals disgust at the lack of government action on the matter. Private prejudices did not generally interfere with a demand for a generous refugee policy.

Therefore, whilst the government was not mistaken in believing that there was antisemitism in war-time Britain, it made the error of not differentiating between types of antisemitism. It also did not allow for public ambivalence on the subject. As a symptom of this, it is important to note that the Ministry of Information's Home Intelligence was not interested in recording pro-Jewish/refugee sentiment in the war - only the reverse. The government's aim was to pacify any possible anti-alien/antisemitic feeling in Britain and to avoid giving in to the demands of 'humanitarian' opinion as far as was possible.
result, as far as helping Jews to escape was concerned, as a contributor to the New Statesman realised, was that "fear of antisemitism (was) as restrictive of compassionate activity as antisemitism itself". 243 Fearing a flood of foreign refugees into the Allied countries, Britain and America effectively decided against any measures that would have facilitated a mass exodus. 244 The 'Allies' Bermuda Conference on refugees in April 1943 was thus doomed from the start. It was designed only to attempt to satisfy liberal opinion that something was being done. 245 As a Foreign Office official wrote several months after the Conference: "from our point of view, fortunately, the German Government appear to be intending to persist to the last in their refusal to allow Jews to leave Germany." 246 Hitler had called Jewish refugees "a valuable hostage to me". 247 In this, his analysis was correct, for the Allies had decided that they could not cope with a large influx of Jews in the war.

The fear of domestic antisemitism was at the bottom of the government's refusal to allow anything other than a trickle of refugees into the country. It was based on a distrust of the British people, but also of the Jewish refugees themselves. The latter was particularly true of Herbert Morrison, whose strict line and fears of antisemitism even brought criticism from his colleagues. 248 A close examination of Morrison's attitudes bring into doubt his previous image as being "favourably inclined to Jews", 249 a man without a "tinge of antisemitism". 250 There is no questioning Morrison's disgust at political antisemitism
either in Britain or in Germany. Moreover, his approval of Socialist Zionist experiments in Palestine cannot be doubted. Nevertheless, his analysis of the causes of antisemitism reveal a less favourable picture. In October 1936, in a meeting with Neville Laski and the Communist Harry Pollitt to discuss the threat of the B.U.F. in the East End, Morrison had suggested that Jews should stop their activities as sweated employers and bad landlords and estate agents, they should be "100% economically clean". Furthermore they should avoid being too prominent in local politics, which was, as Geoffrey Alderman has pointed out, close to demanding that Jews should "accept second class status". It was a sign of Morrison's belief in a "well-earned" theory of antisemitism, which he was to develop further in his position as Home Secretary in the war. Morrison's unjustified criticism of alien Jewish black marketeers has already been commented on. What is interesting in this context is Morrison's reply to his Under-Secretary's plea that revoking naturalization of alien offenders would only strengthen antisemitic forces in Britain. Unimpressed with this argument, Morrison replied that "these (foreign Jewish black market offenders) people (were) creating the anti-alien feeling". There is little doubting what a leading British Zionist called Morrison's "anti-refugee attitude" in the war. It was an attitude which led him to restrict entry of aliens in the war and to urge the removal of refugees from Britain after it, so as not to provoke what he regarded as justified antisemitism. Morrison's own distrust of Jews led him to distrust the
public's attitude to the refugees. It thus ensured that no effort would be made to identify the government with pro-Jewish refugee sentiment.

Although Morrison's views were probably less generous than other government officials, little opposition was put forward to his restrictive stance. Despite pressure from groups such as the National Committee for Rescue from Nazi Terror, the Home Office and Foreign Office constantly refused visas for refugees who had reached neutral countries, but whose lives were still in danger. Only those who could help the war effort were given permission to come to Britain. Rather than satisfy humanitarian feeling in Britain, the government chose to appease any possible anti-alien sentiment. Thus in the Parliamentary debate on refugees after the Bermuda Conference, the Cabinet put pressure on Whips so that the speeches would not be biased in favour of free admission of refugees to Britain. Rather than discussing any possible ways of helping the refugees, the debate become a repetitive discussion of the strength of antisemitism in Britain. With this attitude, it is not surprising that those who had attempted to prove the pro-refugee sympathy of the British people came to regard themselves as at war with the stone-walling policy of the relevant government departments, particularly with Morrison and the Home Office.

Had the government wished to pursue a more generous policy in allowing refugees into Britain, it must be suggested that the British public would not have been in opposition. However, public opinion surveys also show the
limitations of sympathy towards Jewish refugees. Any mass influx would have needed powerful backing by British propaganda agencies to ensure that hostile sentiment did not increase to a dangerous level. Such a policy would not have been considered, however, for throughout the war years the British government constantly refused to identify with the Jewish cause, as its propaganda policy concerning the fate of European Jewry.

At the very start of the war, the government considered issuing a White Paper on conditions in the German concentration camps. Sir Alexander Cadogan, Permanent Under-Secretary at the Foreign Office, offered two objections to this proposal, that were to recur throughout the war. Firstly, the "hair-raising reports about Jewish concentration camps" came from Jews themselves, "who were entirely unreliable (?) witnesses". Secondly, "the Germans will only say that this is further proof that the British Empire is run by international Jewry. And I am sure that sympathy with the Jews hasn't waned very considerably during the last twelve months". The matter would have been left to rest, but a few days later the Germans revived accusations about British South African concentration camps in their atrocity propaganda. Therefore the go-ahead was given for the British White Paper which was published in October 1939. However, although the White Paper included documents on atrocities on Jews, prominence was given to less "sensational" cases involving, in a Foreign Office Official's words, "perfectly good Aryans, such as Niemoller". The aim was to avoid giving Goebbels "an opportunity of talking
once again about the influence of international Jewry in this country". 267 It was necessary, at all costs, to avoid anything that would give strength to the Jews' War accusation.

Although the White Paper sold well, 268 and the British press with a few notable exceptions, 269 was in support of it, 270 the government believed it to have been a failure - dismissed by the public as atrocity propaganda. 271 After it, there was a reluctance to use any atrocity propaganda, and care was made not to single out Jews as suffering any more than other victims of the Nazis. 272 Although aware that Jews were suffering particularly, one official in April 1940 remarked that "as a general rule Jews are inclined to magnify their persecution. I remember the exaggerated stories of Jewish pogroms in Poland after the last war which, when fully examined, were found to have little substance". 273

"Jewish sources", as another Foreign Office official noted, were "always doubtful" - as were the Jews themselves. 274 A broadcast in January 1941, which referred to refugee Jews as "the friends of all that we were fighting to preserve", was objected to because the two did not "follow inevitably". It was also wrong "to emphasize the mainly Jewish character of our refugee population", as there was "so much antisemitic feeling in the world". 275 The Ministry of Information's instructions in July 1941, which stated that atrocity propaganda "must deal with undisputably innocent people. Not with violent political opponents. And not with Jews", have already been noted. 276 Although exceptions were
made to this instruction, 277 it was generally obeyed. However, by the latter part of 1942 it was becoming a very difficult line to maintain as the reports of the dire fate of European Jewry became too numerous to ignore. A Polish Bund report in June 1942 which had outlined how over 700,000 Polish Jews had perished, was followed by a telegram in early August which detailed the Germans' Jewish extermination plan. 278 Thereafter, "almost every day", in Martin Gilbert's words, "news of the killing of Jews on a massive scale began to reach the Allies". 279 Nevertheless, until December 1942, the government resisted attempts to use the extermination reports in its propaganda.

This reluctance was based on the same premises that had controlled policy on Jewish atrocity stories since the start of the war. There was a distrust of what H. Downie of the Colonial Office called the "Jewish technique of atrocity propaganda", 280 or J. Bennett of the Foreign Office referred to as "Jewish Agency 'sob-stuff'". 281 The report of the extermination plan was, in another Foreign Office official's words, a "rather wild story" and thus the government's Political Warfare Executive refused to use it. 282 Although Sir Herbert Emerson, the Director of the Inter-Governmental Committee for Refugees, was in "no doubt that it is the policy of Germany literally to exterminate all Jews ... of all nationality", 283 his government colleagues disagreed. To accept that, would be to accept a particular Jewish problem in Europe, which was contrary to the "view (of) His Majesty's Government that Jews must be treated as nationals of existing states". 284
In early December, the Polish government-in-exile challenged this position, demanding Allied publicity on the extermination of Polish Jewry. Anthony Eden, the Foreign Secretary, who was actually to make this Declaration on 17 December 1942, did not want to pursue this policy, due to what Lewis Namier referred to as "a general fear of contaminating himself by pronouncing the name of Jew". However, the pressure became too immense and Eden announced to the House of Commons that "the German authorities ... are now carrying into effect Hitler's oft-repeated intention to exterminate the Jewish people in Europe". Eden warned that those carrying out "this bestial policy of cold-blooded extermination" would not escape retribution.

The Commons, according to 'Chips' Channon, "was deeply moved" - as were the British people as a whole. Yet the Declaration was regarded as a mistake by the Foreign Office, for it raised public expectations of government action in aiding the Jews of Europe, when no such policy was intended. Thereafter, no declaration was made on behalf of the Jews, who were again relegated to a non-special treatment category. When the Jewish Agency, in July 1943, asked the government to recognise that Jews were in greater danger in German-occupied countries than other people, the Foreign Office response was that although "the argument had some foundation in fact, (it) would meet with the strongest opposition were any attempt made to use it".

Likewise, the Bermuda Conference several months earlier, although devoted to the Jewish refugee problem, refused to acknowledge this fact publicly. Refugees were
to be referred to by nationality rather than by race. 292

Even when the concentration camps were liberated, the
government's policy of ignoring the Jewish aspect
continued. The recently rediscovered government film on
the subject had the instruction that it was "especially
desirable to document the extent to which non-Jewish
German nationals were the victims of the German "concent-
tration camp system". 293 The final script referred to
Jews only 3 times and, in regard to Buchenwald, did not
mention Jews in the 31 categories of those killed there. 294

Similarly doubts of the atrocity stories - based on
distrust of Jewish sources - continued in government
circles until the end of the war. V. Caventish-Bentinck,
chairman of the Joint Intelligence Committee, doubted a
report on the use of gas chambers because "The Poles and
to a far greater extent the Jews, tend to exaggerate German
atrocities in order to stoke us up". 295 One official
noted the need to take allowance for the "Jewish tendency
to superlative", 296 another bemoaned the amount of time
wasted in the Foreign Office "with these wailing Jews". 297
Even as late as January 1945 a Foreign Office official
could note, with regard to atrocities, that the "sources
of information are nearly always Jewish whose accounts
are only sometimes reliable and not seldom highly coloured.
One notable tendency in Jewish reports on this problem is
to exaggerate the numbers of deportations and deaths". 298
James Parkes, in his autobiography, remembered how the
Foreign Office responded to a draft that he had written
throughout the war on the Jewish problem. He originally
put down that 50,000 Jews had been murdered, but the
Foreign Office crossed off one of his noughts. The same
happened with his second draft, which used a figure of
half a million, and finally towards the end of the war
with his last estimate of 5 million Jews killed. At this
stage Parkes gave up. 299

Certain government officials therefore joined the
select group of authors and journals such as Truth, the
Catholic Herald, Peace News, Socialist Appeal and Douglas
Reed in doubting atrocity stories because they were Jewish.
In this they seem to have again been more cynical than the
public, the majority of whom it must be suggested, accepted
the veracity of the reports of the destruction of European
Jewry. 300 Due to a great reluctance of the government to
single out the Jews for special propaganda treatment — a
policy reinforced by doubts of the intensity of Nazi
persecution of Jews — only on one occasion, at the end of
1942, did the British government acknowledge the plight of
European Jewry. 301 As with the rescue of Jewish refugees,
pro-Jewish propaganda was not a priority of the British
government in the war.

In summarising the government's record in helping the
Jews of Europe, what role did antisemitism play in its
inaction? Bernard Wasserstein has concluded that "certainly
there was a tinge of anti-Semitism in the words of some
British officials and politicians ... But anti-Semitism does
not by itself explain British conduct". 302 More important,
in Wasserstein's opinion, was bureaucratic indifference to
the Jewish fate, where helping "the Jews of Europe was seen
303 Wasserstein is right to suggest that direct antisemitism was rare in government circles, except perhaps in the case of the Middle Eastern Department of the Colonial Office, who, in the words of R.T. Latham, regarded "the Jewish world as a sort of secondary enemy". 304 Yet there is possibly more antisemitism, albeit of an indirect variety, in the bureaucratic indifference than Wasserstein allows for. It is true that in the example of the bombing of Auschwitz or the railway lines leading to it, even requests from the Prime Minister could be ignored by civil servants. 305 Nevertheless, I would argue that one of the major bureaucratic reasons behind the refusal to consider a rescue policy, the fear of domestic antisemitism, had its roots, like the refugee spy scares, in a fundamental distrust of refugee Jews themselves. This was particularly true of Herbert Morrison, who was largely responsible for the policy of restricting entry into Britain in the war, 306 but also of many of his colleagues. One Home Office official noted late in the war that many more Jewish refugees could have been accepted into British society without creating serious antisemitism "if they were not so gregarious and not so assertive". More blatantly, J. Bennett of the Foreign Office gave his reasons for not helping European Jewry: "Why should the Jews be spared distress and humiliation when they have earned it?" 307 Distrusting Jews themselves, it was only natural for these officials to distrust the British public as a whole. Thus the government chose to ignore the genuine sympathy that the persecution of the Jews had created in the war. Whilst
the possibilities of helping European Jewry were limited, the British, as the American, government chose to do as little as possible. The government refused to identify with the Jewish cause, thus failing to come to terms with the most barbaric aspect of its enemy's policies. 308 The study of British government reactions to the plight of European Jewry reveals the limitations of a liberal democratic state, where, as Richard Breitman has written, "Western humanitarian values were unable to prevail over the anti-semites and pragmatists who stressed the risks of giving evidence to support German charges". 309

A Foreign Office paper, just after the war, gave instructions on how to deal with accusations that Britain had been responsible for many Jewish deaths by its policy of restricting the entry of Jews into Palestine and elsewhere. The answer was simple: "His Majesty's Government were not responsible for countless Jewish deaths and suffering. The Nazis were responsible". 310 This fact needs to be remembered and the British response to the holocaust kept in this perspective. Yet this does not rule out criticisms of government policies. 311 The government line that Jews were to be regarded as "a purely religious community, on the same national footing as their fellow citizens", 312 and that subjects "must not be discriminated against because of their religious faith" 313 were fine liberal sentiments. Nevertheless, they were irrelevant in the light of an enemy who persecuted the Jews simply because of their race. Thus with the help of sympathetic ministers, such as Lord Woolton and R. Butler,
the Jews could be granted their particular religious demands. However, the more vital requirement of succour to the Jews' co-religionists abroad could not be dealt with; it was more than just a religious matter.

The emancipation contract demanded that Jews, in return for equality, would cease being Jews. At worst they would be 'Englishman of the Jewish faith'. Anti-semitism was seen as being incompatible with liberalism, the former's survival was viewed as the Jews' own fault. Thus in the war, the government refused publicly to admit the existence of antisemitism and therefore was unable to deal effectively with domestic hostility to Jews. Its failure to differentiate between forms of antisemitism (and thus its exaggeration of the danger of domestic antisemitism), was a reflection of the inability of liberalism to deal with the problem of those who did not regard Jews as 'nationals of a different religion'.

When under threat, whether from the "enemy within" (as with the internment crisis in the summer of 1940), or the "enemy without" (as with the fear of a mass influx of Jewish refugees, had Britain agreed to help European Jewry), humanitarian considerations, as an independent factor, soon disappeared from the governmental outlook. The only restraint then operating on the government came from outside pressure from, or on the behalf of, the Jews. It is with the strength of these pro-Jewish or anti-antisemitic forces in the war that the final chapter will deal.
FOOTNOTES: Chapter 6


2. A. Walker minute (n.d. May 1943?) in response to a complaint from the Board of Deputies to Roberts of the Foreign Office, 14 May 1943 in FO 371/36662 W8627. For a similar reaction with regard to Britain's Palestine White Paper policy see 'Answers to the objections foreseen in Washington telegram' in FO 371/45383 E8450, November 1940: "H.M.G. were not responsible for countless Jewish deaths and suffering. The Nazis were responsible."

3. At the time of the Bermuda Conference on Refugees in April 1943 there was concern in Foreign Office circles that allowing any more refugees into Britain would create antisemitism – see Richard Law note to Eden, 7 May 1943, in FO 371/36731 W6933 and the comments in the Cabinet - CAB65/34 WM(43) 10 May 1943 "there were signs of increasing antisemitic feeling in this country ... (thus) it would be preferable ... to avoid implying that refugees were necessarily Jewish". Yet the same month, in response to a letter referring to the "growth of anti-semitism in Britain", a Foreign Office reply stated that "Mr Eden cannot agree that there is a rising tide of antisemitism in Britain - in FO 371/36725 W9383, letter from J. Sturnbeck, 27 May 1943. See similar sentiments from the Minister of Information, Brendan Bracken, Hansard HC vol 387 col 1165. 17 March 1943 in reply to a request from Locker-Lampson for the case for the Jews to be broadcasted on the B.B.C.


6. I. Grant to A. Eastwood, 7 September 1940 in MAF/88/140.

7. H. Wilkin memo, 4 July 1945 in MAF 88/151.

8. In MAF 88/140. This also applied to Jewish refugees in internment camps. J. Fisher, a Home Office official, minuted on 11 September 1940 "kosher food should be provided officially". In HO 45/387 GEN 28/9.

9. For vegetable margarine for Jews see R. J. Hammond, Food vol. 2: Studies in Administration and Control (London, 1956) 590 and the Jewish Chronicle, 12 February 1943. For opposition, see the Hackney Gazette, 18 August 1943. For matzos see the Jewish Chronicle, loc. cit.: and MAF 99/1137 minute 8 June 1943 that indicates that Woolton was brought in on this issue.


12. A. Alderman minute, September 1942 in ibid.


15. A. Greig minute, 15 May 1943, in ibid.

16. See minutes of 15 May 1943 and 17 January 1944 memo for Woolton. Despite the aggravation that Waley - Cohen had created there was no public hostility to this self-appointed food advisor. See memo of 22 February 1944 by M. P. Rosevare in ibid.

17. In 1940 the government consented to a Jewish army chaplain for the B.E.F., even though 'official' numbers of Jewish soldiers were very low. See Hansard HC vol. 357 col. 564, 13 February 1940, and vol. 358. col. 233, 5 March 1940, and the Jewish Chronicle, 5 January 1940.

18. See the memo concerning the Jewish section, 18 July 1941, in the Brotman papers, B of D B5/4/3 and also correspondence in B of D B5/3/7 and memo of Hugh Martin, head of the Ministry of Information's Religious Division, 1 April 1941, on the desire to have "religious propaganda without touching Zionism", in INF 1/770. This file deals with Jewish matters from 1939 to 1941. See also I. McLaine, The Ministry of Morale, (London, 1979), 168 for background details of this section.

19. The Jewish Bulletin which ran from August 1941 to 1945 concentrated on the positive side of Jewish-Gentile relations in the war - see particularly no. 4 (December 1941) - Henry Carter, 'Jewish-Christian Cooperation' and no. 9 (May 1942) J. J. Mallon 'Jews and Gentiles in East London'.


21. See INF 6/431 for the script and the British Film Institute for a synopsis of 'Religion and the People'.

22. For details of the 1902 Act as far as the Jewish community was concerned, see G. Alderman, The Jewish Community in British Politics, (Oxford, 1983), 78. For a general summary of developments in the subject see S. S. Levin 'The Changing Pattern of Jewish Education' in his own A Century of Anglo-Jewish Life 1870-1970, (London, 1970), 57-74. In 1939, under 14,000 Jewish children were in specifically Jewish schools (Jewish Chronicle 23 April, 1943).

24. See the notes of his visit 13 September 1943 and 10 January 1944 in B of D E2/32.


26. See the Jewish Chronicle, 23 April 1943, 27 August 1943 and 14 January 1944 for approval of Butler's interest and 27 October 1944 for approval of the Act. The relevant sections of the Act, enabling religious denominations to establish and maintain day schools with more state aid can be found in HMSO Education Act 1944 (London 1945) 14 and 20. See also Bernard Steinberg, 'Jewish Education in Great Britain during World War II', Jewish Social Studies vol.29 (1967), 27-63.

27. Home Intelligence used a wide range of source to evaluate the problem including postal censorship. See INF 1/264 for a listing of their contacts.

28. The phrase is from a Home Intelligence report in INF 1/264 no. 108 (24 September 1940). In 1939 the influential German emigre Herman Rauschning quoted Hitler as stating "my Jews are a valuable hostage given to me by the democracies. Anti-Semitic propaganda in all countries is an almost indispensable medium for the extension of our political campaign". Hitler Speaks (London 1939), 233. The democracies seem to have taken Hitler seriously.

29. For example, the N.C.C.L. called for the Ministry of Information to stress the connection between anti-semitism and fascism in its 1943 conference - in N.C.C.L. 41/7, as did the Daily Worker, 20 April 1943. The Board of Deputies called upon the Ministry of Information to have an anti anti-semitic department - memo on Jewish defence, in 8 February 1943, in B of D C6/2/6, and also meetings with Brendan Bracken 17 March 1942, 29 April 1943 and 9 December 1943 in B of D C6/10/27.


31. In September 1939 Home Secretary Anderson warned against giving strength to "such anti-alien and anti-Jewish feeling as may be latent in this country - CAB 98/1 CRP(39) 18 (September 1939). Herbert Morrison warned likewise in a meeting with a Jewish deputation 28 October 1942 in FO 371/32681 W14673. A Home Office official on 7 August 1944 warned the Undersecretary for State, Sir A. Maxwell, that the government's refugee policy "might lead to a revival of the anti-semitism fomented by the B.U.F. with consequent disorders" - in HO 213/1009.
32. See the introduction p.4-7 and chapter 4. p.342 for discussion of this issue.


34. ibid. See also Woolton's correspondence in MAF 102/59, 1 August for such comment.

35. Quoted by Hammond, op. cit; This new opposition can be followed in MAF 99/1217 'The Rationing Week'. A. Alderman of the Ministry minuted, 19 July 1943, that Mr. Kent of the National Federation of Grocers "is moving from one position to another".


37. A memo of 4 June 1943 on Kent stated that he "always generalises and exaggerates", in MAF 99/1217. See also the Grocer, 5 June 1943.

38. Memo on anti-semitism for the Ministry of Information, 16 March 1943. See also the comments in the meetings of 29 April, 1943 and 10 December 1943, all in B of D C6/10/27 and interview with Dr. Stephen Taylor, 19 February 1942 in B of D 5/3/6.


40. ibid, Bracken suggested that "figures could prove anything".

41. The questions were asked by Wing Commander James and Captain Elliston in Hansard HC vol. 376 col. 494, 20m November 1941.

42. Morrison minute, 3 December 1941, in HO 213/14. This file 'Revocation of naturalisation' is devoted to alien Jewish involvement in the black market.

43. Two lengthy memos to the Secretary of State of 13 and 20 December 1941 from the Under-Secretaries of State warned that such an enquiry would only lead to anti-semitism. Sir Kingsley Wood, the Chancellor, was also disgusted by the survey and told Morrison that no good could come out of it - letter of 16 January 1942. All in HO 213/14. For a summary of its findings see Chapter 5. p.404.


45. It was stated by Claude Cockburn in The Week, 4 March 1943, continued by Hannen Swaffer in The People, 14 March 1943, and taken up by the N.C.C.L. in its 1943 conference. See N.C.C.L. 41/7.

46. For B.B.C. policy see B.B.C. W.A.C. R28/20 memo 4 May 1942 by A. P. Ryan on Food Rationing Prosecutions. The Ministry of Information suppressed a Ministry of Food film on the black market in 1941 due to its anti-semitism - see INF 1/251 Pt.5, 2 October 1941. Brendan Bracken also privately warned the press about the subject in May 1943. See his comments in the meeting with the Board of Deputies 29 April 1943 in B of D C6/10/27.
47. According to one of its leading contributors, C.E.M. Joad in the New Statesman, vol. 27 (27 May 1944).

48. See the file 'Censorship of Programmes: Antisemitism 1941-8' in B.B.C. W.A.C. R34/277. A comprehensive proposal by Louis Macneice written in December 1942 to broadcast on the subject was turned down. See the Osborne minute of 25 December 1942, as was one for a slot on 'Sunday Postscripts' by Trevor Blewitt, 6 April 1943. Finally the Director-General issued a B.B.C. policy on Anti-semitism on 17 November 1943: "that we should not promote ourselves or accept any propaganda in the way of talks, discussions, features, with the object of trying to correct the undoubted anti-semitic feeling which is held very largely throughout the country".

49. See the comments of Brendan Bracken in the meetings with the Board of Deputies in 1943 in B of D C6/10/27. In 1943 a pamphlet on anti-semitism for A.B.C.A. was suppressed by the government. See letter from Selig Brodetsky to James Parkes, 13 August 1943 in the Parkes papers 15.010 and Norman Bentwich, Wanderer in War: 1939-45 (London, 1946), 111 for the same point.

50. Comments to the Board of Deputies, 10 December 1943 in C6/10/27.

51. See chapter 2 p. 182 for details of this publication.


53. Morrison note on Newsam letter to Randall, 28 June 1943 in ibid. The public agitation for such a libel but will be examined in the final chapter.

54. Unless of course, as has been shown, such a policy became too public and the government - Jew linkage too prominent.

55. Thus Brendan Bracken told the Commons that German anti-semitism had made no impact on the British people and thus required "no counteracting propaganda" from the Ministry of Information - Hansard HC vol. 397 col. 834, 23 February 1944. He also stated that it was not necessary to single out the Jewish war effort even though Jews were particularly singled out by enemy propaganda, Hansard HC vol. 387. col. 1165, 17 March 1943. However, the Ministry of Information did allow Israel Cohen to publish his Jews and the War although there was no evidence that it had received official recognition. The book, which emphasised the Jewish contribution to the Allied war effort, was published in 1942. See Israel Cohen, A Jewish Pilgrimage (London, 1956), 369 for details.

56. See chapter 5 p. 408.

57. Bernard Wasserstein, Britain and the Jews of Europe 1939-45 (Oxford, 1979), comments on a complaint made in December 1939. FO371/24481 C5143 deals with allegations made in 1940. See also the Jewish Chronicle, 16 August 1940.

59. See for example the (unsolicited) comments of a Polish Jewish soldier to his brother in a letter quoted by Postal and Telegraphic Censorship, March-December 1941 - Report on Jewry No.3 Part 11 in HO 213/953. See also N.C.C.L. 310/8.

60. The Daily Worker complained about this paper as early as 30 August 1940. The Ministry of Information refused to give it newsprint - see FO 371/26737 C3668 Roberts minute 8 April 1941. The Foreign Office had reason to believe that the Jestem Polakiem's anti-semitism was being encouraged "by some British Catholics" - Savery memo to Roberts 12 April 1941 in loc. sit; and support in the Catholic Herald, 16 August 1940, 23 August 1940, and 6 June 1941, and the Weekly Review vol. 39 no. 4 (27 April 1944) would back this up. The Patriot no. 1011 (26 June 1941) also defended the paper.

61. See chapter 5 p.408 for discussion of this.

62. The quote is from the Catholic Herald, 5 May 1944, see also the issue of 28 April 1944. For the reaction of the Polish Ambassador see Count Edward Raczyński, In Allied London, (London 1962), 201 diary entry for 11 April 1944, who claims Jewish M.P.'s "had fallen for Soviet propaganda". Churchill believed that "there has been some Communist intrigue behind all this to discredit the Polish division" - PREM 3/352/14A quoted by Wasserstein, op. cit. 129. Surprisingly the liberal Time and Tide vol. 25. no.19 (6 May 1944) agreed, due to its general anti-communism.

63. See for example Michael Foot 'It can Happen Here!' Evening Standard, 27 April 1944 or Civil Liberty, no. 11, (June 1944).

64. This was suggested by the Regional Director for Poland of the Political Intelligence Department M. McClaren to Roberts, 6 March, 1944, in FO 371/39480 C3193. The Daily Worker returned to Polish army anti-semitism after the Katyn massacre - see the issue of 3 May 1943 and had a concentrated campaign on the subject in the spring of 1944 - see the Daily Worker, 5 and 8 May 1944. H. F. Srebrnik, 'The Jewish Communist Movement in Stepney', (Ph.D. University of Birmingham, 1983) 172-3 believes that this was the major reason behind Communist Party activity on the subject, the Soviet-Polish split being "a windfall for the C.P.G.B."

65. Roberts of the Foreign Office suggested that "matters had come to a head owing to the very anti-semitic attitude adopted by recent recruits to the Polish army taken from among Poles captured when fighting with the Germans in Tunisia." Minute of 20 January 1944 in FO371/39480 C1087.

66. See for example the Manchester Guardian, 8 April 1944; Yorkshire Observer, 11 May 1944; News Chronicle, 13 April 1944 quoted by A. Sharf, The British Press and Jews Under Nazi Rule (London 1964), 118. Eleanor Rathbone's motives were as usual, purely humanitarian - see Mary Stocks, Eleanor Rathbone, (London 1949), 303-4. However, Raczyński, op. cit. 210, entry for 7 May 1944 commented that "the conservative papers have defended us after a fashion".
67. A. Wilkinson, of the War Office, believed that Polish Army anti-semitism was "justified". In a note to the Foreign Office 6 May 1940 in FO 371/24481 C6231. This hostility continued in 1944, see the War Office memo of 5 March 1944 in FO371/39480 C3121.

68. The Foreign Office's R. Law referred to the War Office's arrangements as "exceptional" - 4 April 1944 in FO 371/39481 C4519.

69. Driberg was astonished at how the War Office had given way "rather reasonably and rather quickly". He called the public campaign, which climaxed at a meeting at the Stoll Theatre, "a huge success", and one of the most successful in his career - I.W.M. Thames Television Recorded Interviews, 'The World at War' no. 2767, and his Ruling Passions (London 1977), 203. N.C.C.L. 45/4 has details on the Stoll Theatre Conference, 14 May 1944.

70. These were the sentiments of W. Harrison, a Foreign Office official, 23 February 1944, whose viewpoint eventually prevailed. In FO 371/39480 C2643. The B.B.C. was told not to give the problem any publicity whatsoever. See Roberts memo, 6 April 1943, FO 371/39481 C4633.

71. Thus over Jestem Polakiem the government was anxious to avoid "a charge of subsidising ant-semitic propaganda even indirectly," Roberts minute, 19 April 1941 in FO 371/26737 C3836.

72. Roberts minute 26 February 1944. Driberg was not to be told how far the War Office was prepared to go lest his demands increased - according to an agreement between the Foreign Office and War Office, 27 February 1944. Both in FO 371/39480 C3231.

73. E. N. Cooper stated that Polish army anti-semitism could "foment anti-semitic and anti-Polish sentiments in the U.K. at a time when it was essential to present a common front to the common enemy", and that the Home office "was primarily concerned to see that the public peace was maintained". In a meeting with a Jewish delegation, 8 January 1942 in HO 213/347.

