Antiracism and antiracist discourse in France from 1900 to the present day

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The candidate confirms that the work submitted is his own and that appropriate credit has been given where reference has been made to the work of others.
Abstract

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Title: "Antiracism and antiracist discourse in France from 1900 to the present day"
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The thesis examines examples of antiracism and antiracist discourse in France, using an approach which combines history, sociology, discourse analysis and political science. It is based on archive source material and the publications of antiracist, antifascist and anticolonial movements in the period since 1900.

Previous examples of research on antiracism in France have often limited their analysis to very contemporary forms of antiracism, and have given a definition of antiracism which I term 'republican antiracism'. Republican antiracism, definable as a form of antiracism closely linked to republican political culture, takes its values from the Revolutionary heritage of 1789, and stresses universal rights and values. Republican antiracism is studied here from the 'founding event' of the Dreyfus "Affair", through subsequent reworkings and reformulations in the 1930s (antifascism), 1940s, 1950s and 1980s. The thesis focuses on the complex discourses of nation, assimilation, égalité and rights articulated within the republican tradition, the left and republican antiracism.

A definition of antiracism is given here as emanating from a variety of areas (for example antiracist organizations, immigrant rights associations, trades unions) and levels (cultural, economic etc.) of production. This idea of a multiplicity of sites of production of antiracism is illustrated with a study of the relationship between antiracism and antifascism in the 1930s, and the opposition to anti-Maghrebian racism in the period 1947-1962. Throughout, it is suggested that the terms 'universalism' and 'difference' are insufficient as analytical tools for understanding antiracism as ideology, discourse and practice, just as it is argued that antiracism is irreducible to being the 'double' of racism.

To highlight the broad definition of antiracism used, I look at the lessons to be learned for antiracism from anticolonial forms of opposition to racism in the period 1919-1939, suggesting that these mobilizations provided a radical critique of colonial racism which republican antiracism had failed to develop. I examine how republican antiracism in the post-1945 period then integrated this concept of colonial racism as a category of racism.

The historical focus of the thesis is supplemented with a thematic approach to the notion of memory as used within antiracism, notably the memory of colonial and postcolonial forms of racism within the State. The memory of the massacre of Algerians in Paris on 17th October 1961 is studied as an example.
## Contents

### Abbreviations

### Acknowledgements

### Chapter One

**Theory, methodology and sources**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Section 1</td>
<td>General introduction</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Section 2</td>
<td>Theoretical work on racism and antiracism</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Section 3 (a)</td>
<td>Methodology</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Section 3 (b)</td>
<td>Discourse</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Section 4</td>
<td>Sources</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Section 5</td>
<td>Summary of chapters</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Notes</td>
<td></td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Chapter Two

**National republican discourse and antiracism**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Introduction</td>
<td></td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Section 1</td>
<td>Antiracism and the republican tradition</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Section 2</td>
<td>Patriots, nationalists, and definitions of the nation</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Section 3</td>
<td>The “tyranny of the national” (Noiriel 1991)</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Section 4</td>
<td>Assimilation, ’sauvage’?</td>
<td>63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>General conclusion to Chapter Two</td>
<td></td>
<td>72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Notes</td>
<td></td>
<td>75</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Chapter Three

**Antiracist discourses in context : the LICA in the 1930s**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Section 1</td>
<td>Introduction</td>
<td>77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Section 2</td>
<td>The first antiracistes?</td>
<td>83</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Section 2 (a)</td>
<td>The LICA in context</td>
<td>90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Section 2 (b)</td>
<td>Antiracisme as defined by the LICA</td>
<td>98</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Section 2 (c)</td>
<td>The external ‘identity function’ of antiracisme within antifascism</td>
<td>103</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Section 2 (d)</td>
<td>Summary</td>
<td>105</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Section 3</td>
<td>Marchandeau : too little, too late</td>
<td>106</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Section 3 (a)</td>
<td>Introduction</td>
<td>112</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Section 3 (b)</td>
<td>Campaigns (1934-1939)</td>
<td>115</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Section 3 (c)</td>
<td>Reactions to the Marchandeau decree</td>
<td>Notes</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Chapter Four

Anticolonialism: the "distant voice" of antiracism

Section 1: Antiracism and anticolonialism
Section 1 (a): Introduction
Section 1 (b): Working definitions
Section 1 (c): The LDH and the LICA on colonial questions
Section 1 (d): The parties of the left
Section 1 (e): Looking elsewhere
Section 2: Black voices 1914-1939
Section 2 (a): Contexts
Section 2 (b): Négritudes
Section 2 (c): Campaigning
Section 2 (d): Conclusion to Section Two
Section 3: Anti-maghrebian racism and opposition, 1914-1939
Section 3 (a): Introduction
Section 3 (b): Stereotyping
Section 3 (c): Ideological strands within Algerian nationalist discourse
Section 3 (d): Campaigning
Section 3 (e): Conclusion to Section Three
General conclusion to Chapter Four
Notes

Chapter Five

Antiracism 1944-1965: Overtaken by "events"

Introduction
Section 1: Changes within republican antiracism
Section 1 (a): From Résistance to resistance: "Le souci de ne pas s'isoler"
Section 1 (b): MRAP - theory into action
Section 1 (c): The 'cultural' and the 'racial'
Section 1 (d): The end of a myth
Section 1 (e): Conclusion to Section One
Section 2: Colonial and postcolonial 'immigration'
Introduction:
Section 2 (a): The 'crimes' of 'immigration'
Section 2 (b): "Rafles au faciès"
Section 2 (c): Overtaken by "events"
General conclusion to Chapter Five
Notes
Chapter Six
Memory as a theme in antiracist discourse since 1945

General introduction 260
Section 1: Theorizing memories today 262
Section 2: The changing contours of memory: the case of 17th October 1961
Section 2 (a): Introduction to Section Two 275
Section 2 (b): Immediate reactions to 17th October 1961 277
Section 2 (c): Memories in transition and opposition, 1962-1979 286
Section 2 (d): “Non au racisme, non à l’oubli. Pour le droit à la mémoire” 293
Section 2 (e): Towards some conclusions 299
Notes 303

Chapter Seven
Conclusion 311

Appendices
Bibliography and archive sources
Archive sources 316
Secondary sources 319
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviations</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AA</td>
<td>Alliance Antiraciste</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AFNSP</td>
<td>Fondation nationale des sciences politiques, archives d’histoire contemporaine</td>
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<tr>
<td>AIU</td>
<td>Alliance Israélite Universelle</td>
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<tr>
<td>AMRAP</td>
<td>MRAP archives</td>
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<tr>
<td>AN</td>
<td>Archives nationales, Paris</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ADCM</td>
<td>Archives Daniel et Cletta Mayer (AFNSP)</td>
</tr>
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<td>AGPS</td>
<td>Archives du Groupe Parlementaire Socialiste (AFNSP)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ANGI</td>
<td>Association de la Nouvelle Génération Immigrée</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ANM</td>
<td>Au nom de la mémoire</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>APP</td>
<td>Préfecture de Police archives, Paris</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BLIC</td>
<td>Bulletin de la LICA (1929-1931)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CA</td>
<td>Cahiers antiracistes (1943-1945)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CDH</td>
<td>Cahiers des droits de l’homme (LDH)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CDJC</td>
<td>Centre de documentation juive contemporaine</td>
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<td>CDV</td>
<td>Centre de Documentation et de Vigilance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CFTC</td>
<td>Confédération française des travailleurs chrétiens</td>
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<td>CGT</td>
<td>Confédération Générale du Travail</td>
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<tr>
<td>CGTU</td>
<td>Confédération Générale du Travail Unitaire</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CIEMI</td>
<td>Centre d’Information et d’Études sur les Migrations Internationales</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CVIA</td>
<td>Comité de vigilance des intellectuels antifascistes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DL</td>
<td>Droit et Liberté (MRAP) (1949-)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DL NS</td>
<td>Droit et Liberté (MRAP) (March-Sept. 1949 only)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DV</td>
<td>Le Droit de vivre (LICA) (1932-October 1935)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DVNS</td>
<td>Le Droit de vivre (LICA) (New series, from November 1935-)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ENA</td>
<td>Étoile Nord-Africaine</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FEN</td>
<td>Fédération de l’Éducation nationale</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FLN</td>
<td>Front de libération nationale</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FN</td>
<td>Front national</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FNSP</td>
<td>Fondation nationale des sciences politiques</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GRECE</td>
<td>Groupement de Recherche et d’Études pour la Civilisation Européenne</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JODP</td>
<td>Journal Officiel, débats parlementaires</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LDA</td>
<td>La DÉpêche africaine</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LDH</td>
<td>Ligue des droits de l’homme</td>
</tr>
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<td>LDRN</td>
<td>Ligue de Défense de la Race Nègre</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LICA</td>
<td>Ligue internationale contre l’Antisémitisme (1927/1928-1979)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LICRA</td>
<td>Ligue internationale contre le Racisme et l’Antisémitisme (1979-)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LRN</td>
<td>La Race Nègre</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LTM</td>
<td>Les Temps modernes</td>
</tr>
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<td>MDC</td>
<td>Mouvement des droits civiques</td>
</tr>
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<td>MNA</td>
<td>Mouvement national algérien</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MNCR</td>
<td>Mouvement National Contre le Racisme</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Abbreviations (continued)

MRAP  Mouvement contre le racisme, l’antisémitisme, et pour la Paix (1949-1987), then Mouvement contre le Racisme et Pour l’Amitié entre les Peuples (1987-)
MTA  Mouvement des travailleurs arabes
MTLD  Mouvement pour le Triomphe des libertés démocratiques
OAS  Organisation armée secrète
PCF  Parti communiste français
PPA  Parti du Peuple Algérien
PSU  Parti Socialiste Unifié
SF  Sans Frontière
SFIO  Section française de l’Internationale ouvrière
SP  Secours Populaire (Français)
UGIF  Union Générale des Juifs de France
UJRE  Union des Juifs Pour la Résistance et l’Entraide
UNEF  Union nationale des étudiants de France
USTA  Union syndicale des travailleurs algériens
UTN  Union des travailleurs nègres
VJ  La Voix des Jeunes (LICA)
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Chapter One: Theory, methodology and sources

Section One: General introduction

Section Two: Theoretical work on racism and antiracism

Section Three (a): Methodology

Section Three (b): Discourse

Section Four: Sources

Section Five: Summary of chapters

Notes
Section One : General Introduction

Over the past twenty years, questions of racism, antiracism and ‘immigration’ have become central to French society in political and media discourse. The increased visibility of such themes has come about in part due to the electoral rise of the Front national (FN). The political climate of the 1980s was to have considerable influence on the academic production around the themes of racism and immigration. Researchers working in the fields of sociology and history felt the need to add a more rigorous analytical framework for understanding contemporary French society, in order to remind politicians of the ways immigrants had been treated in the past (cf. Wihtol de Wenden 1988, Noiriel 1992), and of the fact that the mixture of racism and populism within the FN’s arguments had historical precedents worthy of study to better inform the present (cf. Schor 1985, Birnbaum 1993). Very few researchers, however, felt the need to analyze the previous forms of resistance to such hostility: the very act of tracing the history of racism and exclusion in previous decades was seen as a sufficient contribution to the debate. These studies gave us new insights into vast areas of previously underexplored aspects of modern and contemporary history, and it is not my intention to question their validity: I shall draw from them extensively in the course of the thesis. Because my methodological approach is to see antiracism as operating within a context determined by processes of racialization, there will be extensive discussions on racism as practice, ideology and discourse in every chapter of the thesis. Yet I wanted to move away from the ‘fascination’ with racism which seemed to exist within some of the most prominent discussions on racism and antiracism (cf. Taguieff 1990).

My approach is thus, to a certain extent, informed by the historical context in which I lived in France for five years between 1989 and 1995. More specifically, the idea that history can help understand the present is reflected in my assumption that there is much to be learned from previous examples of the diverse opposition to racism, hence the wide definition of antiracism used here.
(outlined in Section Two of this Chapter). As a committed researcher, I make no pretence that my approach is 'objective'. Whilst not a member of any of the antiracist associations studied here, I have deep sympathy with the aims of antiracism and have participated in various forms of political action against racism in France. The thesis is intended as a contribution to the debate on contemporary antiracism, a debate which cannot ignore the experiences of history.

After only a short period of my research, it became clear that the memory of previous antiracist action seemed only to have been transmitted within certain old-established organizations such as the MRAP (Mouvement contre le racisme et pour l'amitié entre les peuples, 1949-) and the LICRA (Ligue internationale contre le racisme et l'antisémitisme, 1927-) (1), and on the far left. For those young people participating in the antiracist social movements of the period 1983-85, awareness of previous forms of resistance to racism (except for the Algerian War) was relatively absent, as some of the older activists remarked (cf. Delorme 1984, Bouamama 1994, 23-24), although subsequent campaigns around the theme of memory were to change this (cf. Chapter Six). Indeed, it is tempting to make for the history of antiracism similar comments as for women's history, which has had both to fight for inclusion within a dominant narrative of history, and to strive to change the way that history is itself practised and perceived (cf. Reynolds 1996). The traditional chronological divisions of modern and contemporary history may seem arbitrary or irrelevant for racialized groups, just as traditional historical narratives may fail to relate to women's experiences in any concrete way. The historical periods I use are based around the significance of the Dreyfus "Affair", the antifascist action of the 1930s, the Resistance, and the long process of decolonization: these may or may not fit into historically conventional narratives. If we consider racism as a permanent, central factor of social relations in France, then the traditional divisions into 'peaks' of racism in the 1930s and since the 1980s have to be studied in relation to the supposedly
'quieter times' of the 1950s, for example. I analyze the changes in antiracism and racism as being inseparable from changes throughout society more generally.

Although the context in which contemporary antiracism has to operate is by definition unique, similar problems of agency, autonomy, marginalization and political alignment have beset all the forms of opposition to racism analyzed here. In the context of the 1980s, the relationship between the left and antiracism and, more specifically, the relationship and tensions between republican political culture and antiracism, became a source of controversy.

The first central aim of the thesis is therefore to examine the relationship between antiracism and republican political culture over the past century. This theme informs the choice of historical focus to the thesis. In Chapter Two I describe a concept of republican antiracism - a form of antiracism informed by republican values and forged at the end of the nineteenth century - although the term antiracisme itself was only used from the mid-1930s onwards (cf. Chapter Three). Republican antiracism continues today, if in albeit reworked forms, and uses themes from 1789, the Dreyfus “Affair” and the Resistance to ground its appeals to individual rights historically. My historical approach suggests that republican antiracism’s association with the themes of nationalism, patriotism, assimilationism and colonialism needs to be subjected to critical enquiry. Republican antiracism has tended to use an abstract discourse not based on racism as social practice, although this has not always been the case: where republican antiracism has developed a specifically left-wing analysis, socio-economic inequalities are highlighted as resulting from discrimination (cf. the MRAP in Chapter Five).

Republican antiracism has always been the dominant form of antiracism in France, and has served to marginalize other forms of antiracism. The common understanding of antiracism in France seems to be rather restricted and restricting, and limited to republican antiracism. The second central
preoccupation of this thesis is thus to integrate more fully the conflictual transitional period of the colonial to the postcolonial into the history of antiracism. This transitionary period, which I would date very loosely as having started in the 1920s with the appearance of structured nationalist movements and counter-cultural projects (cf. Chapter Four), and to have continued well into the 1960s, revealed the contradictions within republican colonial ideology, and forced antiracists situating themselves within the republican tradition to rethink some of the values on which their political action was based.

This re-focussing of antiracism as a wider, richer, more complex social phenomenon informs the third central aim of the thesis, which is to devote considerable attention to the production of antiracism from within anticolonial and anti-imperial political movements, thinkers, and counter-cultural projects (cf. Gilroy 1993). My argument is that the most radical, challenging and innovative forms of opposition to racism have largely evolved outside or on the margins of the republican antiracist tradition in both the colonial and postcolonial periods. Racialized colonial groups have not passively accepted oppression. In particular, I look at the affirmations of agency from colonial groups challenging the ‘civilization superiority’ of the Métropole, and the linked critique of the French State. Whilst I view antiracism as a marginal voice, a marginality to be explained by power relations within society, there are important power relations within antiracism itself, which explain, for example, the refusal within republican antiracist organizations to consider the notion of colonial racism until the late 1940s.

The internal progression of the thesis mirrors the move from the study of exclusively republican forms of antiracism in the Third Republic in Chapters Two and Three, with the focus on antisemitism and fascism, to the contestation of the republican State in Chapter Four from colonial subjects in the period 1919-1939. Chapter Five looks at how the MRAP attempted to accommodate such new ideological perspectives in the period from 1949 to 1965 in the context of
decolonization. The way in which antiracism engages with narratives of history is continued in Chapter Six, when I examine the theme of the memory of racist crimes in both colonial and postcolonial periods. All chapters are therefore grounded within specific historical periods. Throughout, I will be referring to contemporary forms of racism and antiracism, to show which themes and forms of antiracism, with historical hindsight, can be said to have successfully challenged racism at a given moment.

The three central themes outlined above - to study: the relationship between antiracism and republican political culture; the transition from the colonial to the postcolonial; the widening of the definition of antiracism - are all approached within a methodology with seeks to account for the multiple sites of production of antiracism. Throughout, I try to show that antiracism is irreducible to being simply the ‘double’ of racism as suggested by Pierre-André Taguieff, whose work I discuss in Section Two (infra). I talk of antiracisms and racisms - in the plural - and distinguish for analytical purposes between antisemitism and colonial/postcolonial forms of racism, although I see them both as being grounded within nationalism in the French context (cf. Chapter Two, and Balibar 1992). The histories of antisemitism and colonial/postcolonial racism are therefore intimately connected, as the FN’s discourse suggests.

This Chapter sets out the theoretical, analytical and methodological basis for the empirical work in subsequent chapters. I begin in Section Two with a more detailed discussion of theoretical approaches to racism, antiracism, ‘difference’ and equality. Having defined my position on these questions, I then explain the way in which I have analyzed the sites of production of antiracism, both in terms of discourse and practice (Section Three). I continue the discussion (Section Four) with explanations of the way in which the research was undertaken, showing the variety of primary and secondary sources used, and possible interpretational problems with the source material. The Chapter ends
with a more detailed summary of the contents of each chapter and how they contribute to the overall thesis (Section Five).

Section Two: Theoretical work on racism and antiracism

If antiracism has received little academic attention in France, comparatively to Britain, there have nevertheless been notable exceptions. First of all, I will discuss the work of Colette Guillaumin and Pierre-André Taguieff, and show how these researchers have helped in defining my approach to racism and antiracism, before going on to outline the working methodology in the thesis, based, in part, on selected theoretical points from these researchers. The choice of theoretical approaches has been made to reflect the methodological preoccupations of the thesis, which come from the fields of history, sociology, politics and discourse analysis respectively. Such an interdisciplinary approach is necessary, due to my stressing of the complex, multidimensional social and political nature of antiracism.

Colette Guillaumin’s work reflects this interdisciplinarity. One of Guillaumin’s main concerns (cf. 1972, 1992) has been with the notion of race as a social construct over a wide timescale. She has shown how this notion has come to naturalize social processes. Guillaumin has stressed the links between classification, categorization, and racialization, processes which I analyze in all subsequent chapters. She has undertaken a sustained critique, which I return to in Chapter Three, of the limits of scientific antiracism to decree race as devoid of common-sense meaning (1972, 1). Other researchers have mirrored her findings. Paul Gilroy, for example, argues that “at a theoretical level ‘race’ needs to be viewed much more contingently, as a precarious discursive construction. To note this does not, of course, imply that it is any less real or effective politically” (1992, 50).
Guillaumin's Marxist-based explanation (1972, 40-42 *passim*) for the development of racism through the nineteenth century has served to ground this development in political structures and hence social relations. This necessary historicization of racism was an important step away from the atemporal, ahistorical presentation of racism as a *mal absolu* or disease which strikes individuals, an approach characteristic of earlier analyses of racism, where the transmission of racism was seemingly devoid of any agency (cf. Taguieff 1990) (2). Guillaumin sees 'race' and class formation as linked processes which constitute composite wholes (1972, 67) (cf. also Gilroy 1987). Guillaumin was perhaps the first researcher in the French context since Fanon (1952, 1956) to see the constitution of colonial racism as the 'unseen' of republican antiracism (1972, 38), and it was this observation which led me to examine the importance of the plurality of racisms at any given historical moment. This in turn resulted in my questioning the ability of republican antiracism to counter colonial forms of antiracism before the late 1940s. Guillaumin (1972, 112-117 *passim*) did not underestimate the difficulties involved in the search for agency and autonomy for racialized colonial subjects, difficulties which I examine in Chapters Two to Six.

Guillaumin has suggested a useful definition of racism, one which I employ throughout the thesis. Racism is, for her, "toute conduite de mise à part revêtue du signe de la permanence" (1972, 78). This is a relatively broad definition of racism. As Rattansi has remarked, the need, when examining racism, is to avoid "supposedly water-tight definitions of racism in favour of actually examining how racial logics and categories work in relation to specific events and social fields" (1994, 71). It is nonetheless necessary for some form of minimum working definition to be applied. Rather than arguing, as Taguieff does (1995, 19), that Guillaumin's work is simply limited to the processes of racialization around physical 'differences', rather than it also including "essentialisation historico-culturelle", I see Guillaumin's definition of racism as capable of explaining what is at play where both physical and cultural racial signifiers are used in the process of racialization, and therefore showing the epistemological
commonality of (for example) both colonial racism and antisemitism. Throughout the thesis I examine the way culture, particularly in the colonial context, has been used as a signifier of 'race', and therefore question the radical novelty of the use of the theme within the *Nouvelle droite/Groupement de Recherche et d'Etudes pour la Civilisation Europeenne* (GRECE) (although I do not question the novelty of the historical situation in which such discourse operates today). As Solomos and Back argue, "(...) the logic of racism needs to be appraised in what we shall call *metonymic elaborations*. This means that racism may be expressed through a variety of coded signifiers" (1996, 27). Feuchtwang (1990, 4) has, amongst others (cf. Taguieff 1990), warned of the way cultural signifiers, since more generally "acceptable" since the 1950s, can work as factors of exclusion: "(...) (c)ategorisation of human populations by culture or ethnic origin is no different from racial categorisation when the ascription of origin assumes a fixed cultural essence in the individuals categorized". The performative nature of discourse (cf. Bourdieu 1982) suggests that any separation between discourse and practice can be simplistic, especially as far as racializing processes are concerned. Guillaumin reminds us of the intertwining between racist discourse, ideology and practice.

Pierre-André Taguieff has continued and developed some of Guillaumin’s theoretical work, and has discussed antiracism more than any other contemporary theorist in France. Here, I will examine certain key aspects of his large corpus, some elements of which I find problematical. Taguieff’s work is inspired by a critique of contemporary forms of antiracism which, according to him, have failed to adapt to changing historical circumstances, and which remain within the logic of antifascism and a denunciation of overtly racialized discourses (1990, 1991, 1991a, 1995). It is worth remembering that his work is inspired by this contemporary preoccupation. Taguieff’s research is based on the vocabulary of philosophy (cf. 1990), rather than detailed sociological or historical argument, and his choice of texts is highly selective (3). He employs a discourse analysis approach, one which is not always fully contextualized: it is therefore cut off
from social practice. This has made his argument open to appropriation by anti-
antiracists such as Yonnet (1993).

Taguieff’s principal epistemological criticism of antiracism (1990, 1995) is that it is the double of racism, that is to say that antiracism reflects, in the negative, the logic of the racist argument. This for him is not a new development. Racism and antiracism correspond, for Taguieff, to two ‘idealtypes’ (in the Weberian sense). Firstly, ‘heterophilic’ racism, which is differentialist and particularistic in nature, defined as the “affirmation absolue de la différence, (...) l’absolutisation de la différence, la naturalisation ou l’essentialisation des différences, soit perceptibles soit imaginées” (1990, 31), has as its double a ‘heterophobic’ antiracism, - “l’antiracisme universaliste et anti-différentialiste” (ibid., 38). ‘Heterophobic’ racism, on the other hand, can be defined as the “évaluation négative de toute différence, impliquant un idéal (explicite ou non) d’homogénéité” (ibid., 29-30) - ‘heterophobic’ racism is countered for Taguieff by an anti-universalistic, differentialist (‘heterophilic’) form of antiracism, one which he views as being dominant (within antiracism) since the 1960s (ibid., 39).

I have several problems with such a conception of both racism and antiracism. First of all, at times, reading Taguieff, one has the impression that racism exists only as a construction of antiracism - an opinion strengthened by his methodological approach in La force du préjugé (1990), where he analyzes “racisme” as defined by antiracists - rather than as an actually-existing set of practices, discourses and ideologies. Secondly, his rather formulaic dual typology is based on a study of elite academic/scientific/political discourse, and can seem relatively distanced from concrete social relations. A third aspect to highlight here is the question of the social mediation of discourse : an argument is never received at its destination (here racialized groups) in the same form that its formulators intended. As Roger Chartier has argued : “(t)he practices of
appropriation always create uses or representations that are hardly reducible to the wills or intentions of those who produce discourse and norms” (Chartier 1989, 171). This is because the “acceptance of messages and models always operates through adjustments, arrangements, or resistances” (ibid., 172).

Antiracist movements such as the MRAP, the LICA or SOS-Racisme are not simply composed of individuals who are subjected to racism: there will also be a variety of reactions to racism from those directly subjected to it. Fourthly, Taguieff's presupposition seems to be that there is little or no individuation on the part of the actors in the racialized groups, and that the ascribed identities applied in dominant discourse to racialized groups are accepted unquestioningly. Chapters Three to Six try to show the richness and complexity of the use of cultural, 'racial' or ethnic identities in the fight against racism. There is therefore the danger of reifying antiracist movements inherent within Taguieff's approach, although there is some evidence of a more nuanced position in his most recent work (1996).

Antiracism has, for Taguieff, failed to keep up with the changing modalities of racialization (1990, 19), which have concentrated on the cultural as a racial signifier since the 1950s, once the overtly biological form of racism became discredited after the defeat of Nazism (1995, 291) (although he offers few precise 'periodizations' of such discourse(s) - cf. Taguieff 1994). For Taguieff, the two forms of antiracism he outlines (universalist, anti-differentialist as opposed to anti-universalist, differentialist) represent an “impossible synthèse” (1990, 42), and are not only irreconcilable but in contradiction (1990, 18). Any form of middle ground - i.e. combining of the two antiracist logics - he describes as being characterized by “oscillation” experienced as “tiraillement” (1993, 48).

Rather than talk of contradictions, antimonies and impossible syntheses within antiracism, I prefer to stress the complexity of responses to racism, and the complexity of forms of antiracism and racism at given historical conjunctures. Certainly the idea of tension within forms of antiracism can occasionally be useful
heuristically - for example the problems which beset black rights campaigners in the 1930s when French trades unions objected to the setting up of black dock-worker unions because of the ethnic rather than simply class basis of such organizations (cf. Chapter Four). My position is, however, that by analyzing racism and antiracism as social practice, the combinations of Taguieff’s two logics will become more visible, to the extent that to talk in terms of such binary classification will itself appear reductive. Whilst Taguieff is most concerned with what he views as the idealistic nature of antiracist demands during the 1980s for “égalité dans la différence” (1990, 42-46 passim), where difference is considered primary, or “différence dans l’égalité” (ibid., 46-48 passim), where equality is the grounding principle, he then projects this criticism onto previous forms of antiracism (1990, 1995). Throughout the thesis I try to illustrate Paul Gilroy’s comments that “(...) there can be no single or homogeneous strategy against racism because racism itself is never homogeneous. It varies, it changes and it is always uneven” (1992, 60-61). I argue that antiracism cannot be reduced to either ‘particularism-differentialism’ or ‘universalism’. Historical contingency suggests that what is defined as ‘particularism’ and ‘universalism’ will change over time. Similarly, many of the terms used to circumscribe such statements are equally liable to change: the definition of the ‘public’ and ‘private’, the secular and the religious, the ‘national’ and the ‘Other’.

Consonant with his formula for the explanation and interpretation of racism and antiracism, Taguieff proposes two processes of racialization which can apply to groups or individuals either as agents or objects: _hétéroracisation_ (the process of racializing the Other), and _autoracisation_ (the racializing of the Self) (1990, 173). It is perhaps not surprising that researchers approaching racism and antiracism from a more sociological perspective than Taguieff have questioned any easy empirical separation between _autoracisation_ and _hétéroracisation_ (cf. Wieviorka 1993, 53, 1993a). Let me take very briefly the dual logic within French colonial policy to further describe this complexity. Assimilationist colonial discourse may certainly have centered on the reduction of
cultural ‘differences’, but its practical, institutional form was to create difference through arbitrary classification of social groups and manipulation of already-existing ethnic identities (cf. Chapters Two, Four, Five). It is significant that, with the exception of the work of Albert Memmi, Taguieff (1990, 1995) uses very few examples from opposition to colonial racism (4). Whilst he does admit that antiracism can “se fondre dans un nationalisme de libération nationale ou ethnique” (1995, 131), he uses the example of Marcus Garvey rather than one from the French imperial context, and qualifies Garvey as an example of “contre-racisme” (cf. Chapter Four). It is with such examples that Taguieff’s political aim (1990, 357, 1996) - to conceive of a republican-based ‘universalist’ antiracism shorn of its ‘excesses’ - becomes most apparent.

Whilst there are large areas of Taguieff’s analytical framework which tend to simplify antiracism, he has, nevertheless, offered an interesting study into the plurality of the ideological references of antiracism. Taguieff proposes slightly varying sub-categories in both of his main works (1990, 1995). The main antiracist “traditions” (1995, 162) can be summarized as having their origins in opposition to antisemitism, pan germanism, fascism, colonial racism and imperialism respectively. This is an interesting way of looking at the plurality of ideological sites of antiracism, which Taguieff then reduces to the more schematic binary construction (hétérophilie, hétérophobie) at an epistemological level. These various antiracist traditions came together, for Taguieff, in the 1950s (ibid., 162). In Chapter Five I look at the way in which the MRAP synthesized various forms of opposition to colonial racism, and I suggest more generally the way in which colonial racism was to be admitted as a form of racism by republican antiracism in the postwar period. Taguieff’s approach is something of a teleological, a posteriori construction and, furthermore, tends to ignore the overlappings between elements of these antiracist traditions. Taguieff does, however (1990), usefully show how racism was equated with German ideologies rather than French ones, an historical development linked to the Third Republic.
and which served to exonerate republican discourse from the accusation of racism (cf. Chapters Two, Three, Five).

Taguieff’s ‘universalist’ opposition to the use of the theme of ‘différence’ is the last area of his work I will comment on here. Theoretical debates on antiracism in France have not engaged extensively with feminism (in the French or British/North-American contexts) (cf. Lloyd 1995). Taguieff’s critique of the supposed incompatibility of universalist (here egalitarian) and differentialist antiracism sets them up in antinomy. Feminist thinkers have devoted considerable attention to such issues, and some have questioned the use of such binary categorizations. As Joan Scott has commented:

“(w)hen equality and difference are paired dichotomously, they structure an impossible choice. If one opts for equality, one is forced to accept the notion that difference is antithetical to it. If one opts for difference, one admits that equality is unattainable” (1988, 43).

It is also important to look at those levels - political, economic, social or cultural - where equality is being claimed (cf. Flax 1992). Colette Guillaumin, whose work has combined reflections on common strategies of opposing racism and sexism, has questioned to what extent the theme of ‘difference’ will be capable of decentering the dominant subject (1992a, 93). In the specifically French context, as I argue in Chapter Two, the republican tradition has constructed the notion of equality on that of uniformity due to the use of assimilationism (as discourse rather than practice) (cf. Silverman 1992). ‘Difference’ and equality were therefore constructed to be in antimony: the republican tradition has, historically, been intimately involved in the classifying mechanisms of ‘difference’.

Guillaumin has herself warned of the use of the idea of ‘difference’ within antiracism, since this idea is “également accueillante à tous ceux qui persistent à penser en termes raciaux sans plus oser prononcer le terme de race” (1992b, 214). The stressing of ‘difference’ can become a form of essentialism (cf. Gilroy 1993). It can also reify the group claiming ‘difference’, rather than underlining the plurality of individual experiences within that group, as Michèle Barret has
pointed out (1986) - thus reducing, rather than extending agency for those concerned. Gallissot has captured very succinctly the misunderstandings possible in the use of the term ‘différence’ within antiracism:

“(q)uand des racistes parlent de la différence, c’est avec l’*a priori* que les hommes sont foncièrement inégaux; ils sont différents par leurs origines et par nature. Quand des antiracistes parlent de la différence, c’est sur le fondement implicite que les hommes sont d’abord égaux et les différences ne sont plus alors que sociales ou culturelles, en tout cas relatives” (1985, 142).

Gallissot’s quote reinforces the need to go beyond the false separation between ‘universalism’ and ‘particularism’, since the antiracist argument he summarizes is a mixture of the two: an assertion of the fundamental equality between individuals whilst recognizing the diversity of social and cultural identities (and his comments are perhaps best suited to the French context where there has been, historically, less essentialization of ‘differences’ within antiracism than in the USA, for example).

Colette Guillaumin has argued in similar terms to Gallissot, but this time from a feminist perspective. For Guillaumin, feminism is about denying the ascribed identities which negate agency, rather than simply replicating any ‘doubling’:

“(c)ar nous (women) sommes différentes en effet. *Mais* nous ne sommes pas tant différentes DES homines comme le pretend la fausse conscience, *que nous ne sommes différentes* DE CE QUE les hommes pretendent que nous sommes” (1992a, 96).

In all subsequent chapters I look at the use of certain identities - Jewish, Arab, Muslim, Algerian, Maghrebian, African, Caribbean, African-Caribbean - within resistance to racism. The use of such identities rarely replicates the ‘doubling’ idea outlined by Taguieff. My position as researcher has been to study how and why these identities are used in the struggle against racism, based on the reservations formulated by Guillaumin and other feminist thinkers.
Michel Wieviorka is another French researcher to have engaged widely in questions of contemporary antiracism. Whilst Wieviorka does describe antiracism as being constantly pulled between universalism and differentialism, he seeks to find some sort of middle ground between the two. The danger lies for him in refusing to recognize the way those involved in antiracism may define themselves in terms of ethnic identity (1993b, 19). He has stressed the need to reformulate questions of antiracism away from the dominant universalist approaches (1993, 1993a). Like Taguieff, his approach looks at a plurality of forms of racism (Wieviorka 1991, 1993b) and antiracism (1993, 1993a). Notwithstanding the considerable reservations I have with Taguieff’s work, listed above, the need to analyze the diverse forms of antiracism and racism is an essential analytical device to have come from Taguieff (and Wieviorka), one which I employ throughout the thesis.

To summarize briefly the principal theoretical points to have come out of French academic research on racism and antiracism: there has been a preoccupation with discursive strategies of racism, racialization and antiracism. Whilst these strategies have usually been historicized, the social practice of antiracist organizations has not. There has been a failure to examine antiracism as operating within specific previous historical contexts. Importance has been attached to how racism can be defined, and how antiracism defines racism. Racism and antiracism emerge from the work of Guillaumin, Taguieff and Wieviorka as complex ideological, discursive and practical phenomena (5). My aim is to avoid reducing these manifestations to schematic, formulaic concepts such as ‘universalism’ or ‘difference’, whilst recognizing the way in which participants in antiracist movements define themselves (cf. Melucci 1988). I retain the themes of plurality and complexity of historical forms of antiracism. In Section Three I suggest a methodology for studying them.
Section Three (a): Methodology

Defining antiracism is a difficult task. I try to integrate this difficult construction of a suitable analytical concept into the discussion throughout the thesis. As Solomos and Back have stated, "(p)artly because the term anti-racism is used in a variety of ways it is by no means clear what it means, either conceptually or at the level of practice" (1996, 102) (cf. also Taguieff 1991a, 21). The need is therefore for a sufficiently flexible, but not too vague, definition of antiracism to allow for the variety of forms of antiracism studied within the thesis.

Antiracism can be defined as a set of ideologies, discourses and practices across a wide range of sites aiming to eliminate racism in its ideological, discursive and practical forms through a variety of methods. However, as I have already argued, antiracism is irreducible to the specifically reactive, oppositional forms which Taguieff has focussed upon (1990, 1995). Antiracism, as Solomos and Back argue, is always faced with the problem of "(...) how to go beyond an essentially oppositional political stance to the articulation of an alternative view of racial and cultural difference to those found in racist discourses" (1996, 111). Antiracism articulates positive values of equality, freedom, solidarity, tolerance, social justice and the right to define one's own contingent situation. Antiracism can come from forms of political action which are not solely concerned with the fight against racism (anticolonialism, anti-imperialism). Antiracism can form counter-cultures (cf. Gilroy 1993) which present values aimed at transforming society and the way social relations are experienced and perceived. One way of evaluating antiracism, which I will shortly go on to describe, is to assess to what extent antiracism has been capable of transforming these perceptions of social relations, or taken-for-granted aspects of discourse.

To account for the plurality of forms of antiracism in society, and look at the power relations which are constitutive of antiracisms and which traverse
them, I analyze antiracisms in terms of a plurality of levels and areas of production which are themselves the result of interconnected histories (6). By levels of production I mean the various social, economic, political and cultural fields from which antiracism emanates. By areas of production, I mean the broad range of producers of both antiracist social discourse and action, notably the declared antiracist associations, human rights organizations, associations for the defence of immigrants, trades unions, intellectual and academic sources of antiracism, and (nowadays) institutional, (mostly) State or local-government based initiatives. The separations made here for analytical purposes are often in practice unclear, as there is overlapping between arguments and action within both the levels and areas of production just defined. This poses the question of the articulation between these different producers of antiracism: I would argue that a further advantage in talking of the production of antiracisms is to situate them within the socio-economic boundaries and societal processes which determine at least partially the forms they take.

The categories just defined, of levels and areas of production of antiracism, are in turn determined by important questions of generation, class and gender. Concerning generation, Weinberg (1977) has shown how it was the sons and daughters of primary Jewish immigrants who were most active in the opposition to antisemitism in the 1930s (cf. Chapter Three). This action evolved as a reaction to the weight of hostility faced by their parents, and an affirmation of the refusal to 'inherit' in turn such forms of hostility. The innovative forms of antiracism seen in France since the mid-1970s have come largely from the sons and daughters of primary immigrants from racialized groups, as Polac (1994, 1991) and Bouamama (1994) have shown. Place in the field of economic production is linked to this point, in terms of the ability to mobilize and gain access to both financial and cultural resources. Generational differences (cf. Azéma 1989) could also be understood in the sense of a shared political socialization; the influence of the antifascist model on antiracism, a model still found today, is but one example. Gender considerations are arguably as
important as generational ones: despite the egalitarian values espoused within antiracism, the organizational structures of the leading associations are only slowly becoming feminized.

Within the declared antiracist associations there will be conflicting responses to and definitions of racism, due to the multiplicity of experiences involved in participation, and whether or not the activists are themselves subjected to racism. This emphasis on the wide-ranging nature of areas and levels of production of antiracism aims to include both the "formal and informal oppositional trends" in antiracism (Solomos and Back 1996, 112). "Micro-resistance" (Gilroy 1987) from racialized groups can challenge power relations whilst being relatively unorganized and unstructured - for example the hostility from colonial subjects, both in the colonies and mandates and in mainland France, to the oppression symbolized by the état-civil instituted by the State, with its mania on proving identity and fixing names (cf. Chapters Four, Five). During the Algerian War, many acts of solidarity towards Algerians took place on an individual level, outside any of the antiracist associations, political parties or trades unions (cf. Chapters Five, Six), as did acts of solidarity towards Jews under Vichy.

Certain themes in campaigning cut across areas and levels of production of antiracism. Republican antiracism has historically been dominant within the production of antiracism. The vague, at times metasocial nature of its formulations can appeal to large sections of the centre-centre left (cf. Chapter Two). Republican antiracism has often failed to analyze the production of racism from within the State. As a focus for campaigning, the State can channel certain forms of protest: where republican antiracism does appeal to the State it is usually in a very legalistic mode (cf. Chapter Three). Antiracism in its organized, structured, associational form works on several levels at the same time - appealing to civil society (cf. Cohen and Arato 1994) as much as to the State, particularly in educational campaigns (7). Antiracism also directs its action
towards specific areas of production of racism such as fascist groups and overtly racist parties etc.. It is therefore important to see where and what antiracism sees as being the levels and areas of production of racism within society - the State, political parties, social groups etc.. It is necessary to study what antiracism critiques, argues and mobilizes against, as well as how antiracism performs these actions of critiquing, arguing and mobilizing. This is how we can assess antiracism's ability to define the main vectors (cf. Wieviorka 1991) of racism at a given moment and, with historical hindsight, see how antiracism has been able to adapt to changes in the dominant forms of racism.

Section Three (b): Discourse

Whilst not wanting to separate discourse from practice, there are certain points specifically relating to the concepts of discourse and ideology which I will now discuss. Discourse is not gratuitous: it is produced and, as such, is an essential site of struggle. As Michel Foucault argued in L'ordre du discours (1971, 10-11):

“(...) dans toute société la production du discours est à la fois contrôlée, sélectionnée, organisée et redistribuée par un certain nombre de procédures qui ont pour rôle d'en conjurer les pouvoirs et les dangers, d'en maîtriser l'événement aleatoire, d'en esquiver la lourde, la redoutable materialité”.

Listing the various “procédures d'exclusion”, both internal and external to discourse, which decree what can and cannot be said at a given time, he argues that “le discours n'est pas simplement ce qui traduit les luttes ou les systèmes de domination, mais ce pour quoi, ce par quoi on lutte, le pouvoir dont on cherche à s'emparer” (1971, 12). As Foucault wrote elsewhere: “(c)'est d'abord parce que le discours est une arme de pouvoir, de contrôle, d'assujettissement, de qualification qu'il est l'enjeu d'une lutte fondamentale” (8). Discourse can therefore be seen as a crucial site of contestation, one in which antiracism is engaged when it seeks to counter the processes of categorization, generalization, classification and stereotyping at the heart of the racist logic (cf. Guillaumin
Abdelmalek Sayad has summarized how, in the context of immigration, language and power are inseparable: "(...) c'est à propos du langage, le langage sur soi et le langage sur les autres, que se révèle au grand jour et de la manière la plus éclatante le rapport de force entre les groupes sociaux" (1990, 19).

These sites of struggle over discourse have to be seen as acting within particular fields, or "formations idéologiques" as Michel Pêcheux calls them:

"les mots, expressions, propositions etc., changent de sens selon les positions tenues par ceux qui les emploient, ce qui signifie qu'ils prennent leur sens en référence à ces positions, c'est-à-dire en référence aux formations idéologiques (...) dans lesquelles ces positions s'inscrivent" (1975, 144).

Pêcheux continues: "(c)ela revient a poser que les mots, expressions, propositions, etc., reçoivent leur sens de la formation discursive dans laquelle ils sont produits (...)" (ibid., 145) (9). The constructivist theoretical approaches of Foucault and Pêcheux just outlined work to question the neutrality of any discourse, and help situate antiracist discourses within specific sites of power relations rather than a political 'void'. An example of what Pêcheux says about discursive formations could be applied to the concept of les Droits de l'Homme, showing how its signification depends on those sites - marginal or dominant - from which rights are voiced, whether as a demand addressed to the State or, in contrast, as a theme in official discourse to negate the idea of any difference between de facto and de jure rights.

Working from an historical perspective, it is important to see how different concepts - such as race, métissage, différence or intégration - can become reinvested with different meanings over time, or how, as in the contemporary uses of différence and intégration, there is some considerable struggle over the meaning of these key concepts in political discourse. Reinhart Koselleck has developed what he terms conceptual history (Begriffsgeschichte) to avoid anachronisms and to show how meanings change over time. His...
approach suggests a way of going beyond any simple dichotomy between synchronic and diachronic analyses of discourse. Koselleck's argument centres around "a methodological minimum claim", which is "that social and political conflicts of the past must be interpreted and opened up via the medium of their contemporary conceptual limits and in terms of the mutually understood past linguistic usage of the participating agents" (1982, 414). Since concepts can have various significations attached to them, antiracism can be seen within this context as the struggle to impose certain meanings over others, and thus to change not simply the vocabulary with which certain processes are thought, but also to introduce new meanings to these processes (cf. also Koselleck 1990). As Koselleck reminds us, "every semantic has (...) an involvement with non-linguistic contents" (1982, 414).

I would argue that it is equally important to study what is not questioned by antiracist discourse at a given moment - what remains at the level of a 'given'. This double-sided approach - that of asking what does and what does not preoccupy antiracism at a given moment - seeks to question the assumptions of a given period which are considered so "obvious" that they remain unquestioned (Wetherell and Potter 1992, 95). As the historian Pierre Laborie has stated:

"(l)es silences, le non-dit, l'attentisme, tout un ensemble de latences ou de sensibilités interiorisées constituent en fait, pour l'historien, autant de révélateurs chargés de signification et, à vrai dire, non des moindres" (1988, 104).

Similar arguments have also been raised which question Foucault's stressing of the "parole interdite" (1971, 21). For the sociolinguist Pierre Achard, "les effets de l'interdit sont des absences, mais toute absence n'est pas la conséquence d'un interdit", and can be "la conséquence d'une omniprésence implicite rendant inutile l'explication" (1986, 14). For Guillaumin, "(c)e qui est tu a une aussi grande importance que ce qui surgit involontairement dans la parole et ce qui surgit involontairement a plus d'importance que l'expression volontaire" (1972, 144). I use such an approach in Chapter Three for the concept of race as
understood by the LICA in the 1930s, to help explain why antiracism used a racial discourse - i.e. one accepting the existence of various 'races'.

A discourse analysis approach can examine how antiracism manages to impose its own definition of the political situation. The question of what assumptions antiracist discourse does or does not engage in is linked to the notion of “common sense”, which I use here in the Gramscian sense as “the uncritical and largely unconscious way in which a person perceives the world” (Simon 1991, 64). Because of its inherent contingency, for Gramsci, “(c)ommon sense is not something rigid and immobile, but is continually transforming itself, enriching itself with scientific ideas and philosophical options which have entered ordinary life” (10). Consequently, “there is not just one common sense, for that (too) is a product of history and a part of the historical process” (Gramsci 1971, 325-326). As a form of a “conception du monde” (Buzzi 1967, 304), common sense will combine many historical temporalities, and could perhaps be thought of in terms of different levels of ‘sedimentation’ within society, and therefore linked with the *Histoire des mentalités* school (cf. Vovelle 1983). For Simon, “(c)ommon sense is the site on which the dominant ideology is constructed, but it is also the site of resistance and challenge to this ideology” (1991, 65). Gramscian “common sense” poses the question of both the production and the reception of discourse, and can be used to analyze the successes of “racist narratives” (cf. Cohen 1992) as well as the choice of appeal to common-sense notions within antiracist discourse. Historically speaking, antiracisms have always attempted to use common-sense notions, such as “frères”, “travailleurs”, “Français”, “Algériens”, “potes”, “républicains” etc. - and often to the exception of “soeurs”, “travailleuses” etc.. Agency and determination are central to such questions: looking at common sense not as a monolithic block, but instead as the contingent creation of an historical process, automatically posits its changeability by antiracist discourse, and thus avoids an overly deterministic approach. Once again, this suggests that antiracist discourses can only superficially be ‘doubles’ of racism.
Antiracism more generally has to establish an identity for itself that can challenge the meanings within dominant forms of discourse. Michel Pêcheux, for example, talks of “dés-identification”, which is different to the ‘simple’ doubling of dominant ideological representations implicit in the notion of “contre-identification” - i.e. in relation to a consensual, non-resistant “identification” (cf. Macdonnel 1986, 39-40, Pêcheux 1975, 200). Pêcheux understands “dés-identification” in the sense that the person no longer identifies her or himself as the subject constituted by the ideological process of subjectification (as outlined by Althusser 1971): there is no longer identity between the other-as-subject and the self-as-subject (cf. Pêcheux 1975, 147-149 *passim*). Pêcheux’s argument goes beyond Sartre’s *Réflexions sur la question juive* (1946/1989): historically, Sartre’s text was probably the first theorized suggestion of the notion of ‘doubling’ applied to racism - a position that I criticized in Taguieff’s work (cf. *supra*). In Sartre’s work at this time, victims of racism are seen in their ‘unidimensional’ category of victims and nothing more - they are not imbued with any depth: rather, these victims respond within the trajectory of apparently straightforward, one-way subjectification. The extent of their agency is drastically reduced as a consequence, and their action against racism (which is the only agency they will be granted as having) will therefore be as a ‘double’ of racism (11). Pêcheux’s theory therefore suggests a means of measuring to what extent forms of antiracist discourse and practice succeed in liberating themselves from this ‘doubling subjectification’. In Chapters Three to Six, for example, I assess how far those involved in struggles against racism see through the mirage of assimilation within republican ideology, or to what extent radical strategies play with and transform negative stereotyping. In all subsequent chapters, I stress that republican ideology has become consensual and fails to challenge racism in radical ways, since racism also emanates from within republican institutions, hence my suggestion that antiracism should use republican political culture in more limited ways - notably the theme of *égalité*. My use of discourse analysis is
to examine the changes in meanings of certain terms and concepts within political discourse (cf. Chapter Three).

To conclude this section: antiracism has to be analyzed both as practice and discourse, as a system of values and a political movement, and seen as reflecting the ideological complexities of the society in which it operates in a given contingent situation. Antiracism can be evaluated by what it mobilizes against, how that mobilization is organized, and to whom it is addressed. Not simply reactive, antiracism tries to challenge dominant concepts within political discourse whilst working on and with common-sense meanings. The choice of themes and repertoires within antiracism stems from the sociology of the participants (working class non-national or colonized workers or middle-class (French) teachers, for example), their ideological references (republican or otherwise) and the aims, long or short-term, of their action (responding to a racist attack as opposed to conducting educational programmes, for example). I will now go on to describe how the choice of source material attempts to reflect the plurality of the levels and areas of production of antiracism as defined in this section.

**Section Four: Sources**

The corpus on which the thesis is based has been chosen to illustrate the main themes as defined in Section One - the relationship between antiracism and republican political culture: the transition from the colonial to the postcolonial: the inclusion of opposition to colonial and post-colonial forms of racism into any historical study of antiracism - all in relation to the theoretical and methodological approaches outlined in sections Two and Three (*supra*). Given the relative absence of in-depth historical studies on antiracism in France, there was a vast range of primary and secondary sources from which to draw. The only area of production of antiracism already extensively studied was scientific antiracism (cf. Taguieff 1990, 1992, 1995), hence the relative lack of attention
devoted to it in the thesis.Whilst I do integrate sources from the Resistance (cf. Chapter Five, Section One), I look more to the significance of the Occupation, Deportation, Vichy and the Resistance on subsequent forms of antiracism.

For the 1980s-1990s, the relative absence of empirical detail can be explained for two reasons. Firstly, it had been my intention to cover the very contemporary period in more depth. However, the nature of the research involved a progressive discovery of new material from the period 1928-1965, and I therefore decided to concentrate on this. Secondly, I was aware of the doctoral research of Cathie Lloyd, Robert Gibb and Philippe Juhem (12), and which gives extensive coverage to the period since the electoral rise of the FN (1983-) : the number and diversity of the opposition movements to the FN to have emerged since the 1980s warrant separate study. Throughout, I try to explain those themes from previous decades still relevant to antiracism today.

I will start with some brief comments about the limits of both the primary and secondary source material. I used extensive archive and documentation sources in Paris, Versailles and Nanterre (13). State archives were exploited for a number of reasons. Firstly, for an organization like the LICA, whose archives are unavailable for consultation (cf. Chapter Three, note 17), the Police archives allowed for supplementary information on membership and political orientation that were not always forthcoming from its newspaper *Le Droit de vivre*. Secondly, for the *Étoile Nord-Africaine* (ENA), even the organization’s secondary literature was incomplete, hence the recourse to Police archives. Other researchers have already used Police sources for the LICA (cf. Schor 1992) and the ENA (Stora 1986, 1992a, MacMaster 1995), but their research was less preoccupied with antiracism. Full permission was granted by the *Préfet* to consult these sources which came within the sixty-year rule covering Police archives. I was less fortunate at the Archives nationales : the Interior Ministry refused me permission to consult archives on antisemitism from the 1930s (14). Surprisingly, I was more fortunate in my demands for dérogations for post-1945 sources, with
some exceptions (15). In Chapter Five I draw extensively from these postwar sources I was allowed to consult, which, as far as I am aware, had never been previously worked on. Sonia Combe (1994) has recently denounced the delays and inconsistencies relating to the contemporary history State archives. An increasing awareness of the sensitivity of the material on which I was working came from the need to book an appointment to consult the inventory of the post-1945 Interior Ministry sources which I then applied to consult. This reinforced my interest in the hiding of the massacre of Algerians on and after 17th October 1961, and which forms the focus for Chapter Six.

Using official sources poses the problem of representation: whilst I wanted to integrate aspects of official discourse into the thesis, the reliability of police reports remains unclear. Nevertheless, these official sources allowed me to question the assimilationism of republican ideology in the colonial context in particular. Also, these archives contained posters and other campaign literature unavailable elsewhere. Whilst working at the Archives nationales, I came across the inventories of the Archives contemporaines de la Fondation nationale des sciences politiques (AFNSP), which provided useful political sources on the Algerian war.

Much material came from the MRAP archives, to which I had access on a more personal basis (16). These archives, fully listed in the Bibliography, were invaluable in providing details of internal debates and campaign techniques which the fully available MRAP newspaper Droit et Liberte did not always give. Only a fraction of the notes taken in the MRAP archives have been used in this thesis. I have concentrated on the MRAP’s transition from being based on the fight against antisemitism to using a wider definition of racism including colonial racism (cf. Chapter Five). I also worked at the Alliance Israelite Universelle in Paris, which helped widen the sources on the opposition to antisemitism and situate the LICA politically. Interviews with key actors within the MRAP such as
Albert Lévy, Daniel Mayer (since deceased) for the LDH, and with Harlem Désir for SOS-Racisme, towards the end of my research, were all of great use.

The periodical publications and campaign literature of associations such as the LICA (1927-), the MRAP (1949-), and SOS-Racisme (1985-), the antifascist organization the Comité de vigilance des intellectuels antifascistes (CVIA) (1934-39), the Ligue des droits de l’homme (LDH) (1898-), national liberation movements such as the ENA, and immigrant rights organizations such as the Mouvement des Travailleurs arabes (MTA) (1972-1977) that I consulted, also presented problems (17). As Ralph Schor has stated, the printed sources of an organization serve as a range of “moyens destines a resserrer la cohérence d’un groupe, à justifier son combat, à défendre ses intérêts, à illustrer ou à renforcer des opinions théoriques, des passions, des préjugés” (1985, 4-5). There are problems of representativity inherent with using the periodical publications of organizations such as the CVIA, the LDH or the LICA: these publications tended to represent the Paris-based elites of each organization (cf. also Chapter Three). There is therefore a Paris bias to the research which I acknowledge. I found extensive campaign literature for the LICA and the MRAP at the Bibliothèque de documentation internationale contemporaine (BDIC) (Nanterre) as well as at the Bibliothèque nationale (Paris) and at the Centre de documentation juive contemporaine (CDJC), Paris. It was difficult to locate sources for the more socially or politically marginal areas of production of antiracism. This is true for far-left groups and immigrant groups - many of the latter’s publications being in Yiddish or Arabic, languages I do not read. These, along with trades union and religious-based action against racism, are important areas of research which I have not had the space to cover extensively. Although politically marginalized, the publications of colonized intellectuals (cf. Chapter Four) are widely available (BDIC and Versailles) (cf. Dewitte 1985). If, as I have already stated, we integrate both the formal and the informal acts of solidarity into a definition of antiracism, then extensive oral histories of activists would be needed. For the 1930s, this is already too late.
Outside of the specific organizations and political movements, I used sources in the Bibliothèque nationale and the Institut d'Études Politiques libraries (Paris) on antiracism, racism, immigration, human rights, colonization and nationalism published from the 1880s onwards in an attempt to build up knowledge of how debates on antiracism and racism were being formulated in academic and political circles. For debates over the past few decades, I used (in particular) the Centre d'Information et d'Études sur les Migrations Internationales (CIEMI), Paris. Very few resource centres have cataloguing under *antiracisme*, or even *racisme, lutte contre*. I also used the excellent Institut d'Études Politiques press cuttings collection for the 1950s onwards. I will now explain in more detail the contents of each chapter.

Section Five: Summary of chapters

In Chapter Two, I examine the way in which a republican tradition became established around the time of the Dreyfus “Affair”, and the legacy this had on antiracism. The political significance of some of the main concepts from which republican antiracism was to draw are studied, including the individualistic conception of human rights. I attempt to show that republican antiracism was based on assumptions of ‘civilization superiority’, and assimilated much of what I call the national republican discourse. The late nineteenth century was co-extensive with the ‘nationalization’ of French society (Noiriel 1991, 1992), which saw rights increasingly based around the division national/non-national. Partially accepting this national republican paradigm, republican antiracism became involved with the definition of the nature of ‘French identity’. Drawing on the work of Étienne Balibar (1992), I critique references to the nation within republican antiracism, and question the construction of an apparently ‘open’ model of national belonging in the French context, since this ‘model’ could be based on an essentialized notion of cultural identity. The historical references span the twentieth century, as I look to the remnants of republican antiracism
today. The Chapter’s focus is mainly theoretical, and should be seen as an introduction to subsequent chapters.

Chapter Three centres on a case study of the LICA in the 1930s, and its relationship with the Front Populaire. Examining questions of agency within antiracism, I show how the association was responsible for the introduction and popularization of the term *antiracisme*. This term was used to demarcate the LICA off from the other antifascist organizations, and the more conservative Jewish groups’ opposition to fascism and antisemitism. I look at the LICA’s use of a racial discourse, and discuss the common-sense assumptions of the 1930s regarding the concept *race*, and the LICA’s position on colonial racism. The LICA became increasingly disillusioned with the left’s failure to prioritize opposition to antisemitism, and had to rely on the State to introduce measures against racism (Marchandeau decree). The Chapter tries to indicate the sociological, political and discursive complexity of one antiracist organization, and the political climate in which it had to operate.

The interwar period is again the focus of Chapter Four, but to show the variety of levels and areas of production of antiracism, I concentrate on the previously largely ignored opposition to racism in France by colonial subjects from the Maghreb, sub-Saharan Africa and the Caribbean. This attempts to bring out the tensions between the forms of opposition to racism from these social groups and the classic republican tradition of antiracism which, at the time, was steeped in the idea of ‘civilization superiority’, with a few exceptions. The overlap between anticolonialism and antiracism is defined. I examine the ways in which colonial subjects defined racism starting off from the concrete practices of the republican State, rather than from abstract values, and suggest that we look at the ways ‘race’ and class can and do work off each other. Intellectual and working-class forms of opposition to racism are compared to stress the plurality of the levels and areas of production of racism. Just how racialized groups attacked negative stereotyping and dominant representations is examined, based
on archive material. These groups offered new viewpoints to the colonizers on what racism was, where its roots lay, and what its practical effects were. I show how these political processes were marginalized by republican antiracism.

Chapter Five focusses on antiracism's ability to adapt to changing forms of racism at a given moment. The period in question is 1944-1964, and the MRAP is the association analyzed. I show how the MRAP developed a much broader definition of racism, one capable of explaining the epistemological links between antisemitism and anti-Maghrebian racism. I look at the significance of the Holocaust and the Resistance on MRAP activists who, through their experiential approach to racism, were able to extend solidarity to Maghrebians in France at the very period when anti-Maghrebian racism was increasing. The MRAP highlighted the theme of equality, and was critical of State practices towards Maghrebians. The MRAP, whilst notionally definable as a 'classic' republican antiracist organization, saw the weaknesses behind aspects of this legacy, especially concerning the denial of racism as existing in France. Using Police archives, I show how hostility to Algerian emigration in France was well established before the start of the Algerian Revolution (November 1954), and detail the lack of response to this newly dominant form of racism which culminated in the massacre of Algerians in Paris on and after 17th October 1961.

Chapter Six concerns the theme of memory within antiracism and, more specifically, how the memory of colonial massacres, and postcolonial racist attacks, has been kept alive within various areas of production of antiracism. Drawing on the work of Maurice Halbwachs (1925/1994, 1939/1950), I look at how the antifascist tradition came to negate the antiracist memory of 17th October 1961, highlighting the possible tensions between antiracism and the left. Bringing the debate up to the 1980s, I show how the past is used today to interpret the difficult situations in which many young people of Maghrebian origin in France find themselves, subjected to racism from the State, its agents, and from civil society.
Notes to Chapter One

(1) The MRAP began as the *Mouvement contre le racisme, l'antisémitisme, et pour la Paix*, changing in 1987 to *Mouvement contre le Racisme et pour l'Amitié entre les Peuples* (cf. Chapter Five). The LICRA started out as the LICA (*Ligue internationale contre l'Antisémitisme*), only becoming the LICRA in 1979 (cf. details in Chapter Three, note 1).

(2) For an example which naturalizes racism, see Delacampagne (1983).

(3) Not one of Taguieff’s many publications (listed in the Bibliography) mentions the writing of Bernard Lecache, the LICA president 1928-1962, who, in the interwar years, probably wrote the highest number of articles on antiracism and racism in France (cf. Chapter Three).

(4) Taguieff (1991) does talk of the importance of the postcolonial dynamic in contemporary France.

(5) I discuss Étienne Balibar’s work in Chapter Two, in particular links he draws (1988 in Balibar and Wallerstein, 1992) between racism and nationalism, and the way in which antiracism articulates *liberté* and *égalité*.

(6) Such a framework could arguably be developed for the analysis of racisms, although this approach is not developed here.

(7) I disagree here with Fillieule and Péchu who concentrate on State-directed demands in social movements (1993, 135). The separation between State and civil society is itself problematical where power relations are concerned, as Foucault argued (cf. Foucault 1984).


(9) Pécheux’s definition of a discursive formation is “*ce qui peut et doit être dit* (articulé sous la forme d’une harangue, d’un sermon, d’un pamphlet, d’un exposé, d’un programme, etc.”) (HAROCHE, Claude, HENRY, Paul and PÉCHEUX, Michel (1971), “La Sémantique et la coupure saussurienne: langue, langage, discours”, *Langages*, No.24, pp.93-106, p.102 quoted in Pécheux (1975, 144-145)).

(10) Gramsci (1971, 326), quoted in Potter and Wetherell (1992, 168). For Gramsci this is not, however, a purely ‘top-down’ interpretation of the transmission of ideas. Gramsci’s notion of common sense is different to the established meaning of “common sense” in English - which he renders by “good sense” (Gramsci 1971, 323, translator’s note 1).
(11) For the need not to reduce racialized groups simply to the rôle of victims, see Gilroy (1992, 1987). See also Chapter Four’s discussion of négritude.


(13) A complete list of archive and documentation centres is given at the start of the Bibliography.

(14) Namely AN F7 14781.

(15) Access was refused for AN Fla 5055 and Fla 5135.

(16) I would like to thank Cathie Lloyd for her help in granting me access to the MRAP archives, and Norbert Haddad for making them available to me.

(17) A list of periodicals consulted is in the Bibliography.
Chapter Two: National republican discourse and antiracism

Introduction

Section One: Antiracism and the republican tradition

Section Two: Patriots, nationalists, and definitions of the nation

Section Three: The "tyranny of the national" (Noiriel 1991)

Section Four: Assimilation, 'sauvage'? 

General conclusion to Chapter Two

Notes
Introduction

In this Chapter, I will analyze, at a theoretical level, key elements of republican discourse during the Third Republic, and show how these theoretical points are linked to republican antiracism as it developed from the 1930s, and which I study in all subsequent chapters. I suggest that the republican tradition, whilst laying down the central concepts of égalité and liberté, was in fact a far from unproblematical source of values - values from which antiracism was to draw extensively. These problems stemmed from the national republican discourse which, from the Third Republic onwards, narrowed access of certain rights to nationals. The republican State, throughout this time, was engaged in its colonial 'mission'. The republican tradition was to construct a vision of French identity which was supposedly non-racial, since based on cultural criteria. I shall question such assumptions. It should be stressed that the construction of this republican tradition was a process: here, certain key events such as the Dreyfus "Affair" will be studied to assess the way in which the 'universal' became increasingly grounded in the national.

I have used the term republican antiracism to add the adjective 'republican' to 'antiracism' may seem strange to a French reader, and could be taken as suggesting that antiracism could evolve or define itself outside of the republican tradition, an idea many activists would refuse to contemplate. But the suggestion that we need to analyze antiracisms in the plural - outlined in Chapter One -, has implied that it would be false to reduce antiracism to a strictly republican heritage. What I will be describing here is the elaboration of an antiracist idiom closely linked to some of the major premises of consensual French political culture, an idiom discernible across several areas and levels of production of antiracism: in specific associations such as the LICA (1927-), as well as in wider political discourse used by political parties, trades unions etc. I imply that this republican antiracism has been the dominant, politically 'acceptable' form of antiracism likely to draw on the widest range of political
symbols and images able to mobilize across large sections of the centre, centre-left and left. Republican antiracism in this sense is not essentially a counter-discourse to the republican State: indeed, I will try to show (in Chapters Three and Four) that the possibilities for any radical critique of racism within French society has come very much from the margins of this republican antiracism, if not from outside it altogether.

In the discussion that follows, I am using the concept of antiracism as an \textit{a posteriori} construct, when I refer to examples of antiracism from before the 1930s: the term only came to exist in French from 1936 onwards (cf. Chapter Three). However, the paradigm for republican antiracism was to a large extent forged in the late nineteenth century (referring back of course to 1789), hence the use of the term antiracism here. What I am trying to show is the articulation between the historical development of the republican State and a form of antiracism situating itself within republican political culture. In particular, I will be looking at those discourses of nation to have come out of the nationalizing process. I will therefore undertake an “archeology”, in the Foucauldian sense (Foucault 1969), of the construction of a national republican discourse, and the variations in form it has taken from the late nineteenth century to the present. As Foucault pointed out, the 1789 Revolution has been the central object of archeological studies: these studies, however, posited the Revolution simply as an external influence on discourse rather than an event constitutive of elements of discourse itself - elements which are still with us (1969, 231).

The Foucauldian approach on a more general level, as Mitchell Dean has suggested, enables us to undertake a “history of the present”, what Dean, summarizing what he sees as the main objective of both Foucault’s archeology and genealogy, describes as being “concerned with that which is taken-for-granted, assumed to be given, or natural within contemporary social existence, a givenness or naturalness questioned in the course of contemporary struggles” (1994, 35). This approach can help shed light on both the republican antiracist
organizations such as the LICA which, in the 1930s, did not problematize its position within the national republican tradition (Chapter Three), and, in turn, the more radical struggles of colonized peoples against colonial/postcolonial racism (Chapters Four to Six) which did question what Gérard Noiriel, upon whose work I shall be drawing extensively, has called the “tyrannie du national” (1991). A “history of the present” can also be understood as the construction of a national republican discourse which can still be found in France in the 1990s, a time of restrictive policies on ‘immigration’, nationality, rights of asylum, and an assimilationist discourse voiced with increased strength, albeit in historical circumstances very different to those of the 1930s or 1950s. Contemporary antiracism’s relation to the republican tradition is therefore still in a constant state of renegociation, as shown (for example) by the first Headscarf “Affair” in 1989-1990 (cf. House 1996).

In Section One, I look at the way in which republican antiracism defined itself in relation to the republican tradition, as this tradition was being constituted at the time of the Dreyfus “Affair”. This republican tradition was not just one in relation to the values of 1789: in Section Two I show how the definition was essentially one based on ambivalent conceptions of the nation and patriotism, and that this definition was not as opposed to right-wing forms of nationalism as the Dreyfusards thought. The way in which the conception of certain rights was to be restricted from the ‘universal’ to the national as the Third Republic progressed is dealt with in Section Three, which includes a critical discussion of approaches to nation-building. I attempt to show just how all-pervasive the national republican discourse became within the Métropole in the period to 1939. Section Four analyzes another facet of the republican tradition - assimilation - and underlines the exclusionary practices associated with it, ones which republican antiracism has not always sought to challenge.
Section One: Antiracism and the republican tradition

Republican antiracism during the Third Republic, and then up to 1945, defines itself in opposition to a certain form of nationalism, closely associated with ethno-cultural racism exemplified firstly by Barrès, then the anti-Dreyfusard movement more generally, followed by the fascist leagues of the 1930s, and, finally, Vichy. The non-monolithic nature of these forms of racism is reflected in the way in which their changing themes are in turn taken up by republican antiracism. Yet this position of declared opposition to racializing discourses carries within it profound ambiguities, since republicanism is itself grounded on assumptions of national identity, albeit theoretically more open ones. For republican antiracism’s development was contemporaneous with the nationalization of French society, colonial expansionism, the cultivation of anti-German patriotic sentiment, and assimilationist discourses (if not always practices). All of these longterm processes and features directly affected the nature of republicanism, and hence those republicans who opposed racism. The constitution of a national republican discourse would form a ‘given’ on the centre/centre-left: this ‘given’ forms the central element to my critique of the republican paradigm for antiracism at this period, but is a paradigm which still has relevance today.Whilst I would ‘periodize’ republican antiracism’s high point as going from the Dreyfus “Affair” to the Resistance, few contemporary antiracist organizations would conceive of situating themselves outside of the epithet ‘republican’, since they (quite naturally) espouse the values of liberté, égalité, fraternité at the heart of the revolutionary legacy.

