Preventive Counterterrorism Policing: The Impact of Community Engagement on Public Cooperation

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A thesis submitted in accordance with the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy

October 2019
The candidate confirms that the work submitted is her own and that appropriate credit has been given where reference has been made to the work of others.

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Dedication

To all those who lost their loved ones to evil, and were left behind to pick up the broken pieces. They are the forgotten victims of terrorism, extremism, and radicalisation.

To all those practitioners working passionately to prevent such damage, and trying to restore some of the broken pieces. The ones that save many lives silently without recognition. Not all heroes have capes.
Acknowledgements

Throughout my doctoral research, some great many people have supported and helped me in different ways. The completion of this thesis has been a great teamwork, without them, it would have been difficult.

My first thanks must go to my contacts in West Yorkshire and East Jutland police and CTU. I cannot name them all, as some have taken part in this study, but without their support, this research would not have been possible. Namely (since they did not take part in the study), Andrew Staniforth and David Donaldson, who opened many doors for me, and endlessly ensured my access to participants on my behalf; without their efforts, this research would have taken a different turn. I also want to give a special thanks to William Baldet for helping with the dissemination of my research, who true to his passion, opened another door to help the families of those vulnerable to radicalisation and extremism.

I wish I could name every single individual at the Info-House who truly changed my vision and made me feel welcomed. The dedication, warmth, and passion you show on daily basis to those that need you the most is ever so humbling. I want to extend this thanks to all those who participated in this research, especially the families. Without their input, I would not have been able to give the unheard a voice. Thank you for trusting me with your pain and struggle. Your strength is beyond words and I am forever indebted to you all.

I owe a great deal to my PhD supervisors, Professors Adam Crawford and Edward Newman, for their continuous support, guidance, feedback, and patience for reading through hundreds of pages over the years.

Many others have also supported the development of this thesis. I am enormously grateful to Professor Tara Brabazon and her wonderfully insightful vlogs. You only have to look at the comments on Twitter and YouTube to see how she has illuminated the darkness for many PhD students across the world.

Finally, my most important thanks go to my family. To my husband, thank you for supporting me through my darkest hours. To my sisters, thank you for being my emotional rock, and especially to Niuosha for helping me through the transcription of the interviews. I am, of course, also grateful to my granddad, who never failed to ask me whether I had finished my PhD yet! I can, finally, say yes.
Abstract

The ongoing and evolving threat from Islamist and far-right extremism, as well as the challenges associated with returnee foreign fighters, means that reporting of radicalisation and extremism is a counterterrorism priority. Surprisingly, the research on incentives and obstacles for reporting is limited — i.e. focused on communication campaigns such as ‘See it. Say it. Sorted’, and the threshold for reporting in targeted communities. Thus, this research aims to contribute distinctively to the literature.

This interdisciplinary comparative case study examines the role and limitations of counterterrorism community engagement (CTCE) in the reporting of radicalisation and extremism in West Yorkshire (UK) and East Jutland (Denmark). Specifically, this thesis explores (1) delivery of CTCE in these regions; (2) the effect of CTCE on reporting behaviour; (3) the motivations of and barriers to reporting for professionals and families; and (4) the extent to which data from this study and theories in the fields of criminology, political science, behavioural science and psychology collectively explain the relationship between CTCE and reporting. Semi-structured interviews and secondary data were collected between 2017 and 2019 to understand if and how the formal reporting of radicalisation and extremism could be encouraged and improved through CTCE. Consequently, the thesis uses, develops and contributes to the existing Transformative Research Design model and Yin’s notion of case studies, which are discussed in detail.

Comparative assessment of practice and experience of this cross-national study are presented. CTCE was delivered through a multi-agency approach in a multi-layered fashion, at times, targeted, focusing on different audiences. The prominent difference was that East Jutland worked closely with families, which was vital to prevention. The results suggest CTCE can positively affect reporting, especially from families and close associates (East Jutland saw 63% average annual increase); and once limited there appeared to be a negative relationship. The thesis argues the positive relationship is due to practitioners connecting with those engaged on a personal level, as well as the support available to reporters. There were similarities and differences in motivation and barriers to reporting between professionals and families, notably trigger points. The data from professional reporters revealed factors that influenced the quality of reports. Mid- to long-term recommendations are proposed. Integrated models of reporting behaviour and CTCE are introduced. The implications and limitations of the study, as well as the future research, are discussed.
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## Abbreviations