74. The Jewish Chronicle, 26 March 1943, has a report of the Glasgow Jewish Representative Council that there was "growing anti-semitism in Scotland due to Polish army influence". The Daily Worker, 5 May 1944, stated that Polish soldiers had told Scottish girls not to dance with Jewish soldiers, and N.C.C.L. 45/3 has evidence of Polish anti-semitism aimed at a wider public. Home Intelligence reported that whilst many people condemned Polish army anti-semitism, "there was a slight increase (in British anti-semitism) at the time of the reports" - INF 1/292 no. 191 (23/31 May 1944). Perhaps Wasserstein op. cit. 130, is a little 'optimistic' in stating that "the spill-over from Polish to indigenous anti-Jewish activity turned out to be very small".

75. The Home Office's E. N. Cooper's comments in 8 January 1942 meeting, HO 213/347.

76. See chapter 7.
77. Bernard Porter, *The Refugee Question in Mid-Victorian Politics* (Cambridge, 1979), 169. This excellent account shows how in the 1850's, middle class public opinion ensured that the government did not reverse its policy of asylum. However, Porter is aware that had there been a real threat to stability and security, liberals would have most likely reversed the policy - loc. cit. 227-8.

78. ibid; 218.


81. Wasserstein, in G. Hirschfeld, op.cit; 65, makes this point as does J. C. Bird, 'Control of Enemy Alien Civilians in Great Britain, 1914-18' (University of London, Ph.D 1981), 325-6 who concludes that "the measures adopted during the First World War provided the model on which aliens policy in World War Two was based".

82. *Hansard* HC vol. 354 col.367, 4 September 1939. See also the Home Office Memorandum for the guidance of Tribunals September 1939 in HO 213/231.

83. This was acknowledged by Anderson himself after Mass internment in the Commons in August 1940 - "My statement of 4 September ... gave me personally the greatest satisfaction. I thought it was in accordance with the best traditions of the country" - *Hansard* vol.364, col. 1542-3, 22 August 1940.

84. Sir. A. Maxwell to John Anderson, 3 January 1940 in HO 213/460.

85. ibid. See also INF 1/770 Memo 'On the Jews', 10 August 1939 on the need to differentiate between democratic and dictatorial treatment of Jews. Similarly, Reilly of the Foreign Office minuted, 28 August, 1939, that due to U.S. interest in the refugees "it seems important that the policy as regards refugees in this country should be presented as favourably as possible". Randall, of the Foreign Office, agreed, saying it was important to impress American opinion. Letter to Cooper, 30 August 1939. All in FO 371/24100 W12851.
86. See Stent, op. cit. 30-41 and HO 213/547 for comments on the A, B, C system.

87. W. W. Simpson, on behalf of a conference of the refugee bodies, thanked the Home Office for "the liberal policy of H. M. Government towards the refugees ... the sympathy and efficiency with which the tribunals have carried out their work". This impression was shared by many of the refugees - see the comments of B. Davies (no. 444385), Dr. R. Friedenthal (no. 3963) and Lady Simon (no. 4529) in the Imperial War Museum refugee tapes. The children at Harris House refugee centre were impressed by "the fairness of the English government" in the tribunals. See their account of 'The First Year at Harris House, Southport 1939-40' in the Manchester Jewish Museum or Manchester Central Reference Library, microfilm 2845.

88. J. W. Wheeler-Bennett, John Anderson: Viscount Waverley. (London 1962), 122. This is confirmed by several refugees - see the comments of Ludwig Spiro and Dr. Friedenthal (tape nos. 4343 and 3963 respectively) in the I.W.M. Refugee tapes. However some refugees fared less successfully, Dr. H. Enoch writing "how hostile people were against the Germans and even against us refugees" - 'Journal 1932-46' in I.W.M. Dept. of Manuscripts. A Mass-Observation report 'Anti-semitism in the London Area at Start of War', commented on the universal anti-semitic feeling especially in refugee areas - in M-O A:TC Antisemitism Box 1. File G.

89. Wanderer in the War 1939-45, 21. Austin Stevens, The Dispossessed (London 1975), 171, also comments on the British feelings of solidarity with the refugees up to May 1940.

90. F. Tennyson Jesse, a refugee worker, to H. M. Harrod in their London Front: Letters Written to America (London 1940), 73 letter of 12 October 1939.

91. R. Kolmel in G. Hirschfeld, op. cit; 261-2 comments how several lost jobs in Scotland in the early part of the war owing to this hostility. Lady Reading claimed that up to 8000 refugee women had lost their jobs as domestics since the start of the war, partly because of anti-German feeling, Home Office meeting, 14 September 1939 in HO 213/1452. The government was aware of the public concern that refugees were getting "soft jobs while the British youth is being conscripted" - A. Maxwell note to Sir J. Grigg of the 4 September 1939 in HO 213/262. The Hackney Gazette, 4 December 1939, Daily Sketch, 10 February 1940 and Evening Standard, 20 January 1940, all report such opposition. M-O A:FR 697 comments on the complaint, made throughout 1940, that refugees were taking British jobs.

92. See New Statesman vol. 19 (6 January 1940) for details of this campaign and also chapter 2 p.135.

93. For Truth see no. 3293 (20 October 1939) the 'refuspy'; the Empire Record no. 288 and 289 (February and March 1940); National Review no. 684 (February 1940). See also New Pioneer vol. 1, no. 11 (October 1939).
94. Daily Mail, 9 October 1939. Ward Price warned that these refugee Jews could soon get a stranglehold on British life as they had done in Germany.

95. Esther Simpson, Secretary of the Academic Assistance Council, was aware that many magistrates were not properly briefed and the net result was that tribunals "played safe" by putting many into a 'B' category. I.W.M. refugee tapes (no.4469). Leo Kahn and H.K.F. Blaschko were two refugees given 'B' category due to the confusion of the tribunals. Blaschko recalled that the man in charge was not "sufficiently conversant with the problems of the refugees". I.W.M. refugee tape (no. 4497) and Kahn felt "the magistrates just hadn't got any instructions as to the criteria which they were to employ". I.W.M. refugee tape (no. 4300). Despite a Home Office memo to the tribunals in September 1939, emphasising that most aliens were refugees (in HO 213/231), further instructions had to be sent to the tribunal leaders on 21 October 1939. See A. Maxwell letter in HO 213/547. Even in January 1940 the Home Office had to admit "divergences of practice owing to varying interpretations" - also in HO 213/547. Many alien tribunals put refugees with engineering experience automatically into category 'B' - see letter of R. C. Martin of the Central Office of Refugees to H. B. Clark of the Ministry of Labour, 19 January 1940 in HO 213/503.

96. See HO 213/459 for figures. 158 "refugees" were interned.

97. For Spier see his autobiographical work The Protecting Power (London 1951), 15-23. Spier could not resist the conclusion that out of the initial 100 interned initially at Olympia, as there were so many Jewish and anti-Nazi people, that the Gestapo had provided the internment list!

98. For Stern see letter from his solicitors to the Under-Secretary of State, 17 November 1939 in HO 283/10/3A.


100. Alec Natan has written an unpublished account of his internment 'Barren Interlude: The Story of My Detention' which is available in the Institut fur Zeitgeschichte, Munich. See M. Seyfert in G. Hirschfeld, op. cit; 165 for details.

101. Peter and Leni Gillman, op. cit; refer to the lack of material released on alien internment by the Home Office. However, due to the pressure on the government to release material relating to fascist internment, a major release of alien related papers occurred in early 1986. The material is in two sections, HO 215 - relating to general questions - and HO 214 - personal files relating to problems associated with internment. Nevertheless, although these voluminous files give an interesting account of the problems associated with running the internment camps in Britain (and also in Canada and Australia), there is very little material that gives an indication of why individuals were interned. There are only occasional hints of why individuals...
were being detained - usually because the Security forces harboured suspicions (not necessarily with any evidence) about the alien. See for example HO 214/61 P4801 1B – the case of W. Fleischner. This would indicate that the naturally suspicious mentality of MI5 was probably responsible for many of the more absurd internment decisions.

102. See HO 283/10/3A.
105. ibid; 70-1. Masters claims that Knight "often made anti-semitic jokes", and that, unlike John Buchan, Knight's thinking on Jewish matters did not progress in the Hitlerite period, and that "he was heavy-handed in his Englishman's view of Jewry".
106. See the Sunday Express, 21 January 1940: "Those Influential Friends of Dangerous Aliens"; Sunday Dispatch, 7 January 1940: "Alien women in luxury" - emphasising the patriotic 'Germaness' of the Jewesses; Sunday Pictorial, 28 January 1940; Daily Express 16 January 1940; 'English spoken here'.
107. Sunday Pictorial, 28 January 1940. Tribune, 2 February 1940, recognised that this represented a campaign to encourage the public to demand mass internment.
108. Letter to his father, 2 March 1940, quoted by J. W. Wheeler-Bennett, op. cit; 239. See also the Jewish Chronicle, 29 March 1940, for a recognition of the hate campaign. Both the Western Mail, 16 February 1940 and the Hackney Gazette, 7 February 1940, claimed that refugees were spies.
109. The phrase is that of Frank Allaun of the Workers' Education Youth Scheme, who recognised the dangers of such hysteria as early as mid-February. See the Manchester Guardian, 16 February 1940. By January 1940 the government's Advisory Committee warned that "public opinion may flare up suddenly as in 1915". Thus the public would need reassuring in a time of "comparative quiet". In HO 45/25754/863027/1.
110. Sunday Dispatch, 21 April 1940, "Hitler'S Fifth Column in Britain is made up of a conglomeration of Fascists, peace fanatics and alien refugees in league with Berlin and Moscow", an argument that could well have come from The Patriot or the Social Crediter. Ward Price in the Daily Mail, 20 April 1940 told the government to "Act! Act! Act! Do it now" and to take the matter out of the hands of the tribunals, as did the former Mosleyite Beverley Nichols in the Sunday Chronicle, 21 April 1940.
111. In Picture Post, 6 April 1940. The Times, 23 April 1940 called for the need of common sense - aliens had already been checked and there was no need for the wholesale internments of World War one. The New Statesman vol. 19 (27 April 1940) called the anti-refugee campaign a "red herring".

112. M-OA: FR84 26 April 1940 on the Fifth Column found general confusion, although several quoted the Sunday Dispatch as their main source of inspiration for demanding mass internment.

113. M-OA: FR79 25 April 1940 'Public feeling about aliens', though the report concluded that the press campaign was beginning to have a developing effect.

114. Quoted by Mass-Observation's Journal Us no. 15 (10 May 1940).

115. ibid; and M-OA FR79.

116. See chapter 2 p.141, for the turn of opinion against the B.U.F.


118. The Manchester Guardian, 13 May 1940 "no half measures will do"; The Spectator vol. 164 (17 May 1940) warned to take no chances. See Harold Nicolson's comments in the issue of 8 September 1939 for earlier opposition to internment; Daily Herald, 17 May 1940 claimed that the government's measures had saved the country from the Fifth Column; and the Jewish Chronicle, 24 May 1940 supported the government's actions.

119. 1.3% according to a B.I.P.O. survey in May 1940, 65% of the 1600 sample felt the government's measures did not go far enough. Quoted by H. Cantril (ed) Public Opinion 1935-1946, (Princeton, New Jersey, 1951), 12. A much smaller survey carried out by Mass-Observation on 18 May 1940 found that 90% wanted internment to be increased. In M-OA: FR118. The New Statesman offered no leading article on the subject until the 15 June 1940. Tribune was similarly quiet until 12 July 1940.

120. See C. Carroll memo, 11 May 1940 in FO 371/25244 W7848.

121. For the Category 'B' change see CAB 65/7 WM(40)137 24 May 1940 and the final change CAB 65/7WM(40)161, 11 June 1940.

122. Accurate figures are difficult to find, Wasserstein, quoting Norman Bentwich, gives a figure of 30,000 - Britain and the Jews of Europe, 90, whilst Miriam Kochan, op. cit; 124, refers to a peak of 27,200. At the end of June 1940 some 18,000 German, Austrian and Italians had been interned, with probably another 10,000 in July 1940 - see the figures in HO 45/24893. Peter and Leni Gillman, op. cit; 225 suggest 7350 were sent overseas. These figures are confirmed by HO 215/153 GEN 4/2 2B.
123. The War Office had called for the internment of as "many aliens as possible" on May 11 1940 - quoted by C. Caroll memo in FO 371/25244 W7848. This request was repeated by Neville Chamberlain in the Cabinet 24 May 1940 in CAB 65/7 WM (40) 137.

124. In the Cabinet meeting of 11 June 1940, where general internment was accepted by the Cabinet, Anderson was in opposition as he felt it would turn those previously well-disposed to the country against it - in CAB 65/7 WM (40) 161.

125. Paul Hoch, op. cit; 81 is perhaps the first to raise the question of what role anti-semitism played in the internments. Whilst perhaps overplaying the Jewish aspect slightly, Hoch is to be congratulated in analysing the internment question with the background of long-term hostility to Jews and foreigners, and not just as "May madness".

126. Nigel West, MI5: British Security Services Operations 1909-45 (London, 1981) 48, points out how Kell, head of MI5, was alarmed at the flood of refugees in Britain and believed there were many thousands of agents. His successor in the summer of 1940, Sir Charles Petrie, seems to have been of a like mind. See FO 371/29176 W3503, Lytton and Latham minutes of 19 April 1941 and 19 March 1941 after an interview with Petrie. Latham was convinced that the War Office and MI5 were responsible for the internments as they had "adopted the rule of thumb that any person of foreign nationality is to be presumed to be hostile". Minute, 27 June 1940 FO 371/25253 W8686 quoted by Wasserstein, op. cit; 95.

127. M. Burkill, a refugee worker, commented on War Office policy which she had to deal with throughout the war. To them "they were simply enemy aliens. The war was on and that was that and the sooner one could put them away and have them safe, the better" - I.W.M. refugee tapes (no. 4494).

128. Morrison to Eden, February 1941 in FO 371/29173 W1810.

129. V. Cavendish-Bentinck, Chairman of the Joint Intelligence Committee used this as an excuse - minute 29 July 1940 FO 371/25248 W1810.

130. The quote is from N. Stammers, 'Civil Liberties in Britain: During the Second World War (D. Phil. University of Sussex, 1980), 101. See this chapter, p.476 for an indication of such prejudices in the security forces. The Hore-Belisha issue had also revealed strong hostility within the War Office.

131. Wells in Reynolds News, 28 July 1940, Martin in the New Statesman vol. 19 (27 April 1940) editorial 'Red Herrings' and F. Lafitte, The Internment of Aliens, (London, 1940), 27. Orwell in his war-time Diary, 8 August 1940, commented that Wells had told him that he had been informed that the "persecution of refugees" was due to "sabotage" from the War Office, who regarded the refugees as a Bolshevik threat. S. Orwell and I. Angus (ed), The Collected Essays, Journalism and Letters of George Orwell, vol. 2 (London, 1968), 413-4.
132. Most notably by R. Stent, op. cit; 252-3. M. Seyfert in G. Hirschfeld, op. cit; 188, rightly points out that there is no evidence of such a diversionary policy and that more mundane reasons, such as "uncertainty, ineffectiveness and a certain amount of xenophobia, were responsible for the internments".

133. C. Carroll reported the government's policy in a memo of 11 May 1940 outlining the initial restrictions, but commented that "His Majesty's Government are committed by Cabinet decision" not to undertake mass internment. Memo of 11 May 1940 in FO 371/25244 W7848.

134. In Cabinet 15 May 1940, Churchill stated that "he thought it important that there should be a very large round-up of enemy aliens" - CAB 65/7 WM(40)123, 15 May 1940. Over a week later he commented how "his view had hardened in the last few weeks" - CAB 65/7 WM(40)137, 22 May 1940. M. Gilbert, Winston S. Churchill vol. VI Finest Hour: 1939-41, (London 1983), 459, comments on Churchill's concern about Fifth Column activities amongst aliens.

135. His biographer claims that Anderson found the mass internments "deeply disturbing". He wrote to his father, 15 June 1940, referring to his "strenuous" time. "There is a whispering campaign going on which puts the witch-hunts of the Middle Ages completely in the shade. Everyone tends now to look askance at his neighbour - very unfortunate, I think". Both in J. W. Wheeler-Bennett, op. cit; 247.

136. Lord Birkett wrote to Anderson on 24 July 1940 stating that the careful work investigating aliens had been "obliterated by the Government policy of wholesale internment". Anderson replied the next day, stating that "it has been a matter of great personal concern to me that the scheme which had been so carefully framed and was working so well ... had to be swept on one side by reason of overriding military considerations" - in HO 213/455. Whilst one has some sympathy with Anderson's position and his objection to mass internment, it is perhaps necessary to ask why he did not pursue his beliefs with more conviction.

137. HO 199/389 shows the government's interest on the press reactions to the aliens as does INF 1/319. Home Intelligence was closely watching the public's attitude - see the papers of Mary Adams, its director, in M-OA: Box 1, File B, 15 and 24 April 1940, memos to the War Cabinet.

138. By N. Stammers, 'Civil Liberties', 74.

139. Churchill was the first to suggest that "when air attacks develop, public temper in this country would be such that such (aliens) would be in great danger if at liberty". In CAB 65/7 WM (40) 123, 5 May 1940. This was repeated by the Parliamentary Under-Secretary at the Home Office, Osbert Peake, to a deputation from the Parliamentary Committee for Refugees, 24 June 1940 - quoted by Wasserstein, op. cit; 94, and repeated by Peake in the Commons, in Hansard vol. 364 col. 1579, 22 August 1940.
140. CAB 67/6 WP (G) (40) 131.

141. On 4 June 1940 it recommended that the aliens problem should be dealt with in a "sedative manner". A talk by Anderson might check "the wave of suspicion which is passing across the country. In INF 1/254. The New Statesman's leading article on 15 June 1940 also called for such an approach. Sir A. Sinclair, of the Air Ministry, told W. P. Crozier that the problem was that Anderson would not take charge of the problem although he was a "very humane man". In A. J. P. Taylor (ed) W. P. Crozier: Off the Record Political Interviews 1933-43 (London, 1973), 172 interview 26 July 1940.

142. The broadcast was given on 30 May 1940 and repeated on the 9 O'clock news. Bland was mistaken about the nature of the fifth column activity in the Netherlands, but nevertheless his warnings were brought to the Cabinet by Lord Halifax on 15 May 1940 - see CAB 65/7 WM(40)123. A correspondent in the New Statesman, 8 June 1940 wondered why, if the government wanted to avoid a spy mania, that the Ministry of Information allowed such a talk to be given. One must assume that the government had given up any pretence at a liberal stance on internment by this stage. Bland's views matched those of the the anti-alien press. Ward Price in the Daily Mail, 24 May 1940, commented that "in Britain you have to realize that every German is an agent" and Beverley Baxter in the Sunday Chronicle, 26 May 1940 stated that he would even intern his German friends.


144. Stent, op. cit; 79 refers to this and its policy of publishing pro-refugee letters - 108 by the end of the year.

145. Daily Herald, 4 July 1940. See the News Chronicle, 4 July 1940, for similar sentiments. The Jewish Chronicle began attacking the government's internment policy from 21 June 1940, shortly after the New Statesman vol. 19 (15 June 1940). Thereafter both weeklies continually attacked the abuses of the internment system, as did Tribune, 12 July 1940 onwards. M-OA: FR 276 16 July 1940 commented on the change of press opinion and the emergence of opposition to internment.

146. On 20 May 1940 Home Intelligence reported that many people believed that an invasion was possible - INF 1/264 no. 2 (20 May 1940). This continued until early July - see INF 1/264 no. 45 (9 July 1940) but two weeks later such fears had nearly disappeared - INF 1/264 no. 56 (23 July 1940).

147. This ship was torpedoed by the Germans on 2 July 1940. 486 Italians and 175 Germans drowned. See Wasserstein, op. cit; 98-9 and Stent, op. cit; 100-9 for general details. HO 214/2, 3, 13, 14, 17, 60 and 74 have details of individuals on this ship.

148. INF 1/264 no. 49 (13 July 1940).

149. See M-OA: FR 324 'Attitudes to Aliens', 10 July 1940.
The B.I.P.O. poll in July 1940 found that 43% wanted to intern all aliens, and a further 48% wanting to intern only those "who may be dangerous". See H. Cantril, op. cit; 12. Neither Mass-Observation's nor B.I.P.O.'s polls found anyone who wanted no internment of aliens.

M-OA: FR 324.

M-OA: FR 424 relating to a survey carried out on 5 August 1940. A month later the 'intern the lot' figure had dropped to 27%. In M-OA: FR 486, survey of 28 September 1940.

See Mary Stocks, op. cit; 284, and Hansard, HC vol. 362, col. 1210-1217, 10 July 1940. Major Cazalet, Colonel Wedgwood, Sidney Silverman, George Strauss, Geoffrey Mander and Sorensen followed her onslaught, though Mrs. Tate and Henry Strauss defended mass internment.

'German and Austrian Civilian Internees: Categories of Persons Eligible for Release from Internment' (Command 6217, July 1940). See also CAB 65/8 WM (40) 217, 1 August 1940.

In a memo of 20 November 1940 Herbert Morrison, the new Home Secretary, reported that some 7,200 had been released under the White Paper scheme. In HO 213/565. By 23 December 1940, 7764 German and Austrian men and 669 women had been released, increasing to 8132 men and 826 women by 1 January 1941. Figures from the government's Council on Aliens, 22nd meeting (30 December 1940) and memo on release figures, 11 January 1941. Both in FO 371/29173 W47.

M. Seyfert suggests that the conditions in the Warth Mills were "certainly an extreme case" - in G. Hirschfeld, op. cit; 172-3. They were, according to Leo Kahn, who spent 10 days there "very bleak, very dirty". I.W.M. refugee tapes (no.4300), and to Ludwig Spiro, a fellow sufferer "very, very miserable". I.W.M. refugee tapes (no.4343). See also Hellmuth Weissenborn (no.3771), Francis Carsten (no. 4483) and Peter Midgley (no. 3941) in the I.W.M. refugee tape collection for similar descriptions.

A report by Mrs. Corbett Ashby on behalf of the Friendly Aliens Protection Committee, 5 March 1941, found that problems such as overcrowding had all been overcome. In Manchester Guardian archive, 223/5/3.

In the same report Corbett Ashby commented that the segregation of the Nazis was "rather inadequate, especially in the women's camps". Whilst Herbert Morrison agreed to the separation of Nazis and anti-Nazis, according to Sir Alexander Maxwell (memo 27 January 1941 in HO 213/564), the Jewish Chronicle, 7 March 1941 reported that the situation in the Huyton Camp, where the mixing of the Jews and Nazis was particularly bad, had only just been cleared up. See Walter Wallich, I.W.M. refugee tape (no. 4431) for a description of the tension in the camp. A report by the Council of Austrians in Great Britain, 3 December 1940, stated that "the plight of the anti-Nazis inside this camp
completely controlled by the Nazis is a really terrible one". In N.C.C.L. 46/1. See also HO 215/130 on Huyton. The segregation of Jews and Nazis continued to cause problems in the Isle of Man after 1941. At the end of 1942 a group of Jews at the Peveril Camp went on hunger strike over this issue. See HO 215/126, and for similar complaints HO 215/169. Accusations of Nazi bullying of Jewish internees were heard as late as 1944. See the Council on Aliens report April 1944 in Fo 371/42786 W5196.

159. At the Port St. Mary Camp, Inspector Cuthbert, its administrator, made sure that the atmosphere and conditions were as good as possible. Eugen Spier, op. cit; 248, who was at the camp in 1941, said he felt like a guest at Port St. Mary. A camp worker, Kathleen Jones, confirms that Cuthbert was "a very fair sort of man" who was liked by all - I.W.M. refugee tapes (no. 4416). Cuthbert himself reported on his years at the camp from 1940-5 for the Home Office concluding that "the treatment was humane, and the interness were treated in no way as suspected persons, but only as human beings temporarily detained because of external circumstances over which they had no control" - in HO 213/1053. On 19 April 1941 the Journal Illustrated ran a piece on the camps, 'Barbed Wire Isle' by Mac Magee and concluded that "it is unfortunate that so many veils of secrecy should be drawn over the complete story of the internment camps in the Isle of Man, for there is much to the credit of the Home Office and the Government of the island that should be made public". Nevertheless it must be pointed out that Cuthbert was the most sympathetic of all the Camp Commandants.

160. See Command 6217 (July 1940).

161. Command 6233 (August 1940). See Stent, op. cit; 209, for details, 1502 people were released under this category.

162. Alfred Lommitz, Never Mind Mr Lom (London, 1941), 138, makes this point.

163. 4610 aliens had enlisted by January 1941, according to a report from E. F. Jacob to Churchill, 13 January 1941 in PREM 3/42/2/2 quoted by Wasserstein, op. cit; 107. Norman Bentwich, They found Refuge, (London 1956), 71 and 108-12, deals with the Alien Pioneer Corps. Alfred Perles, Alien Corn (London, 1944), 239, commented on the lack of choice in joining the non-combative unit. R. V. Jones, Most Secret War (London, 1978), 84, has details of Jewish refugees who went back to Germany under cover during the war.

164. B. Donoughue and G. W. Jones, Herbert Morrison: A Portrait of a Politician, (London, 1973), 303, suggest that Morrison was anxious to release as many aliens as was possible, yet this does not accord with Morrison's statements at the time.
165. Morrison stated that "there is always a risk that at any time of public excitement ... the pendulum may swing the other way".
Draft of 20 November 1940 which became a memo to the Cabinet - WP (G) (40) 309 on 26 November 1940. In HO 213/565.

166. In November 1940 the Joint Intelligence Committee reported to the Chief of Staff that there should be no relaxation of the restrictions. Quoted by Morrison 20 November 1940 in Ho 213/565.

167. Ibid; Churchill wrote to Morrison on 25 January 1941 denouncing MI5, whose activities were an impediment to the Home Office's work. He stated that the danger of May and June had passed and thus "a more rapid and general process of release from internment should be adopted". Morrison disagreed on MI5's role saying their priorities were correct and that he would be at fault if he released aliens without their approval - letter to Churchill, 30 January 1941, both in FO 371/29174 W1408. See also file HO 45/25754.

168. Stent, op. cit; 206, and Kochan, op. cit; 122, deal with the formation of these groups.

169. R. T. Latham produced a draft concerning the Council on Aliens on 30 August 1940. He reminded the Asquith Committee that the Council's first function was "to suggest measures for maintaining the morale of aliens" so as to bind them to "our common cause", and that the only way to do this was to implement an ordered and fast release policy. The Asquith Committee rejected this approach - see their report of November 1940. Both in HO 213/565.


171. See Prime Minister's note of 25 January 1941 in FO 371/29174 W1408 for Lytton's threatened resignation. R. T. Latham minute of 19 April 1941 refers to his resignation due to the interference of MI5 "for reasons which it does not disclose and are usually bad" - in FO 371/29176 W3503.

172. Figures of 9 August 1941 in FO 371/29179 W99JO2. 13,183 men and 2531 women had been released. 7214 men remained interned, with only 1389 in the United Kingdom. 1417 women had not been released, all of them being interned in the U.K.

173. Wasserstein, op. cit; 108 suggests that as few as 300-400 were left on the Isle of Man by July 1942, falling to 25 by April 1944. Doubt can be cast on this last figure. A letter from the Home Office to the Council on Aliens, 17 July 1944 refers to 48 aliens interned - just under regulation 12(5A). In FO 371/42860 WR 335.

174. The 61st Council on Aliens, 5 April 1944, referred to various cases of refugees interned for a variety of petty crimes. In FO 371/42786 W5555. See also HO 215/169 and HO 214/37 for more information about alien Jews interned under regulation 12 (5A).
175. Ludwig Spiro, for example, remembers the strain of internment on his father’s health at the temporary Kempton Park camp - I.W.M. refugee tapes (no. 4343). See also HO 214/41 on V. Leisching.

176. The internment of these elderly Jews was perhaps one of the most ridiculous results of the internment policy. It created great hardship in the East End for the dependants of these people - see INF 1/264 no. 57 (24 July 1940) and No. 69 (7 August 1940). J. J. Mallon wrote to the Times, 23 July 1940 to complain and helped set up a Committee for the Protection of Refugee Aliens - see theToynbee Hall Report, 1938-46, (London, 1946), 11. A petition was signed by many East Enders, half of whom were non-Jewish, to secure their release. See the East End Observer, 27 July 1940. Most appear to have been released due to their age but G. Alexander was detained in Brixton until after November 1940. See the letter to D. N. Pritt, 18 November 1940 in N.C.C.L. 46/1. Alexander remained interned until 1945. See his Home Office file HO 214/54.

177. Particularly at the Huyton camp where the Nazi/Jewish mixing problem was so intense. M. Seyfert in G. Hirschfeld, op. cit; 187, comments on this, as do Walter Nessler and Kurt Frankenschwerth (I.M.W. refugee tapes no. 3993 and 4298 respectively) who were internees there. Mary Kay, an internment camp worker on the Isle of Man, also refers to suicide attempts - I.W.M. refugee tapes (no. 4399). The recently released Home Office files contain tragic suicide stories. See HO 214/8 (Arthur Just who killed himself after his experiences at Warth Mills); HO214/75, HO214/11 and HO214/28.

178. Hoch. op. cit; makes this point about the recent writing on internment.


180. The quote is from Ira Rischowski - I.W.M. refugee tapes (no. 4296). See also Erna Simion tape (no. 4000) for similar comments. HO 215/405 indicates that this was why Cruickshank was replaced.

181. Edith Cain, a landlady at Port St. Mary - I.W.M. refugee tapes (no. 4445). Helga Zinn faced what she regarded as anti-semitic landladies in Port St. Mary, who were more sympathetic to the Nazi internees. Quoted by Austin Stevens, op. cit; 201.
182. Quoted by Peter and Leni Gillman, op. cit; 253.

183. See Wasserstein, op. cit; 96-7; Stent, op. cit; 114-33, for details. Various refugee tapes in the I.W.M. deal with Dunera experiences - see Kurt Enderl (no. 3996), Walter Fliess (no. 3936), Herbert Goldsmith, (no. 3970), Peter Johnson (no. 3790), Hugh Rank (no. 4342) and Hans Wetzler (no. 3992). Julian Layton was sent to deal with the allegations and to deal with the problems in the Australian camp at Hay - tape (no. 4382). A recent channel 4 drama, The Dunera Boys, broadcast on Channel 4 in October 1985 dealt with this episode. HO 215/263 contains the fascinating diary of Heino Alexander who was on the Dunera. The diary of the journey gave, in the words of Postal and Telegraphic Censorship, "a most distressing account of the ill treatment and cruelty experienced on board the S.S. Dunera during what the writer describes as the 'hellish voyage to Australia in 1940'."