What I will suggest, however, is that this national republican discourse was to place considerable limits on antiracist action, creating a situation of “antagonistic indebtedness”. This notion can be applied to various forms of antiracism. Paul Gilroy uses the term antagonistic indebtedness in The Black Atlantic (1993) to discuss the way in which many victims of racism took the ideas behind their frameworks for resistance to racism from the very cultural
repertoire of those dominant groups within society which were oppressing them - what W E B. Du Bois referred to as "double consciousness" (Gilroy 1993, 191). In the French context, many colonized groups, intellectuals or working-class, situated themselves within the emancipatory legacy of the French Revolution (and borrowed specifically from the nationalistic rhetoric of the Revolution - cf. Chapter Four and Bhabha (1994)). However, dominant forms of republican antiracism marginalized these sites of opposition to colonial racism, failing to see their potentially liberating affirmations of agency and autonomy, since viewing such groups as a threat to the cohesion of the colonial nation-state.

Antagonistic indebtedness could also be thought of in a wider sense, and used to describe the double-bind which limited the 'space' for republican antiracism in relation to the national republican State (cf. Gallissot 1985). Republican political culture is notoriously hostile to mobilization around identity politics (cf. Chapters Three, Four, Five). Another example of this wider, looser form of antagonistic indebtedness would be the creation of a "problem of immigration" in political discourse at certain specific conjunctures (e.g. 1880s, 1930s, 1980s-), and the increased hostility to non-nationals which can be present within republican discourses as a result (cf. Noiriel 1992). The hostility to Jewish refugees fleeing Nazi Germany in the 1930s could be given as an example: since the refugee and immigration questions became conflated (not for the last time...), then republican antiracist organizations such as the LICA found the State agencies unresponsive to their appeals for looser entry controls, or, elsewhere, for antiracist legislation, but did not think of questioning the legitimacy of the State's rôle in these domains (cf. Chapter Three). Republican antiracism's inherently abstract legalism has served historically to channel forms of protest and reduce any potentially radical action.

Republican antiracism evolved within the republican tradition, whilst stressing certain elements of that tradition in a particular way. But the historical conjuncture in which republican antiracism emerged served to hide the tensions
which existed within the national republican discourse it espoused, tensions listed in the above two paragraphs. The key transitionary period the late nineteenth century represented, and which revealed the nationalizing processes already well underway, also anticipated themes which would continue unquestioned until the 1950s. This suggests that considerable attention be given to the period as a preliminary to any detailed discussion of the later Third Republic.

The notion of tradition républicaine also needs explanation, however. As Odile Rudelle has pointed out, “(...) les circonstances historiques ont voulu que la “Tradition” et la “République” se soient longtemps pensées comme des contraires”, since the counter-revolutionary thought of the nineteenth century liked to define itself as representing the ‘true’, pre-revolutionary values of tradition against the revolutionary heritage (1987, 31). The actual term “tradition républicaine” was first coined by Waldeck-Rousseau in 1900, as an attempt to integrate all republicans around the Dreyfusard cause (ibid., 32-35 passim). Following Huard, a tradition can be defined as “un contenu organisé d’idées ou de pratiques transmis de façon active sur une période relativement longue par un groupe familial, social et politique et soumis à des interprétations et des ajustements” (1987, 19). The vagueness of this definition gives some indication as to the success of the concept of tradition républicaine itself. Whilst clearly stating the importance of certain values - for example liberté and égalité - the precise content of such values and, as we shall soon see, the articulation between them, is left wide open, allowing for a rassemblement around a series of broad objectives. Girardet describes the complex nature of any political tradition:

“(s)e reclamant d’une même filiation, placés souvent sous un même sigle, à l’arrière plan d’un enoncé présenté comme identique, c’est en fait une gamme relativement étendue d’attitudes et de comportements, de systèmes d’adhésion ou d’engagement que l’historien des mentalités se voit contraint de prendre en compte” (Girardet 1987, 11).

The political re-alignment (or perhaps clarification) of competing political forces that the Dreyfus “Affair” brought about was part of a wider process of the transition to a position of hegemony that republicanism came to enjoy from the
late nineteenth century onwards. As Brian Jenkins points out: “(w)ith the Third Republic, republicanism ceased to be a movement incarnating unfulfilled aspirations and became instead the official ideology of the state” (1990, 80). The invention of the republican tradition thus corresponds to what Hobsbawm has said about the “conscious” (i.e. politically instrumental) invention of tradition more generally - that this will succeed “mainly in proportion to its success in broadcasting on a wavelength to which the public was ready to tune in” (1993a, 263) - a result of historical processes which in turn will influence future processes.

Republican antiracism became a clearly definable concept only in the 1930s, but always refers back to the Dreyfus “Affair” for legitimacy (Taguieff 1990, 20), seeing it as a ‘founding’ event. Republican antiracism therefore aligns itself with what was, from 1900 onwards, a dominant political ideology (republicanism) embracing the majority of political forces. Republican ideology and discourse are of course not monolithic, and show a plurality of forms both diachronically and synchronically, as I attempt to show in every subsequent chapter. There are, however, certain common themes to national republican discourse which were to have tangible effects on antiracism, notably the way in which the French nation and national identity were constructed within republican discourse. The republicans, to summarize, presented a conception of the nation which, they thought, was in antimony with the ‘German’ conception of ethnic exclusivism. I will, after others (cf. Silverman 1992, Guillaumin 1972, 25, 56-57), try to problematize such a simplifying, binary separation which, even at a theoretical level, is a distortion of the complex, polysemic thought of Renan and Michelet (to name but these two). On the level of practice, such typologies of ‘open’ and ‘closed’ conceptions of the nation, national identity and national belonging become increasingly inoperable from the late nineteenth century onwards, given the exclusionary practices which the republican State was to instil - particularly in the colonies - and the way in which the republican State was at one and the same time to construct a discourse hostile to certain cultural and
ethnic ‘differences’, and yet create, through social practices of categorization, new processes of differentiation which would increasingly be perceived (and experienced) in ‘racial’ or ethnic terms. What I shall be arguing throughout the thesis is that French national republican discourse concentrated on forms of racism in Germany (and, in the 1950s, the USA). When antiracism did challenge racism inside France, this racism was defined as being located within specific, easily-identifiable anti-republican political parties and groups. Whilst these forms of racism were challenged during the Third Republic, forms of racism co-extensive to republican nation-state expansion (colonization) were not.

Section Two: Patriots, nationalists, and definitions of the nation

I will now concentrate on theoretical debates over national identity in the Third Republic prior to 1914, before going back to the 1789 Revolution to show how key concepts for antiracism such as ‘citoyen(ne)’, ‘nationalité’ and ‘étranger/étrangère’ became transformed with the late nineteenth-century nationalization of French society, before extending the discussion to cover the period 1919-1939.

The conflicting definitions of the nation heard in the Third Republic were nothing new, and had constituted a central ideological element of the eighteenth century. Well before the Revolution, the struggle had been engaged between Boulainvilliers, asserting the Frankish origins of the nobility, and Mably and Dubos, championing the legitimacy of the third estate through their assertion of the origins of the French people stemming from the Gauls (Citron 1991, 144-145). Sieyès had, in Qu’est-ce que le tiers état? (1789/1988), attempted to define the nobility as being outside of the sovereign nation, since for him, as for all revolutionaries, sovereignty resided with the ‘people’ descended from the Gauls. Subsequent nineteenth century historiography would consecrate this interpretation of national identity as resting with “nos ancêtres les Gaulois” (Citron 1991, 145-149 passim, Noiriel 1992a). The essential underlying
characteristic of these diverse theories is that their definitions of national identity are simultaneously inclusive and exclusive. There may well be a great diversity of criteria for inclusion/exclusion - and I will argue that the frontiers between the 'racial' and the 'cultural' conceptions, in the French case, are fluid and mobile - but the inclusive/exclusive logic is ever-present. Such tendencies can be seen with Michelet who, as Noiriel argues, held a processual view of national identity, an identity which would change over time, and which did not ignore historicity. This separated him from Gobineau and Augustin Thierry. France was "une personne", and this organicist vision held that the internal unity of France was assured (Noiriel 1992a, 16). Yet for Michelet, as Noiriel summarizes, "(p)uisque la France a réussi a transformer ses nationalités en nation, elle doit poursuivre sa mission historique en libérant toute l'humanité" (ibid., 18), and thus the apparently more open model of national identity contained important consequences, since external expansionism was thereby given ideological justification. Taguieff has made similar comments for Ernest Renan's pro-imperialism (1995, 150-151)

According to Noiriel, the period after 1870 marked an important theoretical transition point from the focus of the construction of national identity on the internal level, to that of the French nation and national identity on an external and hence inter-national level (1992a, 20-21) The French nation would be defined by modern theorists in relation to (in opposition to) a reified conception of the German nation. Ernest Renan illustrates how intimately linked definitions of the nation are to particular political contexts. The background to the polemical climate of the early Third Republic was the conflict over Alsace-Lorraine. Renan's lecture Qu’est-ce que la nation? (1882/1992) is, as Silverman has pointed out (1992, 20-24 passim), open to very different interpretations. There were (at the time) to be two readings of Renan, the first of which stressed the hereditary nature of the accumulation of national consciousness over the longterm, a reading developed by thinkers such as Maurice Barrès (cf. Sternhell 1985). The second possible reading appropriated the "dimension symbolique" of
Renan's thought, one which could therefore be adopted by anyone wishing to join the collectivity (Noiriel 1992a, 23). Renan rejects the zoographical definition of 'race' as inapplicable to politics, and stresses the composite nature of the French population brought together in "la grande chaudiere" (1882/1992, 48), and calls the nation "un principe spirituel" (ibid., 53). There is an uneasy balance between a genuine notion of 'presentist' contractualism on the one hand (the "plébiscite de tous les jours"), and, simultaneously, determination through common ancestry: "les ancêtres nous ont faits ce que nous sommes" (ibid., 53, 54).

Elsewhere, however, Renan had developed racial thinking on "les semites" which embraced conceptions of 'civilization superiority' posited as longterm developments (1862/1992, 182-200 passim). But when the cultural is placed within the longterm enracinement of the teleological development of the nation France, then such a race historique is arguably of limited openness to 'newcomers', those whose cultural background does not fit into the already written script of unity under the nation. For Sternhell, both Renan and Taine used what he terms a discourse of "cultural determinism" (1991, 31). Furthermore, because of the widespread belief that the formative years of French national identity were prior to 1789 - a characteristic of republican thought shared by Michelet and Renan - events having happened since 1789 are treated as mere epiphenomena which leave the course of French history and national identity as unchanged in any significant way. Hence the way in which immigration and its history have been excluded from republican narratives of the construction of the nation. The work of Fernand Braudel is an example of the application of such a paradigm to the history of immigration (cf. Noiriel 1992, 50-67 passim).

Renan's performative political myth of the contractualist model of the French nation, based therefore on the premise of individual, almost solicited membership (at the same time as being conditioned by a certain level of heredity), led in turn to a definition of German nationhood as holistic (the individual defined
primarily in relation to the collectivity). The validity of the use of typologies based around holism is questionable, and yet has enjoyed considerable recent academic prestige via the work of Louis Dumont (cf. Dumont 1991, 1991a). In practice of course, the collective would come to make very considerable demands on the individual French citizen: he would be asked, through military service, to “mourir pour la patrie” (Kantorowice 1984). She would be asked to produce children, once national strength was be equated with demographic curves (Pateman 1992, 19-20). As Noiriel argues: “avec la théorie du peuple souverain qui s’impose en 1789, l’individu est identifié à sa patrie et tous les citoyens sont sommes à la défendre” (1991, 35). Renan’s famous speech draws to a close with calls for “(...) les sacrifices qu’exige l’abdication de l’individu au profit d’une communauté” (1882/1992, 56).

The political context of the years prior to the First World War was nevertheless to see this theme of a binary separation between German and French conceptions of nationhood being developed across the left-right divide. Holism was associated with German expansionism: for philosopher Émile Boutroux, the French nation represented “l’humanité sous sa forme la plus pure et la plus haute”, which was opposed to “la moderne culture allemande” symbolized by Fichte (1926, 160) (1). Republican thinkers such as Alfred Fouillee defended the idea that French patriotism was superior to Germany’s since based on ‘universal’ values (cf. Taguieff 1988, 32-33). Such themes re-occur within antiracist publications in the 1930s (cf. Taguieff 1990, 122-151 passim). For Lakhovsky, “(a)utant le Français est individualiste et fanatique de la liberté autant l’Allemand ne prend de plaisir qu’à être l’unité d’un groupement, caserne, société sportive, chorale, orchestre etc” (1934, 80). The German ‘model’ could prove a useful rhetorical device in republican discourse, one of its effects being to underestimate the development of specifically French forms of antisemitism in the 1930s, for example, since analyses of racism at that time assessed their origins to be ‘German’ and not ‘French’ (cf. Chapter Three). Such tendencies were, however, already very present at the time of the Dreyfus “Affair”, which was the theatre
for a widespread internal political debate over conceptions of national identity, marking the simultaneously intra- and inter-national nature of questions of nationhood at the end of the nineteenth century.

Here, I will concentrate on a specific theme within republican discourse during the “Affair”, concerning the use of the terms nationalist/nationalisme and patriot/patriotisme to argue that themes of nation and national belonging permeated Dreyfusard arguments to an extent seldom recognized at the time. Dreyfusards and anti-Dreyfusards struggled to be considered as the legitimate representatives of the nation. As Birnbaum has argued, with its discursive strategies, “le camp républicain entend ainsi retourner les slogans nationalistes en identifiant la France à un patriotisme dont l’exceptionnalité reposerait sur les seuls principes de 1789” (1993, 290). In using the terms patriot and patriotisme, the Dreyfusards were trying to establish some distance between their position and the antisemitic nationalism of anti-Dreyfusards such as Drumont (cf. Winock 1990). Patriot was used by the moderate centre/Radical parties (cf. Stone 1991), the very constituency from which the tradition républicaine was emerging at that time (cf. supra). For the more left-wing republicans, as the above quote by Birnbaum suggests, the idea was to renew with the revolutionary legacy of the positively-connotated patrie, and hence there was, again, a struggle for political legitimacy. Following on from Gallissot (1985) and Étienne Balibar (in Balibar and Wallerstein 1988, Balibar 1992), I will argue that there is in fact a considerable amount of crossover between the concepts of patrie and nation. For Gallissot, “(l)a patrie ou la nation, comme leurs noms l’indiquent, ne cessent de se réclamer d’une idéologie de la parente et de l’héritage” (1985, 53). If there had been a potentially non-exclusive conception of political belonging (i.e. as citizens) during the Revolution, I will attempt to show that by the time of the Dreyfus “Affair”, restrictive, national conceptions of rights and duties had rendered the term patrie problematical (cf. infra). Whilst the terms patriot/patriotisme could be rhetorically effective against the extreme right, they left unhidden the common ground with nationalisme.
Francis de Pressense, the Socialist leader who was subsequently to become President of the LDH, was well aware of the struggle he was fighting, qualifying his actions as "une lutte formidable", where "l'enjeu de cette partie n'est rien moins que l'âme de la France" (1902, 6). Talking of the nationalistic, anti-republican right, his criticism was that with the term patriotism, "ils accaparent, pour leurs sordides raisons, un mot qui devrait réunir tous les Français, et spécialement les Français libéraux et démocrates" (ibid., 25). For de Pressense, "le patriotisme ne consiste pas uniquement à aimer agressivement notre petit pays en haïssant l'étranger" (ibid., 30), showing an awareness of possible uses of the term on the right (cf. Sorlin 1991). Celestin Bouglé criticized the "soi-disant patriotes" who "essayent de déraciner la gloire de leur patrie", and who tried to "usurer et profaner... le beau titre de 'patriotes', si cher aux fils de la Révolution!" (1899, 23, 29). For the Dreyfusards, the term nationalisme was, by definition, infused with antisemitism. LDH Radical Ferdinand Buisson wrote a pamphlet entitled Pourquoi nous sommes Patriotes et ne sommes pas Nationalistes (1902), declaring to the anti-Dreyfusard lobby in general that "nous vous tendrons la main le jour où vous ne la tendrez plus à l'antisémitisme" (1902, 29). For the historian Aulard, the distinction was between the "patriotisme d'ancien régime, ce patriotisme agressif, haineux, conquérant", from which "sont sortis le boulangisme, le nationalisme, toutes les formes du césarisme démagogique", and on the other hand the "patriotisme large et humain", "raisonnable et raisonnable" of the Dreyfusards (Aulard 1904, 11, 13, 12). Antisemitism within the Dreyfusard discourse is presented as a survival of the past. For Ludovic Trarieux, former justice minister, moderate republican and one of the founders of the LDH, the anti-Dreyfusard cause was "une campagne furieuse qui semblait nous ramener plusieurs siècles en arrière", one based on antisemitism's "sentiments sauvages" (1900, 7). "L'histoire de la Patrie", on the other hand, was, for Trarieux, "l'histoire du progrès et de la civilisation" (in de Pressense 1902, 4). It was only once militarism had been identified with the anti-Dreyfusards that the Dreyfusards left the term patriotisme to the Catholic right
(Ozouf 1984). These distinctions between nationalisme and patriotisme are still found in political discourse today, as Alain Finkielkraut has recently pointed out (1995, 192).

Since the Dreyfusard/anti-Dreyfusard division eventually came to be structured around left and right, the left came to be convinced of the absence of antisemitism from within its ranks, a view I shall later question (cf. Chapter Three, Section Two (d)). Since the interpretation of antisemitism given by key social thinkers was that it was crisological (Durkheim 1899), then the permanent underlying features of antisemitism within French society went unquestioned. Durkheim “viewed racial and ethnic distinctiveness as declining and receding bases of social organization” (Fenton 1984, 121). This showed how racial discourses and those of social ‘progress’ would be thought of as binary opposites within republican thought. Accordingly, after the Dreyfus “Affair”, the republican left considered antisemitism as vanquished. For the communist Georges Politzer, “après l’affaire Dreyfus, l’antisémitisme a complètement disparu en France” (1941, 36). For Étienne Balibar,

“la défaite subie par l’antisémitisme après l’Affaire Dreyfus, symboliquement incorporée aux idéaux du régime républicain, ouvre-t-elle d’une certaine façon la porte à la bonne conscience coloniale et permet-elle de dissocier pour longtemps les notions de racisme et de colonisation (du moins dans la perception de la Métropole)” (in Balibar and Wallerstein 1988, 77).

Republican discourse from the Dreyfus “Affair” onwards, therefore, presented racism as being “chez l’Autre” (cf. Gallissot 1985). Such a viewpoint will allow me to engage in a linked, rather than separate, discussion of antisemitism and colonial racism within the Third Republic.

The Dreyfus “Affair” provided an arena for debate in which both sides - republican and anti-republican - could fight for French national identity. Both sides were sharing the same polemical framework, one which appeared to posit binary conceptions of identity, but which in fact overlapped considerably. Thus,
one of the commonest reactions from republican antiracism has been to analyze
racism as purely an emanation of those political forces declaredly hostile to
republican values, rather than seeing such movements and parties as representing
aspects of racism pervasive throughout society. Mainstream (i.e. republican)
political culture was hereby exonerated from any racializing process.

A further reason for the lack of any critical distance from within the
republican tradition to its own practices, was arguably the influence of the
socialization into republican values undertaken via (amongst other factors) the
school system, which projected the image of France as inherently open and
tolerant (cf. Deloye 1994) (2). This image came from the presentation of France
as home of the rights of “Man”, and was to be used to extol the virtues of the
civilizing “mission” overseas. Arguments over a “naturally” tolerant France could
also be found within specifically antiracist publications. Jean Finot, whose 1905
work *Le Préjugé des races* was still being extensively quoted by antiracists in the
thirties, could declare that “parmi tous les peuples, c’est encore la France qui a le
moins de préjugés ethniques et le sentiment le plus inné de l’égalité des individus,
en dépit de la couleur de la peau ou de leurs différences craniologiques” (1905,
431), the memory of the Dreyfus “Affair” seemingly already effaced. Chapter
Four of his book is entitled “La France et les Français comme exemple d’un
peuple supérieur, tout en étant le produit d’un mélange extrême des races”

In the late nineteenth century, the republicans were engaged in a battle for
political legitimacy, presenting France as always already imbued with tolerance -
a tradition of tolerance which the ancien régime was held to have usurped, as this
goes against the linear republican narrative of history and its epistemological
vision of progress. The necessarily contingent 1789 declaration could often be
de-historicized. As Bertrand put it : “(I)es principes généreux de 1789 ont
toujours été gravés dans la conscience nationale, ou plutôt ils y sont emmagasinés
comme la chaleur du soleil dans la houille et dans le diamant” (1900, 158). For E.
Blum in his school textbook, the Constituant “abolissait l’ancien régime pour
continuer la France" (1902, 76). Célestin Bouglé stated that "(i)l nous serait facile de renouer la chaîne du temps, et de montrer comment l'esprit de 1789, père de la France nouvelle, est bien le descendant de l'ancienne France" (1899, 110). Angenot has suggested that the Revolution as événement would naturally be played down by the more conservative and Radical republicans since their evolutionary vision of history placed emphasis on gradual, cumulative change (Angenot 1989, 15). The more radical constitution of 1793 was written out of such presentations of the Revolutionary legacy by the LDH, for example.

Just as the Dreyfus “Affair” came to restate Revolutionary “patriotism” over an exclusivist “nationalism”, therefore, the representations of the 1789 Declaration were also being de-historicized within sections of republican thought. For in the century which had intervened between the revolution and the Dreyfus “Affair”, far-reaching changes had occurred. The ‘universal’ rights of 1789 were coming to receive a more restricted, restrictive definition in the Third Republic, one based increasingly on national criteria. In the next section I will look briefly at how this happened, and the consequences for antiracism.

Section Three: The “tyranny of the national” (Noiriel 1991)

I would argue that rather than seeing 1789 as the application of ‘universal’ rights - rights which will be shown to be necessarily contingent to each political conjuncture - it is the social pressure for their extension and hence universalization that is the key to understanding the Droits de l'Homme. There are no rights whose formulation could ever be ‘above politics’ (cf. Lefort 1981). As the historian Reinhart Koselleck has pointed out, the Revolution opened up a “horizon of expectancy” (1990) for the ideals of equality and liberty to become social practice. We could perhaps then talk about the constant tension created between the enunciation of rights and their (non)realization. This tension is founded on the fact that initially, in the 1789 Declaration, there was no intrinsic differentiation made between the rights of “Man” and those of the citizen - they
were considered as co-extensive and thus used synonymously (Balibar 1992, 131-132). This identity of the two concepts stemmed from the necessary interwoveness, for the revolutionaries, of an affirmation of freedom in the face of absolutism, and civil equality in opposition to the privileges of the ancien régime (ibid., 135-136).

Balibar has used this observation to suggest that we think in terms of égaliberté, a term formed from the fusion of the concepts égalité and liberté, arguing that "(...) les situations dans lesquelles elles (égalité and liberté) sont présentes ou absentes l'une et l'autre sont nécessairement les mêmes" (1992, 135). It follows from this, for Balibar, that "égalité et liberté sont contredites exactement dans les mêmes "situations", parce qu'il n'y a pas d'exemple de conditions supprimant ou réprimant la liberté qui ne suppriment ou ne limitent - c'est-à-dire n'abolissent - l'égalité, et inversement" (ibid., 136).

Balibar's point hints at a methodology with looks at the articulation between liberté and égalité. Chapters Three to Five illustrate this theoretical point, highlighting the tension within republican discourse in colonial and postcolonial situations, for example. Given that fraternité would symbolize the exclusion of women from active citizenship (cf. Landes 1990, Pateman 1988a, Sewell 1988), then such a tension over rights should be applied immediately to the Revolutionary period, and the legacy this would have for subsequent political culture there would be an internal exclusion against women from active citizenship (here voting rights), as well as external forms of exclusion against non-nationals (cf. infra). The pressure to include social rights within the concept of citizenship could also be analyzed similarly. If we use this analysis of the tension between 'formal' and 'substantive' rights and their realization at a given historical conjuncture, then the Revolution is certainly not over, contrary to some assertions (cf. Furet, Julliard, Rosanvallon 1988, Gauchet 1989), which efface the important demands for a nouvelle citoyenneté and more égalité to have come from antiracist social movements from the early 1980s onwards.
Citizenship is a clear example of the way in which the national republican discourse was to operate according to a simultaneously inclusive and exclusive project. If we define citizenship as relating to the civil, political and social domains (cf. Leca 1991, 311), the equality within what came to be the dominant Revolutionary conception of citizenship only realized civil equality. Political equality would be made attainable once those excluded had attained the use of 'reason' necessary to give an 'informed' opinion (cf. Rosanvallon 1992). The benchmark for such a normalizing judgement was patriarchal (cf. Pateman 1988), and even the Abbé Grégoire, whose writing against antisemitism and anti-black racism will be discussed shortly, adhered to the mono-directional vision of Progress whose model was the secularizing, particularistic 'universal' of French civilization. Thus whilst I would agree with the theoretical point made by Bryan Turner that "(t)he modern notion of citizen presupposes the decline of the dominance of hierarchical social structures and the emergence of more egalitarian horizontal social relations between persons who are defined in universalistic terms" (1986, 19), the limits to this 'universalism' are clear, both in terms of the primacy of 1795 over 1793, or once the Republic was re-established with any permanency (i.e. 1871).

Further limits to citizenship were to come in 1848, when the right to vote (which was extended to cover all male citizens) came to be considered as the defining quality of citizenship, used to differentiate between nationals and non-nationals (Noiriel 1991, 44). Noiriel (1991), however, after others (cf. Bruschi 1987), questions the relevance of the distinction between nationals and non-nationals at this time, as most theoretical debates during the Restoration had perceived this question in relatively flexible terms. Also, the right to vote would take some time to become an essential practice for many Frenchmen. Étranger, as an epithet during the Revolution, could be applied to political adversaries as a form of denigration rather than a statement of juridical belonging (Brubaker 1992, 47).
Under the Third Republic, however, the enjoyment of rights was increasingly to become associated with the membership of a State, and, during the course of the nineteenth century, that State was to play an increasing role in the lives of all citizens as it nationalized society. For Noiriel, "(c)itizenship became possible only through the irruption of the state into individual’s daily lives. It is impossible, as a result, to continue separating the state and civil society as if they were two distinct entities" (1996, xvii). I would confirm Noiriel’s definition of the nation as a “politically sovereign institutionalized community” (1996, xvii), and as “(u)n espace fortement delimite et politiquement homogene au sein duquel sont integres des individus qui le plus souvent ne se connaissent pas, mais qui ont des interess en commun” (Noiriel 1991, 310). As Noiriel’s work shows in general (1991, 1992, 1992a), the State, in applying rights, draws the lines between those who do/do not have access to them. Noiriel is careful not to exaggerate his critique of the State qua State, since he points out the empowering aspect of the extension of social rights, and the impact this made on people’s lives. Yet social rights were not to be extended to all, and it is here that the contradiction within the nation-state has become a central, rather than marginal theme of national republican discourse. As Leca argues: “(l)a nationalité est un concept qui est toujours potentiellement exclusionnaire et la citoyennete, dans sa logique sociale, est un concept potentiellement inclusionnaire” (in Sayad 1990, 15).

This codification of rights increasingly on a national level, but restricted to nationals, was to take place from the 1880s onwards, exemplified by the exclusion of foreigners from most of the important pieces of social legislation between 1884 and 1910 (Noiriel 1992, 111-112. Weil 1995, 30-31) (3). The demarcation between nationals and non-nationals became legally clarified for the first time (Noiriel 1992, 86). As Noiriel has remarked elsewhere, “(l)a mise à l’ecart de l’heterogene n’est donc pas un “effet pervers” de la nationalisation de la societe, mais l’une de ses composantes” (1991, 311). The 1889 nationality law, rather than simply illustrating the republican primacy of jus soli, as Brubaker
suggests (1992, 110), was only passed with concessions to those stressing "race" and "hérédité", since "la naturalisation n’offre plus désormais tous les droits reconnus aux citoyens" - those having acquired French nationality could not be elected for 10 years (Noiriel 1992, 85).

The increasing suspicion in which foreigners were then held was translated into the development of identity cards. One’s “identity” no longer being confirmed by the inter-personal interaction of the immediate community, State agencies felt it necessary to ‘guarantee’ the identity of those individuals most likely to pass from one local community to another. The identity card in this sense has been described as the “preuve materielle de la mise a distance des autres” (Noiriel 1992, 164). Those judged most dangerous were foreigners (usually left-wing foreigners) and travelling people; from 1917, foreign workers had to carry an identity card (Collomp 1996, 1130). The police techniques culled the wisdom of physiognomy, leading to a situation in which “(1)teint plus ou moins clair", l"accent étranger", etc., deviennent des indices objectifs, "scientifiques" de l"étrangéte” (Noiriel 1992, 100), symbolized and rationalized under the identity card.

What I have described in the above paragraph, based on Gérard Noiriel’s pioneering work, is a part of the ‘given’ for the contemporary (i.e. current) debates on citizenship and nationality, since the dominant paradigm that rights are exclusive to the membership of one nation-state is the assumption from which much of political culture has been working for over a century now, a logic so deeply set that it usually passes unseen, hence the introductory remarks about the need to conduct a “history of the present” (cf. Dean 1994). As Balibar has observed, “(... au cours du XIXe siècle et du XXe siècle, la “citoyenneté” n’est pas restée définie par l’individualité pure, correlative d’un “état de droit”. Elle s’est spécifiée comme nationalité” (1992, 103). And within the nation-state as it was being formed - i.e. as a process -, the late nineteenth century introduced the idea that equality had “pour limites intérieures et extérieures la communauté
nationale" (Balibar in Balibar and Wallerstein 1988, 72). As Bruschi has pointed out, the borderline was in fact not just between nationals and non-nationals, since "le droit colonial nous apprend qu'on pouvait être français sans disposer pour autant de l'égalité des droits" (1987, 44-45).

Such questions are of immediate contemporary significance. The (literally) millions of identity checks undertaken each year by the police are often inspired by the association of certain ascribed physical characteristics and 'foreigness' and/or crime. As far as I am aware, no antiracist organization calls for an end to identity cards - whilst they all criticize the manner in which identity checks target certain social groups. Few organizations question the need for a foreigner to carry a carte de séjour - whilst they all wish to ease the access for foreigners to the greater rights it accords. In this sense the State has, over a century, been able to impose certain norms. However, in arguing that the concepts of citizenship and nationality should be dissociated in order to allow foreigners resident in France to vote in (local) elections, the idea of a nouvelle citoyennete, popular within antiracism since the mid-late 1980s, has challenged the hegemony of the nation-state in a potentially radical way. Contemporary antiracism has not therefore blindly interiorized all aspects of national republican discourse. Significantly, opposition to such demands for a reformed citizenship came from within mainstream republican discourse of the right and the left (cf. Wihtol de Wenden 1988a). Very few of the republican antiracist discourses before 1945 analyzed in this thesis promote a similar direct questioning of the contradictions inherent within the nation-state. This aspect of modernity was not lived as a contingent, historically-constructed situation.

It is important to stress at this stage, however, the way in which the nation-state was a construction over a long period. Historians such as Eugen Weber (1977) and Peter Sahlins (1991) have shown for how long this process of 'nationalization' (Noiriel 1992) was to go on, a process which would ultimately be incomplete, since arousing opposition (for example regionalism) which would
make it something of a self-perpetuating process (cf. McDonald 1989). By the late nineteenth century there were, however, nationalized elite discourses on nationhood. All social identities have important class and cultural-specific idioms which evolve according to varying temporalities: in the late nineteenth century, attachment to one’s ‘region’ (itself defined in relation to a centre) or village might well have taken precedence over national self-definitions. Nevertheless, the legislation passed would necessarily affect all such social identities through the intrusion of the State. What is often taken for granted (cf. for example Nicolet 1994) is the historical construction of the national language in which all such political debates were to take place (cf. R Balibar 1974, Certeau, Julia and Revel, 1975). Noiriel looks to parliamentary debates, the press, and the school system as the key determinants in the nationalizing process (Noiriel 1991, 91). This is in line with much of the oft-cited literature on the construction (or “production” - cf. Rosanvallon 1990) of the nation (cf. Anderson 1990, Gellner 1983, Smith 1983). Noiriel summarizes that “(si on limite l’étude de la nation aux discours et aux débats politiques, dès la Révolution française, tout a été dit. En revanche, si on l’envisage dans sa dimension sociologique, le moment clé se situe à la fin du XIXe siècle” (1991, 307-308) The proof that an increasingly homogeneous national “imagined community” (Anderson 1990) was being created is shown by the way the perception of the ‘Other’ starts to be more on a national than intra-national basis from the 1880-1890s onwards (Noiriel 1992, 278). These points are developed in Chapters Three and Four in relation to the press and stereotyping.

However useful many of the developmentalist theories are on nation-building with their often teleological projections, they fail to account for the exclusivist side to nationalizing policies. Here, I will consider nationalization as both inclusive and exclusive. Criteria were to be laid out upon which membership of the political and national community was to be based. These criteria would be centred around “cultural conformity” (cf. Silverman 1992, 33), equality being predicated upon uniformity. Conformity presumes a norm. The norm operating
the classification was obviously not called to define itself as specific, contingent or constructed (cf. Guillaumin 1972). For Erving Goffman, "it is not to the different that one should look for understanding our differentness, but to the ordinary" (1963, 127) (4). I continue this discussion in Section Four (infra).

As already suggested, the border between the cultural and the 'racial' within the republican definition of nationhood was ill-defined, shifting, and profoundly ambivalent, whilst that same definition was presented as being in opposition to 'ethnic' criteria. As Brubaker says of the academic developmentalist approaches to nation-building, but an evaluation arguably applicable to the republican tradition itself: "(e)thnicity and nationhood were understood as definitionally antithetical, and as operating at different levels of social and political processes". Ethnicity was not conceptualized as a major component of these processes, more as an impediment - in the form of foreign/regional languages, cultures etc. (Brubaker 1996, 81). Not only was the State trying to eradicate certain social identities but was, as part of the same process, forging what Balibar calls an *ethnique fictive*, which he defines as "la communauté instituée par l'État-national" (in Balibar and Wallerstain 1988, 130). This fictitious ethnicity would, of course, prove to have very real practical consequences for those who were judged not to conform (Calhoun 1994, 13-14). As Taguieff says: "(...) il n'y a pas d'affirmation d'identité nationale sans negation, (qu')il n'y a pas d'inclusion sans exclusion, (qu')il n'y a pas d'amour ("préférence nationale") sans haine" (1991b, 58).

Methodologically therefore, we should ask ourselves about the historical construction of 'differences' (cf. Scott 1988, 206), rather than taking them for granted as always already existing. The study of antiracism is interested in how these assigned identities are then used, subverted and resisted in the process of collective action against racism. Just as the State is creating a dominant identity, by secreting norms of cultural belonging, it is also acting to shape the identities of dominated groups, through its special treatment of (for example) colonial
subjects (cf. Henry 1987/88). What Noiriel terms the “institutionalization of collective identities” has to be seen as affecting both dominant and dominated groups, and the counter-hegemonic repertoires of action of dominated groups (1996, xxii). I develop this point in Chapters Four to Six, looking at how such institutionalized forms of social identity affected opposition to racism from colonized subjects and postcolonial citizens. It should be pointed out that in republican political culture, the prominence of any ‘right to difference’ argument from racialized groups can easily be exaggerated, since such an argument will acquire almost immediate ‘visibility’ in terms of the way it demarcates itself from republican discourse.

Antiracism needs to analyze, therefore, the link between the internal forms of exclusion - those affecting nationals (including colonial subjects) -, and the external forms affecting non-nationals, since processes of racialization can effect both groups when the cultural definition of national belonging is used. In relation to the earlier comments on the republican discourse on the 1789 Declaration, we can see how just as rights were increasingly being subsumed under the “tyrannie du national” (Noiriel 1991), they were being presented by the Dreyfusards as either ‘above’ history, or in their century-old Revolutionary form - formulated within a historical conjuncture which was radically different.

Proof of the way in which a national discourse came to dominate both the centre and the left can be seen in the relative absence of anti-nationalist publications in the Third Republic (cf. however Merle 1906). Socialist deputy Fournière’s *L’Artifice Nationaliste* (1903), for example, limits its “deconstruction” of nationalism to that of the right, what he calls the nationalism based “sur des theories ethniques : la race est son criterium, et non la libre volonte des peuples. Ces theories ethniques sont le fondement de l’antisemitisme (...)” (1903, 103). The way in which a diffuse national sentiment had been infused into the population was observed thirty years later by Henri Lefebvre. In *Le nationalisme contre les Nations* (1937), he judged that “(l)e sentiment national
This interiorization of the national republican discourse, observable within and across all areas and levels of production of social discourse, could have very real consequences of exclusion, and it is hardly surprising that foreigners should be some of the most astute observers of hostility, since on the receiving end of it. A 1928 report from the PCF’s Section centrale de la Main d’Oeuvre Étrangère complained that “(l)’on ne s’attache pas suffisamment dans notre propagande à combattre les préjugés nationalistes très enracinés dans la classe ouvrière”. It continued:

“(…) il faudra démontrer aux ouvriers français, empoisonnés encore par le poison chauvin, que pour les travailleurs il n’y a pas de véritables frontières autre que les frontières de classe. Nous voulons attirer l’attention du Parti sur cette faiblesse de sa propagande” (5).

Trades union discourse, however, since situating racism as a management and State tactic to divide the workforce, could idealize the working class as being devoid of racism. I shall return in subsequent chapters to the way in which the left was situated within a national discourse which could potentially prevent it from expressing solidarity with marginalized and racialized groups. This could be
due to the hostility of the use of identity politics as a source of mobilization against racism, or the fact that the left would ultimately often seek to ‘protect’ its national working-class constituency (cf. Gani 1972) and Chapters Three to Five). Union demands for equal pay between foreigners and nationals were often based as much on an interest to defend the national workforce as any internationalist solidarity (Noiriel 1992, 117).

Gallissot has summarized, for the period from 1919 to 1939, that:

“(e)n dehors de l’internationalisme qui demeure exceptionnel ou marginal, la gauche française, se tenait pleinement à l’intérieur d’une idéologie nationale fut-elle moins anti-bolchévique, moins ancienne combattante, plus universaliste qu’à droite” (1985, 78).

The way in which the national republican discourse was interiorized across all social groups (and therefore can be found - in different ‘doses’ and varying forms - within antiracist discourses), constitutes for Noiriel a sign of the extent of the “interiorisation du pouvoir”. and is for him

“la raison essentielle qui explique (...) le formidable pouvoir de mobilisation lié au national depuis un siècle et l’emprise tyrannique qu’il exerce sur les hommes, y compris ceux qui dénoncent le nationalisme ou qui proclament leur foi dans les valeurs universelles” (1991, 322).

If mobilization against racism was to be successful, it often had to be couched in the national republican discourse of one “France” against another (cf. Lebovics 1992) - themes prevalent in the fight against antisemitism from Dreyfus to Liberation (cf. Chapters Three, Four).

Analysts of contemporary antiracist social movements such as SOS-Racisme have pointed out the way in which such campaign tactics are still used today, with their “(...) discours acceptable pour les nationaux (...) en faisant appel aux valeurs centrales de la communauté politique française (maximes républicaines, Droits de l’Homme, valeurs de l’intégration” (Polac 1991, 84) (6). In creating a broad movement, solidarity can be forged between the different participating social groups. This is of course a positive point to highlight. As I
have already indicated, however, situating oneself in relation to the republican tradition constitutes a position of opposition to explicit forms of right-wing nationalism, but presumes that the social production of racism stops there.

I have already tried to point out the profound ambiguity of the Renanian-inspired theories of the nation - and which intervened precisely at the key period (1880-1890) - since they introduced a form of cultural essentialism at the same time as contractualist, voluntaristic theorizations of adherence to the nation. Thus far I have, however, talked very little of nationalism per se - as an ideology. What I have been describing in this section is the transformation of French nationalism from one of liberation - during the Revolution - to one of hegemony, and through the hegemony of the national state to a position in which it created exclusion. This republican nationalism maintains some measure of the original egalitarian project, but reserving this for nationals only - what Balibar calls "un egalitarisme exclusif" (1990, 58).

Studying nationalisms obviously has to allow for a diversity of historical developments, and include movements of Third World national liberation, dominant Western nation-state "high" forms of nationalism or the "new" nationalism of the contemporary period (cf. Brubaker 1996, Wieviorka 1993). There is the potential within any form of nationalism for the gradation between inclusion and exclusion to alter in either direction which makes it a fundamentally ambivalent political ideology (see post-independence Algeria, for example). As Balibar has argued, "(...) le nationalisme n'est pas simplement la "conscience de soi" collective (ou populaire) de la nation : c'en est précisément l'idéologie" (1992, 82). I am not arguing that the the national republican discourse constituted in the late 19th century takes on the same forms as that of the antisemitic nationalism of Drumont or Déroulède, or later the 1930s fascist leagues. State practices inspired by nationalism could be exclusionary, however. It is when the epistemological approach to exclusion from rights is based on social practice, that the convergence between the supposedly center-center-left
republican discourse and right-wing nationalist 'models' starts to emerge. For an analysis of antiracism, this approach helps to look at how racialized groups define their own situation, and brings out the contrasts between these definitions and those of the dominant groups.

The links between racism and nationalism have often been pointed out by researchers, but these links are usually framed in terms of the overtly racist nationalism of minority political movements (cf. for example Winock 1990), and highlight the (very real) overlap between antisemitism and right-wing nationalisms, although Zeev Sternhell's work (cf. 1987) has shown how such forms of racism could and did overlap onto the left. E. Balibar (cf. 1992) has theorized the links between antisemitism and colonial forms of racism due to their common insertion in the varying forms of French nationalism. This can help to understand the need for antiracist practice capable of admitting the diversity of the practices of exclusion associated with specific types of nationalism at a given moment, whilst founding this analysis on a presumption of a certain level of ideological commonality in the links between these practices of exclusion and nationalism. For Balibar, "(...) si le racisme n'est pas également manifeste dans tous les nationalismes ou dans tous les moments de leur histoire, il représente toujours une tendance nécessaire à leur constitution" (in Balibar and Wallerstein 1988, 69). Balibar, (along with Citron (1991), Nair (1994) and Gallissot (1985) and the work of Noiriel I have already drawn from), has developed a sustained reflection on the legacy of the national republican discourse. The remaining marginality of these critical voices is in many respects a confirmation of the resilience of the republican tradition.
Section Four: Assimilation, 'sauvage'?

To conclude this Chapter, I will attempt to bring out more sharply some of the contradictions for antiracism in its republican forms, through a discussion of the logic of assimilation. Contrary to the 'classical' interpretations of citizenship and nationality, which stress the idealized openness of the republican model (cf. Schnapper 1991), I will suggest that there has never been any real 'model' of openness for certain social groups - in particular colonized subjects - and that assimilation has never been considered a real possibility for Maghrebians in particular in much of elite discourse. A discourse of 'cultural distance' traverses left and right, although in slightly differing forms. This discourse maintains that, in relation to the French 'norms' of national identity, some 'Others' possess a 'difference' judged so irretrievably, radically different, that they should not be allowed into what Noiriel calls "le "club" France” (1992, 335). Where republican discourse does accept the notion of the possibility of assimilation, then the stigmas (cf. Goffman 1963) attached to the process of assimilation can and have provoked hostility and hence lack of solidarity from members of the dominant group with those called on to 'assimilate'. When antiracists argue that 'assimilation' (or 'integration') are possible for groups to whom that possibility is often denied - since they are judged "inassimilable" -, this tactic provides a counter-discourse to overtly racist themes, but does nothing to challenge the logic of assimilation itself.

Assimilation is a difficult concept to define, and is often conflated with intégration in the French context. I have discussed elsewhere the polysemic qualities of both terms (House 1995). Assimilation is always one-way - it is up to the individual or social group to blend into the dominant group - which will then be considered unchanged as a result. Intégration, at least in its use over the past decade, supposedly carries with it a connotation of reciprocity, of exchange, between those individuals or groups called on to integrate and the dominant group (cf. Haut Conseil à l'Intégration 1991). Here, I refer to assimilation in the
sense of "cultural conformity" (Silverman 1992, 33). The French 'model' presupposes that individuals and groups adhere to "French values" - culture, language - before being granted nationality (and hence citizenship). Assimilation is often understood as an inclusive practice. Yet the processes by which politicians, states, and their civil servants decide who needs to be assimilated (and then, in turn, who can be assimilated), operate classifications and categorizations and hence create social differences (cf. Bauman 1991). Assimilation, as Balibar reminds us, implies "la necessite de differencier et de hierarchiser les individus ou les groupes en fonction de leur plus ou moins aptitude ou de resistance à l'assimilation" (in Balibar and Wallerstein 1988, 37-38). Assimilation is an endless process, and can be called into question by the dominant (here national) group at any time (Guillaumin 1972, 106, 108). As Silverman argues (1992, 32-33): "assimilation maintains that there is both an initial difference which must be eradicated ("you must be like us") and an initial difference which can never be obliterated ("you can never be like us")". This is why it is simplistic just to denounce the republican tradition as one hostile to 'differences' alone.

I will argue throughout the thesis that the discriminatory way in which colonial/former-colonized groups are treated within contemporary French postcolonial society stems from such processes of created 'difference', and that republican antiracism prior to 1945 failed to challenge such constructions since caught up in the very assumptions of 'civilization superiority' upon which the assimilationist logic is based. As Balibar states, in relation to racialized groups in contemporary France:

"ce n'est pas parce que ces populations sont irreductiblement differentes qu'elles doivent être traitées différemment par l'Etat, mais, au contraire, parce que l'Etat les traite différemment, en droit et en fait, que leurs différences culturelles, professionnelles et ethniques (qui souvent ne sont pas plus importantes que d'autres, interieures à la "communaute nationale"), occultent ce qui les identifie à la population dominante, et font l'objet d'une discrimination et d'une exclusion" (1992, 115).

Assimilation, therefore, is based on relations of power. The State demands the cultural conformity of individuals and groups. The logic of assimilation is thus
one diffused vertically from the State - for example in the form of the school system. But to understand how these power relations affect individuals and social groups, then the horizontal power relations are just as important - those diffuse forms of power of which everyday situations are made (cf. Foucault 1984), and in which the rôle of stigma can be used (cf. Goffman 1963). This reaffirms the need to problematize any easy separation between state and civil society, or to consider either as a monolithic block. The State does not merely use definitions and categories which it takes as givens from civil society; rather, it secretes definitions into civil society as the result of historical developments which are constitutive of that State’s very continuation. An example here would be the way in which the *harkis* came to occupy a new administrative category as a result of the Algerian revolution (cf. Hamoumou 1993).

Noiriel and Beaud (1989) insist that, methodologically speaking, one must distinguish between “ethnic minorities”, which they define as well established groups present in the process of national construction, and “immigrant communities”, whose later arrival makes them subject to different processes. I would argue that it is the very logic of assimilation to be able to call into question, at any given moment, both the attachment to the nation-state of those groups who cannot be considered as recent arrivals (for example the “Juifs d’Etat” studied by Birnbaum (1991)) and those more recently arrived (the Eastern European Jewish immigrants of the 1930s, for example) pejorative designation from the outside blurs the two groups into one negatively-perceived group. The supposedly neat separation between *Israelites* and *Juifs* formed in the latter half of the nineteenth century, the former designating middle-class ‘assimilated’ Jews, and the latter their newly arrived immigrant coreligionists, faded away in the face of a virulent antisemitism whose *hétérodesignation* (cf. Taguieff 1990) lumps together both groups in its essentialism (cf. Marrus 1971). I return to this question in Chapter Three, where the problems of inter-class unity against antisemitism are analyzed for the 1930s.
Significantly for antiracism, the logic of assimilation was accepted by many middle-class Jews themselves, thus limiting reactions to antisemitism at the time of the Dreyfus “Affair” and again in the 1930s, as Léon Blum pointed out (Blum 1935/1993, 43). Indeed, many Dreyfusards, whether Jewish or not, played down the specifically antisemitic side to the case, highlighting more the denial of justice to Dreyfus: as Trarieux argued: “(t)ous les hommes se valent, tous les hommes sont égaux, au moins devant la loi” (1900, 15).

Another factor which questions the ‘openness’ of the logic of assimilation is that socio-cultural conformity will never hide the racial stigmatization attached to being ‘non-white’. Furthermore, the specific criteria applied in deciding who is/is not assimilated are historically variable (cf. Anthias and Yuval-Davies 1993), hence the fixation on themes of ‘identity’. As Sayad has remarked: “(p)arler de l’identité des domines sans savoir ou en refusant de savoir que c’est parce qu’elle est dominée qu’on en parle, c’est épistemologiquement se vouer à en parler de manière erronée (1990, 11). As stated in Chapter One, the ‘particularistic’ will be defined in relation to a ‘universal’ which is historically contingent: the goalposts for assimilation can often change position.

Where the theorists of the republican assimilationist model claim that they depart from a racial discourse is that the possibility of acquiring a ‘superior’ civilization is open to all. Yet there have always been restrictions on the kinds of social groups who would be admitted to this virtual, potential group of “assimilables”. Fanon (1956) pointed out that the idea of a ‘superior’ civilization is itself a racist concept. Here, I will look at how the debates on assimilation in colonial Algeria came to be translated into a restrictive immigration policy in mainland France, a policy from which Algerians were ideally to have been excluded. Both in the interwar (1919-1939) and postwar years (1945-), however, the irony is that Algerians would arrive in France in large numbers due to the economic and military considerations overriding and overruling the ethnic criteria applied by the State when dealing with Algerian subjects (and all other colonial
subjects). ‘Cultural distance’ predicted their exclusion, economic necessity their presence, but a presence subject, nevertheless, to a hostile discourse. Since Algerian subjects were nationals, then it was difficult to restrict their freedom of movement, and, legally speaking, it is incorrect to refer to them as immigrants during the colonial period (cf Chapters Four and Five). The immigration policies of the interwar years expressly set out to admit into France only those who had, via a sort of *a priori* reasoning, been granted the capacity to assimilate. These practices applied across the mainstream political spectrum. Further examples of official discourse of this nature are quoted from in Chapters Four, Five and Six.

The cultural essentialism behind republican discourse on assimilation can dissolve the theoretical boundaries between the ‘racial’ and the ‘cultural’ - since individuals will not be empowered to change to the dominant (judged ‘superior’) cultural model in their lifetime, and will therefore be excluded from rights. France’s colonial expansionism, reaffirmed under the Third Republic, was the parallel to the nationalizing logic internal to France, and should be seen as part of the same process. As Etienne Balibar argues:

“(u)ne nation existant en acte ou en puissance ne peut s’investir de la mission de sauver l’humanité, ou de lui apporter la paix, ou de la civiliser, etc., qu’à la condition de se penser comme immédiatement universelle dans sa singularité même” (1989, 9).

As Keith Tester has resumed the idea was, for the French (here), that “(...) *our* civilization was invariably held to have happened already, whereas *their* civilisation was still taking place” (1992, 9). The belief that the French nation constituted a model of progress to which others should aspire (cf. Condorcet 1795/1988) became so deeply held within republican circles that it was a ‘given’, as I try to show for the LICA and the LDH in the interwar period. Several examples over a broad historical period should help illustrate this point. The Abbé Grégoire, a figure chosen as an early ‘antiracist’ by various Jewish groups in the 1930s (cf. Birnbaum 1989, Caron 1988, Lloyd 1996, Marrus 1971, Nicault 1990), displayed a very ambivalent position on questions of ‘race’. In both his *Essai sur la régénération physique, morale et politique des Juifs* (1788/1977)
and *De la littérature des nègres* (1808/1977), Grégoire argued that Jews and blacks should be granted the capacity (i.e. the potential) to eventually become ‘equal’ and hence exercise political rights, but that for the time being, they were ‘inferior’. This ‘inferiority’ was not made permanent - and this is where Grégoire’s message marked a change with received thought of the time -, yet the timescale of progress is being dictated from the centre (France), and France therefore provides the governing, dominant paradigm. Such longterm development left little chance for most members of these two groups, except for the elite minority.

In colonial Algeria, cultural assimilation was available to very few (cf. Ageron 1968, 1979). The elite of *évolué(e)s* who acceded to citizenship - via cultural assimilation and therefore de-Islamization (Ageron 1968, 347) -, were there to provide an intermediary social group between colonizers and colonized. This showed that the colonial system was ensuring its own reproduction (cf. Lanasri 1995, 33-50 passim). The colonialist lobby in Algeria was influenced by the racializing thought of Gustave Le Bon and Vacher de Lapouge, and attempted to justify the three-tier citizenship policy there by suggesting that the indigenous subject population was inassimilable, and would always remain so (Ageron 1968, 990-991). Some reformists set out to show that the racial explanation to justify ‘inassimilability’ was unfounded. For Trolard, “(...) le dogme du Musulman insociable a ete invente et propage par ceux qui ont interet a isoler les indigenes, a en faire une societe separee qui aura toujours besoin d’une administration speciale”. The argument considers the *indigènes* to be inferior, however: “il n’y a aucune raison pour refuser a cette race d’hommes les bénéfices de la loi générale de perfectibilité de toutes les races humaines” (1903, 47). Inclusion is considered possible, but in political terms, such assimilation remains a mirage - the more the colonized moved towards it, the more it faded into the distance, since they were not in charge of the criteria defining assimilability and inassimilability.
When immigration had once again become a point of debate within republican discourse in the 1920s and 1930s (cf. Noiriel 1992), then we have the first consistent elements with which to assess the criteria being used for assimilability and inassimilability, which are based on a scale of 'cultural distance'. I disagree with Noiriel (1992) and Gallissot (1985), when they argue that there was no assimilationist discourse applied to immigrants in the period to 1939. The economic and demographic 'experts' who contributed to the discourse on immigration in the hope of influencing government policy did not produce a homogeneous discourse, but this discourse was undercut by the fact the only labour available was often considered ethnically unacceptable (cf. Cross 1983). Much of republican discourse succumbed to this racialized conception of immigration (Schor 1985, 501-502). There were grades in the hostility to Algerians, and to non-Europeans in general, but all writers were hostile to the idea of Algerians coming to mainland France. Interestingly, Italians - against whom a great deal of hostility had been shown at the end of the nineteenth century (cf. Milza 1981 (II), 816-875 passim) - occupied a liminal position: southern Italians, judged too 'Mediterranean', would only be considered as fully 'European' after 1914 (cf. Schor 1985, 100, Milza 1981 (I), 194).

The model for controlling immigration was to increase selection, preferably in the country of origin, as Oualid (1927) and Lambert (1928) argued (cf. Noiriel 1992, Bonnet 1976). The approach was to be based on the organizational methods introduced during World War One aimed at the travailleurs coloniaux (cf. Dormel 1995). As Nogaro and Weil, who had been responsible for the war-time importation of labour, summarized in 1926:

"(...) la politique française actuelle en matière d'immigration, qui ne se réfère plus guère désormais qu'aux étrangers de race blanche, est, dans une large mesure, le prolongement de la politique inaugurée a cet égard pendant la guerre" (1926, 62) (7).

The post-war logic was to be "(s)election, contrôle, assimilation - les trois axes" (Pairault 1926, 311). Such a logic was applied immediately to those Algerians allowed into mainland France, and their opposition to such tactics of militaristic
surveillance is described in Chapter Four. The administrative aim was to select “d’une façon convenable au triple point de vue professionnel, sanitaire et ethnique, une qualité de main d’oeuvre correspondant à la demande des diverses industries et de l’agriculture” (ibid., 10). Pairault conducted a survey amongst employers which revealed that the “Arabes” were universally considered the least productive workers (1926, 189). But as the conservative Oualid complained, referring to Italians, “(i)l est à remarquer ici que souvent les éléments les plus désirables physiquement et économiquement le sont moins politiquement” (1927, 52). For Paon, “c’est surtout entre les différentes familles du rameau européen de la race blanche que se fait et doit se faire le choix des immigrants” (1926, 193). These were relatively moderate opinions compared with those of Pluyette (1930) or Millet (1938), who looked to the racist theorist René Martial for inspiration.

The ‘cultural distance’ theory was accepted by many republicans (cf. Schneider 1990). Charles Lambert, head of the Lyon section of the LDH (cf. Bonnet 1976, 82), argued that “(l)e but d’une politique de renovation française doit avant tout viser l’assimilation d’individus similaires. C’est de l’Europe même et presque exclusivement, que nous devons sortir les paysans nécessaires à nos campagnes” (1928, 75). The confidence in France to assimilate the immigrants it had pre-selected was great, as shown by the LDH president Victor Basch, who himself rejected the hardline assimilationism of many within the association. In a debate in 1925 he declared:

“(j)e ne crois pas au danger des minorités nationales : le pouvoir d’assimilation de la France est très grand (...). D’ailleurs, nous ne devons pas nous permettre que les droits de l’homme soient prises par l’intérêt national” (8).

For Georges Mauco, “(l)’emprise du milieu et le pouvoir assimilateur de la France l’emportent sans conteste dans cette dispute pour les immigrés” (1937, 19). Assimilation was defined rather ominously by the main vector for management views, the Revue de l’Immigration, as “cette liquidation du passé” (9). Mauco, the undisputed ‘expert’ on immigration in the interwar years, had considerable influence within successive administrations in the 1930s (cf. Weil
Mauco viewed the essential criteria for successful assimilation as "parenté ethnique" (1932, 523). For him, immigrants should not be considered as a homogeneous block: there were those that could assimilate, and then those "appartenant à des races trop différentes: Asiatiques, Africains, Levantins mêmes, dont l'assimilation est impossible et au surplus, très souvent, physiquement et moralement indésirable." (1932, 523). By 1937, when Mauco presented his *Mémoire sur l'assimilation* to an international governmental conference on immigration, he had added "les "Israélites" de toutes nationalités" to his list of those judged undesirable (1937, 2). His arguments were formulated in racialized terms: "(d)es trop fréquentes et malheureuses unions entre Françaises et Arabes ou Asiatiques montrent presque journallement jusqu'à quel point l'entente et l'assimilation véritables sont difficiles avec certains éléments" (italics added) (1937, 82). Weil (1995, 77-90 *passim*), argues that Mauco's thought was to be emptied of its less republican elements before being implemented after 1945, although his influence should not be underestimated, and shows the crossover between racial and cultural arguments of 'difference' at the heart of the assimilationist logic. As Videlier has remarked, Mauco's work was dominated by "une conception biologique plus que culturelle du fait national et la croyance en une hiérarchie qui place au sommet de la pyramide des espèces humaines l'homme blanc en sa réalisation la plus parfaite: le Français" (1988, 191-192).

In Chapters Five and Six I analyze similar official and semi-official discourses in the immediate post-war years. I argue throughout this period that there was never any 'model' of assimilation which accepted the presence of 'non-Europeans', and particularly those from the Maghreb. These peoples' very presence in France will be presented as problematical. Such a dominant view was
to have very real consequences: attention moved from the exclusionary mechanisms within French society, to focus on the supposed specificity - whether termed ‘cultural’, ‘ethnic’ or ‘racial’ - of those subjected to discrimination. If one starts off the analysis from the point of view of social practice, and how this affected immigrants, then the analytical separations between the above three categories tend to blend into an ambivalent discourse of exclusion in which a racial element is present, potentially or substantially, and which can be appropriated by wide areas of production of social discourse. Here I have concentrated on elite discourse. The corollary to such discourse is of course the violence, both symbolic and real, that immigrants suffered over this interwar period (cf. Noiriel 1992). The discourse of ‘assimilation’ was not to go uncontested or unchallenged, and I examine aspects of this resistance, and the varying modalities it took, in all empirically-based chapters (Three to Six). There is no idealistic conclusion to be drawn, however, over the success of the campaigns which highlighted the contradictions inherent within the ‘model of assimilation’. The ‘cultural distance’ theme remains widely accepted today throughout mainstream republican discourse, as is shown by the frequent reference to the ‘successful’ assimilation of Italian immigrants in relation to those from the Maghreb (Balibar 1992, 58).

General conclusion to Chapter Two

All of the themes discussed in this Chapter have sought to problematize aspects of republican discourse when it adopts ambivalent concepts of nation, nationalism, patriotism, ‘universalism’, assimilation and the notion of ‘cultural distance’. This has led me to critique the way in which republican antiracism, in its various areas and levels of production, came to adopt some of these same concepts. The historical circumstances surrounding the restrictive implications of such concepts have been analyzed, and the late nineteenth century highlighted as a key period in the limiting of theoretically all-inclusive rights to nationals only. Until the decolonization process was well underway, the vast majority of
concepts such as 'universalism' went unchallenged, since an intrinsic part of the political culture of the republican tradition within which all Metropolitan antiracist and human rights groups situated themselves. The Dreyfus "Affair" served to mask the historical process of the nationalization of rights, since referring to the abstract 'universal' of the Revolutionary period which had, by then, already been superseded. The primacy of the republican tradition as the defining element of political culture in France, a primacy sealed by the Dreyfusards' victory, therefore had the important side-effect of de-historicizing the nature of rights. The republican tradition, a concept itself sufficiently open so as not to imply that republican discourse was set, unchanging, or unidimensional, formed the 'space' within which republican antiracism was to evolve. This limited and limiting space would serve to marginalize the critique of racism from colonized peoples and anticolonial groups more generally. Throughout, I have tried to indicate how such questions of assimilation and national identity continue to be relevant today.

Impossible to date precisely, the first changes in position within antiracism on such questions of the republican tradition came from organizations such as the MRAP in the early 1950s. What we see is the use of some critical distance to focus on the activities of the State, a critique almost literally not seen throughout the 1930s by the centre/centre-left associations such as the LICA and the LDH, which I analyze in the following Chapter. The MRAP, in stressing the centrality of equality of rights, showed that antiracism which situated itself within the Revolutionary legacy could integrate questions of socio-economic discrimination: furthermore, republican antiracism could open out onto a criticism of the State's agencies. In doing so, there was the discovery of the historicity of the republican State itself, and the nature of the national republican discourse. The MRAP, as I show in Chapter Five, linked questions of antisemitism to colonial racism, an antiracist epistemology which the national republican discourse had itself previously denied. These comments are not intended to imbue the general historical approach with a linear progression that it
did not have. Until the 1950s, however, the consequences of the nationalization of society were taken as 'givens', as was the assumption of 'civilization superiority'. Chapter Three develops these points, and looks at agency for antiracism in the thirties in relation not only to the republican tradition, but more specifically to antifascism.
Notes to Chapter Two

(1) The original text dates from 1915.

(2) In an original version of this chapter, much wider space was given to such textbooks from the period 1885-1905 and their presentation of the Rights of “Man”.

(3) Immigrants from those countries with which France had signed agreements on immigration (including Italy in 1904, 1906 and 1919, Belgium in 1906, Poland in 1919) had the right to equal pay with French workers (Weil 1995, 28-29).

(4) Foucault has looked at the same mechanisms but via the reverse process: “(...) il faudrait peut-être, pour comprendre ce que la société comprend par “être sense”, analyser ce qui se passe dans le champ de l’aliénation” (Foucault 1984, 301).

(5) AN F7 13250, 14pp, p.10.

(6) Drawing on the well-established republican symbolism of Marianne (cf. Agulhon 1989), SOS-Racisme produced a poster campaign in 1990 around the theme of métissage (and featuring what turned out to be a Brazilian model...). For Harlem Désir, “(c)e que symbolise cette femme métis (sic), c’est que la France, ce n’est pas une race, c’est une nation” (interviewed in Le Quotidien de Paris, 06 juin 1990).

(7) Weil was the head of the Service d’organisation des travailleurs coloniaux, Nogaro an administrator and Radical deputy (Cross 1983, 34, 242).


(9) Unsigned editorial, juin 1928, p.5.
Chapter Three: Antiracist discourses in context: the LICA in the 1930s

Section One: Introduction

Section Two: The first antiracistes?

Section Two (a): The LICA in context

Section Two (b): Antiracisme as defined by the LICA

Section Two (c): The external 'identity function' of antiracisme within antifascism

Section Two (d): Summary

Section Three: Marchandeau: too little, too late

Section Three (a): Introduction

Section Three (b): Campaigns (1934-1939)

Section Three (c): Reactions to the Marchandeau decree

General conclusion to Chapter Three

Notes
Section One: Introduction

In Chapters One and Two, I tried to outline a theoretical framework within which antiracist discourse and practice could be studied, notably in relation to dominant republican political culture. I argued that republican discourse should not be considered as monolithic, and that there were considerable areas of tension within republican discourse, notably regarding the theme of assimilation, the use of a nationalist discourse, and the articulation between liberté, égalité and fraternité. These areas of tension in turn influence the repertoire of themes to be taken up by antiracism. This Chapter seeks to illustrate some of these points, using a case study of the LICA (1) in the period from 1928 to 1949, concentrating (in Section Two) on the association's attempt to create an identity for itself through the invention and adoption of the terms antiracisme and antiraciste in the mid-1930s, an adoption which sought to stress the ideas of agency and autonomy. The LICA, firmly attached to republican values, nevertheless occupied a place on the margins of consensual political culture, due to the association's opposition to racism, coming at a time of a widespread antisemitism which was not to be found exclusively on the anti-republican right/extreme right. Section Three briefly studies the campaign for the introduction of legislation against racism from 1934 to 1939. This campaign raises important issues for the history of antiracism, notably definitions of the social construction of the category race.

The general context for this Chapter is the left's reaction to racism and fascism during the 1930s. Other organizations besides the LICA will be studied for comparative purposes, notably the Comité de vigilance des intellectuels antifascistes (CVIA) (1934-1939). The idea is to examine how the LICA negotiated ideological 'space' for itself through its opposition to the main vectors of racism which it defined as the fascist leagues in France, and Nazi Germany more generally. The LICA also had to negotiate space for itself in relation to the various areas of production of opposition to racism and fascism.
such as political parties (in particular the SFIO, PC(F), Parti Radical-Socialiste), political movements (Front Populaire) and organizations (CVIA, LDH, Paris Consistory). All of these areas of production of antiracism had differing agendas. The analysis will be based on Chapter One's discussion of the need to study antiracisms - and racisms - in the plural. Since the LICA adhered to republican ideology there was no reason why the LICA should see any contradiction in appealing to the State to repress racism (cf. Section Three): indeed the State was, according to republican conceptions of rights, simply there to ensure the respect of liberté, égalité, and fraternité. The LICA's campaign for legislation against racism, along with its persistent interventions in favour of political refugees from Nazi Germany, caused some friction with the State and successive governments of the Front Populaire, whilst drawing on the various repertoires of republican ideology in order to legitimate its own action. Its discourse is therefore far from gratuitous, and belongs within the republican tradition as a historical construction (cf. Chapter Two). As Brian Turner reminds us (1993, 64), choice of identity comes from a repertoire governed by historical contingency.

Both the LICA and the CVIA show a great awareness of the importance of discursive strategies in their own campaign literature, in the political discourse of other associations and movements, and in their regard critique towards racist discourses. However, to better contextualize the discussion that follows, and following on from the methodology for analyzing discourse outlined in Chapter One, it is necessary to explain certain aspects of (in particular) the LICA's discourse which went at least partially unquestioned, notably the "non-concept" of colonial racism in the 1930s, and secondly the use of the term race in the 1930s.