<table>
<thead>
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<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>BAME</td>
<td>Black and Minority Ethnic</td>
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<tr>
<td>BIAS</td>
<td>Behaviours from Intergroup Affect and Stereotypes</td>
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<tr>
<td>CE</td>
<td>Counterterrorism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CP</td>
<td>Community Policing</td>
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<tr>
<td>CT</td>
<td>Counterterrorism</td>
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<tr>
<td>CTCE</td>
<td>Counterterrorism community engagement</td>
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<tr>
<td>CTU</td>
<td>Counterterrorism Unit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DDP</td>
<td>Desistence and Disengagement Programme</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ESRC</td>
<td>Economic and Social Research Council</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU</td>
<td>European Union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FGM</td>
<td>Female genital mutilation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FLO</td>
<td>Family Liaison Officer</td>
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<tr>
<td>IBM</td>
<td>Integrated Behavioural Model</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IPCC</td>
<td>Independent Police Complaints Commission</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ISC</td>
<td>Intelligence and Security Committee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KSP</td>
<td>Police, Social Services, and the Prison and Probation Services</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LA</td>
<td>Local Authorities</td>
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<tr>
<td>NGO</td>
<td>Non-governmental organisation</td>
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<tr>
<td>POP</td>
<td>Problem-Oriented Policing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PSNI</td>
<td>Police Services of Northern Ireland</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PSP</td>
<td>Police, Social services, and Mental Health Services</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Acronym</td>
<td>Description</td>
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<td>---------</td>
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<tr>
<td>PTA</td>
<td>Prevention of Terrorism Act</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RAN</td>
<td>Radicalization Awareness Network</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RUC</td>
<td>Royal Ulster Constabulary</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SCM</td>
<td>Stereotype Content Model</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SCT</td>
<td>Self-categorisation Theory</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SDT</td>
<td>Self-determination Theory</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SIT</td>
<td>Social Identity Theory</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SSP</td>
<td>School, Social authorities, and Police</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TRD</td>
<td>Transformative Research Design</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VAF</td>
<td>Vulnerability Assessment Framework</td>
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<tr>
<td>WRAP</td>
<td>Workshop to Raise Awareness of Prevent</td>
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Chapter 1

In The Beginning: An Introduction

1.1 Introducing the Thesis

"Twisted minds can be straightened with teamwork, with the government and family." (Abase 2019)

The above comment was made by Hussen Abase, the father of Amira Abase, in response to Shamima Begum requesting to return to the UK. Shamima, Amira, and their friend Kadiza became known as the Bethnal Green Trio when they left home at the age of 15 to join ISIS in February 2015. This incident and the public media focus that surrounded it raised a number of important questions. Is it possible to prevent radicalisation and extremism through a partnership between the authorities and families? High quality intelligence (which requires timely, appropriate, reliable, accurate, and comprehensive information) can be significant in the prevention of radicalisation, extremism, and terrorism, especially in some cases where failing to prevent harmful behaviours could result in costly acts of violence. One source of intelligence is the formal reporting of concerns, through which, commonly, the aim is to stop the escalation of risk that may result in certain acts — namely the prevention of a future event (or series of events). Families are therefore ideally placed to know or suspect, based on changes in behaviour and early warning signs. With growing concerns about returning foreign fighters and recent terrorist incidents, reporting of radicalisation and extremism is a counterterrorism (CT) priority, particularly reports from relatives and close associates. However, data from the Home Office reveals that only a few relatives and close associates report concerns of radicalisation and extremism to the authorities (Home Office 2018c).

Across the North Sea, the Danish city of Aarhus experienced the return of foreign fighters. Practitioners working in the prevention of radicalisation and extremism at community level started to get telephone calls from parents of at-risk individuals, and the foreign fighters themselves. In 2012, approximately 34 people left Aarhus for Syria, 18 of whom returned and reached out to practitioners at the Info-House, as did hundreds of other vulnerable individuals. The work of Info-House resulted in very few people leaving Aarhus for Syria (Rosin 2016). Why was this happening? What were the practitioners doing to encourage not only parents to report their children but also to encourage the vulnerable
individuals themselves to come forward? What is known about the experiences and views of those who reported radicalisation and extremism, particularly relatives?