184. Comments of D. Thorneycroft to Kingsley Martin, 2 November 1941. Thorneycroft was Secretary of the Worthing Refugee Committee. In the Kingsley Martin papers Box 29, file 6. Similar sentiments occur in the internment camp paper The Sefton Review no. 3 (9 December 1940), available in the Manchester Jewish Museum. For other camp papers see HO 215/436.

185. Klaus Loewald was "delighted" to be interned as it released him from his obligations. Quoted by Kochan, op. cit; 66. A Home Office minute on release policy stated that "no alien is released unless he requested it". It continued "we have actually cases of aliens whose friends have pressed for their release, but who have preferred to stay interned; and the Secretary of State has permitted them to do so". In HO 213/432.

186. This has been ignored by commentators of the aliens' crisis of 1940. Although the 'intern the lot' figure had gone down to 27% in September, it revived to 43% at the end of October. The air raids, according to Mass-Observation, had led to a new crop of spy stories. In M-OA: FR 486 report for 8 November 1940.

187. See Chapter 5 p.397-99 for some fictional and press examples. Truth, no. 3530 (5 May 1944) and no. 3583 (11 May 1945) warned against "the Germans in our midst" - referring specifically to Jewish refugees - as did the National Review no. 742 (December 1944). The President of the Board of Deputies referred to a recent speech where refugees were referred to as fifth columnists. In a J.D.C. meeting, 20 March 1944 - B of D C6/7/5/1. Lord Ailwyn, before the end of the war, claimed that the Government had taken an unjustified risk in not interning all Germans throughout the war - Hansard HL, vol. 135, col. 121, 27 February 1945.
188. A Refugee Industries Committee was formed in 1939 to combat xenophobia on the economic front. According to H. Loeb in G. Hirschfeld, op., cit; 234-5 its work increased towards the end of the war, with a growing lobby for returning the refugees. Several Chambers of Commerce voted to refuse giving aliens licences to open shops - see the Hampstead Express, 27 August 1943, Evening News, 16 September 1943, for Balham and 12 October 1943 for Battersea. In 1944 the British Legion Planning Committee adopted a resolution to refuse refugees any work permit unless there were no unemployed ex-servicemen - see the Sunday Dispatch, 19 November 1944: 'British Legion to Fight the 'Alien Menace' to Post-War Jobs'. However, with pressure from refugee groups, who stressed the role of refugees in the war effort, the British Legion 1945 A.G.M. decided not to become anti-alien. See the Ex-Servicemen no. 11 (March 1945) (the organ of the ex-service (non-British) Association). In this sort of atmosphere Israel Cohen decided to write the 'Economic Value of Refugees' for the Contemporary Review, 1 February 1945. See his A Jewish Pilgrimage, 373, for the background to this article.

Many refugees were frightened of what economic future would be allowed them in Britain - from the industrialists to the ordinary workers. See Loeb in Hirschfeld, op. cit; 234-5 and Alfred Perles, op. cit; 241.


190. See his comments to A. Maxwell 13 September 1939 and MacNulty of the Ministry of Health, 23 September 1939, both in HO 213/262. Dr. Anderson does not seem to have been alone in this medical fear concerning jobs. Medical World, the Journal of the Medical Practitioners Union, was constantly anti-alien throughout the war. In the issue of 16 April 1940 (vol. LII no. 10) it demanded action against the alien practitioner who was not liable for military service but who was "building up his practice". It welcomed internment, claiming its view that the alien doctors had always been suspect was now proved, vol. LII, no. 22 (19 July 1940) and claimed there was an alien doctor ramp - vol. LIV no. 13 (16 May 1941). From 1945 it launched a major campaign to send the alien doctors home. See LXII no. 20 (29 June 1945) particularly. Medical anti-alien/semitic sentiments in the war are dealt with by E. Hearst 'A Brain-Gain Rejected: Refugee Doctors in Britain', Wiener Library Bulletin, vol. XIX, no. 2 (April 1965).

191. See memorandum 'Doctors Position', 26 October 1939 in HO 213/262.

192. Note to Sir J. Grigg of the War Office, 4 September 1939 in HO 213/262. R. Assheton of the Ministry of Labour wrote to the Home Office's Osbert Peake on 29 January 1940 with similar sentiments - "The greatest care must be exercised to prevent any impression getting abroad that, whilst our young men are going out to fight, their employment is being taken by young aliens who are neglecting to take the opportunity of volunteering". In HO 213/503.
193. By July 1941 the Home Office was able to report that 36,331 work permits had been given to Austrians and Germans and that several hundred had been put on the Temporary Register of the British Medical Register - draft reply to Lord Davies July 1941 in HO 213/471. H.M.D. Parker, Manpower, (London, 1957), 346, states that up to 90% of employable resident aliens were in work by 1943. The 50th Council on Aliens, 29 April 1942, gives a figure of 87%. In FO 371/32622 W2882. Although strong security restrictions and quotas were put on refugee doctors after mass internment, the shortage of doctors did allow a loosening of policy - see the comments of E. N. Cooper 28 June 1941 in HO 213/339. C. L. Dunn, The Emergency Medical Services, vol. 1 (London, 1952), 424-6 examines these restrictions. Nevertheless, local hostility and discrimination still caused problems for the refugees seeking medical work. See the Manchester Guardian, 3 February 1942; Daily Telegraph 14 May 1942 and The Lancet, 18 July 1942 for examples. The 46th Council on Aliens, 7 January 1942 highlighted this problem, R. T. Latham stating that "he feared there was still a great prejudice against alien doctors, as much amongst patients as among the medical profession". In FO 371/32622 W54.

194. H. Prestige to A. Maxwell, 7 August 1944 in HO 213/1009.


196. File HO 213/1353 refers to this question. The Home Office decided that despite the pressure and the undoubted attraction of having these industrialists, no action could be taken until the post-war refugee policy had been worked out - minute of 24 February 1944. H. Loebl, 'Government financial factories and the Establishment of Industries by Refugees in the Special Areas of the North of England, 1937-61' (M. Phil, University of Durham, 1978) deals with the refugee industrialists.


198. In 1941 the Home Office, with a shortage of locum tenens and assistants, was willing to override pressure from the B.M.A. for once - see Cooper memo, 28 June 1941 in HO 213/339. A Board of Trade official, Mr Shackle, whilst criticising overall Home Office policy, conceded that they could be "liberal in practice" - minute, 10 April 1946 in B.T. 64/163. The Ministry of Labour, whose major consideration was that British jobs should be protected, was also informally less strict with the regulations "as much out of consideration for the refugees themselves as for any other reason" - P. Assheton to O. Peake, 29 January 1940 in HO 213/503.

199. The Ministry of Labour's position as stated in note 198 above was to use alien labour only where British labour could not be found.
Like the Home Office, it was concerned that the issue contained "explosive material" which would vary in force according to the post-war "temper of the country". Sir G. Ince's Ministry of Labour Memorandum 'Employment Policy in Regard to Aliens', 1944 in HO 213/1350.

200. Minute of Shackle, 10 April 1946, in B.T. 64/163.

201. See note 187, above for details of this refugee concern. In addition, Sir Alexander Maxwell in an undated memo, referring to an enquiry from the Jewish Refugee Committee, 27 August 1942 as to whether pre-war aliens should apply for naturalisation now, replied that any talk about such matters would only "increase the nervousness among refugees about their future in this country, which our correspondence and interviews suggest has been a little on the increase lately.

202. This was the hope of Sir Alexander Maxwell in a letter to Sir J. Gregg, 4 September 1939 in HO 213/262.

203. H. Loebl in G. Hirschfeld, op. cit; 220 deals with this active recruitment policy approved by the Cabinet as early as 1933.

204. The figure was provided by Frank Newsam of the Home Office in February 1942. Of this 250,000 Newsam estimated 140,000 were 'permanent'. 50-60,000 were Austrian and Germans and 15-20,000 came after Belgium, Holland and France were overrun. In HO 213/11347.

206. For Britain particularly, see the works of Wasserstein, Gilbert and Penkower.

207. In a Foreign Office memo of June 1944 it was stated that 60,000 alien refugees were allowed in from May 1940 - December 1943. However, Eleanor Rathbone in Continuing Terror (London, 1944) 10, suggests that from 1940-2; 63,000 had entered (quoting Churchill's statement in the House of 7 April 1943), and that in 1943 a further 800 a month had arrived. HO 213/1009 gives a breakdown of these figures for the country of origin.

208. The quote is from Eleanor Rathbone, Rescue the Perishing (London, 1943), 11. A 'Report of the Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry regarding the problems of European Jewry and Palestine'. Command 6808 (London, 1946), 59 suggested that the net increase between 1939 and 1945 of Jewish refugees was "no more than 10,000". This would give a gross figure of over 16,000, nearer to 20,000 as many refugees re-emigrated in the first year of the war. I would suggest that this figure of 20,000 is far too high. A Home Office breakdown of just under 19,000 war refugees, 31 March 1942, found that most were Belgian, French, Polish and Norwegian. Only 154 Germans and 53 Austrians were included. Whilst Jews were to be found in all categories, most refugees were non-Jewish. Also, of the 60,000 figure, 20,000 were seamen according to Rathbone, Continuing Terror, 10. For the Home Office figures see HO 213/1347. Wasserstein, op. cit; 81-2, comments on the problem of the lack of precise figures available.

209. Those that did escape Nazi Europe usually had remarkable stories to tell, often facing bureaucratic obstacles from Britain as their final hurdle - see Catherine Klein, Escape from Berlin (London, 1944), 147; The Times, obituary of Reuben Ainsztein, 8 December, 1981, for the story of his arrival in Britain in 1943; The Guardian, 20 April 1985 for the case of Henry Young. Arthur Koestler's escape from France at the beginning of the war was thwarted by the Foreign Office and he eventually found a seat on a Dutch plane, being interned immediately in Britain. See Iain Hamilton, Koestler (London, 1982), 62-7.

210. A point that B. Wasserstein makes in G. Hirschfeld, op. cit; 76-7.

211. For details of this incident see E. J. Baumel 'The Jewish Refugee Children in Great Britain' (Bar Ilan University M.A. 1981), 144. The ship was eventually allowed to land in Liverpool.

212. Home Office policy was to cancel all visas after 11 a.m. 3 September 1939, the argument being that those in possession of visas had adequate time to leave for Britain before the war. See letter of E. N. Cooper (Home Office) to Randall (Foreign Office), 18 September 1939 in FO 371/24100/ W137792.

213. CAB 98/1 CRP (39) 6th meeting, 25 September 1939.
214. E. N. Cooper told Randall that the Home Office had allowed "one or two cases" admission, refugees who had already commenced their journey but were unable to reach a port in the U.K. before 3 September 1939. This included a party of 30 males from Holland making for the Richborough Camp. See note 212 for details. Generally the policy, if the refugee had reached a neutral country, was that "a definite refusal of facilities was advisable". A Maxwell in a meeting with E. N. Cooper, 11 December 1939 in HO 213/447.


217. Downie memo, 9 May 1940 in CO 111/772/60412 quoted by Zweig, 'British Policy', 1975. Downie believed that mandate policy had been framed to leave colonization policy "almost entirely in the hands of the Jewish Agency, which represents the Zionists of the world". Letter to J. Carroll of the Foreign Office, 20 March 1940 in FO 371/25240/1 W2812.


219. Latham minute, 22 April 1941 in FO 371/27132 E1240.

220. See for example The Patriot no. 922 (12 October 1939).

221. The Struma contained 769 Roumanian Jewish Refugees who left Bucharest to go to Palestine. The Struma reached Istanbul but the British authorities refused it permission to go on to Palestine. The Colonial Office view was that "these are illegal immigrants (who may include Nazi agents) and the Secretary of State for the Colonies takes an extremely strong line about them". Quoted by the Foreign Office's A.W.G. Randall 12 February 1942 in FO 371/32661 W2093. For full details of the Struma incident see Wasserstein, Britain and the Jews of Europe, 143-157 and Zweig, 'British Policy', 362-386.

222. R. T. Latham of the Foreign Office believed that in the matter of spies there were "almost certainly no such cases". Minute, 1 February 1941 in FO 371/27132 E1240. Downie himself could produce no evidence - see his letter to T. Snow, 3 January 1941 in FO 371/29160 W188. Late on in the war the Germans did use a Jewish spy, Paul Ernst Fackenheim, whose nickname was Koch. Koch was released from a concentration camp to spy in Palestine, but it is significant that this was against the wishes of the Gestapo. See Michael Bar-Zohar, Hitler's Jewish Spy (London, 1985).
223. A. Maxwell memo, 18 December 1939 in HO 213/447 regarding the case of a German Jewish family.

224. Latham minute, 4 April 1940 in FO 371/25240/1 W2812.

225. J. Burt minute, 8 April 1940 in ibid.

226. The quote is from J. Carvell of the Foreign Office to Downie, 15 April 1940 in ibid.

227. The deputation consisted of Eleanor Rathbone, Major Cazalet, Cardinal Hinsely and the Archbishop of Canterbury. For details of this meeting of 28 October 1942 see FO 371/32681W14673. Lewis Namier heard a report of this deputation, and how the proposal to let 2000 Jews enter Britain was "met with a flat refusal". Apparently Morrison was more interested in a figure of a score or so. Letter to Crozier, 30 October 1942 in the Manchester Guardian archive, B/N8A/134.

228. See memo to the War Cabinet by the Home Secretary in CAB 66/29 W.P. 942) 427, 23 September 1942.

229. Memo by the Home Secretary, in CAB 66/29 W.P.(42) 444, 2 October 1940. After pressure, Morrison widened the categories to include 180 visas - see letter from Lewis Namier to Crozier, 4 November 1942 in the Manchester Guardian archive B/N8A/139.

230. CAB 95/15 JR (43) 1st meeting, Committee on the Reception and Accommodation of Jewish Refugees, 31 December 1942.

231. It was raised in the second meeting of the Committee on the Reception and Accommodation of Jewish Refugees - CAB 95/15 JR (43) 2 Addendum, 8 January 1943, by Ian Henderson in regard to a proposal to exchange 500 Dutch Jews for German internees here. In a note of 2 July 1943 in FO 371/36663 W9659. Morrison at the end of the war told this to a Cabinet Committee - CAB 95/15 JR (45) 2nd meeting, 16 May 1945.

232. The first point that the Cabinet discussed in regard to the Bermuda Conference was that "there were signs of increasing anti-semitic feeling in this country". See CAB 65/34 WM (43), 10 May 1943.


234. Comment of Joan Pledge to Anthony Eden, 4 March 1943 in FO 371/36654 W3957. For similar comments see Hugh Lyon, of Rugby School in a letter to The Times, 9 February 1943; Hannen Swaffer in The People, 14 March 1943 and Harold Laski in the Daily Telegraph in December 1942 (quoted by Victor Gollancz, Let My People Go (London, 1942), 9,) and the Daily Worker, 7 January 1943. The Foreign Office was alarmed that such stories were circulating and wanted to answer the allegation so as to kill, in A. G. Randall's words, "a legend which is unfortunately getting widely believed". In FO 371/36651 W2069. Shortly after, when questioned in the House, Eden stated that the story "has no basis in fact" - Hansard HC vol. 386, col. 863-4, 3 February 1943.
235. *Let My People Go* was originally published in the Christmas of 1942. Rathbone's effort was *Rescue the Perishing*. Both pamphlets urged the public to write to their M.P.'s and Cabinet Ministers. Early in 1943 the National Committee for Rescue from Nazi Terror was formed which continued until 1946. For a complete set of its minutes see the Parkes papers, 15.057. A. G. Randall referred to the "exceptional pressure on the H.M.G. by refugee sympathisers", later commenting that the enormous number of letters on the subject were largely due to Gollancz's pamphlet. Minutes of 29 December 1942 and 21 January 1943 in FO 371/36651 W2139.

236. For details see its minutes, 9 March 1943 where it was stated that the Gallup (B.I.P.O.) poll was instigated "as Ministers have proved difficult on grounds of anti-semitism here". In the Parkes papers 15.057.

237. The poll was published by *News Chronicle*, 26 March 1943.

238. See M-OA: DR March 1943 from which all the following are taken. DR 2684 commented that she did not particularly like Jews, but wanted them to be rescued and to be allowed here, as did DR 2685 who was also "ashamed" of her anti-semitism. DR 3127; 2703; 3163; 3052 (who found Jews "repugnant as a whole" although being sympathetic to persecuted Jews) 2564; 3207; 2844; 1014; 1980; 3323. Mass-Observation themselves concluded that anti-semitism did not stop sympathy for European Jewry. M-OA: FR 1648. Norman Longmate, *If Britain Had Fallen* (London, 1972), 200-1 points out this ambivalence.

239. Nicolson repeatedly called for the government to do more. See his comments in *The Spectator* vol. 169 (25 December 1942); vol. 170 (16 April 1943) and vol. 171 (17 December 1943). He was involved in the National Council for Rescue from Nazi Terror and also in deputations to Ministers on behalf of refugee groups. See Nigel Nicolson (ed), Harold Nicolson: *Diaries and Letters 1939 - 1945* (London, 1967, 344, for a meeting with Eden on 11 January 1944. Yet Nicolson could also admit to his diary that "I do dislike Jews" - loc. cit; 469 entry 13 June 1945. Lucy Dawidowicz, *The Holocaust and the Historians* (London, 1981), 33-4, has suggested that the lack of attention given to the holocaust in Britain was due to a Nicolson-type prejudice. Yehuda Bauer in a review of the book in *American Jewish History*, vol. LXXII no. 2 (December 1982), 264, rightly points out that the Nicolson example "is very doubtful".

240. Several correspondents DR 3207 and 3003 pointed out, that despite their own dislike of Jews, they had sent letters after reading Gollancz. both in M-OA: DR March 1943. Many were ashamed at the lack of a British response. See DR2567, 2844, 3003 and 1980 (who remarked that "our governments should be ashamed after standing and now refusing to admit the few"). Foreign Office papers are full of generous offers of hospitality for any refugees who could escape - see FO 371/36659 W6325, letters from J. Carruthers on behalf of the Peace Pledge Union (23 April 1943) and Alec Buchanan on a Penzance petition,
241. A point made by the Board of Deputies in a meeting with the Ministry of Information, 19 February 1942 in B of D B5/3/6.

242. After the Allied Declaration on behalf of European Jewry given by Anthony Eden in the House of Commons, 17 December 1942, the Foreign Office believed it would have to meet the pressure "by a new policy, or a modification of the present one"—Randall minute, 29 December 1942 in FO 371/36651 W2069. Nevertheless a few weeks later Randall believed that this pressure could "be held" and that the government could continue on its same limited policy—minute 29 January 1943 in FO 371/36694 W416.


244. In late December 1942 the Foreign Office was debating whether to risk any gestures to help the refugees, as it might lead to a "mass-exodus". With the pressure for the government to do something A. G. Randall concluded that "we shall have to do so"—minute 28 December 1942 in FO 371/32668 W17422. It was this fear of a flood that partially explains the refusal to accept the illegal immigrants to Palestine in such ships as the Struma—see FO 371/32661 W2093. The fear remained in the Foreign Office throughout the war, Randall remarking on 24 December 1943 that "once we open the door to adult male Jews to be taken out of enemy territory, a quite unmanageable flood may result (Hitler may facilitate it!) in FO 371/36747 W17686.

245. A point made clear by Wyman, The abandonment of the Jews, 105 - 123. For strong contemporary criticism see the New Statesman vol. 25 (24 April 1943).


247. Quoted by Hermann Rauschning, op. cit; 233.

248. Richard Law, although no advocate of a liberal entry policy, believed that Morrison's apprehensions were "exaggerated". Note of a meeting with the Council of Christians and Jews, 16 December 1942 in FO371/32682 W17401.
249. According to his biographers B. Donoughue and G. W. Jones, op. cit; 255.

250. According to the then President of the Board of Deputies, Neville Laski, in a meeting with Morrison and Pollitt in October 1936. See the Neville Laski papers in AJ 33/90.

251. See B. Donoughue and G. W. Jones, op. cit; 249 - 258 for details.

252. See note 250 for details.

253. Geoffrey Alderman, op. cit; 116. The records of the meeting are reprinted by Colin Holmes, 'East End Anti-Semitism, 1936' In the Bulletin of the Society for the Study of Labour History XXXII (Spring 1976), 26 - 33.


255. The quote is from Lewis Namier in a letter to Crozier, 17 May 1943. Namier reported that Morrison "always used to be a good pro-Zionist" but that it was now unclear where he stood. See Manchester Guardian archive, B/N8A/231. Joseph Gorny, The British Labour movement and Zionism, 1917 - 1948 (London, 1983), 167 - 8, and 219 - 20 comments how Zionists came to distrust Morrison. For another example of Morrison's hostility to the refugees see his dismissive comments on those who had joined the Pioneer Corps - memo of 29 December 1942 in HO 213/191.

256. In December 1943 A. G. Randall reported that Morrison wanted as many refugees as possible to return to their country of origin. if not they were "likely to prove a very contentious issue in domestic politics. Indeed I understand that the Home Secretary is concerned at the growth of anti-semitic feeling in certain towns and would view with nonconcealed anxiety any attempt to allow all the Jewish political refugees who are now in this country to remain". In FO 371/36672 W17585. Morrison was also eager to point out that "the liberal policy which was adopted in (opening the door to refugees) before the war rests on the principle that the admission of these refugees should not necessarily give them a claim to permanent settlement in the U.K." Letter to Sir Percy Hurd, M.P., 5 March 1943 in HO 213/1015.

257. Eleanor Rathbone in a letter to Anthony Eden, 25 February 1943 gives examples of Jewish refugees refused visas. The draft reply March 1943 was that the only remedy was an Allied victory. See FO 371/36653 W3321. On the 11 March 1943 both Rathbone and Edmund Harvey viciously attacked Morrison in the Commons on the visa question, but Morrison was unmoveable - Hansard HC vol. 387 col. 846-8, 11 March 1943. Perhaps the best example of the Home Office's grim determination to refuse visas.
or entry into Britain concerns the final elements of the story of the Vichy children. In late 1944, with the liberation of Europe in progress, a few of the children who had been granted visas were found to be still alive. Yet the Home Office's policy was to try and get relatives in Britain to go to Europe to look after the children, rather than the reverse. Again the Home Office was worried lest it set a precedent of generosity. See the minutes of 7 December 1944 (Ricks) and note Matthews to Fellner 1 January 1945. Eventually the visas were renewed - Ricks to Fellner 12 July 1945. All in HO 213/615.

258. Eleanor Rathbone and Harold Nicolson were told this in a meeting of 11 January 1944 in FO 371/42751 W544. Nicolson wrote in his diary on the same day "one goes away thinking how reasonable, how agreeable and how helpful he (Eden) has been, and then discover that in fact he has promised nothing at all". In N. Nicolson, op. cit; 344.

259. War Cabinet Minutes on the Bermuda Conference in CAB 65/34 WM (43), 10 May 1943.

260. The debate on Refugees on 19 May 1943 saw Colonel Sir A. Lambert-Ward, Sir Austin Hudson and Mr Colegate of the Wrekin all argue that anti-semitism was dangerous in Britain, the latter bringing the debate to a farcical level by criticising refugees in an agricultural camp for demanding to stop work early on Fridays. Again the refugees were blamed for creating hostility. Mack, Mander, hill and Cazalet all believed that the risks of increased anti-semitism should be taken. See Hansard HC vol. 389, col. 1117-1204, 19 May 1943.

261. Eleanor Rathbone particularly came to despise Morrison. See Mary Stocks, op. cit; 300. James Parkes also tired of Morrison - see his Voyage of Discoveries (London, 1969), 175. Rathbone's relations with the government deteriorated in the latter part of the war, as she despaired of the government changing its rigid approach. In return the departments that she dealt with became tired of her demands - see the comments of Moylan to Randall, 5 January 1944 in FO 371/36673 W17831.

262. A point made by the Archbishop of Canterbury, who stated that "it would be very easy for the Government, by skilled use of the wireless, to win the sympathy and confidence of the people for their proposals (to allow Jewish refugees entry into Britain), especially if a large number of those who were brought out were children and were being delivered from almost certain death". The Archbishop believed that anti-semitism could thus be overcome. In Hansard HL, vol. 126, col. 812, 23 March 1943.

263. See Sargent minute 16 September 1939 on the proposed White Paper in FO 371/23105 C16788.

264. Cadogan minute 16 September 1939 in ibid.
265. Reported in The Times, 28 September 1939. Austin Stevens, op. cit; 63, suggests that the White Paper was "brought out not in defence of the Jews but as a retaliation for German propaganda on British concentration camps in the Boer War".

266. Roberts to Stevens, 16 October 1939, in FO 371/23105 C16788. The first few documents dealt with Christian persecution - see H.M.S.O. 'Papers concerning the Treatment of German nationals in Germany, 1938-9' Command 6120 (London, 1939).

267. Sargent minute 29 September 1939 in FO 371/23105 C16788. Monty Penkower, op. cit; 295, refers to the need to avoid Jewish War charge.


269. Truth no. 3295 (3 November 1939) cast doubt on the stories and on 17 November 1939 (no. 3297) added an editorial note that "atrocity stories should always be regarded sceptically". A week later it published a letter from Major Fuller praising the efficiency of the concentration camps and attacking the Jews in them as "degenerates". Action no. 192 and 3 (2 and 9 November 1939) predictably dismissed the White Paper as "hate propaganda" containing no truth, and the I.F.L.'s Weekly Angles no. 95 (11 November 1939) as a "Jewish plot to help aliens here". However outside this extremist world, doubt was limited. The Daily Mirror, (6 November 1939) published a critical letter with an editorial reply "drivel" (to the letter), and the Bristol Evening News, 30 November 1939 also remained to be convinced. See A. Sharf, op. cit; 87 for an overview.


271. See Sargent minute 5 February 1940 in FO 371/24422 C2026. Sargent believed it had "misfired", due to what a Ministry of Information official called "widespread contra-suggestibility". See Robert Fraser memo on Atrocities as Propaganda Material, 10 February 1942 in INF 1/251 Pt. 4.

272. Thus in a proposed declaration regarding German atrocities in Poland, care was taken to separate Polish wrongs from Jewish wrongs - see Roberts minute 8 April 1940 in FO 371/24423 C5475.

273. R. Leeper minute, 21 April 1940 in FO 371/24472 C5471.

274. Loune (?) minute, 16 April 1940 in ibid;

275. In regard to a proposed broadcast by Lord Lytton. The objection was from R. T. Latham in a minute of 22 January 1941 in FO 371/29173 W821.
276. 'Plan to Combat the Apathetic Outlook of What Have I Got To Lose Even if the Germans Win'. 25 July 1941 in INF1/251/ Pt. 4. Earlier similar instructions were issued with regard to Middle Eastern propaganda, where stories of Jewish persecution were put under the heading 'Undesirable'. Ministry of Information Circular 25 November 1939 in FO 371/24548 E297.

277. On 18 September 1941 the Overseas Service of the BBC gave a broadcast from the "Man on the Street", telling the Jews of Europe to hold on: "Deliverance will come and you too will be rescued from the hell to which humanity has been plunged by the sadists who rule Germany. We in England are fighting for the liberation of all the peoples in Europe, including our Jewish brothers". See the Jewish Chronicle, 26 September 1941 for details. In early June 1942 General Sikorski broadcast details of a Polish Bund report which outlined the extermination of 700,000 Polish Jews between June 1941 and April 1942 and also, for the first time, the gassing of 1000 people a day at the Chelmno camp. It was later summarised by the BBC in its daily internal directive of news, and referred to by the Minister of Information, Brendan Bracken in a press conference of 9 July 1942. The Daily Telegraph, 25 June 1942, was the first paper to use the report, using a headline 'Germans Murder 700,000 Jews in Poland". See M. Gilbert, op. cit; 39 - 46 for details.

278. See Martin Gilbert, op. cit; 59 - 60 for details of the Riegner telegram of 8 August 1942.

279. ibid; 63.


281. J. S. Bennett minute, 7 December 1942 in FO 921/10 quoted by Gilbert, op. cit; 99.

282. Allen minute, 10 September 1942 in FO371/30917 C7853. Eleanor Rathbone reported to W. Crozier, 4 December 1942, that P.W.E. "don't feel sufficiently satisfied that Hitler actually signed a decree for mass extermination by a given date". In Manchester Guardian archive, 223/5/47.


284. Lias of the Ministry of Information to Grubb, 30 August 1942 in FO 371/30917 C7839. With regard to a statement made in the House of Lords, 10 November 1942 about Jewish refuge children in France by Lord Cranbourne, C. Cheetham minuted 27 November 1942 "yes I think it was a pity that (he) used the word 'Jew'. In FO 371/32681 W14673.
285. Namier to Crozier, 7 December 1942 in Manchester Guardian archive 223/5/49. Three weeks later Crozier emphasised this point, for despite the Declaration, he felt the Foreign Office lacked the courage "to pronounce the word J-e-w". Letter of 28 December 1942 in loc. cit; 223/5/99. Blanche Dugdale wrote in her diary 2 December 1942 that there was "so much indifference, and I fear, on the part of the Foreign Office, of definite desire to damp down publicity". In N. A. Rose (ed), Baffy: The Diaries of Blanche Dugdale 1936 - 1947 (London, 1947), 198.


288. Although Home Intelligence reported that despite anger and disgust at the Germans there was "no evidence that the popularity of Jews in this country has increased" - INF 1/292 no. 117 (22 - 129 December 1942).

289. See Allen, Randall and Roberts, minutes, 6, 14 and 23 January, 1944 respectively in FO 371/36673 W17929 on this point.

290. As Frank Roberts of the Foreign Office suggested in a minute of 11 May 1944 "The Allies rather resent the suggestion that Jews in particular have been more heroic or long-suffering than other nationals of occupied countries". In FO 371/42790 W7937. As Lord Cranbourne told Wedgwood, with regard to the refugee issue, "The noble Lord must not regard this as a Jewish problem. Every nation in Europe is being tortured by the Germans". In Hansard HL vol. 126 col. 812, 23 March 1943.


292. See CAB 95/15 JR (43) 20th meeting of the Reception and Accommodation of Refugees Committee (itself changed from 'Jewish Refugees' to 'Refugees' due to the same reason).


294. See Neal Ascherson 'The Film Britain Hid from Germany' in the Observer, 8 September 1985.

295. Minute 27 August 1943. R. Allen minute of same date agreed, and stated that the gas chamber stories reminded him of the human corpse stories of the last war which were a "grotesque lie". Both in FO 371/34551 C9705.

296. Ian Henderson minute of 15 March 1944 in FO 371/42790 W3924.

297. A. R. Dew minute of 1 September 1944 concerning a deputation from the Board of Deputies. Whilst another Foreign Office official E. Wilson did not attack Dew's remark, C. Cheetham in a minute of 7 September 1944 suggested that "the Jews have been given cause to wail by their sufferings under the Nazi regime", and P. Mason, 8 September 1944 agreed. All in FO 371 42817 WR 993.
298. Ian Henderson minute 11 January 1945 in FO 371/51134 WR89. When a telegram from Moscow to the Foreign Office 27 April 1945 stated that 4 million people had died in the Oswiecim – Birkenau camps there was still disbelief. P. L. Rue minuting "it sounds rather exaggerated" and P. Mason feeling that it referred to the whole of Europe. See FO 371/51185 for details.