As Guillaumin has shown, certain forms of racialization remain largely invisible to all but those objectified by these processes: "le racisme conscient et exprimé s'exerce a l'égard des juifs à l'époque où se déroule dans le silence.
I'entreprise coloniale" (1972, 38). This point raises questions already partially touched upon in Chapter Two (cf. also House 1995a), namely the relative impunity with which anti-Maghrebian racism could operate in mainland France and the colonies in the 1920s and 1930s, at the very period during which concerted opposition to the dominant explicit form of racism - antisemitism - was developing. The Algerian nationalist movement under Messali Hadj (Étoile Nord-Africaine - ENA), for example, opposed this process of creating 'difference' undertaken by the French State (cf. Chapter Four, Section Three). In spite of very abstract condemnation of all forms of racism from the LICA (and the LDH) (cf. Chapter Four, Section One (c)/(d)), practical support of Algerians in France was limited to the CGTU and the far left. This conceptual blindness from within much of antiracism to colonial forms of racism during this period stemmed from a set of assumptions coming from a belief in progressive modernity, and which talked openly of 'superior civilisations' and applied them in the support of reforming, rather than abolishing, France's colonial conquests and mandates. An organization like the LICA in the 1930s is, then, at one and the same time marginalized in its opposition to racism within French society, due to the wide levels of antisemitism of the time, whilst the LICA was marginalizing other, dissentient voices stemming from anticolonialism and which carried within them a contestation of racism. It is therefore not anachronistic to analyze the LICA's position critically, since there were - simultaneously - other ideological positions being defended. The LICA's use of an apparently universal conception of human rights therefore shows just how relative this 'universal' could be.

To further stress the importance of contextualizing and historicizing forms of antiracist practice, it should be borne in mind that during the 1930s, there was little rejection of the concept of race per se, both in everyday and scientific discourse, since a racial discourse permeated all of society (cf. Guillaumin 1991). The antiracist position was to stress that the physical could not be invoked to explain the intellectual or the behavioural, and that the various races which were judged to exist were all fundamentally equal (with some
eventually more equal than others...) (cf. Schor 1992, 257-259 passim). It was the differentiation and the discrimination between different races that was considered unacceptable, rather than an affirmation of the existence of races (Lebovics 1992, 159). As the antiracist scientists of the Groupement d'étude et d'information “Races et racisme” argued in 1937: “(...) (l)e fait qu'il existe des races n'implique pas les conclusions doctrinales que l'on est convenu de comprendre sous le terme : racisme” (2). Success in questioning the use of the concept of race as a scientific category was only to occur in the post-war period under the aegis of Unesco-sponsored publications (for example Lévi-Strauss 1952/1987) (cf. however Barkan 1992).

The LICA campaigned specifically around the slogan of the “Union des races” in 1936, arguing that racism could only be overcome by joint action (3). Race on the French left at the time could be used as a synonym for peuple (cf. Guiral 1977) There are nonetheless a few examples where the LICA’s action hinted that it perceived race in this apparently non-racial sense, and where it did attempt a partial “deconstruction” of the concept as it was most widely understood (cf. Section Three (b)). In response to those racists who talked in terms of the supposed “purity” of la race française, there was a wide body of both scientific (cf. Races et Racisme) and vulgarizing discourse which stressed métissage, and the composite nature of the French population throughout history (4). The concept of métissage is extremely complex and polysemic, and whilst it has been used (in various ways) by antiracist social movements since the 1980s, is not entirely unproblematical (5). The concept of race historique, still often used in the 1930s, was not limited to the right: this concept stressed the common origins of the French people and their subsequent identity forged through the Renanian notion of having experienced certain events together (cf. Renan 1882/1992), and was hence (in theory at least) more evolutionary in nature than the “anthropological” category of race zoologique (cf. Taguieff 1990, 524 note 47, Angenot 1989, 1989a). Guillaumin (1977) has shown how the attempt to
distance the concept of race from any applicability to the social sciences in the 1930s was only partially successful.

Recent work on antiracism (cf. Guillaumin 1991, 1992, Taguieff 1992) (albeit from differing perspectives) has argued that the simple ‘top-down’ decreeing of ‘race’ as an inadequate explanatory mechanism for social relations will not suffice to change the understanding that many people have of the explanatory value of ‘race’ in everyday life. As Guillaumin has stated, the variations of the meaning of the word ‘race’ “sont considérables aussi bien dans le déroulement temporel que dans la simultanéité du champ idéologique” (1992, 63). If antiracism does not grasp this point, it will be unable to challenge the ‘explicative value’ of those ‘racist narratives’ as Phil Cohen calls them (1992), which are not taken for fiction - for example the success of the FN in blaming economic and social difficulties on certain chosen social groups. Schor (1985, 1992) has shown how such “racist narratives” operated in the 1930s at the expense of Jews. The question to be asked therefore is to what extent the LICA was able to displace these racializing conceptions of social relations. The LICA’s stressing at times of the use of fascism and racism by capitalism was certainly one step in this direction, since it suggested political solutions to political problems, rather than the recourse to racial explanations.

Whilst the LICA, in the two sections which follow, shows a certain awareness of the limiting factors within the republican assimilationist logic (a logic which, as we have seen, is the dominant rather than sole form that republican discourse and practice have taken historically), this did not necessarily translate into any support for difference. Through the notion of a rassemblement, antiracist organizations such as the LICA are not only appealing to different socio-economic categories, but also to people who see themselves as belonging to ethnically different groups. For Hyman, the LICA’s strategy of an antifascist rassemblement enabled the association “to appeal to young Jews who might otherwise have considered defense against anti-Semitism as too particularistic for
their sensibilities” (1979, 205). Nonetheless, few of the documents examined for the LICA suggest that there was a realization that both *assimilation* and *difference* are two parts of the same process (cf. Silverman 1992, 95-125 *passim*). The counter-discourse which the LICA develops is more a discourse with which to counter the far right - and on the far right's own grounds, the LICA's challenge being limited to that there is no hostility to the republican State and its ideology. It is within this context that Sections Two and Three should be viewed.

Having stressed the absences from the LICA’s discourse, and the limits to its challenge to contemporary common-sense assumptions, I will now turn to those aspects of agency that the LICA was able to develop in the 1930s. Part Two (a) of Section Two concerns certain theoretical and methodological issues specifically relating to the corpus of documents analyzed, and gives a brief outline of the history of the LICA in the period studied. Part Two (b) looks at the 'birth' of the words *antiracisme* and *antiraciste* as conceived by Bernard Lecache (arguably France's most prolific writer on racism and antiracism in the interwar years), and then used by the LICA. In so doing, I shall be arguing that the use of these two terms, whilst being situated within the general debate on the forms of opposition to racism in the interwar years, cannot be reduced to a discussion of whether antiracism is a 'double' of racism. This argument will then be developed in Two (c), where I shall argue that the LICA, through Lecache, makes political capital out of the use of the terms *antiracisme* and *antiraciste* to maintain some specificity in relation to the other antifascist groups, and the political parties within the Front Populaire. In the postwar period, the LICA used the terms to distance itself from those antiracists with communist sympathies who went on to found the MRAP in 1949 (Two (d))
Section Two: The first antiracistes?

Section Two (a): The LICA in context

Before looking at the arguments and practice of the LICA, it is necessary to paint a rough outline of the origins of the association. This started life as the Ligue internationale contre les pogromes (cf. Allali and Musicant 1987) created in 1927 by Bernard Lecache, a former journalist with L’Humanité (until 1923). Lecache’s political trajectory could be described henceforth as a slow but constant move to the centre, more pronounced in the postwar period: this mirrors the political line taken by the LICA as a whole. For the 1930s, an adequate description of the LICA is not dissimilar to that for the LDH, belonging to the “gauche non-communiste, laique et républicaine” (Agrikoliansky 1994, 109), although this did not prevent the LICA from working with the PCF, as the period from 1934 to 1939 showed. The term “antisémitisme” replaced “pogromes” in the title in 1929, although the subsequent anniversary celebrations for the LICA always take 1927 as the reference point (cf. note 1). As “(u)n groupement juif a vocation unitaire fortement ancré à gauche” (Allali and Musicant 1987, 29), the relative success of the LICA in the 1930s in attracting a considerable following has been explained by the association’s “identification of the struggle against anti-Semitism with the universalist goal of combatting fascism” (Hyman 1987, 205). Antifascism in the 1930s was inextricably linked to a critique of capitalism, the latter being presented by organizations such as the CVIA as the source of racism and fascism. Whilst the LICA “se flattait de demeurer independante de tout parti et de toute confession”, the association, as Schor continues, “était nettement orientée à gauche et accordait l’essentiel de son activité aux juifs” (1992, 212) (cf. also Weinberg 1977). This non-aligned sympathy for the left naturally drew the LICA towards the antifascist unity of the Front Populaire, although, as we shall see, the danger was for the theme of opposition to racism (here antisemitism) to become subsumed within the vaguer
discourse of antifascism (a theme also in evidence during the Algerian War - cf. Chapters Five and Six)

The attraction of many young people to the LICA (although their presence was reflected neither in its press nor its decision-making) was, according to Weinberg, that the LICA "implied a Jewish commitment based upon the understanding that one could not escape one's Jewish identity" (1977, 50-51), whilst steering clear of what they judged as the excessive moderation of the older French middle-class Jewish organizations such as the Consistory which refused "la lutte contre l'antisemitisme sur le terrain politique" (Schor 1992, 211). More generally, Weinberg (1977) has shown how it was the sons and daughters of primary Jewish immigrants (and Lecache himself came into this group) who were most active in the opposition to antisemitism in the 1930s, reminding us of the importance of generational aspects outlined in Chapter One.

The strength of support for this "major organisation combatting antisemitism before the war" (Marrus and Paxton 1981, 106), can be seen in the circulation figures for its newspaper, *Le Droit de vivre*, which, quantitatively speaking, represents the richest source available for debates on racism and the struggle against it prior to 1940 (6). Starting as the *Bulletin de la LICA* (1929-1931), only becoming *Le Droit de vivre* in 1932, the newspaper, going from monthly to weekly publication in November 1935, had circulation figures of 35,000 in 1937, and its rôle was described as one of "liaison" between LICA members (LICA 1937, 27). In May 1939, the paper could boast 8,500 subscribers, as against 4,800 in 1938 (7). Bernard Lecache was head of publication from 1936 onwards.

In its early years, the LICA underwent rapid growth: it seems to have corresponded to a need for antiracist action which the LDH at the time failed to satisfy (although there were presumably many LICA members who also belonged to the LDH). By March 1930 the LICA had sections in Paris, Lyon, Strasbourg,
Nancy, Le Mans and Mulhouse (8), and by late the next year Lille and St. Etienne had joined that list (9), and the LICA had 25,000 members (10). This number grew to 30,000 in 1936, after the creation of a section in Algeria, and the setting up of groups in all major French cities (11). The LDH’s membership at this time was in excess of 100,000 (Charlot and Charlot 1959, 1005). The LICA branched out to continue the struggle on an international footing, with the creation in 1934 of the *Fédération Internationale des Ligues Contre l’Antisémitisme* (12), and the *Rassemblement mondial contre le Racisme et l’Antisémitisme* in 1936. From the period after the first Front Populaire government under Leon Blum in May 1936, through to 1939, the LICA’s strength increased to 35,000 members in 1938 (13) and, according to Schor, reached 50,000 in February 1939 (1992, 213). This shows that the LICA was able to outlive the antifascist *élan* of the Front Populaire governments (1936-38). Only in the period immediately prior to the Second World War, did the LICA’s action tail off; many of the LICA’s male activists were called up or volunteered to prove their *patriotisme* against charges to the contrary voiced by the antisemitic press (14). An indication of the relative decline of the association, shortly after it had reformed in early 1948 (cf. infra), was that *Le Droit de vivre* could only sell 5,000 copies (15). Throughout the 1930s, the LICA could muster considerable support at rallies in Paris: 15,000 attended the Salle Wagram on 11th September 1933 (16). These figures suggest that the Ligue was of considerable significance as a catalyst for opposition to antisemitism and fascism in the 1930s.

The material analyzed in this Chapter - some of it transcriptions of speeches - is made up of some 210 copies of the *Bulletin de la LICA* (1929-1931) and *Le Droit de vivre* (1932-1940), as well as other LICA publications such as pamphlets, leaflets, and posters. Police reports and transcriptions of meetings for the period 1928-1940 attempt to make up for the absence of LICA archive material (17). The methodology was to note all occurrences of the terms *race, racisme, antiracisme, antiraciste, antisémitisme, fascisme, fasciste* in the LICA’s discourse, especially where definitions were given, and to then examine
how these terms were used within given contexts, and how the meaning of these terms evolved throughout the 1930s.

The terms *antiracizme/antiraciste*, for example, have what I will call internal or external ‘identity functions’. By internal ‘identity function’, I mean the construction of a collective identity as *ligneurs/lignenses*. The external ‘identity function’ of the LICA’s political language served, as I try to show, as a means by which the association defines itself in relation to the State, and within civil society — in relation to other antifascist groups, as well as racist and fascist groups. These internal and external ‘identity functions’ are therefore intimately linked and may overlap. As Craig Calhoun has pointed out: “(i)dentity turns on the interrelated problems of self-recognition and recognition by others” (1994, 20).

Before introducing the analysis, there are several other important methodological points to raise. The first concerns the relatively limited number of contributors to the formulation of LICA policy, and to the organization's publications more generally. As Schor (1992, 328) suggests, *Le Droit de vivre* reflected "les idees hardies de ses dirigeants, Bernard Lecache, Pierre Paraf, Georges Zerapha..." (and this list would have to include Charles-Auguste Bontemps, the newspaper's editor from March 1936) (18). This male-dominated organization relied on a few public figures to represent it and put across its demands. Internal elections guaranteed some measure of democracy; the middle-class Parisian dominance among the leadership was nonetheless marked.

Whilst the organization attracted support from immigrants for its "willingness to actively defend Jewish areas in Paris against attacks by anti-Semitic bands" (Weinberg 1977, 164), it is unclear as to what extent the (at times) ‘Franco-French’ debates within the Ligue served to put off prospective immigrant members. Nevertheless, according to Paraf, "la plupart de ses adherents se recrutaient parmi les immigres" (1988, 86). There could be pronounced differences between the LICA's leadership and other members and
sympathizers, therefore - differences of nationality (hence citizenship status),
language and class The LICA can perhaps be seen as trying to go beyond the
inter-class tensions within the Jewish communities in 1930s France, tensions
which, as Hyman (1979), Schor (1992) and Weinberg (1977) all underline, were
major limiting factors in the emergence of Jewish solidarity in the face of
antisemitism We get some idea of these tensions via the archives of the *Centre
de Documentation et de l'Vigilance* (CDV), a watchgroup set up by the
Consistory, and which viewed the LICA's relative militancy from the position of
the assimilationist logic of no "Jewish" involvement in politics, terrified as the
CDV was at the spectacle of Léon Blum at the head of the government. For one
CDV member,

"(...) la LICA (qui), recrutant la majeure partie de ses membres parmi les
elements juifs non-naturalises. et meme de recente immigration, a donne a
son action un caractere de "racisme juif", fournissant ainsi un argument
singulierement dangereux a nos adversaires" (19).

This helps to indicate the sociopolitical context within which the LICA was
operating

As Agrikoliansky (1994, 95) points out, there is a polysemic quality to the
function of representation, a term which "en politique, designe autant le droit de
parler au nom des autres que celui de montrer a travers sa propre personne ceux
au nom de qui on parle" Having to rely on the writings of five or so leading
LICA members does, however, mean that there is a relatively stable discursive
network which allows for innovation, changes in vocabulary, and departures from
previous positions to be clearly visible. The authors of many front-page articles
are anonymous. According to Schor (1992) and Weinberg (1977, 92-93), the
LICA's publications betray a characteristic of much of the "Jewish" response to
antisemitism, a response which adhered to a liberalism within the Revolutionary
heritage of 1789. This response was characterized by the notion of rational
debate with one's adversaries, and hence a certain willingness to situate this
argument on the discursive terrain of these opponents, linked to a trust in the
State. These factors are taken into account in what follows, and criticisms of the
LICA's positions will be given from right and left. Situating the LICA's texts (and texts which are transcriptions of speeches) within the rhetorical tradition of the time is equally important, since that of the 1930s relied upon oratorial forms seldom found today. Lecache, Zerapha and Paraf were all born in the mid-1890s, and thus belong to a generation of campaigners whose use of republican symbolism and imagery was taken from the moderate left of the post-Dreyfus era (cf. Devriese 1989).

On a wider level, I would argue that the trading of insults between racists and their opponents belonged to what I call a male public sphere (20). The LICA, for example, set up an École de Propagande which, although not excluding women, welcomed them in much smaller numbers, and trained aspiring Bernard Lecache followers in the art of political rhetoric (21). Another LICA grouping was the all-male Amis de la LICA, a group trained to fight the fascist leagues on the streets - a "groupement de self-defence republicain" (LICA 1937, 13) which the police described as "deux cents jeunes gens repartis en groupes ou secteurs à l'image des organisations de droite" (22). This willingness to engage in anti-fascist violence served to distance the LICA from the more moderate LDH. Women remained largely within their Section Féminine, under Germaine Corrot (23). The relative absence of women's perspectives was representative of other mainstream leftwing associations of the time (cf. however Reynolds 1996, 174-178 passim). The rhetoric of the fight against racism is therefore undercut by important gender considerations in comparison, the CVIA's publication Vigilance devotes much greater importance to women's rights (24). The apparently egalitarian, 'universalistic' demands of the LICA therefore hide certain sets of power relations which include class, gender, and the possession of cultural resources - where these cultural resources may well have a strong gender coding in themselves.

One final comment much has been made of the rôle of the written press in the "dissemiNation" (Bhabha 1994) of the feeling of collective, mediated
identity now increasingly called 'national identity' (cf. also Chapter Two). Benedict Anderson in particular (1990) has argued how 'national' newspapers can be a source of cohesion, bringing certain political themes to be shared by all those within the linguistic community (which community is not necessarily co-extensive with a nation-state) or nationalized language (cf. also Chapter Two). Here, I would like to mention the rôle of newspapers in the dissemination of racism and the stigmatization of the 'outsider'. I argue that in France, the two processes - that of the creation of a feeling of belonging to a distinct nation-state and, secondly, the 'nationalization' of certain negative stereotypes through the written media - are strongly intertwined. Surely it is only with the creation of a relatively stable, mediated reality that stereotypes can become nationally and internationally held ones. An analysis of the LICA's position on the racist press is likely to bring out the commonality of negative stereotyping within this racist press.

The influence of the racist press in the 1930s is difficult to assess (cf. however Micaud 1943). According to Schor (1985, 12) the antisemitic publication L'Ann du peuple reached up to one million people daily in 1930; the circulation figures of Le Droit de vivre look somewhat derisory in comparison (25). The continued demands for censorship of the press coming from the LICA and other organizations, and which are studied in Section Three, should be seen within the context of an uphill struggle by antiracism to have some say in the ever-increasing sites of production of information over the period. Schor (1985, 1992, 237) and Laborie (1990) have pointed out how increasingly widespread antisemitism became in the 1930s after mid-decade - ie. even with the Front Populaire in existence for part of this period. Both the LICA and the CVIA laid considerable stress on the need to reach a wide audience and hence influence public opinion, where "opinion publique" is defined as "un phenomene collectif, reflet et affirmation d'une position dominante a l'interieur d'un groupe social" (Laborie 1988, 103). For Lecache (writing in 1931), "(c)e que nous voulons (...) c'est d'éduquer les masses, l'homme de la rue, l'élite, c'est de permettre aux uns"
et aux autres, d’ou qu’ils viennent, quelque sang qu’ils portent en eux (…) de s’entendre et de se comprendre” (LICA 1931, 6).

The CVIA, which had been formed in March 1934 in the aftermath of the riots of 6th February (cf. Racine-Furlaud 1977, Jackson 1988) and which brought together left-wing and Radical intellectuals, analyzed the rôle of its publication in more specifically class terms. It reminded the readers that since “(…) la demagogie fasciste s’adresse aux masses (…) nous devons mener notre lutte dans les masses - c’est pourquoi la diffusion de notre Bulletin est particulièrement importante” (26) The right-wing press was, for the CVIA, “maîtresse de l’opinion qu’elle oriente à son gре” (27). Consequently, “il est tres important, il n’est pas suffisant, de faire une revue pour l’élite démocratique. Nous devons aussi écrire pour les masses” (28). The political instrumentality of organizational literature is here clearly detailed. The LICA also based a large part of its action on influencing public opinion. The use of the terms *antiracisme* and *antiraciste*, described below, should be seen within the same logic.

Section Two (b): *Antiracisme as defined by the LICA*

There are a number of stages explaining the emergence of the terms *antiracisme* and *antiraciste* in the discourse of the LICA. Seldom elsewhere during the 1930s are these terms employed. Bernard Lecache’s claim in 1948 that “la notion de l’antiracisme est, grâce à nous, entrée dans l’oreille des gens” (29) is probably accurate. As the 1930s progressed, racism was increasingly viewed on the left as a necessary emanation of fascism - hence the fight against racism was one first and foremost against fascism. Because of this, the LICA was able to use the terms *antiracisme* and *antiraciste* without competition and, in so doing, carved out an identity for itself (*antiracisme*) and its activists (*antiracistes*). Politically, this position was slightly to the left of the LDH, whilst the LICA declared unattached sympathies for the non-communist left and the Radicals, and was a founding member of the Rassemblement Populaire (1934-). The context in
which these terms appear is therefore inseparable from the political climate in which the LICA was operating.

A precondition to the eventual emergence of the terms *anti-racisme/anti-raciste* was the increasing adoption of the *concept* of *racisme* within political discourses in the mid-1920s, and has been shown to have been based on the demonization, by French left-wing thinkers, of the *passage au politique* of German national-socialist racial theory. This demonization suggested in turn that France was free of such models of racism in everyday party politics (cf. Chapter Two). As Taguieff points out, the new terms (*racisme*, *raciste*) were to create considerable semantic confusion, since *racisme* as a *term* was then used to cover various *concepts* - these *concepts* were all the various practices of naturalizing inferiorization throughout history, some of which had already been subject to considerable intellectual debate. As Taguieff resumes: "l'institution d'un terme conceptualisant, tel le *racisme*, est susceptible, par un effet retrospectif, de réaliser l'intégrale des sens multiples jusque-là effectués par des termes distincts" (1990, 123) (30) Taguieff fails to examine in equal depth the possible temporary advantages of the emergence of such a concept for mobilization against racism. In Chapter Four I shall show how the concept of *racisme*, as understood by the LICA, served in fact to exclude certain forms of racism. For the moment, however, this is not the main preoccupation of the discussion. An all-encompassing term, *racisme*, was therefore available to be taken up by the LICA.

This adoption of the term *anti-racisme* did not happen immediately, and was the result of political developments. To start with, the predominance of the fight against antisemitism won out against the term *racisme*, as the LICA's original title suggests (*Ligne Internationale contre l'Antisémitisme*). It was only in 1932 that the term *racisme* appeared with any regularity in the columns of the recently launched *Le Droit de vivre*, when it was used to warn against the "repliement sur soi d'un autre racisme de défense", supposedly applicable to that of
Jews fighting "racismes agresseurs" (31). Whereas the term \textit{racisme} was being used increasingly widely in political discourse (32), the newspaper still felt the need to publish an article entitled "Racisme, que signifie ce vocable?" in September-October 1933 (33). A few months later, Bernard Lecache uses the term \textit{racisme}, but in inverted commas (34). Only from mid-1934 onwards is the term used with any frequency, when the LICA pronounced itself "contre le racisme" (35). Some writers in \textit{Le Droit de vivre}, such as Gaston Bergery, had integrated antisemitism relatively early (June 1933) into a larger definitional category of \textit{racisme} "l'antisémitisme lui-même n'est qu'un des aspects de cette théorie raciale (\textit{itself contained within fascism})" (36). In the wake of the events of February 1934, the need for a common opposition from the left towards fascism led to compromises over interpretations of the causes of fascisms, all of which interpretations were class-based (cf. Droz 1992, Racine-Furlaud 1977).

The importance of an \textit{événement fondateur} on which to base action (here 6th February 1934) is to be noted. As Droz argues "(...) la fraction de l'intelligentsia française qui a pris l'initiative de la lutte antifasciste serait restée sans troupes si les événements de février (6th 1934) n'avaient rendu le rassemblement populaire possible" (1992, 184). The LICA was well placed ideologically to enter into wider antifascist action. Lecache had declared in June 1933 that "(l')antisémitisme est le fruit du capitalisme français. Si l'on ne comprend pas cela, on ne comprend rien à notre action" (37), an interpretation presumably not shared by all within the LICA at the time, given the influence of \textit{Radical-Socialiste} sympathizers and activists within its ranks.

The increasingly-used term \textit{racisme} to qualify the actions and writings of the far-right in France, and the Nazis in Germany, did not appeal to everyone. G.A. Tedesco complained in May 1935 that "(d)epuis qu'un régime de fous s'est instauré outre-Rhin, la langue française s'est enrichie d'un affreux neologisme, et il advient que, \textit{de façon courante}, on parle indifféremment de "racisme" et "d'antisémitisme"" (italics added) (38). The term \textit{raciste} was also being used more and more to describe the antisemitic press and the diffuse forms of racism.
in films (39), and used to condemn the opponents of the LICA, which the
organization grouped under the general term of *fascistes*, the meaning of which
widened out on the left after February 1934 to include all members of the fascist
leagues and their (the leagues') activities (cf. Jackson 1988, 43). After February
6th 1934, these organizations (*Croix de Feu, Francistes, Action française* etc.)
could no longer be reduced to a direct equivalent of the German 'model' (40).

With the increase in the use of the term *racisme* to qualify Hitler's action
from 1933, *racisme* and *antisemitisme* were being employed interchangeably,
without the need felt for further definitions, by writers in *Le Droit de vivre* in late
1935 (41). By the time of the legislative elections of April/May 1936, which saw
the victory of the Front Populaire under Leon Blum, the crossover between the
two terms was such that the LICA's opinion poll to centre and left-of-centre
candidates in Paris asked them "(êtes-vous pour ou contre le racisme et donc
l'antisemitisme?)" (42). It was only in 1938, however, that the LICA-founded
*Rassemblement mondial contre le Racisme et l'Antisemitisme* shortened its title
to *Rassemblement mondial contre le Racisme* (43). This serves to reinforce what
was said in Section Two (a), that racism, according to the LICA, could best be
fought within a general antifascist campaign (cf. Weinberg 1977, 92). When
Lecache summarized the campaign tactics of the first ten years of LICA
existence, he used the following periodization (a) between 1928-30, "fascisme =
racisme = antisemitisme" (b) 1931-33, "(l)e racisme, voilà l'ennemi" (c) 1934-36,
"(l)'union antifasciste sauvera le monde" and finally (d), 1937-38, "(a)ntiracistes
de tous les pays, unissez-vous" (44).

When Bernard Lecache came to introduce the term *antiracisme* in *Le
Droit de vivre* in April 1936, he was arguably defining the place of the LICA
within this united front against fascism, saying the LICA would support at the
forthcoming general elections of April/May 1936, "tous les candidats qui
inscrivent dans leur programme la charte de tolérance, l'antiracisme,
l'antifascisme, qui refusent de pactiser, sous quelque pretexte que ce soit, avec
l'hitlerisme" (45). In the aforementioned opinion poll which the LICA then conducted amongst the left-of-centre candidates at the legislative elections, only one of the respondents mentioned antiracisme, showing the novelty of the term in the political discourse of the time.

The LICA was soon using the term antiracisme retrospectively, to qualify the association's action from the start (i.e. 1927) : in a July 1939 poster to celebrate the condemnation of Darquier de Pellepoix for "incitation à la haine raciale" under the newly-passed Marchandeau decree (cf. infra, Section Three), Le Droit de vivre is described as "le seul hebdomadaire antiraciste" (46). In his post-war reflexion on the LICA's previous activities, Lecache said that in 1927-39, "tres seuls nous bâtissions l'antiracisme" (47). For the LICA's twenty-fifth anniversary, Lecache wrote a piece in which he declared "(i)l y a vingt-cinq ans (i.e. in 1927), personne ne voulait se dire antiraciste Aujourd'hui, tout le monde pretend l'être" (48) His decision to name the Algiers-based publication of LICA sympathizers as the Cahiers antiracistes (1943-45) should be seen within the same perspective, one which served to portray the LICA as the most legitimate postwar inheritor of the antiracist struggle. This tactic was repeated during the disputes within the Alliance Antiraciste and involving former LICA members. The Alliance Antiraciste, formed after the war, joined together the increasingly anti-communist (and very depleted) former LICA activists and the younger left-wing members of the underground Mouvement National Contre le Racisme (MNCR), which many of the LICA's members had joined during the Occupation (the LICA having been disbanded in 1940) (cf. Chapter Five).

The use of antiraciste and antiracisme by Lecache and then, by extension, the LICA more generally, supports the quote from Taguieff earlier in this section about the amalgamating effect of the introduction of new terminology (1990, 123) As a concept, antiracisme serves to group together various forms of diverse action This is firstly action within the immediate political conjuncture, since antisemitism and racism were seen as belonging to part of a wider whole -
fascism. Sufficiently specific to indicate clearly what it stands for, *antiracisme* is nonetheless general enough to be able to appeal to a wider, more politically moderate audience than the term *antifascisme* would have been. Secondly, this use of *antiracisme* concerns action over the longer term: a former opponent of racism such as the Abbe Gregoire can then be hailed in 1939 as "le premier antiraciste de la terre" (49), thus creating a direct filiation between the LICA and one of the most celebrated revolutionaries. Lecache also uses the term as a link to the *dreyfusard* heritage: "(...) les antiracistes d'aujourd'hui, fils ou disciples des compagnons de Zola, saluent respectueusement la mémoire de l'auteur de "J'accuse"." (50) Such processes of "inventing traditions", and which took place over a period of five years (roughly 1936-1940) fit within the framework of republican references, and thus stem from a restricted repertoire of choices, where new forms of political action are placed within the context of previous ones for the sake of legitimacy (Hobsbawm 1993, 7).

This construction of a specific identity (internal 'identity function') very nearly led to the LICA changing its name to become the "Section française de l'internationale antiraciste" in December 1936: when discussions were held as to the addition of "racisme" to the Ligue's title, Lecache wrote that the term *racisme* "rallie tous les suffrages" and hence should be included. However, the "militants de la premiere heure" demanded that "antisemitisme" remain in the title, and thus the term *antiracisme* could not be incorporated. Lecache agreed with retaining "antisemitisme" in the title for doctrinal reasons since, for him, "il subsiste des formes d'antisemitisme qui ne semblent pas ressortir du racisme", whilst it was hoped that "racisme" would be welcomed by those "musulmans" (sic) in Algeria which the LICA hoped to attract (51). Some distinction was maintained, then, between the different forms of racism. This suggests that there was a plurality of voices within the association which stemmed from generational differences. In the late 1940s/early 1950s, the older activists within the LICA, whose attention was focussed on opposing antisemitism, refused Lecache's attempts to widen out
the definition of racism to include colonial racism (cf. Chapter Four. Section One (c)).

The LICAs attempt to impose the terms antiracisme and antiraciste was stepped up after the end of the Front Populaire in 1938 and that of the left's united response to fascism with it. The association came out with the new slogan of "Antiracistes de tous les pays unissez-vous!" (52) and reaffirmed the idea of forming alliances only with those who declared themselves openly as antiracistes (53). The campaign culminated in a "Congres de l'Antiracisme" in November 1938 (54). This tactic was not simply one to negotiate some space in terms of party politics, since at the same time the LICAs was championing a unity campaign amongst Jewish associations of all tendencies: because not all of these associations defined themselves in relation to the right-left divide in French politics at the time, then antiracisme could, again, be a useful way round the problem of the long-established antagonisms which the LICAs felt were bedevilling any effective Jewish reaction to racism (cf. Weinberg 1977, 164-165). The LICAs campaigning in the 1930s suggests that antiracism was not simply thought of as a negation of racism.

The antiracist values within the LICAs concept of antiracisme were relatively vague. Racism was to be opposed through "une action à la fois preventive et positive" (55). The LICAs was presented as being "POUR le rapprochement des races, la sauvegarde de la Paix, la defense des opprimes, l'éducation de la liberte (and) CONTRE l'antisémitisme, la guerre, les oppressions, les prejuges assassins, la bête humaine" (56). The LICAs rejected "(...) tout ce qui tend à compartimenter l'humanité dans des barrières artificielles", and sought to replace this with a "société sans frontieres et sans classes (...) sans ghettos et sans races" (57). This ideal society would be one of the "union des races" and "la fraternité interraciale" (58), since the LICAs presented itself as "une organisation interracciale et interconfessionnelle" (59). In this "union des juifs et des non-juifs" (60), Lecache referred ironically to the
LICA activists as “la racaille juive et non-juive” (61). The position was that “la LICA n’incarne pas seulement la defense d’une race” (62). This need to involve those not defining themselves as Jewish was therefore not simply used to pander to the racist argument, common at the time, that the LICA was a “lobby” for “Jewish” interests (see also Chapter Five, Section One (d)). Instead, the LICA appealed to solidarity from all victims of racism and, on a more general level, to all those in society. As Pierre-Bloch argued in October 1936:

“(l)’a lutte contre l’antisemitisme ne suffit pas. Nous avons des compagnons de douleur. Car, la theorie hitlerienne affiche un égal mépris pour toutes les races qui ne correspondent pas au type aryen conçu dans la cervelle du Führer” (63)

Probably due to the hopes aroused by the Front Populaire, the years 1936-38 saw calls for all racialized groups to join together (64). The other area where unity was called for was in the inter-class appeals of the LICA. However, as the 1930s progressed, there was increasing hostility expressed in the columns of *Le Droit de vivre* toward middle-class Jews who failed to show solidarity with working-class victims of antisemitism (65).

The LICA appealed to a humanism which the association itself admitted had “tombe en desuétude” (LICA 1937, 4). For Lecache, “(n)otre doctrine, c’est la doctrine de l’humanisme, de l’anti-esclavagisme: d’un côté c’est le racisme avec ces ghettos, de l’autre, c’est l’humanisme (...)” (66). This metasocial discourse arguably also avoided the theorization of *égalité* which would have embarassed the association on colonial matters, especially if understood as a programme for equal political rights, or social redistributionism more generally (67).

Opposing the hierarchization of ‘differences’ created within racist discourses, the LICA was for the “négation de l’hierarchie raciale, sur le principe de l’unite humaine, et du droit de vivre pour tous” (68), for “l’égalité des races” (69). Lecache viewed the creation of ‘difference’ as the ontological basis of antisemitism, expressing his anger on hearing the racists “dans leur candeur
suffisante, établir eux-mêmes la *différence* qui doit nous (ie. as Jews) séparer*, and thereby refusing ascribed identification (70). In a declaration drawn up with other associations, it is argued that “(i)l n’est pas vrai que la haine soit éternelle. Il n’est pas vrai que les races soient destinées éternellement à s’affronter. Il n’est pas vrai que l’origine puisse constituer un stigmate indélébile” (71). The advantage of such positions is their historicization of racism, denying any validity to the naturalizing constructions of invented ‘differences’. Once racism is seen as a social construct, then it can be viewed as changeable through social forces, and some element of agency is reintroduced. At this theoretical level, the LICA developed a discourse capable of providing considerable challenge to French antisemitism in the 1930s, whilst not questioning in a fundamental way the concept of *race*, and largely neglecting colonial forms of racism (cf. Section One). I will now attempt to show how the political context in which this conception of antiracism had to operate came to limit its efficacy to combat racism.

**Section Two (c): The external ‘identity function’ of *antiracisme* within antifascism**

I have tried to show the internal ‘identity function’ of the use of *antiracisme* and *antiracistes* in LICA discourse - to unify activists, place mobilization within a tradition of opposition to racism, and to define a theoretical antiracist position. Identity also has important external functions. Following Birenbaum (1992, 26), identity can be understood here as an attribute to “se distinguer dans un environnement de concurrence”. If the LICA’s leaders are defining themselves against racism and racist organizations, they are also defining themselves in relation to other, non-racist associations and political parties. The ‘identity function’ of *antiracisme* had originally intervened, it will be remembered, in the few weeks prior to the election victory which led to the first Léon Blum government being formed in June 1936. The LICA had been beset from the start with the problem of political alliances, and here again *antiracisme*
was to play an important rôle. Since antisemitism was associated with the "retrograde" far right, then the LICA's opposition to these groups was obvious (72). But the new-found antifascist 'consensus' on the left, which the LICA contributed to forge and belonged to with commitment, did not mean granting support to any one party on this, all articles in _Le Droit de vivre_ and the leaflets agree, the association having declared itself in 1931 against "telle ou telle conception ressortissant directement à la doctrine d'un parti" (LICA 1931, 13). The LICA's Seventh Congres national of November 1935 reaffirmed this position (73). The LDH held a similar position (cf. Charlot and Charlot 1959, 1000-1003 passim).

Having refrained from intervening in the 1932 elections (74), the LICA was much more involved in those of 1936. Indeed in 1935, LICA activists had fielded candidates at elections to the Seine _Conseil Municipal_ (Paris) in those districts where antisemitic candidates were standing (75). Leading LICA activist G.A Tudesco stood and won against the racist Michel Pares in the IVth _arrondissement_ (Marais) at the legislative elections of 1936 themselves (76). The LICA's position in 1936 was nuanced: according to an editorial in _Le Droit de vivre_, in the first round, LICA members should vote for any candidate publicly opposed to "hitérisme" - hence the first reference to antiracisme and the call for antifascism. Where there was a second round, LICA members should vote for the Front Populaire candidate (77). The victory of the Front Populaire was not a sign for complacency. Bontemps wrote that "(l)e Front populaire triomphant est la condamnation du racisme il n'est pas necessairement son execution" (78).

The police found it hard to put a political tag on the LICA at this time, classing them instead in the vague category of the "groupements de gauche et d'extrême gauche" (79), although according to Paraf, the LICA in the late 1930s "passait (alors) pour subversive" in the eyes of the Interior ministry (Paraf 1988, 91). The LICA's decision not to ally itself to any one political party was stated at
some length at the Eighth Congres National in November 1937. Lecache argued that:

"(n)ous formons partie intégrante du Rassemblement Populaire, mais nous n'avons pas à prendre part pour l'une ou l'autre des organisations politiques qui s'y trouvent. Notre rôle doit être celui de médiateurs pour renforcer l'union contre les ennemis communs" (80).

Priority was given to autonomy of action within a broad-based campaign for unity and union in the face of racism, again showing the interrelatedness of the LICA's 'internal' and 'external' identity functions, these serving to fulfill the rôle of médiateurs, as Lecache defines it.

The LICA was trying to keep some space in which to manoeuvre, outside the dependency on the main political parties and campaigning associations. This was to enable the LICA to set its own agenda. As Léon Rudin argued at a meeting in April 1939 "(n)ous n'avons plus à définir la position de notre organisation par rapport aux Partis Politiques. Nous demandons quelle est la position des partis politiques par rapport à la question du racisme (applaudissements)" (81) Lecache thought in retrospect that the LICA had been too reactive in its action during the 1930s, and that, unable to define the situation, it had taken second-stage to party politics; writing in 1944 he warned that "(i)l faudra ne plus admettre que la LICA (...), soit le groupement auxiliaire d'autres groupements, ce qu'elle a été en fait" (Lecache 1944, 3). Indeed, there were a number of areas of tension between the LICA and the mainstream (PC(F), SFIO, Parti Radical-Socialiste) and non-aligned left (CVIA, for example). This tension came from the fact that, by April 1939, the LICA felt that the main political parties of the left had failed to give sufficient priority to the fight against racism - exemplified for the LICA, as we will see in Section Three, by the Front Populaire's failure to legislate against racism - hence Lecache's choice to revert to the slogan "Gauche, droite? Non, LICA" (82).

There had always been the danger that the specificity of the antiracist struggle would be lost within the more general, party-political nature of
antifascism. More significantly perhaps, the LICA considered the left to be compromised in some respects on the question of racism itself. Superficially at least, the LICA did not at first hint towards such criticism. *Le Droit de vivre* declared confidently after its poll of left-of-centre parliamentary candidates in the 1936 elections that “(i)l n’y a pas de racisme à gauche” (83). As the delegate L. Weinemann declared to the Sixth Congres National of November 1935:

“(o)n reproche surtout aux Israelites de se tourner vers les partis de gauche. Mais ce sont precisement les partis de gauche qui ont toujours rejete toutes les formes de “l’esprit de race” qui a ete, qui est encore, si nuisible a l’Allemagne hitlerienne” (84).

In a text published just prior to the events of February 1934 that were to result in the antifascist action from 1934 to 1939, an editorial in *Le Droit de vivre* declared however that

“( ) il y a une part egale d’antisemitisme dans la gauche que dans la droite classique ( ) du point de vue qui nous est essentiel, nous aurions mauvaise grace a choisir (between right and left), car nous risquerions d’etre egalement dopes” (85).

In the absence of any empirical study comparing levels of antisemitism in the 1930s on the right and the left (in terms of political traditions, political parties, unions, activists, sympathizers, voters etc.), then the above quote is difficult to assess. Antisemitism had, nonetheless, been far from absent from the left at the time of the Dreyfus “Affair” (cf. Fourniere 1903, 59, Cahm 1980, Honore 1981, Birnbaum 1993, Lequin 1994), but, according to Winock (1990, 203-204), the “Affair” had constituted an important turning point in converting the left to opposition to antisemitism. Nevertheless, in the background there was the long-term hostility to the perceived socio-cultural ‘difference’ of Jews, linked to the weight of assimilationism within the republican left (cf. Chapter Two) and then exacerbated by the economic crisis of the 1930s. Also, the discourse around immigrants and refugees (cf. Schor 1985, Noiriel 1991) could provide some indications as to the existence of antisemitism on the left. The sometimes generous antiracist, internationalist positions adopted by union leaders did not always reflect the attitudes of the membership, for example (and inversely). The
populist theme of the "deux cents familles", aimed at the capital-owning elite, often gave prominent place to Jewish families (the Rothschilds, for example). Whilst Jackson stresses the unifying nature of such an anticapitalist theme (1988, 49), Birnbaum (1984) has suggested some possible reversibility between anticapitalism and antisemitism within a populist discourse.

Opposition to antisemitism is often not given great importance in PCF campaigning against fascism. Maurice Thorez, in a speech in August 1935 to warn against the dangers posed by fascism, concentrates on the likely socio-economic results of a hypothetical fascist victory in France. Only at the end of his list of examples does he declare that "ce serait comme en Allemagne, après les Juifs, les catholiques et protestants frappés par le fascisme" (86). For Hyman, however, "while the French CP paid no particular attention to the special case of the Jews as victims of persecution, it did exalt all victims of capitalism and fascism, thus furnishing psychological sustenance to the immigrant Jewish workers" (1979, 113). The PCF was not alone in talking little of the dangers of racism within fascism; similar absences occur in *Vigilance*, the CVIA's publication (cf. however Racine-Furlaud 1977, 106-107 passim). Perhaps LICA activists interpreted this lack of priority given to fighting antisemitism as veiled hostility.

Pacifism was another area of divergence between the LICA and other members of the Rassemblement/Front Populaire. The unity between the LICA and the other organizations centred around the imminence of an internal fascist threat. The LICA, however, was equally preoccupied by the external political situation - notably in Germany (87). It was for this reason that from 1933 the LICA organized, through *Le Droit de vivre*, a boycott in France of German products, for example (cf. Hyman 1979, 208). For Lecache, "le phénomène raciste est international. Nous devons le combattre sur un plan international sous peine de mort" (88). The LICA had, after all, originally been founded to campaign in France against antisemitism in Eastern Europe, and therefore
articulated what would now be called a diasporic vision of Jewish identity (although the term diaspora was not used), based on the need for solidarity amongst Jews, whilst seeking to attract as many non-Jews as possible. The CVIA, on the other hand, was split by the ‘hardline’ pacifist stance of some of its members (cf. Racine-Furlaud 1977, Jackson 1988, 242, 247). Whilst the LICA had always been committed to an anti-war stance, it did not hesitate to condemn the Munich Agreement, some of the “pacifistes intégraux” who opposed the LICA on these matters were subsequently to take on an overtly antisemitic stance (Challaye, Emery) (cf. Irvine 1994, Laborie 1990, 87-102 passim) (89). A new strand of antisemitism was to be born out of such differences - the allegations that Jews wanted war with Germany.

Section Two (d) : Summary

The question of a lack of priority given to opposition to antisemitism, the way in which antifascism as an all-embracing discourse and practice tended to marginalize antiracism, the existence of antisemitism on the French left, and the question of pacifism all serve to question any idealized image of the relationship between antiracism and the Front Populaire. As Racine (1966, 47) has argued, the idea of a rassemblement was based on a platform of opposition to fascism, even if the preservation of democracy was the underlining feature (cf. also Jackson 1988). Internal dissensions were therefore inevitable. The LICA found it difficult to accommodate the at times conflicting political agendas within antifascism. I would disagree here with Weinberg (1977, 92), who argues that there was a deliberate “dilution” of the LICA’s priority given to mobilizing against antisemitism due to its “front commun” antifascist approach. Rather, I see the LICA as having had to adapt to difficult political circumstances and “allies” not always willing to see unfolding historical events from the LICA’s perspective. After the Occupation, and once the LICA was reconstituted in 1948, independence from party politics was strongly reaffirmed. This need to remain ‘unattached’, characterized by the slogan "(o)n n’est ni Trumaniste ni Staliniste",
since "(l)es antiracistes veulent UNIR et non DIVISER", was another way for the LICA to distance itself from the *Alliance Antiraciste* (90). Lecache argued in 1949 that it was only on the LICA's terms that the association would henceforth work with political parties, himself only favourable to "la lutte avec les partis politiques qui acceptent nos mots d'ordre et non point la lutte avec les partis politiques dont nous accepterions les mots d'ordre" (91). As argued in the introduction to this Section, the identity politics at play here concern the LICA's ability to keep its own particular position on racism, through the notion of *antiracisme* (internal 'identity function'), at the same time as rallying those political formations within which it could work most effectively (external 'identity function'). However, the putative discursive consensus of the Front Populaire against racism soon disappeared. Laws were introduced in 1938 victimizing the victims of racism and culminating in an "administrative pogrom" (Marrus and Paxton 1981, 67) (92).

Once this had occurred, the LICA could only appeal to the State, and on the State's own terms, notably the respect of republican values. The campaign for legislation outlawing racist propaganda is one example of the way in which the LICA had to turn increasingly desperately toward the State to suppress racism as the decade progressed. Furthermore, the 1930s coincided with the process of integration of the left into the State which had started in the late nineteenth century and culminated with the election of the Front Populaire, making more complex (while the Front was in power) the articulation of oppositional demands. It is within this context that Section Three should be considered.
Section Three: Marchandeau: too little, too late

Section Three (a): Introduction

As was argued in Section Two, the LICA was very aware of the importance of putting across an antiracist argument, hence the early creation of its *École de propagande*. This also led to discussions over the suitability of certain terms and themes within its campaign literature (93). Likewise, the association undertook particularly close scrutiny of the racist press, and thought hard about the best ways of silencing what Rudin called "un antisemitisme de tribune" (94). The LICA's aim was to "faire comprendre que les notions telles que Race, Sang, Antisemitisme, ne se prêtent guère à un travail positif et au progrès social" (95). However, as was pointed out in an unsigned editorial in *Le Droit de vivre* in March 1935, most people only thought of racism when confronted with a highly explicit form of it: "(...) la propagande anti-juive s'étale sournoisement, va en profondeur, ne prend pas - sauf en Afrique du Nord - un caractère de publicité qui la trahirait" (96). Few outside the activists were therefore likely to champion the passing of legislation against racism. Indeed, perhaps the real indication of the lip-service paid by many politicians to the LICA's themes is that even during the Front Populaire administrations, none of the legislative proposals for prosecuting racist newspapers was adopted, despite intense campaigning. The LICA showed itself to be incapable of mustering sufficient institutional support for such legislation. When the Marchandeau decree was enacted, in April 1939, the situation was arguably too far advanced for the measures to have real effect. This Section will examine in part Three (b) the reasons for this delay, the issues involved, and the terminology used in the proposals for legislation and the legislative documents themselves. The Marchandeau decree was the first legal text to talk explicitly in terms of *race* (97). Part Three (c) will then examine the reactions to this Decree. This Section further illustrates the rôle of appeals both to the State and to civil society at the heart of the LICA's action.
Section Three (h) : Campaigns (1934-1939)

The attempts by the MRAP to pass legislation against racism, finally successful in 1972, are described briefly in Chapter Five, Section One (d). These post-war campaigns were to build on the precedent set by the Marchandeau decree of April 1939. Such debates concern the rights to censure political discourse, and are still very present today as part of the opposition to the FN (98). However, the earliest demands formulated for an amendment to the 1881 law on the press to cover racist abuse (diffamation) seem to have come from LDH president Victor Basch in 1918 (F. Basch 1994, 181). There was, nevertheless, a fundamental problem in the manner in which such questions were conceptualized in French legal discourse, which held a very narrow definition of the groupe, one limited to corps constitués such as the administration, the army and ministers (amongst others). As Hamburger put it: "(l)a législation pénale française n'a pas songé à défendre le groupe: c'est une lacune grave qui risque d'avoir des conséquences désastreuses" (1939, 30). There were thus to be considerable difficulties in extending a law to cover racialized groups, whereas this law - in theory at least - did offer some protection to individuals. The 1881 law did not mention race or origine(s) at all (99). The LICA, the main association campaigning for a revision of the law, complained that no French law "distingue dans la nation une catégorie de citoyens considérés comme constituant une minorité ethnique ou un corps particulier. Il n'est donc pas possible aux juifs diffamés d'instrumenter contre leurs diffamateurs" (100). Hence in France "(o)n n'(y) punit pas la propagande raciste, l'outrage à une collectivité ethnique" (101). The preliminary report on the Marchandeau decree outlines this problem that "un groupement ne formant pas un être moral (...) (would therefore not be considered as having) une existence légale lui permettant d'ester en justice", without specific reference to any one social group (102).

Whilst this legal argument no doubt had considerable weight (and was to be used once the Marchandeau decree was enacted to criticize it), the main
reservation invoked against changing the legislation was the 'necessary' safeguard of the freedom of the press. As such, there was an interesting debate on the limits of conceptions of the rights of "Man", with some tension between freedom of speech and the spirit of égalité. Numerous examples can be considered to show such a tension. At State level, it was this classic liberal conception of rights which stopped prosecution in 1934 of the racist newspaper *L'Anti-Juif* after formal complaints from the LICA and the député Scapini. Whilst the garde des Sceaux apparently agreed that the newspaper was antisemitic, in a hand-written note on the letter sent from the Interior minister on the question, he had added : "le Parquet ne peut évidemment rien faire : la Presse est libre!" (103). Lecache, however, had justified the right to curtail press freedom as early as 1930 : "(l)a tolérance que nous prônons, c'est le fait de ne point entraver l'exercice du droit d'autrui" (104). In February 1934, the LICA's newspaper argued that "(l)a systématisation d'une propagande raciste flottant les instincts primaires des foules (sic) doit faire enlever nos dernières hésitations, nos derniers scrupules (as far as the freedom of the press was concerned)" (105). The LDH in particular, given its history of interventions in favour of freedom of speech, found itself in a difficult position on the question (cf Irvine 1994, 11-12). In a case soon after the enactment of the decree, the LDH stated that not all racist magazines and literature on sale in railway stations should be banned, because of freedom of speech (106) The preliminary report introducing the Marchandeau decree seemed to anticipate possible criticism, as it stated that "(l)e maintien des libertés publiques doit pouvoir se concilier avec la sauvegarde des intérêts collectifs", and says that the "notion de liberté" at the basis of the 1881 law is to be guaranteed whilst articulating it with "la devise républicaine elle-même" (107).

Some of the themes from the 1930s can be seen in the very contemporary debates on antiracism and the FN's discourse. There was, for example, a debate over who was or was not fasciste or raciste, particularly concerning de la Roque, leader of the (extreme) right-wing *Croix de Feu* league (cf. Soucy 1995, 18, 146, 158). By the mid-1930s, consistent with what was outlined in Section Two, using
the tag *fasciste* and/or *raciste* had become a way of delegitimizing opponents in political discourse (cf. also Taguieff 1990, 1995). The CVIA complained, for example, that "(l)es fascistes non seulement ne s'avouent pas, en général, fascistes, mais ils sont prêts à adopter n'importe quelle étiquette même la plus démocratique, pourvu qu'ils arrivent à leurs fins" (108). For the CVIA, "parmi ceux que la voix populaire désigne comme fascistes, aucun groupe important ne se reconnaît pour tel" (CVIA 1935, 5). The term *fasciste* had acquired such a wide meaning, Pierre Gérôme (real name François Walter) went on to complain, that it was becoming inoperable: "(s)i la signification du fascisme prête à de telles incertitudes, rien d'étonnant à voir l'accusation de fascisme renvoyée d'un camp à l'autre" (CVIA 1935, 7-8).

The LICA had hoped that a law against written forms of racism would be introduced by the (first) Front Populaire government, and that it would be carried through with the legislation disbanding the fascist leagues on 18th June 1936. However, this was not to be the case. Such inaction created tension between the LICA and the Front Populaire, especially as legislation had already been enacted in the Netherlands and Switzerland to ban racist propaganda (109). The Rassemblement Populaire (LICA, LDH, SFIO, CVIA, CGT, CGTU) had, prior to the 1936 legislative elections, stated its aims to see the introduction of such legislation (110). The LICA made several direct references to the apparent imminency of legislation once the Front Populaire was about to reach power (111). The LICA demanded "Maurras en prison! Le racisme hors la loi!", Lecache complaining that "(d)ans la France des Droits de l'Homme, nulle loi ne vient contrecarrer les agissements sordides des Maurras. Cette loi, nous l'exigeons au nom des principes démocratiques" (112). Over the next couple of years there were constant reminders in the columns of *Le Droit de vivre* over the lack of legislation (113), and the CDV thought that a text was likely in 1938 (114). The LICA demanded dissolution of the fascist leagues which had reformed after 1936, and "(l')interdiction de tous les meetings, réunions publiques ou privées, qui ont pour objet l'exaltation du racisme et de l'antisémitisme" (115).
Perhaps Blum was afraid that any legislation may have attracted the criticism that he was merely representing "Jewish interests" (cf. infra, Part Three (c)) - no legislation against racism was forthcoming.

In an attempt to spur on action, in February 1939 the LICA produced its own legislative text in the hope it would be adopted. This text conspicuously avoided any mention of race, preferring minorité ethnique, which suggests that even at this time the latter term was considered acceptable within republican antiracist discourse. This LICA text talks of citoyens and ressortissants français, the latter category presumably referring to French colonial subjects. The LICA document went beyond simply reproducing the racialized categories used within racist discourse, and stressed the way in which such categorization was a social construction. The LICA text sought to target:

"(...) tout individu qui aura publiquement, par la presse ou par la parole, diffame des personnes non nommées, mais designées par des appellations collectives employées dans l'intention d'établir une discrimination ethnique tendant à rejeter de la communauté nationale de catégories de citoyens ou de ressortissants français ainsi mis collectivement en cause" (116).

The Marchandeau decree differs from these formulations on certain important points of terminology, as I will show (below). The LICA's proposal also sought to entitle representative associations to become civil parties in any legal proceedings, a proposal which the final Decree did not retain.

Various other groups were also pressurizing for legislation. Oscar de Ferenzy's Catholic publication La Juste Parole being the most significant, although de Ferenzy's position on antisemitism was very ambiguous (cf. Birnbaum 1988, 244-246 passim). The essential basis of these campaigns was to fight antisemitism in mainland France. The colonial dimension was, however, not entirely lacking. In spite of the relatively timid response of the Consistory's Centre de Documentation et de l'Vigilance (CDV) to antisemitism in general, the CDV nonetheless sought to bring in legislation which could also be used for "Français de couleur" (117). A text in the CDV archives talks of prosecuting
those whose action "nuit ou menace de nuire à l'égalité des citoyens devant la loi", where this equality is threatened on account of a person's "race, couleur, religion, origine ou nationalité antérieure", and defines "population" as consisting of "tous ceux qui habitent sur le territoire de la République", therefore implicitly including the colonial territories (118) This text also differs both from the LICA's proposal and the Marchandeau decree in that it fully includes a consideration of the range of means by which racist propaganda is diffused, the CDV-backed text mentioning "écrits, imprimés, placards, affiches, images, dessins, gravures, peintures, emblèmes, disques radiophoniques". Furthermore, the text hints at a more practice-based conception of racism, since it also applied to anyone guilty of racism "dans l'exercice de (sa) profession", stating that the right to practise that profession could then be withdrawn if the individual was found guilty.

In relation to the text in the CDV archives, the wording of the Marchandeau decree is extremely limited. The Decree was published, along with thirty-nine others, on 25th April 1939. As a decree, there was no parliamentary debate on the question, something which attracted criticism from the LICA's youth section (119). The text was accompanied by a decree banning certain overtly fascist-inspired groups in Alsace, and thus attention was pulled towards pro-Nazi propaganda rather than the well-established forms of French antisemitism. There was also a decree which repressed "anti-national" propaganda, further damaging the specificity of the Marchandeau decree itself. In the introductory report (préambule), the Decree was presented as an effort to consolidate national cohésion, therefore as a matter of defence. It was not there to come to the aid of racialized categories: "(...) ce n'est pas proprement leur intérêt qui est en jeu sous ce rapport, c'est bien plutôt celui de la collectivité nationale", the decree having "seulement en vue l'intérêt public et le salut de la patrie". The report stated that action was to be taken since "aucune raison tirée de la race ou de la religion ne peut rompre l'égalité des citoyens, aucune réserve née d'une circonstance héréditaire ne saurait atteindre, à l'égard de l'un d'eux, le sentiment de fraternité qui unit tous les membres de la famille française".

(...
showing the definitional base for *race* was conceived of as hereditary

The first article of the Marchandeau decree introduced new measures only when the defamation "aura eu pour but d'exciter à la haine entre les citoyens et *habitants*" (*habitants* was the term used to refer to non-nationals living in France). The essential scope of the text was to extend the legislation of the 1881 law to cover "un groupe de personnes qui appartiennent, par leur origine, à une race ou à une religion déterminée" (article One), increasing the penalties involved. The text did not offer any guidance as to how to define what this belonging to a specific *race* or *religion* should actually mean in the eyes of the courts. The extension of the legislation was to cover both individuals and groups, but the precondition for any of these new measures was that the alleged offence had to have had the express aim to "exciter à la haine" (120). This was but one of the limits of the Decree, since it also failed to protect those members of a *groupe* taken individually, and did not grant civil party competence to the LICA or any other association (unless they had been named in the offending text/speech) (MRAP 1984, 10). For these reasons, it is hard to agree with Marrus and Paxton when they argue that "(t)here were clearly powerful forces at work within the Third Republic to limit the open expression of antisemitism" (1981, 46). Pétain, acting on his own initiative, issued a decree abolishing the Marchandeau decree. The Petain text declared a full amnesty for all those who had been prosecuted under it (121). However, since the Marchandeau decree appeared within a highly-charged political context, I would argue that the reactions to its publication are of equally vital importance in assessing questions of racist and antiracist discourse at this time.
Section Three (c): Reactions to the Marchandeau decree

Reactions to the Decree were more muted than might have been expected, due to the plethora of other legislation that day. However, a systematic reading of the press in the month that followed the decree reveals a complex response. The most penetrating analysis comes from Georges Zérpha, a dissident member of the LICA, who ran his own publication *La Conscience des Juifs*. For Zérpha, since "(l)e racisme existe en tant que these et objet de propagande, lutter contre le racisme signifie opposer la propagande a la loi, aux pretentions issues de ces theses". However, Zérpha questioned the terminology used in the decree:

"(s)'il plaît au raciste de m'identifier comme tel (as a Jew), libre a lui, mais l'individualiste republicain qui combat cette these n'aurait du adopter la terminologie de l'adversaire, qu'en citant ses references. Sinon, il semble approuver la these raciale".

Using the term "collectivite nationale" only served to hide the effects of racism on Jews, he argued. Zérpha argued that the category of *race* should only be used where it is clearly indicated as a social construction of racist discourse, suggesting instead of *race* - "(l)es individus ou citoyens designes par certaines theses ou conceptions ou propagandes, comme appartenant a une race ou categorie "raciale"°. Criticizing the aforementioned lack of protection for those in any *groupe* when targetted individually, Zérpha argues that "comme l'individu est toujours vise a travers le collectif, la defense individuelle est illusoire si celle du collectif n'est pas assuree" (Zérpha 1939, 5.7) (122). Using Pècheux's typology (1975) of "des-identification" again, it could be said that only by seeing the conceptualization of the racist categorization as a construction, rather than as a given, could the circle of "doubling" of the racist/antiracist discourse be broken. Furthermore, we see here the plurality of voices within antiracism on the question of the social construction of *race*.

The reaction of the racist press seized upon two main aspects of the Decree. The first of these was that the Decree was supposedly evidence of
'Jewish' influence as a lobby on government (cf. Schor 1992, 120) : for Gringore, "ce décret a été passé à la demande d'un certain nombre d'Israélites" (123), whilst for Pierre Gaxotte in Je suis partout, it was the "décret de protection juive" (124). According to Laryent in Action française, the Decree was bound to fail "(...) Daladier, Marchandeau et les Juifs aurient tort de s'imaginer qu'avec des decrets ils viendraient à bout de l'antisémitisme", seeing the Decree as "l'interdiction de poser la question juive" (125). An unsigned article in Drieu la Rochelle's Gringore said that "les mêmes choses peuvent être dites sous une autre forme et la censure n'a jamais eu qu'un résultat, c'est obliger les journalistes à avoir du talent" (126) There is a link here to the effects of the 'discursive consensus' against the explicit expression of racism in political discourse in France since the electoral rise (1983-) of the Front national (127). Leger argued in Action française that "(l')antiracisme que nous professons n'est pas un racisme" (128), and then simply substitutes habitants for Juifs. This was to become common practice, since "habitant ne correspond à aucune réalité juridique et chacun avait la possibilité de lui attribuer sa propre définition, son propre contenu" (Labrosse 1987, 240). There was, in the months which followed the Decree, a simple transposition of terms, readers of racist papers having little trouble to decipher the signifieds behind the various signifiers of racist discourse. The very fact that the term antiracisme had already become a site for struggle deserves comment in the quote from Leger (above), his concept of antiracisme is presumably the defence of the 'French race', but doubles with the contradictory idea that no race should exist other than that in France. After only three years' existence, racists were claiming antiracisme for their own. The FN has taken on board this idea of claiming to be the "real" antiracistes, forming in 1984 the Alliance Générale contre le racisme et pour le respect de l'identité française ou chrétienne (cf. Conte 1996, 29), and which seeks to racialize every crime suffered by a 'white' French national when committed by a 'non-white' person. The association campaigns against what it calls "racisme anti-français", a term was previously used within inter-war antiracism: the LICA, for example, referred to antisemitism as "racisme antifrançais" (129).
Linked to this last point, the second main theme in the racist press centred around the apparent official consecration of race as a social category brought by the Decree. Consequently, *Je suis partout* viewed the decree as a compliment, since

"le décret reconnaît sur notre sol l'existence d'une communauté juive, puisqu'à l'égard de l'antisémitisme il établit une égalité et une solidarité entre les juifs citoyens français et les juifs non-citoyens, ces deux catégories ayant droit comme Juifs à la même protection spéciale", concluding that "(j)amais les pires anti-sémites n'auraient pu espérer pour leurs doctrines une pareille consecration officielle" (130).

Laryent in *Action française* asks ironically "(c)omment peut-il y avoir des questions de race entre "Français"?" (131). Once Darquier de Pellepoix had been put on trial under the Decree for a vicious attack on Lecache, seen as the instigator of the Decree (in spite of the evidence here to show, on the contrary, his relative marginalization by the public authorities), then the theme of the Decree as one which "introduit le racisme dans la législation" became more apparent (132).

There was a reserved response to the Decree on the left. Lecache saw it as the successful culmination of campaigning since 1934, entitling his article "(l)e racisme musele" (133), but the LICA devoted surprisingly little space to the question. This was probably because at the time, the LICA was pursuing action mainly to secure a ‘safe haven’ for Jewish refugees, in the face of increasing opposition from the French authorities, and would not have wanted to jeopardize its position in relation to the *Intérieur* (134). It must have been of some disappointment to those in the association that the legislation they had demanded for so long ultimately came at a time when the LICA’s influence on events was on the wane, and was couched in rather a different terminology and set of principles to those laid out in the LICA’s proposal of February 1939. Elsewhere on the left, there are few lengthy commentaries. Lafargue complains of the narrow definition of propaganda used in the Decree (135), and Lussy that editorial responsibility is
not included in the Decree (136) For L'Humanité, the fear was that the censorship might be applied to the PCF (137), although the Decree was considered strong enough to "mettre fin à l'odieuse campagne antisémitique développée en France par les agents de Hitler" (138), mirroring the common theme on the left which still saw antisemitism as coming exclusively from Germany (139) None of the papers raise the problem of any possible application in the colonies There were no comments on the use of race in the Decree. Little attempt was made to counter the reactions of the racist press when it suggested that its own racialized conception of society had been vindicated by the wording of the Decree. In 1946, the Constitution of the Fourth Republic was to include race as one of the themes that could not be invoked for discriminating against citizens But by then, of course, the context was somewhat different. The LICA's legalism had little effect against the antisemitic press of the 1930s, a time during which, as Lecache wrote in 1947, "nous semblions (alors) proteges par l'appareil des lois republicaines" (Lecache 1947, 2).

**General conclusion to Chapter Three**

In this Chapter, I have tried to show how the 'identity functions' of the terms antiracisme and antiraciste within the LICA's discourse served a dual purpose. Firstly, these terms appealed to all sections of society to join in campaigns against racism. The LICA sought, through its non-exclusive position on antiracism, to attract different ethnic groups, different classes, and different nationalities, within an imprecise, non-aligned left-of-centre association which used traditional methods of campaigning, rallies, meetings, diffusion of ideas through publications, and use of republican personalities such as Léon Blum to legitimize its action. The success of the LICA in forging an identity for itself is reflected in the refounding of the association in 1948.

The abstract humanist positions which lay behind the LICA's concept of antiracisme were feeding off a much wider, historically 'deeper' set of
assumptions within republican ideology. The Chapter has tried to show the socially constructed nature of discourse in questioning the categorizations inherent within racializing discourses, certain LICA activists such as Georges Zérapha were undertaking a similar critique. The various temporalities at play within the republican antiracist discourse examined in this Chapter are of course the historical references to 1789, the political tradition of the Third Republic, and then the conjunctural climate concerning the Front Populaire governments. Bayart has highlighted the ‘intertextual’ nature of this interplay of the various temporalities of political discourse: “les pratiques enonciatives contemporaines nouent des relations “dialogiques” avec des enonces anterieurs (...)” (1985, 359). Mixing together these various references, which are all part of a wider whole, the LICA’s ideology cannot be viewed as counter-hegemonic in relation to a republican State which it trusted. On refugee policy, for example, the LICA simply insisted that the State put into practice its avowed principles of la France terre d’asile. Nonetheless, the LICA’s actions here implied a (limited) questioning of the national republican discourse (cf. Chapter Two).

Whilst the LICA sought, rather as the LDH had done at the time of the Dreyfus “Affair”, to give new political life to older concepts (such as humanisme), since reworking them in a changing historical setting, there were areas of the LICA’s discourse which, on closer analysis, showed up some of the longer-term ‘unseens’ of the ideological construction of republicanism within which the association was working. The constraints of republicanism, with its (Gramscian common-sense) notion(s) of progress, limited any theorization based around égalité, since the association took a reformist, rather than abolitionist, position on the colonies. The association’s inability to conceive of colonial racism as a distinct category was, as we shall see in Chapter Four, simply emblematic of the mainstream left of the 1930s. Only fleetingly during the Front Populaire was there any forceful suggestion within the LICA’s discourse that it considered antisemitism and anti-Black or anti-Maghrebian racism as interrelated. Such ‘unseens’ limited the extent to which racism as pratique became a central theme.
within the LICA’s action. On the other hand, the LICA’s campaigns against the fascist leagues and their street violence - a violence which was often racially motivated - suggest that antisemitism was very much perceived by the LICA as a practice, whether in France or in Germany (or elsewhere in Europe). This hints at the different reactions to racism from those groups directly subjected to a specific form of racism, and those offering their *solidarité agissante* (or indeed not mobilizing over the issue) from a position of non-victims.

