Negotiating Jewishness: Identity and Citizenship in the Leeds Jewish Community

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The candidate confirms that the work submitted is her own and that appropriate credit has been given where reference has been made to the work of others.

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Abstract

In the last few years, multicultural citizenship, once hailed as a solution to national cohesion, has faced increasing political and academic accusations of inciting segregation and group divisions. This has prompted a re-evaluation of different institutional and discursive arrangements of national citizenship and their impact on the integration of minority ethnic groups. This research into the history of Jewish integration into British society analyses the relationship between changing forms of British citizenship and the evolution of British Jewish identities. In so doing, it enhances our understanding of how citizenship policies affect minority self-representation and alter trajectories of integration into mainstream society.

The research draws on an historical and sociological analysis of the Jewish community in Leeds to reveal how the assimilationist and ethnically defined citizenship of Imperial Britain conditioned the successful Jewish integration into a particular formula of Jewish identity, 'private Jewishness and public Englishness', which, in the second part of the 20th century, was challenged by multicultural citizenship. The policies of multiculturalism, aimed at the political recognition and even encouragement of ethnic, racial and religious diversity, prompted debates about private-public expressions of ethnic/religious and other minority identities, legitimating alternative visions of Jewish identity and supporting calls for the democratisation of community institutions. The thesis argues that the national policies of multiculturalism were crucial in validating multiple 'readings' of national and minority identity that characterise the present day Leeds Jewish community.

Employing a multi-method approach, the study demonstrates how the social and geographical contexts of social actors, in particular their positions within the minority group and the mainstream population, enable multiple 'readings' of sameness and differences. In particular, the research explores how a wealth of interpretations of personal and collective Jewish identities manifests itself through a selective and contextualised usage of different narratives of citizenship.
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Special thanks go to numerous members of the Leeds Jewish Community for offering to be interviewed and for sharing their experiences and opinions.
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<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>BHH</td>
<td>Beth Hamidrash Hagadot Synagogue (Orthodox)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Bnei Brith</td>
<td>International Jewish Organisation that promotes interaction among Jews of all denominations through social and cultural activities</td>
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<tr>
<td>Brodetsky</td>
<td>Leeds Jewish Voluntary Aided Primary School (Orthodox)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Eruv</td>
<td>A symbolic wall around the community that involves the creation of a closed boundary and symbolises the extension of one's private domain, which allows some relaxation of the Shabbat observance.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Etz Chaim</td>
<td>An Orthodox Synagogue</td>
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<td>Goy/-im</td>
<td>A Jewish term used to describe non-Jews</td>
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<tr>
<td>Haver(haverim)</td>
<td>Friend (friends) in Hebrew</td>
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<tr>
<td>Halakhah</td>
<td>Jewish law</td>
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<tr>
<td>HSFA</td>
<td>Holocaust Survivors Friendship Association, a regional association of Holocaust survivors and their relatives/friends</td>
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<td>JC</td>
<td>Jewish Chronicle, a national London-based Jewish weekly</td>
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<td>JG</td>
<td>Jewish Gazette</td>
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<tr>
<td>JPR</td>
<td>Jewish Policy Research Institute, a London-based research think-tank that, since its foundation in 1996, has generated a number of valuable national and localised studies of British Jewish life.</td>
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<tr>
<td>LJCS</td>
<td>Leeds Jewish Care Services, a communal social services organisation, which receives funding from LJWB, Leeds City Council and private funders.</td>
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<td>LJHA</td>
<td>Leeds Jewish Housing Association is a Jewish led, minority ethnic housing association, providing homes for the local Jewish Community.</td>
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<tr>
<td>LJRC</td>
<td>Leeds Jewish Representative Council, an umbrella organisation, which consists of representatives of most Leeds Jewish organisations and which functions as the main liaison with the outside world</td>
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<td>Acronym</td>
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<tr>
<td>LJWB</td>
<td>Leeds Jewish Welfare Board, a communal welfare and social services organisation</td>
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<tr>
<td>Lubavitch</td>
<td>– a strictly Orthodox direction in Judaism, which encourages secular Jews to 'return' back to Judaism</td>
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<tr>
<td>Makor</td>
<td>The Leeds Jewish Cultural and Resource Centre</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Masorti</td>
<td>British conservative direction in Judaism that retains a traditional structure of the religious service, but allows some modern 'updates' in other matters</td>
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<tr>
<td>MAZCC</td>
<td>Marjory and Arnold Ziff Community Centre</td>
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<tr>
<td>Menorah</td>
<td>Leeds Jewish Independent School (strictly Orthodox)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pesah</td>
<td>Jewish holiday of Passover that celebrates the exodus of Jewish people from Egypt in ancient times</td>
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<tr>
<td>The Zone</td>
<td>Leeds Jewish youth club/centre</td>
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<tr>
<td>UHC</td>
<td>United Hebrew Congregation Synagogue (Orthodox)</td>
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<tr>
<td>UJIA</td>
<td>United Jewish Israeli Appeal, British Jewish Charity that provides funds for various projects in Israel</td>
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<tr>
<td>WIZO</td>
<td>Women’s International Zionist Organisation, the largest international organisation caring for women, children, which consists of multiple local autonomous charity</td>
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<tr>
<td>YEN</td>
<td>Yorkshire Evening News</td>
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<td>YEP</td>
<td>Yorkshire Evening Press</td>
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Chapter One

Introduction: Jewish identities in the context of Britishness

1.1. The crisis of multiculturalism and ‘model minorities’

Issues of national identity, citizenship, integration and inter-communal relations are not new to British public and academic discourse, yet they continue to grasp attention and dominate the present political agenda. These debates have intersected with the many-sided notion of ‘community’, the multiple interpretations of which have very different implications for the integration of minority groups. In the 1980s, high levels of ethnic diversity, particularly in inner-city areas, and a long history of anti-racist political struggle for equality, promoted multiculturalism and diversity into political and academic discourses, while the 1990s brought the institutionalisation of multiculturalism as a general recipe for a multi-ethnic society (Malik 2001: 4). The inauguration of the Labour Government in 1997, with its electoral slogan of a ‘Cool Britannia’, which proclaimed a new concept of national identity as a ‘community of communities’ in which cultural diversity was to be celebrated, was, perhaps, a pinnacle moment in the history of British multiculturalism (Singh 2003: 40). More recently, however, the celebratory and self-congratulatory tone of the political discourse has been abandoned. Two very different problems – the current flow of Eastern European economic migrants and the rise of Islamic fundamentalism, which is associated in the public imagination with terrorist activities – have once again raised social anxiety about the ‘alien other’.

Whereas the problem of ‘excessive’ immigration has been an established, periodically reoccurring theme in British political discourse, the issue of alienation and extremism amongst British born descendants of immigrants is seen as a new socio-political problem that requires a new solution. A renewed search for the ‘correct’ citizenship formula is quintessentially about finding the right balance between democratic values which respect people’s rights to be different (now understood as a part of their intrinsic ‘human rights’) and the necessity to nurture a sense of national unity based on British distinctiveness, which implies some homogenisation of its population. This throws a different light on the experience of home-grown ‘model minorities’, such as the Irish or
the Jews, who are often portrayed as a successful case of 'integration without assimilation'.

One of the recent supporters of this view, and a former fervent advocate of multiculturalism, is the British Chief Rabbi, Sir Jonathan Sacks, who makes a direct connection between successful Jewish integration and the old concept of 'Britishness'. According to Sacks, it was 'a genuine British identity' that provided Jewish people with 'something to integrate into' and made them proud to be British. Disappointed in multiculturalism, Sacks has now joined the ranks of its critics:

Multiculturalism, the great British experiment, has genuinely failed. ... We now know that it encourages people not to integrate, not to learn the history, language, customs, and culture of the host society. And, therefore, that policy, which was designed to generate social inclusion, has, in fact, created social exclusion.

Today, number one, there is no British identity ... there is nothing to integrate into except a culture of consumerism, teenage pregnancies, kids drinking too much, soccer hooligans... (Sacks 2005).

Such a 'reading' of the British Jewish past puts the Jewish experience in line with the contemporary multicultural backlash (Mitchell 2004: 641) as it provides a sympathetic understanding, on behalf of a minority group, of today's reviving assimilationist pressures. At the same time, it downplays the historic importance of discrimination and anti-Semitism, both institutional and cultural, that, as will be demonstrated in this thesis, gave a much stronger impetus for the Jewish immigrants to 'blend in' to British society. Sack's presentation of history is also economical with another inconvenient fact that is related to the true cost of 'success' to the Jewish community, namely, that the Jewish socio-economic ascent into the mainstream of society was mirrored by their staggering rate of total assimilation. Although neo-assimilationist champions have pledged to retain the institutional achievements of multiculturalism, such as minority equal rights and non-discrimination, their discourse has, at times, become reminiscent of past approaches to integration. This underlines the importance of critically reassessing the past experience of established minority groups such as the Jews.

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1 *Assimilation* here is understood as a process through which members of an ethno-cultural group (such as immigrants, or minority groups) voluntary or through force lose original differentiating traits and adopt the customs and attitudes of the prevailing culture. This is one of the ways that minority groups could become *integrate*, i.e., included in the mainstream of the society while sharing equal opportunities, rights and services with other members of the mainstream of the society.
1.2. Theories of immigrant integration and the established minorities

Public views on the virtues and faults of particular policies of national integration are contested. They nevertheless, share one primary assumption. There is a common belief in the potency of political measures if not to resolve, then at least to influence, the path of immigrant absorption. This position is also shared by many scholars, who agree that the discursive and institutional frameworks of a recipient country are vital factors in determining the routes to immigrant integration (Alba and Nee 2003). Both the identities of newcomers and their paths of integration are conceptualised as responsive to the national institutional and cultural imperatives of the host society. Starting from Roger Brubaker (1992, 1996), such scholars as Charles Tilly (2000), John Rex (1996) and Christian Joppke (1999) have investigated how different citizenship models (understood both institutionally and discursively) affect social mobility, residential patterns, political mobilisation, group organisations and the identity of new immigrants. Academic studies have also linked the emergence of multiple patterns and outcomes of contemporary immigrant integration to the segmentation and differentiation of the societal ‘mainstream’ (Portes and Zhou 1993).

However, contemporary theories, explaining recent waves of immigration, have had little to say about other social groups. Most of the current academic research into citizenship is focused on the first two generations of immigrants, thereby neglecting the impact of citizenship practices on the rest of society, which includes the so-called settled and ‘successfully integrated’ minority groups. Yet, if we accept contemporary understandings of identities as relational and contextual (Woodward 1997) and recognise today’s broad definition of citizenship as including both institutional and discursive practices (Koopmans and Statham 2000), then we have to treat citizenship practices as an important social environment for all social actors. Commenting on the different ways in which a modern nation state deals with incoming minorities, Rex (1996) observed that, in the process of immigrant incorporation, the collective identities and behavioural patterns of the host population change as well. Then, by extension, one can assume that these changes could affect the lives of established minority groups, such as third and fourth generation British Jews, in a dual way – as individual citizens and as bearers of a minority identity. The conclusion that follows is that all minority groups, albeit in different ways, are dependent on the national formula of peoplehood and on how the ‘significant other’ (Triandafyllidou 2001:11) is defined and treated. For instance, in the first part of the 20th century in the US, the Jews and the Irish were not
considered as part of ‘white’ American mainstream, but the arrival of non-European immigrants changed this and the concept of ‘whiteness’ was stretched to incorporate these groups. Since the external and internal images of a minority are interdependent, changes in the citizenship framework will influence the status and self-definition of its members, irrespective of how long the group has been living in the host society. Thus, an analysis of changes in national citizenship provides important clues to ‘why’ and ‘how’ their identities are formed and changed. This is the primary research interest of this study. Using a case study of the Jewish community in Leeds in the UK, this research demonstrates that, just like new immigrant groups, established religious and ethnic minorities are susceptible to changes in the institutional and discursive settings of citizenship.

1.3. Understanding the complexities of British Jewish identities

In the popular discourse British Jewry is often depicted as a model minority that has successfully accomplished the task of integration leaving all identity problems in the past. This characterisation very often implies that British Jews are a monolithic and secure minority, while British Jewish identities are considered as stable, fixed and unproblematic in relation to mainstream British identities. Once the Jewish population joined the ranks of the middle and upper middle class, enjoying relative wealth and prosperity in the eyes of British public, they became a well-respected minority. They are certainly the last to be thought of as immigrants. Yet, if this present depiction of British Jews is compared with the anti-Semitic, anti-alien discourses of the beginning of the 20th century, the contrast is striking. The mass immigration of East European Jews at the end of the 19th century was viewed with fear and disgust. Jewish immigrants were customarily described as an ‘alien race’, not compatible with the ‘British stock’, while their ‘invasion’ of the British Isles was presented as a real threat to the nation (Winder 2004).

The self-image of British Jewry has also been changing. For at least a century, Jewish leaders in Britain struggled, both outside and inside the community, to promote a purely ‘religious’ definition of this minority. They portrayed Jews in Britain as the ‘English of Jewish persuasion’ and fought fiercely against their depiction in racial or ethnic terms. In contrast, official representatives of the British Jewry in the 1990s openly acknowledged the dual, ethno-religious nature of the group. For instance, when applying for non-Jewish funding available for minority ethnic groups, they
opportunistically use the definition that is likely to enhance their chances of success. Even more ironic, in this respect, is the previously cited quotation of the Chief rabbi Sacks, who, just five years ago, was happy using the dual definition of British Jewry, yet now seems to revert to a narrow, religious definition of Jewish identity.

This discursive flexibility in the definition of the Jewish minority in Britain is related to a lack of Jewish consensus over who should be counted as a Jew. The traditional religious definition, in accordance with Halakhah\(^2\), considers a Jew to be a person born of a Jewish mother or anyone, who has undergone official Orthodox conversion. However, this definition clashes with alternative, broader and voluntary interpretations of identity that many people, who consider themselves Jewish, adhere to. Thus, non-Orthodox Judaism takes a more flexible approach, allowing many non-Halakhic Jews to affiliate. In addition, many secularised Jews identify with the Jewish people ethnically or culturally, rejecting a religious connection. The 2001 Census showed that although an overwhelming majority (97%) of those, who indicated their religion as Jewish, listed their ethnicity as ‘white other’, 2,594 Jews indicated their Jewishness through ethnicity only, while 10,950 expressed both a religious and ethnic connection (Graham et al 2007: 20).

While fragmentation per se is not seen as a novelty, but has been long recognised as an inherent feature of the Jewish world (there is a famous saying about two Jews having three opinions), the contemporary legitimacy of voluntary-based identities has changed the nature of social cleavages. This has been reported in many empirical studies of Jewish people in Britain, which unanimously dismiss a simplistic and monolithic representation of the Jewish community (Schmool et al 1998; Graham 2003). This research adds to this argument by showing how unstable, flexible and complex the identities of Jewish people living within the confines of the same Jewish location can be. It demonstrates the existence of multiple and complex readings of identities, which are translated into numerous social divisions and cleavages within a single provincial community.

The study also aims to fill the gap in geographical knowledge regarding the Jewish population in Britain. While many human geographers are currently investigating the socio-spatial integration and identity formation of more recent immigrant communities

\(^2\) Halakhah - (Hebrew: הָלָהָ, a corpus of Jewish religious laws that guides all aspects of human life
(for overviews, see Howard and Hopkins 2005; and Phillips 2007), there is a general failure to see the significance of learning from research on established, ex-immigrant communities, such as British Jewry. At present most of the research on British Jews is commissioned by Jewish organisations, such as the Board of Deputies or the Institute for Jewish Policy Research (JPR). Although they rather admirably use the findings to shape their policies, this policy-orientation (which in most cases is coupled with a quantitative methodology) narrows the scope of investigation, limits their conceptual choice and restricts the research implications to the Jewish community only (see, for example, Graham et al 2007; Becher et al 2003; DellaPergola 1999). Among the few exceptions, which apply broader theoretical frameworks to the research of place-specific identities and communities, are studies of the London Eruv (Watson 2005; Vincent and Warf 2002) and on the Strictly Orthodox Jews (Valins 2000, 2003). The approach taken in this research on Leeds Jews also seeks to adapt general knowledge, as developed within the framework of citizenship studies, to research on a particular minority group living in one locality.

How can the historical changes and contemporary multiple interpretations of Jewish identity in Leeds be best understood? On the one hand, theories within the field of citizenship studies, developed primarily to address present-day issues of immigration, seem appropriate and useful to the analysis of other minority groups such as the Jews. Dwelling on notions such as citizenship, integration and assimilation, multiculturalism, etc., they provide valuable conceptual tools for exploring identities as a response to the particular circumstances of the postcolonial world. On the other hand, many of the new theories of immigrant accommodation are highly contextualised and lack historical scope. They deal with the specific historical circumstances of the multi-ethnic western democracies of the last few decades. Moreover, some theories explicitly maintain that the latest non-European waves of immigration are qualitatively different and not comparable to late 19th - early 20th century European immigration (Massey 1995, Foner 2000). Since the biggest waves of Jewish immigration occurred around 1880-1905, an analysis of Jewish identity in Britain requires an historical perspective that examines the changing identities of the Jewish population in relation to the changing conditions (economic, political, and cultural) of their presence in the UK.
1.4. Research aims

This thesis examines the dialectical relationships between the place-specific identities of Jewish people, and the socio-economic circumstances of their existence, in the context of different national policies and practices of citizenship. Using narratives of self, family and community, the research employs historical and sociological analyses to explore the dynamics of personal and collective negotiations of ‘Jewishness’ and ‘Britishness’ within the Leeds Jewish community. More specifically, the aims of the research are:

- To explore the shifts and restructuring processes that underlie changing Jewish identities from the time of Jewish settlement in Leeds to the present day;
- To examine the diversity of interpretations of Jewish identity, as they emerge in personal and collective testimonies of Jewish life;
- To establish whether, and how, institutional and discursive changes in British citizenship, both nationally and locally,
  - Affect personal and collective views on being Jewish in Britain, and
  - Influence the general dynamics of the community’s life;
- To investigate the role of socio-economic factors in the receptiveness and sensitivities of the local Jewish population to the national practices of citizenship.

To achieve these aims the research, first, examines the intertextualities of identity constructions (Kristeva 1980) that reveal how Jewish people combine national and Jewish discourses to define their identities at different points in the history of the Leeds Jewish community. Second, it probes into the intra-communal diversity of identifications, focusing on how and why the narrative expression of identities varies within the Jewish population. Overall the research sets out to reveal the sensitivities of minority identity to the challenges and opportunities provided by different institutional and discursive settings of Britishness. Therefore, it helps to fill a gap in existing research on the impact of national practices of citizenship on established minorities and to dispute the prevailing image in the popular discourse of British Jewry as having monolithic and fixed identities.

The research was conducted in Leeds between the autumn of 2003 and the summer of 2006. The choice of Leeds was not coincidental for it presented a notable opportunity to research a localised contextualisation to the national discourse on Britishness and
Jewishness. According to the 2001 Census, out of 270,499 thousand Jews in Britain\(^3\), more than half lived in the area of Great London (58%) and another 8.2% lived in Manchester. This explains why Jewish life in the UK is commonly identified with the British capital and to a degree with Manchester. Correspondingly, most academic writings on Jewish issues in the UK focus on these areas (Kushner 1992; Alderman 1998; Bolchover 2003, Valins 2003), while small provincial communities, like Leeds (8,267 Jews) receive undeservedly little academic attention. They are often simply viewed as regional extensions of national (London) tendencies. However, the Jewish population in small communities in the UK, which constitutes approximately one third of the total number of British Jews, deserves special examination. By virtue of being relatively small and remote from the capital, regional communities find themselves immersed in unique, place-specific socio-spatial experiences as Jews and British citizens, whose life depends on the interaction of multiple national and local factors. Jewish perceptions in small provincial communities are shaped by national and international developments, yet are also mediated by the local environment. While members of large-sized communities could be relatively secluded from outside influences, smaller enclaves of minorities are more sensitive to external environments. This vulnerability makes them specifically interesting when assessing the impact of national citizenship on minority identity.

**Chapter Two** situates this research in a review of the literature, drawn across the multi-disciplinary field. The chapter opens with an analysis of the key notion of identity, exploring social and academic implications of different ways of conceptualising social identities. It demonstrates how the constructivist ontology of identity acknowledges the changing patterns of social experience in the second part of the 20\(^{th}\) century and defines ‘minority’, ‘ethnicity’ and ‘community’ as relational, socially constructed categories that are inseparable from their multi-level contextual settings. This also impacts on the way minority identities are researched: the prominence of post-WWII immigration in the creation of ethnic and racial diversity in western societies channelled academic attention towards the problems of immigrant integration in the context of different citizenship arrangements. The chapter proceeds with a description of contemporary theories of immigrant integration and discusses the limitations and benefits of extending

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\(^3\) Since the 2001 Census question on Jewishness implied religious identity, many scholars rightly pointed out that it led to the undercounting of Jews, in particular of secular Jews, in addition to those people who wished to conceal their Jewish identity (Waterman 2003).
various models of integration to the study of Leeds Jewry. It advocates the use of the neo-Institutional perspective, which successfully links individual and collective levels of research, accounts for historical continuity and change, and accommodates both socio-cultural and politico-economic considerations. Overall, this review sets out to define a general theoretical framework, which contributes to the subsequent analysis of Jewish identity, its historical evolution and the contemporary sociological diversity of interpretations.

Following the contextualisation of the research within the broader literature on identity and citizenship studies, **Chapter Three** continues with reviewing the literature, this time focusing on more specialised research on Jewish identities. The chapter is constructed in such a way as to show the historical evolution of Jewish identities and to assess the relevance of the conceptual framework of citizenship to the study of changes and variations in Jewish identity representations. It also highlights the key issues of the contemporary discourse on the Jewish past, present and future, revealing the academically acknowledged importance of national and local environments for the particularities of Jewish identities in Israel and across the Diaspora.

**Chapter Four** discusses the methodology and information sources that are best suited to the research of contextualised understandings of being Jewish. The chapter argues for the appropriateness of qualitative interpretative research that centres on the analysis of personal and collective narratives, understood in this research as tangible time- and place-specific manifestations of social identities. It advocates the multi-method approach and a composite research design that provides the best assurance against the limitations of any singular qualitative method. It further proceeds with a description of the stages of the research process that included an exploratory stage, intensive fieldwork and data analysis, discussing various techniques of data collection and interpretation. The chapter concludes with reflexive evaluations of the research design that assesses the difficulties and potential pitfalls in the research.

Studying place-specific identities requires a good understanding of local contextual dynamics, which are disclosed in **Chapter Five**. This chapter provides a review of the most crucial stages in the history of the Leeds Jewish community, situating them in the circumstances of socio-cultural, political and economic changes in the British society. This review of socio-economic and spatial movements highlights the remarkable transformation of poor foreigners, with no command of the English language, into well-
integrated English-speaking middle-class Britons. It also considers the contemporary characteristics of the Leeds Jewish community in the political and socio-economic context of national and local settings as well as in relation to other places of Jewish settlement in the UK. Drawing on data from the 2001 Census and empirical studies conducted by national and local demographers, it portrays Leeds Jewish community as a remarkable mixture of generic and unique Jewish and British characteristics.

The following chapter (Chapters Six) moves away from the discussion of theoretical and contextual issues that constitute the framework for this study and begins presenting the findings of this research. A detailed understanding of historical continuity and changes in the local expressions and experiences of Jewishness are developed throughout the chapter. These place-specific meanings of Jewishness are simultaneously assessed in relation to different stages of Jewish integration into mainstream British society. The chapter opens with the contrasting comparison of past and present levels of Jewish awareness, which are explored through the analysis of the importance of Jewish identity to people's personal sense of 'self'. It progresses to an investigation of various identity 'readings' that characterised the local Jewish population at different points in history. This shows that they have always involved the intersection of personal, communal, local, national, and international spaces and therefore are inherently complex and multi-dimensional. The analysis also makes an analytical distinction between religious and social (ethnic, cultural, economic) dimensions of identity, which gives an additional perspective on the dynamics of identity expressions among the Jewish population of Leeds. This typology helps to demonstrate quantitative and qualitative differences between contemporary and past assortments of Jewish identity 'readings', which are intrinsically linked to the changed socio-economic circumstances of local Jewry as well as to the evolution of the discursive and institutional settings of national citizenship and belonging. The historical analysis of Jewish discursive formations in Leeds highlights how the workings of national citizenship are being mediated by the local circumstances of minority existence, thus ascertaining the validity of the neo-Institutional theoretical framework of immigrant integration.

The contemporary views and experiences of Jewish people in Leeds are unravelled in Chapter Seven. Capitalising on the richness of empirical data collected in the research, the chapter focuses on the depth and wealth of individual Jewish identities, revealing the increased idiosyncrasy and intertextuality of identity formations. This is manifested in the growing complexity, diversity, fragmentation, and frequent incongruity of
modern Jewish identity narratives across different scales of their existence. The analytical distinction between the religious and social dimensions of Jewish identity that was introduced in the previous chapter is applied to the analysis of contemporary Jewish outlooks. It helps to assess the historical continuity and disruption of identity patterns, as well as to reveal how different kinds of Jewish identification influence personal ways of intertextual borrowings from non-Jewish discourses of identity and belonging, and especially from the national discourse on multicultural citizenship. The chapter concludes with a discussion of the possible reasons behind the increased plurality and patchiness of Jewish identifications, paying special attention to the changing levels of Jewish integration into British society and changing practices of national citizenship. It argues that following their socio-economic ascent into the mainstream of the society, Leeds Jews became more sensitive to the context of national citizenship, internalising the value of plural and idiosyncratic identities, thus creating pressures for the pluralisation of Jewish space.

The exploration of modern meanings and representations of Jewish identity in Leeds continues in Chapter Eight, shifting the focus from individual to collective identity constructions. A detailed account of the mechanisms of institutional and discursive continuity and change in communal organisations, practices and narratives is developed through the chapter. This is achieved through the analysis of two apparently contradictory public images of Leeds Jewry that have very different implications for shaping individual and group identities and every-day experiences. One of them imagines Leeds Jews as homogeneous, traditional and with a sense of historical continuity and intra-group divisions into core and marginal members. The other emphasises the segmentation and heterogeneity of modern Jewish 'free thinkers', who voluntarily form a 'community of communities' based on the democratic principles of tolerance, non-discrimination and respect. Although the traditional narrative historically preceded the second vision of the community, both narratives coexist and could even appear within the same individual account of Jewish self. The chapter highlights the contemporary variety and flexibility of external representations of Leeds Jewry, tracing the origin and legitimacy of this diversity to the general pluralisation and fragmentation of national spaces of citizenship. It concludes with the assertion that different 'readings' of individual and collective identities within the Leeds Jewish community are empowered by the identificational ambiguity in the national discourse, which encourages the contextual, strategic use of narratives.
Chapter Nine provides a comprehensive summary of the research and reflects on its theoretical and political implications. The chapter opens with the revision of the main conceptual ideas of citizenship, integration and minority identity and discusses the empirical findings in the light of these theoretical constructs. The second part of the chapter re-examines debates on the nature and consequences of multicultural citizenship and uses the research findings to address some of its academic and political criticism. On the example of Leeds Jewry, it demonstrated that the impact of citizenship policies on a minority group is never one-dimensional and unmediated. Consequently, the chapter argues for a more nuanced, historically and socially situated assessment of the impact of multicultural and other forms of citizenship on minority groups.
Chapter Two

Researching Minority Identities: A Review of the Literature

This chapter explores the issue of identity and its multi-dimensional relationship with the equally complex notions of community, ethnicity and citizenship. The following literature review reveals the historicity and social constructedness of identities, sketching the dynamics of their discursive and institutional change in society and their implications for academic research. While the traditional view on social identities naturalised the existing social cleavages and focused research on the ‘essential’ characteristics of social groups, the recent paradigmatic shift has embraced the social constructivist ontology of identities, which are viewed as complex, flexible, multi-scaled, and context-specific. Correspondingly, mainstream public and academic discourses treat minority identity as a relational, socially constructed category that is inseparable from its multi-level contextual setting, which, reflecting the changing patterns of social experience in the second part of the 20th century, is often encapsulated in the concept of citizenship. The latter provides a discursive and institutional environment, which is conducive to particular ‘readings’ of social identities.

At the centre of academic attention are the changing scales and dimensions of citizenship as well as the conditions, - historical, cultural, economic and political, - that influence identity formation, representation and contestation. Given the unprecedented scale of international migration that has transformed nation-states into multi-cultural societies, the issue of immigrant integration has been brought to the forefront of the public agenda, inspiring academic research to link theories of citizenship and minority rights with the study of immigration. Hence, a substantial body of academic writings has analysed different types of citizenship as alternative interpretative frameworks for the integration of new immigrants and their identity shifts. This chapter indicates that these theoretical models could be equally appropriate for the analysis of other minority groups in society, including so-called settled and ‘successfully integrated’ minority groups like Jews. It then discusses the limitations and benefits of different models with regard to the study of Leeds Jewry and concludes with a description of the neo-Institutional perspective. The ability of the latter to link individual and collective levels of research, to account for historical continuity and change and to combine socio-
cultural and politico-economic considerations makes this approach the best analytical tool for the analysis of local Jewish identities.

2.1. Defining Identities within Different Ontologies of the Social

The ability of people to define themselves in relation to others is an integral part of human self-consciousness. Philosophers have long acknowledged the centrality of individual and collective identities in human life and identity-related issues have been the focus of social scientific research for some time. In the last century, however, a paradigmatic transformation, related to the re-conceptualisation of social ontology, has had a profound effect on the theorisation of social groups, including ethnic and religious minorities, and on identity research in general. If in the 1950s, 60s and 70s research was focused on the study of behaviour, as an indicator of ‘inner self’, in the 1980s and 90s, under the influence of the Structuralist and Constructionist Schools (see Burr 1995), the priority was given to the analysis of discourse, representation and meanings. This new ontology of the social called for a complex conceptualization of identity and contextual interpretations of the process of identification, which had important consequences for the way social groups, like Jews, began to be perceived in society and to be approached academically.

2.1.1. 'Essentialised' identities

Up until the last thirty to forty years, both political and academic discourses converged on the assumption of static and fixed identities, which were perceived as naturally rooted in some ‘objective’ (biological and primordial) differences or in certain unproblematic social constructs, such as a ‘true’ account of history and cultures (for overview of the approach see Cerulo 1997, Sökefeld 1999). Coherence and continuity were perceived as the inherent attributes of identities, which were conceptualised as “self-identical, persisting through time as the same, as unified and internally coherent” (Butler 1990: 16). It was commonly assumed that, along with unique individual identities, people are carriers of collective identities, which are defined through “a persistent sharing of some kind of essential characteristics with others” (Erikson 1980:109). Group identities were attributed an independent existence in the form of accumulated historical products, institutional arrangements, and symbolic artefacts (Herman 1977: 28). This essentialised vision of identities implied the existence of a
clear, authentic set of characteristics, which all members of the group supposedly shared, and which retained its essence across time (Woodward 1997:11).

Importantly, this representation of individual and collective ‘selves’ in social sciences reflected a broader public consensus regarding the nature of identities and groups. Hence, a common perception of the Jewish people followed the same logic, and, just like any other minority group, it imagined Jews as a homogenized social collectivity with clearly distinguishable physical and psychological features, which were often pathologised (Garb 1995). Since, historically, the nation-building process went hand-in-hand with the hierarchical understanding of human biology, culture and history, national identity was ethnicised, while minority groups like Jews, Gypsies or Irish were simultaneously ‘racialised’ (Miles 1989: 73-7). Thus, the centuries-old marginalisation of Jewish people in Europe that was based on religious difference was strengthened by the official ideology of ‘scientific’ racism’ (Baumann 1999). This process of ‘racialisation’ included social, economic and cultural inferiorisation based on assigned racial, ethnic, and cultural group differences and led to public demands for the expulsion or assimilation of ‘the Other’, “whose presence challenges the political and cultural order of the nation” (Triandafyllidou 2001:11). The perception of Jews as an alien ‘race’ became particularly widespread in times of mass Jewish immigration from Tsarist Russia (1880s -1905). In the UK, it eventually culminated in the passage of the Aliens Act of 1905 that severely restricted Jewish immigration to Britain.

While popular discourse habitually depicted minorities in a derogatory way, the same stereotypical view often dominated academic circles. Therefore, the social research agenda of the 19th and mid 20th century focused on an articulation of the ‘essence’ of minority groups, such as Jews, and on the search for its social and biological roots. Later on, in the mid 20th century, with the arrival of non-European immigrants, racism, albeit discredited as a biological concept, re-emerged as a socio-cultural concept (MacMaster 2001, Barkan 1992). While the treatment of new immigrants from former colonies was openly racist, the dominant discourse of the time no longer used the same language with regard to the Jewish or Irish populations (Cesarani 1990a). They were gradually accepted as members of a ‘white race’ and British, but nevertheless were continuously marginalised as ‘the other’.

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4 On the history of ‘whiteness’ see Bonnett (2000) and see Brodkin (1998) on how Jews became accepted as ‘white’.
Despite the departure from the ‘common blood’ assumption, ethnic and racial identities were continuously perceived as permanent, fixed and ‘natural’. Thus, in the 1950s to 70s, British academic and political discourses habitually labelled all non-European immigrants as ‘black’, regardless of their wishes (Rex and Moore 1967). The result of this external imposition of identity (which, as is recalled by Stuart Hall (1987), was completely alien for most immigrants) was their gradual acquisition and internalisation of this identity. Overall, both academic and political discourses focussed on psychological traits and predispositions, regional features, language, or other common cultural legacies, as clear-cut markers of group distinctiveness.

2.1.2. Identities as social constructs

By the 1980s, changing social practices, through which people ‘live out’ their identities, problematised the assumption of the fixity and stability of identities and altered symbolic systems that defined people’s position and sense of ‘self’. The emergence of alternative centres of identity construction, the disruption and dislocation, the apparent flexibility and fluidity of identities, the appearance of ‘new social movements’, ‘identity politics’ and ‘politics of identity’ (see more in Woodward 1997 and Hill and Wilson 2003) – all have had a profound impact on academic research. Starting from the mid 1980s, scholarly discourse has emphasized the fragmented, fluid, multi-dimensional nature of individual and collective identities (Cameron, 2004). No longer considered fixed and accomplished, identity has become compared to a “production which is never complete, always in process, and always constituted within, not outside, representation” (Hall 1990: 222). The non-essentialist vision of identities accentuates their relational character, asserting that they cannot develop in social isolation, and, hence, require symbolic and social marking in relation to others, bringing social context and the category of ‘other’ into the analysis of social constructs. Scholarly attention has thus shifted to the processes and the mechanisms of identity construction, boundary maintenance and change (Anderson 1991; Jackson and Penrose 1994; Woodward 1997).

The view of identities as socially constructed is intrinsically linked to new conceptualisations of the collective–individual and social–spatial dichotomies. First, as identities are theorised as being simultaneously negotiated both on the individual and group levels, the connection between personal and collective identities becomes increasingly complex and required further theorisation. For instance, developing their communication theory of identity, Hecht et al (2002) conceptualise identity as a
negotiation among (a) individual understanding, (b) enactment, (c) relationships, and (d) communal representation, or any combination of the four. These four frames of identity create an encompassing picture of identity as a process. The first focuses on cognitive aspect of identities, while the second (enactment) depicts how messages express identity; the relational frame demonstrates how one’s relationship to others form and maintain identity and how different identities interact within one individual; finally, communal representation accentuates the group construction of shared identities. These layers, write Hecht et al, “are ‘interpenetrated’ and can operate cooperatively, or they can create dialectical oppositionalities” (2002: 853) as happens in instances when personal experience collides with the collective demands of a group.

The second implication of the social constructivist approach de-essentialises identities, rejecting any category that sets forward essential or core features as a unique property of a collective’s members (Cerulo 1997: 387). Personal and group identities are understood as processes, while identity closures are seen as arbitrary and never finished: just like ‘self’ is always a fiction and an act of creation, human beings use arbitrary closures to create communities of identification, nations, ethnic groups, families, sexualities, etc (Hall 1987: 45). However, this academic understanding of identities as fluid does not mean that in the social world they could not be perceived and acted upon as ‘real’ and ‘essential’. Thus, Bulmer and Solomos (1998) point out that racialised thinking carries very material implications for the included and excluded alike and Miles (1993) concluded that race is a product of racism rather than the other way around. This racialisation adds a racial dimension to existing social cleavages and inequalities, forcing people to see racial implications in previously race ‘neutral’ phenomena (Mason 2000:7). Thus, in the UK, according to Banton (1991), the three Race Relations Acts (1965, 1968 and 1976) instead of solving the problem of racism, have reaffirmed the importance of ‘races’, and inadvertently helped to maintain the old view of ‘natural’ and ‘fixed’ racial categories. As a result, it was continuously assumed that “each individual could be assigned to a race, and that relations between persons of different races were necessarily different from the relations between persons of the same race” (Banton 1991: 115).

Overall, just as in the past, politicians and the general public behave as though races do exist as independent objective categories, reasserting races and ethnicities as ‘real’. Even stronger and more up-todate examples of the material and social power of identity come from the religious domain. The upsurge in religious fundamentalism, which is
particularly evident, but not limited to the followers of Islam across the globe, vividly demonstrates how identity "becomes a major factor in political mobilisation" (Woodward 1997: 24).

Thirdly, both groups and individuals constitute themselves in relation to someone or something else, both in a material and metaphysical terms. Following Derrida (1881) and Foucault (1972), leading theorists of post-modern discourse, social critical theories of the late 20th century highlight the intrinsic connection between the process of identity formation and the marginalisation of selective groups. Therefore, the process of othering is considered as a necessary means in establishing parameters of identities:

...we form our sense of self, our identity, in relation to Others over and against whom we define ourselves. Thus, in order to understand identity, both individual and group, we must attend to the Others over and against whom the self is positioned/constructed/ constituted (Silberstein 1994:5).

Yet, this is a mutually constitutive process, for not only does the majority sharpen its sense of identity against a marginalised 'other', but, equally, those on the margins conceive of themselves in response to their positioning in the wider society (Gilman 1986). Consequently, identity studies pay attention to discursive representations of agencies, political phenomena, actions and processes. Language, as Burman and Parker (1993) observe, underlies struggles of power and control. Linguistic categories and discursive constructions play an important role in legitimising particular versions of reality and silencing or pathologising alternative versions. They are also crucial in constructing boundaries of exclusion (see more on discourse and identity in Chapter Four).

However, since identities are intrinsically linked to the material and social, their contextualisation should also involve more than the discursive practices in which they are embedded. In the words of Allen, "any good con/textualisation of an issue should examine the interplay between space, time, and society" (1999: 252-3). In this conceptual triad, time and society are the most acknowledged dimensions, whereas the scholarly interest in space and spatial metaphors is a relatively recent phenomenon. The pioneering works of Foucault (1986), Soja (1989), Lefebvre (1991) and other critical thinkers helped to reinterpret the notion of space, which ceased to be seen as a neutral background or a reflection of the social, but is understood now as an active participant in the construction of the social (Massey 1993:145). To avoid the artificial dichotomy of spatial-social, one must conceive of them together in a dialectical unity "as part of the
same process, which Lefebvre calls the production of space” (MacDonald 2002: 65). Just as identities are multiple and porous, space is conceptualised as heterogeneous and multi-scalar: it is an entity where real lived-in space is juxtaposed with multiple, often contradictory, imaginary spaces, where space as a place and locality is embedded in regional, national and transnational spatialities. The contextualisation of identities brings out their uniqueness; identities then perform as ‘galvanised reference points’ for ascribing meanings to subjective experiences (Woodward 1997). Different symbolic systems create different meanings that are locked in a constant battle with each other, thus identities are “prefabricated and mobilized in accord with reigning cultural scripts and centers of power” (Cerulo 1997: 387). Overall, present-day studies in identities focus on their role as a multi-scalar medium in the relations of power, disparities of wealth, and sentiments of (non)belonging, which people, living in a variety of social situations – localities, diasporas, transnationalities, choose strategically from available sets of socio-cultural practices – language, legal systems, religion (Hills and Wilson 2003: 3).

2.2. ‘Re-imagining’ community

The understanding of identities as social constructs has led to the re-conceptualisation of collective identities at all scales of social life – from neighbourhood communities to nations and transnational diasporas. The notion of community has traditionally had three important associational links (Kong 2001: 221). First, it presupposed a unity of its members based on some or all of the following: common needs and goals, a sense of the common good, shared lives, culture and views of the world (Silk 1999:8). Second, since social ties and interaction of community members were conceived as happening within a physical locality, the concept of community implied its locatedness in a place. Thirdly, it also had a normative interpretation that described a specific set of relationship between the community and its individual members, which often involved oppression, protecting the prevailing value system including its moral code (Smith 1999:25). However, in the last century this traditional interpretation of community was problematised by the changing nature of personal relationships and of localities, as well as by changing theorisations (Alleyne 2002). The demise of traditional communities was associated with the forces of modernity, leading to the de-personification of the relationship between individuals and institutions, and the increasing amount of ‘stretched out’ communications.
Benedict Anderson’s book *Imagined Communities* (1983), which had a groundbreaking effect on the academic thinking about collectivities, allowed the reconciliation of old views with new realities and a new thinking. It showed the way to expose the supposed ‘objectivity’ of groups and revealed the role of social imagination in collective’s assertion of certain structures of meaning as their ‘true’ representations. At the same time, ‘imagined communities’ are not idealist, for their social imagination is always bounded by some social, political and economic circumstances of their existence. Hence, changing social realities, which according to essentialist ontology were ‘destroying’ the community, could now be understood as the new circumstances of its existence that were likely to bring new structures of meaning.

2.2.1. Minority groups as communities

Although Anderson wrote with regard to national identity, his concept was easily applicable to other scales of social relations and many academic studies on other forms of group identity employed Anderson’s theorisation (Rose 1990). One type of community research, where Anderson’s approach proved to be very useful, was the study of different kinds of minorities – religious, ethnic, racial, sexual, etc. In generic terms, minority is seen as “having shared customs, place of origin, and so on, which are defined in opposition to a hegemonic national community which is often seen as homogeneous” (Valentine 2001: 125). Since any minority group, by definition, is positioned within a wider society and is sensitive to what is happening there, it has to respond to dominant societal cleavages and authorised ‘readings’ of otherness, adjusting the way it looks on itself and presents itself as a group to others. In their article on mosque development in Trinidad, Prorok and Hemmasi (1993) show how mosque building within the East Indian Muslim community “help[s] resolve the tension between political assimilation and maintenance of ethnic identity” (cited in Kong 2002: 224). Since mosques are visual disclosures of a minority’s identity, their building helps to reassert the East Indian Muslim identity. To build a mosque, the community has to organise itself, pulling together leadership and resources, which also intensifies their communal spirit. At the same time, the building process follows external political impetuses, as the intensity of construction followed the pattern of this community’s socio-political engagement within the host society. As it will be shown further in the chapter, similar reasoning is frequently used in citizenship studies, where it helps to analyse the diversity of integration trajectories displayed by immigrant minorities in different citizenship arrangements.
The emphasis on social constructedness focuses academic attention on the mechanisms and circumstances of the construction and maintenance of identity categories. Finding their inspiration in the work of Frederick Barth (1969), many researchers have argued that community boundaries are being constantly re-negotiated and contested: depending on the situation, members of the same group could emphasise different elements of their culture to accentuate or play down their distinctions from other groups. Thus, for instance, the Jewish festival of Chanukah, which refers to a relatively small episode in Jewish history, has different significance for Jewish communities in Christian and non-Christian countries. In the West, it has gained greater significance through its calendar proximity to Christmas and has become an important, widely celebrated holiday. Meanwhile, Jews living in the Arabic world have kept a lower profile for the festival. The same is true for the host society’s perception of a particular ethnic or racial minority. It could either focus on similarities or, alternatively, it could emphasise the differences between the mainstream population and the minority. For example, Jews and Italians in the US were perceived as racially different in the early 20th century, but by the 1950s and 60s they were accepted as ‘white’. Today’s fairer-skinned Latinos also find their entrance in the ‘white American’ middle class easier than their darker-skinned fellows (on the concept of whiteness see Blee 2004).

Importantly, negotiations over boundaries happen both in the group’s communication with other groups, including the host society as a whole, and in their intra-group interactions with other co-members. The latter type of interactions is viewed as no less important than the communication between identity groups (Collins 1991; Shachar 2000). Thus, Dwyer (1999) in her work on young Muslim women, reports on bitter internal debates over the discursive construction of a unifying all-inclusive ‘Muslim community’. While some voices within the Muslim world have a high regard for diversity within Islam, those who support a unitary identity view the inner sectarian divisions as threatening and dangerous. Dwyer warns, “Ethnic communities cannot be imagined as existing in organic wholeness with self-evident boundaries,” but are better understood in terms of an on-going process of negotiation and contestation (1999:54). Overall, the boundaries of ethnicities are acknowledged as more important ethnic markers than some mystical ethnic qualities: as Wieviorka asserts, “Ethnicity is never absolute. …it entails more or less unstable forms of cultural, political, economic and social participation” (Wieviorka 1994: 28).
The conformation of the flexibility and contestedness of identity boundaries emerges from academic discourse on race and ethnicity, as different scholars have very different opinions on the nature and social significance of these concepts. Thus, Anthias (1990) insists on a generic concept of racism, which should cover not only beliefs and ideologies, but also social actions and social structures. Jackson and Penrose (1993: 13), on the other hand, restrict the term ‘racism’ to the indication of place-specific ideologies of ‘race’, and Cohen (1988) defines anti-Semitism as one of the ‘modalities of racism’. Whereas some scholars see no principal difference between race and ethnicity and treat them as synonymous categories (as explored by Alexander and Alleyne 2002; Bulmer and Solomos 1998), scholars, like Mason (2000), disagree. They insist that ethnicity is a “more appealing and legitimate concept for social scientists both because it is intrinsically social and because it is rooted at least partially in the self-definitions of members” (Mason 2000:12). Wieviorka acknowledges that ethnicity often stands for a prudent, subtle form of racism for it “tends to convey a twofold principle of inferiorisation and differentiation” (Wieviorka 1994: 23). Yet he emphasises that in case of ethnicity the production of differentiation is more important that the act of inferiorisation. Moreover, at certain moments “ethnicity can serve to advocate a positive group image” (Ibid: 24). Generally, academic debate surrounding such topics as the constraining role of categorical fixes (Christopher 2002), the implications of the language of ‘minority’ and ‘ethnic community’ (Alleyne 2002) and the role of racism in framing colonial and post-colonial practices (Domosh 2002), points to problematic questions related to the semantics of race and ethnicity.

### 2.2.2. Spatialities of communities

Although communities are imagined, spatial boundaries, which in the public mind are often perceived as natural and absolute, are very important for the reproduction of minorities’ identities. Contestation over territories, borders and place identities often becomes a material proxy for the conflict of socio-cultural identities. This happens on all spatial levels – global, state, regional and local. These no longer follow the conventional linear logic of spatial division (Amin 2002), thus resulting in the globalisation of the local and the localisation of global issues. Kokot et al (2004) emphasize that the conceptualisation of space as a combination of the real, imaginary and social (Lefebvre 1991) is especially relevant to the study of diasporic experiences, which are often imagined as spatially dispersed or ‘stretched-out’ communities:
Diasporas must be conceived within their historical as well as their spatial contexts. ...diasporas are sited in history as well as in space – although by definition they are not bound within one location.

Any diaspora is still a space of real and imagined relations between diasporic communities as well as between them and the homeland. But this space is still composed of places, of localities that are both sites and nodes in a transnational network of mobility and communication.

(Kokot et al 2004: 5).

Thus, diasporas are inextricably linked to spatialities: they may transcend boundaries, but space, place and locality remain important points of reference for them, both symbolically and physically.

Regions and local places are used as symbolic markers for political mobilisation and the politics of identity. In such cases, geographical places provide bases for the reinforcement, reinvention and/or production of new identities of place. For instance, in a qualitative study of ultra-Orthodox Jewry in Manchester, Valins (2003) effectively demonstrates how territoriality and landscape provide visual and tangible signifiers that demarcate the boundaries of community based on religious belief. Collective identities, he argues, have become strongly linked to real, imaginary and symbolic places. Since identities have place related implications, localised identities, especially in conjunction with race, ethnicity, gender, religious and class identities offer “dynamic bases for both progressive political mobilisation and reactionary, exclusionary politics” (Paasi 2003: 476). Real world examples of the latter are, unfortunately, plenty. Thus, the supporters of the British Nationalist Party show clear territorial clustering; recent uprisings of British Muslims in Oldham and Bradford were place-bound as well. On the positive side, however, localities, which are defined by minorities, can bring a sense of security, protection and home to their residents. They act “as a sort of enclave, allowing ... minorities to feel at home in this neighbourhood more so than elsewhere, thus abetting the positive effects” (Brown et al 2003: 268). In his empirical study of the spatial distribution of ethnic groups, Peach (2002: 253) confirms that residential clustering remains very significant for some ethnic minorities, even when, like the Jews in Britain, they are well-established and integrated into wider society.

2.3. New conceptualisation of citizenship and nationhood

The emphasis on social context of identities has shifted the research focus away from the question of ‘what is believed?’ to ‘why?’ and ‘how?’ (Haste 2004: 414). Since different forms of political community imagine individual and group identities
differently, contemporary academic discourse has turned to look at the importance of **citizenship** and **nationhood** as social contexts for shaping collective and personal identities. These concepts define key parameters that position the national ‘us’ against the ‘other’, provide institutional infrastructure, and reflect political, economic and cultural dispositions of power. Contemporary academic research on citizenship has critically reassessed its preceding liberal understanding that likened citizenship to a legal contract (Turner 1993; Fraser 1997). While the legal aspect of citizenship still remains the most acknowledged interpretation of the concept, the notion has been de-essentialised and expanded to include cultural, ideational dimensions. In its formal sense, citizenship still stands for the relationship between the citizen and the state, specifying individual rights (Marshall 1951) and duties as binding linkages between citizens and nation-state (Koopmans and Statham 2000: 18). Nevertheless, citizenship is no longer seen as a monolithic social category that endures unchanged through time and across place. Instead, current academic views focus on its flexibility, which is the outcome from the ever changing terms of interaction between civil society and the state. Hence, citizenship is understood “as an actively created and negotiated status that is shifted and remoulded in response to large and small economic, social and cultural processes and movements” (Marston and Mitchell 2004: 110). The concept of national identity, just like citizenship, is no longer viewed as a universal necessity, but as a project of collective imagination, as a historical contingency (Gelner 1997: 56).

The theorisation of citizenship as open and inclusive membership, widely popularised by T.H. Marshall (1951) in wake of WWII, has been revised. Marshall’s approach, reflecting a distinct historical period of the onset of the welfare state in post-war Europe, maintained that in a democratic society the acquisition of rights by immigrants should progress in the same way that it historically developed: i.e from legal (the equality of citizens before the law) to political (equal access to local and national voting) and then to social rights (guaranteeing a minimum standard of life for all). Defined in these inclusive terms - Marshall hypothesised - citizenship would generate a stronger focus of loyalty than class or any local or regional attachments. Yet, the subsequent increase in the migratory movements of people across borders revealed that citizenship is a ‘mechanism of closure’, a ‘filing cabinet’ that sharply assigns people to a particular territorially articulated nation-state (Joppke 1999). Rejecting the idea of inclusive citizenship, contemporary researchers have moved towards conceptualising
modern states as exclusive bounded membership associations (Brubaker 1996, Tilly 2000), covering both tangible and intangible relations between the citizen and the state:

Citizenship is seen not only as a form of membership, but also as a specific cultural imprint of nationhood which functions as a form of symbolic closure restricting, albeit to different extents and under nationally specific conditions, the ability of migrants to join the national community (Koopmans and Statham 2000: 19).

This new conceptualisation of citizenship emphasises its multi-dimensional nature, its historical contingency and the empirical richness of national forms of citizenship (Joppke 1999, Entzinger 2000). As the interactions between civil society and the state take place at all geographical scales of social life – from the local to the global – the discourses and practices of citizenship become multi-level and could be transferred from one scale to any other. The importance of certain scales of citizenship is determined by historical-geographical particularities. So for example, during the last two centuries, the national scale provided the central stage of citizenship, yet over the last twenty or so years, the national has been eroded in favour of the local and transnational.

As a historically contingent formation, citizenship is thus directly linked to time and place-specific forms of national identity; it conveys a sense of belonging to the political community and a sharing of normative prescriptions and practices of everyday life (Lewis 2004: 8). In the past, citizenship, which evolved together with national identity and nationalism, implied a correspondence between political units, territories and ethno-cultural communities (Gelner 1983). As was shown by Anderson (1983, 1997), the idea of a nation bound together by a common history, language, culture, place of residence and/or ethnicity, has a dual function in sustaining the cohesion of a nation-state. On the one hand, it is outward oriented and gives citizens a clear sense of their distinct identity from people in other territories. On the other hand, its inward-oriented function provides a sense of a community because, regardless of the actual inequality and exploitation that may prevail in each, the nation is always conceived as a “deep, horizontal comradeship” (Anderson 1997: 45). Historically, the articulation of national identity and, by extension, of citizenship in ethnic, mono-cultural terms, denied public spaces to any cultural, religious, racial/ethnic differences. Spaces are made public when they inform others about the discourses of the groups that physically or symbolically occupy them (Jones 2004, for more on public and private spaces, see in Staeheli
and Mitchell 2004). Cultural and religious minorities were discouraged from displaying and communicating their distinctive identities to the general public, these distinctions were only tolerated in the private domain of home, family and ethnic/religious community. Yet, even the private sphere was not totally free of assimilatory pressures. As was observed by Alexander,

Assimilation is historically the first and sociologically the most ‘natural’ response to the contradiction between public civility and private particularity that marked modern mass civil societies ... because the incorporation could be achieved without appearing to challenge the established primordial definitions of civil competence (Alexander 2001: 244)

This new understanding of citizenship and new research directions are directly linked to changing social, political and economic relations in the 20th century. The nation-state, which used to be an autonomous element in the world-system, is no longer a discrete ‘container’ for politics, economics, social relations and culture (Delanty 2000: 95-106). Perhaps even more significant was a change in the socio-demographic composition of practically all leading Western nations. Mass economic migration in the 1950 and 1970s altered the existing ethnic balance and fractured the (perceived) homogeneity, harmony and uniqueness of national cultures. Racially, ethnically and religiously different non-European immigrants, who demanded their adequate representation in state institutions, raised an intractable dilemma for nation-states: how to retain the beneficial effect of nationalism, which creates a sense of national cohesion and solidarity, yet, simultaneously to cope with the increasing cultural diversity of their societies and physical mobility of populations. Growing political tensions in immigrant-recipient countries prompted some of them to experiment with new approaches to citizenship, which later became known under the umbrella-term of ‘multiculturalism’ (Wieviorka 1998).

Despite philosophical differences regarding the nature of multiculturalism and a corresponding variety of national policy choices (Kymlicka 2003; Parekh 2000; Malik 2001), multiculturalism could be generally understood as a public recognition and promotion of “diverse ways of being in the world” (Mitchell 2004:642). The adoption of multiculturalism in some Western countries has given the opportunity for the contestation and subsequent renegotiation of minority identities in the public and private domains (Taylor 1992). This expansion of “imagined life experiences” (Alexander 2001:246) implies that “the qualities of ‘out-group’ members are no longer stigmatized or relegated to the private sphere, rather they reconstitute the notion of civic
competence within the public sphere” (Mitchell 2004:642). In this sense, public spaces are performative and the meaning of citizenship is being redefined in a battle of social identities that are constantly contested and constructed in relation to an imagined ‘public’ (Jones 2004: 173).

In Britain, the path to multicultural citizenship was long and thorny. After WWII, the arrival of ex-colonial subjects triggered the resurrection of racial discourses and discriminatory practices, for “a multiracial empire was one thing; a multiracial Britain was unthinkable” (Shanahan 1999: 76). In the wake of the Holocaust atrocities, political discourse became more discreet than in the 19th century, making fewer explicit statements about the racial attributes of new immigrants – claims very commonly made in the times of Jewish and Irish immigration. Instead, ‘neo-racist’ arguments of the post-war era depicted cultural and racial/ethnic differences as permanent obstacles to the assimilation of ‘coloured people’ to the ‘British way of life’ (Wrench and Solomos 1993). These sentiments became especially strong during the 1980s within the Thatcherite neo-Conservative camp, who argued for the repatriation of foreign-born immigrants and further restrictions on new immigrations (Mitchell and Russell 1990). The Immigration Acts of 1962, 1968 and 1971 and the British Nationality Act of 1981 resurrected the ancient rule of jus soli and effectively limited further immigration from ex-colonies, finally introducing the formal definition of a British citizen. At the same time, fearing racially motivated riots (as was a case in the US), the British government simultaneously intensified the anti-discriminatory message to its own population. Three Race Relations Acts (1965, 1968, and 1976) and the establishment of the Commission for Racial Equality (1976) provided greater legal protection against all forms of discrimination based on race, ethnicity and national origin. The 1970 and 80s also witnessed the unprecedented political mobilisation of non-white British residents, who, inspired by the achievements of Black movements in the USA, fought for the recognition of their rights (Ali 1991: 195). The ‘black’ mobilisation of the 1980s was at the root of the subsequent emergence of explicitly multicultural, multiethnic policies. With regard to the causal nature of this relationship the accounts differ. Some argue that the emergent multiculturalism of the 1980s was a continuation of anti-discriminatory politics, which demanded the recognition of cultural diversity as beneficial for society (Phillips 2004). Others attributed its origin to the uneasiness of the Asian communities with the all-inclusive term ‘black’ (Modood 1994). Yet another controversial position
claims that multiculturalism was 'imposed from the top' as a way of releasing tensions and breaking 'black' solidarity (Malik 2001).

Overall, the institutionalisation of multiculturalism in Britain in the late 1990s was in line with similar developments in a number of other western countries (Canada, Australia, Netherlands and Sweden). Despite national differences, their common challenge was the accommodation of large, settled and eventually well-organised ethnic communities. Consequently, most of the policy provisions were community-focused and the political discourse on immigrant integration centred on inter-communal relations. In the last decade, however, the nature of immigration and the public sentiment towards multiculturalism have changed. A new 'super-diversity' is characterised by the growing socio-cultural variety of newcomers (ethnicity, place of origin, language, religion) and, perhaps even more importantly, by the widening range of immigrants' channels of migration and statuses with regard to social, economic and political rights (Vertovec 2006). One of the new axes of differentiation, which features in the transformation of social identities and practices, is linked to a new type of migration, termed 'transnational migration'. This model of migration, wherein migrants live trans-nationally, setting up homes and places of work in more than one nation-state, has exposed the process of decoupling of identities and territoriality (Marston and Mitchell 2004: 106). The deterritorialisation of the state finds its strongest manifestation in the principle of dual citizenship: it legalises the sharing of national identity with another nation, and, by extension, legitimises identity within a national community without the necessity of residing or working in that community (Ibid: 106). At the same time, a sense of global integration (see more on globalisation in Castle and Davidson 2000), propelled by technological changes, collides with a rising awareness of cultural, ethnic, religious differences, which are often discursively essentialised in a public rhetoric of 'civilisational' incommensurability (Hill and Wilson 2004). The 'clash of civilizations' ceased to be an exclusive attribute of international politics, but has infused national, regional and local politics (Huntington 1996, 2004).

Responding to today's political debates regarding citizenship and national identity 'in crisis', academic circles offer different theoretical interpretations, give contradictory predictions and policy recommendations. For instance, Soysal (1994, 1998) asserts that a new, rapidly developing, form of citizenship, 'post-national membership', renders traditional national citizenship meaningful only in terms of identity. She argues, 'in terms of its translation into rights and privileges, it is no longer a significant
construction” (Soysal 1998: 208). ‘Post-national’ citizenship is of profound importance for immigrants, for it is based not on national belonging but on the transnationalisation of migrant communities. The international discourse on human rights and supranational institutions, like UN, UNESCO and European Union, play a key role in protecting and strengthening the rights of migrants. Using the example of German guestarbeiters, Soysal demonstrates that, in today’s world, the achievement of social rights is possible without the attainment of full political inclusion, thus elevating denizenship (Hammer 1985) to the status of a new institutional transnational form of citizenship.

Soysal’s overoptimistic account of the disintegration of national citizenship is viewed with some scepticism. Thus, Koopmans and Statham’s (1999) empirical test on the validity of post-national, multicultural and national models of citizenship, persuasively demonstrates that the national form of citizenship still enjoys most empirical support, whereas the post-national model bears little empirical credibility. Joppke (1999) in his comparative study of Britain, US and Germany offers another interpretation of the German phenomenon of guestarbeiter: traditional and postnational membership forms coexist in Germany “one conditioning the other, instead of being in a relationship of partial substitution as predicted by postnational membership theory” (Ibid: 644). The political developments of the last five years also prove that national citizenship is still the most viable and potent forms of citizenship. Thus, the discourses and practices related to minority integration are currently in the process of far-reaching change in most of the Western countries (Joppke and Morawska 2003, Mitchell 2004). Practically all immigrant-recipient countries have cut back on their policies of support and active promotion of multiculturalism, often accompanied by devolution of services to the local/community level (Wolch and Dinh 2001). Instead the emphasis is put on the integration in the society as a ‘choice’ and responsibility of individuals and minorities, thus re-introducing the rhetoric of assimilation in the form of revived liberalism and the sharpening division of public and private realms (Mitchell 2004:643).