299. James Parkes, op. cit; 180. Richard Crossman, head of P.W.E's German section in the war stated in 1947 that "we had never" believed in the possibility of 'genocide". When he saw the concentration camp victims "we were to realise that ourpropaga-ganda had fallen far behind the truth". See his Palestine Mission: A Personal Record, (London, 1947), 18.

300. For the doubts of these sources see Chapter 4 p.308, 322 and 339. There are no figures concerning belief of the British public of the destruction of European Jewry. In America in January 1943 Gallup carried out a poll asking "It is said that 2 million Jews have been killed in Europe since the war. Is this true or just a rumour?" 47% said it was true, 29% said a rumour and 24% had no opinion. Quoted by David Wyman, The Abandonment of The Jews, 79. It must be suggested that as the British press had a better record in reporting the issue than its American equivalent, and as there seems to have been a greater liberal response to the crisis of European Jewry in Britain, that more than 47% would have believed it was true. Yehuda Bauer has suggested that compared to America, public opinion in Britain "was much more alert to the desperate position of European Jewry" - in The Holocaust in Historical Perspective (London, 1978), 83. A Mass-Observation survey in March 1943 would seem to confirm this. Whilst a few replies questioned the atrocity stories (see DR 2925, DR 1393 (who doubted them as she thought they were organised by rich Jews), and 2804 (because of reading Douglas Reed), the majority, whether pro- or anti-Jewish, accepted that Jews were suffering terribly in the war. See M-OAs:DR March 1943 for details.

301. See for example the P.W.E. directive for 10, 17, 24 and 31 December 1942 in FO 898/289. Thereafter references became sporadic - see 24 March 1944 in FO 898/293 for example. H. Balfour, Propaganda in War: 1939 – 1945 (London, 1974), 299 – 304 refers to the use P.W.E. made of atrocity stories concerning Jews in December 1942. Walter Laqueur, The Terrible Secret (London, 1980), 92 – 3 suggests that although "no one in the West suggested suppressing the information about the mass murders altogether ... the official concensus was to refer to it only sparingly". Such an analysis would appear to be correct.

302. Wasserstein, Britain and the Jews of Europe, 351.

303. ibid; 352 – 7.

304. Latham minute, 1 February 1941 in FO 371/27132 E1240.

305. Gilbert, op. cit; 267 – 273, 318 – 322 and 341 deals with this issue. See also Bauer, op. cit; 83, 85 and 138; Wasserstein; op. cit; 307 – 20, 349 – 50 and Wyman, op. cit; Chapter 15.
306. Wasserstein, op. cit; 351 comments that Morrison was "too willing to bend with the wind of hostility to refugees". I would again go further and suggest that this was due to Morrison's own hostility. Geoffrey Field suggests that bureaucratic insensitivity to the position of European Jewry "was the most dangerous legacy, the bitter fruit, of the rather unsystematic, non-theoretical and casual (anti-semitic) prejudice that had long existed in England". In 'Anti-Semitism with the Boots Off', Wiener Library Bulletin (Special Issue, 1982), 43.

307. The Home Office quote is by H. Prestige in a note to A. Maxwell, 7 August 1944 in HO 213/1009. Bennett's minute appeared in the BBC 2 documentary 'Auschwitz and the Allies' produced by Rex Bloomstein and shown on 16 September 1982. The quote is also reported in The Listener, 16 September 1982 in a review of the documentary.

308. In the Jewish Agency meeting with the government in December 1942 (referred to in note 281), J. Bennett of the Foreign Office commented on the demand that Jews should be regarded as an allied people: "this is a major fallacy". Although such blatantness was rare, the substance of the comment summarised a wider governmental view.

309. Breitman, op. cit; 152.


311. A point made by Bauer, op. cit; 28 and Wyman, op. cit; in his final chapter: 'Responsibility'.

312. Memorandum on Jews, 10 August 1939 in INF 1/770.

313. Butler minute, 19 February 1943 in FO 371/34362 C1741.

314. Thus when the Foreign Office referred to the establishment of Zionist control over the Board of Deputies in 1943, Ian Henderson attacked "the trend of Jewish organisations in this country ... towards the loss of its British character and the assumption of an international one". Minute of 27 August 1943. R.M.A. Hankey agreed, adding in a minute of 28 August 1943 that "the influence of Eastern European Jews here as elsewhere is growing (a thoroughly bad sign)". Both in FO 371/36741 W12242. Thus to gain the government's respect, Jews had to become as 'British' as was possible, and to sever any foreign connections.
CHAPTER 7
The Response to Antisemitism

The war not only generated dramatic antisemitic developments in Britain, but also produced an equally lively response from Jewish and anti-fascist bodies. New organisations such as the Council of Christians and Jews came into existence, both the Communist Party and the National Council for Civil Liberties launched major campaigns against antisemitism, and there were important changes in the response of Jewish communal institutions. With regard to Jewish defence literature, the bibliographer of Anglo-Jewry has commented that "the war-time period ... brought with it a spate of publications on antisemitism, the Jewish problem, the refugees and allied subjects". ¹ The purpose of this chapter will be to examine the relative strength of groups such as the Council of Christians and Jews in British society - the impact of their activities and propaganda on the public and the government - and the relationship between the groups and an assessment of their tactics. An attempt will also be made to analyse the attitudes of these groups towards Jews. Both external and internal limitations of British philosemitism and anti-antisemitism will be critically evaluated.

As it is possible to trace an antisemitic tradition in Britain over the past hundred years - albeit one that has varied immensely in its strength - an anti-antisemitic tradition can also be found. Attacks on antisemitism in Britain have not been confined to Jews. Nevertheless, by the period of mass immigration from the 1880's a wide
range of Jewish organisations had been established which were aimed at protecting Anglo-Jewry. The Board of Deputies of British Jews, founded in 1760, had become the quasi-official representative body of the Jewish community. In 1871 the Anglo-Jewish Association was formed, aimed at ensuring the well-being of Jews across the world. Just over a decade earlier, the Jewish Board of Guardians had come into existence. This organisation, whilst directly aiming to help the 'deserving' Jewish poor, was indirectly an attempt to make the poorer members of Anglo-Jewry less visible in society - thus removing a potential threat to the well-being of the richer brethren. The community was also served by an important national paper, the Jewish Chronicle, an English language organ which has run continuously since 1841.

When the mass influx began in the last quarter of the nineteenth century, it was, therefore into an already well-organised Jewish community. However, despite the strength of this bureaucracy, there remained powerful self-imposed restraints in how far the community would combat domestic antisemitism. Responding to the unwritten demands of emancipation, the Board of Deputies in particular refused to regard the Anglo-Jewish community as anything other than a religious grouping. Political action was limited to ensuring the freedom of English Jews to practice their faith without restriction. Much energy was thus spent in defending shechita in the 1900's when it was under strong attack, and likewise exemption from restrictive Sunday trading legislation which would have
Antisemitism was not a problem that should have existed after emancipation in the official thinking of the Board. Therefore no attempt was made to counter the literary antisemitism of the Chesterbelloc school, nor of the works of Joseph Banister, and other antisemites. Indeed in the South Wales riots of 1911 the initial official Jewish response "was to play down the Jewish aspect", with most leaders "refus(ing) to believe that anti-semitism had been a factor" in the disturbances. In the Limerick riots 7 years earlier, the blatant antisemitism and subsequent anti-Jewish boycott had forced the Board of Deputies to take some action. However, the Board preferred behind the scenes diplomacy, a tactic utterly unsuited to the problem that was faced. When confronted with violent opposition such as that from the British Brothers' League, the immigrant Jews could not rely on their 'official' representatives for help. Left exposed, an alternative grass-roots response to antisemitism developed as early as 1902, with the formation of an Aliens Defence Committee consisting of East End Jewish and non-Jewish trade unionists.

Likewise, with the issue of alien restriction, the Board of Deputies made little effort to fight the Aliens Bill. As Geoffrey Alderman has suggested "outright opposition to the measure ... was left to a group of radical Liberals ... and to the immigrants themselves". Here the class aspirations of the established community acted as another limiting factor as far as barriers to antisemitic forces in Britain were concerned. Sharing and reinforcing
the government's fear of antisemitism, the Board of Deputies wished to stop a mass influx of alien Jews into Britain. Its sister organisation, the Jewish Board of Guardians, cooperated with the authorities in deporting 50,000 Jews in the immigration period. 15

Opposition from non-Jews to the Aliens agitation should not be minimised. Liberal papers such as the Manchester Guardian and Tribune opposed the Aliens Act consistently in the 1900's, as did most socialists. 16 Nevertheless both these worlds, whilst opposing antisemitism on principle, also demanded of the Jew that he cease being exclusive and that he should ultimately disappear into British society. 17 This was another limiting factor of the forces of anti-antisemitism, and a reminder that the latter is not necessarily always a form of philosemitism. 18 However, in the early 1900's the government preferred to appease anti-alien feeling and to ignore the ever present humanitarian anti-restrictionist sentiment in Britain. It was a pattern that was to become familiar as the century progressed.

The First World War witnessed interesting developments in response to what was an intensely antisemitic period. Faced with continuous anti-Jewish press attacks, the Board of Deputies was forced to take some form of public action and responded with its first major leaflet campaign. 19 Internal struggles involving Zionists and the Balfour declaration had the net effect of opening up the Board, which by 1918 had become a slightly more democratic organisation. 20 Nevertheless the old restraints on direct
action remained strong and there appears to have been no response from the Board of Deputies to the antisemitic riots of 1917. Again the immigrant community was forced to rely on itself, through such organisations as the Foreign Jews' Protection Committee, made up of Jewish socialists, anarchists and trade unionists. East End Jews and non-Jews also joined together to defend the aliens in the British Socialist Party. In contrast, the Board of Deputies refused to use its governmental contacts to complain about alien Jewish internment, fearing that any such protests would give the appearance of disloyalty.

However, in the post-1918 world the Board of Deputies was a slightly different animal, becoming involved in public denunciations of the Jew-Bolshevik libel and actually complaining to the Home Office throughout the 1920's about government treatment of Jewish aliens. Although the 1930's were again to show its limitations, the Board had responded to an extent to the criticisms that it was doing nothing about antisemitism.

The generally harmonious 1920's also saw two interesting developments with regard to the response to antisemitism. Firstly the British far left involved itself in violent clashes with the early fascist movement as early as 1926. In addition a strong link had been forged between young Jews in the immigrant areas and the Communist Party. Secondly, as has been briefly pointed out, 1927 witnessed the formation of the first major Jewish-Christian goodwill body, the Society of Jews and Christians. Thus by the 1930's there were already a variety of Jewish and non-Jewish organisations ready to face the antisemitism of this troubled decade.
At the forefront of the opposition to the B.U.F. in the 1930's was the Communist Party (CPGB). Unlike the Labour Party, the CPGB did not shy away from direct confrontation with the fascists, a policy that helped attract even more Jewish support to the Communist cause. Yet again the Board of Deputies refused to protest directly against the antisemitic threat to Jews, and the working class Jewish community was forced to deal with the problem itself. In 1936 a genuine left-wing popular front organization, the Jewish People's Council (JPC) was created out of a coalition of Communist and Jewish labour groupings. Its willingness to use physical force against the fascists, most clearly seen at Cable Street, was an anathema to the Board of Deputies. Moreover, the hostile relationship between the two defence groups reveals other limitations of the Board's approach. Any cooperation was ruled out, for the Board objected to the full title of its rival organization - the 'Jewish People's Council Against Fascism and Antisemitism'. In a demonstration of the absurd lengths to which the Board would go to honour the emancipation contract, it refused to accept any 'political' involvement. As a result, it was stated in a memorandum, "we cannot declare ourselves against Fascism per se". Any attempt, in the words of the Board's secretary, to "get the whole Jewish community (to be) anti-fascist" would prevent "the very object which it seeks to achieve", which was political invisibility. Not until 1939 did the Board realise the unreality of its approach and actually begin to defend democracy.
The Board, it must be emphasized, was not inactive in fighting antisemitism, indeed its Jewish Defence Committee (JDC) was formed for this purpose in 1938. Yet its approach was to use diplomatic behind-the-scenes negotiations, using governmental and other high level contacts. Occasionally successful pressure could be put on journals and organisations to change their attitude to Jews. However, this was of limited use when confronting papers such as Truth, whose editor was, in the words of a judge in 1941, "obsession(al) with regard to the Jews". The Board also managed to infiltrate extremist organisations like the Nordic League and pass on the information to the Home Office or Scotland Yard. Such contacts gave the Board opportunities denied to grass-roots organisations like the JPC, yet its privileged position was not necessarily of advantage to the whole Jewish community. Feeling insecure of their own position, the Board of Deputies helped to reinforce the government's fear of domestic antisemitism and thus failed to challenge, for example, the cautious policy of allowing refugees to enter Britain in the 1930's.

This insecurity was reflected in the spate of defence literature in the late 1930's from Jewish and non-Jewish writers. Writing in an apologetic vein these authors bent over backwards to give both 'sides' of the case. The net result was that defence literature could become "sugar-coated antisemitism". Only Louis Golding was brave enough to declare that "the Jewish Problem is in essence a Gentile problem". Even he was to criticise Jewish
behaviour towards the end of his book on antisemitism, published by Penguin in 1938. This lack of confidence in the official Jewish world, and the refusal to confront domestic antisemitism directly were to become important factors in the response of the Jewish community in the Second World War years, as will shortly emerge.

By the outbreak of war Jewish defence had become as much a feature of British society as antisemitism itself. Although lacking unity, there were both Jewish ('official' and grassroots) organisations against antisemitism, and non-Jewish ones such as the Communist Party and the National Council for Civil Liberties (NCCL) which had fought antisemitism and fascism since its formation in 1934. The changed circumstances of war were to reshape the policies of some of these organisations and also to create new groups opposed to antisemitism. It is to a consideration of how they tackled the problem of domestic fascism in the war that we must first turn.

After the bitter struggle between the Board of Deputies and the JPC, it is ironic that by the second month of the war informal cooperation could take place between the two groups in an East End anti-defamation campaign. At first the Board of Deputies ignored the street activities of the fascists in the war, stopping its open-air defence campaign "in order not to embarrass the government". Instead unsuccessful attempts were made to persuade the Ministry of Information to suppress fascist antisemitic anti-war literature. However, influenced by a continuation of fascist public meetings, and pressure from the
independent *Jewish Chronicle*, the Board took a more public stand against domestic fascism by the end of 1939. 47

The Board's new found support of democracy led it to take an increasingly militant position against the B.U.F. By the Leeds by-election in March 1940, it was circulating leaflets in support of the democratic parties, and warning that the B.U.F. meant "Concentration Camps for You"! 48 Paradoxically, the change in the Board's tactics in the war were simultaneous with a muting of the Communist Party's attacks on the B.U.F. Although distancing themselves from the B.U.F.'s peace campaign, especially at the Silvertown by-election, 49 the Communist Party generally ignored the Mosleyites in the phoney war, preferring to attack the "fascist bosses in this country". 50 However, clashes between fascists and left-wing Jews did not disappear. A mass meeting in Wilmslow in December 1939 led to particularly violent scenes. 51

The turnabout in responses to domestic fascism was also reflected in the reaction to the new defence regulations in May-June 1940. The Board of Deputies passed on all its information to Scotland Yard on B.U.F. members and welcomed the restrictive measures, 52 whereas the *Daily Worker* warned that the real threat to the country remained: "the workers are not blind to the fact that those who interned Mosley are the very people who have introduced Mosleyism into this country." 53 This 'social fascist' analysis was also applied to domestic antisemitism by the Communist Party in the summer of 1940. The *Daily Worker* claimed antisemitism was not due to Hitlerism or mere Mosleyism but was in fact the "secret weapon of the ruling class",.
who were trying to divert the attention of the workers away from "a dying system". However, with the Nazi invasion of the Soviet Union in July 1941, and the transformation of the conflict from an 'Imperialist' to a 'Peoples' War', the Communist Party also changed its attitude to domestic fascism and antisemitism.

With its reappearance in September 1942, the Daily Worker devoted much space to the post-18B fascist revival in Britain. Indeed, the Communist Party as a whole became almost obsessive about the danger posed by these tiny groups. Why was this the case, and how did the Board of Deputies receive this renewed Communist interest in domestic fascism? Douglas Hyde became the anti-fascist correspondent of the Daily Worker during the war, and in his cynical post-war account of the CPGB he explained the interest in the domestic fascist revival. "Here was the chance once again to come out as the great anti-fascist fighters", Hyde claimed, even though these "obscure neo-fascist organisations" were "very much a question of bricks without straw". Can this analysis be accepted?

There is little doubt that the Communist Party, through mass protests and rallies, elevated groups, such as the 18B Detainees Fund and the British National Party, to an importance that their membership did not justify. Yet Hyde himself later admitted that although the CPGB's campaign contained an element of opportunism, there was also genuine concern of a fascist and organised antisemitic revival in Britain. It was coupled with a fear that the war would be transformed into an anti-Soviet crusade, when
"these groups would then gain importance". The public opposition to these fascist groups from the far left must also be put in the context of the Board of Deputies response. Although the Board had been vocal in its attack on the B.U.F. in 1940, by 1942 it had returned to its earlier, non-public tactics. It refused to attack the 18B Publicity groups, claiming that to do so would "play into the hands" of those who were suggesting that Regulation 18B was simply an attack on antisemites. When the B.U.F. was revived in 1944 in the form of the League of Ex-Servicemen, the Board refused to confront it directly. Instead the Board merely got "in touch with the relevant authorities" to register its concern. Although some unofficial links with the CPGB existed, the Board was not happy with Communist involvement in anti-fascism, claiming it was making "a lot of mischief".

The clash between the two approaches was most clearly seen in the reaction to Mosley's release in November 1943. The Communist Party was at the forefront of the opposition to Herbert Morrison's decision. It helped to articulate the "storm of indignation" across the country where 90% of the population were opposed to Mosley's release. The Board, however, remained silent, a policy that was not unnoticed by the Jewish population. As in the 1930's, the Board of Deputies had shown itself to be out of touch with the feeling of most Jews in Britain, including the Jewish Chronicle, and in 1942 the 'Friends of Jewish Labour' was formed in opposition to it. In 1944 and the immediate post-war years many Jews would look to militant Jewish and left-wing organisations in the fight against fascism rather
than their 'official' organisation. Although organised antisemitism and fascism was of a limited nature in the war, both Jewish and Communist groups had revealed major weaknesses in their opposition to it. A similar pattern can be found in the reaction to the wider problem of domestic antisemitism in the war.

By late 1942 the Board of Deputies JDC was beginning to realise that its defensive position on antisemitism - rebutting attacks on the community and at the same time demanding better behaviour from Jews - was not necessarily working. Nevertheless the dominant aspect of the JDC's response to antisemitism throughout the war continued to be that of an apologetic stance. At the beginning of the conflict, it urged the Jewish community to volunteer for the defence of the country so as to present an image of "a solid wall of loyalty and courage. We must stand in line with the best elements of the whole of the country". The fear that this would not be the case haunted the JDC and in 1940 it decided to devote its resources "to the internal causes of antisemitism". At that stage in the war this was mainly the behaviour of Jewish refugees or evacuees; two years later it would largely be concerned with the Jewish involvement in the black market.

In 1940 a formal body, the Trades Advisory Council (TAC) was formed from within the Board's JDC to maintain "harmonious relations between Jew and non-Jew in trade and industry". One aim was to solve disputes between and against Jewish traders using diplomacy, in which it had some degree of success. More problematic was its desire to deal with Jewish offenders in the economic world. In 1942 and 1943
the TAC launched a major attack on Jewish black marketeers, one that was to lead to a serious split in the Board of Deputies. The Zionist takeover of the Board in the war is well-known. However, a by-product of this development remains to be explored. Amongst the Zionists who had entered the Board were several prominent members of the British section of the World Jewish Congress. Left-wing in politics, they included Noah Barou and Maurice Orbach, both of whom became prominent members of the TAC. It was perhaps their socialist outlook that explains the violence of the language used by the TAC against Jewish offenders. Its public attacks were, it seems, a response to the quiet approach that typified the Board as a whole. It is thus not surprising that the TAC was at loggerheads with the JDC, its original creators, for the latter part of the war.

Despite the different tactics of the TAC from its parent body, the net effect was the same - to concentrate its efforts on the internal causes of antisemitism. At the same time the Board of Deputies became obsessive about answering any antisemitic accusation in the war. Well over a million of its defence leaflets were circulated, the impact of which will be examined later. The desire to answer antisemites rationally could lead to absurd results. When considering an answer to The Protocols; the JDC's Sidney Salomon even suggested pointing out that the eventual goal of the forgery was "the happiness and well-being of all". Yet the apologetic position of the Board was not without a challenge, for in 1943 both the
Communist Party and the NCCL launched major campaigns against domestic antisemitism.

Neither the NCCL nor the Communist Party were newcomers to the fight against antisemitism, for it had been part of their anti-fascism in the 1930's. Nevertheless, their previous opposition does not account for the level of importance in the 1943 campaigns, or their widespread nature. Unlike the Communist Party, the NCCL continued to attack the E.U.P.'s antisemitism in the phoney war period. 78 Even so both groups continued to attack non-organised hostility to Jews. 79 However, despite its opposition to fascism, the NCCL also attacked the defence regulations, especially 18B for its denial of habeas corpus. 80 This policy was maintained until 1942 when the NCCL had become heavily under the influence of Communists, especially since the death in 1941 of its Secretary Ronald Kidd. 81 The NCCL's increasing interest in fighting antisemitism later in the war cannot be explained by Communist influence alone however. It seems to have been largely the work of the NCCL's new secretary, Elizabeth Allen - a member of the Women's Liberal Federation Executive Committee. 82 It is significant that the NCCL produced a leaflet 'Fight Against Antisemitism! What You Can Do' in 1941, at a stage when the Communist Party was taking little interest in the subject. 83

Allen, whose background had been in Jewish refugee work, became increasingly concerned at the level of antisemitism in Britain, her philosophy being that "It Shall Not Happen Here". 84 She supported the demands to use
Regulation 18B against the revived fascist groups, as their activities had "grave consequences for ... the larger civil liberties of the rest of the country". 85 At its Annual General meeting in March 1943 the NCCL recorded its "growing alarm" against increasing antisemitism in Britain, and called for the government to make the disseminating of antisemitic propaganda a criminal offence. 86 A month later a national conference was organised, which launched the NCCL's campaign against antisemitism. 87 The major plank in the NCCL's programme was to change the libel laws to include attacks on Jews as a whole, but its other solution to solving antisemitism was to educate the public. Allen, with a faith in public reasonableness, believed that antisemitism could be removed by discussion, which could "do nothing but good". 88 Public meetings and press debates on antisemitism were sponsored by the NCCL, the impact of which will again be analysed later. The NCCL also attempted to deal with all forms of antisemitism, with Elizabeth Allen launching an attack on publishers of children's and adult literature that included hostile references to Jews. In addition, she urged the public to counter any private manifestations of antipathy. 89

The Communist Party was in full support of the NCCL campaign, indeed in the same year it made the antisemitism/libel offence issue a major element in its programme. 90 Was Douglas Hyde right to suggest that the Communist Party cynically and "deliberately ... us(ed) the Jewish fear of fascism and antisemitism for (its) own political ends", 91 or was its interest in combating antisemitism a genuine attempt to solve a serious problem? The answer is complex.
As the Daily Worker's Walter Holmes suggested late in 1942, the Communist Party's opposition to antisemitism had sprung from the 1930's, and its present policy was "in logical sequence to a long and consistent line of policy". Nevertheless, Hyde's remarks contained an element of truth, for the National Jewish Committee of the Communist Party saw the outcry following the release of Mosley in November-December 1943 as an opportunity to "make of the Jewish people an active element of the Democratic life of the country". Yet the very existence of the National Jewish Committee (NJC) indicates that the Communist Party's interest in its Jewish membership was more than just cynical opportunism.

Formed early in 1943, the NJC was a subsection of the Communist Party's International Affairs Committee. This reflected its anti-Zionist stance and also its attempt to link the fight against fascism and antisemitism in Britain to the struggle of European Jewry. Using the NJC, the Communist Party encouraged "Jewish work" from Jewish Party members. It aimed to rectify "the situation in which Jewish Communists and progressive elements are largely isolated from Jewish life and Jewish organisations" and to lead the Jewish people in the anti-fascist struggle. In the East End particularly, the Party encouraged Jewish work. This culminated in Phil Piratin's election victory in Mile End in 1945, and in several Jewish Communist councillors being elected onto the Stepney Borough Council in the immediate post-war years. In Piratin's campaign "An Appeal to the Jewish Electors" was issued, with up to half of his votes coming from Jews in a constituency where only one third were Jewish.
The question still remains, was the Communist Party opportunist in its anti-antisemitic campaign? From the tone and volume of its literature, it appears that the Party genuinely feared antisemitism, not simply because it threatened Jews, but because it endangered the whole working-class movement by attempting to divide it. 

Palme Dutt, its general secretary, in a secret memorandum of 10 January 1943, stated that "antisemitic propaganda" was "especially dangerous" and it would seem that the Party's concern over the issue was not just to attract Jewish support. Furthermore, the NJC and the attempt to win Jewish support to the progressive cause also indicated a desire to help particular Jewish concerns. The NJC was involved not only in the anti-fascist/antisemitic fight but also in strengthening the cultural identity of the community. A close relationship between the NJC and the Workers Circle, the Bundist orientated Friendly Society, existed, and thus Yiddish culture was actively promoted. The Jewish settlement in Soviet Russia, Biro-Bidjan, and the equivalent in Palestine, were praised, marking an end to the purely assimilationist left-wing solution to the Jewish problem. Thus although the Communist Party's interest in antisemitism from 1943 onwards was not without its opportunist elements, it also reflected a genuine concern in the Jewish problem, and an increasingly important Jewish involvement in Party activities.

Like the NCCL, the Communist Party's major solution to antisemitism was to outlaw it, following the example of the Soviet Union. We have noted that it was not a policy
that appealed to the Home Secretary, Herbert Morrison, or to the public at large. 104 It also brought disagreement in the Jewish and the Labour movement as a whole. The Labour Party was against legislation, believing that "the remedy ... would probably have turned out to be worse than the disease", 105 although Poale Zion, the Jewish Socialist organisation, and the Haldane Club, the left-wing legal group, were in favour of making antisemitism a libel offence. 106 In the Jewish community another conflict developed between the more radical TAC and the Board of Deputies as a whole. 107 The matter was one of tactics. The Board was in favour of a change in the legislation, but it did not wish to pressurise the government on the matter. 108 It also wanted to avoid any contact with the Communist Party as it "would be highly dangerous", 109 and likewise with the NCCL, which was regarded as a "political" organisation. 110 If the legislation had been implemented it is doubtful whether it would have had a great effect. 111 But the issue was significant for the difference in approach it revealed between the Board and radical Jewish/non-Jewish organisations. Both sides shared the same objective but the Board of Deputies stopped short of a public campaign that might have embarrassed the government.

A similar process was at work in the Polish Jewish Army question in 1944. 112 The major opposition to this Polish antisemitism on British soil was orchestrated by the NCCL along with left-wing supporters, culminating in a mass public meeting in the Stoll Theatre in May 1944. 113 Although the Board of Deputies had been concerned about Polish Army
antisemitism since the early part of the war, and was at that stage involved in negotiations with the War Office, it refused to support the NCCL public campaign. Selig Brodetsky, the President of the Board, told Elizabeth Allen that it could not "take part (in) or ... send a message to a meeting of a general political character". Tom Driberg, one of the main organisers of the public meeting, who also asked questions in the Commons on the matter, later remarked that these activities were "against the advice - the almost lachrymose pleading - of the official spokesman of the Jewish community in Britain. They felt that any publicity about this might lead to more antisemitism, perhaps directed against their own flock". It seems also that again the Board did not wish to embarrass the government, as it felt "obliged", as Zvi Avital has suggested, "to demonstrate its patriotism".

In the case of the Polish Jewish soldiers the dual 'behind-the-scenes official' Jewish approach and public left-wing campaign actually complemented each other successfully. On the one hand, in its search for a diplomatic solution, the Board of Deputies found a responsive War Office. On the other, the government's fear of adverse publicity made the NCCL's public campaign a valuable weapon in forcing a quick change of mind. There were thus times when the Board's non-public tactics could pay off. The Board's behind-the-scenes negotiation policy was particularly successful in sorting out misunderstandings involving Jewish evacuees. Nevertheless, there were limitations in the quiet and apologetic approach of the official Jewish organisations as the internment question reveals.
On 23 May 1940, the various refugee organisations met at Bloomsbury House to discuss the crisis and its implications on the refugees. Esther Simpson, secretary of the Academic Assistance Council, was amazed to find that the representatives of the groups, Jewish and non-Jewish, "one after the other" not only supported the government's internment policy but actually demanded that it be extended. Bloomsbury House as a whole, according to Simpson, was in a state of panic, with the Jewish organisations "bending over backwards" to be of assistance of the government, as they were "afraid of increased antisemitism".

As in the First World War, the official Jewish representatives did not want to criticise the government's policy for fear of appearing disloyal. However, as Esther Simpson indicated, there would appear to have been actual Anglo-Jewish support for internment. In the Commons in August 1940 Edward Winterton claimed this was indeed the case, suggesting that "certain prominent Jews in this country" had wanted the internment policy, asking him to "preserve us from the extremist Jewish and Gentile friends of the refugees in the House of Commons and elsewhere". It was a charge that the Board of Deputies bitterly resented, nevertheless it appears to have had an element of truth. Hans Gal, a refugee composer interned in Douglas, remembers with bitterness a visit from a leading British Jew to the camp in the summer of 1940. The visitor said that they (the Jewish representatives) "would do everything for us but we must stay till the end of the war". Gal believed that these British Jews "felt
somehow endangered by the presence of so many co-religionists who could be regarded as not quite safe and reliable". 126 Certainly this would follow on from instructions of Bloomsbury House for refugees to spy on one another in the summer of 1940, and the mutual distrust of the refugees for Bloomsbury House. Indeed one Jewish refugee remained interned, despite the objections of the Home Office Advisory Committee, because "the German Jewish Aid Committee thought he might be an (enemy) agent". 127

It is clear that the policy of the Jewish Refugee Organisations was not to "oppose the general policy of internment", but to do all they could to help the refugees in the way of food, clothing and general conditions in the camps. 128 It was left to grass-roots organisations, like the 'Committee for the Protection of Refugee Aliens', to protest against the most blatant abuses of the government's action such as the internment of elderly East End Jews who had never been naturalised. 129 Although the responses of the various Jewish refugee committees need to be put into the context of the disintegration of opposition to internment in May-June 1940, their continued refusal to attack the government's policy throughout 1940 does allow criticisms to be made. 130 A great deal of information on the refugees was available to the refugee organisations, in addition to ready access to the relevant government authorities. However, the refugee organisations lacked ultimate trust in the people they were supposed to represent, the consequences of which were serious. 131

The role of Jewish and pro-Jewish organisations had an even more important part to play in securing the government's help over European Jewry. This was to be the
most severe test of the strength of British philosemitic and anti-antisemitic forces in the war. With a government unwilling to consider propaganda or physical aid for the persecuted Jews of Europe on its own accord, the activities of those sympathetic to the Jewish cause became vital. Only their pressure stood in the way of a policy of total indifference taking place.

