REPRESENTATION OF TURKEY’S EU BID
IN THE BRITISH MEDIA

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ALAADDIN F. PAKSOY
Department of Journalism Studies

The University Of Sheffield.

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ABSTRACT

This research seeks to understand the political, economic, geographical and cultural discussions in the British media representation of Turkey’s bid to join the European Union (EU). The idiosyncratic aspect of the topic is that both Turkey and the British media have a special relationship with the EU.

Turkey is the only inveterate EU membership candidate. No country has waited at the front door of the EU as long as Turkey yet. There are different reasons behind this and they make the issue interesting to contemplate. In addition to Turkey’s different status compared to the EU membership candidacy processes of other countries, the thesis also takes into account the different and awkward relationship between the EU and the UK, and inevitably the British media. Therefore, the analytical framework of the thesis draws on the notion of ‘a positive Other’ while explaining the media representation of Turkey’s EU bid. The research also highlights the ‘essentialist’ and ‘functionalist’ approaches in its attempt to explain the differences within the EU in understanding the fundamentals of the EU and the view about Turkish membership.

The research sought to explore how Turkey’s EU bid was represented in the British media by focusing on one main research question, namely, ‘How was Turkey’s EU bid represented in the British media?’ In order to answer this question in a systematic way, the study employs a triangulation of different methods. In the empirical chapters, the study first looks at the coverage of different important periods in Turkey-EU relations between 1999 and 2006. The news items published in these periods by six news organisations from the British media are analysed by using quantitative and qualitative content analysis. Secondly, the thesis presents an analysis of how the coverage was produced. The analysis is based on the semi-structured, in-depth interviews conducted with the journalists who work, or had worked, for the British media and who had published news items about Turkey-EU relations. The data gathered from the interviews are presented by employing Shoemaker and Reese’s (1996) hierarchical model. In the concluding chapter of the thesis, the findings from the research are linked to the notion of ‘a positive Other’.
# TABLE OF CONTENTS

Acknowledgements ........................................................................................................... iii

Abstract ............................................................................................................................ v

Table of Contents ............................................................................................................. vi

List of Figures .................................................................................................................... xii

List of Tables ..................................................................................................................... xii

Abbreviations .................................................................................................................... xiv

**CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION** ......................................................................................... 1

1.1. Research framework ............................................................................................... 3

1.2. Structure of the thesis ............................................................................................. 7

**CHAPTER 2: HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF TURKEY-EU RELATIONS** ............. 11

2.1. Introduction .............................................................................................................. 11

2.2. Turkey’s journey towards the West ....................................................................... 11

2.3. Turkey’s EU perspective: 1959-1999 ................................................................... 17

2.4. The period after official candidacy: 1999-2006 .................................................... 22

2.5. Conclusion ............................................................................................................... 29

**CHAPTER 3: BACKGROUND AND LITERATURE REVIEW** .................................... 31

3.1. Introduction .............................................................................................................. 31

3.2. Key points of discussion regarding Turkey’s EU bid ............................................ 32

3.2.1. Political discussions ......................................................................................... 32

3.2.2. Economic discussions ...................................................................................... 43

3.2.3. Geographical discussions ............................................................................... 48

3.2.4. Discussions on culture, identity and religion .................................................... 52
3.3. Media representation of Turkey-EU relations ................................................................. 57
  3.3.1. A snapshot on the specific literature ........................................................................... 58
  3.3.2. The findings in previous studies ................................................................................. 59
    3.3.2.1. The main issues and topics in the findings ............................................................... 59
    3.3.2.2. The findings on the essentialist and functionalist view ......................................... 62
  3.3.3. What can this study add to the shortcomings in the literature? ................................. 64

3.4. Conclusion ......................................................................................................................... 65

CHAPTER 4: ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK ................................................................................. 67

4.1. Introduction ....................................................................................................................... 67
4.2. An explanation of ‘a positive Other’ ................................................................................. 69
  4.2.1. The Other is not static and not one type ........................................................................ 71
4.3. Employing the notion of ‘a positive Other’ in this study ................................................... 74
  4.3.1. Orientalism and positive othering ................................................................................. 75
  4.3.2. Said’s view on Orientalism and how much this study can benefit from it ................. 76
4.4. Turkey as ‘a positive Other’ in the context of the British media ........................................ 81
  4.4.1. The British media and the EU ....................................................................................... 81
  4.4.2. Why is Turkey ‘a positive Other’ for the British media? ............................................ 83
4.5. Conclusion ......................................................................................................................... 85

CHAPTER 5: METHODOLOGY .................................................................................................. 87

5.1. Introduction ....................................................................................................................... 87
  5.1.1. Analysing the content .................................................................................................... 88
  5.1.2. Talking to the journalists in the field ............................................................................ 89
  5.1.3. The deficit of reception ................................................................................................ 91
5.2. Research sample ............................................................................................................... 92
  5.2.1. Sample of events chosen for analysis ............................................................................ 92
  5.2.2. Selection of media outlets ............................................................................................ 94
    5.2.2.1. Eurosceptics vs Europhiles ..................................................................................... 95
6.12. The actors in news items ................................................................. 148
  6.12.1. The actors who support Turkish membership .............................. 149
  6.12.2. The actors who are against Turkish membership ......................... 150
  6.12.3. Turkish actors ................................................................. 153
6.13. Conditions for Turkish entry to the EU ........................................... 154
6.14. Conclusion .................................................................................... 155

CHAPTER 7: QUALITATIVE CONTENT ANALYSIS ........................................... 159
7.1. Introduction .................................................................................... 159
7.2. Turkey as the Other ......................................................................... 161
  7.2.1. Othering Turkey by using historical events and concepts ................ 162
  7.2.2. Othering Turkey by religion and culture ....................................... 170
  7.2.3. Othering Turkey by geography .................................................. 174
  7.2.4. Othering Turkey by political reasons .......................................... 178
  7.2.5. Othering Turkey by economic conditions ..................................... 181
  7.2.6. Othering Turkey by using ‘vox pops’ from Turkey ........................ 183
7.3. Turkey as part of the European Self .................................................. 185
  7.3.1. Defining Turkey as part of the European Self by geo-strategic considerations .............. 188
7.4. Conclusion .................................................................................... 197

CHAPTER 8: INDIVIDUAL LEVEL INFLUENCES ON JOURNALISTS WHILE REPORTING ON TURKEY-EU RELATIONS ......................................................... 201
8.1. Introduction .................................................................................... 201
8.2. Shoemaker and Reese’s hierarchical model ........................................ 203
  8.2.1. Why this model? ...................................................................... 206
  8.2.2. The importance of ‘individual level’ for this study ....................... 207
  8.2.3. Problems in employing the hierarchical model ............................. 211
8.3. Individual level influences on journalists ........................................... 212
  8.3.1. Who is selected to write on Turkey-EU relations? ........................ 213
8.3.1.1. Relationships with Turkey before working there ........................................... 215
8.3.1.2. The length of period the foreign correspondents spend in Turkey ................. 216
8.3.2. Influences on journalists .................................................................................... 218
8.3.3. Journalists’ view on Turkey and Turkish membership of the EU ..................... 220
  8.3.3.1. Journalists’ views on Turkey ........................................................................... 221
  8.3.3.2. Journalists’ views on Turkish membership of the EU .................................. 223
8.3.4. Journalists’ views on how Turkey-EU relations are covered in the British media .... 228
  8.3.4.1. Journalists’ views on the decrease in Turkey-EU relations’ popularity in the British media and the changes in the content .................................................. 228
  8.3.4.2. Journalists’ views on the drawbacks of Turkish membership in news items . 233
  8.3.4.3. Journalists’ views on the clash of civilisations thesis in the context of Turkey’s EU bid ......................................................................................................................... 235
  8.3.4.4. Journalists’ views on why the British media constantly refer to Turkey as a Muslim nation .................................................................................................................. 241
8.4. Conclusion ........................................................................................................... 244

CHAPTER 9: A FOCUS ON THE MEDIA ROUTINES AND THE EXTRAMEDIA LEVELS ...... 249

9.1. Introduction ........................................................................................................... 249
9.2. Journalists’ views on the influences of ‘media routines’ ....................................... 250
  9.2.1. Direct and indirect or minor influences of the editorial line ........................... 252
  9.2.2. The policy of the British media towards Turkey’s EU bid discussions .......... 256
9.3. Journalists’ views on aspects of ‘extramedia’ influences ....................................... 261
  9.3.1. The degree of parallelism between the British media and the British Government .... 261
    9.3.1.1. Political parallelism in the British media concerning Turkey’s EU bid ......... 264
    9.3.1.2. The influence of the UK’s special relationship with the EU on the media representation of Turkey’s EU bid ...................................................................................... 268
  9.3.2. PR activities and the communication between journalists and Turkish officials .. 271
9.4. Conclusion ........................................................................................................... 275
CHAPTER 10: CONCLUSION .................................................................................................................. 281

10.1. Introduction .................................................................................................................................. 281
10.2. The general tone of the content ................................................................................................. 281
10.3. Explaining the media representation with the notion of ‘a positive Other’ .............................. 284
10.4. Contributions, limitations and suggestions for future studies ................................................. 289
10.5. Concluding remarks ...................................................................................................................... 292

APPENDICES ......................................................................................................................................... 295

Appendix I (Quantitative Content Analysis Coding Scheme) .............................................................. 295
Appendix II (Qualitative Content Analysis Coding Scheme) ................................................................. 299
Appendix III (Interview Questionnaire) ............................................................................................... 300
Appendix IV (List of Interviewees) ...................................................................................................... 301

REFERENCES .......................................................................................................................................... 302
LIST OF FIGURES

Figure 5.1: Turkey-EU relations in Google News Archives ................................................................. 93

Figure 5.2: Distribution of research material among different methods .................................................. 100

Figure 6.1: The approach of countries to Turkey whether they are against (-) or in favour (+) of its EU bid in the news items of different periods between 1999 and 2006 ............................................. 139

Figure 7.1: The GDPs per capita of four countries and the EU average in PPS in 2010 ............................. 182

Figure 8.1: Shoemaker and Reese’s (1996) hierarchical model ............................................................... 206

Figure 8.2: An updated version of Shoemaker and Reese’s (1996) hierarchical model for this study ....... 207

LIST OF TABLES

Table 5.1: Distribution of the selected events in the research sample .................................................... 94

Table 5.2: Newspapers’ distribution according to their market type, circulation figures (October 2005) and broad stance on European integration ......................................................................................... 96

Table 5.3: Distribution of the interviewees and where they had published their news items about Turkey-EU relations, and the number of news items included in this research ........................................ 112

Table 5.4: Distribution of the interviewees and how many news items they had published about Turkey-EU relations within the time sample of this study ......................................................... 113

Table 6.1: Distribution of the news items and the political stances of the news organisations in EU affairs ........................................................................................................................................ 123

Table 6.2: Distribution of the news items according to events in the time sample ..................................... 124

Table 6.3: The main topics in the news items .............................................................................................. 126

Table 6.4: The statements in the news items .............................................................................................. 128

Table 6.5: Distribution of the descriptions about Turkey ............................................................................. 131

Table 6.6: Distribution of the labels among news organisations .................................................................... 133

Table 6.7: Distribution of the main issues in each news organisation and in total ..................................... 136
Table 6.8: The total attributions to each country in terms of their position towards Turkey’s EU bid ................................................................. 138

Table 6.9: The issues that the countries raised the most in news items about Turkey’s EU membership ................................................................. 142

Table 6.10: Distribution of differences between Turkey and EU Member States across the news organisations ........................................................................................................ 144

Table 6.11: Distribution of similarities between Turkey and EU Member States across the news organisations ........................................................................................................ 145

Table 6.12: Distribution of the actors who support Turkish membership ................................................................. 150

Table 6.13: Distribution of the actors who are against Turkish membership ................................................................. 152

Table 6.14: Distribution of Turkish actors ........................................................................................................ 153

Table 6.15: Distribution of the conditions for Turkey’s entry to the EU ................................................................. 155
ABBREVIATIONS

AK Party (AKP): Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi / Justice and Development Party

BBC: The British Broadcasting Corporation

CAP: Common Agricultural Policy

CHP: Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi / Republican People’s Party

EEC: European Economic Community

EMU: Economic and Monetary Union of the EU

EU: European Union

EU-15, EU-25, EU-27: The total number of EU Member States

FT: Financial Times

MEP: Member of the European Parliament

NATO: North Atlantic Treaty Organisation

PKK: Partiya Karkerên Kurdistan / Kurdistan Workers’ Party

PR: Public relations

TÜSİAD: Turkish Industry and Business Association

UK: United Kingdom

UN: United Nations

USA/US: United States of America
CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION

“(He) spent the 1986-1987 academic year at the University of Manchester, U.K. as a research fellow. On one occasion he asked a faculty member there who taught Politics in the Middle East, what kind of material on Turkey he uses in his course. The response he received was, ‘Well, in my course we don’t cover Turkey; after all Turkey is not really a Middle Eastern country.” A few days later he directed the same question to another colleague who offered a course on European politics. He again received a “really” answer” (Heper, 2004: 1).

Turkey has been trying to become part of the EU for more than 50 years. Important events have occurred in the last decade and Turkey finally started membership negotiations in 2005. Yet seeking a membership while being an historical Other to Europe (Neumann and Welsh, 1991; Delanty, 1995; Neumann, 1999) makes Turkish accession to the EU a different case compared to the accession process of former candidate countries from Middle and Eastern Europe. Thus, in addition to economic and political discussions, Turkish membership of the EU is a significant historical and cultural challenge for European politicians and public. According to McLaren’s (2007: 273) study, EU citizens hesitate about the cultural differences of Turkey more than its economic and political incompatibilities. This means that even though Turkey can reach a sufficient economic and political level to join the EU, its membership bid may be blocked because of an essentialist approach towards the Turkish issue. Therefore, in addition to its efforts to reach the written EU standards, Turkey also has to convince opinion leaders such as journalists, commentators, parliamentarians, and people from

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1 The membership negotiations are about adopting the EU acquis communautaire. Throughout the negotiation process, Turkish national law will import almost 80.000 pages of EU rules (Grabbe, 2005: 71).
the business circles of the EU, and through them the public at large, of the merits of its case (Grabbe, 2005).

Although the European Commission manages the membership negotiations with Turkey, it is argued that the final accession can be completed only with the approval of EU citizens. It was already decided in France and Austria that Turkey’s full membership could be accepted if citizens of both countries say ‘yes’ to Turkish membership in a possible referendum. Even though the same discussion has not taken place in several other EU Member States such as the UK, Spain and Italy, “[…] the seemingly pro-Turkish elites [in these countries] might somehow be forced to acknowledge public opinion when the day comes for the final decision” (Aksoy, 2009: 471).

This study argues that the media are one of the most important contributors to the formation of knowledge regarding foreign countries and accordingly international politics (see Zhang, 2011). “[…] [O]ur views of the world, and resulting actions, [are] moulded by our predominant source of information: the mass media” (Shoemaker and Reese, 1996: 59). For most EU citizens, therefore, the only way to access information concerning EU affairs, including Turkey-EU relations, is the media.

In this respect, it can be argued that the media coverage of Turkey’s EU bid is influential on the public, the elite, and the politicians (see Aydın-Düzgit, 2006: 11). Therefore, this study argues that if Turkey and its people want to get support for their EU bid from EU citizens, they must first understand the nature and extent of the coverage of Turkey-EU relations in the EU media and the nature of its production. It must then develop a strategy to deal with the knowledge gained. This study is an
attempt at providing research findings about the first task at hand, even though it does not focus on developing the strategies.

With the above presumption concerning the importance of the media, the study seeks to examine the British coverage about Turkey-EU relations and how the coverage is produced. Therefore, the main research question of the thesis is: ‘How was Turkey’s EU bid represented in the British media?’ By asking ‘how’, the question refers to both the content and the production of news items. The verb ‘to represent’ illustrates the way Turkey and its relations with the EU were portrayed in a selection of British news media. In order to substantiate the answer to the main research question, the study also seeks to answer 11 supplementary questions which will be described in the chapters where the empirical data are presented (Chapter 6, 7, 8, 9).

1.1. Research framework
National news media are still more important than pan-European media (e.g. Euronews, Financial Times Europe, International Herald Tribune, European Voice) in forming public opinion within the EU (de Vreese, 2001: 287). Thus, research on each European country’s news organisations, instead of pan-European media, could present more reliable data concerning how EU affairs are discussed in EU Member States. As the UK is one of the “Big Three” powers of the EU, together with Germany and France (Anastasakis, 2004: 10), its domestic media can be seen as some of the most important across the EU. Even though the relationship of the UK and its media with the EU is evaluated as awkward (see Anderson and Weymouth, 1999; Marcussen and Roscher, 2000: 345; Dougal, 2003; Öktem, 2005), the UK can still be accepted as a significant Member State of the Union. In Tony Blair’s leadership, the UK played an especially
active role during the discussions of Turkey-EU relations. Accordingly, the British media can be accepted as influential on the EU political agenda as the news items published in the UK are often quoted in many other countries due to the importance of British politics and the leading position of English as the lingua franca of the EU (Corcoran and Fahy, 2009: 103). For instance, with the help of English, it is easier to write news reports about what the British media outlets said regarding the EU agenda. Therefore, it can be argued that the news items on Turkey's EU accession published in the UK may influence the editors of other EU Member States’ newspapers, and accordingly the wider European public sphere.

The thesis answers the main and supplementary research questions by looking at the news items published in the British media which covered six important events between December 1999 and November 2006. These seven years can be evaluated as the period which spanned the start and the end of intensive relations between Turkey and the EU and accordingly the rise and fall of media interest in Turkey’s EU bid. The research sample consists of five prominent newspapers and a news website. These are: Financial Times (the FT), The Guardian, the Daily Mail, the Daily Mirror, The Daily Telegraph and BBC News Online. The sample for the news production analysis consists of the journalists who had written the news items that are analysed in the study. The research was conducted by a triangulation of three methods which are: quantitative and qualitative content analysis on news items, and in-depth interviews with the journalists.

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2 The research sample consists of reports, commentaries, leaders, reviews and analyses. Therefore, the texts in the sample will usually be described as ‘news items’.

3 As BBC News Online is also included in the sample, the total sample is called ‘the British media’ instead of ‘the British newspapers’ throughout the thesis.
The analyses draw on the analytical framework of the thesis which identifies the special relationship between the UK and the EU, and accordingly between the British media and the EU. Therefore, the differences between the views of the UK and other EU Member States on the Turkish issue are taken into account while explaining the analytical framework. It is claimed that even though the British media still underline Turkey’s differences compared to the media in other EU Member States, these differences are not represented as disadvantages but as an opportunity for the EU and the UK. Therefore, it is stressed that the discussions about Turkey’s EU bid in the British coverage are not underpinned by the characteristics of an Orientalist discourse. For this reason, the thesis argues that Turkey’s media representation concerning being part of the European Self or being the European Other cannot be explained without utilising the notion of ‘a positive Other’ (see Neumann and Welsh, 1991).

While using the notion of ‘a positive Other’, the research also takes into account the essentialist and functionalist approaches which are embedded in the news coverage. It is immensely important to underline that positioning Turkey as ‘a positive Other’ or ‘the Other’ depends significantly on how one envisions the EU. Therefore, differentiating these two understandings of the EU is useful in analysing Turkey’s EU bid in the British media as it helps to better comprehend the special relationship of the UK and its media with the EU (see Lazarou, 2010 for a specific discussion on essentialist and constructivist approaches concerning European identity and how much Turkey internalized it). It should be explained how these different approaches -the essentialist and the functionalist- are understood in this thesis and in the context of media representation of Turkey-EU relations. According to Kösebalaban,
“Today, there are two opposing perspectives in Europe on Turkey: Turkey as an integral part of Europe, and Turkey as the essential historical other of Europe. Underlying these two perspectives is the debate on the definition of European integration. Is European integration based on a single civilization, defined as European civilization and marked by distinct European cultural heritage and values? Or is Europe based on common ideals and a common destiny, a union that members of different civilizations can join on equal terms?” (2007: 101)

Based on the first question of Kösebalaban above, the essentialist approach argues that some characteristics of Europe are the core of Europe and Europeanness, and that they are fundamental and unchanging. It follows that those characteristics of Turkey that cannot be changed -its essentialist characteristics- such as geography, culture, religion and history, comprise most of the essentialist arguments regarding Turkey’s EU membership. Therefore,

“[…] while the logic of raison d’état, through diplomatic and economic contact, extended the boundaries of the European international system to encompass ‘the Turk’, the prevalence of the logic of culture made his [sic] status ambiguous from a societal point of view” (Neumann and Welsh, 1991: 348).

Even though the essentialist approach in EU affairs, including the discussions on culture, is not observable in the British Conservative Party’s politics, it is apparent in the right wing politics of continental Europe. Former French President Giscard d’Estaing’s comment (BBC News Online, 2002) that Turkish accession would be the end of Europe, and François Bayrou’s remark on the importance of “the legacy of the Rome–Athens–Jerusalem triptych’ [...]” (Aissaoui, 2007: 9) for Europe are significant examples of the essentialist approach. That is, it establishes characteristics that of themselves make Turkey’s accession impossible since these cannot be changed.

On the other hand, and in the context of the second question in the excerpt from Kösebalaban (2007), the functionalist view considers the EU at the level of economy and democracy. In this view, the EU is not a Christian club and its characteristics are
universal. Therefore, the expectations of the functionalist approach from Turkey are not about culture, religion or geography but they have more to do with human rights, democracy, economy, geo-strategic considerations, and coming to terms with the problems of history (Tekin, 2010; Ramm, 2009). This means that the functionalist approach sees the problems between Turkey and the EU as alterable if both sides persist in finding solutions.

All the points illustrated above will be further explained and discussed in detail throughout the thesis within the structure which is summarised below.

1.2. Structure of the thesis

The thesis consists of 10 chapters. Chapter 1 introduces the thesis by highlighting the importance and objectives of the study, together with a brief explanation of the research question, sampling, method and analytical framework. In Chapter 2, the study looks at the historical background of Turkey-EU relations. Even though the Turks’ relations with Europe have a long history, the chapter mainly focuses on the period from 1959 until today. Chapter 3 seeks to articulate the literature written on Turkey-EU relations. As the literature consists of numerous publications dealing with different aspects of these relations, the chapter only focuses on the events, terms and concepts which are related to this study’s research questions and accordingly, the research sample. In the same chapter’s second section, specific literature on the media representation of Turkey-EU relations is investigated. The section attempts to utilise all studies on the issue which were published since 2001. Chapter 4 argues that there is not one type of Other and the Other does not have to be an enemy of the Self. The relationship between the Self and the Other can be based on differences which have
several degrees of, rather than a complete, disparity. Therefore, the historical Orientalist approach is not valid in explaining the British media’s representation of Turkey’s EU bid. Thus, instead of drawing fully on the Orientalist discourse and presenting it as a fundamental reason for Turkey’s representation in the British media, the chapter employs the notion of ‘a positive Other’. Furthermore, the same chapter puts forth different aspects of why the British Government and the British media are in favour of Turkey and why the notion of ‘a positive Other’ could be suitable in order to conceptualise the representation that is under scrutiny. After presenting the analytical framework of the thesis, Chapter 5 demonstrates the methodological structure. It claims that the study needs triangulation in order to make the findings more reliable. Then, the chapter discusses the features of an ideal media research methodology. Later, the same chapter elaborates on the sampling process and how each method is applied to the data in the thesis.

After Chapter 5, the thesis focuses on the analysis of its own empirical material. In Chapter 6, the outcomes of the quantitative content analysis of news items are illustrated by using tables and comments regarding the figures. The numerical findings on various points feed into the following chapter. Chapter 7 presents the results of the qualitative content analysis on the coverage. In contrast to the previous chapter, the analysis is based on the latent meaning which takes into account the context in the news items. The main discussions in the chapter concentrate on the representation of Turkey as a European Other and as part of the European Self. Chapter 8 and Chapter 9 exhibit the findings from the fieldwork on the production of news items concerning Turkey’s EU bid. As investigating the news production process is a complex issue, the two chapters about the interview data present the findings by a ‘level of analysis’ and
give the main importance to the individual level. Chapter 8 begins with an explanation about Shoemaker and Reese’s (1996) hierarchical model and then attempts to present the findings by using the individual level of the model. Chapter 9 draws on the model underlined in the previous chapter; however, this time two other levels of the model and their influence on the individual level are examined. Finally, Chapter 10 includes a general summary of the thesis and a discussion on the findings by connecting data with the analytical framework of the thesis. The discussions chiefly seek to answer its main research question. Furthermore, the chapter presents its contributions to the existing literature, explains its limitations and gives some suggestions for future studies. The chapter ends with a brief discussion of the recent state of Turkey-EU relations and some recommendations concerning how Turkey can contribute towards better coverage of Turkey-EU relations.

In summary, the study derives its main significance from its interest in the media representation of Turkey’s EU bid. The research aims to put forth the general representation of Turkey’s EU bid in the British media. The focus is mainly on the overall representation instead of a media outlet specific analysis or detailed comparisons between the news organisations of the research sample. Apart from an examination of the media content, the study is also important as it seeks to illuminate a long-term and immense challenge for Turkish politics. Becoming an official EU membership candidate and finally starting membership negotiations are some of the major events in Turkish politics in the last decade (Keyman, 2006: 211). At the moment, even though Turkey-EU relations are not as significant as they were in the first half of the 2000s, it can be argued that the research investigates a series of historic events about Turkey’s EU adventure which is undeniably crucial in the long
history of Turkish westernisation and Turkey’s contemporary politics. Furthermore, the research is not only interested in the news coverage concerning Turkey’s EU bid as several studies were in the past (*inter alia* Negrine et al., 2008; Aksoy, 2009; Bischof et al., 2010). The study also examines how this coverage was produced by looking at journalists’ views on Turkey’s EU bid *per se* and on news production regarding Turkey-EU relations. No previous study about Turkey-EU relations has focused on journalists in the same way. Moreover, by means of a focus on Turkey’s EU bid, the study debates the different understandings of the EU (e.g. *functionalist*). This gives an opportunity for the thesis to elucidate the relations between the UK and the EU, and accordingly the British media and the EU while analysing the Turkish issue. As will be explained in detail in the Analytical Framework Chapter, without taking into account the special relationship between the UK and the EU, it would be less reliable to conceptualise the media representation of Turkey’s EU bid in the British context.
CHAPTER 2: HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF TURKEY-EU RELATIONS

2.1. Introduction

As most news items in the research sample mention some of the historical events in Turkey-EU relations (e.g. the Copenhagen Summit), presenting the historical developments behind Turkey's bid to join the EU is crucial. Therefore, this chapter provides a summary of how Turkey-EU (previously EEC⁴) relations developed from 1959 to the first decade of the 21st century. The period prior to this will be presented in this section, a short historical survey of Turkish westernisation in the Ottoman Empire and the early Republican period. This historical background is sometimes useful to comprehend the contemporary relations between Turkey and Europe. Following this, the chapter looks at the political problems which postponed Turkish accession to the EU and other political events which moved Turkey much closer to the Western world between 1959 and 1999. Finally, the third section deals with what has occurred in Turkey-EU relations since the Helsinki Summit in 1999 when Turkey became an official EU membership candidate. This final section has a special importance for the thesis as it includes the events which constitute the research sample of this study.

2.2. Turkey's journey towards the West

Turks have been moving in the direction of the west since 500s BC. They started their journey as nomad tribes around the Altay Mountains between the Gobi Desert and

⁴ The European Union had been called the European Economic Community (EEC) before the Maastricht Treaty came into force on 1 November 1993 (The European Union Website, 2009).
west Siberia (Karlsson, 2007: 32). This physical movement from the East to the West changed their culture, religion, language and even appearance (Kongar, 2007). When they arrived in Asia Minor, they dwelled first in the eastern realms of the Byzantine Empire. In 1071, an important victory against the Emperor Romanus Diogenes at the Manzikert Battle opened the gates of the Anatolian western flank to the Turks (Morris, 2006: 14). Then, in 1354, for the first time the Ottomans passed into Europe across the Dardanelles where ancient Greece and Rome lay (Morris, 2006: 15). Edirne (Adrianople) was taken in 1361 and later on it became the capital of the Empire until the conquest of Constantinople in 1453 (Ahmad, 1993: 17). Following this event, the Ottomans continued to proceed westwards. The furthest west they reached was the borders of Vienna in Europe, and Algeria in North Africa. After reaching this zenith, the Ottomans started to lose power and “[t]he themes of decline and corruption became much more pronounced in the 18th century [...]” (Çırağan, 2001: 51). While the Ottomans were losing economic and military strength, Western Europe, on their doorstep, was continuing its rise in philosophy, arts, science, economy and military power (see Ahmad, 1993: 21).

“The defeat of ‘the Turk’ at the hands of superior European military and economic might had necessitated a grudging self-examination on the part of Muslim leaders and intellectuals. The humiliation of military defeat was aggravated by accompanying perceptions of arrested cultural development. Europe was no longer considered an inferior entity to be converted, but a military, economic and political giant to be emulated” (Neumann and Welsh, 1991: 344).

Following the Western advancement, modernisation of the Army became a necessity. However, the reforms “[...] required fundamental changes in society itself and the conservatives, supported by the Janissary army and the ulema, refused to go along with reform which would undermine their own position” (Ahmad, 1993: 22).
Therefore, the Janissaries had to be dissolved as a prerequisite for modernisation of the Army and other necessary changes in society.

“Mahmud II (1808–1839), who succeeded Selim, the reforming sultan who had been overthrown and executed by the Janissaries, seized the opportunity to crush them, replacing them with his new-style army. The conservatives were in disarray once their armed protectors had been eliminated. The reformers were now able to restructure the state [...]” (Ahmad, 1993: 25).

Finally, the Turks’ physical movement to the West became a state led modernisation/westernisation process and this made an enormous impact on Turkish culture, identity and relations with other people in the world. In the new circumstances, the reforms covertly referred to the “[...] Ottoman failure and inferiority, a mirror image of European success and superiority” (Eldem, 2010: 27).

Therefore, the West became

“[...] the inspiration, often the motivator, behind the efforts undertaken by the Ottoman rulers to modernize their state. Western-inspired reforms were introduced as part of the Empire’s effort to survive and in time accounted for a far-reaching transformation of state and society” (Kushner, 1997: 231).

By this means, “Turkey has been one of those exceptional countries that started to transform its identity from an Eastern to a Western [...]” (Heper, 2004: 2). The Turkish desire for westernisation was not a colonial story but the Turks’ “own volition” (Heper, 2004: 2). Even though it was a top down process, the projects for change were ultimately decided by Turkish leaders and intellectuals who thought that westernisation would be the best solution for Turkey to reach the level of modern societies. Even though there is no doubt that the inspiration for modernisation came from foreign ideologies (Lewis, 2002: 481), Eurocentric considerations are insufficient to understand the change in the Turkish state and society. It can be argued that, by and large, the interior problems and internal dynamics in the Ottoman Empire and later in Modern Turkey led the demand for change.
Following the initiatives in the late Ottoman Empire period\(^5\), Turkish westernisation became more explicit and more pronounced after the foundation of the Turkish Republic in 1923.

“During the past hundred years of Turkish history, a process of defensive modernization was implemented, based on the view that in order to be strong against the West one needs to adopt its civilization, getting rid of one’s own tradition and moral codes. For self-empowerment, a comprehensive Westernization process was necessary” (Kösebalaban, 2007: 88).

For a complete transformation, under the leadership of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, founder of modern Turkey, most institutions of the Ottoman Empire were abolished (Massicard, 2005: 54). Immense changes happened in a limited time and these caused a ‘Kemalist historical leucotomy’ (cutting one part of the brain) in the society (Fuller, 2008: 12). The Turkish Republican identity emerged by forgetting the Ottomans’ Islamic past, weakening relations with the Middle East and choosing modernisation via westernisation. Therefore, it can be argued that the new Turkish identity was born by othering the Middle East and what is left from the Ottoman heritage. This led to the formation of Turkish Orientalism towards non-Turkish Muslims.\(^6\) According to Eldem (2010), the difference between Ottoman Orientalism (from the mid-19th century on)

\(^5\) Akyol (2009: 183) argues that the reason behind Turkish modernisation and Turkey’s better democracy compared to other countries in the Islamic world is not because the early Republican period created modern Turkey \textit{ex nihilo}. He argues “[…] it was in fact the Ottoman legacy that gave rise to both Atatürk and modern Turkey. The Kemalist period was undoubtedly a leap forward in several respects, but it was preceded and made possible by a rich heritage of Ottoman modernisation” (Akyol, 2009: 183).

\(^6\) A similar othering process from centre to periphery, especially towards the Arabs, happened in the late Ottoman Empire period. Eldem states

“The point was to dissociate the term ‘Ottoman’ from the notion of ‘Oriental’; after all, the Ottomans were perfectly conscious that their Christian compatriots were much less targeted by Western Orientalism. The precondition, then, was to find an Oriental Ottoman on whom European scorn would be deflected. To some, like Osman Hamdi Bey, who lived in the ivory tower of his studio and his museum and frequently ‘played’ Oriental, that would be pretty much all the rest of the population; most, however, would have to be more specific and direct their attention towards the savage Bedouin, the uncouth Turkish peasant or the unruly Kurd. Not surprisingly, the system worked pretty well. By creating the categories of the civilised Ottoman and the savage Oriental, most members of the elite made peace with an ideology that had been originally designed against them” (Eldem, 2010: 28; also see Makdisi, 2002).
and Turkish Orientalism (in 1930s) is that Turkish Orientalism was in an extreme fashion. He argues that it was even similar to Western anti-Turkish Orientalism. Therefore, Eldem claims that “[i]n fact, the Kemalist establishment agreed with every point of Western Orientalism, as long as it concerned the Arabs, the Kurds, the Ottomans; in short, anybody but the Turks” (2010: 29).

“In embarking on a process of Westernization, the new Turkish regime saw the social and political influence of Islam as its most significant challenge to establish for itself a political hegemony and associated it with backwardness (irtica)” (Kösebalaban, 2007: 89). Therefore, secularisation was also an important step for Turkish Republican style modernisation and its attempts to be segregated from the Muslim world. On 10th April 1928, the Turkish Parliament deleted the clause "The religion of the Turkish state is Islam" and secular Turkey was officially born (Lewis, 2002: 276). The purpose of this amendment was not demolishing religion but to decrease the importance of it in people's daily life (Lewis, 2002: 412). The policy was based on limiting religion to worship and segregating it from politics. However, in reality, the state became powerful over religion by restraining the religious institutions under the control of “the Republican bureaucratic structure” (Criss, 2008: 75).

During the same period, Turkish westernisation was performed by direct changes in public life. The Ottoman Sultanate was abolished in 1922 and the dynasty was banished. The Caliphate and the Islamic courts were abrogated in 1924 (Criss, 2008: 75). Following that, the western hat instead of the fez was welcomed⁷, the Gregorian

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⁷ Wearing a western style hat is compulsory in Turkey since the Hat Law came into force in 1925 (Turkish Ministry of Justice, 2012) http://www.mevzuat.adalet.gov.tr/html/389.html
calendar was adopted, the Swiss Civil Law, Italian Penal Code and French Administrative Law were taken as references while preparing the new legal system (Karlsson, 2007: 50). Besides, the Latin officially replaced the Arabic alphabet in November 1928 (Lewis, 2002: 433). Accordingly, the next generations lost connection with the Ottoman literature and became unaware of their entire historical heritage. This was not only due to the alphabet change but a revolution in language also came into force. Especially in 1933-1934, many Arabic and Persian words were excluded from Turkish and replaced by 'pure Turkish' words or words of European origin (Lewis, 2002: 434). During the same period, women’s suffrage was granted, having a surname became compulsory, and Sunday was accepted as the holiday instead of Friday.

Even though Atatürk’s project of Turkish modernisation originates from Western values, Turkish foreign policy cannot be evaluated as pro-western in the first two decades of the Republican period (Kushner, 1997: 231). As a result, this caused an inward-looking country with a neutral foreign policy orientation. However, there was a consistent aspiration that

“[…] the Turks could, should and would become members of the civilized western world. In the post-Kemalist years there have been significant strides forward in this direction and both foreign policy and cultural orientation have converged and fed each other. […] Turkey adopted a multi-party system, and demonstrated a strong resolve to abide by western democratic rules” (Kushner, 1997: 231).

Following the end of WWII, Turkey ended its neutrality in relations with the Western bloc, Germany, and the Soviets (Jung and Raudvere, 2008: 10). Ankara moved much closer to the Western world and was invited to the United Nations founding conference in the US (Mango, 2004: 37). In August 1949, just a few months after the foundation of the Council of Europe, Turkey became a member of the organisation
along with Greece (Lewis, 2002: 313). Following this, by fighting together with the US and the UN allies in the Korean War, Turkey came closer to joining NATO (Bilgin, 2003: 348). In this period, the Soviet threat on the Bosphorus, the Dardanelles and Turkey’s north-eastern cities Kars and Ardahan motivated Turkey to approach the Western world more (Fuller, 2008: 76). Finally, in 1952, Turkey became a member of NATO, again at the same time as Greece. This gave Turkey the role of a front line state against the Soviet Union throughout the Cold War.

2.3. Turkey’s EU perspective: 1959-1999

Turkey guaranteed its place in the Western bloc after taking France’s side in its war against Algeria in mid-1950s (Dismorr, 2008: 37). Having been a member of most US and Western Europe led organisations, there was one more step left to gain full attachment to the Western world (Aksoy, 2009: 470). This was membership of the newly established EEC. In the circumstances of 1950s, Turkey’s bid to join the EEC was not only related to the economy or westernisation. It was also connected to Greek foreign policy. Birand (1978: 52 cited in Arikan, 2008: 57) argues that Turkey was afraid of Greek’s close relationship with Europe because this could be used in the reciprocal disputes of Turks and Greeks. The main aim of Turkish foreign policy at that time was to be represented wherever Greece was. The Turkish Government had been planning to become a member of the EEC before Greece joined because Greek membership would present a big veto risk for Turkey in the future. Therefore, the first application on the 1st August 1959 was made hurriedly. The leading party members or the public were not sufficiently informed about this speedy application which was an entirely elite initiative (Ugur, 2006: 86-88).
The Ankara Agreement

Even though the 1960 coup slowed down the process, the environment of the Cold War period helped Turkey to approach an association agreement with the EEC (Muftuler-Bac, 2000: 29). At the time when the Ankara Agreement (association agreement) was signed on the 12th September 1963, the EEC Commissioner, Walter Hallstein, said that Turkey was part of Europe. This was exactly what the Turkish Government had expected to hear (Dismorr, 2008: 38) because for the Turks, an association agreement with the EEC also meant being recognised as a European state (Arikan, 2008: 51). The agreement foresaw a step by step integration which referred to preparatory and transitional stages, a customs union and full membership (Littoz-Monnet and Villanueva Penas, 2006: 2).

Apart from the competition with Greece, Turkey’s expectations from the EEC were almost the same issues which are also expressed today: The EEC could bring Turkey many political and economic benefits; it could encourage the continuity of Turkish modernisation; and it could reduce the effect of nationalists, Islamists and populists in Turkish politics (Faucompret and Konings, 2008: 24). Consequently, Turkish politicians were satisfied by the Ankara Agreement as it clearly pointed to Turkey’s full membership in the future (Arikan, 2008: 60). The association became robust by signing an additional protocol in 1970 which became effective in 1973. By means of the Additional Protocol, the road map to a customs union was prepared (Littoz-Monnet and Villanueva Penas, 2006: 2).
Another Coup in 1980

During the 1970s, the Cyprus issue was one of the biggest headaches for Turkey. The Turkish military operation of the island in 1974 created significant problems between Turkey and the international community, including Europe (see Chapter 3, page 34). Moreover, in the same period, Turkey had serious internal clashes between the supporters of the political right and political left. The tension caused bloodshed on the streets, especially among university students. On 12th September 1980, Turkish Armed Forces seized control of the Government and dissolved the parliament. Predictably, these events blocked Turkey’s integration to Europe (Dismorr, 2008: 39). At the beginning of the coup process, the EU’s reaction was not very strong until political parties were shut down, former prime ministers were arrested and human rights abuse increased (Kaleağası, 2006: 286). Following these events, the EEC withdrew its diplomatic relations with Ankara. European countries started to complain about the number of Turkish asylum-seekers who were coming to Western Europe. In October 1980, Turkish passport holders lost their visa-free travel right to most Western European countries (Özkan, 2007: 412). Turkish membership became impossible for the foreseeable future, at least until the military presence had been removed from the Government (Littoz-Monnet and Villanueva Penas, 2006: 2).

On 23rd October 1985, the European Parliament asserted some conditions concerning human rights in order to normalise the relations (Faucompret and Konings, 2008: 30). Thanks to the Turkish style of coup d’État, the military government did not last long and the relations with the EEC were normalised by civil governments. In this respect, Lewis indicates that the army coups in Turkey are different to other young democracies. Interventions by the Turkish Army in politics have always resulted in
them leaving the place to civilians - at least officially - after having provided peace within the country (Lewis, 2002: xi).

**Full Membership Application in 1987**

More than 20 years after the Association Agreement was signed, Turkey started to prepare an application for its full membership (Arikan, 2008: 70). In this period, the EU was in a deepening integration process and for that reason Turkey was afraid its membership bid might be too late. In addition, Turkey had just appointed a civilian government. This could be evaluated in a similar way to the situation in Greece, Spain and Portugal where army coup periods had been experienced and which subsequently delayed the EEC membership of these countries (Arikan, 2008: 71). Finally, Turkey was able to apply for a full membership in 1987. The answer of the EEC came after two years - Turkey's application was rejected due to its political and economic circumstances (Faucompret and Konings, 2008: 31). After receiving the rejection, Adnan Kahveci, the then Turkish finance minister, said that Turkey’s aim was to get attention from foreign investors and show them that Turkey wanted to be part of Europe (Mango, 2004: 89).

**Big Changes in Membership Conditions: The Copenhagen Criteria**

After the fall of the Berlin Wall, most of the ex-communist countries in Middle and Eastern Europe were waiting to integrate with the EU. However, the membership qualifications of the EU, which were mainly based on Birkelbach report and the establishing treaty of the EEC, needed to be amended. Thus, the European Council decided on the Copenhagen Criteria in June 1993 (Faucompret and Konings, 2008: 33).

It was determined that firstly, a country should fulfil the political criteria, and that was
the main pre-condition in order to start accession negotiations. Secondly, compliance with the economic criteria was to be a requirement for full membership of the EU (Littoz-Monnet and Villanueva Penas, 2006: 3). The announcement of the Copenhagen Criteria increased the ex-communist Eastern European countries’ motivation for EU membership.

**A customs union with the EU**

The rejection in 1987 did not completely shut the doors to Turkey (Bryce, 2009b: 174). While the Eastern European countries were becoming closer to Brussels, Turkey concentrated on a customs union with the EU which was less complicated than full membership and could be achieved in a short period. The then Turkish Prime Minister Tansu Çiller thought that a customs union could ease the challenge of full membership (Faucompret and Konings, 2008: 35). Conversely, on the EU side, there was an expectation that a customs union might satisfy Turks and for that reason the Turkish pressure on the EU for full membership might decrease (Bryce, 2009b: 174). Therefore, right at the beginning, the EU emphasised that a successful application for a customs union was not directly related to full membership (Faucompret and Konings, 2008: 35).

The negotiations for a customs union were also problematic. The Turkish Parliament needed to change 14 articles of the ‘army made’ 1983 Turkish Constitution in order to make it correspond with European values regarding human rights and democracy. Meanwhile, Greece resisted the Turkish bid for a customs union. However, when the EU accepted the start of membership negotiations with Cyprus, Greeks stopped their resistance. In the end, a customs union with Turkey began on the 1st January 1996.
Excluding the microstates in Europe (e.g. Andorra), this made Turkey the only country in the world which is outside the EU but part of a customs union.

**The Luxembourg Summit in 1997**

The Luxembourg European Council in December 1997 was a real disappointment for Turkey. The European Council revealed that the membership negotiations were going to start with the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Slovenia, Estonia and Cyprus. Another group of countries from Central and Eastern Europe were also offered the same right when they fulfilled the political and economic criteria (Hülsse, 1999: 15). Turkey reacted harshly to its exclusion from the list. The then Turkish Prime Minister Mesut Yılmaz said "[t]here will not be a political dialogue between Turkey and the European Union" (James, 1997). Turkey even intimidated Europe by talking about annexing the Turkish sector of Cyprus if the Greek side of the island was allowed to become a member of the EU before an agreement between the two sides had been reached (Faucompret and Konings, 2008: 38).

2.4. **The period after official candidacy: 1999-2006**

This section seeks to explain some important events in Turkey-EU relations between 1999 and 2006. Most events in this period constitute the time sample of the content analysis (see the Methodology Chapter).

**The Helsinki Summit in 1999 and afterwards**

Although Turkey's strategic importance decreased following the end of the Cold War, political and security factors changed all around the world after the 9/11 terrorist...
attacks in the US (Arikan, 2008: 228). The new circumstances increased Turkey’s significance again in the new insecure world (Keyman, 2006: 204). Accordingly, the situation also affected the EU and it relinquished its containment policy towards Turkey (Arikan, 2008: 228).

In fact, the wind of change started for Turkey's EU bid in the late 1990s. The victory of Tony Blair in the UK general election in May 1997 brought a vocal supporter of Turkey to the EU. Then, in the following year, Gerhard Schröder became the Chancellor of Germany and his positive view regarding Turkey was in contrast to his predecessor, ex-Chancellor Helmut Kohl (Dismorr, 2008: 49). The earthquakes of 1999 in Turkey and Greece brought the public and politicians together and both sides forgot the past and helped each other. Meanwhile, Costas Simitis, a moderate politician, became the new leader of Greece and supported Turkey's EU bid (Faucompret and Konings, 2008: 38). Moreover, Greece and the EU were in need of Turkish help concerning the Cyprus issue and Central and Eastern European countries' NATO accession (Faucompret and Konings, 2008: 38). In addition to these changes in Europe, the US has also started to give unconditional support to Turkey's EU bid. Just a few weeks before the Helsinki Summit in 1999, the former US president Bill Clinton said that an undivided, democratic and peaceful Europe could never become real without embracing Turkey (Dismorr, 2008: 50). With the help of all these developments, Turkey was finally accepted as an official candidate at the Helsinki Summit in December 1999, 40 years after its application for an association agreement. This upgrade also made Turkey more popular in the EU media and Turkey's EU bid started to appear more in news reports.
The Copenhagen Summit in 2002

The 'Accession Partnership Document' for Turkey, prepared by the European Commission, was accepted by all Member States at the European Council meeting in Nice in December 2000. The point which annoyed Turkey was related to the number of votes and seat distribution for the future EU because Turkey was not included in this equation (Faucompret and Konings, 2008: 41-42).

The Turkish Parliament made important amendments to the Constitution on 3rd August 2002 in order to fulfil the Copenhagen criteria. For instance, teaching different mother tongues (e.g. Kurdish) at private language schools and broadcasting in these languages became legal. In addition, the death penalty was abolished (Faucompret and Konings, 2008: 42; Kirişçi, 2008) and Turkey signed almost all European and international human rights agreements (Arikan, 2008: 232). However, happy days in Turkey-EU relations in the post-Helsinki period did not last long. Even though there was no significant political crisis, it could be observed that the discussions concerning Turkish membership in different European circles were more than Turkey’s responsibility to fulfil the Copenhagen criteria. “[...] [T]he question of Turkey’s Europeanness, and its belonging to European civilization, has re-entered with full force into the European public spheres” (Tekin, 2008: 728). Even though the impact of the 9/11 terrorist attacks in the US increased the strategic importance of Turkey, the cultural aspects of Turkish membership also became a matter of discussion after this event (Aksoy, 2009: 471). For instance, just one month before the Copenhagen Summit in December 2002, former French President Giscard d’Estaing’s famous comment on Turkey’s EU bid echoed in Europe. In his statement to Le Monde, he said that Turkey was not a European country and its membership would be the end of Europe (BBC News Online,
During these discussions, TÜSİAD (Turkish Industry and Business Association) started a large-scale media campaign in European countries in order to get support for Turkey’s EU bid before the Copenhagen Summit on 12-13 December 2002. Full-page advertisements were published in British newspapers and depicted the photo of Tony Blair and the title: ‘The only way to have a friend is to be one’. In Austrian newspapers, TÜSİAD challenged Chancellor Wolfgang Schüssel ‘Don’t pull up the plant to see if it’s growing’ (Dismorr, 2008: 86). Meanwhile, the AK Party (Justice and Development Party) had a landslide victory in the 2002 Turkish general elections. The election results ended the period of 1990s weak coalition governments in Turkey. The party introduced itself as a ‘conservative democrat’ and a fervent supporter of Turkey’s EU bid (Kösebalaban, 2007: 93; Yılmaz, 2009: 62). Different from previous Turkish Government’s European integration motivations, the AK Party government’s understanding of EU membership chiefly focused on being a bridge between two civilisations instead of the full integration of Turkey into the Western world.

At the Copenhagen summit, the European Council announced that eight new members from Central and Eastern Europe plus Malta and Cyprus would become EU members on 1st May 2004. Bulgaria and Romania were considered to be members from the beginning of 2007. Regarding Turkey, the Council announced ‘date for date’ and decided to reveal its decision in December 2004. The Council underlined that membership negotiations with Turkey could only start if Turkey fulfilled the Copenhagen political criteria. The homework which was given to Turkey was about amendments in the law concerning human rights and efforts to find a solution for the Cyprus issue as well as the problems concerning the Aegean Sea between Greece and Turkey (Roy, 2005: 23-24).
The Negotiation Process

After welcoming former hostile, ex-communist countries to the bloc on 1st May 2004, it became harder to deny Turkey which was an old member of NATO (Faucompret and Konings, 2008: 48). The European Commission's report of October 2004 announced that Turkey fulfilled the Copenhagen criteria (Littoz-Monnet and Villanueva Penas, 2006: 10; Aydın-Düzgit, 2006: 19). Thereafter, in the Brussels Summit between 16th – 17th December 2004, the European Council accepted this report and decided to start the membership negotiations with Turkey on 3rd October 2005.

The Austrian objection to the commencement of negotiations with Turkey was hardly suppressed by the EU leaders after a late night discussion. Finally, the negotiations were launched in Luxembourg on 3rd October 2005. According to the Negotiation Framework, the aim of the talks was full membership for Turkey. However, the framework underlined that the process could not guarantee membership as it was 'open-ended'. Accordingly, Turkey could not succeed in getting an exact date for membership. Although there has been no country which could not finish the negotiation process successfully so far, the accession process gives veto rights to each Member State. It also commands that in order to open or close any chapter in negotiations, all EU members must agree unanimously on the case. After completing all chapters of membership negotiations, the draft accession treaty is sent to each country's parliaments. For some countries like France and Austria, ratification can be done by referendum instead of a parliament decision (Hakura, 2006: 106).
**The Port Crisis with Cyprus**

At the 3rd October 2005 EU Council Meeting, Cyprus was one of the countries which were strictly against the start of membership negotiations with Turkey but at the last minute they decided not to use their veto right. Nonetheless, the negotiation process deteriorated in the first year of membership negotiations because of a problem between Turkey and Cyprus in 2006. Turkey had to open Turkish ports to Cypriot vessels and airplanes until the end of 2006 because of an agreement concerning the annex of the customs union. The situation showed that the Cyprus issue had transformed into an EU level problem and the negotiation process had become “[…] a soft-law type of framework for EU intervention in the political developments of Turkey” (Arikan, 2008: 227). Nonetheless, Turkey declared that it would continue not to acknowledge Cyprus. Although the EU pressure caused many changes in Turkish politics, the soft power of the EU has not been powerful enough to alter some crucial problems like the case of the Cyprus issue. As a result, eight of 35 chapters of membership negotiations were frozen at the end of 2006 (Eylemer and Taş, 2007; Turkish Ministry for EU Affairs Website, 2012). This situation was described as ‘a train crash’ by Ollie Rehn, the then EU Commissioner of Enlargement. In its reaction to the situation, Turkey reminded the EU of the isolation of the Turkish Cypriots. Moreover, Prime Minister Erdoğan said “700,000 Greek Cypriots' interests stand against those of seventy million Turks” (Dismorr, 2008: 154). As a last minute solution, Turkey proposed to open one port and one airport provided that the EU accepted the commencement of direct trade with Northern Cyprus. However, Brussels rejected the proposal. Moreover, “[t]he symbolic exclusion of Turkey from the celebrations of the EU’s fiftieth birthday celebrations in March 2007 darkened an already gloomy picture” (Kösebalaban, 2007: 109). Therefore, a new period in Turkey-EU relations began.
The Silent Period

Since some chapters were frozen in 2006, Turkey-EU relations became considerably silent. Accordingly, the media appearance of the relations also lessened. The start of the period was induced by the Cyprus issue. However, two elections in Europe also caused a negative influence on the motivation of Turkey’s bid to join the EU. The relatively pro-Turkish positions of Germany and France in the post-Helsinki period disappeared after the commencement of membership negotiations. Angela Merkel, the leader of Christian Democrat Union, became the Chancellor of Germany in November 2005. She claimed that “the EU of today is different from the EEC of which Turkey was offered the prospect of membership in 1963; the EEC was nothing more than an economic association while today the EU is a political union based on common values” (Die Welt, 16.10.2004 cited in Kylstad, 2010: 18). Therefore, she clearly expressed her view that Turkey should be ‘a privileged partner’ of the EU but not a full member. Things were getting worse for Turkey after the French Presidential election in 2007. Nicolas Sarkozy, an ardent opponent of Turkey’s EU bid, won the elections and suspended some other chapters in Turkey’s membership negotiations with the EU. In addition to the change in two prominent positions in Germany and France, the EU and Turkey became more interested in their domestic issues. While Europe was discussing the European Constitution, the enlargement in the Western Balkans, the global financial crisis, the Eurozone, huge economic problems of Greece, and the Arab Spring, the Turkish issue became remarkably unpopular on the EU’s political and media agenda. Similarly to the situation in Europe, Turkish politicians also became apathetic about Turkey’s EU bid. “[…][T]he celebratory tone of the advocates of membership in Turkey is very much muted, and the level of public support is rapidly decreasing” (Kösebalaban, 2007: 110). Meanwhile, Turkey was improving its relations with the
Middle Eastern countries and dealing with its domestic problems such as the problematic election of the President in 2007, the cooled relations with Israel, the military operations towards the PKK, the clashes between the Army forces and the Government, the *Ergenekon* case, and the Arab Spring. All these reasons made Turkey-EU relations less popular in the EU media.