But to talk of “the LICA”, as a seemingly self-sufficient, fully-constituted subject would pass over the plurality of voices within the organization, a plurality which the absence of archive material renders difficult to assess. The sociological, political, and discursive complexity of one antiracist association, and the complexity of the historical context in which it acted, warn against any hasty generalizations which would take ‘antiracism’ or ‘antifascism’ as a monolithic block, in the 1930s or during any other period. It was indeed this complex political context which finally limited the success of the external ‘identity function’ of antiracism as a defining factor for the association within civil society and in relation to the State, since the LICA, willing to view antiracism within antifascism (although not stressing antifascism’s class-based analysis with great conviction), saw antiracism in effect relegated to just one component of this wider concept of antifascism. Only by studying the association on one level, and its articulation with civil society on another, can a fuller picture of this complexity be given. The LICA was able negotiate some space for its campaigns at the beginning of the first Front Populaire government, after which time antifascism, and hence antiracism (understood on the left as a discreet category within antifascism) ceased to be a priority. Whereas the LICA’s decision to situate antiracism within antifascism had initially been conceived as a form of agency, antiracism eventually lost its specificity within the Front Populaire.

The LICA’s priority was opposition to antisemitism. This Chapter has therefore looked at one area of production of antiracism, using the LICA’s
discourse to assess questions of agency, identity, and the unpackaging (or not) of 'givens' such as race. The LICA did not have the monopoly on action against racism during this period - even if it was the only association to call itself antiraciste. There were other, more marginal sites from which oppositional discourse and practice were emerging. Also, other organizations were to emerge after the Liberation which would adopt a less intransigent line on the colonial question than the LICA. The dominant forms of racism as perceived by republican antiracism were also to change. It is to these important questions that we now turn in Chapter Four and all subsequent chapters.
Notes to Chapter Three

N.B No author is given in many articles used in the corpus. Titles of articles in LICA publications are only given where an argument is summarized - ie. not where a single term or phrase has been taken out as an example (antiraciste, racisme etc.)

(1) Whilst the LICA (Ligue internationale contre l'Antisemitisme) officially decided to change its title to LICRA (Ligue internationale contre le Racisme et l'Antisemitisme) in November 1936 (cf. DVNS No.55, 28 novembre 1936, p.5), its initials remained as LICA during this period (its emblem remained unchanged), and activists continued to refer to it as the LICA. As Weinberg points out (1977, 102, note 94), the organization assumed its original name of LICA after its reformation in 1948 (cf. Section Two) In 1979, the organization changed its name again to LICRA (as above)


(4) See, for example, Finot (1905) (still quoted in the 1930s), Normand (1933, 26-28 passim), Lakhovskv (1934) and Politzer (1941, 51) for pro-metissage positions For a general overview, see Taguieff (1990, 338-348 passim) The "classic" anti-metissage text of the period is Martial's Les metis (1941).

(5) To summarize briefly there are four main ambiguities in the theme of metissage. Firstly, there is often a conflation between metissage culturel and metissage understood in ethnic terms Secondly, anti-immigration arguments have not, historically speaking (from the nineteenth century to the Nouvelle Droite), rejected the concept of metissage, but have used it to say that non-Europeans should not be involved (cf. Mauco 1932, 1937, Schneider 1990) (although brassage may be used as an alternative in this case). Thirdly, as Paul Gilroy has pointed out to me, metissage often presumes that there are ethnically homogenous groups prior to the process of metissage. Fourthly, as Françoise Verges summarizes, metissage in a cultural register was often used by European assimilationists during colonization to "subsume(e) (...) into European culture" the "cultural productions of non-European territories" (1996, 141) (cf. also Chapter Four) Contemporary reappropriations of this concept should therefore beware the previous meanings attached, although I agree with E. Balibar that there has been a constructive use of the concept to argue that "la France "multiraciale" et "pluri-ethnique" existe déjà, sous de multiples formes et en de multiples lieux" (1992, 72-78, 74) (cf. also Bouamama 1994).
(6) It is therefore all the more strange that Taguieff, in his detailed work on such questions during the same period (1990, 1995), seldom mentions the LICA or its newspaper.

(7) DVNS No 153, mai 1939, p.1.

(8) BLIC No 3, mars 1930, p.4

(9) BLIC No 19, octobre 1931, p.5.

(10) BLIC No 21, décembre 1931, p.4

(11) DVNS No 52, 07 novembre 1936, p.5 and DVNS No.17, 05 mars 1936, p.5

(12) Cf. DV No 22, décembre 1934, pp.3-5


(14) Cf. APP BA 1812, police report of 20 avril 1939

(15) DVNS No 191, avril 1948, p.2.

(16) DV No 15, septembre-octobre 1933, p.3. See also the numerous police reports in APP BA 1812. Schor attests 12,000 at the antiracist rally in Paris on 19th June 1939 (1992, 254) - cf. DVNS No 157, 24 juin 1939, p.1. Mass antiracist rallies were therefore not the invention of SOS-Racisme. The African-American singer, dancer and performer Josephine Baker was a huge crowd-puller for LICA’s fundraising galas, and became its déléguée internationale à la propagande in the 1950s. The use of the rally (meeting) was an established form of collective action at the time.

(17) Most of the LICA’s archives were deliberately destroyed by its activists to avoid seizure by the Gestapo. Those archives that the Gestapo did take were subsequently captured by the Soviet army. The LICA’s archives, like those for the LDH and the SFIO for the same period, are only slowly being returned to France from Moscow.

(19) AIU MS 650/6/16, letter from Joly to Robert Schumann, 03 août 1936. See also AIU MS 650/7/24, Schor (1992, 255) and Weinberg (1977, 82).

(20) On the notion of the public sphere see Habermas (1992).

(21) Cf. BLIC No. 1, janvier 1930, p. 4. On the importance of propaganda against racism see DVNS No 46, 26 septembre 1936, p. 4 and C.-A. Bontemps, "(i)l ne faut plus d'une propagande aux mots perimes" in DVNS No 176, 30 mars 1940, p. 1.

(22) APP BA 1812, Surete Generale report, decembre 1934. See also AN F7 13951 There was also a section called the Jeunes de la LICa, present in Paris and Lyon (on Lyon cf. Labrosse 1987, 217-218).

(23) In an important synthesis of the Ligue's positions, racism and sexism were put on the same footing, and voting rights for women supported : "il est important que nos soeurs puissent developper leurs facultes, faire leur education civique, afin d'etre mieux armees pour lutter aux cotes de leurs freres" (LICA 1937, 10-11) There is little evidence of the LICA having practised many of these aims within the period under study.


(25) As Shamir (1971) has shown, there were several newspapers on the moderate left in the 1930s such as l'Aube, which regularly denounced antisemitism. Even so, in quantitative terms, the circulation figures for left-of-center national newspapers in the 1930s never came near those of the right or far right - cf. Schor (1985, 11-16 passim), Soucy (1995, 42-43) and, more generally, Leroy and Roche (1986). Jackson (1988, 251) gives the following circulation figures - 640,000 for Giragoure in November 1936, 339,500 for Candide in March 1936, and 100,000 for Action franaise (no date) (cf. also Sternhell 1987, 357-358).

(26) Vigilance, No. 1, 28 avril 1934, pp. 2-5, p. 2.

(27) "Notes sur la grande presse", l'vigilance, No 6, 27 juillet 1934, pp. 6-7, p. 7.

(28) Leon Emery, "Le probleme de la presse et les taches d'information du CVIA", l'vigilance No 59, 02 novembre 1937, pp. 6-10, p. 9.

(29) Speech to LICA Federation de la Seine Congress, 24th January 1948 in DVNS No 188, fevrier 1948, p. 2.

(30) What Taguieff says about racism here is equally applicable to antiracisme.

(32) Léon Blum, writing in *Le Populaire* of 01 mars 1933, stated that "l'incendie du Reichstag n'est pas un acte de terrorisme communiste, mais une provocation raciste".

(33) Félix Régnault, DV No. 15, septembre-octobre 1933, p. 6.


(35) DV No. 21, août 1934, p. 2.

(36) DV No. 13, juin 1933, p. 1. This is prior to Bergery's rapid move to the far right (cf. Burrin 1986).

(37) "Contre l'antisémitisme et le fascisme - front commun", DV No. 13, juin 1933, p. 1.


(39) Cf. DV No. 26, juin 1935, p. 3.

(40) Bernard Lecache "Pas de milieu : la lutte ou le camp de concentration", DV No. 18, février 1934, pp. 1-4.


(42) DVNS No. 23, 18 avril 1936, p. 5.

(43) An editorial in *Le Droit de vivre* agreed with this change, saying "l'antisémitisme étant aujourd'hui du racisme" (DVNS No. 115, 30 juillet 1938, p. 1). On the *Rassemblement mondial*, see also DVNS No. 46, 26 septembre 1936.


(46) "La justice commence", in APP BA 1812.


(49) Bernard Lecache, "La Revolution nous a tout donne", DVNS No.160, 15 juillet 1939, pp.1+3, p.3

(50) DVNS No 176, 30 mars 1940, p.1.

(51) DVNS No.56, 05 decembre 1936, p.5. The LICA appealed to colonial Algerian subjects out of the fear that they might be attracted to antisemitism.

(52) DVNS No.114, 21 juillet 1938, p.1

(53) Cf. "Choisir ses amis antiracistes", DVNS No.122, 29 octobre 1938, p.1. Lecache had stated in January 1938 that "(n)ous restons 100% Front Populaire" (DVNS No.100, 22 janvier 1938, pp.1+3).

(54) Cf. DVNS No 126, 26 novembre 1938

(55) AFNSP FM 113, extract from Gaston Monnerville’s pleading in defence of Bernard Lecache, who was being sued by Darquier de Pellepoix for ‘diffamation’, 28th November 1938

(56) DV No.9, janvier 1933, p.3.

(57) DV No 18, février 1934, p.1.

(58) DVNS No 18, 14 mars 1936, p.6. Lecache is referring here to Algeria.

(59) BLIC No.3, mars 1933, p.2, note from the Comité Central explaining why Yiddish should not be used to conduct the association’s business.

(60) Lecache in LICA (1932, 11)

(61) DV No 26, mai 1935, p.2


(64) See the poster representing different ethnic groups in DVNS No.53, 14 novembre 1936, p.1.


(67) The LICA did, however, ask electoral candidates in its April 1936 poll: "(a)cepetriez-vous de signer une pétition exigeant le respect de l'égalité des droits entre les races dans tous les pays?" (DVNS No. 23, 18 avril 1936, p.5)

(68) Lecache describing the LICA’s line in the 1930s in (Lecache 1947, 3).


(70) "Je refuse de me taire"). DVNS No.90, 21 août 1937, pp.1+3, p.1.

(71) Joint declaration LICA/LDH/LDRN/Ligue de Défense des Musulmans Algériens, DVNS No 46, 26 septembre 1936, p.1.

(72) "Rapport sur la liaison avec les partis politiques", BLIC No 8, octobre 1930, pp.7-8

(73) On the Sixth Congress see DVNS No.3, 30 novembre 1935, p.5-6, which reaffirmed the place of the LICA in the Front Populaire.

(74) Cf. BLIC No 20, novembre 1931, pp.9-10.


(76) See DVNS No 22, 11 avril 1936, p.1

(77) Bernard Lecache in DVNS No.22, 11 avril 1936, p.1. A disgruntled breakaway group had by this time already formed, the Comité de défense des juifs persécutés, which was dissatisfied with the LICA’s alliance with political parties (Weinberg 1977, 102 note 92).


(79) APP BA 1901, report of 02 avril 1936.

(80) APP BA 1812, according to the (undated) police report on the Eighth LICA Congress, 19-20-21 novembre 1937, 10p., p.9.

(81) APP BA 1812, Compte rendu du Conseil National Extraordinaire de la LICA, 02 avril 1939

(82) For Lecache’s report, see APP BA 1812 as for note 81. See also DVNS No 145, 08 avril 1939, pp.5-6

(83) Cf. DVNS No 25, 02 mai 1936, p.1.
(84) DVNS No 4, 07 décembre 1935, p.5.

(85) DV No.18, février 1934, p 1

(86) "Les succès du Front unique antifasciste", speech to Seventh Congres de l'Internationale Communiste, 03 August 1935 (reproduced in Thorez 1967, 136-189, 144-145)

(87) Cf. for example DV No.14, juillet-août 1933, p.4. DVNS No.33, 27 juin 1936, DVNS No.37, 25 juillet 1936.


(89) See Bernard Lecache, "Deux mots à F. Challaye", DVNS No.120, 15 octobre 1938, p 2.

(90) See DVNS No 187, décembre 1947, pp.1+3. The association's title was only used again from January 1948 onwards.

(91) Speech to Congres Fédéral de la Seine, 05 février 1949 in DVNS No.200, mars 1949, p.4.

(92) As Marrus and Paxton point out (1981, 56), the decree of 12th November 1938 had "modified the generous nationality law of 10 August 1927. French nationality could be stripped from those already naturalized in the event that they were judged "indignes du titre de citoyen français". At the LICA's Ninth Congres National, just after these measures had been taken. Lecache responded in his Rapport sur la doctrine : "(l)a restriction des droits de citoyenneté de ceux qu'on a jugés dignes d'être intégrés dans la nationalité française, tend à créer deux catégories de citoyens, (et) constitue une première brèche dans l'ensemble des principes de la Déclaration des Droits de l'Homme et du Citoyen" (APP BA 1812, police report on Congres, 25-26-27 novembre 1938). Cf. also Maurice Viollette, "La France elle aussi", DVNS No.130, 24 decembre 1938, pp 1+4

(93) Bontemps complained that "(l)e temps use vite les slogans (...) s'il exprimt, par-dessus tout, le sens vrai d'une lutte (...)" ("Il ne faut plus d'une propagnde aux mots perimes", DVNS No.176, 30 mars 1940, p.1). He was referring to the themes used to counter racism against Jewish anciens combattants

(94) "Les antisemites se ressemblent", DV No 1, février 1932, p 4


(97) See however what Henry (1987/88) calls the "construction de l'alterité" in French colonial legal discourse.

(98) See Conte (1996). As I write, another law combatting racist discourse is due to be introduced (cf. "L'avant-projet de loi antiraciste elargit le champ de la répression", *Le Monde*, 22-23 septembre 1996, p.9). This is to add to the existing legislation of 1972 and 1990, following repeated declarations by Jean-Marie Le Pen on "l'inégalité des races".


(100) DVNS No.16, 29 février 1936, p.5.

(101) Bernard Lecache, "La LICA parle directement aux lecteurs", DV No.23, mai 1935, pp.1-2, p.1

(102) Relevant section from *Journal officiel*, 25 avril 1939, "Décret modifiant les articles 32, 33 et 60 de la loi du 29 juillet 1881 sur la liberté de la presse", reproduced in *Rénancntre chrétiens-juifs*, IVe année 1970, 1er trimestre, No.15, pp.23-26, 24

(103) AN, Justice BB18 6492/ 57BL431.

(104) "Rapport sur la doctrine", BLIC No.8, octobre 1930, pp.5-7, p.6.

(105) "Pas de milieu la lutte ou le camp de concentration", DV No.18, février 1934, pp.1-4, p.1

(106) CDH, No 13, 01 juillet 1939, p.399 The CDV also had discussed the problem of racist newspaper sellers (cf. Edmond Fleg to Robert Schumann, 11 juillet 1938, AIU MS 650/6/15). The LDH had supported the LICA's campaign for a change in the law. Interestingly, the LDH Congres national in March 1936 had adopted a "projet de complément" to the original text of the 1789 *Déclaration*, the first article of which was to be changed to: "(l)es Droits de l'Homme s'entendent sans distinction de sexe, de race, de nation ou de religion" (CDH No 13, 10 mai 1936, "L'universalité des Droits de l'Homme", p.327). The term "race" was retained in the formula after further discussion on what to include (CDH No 17-18, 10 juin 1936, p.386). The reasons for this were only explained later: "(s)ans distinction de race, parce que, en effet, nous sommes de ceux qui pensent que les Droits de l'Homme doivent être accordés à tous les individus, quelle que soit leur race, que tous les individus, quelle que soit leur race, doivent avoir exactement les mêmes droits" (CDH No 7-8, 1-15 avril 1938, p.209).

(107) *Journal officiel*, 25 avril 1939, référence as for note 102 (p.24).
(108) *Vigilance*, No 9, octobre 15 1934, p.7.

(109) On Switzerland, see DV No 23, janvier 1935, p.3 and *Paix et Droit*, 15é année, No.4, avril 1935 and No.5, mai 1935. See also *La juste parole*, 3é année, No.51, 03 mars 1939, pp.17-20.

(110) See CDH No.2, 20 janvier 1936, p.4.

(111) "Une loi contre le racisme sera déposée", DVNS No.25, 02 mai 1936, p.1.

(112) DVNS No.31, 10 juin 1936, pp 1+3, p.3.

(113) See DVNS No.40, 15 août 1936 / No.55, 28 nov. 1936 / No.56, 05 décembre 1936 p 1, "Et la loi contre le racisme"/ No 60, 02 janvier 1937 / No.86, 03 juillet 1937, pp 1+3 "Et la loi contre le racisme? Lettre ouverte aux parlementaires"/ DVNS No 96, 27 novembre 1937, pp.1+4

(114) Rene Bloch to Robert de Rothschild, 28th February 1938 "(…) un projet de loi contre le racisme n'attend qu'un signal pour être déposé à la chambre" (AIU MS 650/6/15)


(116) "Messieurs les parlementaires voici un projet de loi contre le racisme", DVNS No.136, 04 février 1939, p.1

(117) Letter from Rene Bloch to Edgard See, 3 octobre 1938, AIU MS 650/6/15

(118) *Projet de loi* (undated), Gilbert Heizmann, in AIU MS 650/6/15 - for this and following references.

(119) Cf. "La haine conduit à l'esclavage", VJ No 5, mars-juin 1939, p 1. Article Three of the Decree does state that these measures will have to be ratified by Parliament, although I have not come across any references to parliamentary debates on the Decree


(121) *Gazette du Palais*, 27 août 1940, pp.169-170 (cf. Marrus and Paxton 1981, 7) The main person concerned by this was Darquier de Pellepoix (see note 132). Xavier Vallat ensured that Lecache was denaturalized during Vichy (Marrus and Paxton 1981, 106) On this see AFNSP FM 113.
Subsequent suggestions from the MRAP went in this direction (MRAP 1984, 14). For an overview of the press reaction, see *Samedi, Hebdomadaire illustré de la vie juive*, No 16, 29 avril 1939, pp.2-3.

No.546, 27 avril 1939, p.2.

"Le decret de protection juive". No.440, 28 avril 1939, pp.1+3. Cf. also Schor (1992, 142-143)


No.546, 27 avril 1939, p.2.

For the FN’s discursive strategies, see Matonti (1993) and “Le president du Front National s’en prend à la "lex lepenia””. *Le Monde* 22-23 septembre 1996, p.9

*Action française*, 26 avril 1939, p.5.

“Requête respectueuse à M le Prefet de Police”, DVNS No.147, 22 avril 1939, p 1.

No 440, 28 avril 1939, p.2.


*Action française*, 27 juillet 1939 Pellepoix was condemned to 3 months imprisonment and a 500-Franc fine, and his co-defendant Gérard to one month's imprisonment and a 500-France fine, for an article in *La France enchainée* of 24th May 1939, "Le Déf i insense". On this see the LICA poster *La justice commence!* in APP BA 1812, and the press cuttings in AN Fonds Vanikoff 72 AJ 602. Pellepoix's lawyer at the trial (26 juillet 1939) had argued that the decree introduced a racial category into the population (cf. the text in AN Fonds Vanikoff 72 AJ 592). Similar charges are still heard today: Yonnet (1993) argues that contemporary antiracism (notably SOS-Racisme) has been responsible for the 'racialization' of French society through its campaign themes.

DVNS No.148, 29 avril 1939, pp.1+3.

According to a police report of 20th April 1939 (in APP BA 1812), Lecache's strategy was to avoid upsetting any political party, in the hope this would ensure a sympathetic hearing for his campaigning on refugees.

*La Lumière*, 28 avril 1939

(137) "Décrets contre la propagande hitlérienne en France". *L'Humanité*, 25 avril 1939, p.2.

(138) *L'Humanité*, 27 avril 1939, p.2

(139) See Georges Oudard. "L'antisémitisme, paravent de la propagande nazie". *Marianne*, 26 avril 1939 and 03 mai 1939
Chapter Four: Anticolonialism: the "distant voice" of antiracism

Section One: Antiracism and anticolonialism

Section One (a): Introduction
Section One (b): Working definitions
Section One (c): The LDH and the LICA on colonial questions
Section One (d): The parties of the left
Section One (e): Looking elsewhere

Section Two: Black voices 1914-1939

Section Two (a): Contexts
Section Two (b): Négritude
Section Two (c): Campaigning
Section Two (d): Conclusion to Section Two

Section Three: Anti-maghrebian racism and opposition, 1914-1939

Section Three (a): Introduction
Section Three (b): Stereotyping
Section Three (c): Ideological strands within Algerian nationalist discourse
Section Three (d): Campaigning
Section Three (e): Conclusion to Section Three

General conclusion to Chapter Four

Notes
In this Chapter, I shall be arguing that the anticolonial struggles contained within them many important critiques of racism which were marginalized throughout the discourse and action of the mainstream French left until the immediate post-war period. After this time, and then contemporaneously with the continuing struggle for liberation with colonized peoples, certain organizations, in particular the MRAP, were to take on board the depth of racism inherent within the colonial situation, particularly concerning treatment of Algerians by the police prior to and during the Algerian War of Independence (1954-62). These later developments will be examined in Chapter Five. Some anticolonial movements had engaged in action against racism in France from the 1920s onwards. The aim of this Chapter is thus to study reactions to colonial racism in the Métropole and the colonies prior to 1939 in both their discursive and practical forms. This should then enable an assessment (in Chapter Five) of the significance of the MRAP's reaction to anti-Algerian racism in the period between its creation in 1949 and the massacre of Algerians in Paris on and after October 17th 1961. Section One considers the theoretical points suggesting why anticolonial thought on racism should have been marginalized within republican antiracism in the period to 1945, and the forms taken by this marginalization. Section Two will look at the denunciation of racism within the early négritude movement and black rights organizations. Section Three studies the opposition to anti-Maghrebian racism in France in the interwar years, in particular from the Étoile Nord-Africaine (ENA). This will prepare the ground for Chapter Five which will, through an analysis of the development of forms of racism in the
1950s, attempt to show how the French left slowly accepted the idea of a multiplicity of racisms.

So far, this thesis has dealt only tangentially with questions of racism within a colonial and postcolonial context. Many of the analyses of the reaction to racism have concentrated on the opposition to antisemitism. In this Chapter, this tendency will be reversed, but it is important to stress that, historically speaking, all forms of racism are intertwined. Nowhere was this more the case than in colonial Algeria (cf. Lorcin 1995, Prochaska 1990). Before embarking on questions of anticolonialism and antiracism, it is necessary to examine the complexity of the colonial experience for all concerned (1), since this complexity determined many of the forms taken by criticism of the racism of the Métropole. In doing so, I wish to argue that the periodization of colonial forms of racism within France needs to be reinterpreted, with more attention paid to the interwar years and those immediately following the Liberation than has often been the case. Rather than concentrating on the period following the start of the Algerian War, I will argue, following MacMaster (1995), that the racism within French state institutions, whilst inherent within the whole colonial project was, in the case of mainland France, to become more powerful from the 1920s onwards.

As Girardet (1968, 1972) has pointed out, the mid-1930s saw a strengthening of commitment to the colonies from all main parties, no less so under the Front Populaire than other administrations of the decade (albeit with a more assimilationist approach). In my criticism of the relative inaction of the mainstream French left faced with the developing forms of racism coextensive with colonial surveillance (cf. Foucault 1976), I suggest that the lack of a sustained counter-discourse from all but marginalized sections of the main parties (SFIO and PCF), the far-left, anarchists and some union federations resulted in the sedimentation of a negative stereotyping of colonial subjects which remained largely unchallenged, as did the exceptional legal and social régime to which these social groups were subjected. Gallissot (1990, 345), amongst others, has
talked of the "importation" into France of the colonial system after 1947, subsequently exacerbated by the Algerian War. For Gallissot, this importation signalled the transition from the dominance of the antisemitic nationalism up to 1944 to the new "preponderance" of colonial racism, although such a position stresses post-WW2 developments rather than the interwar period (cf. Section Three of this Chapter). I will stress the role played in the extension of anti-Maghrebian racism by those administrators, police and army officers and medical staff with experience of colonial Algeria who were sent to deal with the colonized Maghrebian subjects within France. The audience for antiracist opposition to this growing anti-Maghrebian racism in the inter-war period was extremely limited. These limits stemmed from the attitudes of 'civilization superiority' inherent within the mainstream left's cultural project.

An examination of the opposition to racism in the colonial context reveals one important factor that has already been stressed: that rarely is there simply a 'universalistic' or a 'particularistic' reaction to racism, and that these two terms, used in an abstract way, can seldom account for the reality of racism as practice. In the case of French colonization, this is hardly surprising, given that the colonial logic was a subtle mixture of universalism - aimed at the elites within colonial society -, and of the creation and then cultivation of différence, as Ageron (1968, 1979) has shown for Algeria (cf. also Chapter One). Within the opposition to the colonial system, the opposition to French racism is a constant, and not simply marginal theme, whether that be within négritude-inspired writing or national liberation movements (or the latter inspired by the former). Section Two develops these themes. The various forms this opposition will take are themselves partially determined by the carving up of land and the separation of groups which were the result of the colonial project. This led to the fabrication of new identities in the colonies. Furthermore, as Amselle argues,

"(l')assignation de différences ou l'étiquetage ethnique, prophéties autocréatrices, ne traduisent pas seulement la reconnaissance de spécificités culturelles, ils sont également corrélats de l'affirmation d'une identité, celle de l'"ethnie française"" (1990, 35).
These processes of differentiation were carried out in the name of the universalism of cultural superiority over the colonized peoples. The resulting invented differences would be increasingly seen (and experienced) in ethnic or racial terms, by both colonizer and colonized.

Section One (b): Working definitions

Siblot has questioned Taguieff's model (1990) for the interpretation of antiracism (based around the notions of *hétérophobie* and *hétérophilie* - cf. Chapter One) when applied to the anticolonial movement's denunciation of racism. Speaking of the ENA (and then the *Parti du Peuple Algérien* (PPA)) of the 1930s, Siblot argues that "(a)u 'racisme hétérophile' du colonat réplique un discours complexe qui lui denie la possibilité d'une supériorité raciale et en même temps partage avec lui les postulats d'une "hétérophilie" ethnocentré" (1989, 68). The "hétérophilie ethnocentré" allegedly encouraged an exclusive conception of belonging to the Algerian nation on behalf of nationalist leader Messali Hadj - what Carlier has called "un contre-racisme de légitime-défense" (1985, 157). Once again, this highlights the importance of taking into account the conditions of production of antiracism. It was commonplace in moderate republican circles to dismiss the nationalism within national liberation movements as 'racist' (cf. infra). The paradox of the legacy of the colonial project on republican discourse is precisely this complexity of social factors that a simplifying framework for analyzing racism and antiracism may well distort. Siblot states that the viewpoint that antiracism and anticolonialism overlap to some extent, is itself a product of the postcolonial era (1989, 57), a point which warns against anachronism.

Whilst Taguieff in general (cf. 1990) devotes little space to the opposition to racism to have emerged within the national liberation movements, *négritude* and anticolonialism within mainland France, he has, however (1995), sketched a comparison between antiracism and anticolonialism which is a useful introduction
to this Section (2). For Taguieff, "(l)e couplage entre égalitarisme racial et anticolonialisme ne s'opère qu'à la fin du XIXe siècle" (1995, 164). This position is somewhat misleading, since my comments on the LDH and LICA for the interwar years will suggest that both organizations' theoretical condemnation of supposed European racial superiority coexisted with their position on a European cultural 'superiority' which, in practical terms of the colonial experience, could be very similar to an argument of racial superiority. Taguieff sees the early forms of anticolonialism as a "co-tradition" of antiracism in that anticolonialism "met en jeu, d'une part un idéalisme qui se retrouve au fondement de l'antiracisme et, d'autre part, l'idéal politique d'une libération des peuples" (1995, 165). Anticolonialism is recognized as being a broad movement, based, for Taguieff, around a series of categories - liberal, socialist, universalistic/particularistic, antinationalistic/anti-imperialistic and humanitarian ideological (ibid., 26). Antiracism and anticolonialism converge for Taguieff through both a common form and a common content, the latter having emerged in the course of the twentieth century through the denunciation of the use of a supposed racial justification for colonial domination. The similarity in form between antiracism and anticolonialism is "ce fonctionnement strictement critique, contestataire, protestataire ou démystificateur" (1995, 27).

Taguieff's final point quoted here tends to present both anticolonialism and antiracism as counter-discourses, purely in their negativity in relation to the 'enemy'. However, I would define both antiracism and anticolonialism as parts of potential value systems containing conceptions of rights and equality which are not simply reducible to the forms of racism to which they are opposed. In the specifically French context, Taguieff's typology would exclude the countercultural projects of national liberation. Taguieff's position arguably also implies a constricted interpretation of anticolonialism, a francocentric one perhaps, since the opposition to colonialism was to come from thinkers who would not see their thought as having come exclusively from some of the categories mentioned above: nègritude as an intellectual movement and the Présence africaine project.
represented examples of cultural mixing, both liberal and antiliberal, antinationalistic and, at times, harnessed to black nationalism. Taguieff offers no attempt to analyze the overlapping between the opposition to racism within anticolonialism and other forms of antiracism. I would argue that there is some form of exchange going on between antiracisms and anticolonialisms - a two-way process. As far as the antiracist organizations are concerned, this process of exchange emerged in the late 1940s/early 1950s, although tentative earlier examples could be given of joint action involving the mainstream left and anticolonial organizations, particularly during the Front Populaire (3). Taguieff has, however, reminded us of the plurality of anticolonialisms: it is therefore important to examine which strands of anticolonialism would be most open to these forms of exchange with antiracism, and also to define more clearly anticolonialism.

In their interesting history of anticolonialist movements, Biondi and G. Morin start by giving the following definition of anticolonialism, "entendu comme mouvement d'opposition concerté à toute forme de subordination y compris culturelle" (1992, 12), and their study discusses opposition movements in France and the colonies. However, when outlining one of the features of anticolonialists, "le sentiment d'appartenir à une collectivité minoritaire libératrice", the authors state that herein "reside la problématique de l'anticolonialiste, traître idéologique pour ses concitoyens (...), mais range a priori dans la civilisation dominante par les colonisés" (1992, 14). Whilst the distinction between French anticolonialist campaigners in the Metropole and colonized peoples in the colonies/protectorates may at times be useful (and will indeed be called upon occasionally within this Chapter), my conception of anticolonialism and anticolonialists is rather more open, and seeks to include all opponents of the colonial system, excluding the opposition to colonialism on purely economic grounds. This is not to deny important differences of emphasis which may occur in campaigning between uncolonized and colonized activists, as we shall see. The same authors also insist upon anticolonialism's "vocation protestataire", its "tendance a se ranger dans le
camp des anti-institutionnels", and its "autonomie de jugement et d'action provoquant la méfiance des appareils politiques et, par conséquence, une plus ou moins grande marginalisation des milieux anticolonialistes" in relation to the SFIO and the PCF (1992, 13-14). There are, therefore, important overlappings between anticolonialism and antiracism, both in terms of shared egalitarian values, and in terms of their relative marginalization in relation to the established parties of the left in the period to the late 1940s/early 1950s. Before examining the evolution of the PCF and SFIO on the question of colonization and colonial racism, I will now look briefly at the marginalization of the anticolonial position within the LDH and the LICA in the interwar years: this exemplifies the position on the margins of republicanism that anticolonialism was to take.

Section One (c) : The LDH and the LICA on colonial questions

The various periodizations at play within the history of the prise de conscience of racism by those other than its victims, and by republican antiracism more generally, were mentioned in Chapter Two. For the LDH, there were a few marginalized activists who would now be considered as 'ahead of their time' on colonial questions. In the 1930s, the LDH had a large Algerian section, and the Parti Radical - the party most committed to keeping and developing the colonies (cf. Sarraut 1923) - had many members in the organization. Debates within the LDH show how there was a fine line between the conceptions of 'civilization superiority' and openly racialized ones used when discussing colonized peoples.

The LDH took certain decisions hostile to colonial practices. It had called for the abolition of the Code de l'Indigénat in all the colonies in 1927, for example (4). This Code, introduced into the colonies following the law of 28th June 1881, separated off colonial subjects from citizens, in that the male colonized were forced to serve 24 instead of 18 months' military service, and were subject to forced labour. All colonial subjects came under a particularly severe parallel judicial system (Lochak 1992, 294-296 passim). In Algeria, pay
and promotion prospects of colonial subjects working for the State were limited, and travel was subject to official authorization (5). However, the debates prior to and during the LDH's 1931 Congress, which was to vote support for the wonderful and now oft-quoted notion of "colonisation démocratique" (6), give an indication of the moderation of the organization's dominant groups on colonial matters. As G. Morin argues, the LDH's "doctrine assimilationniste s'est constituée dans la periode d'affirmation de l'imperialisme français (...)" (1991, 23). At the 1931 Congrès, Félicien Challaye, one of the dissenting voices within the LDH on colonial matters, asked if "la race blanche" was "tellement certaine de sa superiorité (applaudissements) pour imposer sa civilisation à tous les autres peuples et vouloir les assimiler" (7). Challaye was nevertheless in favour of a stage-theory in the granting of rights, since he had earlier argued that there were still some "groupes primitifs n'ayant pas encore conscience d'être des peuples" (8). In his Congress speech, he argued that "(l)a race noire, la plus méprisée de toutes, a des qualités excellentes de simplicité, de joie cordiale, de résignation à l'inevitable", whilst calling for an end to the colonial system (9).

For other prominent LDH members such as Maurice Viollette (whose 1936 proposals for enlarging access to citizenship in Algeria proved unsuccessful), the LDH "ne peut accepter qu'il y ait des races majeures de droit divin et d'autres races éternellement mineures qui seraient uniquement créées pour assurer la fortune des premières" the answer lay in an assimilationist policy, as there was no room for "ce préjugé de superiorité de race" (10). Challaye, on the other hand, denounced assimilation which, for him, "procède d'un immense orgueil de race" (11). Others, such as Albert Bayet, were for a much more reserved reformism which, whilst extending rights, would not have altered the power relations inherent within the colonies (12). The general tone of the 1931 Congress celebrated the achievements of colonization - underlining Girardet's point that the invoking of human rights could be done as much to defend as to attack the colonial system (1972, 168). Even Challaye's position remained marginal.
One of the factors which limited the LDH's support for organizations such as the ENA, the Algerian nationalist movement founded in France in 1926 (cf. Stora 1986, 1987) and which was repressed by governments of the Right and the Front Populaire in the period in question (13), was the ENA's occasional recourse to opportunistic antisemitism (cf. Section Three). For the LDH, these considerations tended to outweigh the fact that the ENA continually fought against anti-Maghrebian racism in colonial Algeria and mainland France. This fear of the use of a nationalism which used Islam as a mobilizing force was linked to the view of colonized peoples as supposedly 'unfit' for democracy, since insufficiently mature politically. Émile Kahn's intervention at the 1937 LDH Congress shows the tension inherent within such a viewpoint:

"(v)ous savez ce que sont les populations indigenes d'Algerie. Vous savez ce qu'est leur misere, contre laquelle nous luttons. Mais vous savez aussi avec quelle facilite des esprits, qui sont trop souvent des esprits d'enfants, se laissent entrainer a des mouvements qui peuvent etre desastreux" (14).

But the LDH was merely representative of general attitudes of the time, both on the question of the supposed 'simplicity' of colonized peoples (cf. Section Three) and national liberation movements. Any overt nationalism was equated with the danger to democracy posed by German expansionism (15). This helps to explain the profound misunderstanding of the Algerian nationalist movements by the mainstream French left. This delayed the latter's realization that France was supporting the racist practices accompanying the dying colonialism.

The LICA's position on colonial racism and 'civilization superiority' in the 1930s was not dissimilar to that of the LDH. As for the LDH, the LICA was wary of the ENA's perceived ambivalence on the question of antisemitism, particularly after the 1934 antisemitic riots in Constantine (16). For some, the presence of black politicians such as Gaston Monnerville within the LICA was later to be criticized as mere show: blacks were used at the LICA's public meetings, according to Salomon, merely as "catalyseurs d'affection publique" (17). There were, as for the LDH, various shades of opinion within the
organization, although the colonial racism question attracted, in general, minimal attention when compared to the main action of the LICA against antisemitism. Charles-Auguste Bontemps, probably representing the conservative view within the LICA, argued that "(i)l est (aussi) des groupements d'hommes tellement attardés qu'on ne peut en aucune façon envisager leur assimilation immédiate" (18), and that "(i)l existe des peuplades attardées dont on rougit de penser qu'elles sont partie intégrante de l'humanité" (19). At the end of the 1930s, when prominent LICA supporters such as Zérapha were arguing that "(l)es Musulmans et les Noirs entre autres, savent que nous ne faisons aucune différence entre les victimes du racisme" (20) and at a time when the LICA had, during the Front Populaire, opened out, albeit very partially, to opposition to colonial racism, one can still read articles in Le Droit de vivre which extol "(c)omme ce peuple noir est grand par sa douceur (...) Et comme sa naïveté est touchante et délicieuse" (21).

LICA president Bernard Lecache seems to have represented a well-established republican assimilationist position. For Lecache, "le rapprochement des races est parfaitement possible dans la France africaine comme il l'a été dans la France républicaine depuis 1789 sous l'impulsion d'un Abbé Grégoire" (22). The threat of fascism brought the LICA to advise "(g)ardez l'Algérie à la France" in November 1936 (23). The Eighth National Congress (November 1937) reaffirmed the LICA's opposition to the Code de l'Indigène (24). The LICA's generally legalistic approach was reflected in its very moderate call in May 1938 for "(l)’adoption des revendications essentielles du peuple musulman nord-africain, dans la limite des lois de la République" (25). Lecache revealed his paternalism by arguing that the colonized Algerians only had to be better treated and "tu verras comme ils se prendront d'amour pour notre pays" (26). Welcoming the nomination of Méchiri, a sous-préfet of Algerian origin, Le Droit de vivre confidently claims in June 1939 that "(l)’a France est antiraciste", which amounted to a denial of the existence of colonial racism (27). There are nonetheless examples from 1936, of a certain change in attitude by the LICA on colonial
racism which would only be theorized in the immediate post-war years (cf. Chapter Five) (28). I would argue that the examples from the LDH and the LICA reinforce Liauzu's judgement that the ideas of organizations such as the LDH (and here, by extension, the LICA), "s'inscrivent (évidemment) dans les limites fixées par le corpus des notions et des méthodes des savoirs occidentaux de l'époque qui, explicitement ou implicitement, adhèrent à l'idée d'une hiérarchie des stades des civilisations" (1982, 78). Neither the LICA nor the LDH saw colonial racism as a priority within the interwar years. Both organizations were trapped within a position on 'civilization superiority' which involved a reformist, assimilationist position on the French colonies. The one association which did hold a more critical position on colonization was the CVIA, which denounced in 1936

"(l)a France qui se dit libérale et démocratique", but which "refuse aux peuples coloniaux les libertés promises et elle maintient l'inegalité des droits entre des hommes de races différentes. alors qu'elle se proclame d'autre part l'adversaire des théories raciales" (CVIA 1936, 5-6), although the CVIA's action was not concentrated on anticolonialism.

**Section One (d) : The parties of the left**

The comments on the positions of the PCF and SFIO on anticolonialism and colonial racism that follow are simply intended to summarize general themes (cf. Biondi and G. Morin 1992, Joly 1991). Whilst the PCF would act to defend the "travailleurs coloniaux" (as they were officially termed) against management discrimination (cf. Section Three (d)), the Party, its structures and membership were all influenced by France's status as imperial power (cf. Balibar 1992). The fact that, ultimately, the availability of foreign and colonial labour ensured relative social mobility for the French working class created some ambiguity from the PCF towards colonized people's attempts to liberate themselves from French control. There is no linear 'progression' to be read into the PCF's evolving positions over the period 1919-1962 on these questions. Stora (1987, 101) argues that the PCF was mainly preoccupied with the largest groups of interwar
emigration, the Polish and Italians, which would explain the interest of the far left (anarchists, Trotskyists, anarcho-syndicalists) in the Maghrebian (mostly Algerian) emigration (29)

In the period from 1923 to 1935, the PCF adopted a Leninist position on colonial struggles, saying that there was a commonality of interest between the French working class and the proletariat in the colonies (Joly 1991, 27). In this period up to 1935, then, the PCF was to encourage a number of anticolonial initiatives, including the ENA, the first Algerian nationalist organization based in France (cf. Stora 1992, 1992a and Section Three) and the Union Intercoloniale and Ligue Anti-imperialiste. There was, however, an inherent tension here for the PCF between the use of 'ethnic' identity and the primacy of class. Relations between the ENA, various black rights groups and the PCF (cf. Sections Two and Three) were soured because of the apparent 'contradiction', from the Party's perspective, of the use of religion (for example) to mobilize support for the ENA. The PCF made specific pronouncements in the period from 1923-1935 on the need to fight the "préjugés coloniaux qui aveuglent tant d'Europeens" in Algeria (30). The Party's view was that, if colonial workers were being brought to France as a management tactic to divide the workforce - an analysis in line with its definition of racism as a result of capitalism -, then this should not be translated into discrimination by communists towards Algerians (31). It would be unfair to suggest that the PCF did not interest itself at all in the plight of the Maghrebian workers in the Métropole. L'Humanité argued in January 1926 that "(s)euls les communistes defendent tous les opprimés, sans distinction de sexe ou de race" (32), and shortly afterwards denounced "la situation misérable du prolétariat algérien" in France (33). Condemning the "répression envers les travailleurs nord-africains", the PCF called for a "front unique des travailleurs français et nord-africains pour la défense des droits démocratiques, pour l'abolition du Code de l'Indigénat", in the newly-found unity of post-February 1934 left politics (34). The PCF opposed the holding of the Colonial Exposition, which attracted
millions of visitors in 1931. *L’Humanité* being one of the few newspapers not to join in the imperial self-congratulation of the time (Hodeir and Pierre 1991, 102).

The PCF’s position on anticolonial movements changed from the mid-1930s onwards. Henceforth, any anticolonial position from colonized peoples was to prove more suspect to the PCF, since for the Party, fascism, the new enemy, could best be fought by retaining the colonies. As *L’Humanité* put it: "(n)ous travaillons à la création d’une communauté française, métropole et colonies formant un bloc capable de resister au plan d’hégémonie du racisme hitlérien" (35). There was a reaffirmation of assimilationist principles from the PCF, continued during the drive towards national unity during the Occupation, and the PCF’s place until 1947 in the institutional centres of the new Fourth Republic (cf Moneta 1971) led to little questioning of colonial policy: the massacre at Setif in 1945 went unchallenged by the PCF, for example (36). The PCF’s anti-imperialism brought support for the Indochinese cause, however, as part of a more radical anticolonial position after its ministers had left the government in 1947 (Ageron 1979, 612).

Césaire resigned from the Party in 1956, stating that "l’anticolonialisme même des communistes français porte encore les stigmates de ce colonialisme qu’il combat" (37). By this time, the PCF was developing a more involved position against the Algerian War, but was not the initiator of the more radical anti-war campaigns. This dépassement of the PCF on its left by student groups on the Algerian question was to lead to left-wing radical politics in the 1960s and 70s taking on the antiracist question, at the expense of both the PCF and the socialist parties. Theorists such as Balibar (1992) have highlighted how the PCF failed to assume its historic rôle on the colonial question, due to the nationalism which traversed its discourse and practice. What was missing until the late 1950s were calls for greater solidarity with Algerians (cf. Chapter Five). I have tried to show that there was a gap between the party’s theoretical anti-imperialism and
concrete action on the Algerian question in particular, undercut by a suspicion of
the use of ethnicity as a mobilizing force against colonial racism.

Comments similar to these could arguably be applied to the SFIO. After
the Tours Congress in 1920, most of the committed anticolonialists within the
SFIO joined the PCF (Semidei 1968, 1125). This, along with the PCF’s decision
to ban membership of the LDH within its own ranks, led to a splitting up of left
anticolonial voices (Dewitte 1985, 93). Biondi and G. Morin (1992, 164) quote
from an internal SFIO memorandum from 1928 which reads:

(d)’une maniere generale, on peut dire que le peuple francais, quels que
puissent etre par ailleurs les defauts inherents a toute colonisation et a
tout assujetissement de l’homme par l’homme est, de tous les peuples
europeens, celui qui est le moins atteint des prejuges de couleur”.

A reformist position on colonial policy dominated the various currents within the
SFIO in the 1930s (Semidei 1968) (38). The Front Populaire governments would
not tolerate opposition to its assimilationist colonial policy (hence the banning of
the PPA, which had opposed the Blum-Viollette proposals). The antifascism of
the Front Populaire did not see the colonial question as a priority (Liauzu 1982,
92) (cf. Chapter Three). Like the PCF, the SFIO viewed the colonies as a source
of strength towards the end of the 1930s as a counter to German expansionism.
Claude Bourdet has argued that SFIO leaders had been socialized since
childhood, via the ecole republique, into the idea of the mission civilisatrice
(39) This political socialization made for conceptual blindness towards the
colonial practices being seen as racist, as Daniel Mayer recognized (40), and
affected those in positions of responsibility within the Party. Just as for the PCF,
the war period and Liberation increased the call for national unity as witnessed by
the creation of the Union Francaise in 1947 (cf. Betts 1991, Coquery-Vidrovitch
and Ageron 1996). The period of decolonization was thus one of great confusion
on the mainstream left (cf. also Chapters Five and Six).

The radical left of the interwar years (anarchists, Trotskyists, anarcho-
syndicalists) was more likely to link imperialism and colonialism to racism and,
through the egalitarianism which undercut these differing political projects, consider the status of Maghrebians within France as more than a simply marginal theme. Stora calls these fractions of the left the first "porteurs de valise" (1992a, 51-52), and argues elsewhere, for example, that "(c)hornologiquement la Fédération anarchiste de la region parisienne fut sans doute la première organisation politique française à s'intéresser aux travailleurs nord-africains et à mettre sur pied un Comité d'action pour la défense des indigènes, et cela dès 1923" (1987, 55). The anarchists, however, were hostile to the use of religion to mobilize workers to claim more equality (cf. Mohamed 1995). Marginalized from the PCF and the SFIO, these were distant voices of protest (Stora 1987, 102). An analysis of the solidarity networks that were set up on a local level by such activist groups with Maghrebians is needed, however.

Section One (e) : Looking elsewhere

This brief survey of positions of the LDH, LICA, SFIO and PCF on anticolonialism and colonial racism has suggested that we should look elsewhere for more radical condemnation of colonial racism in the interwar years. It was only in the 1950s that there were significant changes in position on these questions, after the lead taken by organizations such as the MRAP (1949-). As Guillaumin has argued "(t)emps d'incubation, necessaire implication de l'affectivité, sont les conditions du surgissement d'un changement de l'expression et peut-être de l'attitude (DU MAJORITAIRE)" (1972, 158). For much of the rest of this thesis, we will be looking at organizations and individuals which evolved outside the main parties of the mainstream French left. This is arguably an important historical development for antiracism, with implications for contemporary action. Indeed, the main innovations in practice and theory on antiracism have largely emerged from the non-aligned left in the post-war period. This section has tried to show that there was a lack of articulation between certain levels of production of antiracism, as defined in Chapter One. There was also a problem of articulation between theory, ideals, and practice. Minorities
within the SFIO and the PCF held views more sympathetic to the denunciation of
abuses within the colonial system, without always pressing for the system's
abolition. As a link into Section Two, I will suggest that the view of racism as
being inherent within the colonial system was a major advance in antiracist
thinking, and was only slowly to be accepted by the mainstream left.

One of the most analytically useful ideas to have emerged from Albert
Memmi's writing is the theorizing of "le fait colonial" as an "ensemble de
situations vecues", within which there is, for the colonized and colonizer, a
socialization into racism (1957/1973, 49). This removes the abstraction of much
of the debate on racism, stressing the experiential as a basis for theory, just as it
implies that racism is a result of social practices and hence socialization and is
open to change. In his introduction to Memmi's Portrait du colonise, Sartre
argued in a similar vein about the "praxis colonialiste" (1957/1964, 52-53). The
stressing of the nature of colonialism as a "fait social total", reciprocally yet
antagonistically involving both sides (colonizer and colonized), was to provide a
major framework for those critical of racism in the 1950s. Writers such as
Cesaire and Fanon had already described similar processes, without necessarily
employing the same terms (cf. Cesaire 1939/1956, Fanon 1952/1975). With these
different and at times divergent thinkers, there is a dialogue between theory and
practice which serves as a useful counter-balance to the often very abstract
antiracist positions described so far within republican antiracism. Also, the
emphasis placed by these writers on the complex nature of reactions to colonial
racism highlights the cultural mixing to have come from the colonial system, and
which determined in part the repertoire of forms of action, discourse and
identification at play within the opposition to racism from colonized activists.
These ideas will help us to understand the action of Algerian and African/African-
Caribbean campaigners in the period 1919-39, examining the exchanges between
various areas and levels of production of antiracism
Section Two : Black voices 1914-1939

Section Two (a) : Contexts

In this Section, I shall be looking at definitions of racism within the colonial context which differ markedly from the theoretical approaches outlined for the LICA in the 1930s (Chapter Three). Colonial racism, as defined by the various black political and cultural movements of the interwar years, is much more all-pervasive, and, rather than relying on a limited number of vectors (such as the far-right, for example), is seen as an intrinsic component of the colonial system qua system, affecting the attitudes of the metropolitan French, consciously or unconsciously, as well as the colonial settlers and civil servants. We shall not, however, limit this discussion to the more exclusively cultural aspects of the opposition to colonial racism. Firstly, as Ayo Langley (1969, 70) has pointed out, the campaigns of black rights groups cannot be limited to the cultural projects of négritude. Within black trades unions, for example, there was resistance to racism which combined cultural aspects and internationalist arguments. Furthermore, the concrete practices of discrimination in many spheres of everyday life for blacks and colonized Maghrebians living in France in the inter-war years brought about mobilization against the racist "terre-mère", highlighting the antimony between the supposedly humanitarian colonial projects with their mirage of assimilation, and the harsh realities instilled by colonialism. It was often the common experience of contact with metropolitan France which encouraged activism from colonized groups, whether middle-class intellectuals or working-class soldiers and dockers. After a preliminary contextual introduction, the concept of négritude is studied as a refutation of colonial racism and the assimilationist logic. A third part then looks at campaigning concerning State institutional practices, and attempts made to found black trades unions in the 1930s. The wide variety of positions described is intended to stress the complexity of the colonial experience.
There is not the space here to devote detailed attention to the history of French colonialism in the Caribbean or on the African continent, nor to the slave trade which linked the two (41). The Second Republic abolished legal slavery in 1848 under the instigation of Victor Schoelcher, a figure revered as much as the Abbe Grégoire by pro-assimilationists. The *Code de l'Indigénat* applied to all colonial subjects in France's Sub-Saharan possessions. Citizen status in the interwar years applied only to those in Martinique, Guadeloupe, French Guyana, La Réunion, Tahiti and certain areas of Sénégal (Saint-Louis, Dakar, Rufisque, Goree) (cf. Lochak 1992, 295). Almost all French Africans were therefore subjects, a factor which should be born in mind for what follows. Léon-Gontrand Damas pointed out the "incoherence" of a colonial system where the vast majority of blacks were subjected to the *Code de l'Indigénat*, whilst there were also several black *députés* (1939, 334).

The vast array of stereotyping of black people in French social discourse has been studied by Cohen (1980), Schneider (1982) and Nederven Pieterse (1992). According to Biondi and Morin (1992, 151), the post-WWI paternalism associated with the presence of black African troops (all referred to as the *tirailleurs sénégalais*, whether from Senegal or not) having fought for France (cf. Stovall 1993, Dornel 1995) brought about a change in the way black Africans in general were perceived in the Métropole. From the former image of *sauvages* - whether *bons sauvages* or not - the new theme was one of supposed childishness and immaturity, political or otherwise (cf. Dewitte 1985, 12). This transformation can be seen in the discourse of advertising, for example (42). The category 'black' should not hide the particular contexts of Caribbean and African colonization, and the varying stereotypes which emerged within each situation. The image of African Americans would also have to be considered in any more complete survey.

There was a tendency to underestimate any hostility in the white metropolitan French attitudes towards the French Caribbean and African blacks.
Ambitious black politicians from the colonies such as Gaston Monnerville (French Guyana), were keen to play down the extent of racism, arguing in 1937 that "(l)e racisme n'existe pas dans la mentalité française" (43). Gratien Candace (Guadeloupe) fully accepted the arguments of the 'civilization inferiority' of black people, saying that whilst "il n'y a pas de races inférieures, il y a des races attardées que les races évoluées doivent aider à monter vers les sommets de la civilisation" (44). This was the commonly-held scientific, academic and generally 'educated' attitude of the time prevalent, as we have seen, among organizations such as the LICA and the LDH. On another level of social discourse, as Dewitte (1985) and Fabre (1985, 1991) have shown, the middle-class craving for Afro-Latin and jazz music in 1920s and 1930s Paris had little direct effect on levels of popular racism (45).

Authors such as the Jamaican-born Claude Mackay, whose work was to have a profound influence on the négritude movements (Kesteloot 1965, 80-81), set out to attack this "illusion" (Fabre 1991, 153) of no French anti-black racism. Mackay's novel Banjo, first published in 1929, paints Marseille society as impregnated with hostility to blacks of all origins, and highlights the role of the local and national press in the 'criminalization' of black males (Mackay 1929/1957, 276-279 passim). In his autobiography, A long way from home, first published in 1937, Mackay reflects on his feelings as a black person in France in the interwar years "it is hell to belong to a suppressed minority and outcast group. For to most members of the powerful majority, you are not a person; you are a problem" (Mackay 1937/1985, 153) (46). There were therefore important, if partially stifled voices in interwar France which rejected the myth of a non-racist France. What had arguably been lacking in the opposition to anti-black racism prior to the 1930s, and what négritude was to provide, was a position from which to challenge the discrimination against African and African-Caribbean cultures. Marxism had provided an explanatory framework for socio-economic resistance, without addressing the cultural side. Thinkers like Césaire represented a synthesis of both Marxism and négritude: for the PCF, such a synthesis
continued to be considered as a contradiction. Marxism, informed by themes of black solidarity, was also to be used in campaigning aimed at a more working-class black audiences in the 1930s, as will be shown for Garan Kouyaté (cf. Dewitte 1985, 172, 199). Before doing so, I will introduce some features of Fanon’s writing which will provide a theoretical background for the discussion on négritude.

I have already mentioned the work of Albert Memmi, whose argument that “(l)a situation coloniale fabrique des colonialistes comme elle fabrique des colonisés” (1957/1973, 85) served to underline how the totalizing colonial system unequally affected all sides. Fanon, however, went one step further, stressing the collective social responsibility for the colonial system. For Fanon:

“(...) une société est raciste ou ne l’est pas. (...) Dire, par exemple, que le nord de la France est plus raciste que le sud, que le racisme est l’oeuvre des subalternes, donc n’engage nullement l’élite, que la France est le pays le moins raciste du monde, est le fait d’hommes incapables de réfléchir correctement" (Fanon 1952/1975, 69).

Fanon’s work (cf. 1952/1975 and 1961/1991) condemns both the economic and the cultural aspects of the colonial system. Fanon suggested that all forms of social discourse and practice within French colonial society (where ‘society’ meant both metropolitan France and the French colonies) were infused with colonial and hence racist assumptions, whether or not there was lip-service paid to the colonial mission in an attempt to justify oppression. Consequently, there would be a cross-class French colonial racism, expressed in different terms, but emanating from the same political order of colonialism. If there are consequences on a collective level for the colonizing society, then the same could be applied to the colonized: for Fanon, “l’aliénation du noir n’est pas une question individuelle” (1952/1975, 8), a point he developed at length in Les damnés de la terre (1961/1991). Opposition to the colonial system would therefore have to be at a collective level, just as the implication arguably was that this commonality of experience of alienation could unite in the face of the arbitrarily divisive
techniques of colonial rule. Fanon, with his insight into the way colonial racism functioned as a practice (in the institutional *regard* of colonial psychiatry, for example (cf. Berthelier 1994)), had seen through, from the point of view of the colonized, the claim that there was any great difference between the cultural and racial justifications for inferiority, showing rather how the cultural and racial discourses would and did feed off each other.

War Minister Paul Painlevé's letter to the Interior Minister in 1928 on the danger of communist-inspired propaganda aimed at colonized soldiers, shows this blending of racial and cultural arguments in French colonial discourse. Painlevé argues that "(l)es indo-chinois qui ont l'intelligence vive et qui appartiennent à une civilisation à la fois plus ancienne et plus évoluée que les Malgaches, et surtout que les Sénégalais, sont particulièrement sensibles à cette *communist-inspired* propagande" (47). This quote shows the notion of the hierarchy of civilizations applied to the colonized peoples, with, internal to colonization, another level of differentiation, since African cultures are placed at the rung of the "lowest of the low". This classifying system had already come into use during WWI (cf. Dornel 1995). As Fanon put it in "Racisme et culture" (1956, 122), the "hierarchy" of cultures is itself a racist concept.

With the discussion on *nègritude* that follows, I am not arguing that, theoretically speaking, there is no difference between a cultural and a racial argument. However, at the level of practice, the combination of the racial and cultural arguments meant that within *nègritude* there would often be an equal rejection of republican cultural assimilationism alongside the more overt colonial racist theory of the right (as exemplified by Painlevé's letter, above). In elaborating a common black identity, the thinkers of *nègritude* were trying to (re)establish an agency lost through slavery and the colonial regimes. As Fanon put it : "(c)'est le blanc qui crée le noir. Mais c'est le noir qui créé la nègritude" (1959, 27). This hints at one of the general ideas of this thesis, that forms of resistance to racism and oppression, whilst necessarily influenced by the
dominant modes of thought or practices of exclusion at a given moment, will usually take shape in a space which is only partially determined by the racism of the dominant group(s). In the discussion on négritude that follows, I do not attempt to paint a full history of the black francophone cultural context of Paris during the interwar years (cf. Fabre 1985, 1991, Dewitte 1985). I will attempt to describe the context in which debates around anti-black racism emerged, highlighting themes relating to the struggle for autonomy.

Section Two (b) : Négritude

Defining négritude is hindered by the different meanings attached to the concept in the period since the early 1930s (cf. Hymans 1971). As Aimé Césaire remarked, "chacun a sa petite negritude à soi" (interviewed in Depestre 1980, 78). Depestre defines négritude as "une Weltanschauung d'origine antiraciste", seeing it the prise de conscience of an alienation that was based both on 'race' and class (1980, 83, 50). Other critics have pointed out the "révolte contre le racisme et l'imperialisme de l'Occident" as a defining characteristic of négritude (Kesteloot 1965, 119). If, as I have tried to show, the theoretical context for négritude was the rejection of a cultural and racial argument, the most useful way of looking at négritude is probably from the experiential point of view - what being black meant for individuals in given situations - this retains the commonality of the experience of racism and colonialism at a group level, whilst allowing for the diversity of contexts - economic, social and political - in which these experiences took place. Such a position also recognizes the existence of 'racial', class and ethnic identities whilst seeing them as historical products. In the period from the publication of Légitime Défense (1932) and L'Étudiant noir (1934) to the Présence Africaine project (1947-), via Césaire's Cahiers d'un retour au pays natal (1939), there was some watering-down of the political radicality of négritude which, according to Vaillant, became a marker of black sensibility and culture from the 1950s onwards (1990, 248). Négritude is
therefore a complex cultural, literary, social and political phenomenon: its lack of fixed meaning has left it open for reinterpretation.

Interwar Paris from the mid-1920s onwards saw the coming together of black intellectuals from all French-speaking colonies and mandates, as well as African-American writers such as Langstone Hughes trying to escape the suffocating anti-black racism in the USA (cf. Fabre 1991). Within this context of cultural mixing (métissage culturel), the driving force behind the intellectual movements was the emergent "micro-société antillaise, un peu mondaine et très assimilée, nourissant des ambitions littéraires et politiques, coincée entre sa position sociale et les rebuffades racistes de la société française" (Dewitte 1985, 44). Out of this context came the first type of négritude to be examined here. Through cultural revues such as La Dépêche africaine and La Revue du Monde Noir (48), a pro-métissage, relatively consensual argument was put forward, which was not harnessed to any specific political project. As Paulette Nardal wrote in La Revue du Monde noir:

"(n)ous avons pleinement conscience de ce que nous devons à la culture blanche et nous n'avons nullement l'intention de l'abandonner pour favoriser je ne sais quel retour à l'obscurantisme ( . . .). Mais nous entendons dépasser le cadre de cette culture pour chercher à l'aide des savants de race blanche et de tous les amis des Noirs, à redonner à nos congenères la fierté d'appartenir à une race dont la civilisation est peut-être la plus ancienne du monde" (49).

The motivating idea behind this project was the need to reinstill pride in a black culture often at best ignored, at worst derided as representing the antithesis of French (therefore 'universal') culture. Nardal is clearly distancing herself from any wholesale rejection of 'western' values. The French interest in l'art negre and the new, more relativistic ethnographical tradition in the 1930s (cf. Lebovics 1992) intervened, as Dewitte has pointed out, at a time when social tensions due to economic crises tended to exacerbate hostility to black people in France (Dewitte 1985, 253). This suggests that at any one time, there will be transformations within the levels and areas of production of antiracism and racism according to varying temporalities.
Césaire, adopting a second, more radical approach culminating in his *Cahiers d'un retour au pays natal* (first published 1939), was to stress the rejection of Eurocentric 'rationalism' in a forthright way (50). Césaire interests antiracism for (among other themes) this bitter critique of the assimilationist logic. In *Cahiers*..., he ridicules the "zèbres se secouant à leur manière pour faire tomber leurs zebrures en une rosée de lait frais" (1939/1956, 85). Césaire claims to have invented the term *nègritude* which was, for him, "la résistance à la politique d'assimilation" (interviewed in Depestre 1980, 74). Rather than *noir* or *homme(s) de couleur*, considered too assimilationist (Dewitte 1985, 224-5), *nègre* (a term also found in official discourse) and by extension *nègritude*, were used as part of a rhetorical *retournement* (cf. Taguieff 1990) (51). Speaking of the 1930s, Césaire describes his frustration at the attitude of the PCF, whose Marxism he then shared: "(j)e reprochais aux communistes, à ce moment-là, d'oublier nos particularités nègres" (interviewed in Depestre 1980, 71). Césaire was therefore attempting to operate a synthesis between Marxism on the one hand, which explained the cultural disregard for black cultures in the socio-economic structures of colonial, post-slavery societies, and a theory for an emancipatory cultural project on the other. Léopold Sédar Senghor, politically more moderate than Césaire, was to use the notion of *métissage culturel* to attempt to escape the vicious circle of the assimilationist logic, without seeking to attack that logic head on (52). Writing in 1950, explaining that "(t)rop assimilés et pas assez assimilés? Tel est exactement notre destin de métis culturels" (for African francophone intellectuals), he added that "nous avons délibérément choisi la solution de l'ambivalence, sinon de l'ambiguïté" (53). This pro-*métissage* argument developed in the 1930s to counter Nazi racial ideology (Hymans 1971, 83) (54).

Fanon probably best summarizes the cultural project of *nègritude*, when he argues that "(…) le Noir ne doit plus se trouver placé devant ce dilemme: se blanchir ou disparaître, mais il doit prendre conscience d'une possibilité d'exister"
(Fanon 1952/1975, 80-81). Fanon's writing sought to break the circle of dependency on the colonizer for the starting point of resistance. But whilst négritude carried a rejection of the assimilationist logic, this critique came mostly from those francophone intellectuals having been through the French higher education system, who felt like Césaire the need to rediscover an oral black 'tradition' which had been lost through the physical violence of slavery and the "symbolic violence" (Bourdieu) of the colonial system's education policy. There was an element of selectivity then, both in what was being taken from the French educational system to use against colonial racism, and in the choice of those cultural elements that had been derided and marginalized under colonialism and which were now to be given greater worth.

This process of selectivity (cf. Kesteloot 1965, 92) was part of the (re)invention of a black cultural tradition, (cf. Hobsbawm 1993). This process used elements "adapted from the culture of the hegemonic country" (Lebovics 1992, 124). It is in this way that Gilroy's comments about "(...) the complicity and interdependency of black and white thinkers" (1993, 31) could arguably be usefully applied to the négritude movement. However, it would be wrong to ignore the power relations which remained within this reformulation of a cultural project, a reformulation which, as has been suggested, was itself partly determined from the outside by colonial racism and the history of slavery. Any return to a "négritude des sources" (Kesteloot 1965, 116) would have been impossible. Diawara states (1992, 386) : "(g)iven that the negritude movement was created in France with French people as its primary audience, the poets had to use French discursive spaces (ethnology, literary canons, Marxism and Christianity) to speak about Blackness" - the cultural exchange remains an unequal one. Guillaumin argues much the same theoretical point, saying that:

"l'arrivée à l'existence des minoritaires emprunte des canaux qui ne sont que partiellement définis par eux-mêmes: la société majoritaire en disposant du pouvoir de fait impose certaines formes à la prise de parole minoritaire" (1972, 122).
This illustrates Chapter Two's comments on the antagonistic indebtedness of some colonized intellectuals. Senghor argues that he and his fellow colonized intellectuals of the 1930s were "munis des armes miraculeuses de la double vue", and hence had the cultural capital (Bourdieu) which enabled them to operate a cultural synthesis (55). Other commentators on négritude have pointed out that the use of 'tradition' as a theme is in itself not unproblematical: Senghor, for example, drew his theory of the attachment to the land of his native Senegal from Maurice Barres's counter-modern eulogy of Alsace-Lorraine (Irele 1992, 207-8) (56).

For some commentators (cf. Bhabha 1994, 44) the colonized intellectual, due to colonial education policy, would feel different to those that are already portrayed as "different" in the dominant discourse, a position which infers that there was a class divide separating intellectuals from workers and which denied commonality of experience of racism (57). Whilst having sought to show up possible limits of the négritude project's opposition to assimilation as theorized by Césaire and then Fanon, due to a lack of dialogue between intellectual and other forms of resistance to anti-black racism, I would argue that some critical space was recovered from which to critique the West from the position of W.E.B. Du Bois's "double consciousness", where the theorists of negritude were "both inside and outside the West" (Gilroy 1993, 30), and where the commonality of experience of racism in whatever form was the founding reason for a counter-cultural project. As I shall attempt to show presently, black trades unionist activists operating in a very different socio-economic and cultural environment to the theorists of négritude had also to negotiate problems of determinism and agency.

A third, more radical, pan-African approach in the 1930s to black identity, and situated on the margins of the négritude movement, was exemplified by Émile Faure's Ligne de Défense de la Race Nègre (LDRN). The LDRN claimed that what was being formulated within the cultural project of négritude was
based too much on a spirit of cooperation, rather than confrontation, with mainland France, and that the result was "un métissage général et fade", another form of assimilation in a different mould. What was needed, according to the organization's publication *La Race Nègre*, was:

"un État nègre englobant toute l'Afrique noire et les Antilles et, au sein de cet État, nous ferons de la question des races ce qu'elle était avant : un élément de diversités, d'agréments et de compétitions joyeuses et non un prétexte à des antipathies bileuses" (58).

As I tried to show in Chapter Three (note 5), *métissage culturel* could simply be interpreted as working in one direction - that of minority cultures having to adopt aspects of the majority culture, where any meaningful reciprocity between cultures was absent due to the colonial system (59). The LDRN's preoccupations concerned the formulation of a separatist black identity at an African level, to use as a basis for political emancipatory projects, and it was highly critical of any cultural mixing (cf. Dewitte 1985, 344-349 *passim*).

Césaire, writing with hindsight, was critical of the dangers of *métissage culturel* when taken in an abstract, idealist sense: in an important article in *Présence Africaine* in 1956, Césaire stressed the power relations at play within the colonial experience, which made for the constant denigration of (here) black cultures. Whilst stating that "dans le domaine de la culture, la règle est le composite et l'habitat d'arlequin, l'uniforme", Césaire sounded the warning that "(...) cette hétérogénéité n'est pas vécue en tant qu'hétérogénéité. Dans la réalité de la civilisation vivante il s'agit d'une hétérogénéité vécue intérieurement comme homogénéité" (1956, 201, 202). I would see *négritude* as drawing away from the specifically "Franco-French" context, the better to attack racism. For example, both Césaire in the *Cahiers...,* and Damas in *Pigments* (1937/1972) saw hostility to racism as a central theme, Césaire defining *négritude* as "mesurée au compas de la souffrance" (1939/1956, 81).