It has been shown that the government believed that its White Paper on Atrocities, published in October 1939, had been a failure with the British public. The government was under the impression that the public had rejected the stories contained in it as mere war propaganda. There is some evidence to confirm the government's analysis. At this stage, according to Tom Harrisson, "the stories of Nazi atrocities have had little effect". In April 1940 Time and Tide could write that "the fate of the German Jews has been forgotten". Nevertheless, a Mass-Observation survey in October 1940 revealed that the public was still greatly aware of the dire plight of European Jewry. This applied to the antisemitic as much as to the philosemitic. Actual disbelief of the atrocity stories was rare, and thus the government's analysis of the public's reaction does not appear to have been correct. The most common response was typified by the liberal Mass-Observer who wrote that she "would like not to believe the stories about the persecution of the Jews ..., but I think there is too much evidence not to believe". Belief therefore was not necessarily a sufficient factor to guarantee action on behalf of the Jews of Europe. As another observer wrote
when asked about this question: "Must you? One had almost forgotten them ..." 137 In the case of others, however, "(Jewish) sufferings under the 3rd Reich are quite sufficient indictment against the Hitlerian regime. Their deliverance is one of our chief war aims". 138 Yet this humanitarian sympathy towards European Jewry was of an unorganised nature, and would remain so for the first years of the war.

The most likely way for such sentiment to become institutionalised was through Christian-Jewish organisations. Although the Society of Jews and Christians had met violent opposition from both communities since its formation in 1927, close contacts had been established by the 1930's between Christian and Jewish refugee organisations. 139 Bloomsbury House, the refugee coordinating body, was to be a springboard for future Christian-Jewish combinations. As one of its leading members, W.W. Simpson, has written "it was ... out of the close, friendly and fruitful cooperation that had developed between Jews and Christians in all that was embodied in the Bloomsbury House experience that the Council of Christians and Jews was born". 140

Out of negotiations beginning in November 1941, the Council (CCJ) was officially launched in March 1942, but not without a series of internal crises. 141 The reason for these will be examined later, but now it is necessary to examine why this important organisation came into existence at that stage in the war. The Society of Jews and Christians had been involved in Jewish 'defence' work in the war, especially in evacuation and blitz areas, but it was a small group, generally lacking in influence. 142
By 1941 the global rise of antisemitism, including anti-pathy to Jews in Britain, stimulated the demand for a more powerful Christian-Jewish umbrella organisation. On the Jewish side there was a desire to gain the support of influential Christians against antisemitism, on the Christian a genuine revulsion against Nazi antisemitism, coupled with a belief that this was also "part of a general and comprehensive attack on Christianity ... and on the ethical principles common to both religions".

The first few months of the CCJ’s activities were dominated by problems of domestic antisemitism, with attempts being made to counter black market accusations against Jews. The approach of the CCJ was similar to that of the Board of Deputies – the use of diplomacy wherever possible, and an apologetic response when attacking antisemitism. W.W. Simpson, its secretary, typified the CCJ’s tactics in a response to a work that claimed that antisemitism was the Gentile’s fault alone. Simpson argued that there were always two sides to an argument and he did "not like one-sided presentations of any case".

In many ways the CCJ mirrored the activities of the Board of Deputies, gaining its success in similar areas. Useful work was carried out in evacuation areas, and in dealing with other personal Christian-Jewish misunderstandings. However, with the problem of securing government aid for the Jews of Europe its limitations were to be exposed. Since its inception, the CCJ had been concerned about the plight of European Jewry, but it was not until the major revelations about atrocities on Jews in late 1942 that it was stung into action.
On 17 December 1942 the Allied declaration attacking the Nazi extermination of Polish Jews was delivered by Anthony Eden in the Commons. The day before Eden's Under-Secretary, Richard Law, met a delegation from the CCJ. The Executive Committee of the CCJ had agreed upon such a delegation on 3 December 1942, although there were doubts about what this would achieve. One of the Executive believed "that the apparent inaction of the Foreign Office ... was not due to any lack of concern but to the difficulty of deciding what action, if any, could be taken". It was also proposed that the deputation should ask the Foreign Office to establish "the authenticity of the reports which had been received from various sources as to the treatment meted out to Jews in Eastern Europe". Indeed, Selig Brodetsky, who was active in the Executive Committee, remarked shortly after the 3 December 1942 meeting, that the disbelief of the atrocities was to be found as much in the CCJ as in the Foreign Office (with the exception of the Archbishop of Canterbury).

With this reserved attitude it comes as little surprise that the deputation was easily deflected by Richard Law. Law wrote after the meeting "in spite of the fact that the deputation expressed great appreciation of my alleged sympathetic attitude, I don't think that I gave anything away". Five days after the Allied Declaration, another delegation from the Board of Deputies, described by the Foreign Office as "a respectable and reasonable body of British Jews", was received. Foreign Office officials were impressed with the public outcry that the Declaration had caused. They believed that this "new situation"
could "only be met", in the words of A.G. Randall, "by a new policy, or modification of the present one". Just a month later the same official wrote after another delegation "that the situation can be held". Were these pro-Jewish deputations partially to blame for the lack of change in government policy in early 1943?

It is evident that the major problem facing the deputations was the unwillingness of the government to consider positive action on behalf of European Jewry - if it could possible avoid it. Nevertheless, there was an awareness among these groups that the government, especially Morrison's Home Office, were being unreasonably obstructive in considering relief measures. Knowledge that the Foreign Office was of a similar mind was less well known, however. As it became clear that little action had resulted after the December 1942 declaration, the deputations continued. In late January 1943 the two senior officials of the Board of Deputies told Richard Law that "they were having great difficulty in holding back their co-religionists at bay" with regard to the rescue of European Jewry. A few months later Law was to write about the "extreme pressure from an alliance of Jewish organisations and Archbishops", showing the government's concern at the problem of satisfying humanitarian sympathy on the issue. Yet at the same time the government after the Bermuda Conference in April 1943, apart from the gesture of soothing words, had refused to change its position of non-action. Ultimately it could afford to do this for the Christian/Jewish representations could so easily be deflected. At a meeting with A. Brotman, the Board of
Deputies' secretary, in April 1943 Frank Roberts of the Foreign Office remarked how "very patient and helpful" Mr. Brotman was. He continued that it was "in our (the Foreign Office's) interest to keep him and his moderate organisation as contented as possible". 165 Over a year later, with little change in the Foreign Office's position, Brotman was again described "as always, entirely reasonable". 166 Norman Bentwich, active in Jewish refugee matters in the 1930's and 1940's, criticised the Board's approach of sending endless memoranda that had "no hope of serious attention by governments", and that the Board's deputations were marked by "unreality and impotence". 167 Was an alternative strategy possible, or was Selig Brodetsky right to say that "there was little we could do"? 168

Reference has already been made to the 'National Committee for Rescue from Nazi Terror', formed early in 1943 as an attempt to galvanise public sympathy for the Jews of Europe into a powerful pressure group. 169 Up to this point, the genuine British concern over the issue had remained amorphous, but the stimulus given by the December 1942 declaration helped to focus it into a coherent pattern. Grassroots organisations, both Church and lay, sprung up and through Victor Gollancz's and Eleanor Rathbone's powerful pamphlets, this spontaneous public feeling was channelled in a coordinated manner. 170 Letters were written to the press, criticising the government's inaction, especially its fear of domestic antisemitism. 171 In addition, resolutions were sent to the Foreign Office which tried to prove the public's approval for aiding the Jews of Europe. 172 Yet the government
remained unmoved and by late 1943, the National Committee for Rescue was struggling to keep alive an issue that it had so successfully brought before a receptive public earlier in the year. Whilst less "reasonable" in its approach than the CCJ or the Board of Deputies, Rathbone's National Committee had thus also failed to change the negative policy of the government.

It has been suggested that Jewish organisations could have followed the example of Samuel Zygielbojm, a Jewish member of the Polish National Council in London, if not in committing suicide as Zygielbojm did in protest against the Allies inaction, in May 1943, then in a policy of mass civil disobedience against the British government. Was the organisation of, say, a hunger-strike in Whitehall a serious option open to the various pro-Jewish groupings? In the reality of the war situation and the attitude of the government this was highly unlikely. As a Foreign Office official put it in June 1941 "when it comes to the point, the Jews will never hamper us to put the Germans on the throne"; the British government knew that however much the Anglo-Jewish community objected to its Middle Eastern policy, or its failure to help European Jewry, that it would not ultimately interfere with Jewish support for the Allied war effort. Jewish and pro-Jewish organisations realised that the major priority had to be to concentrate on an Allied victory, and thus nothing should be done to hinder its progress. Faced with this dilemma there were tremendous limitations on the freedom of action of Jewish groups, that should not be minimised. Nevertheless, there was still a range of options open to groups such as
the Board of Deputies, and internal restraints on their action need to be seriously considered.

Both the Board of Deputies and the CCJ desired official respectability and thus, it must be suggested, did not wish to embarrass the government on the European Jewish question. By March 1943, there were even suggestions within the CCJ that it was spending too much time protesting against Jewish persecution abroad. 177 Thereafter until the end of the war, more time was spent by the CCJ examining domestic antisemitism, and the general question of Jewish-Christian relations in Britain. 178 With the Board of Deputies there was also a lack of confidence reflected in its fear of antisemitism, a fear that it had communicated to the government throughout the war. 179 Both the Board of Deputies and the government shared a private concern about domestic antisemitism, even if in public they denied its existence. 180 It must be questioned whether the Board, and other groups such as the NCCL and the Communist Party, were wise in emphasising domestic antisemitism at a time when the government was using its existence as a reason not to help the Jews of Europe. Frightened of its own safety and of appearing disloyal, the Board of Deputies was trapped in its special relationship with the government and thus made impotent regarding European Jewry. 181

There is no guarantee that even if the Board of Deputies, or other groups had organised mass rallies or hunger strikes that the government would have been stirred into action. Indeed with the protests over Mosley's release, the government, and particularly Herbert Morrison, showed
a strong disregard for what was powerful public opinion. 182

In ignoring humanitarian sympathy over European Jewry, the government revealed the weaknesses of British philosemitic forces. Although the government often admitted that sympathy was more numerically important than hostility, it knew that philosemitism, even in a rampant form, offered no threat to law and order. 183 By its very nature humanitarian support for Jews was non-violent. Consequently, the government was more concerned with potential anti-alienism/semitism than in satisfying the real existence of philosemitism with regard to rescuing European Jewry. However, if the blame for the lack of an Allied initiative on this question rests mainly with the government, pro-Jewish groups can also be criticised. They failed to secure any concessions to the demands which they made, especially at the Bermuda Conference. 184 The desire for respectability, and particularly in the case of the Board of Deputies, a general insecurity, meant that those in close contact with the government failed to offer it a serious concerted challenge. 185 If the impact of philosemitism was weak on the government, was this true of Jewish defence over the whole of British society in the war?

It is a reflection of the efficient nature of Jewish defence organisations in the war that virtually no accusations against Jews went unanswered. Leaflets, pamphlets, letters and books praised the Jewish war effort, defended shechita, and dismissed claims that Jews ran the black market, international finance or were responsible for the war. 186 The authors of these works were aware that
their answers did not necessarily counteract the original charge. Nevertheless can one go as far as one Jewish activist who claimed these defence works "were all futile"? Criticisms were made in the war that literature from the Board's Defence Committee was based on the assumption that antisemitism had rational roots, and could thus be removed by logical counter-arguments. It was a problem that the Board acknowledged increasingly throughout the war, as it spent more and more time considering the psychological roots of antisemitism. Jewish groups began to realise that "there were antisemites who were mentally diseased, who believed that the Jews were in conspiracy against civilisation" and that with these people "nothing could be done". Nevertheless, according to the Board's President, their accusations should not go unanswered for "it avoided the danger of losing by default". Long and futile press discussions therefore took place with the Board's Sidney Salomon and confirmed antisemites such as Douglas Reed and the journals Truth and The Patriot.

A reply to Douglas Reed was published in 1942. However, the Board of Deputies was not in full approval of it, believing the book would give Reed publicity, and would not work because "the antisemitic mind was not receptive (to reason)". Whilst this may have been true of Reed himself, it did not necessarily apply to all his wide readership. Moreover, it must be suggested that not all Jewish defence was wasted in the war. Just as the volume of antisemitica in the 1930's and 1940's made its impact by sheer repetition, the same can be argued about defence literature.
In answering antisemitism, the defence organisations had not only to counter the particular allegations made in the war, but also the deep-held traditional attitudes to Jews that gave rise to them. We have seen that the Jewish black marketeer image was an amalgam of earlier Jewish stereotypes, shaped to fit the requirements of war difficulties. Attempts to answer criticisms of Jewish involvement in the black market, through statistical and other logical counter-arguments, run the risk of being dismissed as Jewish propaganda, but could also be dismissed as they did not match the prevailing stereotype. Indeed, knowledge of the real figures of Jewish involvement in the black market did not necessarily end hostility.

Professor A. V. Hill, a tireless worker on behalf of Jewish refugees, preferred "arithmetic to magic" in considering the Jewish question in Britain. Nevertheless, he continued to believe that Jews were too prominent in the black market when given evidence to the contrary. However, the constant denials of Jewish involvement, particularly in the non-Jewish press, helped at least those sympathetic to the Jewish cause to have ready answers to this most frequent of war allegations.

Repetition was also an important factor in removing misunderstandings based on pure ignorance. Leaflets and booklets outlining Jewish population figures, involvement in finance, the press, politics and the Jewish contribution to the war effort, although bland, could still make "a very good impression on non-Jews". Rather than simply preaching to the converted, defence literature could influence a section of the community whose hostility to Jews did not preclude receptivity to fresh information.
However, the limitations of an educative solution to antisemitism were revealed by the NCCL’s campaign in the last years of the war. The NCCL, like the New Statesman, was "convinced that it (was) useful to bring out into the public mind what antisemitism is, its use by Fascism, and to counter it by deliberate and authoritative statement". Public meetings to discuss antisemitism were sponsored, and debates in both national and local newspapers encouraged. Neither was a particular success, with the participants merely given the opportunity to repent anti-Jewish allegations, or to counter them. In the process little worthwhile discussion took place. It would seem that negative comments on Jews made more impact than positive ones, and that the net result was to increase the 'Jew-consciousness' of the public. The weakness in the NCCL campaign was its assumption that antisemitism in Britain was being organised, rather than being part of a powerful cultural tradition. Its solution of bringing the question out into the open, for the public to see its error, was thus naive, and its results counterproductive. Where educative techniques were used in a more subtle and controlled manner, their results could be more successful.

The great weakness of Jewish defence had always been its easy dismissal as a form of special pleading. The circumstances of the war gave it an opportunity to overcome this limitation, however. Despite its earlier policy, the Board of Deputies stressed in its literature the linkages between antisemitism and fascism, emphasising that Mosley and other antisemites were 'Britain's Fifth Column'.
The fact that other 'Quislings' were also antisemitic gave the opportunity to suggest that antisemitism threatened not just British Jews, but "the precious lives and liberty of all British citizens". The example of British fascists such as William Joyce allowed those writing defence literature to draw a connection between 'Antisemitism and Treachery' - much to the annoyance of British antisemites. In the past accused of disloyalty, the Anglo-Jewish community had now the chance to show how antisemitism was a threat to Britain and the whole democratic world.

The identification of antisemitism with fascism was further strengthened by the activities of the British far left. With the Communist Party enjoying enormous support towards the end of the war, with over 50,000 members and the circulation of the Daily Worker up to 100,000, 'Jewish defence' was given a strong boost. In its propaganda, the Communist Party not only stressed that antisemitism was "A Nazi Weapon", a weapon of reaction whose "real aim (was) an attack on the working class and all democratic forces". It also attempted to correct the public on simple facts of Jewish involvement in British life. Indeed, in this respect its literature was identical to that of the Board of Deputies. By mass circulation of literature and educative workshops, the Communist Party attempted to identify all forms of antisemitism with fascism. This linkage was not just made by the Communist left. David Low's classic cartoon, "How the Beastly Business Begins", connecting antisemitic housewife gossip to the Nazi gas chambers, reflected a wider left-wing anti-fascism which also embraced attacks on anti-
It even reached the *Daily Express*, with its columnist William Hickey (Tom Driberg) writing in January 1943 that "anyone who is against the Jews is at least 50 per cent for Hitler, and that if anyone in Britain can legitimately be called a quisling or a fifth columnist it is the man or woman, who helps, even in a slight degree to spread antisemitism". The business of Jewish defence was thus transformed from a narrow and generally unsuccessful endeavour into that of an important political slogan by the end of the war.

We have so far examined the impact of Jewish defence on the British public as a whole. It is now necessary to briefly analyse how Anglo-Jewry viewed the work done on its behalf. In 1940 the Board of Deputies launched a defence appeal so it could expand its work in the war. Four years later, only a quarter of the amount required had been raised, very little of it coming from the public. It would seem however, and the Board itself believed it was the case, that the failure of the fund reflected not disinterest in the subject of antisemitism, but a disagreement over the Board's tactics. The relative success of appeals for money from Jews for left-wing anti-fascist causes in the war suggests this was indeed the case. Although the Board's Defence Committee believed it had not received the credit it deserved from the Jewish public due to the hidden nature of its work, much of Anglo-Jewry had turned to the left to guarantee its well-being. Criticism of the Board's Defence literature also came from leading Anglo-Jewish publisher, Victor Gollancz, who felt that such propaganda was demeaning and preferred to publish
"positive" books outlining Jewish genius and creativeness. 225

The exciting developments within organisations devoted to the Jewish cause, or to fighting antisemitism in the war, must not, however, disguise their internal problems and other weaknesses. These limitations are perhaps as strong an indication as any of the success of antisemites at home and abroad in challenging the position of the Jew in society.

We have been warned against over-easy criticism of post-emancipation Jewish leadership, in that insecurity, often based on real hostility, gave communal bodies "a very limited range of options". 226 Nevertheless, in seeking to "rehabilitate" the term "British Jew", 227 Jewish organisations, such as the Board of Deputies, in the late 1930's and throughout the war "came very close to appealing to Jews to accept second-class status". 228 The internalization of hostile stereotypes by the Jewish community has already been commented on. 229 It was a process that could lead to demands to co-religionists to change their business behaviour, economic structure and social behaviour. 230 This requirement of 'invisibility' was also demanded of the Jewish refugees, 231 which partially explains the paucity of the community's attack on alien internment in 1940. Being Englishmen of the Jewish faith also limited the communal response to the crisis of European Jewry - seen by the British government as merely foreign nationals of the Jewish faith. Although the Board's Defence Committee saw its future task as spreading the message that "antisemitism (was) a disease of non-Jews", 232 there was a
reluctance to put this into action during the war. Instead, the Jewish community, as the rest of British society, devoted its efforts into demanding 'better' behaviour from its members as the solution to antisemitism. Nevertheless, we have noted that a start was made into investigating the psychological (non-Jewish) roots of antisemitism in the war. 233

Conflicts within the CCJ in its early years are also indicative of the strains operating within pro-Jewish groups in the Second World War. Forty years on the CCJ is a well-established and respectable organisation, but in the war it had to fight to gain credibility. It is again a reflection of the period that George Bell, Bishop of Chichester, lessened his chances of promotion within the Church due to his refugee and Jewish sympathies. 234 There were also objections to the CCJ from the Jewish side, with the ultra-orthodox Chief Rabbi resigning in May 1942 as he saw it as a "Society for the Promotion of Spiritual Inter-Marriage between Jews and Christians". 235 His resignation highlighted the strong tension that still existed between Church and synagogue, for the CCJ had purposely avoided any reference to Christian-Jewish dialogue, which was left to the much smaller Society of Jews and Christians. 236

Even the CCJ's opposition to antisemitism created problems, with James Parkes, the leading Christian writer on the subject, resigning shortly after the Chief Rabbi. Parkes believed that the Board of Deputies wanted to make the CCJ a Jewish organisation under a "gentile umbrella". 237 Rather than token Gentiles, Parkes believed what was
needed was a powerful group of non-Jews to represent the Jewish case to the government. Parkes thus revealed a marked lack of confidence in Anglo-Jewry. With such external and internal problems, it is not surprising that the CCJ's impact was limited, certainly before 1945.

In his diary in late 1945 Richard Crossman wrote that in 1939 he had been "pro-Jew emotionally in 1939" as part of his anti-fascism. Crossman believed that after the war he was now "not emotionally pro-Jew, but only rationally anti-antisemitism". Crossman realised that philosemitism was "a very different thing" to opposing antisemitism, an important distinction to make in regard to the left and the Jews in the war years. In simply identifying antisemitism as a stage or form of fascism there was always a danger that its impact on Jews themselves could be forgotten. An example of this can be found in George Sacks' *The Jewish Question* published by the Left Book Club in 1937. Sacks believed that it was legitimate to "hate the Jew, if you must" but this hatred should not be allowed "to make you the victim of the Fascist who, on the plea that he also hates the Jew, makes you his accomplice in worse crimes".

By the war, this crude analysis had to an extent broken down, with the Communist Party particularly emphasising that all forms of antisemitism must be attacked - including any manifestations of left-wing hostility to Jews. There was a parallel development reflected in the attempt to stop "thinking of Jews as a uniform group", or indeed as mere victims of antisemitism, but rather as a group with its own particular
needs. The National Jewish Committee was one major manifestation of this change. However, not all on the left had abandoned simplistic explanations of antisemitism. John Gollan of the CPGB, writing in 1943, conceded that although the fight against fascist antisemitism was vital to protect the working classes, "dispelling anti-Jewish prejudice" was "comparatively unimportant". In addition many left-wingers had not abandoned their position that Jewish survival had been, and would continue to be, dependent on antisemitism alone.

Such limitations within the various pro-Jewish or anti-antisemitic groups and supporters make it even more difficult to draw up a balance sheet between philosemitic and antisemitic forces in Britain. However, it is important to attempt to evaluate the relative place of the former in British society during the war in which two vital factors were operating in favour of the Jewish community. The first was the almost universal anti-fascist feeling in Britain, the second was the similarly pervasive sense of sympathy for European Jewry. With the first, the impact of anti-fascism could only benefit Anglo-Jewry if it was connected to attacks on Jews, and the second only if European antisemitism was connected to domestic events.

Apart from Jewish groups, liberal and socialist individuals, journals and organisations attempted to connect antisemitism to fascism. It was a policy not only of the Communist Party but also of New Statesman, Tribune, Time and Tide, Reynolds News, News Chronicle, as well as many individual journalists such as Tom Driberg.
Harold Nicolson and Wyndham Deedes to stress this linkage. The cartoonist Low and the playwrights J.B. Priestley and Louis MacNeice all used their artistic skills in the war to make the same point. Yet despite all their efforts it seems that Angus Calder is right to conclude that "the connection between Naziism-Fascism and antisemitism was not widely grasped in Britain". A Mass-Observation survey carried out in January 1944 confirms this impression. Whilst only 2% of the sample wanted antisemitism to be "circumscribed", 24% felt that the future of the country would be harmed if fascists were allowed to continue their activities. Although some of the population were "pro-Jewish" because "Mosley was anti", and others felt that "a nation fighting for democracy (could not) afford antisemitism", the integral connection between fascism and antisemitism had not filtered through to the consciousness of the majority of the British people.

A similar blockage occurred with the question of European Jewry. The news of Jewish persecution did create much sympathy. W.W. Simpson remembers that one of the most exciting aspects of the first years of the CCJ "was the spontaneous development of other groups doing the same thing (that is organising support for the Jews of Europe) independently and without knowing of the Council". One such group was an organisation called 'Unity Against Antisemitism'. A largely middle class Jewish/non-Jewish goodwill body, it emerged with the increase in domestic antisemitism and the news of the fate of Europe's Jews in 1943. Although it soon became part of the HCGL, this
small group was a reflection of how genuine sympathy to persecuted Jews abroad could improve Jewish-Gentile relations at home. 264

We have seen that the news of the atrocities against Jews did bring about a slow reconsideration of attitudes to Jews in general in more liberal circles. 265 Sometimes Jewish defence material could help in this process, one Mass-Observer remarking that she now believed "that the Jew is as good an Englishman as the rest of us ... but, and it is a big but, I am aware that this opinion has been formed only by reading such books as Louis Golding's *The Jewish Problem*, and by making a conscious effort to be fair and tolerant". 266 Yet for much of the population even this slow self-realisation did not take place. It is again important to stress that the most common form of ambivalence on Jewish matters in the war was made up of a sympathy to European Jewry mixed with dislike of the habits of Jews in Britain. 267

In the war therefore, whilst domestic fascism and even possibly political antisemitism became disreputable, the various pro-Jewish organisations could not turn the sympathy created by the horrors committed against the Jews of Europe to gain a full amount of support for Jewry as a whole. The deeply ingrained Jewish stereotypes were too strong to be changed by either the extensive Jewish defence campaign or the devastating events in Europe during the war. Thus although there were impressive developments in the response to antisemitism in Britain during the Second World War, their impact in removing prejudice can be seen
only as a positive factor in changing attitudes to Jews in the long-term. In the short-term, with a government that saw the appeasement of antisemitism at home as more important than the satisfying of humanitarian liberal feeling, Jewish and pro-Jewish organisations were left relatively impotent. As Richard Breitman has recently suggested, "Adolf Hitler (and one might add in the case of Britain, Oswald Mosley) had succeeded in devaluing the lives of European Jews in the eyes of the rest of the world". The antisemites of the 1930's and the Second World War had thus managed to dehumanize the Jew. The forces of philo-semitism and anti-antisemitism in Britain had only succeeded in starting to reverse this process by the end of the war.
FOOTNOTES: Chapter 7

1. Ruth P. Lehmann, Nova Bibliotheca Anglo-Judaica (London, 1961), ix. This development in the war was important enough to merit a section in Lehmann's book, see pp.51-4 - one that was only a selection of the vast amount of material produced.


3. The origins of the Anglo-Jewish Association are traced by Zosa Szajkowski 'Conflicts in the Alliance Israelite Universelle and the Founding of the Anglo-Jewish Association, the Vienna Allianz, and the Hilfsverein', Jewish Social Studies vol.19 (1957), 32.

4. Vivian Lipman's A Century of Social Service 1859 - 1959: The History of The Jewish Board of Guardians (London, 1959) is a scholarly but non-critical account of its activities. David Feldman, 'There was an Englishman, an Irishman, and a Jew...Immigrants and Minorities in Britain' in the Historical Journal vol.26 no.1 (1983), 198-9 deals with this point.


7. For the Board of Deputies' defence of shechita after the Admiralty Report see the Jewish Chronicle, 27 October 1911 and B of D C16/1 Shechita Committee 1904 - 11.

8. See Geoffrey Alderman, The Jewish Community in British Politics (Oxford, 1983), 87 for the Board's campaign for exemption from Sunday trading legislation in 1911 and a general discussion of its refusal to involve itself in party politics.

9. See Bayme 'Jewish Leadership', 47 for details.

10. Ibid., 43-4. See my introduction p.9-11 for a full discussion of these riots.


12. The Eastern Post, 20 September 1902 has details and hostile comments concerning the Aliens' Defence Committee.

Recent works such as Joe Buckman's *Immigrants and the Class Struggle: The Jewish Immigrant in Leeds 1880 - 1914* (Manchester, 1983) and Jerry White, *Rothschild's Building: Life in An East End Tenement Block: 1887 - 1920* (London, 1980) both stress class factors in the established Anglo-Jewish response, to the exclusion of any ethnic considerations. Whilst their work is a useful corrective to earlier works such as Lloyd Gartner's *The Jewish Immigrant in England: 1870 - 1911* (London, 1960), which fails to come to terms with the class conflicts within the community, it must be suggested that they have gone too far in ignoring the ethnic side of the equation. Immigrant Jews were not simply working class, nor were the established middle class community merely capitalists. Both did take into consideration their shared ethnic background. See Todd M. Endelman in David Berger (ed.), *The Legacy of Jewish Migration: 1881 and Its Impact* (New York, 1983), 127-8 for critical comments on White and Buckman.

15. V. Lipman, op. cit., 94 has details.


17. This argument has already been developed in chapter 4 p. 324 Bayne 'Jewish Leadership', 111-115 gives examples from the liberal press at the turn of the century to show its assimilationist stance.

18. Alan Edelstein, 'Philosemitism and the Survival of European Jewry' (Ph.D., City University of New York, 1977), 30 argues that "in its weakest form philosemitism entails anti-anti-Semitism". This does not make any allowance for ambivalent attitudes which combine a dislike of Jews with a repugnance of antisemitism.

19. See Bayne, 'Jewish Leadership', 256-7 for the formation of the Board's Press Committee in the war and also its leaflet activities.


22. Bush, op. cit., 175


29. R. Skidelsky in his biography Oswald Mosley (London, 1975), 403 has called the J.P.C. "a communist front". However, it appears to have been more than this - in fact, a coalition of Jewish workers from the Labour Party leftwards. The Workers' Circle was instrumental in creating the J.P.C., the Circle itself including anarchists, socialists and communists. See Leon Samuels' comments in the Jewish Quarterly no.3 (Winter 1956), 35 for the J.P.C./Workers' Circle link. Mick Mindel, a prominent member of the Workers' Circle, saw the J.P.C. as a "genuine front" - interview with the author, 6 August 1985, as did I. Pushkin, another prominent member of the J.P.C. Interview with the author 23 February 1983. Gisela Lebzelter, Political Anti-Semitism in England 1918 - 39 (London, 1978), 139-42 and 153 is the fullest account of the origins of the J.P.C.


31. Neville Laski confirmed this in a letter to Sidney Salomon, 8 December 1936 in the Parkes papers 15.053
'Jewish People's Council correspondence'.


33. Brotman to James Parkes, 2 February 1937 in Parkes papers, 15.053. For discussions between the two groups in 1938, where differences seem to have lessened slightly, see a report from the J.P.C. to J.L. Fine, secretary of the United Ladies Tailors Trade Union, 30 March 1938 in Hackney Local Library Archive D5/24/51/1.

34. G. Lebzelter, op. cit., 153 sees the change being related to the inclusion of antisemitism in the Italian fascist programme in 1938. However, S. Rawnsley points out that the Board's change did not take place until 1939. In a letter to the J.P.C. 13 March 1939, the Board of Deputies wrote that "pressure of events has made certain modifications necessary, (mainly) in the assertion of the proposition that the resistance to and fight against antisemitism is identified and co-extensive with the fight for democracy". Quoted by S. Rawnsley, 'Fascism and Fascists in Britain in the 1930s (Ph.D., University of Bradford, 1981), 297.