2.4. Citizenship as an explanatory framework for integration

In general, issues of migration and immigrant integration, racial and ethnic relations in Western democracies have become highly politicised, generating a lot of controversy and conflict, and generating a resurgence of academic interest in citizenship and national identities. The reworking of the concept of citizenship reflects both academic attempts to make sense of changing historical circumstances and a political desire to
find an adequate solution to related problems. Consequently, public and academic discourses firmly lock the issues of citizenship and immigration together, setting their main focus on “multi-dimensional conditions and processes affecting immigrants in contemporary society” (Vertovec 2006:33). Based on his comparative research of Western countries, Joppke concludes that “national citizenship remains indispensable for immigrant integration” (Ibid: 645). He also demonstrates that citizenship in democratic states is flexible and could be altered. Kymlicka argues that national sentiments towards citizenship should always be viewed in conjunction with “larger trends regarding the acceptance of newcomers and the accommodation of diversity” (Kymlicka 2003:202). He compares public debates on citizenship, immigration and multiculturalism to a “three-legged stool, each leg of which supports (or weakens) the other two” (Ibid.). These conclusions are generally shared throughout the field of citizenship studies, and, therefore, the main research focus within the field is on the appropriate classification and proper explanatory schemes dealing with modes and trajectories of immigrant integration in host societies.

For a long time, the conventional understanding of citizenship emphasized formal institutional arrangements, like legislature, procedures of naturalisation and legal citizenship specifications. Such an approach, which is still in use, employs the formal criteria of citizenship to explain cross-national differences in immigrant integration ‘regimes’. For instance, Patrick Ireland (1994) explains how similar ethnic groups in France and Switzerland display different forms and levels of political participation by referring to their dissimilar institutional settings – laws of residence, naturalisation, political rights and welfare arrangements. These institutions shape migrants’ access to the host polity and create divergent structures of political claims.

Kriesi et al. (1995) have established that the openness or closeness of political institutions, combined with inclusive or exclusive strategies of authorities dealing with challengers, form the ‘political opportunities’ of the latter. The authors explain the political radicalisation of immigrant movements as the result of closed opportunity structures. When German and British experiences of immigrant integration are compared, formal institutional arrangements seem sufficient to explain the difference. The British citizenship model, which, to an important degree, bears the imprints of its imperial colonial past, provides quicker and easier access to citizenship than the German citizenship framework. Immigrant groups in Britain are included in national and local political spaces on equal terms, which give them an opportunity to claim their
groups' recognition in the public domain. The situation is the opposite in Germany: in legal terms, immigrants remain 'foreigners' for a long time; they are marginalised and denied participation in the national political space. Some additional features of the British institutional structure, like a constituency-based electoral system, reinforce the impact of citizenship legislature. The decentralised majoritarian electoral design benefits the large concentrations of minority communities in specific residential places, giving them the voting power to influence the policy agenda of local councils and elect MPs representing their interests.

Whereas these institutional features are sufficient to account for some cross-national differences, they can not adequately explain many other cases, as, for instance, why the French civic citizenship delivers different results from the British civic citizenship model. The main shortcoming of this approach is the absence of a discursive, cultural analysis of citizenship. Koopmans and Statham (2000) insist that narrowly conceived models of national citizenship and immigrant integration fail “to take seriously the cultural bias, that is cultural codes, and collective identities, and discursive contents, or frames and symbols, that carry the message of political contention” (Koopmans and Statham 2000: 35). Thus, the making of Englishness and the British nation state can not be understood outside the colonial framework (Nash 2002: 227; Hall 2000). The discursive dimension offers an explanation for the variation in experiences between countries with similar formal institutional settings. This raises the question of cultural rights and the development of discursive theories of citizenship. This approach, drawing on theories of symbolic interactionism (Blumer 1969), argues that social problems, identity formation, resources and opportunities are cognitive constructs and have to be communicated and 'framed' in public discourse in order to become a basis for collective action (Hunt et al 1994; Lamont 1995). Thus, depending on the particularities of national discourses on nationhood, immigrants are required to demonstrate different levels of conformity to the cultural norms and values of the host society. Following Brubaker's (1992) statement that citizenship is not simply a set of rights but “a contested political field for redefining the symbolic boundary markers for a national identity” (Ibid: 182), discursive theories insist on a cultural significance of citizenship. Giugni and Passy (2004) define citizenship as a “cultural setting that determines the political opportunities available for the intervention of migrants in the national public space and affects the content of their claims” (Ibid: 75).
In order to account for the discursive dimension of citizenship, Brubaker introduces the concept of 'cultural idioms' of nationhood and demonstrates how present-day formal definitions of citizenship reflect deeply rooted understandings of nationhood (Brubaker 1992, 1996). Therefore, the difference between the French and German handling of immigrants is explained by distinguishing the French tradition of political nation and the German ethnic model of nationhood. Castles (1995) has modified Brubaker's twofold model of citizenship into a three-fold typology. Each of the three types of citizenship defines a certain type of arrangement for dealing with ethnic minorities and immigrants. The 'ethnic' or 'exclusive' regime (exemplified by Germany, Austria, Switzerland and Israel) denies or severely restricts access to political rights and political community to migrants and their descendants. The 'assimilationist' or 'republican' regime (France, USA of some 20 years ago) is best depicted as a 'melting pot' approach, which provides relatively easy access to full citizenship, but requires a high degree of cultural assimilation and denies any special recognition of group rights in the public sphere. Finally, 'multicultural' or 'pluralist' regimes (Britain, Canada, the Netherlands, USA - all in the 1990s) provide both easy access to citizenship and the recognition of the rights of cultural minorities to maintain their difference.

On a more general level, Kymlicka proposes a typology of public claims that explains national variations in the recognition of cultural differences (Kymlicka 1995). He suggests four main types of public discourse that lead to different demands and expectations. First are the demands of those groups, whose existence predates the society in question and who feel themselves to be victims of social and ethnic destruction (Indians in America, Aborigines in Australia). They back their demands with historical legitimacy and acute awareness of former injustices. A second group of demands results from broad societal debates concerning immigrants, who bring very distinct traditions and culture to the recipient society. A third line of reasoning emanates from long established cultural and ethnic groups who strive to preserve and maintain their distinct identity despite the unfavourable effects of modern economic life (like Scottish and Welsh people in the UK). Finally, the most influential line of argument, in terms of public discourse, targets the production of new identities, which assert their validity and demand their place in modern unstable and rapidly changing societies. This trend is inextricably connected to, and feeds into, the increasing fragmentation and fluidity of societies in which identities are constantly invented, re-invented and moulded. Although all types of arguments are present in the national or
local discourse of a democratic state, the significance of any of them, and their juxtaposition in the discourse, varies greatly. These differences are indicative of the role that particular historic environments and political cultures play in shaping ‘multiculturalist’ policies (Bulmer and Solomos 1998).

In a similar fashion, Adrian Favell’s (1998) discursive analysis explains British-French divergence by their difference in ‘public philosophies of integration’, which are embedded in nationally-specific sets of language and symbols. The situation in France is different in terms of immigrant cultural rights and the expectations of a host polity: easy formal access to national political space is ‘packaged’ together with a strong demand to embrace Republican values. This effectively undermines the legitimacy of claims for the recognition of cultural rights within public space and confines cultural diversity to the private domain. The opposite is true of Britain: British discourse on multiculturalism in the late 1990s gave wider recognition to minorities’ cultural differences. It has legitimized their claims for more assertive collective identities and their demands for public policies delivering their group rights. Koopmans and Statham (1999: 692) theorised that pressures towards assimilation and the lack of recognition of ethnic and cultural differences in France should produce a different type of collective identity (more interethnic based on the common experience of cultural and social exclusion) as well as different claims than in Britain. An extensive case-study of Muslim identity formation and representation in France by Samers (2003) corroborates this idea. Samers maintains that, since many immigrants “perceive French republicanism as both a discursive and rhetorical formation [to be] at the root of social and economic exclusion” (Ibid: 354), their unification around Islam “provides a diasporic ‘moment’ for young people of Muslim origin, whether they were Maghrebin, Turkish or West-African” (Ibid: 361). Samers refers to North African identity in France as an experience of ‘enforced diaspora’ that resulted from “a potent cocktail of Arabophobia, … Islamophobia, and the formation of imaginary boundaries through stigmatization” (Ibid: 354). He likens his concept of ‘enforced diaspora’ to the idea of a ‘victim diaspora’ in Cohen’s (1997) typology of diasporic experiences.

Although the cultural theories of the 1990s were instrumental in depicting the impact of the discursive environment on citizenship, immigrant identities and behaviour, they often disregard social inequalities and disengage from a structural analysis and the political economy of differences (Hart 2000). They frequently overemphasize the role of discourse and neglect the impact of structural forces and material factors on identities
and behavioural patterns. Yet, the spaces of diasporic existence are broader than just ideational categories of narratives and discourses. Since “identity marks the conjuncture of our past with the social, cultural and economic relations we live in now” (Rutherford 1990:19), physical and social positioning, economic and political institutions have to be included in the analysis. Their role is twofold: they perform simultaneously as factors that influence the construction of identity and as tangible or symbolic manifestations of identities. As was observed by Marx, “people do make their own identities but not in the circumstances of their own choosing and from resources they inherit that will always be incomplete” (cited from Gilroy 1997: 341).

Recently, however, a growing number of studies have integrated the critical approach and structural theories, acknowledging that issues of integration and social cohesion are interlinked with social exclusion, socio-economic deprivation and social mobility. Discourse does not exist in isolation from the structural setting, but neither is it a mere reflection of structural environment. Empirical evidence in comparative studies, as provided in Joppke (1999) Koopmans and Statham (1999) and Tilly (1999), shows that this is the case with regard to the forms and nature of minorities’ claims and mobilisational patterns. Joppke (1999) also demonstrates the malleability of citizenship in modern democratic states in response to immigration pressures and immediate economic, social and political concerns of the day. No less significant are the political factors and power dimension – the ability of political leaders to reinvent and construct identities; to use ethnic, racial, cultural and religious differences as key resources in political mobilisation. Thus, most of the latest theoretical attempts to develop classifications of citizenship regimes and explain the evolution of national frameworks of immigrant integration combine structural and discursive analysis, taking into the account both formal and informal citizenship arrangements. For example, Koopmans and Statham (2000) acknowledge that although every Western democracy has been shifting its citizenship framework since 1970s, “the elements these countries used, combined, and varied during this learning process, were to an important extent drawn from pre-existing institutional and cultural repertoires of citizenship and nationhood” (Koomans and Statham 2000: 28).

Wieviorka (1998) and Entzinger (2000) suggest defining minority rights by separating their political, cultural and socio-economic dimensions. Thus, depending on the consistency of national approaches with regard to the dimensions of minority rights, Wieviorka distinguishes integrated and disintegrated forms of multiculturalism:
Canadian or Swedish multiculturalism represent the first, and the US in the 1990s – the second type of multiculturalism. To these three aspects of minority rights Entzinger adds another dimension of citizenship. In a fashion similar to Taylor’s (1992) distinction between the politics of equal rights and the politics of difference, Entzinger distinguishes the liberal approach (liberal individualism) that considers immigrants as individuals and the communitarian approach that treats them as members of cultural groups. According to Entzinger, nation-states’ views on the ontology of the minority play an important role in establishing institutional and discursive framework for the integration of immigrants and handling of established minorities.

Table 2.1. Models of citizenship (based on different individual and group rights)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Liberal Individualism</th>
<th>Equal individual rights</th>
<th>Liberal Pluralism</th>
<th>Equal Opportunity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Communitarian group approach</td>
<td>Group-based rights</td>
<td>Multiculturalism</td>
<td>Equity (equality of outcome)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Entzinger (2000: 107)

The resulting six options of approaching citizenship rights represent different ways of integrating minorities and immigrants into society, and, according to Entzinger, give a better understanding of the real politics behind integration. Although in theory a balanced integration strategy should keep individual and group approaches separate, Entzinger acknowledges that in real life elements of both tend to creep in ... [as] the result of political compromising” (Entzinger 2000:114). A state could use a ‘pick-and-mix’ strategy, selectively applying different options in different domains. The easiest of all options - and what many liberal states do – is to recognise immigrants’ rights for distinct identity in the cultural domain; the hardest option is to actually achieve pluralism in the legal system creating separate legal specifications for each group. A milder and more widespread version is a parallel arrangement (for instance, in a form of power devolution) for territorially distinct and long established national minorities.

The weakness of Entzinger’s model is that it is rather static and only indirectly accounts for intra-national variations. As an alternative, Koopmans and Statham (2000) conceptualise citizenship “as a conceptual and political space, in which different actors and policies can be situated and developments can be traced over time” (Ibid: 20). The two dimensions of citizenship space are its formal criteria and cultural requirements.
The formal criteria set extremes at either civic-territorial or ethno-cultural definition. The cultural obligations tied to citizenship could fluctuate between cultural monism and cultural pluralism. Consequently, four ideal types of citizenship are: (1) ethnic assimilationism (manifested in the requirement to take a citizenship test, devised as confirmation of integration in the mainstream culture); (2) ethnic segregationism (Apartheid system in South Africa, ‘guestarbeiter’ approach); (3) civic republicanism (a requirement for political integration prior to the claim for full social rights); and (4) civic pluralism (integration on terms specific to a cultural group of belonging).

Figure 2.1. A two-dimensional space for situating conceptions of citizenship

![Diagram of a two-dimensional space for situating conceptions of citizenship](source: Koopmans and Statham 2000: 20)

An undeniable benefit of this classification is the flexibility that is built into the notion of citizenship space, rather than a rigid and homogenising pigeonholing of countries. Since this model depicts citizenship and immigrant integration as a continuum, it allows the dynamics of political discourses both on a national and local level to be traced. It also gives an opportunity to present the diversity of positions occupied by different political actors involved both in national/local discourse and in intra-group debates.

2.5. An institutional analysis of social integration and minority identities

Although the above theories of citizenship regimes are helpful in defining the general institutional and discursive settings of immigrant incorporation and minority identities, their main drawback is their disregard for human agency and a consequent inability to account for differences within the same national setting. Their focus on the national level does not explain why diverse patterns of behaviour, as demonstrated by different minority groups or by different members of the same minorities, occur within the same national framework of citizenship. For instance, in Britain, the 2001 Census data shows that ethnicity, race and gender, especially in conjunction with the place of residence, affect the educational and professional achievements of minority group members. Similarly, within the Jewish population, there is a sharp contrast between intermarried
Jews and socially and residentially encapsulated Hassidic communities, although Jews in both groups are British-born citizens in the third or fourth generation. Why is this so? In order to answer this one needs to consider the identities and actions of individuals and groups in the context of the “institutional structures, cultural beliefs and social networks that shape [them]” (Alba and Nee 2003: 14). This approach, advocated by the neo-Institutional school of thought, has the advantage of combining historical and socio-economic considerations regarding the stability and change of institutional structures with an understanding of individual and group behaviour as purposeful, but context-bound (see more on neo-Institutionalism in Brinton and Nee 1998). The complexity of this research paradigm stems from a compound understanding of causality: with regard to the incorporation of immigrants and their descendants in society, the approach assumes that a variety of causal mechanisms operate at individual, primary-group, and broader institutional levels. Individuals and corporate actors act as welfare-ameliorating agents, whose actions are purposive but context-bound. This ‘bounded rationality’ (Simon 1957) means, on the one hand, that cultural beliefs, law, ideology and religion mould perceptions of self-interest and define how people are likely to act upon them (proximate causes). On the other hand, people’s interests and actions are conditioned by institutional settings (distal causes) that provide incentives, rules and resources (Alba and Nee 2003).

Hence, neo-Institutional theories of integration/assimilation5 bring together an analysis of the acculturation process and the study of the social, economic and political mobility of ethnic minorities. Acculturation, which indicates a change of primary ethnic identity, can not be properly understood without a structural analysis of the host society and existing patterns of social mobility. In adapting to life in the host country, immigrants and their descendants, whose common goal is to ‘make it’ in a new land, face choices available through ‘ethnic’ and ‘mainstream’ strategies. ‘Ethnic’ strategies encapsulate the path of selective acculturation or deliberate attempts to preserve ‘old world’ values and rebuild ethnic networks for socio-economic advancement. ‘Mainstream’ strategies imply the abruption or adaptation of old values and behavioural standards as well as an active remoulding of individual and collective selves to converge with the host society’s

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5 American social scientific tradition interprets the term ‘assimilation’ in a value-free, non-pejorative manner, making it conceptually similar to the notion of ‘integration’, which is preferred by European scholars and politicians. The US concept of ‘assimilation’ implies a compound model containing two manifestations of immigrant incorporation: social-economic mobility and convergence with the norms of the host country.
norms. The process of immigrant integration is multidimensional and complex; therefore, the strategies are not mutually exclusive and could be mixed. Yet, these choices, the individual and cumulative consequences of which are often hard to gauge, and which, therefore, frequently produce unintended outcomes, depend, among other factors, on the type of ‘capital’ that individuals and groups have at their disposal. Nee and Sanders (2001), in their study of Asian immigrants in Los Angeles, developed a forms-of-capital model that distinguishes human-cultural, financial and social forms of capital. They argue that the forms of capital available to different ethnic groups and to different sections within those groups explain the similarity and diversity of patterns of entry into the American mainstream. Although formulated in relation to contemporary immigrants in the US, this model seems helpful in explaining distinct paths of immigrant adaptation in different historical and geographical settings. For instance, it sheds light on why Reform Jewry in Bradford, who were the descendants of wealthy Jewish-German merchants, enjoyed recognition and acceptance by the local and national Jewish orthodox authorities as early as 1880s, whereas in most other UK Jewish communities the Reform movement was marginalised and stigmatised up to the mid 1990s. (see Aronsfeld 1981 on the history of Reform movement in Bradford and Kershen and Romain 1995 on Reform Judaism in Britain)

The theory of ‘segmented assimilation’ (Portes and Zhiu 1993; Portes et al 2005,) focuses on the second generation of immigrants in the US and assigns particular importance to pre-migration resources, which create their context of exit. It includes such elements as the money, skills, knowledge and social status that immigrants bring with them, as well as their means of migration and their status in the host country (Zhou and Xiong 2005: 1123). These resources are among the most crucial factors that influence identity formation amongst today’s children of immigrants. However, the workings of cultural, financial, legal and social resources are conceptualised in conjunction with meso-level contextual variables (quality of schooling, youth cultures within the school, socio-economic connectedness or the segregation of neighbourhoods). National-level factors, such as positions in the system of racial stratification, government policies, labour market conditions, public attitudes and the strength and viability of ethnic communities, are also analysed in this compounded model as important elements of the context of reception (Ibid.). Particular contexts of exit and reception can create distinctive socio-economic environments and certain socio-cultural patterns of
adaptation. This explains the diversity of integrative trajectories adopted by individuals and groups of newcomers.

Some researchers working on transnational migration find the model of 'segmented assimilation' helpful in the analysis of the transnational practices of second generation immigrants. Levitt and Glick-Schiller (2003) insist that, just like trajectories of integration, transnational ways of being (social relations) and ways of belonging (identification with a group extending beyond a single location) are locally grounded: they are bound by the opportunities and constraints found in particular localities. Haller and Landolt agree that "transnational and assimilative trajectories of incorporation are not mutually exclusive", explaining that both are "determined at least partially by the local settings and institutional context in which immigrants carry on their lives" (2005:1186). Their empirical study of immigrants in Miami, which tested the likelihood of immigrants pursuing transnational ways of being and belonging, confirmed that the immigrant second generation may feel simultaneously attached to different dimensions of their social location, like ethnicity, pan-ethnicity, nation, race, religion, but they rarely cross established identity categories. The scholars confirmed that variables specified by the 'segmented assimilation' theory (including class, ethnicity, religion, gender) are equally important for understanding of various ways of engaging in transnational practices.

While the above theories are designed to explain the behavioural and identificational patterns of contemporary immigrants and their immediate descendants, they could be helpful in the analysis of older and more settled immigrant groups, like Jews or the Irish. For instance, in the last decade the number of young British Jewish people visiting Israel and the number of British Jews emigrating to Israel have increased considerably, indicating a growing interest and attachment to the Jewish 'historic homeland'. Since most of these people come from well-integrated middle class families, this could not be attributed to 'reactive identities' promoted by 'downward assimilation'. However, this could be a case of what Haller and Landolt (2005) call 'bounded solidarity' promoted by family ties and family structure as well as 'value introjection' founded on religious belief (Ibid: 1204). The theoretical model described points to the importance of distinctive family and communal values/infrastructure/policies as well as to the increasingly active Diaspora politics of the Israeli government.
The neo-Institutional perspective presents integration as a path-dependent process involving the interaction between collectivist and individualist modes of adaptation (Alba and Nee 2003: 45), but “the question of what immigrants are being assimilated into” is also important (Mitchell 2004:648). In their seminal work *Rethinking the American Mainstream*, Alba and Nee (2003) define mainstream society as “a core set of interrelated institutional structures and organisations regulated by rules and practices that weaken, even undermine, the influence of ethnic origin per se” (Ibid: 12). These scholars emphasise the encompassing and relational nature of the mainstream, which cuts across the class divide and may include members of formerly excluded minorities. Looking historically at the changing nature of the American mainstream, Alba and Nee insist that there is certain continuity in the way old European and post-WWII non-European immigrants integrate into American society. A traditional assimilation, based on the stretching of the notion of ‘whiteness’, was certainly more prevalent in the past, but, is still evident today as one of the routes of integration. However, due to the racial and ethnic diversity of contemporary immigrants, it is unlikely to be a dominant mode of integration. More importantly, the mainstream itself has always been changing and the social boundaries separating different groups have always retained the ability to blur, stretch and move. The evolution of conventional understandings of mainstream religions in America is illustrative here: while in the past the mainstream was associated with white Anglo-Saxon Protestantism, now it includes all denominations of Christianity and Judaism.

Generally speaking, Alba and Nee (2003) conceptualise the social mobility of immigrants and their descendants as comparable to the intergenerational mobility within the mainstream population, and this has important implications. It expands the heuristic capacity of this model, making it viable for the analysis of any minority group in different national, regional settings. Thus, drawing on a similar theoretical perspective for an analysis of London’s Arab communities, Caroline Nagel (2002) maintains that various segments of the Arab population in London, depending on their social and geographical contexts, construct and use different notions of the mainstream, thus actively reconfiguring the terms of sameness and difference and, consequently, employing differing discursive and physical strategies of engagement both within and outside their own community (Nagel 2002: 279). The role of governmental policies, formal institutions and public discourses is crucial here as they can speed up, impede or redefine acceptable norms and conventions in a society.
Despite their recognition of diverse trajectories of integration, Alba and Nee’s notion of ‘successful integration’ tacitly presumes incorporation into the middle class, rather than working or lower classes. Moreover, Alba and Nee, while acknowledging historical changes in the mainstream, nonetheless assume that it is coherent and monolithic, albeit more tolerant to ethnic/cultural/religious differences than in the past. The theory of ‘segmented assimilation’ has a more nuanced understanding of the contemporary mainstream, as it assigns high importance to the existing stratification of society, defining mainstream as “shaped by systems of class and racial stratification” (Zhou and Xiong 2005:1122). Since cultural identities are formed through a dialectic of self-attribution and the embedded ascriptive conditions of the social world (Vertovec 2001), discrimination and exclusion of any kind (racial, social, religious, economic) play a critical role in fragmenting the process of integration into divergent trajectories. ‘Segmented assimilation’ predicts downward, upward or horizontal intergenerational mobility, as measured both in relation to parental status and the degree of convergence towards socially recognised norms. This theory posits that although assimilation outcomes are diverse, they are not random and they represent a unique blend of individual/communal resources and the structural and cultural environments of the receiving country.

Nevertheless, the ‘segmented assimilation’ theory remains rather ahistoric, as its analysis of the changing nature and attributes of mainstream is incomplete. Just like Alba and Nee’s theory, it does not provide a thorough examination of the question. This could be explained by their main interest in the present circumstances of immigrant integration in the US, rather than past records. Yet, to use this concept for the analysis of minority identity in general, one needs to acknowledge that the socio-economic and cultural changes over the last century have had a profound impact on traditional mechanisms of identity production, hence, by implication, on the nature of the societal mainstream. This is directly linked to changes in the discourses and practices of citizenship, which in the course of the 20th century affected, and were affected by, a transformation in the socio-spatial organisation of society. New socio-spatial arrangements include, among other things, many new forms of economic production, technology, population re-clustering, and the redevelopment of urban spaces (Marston and Mitchell 2004:111). Thus, in the UK, the processes of economic restructuring, deindustrialisation, de-scaling and the growth of service economy in the 1960 and 80s have fractured conventional class-based politics making social cleavages more complex.
and multi-dimensional. Localised class-based identities, especially in the form of working class neighbourhoods (Bourke 1994), have largely lost their significance and have been gradually substituted by a much more complex system of social, economic, cultural and political identities. The association of some ethnic neighbourhoods with a particular type and place of employment, which was clearly visible in the 1960 and 80s, rarely exist nowadays. Simultaneously, the middle class, which is conventionally associated with the mainstream, has almost doubled in size, recruiting heavily from the working class. By the mid 1990s it had become more diverse and fragmented than ever (Goldthorpe 1995): more gender balanced and ethnically mixed, yet even more varied in income, consumption patterns, lifestyle and cultural habits, political preferences, and overall identities. As a result, the notion of the mainstream has become stretched. More importantly, within the fragmented class structure, not work but leisure activities have become the main base for social identities (Wynne 1998). Although economic, spatial and cultural cleavages are related (Savage 2000), the relationship is complex as these lifestyle practices are characteristically unstable and tend to change with different life stages. As a result, Wynne (1998) argues,

"..social identities may no longer be 'read' from class or occupational position but rather exist as a combination of individual choices made available by these destabilising processes (Wynne 1998: 150).

This destabilises cultural and social practices of distinction, increasing the individual and collective ability to 'pick-and-mix' various identities. In a contemporary society of 'consumer choice' where religious, ethnic and cultural identities have become new consumables, the mainstream culture has become more tolerant to and more tempted by the 'exotic'. For instance, many Western religious institutions, recognising the freedom of individual choice, find themselves competing with other lifestyle/spiritual activities. Hence, they employ marketing techniques to increase their attractiveness and raise their public profile. By the same token, the retreat into tribalism and religious fundamentalism, which challenges the established private-public divide, is often presented as a particular form of public and personal opposition to the establishment, attempting to redefine the conventional borders between politics, religion, culture and economy."
2.7. Conclusion

This chapter has demonstrated the link between different ontological understandings of the social, different conceptualisations of identities and different research agenda with regard to minority groups. The social constructivist approach that treats identities as flexible, relational and contextual has a better grasp of the changing patterns of social experience in the second part of the 20th century than the essentialised and naturalised understanding of identities. Responding to a political agenda of managing ethnically and culturally diverse societies, academic research has focussed on questions of immigrant integration in the context of different citizenship frameworks. Although most of the theories of immigrant integration focus on first and second-generation immigrants, it is argued here that the theorisation of citizenship as a combination of institutional and discursive settings could be applied to established minorities, like the Jews in the UK.

British experience shows that, in the course of the 20th century, the UK citizenship regime has changed, allowing a plurality of ways of constructing minority identity. In addition, economic changes have led to the fragmentation of the societal mainstream, bringing a segmentation of middle class interests and identities. Therefore, a study of changing Jewish identities has to be grounded in the changing socio-economic and cultural circumstances of Jewish presence in the UK. In this respect, the Institutional approach provides a useful conceptual framework for building a productive and dynamic synthesis of discursive and structural theories, enabling a comprehensive analysis of place-specific Jewish identities. However, neo-Institutional theories of immigrant integration are designed to deal with the contemporary situation and are often a-historical. To widen their historical scope, the main theoretical concepts would require certain adjustments. A successful theoretical approach to the analysis of the Leeds Jewish community has to take into consideration the idiosyncrasies of the UK institutional and discursive environments, their juxtaposition with the particularities of the Leeds locality, and the distinctive experience of the local Jewish minority. For this purpose, the general conceptual framework for analysing minority identities that has been discussed in this chapter is developed through a more nuanced review of the particularities of Jewish identities, and the way they are approached theoretically, in the next chapter.
Chapter Three

Making Sense of Jewish Identity

Jewish identity is the subject of extensive scholarly writings and hot debate among Jewish people. The uniqueness of Jewish historical experience and the fusion of religious, ethnic and cultural dimensions, while strengthening a sense of belonging, simultaneously create lots of tensions. According to Horowitz,

What makes the study of Jewish identity complex is that we are not dealing with a unilinear phenomenon, but one more akin to a multi-flexed phenomenon moving in a variety of historical as well as structural directions. To discuss the Jewish condition is to examine religiosity, nationality and culture all at once as well as one at a time (Horowitz 1998: 3).

These tensions feature prominently in contemporary Jewish discourses across the world: Jews in the Diaspora and Israel ardently debate who should be considered a Jew, his/her obligations towards fellow Jews and relations with the non-Jewish world. Unsurprisingly, these issues catch the attention of scholars, who, just like the public, often have contradictory views regarding the nature of Jewish identity. The intent of the following review is twofold. On the one hand, it depicts the evolution of Jewish collective and individual identities, highlighting the key issues of contemporary discourse on Jewish past, present and future. On the other hand, this chapter demonstrates that, despite what is called the ‘uniqueness’ of Jewish experience, the conceptual framework of citizenship, expressed in institutional and discursive terms, is well-suited for the analysis of Jewish communities at various scales and across time and space. Indeed, both the empirical evidence and its scholarly interpretations point to the tremendous importance of national/local environments for the particularities of Jewish identities in Israel and across the Diaspora.

A word of caution is required in relation to the term diaspora, which, in contemporary academic debates, is a very contentious and multilayered concept: it stands simultaneously for a descriptive typological tool and a social condition (Anthias 1998), and is used in relation to a large range of transnational movements (for the debates, see Anthias 1998; Werbner 2000). Both usages are applicable to the Jewish Diaspora, thus creating a common denominator for its comparison to other ethno-cultural minority groups. At the same time, the uniqueness of Jewish identity becomes evident in the importance of the classical usage of the term, which depicts a normative model for the
Jewish experience in the condition of statelessness (Arendt 1978). The following review shows the history and ontological significance of the latter meaning of diaspora, which puts Jews apart from other diasporic peoples. It also points to the present simultaneous use of classic and contemporary meanings, which creates ambiguities regarding the uniqueness or typicality of Jewish contemporary identities.

3.1. Traditional definition of Jewish identity

Throughout the centuries Jewish identity has been rooted in Judaism, understood as a divinely ordained body of beliefs, norms and practices. Up to the 19th century, Judaism, while embracing different interpretations of the same tradition, preserved a relatively unified structure. Despite the geographic and cultural divisions within Klal Yisrael (understood as the ultimate unity of all Jews) – the division of Sephardi from Ashkenazi Jews, for example, or of Litvaks from Polaks – all Jewish establishments accepted the binding authority of the Torah, which was universally viewed as given by God to Moses on Mount Sinai (Cohn-Sherbok 1991: xi). The principal tenets of Judaism were defined in the aftermath of the destruction of the second Temple (70 CE), providing Jewish people with resources for identity-definition and identity-maintenance sufficient to survive outside their land and Temple (Harvey 1999). For the next thirteen centuries of Diasporic existence (500-1800 CE), when Jews were confined to the margins of their host societies, the religion was further systematised into codes, often borrowed from the philosophical and cultural forms of host nations. Thus, diaspora was a principal spatial, political and cultural framework for the emergence and development of Judaism: it became “the frame within which Judaism, distinct from the original Hebraism, developed through its contact with reality” (Azria 2002: 154).

Nevertheless, the meaning of diaspora for Jewish people has always been intrinsically ambiguous and compound owing to the tension between two levels of reality – actual and ideal – as well as between two different spins on the condition: positive and negative (Gruen 2002: 18). While diaspora was often understood as multiple real experiences of Galut⁶, it was simultaneously seen as an abstract concept of displacement and off-centring of Klal Yisrael from the imaginary elsewhere. This ‘elsewhere’, the location of Jewish foundation and ultimate fulfilment, was in the Jewish collective imagination the place to which Jews were destined to return on the

⁶ Galut or Galus - (Hebrew: גלות) literary meaning ‘exile’, usually refers to exile of the Jewish people from the Land of Israel.
completion of their God-given mission of being ‘a beacon of light for all nations’. The other two interpretations of diaspora, although intrinsically linked to the first two, were more concerned with normative aspects of the Jewish Diasporic condition. The negative approach envisioned diaspora as a bitter and doleful Galut, exile, God’s punishment for the sins of the Israelites, which had to be overcome. The alternative approach offered a more comforting vision: by portraying Jews as the ‘people of the Book’, it abandoned territorial legitimation and did not aspire to a land for the Jews to have as their own. To a certain extent, sacred space in rabbinic Judaism has been successfully transformed into sacred time, thus making the sacredness portable. For instance, by celebrating and keeping Shabbat, which gives one a taste of the world to come, one carries sacred space to wherever one is (Kunin 1994: 136). The existence of a ‘portable Temple’ and the embracing of the Jewish texts that define Jewish nationhood and Jewish identity could mean that the diaspora condition was a virtue rather than a Galut. This interpretation allowed and even demanded primary attachment to the land of actual residence rather than to the mystical ancestral land (Gruen 2002: 18). According to Azria (2002), although in Modernity the negative approach became prevalent in European communities, eventually culminating in a worldwide Zionist movement, both views of diaspora (as a punishment and as a blessing) have become integral to Jewish identity:

...it projects the Jew beyond his miserable existential condition and assigns him two distinct goals: the return to Zion and the end of the exile; to be “a beacon of light for all nations.” This universal mission is considered one of the eschatological goals of the dispersion itself (Azria 2002:150).

This ‘Diaspora paradigm’ (as it was called by Azria) worked in Judaism as a heuristic concept, turning the narrative of Diaspora, Exile and Redemption into the principal ontological parable and the founding myth of the Jewish people, to which the personal and collective histories of particular Jewish communities have been organically fitted. Discrete narratives of migration and settlement of individuals and communities have traditionally been adjusted to measure up to this Grand Narrative of Diaspora, Exile and Redemption, which emphasized the commonality of Jews through time and space as a special and unique people destined to live in strangers’ lands and to carry out God’s mission.

Two other elements of this long-established Jewish identity, which complemented the ‘Diaspora paradigm’, were kehillah (community) and minhag (tradition). For centuries of Jewish diasporic existence, the ‘borders’ between Jews and host societies were clear-cut and unambiguous. The ‘alienation’ of Jews in Christian and Muslim contexts
became internalised in Jewish self-understanding, which reinforced Jewish community and solidarity. The community, the primary framework of socialization and sociability, played an important role for centuries in shaping Jewish identities. In this miniature social system the individual was an integral part of the whole, was absorbed by the group and her existence was worth living only through the group (Azria 1998: 27). Individual and communal identities were intrinsically connected through the normative authoritative dimension of tradition. Since it was believed that God gave to Moses both original laws and their interpretations, the elaborate Talmudic system of tradition and its subsequent formalization in Halakhah covered every aspect of personal and social life. Tradition was an all-embracing frame and matrix of an inherited package deal, which threatened collective punishment if anyone discarded its tenets.

### 3.2. Modernity and the disintegration of traditional Jewish identities

Over the past two hundred years, internal and external developments problematised the legitimacy of the established mode of Jewish identity construction and challenged its centrality to the concept of Klal Yisrael. During this period, political ideas, movements and socio-economic developments that shaped modern European society affected the Jewish world perhaps in a more profound way than for other peoples. Jews experienced an unprecedented fragmentation into a wide variety of sub-groups with markedly different orientations. By placing the emphasis on emancipation, ethnicity and particularly nationalism, modernity ignited the ongoing debate over the character and parameters of Jewish identity. This debate has defined the principal lines of Jewish public and academic discussions in the course of the 20th century and it continues to be crucial to contemporary discourse. Jewish derivatives of the 19th-century liberal ideas of Humanism and Modernisation were Haskalah, the Jewish version of Enlightenment, and Zionism, the Jewish version of Nationalism (Birnbaum and Katznelson 1995). Jewish ideas on Enlightenment encapsulated in Haskalah promised Jews emancipation from a life confined to the physical and social boundaries of the ghetto:

> The startling effects of this fundamental shift cannot be overemphasised. Freedom from segregated existence brought on a transition from a life oriented by revelation, tradition, and a sense of the holy to one in which religion became privatised if not irrelevant or obsolete (Borowitz 1991:3)

*Emancipation* delivered benefits for Jews as individuals, although its influence on Jews as a collectivity was far more problematic. On the one hand, it enhanced the social status of the Jewish people and allowed them to participate in arenas of social,
economic and political life that were previously inaccessible to them. On the other hand, the long-term effects on Judaism as a culture and a religion were damaging. Modernisation brought ‘Cartesian individualism’ and dismantled the virtually self-governing Jewish community (Wettstein 2002:8). The acceptance of Jews in Gentile society created new interests, relations and loyalties outside the confines of their community. When old and new allegiances clashed, a steadily growing proportion of Jews made their own choices, ignoring communal and rabbinical leaders’ rulings. Often there were trade-offs between the Jewish and Gentile worlds, yet cases when the old was completely discarded for the sake of the new were also common. According to Endelman (1990: 2), from the age of Enlightenment to the period of the Holocaust, several hundred thousand Jews separated themselves from Jewish communities and assimilated into the mainstream host societies.

Some Jewish intellectual thinkers placed the emphasis on *ethnicity and nationalism* and prompted the reinterpretation of Jewish identity on the Western model of modernisation. Appealing to the notions of universalism, humanism and liberalism, they saw Jewish identity as voluntary, while traditional Judaism was deemed backward and obsolete. Although there were Jewish intellectuals, religious and secular, who warned of the high price of emancipation, their voice remained marginal throughout the emancipation process. The modernisation of Judaism, inspired by Protestantism, was theorised on the Christian model of society. Consequently, assimilation and acculturation to Western norms and outlooks were considered progressive and imperative to the development of a ‘modern’ Jewish identity. This was the initial reasoning behind the Reform and Liberal movements, which emerged in Germany in the 19th century. Jewish liberals advocated the abolition of all social and economic inequalities and cheered assimilation and intermarriage as the way towards the future, where religion would “no longer be a permanent and insuperable dividing wall preventing a union of peoples” (Sharfman 2004). This undermined the supremacy of the traditional divine or transcendent legitimation of Jewish identity and, by implication, of theological and metaphysical space, and transferred attention to a secular space of the social and the cultural. Since “to be Jewish now meant to identify with Jewish people and its cultural heritage” (Silberstein 1994:2), ‘Jewishness’ instead of ‘Judaism’ became an alternative identity differentiator. The emergence of a secular Jewish discourse transformed the concept of Jewish identity into a highly contested issue. A wide range of Jewish identities today
(from secular Jewishness to ultra-Orthodox Judaism) is an outcome of these century-old transformations.

In a Gentile world, the very same rooting of Jewishness in the Jewish People and their history, rather than in religion, brought different interpretations of the ‘Jewish problem’. If in the Middle Ages anti-Semitism was based on Christian theology, in modern times it ceased to be a purely religious matter. Some ‘liberal’ anti-Semites argued for the creation of incentives for full cultural assimilation of Jews into the host nations. This logic is apparent in the recommendation to the French Assembly by Count Stanislas de Clermont-Tonnerre (1789), who advocated the view that “Revolution granted Jews everything as individuals ... but nothing as a nation” (cited in Wieviorka 2003:255). Still other anti-Semitic commentaries used the emphasis on ethnicity as an excuse to racialise Jewishness as permanent, surpassing the religious boundaries and irreversible by conversion or assimilation. For them, Jewishness was a “racial identity, one that can be observed, measured, understood and pathologized” (Garb 1995: 22). Jewish responses to the new forms of anti-Semitism were very diverse. Ideologically they ranged from the Dubnowist Yiddishist movement and Marxist Bund Party, both advocating Jewish autonomies in countries with sizeable Jewish minorities (Gorny 2003:15), to the Zionist movement, which transformed the Biblical idea of ‘returning to Israel’ into a practical plan of resettling the Jews in the land of Israel. In Eastern Europe, where at the end of the 19th century anti-Semitism was state-sponsored and particularly violent, a common Jewish response was to emigrate. The massive Jewish migration at the turn of the 20th century changed the demographic map of world Jewry, laying the foundation for the great American Jewish Diaspora, reinvigorating the already assimilated western European Jewish communities, and establishing a foothold in Palestine, which was controlled by the Ottoman Empire. Religious and secular visions of Jewishness were drifting further apart, but, in the face of external threats, Zionism became a unifying force that strove for the creation of the state of Israel.

Although the period of the late 19th–early 20th century was important for the evolution of Jewish identity, it was WWII that unleashed the most dramatic changes in the modern Jewish world. The destruction of European Jewry in the Holocaust and the establishment of Israel (1948) were among the main formative events of the 20th century, and they continue to be central, albeit controversial, to the contemporary Jewish experience. In the aftermath of WWII, Europe lost its position as the leading Jewish centre, as so many people had perished and many were dislocated to other parts of the
world. As a consequence, the present Jewish map is simpler than that of 1939: its two main reference points are Israel and the US, as over eighty percent of world Jewry from the total of 13.2 million resides here (DellaPergola 2003). In addition, sizeable Jewish communities have remained in the UK, France, Canada, Australia, Russia, Germany, and Ukraine. The establishment of Israel and the progression of multi-ethnic democratic societies in the West transformed Jews from an exilic people into a truly diasporic one (Gorny 2003: 21). It has also ‘normalised’ the Jewish Diaspora by providing Jews with a real and legal homeland, even though most of the diasporans were not born there and many have never been there.

After WWII, as more Jews moved to Israel or settled in western democracies, the downfall of traditional Jewish identity accelerated. The orthodox religious interpretation of Judaism as well as traditional communal life was attacked from multiple angles. Jewish nationalism, especially prominent in Zionist ideology, was an important source of secular Jewishness from the beginning of the 20th century, but after the establishment of Israel and especially during its wars with the neighbouring Arab countries, it blossomed worldwide as a principal type of Jewish identity. In some sense, Zionism functioned as a quasi-religion, where God was replaced by peoplehood; it rooted Jewish identity in the emotional connection with Israel and in practical help with its survival. By offering a strong Jewish identity, with optional religious identification, it attracted a growing number of secularists wishing to maintain their Jewishness though feeling uncomfortable with the religious doctrines of Judaism (Poll 1998: 151). In Israel the early political institutionalisation of Orthodox Judaism suppressed the development of alternative forms of religious identity, which resulted in a growing divide between a limited but “increasingly stringent and separatist religious Jewish identity” (Ibid: 67) and widespread Israeli secular nationalism that has a weakening association with Jewishness. In a study of contemporary views of Israelis, Etzioni-Halevi (1998: 70) shows that the positive sentiment towards religious tradition among secular Jews in Israel has been diminishing from generation to generation.

Perhaps an even bigger post-WWII challenge to traditional Jewish identities, both in Israel and the Diaspora, was the increasing freedom of modern open societies. In western countries, where the majority of Diaspora Jewry currently lives, each subsequent generation of Jewish immigrants benefited from fuller citizenship rights – in particular, access to free education, and declining anti-Semitism and discrimination. The outcome is a story of successful integration and upward mobility in the various host
societies (for American Jewry, see Chiswick 1995, Goldsheider 1995; for British Jewry, see Carlowe et al. 2003), which, after WWII, led to the “widespread embourgeoisement of Jewish society and its adaptation to middle-class values and behaviour” (Webber 1994:79). Jews increasingly entered such liberal professions as medicine, accountancy and law, while moving into suburbia and abandoning immigrant landmanship organisations. Inevitably, this success came at a high price: acceptance into the host societies’ mainstream made Jewish communities face the same challenges as the corresponding Gentile communities. Hence, the individualism, secularisation, social and geographic mobility, and social, cultural, and ethnic mixing inherent in a modern metropolis, albeit with certain time-lags, speeded up the breaking of ancestral and communal traditional ties (Azria 1998: 27). It became possible to think of Judaism, conceptualised in most host countries as a private religious matter, as detached from the ethno-cultural expression of Jewishness. More crucially, both forms of Jewish identity became optional: since membership of the Jewish community was no longer imposed by the outside state, it became a voluntary matter, often one identity among many others.

This brought about two paradoxical consequences for Jewish communities (Webber 1994). First, whereas Jewishness became a voluntary act of self-identification, Jewish acceptance of non-Jewish social and national identities followed the reverse development and became an obligation: integration in the host nations required unquestionable acceptance of national citizenship and full loyalty to the nation. Consequently, as there has been a great variation in national models of citizenship and in host nation’s treatment of minorities, Jewish adoption of cultural and social values varied greatly across nation-states. The second paradox reveals the contradiction between the western conventional definition of ‘Jewish community’ as a religious minority and the internal trend within the Jewish world towards non-religious expressions of Jewish identity that are more in-tune with a middle-class lifestyle. This, for instance, explains the growth in leisure-related and non-religious activities as well as the professionalisation of communal services that were previously run by volunteers.

3.3. The complexities of post-Modern Jewish identities

In the mid-1960s, having achieved a relatively high level of integration, western Jews found themselves suddenly interested in what made them different from the others. The

7 Landmanship - from Landsmann (German) – a person from the same place of origin
Six Day War of 1967 became a turning point for world Jewry, when “the dominant theme of Diaspora Jewish life shifted ‘from integration to survival’” (Sacks 1993:109). In the 1970s and 1980s, this quest for Jewish identity was channelled into practical concern for the physical survival of Israel and support of Soviet Jewry. By the 1990s, the physical survival of Israel was no longer major concern and Soviet Jews were free to live Jewish lives, so the Jewish Diaspora turned its attention onto itself. When, in the second half of the 20th century, rates of intermarriage rose to more than 50% in the US and France, and came close to 40% in Britain (DellaPergola 2003:55; Poll 1998: 152), it prompted many Jewish agencies to search for new forms of collective continuity. The major challenge for Diaspora Jews was identified as the spiritual survival of Jews “among non-Jews without the aid of territorial borders or zealous religious observance” (Ben-Rafael 2003:356). Since Jewish people are simultaneously engaged in multiple structural, cultural and social environments, which create various, often mutually exclusive definitions, categories and aims, today’s Jewish identities are very complex, fragmentary and ‘impure’. At the same time, in the context of contemporary open and multicultural societies, the terms of inclusion in national and local discourses have changed, allowing diverse Jewish collectivities direct representation in the non-Jewish world. This underlies the absence of one closed, exclusively Jewish public domain and explains why ideologically different Jewish movements, instead of clashing with each other within the Diaspora, prefer to live parallel lives in the national and local environments (Medding 1995:103).

In order to halt falling membership rates, a successful modern synagogue now had to adapt to the new realities and to become more than a place solely of religious worship and study. This is especially apparent in the US, where many synagogues have been transformed into community centres, providing an exclusive social framework for recreational and cultural activities. This has helped to broaden the basis for synagogue membership, and it is now possible for an atheist Jew, without any religious commitment, to be meaningfully involved in religious celebrations. Yet it has also undermined the traditional bases of solidarity and cohesion, making the Jewish community ‘an intermittent reality’, which coalesces only from time to time on significant, exceptional, highly emotional circumstances (Azria 1998: 29). In the UK, there is a growing acknowledgement of the stark internal differences, both socio-economic and ideological, which split Jewish communities into incompatible subgroups and undermine the traditional centrist moderate Orthodoxy. Among the reasons for this
community fragmentation is the transformation of the main Jewish institutions – the family and the community. According to the Census of 2001, there exists a greater than ever variation in the structure and circumstances of Jewish households. For instance, while 46,000 Jewish-headed households own their houses, 10,500 households live in social-rented accommodation. The most staggering fact, however, is that only 19% of households contain married couples with children, the building blocks of a traditional model of Jewish community, whereas nearly half (48%) of all households consist of either a single person or a long-retired couple (see more in JC 18.05.2007:37).

At the same time, there is evidence of new forms of associational and contextual ties, which create alternative bases for Jewish ethnic cohesion and correspond to the new socio-economic and cultural realities of post-industrial and post-modern societies (Goldsheider 1995). Thus, American and British Jews demonstrate distinctive patterns of educational and occupational concentration at high socio-economic levels, for example increased Jewish densities within a few universities and employment in a small number of professions, such as in education, medicine and law. This concentration in certain jobs and educational institutions not only sets Jews apart from other minorities, but also links Jews economically – in terms of life-style, worldviews and prestige – and fosters family and kinship networks, leading to the overlapping of ethnicity and social class. This new basis for collective cohesion is reinforced by the remaining traditional communal ties and religious affiliation, as well as by a still relatively high residential concentration. Overall, the solidarity and cohesion of all Jewish collective identities seem to be dependent on a mixture of symbolic and instrumental elements (Gans 1979), yet different national and local settings foster a qualitatively and quantitatively different combination of elements.

Nevertheless, there are a few trends that are indicative of all Diaspora Jews. For instance, many communities report a growing number of members who, while identifying as Jews, don’t wish to commit to particular Jewish community institutions and don’t feel bound by any obligations to externally ascribed groups. Several studies of American Jewry (Goldscheider 1986, Medding 1998, Cohen and Eisen 2000, Rebhun 2004) point to certain downward tendencies that probably characterise other Jewish diasporic experiences. They indicate the existence of a generational decline in the importance attached to being Jewish, in the level of ritual observance and communal commitment, although the decline is far less marked for those with strong religious affiliation (Winter 1996). At the same time, there is a reported high or increasing level
of subjective, ‘interior’ Jewish attachment, accompanied by a greater value of home and family-based rituals and practices (Waxman 2003:153). Many choose to participate selectively in certain Jewish practices or group activities, or to create their own affinity groups that match their own ideas of what being Jewish means today (Azria 1998: 29).

These freewheeling community groupings take various shapes, participating in cultural, social, charitable, educational and leisure activities, and even in customised religious practices. This weakens Jewish singularity, but fosters Jewish pluralism and feeds on-going ideological debates on grand and small issues of Jewish identity. There has been a growing discord with regard to such a previously consensual issue as unqualified support of Israel. In the last few decades, the popularity of Zionist ideology has been in decline, and the emergence of critical Jewish discourse both in Israel and the Diaspora has prompted talk of a post-Zionist era. While the majority of Jews maintain vocal support for Israel, some simultaneously question the justice of Israeli policies towards Palestinians and Israeli Arabs. They appeal to human rights and democratic principles, envisioning Israel as a ‘state for all citizens’ rather than as a Jewish state (Ben-Rafael 2003:354). Diasporic post-Zionists have also disputed the centrality of Israel for the Jewish world, rejecting a classical Zionist call to all Jews to make aliyah (settle in Israel) (for more, see Habib 2004). A growing number of American and British Jews consistently identify their country of residence as their true ‘home’: “they are not in their own view and in their behaviour in ‘exile’ or in Diaspora” (Goldsheider 1995:131). Acknowledging this fact, Benyamin Netanyahu, who during his term as Israeli prime minister openly called Diaspora Jews to fulfil their duty by relocating to Israel, has recently accepted that “a strong Diaspora makes for a strong Israel” and that “for the last half-century, the two pillars of Jewish life have been a strong Israel and a strong Diaspora” (JT 20.10.2006:8).

For a Jewish Diaspora that for centuries lived without a centralised authority, diverse identities are not a novelty, but what is uniquely different today is that the adoption of even stringent religious observance in most cases is not a transmitted inter-generational attitude but a matter of personal choice. Thus, ironically, the re-emergence of strict Orthodoxy is, to an extent, the “by-product of the disillusions generated by modernity” (Azria 1998: 29); just like other new forms of Jewishness, it is an attempt to find the solution to a contemporary identity crisis. The danger that “young hearts are being turned away from the core values of a centrist, integrated and tolerant Orthodoxy” is acknowledged in the British Jewish mainstream, whose leaders today speak openly of
the need to “train inspirational, modern, Orthodox young men and women” able to support a “tolerant, inclusive and non-partisan modern orthodoxy” (JC 18.05.2007:11). New and traditional styles of expressing Jewish identity coexist, just as new interpretations of traditional styles find their way into contemporary discourse and practice. Thus, the word kosher, which in traditional Halakhic interpretation is a technical term defining a complex set of rules for handling food, has become a largely symbolic, ethicised and customised identity marker for secular Jews.

This is indicative of the contemporary permeability of the boundaries between secular and religious, modern, pre-modern and post-modern, in which previous clusters of Jewish modes of self-identification have been dis-assembled, mended and intermixed. Interestingly enough, both new religious outreach programmes (such as Lubavich Hasidim) and new forms of secular Jewishness, including issue-specific interest groups, engage in the discursive reconstruction of the Jewish past as the way of legitimising their present identities. The prevalent concern with authenticity has boosted an interest in Jewish history, usually taught in a secular manner, and led to the rise of ‘identity tourism’ and to the development of new avenues for experiencing Jewish identities, such as conferences, music festivals, even interfaith services. The very same concern underlies the proliferation of such organisations as the Jewish Vegetarian Society; this particular organisation attempts to ‘authenticate’ vegetarianism by reference to the Torah, thus cultivating a Jewish angle on topical issues that derive from the wider secular environment.

This post-modern focus on authenticity – the search for ‘roots’ and the revival of ‘authentic’ Jewish traditions – stands in sharp contrast to Modernity, in which Jews, adjusting to the new circumstances of their existence, abandoned or reformed vast areas of traditional Jewish ritual. Jonathan Webber describes this new mode of collective behaviour as

...the attempt to provide a cognitive framework for a set of newly perceived authenticities, on the model of culturally reconstructed ethnic revivals of ‘ethnic’ or ‘minority’ identities found elsewhere in the wider society, and they provide the sense of an objective basis for a post-modern identity of Jewishness (Webber 1994: 81)

The sensitivity of British Jewish discourse to national cultural idioms has recently been demonstrated by the apparent cooling down of British Jewish public support for multiculturalism, which coincided with the national U-turn on the policy of minority integration and citizenship. When in the aftermath of September 11th 2001, Chief Rabbi
Jonathan Sacks made a number of public speeches and even published a book entitled *The Dignity of Difference* (2002b), he celebrated multiculturalism and, rather to the dismay of many Orthodox rabbis, proclaimed that "God is greater than religion, that he is only partially comprehended by any one faith" (Sacks 2002a). Arguing that there was value in almost all cultures and belief systems, he asked people of all creeds "to recognize the irreducible, glorious dignity of difference" (Ibid.), an appeal that was greeted with applause by non-Jewish and Jewish non-Orthodox audiences. However, a few years later, when public discourse had shifted in favour of more restrictive and assimilationist policies towards immigrants and minorities, Jonathan Sacks was again at the forefront of the debate, ditching his previous arguments and now criticising a culture of 'competitive victimhood', the political correctness of multiculturalism, and identity politics that poisoned British politics (JC 26.10.2007: 1). These new ideas have been summarised in his latest, highly controversial book, *The Home We Build Together* (Sacks 2007), which sparked discussions in Jewish circles that mirrored national political debates, prompting Jewish opponents of multiculturalism to rejoice and its supporters to accuse Sir Jonathan of spineless populism and hypocrisy.

### 3.4. Contemporary academic research on Jewish identity

The unevenness of contemporary Jewish society in the context of cultural and ideological change, which is evident in the remarkable multiplicity of Jewish social agendas, features prominently in Jewish public discourse and creates a similar resonance in academic debates on Jewish identity. Enriched by post-modern philosophy, the arguments have become more complex and multi-layered. For instance, in a volume dedicated solely to the topic of Jewish identity (Goldberg and Krausz 1993), such very up-to-date and complex issues as universalism and particularism of Jewish identity, Jewishness as a choice and obligation, the relationship between Jewish religion and ethno-cultural identity, Israel and the Diaspora, are acknowledged as the formative dimensions of contemporary Jewish discourse. Moreover, there is a growing academic consensus that "any attempt to locate anything like the correct account of Jewish identity, or the correct Jewish identity, is doomed to failure" (Wettstein 2002: 9). This position stands in contrast to the pre-1980s paradigm, which essentialised and simplified Jewish identity (Litvin and Hoenig 1965; Herman 1977).

An essentialist approach, still in existence but occupying a rather modest position, assumes the 'civilisational' singularity of Jewish people and the natural 'givenness' of
Jewish collective identity (Silberstein 1994: 3). Its secular version defends the existence of a common coherent set of values, beliefs, attitudes, and behavioural traits of Jewish people. Religious essentialism agrees with the theological definition of Jewish identity and depicts it as a homogenous and coherent collection of divinely ordained beliefs, blaming the contemporary identity crisis on ‘the destructive impulses of modernity’. As shown in the quotation below, it places the theological matrix of God’s dealings with the people of Israel at the heart of Jewish identity, while ethnic attributes of identity – land, language and individual self-identity – are considered secondary:

Even if many contemporary Jews identify themselves as such primarily through other elements of the Jewish civilization, it is to the Jewish religion that we must turn to understand the identity of the Jewish people (Dorf in Harvey 1999)

The mainstream of academic research on Jewish topics rejects the simplicity and singularity of Jewish identity, celebrating Jewishness as a variety of fluid and often disconnected ‘selves’. This approach acknowledges the ethnographic complexity of contemporary Jewish identities, identifying its sources in the multiple dimensions, multiple categories, and multiple aims that Jews face in modern plural societies (Webber 1994: 84). It debunks the idea that there is or ever was one unified Jewish collectivity, favouring a post-modern ontology of social constructiveness and embracing Benedict Anderson’s notion of the ‘imagined community’ (Anderson 1983). This approach envisions Jewish identities as being “in constant flux, continually being defined and redefined according to different social circumstances, including the effects of other cultures, economic and technological developments and political conditions” (Krausz and Tulea 1998: 262). As shown by Jonathan Sacks’s appeal to see Jewish identity ‘as something to be created’ rather than fixed (Sacks 1994: 116), this ontology has also penetrated Jewish public discourse. The corresponding epistemology conceptualises Jewish collective identity, Klal Yisrael, which in the past was expressed in transcendental language, in terms of subjectively constructed images that were formed in response to historically unique juxtapositions of cultural, economic, political and social circumstances. Even though traditional collective identity unambiguously stresses religious faith above all else, it has never been homogenous: this is explained partly by the absence of a central religious authority in Judaism, and partly by the variety of “physical and spiritual conditions under which Jews lived in different periods and places” (Ben-Rafael 2003:343). The novelty of the last century was in a full-scale re-conceptualisation of Jewishness that disentangled the bundle of religious faith,
ethnicity and culture, and encouraged critical revisions of each of the constitutive elements. Since all these elements were unified and rationalised through the ‘Diaspora paradigm’, it’s easy to understand why so much special scholarly attention has been paid to the changing perceptions of the diaspora as a condition for and a definition of one’s Jewishness (Azria 1998, Habib 2004).

Today, when it is widely acknowledged that the full range of expressing one’s Jewishness cannot be reduced to a singular Jewish identity but is best described by Wittgenstein’s (1961) concept of ‘family resemblance’, the research agenda consists of defining, clustering and explaining the plurality of Jewish identities. The immediate focus of Jewish historians and sociologists is on the dynamic and circumstances of the Jews’ collective self-awareness (Gorny 2003:15), on the interplay between environmental conditions and Jewish ‘identity packages’ (Webber 1994: 83). The term ‘environment’ has a very broad connotation, which often depends on research goals and research design. As a rule, case-studies of Jewish communities implicitly or explicitly acknowledge the importance of the structural and cultural characteristics of the host nation-states, which form distinctive citizenship frameworks. Unsurprisingly, most academic writings on Jewish identity take a country-specific approach, comparing the differences among American, British, French, Russian or other national models of Jewishness. The differences and similarities are often explained by the nation-specific terms of Jewish inclusion in the national communities. Thus, the scholars agree that “the evolution of the Jewish community in France ... corresponded in large measure to the evolution of the model of political culture in France” (Trigano 1994:185); American Jews see themselves as Americans at least as much as they see themselves as Jews, often making these two cultures interchangeable (Heilman 1998: 81); and for most Russian Jews, “Jewishness is perceived as nothing but ethnicity, which should not be affected by the individual’s choice of confession” (Gitelman 2003: 202). Generalising, Jonathan Webber (1997) points out that an image of all Jews identifying as members of an ethno-religious group is no longer applicable since socio-political processes have impacted on European Jews differently in their respective countries. In a more universal approach to the role of anti-Semitism in Jewish self-identity, Gilman comments how the external images of the group becomes internalised by its members:

As Jews react to the world by altering their sense of identity, what they wish themselves to be, so they become what the group labelling them as ‘Other’ has determined them to be (Gilman 1986: 12).
While national context has become an important explanatory force for the cross-country differences in Jewish identity, national institutions and discourses of citizenship are recognized as significant causes of identity change within national borders. A study of Russian Jewish immigrants in Chicago in the 1980s and 1990s vividly illustrates the impact of a national understanding of Jewishness on individual definitions of the Jewish self. According to the study, while the newcomers were more likely to use the Russian ethno-cultural definition of their identity, with time they adopted the American notion of Jewishness as a religion, and the longer they stayed in the US, the more likely they were to make the transition (Gitelman 2003: 201). According to another study of American Jews (Heilman 1995), although most Jewish people do not associate their identity exclusively with religion, nearly half stated that Jews in America were a purely religious group, reflecting the dominant non-Jewish view of American Jews (Lipset and Raab 1995: 60).