### 2.5. Conclusion

This chapter presented the historical development of Turkey’s bid to join the EU. Following a long westernisation process in political and cultural terms, Turkey wanted to be a full partner of Western Europe just after the EEC was established. By signing the Ankara Agreement, Turkey and the EEC agreed on full membership for Turkey provided that some phases would be completed. However, because of various types of problems the Turkish bid became the longest waiting process at the front door of the EU. In the 1970s and 1980s, Brussels indicated Turkey's economic and political problems as a rejecting reason for Turkey whereas in the 1990s the agenda was specifically based on its problems with Greece and Cyprus as well as human rights issues. Meanwhile, the EU had made enormous changes in its structure and developed into a more integrated organisation.

Towards the end of the 1990s, Turkey started to have fervent supporters within the EU. Finally, at the Helsinki Summit in 1999, Turkey became an official candidate. This motivated Ankara to continue with economic and political reforms. During this period, the most significant event was probably the European Council meeting on 3rd October 2005. The media attention on the Turkish issue had never been so prominent before. Following long discussions between European rivals, particularly ‘Austrians versus the
British’, a decision was made to start membership negotiations with Turkey. It was a decision which had made all candidates a full member in the past. Therefore, the opponents were as angry as the supporters were happy. However, after just one year, the negotiation period was seriously damaged because of a crisis between Turkey and Cyprus, a new EU member.

Consequently, one can argue that Turkey has never come as close to EU membership as in the first decade of the 2000s due to having the official candidate status and being in the membership negotiation process. Today, mostly because of the influence of Germany and France, the EU authorities have avoided revealing a date for the completion of negotiations. Recently, different political agendas in the EU and in Turkey, especially the crisis in the Eurozone, and Turkey’s political interest in other parts of the world, have decreased the importance of the issue. However, the new changes cannot easily diminish the importance of this nearly 60 year old story.
CHAPTER 3: BACKGROUND AND LITERATURE REVIEW

3.1. Introduction

This chapter deals with background material which underpins the research findings and analyses in the following chapters. The breadth of the discussions on Turkey-EU relations and how it was represented by the British media in particular can be better understood after consideration of this background information and a literature review. In some sections, the discussions may appear to be closer to different areas such as politics, geography, sociology, history rather than media studies. However, the research requires this kind of interdisciplinarity which can also be seen in different previous studies in the field (e.g. Anderson and Weymouth, 1999).

The chapter begins with a section which comprises the main discussions on Turkey-EU relations in the extant literature. As the literature is remarkably broad, the section mostly focuses on the common terms and concepts, how pro-Turkish and anti-Turkish discourse legitimise their views, and other key debates which are common in the news items on Turkey-EU relations. Following this, the second section looks at what was covered in the media concerning Turkey’s EU bid. The section seeks to explain how the academic works on the media representation of Turkey-EU relations analysed the issue. Both sections seek to clarify what this dissertation focuses on in the following chapters.
3.2. Key points of discussion regarding Turkey’s EU bid

The discussions, which were found in the literature on Turkey-EU relations, are categorised under four sub-sections which are politics, economy, geography and culture. Some issues were inevitably suitable for more than one category (e.g. absorption capacity, clash of civilisations) (see Kösebalaban, 2007). They were categorised according to their most important association in the Turkish membership context. All the issues in four categories will allow the reader to more clearly comprehend the findings and analysis of the thesis.

3.2.1. Political discussions

The accession phase of the Central and Eastern European countries to the EU was a technical process which was mainly managed by the specialists of the Commission. However, the Turkish accession has usually been a politicised issue among the politicians of Member States (Barysch, 2005: 6). European politicians even exploited Turkey’s EU bid during the national or local elections of their countries. This is probably because of the fear that Turkish membership is going to influence people’s daily lives in Europe. Moreover, the Turkish issue is considered with its possible impact on how the EU is going to evolve. Therefore, Turkey’s bid is not only about the discussions on Turkey, it is also an important factor for the future definition and organisation of the EU.

Even though all debates on Turkey-EU relations are somehow political, this section seeks to clarify the points which are ‘directly’ related to political discussions in Turkey-EU relations. As each political issue’s detailed historical background may lead this section to long discussions, the priority is given to each political issue’s direct
connection with the debates on Turkey’s EU bid. The points explained below usually appear in the news items on Turkey-EU relations. They are: Democracy and human rights; The Cyprus Issue; The Armenian issue; The clash of civilisations thesis; European Public Opinion towards Turkish membership; Privileged partnership; and Absorption capacity.

**Democracy and human rights**

Human rights, the rule of law, guaranteeing democracy, and respect for and protection of minorities are the essence of the Copenhagen political criteria to join the EU (Sakwa and Stevens, 2006: 68; Aksoy, 2009: 482). Turkey’s insufficiency in those points is a crucial reason why Turkish membership of the EU is being postponed. It has been more than 50 years since Turkey signed the Association Agreement with the EU. It can be argued that Turkey is also responsible for this long term waiting process. The internal problems (e.g. army coups, coalition governments, the Kurdish issue, the tension between the Islamists and the secularists, etc.) in Turkey should be taken into account while its long journey to the EU is criticised. Moreover, it can be claimed that nationalists, Islamists, extreme left groups, parts of the bureaucracy (e.g. State Planning Organisation), military, and traditional Republicans had slowed down the reform movements for Turkey’s EU bid in different periods (Ahtisaari et al., 2004: 30).

As a result, compared to the EU average, Turkish civil society organisations are still weak and they have an insufficient role in affecting the government’s decisions.

However, in recent years, the EU’s soft power effect had an enormous impact on the change in Turkish democracy (Dismorr, 2008: 57). Since the Helsinki Summit in 1999, the Turkish Parliament made significant amendments to the Turkish legal system in
order to integrate it with the EU’s *acquis communautaire* and increase the quality of human rights and democracy in the country. Accordingly, starting membership negotiations was an important proof of providing the Copenhagen criteria which can be seen as a measure of human rights and democracy according to EU standards. Decrease in the Turkish Armed Force’s intervention in politics, more freedom in religious affairs, and new initiatives in order to solve the Kurdish issue are some of the examples concerning the rehabilitation in Turkish democracy.

**The Cyprus Issue**

In addition to the issues on human rights and democracy, there are several political crises which have blocked Turkey’s bid to join the EU. The Cyprus issue is one of the vicious circles. Greece’s EU membership in 1981 and the Greek Cypriots’ accession to the EU in 2004 made the Cyprus issue an EU wide problem. Accordingly, the EU lost its impartiality due to having one side of the issue within the community. Now Turkey is in the situation of being called ‘the invader’ of a part of EU land (North Cyprus) and at the same time a country which is an official membership candidate for the organisation which is the owner of this ‘invaded’ land.

The story of the problem dates back to the end of 19th century when the Ottomans leased Cyprus to the British. When the Ottomans entered WWI, the island was annexed by the British Empire. Turkey accepted this annexation in the Treaty of Lausanne in 1923. After some decades, the ethnic conflict between Turkish and Greek Cypriots on the island provoked some discussions concerning the partition of the island between Turkey and Greece. However, this plan was abandoned and an independent state was established on 16th August 1960 (Kazancigil, 2005: 173-175). Even though the
new entity looked like a compromise between the two groups of the island, “neither of whom was willing to build a nation together” (Kazancigil, 2005: 175).

On 15\textsuperscript{th} July 1974, a right-wing coup d’état in Cyprus raised serious concerns in Turkey. Ankara was worried about the safety of Turkish Cypriots and the annexation of the island to Greece. Turkey invoked “article 4 of the 1960 Treaty of Establishment, which gave them the right to intervene if the independence, territorial integrity and security of Cyprus were threatened” (Kazancigil, 2005: 176).

Consequently, the Turkish Armed Forces landed on the northern sector of the island on 20\textsuperscript{th} July 1974. Even though Turkey defined the act as a ‘peace operation’, the then EC condemned the Turkish intervention to the island (Faucompret and Konings, 2008: 28). The military operation only took two days and the northern part in the island was \textit{de facto} detached from the south. As a result, the Turkish Armed Forces stayed on the island and the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus was established in 1983. No country has recognized the entity except Turkey yet (Kazancigil, 2005: 178).

Kofi Annan, former Secretary-General of the UN, acted as a mediator and prepared the Annan Plan which aims to unify the island. However, the plan was rejected in a referendum in 2004. Even though 65 per cent of Turkish Cypriots said ‘yes’, the results of the referendum shows that 76 per cent of the Greek Cypriots rejected the unification plan (Aydın-Düzgit, 2006: 14). If the EU had asked for ‘good neighbourly relations’ as a criterion for membership from Greek Cypriots, the Annan Plan would have become real and the island would have been united (Arikan, 2008: 234). Since the Annan Plan was refused, the peace negotiations have been going remarkably slowly.
However, there is hope as long as Turkey stays on the EU track. Greece has been supporting Turkey’s EU membership since 1999 and the solutions for the problem in the region seem attainable only within a European perspective. Birand (2006: 117) argues that if Turkey-EU relations have serious problems, Turkey will be the most negatively affected one. The Cyprus issue or the continental shelf problem between Turkey and Greece in the Aegean Sea will be less important matters as long as Turkey seeks to be part of the EU. Since the Turkish military operation in Northern Cyprus in 1974, both parties have never been as close to solving the issue as in the first decade of the 21st century.

The Armenian issue

Since the 15th century, the minorities in the Ottoman Empire, including the Armenians, had enjoyed a significant freedom and autonomy. Following the start of political and economic decline in the Empire, the rise of Turkish nationalism made the minorities the target of violence. “[…] [T]he Turks tried to suppress one national movement after another. In the end they too adopted nationalism, waged their own struggle […]” (Ahmad, 1993: 24). Particularly after Greek and Bulgarian independence, the Ottoman Turks started to be afraid of the same initiative from Armenians (Chiclet, 2005: 164). Accordingly, while the Ottoman Empire was fighting against Russians in the Eastern Front in WWI, independence-seeking Armenians (Ottoman citizens) in the East of Turkey started fighting on the Russian side. A great deal of violence towards the Armenians, first in Constantinople and then in Eastern Anatolia, began. On 24th April 1915, Turkish authorities made a decision to deport Armenians to Syria in order to stop their cooperation with Russians. A significant number of Armenians (the exact number
is always a discussion) died on the way due to the weather conditions and famine (Kongar, 2007: 88-89).

Today, the events in 1915 are highly politicised. Turkey argues that “many Armenians lost their lives in the events of 1915, this by no means amounted to a systematically planned ‘genocide’, and that many Turks and other residents of Anatolia also perished at the same time” (Aybet, 2006: 535). Therefore, the Turkish side always defends itself by naming the events with the terms 'massacre' and 'deportation' while the Armenians call the events 'Armenian Genocide' (Kongar, 2007: 88). More than 20 parliaments (e.g. French, Greek) around the world acknowledged 'genocide' by the efforts of Armenian diaspora (Ahtisaari et al., 2009: 30-31). Even though Turkey strictly rejects the allegations, the issue has been attached to Turkey’s EU membership bid. Politicians from different EU Member States, especially the French, make statements which politicise the Armenian issue, and warn that Turkey cannot join the EU before it comes to terms with its past. Thus, “Turkey is likely to find the issue increasingly linked to its bid to join the EU”. The issue has not been included in the Negotiating Framework (2005) of Turkish membership. However, a report of the European Parliament in 2002 recommends Turkey to work on a compromise in its relationship with Armenia (Chiclet, 2005: 171).

The clash of civilisations thesis: Can Turkey be a model for the Muslim world?

Even though the clash of civilisations thesis is significantly related to cultural discussions, this section focuses on its reflection in politics. Turkey was an important ally for the Western European powers in the Cold War period. However, after the end of the Cold War, Turkey had lost its frontier security character between the Soviet and
the Atlantic blocks (Aybak, 2006: 70) and Turkey has become a new buffer zone between the Muslim and Christian world in the post-9/11 world. This was actually turning to the past, to the origin of discussions regarding the tensions between the Eastern and the Western world; but this time Turkey is being shown as a model for Muslim countries and a solution for the clash of civilisations (Keyman, 2006: 203). With a secular state system, a Muslim society, and good relations with the Western world, Turkey has a “unique geopolitical identity [which] makes the country an ideal broker between these civilizational realms” (Kuzmanovic, 2008: 42).

The clash of civilisations thesis is employed with different meanings by two different camps in the EU. While the thesis is used by some European politicians who are against Turkish membership, the invalidity of the thesis is employed in the pro-Turkish membership politicians’ arguments. Especially, British politicians underline why the clash of civilisations does not exist by referring to characteristics of Turkey. According to their view, Turkey is the solution to avoiding a clash of civilisations if it ever exists (see Aissaoui, 2007: 12).

“[...] The argument that was consistently deployed by the [British] government was that EU membership would help consolidate democracy and secularism in Turkey, which was overwhelmingly a Muslim nation, and this would, apart from sending all the right messages to other Muslim nations which were similarly trying to democratize, help repair the relations between the West and the Muslim world that were significantly damaged by the September 11 attacks and the subsequent War on Terror” (Aksoy, 2009: 476).

There are also views which consider Turkey incapable of being a model country for the Muslim world or playing a mediator role between the Eastern and the Western world. Karlsson (2007: 80) argues that when Turkey’s westernisation process is completed, this can be a good example to other Muslim countries as a proof of a democratic and Muslim country. However, he believes that Turkey cannot be a direct, one to one
model for other Muslim countries due to several historical, cultural and political reasons - e.g. Turkey's secular experience, political self-confidence which comes from its imperial roots, long standing relationship with the Western world, and NATO membership (Everts, 2005: 65). According to this view, there are remarkable differences between Turkey's and Middle Eastern countries' pasts. Unlike the Iranian and Arabic world, Turkey's Kemalists and Islamists were deeply affected by European thinking and European politics. Besides, Turkey has never been a colony and the Islamic thought in Turkey has never been a significant base to stand against imperialist powers (Karlsson, 2007: 103). Moreover, Turkish voters or political parties can show their reactions through democratic ways which are not always possible in the majority of other Muslim countries (Akyol, 2009: 192). For example, when the Islamist Refah Party was abolished because of its non-secular activities, Necmettin Erbakan, the leader of the party, applied to the European Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg instead of encouraging his voters to rise up (Karlsson, 2007: 104). Regarding the same issue, Ahtisaari et al. (2004: 16) argues that because of Turkey's secular character and long term close relations with Europe, the Turkish model cannot be directly applied to other Muslim countries (Ahtisaari et al., 2004: 17). Yet they argue that Turkey can be an effective member of the bloc in relationships with Muslim countries (Ahtisaari et al., 2004: 43).

*European Public Opinion towards Turkish membership*

Public opposition to Turkish membership is a serious obstacle for Turkish accession. Since the beginning of the EU, it has been thought that the Union was built by elites without any interest in public opinion especially in the period leading up to the common currency decision and accepting new members from Middle and Eastern
Europe. The recent referendums regarding the EU constitution showed that governments cannot ignore, anymore, what the citizens think (Hakura, 2006: 110). Public opinion may become more effective when the day comes for Turkey's EU membership because the French and Austrian governments have already announced that they could consider a referendum for the ratification of Turkey's membership. Thus, it should be noted that when EU leaders make a decision, they do not only take into account maps, energy corridors, trade and defence policies; they also care about the reaction of the public to their decisions (Kaleağası, 2006: 355) as it is hard to apply a policy successfully in a long term process without public support (Chatzistavrou, 2008).

According to a Eurobarometer survey in March-May 2006, 38 per cent supports Turkey's EU bid while 49 per cent\(^8\) of EU citizens (of EU25) are against Turkey even if it reaches the Copenhagen criteria. Austria is the leading opponent country by 81 per cent and Sweden is the strongest supporter by 60 per cent. The countries which prefer less intensive integration within the EU (such as Spain and the UK) are in favour of Turkish membership while the French and Germans are against the Turkish bid due to several specific factors and their intensive approach to European integration (Eurobarometer, 2006: 70-71). As a result of their strong opposition, a new proposal which is ‘privileged partnership’ instead of a full membership started to be spelled out in European circles.

\(^8\) It should be borne in mind that EU citizens tend not to give strong support to new candidates. According to a Eurobarometer poll, conducted in 1997 and published in 1998, support for each of 11 new candidates was between 33-47 per cent (Eurobarometer, 1998: 55; see also Anastasakis, 2004)
**Privileged partnership**

Some countries which are against the Turkish bid argue that proposing a ‘privileged partnership’ to Turkey instead of full membership is much better for both sides. Although the content of the proposal is still vague, the aim is not to lose an ally and weaken economic ties if Turkey cannot be a member of the bloc. However, the discussions on privileged partnership always come to the agenda when the relationship between two sides is problematic. For this reason, the proposal usually disappears without any productive and deep discussion. In fact, Turkey has many bilateral agreements with the EU and a customs union. Therefore, regarding the 'privileged partnership' proposal, Turkey believes that it already has a privileged relationship with the EU (Barysch, 2005: 8).

Germany, Austria and France are the leading countries which think that this offer is the most suitable third way for the relationship with Turkey. While they propose 'privileged partnership' with Ankara instead of full membership, they argue that the EU has changed a lot since the Association Agreement with Turkey (Kylstad, 2010: 18). Even though the Turks were promised to a welcome to the Union in the past, the anti-Turkish camp defend itself by referring to the EU’s deeper integration perspective today. Therefore, their answer to "pacta sunt servanda (agreements must be kept)" is "rebus sic stantibus (things thus standing)" (Kaleağası, 2006: 261). If the ‘privileged partnership’ initiative is going to be like the Barcelona Process⁹ or the European Neighbourhood Policy¹⁰ of the EU, it can be argued that the initiative could become a

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⁹ The Barcelona Process aims to strengthen the relationships between the EU members and non-EU Mediterranean countries since 1995 (Europa Glossary, 2009).
¹⁰ The European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) was developed in 2004 in order to avoid big gaps between the EU and its neighbours. The project aims to achieve better security, prosperity and stability around the EU. The policy includes several countries surrounding the EU borders including Ukraine, Belarus,
symbolic act and it may end up offering no profit for the EU or Turkey (Chatzistavrou, 2008).

A more radical alternative proposal, which has not been sufficiently discussed yet in European political circles, was emphasised by former French Prime Minister Michel Rocard. He thinks that instead of privileged partnership, a gradual membership of Turkey in three phases until 2023 could be better for both sides. According to this, Turkey’s EU membership can start on less disputed areas such as education, culture, research, and environment. Then, if everything goes well, the full membership can be awarded in 2023 when the Turkish Republic will be 100 years old (Rocard, 2008: 89).

Absorption capacity

Another common term in the political discussions on Turkey-EU relations is ‘absorption capacity’. The term is not as new as the term ‘privileged partnership’ since the EU’s capacity to absorb new members was also mentioned in the final declaration of the Copenhagen summit report in 1993. However, it did not influence the Eastern European expansion in a negative way (Aydıñ-Düzgit, 2006: 7). In contrast, the term became a popular excuse to say ‘no’ to the Turkish side during the 3rd October 2005 meeting of EU leaders and in the early period of membership negotiations. It was not only mentioned by European politicians and accordingly the media but was also used in the Negotiating Framework:

"While having full regard to all Copenhagen criteria, including the absorption capacity of the Union, if Turkey is not in a position to assume in full all the

Caucasian countries, countries in the west part of the Middle East, and all North African countries which have coastlines on the Mediterranean Sea (The European Commission Website, 2009). Like some other categorizations or decisions by the EU, the ENP reveals that Turkey is perceived as within the EU. Thus, the ENP does not include Turkey and does not see it as a neighbour but includes Turkey's non-EU neighbours excluding Iran and Iraq.
obligations of membership it must be ensured that Turkey is fully anchored in the European structures through the strongest possible bond” (Negotiating Framework, 2005: 1).

The expression ‘the strongest bond’ in the framework evoked Turkey a ‘privileged partnership’ even though the term was not directly used. Neither absorption capacity nor privileged partnership was mentioned in the negotiating framework of Croatia which started membership negotiations at the same time as Turkey in 2005 (Aydın-Düzgit, 2006: 6). Karlsson (2007) argues that some EU leaders never believed a change might happen in Turkey to that extent. He thinks that when Turkey fulfilled the Copenhagen criteria to start membership negotiations, opponents have started to invent new criteria such as geographical, geo-strategical, cultural, historical and finally the ‘absorption capacity’. Therefore, he asks if any other EU member has been absorbed so far.

After presenting the political discussions, the economic dimension of Turkey-EU relations should also be considered.

3.2.2. Economic discussions

In the 1970s, when the EU was called the Common Market, a leftist political motto in Turkey was popular: "They are the common, we are the market" (Ortaylı, 2008: 103). However, this approach was weakened by the rise of pro-free market politicians (e.g. Turgut Özal) in the 80s and a customs union between Turkey and the EU came into force in 1996 which showed that the Turkish economy could compete with the rival producers in European markets.
Without a doubt, Turkey is economically more connected to Europe than Asia or the Middle East. In 2010, four of the top five export partners of Turkey were EU member countries (CIA The World Factbook, 2012). It is clear that the Turkish economy, similar to those of new members from Middle and Eastern Europe, is not as strong as EU-15. However, if only the GDPs before starting the membership negotiations with the EU is considered for each country, Turkey (in 2003) has better indications than Romania (in 1999) and Bulgaria (in 1999) (Ahtisaari et al., 2004: 40). Besides, when the Turkish economy is compared to ex-communist members of the EU, it can easily be claimed that Turkey is much more experienced in market economy. For instance, while the new EU members, the previously communist countries, did not have any representation at BUSINESSEUROPE (established in 1958), Turkey was one of the members of the organisation (Kaleağası, 2006: 281).

After this brief review of economic discussions, it would be better to explain the economic debates by means of details from pro and anti-Turkish membership stances.

**The economic arguments of Turkey’s supporters**

The pro-Turkish camp argues that Turkey can strengthen the EU's competitiveness in the global market. It is claimed that not including Turkey in European integration may cause the EU to be ranked after China, the US and India in 2040 in the list of economic giants. If Turkey is included, the prediction indicates that the EU can reach the level of the US (Yeşilada et al., 2006).

In contrast with the opponents of Turkish membership, the pro-Turkish camp thinks that there will not be a serious Turkish burden on EU funds. If Turkey joins the EU in
2015, the cost of Turkey’s share in the membership funds will not be more than 0.16 per cent of the EU’s total gross product (Gros, 2005). Furthermore, as it was applied to the new members from the Middle and Eastern Europe, some restrictions in agricultural subsidies, free movement of workers and regional aid will also be applied to Turkey in the first years of membership in order to manage the transition period (Hakura, 2006: 108).

The pro-Turkish camp believes that Turkey “[…] managed to liberalize its economy to a considerable extent, and has been increasingly integrated into the world economy” (Aksoy, 2009: 482-483). The total of Turkish exports increased from less than three billion dollars in 1980 to 20 billion dollars in 1990. Following the economic boom in recent years, the total export exceeded 100 billion dollars in 2007 (Pamuk, 2008). This growing economy is a huge market for EU Member States and it can carry the EU to the new markets. According to Kaleağası (2006: 210), as Spain brings Latin America to the EU, Turkey can bring the Black Sea, Caspian and Middle Asia regions to the EU economy. Moreover, Turkey’s young population can be beneficial for the EU’s social security and retirement systems (Kaleağası, 2006: 112).

Concerning Turkey’s large size and population, and relatively lower GDP performance compared to the EU average, supporters of Turkey’s EU bid defend their view by underlining the rehabilitation effect of long term membership negotiations. They argue that the former EU candidate countries rehabilitated their economies during the negotiations. According to this view, when Turkey is criticised as a poor country, it should be remembered that the negotiation period will be long and Turkey will reach a better economic level at the end of the negotiations. Most of the new members from
Middle and Eastern Europe became a centre of investment during the negotiations and afterwards. The way to the full accession will also encourage Turkey to make significant institutional changes and these developments can lead Turkey to have new entrepreneurship and employment investments (Hakura, 2006: 111).

**The economic arguments of Turkey’s opponents**

Many EU citizens evaluate European integration in terms of its economic effect on their lives and their greatest fear is usually revealed as losing jobs because of immigration (McLaren, 2007: 255). A possible immigration flow of Turkish workers to the EU is one of the main issues that the opponents of Turkish membership in the EU seriously hesitate about (Anastasakis, 2004). The lower income levels are the strongest argument against Turkish integration since they fear that their positions can be substituted by cheaper labour power. This can happen through immigration or moving the industry to Turkey where wages are cheaper (McLaren, 2007: 255). Moreover, in many sectors, producing something in Turkey costs less than in most of the EU Member States. This situation can negatively affect some EU members which produce similar products to Turkey (Arikan, 2008: 237). European farmers are also very uneasy about Turkish integration into the EU. The Turkish agriculture sector is significantly large and it can decrease the prices of products and the shares of subsidies to the farmers of other Member States (McLaren, 2007: 256).

Probably, the strongest trump in the opponents’ hand is the problem of regional differences in Turkey which is incomparable to any EU member. Mango (2004: 250) argues that Turkey has already incorporated a European way of life or standards. However, the problem he underlines is that the opportunities and improvements have
not been expanded to the whole society. This inequality is overlooked in the shadow of political, cultural or geographical discussions concerning Turkey's EU bid. Indeed, Eastern-Western division in Turkey in terms of economy, educational level, and culture is remarkably strong. A reflection of this inequality also shows itself in different parts of big cities as a result of huge internal migration.

According to Morris (2006: 4-5) the seaside in the Bosphorus and the shores of Lake Van can depict the differences between the first world and feudal poverty. While pointing out the Eastern-Western differentiation on the Turkish map, Mango (2004: 208) describes the eastern and south-eastern regions of Turkey as 'Turkey's Middle East'. Similarly, Dismorr (2008: 115) claims that the Kurdish-dominated, southeast of Turkey is more like its oriental, Middle Eastern surroundings and significantly different from the European Mediterranean environment of Turkey's west coast. The reason for this huge gap is related to the imbalanced share of money as the main economic activities are in the western flank of the country, especially in the Marmara and Aegean regions. Because of these differences, the regional income inequality is much more than in the other EU-25 countries (Faucompret and Konings, 2008: 125). For example, when the average GDP unit for Turkey is 100, it is 153 for Marmara region (which includes Istanbul) and only 28 for Eastern Anatolia region (Ahtisaari et al., 2004: 37).

All in all, providing “[...] a functioning and competitive market economy” (Aksoy, 2009: 482) is one of the requirements of fulfilling the Copenhagen criteria. Accordingly, three quarters of the negotiation chapters are related to economics. Turkey still has lots of things to do in the field of economics for its EU bid (Hakura, 2006: 111) and the recent
global financial crisis and its impact in the Eurozone may slow down the integration process of Turkey.

3.2.3. Geographical discussions

This section argues that the geographical categorisations of the world are highly political. In particular, the places which are in the zone of geographical ambiguities can be categorised either in or out by means of politics. It can be claimed that no other continent's borders in the world are as politically manipulated as the eastern (including the southeast) border of Europe. Thus, the geographical ambiguity of Turkey has a crucial place in the discussions concerning Turkey’s EU bid.

Said (2003: 4-5) argues that the Orient and the Occident do not exist as facts of nature. He indicates Vico’s opinion that history is made by humans and connects this argument to the relationship between the East and the West which are shown as cultural and geographical actualities i.e. they are actually human-made. In this respect, the division between Europe and Asia can be seen as the most human-made continent border which annihilates a continent called Eurasia. Europe’s southern, western and northern borders look indisputable as they are surrounded by the sea. However, the eastern end of the continent is porous. Even though there is no standard definition on where Europe’s eastern borders end, the most well known line is probably drawn throughout the Ural Mountains, the River Don, the Caspian Sea to the Black Sea, the Bosphorus, the Dardanelles and the Aegean Sea (Delanty, 1995: 49; Duroselle, 2005). This ambiguity on the eastern side of the continent makes it impossible to discuss the geographical borders of Europe without the impact of politics.
In addition to the historical influences of the Byzantium, the Ottoman and the Russian Empires in Eastern Europe, the EU (the then EEC) was associated with the concept of ‘Europe’ in the Cold War period. This monopoly on the concept restricted the idea of Europe to the western flank of the continent and excluded the eastern part (Delanty, 1995: 129). Even today, the concept of Europe is much more related to Paris and Vienna than Bucharest and Sofia. It can still be witnessed that a person from Istanbul or Belgrade can say "I am going to Europe" when they are going to Western Europe although they are not outside the continent that they refer to. Delanty defines this situation as “the westernization of Europe” (1995: 30) which arose from the time of the Holy Roman Empire when the centre of the continent was shifted from the Mediterranean region to the Baltic. The possible full integration of Turkey to the EU will move the centre point of the continent more to the southeast. This will bring the concept of Europe nearer to its origin, to the land of antiquity.\footnote{If the beginning of the concept of Europe is investigated, there is an irony regarding the discussions of Turkey’s geographical position because ancient Europe was exactly where Turkey is situated now. Delanty (1995: 16) argues that although the idea of Europe was not significant in antiquity, the concept of Europe referred to the Greek world of Asia Minor not western Europe (also see Leontidou, 2004).}

The following examples show how slippery it is to decide on the borders of continents. It is seen in the examples that the continental divisions are not innocent when the definition of geographical places is in the hands of politicians. The ambiguities in the eastern border of Europe will be explained via three places respectively: The island of Cyprus, Asia Minor, and the small European piece of Turkey.
The island of Cyprus

Europe’s eastern border is still like pieces of puzzle for politics and new bits were attached to the complete / incomplete European map in the expansion of the EU in May 2004. Among these pieces, Cypriot membership of the EU was the controversial one for Turkey. However, few people emphasized that the membership of Cyprus was a new legitimating trump for Turkey to use in the discussions regarding geographical aspects. Although Cyprus was an important part of ancient Europe like Asia Minor, now it is the furthest EU member from the European mainland. The island is 170 kilometres from Beirut while the closest EU capital Athens is 500 kilometres away. From Nicosia it takes half an hour to go to Damascus, one hour to Tel Aviv and four hours to Brussels by flight (Karlsson, 2007: 9).

Similarly to Cyprus, Turkey is sometimes included in European maps and sometimes not but the membership of Cyprus has enlarged the frame of the European map and now the big part of Turkey is automatically included in order to position Cyprus in the frame. However, this was manipulated in the new design of the Euro coins where Cyprus was virtually carried and placed in the location of the Aegean Sea and Asia Minor. Turkey was completely excluded except for Eastern Thrace and Istanbul. The former Euro coin design referred to the Member States of the EU instead of representing the whole continent but according to Financial Times, the European Commission proposed a new design which depicts a larger Europe as far as the Caspian Sea, including Turkey. This design was rejected by the European Council and new coins were circulated in 2008. Italian Liberal MEPs, Marco Cappato and Marco Pannella’s, objections did not change the decision. They claimed “the design shows dictatorships, such as Belarus, but not a democratic country like Turkey with whom the accession
talks are ongoing” (Boundsin, 2007). While most nation states and empires have always been keen to add more lands to their sovereignty and to depict these on maps, it is remarkable that the European Council has consciously framed the Europe of the EU in such a way as to exclude Turkey’s geographic existence on euro coins and narrowed the map proposal of the European Commission.

**Asia Minor**

A 'politics led geographical division' could happen in Asia Minor by a military occupation. During the Greco-Turkish war after WWI, on May 1919, a Greek army came to Izmir with the support of British, French and American warships. First Izmir and then the surroundings were occupied (Lewis, 2002: 241). Eventually, the western part of Asia Minor, almost as far as Ankara, was under Greek occupation. If this region had not been taken back by Turks, one could claim that the western flank of Asia Minor could be accepted as part of Europe today. This postulate can be seen in the contemporary status of the Greek Aegean Islands on the west coast of Asia Minor.

**The Small European Piece of Turkey**

The conquest of Constantinople in 1453 by the Ottoman Empire was the start of ongoing discussions about the location of Turkey vis-à-vis Europe. The Islamic civilisation's new capital was now in one of the most important cities of Europe. Therefore, the discussion, which is still alive, was born: “Turkey in Europe” (Delanty, 1995: 36). After proceeding until Vienna in the 16th century, Turkish sovereignty in Europe came back to the most south eastern part of Europe again after WWI. The

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12 It should be highlighted that the term ‘Turkey in Europe’ was also used to refer to the Balkan territories of the Ottoman Empire, particularly in the 19th century (Livianos, 2006).
name of this place is the Turkish part of Thrace which is the land between Edirne (Adrianople) and Istanbul. Thrace includes only three per cent of Turkey but it is bigger than Malta, Cyprus, Luxembourg and Slovenia and insignificantly smaller than Holland and Belgium. This land is remarkably small in relation to the whole Turkish map, however the population in the region is the most densely populated area of Turkey with more than seven million (Karlsson, 2007: 77). If the essentialist geographical definition of Europe is valid, it is not meaningful to claim that this three per cent of Turkey is the legitimising of Turkey's attachment to Europe.

Consequently, although the Treaty of Rome, establishing the EU (the then EEC), does not refer to having one hundred per cent European land in order to be eligible for becoming an EU member (Karlsson, 2007), Turkey can use the historical impact of Asia Minor in ancient Europe to argue for inclusion. As the effect of politics changed the geographical definition of Europe several times in the past, it may not be a big surprise if one day the east of Asia Minor is accepted as the end of the extended European map.

3.2.4. Discussions on culture, identity and religion

The essentialist uncertainty of Turkey's belonging to Europe is not only an issue of geographical discussions (Tekin, 2008: 727). Debates on culture, identity and religion also have crucial roles to play in understanding why Turkey's position between the East and the West is blurred. The economic reservations and political issues were the most important discussions in the Eastern European Enlargement of the EU in 2004. However, when they evaluate their hesitations on Turkey's bid to join the EU, European citizens give more importance to culture, way of life, symbols and values.
more than economic reservations (McLaren, 2007: 273). This gives Turkey's EU bid the unique position in the overall EU enlargement process.

More support in opinion polls in EU Member States for the membership of Ukraine, which is economically and politically further from fulfilling the EU membership criteria than Turkey, can be a sign of the impact of cultural issues on Turkey’s EU bid (Eurobarometer, 2010: 62; also see Strasser, 2008: 179). Another sign is that there were no serious concerns about Romanian and Bulgarian membership in 2007. Therefore, even though the Copenhagen criteria for EU membership do not refer to religion, culture and identity, Turkey’s differences in those issues from Europe are at least as significant as Turkey’s geography, size and economy (Kirişçi, 2008: 29).

An identity between the Eastern and the Western world

Is Turkey significantly different than Europe? Do Turkish people believe that they belong to the Middle East? Answering these questions is never easy. Similar to the story in the epigram of the Introduction Chapter of this thesis, Graham Fuller, at the beginning of his book The New Turkish Republic, talks about one of his memories of Turkey which shows the confusing categorisation of Turkey between the East and the West. According to Fuller’s story, he met a regular Turkish man in a regular town in the Middle Anatolia region in the late 1990s. The man asked him how he learnt to speak Turkish. Fuller answered “I am a Middle East expert”. The man said without any irony “then what are you doing here?” (Fuller, 2008: 27). It is interesting to hear something like this from a regular person in an ordinary town, because in big cities, especially in Istanbul, people rarely define themselves as Middle Easterners. For instance, when Turkey started its membership negotiations in 2005, lots of British reporters went to
Istanbul and asked people if they wanted to be part of Europe. The answers confused the reporters because Istanbulites already felt themselves to be living in Europe (Christensen, 2006: 66). It may be hard to believe those Istanbulites if Europe is perceived only as Western Europe. However, while Europe is expanding to the East, the centre of the continent is also being located further east of Brussels. Karlsson (2007: 82) explains this by using examples from the East and South of Europe. He argues that most Turks are sociologically Europeans. The difference is they are less urbanised than the average European. He believes that Turks who do not see themselves as European in today's Turkey are simply like the people who do not see themselves as European in Cyprus and Malta and especially in Romania and Bulgaria.

**Cultural issues from an essentialist view**

Although the influence of religion in Europeans' daily life is not as strong as before the Reform Movement, the Industrial Revolution and the rise of Communism, still today it cannot be claimed that European culture is free of the influences of Judeo-Christianity (Kahraman, 2002: 10). The impact of religion has even produced a nickname for the EU which is 'the Christian Club'. Regarding this, Pope Benedict XVI, when he was Cardinal Joseph Ratzinger, once emphasised that the idea of a ‘Christian Club’ for Europe is acceptable (Morris, 2006: 196).

Turkey’s position vis-à-vis Europe concerning culture and identity is not welcomed by the essentialist camp. Therefore, what Christensen (2006) and Karlsson (2007) argued above is probably not enough to persuade the Europeans who have an essentialist understanding of Europe. The core of the essentialist and anti-Turkish approach to European identity has been based on excluding the Other instead of finding common
values, aims and an apprehension of belongingness. This makes the points of difference more important than the common heritage. As a result, historically, this approach defines European identity by negating Andalusian Arabs, the Ottoman Empire, overseas colonies, and the Soviet Union (Delanty, 1995). Their understanding sees contemporary Turkey as the Other of Europe too. The exclusionary discourse of this approach is much stronger in the European countries which have “difficulties with their Muslim immigrants, including Turks” (Kirişci, 2008: 31).

In 17th century England, in his work called ‘An Essay towards the Present and Future Peace of Europe by the Establishment of a European Diet, Parliament, or Estate’, William Penn proposed to establish a European Parliament which includes the Ottoman Empire and Russia (Ortaylı, 2008: 10). This proposal can be seen as an important step for the future of European integration. However, the precondition in order to be accepted by this bloc was to be converted to Christianity (Neumann and Welsh, 1991: 340; Neumann, 1999: 51; Karlsson, 2007: 20). Today, there is nothing related to religion in the Copenhagen criteria but there are unwritten, implicit opinions about Turkey’s Muslim identity. Some opponents refer to the impact of religion in Turkish society and how it magnifies the cultural differences between Turkey and Europe. Some of them even think that accepting Turkey to the EU is the core danger for Europe’s Christian identity. They worry that when Turkey is welcomed to the EU, the ratio of Muslim people in the Union will increase significantly (Karlsson, 2007).
Cultural issues from a functionalist and cosmopolitan view

A functionalist or cosmopolitan understanding of the EU does not see cultural and religious differences of Turkey as a problem for European identity. According to this view, the idea of Europe has been changing since it has existed. Therefore, Europe is more a product of history than its subject (Delanty, 1995). In Delanty’s words, in this view Europe can be defined as "a historically fabricated reality of ever-changing forms and dynamics" (1995: 3). The same point of view’s loose definition for European civilisation even provides an in-group place for Turks as “[m]odern Turkey is a combination of the Ottoman heritage and westernization” (Delanty, 2010: 16). This approach opens the door to Turkey which has had a relationship with Europe for 900 years (Ortaylı, 2008: 111). Particularly, European liberal and leftist politicians’ view puts forth that Turkey can find a place in the idea of Europe because

“[i]n the world of the twenty-first century there is no longer a closed space called ‘the Christian West’. With growing transnational interconnections and obligations, Europe is becoming an open network with fluid boundaries in which the outside is already inside” (Beck and Delanty, 2006: 16).

Therefore, positive improvements in the progress of Turkey's EU membership between 1999 and 2005 can be also explained by the rise of functionalist politics in Europe (see Delanty 1995: 145).

All in all, it is a fact that Turkey has been used as ‘negation’ in the identity building process of Europe and it will be hard to delete this from European identity's memory (Chatzistavrou, 2008). However, it is clear that the cultural differences and religion are not the only factors of significance in order to be accepted by Europe. For instance, Turkey's long EU journey would finish if Europe's reaction was as clear as the answer to Morocco. When Turkey applied for full membership in 1987, it took two years to make
a decision to reject Turkey. The reasons for the rejection were political and economic. However, Morocco’s EU bid was instantly rejected on the grounds that it was not a European country, which has never officially been a reason for the Turkish case (Ahtisaari et al., 2004: 13; Rumelili, 2004: 42; Karlsson, 2007: 66; Faucompret and Konings, 2008; MacLennan, 2009: 22). Therefore, one can argue that the relationship between Turkey and the EU is not a basic Muslim-Christian identities’ clash. It is a product of a complex structure which includes all political, economic, geographical, and cultural aspects discussed above. Consequently, this complex structure is one of the points which justifies the applicability of the notion of ‘a positive Other’ concerning the representation of Turkey’s EU bid in the British media (see the Analytical Framework Chapter).

3.3. Media representation of Turkey-EU relations

Having presented the key points of discussion concerning Turkey-EU relations in the broad literature, this section focuses on a more specific literature which consists of the studies on the media representation of Turkey-EU relations. The large extent of this specific literature includes journal articles while there are also few theses, books, book chapters, and conference papers (inter alia Gencel-Bek, 2001; Durna, 2004; Leinonen, 2004; Chaban et al., 2005; Öktem, 2005; Baştürk-Akca and Yılmaztürk, 2006; Christensen, 2006; Koenig et al., 2006; Loukas, 2006; Marin et al., 2006; Aissaoui 2007; Devran, 2007; Ergül, 2007; Negrine, 2008; Negrine et al., 2008; Tekin, 2008; Aksoy, 2009; Bryce, 2009a; Bryce, 2009b; Kejanlioğlu and Taş, 2009; Orhon and Dimitrakopoulou, 2009; Schneeberger, 2009, 2011; Walter and Albert, 2009; Wimmel, 2009; Bischof et al., 2010; Tekin, 2010; Paksoy, 2010; Paksoy, 2011; Papanathanassopoulou and Negrine, 2011; Hinrichsen, 2012). The studies found in the
literature were all published after 2001 and their scope is mainly newspapers from Turkey and EU Member States.

3.3.1. A snapshot on the specific literature

There is a growing literature on media representation of Turkey-EU relations. The academic interest in the topic reached its peak in 2008 and 2009. The majority of the research projects focus on the 3rd October 2005 process when Turkey started membership negotiations with the EU. English language media is the most common research sample. There are several works which focus on the British and American press and one more study comprises the Australian and New Zealand news media. In addition to the English language media, news content from many countries’ (such as France, Germany, Turkey, Austria, Greece, Spain, Slovenia, Sweden) national media have been investigated on the issue so far. Even though several studies are only focused on one country (inter alia Negrine, 2008; Bryce 2009a; Tekin, 2010), there is also a substantial literature on EU-wide and national media comparative research projects covering more than one country’s media (e.g. Chaban et al., 2005; Koenig et al., 2006; Negrine et al., 2008; Wimmel, 2009; Bischof et al., 2010; Hinrichsen, 2012). Several studies ground their theoretical framework on Orientalism or at least draw on Edward Said while explaining their findings (inter alia Baştürk-Akca and Yılmaztürk, 2006; Devran, 2007; Bryce, 2009a; Bryce 2009b; Kejanlioğlu and Taş, 2009; Bischof et al., 2010). Nonetheless, it can be argued that the majority of the literature concentrates on empirical data instead of drawing on a heavy theoretical framework. Concerning the methods employed in the studies, it was discovered that the interest in qualitative methods -especially content and discourse analysis- is more common than a quantitative approach.
3.3.2. The findings in previous studies

This section will elucidate how previous studies dealt with the media representation of Turkey’s EU bid and what they presented in their findings. Following the precedent set in the previous sections in this chapter, more importance will be given to the points which are related to this thesis’ research framework.

3.3.2.1. The main issues and topics in the findings

The literature often illustrates the media representation of the geographical, cultural, historical, and political discussions on the issue. As most studies’ research samples include the period around 2004 and 2005, the political debates before and after the start of membership negotiations have a crucial influence on the findings. It was found that various actors, subjects, positive or negative political issues and terms, such as the Cyprus issue, democratic deficits or improvements, economy, the EU’s ‘absorption capacity’ and proposing ‘privileged partnership’ instead of full membership for Turkey, are widely included in the analysed news items.

Issues were covered with different framings in different countries. For instance, economic debates were often overlooked in the French and Greek media while Turkey’s economic power was represented as an advantage of Turkish membership in the British coverage (Papathanassopoulos and Negrine, 2011: 164; also see Koenig et al., 2006; Negrine et al., 2008). Similarly, political issues are not consistent. The same political debates are represented differently in different countries -as well as in different periods- as they change throughout Turkey’s EU membership journey. Therefore, it can be seen in the literature that media coverage represents at the same
time both Turkey’s old and new image in democracy, human rights and economy. On some occasions, this even leads to a confusion concerning what Turkey has really transformed into (Christensen, 2006: 68; Chaban et al., 2005: 28). In the example of the British media, this causes a more complex situation as the general Turcophile stance of the papers are usually interrupted by the drawbacks of Turkish membership and the differences of Turkey from EU Member States. Negrine argues “[...] a careful reader of the British press would be confronted by a representation of Turkey and the European Union that emphasized differences despite the overwhelming support the press gave to the bid” (2008: 626).

‘Problems between Turkey and the EU’ is a common finding in most studies. For instance, the problematic or difficult themes are the most coded ones in a study on the British, French, Greek and Turkish news coverage (Negrine et al., 2008). The analyses about the French and German press in particular, show that the media tend to cover Turkish membership discussions by focusing on the possible problems which might be brought to the EU by Turkish accession. Moreover, the total number of references to differences between Europe and Turkey in the news content by far outnumber the similarities. Accordingly, it was found in the French press that Turkey’s EU bid often becomes an issue of domestic politics in France (Negrine et al., 2008). As expected, Turkish membership is linked to a possible immigration flow which is always a trump card in right wing politicians’ hands, particularly before the elections. Regarding this issue, a remarkably counterfactual argument was detected in Le Figaro on 16th December 2004. The French daily pointed out that the extreme right wing party Front National (FN) which claimed “200 million Turkish-speaking people” were waiting for Turkish accession to immigrate to Europe (Tekin, 2008: 747). The example refers to
Turkic people in Middle Asian countries as if they are Turkish passport holders and as if they speak completely the same language with Turkish citizens. This kind of extreme examples concerning the Turkish issue are relatively rare in the British press where the debate on the issue is less tense.

The studies which specifically focus on the British press show that the general tone of the news items published in the UK are by and large in favour of Turkey’s EU bid (Öktem, 2005; Christensen, 2006; Baştürk-Akca and Yılmaztürk, 2006; Koenig et al., 2006; Negrine, 2008; Negrine et al., 2008; Aksoy, 2009; Bryce, 2009a; Bryce, 2009b; Schneeberger, 2009; Wimmel, 2009; Paksoy, 2011; Papathanassopoulos and Negrine, 2011). However, this does not mean that the opposition discourse and the drawbacks of Turkish membership are not portrayed. For instance, Devran’s study (2007) shows that the Orientalist discourse dominates the British coverage on Turkey. Moreover, the opinion polls from France and Germany where the results are significantly anti-Turkish can be frequently seen in the British coverage (Papathanassopoulos and Negrine, 2011: 163). Besides, the British press does not hesitate to present economic, political and cultural differences between Turkey and the EU Member States. “Turkey has generally been deemed to be too populous, too poor, too undemocratic, too illiberal and too culturally different to become a full member of the EU” (Aksoy, 2009: 470). Even some left-leaning or liberal-minded news organisations such as The Guardian have a tendency to emphasise the cultural dissimilarities (Schneeberger, 2009). The continuous representation of these differences may cause a mediated Othering of Turkey in the European context (Schneeberger, 2009: 99). Nevertheless, in the British media representation of Turkey, the negative and critical elements are always together
with the positive overall tone compared to the representation in the Franco-German media:

“What is indeed striking in the British [media] debate is that all negative arguments on Turkey’s democratic deficits and status as a cultural misfit are recognised by most authors but the conclusions differ profoundly from those of the Turco-sceptic agenda of continental European debates” (Öktem, 2005: 13).

More differences between the coverage of continental Europe and the British will be discussed together with the essentialist and functionalist understanding of the EU in the following section.

3.3.2.2. The findings on the essentialist and functionalist view

Several studies in the literature suggest that there was a cleavage between the Franco-German media and British media in their approach to Turkish membership (inter alia Öktem, 2005: 10; Koenig et al., 2006; Devran, 2007; Negrine et al., 2008: 53; Wimmel, 2009). The reason for the differences between the two can be categorised by Franco-German media’s essentialist and the British media’s functionalist understanding of the EU. Compared to the British media, the extent of illustrating Turkey as the Other is greater in the continental European press where the recontextualisation of the dichotomies “Orient and Occident, tradition and modernity, civilisation and barbarism” is frequently observable in the news items concerning Turkey-EU relations (Bischof et al., 2010: 377). The reason for this manifest Othering in the European press can be explained by stances such as ‘ingroup favoritism’ which refers to an essentialist understanding of Europe (Tekin, 2008). In contrast, it was found that the discussions of Turkey’s EU accession in the British newspapers were framed in a more liberal multiculturalist way compared to the news items published in France and Germany (Koenig et al., 2006: 158). Regarding the same segmentation, Negrine et al. (2008: 56-
claimed that the UK and France had different experiences in their relations with Turkey and the EU. Because of the dissimilarity in their experiences, the French media’s approach sees the incompatibilities between Turkey and the EU as permanent issues which do matter. On the contrary, the British coverage argues that Turkey’s problem on the way to reach EU membership can be dealt with, since being part of European identity depends on fulfilling the principles which were specified beforehand rather than the essentialist aspects of Europeanness (Schneeberger, 2009: 99).

Therefore, it can be argued that the British media often evaluates the Turkish issue by means of tangible topics such as economics and human rights while the French is more interested in identity issues such as questioning “‘Who are ‘we’? What is the ‘EU’?’” (Negrine et al., 2008; also see Aissaoui, 2007: 8; Tekin, 2008). The questioning is usually related to an essentialist understanding of European identity. The excerpt below from a French politician, François Bayrou, quoted in Le Figaro, is an explicit example to show the degree of the essentialist view.

“Bayrou argued that Europe is a cultural project as well as a political one and presented European culture as rooted in Christianity and the legacy of ancient Greece and Rome. He stated that ‘one cannot treat with disdain one’s heritage that draws on the legacy of the Rome–Athens–Jerusalem triptych’[...]” (Aissaoui, 2007: 9).

The difference between the essentialist and functionalist camps inevitably cause different observations on the same issues. The examples from The Guardian and Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung in Wimmel’s study (2009) explain this point.

“[...] Chris Alden interpreted the territorial size and the rapid population growth not as a substantial structural problem, but as the greatest potential advantage of Turkey’s inclusion in the EU, a fact of which nobody on the continent wanted to take serious note. ‘The most obvious strengths to Turkey’s case are its size, strategic position and powerful military’ (GUA, 12 Dec 2002: 18). The potential conflict between widening and deepening the EU expressed almost ad nauseam by the FAZ [Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung] journalists was not even perceived in passing as a problem by the Guardian journalists, so
incomprehensible was the ambition of a deepened political integration to them” (Wimmel, 2009: 236).

All these differences between the Franco-German axis and the Anglo-Saxon perspective converge at one point which is *Europe’s finality*, namely the “old controversies between a politically integrated European federal state (*Bundesstaat*) and an intergovernmental association of sovereign nation-states (*Staatenbund*)” (Wimmel, 2009: 224). It can be argued that the media representation of Turkey’s EU bid is shaped by this very controversy. Therefore, Turkey is a popular object to exploit in the media debate of *Europe’s finality* as Turkish membership of the EU unveils what the EU wants to be in the future.

### 3.3.3. What can this study add to the shortcomings in the literature?

Probably the main shortcoming in the literature is the deficit of production and reception studies. No study on the media representation of Turkey’s EU bid has used interviews in order to explore the news production step. Only one study (Schneeberger, 2011) conducted focus groups as a method. Moreover, almost all academic work was based on an analysis of newspapers. While very few studies looked at the news coverage on TV (e.g. Chaban et al., 2005; Hinrichsen, 2012), no research project has focused on radio, magazines, news websites or social media. Only three studies presented a visual analysis of news photographs of Turkey-EU relations (Baştürk-Akca and Yılmaztürk, 2006; Loukas, 2006; Paksoy, 2010). It is significantly rare to see a study which makes a sufficient literature review concerning the existing studies on media representation of Turkey’s EU bid. For this reason, it was discovered that several studies did not quote from each other.

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13 Only Tekin’s study (2010) of the French political discourse on Turkey’s EU bid includes interviews with journalists who work for the French media. However, the interviews in her study were not conducted in order to analyse the news production step.
The differences of this thesis compared to the existing literature are: the complete presentation of the specific literature on the media coverage of Turkey-EU relations since 2001; wider material and time samples on news content; and interviewing journalists as an additional method in order to look at the production of the news items. Moreover, this study employs an analytical framework based on the notion of ‘a positive Other’ which seeks to better explain the findings and propose a conceptualisation concerning the media representation of Turkey-EU relations in the British media context.