35. Partly as a response to the J.P.C. pressure. See their own The Problem and Meaning of Jewish Defence (Leicester, 1947?) for details of its origins and Lebzelter, op. cit., 143 for a more critical analysis.


37. Holmes, op. cit., 201 refers to the success with the Catholic Times and the National Citizen Union. The Board also appears to have 'bought off' the British Empire Union in 1939, when it appeared to have been coming under the influence of Captain Ramsay. See B of D G6/6/5 correspondence for 1940.

38. For the Truth failure see B of D C15/3/33. The judge's quote is from the Jewish Chronicle, 22 August 1941 in a libel case involving Truth and Neville Laski. The Board was equally unsuccessful with the Catholic Herald. See B of D B4/CAR 11.

39. See B of D C6/10/29 for correspondence with the Yard. The recently released Mosley papers also give an indication of the Home Office-Board of Deputies link on fascist intelligence. See file HO 14/22/54 in particular.

40. Lebzelter, op. cit., 144-5 suggests that Neville Laski, the President of the Deputies in the 1930s, "carried considerable weight with the authorities". Samuel Hoare, the Home Secretary, told the Cabinet after
Kristallnacht that the Jewish representatives were "averse from allowing very large numbers of Jews to enter this country...since they were afraid of an anti-Jew agitation in this country". CAB 23/96 Conclusion 55 (38), 16 November 1938. A. J. Sherman, Island Refuge: Britain and Refugees from the Third Reich 1933 - 39 (London, 1973), 88 refers to the mutual fear of antisemitism that "haunted" both Jewish organizations and the Home Office.

41. The phrase is quoted by James Parkes in regard to his own Enemy of the People. Parkes, in an undated memorandum on the book, referred to his desire to appease the Gentile reader. In the Parkes papers, 07.006.005. For other examples see my chapter 1 p. 81, 83.

42. Louis Golding, The Jewish Problem (Harmondsworth, Middlesex, 1938), 11. However, see the critical comments on Jewish behaviour on pp. 203-6.

43. For the origins of the N.C.C.L. campaign see Lebzelter, op.cit., 165-7 and Mark Lilly, The National Council for Civil Liberties: The First Fifty Years (London, 1984).

44. See note from Jacobs of the J.P.C. to the Deputies, 3 October 1939 in B of D C6/9/1/3 F3.

45. An explanation given by the Board's Sidney Salomon to Israel Cohen, 27 January 1944 in B of D C6/2/13B.

46. The Ministry of Information informed Neville Laski that they had "no right to interfere with British Union", letter of 5 October 1939 in C6/9/1/3 F3. Laski had complained about a leaflet which included the statement: "the dope machine of Jewish finance (has) deceived the people until Britain was involved in war in the interest of the Money Power which rules Britain through its Press and Parties". The Ministry of Information deleted it from the 9 September 1939 issue of Action but were told by the Attorney General that prosecution was impossible with the present regulations. See letter of 26 September 1939 to Sir Donald Somervell in NO 144/21429/4-5.

47. Salomon to Israel Cohen, 27 January 1944 in B of D C6/2/13B refers to the revival of the Defence Committee's Open-air Campaign due to renewed fascist attacks, and the Jewish Chronicle, 3 November 1939 and 29 December 1939 called for a revived street defence campaign. The Jewish Chronicle remained critical of the Board's approach, attacking it for being "too defensive" as late as 8 March 1940. It had criticised the Board's inaction on fascism earlier - see Jewish Chronicle, 5 June 1936 - although it stopped short of violent opposition to the B.U.F. Nevertheless it praised the work of the J.P.C. which folded in late 1939 - see the Jewish Chronicle, 12 January 1940.

48. In the Laski papers AJ 33/158. The leaflets emphasised
that the Nazis stood for Brutality, Unscrupulousness, and Frightfulness and were the anonymous work of Sidney Salomon. Mosley wanted to attack the Board for the leaflets - see Special Branch reports of 27 March 1940 in HO 45/24895/27 referring to a B.U.F. meeting of 19 March 1940 at Hogarth Hall.

49. The Daily Worker, 19 December 1939 said its stance of peace for the people "is the exact opposite of the Mosley 'peace' policy, which means turning the fight against Germany into a fight against the Soviet Union and against the workers of this country". At Silvertown, the only by-election where both the B.U.F. and the C.P.G.B. were represented, Harry Pollitt in an election leaflet "Silvertown against Fascism" emphasised the difference between the two peace movements. Quoted in John Attfield and Stephen Williams, 1939: The Communist Party and the War (London, 1983), 183. See also the Daily Worker, 21 February 1940.

50. Report of a C.P.G.B. meeting in High Wycombe, 10 March 1940 in INF 1/319. Douglas Hyde suggested to me that the C.P.G.B. decided to ignore the B.U.F. in this period as they were both against the war. Interview with the author, 17 September 1983. Less convincingly, Phil Piratin claimed that the B.U.F. was no longer active after September 1939 - see his The Flag Stayed Red, 68.


52. S. Salomon, 'Now It Can Be Told' has details in B of D C6/9/21 fl.


54. Randall Swingler, 'Antisemitism: Secret Weapon of the Ruling Class' in the Daily Worker, 14 October 1940.

55. Douglas Hyde, I Believed (London, 1951), 139-140.

56. See the Daily Worker, 10 April 1943 for the meetings against the British National Party and the Hackney Gazette, 31 March 1943 for hostility to a town meeting against Godfrey's organization.


59. J.D.C. report 30 November 1944 in B of D C6/2/6 and also in C6/9/1/3(6).

60. B of D C15/3/9 has correspondence to Marx House in 1944. John Wills, employed to research antisemitism by New Statesman, had links with both the Board of Deputies and the Communist Party and thus acted (briefly) as a
liaison man. See his report of 2 April 1943 in the Kingsley Martin papers 30/1. Douglas Hyde referred to indirect C.P.G.B. links to the Board, but believed that the Board generally distrusted the Communists. Interview with the author, 17 September 1983.

61. The quote is from Sidney Salomon in a letter to Barnett Samuel, 30 June 1944 in B of D C6/2/13m. For similar sentiments see Salomon's letter to W.W. Simpson, August 1943 in B of D C15/3/20.


63. See the letter of Chimen Abramsky in the Jewish Chronicle, 24 December 1943 on the Board's inaction.

64. A letter of 1943 (?) to the editor of the Jewish Chronicle, Ivan Greenberg, referred to the "biting frigidity" between the Board and the paper. In the Brodetsky papers AJ/3. For the formation of the 'Friends of Jewish Labour', formed because "The Board of Deputies could not adequately put forward the view of Jewish labour movements...in East London", see the East End Observer, 8 May 1942. Douglas Hyde referred to the pressure put on the Jewish Chronicle by the Board not to put too much emphasis on anti-fascism. The Board was worried by the amount of space the Chronicle gave to neo-fascist groups. This was due to the paper employing Jack Spector, a Communist sympathiser. Interview with the author, 17 September 1983. Spector himself claims that the Jewish Chronicle was "keen for information all the time". Interview with the author, 7 April 1984.

65. The Daily Worker, 6, 13 and 20 November 1944 refers to opposition to the League. In the post-war period the '43' group were to emerge as the most militant response to street fascism. See Alexander Hartog, Born to Sing (London, 1978), 70-77 for the '43' group.

66. See the J.D.C. note 'Future tasks', 18 November 1942 in B of D B5/4/3 and also the comments in the J.D.C.'s The Problem and Meaning of Jewish Defence, 3.

67. Board of Deputies document 'A Duty to Britain and A Duty to the Community' in the permanent exhibition of the Manchester Jewish Museum.

68. 'Memorandum on the Defence Committee 1940' in B of D C6/2/6.

69. See for example the J.D.C.'s 'Internal Causes of Anti-semitism: A Survey of the Problem' (1942) in B of D C6/9/1/3 F5. The Aliens Committee was dedicated to


71. See the memorandum of 6 August 1945 dealing with the T.A.C.'s success in discrimination cases in B of D C6/2/13a.


74. This has been covered in chapter 5 p.410-11.

75. Salomon wrote to the President of the Board on 22 September 1942 outlining the split between the T.A.C. and the Deputies. The Jewish Chronicle took the Board's side in this dispute. See the editorial in the 31 July 1942 issue.

76. The T.A.C.'s The Problem and Meaning of Jewish Defence, suggests that well over two million items of defence literature had been distributed since 1936. Most of this would have taken place after 1938.


78. See Civil Liberty no.13 (March 1940) editorial on fascist antisemitic activity in the East End.

79. Civil Liberty, no.11 (January 1940) and no.16 (June 1940) dealt with non-fascist antisemitism as did the Daily Worker, 5 October 1939; 8 January 1940; 29 March 1940; 14 October 1940; 25 November 1942 and 2 December 1940.

80. See Civil Liberty no.9 (October 1939) and no.20 (November December 1940). One of Ronald Kidd's last works, British Liberty in Danger (London, 1940), 211-7 warned particularly about the implications of Regulation 18B.

81. The accusation of Communist control was strongly denied by Kidd and E.M. Forster in Time and Tide vol.22 no.26 (28 June 1941) but it appears that by the end of the war, apart from Elizabeth Allen, communists were highly prominent in the movement. See Henry Pelling, Britain and the Second World War (Glasgow, 1970), 315-6 and Martin Kettle 'What Price Liberty?' in the Sunday Times (colour magazine), 19 February 1984.

83. The leaflet is in the N.C.C.L. archive 100/13. The Communist Party certainly did not bring up the question of antisemitism in its People's Convention early in 1941 - see D.H. Pritt, *The People's Convention 1941: Together Against Hitler* (London, 1941), where there are no articles or resolutions on the subject.

84. The title of her major work attacking war antisemitism which was published in 1943 and widely circulated across the country.

85. In *Civil Liberty* no.4 (July - August 1942). See also her comments in the same journal no.9 (March 1943) explaining that as the fascists were against civil liberties it was necessary to be against them.

86. Details of the A.G.M. of 27 March 1943 are in *Civil Liberty* no.10 (April, 1943). See also N.C.C.L. 41/8.

87. Full details of this conference are in N.C.C.L. 41/7. See also *Picture Post*, 8 May 1943 and *Civil Liberty* no.11 (May 1943).

88. In J.J. Lynx (ed.), *op.cit.*, 98.

89. See her *It Shall Not Happen Here*, 24 and 30-1 and N.C.C.L. 45/2 and 311/1 for details.

90. The *Daily Worker*, 19 April 1943 stated that the N.C.C.L. campaign against antisemitism should "be welcomed by all democrats who are alive to the seriousness of the present situation". Walter Holmes called for a law against antisemitism such as that in the Soviet Union in the *Daily Worker*, 29 October 1942 and this became Party policy in 1943.


92. In the *Daily Worker*, 19 December 1942.

93. The quote is from a meeting of the National Jewish Committee of the Communist Party (N.J.C.), 8 December 1943 'Party Work Amongst the Jews in Britain' in the Zaidman collection.

94. The fullest treatment of the N.J.C's origins is in H. Srebrnik, 'The Jewish Communist Movement in Stepney' (Ph.D., University of Birmingham, 1983), 100-1 and 111-117. See also G. Alderman, *op.cit.*, 117.

95. A document of 27 February 1943 of the N.J.C. quoted by Srebrnik, 'The Jewish Communist Movement', 185 indicates the domestic/foreign antisemitic tie up. For
hostile comments on its anti-Zionism, see the Jewish Standard, 26 May 1944, which also accused the Communists of exploiting the Jewish fear of antisemitism.

96. From a booklet 'The Jewish Question: Statement by the National Jewish Committee of the Communist Party' (London, 1944), 18-19 in the Zaidman collection.


98. 'The Appeal to the Jewish Electors' and other material relating to the election is in the Zaidman collection. The London Committee of the N.J.C. were preparing for the Mile End campaign as early as November 1944 - see their minutes, also in the Zaidman collection. The Jewish Forum, May - June 1945, a Jewish Communist publication, had an article by Piratin urging that "Every Jew must Vote Progressive!" G. Alderman, op.cit., 196 has details of the Jewish proportion of Mile End, which he estimates was 5,400 out of 16,200. Piratin polled 5,075 votes of which Alderman believes 2,500 were Jewish. Srebrnik 'The Jewish Communist Movement', 201 estimates that the Jewish proportion of the electorate was higher, from 40 - 50%. With the huge population movement in the area it is difficult to produce a conclusive figure.

99. Noreen Branson, op.cit., 161 comments that this was the case with Palme Dutt in the 1930s and it was a theme that continued in the war itself. It was stressed by William Gallacher in his Antisemitism: What It Means to You (London, 1943), 1-15 and 23; by I. Rennap (I.Pennar), Anti-Semitism and the Jewish Question (London, 1942), 111-6; in Marx House's Anti-Semitism: A Nazi Weapon (London, 1944), 1-2 and by John Gallan 'Antisemitism' in Labour Monthly, vol.25 no.6 (June 1943), 177-181.

100. Memorandum 10 January 1943, letter to London District Committee, CUP 1262K4 in the Palme Dutt papers, British Library.

101. The papers of Lazar Zaidman, active in both the Workers' Circle and the N.J.C., show the close linkages. The Workers' Circle had a peak membership of just under 3,000 in January 1940, declining to 2,430 in 1943. See The Circle vol.10 no.1 (April 1943). In an appeal to the Jewish voters in South Hackney, William Rust, the Communist candidate in 1945, not only pledged to make antisemitism a legal offence, but also indicated he would give "Encouragement and help for Jewish cultural needs, theatre, cinema, books, clubs, etc., in Jewish districts". Campaign leaflet in the Zaidman collection.

102. See the N.J.C.'s 'The Jewish Question', 9-11 for support of the Yishuv and I. Rennap, op.cit., 49-54 for praise of Biro-Bidjan. Hyman Levy outlined what he saw as the new Communist position that "it was no use pretending that Jews were not a separate people" in a
meeting of the N.J.C. on 9 May 1944, reported by the Jewish Standard, 26 May 1944. The Jewish Standard declared that the N.J.C.'s stand was still assimilationist, a charge that Levy denied - see the Jewish Standard, 16 June 1944. See also his article 'The Problem of Assimilation' in J.J. Lynx, op. cit., 58-60.

103. One result of this was the production of the Jewish Clarion, a monthly Communist organ that ran from December 1945 until the late 1950s.

104. See chapter 4 p. 340 for the public response, and chapter 6 p. 469 for Morrison's. Attempts to discuss it in the Commons were quickly dismissed. See the Attorney-General's comments in Hansard HC vol. 377 col. 1788-9, 18 February 1942, Morrison's in HC vol. 387 col. 1355-6, 18 March 1943 and Winterton's in HC vol. 391 col. 511-2, 15 July 1943.

105. The quote is from James Walker of the National Executive at the Labour Party A.G.M. in 1943. Poale Zion, Labour and the Jewish People (London, 1943), 9 indicates that attempts to bring the issue into the conference were rejected - see also The Labour Party Annual Report 1943 (London, 1943), 190. For Harold Laski's objection to such legislation see N.C.C.L. 44/4 and 41/7.

106. The Board of Deputies Law and Parliamentary Committee, minutes 4 June 1943 refer to the Haldane Club's interest - in B of D C13/1/12. See also the Middleton papers, letter of 15 December 1942 in JSM/210/198.

107. See the T.A.C. memo, 22 November 1940 in B of D Ch/2 Fl, and Noah Barou 'The Defamation of Communities: The Need for Legislation' in the T.A.C.'s Monthly Bulletin vol. 3 no. 12 (December 1944). The Workers' Circle, which had become active in the Board in the war, also demanded legislation. See letter of 21 March 1944 from N. Weiner to the Board in B of D Ch/3 F2. The Jewish Chronicle, 4 June 1943 came out in favour of legislation, with certain reservations, but the Jewish Standard, 14 July 1944 was firmly against the proposals.

108. For the Board's interest in Community Libel see B of D Ch/2 and Ch/3 and G6/7/3/2 memorandum on the Porter Committee, 1945.

109. See the minutes of the Law and Parliamentary Committee, 4 June 1943 in B of D C13/1/12.

110. Thus again honouring the emancipation contract. See the minutes of the Board of Deputies, 17 October 1943 for this explanation in B of D A32. The Board did maintain some connection with the N.C.C.L. - see B of D E3/75 for correspondence, linkages which were closest with the T.A.C. See N.C.C.L. 45/2 for contact between Elizabeth Allen and the T.A.C.'s Maurice Orbach.
111. G.W. Allport, *The Nature of Prejudice* (Reading, Mass., 1954), 468 illustrates how little impact the laws passed in certain parts of America had made. B of D C6/3 F2 has examples of such legislation in America and Canada.

112. For fuller details see chapter 6 p.470-2.

113. See N.C.C.L. 45/4 for details of the Conference on Jews in the Polish Army at the Stoll Theatre, 14 May 1944, or *Civil Liberty* no.11 (June 1944).

114. For the Board's earlier protests, see the delegation to the Home Office, 8 January 1942 in HO 213/347; meeting of the Board and the Ministry of Information, 29 April 1943 in B of D C6/10/27 and FO 371/39/40 C1087 which outlines the Board's involvement in the issue in 1944.


118. The government's response is examined in chapter 6 p.471.

119. See chapter 3 p.276 for an analysis of the success of this approach in regard to Jewish evacuees.


121. Imperial War Museum refugee tapes (no.4469).

122. Ibid.

123. Hansard HC vol.364 col.1539-41. Winterton believed that conditions could be improved but "the interests of this country must come first". He did, however, "deplore the fact that it had not been possible to make more distinction between anti- and pro-Nazis". Letter to Bishop Bell, 14 July 1940 quoted in R. Jasper, *George Bell: Bishop of Chichester* (London, 1967), 151.

124. Selig Brodetsky wrote to Winterton on 23 September 1940 asking him to recant his remarks, but he refused...
letters in the Board of Deputies archive, copies in the possession of Mr. Ronald Stent. I am grateful to Mr. Stent for letting me see his notes on the subject.

125. See Hans Gal I.W.M. tape (no. 4304) for his interesting comments on this visit. Gal concluded that "this was a shameful event and not forgotten".

126. ibid.

127. The quote is from a Metropolitan Police report of 3 February 1942 in HO 215/169 Gen 4/10/2 concerning F. Sellman. The instructions to spy were given at a meeting of the Board of Deputies Aliens Committee public meeting in June 1940 by Mrs. Petrie, the Board's Public Relations Officer. Details in B of D C2/2/6. Tapes (no. 4584) W. Feldberg; (no. 4300) Leo Kahn; and (no. 4479) E. Simpson highlight the problems in dealing with Bloomsbury House. Accusations of inefficiency in Bloomsbury House, and particularly the German Jewish Aid Committee, have recently been made by Sir John Lawrence, a non-Jewish worker there. See his letter in the Sunday Times, 23 February 1986 and an analysis of it in the Jewish Chronicle, 28 February 1986. Leo Kahn claims his internment was due to a mix up of names in the refugee organizations - see I.W.M. tape (no. 4300).

128. From The Report of the Central Council for Jewish Refugees 1940 (London, 1940). See also the Bloomsbury House Christian Council for Refugees from Germany and Central Europe, circular for July 1940, for a similar policy. In the Manchester Guardian archive 223/5/3. Stent, op. cit., 67 concludes that the Central Council for Jewish Refugees "would accept whatever decisions the Government took without question" and that they saw their job as "merely to alleviate hardships".


130. The Jewish Chronicle for example soon reversed its support of internment. See chapter 6 p. 478, 482, for details. To be fair to the Central Council for Jewish Refugees, it did try to secure the "release of all those for whom there was no ground of suspicion" - Report for 1940, but this was not a basic attack on internment itself.

131. Stent, op. cit., 207-8 and Norman Bentwich, They Found Refuge (London, 1956), 121 comment on the "happy" relations between the government and Bloomsbury House. Whether the government's actions called for a "happy" relationship is open to doubt.

132. See chapter 6 p. 500.


135. Thus some antisemites supported Hitler for his policy of extermination - see M-OA: DR 1145, 2402 October 1940. Others, although antisemitic, disliked Hitler's methods - see DR 1235, 2588, 1014, 1563. Those ambivalent to Jews (the majority) also believed and generally attacked the excesses of Nazi antisemitism - see DR 2475, 1056, 2038. Philosemites had little difficulty in accepting atrocity stories - see DR 1190, 2669, 1270.

136. M-OA: DR 2486, October 1940.

137. M-OA: DR 1206, October 1940.

138. M-OA: DR 2669, October 1940.


140. Simpson, 'Autobiography', 17. See also Norman Bentwich, op. cit., 121 for a similar connection between Bloomsbury House and the C.C.J.

141. These early discussions leading to its formation can be found in the C.C.J's own archive, notes of meeting on Jewish-Christian Relations, 19 November 1941 and in B of D C15/3/21.

142. The minutes of the Society of Jews and Christians for the war years are in the Parkes papers 15.076. See also its Bulletin, especially vol. 2 no. 3 (November 1941).

143. See B of D C15/3/21 F2 for preliminary statements from Sir Robert Waley Cohen and W.W. Simpson for the formation of a new organization.


145. This was the sentiment of the Archbishop of York, William Temple, and made part of the Constitution of the C.C.J. See the 'Aims of the Council', C.C.J. council minutes of 1st meeting, 20 March 1942 in C.C.J. archive. See also Simpson, 'Autobiography', 19-21.

146. See the minutes of the Executive council of the C.C.J: 4th meeting, 7 May 1942 to 12th meeting, 5 November 1942.

147. The work was A. Cohen's *The Psychology of Antisemitism*
(London, 1941), published by the Board of Deputies, which concluded that "Jewish misdeeds do not originate antisemitism" - pp.20-21.

148. W.W. Simpson to Sidney Salomon, 4 September 1941 in B of D C15/3/20 F2. See also his comments to James Parkes, 7 September 1943 in the Parkes papers 16.715.

149. See for example, Executive minutes of the C.C.J., 17th meeting 4 March 1943.

150. At the second meeting of the Executive Committee, 13 April 1942 a 'model' resolution was passed for church groups so that they could record their "increasing concern at the Nazi treatment of the Christian Church and of the Jewish community in Germany and German-occupied territories". No action appears to have been taken after this until December 1942.

151. Details of the C.C.J. deputation can be found in FO 371/32682 W17401 and in the C.C.J. executive minutes 15th meeting, 7 January 1943.

152. Reported in the C.C.J. executive minutes 13th meeting, 3 December 1942.

153. ibid.


155. Law's note of meeting of 16 December 1942 in FO 371/32682 W17401.

156. Randall brief, 22 December 1942 in FO 371/32682 W17521.

157. Richard Law told Osbert Peake of the Home Office that "the Foreign Secretary's statement in the House had created a new situation" and that Morrison's "non-possimus attitude" might prove impossible to maintain. Law minute, 18 December 1942 in FO 371/32682 W17401.

158. Randall brief for the Cabinet Committee on Refugee Problems, 29 December 1942 in FO 371/36651 W2069.

159. Randall minute 29 January 1943 in FO 371/36694 W416.

160. Richard Law was aware of the C.C.J.'s distrust of Herbert Morrison. See his comments in the meeting of 16 December 1942 in FO 371/32682 W17401.

161. Eleanor Rathbone wrote to the Foreign Office on 9 August 1943 attacking the government's record on refugee rescue in a vicious memorandum. However, she absolved the Refugee Department of the Foreign Office of responsibility, stating that "Mr. Randall and his colleagues seem to have done everything in their power to quicken action through the usual channels open to civil servants". In FO 371/36665.
Rathbone did not appear to realise that the relevant Foreign Office departments were also inflexible. W.W. Simpson, present at the 16 December 1942 meeting with Richard Law, was similarly surprised to find how negative the Foreign Office had been. Interview with the author, 9 September 1984.

162. Details of meeting between Richard Law, A. Brotman and S. Brodetsky, 29 January 1943 in FO 371/36694 W416.
163. Law memo, 7 May 1943 in FO 371/36731 W6933.
164. See chapter 6 p.496 for details.
165. Roberts meeting with Brotman, 24 April 1943 in FO 371/36658 W5550.
166. Roberts meeting with Brotman, 12 October 1944 in FO 371/39454 C14201.
169. See chapter 6 p.494.
170. See the minutes of the National Committee for Rescue from Nazi Terror, 1943 - 45 in the Parkes papers 15.057 and Victor Gollancz, Let My People Go (London, 1942) and Eleanor Rathbone, Rescue the Perishing (London, 1943). Both contain resolutions from local groups that had formed after the Allied Declaration.
171. See for example the letter in The Times, 16 February 1943 signed by a wide range of intellectuals; Sir Neil Malcolm in The Times, 22 December 1942; and Hugh Lyon in the same paper 9 February 1943.
172. The government was dismissive of such public responses, Morrison writing to Rathbone, 9 March 1943 that "I need hardly say that the government has not omitted to inform itself of public opinion in this matter" - in FO 371/36655 W4100. The Foreign Office grew tired of such pressure, C. Cheetham minuting on 4 May 1944 "it seems hardly necessary to enter this resolution. We get any amount of the same thing and generally just cross them off", in FO 371/42751 W6988.
173. See the National Committee minutes, 21 July 1943 for alarm at falling public concern, in the Parkes papers 15.057. Harold Nicolson in The Spectator vol.171 (17 December 1943) pointed out the need for continued public pressure.
174. The suggestion came from Barnett Litvinoff, A Peculiar
175. Unidentified minute, 14 June 1941 in FO 371/26172 quoted by B. Wasserstein, op. cit., 37.

176. This was recognised by Brotman and Brodetsky in a meeting with Richard Law, 29 January 1943 in FO 371/36694 W416.

177. See the executive minutes of the C.C.J., 17th meeting 4 March 1943.

178. Thus for example the 19th meeting of the C.C.J., 6 May 1943, was devoted to a discussion of domestic antisemitism. In 1944 and 1945 much time was spent in developing local groups and international links, and no mention was made of European Jewry in the Executive Committee minutes.

179. See chapter 6 p.467 for details of meetings between the Board and the Home Office and Ministry of Information on domestic antisemitism.

180. Holmes, op. cit., 107-8 comments on how the Board had, at times, used antisemitism as a weapon, and, at others, denied its existence. See also Bayme, 'Jewish Leadership', 47 and 239 for relevant comment.

181. The fear of appearing disloyal is suggested by Litvinoff, op. cit., 152-3 - one that cannot be ignored as it permeated much of the Board's policy.

182. For the government reaction to the outcry against Mosley's release see file HO 45/24894.

183. This was a point most clearly made by Herbert Morrison to a deputation on 28 October 1942 where he stated that although "the general body of opinion in this country was humanitarian...there was also a body of opinion which was potentially antisemitic" which should not be ignored. In FO 371/32681 W1463. See similar comments by Osbert Peake minute of 24 April 1943 in FO 371/36725 W6785 and Richard Law minute 7 May 1943, who warned that anti-alien/semic feeling should not be forgotten, just because it was not at present organized. In FO 371/36731 W6933.

184. Thus a Bloomsbury House meeting, at the time of the Bermuda Conference, followed the government line, when launching an appeal for the refugees, and covered up any reference in particular to Jews. See letter from Lewis Namier to W. Crozier, 15 April 1943 in the Manchester Guardian archive B/N8A/209.

185. The requirement of respectability was strong in the C.C.J. which refused any co-operation with the Communist Party or the N.C.C.I. in their anti-antisemitism campaigns in 1943, or any part in the issue of Polish
army antisemitism in 1944. See the C.C.J. Executive minutes, 18th meeting, 8 April 1943 and 29th meeting, 16 May 1944 respectively.

186. For a cross section of these works see the Board of Deputies Defence Committee's Publications in B of D C15/2/4.

187. See, for example, a J.D.C. report of 18 November 1942 'Our Future Task' on the self-acknowledged limitations of defence literature. In B of D B5/4/3.

188. N. Bentwich, Wanderer in War, 178-9.

189. See for example the Jewish Standard, 31 December 1943, editorial and article by Dr. Rietenfeld.

190. Selig Brodetsky to the preliminary meeting of the C.C.J., 19 November 1941 in the C.C.J. archive. See also the Jewish Chronicle, 15 December 1944 for similar comments.

191. Brodetsky at the preliminary meeting, 19 November 1941.

192. See Truth no.3561 (8 December 1944) and no.3565 (5 January 1945) for Salomon's reply to Reed and the journal, and similarly Israel Cohen's reply to Collin Brooks in Truth no.3432 (19 June 1942) and The Patriot no.994 (27 February 1941) for Salomon's attempts to counter the Jew-Bolshevik canard.


194. Sidney Salomon, in a note of 13 October 1943, suggested that Reed should be ignored on publicity grounds - in B of D C6/2/13m. The quote is also from Salomon in a review of Weiss's book in the Jewish Chronicle, 5 February 1943.

195. See chapter 5 p.400 for details.

196. As Brendan Bracken told the Board of Deputies in a meeting of 10 December 1943 in B of D C6/10/27.

197. A Mass-Observer remarked that "the black market despite B.B.C. denials is largely Jewish. This is not prejudice" - in M-OA: DR 1313, March 1943. Yet she was at the same time "sorry to confess" an increased hostility to Jews in the war.


199. Letter to W.W. Simpson, 8 June 1943 in B of D C15/3/21 P2. G.W. Allport, op.cit., 328-9 has relevant discussion on this. He states "self-insight does not automatically cure prejudice. At best it starts the individual wondering".

200. See the comments in the Glasgow Herald, 3 October
1942; Glasgow Daily Record, 28 May 1943; Evening Standard, 25 July 1942; The People, 14 March 1943; Daily Worker, 12 December 1942 all attacking the Jewish black market accusation. A Manchester Guardian article of 14 January 1942, which included the results of a T.A.C. survey on the black market, was actually used by Home Office officials to counter Morrison's attack on alien offenders. See A.M. (? ) note, 16 January 1942 in HO 213/14.

201. The quote is from a J.D.C. report, 23 June 1942 in the minutes of the Board of Deputies, volume 31.

202. B of D C6/2/13a and 6 have miscellaneous letters commenting on the use of defence literature in combating local prejudice and in actually changing peoples minds. See particularly a letter from Mrs. Le Blanc-Smith, 24 March 1944 to Sidney Salomon in C6/2/13a. The Board's British Jewry in Battle and Blitz (London, 1943) was described by the East London Advertiser, 6 October 1944 as "an inspiring roll of heroism".


204. There was a violent reaction to a meeting in Willesden Town Hall in April 1944 - see the debate in the Kilburn Times, May - June 1944.

205. N.C.C.L. 45/1 has a range of press discussion of antisemitism in which the N.C.C.L. was involved.

206. This would appear to be the impression gained from Mass-Observation's survey on Jews in March 1943. Several correspondents had their prejudices confirmed by hostile letters in the New Statesman. See M-OA: DR 2512, 3003, March 1943.


208. The idea of an organized antisemitic campaign is made clear in Elizabeth Allen's It Shall Not Happen Here, passim and N.C.C.L. 41/8 which has 'evidence' of this campaign.