Surprisingly, little is known about the motivations and obstacles (push and pull factors) of cooperative behaviour (i.e. reporting) and citizen participation, in relation to radicalisation, extremism, and terrorism. This thesis is a collaborative ESRC project, funded primarily to compare the prevention of radicalisation and extremism in Denmark (East Jutland) and the UK (West Yorkshire). It seeks to contribute to this gap by exploring the relationship between community-based engagement and the reporting of radicalisation and extremism, which, it will be argued, lacks an informed body of research to complement policy and practice.

From a multidisciplinary and interdisciplinary lens (see Chapter 4), this thesis integrates the literature of several relevant disciplines — criminology, political science, behavioural science and psychology — to explore reporting behaviour, as well as the importance of counterterrorism community engagement (CTCE) in the reporting of radicalisation and extremism. The thesis uses reporting behaviour as a proxy measure for the (in)effectiveness of CTCE (see Section 1.3). The thesis hypothesises a relationship between CTCE and reporting behaviour, and that through connecting with the individual at a personal level, the psychological needs of reporting are met, which result in an increased number of reports, especially from relatives and close associates. Moreover, it hypothesises that there is a difference in how CTCE is delivered in East Jutland and West Yorkshire, and that this difference has an influence on reporting behaviour.

The thesis synthesises a range of relevant theories focused on cooperative behaviour and decision-making from separate disciplinary approaches to construct a conceptual and analytical framework, for the use of CTCE in the prevention of radicalisation and extremism, and as a tool to assess its impact on reporting behaviour. These theories were selected based on their relevance to, and ability to explain, predict, and understand the processes of, the decision to report, and the relationship (if any) between reporting behaviour and CTCE. Therefore, the theories from behavioural science, including psychology, are especially useful to this thesis, as they allow for consideration of internal and external factors that shape behaviour, as well as relationships. Moreover, theories from criminology and political science provide valuable insight for understanding police-public relationships, as well as public responses to CT, related strategies and challenges that authorities face in encouraging public cooperation, especially in a CT context.
It is important to note that while CT strategies are interesting concepts and in need of further examination (there are several general reviews of these strategies e.g. Hemmingsen 2015; Radicalization Awareness Network 2018; Joint Committee on Human Rights 2018 each, to some extent reflecting on work being done at the community level), due to the pace of development and breadth of this research, this thesis will not be analysing the CT strategies of the UK and Denmark as a whole, as this is beyond the scope of this thesis. Rather, the study focuses on one particular aspect of CT strategies: namely community-based engagement: an exploration of one of the cogs (Community Engagement) in this machine (CT strategy) that is used, among other means, for prevention purposes. More specifically, the thesis is interested in exploring the impact of CTCE on reporting behaviour.

The thesis aims to explore: (1) the method and style in which CTCE is delivered in East Jutland and West Yorkshire; (2) the effect of CTCE on reporting behaviour; (3) the motivators and barriers that influence reporting of radicalisation/extremism by professionals and families; and (4) the extent to which the above-mentioned collective interdisciplinary literature and data from this thesis can establish drivers and predictors of reporting behaviour in a CT context, as well as explain any relationship between CTCE and reporting.

Thus, the following review presents an overview of the evolution of CTCE as a preventive strategy and the contributing factors of citizen participation and reporting behaviour, in addition to a comparative analysis of CTCE and reporting of radicalisation and extremism in East Jutland and West Yorkshire, as well as the impact of CTCE on reporting in these regions.

The current chapter first outlines the meaning of key terms used in this thesis. Next, it sets out the field of inquiry and draws up the boundaries of the context and the landscape of the thesis, focusing on the effect of CTCE on the reporting of radicalisation and extremism. This is followed by a discussion of the gaps in the literature that this thesis will address, highlighting originality. Subsequently, the research aims, questions and approach are stated. The chapter concludes by outlining the structure of the thesis.