3.4. Conclusion

The broad literature on Turkey-EU relations and the specific literature on the media representation of Turkey’s EU bid were demonstrated by focusing on the points which are related to the main concerns of this thesis.

In the first section, the literature on Turkey-EU relations was examined by a categorisation of political, economic, geographical and cultural discussions. The overall view on Turkey throughout these categories was that Turkey was enjoying its position between the Eastern and the Western world while it was also suffering an identity crisis because of not belonging to any side. Therefore, it is impossible to decide on a consistent image of Turkey for Europeans. The section also argued that understanding Turkey-EU relations is significantly related to how the EU is imagined. It was claimed that a person’s ‘functionalist’ or an ‘essentialist’ perspective to the EU more or less reveals their thoughts on the Turkish issue.
The second section of the chapter focused on the particular literature which is about the media representation of Turkey-EU relations in various countries. The examination of the data was mostly performed by discourse or content analysis and they looked mainly at some periods in 2004 and/or 2005.

Having presented the previous studies on the issue, the section also illustrated the deficits in the literature. It was found that the majority of research projects on the issue were interested in newspaper analysis and overlooked the reception and production analysis. The end of the chapter explained what this study can add to the extant literature by taking into account the aforementioned shortcomings. Consequently, all the new aspects and their contribution to the lacunae in the literature will be underlined in detail in the next chapter on analytical framework, and then in the following one on the methodology. Finally, how these different aspects were applied in the thesis can be observed throughout the data presentation in relevant chapters.
CHAPTER 4: ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK

“The opposite of light shows what is light,
Hence colors too are known by their opposite.
God created pain and grief for this purpose,
To wit, to manifest happiness by its opposites.
Hidden things are manifested by their opposites;
But, as God has no opposite. He remains hidden.”
Rumi

4.1. Introduction

Almost everything requires an opposite to come into existence and to make sense.

Similarly, identities also need an opposite to define and make themselves stronger
(Fürsich, 2002). Drawing on Bakhtin, Tekin argues

“[…] meaning is, in essence, dialogic and all meaning is relational. Therefore it is
impossible to consider one Self as a Self, and to become self-conscious, if one
does not reveal one’s Self to the Other, through the Other and with the help of
the Other” (2010: 12).

Thus, it can be argued that the Self and the Other are interdependent. This applies to
how European identity was/is being constituted since “[…] the construction of a
European common identity depends on the existence of Europe’s cultural others”
(Kösebalaban, 2007: 97). Regarding this, Hall says

“[…] the West’s sense of itself - its identity - was formed not only by the
internal processes that gradually moulded Western European countries into a
distinct type of society, but also through Europe’s sense of difference from
other worlds - how it came to represent itself in relation to these ‘others.’”

In the same way, Delanty (1995) argues that European identity required a common
enemy since “[c]onsciousness of a shared history was an impossible criterion: the
divisions and discontinuities in European history were too great to produce a unified
“Asia and the idea of the Orient was [...] one of the mirrors in which a European self-image emerged in a long historical process” (Stråth, 2000: 411). Within this demarcation, as an historical Other of Europe, Turkey has been contributing to what is meant by ‘European’ for centuries (Delanty, 1995). However, it has recently started to take charge of a new duty by playing the role of the European Other in a different way while waiting at the front door of the EU as an official EU membership candidate. This time Turkey is not an object to serve as the central Other of the European identity as it had been in the past. Instead, Turkey is now the object of the discussions on ‘what is European identity and where does it end?’ between the European rivals, namely the UK and the Franco-German axis, which compete on what the EU will evolve into. Therefore, when the concepts ‘the Self’ and ‘the Other’ are evaluated in the context of Turkey-EU relations, the approaches to Turkey’s EU membership are directly related to the definition of the EU. That is why Turkish membership does not only refer to Turkey’s status, but also to the EU’s future identity and the rationale of European integration (Beck and Delanty, 2006: 11; Tekin, 2008; Aksoy, 2009; Wimmel, 2009; Kylstad, 2010; Papathanassopoulos and Negrine, 2011). Accordingly, Turkey “[…] throws up questions about what the EU is, what it means to be European, what it means to be in Europe, and who should be in and who should be out” (Papathanassopoulos and Negrine, 2011: 168). Hence, the representation of Turkey’s EU bid in the British media is actually the objectification of Turkey in the contention between the two aforementioned rival sides of the EU.

In the light of the brief discussion above, this chapter seeks to build an analytical framework for the findings and discussions of this thesis. First of all, the chapter will
describe the notion of ‘a positive Other’. Then, the chapter discusses the notion together with its links with Self/Other nexus and Orientalism. The main argument here is that there are different types of Others and they are not static. Furthermore, it is argued that the relationship between the Self and the Other does not have to be based on antagonism.

Through the end of the chapter, it will be illustrated why the notion of ‘a positive Other’ is the core of the analytical framework of this thesis. In accepting the existence of a continuum of different types of Others and different degrees of positive and negative relationships between the Self and the Other, it is asserted that the representation of Turkey’s EU bid in the British media can be ideally contextualised by the notion of ‘a positive Other’.

4.2. An explanation of ‘a positive Other’

Since Claude Lévi-Strauss introduced the term “l’égo et l’autre”, the concepts “the Self” and “the Other” have received significant attention from researchers who study identity, especially in disciplines such as cultural studies, media studies, international relations, sociology and history (Criss, 2008: 67). For instance, Sartre and others highlighted the importance of the Other in explaining the formation of the Self. Foucault put forth the necessity of looking at who the Others are in understanding the sane and the mad (Neumann and Welsh, 1991: 332). Furthermore, Said’s (2003: 3) initiative to show how the European Self empowered itself by degrading its Oriental Other are additional examples of what these two terms are about (Neumann and Welsh, 1991: 332). Connected to the latter, there are numerous studies underlining the differences and clashes between the European Self and its Other (inter alia
Neumann and Welsh, 1991; Hall, 1995; Robins, 1996; Neumann, 1996; Hall; 1997; Said, 1997; Stråth, 2002; Said, 2003; Kösebalaban, 2007; Strasser, 2008; Tekin, 2008; Bryce; 2009a; 2009b; Tekin, 2010). However, ‘a positive Other’, a term coined by Neumann and Welsh (1991), has not reached the place it deserves in theoretical discussions concerning the Self/Other nexus. This chapter attempts to place the British media representation of Turkey-EU relations within an analytical framework of ‘a positive Other’, in other words ‘positive othering’.

While writing on how the Other can also be a positive entity, Neumann and Welsh (1991) give examples from 18th century philosophers of the Enlightenment such as Rousseau’s point on the ‘noble savage’ and Cusanus’ argument concerning the importance of a dialogue in attaining positive results in relations with the Turks. According to Neumann and Welsh “[…] one should not rule out the possibility of turning a traditionally apposite Other into a positive Other, with which one could have mutually fruitful interaction” (1991: 331). There are a few studies in the literature which borrowed Neumann and Welsh’s (1991) notion. They employed it in order to explain the relationship between nationalism and identity (Petersoo, 2007; Borou, 2009; Esperza, 2010). In addition, some studies in the literature support the idea of ‘positive othering’ even though they do not refer to the notion directly. For instance, certain studies on liberal constructivism in International Relations theory underline that the Other should not always necessarily be a dangerous entity (Wendt, 1994; Rumelili, 2004; Tekin, 2010). In this respect, “the contingency and the transformability” are the main points highlighted by liberal constructivists while understanding the relationship between the Self and the Other (Rumelili, 2004: 34). Therefore, what they
discuss by referring to ‘positive identification’ can be related to the notion of ‘a positive Other’.

4.2.1. The Other is not static and not one type

There are various types of Others and most of them are open to change (Billig, 1995: 81). This means that Others may have specific characteristics, different relationships with the Self and different proximities to the Self. Therefore, this thesis argues that different types of Others and their non-static character in relation with the Self underpins the formation of ‘a positive Other’.

Even though, following Said’s argument, “the possibility of cosmopolitan interaction between the West and East becomes seemingly impossible given that the former’s identity has been defined negatively against the latter through the construction of orientalism” (Hobson, 2006: 107), the changes in the world and expectations in politics may alter the status of the Other (Petersoo, 2007). Therefore, it is meaningful to recall another of Said’s points which highlights the dynamic character of othering by saying “each age and society recreates its Others” (Said, 1979: 322 cited in Tekin, 2010: 176). Tekin (2010: 176) connects this dynamic nature to the existence of an identification from negative to positive which may lead the Other to be an extension of the Self in the long run. This transformation has been proven by history several times. For instance, the problematic relationships between Germany and France, Britain and Europe, and Eastern and Western Europe were resolved in the 20th century (Tekin, 2010: 176). Moreover, Turkey itself is an outstanding example in this type of transformation.
“With the demise of the Ottoman Empire in the wake of the 1908 revolution of the Young Turks and the defeat in World War I, a representation of Turkey began to take shape as a normalizing and modernizing nation and, with its entry into NATO, even as a trusted ally. More important, in being represented as a case of normalization, the transformation from a sick to a reborn and young body politic also made ‘the Turk’ less central as a constitutive other” (Neumann, 1999: 60).

The resolutions in Europe mentioned above and Turkey’s transformation concerning its relationship with the European Self show that political, economic, and geographical actualities make the Other changeable.

As part of its *raison d'être*, the Other should be, to some degree, different from the Self. However, the relationship between the two does not have to be antagonistic (Rumelili, 2004; Petersoo, 2007: 120). Moreover, Tekin (2010), following Todorov (1999), argues that the Other does not have to be seen as unequal. She asserts that the Self’s aim to define itself is not only

“dependent on the attribution of absolute negativity, as it has been suggested by some earlier constructivist works. In this view, it is the absolute or radical difference of the Other that accomplishes its constitutive role in the formation of collective identities” (Tekin, 2010: 14).

At this point, it can be argued that the representation of the Other can be seen as a ‘continuum’ (Tekin, 2010: 14; also see Wendt, 1994; Rumelili, 2004).

“Along this continuum, relations of identity and difference, and cooperation and conflict are assumed to co-vary. In negative identification, self sees the other as different, threatening, and inferior, and their relations are characterised by conflict and the ever-present possibility of war. In positive identification, the other is seen as similar, and as a non-threatening extension of self, and going to war with the other becomes a non-possibility” (Rumelili, 2004: 34).

Similarly, identifying the different types of Others is related to how the Self is defined. For instance, if the European Self is associated with essentialist characteristics, the transformation of the Other in order to be an extension of the Self would be
significantly difficult. Moreover, the Other then requires its differences to be assessed by the Self as temporary and amendable. Concerning this issue, Rumelili says

“If difference is constructed to be deriving from inherent characteristics (the other as non-self), then the possibilities for change in the ‘other’ are by definition nonexistent, and the other is placed in a position of permanent difference. If, on the other hand, difference is constructed to be deriving from acquired characteristics (the other as less self), then, by definition, there is the possibility that the other will become like self one day, so the other is only in a position of temporary difference” (2004: 37).

In addition to the discussions above, one should also examine Bakic-Hayden’s (1995) theory of “nesting orientalisms” in order to explore the existence of different types of Others in relation to the European Self. According to her theory, “Asia is more ‘East’ or ‘other’ than eastern Europe; within eastern Europe itself this gradation is reproduced with the Balkans perceived as most ‘eastern’; within the Balkans there are similarly constructed hierarchies” (Bakic-Hayden, 1995: 918). Bakic-Hayden’s point can be reified by looking at those countries which are the European Other and those located on the periphery of Europe. For instance, the Turks’ position as a European Other is historically identified (inter alia Neumann, 1999; Stråth, 2002; Karlsson, 2007; Strasser, 2008; Aksoy, 2009; Bryce, 2009; Lazarou, 2010). Apart from their impact on Europe’s religion and culture as an Other, the Ottoman Turk was also the important Other for the establishment of the modern state system in Europe (Neumann and Welsh, 1991: 330; Neumann, 1999: 43). Even today, the French discursive space sees Turkey as the most distant Other of Europe when compared to American, Russian and even North African Others. Within French political discourse, Morocco, whose membership bid was rejected by the EU (the then EC) in 1987, is evaluated as much closer to France than Turkey (Tekin, 2010).
Consequently, in the light of the discussions above, this study accepts the existence of different levels of Others, and argues that Turkey’s position in its relation to the European Self should be evaluated within their particular relatedness rather than a nebulous and broad binary of Self/Other. While admitting this, the study does not seek to impoverish the meaning of the Other. Seeing the relationship between the Self and the Other as a continuum does not ignore the very existence of both sides of the nexus as they are the actual reason for the emergence of ‘a positive Other’.

4.3. Employing the notion of ‘a positive Other’ in this study

Having explained what this study means by ‘a positive Other’ and the similar points in the liberal constructivists’ understanding of Self/Other nexus above, this section argues that the notion of ‘a positive Other’ can theoretically explain what this study deals with in its empirical work. As was outlined in the literature review, the majority of news organisations in the British media are in favour of Turkish membership of the EU. The mostly positive tone in the coverage generally represents a functionalist, and sometimes a Kantian approach to the Turkish issue. This is because the British media sees the EU in a cosmopolitan way in order to reach a “peaceful coexistence between diverse states through interdependence and law-governed relations” in Europe (Kylstad, 2010: 15; also see Delanty, 2006). However, the coverage of the same news organisations continuously highlight Turkey’s differences from Europe, and also in a sense orientalise Turkey in the EU membership context. In order to reach a better understanding of this controversial-looking situation, these significant findings require ‘a positive Other’ as a sub-notion within the Self/Other nexus or Orientalism.
4.3.1. Orientalism and positive othering

Some of the existing research on the media representation of Turkey-EU relations, including the analyses of the British coverage, utilise the importance of Orientalism, especially Said’s *Orientalism*, in their theoretical background, (*inter alia* Baştürk-Akca and Yılmaztürk, 2006; Devran, 2007; Kejanlioğlu and Taş, 2009; Bischof et al., 2010). This thesis also draws on Said in many cases since it acknowledges Orientalism’s “central importance for an investigation of representations of the Islamic world (specifically the Near and Middle East) as the cultural contestant against which 'the West' first had to define itself” (Bryce, 2009b: 67; also see Kösebalaban, 2007: 97).

However, it would not be adequate to set the analytical framework of this thesis only within a view which is interested in an analysis of the exclusion of the Oriental (Turkey) from the Occidental (the EU), or exploring the media representation through the clashes between the Self and the Other.

The long relationship between “‘Europe and the Turk' is not one of perennial mutual hostility, of an undifferentiated Western anti-Turkish prejudice [...]” (Bryce, 2009b: 115). The relations are often influenced by pragmatic expectations from both sides rather than only *essentialist* goals. On the contrary, Orientalism is mainly based on an analysis of a political doctrine which makes the differences between the East and the West much stronger (Said, 2003: 204). It is primarily motivated by the West’s relations with particularly the Arab Muslims within the colonial and post-colonial circumstances. Therefore, drawing on Orientalism or other theoretical approaches which focus on ‘othering’ in the context of Turkey-EU relations in the British media fails to see a crucial point concerning ‘the British exceptionalism’ (Smith, 2005; also see Marcussen and Roscher, 2000: 345; Anastakis, 2004: 8), namely the Eurosceptic character of the
British media and the awkward relationships between the UK and the EU. More importantly, building the analysis only as a critique of the Orientalist discourse in the media coverage beforehand may slant the research outcomes in a negative way. The section below elucidates the position of the Orientalist discourse in this study and discusses the extent to which it is – or is not – useful in explaining what this study deals with.

4.3.2. Said’s view on Orientalism and how much this study can benefit from it

The basic definition of Orientalism refers to activities such as teaching, writing or researching the Orient. Accordingly, the people who perform these activities are the Orientalists (Said, 2003). However, the concept’s meaning is not limited to an academic discipline or a group of people who are interested in discovering the Orient. Orientalism also refers to a way of thinking that is established on the ontological and epistemological differences between the Orient and the Occident (Said, 2003: 2). It is possible to see those differences in the works of many poets, researchers, philosophers, economists, political theorists, and administrators (Said, 2003: 2). There is also the third meaning “which is something more historically and materially defined” (Said, 2003: 3) compared to the other definitions above.

“Taking the late eighteenth century as a very roughly defined starting point Orientalism can be discussed and analyzed as the corporate institution for dealing with the Orient – dealing with it by making statements about it, authorizing views of it, describing it, by teaching it, settling it, ruling over it: in short, Orientalism as a Western style for dominating, restructuring, and having authority over the Orient” (Said, 2003: 3)

Following this definition, Said mentions that he employs Foucault’s notion of discourse in order to analyse how European culture managed and even produced the Orient in...
the post-Enlightenment (Said, 2003: 3). At this point, the notion of ‘power’ has a crucial role to play. Hall argues

“[p]ower not only constrains and prevents: it is also productive. It produces new discourses, new kinds of knowledge (i.e. Orientalism), new objects of knowledge (the Orient), it shapes new practices (colonization) and institutions (colonial government)” (1997: 261).

All in all, it can be argued that Said is interested in the analysis of a Western-originated discourse which identifies the Orient, makes comments on it, and furthermore dominates it.

Orientalism sees the West as a natural born eminence when compared to the East. Therefore, Orientalist thought examines the West through the contrast between the 'Self' and the 'Other' which is actually the categorisation of the 'advanced' and the 'backward' (Hobson, 2004: 7; Aissaoui, 2007: 13). Moreover, in Hall’s words, it is a discourse which produces “racialized knowledge of the Other” (1997: 260). To put it mildly, Orientalist discourse is reductionist. It tends to represent the negative side of the Orient’s characteristics. It shows its reductionism in different fields such as arts, literature, media, politics, academia, etc. Said gives a striking example from an essay, published by Harold W. Glidden in the American Journal of Psychiatry in February 1972, which can explain the level of this reductionism. The title of the essay is 'The Arab World'; it deals with the Orientalist frame of mind. Even though it is only four pages long, it claims to reflect the psychological portrait of 100 million Arabs for a period of 1300 years (Said, 2003: 48). There are other examples which illustrate the traces of Orientalism in some prominent Western scientists’ language. For instance, Weber “[...] contrasted Islam with Western Europe in terms of modern social development” (Hall, 1995: 222). He thinks that features like 'rationality' and
'predictability' can be only seen in the West (Hobson, 2004: 15). According to his Orientalist view, the Occident world owns the rational science and rational individual while the Orient accommodates coercive religions and a collective way of life (Hobson, 2004: 16). Similarly,

“Montesquieu held that one could define the nature of any particular state, society, or individual with reference to an ahistorical, constant criterion such as climate or religion. Despotism was exclusively defined as an Oriental regime to be encountered only in Asia; it corresponded to the warm-climate zone” (Çıarakman, 2001: 57).

**Insufficient remarks on Turkey in Said’s Orientalism**

Even though Said’s *Orientalism* is a widely acknowledged work, there are various critiques concerning its theoretical and methodological problems (Lewis, 1982; Bayoumi and Rubin, 2001). For instance, Mellor criticises Said’s Foucauldian approach.

“[…][H]is reduction of all knowledge and understanding to discursive representations of power interests not only substitutes a textual imperialism for colonial hegemony but also encourages an easy recourse to accusations of racism and ethnocentricism that actually limits rather than expands the intellectual possibilities of scholarship” (Mellor, 2004: 101).

Another criticism performed by Mellor (2004) directs to the fundamentals of Said’s work. Said criticises the interest of Orientalists on Western sources while explaining the Orient. However, concerning this issue Mellor argues that Said “himself looks to Foucault and Gramsci rather than to Middle Eastern philosophers and theologians” (Mellor, 2004: 101). Elaborating these issues could lead this section to long and nebulous discussions while this thesis is more interested in the critiques on Said’s work related to its lack of references to Turkey and its status within the Orientalist discourse. Therefore, this section seeks to discuss what Said had written on Turkey and its position between the East and the West.
Even though Said had already mentioned in the introduction chapter of *Orientalism* that Germans and Russians had less to do with the Orientalist tradition (Said, 2003: 1), *Orientalism* was criticised by several scholars (e.g. Ahmad, 2000; Irwin, 2006; Varisco, 2007) because of its limited scope of research material which overlooks examples from Germany and Russia while it focuses on Britain, France and the US (Lewis, 1982: 13; Bryce, 2009b: 65). The lacuna is not only limited to the sample on the Occident. Said’s work does not focus on Turkey as much as it does on other leading countries and nations of the Middle East. Bryce (2009b: 1) argues that the discussions on the Ottoman Empire and the Turkish Republic in Said are not satisfactory when compared to the continuous references to the Muslim Arab countries (also see Lewis, 1982: 9).

Similarly, MacLean (2006: viii) argues “[…] Said himself omitted any discussion of the Ottoman Empire from *Orientalism*”. The reason for Said’s lack of interest in Turkey could be related to “his close association of the Orientalist discourse with the extension of de-facto and formal colonial rule by European powers in the Arabic-speaking Middle East” (Bryce, 2009b: 112). Even though the majority of this region used to be part of the Ottoman Empire, one can argue that Said’s discussions concerning those countries do not originate from his thoughts on Ottoman Turkey or Modern Turkey. Bryce (2009b: 112) explains the non-existence of Turkey in the centre of Said’s *Orientalism* by using the notion of *liminality*. He argues

> “It is not that Said necessarily neglects Turkey (it features as a unit of analysis where instrumentally relevant to his thesis) but that he does not consider the *liminal*, disruptive positions that the Ottoman Empire and the Republic of Turkey occupy vis-à-vis the reified notions of Europe or the West (materially and discursively) […]” (Bryce, 2009b: 112).

In the same vein, Said’s other seminal work *Covering Islam* (1997) does not deal with Turkey in the most crucial discussions of the book. For instance, Said does not mention Turkey when he argues that the Islamic world, from North Africa to South Asia,
‘excluding Lebanon’ (Said’s emphasis), articulates itself by using Islamic terms (Said, 1997: 62-63). If he thought that Turkey was not part of this region but a member of the periphery, he could have at least referred to Turkey’s position in expressing itself through secular or Islamic terms. Turkey is mentioned in some sections of Covering Islam, such as Turkey’s decision to live a western way of life together with Israel in the Middle East (Said, 1997: 138). However, Turkey was never treated as one of the main countries discussed in the book.

Similar to Orientalism, his book Covering Islam also puts forward immensely crucial arguments on how the West sees the East but these are not theoretically and empirically sufficient to adopt in the case of Turkey and its bid to join the EU. The very limited reference to Turkey in Covering Islam could be because of Said’s main interest in the oil crises in 1974, the Iranian Revolution in 1979, Islamic fundamentalism and terror while explaining the stress between the Eastern and the Western world. One can argue that these issues are not directly related to Turkey and that is why Turkey was overlooked in most examples given in the book. Making the same explanation for Turkey’s status in Orientalism is probably inadequate. The reason for the insufficient focus on Turkey in his work Orientalism can be the fact that Turkey is not the most appropriate example to explain the differences between the East and the West. More analysis on Turkey could have even impoverished Said’s several arguments in Orientalism. Thus, Bryce’s (2009b) aforementioned point on Said’s lack of interest in Turkey’s liminality in its relationship with Europe is meaningful. Consequently, the disinterest in Turkey in Said’s works not only causes Turkey’s limited appearance in the discussions on the Oriental discourse but also leads to a lack of emphasis on Turkey’s special position between the East and the West. It can be argued that drawing on the
Orientalist thought for a study on the representation of Turkey-EU relations in the German or Austrian context, where “more exclusivist interpretation of European identity” (Schneeberger, 2009: 100) exists, would be more convenient (see Ramm, 2009). Besides, employing the complete version of Said’s approach in Orientalism would have been an ideal choice if the case had been on the representation of Morocco’s EU bid in the French or German media. Therefore, this study requires a notion which can explain Turkey’s EU bid in the British coverage beyond simply saying that ‘Turkey is being orientalised’.

4.4. Turkey as ‘a positive Other’ in the context of the British media

When Neumann and Welsh (1991: 331) explained their notion of ‘a positive Other’, they referred to a ‘mutual fruitful interaction’ between the Self and the Other. If this is the main condition of transforming an Other into a positive Other, it can be argued that the British media’s and Government’s expectations of the results of Turkish membership of the EU are the aspects of this fruitful interaction. Before understanding why the British media sees Turkey as ‘a positive Other’, one should look at the special relationship between the British media and the EU.

4.4.1. The British media and the EU

There is a general acceptance of the awkward position of the UK in the EU. Compared to France and Germany, “the fundamental attitudes of the British elite towards European integration have remained essentially the same since the end of World War II” (Marcussen and Roscher, 2000: 344). Inevitably, this awkwardness has an impact on the constitution of the Eurosceptic approach of the British media in EU affairs (see Anderson and Weymouth, 1999; Dougal, 2003; Öktem, 2005). This Euroscepticism
shows itself in the news coverage at different levels. There are some clear objections regarding further integration with the EU, which are “[...] economic (with socio-political undertones), political (mainly sovereignty and defence issues) and the historic-cultural, including at its most extreme, a palpable dislike of foreigners, and of Germany in particular” (Anderson and Weymouth, 1999: 63). For instance, when the discussions about the EMU (Economic and Monetary Union in the EU) were on the agenda, it was emphasised that Britain had a strong currency and using the same currency with other members of the EU would weaken British control on the national economy. Moreover, there are some political discussions which argue that Britain has a sound parliamentary democracy and if the authority of the British Parliament is partly or fully transferred to the hands of Brussels’ non-elected bureaucrats, the power of the national parliament may diminish. Moreover, the Eurosceptic approach in the British press argues that the strong foreign policy of the UK may lose its power if further integration comes into force. In addition to this, it is claimed that the British military power can be more influential if it continues to cooperate with the NATO alliance instead of choosing an advanced military integration with other EU members (Anderson and Weymouth, 1999: 5).

There is an identity issue behind the practical issues mentioned above. Anderson and Weymouth (1999: 5-6) argue that the strong Euroscepticism in the British press contributes to the construction of an external ‘Other’ for the British which is ‘continental Europe’. This is what two European Others –but within different contexts– ‘Turkey’ and ‘the UK’ have in common. Since ‘their enemy’s enemy is their friend’, the situation establishes a ground for a pro-Turkish stance in the British coverage of
Turkey’s EU bid. Accordingly, this substantiates the conceptualisation of Turkey’s representation as ‘a positive Other’.

### 4.4.2. Why is Turkey ‘a positive Other’ for the British media?

Having discussed the British media’s approach to the EU affairs in brief, this section focuses on the rationale behind portraying Turkey as ‘a positive Other’. The reasons why the UK is in favour of Turkey’s EU bid, listed by Anastasakis (2004) and Öktem (2005) below, can also refer to why Turkey is ‘a positive Other’ in the British media:

“[…] the way in which Britain perceives (a) the future of the European Union (and the position of Turkey within this); (b) its strategic interests in the region of the eastern Mediterranean and the Middle East (and Turkey’s compatibility with those interests) and (c) the British approach to ‘Other’ identities and cultures” (Anastasakis, 2004: 7).

“The UK’s foreign policy objectives are decidedly trans-Atlanticist, and its economic interests are global rather than European. […] The case for Turkey’s membership bid then appears as the perfect template on which UK visions of Europe, clearly shaped by British Euroscepticism and, indeed, visions for global governance can be expressed. From this perspective, the accession of Turkey would make possible the transformation of the EU into a free-trade zone of democratic states and subvert Franco-German hegemony and perceived plans for a supra-national European state” (Öktem, 2005: 15-16).

Thus, the British politicians advocate that “[...] Turkey should be let in for the sake of British interests if it fulfils the entry criteria, regardless of whether it is culturally part of Europe or not” (Aksoy, 2009: 475). In order to elaborate on those reasons, one should point out that the UK’s and Turkey’s relations with Europe/the EU are relatively different compared to other major EU Member States and the positions of other EU membership candidates. On the one hand, Turkey is part of Eastern civilisation but has also been positioned awkwardly in the Western world since the Treaty of Paris in 1856, which is “commonly cited as the date at which the Sublime Porte was formally admitted into the European club of states” (Neumann and Welsh, 1991: 331; Ortayli,
2008: 111). Besides, this can be proven by the political conditions of the contemporary world as Turkey is part of NATO, the Council of Europe, and an official EU membership candidate. On the other hand, the UK has an idiosyncratic status in Europe because of its history and contemporary position in Brussels (see Anderson and Weymouth, 1999; Ash, 2001; Anastasakis, 2004; Öktem, 2005; Wimmel, 2009). “Britain often challenged the motives of the EU and acted against the prospect of a supranational entity, fearing that it could dominate British national interests” (Anastasakis, 2004: 8). Therefore, the UK and accordingly the British media in general envisage a looser EU which promotes free trade together with a protection of national sovereignty. Furthermore, compared to its rivals in the EU, the UK’s “integrationist approach to different cultures explains the limited significance of culturalist arguments in the [British] public debate” (Anastasakis, 2004: 7). These reveal that the UK employs its European identity in a more functionalist way than an essentialist one. Therefore, one can argue that the UK’s European identity can be seen as an example of ‘postmodern collectivity’ (Rumelili, 2004: 46). Even though this collectivity requires a difference from the Other, it does not see the Other as a threat to its European identity (Rumelili, 2004: 46).

Seeing Turkey as a non-threatening positive Other in the context of its EU bid is related to how the Self considers the conditions of being accepted to be an extension of itself. The Self’s positive approach, in this case that of the UK and the British media, to the Turkish issue is primarily connected to what the British understand from the EU project. Continental Europe’s hesitations regarding Turkish membership and how the cultural borders of Europe are going to be defined (Lazarou, 2010: 27) is not generally an issue in the UK. Because of Britain’s inclusive understanding of European identity, Turkey’s differences from the EU are degraded into some temporary practicalities.
These practicalities can be amended according to written values (such as the Copenhagen criteria) and finally, the Other can be part of the Self if it fulfils its responsibilities.

In addition to all these, Turkey’s own characteristics also contribute to the UK’s and the British media’s expectations. Keyman’s (2006) long sentence below summarises a long debate:

“Turkey with its ability to achieve the co-existence of Islam, secular modernity and democracy constitutes an alternative modernity, and it is this characteristic of Turkey that creates its recent perception in academic and political discourse as an important actor whose experience of modernity should be taken seriously by any attempt aiming at going beyond the clash of civilisations, beyond the orientalist divide between the West and the East, and more importantly beyond the culturally essentialist and fundamentalist desires to codify difference as the dangerous Other” (Keyman, 2006: 206).

Therefore, it can be argued that Turkey has been trying to dispose of its representation as ‘the Other’ – at least since the start of the Republican period (Aksoy, 2009: 471). Its representation concerning its EU bid in the British media can be seen as one of the most suitable domains to dispose of its image as ‘the European Other’.

4.5. Conclusion

The chapter has shown that the Other does not have to be a static entity. Its positive relationship with the Self and the changing circumstances which surround the Other’s characteristics can make the borders between being the Other and being the Self porous. It was proposed in the chapter that Turkey’s EU bid discussions in the British media is one of the suitable examples to explain the conditions above. Therefore, the notion of ‘a positive Other’ was employed in order to conceptualise how Turkey was represented in the British media.
The notion does not simply refer to being between the Self and the Other. The notion has to do with an entity that still protects its certain characteristics as an Other, but also transformed itself by meeting a set of desired norms (e.g. the Copenhagen criteria) in order to be accepted by the Self. Thus, the Other’s efforts to make itself ‘a positive Other’ is not possible before the Self admits this transformation.

The notion of ‘a positive Other’ can be improved in further studies in order to better explain media content which includes similar issues. It can be useful in various contexts, especially when a media outlet supports an issue with several caveats in the coverage. It does not have to be related only to countries, it can be applied in any context which includes some positive aspects that can be added to the Other. However, the Other should be accepted by the Self even though the media represents its differences from the Self.

All in all, this chapter claimed that the representation of Turkey’s EU membership in the British coverage cannot be understood by only employing the theoretical discussions covering the Orientalist thought or Self/Other nexus. Turkey’s special status between the Eastern and Western world, the UK’s awkward relationship with the EU and the British media’s overall Eurosceptic approach to EU affairs constitute a perfect domain to apply the notion of ‘a positive Other’. Therefore, it is a necessity for this study to draw on ‘positive othering’ in order to conceptualise Turkey’s aforementioned special status in the British media.
CHAPTER 5: METHODOLOGY

5.1. Introduction

A specific method employed in a research project cannot always be adequate to explore what the study seeks to uncover. Moreover, “a research method appropriate for one question may be inappropriate for another” (Gray, 2004: 33). Thus, triangulation is implemented and methods are usually supported by other methods in order to reach more reliable findings.

According to Jensen, “[...] triangulation is a general strategy for gaining several perspectives on the same phenomenon. In attempting to verify and validate findings, the strategy addresses aspects of both reliability and validity” (Jensen, 2002b: 272). Therefore, quantitative and qualitative findings can be merged and utilised within the consistency of triangulation (Gray 2004: 257). This increases the scope and quality of the research as using quantitative and qualitative approaches coherently together makes the analysis much stronger (Deacon et al., 1999: 134).

In this study, the examination on the media representation of Turkey-EU relations in the British media is conducted by finding answers to supplementary research questions in each empirical chapter (see the research questions in chapters 6, 7, 8, 9). Even though all supplementary research questions seek to contribute to answering the main research question, they are grounded on a variety of topics. Because of this variety among the supplementary questions, the methodological framework requires a triangulation of different methods. Therefore, as part of its triangulation, this study
employs three methods to collect and analyse the data: Quantitative content analysis; Qualitative content analysis; In-depth interviews.

The three sub-sections below explain why the three methods utilised in this study were chosen. Then, the chapter illustrates how the research sample was formed. In the last section, a detailed explanation regarding the application of each method to the research sample is put forward.

5.1.1. Analysing the content

As this study employs two types of content analysis, it would be useful to explain how much the quantitative content analysis and the qualitative content analysis need the help of each other in this study’s research framework.

The quantitative content analysis in this study is employed to find and highlight broad aspects of the analysed material. The analysis seeks to put forward the ‘big picture’ only and the results may not reveal the essence of what is being analysed. Regarding this point, Deacon et al. argue “[...] the [quantitative] method is not well suited to studying ‘deep’ questions about textual and discursive forms” (1999: 117). For this reason, there would have been a serious deficit in findings of this study if the research methodology had been only based on quantitative aspects of the news items about Turkey’s EU bid. Therefore, the research requires a qualitative textual analysis which can help to “overcome the common limitations of traditional quantitative content analysis such as limitation to manifest content and to quantifiable categories” (Fürsich, 2009: 240-241). By employing qualitative methods in this research, the researcher will be able to learn “the intricate details of phenomena” (Strauss and Corbin, 1990: 19)
and “discern latent meaning, [...] implicit patterns, assumptions and omissions of a text” (Fürsich, 2009: 241). While doing that, the findings from the quantitative content analysis can contribute to the qualitative work as the quantitative findings in Chapter 6 can be seen as a manifest analysis (see Riffe et al., 2008) which helps to better comprehend the qualitative content analysis. Richardson explains how quantitative analysis on news coverage helped him in his work ‘(Mis)Representing Islam’ (Richardson, 2004) in grounding his qualitative analysis:

“[The research] developed from quantifying the patterns across a sample of texts (content analysis) into a project aimed at examining meaning within texts and relationships between these meanings and the wider processes of newspaper production and consumption; it developed from summarising what newspapers write about Islam to a project aimed at analysing how newspapers write about Islam [...]” (Richardson, 2007: 20).

5.1.2. Talking to the journalists in the field

Fürsich (2009) underlines the importance of analysing a “single text” in media research, even though it is independent from production and reception analyses. She refers to “the autonomy of cultural practices or objects as signifiers in their own right” (Fürsich, 2009: 240), which considers the possibility of analysing a single text without looking at the aims of producers and the understanding of reception. However, others have drawn attention to the importance of studying how content is produced and consumed (see for example Shoemaker and Reese, 1996; Philo, 2007; Firmstone, 2008b). Greg Philo’s (2007) recent critical intervention, ‘Can Discourse Analysis successfully explain the content of media and journalistic practice?’, refers to the deficit of production and reception analyses when a qualitative study is conducted on content. As “the discursive practices of journalism are the processes through which journalists produce texts, and readers use and understand them [...]” (Richardson, 2007: 75), Philo (2007) claims that even a detailed analysis performed on content is
not enough to explain the communicative event. He evidently criticises Norman Fairclough’s\textsuperscript{14} and Teun van Dijk’s approach in Critical Discourse Analysis, claiming that their work “does not include the study of key production factors in journalism or the analysis of audience understanding” (Philo, 2007: 175). His critique was actually “directed to any type of stand-alone, qualitative textual analysis” (Fürsich, 2009: 238) because Fürsich (2009: 238) underlines that Philo is in favour of an approach which sees research in media studies “as a totality” (Philo, 2007: 194). Regarding the same issue, Fowler (1991: 222) stresses the importance of other factors as news items are not just ‘reality but a product’. He suggests,

“[News] is produced by an industry, shaped by the bureaucratic and economic structure of that industry, by the relations between the media and other industries and [. . .] by relations with government and with other political organisations” (Fowler, 1991: 222).

Philo’s (2007) comments regarding the importance of production and reception studies in the context of media analysis fit in well with the scope of this study. Therefore, by means of conducting interviews with journalists from the British media, the chapters of news production (Chapter 8 and Chapter 9) of this thesis seek to explain the production process of news items on Turkey-EU relations, and the journalists’ personal views on Turkish membership of the EU.

\textsuperscript{14} In fact, Fairclough’s approach does take into account ‘productional’ and ‘interpretive’ processes on theoretical level (Fairclough, 1995). According to his approach,

“[...] [A] media text such as a newspaper article or the transcript of a TV news bulletin is not a definitively accomplished entity. It is rather the product of interaction between a process of production and processes of interpretation in which participants draw on the resources of knowledge, belief, ideas, values and assumptions which are available to them. Texts in this sense occur as the interplay between the ‘traces’ they bear of their production and the ‘cues’ they provide for their interpretation” (Deacon et al., 1999: 152).
5.1.3. The deficit of reception

Applying Philo’s approach of full ‘totality’, or in Fürsich’s (2009: 249) words a ‘multi-step approach’ to media research might make this study more rigid. However, looking at reception while staying within the boundaries of this research project was not methodologically possible.

As the news items chosen for the study are the starting point of both quantitative and qualitative news content analysis and the interviews conducted with the journalists who had written these news items, a reception study should also have been connected to these news items for consistency within the research. However, the research’s time sample, covering the period between 1999 and 2006, makes it problematic to conduct a reception study which can highlight what British readers understand from the news items about Turkey-EU relations. Some focus groups could have been organised during the research project (between 2009 and 2012) in order to identify readers’ opinions on the Turkish issue and see their interaction with news items. Yet studies focusing on historic news items cannot easily connect with audiences who can really contribute to the research (Fürsich, 2009: 245). Thus, it was felt that the unpopularity of the Turkish membership case since 2006 and the weakened audience memory would have made it hard to grasp what their opinion would have been within the relevant time sample of the research.

All in all, it is obvious that the ideal media research study should include all aspects of the process from the beginning of the creation of the message to its content, and finally to its comprehension by an audience. Yet, several factors such as technical and economic issues usually prevent media researchers from covering all three steps.
Extensive research projects such as the Glasgow University Media Group have conducted studies which cover production, content, and reception aspects at the same time. However, ‘single site projects’ can be seen more often if the studies of media in the past are investigated (Fürsich, 2009: 239).

5.2. Research sample

Before elucidating how the methods were applied in this study, it would be useful to explain the research sample. Therefore, this section looks at how the research and time samples were designed and what techniques were used to collect the research material. The research sample constitutes the material for quantitative content analysis, the basis for the smaller sample of qualitative content analysis on news coverage and the interviews with the journalists. Even though the three methods have different samples, each method’s sample is connected to the others and they are all fed from the same source to different extents. The section firstly explains how the time period was chosen to collect the news items on Turkey-EU relations, published in the British media.

5.2.1. Sample of events chosen for analysis

A systematic analysis which is eligible to be validated requires to be based on a research design which was specified prior to starting the analysis. Employing such criteria of selection for material and time samples before collecting the data and conducting the analysis provides an investigation with a systematic approach and to some extent, a degree of objectivity (Gray, 2009: 500). Therefore, first of all, the research sample of this thesis should be based on sufficient representative period/s.
Attention to European integration on the news media increases when significant EU meetings happen or new rules come into force. Empirical studies show that news reports about the EU reach a peak when key events take place (de Vreese, 2001: 286). “[...] [A]s full membership turned into a realizable prospect, the press gave increasing coverage to Turkey-related news and commentary, palpably to a greater extent than it did for any other candidate” (Aksoy, 2009: 470). Therefore, Turkey’s EU bid has become an important topic on the EU agenda since the Helsinki Summit in 1999 when Turkey became an official candidate for membership. Accordingly, the academic interest in the media representation of Turkey-EU relations started to grow from 2001 on (see Gencel-Bek, 2001). Furthermore, as seen below, when “Turkey-EU relations” was searched in Google News Archives, it was seen that the distribution of this topic in news items that are in English had reached a peak in 2004 and started to decrease after 2006 (Google News Archives, 2008).

Figure 5.1: Turkey-EU relations in Google News Archives

Therefore, the sample selection for this study was based around six important events in Turkey-EU relations between 1999 when Turkey was accepted as an official EU membership candidate and 2006 when membership negotiations were damaged by the port crisis between Turkey and Cyprus. The events were compiled from different sources such as Birand (2001), Dedeoglu (2003a), Faucompret and Konings (2008), and chronological data of the Turkish Ministry for EU Affairs, formerly known as Secretariat
General for EU Affairs (Secretariat, 2010). In order to place these events in context, one week before and one week after the events were included in the time sample. Sundays were excluded. The events below constitute the time sample of the study (more details concerning these events were presented in Chapter 2).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Events’ date</th>
<th>Events’ content</th>
<th>The period added to the research sample</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>10th – 11th December 1999</td>
<td>Turkey became an official EU membership candidate at the Helsinki Summit.</td>
<td>From 02-12-1999 until 20-12-1999</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3rd August 2002</td>
<td>The Turkish Parliament abolished capital punishment and gave broadcasting rights for different mother tongues and dialects, including Kurdish in order to meet EU standards.</td>
<td>From 26-07-2002 until 12-08-2002</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12th – 13th December 2002</td>
<td>In the European Council Summit in Copenhagen, it was declared that a decision for ‘Turkey – EU negotiations starting date’ would be made in December 2004.</td>
<td>From 04-12-2002 until 21-12-2002</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16th - 17th December 2004</td>
<td>In the European Council Summit in Brussels, the Commission’s report, which recommended start of membership negotiations with Turkey, was accepted.</td>
<td>From 08-12-2004 until 25-12-2004</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3rd October 2005</td>
<td>Turkey started membership negotiations with the EU.</td>
<td>From 24-09-2005 until 11-10-2005</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29th November 2006</td>
<td>Because of a lack of compromise on the Cyprus issue, namely the port problem between Turkey and Cyprus, the EU Commission froze some of the negotiation chapters with Turkey.</td>
<td>From 21-11-2006 until 07-12-2006</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

5.2.2. Selection of media outlets

Having decided on the time range of the sample, five national newspapers were selected for the analysis. These were The Guardian, The Daily Telegraph, Financial Times (the FT, London edition), the Daily Mail, and the Daily Mirror. Moreover, BBC
News Online was also included in the research sample in order to look at how the Turkish issue was covered in an online news resource which had never been previously used in studies of the media representation of Turkey-EU relations\textsuperscript{15}.

The media outlets’ political stance, especially whether they are Europhile or Eurosceptic, is the first criteria in order to make a balanced and representative sample selection.

5.2.2.1. Eurosceptics vs Europhiles

The newspapers which represent a notably critical view of the EU and its influences on the UK in general can be accepted as Eurosceptic newspapers. The Eurosceptic approach is seen in any type of newspaper in Britain but it can be said that it is much more common in tabloids (Anderson and Weymouth, 1999: 63). On the other hand, the papers which have a pro-European stance and which are relatively more positive to Britain’s participation in European integration can be named as Europhile papers. In terms of categorising some prominent British news organisations according to their stance in European issues, it is possible to claim that

“[t]he discourse of the Independent, Guardian, Financial Times and the Mirror [...] is not unreservedly pro-European. [...] However this pro-European discourse distinguishes itself from the dominant Euroscepticism of the British press represented by the Telegraph, The Times, Mail, Express and Sun [...]” (Anderson and Weymouth, 1999: 111).

Following this evaluation, the table below was prepared according to market type, political stance on EU affairs (Anderson and Weymouth, 1999; Swatridge, 2003;...)

\textsuperscript{15} It should be clarified that most news items analysed in this study were not only published as hardcopy but also digitally on the websites of each newspaper. All news organisations included in the sample, excluding the FT, offer free access to their websites. This means that the news items are available for all English speakers from all around the world via the internet.
Anderson, 2004; Geddes, 2004: 219; Aksoy, 2009), and the circulation figures provided by the Audit Bureau of Circulations (2005). The figures originate from the average numbers per day in October 2005 – a month when the frequency of news items on Turkey-EU relations reached a peak in the British media. The highlighted papers in the table are the ones which were selected for the analysis.

Table 5.2: Newspapers’ distribution according to their market type, circulation figures (October 2005) and broad stance on European integration

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Market Type</th>
<th>Newspaper</th>
<th>Total daily circulation (October – 2005)</th>
<th>Broad stance on European integration</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>TABLOID</td>
<td>The Sun</td>
<td>3,224,327</td>
<td>Eurosceptic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>The Daily Mirror</td>
<td>1,684,660</td>
<td>Europhile</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>The Daily Star</td>
<td>820,028</td>
<td>Europhile</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MID-MARKET</td>
<td>The Daily Mail</td>
<td>2,246,243</td>
<td>Eurosceptic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>The Daily Express</td>
<td>810,827</td>
<td>Eurosceptic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BROADSHEET</td>
<td>The Daily Telegraph</td>
<td>847,311</td>
<td>Eurosceptic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>The Times</td>
<td>659,510</td>
<td>Eurosceptic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>The Guardian</td>
<td>387,524</td>
<td>Europhile</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Financial Times</td>
<td>384,615</td>
<td>Europhile</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>The Independent</td>
<td>231,092</td>
<td>Europhile</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Among the news organisations in the research sample, BBC News Online is the hardest one to position between Europhile and Eurosceptic groups. During the interviews, conducted for this thesis, two journalists from the BBC persistently claimed that the BBC is impartial in European affairs. However, impartiality in media is a complex issue and it is almost impossible to use this concept without ‘relatively’ before it.

16 No account is taken on the ownership of these newspapers because the sample represents a balanced view between Eurosceptic and Europhile newspapers.
“The commercial sector was and is required by the law to present news and, generally, to treat contentious public issues with due impartiality [in the UK], whereas the BBC, through its governors, traditionally promised to behave with due impartiality on controversial matters” (Wilson, 1996: 39).

Following an accusation that the BBC is systematically Europhile, an independent panel report (2005: 4) on the BBC coverage of the EU puts it clearly: “Although the BBC wishes to be impartial in its news coverage of the EU it is not succeeding\(^\text{17}\). The report does not accept that the BBC has a systematic Europhile approach but it recommends that “[t]he BBC must not slip into construing its task as either one of counterbalancing ‘ignorant anti-European’ prejudice stimulated by the eurosceptic section of the press, or as taking its agenda from that press” (Independent panel report, 2005: 5). Finally, the report advises that the BBC should cover EU affairs more noticeably impartially. Conversely, Anderson (2004: 169) argues that the BBC content is also influenced by the strong Euroscepticism in the British media (also see McLeod, 2003). Therefore, it can be argued that there is an ambiguity in the position of the BBC and that is why it is included in the research sample neither as Eurosceptic nor Europhile.

The papers’ market type, circulation figures, and their stance between political right and left were the other criteria taken into account while choosing the news organisations for the research sample. The Guardian can be accepted as the leading paper of the British left while The Daily Telegraph represents the right wing (Negrine, 2008: 631). Besides, the FT was selected because of its significant interest in EU affairs and international politics. One can argue that all these three quality papers in the

\(^{17}\) The report explains the problem of impartiality under five headings which are “Institutional mindset”, “Over simplified polarisation of the issues and stereotyping”, “Westminster prism”, “Ignorance”, and “Omission” (Independent panel report, 2005: 4).
sample have more influence on decision-makers, the elite, and accordingly the British political agenda than most other newspapers.

Concerning the justification of the selection of tabloids, the *Daily Mail* is a powerful mid-market tabloid with a circulation of more than two million copies daily (Negrine, 2008: 631). The *Daily Mirror* is a representative of the British left wing tabloids. According to Anderson and Weymouth (1999: 83), these two tabloids publish more reports on EU affairs than *The Sun*.

### 5.2.3. Collecting the research material

The databases *LexisNexis*, *NewsBank*, and *Factiva* were used to collect the majority of material from newspapers. The news items of BBC News were gathered from the online archive of BBC News. Some missing materials from *The Daily Telegraph* were provided from *The Daily Telegraph’s* own archive. In order not to overlook any news items in the time sample, three different statements which are “Turkey and the EU”, “Turkey’s EU bid”, and "Turkey EU" were placed in inverted commas in electronic archive’s search engines. To be selected for analysis, the item must have more than 100 words and the main context must be directly related to Turkey-EU relations. The items which only made a passing reference to Turkey’s EU bid were not included. All types of news items were incorporated into the sample as a unit of analysis while letters to editors and visual components were excluded.

**A special case: Financial Times**

*Financial Times*, an overt Europhile paper, is the newspaper of choice especially in Brussels for many EU institutions, business associations, think-tanks, NGOs, etc.
(Corcoran and Fahy, 2009: 103). It covers the EU in detail, “enjoys privileged access to EU institutions and has a strong record of publishing exclusive stories about European affairs, or publishing one-on-one interviews with Commissioners and other high-ranking officials” (Corcoran and Fahy, 2009: 104). The FT has also an enormous interest in Turkey and its bid to join the EU. It is perhaps the strongest supporter of Turkish membership and its support is significantly explicit compared to other British news organisations. In total, 127 news items about Turkish membership were eligible for selection criteria in the FT within the time sample of this study, which is far more than the number of news items published by all the other media outlets. However, it was risky to add so many items from one newspaper to the sample as it might have skewed the total outcomes of the analyses in a sample where the other five news organisations published 123 news items in total. Excluding all news items from the FT would have also damaged the validity of the research. Thus, it was decided that the FT could contribute to the research through an analysis limited to the items which were published in ‘the negotiations’ period\(^{18}\), when the discussions surrounding Turkey’s EU membership reached a peak in the British media. Finally, 107 items of the total of all 127 items published by the FT were excluded and only 20 items were added to the research sample. As a result, the total of the research sample reached 143 news items which were published by six different news organisations.

\(^{18}\) In order to be aware of the FT’s position in other events, some news items were scanned and read. Although it was not a systematic analysis, it can be assumed that the FT’s position is not different from its coverage in the period which is chosen for this study.
5.2.4. Distribution of research sample among three methods

Before explaining how different methods utilised the research sample in detail, Figure 5.2 below summarises the distribution of the selected research material among three different methods.

**Figure 5.2:** Distribution of research material among different methods

1. **RESEARCH POPULATION:**
   News items concerning Turkey-EU relations published anytime in the British media.

2. **QUANTITATIVE CONTENT ANALYSIS:** The selected 143 news items from six events between 1999 and 2006 which were published by six media outlets.

3. **QUALITATIVE CONTENT ANALYSIS:** The selected 30 news items (five items from each media outlet).

4. **PRODUCTION ANALYSIS:**
   The interview sample of 21 journalists who wrote the news items of the research sample.

**Research sample for quantitative content analysis**

All aforementioned 143 news items are included in the quantitative content analysis.

**Research sample for qualitative content analysis**

Because of the breadth of the sample for a qualitative analysis, instead of employing all 143 news items, it was decided to choose five ‘typical’ news items from each of six news organisations which amounts to 30 news items in total. Qualitative analysis focuses on “typical texts” (Wodak and Meyer, 2009: 23). Thus, these 30 items, selected
for the systematic analysis, should be the typical ones which cover most of the discussions concerning Turkey-EU relations. “What is typical in which social situation, and for which aspect of a social problem, however, frequently remains vague” (Wodak and Meyer, 2009: 23). In order to get rid of the vagueness, it was decided that the best examples for qualitative content analysis could be the news items which cover the highest number of ‘issues’ (such as ‘Democracy and human rights issues’, ‘the Cyprus issue’, ‘the Armenian issue’, etc.) that are listed in the Quantitative Content Analysis Chapter.

In order not to exceed the quota of five news items per news organisation, the number of words was taken into account if the number of issues is the same for the news items (Say, each of A, B, C, and D covers five issues and they are included in the sample. If news item E and F cover four issues, then news item E was selected for the fifth position as it covers more words in the text).

Apart from the systematic analysis of these 30 news items, other items among 143 items were also scanned. In this way, it is possible to investigate if 30 news items can represent the whole sample and if there are some different points which could be useful in qualitative analysis that were not found in the sample of 30 news items. For instance, findings related to the ‘historical events and concepts’ in the qualitative content analysis were enriched by some of the items that were not selected for the qualitative analysis sample.