209. Thus the National Council of Labour Colleges reported that visits to Trade Unions and Workmen's Clubs on antisemitism did "much good" - letter to Sidney Salomon, 17 July 1944 in B of D C15/3/19.


211. ibid., 8.

212. See particularly James Lunn's Treachery and Antisemitism (London, 1942) and Israel Cohen's 'Antisemitism
and Treachery' in *New Statesman* vol.23 (30 May 1942). See Collin Brooks article of the same title in *Truth* no.3430 (5 June 1942) for a hostile antisemitic response.


216. For a clear example see W. Gallacher, *op.cit.*, 3-12. An editorial in the *Jewish Chronicle*, 18 February 1944 claimed that the Defence Committee's work was beginning to bear fruit as non-Jews were using its literature to counter antisemitism.

217. For example, the Lancashire Communist Party had a day school on antisemitism in March 1943. See *Lancashire News* vol.6 no.13 (February 1943) for details. Similar events took place at Marx House in 1944 - see Marx House, *Antisemitism*.

218. Printed in the *Evening Standard*, 18 June 1943. The *Jewish Chronicle*, 25 June 1943 referred to it as a "great cartoon".

219. For example, the Independent Labour Party published Sid Goldberg's *What of the Jews?* (London, 1944). *Tribune*, *New Statesman*, *News Chronicle* and Reynolds *News* all attacked antisemitism in the war, a fact that will be developed at the end of the chapter.


221. Details of the Defence Appeal Fund are in B of D C6/7/5/1. The aim was to collect £250,000, but only £34,000 had been collected from the public.

222. In a letter to the *Jewish Chronicle*, 31 December 1943 Maurice Domb claimed that the fund had failed because the Jewish public was not concerned with antisemitism. The editorial in the same issue denied this was the case, as did the Board's Defence Secretary, Gordon Liverman, in a letter to the *Jewish Chronicle*, 7 January 1944. In a meeting of the Executive Committee of the Board, 18 June 1944, it was acknowledged that the Fund had failed partly because of policy disagreements from the Jewish public. In B of D A32.

223. Thus in May 1943 37 out of 50 workers in an East End factory contributed to a Communist Party collection to ban all fascist groups. Quoted by H. Srebrnik, 'The Jewish Communist Movement', 187. In addition, over £42,000 was collected by the Jewish Fund for Soviet Russia - see the *Jewish Clarion*, April 1945.

224. See the comments in its *The Problem and Meaning of*
Jewish Defence, 3.

225. Gollancz resigned from the Board's Defence Committee in 1944 for this reason. See his letter to Selig Brodetsky, 22 May 1944. In B of D C15/3/17 and also the correspondence in C6/10/22. Gollancz made the point about positive defence in a meeting at the Ben Uri Art Gallery. See the Jewish Standard, 30 June 1944 and also his letter to James Parkes, 20 October 1944 in the Parkes papers 09.023. Gollancz published such works as Edmond Fleg's Why I am a Jew (London, 1943) although he continued to publish the thrillers of Dorothy Sayers, which included antisemitism, in the war.


227. According to a Jewish Chronicle editorial, 22 December 1944. The goal was to be both British and Jewish.


229. Chapter 5 p.409.

230. For Jewish accusations of Jewish sharp practice see Sidney Salomon, 25 February 1942 in B of D C6/2/13b; demands for a wider economic spectrum, the Jewish Chronicle, 9 August 1940 and the end to social ostentation Board of Deputies Annual Report 1943 (London, 1944), 28.


236. A point made to me by W.W. Simpson, the C.C.J's Secretary, in an interview, 6 April 1984. Simpson suggests that the Catholic members were equally worried "about anything even approaching religious discussion" as the Chief Rabbi was.

237. Parkes letter to Brotman, 15 June 1942, in B of D C15/3/21 F2 and also letter to Brodetsky, 8 June 1942 in loc.cit.
238. ibid. See also his autobiography Voyage of Discoveries (London, 1969), 149 and 174–5.

239. W.W. Simpson in an interview with the author, 9 September 1984 believed that the C.C.J. was "a little ahead of public opinion".


241. ibid.

242. For critical comment on this book see Steve Cohen, That's Funny, You Don't Look Antisemitic (Leeds, 1984), 93.


244. See for example the Communist Party leaflet 'Antisemitism: Plain Speaking' referring to all forms of antisemitism as a disease. The Leaflet, published in 1943, is in the Communist Party Archive.

245. See for example the Daily Worker, 17 April 1943 for an attack on the left-wing Railway Review.

246. 'Antisemitism: Plain Speaking'.


248. See Walter Holmes in Daily Worker, 30 June 1944 and chapter 4 p.326-7 for other examples.

249. See the New Statesman vol.18 (9 December 1939); vol. 19 (6 January 1940) and (27 April 1940); vol.23 (30 May 1942); vol25 (13 February 1943); (20 March 1943), (24 April 1943), (25 September 1943) and (16 October 1943). For the interest of its editor, Kingsley Martin, in the question, see his diary 7 February 1943 in the Kingsley Martin papers Box.8 no.36 and C.H. Rolph, Kingsley: The Life, Letters and Diaries of Kingsley Martin (London, 1973), 242.

250. See Tribune, 31 May 1940, 6 March 1942; 29 January 1943; 17 December 1943; 11 February 1944; 21 July 1944; 22 September 1944; 8 December 1944.

251. Time and Tide vol.20 no.43 (28 October 1939); vol.22 no.48 (29 November 1941); vol.24 no.17 (24 April 1943).


253. News Chronicle, 1 April 1943.

254. For example in the Daily Express, 7 January 1943 and in Reynolds News, 25 June 1944.

255. Particularly in The Spectator. See vol.163 (27 October 1939); vol.164 (2 February 1940), vol.168 (16 January
1942); vol.169 (25 December 1942); vol.171 (17 December 1943).

256. See The Highway, December 1944.

257. For Low see this chapter p.576. For Priestley and MacNeice see chapter 5 p.407.


260. M-OA: DR 2281 October 1940.

261. M-OA: DR 1578 October 1940. See also the ambivalent comments of M-OA: DR 1362 March 1943, who was becoming increasingly hostile to Jews, but was aware that anti-Semitism was "the first stage of fascism".

262. Interview with the author, 9 September 1984.

263. See the Jewish Chronicle, 30 April 1943 for details of its formation. For its activities see the same paper, 9 July and 6 August 1943 and N.C.C.L.45/2.

264. Its merging into the N.C.C.L. is detailed in the Jewish Chronicle, 3 September 1943 and Civil Liberty no.8 (March 1944).

265. See chapter 4 p.335-6.

266. M-OA: FR A12 who gives details of her antisemitic family background and her attempt to come to terms with it.

267. See chapter 4 p.335 and chapter 5 p.414,420 for examples.

CONCLUSION

Three million Polish Jews were annihilated in the Second World War, representing 90% of the pre-war total. A similar percentage of Baltic, German and Austrian Jews perished. Elsewhere in German-occupied Europe the proportion varied immensely - from 50% of Rumania's 600,000 Jews to 22% of France's 350,000 Jews and 20% of Italy's 40,000 Jews. Of all the occupied territories only Denmark and Finland maintained their Jewish population intact, contributing nothing to the 5 - 6 million Jews who perished in Hitler's Final Solution.

In war-time Britain, over 1,200 Jewish servicemen and women and many other Jewish civilians lost their lives as a result of the conflict, but no Jew was killed by his fellow citizens. Violence was not absent in the British scene - fascists and organized antisemites were responsible for physical attacks on Jews and their property in the phoney war period, and later Jewish evacuees and even occasionally Jewish ex-servicemen were beaten up. There were disturbances in the shelters just before and at the start of the blitz, and even a minor battle between Jews and non-Jews in an East End cinema in 1944. Yet, taken together, such incidents pale into near total insignificance compared with the enormity of Nazi barbarism toward Jews. 'Physical' antisemitism in Britain during the Second World War, when set against the riots of the earlier conflict, appears meagre. Unlike even its great democratic ally, the United States, Britain was free from 1939 to 1945 of major anti-Jewish disturbances.
Nevertheless, in drawing a global picture of anti-Semitism in the Second World War, as has been pointed out by Michael Marrus and Robert Paxton, "one runs the risk of comparing the incomparable". It is tempting to suggest that those countries that managed to save the greatest percentage of their Jewish population did so because they were opposed to antisemitism, and that those who failed to do so supported Nazi treatment of Jews. The reality is more complex. It is true that the deep tradition of antisemitism amongst the Polish people helps to account for the pitifully small number of Jews who managed to survive the holocaust, and that Danish desire to preserve the forces of democracy led to the protection of its Jewish citizens against Nazi orders for deportation. Yet the destruction of three quarters of Dutch Jewry does not reflect the strength of native antisemitism in Holland (indeed there was much active resistance to Nazi persecution of Jews in the war) as much as the domination of this country by the Germans (added to the difficulty of hiding Jews as a result of geographical factors). Similarly, although France came well down in the league table of the proportion of Jews killed in Nazi-occupied Europe, it was a position that did not reflect the high level of antisemitism in both the Vichy governments and the country. What is being suggested is that although 'domestic' attitudes to Jews could be significant, the most important factor in deciding the fate of Europe's Jews was the degree of control that the Nazis exercised in each country. The Jews of the Channel Islands were deported without protest, although as one Jersey resident put it, he 'had certainly never heard a word of either disparagement or
detraction" against them. Had the same degree of Nazi control existed in mainland Britain, it is probable that a similar pattern would have developed. The fact that Britain had no death camps in the war, and indeed little violence towards its Jewish minority, does not mean that British antisemitism should be dismissed as unimportant. It is often assumed that British antisemitism has been trivial, "confined to music hall humour and a form of upper-class joking", in the words of one historian, and leaving "only a faint and delicate odour in the records" according to another. Aside from 'insignificant' 'golf-club' discrimination antisemitism is assumed to be foreign - as a 1930's magistrate stated: "very un-English and very unfair". In Britain, like America, the antisemitism which existed was just "one of the many freak details that made up the normal background of everyday life". Britain, like America, was "different". There could be no real antisemitism in Britain, wrote the New English Weekly in 1942 for "the thing is too preposterously contrary to British character". A closer comparison of British attitudes to Jews with that of Germany and France in the war shows the dangers of such assumptions.

It has been suggested that "the restrictions under which German Jews had lived in the 1920s were little different from those Jews faced in the United States and England". In all three countries Jews suffered from economic and social discrimination. It is a reminder that no country had a monopoly over antisemitism. Moreover, the eventual horrors committed against Jews did not seem even a remote possibility just a decade before Hitler came to power.
Indeed, in the 1920s France has been categorized as a tolerant society with a "relatively favourable climate for Jews".24 If Britain's treatment of Jews in the 1920s was comparable with that of France or Germany, how much had this changed by the Second World War?

The fundamental aspect separating Britain from, on the one hand, Nazi Germany and, on the other, the collaborationist French was the role of the State. The Nazis carried out extermination whilst the Vichy government, on its own initiative, set about Aryanizing France and creating atrocious concentration camps for Jewish refugees.25 The British government may have temporarily interned its Jewish refugees, shipping many to the dominions;26 it may have contributed to the dehumanizing process in failing to regard the rescue of Jews under Nazi control as a major priority;27 it may have been suspicious of Jews to the extent of refusing them entry into the higher echelons of the Foreign Office28 or demanding Aryan film makers for its Air Ministry;29 it may even have discriminated against Jews as Jews en masse in Palestine and forcibly turned away Jewish refugees from its waters in this area.30 None of these can be dismissed lightly, yet they are not in the same category as the Nazi government's Final Solution or even Vichy France's anti-emancipation enactments.

Where a direct comparison can be made with France and Germany is in the area of popular attitudes to Jews. In Germany "during the war a marked worsening of attitudes toward Jews became apparent".31 Domestic war tensions also had a negative impact on attitudes in France,32 but this was
also the case in many countries including America, South Africa and to an extent in Britain. Indeed it is striking how the accusations against Jews in France, particularly foreign Jews, mirrored those in Britain. In the former country Jews were assumed to control the black market, were criticised for not contributing to the war effort and also for ostentation in seaside resorts and country towns. Actual popular violence against Jews was confined to occasional window smashing, carried out by native French extremist groupings. No aspect of this could be regarded as alien to the British experience.

As regards popular support for state measures against the Jews, both the German and French people approved, or were not disturbed by, quotas or elimination of Jews from the economy and public life. Nevertheless, violent measures against Jews were actively supported by only a tiny proportion of the population. However, indifference due to a mixture of fear and possibly antipathy to Jews stopped any major action on behalf of either German or French Jewry. Deportations to the East went unopposed, though individual Jews were hidden by a minority (who may themselves have been antisemitic) - such actions came more from humanitarianism than philosemitism.

In Britain, a small but significant proportion advocated extermination as the solution to the Jewish problem. However, it is doubtful if all this section of the population would have maintained this view had the cruel reality of Jewish persecution been thrust upon them. There was some support for Nazi antisemitism, often described as "one of the few things in which I agree with Hitler", but
general revulsion at Nazi methods. Nevertheless, there was also widespread concern over the alleged power Jews had in Britain, and whilst few actively sought to curtail it, it must be suggested that any legislation to restrict it would not have been unpopular. Deportations, pogroms or death camps were seen as unacceptable solutions by the vast majority of the population, but it seems doubtful whether there would have been mass protests had the Nazis implemented such a policy on British soil. There was a strong tradition of philosemitism and anti-antisemitism in Britain, but the alien internment question in the summer of 1940 showed how easily such forces could fade away in a period of crisis. Had the Nazis been in control in Britain, philosemitic sentiment would have had even less chance of success. In addition, in such circumstances it is possible that domestic antipathy to Jews would have "helped divert awareness of the scale of Jewish suffering" as was the case in France and Germany. Jews who were prepared to use cyanide capsules in the event of a Nazi invasion of Britain were not necessarily suffering from paranoia.

However, antisemitism in Britain during the war was of more importance than the potential of a counterfactual history, for it had a real impact on the Jewish minority as well as society as a whole. The Nazis constantly warned the Allies that antisemitism would be their downfall. Therefore it is not surprising that the British government was genuinely concerned about domestic antisemitism. Nevertheless, it has been suggested that "by itself... anti-semitism...was not a significant index of low morale." Had there been widespread public belief in the suggestion
that Britain was fighting the Jews' War - i.e. a war on behalf of international Jewish finance - then it is possible that contributions to the war effort would have declined. As it was, the fear of support for this form of antisemitic propaganda ensured that Britain was denied a suitable (Jewish) Minister for Information in the shape of Leslie Hore-Belisha.47

Ironically it could be argued that the idea that Britain was fighting for the benefit of the Jews actually aided morale. This occurred because the public believed in a more watered down version of the Jews' War. It was thought that the Jews were gaining from the war through black marketeering, but not contributing to it due to their alleged army dodging.48 In both areas the Jews acted as scapegoats for real problems in the war - the shortage of food and other everyday goods and the immense strain of military and other forms of national service. Rather than being divisive, the release outlet of this grumbling form of antisemitism made the British as a whole more cohesive as a nation. However, where Jewish-Gentile co-operation was vital, as in the shelters and the civil defence services during the blitz, common human suffering overcame past latent hostilities in the majority of cases.49 Overall, therefore, antisemitism did not adversely affect morale in Britain. Attacks on Jews were rarely physical, and thus not a threat to public order. In addition, Jews were a safe outgroup, small in numbers and immensely loyal to the Allied effort.50 Scapegoating can cause dangerous discord in a war-time society, but in Britain, antisemitism perversely helped the population come to terms with the tensions of the war, without causing serious internal fragmentation.
There were, however, major losses to the British war effort due to direct or indirect antisemitism. Hore-Belisha was one example, but perhaps more significantly was the wastage caused by internment. This arose from both public and governmental xenophobia/antisemitism. Out of the 27,000 interned were many leading scientists, propagandists and industrialists whose skill and future goodwill was of immeasurable benefit to Britain. Although the war contribution of the refugees was phenomenal, its potential was even greater. Their various achievements occurred despite, rather than because of government encouragement. No balance sheet can be drawn up between the 'losses' and 'gains' of British antisemitism in the war, for again one is comparing the incomparable. There are other issues of importance which are even less quantifiable. Firstly, the war saw the continuation of organized fascism and antisemitism. The period was one of immense difficulty for these extremists, especially after the government's major measures against them in the summer of 1940. They also faced an increasingly hostile public which began to link their activities more and more to that of the enemy. Nevertheless, the influence of these organizations was not totally negligible. They had some success in linking the Jews to the war in the popular imagination, and they added to the general suspicion and fear of Jewish refugees and caused the government to appease antisemitic sentiment so as to stunt its potential. Furthermore, the survival of organized fascist antisemitism, along with a wide variety of antisemitic journals and literature in the war, indicates the tenacity of this tradition in Britain. Those within the tradition have had a self-
conscious desire to preserve it, especially in times of adversity, so that their message can revive in more favourable circumstances. The evidence from the war years would suggest that however strong the atmosphere is against extremist antisemitism, it will continue to survive, even if in a shadowy and feeble form, keeping alive anti-Jewish images and myths for future generations.

Secondly, the war witnessed the continuous use of negative Jewish stereotypes by the wider population. It is important to emphasise that there was a dynamic element in the public's perceptions of Jews - new images such as the black marketeer and the refugee came into existence, yet even these owed much to previous beliefs concerning Jews. The durability of Jewish stereotypes is impressive in the war years. Despite the apparent ease with which the destruction of European Jewry was carried out, fears of Jewish power remained. Both the extreme left and the right linked Jews to international finance although such a linkage was, by the 1940s, nearly half a century out of date. The Jewish refugee, both on paper and in person, was treated not necessarily as a victim, but as a threat to economic and national security. It is also vital to stress that the Jewish image in society did not exist in a vacuum - it could have a real impact on behaviour to Jews. There was no clear relationship between thought, speech or the written word and actual treatment of Jews within the individual, for ambivalence on Jewish matters was the norm. However, it is difficult to argue that personal prejudice against Jews was ever a purely private affair. Even if it manifested itself only in reading antisemitic novels,
or in telling anti-Jewish jokes, thought could affect behaviour.\textsuperscript{59} One cannot understand the internment panic of 1940 solely by the impact, for example, of literature where Jews appear as spies. Yet the latter was part of an antisemitic tradition and culture that allowed the scare (in a period of crisis) to develop.

The most immediate impact of antisemitism was on Anglo-Jewry itself, the effect on which will be examined shortly. Before then it is important to ask firstly why antisemitism existed in Britain during the war. Secondly, we will examine the solutions put forward by the British public to the Jewish question. Turning to the first point, the simplest explanation was that antisemitism had been exported to a country where it was naturally alien. There is some truth in Louis Golding's belief that antisemitism in Britain was "made in Germany".\textsuperscript{60} Nazi propaganda before the war and during it does seem to have increased Jew-consciousness in Britain, although not always negatively.\textsuperscript{61} The Mass-Observer who would have been unfavourable to Jews "had it not been for (the propaganda of) Hitler and Streicher" was not alone.\textsuperscript{62} The Nazis were also not the only 'foreign' influence on antisemitism in Britain during the war. Polish antisemitism is the most famous example of an ally spreading dislike of Jews on British soil,\textsuperscript{63} but the French,\textsuperscript{64} Dutch\textsuperscript{65} and even Americans\textsuperscript{66} were not free from such prejudice, although admittedly on a smaller scale.

Nevertheless, the internationalism of antisemitism in the war must not disguise the domestic roots of the British variety. Foreign influences have always been important on British antisemites - whether French in the case of Belloc,
or Russian with Arnold White, and German with Arnold Leese and, to a lesser extent, Oswald Mosley. Yet as the last-named told his 18B interviewers in July 1940, there was also a "long anti-Semitic tradition in Britain". It was this, rather than an exotic import that is the more significant factor in explaining the presence of antisemitism in Britain during the Second World War. To understand the degree of hostility to Jews, however, one must examine the social and economic problems of British society in the conflict.

It has been the argument throughout this thesis that it is tensions within British society that explain manifestations of antisemitism. Strains of the phoney war, strains due to the threat of invasion, strains due to the hardships of rationing, strains of mass evacuation, strains of war weariness, all needed an outlet and the Jews were often a suitable scapegoat. This suitability was due to several interconnecting reasons. Firstly, Jews had been a scapegoat so often in the past that their selection as modern victims had become an almost automatic reflex. Secondly, the Jewish image, so firmly rooted in British consciousness, was both highly flexible and diverse, and thus capable of adaption to new needs. Thirdly, in some cases there was a degree of Jewish involvement to give sweeping accusations plausibility. Had there been no Jews participating in the black market, it would have been difficult for the press and others to give the impression, widely believed by the public, that Jews controlled this activity. However, the Jewish involvement was distorted to give this picture, even at times to the extent of inventing the Jewish offender.
The tensions of the war led to the black marketeer becoming a scapegoat character. The character needed to be unBritish, disloyal, powerful and obsessed with money - the past Jewish image fitted smoothly into this role. Jewish involvement in the black market helped to confirm rather than create this powerful war stereotype. 69

In other instances, as with the Bethnal Green Tube disaster in 1943, domestic tensions and the prevailing Jewish image were enough on their own to create the antisemitic rumours. Here the Jewish involvement was irrelevant, for the 'Jewish panic' slanders that spread across Britain were part of an automatic antisemitic reflex, lacking any connection with the real event. 70 To summarize, the activities of Jews did not affect the overall levels of antisemitism in Britain during the war. This does not mean that the Jewish role should be neglected, for it is often vital in the process of exaggeration and distortion that is the basis of hostility to Jews.

Can antisemitism be put down to a general British xenophobia which is always likely to be intensified by war? The answer is complex. This study has shown that although the Jewish community in Britain had become acculturated by 1939, the vast majority of the population still regarded Jews as foreign. 71 The arrival of Jewish refugees from the continent in the 1930s, and to a lesser extent in the war, strengthened the 'unBritish' image of Anglo-Jewry. In theory a general rise in the level of xenophobia in the war could have also increased antisemitism. This certainly can be seen in the invasion panic of 1940 where the general suspicion against all foreigners led to a rise in hostility
to Jews, and in Lord Wedgwood's words "put a cachet of respectability on antisemitism". However, even in this period of crisis, hostility to foreigners also took a specific form. Only with the entry of Italy into the war on 11 June 1940 did anti-Italian feeling surface prominently, having an immediate and quite violent effect. A general increase in xenophobia may have adversely affected the Jewish minority in Britain. Nevertheless, when xenophobia was specific against other groups it was also possible that it could have deflected hostility to Jews.

There were over 100,000 refugees in Britain during the war. In addition there was the enormous Irish-born population and American, Polish and other foreign troops on British soil. This had an ambivalent impact on the Jewish community. On the one hand, so strong was the identification of Jew with 'alien' in Britain that the alleged misconduct of any continental refugee or foreigner could be interpreted in an antisemitic light. On the other, the emergence of new out-groups, such as the Americans in the second half of the war, did at times divert attention away from Anglo-Jewry. The stereotype of the American was in some ways similar to the stereotype of the Jew, especially with regard to alleged money-mindedness and ostentation. Although the comparative wealth of the American soldiers brought with it some popularity, it also created jealousy and resentment. It is significant that the Jew-black marketeer linkage was weakened by the Christmas of 1943, with U.S. troops becoming the new scapegoats for scarce goods. Jews themselves could take part in this substitute scapegoating activity - for example, joining up with other white
East Enders against Lascars in the shelters during the blitz. Nevertheless, more than one ethnic conflict could exist at one time. In Liverpool and Glasgow Catholic-Protestant tensions did not preclude quite powerful antisemitism, although in Northern Ireland the Jewish community was so small and lacking in prominence that it enjoyed a quiet existence, in this bitterly divided country.

A third factor in the equation of the impact of foreigners in Britain on domestic antisemitism is that their very presence challenged xenophobia. As a senior Home Office official wrote in November 1944 "the traditional insular attitude of the British public towards foreigners has been substantially broken down during the war. British subjects have found foreigners working beside themselves in munition factories, civil defence, and other wartime occupations, have accepted them in Trade Unions and got used to their presence". The war opened up many opportunities previously denied to Irish immigrants, who were now accepted into many parts of the economy outside the traditional building or labouring occupations. On a much smaller scale, skilled West Indian workers, despite initial hostility, found positions as engineers in the north-west of England. However, one can overstate the degree of integration that took place. Fear of foreign job competition remained and the West Indian workers in particular soon found themselves displaced after the war.

Neither did stereotyped thinking about foreigners disappear with closer contact. Those who had worked or lived with West Indians now knew that the black man did not
possess a tail (a widespread belief that parallels that of Jews and horns in the evacuation areas), but other fears, such as the sexual superiority of blacks persisted. Other deeply ingrained prejudices linking the Irish with drunkenness, Italians with cowardice, would remain despite the closer contacts of the war. In short, there is no clear linkage between xenophobia in the war and antisemitism. A general rise in xenophobia could adversely affect the Jewish community, and conversely a decline in distrust of foreigners could benefit it. It is important, however, to stress that there were also individual traditions of hostilities to various national, religious and racial groups in Britain. The existence of a cultural tradition of antisemitism ensured that hostility to Jews was not dependent on xenophobia alone.

Before turning to the overall impact of the war on Anglo-Jewry, it is necessary to examine how Gentiles envisaged the future of Jews in Britain. At the end of 1944 the Jewish Chronicle bemoaned the lack of prestige the term 'British Jew' possessed. The goal should be to be British and Jewish, avoiding total assimilation. The Chronicle's concern was justified for those non-Jews who accepted that one could be both were rare; in fact, they were confined to cultural or religious philosemites. Although the British government respected the religious requirements of the Jewish community, the population as a whole appears to have regarded Judiasm as at best an anachronism, at worst barbaric. Judaism was perceived as an excuse for exclusivity, which in turn was responsible for antisemitism. What was needed, according to a Mass-
Observation survey, was for Jewish behaviour to "correspond more to the life and manners of Gentiles". This then was the liberal compromise. A small section of the population rejected this solution, believing that the only solution was to remove Jews to a country of their own, or (very rarely) to remove Jews altogether.

In theory therefore, most Britons wanted Jews to assimilate into the wider society. Did this take place in the war, and what pressures were there on the Anglo-Jewish minority? As with the Irish, the demands of the war economy opened up many opportunities for Jews. In addition, evacuation, the blitz, military and civil defence duties threw Jew and Gentile into close proximity. Although the classic immigrant trades such as tailoring and furniture making would still be significant for the Jewish community well after the end of the war, they would no longer dominate Anglo-Jewish economic history. The original settlement areas such as the East End, Cheetham and the Gorbals would also lose centre stage, the war accelerating their decline as Jewish districts.

Superficially, it would appear that during the war Jews were allowed to enter all aspects of British society, both social and economic. In return, the Jewish community willingly accepted the new opportunities offered to it. However, a closer analysis reveals a more contradictory situation. Many Jews did wish to move closer to Gentile society in that they were looking for non-traditional forms of employment, or housing in non-Jewish areas and leisure outside Jewish circles. Many met blatant discrimination but, more often, there was subtle exclusion. Job
discrimination against Jews reached a peak in the last years of the war and those immediately after it. On its own this discrimination was not enough to stop Jews moving freely in British society, but this hostility confirmed the insecurity of Anglo-Jewry, which was not without foundation. It has been suggested that "if it were possible to analyse the collective psyche of the Anglo-Jewish community, one deep-rooted hypochondria would be exposed: the fear of antisemitism". Yet it must be doubted whether this malaise can be called hypochondria, for the fear of rejection from Gentile society has been based on real experiences. It is this that gives the real bite to 'golf-club' antisemitism - not that it in itself inflicted great hardships, but that it highlighted the fact that Jews were outsiders in British society. In and after the war, Anglo-Jewry responded by moving away from traditional trades and settlement areas, but went on to new Jewish districts and attempted to achieve economic independence, so that potential hostility could be avoided. The strength of British antisemitism in the war was not in its violence against the Jewish community, but that it caught Jews within a vice, demanding that Jews assimilate yet denying them free access to Gentile preserves.

The war did bring changes in the nature of British antisemitism. When Charles Solomon declared in June 1942 that "anti-semitism is no longer respectable" he was not totally mistaken. Extremist antisemitic and fascist groups were handicapped in the war by the public connecting them with the Nazis. Mosley's post-1945 attempts at a comeback were certainly hindered by such linkages. The man who could well have been Prime Minister became a pathetic figure,
espousing anti-black racism to ever decreasing audiences. Attitudes to Nazi Germany have also caused problems within the radical right since 1945, leading to a series of splinters and unstable coalitions, of which the National Front was the most prominent. However, the relative success of the National Front in the late 1960s and early 1970s, despite the neo-Nazi careers of some of its leaders, is a warning against relying on the sheer unrespectability of such groups. It is difficult to assess the total impact of the National Front, but apart from causing distress amongst new immigrant communities, it must be argued that the threat of its continued success encouraged rigid immigration control to be imposed in Britain during the 1970s. The comparative ease with which some National Front supporters have moved into the Conservative Party recently also casts doubt on whether such extremists can be regarded as permanently outside the pale of mainstream British politics.

