Elements of Equality

In this work I defend the thesis that there are three individually attractive and mutually supportive elements of equality, namely distributive equality, relational equality, and basic equality, all of which should be of our concern, and be integrated into an egalitarian conception of justice. To begin with, I argue that egalitarian distributive principles that regulate the major institutions of society are best seen as grounded in our concerns for fairness in the distribution of benefits and burdens, as well as in the procedure which gives rise to distributive outcomes. I then argue that the justification of distributive principles may also be regarded as a constitutive part of an articulation of the relational ideal of equality, and that no egalitarian should forsake distributive equality in light of our commitments to distributive fairness and procedural fairness. Finally, I argue that the idea that democratic citizens are one another’s equals should be interpreted as suggesting that they are all to be governed by egalitarian principles of justice, which have no interest in giving differential status or treatment to any of them as far as they have the capacity to fully understand and act in accordance with the demands of justice.