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19 Five news items, which include the highest number of ‘main issues,’ were selected from each news organisation. However, only four news items from the Daily Mirror include ‘main issues’. Because of this, even though the fifth item from the Daily Mirror did not include any issue, it was added to the sample in order to equalise the number of news items from each news organisation.
Research sample for production analysis

The selection of the journalists for the interviews was made according to specific criteria. The aim was to talk to the journalists who had written the news items that were analysed in the quantitative and qualitative content analysis of the study. Therefore, the names of 62 different journalists who wrote the 143 news items were listed. Emails, telephone calls, and connecting with gatekeepers helped the researcher to contact these journalists. However, it was not possible to reach or get positive replies from all of them due to a variety of reasons. Some journalists had changed their career. Some had moved away or were no longer interested in the Turkish membership. Many journalists were always busy and some of them refused to talk. There was no response at all from 14 journalists and, unfortunately, one of them had passed away.

Using the snowball technique was usually not possible due to the constraints imposed by the selection criteria in the research sample. The aim of the project was not to talk to any journalist who had, at one point in time, written about Turkey-EU relations; the aim was to talk to the journalists who had written the news items between 1999 and 2006, particularly in the context of specific events which were selected for the content analysis sample of the study. In brief, the journalists must have been the ones who had written the news items that had been selected for the research sample of this study. Finally, 21 journalists who agreed to participate in the interviews formed the production step of the study.
5.3. Application of each method

5.3.1. Quantitative analysis

According to Holsti’s inclusive definition “content analysis is any technique for making inferences by objectively and systematically identifying specified characteristics of messages” (1969: 14). However, the definition of ‘content analysis’ is not very consistent within the academy. Some researchers’ definitions have a more general view and they argue that content analysis refers to all methods which examine content. According to some others, content analysis is associated more with a “specific analytical approach” (Deacon et al., 1999: 115).

Even though the majority of definitions refer to the ‘systematic’ character of content analysis (Riffe et al., 2008: 23), it is not possible to expect that all readers and analysts understand the same from the same text. Krippendorff (2004: 23) argues “[i]f content analysts were not allowed to read texts in ways that are different from the ways other readers do, content analysis would be pointless”. According to him,

“[c]ritical scholarship would be stifled if it could not go outside of what everyone accepts as true. Content analysis is in trouble only when expert interpretations fail to acknowledge the uses of texts by designated populations of readers or actors, particularly when content analysts fail to spell out the criteria for validating their results” (Krippendorff, 2004: 23).

This research puts emphasis on the specific analytical approach of content analysis which gives great importance to being systematic. Following Krippendorff’s definition (2004: 18): “[c]ontent analysis is a research technique for making replicable and valid inferences from texts (or other meaningful matter) to the contexts of their use”, it can be argued that

“quantitative content analysis is reductionist, with sampling and operational or measurement procedures that reduce communication phenomena to
manageable data (e.g. numbers) from which inferences may be drawn about the phenomena themselves” (Riffe et al., 2008: 23).

Dealing with 143 news items of the research sample, and finding their general overview would be impossible without the quantification of data. Thus, quantitative content analysis is one of the methods that was employed in this study to perform a systematic examination of the coverage on Turkey-EU relations. At this point, it is worth asking what a systematic examination consists of. Riffe et al.’s explanation firstly refers to research design. They argue:

“Whether testing theory-driven hypotheses or solving practical problems, one may speak of the researcher being systematic on [...] research design: the planning of operational procedures to be employed. The researcher who determines in advance such research design issues as the time frame for a study, what kind of communication constitutes the focus of the study, what the variables are to be, or how precise the measurement must be—who, in effect, lays the ground rules in advance for what qualifies as evidence of sufficient quality that the research question can be answered—is also being systematic.” (2008: 25)

In the light of their explanation, it can be argued that in order to conduct the analysis systematically and make it eligible to be validated, the research design should be specified before starting the content analysis. Having already explained the systematic selection of research material in the previous section, the preparation of the coding schedule, reliability test and presentation of the data are described below.

**Coding schedule**

Quantitative content analysis seeks to generate numerical data from a research sample. A coding schedule should be prepared to transform a text-based content into numbers because “[c]oding is the transcribing, recording, categorizing, or interpreting of given units of analysis into the terms of a data language so that they can be compared and analyzed” (Krippendorff, 2004: 220).
Before designing a coding schedule, a saturation sample was prepared in order to see what kinds of issues are discussed in news items. By this means, the coding schedule was designed by taking into account the saturation sample, literature review and research questions of the study. The categories in the coding schedule consist of several themes such as: distribution and frequency of news items; topics, statements, issues, labels that are associated with Turkey-EU relations; different countries’ approach to Turkish membership; reasons for being in favour or being against Turkey’s EU bid; and the mandatory conditions, which were underlined for Turkish accession to the EU. As new themes and issues emerged throughout the analysis, new values were added to the categories until the completion of the coding schedule for each news item. Coding per category was done by up to three or six values from the beginning of text depending on the question (see Negrine, 2008: 633; Kejanlıoğlu and Taş, 2009: 44). The final version of the coding schedule can be seen in Appendix I.

**Inter-coder reliability test**

Validity and replicability are significant features of a systematic analysis. In order to make these features visible, analysts’ values and beliefs should not influence the results of analysis. Furthermore, when coders analyse the same material, there should be consistency among their answers on the coding schedule. These can be provided if “[r]esearch definitions and operations that were used [...] [a]re reported exactly and fully” (Riffe et al., 2008: 26). In this way, the research can be repeated and tested when the same procedures are followed (Riffe et al., 2008: 26). Therefore, a content analysis needs reliability tests to be valid and replicable. According to Krippendorff (2004: 216-217), “analysts must generate reliability data at least under test-test conditions and
account not only for individual instabilities but also for disagreements among observers, coders, or analysts”. In order to provide that in this research, three coders analysed six news items per person and filled in the coding schedule. The ReCal2 software was employed so as to test the reliability of coders’ answers (ReCal2 website, 2010). The software can present the outcome of reliability analysis through different ways such as ‘Krippendorff’s Alpha’ and ‘percent agreement’. According to Krippendorff (2004: 241), the reliability between variables should be at least $\alpha=0.667$. The majority of categories in the coding schedule provided acceptable reliability. However, in four categories, the consistency level was less than 70 per cent and below Krippendorff’s cutoff point (2004: 241). In these cases, the questions were either changed or deleted. For instance, coders’ answers were not consistent enough in the category of ‘statements’. The coders complained about the number of choices for this category on the coding schedule, which was up to three when they were coding, and they said that this could be the reason for different answers. Thus, the number of codeable values in the category of ‘statements’ was changed to ‘up to six’. The coders coded these categories again after the amendments. The final results satisfied the reliability test.

Some questions were too open to interpretation and the result of the inter-coder reliability test was not satisfactory. For instance, coding the category ‘The overall approach of the news item to Turkish membership’ was a considerably problematic one. The consistency was even less than 50 per cent in that category. Coders said that they were not sure while they were coding this category as some news items included both pro and anti-Turkish membership statements. Thus, this question was omitted from the coding schedule and it was decided that it would be more reliable to find an
answer to this question by analysing the overall tone of quantitative and qualitative content analyses. There are several questions in the coding schedule that can help to make some assumptions concerning the position of each news item and accordingly each paper.

**Using SPSS and presenting the data**

The newspaper items were coded and the data was put into an SPSS file. In some categories, the number of values was greater than expected and this made it difficult to manage and analyse the data. For instance, there were 121 values in the “Main Topics” category and they were reduced to 33 by using the ‘collapsing values’ option of SPSS. Apart from these, using SPSS helped the calculation of the results and made the data easier to organise and analyse. The results obtained from SPSS will be presented in tables together with the inferences which are based on the results found in the data. All percentages which refer to the distribution of values in the tables were calculated by using the total number of news items (n=143). Thus, the percentages show the distribution of values among news items.

5.3.2. Qualitative analysis

5.3.2.1. Qualitative content analysis

Qualitative analysis refers to any type of research which does not extract quantitative results (Strauss and Corbin, 1990: 17). It is a technique that analysts investigate discursive constructions and latent meanings in text. It has still some problematic aspects and it would appear to be less scientifically robust and more subjective. First of all, qualitative content analysis is a huge methodological space where the researcher should find his or her own way by taking into account what exactly is required of their
research. It is usually not possible to find a concrete way to proceed or analytical tools that can fully lead the research as each research project has its own dynamics (Deacon et al., 1999: 178). In contrast to quantitative content analysis, the methods employed in qualitative analysis are usually explained inadequately and there are numerous ways to apply them to a research sample. Thus, “text analysis in the cultural-critical paradigm does not draw from a united intellectual and methodological tradition [...]. Its history is similarly fractured” (Fürsich, 2009: 240). However, there are several approaches and techniques used in qualitative analysis which are not completely “standardized logical or mathematical models’ but are [, at least,] grounded on systematic procedures” (Jensen, 2002a: 245; also see Gray, 2009).

**Performing the Analysis**

In the case of this study, the research framework requires a qualitative analysis in order to transcend the manifest findings gathered from the results of a quantitative content analysis (Richardson, 2007). In this way, conducting the investigation by taking into account the ‘context’ of the news items in the research sample can become possible. Thus, the lack of context in the results of quantitative analysis of this study will be enhanced by employing a qualitative method. In general terms, the research will benefit from the contributions of qualitative content analysis and will adapt this by providing deeper answers to the research questions.

In this study, the application of the qualitative content analysis on news items is conducted in three steps. As the questions are available before starting the analysis, the first step has a deductive character while the second step is inductive. At the first step, by using the Qualitative Coding Scheme, the questions shown in Appendix II were
asked of each news item selected for the research sample. The second step is about coding. The answers gathered in the first step will be coded using NVivo, qualitative analysis software, so as to make connections efficiently between different coded materials (see more about data transcription, coding and NVivo in the section below). This step is also necessary in order not to generalise one example into the whole sample as NVivo allows the researcher to see how frequent were the findings and how much it is possible to generalise the inferences to the whole sample. Finally, the last step is about presenting the analysis. This step merges the material with the study's analytical framework related to the notion of ‘a positive Other’.

5.3.2.2. In-depth interviews

Having explained the quantitative and qualitative content analysis methods for the investigation of news content, this section focuses on the methodological background to the in-depth interviews conducted for this study. Interviewing the journalists from the British media helps to explain how and why the Turkish membership issue is covered in a particular way. The two main aims of the interviews are to identify how the journalists, personally, approach the issue of Turkish membership of the EU and to examine how the production process of the news items concerning Turkey’s EU bid takes place. The interview questionnaire was prepared according to the discussions in the literature review and the findings in the content analysis of this study. In total, 17 questions were asked of all journalists. The questions could be categorised under six groups: ‘Individual level’, PR, British media and the editorial process, British politics, content and agenda, other discussions and journalist-specific questions (see Appendix III for the full list of questions).
Researchers rarely prepare a complete list of questions. Most qualitative interviews are flexible and their structure is changeable so that the interviewees can bring some unexpected points to the conversation (Mason, 2005: 62). Adding new questions, when it is necessary, could boost the quality of conversations, and it is worth giving more importance to certain questions when the context requires. For these reasons, the interviews were conducted in a semi-structured fashion. The conversation flowed naturally to different areas in the interviews and this provided extra data that could be useful in the research.

The news items written by the interviewees were reviewed by the interviewer before starting each interview. When some interesting points which were not related to the 17 questions were found in the news items, these were noted as specific questions and were asked of the journalists in addition to the 17 questions. Specific questions were generally about some interesting concepts that the journalists used in their news items, or they were related to some issues which cannot be usually found in the news items on Turkey-EU relations. The questions were usually asked in the same order, excluding the specific questions for each journalist. If the journalists did not answer in enough detail or depth, the same question was asked in a different way again, or some examples related to the question were given in order to encourage the interviewee to answer the question. However, it could be too much to expect informative answers to all questions in interviews. ‘Knowledge questions’ sometimes cause awkwardness if the interviewees cannot give any answer. On these occasions, Gray (2004) advises that the interviewers should never be surprised and should never give clues which could make the interviewee feel humiliated. Some journalists wrote only one or two news items on Turkey’s EU bid. They are not experts on Turkey-EU relations and they wrote
these as part of their daily work while they were based in London. At some points during the interviews, these journalists could not answer some questions properly due to their lack of knowledge about the question. Although the interviewer tried to explain the question one more time, there was no insistence on receiving an answer.

The interviewees do not always explain everything which an interviewer wants to learn (Becker and Geer, 1957). Some journalists refused to answer some of the questions even though they knew something about the topic. These questions were mainly about other media organisations’ view on the Turkish membership issue and the interviewees avoided making comments about their colleagues’ approach to Turkey’s EU bid.

The majority of news items were written in London while some of them were sent from Brussels, Istanbul, Paris and Ankara. Many journalists had changed their places and postings, and reaching the ones based in London was more convenient. When the data that were being gathered in the interviews started to feel similar, and when it was obvious that no new views were emerging, it was thought that the saturation of the sample had been reached, and conducting interviews could be finalised. In the end, 21 interviews were conducted with the journalists. Seven interviews were completed by telephone while, 14 interviews were conducted face to face. Interviewing by email did not work in this research. Some journalists agreed to answer the questions by email but they did not return the questionnaire. Only one journalist answered the questions by email but it was not included in the research findings. It was obvious that he did not spend enough time on it since he gave very short answers by writing ‘Yes-No’.
Meetings with the interviewees took place in different locations such as newspapers’ headquarters, the BBC, the House of Commons, restaurants, and the journalists’ homes. All the interviews were digitally recorded. The interviews usually took 45 minutes with a few ranging between 30 to 70 minutes. The number of participants from each media organisation is approximately in line with the distribution of news items that were analysed. However, the Daily Mail was a special case. The majority of journalists from this paper were not accessible. Only two journalists replied and they said that they were not interested in participating in the interviews. The reason could be the general reluctance of midmarket and tabloid newspapers to become involved in EU issues or academic research. In his study called ‘Making Europe news’, Statham (2008: 416) also wrote that The Sun did not want to participate in his research project due to the paper’s Eurosceptic approach in its editorial line (also see Firmstone, 2008a).

The distribution of the number of journalists who participated in the interviews according to their news organisation at the time the news item was written is as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>News organisation</th>
<th>Number of journalists participated</th>
<th>Number of news items analysed</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The Guardian</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Daily Telegraph</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BBC News Online</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Financial Times</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Daily Mirror</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Daily Mail</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>143</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
It is also worth looking at how much these interviewees contributed to the whole sample. Table 5.4 shows the distribution of the interviewees and how many news items they had written within the time sample of this research. Some news items in the sample were published without including a byline. They were either written by wire services or published as anonymous. Moreover, the reason why some journalists’ names were counted less than the number of items they had published is related to the fact that they were active leader writers when Turkey-EU relations were popular in the agenda. All in all, at least 59 news items in 143 analysed items were written by the journalists who participated in the interviews. In order to keep them anonymous, the journalists will be referred to by their code names only throughout the thesis (e.g. J1).

Table 5.4: Distribution of the interviewees and how many news items they had published about Turkey-EU relations within the time sample of this study

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Journalist</th>
<th>Number of news items</th>
<th>Posting while writing about Turkey</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>J1 (The Guardian)</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>Brussels</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>J2 (The FT)</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>Istanbul-Ankara</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>J3 (The Telegraph)</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>Brussels</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>J4 (The Telegraph)</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>Istanbul</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>J5 (The Guardian)</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>London</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>J6 (BBC News)</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>Istanbul</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>J7 (The Guardian)</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Paris</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>J8 (The Telegraph)</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Brussels-London</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>J9 (BBC News)</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Brussels-Istanbul</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>J10 (The Guardian)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>London</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>J11 (The Guardian)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>London</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>J12 (The Guardian)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Istanbul</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>J13 (The Guardian)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>London</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>J14 (The Mirror)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Brussels</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>J15 (BBC News)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>London</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>J16 (BBC News)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>London</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>J17 (The FT)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>London</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>J18 (The FT)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Paris</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>J19 (The Guardian)</td>
<td>1+Leaders</td>
<td>London</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>J20 (The Guardian)</td>
<td>Leader writer</td>
<td>London</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>J21 (The Telegraph)</td>
<td>Leader writer</td>
<td>London</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>59+Leaders</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

All interviews were conducted in English except the one with a Turkish journalist. Although the questions were asked in Turkish, some explanations were made in

---

20 The majority of journalists had also written about Turkey-EU relations in other periods which are not included in this study’s sample.
Performing the analysis

Analysing the data gathered from the fieldwork is as significant as conducting the interviews. However, finding the most appropriate way to do the qualitative analysis on the interviews is not an easy task. Qualitative research is usually inductive and it does not offer a broadly established strategy to analyse the data (Gray, 2009: 494). Richards (2005: 70) argues that there is no specific technique which can help researchers to deal with their data in qualitative analysis. She claims that after having gained experience, researchers can improve their own approach to work on data. However, it is immensely useful to get help from the methodology literature about qualitative analysis while improving a specific technique.

The data transcription and coding

The interview analysis in this thesis is grounded on four steps which are transcription, coding, post-coding, and interpreting. As a first step, all the digitally recorded data were transcribed by the researcher. Although it was a very lengthy job, transcribing the data made the researcher more familiar with what kind of data were collected (Gray, 2009: 496). Thus, it can be said that the analysis started while transcribing as that process had an initial impact on building the categories.

The second step is coding. ‘Raw’ data cannot be easily interpreted or connected with other points within the data. For this reason, conceptualising the data is a crucial step of the analysis. “By breaking down and conceptualizing we mean taking apart an
observation, a sentence, a paragraph, and giving each discrete incident, idea, or event, a name, something that stands for or represents a phenomenon” (Strauss and Corbin, 1990: 63). Therefore, coding is required in order to conceptualise the material.

Richards (2005: 88) uses three different terms to explain different kinds of coding which are ‘descriptive’, ‘topic’, and ‘analytical’. While descriptive coding deals with the general information about the speaker such as gender, age, and job, topic coding simply designates the main topics of the document or passage. Both of them require little interpretation which is not the case for analytical coding. Analytical coding, which was used in the qualitative analyses of this thesis, cannot be as automatic as ‘descriptive’ and ‘topic’ coding. It deals with explanation and reflection on meaning which is different from the other two. Besides, analytical coding produces categories and extracts new thoughts about the elements in documents (Richards, 2005: 94).

Emergence of categories during the analysis is in contrast with quantitative research where the categories were prepared beforehand or were set by a pilot study (Richards, 2005: 86).

In contrast to survey research, performing qualitative research is not sequential between research design and results. The aim in qualitative research is to learn something from the data and to employ the learned material in the whole research (Richards, 2005: 80). In order to learn from the data, the researcher needs to revisit the material until it is completely comprehended (Richards, 2005: 86). Revisiting is much easier and the data are better organised when they are coded in software. In this research, qualitative coding was performed with the help of NVivo, qualitative analysis software.
CAQDAS (Computer Assisted Qualitative Analysis Software)

Although the software for qualitative analysis may disappoint some researchers, they could be useful to some extent if researchers do not expect the software to analyse the whole material on its own. Qualitative computing is dependent on the limits of artificial intelligence of the software. Gray (2009: 518) says

“[COQDAS] do not generate codes for you – this, obviously is the task of the researcher. The researcher still also has to interpret the data. But CAQDAS software does cut out much of the drudgery of manipulating qualitative data”.

Thus, CAQDAS can only assist researchers in clerical, mechanical works not in analytical processes (Richards, 2005: 69; Welsh, 2002). For instance, it is possible to reshape the categories in qualitative analysis by collapsing the codes in order to reach more functional codes (Richards, 2005: 86), and this is easier and quicker if COQDAS is employed. What software does is a mechanical process and it should not be thought that the ‘find’ button brings out the meaning. It actually simply refers to the occurrence of the searched characters in the database (Richards, 2005: 93). For instance, searching ‘Turkey’ could bring the bird ‘turkey’, or searching for ‘clash of civilisations’ without looking at the context can never explain whether it is used in a positive or negative way in the context of Turkey’s EU bid.

NVivo, a recent qualitative analysis software, was employed in this study in order to perform coding more easily, and organise and analyse the qualitative data more reliably and practically. By using the software, annotations, memos, and links or pointers were utilised to conduct the qualitative analysis. Annotations are the records which relate to the content of the document (e.g. they could be related to the gestures of the interviewee, or they could be used to select the direct quotations from the
conversations). Memos are about other themes or ideas which emerge from the
document that is analysed. Links or pointers help to make connections between two or
more different important points within the document (Richards, 2005: 73-75).

Other benefits of NVivo relate to revisiting the raw material. According to Wainwright
and Russell (2010: 3),

“the researcher can think analytically about the data while being immersed in
the flow of the recorded interview, attending to utterances, silences, emotions
and the interactive dialectic between interviewer and interviewee in ways that
are difficult when reading even detailed transcriptions”.

With the help of NVivo, the coder revisited the raw material easily, and tried to better
understand the flow of the conversations by listening to them again and again when
required.

Getting help from qualitative computing brings some problems too. As it is easier to do
coding with software, it is sometimes risky when the researcher codes too much
(Richards, 2005: 100). In order to avoid too much coding, the researcher should keep
asking ‘why am I interested in that?’ during the coding process (Richards, 2005: 101).
The coded material should always be related to the aim of the research.

**Finalising coding, post-coding and interpreting**

It is always problematic in qualitative analysis to decide on the perfect time to
conclude the coding and analysis. According to Glaser and Strauss, if no new
categories, properties, and relationships could be found in the data, one could say that
the research has reached the point of “theoretical saturation” (1967: 61). When coding
is finalised, the post-coding process can be started as the third step in the analysis.
Coding in qualitative research does not present the data in one place that summarises the whole sample, whereas this could be expected from a survey result (Richards, 2005: 96). Qualitative analysis seeks to learn more than what percentages or frequencies reveal. For this reason, after coding the data, and building the concepts and categories, the links between these should be identified in a post-coding process. In order to yield a theory or a conceptualisation from the data that is being analysed, links between categories and concepts should be found (Gray, 2009: 496).

Interpreting is the last step of the interview analysis. As it is impossible to present all the data, the researchers must summarise what has been found while presenting the analysis of the interviews. Summarising the material requires selection and interpretation. For this reason, researchers’ own interpretations surround the findings in the interviews (Strauss and Corbin, 1990: 22). Regarding this point, Diesing says “actually scientific knowledge is in large part an invention or development rather than an imitation; concepts, hypotheses, and theories are not found ready-made in reality but must be constructed” (1971: 14 cited in Strauss and Corbin, 1990: 59).

After all steps are completed in the interview analysis, the findings are presented by employing Shoemaker and Reese’s (1996) hierarchical model which is explained in detail in Chapter 8.

5.4. Conclusion

This chapter has outlined how research material was collected and analysed. A detailed explanation of this procedure has been given in order to clarify important
points such as triangulation, sampling, coding, reliability test, and CAQDAS before the analyses are presented in subsequent chapters.

The chapter presented a comprehensive justification concerning the research sample, as an orderly sampling is one of the priorities of this research’s methodology. The research population was first narrowed by applying some criteria, discussed in the chapter, concerning when and where the news items were published. The first elimination of the material founded the research sample for the quantitative analysis. Afterwards, the second elimination created the basis for qualitative analysis and the sample for in-depth interviews.

As was explained, this thesis employs three methods which are: quantitative content analysis, qualitative content analysis and in-depth interviews. They are part of a triangulation which is utilized in order to answer the main research question of the study in a systematic way. The quantitative inquiry seeks to put forth the manifest meaning and findings concerning the representation of Turkey-EU relations in the British media. The method deals with several categories and explains how the issue was covered by employing frequencies and percentages. The general picture of a relatively large sample becomes easier to observe by providing these numerical data. In contrast, the qualitative content analysis looks at implicit and latent aspects of news items which are not quantifiable. This second method takes into account ‘the context’ of the materials which it is regularly not possible to reach by quantitative data. Accordingly, both content analyses have different goals but they act as complimentary methods in order to exercise the analysis on the coverage. As the last component of the triangulation, semi-structured in-depth interviews with journalists were included.
as a method in order to look at how the analysed text materials were produced by the media.

Both quantitative and qualitative analyses benefited from CAQDAS to provide a consistent inquiry. SPSS helped to perform the quantitative analysis on the news coverage while NVivo was useful for the qualitative work on news items and in-depth interviews.

The following four chapters which present the findings and analyses of this thesis are methodologically grounded on the procedures discussed throughout the above chapter. The first one deals with the quantitative content analysis of news items on Turkey-EU relations.
CHAPTER 6: QUANTITATIVE CONTENT ANALYSIS

6.1. Introduction

This chapter presents a quantitative content analysis based on the research sample of 143 news items. The findings in the chapter can be accepted as the outcomes of the first level of content analysis where the manifest meaning is put forward by frequencies and percentages. Therefore, what is presented here provides a basis for the following chapter which focuses on the latent meaning in the news items.

The analysed data will be illustrated in tables and inferences concerning the meaning of these numbers in the context of the main research question “How Turkey’s EU bid was represented in the British media?” In order to find an answer to this question in a quantitative fashion, the analysis is constructed around these supplementary research questions:

- **RQ1**: Which topics, statements, labels, issues and conditions shaped the news items?
- **RQ2**: What are the positions of different countries?
- **RQ3**: What kinds of differences and similarities do the news items represent?
- **RQ4**: What are the reasons for opposition to and support for Turkish membership?

The chapter firstly looks at the distribution and frequency of news items according to news organisations and time periods. Then topics, statements, labels and issues that
are associated with Turkey-EU relations will be presented. It will be followed by the section about the approach of different countries to Turkish membership. Having clarified each country’s view, the chapter will then focus on the differences and similarities between Turkey and EU Member States and the reasons for support and opposition to Turkish accession. The final sections will be about the actors who shape the news items and the mandatory conditions that are noted for Turkish accession.

Defining the concepts used in the content analysis is highly significant in order to make the research concrete and thoroughly understandable. Berger (1991: 26) says “if we are to examine violent content, we have to define what we mean by violence…” Thus, the concepts that could be ambiguous (e.g. ‘Statements’ in Section 6.6) in some cases will be discussed in each relevant section in the chapter.

6.2. Distribution of the news items

As mentioned in previous studies (inter alia Anderson and Weymouth, 1999; Kevin, 2003; Negrine, 2008; Negrine et al., 2008), upmarket newspapers are far more interested in ‘EU affairs’ or ‘Turkey-EU relations’ than are the tabloids. As Table 6.1 shows, the research’s findings are in line with this point. More than 2/3 of all news items which are ‘directly’ related to Turkey-EU relations were published by three broadsheets (The Guardian, The Daily Telegraph and the FT). However, only 14 per cent of news items in the sample were published by tabloid papers (the Daily Mail and the Daily Mirror). The remainder were published by BBC News Online (16.1 per cent). The same table also shows that the majority of news items about Turkey’s EU bid were published by the Europhile papers. The categorisation was made according to the explanations in the Methodology Chapter.
Table 6.1: Distribution of the news items and the political stances of the news organisations in EU affairs (n=143)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>Political stance</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Guardian</td>
<td>48</td>
<td></td>
<td>Europhile</td>
<td>73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FT</td>
<td>20</td>
<td></td>
<td>Eurosceptic</td>
<td>47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mirror</td>
<td>5</td>
<td></td>
<td>Other</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Telegraph</td>
<td>32</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mail</td>
<td>15</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BBC</td>
<td>23</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>143</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The start of membership negotiations with Turkey on 3rd October 2005 received considerable attention in the European media. The deadlock between the countries which supported Turkish membership and the countries which were against was solved by British pressure in the period when the UK was holding the Presidency of the Council of the EU. The UK’s leading position also influenced the British media and news items, published in this period (42 per cent of the total sample), by far outnumbered the other events in the sample (see Table 6.2). The Copenhagen Summit (12th – 13th December 2002), where 10 new countries’ membership was guaranteed, was also an important platform to discuss what Turkey was going to get from the EU. Turkey could only achieve ‘a date for a date’ to start membership negotiations and the discussions had widespread coverage in the British media. In this period 24.5 per cent of the whole sample was published.

It is worth underlining the point that the historic day for Turkish democracy when the death penalty was abolished and many other amendments came into force in the Turkish legal system through the decisions made in the Turkish Parliament (3rd August 2002) did not resonate strongly enough in the British media compared to other European events in the time sample. This shows that Turkey’s own initiatives cannot get enough attention from the British media if Turkey does not discuss the issues with
EU Member States. Table 6.2 shows different events with frequency and percentage of news items published in the week immediately before and immediately after each event.

Table 6.2: Distribution of the news items according to events in the time sample (n=143)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Event Description</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Helsinki Summit (10th – 11th December 1999)</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>6.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkish Parliament (3rd August 2002)</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Copenhagen Summit (12th – 13th December 2002)</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>24.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brussels Summit (16th - 17th December 2004)</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>16.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Negotiations (3rd October 2005)</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>42%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Port problem (29th November 2006)</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>9.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>143</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

6.3. Length of news items

Including the news items from BBC News Online, nearly 87 per cent of all news items contain more than 300 words. It can be assumed that the media outlets which cover the Turkish membership issue in relatively longer articles have more interest in the issue. As the broadsheet papers usually publish much deeper analysis on political issues, the news items that include less than 300 words were mainly found in the Daily Mirror and the Daily Mail. The longest articles were published by The Guardian, the FT, and BBC News. The reason why the news items on BBC News Online are longer than The Daily Telegraph and almost the same as the FT could be related to online journalism’s advantage of space.
6.4. Appearance on the front page and type of news items

Newspapers are not often read like books, and their international news pages might be skipped by readers (Anderson and Weymouth, 1999: 168). Thus, page numbers could influence readability of a news item. Excluding the 23 news items on BBC News, it was found that the Turkish issue was covered six times on the first page in the sample (The Guardian, three times; The Daily Telegraph, twice; The FT, once).

An examination of 143 news items indicates that the research sample includes a greater variety of types which are reports (105 items), commentaries (18 items), leaders (9 items), reviews (7 items), and economic analyses (4 items). Being covered in leaders by broadsheets shows the media outlets’ editorial interest on the Turkish issue. However, no interviews were published about Turkey-EU relations in the British media.

6.5. Main topics in news items

This section deals with the main topics which were covered in the news items on Turkey’s EU bid. Table 6.3 shows that almost half of all news items (44.8 per cent) in the research sample referred to the support of some EU Member States (the UK is the main one) or the US for Turkey’s EU bid. ‘Efforts of EU Member States to block Turkish membership of the EU’, which is the opposite of the most common value mentioned above, is the second one (37.1 per cent). More data about the countries that support or oppose Turkish membership in the news items will be presented in Section 6.9.1 in this chapter.
### Table 6.3: The main topics* in the news items

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Topic</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>%**</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Support of EU Member States and the US for Turkish membership</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>44.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Efforts of EU Member States to block Turkish membership of the EU</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>37.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The start and the length of negotiation process for Turkey’s EU membership (or other major steps for Turkish membership)</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>33.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The EU’s internal issues</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>19.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Cyprus problem for Turkish membership and/or Turkey’s relation with Greece</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>17.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkey’s efforts for EU membership and westernisation</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>17.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The EU’s critics on Turkey</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>9.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkey’s reaction to the slowed down membership process</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>9.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkey’s internal issues</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>8.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alternative offers to Turkey instead of full membership (e.g. Privileged Partnership)</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>8.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The cost of rejecting Turkey for the EU</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>8.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The relationship between Turkish membership and the clash of civilisations thesis</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>6.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Human rights issues in Turkey</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>5.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkey as a bridge between East and West</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>5.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other topics</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>31.5%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Up to three topics were coded in each news item. For this reason, the total of percentages is more than 100%. ** n=143 (total of analysed news items)

### 6.6. Statements

This section looks at the statements which were mentioned in the news items. Although they can sometimes be hard to distinguish, the statements are different from ‘the main topics’ as they include an argument and their structure is distinct from a
heading which summarises the notions it includes. Instead the statements usually reveal the political stance of authors and/or actors who addressed them in the news items. For instance, mentioning the suitable time for Turkish membership by saying “Turkish membership cannot happen before at least a decade” was evaluated as a statement as it argues and proposes something. There are 193 different statements found in all the news items in the research sample and the ones that featured in more than 10 per cent are shown in Table 6.4 below. As the statements elaborate the topics discussed in the previous section, in most cases, they refer to very detailed indications. For instance, while support for Turkish membership to the EU is a type of topic in the ‘Main topics in news items’ section, this section includes more detailed findings such as a comment of a supporter of Turkey’s EU bid: ‘Turkish membership is a historic development / is a new era’.
**Table 6.4: The statements* in the news items**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Statement</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>%**</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>There are different approaches to Turkish membership within the EU.</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>27.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkish membership cannot happen before at least a decade (Turkey should wait longer)</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>25.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Some EU Member States think that ‘privileged partnership’ or special or alternative partnership instead of full membership could be offered to Turkey</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>25.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Austria wanted to block the start of negotiations.</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>25.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The UK’s diplomatic efforts helped Turkey to start the negotiations or helped Turkey to continue towards membership</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>23.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N.A. / Cannot tell</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>20.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany and France have the same position - negative or sometimes positive but critical 'in terms of Turkish membership'.</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>16.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkish politicians do not want to accept everything directed from the EU.</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>16.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The majority of Europeans are against Turkey’s EU bid. / A specific EU Member State is against Turkey’s EU bid.</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>13.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkish membership can contribute a possible solution to the Cyprus problem and other problems between Turkey and Greece</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>12.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkey’s bad human rights record postponed/postpones its EU membership.</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>11.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkish membership is a historic development / is a new era.</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>11.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkey has made a considerable progress in human rights and other political reforms in recent years.</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>11.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkey has been waiting for the membership for a long time</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>10.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Even though Turkey has started the negotiation process, the process can be interrupted by any EU Member State</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>10.5%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Up to six statements were coded in each news item. For this reason, the total of percentages is more than 100%. ** n=143 (total of analysed news items)
In general, it is interesting to see that political affairs dominate the most common statements and no data that is directly related to cultural discussions was found at the top of the list. The results show that the British media has a special interest in underlining the existence of different ideas about the Turkish issue. More than a quarter of all news items indicated that ‘there are different approaches to Turkish membership within the EU’ (27.3 per cent).

The second most common statement which was underlined in news items is ‘Turkish membership cannot happen before at least a decade’ (25.9 per cent). This statement was usually employed by European politicians who want to ease people’s minds when public opinion was not happy about the prospect of Turkish membership. Other most common statements refer to countries’ support or opposition for Turkey’s EU bid. It can be implied from all of them that readers are frequently reminded that EU Member States do not have a shared opinion on the Turkish case: ‘Some EU Member States support the idea of privileged partnership instead of full membership for Turkey’ (25.2 per cent), ‘Austria wants to obstruct the commencement of negotiations’ (25.2 per cent), and ‘the UK’s diplomatic efforts helped to open the way for Turkish membership’ (23.1 per cent). Frequent emphasis on the last one reveals that EU affairs are a kind of battlefield for British media and British politicians in order to demonstrate the controversies between the UK and its European rivals.

6.7. Describing Turkey through labelling

Said (1997: 10) suggests that labels must be taken seriously. According to his view, ‘[t]o a Muslim who talks about ‘the West’ or to an American who talks about ‘Islam,’ these enormous generalizations have behind them a whole history, enabling and
disabling at the same time” (Said, 1997: 10). He argues that using these labels has another function which is

“[…] to produce a much more complex meaning. To speak of ‘Islam’ in the West today is to mean a lot of the unpleasant things […]. Moreover, ‘Islam’ is unlikely to mean anything one knows either directly or objectively. The same is true of our use of ‘the West’” (Said, 1997: 10).

Drawing on the importance of labels mentioned above, this section looks at the labels used to describe Turkey in the British media. The first sub-section employs a general level analysis by focusing on how Turkey was positioned between the Eastern and the Western worlds. Then, the second sub-section investigates more detailed descriptions about Turkey and presents quantitative data relating to the labels used to describe Turkey in the news items.

6.7.1. Positioning Turkey between the East and the West

The values used in this section consist of five identifications that describe and position Turkey in general ways. The majority of news items did not include any general description about Turkey’s place between the Eastern and the Western world. Only 28.7 per cent of all news items include at least one description of Turkey about this issue. Among the descriptions ‘European’ is the most common one, which was found in 11.2 per cent of news items. It is followed by ‘Middle Eastern / Eastern’ which was seen in 7.7 per cent of the sample.

When the papers are compared, the difference between The Guardian and The Daily Telegraph in terms of describing Turkey is significant. However, the low frequency of the values prevents the study from drawing valid deductions from these results.
Table 6.5: Distribution of the descriptions* about Turkey

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Description</th>
<th>BBC</th>
<th>DAILY MAIL</th>
<th>FT</th>
<th>GUARDIAN</th>
<th>MIRROR</th>
<th>TELEGRAPH</th>
<th>TOTAL Frequency</th>
<th>TOTAL %**</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>European</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>11.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middle Eastern / Eastern</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>7.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A mix of east and west</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>5.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asian</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>4.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not European</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>4.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Up to five conditions were coded in each news item.
** n=143 (total of analysed news items)

Only the direct appearances of the descriptions were counted in the news items. For instance, calling Turkey ‘Muslim’ in a news item did not mean that Turkey was automatically coded as Middle Eastern. That is why the results of this table should not be seen as incompatible with the following section’s Table 6.6 where the label ‘Muslim’ is topmost on the list.

6.7.2. Labels that are used to describe Turkey

This section seeks to understand how Turkey was described, by the labels which were used in the news items about Turkey-EU relations. All the 143 news items were analysed and the exact labels (adjectives, words or phrases) that refer to Turkey listed in Table 6.6 (without any truncation, collapsing or categorising) were extracted. It was found that 77.6 per cent of news items employed at least one label while describing Turkey.
According to the findings, Turkey is associated with its religion in almost half of all news items (48.3 per cent). In most cases, the label ‘Muslim’ was used in order to depict the cultural and religious differences. Occasionally, Turkey’s religion was stressed with the aim of proving that the EU is not a Christian club. The British politicians especially mentioned the issue of religion in order to propose a solution to the clash of civilisations. However, in most cases, the attribution to Turkey’s religion was made in order to depict Turkey’s difference from EU Member States. Thus, it is meaningful to ask the reason for this remarkable number of attributions to religion and culture and how it comes to outnumber other labels.

Consequently, it is important to consider whether the British news media represents Turkey with its religion on purpose. No journalists confessed to this in the fieldwork but in practical terms, what journalists said can contribute some more contemporary and Turkey-specific explanations to Said’s (1997: 61) arguments on labelling the East. The journalists who had written some of these news items in the British media think that the high frequency attribution to ‘Muslim’ could be related to several reasons: Islamophobia; the situation in the post-9/11 era; some journalistic tricks; relevance of attribution to the Muslim identity of Turkey because of Turkey’s different position in Europe in terms of religion and culture; and European politicians’ continual attribution to the issue. There are more discussions about associating Turkey with its religion in Chapter 8 (on page 241) where the journalists explain the reasons for this continuous attribution.

Although the news items did not usually explain whether they referred to people or the state when they used the word ‘Muslim’, in some news items Turkey was
noticeably represented as a secular country (11.9 per cent). However, this “antithetical knowledge” (Said, 1997: 157) produced by some journalists in the British media cannot be a strong alternative to the existing orthodox coverage of Turkey and Islam. This is because references to Turkey with words such as ‘Secular’ and ‘Secularism’ are almost four times fewer than those indicating that Turkey is Muslim. Regarding the labels, apart from ‘Muslim’ and ‘Secular’, which were seen in more than 9.8 per cent of all news items, it could be argued that there is relatively balanced distribution of labels in terms of positive and negative meanings. For instance, the total of relatively negative attributions ‘Large and populous’ (16.8 per cent) and ‘Poor’ (9.8 per cent) is not significantly different from the total percentage of relatively positive attributions ‘A full partner of Europe’ (13.3 per cent) and ‘Democratic’ (10.5 per cent).

**Table 6.6**: Distribution of the labels* among news organisations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Label</th>
<th>BBC</th>
<th>DAILY MAIL</th>
<th>FT</th>
<th>GUARDIAN</th>
<th>MIRROR</th>
<th>TELEGRAPH</th>
<th>TOTAL Frequency</th>
<th>TOTAL %**</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Muslim</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>48.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Large and populous (or big, vast), (emphasising the population)</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>16.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A full partner for Europe / Pro-western / European public / European power / A NATO member</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>13.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Secular</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>11.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democracy / Democratic</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>10.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poor</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>9.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Different from Europe (Not European)</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>5.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other labels</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>53.1%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Up to 3 conditions were coded in each news item. For this reason, the total of percentages is more than 100%. ** n=143 (total of analysed news items)
As mentioned above, the labels coded for this category were not collapsed on SPSS. Thus, some labels, especially the least coded ones, may look remarkably similar to each other. The labels which were coded in less than five per cent of all news items mostly show the British media’s interest in underlining Turkey’s religion: “A bridge between two civilisations”, “Modern”, “A holiday destination”, “Moderate Islam”, “Mildly Islamist Government”, “Moslem State”, “Islamic-tinted government”, “Islamic country”, “government of former Islamists”, and “the most relaxed Muslims”.

Before concluding, Said’s consideration can help to improve the analysis in this section. He has argued that there is a tendency to compare ‘Islam’ with ‘the West’ instead of Islam with ‘Christianity’. He claimed that this is because of the acceptance of ‘the West’ over ‘Christianity’ and belief that ‘the Western culture’ has exceeded the power of its religion. However, the concept of ‘the East’ is still equated with ‘Islam’ (Said, 1997: 10). These points can help us to understand why Turkey’s religion appears more often in news items and why Turkey is more associated with being ‘Muslim’ than being a member of ‘the Eastern world’, ‘the Middle East’ or being ‘a bridge between the East and the West’. Following Cahen and others’ suggestions, Said (1997: 61) argues that it would be more appropriate to describe Muslim societies as "Near Eastern," "Mediterranean," "medieval" or "preindustrial" societies.

“For sociopolitical history, Islam can furnish some elements of explanation but by no means all that are needed. The institutions and policies of even the most fervently ‘Islamic’ states cannot be explained without taking into account geographical position, economic needs, and the interests of dynasties and rulers" (Said, 1997: 61)."
6.8. Main issues

One of the most important sections of this chapter focuses on the ‘issues’ that are highlighted in the news items covering Turkey’s bid to join the EU. Having discussed the points related to these issues in Chapter 3, this section’s findings reveal the degree of importance given by the British media to those issues in Turkey’s EU bid. It can be assumed that most arguments in the political agenda concerning Turkish membership had been shaped by issues such as ‘Democracy and human rights’ and ‘The Cyprus issue’ in the last decade. The majority of these issues are very critical to Turkey’s EU bid. For instance, 51.7 per cent of all news items refer to Turkey’s bad human rights record and only 1/5 of this percentage mentions Turkey’s efforts to rehabilitate it. ‘The Cyprus issue and Turkish-Greek relations’ is the second most commonly underlined issue in the news items on Turkish membership (43.4 per cent). The table below shows all 13 issues according to total figures and their distribution within each news organisation. The ratio of the issues within each media outlet\(^{21}\) shows that the news items with most issues (polemical) were published by The Guardian while the FT and the Daily Mirror covered the least tense discussions (see the last row of the table below).

\(^{21}\) It is calculated by dividing the number of issues referred by a news organisation into the total number of news items published by the same news organisation.
Table 6.7: Distribution of the main issues* in each news organisation and in total

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Issue</th>
<th>BBC</th>
<th>DAILY MAIL</th>
<th>FT</th>
<th>GUARDIAN</th>
<th>MIRROR</th>
<th>TELEGRAPH</th>
<th>TOTAL Frequency</th>
<th>TOTAL %**</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Democracy and human rights issues</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>51.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Cyprus issue / Turkish-Greek relations</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>43.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Long term wait of Turkey</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>31.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Privileged partnership</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>28.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clash of civilisations</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>26.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Kurdish issue</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>23.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Armenian issue</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>12.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Referendum in EU Member States for Turkey's EU membership</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>11.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Invalidity of clash of civilisations</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>9.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Absorption capacity</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Islamic fundamentalism</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>6.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Suspicions on Turkey's secular democracy</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>5.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Proposed adultery law</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total number of issues</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>158</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>369</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total number of news items</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>143</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The average number of issues discussed in each news item</td>
<td>2.22</td>
<td>2.33</td>
<td>1.95</td>
<td>3.29</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>2.43</td>
<td>2.58</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Up to six issues were coded in each news item. For this reason, the total of percentages is more than 100%. ** n=143 (total of analysed news items)

It was also found in the analysis that the distribution of the main issues changes over six different events in the time sample. For instance, most issues reached a peak in the
Negotiations period (3rd October 2005). In this period, issues such as privileged partnership, absorption capacity, the Armenian issue, and the referendum discussions overwhelmingly dominated the news items on Turkey’s bid for accession to the EU. ‘The Kurdish issue’ and ‘Democracy and human rights issues’ are the only issues which appeared in every period. The Cyprus issue, without any remarkable fluctuation, showed itself in all periods except one.

6.9. Countries and issues

Many news items referred to countries, politicians or other people whose nationalities are obvious and who talk in the name of their country. So, the issues raised by these people (such as saying “Angela Merkel proposed privileged partnership…” or the country itself (such as saying “Austria is against…”)) were coded and linked to the country in question. In this way, the quantitative findings can reveal which issue is more important to mention for each country. Eight main countries are listed in Table 6.8 below. Seven countries (Denmark, the Vatican, North Cyprus, Libya, Switzerland, Spain, and Sweden) which did not appear as often as the main countries in the news items were listed as ‘Others’.

6.9.1. Countries

The total column in the table below shows the total attributions to each country in terms of their position in Turkey’s EU bid. The numbers in this column also set out the extent to which these countries are associated with the discussions about Turkey’s bid to join the EU in the British media. It is obvious that the UK is at the top of the list and it is followed by Austria and France. Turkey’s position was not counted in this section as it is the party whose membership to the EU is discussed.
Table 6.8: The total attributions to each country in terms of their position towards Turkey’s EU bid

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>In favour</th>
<th>Against</th>
<th>Neutral</th>
<th>In favour with some negative point/s</th>
<th>Against with some positive point/s</th>
<th>Total Attributions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>UK</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Austria</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USA</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cyprus</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greece</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>127</td>
<td>101</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>270</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The columns in Table 6.8 designates the approach of countries to Turkish membership by their position in terms of being ‘in favour’, ‘against’, ‘neutral’, ‘in favour with some negative points’, and ‘against with some positive points (mainly refers to negative, critical countries)’. No news item mentioned that the UK is against Turkish membership and almost half of all news items in the sample underlined that the UK is in favour of Turkey’s EU bid. This strong support was mainly portrayed in speeches made by the then Prime Minister Tony Blair and the then Foreign Secretary Jack Straw.

The antithesis of the UK’s approach to Turkish membership is Austria which was shown as an opponent to Turkish membership 44 times in 143 news items. Among the pro-Turkish side, the UK is followed by the USA, Greece, Italy, and ‘Other countries’ group when the total of being in favour and against is calculated. On the opposition side, Austria is together with France, Germany and Cyprus.
Figure 6.1 below was designed using a point system by calculating five columns in Table 6.8. Accordingly, being in favour means ‘+1’, while it is ‘+0.5’ to be in favour with some negative point/s. The same point system was applied to the opposition side by using negative numbers. Figure 6.1 shows that the UK is almost alone in supporting Turkey among EU Member States as Greece’s and Italy’s support was seldom mentioned in the news items. Besides, it should not be forgotten that the Greek support is very conditional and strongly linked to the solution of the Cyprus issue. Because of the UK’s very high positive point, the average point when all countries’ points are aggregated is +19.5.

**Figure 6.1:** The approach of countries to Turkey whether they are against (−) or in favour (+) of its EU bid in the news items of different periods between 1999 and 2006 (n=143 news items). (Countries that were found in items coded only once per news item).

According to these results, Austria provides the strongest opposition to Turkish membership of the EU. However, Austria’s place in the figure is closely related to its inflexible stance during the period when Turkey was about to start membership negotiations in October 2005. The high frequency of news items in this period made Austria the main opponent, followed by France, Cyprus and Germany.

It is important to emphasise that the non-appearance of France at the top of the list could be related to the research’s time sample. Since Nicholas Sarkozy came to power in France in 2007, the figures had shifted drastically in terms of opposition to Turkish membership when compared to France’s relatively positive approach in the Chirac era (Paksoy, 2011). However, this study’s sample does not include the period after 2006.
Moreover, even though Germany is on the opposition side, its value could be more negative if Gerhard Schröder’s mild approach -compared to Angela Merkel’s- to Turkey while he was in office between 1998 and 2005 did not coincide with this research’s time sample. Cyprus could not be the first or second one on the opponents list because of its conditional support for Turkish membership in some periods.

### 6.9.2. The issues that were raised by countries

Having looked at the main issues in Section 6.8 and the general approach of countries to Turkey’s EU bid above, this section seeks to elaborate on the countries’ views by examining the issues that were raised by those countries. The general overview of Table 6.9 shows how much certain countries are associated with some specific issues. For instance, Austria’s negative approach to Turkish membership is very associated with the issues ‘privileged partnership’ (along with Germany) and ‘absorption capacity’. Another remarkable association of issues and countries is the correlation between the UK and ‘the invalidity of the clash of civilisations’.

The table shows that Cyprus (15 times) and Greece (7 times) are only interested in their own problems with Turkey, instead of making comments about human rights issues in Turkey, the possible results of Turkish membership or more abstract issues such as the clash of civilisations and its relationship with Turkish membership to the EU. Interestingly, similar to Greece and Cyprus, Turkey also referred to the Cyprus issue and the relations with Greece the most, compared to other issues. In addition to the importance of finding a solution to the Cyprus issue if Turkey wants to join the EU, this kind of deep interest in addressing the issue or allowing Turkey to make comments on the Cyprus issue more than other issues in the British media may mean that Turkey
has more to say, has more arguments to make to defend itself in this case than other issues. Thus, within the context of Turkey’s EU bid representation in the British media, it may be assumed that Turkey has less to say about ‘Democracy and human rights issues’ than ‘the Cyprus issue’ even though ‘Democracy and human rights issues’ were emphasised more than ‘the Cyprus issue’ in the news items (see Table 6.9). (See J9’s comments on the Cyprus issue as a potential ‘good case’ for Turkey in Section 9.3.2 in Chapter 9).

After the ‘human rights issues’ (9 times), the issues that were referred to the most often by the UK are ‘the invalidity of clash of civilisations’ (8 times) and ‘long term wait of Turkey’ (8 times). ‘The invalidity of clash of civilisations’ was not addressed by other countries except the UK and Turkey, and while the ‘long term wait of Turkey’ was mentioned by the UK, Turkey was almost silent despite having waited on the European doorstep for many years and it did not use this fact as part of its arguments in order to explain that it deserves to join the EU. Table 6.9 shows the frequency of the most raised issues and the total per country. The reason why the total number of issues here and in Section 6.8 is different is because some issues were sometimes raised by authors without referring to any country. The general overview of the table illustrates that the countries which support Turkey’s EU bid underline the issues that are related to the Copenhagen criteria. On the other hand, the opposing countries’ (such as Austria, France and Germany) priorities are their public opinion and proposing privileged partnership to Turkey.
Table 6.9: The issues that the countries raised the most in news items about Turkey’s EU membership

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Countries</th>
<th>Raised issue 1</th>
<th>Raised issue 2</th>
<th>Raised issue 3</th>
<th>Total number of raising</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Austria</td>
<td>Privileged partnership (30 times)</td>
<td>Referendum in EU Member States for Turkish membership (9 times)</td>
<td>Absorption capacity (8 times)</td>
<td>50 times</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>The Cyprus issue / Turkish-Greek relations (21 times)</td>
<td>Human rights issues (6 times)</td>
<td>Clash of civilisations (6 times)</td>
<td>43 times</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The UK</td>
<td>Human rights issues (9 times)</td>
<td>Invalidity of clash of civilisations (8 times)</td>
<td>Long term wait of Turkey (8 times)</td>
<td>37 times</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>Referendum in EU Member States for Turkish membership (14 times)</td>
<td>Clash of civilisations (7 times)</td>
<td>Human rights issues (5 times)</td>
<td>33 times</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>Privileged partnership (6 times)</td>
<td>Human rights issues (5 times)</td>
<td>The Cyprus issue / Turkish-Greek relations (4 times)</td>
<td>21 times</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cyprus</td>
<td>The Cyprus issue / Turkish-Greek relations (15 times)</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>15 times</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greece</td>
<td>The Cyprus issue / Turkish-Greek relations (7 times)</td>
<td>Human rights issues (Once)</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>8 times</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The US</td>
<td>Human rights issues (Once)</td>
<td>Clash of civilisations (Once)</td>
<td>Suspicions on Turkey’s secular democracy (Once)</td>
<td>3 times</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other countries</td>
<td>Clash of civilisations (5 times)</td>
<td>The Cyprus issue / Turkish-Greek relations (3 times)</td>
<td>Human rights issues (3 times)</td>
<td>18 times</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
6.10. Differences and similarities between Turkey and EU Member States

In this section, differences and similarities refer to what Turkey and the EU lack and hold in common in terms of various aspects such as culture, politics, economy, etc. Almost 60 per cent of all news items underlined at least one difference between Turkey and EU Member States. However, when similarities are analysed, it was seen that only 22.4 per cent of news items referred to at least one similarity. Because of this difference in the ratio -bearing in mind the possibility of the existence of insufficient similarities between Turkey and EU Member States in daily life and politics compared to differences- it can be assumed that the British media is more interested in representing the differences instead of the similarities. This is in line with what was mentioned by previous studies (Negrine et al., 2008; Aksoy, 2009; Scheneeberger, 2009).