Scholarly interest in the interaction between a national concept of citizenship and the self-identification of the resident Jewish population has prompted a number of publications on Jewish attitudes to multiculturalism. Biale et al (1998) point to the contemporary American Jewish ambiguity towards multicultural policies, explaining it by the liminal position of Jews in western democratic societies. On the one hand, Jews, who in the past were considered as “insiders who are outsiders and outsiders who are insiders” (Biale et al 1998:5), enthusiastically supported the Enlightenment and its universalistic principles, which removed discriminatory barriers to Jewish integration. This enthusiasm is still present in contemporary Jewish narrative, and underpins the argument of those who advocate the relevance of integration in the ‘Jewish way’ for recent immigrants. On the other hand, multiculturalism, which invites the proud articulation of ethnic and racial distinctiveness, and reduces the tensions of dual identities, also proved to be very instrumental. It helped to revive American Jewish identity and to halt the disappearance of local Jewish communities due to assimilation. Sharot (1998), in his analysis of the changing relationship between ethnic Jewishness and Judaism, expresses a similar view that multicultural citizenship rid American Jews of the pressure to proclaim their Americanness by refuting an ethnic Jewish identity. According to this scholar, “the disappearance of a unified single notion of what it means to be an American causes the conception of what it means to belong to a specific ethnic group to lose its clarity” (Sharot 1998: 95). Hence, the group boundaries become more blurred, unstable and overlapping with other identities (DellaPergola 2003: 49), whereas
cultural, religious and ideological diversity makes it hard for individuals and communities to reach a coherent sense of self (Heilman 1998:83). Sheffer (2003), although he disagrees with Biale et al. (1998) regarding the uniqueness of Jewish diasporic experience and considers contemporary Jewish Diaspora as a typical ethno-cultural entity, shares their view regarding the paramount importance of the host-country environment. He argues that just like any ethno-cultural diaspora, the Jewish Diaspora is formed and determined in response to close and distant environments, making hybridization of identity inevitable (Sheffer 2003: 33). Sheffer combines a methodology of individual decision-making with the analysis of structural and discursive conditions of citizenship, enabling a neo-institutional theoretical explanation for the empirical evidence of increasing pluralisation of Jewish Diaspora in Western democratic societies.

3.5. Conclusion

This chapter’s historical review of Jewish identity, its analysis of contemporary issues and its review of current academic debates demonstrate that the way Jews identify themselves has always been sensitive to their discursive and structural environments, including national and local settings. Since for most of its history, Jewish people lived in the Diaspora, the policies towards minorities in their countries of residence made a big difference to the way the local Jewish population came to see itself. However, the Jewish presence in pre-modern Europe had one unifying feature: Jews were persistently marginalised, persecuted and expelled, making Jewish survival outside its community virtually impossible. This historic condition explains the emergence, persistence and unifying centrality of the ‘Grand Jewish Narrative’ that defines Exile, Return and Redemption as the ontological motif of Judaism and the Jewish people.

Modernity brought important social changes, giving Jews an opportunity to integrate into their host societies, at the very time that it was throwing traditional patterns of Jewish identity into disarray. However, the terms of Jewish integration in their various host nations, albeit predominantly mono-cultural and assimilative, varied in accordance with national cultural, political, and economic circumstances. This led to the increasing variation in the way Jews in different countries came to identify themselves. In the last couple of decades, Jews in the West together with the population of their respective countries were offered “a mix of pluralism, multiculturalism and postmodern thought” (Harvey 1999). The institutionalisation of cultural and religious diversity in
multicultural societies, which was actively promoted in the 1990s, created a broad range of individual responses to crosscutting racial, ethnic, religious and social identities, thus giving legitimacy to an individualised search for one’s Jewishness. Yet, even then national differences remained important conditions of defining individual and collective identities. Today, when in Britain and many other Western countries the official multicultural rhetoric is being increasingly ‘toned down’ in favour of ‘community cohesion’ (Home Office 2001), the role of national structures and ideas of citizenship is even more prominent, for their impact on the articulation and experience of minority identities is more visible.

This thesis features prominently in contemporary Jewish public and academic debates, highlighting the fluidity and contextuality of modern Jewishness, and identifying national practices of citizenship as important explanatory factors in modern Jewishness. Thus, a neo-institutional approach to immigrant integration provides a valid and useful analytical framework for the study of Jewish identities.
Chapter Four

Research Methodology

4.1. Minority groups in the context of citizenship

The complexity and multi-dimensionality of research issues associated with minority groups in the context of citizenship have brought a variety of theoretical and methodological approaches to the subject matter. As this research area cuts across the conventional boundaries of academic disciplines, it is of interest to sociologists, political scientists, economists and geographers, who often operate within different research traditions, and have particular affinities for special methods of data gathering and data analysis. Thus, for instance, with regard to citizenship policies and their impact on immigrants and minorities, most economists employ quantitative methods (Clarke and Salt 2003, Blackwell and Seddon 2004), while political scientists prefer to build theoretical models and use comparative methods to validate them (Yoppke 1999, Kriesti et al 1995, Koopmans and Statham 2000). Geographic studies of citizenship, immigrant integration and minority identities, like sociological approaches to these issues, do not favour one methodology over the other, but use both quantitative and qualitative methodologies, depending on the researchers’ goals, their ontological and epistemological premises, as well as on other constraining factors, like the availability of resources and the type of information which is needed. Sociologists and social geographers, who seek to identify social patterns and general trends in the society, engage, in their own words, “in the ‘real’ world, with numbers and census categories” (Peach 2002: 252). Supporters of quantitative methodologies may recognize the constructiveness of social categories such as ethnicity or race, but believe that this “does not make the phenomena less potent” (Peach 2002: 253). Although quantitative research is often criticised for its empiricism and statism, it could be very helpful in portraying a general picture, identifying social and spatial trends and suggesting further research areas for qualitative research. Thus, examining the Jewish world, DellaPergola’s socio-demographic analyses (2003, 2001, 1999) or the research carried by the Jewish Policy Research Institute (London) provide useful insights into Jewish residential, occupational, socio-economic and cultural patterns, which have both applied and theoretical significance. DellaPergola’s typology of Jewish identification (DellaPergola 2003: 47), which he applied to statistical data, reveals the flexibility of identities and
their interconnectedness with the environment, thus demonstrating some compatibility with the qualitative approach to identities.

Scholars, who adhere to postmodernist understanding of social categories, take a special interest in the production, representation and contested nature of meanings, identities and social boundaries (Anderson and Gale 1999, Jackson and Penrose 1994), thus favouring qualitative methods for their excellent suitability to the research in subjective meanings, values, ideas and identities (Amin 2002, Dwyer 1999, Valins 2003). Their methodology assumes a greater role of subjective constructions in regulating social perceptions and behaviour and involves qualitative, interpretative methods. Epistemologically speaking, qualitative methodology is less suitable for the research that seeks the ‘excavation’ of objective data and historical facts: its data is of limited generalisability, but it works well as a part of an inductive approach, providing a basis for further theorisation. Qualitative methodology is a common choice for the study of identities for it provides rich grounded accounts preserving the empirical richness and ‘authorising’ the stories of ordinary people. For example, the study of Kress and Elias in Jewish identity has acknowledged multiple ‘contexts’ of Jewish identity, stressing the importance of individual accounts, “While trends certainly exist, the individual’s description of his or her religious world provides rich and often idiosyncratic information, and there is no substitute for this” (Kress and Elias 2000: 194).

4.2 Research design: the stages of the research process

This research, which examines the Jewish population of Leeds, focuses on the wealth and contextuality of individual and collective understandings of being Jewish. In particular, the study analyses the diversity, fluidity and multi-dimensionality of interpretations of Jewishness in various institutional and discursive settings of national and local citizenship. The emphasis on the relational nature of identities is theoretically embedded in a postmodernist social ontology, which defines language and text as social practices that create and reproduce social meanings and reaffirm social identities (Strega 2005). This perspective considers ‘discourses’ – or ways of thinking and talking about topics – as “systems of thoughts composed of ideas, attitudes, courses of action, beliefs and practices that systematically construct the subjects and the worlds of which they speak” (Lessa 2006: 285). As was pointed out by Foucault (1972), discourses shape what constitutes ‘knowledge’ and determine cultural meanings at particular historical times. Discourses, however, are not closed systems of meaning, but draw upon
meanings and values constructed by other discourses (Sohoni 2006:828). Hence, any local discourse has to be analysed in its intertextuality, which reveals the embeddedness of the minority discourse in other national and local discourses (Kristeva 1980). The implication for this research into the local meanings of Jewishness is the need to examine the discursive link between 'Jewishness' and other forms of belonging, and primarily national belonging, articulated in the concept of 'Britishness'.

Since narrative is a ‘privileged’ form of discourse (Labov 1997), for it is a well-formed construction (spoken, written or imagined) that describes a sequence of real or unreal events with a beginning, a middle, and an end – this research examined the discursive practices of Leeds Jewry through the study of personal and collective narratives of belonging. Narratives, which function as tangible time- and place-specific manifestations of personal and group identities (Schiffrin 1996), are widely appreciated in the field of social research, just as they are popular within the field of Jewish studies (see examples in Habib 2004, Krausz and Tulea 2002, Wettstein 2002). The examination of oral and written accounts of Jewish self among the Jewish population of Leeds presented a unique opportunity to explore the importance of discursive and institutional environments in the formation and interpretation of social identities. As observed by Somers (1994: 614), narratives and identities are directly linked, for “people construct identities (however multiple and changing) by locating themselves or being located within a repertoire of emplotted stories”. Stuart Hall directly likened identity to a “narrative, a story, a history. Something constructed, told, spoken, not simply found” (Hall 1987: 45). When people transform their experience into text, by narrating it they create their own meanings and accordingly live their lives (Mavrommatis 2006:502).

The analysis for this research was approached from a historical and sociological perspective. An analysis of Jewish narratives of belonging over time, which were generated at different moments of British-Jewish history, was instrumental in tracing the evolution of Jewish identities in conjunction with a British national identity. A sociological analysis of contemporary oral and written testimonies examined the diversity and intersectionality of identities that Jewish people ascribe to. Such narratives of belonging reflect the plurality of personal and collective engagements with different social spaces, multiple positionings within British society, within the world Diaspora and British Jewry, within the local population and the local Jewish community.
The focus of the research on narrative and discourse restricted the selection of methodological tools and favoured such qualitative methods as in-depth and semi-structured interviewing, ethnography and text analysis. Some of the problems associated with these qualitative methods, such as the risk of bias and misrepresentation (see section 4.6 for details) prompted the diversification of methods of data collection and analysis. In addition, the anticipated difficulty in accessing younger participants, who often were unwilling to commit to a full-scale interview, led to the inclusion of a small questionnaire survey. The quantitative data complemented the qualitative research and enabled some useful insights. The design of the questionnaire included closed questions and some ranking scales, which helped to improve the validity and reliability of data; it also contained a number of open-ended questions, which provided additional narratives and opinion statements for qualitative analysis.

The exploratory stage of the research started with an assessment of national policies, institutions and discourses of citizenship as the background against which ‘place-specific’ identities are defined. This initial research phase also included a collection of basic information about the Jewish community of Leeds, complementing it with qualitative and quantitative data available in the national Census 2001 and in multiple studies of British Jewry (JPR 2002, 2003). This data helped to place the Jewish population of Leeds in the context of British Jewry and to compare it to other British Jewish communities and other ethnic minorities in Leeds. The next stage of the research involved gathering and examining various accounts of personal and collective lives. In particular, the research aimed to explore the variety and consistency of narratives of Jewish belonging, their manifestations in individual and collective accounts of communal and family histories, and in public debates on the issue of the day.

Initially, qualitative interviewing was adopted as the primary method of study, whereas ethnography, questionnaire and text analysis were thought as supplementary methods. Reflexive qualitative research is never a rigidly structured process, and ‘soaking and poking’ (Fenno 1978), the process of shifting back and forth between the theoretical framework and empirical data (Putnam 1993:12), is inevitable. As the fieldwork progressed, ethnography and text analysis became equally important methods of collecting narratives, providing rich and unique sets of data. Similarly, in March-April 2005 an opportunity presented to expand questionnaire survey to a large group of adults of diverse background. As the original version of the questionnaire was designed for Jewish teenagers and piloted in November 2004 on 14-17 year olds, the questionnaire
was adapted to an older audience, thus enabling intergenerational comparisons. This extension helped to identify certain systematic inconsistencies in answers, which could be a sign of methodological faults or an indication of fragmented identities. To properly interpret the questionnaire responses, a number of respondents were approached for further in-depth interviews. Likewise, those interviews, which were conducted after the questionnaire survey, incorporated questions from this questionnaire. This helped to acquire a deeper understanding of the rationale behind responses and to validate interpretations. Thus, the research methodology evolved into a multi-methods approach, where interviews, questionnaires and document analysis became intertwined with ongoing ethnographic research. Table 4.1, which may be found at the end of the chapter, provides a summary of the empirical data gathered in the research and lists approaches to analysis.

4.3. The exploratory research (November 2003-September 2004)

During the early stages, the research pursued two separate, yet interrelated goals that helped to bridge the national and local levels of analysis. First, the exploratory research sought an understanding of contemporary and historical British citizenship practices, especially in relation to ethnic and religious minority groups. National governmental on-line resources, media publications and academic writings were used to identify relevant national and local institutions and agencies, and to examine current and past discourses regarding the nature of Britishness and Englishness in relation to Jewish and other minority identities. Second, engagement with the Leeds Jewish community was prioritised. This provided valuable preliminary information, which was instrumental in the development of a grounded research agenda and establishing good relations with individual members of the community and Leeds Jewish agencies.

As a foreign-born newcomer to Leeds, despite a year-long residence in Moortown (the residential area of most Leeds Jews), my status at the beginning of the field work was that of an outsider. My knowledge and contacts with the local Jewish community were equally limited. Yet, this residential position proved to be very useful in securing early engagement with different sections of the community and made ‘participant observation’ an efficient way of researching the Leeds Jewish community. To enlarge my circle of contacts I first joined the Jewish Historical Society (JHS) and became a regular at the monthly meetings of its Leeds branch. There I met many knowledgeable locally embedded people, some of whom later became my interviewees. This was
especially valuable as most of the people were in their 60 and 80s, the age group I had no regular engagement with during my daily life. Local amateur historians of the JHS shared their knowledge, pointed towards available sources of information (national and local publications about the Leeds Jewry) and helped to build the database of past records crucial for later stages of the research. Secondly, capitalising on my membership at the time of the only Reform Synagogue in Leeds (Sinai), I became familiar with individuals and families that represented a special segment of the community. Not only did these people hold an approach to Judaism that was distinct from the majority of Leeds Jews but, in the past, due to the non-Orthodox status of Sinai Synagogue, they have been excluded from many communal activities, which made them feel marginalised. Thirdly, I attended the meetings and public lectures of the local Holocaust Society Friendship Association (HSFA), thus gaining access to outlooks on Jewish identity formed through the unique experience of foreign-born child refugees, who made Britain their second home. Attendance at JHS, HSFA and events at Sinai proved instrumental in obtaining an understanding of the communal life (formal organisations, informal arrangements, and major points of communal discourse) and in building a network of contacts in the community. Thus, using a snowballing technique (Valentine 1997: 116), my initial conversation partners very often became my aids in identifying other potential interviewees amongst their friends, family and acquaintances, as well as helping with my search for other data sources.

As a parent of children attending a local Jewish state voluntary-aided primary school (the Brodetsky), I found it relatively easy to establish chatty and friendly relations with teachers and parents. As most of the parents were in their 30s to early 50s, regular engagements with the school ‘community’ supplied rich evidence regarding the lifestyle and identities of these age groups. The empirical evidence collected there included daily conversations with some parents, sporadic talks with others, observations during school events and governor meetings, and some in-depth interviews. The simultaneity of my social positions as a parent and as a researcher (Fuller 1999: 221) gave a unique base for interpreting the later research findings regarding the flexibility and sensitivity of Jewish identities in different contextual environments. The empirical data gathered at school had an additional value, for school constitutes a very special social place, where people’s experiences of Jewishness and Britishness intermingle daily, creating conflicts and challenges, sometimes inspiring innovative solutions, sometimes reviving or revising old interpretations of Jewish self.
In addition to engaging in preliminary ethnographic research, secondary data sources were also useful in evaluating the Leeds Jewish community from multiple comparative perspectives. Thus, the detailed reports of the Institute of Jewish Policy Research (IJPR) on specific Jewish communities (London, Manchester and Leeds) as well as their publications on such aspects of British Jewish life as schooling, religiosity, socio-economic and spatial distributions, etc., helped to place the Leeds community in a national context and to identify some features of its typicality and uniqueness. Equally helpful was the Census 2001 data. Not only did this provide important clues on the position of Leeds Jewry vis-à-vis other Jewish communities in Britain, but it also allowed comparisons between the Jewish population of Leeds and other Leeds-based minority groups in terms of their numbers, spatial distributions, socio-economic wellbeing, etc. Other sources of secondary data were two Jewish newspapers: the local weekly ‘Jewish Telegraph’ and the national weekly ‘Jewish Chronicle’, which has a separate space for reporting on provincial news, as well as a newly published neighbourhood magazine ‘J-Life Leeds’. The printed media analysis provided helpful factual information and supplied significant clues regarding the community’s discursive ‘points of concern’ (Laitin 1996) during the explorative stage of the research; it also remained an important part of fieldwork at later stages.

The exploratory phase of the research was vital for the development of the theoretical framework of the research and its methodological tools. It also revealed national discourses on citizenship and minority rights, which are important conditioning factors for a ‘place-based’ sense of belonging. The introductory empirical study contributed to my factual knowledge about the Jewish community of Leeds, and, perhaps even more importantly, informed my understanding of what makes local Jewry ‘tick’. As a result, issues, which were of collective and individual concern in the community, were taken into account while developing indicators for the questionnaire survey, interviews or observations. Similarly, preliminary engagements with the Leeds Jewish community revealed the existence of cleavages and factions within the community, which provided the basis for subgroup categorisation. For example, it revealed the importance of such characteristics as religious outlook and religious observance, age, gender, marital status and personal experience of migration on people’s narratives of belonging, their sense of Jewishness and Britishness. Overall, the knowledge obtained in the first stages of the research helped to define the conceptual framework and fine-tune my research
instruments; it also proved invaluable in interpreting the findings at the later stages of the research.


Initially, qualitative interviewing was considered as the principal empirical method of collecting contemporary data, while the work with documents, like newspapers, communal publications, memoirs, became the method of choice for historical analysis; other qualitative methods, including ethnographic involvement and qualitative text analysis together with a questionnaire survey were designed as supplementary methods. However, after two months of data gathering, the quantity and quality of information gathered through ethnographic research, as well as through questionnaire and document analysis, surpassed the boundaries of supplementary data. My experience in the field confirmed the definition of ethnography as ‘a curious blending of methodological techniques’ (Denzin 1981), for in the course of the empirical work genuine social interactions with members of the community were combined with direct and participant observations, informal interviewing, newspaper analysis and collection of other documents. The overall methodology has developed as multi-method, where all techniques became equal contributors to the process of data collection and interpretation (see Figure 4.1 for a summary of all methods used in the research).

![Figure 4.1. Multi-method Research](image)

The diverse sources of empirical data used in the course of this research reflect the eclecticism of the research methods. In the course of three years, I regularly attended communal events of various formats, ranging from a simple one-hour topical presentation to a day-long communal learning programme (LIMMUD), from passive listening to a presentation to an interactive focus group discussion. These religious, cultural and social functions offered many opportunities to observe and talk with community members in various settings, and
hence, to assess how contexts – be it an interfaith forum or internal communal event, religious celebrations or secular cultural function – influence the experiences and narrations of Jewish identity. As the ethnographic work was combined with more active methods of data generation, additional sources of data included: 20 voice-recorded in-depth interviews, which involved 27 people; multiple informal conversational interviews; and 73 questionnaire responses, which provided valuable quantitative and qualitative insights in the nature of Jewish identity among the Leeds Jews.

Additionally, primary data collection was complemented with an analysis of secondary empirical information (Hammersley 1998: 35-36). This drew heavily on the examination of Jewish and non-Jewish media outputs: newspapers, magazines, a BBC documentary on the Jews of Leeds, and three short video productions by Leeds Jewish Menorah School. These contemporary (2003-2006) and past (1888-1990s) productions allowed a comparison of the national and local Jewish media coverage of important events and topical issues at different time periods. It also endowed the research with an additional pool of collective narratives, autobiographic accounts and tales of communal history. On top of the primary research data generated by this research, the study benefited greatly from empirical information produced by other research projects investigating diverse aspects of Leeds Jewry.

Despite such a close blending of various approaches, ethnographic participation, interviews, questionnaire and secondary data analysis are widely held as analytically distinct methods of data gathering (Wolcott 1995). Their individual impact on the research is discussed later.

4.4.1. Ethnographic engagement

4.4.1a Direct observations and personal participations

During my study of the Leeds Jewish community, both direct and participant observations (Kitchin and Tate 2000: 219-223) have been crucial elements of the fieldwork. My residence in Moortown, the focus of the Leeds Jewish community, as well as personal and organisational links established at the exploratory stage, created a good foundation for more intensive ethnographic engagement with the Jewish community of Leeds. It is widely held that living with the researched community provides the researcher multiple opportunities for observing events, behaviours and artefacts in their natural social settings, while the process of observation allows a
recording of people’s lives as they live it rather than as they reflect upon it later (as in the process of interviewing) (Marshall and Rossman 1995: 79). My residence in the area that is widely acknowledged as Jewish, and my personal involvement in some local Jewish institutions (e.g. school and Synagogue), enabled a relatively easy access to the community and a potent opportunity to observe local Jewish people as they engaged in their everyday life-worlds.

My school connection and Synagogue affiliations and other personal links were helpful in earning trust, while my initial introduction as a researcher gave me a reputation of an ‘inside outsider.’ Although I never actively concealed my interest as a researcher, on many occasions I was not perceived as one. My personal involvement in the community - bringing children to school and after-school activities at the local Jewish youth club (the Zone), family attendance of Synagogue services, participation in communal and private events - frequently meant that my interactions with Jewish people and institutions in Leeds were indistinguishable from other participants.

This provided an excellent opportunity to connect empathetically to people and to understand their feelings and meanings. The downside was the danger of a biased ‘reading’ of events which had personal significance. Regularly attending communal places, like Synagogues, Jewish schools, the recently built Jewish Community Centre, kosher shops, etc, I sometimes remained a detached viewer and directly observed the behaviour and conversations of different members of the community. On numerous occasions, however, these conversations, events and behaviours were inseparable from my involvement as a participant. The degree of my involvement varied greatly. For instance, when taking part in a focus group on the future of the newly built Community Centre, I expressed my views on the subject, at the same time recording other participants’ statements and the narration of the moderator. In contrast, my participation in most of the sessions of JHS was limited to asking questions after presentations and to mingling among the audience during the ‘tea and biscuit’ time. To reduce possible subjectivity, I tried simultaneously to widen my range of contacts to include people who represented different segments of the community and, at the same time, to widen the range of events attended, incorporating events and activities in which I had no prior personal interest as a member of the community. Some of the conversations were with people whom I met only once. Others were with people whom I met on several occasions and engaged in recurring talks.
During the research, I participated in nearly 50 communal events of various types: talks, focus groups, discussions, religious and cultural ceremonies, collective dinners and study sessions, events for families and for particular age groups (for a detailed account see Appendix 1). The events attended included: more than 20 monthly talks within Leeds JHS; a few talks within the Holocaust Survivors' Friendship Association (HSFA); two general public discussions of the future development of the local Jewish community; three LIMMUD events (a day-long programme of Jewish learning); Synagogue leisure club meetings; celebrations of Yom Hatzmaut (Israeli Independence Day) and three annual Leeds Jewish Performing Arts Festivals. These events were organised by religious and secular communal authorities, private individuals and various grass-root organisations. As a rule, I relied on information in the Jewish Telegraph (local newspaper), communal notice-boards and ‘word of mouth’ to find out about the forthcoming events. They took place in very different geographical locations: most were held within the communal borders (Moortown, Shadwell, Alwoodley in LS17), yet in a few cases the venues were outside this core area. Thus, two LIMMUD events were held in Weetwood Hall (Leeds University), while the Jewish Arts Festival and some interfaith events took place in the city centre. Some of the occasions were extremely useful in obtaining personal and collective narratives of self; they provided a lot of factual information and opportunities to observe people’s behaviour, record their opinions and conversations. For instance, the Reform Synagogue group discussion ‘Focus on the Future’ (07.11.2004) included debates on Progressive Judaism’s interpretation of Jewish identity, the marginality of Sinai members among Jews of Leeds and strategies for the development of a positive Sinai image in the community. Other events, although dedicated to issues unconnected with the research, contributed indirectly: I observed people asking questions, sharing their opinions and conversing.

At the stage of intensive data gathering, the ethnographic work turned into a very time-consuming but fascinating process as I was attending events, interviewing people or reading documents almost every day. Thus, for example, I used a snowballing approach to identify new interviewees: as a rule, people that I met volunteered to assist with my research and recommended me to their friends and relatives, asking them for help on my behalf. Assistance from the key organisational figures was especially valuable, as the approval of these communal ‘gatekeepers’ (Burgess 1984: 48) granted access to people, situations and additional sources of information. For instance, after overcoming initial suspicion and gaining the trust of the chair of the HSFA, I received access not only to
its members and meetings, but to empirical data that they had accumulated through their own research. In another instance, activists in JHS, who are often active members in other communal organisations, referred me to a wealth of published materials about Leeds Jewry, shared their personal writings and informed me about forthcoming events. In addition, my family's engagement with Leeds Lubavitch Centre helped me to meet the staff and pupils from the Menorah Independent Jewish School, and to receive video copies of their three research projects – two on various aspects of Judaism and one on the immigrant history of the Leeds Jewish community.

At the beginning of the research process, most observations were holistically described because I was searching for key themes. However, once the research evidence allowed more context-sensitive generalisations about people, events and community, my observations became more structured, although they continued to include narrative descriptions of the events. Whereas most of the observations were people-focussed, important information regarding the collective sense of 'Jewish self' was recorded from the socio-cultural landscape – architectural design and the special location of communal infrastructural facilities, organisations' signs and window dressings, private Jewish houses, a Jewish housing estate and communal buildings were all noted.

4.4.1b. In-depth Interviews

The in-depth interviews involved 27 people. Most (14 people) were interviewed individually, some (6 people) were interviewed as family members, and the remaining interviewees, coincidentally all females, preferred a group interview. Younger women cited their lack of time as the reason for being interviewed in pairs, whilst a 50+ year old female, who felt uncomfortable talking on her own, invited two of her lady friends for moral support. Most of the interviews were taped or digitally recorded. However, on two occasions, due to technical failures, the interviews were recorded from memory immediately after the meetings.

The age distribution of the participants included 11 people in their 70s and 80s, 6 – in their 50s and 60s, 7 in their late 30s to 40s and 3 in their early 20s. This, given the aging Leeds Jewish community, is only a little bit skewed towards its older population. There were two main reasons for this skew. First, older people as a rule have more time and are more willing to participate in such studies as they like to go back in time and share their memories. Secondly, as a relative newcomer to Leeds and a 30+ year old parent of young children, there were limited opportunities for everyday interaction with the older
generation. Therefore, at the beginning of the interviewing process, I actively sought interviewees among 50-80 year olds. Most of the interviews (16) were conducted at the interviewees’ homes, which was particularly important for older people, who often had limited mobility and also felt psychologically more comfortable in their own residences.

The choice of an in-depth non-standardised interview (Fielding and Thomas 2001: 124) reflects its advantages over a more formalised form of conversation for the collection of personal narratives. The in-depth interview is informal in style and engaging emotionally. Its accounts-as-stories framework represents richer and more accurate reports, improves an understanding of the ambivalences and uncertainties of narrators, illuminates individual interpretations in a social, cultural, and personal context, and preserves the richness of interviewees’ own language (Kaufman 1994, Orbuch 1997). These features suited the research aims perfectly for they provided enough flexibility to accommodate socio-economic, cultural, generational and ideational differences among my interviewees, whilst ensuring coverage of key topics, such as family history, Leeds community and Israel, Jewish identity and national citizenship, assimilation and multiculturalism, etc. (see Appendix 2 for the interview schedule).

The downside of the non-standardised form of interview was a considerable variation in the length and structure of interviews. Some of my respondents were keen to talk for hours, while others gave concise answers. Hence the duration of interviews varied from 30 minutes to three hours. Actual questioning on substantial issues is a trade-off between the breadth and the depth of information, and the researcher always tries to bring the conversation back to certain topics (Kitchin and Tate 2000: 214). However, when collecting personal narratives, any intervention by the researcher has to be administered carefully, thus at times certain topics were omitted in some of my interviews, hindering the general comparability of responses.

**4.4.1c. Informal interviews**

In addition to in-depth interviews that followed an interview schedule and were properly recorded, I used every opportunity for informal interviewing, conversing with newly acquainted people during social functions in the community and engaging people whom I knew in recurring conversations. The informal conversational interview lacks any formal structure, which makes challenging to analyse and generalise. At the same time it provides enormous flexibility and allows the respondents to talk about any issues and in any way that they feel appropriate (Kitchin and Tate 2000: 214-215).
This form of interviewing provided some very interesting insights regarding the changing nature of Leeds Jewry, gave access to immediate grass-root reactions to national and local events (like the July 7th London bombing, Israeli-Palestinian conflict, Synagogue disputes, etc.). Sometimes, this informal interviewing, which lasted from five minutes to a couple of hours, revealed a very interesting narrator or hinted at the existence of unusual accounts and novel points of views, thus challenging some of my research preconceptions. On some occasions, informal interviewing was the only way of talking to people, mostly females, who felt uneasy about a longer, properly recorded interview. During my everyday life in the community, I also befriended some families with young children. Most of them contained at least one foreign-born parent (Israeli, South African or German), which might have been the reason why they were more open for new relations than local and established Jewish families. The interaction with these people became fairly regular and friendly, providing numerous opportunities to discuss different issues in a natural atmosphere on multiple occasions. Frequent interactions in naturally occurring circumstances gave me cues regarding the complexity and contextuality of Jewish identity among thirty something year olds, whose unique trade-off patterns between the Jewish and non-Jewish worlds suggested clear generational shifts in Jewish identity.

Approaching the process of interviewing reflexively, one has to pay special attention to the multiple effects of the interviewer on the behaviour and answers of the respondents (Fielding and Thomas 2001: 133). I was aware of the simultaneity of respondents’ perceptions of me as an outsider (a researcher and a foreigner) and insider (a Jewish person living within the Leeds Jewish neighbourhood). Therefore, prior to interviews, I was often ‘grilled’ on my family, parents, and Jewish life in my country of origin (Russia). Sometimes it triggered certain memories in the interviewees, like their participation in the Refusnik movement in the 1970s and 80s, which stirred conversations in a particular direction and added these specific narratives to their accounts of their life-stories. Often, it worked to my advantage as people were more willing to share with a newcomer their views and judgements on the history and the present status of Leeds Jewry. At the same time, my insider status allowed them to speak freely on such sensitive issues as anti-Semitism and the relationship with non-Jewish people.
4.4.2. Questionnaire (73 responses)

Questionnaire surveys are recognised as invaluable for collecting data on attitudes, values, personal experiences and behaviours (Parfitt 1997: 85), which made this technique a helpful way of collecting data about Jewish youth in their late teens to early twenties. As young people are always on the go and are not very enthusiastic about individual interviews that are recorded and that take a large amount of time, asking them to fill in a short questionnaire was an accepted trade-off between the quantity and the quality of information. The questionnaire contained closed and open-ended questions as well as ranking scales, including a Likert scale of contrasting statements (Likert 1932). The questions, covered:

1. opinions about Leeds and Leeds Jewish community
2. Jewish identity (different aspects, personal importance, perceived changes in the last 50 years)
3. family history (importance, interest and actual knowledge)
4. Jewish social life (friends, membership in organisations, importance of Jewish neighbourhood)
5. plans for the future (travelling and living)
6. views on British and Jewish identities (Jewish uniqueness, anti-Semitism, the relationship with the non-Jewish world)

The questionnaire was piloted in November 2004 on 17 Jewish youngsters, aged 14-23, whom I met at the Zone, a Jewish Youth Centre. The 14-15 year olds took part in a weekly Jewish leadership course, whereas the 17-23 year olds were the Zone youth leaders. In some sense these were not ‘average’ Jewish teenagers: their very presence at the Zone, especially their participation in the leadership course, indicated a stronger than average Jewish identity. In my subsequent analysis of the pilot study findings, this skewedness was taken into consideration. Following the pilot, a few questions of clarification were added and the wording of some questions was changed to make it more understandable and concise. The revised version of the questionnaire included questions on ranking aspects of Jewishness, and more probing questions on anti-Semitism and racism, on the meaning of the word ‘community’ and on Synagogue attendance.

The revised version of the questionnaire was completed by four 17 year old female students of the Menorah Jewish High School, five more youth leaders at the Zone, and 21 Jewish boys at Leeds Grammar School (14-17 years of age). This yielded 30 more responses. Then, in April 2005, a Jewish learning day (LIMMUD) was held in the community, which gave me the chance to distribute the questionnaire to an older
audience. Although more than 60 questionnaire forms were distributed, only 21 people aged 23 - 80 returned the completed forms. In addition, five of the interviewees also filled in the questionnaire, which helped with the interpretation of their responses.

4.4.3. Secondary data

During the initial stage of the research, the purpose of my engagement with secondary sources of information was purely informative: they helped to familiarise me with the past and the present of Leeds Jewry. This uncovered a wealth of pre-existing information, which changed the role of the secondary data in the research. As these diverse sources provided rich information about personal feelings, opinions, and debates in the community, they were used for data analysis along with the primary data. Some sources dated back to as early as the 1880s and provided a unique historical outlook on the communal life of Leeds Jews upon their arrival from Eastern Europe. Likewise, secondary data generated in the 1980s included materials from the Leeds Jewish Historical Society (two audio recorded in 1978 interviews with local elders and research publications full of authors’ personal reflections), newspapers, two autobiographies (Teeman 1976, Lipman 1980) and a BBC two-part documentary movie. These revealed the main concerns and debates of that time and their analysis was instrumental in understanding the impact of early multicultural discourses on local Jewish identities.

The secondary data used for this research ranged from academic studies to research findings of local amateur historians, from non-Jewish official and quasi-official documents to Jewish private autobiographies and Jewish national and local periodicals. For instance, publications produced by members of the local Jewish Historical Society in the last thirty years were not only priceless for empirical information based on their archival work, but also invaluable as a particular type of narratives of the past. Multiple academic literary and documentary sources, which were produced in the last decade, were helpful not only as a background to my findings but were also used as independent sets of written narratives of belonging. They included sociological surveys of the community (LSPG 2006, Waterman 2003), writings on the history of the community (Freedman 2003, 2002, 2001, 1995, 1992, Bergen 2000), five autobiographies, communal and local newspapers, Synagogue magazines and other publications, and three short video productions by the pupils of Leeds Jewish Menorah School. Of particular significance was the regional Jewish newspaper, the Jewish Telegraph, which was a great source of quotations that helped to demonstrate the ethnographic findings.
As ethnographic data was often recorded after my observation/participation in events and, therefore, did not contain precise quotations, JT publications (local Jewish residents’ letters as well as general editorial articles) were useful illustrations to the conclusions achieved through the analysis of other data sources.

Finally, the research benefited from the findings of two undergraduate research projects (Bissell 2006 and Cass 2006) that explored historical changes in the image of the Leeds Jewish community through extensive work in local archives.

4.5. Data analysis

With the exception of data obtained from the questionnaire survey and some secondary sources, the data used in my research is predominantly qualitative. The approach to its analysis, thus, was a largely inductive, open-ended and iterative process. Due to its highly diverse origin, which included both research-generated and independently existing data, the research uses a combination of ‘grounded theory’, ‘narrative analysis’ and ‘formal structures’ approaches (Crang 1997: 184). The ‘grounded theory’ approach was particularly useful at the early stages of the research, and the ‘formal structures’ approach was instrumental in the analysis of the findings of the questionnaire survey. The analysis of ‘narratives of belonging’ retained a key role throughout the study since this was central to my main research question about the specificity and stability of local Jewish identities. Thus, regardless of data origin – oral and written, individual and collective, private and public, intra- and inter-communal, present and past, – the main heuristic approach involved the process of cross-referencing Jewish accounts of self, family and community against changing representations of citizenship and minority identity. In other words, the narrative analysis allowed the identification of different narratives of Jewish self and the exploration of their connection to specific narratives of national citizenship.

Although narrative analysis is a highly fluid, interpretative process, which does not have fixed ‘rules’ of conduct and analysis, there are certain guiding techniques. One way of bringing some systematic order into the data analysis is to look for the recurrent themes and terms in the analysed accounts (Crang 1997: 186). Themes are essentially metaphors; they are generalised statements about beliefs, attitudes, values, or sentiments that individuals use to unify separate elements and experiences into an overarching meaning (Elliott 2005). Yet the identification and categorisation of ‘themes’ in narratives is a repetitive process, which requires the researcher to go back and forth
between grounded accounts and analytical categories that arise from the researcher’s theoretical framework. Therefore, the aim of my initial empirical analysis was to identify and categorise key themes and terms that work as markers of self-representation. For this purpose, I used data from the early episodes of participant observation and from some secondary sources (newspapers, memoirs and other national and local publications). Among the ‘themes’ that were immediately obvious were ‘family history as a case of successful progression’, a particular interpretation of ‘communal past’, which linked geographical movement and the socio-economic improvement of Leeds Jews, and representations of the present-day community in terms of ‘the traditional centre’ and ‘the margins’.

During the next stage, the main task was to link these empirical themes with theory-derived analytical categories of identity narratives. The data for the narrative analysis came from almost all types of sources: interviews, public speeches and conversations, memoirs, newspaper articles and open questions of the questionnaire. The construction and the search for correspondence between theoretical and empirical categories was a continuous process. Some key themes were amalgamated during the period of intensive data collection or, if they turned out to be too broad, they required ‘axial coding’ (Crang 1997: 188). Analytical categories underwent similar alterations and resulted in the following generic narratives: the Grand Jewish Narrative envisioned Jewishness as unique and incomparable to other minorities in Britain, whereas cross-cultural narratives emphasised the commonalities between Jewish and other minorities’ experiences. Some empirically identified themes fitted perfectly into one or other of these generic narratives. It was equally important to identify how empirical themes corresponded to the narration of Jewishness as either a private religious identity or as a publicly reasserted and/or ethnically grounded identity. Finally, it was important to establish how themes matched theoretically defined ‘assimilationist’ and ‘multi-cultural’ models of citizenship.

The spatiality of narratives, which indicated the relational positioning in the story of the above categories, was of particular interest in the analysis. For instance, family and community histories could be a means of engagement with a different spatiality, which is wider than one’s ethnicity and religion. Such an inclusive narrative is constructed when private or group experiences are positioned within a broader narrative of immigration and minority life – just like when the problem of anti-Semitism is viewed as an extension of racism rather than a qualitatively different phenomenon. On the other
hand, when the narrative of Jewish life is exclusively defined within a Jewish space, there is a process of simultaneous ‘othering’ of the rest of the society. This concept of ‘other’, which is inseparable from the concept of ‘self’, received special attention in the narrative analysis for it shed light on the portrayal and relationship between the narrator’s sense of Jewishness and Britishness.

In addition to the narrative analysis and ground theory approach, a more formalised empirical analysis was applied to the questionnaire data. The analysis of these findings helped to obtain a deeper understanding of the complex relationship between respondents’ Jewish and British identities. By studying the ranking scales of opinions about Jewish identity, it was possible to disentangle different aspects of feeling Jewish and to measure their relative importance for different groups of respondents (by age, gender, religiosity). The findings allowed a separation of normative perceptions from the actual experience of Jewishness and to probe into the link between different meanings of Jewishness and different understandings of citizenship (using the Likert scale). This provided supportive evidence for the multi-dimensionality of Jewish identity and the strategic contextuality of narratives of belonging.

4.6. Methodological Evaluation

Given the complexity of the research topic, the composite research design seems to provide the best assurance against possible flaws, yet, just like any research methodology, it cannot escape them completely. Some of them are generic problems of any qualitative research, while others are restrictions specific to this research project. First, the qualitative approach used in this study allows only limited generalisations and provides insights into the research question—it does not seek to provide conclusive evidence and could not claim ‘proof’ of any causal connections. Secondly, qualitative research is highly interpretative: it creates its own ‘reading’ of the world, which, in the absence of rigorous and replicable procedures, raises questions of validity, reliability and utility. This increases the risk of misinterpretations, which arise due to the influence of personal preconceptions and the ‘interviewer’s effect’ (Mangione et al. 1992). In the course of this research, people’s actions and sayings were established as dependent on their interpretation of my position in the community as insider-outsider. Finally, as there are no representative sampling procedures and only ‘soft’ categorisation of the research objects, the danger of skewed information remained higher than in a quantitative study.
To minimise these possible shortcomings, several strategies of methodology improvement have been deployed in the research. In accordance with the reflexive approach, I tried to keep the research process transparent (King et al. 1994) and to be always aware of my social and spatial proximity, which could bring biases in collecting and interpreting data. Equally important was to reflect on the possible effect of my presence on a respondent's narration (Berger, Gluck and Patai 1991: 9) and to acknowledge the sensitivity of 'narrative production' to the contextual environment. Hence, the interpretative context of narrative, linking the linguistic construction to the social environment (Patterson and Monroe 1998), was an important part of the analysis of narrative accounts. In addition, following Putnam's (1993) advice about the importance of socio-cultural immersion, I submerged myself in the life of the Leeds Jewish community; for three years I participated in diverse communal events, acquired memberships in a number of organisations and developed good relationships with ordinary residents and lay leaders. In addition, I followed the regional (North England) and national Jewish press on a weekly basis and used all opportunities to converse with familiar and unfamiliar community members about topics of the day, daily events and their lives. These multivalent, continuous engagements with the community increased my confidence in the accuracy of my understanding of the Leeds Jewish community as an insider, at the same time preserving a reflexive external perspective of a social researcher. Thirdly, and most importantly, the choice of a multi-method approach enabled the triangulation of data, theories and methods (Denzin 1970). For instance, my interview-based observations were referenced against the inferences acquired through participant observation and newspaper analysis. Finally, qualitative findings were combined and supported by a quantitative analysis of the information obtained through the questionnaire.

In addition to the general challenges presented by a qualitative research methodology, other limitations have to be acknowledged. Due to constraints on time and resources, this research looked at the local Jewish community holistically and, although some comparative analysis of particular social groups was undertaken, a thorough examination of subgroups was not feasible. The findings hint that there are some other interesting topics that are worthy of a more detailed examination, such as the particularities of the female perspective on Jewishness or the difference of an Israeli perspective on Jewish life in Leeds. Another important limitation was the omission from the study of certain segments of the Jewish population, particularly those institutionally unaffiliated Jews who live in other parts of the city, and who, according to the 2001
census, constitute almost a quarter of self-identified Jews of Leeds. Many of them are students and young professionals and their views on Jewish identity could be very different from the residents of Moortown and Alwoodley. However, the inclusion of the people who do not identify with the community is technically difficult as there is no database of their whereabouts, and their inclusion would also require a different theoretical framework.

Additional pressure on the reliability of data comes from the use of a snowballing technique, which I used to find new people in the community. This may have created some bias in the sample. Similarly, most people that I met during communal events could be characterised as ‘activists’ who keenly participate in communal life and ‘nurture’ their Jewish identity. To compensate for this possible skewedness, method triangulation and data triangulation were used. A special attempt was made to identify and engage less active members of the community, for example, by including Leeds Grammar Jewish pupils in the questionnaire survey. Their affiliation with the Jewish world was more diverse than among the members of the Jewish youth club. The use of secondary data was also helpful in verifying the primary research findings. While this impeded a detailed cross-sectional analysis of the Jewish population, it certainly helped to increase the validity of the general findings and, thus, was considered as an acceptable methodological trade-off.

Table 4.1 summarises the empirical data used in the research. Appendix 1 contains its detailed description.
Table 4.1: Summary of empirical data and approaches to its analysis

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<th>Time period</th>
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<td>Imperialism and</td>
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<td>Jews of Leeds.</td>
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<td>Racism</td>
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Chapter Five

The Leeds Jewish community: its past and present

Any research into place-specific identities requires a good understanding of local contextual dynamics, the knowledge of the local socio-economic, spatial and cultural changes and their position in the wider social environment. Therefore, before any meaningful historical and contemporary study of Leeds Jewish identification patterns can be accomplished, one needs to look into the history of the Jewish community and to analyse Leeds Jewry in relation to both Jewish and non-Jewish environments. This chapter aims at filling in this knowledge gap by providing a review of the most crucial stages in the history of the local Jewish community, which, as it demonstrates, were connected to major national historical events and to general trends in the life of British Jewry. It also assesses the contemporary characteristics of the Leeds Jewish community in the context of national and local political and socio-economic settings as well as in relation to other places of Jewish settlement in the UK.

Overall, this chapter portrays the Leeds Jewish community, which according to the 2001 Census is relatively small yet still the third largest in the UK (8,267 people or 3% of UK Jews), as a remarkable mixture of generic and unique Jewish and British characteristics. Leeds Jewry today exhibits some national Jewish tendencies and certain features that are typical of provincial Jewry in the UK, yet particularities of its historical formation reinforced by distinctive local factors create a unique social juxtaposition that sets the Leeds community apart from other Jewish places in the UK. Consequently, this chapter depicts how over time, the local Jewish community has passed through a series of socio-economic and spatial movements, which in the course of four generations have transformed poor Yiddish-speaking immigrants into a contemporary well-integrated middle-class community. It concludes with a detailed portrait of the present-day community, which draws on data from the 2001 Census and empirical studies conducted by the national Jewish think tank – the Jewish Policy Research Institute – and local demographers.

5.1. Early years

When in 1656, after the 350-year-long expulsion, Jews were allowed back into England, they settled in London and important seaport towns. Almost a century later, in pursuit of
trading opportunities, they moved to provincial cities. Leeds was one of those places, and some indirect evidence suggests a Jewish presence in Leeds by the mid-18th century. However, the Leeds Jewish community really took off in the 19th century: 1840 saw the opening of the first Jewish Cemetery in Gelderd Road, in 1842 the first Jewish marriage took place in Leeds, and in 1846 the first Synagogue at Back Rockingham Place began to function. If in 1822 there were no more than two Jewish families, the 1841 Census now indicated 56 people, with the number gradually rising to 144 in 1851. The first Jewish settlers in Leeds were predominantly anglicised middle-class merchants of German descent (Freedman 1992:3). Well in keeping with the informal social contract that had been established between British Jewry and the host society, these Jews were “leading a somewhat secretive existence” (Diamond 1975: 4). The decorum tirelessly advocated by the British Jewish elites prescribed that the Jewish population should keep their heads down and avoid drawing public attention to Jewish issues and individual Jews as representatives of a minority group. A British Jew was supposed to embrace the English way of life and express loyalty and patriotism, perhaps even more than the English (Rubinstein 2003).

To understand this set of attitudes, one has to place it in the wider international context of anti-Semitism. In contrast to countries where Jews were actively persecuted or discriminated against and denied civil rights, 19th-century England offered a real possibility of integrating while retaining a certain Jewish identity. Yet the only acceptable and compatible model of Jewishness was narrowly defined as a religious identity. Being outside the immediate interest of the British central government and outside of the public realm, a diversity of religious identities was tolerated, while cultural and linguistic assimilation was unconditional. Embraced as a fair price for relative security and fairer treatment, this interpretation of Jewish identity was institutionalised, actively propagated and, as a consequence, gradually internalised by the subsequent generations of Jewish immigrants. Even Judaism as a religion, as practised by Anglo-Jewry, gradually became anglicised. The process was evident in the evolution of the two most prominent institutions of Anglo-Jewry – the Board of Deputies of British Jews (established 1760) and the Chief Rabbinate (established 1766). By the middle of the 19th century, both institutions were structured in a similar way to the organization of the Anglican Church. Another institution that became a pillar of Anglo-Jewry was the United Synagogue (established 1870), which came to signify a specifically British mode of Jewishness – moderate, acculturated and "lukewarm on
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Zionism" (Rubinstein 2003: 18). In the words of Elkan Levy, ex-president of the United Synagogue, English Judaism came to look more like the "Jewish Division of the Anglican Church" than a distinct religion (Levy 2004).

The great Polish-Russian immigration of 1880-1914 brought a type of Jewishness evidently alien to English society, and it strained and challenged the established social 'contract' that Anglo-Jewry had nurtured. The Jewish culture of the new immigrants was inseparable from their religious identity (Yiddish language, life-style, food, dress-code, and strict observance of religious laws) and was not harmonised with Western decorum. Immigration of an enormous magnitude, coupled with high birth rates, brought the rapid growth of the Jewish population in the UK, which, in the 50 years from 1860 approximately quintupled from its original 60,000 (Gartner 1973:280). In Leeds the growth was even more dramatic: within 40 years the size of the community increased more than six-fold, driving the rate of Jewish concentration in the overall population of Leeds from 0.1 % in 1861 to 3.2% in 1901 (see table 5.1).

Table 5.1 Leeds Jewish Population: Comparison with total Leeds Population, Numbers and Percentage based on Census statistics

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Jewish population total</th>
<th>Leeds total</th>
<th>Percentage of Jews</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1861</td>
<td>219</td>
<td>207,149</td>
<td>0.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1871</td>
<td>988</td>
<td>259,200</td>
<td>0.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1881</td>
<td>2,923</td>
<td>309,119</td>
<td>0.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1891</td>
<td>7,914</td>
<td>367,505</td>
<td>2.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1901</td>
<td>13,858</td>
<td>428,953</td>
<td>3.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Freedman 2002: 18

The arrival of East European Jews aided the rapid growth of Jewish settlements throughout the UK, leading to the emergence of 'ghetto-like' segregated communities in big industrial centres (Whitechapel in London, Red Bank and Strangeways in Manchester), where immigrants had very limited interaction with the English public. In Leeds, while the first Jews, who as a rule came from the south of the country in search of trading opportunities, settled in the vicinity of Briggate, most of the Eastern European Jews settled in the more affordable district of the Leylands. This was in the

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8 The word ghetto has become a very loaded term in academic and public discourses, since it is almost always used in negative connotations. However, in most of Anglo-Jewish literature (public and academic) it has been in use since the beginning of the 20th century as a descriptive term.
north-east of the city, bounded by Skinner Lane to the north, Regent Street to the east, Lady Lane to the south, and North Street to the west (see Figure 5.1.).

**Figure 5.1 The Boundaries of the Jewish settlement in Leylands**

Source: adapted from Leeds Map, 1933

The new Jewish immigrants, who were poorer and more different from the English than the preceding Jewish settlers, had to live in the cheapest accommodation, relying greatly on mutual support for their survival. Since the bulk of Jewish immigration happened within a short period of time, the Leylands, a very poor district with back-to-back houses that deteriorated into unsanitary slums, became known as the Jewish quarter. According to the 1881 Census, almost 80% of Leeds Jews lived in the area (table 5.2). One of the Jewish residents of Leeds, Louis Teeman (1976: 8) likened the Leylands to "a hillside full of rabbit holes." Before the Jews settled there in numbers, it was the area
of Irish immigrants, with a reputation as a place of criminals, drunkenness and immoralities.

Table 5.2 Data on Jewish Population Numbers in Leylands

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Total number of Jews in Leylands</th>
<th>2,371</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total population in Leylands</td>
<td>8,515</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percentage of Jews in Leylands from population of Leylands</td>
<td>27.80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percentage of Jews in Leylands from population of Jews in Leeds</td>
<td>80.73</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Vaughan and Penn: 2006, based on 1881 Census

There were two patterns of Eastern European Jewish immigration to Leeds. Fleeing from the pogroms in Russia, many Jews, while on the way to America, had to travel from Hull to Liverpool but for some reason cut their journey short and stayed in places along the route, like Leeds or Manchester or Wakefield. However, many Russian Jews had Leeds as their specific final destination because of recruitment for the fast-growing tailoring industry. Started in 1856 by a non-Jew, John Barran (later elected Mayor), with the assistance of an outworker, Herbert Friend, a Jewish immigrant from Poland, the tailoring industry expanded rapidly in Leeds, especially after the introduction of the division of labour. Although no Jews were allowed to work in Barran's factory, Friend hired Jewish tailors to do the subcontracted work in their own premises. At first, recruiting agents for Herbert Friend came to Hull and other ports of Jewish immigration to look for skilled tailors; later they went to Lithuania and Poland and advertised Leeds as a place to move to. Thus Jewish immigrants to Leeds were remarkably uniform in their origin: around 80-90% of the immigrants came from a few Jewish settlements in the Russian provinces in Lithuania, north-east Poland and neighbouring parts of Byelorussia. Most of the immigrants in 1870-1907 were tailors and other garment workers, as well as unskilled men and women who were quickly trained to work on a particular part of the garment. In the 1891 Census, 72% of the listed occupations of Jews were in tailoring (Freedman 2002). In 1888 The Lancet had this to say about Jewish immigrants to Leeds:

> on starting, [they] are often acquainted with but one word of English, and that word is 'Leeds'. They generally land at Hull, proceed direct to Leeds and know nothing of England or English institutions save what they have been able to learn in that town (cited in Raisman 2002:15).

The poverty and illiteracy of the newcomers created a further embarrassment to middle- and upper-class Anglo-Jewry. Before the intense Jewish immigration of the late 19th century, the 'Jewish question' was rarely discussed in British national discourse. In rare
instances of anti-Semitism, Jews were described as ‘wealthy cosmopolitans’, who desire world domination, who had no allegiance to the indigenous society, and who could easily spy on their hosts and betray their generosity (Kushner 1990:152). After the acceleration of immigration, the public debate on the Jewish question was legitimised. In contrast to Jewish attempts to define Jewishness as a matter of religious difference, the dominant public discourse racialised Jews, viewing them as fundamentally different from the English, and regarding their integration as impossible and dangerous. In 1887 the Pall Mall Magazine likened England’s New Jews to a “pest and a menace”, warning of a “Judenhetz brewing in East London” (Winder 2004 cited in Guardian 2004). The Anglo-Jewish elites attempted to halt further immigration, lobbying for legislation imposing immigration controls. The Aliens Act was passed in 1905 and was explicitly directed against Jewish refugees, who were repeatedly represented as dirty, unclean and likely to spread infectious disease in epidemic proportions. For those immigrants who were already in Britain, the Jewish leadership tried to arrange further transition to the colonies. Those who stayed in the UK, despite efforts to transfer them, had to be looked after so as not to “let them become a charge on the Gentile community” (Kershen 1995: 37), and simultaneously to be anglicised as quickly as possible:

From the point of view of the late-Victorian acculturated British Jewish community, the acceptance they had laboured long to earn seemed threatened by newcomers with strange customs who did not readily blend into the English scene, and so community leaders attempted to mould the incomers to a pattern of private religion, maintained in the home not in the street, where attendance at synagogue on Saturday mirrored church attendance on Sunday. (Board of Deputies of British Jewry 2005)

Similar actions were taken in Leeds: the Leeds Jewish Board of Guardians (the precursor of today’s Jewish Welfare Board) was formed in 1878 to attend to the needs of the poor. These efforts were insufficient, however, given the absence of a viable communal institutional structure and the lack of strong leadership to guide the newcomers into the established mode of Anglo-Jewish life. In addition, the sheer scale of immigration, which increased the Jewish population 20-fold in less than 50 years, diluted the acculturating impact of the anglicised Jews, who were not as numerous and well-established as in London or Manchester. At the turn of the 20th century in Leeds “the poor wandering immigrants of the 1880’s ... began to take over the status and influence of the home-born Jew” (Diamond 1975:2).

Broadly, Leeds Jewry of the late 19th-early 20th century developed as a working-class immigrant community, relatively homogenous in socio-economic status, a ‘bastion’ of Orthodoxy (Sterne 1981) – very observant, yet “narrow and unimaginative” (Diamond
There were no Reform Jews, and the existing Marxists and other secularists, who were muted in an overwhelmingly Orthodox community, moved out of the area if they could afford to. Despite the similarity of its members, Leeds Jewry was known for constant squabbles and discord for many years to come (Krausz 1964:10). Jews resisted any unification, distrusted central authorities, preferring small chevras (fraternities) often formed according to ‘landmanship’ and led by a trusted rabbi. Already in 1869 the newcomers, upset with the rules in the ‘Englisher Shul’ (the Great Synagogue in Belgrave Street built in 1860 and modelled on the New Leeds Parish Church), set up their own chevra and later New Briggate Synagogue, which was nicknamed Grinner [foreigner] Shul. This fragmentation intensified with the arrival of more immigrants, encouraging the growth of independent synagogues, chevras and charities. In addition to divisions based on place of origin, the main groups within the community at the turn of the century were formed on the basis of degree of religious orthodoxy, economic situation, and politics. Any attempts at amalgamation or creating centralised communal institutions (like Shehita Board or Beth Din) were futile for a long time. In 1924, the Jewish Chronicle described the Leeds community as “a bubbling lava of chaos and disharmony” (Freedman 1992). Social fragmentation was initially duplicated by economic fragmentation, which was typical of the ‘sweating system’. However, in 1893, Jewish tailors, who were denied membership in English trade unions, formed their own Jewish Amalgamated Tailors’, Pressers’, and Machinists’ Union, followed by the Workers’ Burial Society and Workers’ Co-operative. These organisations were very influential in the community, and it was even suggested that the trade union went “further towards constituting a body representative of Leeds Jewry as a whole, than any other institution or organisation” (O’Brien 1975: 8). In 1902 a Jewish businessman, Montague Burton, who played a formidable role in the development of Leeds economy and in the life of local Jewish community, set up his business in Leeds, initiating a period of industrial amalgamation. Eventually, the clothing industry became a big factory business: one of Burton’s factories, located in Hudson Road Mills, employed more than 10,000 people, most of whom were Jewish.

As in many other British towns of mass Jewish settlement, Jewish Leylanders lived in spatial and social segregation, which can mainly be explained by reference to language and cultural barriers, striking poverty, religious needs and the anti-Semitism of the English (Vaughan and Penn 2006). Mono-sectoral employment was an additional

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9 Also often referred as 'grünner', 'greener' or 'greenhorn'.

factor, in sustaining high residential clustering among Leeds Jewry long after its early days in Leylands. This constellation of economic and social factors, coupled with the relative weakness of acculturated elites in Leeds, further reduced the pressures of assimilation and slowed the process of acculturation more than in other places of Anglo-Jewish life. In the absence of state welfare, living in close proximity to each other allowed Jews to improve their position in society by cutting costs, providing benefits and securing the grounds for further upward mobility (Waterman and Kosmin 1987).

The aspirations of Jewish newcomers were to obtain physical, financial and social security. However, according to Burgess (1925), Jewish settlers in the Leylands in the 1880s and 1890s lived in constant fear of raids from Mabgate and Quarry Hill carried out by drunken English and Irish hooligans. The first generation of immigrants, who had experienced Russian anti-Semitism at first hand, never dreamed of fighting back. It took another generation of younger, English-born Jews to go and fight the offenders. This second generation of immigrants was in some prominent respects similar to the first one, as most of them kept to their parents' model of Jewishness, achieved only minor socio-economic improvement, and continued employment in the tailoring industry. Most married within their own community and drew their close friends from within its boundaries (Endelman 1990: 176). Yet growing up on English streets provided a more secure environment than the Pale of Settlement, a tract of land in Tsarist Russia to which Jews were restricted, and the 1870 Education Act ensured compulsory free education for all. So, English-born Jews grew up differently from their parents. Leeds' four Board schools, which catered almost exclusively for the Jewish community, became the stamping blocks of Jewish acculturation. Jewish children, who took secular education very seriously, became fluent in English, while the rate of Yiddish-speaking declined; they also took to English sports and entertainment (Endelman 1990: ch.6). They were more assertive than their parents, and by fighting the hooligans succeeded in making Leylands safer for Jews (Burgess 1925), although warfare with English gangs continued well into the 1930s and 40s.