I have outlined two strands of the early *négritude* movements: (i) the pro-*métissage* arguments of *La Revue du Monde Noir* and *La Dépêche africaine*
(late 1920s-early 1930s) : (ii) Cesaire's position on *negritude* in the 1930s, based around his critique of assimilation, and the Fanonian prolongation of such thought into the 1950s. Drawing on the *negritude* movements in order to go further politically was the more radical pan-African stance of newspapers such as *La Race Nègre* (1927-37). I have sought to highlight the heterogeneity, both synchronically and diachronically, of the *negritude* movements and to suggest that the opposition to racism, from an experiential position, and notwithstanding the important differences of interpretation which separate them, is their common theme.

In the postwar period, French anticolonial activists did not necessarily welcome the concept of *negritude* with open arms : Sartre's description of *negritude* in *Orphee noir* as a form of "racisme antiraciste" (1948, 582) showed the ambivalence of Marxism towards the use of identity politics (60). Without defining just how *negritude* was, for him, a racist concept, Sartre saw *negritude* merely as "le temps faible d'une progression dialectique" (1948, 602). Using the Hegelian *Aufhebung* (the reconciliation and *dépassement* of the two opposing sides of the dialectic, in which *negritude* was the negative part, into a new state more than the sum of its constituent parts), Sartre conferred on *negritude* merely transient status - to be tolerated whilst it lasted, perhaps, but only because it constituted "le seul chemin qui puisse mener à l'abolition des différences de race" (*ibid.*, 582). *Negritude* was "passage et non aboutissement, moyen et non fin dernière" (*ibid.*, 603). Fanon's feeling of betrayal on reading Sartre's position is well known: "(...) je sentis qu'on me volait ma dernière chance" (1951, 674). In *Les damnés de la terre*, however, Fanon rejoined Sartre to some extent on this point (Gendzier 1973, 227, Caute 1969, 75) : Fanon saw "(l)e racisme antiraciste, la volonté de défendre sa peau qui caractérise la réponse du colonisé au racisme colonial" as merely the first step in a developmental process towards the formulation of national liberation ideology (1961/1991, 177), a position which suggests that any 'doubling' of the racist argument that might occur in antiracism is merely the first step to a wider (for Sartre, more 'universal') base
towards the politics of emancipation. Postcolonial Marxist critics such as Depestre distance themselves from any essentialization of black identity within négritude, and see the cultural resistance of négritude as potentially denying class struggle, rather than trying to link the cultural and the economic (1980, 47).

Sartre's position in Orphée noir on the important question of the articulation between 'race' and class, was to see négritude as eventually subsumed by the socialist revolution, which would be the passage towards 'universalism' (Fabre 1985, 187) : "la notion de race ne se recoupe pas avec celle de classe : celle-là est concrète et particulière, celle-ci universelle et abstraite" (Sartre 1948, 602). For Prochaska, Fanon went beyond this position by suggesting that "race and class do not simply overlay each other but actually reinforce one another in ways which create a more unequal and racist social order than one based on either race or class alone" (1990, 155). I shall retain from this the notion that antiracism can usefully look at this mutual reinforcement, both ontologically and practically, of 'racial' and class factors, whereas very often only one side is concentrated upon - i.e. 'race' or class. Some of the movements analysed in Section Two (c) display a synthetic approach to 'race' and class questions : it is often the white metropolitan French response to this synthesis which then seeks to force protest into the ontology of 'exclusively' 'racial'-based or class-based forms, thus refusing what Gilroy terms the "reciprocal determination between 'race' and class struggles" (Gilroy 1987, 31). The examples that follow are intended to illustrate these points. I am not arguing that black protest is reducible to opposition to racism (cf. Gilroy 1987, 24-25).

**Section Two (c) : Campaigning**

There is perhaps something incongruous in suggesting that it was the French army as an institution which served as a major spur to the disintegration of Empire. Analysts of nation-building have underlined the significance of the army as an integrating, "nationalizing" institution, instilling a strong feeling of
national belonging (cf. Kantorowice 1984). However, the obligatory army service for large numbers of colonized men was to bring about a fundamental requestioning of attachment to France and revealed the unjust way in which they were treated by the French State. Having served France in WWI in large numbers (cf. Stovall 1993, Gallissot 1985a, Horne 1985, Dornel 1995), the experience had brought for many colonized soldiers the demythologizing of French triumphalism over its civilization, citizenship, and supposed values of tolerance. This process had probably started with the forcible mass-scale recruitment drives in the colonies, and the disruption this brought to local communities and economies (cf. Betts 1968, 42-43). Many African soldiers in particular, felt they had paid "la dette du sang", and should therefore be entitled to French citizenship (61).

Problems surrounding demobilization further complicated matters, as many Senegalese tried to stay in mainland France rather than suffer the same forcible 'repatriation' as the Moroccans and Indo-chinese (cf. Dewitte 1985, 52). Fall (1987, 17) stresses the willingness of many of these African colonial subjects to 'assimilate'. Instead, I would see the disillusionment caused by the French State's refusal to grant citizenship (and with it theoretical equality) as a major explanatory factor in the emergence of radical black publications and organizations in the 1920s and 30s.

The main theme of contestation which came from black protest organizations on the question of the army was the way in which black people were considered solely as 'canon fodder' by the State: a black person's life was quite simply not seen as worth that of a white soldier's. As the pan-African Ligue de Défense de la Race Nègre (LDRN)'s newspaper La Race Nègre complained in 1934: "(p)endant la paix nous sommes des sidis, des bamboulas, des chocolats, des mal blanchis, et on ne comprend pas pourquoi nous soyons encore en France" (62). Although blacks were welcomed when it came to fighting, few employers would employ them after the War: Julains argues in the Le Cri des Nègres (close to the PCF) that subsequent to the "période faste" of WWI, black people "sont devenus des éléments presque indésirables" in mainland France (63). For André
Beton, "chacun sait que nous ne sommes considérés comme Français qu'en temps de guerre" (64). *Le Cri des Nègres* printed a cartoon depicting a black man having lost part of his arm, responding to a prospective employer's "(l)es Nègres sont de race inférieure", by retorting "(v)ous ne disiez pas ça en 1914" (65). Elsewhere, the publication suggested that work was being refused to black men to force them back to the colonies (66). On the military question, even the moderate *La Dépêche africaine* joined in: for Gabriel Julien, "(m)obilisé pendant la guerre, le travailleur colonial a fait son devoir, il ne regrette pas, mais il s'étonne que l'employeur européen continue à le considérer comme une bête de somme" (67). Other complaints centred on the widespread use made of soldiers from the colonies to police other colonies. Such practices fitted well into the Marxist analysis of colonial rule employing divide and rule tactics. The inequalities attached to military service was a theme taken up by cultural revues such as *La Dépêche africaine* as well as more militant newspapers such as *Le Cri des Nègres*.

Another area of black activism concerned trades unions. As Dewitte (1985, 204-5, 286-7) has shown, there was often a conflict of interest for left-wing black activists in France in the interwar years, who found themselves trapped between the hypothetical support of the PCF/CGT/CGTU on the question of economics and colonialism, and these organizations' hostility to the use of black identity as a form of mobilization. As Fabre has pointed out, "French anticolonialists (...) attacked the colonial system through the principles of the rights of man and the workers' international, which made no allowance for racial specificity" (1991, 147). Rather than seeing questions of 'race' and class as a complex whole resulting from the colonial experience, the PCF/CGT/CGTU tended to view the 'race' question as antithetical to that of class, or as a bourgeois political theme to cause a diversion away from class politics (hence also the hostility to the cultural themes of national liberation).
When Garan Kouyate (cf. note 71) tried to set up black dock-workers unions in Marseille, Bordeaux and similar large ports in 1930, he encountered opposition from the public authorities. It will be remembered that there were relatively large numbers of black dockers, sailors and travellers in the main French maritime cities at this time, very often living in precarious financial circumstances, as Claude Mackay has shown (1937/1985). The aims of Kouyate's Syndicat Negre de Marseille were, according to the statutes, to intervene "en faveur de ses adherents sur les questions de placement, de salaires, de chomage". for equal pay "sans distinction de race, de couleur, ni de sexe". Significantly, it was also stated that "pour ameliorer leur situation les travailleurs negres doivent d'abord compter sur eux-memes", something of an indictment of established French unions, perhaps (68). For the authorities, "(l)e veritable lien envisage entre les membres de ce syndicat, n'est pas un lien professionnel, mais un lien ethnique", hence the illegality of the union. The Procureur general du Parquet d'Aix added in his letter to the garde des Sceaux in March 1930 that "(i)l y a un intérêt général à ne pas autoriser (ainsi) la constitution de syndicats de "races" alors (surtout) qu'(....)ils risquent de devenir des foyers d'agitation communiste" (69). The procureur had the insight to see that the organization possessed a dual identity which for itself was not a contradiction, even if for a colonial power such propagandizing was considered doubly dangerous since combining 'race' and class.

Part of the struggle for black anticolonial activists was also to achieve a meaningful form of autonomy from the PCF. Emile Faure's newspaper La Race Negre, representing the Ligue de Defense de la Race Negre (LDRN), was hostile to militants such as Kouyate who sought financial support from the PCF. An editorial of 1932 argues that "(l)e respect humain ne permet pas d'admettre qu'un peuple blanc s'arroge le droit de décider des destinees d'un peuple negre" (70). Kouyate, who had split away from the LDRN after 1931 for these very reasons of PC support, tried to operate a fusion between the radicalism of Marcus Garvey's message and the constraints imposed by communist funding (Biondi and
Morin 1992, 180). Kouyate founded the *Union des Travailleurs Nègres* (UTN) in 1932, whose aim went beyond that of a trades union to "assurer le développement culturel et l'entraide mutuelle entre les travailleurs manuels et intellectuels nègres de tous les pays", showing its willingness to appeal to non working-class blacks (71). The UTN saw itself as "l'organisation de défense du prolétariat nègre" through its newspaper *Le Cri des Nègres* (72), and was to become involved in the *Rassemblement populaire*. Both the LDRN and the UTN were trying to negotiate some autonomy on the Left, similar to the LICA in Chapter Three, but from a much more marginalized place within the political debate, in relation to the main parties of the Left or the trades unions. There were differences in emphasis during the time of the *Rassemblement populaire*. For the UTN, "les travailleurs nègres (...) sont et seront dans toutes les manifestations organisées contre le fascisme", since "le fascisme est d'essence negrophobe" (73). For the LDRN's newspaper *La Race Nègre*, however, the idea of a more general hostility to French society was in order: "(s)i le peuple français, dans sa majorité, n'approuve pas l'abomination dont nous sommes victimes, qu'il le montre en la faisant cesser". spreading responsibility for the position black people were in to the collective level (74).

The first section of this Chapter tried to show that it was precisely this critical distance from the colonial project which the French left lacked. Damas highlighted the contradictions of "la France qui ne perd pas une occasion de se proclamer l'amie des noirs, sans perdre par ailleurs une occasion de les maintenir impitoyablement en esclavage", where "le préjugé des races" was simply "un excellent moyen de colonisation" (1939, 340, 334). The LDRN's demands for the "(m)êmes droits sociaux et politiques pour les travailleurs nègres résidant en France que pour les travailleurs blancs" and the "(s)uppression de la police spéciale chargée de la surveillance des travailleurs nègres" (cf. Dewitte 1985) brings home the extent of inequality faced by the colonial subjects in France (75). Such demands also show opposition to the French State's racism on the question of citizenship, for example, as well as demands made to the French State to allow
colonial subjects in France to benefit from the same material advantages as the native French working class in the form of social security benefits. Similar themes are to be found with organizations fighting for the rights of colonized Algerian subjects (Section Three of this Chapter). The boundaries between anticOLONIALISM and antiracism here are very thin: since colonialism is defined as being based on a racist premise, then it is arguably less a question of two separate discourses (one antiracist, one anticolonial) more of one wider, adaptable discourse linking racist practice in the colonies with the status of blacks in France.

The section started with a discussion of négritude. I suggested that the boundaries between the political and the cultural were fluid and complex, consonant with the idea of négritude as a counter-culture. The reactions to the 1931 Exposition Coloniale show many of the same characteristics. Most protest against the Exposition came from the cultural field (Lebovics 1992, 106), including the surrealists. I would see the Exposition as the archetypal statement of 'civilization superiority', even if La Dépêche africaine betrayed its assimilationist position by not condemning it overtly (76). For Saumane in La Race Nègre, "(e)xposition coloniale? Soit! Alors, nous exigons une véritable exposition, celle qui comporte le génie de notre race, l'étalage de nos moeurs, de nos traditions et le film vécu de notre existence" (77). The alternative cultural project to that of colonialism is to be noted here. The UTN organized a counter demonstration (78). Almost simultaneous to the debates on the forthcoming Exposition, were the protests raised against the exhibiting of black women known simply as "les Négresses" in the Jardin d'Acclimatation in Paris. La Race Nègre issued a press release which said that

"(c)es exhibitions, faites dans le but de ridiculiser les Négres auprès du Français moyen, borné et casanier, complètent la campagne de dénigrement par la parole, les livres et l'image qui se poursuit depuis un siècle et qui doit cesser maintenant" (79).

In comparison, the LDH's Bureau Central, reacting to a complaint by its Aubenas (Ardèche) group that such an exhibition was degrading, talked instead of its "intention instructive" (80), although leading LDH member Charles Gide was to
severely criticize the 1931 Exposition itself (81). *La Dépêche africaine* was to constantly denounce the objectifying practice of public displays of the "Négresses" (Dewitte 1985, 233). Stéphano Rosso in *Le Cri des Nègres* turned the question of the effects of colonization round: "(l')alcoolisme, le syphilis, la tendance au vol, en un mot toutes les tares des "METROPOLES CIVILISEES" ont été implantées chez eux (the colonized peoples). C'est tout l'apport de la colonisation" (82). Cultural domination, and the power relations that implies, were seen as an intrinsic part of the colonial experience, viewed as based on racism.

Section Two (d): Conclusion to Section Two

More research, following on from Dewitte (1985) is needed on black organizations in France during the interwar period. There is a lack of written documentation on the experience of black women in France over this period: often confined to domestic service, the public sphere remained largely closed to them (cf. Nederveen Pieterse 1992, 182-186 passim). Drawing inspiration from Ayo Langley (1968), I have tried to show how négritude was not the only assertive force against colonial racism affecting black people in France during this period. The interweaving of 'race', class and ethnicity in demands for more rights and dignity mirrored the complex situations in which black people found themselves. There was, however, a lack of theorization of this interplay of varying social factors from both the intellectual theorists of négritude and working-class black radicals. I have tried to show that this antiracism was more than the 'simple' negation of racism, and thus went beyond the 'doubling' so central to purely discursive analyses of racism (cf. Taguieff 1990, 1995). The colonial experience of racism, as seen in the publications analyzed here, was of a systemic nature, to be located in certain State institutions, but which also existed elsewhere in the eyes of campaigners, notably in general levels of hostility throughout the population. Colonial racism could not simply be isolated on the far-right, notwithstanding the far-right's overt hostility to blacks (cf. *Action*
By the time of the reorganization of the *paysage antiraciste* at the end of the 1940s, the experience of Occupation, Deportation and Resistance, and the call of *nègritude* championed somewhat ambivalently by Sartre, were to bring sections of the mainstream French left, and republican discourse more generally, to admit the existence of colonial racism as a distinct category of racism (83). This category of *racisme colonial* covered more than anti-black racism. Before turning to these post-war developments, I would like therefore to mention, albeit briefly, another aspect of the lessons contained for antiracism within anticolonial and liberation movements - the opposition to anti-Maghrebian racism, in particular from the Algerian nationalists.

Section Three: Anti-Maghrebian racism and opposition, 1914-1939

Section Three (a): Introduction

This section attempts to show a number of themes which will be used in Chapter Five. First of all, I shall suggest that the interwar period saw the development of a body of themes of anti-Magrebian racism some of which continue to exist today (84). Secondly, I shall look at the reactions to this racism from the ENA-PPA (*Étoile Nord-Africaine - Parti du Peuple Algérien*), in conjunction with denunciations of anti-Maghrebian racism from other sources. As with the discussion on anti-black colonial racism, I shall begin with a theoretical approach to the causes and manifestations of this form of colonial racism, before looking at the opposition to these historical constructions, drawing out some conclusions linked to the typology outlined in Chapter One.

Theorizing on the explanatory framework to give to anti-Maghrebian hostility in the interwar years has not been a priority for researchers. Gallissot, for example, prefers to speak of "preracismes" (1985a, 37) against Maghrebians for the early interwar period: for him, "(l)e nationalisme français anti-arabe n'avait pas encore pris corps" (1983, 38). Gallissot does, however, look to the
development of police and administrative surveillance on those Maghrebians already on the French mainland as an extension of the colonial practices of discrimination in the colonies, but Gallissot sees this more as a post-WWII development (1990, 345), whereas some historians have shown how State policy during WWI was to apply to the mainland segregationist policies from the colonies (Dornel 1995, 51). Massard-Guilbaud, arguing for the 1930s, states that 
"(l)es poncifs coloniaux avaient traverse la mer avec les migrants" (1995, 82), without developing further on this point. Pierre Birnbaum, one of the rare historians to have attempted comparisons of antisemitism and anti-Maghrebian racism, adopts the relatively consensual view that it was the Algerian War which saw a fundamental transformation in hostility to Maghrebians, at which time popular racism joined the longer-standing doctrinal opposition of the far-right (85). Even Said Bouamama, who underlines the importance of cultivating memory of struggles against racism (cf. Chapter Six), suggests that the "rapports scandaleux" between the police and Algerian emigration go back no further than the Algerian War (1994, 70). Following on from the work of Neil MacMaster (1995) and Sophia Lamri (1993), I will suggest that the 1920s and 1930s saw the development of anti-Maghrebian racism within certain State institutions and within sections of the written media. This relative lack of reflection on the anti-Maghebian racism of the interwar years is all the more surprising in that certain themes - the 'criminalization' of the Maghrebian, and the interlinkage between the colonial administration, scientific discourse and racist practices - were to be discussed at length by Fanon in Les damnés de la terre (1961/1991, 350-367), as part of the construction of the myth of Nord-Africains as "(f)aineants nés, menteurs nés, voleurs nés, criminels nés" (ibid., 353).

The estimated 100-150,000 Algerians in France in the 1920s and 1930s made them easily the largest colonial emigration, although numerically far below levels of Polish or Italian emigrants (Carlier 1985, 155) (86). Official and commercial/colonial interests were opposed to increasing the numbers of Algerians in France, judged to be 'unassimilable' and poor workers. Their stay in
France might undermine the political and economic order in Algeria, it was feared (Massard-Guilbaud 1995, 54-56 passim, Meynier 1981, 459-484 passim, Dornel 1995). This opposition increased after the paternalistic gratitude towards colonized Maghrebians' participation in WWI had subsided (87). WWI had seen the arrival of large numbers of Maghrebians in France to help with the war effort (cf. Stovall 1993). Throughout the interwar years, the pay, working and living conditions of most of these 'unskilled' "travailleurs coloniaux" were well below those of other emigrations and the French working class, a point to which we shall return (cf. Ath-Messaoud and Gillette, 1976, 34-38 passim).

Algerian subjects occupied a special position of 'legal liminality' in relation to Moroccans and Tunisians: specific legislation was needed to cut out the rights to freely circulate between Algeria and the Métropole which had been confirmed by the law of 15 July 1915 (88). Archival sources reveal just how confused various State officials were as to how to deal with Algerian subjects (89). Confusion was rife in official discourse, which proved unable to name Maghrebian colonial subjects by any fixed term: instead, they were referred to variously as "les arabes" (90), "musulmans" (91), "les masses musulmanes" (92), "indigènes" (93), "masses indigènes" (94), "la masse des nord-africains" (95), "musulmans nord-africains" (96) "populations nord-africaines" (97) or "Algériens" (!), "musulmans" and "indigènes" within the same document on the ENA (98). Such uncertainty arguably proves the total indifference in which these people were held. As Memmi remarks: "(l)e colonisé n'est jamais caractérisé d'une manière différentielle ; il n'a droit qu'à la noyade dans le collectif anonyme" (1956/1973, 115). The police complained that Algerians were difficult to 'spot': the ENA's decision to invite more 'white' French workers to its meetings was seen as a deliberate attempt "pour entraver l'effort des inspecteurs de police qui cherchent à identifier les militants musulmans à la sortie des meetings" (99).

The round-ups (rafles) and mass detention of Algerians and other Maghrebians date back to well before 1954. A first series of round-ups of
colonized Maghrebians occurred at the end of WWI. to enable the authorities to send them back to the colony and mandates (Stovall 1993, 52). Such practices became systematized in 1930s Paris to combat Algerian nationalism from the ENA. 250 "indigenes" were arrested in October 1934 after an ENA meeting was banned (100), and Le Populaire complained in July 1935 of "une rafle monstre" in Boulogne-Billancourt, calling such action "brimades" (101). When the MRAP came to denounce the parallel between round-ups of Algerians after 1949, and the round-ups of Jews under Vichy, the organization tended to forget that Vichy itself was, to a certain extent, carrying on an established tradition of police action based on supposed phenotypical and cultural traits (cf. Chapter Five). Furthermore, the police round-ups and other forms of colonial racism which became a common sight in French cities from the late 1940s onwards were simply more visible practices of what had been going on in Algeria and other colonies from the first days of colonial conquest (cf. Benot 1994)

**Section Three (h) : Stereotyping**

I shall now turn to some of the stereotypes applied to Maghrebians. The arrival of stereotypes in France from the Maghreb was facilitated by the general levels of ignorance in Metropolitan France about the colonies and their inhabitants (Stora 1987, 47, August 1985). Messali Hadj wrote of his experience as a factory worker in Paris in 1923 : "les travailleurs français ignoraient presque tout de notre civilisation et de notre passe" (1982, 130). *Pied-noir* culture in Algeria was profoundly undercut with stereotypes of colonial subjects (Sivan 1979, Prochaska 1990). The overlap between the military and the economic domains, exemplified by the rôle assigned to the "travailleurs coloniaux" in France during WWI, facilitated the passing of stereotypes into everyday life in France (Gallissot 1983, 38, cf. also Lorcin 1995). The first major theme of such stereotyping was the supposed 'simplicity' of these colonial subjects, considered to be "grands enfants" (Schor 1985, 168, Stovall 1993, 48-49). Such a viewpoint formed the basis for other 'behavioural' stereotypes. This theme of 'simplicity' was
found mainly in police reports and the writing of those in France such as Pierre Godin to have had experience as administrators in Algeria (cf. MacMaster 1995). Because of this alleged innate 'simplicity', Maghrebians were presented in official discourse as in danger of joining political or religious parties or movements judged subversive to the imperial order (ie. in the Métropole or the colonies). A police report of November 1934 on Algerians in France talks of "cette foule d'hommes que leur esprit simpliste et leur ignorance exposent, presque sans défense, à l'appel des partis extrémistes" : "les populations nord-africaines" are judged "toujours impressionnables et souvent portes à se plaindre de persécutions imaginaires" (102). Underlining the supposed "simplicité des auditoires" of the ENA, another report scorns "des hommes qu'un défaut total de sens critique livre sans défense aux fomentateurs de troubles" (103) These themes received no direct refutation on a theoretical level : part of wider attitudes of 'civilization superiority', their influence probably extended well beyond the police and colonial officials quoted here. Arguably drawing on the influence of racial thinkers such as Gustave Le Bon, and Gabriel Tarde, this fear of demands for democracy and independence, and the use of religion (here Islam) or communism to mobilize colonial subjects, sought to stress the political 'immaturity' of the colonial subjects, hence the lack of legitimacy for the granting of more rights (104).

Images of Islam undercut much of this negative stereotyping of Maghrebians (cf. House 1995a), albeit indirectly. Republican ideology equated levels of civilization with levels of secularization, it should be remembered. Ray's study of Moroccans in France in the late 1930s considers them to be living in the Middle Ages due to their use of the Islamic calendar, for example (1938, 375) (105). Images of Islam influenced social discourse in another way : Lorcin argues that the myth of the sexual 'insatiability' of the 'Arab' male came from the supposedly unstable Muslim family structure and the acceptance of polygamy (1995, 65) (106). Lorcin underlines the interweaving of racial and cultural discourses of *mise à distance* in colonial Algeria : "(a) clear distinction had to be
maintained between the settler and the indigenous population, and if this could not be done physically it had to be done culturally" (1995, 253). The creation of 'ethnic difference' in the colonies was undertaken by the far-right in Algeria, attempting to stir up hatred between Muslims and Jews for example, particularly during the Front Populaire (107).

Sections of the written media were to develop and extend the view of Maghrebian men as sexually dangerous, a theme already present in official discourse during WWI (cf. Dornel 1995) : an anti-méïissage theme was central to this (Schor 1985, 126-133 passim, Meynier 1981, 470). As MacMaster (1995) has vividly described for the aftermath of the Rue Fondary murders, in which a psychologically unstable Algerian murdered two French women in the XVth arrondissement in Paris in November 1923, the mid-1920s saw the coming together of this theme of sexuality with that of the supposed natural aggressivity of the Maghrebian male - particularly the 'Arab' of the 'Arab myth' (cf. Videlier 1988, 179 and Lorcin 1995). The LDH's publications made no reference to these incidents. What followed was the amalgamation of various themes - not unlike that of the Front national's discourse in the 1980s (cf. Taguieff 1990) - to include immigration, sex, violence; crime and disease (cf. Videlier 1988, 14), with the added characteristic of drunkeness thrown in for good measure (Meynier 1981, 477). Even L'Humanité succumbed to elements of this stereotyping, talking of the "veritable importation de microbes epidemiques" that Algerians arriving in Lyon were supposedly bringing with them (108). The question of contagious diseases essentially concerned syphilis, whereas in fact it was the poor working conditions that made tuberculosis the real problem in France for Algerians (Lamri 1993, 22). The numbers of Algerians in hospital due to this latter disease led to attacks of their taking advantage of the health services. Fanon later analysed this process of seeing the Algerian as the problem, whereas it was the "Nord-Africain" who was "en perpetuelle insecurite" - politically, socio-economically, medically and administratively, and not the native French population (1952, 245) (109). Messali Hadj remembers how his "compatriotes"
were "harceles par l'arabophobie de la presse qui frappaient sur "les Sidis et les Arabes"" at the time of the Rifian War (1924-26) (1982, 154-5).

Such stereotypes were to persist. The ENA's meetings and rallies in the mid-1930s often mentioned media representations. According to police, one speaker at a meeting in Drancy in March 1936 "fit remarquer a ses auditeurs que les Nord-Africains servaient une fois de plus de boucs emissaires et que la presse bourgeoise avait grossi les faits pour laisser croire que les musulmans nord-africains résidant en France sont des parasites vivant aux dépens de la collectivité" (110).

In September 1936, again according to the police report, Radjef Belkacem "proteste contre la mauvaise réputation faite aux Nord-Africains français dans les milieux français où ils étaient traités de "sidis" et de "bicots"" (111). Le Droit de vivre published an anonymous article which denounced the hostile media campaign after an Algerian had slashed a cinema screen in early 1939: "il faut en finir avec ces méthodes malveillantes et ne pas confondre les "sidis" comme on surnomme pejorativement nos coreligionnaires, avec les "mabouls" qui se rencontrent dans les collectivités" (112). There was, therefore, a panoply of themes concerning Maghrebians within social discourse which aroused concern for Maghrebians in the interwar period. I shall now look at some of the ways in which this concern was expressed.

Section Three (c) : Ideological strands within Algerian nationalist discourse

In the short discussion of the discourse and action of the ENA and PPA against racism which follows, as with the discussion on négritude and black rights organizations in the previous section, I seek to widen the definition of antiracism to include aspects of anticolonial and national liberation campaigning, and show that opposition to colonial racism in France did not begin in the post-1945 period. Linking the question of national liberation movements to that of antiracism is to suggest that they are both movements of desubordination (Gilroy 1987) and resistance. The complex ideological references of the ENA include
communism, Islam, pan-Arabism and the values of 1789 (cf. Ageron 1979, Stora 1986, 1987, 1992, 1992a): these ideological references indicate that in the ENA's discourse there will be little simple 'doubling' of the racist argument. Ouamara (1986) describes the discourse of the ENA as a "desarticulation" of colonial discourse, the latter itself a multi-faceted phenomenon, as I have tried to show. These four ideological strands of the ENA's discourse (communism, Islam, pan-Arabism and references to 1789) will be discussed prior to a study of the main themes of ENA-PPA action chosen for study which concern antiracism: (i) the denunciation of the socio-economic conditions in which many Algerians in France found themselves: (ii) the action against those State agencies responsible for the surveillance of Maghrebian colonial subjects in France. The ENA-PPA, whilst not the only expression of opposition from Algerians to the colonial system in the interwar years, was nonetheless the most active in mainland France, hence the attention given to it here (113). It also managed to involve large numbers of Algerians, mainly in the Paris region (cf. Stora 1986, 1987).

The first ideological reference within the ENA dealt with here is communism. Many Algerian activists who formed the ENA in June 1926 were influenced by the communist anticolonialism of the 1920s (cf. Stora 1992, 24-25, 1992a, Lamri 1993, Ageron 1979, 349). For reasons not unlike those creating tension with black activists at exactly the same period (cf. Section Two (c)), the PCF was willing to support anticolonial groups, provided that some autonomy was surrendered to the Party, and given that the primacy of class interest was maintained. The ENA was formed to protest against the interference of the PCF in the Union Inter-Coloniale (Stora 1986, 58). The ENA-PPA was to keep from the PCF its social egalitarianism, and committed communists remained within its ranks (114).

Islam and Arab nationalism, the second and third ideological references within the ENA's discourse, will here be discussed together. After 1933, references to Islam increased in the ENA's publications (Stora 1992a, 70), since
religion was seen as the lowest common denominator of the ENA's potential supporters. The aspects of the ENA's arguments that the LICA and LDH rounded upon were the use of Arab nationalism and occasional antisemitism. The opportunistic use of antisemitism was the logical extension of the anti-Sionist approach inherent to the thought of theorists such as Cheikib Arslan, who exerted considerable influence in the mid-1930s among Arab nationalists (cf. Stora 1986) (although this was after the 1934 events described below). The ENA was to spend much time denying the charge of antisemitism, which the ENA used as a mobilizing theme in Lyon (Videlier 1988, 27) and in Algeria in the mid-1930s, prior to the Front Populaire. The charge of antisemitism came principally after the publication, in El Onma, the ENA's newspaper, of an article following the anti-Jewish riots in Constantine in February 1934 which was highly critical of Jews in Algeria for having accepted citizenship granted by the Cremieux decree of 1871. Because of their citizenship, the ENA portrayed Jews as having sided with the colonizers (115). Henceforth, police reports tended to exagerate the use of antisemitism, in order to deliberately mark off the ENA from mainstream French politics (116). It is unclear as to just how marginal such a position was within the ENA. Messali Hadj saw the Constantine riots as a "provocation de l'imperialisme français", and at a public meeting in Paris in August 1934, expressed the "solidarité effective et agissante" of the "musulmans nord-africains" towards the riot's victims (Messali Hadj 1982, 180). As member of the Rassemblement populaire, the ENA was involved in antifascism (117). The ENA continually refuted the charge of racism, saying it "(…) n'a aucun préjugé de races, et combat l'imperialisme, createur de misère et d'ignorance" (118), and that the ENA "a en toute circonstance manifesté ses sentiments antiracistes et antifascistes" (119).

In the late 1930s, it will be remembered, the mainstream left's antifascism brought it to defend the imperial order. National liberation groups fighting the colonial order were often accused of a more diffuse "racisme anti-français", separate to the accusation here of antisemitism. Branded "fascistes" by the PCF
after 1937, the PPA tried to explain the theoretical limits of the way in which all nationalism was being interpreted within the antifascism of the period: *El Ouma* concurred that the PPA used nationalism, but one:

"qui n'a (...) rien de chauvin ni de xénophobe parce qu'il ne se fond sur aucun préjugé ni complexe de race. Et c'est justement pour ne l'avoir pas compris ainsi, et pour s'être arrêtés à la seule apparence d'un mot qui peut évoquer certaines doctrines européennes, foncièrement racistes celles-là, que certains partis démocratiques et ouvriers continuent de nous combattre âprement" (120).

The ENA's blending of Islam and nationalism emerged in the "micro-resistance" (Gilroy 1987) displayed against the assimilationism of French legislation. The ENA denounced what Messali called "christianisation forcée" - "l'obligation qui était faite aux maires français de refuser d'inscrire sur le registre de l'État-civil les prénoms arabes des nouveaux-nés de mères françaises mariées à des Arabes" (Messali Hadj 1982, 159-60) (121). The ENA was critical of colonial subjects who took citizenship, reminding them that "(...) il est impossible de changer de nationalité comme on change de cravate" (122), showing that the question of national identity was, for the ENA, irreducible to a piece of paper, a theme often found in the discourse of the far-right. There were thus complex uses of nationalist discourses at play within the ENA-PPA.

Both within and outside the context of republicanism, the ENA remains impossible to fit into any simple category. This is shown by the use made by the ENA and other organizations of republican discourse. As Stora says:

"(...) les nationalistes indépendantistes de l'immigration empruntent le discours républicain pour mieux le retourner contre la France bien réelle, la France coloniale. L'invocation de '89 permet la mise en contradiction de la France avec l'histoire de ses principes" (1992a, 69).

The LDH's traditional argument, for example, based on this tension between republican theory and practice, was inconsequential for colonized campaigners, due to their experience of racism and arbitrary rule, hence the parallel discourse of the ENA and others. Ammar Imache was to point out the hypocrisy of the French State in 1934: "(...) maintenant, c'est dans la capitale de la révolution,
c'est dans la ville des droits de l'homme, ô ironie! Que les lois abjectes nous sont appliquées" (123). Ridiculing an article by Jules Rouannet in February 1939 which had argued that racism in the colonies was impossible due to the mission civilisatrice, El Ouatani asked: "(p)ourriez-vous nier que l'institution des tribunaux d'exception, ce n'est pas du racisme? Pourriez-vous nier que le code de l'Indigénat n'est pas un code de racisme?" (124). What went against the most elementary logic, complained Abou-Nouas in Le Parlement Algérien, was that "une démocratie, proclamant l'égalité des hommes sans distinction de race, de rang ou de religion, érige en principe la supériorité de races dans ses rapports avec les peuples vivant sous sa domination" (125). Elsewhere, the anarchist Sâl Mohamed wrote of the contradictions of "la douce France" (126). The colonial experience involves all sections of French society, providing the ENA with a counter-cultural project based on a complex whole of religious and secular, theoretical and experiential demands, in which the refutation of racism was an important underlying factor.

Section Three (d) : Campaigning

Criticism of the social conditions in which Algerians in France had to live, linked to colonization in general, was a common theme of ENA-PPA campaigning. The Algerian nationalists were not totally without support on this question. Trades unions, particularly in the 1920s, played an important role in defending the rights of colonized Maghrebians in France (cf. Gallissot 1985b, Gallissot, Boumaza and Clément 1994, Schor 1985, 520-522 passim, Gani 1972), and tried to encourage colonial subjects to join them. The CGTU argued that Algerians were being exploited precisely because they did not belong to a union (127). The CGTU supported their equal rights on pay, working conditions and welfare (cf. Schor 1981, 65). The CGT's newspaper La Voix du Peuple admitted that there was much work to be done amongst the French working class: "(l)es Européens, même les bolchéviks, quoi qu'ils en disent, considèrent les Arabes comme des êtres inférieurs, mal-faisants, paresseux et malpropres" (128).
What aroused the greatest attention from the ENA was the impunity of employers in their discriminatory recruitment and redundancy practices. It was common practice to dismiss Algerians before other workers (Videlier 1988, 171), the myth of the "pauvre rendement" of Algerian workers helping in this (Schor 1985, 167). At a meeting in Puteaux in September 1935, Abdelkader, according to the police report, "affirma que même à Paris, les Algériens sont considérés comme des êtres inférieurs par les employeurs" (129). The way in which this workforce had been brought into France in vast numbers during WWI, governed by a military system, and employed in large groups within mines, factories and quarries, did not help employers to consider them as individual workers (cf. Stovall 1993, Dornel 1995). At a meeting in September 1936, Belkacem complained (according to the police report) that Algerians could only find "des travaux rebutants et dangereux pour un salaire inférieur à celui des ouvriers français" (130).

Not only was the "mesure raciste" of dismissing Algerians before other workers common practice (131), but what irked most was that Algerians were French subjects and were being replaced by Europeans who were non-nationals: "(n)'est-ce pas encore du racisme lorsque dans les usines (...) on peut voir des ouvriers arabes renvoyés et remplacés par des étrangers" asked Messali Hadj in August 1937 (in a rare combination of antiracism and nationalism...) (132). The problem for writers in *El Ouma* such as Beddek Mohamed was that not only were employers racists and "fascistes" (133), but that there were also some "syndicalistes racistes" who would not help Algerians on these issues (134). Such comments seemed to increase with the economic crises of the 1930s, patience with the unkept promises of the CGT (135) or the Front Populaire (136) wearing progressively thinner. The far-left groups remained faithful to their social egalitarianism (137), and the activity of Algerians such as Saïd Mohamed within anarchist organizations is to be noted (cf. Mohamed 1995). It can be said that on the theme of socio-economic rights, some support to Maghrebian subjects living in France was forthcoming from the left.
Secondly, linked to the Algerians' fears of further marginalization within French society was the campaign, led by the ENA and involving rallies and petitions, against the attempts by the State to segregate off Maghrebians from the rest of the population through a series of measures which sought, under the cover of social services - foyers, hospitals and advice centres - to bring them under closer administrative and police control. Starting with the creation of the *Service de surveillance, de protection et d'assistance des Indigènes Nord-Africains* in 1925, situated in the rue Lecomte in Paris (often referred to as the "rue Lecomte", the shortened form used hereafter) (cf. MacMaster 1995, Lamri 1993), and leading to the creation of the *Hôpital franco-musulman* in Bobigny in 1935, the strategy employed resembles closely the logic of *discipline* used by Michel Foucault. In *Surveiller et punir* (1976), *discipline* refers for Foucault not only to specific institutions (police, hospitals, army etc.) but also the wider *technique* involved, which, under the appearance of socially beneficial action, serves to undermine the individual as subject at the same time as there is greater individualization - this process being for Foucault one of the major tendencies within the deployment of power in the modern period (cf. Foucault 1984, 302-303). Such a process is well illustrated by Gomar, describing in his thesis (1931) what was being undertaken at the rue Lecomte, where the aim was to work towards

"le contrôle constant de la main d'œuvre nord-africaine de Paris. Pour cela, il faut individualiser ceux qui en font partie. Le but est d'avoir à la place d'une foule anonyme de 60000 êtres inconnus, interchangeables, des individus repérés et immatriculés" (138).

As Godin succinctly put it, the aim was to "encadrer et (de) discipliner la nouvelle invasion" (1933, 82). The authorities were to amass a file index on thousands of Maghrebians in the Paris region and then throughout France before the war (MacMaster 1995, 159). Noiriel has described at length the power relations involved in the administrative categorization of social groups (1991, 1992). The interwar years saw the development of increasing State control of migrations, both prior to emigration and then once in France (Noiriel 1992). The
head of the rue Lecomte was Pierre Godin, former colonial administrator in Algeria (cf. Macmaster 1995). His team of arabophone and berberophone officials showed at best paternalism, at worst overt racism towards those Maghrebians under their charge (cf. Godin 1933).

From the sources consulted, opposition to this regard policier within the "framework of colonialist controls in the imperial heartland" (MacMaster 1995, 157) can be divided into two periods, one between 1926 and 1934, denouncing the action of the rue Lecomte, and the second, from 1935 to 1938, also attacking the use of the Hôpital franco-musulman. In the first period, the ENA was supported by the PCF (cf. MacMaster 1995). At a meeting of "travaillleurs coloniaux" (the police terminology disliked precision) held in March 1927, one speaker complained of discrimination: "l'attitude à notre égard des employés des bureaux de la rue Lecomte (Brigade nord-africaine) est significative. Nous sommes reçus comme des chiens, cette organisation, à notre avis, est une seconde Préfecture de police" (139). In this first period, the rue Lecomte was a central theme of ENA campaigning, one which affected all of its potential audience (140). The ENA organized a petition in 1934 against the rue Lecomte, which was referred to as "(c)ette commune mixte installée en plein Paris", a reference to the combined military and civil form of administration prevalent in parts of Algeria (141). In November 1934, 2500 attended a rally at the Mutualité to protest "contre les vexations dont sont victimes les Africains du Nord", at which Messali Hadj denounced racism (142).

From 1935 onwards, however, these references became even more prolific, due to the opening of the Muslim hospital in Bobigny. This Hospital had exactly the same logic behind it as the rue Lecomte and, as Lamri (1993) has shown, sought to appease demands for more health controls following the press campaigns which had accompanied the rue Fondary case. Whilst Godin's report does display some assimilationist paternalism (arguing for separate amenities for 'intellectuals'), he nevertheless describes Muslims as "ces races condamnées"
(1933, 82). The hospital's title was inaccurate, however, as it was only for the use of colonized Muslims: a Turkish Muslim would not have been treated there, for example. This recognition of Islam by the French State in specific cases for "social peace" has been studied for more recent years by Barou (1985). Maghrebians were forced to go there, "comme s'ils étaient des pestiférés" as Messali Hadj put it (1982, 160). The ENA organized meetings soon after the hospital opened in March 1935 (143). According to the police report, Belkacem complained in July 1935 at a rally in Puteaux of the "lois d'exception qui frappent les Nord-Africains et contre la création d'un hôpital édifié (affirma-t-il - notes the police report) pour isoler les ouvriers algériens de leurs camarades français" (144). There were formal attempts to have the hospital closed at the Conseil Municipal (145). The organization participated in the vast 14-juillet march in 1936 with banners demanding the closure of the rue Lecomte (146). In September of the same year, the ENA organized a "grand meeting de protestation contre le service spécial de la rue Lecomte et la spécialité de l'hôpital de Bobigny" (147).

Other newspapers joined in El Ouma's campaign: the pro-Independence La Justice published an article by Messali Hadj which asked:

"(n)est-ce pas du racisme lorsqu'en plein Paris, ville-lumière (sic) et ville de la révolution, il y a un hôpital spécial pour parquer comme des lépreux les travailleurs arabes et un service spécial de police (...) qui aggrave à l'infini la vie de mes compatriotes exiles volontaires" (148).

El Ouma in December 1937 put it this way: "(u)ne mesure qui nous a touchés dans notre dignité a été la création d'un hôpital à Bobigny que l'on réservait aux Nord-Africains, comme si nous étions de race inférieure, des pestiférés" (149). The rue Lecomte was denounced outside of nationalist circles: Magdelaine Paz wrote that "(v)ouloir contrôler et protéger une population par les moyens de l'espionnage, de la corruption, de la grossièreté policière et de l'incurie, assortie du plus abominable préjugé racial, était une gageure" (150). For the ENA, these State agencies formed the "régime des travailleurs Nord-Africains" (151): by 1938, the manifestly unjust nature of the police surveillance had brought support
for the campaign from the LICA (152). Until that date, it is unclear as to how successful the ENA had been in widening its campaign to include elements of the left. There are examples of meetings in common between various anticolonial groups and sections of the left throughout the 1930s which may well have helped to increase awareness of the police presence which exacerbated already difficult socio-economic conditions (153). The ENA's ability to influence official policy was minimal: Algerians may have benefitted indirectly towards the late 1930s as the State's attention became focused on refugees fleeing Nazi Germany, but the rue Lecomte was only disbanded after Liberation (154).

Section Three (e): Conclusion to Section Three

The ENA's campaign located racism within the French State as practice. Linked to this, the ENA pointed out the contradictions inherent within proclamations of republican values and the endorsement of repressive police practices. I have tried to hint at the influence played by the rue Lecomte on the Paris police as a whole, suggesting that further work is needed to determine the influence such an established tradition of police action was to have in the postwar period. The importance of the written press has also been stressed. The ENA's publications and meetings seem to refer very little to levels of racism between workers, or to other everyday situations: if, analytically, public opinion and the press are two distinct elements, practically, the press hostility to the ENA-PPA may well have been translated into more general anti-Maghrebian antipathy (155). Regarding the typology established for assessing antiracist action, we can say that the explicit vectors of colonial racism within France in the 1930s were successfully identified - the segregationist social policy and police action, and the hostile press. These were not to disappear overnight. From the Front Populaire onwards, there were faint signs from the LICA of the acceptance of the significance of colonial racism (156). Specific campaigning against colonial racism from the antiracist organizations was to await the end of WW2. Historically, therefore, it can be said that the ENA's campaigns, helped by limited
support on the French left, represented the first concerted attack on anti-Maghrebian racism within the Metropole, suggesting that the accepted periodization for the emergence of anti-Maghrebian racism in France be reviewed.

**General conclusion to Chapter Four**

I will now attempt to draw out some general conclusions for this Chapter, based on the typology elaborated in Chapter One. This Chapter has shown the historical background to the emergence of opposition to colonial racism, and the marginalized place that these oppositional forms of discourse and action occupied in relation to the mainstream left. In relation to the study of the LICA's opposition to antisemitism (Chapter Three), it is almost as if we are dealing with two or more entirely different discourses: one against antisemitism, and then a composite whole of opposition to colonial racism in its various forms. This suggests that in the interwar years, republican antiracism failed to link antisemitism to other forms of racism in any meaningful way. Organizations concentrating on anti-black racism were forced, through anti-black racism's evident link with the colonial system more generally, to reflect on the other forms of racism that this colonial system produced, without however having recourse to the universalizing republican discourse which, in the field of opposition to colonial racism, proved ineffective and which had little critical to say of the French State. In contrast, the overlapping between antiracism and anticolonialism is thus strongest in those organizations composed of colonized groups (UTN, LDRN etc.) rather than the traditional French left. Nevertheless, some of the more marginalized on the French left (already marginal, but marginalized further due to their anticolonialism), and the LICA to some extent during the Front Populaire, did show some awareness of the problems involved, without however considering these forms of colonial racism as a priority for action. This was probably due to the explicit nature of the antisemitism in the 1930s, an explicitness due to the fascist leagues and ideologues. Anti-Maghrebian
and anti-black racism, with roots firmly established within the practices of the colonial system(s), often did not enter into the definition of what constituted racism for some metropolitan campaigners, who failed to confront the issue of racism as practice.

Whilst attacking the colonial order, the black rights newspapers of organizations such as the UTN and LDRN, as well as the ENA, undertook an analysis of what Noiriel (1991) has called the “tyrannie du national”, the way in which the primordial references to the nation are translated into concrete practices of exclusionary measures in the form of army service, identity cards and separate State agencies for dealing with colonial subjects and foreigners (cf. also Chapter Two). The UTN and LDRN able to reveal the blind-spots of republican theorizing on racism. Since this national question traversed the republican responses to racism (LDH, LICA), then the resistance to colonial racism opened up new viewpoints on what racism was, where its roots lay, and what its practical effects were.

Very generally, republican discourse is an identification with certain values of _theoretical_ equality, but which practically, in the colonial context, produced inequality. the antiracism within the anti-colonial movements analysed here was more one of the “dés-identification” analyzed by Pêcheux (1975) (cf. Chapter One), where there was more than a simply oppositional discourse, and where new perspectives were opened up from which to avoid subjectification, coming from an experiential approach. This “dés-identification” stemmed from counter-cultural arguments, which, drawing on articulations of religious identity (Islam for the ENA) or, in the case of _nègritude_, pre-colonial cultural practices with some Marxist inspiration (157), sought to produce alternative cultural projects to the _mission civilisatrice_. At the same time, however, these forms of resistance were inevitably fashioned by the colonial context within which they emerged. The separation between the cultural and the political is impossible here, as the two are so closely intertwined. This theorizing of a counter-cultural project
was by definition an intellectual construction. This posed problems of 'translating' this project into a more popular means of resistance; the history of anticolonialism suggests that this was only achieved in the period after 1945, and there are tensions present here between the theorizing of négritude and the questions of socio-economic conditions which such theorizing tended to leave behind. The counter-cultural project started off from the denial of a hierarchy of civilizations, with this 'hierarchy' often providing the support for a more explicit form of racism. The use of the cultural as a base for resistance was to provoke the hostility of those examining the question from the national paradigm, or (and perhaps from the same people) those who saw non-European culture as obscurantist. Opposition to the assimilationist project thus ran as a theme throughout the more radical anticolonial movements, their cultural projects often arousing hostility from the PCF due to the Party's acceptance of the dominant assimilationist model.

The conditions of possibility for a wider definition of racism from metropolitan French campaigners were therefore delayed for all of the above reasons. The idea of this Chapter is that the forms of resistance to colonial racism that did exist in the interwar years need integrating into the history of antiracism, which cannot be reduced to that of the republican discourse of the mainstream left/centre-left. The conflicts and contradictions of the decolonizing period, into which France entered after WW2, were to throw up some very different political and social contexts. Within these contexts, the forms of racism analyzed here remained both in theory and discourse. But the changing historical circumstances and the experience of WW2, were to play a crucial rôle in these newer definitions of what constituted racism, and hence the arrival of a critical gaze towards the practices of the national republican State from those on the mainstream left who, throughout the interwar years, had concentrated on the fight against antisemitism. How these changes occurred within the MRAP in the context of the anti-Maghrebian racism of the 1950s and 1960s forms the basis of Chapter Five.
Notes to Chapter Four

(1) The 1959 Congress of Negro Writers and Artists used the term "colonial experience" to describe all the various relations to have come out of the "fait social total" (Durkheim) of colonization, including racism and the reaction to it (Gilroy 1993, 195).

(2) It is also one of the few studies I have come across to attempt a comparison.

(3) For example, the meetings of the LICA-inspired Comité National Français du Rassemblement Mondial contre le Racisme et l'Antisémitisme in 1937 (cf. APP BA 1812).


(5) On the Code, only totally withdrawn in 1944, see Ath-Messaoud and Gillette (1976, 120-121). See CDH No.3, 30 janvier 1928, p.65 for the Commission coloniale's debates (19 décembre 1927) on whether indigènes should be allowed to join the organization.

(6) CDH, No.15, 30 mai 1931, p.340.

(7) Compte rendu sténographique, Congrès national de la LDH (Ligue Française pour la Défense des droits de l'Homme et du citoyen) 1931, Vichy 24-25 mai 1931, p.309

(8) "La colonisation et les droits de l'homme", CDH No.5, février 1931, pp.99-103, p.103. The 'stage-theory' was not dissimilar to the notion that the granting of political rights had to be merited. Henri Guernut, speaking as LDH General Secretary in Algeria, argued in 1923 on whether wider political rights should be granted to Algerian colonial subjects : "(o)n vient au monde un homme, on ne naît pas un citoyen : on le devient quand on en est digne" (CHD No.10, 25 mai 1923 pp.225-226).

(9) Compte rendu sténigraphique, Congrès national de la LDH de 1931, Vichy 24-25 mai, pp.293-4, p.295.

(10) "Le problème de la colonisation", CDH No.6, 28 février 1931, pp.99-103, p.103.


(13) The 1937 dissolution was against the PPA (Parti du Peuple Algérien), the new name taken by the former ENA after previous dissolutions.

(14) Compte rendu sténographique, Congrès national de la LDH de 1937, Tours 17-19 juillet 1937, p.130. Kahn's opposition comes in part from the alleged antisemitism of the ENA, which is examined in Section Three.

(15) Cf. Chapter Two for the comparison patriotisme/nationalisme. As Victor Basch reminded Challaye: "(p)our nous, tout nationalisme, quel qu'il soit, est condamnable dans tous les pays" (CDH, No.8, 15 avril 1937, p.283).

(16) Cf. DV No.21, août 1934, pp.1+2 and Section Three (c).

(17) "Dès qu'un orateur parlait "des frères de couleur", il faisait aussitôt une petite courbette à gauche, une autre à droite, sous les applaudissements délirants de la foule" (Salomon 1948, 775).


(19) DVNS No.58, 19 décembre 1936, p.2. This is in the same passage as Bontemps expresses his distaste for the term "race inférieure".

(20) La Conscience des Juifs, No.5, mai 1939, p.11. The "nous" here refers to those in the LICA.


(22) Speech to the newly-founded Algerian section of LICA, DVNS No.18, 14 mars 1936, p.6.

(23) DVNS No.52, 07 novembre 1936, p.1.

(24) Cf. summary in DVNS No.96, 27 novembre 1937.

(26) DVNS No. 108, 07 mai 1938, p.3.

(27) DVNS No. 154, 10 juin 1939, p.1.

(28) Cf. Louis Parrot in DVNS No. 94, 30 octobre 1937/ No. 95, 13 novembre 1937/ No. 96, 27 novembre 1937/ No. 97, 11 décembre 1937.

(29) Technically speaking, Algerians at this time were French subjects, and therefore did not count as immigrants (non-nationals) - cf. Section Three.


(33) *L'Humanité*, 10 mars 1926.

(34) *L'Humanité*, 02 novembre 1934.

(35) Quoted (undated) in Ageron (1978, 274). Stora (1987, 35) argues that there was a short period between February 1934 and Spring 1935 when the PCF combined antifascism and anticolonialism.

(36) Sorum (1981, 36) has argued that State violence in the colonies was kept off the agenda through press censorship. See also Benot (1994), Mekhaled (1995) and Chapters Five and Six.

(37) In his "Lettre a Maurice Thorez", Octobre 1956, in Cesaire (1976, 463-475, 470).

(38) After their defeat in the June 1938 Congress in Royan, Pivert and Guérin from the *Gauche révolutionnaire* tendency, which took the strongest anticolonial position within socialism at the time, founded the *Parti Socialiste Ouvrier et Paysan*, which was in favour of national self-determination (Semidei 1968, 1150).

(39) Interviewed (October 1978) in Hamon and Rotman (1979, 28).

(40) "Il y avait un peu de paternalisme dans notre anticolonialisme". Interview with Daniel Mayer, Orsay, 12 July 1995.

(42) On advertizing and iconographical portrayals, see Nederven Pieterse (1992) and Bachollet, Debost, Lelieur and Peyrière (1992), the latter authors summarizing that "(e)n publicité, le visage noir apparaît privé du regard. Il fascine par son expression vide de sens, déchargée de toute dimension symbolique" (1992, 154).

(43) DVNS No.66, 13 février 1937, p.3. Cf. also Monnerville’s memoirs (1975, 60-62 passim).

(44) "Union des races", DVNS No. 134, 21 janvier 1939, pp.1-2. As Schneider summarizes: "(d)ifferences in technology were taken as proof of racial and mental superiority" (1982, 210).

(45) Jane Nardal argues this point in "Pantins exotiques", La Dépêche africaine, 1ère année No.8, octobre 1928, p.2.

(46) Thanks to Paul Gilroy for pointing this book out to me, and to Catherine Collomp for lending me her copy.

(47) AN F7 13412, letter dated 12 juin 1928.

(48) Published from October 1928 to April 1934, La Dépêche africaine (subtitled: Grand organe republicain indépendant de Correspondance entre les Noirs et d'Études des Questions Politiques et Économiques (Coloniales), "se montre préoccupée par l'élaboration d'une identité nouvelle et métisse" (Généries 1989, 31), celebrating Schoelcher and the Abbe Gregoire. La Revue du monde noir (published October 1931 to April 1932) again stressed métissage, but was more theoretical and "très afro-américaine" (Dewitte 1985, 257). Dewitte in general places greater insistence on the period 1925-30 as the vital formative years of négritude than is suggested here.

(49) "Éveil de la Conscience de Race", La Revue du monde noir, No.6, avril 1932, pp.25-31, p.31.

(50) "(…) parce que nous vous haïssons vous et/ votre raison, nous nous réclamons de la/ demence precoce de la folie flambante/ du cannibalisme tenace" (Césaire 1939/1956, 47-48).

(51) On the choice of terminology, see La Voix des Nègres, janvier 1927, which states that "(n)ous nous faisons honneur et gloire de nous appeler Nègres, avec un N majuscule en tête" (Fall 1987, 23) (cf. also Dewitte 1985, 143). On official discourse, see AN F7 13412 : police report dated 04 juin 1931 which mentions "nos colonies de race nègre" (p 8), and APP BA 1812, police report dated 13 septembre 1937.

(52) On Senghor’s changing position on métissage see Markovitz (1969) and Vaillant (1990).

(54) Cf. also Chapter Three, note 5


(56) Senghor distanced himself from this position in the later 1930s (Markowitz 1969, 54).

(57) Markowitz has argued, for example, that "(n)égritude as defined by Senghor spoke to alienation and not to exploitation, to the individual and not to the mass, to the intellectual and not to the illiterate, to the modern and not to the traditional" (1969, 45).


(59) Glissant argues that *métissage* can become fixed, denying the processual, evolutive nature of cultural production, hence his use of the concept of *créolisation* (1990, 13) (on this see also Verges 1996).

(60) Sartre described *négritude* within the article variously as "une certaine qualité commune aux pensées et aux conduites des noirs" (1948, 583), "une certaine attitude affective à l’égard du monde", or, still, "pour employer le langage heideggerien, (c’est) l’être-dans-le-monde du Nègre" (ibid., 590).

(61) Cf. Philippe Dewitte “La dette du sang”, *Hommes et migrations*, No.1148, novembre 1991, pp.8-11. Granting of citizenship was discretionary even after certain specific criteria (such as ‘loyal service’ to the French State) had been taken into consideration (cf. Dewitte 1985, 20, 47-48).

(62) Émile Faure’s *La Race Nègre*, 1934 (no other references given), quoted in Dewitte, ref. as in note 61, p.11.

(63) "Chair à canon et chair à travail", *Le Cri des Nègres*, Nouvelle Série, IIIe année, No.4 janvier 1934, p.3.

(64) "Chacun chez soi", Émile Faure’s *La Race Nègre*, 7e année No 1, nov.-déc. 1934, p.3

(65) *Le Cri des Nègres*, IVe année No.21, octobre 1935, p.4

(66) "L’action antifasciste" (editorial) *Le Cri des Nègres*, IVe année No.11, novembre 1934, pp.1+3.
(67) "Le Travailleur Colonial" *La Dépêche africaine*, 1ère année No.9, novembre 1929, p.2.

(68) AN Justice, BB18 6215/ 49BL112.

(69) AN Justice, BB18 6215/ 49BL112, letter dated 25 mars 1930.

(70) "To be or not to be", Émile Faure's *La Race Nègre*, 5e année No.1, février 1932, p.3. The LDRN's founder, Lamine Senghor, had set up the organization in 1926 in protest at what he saw as the PCF's tokenism towards black activists (Fall 1987, 22).

(71) According to the statutes (dated 03 septembre 1932) in AN F7 13948. Kouyate himself ranked as an intellectual - having come to France from what is now Mali (the then *Soudan français*) to train as a schoolteacher, before being thrown out of college in Aix-en-Provence for political subversion (cf. Génériques 1986, 32-35, Dewitte 1985, 174-186 *passim*).

(72) "Pour l'unite de l'action" *Le Cri des Nègres*, Nouvelle Série IVè année No.8, août 1934, p.1. Dewitte (1985) is the most extensive study of the complex history of radical black organizations in the Métropole between 1919 and 1939. For a summary, see Génériques (1986, 30-36 *passim*).


(74) "Épurons notre race" (editorial) *La Race Nègre*, IXè année No.1, janv.-fév.1936, p.1. The LDRN did participate with the UTN, LICA and SFIO in meetings held in common, for example 19th September 1936 (cf. DVNS No.46, 26 septembre 1936). Speakers at an anticolonial meeting (January 14th 1936) claimed that all white people were racist, a charge which Gabriel Cudenet then refuted. According to the police report, Cudenet "assura les auditeurs de couleur que le jour où le pouvoir sera entre les mains du Front Populaire, il n'y aurait plus de préjugé de race" (in APP BA 57, police report dated 30 janvier 1936). For Léon-Gontrand Damas, most of the French people were not racist but this silent majority "n'a pas droit à la parole" (1939, 340). On this cf. also Dewitte (1985, 332-349 *passim*).


(76) "Ce que sera l'exposition de 1931", *La Dépêche africaine*, 3è année 1930, No.s 27-28, août-sept., p.2.

(77) "L'exposition coloniale internationale", in Kouyaté's *La Race Nègre*, IVè année N°3, 1930, nov.-déc., p.3.

(79) Published 19 juillet 1930, reproduced in Kouyate’s *La Race Nègre*, IVè année No.2, septembre 1930, p.2.

(80) CDH No.29, 30 novembre 1930, p.690.

(81) For C. Gide, there should be "l’ouverture d’une exposition des atrocités coloniales, à mettre en regard de l’exposition de Vincennes" (CDH. 20 avril 1930, No.11, p.256).

(82) "Alors que l’exposition se ferme!" *Le Cri des Nègres*, Ière année No.3, octobre 1931, p.3.

(83) For more detail of the anti-black policies of Vichy, see Fraternité, No.43, 23 mars 1945, p.4, Rene Maran in Fraternité, No.44. 09 avril 1945, pp.1+3 and Monnerville (1975, 268-275 *passim*).

(84) The term 'anti-Maghrebian racism' is simply employed here through want of a better term. 'Maghreb' can be considered as a term invented in the Machrek - the East of the Arab world, to designate the West of the Arab world (thus including Libya and Mauretania). 'Maghreb' runs the risk of hiding the complexity of the colonial and postcolonial situation between France and Algeria, Tunisia and Morocco. (Franco)-Maghrébin(e) is, however nowadays the term most commonly in use by (especially) young people from whose parents are from Algeria, Morocco or Tunisia, and who live in France, to refer to themselves. This is explained by the fact that Nord-Africain was used in official colonial discourse (cf. Tamba, Said "Nord-Africain", *Pluriel recherches. Vocabulaire historique et critique des relations inter-ethniques*, Cahier No.1, 1993, pp.72-73). Arabe is inaccurate, since many of the emigrants to France were from Kabylia and hence Berbers, and Arabe tended to be used pejoratively by the European settlers in Algeria (cf. Roche 1992). 'Anti-Muslim' racism would suggest that the religious criterion is the most important: Musulman(e) was used as a racial tag in colonial Algeria, and is now used by the Nouvelle Droite as such (cf. Taguieff 1994), but is incapable of expressing the complexity of this colonial and postcolonial racism. Certainly the events of the period since the 1920s would point to a specific type of anti-Algerian racism, but the inability of the racist gaze to distinguish between Moroccans, Tunisians and Algerians (cf. Giudice 1992 and Chapter Five), and the collective solidarity that has grown up in the post-war period over racism against Maghrebiens, explains the choice here of 'anti-Maghrebian racism'.
(85) According to Birnbaum, for the extreme right: "(l)a guerre d'Algerie a sans
doute porte atteinte au mythe arabe et provoque de plus un racisme auparavant
limite ou, en tout cas, attenue par la reconnaissance du courage arabe et par le
souvenir de l'aide immense apportee par les arabes durant les conflits opposant,
depuis 1870, la France à l'Allemagne" (1993, 272).

(86) I am not suggesting that there was any causal link between numbers of
Algerians in France and levels of solidarity/hostility. The idea here is the inverse:
to show themes and discuss levels of hostility and practical discrimination at a
period of relatively low emigration. On the history of Algerian emigration to the
Metropole in the earlier period of the Third Republic, see Ath-Messaoud and
Gillette (1976, 26-33) and Ageron (1968). The term 'emigration' is itself
problematical, since few Algerians stayed in France for more than a few years at
this period.

(87) Future Nationalist leader Messali Hadj says his fellow Algerian soldiers in
Bordeaux in 1918 were "unanimes pour constater cette grande difference qui
existait entre le comportement des colons d'Algérie et celui du peuple français"
(Messali Hadj 1982, 96, 97).

(88) Controls were to increase during the 1920s. For example, a decree dated 4th
August 1926 made entry into mainland France for men possible only after
military service had been accomplished. Henceforth, "tout depart (from Algeria
by a French subject) etait subordonne à la production d'une carte d'identite, d'un
extrait de casier judiciaire, d'un certificat medical, d'une contre-visite lors de
l'embarquement, d'un cautionnement garantissant le paiement du voyage de
retour, et d'un pecule de 150 francs" (Ath-Messaoud and Gillette 1976, 35).
Vaccination certificates had also to be supplied following the decree of 4th April
1928. As Lamri states: "l'établissement de contrôles médicaux aux frontières
répond plus a des motivations d'ordre politique qu'à des préoccupations
strictement sanitaires" (1993, 21). The décret Salengro (17th July 1936) re-
established freedom of circulation (Massard-Guilbaud 1995, 404). The Front
Populaire then reintroduced the payment of a deposit in December 1936, and
medical certificates for economy-class ferry passengers in January 1937 - thereby
practicing indirect discrimination (Stora 1992a, 40). The 1947 Status d'Algérie
abolished most measures of control.

(89) The Journal Officiel of 26th November 1920 reminded that "(l)es travailleurs algériens ne doivent plus être considérés comme des étrangers"
(quoted in Gallissot 1985a, 207).

(90) APP BA 56, Renseignements Généraux to Préfet, 06 juin 1935.

(91) APP BA 56, Cabinet du Procureur de la République adjoint (Paris), 23
août 1935.

(92) APP BA 56, police report dated 28 septembre 1934.
(93) APP BA 56, police report dated 28 octobre 1934.

(94) APP BA 57, police report dated 12 mars 1935.

(95) APP BA 57, Pierre Godin to Préfet, 30 août 1935.

(96) APP BA 57, police report dated 19 mars 1936.

(97) APP BA 56, Note sur l'activité de l'ENA depuis sa création jusqu'au 15 novembre 1934, (Renseignements Généraux), dated 23 novembre 1934, p.117.

(98) APP BA 57, "Rapports d'ensemble et notes de Monsieur Godin", dated 04 septembre 1935.

(99) APP BA 57, police report dated 28 février 1936.

(100) APP BA 56, police report dated 28 octobre 1934.

(101) Le Populaire, 30 juillet 1935.

(102) APP BA 56, Note sur l'activité de l'ENA depuis sa création jusqu'au 15 novembre 1934, (Renseignements Généraux), dated 23 novembre 1934, pp.1, 117.

(103) APP BA 56, letter dated 26 octobre 1934 from the Directeur-adjoint, chef du Service des Affaires Indigènes Nord-Africaines to the Préfet.

(104) "Le croissant rouge monte", L'Ami du Peuple, 17 mai 1934.

(105) On this see also Fonville (1924) and Gomar (1931).


(107) As Birnbaum says (1993, 267) : "c'est bien au nom de ce relativisme intégral des cultures qu'une partie non négligeable des droites radicales va chanter les mérites de l'Islam, hors de France".


(109) Meynier asks "(d)ans quelle mesure cela (negative stereotyping in the press in the period to 1930) ne contribuera-t-il pas à raidir l'hostilité aux réformes politiques (for the colonies) dans l'entre-deux-guerres" (1981, 470).

(110) APP BA 57, report of 19 mars 1936. The speaker was Si Djilani.
(111) APP BA 56, report of 22 septembre 1936 on rally held 18th September 1936.

(112) DVNS No.137, 11 février 1939, p.3.

(113) The Archives de la Préfecture de Police (APP) reveal more about the ENA's campaigning than the very incomplete collections of El Ouma at the BDIC and BN, Versailles. For the critique of colonial racism from Algerian students for this period, see Pervillé (1984).

(114) From 1937, the PCF not only withdrew its support for the ENA, but accused its reincarnated form the PPA of fascism. The ENA was dissolved by decree on 26th January 1937.

(115) "Les événements sanglants de Constantine", El Ouma No.50, août-septembre 1934 (text reproduced in Kaddache and Guananeche 1984, 60-61).

(116) Cf. for example APP BA 56, Note sur l'activité de l'ENA depuis sa création jusqu'au 15 novembre 1934 (Renseignements Généraux), dated 23 novembre 1934, p.44.


(120) Anonymous article, El Ouma, No 59, janvier 1938, p.1. A distinction should be made between the nationalism of liberation movements and this nationalism once institutionalized hegemontically within the newly independent country, which may well then repress cultural minorities in the name of a 'national' culture, as has been the case with the independent Algerian State.


(122) "Pourquoi nous luttons contre le projet Viollette", El Ouma, No.59, janvier 1938, p.1.

(123) "La repression s'aggrave! Le vrai visage de l'impérialisme", El Ouma, IVé année No.28, décembre 1934, p.1.
(124) "Incompatibilité du racisme et de la colonisation", El Ouma, No.70, mars 1939, p.2 (in response to Rouanet's article in Dépêche africaine, 21 février 1939). See also "le colonialisme "raciste", in El Ouma, No.71, avril 1939, p.1 (editorial).