6.10.1. Differences between Turkey and EU Member States

How much Turkey is different from the EU Member States or how much they do not have in common were mainly highlighted in the news items which include critical views on Turkish membership. In total, 85 of 143 news items referred to differences between Turkey and EU Member States at least once. Nearly half of all news items refer to differences in terms of religion and culture. Differences in terms of economic level, geographical location, and human rights record are overshadowed by the attributions to Turkey’s different religion and culture.

Table 6.10 shows the distribution of differences across the news organisations. It is interesting to see that The Daily Telegraph referred to religion almost as much as The Guardian even though the total of news items in the sample from The Daily Telegraph
is almost half of *The Guardian*. The average number of differences in each paper shows that BBC News and *The Daily Telegraph* are the most interested ones in mentioning differences.

| Table 6.10: Distribution of differences* between Turkey and EU Member States across the news organisations |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | BBC | DAILY MAIL | FT | GUARDIAN | MIRROR | TELEGRAPH | TOTAL | TOTAL %** |
| Religion and culture | 11 | 5 | 7 | 19 | 3 | 18 | 63 | 44.1% |
| Economics | 4 | 2 | 4 | 9 | 0 | 3 | 22 | 15.4% |
| Geography | 2 | 2 | 1 | 3 | 0 | 6 | 14 | 9.8% |
| Democracy and Human Rights | 4 | 1 | 1 | 7 | 0 | 0 | 13 | 9.1% |
| Demography (and the size of the country) | 3 | 0 | 3 | 3 | 0 | 0 | 9 | 6.3% |
| Power of the army on political decision-making | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 3 | 2.1% |
| Other differences | 3 | 0 | 2 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 7 | 4.9% |
| Total number of the differences | 28 | 10 | 18 | 42 | 3 | 30 | 131 | - |
| Total number of news items | 23 | 15 | 20 | 48 | 5 | 32 | 143 | - |
| The average number of differences in each news item | 1.22 | .66 | .9 | .88 | .6 | .94 | .92 | - |

*Up to three differences were coded in each news item. For this reason, the total of percentages is more than 100%.  ** n=143 (total of analysed news items)

6.10.2. Similarities between Turkey and EU Member States

News items refer to similarities fewer times than differences. Only 32 news items refer to similarities in 143 news items of the sample. The most common similarity is Turkey’s European character which was found in only 16 news items (11.2 per cent). Other similarities refer to Turkey’s NATO membership (3.5 per cent), geographical proximity (2.8 per cent), and corresponding culture (2.8 per cent). These figures are very much less than those shown in Table 6.10 about differences. The average number in Table 144
6.11 below shows that *The Guardian* and the *FT* are the most interested media outlets in stating the similarities between Turkey and EU Member States.

### Table 6.11: Distribution of similarities* between Turkey and EU Member States across the news organisations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Similarity</th>
<th>BBC</th>
<th>DAILY MAIL</th>
<th>FT</th>
<th>GUARDIAN</th>
<th>MIRROR</th>
<th>TELEGRAPH</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
<th>TOTAL %**</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Being a European state</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>11.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NATO membership</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>3.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Geography</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religion, culture and identity</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Custom Union with the EU</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democracy and Human Rights</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economics</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other similarities</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>5.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total number of the differences</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total number of news items</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>143</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The average number of differences in each news item</td>
<td>.13</td>
<td>.33</td>
<td>.4</td>
<td>.42</td>
<td>.31</td>
<td>.32</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Up to three similarities were coded in each news item. For this reason, the total of percentages is more than 100%.  ** n=143 (total of analysed news items)

### 6.11. Reasons in support and in opposition to Turkish membership

The idea of support and opposition were used in several categories. In the context of this research, these refer to positive or negative comments made by the author or different representatives of each country such as politicians, public, or sometimes a country’s name in the name of that country. This section looks at what kinds of points were addressed in order to explain and legitimise the authors’, actors’, and countries’ support or opposition to Turkish membership.
When a broader picture in terms of representing the reasons for support and opposition to Turkish membership is examined, one can see that 69.9 per cent of all news items refer to the reasons for support with at least one reason per news item. However, when the same is analysed on the opposition’s side, one can see that 81.8 per cent of all news items attribute reasons for being in opposition to Turkish membership. Furthermore, when reasons about support and opposition in the following sections are compared, it is seen that the total attribution to reasons for opposition (338 times) is more than the total attribution of reasons for support (253 times). Thus, this implies that the British media tend to signal the reasons for opposition more often than support for Turkish membership.

6.11.1 Reasons in support of Turkish membership

There are 33 different reasons to support Turkish membership found in the news items. As politicians were usually central to items, and due to the British politicians’ continuous references to the topic, the most common reason depicted in the items is Turkey’s possible contribution to solve the problem of ‘the clash of civilisations’ and the Turkish help to provide better relations between the Western world and the Muslim world (25.9 per cent). Secondly, 21 per cent of all news items underlined that Turkey has deserved to commence membership negotiations with the EU as it had fulfilled the Copenhagen criteria and other conditions set for membership negotiations. Finally, the third most mentioned reason refers to Turkey’s strategic importance for today and future of the EU (16.1 per cent).
6.11.2 Reasons for opposing Turkish membership

The most often mentioned reason why politicians, people or countries are against Turkish membership is not directly related to economics, culture, geography or political clashes but something that perhaps covers all those referred to above. More than a quarter of all news items highlighted that the main reason is the negative approach of the European public to Turkish membership (27.3 per cent). This can mean that the British media is interested in covering the public opposition and/or the quoted politicians usually employ public opinion when they legitimise their opposition to Turkish membership. However, it is worth noting here, as was also underlined in Negrine’s study (2008), no attribution to British public opinion concerning Turkey’s EU membership was found in the research sample even though the British media usually gives importance to continental Europe’s public opinion data in its coverage (Negrine, 2008).

The second most common reason cited is opposition to awarding Turkey full membership instead of some other option such as a restricted membership or a special agreement like ‘privileged partnership’ (24.5 per cent). Other reasons are related to what this study usually encounters in the qualitative and quantitative analysis, which are the bad human rights record of Turkey (23.8 per cent), cultural difference (21.7 per cent), the Cyprus issue (19.6 per cent), and economic problems (17.5 per cent).

It is also worth looking at which reasons were mentioned on fewer occasions. For instance, according to the findings, among 143 news items, only one news item (0.7 per cent) identifies the Turkish immigrants living in EU Member States as a reason for opposition to Turkish membership. Although the British media was not interested in this issue, “[...] European-Turkish relations as well as conceptions of European identity
are affected by the over one million\textsuperscript{22} Turkish residents in Europe, and by other groups of resident Others” (Neumann and Welsh, 1991: 347). A Eurobarometer (2006: 71) poll shows that the strongest opposition to Turkish members is in Austria (81 per cent) and Germany (69 per cent). The opposition figures in these countries, where the majority of Turkish migrants in Europe dwell, might reveal the correlation between the higher number of Turkish immigrants and the higher degree of opposition of these countries’ public to Turkish membership. British media did not directly mention it but it should be kept in mind that the complaints about the people of Turkish origin living in Europe could be hidden in the most underlined reason for opposition: ‘European public’s negative approach’.

The other interesting point is that ‘Opposing Turkish membership without emphasising any reason’ was only found in three news items. However, ‘Support for Turkish membership without emphasising any reason’ was found eight times in the category of ‘the reasons in support for Turkish membership’. This could be related to quotations from politicians, which were summarised or truncated, or the other sources of news items, which do not explain the reason for their support. However, it can be claimed that elaborating on the reasons for opposing Turkish membership is more common in the British media.

6.12. The actors in news items

Politicians’ power and their ability to gain access increase their chance to be addressed in news items (Gans, 1979). “In their interactions with the media, political actors pursue their own goals and do frequently dominate media content” (Negrine, 1994: \textsuperscript{22})

\textsuperscript{22} According to a more recent study, the population of Euro-Turks is almost four million in all EU Member States (Kaya and Kentel, 2005: 41).
12). Their interactions could usually be more than external influence, and political actors become the topic of the content. This is also a practice employed by journalists as they prefer powerful sources in order to make their reports more persuasive. Employing politicians as actors in news items will increase the reliability and worthiness of their reports (Gans, 1979). Dearing and Rogers (1996: 39) argue that the White House is one of the main institutions in the US in the media agenda-setting process. The same could be said for the position of Westminster. As it is hard to talk about the direct influence of the British public in Turkey’s EU bid discussions, the Turkish issue is mainly narrated by British, Turkish or other European politicians. When using the concept ‘actors’, this section usually refers to political actors, who make a significant contribution to the coverage by being quoted or mentioned. Apart from the politicians, few actors represent the public, academics, or people from NGOs. The findings concerning the actors are going to be presented in three sections: the actors who support Turkish membership; the actors who are against Turkish membership; and Turkish actors. The reason for separating Turkish actors from other actors is because of the strong possibility that Turkish actors’ support for Turkish membership would skew the general outcome of the findings.

6.12.1. The actors who support Turkish membership

Tony Blair and Jack Straw, shown at the top of Table 6.12, were quoted and mentioned far more than other European politicians. The representatives of the Franco-German axis, the then German Chancellor Gerhard Schröder and the then French President Jacques Chirac, follow them in the table. Former British Foreign Secretary Jack Straw’s colleagues Joschka Fischer (former German Foreign Minister) and the period’s four different former French Ministers of Foreign and European Affairs appeared only once
and that left Jacques Chirac alone in supporting Turkish membership in the time sample of this study. It is understandable that the British politicians are quoted and mentioned more than other countries' actors in the British media but, interestingly, including the other actors in the table below, the American politicians (23 times) were quoted and mentioned more than the French (15 times) and as much as Germans (23 times). French support for Turkish membership was usually with caveats in this research's sample; however Germany, particularly when Schröder was in office (1998-2005), was one of the main proponents of Turkish progression for EU membership. Thus, the table shows the importance of the American opinion on Turkish membership for the British media.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 6.12: Distribution of the actors who support Turkish membership</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tony Blair</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jack Straw</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gerhard Schröder</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jacques Chirac</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>George Bush</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Joschka Fischer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pope Benedict</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Olli Rehn</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Javier Solana</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other actors</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

6.12.2. The actors who are against Turkish membership

The most mentioned and quoted opposition actor is not one of the active politicians of the period but the President of France between 1974 and 1981, Giscard d'Estaing. His
famous statement claiming that Turkish membership would be the end of Europe resonated in different circles when the Turkish issue was an important topic of the EU agenda (BBC News Online, 2002). The reason why so much significance was attached to what Giscard d’Estaing had said could be related to the findings in Section 6.11.2 which deals with the reasons for opposing Turkish membership. The results in that section illustrated that the ‘European public’s negative approach to Turkey’ is the most mentioned reason for opposition in the British media while most European politicians, even the German Chancellor and the French President, were positive or at most lightly critical of Turkish membership in the time sample of this research. Thus, it could be assumed that Giscard d’Estaing was employed in the news items as the voice of strong opposition among the European public in this period by occupying the vacant position on the opposition side. It may be important to note, though, that Jacques Chirac was trying to straddle two positions. He was supporting Turkish membership but at the same time he was being very critical as he was undergoing enormous pressure from his own party members, other members of the Parliament and French public opinion before Turkey started the membership negotiations with the EU (Aissaoui, 2007: 1). A report of The Daily Telegraph describes how he straddled these positions:

“[…] France is emerging as the country most likely to scupper Ankara’s bid, with two thirds of voters now hostile to accession. President Jacques Chirac, an increasingly lonely friend of Turkey, broadcast to the nation last night to explain the need to reach out to Ankara” (The Daily Telegraph, 2004c).

Having appeared in the pro-Turkish actors Table 6.12, Chirac’s position at the centre also made him appear as one of the most quoted and mentioned persons in the opposing actors’ table.
Table 6.13: Distribution of the actors who are against Turkish membership

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Actor</th>
<th>Quoted</th>
<th>Mentioned</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Giscard d’Estaing</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ursula Plassnik</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jacques Chirac</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wolfgang Schüssel</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Angela Merkel</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Edmund Stoiber</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pope Benedict</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other actors</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>56</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>119</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The former Austrian Foreign Minister Ursula Plassnik and the former Austrian Chancellor Wolfgang Schüssel, who were strongly against Turkish membership when the membership negotiation process started on 3\textsuperscript{rd} October 2005, outnumber their many other European counterparts. Although the Cyprus conflict is one the most topical issues in many sections of this research, it is clearly seen that the Greek and Greek-Cypriot politicians were not allowed to talk enough while they were supporting or opposing Turkish membership. Former Cypriot President Tassos Papadopoulos was quoted only once and mentioned twice as an opposing actor while George Papandreou, former Minister of Foreign Affairs of Greece between 1999 and 2004, appeared only once in each in favour and opponent position.
6.12.3. Turkish actors

The gap between the top actor and the other actors on the list is the biggest in the Turkish actors’ table. Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, Turkish Prime Minister since 2003, had been mentioned 45 and quoted 31 times. Moreover, Erdoğan is also number one on the list if all Turkish and other actors’ tables are put together. Although Said (2003: 34-35) argues that the Occident knows the Orient’s expectations and what can be better for them, and speaks in the name of the Orient in politics, this research’s quantitative findings shows that Turkish actors’ comments were covered at least as much as EU politicians. In the Turkish actors table, Erdoğan is followed by the then Turkish PM, and the then Foreign Minister Abdullah Gül who was referred 35 times in total. In a way, this contradicts Said’s comments and observations.

Table 6.14: Distribution of Turkish actors

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Quoted</th>
<th>Mentioned</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Recep Tayyip Erdoğan</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abdullah Gül</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bülent Ecevit</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mustafa Kemal Atatürk</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rauf Denktaş</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abdullah Öcalan</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkish public (Regular people’s opinion)</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Orhan Pamuk</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other actors</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>111</td>
<td>201</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
6.13. Conditions for Turkish entry to the EU

The conditions that were set for Turkey to join the EU were analysed in this part of the research. It was found that 115 of 143 news items include at least one condition which refers to Turkish accession to the EU. Most conditions are expressed by EU Member States or EU institutions in Brussels. It could be argued that the conditions could be a sign of the possibility of Turkish membership. If a country is against Turkish membership and if it does not mention any condition, this may mean that Turkey does not have so much to do to persuade the country. News items, usually through EU Member States and regardless of whether they are for or against Turkish membership, mentioned at least one condition for Turkish membership in 80.4 per cent of whole sample.

The most cited condition is about amendments to the Turkish legal system in order to increase the level of democracy and human rights (42.7 per cent). This is followed by a requirement for Turkey to deal with the Cyprus issue and other problems between Turkey and Greece (32.9 per cent). The third most cited condition is that Turkey should wait longer for EU membership (21.7 per cent). Almost all conditions in the research sample are related to politics except ‘Turkey must change culturally’ which was mentioned in five news items. Excluding this essentialist argument about culture, the requirements represented in the British media look achievable sooner or later. The conditions which were coded in more than five per cent of all news items are listed in Table 6.15 below.
Table 6.15: Distribution of the conditions* for Turkey’s entry to the EU

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Condition</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>%**</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Changing the law (and other reforms in terms of democracy and human rights according to EU standards)</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>42.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finding a solution for the Cyprus issue (and for other problems between Greece and Turkey)</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>32.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Need for time for Turkish membership (or start of negotiations) (Implementation of reforms needed)</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>21.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU Member States’ efforts to convince their publics</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>12.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic improvements</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>10.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Accepting the start of Croatia’s membership talks</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>8.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The EU’s ability to absorb Turkey</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>7.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other conditions</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>32.9%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Up to 3 conditions were coded in each news item. For this reason, the total of percentages is more than 100%. ** n=143 (total of analysed news items)

6.14. Conclusion

The chapter quantitatively examined 143 news items which were directly related to the discussions on Turkey’s EU bid. In this way, four supplementary research questions were answered in the chapter.

RQ1: Which topics, statements, labels, issues and conditions shaped the news items?

The analysis highlighted that the most common topics in the news items were “Support of EU Member States and the US for Turkish membership” and “Efforts of EU Member States to block Turkish membership of the EU”. This shows that the British media portrays the Turkish issue by means of a challenge between European rivals,
mainly the British and Franco-German politicians. The statements which were found most often in the quantitative analysis referred to the different ideas on Turkey’s EU bid among the politicians in the EU. It is followed by another common argument which highlights that Turkey still has a decade to wait for membership.

In terms of the adjectives, words, and phrases that were used most often to describe Turkey, it was ascertained that Turkey was usually associated with the label ‘Muslim’. Almost 50 per cent of all news items emphasised that Turkey is a Muslim country. As it may refer to an eccentricity, it would have been journalistically more interesting to underline that Turkey is ‘Muslim’ and ‘secular’ at the same time. However, the secular character of the Turkish Republic was underrepresented in the coverage compared to Turkey’s Muslim image. While the EU is clearly based on secular values (Tekin, 2008; Lazarou, 2010) and British politics is by and large free from religious motivations, why is Turkish accession associated with religion the most? This is one of the reasons why this study requires an analysis of news production, which will be discussed in Chapter 8.

The most common issues in Turkey-EU relations which were discovered in the analysis were related to democracy and human rights, the problems in Cyprus, and the waiting period for Turkey. These points were more or less the same as the conditions which were put forward for Turkish membership. The conditions which could open the way for Turkish membership illustrated that the rehabilitation of the level of democracy and human rights is a must. Besides, a notable number of news items suggested that Turkish membership would not be possible before a solution to the Cyprus issue was found. Interestingly, the same section revealed that a necessity for a cultural change as
a condition to join the EU was only covered in five news items. This means that even though the cultural issues are represented as the leading differences between Turkey and the EU, they are not shown as one of the criteria that Turkey must fulfil.

**RQ2: What are the positions of different countries?**

According to the quantitative results on each country’s view, the UK and the US are the strongest supporters of Turkey’s EU bid while Austria, Germany and France are against Turkish accession. Concerning the main issues raised by different countries, it was discovered that the pro-Turkish view underscores human rights issues while the opposing countries refer to the importance of European public opinion and alternative proposals to Turkey instead of a full membership.

**RQ3: What kinds of differences and similarities do the news items represent?**

As explained in the Analytical Framework Chapter, othering does not always have to refer to the negativity of the Other. Othering can be provided by exclusively representing the differences as well. The quantitative results showed that othering Turkey was performed via underlining Turkey’s differences from the European Self where the similarities between Turkey and the EU Member States were outnumbered. While ‘religion and culture’ was shown as by far the most common difference, Turkey’s ‘European’ character was the leading one among the similarities between Turkey and the EU Member States.

**RQ4: What are the reasons for opposition to and support for Turkish membership?**

Even though the British media usually represents the British politicians’ strong support for Turkish membership, it was found that the British media is quantitatively more
interested in explaining the grounds for EU Member States’, politicians’ and public’s opposition to Turkish membership. In the news items, the reason for opposition mainly originated from the European public’s view on the Turkish issue and offering Turkey full membership instead of a limited type of proposal. On the other hand, the reason for supporting Turkish membership was related to Turkey’s special role between the Eastern and Western world. Moreover, Turkey’s latest performance in adapting itself to the European level of democracy was also shown as a reason for pro-Turkish views in the British media.

All in all, the general overview of tables presented in this chapter showed some strong indications of Turkey’s ‘Other’ character in the British news coverage. Drawing on the discussions in the analytical framework of the thesis, it can be argued that these quantitative indications constitute the ‘Other’ half of the notion of ‘a positive Other’ in its usage in the context of this study. Tracing the ‘positive’ half requires a qualitative analysis on the news coverage which takes into account the political and cultural contexts. Therefore, the following chapter provides a qualitative analysis of the news items so as to examine the latent meanings in the news items on Turkey-EU relations. It examines the Turkish issue via the essentialist and functionalist approaches and their influences on representing Turkey as part of the European Other and as part of the European Self. In this way, a deeper and more contextual account can be given to the quantitative findings set out in this chapter.
CHAPTER 7: QUALITATIVE CONTENT ANALYSIS

While referring to Turkey-EU relations, former French President Jacques Chirac once said: “We are all, the children of Byzantium!” (Hurriyet Daily News, 2004).

7.1. Introduction

A quantitative content analysis cannot reveal more than ‘what was said’ and/or ‘how many times it was said’ in a text. Thus, a quantitative analysis can help to answer only some of the research questions in this study. To develop the research only on the basis of quantitative work would probably be of limited value as it is important to relate findings to a text’s qualitative characteristics (Richardson, 2007). Therefore, an analysis of news items concerning Turkey-EU relations requires to consider the usage of words, inferences from sentences, and more importantly the ‘context’ of news items in order to get a deeper understanding of the meaning of texts. For instance, representing the fact that Turkey is a country of 70 million and the majority of the public is Muslim is not only a fact. They also have a meaning depending on the context. Therefore, in which context Turkey-EU relations were represented is what this study also takes into account.

The research questions below set out why this study requires a qualitative content analysis alongside a quantitative examination on news items. The questions are interested in the construction of in-groups and out-groups and how social actors, events, and processes played a role in the demarcation of ‘the Self’ and ‘the Other’ within a sample of news items:
RQ1: What are the components that represent Turkey as the Other in the European context?

RQ2: What are the components that represent Turkey as part of the European Self?

The answers to the questions are presented in two main sections of this chapter. On some occasions, the same issues could be discussed in different sections by addressing the different aspects of the issues. For instance, ‘geography’ in Section 7.2.3 (Othering by Geography) has more to do with European identity, while the geographical dimensions in Section 7.3.1 (Geo-Strategic Considerations) are pertinent to politics. However, it is sometimes inevitable to avoid the overlapping of themes as some sections are to some extent similar. This can be accepted as a natural result since the authors did not write their news items according to this study’s categories of qualitative content analysis.

**Employing the concepts of ‘the Self’ and ‘the Other’**

Turkey is the first official EU membership candidate whose Europeanness has been central to many discussions (Jung and Raudvere, 2008: 6). Therefore, together with the notion of ‘a positive Other’, an analysis on the media representation of Turkish accession to the EU can be better explained by employing ‘the Self and the Other’ nexus in the research. The two concepts are going to be used to imply being or not being part of Europe – in particular the EU – in terms of religion, culture, history, politics, economy and other issues discussed in this chapter. Thus, when the concept ‘the Self’ is used, it actually refers to the European Self and being part of it by means of identity and the other elements identified above. In contrast, ‘the Other’ addresses non-Europeanness, or in Gerard Delanty’s (1995) words being a ‘negation’ of Europe.
Therefore, in this study, ‘othering Turkey’ in the British media refers to the exclusion of Turkey in the European context by employing the different dimensions which are listed throughout Section 7.2.

Arguing that Turkey was orientalised, shown as the Other, and depicted as distant from the European Self would have been much easier if this study had been grounded on other European countries’ contexts (e.g. Germany, France, or Austria). This does not mean that Turkey was not orientalised in the British media, nor that it was not represented as part of the European Self. The findings showed that it is not possible to draw a concrete conclusion about whether the British media represented Turkey as the Other or as part of the Self because of the British media’s stance in the Turkish issue which is possibly influenced by Britain’s special relationship with the EU and the Government’s unlimited support for Turkish membership. Thus, it would be fruitful to discuss the issue under two different titles where Turkey was shown as the Other or as part of the Self. Since the main discussions are richer (not necessarily quantitatively but qualitatively) in Othering Turkey than showing it as part of the European Self, the section covering the Other discussions comes first.

### 7.2. Turkey as the Other

This section seeks to discuss how Turkey was described as the Other in the context of Turkey-EU relations in the British media. It was found in the sample that ‘othering’ was performed through historical events and concepts, religion and culture, geography, politics, economic conditions, and by using quotations from the Turks.
7.2.1. Othering Turkey by using historical events and concepts

As “[…] journalism deploys history to maintain the coherence of its practice in the present” (Conboy, 2011: 517), looking at how Turkey was represented by using historical events and concepts can be an asset for this study. Fürsich argues that “[i]t is the task of the textual analysts to establish how current ostensibly innocuous representations can reverberate problematic historic discourses” (2009: 246). Moreover, Neumann (1999: 62) claims “[p]resent-day representations of Turkey […] carry with them the memory of earlier representations”. Following Fürsich (2009) and Neumann’s (1999) arguments, this section seeks to demonstrate the historic discourses by means of the historical events and concepts which were employed in creating Turkey’s EU bid representation in the British media. Therefore, it is argued that the historical events and concepts employed in the news items concerning Turkey’s EU bid actually refer to more than the memory of a historical term or phenomenon. They usually explain a current event by referring to negative incidents in the past. Moreover, as some of the historical events and concepts found in this study are metaphors (e.g. ‘Trojan horse’), the possibility of exaggeration by the newspapers “for the sake of emphasis” (Conboy, 2007: 40) increases.

Historical events concerning the relations between Turkey and Europe are reduced to a mere few words which are full of meaning in the British media coverage. On some occasions, depending on the context, the historical events and concepts served the formation of Turkey’s representation as an Other; in some cases they were used in order to refer to the political problems that occurred in the relatively near future; and in some news items, the historical events and concepts were employed in order to
make the news items more interesting and/or informative. The historical events and concepts found in the analysis are the Siege of Vienna, Ottoman grand viziers and sultans, the Sick Man of Europe, the bazaar culture, and the mythological stratagem of the Trojan horse. Similarly, in her work on the French media, Tekin (2008) found several historical events and concepts used in the French discourse about Turkey’s EU membership such as “the Trojan horse metaphor, or the metaphoric use of ‘Janissaries’, the ‘Sublime Porte’, or the ‘Sieges of Vienna’” (Tekin, 2008: 750) which historically refer to war and aggression. The sub-sections below present the examples found in the research sample.

**The Siege of Vienna**

The battles between the Ottomans and the Habsburgs, specifically the ones in Vienna (the first in 1529, the second in 1683) have always been a popular association with Turkey’s EU bid. “Many Europeans feel that the eventual entry of Turkey will be a new siege of Vienna” (MacLennan, 2009: 21). This connection also appears in representation of Turkey’s EU bid in different EU Member State’s media (Öktem, 2005; Kösebalaban, 2007; Negrine, 2008; Negrine et al., 2008; Strasser, 2008; Tekin, 2008; Aksoy, 2009; Bryce, 2009a). While the agenda is on Turkey-EU relations, some headlines refer to this historical occasion in order to highlight the most western point the Ottoman Empire had reached in its enlargement to the west. In this way, the abstractness of cultural and religious discussions regarding Turkey’s EU bid are objectified by the mythical meaning of the Siege of Vienna. Although Turks had had many wars with other Europeans (Venetians, British, Russians, etc.), fought together with Germans and Austro-Hungarians against the Allied Powers in WWI, these are usually overlooked in the public discourses (Schneeberger, 2011: 26). This could be
because of the fact that 'the Siege of Vienna' has more symbolic meaning as Catholic Europe strengthened its unity by defending Vienna.

The examples in this study’s sample underline that ‘the Siege of Vienna’ by the Ottomans is still being kept alive in today’s Europe. In particular, the Austrians’ opposition to Turkish membership is clearly associated with the Siege: “In Austria, still affecting to be traumatised by the siege of Vienna in 1683 and where a referendum has been promised, opinion is six-to-one against [Turkish membership]” (The Guardian, 2006). Interestingly, even some news items which strongly support Turkish membership include attributions to the existence of some Austrians who believed that they had saved Europe from the Turkish attacks at the gates of Vienna in 1683 (Financial Times, 2005b). The framing of the item reveals that these reports do not support these Austrians’ thoughts but it is worth noting that Turkish membership is associated with a historical event which recalls a battle in the past no matter whether the content is in favour or against Turkey’s EU bid.

Referring to the Gates of Vienna not only serves Turkey’s exclusion from the European contexts but it also helps, in Negrine’s words, the British press to differentiate the British history from that of other European countries:

“Continental European history – e.g. the repulsion of the Turks at the gates of Vienna in 1683, which was mentioned in British press coverage as part of the rich tapestry of opposition [to Turkish membership] – was reported as the opposition, and the history, of others. It was their – Austrian, German, French, etc. history – not British history, nor European history” (Negrine, 2008: 642).

According to this view, apart from othering the British history from the rest of Europe, underlining ‘the Siege of Vienna’ creates a specific understanding of the European history by the British in terms of deciding who was the Other, or who was the enemy.
It can be inferred that the Germans and the Austrians and other countries which were once part, or in danger of becoming part, of the Ottoman Empire met the Ottomans in person and that is why they have a different history of Europe (a personal interview with J5, 2011).

Although it was mentioned above that ‘the Siege of Vienna’ associated Turkey-EU relations with war and hostility, this historical incident was also used by the same journalists who are in favour of Turkey’s EU membership in order to explain their critiques concerning Turcosceptics in Europe. In an example from the FT coverage, the author argues “Hapsburg history is no justification for the nasty prejudices of those in Vienna who seem to think the Ottoman hordes are threatening to tear down the gates of Christendom” (Financial Times, 2005d). Also, the incident was used in the Daily Mirror so as to show the battle between the British politicians who are in favour of Turkey’s EU bid, and the anti-Turkish membership initiative within the EU: “Straw played a blinder in lifting the Siege of Vienna” (The Daily Mirror, 2005).

**Linking contemporary Turkish politicians with the Ottoman leaders**

In an article published in The Guardian, two consecutive sentences towards the end of the commentary covertly link the Turkish PM Erdoğan with an ‘Ottoman grand vizier’. The author associates the danger of the grand vizier’s life with Erdoğan’s political career:

"[...] the defeat of 1683 [the Battle of Vienna] cost the grand vizier his life and the sultan his throne. Having staked so much on Europe, the Erdoğan
government would risk being swept aside by resurgent Kemalism or resurgent Islamism, or perhaps both.\textsuperscript{23} (The Guardian, 2006).

Among the news items concerning Turkey-EU relations which refer to the Ottoman leaders, the following example has an epic style narrative. This time BBC News connected Turkish PM Erdoğan, who successfully secured a date from the EU to start membership negotiations, with Mohammed the Conqueror who ended the Byzantine period in Constantinople and made Turks the dwellers of this significant European capital from 1453: “Erdogan has every right to return to Ankara in triumph. He gained the title of Mohammed the Conqueror, who five centuries ago passed triumphantly through the gates of the then world” (Simerini cited in BBC News Online, 2004). This kind of historical allusion usage was even observed during the interview with J17 (the FT). While discussing whether Turkey was taking an Islamic route and becoming more interested in the Middle East, he related the Turkish Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu’s opinions with the ‘Ottoman Caliphate’ (see Section 8.3.3.1 in Chapter 8 for more details). All these attributions probably became more popular because of Turkey’s rising interest in relations with the countries in the Balkans and the Middle East which used to be part of the Ottoman Empire. Therefore, going back to 500 years ago and finding political figures from Ottoman history –even though they were in a different political scene- should be an unmissable opportunity for journalists to enhance and colour their texts.

\textsuperscript{23} This prediction, made in 2006, does not seem acceptable now as Erdoğan immensely increased his political power in Turkish politics even though the Turkish motivation for EU membership has extensively decreased since 2006.
Historical events and concepts are not consistent in positioning Turkey in the East or the West. The famous analogy ‘the Sick man of Europe’ is worth noting here because when Turkey becomes a patient, it is the patient of Europe, not of Asia (Mango, 2004; also see Said, 2003: 223; Çirakman, 2005; Mantran, 2005; Livianos, 2006; Bryce, 2007; Kösebalaban, 2007; Bryce, 2009b; Ramm, 2009: 103; Lazarou, 2010). The historical roots of the metaphor originated in a period when Britain was supporting the Ottoman Empire in order to stop the Russian expansion to the Balkans. Although it was claimed the term ‘sick man’ was firstly used by Tsar Nicholas I in 1835 (Neumann, 1999: 55), Livianos (2006: 299-300) argues that the ‘of Europe’ of the term was added afterwards by an unknown person. Besides, he claims that the term ‘the Sick Man of Europe’ could refer to the Balkan territory of the Ottoman Empire instead of imagining the whole Empire in Europe. Nevertheless, it can be said that the term ‘the Sick Man of Europe’ has a place in the discussions concerning Turkey in Europe and/or Turkey of Europe (Bryce, 2009b: 112).

Still, ‘the Sick Man of Europe’ is a journalistic expression to use in the media to explain the state of Turkey-EU relations. Following the economic crises in Turkey in 2001, in an article published in The Guardian, Polly Toynbee discussed Turkey in the following way: “The sick man of Europe - sick maybe, amid its economic crash, but European?” (The Guardian, 2002). However, the usage of this historical concept does not always contribute to Turkey’s representation as an Other of Europe. In an article published in The Daily Telegraph, Geoffrey Lewis says “[Turkey] was a European power for 500 years. No one ever called it the Sick Man of Asia” (The Daily Telegraph, 2002b). The same article’s headline is remarkably clear in order to show the support of the article
for Turkish membership of EU: “Turkey will not be the sick man of the EU” (*The Daily Telegraph*, 2002b). Similarly, while Martin Kettle, of *The Guardian*, was explaining the growth of the Turkish economy, he wrote “[u]nder Erdogan modern Turkey is one of the healthier men of Europe” (*The Guardian*, 2006). Even though ‘the healthier men of Europe’ contrasts with the past, it can be claimed that it reminds the reader of the popular naming of Turkey in the 19th century.

*The bazaar culture*

Some historical concepts were also used to explain Turkey’s behaviour and acts in the membership negotiations. A leader published by the *FT* includes the word ‘bazaar’. Although the word looks innocent at first sight, it could be seen as a metaphoric tool to orientalise and other Turkey from the European way and standard of negotiations. Moreover, the concept was employed while explaining how Turkey misunderstood the process of the membership negotiations. Thus, it may also refer to how backward and irrational Turks are while talking to the modern and rational Self:

“[T]he Turks must realise at the outset what EU full membership means. Some of them seem to be under the illusion that negotiating it is a bit like bargaining in the bazaar: haggle and then split the difference” (*Financial Times*, 2005b).

It should be underlined that this observation was made by the leader writer(s) of the *FT*. It was not quoted from or inspired by someone else. Therefore, one could argue that this item tried to explain the membership negotiations, one of Turkey’s most important steps in its history of westernisation, through a metaphor which is widely related to the Eastern culture: bargaining in the bazaar (*Encyclopaedia Britannica*, 2012).
A Trojan horse

Using the ‘Trojan horse’ in the context of Turkey-EU relations refers to the danger of a non-European intervention in the EU’s domestic affairs, such as the US influence on the EU via Turkey or the power of Islam that Turkey may bring to Europe (see ‘the Trojan Horse Syndrome’ in Kaleağası, 2006: 252). As an example of how this historical concept was used in the news items, there is a quotation from Libya’s ex-leader Muammar Gaddafi, published in the Daily Mail: “President Gaddafi warned yesterday that Turkey will be a Trojan horse for Islamic militants if it joins the EU” (The Daily Mail, 2004). Although they could also have used the concept while quoting from the anti-Turkish camp, The Guardian, The Daily Telegraph and the Daily Mirror did not cover the quotation concerning Gaddafi’s ‘Trojan horse’ argument (Negrine, 2008: 638). However, instead of linking it with Gaddafi’s argument, in one item, The Guardian represented Turkish accession to the EU as “a Trojan horse in the heart of the West” (The Guardian, 2004a). Among the news items in the British media, John Casey’s article is the one which used the ‘Trojan horse’ most explicitly: “I respect the Turks and admire Islam, but I do not think we should ever break down the walls and admit this particular Trojan horse” (The Daily Telegraph, 2002a). It can be seen that the ‘Trojan horse’ concept is generally used to underline Turkey’s difference from Europe and the danger it could carry to the heart of Europe. Previous studies on the same issue even found that the use of the ‘Trojan horse’ in news items refers to Turkish people’s accession to European land (“70 million Turks”) in both the Austrian and the French press (Bischof et al., 2010: 381).

Consequently, one can argue that the historical events and concepts employed in news items in the British media link today’s discussions with the past, usually with the
Ottoman period. In a way, they are useful as a journalistic facility in order to explain long stories and histories with few words and make the texts more colourful to read. However, linking some contemporary issues in Turkey-EU relations with some historical events and concepts because of similarities between them may cause an obscuration of different conditions in two different periods (Pöttker, 2011: 531). Moreover, the news items usually employ the historical events in a remarkably summarised way without considering whether all the readers already know the story of these historical events. Thus, one can argue that the use of these historical events contributes to an inadequate representation of Turkey’s EU bid by means of superficial narration in news texts. Because of this, the items do not adequately represent what happened after the Siege of Vienna until today in relations between Turkey and Europe. The history of relations consists of more than wars and problems such as trade, diplomatic relations, and cultural exchanges (see Finkel, 2005: 283-284; Criss, 2008: 69). Therefore, it can be claimed that the use of historical events and concepts in news items usually contributed to the exclusion of Turkey in the European context. In the same way, Turkey’s different types of relations with Europe and Turkey’s efforts at westernisation were overlooked in historical attributions.

7.2.2. Othering Turkey by religion and culture

“Despite Turkey’s attempts since the founding of the republic in the 1920s to project itself as European, Turkey and Islam have continued to be seen largely as synonymous as far as the dominant European perception is concerned” (Kösebalaban, 2007: 101). Therefore, it can be claimed that the religious and cultural difference is one of the core discussions in Turkey’s EU bid (Tekin, 2008; Lazarou, 2010). As was seen in the Quantitative Content Analysis Chapter, this situation inevitably appears in the media.
representation too. The results of the qualitative content analysis also provide several examples to illustrate the representation of Turkey with religious and cultural differences compared to the dominant religion and culture in Europe. For instance, a report published in the Daily Mirror underlined that Turkey could become “the first Muslim nation to join the Union” (The Daily Mirror, 2002a). This emphasis overtly shows that the EU does not have any Muslim member at the moment and it is important to mention Turkey’s religion because of its difference compared to the bloc which Turkey wants to join. There are more explicit comments concerning how much Turkey does not fit in the European context. A commentary published in The Daily Telegraph is one of the most powerful items in terms of building an argument showing up Turkey’s otherness in religion and culture. In the commentary, the author tries to cover almost all essentialist discussions in order to exclude Turkey while he overlooks some advantages of Turkish membership for the EU. Thus, this article (The Daily Telegraph, 2002a) is probably the only news item in the sample whose context is similar to the former French President Giscard d’Estaing’s view (BBC News Online, 2002) concerning the Turkish issue. It is overtly seen that the authors’ ideal Europe was shaped by Christian values even though he accepts the differences between different European countries. The headline of the article clearly underlines Turkey’s difference and incompetence for EU membership and calls Turkey “too different”, which is a signpost to deep discussions in the text: “Turkey must not join the Christian EU: Europe's political and cultural heritage is just too different to accommodate its Eastern neighbour” (The Daily Telegraph, 2002a). However, in some sections of the article, the author’s justifications are not strong enough: “Turkey has a traditional pull towards both Central Asia and the Middle East” (The Daily Telegraph, 2002a). Significant ties with the Middle East are undeniable. However, mentioning this without Turkey’s close
ties with Europe is not easily acceptable. Furthermore, arguing that Turkey has ‘a
traditional pull towards Central Asia’ is too crude since Turkey’s cultural proximity to
Central Asia is probably not more than Turkey’s cultural proximity to Europe and the
Middle East.

Even though BBC News is careful in its language when it refers to religious and cultural
differences, its quotation from the Spanish daily *El Mundo* highlights an explicit
othering by constructing its argument in an *essentialist* way:

> “Religion must not be an objection to Turkey’s accession, but its history and
culture, which are not European, can be. The EU can assimilate the entry of
small countries like Romania or Bulgaria but not a population of 70 million, with
a mentality and standards of behaviour alien to its identity” (*El Mundo* cited in
BBC News Online, 2004).

The first sentence in the quotation used by BBC News contains an overt contradiction.
It is probably not easy to envisage or understand history and culture by excluding the
impact of religion on societies. The second sentence has a more persuasive argument
as the justification is supported by numbers, the population of Turkey.

Excluding Turkey by using culture is not only associated with the Turkish people’s way
of life or their spiritual choice. There are also examples that differentiate Turkish
culture from European culture because of politics, namely the culture of the political
act. For instance, as with the ‘bazaar’ concept mentioned above, the quotation from
the Greek paper *Kathimerini* on BBC News criticises Turkey due to its attitudes in the
membership negotiations. This time, othering is grounded on the equalisation of not
being too much of a bargainer with being thoroughly European: “In effect, it [Turkey]
wants Europe with its rights, but without its obligations! Its stance shows how alien it
finds the European culture” (BBC News Online, 2004).
Finally, an unusual example which is not representative of the whole sample is worth noting here because it is not easy to see the same argument in other items concerning Turkey’s EU bid. Without mentioning their name, a report in *The Daily Telegraph* refers to an EU diplomat who said “*with a dismal human rights record, an overbearing military and a chaotic economy, Turkey would have faced blunt rejection if it had been Christian*” (*The Daily Telegraph*, 2002c). As was found in the Quantitative Content Analysis Chapter, 21.7 per cent of all news items in the sample connected the reason for opposition to Turkish membership with religion, culture and Turkish identity. Thus, the argument made in *The Daily Telegraph* above is not a usual one within the general representation of Turkey-EU relations in the British media. It is even possible to argue that calling Turkey “*culturally too different*” [*...] in many circles in Europe has become a polite code word for opposing Turkish membership on the grounds that Turkey is not Christian and hence is not European and cannot actually become European” (Kirişci, 2008: 19). The same diplomat in *The Daily Telegraph* also said “*Turkey has been given kidglove treatment precisely because it is a Muslim nation. Europe has bent over backwards to prevent a clash between the Christian and Muslim worlds in the volatile climate since the September 11 attacks*” (*The Daily Telegraph*, 2002c). The reference to the 9/11, referring to Turkey as a solution for the clash of civilisations, was uttered by the British politicians many times in the sample. However, this one claimed that Turkish membership of the EU would be rejected if Turkey had been a Christian country.

All in all, what the diplomat said in the two examples above showed that trying to benefit from Turkey’s religion in politics and special position between the East and the West is the core reason for the functionalists’ pro-Turkish view.
The lack of Turkey’s secular character in the content

Some items in the sample overlook Turkey’s secular character. For instance, calling Turkey a ‘Muslim country’ is common and acceptable but calling Turkey a ‘Muslim state’ is inappropriate: “Europe turning its back on a predominantly Muslim state would suggest the EU is a Christian club” (The Guardian, 2005a). Moreover, in the Daily Mail, the author portrayed Turkey using the issues that the majority of Muslim countries are usually associated with when they are covered in the Western media (e.g. fundamentalism, religious freedom for non-Muslims, problems with woman rights) (see Kirişci, 2008: 31). Therefore, it can be argued that the author does not evaluate each Muslim country with its own characteristics. However, at this point, one should take into account news reports’ general characteristics, especially their tendency to include negative events; i.e. negative framings about Turkey can bring conflict to news stories (Papathanassopoulos and Negrine, 2011: 163), or the importance of negativity as news value (O’Neill and Harcup, 2009: 166). The world in the post-9/11 environment has made relating political issues to Islam more interesting. Representing Turkey in this way may cause many generalisations and misunderstandings, especially if the discussion is about a country which is run by a secular state like Turkey (The Daily Mail, 2006). Nevertheless, there are a large number of news items which refer to Turkey’s differences from other countries when it is evaluated within the Middle East (see Section 7.3.1).

7.2.3. Othering Turkey by geography

As discussed in Chapter 3, Europe’s eastern border is vague and that is why it is “the only continent ‘not to be a continent at all from the point of view of most
geographers’” (Bruter, 2005: 81 cited in Papathanassopoulos and Negrine, 2011: 157). However, there is also a generally accepted version of European borders which considers the great part of Turkish land Asian (Delanty, 1995: 49). Therefore, deciding on the boundaries of Europe is a matter of subjectivity (Bryce, 2009a; 2009b) and this makes geography one of the most important trump cards in the hands of politicians who are against Turkish membership of the EU. In addition to the numeric findings concerning geography in the quantitative content analysis, the analysis in this section seeks to explore how geography is used in the context of othering Turkey.

A news item in the Daily Mail includes an expression referring to Europe’s historical frontiers when it was mentioning Turkish accession to the EU: “[...] the EU expand[s] beyond Europe’s historical frontiers” (The Daily Mail, 2005). Similarly, a leader in The Daily Telegraph succinctly puts it: “[Turkey] whose territory lies mainly outside Europe” (The Daily Telegraph, 2004b). Moreover, another leader, published by the FT, underlines that Turkey’s duty to prove its Europeanness is harder than former candidates because it is not from the “conventional boundaries of Europe” (Financial Times, 2005b). This example demonstrates that even the explicitly pro-Turkish news organisations such as the FT may sometimes employ an essentialist view concerning the Turkish issue.

Geographical exclusion of Turkey was not only framed by Turkey’s location out of Europe’s conventional borders. Some news items also claimed that Europe is being brought to the Middle East by opening the doors to Turkey. An article, published in The Daily Telegraph, argues that Turkish membership will push “the EU’s borders deep into the Middle East” (The Daily Telegraph, 2004a). It can be inferred that the EU comes
closer to its Other (the Middle East) via Turkey. The same argument could be found in the *Daily Mail* when it referred to its hesitations about extending “Europe's frontiers to Iran, Iraq and Syria” (*The Daily Mail*, 1999a). It is worth asking at this point whether the same discussion could have been made when Greece and Bulgaria were waiting for membership as they share a border with Turkey, a country which is largely situated out of Europe. The same argument could be made for another EU member Cyprus which is relatively close to Syria, Israel and Egypt, and sharing a border with the Turkish sector of Cyprus.

The news items also covered the politicians’ thoughts regarding the geographical boundaries of the European Self. One item touched on a comment made by the then European Parliament president Nicole Fontaine: “[She was] suggesting it was time to define the EU's geographic limits. If not, she said, North African nations will soon be knocking on the door, posing greater problems” (*The Daily Mail*, 1999a). Her comment is more about who will then ask to be let in but the comment also categorises Turkey in the same group with the North African ‘others’ of Europe. Fontaine is not alone in putting forward this kind of argument. In an opinion piece in *The Daily Telegraph*, John Casey employs the Middle Eastern countries in order to justify his exclusion of Turkey:

“If you break away from history and apply purely universal criteria for membership - democracy, minority rights etc. - so that Israel could be admitted now, Egypt in due course, and even, one day - who knows? - a liberated Iraq, you will have destroyed even the slim possibility there now is of Europe's being a true community” (*The Daily Telegraph*, 2002a).

Casey points out the necessity for Europe to retain a core identity and being a community, since that will be diluted if the EU goes beyond what its current borders. However, his comments entirely overlook Turkey’s special position between the East and the West. His argument is similar to Fontaine’s and other French politicians’
examples such as recommending the EU to welcome Morocco if Turkey is accepted (see Rumelili, 2004; Tekin, 2008; Tekin, 2010).

Sometimes geographic othering is attached to the EU’s criticism of other countries. For instance, European politicians’ anger concerning the US intervention in Turkey’s bid to join the EU was discussed in a geographic framing. A quotation from Pascal Lamy, the French EU Commissioner at the time, was used in the Daily Mirror in order to highlight his response to the US intervention in EU affairs concerning the Turkish issue. He says "Can you imagine the reaction if we told them [the US Americans] to enlarge into Mexico?" (The Daily Mirror, 2002a). Here Turkey’s separation from the European context is defined by Mexico’s separation from the Northern American context. Although the raison d’être of NAFTA cannot be seen as the equal of the EU, it is worth noting that Mexico and the US are in the same economic bloc. Thus, the US and Mexico have already enlarged into each other in an economic way. The Mexico example was also mentioned by Anders Fogh Rasmussen, former Prime Minister of Denmark, in order to exclude Turkey from Europe: “He (Rasmussen) asked: ‘If you are so keen on us letting the Turks into the EU, why don't you let Mexico into the United States?’” (The Daily Telegraph, 2002c).

All in all, it can be argued that geographic exclusion, as one of the main pillars of the essentialist perspective regarding Turkey’s EU membership, was explored as a problematic matter in the media representation in almost all different periods of the research sample. It is a strong case for the opponents, and some aspects of this issue are almost facts which are mentioned in the news items even by neutral or pro-Turkish membership news items.
7.2.4. Othering Turkey by political reasons

Underlining political reasons in order to exclude Turkey from Europe is mainly employed by German, French and Austrian politicians who are against Turkish membership, and the journalists who are suspicious or not in favour of Turkey’s EU bid. As the British politicians are usually on the side of the ‘in favour’ discourse, the British media quote from other European countries’ media or other European politicians when it needs to cover the political reasons for opposing Turkish membership. For instance, a quotation from *Berliner Zeitung* has a strong argument in terms of the negative geo-strategic influences of Turkey’s EU membership for Europe:

“The extension of the territory of the EU towards the crisis regions of the Caucasus, Middle East and Central Asia holds out more risks than opportunities... No European politician is in a position to say confidently whether the Turkey operation will be successful and the EU patient will still be alive after the operation” (*Berliner Zeitung* cited in BBC News Online, 2004).

However, the examples covering the issue with the help of foreign press do not mean that the reports in the British media or the British media’s own columnists never refer to the political disadvantages of Turkey’s EU membership. For instance, in *The Daily Telegraph*, as a counter argument to George W. Bush’s insistence on Turkish membership of the EU, former Danish Prime Minister Anders Fogh Rasmussen said that the meaning of the EU “involves sharing a law-making parliament, a currency and a supreme court in a close-knit union” (*The Daily Telegraph*, 2002c). By means of this, Rasmussen implicitly referred to the reasons why they are suspicious of Turkey’s accession.

There are also some extreme examples in the news items which exclude Turkey from the European Self by using political reasons. Although this example is not in line with
the general overview of the items published by *The Daily Telegraph*, the item overtly or covertly associates Turkey with terrorist attacks and intensifies the danger with a vague expression which makes a connection between Turkish membership and radical Islam in the name of public opinion: “The offer to embrace Turkey flies in the face of public opinion across most of Europe, where antipathy to radical Islam has risen sharply since the terrorist attacks in America and Madrid” (*The Daily Telegraph*, 2004a).

Similarly, the *Daily Mail* goes beyond discussing religion within the boundaries of cultural differences between Turkey and Europe and associates Turkey with Islamic fundamentalism without illustrating any specific example. The author asks “[w]ill Europe be the solution to Turkey’s fundamentalism problem, or will Turkey simply take its fundamentalists into the EU?” (*The Daily Mail*, 2006). It can be inferred that the author assumes that there is a ‘fundamentalism’ problem in Turkey without deepening the discussion or giving some concrete examples in order to make the claim stronger. Some items illustrate specific examples while discussing the same issue. For instance, an item in *The Guardian* tells the reader that even the Turkish liberals support the Turkish PM who used to belong with radical Islamists. Without knowing Turkish PM Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s full story, it would be hard to comprehend this comment: “Turkish liberals who still support a prime minister who, as a youthful radical, sat at the feet of the proto al-Qaida warlord Gulbeddin Hekmatyar, as the best way of safeguarding the country’s secular democracy” (*The Guardian*, 2005b).

Othering or welcoming Turkey by political reasons can be discovered better by looking at the news items’ approach to the main political issues in Turkey’s EU bid. For
instance, in a leader published in *The Daily Telegraph*, the author listed the main areas that Turkey must improve. One of the obligations in the third one is confusing. It claims that Turkey “must settle minority and historical issues better than it has so far managed to come to terms with its Kurds and the Armenian question” (*Financial Times*, 2005b). There is no direct attribution in Copenhagen Criteria concerning historical issues and the EU has not referred to the Armenian issue in the negotiating framework (Aybet, 2006) even though the European Parliament released a report on 28th February 2002 and advised Turkey to have neighbourly relations with Armenia (Chiclet, 2005: 171).

Othering Turkey by political reasons also includes the Cyprus issue and Turkey’s human rights record. For instance, Turkey was represented as an occupier when the *Daily Mail* was referring to the Cyprus issue: “Turkey occupied its [the island’s] northern Third” (*The Daily Mail*, 1999b). Moreover, the *Daily Mirror* employs a much more transparent language. Although calling the military operation to Northern Cyprus in 1974 an invasion was found in several news items in the British media, employing the adjective “brutal” (*The Daily Mirror*, 2002b) in order to describe the operation was found for the first time in the research’s sample. Furthermore, regarding the human rights issues in Turkey, the *Daily Mirror* uses the word ‘appalling’ which intensifies the degree of Turkey’s bad human rights record (*The Daily Mirror*, 2002b). Concerning the Kurdish issue within the human rights discussions, the Turkish state, in one example in the *Daily Mail*, was shown as the only party responsible for the loss of lives. Furthermore, the report used the word ‘guerilla’ while talking about the PKK24 and represented the clash as the war for Kurdish people’s homeland: “Thousands of people have been killed

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24 The PKK is accepted as a terrorist organisation by several countries and the EU (Dedeoglu, 2003b)
in a ruthless campaign against Kurdish guerrillas fighting for a homeland” (The *Daily Mail*, 1999b).

Lastly, an excerpt quoted from *Die Presse* on BBC News underlines Turkish membership’s possible impact on the distribution of power in the EU’s political and economic structure. Austria, in particular, is unhappy with the economic burden of Turkish accession:

“[Turkish membership] will massively shift the balance of power. For Austria these shifts are particularly interesting from the financial point of view. With Turkey, the recipient countries will be hugely strengthened. Today’s net donor countries, of which Austria is one, could then be outvoted by those who receive the money” (*Die Presse* cited in BBC News Online, 2004).

Having quoted the example above, other issues concerning the negative economic influences of Turkey’s EU membership are discussed more in the following section.