10 There were some notable exceptions, such as Michael Marks, the founder of Marks & Spencer; Hyman Morris, alderman and the first Jewish Lord Mayor; and Victor Lightman, a successful businessman in the cabinet-making industry.
5.2. ‘Little Israel’ in Chapeltown

According to witness testimonies, life in the slums of the Leylands was not the preferred choice of its residents, and when the opportunity arose, people eagerly moved out of the area. Yet most of them did not move away from other Jews, remaining in the vicinity of the community and its jobs (Raisman 2002). In this way, in search of better living conditions, Jewish people gradually advanced northwards towards the second area of their settlement in Leeds, Chapeltown (See Figure 5.2). In 1907 Roundhay Road Synagogue became the first Synagogue to open north of the Leylands, followed by Lokever Shul in Francis Street in 1913. The famous Herzl-Moser Hospital, in Leopold Street, had opened in 1905, the first communal institution in the Chapeltown area. A similar “linear tendency of Jewish settlement” (Lipman 1967: 84) along the main transport route in the vicinity occurred in many other urban places of Jewish life: Jewish immigrants in Manchester moved further north to Cheetham, away from the slums of Red Bank and Strangeways; and in London, Jewish East Enders relocated to Hackney and Stoke Newington. In Leeds, slum clearance in parts of the Leylands, initiated in 1907-08, catalysed the population and institutional flight from the area, so that the northern district of Newport as well as “the streets to the immediate north-west of the area – between North Street and Camp Road – became solidly Jewish” (Freedman 1992: 16). By the end of the slum demolition in 1937, most of the Jews had already moved out, and the Golden Cross end of North Street at Sheepscar had become the new centre of Jewish communal life: most of the Jewish shops were on North Street, most of communal organisations and Synagogues were in Chapeltown. In 1956, writing about Chapeltown and its Jewish community, the local newspaper, Yorkshire Evening News, compared the district to “a little Israel in full working order” (Scott 1956 cited in Freedman 2003:41, fn70)

Some commentators on Leeds Jewish life likened the exodus from the Leylands to the communal ‘coming of age’ (Sterne 1989). Although the level of social and economic segregation remained fairly high, there was much more public and private intermixing with the Gentile population. Chapeltown, built in the second half of 19th century as a middle-class residential area, had a substantial non-Jewish population when the trickle of Jewish settlers became a flood. Even with some of the Gentiles fleeing the area, Jewish residential concentration in Chapeltown and later in Moortown/Alwoodley never reached the level of the Leylands (Sterne 1989:12).
The English-born Jews, who were more educated and acculturated than their parents, took to traditional English recreational activities: playing football, cricket, golf, and tennis, and enjoying rambling and outings to films and theatres. When faced with discrimination in Gentile organisations, they often established their own clubs and societies. That was the story of Moor Allerton Golf Club, the first Jewish Golf club in Europe, which was opened in 1923, (Hyman 1994). Second-generation immigrants had
no language difficulties and, despite institutionalised anti-Semitism, succeeded in wider occupational diversification. An analysis of the marriage register shows that tailoring as a profession of bridegrooms dropped from 62% in the 1920s to only 43% at the end of the 1930s, and by the 1960s "the Jewish tailor [was] almost non-existent in Leeds" (cited in Freedman 1989: 6). More importantly, large differences in wealth and social status between members of the community were developing. While there were a few really affluent Jewish families and most Leeds Jews remained working class, the middle class was steadily growing. It reached around 10% by the 1930s (Bergen 2000: 2). It consisted of entrepreneurial immigrants, who had succeeded in setting up their own small businesses, and children of immigrants, who through city scholarships had obtained a professional education. In 1935 the Jewish Chronicle (JC), 7th June, quoted the journal Men's Wear as reporting that most of the 200 tailoring firms in Leeds were Jewish-controlled, while the remarkable success of Jewish children in education was and still is a source of communal pride. In 1909 the JC reported that although Jews constituted less than 5% of the total Leeds population, Jewish children in the first decades of the 20th century often gained more than a quarter of the 150 city scholarships to higher education (Freedman 1992: 12).

One more sign of communal maturity was the formation of organisations that catered for the whole community rather than for just one of its segments as before. Although fragmentation remained a distinctive feature of Leeds communal life well into the 1970s and 80s, the formation of B'nai B'rith Lodge (1927), the 'House of Lords of the community' (Saipe 1985:31), had a profound effect on the development of integrated Jewish institutions. The Lodge, consisting of the most influential and well-off Jewish figures, supported the formation of new religious and educational organisations and charities and the integration of existing ones, initiated the reconstitution of the Leeds Jewish Representative Council (1938), and promoted the dissemination of the Zionist movement. These latter two factors were instrumental in bringing the community together and creating an external perception of one unified community. Zionism in Leeds started in 1898 within a small circle of Leeds intelligentsia, who met at a private house (Walsh 1982). By the 1920s it had grown in strength and popularity, especially after the arrival of Professor Selig Brodetsky, an intellectual, communal leader, and passionate Zionist, who came to work at Leeds University. Equally important was the backing of Montague Burton, one of the most influential figures in the community. The famous and long-lasting 'Blue-and-White Bazaar' was started in 1921 as a 'Palestinian
Bazaar'. It became a distinct feature of Leeds Jewry, helping various Zionist causes and contributing to the founding of a Leeds Colony in Palestine. But equally, Zionist activities in Leeds in the 1930s were part of the widespread popularisation of Zionism in the UK, which displaced traditional religious values and Yiddish-based culture as an alternative means of communal solidarity (Alderman 1998: 309).

Another communal organisation that was at the heart of Jewish social and political life was the Jewish Institute. Started in 1896 as the Jewish Young Men’s Institute in Brunswick Terrace, this establishment for working-class entertainment soon outgrew the usual ‘club’ services. At its subsequent locations at the corner of North Street and Albert Grove (1905-36) and Savile Mount in Chapeltown (1936-80s), it became one of the most successful communal organisations, which attracted people for entertainment and sports and “served as a training ground for almost every Jewish politician in Leeds” (Saipe 1985: 23).

The move to Chapeltown and later to Moortown set off a series of synagogue amalgamations. The best-known example was the United Hebrew Congregation, UHC, which still exists today. This was formed in 1931 by the merger of former rivals – New Briggate Synagogue (Grinner Shul) and Belgrave Street Synagogue (Englisher Shul) – both relocating to Chapeltown, and New Leeds Congregation, created by those who had moved to Chapeltown before WWI. The Synagogue building for the UHC congregation, New Synagogue, was opened in 1932 on Chapeltown road. Its remarkable Byzantine style, with a large dome and a minaret, made it a major visible landscape marker of Jewish presence in Leeds and a symbol of the community’s growing affluence.

Increasing Jewish participation in local and national political and social life was another sign of Jewish integration into the host society. Jews successfully stood for Council, representing different political parties. Some were elevated to the Aldermanic Bench, and in 1941 Hyman Morris was elected the first Jewish Lord Mayor of Leeds. The Trade Union of Jewish Tailors increased its influence, claiming in 1913 to have in excess of 4,000 members (cited in Freedman 1992: 14), and in 1915 merging with the National Union of Garment Workers, the very organisation that some 20 years earlier had refused to accept Jewish members,

5.3. Challenges of wartime

WWI and WWII were important periods in the history of the Leeds Jewish community, as in the life of Anglo-Jewry in general. Both wars, but especially the First, raised the
key question of allegiances and identities, dividing Jews in Britain over the competing appeals of British and Jewish loyalties and raising suspicions and hostility amongst the British public. During WWI, Jewish leadership, including the Chief Rabbi J.H. Hertz, urged Jews to show their patriotism to King and Country and to fulfil their citizenship duty by enrolling in the Army, simultaneously dismissing the validity of conscientious objection on religious grounds. The *Jewish Chronicle* implored Jews to repay England for its hospitality, running the following advert: “Britain has been all she could be to the Jews. Jews will be all they can be to Britain. Join the special Jewish unit” (*JC*, 01.01.1915). However, for many British Jews, their Jewish obligations contradicted the patriotic call of joining the war effort. Thus, a group of eminent rabbis in Leeds disputed Hertz’s ruling on Jewish conscientious objectors, and mounted a serious challenge to his authority (Cesarani 1990b: 66). There were also concerns about the anti-Semitism of the British officers and soldiers. In addition, foreign-born Jews – and in Leeds they constituted the majority – were often unwilling or ineligible to serve in the British Army.

Expressing Jewish international solidarity, some Jews refused to fight in the war on the side of the very Tsarist regime which many of them escaped from and which continued the persecution of fellow Jews in Russia. In 1916, enlisting the support of Liberal MPs and newspapers, a *Foreign Jews Protection Committee* was formed to fight against the deportation of Russian Jews who refused to serve in the army. Nationwide, around 25-30,000 Russian-born ‘friendly aliens’, whose presence was very noticeable given the absence of so much of the male population on active service, became the target for increasingly mocking press coverage and popular hostility. Although suspicion and anti-Jewish public sentiments were not a novelty, the violent rioting that occurred in Leeds on the 2nd and 3rd of June 1917 came as a nasty surprise, and prompted the formation of the *Leeds Jewish Representative Council*, which was to represent communal interests to the Gentile world. The situation with interned ‘enemy Jewish aliens’, who required Jewish services and communal support, created an additional test for Jewish loyalties, widening the intra-communal schism. Most of the British Jewish establishment in London distanced themselves from ‘enemy aliens’, but a few national organisations and regional communities, including the Leeds community, supported them. In Leeds, the community provided religious services and kosher meals to Jews held in the camp for enemy aliens at Lofthouse Park.
The onset of WWII brought the problem of 'enemy Jewish aliens' back onto the agenda, when 55,000 Jewish refugees, who had fled Nazi-occupied Europe and settled in Britain prior to the war, were subjected to special 'enemy aliens' measures, including internment in the British Isles or abroad (Cesarani 1993:45). Just as in WWI, the Anglo-Jewish establishment did not want to make itself conspicuous by overt relief of the interned. They behaved in accordance with the convention of Jewish decorum in Britain: to keep a low public profile and to avoid drawing attention to Jewish 'problems'. The similar attitude of the majority of British-born descendants of Eastern European Jews, who by then were familiar with British customs and had a good command of English, demonstrated that they too internalised the behavioural code of Anglo-Jewry and were scared by the rising anti-alien sentiments of the British public and by the power of Mosley’s fascist movement. When Jewish refugees started arriving in Britain in large numbers in the 1930s, British Jews were uncomfortable with the increased publicity and responded with a display of patriotism and loyalty to Britain. They raised no complaints about the anti-alien restrictions, bolstered self-financing of the refugees and did not ask for any state funds or other forms of assistance for Jewish refugees. Extensive fundraising and collections for the relief of German Jews were undertaken, yet Jewish communities across the UK were increasingly concerned with the actual resettlement of Jewish refugees. Britain strictly limited immigration both to the UK and to Palestine. The halt of Jewish immigration to the latter became nearly absolute after the White Paper of 1939 (Hurewitz 1976), but the resettlement of Jews in Britain had some serious repercussions. Not only were they noticeably foreign and thus threatened the social ‘contract’ carefully crafted by Anglo-Jewry; in the eyes of the British public, German Jews also represented the enemy and cast a shadow of suspicion on all Jewish people in the UK. The refugees were issued with a leaflet on how to behave, talk, and dress in order to avoid the undesired attention of the public and were encouraged to become ‘200% English’ in every aspect of their lives (Cesarani 1993).

The developments in Leeds followed national trends. When the war began, the Jews of Leeds joined the ranks of other British Jews, many serving in the British Armed Forces while others were doing their best on the ‘home front’. Prior to the war, a network of local committees dealing with various aspects of the refugee crisis was created, and a number of subscription funds came into operation in the 1930s. The Leeds Jewish Refugee Committee (1934) supervised the immigration and settlement of refugees in Leeds. Overall, around 700 German refugees and 900 London Jewish evacuees were
assisted (Bergen 2000, Freedman 2003). Many refugees were of educated and middle-class background and practised either no religion at all or a Reform version of Judaism. This created tensions and misunderstandings within the Orthodox working-class Jewry of Leeds. As most of the refugees left after the end of the war, their overall influence on the community was more modest than in London or Birmingham. Yet Leeds Jewry was endowed with some prominent communal leaders, just as its religious life was diversified with the opening of the Reform Synagogue, Sinai, in 1944 (Sterne 1985).

5.4. The post-war period (1950 and 1980s)

After the war, many Jewish servicemen were decommissioned and Jewish life in Chapeltown returned to normal. Although the area was not structurally damaged during the German air bombing, the process of Jewish migration further north accelerated. Jewish families had already been moving to Moortown and Alwoodley before the war: according to some evidence, around 300 Jewish families lived in Moortown in 1936 (JC, 23.07.1937: 20), though they represented a small well-off minority of Leeds Jews. The accelerated movement of better-off Jews to the northern suburbs after the war was accompanied by the development of a Jewish infrastructure (synagogues, chedarim, shops, clubs) in the new residential area. The growing class differences acquired spatial representation, splitting Leeds Jewry into two separate communities, with working-class Jews in Chapeltown and middle-class Jews in Moortown/Alwoodley. As more Jewish people improved their socio-economic position, the process of relocation increased, and from the late 1950s, when the Leeds Jewish Housing Association opened the Queenshill Estate, Chapeltown experienced a concerted Jewish flight out of the area. Saipe recalls that addresses on the synagogue membership lists were changed weekly (Saipe, cited in Freedman 2003: 42). By the 1970s, most of the communal organisations, synagogues, and shops had moved north and, as Grizzard and Raisman (1980) estimated, in 1979 there were about 500 Jewish residents living in Chapeltown. As Jews were moving out, newly arrived economic immigrants from Europe – Poles, Latvians, and Serbs – followed by West Indians and South Asians, moved in, thus catalysing the Jewish exit. Yet the newcomers’ influx into the neighbourhood was not the main reason for the Jewish exodus. The underlying cause of the move was the same as 30 years before: Jewish people aspired to better housing conditions and pleasanter surroundings and finally were able to afford them.
These middle-class aspirations, harboured by all British Jews, were in line with the desires of many other British working-class families, and demonstrated an ever-increasing rate of social, cultural, and economic integration, achieved by the minority. In this respect, the impact of the wartime experience on the individual members of Jewish communities in Britain was enormous. The war exposed them to the non-Jewish world and provided new avenues for personal integration. In Leeds, an additional factor was the demise of the cloth-manufacturing industry, which speeded up occupational diversification, when the young generation of Jews, who were better educated than their parents, entered professions (education, medicine, law). According to the Leeds Synagogue marriage registers, the number of bridegrooms who were in professions rose from 5% in the 1920s to 34% in the 1980s, while the rate of professionals among brides' fathers in the 1980s, who presumably married in the 1960s, was 23% (Freedman 2005:32). Yet despite their efforts towards integration, the level of anti-Semitism in society remained high. To avoid job discrimination, which was an everyday occurrence, many Jews had to conceal their Jewish identity and change their names. This was an important contribution to the general tendency of assimilation and drifting away from Jewish traditions, especially with regard to secularism and widespread abandonment of religious practice.

The successful integration of Jewish people into the British mainstream was evident in the increasing similarity of socio-demographic profiles of Anglo-Jewish communities and the broader British public. For example, although the number of Jews in Leeds was at its peak in the 1950s, the actual number of mikvah\textsuperscript{11} attendances dropped from 181 a week in 1909-10 to 26 in 1935, and finally to 10 in 1956 (Freedman 1992: 10). The average synagogue attendance on a regular Shabbat morning in Leeds in 1986 stood at only 12%, which was very near the estimate by the English Church Census for Sunday Church attendance – 10% (Freedman 1992). The rate of intermarriage was also climbing steadily through the century, and was accompanied by its increasing acceptance within the community. At the beginning of the 20\textsuperscript{th} century, marrying out was very rare and almost always led to expulsion from the family and community. Krausz’s 1958 research of Leeds Jewry estimated the rate of intermarriage to be around 10%, although it was still socially stigmatised (Krausz 1964). By the 1980s, in line with

\textsuperscript{11} Ritual baths, obligatory for women and recommended for men
the national Jewish trend, more then a quarter of Leeds Jews were marrying out (Waterman 2003). By this time there was also a higher level of understanding and sympathy in the community.

At the group level, however, neither communal institutions nor the image projected to the broader society changed noticeably in the aftermath of the war. The only exception was in welfare provision, which, due to the establishment of the national welfare state, transformed the communal system of social care from a “relief-giving body to a service provider” (Skyte 1999:15). In other regards, both national and regional leaderships resumed the pre-war pattern of collective behaviour and collective self-identification as an ethnically indistinguishable religious minority. Following a national trend, a Leeds Council of Christians and Jews (CCJ), whose mission was to foster ‘better feeling between both faiths’, was established in 1945. On the whole, relationships with the non-Jewish world, defined as Judeo-Christian relations, continued to be a significant element of the community’s self-reflection up until the late 1980s. Even though the majority of Jews supported the Zionist cause and cheered the establishment of Israel in 1948, they showed restraint in their public expression of feeling due to the same old concern of ‘dual loyalty’. Yet their main consideration had less to do with the opinions of the Gentile public than was the case before WWII; rather, it was an internal self-restraint, for “they thought the patriotic emotions which British Jews undoubtedly ought to hold should be directed entirely in favour of British patriotism” (Rubinstein 2003: 18). In the 1960s, following the dissolution of the British Empire and the relocation of the main centres of Jewish life to Israel and the US, this distinctively English mode of Jewish identity, although surviving to the present, began to crumble (Rubinstein 2003: 19). The drop in religious belief and observance, which began in the 1920 and 30s, continued to accelerate, which made a growing number of middle-class Jews, who were increasingly concerned with Jewish continuity, turn to alternative forms of Jewish identity. Zionism, the revival of Jewish cultural heritage and education, building up social networking – all these non-religious forms of Jewish identity received a boost in the late 1960s and 70s.

The Six-Day War (1967) made many British Jews feel ardently patriotic about Israel without abandoning their loyalty and passion for Britain. The majority of Leeds Jews also expressed their solidarity with Israel, while various Zionist activities (fundraising, edification, assistance with emigration) were at the forefront of communal life. Even in

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12 This estimate is an extrapolation from the findings in the JPR survey of Leeds Jewry in 2001, which ascertained that 27% of older respondents (aged 75 and over) had a child who had married a non-Jew.
times of economic depression in the 1980s, the Joint Israel Appeal and other Israel-oriented charities received most generous support (Alderman 1998:386). The period from the 1950s to the 1970s witnessed an increase in Jewish aliya\textsuperscript{13} to Israel, thus reinforcing multiple family links between the British and Israeli Jews. Although the precise number of Leeds Jews among the 30,000 British Jewish immigrants to Israel since 1948, is not known, it had to be substantial, for it was acknowledged (Freedman 1988) as one of the main causes of a sharp decline in the Jewish population of Leeds.

The other reasons for the plunge in the community's size, which fell from around 20,000 in the 1950s to approximately 10,000 in the 1980s, were the unintended consequences of Jewish successful integration into British society. The more Jews advanced economically and the more they became culturally similar to the mainstream population, the lower became Jewish fertility rate, the more aging occurred, and the higher became the rate of 'marrying out' (Freedman 1992). Besides more assertive Zionist sentiments, the changing self-perception of British Jewry was evident in the increased interest in cultural and social forms of Jewish identity. In Leeds, similar attitudes led to the creation of new communal institutions, some of which had been in existence in London for many decades. For instance, whereas Jewish Schools in London had been running since the 1732, in Leeds it took the community more than 200 years and lots of talks and negotiations before full-time Jewish schools became a reality in 1958. The Brodetsky Primary and Morris Silman Middle schools opened under the auspices of the Leeds Educational Authority with the community co-sponsoring the Jewish education. In addition, the newly arrived orthodox Lubavich Jews set up a private orthodox Jewish school, Menorah in mid 1970s. The same decade witnessed the formation of local branches of the Jewish Historical Society of England and the Jewish Genealogical Society of Great Britain, which generated some outstanding research projects and publications and attracted considerable interest from the local Jewish public.

5.5. The 1990s and the present

Many of the socio-demographic trends of the 1970s continued in the following decades, as the Leeds Jewish community kept on shrinking and aging. Long gone were the days of Leeds reputation as the place with the highest concentration of Jews in the UK, when

\textsuperscript{13} Literally, ascending (Hebrew), the term is used for referring both to Jewish immigration to Israel and to the honour of reading a portion from the Torah during synagogue services.
Leeds Jews reputedly formed 5% of the total Leeds population. According to the latest Census data (April 2001), the 8,267 people who identified their religion as Jewish constituted only 1.16% of the total Leeds population (715,402), thus putting Leeds Jewry in second position behind the Muslims (2.99%) and almost on a par with the Sikhs (1.06%) in the ranking of all religious minority groups of the metropolis (Table 5.3).

**Table 5.3 Population by Religious Group in Leeds, Manchester and London in wards with a significant Jewish presence**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ward</th>
<th>Christian</th>
<th>Buddhist</th>
<th>Hindu</th>
<th>Jewish</th>
<th>Muslim</th>
<th>Sikh</th>
<th>Other religion</th>
<th>No religion</th>
<th>Religion not stated</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>England and Wales</strong></td>
<td>71.75</td>
<td>0.28</td>
<td>1.06</td>
<td>0.50</td>
<td>2.97</td>
<td>0.63</td>
<td>0.29</td>
<td>14.81</td>
<td>7.71</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>England</strong></td>
<td>71.74</td>
<td>0.28</td>
<td>1.11</td>
<td>0.52</td>
<td>3.10</td>
<td>0.67</td>
<td>0.29</td>
<td>14.59</td>
<td>7.69</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Leeds</strong></td>
<td>68.86</td>
<td>0.22</td>
<td>0.58</td>
<td>1.16</td>
<td>2.99</td>
<td>1.06</td>
<td>0.21</td>
<td>16.79</td>
<td>8.12</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moortown</td>
<td>59.18</td>
<td>0.32</td>
<td>1.99</td>
<td>7.18</td>
<td>4.34</td>
<td>5.50</td>
<td>0.18</td>
<td>13.60</td>
<td>7.71</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Roundhay</td>
<td>60.77</td>
<td>0.20</td>
<td>0.72</td>
<td>3.52</td>
<td>6.57</td>
<td>2.83</td>
<td>0.23</td>
<td>17.06</td>
<td>8.09</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North</td>
<td>56.70</td>
<td>0.29</td>
<td>1.14</td>
<td>17.72</td>
<td>3.33</td>
<td>2.58</td>
<td>0.12</td>
<td>10.75</td>
<td>7.37</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Greater Manchester</strong></td>
<td>74.15</td>
<td>0.21</td>
<td>0.70</td>
<td>0.88</td>
<td>5.04</td>
<td>0.15</td>
<td>0.17</td>
<td>11.33</td>
<td>7.37</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bury (Borough)</td>
<td>73.68</td>
<td>0.14</td>
<td>0.37</td>
<td>4.94</td>
<td>3.74</td>
<td>0.11</td>
<td>0.17</td>
<td>10.16</td>
<td>6.70</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pilkington Park</td>
<td>56.11</td>
<td>0.12</td>
<td>0.96</td>
<td>22.44</td>
<td>2.09</td>
<td>0.31</td>
<td>0.16</td>
<td>9.23</td>
<td>8.59</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sedgley</td>
<td>46.12</td>
<td>0.15</td>
<td>0.57</td>
<td>26.08</td>
<td>7.33</td>
<td>0.49</td>
<td>0.47</td>
<td>9.04</td>
<td>9.74</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>St. Mary's</td>
<td>64.49</td>
<td>0.28</td>
<td>0.56</td>
<td>12.08</td>
<td>2.20</td>
<td>0.33</td>
<td>0.20</td>
<td>12.80</td>
<td>7.07</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Outer London</strong></td>
<td>60.52</td>
<td>0.61</td>
<td>5.44</td>
<td>2.28</td>
<td>6.45</td>
<td>2.04</td>
<td>0.55</td>
<td>14.15</td>
<td>7.95</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Barnet (Borough)</td>
<td>47.32</td>
<td>1.09</td>
<td>6.68</td>
<td>14.84</td>
<td>6.16</td>
<td>0.35</td>
<td>1.02</td>
<td>12.82</td>
<td>9.72</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>East Finchley</td>
<td>50.93</td>
<td>0.87</td>
<td>5.48</td>
<td>8.28</td>
<td>5.47</td>
<td>0.54</td>
<td>0.81</td>
<td>18.97</td>
<td>8.64</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Edgware</td>
<td>27.79</td>
<td>0.69</td>
<td>8.91</td>
<td>36.69</td>
<td>5.33</td>
<td>0.24</td>
<td>2.03</td>
<td>6.64</td>
<td>11.69</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Golders Green</td>
<td>29.62</td>
<td>1.27</td>
<td>5.43</td>
<td>29.48</td>
<td>7.70</td>
<td>0.15</td>
<td>0.99</td>
<td>9.53</td>
<td>15.82</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>West Finchley</td>
<td>43.25</td>
<td>2.03</td>
<td>11.83</td>
<td>8.97</td>
<td>5.43</td>
<td>0.67</td>
<td>2.25</td>
<td>17.83</td>
<td>7.73</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Census 2001
The same data also show that the percentage of Jewish people in Leeds still significantly exceeds the half-percent average for England and Wales, and that it is also higher than the proportion of Jews in Greater Manchester (0.88%). At the same time, it is much lower than in the Outer London area, where the Jewish presence (2.28%) is almost twice as high as in Leeds. At the ward level, the highest concentration of Jews in Leeds is in Alwoodley, Shadwell and parts of Moortown, with the overall figure for the North ward reaching 17.73%. In comparison with some wards in Manchester and London, where Jews constitute up to a third of the total ward population, it looks distinctly low. Overall, the distribution of Jewish people in Leeds (Figure 5.3) confirms the conventional image of Jewish people living in concentrated spatial proximity to each other, though not in segregation from the rest of the population.

Figure 5.3  Distribution of Jewish Population in Leeds

In terms of their socio-economic position, the Jews of Leeds compare favourably both with other minority groups and with the general population of Leeds. They continue to enjoy their educational and occupational advantages. According to the 2001 Census, of all ethnic and religious groups in Leeds, Jews are least likely to be unemployed. This is
consistent with their much higher than average occupational levels. Accordingly, 44.5% of Leeds Jews are in professional and high managerial positions, whereas the figure reaches only 26.8% for the general population of Leeds. Even more startling is the educational difference: the 2001 survey of Leeds Jews conducted by the JPR established that 38.9% of their sample had a university degree or higher educational qualification. This is twice as high as the 2001 Census-based figure for Leeds in general, which indicated that only 19.2% of Leeds working-age population has a university degree or higher education. However, Leeds Jews lose their lead when compared to other Jewish communities in the UK. The JPR survey of the Jewish population in London and in the Southeast (Becher et al. 2002) estimated the rate of higher education among Jewish residents there to exceed 50%, while the rate of high managerial or professional employment was 67% (cited in the JPR report 2003:62). The researchers concluded that in comparison to their southern counterparts, Leeds Jews are slightly poorer and less well educated.

At the same time, in terms of their longevity, Leeds Jews are in line with other British Jewish communities as being older and expected to live longer than the average person in the UK. Figure 5.4 provides the comparison between the Jewish populations of Leeds and of England and the general population of England. Freedman (2004) gives 85.6 years and 78.3 years as the average life expectancy for Leeds Jewish females and males respectively, contrasting it with the 78.8 for women and 72.4 for men in the overall population of England and Wales. Whereas the national figure for the over 65s in the 2001 Census was just 16%, some 27.3% of Jews in Leeds and 25 % of Jews in England were aged 65 or over. The 2001 Census also revealed that the median age of Leeds Jews was 42, considerably higher than the median age of the Leeds general population, 36, and of England and Wales, 39.

Despite the long-term shrinking and aging of its population, Leeds Jewry is still robust and vibrant. There are seven Orthodox synagogues, one Reform synagogue, and a Masorti congregation; a kosher deli, a kosher butcher and a kosher baker; a nursery, a voluntary-aided primary school and a privately run Orthodox school, and a Youth centre, as well as a multitude of other cultural, educational, sporting and Zionist groups. Communal social services, carried out by the Leeds Jewish Welfare Board and the Jewish Housing Association are recognised by national Jewish authorities and by the Leeds City Council to be of exceptionally high standard, and the 2005 opening of the Jewish Community Centre, the building of which was initiated by these organisations. is
the most vivid testimony to this. These facilities are very important for many members
of the community, as in their outlook and daily practices the Jews of Leeds retain their
‘traditional’ and communal flavour. The data provided by the JPR Institute points to the
higher conservatism of Leeds Jews relative to other communities. Thus, the general
decline of one third in the number of Jewish people in Britain who saw their religious
practice as ‘traditional’ (not strictly Orthodox) was largely offset in Leeds, where the
drop was only one-tenth (Becher at al 2003: 58). Whereas every third Jewish person in
the UK is not religiously affiliated, only 11% of the respondents of a 2001 JPR survey
in Leeds were not members of any synagogue (Waterman 2003:8). Of those who held
synagogue membership, almost 80% were members of Orthodox shuls in Leeds, yet
nationally, the figure was less than 50% (see Figure 5.5). However, the maintenance of
certain religious customs was not directly related to their personal viewpoint, as almost
half (47%) of the participants claimed a secular or somewhat secular outlook (see
Figure 5.6 for a comparison of the outlook of Leeds Jews and London Jews); many
also reported neglectfulness with regard to other Orthodox practices. For instance,
although Jews in Leeds were more likely than Jews nationally to buy kosher meat and
attend a Passover Seder, 78% of respondents stated that they ate non-kosher food
outside their homes and fewer than one in ten refrained from travelling on Shabbat
(Waterman 2003: 8). Overall, this selectivity is fairly typical of British Jewry in general,
just as the Leeds Jews’ perception of the importance of social mixing with other Jews is
a common feature of most Jews in the UK.

**Figure 5.4 Age profile of Leeds Jews and Jews in England and Wales**
Figure 5.5. Synagogue membership in Leeds, London and England, 2001

Source: Becher et al 2003: 59

Figure 5.6. Outlook of Jews in Leeds and London

Source: Becher et al 2003: 61
Chapter Six

Being Jewish the local way: a historical perspective

This chapter uses a historical perspective to research the variety of local understandings and experiences of Jewishness. It begins with an exploration of people’s views regarding the importance of Jewish identity to their personal sense of ‘self’ and discusses the reasons behind the historically different levels of Jewish awareness. It continues with an investigation of identity ‘readings’ that characterised the local Jewish population at various points in history. These are set within the changing social and economic circumstances of Leeds Jewry, which mediated and contextualised the impact of national citizenship on the perception of Jewish ‘self’. To ease the comparison of narratives defining the identities of Leeds Jews, the analysis makes an analytical distinction between religious and social (ethnic, cultural, economic) dimensions. The assessment of the dynamic relationship between these spaces of Jewish identity helps to portray the process of historical change that resulted in the contemporary multiplicity of ‘identity packages’.

Overall, the historical analysis of ‘ideotypical’ (Weber 1949) personal narratives among local Jews confirms the responsiveness of minority identity to the national context of citizenship, yet highlights the way in which local circumstances play a crucial role in defining the forms of response.

6.1. Changing awareness of Jewish identity and its discursive importance

One of the main features of contemporary Jewish discourse, which mirrors national politics and which has been clearly identifiable in the study of Leeds Jewry, is the overwhelming concern with identity issues. At present, the Jewish world is full of heated debates and conflicting opinions on who ought to be considered a Jew and what Jewishness stands for. Yet this obsession with finding the ‘right’ answer, as well as the generally high level of importance assigned to identity matters, is a fairly recent phenomenon, while for the greater part of the 20th century these issues were not on the agenda of Jewish settlers and their descendants. Commenting on similar trends in American Jewry, Gans (1979 and 1994) introduced the terms ‘symbolic ethnicity’ and ‘symbolic religiosity’, which he uses to emphasise the symbolic nature of modern
concerns with minority identity, group consciousness and aspirations for self-fulfilment (Gans, 1979: 12).

Although the contemporary diversity of views on Jewishness is quite staggering, one common feature is the importance of Jewish identity for a personal sense of self and for the continuation of Jews as a people both in the Diaspora and in Israel. The examination of contemporary testimonies of Leeds Jewry points to a general high awareness of these issues and to the centrality of shared identity and feelings of belonging in personal and collective accounts of Jewish life in Leeds. Thus for most of the participants of the questionnaire survey of all ages and backgrounds, a sense of belonging was the most important aspect of their Jewish identities. The most typical explanations of why Jewish identity was important to them were:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Comment</th>
<th>Age</th>
<th>Identity Aspects</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>it's part of who I am – my identity, my beliefs, where I come from and what I am part of</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>anonymous female</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I enjoy the feeling of belonging – a sense of community – a sense of connection to a rich and long history</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>Dana</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>because it gives me a sense of identity and I have a lot of friends because we are all Jewish</td>
<td>independent school</td>
<td>anonymous pupil of independent school</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>a sense of self and belonging to a community</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>Alana</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Almost all communal events that were attended in the course of this research – whether a talk on current affairs in the Middle East, a debate on local politics, or even a concert of Klezmer music – were bound to highlight the issue of identity and to raise the question of the meaning of Jewishness. A review of the Jewish Telegraph (JT), a regional Jewish weekly newspaper, also identified the concern with identity politics as one of its most regular features. So, when in October 2006 the national government went ahead with the proposal for instituting quotas for the admission of children of other denominations to faith schools, the outcry in the Jewish press was enormous. Both regular columns and readers’ letters were full of concerns regarding the impact of this policy on the preservation of the ‘Jewish spirit’ among the young and increasing dangers of intermarriage. For instance, in the wake of the proposal, the JT published the following commentary, entitled “Faith schools must remain – reasons are understandable”:

Many parents send their children to Jewish schools to ensure that they mix with Jewish youngsters. This is not because they are intolerant of other religions, but because they want to encourage their offspring to meet and eventually marry within the faith. ...
It is not that we want to exclude others purely for the sake of so doing, it is that we want to offer our offspring the maximum opportunity of a Jewish education ... and at the same time to learn in a Jewish environment surrounded by their peers.

The same concern with the preservation of Jewish identity and Jewish life was just as evident in private narratives obtained through interviews and responses to the questionnaire survey. For instance, Angela, a female interviewee in her early 20s, stressed the importance of 'marrying in' for the preservation of Jewish identity:

I had both Jewish and non-Jewish friends, lived in Turkey for a while. For the last three years I became concerned that I would meet a Jewish boy. It's hard to find one, a good one, but to narrow a choice to only Jewish people – it's even more difficult. All my sisters married Jewish men. It's good because it allows you to keep your identity and bring up kids Jewish. If fathers are not Jewish, they are likely to resist circumcision, bar mitzvah and celebration of other festivals.

These personal and collective concerns with identity stand in stark contrast to the earlier days in the history of Leeds Jewry, when the question of identity seems rarely to have been discussed among the ordinary members of the community. During the interviewing, all of the older respondents, whose childhood in Leeds dated back 60 to 70 year ago, denied having any purposeful conversation with parents, teachers, or peers on what it meant to be Jewish. Yet this group of interviewees jointly spoke about a strong feeling of Yiddishkeit (Jewishness) which surrounded them everywhere in the community and which was stamped in the consciousness and the subconsciousness of Jewish immigrants and their children. In his unpublished memoirs, Mr. Green, a retired businessman in his 80s, remembered the atmosphere of their district to be 'thick' with a Jewish presence, so much so that it is understandable that its residents had no need and no desire to talk about identity:

Try and imagine an area of the city, peopled almost entirely by Jews, very few of whom could speak English, living cheek by jowl, all impecunious, and most of them being associated with the clothing trade in one capacity or another. Add to this mix an overriding ambition to rise both financially and socially, an insatiable search for knowledge, a love for education and the arts, and you are left with an explosive atmosphere that almost defies description.

Furthermore, this environment, where social interaction tended to be intense, was conducive to the maintenance of religious and cultural identity.

Green, 2004: preface

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14 Mr. Green was one of the interviewees for this research
This recollection of Jewish life in Leeds in the first half of the 20th century is typical of many other reminiscences of the older interviewees. Some of them pointed out that even non-Jewish people who lived or worked in the area were not immune to an overwhelming Jewish spirit:

Now, invariably, there is one little thing that I used to remember from my childhood: there used to be a non-Jewish guy who used to meet the trains at the station with the hand cart, and he used to put the few belongings in and to wheel them to the Leylands. He was the only one who used to know they are immigrants and have nowhere else to go. And his name was Jimmy-the-Jew.

**Interviewer:** He wasn’t Jewish?

He was not Jewish, but he became very familiar with Yiddish. And I remember that one day as a boy, going to shul with my father — going to North Street, which was the main centre of Jewish shops — we met him. He knew my father and he said (and it was a Kol Nidrei night): ‘Do geist im Shul? Bet for me rechet [are you going to Shul? Say a word for me there]. That was Jimmy-the-Jew — very well-known.

Mr. Bennett, in his 80s

Looking at more recent memories of Leeds Jewish life, dating from the 1930 to 1950s, it is noticeable that they also pointed to the distinctly Jewish spirit of the neighbourhood that made its residents take their Jewishness for granted. To a great extent, the persistence of this atmosphere was due to the continuous high residential concentration that persisted despite the northward movement of Jewish families to the Chapeltown and later Moortown areas. Whereas some of the ethnographic studies in the 1950s (Wirth 1956) asserted that the primary individual motive of Jewish residential movement was assimilationist — to get away from other Jewish neighbours — this was not the case in Leeds. All interviewees were certain that, while moving northwards ‘to better ourselves’, their families made sure that in new locations they would also find many Jewish neighbours, Jewish shops and barbers, synagogues and other Jewish establishments. The residential clustering could be partly explained by the ongoing employment in the clothing trade, and many interviewees reported that the usual practice was to work either for oneself or for a fellow-Jew, often at one of the big clothing factories located in Harehills and Chapeltown. However, a no less important factor was a continuous acceptance of religious orthodoxy as a behavioural norm of the majority of Jews in Leeds. Another interviewee’s reminiscences of Jewish Chapeltown in the 1950s are full of nostalgic admiration for the orthodox glory of past days:

*And the picture of Leeds was a wonderful one. On Shabbat morning the whole of Chapeltown, where everybody lived and most congregated, ... you’ll see them walking in their finery. There was a tremendous respect for*
the person that was Orthodox. If someone was not Orthodox and they drove a car, for example, they would hide their faces; if somebody did not have a kipah or a hat, for in those days people did not wear kipot quite as openly, but if they did not wear a hat on Shabbat while walking to Shul, it was a shame.

Mr. Colson, in his 60s

Generally, all the research evidence affirms that, with regard to the significance and awareness of one’s Jewishness, the Chapeltown period (1930 to early 1960s) witnessed a continuation of the previous patterns. Many of the first generation of immigrants were alive and exemplified the old spirit of innate Jewishness, while their English-born children, who by that time were running the community, also felt naturally Jewish, taking their identity for granted. Yet the identities of the latter were much more anglicised and lacked the ethnical distinctiveness, which characterised the identities of their parents, who had first-hand memories of life before immigration. In addition, as the above quote also indicates and other testimonies corroborate, certain forms of private dissent from the strict rules of Shabbat observance (for example, discreet driving, working or an attendance of sports and cultural events) has always existed in Leeds. The majority of Jewish neighbours accepted and participated in these transgressions, as long as they remained within the perceived conventional boundaries of traditional Orthodoxy. In the circumstances of normative orthodoxy and actual, albeit gradual, relaxation of religious practice, social interactions evolved as the main conveyor of Jewish identity. Thus, as confessed by another interviewee, a Jewish male in his 50s:

We identified as Jewish. We did not put, really, anything into practice, and that was the general ethos of the community. There were a few people religious, but most people were just – 'had your barmitzvah' – they went to cheder, they went 5-6 times a week and mixed with other Jewish people. You know, wherever you were, when you played on the streets, ...most people on the streets were Jewish. We did not really play along the non-Jews. We always mixed with Jewish people. We had few non-Jewish friends.

Mr. Conway

While social interaction secured the ‘naturalness’ of Jewish identity, all conscientious efforts of Jewish ‘Loiners’\(^\text{15}\) were aimed at bettering their lives in socio-economic terms. As a result, the Jewish distinctiveness of the subsequent generations continued declining: the wants of Jewish children, just like their parents’ aspirations, were shaped by English society and the expectations of the mainstream culture. The historical analysis of narratives reveals a gradual corrosion of specifically Jewish themes in

\(^{15}\) This local term refers to a person who was born in Leeds and lived there most of his life.
personal testimonies. As they became the reflections of middle-class ambitions, narratives conformed to the mainstream expectations and displayed only a subtle Jewish colour: there was just an occasional use of certain Yiddish words, and mentioning of names and places that were identifiably Jewish.

This style of narration is vividly evident today in the way that the older generations talk about their youth. For instance, the short-story reminiscences of the local synagogue leisure club members, joined together under the theme “Everyone has a story to tell, here is mine…” (BHH Synagogue, April 2004), had this distinctively ‘Jewish flavour’, yet otherwise were typical narratives of their non-Jewish contemporaries. They spoke of how they loved going dancing and watching ‘pictures’; how during the War they joined the Army and fell in love, etc. Their Jewishness was manifested in small matters, like the Jewish venue for social functions (the famous Jubilee Hall) or certain problems that they experienced (parental disapproval of romantic relations with non-Jews), and so on, but it did not define their worldviews and values, which increasingly mirrored those of the mainstream culture. Another example comes from the memoir books of Joan Gordon, a local Jewish poet in her 80s, who published them in the last ten years. In these memoirs she depicts a typical life of a young British girl, growing up in pre-war Leeds. In a second book, What I Never Told Mother (2004), Joan describes how, in order to get her mother’s permission for her first independent trip to a summer camp, she emphasised that it was a Jewish establishment: ‘I want to go to a summer school, a Jewish summer school, that might mollify her’ (Gordon 2004: 5). Later, writes Joan, she found the camp to be a disappointment – ‘Our place is a dead loss, all girls and no fellows’ – and switched to another non-Jewish camp, where she briefly dated an Irish Catholic: ‘I didn’t tell Mother that bit,’ she giggled.

Interestingly, the declining intensity of Jewish identity is paralleled by a rising awareness of the necessity to act in order to assure Jewish continuity. It is probably impossible to pinpoint the moment when this interest in identity issues became the new driving force of the community, but it is clear that, starting from the late 1960s, there began a growth in the previously sporadic engagements with the topic. Informal conversations and formal interviews with the members of the Leeds branch of the Jewish Historical Society (JHS) confirmed that this was the period when a generation of newly middle-class Jews reached maturity and was willing to invest time and resources in exploring identity issues. Barbara (in her early 60s), a long-standing secretary of the JHS, directly linked the ‘Jewish awakening’ with the rising interest in social histories in
the broader public. She recalled the enthusiasm that captured many in her generation after watching *Roots*, an American television series exploring the social history of African Americans: *"It generated an interest in family history and motivated some in the community to go and do searches in archives, even to involve their grandchildren in this work."* The formation of the local branches of Jewish historical and genealogical societies in the 1970s was symptomatic of the snowballing interest in Jewish heritage. Soon, a new newspaper feature, which was also named *Roots*, began to appear in the pages of the *Jewish Telegraph*. It published letters from the descendants of the early Jewish immigrants, who were dispersed around the world and were trying to uncover their family histories and to reconnect with long-lost relatives. This new fascination with one’s family history and the life of one’s ancestors was not an exclusively Jewish phenomenon; rather it was a ‘fashion’ adapted from the general public. In the decades since then, Jews, together with many other Britons, have done and continue doing ‘history detective’ work as a way of crafting their present identities.

6.2. The historical evolution of Jewish identity ‘readings’ in Leeds

Comparing today’s identity patterns with the past records of Jewishness among the local Jewish population, one cannot help noticing an unprecedented level of diversity and issue-related fragmentation characterising the present state of the community. Although the ambiguity, partiality, and multi-dimensionality are intrinsic to all identities (Hall 1987; Woodward 1997) and, as the following historical analysis demonstrates, they certainly have always been evident in local Jewish discourse, their public range was limited to a few ‘identity packages’ and a few narratives, which individuals were ‘unauthorised’ to alter. In contrast, today’s diversity comes from greater individual freedom to fuse different identity issues into ‘bespoke identity packages’. For most of the current Jewish residents of Leeds, the Jewish ‘self’ coexists, competes, and evolves in a symbiotic interdependence with other personal identities. This mirrors the counterpart experience of many of their non-Jewish contemporaries, of course. The exposure to secularism undermined the traditional vision of Jewishness as an overarching religious identity that defines and ‘rules’ other sides of an individual ‘self’. A good example comes from the pages of a newly created local lifestyle magazine, *J Life Leeds*, which recently published a statement entitled ‘My Jewish teenage life’ by a local teenager Sam Sank. Sam summarises his experience of competing identities as follows:
My teenage life. My Jewish teenage life. It’s not easy being a Jewish teenager what with school life, home life, social life and a Jewish life being juggled constantly.

Out of all these continuous issues, the most important one in our grandparents’ eyes is our Jewish life. However, the most important one in our parents’ eyes is our school life, whereas for us it is definitely the social life. The ability to manage all of them is a skill that only few possess, so for many some ‘lives’ need to be sacrificed.

The ability to manage all of them is a skill that only few possess, so for many, some “lives” need to be sacrificed.

This month, I will argue the case for the Jewish life, the life that is ever so important for our aging grandparents. However, when presented to us the Jewish life seems more of a chore than anything.

This statement is also remarkable in showing an inter-generational difference in prioritising different parts of one’s ‘self’. For ‘our aging grandparents’, Jewish identity ‘is ever so important’ and so much stress is put on ‘the importance of Judaism’, for the young, Jewish life ‘seems more of a chore than anything’. This signals sympathy for and understanding of those Jews who don’t want to observe strict rules of Judaism.

However, insists the author, even a small effort could bring an incredible reward in the form of belonging to a special group:

For a Jewish teenager the bond between fellow Jews is surprisingly strong. It is surprising because most teenagers would disagree with what I am saying but the bond, unknown to them, is very subtle. When asked to go out on a Friday night with his non-Jewish friends, a good Jewish teen would decline, not necessary because he would not be present for Kiddush but because deep down he knows he has a moral duty to stay with his family.

...These amazing feelings that Jewish teenagers feel when faced with these kinds of situations are what make Jewish teenagers different to anyone else. We are able to understand why our elders stress so much on the importance of Judaism and we can see that it brings us together in a special way.

Another striking feature of the narration is the absence of a religious dimension: there is no God in the author’s argument, and the reward for keeping (some) laws of Judaism is a sense of belonging to a group.

Sam’s secular and disjointed approach to Jewish identity stands far apart from traditional Jewish identity, which, owing to a prolonged existence in the Diaspora, was historically established as an encompassing, multidimensional identity, where religious and social (ethnic, cultural, economic) spaces were integrated and tightly regulated by a set of religious laws and customs. In the past conditions of residential and social segregation, the ‘Diaspora paradigm’, expressed through the Grand Jewish Narrative
(see chapter 3), was reinforced by the rule of the minhagim (customs) and social control of the community (Azria 1998). The last 150 years witnessed changing local, national, and international circumstances of Jewish existence, which disrupted the established mechanism of identity production, problematising the traditional Jewish narratives and forcing them to adjust. Thus, Sam’s understanding of Jewish identity as just one of his identities is fairly typical not only of British Jews but also of most of his non-Jewish peers. This ‘reading’ of minority identity is influenced by the dominant discourse in society at large, which at the moment legitimises personal freedom of identity and endorses ‘identity shopping’. In the past, the British conventions of minority identity representations were much less generous, and that restricted the development of Jewish identity both nationally and locally. The following analysis looks at how the historical particularities of the Leeds Jewish community conditioned local Jewish responses to the changing context of national citizenship, setting in motion a unique, local dynamic of identity change.

6.2.1. From ‘Greeners’ to ‘Englishers’: the first steps of Anglicisation

As has been shown, in the early period of Jewish presence in Leeds, the majority of foreign-born Jews did not think about their Jewishness: it was simply their ‘natural’ identity acquired in shtetls (small villages in the Pale of Settlement). When the rapid development of the clothing industry in Leeds provided opportunities for thousands of new immigrants, their large-scale arrival swamped the minuscule congregation of anglicised middle-class Jews already living in Leeds. The presence of around 20,000 predominantly foreign-born immigrants, who, because of anti-Semitism and lack of knowledge of English, lived and worked in spatial and social seclusion, assured the continuity of their primary immigrant identities. On their arrival in Leeds, as many witness testimonies agree, the environment of the typical shtetl was reproduced in the Leylands. This was linked to the proliferation of a traditional Jewish identity, which defined religious space as the main dimension of Jewish life, the one that structured the workings of other existential spaces. Recollecting his childhood, Mr. Green noted that:

Even though Harry, my father, had religious doubts, to my grandfather his faith was everything – quite literally, it dominated his life. He would sit by my side in the synagogue, and his admonition “Daven” (Pray) still rings in my ears. His entire life revolved around work and prayer, as it did for dozens of other refugee tailors.
The newcomers, who were nick-named ‘greeners’, set up their own small synagogues and ‘chevras’ (fraternities) and trusted no one but their ‘rabbi’, who most often came from the same shtetl as his congregants, was a native Yiddish speaker, and conformed to the familiar “old-fashioned stern long-bearded rabbi-type” (Teeman 1972: 158). As most working-class Jews spent their lives oscillating between hard work and prayer, children – who often helped their parents with work from the tender age of five – learned from the elders and absorbed many of their habits. However, no less vital for the communication of identities was the formal Jewish upbringing of children. It was traditionally done at chedarim, numerous private Jewish schools for which fees were paid, or, when the parents could not afford such fees, at the community-sponsored Talmud Torah (founded in 1887). Somewhere around the age of three, even before they started assisting parents with work, children went to cheder, which they attended before and after the normal school day and for five to six hours on Sundays. There, together with the basics of Hebrew and Jewish faith, they internalised the fundamentals of the traditional Grand Jewish Narrative, which, while using the concepts of gola and galus (dispersion and exile), linked the immigrant history of their families with the general history of the Jewish Diaspora. In the pamphlet produced for the Leeds branch of the Jewish Historical Society (1982), Alderman Walsh, who attended cheder in the first decade of the 20th century, acknowledged how ‘the sense of exile was implanted in us as children.’ He recalls that the first Hebrew song that they learned during the lessons at cheder was called the Cheder Koton (Little Class). This song was about a ‘Rebbe’ and his class of children whom he was teaching to read Hebrew, and contained the following last verse, which was considered significant enough to be printed in their exercise book: ‘and when in exile you bear your yoke and sigh bitterly, in writings you will find comfort from all your sorrows’ (Walsh 1982: 4).

The internalisation of the Grand Jewish Narrative, which was the main ‘paradigm’ of religious education, was helped by its common use in everyday life. For instance, during the celebration of Pesach (Passover), which commemorates the deliverance of the Israelites from enslavement in Egypt, the Grand Jewish Narrative was reiterated. This holiday has always had a special significance for Jews, but for the immigrant Jewish families it gave a special meaning to their own experience. In his memoirs, Louis Teeman remembers his father making such a connection:

*My father raises his glass: ‘Not only once have they risen to destroy us but in every generation...But the Holy One, blessed be He, always delivers us from their hands.’*  
Teeman 1972: 354
This narrative was often recalled when encountering discrimination from Gentile employers who refused to hire Jews, or when facing anti-Semitic abuse and violence, or when taking care of their poor and needy, who should never be allowed to go to a workhouse of the goyim (non-Jews). The sense of a rich Jewish atmosphere, which many of the interviewees mentioned in their stories, was inseparable from their strong sense of shared alienation and ‘otherness’ that the foreign-speaking immigrant Jews experienced upon their arrival and settlement in Leeds. To them the world consisted of ‘us’ – the Jewish ‘brethren’ and ‘them’ – the goyim. Even though the Irish community lived next to Leylands and interacted with the Jews (the Irish women often worked in Jewish families during the Shabbat hours when Jews are not allowed to work), in the Jewish testimonies of the time one could not find a single reference to them. In Jewish eyes they were ‘English’, not distinguishable from the rest of the goyim. Of particular importance for the proliferation of this narrative, as well as for the general preservation of distinct cultural identities of Eastern European Jews, was Yiddish, the language they brought from der heym (home). It was the language in which they spoke at home, sang songs, conversed on the streets, delivered sermons and studied Torah. In a talk about the past days of the community, Rev. Gilbert of Etz Chaim Synagogue remembered that Yiddish could still be heard in the late 1950s. In an article in the Leeds Times in the 1880s, Yiddish is vividly portrayed as a central feature of the Leeds ‘ghetto’:

The Jews' quarter well repays a visit. Whatever language is spoken, the Hebrew is almost exclusively used in writing. Hebrew characters are chalked by the children on the walls. Notices in shop windows and price-lists in the public houses are all in the same character.

Leeds Times 12.5.1888

Language was an important barrier that separated the Jewish newcomers from their more anglicised ‘brethren’. In contrast to the ‘alien’ Jewishness of Eastern European immigrants, the Jewish identity of the congregants of the Great Synagogue in Belgrave Street, which catered for the established and more anglicised middle-class Jews, was much less pronounced. In fact, their ‘Englishe Shul’ was the first and for a long time the only synagogue in town to accept the authority of the London-based Chief Rabbi and to follow the model of Judaism propagated by the Anglo-Jewish establishment. In this synagogue, where the stained-glass windows resembled those of English churches, an English-born ‘minister’, Moses Abrahams, who looked more like an English clergyman than a ‘Yiddishe rebbe’, conducted the services in English; what’s more, he – and ‘this was almost unbelievable’, exclaims Louise Teeman in his memoirs – ‘did not speak Yiddish! ’ (Teeman 1972: 158). Being more integrated in the economic, political and
cultural life of the city, the members of this synagogue had clear views on what constituted appropriate conduct for the Jewish minority in English society. As is evident from the articles and readers' letters regarding Leeds affairs that appeared in , during the late 19th and early 20th centuries, the more prosperous, more assimilated middle-class Jews, who in most instances authored the letters, were troubled by the apparent foreignness and poverty of their Eastern European counterparts. Commenting on the conference of foreign-born rabbis, which was held in Leeds in 1911, the readers of the JC condemned their apparent ‘otherness’ and out-of-datedness:

*Narrow-minded medievalism, ascetic religiosity, superstitious worship of customs more honoured in the breach than in observance, bigoted intolerance, a limpet-like clinging to the letter and a disregarding of the spirit, an apotheosis of Sheitel and the haloing of every anachronism of the Ghetto – that is the tendency under like conditions of the so-called ‘Foreign Rabbi’*

JC 24.03.1911:11.

Despite the apparent discord that existed between the Jewish ‘Englishmen’ and their foreign-born co-religionists – a discord that earned the community the reputation of ‘a bubbling lava of chaos and disharmony’ (JC, 18.01.1924:9) – there existed one important commonality in the way they narrated their identity. Although they dressed differently, spoke different languages, had different cultural interests and different intensity of religious observance, they shared a belief in the centrality of Judaism to Jewish identity. Even when the anglicised leadership called for a display of patriotism to the Empire, they used a religious argument, and referred to the Talmud teachings that commanded Jews to give full loyalty to the rulers of the land they resided in. When in 1916, during the celebration of Empire Day in one of Leeds council schools, one of the Jewish teacher assistants, supposedly expressed, in the words of JC, “the irrelevant wish ... that they would live to salute the Jewish flag some day in Palestine” (JC 09.06.16: 6), the newspaper hurried to denounce such behaviour. In the article entitled the ‘*Alleged Jewish Disloyalty in Leeds*’ they explained how this action would be wrong from the religious point of view and reassured of total Jewish loyalty to the Empire:

*The reports which have reached us concerning the attitude of one or two of our coreligionists in Leeds towards Empire Day must leave a most unfortunate and deplorable impression. ...They indicate an attitude which is absolutely and from top to bottom at variance with the feelings of the overwhelming mass of Jews in this country whether of British or Foreign birth. They represent a line of action which is false and recreant to Jewish religious teaching, which commands and demands perfect loyalty to the country of one's birth. And they are pregnant with dishonour and disservice to that very Jewish Nationalism which was dragged into the issue and which*
The ontological primacy of the Grand Jewish Narrative that emphasised the shared history of Jewish sufferings and persecutions was also preserved, yet in the interpretation of it favoured by the Anglo-Jewish establishment, England was the ‘land of milk and honey’ and ‘the stronghold of liberty’ that brought ultimate deliverance to the Jews in the form of emancipation and social equality. In the beginning, this ‘reading’ of the traditional Narrative was not popular with the ordinary Jews of immigrant descent, whose hard life in the sweatshops of Leylands left no time and desire to think about such matters. Gradually, however, with their further integration into English society and the disappearance of ‘shtetl mentality’, Leeds Jews came to endorse the Chief Rabbi’s vision of Britain as a ‘land of Jewish salvation’.

The main concern of the ‘cultured and progressive’ Leeds Jews, as they called themselves – a minority, albeit a very influential and overrepresented minority – was to downplay this ‘foreign element’ in the eyes of the Gentile public while simultaneously ‘educating’ the newcomers to be proper Englishmen. The ‘educational’ efforts of the anglicised Jews played an important though limited role in this process of acculturation. The Jewish religious education in the Talmud Torah, which was at that time sponsored by the ‘Englishe Shul’ and which was organised in conjunction with and on the premises of the Council Schools, followed the guidelines of the London Religious Educational Board, thus instilling a ‘proper’ model of Judaism in the children of Jewish immigrants. English schooling, however, which was advocated and publicised by the Jewish ‘better-offs’ and encouraged by the immigrant parents as a ‘ticket’ to a better life, played a more decisive role in changing the identity of the Jewish youth. The pages of the JC of the time were full of praise for the educational processes that mould Yiddish-speaking kids into patriotic and loyal citizens. Describing the celebration of Empire Day in the Gower Road School, the JC cited the speech by Morris Goldberg, a Jewish pupil from the school, as a shining example of proper citizenry. The boy praised Queen Victoria and her ‘glorious Empire’, expressing gratitude for ‘living in a justly governed country, where we may worship God in our own way’, and stating how proud he was ‘to belong to the British Empire and to salute the flag of Freedom’ (JC 29.06.1906: iii).
With the onset of WWI, when Jews were looked upon with suspicion, the foreign- and English-born rabbis of Leeds put their quarrels aside and preached unquestioning support for King and Empire. In August 1914, the leadership of various congregations of Leeds held a joined ‘patriotic demonstration’ to show their support for the cause of war. Later, in his sermon, Rev. Abrahams of the Belgrave Synagogue appealed to the Jewish community ‘to show their loyalty, to respond enthusiastically to the call to arms and to offer themselves freely for the Empire’s cause’. He was certain that

\[
\text{Jews had no need to be reminded of their duty, many of them had joined the service of the King, and \ldots\ would voluntarily do their utmost towards maintaining high the glorious flag of Great Britain, which was the flag of liberty, righteousness and love.}
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JC 14.08.1914: 11.

In less than a month, the JC reported on a sermon delivered by a ‘foreign rabbi’ Daiches, who in a similar fashion ‘urged upon his audience the duty of assisting the authorities in all the efforts now being made in various directions in connection with the war’ (JC 18.09.1914: 30). Soon afterwards, a committee for assistance with naturalisation was formed, helping many immigrant Jews to transform into ‘imperial subjects’. Within a couple of decades, most members of the community were comfortable with this identity narration. A celebratory address in 1937 to the members of the Leeds Judean Club (a Jewish youth activities centre) conveyed this theme very accurately. The speaker, while re-asserting the religious definition of Jewish people, stated that English Jews ‘were as proud to be Englishmen and as ready to accept the responsibilities of English citizenship as any other denomination’ (JC 23.04.1937: 40).

The Grand Jewish Narrative was presented in its revised edition, linking Jewish exclusivity (Jews as God’s Chosen People) with traditional English values, as Jews were said to be ‘the People sent by God to set justice upon the world, to be tolerant and to be forgiving’ (Ibid.).


While most of Leeds Jewry at the beginning of the last century were religious in their outlook and observant in their behaviour, there were some who did not fit this profile and whose Jewishness was defined in non-traditional ways. Back in Russia or soon after immigration, such people were exposed to revolutionary, socialist and anarchist ideas. Despite divisions and different views on issues such as Zionism, trade unionism
or international revolution, they were at one in rejecting religious representations of Jews as ‘God’s chosen people’. Instead, they advocated a class-based approach to the position of foreign Jews in the UK, arguing that Jewish workers, just like the English proletariat and the proletariat in other countries, were victims of fierce capitalist exploitation, while considering Jewish capitalists as bad as capitalists of other nationalities. In Leeds, the devoted followers of these principles – explicitly atheists rejecting any religious practice, and mostly members of the intelligentsia belonging to an anarchist wing of the Socialist Party (Halbrook 1982: 192) – constituted only a tiny minority of the Jewish population and did not fit into the religious and Orthodox Leylands. Many years later, Michael Isaac Lipman, a self-confessed ‘socialist businessman’, explained his parents’ decision to move away from Leylands ‘bigotry’:

_They refused to bring up their family in the hypocritical atmosphere of people professing one code of conduct on Shabbath or the Day of Atonement, but behaving quite differently on other days of the week._

_In those days the immigrant population in Leeds as elsewhere could not differentiate between religious and political dissent, and, in terms of opprobrium, we were referred to as ‘Lipmans, the Socialists’._

Lipman 1980: 5-6

In a series of local newspaper publications about Leeds Jewry (YEN 1925), Burgess claimed that the majority of Jews reciprocally disliked these radical supporters of political dissent. The radicals’ common meeting place, an Anarchist club, was located away from the community, in a converted workroom in Elmwood Street off Meanwood Road. It was a truly internationalist venue, where Jewish, English, German, and Russian radical thinkers discussed current politics and suffragette issues, expressed solidarity with workers’ movements around the world, devised action plans, and marked English national holidays and international revolutionary events. Interestingly enough, they considered it appropriate to celebrate Christmas and other Christian holidays, yet all Jewish holidays were dismissed as backward and dangerous. Burgess (21.01.1925: 6) reported on an instance when socialists organised their annual dinner on Yom Kippur, when religious Jews were fasting: “no wonder the community considered them outsiders,” exclaimed Sterne in his research paper on the community (Sterne 1982:8).