(127) Undated CGTU tract in AN F7 13412. The CGTU/PCF published El Amel (Action) aimed at Maghrebian workers in France. See also Maurin (1933).


(129) APP BA 57, report dated 17 septembre 1935 from the Services des Affaires Indigènes Nord-Africaines on ENA rally held 14 septembre 1935.

(130) APP BA 56, police report of 22 septembre 1936 on ENA rally held 18 septembre 1936.

(131) APP BA 56, police report of 28 décembre 1936.

(132) "Une interview de Messali Hadj", La Justice, 17 août 1937 (text reproduced in Kaddache and Guenaneche (1985, 27-31, p.30)

(133) "Dans l'Est. Les fascistes et leurs valets à l'oeuvre", El Ouma, No.54, 01 septembre 1937, p.3.


(137) Cf. the Parti Ouvrier International's publication Lutte Ouvrière, No.49, 07 juin 1937, saying it is "aux côtés des ouvriers nord-africains" (text reproduced in Stora 1987, 119-122).


(139) AN F7 13412, police report dated 28 mars 1927 on meeting held 28th March.
(140) APP BA 56, *Note sur l'activité de l'ENA depuis sa création jusqu'au 15 novembre 1934* (Renseignements Généraux), dated 23 novembre 1934, pp.12, 94.

(141) APP BA 56, copy of petition dated octobre 1934.

(142) *Le Populaire*, 23 novembre 1934

(143) APP BA 57, police report dated 16 juillet 1935 on meeting held 13th July 1935.

(144) APP BA 56, police report dated 30 juillet 1935 on meeting held 27th July 1935.

(145) APP BA 57, police report dated 21 janvier 1936.

(146) APP BA 56, police note dated 16 juillet 1936.

(147) APP BA 56, police report dated 22 septembre 1936, on meeting held 18th September 1936.


(151) *El Ouma*, No.64, 27 mai 1938, p.1.

(152) Schor (1981, 64) quotes DVNS No.114, 21 juillet 1938 as declaring its hostility to the rue Lecomte.

(153) See APP BA 56, police report dated 10 décembre 1935 on the "Soirée de solidarité franco-arabe" held the same day, with the PCF, Secours Rouge International and the Ligue française contre l'impérialisme et l'Oppression coloniale. Cf. also APP BA 57, police report dated 30 janvier 1936 on joint meeting of ENA and the *Ligue Anti-Impérialiste* of 14 janvier 1936.

(154) *Droit et Liberté* claims that the dissolution came "grâce à l'action unie des travailleurs algériens et français" (No.127 (231), octobre 1933, p.5).

(155) For articles specifically hostile to the ENA, see Claude Gaudin in *Le Jour*, 30 décembre 1936, "Les Kabyles qui débarquent en France" and 01 janvier 1937, "L'ENA contrôle 45000 Arabes".
(156) A poster for a meeting of the LICA-inspired Comité National français du Rassemblement Mondial contre le racisme of 5th February 1937 states: "(l)e racisme est l'ennemi des Musulmans qu'il veut asservir/ Le Racisme est l'ennemi de tous les hommes libres".

(157) Such usage of 'tradition' is not unproblematical (cf. supra, Sections Two (b) and Three (c)).
Chapter Five: Antiracism 1944-1965: Overtaken by “events”

Introduction

Section One

Changes within republican antiracism

Section One (a): From *Résistance* to resistance: “Le souci de ne pas s’isoler”

Section One (b): MRAP - theory into action

Section One (c): The ‘cultural’ and the ‘racial’

Section One (d): The end of a myth

Conclusion to Section One

Section Two

Colonial and postcolonial ‘immigration’

Introduction to Section Two

Section Two (a): The ‘crimes’ of ‘immigration’

Section Two (b): “Rafles au faciès”

Section Two (c): Overtaken by “events”

General conclusion to Chapter Five

Notes
"Triste mission que d'appeler les gens, jour après jour, à ouvrir les yeux" (Rayski 1985, 126).

**Introduction**

"Tout racisme n'est pas un racisme d'État, officialisé, mais tout racisme est ancré (y compris comme "pathologie") dans la structure des institutions et dans le rapport conscient ou inconscient des individus et des masses à ces institutions. Ce qui devient alors déterminant est la contradiction entre la forme égalitaire et les mécanismes inégalitaires des institutions et avant tout de l'État donc entre la citoyenneté et la sujétion. Il faut en faire l'histoire singulière dans chaque nation et à chaque époque" (Balibar 1992, 11).

Following on from Étienne Balibar's statement, I will attempt to retrace this history in relation to antiracism and racism in the period from 1944 to 1965, examining the transformations in campaigning within antiracism, with most attention paid to the Mouvement contre le racisme, l'antisémitisme, et pour la Paix (MRAP). The aim is to indicate that in the postwar period the MRAP developed, in relation to interwar republican antiracism, a much wider definition of what racism was, the forms it took, and how it should be fought. Underlying these points is the suggestion that, rather than the period in question representing a lull in racism in France, the Algerian war in particular saw the development of a State racism which organizations such as the MRAP were able to target but found difficult to reduce. I will argue that the period between 1944 and 1964 also saw the start of the emergence of the basic themes of contemporary forms of racism with their arguments of 'cultural differentialism' (cf. Taguieff 1990). The MRAP, which emerged from those Resistance activists fearing the return of antisemitism, widened the definition of racism, terming racism as "indivisible", seeing all forms of racism as coming from a certain "unicité", and underlining the need for pluralism - both in terms of who should mobilize against racism, and what forms this mobilization should take. On this last point of mobilization, the MRAP was to argue that antiracism could not be simply reactive, but needed to be undertaken in the form of preventive education and campaigning. The
organization shows once again that whilst the study of antiracism needs to start off from an analysis of racism, antiracism will not simply be its 'double'.

To illustrate these points, the second half of the Chapter presents a study of anti-Maghrebian racism in the period from 1944 to 1965, and the MRAP's reactions to this racism compared to other organizations (LICA, LDH, trades unions, *Mouvement pour le Triomphe des Libertés Démocratiques* (MTLD), etc.). The MRAP, drawing the parallel that certain sectors of the State - notably the police - were applying similar discriminatory practices to Maghrebians as to Jews under Vichy, sought to mobilize around the refusal to return to such previous methods. The MRAP's campaigning in this area from its foundation in 1949, explains why it was active in the protest against the massacre of Algerians on and after 17th October 1961: when demonstrating against the curfew placed on them by *Préfet* Maurice Papon, hundreds of Algerians were killed or disappeared at the hands of the French security authorities (cf. also Chapter Six). The MRAP stressed the importance of *liberté* and *égalité* and the close link between the two, trying first to challenge the republican State on its own terms, before slowly coming to see that the formulaic statements of France as a country 'free' of racism could prove counter-productive to effective antiracist action. The campaign themes mentioned briefly here, and which are discussed in more detail in Section Two, did not come about by chance. In Section One, I will try to show how the experience of antisemitism made the MRAP activists more sensitive to other forms of racism: the antifascist legacy added the necessary cohesion during the organization's early years. This Chapter goes from the end of the Occupation and accompanying demands for what proved to be only a tentative, transient unity of antiracism in the form of the *Alliance Antiraciste* (1946-1948), up to the first example of what the MRAP was to call 'postcolonial' racism in 1964-5, where segregation in public services towards Algerians was denounced as a continuation of themes from the time of the Algerian War. My analysis is not limited to State racism: indeed, the study here seeks to examine the articulation, in antiracist discourse, between denunciations of State racism and racism within
State agencies on the one hand, and the overt racist organizations and the hostile press on the other: the context is a period of crisis for the French State in the passage from the colonial to the postcolonial. The MRAP is probably the main organization to have intervened on all of these questions, showing the breadth of its campaigning, and, implicitly, the extent of racism at the start of the *Trente glorieuses* (cf. Ross 1995).

**Section One: Changes within republican antiracism**

**Section One (a): From Résistance to resistance: “Le souci de ne pas s'isoler” (1)**

The reasons behind the theoretical and practical innovations in the MRAP's campaigning can be seen as far back as the constitution of the clandestine *Mouvement National Contre le Racisme* (MNCR) in 1941: the MRAP was formed mainly by former MNCR members. An essential theme of the discourse of the Jewish resistance groups was the need for solidarity between Jews and non-Jews in the fight against the racism of Vichy and the occupier (cf. Rayski 1950). Albert Lévy, former General Secretary of the MRAP, attributes the founding of the MNCR to the fact that "dans les milieux de la Résistance, certains ont estimé qu'il y avait une lutte spécifique à mener contre le racisme dans le cadre général du combat pour libérer la France" (Lévy 1993, 2). The MNCR's action can be divided into two areas. Firstly, with the aid of other concerned groups such as sections of the Catholic Church (cf. Bédarida 1977), it sought to save as many Jewish children from Deportation as possible through direct intervention and networks of safehouses. Another organization closely involved in such action was the *Union des Juifs pour la Résistance et l'Entraide* (UJRE), which saw "(l)a lutte pour les droits et la liberté des Juifs (as) inséparable de la lutte pour la libération de la France" (2). The MNCR highlighted the dangers facing Jews, informing them of the likely consequences of Vichy policies and the rôle of the *Union Générale des Juifs de France* (UGIF).
set up by Xavier Vallat, Vichy's *Commissaire général aux questions juives* (Rayski 1985, 126). The MNCR transmitted news of anti-Jewish persecution to the entire population in France: campaigning through information was all the more needed according to C. Lévy, due to the "place modeste et rarement prioritaire accordée par l'ensemble de la Résistance à la persécution des Juifs et, surtout, à son accomplissement ultime, la solution finale" (1987, 100).

According to Adam Rayski, who played an active rôle in the Jewish Resistance, the MNCR had "une presse clandestine digne des plus importants réseaux de la Résistance" and played a significant role in the "prise de conscience par les Français - à travers la barbarie raciste - de la véritable nature de l'occupant" (1985, 128). Publishing two main newspapers, the symbolically-titled *J'accuse* in the occupied zone and *Fraternité* in Toulouse, the MNCR also tried to elicit support through publications such as *Lumières* (with Vladimir Jankelévitch), targeting specific social groups such as intellectuals (3). The need for articulation between theory and action, the importance of informing the public of the dangers of racism, and the incorporation of intellectuals into campaigning are all themes which the MRAP was to go on to use. Another theme to which we will return was that racism, for the MNCR, could not be reduced to antisemitism: continuing after Liberation, the organization stated that the new Constitution to be voted "en nous donnant des droits et des libertés que la plus simple logique appelle, devra aussi nous abriter, abriter les minorités, les populations de nos colonies" from racism (MNCR 1945, 10) (4)

The MNCR's action was all the more needed since the LICA had been disbanded in 1941. Many of the LICA's members had already been called up to fight, and later joined the Resistance, or were deported. Bernard Lecache, the LICA's founder and president, spent much of the war in various prisons in southern Algeria (5), publishing the *Cahiers antiracistes* from Algiers (1943-45) once freed. At Liberation, the need for unity between the MNCR and the remaining former members of the LICA was felt: two reasons were put forward
for this. Firstly, the extent of antisemitism in France during the Occupation made campaigners realize that, unlike during the post-Dreyfus era, there could no longer be the pretence that antisemitism had disappeared completely (6); the end of Hitler would not signal the end of antisemitism (7). Secondly, the unity in action which was central to many Jewish resistance organizations was translated into a call for unity amongst all antiracists. As Roger Darval argued, the aim of a united antiracist organization would be to

"souligner nettement qu'il n'y a pas lieu d’envisager l'action contre le racisme uniquement du point de vue de la défense des victimes les plus immédiates. C'est toute la France qui subit les contre-coups des persécutions raciales et c'est toute la France qui doit s'y opposer" (8).

The resulting organization, the Alliance Antiraciste (AA), was formed in June 1946, (9), its governing committee representing MNCR and former LICA activists in equal numbers. The AA's charter, arguing that "le racisme ne pourra être définitivement vaincu et éliminé que par l'instauration d'une société d'où seront bannies l'inégalité et l'injustice et par l'établissement d'institutions internationales (...)" (10), was an attempt to draw together what were in effect quite different approaches to racism, antiracism, and forms of action. Indeed, these differences led to Le Droit de vivre being published again by July 1947, and the LICA officially regained its title in December 1948 (11), although from 1947 the AA was in fact dominated by former LICA activists under Bernard Lecache.

There were several important underlying reasons for the sharp differences opposing the MNCR and LICA currents. For Albert Lévy, the rupture between the former MNCR members and the LICA-dominated AA "s'explique pour des raisons politiques et sociales" (A.Lévy 1993, 2). The dissident members of the AA were those such as Charles Feld and Charles Palant, previously with the MNCR, and who upheld the need to place economics and practical questions of inequality as vital factors in the explanation of the causes and consequences of racism and how to fight it (12). These dissidents criticized the AA's tendency towards being "au-dessus des contingences politiques contemporaines" and those AA leaders such as Lecache who allegedly "font pencher la (the AA's political)
balance du côté de la reaction" (13). Amongst the MNCR current there was broad sympathy for the Soviet Union, a point which, in the context of the start of the Cold War, was to explain the LICA's refusal to work with the MRAP throughout the period in question (14). The LICA had always been suspicious of party politics (cf. Chapter Three), the postwar period confirming its position of unaligned anti-communism moving slowly to a centrist position: Lecache had stated in 1944 that "(l')antiraciste est sectaire (only) dans la mesure ou il fait la chasse à l'intolérance" (Lecache 1944, 2) (15). Linked to these political reasons were social ones. In relation to the LICA, the activists who founded the MRAP "appartenaient à des milieux plus populaires, recemment immigrés qui avaient beaucoup souffert de la guerre et de l'occupation" (A.Lévy 1993, 2). A third argument also intervened: the LICA was to show itself less concerned by forms of racism other than antisemitism. Lecache was constantly to complain about this until the start of the 1960s (cf. infra).

The background to the founding of the MRAP, therefore, shows how antiracism is influenced by the wider social and political tensions of its time. This necessary implication in political struggles - without membership at an organizational level of any one political party -, was to serve the MRAP well in the 1950s. The MRAP at its foundation saw itself as representing "l'immense majorité de la population juive" (MRAP 1950, 4). The card advertising the inaugural conference on 22nd May 1949 (although the title MRAP had existed since January of that year), shows the doves of peace surrounding the barbed wire and watchtowers of a concentration camp. Keeping the association that war equalled fascism (the discursive tactic of 1930s antifascism), - a theme which had just been all too tragically confirmed -, the organization therefore considered that the word "Paix" had to figure in its title - *Mouvement contre le Racisme et l'antisemitisme et pour la Paix* - which implied from the start a broad alliance (in 1987 the MRAP changed its title to the *Mouvement Contre le Racisme et Pour l'Amitié entre les Peuples*). The MRAP was a coalition of over fifty Jewish-based organizations (16), as Albert Lévy explains: (...)
"(...) le MRAP au départ a été formé surtout par des Juifs, par des sociétés juives, des organisations juives, c'était un peu une alliance (...) entre différents courants de la population juive - il y avait des communistes, il y avait des sionistes, il y avait des socialistes (...) qui étaient organisés en tant que tels et en tant que Juifs en même temps, donc, et qui se sont réunis pour lutter contre le retour de ce qu'ils avaient vécu".

A.Lévy sees the generation which created the MRAP as a "génération qui avait subi la guerre, et qui avait combattu, ou qui avait été victime du nazisme" and which harboured "la crainte du retour du nazisme et du retour à la guerre" (17). It is important to stress here the experiential approach to the fight against racism, as this was one factor which explained the relative ease with which the MRAP was to take on board the defence of Algerians from 1949 onwards.

The political socialization of 1930s antifascism, with its frontiste approach, explanation of racism as part of fascism, and broad if unaligned left-wing sympathies (cf. Rayski 1950) all mark the early MRAP, the MRAP's rôle being defined in Droit et Liberté as leading "l'offensive sur les plans judiciaire politique, idéologique, contre les appels au meurtre et contre la persécution raciale" (18). Linked to this was what Albert Lévy describes as the MRAP's "souci de ne pas s'isoler", and the "souci d'avoir un éventail politique très diversifié de personnalités représentatives", to show the organization's pluralism : "ce n'était pas une organisation de défense des Juifs mais une organisation sociale en quelque sorte de lutte démocratique contre le racisme, qui n'est pas une auto-défense" (19), hence the Comité d'Honneur which included Aime Césaire, Albert Bayet, Marcel Prenant and, later, Sartre. Formed within a very specific context, therefore, the MRAP nevertheless reflected the need for a wide base which, in turn, had implications for its theoretical position on racism.
Section One (b) : MRAP - theory into action

I will now examine the MRAP's theoretical approach to racism and antiracism: this will situate the MRAP's position on decolonization, and allow for a comparison with the LICA and other groups. As stated in the Introduction (supra), the MRAP's theoretical position can be situated around three themes: the (i) "unicité" and (ii) indivisibility of racism, with (iii) the need for a pluralist antiracism, both in terms of who should mobilize and the forms that mobilization should take. Albert Lévy uses the concept of 'unicity' to show the links between various forms of racism, the point to communicate within antiracism being that "(l)e racisme est un tout, quelles qu'en soient les victimes". He now quotes Albert Memmi's concept of heterophobia (1994) as allowing to "figurer justement cette unite dans la diversite" of racism (20). Memmi, in fact, sees heterophobia as "le refus d'autrui au nom de n'importe quelle difference", reserving the term racism as "désignant le refus d'autrui au nom de la différence biologique" (1994, 132).

The notion of heterophobia is not unproblematical (21): Memmi often fails to account for the mechanisms of differentiation, taking the 'difference' on which his theory is based as a given. I would argue that Albert Lévy is in fact using the concept of heterophobia in a slightly different way to underline the links between the various forms of racism: this was an innovation which came from the MRAP - the previous epistemological attempts at expressing this commonality were all Marxist exploitational approaches, ones which the MRAP's position complements rather than opposes. This point can be illustrated by quoting one of the MRAP's founders, André Blumel, who argued that

"antisémitisme et racisme sont intimement liés et en réalité synonymes. Si les Juifs dans leur propre combat contre l'antisémitisme doivent s'appuyer aussi sur les races que les racistes qualifient d'"inférieures" pour mieux les asservir, ils doivent aussi les aider inlassablement dans leur lutte spécifique pour l'affranchissement ou la libération" (22).

Blumel's quote shows how such an approach facilitates practical support for action against colonial racism.
This position remained unchanged throughout the period in question. The MRAP's position in 1965 was that forms of racism, "que l'analyse doit distinguer pour les besoins de la lutte, sont étroitement liés entre eux (since) (...) seule, la tactique conduit à certaines époques, les racistes à épargner provisoirement telle ou telle de leurs cibles" (23).

Such an analysis can then interpret which forms of racism are hegemonic at a given moment, and the transitions from one dominant form to another. The current MRAP president, Mouloud Aounit, states that the association's "façon de percevoir le combat contre le racisme a pour pivot son unicité", showing the continuity in approach from previous decades (Aounit 1996, 137).

In defining racism as "indivisible", the MRAP was calling for solidarity with racialized groups and, perhaps given the MRAP's early membership, from Jews for other racialized groups. But it was also responding to the anti-Maghrebian press campaigns of the postwar period (cf. infra, Section Two), which sought to 'criminalize' Maghrebian emigrant males, as did the theoretical racist publications such as Maurice Bardèche's Défense de l'Ocident (published from 1954). These two points ("unicité" and "indivisibilité") can be seen in the following quotes: campaigning for the release of fourteen Algerian workers in Lyon on dubious charges in 1951, the MRAP secretariat argued that "(l')expérience nous prouve que le racisme est indivisible. Il ne saurait frapper les uns en épargnant les autres. Tous ceux qu'il menace, noirs, jaunes, nord-africains, juifs se sentent directement solidaires des 14 de Lyon" (24). This is because "(...) le racisme, comme la liberté est indivisible. On ne peut imaginer un raciste qui ne manifesteait de la haine contre les Nord-Africains et qui n'en manifesteait pas en même temps et dans les mêmes termes contre les Noirs ou contre les Juifs" (25).

As I will argue later, however, there is nothing predetermined about the different forms racism will take: there may well be varying logics underpinning superficially similar discursive and practical forms of racism. The logic of the factès-inspired racism, and the MRAP's reaction to it - which compared anti-
Maghrebian racism to Vichy antisemitism — will be taken as a case in point in Section Two.

The MRAP position that "(l)a liberté est indivisible" was to be restated in 1954 (26). In stressing both égalité and liberté, the MRAP was close to E. Balibar's subsequent concept of égaliberté, where "les situations dans lesquelles elles (égalité and liberté) sont présentes ou absentes l'une et l'autre sont nécessairement les mêmes" (1992, 135) (cf. Chapter Two). In the context of the Algerian War, this was an accurate depiction of the wearing down, both legally and extra-legally, of the rights of Algerians and their supporters (cf. infra). The problem for the MRAP's campaigning was to communicate this indivisibility, hence theoretical universality of rights of all individuals, in a period when tolerance levels against antisemitism were lower than those against anti-Maghrebian racism. After her report on the situation of Algerians in France in 1951, Claudine Inductor concluded that "(i)l est clair que pour nous le combat contre l'antisémitisme est intimement lié au combat contre le racisme, les deux ayant les mêmes origines et servant les mêmes objectifs" (27). But as Jacques Madaule put it in 1957:

"(c)e qui leur (the metropolitan French) paraissait intolérable chez eux, parce que des Français de France en étaient les victimes (during Vichy), leur semble acceptable en Algérie parce que les victimes sont des "bougnoules" et que les "bougnoules" ne sont pas tout à fait des hommes" (28).

The MRAP defined its rôle in universalistic terms to "défendre L'HOMME et ses droits inaliénables dans tout Algérien, quelle que soit son origine ou sa confession" (29). As Kristin Ross has pointed out, however, "(p)recisely at the moment that colonized peoples demand and appropriate to themselves the status of men (sic), (...) French (structuralist) intellectuals announce the "death of man"" (1995, 163) : this may have limited the audience for this anticolonialism within some intellectual circles.
The campaign for a broader antiracism was restated by Albert Lévy in 1963, warning against what he termed "une conception synthétique de la lutte antiraciste, une sorte de défense parallèle de certaines minorités sans tenir compte du lien entre les différentes formes du racisme, en acceptant même que la défense des uns se fasse au détriment des autres" (30).

The concept of "racisme indivisible" was therefore used to push for solidarity in the face of racism. Writing just as the MRAP was beginning to use this theme, Fanon showed the complex links between different forms of racism. Whilst agreeing that, at a theoretical level, "(l)e racisme colonial ne diffère pas des autres racismes. L'antisémitisme me touche en pleine chair. (...) Je ne puis me désolidariser du sort réservé à mon frère" (1952/1975, 71), for Fanon the forms racism could take were not always identical. Comparing antisemitism and anti-black racism under the Sartrian paradigm of the regard, (cf. Sartre 1943/1993), he argues that

"(...) le Juif n'est pas aimé à partir du moment où il est dépiste. Mais avec moi, tout prend un visage nouveau. Aucune chance ne m'est permise. (...) Je ne suis pas esclave de "l'idée" que les autres ont de moi, mais de mon apparaître" (1952/1975, 93).

As Sander Gilman (1991) has shown, however, cases of representing the 'Jew' according to supposed 'black' physical traits were common in nineteenth century Western Europe (and when Hitler talked of the 'negrification' of France, he was also targeting Jews). Fanon was to recount how very often in Algeria he was 'mistaken' for an Arab or Berber Algerian by the police (1952/1975, 73). Unity and indivisibility at an epistemological level could still lead to a varied social expression of discrimination. Fanon's was perhaps one of the few voices at that time to insist on this complex colonial situation and how it related to mainland France. The MRAP saw through the paradigm of supposed 'civilization superiority' (31).

*Pluralisme*, the third term by which Albert Lévy characterizes the action of the MRAP since its creation in 1949, has two parts to it. Firstly that "(l')anti-racisme n'est pas l'affaire d'un parti, ni d'un groupe, ni d'un milieu, c'est l'affaire de
tous les mondes" hence the need for the broad antiracist approach described above based around the notion of solidarity. Secondly, this pluralisme can also be understood as "les formes de lutte contre le racisme, qui peuvent aller de la défense, de la riposte à la prévention, à l'éducation" (32). Under the influence of the UNESCO-sponsored work from the late forties onwards, the MRAP was to place greater attention on these latter two forms of mobilization, what Albert Lévy calls a "pédagogie antiraciste" (cf. Lloyd 1996) (33). Charles Palant defined the MRAP's objectives in 1959 as "(m)obiliser, instruire, informer" (MRAP 1959, 85-87). In 1960 the MRAP supported the setting up of the Comité de Liaison des Éducateurs contre les Préjugés Raciaux (1960-1974), the aim of which was to "promouvoir une action pédagogique contre les préjugés raciaux et contribuer à développer une éducation orientée vers la fraternité humaine" (34). Whilst I will suggest that the MRAP's ability to affect certain vectors of racism - particularly those within the State - was limited, there is evidence that the MRAP played a role in sensitizing the public on questions of racism, as part of a wider trend in this direction throughout the 1950s and 1960s. Albert Lévy, for example, surveying the action of the MRAP from its foundation to 1963, said that the public was more aware of racism than in 1949 : "(e)n conséquence l'action contre le racisme naît souvent en dehors de notre intervention, et nous rencontrons un terrain favorable pour l'organiser et le développer" (35). Because of this, the MRAP should "rendre les CITOYENS ACTIFS et non se substituer à eux" (36). "Reactive antiracism" was only one of the MRAP's activities, therefore.

The MRAP's stance on decolonization illustrates how some of these theoretical positions were put into practice. For Fanon, the MRAP was one of the most active antifascist movements in the 1950s, and "l'un des premiers à avoir pris position contre le principe de la guerre d'Algérie et pour la reconnaissance de la nation algérienne" (37). The divisions within the French left over the Algerian War are well known and have been studied elsewhere (cf. Hamon and Rotman 1979, Droz and Lever 1982, Sadoun 1990, Joly 1991). The MRAP's growing suspicion of the rôle of the State as the war progressed - in a climate of wider
campaigns against torture and human rights (cf. Alleg 1958, Lindon 1959, Vidal-Naquet 1962) -, meant that its antifascist position seemed vindicated, since "(...)
racisme et fascisme sont étroitement solidaires au point d'être inséparables. L'un, en tout cas, mène à l'autre" (38). The former MNCR activists had put their imprint on early Alliance Antiraciste statements condemning racism in the colonies (39), the MRAP denouncing the "arbitraire et (de) l'oppression" involved in colonial rule (MRAP 1951, 4). But it was the MRAP's focus on equality - "(l')antiracisme veut que tous les hommes soient égaux" - (40), and the recognition that independence was about the fight for equality (although not necessarily an equality which referred exclusively to republican antiracist discourse) that enabled the MRAP to recognize the changes to the theoretical bases of racism which were to emerge in the 1960s, traces of which can be located in elements of 1950s social discourse.

Section One (c): The 'cultural' and the 'racial'

The rejection, by the early négritude movement and ethnologists (cf. Lebovics 1992) of the myth of 'civilization superiority' (cf. Chapter Four), had provoked a reaction from right-wing cultural essentialists from the 1920s onwards (cf. Sirinelli 1991). The eschatology of the supposed decline of the West is exemplified by the 1935 Manifeste des intellectuels français Pour la défense de l'Occident, signed by (amongst others) Louis Bertrand, Abel Bonnard, Robert Brasillach, Léon Daudet and Drieu la Rochelle. The manifesto attacked the "faux universalisme juridique qui met sur pied d'égalité le supérieur et l'inférieur, le civilisé et le barbare", stressing that "la civilisation d'Occident (... was) le seul avenir valable qui, aujourd'hui comme hier, soit ouvert au genre humain" (41). This declaration brought a sharp rebuke from the Comité de vigilance des intellectuels antifascistes (CVIA), which published a Réponse aux intellectuels fascistes (42). There was an awareness by the far-right in the 1930s that, on the question of colonization, the ideological battle was being lost. The overlap between the cultural and the 'racial' is implicit rather than explicit in the
Manifesto. This refusal of civilization equality was to be the mainstay of far-right theorizing, although it should be said that it was only with the Algerian War that the idea of the mission civilisatrice died its death on the mainstream left. For the far-right, decolonization implied the idea of a natural equality that theorists such as Alain de Benoist could not tolerate (Berstein 1990, 213) (cf. also Taguieff 1994, Duranton-Cabrol 1991).

The 1950s and 1960s were to see the start of a transformation of racist theorizing which, behind the traditional themes of antisemitism expressed, for example, in Poujade's populist hostility to Mendes France (43), sought also to see a danger to the French nation (or 'race', the two being synonyms for such theorists) in the arrival of colonial citizens and subjects into mainland France. This hostility to colonial emigration was not new (Chapter Four). The period in question sees it become the dominant form of racism and, due to the opposition to the colonial project, colonial racism and 'civilization superiority' to have swollen up since the 1920s, was a discourse which was becoming more complex. As Guillaumin has remarked, as soon as there was "un debut de parole autonome" to emerge from colonized counter-cultural movements, then there was a "complexification accrue du stereotype" in social discourse (1972, 209) directed against the 'Other'.

The unambiguously titled Défense de l'Occident, with its racist cultural project, appeared from 1954, under the direction of Maurice Bardeche - the various pieces of legislation granting amnesties to former collaborators - and which the MRAP fought continuously - , gave new life to the extremism which had been forced underground in the first few years after Liberation. The MRAP's archives contain numerous examples of legal action taken against the nebulous far-right publications which gained a new lease of life in the post-Poujade, pre-Independence early years of the Fifth Republic (ie. 1958-1962) (44). With Algerian Independence already looming, there was, according to Duranton-
Cabrol, a transformation on the far-right, with an anti-*metissage* argument still as its base, towards an

"anti-colonialisme de droite, soucieux des différences entre les peuples, qui préfigure le tiersmondisme du GRECE: ainsi la grandeur de la France, cessant d'être soutenue par l'empire d'Outre-Mer, s'adosse-t-elle désormais à l'Europe et à la culture occidentale et à la race blanche" (1991, 67).

Thus, in spite of what Rioux (1994, 215) calls "deux décennies très moroses" (1945-1965) in the history of the far-right in France, important theoretical changes were starting to take place, and which suggest that Taguieff (1994, 1993a) underestimates the relevance of this period in the formative history of the GRECE and the *Club de l'Horloge* (45). Two aspects can therefore be brought out of this period of evolution within far-right discourse: firstly, the move towards a racist theorizing of European identity linked to increased hostility towards emigrants from the colonies: secondly, the rhetorical tactic of using the cultural as a racial signifier. Such developments did not go unnoticed during the period in question, although it remains unclear as to how far the MRAP, having seen how powerful colonial racism was becoming in the Metropole, actually stressed, prior to the sixties, the change in that racism's expression in terms of the increasing use of the 'cultural'.

In 1956, Fanon published an article on the evolution from overt biological racism to cultural differentialism (as it has now come to be called after Taguieff (1990)). Analyzing the phenomenon from a Marxist viewpoint, he explained this transformation by the fact that "(l)a perfection des moyens de production provoque fatalement le camouflage des techniques d'exploitation de l'homme, donc des formes du racisme" (1956, 125). An article in the LDH's revue *Après-Demain* in 1958 looked at the discourse of the Poujade-inspired *Fraternité française*, and noted that "(l)e mepris se fonde (ici) (ie in the article) sur l'éloignement par rapport à la civilisation occidentale considérée comme le critère de toute valeur" (46). Similar analyses from antiracists remained marginal until the 1960s, however. Roger Maria (MRAP) attacked the attempted retournement
of the anticolonial argument by the far-right, which was trying to present black critiques of racism as 'anti-white racism' (47). The MRAP defined its analysis of the situation in 1965 as follows:

"(a)ujourd'hui, sous l'influence du processus de décolonisation, la propagande raciste s'attache surtout à dénigrer les peuples noirs, jaunes ou arabes, et à présenter leur emancipation comme un perçu pour les peuples blancs, pour la civilisation occidentale: dès lors, le racisme peut paraître simplement défensif et conforme à l'intérêt national" (MRAP 1965, 3-4).

This form of racism was described as "un racisme post-colonial", one which was adapting certain themes to have emerged from the Algerian War, during which time and since "(u)n climat de psychose anti-algérienne est suscité où l'on veut faire croire que tous les criminels sont Algériens et que tous les Algériens sont criminels". This is because "(...) le racisme est daté, et à telle situation correspond tel racisme" (48). The form of racism described in the above MRAP (1965) document is strikingly similar to current (ie. 1990s) racism.

According to Jean Schapiro (MRAP), the tactics of publications such as Défense de l'Occident ("cette littérature neo-raciste") were to say that "les racistes (...) ils sont en face. Les racistes ce sont eux que nous (in the MRAP) appelons les antiracistes". For Schapiro, the far-right's message was "la défense du blanc contre les continents d'outre-mer" (49). By the mid-sixties therefore, the MRAP was thus able to theorize on the transition from colonial to postcolonial racism. Having campaigned against the racist practices of the State before and during the Algerian War (cf. infra, Section Two), it was well placed to analyze which themes were being recycled from that period in the light of decolonization, and how such postcolonial racism against Maghrebians had become the dominant form of racism in France, whilst analyzing racism as being produced by various areas of production - the neo-fascist groups, the State, and the more diffuse forms of racism latent within French society (what Edgar Morin (1969) calls "infra-political" racism), thus avoiding the same 'fixation' on the fascist leagues which reduced the effectiveness of the antiracism of the thirties (50). The MRAP evolved towards this position rather than starting off from it in
1949 and, as I have suggested, there is no easy periodization for these changing positions within antiracism and racism. From 1949 to the mid-sixties there was also a quite significant change in the MRAP's view of how deeply rooted racism was within French society.

Section One (d): The end of a myth

There was a tendency within mainstream republican discourse throughout the Third Republic to minimize the amount of racism in France, or, alternatively, within republican antiracism, to recognize the existence of racism but to reject it onto outside, usually 'German', sources (cf. Chapter Two) - what Lebovics (1992) terms the fight for the "True France", still caught up in the struggle for the legitimacy and hegemony of republican values. In Chapter Four, I tried to show how those Algerian nationalists and counter-cultural négritude movements which challenged this view of a 'non-racist' France were often marginalized on the mainstream left, since their criticisms raised sensitive questions about colonial racism. The reaffirmation of republican values which the épuration was designed to accomplish was not undertaken with any real nostalgia for the defunct Third Republic (cf. Novick 1968). The period 1944-1964 sees the fragmenting of the myth of a 'non-racist' France on the French left/centre-left, previously presented as an essential component of the "esprit français" (51). As Cathie Lloyd argues, "(…) this discourse became less credible as the antiracist movement was faced with the difficult, long task of understanding and responding to racism in France" (1996, 130). Official discourse was to use this polysemic theme of a 'non-racist' France to reject the MRAP-sponsored proposals for tighter legislation against racism from 1959. The only example I have come across of the MRAP using the ritual pronouncement that "(l)e peuple français n'est pas raciste", was in opposition to Poujade, within a logic of a republican Front which explicitly used discourse and imagery from the time of the Front Populaire (52).
The theme of a 'non-racist' France continued to be widely present elsewhere, however, especially regarding anti-black racism. Since the 1920s, for example, the question had become tied up with the equivalent of the 'German myth' as regards antisemitism. Because the problems faced by blacks in the USA had come to attract a certain amount of media attention in France with the Scottsboro case in 1931, and then with the postwar civil rights movement, racism in the USA was often presented by French observers as totally unlinked to anything that could happen in France, portrayed as a country comparatively free of anti-black racism. Charles Feld's article in *Fraternité* in 1946 on "L'enfer des noirs" in the USA did not mention black French citizens or subjects, for example (53). Pierre Paraf, the future MRAP president, could still declare in 1948 that France was the "moins raciste (country) du monde" (54). Gérard Rosenthal's report to the LICA-dominated AA Congress in 1948 stated that "(l)es manifestations du racisme contre les noirs ne s'exercent pas avec éclat dans la France métropolitaine" (Rosenthal 1948, 1) (55). Mannoni's *Psychologie de la colonisation* (1950), portrayed France as 'non-racist', arousing Fanon's criticisms in *Peau noire masques blancs* (1952/1975, 69-89 passim).

The LICA's reactions to the stabbing of the Cameroons writer Ferdinand Oyono in Paris in June 1959 illustrate the way in which France was being personified as 'non racist'. The LICA produced a poster which read:

"Pas de ça chez nous!
Paris n'est pas Little Rock ou Notting Hill
Unissez-vous à nous pour prouver que le racisme n'est pas français" (56).

The LICA refers to Britain and the USA (and subsequently South Africa), seen as countries of less successful 'race relations', rather than looking at the French situation. The use of foreign examples in this way was destined for a long history: nowadays it centres on the term "ghetto", and the supposed inexistence of "ethnic communities" in France, and has been largely appropriated by official discourse traversing left and right (57). Choosing foreign examples arguably brought more of a consensus, whereas critiquing the French colonial State in the
midst of decolonization could have provoked dissension within the LICA. 1959 saw a spate of attacks on Africans and African-Carribbeans in Paris by far-right activists, and refusals to serve them in bars (58). The MRAP worked with the *Présence Africaine* project in fighting anti-black racism, and saw the second Congress of Negro Writers and Artists in 1959 as putting across an "idéologie antiraciste" (59).

Various pieces of proposed legislation against racism, sponsored by the PCF, the *Mouvement Républicain Populaire* and the SFIO, and supported by the MRAP, were introduced from 1959 to combat this increase in racism of the late 1950s, and to improve on the inadequate Marchandeau decree (cf. Chapter Three, Section Three) (60). Successive Gaullist governments shelved attempts to discuss legislation, thus eliciting protests from the MRAP (61), and hence official reaction. For the *garde des Sceaux* Jean Foyer in 1963,

"(I) a France a sujet de se féliciter de l'absence sur son territoire de discrimination ou de ségrégation raciale. Il n'apparaît pas nécessaire dans ces conditions d'ajouter aux dispositions légales en vigueur" (62).

Similarly, Pierre Arpaillange argued in 1966 that there was no need for more legislation, since "(...) des actes de discrimination ou de ségrégation raciale (...) en France, demeurent exceptionnels" (63). When racism was admitted, official discourse preferred to talk of "isolated" acts (64). Such denials have continued ever since (cf. Giudice 1992, 342-343, MRAP 1984).

The MRAP reacted against official denials of the existence of racism in France, passing a resolution in 1965 that very often there was "la négation, pure et simple" of racism, particularly antisemitism (65). In 1965 the MRAP explained that the lack of attention given to racism by the "bonne conscience" of 1789 (presumably thereby addressing a message to those on the left as well as to the State) was leading to the fact that "(...) toute manifestation de racisme est systématiquement minimisée, comme incompatible, en son essence, avec "l'esprit français"" (MRAP 1965, 3). Engaging with the rhetorical use of racism in the USA to marginalize anti-black racism as an issue in France, a MRAP policy
document in 1964 says that support should be given to antiracists in the USA, but that the questions raised by the situation there should then be used to bring attention back to what is happening in France (66). The MRAP, through its antiracist practice of interventions against all forms of "indivisible" racism, saw that republican antiracist discourse could be turned round and used as a defence mechanism by the State.

A comparison with the LICA over the same period should help to bring out the transformations in antiracist discourse and action introduced by the MRAP during the 1949-1964 period (67). Like the MRAP, the LICA sought to be seen as more than 'simply' a 'Jewish' organization. One of the reasons for this was arguably a reaction to the antisemitic campaigns of the 1930s, which had suggested that the LICA constituted a powerful 'Jewish lobby' (68). Bernard Lecache advised in 1945 that "(...) nous devons être de moins en moins une organisation juive" (1945, 717). But Lecache also offered a new interpretation of racism and hence antiracism for the LICA, which should no longer devote

"(...) l'exclusivité de ses activités à la lutte contre l'antisémitisme, en délaisant d'autres tout aussi importantes et essentielles que celles-la. (...) Il est (donc) impossible de se vouloir limiter à détruire une seule des formes de l'intolérance: l'antisémitisme. C'est tout le racisme qu'il faut combattre" (Lecache 1944, 3).

Such an evolution had already been tentatively and transiently sketched during the Front Populaire (69). Some LICA supporters in the AA seemed to echo this apparent change in position. Samy Lattès argued in 1947 that "(a)ctuellement, en France, le racisme se présente surtout sous trois aspects : l'antisémitisme, le colonialisme, la xénophobie" (Lattès 1947, 1). One year on, Gérard Rosenthal was arguing the same:

"(p)our remplir ses devoirs et renforcer ses moyens, l'antiracisme doit étendre son champ d'action à toutes les manifestations du racisme", (since) "la solidarité qu'elle (the AA) mobilise contre la persécution n'est pas la solidarité raciale, c'est la solidarité antiraciste" (Rosenthal 1948, 1, 2).
Lecache was trying to steer the AA (dominated by the LICA by 1948) to a broader conception of antiracism: "(n)ous sommes contre tous les racismes, non seulement contre le racisme anti-Juif, mais contre le racisme anti-noir ou contre le racisme anti-jaune" (70). Antiracism was, for Lecache, badly served when reduced to "la seule défense d'une catégorie déterminée des victimes du racisme"; instead, Lecache advocated what he called the "universalité de l'antiracisme" (71).

Such attempts to innovate, however, met with ingrained opposition from an older generation of LICA activists. In 1950, Lecache reacted to this opposition: "(b)ien des nôtres, par une déviation naturelle de l'esprit restent étrangers aux problèmes antiracistes intéressant les hommes de couleur et des peuples coloniaux" (72), and stated in 1954 that "(d)evant les vestiges du colonialisme, la LICA prend une attitude trop prudente qui n'est pas de nature à lui concilier la confiance des noirs" (73). This reticence on behalf of the LICA to engage in the sort of activism that the MRAP showed throughout the 1950s was probably due to the former's inability to recruit new, younger members (74). Lecache argued that the postwar generation had certain advantages for antiracism, since it wasn't "(...) affligée d'un mode de pensée, d'un style de vivre, d'une education, de préjugés qui, trop souvent, paralysent ou égarent les anciens" (Lecache 1961, 27). The preponderence of older members, socialized into the model of Third Republic antiracisme moral, meant that colonial racism was not seen as much of an issue. This can be seen through the LICA's position on the Algerian War.

As the LICA's Philippe Benassaya says about the Algerian War, "il y a eu un débat très passionné à la LICRA du fait des appartenance politiques des uns et des autres" (1996, 111) (75). The LICA's eventual rallying behind de Gaulle, and by inference his policy of self-determination for Algeria, marked the end of a decade-long trajectory with few clearcut policy statements on decolonization in Algeria. The LICA's governing council was still voting for "association" between
the two countries rather than independence in November 1959 (76). On the Algerian question, Lecache's positions can be traced as reformist in 1944 (77), opposed to independence in December 1954 (78), for "(l)a repression dans la justice" (79), progressing in May 1957 to "(l)'antiracisme admet et reconnaît la volonté d'émanicipation des peuples dits mineurs" (80), and in October 1958 to the call that "(l)a décolonisation doit être, dans les faits les plus brefs, un fait accompli" (81) : this allows us to situate his positions as those of the centre/centre-left. His, however, seems to have become an increasingly solitary voice. The LICA's reformism is evident by the position that

"(l)'Algerie restera française si l'on fait cesser la règne de la misère, de l'intolérance et de la peur", since "(p)our détruire les fellaghas (sic) il faut sans doute des armes mais, avant tout, de profondes reformes culturelles et sociales" (82).

Elsewhere in the columns of *Le Droit de vivre*, Georges Zérapha took a firm pro-*Algérie Française* position, writing an article against *Esprit* and *Les Temps modernes*, both supporters of Independence : "(r)appelons que c'est le FLN qui fait la guerre à la France. Ce n'est donc pas à la France qu'il faut prêcher la paix" (83).

**Conclusion to Section One**

Whilst the LICA did not ignore the situation faced by Algerians in France (cf. Section Two), and there were a few explanations offered as to why the nationalist movement was so strong, there was arguably little real connection made between antiracism and anticolonialism, between decolonization and colonial racism, and, above all, little reflection on the rôle of the State (84). The crucial separating point between the MRAP and the LICA was not only that the recognition of a plurality of racisms was a defining characteristic of the MRAP - rather than the marginal voice in the LICA -, but that this recognition of plurality was translated into concrete action. The LICA neither analyzed the articulation between racism and the State, nor drew the consequences from the support of the State in the repression of Algerian nationalists on the one hand, and the
development of racism within the State on the other. This meant that the LICA was, according to Albert Levy in 1962, willing to tolerate the abuses of the Gaullist State, since seeing its actions as a moindre mal (85). The innovations from the MRAP described in this section overcame many of the apparent contradictions between theory and practice which were central to the republican antiracist tradition exemplified by the LICA, with its vague discourse of human rights trying to fight very specific racist arguments, as Guillaumin has pointed out (1986, 17). But the racist theorizing of those nostalgic for Vichy or trying to choose new racist themes for an evolving society in a period of political instability did not represent the entire production of racism in this period. The MRAP engaged against racism within State agencies, and the indifference of the general public to such, often fatal, practices.

Section Two: Colonial and postcolonial 'immigration'

Introduction

Writing on the massacre of Algerians of 17th October 1961, Manceron and Remaoun remind us that

"(l)a gravité de cette épisode tragique ne doit pas occulter l'état de non-droit qui a régné en France avant le début de la rebellion et qui s'est poursuivi tout au long de la guerre. Il faut replacer en effet cette violence policière dans le cadre de la négation constante des droits et libertés pour les Algériens en France même, et de la violence répressive qui a commencé avant 1954 et s'est poursuivie tout au long du conflit" (1993, 161).

The authors add that "(i)l y avait quelques résistances à ce racisme mais celles-ci n'étaient pas à la hauteur de la répression qui frappait les Algériens" (ibid., 165). Their first quote suggests that the normalization of violence and repression against Algerians had as a 'logical' consequence October 1961. Following this observation, this Section intends to examine the political, administrative and socio-economic situation of Algerians in France from 1947 onwards. Secondly, the reaction of the MRAP as events unfold is studied, placing the organization's
action within the general context of protest against inequality and the State's excesses. I agree with Manceron and Remaoun that the reaction to the long-term repression of Algerians was woefully insufficient to influence successive governments into altering policy. However, it is necessary to tell the history of stifled voices of protest, of which the MRAP's was but one. Undertaking a 'regressive history', going from 1961 to 1947, it is tempting to come to the same conclusions as Marrus and Paxton (1981) when they see the germs of Vichy practices in policies of the 1930s, policies to which wide elements of society had acquiesced seemingly unquestioningly. The MRAP was to draw such an analogy between Vichy and the French State from 1950 onwards. This Study therefore seeks to ask wider questions: of the ability of antiracism to influence State policy, of the compromises of the mainstream left, and, centrally, the relationship between nation, State and 'race' which was played out over this transitional period from the colonial towards the postcolonial.

Section Two (a) : The 'crimes' of 'immigration'

Firstly, it is necessary to describe the political context of immigration in which the MRAP was to operate in the period from 1949: the situation it inherited and its successive developments (86). Having been granted citizenship (ordonnance of 7th March 1944, law of 7th May 1946), and therefore free circulation between Algeria and mainland France (confirmed by law of 20th September 1947), many Algerians were to take advantage of the chance to escape the poverty, demographic pressure and denial of rights in Algeria (Ath-Messaoud and Gillette 1976, 40, cf. also Bourdieu and Sayad 1964/1977, Sayad 1991, Stora 1992a). This immigration was to play a crucial rôle in the national liberation struggle, as Ath-Messaoud and Gillette explain: "(a)insi l'émigration s'était-elle retournée, arme à double tranchant, contre la domination coloniale dont elle avait jusqu'alors été un instrument" (1976, 44). Once in France, all Algerians had the right to vote and, in theory, the same 'rights and duties' as all other French citizens, with some discriminatory legislation on social security and
insurance (cf. note 151). In the late 1940s, there was considerable pressure for greater rights for immigrants (non-nationals), especially those having fought in the Resistance (cf. Courtois, Peschanski, Rayski 1989) (87). This solidarity was seldom to extend to Algerians.

The numbers of Algerians never ceased to increase throughout the period from 1947, attaining an estimated 350,000 in 1962, accompanied by the start of (unofficial) family regroupement and the decision to settle in France (Stora 1992a, 98 and 1993, Lamri 1995). There were very few Tunisian or Moroccan emigrants over this period. Whatever their training, Algerians tended to be placed in the ouvriers spécialisés category (97.4% of them, according to Stora (1992a, 98)).

An entire journalistic-sociological genre called misérabilisme was to be devoted to revealing the appalling conditions in which many of the Algerian emigrants were forced to live (88). Openly discriminated against because of their origins (Moscat and Péju 1952, 477, Stora 1993, 50), many Algerians found themselves unemployed as a consequence. Chentouf estimates that in 1955, "(l)e chômage etait (donc) cinq fois plus elevé chez les salaires algériens que parmi l'ensemble des salariés européens" (1985, 44). For Ghazi (1952), Algerians were "doublement prolétaires", paid less than their co-workers. Such a position merely served to reinforce a feeling of national (ie. Algerian) cohesion in the face of French hostility (Stora 1993, 51) (89). Poor housing conditions were the corollary of socio-economic status: as one police report put it in 1951, "(l)es publicistes, les journalistes qui se sont penchés sur le problème du logement des Nord-Africains ont tout dit, tout décrit, et cependant il semble que la réalité dépasse encore tout ce que l'imagination peut concevoir" (90). The 1950s saw the development on a larger scale of the bidonvilles (cf. Sayad 1995, Hervo and Charras 1971), as Algerians were unable to stay in the already overcrowded private rented suburban accommodation (cf. Leriche 1956, Mahmoud X 1960, Manceron and Remaoun 1993, 161-165 passim). 'Camped' on the outside of Paris (and Lyon), in areas the authorities considered as 'no-go' areas (cf. Laronde 1993, 99-102 passim, Begag 1986), the repression of October 17th was to be all
the fiercer since seen as an 'invasion' of the public sphere of the tranquil inner metropolis.

Patrick Weil has drawn the useful distinction between the State's constitutional obligations ("l'État de droit égalitaire") and the State's actual deeds ("l'État acteur") (1995, 478) as regards immigration policy. For Weil,

"(à) partir de cette date (free entry into mainland France from 1947), l'affaire coloniale domine la politique d'immigration qui se reorganise autour du problème algérien. Juridiquement, l'immigré est toujours italien, espagnol, polonais ou portugais. Politiquement puis socialement, il devient l'Algérien" (1995, 93).

_Nord-Africain_ was the commonest administrative term used for colonized 'Algerians' (to have used the term 'Algerian' would have been to admit the existence of a separate Algeria - cf. Stora 1992, 20-21) (91). Calls to limit Algerian immigration were to come from a variety of sources. From 1947 onwards, there was a 'criminalization' of the Algerian male, said by both police and a hostile press, to be prey to violent crime, a prevalence explained by economic hardship or viewed as 'inherent': commonly, one finds a mixture of the two explanations (92). A report in February 1948 says that "il parait indispensable d'envisager l'arrêt de l'immigration nord-africaine et le rapatriement des éléments sans ressources" (93). The Interior Ministry asked for advice on "les moyens de réduire, dans la mesure du possible, l'afflux des Algériens dans certains centres tels que Paris et Marseille" (94). The Seine Préfet wrote to the Interior Minister to ask if it would not be possible for those Algerians sentenced in France to serve their time in Algeria - which would have represented a form of deportation (95). But the problem which the authorities faced was that there could be no explicitly discriminatory measures applied. As the Préfet reflected:

"(s)ans doute, la qualité de citoyens français reconnue aux indigènes algériens rend ce problème extrêmement malaisé à résoudre" (96). Some of the tried and tested measures of the interwar years were simply no longer operable (cf. Chapter Four, Note 88): "(i)l ne saurait être question d'éditer des règlements sanitaires visant exclusivement les musulmans qui sont des citoyens français", as
one leading civil servant had to remind another (97). No legislation was passed:
the Préfet intervened to ask

"(...) M. le Procureur Général près de la Cour d'Appel de Paris que les
délinquants appréhendés (par mes Services) soient sévèrement poursuivis
et qu'en particulier les coupables, d'origine nord-africaine fassent l'objet
des rigueurs les plus grandes et soient frappés chaque fois que cela
serait possible d'interdiction de séjour", in an attempt to "éliminer tout
d'abord les éléments indésirables" (98).

It would appear that this was the 'invisible' reply from the authorities.

What legal protection there was against this sort of action was imprecise:
the 1946 Constitution had included the word race in its preambule, and had
decreed that "(...) tout être humain, sans distinction de race, de religion, ni de
croyance, possède des droits inaliénables et sacrés". It was only in 1958 that race
featured specifically in an article (Article Two) of the new Constitution, however
(99). The MRAP was to label as 'racist' the repression targetting Algerians (or
those 'spotted' as such - cf. infra). Continuing the colonial traditions, the police
was applying discriminatory, exclusionary practices under the appearance of
legality and uniformity. Robert Miles (1993) has discussed the question of
whether such indirect practices constitute racism (in particular over the 1905
Aliens Act in Britain). The civil servants quoted above, and those to be quoted
below, are all examining who they think should belong not only in the French
nation, but who should belong in France. As the Directeur Général de la Sûreté
Nationale asked:

"sans porter atteinte à l'esprit ni à la lettre des textes de l'assimilation ne
serait-il possible d'obtenir du Parlement dans l'intérêt même des Nord-
Africains des dispositions législatives permettant le refoulement des
Français de l'Union qui se seraient révélés inassimilables ou indésirables"
(100).

Gilroy (1987, 78-82 passim) examines a very similar official discourse in pre- and
postwar Britain. The authorities were responding to pressure from small
businesses and the press in Paris, concerning crime statistics (101). These
statistics, however reliable, used the category Nord-Africain - of questionable
legality itself (102) - , hence certain crimes were being attributed to certain social groups.

The discourse on Maghrebian criminality was already a racialized one (Chapter Four). As Guillaumin has remarked over the process of stereotyping: "(l)e stéréotype en soi peut disparaître, si l'organisation où il est inséré persiste il reparaît sous une forme différente" (1972, 32). The stereotypes in the late 1940s, which were to set the mark for the next few decades, were a predictable mixture of the old and the new. Reports reveal a close link made by the police between the 'mentality of the North African' and the choice of crime. The theme of sexual violence is still ever-present: "il convient de noter, contrairement à une opinion couramment admise, que les nord-africains ne se contentent pas de se laisser entretenir par des femmes, mais qu'ils se les soumettent par la violence", judged one report (103). Sexual diseases also remained a common theme (104). The same paternalism of the rue Lecomte is to be found in the explanations for the 'waywardness' of the emigrant: "(l)e passage de la Méditerranée correspond pour lui à un saut dans l'histoire de plusieurs siècles" (105). Unstable, unpredictable and nervous, with "un retard de maturation et de développement mental", "(i)l se comporte comme un grand enfant" (106).

In a similar vein, the 1948 report had stated that "(l)a criminalité nord-africaine dans la région parisienne est essentiellement primitive. Les infractions requérant des moyens intellectuels plus développés s'appliquent à un pourcentage particulièrement faible", thus "la spécialité nord-africaine semble être l'agression pure et simple dans la rue" (107).

This was perhaps the 'innovation' in the stereotype from the prewar period street crime could be seized upon by the press to create the same panic as during the rue Fondary case in 1923 (cf. MacMaster 1995). Unable to support themselves, living - according to the police - "dans une promiscuité et une oisiveté propices au déchaînement des pires instincts" (108), many Algerians, again according to the police, were resorting to what is now called mugging. In
1948, it was estimated that 36% of the "auteurs d'agressions sur la voie publique (...) sont des Nord-Africains" (109) : although there was no indication as to who the victims were. The report of almost three years later, however, coming after the press campaigns, police instigation of further rafles and other repressive action, has to admit that "(i)l n'apparaît pas, en effet, que la criminalité nord-africaine ait augmenté (since the last report)", although street crime remained the "spécialité" of the Nord-Africains (110). The Préfet even went as far as writing an article in Le Figaro (111) to calm the ardours of the anti-Algerian lobby, which had earlier complained that "(…) les rues de Paris apparaissent moins sûres que ne l'étaient les boulevards extérieurs aux alentours de 1900!" (112).

If the theme of criminality was changing shape around a discourse of street crime, then another image of the Algerian was being formed - within the police at least. The same report which recognized the drop in crimes by Algerians stated that

"alors qu'auparavant les Nord-Africains ne prenaient partie aux manifestations de voie publique qu'à titre individuel, les années 1950 et 1951 ont été marquées par des manifestations violentes et organisées auxquelles participaient presque exclusivement des Nord-Africains" (113),

referring to the nationalist, pro-Messalist PPA-MTLD (Mouvement pour le Triomphe des Libertés Démocratiques) demonstrations. From street crime to 'political criminality', the transition was almost simultaneous (1948-1951). In many respects the way in which the police had dealt with the 'problem' of street crime was to be transferred to the fight against Algerian nationalism. For the police, in response to the clamours for repression from small businesses in the 18th arrondissement, had already undertaken in the summer of 1947 "des rafles monstres dans les quartiers dont les Nord-Africains ont fait des citadelles du marché noir" (114). The police operated "(d)es rafles journalières", "des actions massives et fréquentes" in Montmartre and around Place Clichy (115). This action had been insufficient, the February 1948 report concluded : the former Brigade Nord-Africaine of the rue Lecomte, with its 30,000 individual files on
Maghrebians could not be brought back overnight (116), but some sort of identification process would be needed to improve the repression: such statistics would have to include "l'âge, la race, les caractéristiques (anciens combattants, chômeurs, techniciens etc.)" of the Algerians, the report concluding that "(...) il serait élémentaire de spécialiser des policiers dans la répression nord-africaine, de même qu'on spécialise des policiers dans la recherche des fraudeurs financiers ou des trafiquants de drogue" (117).

Such, therefore, was the sentiment in the higher echelons of the police towards the Algerians, well before November 1954 and the outbreak of the War of Independence. The repression was not, as Einaudi (1991) seems to suggest, simply a result of the nationalist movement. It was part of the repression of emigration, linked to a discourse which sought to 'criminalize' that emigration, blurring the distinction between political repression and 'everyday' policing, making a 'suspect' of every Algerian, in a striking parallel to French military tactics used in Algeria during the war (cf. Stora 1992, 20). As the author of one report noted as early as May 1947: "(...) le problème nord-africain dans la Métropole est devenu non plus une question de prévention mais une question de répression" (118). The rounding-up of Algerians was thus a well-oiled tactic in the Paris police from the late 1940s onwards. It is in this context that the MRAP and other organizations were to intervene.

The events described above did not go unchallenged. The Alliance Antiraciste does not seem to have responded to the first police action in 1947. In 1949, however, there were protests from L'Humanité against "une campagne de division à caractère raciste" (119), and Libération (120). The MRAP started its opposition to the press campaigns in November 1949 (121), warned about the increase in anti-black and anti-Maghrebian press stories (MRAP 1951), and complained that "(...) ces calomnies sont destinées à créer la division entre Français et Nord-Africains et à justifier en même temps la situation d'infériorité (...) imposée à ces derniers dans tous les domaines" (122). The MRAP then
organized a petition against such stereotyping in August 1952, issued press releases against the most explicitly anti-Algerian articles and journalists in 1952 (123), and grouped together concerned intellectuals (Césaire, Vercors, Leiris) to denounce the "campagnes racistes dirigées contre les travailleurs nord-africains" (124). The MRAP was to take action in the future against racism in the press (125). The MRAP was far from alone. Maghrebian set up their own protest committees. In Marseille, the Association des Musulmans Algériens de Marseille organized meetings against the press, 1,500 attending one held 20th February 1949 (Stora 1993, 59), thus signifying autonomous antiracist action by Maghrebians in the city well before the Mouvement des Travailleurs Arabes (MTA) (1972-77) (cf. Chapter Six). In Paris, a Comité (provisoire) de Vigilance et de Coordination pour la Défense des Nord-Africains en France sent deputations to the Préfet in November 1949 and organized a public meeting in June 1950 (126). The MTLD did likewise, complaining that, according to the police report, "(t)out est fait pour présenter nos compatriotes comme des gens sales, menteurs, voleurs, ivrognes, et même assassins" (127).

Some writers tried to assess the extent of the damage done by such stereotyping. For Moscat and Péju, "(l)a vérité est que, pour certains policiers - et journalistes - non seulement le Nord-Africain est présumé coupable, mais le coupable est presume nord-africain", and popular imagery had come to conceive that "(l)e natif des Deux-Sèvres qui vole un portefeuille est un voleur. Le Nord-Africain qui en vole un est d'abord un Nord-Africain" (1952, 494, 495) (128). The same newspapers to have praised Algerian soldiers during the Occupation had "changé leurs batteries depuis que la guerre est finie, et c'est un torrent d'injures qui se déverse sur lui" (Algerians in general), Ghazi complained (1952, 231). The period to 1954 is not usually presented as of key importance in understanding anti-Maghrebian racism. Fanon dates the start of hostility (as a direct result of the War) as late as 1957 (129). Estrines, however, says in 1954 that (for St.Étienne) "(l)es manifestations de sentiments racistes s'étendent à l'ensemble de la vie quotidienne" (1954, 340-341). For Lamri (1995, 48-49) it is
"à partir des années 1950, (that) l'opinion française à l'égard des Algériens s'infléchit : on passe progressivement de l'indifférence à l'inquiétude à la veille du conflit algérien".

The articulation between press stereotypes, police stereotypes, and more general public opinion is indeed a complex one. I have tried to show that there is a continuity from the 1930s to the 1940s-50s at the level of certain stereotypes - sexual violence, 'aggressivity', 'simplicity', 'backwardness' amongst several areas of social discourse. These assumptions formed the interpretational repertoire for the perceptions of public demonstrations by Algerians throughout the 1950s and early 1960s, in their struggle for independence, and more rights whilst in France (cf. Ageron 1990). Such perceptions were not limited to the police. The reactions to the 1949-1952 press campaigns also show the problems there were to be in mobilizing non-Algerians around these themes: mobilization tended to lack any general theme capable of bringing together those elements of the left to oppose discriminatory pratices such as *rafles*. Not only was the left divided among itself (cf. Coquery-Vidrovitch and Ageron 1996, 424-436 *passim*), but also divided from any concerted joint action with Algerians. Subsequent developments from 1952 were merely to confirm such lack of unity.

**Section Two (b) : “Rafles au faciès”**

After the then traditional *14-juillet* march of the Left to Place de la Nation in 1953, the forces of order opened fire on one section of the march just as it was dispersing. Six of the seven dead were Algerian, and there were 44 serious injuries. On 22nd July, an estimated 22,000 attended the victims' funerals (Einaudi 1991, 46-47). This was to be one of the very few largescale exhibitions of public solidarity for Algerians before or during the Algerian War. The presence of the MTLD cortege in the demonstration is a symbolic expression of the position of 'outsiders' it, and more generally all the Algerians in France, occupied in relation to the French left: marching with it, but at the end of the
demonstration, and with a separate agenda that the left seemed in no hurry to adopt. Algerians were simultaneously inside and outside the French left, on its borders, through choice or rejection. Writing of the 1950s, E. Balibar estimates that "(l')occasion a été manquée de forger entre les travailleurs français et les travailleurs immigrés une unité organique dans les luttes" (1992, 25). As part of the MRAP's protest against the killings, Droit et Liberté published what some of the MTLD banners had demanded that day:

"À bas le racisme policier"/"Plus de chasse au faciès"/"À bas les racistes semeurs de haine"/"À bas le racisme patronal et gouvernemental"/"À travail égal salaire égal"/"Prestations familiales égales pour tous - extension de la Sécu. en Algérie",
demands both general and specific, few of which would have met with the disapproval of the French marchers (130). In carrying aloft a picture of Messali Hadj, however, the Algerian demonstrators had made themselves a target for repression. This was not the first example of police or gendarme brutality. As the deputy Abelkader Cadi asked in the parliamentary debate on 16th July 1953:

"(p)ourquoi la police perd-elle son sang-froid en présence d'Algériens? Est-ce qu'un mot d'ordre? Sinon, pourquoi cette différence de traitement?" (131). The term *faciès* was being used to describe the 'picking off' of Algerians - separately or in groups - by the police, according to certain supposed phenotypical characteristics.

In *Modernity and the Holocaust*, Zygmunt Bauman, quoting from Herbert C. Kelman, lists three conditions which have to be met for the erosion of "moral inhibitions against violent atrocities" : the authorization of violence, the routinization of such violence, and the dehumanization of the victims (132). For Bauman, such violence can only happen if the "pluralism of social powers" cannot or will not protest (1991a, 114). What I have attempted to describe thus far in this Section would seem to fit Kelman's typology for largely unlimited violence : the French State was to authorize and cover certain illegalities (torture, murder) in regard to the Algerian War, applying them as almost 'everyday' occurrences. It should be remembered that both the SFIO and the PCF voted the
"pouvoirs spéciaux" in 1956 (133). The rafles were installed from the late 1940s onwards, and based on a dehumanization of Algerians which could result in a relative indifference from those whose solidarité agissante might otherwise have forged enough of a barrier to such tactics.

Racism within the State was occurring on a large scale at the supposed time of the triumph of French modernity, of France's entry into the consumer society of the Trente glorieuses (cf. Ross 1995), and of the final period of nationalisation of society described by Elias (1939/1978 and 1939/1982) over the long term, and E. Weber over the median term (1880-1950) (1977) (cf. also Noiriel 1992). If we posit that the Trente glorieuses were possible only with immigrant labour (134), then Maghrebians come into the picture as a central feature. From 1947, the colonized were coming to the Métropole in increasing numbers, called by economic misery in Algeria and economic necessity for France (two sides of the same coin), and, furthermore, using the Métropole as a crucial front in the independence struggle to a greater extent than in the interwar years (cf. Chapter Four). Reactions to this development revealed the contradictions of what French national belonging represented - a racialized conception in this case. It is in this sense that Guillaumin's comments on the transfer of the bestializing stereotypes from the indigenous, rural-then-urbanized French working classes of the nineteenth century, via Italian and Polish emigration, coming to fix themselves on Maghrebians in the course of the twentieth century inform us of the processes of reproduction of social and racial stigmas, blending to reinforce one another (Guillaumin 1972, 7). The Maghrebians were Louis Chevalier's classes dangereuses (1958/1978), unknown since ignored, but all the more feared because of it, poorly integrated into French society outside the workplace (and often segregated within the workplace - cf. Ghazi 1952, Chentouf 1955, Etcherelli 1967). Is it not at this period that the increasing individualization of French society started to wear down the solidarities which previous decades had seen? Paris in the 1950s was full of strangers, people new to the city or, increasingly, its suburbs (including many of the police who would perform the
killings, beatings etc.), but not all of these newcomers were *aliens*, representatives of the radical 'difference' conferred upon them by the racializing discourse of the time, with its sediments of imported colonial ideology reworked into the decolonizing Metropolitan context (135).

Part of a phenomenon mentioned in Chapter Four, the importation into the Métropole of a scale of violence usually limited to the colonies exemplified the 'two-track' power deployment of the French State - the overtness of violence in one context (the massacre of Sétilf in 1945, or those in Madagascar in 1947, for example) seemingly contrasting to the 'absence' of violence in the Metropolitan case. Georges Cogniot (PCF) underlined such a situation in his speech during the parliamentary debate following the 14th July killings:

"(v)ous vous trompez, messieurs les ministres. si vous croyez le moment venu de vous comporter à l'égard des travailleurs algériens en France comme vous le faites à l'égard des peuples coloniaux dans leurs pays"

(136).

Part of the problem in commemorating 17th October 1961 has been that many simply could not believe that such a massacre was possible *in Paris* (Heurgon 1994, 337) (cf. also Chapter Six). The colonial-state violence transferred into mainland France could only be practised on the 'undifferentiated' Algerians. Devoid of individuality in the dominant gaze, a 'mass', looked at but not *seen*, it was all the easier to mistreat them. What Colette Guillaumin calls the "biologisation de la perception" was to install itself into the police logic, an essential step on the path to dehumanization (1972, 67).