One self-conscious attempt to sanitise neo-fascism is the expanding holocaust denial industry. As this study has shown, it had its roots in the war itself with such protagonists as Douglas Reed and Alexander Ratcliffe, as well as the social credit movement, assorted pacifists, the Catholic Herald, and Truth. Now international, leading members of the National Front and the British Movement have made contributions to the growing 'denial of the Six Million'. Its impact, certainly in Britain, cannot be said to be great at present; the danger lies in the future, as memories fade and it becomes easier to whitewash both antisemitism and National Socialism. The growing rehabilitation of the rep-


utation of Oswald Mosley can be seen as another, if less important, manifestation of the radical right's attempt to gain historical respectability in Britain.105

In the world of non-organized British antisemitism the impact of the holocaust has been less dramatic. The news of the destruction of European Jewry did cause many to reconsider their views towards Jews, but attitudes change slowly and horror at Jewish persecution abroad often did not preclude antipathy to Jews at home.106 Despite the attempts of Jewish and anti-fascist organizations to link all forms of antisemitism with Nazism, ambivalence on Jewish matters remained the norm in the war.107 Nor should it be assumed that antisemitism was unacceptable in public forms. Douglas Reed, despite his growing paranoia about Jewish power, remained an eminently publishable social commentator for Jonathan Cape.108 Starting from the extreme, John Hooper Harvey proved that even medieval myths about Jews could be presented respectably.109 Dislike of Jews was no barrier to the successful political careers of men such as Lord Winterton, Lord Moyne and even Anthony Eden - all of whom had to deal with Jewish matters in their government capacity.110

The impact of the revelations of the Nazi concentration and death camps and the Nuremberg trials in 1945 and 1946 on attitudes to Jews can be divided into the short and long term. John Rae has written that "when the war ended and the secrets of Belsen and Auschwitz were exposed, the Jews enjoyed a brief popularity".111 His impression of the brevity of this philosemitism is confirmed by Mass-Observation, who could claim as early as 1947 that "people are no longer
moved by the thought of Jewish suffering in concentration camps.\textsuperscript{112} The anti-Jewish riots in Britain in August of that year—following the hanging of two British sergeants by Zionist extremists in Palestine—would indicate that the initial reaction had indeed been short-lived. The riots occurred in nearly every large British city, and although attacks on persons were rare, the numbers involved in the disturbances alarmed the Jewish community, and damage to property was substantial.\textsuperscript{113}

David Leitch has claimed that Jewish terrorism in Palestine in 1946 and 1947 "neutralised much of the sympathy in Britain for the plight of European Jewry."\textsuperscript{114} This was certainly true in the short-term, but it is difficult to assess the long-term effects of the holocaust on non-Jewish attitudes in Britain. The Churches in particular have shown tremendous sympathy to Jews since the war, the Council of Christians and Jews no longer being ahead of its time in seeking positive relations between the two religions. While the holocaust factor may have put certain restraints on public antisemitism in the last few decades,\textsuperscript{115} it has not stopped the occasional manifestation of social prejudice, such as that encountered by Arnold Weinstock during the 1960s in the City of London.\textsuperscript{116} Attacks on prominent Jewish politicians as Jews in the 1980s have prompted one Jewish commentator to suggest that "such...antisemitic comments...would scarcely have been thinkable a few years ago".\textsuperscript{117} Whilst there is a danger in overestimating the strength of British antisemitism in the 1980s,\textsuperscript{118} the anti-pathy revealed in such cases as the resignation of Leon Brittan serve as a warning of the continuation of prejudice
against Jews, and also on the changing acceptability of racism in British society. 119

The 1947 riots, born out of a mixture of foreign events, despair at post-war austerity, Bank Holiday exuberance and latent antipathy to Jews, were the last mass antisemitic demonstrations in Britain. They were not, however, the last acts of violence against Jews in Britain. The 1960s witnessed fascist attacks on Jewish property, resulting in the death of a Yeshiva boy, 120 and such incidents have continued in the 1980s. 121 Although not on the same scale as violence against the black community, these antisemitic attacks indicate that the presence of West Indians and Asians in Britain has not totally deflected attention away from the Jewish minority. Radical right-wing groups have maintained and indeed appear to be increasing their antisemitism. 122 The presence of other more easily identifiable ethnic minorities since 1945 in Britain has meant that Jews are no longer so readily seen as news. 123 However, it must be argued that the generally high level of racism present in the depressed Britain since the 1970s is also affecting the Anglo-Jewish population. Ritual slaughter is just one issue in which Jews are under attack along with coloured minorities. 124

When the Jewish shadow Home Secretary, Gerald Kaufman, launched an attack on the granting of British citizenship to the South African athlete, Zola Budd, the Sunday Express replied that she at least "had a British grandfather, which was more than could be said for Mr. Kaufman". 125 Here was an example from the 1980s of how impermeable the Jewish stereotype - in this case as an alien - can be. How
much then did the close contact between Jew and non-Jew in the Second World War change the perceptions of Jews in Britain?

It has been suggested that whether as evacuees or as members of the Forces, good relations with individual Jews did not necessarily change attitudes to Jews as a whole. Gross misunderstandings such as that Jews had horns were largely removed from British society in the war - it was rare for even the remotest of villages to have had no Jewish contacts at some point in the conflict. Yet post-war studies on attitudes to Jews show that less exotic beliefs about Jews persisted, such as their alleged avarice, clannishness, flashiness and cowardice. On the positive side, Jews were still seen as artistic and intelligent, although the latter category was also seen as a negative attribute. The Jewish black marketeer, the most powerful war stereotype concerning Jews, certainly survived after 1945, being continued in the slightly less negative guise of the 'spiv'. The Lynskey tribunal in 1948 involving Sidney Stanley, the 'super spiv', created a fair amount of antisemitism, and the notorious 1947 editorial in the Morecambe and Heysham Visitor referred to "British Jews, who have proved to be the worst black market offenders". The Jewish stereotype thus proved to be particularly obdurate, and while many Jews and non-Jews formed good relations in the war, close contact at best only started a process in which deeply ingrained attitudes were re-examined.

In conclusion, what separated Britain from Germany in the 1930s and 1940s in their treatment of Jews was not so
much the failure of British antisemitism but the continuation of British liberal democracy. Yet paradoxically it was only the internal weaknesses of liberal democracy that allowed both antisemitism and Anglo-Jewry to survive. In the world in which Jews were emancipated, a separate Jewish community should have disappeared. At the same time, antisemitism should also have ceased. The British government in the Second World War found itself unable to remove antisemitism and thus it set about appeasing those who were hostile to Jews. Indeed, the fear of domestic antisemitism was largely responsible for the government's feeble response to the desperate plight of European Jewry. The government considered that an influx of foreign Jews, however small, would lead to serious problems, an analysis prompted by the belief that it was the Jews themselves who created antisemitism. This was, after all, the argument of the emancipation contract. The genuine fear of antisemitism in British society was used to put pressure on the Jewish community to conform - in other words, toleration had its price. Yet at the same time Anglo-Jewry was also under pressure from those who would not accept them moving closer into society. Thus on the one hand, Britain had avoided the excesses of Nazi antisemitism, on the other, it had failed to produce an environment for the healthy existence of a positive Anglo-Jewish identity.

This study has argued that Britain has had an antisemitic tradition, or to be more accurate, traditions, which continued to operate in the Second World War and made a real impact on the treatment of Jews at home and abroad. This does not mean, however, that the supposed decency, humanit-
arianism or liberalism of the British with regard to Jews or other ethnic minorities should be rejected as insignificant. The actual belief that Britain was all of these things did affect reality. At the start of the war Britain's liberal treatment of refugees was a self-conscious policy to show the world how decent British society was, especially compared to those countries who had forced out these unfortunate people. Nevertheless, the invasion panic just over half a year later shows the dangers of relying on such decent humanitarianism. Even so, there is a contrast between the treatment of internees in Britain itself, and those shipped abroad. The latter suffered serious indignities and abuse, it could be argued, because they were no longer under the relative protection of liberal opinion at home. In Palestine, events such as the turning away of refugees to almost certain death in Nazi Europe were possible. However, it is doubtful whether this would have been allowed to happen in Britain, because of government respect of humanitarian feeling. The belief in Britain that racism does not exist can thus, at times, circumscribe such antipathy. Nevertheless, there are also great dangers in assuming that racism does not exist. Vigilance is vital with regard to racism or antisemitism in Britain; such caution cannot occur if there is no recognition of the continued existence of hostility to racial and ethnic minorities.

In 1955 the distinguished Jewish sociologist, Maurice Freedman, called for more research into the Jewish minority in Britain. Such work would be significant for the Jewish community, but more importantly for Freedman was "the
light which a study of Jews in Britain throws on the working of British society". It has been the aim of this study to follow this advice – to study the Anglo-Jewish minority and in so doing to reveal much about the nature of British society.

In recent years progress has been made in the study of Anglo-Jewish history. Researchers have seen the need to put the Jewish experience in the wider context of British social, economic and political history. There has been a reaction to treating "Anglo-Jewish history...in a vacuum", against the ghettoization of Jewish history. There is, however, a need for more such research for large areas of Anglo-Jewish history remain to be explored. We need studies of the Jewish image in the popular consciousness in the period of mass immigration – often called for but rarely carried out. Likewise there is a need for more work on the important contribution of Jews to the British economy. The 1920s and the post-1945 world remain virgin areas for students of Anglo-Jewry, yet both are vital if we are to understand the Anglicization of the Jewish community. Relations between other minorities and Jews is another important neglected area, increasingly so as Britain attempts to become a multi-cultural society. There is a need not just for studies of Jews, but of all immigrant and minority groups in British society if we are to understand its real complexity. There is, it must be remembered, a potential danger in such research. "The discipline of history," in the words of Philip Curtin, "has become too specialized and parochial." If, however, the historian of these immigrant and minority groups is not
only an expert in the group itself, but in the wider society and its reactions to the group, the pitfalls of over-specialization can be avoided. Specialist historians need to examine all kinds of responses, from popular to governmental. It is necessary to analyse sources from the Commons to comics so that a total synthetic picture can be drawn up. Nevertheless, as Curtin has pointed out, "we have specialists in black history (and one might add Jewish and other ethnic/immigrant/minority history), women's history, and historical demography, but people outside these specialities pay little attention to their work". The study of Anglo-Jewish history, including that of antisemitism, has come of age; it is vital to incorporate what has been revealed into the mainstream of British history.
FOOTNOTES TO CONCLUSION

1. The figures in this paragraph are taken from Lucy Dawidowicz, The War Against The Jews, 1933 - 45 Harmondsworth, Middlesex, 1983), 479-

2. Israel Cohen, Contemporary Jewry (London, 1950), 221-3 has figures of Anglo-Jewish military losses in the war. No figures exist for civilian deaths, but as Jews were still prominent in areas such as the East End which were heavily blitzed, it must be assumed that these would have been higher on average than the British population as a whole. See the Jewish Chronicle, 20 September 1940 for this point.

3. See chapter 2 passim.

4. See chapter 3 p.267.

5. The Jewish Echo, 6 October 1944 refers to Jewish ex-servicemen being physically attacked in Glasgow.

6. See chapter 3 p.238.


8. In 1943 and 1944 there were anti-Jewish riots in both Boston and New York. See Time vol.43 (10 June 1943), 76-8 for a 'low-key' account of this violence.


14. The Jews of the Channel Islands were deported by the Nazis without any protest. See Angus Calder, The People's War (London, 1969), 412 and R.C.F. Maugham, Jersey under the Jackboot (London, 1946), 38 for an Islander's account of the deportations.

15. Norman Longmate, If Britain Had Fallen (London, 1972), 201 concludes that it would have been "doubtful" if there would have been protests when German edicts against Jews were enforced. See also K. Brownlow, How it Happened Here (London, 1968), 14-15, 138-9, 167-8 and 178-181.


18. Philip Howard in an article in The Times, 19 October 1984. 'Thanks Moses, you were a real Brit', confines British antisemitism to exclusion from clubs such as 'The Honourable Company of Edinburgh Golfers' and concludes that there were "worse forms of discrimination than not being allowed to play ball with the pom-pous nosbs of Edinburgh".

19. Quoted by the Jewish Chronicle, 7 February 1936. It was a view also shared by Jewish commentators. Louis Golding wrote in 1938 that "it has been said more than once (but is none the less true for that) that antisemitism is un-English" - in The Jewish Problem (Harmondsworth, Middlesex, 1938), 148. At the same time Ronald Kidd, secretary of the N.C.C.L., warned the Jewish community of the danger of assuming that the British character was against antisemitism - see the Jewish Chronicle, 10 March 1939.


22. In a review of Insanity - abounding - vol.21 no.10 (25 June 1942).


25. ibid., 58-71, 121-176.


27. See chapter 6 p.506.

11 July 1930 where Nicolson discusses "the awkward question of the Jews" in regard to the Foreign Office. The comments of Bruce Lockhard, 1 August 1945, on the proposal to send Harold Laski to be Ambassador to Washington: "You could not send a Jew to Washington. In any case no-one would ever know what to believe in his reports" indicates that this discrimination continued to at least 1945. See Kenneth Young (ed.), The Diaries of Sir Robert Bruce Lockhard 1939 - 1965 (London, 1980), 477.

29. This fact is revealed by Muriel Box, Odd Woman Out (London, 1974), 155-6 whose husband's film company was vetted by the Security Services as "they won't do business with Jews".

30. Lewis Namier wrote to W.P. Crozier, 28 February 1940 suggesting that "the principles of the Nuremberg legislation has now been introduced into Palestine by H.M.G., there is to be discrimination against the Jews in the matter of land purchase on grounds of race and religion". In the Manchester Guardian archive B/N8A/5.


32. M. Marrus and R. Paxton, op.cit., 174:


36. ibid., 174.


40. One wonders if the author of a letter to the N.C.C.L., who claimed that he/she would like to shoot Jews "till my arm fell off from doing so", would really have enjoyed such an action. Letter in N.C.C.L. 311/1 from
H. Marshall to E. Allen, 16 July 1943. M - OA D 5296, a pathological antisemite who had advocated extermination wrote in her diary after the revelations of the concentration camps that the S.S. "ought to be systematically shot" - M - OA: D 5296, 19 April 1945. J. A. Cole, Lord Haw-Haw and William Joyce (London, 1964), 197-8 claims that even Joyce was upset in seeing the reality of Jewish persecution in Germany.

41. The quote is from M - OA: DR 1145 October 1940. For similar sentiments see M - OA: DR 2265, 2829. E. Allen, It Shall Not Happen Here (London, 1943), and a letter from a youth leader to the Board of Deputies, 20 June 1944 in B of D C15/3/19 indicate that this was not an uncommon reaction.

42. M - OA: FR 1993, carried out in January 1944, reveals that up to 10% of the sample felt that Jews were trying to get ahead of "people like you" but only 2% wanted Jews to be circumscribed by law.

43. See chapter 6 p. 478.


45. For examples of this see R. J. Burnett, These My Brethren: The Story of the London East End Mission (London, 1946), 33-4. Kingsley Martin carried such a capsule according to his biographer "because (he seems to have thought) he looked like a Jew". In C. H. Rolph, Kingsley: The Life, Letters and Diaries of Kingsley Martin (London, 1973), 242.


47. See the introduction, p. 4-7.

48. See chapter 5 p. 400-6.

49. See chapter 3 p. 238-9.

50. A fact that the government exploited in its handling of Palestine and its policy to rescuing European Jewry. There is no evidence that Anglo-Jewry weakened in its support of the war due to antisemitism at home.

51. See chapter 6 p. 488-9. The benefits that the refugees brought to Britain and the waste of internment is only now beginning to be fully realized. See Norman Lebrecht 'Unforeseen Legacy of an Exodus' Sunday Times, 23 September 1984 for the former point.

52. See chapter 2 p. 141.

53. See chapter 6 p. 466-9.

54. For example the National Front's 'intellectual' organ-
New Nation - contains a series on 'Great British Racialists'. See the Autumn 1982 issue for a portrait of H.H. Beamish.

55. See chapter 5 p. 393, 400.
56. See chapter 4 p. 316-7.
57. See chapter 5 p.396-9.
58. As does Stephen Wilson, Ideology and Experience (East Brunswick, New Jersey, 1982), XV.
59. Claude Cockburn, Bestseller (London, 1972) 10-11 argues that even reading antisemitism is giving it tacit support. For a discussion of the impact of jokes, see chapter 5 p.
60. Golding, op.cit., 148.
61. J.J. McCall in the Glasgow Daily Record, 28 May 1943 argued that radio propaganda had increased antisemitism in Britain as did Time and Tide vol. 22 no. 48 (29 November 1941). Two Mass-Observers were of that impression in their local experiences - see M - OA: DR 2708 and 2977, March 1943.
62. Quoted by M - OA: TC Antisemitism File G. An audience research report on William Joyce carried out in late 1939/early 1940 found mixed reactions. More people who listened to Joyce felt Jews would gain from the war - 21% compared to 17%, whereas Hore-Belisha was more popular with Hamburg listeners than those who never listened. In B.B.C. W.A.C. R9/13/5/1.
63. See chapter 5 p.408 and chapter 6 p.470-2.
64. Pierre Tissier was a Gaullist in London during the war. His book The Government of Vichy (London, 1942), 153-6 supported a degree of exclusion of Jews from French society. M. Marrus and R. Paxton, op.cit., 189-90 include other examples of French antisemitism during the war in Britain.
65. J. Presser, op.cit., 327 states that "nor was antisemitism entirely unknown among those who escaped to join the Dutch forces in England", although he gives no examples.
66. Elizabeth Allen, op.cit., 20 has an example of American troops spreading rumours and George Orwell in Tribune, 8 December 1944 comments on an antisemitic American leaflet 'The First American...' circulating in Britain.
67. In his interview of 22 July 1940 in HO 283/16/25.
68. As did the Catholic Herald, 18 July 1941.
69. See chapter 5 p.404.
70. ibid., p.407-8.

71. See chapter 4 p.310 and 5 p.391.

72. In Hansard HL vol.124 col.344, 10 September 1942.

73. INF 1/264 no.21 (11 June 1940) although no.19 (8 June 1940) did report "growing anti-Italian feeling. Italian shopkeepers in Glasgow may fare badly if Italy comes into war". The outcome of this prophetic analysis is dealt with in chapter 4 p.342. The reaction against Italian internment especially after the sinking of the Arandora Star is dealt with by INF 1/264 no.66 (3 August 1940) and D. Sheridan (ed.), Among You Taking Notes: The Wartime Diary of Naomi Mitchison (London, 1985), 109 entry for 22 January 1941. See also P. Leoni, I Shall Die on the Carpet (London, 1966), 173 for the favourable treatment of an Italian in a South Wales town after internment.

74. A point made by James Parkes in a memo to Sidney Salomon, August 1943 in B of D C15/3/19. For an example of this see the letter of Captain James M.P. to The Times, 10 April 1943. James believed there were 200,000 Jewish refugees who had come to Britain since 1933. In fact this was a figure for all refugees.

75. Thus M - OA: FR 823B carried out in October 1940 found that Jews and Americans were almost equally regarded as mercenary, together accounting for 80% of all comments in the category.

76. INF 1/292 no.168 (14 - 21 December 1943) reported that U.S. troops were believed to be buying up goods in short supply and generally encouraging the black market. At this point Naomi Mitchison wrote that "one begins to feel no need to bother about antisemitism, as the Americans have completely taken the place of the Jews - stories about rape etc." - diary entry for 19 - 24 November 1943. See Sheridan, op.cit., 260.

77. Reported by Tom Harrisson in the New Statesman vol.20 (28 September 1940). Basil Henriques reported the reverse - coloured shelterers gaining acceptance through antisemitism. See the Bulletin of the Society of Jews and Christians vol.2 no.3 (November 1941).

78. For Liverpool see the Economic League report of February 1941 in B of D C6/10/16, and INF 1/292 no.36 (3 - 10 June 1941). For Glasgow see the reports to the J.D.C. in B of D C6/4/2/6 and the report of the City of Glasgow police in NO 45/25398/286-7.

79. For Belfast see the Jewish Chronicle, 16 July 1943 and INF 1/293 special report on antisemitism, 15 January 1942, where it was suggested that "in Northern Ireland alone, there is said to be 'no Jewish problem'; out of a total population of a million and three quarters, there are only fourteen hundred Jews; 'So long as
Protestants and Roman Catholics are so deeply concerned with their own quarrels and antipathies antisemitism is unlikely to thrive".


82. Anthony Richmond, Colour Prejudice in Britain: A Study of West Indian Workers in Liverpool, 1941 - 1951 (London, 1954), 35 deals with this initial reluctance to employ these West Indians, recruited by the Ministry of Labour.

83. ibid., 50, and Graham Smith, 'Jim Crow on the Home Front (1942 - 45)', New Community vol.8 (Winter 1980), 326-7 points out how the new war opportunities were short-lived for these West Indians.

84. Richmond, op.cit., 59 reports that at least one West Indian was asked where he kept his tail.

85. Richmond, op.cit., 70-8 refers to this strong stereotype.

86. For the Irish-drunkenness link see Jackson, op.cit., 157. For Italians see M - OA: FR 523B where Italians receive 75% of the comments on cowardice.

87. Editorial in the Jewish Chronicle, 22 December 1944.

88. Chapter 4 p.327 and 5 p.391 deals with this small minority.

89. See chapter 4 p.327-8 and chapter 6 p.462-5 for the government response.

90. M - OA: FR 1669L April 1943 'Means of overcoming antisemitism'.

91. See this chapter note 39 for those who advocated extermination. See the Jewish Chronicle, 17 October 1941 and M - OA: D5076, 22 March 1943 for examples of support of an African Jewish settlement - the solution of the Britons, the I.P.L. and Social Credit movements. Mosley's deportation plan for Jews is examined in chapter 2 p.174.

92. See chapter 4 p.334 for a discussion of this.


94. See chapter 4 p.333.

96. See chapter 4 p.333-4.

97. A point made by Maurice Freedman in his own A Minority in Britain (London, 1955), 209, 219n, 220 and 239. Richmond, op.cit., 99 points out that great strain was often reported by West Indians in the war because they were uncertain whether they were going to be accepted or rejected by the white population - a factor operating in a more subtle manner with the Jewish community, but none the less, importantly.

98. 'Hitler killed Anti-Semitism in Britain' in the Jewish Bulletin no.10 (June 1942).


100. Martin Walker, The National Front (Glasgow, 1977), passim., deals with the splits that occurred in the League of Empire Loyalists in the 1950s leading on to the (second) British National Party and Jordan's National Socialists in the 1960s. The National Front was an amalgam of outright neo-nazi groups, populist anti-immigration societies and A.K. Chesterton's League of Empire Loyalists, which maintained its conspiratorial antisemitism, but aimed at respectability.


102. The Guardian, 10 October 1983 deals with the entryism of racists and fascists into the Conservative Party. Denis Pirie, a neo-nazi in the early 1960s, and still connected to Martin Webster in 1985, was allowed to keep his prominent position in the Department of Trade and Industry, despite disclosures about his background. See the Jewish Chronicle, 19 April 1985, 10 and 17 May 1985. The Pirie case is another example of how anti-semitic extremists can operate through all levels in British society.


has also denied the Holocaust in *Nationalism Today*, June 1985. See the *Jewish Chronicle*, 14 June 1985 for details.

105. Mosley started the trend himself with *My Life* (London, 1968) - his autobiography. Robert Skidelsky's *Oswald Mosley* (London, 1975) added much more weight to the Mosley reappraisal business. Since then Mosley's wife, Diana Mosley's autobiographies have contributed to this trend - *A Life of Contrasts* (London, 1977) and *Loved Ones* (London, 1985), as has her son, Jonathon Guinness, in his *The Mitfords* (London, 1984). Mosley's secretary, Jeffrey Hamm, has added to this collection maintaining that the B.U.F's activities were all good fun in his *Action Replay* (London, 1983).

106. See chapter 4 p. 335.

107. See chapter 7 p. 575-7 for the attempt to link all forms of antisemitism.

108. See chapter 4 p. 338.

109. See chapter 2 p. 179.

110. See chapter 4 p. 340.

111. John Rae, *The Custard Boys* (Bath, 1975), 55. In a letter to the author, 17 March 1986 Mr. Rae states that when he was at school at the time of the camp disclosures "the very few Jewish children there acquired a sort of temporary popularity".

112. W - OA: FR 2515 'Attitude to Palestine and the Jews', September 1947 - see the concluding remarks.

113. For the riots see the *Jewish Chronicle* 8 and 15 August 1947, and the *Manchester Evening News*, 4 – 7 August 1947.


115. Richard Adams, the author, is comparatively rare in modern Britain in that he has admitted having "regrettably little love to spare for Jews". See *The Mail on Sunday Magazine*, 22 August 1985.


118. A point made by Tony Lerman in the same edition of *The Jewish Quarterly*, 1-2.
119. For indications of antisemitism behind the forced resignation of Brittan see Alan Watkins in *The Observer*, 26 January 1986 and Max Hastings in *The Sunday Times*, 26 January 1986. For subsequent antisemitism, particularly from the Conservative M.P., John Stokes, see the *Jewish Chronicle*, 31 January 1986. Brittan's own surprise over the antisemitism, reported by his wife in the *Jewish Chronicle* loc. cit. indicates the dangers of assuming that none exists in British society.

120. See the *Jewish Aid Committee of Britain, With A Strong Hand* (London, 1966), 10-15 for an account of the 1960's violence, and an attack of the established Jewish organization's lack of response to it.

121. For an analysis of recent violence see the *Jewish Chronicle*, 12 July 1985 for a report from the Centre for Contemporary Studies, which indicates that attacks in July 1984 - June 1985 rose sharply to 225 incidents.

122. Thus recent National Front publications in 1985 and 1986 have concentrated their attacks on Jews more than on blacks or Asians. See the *Jewish Chronicle*, 11 April 1986.

123. Thus Julius Gould could point out that the heated debate about Rachman and 'rachmanism' in the late 1950s and early 1960s "at no time came to centre on his Jewish origins. Indeed, for some time, the Press referred to him not as a Jew but as a Pole". In J. Gould and S. Esh (eds.), *Jewish Life in Modern Britain* (London, 1964), 200. In response, part of the Anglo-Polish press referred to him as a Jew and not a Pole - a reminder that Polish antisemitism continued after the war. See Shirley Green, *Rachman* (London, 1979), 7.

124. Jewish education, like Muslim education in Bradford, has come under attack for its alleged lack of secular content. See the *Jewish Telegraph*, 22 November 1985. Attacks on circumcision could be another issue of common concern for Jews and Muslims in Britain.

125. Quoted by Rosenberg, *op. cit.*, 23-4. Similar comments came with the Brittan resignation, a London newspaper calling Brittan "a first generation Englishman" and John Stokes M.P. demanding his replacement by "a red-blooded Englishman". See the *Jewish Chronicle*, 31 January 1986.

126. For the evacuation experience, see chapter 3 p.276 and for the army chapter 5 p.387, 406.

127. Nevertheless Bernard Kops, *The World is a Wedding* (London, 1963), 132 reports that when performing in
a South Wales village just after the war the locals believed Jews had horns.

Both M - OA: FR 2463 'The Jews', July 1946 and attitudes reported by H.J. Eysenck in his essay 'The Psychology of Anti-Semitism', in his own Uses and Abuses of Psychology (Harmondsworth, Middlesex, 1953), 261-2 show the prominence of these familiar accusations against Jews in post-1945 Britain. The Mass-Observation survey indicated that favourable attitudes to Jews had increased since the 1943 survey (30% compared to 25%), although this was down on a smaller survey carried out in 1944. Unfavourable attitudes were much higher, however, in 1946 rising to 62% from 13% in 1943. The exact accuracy of such polls can be questioned, but these figures indicate that negative attitudes to Jews had not declined with either the close contact of the war or the news of the holocaust. For the 1943 survey see M - OA: FR 1648. For the 1944 survey, The Sydney Jewish News, 27 October 1944.


See for example the cartoon in the Daily Express, 24 June 1947 for an extremely Jewish stereotype representing a spiv. Reproduced by David Hughes 'The Spivs', in Sissons and French, op.cit., 91.

John Gross 'The Lynskey Tribunal' in Sissons and French, op.cit., 272-3 refers to the antisemitism generated by Stanley's trial.

Morecambe and Heysham Visitor, 6 August 1947.

M - OA: FR 2463 indicated that those who had met Jews either socially or in the army varied in their attitudes as much as those who never had any contact. Most people, whether pro or anti-Jewish, claimed they had "met individual Jews whom they liked very much" but this did not change overall impressions of Jews in the majority of cases.

See chapter 6 p.494-6.

This argument continued after the end of the war. In August 1947 the 4,500 refugee Jews on board the 'Exodus' were turned back from Palestine to Europe. According to Alan Bullock "bringing them to the United Kingdom was ruled out on the grounds that it would lead to more anti-Jewish demonstrations". In his Ernest Bevin: Foreign Secretary (London, 1984), 449.

The reactions to claims that the British have been in any way antisemitic have been heated. Ben Lewin's Channel 4 docu-drama, 'The Dunera Boys', which only hinted at British antisemitism towards internees on this ship, brought an angry response from viewers. In Channel 4's Right to Reply programme, 18 October 1985 one viewer was "flabbergasted" at the mere
suggestion, another felt it was a gross insult to Britain who had done so much to aid refugees in the past.

137. See chapter 6 p. 474.
138. Ibid., p. 478.
139. Ibid., p. 487.
140. The government was always aware of humanitarian feeling on refugee issues, but managed to avoid accepting proposals allowing any numbers to enter Britain. However, when refugees did manage to escape, none were refused entry. See chapter 6 p. 491.
141. Diana Geddes has written, in explaining the success of the racist Front National in France, that "one of the most striking differences between French and British attitudes to immigrants in their respective countries is that the French admit much more openly that they are racist. They maintain that they are being less hypocritical than the British, which is probably true; but it also means there is much less moral and social opprobrium attached to racism in France than in Britain, which in turn means less is done to fight it". 'Chauvinism with a shove' in The Times, 2 December 1985.
143. For example, Bill Williams and Joe Buckman's work on Jewish trade unionism. For Williams see his 'The Beginnings of Jewish Trade Unionism in Manchester, 1889 - 1891' in K. Lunn (ed.), Hosts, Immigrants and Minorities: Historical Responses to Newcomers in British Society: 1870 - 1914 (Folkestone, Kent, 1980), 263-307. For Buckman his Immigrants and the Class Struggle: The Jewish Immigrant in Leeds 1880 - 1914 (Manchester, 1983).


The works of Gainer and Garrard on the aliens question at the turn of the century have been followed by excellent works on Jews in the East End, including

The study of Jewish refugees from Nazi Europe has also matured in recent years shown by the publication of a collection of essays on the subject - G. Hirschfeld (ed.), Exile in Great Britain (Highlands, New Jersey, 1983). Part of these studies have looked at internment, the works of Stent, the Gillmans and Kochan, adding to our understanding of this controversial area. Bernard Wasserstern's Britain and the Jews of Europe (London, 1979) is a brilliant analysis of the governmental response to Jews in the war, of which more such studies are needed.

The area of Anglo-History before the mass immigration of the 1880s has also ceased to be of mere antiquarian interest. Todd Endelman's The Jews of Georgian England 1714 - 1830 (Philadelphia, 1979) and M.C.W. Saltstein's The Emancipation of the Jews in Britain: The Question of the Admission of the Jews to Parliament, 1828 - 1860 (East Brunswick, New Jersey, 1982) are both important books, both firmly rooted in the economic, social and political context of British society.

Finally, Ph.D. theses from Bryan Cheyette (Sheffield) 'An Overwhelming Question: Jewish Stereotyping in English Fiction and Society 1875 - 1914' and David Cesarani (Oxford) 'Zionism in England, 1918 - 1939' as well as my own thesis, which will all be submitted in 1986, indicate the growing seriousness in the study of Anglo-Jewish history and its application to British history as a whole.

144. B. Williams in Lunn, op.cit., 264.

145. For example by Alan Lee in his important article 'Aspects of the Working-Class Response to the Jews in Britain, 1880 - 1914', in Lunn, op.cit., 107-133.

146. The relationship between Jews and Muslims in the ritual slaughter debate is an important area of enquiry, so is that between Jews and West Indian/Asian groups in fighting racism from the outside society and between the groups. See Michael Coren's 'When Underdog Bites Underdog' in the New Statesman, 15 March 1985 for a discussion of black-Jewish relations.

147. In a speech as outgoing president of the American Historical Association in December 1983. See The Chronicle of Higher Education, 4 January 1984. American historians seem more aware for the need of synthetic approaches to the past. In May 1985 a conference 'What is the Future of the Past?' was devoted
to this subject at Rutgers University. No such activity has taken place amongst British historians.

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