Compared to this ostracism of atheist Jews, the position of less extreme adherents of socialist ideas was quite different, for they never explicitly rejected Judaism and felt comfortable among the observant Jews. Consequently, they were more influential among their Jewish ‘brethren’, and their trade unionist activities had a lot of
sympathisers among the Jewish workers of Leeds. According to the testimony of Joseph Finn in the JC (08.05.1903:ii), who later became a prominent figure in the national Jewish Trade Union, the socialist Unionists should be credited with forming the first Leeds Union of Jewish Tailors and with organising the strikes of 1885 and 1888. While accepting the religiosity of most of its trade union members, the socialists could not accept a modified version of the Grand Jewish Narrative as the discursive means of Jewish integration into mainstream society. Instead they endorsed the universal imperative of class-consciousness. Accordingly, in 1895, Leeds was the only place outside London to host a meeting launching *A Voice from the Aliens*, the first-ever Jewish pamphlet against immigration controls, of which Finn was the author. Addressed by Eleanor Marx (the daughter of Karl Marx) and the Russian Anarchist Prince Kropotkin (JC 13.12.1895:17), the audience condemned the Cardiff resolution of the TUC and supported the Jewish Unions’ appeal to their ‘English fellow-workers’. Using the internationalist socialist rhetoric, the leaflet exposed

> the policy of the ruling classes to attribute the sufferings and the miseries of the masses (which are natural consequences of class rule and class exploitation) to ...the foreign workers in general, and... [to] the Jewish workers in particular.

The political power of Leeds Jewish trade union became very visible in 1906, when Lord Balfour lost his MP seat as a Leeds based candidate. Even though some wealthy members of Leeds Jewry openly endorsed him, Balfour’s support of the Anti-Alien Act cost him the support of the local Jewish Union, which orchestrated his defeat. The universalistic narrative of the Jewish Union explains its eagerness to merge with the national English Union of Garment Workers, which eventually happened in the second decade of the 20th century. The unionists retained their influence on the working class Jewry of Leeds up until the 1950s, when the demise of the tailoring industry signalled the disappearance of working-class Jews. The major impact of the unionists was in improving the socio-economic conditions of Jewish workers, while their universalistic ‘class consciousness’ provided an additional trajectory of integration into the mainstream of British society.

Speaking about the ideological movements that impacted on the life of Leeds Jewry, one has to mention another very important force – Zionism, which, although started at the margins of the community, was destined to become a driving force of community

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16 See more in his letter to the JC of 14.2.1902
unification in 1930s and to define the nature of Jewish identity in Leeds for many years to come. In 1898, a small group of visionaries, whom ‘the rest of Leeds Jewry looked upon as cranks’ (Saipe 1985: 28), formed the first Leeds Zionist Association, later followed by the Hebrew Literary Society and the youth Zionist organisations of Bnei Zion and Bnoth Zion (sons and daughters of Zion). Remembering the early days of Leeds Zionism, Joshua Walsh, who in 1913 at the age of 12 became a regular participant in the Zionist group, gave several reasons for a slow takeoff:

Then, only a minority of the community was Zionist. Many were indifferent and regarded Zionists as scatter-brained ideologists, remote from reality. Many Jews were actively opposed to Zionism. We were aliens and outsiders here struggling for acceptance by, and participation in, the life of the general community. Many feared that to be labelled Zionist would militate against our admission into the ranks of the wider community here. Others opposed Zionism from a fundamentalist religious view. A return to Palestine, they proclaimed, could only occur by Divine Intervention, and the advent of the Messiah.

Walsh 1982: 3

What is notable, however, is that Zionist pioneers in Leeds combined their immense dedication to the Hebrew language and Jewish culture with religious observance. From the very beginning, local followers of Zionism established a Zionist synagogue, Agudas Hazionim, which remained the hub of their activities. According to Walsh, the Leeds Zionist ‘coterie’ was influenced by the teachings of Ahad Ha’am, who advocated Spiritual Zionism (Ha’am 1897), which viewed Palestine as a spiritual centre rather than a national home for all Diaspora Jews. The compatibility with Judaism and the emphasis on the practical rather than political aspects of Zionism (Don-Yehiya 1998) were decisive in winning the support of the masses. The issuing of the Balfour Declaration of 1917 gave an additional reason to believe that Zionism was a feasible solution to the problems of Jewry worldwide, while the end of WWI removed the general public concern over Jewish allegiance to Britain. More importantly, in the early 1920s the movement received the endorsement of the communal leadership, which by that time had passed from the ‘Englishers’ to the ‘Greeners’ and their children, who were less anglicised and thus more sympathetic towards Zionist ideology.

Not surprisingly, the creation of many additional Zionist organisations in Leeds followed; they included women’s Zionist groups, and branches of the Jewish National Front (JNF) and a Labour Zionist Party, Paole Zion. The women’s input was of great significance. It also allowed the growing number of middle-class wives to use their talents in the semi-public domain of communal work. The fusion of socialist and Zionist
interests under the *Paole Zion* banner greatly enhanced the Zionist movement, at the same time cooling down the class conflict within the community. In the late 1920s and early 1930s – under the guidance of a tireless Zionist, Professor Selig Brodetsky, and with the financial and organisational backing of such communal leaders as Montague Burton, Moris Silman, and aldermen Morris and Walsh – the diverse Zionist activities were centralised under the auspices of the *Leeds Central Zionist Council*. Their main activities were fundraising and education. According to the annual reports of the Council (Bergen 2000: 20 n. 55), some 3,000 JNF fund-raising boxes were distributed in Leeds, covering most of the Leeds Jewish households, and ensuring universal support for the cause. Such fund-raising initiatives as the Leeds Palestine Bazaar and a ‘Penny a Day Pledge’ became highlights in the Zionist calendar, while regular contributions came from Jewish-run businesses, such as the Burton factory. As a part of the continuous educational effort, the Zionist council ran subsidised adult Hebrew classes and an extensive network of youth organisations.

The undeniable success of Zionism in Leeds in the 1930s had many important implications for the development of local Jewish identities. By offering an inclusive idea and providing an extensive infrastructure that covered all spaces of communal life – work, religion, leisure, and education – Zionism “gradually weld[ed] Leeds Jewry into one united community” (Saipe 1985). No less importantly, Zionist organisations created a specific Zionist atmosphere that shaped the identities of younger generations. Virtually all the people interviewed in the course of this research were members of some sort of Zionist organisation, and for most of them, participation in Zionist activities started in their childhood. Many of them spoke warmly of their membership in one of the numerous Zionist Youth movements, such as the pro-religious *Bnei Akiva*, the nationalistic *Federation of Zionist Youth*, or the socialist *Habonim Dror*. The joint efforts of the Leeds Zionist Council and the community’s educational authority, the *Talmud Torah*, brought about the foundation of the Brodetsky school in 1957.

An important feature of local Zionism was its accommodation of the pre-existing popular ‘readings’ of Leeds Jewish identity. Zionist ideology, at least in the early years, made use of the original interpretation of the Jewish narrative of ‘ending the galut’ (exile) with an emphasis on ‘returning to eretz Isroyel’ (the land of Israel) as an ultimate solution to all Jewish sufferings. Naturally, its explicit nationalism raised fears of being accused of dual loyalty, and reinstated the sense of marginality as ‘belonging to both worlds’ (Krausz 1964:133). Interestingly, Rosenthal (2005) speaks about similar fears
that were expressed by American Jews in the 1930s. After years of indifference and rejection, what made American Jews turn to Zionism was the public acknowledgment that Zionism, understood as practical help for Jewish freedom fighters in Palestine, is a reflection of a truly American spirit and therefore does not contradict their primary identity (Rosenthal 200: 210). For both American and British Jews, this was a particularly sensitive issue before WWII: the external representation of Zionism unambiguously connected it to a ‘Jewish problem’ of a global rather than national scale. In particular, Zionism was presented as a policy that was instrumental in helping foreign-based ‘Jewish brethren’ to escape the anti-Semitism of illiberal countries, and therefore as a line of action ‘consistent with the noble traditions of England on the question of national emancipation and justice’ (YEP, 12.11.1917). On the other hand, by giving an alternative focal point of Jewish concern, which was discursively constructed as compatible with western liberal values, Zionism prepared the ground for the accelerating secularisation and anglicisation of Jewish people, downplaying the importance of strict religious observance, which was an impermeable barrier to assimilation.

6.2.3. Further acculturation and the evolution of identity narratives

Overall, the development of Jewish identity in Leeds in the first half of the 20th century followed the classical pattern of assimilation theorists pioneered by the Chicago School sociologists (Parks 1950 and Burgess 1926). According to these theories, the increasing Jewish integration into British society coincided with the weakening of the primary immigrant identities and the accommodation of the cultural norms and values of the host society. This has a dual effect on the proliferation of Jewish identities in Leeds. On the one hand, it instilled a growing acceptance of Jewish self-representation as ‘Englishmen of Jewish persuasion’ or an adoption of more regionalised identities as ‘Jewish Loiner’ or ‘Jewish Yorkshirite’, who nevertheless preferred not to publicise their Jewishness in non-Jewish circles. In 1955, a special supplement of the JC on Leeds mentioned both linguistic assimilation and local ‘patriotism’ as contemporary features of local Jewry:

*Its language has changed – in common with the rest of Anglo-Jewry Yiddish is rarely heard and hardly ever spoken at public meetings. Its sons speak with pride of Leeds prowess on the football field and of Yorkshire’s on the cricket field.*

JC 2.09.1955: i
On the other hand, since Zionism and intense ongoing communal interactions maintained people’s perception of the permanence of Jewish identity, the main concern for many was still with socio-economic improvement. This resulted in an increasing neglect of Jewish education, and facilitated the growth of secularisation. As early as 1916, the falling rates of observance became a matter of such concern for some that a special society, Shomrei Shabbos, was formed in Leeds to promote a stricter observance of Shabbat. A few years later, in a letter to the JC, entitled ‘Leeds Brummagem’, Rabbi Hurwitz complained about the fashionable practice of holding Jewish functions in non-Jewish, non-kosher establishments and breaking many other Jewish laws. He linked it to the decreasing influence of Jewish clergymen on their congregants:

_I have never yet met a minister who would have the courage to speak to his congregants about the Dietary Laws, Shabbath Observance, or Mikvahs, when those members openly flout every principle of these corner-stones of our religion._

JC 19.03.1920:32.

The famous Jewish Golf Club, which was established in 1923 and was the ‘pride’ of the community and a sign of its ‘coming of age’(Hyman 1994), ran ‘business as usual’ on Shabbat and Jewish festivals, encouraging its affluent members to transgress Halacha. Judging from the increased frequency of concerned letters and articles that appeared on the pages of the JC, the problems persisted in the following decades. In the 1940s, even the relatively undemanding education for the barmitzvah, the Jewish right of passage, became of unsatisfactory quality, prompting Rev. Dr Cohen of BHH Synagogue in his letter to JC to expose the ‘usual Barmizvah farce – when they learned the minimum and the soul is lost’ (JC 15.09.1944: 14). In February 1945, the newspaper mentioned a local suggestion of instituting compulsory attendance at barmitzvah classes to combat the number of absentees (JC 2.02.1945), while in November its article title grimly stated, ‘Leeds parents are not helping: majority of children receive no Jewish education,’ pointing to the apathy of the parents: (JC 23.11.1945). The situation with religious education was symptomatic of the growing indifference to religious practice in general, which, just as in other Jewish communities worldwide, was more noticeable with each consecutive generation (Poll 1998).

In his 2004 talk to the local Jewish Historical Society (see Appendix 1), Rev. Gilbert of Etz Chaim Synagogue – who grew up in post-war Leeds and therefore experienced Leeds Jewish life of the 1950 and 60s first hand – attributed this phenomenon to two tendencies. For some Jews, he claimed, transgressing Shabbat was a work necessity,
especially as many of them had by that time moved into self-employment or owned small businesses. One of the interviews provided a good illustration of this point. Mr. and Mrs. Bennett, a typical Leeds Jewish couple in their 80s — who had been involved in the clothing industry, initially as employees, then as small independent producers, and later as cloth retailers — explained that, once they were running their own business, they had to stay open on Shabbat. Saturday, as the busiest day of the week, was essential for keeping their shops afloat. Besides work necessities, Rev. Gilbert also noted that for many Jews it was mostly the ‘tempting pleasures’ of the major culture that made them transgress the Jewish laws. Leeds Jews, just like other Englishmen around them, wanted to eat out, visit the theatre or attend a football match irrespective of the Jewish calendar. As a consequence, the socially acceptable boundaries of religious transgression widened through the 20th century. In the judgement of Rev. Gilbert, these tendencies were quite consistent with the nominal Orthodox traditionalism of Leeds Jewry, which is still widely held as the main definitional attribute of the community. This traditionalism, based on the continuous conformity to the behavioural norms of the majority, was intolerant of any form of radicalism (ultra-Orthodox or Reform), but accepted subtle adjustments and trade-offs both in individual behaviour and in institutional arrangements.

By the same token, despite the decline in religious practice and belief, the dominant narration of Jewish identity remained within the established Grand Jewish Narrative that emphasised Jewish uniqueness based on its special destiny as ‘God’s chosen people’. To a great extent it reflected the frustration with the persistent sense of ‘otherness’ that the Jews, by then predominantly British-born, felt was being imposed by the native population:

*The best Goy hates the Yid. You can’t get away from it — the Jew is a Jew, the Gentile is a Gentile. ... The Jew feels different when he is with Goyim. Something says in you, you’re not one of them. For example, if you are in a group of Goyim, you feel you are out of it. If you say, ‘Our Queen’ you don’t know if they are laughing at you.*

cited in Krausz 1964: 128

Apart from the ongoing secularisation, individual experiences during WWII also played an important role in the changing views of Leeds Jews. Many of the Jewish residents, especially those members of the community whose pre-war life was confined to the Jewish neighbourhood, experienced close encounters with the outside world: men joined the army, women ‘stepted into’ created job vacancies, and some Jewish children were evacuated to the Yorkshire countryside and stayed with non-Jewish families. Both
Mr. Hirseman, who was evacuated from Leeds Chapeltown to a North Yorkshire farm, and Mrs. Hirseman, who spent some time in Bishopthorpe being "the only Jewish girl in the village", described their evacuation as an eye-opening and difficult experience, one of adjusting to a non-Jewish world of churches, Christian holidays and 'treife' (non-kosher) food. Another interviewee, Mr. Weis, who was 20 when he joined the army, recalls the same revealing experience of stepping outside the Jewish neighbourhood and abandoning a Jewish way of life. Yet in his case, it was the Holocaust rather than the life among the non-Jews that made him reconsider his faith:

> When I came out of the army, I must be honest about it, the Holocaust destroyed my belief in God as such. It just traumatised me, because even as a soldier in the army, we had no idea of what was going on in Germany, we did not know about concentration camps. ...And when I found out that six million Jews were lost ... where was God? Was He looking the other way? Was He on holiday? I could not take it in.

Mr. Weis, in his 80s

Mr. Weis’ questioning of God was symptomatic of the time, as many Jews felt anger, sorrow, and helplessness in response to the Holocaust. For some, it led to further abandonment of their Jewish identity; they left the Jewish neighbourhood and strengthened their efforts to assimilate. However, the majority of Leeds Jews, whose strong socially rooted identity remained integrated with religious practice, carried on with traditional communal life, taking comfort and security from the familiar surroundings of Leeds’s Jewish neighbourhoods. When Jews started moving to the northern suburbs of Alwoodley, their lifestyle was increasingly defined by the mainstream middle-class culture rather than by Jewish tradition, especially since the latter was for many of them associated with their working-class uneducated parents and grandparents.

Conversations with older members of the BHH Synagogue leisure club (in the spring of 2004) supported this claim. Talking about the post-war changes, the interviewees mentioned that growing affluence was one of the reasons for the decline in religious observance. For instance, when Jews got houses with private baths, many abandoned the practice of going to the mikvah; when they became car-owners, many gladly joined the ranks of supermarket shoppers, relaxing if not abandoning the observance of the laws on kosher food. Many respondents also mentioned an intensified wave of anglicisation of Jewish names, which in the context of post-war anti-Semitism remained an impediment to their professional and social development.
Overall, for the majority of local Jewish people, the underlying cause of drifting away from religious observance was the success of their integration into English society: together with the rest of society they were growing increasingly secular and consumerist. Some of the interviewees, who were old enough to remember the 1950, 60s and 70s, recalled that religion was viewed as ‘old-fashioned’, as ‘a thing of the past’, while the younger generations ‘craved’ the secular life-style of the majority and saw religious observance as an impediment to their freedom. In his extensive research of Leeds Jewry in the late 1950s, Krausz investigated the extent of adherence to certain religious traditions, concluding that “most of these observances ...are kept up because of their symbolic nature” (Krausz 1964: 109). The statements of his interviewees reveal the lack of religious belief and the importance of upbringing: ‘Kosher food is bought out of habit and because of respect to parents.’ ‘The whole principle of it is hygiene, and we’ve been brought up to it.’ ‘Every Yid has a mezuzah17. We’ve been brought up to it. Whether it keeps out evil I don’t know – but a house without it is lost’ (cited in Krausz 164: 108-109).

Overall, Jewish upbringing and the strong social bonds that connected members of the Jewish community through the extensive network of formal and informal institutions (communal education, welfare and recreation, family ties and synagogue membership) sustained the sense of togetherness and common identity in the after-war generation of Leeds Jews. Yet the decline in religious observance and belief weakened the sense of Jewish identification.

6.2.4. Jewishness in a post-war Britain: the rise of identity politics

In post-Holocaust Europe, the number of Jewish people who openly supported the state of Israel as a solution for the dispersed European Jews was growing. Coupled with their falling religiosity, this support ensured the blossoming of Zionist sentiments in many Jewish communities worldwide. In Leeds, the existence of strong local Zionist institutions made that development especially pronounced, prompting Alderman Walsh to write in the 1980s that ‘we are all Zionists now’ (Walsh 1982:3). Yet Zionism in Leeds has become more than an alternative mode of identity conveyance, it has also became a means of social engagement within the community. Zionist sentiments

17 a piece of parchment inscribed with a holy text, pinned in a small metal case to a doorpost
became particularly strong in the years either side of the establishment of Israel, as is illustrated in the continuation of Mr. Weis’ life story:

I think it was only after Israel became a sovereign state that I started to get some belief back into my Jewish identity. I stopped eating pork, I started going to shul regularly, and it suddenly became my way of life, and I met friends there and we socialised ... and started to live a pretty Jewish life.

In this extract, Mr. Weis, who later in the interview admitted his ‘religious doubts’, demonstrated a new understanding of Jewish identity. Based on the fusion of Zionism and Judaism, this identity ‘reading’ has become typical of his generation of local Jews. He constructed his ‘return’ to Jewish identity, which was triggered by Israel’s birth, through the renewal of religious observance, even in the absence of religious belief. For Mr. Weis, as for many others among his Jewish contemporaries, the link between identity and observance was almost axiomatic and any deviation was a heresy. Yet with time, this ‘truism’ has gradually lost its appeal and, as the research findings show, only a minority of the next generation of Jews shared this opinion. The changing nature of Jewish identity was also evident in the narrative shift in the representation of Zionist goals. As previously described, in the earlier days of Zionism, the calls for Jewish nationhood in Palestine were placed within the greater Imperial discourse that accentuated the innate British sense of justice and progress.

After WWII, when British anti-Semitism was on the rise, the same narrative connection was reiterated and even strengthened. Zionists raised concerns over the ‘unnatural British cruelty’ to the displaced Jews of Europe demanding British justice and compassion. One public event in Leeds, in October 1945, provides a good illustration of such rhetoric. On that day, 1,500 Jewish people gathered at the New Synagogue, Chapeltown Road, to express how they were “seriously concerned with the grave plight of Jews in Germany and Austria, and feel that another winter would prove fatal to them” (JC 12.10.1945: 12). The assembly denounced the White Paper Policy of the British government, which prevented the settlement of displaced Jews in Palestine. Addressing the crowd, Rev. Super asserted, ‘It is hard to believe it [the White paper policy] represents anything English’, and that it was ‘an offence to the consciousness of Britons, and that they are deeply revolted that such cruelty is enforced in their name” (Ibid.).

Two decades later, however this narrative link between Zionism and Britishness lost its significance. Instead, a bolder, more assertive nationalistic narrative, one that presumed
unconditional Jewish allegiance to Israel, moved centre-stage from the marginal space of Diasporic identity. While devoted Leeds Zionists had been contemplating aliyah from the inception of the movement, they did not promote it openly until the late 1950s. Starting from that time, Zionist calls for British Jews to settle in Israel grew and were heard even outside of Jewish communities. In Leeds, the positive nationalistic spin on Zionism was stronger than in London or Manchester. This could be chiefly attributed to the fact that in Leeds, Zionism has been a formative force since the 1930s, enjoying universal support and virtually no institutionalised opposition. Hence, in the post-war period, concern with Israel became an unchallenged focal point of Jewish identity in Leeds, whereas in other places its approval has never been unanimous. Outside Leeds, where vocal institutionalised opposition has always challenged Zionism, calls for aliyah were weaker (Rubinstein 1996: 364-378). In contrast, in 1980, the Leeds Zionist Council sponsored a series of meetings promoting a better understanding of Israel and explaining to Leeds Jews the advantages of aliyah. During the first meeting, a past-president of the Council, Victor Zermansky, who was also a president of the Leeds Jewish Representative Council and whose own daughter lived in Israel, presented the future of British Jewish youth as a stark alternative between total assimilation and aliyah. At the same time, Zermansky disassociated Zionism and religion: ‘Israel has such an attraction for young people not for religious reasons but because of a sense of identity’ (JC 22.02.1980: 9). This symbolised another break with the old narration of Zionism.

Such a change in the narrative construction of Zionism could be partially attributed to external circumstances: after its cessation as leader of an Empire, Britain had no direct control over the territories of former Palestine, making it easier for the Diaspora Jews to openly support Israel. The latter was facing real threats to its existence and desperately needed the help from the Diaspora. In addition, British-Israeli relations improved in the mid 1950s. This reduced the pressure on British Zionists, since there was less chance of being accused of disloyalty to the Crown. Although these international factors were important, the changing political, economic and social climate inside Great Britain had a decisive effect on the Jewish reading of its ‘self’ as a minority. Although many of the interviewees spoke of the overall positive impact of the post-colonial immigration on the status and self-perception of local Jews, the initial Jewish attitude to new immigrants had mirrored the racist and discriminatory rhetoric of the English majority. When in the 1920s Professor Selig Brodetsky was refused service in a Leeds restaurant
because of his ‘Jewish faith’, this anti-Semitic incident was taken up by “an editorial in a Leeds evening paper asking whether a restaurant had the right to refuse to serve people, Jews or Negroes (sic)” (Brodetsky 1966: 94). This comparison upset many anglicised Jews in Leeds, who, like other British Jews, fought feverishly against any comparison with the black minority and struggled hard to ‘prove’ their ‘whiteness’ and ‘Englishness’. Brodetsky’s answer to these complaints was ahead of its time, as it was consistent with the multi-cultural and anti-racist discourse of the 1960s: “If Jews are not prepared to be equated with Negroes, they have no right to demand equality with Europeans.” (Ibid.)

According to Krausz (1964: 130), in the 1950s, during the ‘exodus’ from Chapeltown, one could hear Jewish discriminatory and derogatory remarks towards more visibly different and poorer immigrants. The newcomers became the new ‘other’, the new ‘underdogs’ of British society. Mr. Terrill, an interviewee in his 60s, recalled how, prior to the arrival of the new immigrants, Jewish pupils were frequently bullied just for being Jewish. Later, the situation changed: ‘When the Black pupils arrived, we, the Jewish boys, were glad, for they were picked on and the Jews were left alone.’ During a later interview meeting, however, Mr. Terrill thought it was important to finish the story, describing how eventually Jewish boys became friends with new immigrants and joined forces in fighting back against the bullies.

These final remarks of Mr. Terrill are symptomatic of the changing discursive environment of the 1960 and 70s, which was characterised by a growing emphasis on solidarity and on the similarity of new immigrants’ position with the earlier Jewish experience of anti-alienism and prejudices. In 1976, concerned with the rise of the BNP and their advance in the local elections, Victor Zermansky explicitly linked racism towards new immigrants and anti-Semitism, warning delegates of the Leeds Jewish Representative Council of the possible anti-Semitic implications of the recent anti-alien sentiments:

It must be realised that although the present weight of their propaganda is aimed at recent immigrants, there is now a revival of racism and fevered anti-Semitism, too reminiscent of Nazi Germany in the 1930s

JC 30.07.1976: 32

Later on, this discursive linkage was endorsed by the British Board of Deputies, and in 1982 its president stated unambiguously, “Like the black communities in Britain, we, the Jews, were also immigrants.” He also linked the future of Jewish communities with
the treatment received by the new immigrants: "If the Black community loses its freedom, then the same will eventually happen to the Jewish community" (JC 16.07.1982: 8). Multiple conversations with the senior and middle-aged Jewish residents of Leeds during the course of this research confirmed that this comparative rhetoric was not limited to the communal leadership and was often used by ordinary Jews. It reflected the growing awareness of the composite and complex nature of British society. Thus, the word goyim, which for previous generations was almost automatically understood to mean ‘the English’, resumed its original generic meaning of ‘non-Jewish people’, and was used in reference to the mainstream population and minority groups alike.

A rise in inter-faith and inter-ethnic activities speeded up the acceptance of cross-cultural comparisons as a part of Jewish identity narratives. The 1976 autobiography of Louis Teeman demonstrated his comprehension of the diversity of the non-Jewish population and his eagerness to use cross-cultural comparisons linking contemporary immigrant experience with his family history. Remembering his school years in the Lovell Road School, he also described his encounter with the current pupils, who came from ‘more exotic places’. On observing how “immigrant dark heads bent over books where once white immigrant heads had concentrated” (Teeman 1976:378), he spoke about a sense of ‘history repeating itself’ and wished “the new immigrants [to] confound their detractors too” (Ibid.: 379). Similarly, it was customary for the publications produced by the local Jewish Historical Society to contain references to the new immigrant minorities, comparing their experience with the Jewish one. Their 1981 pamphlet on Leeds Jewry in WWI employed a sympathetic comparison with the Asian disturbances in Chapeltown in 1981 to narrate the 1917 anti-Jewish riot. Institutionalised racism was identified in both cases: “Just as Asian communities in 1981 complained about the delay of the Police to respond to racial attacks, in Leeds in 1917 it appears the Police were a long time in coming to quell the trouble” (Grizzard 1981:10).

Although the use of cross-cultural narratives in the 1960s, 70s and 80s has increased, thus signalling the beginning of a shift in the self-representation of British Jews, the old narrative has retained its centrality for the majority of the ordinary Jews of Leeds. On the surface, these narratives were based on contradictory premises: the Grand Jewish Narrative assumed a specific Jewish relationship with God, land of Israel and Torah, thus accentuating the idiosyncrasy of Jewish experience; the cross-cultural narrative, by
contrast, emphasised the similarity of minority experiences despite the actual cultural, ethnic, and religious diversity. In practice, however, the two types of narrative often shared the same discursive space. For instance, in the same autobiographical account of Louis Teeman that has just been used to demonstrate his mastery of cross-cultural narrative, one finds that the Grand Jewish Narrative is still his primary conveyor of identity. Appealing to his grandchildren he writes:

No, it is not easy my dear grandchildren to be a Jew, but for myself I have never wanted to be anything else. ...To be of a people who have suffered so much and yet survived, to be of a people who have contributed so much, to be of the People of the Book, and of the Exodus, and the Return. Is it not an epic tale and am I not fortunate to be part of it?

Teeman 1976: 196

Understandably, it was hard to avoid the comparison with new immigrants, who were transforming their former ‘Little Israel’ into a different sort of alien enclave. In addition, the presentation of anti-Semitism within a broader notion of racism gave Jewish people discursive and institutional support in combating discrimination. At the same time, the comparison with new immigrants was not always used to endorse a sense of similarity, but sometimes was exploited as a new way of bolstering a sense of Jewish exclusivity and superiority. As middle-class Alwoodley-based Jews looked upon the poor working-class newcomers, who reminded them of their previous life in Chapeltown, it brought a sense of satisfaction and accomplishment. One of the popular forms of narrating this historic transition linked Jewish success to an exclusively Jewish set of qualities, hence giving a modern spin to the Grand Jewish Narrative. This hints at the strong probability that the emergence and growing use of cross-cultural narratives in the 1960s went hand in hand with the proliferation of the traditional narratives of Jewishness. Overall, this duality was at the root of the future pluralisation and fragmentation of local Jewish identities.

6.3. Conclusion

This historical study of local Jewish identities has revealed their dynamic nature and demonstrated the complexity of factors that influenced the direction of their development. It has shown that the embodiment of Jewishness in narratives of self, family, and community has always been complexly multi-dimensional, for it always involved the intersection of personal, communal, local, national, and international spaces. The analysis of national and local Jewish historical records confirms the existence of different ‘models’ and narratives of Jewish identity, which was especially
noticeable in Leeds in the wake of major influxes of Jewish immigrants. At the same
time, the analysis has demonstrated quantitative and qualitative differences between the
contemporary and past assortments of Jewish identity 'readings', differences which are
intrinsically linked to the changed socio-economic circumstances of local Jewry as well
as to the evolution of discursive and institutional settings of national citizenship and
belonging.

The diversity of Jewish 'identity packages' that characterised the early years of Jewish
settlement in Leeds was 'imported' from the Eastern Europe by Jewish immigrants
(Gartner 2001), and reflected the main Jewish schism of the time, in which new
ideologies of socialism and nationalism clashed with the pre-modern understanding of
Jewishness (Ben-Rafael 2003). The prominence of these different ways of Jewish
belonging has been very unbalanced both in terms of their representation in the national
discourse and in terms of the internal Jewish discourse. Hierarchically racist and Anglo-
centric citizenship of the British Empire required acculturation and penalised any public
visibility of ethno-cultural differences. This made successful socio-economic integration
into British society conditional on the privatisation of minority identity. Although the
spatially and socially segregated Jewish community of Leeds retained institutional
fragmentation and discursive distinctiveness for longer than many other Jewish
communities in the UK, its subsequent generations eventually followed the established
route of acculturation.

The analysis of Leeds Jewish communal records and private testimonies revealed the
generational decline of primary immigrant identities, accompanied by the growing
internalisation of a socially advantageous 'reading' of Jewishness as a private religious
identity which was compatible with socio-cultural assimilation. The communication of
Jewish identity to the non-Jewish world in Leeds, particularly in the critical moments of
British history, emphasised the 'Englishness' and regional patriotism of Leeds Jews,
actively dismissing alternative representations of the group in racial or ethnic terms.
Increasing engagement with the Gentile world resulted in the centralisation of
communal representative institutions, and eventually led to the institutionalisation of the
conventional, religiously defined Anglo-Jewish identity and to the reinterpretation of
the remaining ethno-cultural distinctions as religious markers. Continuity was achieved
by the retention of the Grand Jewish narrative, which was slightly altered to make it
compatible with the mainstream British Imperial discourses: Jews were depicted as a
historically persecuted religious community, which found a 'safe haven' and true
emancipation in Britain, thus fusing Jewish identity with English national patriotism. The historical records of the Leeds Jewish community confirm the existence of this dynamic from the late 19th to the mid-20th century.

Starting from the late 1960s, the established ‘formula’ of Jewish integration into British society began to malfunction and required alterations. On the one hand, post-colonial immigration changed the demography and the discourse in most British urban centres including Leeds, thus making comparisons with other immigrant groups inevitable. On the other hand, once many in the Leeds Jewish community joined the ranks of the middle class and became part of the societal mainstream, the role of the non-Jewish environment in shaping their identities, attitudes, and attachments, including their views on Jewishness, increased. Quite characteristically, accounts of Jewish life in Leeds register these changes. While the self-promoted image of Jews as a religious minority with a unique, incomparable immigrant history retained dominance, alternative narratives emerged in the public discourse. They were adopted from the national discourses on citizenship, identity, racism, and later on multiculturalism, and asserted that Jews, just like many of the immigrants who came to the UK after WWII, should be regarded as an ethno-cultural group. This type of narration attempted to revise the history of Jewish immigration through comparison with the post-WWII immigration. By the 1990s, these ethnicised cross-cultural narratives had become firmly ingrained in Jewish discourse both nationally and locally, and were conventionally used as the main frameworks for Jewish self-representations to the non-Jewish world.

Overall, the historic and contemporary perspective has validated the receptiveness of Jewish identity, which in this regard is no different from any other minority identity, to local, national and international circumstances. Changes on a range of scales can be seen to have important consequences for the actual experience of Jewishness in Leeds. At the same time, the institutional and discursive contexts of national citizenship and belonging seem to play a particularly vital role in moulding a Jewish sense of self, both individually and collectively. The ‘rules’ of citizenship, which define the conditions of national inclusion, also mediate the impact of international events, provide the interpretative codes for local occurrences, and structure the discursive representation of minority identity in the Jewish and non-Jewish spaces.
Chapter Seven

Being Jewish the local way: contemporary identities

This chapter focuses on the contemporary views and experiences of Jewish people in Leeds, exploring the depth and wealth of individual Jewish identities in a framework of intertextuality with non-Jewish discursive formations (Kristeva 1980). The empirical data acquired from the questionnaire responses, interviews and media resources (Appendix 1) reveals that, compared to the past, the representations of Jewish 'self' have become more complex, diverse, fragmented and frequently incongruent. The complexity and plurality of today's identities is vivid in competing views on Jewishness that are backed up by corresponding multiple claims of their authenticity and legitimacy. Their incoherencies are also evident in the apparently conflicting narratives that often co-exist within the same personal or collective testimonies. More importantly, the embodiment of Jewishness in narratives of self, family, and community proves to be idiosyncratically multi-dimensional and multi-scalar: it involves the intersection of personal, communal, local, national, and international spaces (Amin 2002). As each of the spaces often bolsters a different meaning of Jewishness, contradictory representations of Jewish identity, which share the same narrative space, become the reality. Consequently, there is a much greater diversity of public expressions of Jewish identity and a popularity of 'mix-and-match', issue-related approaches to self-identification.

The chapter concludes with the discussion of possible reasons behind the increased plurality and patchiness of Jewish identifications, paying special attention to the institutional and discursive changes in national citizenship. It argues that the increased acculturation and middle-class status of the majority of Leeds Jews make their identities highly sensitive to the context of national citizenship. Yet, the evolution of British citizenship in the last two decades has 'normalised' fragmentation and pluralism in the representation of mainstream identities, thus creating pressures for the pluralisation of Jewish space.

7.1. Discursive acknowledgement of changes in Jewish identity

One of the most established images of Leeds Jewry, which, until recently, anyone visiting the local Jewish community was almost certain to encounter, was its
presentation as closely-knit, provincial, ageing, and slow moving. Indeed, during the explorative stages of this research project, when the first snapshot information was gathered, many respondents gladly or bitterly cited Leeds traditionalism with its continuity of identities and practices as the main defining feature of its Jewry. Such a characterisation of ‘Jewish Loiners’ seemed puzzling, especially when compared to the visibly fractured communities of London and Manchester, where the intra-communal ‘sinat chinam’ (a Talmudic term defining hatred between Jew and Jew) is institutionally and discursively articulated. This intra-communal fragmentation at the national level is consistent with the highly segmented space of national politics and with the pluralisation of identities at various scales of British life. Therefore, the initial image of Leeds Jews as unchanged and comfortable with their old-fashioned Jewish ‘traditionalism’ was intriguing and prompted further investigation. As the research progressed, the research evidence pointed to the existence of diverse and segmented views regarding the nature and practice of Jewish identity, indicating that the representation of Leeds Jewry as a monolithic conservative stronghold was misleading.

While there is an obvious continuity of certain patterns of Jewish identification, they coexist with many innovative and up to date attitudes to Jewish ‘self’, which were inspired by national identity politics (Weller 2004: 12). Although institutional and discursive articulation of this diversity has been less pronounced in Leeds than in London or Manchester, private accounts of self-identification have become noticeably plural, thus setting in motion changes in communal space, which is analysed in the next chapter. Consider, for example, this web-poster for one of the recent meetings of a discussion group at Sinai Reform Synagogue, which mixes traditional Jewish concerns with new ‘issue-politics’:

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Your opportunity to ask those difficult questions ....

Wednesday, 02/05/07 19:30 - 21:00

Sinai's Jewish Life Forum is meeting tonight to discuss the issues that are important to you. For example:
What do you think we should do about recycling the old Siddurim?\(^\text{18}\) Can we have Eco Kashrut? What should our response be to Israel coverage in the UK media? Let us know what questions you want to discuss by 11th April.

Source: Sinai’s website
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\(^\text{18}\) According to the Jewish law, it is forbidden to destroy any source of writings containing the name of God; instead they should be buried in a special way. However, some Jewish environmentalists argue that recycling represents a process of ‘renewal’, not destruction, and strengthen their case by the quotes from Ecclesiastes Rabbah 7:28, where God urged Adam ‘not to destroy and corrupt My world’.
Whereas the Reform movement is particularly distinguished in their upfront engagement with moral and ethical issues of contemporary society, the concern for such national high-flyers as immigration, human rights, inter-communal cohesion, terrorism or ethical shopping was evident at many other communal meetings that have been attended in the course of this research. Thus, one of the talks in the BHH Orthodox Synagogue was dedicated to ‘Vegetarianism and Judaism’. The rabbi, who was himself a committed vegetarian, had the difficult task of explaining an apparent contradiction between vegetarianism and a Chalachic (Jewish law) prescription for eating meat on Shabbat. In the question time after his talk, this rabbi had to reluctantly accept the weakness of his position; nevertheless, he was not willing to give up his vegetarianism. Similarly, a local Jewish group, Leeds Chaverim (i.e friends in Hebrew), that was established in 2002 with the purpose of providing all-inclusive and ‘non-judgemental’ Jewish socialisation for 20-30 year-olds, has recently reported on their partnership and support of volunteers based in Sri Lanka, who were involved in rebuilding the local infrastructure after the 2005 tsunami. Members of the group felt that their strong Jewish identity was inseparable from their active social positions in non-Jewish matters. In their own words, they took their lead ‘from the precept of ‘tikkun olam’ - ‘healing the world’,’ which encourages Jewish efforts in bettering the world and humankind, regardless of race or religion.

A further example of Leeds Jewish engagement with contemporary issues is found in the work of the local organisation of Holocaust survivors (HSFA). Their main activities include teaching about the Holocaust in educational establishments, which they claim is “particularly relevant to the Citizenship Curriculum,” as well as work with contemporary refugees. Their leaflet explains how:

\[\text{The Association is actively participating in local authority workshops to explore the sharing of experiences between Holocaust survivors and young present day refugees and asylum seekers, in order to assist them to come to terms with the personal tragedies and upheaval they have suffered.}\]

HSFA statutory leaflet: 2

Jewish interest and participation in national and local public life is not a new phenomenon. Jewish people have always been interested in hearing a Jewish perspective on non-Jewish matters and in discussing possible implications for the Jewish people. What is new, however, is the rising number of dedicated people, whose

\[19\text{ The information was taken from the website of the organisation http://leedschaverim.co.uk}\]
strong principles on such issues as human rights and/or environment protection prompt them to reconsider and revise established views on Judaism and Jewish identity. Thus, the rabbi, who talked about vegetarianism, tried to connect his vegetarianism, which he had acquired independently from his religious views, to his Jewishness, rather than allowing his Jewishness to define his moral and life-style choices.

Even more symptomatic of changing attitudes is that a growing number of Jewish people, regardless of whether they share these views or not, consider such revisions legitimate. This is one of the main messages regularly advocated on the pages of JC. Thus, in a recent edition on the state of contemporary Judaism, JC publishes rabbi Soloway’s appeal to Jews to “step back from our own version of what we think it means to be a Jew and consider the other, that Jew who is so different to us, seemingly worlds apart; and yet we are part of each other” (Soloway 20.07.2007: 26). This emphasis on Jewish diversity has been growing locally and it is noticeable in both public and private accounts. For instance, in his rebuttal of the ultra-Orthodox accusation of the ‘anti-Jewish’ nature of the Jewish Telegraph, a columnist from this regional Jewish newspaper, Selwyn Dorfman, openly defies the exclusivity of the Orthodox rabbinical authority:

*The rabbonim and their acolytes are entitled to express their opinions, too, but branding those of us who beg to differ as “anti-Jewish” says more about them than it does about the Press. ... There will be (or certainly ought to be) tolerance and respect for everyone.*

Dorfman 27.07.2007: 11.

Similarly, the official theme of the 2007 Leeds Jewish International Performing Arts Festival (2-6 September 2007) was diversity within the Jewish world, featuring Black/Jewish, Chinese, Uzbekistani, Ladino, American and local performers. The Festival Director expressed astonishment at the variety of Jewish performers, who ‘exist on the fringes, outside the mainstream, of Jewish culture’ (Mrs. Ruhan, mid 30s). She also acknowledged that with ‘cultural diversity being an official theme this year of Leeds cultural life, the Jewish Arts Festival fits nicely in this profile and shows the openness of Jewish people to the new and different’.

The questionnaire survey and interviews conducted for this research confirmed that, privately, local Jews also recognize the increasing diversity and change of the Jewish world. Thus, when asked to compare the contemporary state of Jewish affairs with that 50 years ago, virtually all people agreed that it has changed considerably and many of them mentioned increased Jewish pluralism as an integral feature of today’s life:
traditions have changed and so has practice
(Hadassah, 14, comprehensive school)
there is more involvement of all types of Jews
(Anonymous female, 15, Jewish school)

Judaism has become far more secular and more diverse as people marry out more
(Anonymous male, 16, independent school)
because we are 6 million less and the attitude of Jewish youth have changed
(Anonymous male, independent school)

community is more divided: Orthodox create a split
(Barbara, 74)

no choice previously
(a retired female)

people now are more open about their religion. Before – you wanted to merge with the crowd, today there is a choice, but then, many don’t use it
(Jeremy Krawitz, 75)

it is easier because there is more democracy, but at the same time more difficult because Judaism is pushed away by many
(Helen Perc, 45)

What the above quotes also show is that people tend to accept an individual’s right to choose an identity, including the right to keep a Jewish identity in any way the person wishes. The survey showed that an overwhelming majority of respondents of all ages (i.e. 83% of those who answered the question) agreed with the statement that ‘Nowadays Jewish people are free to choose and to change their own identities’ (see Questionnaire in the Appendix 3), and only 9% of the respondents disagreed.

An analysis of the negative answers to this statement revealed a surprising diversity of reasons, which shows not only the existence of a diverse range of opinions but also the expectation of their legitimacy. For the more religiously committed people (3 out of 6 respondents), the explanation is consistent with the Grand Jewish Narrative that defines Jewishness as a God’s given identity. Within this narrative, even partial abandonment of one’s Jewishness is considered as a transgression against God and is never justified. Yet, this is an ideal, admit the respondents, whereas in the real world, more and more people drift away from Judaism. More secular explanations included the continuing importance of anti-Semitism, which always reminds Jews of their ‘otherness’, as well as the definition of Jewishness as an ethnic identity, which makes it an in-born permanent feature.

This is how 21-year-old Alex explained his ambiguity regarding this statement in the follow-up interview: “One can change their image, and even maybe their identity, but can never change the fact that they were born, and therefore are, Jewish.” What makes Alex’s views particularly interesting is that later in the interview this unambiguously ethnic vision of Jewishness is suspended in favour of a more traditional, religious vision
of Jewish identity. Although by his own admittance Alex is not religious, but a passionate Zionist, and although he does not consider religious belief and observance as important for a sense of Jewish self, Alex’s narration constantly oscillates between religious and ethnic understandings of Jewishness. Thus, he accepts and even praises the importance of religious commitment for the continuation of Jewish identity:

There will always be extreme forms of religion: extremists Islamists, Lubavitch Jews. But I think it is essential to have this kind of people because they are the ones who really-really care and drive the religion forward, the sort of people who will debate the religion until they die. Yet it is essential for non-Jews to mix with Jews and Jews to mix with the non-Jews, it is the only way to reach complete understanding of all faiths and cultures.

This statement blends together a centuries-long Jewish appreciation of Tzadikim (religiously righteous people), a modern secularist anxiety over staunch religious observance, hence the term ‘religious extremists’, mixing the above in a complex multi-cultural perspective. The latter allows Alex to express his tolerance of forms of Jewish identity that he personally does not share; it helps him to draw a similarity between Jewish and other minority identities and to appreciate the inter-communal relations as a remedy against prejudice and bigotry.

7.2. Spaces of Jewish belonging

This personal ambiguity regarding the nature of Jewish identity and the uncertainty regarding the importance of religious, ethic and cultural markers in the Jewish world is integral to the present Jewish discourse nationally (Miller et al. 1996) and internationally (DellaPergola 2003). The narratives and responses of both interviewees and survey respondents demonstrated the complexity and pluralism of present-day understandings of Jewish identity. On the one hand, they showed the viability of past ‘identity packages’ (Webber 1994:83); most respondents were aware of their existence and had a certain affinity with a particular version of Jewishness (secular-cultural, religious or/and Zionist). On the other hand, increasingly eclectic approaches to the construction of the Jewish self were evident, albeit with an acknowledgment of the apparent continuity of the old identification patterns. This research finding is consistent with the arguments developed by DellaPergola (2003: 49) and Heilman (1998: 83), who pointed towards the destruction of the fixity of established models of Jewishness as a worldwide trend.

This analysis of contemporary Jewish outlooks uses the same analytical distinction between the religious and social dimensions of Jewish identity, which proved to be
helpful in the historical analysis of identities. Although the example of Alex has demonstrated how blurred the borders between spaces of Jewish self are, this analytical demarcation of the dimensions of Jewishness functions as a Weberian ideo-typical construct (Weber 1949); a useful theoretical device, which helps to assess the degree of historical continuity and disruption of identity patterns. It also sheds light on how different ways of identification as a Jew interact with other sides of personal identities, including national identity, and how these interactions influence the choice of narratives that people use to describe themselves, their families and the community.

The religious dimension is possibly the most crucial for understanding the personal idiosyncrasies of contemporary Jewish identities (Amyot and Sigelmal 1996). This is a complex space not only in terms of its internal organisation, which includes ideational and behavioural sides, but it also has various ways of reconnecting to other spaces of human life (Sharot 1997). Depending on its significance for one's sense of Jewishness, the interaction of religious space with other existential spaces (work, family, politics, and social relations) could be of various natures, which leads to different ways of narrating Jewish identity (Winter 1996). Despite a steady process of secularisation over the 20th century, the religious side of Jewish identity has remained a point of reference and a crucial signifier even for those 6% of Leeds Jews, who consider themselves atheist both in terms of outlook and in practice (Waterman 2003: 9, table 3). At the same time, one cannot deny the growing significance of the socio-cultural dimension of Jewishness, which, as was demonstrated by the 1990s survey of British Jews (Schmool and Cohen 1998), has become detached from the religious expression of Jewish identity for many Jewish people. This provides an outlet for a powerful desire to belong, to identify with something special, and to be proud, but it is also a space where one could experience a sense of alienation and a 'tag' of otherness, which is imposed regardless of one's wishes. More importantly, in the absence of a strong religious anchor, Jewishness becomes one of many social identities, which are bound to interact and influence each other.

In order to explore the diversity of today's understandings and to assess the degree of change from the past, both the questionnaire and the interview schedule included a series of questions on different aspects of modern Jewish life. The responses to particular questions were analysed in relation to other accounts and statements provided by the same individuals, which helped to check the validity of data interpretation and to uncover possible inconsistencies. The questionnaire offered an open-ended list of
attributes of Jewish identity, inviting respondents to assess and evaluate the importance of different aspects to feeling Jewish (Appendix 3).

Q 3: Could you, please, state the significance of each of the following aspects to feeling Jewish?

Q 4: Could you, please, rank the above attributes according to their importance to feeling Jewish? (1 – the most important, 8 – the least important).

The list included religious attributes (belief and observance) and socio-cultural aspects (friends, neighbourhood, participation in communal life, Jewish knowledge); in addition, the list contained Zionism and anti-Semitism, which in the past had a profound influence on the way local Jews identified themselves. Table 7.1 summarises the rank scores of attributes based on the answers to these questions. The first of the questions reflected the relative significance assigned to the attributes by each individual, and its joint group index also showed the unanimity of views in each group. The second question compared the group aggregated ranking of attributes based on how individual respondents within each group ordered the attributes, while the category ‘total’ listed ranks of summed scores for both questions.

As was expected, characteristics such as religiosity, age, involvement in Jewish youth groups, and the type of school attended (for teenagers) offered some insight into why personal hierarchies of identity attributes were constructed in a particular way and what the individual affinities towards a particular version(s) of Jewishness were. At the same time, proper interpretation of causation required an additional narrative analysis of respondents’ commentaries and interviewees’ testimonies, which revealed a complexity of reasons behind today’s identity choices. Thus, the same choices regarding Jewish attributes were often grounded in different identity models. Even more revealing was the ease with which individual respondents, just like Alex, were able to shift narrative spaces and combine different identity models.
Table 7.1 The rank scores of Jewish attributes by different groups of respondents based on Q3 and Q4

(*n* - is the number of respondents in each group)

**Q 3:** Could you, please, rank the above attributes according to their importance for feeling Jewish? (1 – the most important, 8 – the least important)

**Q 4:** Could you, please, state the significance of each of the following aspects to feeling Jewish?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Groups of Respondents</th>
<th>Attributes of Jewishness</th>
<th>Pilot Q3 (17)</th>
<th>Jewish Youth Activists (5)</th>
<th>Independent School (21)</th>
<th>Jewish School (4)</th>
<th>Adults (26)</th>
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The patterned area indicates the top three choices of attributes

School children and youth club members were 14 to 17 year olds,

Jewish activists were in the age range of 19 to 23 years, and adults were from 22 to mid 80s

*the Pilot, which was conducted at a Jewish youth club, the Zone, did not include Q 4.

**most of the respondents in the category ‘adults’ were questioned during the Leeds Limmud 2006 Jewish learning day, but the group also includes the responses of a few people who filled in the questionnaire prior to the in-depth interview.
7.2.1. Socio-cultural space

As is evident from the Table 7.1, the majority of respondents considered socio-cultural attributes as the most important for their Jewish identities. However, members of Leeds Jewry valued socio-cultural attributes differently and the analysis of individual ranking choices demonstrated that different attributes achieved varying degrees of consensual support. Perhaps the least controversial of all attributes of Jewish identity was ‘knowledge of history, culture and tradition’ as virtually no one thought that it was unimportant and the majority placed this category at the top of their ranking hierarchies. The unanimity in the perceived importance of ‘Jewish knowledge’ was not surprising, as this has become the focal point for people with otherwise conflicting views on Jewish identity. On the one hand, this feature is congruent with a traditional religious view on Jewishness, which assigns high value to Jewish learning and traditions. On the other hand, almost a century long process of secularisation has made this socio-cultural attribute the primary way of expressing Jewish identity for many less religious and non-religious Jews.

Slightly more contentious was another social category, ‘Jewish friends’, as its perceived value depended on the religious views of the respondents. While near 80% of the participants in this research questionnaire admitted that at least half of their friends were Jewish, more secular people placed a high value on this attribute of Jewish identity. For instance, pupils from secular schools saw Jewish friends as the main contributor to their sense of Jewishness, while for Jewish school pupils, who have strong religious views, this category occupied the lowest rank. Even though most of their friends were Jewish and played a significant role in their everyday lives, their normative views assigned the category ‘friends’ a complementary status, something that follows from being Jewish rather than defining it.

All grown-ups, regardless of their observance and outlook, thought that ‘participation in communal life,’ was just as important as ‘knowledge’ and ‘friends’. Interestingly, participation was rated rather low by all teenagers except for the pupils of the Jewish

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20 The only person (a pupil from an independent school) who marked ‘knowledge’ as unimportant also marked other categories accordingly and later explained his position by his atheistic outlook and a general indifference to his Jewish identity.

21 This was supported by the 2001 JPR survey of Leeds Jewry, which confirmed the close-knit nature of local Jewry. In their sample, three quarters of Jews with a secular outlook and more than 96% of people with somewhat religious outlook had more than half of their friends who were Jewish (Waterman 2003:9)
school. Especially surprising was to see this neglect of communal activism from the participants of the pilot survey, most of whom were enrolled in a Jewish leadership course conducted by the Jewish youth centre. As these children also indicated their keenness on socialising with other Jewish kids, their low evaluation of ‘participation’ could be best explained by their unwillingness to partake in the ‘grown-up’ activities of the community, which they associate with older generations and no ‘fun’. Supporting this conclusion is another finding: in their comments to open questions many of the teenagers repeatedly highlighted the importance of organized activities for young people in Jewish community.

The other social attribute of Jewish identity, which prompted a controversial response, was ‘residence in the Jewish neighbourhood’. It was an unambiguously important category for the religious segment of the community, which will be discussed later, but, interestingly, the majority of respondents had doubts about the relevance of living in the Jewish surroundings for their sense of Jewish identity. Despite almost all of the respondents living in the LS17 and LS8 postcode areas, and feeling happy about it, they placed low value on this category, thus indicating the existence of a disjunction between the ‘reading’ of physical space in the Leeds Jewish imagination and actual spatial practices (Lebevfre 1994; Soja 1996). When explaining their answers, some people were concerned that living in very close proximity to other Jews could destroy personal anonymity, which was an important factor in their personal well-being. Thus, Hannah, a pupil from a local comprehensive school, confessed that what she liked about living in Leeds was that her feeling of being part of a community did not come at the expense of personal liberties. She explained that ‘You always feel like a part of the community but at the same time [as] ‘an individual’. At the same time, many others thought that modern means of communications made physical proximity irrelevant. This sentiment was especially strong among the younger respondents and among the members of the Reform movement, who did not have a prohibition on travelling or carrying on Shabbat.

More intriguingly, the low priority given to the importance of living in the area was combined with the perceived importance of the geographical visibility of the Jewish neighbourhood. Thus, many personal descriptions of the Leeds Jewish community emphasised the role of the cultural landscape and symbolic Jewish markers (buildings, objects and people) as a tangible expression of community; a landscape which reinforced their Jewish identity and pride. For instance, for Eddie (66), the Jewish community is embodied in its physical infrastructure, as his listing of the community's
main ingredients includes ‘different synagogues, Jewish shops; community and youth centres; Jewish welfare agency, B'nei B'rith, Hillel etc.; Jewish education and Cheders; Jewish Housing’.

Overall, the importance of socio-cultural space comes as no surprise in a community that historically has shown a high density of intra-communal interactions based on occupational and residential concentration. With the decline of religious commitments, ‘social capital’ (Putnam 2000) has become the most important and uncontroversial asset of Jewish life in Leeds. This finding is consistent with the conclusions drawn from a 2002 survey of London Jewry conducted by JPR, which suggests that “the binding force or ‘glue’ that unites the highly complex and segmented Jewish community has a distinctly cultural flavour” (Graham 2003: 39). In a community where the majority does not have strong religious commitments, socio-cultural markers of Jewish identity, which are all-encompassing and attractive to even the most secular members of the community, constitute the focal point of Jewish life both locally and nationally. From the middle of the 20th century, this socio-cultural secular Jewishness has been associated with Zionist ideology, but, as will be shown in the next section, it ceased to be an uncontroversial unifying force, pushing many Jewish communities, including Leeds, to look inwards and to seek new meaning of Jewishness through social activities and cultural continuity. The fact that most respondents (84% of adults and 55% of youngsters) considered family history as important for one’s sense of identity and expressed an interest in their own family history (88% and 76%) supports this conclusion. When asked whether they enjoyed living in Leeds, 68 out of 72 respondents expressed their great satisfaction and for many of them the rich and rewarding Jewish social life was the main ingredient of their happiness.

| It has the advantages of a big city but close to unspoilt rural areas. The Jewish Community is big enough to provide a good social life with a good range of activities, and is generally a friendly community | male, 46 |
|lots of things to do, very tight Jewish community | male, 20 |
|It has an active Jewish community and it’s fun | female, 14 |
|because I feel that the centre of Leeds is where most Jewish people live (Alwoodley) and I really like it that way. It is a nice pleasant place to live | anonymous young person |
|Supportive Jewish community: good family atmosphere and range of schools for religious types: good social activities for all ages: good welfare board, kosher shops; shuls | male, 19 |
7.2.2. Zionism

Whereas the high value placed on the socio-cultural attributes of Jewish identity was quite predictable, the relatively low ranking of Zionism as a component of identity was an unexpected finding given that the Leeds Jewish community has been a Zionist stronghold for many years and many of its organisations still have the word ‘Zionist’ in their name. Only a few survey respondents, most of whom were leaders from a Jewish youth club, where secular Zionist traditions remained deeply rooted, marked Zionism as an important attribute of Jewish identity. Conforming to the Zionist model of Jewishness, which in the 1960s played a unifying role for different segments of the Leeds Jewish community, contemporary Zionists viewed Zionism and participation in the communal social life to be of much higher relevance to their identity than other groups considered it. Angela, one of the youth leaders, who was born and lived in Britain all her life, confessed her feelings about Israel: “I feel like it is my true motherland, I need to do everything to promote its course and it makes me feel proud.”

Secular youth leaders also downplayed the significance of the religious side of their identity, placing religious belief and religious practice at slightly lower positions than other groups’ ranking. Michele, a 21-year-old youth leader from the youth centre, the Zone, who is proud and happy to be Jewish, commented: “I think people focus too much on religion and should concentrate more on the person.” In contrast, the view of this 15 year old pupil from an independent school, who clearly did not share a secular view on Jewishness, emphasised the duty of a Jew to follow a lifestyle consistent with religious laws: “it is not coincidence or a nice thing to be, but a job and a way of life.”

For the rest of the respondents, an uncritical commitment to Zionism was no longer acceptable. Further investigation into the question uncovered the great discursive ambiguity associated with the term Zionism (for Zionism as a discourse, see Silberstein 1999). As it was pointed out by some respondents, Zionism could be interpreted simply as love of Israel and support for Jewish people in Israel, or it could stand for support for Israeli politics, and perhaps could be understood as an obligation for all Jewish people to ‘return’ to Israel. Although most of the respondents admitted that Israel was important for Jewish identities, the ambiguity increased as the age fell. Thus, when asked to evaluate the statement ‘every Jewish person has to support Jewish people in Israel and in other countries’, 70% of adults, who answered the question, and more than half of Jewish teenagers agreed with the assertion. At the same time, younger people were more likely to be negative or unsure about this claim with almost a quarter of
independent school pupils disagreeing and the same proportion of other teenagers choosing the ‘don’t know’ option.

A religiously committed middle-aged female, who grew up in Leeds and, in the past, had been involved in many Zionist activities, had a different objection to the use of the term. When evaluating other attributes of Jewish identity, she demonstrated little hesitation, indicating their importance for a sense of Jewish identity, but she paused indecisively over Zionism:

It depends on what do you mean by Zionism: Zionism as an ‘ism’ is not important, but Zionism as a love of Israel is intrinsic to Judaism. I don’t like Zionism as an ‘ism’ because, unfortunately, with some people it replaces Judaism. If you call the love of Israel being a Zionism, then I am a Zionist, but I do not like to refer to myself as one, because it is like Communism or Socialism, and it is not like that.

Helen Perc, 47

More secular interviewees also wanted to distance themselves from the term Zionism, but their explanations mentioned different reasons. Some indicated that widespread liberal criticism of Israeli politics compromised Zionism as a basis for identification, while others were not happy with the old Zionist appeal to all Jewish people to make ‘alihah’ and to settle in Israel for good. This was clearly articulated during a talk, entitled ‘Zionism now?!’, which was given in February 2004 by the Israeli Shaliach (‘messenger’ lit. in Hebrew) of the time, Yehuda Bergman, whose main purpose was to promote the community’s relationship with Israel and assist emigration. When the speaker portrayed a grim demographic situation in Israel and called for more Jewish people to make ‘alihah’, one upset grandmother stood up and started an emotional rebuttal, telling a sad story of her daughter’s family, which had moved to Israel and was failing there. She asserted that British Jews had obligations as British citizens and were more helpful to Israel being rich and influential here than poor and ill-adapted immigrants. Striking a similar chord, 19-year-old Leeds-born Chana, who had just returned from her gap year in Israel and was keen on promoting Israel at home, said:

During my stay in Jerusalem, someone said that it was better to be a Jew in Diaspora than in Israel, because if all the Jews have lived in Israel, who would defend and protect us? The statement stuck with me and now that I am back I feel it even more so.