### 7.2.5. Othering Turkey by economic conditions

The Self and the Other demarcation, by pointing to economic differences, does not appear in deep discussions. The news items in the sample do refer to the economic aspects of Turkish membership of the EU, however, they do not go beyond calling Turkey poor or under the average GDP of EU Member States. A leader article published in the *FT* includes the labels “the Union’s poorest and most populous member” (*Financial Times*, 2005b). Similarly, in *The Guardian*, Turkey was named as “the EU's poorest member” (*The Guardian*, 2005d). The author wondered if Turkey “can fit into a club dominated by wealthy, industrialised nations” (*The Guardian*, 2005d). Here, the commentary predicates the EU members as “industrialised nations”. However, it can be argued that the author overlooks the enlargement in 2004 and the following one in 2007 (the item was written in 2005), and is being unfair by failing to see the GDP and
industrialisation level of the new members from Central and Eastern Europe compared to Turkey. Figure 7.1 below illustrates the GDPs of four countries calculated according to the average GDP of all EU Member States (100 unit).

![Graph showing GDPs per capita of four countries and the EU average in 2010 (Index: EU-27=100).](image)

Unlike the previous example from The Guardian, another item from the same paper has a stronger argument. It criticises Turkey’s economic weakness by referring to numbers to empower its argument: “In the UN development project’s human development index, Turkey ranks 92nd, well below every other European nation, including Albania” (The Guardian, 2006).

The last example is from the Daily Mail, which usually considers the economic consequences of new members’ accession in terms of an immigration issue. The
paper’s general hesitation concerning the enlargement, especially the ex-communist countries, inevitably targets Turkish membership too (The Daily Mail, 1999a). It is crucial to note that the item was written in 1999 when the Eastern European members were not part of the bloc. That is why the author is overtly critical of the expansion including Turkey.

7.2.6. Othering Turkey by using ‘vox pops’ from Turkey

This section looks at how the news items used quotations from Turkish people and how these quotations served Turkey’s exclusion from the European Self in the British media. This allows the study to become familiar with the comments from the Turkish side and representation of their opinion regarding Turkey and the EU and being between the Self and the Other. The data qualitatively analysed for this section consist of a selection of quotes (‘vox pops’) from Turkish people on Turkish streets. Turkish people’s reactions were usually in anger and tiredness which served to position Turkey as an out-group country in the European context. Therefore, it can be argued that the ‘vox pops’ represented a Turkish public opinion which is in contrast with that claimed by Christensen (2006: 66) and Karlsson (2007: 82) in Chapter 3.

In a report on BBC News, a Turkish newsagent in Istanbul says: “I don’t wanna join the EU, it is a Christian club” (BBC News Online, 2005a). When the context in the news item is taken into account, it can be argued that the news item used this person in order to reveal the reaction of Turkish people to the deadlock in Turkey-EU relations just one day before 3rd October 2005 while Turkey was waiting to start membership negotiations. The example shows how the term ‘Christian Club’ is used as a label or metonym among Turks.
The usage of personal pronouns by Turkish people on the street can help to understand how Turkish people were represented in terms of their understanding of Turkey in Europe as the Self or the Other. The examples found in the British media constantly refer to the EU by using third person plural pronoun ‘they’, and Turkish people who talked to the British media exclude themselves from Europe by using ‘we’ and ‘us’. Here are some examples from BBC News’ street interviews: "They don’t want us! They keep playing games. They claim we were bad to the Kurds, they talk about the Armenians" (BBC News Online, 2005a). "They will give us such long dates to become members. They will make us come crawling and then wring everything out of us" (BBC News Online, 2005a) (Italic emphasis added).

The majority of the quotations from the public could be evaluated as remarkably crude. Even the examples from The Guardian appear as if they are from a tabloid newspaper: "The conditions they're placing on us are becoming comical. Soon they'll be saying Turkish men should cut off their moustaches and change their hairstyles" (The Guardian, 2004b).

Contribution to the differentiation was not only made by means of the Turkish public. The Daily Mirror chose quotations from the Turkish leaders which represent themselves as different from the Europeans: “[H]e [former Turkish PM Abdullah Gül] said the ruling was blatant ‘discrimination’ against a Muslim country by a ‘Christian club’” (The Daily Mirror, 2002a). This example shows that employing religious differences is not only a discursive strategy of the politicians from the EU but also of the Turkish politicians.
This section presented the qualitative analysis regarding how Turkey was othered in the news items about its EU bid. As the study is not only interested in how Turkey was shown as the Other, the following section seeks to explore how Turkey was positioned as part of the European Self in the British news media.

### 7.3. Turkey as part of the European Self

In addition to the explanations in the Analytical Framework Chapter, it would be useful to identify what this study means by the European Self. First of all, understanding if Turkey is or can be a part of the European Self “[...] is dependent on Europe’s self-definition” (Jung and Raudvere, 2008: 6). Thus, it is not possible to evaluate Turkey’s European characteristics and describe how Turkey is made a component of the European Self without explaining the meaning of the European Self. Moreover, while elucidating what can represent the European Self, “what needs to be explored is not only how the idea is being configured but also who has the power to define what the idea of Europe is” (Papathanassopoulos and Negrine, 2011: 153). For a contemporary definition of the European Self, the EU and its mechanism can be seen as a strong representative of this power. Therefore, bearing in mind Delanty’s (1995: 30) term “the westernisation of Europe”, one can argue that being a member of the EU, or preferring not to join the bloc while having the capacity to do so (e.g. Switzerland and Norway), has an impact on being accepted as thoroughly European. Thus, the countries such as Turkey, Russia, Ukraine and Armenia are seen as disputably European since they do not have the above-mentioned capacity. When more historical and cultural criteria are taken into account,
“[r]eferences are made to Europe’s heritage of classical Graeco-Roman civilization, Christianity, and the ideas of the Enlightenment, Science, Reason, Progress and Democracy as the core elements of this claimed European legacy. There are subtexts of racial and cultural chauvinism, particularly when confronted with Islam. Europe acquires distinction and salience when pitted against the Other” (Stråth, 2002: 388).

This historical and culture-based explanation of the European Self excludes the different ones which do not hold Europe’s core values. However, when it encounters differences within the countries which fit the historical and culture-based criteria, the differences are evaluated “in the form of unity in diversity” (Stråth, 2002: 388). Accepting or rejecting this historical and culture-based understanding of Europe unavoidably influences the support or the opposition of Europeans for Turkish membership. The ones who envisage a Europe grounded on the inheritance of Christian culture do not accept welcoming Turkey to the EU. However, the others who “anchor their understanding of a distinct European culture in the Enlightenment heritage of secularism and civil liberties, which make Western Europe stand out with its long-term democratic traditions and comparatively evenly distributed economic welfare” (Jung and Raudvere, 2008: 6)

are more open to accession of new countries, including Turkey if the political and economic criteria are met. All these different approaches while defining Europe brings to mind the aforementioned essentialist-functionalist demarcation.

**Making Turkey a part of the European Self**

As discussed in the Analytical Framework Chapter, “the images of the Other might be perceived as a ‘continuum’, a long-abominated enemy could turn into an ally, an extension of the Self, over time” (Tekin, 2010: 14). The media representation of Turkey’s relations with the EU in the British media can be shown as a significant example for this argument. However, writing about Turkey as part of the European Self in media representation is difficult while several studies in the literature concerning
East – West demarcation or European identity touched on Turkey’s otherness (see Huntington, 1993; Delanty, 1995; Neumann, 1999; Tekin, 2008; Tekin, 2010; Robins, 1996). Even though the British news organisations published many news items which show Turkey as part of the European Self, the degree of seeing Turkey in that way, as might be expected, has different levels and reasons.

The welcoming discourse concerning Turkey as part of the European Self in the British media is mainly grounded in the British politicians’ utterances. For instance, excluding Turkey from the EU because of Turkey’s religion is usually strongly criticised by British politicians. Their determined discourse once more proves that there is a significant degree of opposition to Turkish membership in Europe because of Turkey’s religion. In an example, published in BBC News, Jack Straw used the term "theological-political divide” while he was talking about the Austrian opposition. He said “[this division] could open up even further down the boundary between so-called Christian-heritage states and those of Islamic heritage" (BBC News Online, 2005b). Similarly, Tony Blair’s speeches give a strong support for Turkish membership especially if it is being excluded due to the religious issues. Blair’s approach sees Turkey as an in-group element regardless of Turkey’s dominant religion: “We are stating as a fundamental principle that the fact that Turkey is a Muslim country does not mean it should be barred from the European Union” (The Daily Telegraph, 2004a). A condensed version of the same quotation was published by the Daily Mirror too (The Daily Mirror, 2004).

On some occasions, Turkey was seen as a component of the European Self by denoting actual facts. According to a commentary in The Guardian, even though Turkey is defined as a country between in-group and out-group, its participation in many
European events “from the Champions League and the Eurovision Song Contest to NATO and the Council of Europe” (The Guardian, 2006) proves that it is an in-group country. In the same way, BBC News portrays Turkey as part of the European Self by referring to Turkey’s NATO membership and the associate EU membership status (BBC News Online, 2005b). This view is in line with representing the possibility of Turkey’s adhesion to the European Self if it obeys the club’s rules and meets the standards: “The EU accepted Turkey as a formal applicant for membership but insisted that it must improve its record on human rights and relations with its neighbours” (The Daily Mail, 1999b).

Some examples argue that the European Self should not be constituted by excluding the Other. In an item published in The Guardian, Andrew Finkel discusses the issue of constructing European identity by excluding Turkey. He criticises “those who still think Europe should define itself by whom it can exclude, not whom it can embrace […]” (The Guardian, 2005b). More attention-grabbing comment in terms of welcoming Turkey as an in-group country was to be found in The Daily Telegraph. Although his article’s context was based on being sceptical about Turkish membership, John Casey cited the Bishop of Oxford who made pro-Turkish remarks by accepting “Turkey’s admission on grounds of Christian ‘inclusiveness’” (The Daily Telegraph, 2002a), the Bishop’s comments totally clash with the other approaches which employ Christian values of Europe in an essentialist way, found in the research sample.

7.3.1. Defining Turkey as part of the European Self by geo-strategic considerations

As mentioned in the Quantitative Content Analysis Chapter, Turkey’s role to help to deal with clash of civilisations was shown as the most common reason for support for
Turkish membership. Therefore, it can be argued that accepting Turkey as part of the European Self has more geo-strategic reasons than other justifications. Even though explaining the geo-strategic dimension is not an easy one, it can be claimed that it refers to different examinations of Turkey’s geographical position while taking into account political strategies (Tekin, 2010).

In this section, the geo-strategic dimension will be examined by focusing on this question: How can the British media representation of Turkey still include the points that designates Turkey as part of the European Self while the British coverage also represents Turkey by extreme characteristics such as the most populated and the poorest of Europe “with the biggest vote in the Council of Ministers” (Financial Times, 2005b) and being culturally different from Europe? It can be argued that this is because Turkey is always on the extreme side. It is extreme in terms of its geo-political contribution to Europe and it is extreme in terms of its characteristics which make it unsuitable to be accepted to the EU, such as cultural differences and the negative public opinion in Europe. Moreover, the answer to the question could be related to the support for Turkish membership by the British Government is not because of Turkey’s European character. It is because of political benefits for Britain. That is why Turkish membership can be welcomed by the Europeans who see the EU with a more functionalist approach than an essentialist one. Therefore, Turkish membership of the EU is different from previous candidate countries in the EU expansions in 2004 and 2007, which makes Turkey an unusual case. Inevitably, this geo-strategic game has a reflection in the British media.
The geo-political reasons for the UK’s support for Turkish membership in the British media

Claiming that Turkey’s accession can make the Western world’s image better in the eyes of the Muslim world or arguing that Turkish membership can make the EU’s communication with the Islamic world better are common examples to explain support for Turkish membership (e.g. The Guardian, 2005d; The Daily Mail, 2002). The British politicians, in particular, contributed to that kind of representation by referring to the multicultural character of Europe in the British media. Blair’s positive comments on welcoming a Muslim country to the EU is a strong example of how some British politicians approach the Turkish issue: he claimed that “[t]his is a good day for Europe, Turkey and the wider world” (The Daily Mirror, 2004) on the day when some problems were solved in order to start the membership negotiations with Turkey.

Other examples found in the British media also clarify the reasons for the British politicians’ support for Turkish membership. It is argued that if Turkey becomes a member of the EU, “no longer will the jihadists be able to speak of the Christian west pitted against the Muslim rest” (The Guardian, 2005d). Correspondingly, in Blair’s words, Turkish membership is “an example of the West’s positive engagement with the Muslim world at a time of heightened tension” (The Daily Mail, 2005). He uses ‘we’ the third plural pronoun in his utterance in order to explain that Muslims and Christians can cooperate and Turkish membership is an important way to realise his proposal and says ‘we can work together’ (The Daily Telegraph, 2004a). Therefore, Turkey’s transformation into an in-group country is possible if it functions as a conciliator between the East and the West. Another report, published in the Daily Mirror, implicitly represents Turkey as an in-group country in the context of Western
alliance against terrorism. It refers to the US and British support for Turkish membership of the EU due to Turkey’s possible help to the alliances during the invasion of Iraq in 2003 (The Daily Mirror, 2002b). Therefore, it can be argued that Turkey’s role as part of the European Self is recalled when the politicians’ agenda is related to some political clashes. The problems and conflicts between the East and the West to which Turkey’s characteristics might be a solution are usually emphasised. Thus, the British support for Turkish membership is not thoroughly essentialist but geo-strategic. Because of the UK’s kind of approach to the Turkish issue, one can argue that Turkey is welcomed to be part of the European Self for the sake of its ‘Other’ character. This situation influences the representation of Turkey-EU relations in the British media and Turkey inevitably appears to be a fragile partner of the European Self.

**Turkey’s fragile belonging to the European Self**

The reason of fragile belonging is closely linked to politicians’ decisions and it is especially dependent on the position of the British Government. A report published in the Daily Mirror argues that a possible rejection of Turkey by the EU could have easily made Turkey an out-group but Jack Straw’s efforts did not allow it (The Daily Mirror, 2005). Turkey’s belonging to the European Self is again fragile in its representation in the British media because Turkey’s EU membership is seen as Turkey’s only chance to specify itself an in-group or out-group country within the context of Europe (The Guardian, 2006). This fragile belonging includes suspicious presupposition about what happens if Turkey turns its face from the EU –suspecting whether Turkey can be pushed to eastwards if it cannot join the EU (The Guardian, 2005b; The Daily Mirror, 2005) (also see Jung and Raudvere, 2008: 5). These kind of comments can be seen as
an example of the Orientalist approach since the author covertly, possibly unconsciously, serves the Eastern image of Turkey by stating that Turkey’s only alternative is the East if it turns its face back from Europe.

**Turkey in Between**

Another dimension of Turkey’s geo-strategic importance for the EU can be described by referring to the discussions which envisage Turkey as in between two continents. By using the Anatolian peninsula, Istanbul and the Bosphorus Bridge as metaphors, Turkey was portrayed as a country which connects the Eastern and the Western world.

“This motif has been extensively used by Turkey to promote her [*sic*] international relations or simply explain her [*sic*] ‘multifaceted’ foreign policy. It has often been necessary, for example, to explain to the west Turkey’s Islamic orientation, and to the Muslim nations the state’s alliance with the west. But the bridge motif has also been offered as an answer to Turkey’s identity problem in general” (Kushner, 1997: 231).

In the findings of qualitative analysis, several news items represented Turkey by employing the bridge rhetoric instead of positioning Turkey as only external to Europe (e.g. *The Guardian*, 2006; *The Daily Mail*, 2005). However, representing Turkey by the bridge rhetoric only appears when Turkey serves the European Self by using its non-European characteristics.

Because of the bridge rhetoric, the British media intensifies the vagueness of Europe’s eastern border but contributes to finding a place for Turkey between two worlds. Concerning the bridge argument, Timothy Garton Ash’s expression in *The Guardian* is highly illuminating. He does not believe that Europe ends at a concrete point. Instead, it gradually disappears and leaves the scene to Asia in a transitive way. He says:

“[A]t its eastern and south-eastern borders Europe does not end, it merely fades away. It fades away across the great expanses of Turkey and Russia.
Somewhere between Moscow and Vladivostok, somewhere between Istanbul and Hakkari, you find yourself more in Asia than in Europe” (The Guardian, 2005c).

This kind of representation leads Turkey to be positioned as part of the Self and the Other at the same time.

Leaving Turkey in between has a direct political reflection in Turkish accession to the EU too. Even Austria, the main opponent of Turkey’s EU bid according to the majority of the news items in the research sample, cannot say an implacable ‘no’ to Turkish membership and it proposes an alternative relationship (privileged partnership). What the proposal means is still vague but in Wolfgang Schüssel’s, former Chancellor of Austria, words this alternative relationship should “ensure that Turkey would remain bonded as strongly as possible to the EU” (Financial Times, 2005c). This can show that Turkey is actually not entirely excluded from Europe. The issue of ‘privileged partnership’ was already explained in the Background and Literature Review Chapter but it should be argued here that the term ‘privileged partnership’ also includes ‘the Self’ and ‘the Other’ dimensions. Not welcoming Turkey as a full member but also not fully closing the door created the concept or proposal of ‘privileged partnership’. Even though it is still not a clear proposal, one can argue that ‘privileged partnership’ refers to a quasi-ingroup or quasi-outgroup position of Turkey which neither makes Turkey completely the Self or the Other in the European context.

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25 Vladivostok is located in the southeastern Russia near Russian borders with China and North Korea.
26 Hakkari is located in the most southeastern corner of Turkey by the Iranian and Iraqi borders.
Turks are ‘the good Muslims’

Turkish version of Islam sometimes appears as a crucial example concerning the representation of Turkey as ‘a positive Other’ in the coverage. Historically, Turkish Islam has less to do with state affairs compared with the situation in most other Muslim countries (see Heper, 2004: 4). This is a significant way for Turkey to differentiate itself from Middle Eastern countries. “[...] Turkey does not have a tradition of Islamist violence and there is a synthesis of Islam and democracy that goes back to the Ottoman Empire” (Akyol, 2009: 188). Therefore, Turkish contribution to the radical Islamic movements around the world is extremely small (Roy, 2005: 21). This image of Turkey was not underrepresented in the British media. According to the findings in the sample, the Turkish version of Islam is the one that Europeans want to see. It is the Islam which is friendly with the Western world and relatively less connected with politics. Thus, according to some news items in the sample, the characteristics of Turkey’s religion are suitable to be accepted into the European Self as Turkey can make it easier to constitute the European version of Islam:

“Turkish Islam is different from the one which bred the fundamentalist movements which threaten us... If it hopes to continue to live with its values in a world which would not only be made up of antagonist civilisation blocs, Europe has everything to win from this Islam, and, who knows, from building with it a European Islam to challenge the one promoted by fundamentalists” (Le Temps cited in BBC News Online, 2004).

Even though it was not always defined by the expression ‘good Muslims’, Turkey is sometimes represented in the British media as the ‘good’ one and the model one in the Islamic world. This usually happens because of the British politicians’ discourse when they explain their support for Turkish membership. A leader article, published in The Daily Telegraph, argues: “As the war between Islamists and the West continues unabated, the Prime Minister [Tony Blair] has rightly recognised the strategic
importance of reaching out to a moderate, secular Muslim nation” (The Daily Telegraph, 2004b). The same issue was mentioned by Joschka Fischer, former Foreign Minister of Germany, in the excerpt from The Guardian, however he was criticised by the author as Fischer’s approach to Turkey does not make Turkish people happy:

“Morris quotes Joschka Fischer: "To modernise an Islamic country based on the shared values of Europe would be almost a D-Day for Europe in the war against terror." This is not an argument that appeals to Turks, who feel patronised by attempts to depict them as the well-behaved Muslim nation. They already see themselves as an important part of the European economic zone” (The Guardian, 2005b).

These examples illustrate how the Turkish Other is being employed/exploited by European politicians. This time exploitation of the Turkish Other in the European context seeks to transform the Turkish Other into a component of the European Self.

**The responsibilities of the EU and the promises to Turkey**

According to the findings in Tekin’s study (2008) regarding Turkey’s EU bid in the French political discourse, backers of Turkish accession think that the EU is responsible for rehabilitating Turkish democracy (Tekin, 2008). When the British media is analysed concerning the same issue, it can be said that the proponents’ voice is much stronger than in France in emphasising the importance of the EU’s responsibilities concerning the efforts to make Turkey part of the European Self. In a report published by the FT, some European diplomats took responsibility for transforming Turkish democracy even though they were still not sure if Turkey could ever join the bloc: “Many European diplomats believe the only way to guarantee Turkey continues to reform is to make a serious offer of membership. But they are still deeply unsure if Ankara will ever join” (Financial Times, 2005a). Furthermore, a leader article in the same paper refers to the EU’s responsibility by motivating the EU to continue going further in Turkish accession.
Otherwise, the leader argues, Turkey’s improvements in human rights and democracy would be harmed (Financial Times, 2005b). Similarly, some news items published by the Daily Mail have underlined the EU’s responsibility to encourage Turkey to become a member. Hence, it would be easier to solve problems between Turkey and Greece, and improve human rights level concerning the minority rights in Turkey.

According to some news items, Turkey can be part of the European Self because of promises given to Turkey a long time ago. They are mentioned by the journalists who are in favour of Turkish membership and their argument is mostly grounded on a principle of Roman law, pacta sunt servanda. According to this view, the EU has promised Turkey membership many times and it should keep its promises. In his article published in The Guardian, Timothy Garton Ash refers to these promises given in the past. He argues that a special relationship could, idealistically, be offered to Turkey and Russia as they are the countries between Europe and Asia, however it is too late for this in the Turkish case. He says:

“We have promises to keep. For more than 40 years we have assured Turkey that it will belong to our European community. We have repeated, strengthened, made concrete these promises over the past decade” (The Guardian, 2005c).

Philip Stephens (the FT) underlined the same issue. He refers to Turkey’s long EU journey and how European politicians accepted that Turkey is part of Europe long time ago:

“It begins, just begins, to redeem a promise first made 40 years ago when the then six members of the common market declared, without equivocation, that ‘Turkey is part of Europe . . . This is a geographical reality as well as a historical truism’” (Financial Times, 2005d).

Moreover, the same argument was used by British politicians too. For instance, Jack Straw tried to legitimise his support for Turkish membership by referring to promises:
“keeping a membership promise made to the country [Turkey] in 1963” (BBC News Online, 2005c).

7.4. Conclusion

This chapter presented the findings from the qualitative content analysis on the news coverage. The chapter illustrated the material by separating them into two sections which are ‘Turkey as the Other’ and ‘Turkey as part of the European Self’. Under these categorisations, the chapter answered two research questions.

RQ1: What are the components that represent Turkey as the Other in the European context?

It was found in the qualitative analysis that several components were used in order to represent Turkey as part of the European Other. First of all, the historical events and concepts (e.g. the Siege of Vienna, a Trojan horse) were examined. It was seen that the British media made use of historical events and concepts in order to enrich the stories and explain long discussions with some historically loaded examples. The historical links were mainly based on the relations between the Ottomans and its European rivals. One can argue that the interest of the British media in the examples from the Ottomans can be related to the ‘Neo-Ottoman’ approach in Turkish foreign policy in recent years. However, the general tone of the examples refers to war, violence and

27 Since former Turkish PM and President Turgut Özal’s active policy towards the former Ottoman lands, Turkey has become more interested in the regional crises around its borders (Roy, 2005: 20). However, according to Taspinar,

“Neo-Ottomanism does not call for Turkish imperialism in the Middle East and the Balkans. Similarly, it does not seek to institute an Islamic legal system in modern Turkey. Instead, neo-Ottomanism favors a more moderate version of secularism at home, and a more activist policy in foreign affairs. In this neo-Ottoman paradigm, Ankara exerts more ‘soft power’—political, economic, diplomatic, and cultural influence—in formerly Ottoman territories as well as in other regions where Turkey has strategic and national interests” (2008: 14-15). (Also see Yavuz, 1998; Laçiner, 2001).
problematic issues rather than collaboration between the Turks and Europeans. Therefore, it can be claimed that these examples contributed to the representation of Turkey as the European Other in the British media.

The strongest othering examples were probably found in the ‘Othering Turkey by religion and culture’ section. It was seen that Turkey’s Muslim character was represented as a significant difference in the news items even though it was not depicted as a danger to the European Self in general. The same section also argued that Turkey’s secular character was underrepresented and accordingly, in some cases, the coverage overlooked Turkey’s differences from other Muslim countries. The section about geography revealed that even the pro-Turkish papers, which do not have an essentialist approach, referred to Turkey’s non-European geographical position. The same section also stressed a functionalist view concerning the risk of sharing borders with countries such as Iran, Iraq and Syria if Turkey joins the bloc.

As the British politicians are the fervent supporters of Turkish membership, the British media used continental European politicians’ or European media’s comments while referring to Turkey’s otherness in terms of politics. Othering was performed by underlining Turkey’s non-European negotiating culture in politics and Turkey’s links with fundamentalist Islamic movements. Besides, the section also highlighted how Turkey was represented as a European Other because of its problematic relations with its neighbours.

The economic aspect in portraying Turkey as the Other was chiefly related to Turkey’s low economic power and insufficient industrial level compared to the EU average. It
was seen in the sample that calling Turkey “poor”, “big” and “densely populated” is common in the coverage no matter whether the media outlet is in favour of Turkish membership or not. Finally, the last sub-section of ‘Turkey as the Other’ focused on the examples in the British media which utilised ‘vox pops’ from Turkey. It was seen that Turkish people on the street also exclude themselves from Europe by means of using the third person plural pronoun. The quotations from the Turks usually represented Turks as part of “we” while the EU was associated with “they”. Several examples were remarkably simplistic. Therefore, it can be argued that the British media used Turkish ‘vox pops’ as a contribution to its content which represents Turkey as ‘different’ compared to the EU Member States.

**RQ2: What are the components that represent Turkey as part of the European Self?**

The second section of the chapter dealt with the examples from the British coverage which highlighted Turkey’s characteristics to be part of the European Self. Apart from Turkey’s Europeanised politics and the promises which were given long time ago, it was seen that the main component that represent Turkey as part of the European Self is Turkey’s geo-political importance. The British politicians’ *functionalist* understanding of the EU shaped the overall tone of the coverage concerning why Turkey is suitable to be part of the European Self.

British politicians’ comments (e.g. Tony Blair’s usage of the first person plural pronoun while referring to the collaboration between the East and the West), and accordingly the British media’s representation, put forward the idea that Turkish membership would have a significant role if the EU wanted to end the clash of civilisations and develop better relations with the Muslim world. This was portrayed in the coverage
which suggested that Turkish help in the EU’s global objectives would be enough to allow Turkey to enjoy EU membership, provided that it also met the Copenhagen criteria.

The section also underlined Turkey’s ‘in between’ character and its capacity to be a bridge between the two civilisations. Besides, it was found in the coverage that the British media tend to represent Turks as the ‘good Muslims’ by differentiating Turkey from other parts of the Muslim world.

All in all, almost all pro-Turkish ideas ended up with a functionalist expectation of Turkey. Therefore, it could be argued that the British media does not see Turkey as genuinely part of the European Self. However, it would become so if it obeyed the functionalist rules of London’s EU game.
CHAPTER 8: INDIVIDUAL LEVEL INFLUENCES ON JOURNALISTS WHILE REPORTING ON TURKEY-EU RELATIONS

“All knowledge of other cultures, societies, or religions comes about through an admixture of indirect evidence with the individual scholar’s personal situation, as well as the overall political circumstances. What makes such knowledge accurate or inaccurate, bad, better, or worse, has to do mainly with the needs of the society in which that knowledge is produced” (Said, 1997: 168).

8.1. Introduction

Academic works on mass media usually focus on media outputs and their influences on the audience while news production is usually overlooked (Shoemaker and Reese, 1996: 3; also see Richardson, 2004: 34). Similarly, the research on Turkey’s EU bid representation in the media mainly focuses on the content (inter alia Chaban et al., 2005; Öktem, 2005; Baştürk-Akca and Yılmaztürk, 2006; Christensen, 2006; Koenig et al., 2006; Aissaoui 2007; Devran, 2007; Ergül, 2007; Negrine, 2008; Negrine et al., 2008; Tekin, 2008; Aksoy, 2009; Bryce, 2009a; Bryce, 2009b; Kejanlioğlu and Taş, 2009; Schneeberger, 2009, 2011; Walter and Albert, 2009; Wimmel, 2009; Bischof et al., 2010; Tekin, 2010; Hinrichsen, 2012). These research findings were gathered through different textual analyses (e.g. content analysis, critical discourse analysis). The production process of news content concerning Turkey-EU relations, and its reflection
on the reception are usually ignored. It seems that researchers tend to be more interested in the news content of Turkey-EU relations instead of asking questions about how this news content occurred, and how journalists approach the Turkish issue. This could be related to the fact that analysing news content could be relatively less time consuming and more economical when it is compared to organising and conducting interviews with journalists. Regarding the same issue in media studies in general, Philo (2007) refers to the deficit of production and reception analyses and discusses if it is possible to analyse an issue only within the boundaries of the content. In the words of Verschueren, a study which focuses only on the content would probably miss the “structural and functional properties of the news gathering and reporting process” (Verschueren, 1985 cited in Richardson, 2007: 40). Therefore, it can be argued that the ideal news media study should not only be limited to a focus on the content (for multi-step approach, see Fürsich: 2009).

After listing the above reasons, it can be claimed that obtaining journalists’ views on Turkey’s EU bid in general and getting to know how the news items concerning Turkey-EU relations emerge can help to make the issue of Turkey’s EU bid representation in the British media easier to understand. Thus, one of the important points that this study seeks to contribute to the field is to find out what occurs in the journalists’ milieu where media content on Turkey’s EU membership is produced. In this way, the ‘source’ level of the basic communication model can be better exposed in terms of the media representation of Turkey’s EU bid in the British media.

28 Several studies which look at the British media and its relation with the EU employed interviews as a research method (inter alia Morgan, 1995; Gavin, 2001; Raeymaekers et al., 2007; Firmstone, 2008a; Statham, 2008; Corcoran and Fahy, 2009);. However, their focus was not on Turkey-EU relations.
Research Questions

The chapter attempts to answer the following three research questions by presenting the findings in the interviews conducted with journalists working for the British media.

As seen below, the first research question refers to the concept ‘socialization’ while the second and the third one are related to ‘attitudes’.

RQ1: Who is selected to write on Turkey and what are the most important influences on them while they are writing their news items? (Socialization)

RQ2: How do the journalists who have written on Turkey-EU relations view Turkey and its bid to join the EU? (Attitudes)

RQ3: How do the journalists who have written on Turkey-EU relations view the coverage of Turkey’s EU bid in the British media? (Attitudes)

In order to answer these research questions, the data found in the interviews will be presented by employing Shoemaker and Reese’s (1996) hierarchical model. Founding the production analysis on the model’s ‘individual level’ makes it possible to learn the journalists’ views on Turkey’s position between the European Self and the European Other. Together with the following chapter on ‘media routines level’ and ‘extramedia level’ influences, journalists’ overall view concerning how the news items on Turkey-EU relations are produced can help to disentangle how and why Turkey is perceived and represented as ‘a positive Other’ in the British media.

8.2. Shoemaker and Reese’s hierarchical model

Inspired by Gans (1979) and Gitlin (1980), Shoemaker and Reese (1996) categorised different theoretical perspectives regarding the formation of media content. The perspective which refers to individual media workers’ influence on news content
explains this influence by employing media workers’ ‘socialization’ and ‘attitudes’ during news production. This is a media worker-centred approach and it claims that the media workers’ professional, personal, and political positions direct them to construct a social reality (Shoemaker and Reese, 1996: 6). Therefore, the analyses on news production in this thesis are positioned within the theoretical perspective which argues that individual media workers influence the media content. Thus, accepting the importance of the individual in the formation of news content is an assumption of the study. Therefore, this influence is seen as a given in the research framework. By following Shoemaker and Reese (1996) and unpicking the concepts ‘attitudes’ and ‘socialization’ while looking at the influence of individual level that shapes news content, this study can help to reach a better understanding of how media workers’ personal views and interaction with the world influence news production. The study defines ‘attitudes’ as the internal influences shaped by individual journalists’ personal ideas, including their political views. The term ‘attitudes’ is not employed in this study as wide as its meaning in Shoemaker and Reese (1996) as this study seeks to discover individual journalists’ attitudes regarding a specific case, Turkey and its bid to join the EU, instead of focusing on journalists’ personal characteristics or wider attitudes. On the other hand, ‘socialization’ refers to the external influences related to journalists’ daily praxis which can affect journalists’ writings within the boundaries of the individual level (see Donsbach, 2004). At this stage, it would be useful to explain Shoemaker and Reese’s (1996) hierarchical model in detail.

What does the model cover?

Shoemaker and Reese’s hierarchical model “establishes a theoretical framework for analyzing media based on levels of analysis [...]” (Reese, 2001: 178) and describes
influences on media content through five levels which are individual, media routines, organisational, extramedia, and ideological. “From micro to macro, these levels address what factors shape media and news content [...]” (Reese, 2001: 173; also see Reese, 2007: 35). The individual level -or in Cottle’s (2003) categorisation: the micro-level analysis of news production- is founded on the individual employees working for the media industry. Their preferences, social background, working experience, and praxis in daily work are some examples that the model’s individual level looks at (Williams, 2003: 97). The second level, ‘media routines’, refers to the routinised, repetitive events that are taking place while media workers produce the media content. These events are generally constraints on the individual media employees (Shoemaker and Reese, 1996: 105). The third level, ‘organisational influences’ “seeks to explain variations in content that cannot be attributed to differences in routines and individuals” (Shoemaker and Reese, 1996: 139). Besides, this level is interested in the influence of ownership, organisational goals, roles, and the structure of media corporations on media content. ‘Extramedia influences’ which represent the fourth level of the hierarchical model refer to issues that are extrinsic to the media organisations, including the sources of information that contributes to media content (Shoemaker and Reese, 1996: 175). The fifth level that covers all circles in the model is ‘ideological level’. “Ideological analysis involves assumptions about power and how it is distributed in society” (Reese, 2001: 183). According to Shoemaker and Reese, the ideological level seeks to examine the position of the media in spreading ideology. The level aims to identify “how media people, practices, and relations function ideologically” (1996: 221). Further discussions regarding each level will follow in the relevant sections of this chapter and in the following chapter.
8.2.1. Why this model?

Several publications concerning production studies, media organisation and media work (*inter alia* Berkowitz and Limor 2003; Ibrahim, 2003; Whitney and Ettema, 2003; Williams, 2003; Fahmy and Johnson, 2005; Firmstone, 2008a; Preston, 2009; Hanitzsch and Mellado, 2011; Keith, 2011; Seo, 2011) refer to Shoemaker and Reese’s model (1996) when they explain the emergence of media content. Shoemaker and Reese (1996: 271) argue that no research can employ all their levels and explain the influences on the media production at once. The model is flexible and open to be reconceptualised which make it easier to apply it to this research. Thus, it could be argued that the model’s levels are suitable for separation and analysis of each level. Keith’s work (2011), based on reconceptualising Shoemaker and Reese’s hierarchical model, shows that the model is ripe for updating. She argues that the model is still useful but is not adequate to explain the routines of new media which have enormous differences when they are compared with the traditional media. For this reason,
Keith’s work (2011) proposed an updated version of the model. In addition to her approach, reconceptualising the model by giving more importance to ‘individual level’, this research adapts Shoemaker and Reese’s (1996) hierarchical model by increasing the coverage area of individual level (see Figure 8.2 below). The reasons why individual level is more important are explained in the following section.

Figure 8.2: An updated version of Shoemaker and Reese’s (1996) hierarchical model for this study

8.2.2. The importance of ‘individual level’ for this study

If media content is seen as a construction, comprehending it requires dealing with how the content is constructed (i.e. understanding the ‘construction’) (Reese, 2007: 33). Therefore, in this study, Shoemaker and Reese’s (1996) hierarchical model is used in order to comprehend how the construction of news occurs within the limits of individual media workers. By exploiting a ‘levels-of-analysis’ approach, the data will become easier to organise and explain at different levels. Besides, “[o]nce researchers begin to understand their questions and studies within a levels-of-analysis framework, it becomes easier to compare them to other research, [and] see connections among different levels [...]” (Reese, 2007: 37). More importantly, performing the analysis by
employing different levels will help the researcher to be aware of mistaken causalities. As Reese (2007: 38) points out “[t]he policies of a media organization, for example, may not directly translate into knowing the political views of its employees”.

In this study’s level-of-analysis approach, the individual level is at the centre and is the main focus. However, in Shoemaker and Reese’s model, the dominance of individual level, compared to other levels, is a matter of controversy. Although it was not overtly explained, it could be argued from the name ‘hierarchical’ that Shoemaker and Reese’s model includes different levels which have different ranks of power in influencing media content (Keith, 2011). Hanitzsch and Mellado (2011: 406) argue that the earlier research on media production found that the impact of individual level was more powerful. According to their research, the influence of ‘organisational level’ has become more important in recent years. However, there are several studies which refer to the influential role of individual level when it is compared to other levels in Shoemaker and Reese’s hierarchical model (inter alia Donsbach, 2004; Fahmy and Johnson, 2005; Firmstone, 2008a). For instance, concerning how much the editors give a political slant to news reports, a survey illustrated that only one per cent is ‘often’, and six per cent is ‘occasionally’ under editorial pressure among the journalists who work in the British media (Donsbach, 2004: 144). In the same survey,

“not more than 10 percent of the respondents in all five countries [including the UK] stated that ‘pressure from senior editors’ or from ‘management’ are ‘very important’ as limitations to their professional work” (Donsbach, 2004: 144).

In addition, in her research about the influence of editorial process on the opinions of the British press towards Europe, Firmstone (2008a: 220) argues that individual media 208
workers have a crucial impact on shaping the level of editorial importance in news items about European issues. According to her findings,

"[...] in the day-to-day production of opinion, individual journalists have greater opportunities to directly shape newspapers’ opinions than is attributed to them by studies of news production which see individuals as ‘replaceable cogs in the wheel’ and suggest that “news changes very little when the individuals who make it are changed” (Golding and Elliot, 1979, p. 209). These findings suggest that the opposite is true of opinion leading, and that a newspaper’s style of giving opinion on Europe may alter if key individuals involved in its production, such as leader writers, change” (Firmstone, 2008a: 225-226).

Having given some examples from the literature concerning the importance of individual journalists in media production, the section below explains why the individual level is more important compared to other levels for this study:

\section*{a) The case of Turkey-EU relations:}

According to Keith (2011), the media routines level is more powerful than the individual level in terms of influencing the content. However, a single individual journalist can be more influential if there are some absences in other levels (Keith, 2011). One can assert that this argument depends on the issue which is covered in the media. For instance, according to Firmstone’s study, “[...] individual journalists play a dominant role in shaping the level of editorial importance attributed to Europe at the majority of newspapers, and often take the lead in editorial policies to campaign on specific issues” (2008a: 220).

Even though it has been shown that the British media does have a direct approach to EU affairs in general, this study also argues that Turkey-EU relations specifically is not an issue that all news organisations in the UK have a strong and direct ideological view of. This view of the Turkish issue is related to their understanding of the EU. Besides,
Turkey-EU relations is usually part of the foreign news section and it could be argued that foreign policy issues are likely to be less politicised. Moreover, the Turkish issue cannot have an impact on circulation figures or the organisational chart of the paper. Thus, organisational and ideological levels cannot be as influential as they are in a domestic issue which can be directly related to British people’s life. That does not mean that the ideological level does not have an influence on the Turkish issue at all. However, as the study is mainly focused on individual media workers, the ideological level is not discussed in a specific section.

**b) Media freedom:** It could be assumed that the individual level has a greater influence where media freedom has a relatively better record because “when communicators have more power over their messages and work under fewer constraints, their personal attitudes, values, and beliefs have more opportunity to influence content” (Shoemaker and Reese, 1996: 91). Regarding this point, Hanitzsch and Mellado’s (2011: 418) research puts forward a well known notion that political influences are stronger in less democratic states with low levels of press freedom. According to an index published by ‘Reporters Without Borders’ (2012), the UK is the 28th country among 179 countries in terms of the level of press freedom. Thus, it can be argued that the relatively free environment of the British media increases the influence of the individual level. However, one should also take into account the organisational and cultural factors which may mediate the broader ‘freedom of media’ argument. In this sense, where the UK stands is only one of many possible indicators of individual level freedoms. Also, journalists are ‘employees’ and their work is as restricted as the work of all employees is.
c) Possibility of an examination: The influence of organisational and ideological forces could be easily seen but it is usually hard to examine them systematically. By contrast, observing and examining individuals in media organisations is relatively more viable (Reese, 2007: 37). Moreover, the interviewees who participated in this research are, by and large, senior journalists. They acquire levels of autonomy and are less prone to pressures from organisational forces (see Tunstall, 1971). However, this does not mean that the organisational level is less important and invisible in this research’s findings. Organisational level influences were sometimes depicted through the voices of the individual journalists.

Finally, one should also bear in mind that the levels of the hierarchical model are not very solid and some issues may appear at different levels with different degrees. Therefore, even though the interview analysis is grounded on the individual level, the research also makes use of focusing on other levels in order to thoroughly explain the news production step (see Ibrahim, 2003).

8.2.3. Problems in employing the hierarchical model

Employing Shoemaker and Reese’s (1996) hierarchical model for this study raises a number of problems. First of all, the majority of examples which explain the model were based on the US media. Secondly, the model was developed in the pre-internet age (or in the period when internet media was not as powerful as today) and this could be a problem as the research sample also includes a news website. Thirdly, it is tacitly seen in Shoemaker and Reese’s (1996) explanations that the individual level has the least influential power since it is surrounded by other levels. Finally, in this study, as explained before, the individual level will have a special emphasis while the other two
levels (media routines and extramedia) will have complimentary contributions, based on journalist’s views (see Chapter 9).

Before concluding this section, it is important to pay attention to what Shoemaker and Reese advise:

“Many studies make observations at one level of analysis and interpret those findings at a higher level. For example, many scholars have examined individual journalists and then drawn conclusions about media organizations as a whole. Individual bias, however, does not translate automatically into media bias. Similarly, ideological analyses may yield elegant theories of media and society, but individuals still have latitude in their behavior. Their actions, although constrained, are not automatically determined by higher-level social forces” (Shoemaker and Reese, 1996: 271).

Therefore, this study does not seek to draw concrete conclusions about the news production mechanisms of media organisations by means of interviewing only individual journalists. Since making an analysis of the whole media production system is a much more complex process, the results of the interviews could only explain the journalists’ experiences and views. However, as mentioned before, the journalists who participated in this research are generally senior staff (some of them are even leader writers) and their views, to some extent, can represent a broad picture of their news organisations. Consequently, even though this study accepts the importance of all levels of news coverage, the primary focus of the research concerning the production step is on individual journalists.

8.3. Individual level influences on journalists

Having discussed the characteristics of Shoemaker and Reese’s model and how it can be applied to this study, this section will look at the first step of the levels-of-analysis. According to Shoemaker and Reese (1996), the concept of ‘individual level’ includes
different intrinsic elements about journalists such as their personal background (education, sexual orientation, etc.), personal attitudes (political views, religious beliefs, etc.), and professional orientations and how they define their roles in producing media outputs. Because of the research questions, this study is interested in the journalists’ personal attitudes in politics, i.e. their approach to Turkey’s EU bid, and their professional orientations in order to see how they shape media representation of Turkish membership of the EU. The section firstly deals with how the journalists, who write on Turkey’s EU bid, are chosen. Secondly, it focuses on the influences on journalists while they write news items on Turkey. Then, the section looks at the journalists’ views on Turkey and its bid to join the EU. Finally, the chapter illustrates what journalists said about the coverage on Turkey-EU relations.

8.3.1. Who is selected to write on Turkey-EU relations?

Although this section appears to represent the organisational level, the focus of the questions answered in this section mainly concern individual journalists. Why does a journalist write about Turkey and the EU? How are they selected? What makes them special? Is it a complicated process to be selected or is it just because of daily routine in a media organisation? Do the news organisations choose journalists to create a policy in the Turkish issue or do the journalists decide themselves to write about Turkey? A discussion on these questions can also reveal how much importance the British media give to the Turkish issue.

Journalists’ location is an important key to start answering these questions. The majority of news items about Turkey-EU relations were written by London, Brussels or Istanbul-based journalists. This study shows that the news items that were written in
London are simply a matter of who is free on any particular day to write about the Turkish issue. Therefore, it could be said that there were no special criteria used to select the journalists who were to be based in London and who wrote about Turkey’s EU bid. In Brussels, the news items on Turkish membership of the EU were written by EU correspondents while in Istanbul Turkey correspondents of the British media organisations or freelancers had written the news items.

All commentary writers claimed that writing about Turkey was their decision. They said that it was an interesting topic when the discussions were on the EU agenda. However, concerning long articles, deep analysis, or special supplements about Turkey and its bid to join the EU, the newspapers used the journalists who are experienced in EU affairs. J11 (*The Guardian*) who published a survey project about Turkey, says that he was chosen to write on Turkey because he used to work in Brussels and had many contacts in TÜSİAD. He said “I was experienced and was interested. [...] Not because I was pro Turkish membership or anti Turkish membership. It has to do with *professionalism*. Who is the best person to do this?” What J11 underlines by the term *professionalism* in his comments is related to the experience and skills of journalists that help them to cope with news stories which demand an area of expertise. However, when choosing a journalist to send to Turkey, the decision is usually based on practical reasons instead of looking for Turkey experts. Almost all interviewees said that the choice of people for foreign posts, including Turkey, is usually made randomly. Apart from some desired characteristics of some news organisations, especially the *FT*, there appear to be no special criteria for selection as a Turkey correspondent of a British news organisation. Although it is not applied in most media organisations, J18 (the *FT*) assesses the desired characteristics of a journalist that they want to send to
Turkey as follows:

- A level of existing expertise about Turkey,
- Being able to speak Turkish,
- Some previous reporting experience in Turkey.

**8.3.1.1. Relationships with Turkey before working there**

Some journalists confessed that they did not have a special interest or knowledge regarding Turkey before being posted there. These journalists said that the reason why they went to Turkey was personal and/or a vacant position. For instance, according to J6’s (BBC News) experience, there are probably two ways for correspondents to go into a foreign country. One is being an academic expert and the other one is going to an unknown country like a blank sheet of paper, in other words with the similar level of knowledge as the audience. J6 said that he started to work in Turkey with no prior knowledge of the country. He said:

“...I had never been to Turkey before I got the job as the BBC’s Turkey correspondent [...] You sort of take the audience along with your discovery. [...] I certainly was not Turkey expert when I got the job. I didn’t come in, in my view, with any strong ideological opinion about the place one way or another”.

Another BBC journalist J9 who worked in Turkey for three and a half years also said that he did not know much about Turkey before going there as a correspondent. He says: “I applied to go Turkey because someone told me that the last correspondent had a great view of the Bosphorus. I thought that sounds good. And the job was coming up”.

Another journalist, J2 (the FT), also confessed that he was not a Turkey expert before going there. He says:
“Totally practical reasons. I was not a Turkey expert. The paper at the time had upgraded the posting\textsuperscript{29}. It used to be just a stringer or super stringer job. It was made a staff post when I went there. That was very important. We were taking Turkey more serious[ly]”.

As “[u]nfamiliarity with a subject can [...] lead to inaccurate reporting” (Negrine, 1994: 127), going to a country as a correspondent without knowing much about that country could negatively influence the depth of news items. However, starting to work in a country as a blank sheet of paper could also increase the possibility of relatively unbiased writing. This claim can be also supported by the discussion below about the problems of working in a country as a correspondent for a long time.

\subsection*{8.3.1.2. The length of period the foreign correspondents spend in Turkey}

The importance of changing foreign journalists’ working places was highlighted by the interviewees. For example, J18 (the \textit{FT}) said that the \textit{FT} has a policy that they try to move correspondents every four or five years to different countries. The reason is that a new correspondent will see a country with a fresher perspective and they will understand the country in a different way. Also, he argues that if a foreign correspondent has been in a country too long, they would become uninterested and could think that they know that debate, and have written about this many times before. According to J12 (\textit{The Guardian}) the aim of this shift is to avoid foreign correspondents being more loyal to the place they live in than to their readers.

J15 (BBC News) has a different view concerning the length of period the foreign correspondents spend in Turkey. Even though many Turks simply think that the

\textsuperscript{29} In 2004, the \textit{FT} upgraded the status of its staff in Turkey. It was the time when Turkish membership issue was on the verge of becoming one of the most popular issues in Brussels and other capitals in the EU.
Western media always represent the problematic sides of Turkey, what J15 argues is a reverse angle of this kind of thought. He explains why some foreign correspondents tend to be biased (being too much pro Turkey), and avoid seeing the problematic sides of Turkey through complaining about two extreme types of foreign correspondents. He says:

“I have a private theory about Western journalists who lived in Turkey. They tend to go to one of two extremes. Some Western journalists who live in Turkey, they adapt extremely well, in some ways too well. They learn very good Turkish. They appreciate the Turkish way of life. They even live in a nice house on the Bosphorus. They enjoy everything positive about there. And they become very very defensive of Turkey and they become in a way excessively pro-Turkish to the point where they refuse to see any false (bad things). They become very angry when other people criticise Turkey. And that is quite a common syndrome. And there are other Western journalists who are living in Turkey for a while. For some reason or other, they just don’t settle. The place doesn’t suit them. They have a kind of antagonistic relationship with the authorities. They become sort of anti-Turkish. [...] I suppose, to learn Turkish and to learn Turkish reality is a big personal investment. And if you make that effort, then you have a certain stake in sort of good personal relationship with Turkey. If you are a Western journalist and living in Istanbul or Ankara, and you have a good life, and you are enjoying Turkish culture, it takes a lot of bravery then to go to Diyarbakir and write about the bad things which Kurds are suffering”.

Finally, J15 (BBC News) summarises his observation by claiming that the Western journalists who write on Turkey are torn by two different impulses. On one hand, there is a sensitivity to human rights questions in Turkey especially in the darker times when the war with the PKK was at a peak. But at the same time, there is a great belief in Turkey's potential. He said that people talk of Turkey as a model Muslim democracy and a bridge between the East and the West. According to J15, when journalists use these expressions, it is partly reflecting reality but partly it is a wishful thinking which tries to create reality by using certain expressions.
Consequently, this section revealed that British news organisations do not have a specific set of criteria to select journalists who will be sent to Turkey. Moreover, it was seen that the journalists who worked in Turkey did not have any special relationship with the country before starting their Turkish experience. Finally, it was found that there is a tendency to change the place of correspondents every four or five years as staying too long in one place may influence the journalists’ critical view on the country they live in.

8.3.2. Influences on journalists

One of the aims of conducting interviews with the journalists working for the British media was to investigate the most important constraints on the journalists who have published news reports on Turkish membership in the British media, and to reveal the sources of their data while writing about Turkey. Various influences and sources were put forward by the journalists. The most important ones are ‘politicians and the political establishments’, ‘journalists’ visits to Turkey’, and ‘the media (including books)’.

Different journalists said that they used the information flowing from the MPs in Westminster, the Turkish Government, Turkish opposition parties, the European Commission, the MEPs in Brussels, and progress reports about Turkey written by Brussels. Especially the journalists who had worked in Brussels highlighted the EU’s different bodies as their main sources of information.

Half of all the interviewees underlined the importance of their visits to Turkey while explaining what influenced their writings on Turkey. A Turkish journalist (J4) who used
to write for The Daily Telegraph thinks that foreign journalists’ visits to Turkey have importance in terms of dispelling the prejudgements and seeing different aspects of the country. She says:

“They (foreign journalists) are the most affected by the [Turkish] people, because they are influenced by the interest and warmth which is manifested by Turkish people. Even though the journalists might come here with some prejudices, they receive a positive impression right at the beginning. They forget the stereotypes. But throughout the time they spend here, they get to know Turkey, they explore different aspects, different levels of Turkey”.

J10 (The Guardian) also underlines the importance of visits and interaction with Turkish people. He thinks that there is neither a big nor heterogeneous enough Turkish community in the UK, and journalists can identify Turkey better by visiting it.

Among the influences on journalists, the media is the third most important one. Regarding this issue, Shoemaker and Reese argues:

“To a certain extent, each news organization acts as a source for the others. Journalists read, watch and listen to news, from their own and from competing organizations; and when a story breaks first in one medium, it may quickly be picked up by other media” (1996: 189).

Half of all journalists claim that what they read in books and what they follow in the media has a strong influence on their approach while they are writing about Turkey’s EU membership. This shows that different media can influence other media while the media content is being produced. Sometimes this could be useful for wider media debates. Firmstone’s study (2008a) of the influence of the editorial process on the British press’ approach to EU affairs underlines the impact of wider media debates on each newspapers.

“Journalists from two pro-European newspapers explicitly commented on how their judgements are influenced by the tone of opinion leading and treatment of Europe in news coverage by other newspapers (Guardian and Independent). They felt that their newspaper’s editorial voice should respond and retaliate to negative coverage of the EU because they have a duty to take part in the
national debate in a proactive and positively orientated way” (Firmstone, 2008a: 222).

Other factors that shape journalists’ knowledge and view but that are less common than the three main ones discussed above are diplomats, readers, personal interests, personal observations, Turkish business leaders, conferences, academics, Turkish think-tanks, journalists’ Turkish friends, experts and haphazard things. It is also important to ask what does not influence the journalists when they write about Turkey. Similar to underrepresentation of the public opinion in the British coverage on Turkey-EU relations (also see Negrine, 2008), no journalists said that they were influenced by the British public.