Georg Simmel has looked at the increasing significance taken by facial features in Western society, showing how it was the face, rather than other parts of the body (increasingly concealed under its clothes of 'decency'), which came to provide the essential component of individuation (1901/1984, 140). As Guillaumin states: "une différence physique réelle n'existe que pour autant qu'elle est ainsi désignée, en tant que signifiant, par une culture quelconque" (1972, 67). David Le Breton, following on Robert Antelme's *L'espèce humaine* (1957/1978),
which looked at the power relations inherent within Nazi concentration camps and the use of techniques to reduce the individuality of the prisoners, and hence break down their resistance more easily (the corps dociles of Foucault's *Surveiller et punir* (1975)), insists on the face as a "supplément de signification qui donne à chaque acteur le sentiment de sa souveraineté, de son identité propre" (1992, 11). In a situation of unequal power relations, "le visage est aboli, mais dans une relation de sujet à objet, où l'un des protagonistes se revendique le maître du visage" (1989, 103). For Le Breton, "(o)ffrir la singularité de son visage, c'est attester aux yeux des autres de la plénitude de son existence (...). Et priver l'autre de son visage, c'est déjà anticiper sa mort par une procédure symbolique et équivoque". He continues, "(s)ì le visage est le signe de l'ètre de l'homme, la négation de l'homme passe par celle de son visage" (1989, 100). The racist regard, for Le Breton, is "le refus de le considérer (the Other) dans sa singularité visagière" *(ibid.*, 100), where the Other is "prive de sa différence infinitésimale pour se muer en représentant anonyme cristallisant en lui la catégorie haïe" (1992, 100-101). He concludes that "(...) il est socialement absurde de concevoir des hommes sans visage dont on puisse se souvenir" (1992, 201).

One can therefore draw an analogy between the practices of antisemitism and those of colonial racism in their common attempts to depersonalize and dehumanize the dominated group via the non-reciprocity of the gaze (although Le Breton does not limit his discussion of the regard in concentration camps to how it affected 'Jews') There is perhaps a useful development here of Sartrian and Fanonian theorizing on the Hegelian 'dialectic' of the regard, since Le Breton grounds his theory in concrete situations rather than abstractions. The increased use of this regard colonial in France which denied Maghrebians any individuality, and which operated within the changing political context previously described, formed the fixation on the facies : the medical term from the Latin carried the idea of a supposed 'type' of which each individual Maghrebian was seen merely as the representative. Thus if we can agree with Guillaumin that "ceux qui sont "mis
à part" se trouvent dans une situation particulière: s'ils sont admis dans l'humanité abstraite, ils sont aussi ceux qui n'ont aucune individualité" (1972, 74), the social processes described here had, by the late 1950s, gone one step further, towards the dehumanizing of Maghrebians.

These processes can best be seen through several symbolic examples. Antiracist activists of the time quoted the Paris Préfet's astounding report after a demonstration on 28th May 1952: "(n)ous avons procédé à l'arrestation de 718 personnes se décomposant comme suit: 555 hommes, 28 femmes, 85 Nord-Africains, 35 étrangers et 13 individus arrêtés pour délits divers" (137). Neither 'men' nor 'women' - since this category here is reserved only for some French nationals -, Nord-Africains in this discourse occupy the uneasy space of 'non­foreigners' and 'non-nationals' (although Algerians, to whom this category implicitly refers, as we have seen, had theoretically enjoyed most of the rights of full French citizenship when in mainland France since 1947). The Algerians were, in practice, treated as subjects rather than citizens.

Maghrebians occupied another borderline zone - they could not be 'spotted', they defied phenotypical definition. A police report complained in 1948 that identification "est toujours difficile en ce qui concerne les Nord-Africains, car pour une personne non avertie, même pour un policier, tous se ressemblent" (138). When Maghrebians carried out street theft, "(l)es victimes ne peuvent jamais reconnaître leurs agresseurs", complained one newspaper report (139). Hence, I would argue, the acharnement of the police at nationalist demonstrations: since such events had an almost purely Algerian following (the absence of French sympathizers itself worthy of note), then repression would (in theory) seldom hit non-Algerians. The porteurs de valise (cf. Hamon and Rotman 1982), those French who actively involved themselves in the Independence struggle, were initially used precisely since they could pass through the regard policier unchecked, since 'white'. It is impossible to list here the literally dozens of cases of 'mistaken identity' police (or individuals) practised throughout the
period: South Americans, Antillais and African Americans were the regular victims of a police regard (or physical violence) intended for Algerians (140). The way in which the gaze had come to fall on Maghrebians in general was well illustrated by an anonymous article in Droit et Liberté in 1958 which argued that whilst it may have been easier for the forces of order to 'spot' an 'Algerian' in 1958 than a 'Jew' in 1943,

"(...) les erreurs sont toujours possibles: un de nos amis, instituteur, israélite, nous signalait l'autre jour qu'il avait été arrêté à la sortie du métro dans une rafle d'Algériens. La forme de son visage l'avait rendu "suspect": l'inspecteur sans doute s'était trompé de quelques années" (141).

One can see how the same individuals could unwittingly be caught in two historically distinct types of racism which, however, revealed themselves in the form of a similar practice. This experiential approach fostered within the MRAP an empathy for what Maghrebians were living through in France.

As Gérard Noiriel has remarked, the problem of 'identification' for State agencies, an expression of the "tyrannie du national" (Noiriel 1991), is one which has to be seen over the long term (cf. also Chapter Two): here were French nationals, essentialized as inherently 'different', hence subjected to inequality, being caught up in a process of mass-scale, blanket rafles. Such events help us affirm Balibar's statement that racism is an 'excess' of nationalism (1992, 81-82), not a dérapage, but a latent possibility inherent within its very project (here attempting to ensure the continuation of that project). The analogies to be drawn therefore between Vichy and the anti-Maghrebian racism in postwar France are practicable at an epistemological level, brought together by the French nation-state in crisis. Remembering the first quote in this Section (Manceron and Remaoun 1993, 161) on the routinized nature of anti-Algerian violence, supported by Einaudi's assessment that rather than being an "accident", the massacre of 17th October was "le produit de pratiques bien installées, d'une politique particulièrement répressive qui a trouvé son point culminant à ce moment-là" (142), it is necessary to follow the reactions to such events. The
aforementioned reaction to the 'rafles and faciès' approach as an analogy to Vichy was to become more precise as the 1950s progressed. It is the MRAP's reactions, along with those of other concerned groups, which will be analyzed here.

Section Two (c): Overtaken by “events”

The first MRAP protests to use the faciès theme date from the arrest of 1,127 Algerians on 17th September 1950, as they protested in central Paris against the refusal of the Société Nationale d'Édition Parisienne to sell the MTLD newspaper L'Algérie Libre. In their press release, the MRAP judged that

"(l)e racisme le plus ignoble présidait à ces opérations", and that "(c)es méthodes rappellent les arrestations "au faciès" que pratiquaient sous l'occupation les corps de policiers "spécialistes" constitués par les traîtres PUCHEU et Xavier-VALLAT pour rechercher les Juifs" (143).

Droit et Liberté published an article entitled "Quand "sale bicot" remplace "sale juif"", insisting on the practical nature of police discrimination : "(p)our avoir les cheveux crépus ou le teint basane des hommes ont été emmenés comme des criminels" (144). Posters were produced, one saying "Comme aux jours sombres de l'occupation / Rafles racistes en plein Paris / (...) c'est au "faciès" que les policiers reperaient leurs victimes". The poster concluded : "(i)mposons le respect de l'égalité des droits reconnu par la Constitution à tous les habitants de notre pays quelle que soit leur origine" (145). Another poster made even more explicit the analogy with Vichy and the persecution of Jews:

"(c)e déploiement spectaculaire de forces répressives, ces arrestations arbitraires, cet ignoble racisme s'inspirent directement des méthodes employées par l'occupant nazi et ses agents. Les cris de "sale bicot" qui ponctuaient les opérations policières évoquaient ceux de "sale juif" proférés par les policiers vichystes lorsqu'ils livraient à la Déportation, aux chambres à gaz les innocents par milliers" (146).

Several themes here can arguably be traced back to the MNCR's action during the Occupation - for example the will to inform the population of the dangers involved in the situation, and, by so doing, bring together a wide base of support
for the MRAP's campaigns. With the memory of the Occupation and Vichy so close, then talking of "(...) les rafles qui rappelaient les temps sinistres de Hitler et de Pétain" (147) sought to provoke the forms of solidarity of the Resistance.

The MRAP linked the police discrimination to the general position of Algerians in relation to the State: for Charles Palant, Algerians coming to France "retrouvent ici le racisme légal et administratif sous toutes ses formes et la misère la plus noire" (148), the MRAP declaring that "rafles "au faciès", matraquages, arrestations arbitraires, discrimination dans l'embauche, les salaires, les lois sociales et le logement, sont le lot brutal des travailleurs nord-africains vivant en France" (149). The demand for equal rights had the advantage of grouping together all the areas in which Algerians were facing discrimination, seeing the action of the State merely as one strand of a wider problem. In July 1955, the MRAP demanded, for all workers originally from the colonies,

"(...) que leur soient appliquées, ainsi qu'à tous les travailleurs d'outre-mer, les garanties constitutionnelles et qu'ils soient reconnus les égaux des autres travailleurs quant à l'embauche, aux salaires, au paiement des allocations familiales et devant la justice" (150).

There was no opposition from the MRAP to the State qua State: the demand is for the cessation of racist practices by the forces of order and an end to inequality in social provision (151), just as a demand is made to the State to repress the more explicit racism in the press. The MRAP did not depart from the position that the republican State could deliver the necessary constitutional safeguards on equal rights.

These first protests which, with the exception of the last MRAP quote, date from 1950 to 1952, do not seem to have met with much success in influencing policy, as the rafles continued (152). PCF local councillors in Paris, complaining to the Préfet that "(d)e telles façons d'agir (the rafles in the 18th arrondissement) sont de tendance à créer une différenciation dans les droits des Français et des Algériens, aux dépens de ces derniers", were told that the fact that a lot of Nord-Africains were being arrested "provient du fait qu'ils
fréquentent tout particulièrement le 18e arrondissement" : the police thus denied any discrimination was taking place (153). Stora estimates at 10,000 the number of Algerians "'contrôlés'' on 8th December 1951 (1992a, 103-104). The MTLD was to refer to the 8th December 1951 *rafle* as symbolic of anti-Algerian repression (154). By 1952, Algerian demonstrations ending in deaths had become commonplace, before the first widely publicized accounts of such practices appeared, following the previously described *14-juillet* march in 1953 (155).

After the July 1953 demonstration, the *Brigade des Agressions et violences* was set up, on the model of the former *Brigade nord-africaine* (cf. Chapter Four) : one writer in *Droit et Liberte* referred to this new *Brigade* as the "brigade du racisme" (156). This special police force was therefore in place before the start of the Algerian uprising on 1st November 1954. The MRAP continued to highlight discrimination : "(r)appelant... que dans certaines sphères de l'administration et de la police, l'on tolère ou l'on encourage les brimades racistes à l'égard des travailleurs et des étudiants d'Outre-Mer", the MRAP reminded the government that "la liberté est indivisible" (157). By 1955, there were responses from both the LDH and the LICA, hitherto reticent to commit themselves (158). But on the eve of the voting of the special powers in 1956, the limited number of groups on which Algerians in France could rely helps to explain the marginalization of opposition to anti-Maghrebian racism from 1955-56 onwards.

The lack of attention given to the Algerian question prior to 1955 amongst mainstream political parties and public opinion has been widely documented (cf. Ageron 1990, Droz and Lever 1982, Joly 1991). Most sympathy for Algerians tended to come from those sections of society with whom Algerians were in regular contact at grass-roots level, such as the solidarity networks on the far-left (cf. Hamon and Rotman 1979, 60), anarchists (cf. Mohamed 1995), and longstanding anticolonialists. The left referred to Maghrebians as *travailleurs nord-africains*, thus ascribing them as having a 'unidimensional', functional rôle within the French economy. The USTA (*Union syndicale des travailleurs algériens, pro-Mouvement national algérien (MNA)*)
complained that the CGT's discourse was for equal rights, but that it didn't put them into practice (USTA 1957, 24). French union assertions that "la discrimination raciale est l'ennemi commun de tous les travailleurs" (159) often sounded as empty rhetoric for many Algerians. For the anarchist Sail Mohamed, "(m)alheureusement (for Algerian workers), au contact de leurs frères de misère de la métropole, qu'ils distinguent nettement des tueurs d'outre-mer, ils se heurtent souvent à l'incompréhension et au dédain (...) sans toutes fois généraliser" (1995, 27).

There was a battle for membership between the PCF (via the CGT) and the nationalist mouvement (cf. Pitti 1995). For Ghazi, "(n)ous aimons bien à croire que le cégétiste français, par surcroît inscrit fervent du parti travailliste, n'a aucune réaction raciste contre le prolétaire nord-africain, mais les faits sont loin de confirmer cette opinion" (1952, 226). As one union leader was to put it in 1959 : "ce serait pour nous une profonde erreur de croire que la propagande raciste et antisémite est sans influence sur la classe ouvrière" (160) (cf. also Stora 1992, 22). Inter-union action against discrimination was further hindered by the polarization brought about by the Cold War, and the fact that the CGT was hostile in the 1950s to the recourse to immigrant labour (Wihtol de Wenden 1988, 101). The French left in general was confused by the struggle between the MNA and the Front de libération nationale (FLN) (Ageron 1990, 62). As for the MRAP, its pluralism cut across the typologies offered for understanding the political situation at the time : the MRAP contained elements of all three of Vidal-Naquet's opponents to the war - "Dreyfusards", "Bolchéviks" and "tiersmondistes" (1986, 14), just as it cut across Bonnaud's divisions of "gauche anticolonialiste respectueuse" (PCF, CGT, part of the far left) and the "gauche anticolonialiste irrespectueuse" (willing to break the law, disclose information, desert etc.) (161).

As the repression intensified, the MRAP, by informing the left of what was happening, particularly in Paris, became one of the few critical voices to escape censorship. The MRAP's Armand Bittoun detailed (...)
"ces arrestations collectives illégales sans qu'il y ait à l'origine le moindre délit à la charge de l'homme qu'on arrête brutalement, dans la rue, ou au café, qu'on matraque, qu'on jette dans une voiture de police, simplement sur son signalement : teint basané et cheveux crépus" (162).

With such "rafles monstres" (163) continuing, the scale of the problem was such that the MRAP was arguably reduced to the rôle of témoignage, giving details after the largest rafles of what it called "la répression généralisée" (164). For many in the MRAP, the recreation of a situation similar in many respects to Vichy - not only by the extent of racism, but also by the powers the State had gained (internment, censorship) - must have been sinister. On August 28th 1958, the Vélodrome d'Hiver was requisitioned for use after the rafles, thus providing a symbolic link with the Vichy use of the site (Einaudi 1991, 52-53).

At the start of September 1958, the first curfew was imposed on Algerians in the Paris region (Tristan 1991, 32). As Einaudi states: "(p)eu de voix s'élèvent contre cette décision" (1991, 53). The MRAP did, from October 1958, have the advantage of Article Two of the 1958 Constitution ("la France assure l'égalité devant la loi de tous les citoyens sans distinction de race ou de religion") with which to press its claims. From August 1958, with the FLN decision to "porter la guerre en France", then what little sympathy there was for Algerians from the "gauche respectueuse" diminished further but it should be pointed out that the undoubted police hostility to Algerians due to the FLN's attacks (cf. Einaudi 1991) was merely one supplementary explanatory factor in further violence against Algerians. Most of the context which explains October 17th 1961 was in place much earlier, as this Section has tried to show. One senior member of the MRAP was to resume in November 1960:

"(p)ar plus d'un aspect la condition des Algériens en France rappelle celles des Juifs sous l'occupation. Aucun signe distinctif n'existe à l'exemple de l'étoile jaune, il n'en est pas besoin, les rafles le prouvent. Mais pour le reste...il existe en fait pour les Algériens un couvre-feu, ils relèvent d'une police spéciale (harkis) ils ne sont assurés ni de la permanence de leur domicile, ni de leur domicile ni de leur travail (interdiction de séjour, internement)" (165).
Einaudi (1991) and Levine (1985) have studied in more detail the events leading up directly to 17th October 1961. The curfew, against which the demonstrators were protesting that day, and which applied only to the *Français musulmans algériens*, had stated that it was "vivement recommandé" that they observe the curfew, hence keeping a pretence of legality (cf. Einaudi 1991, 299-301 *passim*). The MRAP denounced a case of "discrimination raciale officiellement instituée" (166). As with the marchers of 14th July 1953, there were banners protesting against racism on October 17th 1961 (167). I deal with the significance of reactions to the events of that day in Chapter Six. What I have suggested in this Section is that there was little attention paid to the problems faced by Maghrebians in France socially, politically and administratively in the postwar period, that the State practiced segregative measures against them, and that the war situation further weakened what little support Maghrebians had previously enjoyed.

**General conclusion to Chapter Five**

If the MRAP had insufficient political weight to influence State policy, several of the themes directly linked to the MRAP's campaign on *faciès* and the analogy with Vichy were nonetheless used to protest against the massacre of October 17th 1961, hence showing the association's audience amongst sections of the concerned left. *Les Temps modernes* (LTM) published a petition signed by 229 intellectuals, which stated that

"(...) (l)es fureurs racistes dont Paris est désormais le théâtre (...) nous ramènent aux jours les plus noirs de l'occupation nazie : entre les Algériens entassés au Palais des sports en attendant d'être "refoulés" et les Juifs parqués à Drancy avant la déportation, nous nous refusons de faire la différence" (168).

LTM said that until then, the term "pogrom" had been untranslatable into French, but "(p)ar la grâce du Préfet Papon, sous la cinquième République, cette lacune est comblée : née à Alger, la "ratonnade" s'installe à Paris" (169). For Bernard Lecache, the events of October 1961 belonged to the "(d)octrine du pogrome,
doctrine des fours crématoires, doctrine du génocide" (170). The MRAP saw the massacre as "la forme actuelle du pogrome" (171).

Not all agreed with such parallels. Denouncing what James Young more recently has called the "dangers of archetypal thinking", when one event is figured in the light of another/others (1988, 95), the editorial board of *Esprit* judged it

"inutile (...) de pratiquer des assimilations historiques. La situation des Algériens n'est pas celle des Juifs, jadis désignés par leur religion ou leur nom et arrachés de force à des communautés paisibles : depuis des années, le peuple algérien combat pour faire reconnaître son existence" (172).

*Esprit* chose instead to underline the extent the war situation had played on 17th October. An editorial statement in LTM's November 1961 edition shows the reductive historical vision at work:

"(l)es Juifs parqués au Vel' d'Hiv sous l'occupation étaient traités avec moins de sauvagerie par la police allemande que ne le furent, au Palais des sports, par la police gaulliste, les travailleurs algériens" (173).

LTM's critique of police brutality here totally forgot the Nazi annihilation of the Jews (and, here, the part played by the French State employees in that annihilation).

The comparison made between anti-Maghrebian racism and antisemitism revealed the recognition of a plurality of racisms, a recognition within the left due in part to the MRAP's influence. Yet the absence of a tradition of republican antiracist campaigning against colonial racism meant that the only historical model to which the MRAP had to refer was the Holocaust, and Vichy's rôle therein. This was part of the MRAP's general tendency to ground protests in previous models of action and hence attempt to establish a consensus (cf. Lloyd 1996). The MRAP, in focussing on the legacy of Vichy, was therefore stressing the complicity of the State and its "racisme légal" (174). Having been formed in the aftermath of the Holocaust, the MRAP's references to other recent events
(such as the Front Populaire) were limited (notwithstanding the MRAP's references to Grégoire and Zola, more distant historical influences).

The experience of the former MNCR activists, who had previously pointed out the complicity of the agents of the State in the rounding up of 'Jews' under Vichy (cf. Rayski 1950), meant that, for the MRAP, the abuses of power inherent within the modern State were well known. The problem was how to communicate this tendency to a wider audience, when the relays of the broader left steadfastly refused to adopt such a position, since ultimately, intimately bound up with a colonial history in a period of crisis: when changes of position did occur from the Union nationale des étudiants de France (UNEF) (cf. Monchablon 1983) and the LDH, or by the time new, more sympathetic political parties did form (eg. Parti Socialiste Unifié (PSU)), the exclusionary practices described here were already well established, and difficult to dislodge.

Faced with an evolving form of anti-Maghrebian racism, exacerbated due to the War, the MRAP's repertoire of action was limited to the themes of anti-antisemitism because there was no established republican antiracist campaigning against colonial racism which could evoke previous antiracist practices in this domain, rather than discourse (cf. Chapter Four). There is a possible critique to be made of the MRAP's action in this domain. As Taguieff has suggested for the opposition to the FN since the early 1980s, there has been a tendency to see the FN merely as a "phénomène resurgent", and hence use the traditional antifascist rhetoric to combat the racism articulated by the party. For Taguieff, such an analysis is only half the story, since the FN should also be analyzed as a "phénomène émergent", notably concerning the evolution in forms of nationalism and the situation of postcolonial immigration (1996, 53). If we attempt to apply such an analysis to the 1950s, then the MRAP tended to elide and subsume anti-Maghrebian racism within the general critique of the State practices which were presented as essentially unchanged since Vichy, Maghrebians rather than 'Jews' being the new subjects of this objectification, the new objects of this
subjectification. But the logic behind the State's actions against Jews in 1940-43 and against Maghrebians in the period from 1945 onwards was fundamentally different, as my opening remarks to this Conclusion attempted to suggest, just as the State repression of Maghrebians was in part an opposition to their decolonizing movements of desubjectification. It is unclear whether the MRAP seized the rapidly changing socio-political context within which the newly dominant anti-Maghrebian racism was being framed, due to the association's preoccupations with previous forms of racism (here antisemitism).

Notwithstanding these criticisms, the MRAP developed (for the period) an innovative approach to the epistemology of racism (its “indivisibilité” and “unicité”), linking in its analysis the various levels and areas of production of racism. The older, better-established antifascist model of action, which was ultimately to bring the left together from October 1961 (cf. Chapter Six and Gaiti 1994), was perhaps of limited value in analyzing colonial and postcolonial forms of racism - as the 'inequality in memory' between October 1961 and the killing of nine communist demonstrators at the Charonne metro-station in February 1962 arguably shows. The MRAP, whilst continuing to fight antisemitism, saw from the mid-1950s onwards the change in the dominant forms of colonial and then postcolonial racism, whilst lacking the 'argumentative repertoire' to respond to this development. What seems missing within antiracism from this period is any sustained reflection on the relationship between the nation-state and antiracism, and the inability of civil society to check the powers of the national republican State. This is a question of great contemporary importance, since antiracist action today is still concerned with racism within State agencies and the logic of facties. The MRAP's insistence on educational action from the early 1960s onwards would appear vindicated in the light of the limits of mobilization it faced over the period from its creation in 1949 to 1962. The MRAP in the period studied here is a good example of republican antiracism opening out to new ways of defining racism.
In a period of crisis of the nation-state, the ability of antiracism to make its voice heard was severely limited, as ‘events’ such as 17th October 1961 were to show. The interpretations of the significance of 17th October 1961 amongst various social groups have changed over time. Chapter Six seeks to continue the investigation of antiracism and its struggles for the definition of the political situation.
Notes to Chapter Five

(1) Interview with Albert Lévy, Paris 18th September 1995.

(2) DL No.3, mars 1944, p.1. The MRAP was to take over the title of the newspaper from 15th September 1949. On the UJRE, itself an amalgamation of several Jewish organizations, see Amiel (1969, 310).

(3) Cf. also the MNCR's 1943 publication *Le mensonge raciste* (MNCR 1943). *J'accuse* was published October 1942 to August 1944, *Fraternité* from October 1944, (becoming the *Alliance Antiraciste's* newspaper in June 1946), and *Lumières* from Spring to Summer 1944. Mention should also be made of *Notre Parole* (*Organe de la section juive de la MOI, zone Nord - juin 1941-mars 1943*) and *Notre Voix* (*idem, zone Sud, été 1942-juillet 1944, 76 No s*).

(4) Cf. also *Fraternité*, No.31, novembre 1944, p.3 and Claude Chaillet, "L'Antiracisme, Principe Constitutionnel", *Fraternité*. No 63, 14 novembre 1945, pp.3-4, p.4.

(5) On this, see AFNSP FM 113.

(6) For an example of the pro-unity position, cf. Roger Baron, "L'unite antiraciste", DL No.5 07 mars 1945, p.1.


(8) "Fusion", *Fraternité*, No.39, 27 janvier 1945, p.1

(9) Charles Feld "La Naissance de l'Alliance Antiraciste", DL No 96, 30 mai 1946, p.1.

(10) "Charte de l'Alliance Antiraciste", DL No.94, 20 juin 1946 p.3. The Charter describes racism as "antihumain", "un mensonge", "reactionnaire", "une hypocrisie", "un principe de haine", and "un crime". The Charter "affirme que la race n'est pas un facteur déterminant décisif de l'individu (...)."


(12) Cf. DVNS No.84, juillet 1947, p.3.

(13) DL NS No.19, 01 janvier 1949, p.4.

(15) For the LICA, the MRAP's creation is "(u)ne entreprise de dissidence", with "l'esprit fâcheusement influence par les contingences partisanes" (DVNS No.201, 01 avril 1949, p.4). The MRAP is later denounced as an "organisation para-communiste, qui veut concurrencer la LICA " (DVNS No.24, 30 décembre 1954, p.2). The criticism of the LICA by the MRAP in the period to 1964 centres on its political moderation (Charles Palant "S'unir et vaincre" DL No.60(264), 20 décembre 1956 p.3 - in the context of anti-Poujadism) and alleged anti-arab sentiment (DL No.87(291) janvier 1960, p.8).


(17) Interview with Albert Lévy, Paris 18th September 1995. Lévy was not one of the MRAP's founders, but as a journalist with Droit et Liberte was well placed to view early developments and then held the position of the MRAP's secrétaire général from 1973 to 1986.


(19) Interview with Albert Lévy, Paris 18th September 1995

(20) Interview with Albert Lévy, Paris 18th September 1995.

(21) Bauman sees the concept of heterophobia as too "diffuse" a form of hostility, whereas racism's defining characteristic is the permanence it confers on its victims (1991a, 64).

(22) "Grandeur de ce combat", DL No.29, 01 juin 1949, p.1. There is no rejection of the category 'race' at this point in the MRAP's discourse.


(24) AMRAP 1 A, "Message du MRAP au meeting de solidarite aux 14 Algériens juges à Lyon", 26 septembre 1951.

(25) "Le racisme est indivisible", DL No.89(193), 28 septembre 1951, p.3.


(27) "Si je n'étais pas solidaire des travailleurs algériens je me mepriserais", DL No.61(165), 02-08 février 1951, pp.1+6, p.1.

(28) DL No.164 (268), mai 1957, p.5.

(29) AMRAP 9, Un mémorandum du MRAP sur le drame algérien, juin 1961, p.3.


(33) Interview with Albert Lévy, Paris, 18th September 1995. The MRAP was not alone in giving wide coverage to UNESCO-sponsored publications. *Le Droit de vivre* (LICA) described the 1950 UNESCO declaration on 'race' as "la plus importante déclaration qui ait jamais été faite sur le sujet si controversé du problème racial" (DVNS No.209, 15 octobre-15 novembre 1950, pp.2-3).

(34) AMRAP 15, Article 2 of statement of aims in 1960.


(36) AMRAP 9, speech by Albert Lévy to 17th *Journée Nationale*, 20th June 1966. From the mid-1970s onwards there would be a reaction against organizations such as the MRAP who were viewed by some immigrant groups as failing to carry out this policy of empowerment (cf. Polac 1991, 1994, Wihtol de Wenden 1988, and *infra*, Chapter Six).


(38) MRAP President Lyon-Caen, 12 mars 1958, in DL No.71 (275), p.5.


(40) DL No.159(263), 08 novembre 1956, p.7.

(41) Published in *Le Temps*, 04 octobre 1935.


(43) Poujade's opponents identified his populist antisemitism as an essential part of his doctrine. For the PCF, his policies contained "tous les relents hitlériens de l'antiparlementarisme, de l'antisémitisme, du racisme" (Grenier 1956, 16). Cf. also AMRAP 4, Rioux (1994), Birnbaum (1993), and Chebel d'Appollonia (1988, 291-298 *passim*).

(44) The MRAP (cf. AMRAP 6E), supported by Alioune Diop, editor of *Présence Africaine*, lodged a complaint about the following article from the neo-fascist *Jeune Nation*, which said that the Polish and Italian immigration prior to 1939 had been able to "assimilate", "(m)ais nous ne croyons pas possible
l'assimilation des millions d'Arabes oisifs, envahissants (sic), tels la lepere, les quartiers de Paris pour les transformer en "medinas", des bandes de negres arpentant le Bd. St. Michel ou les quais du port de Marseille, des milliers de Juifs, dont la premiere precaution fut de s'assurer la double, voire la triple nationalite" ("Nous ignorons la haine", No.19, 2e annee, août 1959, p.12). On Jeune Nation and the context of the early Fifth Republic, see Rioux (1994).

(45) Taguieff does point out the change from the "nationalisme integral" of Maurras and Barrès to the European-wide nationalism which thinkers such as Bardèche espoused (Taguieff 1993a, 7).

(46) Jacques Rivelaygue and J.-P. Osier, "Racisme, antisemitisme et xenophobie en France", Apres-Demain, No.6, juin 1958, pp.5-6, p.6. The authors' comments are based on an analysis of "L'égalité des hommes et la hiérarchie des cultures", Fraternité française, 03 mai 1958.

(47) "Vous dites?", DL No 190(294), avril 1960, p.3.

(48) AMRAP 1A, text from press conference held 19th May 1964 Contre la nouvelle vague de racisme anti-algerien : les problemes des travailleurs emigres et la solidarite des democrates francais, pp.1, 12, 1

(49) AMRAP 12, "Les themes actuels de la propagande raciste et anti-sèmite", speech to Journee Nationale, 24th May 1964, 9p., pp.8,4,1

(50) Cf. AMRAP 9, circular paper to the Conseil National of 20th January 1963, 5p, p.3. Cf. also Chapter Three.

(51) On the relationship between myth and politics, see Barthes (1957) and Girardet (1986) for two diverging approaches.

(52) AMRAP 5, appeal dated 12th June 1955. Cf. also Note 43.

(53) Fraternité, No.101, 08 août 1946, pp.1+4

(54) DVNS No.195, septembre 1948, p.3.

(55) This was indicative of the LICA's continuing focus on antisemitism rather than other forms of racism.

(56) DVNS No.284, 01 juillet 1959. On Notting Hill at this time, see Gilroy (1987, 81-84 passim).

(57) For critical studies which examine the construction of this discourse as it is today, see Silverman (1992), Lapeyronnie (1993), Wacquant (1992).
(58) Cf. on this AMRAP 10F, and DL No.184(288), octobre 1959, p.3. There are few academic studies on blacks or anti-black racism in France at this time (cf. N'diaye 1970, 11-12). Dadié's *Un Nègre a Paris* (1959) probably says more than any empirical study could. A State-sponsored survey in 1963 found that "(l)a majorité des interviewés éprouvent un sentiment de supériorité manifeste ou latent à l'égard des noirs" (COFREMCA/Ministère de la Cooperation 1963, 2).

(59) "Un véritable humanisme", DL No.181(285), 05 mai 1959, p.7. On the 1956 Congress see DL No.158(262), 20 septembre 1956, p.5. See also Diop's "Quand les écrivains noirs de tous les pays se réunissent", DVNS No.258, 01 octobre 1956, pp.1+3, and Parafs article "Présence noire en Sorbonne", *ibid.*, p.3.

(60) On the MRAP's attempts to introduce further legislation against racism (1959-1972) see AMRAP 7, 8, 11, and MRAP (1984).

(61) The MRAP later complained of the "indéniable mauvaise volonté du gouvernement" in this matter (AMRAP 9, preparatory report for *Conseil National*, 15 décembre 1963, 9p, p.3).


(63) AMRAP 7E, letter to Charles Palant, 01 décembre 1966. Arpaillange was at that time advisor to the *garde des Sceaux*.

(64) Roger Frey to MRAP, 16th April 1965, reproduced in MRAP (1965, 48).

(65) AMRAP 9, "Résolutions adoptées à la XVIe *Journée Nationale*", 16th May 1965, 4p, p.2.


(67) Just how representative Lecache is of the LICA after 1945 is uncertain whilst remaining LICA President, he often criticizes the association's inability to adapt to changing political developments.

(68) Cf. the hostility to the Marchandeau decree in the racist press (Chapter Three, Section Three).

(69) On the limits to this openness, see Chapter Three.

(70) Speech to Congrès fédéral de la Seine, 24th January 1948, DVNS No.188, février 1948, p.2.


(72) "Rapport politique" to 13th LICA Congrès National, 11-12 février 1950, p.3.
(73) "Rapport sur la doctrine" to 17th Congrès National, in DVNS No.241, 30 décembre 1954.


(75) It is, however, debatable as to whether the LICA was "contre la guerre d'Algerie", as Benassaya claims (1996, 111).

(76) See DVNS No.286, 15 novembre 1959, p.5.

(77) "Le musulman d'Algerie et son droit de citoyen", C'ahiers antiracistes, Tome 1, No.5, mars 1944, p.288.

(78) "Quant à l'Algérie (...) elle fait partie intégrante de la patrie", DVNS No.241, 30 décembre 1954, supplément.

(79) "Juguler le racisme en Algérie", DVNS No.242, 31 janvier 1955, pp.1+4, p.4.

(80) Speech to Congrès National, 11-12 mai 1957, reproduced in DVNS N°266, 01 juin 1957, p.5.

(81) DVNS No.277, 01 octobre 1958, p.4.

(82) Bernard Lecache, DVNS No.240, 30 novembre 1954, pp.1+4

(83) "Réponse à "Esprit" et à "Temps modernes", DVNS No.290, 30 avril 1960.

(84) Cf. however Pierre-Bloch's "Nos amis nord-africains", DVNS No.248, 01 octobre 1955, p.2.


(86) Other important MRAP campaigns in the period 1949-62 were the Rosenberg trial and execution, the rearmament of Germany, and action against Poujade.

(87) The main organization was the Centre d'Action et de Défense des Immigrés, close to the PCF (see Wihtol de Wenden 1988, 102-103).


(91) "Le "Nord-Africain" est une expression dont le sens beaucoup trop large doit être dés maintenant limité à la catégorie d'individus qui nous intéressent particulièrement, c'est-à-dire l'essentiel des immigrants. Tunisiens et Marocains doivent être éliminés d'abord: ils sont très peu nombreux" (AN F1a 5061, "Le problème Nord-Africain", 22 novembre 1951, *op. cit.* note 90, p.2).

(92) For example, AN F1a 5061, "Le problème nord-africain", 22 novembre 1951, which states that "le travailleur nord-africain n'est atteint d'aucune infériorité intellectuelle, mais la différence vient seulement de son Education" (p.10).


(94) AN F1a 5061, 30 septembre 1948, *Directeur de la Sûreté Générale to Directeur des Affaires Générales Sous-Direction de l'Algérie*.

(95) AN F1a 5061, 7 septembre 1948.

(96) AN F1a 5061, 27 février 1948.

(97) AN F1a 5061, 10 mai 1947.

(98) AN F1a 5061, 7 septembre 1948. Emphasis added.

(99) The preambule to the 1946 Constitution reads : "(a)u lendemain de la victoire remportée par les peuples libres sur les régimes qui ont tenté d’asservir et de dégrader la personne humaine, le peuple français proclame à nouveau que tout être humain, sans distinction de race, de religion, ni de croyance, possède des droits inaliénables et sacrés". It also states that : "(l)à France forme avec les peuples d'outre-mer une Union fondée sur l'égalité des droits et des devoirs, sans distinction de race ni de religion". On this and the 1958 Constitution, cf. Borella (1992). The 1958 Constitution, states in Article Two, Paragraph One that "(e)lle (France) assure l'égalité devant la loi de tous les citoyens sans distinction d'origine, de race ou de religion".

(100) AN F1a 5061, letter to *Direction des Affaires Générales Sous-Direction de l'Algérie*, 10 mai 1947.
(101) "Le public et la presse parisienne n'ont pas manqué de s’émouvoir de cette situation" (the crime rate) (AN Fla 5061, Seine Préfet to Interior Minister, 7 septembre 1948) : "(l)a presse, sous des titres à sensation a mis en relief les aspects inquiétants de cette situation, et l’opinion publique prompte à exagérer s’en est émue" (AN Fla 5061, Directeur de la Police Judiciaire to Préfet, 22 novembre 1951).

(102) It is unclear what justified in law the keeping of such statistics : Algerians, as French citizens, were, in effect, being separated off as Nord-Africains, as the quote in note 91 shows. The authorities were well aware of the thin line being trodden, and discussed how to respond to probing parliamentary questions on this - cf. AN Fla 5054.


(104) Venereal diseases were judged "l’un des fléaux des populations Nord-Africaines" (AN Fla 5061, Rapport sur la criminalité nord-africaine dans le Département de la Seine, 20 février 1948, pp. 2).

(105) AN Fla 5061, Le problème nord-africain, 22 novembre 1951, 15p, p.9.

(106) Le problème nord-africain, pp.10,3,10.

(107) AN Fla 5061, Rapport sur la criminalité nord-africaine...., p.5.

(108) AN Fla 5061, Direction de la Réglementation et des étrangers to Directeur de la Sécurité Nationale, 16 septembre 1948.

(109) AN Fla 5061, letter from Préfet to Interior Minister. The letter argues that between 60-80,000 Algerians in Paris and its suburbs "ne peuvent justifier d’aucun moyen d’existence avouable".

(110) AN Fla 5061, letter from Directeur Générale de la Police Municipale to Directeur du Cabinet du Préfet, 3 décembre 1951.


(112) Pierre Noailles, "Il faut remettre en activité la brigade nord-africaine", Ce matin (Le Pays), 18 août 1948. It is impossible here to give all references to articles seeking to highlight the supposed criminal activities of Maghrebians : cf. however L’Aurore, 23 08 1949 "Chronique de la pègre nord-africaine", and 26 09 1949 "Huit agressions nocturnes dont quatre commises par des Nord-Africains" : France Soir, 20 09 1949 "La police est désarmée en face de la criminalité nord-africaine à Paris".

(113) AN Fla 5061, Directeur Général de la Police Municipale to Préfet's office, 3 décembre 1951.
(114) AN Fl a 5061, Directeur Général de la Sûreté Générale to Directeur des Affaires Générales Sous-Direcition de l'Algérie, 10 mai 1947.

(115) AN Fl a 5061, Préfet (Seine) to Interior Minister, 24 juin 1947.

(116) The Brigade Nord-Africaine had been disbanded in December 1945.

(117) AN Fl a 5061, Rapport sur la criminalité nord-africaine dans le Département de la Seine, 20 février 1948, p.20.

(118) AN Fl a 5061, Directeur Général de la Sûreté Générale to Directeur des Affaires Générales, Sous-Direcition de l'Algérie, 10 mai 1947.

(119) 26 septembre 1949.

(120) See Libération, 17, 18, 19 octobre 1949.

(121) DL No 2(106), 06-11 novembre 1949.


(123) AMR A P 1A, 2nd September 1952. See also "Mais Ahmed est innocent", DL No.115 (219), octobre 1952, pp.1+3.

(124) DL No.116 (220), novembre 1952, p.4.

(125) See DL No.177(281), décembre 1958, which denounces Le Figaro's style of reporting, and AMRAP 1B on articles in Minute in 1964.

(126) Alger Républicain, 15 novembre 1949, AN Fl a 5061, note dated 7 juin 1950.


(128) See also Laffont (1954), who derides the stereotyping only to conclude that immigration should be stopped (cf. on this Stora 1992, 21-22).


(130) DL N°126 (230), septembre 1953, p.3.
(131) JODP 17 juillet 1953, Assemblée Nationale, séance du 16 juillet 1953, p.3505. The debate (pp.3504-3515) saw the police being accused of racism by Emmanuel d’Astier de la Vigerie (pp.3506, 3514). André Liautey demanded legislation to withdraw French citizenship for all those who had acquired it since 1943 (p.3510).


(134) This is not to adopt the justificatory, pro-modernizing position that was often used to defend the mission in Algeria - the number of roads/hospitals built etc..

(135) On aliens and strangers see Bauman (1993, Chapter Six, 145-185 passim).


(137) DL No.127(231), octobre 1953, p.5. The statistics don’t add up.

(138) AN Fla 5061, Rapport sur la criminalité nord-africaine dans le Département de la Seine, 20 février 1948, p.20.

(139) France-Soir, 20 septembre 1949.

(140) "On commence à savoir, en France, ce qu’il en coûte d’avoir le faciès nord-africain, même lorsqu’il se trouve qu’on n’est pas réellement algérien (Jeanson 1962, 56) : "(u)n des grands chocs ressentis par les Antillais en France aura été de se voir confondus dans les rues des villes avec les Algériens au temps de la guerre d’Algérie. La police française ne faisait souvent pas le détail" (Glissant 1981, 74-75). Cf. also Smith (1963/1975).

(141) "Au faciès", DL No.169(273), janvier 1958, p.2.


(143) AMRAP 1A, resolution dated 19th September 1950.

(144) DL No. 42(146), 22-28 septembre 1950, p.3.

(145) DL No.42(146), 22-28 septembre 1950, p.3.
(146) AMRAP 1A.

(147) "En plein Paris - rafles de nord-africains "au faciés"", DL No.70(174), 06-12 avril 1951, pp.1+3, p.1.

(148) Charles Palant, "Le racisme est indivisible" DL No 89 (193), 28 septembre 1951, p.3.

(149) DL No.112 (216), juin 1952, manifesto from Journée Nationale of 18th May 1952.

(150) Declaration from Journée Nationale of 12th June 1955, DL No.147 (251), juillet 1955, pp.4-5.

(151) Family benefit was paid at a lower rate to those families of Algerian workers in France which remained in Algeria - cf. AMRAP 5, Armand Bittoun "La condition des Nord-Africains en France", to MRAP Journée Nationale, 12th June 1955, 12p, p.7. This discrimination was also denounced regularly by the MTLD (cf. L'Algérie libre, No.7, 15 janvier 1950, pp.1+4). The other main discrimination was in Social Security provision : "le travailleur emigre lui-même ne conserve le droit à ses prestations que dans la mesure ou il reste en France" (Moscat and Peju 1952, 490-491).

(152) 1,743 Algerians were arrested on 1st May 1951, according to the police (AN Fla 5061, report dated 3 december 1951).

(153) Bulletin Municipal Officiel, 23 novembre 1951. The date on the Préfet's reply (AN Fal 5061) is unreadable.

(154) A photo of the rafle is reproduced in a MTLD publication (MTLD 1953, 140).


(156) DL No.127(231), octobre 1953, p.3 (anonymous).


(158) Cf. however Paraf's condemnation of the 14th July 1953 shootings, where "on a pu déplorer une large part de racisme" ("Ce qui rôdait autour du 14 juillet", DVNS No.227, 20 juillet 1953, pp.1+4, p.1). See La Ligue-Infomations, No.25, 07 octobre 1955, p.2 for the LDH, and "Un grave danger", DVNS No.247, juillet 1955, p.4 for the LICA.

(159) Daniel Bongars, representative of the Union des Syndicats de la Région Parisienne, DL No 95 (199), 16 novembre 1951, p.1.
(160) Jean Eloi, Secrétaire Général de la Fédération des Travailleurs du Bâtiment-CGT (MRAP 1959, 45).

(161) Bonnaud ("Barbares, barbarie, barbaresques", La Quinzaine littéraire, 01-15 décembre 1989) quoted in Stora (1992, 63). Bonnaud has a third category of "gauche coloniale", into which the LICA arguably fell.


(163) "Racisme et antisémitisme en Lorraine", DL No.150(254), 20 novembre 1955, p.3.

(164) "Positions et témoignages". DL No.168(272), décembre 1957.

(165) A. Dymnstajn "La condition des Algériens en France". DL No.194(298), novembre 1960, p.6.


(167) A banner on a (rare) photograph reads "Halte au racisme" in Rouge, No.893, 16-22 novembre 1979, p.17.


(171) AMRAP 9, Albert Lévy to Conseil National, 14th January 1962, p.1.


(173) "La "Bataille de Paris"". LTM No.186, novembre, pp.618-620, p 618.

(174) AMRAP 9, Albert Lévy to Conseil National, 14th January 1962, p.5.
Chapter Six: Memory as a theme in antiracist discourse since 1945

General introduction

Section One: Theorizing memories today

Section Two: The changing contours of memory: the case of October 17th 1961

Section Two (a): Introduction to Section Two

Section Two (b): Immediate reactions to 17th October 1961

Section Two (c): Memories in transition and opposition, 1962-1979

Section Two (d): "Non au racisme, non à l'oubli. Pour le droit à la mémoire"

Section Two (e): Towards some conclusions

Notes
"Car le passé, lui, ne se défend pas tout seul comme se défendent le présent et l'avenir" (Jankélévitch 1971/1986, 60).

**General introduction**

Previous chapters have sought to examine the relationship between antiracist discourse and practice, closely associated with narratives of history. In this final Chapter, the aim is to bring together several of the principal themes and hypotheses of the thesis, based upon a discussion of the use of memory in campaigns against racism. The notion of memory, and the oft-cited *devoir de mémoire*, have become common references in contemporary France, endowed with sufficient plasticity to be moulded to almost any argument, any campaign. As Todorov has sceptically observed, "l'exigence de recouvrer la memoire ne nous dit pas encore quel sera l'usage qu'on en fera" (1993, 35). The sociologist Jean Duvignaud remarked (1968, xii) that memory is called upon in times of crises since it allows us to be situated, offering apparent stability. However, this instrumental rôle of memory has been and still is a site of struggle, of dissonance : the call to a consensual memory, exemplified by the State's commemorative ceremonies, can serve to mask the memory of various social groups, some of them racialized. Counter-memories develop in relation to the dominant memory, where dominant memory is defined by Rousso as "un sentiment collectif diffus ou prévaut une certaine interprétation du passé et qui peut avoir valeur de mémoire officielle" (1990, 12). This Chapter sets out to highlight how, over the past thirty years, the hegemonic position of this dominant memory has come under increasing pressure to develop a more inclusive, rather than exclusive notion of memory.

After a preliminary theoretical discussion in Section One on memory and the typology of its transmission, based around the work of Maurice Halbwachs, in Section Two a specific case of memory reactivation will be studied, concerning the killings of Algerians by the French security forces on and immediately after
17th October 1961. Both Sections One and Two, in different ways, pose complex questions of the 'national history' of France (cf. Citron 1991), and engage with the notion of a national republican discourse, as outlined in Chapter Two. The marginalizations of antiracist counter-memories serve to highlight not only the marginal place occupied by antiracism within French society at large, but in particular the marginalizations within antiracism of certain themes which sit uneasily within the *tradition républicaine* in its metahistoric, seemingly 'eternal' celebration of 'la douce France'. The study of memory within antiracism also provides a window onto the types of intervention, and the repertoires of action available to antiracist activists at given historical conjunctures, and reaffirms the need, highlighted throughout the thesis, to consider antiracism as a wide body of thought and action differentiated across various levels and areas of production of social discourse and the temporalities within which they are in turn inscribed. The differences and articulation between antiracism and antifascism, generally accorded little theoretical importance in antiracist publications, can at last be analyzed more clearly due to the memory of 17th Ocober 1961, which was to be subsumed within the antifascist memory of Charonne (8th February 1962): confusion between these two events still reigns amongst many on the left to this day (cf. Einaudi 1991 and note 68). Antiracism's rôle as more than just a 'double' (Taguieff 1990) of racism can be seen through the educative purpose of the use of history within antiracism. This practice is now an essential part of the associational activity which employs the memory of racist crimes to construct a more equal future based on a colonial past with which all sides should come to terms (cf. *infra*, Section Two (d)/(e)).

Questions of the transition from the colonial to the postcolonial are as central to the discussion in Section Two as they were in Chapter Five: following Fentress and Wickham's observation that "the way memories of the past are generated and understood by given social groups is a direct guide to how they understand their position in the present" (1992, 126), this link from the colonial to the postcolonial is a theme which has run through young peoples' opposition
to racism since the 1970s. This creative, innovative collective action (cf. Bouamama 1995, 1994), one which cannot be reduced 'simply' to an opposition to racism, has involved a questioning of what could be called the traditional humanistic, 'universalistic' antiracist narratives of organizations such as the MRAP, seen by young people as too distanced from the harsh realities of (sub)urban living and (sub)cultures in the 1980s to provide a coherent framework for action with which they can identify (cf. Jazouli 1992). Denise Jodelet (1993, 85) has pointed out the complex interplay of historicities between past and present in collective memories. If the interest of studying previous forms of antiracism has any practical application today, it is arguably in the light it can hope to shed on the struggles over the changing representations, and hence definitions, of historical events.

Section One: Theorizing memories today

The work of Maurice Halbwachs on collective memory, based essentially around Les Cadres sociaux de la mémoire (1925/1994) and the posthumous La Mémoire collective (1939/1950) (Halbwachs died at Buchenwald in 1945), is such a constant reference point for academic writing on the sociology of memory that it would be impossible to list here all the uses made of his studies (cf. Namer 1987, 1994). In structuring this theoretical discussion on memory around Halbwachs, I shall attempt to take out the most constructive points for the study of antiracist use of memory, whilst outlining those areas in which Halbwachs' approach is perhaps less instructive for contemporary society. Using Halbwachs today involves trying to reinstate the gender and ethnic factors which were largely excluded from his work, consonant with his methodological affiliation to Durkheimian analysis (cf. Lehmann 1993). Halbwachs' use of the family institution as paradigmatic of the transmission of memory across the generations may now also seem outdated (cf. however Muxel 1996), although for Halbwachs the family served to represent the intermediary structure between individual and collective memory. One of the main tenets of Halbwachsian theory - the
presentation of memory as a reconstruction of the past, whether that memory is individual or collective (Halbwachs 1925/1994, viii) - is however central to the preoccupations of this Chapter. As Namer summarizes, for Halbwachs, "se souvenir ce n'est pas revivre mais c'est reconstruire un passé à partir des cadres sociaux du présent" (Namer 1994, 329). Some critics have seen this as an overly 'presentist' approach (cf. Coser 1992, 25-26, and Dean 1994, 28-36 passim, more generally) : Namer himself implicitly suggests as much, by arguing that "(l)e travail de la mémoire repart (donc) au présent pour restructurer le passé, c'est-à-dire en soulignant les aspects qui se relient au présent et en négliger les autres" (1987,41). Section Two tries to bring out the absence of any epistemologically anachronistic use of the past in contemporary antiracist discourses on memory, by showing how memory can highlight the commonality of racism but in changed historical circumstances, thus creating inter-generational solidarity amongst racialized groups, based on the concept of historical remanence.

Opposing Bergson's intuitive-based approach (Vromen 1986, 57), Halbwach's thesis states that individuals and the social groups in which they are necessarily placed (here revealing his indebtedness to Durkheim), can only remember through the various social frameworks (cadres sociaux) available to them : "(...) il n'y a pas de mémoire possible en dehors des cadres dont les hommes vivant en société se servent pour fixer et retrouver leurs souvenirs" (1925/1994, 79). The definitions of cadre social in Les Cadres sociaux de la mémoire are at times confusing, particularly the relationship between the structural elements (social groups, classes, professions) and psychological ones. When Namer (1994, 336) points out that Halbwachs uses cadre social as a "vision du monde" of a social class then the Althusserian theory of base/superstructure comes to mind (cf. Althusser 1971). For cadre social de la mémoire (which Coser (1992) translates as 'social framework of memory'), Halbwachs seems to prefer the idea of notion, which Namer summarizes as "une réalité liant les pôles opposés du concept et du sensible" (1994, 327). Hereafter I will use the term memory vector rather than framework, in order to stress the
importance of social memory as carried by easily identifiable social groups which are also areas of production of antiracism (immigrant associations, countercultural movements, antiracist associations, political parties, organized labour), whilst retaining social frameworks of memory to indicate the interpretational structures carried by these vectors of memory.

Halbwachs' theory raises questions of individual or group agency: some analysts see Halbwachs as having overstressed the weight of the collective on the individual (Fentress and Wickham 1992, ix). Associating antiracism with such an apparently holistic approach may seem incongruous, Barrès having used what Namer calls an "idéologie de la mémoire anti-républicaine" (cf. Namer 1994, 301). As Fentress and Wickham say, the problem today is "how to elaborate a conception of memory which, while doing full justice to the collective side of one's conscious life, does not render the individual a sort of automaton, passively obeying the interiorized collective will" (ibid., ix). Such a problem is all the more relevant for a study of counter-memories. Instead of 'collective memory' (the latter being the term used by Halbwachs), the same authors prefer 'social memory', hence emphasizing the communicative processes involved in the articulation between the individual and her or his social environment (pp.ix-x). Social memory will be used in the discussion that follows (1).

Agency is also central to the conscious acts of cultivating memory as a form of campaigning with which we shall be dealing later on. As Namer states, summarizing Halbwachs:

"(l)es cadres sociaux, dont nous savons qu'ils assurent la coordination des totalités spatiales, temporelles et de signification, creent donc non seulement des grilles qui vont anticiper des logiques possibles de repérage d'un souvenir, mais ils creent un climat, un a priori affectif et evaluatif" (1994, 328).

Halbwachs therefore provides one way into a reflection on the social factors influencing the conditions of receptivity to certain themes, arguments and events (for example Charonne, 8th February 1962), helping us understand, by the same
token, the structural factors likely to marginalize the imposition of the memories of other themes and events (17th October 1961, for example). Gillis argues that "(i)dentities and memories are not things we think about, but things we think with" (1994, 5). Instead, I would see much of the antiracist campaigning on or using the theme of memory as a combination of thinking about and thinking with social identities and memories, therefore revealing a critical political and historical awareness to social constructions.

Linked to the questions of agency already evoked, there are other areas where the theme of memory in antiracist campaigns may sit rather uneasily with the Halbwachsian argument. In the conclusion to Les Cadres sociaux de la mémoire, the memory frameworks are theorized as belonging to the long duration, described in evocative terms:

"(l)es cadres sociaux de la memoire sont a la fois dans la duree, et hors d'elle (...). Ils ressemblent a ces trains de bois qui descendent le long des cours de l'eau, si lentement qu'on peut passer sur eux d'un bord a l'autre ; et cependant ils marchent, et ne sont pas immobiles" (1925/1994, 279).

In La Mémoire collective (1939/1950, 118), Halbwachs refers to these frameworks as belonging to the "temps immobile". Whilst Halbwachs does show that memory frameworks can be altered during or following historical events (cf. Namer 1994, 229-331 passim), the scope to act on history would appear heavily restricted by this general tendency to stress the long-term. When antiracists campaign on the theme of memory, they are attempting to introduce some agency into these seemingly atemporal, metahistorical frameworks which emphasize the deeply embedded nature of some forms of group beliefs. Such antiracist strategies may be criticized as lacking the urgency of more 'reactive' campaigning - against racist attacks, for example. Nonetheless, the post-1968 use of memory to counter anti-Maghrebian racism has closely associated historical factors (notably the memory and legacy of the Algerian War) with very contemporary forms of racism: by using memory and history jointly, antiracism is here linking past and present (cf. infra, Section Two).
These points arguably show up a weakness in the neat separation Halbwachs attempted to draw between history and memory: for him, since individual memory relies on the group for stimulus and context, then if the social group no longer exists, the frameworks for remembering that they carried will disappear (1925/1994, 279). History will take over where 'tradition' (which Halbwachs here uses interchangeably with 'memory') ends (1939/1950, 68-69). Historical memory is for Halbwachs a question of discontinuities, tradition/memory one of continuities, hence the primacy of long-term factors (1939/1950, 102) (2). There is probably some denial here of the historicity of the cadres sociaux de la mémoire, as was suggested by the above metaphor of slowly floating logs on the river. For the historian Suzanne Citron, "histoire(s) et mémoire(s) s'entrelacent les unes aux autres en spirales indéfinies" (1993, 69). The consciously political, instrumental rôle of cultivating memory through history can be seen in the way republican antiracist discourse celebrates the Abbé Grégoire, or Zola. The competing memories around Jeanne D'Arc, Clovis, the Vendée or the Dreyfus "Affair" show the interlinkage of memory and history. As Halbwachs himself usefully suggested, it is not simply the "mesure materielle du temps" which is the primary explanatory factor in the forgetting or remembering of an event or a person, since it is a question of the group keeping that event, period or person alive in social memory (1925/1994,167). In his study of the use of memory within deportee associations, Namer observes the interlinkedness of social memory and history: "la mémoire sociale et collective des organisations de déportés se substitue à l'histoire absente des camps" (1987, 147).

If Halbwach's work today raises questions of historical agency and determinism, it also highlights the complex articulation between individual and social memory at one level, and social and national memory at another. Since "(t)oute mémoire collective a pour support un groupe limite dans l'espace et dans le temps", for Halbwachs there will always be a "multiplicité des mémoires collectives" (1939/1950, 75,76). This multiplicity would, however, be eventually subsumed into the national society: according to Namer, for Halbwachs "(...) la
mémoire collective proprement dite est au sens étroit la mémoire d'un groupe ou
d'une société et au sens large la mémoire de la société nationale qui implique
toutes les sociétés particulières" (1994, 343). Halbwachs sought to reassert
"l'idéal républicain "progressif"" over the counter-modern ideologies of thinkers
such as Barrès (Namer 1994, 320). This implies some conflictuality in the
processes leading to 'national assimilation' (cf. Noiriel 1992) : regional(ist) or
immigrant group memories are however omitted from his discussions, as is the
articulation between one level of memory and another (outside the example of
the family) (3).

The question of the articulation between the various strata of social
memory (individual, group, collectivity) is, however, fundamental to this Chapter.
Where Halbwachs does address issues of the conflictuality of social memories is
in the religious domain : he sees as inherent to organized religion the struggle for
legitimacy and the decreeing of an authorized narrative of religious memory : "la
mémoire du groupe religieux (...) prétend s'être fixée une fois pour toutes (...)"
Bourdieu 1971) could, however, arguably be extended to the political
instrumentality of the cultivation/occultation of memory at the heart of
contemporary debates on racism and French 'national identity' (cf. Silverman
1992). The post-1968 period, for example, has been marked by a more
pronounced refusal by social groups and social movements of any supposedly
fixed, decreed memory as embodied by the national republican State. The
articulation between social and 'national' memories (the latter being a social
memory on a larger scale) is therefore now probably more complex (if not more
conflictual) than when Halbwachs was writing. Civil society has become the
source of memory, the State now unable to ensure its hegemony as producer of
memory, as Nora has noted, regretting what for him has become "une multiplicité
d'initiatives décentralisées où se croisent et chevauchent le médiatique, le touristique,
le ludique et le promotionnel" (1992, 984).
For Namer (1994, 366), Halbwachs had however started to foresee the "impossible unification d'une nation par son impossible mémoire collective" as early as the 1920s. As Halbwachs himself commented: "(c)hacun est membre de plusieurs groupes, il participe à plusieurs pensees sociales. son regard plonge successivement dans plusieurs temps collectifs" (1939/1950, 126). Since "la remémoration (i.e. as a process) se situe au carrefour des réseaux de solidarité multiples dans lesquels nous sommes engagés" (Duvignaud 1968, xii), then it should come as no surprise that the opposition to a monolithic "memoire excluant" symbolized by the established (i.e. dominant) discours républicain has grown in recent decades, where that excluding memory "repose sur la négation de l'Autre", and is "totalisante et lineaire" (Citron 1991, 285). The increasing interdependencies of contemporary society mean that, "as individuals, we cannot rely on the support of collective memory in the same way people in earlier periods could" (Gillis 1994, 15): perhaps any single collective (i.e. social) memory is more accurate here. This is a point to which we shall return.

What links the question of the articulation between individual and group memories on the one hand to those of social groups in relation to the wider collectivity on the other, is arguably the necessary transmission of memory. If we have not personally experienced an event, then the knowledge we have of it comes from a "memoire empruntee" (Halbwachs 1939/1950, 37). As the philosopher Vladimir Jankélévitch, one of the most prominent 'memory activists' of the postwar years was to point out, the difficulty with transmitting Holocaust memory was that "ce qui est arrivé n'avait pas la même importance pour eux (non-Jews) et pour nous. Ils n'ont pas vecu cela (the Holocaust)" (1948/1986, 100). Such a problem besets any attempt to cultivate memory outside the group immediately concerned by the events to be remembered. In the elaboration of antiracist discourse on memory, there are considerable problems of transmitting what is only at first sight a specific group memory like that of 17th October 1961 to the wider collectivity (many different groups were in fact implicated, whether as participants, witnesses or perpetrators). These difficulties are due to the
historical factors underpinning and shaping the frameworks of memory present within French society - even before the State's occultation of that memory is taken into account. Contemporary antiracist discourse on memory calls for inter-group solidarity for past sufferings with a close eye on the present, since present social factors determine the choice of the event or theme whose memory will be cultivated, and, equally, the repertoire of discourse and action within which this will be undertaken.

The political context has obviously changed considerably since the inter-war period when Halbwachs was writing, when the republican model was apparently hegemonic, and anti-republicanism in resistance. If Halbwachs, as we have seen (cf. supra) tended to underplay conflictuality within his typologies, there was nevertheless a subtle political project to his action. Today, it is almost as if we have turned full circle: postcolonial memories target the past and present actions of the State, and the legacy colonial history provides in the present. Antiracist counter-memories also challenge both the creation of 'difference' within colonial practice and the assimilationism of colonial discourse - the latter discourse having resurfaced (cf. Schnapper 1991) in an attempt to palliate the republican model whose dominance is now on the wane. Holocaust memory in France also challenges the State's official version(s) of its past actions. "Narratives of resistance" (Fentress and Wickham 1992, 117) are therefore present within antiracist cultivation of memory, whether these be narratives of resistance to the State, to racist groups or to more diffuse attitudinal factors (or all three). As Balibar has pointed out (in Balibar and Wallerstein 1988, 59), there is a "mémoire collective au sein du racisme actuel" which must also be taken into account.

Within these antiracist narratives of memory there will, however, be various degrees of conflictuality to the State (or social groups) at play: the legalistic critique of the post-Liberation State amnesty policy undertaken by the MRAP in the 1950s (and which, for reasons of space, it has been unable to
include in this Chapter) was not a fundamental questioning of the ontological nature of the State's past actions. By contrast, Section Two shows how the postcolonial State is now heavily criticized by antiracist discourses on memory for its role as past and present agent of a repression which is judged discriminatory and to have been hidden. Jodelet argues that groups seek either to "maintenir vivace le souvenir des événements qui ont marqué une histoire commune, comme c'est le cas pour la communauté juive", or to bring back attention "dans la conscience collective, des éléments du passé, occultés ou oubliés" (1993, 79). This comment on the forms of action is useful, since it would be dangerous to think of the history of one social group as totally separate from the rest of society (and consider that, by extension, Holocaust memory is for 'Jews' only, for example). To that extent, Vichy, the Algerian War, racism, antisemitism and discrimination are also part of the "histoire commune" of France today: antiracist cultivation of memory therefore plays on both of the registers Jodelet has outlined (with the obvious differences in emphasis that various historical circumstances have produced), and suggests that all are implicated, albeit in different ways, in historical circumstances. This implies the possibility of acting on history, stressing agency and not determinism, involvement rather than detachment, solidarity over individualism, and therefore constitutes an important refusal of the depoliticized vision of society which the éclatement of contemporary memories could bring.

There are several important distinctions that can be made concerning the loss of social memory. Firstly, there is the aforementioned 'structural' explanation offered by Halbwachs as to why social memories can/cannot sustain themselves via their groups and frameworks of memory. Some groups will not have time to consolidate their memory before disappearing - Halbwachs saw this exemplified in the difficult constitution of working-class social memories (cf. Namer 1994, 340-341). This can help us understand the problems faced by racialized immigrant groups, whose previous struggles may not be able to produce sufficient memory sites (or interest throughout other social groups) to be kept
Many activists in the 1980s and 1990s (cf. Bouamama 1994, 23-24) have complained of such a difficulty for Algerian, Moroccan and Tunisian emigrants, reflected in a supposed lack of memory transmission across the generations. Reasons for this would include socio-economic disadvantage linked to colonial/postcolonial periods, geographical mobility, temporary housing which no longer exists (*bidonvilles, cités de transit*) and the relationship between oral and written communication. Several of the explanations listed here fit well with Halbwachs' notion that memory of an event or person is facilitated through association with a place (*localisation* - cf. 1925/1994, 126 and *supra*, Section Two), and through language (Halbwachs 1925/1994, Chapter Two "Le langage et la mémoire", 40-82 *passim*). More generally, Halbwachs reminds us that it is necessary to undertake the social anthropology of all social groups (not just dominated ones), due to the influence of the *cadres sociaux* on all social agents.

Structural elements in memory loss/conservation are one issue. Secondly, in a more overtly instrumental situation, when the State (or indeed any social group) intervenes to commemorate, it operates a selection of which events to remember, and which memories of the same event are to be retained to the exclusion of others (Fentress and Wickham 1992, 115). This phenomenon therefore acts on two levels: there is on one level the Foucauldian notion of discursive exclusion through the "tabou de l'objet" (Foucault 1971, 11) - that about which one must not speak, write, campaign etc., where the State is able to control, at least in the short-term, the diffusion of (dis)information (17th October 1961 is such an example). This is particularly the case for what Nicolaidis (1994, 13) calls a "crime national", defined here as "la tendance, de la part des autorités responsables, à dissimuler ou à minimiser l'événement, à en altérer le sens; et la docilité avec laquelle la société (n')intègre (pas) ces éléments dans le système de représentations sociales et nationales qui est le sien". Halbwachs had considered that an event needed to be registered mentally as being of great importance at the time to then stick in the minds of all those in the group, not only those who had experienced it directly (1925/1994, 130), otherwise these memories "passent à
l'arriere-plan", as he wrote elsewhere (1939/1950, 26). Amnesty policies often fall into this category (cf. Gacon 1994, Nicolaidis 1994). Such policies, as the MRAP was to highlight in the 1950s against the clemency shown Vichy officials, tend to normalize, banalize racism in the past and, in so doing, create a precedence for the future: the association responded to the freeing of Xavier Vallat in 1950 by stating that this represented

"l'admission de l'idée que les déportations des juifs ne signifient pas un crime dont les coupables doivent être sévèrement châtisés et contraints de purger leur peine, et l'admission de cette idée ouvre des perspectives que dans l'avenir des faits semblables pourront se répéter sans qu'il leur soit appliqué des châtiments" (MRAP 1950a, 1).

Similar themes will be shown in Section Two concerning the State's attempted elision of the atrocities of the Algerian War.

The second level on which the overtly instrumental organization of forgetting can intervene is with the commemorative process itself: Namer defines commemoration as the "réécriture de l'histoire d'où sont bannies les blessures faites à l'identité, à la fierté nationale" (1994, 214) The French State's rôle in the deportation of Jews under Vichy, for example, has long been played down whilst the Nazi-based initiatives were highlighted in official discourse. The comparative ease with which Barbie was eventually brought to justice in relation to Bousquet, Papon or Touvier (cf. Rousso 1990, Conan and Rousso 1994), shows the less open side to this now supposedly consensual memory denouncing antisemitism. Sonia Combe (1994) has recently described the selective permission to consult State archives on sensitive issues (cf. my Chapter One).

In opposition to such practices of imposing fixed historical narratives, counter-memories attempt to stop any foreclosure or fixity in the arbitrary and totalizing representations of events which states and social groups may impose, recognizing that there can be no total, finished, 'cleansed' meaning to historical processes, no "religion civile de la mémoire" which 'normalizes' (banalise) and 'ritualizes' some events at the expense or the elision of others (Brossat 1994,
To illustrate this last point: the memory of 17th October 1961 as carried by antiracist and immigrant rights associations since the late 1970s has had to negotiate a space between the French State's "crime national" (negation), those representations provided by the Algerian State association (evoking that memory partially and inconsistently), and the mainstream French left (PS, PCF) (which subsumed that memory within antifascism), all of which marginalized the massacre for 20 years, albeit according to very different rhythms, modalities and political agendas. A combination of the structural and instrumental factors described here explains the marginalization of the memory of 17th October. The counter-memories involved here are not mere doubles of one producer (the French State). They hint at a more open approach to colonial history, the release of information, and the inclusion rather than exclusion of conflicting memories of the same events (cf. Section Two (d)/(e)).