JT 15.09.2006: 2

On the whole, although the evidence from this study confirms the apparent decline of the Zionist model of Jewishness, it also shows that Israel remains central to the identity of the majority of Leeds Jewry. Most people, interviewed in the course of the research
indicated their support of Israel and love of Israel, and surprisingly almost all of them
have visited Israel at least once either on a short tourist trip or have lived there on a
work or educational program. This finding was consistent with the JPR data on London
Jewry, which showed that 88% of the sample visited Israel at least once and more than
80% were willing to send their children on an educational trip (Graham 2003: 18). The
JT on a regular basis devotes a substantial part of its space to the coverage of Israeli
affairs and the links between local community and Israel; it pays special attention to
personal stories and opinions, regularly publishing interviews with people who travel to
Israel as well as letters of support for Israel and condemnation of critics of Israel. In this
respect Leeds still differs to London, where a sizeable and more vocal number of Jews
openly criticise Israel and distance their Jewish identity from Middle East politics. In
contrast, in Leeds, people keep criticism private, either because they feel uncomfortable
displaying it in a largely pro-Israeli community or because they consider it morally
wrong. As one female reader of the JT commented, 'If we don't promote a positive
image of ourselves and Israel, no one else will.' (JT 5.09.2004: 4)

7.2.3. Religious space

Although the importance of the religious dimension of Jewish identity has been steadily
decreasing for most of the 20th century, it remained crucial for understanding the totality
of Jewish identity (Winter 1996). The empirical data collected in this research indicated
that the choices of identity categories made by religiously observant people were
predictably different from the rest of the sample. Thus, the vision of Jewishness
exhibited by pupils from Menorah, an independent strictly Orthodox Jewish school, fits
the traditional Judaic model of religious Jewish identity. Coming from a small number
of local strictly Orthodox families, they all marked religious observance as a top
priority (rank 1). For other respondents, this category proved to be a divisive one, with
opinions ranging from 'not at all important' to 'very important' and the average group
scores being of much lower value: '5' for adults and independent school pupils, and
even lower, '7' and '8', for the members and activists of the youth club.

An Orthodox view on Jewishness treats religious space as an encompassing dimension
of human life, which penetrates and structures other existential spaces. For Jewish
people who are deeply religious and observant, this model is considered as the only
'correct' one. All aspects of their lives should be structured by the requirements of
Jewish law, which leaves virtually nothing unregulated – dietary habits, dress code,
social relations, business ethics, family life, etc. In an informal conversation, the wife of a local Orthodox rabbi explained that wearing ‘proper’ clothing is not only necessary because of the laws of *tsniut* or modesty, but it is also set as a constant reminder of one’s Jewish identity, which helps one to avoid improper deeds and thoughts. It is even truer for men, who have a Biblical instruction to wear a *tzizit* [a four-cornered garment with fringes] which is set as a constant physical sign of the Jewish obligation to fulfil commandments.

Given such tight regulation, it was not surprising that religiously committed respondents placed a high value on ‘living in the neighbourhood,’ because it follows the Chalachic requirement to live in the proximity to Synagogue and other Jewish amenities. As was explained earlier, their negation of the importance of ‘Jewish friends’ conformed to the same logic: simply because social space should be treated as a consequence, not a cause of one’s Jewish affiliation, it should be considered inferior to the observance of Torah laws. Similar reasoning explains another empirical finding that initially looked puzzling: why didn’t religious people place equally high value on the ‘religious belief’ category? Indeed, the belief for them was less important then for the majority of ordinary people (except for the secular Zionists), who thought of it as one of the top three ingredients of Jewish identity. As one local Orthodox rabbi explained in his Synagogue sermon, ‘one would never know all the answers and never understand everything, but a Jew has to follow the laws of Torah, because that is what being Jewish is about.’ ‘Never forget that you are a Jew and have to behave according to Hashem’s’22 will’ is an axiom that guides their lives and motivates the upbringing of children. Hence, even children learn to tame their desires in accordance to the Jewish law. Consider the episode that took place in a local Jewish primary school during a sports event. A girl of nine from an observant family was crying out loud because she felt hungry and did not have any money to buy food that was sold on the premises. Another concerned parent offered her a kosher chocolate bar and the face of the girl sparkled with delight, but when it turned out to be a milk chocolate she could not hide her disappointment: “I’ve recently had a burger [which contained meat], so I am not yet allowed any milk” and she moved away.

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22 ‘Hashem’ (literary translates from hebrew as ‘the Name’) is the accepted among religious Jews way of referring to God.
Not surprisingly, almost all of the interviewees, who felt that their observant lifestyle was in dissonance with the majority of Leeds Jewish families, admitted that they had considered or still consider moving away to Manchester or London. All of the pupils from a Jewish school, who answered the questionnaire, declared their desire to move away from Leeds to other places abroad or in England. Most of them wished to continue their education, but did not consider going to a secular university, despite achieving top marks in A-levels. The reason behind their and their families’ inclination towards a Seminary (a religious institution for female higher education) was the fear of a ‘wrong’ environment, which was not conducive to a religious lifestyle.

For less observant Jews, however, these Orthodox complexities of adjusting the spaces of modern life to religious commitments proved to be less of a problem and often involved an inverse relationship of adjusting religious space to fit the necessities of the modern world. They usually hold a more secularised view that considers religious space as one of many dimensions of human life. How much of the religious dimension is permitted in one’s life and how it coexists with other existential dimensions is a matter of personal conviction and frequently is open for ad-hoc negotiations. At the extreme end of the secularised scale were self-confessed atheists, who completely denied any sacred value of Judaism. Instead they credit the religious dimension only with a symbolic, socio-cultural function. As one atheist interviewee, who nevertheless visits a Synagogue regularly put it:

Don’t get me wrong, I like Judaism, but I just can not believe in G-d. I find the whole concept ridiculous. ...And to build your whole life on the belief for which there is not only no evidence but not even teeth of evidence, - well, I can’t do it

Mr. Green, in his 80s

This completely secular model of Jewishness is often criticised as unsustainable and weak; it is frequently blamed for a high level of assimilation. Addressing this criticism a local male reader of the JT, who describes himself as ‘a secular Jew happy in my Jewishness’, defends his way of being Jewish citing his family experience where all ‘have been married in shul’, which means that all have married Jewish. He also seeks legitimacy in numbers arguing that ‘there are thousands like me’ (JT 15.09.2004: 5). The irony of the situation is that to bolster his argument he compares the decline of Jewish religious commitment to the decline of Church attendance, thus inadvertently accepting the definition of Jewishness as a religious identity.
However, the finding of this study, which was consistent with the results of other surveys, was that the majority of Leeds Jewry did not want to abandon the religious dimension completely. Therefore, religious belief emerged as a relatively significant attribute of their sense of Jewishness. People search for ‘spirituality’ and sacredness in Judaism, but approach the religious customs pragmatically. Thus, responding to the debate about the Chalahic prohibition to use a wheelchair to get to Synagogue on Shabbat, Joseph Lewis, a JT reader in his 80s, who described himself as an Orthodox Jew, wrote:

*The Torah, which has been the source of our guide to a good life for over 2000 years, should supply a solution to our problems and not a prohibition to our needs*

JT 24.08.2007: 7.

Many in this group of people detach religious conviction from its practical implementation, which reflects the position of many educated people in a modern secular world: whereas it is hard to believe in the absolute divinity of the rituals, the yearning for spirituality and divinity is fulfilled through the general belief in G-d. Hence, the religious dimension is used as a way to spirituality, while rituals are seen as conventional, hence optional, entry points to religious space. This confirms the continuation of a well-recognised Leeds Jewish *traditionalism*, which legitimises a selective maintenance of Jewish rituals:

*I was brought up that I wouldn’t go in a car, but would switch on the light, I would use my Shabbos kettle, I wouldn’t use my electric kettle, but would use the electric fan. It was very illogical and used to drive my husband mad*

Helen Perc, 45

The religious dimension could be treated as an independent parallel space, which does not impose on other dimensions of human life; alternatively, a certain structural hierarchy could be personally and socially negotiated. In any case, there exist certain entry-exit points into and out of this religious space. These may be associated with material objects like Synagogue, the community centre or the Torah, or there may be behavioural and spiritual triggers, like saying certain prayers, celebrating holidays and engaging in Jewish learning. This often leads to the development of a fragmented mentality whereby different normative and behavioural frames govern different spaces of everyday life. For instance, when describing Leeds Jewry as a whole, many

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23 According to the JPR Survey of Leeds Jewry in 2001, around 60% of the respondents described their religious observance as ‘traditional’, most of whom considered their outlook as ‘somewhat religious’ (60.7%) and ‘somewhat secular’ (23.7%). Another 22% defined their practice as ‘just Jewish’, whereas only 6% thought they were strictly Orthodox and 7% confessed to a secular lifestyle (Waterman 2003:9).
interviewees pointed to the large numbers of friends, relatives and acquaintances, who kept kosher at home, but did not hesitate to break the laws of Kashrut when going out. In another interesting confession, some female interviewees, who belong to Orthodox synagogues, admitted dual standards with regard to women’s rights: they supported gender equality in a secular world, but would not even consider the possibility of having a female rabbi or cantor (service conductor) in their Synagogue.

7.3. Jewish identity and Britishness

Perhaps, the best way to assess how much Jewish identities have become pluralised and fragmented is to look at them in the context of their interaction with the rest of society (Hofman 2006). When Jewish people speak about society in general, discuss social problems and issues, they knowingly or inadvertently position themselves in relation to other social groups, thus invoking particular models of citizenship and Jewishness. A narrative analysis of their accounts brings to light the complex and multidimensional relationship between different models of Jewish identity and different visions of national identity, and reflects the complex nature of Jewish inclusion in national spaces of belonging. The research evidence suggest that today’s pluralisation of the discursive spaces of Jewish and national belonging allows greater flexibility and contextual use of different narratives of self. Most people demonstrate ambiguous and fragmented visions of national and Jewish identifications, strategically picking and mixing different narratives of citizenship and Jewishness. Thus, depending on the context, Jews could present themselves as either a religious, or ethnic, or a racial minority group, or even as all of them together, while nationally they could define themselves as English, British or indeed feel alienated as foreign immigrants. By the same token, the representation of Jewish people as a historically unique group, which resurrects the Grand Jewish Narrative, goes hand in hand with drawing comparisons with other British minorities, which is part of a cross-cultural narrative. Similarly, self-identification as the ‘English of Jewish heritage’ (the preferred image of British Jews throughout most of the 20th century) shares the same discursive space as the definition of self as the ‘other’ of English ‘goyim’ (non-Jewish). The former image is still active, especially when talking about new immigrants or foreign affairs, while discussions on Middle East politics or anti-Semitism are likely to activate the latter type of identification.

To the observer, Jews very often look like a case of ‘successful integration’ with an unproblematic identity. Indeed, many Jewish people are happy to convey the image of a
model minority' to the wider society. Most of the people interviewed in the course of this research thought that other minorities could learn from the Jewish example of successful integration, which they attributed to hard work, collective responsibility and most of all to the Jewish willingness to become English in a socio-cultural sense:

I’ll tell you something interesting: all Jewish children strived to achieve academically. ... Unlike the Muslims today we wanted to integrate. Jewish people practiced their fate discreetly.

Mr. Bennett, in his 80s

It comes as a surprise then that many Jews, who are British-born, are in the third and forth generations and who often are indistinguishable from the English white majority, would fail the so-called ‘cricket test’, the measure of citizenship integration suggested by Lord Tebbit in 1990 as a way to assess the Britishness of South Asian minorities. When Israel and England were drawn in the same qualifying group for the 2008 Euro Cup, some saw it as a Jewish version of Tebbit’s loyalty test. Ahead of the first game in March 2007, both the local and national Jewish press ran a string of interviews with British Jews, asking whom they intended to support. The answers showed a split, but more importantly they revealed different grounds on which people defined their Jewish identity. For some, who saw Jewishness strictly as a matter of religion, their unquestionable loyalty was to the English team; for others, who ethnicised their Jewishness, it was ‘a coming together of two home nations’ (J Life Leeds, 03.2007: 6).

In a publication of the JT entitled ‘Question of Support: It’s England v. Israel ... but who will you be cheering on? ’ (JT, 3.02.2007: 20) opinions were characteristically divided. Adam of Whitefield said, ‘Judaism is my religion, but my nationality is English, so I’ll be supporting the boys all the way.’ Leeds United fan, Mike, shared this opinion, ‘I am definitely going to be supporting England – I am English, after all,’ but tried to stress the strength of his Jewish identity by explaining that ‘if Israel were playing any other team apart from England, then I’d support them.’ Many other Jews, interviewed in the newspaper, backed Israel and wished them victory, yet they grounded their allegiances in very different models of Jewishness. Thus, for Simon Ross of Leeds, Israel as a home country for all Jews compelled him to support it: ‘I am Jewish and I support Israel rather than England without a doubt, they are number one.’ For Richard Masser, a coach of Leeds Maccabi, a Jewish boys’ football team, it was a strong religious identity that compelled him to support Israel: ‘I will definitely be supporting Israel because that is where my heritage lies. My religion is my priority.’ Stephen Parker of Leeds emphasised his Zionist allegiance to Israel: ‘I like to see England do well, but on this
occasion, as a Zionist, I would like to see the underdogs win. It will also help to raise a more positive image of Israel.’ Still many interviewees felt uncomfortable with the ambiguity of the situation, which splits their affinities, wishing for a draw as way out: ‘A draw would be best all around as I’d love to see both teams qualify,’ confessed Sheldon Lee, a co-manager of Manchester Maccabi. As if sensing this tension, a JT columnist Doreen Wachmann in an article, entitled ‘Flag is not a loyalty badge’ (Wachmann 30.06.2007:7) plays down the role of sympathies in spectator sports, ‘whether or not one enjoys spectator sports is a totally private matter for each individual.’ She simultaneously offers another criterion of Britishness, ‘what matters is that I keep British law,’ which, according to Wachmann, makes Jews, who contributed to Britain ‘on a scale far disproportionate of their numbers,’ model citizens.

This diversity of opinions illustrates the continuing pluralisation of Jewish space (Hofman 2006), which was set in motion in the second half of the 20th century, as well as the increasing public acceptance of this process as legitimate. What is qualitatively different about the present discourse is that British Jews are no longer afraid of looking disloyal and openly air their support for the Israeli team at the expense of the English team. This is directly connected to the changes in national citizenship: today, although assimilationist pressures still exist and have perhaps intensified in the last few years, they are different from the past. Now they are about political unity and the acceptance of liberal democracy as the foundation of the state, rather then about giving up one’s ethnic, cultural or religious identity. As was demonstrated in chapter six, the past assimilationist model of British citizenship required unconditional loyalty and patriotism and allegiance to the monarch and the country. Part of the same package was a self-presentation of Jewish people as a religious minority, who are otherwise absolutely English or British. The advent of multiculturalism redesigned British citizenship around the concept of civic Britishness based on a politics of identity and ethnic, racial and cultural pluralism. Starting from the 1960s, the changing national discourse regarding the status of new ethnic minorities in Britain, reinforced by race equality legislation, triggered a revision of Jewish status, and led to the simultaneous use of religious and ethno-cultural models of self-presentation. Both models are currently active and are used strategically regardless of how religious or secular the person is.

At the same time, the evidence indicates that the old model of national identity, which restricts Jewishness to the private space, is still active and finds sympathy in the eyes of
some Jews. In line with this restrictive model of British Jewish identity, many voices continue to advocate self-policing and restraint, which means `keeping the quarrels to ourselves' with minimal non-Jewish exposure. ‘We in this country, thank God, are entitled to our opinion’, wrote Howard Klineberg in his letter to the JT (7.11.2003:6), ‘but as Jews, those opinions on Israel, if negative, need to be kept to oneself.’ Judging by other letters, published in the JT, Mr. Klineberg was not alone and each public display of internal problems within Jewish communities, or any media coverage of dissenting opinions within the Jewish community, brought disapproval. Thus, a flood of reproachful letters followed the newspaper’s controversial front-page headline ‘Killing Palestinians...’ (JT 08.09.2004:1), which reported on a small group of religious extremists in the Israeli Parliament. ‘Is your latest headline a CV to write for ‘Terrorist International’? ’ asked Lawrence Stone from Alwoodley. ‘It was a headline the general press could easily pick up,’ warned Elissa Winston. Stanley Scott joined the condemnation: ‘To non-Jewish people, who ... see the paper on the newsstands, they will assume this statement stems from all rabbis.’ Gerty Jackson’s letter, entitled Enough enemies, summarised the argument:

I was shocked by the front-page headline. This is taking freedom of the press too far.
I do not doubt that it was said because I have visited Israel several times, but we have enough enemies and this trouble-making is not news.’
JT 15.09.2004:4

An even bigger outcry followed in response to the formation in February 2007 of the ‘Independent Jewish Voice’, an alternative Jewish representative organisation critical of Israel. When members of this organisation openly supported the boycott of Israeli goods and academic links, another JT reader remembered the old saying ‘never wash your dirty linen in public,’ urging different Jewish factions to sort ‘family problems’ within the ‘family’ (JT 27.07.2007:9). Interestingly, when the same people talk about other minorities in the UK, they often abandon this logic in favour of openly democratic values. For instance, when engaging in observation at several inter-faith communal events for this research, it was clear that Jews were reassured by signs of internal discord within the British Muslim community as this undermined their fears of universal support for radical Islamists.

It is important to emphasise, however, that the research evidence points towards a clear age related bias with regard to models of Jewish representation. Older people, who grew up at a time when Jews customarily kept their identity private, were more inclined to
present a united front. Since older people are more likely to write letters to newspapers, one could suspect that most of the authors of the letters quoted above belong to this age group. In contrast, younger Jews largely disapproved of the strategy of silencing internal discord and considered it ineffective in combating negative images of Jews in Britain. Instead, they spoke in favour of a public celebration of Jewishness and supported overt attempts to combat anti-Semitism, while simultaneously favouring a healthy display of diverse opinions. This was especially evident with teenagers and people in their 20s, many of whom have been exposed to a powerful mixture of democratic and multicultural values through education. Informal conversations with some youngsters at the Community centre revealed a more thoughtful attitude to so-called Jewish traitors, who dared to criticise Israel publicly. Although none of the interviewees indicated their personal support for such views, they defended them on the grounds of free speech, insisting that the best response to this negativity would be to campaign more strongly in support of Israel and Jews.

Behind this strategy is a great desire to think positively about one’s identity and openly display one’s pride in being Jewish, not hiding this identity in a space of private and communal life. In the course of the empirical research, this attitude emerged amongst Jews of all ages. With the exception of two pupils from an independent school, who dismissed it on religious grounds, none of the respondents thought that their Jewish identity was unimportant. Most of them pointed to the great sense of belonging and pride provided by their Jewish identity:

*I enjoy the feeling of belonging – a sense of community – a sense of connection to a rich and long history*

female nursery teacher, 50

*it’s my identity and heritage*

male, 15

*because I feel I belong to a special community rather than being an individual in a religion*

male, 19

*I feel I have a certain identity and I enjoy it*

female, 17

*Because I am proud to be Jewish*

male, 16

*people have to be proud to be Jewish*

anonymous young male

*it is a big part of my life, it is my identity, looking back many years, Jews had a colourful history and most necessary, it has to have a bright future*

male, 20
These attitudes, which are markedly different to the feelings prevalent among British Jews in the past, are strongly connected to a new understanding of national citizenship, which nurtures a pride in being different. In the opinion of Michael Kraft, a middle-aged interviewee, the difference between his school experience and today's school children is staggering. He felt that in the past all Jewish children, as the only minority pupils, wanted to be like the English majority, but nowadays the majority have become 'multicoloured' and it is 'cool' to be different – Sikh, Muslim, Jewish, Black, or anything else.

Other interviewees also observed that a 'negative' definition of Jewishness was no longer acceptable. In December 2004, a semi-formal parents' get-together at the Sinai Reform Synagogue discussed the difficult issue of 'living through Christmas' for families with non-Jewish members and Jewish children in non-Jewish schools. When one father, who referred to his Jewishness as negatively defined (for example, 'Jews don't do Christmas, Jews should not marry out') recalled the resentment and anger that he had endured as a child around the Christmas period, the discussion immediately brought up the issue of positive and negative identifications. A number of people remembered that they grew up with a strong sense of marginality and awareness that being Jewish meant being excluded from certain activities, deprived of certain experiences. All participants agreed that in today's world it was wrong to build one's sense of Jewish identity on this negativity. As an example of how one could turn 'negative' into 'positive', a female parent in her 40s argued that one could actually celebrate Christmas as a 'cultural' tradition and feel Jewish: 'My daughter puts a Magen David (Jewish star) on the Christmas tree and that actually reasserts her Jewishness.' This quote provides another illustration of how, in an era of multiculturalism, Jewish people not only feel less afraid of deconstructing old identity stereotypes and building their own 'bespoke' identities, but they are also gradually loosing their fear of being reprimanded for it, believing that this activity is legitimate and worthy of public display.

7.4. Contemporary views on Anti-Semitism

As a result of the growing intolerance to negative imaging of Jews, the phenomenon of anti-Semitism has been undergoing both conceptual and attitudinal revisions. Although many Jewish people, especially of the older generations, prefer not to publicise instances of anti-Semitism outside of the community, the number of Leeds Jews who no
longer feel ashamed of publicly discussing or counteracting them has grown. Partially it could be explained by the fact that only a minority of Leeds Jews, particularly among the young, have experienced anti-Semitism directed against them personally (see Waterman 2003: 11). Hence for many it is more of a theoretical issue than a gruesome reality of life. More importantly, the present model of citizenship does not penalise, and perhaps even encourages, the reporting of hate crimes. In the past, public acknowledgement of anti-Semitism inadvertently confirmed the marginality of Jews, undermining their status as indistinguishably English citizens. Today the official discourse of citizenship accepts multicultural composition of the society; hence, an acknowledgement of discrimination does not diminish the citizenship status of a minority group in the same way as the past. However, outside the realm of official politics, the old model of citizenship based on English superiority has not been discontinued, thus supporting a continuation of the old privatised attitude to anti-Semitism. This underpins the current ambiguity and anxiety with regard to the phenomenon, and has led to a further fragmentation of attitudes, narratives and behavioural patterns. An examination of respondents' testimonies on the nature and causes of anti-Semitism confirmed the complexity and many-sidedness of its contemporary understandings, which were linked to different ways of defining Jewish and national belongings.

In an age of positive identities, it is understandable why anti-Semitism (i.e. fear and/or experience of anti-Semitism), which is associated with externally imposed negative conception of Jewishness, scored very low in personal rankings of different aspects to feeling Jewish (Table 7.1). At the same time, most of the respondents were aware of the role that social prejudice and stigma had played in the formation of Jewish identities in the past and showed concern about the possibility of its intensification in the future. For Hava, 18, a pupil at a Jewish school, this was a formative narrative of Jewish identity: 'there is a lot of bad in the world and anti-Semitism to Jewish people ... remind us that we are Jewish and why we should all stick together.' The interpretation of anti-Semitism as a unique, timeless and almost irrational hatred of Jewish people, which from the ancient times has been axiomatic in the Grand Jewish Narrative, is still widely used by local Jews of different age, gender, and religiosity. These two citations, from females of very different backgrounds, share an emphasis on the permanence of anti-Semitism. For a very religious 40+ year old interviewee Helen, 'anti-Semitism is a creation of God, there is no rationale behind it, just blind hatred on the side of other
people', while for a Reform-affiliated 26-year-old community leader, 'it's always around' for 'we are constant "other" in Europe.' Interestingly, this narrative is frequently recalled when people describe past episodes of local, national or international Jewish history. On the other hand, this traditional viewpoint coexists with a contemporary revision of anti-Semitism that links the phenomenon to multi-cultural narratives. For instance, one 66-year-old male respondent asserted that 'any "anti" is based on ignorance, lack of integration, the press one reads, the people one mixes with.'

The richness of contemporary discourse regarding multiculturalism and citizenship enables multiple ways of assembling the argument, so that people apply the same multicultural narrative to support differing opinions. For instance, those who saw anti-Semitism as part of racism, and those who thought it was qualitatively different, were equally likely to use multicultural rhetoric. Overall, younger people were more inclined to subsume anti-Semitism under a general notion of racism, even though most of the school pupils had difficulties explaining their views. Two Jewish youth leaders, who were prepared to 'decipher' their views, made this relationship clear:

- 'it's lack of understanding and tolerance' male, 19
- 'a lot of the anti-Semitism stems from stereotypes as does ethnic racism' male, 21

Rather surprisingly, the same view, backed by multicultural values, was expressed by a number of religiously committed people. One of them, 21 year old Rachel, a former Jewish school student, stated, 'it is just abuse of a minority due to ignorance or a small amount of knowledge. People hate things that are different, no matter what it is!' Another 17 year old Jewish school pupil repeated: 'people are anti-Semitic for the same reasons as to other ethnic groups; they can not understand how people are different to them.' Further conversations with this group of Jews showed that many, who felt strongly their 'otherness' in a largely secular Jewish community, turned to the non-Jewish narrative of prejudice to explain the bias towards them in the community. This application of the multicultural narrative was common in different age groups of strictly Orthodox Jews, although young people showed more confidence and consistency in their argument, while older respondents preferred to use different metaphors in different contexts. Thus, Mr. Conway (a 50+ year old local), when speaking generally about inter-group tensions, pointed to many similarities between Jews and other minorities, particularly regarding the general attitude of the secular to the religious.
while retelling his personal experience of harassment by Pakistani youths, he reverted to the traditional explanation that ‘there’s some now and always will be anti-Semitism’.

Understanding anti-Semitism as an instance of racism is consistent with the conventional interpretation of the phenomenon in contemporary national discourses on multiculturalism. This explains why so many respondents effortlessly connected this ‘reading’ of anti-Semitism (as a form of hate-crime) with multiculturalism. More intriguing was the finding that people, who separated the concepts of anti-Semitism and racism, were equally likely to use multicultural values to explain their position. Some even thought that discrimination and prejudice were much worse for other minorities than for Jews:

_Asians and Blacks have it more than Jews, but because of their policies now there are less graffitis on our homes. People are more accustomed to Jews._ Alicia, 40s

_you can’t always tell someone is Jewish by their looks. I am Sephardi and often mistaken for Mediterranean or Indian and the abuse is different._ Jennie, 44

_for non-kippah wearing Jews, their Jewishness is less obvious than for Black/Asian people._ Simon, 28

_I believe other ethnic groups still experience discrimination which Jews don’t._ anonymous male, 41

These statements indirectly point to the voluntary nature of Jewish identity, which, in comparison to visible racial differences, is much easier to hide and disguise as ‘white’.

When talking about anti-Semitism in general terms, many people mentioned the Holocaust as an important reference point, as the darkest hour in modern Jewish history:

_‘there was a Holocaust in the past and people are more tolerant now’_ anonymous male, 16

_I believe Holocaust shows how anti-Semitism here used to be._ Brad, 16, independent school pupil

Whereas the Holocaust and anti-Semitism are important identity ‘signifiers’ for all Jews, their narrative place and interpretation could vary. For some they are exclusively Jewish markers, for others – and especially for people actively involved in cross-communal work such as inter-faith forums, Holocaust education, or support for today’s refugees – the contemporary meaning of Holocaust is not limited to the Jewish experience. Thus, a 50+ year old teacher, who uses the Holocaust in her work with young offenders, insisted that the Holocaust was not a one-off tragic Jewish incident but
a continuous chain of atrocities, which included contemporary genocide in Rwanda and Sudan. The opinion of two local ladies in their 60s, who in January 2007 participated in Holocaust commemoration in Leeds City Hall, was very different. They felt disgraced that a supposedly Jewish memorial day had been ruined because of an ‘inappropriately big accent’ on non-Jewish victims of contemporary violence.

This absence of accord is also evident in the way local Jews assess the historical change in the level of anti-Semitism and how they comment on its present level. The opinions are split within all age groups, but teenagers are marginally more optimistic in their evaluation of the perceived change and future prospects. The fragmentation of the Jewish discursive space occurs on many levels: in terms of positive-negative judgments and the type of values used to make judgements (Jewish and all-human), in terms of causal explanations, and in the choice of narratives. For those, who, like 14 year old Ed, believe that ‘there's less anti-Semitism [and] the Jewish community has grown,’ the explanation most often lies in the space of national politics, which makes the connection to multicultural narrative very blunt. According to 19 year old Ben, ‘people today are much more informed about Judaism and Democracies make an effort to combat anti-Semitism’, while Michelle (21) considers it appropriate to comment about racism in general: ‘racism was very bad in the past and is still found now, but must have been harder to cope with.’ 42 year old community worker Helen shares this opinion, feeling ‘less defensive about it [her Jewishness] than previous generations; less stigma to being a minority; not seen as an immigrant’. However, she attributes this not only to political changes in the nation, but also to the changing position of Jews in the society: ‘Less state-sponsored overt prejudice. Jews are more integrated into mainstream/ powerful parts of population.’ Chana, 18, attributes the power of change solely to the Jewish people: ‘I think with the current situation Jews are less tolerated. However, the Jewish population is a bit stronger.’

While most people think that physical safety for Jews has improved, many do not consider it as an adequate indicator of diminishing anti-Semitism. Among those respondents who asserted that anti-Semitism has not diminished, and perhaps even has grown, only a small minority simply use the original Grand Jewish Narrative, arguing, like 15-year-old Ralf, that ‘people will always hate the Jews no matter what.’ Most other respondents who expressed concern with a rising level of anti-Semitism turned to more complex narratives that blend Jewish and non-Jewish discourses:
Anti-Semitism is more political. People know what the Jew is like now and the hatred still exists; before it was just ignorance.

Rachel, 21

it is less apparent, but below the surface it exists. Jews are not necessarily perceived as being victims any more and are regarded unfortunately as oppressors in the Middle East.

Dana, 50, nursery teacher

there is actually more anti-Semitism than there was in the past. You have the Arabs, the Blacks and the Christians. It's not everyone, but at least 94% of the people.

Hava, 18, Jewish school pupil it has simply mutated because we find anti-Semitism from the above groups [Blacks and Asians]. Anti-Semitism unites them against us.

local Orthodox rabbi, 30s

Understandably, many point to new forms of anti-Semitism, ‘it is shown in different forms (media)’ (Eddie, 14 Independent School), especially the one ‘wrapped up as anti-Israel’ (Barbara, 74). Yet, even this interpretation could generate cross-minority references. Johanna, 17, a pupil of a local secular school with a strong inter-communal ethos, makes an obvious parallel between Jewish and Muslim misrepresentations in the UK: ‘media representation is biased against both Israel and Islam’.

7.5. Jewish identities as a reflection of national discourse

Generally speaking, the incongruity of identities seems to be rather typical of many respondents, especially those of a younger age, and/or those of a more secular outlook. Often intra-group differences were as pronounced as inter-group ones, and personal inconsistencies were very common. When personal responses to the questionnaire were analysed with regard to their internal consistency, the incongruities were the norm rather than the exception. For instance, some people who confessed to be secular and unobservant, yet, who also considered their Jewish identity to be strong, often marked the religious observance category as very important to feeling Jewish. However, their own example (as secular and with a strong Jewish identity) negated the importance of ‘religious practice’ to strong Jewish identity. For an anonymous 16 year-old pupil from an independent school who apparently has very strong atheistic convictions these incongruities were particularly blunt. To begin with, he denied any importance of Jewish identity for him explaining that ‘I am an atheist’, thus asserting that Jewishness was a strictly religious identity and it was not suitable for him. Later, when strongly disagreeing with the statement ‘one could be secular and Jewish’, he reconfirmed his narrow understanding of Jewishness. In a few other instances, however, without noticing it, he switched to the ethno-social definition of Jewish identity. Thus he did not
think that ‘Judaism is central to being Jewish’ and his definition of Jewish community
did not mention religion and probably reflected his general views on what any good
community ought to be. According to his views, the Jewish community consists of
“people socialising with each other simply because they are Jewish and feel they can
trust each other.”

Likewise, the majority of respondents of all ages saw no contradiction in their
simultaneous approval of such conflicting statements as

- Nowadays Jewish people are free to choose and to change their own identities
- Judaism (as a religion) is central to being Jewish
- Nowadays one could be secular and Jewish

Agreement with the second statement means acceptance of religious standards as core
values of Jewish identity, which are explicit about the permanence of one’s Jewishness
and the utmost duty of following the Torah laws. Yet, the agreement with the other two
statements presupposes the freedom to choose identity and the legitimacy of secular
Jewishness, which defies the religious principles of Jewish identity. This apparent
incoherence of answers indicating a fragmentation of Jewish identities, is connected to
the changing terms of national citizenship, which had a direct and a mediated impacts
on the perceptions of Jewish self. On the one hand, for many British Jews the breakup
and disruptiveness of identities has become a normal state of personality, thus making
Jewish identity only one of many, often loosely integrated personal ‘selves’. Hence, the
fragmentation of general identities, which legitimised a contradictory and incoherent
sense of self, has ‘infected’ the Jewish self, authorising incongruous and plural Jewish
identities. On the other hand, the changing model of national citizenship contributed to
the fragmentation of the Jewish discursive space and the pluralisation of public
representations of Jewish identities, which has also reinforced individual aspirations for
‘designer’ Jewishness. Returning to the above example, the logic behind the
contradictory answers could be understood only by framing them in the appropriate
discursive fields. The pro-choice attitude to identity (Jewish people are free...) reflects a
common Western democratic value of freedom of choice rather than a traditional Jewish
value. At the same time, the affirmation of the centrality of Judaism pays tribute to the
time-honoured interpretation of Jewishness as a religious identity, which is still a valid
representation of British Jewry in the national discourse. Finally, the third statement is
likely to be interpreted as a confirmation of the factual existence of a great number of
secular Jews, irrespective of respondents’ personal attitudes to it.
Although similar influences affect other minority groups in the UK, there are several reasons why Jews, nationally and locally, are perhaps more sensitive to them than other ethnic minorities and are more open to them today than in the past. As one of the well-established minority groups, Jewish individuals feel culturally and economically fully integrated into society, which enhances their exposure to national discursive and institutional developments. Their middle class status and high level of secularisation gives them the educational, financial and ideological resources to withstand the potentially coercive communal power to force a certain ‘reading’ of British Jewish identity. A reduction in the level of overt and institutionalised anti-Semitism has increased the Jews’ sense of physical security, and their ‘whiteness’ has provided then with the choice of whether to ditch, or to keep some form of, their Jewish identity. As was argued earlier, the motivation for local Jews to identify with other Jews stems from a general desire to belong and to identify with a distinct community of which they feel proud. Related to it is the growing role of the ‘consumer approach’ to identities in general, and to Jewish identity in particular, which is encouraged by the new model of citizenship.

In addition to the increasing independence of Jews as individuals vis-à-vis their collectivity, the changing model of national citizenship has problematised the previous version of Anglo-Jewish identity, leaving it vulnerable to intra-communal discord. Rabbi Julian Sinclair traces back the roots of this development to the 1970 and 80s, when the rebellion of a new generation of professional Jews against their parents’ ‘ersatz anglicised Judaism’ fell on the fertile ground of multiculturalism:

Many of us understandably drifted further away from Anglo-Jewishness, but some tried to retrace our grandparents’ ...authentic brands of Yiddishkeit.

From the 1970s one could pursue these journeys under the flag of convenience of multiculturalism. Monolithic Englishness was crumbling and gradually it became acceptable to be British and something else. ...Jews took their place among the ranks of recognised ethnic minorities in whom our post-imperial British hosts began to display a belated curiosity

Sinclair 29.06.2007: 39

A local community activist, Alan (46), makes a similar observation with regard to the local community today: ‘middle of the road’ Jewish observance is slowly disappearing as Jewry polarises towards either religious or non-religious. Israel has become much more central to the concept of modern Judaism.’
7.6. Conclusion

This chapter has demonstrated that the local Jewish population, just as Jews in other localities across Britain, has been increasingly exposed to the complexities and fragmentation of contemporary identities across different scales of their existence. As a consequence of identity politics, multiple issues simultaneously compete for public attention, thus creating additional cleavages in society and undermining traditional identity packages based on socio-economic status, ethnicity, religion, age, or gender. Although some identities are imposed, some are learnt in the process of socialisation, and some are acquired (consciously and voluntarily), people today have less societal inhibitors than in the past to prevent them from mixing and ‘tailoring’ identities to fit their individual needs and aspirations. In the words of Jeremy Rosen, a regular columnist for the JT,

*The post-1960s tolerance of different cultures, religions, and immigrant societies meant that one no longer needed to accommodate to prevailing norms. There weren’t any, any more.*

JT 24.08.2007: 9.

This is especially vivid in the segmentation of the middle class, which is no longer associated with whiteness and Christianity, but includes people of different racial, ethnic, religious and gender mix. The combinations of traditional understandings of Jewish ‘self’ and new meanings of citizenship have broadened the spectrum of local interpretations of Jewishness. This is reflected in the creative synthesis of old and new, Jewish and non-Jewish narratives. In her research on contemporary Jewish identities in Croatia, Hofman (2006) makes a similar argument regarding the increasing idiosyncrasy of Jewish identity constructions, while emphasising the importance of multiple social and political contexts within which groups are situated.

The narrative analysis of contemporary testimonies of Leeds Jews shows how identity narratives of different origins come together in a creative fusion, and at times in a conflicting rivalry. The spectrum of discursive scenarios includes a time-honoured Jewish narrative that sets the Jewish experience aside from other peoples’ experiences; a traditional Anglo-Jewish narrative that combines cultural assimilation with religious distinction; cross-cultural narratives of minority experience, which are the discursive borrowings from identity politics and anti-racist ideology, as well as multiple interpretations of multiculturalism. While this chapter has focused on how changing national citizenship affects Jewish people as individuals, the implications of this change
have exceeded the individual level, bringing the restructuring of Jewish collective identities. This will be explored in the following chapter.
Chapter Eight

Imagining the community: Jewish collective identity

This chapter continues with an examination of the complexities of modern meanings and representations of Jewish identity. While the previous chapter was concerned with the personal views, opinions and identities of Leeds Jews, this chapter focuses on collective identities analysing the Leeds Jewish community as an intersection of the imagined, the physical and the social, as a totality, which constitutes, in Lefebvre’s terminology, the production and maintenance of localised Jewish space (Lefebvre 1991; Soja 1996). This angle of analysis gives a different perspective on the Leeds Jewish population for it helps to appreciate the mechanisms of institutional and discursive continuity and change of communal organisations, practices, narratives and identities.

The chapter focuses on the analysis of two public images of Leeds Jewry, exploring their main premises and examining the functions of these discursive metaphors or ‘space representations’, in shaping individual and group identities and every-day experiences. These, in turn, feed back to maintain or challenge these images. While one of these ‘conceived images’ (Soja 1996) homogenises the Leeds Jewish community as a union of similar individuals with the key word ‘traditional’ attached to it, the second narrative presents Leeds Jews as a segmented ‘community of communities’ and emphasises multiple cleavages and divisions that criss-cross this population. This image renders the traditional basis of communal solidarity obsolete and, reflecting new discursive and institutional realities of national citizenship, advocates the adoption of a new formula of communal solidarity as well as new ways of its representation in the wider society. The chapter concludes with an analysis of a contemporary variety and flexibility of external representations of this place-specific Jewish collectivity, tracing the origin and legitimacy of this diversity to the general pluralisation and fragmentation of national spaces of citizenship. The identificational ambiguity in the national discourse empowers different ‘readings’ of individual and collective identities and encourages their contextual usage.
8.1. Traditional image: ‘Community of the same’

The first narrative of the collective ‘self’ assumes the existence of certain fixed criteria that define the ‘essence’ of the local Jewish community. This representation of local Jewish space has a profound effect on ‘lived space’ (Soja 1996: 68), on how its members perceive their position within the community and, consequently, on how they experience their Jewishness. This stereotype defines members either as comfortably ‘fitting into’ the community or remaining on its fringes. Drawing on individual accounts, it was possible to paint a portrait of a ‘typical Jewish Loiner’ (Table 8.1),

**Table 8.1. A typical Jewish ‘Loiner’, as viewed by members of Leeds Jewish community**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>General Credo</td>
<td>- ‘traditional’</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- ‘Englishman of Jewish persuasion’</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Family Origin and History</td>
<td>- Leeds ‘born and bred’</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- of ‘Ashkenazi’ (E.European) descent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- family connection with tailoring</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- knows and interested in the communal past</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religious Affiliation</td>
<td>- member of an orthodox Synagogue</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- selectively observant</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- not interested in religious learning</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social Relations</td>
<td>- deeply-integrated into the communal social networks</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- through family, relatives and friends</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- member of Jewish organisation for reasons of identity and socialisation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Family Life</td>
<td>- traditionally gendered, at certain point in life expected to be married with a few children</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- conforms to the conventional family role patterns of male being the main income provider and female responsibility for housekeeping and child-caring, her career is being secondary</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Socio-Economic Status</td>
<td>- middle class and above with good secular education</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(college education is expected by under 50 y. olds)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- present or former occupation as professional, manager or self-employed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Place of Residence</td>
<td>- LS17 or LS8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
which comprises a list of subjectively selected markers that define the core and the margins of the community. As was stated in chapter 7, many interviewees, when asked about the collective image of Leeds Jewry, characterised it as a closely-knit traditional provincial community. Although the term ‘traditional’ has been frequently used to characterise the whole of Anglo-Jewry, in Leeds it has become especially pronounced. This stereotype is a continuation of a historically dominant homogenising narrative representation of the Leeds Jewish community, which since the mid 1930s has been consensually described as a uniform Jewish group in terms of its immigrant origin, adherence to traditional Orthodoxy, working class status and affiliation with tailoring businesses (see chapter 6). For many current members of the community, this representation (with a few updates) is still appropriate.

This is supported by the frequency with which this image is being recycled in different narrative contexts. Thus, Joan, 67, who came to Leeds from Glasgow, thinks that Leeds Jewry still possess ‘provincial attitudes and Lithuanian connections’. Although the term ‘traditional’ is extensively used in the communal discourse, its meaning has become fuzzier than ever (see chapter 7) because it is applied to different dimensions and scales of social life. It is, for example, used interchangeably with regard to religious, social and cultural spaces. It also defines values, norms and behavioural expectations associated with the Jewish and non-Jewish mainstream, operating at communal, local, national and international levels. For instance, in the following self-reflection, ‘traditionalism’ assumes a religious meaning at the family scale:

_I come from a traditional family. We always sit together for a Friday meal, do Seder, buy kosher meat, but we don't not drive of Shabbat, we don't go to Shul, we watch telly on Friday. I love Jewish holidays, but we are more traditional than religious_

Angela, 23, youth leader

No less widespread is a social understanding of traditionalism, which, in the opinion of the respondents, is another key feature of the Leeds Jewish ethos. According to this understanding, a typical Leeds Jew has to be locally born, resides in the Jewish neighbourhood (LS17 or LS8), and is deeply socially embedded in extensive family and friendship networks. Helen, 42, who came from another provincial community, but has been living in Leeds for 9 years, picks this up in her definition of Leeds distinctiveness as ‘more inbred – less immigration: lots of close relatives, high numbers of ‘family’ businesses.’ Since people tend to choose those communal activities and organisations (secular and religious), which are attended by their social circle, social cleavages based
on family/friendship ties often become institutionally embodied, thus reinforcing their significance in the community\textsuperscript{24}. Generally, this narrative portrayal of a typical Leeds Jew views membership in Jewish organisations as an important signifier of Jewish identity. Many interviewees confessed that family, friends and status played a decisive role in their choice of communal organisations, groups and charities that they belong to and support. Thus, women of the same generation and social background, who are often friends beforehand, form local groups of WIZO (Women Zionist Organisation) so that their charity work and socialisation can go hand in hand.

Choice of Synagogue membership provides a particularly good illustration of the power of social ‘traditionalism’. Most people keep membership in a particular Synagogue ‘\textit{out of habit and family tradition}’, paying little attention to the particularities of Synagogue ethos and its religious life. For teenagers and young adults, who often keep membership together with their parents, their attendance at a certain Shul depends more on where their friends go (or not go). In the words of Michelle, 21, a communal youth leader,

\begin{quote}
I have been to Shul all my life. We belong to Street Lane as a family, but when I’ve got older, with my friends, they all belong to Etz Haim, so I normally go to Etz Haim, to socialise.
\end{quote}

Another prerequisite of synagogue membership implied in the concept of the Leeds Jewish ‘mainstream’ is the requirement to attend one of the three main Leeds Orthodox Synagogues. Although affiliation with an Orthodox Synagogue is often considered as a feature of mainstream British Jewry in general, this requirement has been particularly stringent in Leeds. Thus, a few highly educated mothers privately confessed to not being happy with their families’ Orthodox membership and felt that the Reform Synagogue would be a better choice for them. They blamed the social stigma attached to the Reform Synagogue for their decision to continue with Orthodox membership for the sake of their children, who would otherwise risk being socially marginalised. One mother of three, in her late 30s, admitted that the Reform was particularly appealing to her because of the absence of physical and social barriers to women’s full participation in the services\textsuperscript{25}, but she insisted that their affiliation with the Orthodox synagogue better reflected their social status in the community.

\textsuperscript{24} see more on social cleavages in Ebbinghaus 1996:68.
\textsuperscript{25} In accordance with the Orthodox requirement of segregating males and females during the service, the synagogue design incorporates a physical barrier or a detached ladies’ gallery, which increases the distancing of women from the religious service and encourages them just to the socialise.
Another side of British Jewish religious traditionalism that has been deeply engrained in Leeds Jewish culture is the paradoxical duality of expectations, which disassociates Orthodox Synagogue membership from the requirements of stringent religious observance. Thus, in a synagogue all people are expected to behave in accordance with religious rules: they dress properly, they separate males and females during the service, they observe dietary laws of Kashrut, don’t use electricity on Shabbat, etc. Yet outside religious premises, personal desecrations of these laws are no longer stigmatised, and, over time, the list of acceptable transgressions has got longer. For instance, because of the Orthodox prohibition on driving on Shabbat or Jewish Holidays, all Orthodox Synagogues keep their parking spaces closed. Since many people drive to the service, they park in the immediate vicinity instead. In the past, this level of defiance lay outside the boundaries of socially tolerated misconduct, which was part of a Leeds-specific understanding of ‘traditionalism’, and transgressors would have been publicly shamed. Consequently, they parked further away from the Synagogue and then walked the rest of the distance with everybody else, hiding their ‘sins’ from public view. Today, those who drive on Shabbat have no fear of being reprimanded by other congregants or religious authorities. Moreover, since parking on the streets creates traffic bottlenecks and is a subject of regular complaints from local residents, many openly rebel against the ‘inconvenient’ and ‘outdated’ regulation on Synagogue parking and some have been known to demand that spaces are opened.

The contradiction between nominal Orthodoxy and behavioural religious laxity that underlies the image of Leeds Jewry as a traditional provincial community has another manifestation – religious learning, which, the narrative tells us, is not appealing for the bulk of busy and practical local Jews. This trait has been seen as an unfortunate marker of the Leeds community since its earliest days and has been passed down to today’s local Jewry. This is exemplified by an account from one of the interviewees:

The way I see it, Jewish seed in Leeds is not really a learned seed, it is a sort of artisan seed. The background of people who came here from the places in Poland, Lithuania – well, they were mainly working people. There were not many people who were intellectuals. I think those tended to go mainly to London or Manchester. I am not sure, why they went. Here, it was workers’ environment and a lot of them have done very well, a lot of them became very wealthy. But we still do not have this ethos.

Mr. Conway, in his 50s

Thus, the narration of collective identity for Leeds Jewry through references to traditionalism implies an institutionalised incongruity between, on the one hand, an
adherence to normative Orthodoxy as an identity ‘marker’ and, on the other, a growing social tolerance of transgressions and secularism. This is consistent with the research conclusions outlined in chapter 7, which established the strong influence of secularism on the privately held views of Leeds Jews. Generally, the research data show that for many local Jews their religious beliefs are disconnected from their participation in religious practice. This explains why people easily accept Orthodox Judaism, which they see as an authentic model of Jewishness, but view its restrictive impositions on a modern lifestyle as optional and open to negotiation. Ironically, such an interpretation of traditionalism contradicts the basic principle of canonical traditional Judaism, which in this research was exemplified by the views of religiously observant people, who placed religious practice at the top of the hierarchy of Jewish attributes and insisted on unquestionable compliance with rabbinical authorities. As historical analysis of local data has demonstrated (chapter 6), the evolution of Leeds Jewish traditionalism has followed the historical paths of Jewish socio-economic and cultural integration into the mainstream of British society, thus absorbing many of the cultural habits and values of British middle class.

These cultural borrowings from British middle-class morals, albeit sometimes with a time lag of a generation, could be seen in many of the qualities typically ascribed to Leeds Jews, but they are most clearly identifiable in the description of family life and social status. The local Jewish collective narrative has not changed much since the 1950s when a substantial part of the Leeds Jewish population joined the ranks of the middle class (see chapter 6). That is how Mrs Rosenbloom, a holocaust survivor, who married a local Jewish ‘Loiner’ in the 1950s, describes the family expectations of the time:

*My husband was a proper Englishman, proper Leeds man; and of course he was born into a relatively Orthodox Jewish family, who followed Kashruth and did the regular bits and pieces. ...I was driven by a desire to study and to have a career, which 50-60-70 years ago was also not quite an acceptable thing for a nice Jewish girl to do. But, nevertheless, I did succeed, I had a career and Norman was tolerant and acceptable of all those sort of things. Although I think that his family found it a bit difficult because they thought I should be more at home doing more cooking and looking after him.*

Just as in the past, today’s stereotypical description of Leeds Jews still assumes women will play a conventional gender role, involving marriage, children and a traditional division of family responsibilities: the male duty is to provide for the family financially, while the women assume domestic responsibilities. Perhaps the biggest contemporary
alteration to this model relates to the current expectation that women will continue working after marriage, although it is most likely to be a part-time job that supplements the husband’s income. She is still expected to look after her family, although the pressure to be a ‘perfect mum’ has subsided and men are expected to be more involved in domestic chores and children’s upbringing than before. To a great extent, this stereotype is rooted in national Jewish expectations of conventional family life, which are confirmed by national statistics. According to the 2001 Census, Jews were less likely to cohabit than the general population (8.2 per cent compared with 13.1 per cent), especially in households with children (84.5% of such households had married parents compared with 65.1 per cent in general population; see Graham et al 2007: 53-4). This trend is confirmed at the local level by Murray Freedman, who in an open letter to wrote, ‘one hardly ever hears of the Jewish offspring of co-habiting couples where both parties are Jewish’ (Freedman 23.03.2007:10). This claim is supported by the research interviews with married, widowed and single locals, who unanimously portrayed the traditional Jewish family as the ‘cradle’ of Jewish life; a vehicle for fighting assimilation and passing a Jewish heritage down through the generations. Similar representations of Jewish family life have been prevalent in the local Jewish press. A sample of publications over the last three years (from 2004 to 2007) revealed that most articles narrating personal life stories of local Jews depict a traditional family pattern and involve conventionally gendered, married or widowed people.

When one considers how the community is habitually described in socio-economic terms, the middle-class bias shines through even more clearly. There is some ambiguity with regard to the depiction of older generations, whom the collective narrative imagines as of poor working class background, hard working and self-made. However, the portrait of the community’s average member, of less than 60 years old, is very reminiscent of a 1980s-styled middle-class Englishman. Accounts from a cross-section of the community typically portray community members as: male, with a decent school education (acquired privately or publicly), likely to have a university degree, and a job from the top occupational range that includes professionals, businessmen, managers and the self-employed. When, in June 2005, parents of the local Jewish primary school pupils gathered to discuss falling payments for Jewish Studies, this stereotypical presentation of local Jewry was vividly demonstrated. A common view was that low contributions were not related to the financial abilities of the majority of parents, who ‘drive posh cars’ and ‘go on fancy holiday trips’ but to the voluntary nature of
contributions, which some parents chose to ignore, spending the money instead on 'their other kids' fees for Leeds Grammar'.

The geography of the community plays a great part in reinforcing this perception of Jewish middle class wealth and prosperity. Thus, Edward Ziff, President of the Leeds Jewish Welfare Board, in his annual charity appeal referred to the prosperity of the Jewish residential area as proof of people's financial capability to contribute more to charity: 'If I walk around the comfortable and affluent areas of our community, I fear how few families donate to the Board' (JT, 21.09.2007:1). A high level of spatial awareness, which symbolically linked the physical geography of residence with a high socio-economic status and the historical achievements of the Leeds Jewish community, also emerged in most of the personal stories and collective narratives recorded for this research. The narrative analogy between the residential movement of local Jews and their socio-economic advancement, which acquired a central discursive role in the 1960s and remains a significant marker for today's Jews, testifies to the great historical stability of the local Jewish discourse.

The normality of a middle class lifestyle is also evident in the assumed range of recreational activities that, according to the prevailing view, an average Jew in Leeds is involved in. Thus, an analysis of commercial advertisements in the local Jewish newspaper, JT, and the latest glossy communal magazine, J-Life Leeds, reveals a traditional range of middle-class interests: golf clubs and expensive health and fitness centres, theatre, restaurants, art and consumer exhibitions, personal financial investments and exotic holidays. However, the stereotype incorporates one key difference that sets local Jews apart from the rest of middle-class British people: Jews in general, but local Jews in particular, 'just like to be left among ourselves' (Mr. Conway, 50s). They find reassurance in seeing lots of other Jews engaged in the same activity or belonging to the same organisations.

The research did not uncover any clear expectations about the political sympathies of Leeds Jews. All data sources, however, pointed to the affinity of the majority of local Jews to a 'middle of the road' approach to politics in all respects, except for issues of special Jewish interest, such as Israel or anti-Semitism. Given its reputation as a strong Zionist foothold, Leeds Jewry is expected to support Israel unconditionally. This image finds confirmation in the frequency and enthusiasm of Israel and Zionism-related publications in the JT, which by far outweigh other locally reported news. By and large,
in the space of national politics, the Leeds Jewish community has a reputation for being more politically conservative than British Jewry in general. This political conservatism often emerged during interviews and informal conversations with the older generations. Thus, with specific reference to the role of Michael Howard and Oliver Letwin in the Conservative party, Mr. Hirseman (70s) conveyed his disapproval of Jewish front-line involvement in national politics, saying 'it's bad for Jews to run for the offices'. He justified this with reference anti-Semitism, arguing that 'they don't like us nowhere in the world, especially Muslims'. Mr. Hirseman, along with some other interviewees, also disapproved of British Jewish 'radicalism', especially in London, where, according to him, some Jews have often voiced more extreme opinions than their non-Jewish counterparts.

8.2. Defining the margins of the community

The narrative representation of a typical Jewish 'Loiner' seems to be deeply ingrained in the collective mentality of local Jews and is very important for understanding private and collective identities. Almost any narration of communal or family histories dwells on this image of Leeds as traditional and enclosed. This narrative is also frequently applied to the present community as a means of assessing the historical trajectory of Leeds Jewry. This simultaneously positions the group in the space of national/international Jewish affairs and in British society. For some, Leeds Jewish traditionalism is a positive personal experience. Hence, it is viewed as 'social capital' (Putnam 1993 and 2000), an invaluable asset in further communal development. For instance, some respondents emphasise the relatively small size but hospitable character of the community that creates a 'friendly ambience' (Ben, 15) and sets it apart from London and Manchester. The following comments give reason why younger Jewish residents like the Leeds community:

26 A more objective view on Jewish 'radicalism' and other aspects of socio-political attitudes of British Jews, including London Jews, see the 1996 Jewish Policy Research Institute study (Miller etc. 1996).
- The Jewish Community is big enough to provide a good social life with a good range of activities, and is generally a friendly community. Alan, 46

- because I knew lots of people there Alex, 16

- there’s lots of social stuff to do and a close community to be involved in if you want to and need support Johanna, 17

- Supportive Jewish community; good family atmosphere and range of schools for religious types; good social activities for all ages; good welfare board, kosher shops; shuls. Rachel, 21

Others dismiss the Leeds traditionalism and closeness as a communal liability, an outdated mode of communal existence, which Leeds Jewry has to overcome to have a sustainable future. For instance, Allan, 71, who has lived in Leeds all his life, describes Leeds Jewry as parochial, while 67 year-old Joan feels uncomfortable in Leeds because of ‘middle class complacency [and] religious conservatism.’ She suggests that a way forward is through a ‘much, much more democratic leadership of community. Conscious attempt to get away from middle class control of everything’ and to put ‘women in more influential and feminist roles.’ Still, most people are less categorical in their judgements and opportunistically use parts of this narrative to create positive and negative images of Leeds traditionalism.

Arguably, a more important function of this narrative is to categorise members of the community into those who comfortably fit in and those who are sidelined to the margins of the community. The articulation of ‘typicality’ enhances a sense of solidarity in some, but it simultaneously constructs the notion of who is the ‘Other’ (Allen 1999: 261) inside the community, promoting a sense of marginality and discomfort for those who do not confirm to this constructed image. Mrs Rosenbloom, a holocaust survivor, says that even now ‘[I] do not feel comfortable that I belong here,’ despite spending nearly 60 years in Leeds. Later, in the interview she reiterated the feeling and pondered on the possible explanation:

And even at my old age I still do not feel a 100% integrated into Leeds Jewish community. I think most of it has to do with independence, and, coming from a continental background, a different sort of Jewishness.

...I think that I could describe myself as a secular Jew – I was born Jewish, I appreciate the Jewish culture, although I am rather ignorant in many ways...but I find it very difficult to accept the confines of religious practice. ... Now, within that context, I think that indigenous Jewish population finds it very difficult.
Mrs. Rosenbloom attributes her marginality to being an outsider and having secular convictions in a community that demands at least nominal adherence to Orthodoxy. In fact, both of these factors, operate in conjunction with other factors, defining how close an individual or a group is to the symbolic ‘centre’ of the local Jewish community. Given that a sense of belonging and identity are the main reasons for engagement in the community, these dimensions of marginality (referred further as ‘vectors of Jewish marginality’), are very important: the perception of social distance influences the level of psychological comfort and provides (dis)incentives to participate in the community.

Table 8.2 lists four key dimensions of Jewish marginality in Leeds: religious affiliation, birth-place, residence and social status. Not all of them have equal significance and often a marginal position on one of the ‘axes’ could be offset by a central position in other categories. Thus, some community members reside outside the collectively imagined physical borders of the community (sometimes living as far away as Harrogate) but nevertheless self-identify, and are identified, as typical representatives of the Jewish community. Their residential detachment is compensated for by their extensive social embeddedness in the local community through family, work, Synagogue membership, etc. and conformity to the Leeds-specific understanding of Jewish identity.

Of all vectors of marginality, religious affiliation stands out as the most important for local Jewish people. Since the image of the community is linked to traditional Orthodox Judaism, deviations towards more secular, reform or strictly Orthodox practices are perceived as visibly ‘different’. Interestingly, the attitude to people who are fully secularised and unobservant is more sympathetic than to Reform and strictly Orthodox Jews. Atheists are commonly perceived as demonstrating a passive non-compliance with religious standards, but do not challenge the usual order of things.

As far as Reform and strictly Orthodox Jews are concerned, the picture is different, for they, although in very different ways, actively defy many conventions of traditional English Orthodox Judaism. Hence, many interviewees, who considered themselves ‘middle of the ground sensible Jews’, openly distanced themselves from either camp, but spoke about atheists with more sympathy.
Table 8.2. The local vectors of Jewish marginality

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>vectors</th>
<th>margins</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>religious affiliation</td>
<td>Secular</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Reform</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Strictly-Orthodox</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Birth-place</td>
<td>other places in the UK</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Israel</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Other abroad</td>
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<tr>
<td>residence</td>
<td>Leeds city borders</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Commuting Jews from around Leeds</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>students</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>status-related</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>economic</td>
<td>Poor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>minority</td>
<td>Sexual minorities, disabled, women</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>marriage</td>
<td>Out-married and cohabiting with a non-Jewish partner, children from such relationships</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Attendance at a meeting of the North Leeds Debating Society on the divisiveness of religion (Is Religion Divisive? 24.11.2003) revealed that some Jewish (usually male) participants with strong anti-religious convictions had partners, family and/or friends, who practice traditional Judaism. This suggests that the coexistence of atheism and traditionalism within the confines of one Jewish family is possible and is likely to be less troublesome than the coexistence of religiously observant orthodoxy and mainly culturally inspired traditionalism.

In contrast, the local Reform movement has been living with a sense of marginality from the very first days of its creation in the 1940s. Back then, a group of middle-class Jewish refugees, who came to Leeds from Europe and from London, found Leeds’ close-knit working class traditional community very unaccommodating. They became a driving force behind the creation of the Reform Synagogue, which was based on their own understanding of Jewish identity. Thus, their marginality in the community was multidimensional: their different brand of Judaism and their different class background amplified their status as strangers to Leeds. Due to a long history of alienation in the local community, a sense of social difference from ‘Jewish Yorkshire men’ has become a part of the Leeds Reform identity narrative. One of the founding members of the Sinai Synagogue, German-born Ernest Sterne, in his book dedicated to the Synagogue,
remembered that, from the earliest days, locally born Jews did not hide their animosity. Indeed, resistance from a Jewish Councillor stalled their planning application for the acquisition of burial land in Leeds, prompting them to bury their dead in a Bradford reform cemetery (Sterne 1985:6).

A narrative of marginality regularly appears in public meetings and on the pages of the Sinai Chronicle, the Reform Synagogue magazine. In personal conversations, members of the Reform congregation described ostracism and discrimination from non-observant but Orthodox-affiliated Leeds Jews. Sharing her bad memories, Mrs. Silver in her late 70s, a founding member of the Synagogue, remembered how an Orthodox person, on learning that she was a Reform Jewess, told her publicly, ‘I would not care if you did not call yourself Jewish.’ This offended, but did not surprise her, as she explained, ‘I am used to hearing things as a Reform Jewess, things that are not very nice.’ Other members of the Reform movement bitterly recounted how they were still denied proper representation in communal organisations, such as Leeds Bet Din (the supreme Rabbinical authority) or Kashrut Committee (Dietary supervision). They remember cases where the children of Reform-converted parents were not allowed in the community’s summer schemes because of their Reform conversion, which is not recognised by the Orthodox authorities.