As a result, this section showed that the journalists are influenced by political events, its actors and institutions the most while writing about Turkey’s EU bid. It means that no matter what Turkish authorities expect from the coverage, the construction of the news content is mostly related to how Turkish, British and other European politicians contribute to the political and media agendas. However, these political acts are not represented by a mirror effect in the media. How these events are mediated and become a media representation of Turkey-EU relations by the influence of journalists and editorial lines will be explained in the following sections and Chapter 9.

8.3.3. Journalists’ view on Turkey and Turkish membership of the EU

In Section 8.3.1 above, J11 (The Guardian) referred to the importance of professionalism. Even though most journalists can be seen as professionals, Donsbach (2004: 135) argues that individual journalists’ subjective beliefs influence their decisions while producing the news content. Accordingly, it can be argued that
Journalists’ understanding of Turkey should have a positive or negative influence on the news items they write on Turkey’s EU bid. Interviewees were asked what kind of personal associations they have about Turkey in general. The aim was to explore the ‘attitudes’ dimension of influences on the individual level by looking at what sort of metaphors, images, socio-historical understanding they have when they think of Turkey.

8.3.3.1. Journalists’ views on Turkey

Several well known clichés about Turkey were mentioned such as ‘being a bridge between the Eastern and the Western world’, ‘crossroads of civilisations’, and ‘being a melting pot’ while some journalists defined Turkey as ‘a vibrant, strong, growing economy’, and ‘a new emerging market’. The journalists’ overall view of Turkey significantly coincides with the findings in the news coverage (see 7.3 on page 185).

The majority of the journalists positioned Turkey between the East and West. The journalists who visited or lived in Turkey mentioned their associations according to their personal experience in Turkey. For instance, J21 (The Telegraph) refers to contradictions that cannot be seen in many countries such as being a Muslim country where everyone drinks beer. J15 (BBC News) thinks of Turkey as a country of great charm and violence. He supposes that Turkey is an Eastern country in the sense of warmth and politeness, and dignity. However, he also thinks that Turkey contains a great potential of violence. Furthermore, J2’s (the FT) personal experience associated Turkey with how crowded it is. He thinks “[Turkey has] a very competitive society because the resources are relatively limited, the population is very large, and everybody is fighting for their share of resources”.
Regarding the image of Turkey and its bid to join the EU, J17 (the FT) expresses his own observation which underlines a shift from the secular military power to the rise of Islamism in Turkey. He says:

“One of the things that will influence [British] public opinion [...] in the next few years will be whether Turkey is still seen as a secular as well as a Muslim state. If Turkey goes down the road of increasing Islamism, then I think that will be reflected in a greater hostility to membership. [...] It really is crucial what Turkey does in the next five to ten years in its domestic governance. When I go to Turkey, I meet people from sort of all secularist establishments. They are deeply pessimistic. Because they say ‘Turkey is taking Islamist route’. Then you read some of the stuff that Davutoğlu, the Foreign Minister, says. I have been to various conferences where he speaks and it does sound a bit like sort of Ottoman Caliphate. I think, the big danger for Turkey is that the old image, the military dictatorship, gives way to one of a sort of Islamist”.

In addition to J17’s (the FT) comments, also J15 (BBC News) points out that there is increase in Islamophobia in European politics and their only choice is to support the secular Turkish state. However, he thinks that the argument has become harder to make in recent years because he argues that Turkey appears to be growing more religious.

This section revealed how journalists view Turkey. Although various images were underlined, the main image of Turkey for the journalists was related to Turkey’s position as a bridge between Eastern and Western worlds. Finally, these are the other associations about Turkey which were highlighted by the interviewees only a few times: Human rights issues, regional power, history, the main country of Southeastern Europe, culture, sunny weather, chaotic vibrancy, not being completely European, young generation, the Bosphorus, food, friends, and plastic flowers.
8.3.3.2. Journalists’ views on Turkish membership of the EU

The individual level in Shoemaker and Reese’s (1996) hierarchical model also refers to journalists’ political views. In order to understand their general view about Turkey’s EU bid, it is important to look at what the journalists think about the possible benefits and damages of Turkey’s EU membership to the UK. The interviewees mostly underlined the political and economic advantages and disadvantages. Although cultural impacts were frequently mentioned in the results of the quantitative and qualitative content analyses, very few journalists were interested in the cultural impacts while they were explaining the advantages and disadvantages of Turkey’s EU membership.

Advantages

There are different kinds of advantages overemphasised by the journalists. First of all, J19’s (The Guardian) point is worth noting. He discusses the general advantages that Turkey can provide for the UK in the context of EU membership. These advantages originate from the similarities between the two countries concerning their understanding of Europe. J19 says:

“Britain and Turkey, in many ways, are not similar societies but they have similar relationships to the European project. They are large countries of the periphery. They look outward away from Europe as well as inward towards Europe. The British look across the Atlantic, the Turks look into the Middle East and the Black Sea region. The British are instinctively very comfortable with the notion of a country like Turkey being part of the EU but also having other alliances and other trading partnerships and other relationships [...]”.

Some journalists believe that Turkish membership can be advantageous in solving the problems between the East and the West. Clearly, Turkey within the EU, and bound close to Europe would be a rejection of the idea that Islam and Christianity are doomed to clash. J5 (The Guardian) believes that a modern, democratic Muslim state within the bloc is good for both the West and the Muslim world. He thinks that a
democratic Turkey can be shown as a good example for Turkey’s Arab neighbours. This time, it is not the content but a journalist’s view that ‘a positive Other’ is used in order to evaluate the Orient.

It was also underlined in the interviews that Turkish membership of the EU could make Turkey a new ally for the UK in Brussels. Therefore, with the help of Turkey, the UK can be more powerful against the Franco-German axis of the EU. Besides, the federalist views in Europe could weaken if Turkish membership happens. Thereby, the British Eurosceptics who are afraid of further integration in the EU could ease their fears by welcoming Turkish membership. J6 (BBC News) thinks that welcoming Turkey is a real advantage for the UK in order to water down the idea of Federal Europe. Also, in the words of J17 (the FT), Turkish membership means “a vision of Europe that the UK would embrace which is an outward looking Europe” and this can make the EU more powerful in international issues.

Almost all journalists believe that the UK sees the EU as a trade bloc and this is in line with Turkey’s motivations for EU membership which is also mainly led by economic expectations. For this reason, the journalists think that the Turkish accession would help the UK to make the EU more concentrated on economic issues rather than political integration. It was also underlined that Turkey’s energetic and entrepreneurial features, a young educated work force, will be beneficial for the UK. However, the journalists’ economic expectations from Turkish membership indicate long term outcomes. J8 (The Guardian) highlighted that 70 million Turks will get richer over the next 30 years and this would be a primary advantage for British companies. J13 (The Guardian) thinks that the future of the world will be shaped by the emerging markets
and the EU should not lose an emerging market like Turkey if it wants to compete with future superpowers. She says: “[E]merging markets are becoming more powerful. [...] Turkey is becoming more powerful. [...] All European nations want to trade with Turkey. They can see a new market right at their door step”. According to J18 (the FT) if the EU wants to increase its growth rate in the long run, it should admit Turkish membership because the growth rates in Turkey are remarkably higher than anywhere else in Europe.

Two interviewees connected Turkish membership with giving more importance to the market economy instead of state intervention. J21 (The Telegraph) argues that when Turkey joins the bloc, social protection and stuffy bureaucracy would be weakened. Moreover, the EU will not be able to apply the same agricultural subsidies, and there will be fewer restrictions on labour. J9 (BBC News) also thinks that the UK has a lot in common with Turkey in terms economic approaches. He says: “I think, [Turkey is] now less in favour of state intervention, [...] and more in favour of sort of freeing up individual enterprise. And in that sense [...] it is on the British political scale of things rather than, say, France where state intervention is heavy”.

All in all, the general tone of the journalists’ comments concerning the advantages of Turkey’s EU membership for the UK is mainly related to political and economic benefits, and the meaning of the EU. It was underlined by the journalists that an EU including Turkey would be to the benefit of the UK as its understanding of the EU is relatively similar to Turkey’s. This view is strongly in line with the functionalist approach of the UK which was discussed in previous chapters.
**Disadvantages**

The interviews showed that the political disadvantages of Turkish membership for the UK are not significantly important. The journalists, who think that there are disadvantages, argued that it would be naïve to assume that if Turkey walks into a new association that it would not change its character. According to their view, the changes may not always be what the UK wants to see. In terms of tangible consequences, the disadvantages that would influence the UK if Turkey joins the EU are mainly based on the migration issue. As there is no doubt that the accession of Eastern European countries led to a huge flow of migration to the UK, the journalists emphasised the sensitivity of the British public on this issue. Therefore, the interviewees mentioned that migration to the UK should be handled sensitively; otherwise it could be a massive disadvantage for the UK. J9 (BBC News) said:

“Britain has had enormous upheaval in the last ten years with the movement of workers across the European Union. And clearly, individuals and institutions have faced great difficulty adapting to what is being the greatest number of people coming into the UK at such a time, such a speed probably in all our history. I think there is a great concern about that”.

Some journalists mentioned that if Turkey joins the EU, it will enjoy much more than it contributes to EU funds. For instance, the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) of the EU may be especially affected by the Turkish accession and this can have an impact on the British economy. Regarding this issue, J16 (BBC News) argues: “Given Britain’s hostility to the Common Agricultural Policy, and the general agro-bias of the EU, I think another country (Turkey) with a large agricultural sector that might require financial support is something that might be a problem to the UK”.

J10 (The Guardian) has a different view from other journalists. Although he supports Turkish membership and accepts its several benefits, he is not sure if the UK will get
benefits or damages from Turkey being a member of the EU. He says: “I think it is an issue which is a very marginal significance to Britain whether or not Turkey is in the EU or not. That’s why it is not a big issue in the media; it is not a big issue in politics”.

All in all, 17 of 21 journalists clearly said that they were in favour of Turkish membership. Among those, 10 journalists are strongly in favour while seven of them support Turkish membership while mentioning some negative points. Interestingly, only one journalist was against Turkey’s EU bid whereas the others were unclear. J17 (the FT) succinctly put the journalists’ general view in the Turkish membership issue: “I am in favour of Turkey joining the EU but I am only in favour when it meets the criteria”. Even though it cannot be a commensurable comparison, J17’s (the FT) and majority of other journalists’ approach in the sample bring to mind the results of qualitative content analysis in Chapter 7. How the British news coverage denotes Turkey as part of the European Self is not significantly different from the journalists’ comments on the advantages and disadvantages of Turkey’s EU membership for the UK. Nevertheless, compared to the content, there is less highlighting on positioning Turkey as the Other. This could be related to the fact that othering Turkey in the news items are mainly performed by quoting from European politicians and European media that are against Turkey’s EU bid. During the interviews, the strongest emphasis on Turkey’s Other character was made by J9, former Turkey correspondent of the BBC. However, according to the context during the interview, he was talking in the name of a general overview of different circles regarding Turkey. Hence, it was not necessarily his personal opinion:

“Twenty years ago the European Union was a Western European Union. It is now a Central and Eastern [one]. So, the dominated one, it would become even
further east. It is difficult to see whether that can hold us together because Turkey is 'Other’”.

8.3.4. Journalists’ views on how Turkey-EU relations are covered in the British media

Another dimension of the analysis on the individual level is related to journalists’ views on the coverage of Turkey-EU relations. Analysing the journalists’ views on the coverage can help to clarify the points concerning the representation of Turkey’s EU bid. Thus, this section focuses on the research question ‘How do the journalists who had written on Turkey-EU relations view the coverage of Turkey’s EU bid in the British media?’ The discussion starts by examining the reasons why Turkish membership has lost its popularity. Then, it continues by focusing on the changes in the topics that Turkey is politically associated with. Finally, by referring to journalists’ views, the section will analyse more specific issues concerning the content which are the drawbacks of Turkey’s EU bid, the clash of civilisations thesis, and constantly associating Turkey with Islam.

8.3.4.1. Journalists’ views on the decrease in Turkey-EU relations’ popularity in the British media and the changes in the content

When membership negotiations with Turkey were due to start on 3rd October 2005, there were tense discussions in the EU, including the media agenda. Interestingly, after Turkey started membership negotiations, Turkey’s EU bid weakened in the EU’s political agenda, and the same happened in the media agenda. As the majority people receive most information about recent political affairs -especially international relations or elite discussions- from the media, the decrease in news items concerning Turkey’s EU bid means that EU citizens are likely to know less about Turkish membership. This situation may have an impact on how EU citizens see Turkey in the
context of the EU. If Turkey-EU relations become less prominent on the agenda, the importance of Turkey’s EU bid could be perceived as less important than before. The news items about Turkish membership are not only about agreements, diplomatic affairs, or discussions between politicians. When Turkey-EU relations are on the agenda, the European media also covers the positive changes in Turkey in terms of legislation, better human rights record or broadly speaking, ‘Europeanisation’ of Turkey. If the number of news items about Turkey’s Europeanisation decreases, this could mean that the readers would read fewer news items which emphasise the words ‘Turkey’ and ‘the EU’ in the same sentence or paragraph. As Turkey’s position between the East and the West is a matter of discussion, the readers from EU Member States, possible voters in a possible referendum about Turkish membership in the future, may not become accustomed to the idea of Turkey as a European country without long term media cultivation. Although the news items about Turkey’s EU bid do not always support Turkey, it can be assumed that any type of news item could contribute to the association of Turkey with the EU if the coverage is not overtly based on an anti-Turkish membership approach. However, the news items that associate Turkey more with the Middle Eastern issues, which have recently become overly common, could make Turkey more related to the Middle East in readers’ minds.

The alleged reasons for the reduction in coverage of Turkey’s EU bid in the British media

According to the journalists, the main reasons why Turkish membership became uninteresting in the British media are the rejection of the European Constitution referendums, the results of the biggest EU enlargement in 2004, the Cyprus issue, Turkey’s domestic problems, new Turkish policy towards the Middle East, and finally
the financial crisis in the EU. Regarding the last reason, J17 (the *FT*) argues that the Turkish issue is now bound up with the financial crisis in Europe, in other words he connects the problem with Europe's lack of confidence. He thinks that Europe does things when it feels confident about its own role. Furthermore, Turkey has now focused on political clashes at home since the motivation for Turkish membership disappeared on both sides and it has become more interested in the Middle East. Thus, these make Turkey-EU relations a side issue, and it is harder for Turkey to grab headlines.

J1 (*The Guardian*) says: “I have a lot of articles about Turkey. That is because it was an interesting story [in 2005]. […] It was a huge battle about what your vision is for the future of Europe [between the UK and the Franco-German axis]”. However, concerning the situation of Turkish membership of the EU in the British media in recent years, J9 (*BBC News*) argues “[...] to be honest, for most people and most media outlets, [...] Turkey is just off the radar! Just off the radar!” He adds “writing stories about improving human rights in Turkey, or writing stories about a [membership] process which is now being effectively blocked is not a story”. Moreover, the news items related to human rights issues themselves are now not as attractive as in the past. A Turkish journalist, J4 (*The Telegraph*) thinks that one of the reasons why Turkey is not significantly popular in the European media anymore is that there is not as much violence in recent years as in the past in Turkey. She also thinks that Turkish membership has been discussed for more than 60 years and both Turks and Europeans are becoming bored of this issue. She adds “there is nothing left to write about Turkey-EU relations except the Cyprus issue. And when you talk about Cyprus, all people yawn”.

230
All in all, when the overall alleged reasons are evaluated, it can be argued that the factors for the reduction in coverage of the Turkish issue in the British media are related to both Turkish and EU parties’ lack of motivation due to various reasons. As a result, Turkey’s EU bid is no longer a news story. This is also related to the fact that the interest of the British media in EU affairs in general is not strong enough to cover issues which are becoming less important in the political agenda such as Turkey’s EU bid.

**The change of content in the news items about Turkey**

It is not just the decrease in the number of news items about Turkish membership. A shift can also be observed in the content. Turkey was strongly associated with its bid to join the EU in the first half of the 2000s. Since some important chapters in the membership negotiations have stalled in 2006, the coverage on Turkey has become more related to other issues in the Middle East. J9 (BBC News) thinks that from 2000 until 2004 and 2005, most of the time the coverage was on human rights, the Kurdish issue, to some degree Armenia, and to some degree Cyprus. He argues that these issues would often come together under the umbrella of EU accession. However, in recent years, there has been an explosion of coverage about Turkey's new role in the Middle East, relations with Russia, Turkey’s strategic position, its economic strength, and the popular term Neo-Ottomanism.

The reasons, proposed by the journalists, why Turkey has become embroiled in the Middle East while it was actually in the EU membership negotiation process are not significantly different from the reasons accounting for Turkey-EU relations becoming
less popular in the European media agenda. In general, journalists listed the four main reasons for the shift: Firstly, huge problems with the opposition from France and Germany; secondly, the vicious circle in the Cyprus issue; thirdly, the financial crisis in Europe which was particularly emphasised by the journalists from the FT; and finally, the shift in Turkey’s foreign policy. At this point, it is meaningful to ask what has really changed in Turkey’s orientation according to the journalists’ understanding. Can all these changes be interpreted as Turkey moving further away from the West? J15 (BBC News) thinks that Turkey is perceived to have moved towards the Muslim camp, in a sense, ‘the radical camp’, and it left the pro-Israeli camp. In addition to this, J20 (The Guardian) emphasised that Turkey has become a strong voice of the Palestinian people, and Turkey, as a regional power, has more influence on shaping Iraq’s future.

Although the shift is accepted by several journalists, they are still not sure that Turkey has completely drifted from the Western world. According to them, Turkey is, economically and politically, still connected to Europe with strong ties. For instance, J17 (the FT) rejects a fundamental change in Turkey’s position between the East and the West. He says:

“Although some people think Turkey abandoned Europe for the Middle East, I don’t believe that. So, when I go to Turkey and talk to business leaders, they emphasise how much of Turkey’s economic development still depends on Europe. [...] What is happening is that Turkey is also seeing opportunities in the Middle East. Some people say ‘alternatives’, some people say ‘additional opportunities’. Some people say ‘it is a zero sum. Turkey has to be with the Middle East or has to be with Europe’. But I remember, [Turkish] President Gül was here (in London). He emphasised ‘it is both’. It is not either/or. It is both”.

J10 (The Guardian) also supports this argument. He accepts that Turkey is rebalancing itself between the Middle East and Europe. However, J10 does not think it affects the way British opinion looks at Turkey. J2 (the FT) is also on the same line. He argues that
although Turkey is increasingly identified as a Middle Eastern player, this has not affected Turkey's image as a Western country where you can go on a holiday and have a great time. Thus, he thinks that the image of Turkey is still the same in the UK.

Apart from the change in topics that Turkey is discussed with, it is also important to consider the depth of these discussions. J3 (The Telegraph) criticised the lack of depth regarding the content of the reports on Turkey. He argues that the content of the news items miss the background of long term relations between Turkey and Europe. He says:

“I think that day to day, most daily newspaper journalists are just writing about what is happening. So, they are affected by the news events, by speeches [...] and they tend to be focused on present day. If you see an analysis, saying things are going badly with Turkish membership, usually they will give as evidence two or three things that have happened in the last couple of months. So, people will look at Turkey’s relationship with America or with NATO or with Israel or a row with the Prime Minister in Davos or whatever it is. It tends to be very driven by events, political agenda, and short term news agenda”.

It was explored in this section that the journalists working for the British media clearly accept that there is a change in Turkish foreign policy towards the West and the Middle East and this has a reverberation in the media representation of Turkey. However, the journalists are also mostly sure that the political and economic links of Turkey with the EU is still strong.

8.3.4.2. Journalists’ views on the drawbacks of Turkish membership in news items

There are many reports, which are positive to Turkey’s EU bid, but they still cover many drawbacks of Turkish membership. Journalists were asked how they account for this and why almost all the news items somehow include a negative point or problem about Turkey or Turkish membership to the EU such as the Armenian issue, the Kurdish
issue, and the Cyprus issue.

The journalists think that they should be investigative and critical to any issue they cover. J20 (The Guardian) argues that journalists should also try to analyse problems. This means that even though The Guardian is in favour of Turkish membership, it does not avoid criticising Turkey. The same comments were made by J18 (the FT). He argues that the media should continue to discuss the problematic issues which have become obstacles for Turkish membership. He says:

“We are critical in what we write about. [...] I don’t think that we are anymore critical of any government than we are our own [the British Government]. [...] There is a very aggressive news culture in Britain. [...] People highlight problems in Turkey, they would write a lot about Armenia. [...] I don’t think there is any of the news organisations would single out Turkey for particular criticism (he refers to the British media). [...] I would like to think that we are absolutely right about the faults in Turkish society, economy and government. We absolutely should write about the Armenian and the Kurdish issues, education, or penal policy, or whatever”.

According to most journalists, it is not ethical to hide problems and it is better to have an honest discussion on the issues rather than pretending they do not exist. J10 (The Guardian) thinks that mentioning the drawbacks is inevitable although the report seems to be in favour of Turkish membership. He says:

“Nobody is perfect, no country is perfect. If you are doing a proper report on the country, you have to do the negative side of it as well. I think it will be unrealistic to expect an article saying everything in Turkey is wonderful, we want to have them as soon as possible. There are issues”.

Some journalists explained the drawbacks issue by making a relationship between conflicts and being interesting. According to J1 (The Guardian), journalists want stories and conflict makes stories worthy. He says that if an event is peacefully going on, it can hardly become a story. Similarly, J2 (the FT) believes that news items should be interesting in order to get attention from the readers. He thinks that the drawbacks
which surround the Turkish membership discussions are all interesting aspects of Turkey’s candidacy. He says:

“It is a huge country, it is a Muslim country, it is a very poor country, relatively speaking. [...] There is a story today about Turkey's huge numbers of young people. What are they going to do in 20 years time? How many of them coming to Britain? Just because that story is in The Guardian today doesn’t mean that The Guardian has suddenly focused on this as a problem. It is just news; it is interesting to read about it”.

Therefore, it can be argued that underlining the drawbacks and clashes of Turkish membership is a necessity for the British media in order to keep its critical standpoint and make the news items more interesting. Having discussed journalists’ views on the coverage of drawbacks of Turkey-EU relations, the following section explains an issue which can be seen as both a drawback and an advantage for Turkey’s EU bid.

8.3.4.3. Journalists’ views on the clash of civilisations thesis in the context of Turkey’s EU bid

In his well known article, Huntington (1993: 22) claimed that the new world order will be built according to cultural differences between different civilisations and its effect will be observed more than the effect of ideology or economics. He thinks that Turkey would never become a member of the EU because of its religion. He sees Turkey as a 'torn country' whose politicians and elites try to attach their country to the Western world while the culture of the country is non-western (Huntington, 1993: 42). According to Huntington’s (1993: 44) approach, if the torn country seeks to be transferred into another civilisation, it should fulfil the three tasks below. He thinks that the first and the second points are relevant to Turkey but the last condition has not been met.

- The politicians and the economic elites should back the change.
- The public should be in favour of this transformation.
- The majority of the intended host civilization should have positive opinions to welcome the torn country.

As the discussions about the clash of civilisations are important in understanding how Turkey’s EU bid is represented in the British media, it is useful to look at the journalists’ position on this phrase. This section seeks to investigate whether the journalists think that the clash of civilisations paradigm has a connection with Turkish membership and in what way the journalists understand the clash of civilisations in the context of Turkey’s bid to become a member of the EU. Do they evaluate Turkish membership of the EU as a solution for the clash of civilisations? Or do they evaluate Turkish membership of the EU as a contribution in deepening the impact of the clash of civilisations?

Several journalists accepted that the clash of civilisations has an impact on discussions about Turkey’s EU bid. They underlined a clear reason; most countries in Europe are Christian and Turkey is a Muslim country albeit a secular state. J9 (BBC News) says:

“...There is no doubt that amongst the British population, amongst the British media, there is Islamophobia. And I know that it has been expressed to me that there is concern about Turkey, an overwhelmingly Muslim country, joining a predominantly Christian organisation, or organisation that predominantly has Christian population.”

Even though some journalists do not believe that Turkey contributes to any clash of civilisations, they think that the impact of the clash of civilisations discussions is the main element of Turkey’s EU membership story. For instance, J13 (The Guardian) argues that the whole Turkish membership issue is seen through the prism of the clash of civilisations. However, for some journalists, ‘the clash of civilisations’ discussions...
have become a cliché in recent years. For instance, J12 (The Guardian) and J6 (BBC News) argue that the media repeated the clash of civilisations paradigm too many times and now it is a popular cliché for journalists and politicians.

Although it is common to see attributions to the clash of civilisations in most news items on Turkey-EU relations in the British media, J2 (the FT) said that he had never used this paradigm in the news items he had written about Turkey. He thinks that the clash of civilisations argument is ‘nonsense’. He claims that if there is going to be a clash of civilisations, it will not take place in Turkey. Again, according to J11 (The Guardian), the clash of civilisations is artificial, and some politicians who are against Turkish membership want to use this paradigm in order to legitimate the obstacles in front of Turkey’s EU bid. J10 (The Guardian) has a recent example concerning the nonexistence of the clash of civilisations. He thinks that anybody who goes to Turkey and talks to people particularly in the last ten years can see that Turkey’s leading party, the AK Party, a conservative party which is also called an Islamist party by some people, is as much democratic as the secular people. He argues that accepting that there is a sort of clash of civilisations, and Islamists are somehow anti-democratic and they represent something different from European values in terms of understanding of human rights is not true.

**Using the clash of civilisations paradigm as a strategy**

According to several journalists, Turkey is a successful story in terms of democracy when it is compared with other parts of the Islamic world. Turkey is a predominantly Muslim nation but a secular state has a special position in the Muslim world. Important events in the first decade of the 21st century brought Turkey new duties. As seen in the
content analysis results, the British Government’s argument in support for Turkish membership is dominated by the idea of Turkey as a bridge between the West and the Muslim world. The British politicians see Turkey as a secular Muslim partner, a secular Muslim democracy, and they do not want Turkey to turn its face to the East and becomes less democratic. For these reasons, the arguments about Turkey are all strategic ones and Turkey is never discussed, or very rarely discussed, as a normal case (J3, of The Telegraph).

As was raised by the journalists in the interviews, Turkey’s increasing strategic importance means that Turkey will continue to be discussed as an unusual case. Because of this, Turkey’s membership process differentiates from other former membership candidates. J4 (The Telegraph) thinks that especially after 9/11, Turkey became one of the most important places and one of the most interesting stories for journalists. She says:

“The journey of Turkey could solve the questions, contradictions and suspicions of 9/11. [...] People are looking for a solution. The US seeks a solution. Maybe the address of the solution is Turkey [...] Turkey is a country which is watched and followed in the Muslim world. Also the Muslims in Europe watch Turkey. For these reasons, Turkey can be a model country for Muslims”.

In contrast to what J10 and J2 claimed in the following section, J4 (The Telegraph) argues that Turkey’s strong relationship with the Middle East can help Turkey to be a bridge between the Western and the Eastern world. She does not believe that Turkey’s ties with the Middle East are weak. J17 (the FT) also believes that Turkey can be a model country for the Muslim world. He thinks that Turkey has a significant position to prove that the clash of civilisations is an unclear paradigm. Finally, J21 (The Telegraph) believes that if Turkey can be kept in the Western camp, remain a democratic and
stable and prosper country, an example to the Muslim world, it will prove that the next
century is not necessarily going to be a century of the clash of civilisations.

**Turkey is not able to act as a bridge**

Two journalists insisted that Turkey can never be a solution for the clash of
civilisations, and seeing Turkey as a bridge between the Muslim world and the
Christian world is an overstatement. J10 (*The Guardian*) thinks that the bridge argument is exaggerated. He believes that Turkey’s relationship with the Middle East is not strong enough to help the Western world in approaching the Middle East. He says:

“When it comes to this ‘bridge argument’ that people often say that Turkey can be a bridge between Christian Europe and sort of Islam, Middle East. I think that is nonsense! When you look at it, actually Turkey has much closer links with Europe than it does with the Arab countries and the Middle East. It is only in the last three or four years that Turkey had good relations with these leaders from [the Middle East]”.

About the same discussion, J2 (the *FT*), who had worked in Turkey as a journalist for three years, strongly emphasised that expecting Turkey to be a solution for the clash of civilisations or being a bridge between the East and the West is absurd. He criticises what Tony Blair usually said about Turkey’s role between two civilisations. He thinks that Blair is a man who misunderstands Turkey and expects so much out of Turkey. He says:

“For a long time, certainly until 2003 or 2004, Turkey was not any kind of bridge or buffer or whatever against the Islam or against fundamentalism or whatever. In particular, it was never a bridge between the West and the East. Because institutionally, philosophically, politically, historically, Turkey is incapable of playing that role. It doesn’t want to play that role [...]. It was a very inward looking country, completely absorbed by itself, with very little contact with the rest of the world. [...] I still believe that Turkey is incapable of playing that role except that Erdoğan seems to think that it can. What you now have is Turkey overreaching. Encouraged by the likes of Blair and the Americans. I think that that is a big mistake and this going to cost Turkey in the long term”.

As discussed in previous chapters, the UK has a different relationship with the EU and
it appears in various issues. Again in this section, some journalists argued that understanding the clash of civilisations in the context of Turkey’s EU bid would be different in the UK when it is compared to the discussions about the same issue in continental Europe. J17 (the FT) thinks that seeing Turkish membership to the EU as deepening the clash of civilisations is not an acute problem in the British media as it is in Germany or France where there is a tradition of seeing the EU as sort of recreation of Charlemagne’s Europe. He says: “We (the British) are more secular in our view. We are more relaxed and more cosmopolitan”. Differences of the UK when it is compared to continental Europe also pointed out by J9 (BBC News). He thinks that the concern over watering down the EU or changing the fundamental character of the EU might exist in France and Germany but it does not exist in the UK. He argues that the British would be more interested in the economic benefit or damage of Turkish membership instead of its –so called- threat to Christianity or the European culture.

All in all, even though some journalists are very critical of the issue, the overall tone of the journalists’ comments mean that the British Government sees Turkey as a bridge between two worlds. This is one of the important reasons concerning the UK’s support for Turkish membership. In this way, it is an opportunity for the British media and the British Government to show that they see the EU as a strategic project rather than a cultural realm. Therefore, when the journalists’ views are summarised, it can be claimed that the clash of civilisations paradigm is a tool for British politicians and the British media to show its support for Turkish membership.
8.3.4.4. Journalists’ views on why the British media constantly refer to Turkey as a Muslim nation

One of the most striking points in the quantitative analysis of the coverage was the fact that Turkey was constantly referred to being Muslim (48.3 per cent of 143 news items). Even though the context of the news items was not always about religion or culture, the authors of the items somehow mentioned that Turkey is a Muslim country or has a Muslim nation. This association outnumbers the attributions to Turkey’s ‘secular’ character which was found in 11.9 per cent of all news items. If the discussion was about Bulgarian membership of the EU, it would be unlikely to see attributions to sectarian difference such as describing it as an Orthodox nation. Thus, there should be some reasons to justify the insistence of the British media on constantly describing Turkey as a ‘Muslim’ country or nation. Journalists were asked why the British media always prefer to say ‘the Muslim nation’ instead of simply calling it ‘Turkish public’ in the news items. When all answers from the journalists are analysed, it is possible to categorise the three main reasons: the circumstances in the post-9/11 world and Islamophobia; journalistic tricks; and relevance.

The circumstances in the post-9/11 World and Islamophobia

Several journalists said that one of the most important facts about Turkey is that it is a Muslim country. According to J21 (The Telegraph), using the word Muslim has a political meaning now which was not the case before 2001. Also, J2 (the FT) says: “[this] is just the way it is in the first decade of the 21st century”. He thinks that if the war in Iraq and 9/11 have not happened, all that kind of thing would be irrelevant. Similarly, J19 (The Guardian) thinks that the reason is the European and British publics’ obsession with terrorism and militant Islam. According to some journalists, the word
'Muslim’ could serve the newspapers’ ideology if they are against multicultural society and migration to Europe. J11 (The Guardian) argues that if the newspaper is hostile to Turkish membership, it might use this word in order to remind its readers that Turks are Muslims. For all these reasons, J14 (the Mirror) thinks that the word ‘Muslim’ might convey something more like a threat instead of simply a description of one nation’s major religion.

**Journalistic tricks**

Some interviewees argued that emphasising Turkey’s religion should not necessarily be ideological or pejorative. It was mentioned that technically it is a necessity in a news item to use a different word or adjective instead of ‘Turkey’ after mentioning Turkey more than once. J11 (The Guardian) claims that sometimes journalists get tired with the same thing and think of another way to describe the thing. He says “you can’t say ‘Turkey Turkey’ all the time”. J6 (BBC News) claimed that it could be just journalistic shorthand. He says “if you have only 500 words, I have got to remind people that Turkey is mainly Muslim”. Besides, he argues that it could be related to lazy journalism such as copying things from agency wires. According to him, most wires tend to write things in a very summarised and superficial way. He thinks that some readers may need some basic information and constantly emphasising ‘Turkey is a Muslim country’ does not have to have a negative impact. Furthermore, J18 (the FT) argued that most journalists have a kind of laziness and they apply this to all companies, individuals, countries, etc. while they are writing. He does not think that there is anything sinister into the Turkish issue. He said “when we write about Indonesia for example, we often write it is the most populous Muslim nation”.

242
Concerning the journalistic dimension of the issue, J4 (*The Telegraph*) argued that this could be related to seeking more attention from the readers. She thinks that while the world is getting more obsessed with Muslims, the news organisations could attempt to make their news items more interesting by connecting them with Islam. She says “After 9/11, this obsession increased. So, if the news item is about a Muslim country, it gives importance to the item even starting from the first sentence. I think [...] they use it to make it (a news item) interesting”.

*Relevance*

It was also found in the interviews that describing Turkey usually as ‘Muslim’ is relevant to the context. The interviewees said that Turkey has an overwhelmingly Muslim population and it is relevant in some elements of the debate when it comes to EU membership. For instance, J2 (the *FT*) thinks that using the word ‘Muslim’ all the time is not irrelevant. He says “it would be misleading not to mention [it] in a news report or any kind of piece about Turkey. You have to mention it”. According to J17 (the *FT*), Turkish membership to the EU is a rare and interesting event. If Turkey joins the EU, it would be a big change in the EU to have a non-Christian nation. That is why it is relevant to emphasise that it is a Muslim country or nation. Also J1 (*The Guardian*) thinks that it is relevant to mention that Turkey is a Muslim country in a responsibly written report but he also warns “where you can get dangerous is if there is any sort of undertone of prejudice in there, and then you are getting into the Giscard d’Estaing territory of ‘too big, too poor and too different’”.

Several journalists think that both pro-Turkish membership and anti-Turkish membership arguments put forward by politicians are usually based on culture and
religion. Thus, it is normal to see religion’s reflection in news items. J8 (The Telegraph) says:

“All the British politicians who have made the case like Tony Blair and David Cameron have identified the attraction of having a big Muslim country in. It is relevant to those who are in favour of it because it is an argument that has been used by Tony Blair and David Cameron”.

Hence, it can be argued that associating Turkey with being ‘Muslim’ could sometimes have positive aspects in terms of support for Turkey’s EU membership when Turkey is defined as the only Muslim democracy or shown as a model for the Muslim world.

8.4. Conclusion

This chapter once more shows that a production analysis on news content could be conducted by focusing on different layers of a process. The chapter specifically focused on the journalists who work or had worked for the British media and published news items about Turkey’s EU bid. The research questions below were answered in the chapter by presenting an analysis of the interviews which were conducted with 21 journalists.

RQ1: Who is selected to write on Turkey and what are the most important influences on them while they are writing their news items? (Socialization)

Most journalists who worked in Turkey in the past confessed that their knowledge of the country was very limited when they arrived there. They preferred to work in Turkey because of practical reasons in their career. At the London offices of British media outlets, no criteria were applied to the journalists who were chosen to write about Turkey-EU relations. Similarly, there is a random selection when somebody is appointed or sent to Turkey or other offices abroad. Only an editor from the FT (J18)
said that they expect their correspondents to have some expertise about Turkey and an ability to speak Turkish. Concerning what influenced the journalists the most when they write about Turkey-EU relations, it was found that the politicians and political institutions are the most influential entities. Besides, the journalists’ visits to the country and Turkey’s representation in the media were highlighted as significantly influential by the journalists.

RQ2: How do the journalists who have written about Turkey-EU relations view Turkey and its bid to join the EU? (Attitudes)

The journalists’ understanding of Turkey was greatly affected by the country’s position between the East and the West and how much this position may be of value in helping to solve the problems between the two sides. It can be argued that the British journalists have various views about the issues which surround Turkey’s EU bid. Their overall approach is in line with the general view of the British media, which sees Turkey as ‘a positive Other’, and is in favour of Turkish membership with some caveats. They think that the UK and Turkey have a great deal in common in terms of their expectations of the EU and how the EU should be shaped in the future. Several interviewees mentioned the political and economic influences of possible EU membership of Turkey on the UK. Interestingly, very few journalists talked about the cultural dimension of Turkey’s EU bid although it was discovered in the quantitative content analysis that cultural and religious differences were frequently mentioned in the British coverage. This shows that journalists are not very interested in the cultural impacts or do not see it as an issue for Turkish membership. While the individual journalists do not refer to the cultural discussions on Turkey’s EU bid in their personal comments, the reason for the popularity of cultural discussions in the coverage may
possibly be related to bringing some conflict to the news items. This could also originate from the fact that quoting from EU media and EU politicians that are not happy with Turkish membership is common in the British media.

All in all, similar to what was found in the content analysis, the journalists think that the discussions on Turkish membership is mostly associated with the UK’s and the EU’s global strategic plans. Therefore, Turkey is not seen as a country that can contribute to the political and cultural unity of Europe. That is why the overall tone of the journalists’ views suggests that Turkey is not a usual EU membership candidate. In contrast with these, Turkey is still welcomed to the EU by most of the journalists. This stance could have an influence on why Turkey was represented as ‘a positive Other’ in the British coverage.

RQ3: How do the journalists who have written on Turkey-EU relations view the coverage of Turkey’s EU bid in the British media? (Attitudes)

The journalists underlined that Turkey-EU relations used to have a news value in 2005 when there were tense discussions on Turkish membership and the future of Europe between the UK and the Franco-German axis of the EU. The same issue is no longer significantly interesting for the journalists as both Turkey and the EU have lost their motivation in membership negotiations. Moreover, it was mentioned in some interviews that in recent years there is less violence and human rights problems in Turkey for the Western media to write about. The journalists accepted that the change was not only about the decrease in the number of news items about Turkish membership but a shift has also happened in the content which Turkey is associated with. They stated that Turkey used to be linked with the EU affairs until some
important chapters in the membership negotiations were stalled in 2006 and accordingly Turkey has become more interested in the Middle East.

The journalists have also made comments concerning the reasons for continuing remarks on the drawbacks of Turkey’s EU bid in the coverage. They argued that even though the British media is by and large in favour of Turkey’s EU bid, it should also represent the negative sides of Turkish membership in order to protect its investigative and critical character.

Consequently, the chapter demonstrated what influenced the journalists while writing on Turkey-EU relations. It is possible to position this chapter’s outcomes in the lacuna concerning the influence of the individual level on news content regarding Turkey’s EU bid. ‘Media routines level’ and ‘extramedia level’ aspects which are also crucial in the production step of the news content will be discussed in the following chapter.
CHAPTER 9: A FOCUS ON THE MEDIA
ROUTINES AND THE EXTRAMEDIA LEVELS

“On the day David Cameron gave his speech, I was pretty firm in my coverage that we had to show the meat of his speech which was about his enthusiasm for Turkish accession... Various editors in London wanted most of the story to be about his description of Gaza as a 'prison camp'. Israel and Palestine is a story with which foreign editors and editors feel comfortable. Turkish accession is a story that they don't feel very comfortable with” (J9, of BBC News).

9.1. Introduction

The previous chapter presented the analysis on the individual level influences. The analysis of news production in this thesis would be left incomplete if the individual level’s interaction with two other levels was not examined. The ‘levels-of-analysis’ character of the hierarchical model enables an investigation on the interactions between different levels and “help[s] classify influences operating both separately and in conjunction with each other” (Reese, 2001: 178). Thus, this chapter focuses on ‘media routine’ and ‘extramedia’ levels in the news production step.

Even though the analysis on the production step in this research is built on the individual level, the impact of media routines and extramedia levels can be seen in several discussions in the interviews. It was found in the analysis that individual journalists’ socialization within the ‘media routines’ and ‘extramedia’ levels sometimes influences the individual level, and accordingly the construction of news media outputs. Since this study gives more importance to individual level in explaining how
news content is produced, the two levels are analysed within the limits of their relationship with the individual level. Therefore, the explanations concerning individual level in the previous chapter are also valid for this chapter’s analysis.

These are the research questions related to the influence of media routines and extramedia levels:

**RQ1:** How do the journalists view the influence of media routines level on the coverage of Turkey-EU relations? *(Socialization)*

**RQ2:** How do the journalists view the influence of extramedia level on the coverage of Turkey-EU relations? *(Socialization)*

The next section will answer the first research question by examining the influences of editorial line on the coverage, and journalists’ views on the British news organisations’ policy regarding the Turkish issue. Then, the following section deals with the second research question and includes an investigation on a parallelism between media and politics in the context of Turkey-EU relations. The same section also covers a focus on what journalists think on the PR activities concerning Turkey’s EU bid.

### 9.2. Journalists’ views on the influences of ‘media routines’

“[...] [N]ews workers ‘see’ some things as news and not others. Through their routines, they actively construct reality” *(Shoemaker and Reese, 1996: 120).* Thus, media routines can identify what is counted as news and what is not *(Preston, 2009: 52).* Moreover,

“Like people, organizations develop patterns, habits, and ways of doing things. The media organization must find ways of effectively gathering and evaluating its raw material. Most of these routines have become part of the news
business, giving workers clearly defined and specialized roles and expectations” (Shoemaker and Reese, 1996: 117).

Drawing on the points above, this section seeks to find out the media routines level influences on the news items about Turkey-EU relations. The ‘socialization’ aspect, discussed in the previous chapter, appears here in the relationship between editorial process and individual media workers. The interviewees were asked if the editorial process had an influence on their writings, and whether their news organisations had a specific policy concerning Turkey’s EU bid.

Firmstone (2008a) and Donsbach (2004) underline the importance of individual journalists in news making practises. According to Donsbach (2004: 143), although there is pressure from editors and organisations on individual journalists, this is not a direct but a psychological influence. The overall findings in this research are more or less in line with what Donsbach (2004) and Firmstone (2008a) argued. The journalists who participated in the interviews said that the writer’s perspective is much stronger than the influence of media routines in news production in their experience.

Excluding two journalists (the ‘Gaza’ example of J9, of BBC News, and the ‘mildly Islamist’ example of J4, of The Telegraph, which can be seen in the following section), no interviewee claimed that they experienced a direct influence from the editorial process. However, it is possible to see from what journalists said below that there are inevitable ‘indirect’ and ‘minor’ influences of newspapers’ editorial line on what journalists write.
9.2.1. Direct and indirect or minor influences of the editorial line

Explicit editorial lines as commands, which are intended to slant the political direction of news items, are evaluated as ‘direct influences’ in this section. Other influences, which are often hidden and less significant, are described as ‘indirect’ or ‘minor’ influences.

According to Tunstall, “any journalist submits to some extent to the policy controls of his [sic] news organization [...]” (1971: 123). Sometimes this translates into some degree of ‘indirect influence’ of the editorial line through the editorial expectations places upon individual journalists (also see Williams, 2003: 108-109). For instance, J9 (BBC News) thinks that journalists know who they are writing for, thus they probably cover what they see according to what their paper demands. Regarding the same issue, J21 (The Telegraph) says “[...] each newspaper will have a particular view and it will look for people (journalists) who will follow that line” and J12 (The Guardian) argues “you understand who wants the story before you began to write it. [...] You know why they ask for the story”. This is where the British media outlets’ view concerning the Turkish issue has an influence on individual journalists without a direct command from the editorial line.

The type of newspaper is also important to observe the degree of editorial impact on individual journalists. In terms of the differences within the British press, J8 (The Telegraph) thinks that the editorial line has less influence on journalists in The Daily Telegraph when it is compared to his experience in the Daily Mail. He says:

“When I worked for the Daily Mail, there was a pressure to slant stories in a certain direction. [...] Broadly, the tabloid papers have fixed editorial lines. [...]
[The Daily Telegraph] allowed its journalists to report news in a straight and objective way”.

Moreover, the newspapers’ stance on Turkey-EU relations is also significant concerning the question of ‘how much the news items are amended when they are sent from reporters to editors?’ J20 (The Guardian) argues that Turkey’s EU membership is not usually a polemical issue in his paper. Thus, he thinks that although both the editorial line and the journalists influence each other, there is a shared view about Turkey’s EU bid in The Guardian.

When the journalists were asked if the news items that they had written were changed by the editors in London, most journalists said that there was no change except some ‘minor influences’ such as technical mistakes or typographical faults. J6 (BBC News) thinks that the changes by the editorial line are mainly technical and related to the question of space rather than trying to change the editorial angle. He does not think that there is necessarily any sort of deep seated editorial agenda going on about Turkey’s EU membership. J14 (the Mirror) experienced her piece being shortened, however, the content of her news items were not substantially changed. According to J12 (The Guardian), the reason for technical changes can be accounted for by gaps in the coverage. He says “I think the assumption is that if they have to change a lot, you are not doing the job really well.”

Concerning the direct influence of editorial line on news items, it can be argued that this kind of point-blank influence was detected in a small number of examples in the research sample. For instance, in his visit to Ankara in 2010, Cameron’s strong support
for Turkish membership was overshadowed by what he said regarding the Palestine issue. J9 (BBC News) who attended Cameron and Erdoğan’s press conference in Ankara says:

“On the day David Cameron gave his speech, I was pretty firm in my coverage that we had to show the meat of his speech which was about his enthusiasm for Turkish accession... Various editors in London wanted most of the story to be about his description of Gaza as a ‘prison camp’. Israel and Palestine is a story with which foreign editors and editors feel comfortable. Turkish accession is a story that they don’t feel very comfortable with”.

It is difficult to investigate if the words or adjectives or different expressions are being amended after the reporter sends it to editors. Only J4 (The Telegraph) confessed that there is a direct influence on the language of the news items she had written. The amendments were about the words which were used in connection with the AK Party, Turkey’s leading party since 2002 which contributed a lot to Turkey’s EU membership perspective (Akyol, 2009: 192). Although the party rejects the claim that it is an ‘Islamic party’, defining the AK Party is still not very easy in domestic and international media and indeed it is often defined as an ‘Islamic party’30 in the British media. J4 said that she did not use a description like that in her first news items about the AK Party but then the editors in London added the description of ‘mildly Islamist’. She says:

“I think it is wrong to call the AK Party government as a ‘mildly Islamist government’. I don’t think that Islamists have a mild version. I don’t know why The Telegraph consistently uses this concept. I think they like it. There is no

30 Although this research’s content analysis did not have a special category for the AK Party, it was found in the sample that all broadsheets (The Guardian, The Daily Telegraph, the FT) defined the AK Party as an Islamic party at least in one news item. Moreover, the country profile about Turkey on BBC News website defines the AK Party as an “Islamist-based” and “Islamist-leaning” political party (BBC News Online, country profile, 2012). Concerning this issue, Christensen criticises the British media. According to him, defining the AK Party ‘Islamist’ without further information is an important example of information deficit in the media representation of Turkey (Christensen, 2006: 67). In contrast with the media coverage about the AK Party, its leaders always reject their party’s alleged association with Islamism (Hale, 2007). In Article 2.1 of the Party Programme, the AK Party reveals its position respecting secularism: “Our Party refuses to take advantage of sacred religious values and ethnicity and to use them for political purposes” (The AK Party Website, 2011). The literature is not consistent as to whether the AK Party is a conservative democratic party or an Islamist one (Heper, 2004: 12; Rumford, 2006: 189; Keyman, 2006: 212; Kotsovilis, 2006: 57; Kösebalaban, 2007; Yilmaz, 2009: 62).
other explanation. I would not use this term. I would say ‘conservative’ in order to explain it briefly. [...] I discussed with them a lot but they don’t change this term”.

Another direct influence by the editors in London is related to one of Turkey’s biggest headaches in its EU bid: the Cyprus issue. Calling the military operation by the Turkish Armed Forces in Cyprus in 1974 an ‘invasion’ is almost impossible in Turkish media outlets. When the word ‘invasion’ was used by a Turkish journalist, J4 (The Telegraph), it was interesting to ask if it was her own expression or not. She explained why she used it:

“Actually I am against the term ‘invaded’. Because when you look at the UN Guarantee Agreement³¹, the first part [of military operation to Cyprus] is not an invasion but the second operation can be seen as an invasion. [...] Sometimes I use it like this but not consistently. You should also take into account the space you have on newspaper. You cannot explain the UN Guarantee Agreement in detail. But I am still not sure if it is right to use this term or not. I am in between”.

This section showed that there are direct, indirect and minor influences of the editorial line on the news coverage about Turkey-EU relations. Indirect and minor influences were demonstrated as part of the daily routines of journalists. Concerning the direct influences of the editorial line, only two journalists gave examples from their own experiences. As a result, it can be argued that the news coverage on Turkey-EU relations is not frequently influenced by the editors’ direct interventions. However, there is a strong belief among the interviewees that the journalists know which news organisation they write for. Therefore, there is an inevitable influence of the news organisations’ policy concerning the EU in general and Turkey-EU relations in particular. The following section will present more discussions on this issue.

³¹ J4 refers to the Article IV in the Treaty of Guarantee (1960: 2) which states: “In so far as common or concerted action may not prove possible, each of the three guaranteeing Powers reserves the right to take action with the sole aim of re-establishing the state of affairs created by the present Treaty”.
9.2.2. The policy of the British media towards Turkey’s EU bid discussions

Having explained the journalists’ view on the influence of editorial process, this section seeks to look at how the British newspapers and the BBC approach Turkey’s EU bid. Journalists were asked if they think that the editorial lines have a policy about Turkish membership. Some journalists clearly revealed their media organisation’s view about Turkey’s EU bid. Some of them said that the issue does not hold enough importance in the agenda to settle a view. And some journalists did not want to talk about the general view of their and other media organisation’s approach to Turkish membership. They said that they are not in the position to explain this.

It was seen in the answers that journalists asserted the policy of the British media in the Turkish issue through the special relationship between the UK and the EU. Therefore, even though some journalists disclose that some media outlets do not have a specific policy on Turkey’s EU bid, it can be argued that a policy towards the Turkish issue inevitably occurs when the news organisations’ positions regarding general EU affairs are considered. For instance, Euroscepticism was underlined in the interviews regarding its connection with the British media’s view on the Turkish issue. Then, journalists highlighted a second strand which harbours a certain chauvinism that wants to close the UK’s door to foreigners, especially to Muslims. This is where Turkey’s representation as ‘a positive Other’ disappears. However, this strand is mainly limited to the tabloids and they rarely cover the Turkish issue.

Even though Euroscepticism decreases the level of interest on EU affairs in the British media, most journalists argued that Euroscepticism in the British media actually serves
Turkish membership. They argued that the majority of media organisations in Britain want a broader, wider Europe, embracing Turkey as well as Eastern Europe. J2 (the FT) and J16 (The Telegraph) think that the British elite and many journalists, working for the British media, do not believe in further integration in the EU. Thus, their approach to Turkish membership could be positive in order to dilute the initiatives for European federalism. J3 (The Telegraph) summarises the situation with a phrase in English: "You can also kill a cat with cream". He thinks that the traditional British Conservative approach to the EU probably wants to admit China too if it could. In this way, the EU can expand more and more and, accordingly, transform into a meaningless political organisation. What J3 said explains one of the core reasons why Turkey was represented as ‘a positive Other’ in the British media.

According to the journalists, the second strand in terms of British media’s view in the Turkish issue is related to chauvinism. This is generally seen in the tabloid papers which do not publish deep analyses concerning the Turkish issue. Their arguments are mostly about migration and the discussions are usually superficial. When they represent the Turkish accession, the tabloids could be in between because what they defend clashes with the Turkish case. J8 (The Telegraph) indicates the dilemma:

“The traditional tabloid papers the Daily Mail, The Sun and the Daily Express which are hostile to immigration but also hostile to the EU. Therefore, Turkish membership presents a dilemma. [...] Is it a good thing because it will weaken the EU or a bad thing because of immigration? My sense is that those issues aren’t fully resolved [...]”.

Economic recession in Europe also has an impact on how migration issues are discussed. J3 (The Telegraph) thinks that the relatively positive approach to Turkish membership in the British media may change soon. He believes that when economic times are bad, British people become more hostile to immigration. For the first time
now in the UK, people may start talking about Turkey in the context of immigration concern.

Some journalists did not want to talk about other media organisations’ positions on the Turkish issue but they clearly revealed their media organisation’s attitude concerning Turkish accession. Some of them preferred to say that they were in the middle and impartial. No journalists said that their media organisation is against Turkish accession but they emphasised that the tabloid press could be critical or simply against further expansion of the EU. Different British media organisations’ perspective regarding Turkey’s bid to join the EU and how they legitimise their approach are listed below:

**The Daily Telegraph**

J4, who used to be the Istanbul correspondent of *The Daily Telegraph*, said that *The Telegraph* is strongly in favour of Turkish membership. The reason in her words is “because *The Daily Telegraph* wants to strengthen the Atlantic axis and Turkish membership is perceived within the UK’s relations with the US”. Again J21 (*The Telegraph*), a leader writer, accepted that *The Daily Telegraph* has always been in favour of Turkish membership of the EU.