The State can therefore be one of the crucial vectors either of memory cultivation or forgetting, but it is not alone in this process. I shall refer to (i) official, (ii) organizational and (iii) oppositional forms of memory (4), each of which will be evolving at differing rhythms. The recent (post-1950s) diversification in media resources means that social memory is now transmitted not just through the written, printed word, or intersubjective oral communication, but via films, television, and videos, all of which can compensate for the absence from State education programmes or commercial productions of key themes (5). Images help show "le caractère "pluriel" des sens" (6). Furthermore, as Citron observes: "le film, la télévision, les archives filmées sont des matériaux qui bousculent les constructions linéaires des histoires traditionnelles" (1993, 69). Antiracist groups have made good use of these media to cultivate memory, the upsurge in associational activity since 1981 and new radio initiatives (cf. Radio-Beur) further encouraging this tendency. The memory of 17th October 1961 was kept alive on the far-left by Jacques Panigel's film *Octobre à Paris,* just as Élie Kagan's photographs of the police repression have been widely used to provide

Those nostalgic for the time when the republican State was able to impose its "histoire nationale" from above have underlined the importance of these vectors of production of memory and the media they use (cf. Nora 1992), although this Chapter tries to show that the attempt to revise the memories of 17th October 1961 is far from complete. Section Two sets out to highlight the production of a view of history, exemplified below by Dimitri Nicolaidis, and which has been in part brought about by campaigning around the theme of memory:

"l'histoire n'est plus cet objet que l'on met à distance pour mieux l'interpréter, lui assigner un sens : elle est tissée dans le vécu d'individus et de groupes aux destins entrecroisés et superposables, se recompose en fonction des strates mémorielles de multiples agents, collectifs ou individuels, acteurs ou observateurs, décideurs et victimes" (1994, 11).

As with other areas of antiracist action, therefore, the invocation of memory, when traced over a wide period, allows us to see how social transformations influence the levels and areas of production of antiracism.
"L'oubli est mauvais conseiller. Quand il s'installe dans l'histoire, il la mutile et la détourne", Tahar Ben Jelloun (1984, 33).

"Je suis le plus grand persecute de ce siecle apres Dreyfus" : Maurice Papon (7).

Section Two : The changing contours of memory : the case of October 17th 1961

Section Two (a) : Introduction to Section Two

In this Section I will attempt to apply some of the theoretical points from Section One to the memory of the massacre of Algerians in Paris in October 1961. Firstly (Two (b)), I shall examine the immediate reactions to the events by all groups which could have become possible vectors of its memory, underlining the divisions on the left at the time, whilst arguing that there was perhaps more of a reaction to the killings than has been stated recently (cf. Einaudi 1991). Secondly (Two (c)), I shall look at how the memory of Charonne, which symbolized the left's re-found unity, came to mask that of October 1961. After studying the factors encouraging or limiting the permanence of memory after October 1961 within Algerian emigration and the left in the face of the State's official cover-up, I shall see how, for many young people of Maghrebian (particularly Algerian) origin, this memory has come to symbolize the climate of racism which exists in contemporary France (Two (d)). Finally, examining how 17th October 1961 is commemorated today (Two (e)), I will argue that those associations concerned with the memory of immigration and racism provide an interesting model for future antiracist action.

As Halbwachs argues in *La Mémoire collective*, memory of an event will remain in people's minds if it has been accorded wide importance by social groups at the time of its occurrence (1939/1950, 48). The killing of between forty and 250 Algerians (cf. Einaudi 1991) before, during and after the non-
violent Algerian demonstrations of 17th-20th October 1961 arguably failed to 'constitute an event' (*faire événement*), historically speaking, at the time (8). Certainly the State stepped in to distort interpretations of the causes, nature and intent of the demonstrations, to then hide its involvement in a mass killing, to prevent the dissemination of accurate information and a judicial enquiry, and then later, in the form of amnesties, to absolve the guilty from any future judicial worry. But as I shall try to show, there were many at the time who did know of the extent of the massacre. There were problems of the transmission of this testimony, problems strengthened by the insufficient social frameworks of memory available, and the conditions of possibility for a concerted response to racism at that moment of the Algerian War. As I argued in Chapter Five, police repression of Algerian emigrants was a well-established practice. What distinguished 17th October from previous State brutalities (for example 14th July 1953) was merely the scale of the operation, and the cold-bloodedness with which it was carried out in non-confrontational situations (and this in mainland France, as opposed to the colonies, where such atrocities had a long history (cf. Benot 1994, Mekhaled 1995). The Algerian nationalists had already seized on the massacre at Setif in May 1945 as an important date which could unite opposition to the French State (9). There was those who saw very early the importance of the memory of the brutality of colonization. Pierre Vilar reminded the MRAP's 1956 *Journée Nationale* that "(...) toute attenuation dans l'évocation historique des brutalités de la guerre et de la colonisation (...) voile les réalités et favorise les complexes de supériorité, de domination, de l'"homme blanc", son plus grand péché" (10). Unlike the Algerian nationalists, most of the French left had let the Setif massacre be forgotten, due to the lack of priority given to the colonies at the time, and the disinformation spread about the extent of the French army's reprisals.
Section Two (b): Immediate reactions to 17th October 1961

The isolation of the FLN from the mainstream left must be singled out as a major explanatory factor in the creation of the immediate situation in which the massacre occurred: the only protests in the Assemblée Nationale prior to 17th October against the discriminatory police measures applied to Algerians came from Algerian députés (11). Part of the acceptance of the State's narrative of events came from the almost unanimous condemnation by députés of FLN violence and the need expressed to 'protect the police'. For Gaiti (1994, 27):

"(l)e silence de la plupart des hommes politiques ou des journalistes témoigne de leur acceptation de cette définition de la situation : les manifestations comme les attentats sont des troubles à l'ordre public et la police comme le gouvernement ont fait leur devoir".

Whilst the FLN's demonstrations were carefully planned operations, designed to show its strength at a period of negociation and occupy the symbolic space of the capital (cf. Mann 1990, Gaiti 1994, Haroun 1986), the date for the main FLN demonstration that autumn was to have been 1st November (seventh anniversary of the start of the Revolution): the police curfew therefore intervened to precipitate events, hence the demonstrations on and around the 17th October. For Stora (1992a, 384) the FLN's decision to demonstrate was a reaction to the non-mobilization of the left against the curfew and the increasing number of Algerians to have disappeared in the Paris region since early September, the security forces often killing suspected FLN activists. Whilst what I shall go on to describe is very much a catalogue of missed opportunities on behalf of the left to react in proportion to the massacre, there are several contextual factors which first need to be taken into account.

The number of demonstrations, in sites dispersed in the suburbs (Nanterre, Colombes), in Paris intra muros, and in provincial cities in the north and east (Stora 1992a, 361), have made it difficult to choose a particular site for 17th October on which memory can be focussed: we refer to the date - 17th October (although the killings were spread out over several days) - rather than a
specific place, as for Charonne, the latter already familiar as a Metro station. Halbwachs, as we saw in Section One, laid great importance on what he termed the *localisation* which memory sites could evoke (1925/1994, 126). Much of the killing went on in anonymous woods (Fontainebleau), or controlled areas (Vincennes, Palais des Sports), and, as Einaudi has shown (1991), the police practice was to remove identification papers from those it drowned in the Seine, further depersonalizing individual deaths. It is therefore the Seine, the Canal St. Martin and the Grands Boulevards (the latter sites having provided a number of irrefutable testimonies at the time) which have been chosen by various organizations as the memory sites to commemorate the massacre today (cf. *infra*). Press censorship resulted in the seizure of many of the publications from which I shall quote. Also, all street demonstrations were prohibited - although as Madeleine Reberioux, former LDH President and anti-war activist at the time reminds us - . "Paris en 1961 ce n'était pas le Berlin de Hitler" (1993, 297). Democracy was therefore severely restricted, and the typical means of intellectual intervention - petition signing, brochure publishing, the holding of public meetings and demonstrations (cf. Sirinelli 1990, Rioux and Sirinelli 1991) were consequently ill-suited to the immediate context.

Now whilst the left was split (cf. Heurgon 1994), there was nonetheless a certain commonality of themes on the left which linked the discrimination against Algerians to Vichy antisemitism (cf. Chapter Five). The FLN picked up on this theme, asking "à quand l'Etoile jaune pour les Algeriens?". Mocking the usual rhetoric of a tolerant France, it said that action ought to be taken, so that Paris, "qui fut la capitale du droit d'asile" did not become "la capitale du racisme" (12). As I tried to show in Chapter Five, the comparison made between anti-Maghrebian racism and antisemitism revealed the recognition of a plurality of racisms. Yet there was no well-established tradition of campaigning within republican antiracism against colonial racism: the memory of 17th October (the last large-scale manifestation of colonial racism) could thus not be figured within any campaigning tradition, and hence assured some permanence.
The criticisms of the reactions to 17th October point out not only their small scale response, but the purely formal nature of that response (cf. Hamon and Rotman 1979, 373-377 passim, Einaudi 1991). As Anne Tristan puts it: "(l')émotion soulevée ne suffit pas à obliger le gouvernement à rendre des comptes" (13). Madeleine Reberióux admits that "(n)ous ne fûmes pas trop nombreux le lendemain à protester" (1993, 297). Maspero's ironical comment that the response came mainly from "toujours les mêmes petits groupes d'intellectuels de gauche irresponsables et de "porteurs de valises" dévoyés" (1990, 258) is an implicit indictment of the confused and ultimately inadequate reaction of the mainstream French left, a reaction which I will now describe. If we keep in mind Tartakowsky's estimation that of the thirty-two protests linked to 17th October, twenty were composed almost entirely of Algerians (1990, 132, note 4), the reasons why the massacre would not remain in the mainstream left's memory become apparent. Not only was the left divided by the Cold War 'barrier' between the PCF (and in this case PSU) and the SFIO, but the parties were split amongst themselves as to how to support 'disengagement' from Algeria, further complicating matters.

The minutes of the Groupe Parlementaire Socialiste (GPS) meetings in the weeks after 17th October reveal great conflict: if Pierre Forest could argue of the Algerians that "(s)i on ne les maîtrise pas maintenant, il faudra trouver un nouveau Charles Martel pour les repousser à Poitiers", his voice was marginal (14). Most expressed concern at the massacre, and the problem centred on how to prove the killings and criticize the security forces (15): it should be remembered that when the massacre was discussed by the Paris (Seine) Conseil Municipal, the vote was largely in favour of even tougher police action (16). Few in the GPS minutes believed the official statement of two deaths (17). The PSU's Bureau national of 18th October, calling for the "(e)ncouragement de toutes les manifestations concrètes de solidarité avec les travailleurs algériens", sent a circular to its federal secretaries saying that what should be stressed was that "en
dépit des reactions racistes qui peuvent se faire jour dans la population, le courant profond est en faveur de la Paix en Algérie" (18). But at the Bureau National a week later, the PSU spoke of the divisions on the left: a day of action could be envisaged, "par contre un meeting serait une très mauvaise résolution, compte tenu de la quasi impossibilité de faire un véritable meeting commun" (19). The problem of rallies being banned was secondary to the disunity on the left, therefore. This was shown by the short protest the PSU organized at Place Clichy on 1st November, followed by a rapid wreath-laying ceremony outside the Rex cinema, before the police dispersed the crowd (cf. Heurgon 1994, 341-343 passim). The PSU considered its reaction to 17th October as a success and hoped its recruitment would increase as a result (20). On the same day, a different protest took place, organized by the Comité Audin and Témoignages et Documents (Einaudi 1991, 238). There were low-key PCF protests (ibid., 1991, 197). The union protests were not ones for mobilization, but more to forewarn the government against any repeat of the massacre (Stora 1992, 98, Einaudi 1991, 194-199 passim), although the Confédération française des travailleurs chrétiens (CFTC) published a highly critical text which summarized the anonymous testimonies of demonstrators or witnesses (21). The PSU, still in its formative years (cf. Heurgon 1994), and without wide support, was the only party to react with any spontaneity to the massacre.

The most concerted action came from what might objectively rather than pejoratively be called the disorganized left. Students and intellectuals in Paris mobilized in numbers, undertaking several demonstrations centred around the Sorbonne (Einaudi 1991, 224-225), certain professors reading out a text on 30th October which declared that "(s)i les Français acceptent l'institution légale du racisme en France, ils porteront la même responsabilité que les Allemands qui n'ont pas réagi devant les atrocités du nazisme" (22). The UNEF, which had come out in favour of Independence for Algeria, was involved in the protests (cf. Monchablon 1983, 1991). But the students and intellectuals, if they had managed to challenge the State's version of events, by coordinating testimonies of the
massacre in the two weeks which followed, had no "relais organisationnels susceptibles de soutenir un grand mouvement de masse" (Mann 1990, 299). Vidal-Naquet now explains the lack of success of the counter-narrative offered by Vérité-Liberté and Témoignages et Documents by the fact that "nous sommes (ie. then) à une époque où nous n'avons pas accès aux medias" (23). The students upheld no pretence about the hostility of most onlookers to the Algerians on 17th October (24). Esprit reflected on the long history of missed opportunities for solidarity with Algerians, declaring that "voilà peut-être notre dernière chance : chaque Français est mis en demeure d'approuver ou de combattre. Donc à chacun son combat, par la parole, le geste, l'action (...)" (25). Other well-informed sources measured the relative lack of reaction, the PSU's Andre Philip saying that "(l)e racisme s'est manifeste après le 17 octobre. La solidarité des travailleurs ne s'est pas manifestée" (26).

Yet if the response was insufficient (rather than inexistant), there are several sources which suggest that, as we saw in Chapter Five, it was those sections of the French population in closest contact with Algerians who responded most (cf. also Evans 1994). There were protests and stoppages in those factories where Algerians failed to return to work the following morning (cf. Einaudi 1991). The Secours Populaire (SP) published a critical text stating that it, unlike other (unnamed) organizations, "n'a pas commencé l'organisation de la solidarité aux victimes algériennes de la répression le 17 octobre. À la suite des crimes et des brutalités commis dans cette période, il (the SP) a simplement intensifié au maximum ce qui est son activité permanente" (Secours Populaire 1962, 8). There had been some public reaction on an individual level, the Secours Populaire argued : "(e)n trois jours 210 personnes ont téléphone ou écrit à la Fédération de la Seine pour proposer leur aide dans le parrainage d'enfants algériens" (Secours Populaire 1961). Such individual acts of solidarity again suggest that a wide definition of antiracist action is often needed. The FLN judged the protests as having gone beyond "le cadre habituel des protestations purement formelles pour entreprendre des actions concrètes afin de mettre un
terme à ces mesures d'exception et à ce régime de terreur" (27). Haroun (1986, 371) quotes from an undated FLN report which recognized that

"la gauche française n'a pas hésité à mettre en relief le comportement discriminatoire de la police vis-à-vis de nos compatriotes et continue de dénoncer par voie de presse les brutalités, les menaces et les assassinats dont nos frères furent victimes".

If some evaluations of the response probably exaggerated its extent (28), it is the lack of coordination of the responses to 17th October that is the striking feature. The MRAP for example, which also refuted the State's official version(s) of events, and highlighted the "60 morts et des centaines de disparus" (29), organized a commemorative ceremony on 11th November and a rally on 8th December. It was well placed to observe the evolution which was to occur throughout the following months: the MRAP saw 17th October as a cut-off point in the fight against racism and the fascism of the *Organisation armée secrète* (OAS) (30). Albert Lévy, speaking in January 1962, talked of the "levée de boucliers contre les violences racistes de la police", and saw 17th October as the event which had made many distance themselves from the Gaullist State's actions. For Lévy, "(m)ême les manifestations anti-OAS d'aujourd'hui puissent en partie leur élan dans le sursaut ANTIRACISTE qui a eu lieu après le 17 octobre" (31).

This was to be the ambiguous legacy on the French left of 17th October 1961: the start of a rassemblement which was only finally able to crystallize against the OAS within the paradigm of antifascism, at the loss of the specificity of 17th October amongst some of the possible oppositional vectors of memory. Where 17th October did qualify as an event (in the Halbwachsian sense of an event social memory will then retain), it was in the drive to more unity on the left, a unity which Charonne came to signify. Well before Charonne, in the November-December period of joint PCF/PSU/trades union anti-OAS action symbolized by the 19th December demonstration (cf. Gaiti 1994, Heurgon 1994 348-354 passim, Monchablon 1983, 128-129), *Esprit* editor Paul Thibaud warned that "l'événement (17th October) tend à devenir tout simplement un de ces tristes
scandales policiers qui, sous les récentes Républiques, ont remplacé les joyeux scandales financiers de la IIIe" (32). From November, as Mann argues, "l)e péril fasciste devient désormais un thème beaucoup plus mobilisateur que la question de la solidarité avec la révolution algérienne" (1990, 300) : this fascist threat was seen by many on the left as symbolized by the police violence during these (banned) demonstrations "contre le racisme et pour la paix en Algérie" (33).

Tartakowsky (1986) points out that the traditional aim of antifascist marches since the 1930s has been to reaffirm unity on the left. Today, Albert Lévy estimates that from the 17th October onwards, "il y a eu peut-être une relance un peu (sic) de l'action contre la Guerre d'Algérie parce que les organisations concernées qui n'ont pas pu réagir, ont évidemment cherché à se manifester par la suite" (34). Gaiti talks less prosaically of "rattrapage" (1994, 28).

Following Gaiti (1994), I have tried to explain the changing political context which shows how a united left was better placed to demonstrate against the nine deaths which occurred at the hands of the police at Charonne on 8th February 1962. As Heurgon has remarked, however, "(s)ans le drame de Charonne, la manifestation du 08 février aurait sans doute laissé l'impression d'un demi-échec, s'inscrivant après le sommet de la mi-décembre dans le déclin continu des manifestations contre la guerre d'Algérie" (1994, 370). What united the left in February 1962 was the violence of the OAS and the police. The burials on 13th February were marked by a general strike in Paris, between 500,000 and 1 million showing their support at Père-Lachaise, with many demonstrations outside of Paris. The comparison between Charonne and 17th October, which highlights the unequal response to the two events by the French left, is now highly politically charged, and centres around a critique of the rôle of the PCF during the Algerian War (cf. Balibar 1992). For Giudice (1992, 339) : "(o)ctobre, février : deux histoires, deux mémoires, deux mondes parallèles". For many who were actively involved, the comparison revealed the racism within parts of the left exacerbated by the War (Jeanson 1962, 29). As Heurgon (involved in the PSU at the time) argues, with Charonne, "il s'agit cette fois de victimes
présentables, tous français, tous membres ou sympathisants du Parti communiste" (1994, 340). Daniel Mayer, the then LDH president, remembers having intervened at the time to say that

"quand il y avait sept ou huit morts européens - français - dans des échauffourées avec la police, toute la France était mobilisée, et quand il y avait des centaines de morts algériens, pendus dans le Bois de Boulogne ou jetés dans la Seine, il n'y avait pour ainsi dire pas de manifestants"

(35).

As Jacques Panigel remarks, talking of the Comité Maurice Audin : "(i)l est sûr que si ce comité s'était appelé "Comité Mohammed" il aurait eu moins d'audience" (36). For Hamon and Rotman, "(l)es Français se sont empressés de dissocier les deux dates et de camoufler l'immense charnier des Algériens victimes derrière les stèles de neufs des leurs" (1979, 379). Mann (1990, 302) resumes that "toute tentative visant à relier la force du souvenir au nombre de victimes, que la manifestation (17th October) a laissées derrière elle, est vouée à l'échec". Coulon, in the only empirical study undertaken, has shown the memory of Charonne rather than 17th October to be much more firmly embedded among young people today (37).

The question to then be answered is of the level of intentionality of the undeniable occultation of 17th October 1961. This occultation has to be studied for the socialist and communist traditions (and of course Gaullism) - both over the short term of 1961-1962, and then within the parties' frameworks of memory which would/would not ensure memory transmission in subsequent decades. Albert Levy strongly rejects the argument that there was a deliberate choice at the time to commemorate one event at the expense of another, and stresses the evolution of the political situation over the four months separating the killings (38). The one speech at the funeral on 13th February which did link Charonne to 17th October - by the Confédération française des travailleurs chrétiens (CFTC) representative, figured the dead of both demonstrations as "héritiers de la Révolution française" (39). Little attention was given on the left to the Algerian demonstrator Mohammed Ait Saada, still in a coma the week following Charonne.
As I attempted to show in Chapters Four and Five, the left (and, historically, republican antiracism, which included centrist tendencies) had been unable to provide concrete opposition to colonial racism: the differences in reaction to the two massacres was to be expected, therefore. After Charonne, the left could refer to the opposition to the extreme right demonstrations of 1934, to the rallies of the Front Populaire, the heritage of the Resistance and the revised antifascism of recent campaigns against Poujade. As Hamon and Rotman say, Charonne "est solidement inscrite dans la mémoire collective du mouvement ouvrier de ce pays" (1979, 378). The left's repertoire of action against colonial racism was almost non-existent. It is emblematic of this situation, that those sections of the left which did keep the memory of 17th October alive within their own traditions (intellectuals, UNEF, "porteurs de valise", the far left), had all been the most implicated in the events at the time (41), and marginalized for this reason. With 17th October and Charonne, there is a complex relationship between antiracism and antifascism, and a rare historical moment where antifascism came to work against the specifically antiracist protests which followed 17th October.

Where levels of intention are more easily assessed is in the literature of the PCF over subsequent decades. If one reads L'Humanité around the 8th February in the years immediately following Charonne, then one is aware of the efforts deployed to keep alive the memory of Charonne: 100,000 attended a PCF-organized demonstration in February 1963 which represented "(l')unité antifasciste" (42), and there is the same amount of attention devoted at the relevant dates in later years (43). But this memory is concerned just as much with the unitary demonstration of 13th February as with the massacre itself. If by the 1980s such selectivity was more difficult (44), in 1983 L'Humanité could still evoke Charonne and forget the 17th October (45). Giudice (1992, 337-338) describes how Charonne was identified so closely with the PCF that the Maoists (Gauche prolétarienne) organized their protest (25th July 1972) over the death of Pierre Overney around Charonne in an attempt to 'win back' Charonne for the
far left. Nonetheless, the aforementioned lack of any single memory site for 17th October should not be forgotten, nor should the State's instrumentality in concealing the extent of the massacre. 17th October has to be inserted into the immediate context of the Algerian War, and then analyzed in relation to the memory of the War (or absence of that memory) over the following decades (cf. Stora 1992). The multiple temporalities of social discourse are again evident here. As Mohand Hamoumou, who has worked on the hidden history of the 'harkis' reminds us: "(l)es oublis des États ne sont jamais fortuits. Ils oublient ce qu'ils ont intérêt à oublier" (1993, 319). Many observers speak of the repression (refoulement) of the memory of the War by the State. For Abdelkader Djeghoul, "(l)e 17 octobre est le jour où dans le même temps l'État français étend à son territoire "l'État sauvage" et se doit de l'extirper de sa propre mémoire et de la conscience collective pour continuer à se présenter comme le garant de l'État de droit" (46). Refoulement as a notion raises questions of agency and tends to personalize the State, whereas what we are dealing with here are political choices made by successive administrations, in particular over amnesty legislation. As Nicolaidis argues, one of the functions of the amnesty policy is to reassert the ascendancy of the State in its power to decree what should still or no longer be considered as of historical importance (1994, 18-19). In comparison to Vichy, the amnesties concerning the Algerian War introduced new precedents: whereas in the past, amnesties had covered those already condemned, the new provisions also covered any future accusations (Manceron and Remaoun 1993, 35-36) (47). These amnesty measures were helped by the marginalized vectors of the memory of Algerian War atrocities, of which the 17th October was the worst in mainland France.

Section Two (c) : Memories in transition and opposition, 1962-1979

If the State was capable of hiding the extent of the massacre of 17th October, it was powerless to stop what Stora usefully calls the "underground" memory of the Algerian War, and, within that, the memory of 17th October. For
Stora, the period from the early 1960s to the early 1980s sees "la memoire de guerre, tapie, se propager de maniere souterraine a partir de l'espace familial et prive ; puis reinvestir progressivement l'espace public" (1992b, 11). Stora's comments, which concentrate on the French reaction to the War, need to be adapted somewhat for the Algerian memories of the War; their contours obey a different form and have evolved at a different rhythm. Whilst the memory of 17th October is usually cultivated to evoke the brutality of the event, for some Algerians, 17th October might be remembered positively, as an example of collective self-affirmation (48), or, for some Algerian women, of a spatial and political visibility from which they were often excluded (49). Jacques Panigel's clandestine film "Octobre a Paris", shot in November 1961, manages to raise some of these memories, in spite of having been filmed ostensibly to reveal the enormity of the massacre. Couched in the Marxist-Leninist revolutionary discourse of the time, the film sets out to describe "ce moment ou le peuple algérien de Paris découvre son existence en tant que masse, impliquée directement dans sa guerre de libération". Panigel wanted "la restitution a la population algérienne du droit de parole" through the film (Octobre a Paris 1963, 3, 4). The solidarity among Algerians portrayed in the film contrasts sharply with the hostility of the French. The film, successfully banned until 1970 (50), but shown on the far-left film circuit, ends with a direct link to Charonne:

"(l)a porte se ferme sur l'Algerien. Mais ne partez pas! Le 17 octobre continue! La porte va se rouvrir/ C'est sur nous qu'elle rouvre! sur nous qui ne sommes pas des bicots, qui n'étions pas des youpins, il y a vingt ans!" (ibid., 22).

Other ways of representing the 17th October included Kateb Yacine's poem "Dans la gueule du loup", written in November 1961, which asked:

"Peuple français, tu as tout vu
Oui, tout vu de tes propres yeux,
Et maintenant vas-tu parler
Et maintenant vas-tu te taire" (51).
We shall return to these various forms of counter-memory later on: for the moment it is important to remember that the 17th October cannot be seen simply through the eyes of the French or Algerian State.

It might have been expected that the newly independent Algerian government would seek to commemorate what the French State was trying to hide. A square in Algiers was renamed *Martyrs du 17 octobre* (52), and in 1962, the 17th October was declared *Journée Nationale à l'Émigration* (Giudice 1992, 340). Yet the Algerian government soon quarrelled with the *Amicale des Algériens en France* and decided to remove sponsorship from the book by Marcel and Paulette Péju on the 17th October due to be published in 1962 (Manceron and Remaoun 1993, 170). From 1964, the FLN sought to marginalize Algerian emigration in France (Stora 1992a, 419-421 *passim*). As Stora has shown elsewhere (1992), the FLN wrote out the Messalist current from the history of Algerian nationalism: the late conversion of many Algerian emigrants in France to the FLN was to mean the non-recognition of their sufferings for two decades. In the 1980s, the Algerian State transformed previous representations of Algerian emigration, now imbuing that emigration with revolutionary heroism: the satellite *Amicale* (cf. Ireland 1994, 38) could declare in 1985 that "(l)e 17 octobre est le symbole de l'unité de la communauté algérienne en France" (53), although hostility to the FLN-France is still seen (54).

The cultivation of the memory of 17th October amongst the Algerian emigrants and their families in France has developed parallel to that of the Algerian State. As I suggested in Section One, transmission of memory in (any) emigration is faced with the problems of space, time and language at the centre of the Halbwachsian typology. Albert Memmi refers in *Portrait du colonisé* to "l'amnésie culturelle" which can occur in a colonial context due to the suppression of those institutions which could uphold memory (1957/1973, 132). In the absence of the Algerian State via the *Amicale* as a major vector for the memory of 17th October, then memory of the massacre was transmitted through
the family (Bouamama 1994, 26). As Bouamama reminds those (cf. Levine 1985, 220) that suggest that there was a conscious effort by Algerians to forget the massacre, if Algerians in the period from 1962 to the mid-1970s did not use the memory of the racism from the Algerian war period as a theme for collective mobilization, they had not however forgotten (Bouamama 1994, 71). As Sans Frontierë (SF) (1979-1985) wrote in 1979: "la journée du 17 octobre à Paris (...) est inscrite à jamais dans la mémoire collective de l'immigration algérienne" (55). Neither formalized, closed nor institutionalized, this memory was available to be used within the context of the fight against racism in the 1970s.

Action against racism brought together the far-left (Maoist/libertaire) students and intellectuals (whether of immigrant origin or not) in the period 1970-1977 (cf. Giudice 1992, Polac 1991, 1994, Mauriac 1976). The Mouvement des Travailleurs arabes (MTA) (1972-1977) created a tradition of protest against racism and for equal rights which provided the political socialization for the activists of Sans Frontierë (Polac 1994). The MTA emerged from the Comités Palestine (1971-1973), which mixed appeals to Arabs in the diaspora with Marxist-Leninism, hostility to the Amicales, the French State and the main parties of the left in France. The MTA mobilized against racism in the Goutte-d'Or which, after the Algerian War, had become an important memory site for Algerians and their supporters (Polac 1991, 377). The demonstration against the murder of Djellali Ben Ali in November 1971 was the first since 1962 "à avoir comme objet le meurtre d'un Arabe par un Français" (Giudice 1992, 61). This mobilization was ideologically rather than ethnically exclusive, and included Sartre, Foucault and Genet. The politically astute coordinators of these Comités Palestine-based protests saw how they could try to attract support from those who had opposed racism during the Algerian War. When Mohamed Diab was killed in police custody in November 1972 (cf. Giudice 1992, 83-92 passim), then a demonstration in Paris was organized (16th December). The organizers' aims, recorded in an anonymous letter in the organization's archives, are worth quoting in full: as during the Algerian War, (and specifically after 17th October),
the letter states, "(l)e français (sic) qui n'a pas la pratique sociale des victimes du racisme doit avoir des preuves pour comprendre et sympathiser" (hence the organization by activists of an enquiry into Diab's death) (56). Diab's killing "va chercher très loin dans le tréfonds de la mémoire collective". What was needed, the letter continues, was "l'idée des 121" - those intellectuals who signed a petition published in September 1960 which condemned the War and encouraged desertion from the army (cf. Sirinelli 1991, 289-290). Some of those involved in 1960 participated in the 1972 campaign (including Sartre) and another call for mobilization was published:

"(i)ls faisaient appel à la mémoire historique des français (sic) ; et choisissaient (ie. in 1972) comme point de départ de la marche sur le ministère (Justice) Bonne nouvelle = le cinéma Rex - où les Algériens avaient rougi les pavés de leur sang en Octobre 1961. (...) cet appel permettait de faire pleins feux sur les horreurs que connaissent aujourd'hui aussi les immigres".

The political context had certainly changed since 1960-61, but the dominated position of Maghrebian immigrants remained the same (cf. Wihtol de Wenden 1988). Continuity in the tradition of immigrant and far-left militancy was therefore provided through the appeal to the memory of the Algerian War, and the recognition of the solidarity of sections of French society towards victims of racism at that time, linked to the opposition to the impunity of those having carried out racist killings. We shall see how, from the late 1970s, the memory of 17th October is employed by associations and publications as a link to the fight against racist violence today from a position of autonomy in relation to all parties of the Left, Christian aid groups, and the LDH, LIC(R)A and MRAP (57).

The reference to French intellectuals in the above text (here Sartre in particular) underlines the instrumental role played by intellectuals in the transmission of memory. As Polac (1994) has pointed out, it is emblematic of the socio-economic position of Maghrebian immigration that many of the intellectuals involved in the MTA initiative were of Maghrebian origin but came to France after having studied abroad and had already acquired experience of
political action (Driss El-Yazami, for example). Others, such as Farid Aichoune, came from families of former FLN activists, and had acquired political socialization through (in Aichoune’s case) the Maoist *Gauche prolétarienne*. For Jazouli, the SF project (1979-1985) had an intellectual base (1992, 62-63), and sought to change the way the dominant discourse on immigration was formulated, by reinstating the memory of immigration and the struggles contained within that history, promoting the cultural expression of immigrant-based groups. The SF project reflected the passage from *gauchisme politique* to *gauchisme culturel* in the 1970s (cf. H. Weber 1988, 179). As an editorial in 1984 summarized:

"(l)orsque nous avons entamé en mars 1979, l'aventure de SF, une idée principale guidait nos pas : Témoigner. Car nous étions ahuris de constater qu'un pays d'immigration, comme la France, et ce depuis un siècle, se trouvait tous les 30 ans à découvrir "ses immigres" comme si aucune mémoire n'avait traversé ce siècle d'immigration" (58).

SF sought to link the two main frameworks within which the memory of 17th October is cultivated today: firstly within the calls for the memory of the history of immigration, secondly within the campaigns against racist violence. For example, shortly afterwards, Farid Aichoune wrote:

"(d)e la tuerie du 14 juillet 1953 au massacre du 17 octobre 1961 en passant par les assassinats de maghrébins ces dernières années, la même haine semble traverser les générations, à travers certaines couches de la population" (59).

Mehdi Lallaoui describes the period of 1976-1980 as one during which "il y a toujours les crimes racistes qui passent de la première génération pour toucher la deuxième" (in Bouamama 1995, 33). There is often no easy distinction to be made between personal, private memory and social (group) memory in such contexts, where the social memory of past examples of racist violence can be used by individuals to help interpret their own personal experience. Furthermore, Aichoune did not see the memories of 17th October and Charonne as mutually exclusive: "(l)e sang des uns ne peut laver celui des autres, nos racines sont sanguinolantes - et la mémoire ne peut faire son choix!" (60). Both events are included as historically linked.
The SF action fits in well with the descriptions of certain forms of intellectual intervention. Edward Said speaks of one mode adopted by intellectuals - "representing the suffering of your own people, testifying to its travails, reasserting its enduring presence, reinforcing its memory (...)" (1994, 23) (61). Reinstating the memory of immigration is part of the "prise de parole", of the refusal to be contained solely within the logic of economic production, and the occupation of a dominated role within that production, Polac arguing that : "(...) prendre la parole c'est faire déflection par rapport à l'ordre de l'immigration. Cet ordre exige déjà la soumission à l'exclusion du politique et à l'acceptation du provisoire" (1994, 362). Activists such as Driss El-Yazami (now president of the association Générales), are difficult to fit into some typologies which reduce intellectual intervention to petition-signing on the Left Bank (cf. Sirinelli 1990).

The prerequisite for SF-style intervention is the possession of the cultural capital of which most immigrants fall short in the French context. Eyerman's concept of "movement intellectuals" well describes the forms of intervention of those having carried the memory of 17th October in the late 1970s/early 1980s into the public sphere : Eyerman talks of "those individuals who gain the status and the self-perception of being 'intellectuals' in the context of their participation in political movements rather than through the institutions of the established culture" (1994, 15). With SF, there could be no neat separation between the 'cultural' and the 'political'. The cultural project of SF was one of the few examples of 'discours savant' and 'racisme vecu' no longer being isolated from each other, but rather in dialogue (cf. Jazouli 1986, 150-151). The SF's search for an autonomous political space in which to operate, was consonant with the antiracist and immigrant action of the 1970s-1980s, and is a defining feature of the vectors of the memory of 17th October today. In this last part, I shall examine some of the further uses of the memory of the massacre up to the present day.
Section Two (d): “Non au racisme, non à l’oubli. Pour le droit à la mémoire” (62)

To consider the vectors of the memory of 17th October today is to look at a wide range of associations and individuals with at times differing motives, and which situate themselves within various traditions of political intervention. In danger of becoming a ‘narrow’ memory (restricted to Algerians, their families, antiracist activists with close links to Algerian emigration, the far-left etc.), due to the occultation by the State, the right, the PS and the PCF, that memory is now widening out to touch other social groups. Namer (here summarizing Halbwachs) points out that

"(...) reinventer le souvenir c'est élargir en même temps les groupes porteurs de memoire et le contenu de cette memoire, reinventer c'est réintégrer ce qui autrefois n'avait été intégré, réactualiser ce qui était resté enkyste dans le tissu de la société à côté de sa memoire collective" (1994, 316).

Halbwachs's central thesis of the reconstruction of the past through the concerns of the present (cf. Section One) is vital here. In the context of the 1980s and 1990s, characterized by the centrality of the theme of 'immigration' in a hostile political discourse (cf. Bonnafous 1991) and the accompanying electoral rise of the Front national, then "de nouveaux groupes politiques (...) vont tenter de s'approprier cet événement resté jusque-là sans porte-parole collectif sur le territoire français" (Gaiti 1994, 20) (63). Gaiti (1994) describes the memory of 17th October as one of a "mémorie morale", which has come about due to the perception of the French State as continuing its practice of racism today. What is at stake today in the memory of colonial and postcolonial racism by various groups is "(...) davantage qu'une simple réparation, la reconnaissance (by the French State) de leur souffrance, cela seul devant peut-être permettre de mener à son terme le travail du deuil et de panser les plaies" (Dupuy 1994, 151). But as I argued in Section One, quoting from Jodelet (1993, 85), there is a complex relationship between past, present and future in the memory of 17th October. In spite of the flourishing associational activity since 1981 (law of 9th October
1981), it is unclear as to whether this memory is being transmitted to those in the *banlieues* who are often on the receiving end of what they judge to be racist violence.

The SF project, it will be remembered, sought to link the memory of 17th October to the racist violence and arbitrary State action of the late 1970s-early 1980s, and hence transcend the generational divide between primary immigrants and their daughters and sons, as well as political generations. The sociological concept of generation is not straightforward: Noiriel (1992, Chapter Four, 211-311 *passim*) has pointed out the problem of isolating analytically any second (and by inference) third generation of Maghrebian emigration. Generation, as Eyerman reminds us, "implies more than being born at approximately the same time: it suggests a commonality of experience which creates ground for shared outlook, a sense of collective destiny, that unites actors, even those who have never met" (1994, 70). With Maghrebian immigration the generations overlap considerably. Considerations linked to generation here would also have to include the decision by the vast majority of primary Maghrebian immigrants from the mid-1970s onwards to remain in France and the subsequent increased interest of their sons and daughters in their parents' histories (64).

When the collective action of the 1980s started (*Marche contre le racisme et pour l'égalité des droits*, 1983), some SF activists felt isolated by the demands of generational autonomy by many younger participants whose political socialization could not have included the 1970s (Polac 1991, 44). Bouamama now judges that within Maghrebian emigration in general, "la mémoire collective fait défaut" (1994, 31). Christian Delorme at the time declared that "Le "Mouvement beur" a une histoire" to remind the protesters of previous collective action (Delorme 1984). The result was for Bouamama that "(l)es marcheurs de 1983 sont les héritiers généralement inconscients de plusieurs décennies de luttes de l'immigration (1994, 230). Driss El-Yazami explains that the media reaction to the 1983 March was a gross simplification since it portrayed a seemingly 'clean'
generational break between parents and children, representing the parents as "une génération (...) qui avaient tout subi, tout accepté, qui étaient des esclaves, face à des jeunes qui allaient tout revolutionner" (65). Such reactions to media representations led to the founding in the 1980s of associations such as Génériques concerned with the history of immigration.

The relationship to the history of immigration and the legacy of previous struggles (which cannot be reduced to action against racism) was one on which the collective action against racism and for social justice of the 1980s was divided. Whilst these movements all sought political autonomy, some activists did seek to see the 1980s collective action as a progression from the MTA of the 1970s (cf. Bouamama 1995). This explains the reinvestment in the role of the memory of 17th October as a means of intergenerational cohesion from 1984 onwards (cf. Bouamama 1994). The Collectif Jeunes, supported by Radio-Beur and the Association de la Nouvelle Génération Immigrée (ANGI), commemorated the massacre by the Canal St. Martin on 17th October 1984. Farid Aichoune from Sans-Frontière/Radio Beur wrote of the massacre that "(c)'etait hier en plein Paris, c'etait nos meres, nos peres que l'on tuait; mais c'etait nous aussi, pour les plus äges d'entre nous" (66). Rather than directing demands at the State therefore, this assertion of a collective identity was an attempt to bring together an increasingly plural platform of demands at the time of Convergence N4. The Radio-Beur/ANIGI current stressed a history of emigration and its common sufferings during the Algerian War to mobilize around contemporary antiracism. The use of 17th October in this instance was criticized by other cultural projects such as Im'Media which, like Radio-Beur and ANGI, sought to influence the often hostile and simplifying media representations of young people of Maghrebian origin. Im'Média questioned the potentially exclusive rather than inclusive message of some of the appeals to the unity of a 'community' around the use of memory. For example, referring to Nacer Kettane's novel Le sourire de Brahim (1985), where the main character Brahim's trajectory takes him from the death of his brother on 17th October 1961 to the Marches of 1983-5 via 1970s
far-left activism. Im'Média asks "(y) a-t-il un lien et lequel entre les galérès des beurs et les luttes du FLN? Pour Brahim c'est évident. Ce ne l'est pas pour un fils de harkis" (67). The complex historical processes at work during the War and since could be over-simplified in a unitary rather than multi-voiced narrative, therefore.

These developments came at the same time as a reawakening on the mainstream left to the memory of the massacre, later helped by weakened Gaullist traditions after Mitterrand's election in 1981. As Einaudi recounts, the article in *Libération* on 17th October 1980 which triggered this memory was inspired by a critique of the different value systems on the left towards an antisemitism universally condemned after the terrorist attack of the rue Copernic (3rd October 1980) and, for the journalist Jean-Louis Péninou, the left's relative indifference to historical and contemporary forms of anti-Maghrebian racism in comparison (1991, 278-279) (68). It is perhaps indicative of the marginalization of the vectors of the memory of 17th October that the subsequent media (especially television) interest could affect a wide public overnight (as the aformentioned study by Coulon (1993) has shown), and that this media interest could pass over the way the memory has been kept alive within Algerian emigration in particular.

The multiplicity of memories at play in the mid-eighties is well shown by the 1985 commemorations of 17th October, of which there were three: the interest in the commemoration has not necessarily engaged a consensual representation of its contemporary signification. The small gathering by the *Union des travailleurs arabes* showed the relevance of the memory to older, mostly primary immigrants who could not identify with the more integrationist representations provided by SOS-Racisme, which was commemorating the massacre for the first time after its founding earlier that year (cf. Désir 1985). For Harlem Désir, although SOS-Racisme did not identify itself as being "sur la ligne communautariste", the "mémoire tronquée, niée de l'immigration en France" was
a theme with which its leaders were already familiar: the specific memory of the massacre came from the UNEF (within which both Julien Dray and Désir had previously been active) (69). The association asked the director Ariane Mnouchkine to imagine a *mise en scène* to commemorate the massacre: "(...) à la nuit tombante, une centaine de chaussures symbolisant les victimes de la répression ont été retirées des eaux du fleuve (the Seine) et posées sur un long tapis rouge représentant le sang versé" (70). Such innovative, more actively participative forms of commemoration are similar to those of the "counter monument" artistic movements in contemporary Germany (cf. Young 1993). The association’s aim to "faire un peu une espèce d’unité de la mémoire des mouvements antiracistes" has not proved totally successful (71). On the same day in 1985, other members of the *paysage antiraciste* (Radio-Beur, MRAP, *Conseil des Associations Immigrees en France*) gathered to commemorate 17th October, highlighting the divisions of the time within antiracism (cf. Bouamama 1994) when SOS-Racisme was under heavy criticism for its alleged attempts to monopolize antiracism.

The memory of 17th October has also been associated with activists who, taking an integrationist line, campaigned for young people of Maghrebian origin to take up the right to vote. For Abdel Aïssou, vice-president of the *Mouvement des droits civiques* (MDC)

"(...) pour un enfant issu de l’immigration maghrebine en France, vouloir comprendre octobre 1961, c’est tenter de dénouer l’écheveau contradictoire d’une présence: contradictoire parce que jamais posée sous l’angle d’une histoire acceptée comme commune" (72).

I would interpret "histoire commune" here as a colonial history in which all are implicated, rather than the attempt to impose a single reading of that history. The MDC organized a commemorative ceremony at Charonne on 17th October (cf. Einaudi 1991, 295) to illustrate this interpretation of a linked history - the Algerian War being of course at the root of both massacres.
Alongside these general, necessarily long-term forms of campaigning aimed at civil society, there are specific demands addressed to the State. The MRAP, which did not forget the 17th October (73), has campaigned with the MDC and _Au nom de la mémoire_ (ANM) for the opening of the State archives - which the Interior Ministry under successive right and leftwing governments has steadfastly refused. The associations have also looked to stress the importance of the study of the Algerian War in State schools (74), and the MRAP has called for "le jugement de Monsieur PAPON pour qu'il paie le prix de ces crimes" (75). The 1991 commemorations drew the largest media attention (76). The demonstrators on 17th October 1991, who followed the symbolic route from the Canal St.Martin to the Rex cinema, demanded "le droit à la mémoire", the right for this oppositional memory to be recognized by the State (77). It can perhaps now be said that the mainstream left (PS, PCF) recognizes this memory. The PCF's Claude Billard showed how the Party's period of silence on 1961 is now over:

"(t)rente ans apres, le 17 octobre est à la fois journée de souvenir et journée de lutte. En effet, cet hommage aux martyres d'hier, victimes du colonialisme, et l'action d'aujourd'hui pour la défense des droits et le respect de la dignité sont intimement liés" (78).

In an interesting reversal of previous situations, it would appear that the marginalized vectors of memory have ultimately come to impose in part their definition of the situation on a political party with a strong tradition of memory transmission according to its own narratives.

Yet it remains unclear as to what extent the violence in the _banlieues_ which many young people face and perceive as racist - whether originating in the security forces or individuals - is being integrated into this developing historical memory of colonial and postcolonial society. Abdelwahed Allouche, for example, argues that a true "mémoire collective" of such crimes is lacking, since there is no real collectivity to which young people in the suburbs refer (79). Allouche prefers the term "mémorisation", since it is less "globale" than mémoire collective, and is event-based. Patrick Champagne (1991) has shown how such a development is encouraged by the media reporting of (sub)urban violence, which seeks to
sensationalize the violence against the police and property, but which speaks less of the violence suffered at the hands of the police in return, imposing fixed narratives for the interpretation of violence of which each successive confrontation is presented as being merely the epiphenomenon.

**Section Two (e) : Towards some conclusions**

The memory of 17th October, in looking at the history of immigration and of racist crimes, has sought to work on two levels : firstly that of the social memory within postcolonial immigration, and secondly that of French society more generally. In both cases, the vectors of memory have been marginalized, but for different reasons. The reasons behind the marginalization of the vectors within the French 'memory activists' were ideological, since the intellectuals (university teachers, students, writers) whose social position enabled transmission of this memory within their restricted groups, were largely rejected by mainstream political parties. The changing rôle of intellectuals over the past few decades would also have to be taken into account (cf. Bauman 1987). The socio-economic position of Algerian emigration on the other hand, meant that there were few holders of this memory with the cultural capital in the French context to be listened to. Those of Maghrebian origin who have sought to spread the memory of 17th October have often been university educated (whether in the Maghreb or in France). In relation to the memory of racist crimes today, some effort would be needed to incorporate the voice of the excluded from the cités into such a memory.

Thus far, the postcolonial slant on memory has been based on the Maghreb, with Algeria in particular. Associations such as *Au nom la mémoire* (ANM) do however try to bring memories together : the analytical separation here between a 'French' and an 'Algerian' memory could forget that these memories are jointly of the colonial period, even if these experiences that they
provoked are still very different. Writing on the fiftieth anniversary of the Sétif massacre (1945), the ANM president Mehdi Lallaoui declared that:

"(c)ontre les haines de tous bords, la mémoire, elle aussi, est un enjeu pour la démocratie. Faire oeuvre de mémoire pour nous, est un acte d'éducation antiraciste élémentaire, car les fondements de ces concepts de supériorité sont nourris par les aventures coloniales. (...) Nous pensons qu'une histoire partagée et acceptée par tous contribuera au respect de l'autre et, d'une certaine façon, à une reconciliation des peuples des deux rives de la Méditerranée" (80).

Although it may be a long time before these memories are shared, the historical vision here is forward looking. Without any myth of progress, this conception of memory and history is concerned with the past (what happened, what was covered up), with the present (since linking the colonial to the postcolonial and its attendant forms of racism), and the future - as part of a constructive critique of contemporary society and the recognition that there is a plurality of experiences which have to be given equal weight before any attempt to bring them together can be made. Whilst Mongin's critique of the contemporary use of memory as a substitute for any coherent vision of the future may be true generally (1994, 63-66 passim), Lallaoui's statement in fact shows the very articulation between "fondation" and "present" which Mongin calls for (but of which he sees few examples) (ibid., 154-155).

Based on the memory of a colonial praxis which produced an interwoveness of the 'universal' and the 'particular', all the calls to memory we have seen in this Section do more than address demands vertically towards the State: these demands are symbolically very important, demanding the recognition of previous discriminatory action, the disclosure of information etc. (81). But so too is the horizontal, transversal function of the cultivation of memory within civil society, and which works to solidify internal bonds within social groups, to form collective identities, and then to transmit these memories to those social groups whose solidarity had been lacking, suggesting solidarity in the present should come out of a recognition of the sufferings of the past. Such a function exists without the State playing any major rôle. Both Sections One and
Two illustrate the problematical transmission of memory both within social groups (across generations, for example) and between social groups. The difficult articulation of memory transmission between social groups and the national collectivity has also been illustrated where the State refuses to recognize the events which are to be commemorated (17th October), or/and where the State produces its own official version(s) as a substitute for a real assessment of the historic(al) significance of past events (Vichy participation in the Holocaust, for example). Contemporary antiracism obviously addresses other, linked issues - socio-economic inequality, for example. Those in precarious economic situations may not perceive the 'memory activism' within antiracism as entirely relevant to their lives. But the questions of historical agency which the memory issue raises are applicable to all the domains of antiracism analyzed in the thesis. And where antiracism becomes a question of the affirmation of historical agency, then the forms it takes develop well beyond any 'doubling' of racism.

The problem of the cultivation of memory within antiracism today is that this discourse could be 'recuperated' by the dominant, State-based commemorative discourse which seeks to impose its own official version. The potential radicality of the memory of 17th October risks this submersion into a watered-down call of State-led reconciliation or PS or PCF commemoration (cf. Giudice in Woodall 1993). Todorov's scepticism over the current use of the theme of memory, quoted in the introduction, has led him to provide a response. He insists on the need to put each event to be remembered in relation to one another (1993, 43-44). The crime writer Didier Daeninckx has attempted to do just that in *Meurtres pour mémoire* (1984), where Vichy is figured alongside 17th October, and the personal trajectories of the main characters, whether as victims or perpetrators, condense the historical events of the past half century. Calling for a "pédagogie de la mémoire qui reste à inventer", Daniel Lindenberg warns against any simplification of history within the call to memory:

"(u)n simple catéchisme antifasciste, anticolonialiste et antiraciste, ne saurait suffire. En revanche, la confrontation des mémoires entretenues par des groupes différents (nous ne disons pas "communautés") qui coexistent et parfois s'affrontent - jusqu'au sein d'une même famille, (...)"
voire d'un même individu - constituerait un premier pas vers l'élaboration d'une telle pédagogie" (1993, 30).

In this way the parallels and the differences between key historical events central to antiracism could be brought out, rather than Vichy antisemitism treated as the same practice as anti-Maghrebian racism during the Algerian War (or since).

This attempt to articulate the various forms of racism could bring in turn a more coherent synthesis between the various levels and areas of production of antiracism studied in the thesis, which have at times pursued paths which diverged, rather than converged (cf. Chapters Three, Four, Five). The 'memory activism' analyzed here starts off from the memory of racism as practice, to then become a discourse worked and reworked in the light of subsequent historical developments, a reconstruction which is inevitable, as Halbwachs showed. Such discourses avoid the over-abstract nature of those not founded on practice. As a struggle for the definition of the situation, of the adoption of a new historical narrative and hence an assertion of agency, antiracist memory activism addresses historical agency in innovative and exciting ways, even if one must be realistic about the speed with which such inevitably long-term campaigns will bear fruit. The different temporalities, rhythms and interdependencies of social discourses are complex, as we have seen in this Chapter. This thesis has tried to indicate the multivocality of these discourses within antiracism around the themes of equality, solidarity and the right of individuals and groups to define their contingent situations, away from the assigned identities often forced on them. The social memories studied here trace a path from the reactive to the proactive, and have brought hopes for the future from tragic historical circumstances.
Notes to Chapter Six

(1) Halbwachs used the term *mémoire sociale* instead of *mémoire collective* in some of his unpublished work (Namer 1994, 320).

(2) There is also a positivistic and overly empirical slant to Halbwachs' conception of historical studies, one which portrays history in terms of 'truthful' narratives, again dating his work somewhat in the light of (amongst others) White (1978), and Rancière (1992).

(3) Nora points out that Halbwachs' typology of a "histoire nationale" on one hand and a "histoire des groupes" on the other refers to a period (the Third Republic) during which the State's rôle was to "assurer l'équilibre d'ensemble et de faire accepter par tous sa politique et ses lois ; et pour les individus de négocier les modalités de leur adhésion et le degré de leur engagement dans ce credo collectif et fondateur du lien social", and that this articulation between national and sub-national groups no longer pertains in the same way today (Nora 1992, 1006-1007). Halbwachs' original typology is retained here to allow a discussion of what I see to be the conflicting projects between the last vestiges of this 'national project' and the counter-hegemonic use of memory within antiracism.

(4) 'Oppositional' memory comes from Fentress and Wickham (1992, 135). Not all organizational vectors of memory will be oppositional in relation to the State and dominant attitudes, hence the use here of three categories.

(5) The surfeit of media representations of the Holocaust has led Hartman to complain that the event can now appear "weightless", as if devoid of its historical reality (1994, 11).


(8) Gaiti's article (1994) is the first academic work of any length devoted specifically to 17th October. Journalistic research (cf. Levine 1985, Einaudi 1991) has played a substantial rôle in establishing the chronology of events, a rough figure for the numbers killed, and highlighting the official denials that followed. As Gaiti herself says (1994), this research interest shows the evolution of the status of the event, away from the testimonies of the time to a more 'lucid' approach to the history of the Algerian War (cf. Stora 1992, 1992b).
(9) For how this memory was cultivated in Marseille, see Jordi, Sayad and Temime (1991, 7, 71). For Hamoumou (1993, 144) "(l)a répression des "émeutes de mai 1945" fait partie de la mémoire collective des Algériens musulmans".

(10) AMRAP 5, speech to Journée Nationale, 10 juin 1956.


(14) AGPS, meeting of 18th October 1961.

(15) AGPS, meetings of 30th October and 7th November 1961


(17) AGPS, meeting of 7th November: André Chandernagor declared that the number of corpses in the Seine had grown considerably. Even those hostile to the FLN realized that "(l)es informations qui nous ont été fournies par la presse ne sont pas complètes. Il y a certainement 20 ou 30 morts (...)" (Arthur Conte at GPS meeting, 18th October).

(18) ADCM, 2M 1.1, Compte-rendu de la réunion du bureau national (PSU) du 18 octobre 1961.


(20) ADCM, 2M 1.1, Compte-rendu de la réunion du bureau national (PSU) du 02 novembre 1961.

(21) "Face à la répression", reproduced in LTM No.187, décembre 1961, pp.784-802.

(22) "Ratonnades à Paris", Cahiers Libres, No.29, 1961, p.45.
(23) Interviewed by Frank Eskenazi in *Libération*, 12-13 octobre 1991, p.27.


(28) The PCF's Robert Ballanger (who with UDSR deputy Eugène Claudius Petit did the most to discredit the government's version of events in the Assemblee Nationale), declared for example that "(h)eureusement que la réaction populaire, celle des organisations syndicales, des groupements démocratiques, est venue apporter le témoignage que notre pays n'est mur ni pour le racisme ni pour le fascisme" (JODP 31 octobre 1961, *Assemblee nationale*, 3e seance du 30 octobre, p.3613).


(30) MRAP *Appel* (early 1962): "Depuis des semaines, l'action du peuple monte et s'unifie (...)"


(34) Interview with Albert Lévy, Paris 18th September 1995.

(35) Interview with Daniel Mayer, Orsay 12th July 1995.


(37) In response to the question "(e)st-il vrai que, pendant la guerre d'Algérie, lors d'une manifestation pacifique d'Algériens de la région parisienne, plus d'une centaine de manifestants ont été tués par la police et de nombreux corps jetés dans la Seine?", 55% said 'yes', 33 % 'no' and 12% did not reply (Coulon 1993, 17). A similar question on Charonne produced responses of 77%, 11% and 12% respectively. Coulon adds that the 'yes' responses to the 17th October question are probably artificially high, due to the survey having been undertaken shortly after the 30th anniversary of 17th October (cf. infra) (*ibid*, 28).
(38) Interview with Albert Lévy, Paris 18th September 1995.

(39) Quoted in Heurgon (1994, 374).


(41) Stora (1992, 224) quotes Alain Geismar as saying that the May '68 slogan ""CRS-SS" qui pouvait passer pour excessif évoquait pour nous les massacres d'Algériens". For Einaudi (1991, 277), during the 1970s "le souvenir en est (of 17th October) cependant préservé dans les milieux PSU et "gauchistes", actifs à l'époque, et par quelques personnalités". For Harlem Désir, the memory of 17th October was transmitted within the UNEF - "ça faisait partie de notre culture politique" (interview, Paris 25th August 1995).


(43) L'Humanité, 14 février 1963. See also L'Humanité, 13 février 1964 and 08 février 1972. L'Humanité's attack on Roger Frey, Interior Minister during both 17th October and Charonne, does give equal weight to both massacres (15 septembre 1964). There is no first anniversary of 17th October in L'Humanité in October 1962. For the PCF's interpretation of its reaction at the time, see Jean-Michel Cordier "Ce soir-là, il pleuvait", L'Humanité, 17 octobre 1991, p.2.

(44) Media interest picks up again in the early eighties (cf. infra).

(45) 03 février 1983.


(47) Stora has shown how, if the first amnesty texts were issued by decree in March 1962 and incorporated into the Évian agreements (1992, 281), the December 1964 amnesty was voted by the Assemblée Nationale, as was the law of 24th July 1968 which ended all criminal affairs linked to the "events" (ibid., 215).


(49) See the testimonies in Anne Tristan's article in Le Monde, 20-21 octobre 1991, and also Stora (1992a, 311-313 passim).

(50) Presented at the Venice festival in 1962, and at Cannes in 1963, the film was first shown privately in October 1962 and then seized. See "Il y a un an ...", DL No.213, 15 octobre-15 novembre 1962, p.3 and supra, note 36.

(52) Bernard Cohen in *Libération*, 17 octobre 1985, p.16.


(56) This and all following quotes from the letter : BDIC, Fonds Said Bouziri, Microfiche 214/4, *Lettre à un camarade en prison*.

(57) This is not to say that the groups listed here have not been active in keeping alive the memory of 17th October.

(58) "Mémoires", *Sans Frontière*, No.84, mars 1984, p.27.


(60) "Le temps des charognes", *Sans Frontière*, No.49, 12-18 février 1982, p.5.

(61) Tahar Ben Jelloun has expressed similar comments : "(c)'est un privilège pour un Maghrébin vivant en France de ne pas subir directement, sur son propre corps, le racisme ordinaire. Un privilège amer. (...) A la limite, pourquoi écrire sur le racisme quand il contourne-votre corps? J'ai évoqué plus haut des voix et des visages. Ils sont miens chaque fois qu'une main ou un regard les froisse et les interrompt" (1984, 157).


(63) Gaiti probably exaggerates the exclusive nature of such concerns.

(64) Several of the 'memory activists' to have revealed important information about Vichy have experienced Vichy personally - for example Maurice Rajsfus and Michel Slitinsky.


"Mémoire floue pour un manifeste", Im'Média, No.2, printemps 1985, p.45. The loss of the memory of women's experiences of 17th October is also a danger - see however Anne Tristan's "La répression de la manifestation algérienne à Paris", Le Monde, 20-21 octobre 1991, p.2.

Péninou, reviewing Hamon and Rotman's study on the "porteurs de valises" (1979), refers to 1960 rather than 1961 as the date of the massacre ("Les clandestins français et la Guerre d'Algérie", Libertéon, 18 octobre 1979, pp.13-14). His colleague Éric Favereau talks of the "ratonnades d'octobre 1962" ("Divergences 1985", Libertéon, 17 octobre 1985, p.16). This shows the imprecise memory of 17th October 1961 handed down on the mainstream left. Pierre Paraf, for example, talks of his involvement at the time in the campaigns in support of "(...) les Maghrébins auxquels la guerre d'Algérie allait rendre le séjour en France de plus en plus difficile (la fusillade du métro Charonne provoquant une juste indignation)" (1988, 182).

Interview with Harlem Désir, Paris 25th August 1995. Désir adds: with 17th October "il y a un peu tout ce qui se rejoint. Maurice Papon - donc un ancien de Vichy - la Préfecture de Police, le black-out sur l'information (...)".


The main publications were Einaudi (1991), Tristan (1991), "17 octobre 1961 : ce jour-là", Libertéon, 12-13 octobre 1991, pp.21-28. ANM organized a conference at the Sorbonne and the placing of a monument at Bézons (Hauts-de-Seine), where several bodies were washed up in the days following 17th October.


(79) "Les jeunes des banlieues et la mémoire des crimes sécuritaires", Hommes et migrations, No.1158, octobre, pp.6-9, p.6. Allouche asserts (ibid., 7) that young people in the poor suburbs "(...) ne constituent pas une communauté ethnique, religieuse ou socio-professionnelle bien délimitée", using the Halbwachsian notion that if such essential frameworks of memory are missing, then there will be little social memory. As Dubet (1987), Aichoune (1991) and Begag and Delorme (1994) have shown, the uniting reference point is in fact spatial - that of belonging to one place (cité), hence the nature of the protests which arise after a bavure. The problem is that today there are few links between different cités, whereas the successive marches of 1983-1985 had brought about a nation-wide consciousness of racism as experienced by young people in the cités (Bouamama 1994, 36-37). It should be noted that not all analysts share the same position. Body-Gendrot, for example, argues that "(...) la construction médiatique fait d'un problème local un problème national et général" (1993, 14) : the problem being just how that "problem" is then defined, one often not from the perspective of young people in the cités.

(80) Libération, 08 mai 1995, p.22.

(81) See also L’État assassine, meurtres racistes et sécuritaires, Hors série Réflexes, N°1, 1992.
Chapter Seven: Conclusion
Conclusion

This thesis has engaged with antiracism as practice, ideology, and discourse, and has sought to show the articulation between these three aspects of antiracism in specific historical contexts. As stated in Chapter One, the idea was to write antiracism into contemporary French history as a significant and not merely marginal theme, and to redress the balance between the numerous studies on racism and the relative paucity of research on antiracism. The thesis was born out of the idea that today’s antiracism has to engage with the past. If this engagement should be a critical one in relation to traditional national republican narratives (cf. Chapters Two, Six), it could also be a constructive examination of previous forms of antiracism to assess where and how it has been able to challenge various forms of racism. Furthermore, for those situating themselves within the definition of republican antiracism (cf. Chapter Two), reflections on past failures to mobilize could possibly indicate the importance of listening to the experiences of racialized groups who are politically, economically and socially marginalized.

In Chapter One, I outlined three specific themes around which the thesis was based. The first of these was an examination of the relationship between antiracism and republican political culture over the past century. Throughout, I have highlighted certain themes within this political culture which suggest that as the dominant political culture, republicanism could only be formulated together with antiracism at the price of certain compromises over liberté, égalité, and fraternité. Where republican antiracism embraced assimilationism - even where this was apparently an effective counter-discourse to overtly racist themes of inassimilabilité - this failed to remove relations of power between dominant and oppressed groups (immigrants, colonial subjects). Similar comments were made for the themes of patriotism, nationalism and the colonial ‘mission’. Using vague arguments on individual human rights has led republican antiracism into metasocial discourses not grounded in specific social relations: this has left
antiracist discourse open to récupération by mainstream parties of the left (or right). Only in the 1950s was there a closer articulation between social, political and economic rights in concrete situations (for example the MRAP campaigns in favour of Algerians in the 1950s - cf. Chapter Five). The theme of the equality of rights was understandably retained by the new forms of antiracist mobilization of the 1980s (cf. Bouamama 1994). Mobilizations such as the 1983 Marche contre le racisme et pour l'égualité des droits well illustrated the way in which social movements can reinvest old themes with new meanings (cf. Melucci 1988). Similar comments could be made about the concept citoyenneté : the Revolutionary heritage is therefore being constantly reworked and is far from monolithic. Balibar’s concept of égaliberté (cf. Chapter Two) has been used to show how liberté and égalité have to be thought of as intimately linked. The final two chapters of the thesis have stressed the usefulness of solidarité (rather than fraternité - cf. Chapter Two) : solidarité can mobilize racialized and non-racialized groups by highlighting the necessary involvement of everyone in political struggles, and is now widely used in contemporary antiracist discourse.

I have suggested that republican antiracism’s highpoint was the period to 1945. Since then, fundamental changes have undermined the primacy of the nation-state upon which republicanism was based (decolonization, de-industrialization, globalization, European construction) (cf. Silverman 1992, Touraine 1992, Wieviorka 1993), although the invocation of the nation-state is still heard today to justify stricter controls on who enters France, and who becomes a French citizen (cf. Nair 1994) . Disillusionment with the idea of Progress (cf. Bauman 1991, 1991a, Mongin 1994) has been translated into increased disaffection with the traditional parties of the left (SFIO/PS, PCF). Republican antiracism has always held a conflictual relationship with such parties (cf. Chapters Three, Five, Six). A multiplication of the sites of political action outside the traditional left since 1968 has proved the relevance of the search for autonomous antiracist action. Innovations in the forms of campaigning have transformed those organizations such as the MRAP still situating themselves
within primarily republican references and support for the left. Recent academic debates on antiracism have reflected this preoccupation with rethinking both the role of republican institutions and that of the left (Taguieff 1996, Wieviorka 1993). I suggested in the above paragraph the directions this discussion might take, in the light of the conclusions to the thesis.

The second aim of the thesis was to study in some depth the conflictual transitionary period from the colonial to the postcolonial, closely linked to the third aim of the thesis, which was to include a history of the production of antiracism from within the anticolonial and anti-imperial political movements which, with hindsight, can be said to have been so instrumental in this same transition. The points of tension this period (1920s to 1960s) saw between republican antiracism and racialized colonized groups, has been given considerable attention in the main body of the thesis (Chapters Four to Six). Here, I will summarize the possible lessons for antiracism from such a study.

Republican antiracism slowly came to accept the plurality of perspectives on racism which anticolonial groups brought. An acceptance of the plurality of definitions and experiences of racism serves to highlight the multiple sights of production of racism and antiracism, showing that definitions of racism have to be based on specific situations and social relations (notwithstanding the working definition of racism outlined in Chapter One). Opposition to colonial racism started off from racism as practice to then expand definitions and analyses, rather than theorizing from the abstract. In so doing, the interplay between ‘race’ and class was shown much more clearly than within republican antiracism. The problems of agency that beset the action of the LDRN, for example (cf. Chapter Four), illustrated the double marginalization of antiracism on one level (cf. Chapter Three), and of colonized groups within antiracism on another. This idea of a ‘double marginality’ can still be applied, for example, to racialized groups such as those of Maghrebian origin in France. I have tried to show that there has been a long history in France of opposition to colonial racism (1), one which
interests antiracism not simply in the sense of writing a fuller history of such forms of protest, but also of learning from the way in which this protest was able to show "dés-identification" (Pêcheux 1975) more clearly than antiracist groups situating themselves exclusively within the republican tradition.

Both methodologically and empirically, I have looked at a wide range of areas and levels of production of antiracism (and racism), and have tried to refute approaches to analyzing antiracism in terms of simplistic binary categories of 'universalism' or 'particularism' (cf. Chapter One). Rather than antiracism being simply a 'double' of racism, I have suggested that there will be any number of different forms of racism at a given moment with which antiracism will be engaged, and that just as antiracism reworks previous arguments to fit new contexts, so does racism. I therefore see the cultural racism prevalent in the FN discourse as a hybrid mixture of old cultural essentialism from colonial times reformulated into the new historical situation of postcolonialism, with a largely unchanged current of antisemitism still present. Social discourse, of whatever nature, usually presents a complex combination of temporalities. Antiracism should beware the analysis of racism in terms of 'peaks' and 'troughs', since this is often attached to an analysis of the most visible areas of production of racism such as political parties, and can hide the permanence of racism within everyday social relations (although the FN has undoubtedly served to exacerbate these levels of already existing hostility), or the actions of the State. Whilst studying these forms and levels of hostility is vital, just as vital are the lessons to have come from those, from racialized groups or not, who have suggested that solidarity and egalitarian values should be the basis for social relations.

Note to Chapter Seven
(1) Opposition to racism in the colonies has of course a long history - cf. Sala-Molins (1992), Biondi and Morin (1992).
Appendices: Bibliography and archive sources
BIBLIOGRAPHY AND ARCHIVE SOURCES

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Bibliotheque de l’Institut d’Etudes Politiques, Paris  
Bibliotheque nationale, Paris and Versailles  
Bibliotheque Sainte-Geneviève, Paris  
Centre de documentation juive contemporaine, Paris  
Centre d’Information et d’Etudes sur les Migrations Internationales, Paris  
Fondation nationale des sciences politiques, Archives d’histoire contemporaine, Paris  
Institut du Monde arabe, Paris  
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2. ARCHIVES

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