For most of the Reform movement’s existence in Leeds, the Orthodox authorities of Leeds Jewry have disapproved of the movement and accused them of damaging Judaism and encouraging assimilation. They also warned their congregants of other ‘disastrous consequences’ of the Reform movement. One female, 41, non-observant Jewess with a traditional background, intuitively lowered her voice when talking about the Reform Jews and whispered, ‘Imagine, women are wearing talit and kippah27 there, that is too much. What’s next then?’ In another instance, reported by a Jewish teacher responsible for a Jewish Assembly in an independent school, parents of Jewish pupils almost unanimously objected to a Reform rabbi giving a talk to their children for the fear of ‘improper ideas’, yet, they had no problems with a Muslim or Christian cleric talking.

Given the prolonged history of local stigmatisation and negativity, the Sinai congregation has bolstered the image of ‘self’ by investing in its positive representation.

27 These are a shawl and head cover, which are designated male attributes.
and inclusion at other scales of Jewish and British life. Thus, the Reform-affiliated Jews forge more ties with sympathetic Jewish institutions nationwide and abroad, and seek cooperation with local non-Jewish organisations. They are very vocal in inter-faith and inter-ethnic relations locally and regionally, often taking on a role of community’s emissary in inter-communal affairs. When, in the wake of the London bombing on July 7th 2005, Leeds citizens rallied for a Vigil on Millennium Square, a spokesperson for the Jewish community was a Reform Rabbi. Similarly, members of the Reform synagogue are known to actively participate in many multi-faith organisations, such as the Leeds interfaith group Concord, to actively support the work of Leeds Council Refugee and Asylum Service, and to initiate contacts with the local Muslim community.

Interestingly, strictly Orthodox Jews in Leeds are often singled out and marginalised in the same way as the Reform-affiliated ones, both being imagined as operating beyond the ‘normal’, i.e. common-sense Judaism. Those interviewees, who self-identify as strictly observant, often envision themselves as ‘a minority within a minority’. A letter written to JT (17.01.1997:3) by an anonymous Orthodox man, entitled ‘We felt like Pariahs in Leeds...’ colourfully describes his family experience of living in Leeds:

For almost a decade, I and my family lived in Leeds. Because we are Orthodox, we were treated, in the main, like pariah, put down, ridiculed and humiliated. Our children were laughed at for wearing capes and it was indeed the lack of adequate Jewish education that drove us to move away.

The similarity between his feeling of being ostracised and ridiculed and the Reform experience is evident to an outside observer, but the author of the letter sees Reform Jews as part of the secular mainstream, which makes him feel like a pariah. Responding to the sympathetic publication in the previous week, the author criticises the Reform movement, alongside the traditional majority, blaming low observance and wicked Reform ideology for the demographic decline in the community:

The gentleman who wrote so soothingly against the Orthodox last week, might ask himself why the Jewish community in Leeds has shrunk from a post-war 30,000 to a mere 8000 now, and if he does realise, that, like Sodom and Gomorra, people flee from ignorance and hatred.

...the reform manner of conversion is not valid in Jewish law, and all children born of such matches are non Jews: it causes assimilation.

In contrast to Manchester or London, not only is the number of strictly Orthodox people in Leeds very small, but available facilities are minimal and social life is very limited, which makes it more difficult to sustain an observant lifestyle. The sense of being the marginalised ‘other’ is particularly articulated among the young. Teenagers were
particularly vulnerable to the lack of social infrastructure in Leeds, which was available to observant people in bigger communities. When an 18 year old female from a Jewish school was asked whether Leeds was a good place to live she explained that the life was nice ‘if you’re allowed to go to clubs and bars and any restaurant.’ However, she sighed, ‘if you’re very religious you can’t eat anywhere and there is nothing for children or adults to do around Leeds that involves Jewish people.’ Technically, this statement is incorrect and the community has a number of Jewish organisations for people of all ages, but observant people feel excluded from certain parts of the communal space because of the ‘non-Kosher’ status of those places. Mr. Conway, 50, complains about the lack of adequate educational and entertainment provision for children of the strict Orthodox background:

*I am worried about the younger people because there does not seem a lot going on for them around here. My children do not have many friends around here; most of them are in Manchester, that’s where their social life is. They won’t go to the Zone [community’s youth centre for teenagers] because it is not frum enough for them.*

In another interview, a strictly Orthodox woman raised her grievances with regard to the absence of adequate learning facilities in Leeds, which pushed her outside the community, not only in a social but also in a physical sense:

*In terms of community services you’ve got less available here than they do in Manchester or London. ...when we want to go and learn things, I have to go to Manchester some other time because we have not got the learning facilities for Jewish advanced learning. There are some things here but they are not to the extent that we would want, so that you have much more available to those communities and it could be very frustrating that you have to go out of our community to do that.*

Helen Perc, 45

Perhaps the biggest and the most visible group of strictly Orthodox Jews are members of the Lubavitch movement, who settled in Leeds in the mid 1970s. The main philosophy of this international movement is to bring Jews back into religion and revive Jewish life around the world, yet the realisation of this aim requires intensive interaction with the local Jewish population. Thus, the Lubavitch in Leeds started with building or rebuilding the basic religious infrastructure, like Mikvah (ritual bath), Jewish school for the strictly Orthodox, and initiating programmes for adult learning and children’s activities, like summer camps. As some of the members remembered, they were initially met with social rebuff, which was stronger than the sentiments towards the home-grown

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28 Kosher is understood wider than terms as something that complies with the Chalachic requirements
29 Frum – from Yiddish meaning religious and observant
'frummies'\textsuperscript{30}, for the Lubavitch, like the Reform in Leeds, experienced multiple marginalisation: their 'othering' in terms of religious practice was magnified by their status as outsiders with little engagement in local social networks. However, since the success of their mission depended on it, the Lubavitch invested heavily in building social links with the mainstream local community.

Rather surprisingly, the Lubavitch activities have upset local religious people, who looked down on the secularised majority and expected the Lubavitch to reinforce their 'camp'. Even now, when the Lubavitch has become acknowledged as almost indigenous to Leeds, many locally-born Orthodox Jews are still quite reserved and prefer to keep slightly separate from them. The following statement of locally-born Mr. Conway acknowledges the role of the Lubavitch in reviving the community's Jewish learning programmes. Yet, simultaneously he differentiated 'their' (Lubavitch) Judaism from 'our' (local Orthodox) understanding of Jewish identity:

\begin{quote}
My family are more and more into this learning ethos, especially from the religious point of view, and there is not much here...well, when Lubvich came, they've given us something, but not what we really wanted completely.
\end{quote}

The above example also demonstrates that the status of an outsider, particularly important in the past, has not lost its significance in the present day community and continues to articulate a certain social distancing and a sense of marginality. Most often, however, the status of an outsider works as a proxy or a marker for identifying a different model of Jewishness. Since Leeds Jewish traditionalism has absorbed many of the qualities of the British Jewish identity, Jews coming to Leeds from other parts of Britain find it less difficult to fit in, while foreign-born Jews find it the hardest. The statement of Mrs. Rosenbloom, cited earlier, and conversations with other Holocaust survivors, who have been living in Leeds for more than sixty years, confirmed that many of them, although successfully integrated socio-economically, do not feel full belonging to the local Jewish community. The main reason is the huge perceived cultural and social difference between their understanding of Jewish identity and the Leeds model of Jewishness.

At the same time, the reputation as non-natives brings certain advantage to such Jewish groups as Reform or Lubavitch, for it makes them attractive to people, who, like them,

\textsuperscript{30} 'frummy' comes from the Yiddish 'frum' (adj.) i.e. religiously observant, and is used by the non-strictly Orthodox to define the strictly Orthodox in a slightly derogatory way.
are uncomfortable with the mainstream traditional Jewishness. The freedom from the community's cultural background allows such groups to make identity claims that transcend local borders. Not surprisingly, recent newcomers to the Leeds Jewish community often find these Synagogues more attractive and welcoming than any of the traditional Orthodox Synagogues in Leeds. Thus, the Lubavitch centre has become de facto a social club for many Israeli men, while the Reform Synagogue seems to possess the highest number of non-native Jews.

Another 'vector of marginality' relates to the geography of Jewish space in Leeds and those who lie outside the physical borders of the community. The collective imagination commonly demarcates LS17 and parts of LS8 as a territorial expression of local Jewish space. This imagined space has an objective demographic basis; more than three-quarters of all Leeds Jews live within this area according to the 2001 Census data (see chapter 5). In addition, all main communal institutions – Synagogues, shops, the Community centre, nursing home, schools and youth club etc. – are confined to this territory. Place of residence thus has a bearing on an individual's own perception of marginality, and their ascribed marginality. However, place of residence is less significant than perceptions of social inclusion in the community. This is partly explained by the continuous demographic decline of Leeds Jewry (Graham et al 2007: 43), and the increasing value of including any Jewish individual in the population count. Thus, the physical borders of 'community' have become fluid and context-sensitive.

Since almost a thousand Leeds Jews (identified by the Census 2001) live in close proximity to the University and a substantial number of Jewish professionals live in the city centre or in small towns outside Leeds, the notion of the Leeds Jewish community is often stretched to accommodate these groups. This adds to the discursive ambiguity of the territoriality of Leeds Jewry, which, depending on the circumstances, could be restricted to the LS17 area or extended to cover all Jews in Leeds and its vicinity.

Despite the discursive flexibility of the physical borders of the community, and, as a consequence, the ambiguity of geographical marginality, residing in the affluent LS17 area has an additional impact on perceptions of marginality. Upon an inspection of the rich neighbourhood of Alwoodley, a recently arrived Israeli remarked with satisfaction,

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31 Many Israelis have a very secular upbringing and an ethno-nationalist Jewish identity; hence often they discard religious observance and do not attend Synagogue. One Israeli woman confessed that living in Diaspora made her wish to attend Synagogue as this was the only way of maintaining the Jewish identity outside Israel.
'Now I understand why everybody says how wealthy and posh Jews have become; it looks nice and one can be proud of living here' (Alex D., 35). This link between place of residence, property ownership and socio-economic well-being accords local Jews a high social status. Jews deviating from the conventional middle class stereotype also find themselves at the margins of the community.

Although there is recognition of a wealth gap that separates the community’s rich population from the less affluent, real poverty, especially among the younger generations, is considered to be non-existent. Even the elderly and disabled, who are viewed as legitimate recipients of community-run social services, are not associated with poverty and deprivation. According to prevailing opinion, the last poor Jew ceased to exist in Leeds soon after WW II and since then, all kinds of ‘help the poor’ appeals are interpreted as directed solely outside the local community – to support the ‘real poor’, Jewish and non-Jewish, nationally and internationally. However, in his plea for community support, Robert Manning, Chair of Leeds Jewish Care Services, dismissed the myth of affluence and referred to ‘vulnerable, potentially marginalised or needy’ people, which ‘you have thought too sad to be true’ (LJCS Annual Report 2005-2006: 3). According to him, this ‘mistaken’ belief, partially prompted by the invisibility of such people in the communal landscape, plays some role in the falling rates of private donations to many communal organisations. In the words of one local rabbi, many wealthy individuals, ‘see their luxuries as necessities in their lives and lose sight of what they are fortunate to have and do not share as they should with others’ (JT 21.09.2007:21). The financial crisis faced by community’s social care programmes prompted the President of Leeds Jewish Welfare Board, Edward Ziff, to issue another reminder to ‘the affluent parts of our community’ that there are other members who face ‘issues as wide as drug abuse, family breakdown and learning difficulties, as well as many other issues’ (JT 21.09.2007:1).

If the invisibility of the poor and needy disturbs communal lay leaders, who try to raise the public awareness on behalf of these groups, the low profile of other marginal groups seems to suit them well. People with non-traditional sexual orientations, for example, are dually marginal: not only is there no institutional representation in the community, but they are also non-existent in the communal discursive space. Interviewees and questionnaire respondents never mentioned the topic, neither was it ever raised at communal meetings. A few rare publications in the local Jewish press informed the reader about national and international happenings, but were silent on the situation in
Leeds. When in 2004 a young Orthodox rabbi, whose job, according to the Synagogue leadership, was to attract the unaffiliated, invited an American gay rabbi to talk about his new book, this created a fierce protest. This culminated in the leaders, behind the rabbi’s back, withdrawing the invitation. Soon after the event, the Rabbi announced his departure, prompting speculations that he was too ‘liberal’ for this traditional Shul. The cloud of secrecy was partially unveiled during a focus group session with members of the Reform Synagogue, organised in the framework of research for the Equality and Human Rights Commission\(^\text{32}\). The participants draw the line between the growing tolerance of people as private individuals, especially among the young, and the remaining non-recognition of such people on the communal level:

> Our religion does not allow homosexualism. We Reform are a bit more liberal on the issue, but Orthodox will condemn you to death.
> Daniel, in his 70s

> Most people of my age are fine with it. I do not think it will ever be a norm, but it is not abnormal either...
> Rebecca, in her early 20s

The case of a local homosexual man who ‘came out’ in the 1960s and who was so ostracised that he had to emigrate to the US was brought forward as an example of increasing tolerance: today, some known, but discreetly practicing, gay people are no longer driven out of the community. The focus-group participants attributed the growing private tolerance to changing national policies that decriminalised homosexual relations, guaranteed protection from sex-discrimination and educated wider audiences. Interestingly, the discussion of sexual minorities triggered discussion about British society at large and inspired comparisons with other faith communities and other minority groups:

> This idea with homosexualism is almost parallel to female clergy issue: if you can accept women to be priests – it’s parallel then – you’ll accept the gay. Here, [Jewish] Orthodox and Catholic have a commonality.
> Rowena, 70s

This narrative connection demonstrates how the national political agenda, where different types of minority rights are discursively and institutionally linked under the notion of ‘equal rights’, is being reconstructed in the discursive space of the community.

\(^{32}\) The principal researchers were Professor Gill Valentine and Dr. Louise Waite, Leeds University,
8.3. 'Community of Communities'

The narration of Leeds Jewry as a community of people with the same cultural, economic and religious characteristics and a shared sense of local history is a powerful way of identity representation, but it has very serious limitations, which make it unsustainable in the long run. This has been the conclusion of the main communal representative body, the Leeds Jewish Representative Council (LJRC), which has been propagating an alternative image of the community. Its current statement of objectives emphasises the need to 'enhance the unity and mutual cooperation of Jews living in Leeds and its surrounding districts' and to support Jews 'irrespective of their political or religious affiliations' (LJRP website). As the previous section has demonstrated, the restrictions of the traditional narrative put many Jewish people at the symbolical and physical fringes of the community, which in the situation of a continuous demographic shrinkage (Graham et al 2007: 42) leaves little hope for the community's survival in the future. The decrease in the number of 'traditional' Jews, who, according to the old narrative, are the backbone of the community, is especially pronounced - given their significantly old age, their statistical forecast is gloomy.

This research has revealed that the threat of demographic decline had become in itself an established narrative theme in the contemporary description of the community. According to the research evidence, older people, who self-identify with this quickly disappearing group and who remember the past glorious days when the community stood at 25,000, are very pessimistic about the future. Thus, Mr. Miller, in his 70s, who took an interest in local demography, admitted, 'the tendencies are depressing,' and bitterly predicted the disappearance of Leeds Jewry in the next 20 years. In contrast, the outlook of the younger Jews is less extreme, and some even think that Leeds today is still a 'large Jewish community, [which has] plenty on offer for Jewish people' (anonymous pupil, 14, independent school). Sharing the concern of the older generations but identifying with the optimism of the young, LJRC vice-President Robert Bartfield reassured the community members after the publication of the 'sad' statistics from the 2001 Census:

> Those predicting a dismal future for the Leeds Jewish community are way off the mark. We can look forward with optimism rather than pessimism.
> JT, 1.07.2007:1

The key to an optimistic outlook is a complex pro-active set of measures, which was designed following a special strategic assessment of the Leeds Jewish community,
commissioned by LJRC. It identifies seven target zones and offers six core strategies (Figure 8.1) that promote a totally different image of the Leeds Jewish community. Instead of the ‘community of the same’, Leeds Jewry is imagined as the ‘union of different’ or ‘community of communities’ that conveys a new mission statement, ‘LEEDS - A GREAT PLACE TO BE JEWISH,’ to both native Jews and newcomers.

Figure 8.1. Targets and strategies for the development of the Leeds Jewish Community

- encouraging and accepting diversity whilst ensuring everyone feels part of the wider community system;
- offering additional attractive options for everyone across ideological, age and interest groups, both as cross-communal projects as well as denominational projects;
- being a welcoming and friendly community;
- establishing additional vibrant education provisions;
- reaching out even more to moderately affiliated and unaffiliated Jews; and
- attracting Jews to settle in Leeds and encouraging them to stay

Source: LJRC Strategic Planning Report 2006: 4

This list of policies reflects not only a concern with the natural decline of the native Jewish population, which has to be corrected by attracting ‘new blood’ to the community, but it also publicly acknowledges the segmentation of the community and

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33 Leeds Strategic Planning Group, which included a number of local lay leaders conducted the research in association with Leatid, a Paris based Jewish leadership training consultancy about community development, and was sponsored by a British–Israeli organisation United Jewish Israeli Appeal, UJIA, which promotes cooperation between UK and Israeli Jews, particularly focusing on educational programmes. Their final report is available on-line at LJRC website.
the need to address the positions of different sections of the local Jewry in different ways. Interestingly, this positive spin on segmentation has less to do with socially divisive factors, such as class, income, education, which are still considered to be worth fighting for, and everything to do with voluntary and subjective factors, such as different forms of Jewish identity, general ideological views and lifestyle choices. For example, acknowledging the need to overcome the wealth divide, the chief executive of the Leeds Jewish Housing Association, Sheila Saunders, validated the decision to engage in a £60-million renovation project at the community’s housing estate:

_We must build new homes that people could either rent or buy. This is the only option ... essential if the Leeds Jewish community wants to remain cohesive and not socially and economically divided as the ‘haves’, the ‘have a bit less’ and the ‘very have nots’._


The opposite is true with regard to the diversity of Jewish life in Leeds. The claim that Leeds could provide for any Jewish taste is at the centre of a new internet-based marketing campaign of the community. Designed by Leeds Jewish Initiative, a community group, specially instituted by the Representative Council in 2006 to attract new and unaffiliated young adults, the website employs a professional advertising technique that describes the attractions of Leeds from multiple angles. One of them is a great choice of Jewish facilities:

_Living in Leeds brings the best of it all: city vibe, community feel, countryside at your doorstep! Leeds is the UK’s fastest growing city and this can be felt whenever you look around. Our Leeds Jewish community is on the rise itself with many organisations and community opportunities available. There are also various synagogues in Leeds for you to call home, kosher shops to find what you fancy, Jewish schools, and much more_  

Leeds Jewish Initiative website

This representation of local Jewry as ‘a community of inclusiveness and choice’ puts the collective image of the community in agreement with the majority of its members’ personal views on Jewishness that were explored in the previous chapter. In line with national trends, private understandings of Jewish identity in Leeds have become progressively more fragmented and diverse in the last twenty years, and, in a sense, a new collective image presents an attempt to find a social formula that will reconcile contradictory views and preserve a sense of togetherness. The importance of the topic for local Jews is evident from the frequency and intensity of public debates, media coverage, and spontaneous conversations related to the future of the community. This
also came through strongly in the data accumulated through interviews and a questionnaire survey. Table 8.3 highlights a range of individual opinions on the nature of the Jewish community. Reflecting the uncertainties of the contemporary discourse with regard to the modern function of the Jewish community, the views ranged from the reiteration of a traditional communal formula based on ‘sameness’, to the utilitarian view of community as a service provider, through to demands for spiritual harmony and respect of differences.

Given such diversity, it is understandable why the supporters of the new ‘model’ of collective identity present it as the only viable solution for the future: it allows for the maintenance of group cohesion, the preservation of a sense of identity and simultaneously legitimises, even celebrates, intra-communal differences. The similarities with the national discourse on Britishness are apparent, and are especially visible in the extensive use of such narrative constructs as ‘community cohesion’, ‘community of communities’, ‘respect for differences’. This adoption of national linguistic constructs to localised Jewish experience is symptomatic of the whole of British Jewry, which experiences increasing polarisation of its religious wings as well as the fragmentation and shrinkage of the mainstream traditional orthodoxy. Hence, just as British Chief Rabbi Jonathan Sacks talks about ‘the importance of “inclusive Orthodoxy” ...that ... included every Jew who respected Judaism’ (Wachmann 07.09.2007:14), local Jewish discourse around a new Community Centre (MAZCC\textsuperscript{34}) focuses on the symbolical importance of different segments of the community coming together to share the same physical space.

\textsuperscript{34} MAZCC – Margery and Arnold Ziff Community Centre
Table 8.3. Leeds Jews on ‘what makes a Jewish community a community’

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<th>Community as</th>
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<td></td>
<td><strong>Normative similarity and commonality of interests</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Cohesive group with shared values, religion + goals; care</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(local Orthodox rabbi, 34)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- People with like-minded interests (Barbara 50)</td>
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<td></td>
<td>- shared ideals, shared interests; caring and preserving</td>
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<td></td>
<td>community via charitable works and friendships (Dana 50)</td>
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<td></td>
<td><strong>Geographical proximity</strong></td>
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<td></td>
<td>- by just being Jewish and living in the same vicinity, i.e.</td>
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<td>Leeds, Alwoodley, England (Simon 21)</td>
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<td><strong>Shared sense of belonging</strong></td>
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<td></td>
<td>- people socialising with each other simply because they are</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Jewish and feel they can trust each other (anonymous pupil</td>
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<td></td>
<td>of Independent School, 14)</td>
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<td></td>
<td><strong>Extended family</strong></td>
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<td></td>
<td>- One of the great strength of being Jewish ... that we are like</td>
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<td>a large, extended family; you look after your old and young</td>
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<td></td>
<td>people. (Ann 37)</td>
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<td></td>
<td><strong>Provision of services and infrastructure</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- shuls, mikvah, kosher shops, school (Naomi 49)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- different synagogues, Jewish shops; community and youth</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>centres; Jewish welfare agency, B'nei B'rith, Hillel etc.;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Jewish education and Cheders; Jewish Housing (Eddy 66)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- the only thing that binds the Jewish community is the fact</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>that they are all Jewish and want to maintain their Jewish</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>identity and enjoy the provision of services and amenities</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>necessary for a Jewish existence (Alan, 46)</td>
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<td></td>
<td><strong>Spiritual unity</strong></td>
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<td></td>
<td>- not size, but closeness of people and in this respect four</td>
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<td></td>
<td>people can make a community, but here you have people who</td>
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<td></td>
<td>would not speak to each other (Murray 74)</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- a group of people who are proud for each other</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(anonymous pupil of Independent School, 14)</td>
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<td></td>
<td><strong>Unity of different</strong></td>
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<td>- when the community involves different types of people and</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>does different events for them (female pupil, 17, Jewish</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>school)</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- All ages, social life that caters for all ages (these make a</td>
</tr>
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<td></td>
<td>good community for general Jewry) – for me religious life is</td>
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<td></td>
<td>very important so shiurim and other things would be of</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>primary importance (Rachel, 21)</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- different ages, different strains of religion working in</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>harmony to enhance each others lives (Helen Perc 45)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- friendship, closeness, collective, inclusion, interaction</td>
</tr>
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<td></td>
<td>(Ralf, 15)</td>
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Source: interviews and questionnaire responses
Both national and local Jewish appeals to a new type of communal unity are reminiscent of the national discourse on the construction of a shared identity in a multicultural Britain. For example, commenting on the difficulties of bringing various ‘bits of the community’ together, Helen Lewis, chairman of the MAZCC management committee, employed a narrative metaphor that, just like the national narrative of building New Cool Britannia, praised people’s determination to overcome prejudices and build a new unity based on inclusiveness and mutual respect:

> There was uncertainty whether you could mix groups who have different needs and aspirations and people are understandably still nervous about how this will work, but there is a commitment to make it work for everyone so everyone feels at home. ...We hope that everyone could use it in the way that suits them

JT 10.07.2005:4

The construction of collective identity based on the acknowledgement of differences also incorporates those normative changes in British society that reflect a new relationship between an individual and a group. In a present multi-cultural but much more individualist society, the main function of the Jewish community has shifted from providing a physical, economic and social ‘safety net’ towards identity production, which has led to a new type of private-public relations. Less and less viewed as an obligation, communal membership is becoming customer-based, which is accompanied by a new expectation from the leadership to provide democratic and transparent governance and high-quality, professional, services. People gladly choose Jewish services, products and institutions, if they deliver at least the same quality as non-Jewish alternatives. Very few are ready to support Jewish products or services irrespective of quality. This is true for education, shops and restaurants, nursing homes, lectures, parties, etc. Indeed, this consumerist attitude is thought to be at least partially responsible for the failure to launch a Jewish high school in Leeds. In the past the main stumbling block was the resistance of the Leeds City Council, which is no longer an obstacle. However, the plans for a Jewish High School have been abandoned, despite more than sixty youngsters daily commuting to Jewish schools in Manchester. One female parent, whose child was in the Leeds Jewish Primary School, explained this conundrum: ‘Who wants to have their kids as guinea pigs? And which school could persuade the parents, before it even opens, that the standards would be as high as in Leeds Grammar or in Manchester’s King David?’ This shows that, just like the majority of British Jews, Leeds Jewish people want a Jewish upbringing for their kids, but are not prepared to compromise the quality of their secular education. As
sophisticated consumers, Leeds Jews demand high educational standards and many welcome the idea of a Jewish High in principle, but only few are prepared to take the risk.

An understanding of this new social reality is gradually taking over the communal institutions, which are trying to adjust their strategies. During a communal day of Jewish learning (Leeds Limmud 03.04.2005), a session entitled ‘What makes a local community buzz...’, dedicated to new approaches in community development, featured a local Reform rabbi, who explained the underlying new philosophy of his Synagogue’s successful developmental strategy of ‘living Judaism’:

*By our parents and grandparents it was assumed that one was in the community as a way of obligation not by the act of volition and if you choose to distance yourself from the community, it would lead to ostracism. Now we live in the world where there is no such ostracism but there is a massive expansion of choice of how to spend our free time. We have different expectations what to do with our time. The model for this is the number of TV channels.*

He urged communal leaders to reconsider their expectations with regard to people’s commitment as they no longer felt morally obliged to join in and were reluctant to commit full time. Instead, he suggested a new positive attitude, ‘if only six people came – it’s fantastic, not awful’, and a new strategy of piecemeal involvement based on people’s interest and voluntary choice:

*Our parents and grandparents assumed that people would be part of Jewish community because the G-d is watching, we are dealing today with customers, and it is our job to make them want to come here. ...Most people want and will do something if they are asked properly.*

It is interesting that this advice on the successful approach to community development comes from the Reform Synagogue, which, due to its marginal status, has become attuned to the changing social relations earlier than many centrally positioned communal institutions. Rather intriguingly, the same non-judgemental, piecemeal strategy of dealing with congregants was also crucial for the success of the Leeds Lubavitch movement, another institution, which operated on the margins of traditional community and which, ironically, represented the opposite side of the religious spectrum.

This customer-based approach, initially pioneered at the margins of the community, is gradually taking over its mainstream institutions. Thus, all three main Orthodox Synagogues in Leeds have invested, in the words of Mr Goldstein, a member of UHC
Synagogue, in ‘intelligent marketing’ that helped to ‘capture the local market’ and provide ‘value for money’ (JC 28.12.2006). Speaking about the whole of the Leeds Jewish community, the increased amount of public consultations and public opinion surveys that precede any important communal decisions indicate that its management structures are becoming more attuned to people’s voices. Consider the language used by Rebecca Weinberg, the Leeds Jewish Welfare Board chief, in assessing the first two years of the MAZCC:

‘Quite simply: our service users come first. ... We may be the only kosher facility, but that will never tempt us to overcharge or take advantage of our loyal customers. ... We aim to have a high quality, well-operated business that delivers the surplus...’

JT, 08.06.2007: 5

Besides its ‘consumer orientation’, the above quote points to the apparent professionalisation of community-based services, where professionally trained carers and managers replace volunteers in many communal activities. Without a doubt, this drive towards a system of professional care and management reflects the demand of high quality services from the majority of community members, who otherwise could ‘vote with their feet’ and find these services outside the community. However, the circumstantial evidence points to the fact that many community organisation are also pushed to ‘embrace a corporate and business approach’ (LJCS 2005-06: 4) by changes in project financing. On average, they are getting more dependent on taking contractual work from national and local authorities for the provision of place-based services and on the acquisition of national, regional and international grants. This requires financial transparency, efficiency and competitiveness, as demonstrated by successful applications for external funds to co-finance such projects as MAZCC, youth centre the Zone, the Roots room at the Lubavitch Centre, etc.

Another manifestation of changing relations inside the community is an increasing democratisation of the decision-making process that occurs on all levels of communal life. The middle-class majority is no longer satisfied with a dictatorial style of governing, even if it is done for the sake of the ‘common good’ by a supposedly ‘benign dictator’. Reflecting on the social distance that existed between community leaders and ordinary members in the 1960s, Mr. Conway (50s) admitted with satisfaction that today this distance has considerably shrunk:
These days you can actually get to and speak to the rabbi. Now it seems a bit easier... the rabbi is expected to speak to people a bit more. I remember in the days when I was growing up... there was like a hierarchy. I don’t know where it came from, but the president and the rabbis – they were like the elites of the Shul. I do not remember my father speaking to any of the executives of the Shul. It has changed over the years as everybody speaks to everybody else now.

However, many interviewees were of the opinion that there is still a big distance and lack of transparency between the leaders, ‘powerful rich men in their 50s’ (Helen, 42), and rank-and-file members of the community. The demand for much more democratic governance came through as one of the main concerns in research into the Jewish community directed by the Leeds Strategic Planning Group. When asked about their recommendations for the community’s leadership, interviewees pointed to the need for more inclusion, representation and accommodation of differences, citing: ‘represent all levels of community’, ‘listen, encourage and facilitate’, ‘welcome diversity e.g. mixed marriages, gay, religious pluralism etc.’, ‘encourage Jewish involvement’, ‘include any Jewish person living in Leeds’ (see Appendix 4 for a full range of views).

An acknowledgement of the need for change was confirmed by the author’s own research. One interviewee, 67 year-old Joan, thought that not only was the current situation unsatisfactory, but that the changes were too slow. She felt that the local Jewry still urgently needed democratisation and feminisation of leadership:

...much, much more democratic leadership of community, ...conscious attempt to get away from middle class control of everything ...women in more influential and feminist roles.

Joan was not alone in raising her opposition to the traditional assumption that charity was the only acceptable for women ‘domain’ of public work. Doreen Wachmann, a columnist for JT, who in her writings combines feminist views and religious convictions, also rejected the assertion that ‘a woman’s principal prowess was in her recipes’ (Wachmann 17.08.2007: 4). Although the position of women in the community has been improving (following, albeit with a delay of 10 to 15 years, the national trajectory of gender equalisation), their status in the communal world remains ambiguous. On the one hand, many people from the older generations, who constitute the majority of Jews in Leeds, are comfortable with the traditional model of community governance, which assigns women to social work and charity, leaving leadership to males. Thus, most of today’s female Jewish charities (e.g. groups within WIZO [Women’s Zionist Organisation] or Ladies’ Guild of UJIA) are at least 20 to 50 years old and involve predominantly middle aged middle-class long-standing members.
Although their fund-raising work for various projects in Israel and in Britain is very important, no less significant for these women is the pleasure of socialising with their friends. In recent years, however, the Jewish Telegraph has reported on the closure of many of such organisations because of lack of participation. On the other hand, the community has experienced a steady growth of Jewish female high-fliers, both in education and career-wise. According to the Census 2001 data, ‘Jewish women were higher achievers than the average British man’, and even ‘outperformed Jewish males in the 16–24 cohort’ (Graham et al. 2007: 83-4). In Leeds, like in other Jewish communities in Britain, women have become actively involved in running many secular communal organisations; they are visible in the communal public space and often represent the community in the wider society.

Female progress in religious affairs is slower. Orthodox guidelines still prescribe women a spectator’s position, keeping them effectively outside religious practices. The 2002 report of the committee monitoring implementation of recommendations made by the Chief Rabbi in 1993 stated, “Many Jewish women feel alienated by the male-dominated ethos and practices of their synagogues.” This alienation was very visible in Leeds during a national conference on ‘Domestic violence and the Jewish community: the last Taboo?’ (30 November 2003), when female members of the audience spontaneously raised the issue of gender inequality. They attacked a young Orthodox rabbi, an invited panellist to the conference, on the question of religious divorce for women, which they saw as as a form of ‘domestic coercion and inequality’ (a divorcing woman under Jewish Law has to obtain husband’s consent), and complained about under-representation and under-appreciation of women in Orthodox synagogues. Indeed, only in 2005, United Synagogues, the association which includes most of the UK Orthodox synagogues, issued permission for women to be elected (but not to head any commission) to synagogue executive boards. In contrast, women’s rights within the local Masorti (Conservative) movement have been substantially extended, while gender equality has always been a cornerstone of the Sinai Reform Synagogue, creating an additional attraction for marginally positioned Leeds Jews.

At the same time, the Orthodox authorities have softened their stance on women’s religious learning, providing an outlet for those females who want a more meaningful connection to Judaism within an Orthodox approach. Thus, in March 2007 BHH Synagogue held a special Shabbat service, honouring over 30 local women, who had completed a six-month Judaism course, ‘We – the women of the book’, while ladies’
Chavruta (meaning female friend) learning is a weekly study session at the Lubavitch Centre. In a private conversation with one Lubavitch rebbetzen (wife of a rabbi), she argued that in a modern world, women's education holds the key to the preservation of Judaism. Whereas in the past women stayed in the private domain, learning Jewish customs from their mothers, now this generational link has been severed and girls are exposed to the secular world; hence, they need knowledge and education to intelligently withstand outside pressures and retain a commitment to Judaism – only then Jews, she argued, as a people, would avoid assimilation.

Demonstrating another remarkable similarity with a more secular view on modern Jewish identity, this strictly Orthodox attitude acknowledges the instrumental role of education in satisfying a modern desire to belong and to positively identify. As this research has shown, 'knowledge of Jewish history, culture, holidays and traditions' was consistently chosen as the main feature of present Jewish identities (see chapter 7), and many of the interviewees agreed that a growing interest in Jewish learning was a sign of the revival of the Leeds Jewish community. Thus, many people, who have been living in Leeds for the last twenty years admit that, although the community has shrunk, it has become much 'fitter and more active in terms of Jewish life' (Michael Kraft, in his 50s). Not coincidentally, this registered revival of Jewish learning of all kinds is associated with the push coming from the former 'margins' of traditional Judaism. Indeed, the contemporary hubs of local Jewish learning are the Lubavitch centre, the Reform synagogue and the Jewish Community Centre, while traditional Orthodox Synagogues, which were the main places of Jewish learning in the past, are being forced to catch up. Illustrative in this respect is an account of the communal history, narrated by another Lubavitch rebbetzin, whose family arrived in Leeds 23 years ago. In her view, Leeds Jewry 'has become much more religiously knowledgeable and observant than 20 years ago.' She attributes the phenomenon, however, solely to the outstanding work of Lubavitch Hassidic Jews, who came in the 1970s, and demonstrated their commitment to the community and intentions to stay permanently. They created basic infrastructure that attracted more religious people to settle in Leeds, they run programmes for adults and youngsters, and put moral pressure on their congregants to be more observant.

8.4. Locating the Jewish community in wider society

While people from across the community acknowledge the role of Lubavitch in the promotion of religious awareness (not necessarily the observance itself) of the
community, many interviewees also pointed to broader societal changes as a catalyst for changing attitudes in the Jewish community. Mr. Hirseman, in his 70s, acknowledges the role of Lubavitch, ‘When Lubavitch came they showed the true level of observance – we were not aware of it’, but he also highlighted how seeing ‘Muslims and Hindus, [who] display their religion so publicly’, helped Jews to display their identity in public more assertively. The institutionalisation of pluralism and multicultural citizenship in Britain has altered the external reference point for the community creating opportunities for a more visible public representation of Leeds Jewry as a minority that enjoys both religious and ethnic status. Good relationships with local authorities and local non-Jewish population have always been a priority for any Jewish community, as its existence often depended on the goodwill of the host society, but the development of national legal and institutional safeguards against discrimination and the mistreatment of minority groups changed that volatility in Britain, as in many other western countries. Although the protection of Jewish interests in the wider society is still perceived as the main purpose of outside work, no less imperative now is the impact of the Jewish external image on the feelings of community members. LJRC acknowledges the vitality of the external representation of the community in its work, and lists the following activities as key dimensions of their work outside the community:

We Provide...
- A point of reference for the outside communities
- An appropriate body to represent the Jewish point of view to the media
- Local and national political activity and pressure
- Links with national Jewish organisations
- Representation on influential committees

LJRC website, 2007

In the past, when the gravitational centre of British society was the white English middle-class, Jews, who longed to identify with this mainstream, had to conceal or ‘tone down’ their Jewishness, both as individuals and as an officially recognised religious group. In the words of community activist Michael Kraft, 50, ‘the organised community always wanted to ask permission of the goim: could we do this or this?’ The re-emergence of British society as more multi-ethnic, multi-faith and multicultural helped many local Jews to openly state their Jewishness and, as a consequence, made them more sensitive to the external perceptions of Jews in general and the local community in particular. Positive external images of Jews in the locality, nationwide and in the world create a feel good factor and boost the motivation to identify and belong. Data from the questionnaire survey and interviews confirmed that since the desire to belong and to feel proud is the main motivator for Jewish identification (being Jewish makes me feel like I
belong, Hannah, 18), the upbeat collective image is paramount for positive individual identification, and, consequently, for people's desire to participate and support the community. The same data also showed how increasingly diverse the contemporary views on Jewish identity are, so that the desire to identify and belong is one of a few common denominators that allows Jews to nourish a sense of 'common unity'. Therefore, the prevailing majority of people who participated in this study spoke in favour of a positive and cohesive representation of the community both inside and outside, which should be achieved through the accommodation of differences and not by the suppression of dissent: better integration of 'odd-ones-out' i.e. single people, foreigners (other than Holocaust survivors). Do not ask about their past life but present life in Leeds (anonymous pensioner). As was noted earlier, this has been accepted by the Leeds Jewish community leadership, which has made the image of Leeds Jewry as a dynamic, unified yet accommodating community an important part of the communal revival strategy (Leeds Strategic Planning Group 2006).

The desire to create a positive collective identity is evident in the way communal leaders liberally 'pick-and-mix' different narrative constructions of Jewish identity to fit the contextual circumstances and enhance their arguments. Depending on the audience and the message that organisations strive to convey, Jewishness could be interpreted as a religious identity or as an ethno-cultural one; emphasis could be placed on the uniqueness of Jewish experience (historical or Israel-related) or on its similarity with other minority groups. Sometimes the communal representatives portray the Leeds Jewish community as an example of successful minority integration worth following, yet, at other times, demanding special provision for Jewish needs from local authorities, they use multicultural arguments about the importance of ethnical/religious diversity. For instance, in her AGM speech on March 26th 2006 Sue Baker, president of LJRC at the time, thought it was important to convey to the participants the words of Sikh community leaders, who had asked for advice on establishing a communal representative council. She highlighted that externally the community is 'perceived strong, cohesive and influential, despite representing only 1.2 per cent among the local ethnic minorities.' (JC 31.03.2006: 32). In this quote, the emphasis on a perceived Jewish strength and unity is merged with an implied understanding of Jewishness as an ethnic category.

When, however, the discursive focus shifts to Jewish relations with other minority groups, the local Jewry is imagined as a faith community. In this context, they represent
themselves as engaging in dialogue with other faith and interfaith groups, like the Jewish-Christian Council, Leeds Faith Forum and the Muslim Council. Since this self-representation as a ‘faith community’ may be coupled with different narratives of national citizenship, different interpretations of Jewish history that evoke either the Grand Jewish Narrative or cross-cultural narratives of Jewish self, very different interpretations of inter-communal relations become possible. The narrative dynamics of Jewish-Muslim relations in Leeds is interesting in this respect. Before the London bombing, with the exception of Sinai (Reform) Synagogue, which pioneered Jewish dialogue with local Muslims, the mainstream Jewish community’s attitude was cordial but distant despite a mosque being opened in the immediate vicinity of two Synagogues. ‘What do you expect?’ asked one Orthodox rabbi, ‘we daven (pray - Yiddish) and they daven’ (JC 22.07.2005:3). In the aftermath of July 7th 2005, Leeds Jewry reconsidered the importance of their relationship with the local Muslim community, whose moderate leadership was also eager to intensify their contacts with Jews. Rabbi Morris from the Sinai Synagogue, by then already involved in a three-religion organisation ‘Leeds Connection’, became one of the organisers of a 5,000-people vigil in the city centre and a spokesperson on behalf of the whole Leeds Jewry. This had the effect of advancing the status of his synagogue away from the periphery of the community. On the Orthodox side of the community religious spectrum, the same gruesome events pushed Rabbi Levy from the UHC Synagogue to finally meet with Russell Bhaman, a leader of the Baab-Ul-Ilm mosque, located just across the road from the UHC synagogue.

The comparison between the Reform and Orthodox narratives is worthy of note. Reflecting on the events in a Synagogue monthly, Rabbi Morris talks about the need for ‘members of three Abrahamic religions ... to stand visibly together in solidarity and to affirm the religious rejection of violence’ against common ‘enemies of civilisation’. He emphasises commonality and the need for ‘co-operative relations with other religious communities of whom we may have been slightly suspicious’ (Sinai Chronicle 2005, 41, 8:3). In his sermon two days before the meeting with the Muslim leader, Rabbi Levy also urged his congregation to ‘enter into dialogue with other faiths, the majority of whom are decent and peace-loving,’ but, according to him, the common denominator for both Jews and Muslims is religion and the Muslim passion for the faith deserves envy. This view of Muslim-Jewish commonality helps him to transfer the emphasis back to his congregants, who, according to him, are ‘ill-equipped’ for interfaith communication because their poor knowledge of Judaism restricts their ability to convey its principles and the values of the Torah (JC 22.07.2005: 3). Overall, this
account constructs Muslims as an important ‘significant other’, about whom Jews feel ambivalently and against whom they measure their achievements. In the AGM speech mentioned earlier, Sue Baker reiterated that promoting good relations with Leeds Muslims in the city and on campus were a priority for the LJRC, and recommended that the focus of this communication should be the similarities of religious life and commonalities of minority experience in the UK. She described her visit as a guest speaker to the Leeds Grand Mosque on October 19th, 2006, the day that Muslims were breaking the Ramadan fast, and her speech on Jewish fasting on Yom Kippur as an example of a possible bonding experience.

At the same time, a celebration to mark the 350th anniversary of Jewish re-settlement in England (held in November 2006), which Sue Baker referred to in her speech as an event ‘for the whole community’ (JT 3.11.2006:1), put in centre stage a different account of Anglo-Jewish identity, with different implications for newer minorities in Britain. The narrative, which is commonly recalled in recounting the Jewish history of resettlement in Britain, provides an example of successful integration without assimilation. The story combines the Grand Jewish Narrative with an ethno-cultural mono-centric model of national citizenship (see chapter 6), and present day immigrant communities are urged to follow the Jewish example. The message is particularly directed at a ‘problem-ridden’ Muslim community in the UK. Rabbi Levy, who was present at the celebration, recounted the history of Leeds Jewry and praised their achievements in integration, but also felt compelled to point out:

*Integration and acceptance did not happen overnight. There was a struggle to find their identity of being Jewish and British.*

*The freedom and liberties that have evolved over 350 years have encouraged us, by the grace of God, to achieve those things.*

*We care about national identity and cohesion, but we do not compromise our faith and Jewish practice, which includes Shabbat and kashrut. We may not compromise in order to advance.*


Changing the focus to the issue of anti-Semitism and Israeli-Palestinian relations brings about another narrative metamorphosis that again reconfigures Jewish-Muslim relations. In this discourse, Muslim radicals could be portrayed as propagators of anti-Semitism and simultaneously as enemies to western civilisation, thus constructing a Judeo-Christian union based on a commonality of Islamic threat. Alternatively, the topic could be framed within the Grand Jewish Narrative that segregates Jews from everybody else. This narrative construct was demonstrated in a Shabbat sermon of a Lubavitch rabbi,
who maintained that anti-Semitism was an unavoidable and eternal phenomenon that would haunt Jewish people until the Messiah’s coming. Yet another way of narrating Jewish-Muslim relations in the context of anti-Semitism was presented by Sid Cohen, district organiser of the Leeds Jewish National Front. Quoted in a JT article ‘Race Hate in Leeds’ (JT, 2.02.2007: 7), he condemns communal complacency with regard to anti-Semitism and refers to local Muslims as an example of another racial group that is better attuned to the present realities of British society. He is convinced that Muslims ‘would not tolerate racist behaviour’ and ‘would stand up for their rights whereas we do the opposite far too often’. At the end of his speech, citing his personal encounter with anti-Semitism, he returns to a conventional definition of Jewishness as a religious identity: ‘I felt strongly that my religion has nothing to do with me doing a professional job that I knew I had the experience to carry out.’

The above examples demonstrate how different contextual conditions influence the construction of the Jewish self in relation to other social groups and British society in general. This also helps to explain the clearly identifiable inter-generational differences in the way people incorporate the notions of multicultural citizenship. Thus, older people, who grew up under a different model of national citizenship, were likely to retain more elements of past perspectives, especially if they were comfortably embedded in the stereotypical ‘centre’ of the local Jewish community. The perception of one’s marginality, however, increased the likelihood of their engagement in cross-cultural narratives. In contrast, younger Jews as well as Jewish youth organisations were generally more inclined to internalise the multicultural model of wider society as a natural context of their Jewishness, the context that permits and even requires sharper statements of differences than those acceptable in the past. Much of it has to do with a different educational environment, which sanctions multicultural narratives and encourages individuals to see their identity in the context of institutionalised pluralism. Thus, many interviewees (children or parents of children from non-Jewish schools, private and state) pointed to the role of citizenship classes and school policy in advancing an awareness of social diversity, and knowledge of different faiths and cultures in the context of community cohesion. In an interview in JT, the new head teacher at Brodetsky Jewish Primary School, Simon Camby, also identified this as a priority:

*One of the things we need to do...is to try to make sure our children have an appreciation of the wider community and that we are interacting with other local primary schools.*
For the children, potentially there is a sense of isolation. There is a real sense of specialisation – but what we need to make sure is that the children see the bigger picture.


8.5. Conclusion

Throughout the history of Jewish Diaspora, Jewish life has been always community-bound, and, as this chapter demonstrates, in present day Leeds, just like in the past, the sense of physical and metaphysical togetherness remains important to Jewish identification. However, the bases for this unity, as well as the functioning and the meaning of modern communal life, have become very different. Just like individual Jewish ‘selves’, Jewish collective representations, both in terms of communal organisations and as self-portrayed images, have been influenced by the changing institutional and discursive realities of British society. A high level of integration in British society made Jewish people sensitive to new understandings of minority identity that circulate in national discourses, which inadvertently triggered the revision of their personal identities as citizens and Jews as well as creating a demand, at least from certain segments of the Jewish population, for the revision of their collective identity.

Despite the undisputed general influence of multicultural citizenship on the construction of Jewish identities in Leeds, its impact on particular groups and individuals within the community varied. Different terms of their individual inclusion in the society have altered the socio-economic composition of the community, making it more affluent, yet more segmented, with an articulated demand for a different, more customer-oriented basis for the individual-group relationship. The segmentation of increasingly autonomous members problematises the traditional narrative representation of the Jewish community as the ‘unity of the same’, since this normally involves greater social control over individuals in the group. At the same time, the new formula of national citizenship encouraged pluralisation of minority identity representations and further undermined the centrality of the traditional narrative by enabling multiple points of Jewish entry into the societal mainstream and different ways of conveying Jewish identity in public. An important consequence of national discursive plurality is that previously marginal groups in the community could use alternative references to national discourse to claim the legitimacy of their ‘reading’ of Jewish identity and hence enhance their status in the community.
As a result of this pluralism of identity representations, Leeds communal discourse combines both types of collective identity – a traditional image that emphasises the socio-economic, cultural, ethnic commonalities of its members and a ‘unity in difference’ model, which suggests a new formula of group solidarity based on a respected diversity of interests and identities. While the traditional narrative historically preceded the new vision of the community, it would be a simplification to present them as a historical progression where one vision is being replaced by the other. In a new and fragmented world of national and communal discourse both narratives coexist and could even appear within the same individual account of Jewish self. Given the importance of positive identification, both narratives could be strategically used to enhance the ‘feel good’ factor among the members and to promote a positive image of Leeds Jewry in the wider community. Thus, the traditional narrative could provide an additional way for social solidarity by nurturing a sense of shared communal history and place. Similarly, the strength of the second narrative is in a new formula of communal cohesion based on inclusiveness and accommodation of diversity, which also allows greater contextual flexibility of Jewish narratives of self. The advantages of this flexibility are particularly visible in the way the Leeds Jewish collective identity is being constructed in relation to outside society as, depending on the context, the emphasis could shift from ethnic to religious or even to a racial minority signifier. By the same logic, the availability of the Grand Jewish Narrative and cross-cultural narratives allows the different strategic positioning of the community and its sections vis-à-vis other social and minority groups and vis-à-vis British society as a whole.
Chapter Nine

Jewish Identity in Leeds and the Evolution of British Citizenship

This concluding chapter summarises the central premises of the thesis and, using the key concepts of 'place-specific minority identity', 'citizenship' and 'integration', draws together the themes of 'Jewishness' and 'Britishness'. It discusses the main findings of the research, reflecting on the historical evolution and contemporary diversity of Jewish identities in Leeds. The chapter once again emphasises the importance of national citizenship for the expression and experience of minority identities, which are shown to be flexible and permeable. At the same time, it draws attention to the multi-dimensionality of the other institutional and discursive contexts in which members of minority groups are simultaneously embedded. These socio-cultural and economic forces mediate the impact of national citizenship on individual members and on the group as a whole, conditioning the strategic responses that minorities deploy both individually and collectively.

The chapter concludes with an evaluation of the research's academic significance and its policy implications. This is framed in terms of this research's contribution to contemporary debates on multiculturalism and minority communities. It argues against a simplified and a-historical approach, suggesting the necessity for complex and contextualised understandings of the ways national and minority identity are negotiated.

9.1. Researching Jewishness through citizenship

This thesis has examined the complexities and multi-dimensionality of past and present identity representations within the Jewish population of Leeds. These were assessed in the context of changing social, political, economic and cultural circumstances of national life, while taking a special interest in the discursive and institutional aspects of national citizenship and their implications for the life of a relatively small provincial Jewish settlement. Adapting theories focussed on the particularities of post-world war II immigrants' integration through an examination of national citizenship arrangements, the thesis has argued that established minorities are just as susceptible to changes in institutional and discursive settings of citizenship as new immigrant groups. Drawing on
a case study of the Leeds Jewish community, it has demonstrated the complex dynamics of personal and group negotiations of 'Jewishness' and 'Britishness'.

This was achieved with the help of a qualitative, reflexive research methodology that has employed historical and contemporary analyses of narratives of Jewish life in Leeds. Using a multi-methods approach that combined ethnographic research with in-depth interviews, a questionnaire survey and secondary data analysis, the research has looked at group and individual accounts, which recall family and collective memories as well as current representations of self and community. Although the qualitative nature of the methodology, as well as the focus on one research locality, limits generalisations and can not claim 'proof' of any causal connections, it has provided some powerful insights into the intra-communal and external dynamics of identity production and negotiation.

The main explanatory concepts of the research were the notions of minority identity, citizenship, and integration. The thesis has taken a social constructivist approach, which rejects an essentialised vision of identities and defines them as flexible, relational and fluid. At the same time identities are not seen as voluntaristic and indeterminate, but as discursively and institutionally conditioned. By the same token, citizenship, understood as simultaneously a form of collective identity and a set of institutional and discursive practices, has been theorised as an important context for the production of Jewish identity as a British/English minority identity. Consequently, immigrant integration has been conceptualised as a multidimensional process that covered the acquisition of formal rights and obligations, socio-economic mobility, convergence of cultural norms and everyday practices, as well as the reworking of identities and loyalties (Lewis 2004: 8).

The fusion of discursive and institutional frameworks has revealed the complexity of the relationship between the contexts of citizenship and collective and individual identities of migrants. It has been a premise of this thesis that a minority group, despite its internal diversity, is constructed as an 'imagined community' (Anderson 1983) from inside and from outside of the group. It is associated with a number of cultural signifiers, social and institutional 'trademarks', which are recognised as unifying and delineating a group's boundary vis-à-vis the rest of society. Although the cultural

\[35\] It has to be noted that the acceptance of common signifiers by the group's members does not mean that they agree on the interpretation and significance of these symbolic codes.
heritage of the group in question is important for the demarcation of minority boundaries, this heritage is itself a ‘performance’, which is being continuously negotiated in relation to their imagined audiences located at different spatial scales (Webner 2005). These negotiations on the national and local levels are to a great degree conditioned by the nature of socio-economic cleavages in a host society (class, religion, race, etc.) as well as by its ‘rules’ of social engagement, which are conceptualised in this research within a citizenship framework. As a ‘community’, an immigrant group gradually becomes more embedded in the institutional settings of a host country and, consequently, more sensitive to its rules and incentive structures. Another aspect of a minority’s integration is its connectedness to national discourses, which is normally manifested in the increasing intertextuality of a group’s identity representation. To put it simply, minority identities are defined in terms and relations that are meaningful and significant in the cultural context of their host nations. For example, the descendants of Eastern European Jews in Britain or the US have constructed their Jewishness in religious terms, while those descendants who stayed in Soviet Russia have learned to see their Jewishness as an ethnic identity. The process of group identity production is paralleled by the production of individual group members’ identities. These individual identities could have different dynamics from that of the minority group, since they will be shaped by their relations with the host society as well as their own ‘community’.

The research demonstrates that intra-communal processes of Jewish identity construction are sensitive to the general terms and conditions of minority inclusion in the wider society. It also shows the complexity and multidimensionality of this relationship. On the one hand, the changing formula of national citizenship has influenced the community as a collectivity and has affected its members as individual citizens, thus creating different trajectories of integration. On the other hand, the impact of national discourses and institutions of citizenship has been, and continues to be, mediated by a number of other national and local conditions.

Citizenship arrangements in Britain are now fundamentally different from the past. During the large-scale Jewish immigration of the late 1880s, the British Empire had no formal definition of citizenship. While the notion of ‘British subject’ was an inclusive term, it existed in the context of a hierarchically racist worldview and ethnically defined English national identity. The pressures to assimilate were incredibly strong, demanding almost total abandonment of previous identities and cultures of immigrants. In the last quarter of the 20th century, however, the terms of social inclusion have began to change.
Formal institutional arrangements, public policies as well as official discourses on citizenship have been redefined in accordance with the principles of multiculturalism. Although debates about how to integrate immigrants ‘properly’ have recently intensified, at present the assimilatory pressures are still much weaker than in the past. The quintessence of being British is identified through belonging to the British ‘political community’ rather than through the sharing of white English ‘culture’. Britishness, defined in racially and ethnically inclusive terms, is largely accepted as a legitimate representation of British nationhood. Finally, in contrast to the beginning of the 20th century, when citizenship rights were defined in accordance with liberal philosophical thinking, today’s immigrant and minority groups enjoy the legitimacy of their collective identities in a public space, with at least some of their citizenship rights being group-based.

These developments have taken place in the context of declining class-based politics, rising levels of secularism and increasingly consumer-oriented attitudes to social policies and identities. As a result, mainstream British society, which in the past was entirely associated with white Christian English middle class culture, has been challenged and fragmented, creating multiple representations. In these circumstances, Jews, individually and as a group, very much like any other established minorities, have faced a growing inconsistency between the new socio-political reality and their old identities. This has given rise to a variety of responses, which constitute the sociological focus of my research and will be discussed further.

9.2. The changing dynamics of Jewish identities in Leeds

The review of local Jewish narratives revealed that both the collective and individual identities of the Leeds Jewish community have been in continuous motion for more than a century. Yet, the trajectories of those changes at different moments in time have been very different. The historical analysis of discursive and institutional changes in national citizenship has been instrumental in comprehending these differences.

During the early stages of the settlement (1880-1915), Leeds Jewry was in many ways typical of the London or Manchester Jewish communities: many poor immigrants from Eastern Europe living in segregated areas and working in sweatshop industries. Certain differences, however, set Leeds apart and put it on a slower path to integration than other Jewish settlements. First, at the time of mass migration in the late 19th century, the number of established English-born Jews in Leeds was very small and their influence on
the community remained limited. In Leeds, the ability of this small group of British-born and anglicised Jews to orchestrate and speed up the assimilation of the new-comers was more modest than, for instance, in London, where Jewish elites exerted a powerful ‘dual closure’ on immigrant Jews, forcing them to internalise a certain vision of Jewishness (Cooke 2000:451). The second reason for Leeds Jews’ slow assimilation was in their mass employment in the tailoring industry, which aided the continuation of residential and employment segregation and reduced social contacts with non-Jews to a minimum. These factors resisted institutionalised pressures to assimilate, but were not able to stop the anglicisation of Leeds Jews.

The identities of the first generations of immigrants were shaped by their experience in their country of origin (Tsarist Russia), which remained the main reference point for their Jewishness. These identities reflected the main ideological divisions of the time, in which the supporters of socialism and nationalism challenged the traditional, pre-modern vision of Jewishness. Still, the particularities of Jewish immigration to Leeds were such that most of the Jewish immigrants who settled there identified with ‘traditional Orthodoxy’, thus conveying their own experience of translocation through the traditional Jewish narrative of Diaspora, Exile and Return. This ‘Grand Jewish Narrative’ (Azria 2002) has been the principal ontological paradigm for Jewish people for centuries, binding together the otherwise diverse experiences of Jewish exiles in time and space.

Lack of leadership, together with residential and occupational segregation, also brought communal fragmentation, which impeded the unification of representative institutions and slowed assimilation further. Under these conditions, the primary mechanism of integration was free public schooling, which promoted a British/English identity as the means to individual socio-economic mobility. Most of the ensuing changes in the communal infrastructure reflected the changing needs of its individual members rather than the premeditated attempts of the community’s leadership to orchestrate collective anglicisation. Given widespread discrimination and exclusion, it is not surprising that most communal organisations formed by second and third generation immigrants replicated the typical English organisations which denied membership to Jews (cricket team, golf club, trade union, etc.).

For these English-born descendants of Eastern European Jews, the Grand Jewish Narrative retained its centrality, especially in their recollections of the past, but it had to be modified in order to fit into their newly embraced, but highly significant, identity as
a British citizen. As acculturation and economic integration progressed, the socio-economic ascent of Leeds Jews was mirrored in the changing geography of a community that was steadily moving northwards to suburbia, and in the gradual dilution of minority identity, which was becoming more symbolic (Gans 1994). The increasing levels of engagement with the host society encouraged the privatisation of Jewish identity in the spaces of home and community. Although the British dominant discourse continued to define Jewish people as an ‘alien race’ well into the late 1950 and early 60s, Jews increasingly saw their ‘otherness’ only in religious terms. Culturally and socially they considered themselves to be English.

The formula of private Jewishness and public Englishness remained the dominant British mode of Jewish engagement with the non-Jewish population in Leeds, as elsewhere. This had severe consequences for the community, which was rapidly loosing its members through secularisation and assimilation. In addition, after world war II the improved well-being of community members and the post-war welfare state reduced people’s economic dependence on the community, allowing many more to drift away. Despite all the shortcomings, the privatisation of Jewish identity as a religious identity was a successful individual strategy for upwards mobility. This explains why it remained the dominant ‘reading’ of Jewishness well into the late 1980s.

At the same time, the narrative analysis of past documents reveals that from the late 1960s – early 1970s onwards, the accounts of family/community histories and for the first time made reference to non-Jewish immigrants, alternating the Grand Jewish narrative with a cross-cultural narrative of immigration and Diaspora. This corresponds to the changing national/local political and institutional landscapes - the beginning of racial equality politics, black awareness, the ‘discovery’ of alternative social histories, and a general public interest in family histories. In Leeds, immigrants from Britain’s ex-colonies replicated the residential pattern of the Jewish community and settled in proximity to the remaining Chapeltown Jews. Close encounters within this shared residential space increased Jewish awareness of other non-English minority groups, prompting comparison and argument regarding the validity of cross-cultural narratives of immigration. Yet, evidence suggests that cross-cultural, inclusive narratives remained secondary: they were either used in individual narratives or adopted by marginal groups within the Jewish community (e.g. the Reform movement). It was only in the mid 1990s that the cross-cultural narrative received legitimation by the mainstream organisations of Leeds Jewry. Evidence from interviews and document
analysis shows active, albeit contextualised, usage of both narratives by individuals who represent various segments of the community. Communal leaders in their public speeches in the community, and, more frequently, speakers at inter-faith and inter-communal events, use cross-cultural narratives. Nevertheless, the Grand Jewish Narrative, slightly reinterpreted and intertwined with the significance of the creation of the state of Israel, has kept its centrality for the continuity and unity of diverse Jewish identities. An examination of the post-war Jewish community reveals a gradual institutional decline in the conventional (privatised and monolithic) representation of Jewishness and a rise in the pluralisation of institutions based on ‘identity politics’ and ‘lifestyle choices’. This, unquestionably, corresponds to rising levels of education and the growing number of middle class and professional Jews.