**The Guardian**

J1 (*The Guardian*) and J20 (*The Guardian*), a leader writer, said that *The Guardian* is extremely pro Turkish. J20 believes that the reasons why *The Guardian* supports Turkish membership are exactly the reasons that Angela Merkel, Nicholas Sarkozy, or the Austrians worry about. J20 said “we don’t believe, as a paper, that the EU is good
as a Christian club”. J10 (The Guardian) also claimed that his paper has a clear policy regarding Turkey’s EU bid. He said that the editorials written about Turkish membership obviously reveal The Guardian’s position.

**Financial Times**

J18 (the FT) strongly emphasised the support of the FT for Turkish accession to the EU, and the importance they give to Turkey in their coverage in recent years. He thinks that the liberal press in Britain more or less have the same approach concerning Turkish membership. He says:

“The FT has always been very supportive of Turkish membership. [...] The business elite in Britain, when they express their corporate view, perhaps they would be in favour of Turkish membership. I think the liberal press, The Guardian, and The Independent, [...] I imagine they would have been supportive” (He refers to 2004 and 2005 when the discussions about the Turkish membership issue were on a peak).

**BBC News**

In the Methodology Chapter, the question of the BBC’s stance regarding the EU affairs in general was raised. Here, the journalists from BBC News who participated in this research revealed their organisation’s stance concerning the Turkish issue. J16 (BBC News) claimed that the BBC is always impartial. He argued that the BBC does not have a position either for or against Turkish membership of the EU. He said “we just cover the forces that shape that position”. Again, J9 (BBC News) thinks that the BBC does not have an exact standpoint about the Turkish membership issue. When their view is considered together with this study’s content analysis, it can be argued that the general tone in BBC News coverage is neither in favour of nor against Turkey. However, it should also be underlined that the qualitative content analysis included several examples from BBC News which represented Turkey as the Other of Europe.
Even though the reason for this type of representation is the quotations from the media of other EU Member States, the selection of quotations was made by individuals in charge of BBC News in line with editorial decisions.

**The Daily Mail and the Daily Mirror**

J8 (*The Telegraph*) stated above that tabloids are probably in the middle concerning the Turkish issue and some journalists mentioned that tabloids are against further expansion of the EU. However, the data gathered from the interviews regarding the tabloids’ approach is limited. As no journalist participated in the interviews from the *Daily Mail*, and because of only one interviewee from the *Daily Mirror*, the perspective of these two media organisations could not be clearly demonstrated by the interviews. However, their general stance about Turkish membership was demonstrated by the examples given in the content analyses in Chapters 6 and 7.

All in all, the journalists’ views concerning the approach of their news organisations to the Turkish issue demonstrated that *The Daily Telegraph*, *The Guardian* and the *FT’s* editorial view is clearly pro-Turkish. Even though there was not enough information about the other news organisations, it can be strongly argued that they are at least not against Turkish membership of the EU. However, the reason for this positive approach, as explained by the journalists, is related to the British media’s Euroscepticism rather than a special interest in Turkey. How other influences are also in line with that view can be seen in the following section.
9.3. Journalists’ views on aspects of ‘extramedia’ influences

There are various points which influence media content although they do not originate from the media or individual journalists. They are classified as an extramedia level in Shoemaker and Reese’s hierarchical model (1996). According to Reese (2001: 182), acknowledging this level means that the power to construct news content does not only belong to the media itself. The power over the content is shared with various entities such as “the government, advertisers, public relations, influential news sources, interest groups, and even other media organizations” (Reese, 2001: 182). Among those entities, following Reese’s approach, this study’s empirical analysis paid more attention to “systemic, patterned, and ongoing ways media are connected with their host society” (2001: 182). Therefore, the following sections look at journalists’ views on the influences of politicians (with a special emphasis on the UK’s special relationship with the EU and its influence on Turkey’s EU bid) and PR activities which are units of Shoemaker and Reese’s (1996) extramedia level. Firstly, parallelism between media and politics is examined in the context of Turkey-EU relations and the British media.

9.3.1. The degree of parallelism between the British media and the British Government

In order to comprehend the construction of news, the extramedia level influences should also be investigated as the media often “rely on external suppliers of raw material, whether speeches, interviews, corporate reports, or government hearings” (Shoemaker and Reese, 1996: 127). For instance, the results of this research’s quantitative content analysis showed that almost all quotations and references in the
news items were provided from politicians. Before analysing how journalists explained the impact of politics on their work, a crucial term parallelism should be described.

‘Party-press parallelism’ (Seymour-Ure 1974; Blumler and Gurevitch 1975) and its adaptation政治 parallelism32 in Hallin and Mancini’s study (2004) are two concepts that can help to explain how the British media distinctly reveals its political tendency. When the Liberal (i.e. the Anglo-American) model of mass media is evaluated, it is seen that “[...] [i]n the U.S., Canada and Ireland political neutrality has come to be the typical stance of newspapers. The British press, on the other hand, is still characterized by external pluralism” (Hallin and Mancini, 2007: 28). What they mean by ‘external pluralism’ is “the existence of a range of media outlets or organizations reflecting the points of view of different groups or tendencies in society” (Hallin and Mancini, 2004: 29). Thus, they argue that this situation leads to a political parallelism in the British media and they claim that “it is no coincidence that the concept of ‘party-press parallelism’ was developed in Britain, where [...] the press has always mirrored the divisions of party politics fairly closely” (Hallin and Mancini, 2007: 28). Similarly, Negrine (1994: 40) claims that the British newspapers transfer the ideology of political parties to the readers. He asserts that British newspapers and British political parties, historically, have connection. Because of the degree of this connection, he uses the broad concept ‘parallelism’ in order to explain the relationship between a news organisation and a party political discourse.

32 In Negrine (1994: 52), ‘parallelism’ is “a concept which explores the extent to which newspapers reflect or fail to reflect the breadth of the party political discourse”. According to Hallin and Mancini (2004), while ‘party-parallelism’ refers to a direct relationship between a news organisation and a political party, a broader term ‘political parallelism’ is related to the general approach of a news organisation in political issues and how parallel it is with political parties or other kinds of institutions (Hallin and Mancini, 2004).
As an example, just before the 1997 elections in the UK, the *Daily Mirror* placed the slogan “Loyal to Labour, Loyal to You” on its banner (Hallin and Mancini, 2004: 211). “Even the page three girl was mobilized in the *[Daily Mirror’s]* campaign effort: each day a different ‘Blair Babe’ appeared to say why she was voting Labour” (Hallin and Mancini, 2004: 211). This is not significantly different for British broadsheets. Distribution of readers’ sympathy to each political party shows the British paper’s main political orientation. For instance, according to a study conducted in 1997 in the UK, 67 per cent of *The Guardian* readers support the Labour Party while only eight per cent is in favour of the Conservative Party. The picture is the opposite among *The Daily Telegraph* readers as 57 per cent of its readers support the Conservatives (Scammell and Harrop, 1997: 161).

An event, which shows the degree of the British media’s distinct political tendency and the tradition of announcing which party they are going to support in the elections, recently caused a controversy in Turkey. *The Economist* advised Turkish people to vote for the Republican People’s Party (CHP), the second biggest political party of Turkey, in the Turkish General Election in 2011. The Turkish ruling party the AK Party’s leaders, including the PM Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, harshly criticised *The Economist* because of its advice to Turkish voters. Following this, *The Economist* wrote “Mr Erdogan has accused *The Economist* of acting in concert with ‘a global gang’ and taking orders from Israel. This may win him votes at home, but it will hardly add to his credibility in the West” (*The Economist*, 2011).
All in all, it can be claimed that there is some degree of *political parallelism* between the British news organisations and the British political circles. When the overall tendency in the British press is examined, it is seen that the right-of-centre in British politics has more supporters within the British media (Anderson and Weymouth, 1999: 60-61). However, the existence of *political parallelism* does not mean that only a few political orientations are available in news content of the British media (Hallin and Mancini, 2007: 29). Moreover, it should also be underlined that the political stance of other news organisations in continental Europe may not be seen as less distinct than the British (Hallin and Mancini, 2007).

The following sub-sections will look at what the above overview on *political parallelism* means in practice. Firstly, *political parallelism* in the British media in the context of Turkey’s EU bid *per se* will be analysed. This will then be followed by an analysis of the impact of the UK’s special relationship with the EU on the content of coverage.

### 9.3.1.1. Political parallelism in the British media concerning Turkey’s EU bid

As one of the indicators of *political parallelism* can be “manifested in journalistic role orientations and practices” (Hallin and Mancini, 2004: 28), this section seeks to investigate the journalists’ views on the degree of an interaction between the British media and the British Government, and who influences who in Turkish membership discussions. Although journalists’ overall view suggests that there is a remarkable amount of interaction between politicians and journalists in the issues which are directly related to the UK, it was found that the politicians’ influence on the British media is limited in the discussions regarding Turkey’s bid to join the EU. Some journalists believe that to some extent there is a correlation between what the British
media say about Turkish membership and what the Government thinks on the same issue. While looking at this correlation, the political stance of each paper is significant. J6 (BBC News) thinks that to some degree media follow political parties’ policy. He says “[the Daily Mail and The Daily Telegraph] are always trying to push the Tory Party to become even more Eurosceptic than it already is”. J11 (The Guardian) has a similar view. He argues that media people and politicians spend a lot of time talking to each other. The views held by The Guardian have quite an influence on what happens inside the Labour Party and vice versa. J4 (The Telegraph) also emphasises the significance of journalists’ meetings with politicians. She says:

“The leader writer probably speaks to the Foreign Secretary about Turkey’s EU membership when they are sitting at a gentleman’s club. This is very normal. They don’t use force. They think about Britain's benefits. [...] How can they write their commentaries without communicating with politicians?”

This communication is not always limited to an interaction. In some cases, influences become stronger. Even though there are not many, some journalists think that there is a significant influence by politicians which shapes the British media’s view on Turkish membership. For instance, J17 (the FT) thinks that both the Government and the main opposition party are in favour of Turkish membership and this has an important influence on the media. His view is a crucial example of political parallelism as he argues that if the Government was hostile to Turkish membership, the media would be less favourable to Turkey’s bid to join the EU. J21 (The Telegraph) explains the influence through a different perspective. According to his view, political parallelism of the British media in the Turkish case is pertained to the insignificance of Turkey-EU relations for the British media. He thinks that Turkish membership is not one of the main events of the political and public agenda. Thus, it is possible to see that the media is following the Government in the Turkish membership case. He thinks that the
discussions regarding Turkey’s bid to join the EU is not a big enough issue for the media to campaign on it. He also adds that there is a consensus within the foreign policy establishment regarding the Turkish issue and it is accepted by most political parties. J20 (The Guardian) claims the opposite of what J21 (The Telegraph) suggested. He says “I think [the media is] driving. If it was an issue that was important enough, it would be the other way around. In this case it is [driven] by experts”. Similarly, J14 (the Mirror) claimed that if it is about something that the public is not very aware of, then the media will have their own approach and it will be very much driven by individual newspapers and newspaper editors.

It was also highlighted in the interviews that foreign policy issues tend to be less politicised. Thus, Turkish membership discussions could be less tense in terms of the mutual influence between the British Government and the British media. J12 (The Guardian) said:

“The Daily Telegraph is a very conservative newspaper as you know but when it comes to foreign policy, it is really not that different from any other newspapers. Foreign policy is less party politicised unless it is something very specific to British. What The Daily Telegraph thinks about Tunisia isn’t going to be very different from what The Guardian thinks about Tunisia. Or about Turkish membership. Because it is not a domestic story. Unlike Germany where Turkey is a domestic story”.

Therefore, it is not easy to say that the Turkish issue might cause clashes within the British political parties.

Almost all journalists think that there is no formal correlation between what the Government thinks and what the British media say about Turkish membership. They think that the media and the Government are fairly separate. According to J10, The Guardian’s view on Turkish membership is not related to the British Government and
the similar line with the Government on this issue is just a coincidence. Some journalists are remarkably sensitive in emphasising that their coverage is not influenced by state power. They think that intellectual dialogue between British journalists from the established papers and the Foreign Office or people from 10 Downing Street does not mean that the journalists follow the official view. J2 (the FT) says: “Certainly, our coverage of Turkey in the FT has no relation whatever with the thinking in the British Government. [...] It is purely news driven, policy driven. It is driven by events in Turkey and Europe”.

Two journalists tried to demonstrate the weakness of the Government’s influence on the media coverage about Turkish membership through expressing the differences in Government’s and media’s approach. J13 (The Guardian) underlines the existence of various approaches in the British media about Turkey. She thinks that the Government does not have an influence on the British media because “different newspapers end up in different places on [the Turkish issue]. [...] There is a kind of variety of opinion”. What J13 claimed is too broad when it is compared with the detailed content analysis in this thesis. In terms of being in favour of or against Turkish membership, it can be easily said that the results are not as various as J13 claims. For instance, there is no news organisation which is totally against Turkish membership of the EU in the sample. However, it is not hard to assert that The Guardian and the FT are overtly in favour of Turkey’s EU bid.

J9 (BBC News) also highlights the difference between the British media and the Government concerning their approach to the Turkish issue. He said that, to some degree, Islamophobia plays a part in some negativity towards Turkish accession in the
British media. Such negativity is not reflected from the Government. Also, he thinks that the British media is more sceptical than the Government in overall issues regarding Turkey’s EU bid. J9’s comment is important because this thesis argues that the British coverage represents Turkey as ‘a positive Other’ while the British politicians’ view in the same media coverage portrays Turkey as an integral part of the European Self. This point is probably related to the British media’s critical stance regarding any type of issue, negativity as a news value (see O’Neill and Harcup, 2009: 166), and other reasons which will be discussed in Chapter 10.

9.3.1.2. The influence of the UK’s special relationship with the EU on the media representation of Turkey’s EU bid

As several times explained in the thesis before and in the Media Routines Level Section in the first half of this chapter, the UK has a different relationship with the EU when it is compared with other major European countries such as Germany and France. Accepting that the British Government’s overall approach to the EU has a reflection on the British media (Anderson and Weymouth, 1999) as part of existing parallelism, this section considers whether the journalists think that the UK’s special relationship with the EU, as a source in the extramedia level, also have an influence on how Turkey’s EU bid is represented in the British media.

*The Eurosceptic approach is happy with Turkey’s EU bid*

Almost all journalists think that the special relationship between the UK and the EU definitely has an influence on the media representation of Turkish accession to the EU. J6 (BBC News) thinks that the Eurosceptics in the British media are happy with the idea...
of having countries coming in which would maybe slightly shift the centre of gravity away from the Franco-German axis in the EU. He argues that the Eurosceptics are in favour of the idea of seeing the EU as an internal market and a free trading bloc, and Turkey can help the UK to transform the EU into such an organisation. J9 (BBC News) has a similar view. He says:

“[The UK’s special relationship with the EU] probably adds to some newspapers’ enthusiasm for Turkey. Because those newspapers themselves are sceptical and they understand the process of bringing Turkey [...] would almost certainly halt further integration within the European Union”.

Also J17 (the FT) thinks that the British media is sceptical and hostile towards the integrationist Franco-German view, and the idea of ‘United States of Europe’. Thus, the British media tends to favour the plan of widening Europe in order to dilute the integrationist view. J3 (The Telegraph) argues that Britain’s awkward relationship with the EU is at the heart of all discussions while explaining how Britain and the British media approach Turkish membership. Therefore, he argues that the British media, through politicians’ speeches, usually employs Turkey in explaining its own problems with Europe. Similarly, J20 (The Guardian) clearly claims that the British politicians are not able to express their support for Turkey without indicating Britain’s own problems with the EU. He gives the example of David Cameron’s speech in Ankara in 2010. He says:

“[Cameron] quoted from de Gaulle ‘Britain can never become a member of the EU’, and he explained how ‘never’ never means anything in politics and how he was angry. What Cameron was doing was positioning himself not in the Turkish debate but in the EU debate. So, in a sense that is exactly an example of how the two are inseparable. You can’t discuss Turkey's bid to the EU without discussing Britain's [relations] with the EU...”

Among the interviewees, only one journalist, J2 (the FT) was not sure that this kind of awkward relationship between the UK and the EU could have an influence on Turkey’s EU bid representation in the British media. Although he believes that the main reason
for the UK’s support for Turkish membership is related to the UK’s Eurosceptic approach and awkward relationship with the EU, he is not very sure whether this Eurosceptic approach of the British elite influences the British media coverage of Turkey.

**Insufficient coverage**

Another influence of the UK’s special relationship with the EU on the media representation of Turkey’s EU bid is about the insufficiency in the coverage. The interviewees think that the Eurosceptic approach of the UK could have negative influence on the amount of coverage concerning Turkish membership. As the Eurosceptic approach is powerful in some circles of the UK and the British media, EU affairs have less importance in the media when compared to other EU Member States. The journalists who had worked in Brussels argued that editors in London are not significantly interested in European affairs. J1 (The Guardian) says: “European Union [issues] is not like reporting from Washington where [editors in London] are interested in everything. […] So, there is a problem about writing stories and getting space in the paper. It is not with pro-Turkey or anti-Turkey”. Similarly, J14 (the Mirror) argues that any EU issue actually is more widely covered in France and Germany and “their citizens are more up to speed on EU events” whereas the British media tend to invest very little in their coverage of the EU. She claims that much of the politics is driven by the domestic agenda and EU affairs are not always significant for the British media. Therefore, it can be argued that the British media’s general reluctance on EU affairs inevitably influences how and how much Turkey-EU relations are covered.
This section looked at the journalists’ views in order to see whether political parallelism exists in the British media coverage of Turkey-EU relations or not. More discussions will be presented in this issue in the Conclusion Chapter. The following section below demonstrates another influence of the extramedia level on news items.

9.3.2. PR activities and the communication between journalists and Turkish officials

Another aspect of Shoemaker and Reese’s extramedia level influences is PR activities. As this research focuses on Turkey’s EU bid, journalists were asked if the coverage in this issue can be changed by propaganda and PR activities. Most journalists do not believe that PR activities can influence the news items. They advise that ‘hard sell’ initiatives could be very risky. For instance, J18 (the FT) argues that most journalists in the British media would resist the mechanical initiatives which aim to increase the number of news reports that are positive for Turkish membership. He says:

“The British media is an incredibly anarchic milieu. So, I think journalists or news organisations probably do not respond to organised lobbying, or organised pressure in the way that the people who design these campaigns necessarily want”.

J4 (The Telegraph) argues that PR activities do not reflect real life and politics, so that they could even be harmful for Turkey. She claims that if Turkey improves itself, Europeans and European media will notice it. She adds “boat trips for foreign journalists in the Bosphorus” could only satisfy the journalists who are coming from far away countries which do not have any political issues with Turkey.
The defensive approach of Turkey and weak communication between foreign journalists and Turkish officials

It was disclosed in the interview data that the journalists were remarkably critical regarding Turkish officials’ weak communication with foreign journalists. J4 (The Telegraph) said that she did not think the Turkish Government had a good relationship with the foreign press. J11 (The Guardian) criticised how hard it is to conduct an interview with Turkish politicians. He found that TÜSİAD was more informative for him than the Turkish officials because he thinks that the Turkish state is “too secretive and too defensive”.

An experienced BBC journalist J9, who worked in Istanbul and Brussels when Turkish membership was a popular issue, also thinks that Turkey is generally defensive in discussing issues. He says that journalists tend to see the worst side of the stories. If they are not advised, they continue to do that and the negative side will get published. He thinks that the important part of the insufficient communication between Turkish officials and foreign journalists is related to Turkey’s tendency to be defensive instead of proactive. According to his experience, Turkey has, amongst the great and civilised nations, probably the worst public relations of any country he has ever encountered. Although he accepts that it has improved recently to some degree, what J9 observed whilst he was working in Brussels and Istanbul is a proof of the weak communication between Turkish officials and foreign journalists:

“In five years in Brussels, not once did the Turkish Representation in Brussels ever contact me, ever reach out to me, ever invite me for a meal or a chat. Not once! It was a similar situation in Turkey itself. The Government used to be extremely sensitive about the coverage which it received from the BBC, The Guardian. And yes, extremely difficult to, again, be in contact with over any relevant period of time.”
J9 thinks that the reason for the weak communication between Turkish officials and foreign journalists could be linked to Turkish pride. He thinks that this pride is manifested by thinking "why should we reach out to you (the foreign media)? Why should we explain things to you?" He also connects this pride with Turkey’s distrust of the foreign media which probably comes from having been in a relatively closed society for a long time:

“\[\text{It is a function as I think of all diplomatic outreach. It is a function of the nature of the country itself which sees very little reason why it should be going to the effort to explain itself to other countries. Turkey sees itself, widely, as a great nation.}\]

When he was asked what could have happened if Turkish officials had been in touch more with foreign journalists in Turkey, Brussels or London, J9 said that Turkish officials would have been able to make the case for Turkey's EU membership, and they would have been able to explain many of the difficulties which are currently emerging in the accession process (e.g. the Cyprus issue and the problems in human rights).

There are also some journalists who had had positive experiences about Turkey’s efforts to explain itself. In J1’s (The Guardian) experience, the Turkish Mission in Brussels has a successful press office. Also J13 (The Guardian) was very impressed by a conference which she attended in Istanbul in 2006. She said that the organisation brought together the Turkish elite from media, business, and politics with the European elite. She considers that this kind of organisation can have a big influence on how Turkey-EU relations are discussed in the media.

Thirteen of the 21 journalists attended at least one event related to Turkish membership of the EU. However, only four of them said that the event was organised
by the Turkish State. The events they attended were mostly organised by TÜSİAD, Turkish universities, Turkish think-tanks, and other Turkish NGOs. Three journalists underlined the contributions of TÜSİAD and how active they are with J11 especially thinking that TÜSİAD is more proactive than the Turkish Government in EU affairs.

**What should Turkey do?**

The journalists who participated in the interviews talked about their own experiences and gave advice to Turkey for better relations with the media in the EU. The majority of journalists believe in initiatives in real politics. They think that improvements in the rule of law, human rights, and economy could have more positive results when it is compared to ‘hard sell’ PR activities on journalists. J17 (the *FT*) summarises what the majority of journalists argued:

“I don’t think governments can, by saying things, necessarily change opinion. The governments change opinion by doing things. So, in ten years time, if Turkey is an even more prosperous, democratic state, then its case with public opinion for membership would be much much stronger. The fear, in the public mind still, is Turkey is a poor country. If we let them in, they will send all their people here”.

Hence, it can be suggested that what Turkey should be doing is making PR about what it has succeeded regarding democracy, economy, and culture.

The interview outcomes showed that the journalists demanded more access and outreach for the press. They emphasised the importance of good communication with the foreign press. They think that it is significantly useful for the Ministries or the PM’s office to engage with the foreign journalistic community and have a regular dialogue with them about what are the important issues and how they are covered in the international press. They claim that this is especially important in capitals such as

Consequently, if Turkey wants to get more support from the European public, it should employ media in order to disseminate its arguments which show that it deserves to be part of the EU. Moreover, many PR and lobbying organisations focus on the elite instead of aiming at the public only. This is because the elite are one of the major news sources who can influence the media content (Corcoran and Fahy, 2009: 100). The elite are usually the decision makers which include politicians, people from think tanks and pressure groups. Media can serve them as the basis for ‘elite-elite communication’ where the elite can follow other elite’s opinion. Also, the elite’s views could be influential on the media as much as the media’s influence on them. A recent Turkish initiative the Public Diplomacy Institution which was established in 2010 and works under the Prime Minister’s Office should also focus on the European elite in order to influence Turkey’s media representation. The institution is already engaged in some activities such as raising the reputation of Turkey in international circles by organising meetings where foreign journalists meet Turkish ministers (Kamu Diplomasisi Koordinatörlüğü, 2011).

9.4. Conclusion

Since “[...] how or how far the personal characteristics or orientations of journalists are translated into actual influences on news content seems [...]” vague (Preston and Metykova, 2009: 34), the focus on the individual level is usually not enough to uncover the complex structure of the news production process. Therefore, following the discussions in Chapter 8, this chapter included the findings from the interviews which are related to the media routines and the extramedia levels. The influences of these
two levels on news items were analysed by looking at the journalists’ personal experiences.

As a contribution to macro analysis on production studies in the context of the hierarchical model, the chapter illustrated that some levels of the model can be utilised in helping the analysis of a third level as this chapter did for the individual level. In terms of the micro analysis, the findings which were presented in this chapter can be useful to fill the lacuna on the influence of media routines and extramedia levels concerning the news items about Turkey’s EU bid. The overall outcomes of the micro analysis are presented under two research questions below.

**RQ1: How do the journalists view the influence of media routines level on the coverage of Turkey-EU relations? (Socialization)**

“The routines level of analysis considers the constraining influences of work practices” (Reese, 2001: 180). It was seen in the interviews that the journalists who had written on Turkey-EU relations were not exposed to a serious degree of pressure from their editorial line. Excluding two interviewees, no journalist claimed that their news items on Turkey were directly changed during the editorial process. This relatively low degree of constraints from the media routines level, especially from the editorial line, once more showed the significance of the individual level in the context of news items on Turkey’s EU bid. In this respect, it can be suggested that this study is more or less in line with what Donsbach (2004) and Firmstone (2008a) argued concerning the importance of the individual journalists. However, three journalists strongly underlined the significance of journalists’ awareness of the expectations from the editorial line. They argued that even though there is no direct demand from the editors, the
journalists know why they asked for the story (e.g. J12, of The Guardian). Moreover, most journalists accepted the ‘minor’ influences at the media routines level by referring to the points such as the problem of space in their newspapers or some technical mistakes such as typographical faults. Yet, in J6’s (BBC News) words, these amendments did not intend to slant the political angle of the journalists’ piece.

Two key points, which are ‘Euroscepticism’ and ‘chauvinism’, appeared at the stage of an analysis on the policy of each British news organisation on Turkey’s EU bid. No journalist claimed that their news organisation is against Turkish membership. Regarding some journalists’ argument that some editorial lines do not have a specific policy on Turkey, it can be claimed that these media outlets’ policy inevitably appears on the Turkish issue when their view on general EU affairs is concerned. Moreover, the overall findings in the content analysis and the interviews illustrated that The Guardian, The Daily Telegraph and the FT have a clear view on the Turkish issue.

**RQ2: How do the journalists view the influence of extramedia level on the coverage of Turkey-EU relations? (Socialization)**

According to what most interviewees said, politicians’ influence on the coverage is limited in the Turkish case. The journalists accepted that there is strong communication between them and politicians but they do not think that there is a parallelism between the British media and the British Government concerning the Turkish issue. However, some journalists believe that the media would have had a different stance if the Government was against Turkish membership. Therefore, it can be argued that there are various views concerning either the media or the politicians drive the other one in the Turkish case. One view suggests that the discussions on the
Turkish issue are expert-driven. Therefore, this view argues that the media has an influence on politicians concerning the debate on Turkey’s EU bid. Another group of journalists think that Turkey’s EU bid is not controversial in the British media. Therefore, they claim that the media do not have a decisive position on the issue which can drive the discussions. This view also underlines that there is a consensus of support for Turkish membership among different political parties and the media in the UK. Interestingly, it was found that when there is a debate concerning the problematic sides of Turkish accession, the discussions in the news content are mainly boosted by employing the opposing views from continental Europe (e.g. Giscard d’Estaing; Jacques Chirac; public opinion polls). Thus, these issues cannot become significantly tense within the limits of British politics.

According to the journalists’ comments, the relatively modest interest of the British news organisations in EU affairs unavoidably influences the coverage of Turkey’s EU bid in the British media. This, at least, causes a quantitative under-representation of Turkish membership and other EU affairs in the British media (see Anderson and Weymouth, 1999). The journalists said that this is not a direct attitude towards the Turkish issue but Turkey is significantly influenced by the British media’s cold manner regarding the EU.

The chapter also looked at journalists’ views on PR activities as part of the extramedia level influences. Some interviewees were remarkably critical about the communication of Turkish officials with foreign journalists. Moreover, it was found out that the journalists do not believe in ‘hard sell’ PR. They think that these kinds of initiatives may cause negative consequences for Turkey. They believe that what Turkey does in terms
of improvements in rule of law, human rights and economy will have a positive representation in the British media.

All in all, the findings in this chapter demonstrate that Euroscepticism in the British media is one of the reasons why the coverage in general is in favour of Turkey’s EU bid. Regarding a connection with the analytical framework of the thesis, the journalists’ views on the British media’s approach to Turkey’s EU bid verified the appropriateness of conceptualising the media representation of Turkey as ‘a positive Other’. The following chapter will present the concluding remarks on the topic of this thesis and answer the main research question of the thesis by employing the notion of ‘a positive Other’.
CHAPTER 10: CONCLUSION

10.1. Introduction

This chapter seeks to present the key findings of the thesis together with their connection with the analytical framework of the research. As each supplementary research question was answered in the conclusion sections of relevant chapters, they will not be answered here again. However, the findings that are related to the supplementary questions will help to answer the main research question of the thesis which is ‘how was Turkey’s EU bid represented in the British media?’

The chapter will present an answer to the question by means of conceptualising the media representation of Turkey’s EU bid in news coverage and discussing the role of news production in the formation of this representation. The chapter firstly focuses on the general tone of the content. Then, the notion of ‘a positive Other’ is discussed together with its relations to news coverage and how the coverage is produced. Afterwards, the chapter explains contributions of this thesis to the field, reveals the limitations of the study and expounds its suggestions for future research. Finally, the chapter presents concluding remarks in brief.

10.2. The general tone of the content

By taking into account all the headline and body of news items in the sample, this section seeks to illustrate the overall picture concerning the British coverage of Turkey-EU relations. Revealing the degree of support or opposition is not simple but one can infer the general tone of the items in the sample after conducting a systematic
quantitative and qualitative content analysis. The overall examination showed that the majority of news items in the sample had a balanced view in general. Most news items tend to present the ideas of both sides of the argument. However, analysis of the sample showed that there are more news items in favour of Turkey than negative ones. Owing to the triangulation of different methods in the research, this claim can be underpinned by the findings from the ‘media routines level’ analysis which demonstrated that the editorial lines of most papers are in favour of Turkish membership.

Yet, even though the items generally support Turkish membership of the EU, they also underline the drawbacks of the accession (e.g. size and population of Turkey, relatively poor economy) and other points which make Turkey ‘non-European’ or at least ‘less European’ in the context of the coverage. Moreover, even the positive items usually include lines which remind Turkey of its responsibilities to become a member, and attributions to negative public opinion in Europe. Thus, the items have an approach which highlights that ‘Turkey should join the EU but...’ which makes the British media outlets, in Aksoy’s words, the “critical advocates” of Turkish membership (2009: 497). Therefore, the representation contributes to an understanding that admits Turkish accession only with some caveats.

Furthermore, even though the underlining of Turkey’s differences from the EU Member States outnumbered the similarities in the British coverage, the results of both the quantitative and qualitative analysis are not able to clearly show whether Turkey was othered or shown as part of the European Self by the overall coverage. This is because of the general supportive tone of the news coverage and the editorial line
of most media outlets even though Turkey’s Other character was preserved in the content. Therefore, the study proposed the notion of ‘a positive Other’ in order to conceptualise the overall tone of the British coverage on the Turkish issue. The notion refers to support for Turkish membership without overlooking Turkey’s differences in various aspects from the general characteristics of EU Member States. The reasons for this type of conceptualisation were also validated by the overall findings in the interviews which suggest that the British media tends to highlight Turkey’s Other character while it also supports Turkish membership of the EU for the benefits of the UK.

All in all, it can be claimed that the British media tends to cover the issues which represent Turkey as an ‘Other’ in the European context. However, the same news organisations also accept Turkey as a potential member of the European Self due to their understanding of the EU and their approach to Turkey-EU relations and/or the UK - EU relations per se. Accordingly, the representation of Turkey’s EU membership in the British media exposes that Turkey can become a member of the EU if only the membership is considered by a functionalist approach. This view gives importance to the geo-political benefits of Turkish membership for the UK, e.g. Turkey’s duty of reaching the Muslim world and acting as a bridge between the two worlds. In this way, Turkey can be a mediator and the EU can reach out to the Other via Turkey. As a result, even though it seems confusing and awkward, the general tone of the content reveals that Turkey’s chance to be part of the European Self is dependent on Turkey’s characteristics related to its ‘Otherness’. This point can be shown as one of the reasons why Turkey is ‘a positive Other’ in the overall coverage.
10.3. Explaining the media representation with the notion of ‘a positive Other’

The explanations above elucidate the general tone of the coverage about the Turkish issue. One should also elaborate the reasons behind it in order to comprehend the media representation. The reasons were accumulated from the findings in the content and the general outcome of interviews by taking into account the analytical framework of the thesis.

As mentioned in the Introduction and the Analytical Framework chapters, describing Turkey’s media representation as ‘a positive Other’ is significantly related to how the context, where the representation emerged, approaches the EU in general. ‘Functionalist’ and ‘essentialist’ approaches were employed in this thesis in order to distinguish different understandings of the EU. The research clearly shows that the overall British coverage evaluates the EU affairs in general with a functionalist approach. This type of understanding has an immense influence on the formation of Turkey’s media representation as ‘a positive Other’ in the British coverage.

By means of this functionalist approach, when the British media represents Turkey as ‘a positive Other’, it not only shapes the representation of Turkey as an Eastern or Western country, it also serves to protect the British identity vis-à-vis the EU identity. By portraying a type of Turkey which is suitable for the European Self, the British media proposes that the EU identity can be shaped according to British interests. Therefore, one can argue that Turkey’s representation in the British media as ‘a positive Other’ is firstly useful for the UK’s understanding of the EU and its confrontation with the Franco-German axis in the Union. This does not have to do with
the British media’s employment of Turkey in a context of Self/Other nexus as a way to strengthen its British identity versus the Oriental. Instead, the British media creates its own image of how the EU identity should be by utilising the discussions on Turkey’s EU bid.

The journalists’ overall explanation about the reasons for showing Turkey as ‘a positive Other’ and the supportive tone in the content can be summarised by J2’s (the FT) point on the issue. J2 argues that the British media’s default position is related to its elite and strategic perspective on the Turkish issue. He thinks that this is a legitimate but also dishonest view to take because he believes that the British media’s positive approach to Turkish membership does not have resonance on the street. J2 claims that if Turkey becomes closer to joining the EU, then all the tabloids and probably some right wing broadsheets such as The Times and The Daily Telegraph will show their real face and come out against Turkish membership.

As J2 underlined the difference of the right wing perspective, in some cases, a total explanation concerning the British media’s approach is not valid. Therefore, the differences within the British media should be highlighted too. For instance, while supporting Turkey’s EU membership, the Europhile papers, such as The Guardian, also refer to spreading liberal values instead of only shaping the EU according to the UK’s benefits. Concerning this issue, it was found in the coverage that The Guardian’s support for Turkish membership is less strategic and focussing less on the UK’s interests compared to the support of The Daily Telegraph. Similar differences were also mentioned in Aksoy’s (2009: 498-499) work regarding The Guardian and The Times. Therefore, it cannot be argued that the sole reason for making Turkey ‘a
positive Other’ is to transform the EU into a loose international organisation even though it is the main raison d’être of this sort of representation.

It can be asked at this stage if Turkey is happy with its representation as ‘a positive Other’. As was presented in the quantitative content analysis results, the most frequent reason regarding the support for Turkish membership was ‘Turkey’s mediator role between the Eastern and Western world’. It can be argued that this is exactly what is expected by Turkey’s recent EU vision. Therefore, in addition to its benefits for the British media, Turkey’s representation as ‘a positive Other’ in the context of Turkey-EU relations is also useful for Turkey’s understanding of the EU.

“It is important to note that the AKP leadership has redefined the EU integration project. Initially voicing the view that EU membership for Turkey is a civilizational project, the AKP leadership came under criticism from its own popular base and intellectual elite and eventually began to present EU membership as a dialogue or meeting of two civilizations rather than as an entry of Turkey into the civilization represented by the West” (Kösebalaban, 2007: 95).

Therefore, concerning the new circumstances, it can be argued that Turkey’s EU bid is not only about Turkey’s will to be embedded into a new civilisation anymore. Since the AK Party came into power, the EU has become a tool for Turkey to link the two civilisations. Turkish PM Erdoğan’s initiative to establish the Alliance of Civilizations with the former Spanish PM José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero, in 2005, is an example of how Turkey’s strategy on EU membership coincides with its media representation in the British media and the motivation of the UK Government’s support for Turkish membership. The individual level analysis of the journalists also expounded the similarities between the UK and Turkey concerning their expectations from the EU.
The extramedia level analysis in Chapter 9 examined whether there is a political parallelism between the British media and the British Government concerning Turkey’s EU bid. It would be useful at this stage to deal with its connection with the reasons for Turkey’s representation as ‘a positive Other’. It was discovered that there is a difference between the stances of British politicians and the British media concerning Turkey’s EU bid although they are both in favour of its accession. Moreover, it is a fact that the Conservative Party, the Labour Party and the Liberal Democrats in the UK all strongly support Turkish membership of the EU. They see Turkey as a full partner of European or, in a more inclusive grouping, Western powers. Similarly, the majority of the British media in the research sample is in favour of Turkey’s EU bid. However, it is still possible to see many examples in the British coverage where Turkey is represented as the Other of Europe. Thus, the general outcome of this research claims that the British news media do see Turkey in Europe but there is not a strong representation of Turkey as a country of Europe (see Neumann, 1999; Koenig et al., 2006).

It was found in the news content that the UK was shown as the strongest supporter of Turkish membership among the EU Member States. By and large, the news items framed Turkey and the UK in complete cooperation which reached a peak on the verge of the start of the membership negotiations on 3rd October 2005 when the UK was holding the Presidency of the Council of the EU. Since the UK was running the meetings, success or failure was directly related to British politicians’ performance. Therefore, this increased the interest of the British media in the issue and probably influenced the degree of support for Turkish membership in a positive way. However, the degree of support in the media coverage was not as strong as the support of British politicians. For instance, the British media’s interest in underlining Turkey’s
differences from EU Member States in terms of culture, politics, geography and economy can be shown as a solid example. As illustrated in the quantitative content analysis in Chapter 6, around 60 per cent of all news items in the analysis in some way or other mentioned Turkey’s differences while only 22.4 per cent highlighted the similarities. The news source of the highlighted differences was not the British politicians but the politicians from other EU Member States or the journalists’ personal contributions to the coverage. Therefore, this research claims that the notion of ‘a positive Other’ can only explain the media representation but not the UK’s official political stance. It is extremely rare to see a critical view on the Turkish issue from a British politician quoted in the British media. It can even be argued that the British politicians evaluate Turkey as an indisputable member of the European Self instead ‘the European Other’ or ‘a positive Other’. Thus, it must be highlighted that the notion explains the British media’s view on the Turkish issue rather than the UK Government’s. For these reasons, even though there is a parallelism in the sense that the media follow the political positions of those in power especially when they are all in agreement, it can be argued that an exact political parallelism between the British politicians’ general view on Turkey’s EU bid and the British coverage on the Turkish issue did not fully appear in this thesis’ analyses.

The reason behind the difference between both sides’ stances could be because of their different aims and duties in the context of Turkey’s EU bid. British journalism did not have the responsibility of persuading other EU Member States in order to start the membership negotiations on 3rd October 2005 while the British Government, especially during its Presidency of the Council of the EU, made a great deal of effort to stop the Austrian and Cypriot objections. Another reason could be the quotations in the British
coverage from opposition leaders and the media in other EU Member States.

Furthermore, the research findings also put forward that Turkey’s representation as ‘a positive Other’ in the British context was influenced by the individual journalists. This can be deduced from the journalists’ views concerning the production of news items which were analysed within the individual level of Shoemaker and Reese’s hierarchical model. Moreover, the analysis on the individual level and the extramedia level influences also revealed that the difference between the coverage and the politicians’ view is related to the British media’s critical approach to any issue and journalism’s general tendency to set out the problematic aspects while communicating an event, i.e. *negativity* as a news value (see O’Neill and Harcup, 2009: 166). Regarding a significant example on this issue, J9 (BBC News) stressed that the British coverage is sometimes influenced by Islamophobia while the British politicians never link this issue with Turkish accession.

All in all, the findings cannot claim that there is a complete *political parallelism* between the British media and the British Government on Turkey-EU relations. What it can argue is that there is a *parallelism* concerning both sides’ approach to the EU affairs in general and this is doubtlessly influential on the media representation of Turkey’s EU bid.

10.4. Contributions, limitations and suggestions for future studies

First of all, the thesis’ specific literature review -studies on the representation of Turkey-EU relations in different countries’ media- looked at almost all academic works which were published on the issue since 2001. This was a crucial attempt to present
the overall picture on the topic, as it was noted that most studies in the literature did not refer to each other. Secondly, the study looked at a wider research sample which covered seven years (1999-2006) while the previous studies mostly focused on 2004 and 2005 when Turkey-EU relations reached a peak. Furthermore, the data were analysed by using a triangulation of quantitative and qualitative content analysis and in-depth interviews. In terms of employing methods, this was a new approach among other studies in the same subject. In particular, conducting interviews with the journalists who had written the news items in the coverage was the first attempt in research projects on the media representation of Turkey-EU relations. The data found in the interviews were categorised by using Shoemaker and Reese’s (1996) hierarchical model which provided a standard terminology. Concerning the different levels of news production, the model also gave an opportunity to conduct comparable levels-of-analysis research for further studies (Reese, 2007: 37). Finally, regarding the theoretical aspects, the study brought the notion of ‘a positive Other’ from a study in international relations (Neumann and Welsh, 1991) and applied it in a research project in journalism studies in order to conceptualise the media representation of a political event.

Concerning the limitations of the study, a sampling method of the analysis of the news content was the main restriction. Apart from that, the British nationwide newspapers’ and BBC News website’s coverage of Turkey-EU relations were analysed without any significant limitation. Restrictions in the research were mostly related to the analysis of news production. Firstly, the interviews were conducted in 2010 and 2011 although the general issues in the interviews were about the journalists’ experiences between 1999 and 2006. Due to the lapse of time, some points in the discussions were probably
overlooked by the interviewees. Moreover, excluding Brussels and Istanbul correspondents, several journalists in the sample wrote about Turkey’s EU bid as part of their daily routine at London offices. These journalists’ focus was not on the Turkish issue during the process when the interviews were conducted. Secondly, the production analysis on the coverage was totally limited to the interviews with journalists. Even though several interviewees were experienced journalists, leader writers and editors, a full production analysis would have been possible if other research techniques such as focus groups, questionnaires and newsroom observation had been employed. By this means, other levels of Shoemaker and Reese’s hierarchical model could have been included in the analysis. Thirdly, as was discussed in Chapter 5 in detail, the study did not look at the readers and how they understood the news items about Turkey’s EU bid.

Having explained the contributions and limitations, this section also presents some advice for future research projects in the same or similar topics. First of all, the examination of the journalists in this thesis may be an inspiration for other under-explored research projects, such as an investigation into the reception step. Such initiatives, built on the existing production and content research, can help to reach the ‘multi-step’ results concerning the media representation of Turkey’s EU bid in the loop of production, coverage and readers (see Philo, 2007; Fürsich, 2009). Moreover, if an intensive political process similar to 3rd October 2005 happens again in Turkey-EU relations, then the new media could also be a domain for analysis. Even though the silent period of today is not viable for this kind of study, looking at what people share about Turkey’s EU bid in social media when the issue becomes popular again would be an asset for the literature.
Lastly, as was found in the extramedia level analysis, Turkey is immensely sensitive to the foreign coverage about any issue regarding Turkey. On the other hand, as some journalists claimed, Turkey is defensive and secretive in its relationship with foreign journalists. Therefore, a study of Turkish politicians and a social psychology investigation into Turkish audience’s interest in the foreign coverage of their countries, which is actually the same for most rising nations, could be useful research projects following the outcomes of this thesis.

10.5. Concluding remarks

Having illustrated the conceptualisation of the media representation of Turkey’s EU bid, finally, this section discusses the future of Turkey-EU relations in brief and then offers some advice regarding how Turkey can contribute to a better coverage of Turkey-EU relations.

Today, mostly due to the influence of Germany and France, the EU authorities have avoided revealing a date for the completion of negotiations and the date for Turkey's full membership. As Finkel (2009: 121) argues “[n]ow is not the time to risk humiliation by being seen to want EU admission, but rather to wait in the wilderness until a new generation of more sympathetic European leaders comes to power”. Therefore, it can be argued that changes in the political situation in Germany and France could make Turkey’s EU membership popular again in the EU’s political and media agendas in subsequent years. This may especially be realised if socialist or social democratic parties become powerful. François Hollande’s recent victory in the French Presidential election and his positive approach to Turkey could be the spark of change. However, it
is a fact that the financial crisis in the EU is a massive obstruction to bringing Turkey to the EU agenda again.

Even though the issue firstly needs important political events in order to grab headlines in the coverage, it would be fruitful to highlight some points concerning what Turkey should do for a better coverage for its EU bid in the British media. First of all, it was explored in the extramedia level analysis that ‘hard sell’ PR activities could not work in the British media. The journalists advised Turkey to develop itself in the direction of EU standards in terms of democracy, rule of law, and economy, and manage to find solutions for political vicious circles (e.g. the Cyprus issue) which are obstacles to better relations with the EU. They think that positive changes in these points would have automatic reverberations in the British media. Therefore, Turkish officials should observe whether Turkey’s good deeds in the direction of EU membership reverberate sufficiently in the media or not. Moreover, as mentioned in Chapter 9, some journalists complained about the inadequate information channels and the difficulty of reaching Turkish authorities. In J9’s (BBC News) words, bad communication costs Turkey because without efficiently employing media as a channel, Turkey cannot make a case on some issues even though Ankara is genuinely right (e.g. some aspects of the Cyprus issue). Therefore, Turkey must communicate better with foreign journalists who work in Turkey and in EU Member States.

All in all, the thesis showed that the British media’s approach to Turkish membership was not a simple choice of supporting or opposing. It was discovered that the British media’s position in the Turkish issue originated from the awkward relationship between the UK and the EU, and accordingly between the British media and the EU.
Therefore, even though the representation in the content and the news making behind that appear to be supporting Turkey’s EU bid in general, one can argue that this is not because Turkey is a *bona fide* European country for the British media. For this reason, it can be claimed that the British media’s support for Turkish membership is not genuine but strategic and pragmatic. Consequently, bearing in mind all the discussions in the thesis, the British media tells us that Turkey is different but not an enemy. Turkey is an Other but a ‘*positive*’ one.
Appendix I: Quantitative Content Analysis Coding Scheme

Instructions:
- Please write the answers (value number) next to the question mark of each question.
- If you cannot find the answer, you should code ‘N.A.’

1  Date of issue?

2  The name of news organisation?
   (1) BBC NEWS ONLINE
   (2) THE DAILY MAIL
   (3) FINANCIAL TIMES
   (4) THE GUARDIAN
   (5) THE DAILY MIRROR
   (6) THE DAILY TELEGRAPH

3  Period of the sample?
   (1) HELSINKI SUMMIT (02/12/1999 - 20/12/1999)
   (2) TURKISH PARLIAMENT (26/07/2002 - 12/08/2002)
   (3) COPENHAGEN SUMMIT (04/12/2002 - 21/12/2002)
   (4) BRUSSELS SUMMIT (08/12/2004 - 25/12/2004)
   (6) PORT PROBLEM (21/11/2006 - 07/12/2006)
4 Item number?

5 Length of item?
   (1) 100-300 words
   (2) 301-600 words
   (3) 601 & over words

6 Type of article?
   (1) Report
   (2) Leader
   (3) Commentary
   (4) Review
   (5) Economic Analysis

7 Page number?

8 Name of journalist (byline)?

9 What are the main topics of the news item? (Up to THREE from the beginning)

10 What statements are made about Turkey’s relationship with the EU in the news item
   (Please code the first SIX statements)?

11 Which issues does the news item cover (Please code the first SIX issues)?
12 Please identify which country highlights or raises the issue (i.e. puts it on the agenda)?

(One country may raise more than one issue, but at most three issues should be coded. NO more than SIX countries/issues. Please code in sequence in which they appear in the text. Please leave it blank if no data were found.)

13 Does the news item refer to any differences (i.e. comparison, especially by using the word relatively) between Turkey and other EU Member States? If so, what are they (Up to THREE differences)?

14 Does the news item refer to any similarities between Turkey and other EU Member States? If so, what are they (Up to THREE similarities)?

15 What are the main reasons put forward in the news item in support for Turkey’s bid (Up to SIX reasons)?

16 What are the main reasons put forward in the news item in opposition to Turkey’s bid (Up to SIX reasons)?

17 Who are the actors (excluding Turkish actors) who support for Turkey’s EU bid? Were they only quoted, or were they only mentioned or both? (Up to THREE from the beginning of the news report. Please code in order of appearance.) Please fill in the boxes below:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Actor</th>
<th>Quoted</th>
<th>Mentioned</th>
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</tbody>
</table>
18  Who are the actors (excluding Turkish actors) who oppose Turkey’s EU bid? Were they only quoted, or were they only mentioned or both? (Up to THREE from the beginning of the news report. Please code in order of appearance.) Please fill in the boxes below:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Actor</th>
<th>Quoted</th>
<th>Mentioned</th>
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</tbody>
</table>

19  Who are the Turkish actors in the news item? Were they only quoted, or were they only mentioned or both? (Up to THREE from the beginning of the news report. Please code in order of appearance.) Please fill in the boxes below:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Actor</th>
<th>Quoted</th>
<th>Mentioned</th>
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</table>

20  Does the news report contain a statement that indicates whether a particular country is in support or against Turkey’s bid? (Please code up to THREE countries)?

23  How is Turkey described in the news item? (You can select more than one)

24  Which adjectives, words or phrases are used to describe Turkey? (Up to THREE from the beginning of the news item)?

26  Which conditions for Turkey’s entry into the EU appear in the news item? (Please code up to THREE in order of appearance)?
## Appendix II: Qualitative Content Analysis Coding Scheme

**News item:**

**News Organisation:**

**Date:**

**Author:**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>QUESTIONS</th>
<th>ANALYSIS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1- How are Turkey, its actors, and the events that Turkey is involved represented in terms of being the Self or the Other</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2- What kinds of labels are attached to Turkey and Turkish actors?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3- Which arguments are employed in order to justify positive or negative attributions about Turkey’s EU membership?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4- What is the author’s position in the context?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5- How does the overall content approach to Turkey-EU relations?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6- Does the news item include any interesting point which was not mentioned in other questions of quantitative and qualitative analysis?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Appendix III: Interview Questionnaire

1- What can be the most important influences on the journalists who have published news reports about Turkish membership in the British media in terms of their approach to Turkey?

2- There are at least 50 different journalists in the British mainstream newspapers who have written at least one news item about Turkey’s EU bid in the last decade. Do you know how they were chosen among all the journalists? Or why were you chosen?

3- Personally, what do you associate Turkey with? Metaphors, images, socio-historical understanding?

4- What do you think about Turkish membership of the EU?

5- What can Turkey do in order to increase the number of the news items which supports Turkey’s EU membership on the British media?

6- Have you ever attended any meeting or presentation organised by Turkish officials regarding Turkey’s EU bid?

7- Do you personally think that the British public’s approach to Turkish membership is largely influenced by the British media? Or do you think that British people are not aware of Turkish membership?

8- Do British papers have a specific view or policy about Turkish membership?

9- Did the editorial process change the news item you had written about Turkish membership? Do we read the writers’ perspective or the media organisation’s perspective?

10- There are many reports which are positive to Turkish membership but they still represent many drawbacks of Turkish membership. How do you account for this?

11- The UK has a different relationship with the EU if we compare it with other EU Member States. Do you think that this can have an impact on the representation of Turkey’s EU bid in the British media?

12- Is there any correlation between the British media and the British political parties in terms of their approach to Turkish membership? And are the media following political parties’ policy or driving it?

13- What can be the advantages and disadvantages of Turkish membership for the UK?
14- There is a remarkable amount of attribution to ‘the clash of civilisations’ while Turkey’s membership is discussed in news reports. Can you see any connection between the clash of civilisations thesis and Turkish membership?

15- The Turkish membership topic is not as popular as in the past couple of years in both the UK’s and the EU’s media agenda. How can Turkish membership be popular again like in 2004 and 2005? Is it just depended on the politicians?

16- Is there a change in the news topics that Turkey is associated with?

17- Why the British media always prefer to say the Muslim nation instead of Turkish public in the news coverage?

**Appendix IV: List of Interviewees**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Interviewee</th>
<th>Date and place of the interview</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>J1 (The Guardian)</td>
<td>17-05-11, London</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>J2 (The FT)</td>
<td>14-01-11, London</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>J3 (The Telegraph)</td>
<td>29-03-11, Telephone</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>J4 (The Telegraph)</td>
<td>24-01-11, Istanbul</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>J5 (The Guardian)</td>
<td>18-01-11, Telephone</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>J6 (BBC News)</td>
<td>14-01-11, Telephone</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>J7 (The Guardian)</td>
<td>03-05-11, Telephone</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>J8 (The Telegraph)</td>
<td>14-12-10, London</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>J9 (BBC News)</td>
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"We are only two weeks from an existential explosion", 2 December, p. 37

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"If the EU can't handle 15 members, why go for 28?", 13 December, p. 28

"Chirac laughs as Blair stands alone", 11 December, p. 5

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"A Minister told me recently the papacy is banjaxed. This critical Turkish visit proves he is wrong", 29 November, p. 14

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