A proliferation of concern with identity and a sense of personal belonging has emerged as the most important factor in the local dynamics of Jewish identity production. Although the Leeds community boasts a well-developed welfare system, the primary reasons for community membership are ideational, social and religious. As most of its members are middle class and well educated Britons, their search for a reconnection with their Jewish heritage is rooted in their general desire to identify and belong. Consequently, private constructions of Jewish identity are intertwined with other sides of people’s lives. This is evident in the increasing fusion of specifically Jewish concerns and non-Jewish national and local agenda. This study of private narratives of self, family and community has revealed that intertextual borrowings from national discourses have not only become an established practice, but a self-conscious and strategic choice for many of the members of the Leeds Jewish community. Rather interestingly, while many of the multicultural arguments are being adapted to their narratives of Jewish self (and this is especially true for those members who define themselves as marginalised), a universalistic liberal philosophy is often used to justify the right of an individual Jew to choose and modify her identities as she pleases. This is not a uniquely Leeds phenomenon. The Report of the Commission on Representation of the Interests of the British Jewish Community (CRIBJC 2000) recognises that the segmentation of British Jewry is connected to the recent fragmentation of the British mainstream. Contemporary constructions of personal Jewish identity are often based on ‘lifestyle choices’ and are progressively idiosyncratic and eclectic. Leeds Jewish narrative practices, for example, show the existence of multiple ways of being and
expressing one’s Jewishness, as well as pressures for their recognition within and outside the Jewish community.

In researching today’s patterns of local Jewish identification, this study employed an analytical distinction between the religious and social dimensions of Jewish identity. This has been important for understanding the historical continuity and the present variety and consistency of personal identifications. The research indicated that, for many Jews in Leeds, the socio-cultural dimension has become by far the most important space of Jewish existence. This reflects a generally high level of secularisation within the community, but more importantly, cultural expressions of Jewish identity are inherently more pluralistic and permeable than identities regulated by a more rigid religious space. They make possible the construction of ‘bespoke’ identities, which, just like today’s national politics, are issue-sensitive and fragmented. The empirical evidence has supported this claim by showing a growing discursive flexibility and context-specificity to narrative constructions of personal identities. For instance, both the Grand Jewish Narrative and cross-cultural narratives could be strategically employed to support different claims within the same personal account, or, depending on whether Jews are constructed as the ‘English’ or as an ex-immigrant minority, different attitudes to contemporary immigrants are justified.

Following Gans (1979), the socio-cultural forms of diasporic Jewish identifications have often been theorised as symbolic identities that provide relatively cheap and efficient ways of satisfying the desire to belong (Hofman 2006; Rebhun 2004). These expressions of Jewishness do not demand strong commitments or penetrate into everyday lifestyles. They also are unlikely to conflict with other aspects of people’s lives. At the same time, they allow publicly visible individualised ‘readings’ of Jewish identity, which reflect people’s aspirations for self-fulfillment. The data accumulated by this research showed that those members of the community who self-identified as religiously observant had predictably less diverse cultural ‘repertoires’ of identity expressions than their more secular counterparts. Such people accept the supremacy of Halakhah, Jewish religious law, which structures and regulates their lives in all existential space. Their identities are therefore more in line with the traditional Judaic model of Jewish identity. Compared to the less religiously committed, religious Jews exhibit more cohesive, structured and inflexible identities. Yet even their narrations of ‘self’ include many intercultural borrowings and references to multicultural arguments.
even though their understanding of multiculturalism emphasises coexistence rather than interaction with other social groups.

The pluralism and fragmentation of individual Jewish identities in Leeds is matched by the growing pluralisation of collective narratives of Jewish self. Both types of identification have been strongly influenced by the changing realities of British society. These are multidimensional changes, which work together to undermine the previously successful formulae of personal and group Jewish identities. As members of the British middle class, Jews tend to be relatively autonomous and discursively adept in making their expectations heard. Their aspirations include the delivery of customer-based ‘services’ from communal organisations, a positive way of identification and a general sense of pride and belonging. Yet, as typical members of the middle class, Jews are becoming more segmented, which is translated into the fragmentation of the Jewish community. This undermines a traditional representation of the community as the ‘unity of the same’. Many younger Jews in particular believe that this model of collective identity is dated, factually incorrect and morally unjust, for it suppresses and marginalises many alternative voices in the community.

Local Jews have successfully adopted multicultural rhetoric to justify the legitimacy of their demands. Paradoxically, whereas many voices in the national discourse consider multiculturalism to be a communitarian argument, for many Leeds Jews it is about the freedom of previously marginalised groups/individuals to publicise their identities and to have adequate representation in the community’s institutions. In such narratives, the Leeds Jewish community is constructed as a micro-model of the national community. It is therefore argued that the community should follow the example of the nation and pluralize, looking for a new ‘community cohesion’ recipe that is based on social inclusiveness and the accommodation of diversity. The non-religious leadership actively promotes this new collective identity, considering it as a core element in their strategy to revive the declining community. This is consistent with Chouliaraki and Fairclough’s (1999) claim that discourses can not only legitimize the status quo, but also initiate and shape economic, social and cultural changes. An important feature of the new collective image of Leeds Jewry is its linguistic presentation as a ‘community of communities’, which itself is an intertextual formation, a discursive borrowing from national politics. Overall, eclecticism and context sensitivity characterise nearly all of the current discourses in the Leeds Jewish community. This development seems to be directly
linked to the nestedness and multiple nature of identities in contemporary mainstream society.

9.3. Reflections on the notion of ‘multicultural vulnerability’

In the last few years, multiculturalism has come under increasing criticism in many western countries in both political and academic circles. Mitchell (2004: 641) correctly observes that state-sponsored multiculturalism is in retreat amid a generalisable discourse of its ultimate failure. In Britain, the multicultural backlash has led to the abandonment of the state’s active promotion of diversity and the revival of assimilationist and exclusionist sentiments with respect to social integration. This is apparent in the changing rhetoric of the government, which, in an attempt to revive Britain as a coherent nation-state, openly endorses patriotism and nationalism. For example, in his first major speech of 2006, Gordon Brown called for the need to “embrace the Union flag”, institutionalise a British national day and find the “essential common purpose ... without which no society can flourish.” (BBC News Report, 14.01.2006).

Although multiculturalism has different meanings and multiple implications, its contemporary critics focus predominantly on the failures of state multicultural policies with regard to the integration of first and second generation immigrants. At the same time, they often ignore another important aspect of multicultural citizenship – its powerful re-constitutive effect on a society that had to come to terms with a novel, more inclusive arrangement of civic competence within the public sphere. In this respect, this study, in investigating the change and diversity of individual and collective identities within the Leeds Jewish community, has provided useful insights into how multicultural citizenship has impacted on the production of identities in a minority group, whose primary integration happened in a very different normative climate. The research findings contest the prevailing belief that Jews have successfully left all their adjustment problems in the past and now enjoy unproblematic and ‘set in stone’ identities. The historical analysis of Jewish life in Leeds revealed that the national ‘multicultural turn’ has disabled a previously successful formula of Jewish integration, based on ‘public Englishness and private Jewishness’, and has unleashed previously suppressed forces inside the community.
The retreat of state multiculturalism is manifested in another ontological shift from the recognition of minority communities as legitimate building blocks of society and identity providers for their members (Shachar 1999: 89) to the re-statement of a neo-liberal belief in individuals as “atomised free-thinking and entrepreneurial subjects who can ‘choose’ to assimilate or not as they wish” (Mitchell 2004:645). In the wake of the ethnic riots in 2001 and the recent surge in ‘home-grown’ terrorism, ethnic and religious communities have been re-conceptualised as failing and even as deliberately disrupting their members’ integration into the wider society. Communitarians are currently on the loosing side and minority communities are theorised as powerful and suppressive entities that contradict liberal values of individual freedoms (see more in Mason 1999 and Shachar 2000). However, it might be argued that debates over the superiority of liberalism or communitarianism are somewhat misguided because they tacitly assume the rigidity and homogeneity of community. This research points to the inaccuracy of this assumption.

The approach taken in this thesis is to treat community, just like identity, as a contextual and relational positioning rather than as an essentialised fixity. As Werbner rightly observes, instead of dismissing it altogether “one should theorise its heterogeneity: its ideological, political, cultural and social divisions, on the one hand, and its situationally changing boundaries, on the other” (2005: 748). The thesis endorses the above position and, using the example of the Jewish community in Leeds, provides extensive empirical support for it. Moreover, the research has shown that, for the Leeds Jewish community, multiculturalism has become a liberating and democratising force. By enabling and legitimising claims of previously marginalised and suppressed voices, it has helped to pluralize the communal public sphere and to redefine the officially endorsed collective image, which now describes Leeds Jewry as a ‘community of communities’ that welcomes and accepts internal diversity.

Concurrently, this study has also shown that while a multicultural framework of national citizenship forms an important context for the historical evolution of Jewish collective and individual identities, a number of other local and national factors intervene to mediate the impact of national policies. In the case of Leeds Jewry, it was the changing socio-economic status of its individual members that enhanced their bargaining power vis-à-vis the communal religious and secular establishment. Although the community’s welfare provision is excellent, for the majority of its members it is a supplementary reason for identification. Similarly, despite their concern with rising
levels of anti-Semitism, Jews entrust their security to national rather than communal institutions. Once a reduced dependence on the community was coupled with the enabling conditions of multiculturalism it created the opportunity for democratic processes to take off. As a result of internal pluralisation, the group boundaries become blurred and more permeable, increasing the sensitivity of the group to the external environment.

This understanding of the dynamic triadic relationship of the national, the communal and the individual have important implications with regard to the development of national political strategies. Overall, the evidence from this research supports the historically and spatially grounded approach to minority integration, yet also points to some general suggestions. First, the research indicates that minority communities are not necessarily a threat to liberal democracy and to a cohesive nation, but, given the right set of circumstances, can be a ‘cradle’ of democracy, where through their participation in communal NGOs individuals learn to be active members of national civil society. Second, national policies can induce the ‘right circumstances’ for integration by recognising and encouraging alternative voices within the community, and by legitimising their representation in the national/local public spaces. Third, as independent individuals have very different relationships with their communities, policies that help to accelerate the upward socio-economic mobility of a minority group’s members should be also beneficial in promoting the internal pluralisation of communal public space.

At the same time, if national citizenship policies become more assimilationist and individualistic in their dealings with minority members, this is likely to halt internal democratization. While some members will choose, if possible, to drop their minority identity, others are likely to feel more threatened. This can obstruct internal debates and pluralism. Additionally, as this has research shown, school is a very powerful means of teaching ideas about ‘citizenship’ to children, who are likely to apply the models they learn to their own communities. Hence, multicultural upbringing encourages communal democracy, while assimilationism is likely to support a hierarchical, authoritarian structure.


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Appendices

Appendix 1

Summary of collected empirical data by method of research

All methods of data collection included:
- Interviews
- Ethnographic research
- Questionnaire
- Text and Media Analysis
- Secondary Data

1. Interviews

An overview of interviewees (27 people) and the information on their background

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Code name</th>
<th>age</th>
<th>Family</th>
<th>religiosity</th>
<th>Profession/education</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mr. Miller</td>
<td>70+</td>
<td>Local, lives w. his wife, has children, grandchildren</td>
<td>Traditional, Orthodox, observant</td>
<td>Retired pharmacist, later – MA in Jewish Studies (Leeds University), prominent local historian</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mr. Weis</td>
<td>80+</td>
<td>Local, widower, grown up sons</td>
<td>Very mildly observant, but a member of an Orthodox syn.</td>
<td>Retired jeweller, later – high ed-n, got PhD (Man. Uni in Jewish Studies), cartoonist at BHH</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mr Green</td>
<td>80+</td>
<td>Local, Widower, children living separate</td>
<td>Secular, but member of an Orth. Syn.</td>
<td>Retired from retail business (ex-owner of radio/TV sales)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mrs. Silver</td>
<td>70+</td>
<td>From Germany, widow, no children, lives along</td>
<td>Secular outlook, member of the reform syn.</td>
<td>Holocaust survivor, retired teacher, continuous self ed-n and charity activities, was one of the founders of the Reform syn.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mrs. Rosenbloom</td>
<td>70+</td>
<td>Widow, children – separate lives</td>
<td>Secular outlook, Orthodox syn</td>
<td>Holocaust survivor, retired biologist (Leeds Uni), president of FHSA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mr. Conway</td>
<td>50+</td>
<td>Local, married, has a wife and 3</td>
<td>Strictly orthodox</td>
<td>University Degree, manager in NHS, wife – a school teacher</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Name</td>
<td>Age/Rank</td>
<td>Details</td>
<td>Background/Role</td>
<td></td>
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<td>-------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>----------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Mr. and Mrs. Bennett</strong></td>
<td>80+</td>
<td>A local couple, children live separately</td>
<td>Retired business couple (tailoring, then retail)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>husband – trad. Orthodox, observant; wife – reform and observant</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Mr. and Mrs. Bennett</strong></td>
<td>40+</td>
<td>Son of the above, wife and 2 children</td>
<td>Lawyer, members of Free Masons, wife has converted to Judaism</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Junior (son)</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td>Secular outlook, members of Sinai</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Mr. Colson</strong></td>
<td>60+</td>
<td>Came to Leeds as a child, lives w. his wife, has children, grandchildren</td>
<td>Member of local Jewish establishment, Masonic Lodge, Rotary Club</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Trad. Orthodox, observant</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Mr. Terrill</strong></td>
<td>60+</td>
<td>Local, lives w. his wife, has children, grandchildren</td>
<td>Owns a small business, college grad., activist at the local tennis club; his wife has converted with Orthodox authorities</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Trad. Orthodox observant</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Mr. and Mrs. Hirseman</strong></td>
<td>70+</td>
<td>A married local couple, children, grandchildren</td>
<td>Retired, he was in printing, she was a secretary, secondary education</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Trad. Orthodox observant</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Michael Kraft</strong></td>
<td>50+</td>
<td>from London, lives w. his wife, has a daughter, 20</td>
<td>University degree, a free-lance consultant in social research and law</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Modern orthodox, Lubavitch</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Barbara, Margaret, Rebecca and Anna</strong></td>
<td>50-70+</td>
<td>All – married, live w. husbands, have children and grandchildren</td>
<td>Ed-n: college, part time jobs and main occupation – housewives and community’s work</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Trad. Orthodox, some observance</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Jeremy Krawitz</strong></td>
<td>80+</td>
<td>From Wales, lives w. his wife, has children, grandchildren</td>
<td>Ed-n: college, currently retired professional</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Secular outlook, Orthodox syn.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Helen Perc</strong></td>
<td>45</td>
<td>Lives w. her husband, has 7 children (youngest – 4)</td>
<td>Ed-n: college, housewife</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Strictly Orthodox</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Alicia</strong></td>
<td>40+</td>
<td>Local, not married, lives w. her mother,</td>
<td>University Degree, works for a charity</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Trad. Orthodox, observant</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Name</td>
<td>Age</td>
<td>Relationship</td>
<td>Education</td>
<td>Occupation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-------------------</td>
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<td>--------------</td>
<td>-----------</td>
<td>------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Samantha</td>
<td>30+</td>
<td>Separated, 2 young children</td>
<td>Secular, non-member</td>
<td>Work: legal secretary</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alex T.</td>
<td>early 20s</td>
<td>Local, single, lives w. parents</td>
<td>spiritual Zionist non-observant</td>
<td>Schools: Brodetsky, LGS, Allerton High, currently is studying at teachers’ College</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ilana and Natasha</td>
<td>30+</td>
<td>Married w. kids in their early teen</td>
<td>Secular, Sinai and ?</td>
<td>Both with a Uni. degree, now work PT at the communal organisations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Michelle and Angela</td>
<td>21 and 23</td>
<td>Single</td>
<td>Quite secular, some nominal observance, but orthodox syn.</td>
<td>Schools: Brodetsky, Allerton High, Zone youth workers</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### 2. Ethnographic research:

#### 2.1. On-going relationship (repetitive conversations)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Main contact</th>
<th>Age</th>
<th>Family</th>
<th>Background information</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1 Ruth</td>
<td>30+</td>
<td>Married with 3 kids</td>
<td>Secular Israeli, no Synagogue membership</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 Mahayan and Roni</td>
<td>Late 30s-40s</td>
<td>Married with 3 young kids</td>
<td>Husband -Secular Israeli, wife – French, traditional Judaism, ex-Masorti</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 Anna and Alex F.</td>
<td>40+ - 50+</td>
<td>Married with 2 kids</td>
<td>German-S.African Masorti, Secular</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 Samuel and Sheila</td>
<td>40+ - 50+</td>
<td>Married with 2 kids</td>
<td>English-S.African Reform, secular</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 Suzan</td>
<td>30+</td>
<td>Married with 2 kids</td>
<td>Secular, English married to Israeli</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6 Liat and Alex D.</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>Married with 2 kids</td>
<td>Secular, Israeli, living in the community for a year</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7 Marsha</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>Married 1 child</td>
<td>Culturally Jewish, traditional Judaism, married to an Israeli</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
2.2. Situational engagements

Conversations and participation in the events at the Brodetsky Primary School and the Zone, youth club

As my children (age 7) attend the Brodetsky School and have regular activities at ‘the Zone’, I had multiple opportunities to engage in conversations with parents, teachers, youth leaders and teenage leaders, as well as participate on a regular basis in the organised events. As a result, I developed friendly relationship with many people in the age groups of 20-40+.

Personal conversations at the Lubavich Centre in Leeds

In contrast to the prevailing Jewish opinion, which is pessimistic about the future of the shrinking Leeds Jewish community, the people, I talked to at the Lubavich centre, express optimism and consider Judaism in Leeds to be on the rise. They explain it in the following way: although the overall number of Jews in Leeds is declining, the number of observant Jews is growing. Similarly, the average level of awareness and knowledge among those, who identify themselves as Jews, is higher than 20 years ago.

In their views, anti-Semitism is an internal phenomenon. It might change its appearance but ‘Gentiles will always hate Jews and anti-Semitism will always exist’. Thus this phenomenon is firmly structured as an exclusively Jewish attribute (within Jewish narrative) and not as a manifestation of general racism.

2.3. Attendance of the communal events:

As a member of national Jewish Historical Society, during the last 3 years I attended more than 20 monthly talks by the communal and external speakers of the Leeds brunch of JHS including such topics:

- on the history of British Jewry (medieval and contemporary)
- on the regional and London communities of Jews
- on the local Jewish history (events, organisations, people, personal lives and family histories, economic and political activities).

These meetings provided me with a lot of factual information about the history and the presence of the community, helped to establish contacts with many local residents and

1 Lubavitch movement started in 19th century in Poland. It is based on a specific interpretation of Judaism and one of its main principles is to ‘reach out’ to all Jews (who do not observe religious laws) and bring them back to Judaism. They came to Leeds around 25 years ago and contributed to the revival of the religious infrastructure (Mikvah, study programmes, independent Jewish school)
at times presented an opportunity to collect short statements and narratives. Below is a list of some JHS talks, which I attended.

**Bernard Silver and Anglo-Jewish Historians**

*Silver was the founder of JHS, Leeds Branch in 1978. The talk was helpful in establishing contacts with local historians and learning about the history of the creation of JHS in Leeds.*

*a Tribute Lecture by Prof. A. Newman*  
Donisthorpe Hall (Jewish nursing residence)  
September 2003

**On religious identity, Zionism and current politics**

*The speaker gave brief encounter of the history of Zionist movement and its different factions (religious, secular, national, international, local, women’s organisation), contemporary Zionism and anti-zionism.*

*(the speaker was from Manchester University, Jewish Studies)*  
5 October 2003

**Zionism now?! by Yehuda Bergman the representative of Israeli Board in Leeds (promoting Israel and assisting emigration)**

*Assessing the grief demographic situation in Israel, the speaker called on the Leeds Jews to go to Israel to contribute to the survival of the Jewish state. At the same time, he acknowledged that at the moment many Israelis do the reverse and settle in the West, including UK and Leeds.*

February 2 2004

**The Jews of Bradford**

*A talk on the history of the Bradford community helped to put Leeds community in perspective and Q&A time was very useful in collecting people’s memories and opinions regarding similarities and differences between Leeds and Bradford.*

*by Sydney Levine*  
May 10, 2004

**Well-Suited: the Rise and Fall of the Leeds Tailoring Industry,**

*The Talk was based on the research conducted by the speaker and provided a wealth of information regarding the Jewish involvement in the industry and the history of the Jewish community. Q&A session generated lots of debates regarding the Jewish past and the present immigrants. Many people shared their memories regarding their work in the industry and its impact on the community.*

*By Dr. Katryna Honeyman*  
December 6, 2004

**The Jews of Lithuania: Holocaust, Immigration, Achievements,**

*The useful bit of the talk referred to the historical roots of Jews in Leeds, of which up to 80 percent belong to Litvaks (descendants from Lithuanian immigrants).*

*by Dr. Saul Issroff*  
27 June 2004
**Local Jewish History through reading gravestones**, by Malcolm Sender  
July 5, 2004  
The speaker constructed a talk as a series of narratives regarding the history of the Jewish cemetery.

**The Day Jack Spot Came to Leeds**,  
By Nigel Gizzard  
7 March, 2005  
A local amateur historian presented his own vision of how the Jewish-only notorious criminal visited Leeds in 1930s and what the community of the time really looked like (crime and gambling).

**Trick or Treat: the Jews Resettled in England 1656-2006**, by Prof. J. Alderman  
3 July, 2006  
An informative overview of the historic development of Anglo-Jewry, very useful in placing Leeds community in a general national context.

**Irina Kudenko Time and Jewish Identity: Changes of Self-Perception of Leeds Jews over the last century**  
10 January 2005  
My own presentations of the preliminary findings to the local audience, which I tried to engage in conversation regarding their past, albeit with only partial success.

**Other events**

**North Leeds Debating Society: Is religion divisive?**  
Quakers' House 24 November 2003.  
Although it is not a Jewish organisation, the majority of the participants and panellists were Jewish and the main discussion was about Judaism. The educated, middle class professionals, mostly retired, with Jewish upbringing, but militantly secular in their outlook, many of whom are married to non-Jews, shared their personal life stories while arguing for or against.

**Chapeltown and its Jews**  
by M. Freedman, a prominent local historian  
BHH Synagogue Leisure Club, Monday – mid October, 2003  
Based on his extensive research, the speaker gave a good review on the location, composition, personalities of the community in times of its residence in Chapeltown. The audience were predominantly retired senior members of the community, who responded to the talk with vivid and emotional memories from their youth.

**Domestic violence and the Jewish community: the last Taboo?** Conference organised by Leeds Women’s Jewish Aid  
Queenhill Estate, 30 November 2003  
The representatives of Jewish organisations, local government (judge, social worker), local GP and an Orthodox rabbi from BHH Synagogue discussed the issue in general terms, highlighting the differences between
minority groups and general public. During question time female members of the audience debated the rabbi on the get (religious divorce for women) as a form of domestic coercion and inequality and on under-representation and under-appreciation of women in Orthodox synagogues.

**Long Term Planning for British Jewry**
A national seminar organised by Jewish Policy Research Institute (JPR)
London, Dec. 8 2003

This day seminar for the communal leaders and welfare workers addressed contemporary problems of British Jewish communities and discussed their implications and practical solutions. JPR Institute presented the results of their extensive national research as well as their findings from the studies of Leeds and London communities.

**60s Anniversary of Leeds’s Reform Synagogue**
Sinai Reform Synagogue, 13 January 2004

The celebratory service in the presence of Lord Mayor, representatives of UK reform synagogues and 3 former rabbis at the Sinai Synagogue. People shared their memories about the history of the reform movement in Leeds and their life in the community.

**Israeli Expo**
Etz Haim Synagogue, 1 February 2004

Dedicated to the links between the Diaspora and Israel, this event was well attended. Several relief appeals for the Israeli poor were launched, people sampled wine and food from Israel, and browsed through stalls of many Jewish Israel-oriented organisations.

**Focus on the Future**

**The Sinai Reform Synagogue membership meeting**
(A focus group-style workshop)
7.11.04

This meeting concluded a series of mini-focus-group discussions regarding the short term and long term future of the Synagogue, its mission, goals and strategies. Main topics of the debates were on the Progressive Judaism interpretation of Jewish identity, the relationship of Sinai members with the rest of Leeds Jewry (the awareness of marginality and strategies for the development of Sinai positive image)

**“How Judaism is Portrayed in Islam”**
by Dr. Hassan Alkatib, Vice-Chair and Assistant Imam of Leeds Grand Mosque, at Sinai Reform Synagogue, Thu 6.5.04

A presentation and a follow-up question-time regarding the Jewish-Muslim relationship (inter-communal interaction, British, Leeds affairs, mid-East and international terrorism)

**‘Everyone has a story to tell. Here is mine…’ Short presentation of memorable events from the Past by the**

6 people shared the episodes of their lives. Most of the narratives were memories of their youth with very subtle Jewish references. Only two stories
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>members of BHH Synagogue Leisure Club</strong></th>
<th>contained explicit Jewish awareness. After the presentations I talked with some of the club members regarding their family histories, their lives and their families, experiences of Anti-Semitism, etc.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>BHH 10 May 2004</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

**Eruv**—**London experience**

a talk by a London rabbi, who was involved in the project
Lubavitch’s Centre, Jan 2004

The erection of Eruv was very controversial, but despite strong objections (including Jewish), it was launched in London in spring 2003. The audience was inspired, enthusiastic about the experience and showed interest in devising Eruv for Leeds.

**Building continuity through Jewish education**

by Roni Cohen, an OFSTED inspector
UHC, 14 March 2004

This talk was about the sustainability of Jewish Identity, and on how to help people, starting from young children, to reconnect to their Jewish heritage. Related to the idea of transmittance of Jewish knowledge are the issues of change and continuity in Jewish identity, its values and norms, the agency (what is community today and who in the community has to do it?) and location (synagogues as real learning centres for all generations). The speaker also raised a question of external vs. internal images of Anglo-Jewry.

**Censorship and Self-Censorship in Anglo-Jewry: Hugo Green’s Affair**

by Prof. Geoffrey Alderman, an acclaimed Jewish historian
UHC, 21 March 2004

The talk was about Jewish identity and the image of Jews for inside and outside audiences. The desired image to project to the outside world is of unity and cohesion; yet it is challenged by a modern world and multiple identities that people have nowadays. In addition the speaker discussed the controversial position of the Chief Rabbi over his public recognition of the late reform Rabbi in 1993, he also provided interesting historical accounts from British Jewish Life.

**The future of interfaith relationship**

by Malcolm Weisman, the Chief Rabbi representative for small communities
Leeds Town Hall 18 May 2005

The event was organised by the regional Council of Christian and Jews, and apart from the presentation regarding the bi-faith relationship contained an extensive Q&A session when local Jews shared their opinions, told reminiscences and express their concerns for the future. There was a clear realisation of the vitality of tri-faith relations (Jews, Christians and Muslims).

---

2 Eruv — (lit) the wall, involves the creation of a closed boundary, a symbolic wall around the community that symbolise the extension of one’s home to the neighbourhood covered by the eruv, hence allows some relaxation of the Shabbat observance. In particular, the prohibition to ‘carry’ is lifted and people could bring their babies or push the disabled. Eruv is a thin 5mm wire that is passed on around 5 m height.
As part of my data gathering, I attended a number of events, organised by the local Holocaust Survivors Friendship Association (HSFA). This organisation, founded in 1996, provides its members with a venue for meeting and sharing their experiences, as well as being involved in research and teaching regarding Holocaust. The following lists contained the events that I've participated in:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Event</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Danish Jewry during Holocaust</strong></td>
<td>The talk described the fate of Danish Jewry during Holocaust and outlined a set of structural and cultural factors (Jews as established, integrated and de-segregated minority in the Dutch society) that explained why the host population was much friendlier to Jews in Denmark than in other Western European Countries. The speaker talked about her experience of immigration to Leeds and theambiguity of identities this relocation has caused</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HSFA, March 2004</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>From Kindertransport to Quakers, a talk</strong></td>
<td>A personal story of immigration and settlement with constant references to the current refugees and immigrants’ experience. A perfect narrative for my research. Issues of the identity change and an inclusive narrative of immigration are discussed with the audience</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>by Josephine Dunn, a refugee from Nazi Germany who settled in Yorkshire</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June 2004</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Making a New Life: Holocaust Survivors in Yorkshire</strong></td>
<td>an on going research project based on oral testimony and in-depth interviewing about the lives made after arriving in Britain as refugees. It is also archiving documents, artworks, writings and other historically valuable materials. I was able to obtain the initial 28 short written autobiographic accounts of HSFA members, which we helpful in understanding the identities of this part of Leeds Jewish community.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Started June 2006</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HSFA in collaboration with CATH Centre (Leeds University),</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Sharing personal experience of the visit to Auschwitz</strong></td>
<td>The speaker started with the narration of his childhood in Germany, his escape and settlement in Britain. A very personal account of his life and the recently completed trip to Auschwitz was interwoven with historical facts and accounts of the events.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>By Martin Kapel</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31.10.2004</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>University Seminar for the researchers of Holocaust Survivors</strong></td>
<td>The seminar provided a comparative perspective and good methodological framework for the research dealing with the Survivors. The researchers from Manchester and London shared their concerns and findings. Of particular interest was a 15 min video that documented the Holocaust</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7 December 2004</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The Presentation of the Project to the students of Leeds University

By Brett Harrison (researcher) and Trude Silman (the HSFA Chair)

November 14 2006

Trude's presentation was a well-formed narrative of her life and family in Germany prior to migration and after her arrival to the UK as a child refugee. Her account contained constant link to the present situation and the fate of refugees in Britain today.

Brett's presentation was more descriptive with lots of slides containing photos and other documents that depicted Holocaust survivors at various stages of their life.

LIMMUD (A day of Jewish adult learning)

In the last 2 years I've participated in 3 events organised under the auspices of Leeds LIMMUD (a branch of National LIMMUD organisation)

Limmud 3 April 2005, Weetwood Hall, Lawnswood, Leeds

Renewing Community: What Makes a Synagogue Community 'Buzz'? A presentation-workshop engaging the participants into an active discussion of how to invigorate the synagogue life in the times of low religiosity and competing recreational activities. An articulate expression of the opinion on the difference between the Jewish community today and in the near past (40y. ago)

By Judy Plaut and Ian Morris

3 April 2005

Making a New Life: Holocaust Survivors in Yorkshire An academic presentation of the joint research activities by CATH centre (Leeds University) and HSFA with the illustration of narratives as collected by in-depth interviewing of the survivors.

By Grizelda Pollack

3 April 2005

Combating Calumnies: A Case Study of 'Jews for Jesus' advertisement A one-sided presentation of the offensive nature of the ad and the exploration of the difficulties for 'mainstream' Jews combating such a 'heresy': extreme consciousness regarding Jewish external image in the society, the impact of multiculturalism on the Jews and the role of public expectations of pluralism in Jewish communities. Q&A time was extremely enlightening regarding the audience's opinions.

By Jonathan Hoffman

3 April 2005
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Leeds Limmud After Hours</th>
<th>November 2005, MAZCC (community centre)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>The Writer in the Attic: Tamar Yellin and “The Genizah at the House of Shepher”</strong></td>
<td>The locally-born writer, who now lives in London, presented her novel that explores the search of a middle-aged woman of her Jewish identity. The talk was interwoven with personal memories and thoughts on the meaning of Jewishness for different generations of people</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>By Tamar Yellin</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MAZCC 21 September 2005</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>The Turkish Jews of Leeds</strong></td>
<td>An interesting report of a relatively unknown segment of Leeds Jewry, however, even more interesting is the self-reflexive account of the origin of the presenter’s research interest in the topic (tourism and Jewish identity)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>by Nigel Gizzard</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MAZCC 21 September 2005</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Limmud 5 November 2006</th>
<th>Weetwood Hall, Lawnswood, Leeds</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Jewish Welfare and Society in Modern British History</strong></td>
<td>An informative talk on the similarities and differences between gentile and Jewish communities in looking after their needy starting from the Victorian period to nowadays.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>By Derek Fraser (a history Prof. At the Uni of Teeside)</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 November 2006</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Pilgrim, tourist, traveller, wonderer, seeker? Jewish Travel and Jewish Identity</strong></td>
<td>Based on her recently completed MA in Jewish Studies (Leeds Uni), the speaker presented her findings with active engagement of the audience in the discussion regarding Jewish identity and travelling</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>By Anna Dyson (communal lay leader for the youth’ activities)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 November 2006</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Is there such a thing as Modern Orthodoxy?</strong></td>
<td>A presentation that evolved into a theological discussion regarding the contradictory relationship between the post-modern philosophy of self and the pre-modern nature of Jewish Orthodoxy. This resonated with the question of the survival and continuity of Jewish Diaspora</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>By Jonathan Davies, a Jewish lay leader from Manchester</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 November 2006</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Towards a Muslim-Jewish Dialogue</strong></td>
<td>the panellists’ brief presentations regarding the nature of Jewish-Muslim relationship was followed by a very intensive discussion on the Judo-Muslim</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A panel discussion mediated by Mohammed Amin and David Berkley</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
During the later stage of data gathering, approximately in early spring 2005, I became aware of the community research project aimed at the “strategic assessment of the Leeds Jewish community ... for offering a set of strategic directions for the community as a whole” (LSPG 2006). Commissioned by the Leeds Jewish Representative Council and supported by other local and national Jewish agencies, the project was conducted by a number of communal lay leaders with the academic support of LEATID (European Centre for Jewish leadership). In the course of this wide-scale study, which involved approximately 500 people (7.5% of the community) through interviews, focus groups, and questionnaires, there were two open public meetings that presented the findings and asked for the public feedback.

**The future of the Leeds Jewish Community**

By LSPG and LEATID

Weetwood Hall, Lawnswood, Leeds

3 April 2005

This was an open public discussion of the preliminary findings of the research within the Leeds Jewish Initiative. A 30 min presentation was followed by two hour debate regarding actions needed to secure the future of the community. The audience roughly reflected the demographics of the community with the older people (60+) constituting more than half of the participants; however, younger people (under 25) were clearly underrepresented.

**Meeting with David Israel** (local spokeman for UJIA) and **Andreas Spokoiny** (researcher from LEATID, Paris)

UJIA office 6 June

In a fruitful conversation regarding the findings in our parallel studies of Leeds Jewish Community, we agreed on cooperation and exchange of the findings. As a result I obtained a set of empirical data containing the opinions of diverse members of the community obtained in interviews, focus groups and questionnaire responses.

**Strategic Plan for Leeds**

By LSPG and LEATID

This meeting contained a presentation of the final report of the research findings and the outline for the actions required in few strategic areas of communal life. The main emphasis is on the communal unity based on the accommodation and respect of...
different ways of being Jewish. This was followed by questions from the audience regarding the proposed plan.


4. Questionnaire survey

Overall there were 73 responses:
- 43 young people’s responses (age range 14-19 y. old), comprising of
  - a pilot study: 17 responses (November 2004),
  - a revised version
    - 4 pupils from Menorah (Jewish independent) school
    - 5 participants in the Zone
    - 21 responses from Leeds Grammar School.
- 22 adult responses (age range 23 to 80) 2nd edition of questionnaire
- some of the respondents were later interviewed in order to obtain a better understanding of their answers, as well as some interview schedules were modified and included the questions from a questionnaire.

5. Text and Media Analysis

5.1. written memoirs by past/present Leeds residents

The following published and unpublished memoirs were used for narrative analysis:


Another source of data for NA were local periodicals - *Jewish Telegraph, J-Life, Yorkshire Evening Press, Yorkshire Evening News, Synagogue publications*, and a Jewish national – *Jewish Chronicle*. 
5.2. Media Sources:

- 2 part BBC production on the Jewish Community of Leeds (1978) featuring the history of the Jewish immigration and early settlement in Leeds, interviews with different generations of immigrants, talking about their life, identity and community.

- the short video productions by the girls of Leeds Menorah High School (2003-2004):
  - on Shabbat (a narration about the religious meaning and celebration of Shabbat organised as a string of oral statements by local Jewish residents)
  - on Kashrus (an educational documentary familiarising with the basic tenets of Kashrus, which featured local residents talking and demonstrating their dietary arrangements in accordance with the Jewish Law)

on the history of Leeds Jewish community (a documentary about the early years of Leeds Jewry, organised as a tour around former communal landmarks in Leyland and Chapeltown by a local historian Murray Friedman, and featuring different senior members of the community narrating their memories)

6. Secondary data – utilising the findings of other studies

Proceedings of the JHS and local social scientists were treated as sources of actual information and were also analysed in terms of narratives and themes that they identify as important:

- Freedman, M. (1992), Leeds Jewry: the first hundred years
• Walsh J.S. (1981), Mrs' Sheinblum's Kitchen, Leeds: Porton and Sons Ltd.
• Saipe, L. (1956), A History of the Jews in Leeds, Leeds

In addition I used the findings of two undergraduate research projects regarding Leeds Jewish community

• Cass, R. (2006), An Investigation into the Changes and Developments in the Self-Reflection of the Jewish Community in Leeds Since the End of the Nineteenth Century, Undergraduate dissertation.
Appendix 2

Interview schedule

Preamble:

Thank you for agreeing to meet and talk, I do appreciate your help. My name is Irina Kudenko, I am doing a PhD research at Leeds University, the School of Geography. My project is about the Leeds Jewish Community, about what does it mean to be Jewish in Leeds. The focus is on how different groups within the community think about their Jewishness and Britishness (Englishness), and the changes that happened over time in the collective and individual identities.

Today I would like to talk with you about yourself, your family, your memories, views and opinions about the Jewish community.

Topics for the interview:

Family history:
- Family origin
- Arriving at Leeds
- Settling in Leeds
  - Actual address
  - Neighbourhood and Integration into the society
  - Education and jobs
  - Discrimination
- Moving homes
- Children and parents relationship

Community
- History of Leeds Jewish community
  - Knowledge and judgement (numbers, religiosity, location, synagogues, Zionism)
  - Person’s views on its relevance for today
  - Views on the changes: comparing the present and the past of the community
- Current affairs and involvement (Jewish - local, national, international, Zionism; non-Jewish – local, national)

Identity:
- self-identification: British, Jewish, English, foreigner, etc.
• Importance of family history for the identity in general (+ for the Jewish identity)
• How would you compare your experience of being a Jew with your parents/grandparents’ experience?
• Role of Leeds in Jewishness:
  • how local communal particularity mediates the experience of Jewish identity (what sets Leeds apart from other Jewish communities in the UK)
  • networking and the perception of outsiders
• Religiosity
  • Importance for the Jewish identity
  • Importance for the personal identity
  • (grand-)Parents’ observance and (grand-)parents’ Jewishness

**multiculturalism of contemporary Britain**

• Understanding and narrating
• Evaluation (good-bad and for whom)
• The understanding of inter-communal relations:
  • between Jewish communities
  • interfaith
  • host society – immigrants
  • racial and ethnic

**Keywords:** Jewish Diaspora Israel Zionism
Religion Ethnic (Cultural Social) Synagogue
Multiculturalism anti-Semitism racism
Jewish immigration (19c) contemporary immigrants
Appendix 3

Questionnaire Form for Adults

We would like you to answer the following questions as a part of a research project on the Leeds Jewish Community. The study, conducted by Irina Kudenko, Leeds University, the School of Geography, examines the ways the members of Leeds Jewry understand the meaning of being Jewish in contemporary Britain, of being Jewish and living in Leeds. The focus is on how different groups within the community think about their Jewishness and Britishness (Englishness), and the changes that happened over time in their collective and individual identities.

1. Do you think Leeds is a good place to live? □ yes □ no
   Why?

2. In your opinion, is Leeds different from other British cities with sizeable Jewish communities?
   Could you explain your answer? □ yes □ no □ don't know

3. Could you, please, state the significance of each of the following aspects to feeling Jewish?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Very important</th>
<th>Of some importance</th>
<th>Don't know</th>
<th>Not very important</th>
<th>Not at all important</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Knowledge of Jewish history, culture, holidays and traditions</td>
<td>□</td>
<td>□</td>
<td>□</td>
<td>□</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religious belief</td>
<td>□</td>
<td>□</td>
<td>□</td>
<td>□</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religious practice (observance)</td>
<td>□</td>
<td>□</td>
<td>□</td>
<td>□</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jewish friends</td>
<td>□</td>
<td>□</td>
<td>□</td>
<td>□</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Participation in Jewish social life and communal events</td>
<td>□</td>
<td>□</td>
<td>□</td>
<td>□</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Living in a Jewish neighbourhood</td>
<td>□</td>
<td>□</td>
<td>□</td>
<td>□</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zionism</td>
<td>□</td>
<td>□</td>
<td>□</td>
<td>□</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
4. Could you, please put the above attributes in a ranking order according to their importance for feeling Jewish? (from 1, the most important attribute, to 8, the least important)

ranks
- Knowledge of Jewish history, culture, holidays and traditions
- Religious belief
- Religious practice (observance)
- Jewish friends
- Participation in Jewish social life and communal events
- Living in a Jewish neighbourhood
- Zionism
- Anti-Semitism

5. How important is it for you to feel Jewish?

- very
- rather
- don’t
- not very
- unimportant

6. If you can, please, say why

7. Do you think being Jewish today is different from what it was in the past (say 50 year ago)?

- yes
- no
- don’t know

8. Could you, please, say why

9. Some people say that there is much less anti-Semitism today than in the past. Do you agree with this opinion?

- yes
- no
- don’t know

10. Could you, please,
11. Do you think anti-Semitism is similar to the discrimination experience of Black and other ethnic groups today?

- [ ] yes
- [ ] no
- [ ] don’t know

Could you please elaborate?

12. How many of your close friends are Jewish?

- [ ] all or nearly all
- [ ] more than half
- [ ] about half
- [ ] less than half
- [ ] none or very few

13. Do you have any Asian or Black people among your close friends (whom you are likely to invite home)?

- [ ] yes
- [ ] no

14. Do you have any Christian close friends (whom you are likely to invite home)?

- [ ] yes
- [ ] no

15. Are you a member of a Jewish club or organisation?

- [ ] yes
- [ ] no

16. Are you a member of a Synagogue?

- [ ] yes
- [ ] no

17. How many times did you attend Synagogue services in the last year?

- [ ] didn’t go at all
- [ ] went once or twice a year
- [ ] went for major holidays and occasional Shabbat services (3-6 times a year)
- [ ] went for major holidays’ services (7-10)
- [ ] once or twice a month
- [ ] almost every week and more

18. In your opinion, how central is the knowledge of one’s family history for the understanding of one’s identity?

- [ ] very important
- [ ] rather important
- [ ] don’t know
- [ ] not very important
- [ ] not at all important

19. How interested are you in finding out more about

- [ ] your family roots?
- [ ] the history of Leeds Jewish community

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>very interested</th>
<th>interested</th>
<th>not very interested</th>
<th>not at all interested</th>
<th>never thought about it</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>[ ]</td>
<td>[ ]</td>
<td>[ ]</td>
<td>[ ]</td>
<td>[ ]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>[ ]</td>
<td>[ ]</td>
<td>[ ]</td>
<td>[ ]</td>
<td>[ ]</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
20. Do you talk at home or with friends about Jewish subjects?

☐ yes  ☐ no

If yes, what are the most likely topics (choose as many as you need)?

☐ Holidays, traditions, customs  ☐ Religious matters
☐ Books, films and other works of art  ☐ Communal affairs
☐ Family history  ☐ Other: ________________

21. Do you know anything about your family history?

☐ yes  ☐ no

22. If possible, could you briefly answer the following questions:
   a) when and where from did your ancestors come to Leeds?
   
   b) where and how did they live in Leeds
   
   c) what did they do for living?
   
23. The word ‘community’ can mean many different things. In your opinion, what makes a Jewish community a ‘community’? What are its main elements?

24. Is there anything particular that makes Leeds Jewry different from other Jewish communities in Britain?

☐ yes  ☐ no  ☐ don't know

25. Could you, please, specify

26. In your opinion, what measures/policies could help to improve the life of the Jewish community in Leeds?

27. Speaking about your plans for the future, do you see yourself as
28. If you thinking of moving away, do you consider moving to:
(tick more than one, if needed)
- [ ] Israel
- [ ] other places abroad
- [ ] other places in the UK

29. Would the existence of a Jewish community be an important factor in your choice of residence?
- [ ] yes
- [ ] no
- [ ] don't know

Please, indicate how much you agree or disagree with the following statements:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Statement</th>
<th>Fully agree</th>
<th>Rather agree</th>
<th>Don't know</th>
<th>Rather disagree</th>
<th>Fully disagree</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>30. Nowadays Jewish people are free to choose and to change their own identities</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31. Judaism (as a religion) is central to being Jewish</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>32. Jewish people in Britain are happy and proud to show their Jewishness</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>33. British society today weakens the sense of being Jewish and encourages assimilation</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>34. Like Jewish refugees 100 years ago, today's refugees have to fight hard to 'make it' in a foreign land</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>35. Nowadays one could be secular and Jewish</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>36. Every Jewish person has to support Jewish people in Israel and in other countries</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>37. It is easier to be Jewish today than 100 years ago</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>38. Jewish people in the UK prefer not to show that they are Jewish to the non-Jewish public</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>39. Jewish immigrants to Britain in the late 19th century were in a very different situation than today's refugees in the UK</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Could you, please, provide some information about yourself?

1. How old are you? ____________

2. Are you: male □ female □

3. Where were you born? ______________________

4. How long have you been living in Leeds?

□ lived here all my life  □ More than 15 years
□ 5-15 years  □ Less than 5 years  □ other, specify ______________________

5. Do you live

□ with parents  □ with the partner and children
□ alone  If else, specify ______________________
□ with your partner/spouse

6. How many children do you have? ______

7. In which area code do you live? □ LS17 □ LS8 □ other, specify ______

8. If you lived in Leeds as a child, what school(s) did you study at?

____________________________________________________________________

9. Are you currently

□ working as an employee  □ full-time student
□ self-employed  □ temporary unemployed
□ retired  □ permanently unemployed

10. If appropriate, please tick one box to show which best describes your occupation. (If you are not working now, please tick a box to show what you did in your last job).

□ Higher professional/senior manager  □ Intermediate/other workers
□ Clerical and intermediate occupation/junior manager Or simply state your occupation
□ Lower supervisory and technical occupations
□ Own account non-professional

Thank you for your participation in the survey.

Although you could remain anonymous, I’d like, if possible, to ask for your name and address. As this study is ‘a work in progress’, additional questions or some changes to the existing questions are bound to arise. If you don’t mind, it would be great to be able to get back to you with them.
You name_________________________Your address_________________________

If you have any questions, please, contact Irina Kudenko on (0113) 266-8373
Appendix 4

Questionnaire data from the research conducted by the Leeds Jewish Strategic Initiative Group and LEATID, Paris.

Which of the following activities and programmes would interest...

(please tick one or more boxes)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Activity</th>
<th>You</th>
<th>Your spouse</th>
<th>Your children</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Kosher restaurant</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sports club</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Community centre</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Drama group</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kosher café</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kosher cookery course</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Library</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religious discussion groups</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Communal Shabbat events</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Please list any suggestions of your own which may be of interest to you or your family:

- stimulating retirement activities for 55+ eg walking, theatre, badminton, dancing etc, separate from
- Jewish education - history & religion
- Jewish golf/tennis club not just for adults
- inter-synagogue events eg sports day
- Activities encourage students into community
- Activities to bring in those outside LS17 eg central Leeds, outer Yorkshire. etc
- Duplicate bridge & scrabble
- Kosher nursery open all day
- young family group events eg baby boomers on a sunday
- Yakar
- Yoga/Pilates
- Social/dating group
- 60s/70s/80s theme discos
- Hebrew lessons
- book club
- cultural events
- kosher shops
- Limmud
- Eruv
- wine tasting
- training days
- sports days
- religious days
- drama days
- community days
- Jewish films
- coffee mornings
- Centre for the 18+
- education days
- Genealogy
- food fair
- literary group
- Walking group
- charity days
According to you...

Please, answer freely regarding the Leeds Jewish community

What do you associate with the words 'Jewish Community'?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>more interaction between orthodox and reform</th>
<th>enlarged family with common heritage</th>
<th>cohesive group of people working to better future</th>
<th>distance because I'm member of Sinai</th>
<th>Jewish organisations, institutions &amp; social life</th>
<th>feeling comfort at social &amp; cultural events &amp; shul</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>family &amp; friends</td>
<td>solid</td>
<td>close knit</td>
<td>inward looking</td>
<td>warm</td>
<td>culture</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>all the Jews living in Leeds</td>
<td>backup of Jewish shops etc</td>
<td>anyone who's Jewish</td>
<td>family &amp; friends (2)</td>
<td>close-knit, mid-size &amp; active</td>
<td>sense of belonging &amp; ID (6)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jews of any or no religious conviction who come together</td>
<td>well led but lacking &lt;40yo leaders</td>
<td>collection of people who want to be recognised as Jews and participate in some activities</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>unity</td>
<td>Chessed</td>
<td>Ahavat Yisrael</td>
<td>provides for itself</td>
<td>acting together</td>
<td>friendship</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>provincial</td>
<td>rep council</td>
<td>activities</td>
<td>incestuous</td>
<td>future</td>
<td>youth groups</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>history</td>
<td>shul (3)</td>
<td>coming together (2)</td>
<td>support</td>
<td>global village</td>
<td>Peter Myer's deli</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>childhood</td>
<td>narrow</td>
<td>id</td>
<td>infighting</td>
<td>claustrophobia</td>
<td>welcoming</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>individual empire building</td>
<td>has social conscience</td>
<td>FZY</td>
<td>Habonim</td>
<td>money</td>
<td>fragmentation</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

What is the main issue faced by the Leeds Jewish community today?

| fragmentation | disillusionment | anti-Semitism (2) | negativity | apathy & discord | youth |
| outreach to incoming 'urban professionals' | inability to attract/keep young Reform families (2) | attitude towards Jewish education for children post-Brodetsky (3) |
| assimilation (5) | lack of Jewish id | disappearance | apathy (3) | marrying out (5) | Jewish education for children post-Brodetsky (3) |
| reducing religious practice, education and knowledge | decline in numbers (10) | maintaining interest of majority in Judaism |
| mixed relationships (2) | too little for too few | maintaining values |
| tomorrow | materialism | loss of faith |
| observance | lack of community centre |
| loss of faith | lack of community centre |
What is the biggest success of the Leeds Jewish community?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Donisthorpe (2)</th>
<th>LJWB (6)</th>
<th>Theatre festival (2)</th>
<th>Leeds CDP</th>
<th>The Zone (10)</th>
<th>housing/LJHA (2)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>surviving after demise of tailoring industry</td>
<td>Jews have much in common from industry reform to ultra-right</td>
<td>acting together, usually, to be greater than sum of parts</td>
<td>its continuation in face of extinction (3)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>reputation as one unit</td>
<td>Manny Cussins house</td>
<td>acceptance</td>
<td>Limmud &amp; Melton (3)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fundraising</td>
<td>LJHSA</td>
<td>FZY</td>
<td>Lubavitch</td>
<td>Shlichut</td>
<td>Brodetsky (4)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

What's the best thing the Leeds Jewish community has done for you?

| Kashrut supervision retaine d my Jewish ID feeling of importanc e | Talmud Torah Sinai synagogue | being there |
|---|---|---|---|
| Judean Club The Zone youth movements employe d me learning | Brodetsky |
| established the Jubilee Hall friends grew up with & still close to provision of Donisthorpe | Jewish ID & sense of belonging (5) | Social/Religious network involveme nt in committe es |
| encourage d me to go on Israel tour - amazing don't expect it to do anythin g - other way round | provided Jewish environment for me and family (4) | welcome d our family / accepte d me from outside (5) | Yom HaShoah & Yom Ha'Atzmaut celebrations |
| educated my children and given them Jewish ID |

What would you be willing to do for the Leeds Jewish Community?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>anything in my power (2)</th>
<th>voluntary work at any level (8)</th>
<th>always looking to help</th>
<th>stand up &amp; be counted</th>
<th>helping attract more families</th>
<th>help organise events</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>help put back some of the benefits I've had</td>
<td>help set up community website</td>
<td>help set up retirement group</td>
<td>support work of WJR</td>
<td>communal work</td>
<td>give money (2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>already involved (5)</td>
<td>entertain</td>
<td>teach computing</td>
<td>attend events</td>
<td>fundraising</td>
<td>teach (2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>lead it!</td>
<td>charity work</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>inject a bit of life</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### What would you like the Leeds Jewish Community to do for your children?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Encourage their community feeling</th>
<th>Accept them whatever their circumstance</th>
<th>Offer an inclusive and vibrant Jewish life</th>
<th>Encourage involvement eg community centre</th>
<th>An all-inclusive approach to education</th>
<th>Better education but NOT a high school</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Youth club</strong></td>
<td><strong>They live in London</strong></td>
<td><strong>Attract more young Jewish families</strong></td>
<td><strong>Maintain school, zone &amp; youth movements</strong></td>
<td><strong>Provide Jewish high school</strong></td>
<td><strong>More opp’s for singles 25+</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Entice them back</strong></td>
<td><strong>Inject a bit of life</strong></td>
<td><strong>Provide them with Jewish future</strong></td>
<td><strong>Open kosher eating facility</strong></td>
<td><strong>Jewish education not in Brodetsky</strong></td>
<td><strong>Entertainment centre</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Varied &amp; open-to-all activities</strong></td>
<td><strong>Provide them with Jewish education</strong></td>
<td><strong>Open kosher restaurant/cafe</strong></td>
<td><strong>Provide a community for them to come back to live in</strong></td>
<td><strong>Give context where diversity &amp; commitment are welcome</strong></td>
<td><strong>Give them yiddishkeit, Hebrew, Zionist &amp; Jewish education (4)</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### What would encourage you to participate in the community's activities?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Common purpose amongst entire community</th>
<th>Activities not focused around charities or Shabbat</th>
<th>More interesting and diverse programmes</th>
<th>Attractive events for older single adults</th>
<th>Sense of achievement and duty</th>
<th>If I felt I could help rejuvenation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Already involved (4)</strong></td>
<td><strong>Less rabbinic interference</strong></td>
<td><strong>Chance to meet people of my age</strong></td>
<td><strong>Vibrant/upmarket community centre</strong></td>
<td><strong>Don’t like committees</strong></td>
<td><strong>Interesting activities</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### What would encourage your friends to participate in community activities?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Less negativity and competitiveness</th>
<th>Knowing their interests</th>
<th>Activities outside of shuls</th>
<th>Better religious leadership</th>
<th>Encourage them to come</th>
<th>Kill preconceived ideas</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Knowing how to participate and time required</strong></td>
<td><strong>Vigorous PR campaign to make being Jewish ‘cool’</strong></td>
<td><strong>Kosher eating facility disseminating info</strong></td>
<td><strong>Interesting activities</strong></td>
<td><strong>More interesting and diverse programmes</strong></td>
<td><strong>More attractive single young men</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
According to you...
please answer freely regarding the Leeds Jewish community

I expect the Leeds Jewish Community to...

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Work together once it realises that, unless it does, it will die</th>
<th>Be broadminded and welcome non-orthodox Jews</th>
<th>Forget the high school - it's a dead end</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Be apathetic</td>
<td>Be inclusive</td>
<td>Pull together</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Consolidate and grow in stature or numbers</td>
<td>Solve problem of lack of education</td>
<td>Reach out to unaffiliated &amp; uni students</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Look after it's own</td>
<td>I don't 'expect' anything</td>
<td>Grow</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Have Kosher restaurant subsidised by Beth Din</td>
<td>Encourage Zionist activities</td>
<td>Have place for 14 - 21 year-olds to meet</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Concentrate on our vulnerable</td>
<td>Better facilities for youth</td>
<td>Promote Jewish continuity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Provide kosher restaurant</td>
<td>Understand each other</td>
<td>Throw great parties</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Understand that without Jewish education there's no future for community</td>
<td>Reach out to &amp; attract highly motivated affiliated Jews from London &amp; Manchester</td>
<td>Attract unaffiliated within Leeds and the affiliated from without Leeds</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Provide usual religious &amp; communal structures &amp; services</td>
<td>Change and develop to meet needs of members</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

I expect the leaders of the Leeds Jewish Community to...

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Represent all levels of community</th>
<th>Encourage positive relationship with other faiths</th>
<th>Include any Jewish person living in Leeds</th>
<th>Be open to all branches of Judaism</th>
<th>Make Leeds best place for Jews to live in UK</th>
<th>Forget the high school - it's a dead end</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>No bigotry or Racism</td>
<td>Be innovative &amp; forward thinking</td>
<td>Encourage students to stay</td>
<td>Make allowances for each other</td>
<td>Represent our views</td>
<td>Listen, encourage and facilitate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Work together</td>
<td>Guide</td>
<td>Keep Shabbat</td>
<td>Be positive</td>
<td>Unifying force</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Be able to work together</td>
<td>Listen to views of everyone</td>
<td>Look at how to achieve</td>
<td>Inclusive not critical</td>
<td>Help fund a Kosher restaurant</td>
<td>Keep their difference private</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
I expect our Rabbis to...

- have sense to sit together & thrash out proper comm. instead of 'rag-bag' of shiurim
- work together to uphold & improve standards & unite community [2]
- invest energy in rebuilding/revitalising community & reaching out to unaffiliated
- provide creative and challenging educational programmes
- reach out to masses to encourage them to be practicing Jews
- keep partisan differences private & these alienate the young

- treat each other with respect II
- be tolerant of each other III
- spend less energy fighting heterodoxy
- more understanding
- support these initiatives
- end their petty disagreements

- be more rational
- show more respect
- less arrogant
- be more pastoral
- be more available
- less opinionated

- work together
- be realistic
- show leadership
- teach Torah
- inspire us
- not be bigoted

- understand needs of lesser mortals & that they're not all intellectuals
- understand various degrees of observance in community
- bring youth back through special services
- embrace, not repel, congregants

- teach Judaism in +ve and modern context
- support community, not just own synagogues
- put survival & continuity before perfection
- more responsible for their statements [2]
- teach: survival, not perfection

- be religious and moral leaders
- role models and set an example V
- keep their differences private
- live in separate world
- bend, not break, Halacha
- understand our needs
What social events and/or role models have influenced you?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>in younger years pub and club life, synagogue life in older years</th>
<th>Yehuda Bergman (Shaliach)</th>
<th>Junior Organisation for Leeds Jewish Charities</th>
<th>some role models have been negative</th>
<th>Living Judaism project</th>
<th>Cultural &amp; Zionist activities</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Rabbis Medalle &amp; Apfel</td>
<td>Jubilee Hall social club</td>
<td>Leeds One-Day Limmuds (2)</td>
<td>Dudu Fisher concert</td>
<td>various communal leaders</td>
<td>inspiring visiting speakers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hazel Broch</td>
<td>madrichim (2)</td>
<td>Hillel activities</td>
<td>Limmud (3)</td>
<td>Rabbi Sufrin</td>
<td>Judean Club</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yom Ha'Atzmaut</td>
<td>Israel</td>
<td>WIZO</td>
<td>Melton</td>
<td>LJTF</td>
<td>Israel activities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FZY (3)</td>
<td>Lubavitch</td>
<td>Brodetsky</td>
<td>B'na'i Brith activities</td>
<td>Solidarity Rally</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

What would you like to know more about?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>what's going to happen in 30 years!</th>
<th>why you want my answers!</th>
<th>the community itself</th>
<th>sports and games for adults</th>
<th>activities in the community</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Talmud</td>
<td>Jewish knowledge</td>
<td>Aliyah speaking</td>
<td>Hebrew Israel</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Thank you for taking time to fill in this survey. Your answers will be used to help us provide quality services, activities and programmes adapted to your needs and interests.

We would very much appreciate any comments, suggestions and advice you have to improve your Jewish community:

- Food is big worry - bad enough no restaurant but end of Leeds if bakery closes. Kosher ventures must also attract non-Jews. Need a King David, Leeds
- Stop JT printing negative front pages that our enemies would be proud of. Print good news on front page - make us proud & positive - not cynical and negative
- communal Friday night/Shabbat lunch & communal Seder for those needing
- establish and maintain good relations between all shuls & orgs
- community / shuls should sponsor kosher restaurant
- list serve for community (will help set it up)
- lack of recognition for children of one non-Jewish parent increases intermarriage - should be more welcoming eg change of Halacha
- need to reclaim golf club and restrict it to Jews - we could have swimming and tennis there - why pay David Lloyd?
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>easier orthodox conversion etc.</th>
<th>open shuls to young thru' week for activities, not to push religious practice</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>not enough learning opportunities - Melton too secular, Lubavitch too frum and no opportunities for women</td>
<td>survey is brilliant, especially breadth of questions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I believe this survey will come to nothing</td>
<td>greatest need is to entice young adults to settle/return/participate in community - they must feel valued &amp; important</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brodetsky doesn't give that good Jewish or Hebrew education</td>
<td>shuls need to 'reform' practice to bring women in</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>do outreach work, find people and talk to them</td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>