**1.2 Introducing the Key Terminologies**

Before describing the problems and gaps this thesis seeks to address, it is important to explain and define some of the key concepts, specifically ‘pre-criminal space’ and ‘CE’, at the outset, for the purpose of clarifying definitions and hence the scope of the thesis.
It is not the aim (or within the scope) of this thesis to explore pre-criminal space as a phenomenon or its evolution and use in CT or crime prevention. The aim of this section is to introduce the term to the reader. Chapter 2 of the thesis explores the preventive turn and evolution in policing, and its relevance to this thesis. Pre-criminal space is a term that is used frequently in CT and crime prevention, and it lacks a definition (Heath-Kelly 2017, p.280; Ashworth & Zedner 2014; Zedner 2007). The notion itself “consists of three terms: ‘pre’ meaning before, ‘criminal’ as a person who has committed a crime or repeated crimes, and ‘space’ as a continuous physical area” (Goldberg et al. 2017, p.210; Ashworth & Zedner 2014; Zedner 2007). However, ‘space’ can also refer to time or context. Thus, ‘pre’ modifies the person (i.e. criminal) and the ‘space’, as there is a suggestion of a trigger or threshold that needs to be met for the modification of the person. Therefore, the urgency for action in a given context is implied through the notion of time.

Although there is no definition for the term, it is suggested that pre-criminal space can be linked to crime prevention measures of the mid-twentieth century that predicted the probability of future offending through the use of data and calculative rationality of risk on prior criminal conduct, school leavers, and economic deprivation (McCulloch & Wilson 2015, p.9). These predictive measures, especially in CT, have been criticised by many since it brings ‘community’ into a pre-criminal space and underassessment of terrorism risk, as they might be viewed with suspicion (Heath-Kelly 2017, p.283). This is also referred to as ‘targeted communities’, as a certain community is believed to be associated with the risk factors of terrorism and extremism. The notion of risk factors and types of prevention are discussed in Chapter 2, criticism of ‘targeted communities’ are examined in Chapters 2 and 3.

Although controversies exist around the tools or methods use to predict criminal behaviour, the pre-criminal space is all about seeking to ensure that a crime is prevented. Therefore, it is looking for environmental and individual factors that are believed to shape a specific crime. This notion of social and environmental factors is one that crime prevention approaches and theories have started to adopt, leading to a preventive turn in policing (discussed in Chapter 2). One form of pre-crime prevention strategy is CE, which refers to the development and maintenance of the relationship between communities and public bodies (e.g. police, councils, health providers etc). The term CTCE is used consistently throughout the thesis to designate a form of CT strategy that indicates a mode of delivery that is hybrid, consisting of elements and aims of both CT and CE in varying combinations and mixes within the prevention of radicalisation and extremism. Its evolution and application are discussed in Chapters 2 and 5.
Myhill (2012, p.19) explains that CE has different meanings for everyone and defines CE as "the process of enabling the participation of citizens and communities in policing at their chosen level, ranging from providing information and reassurance to empowering them to identify and implement solutions to local problems and influence strategic priorities and decisions." As a 'soft' policing strategy (i.e. one that is not punitive), CE is regarded as preventive and proactive policing strategy (Docobo 2005; Sherman 2006), rather than one with the intent of punitive action. Thus, the emphasis is upon a more persuasive mode of social control, with the agenda that is not usually typical of policing areas (Innes 2005). As such, CE commonly operates in the pre-criminal space. It is based on the notion that crime prevention can be made possible through citizen empowerment (Stevens 2001). Although CE as a concept is well-established in the literature concerning public policy (Mccabe et al. 2006, p.8), the meaning differs for different users of the term, and different contexts within the literature. Thus, there is no fixed definition, as a result of CE being a complicated term: ‘community’ and ‘engagement’ are themselves problematic notions (Myhill 2012, p.15).

For the purpose of this research, the thesis will define community as a group of individuals that share commonalities such as ethnicity, religion, location, values, norms, and other forms of identity. These social ties are important for the sense of identity and social roles (Ritzer 2007). Communities can be small (micro level) (e.g. a neighbourhood) or large (macro-level) (e.g. national and international community) (James 2006). Research has identified that factors constitute a ‘sense of community’: membership, influence, integration and fulfilment of needs, and shared emotional connection (McMillan & Chavis 1986). An individual may have multiple community memberships at any one time (e.g. culture, gender, profession, sports team membership, etc.). This membership is fluid, as the individual may move in and out of communities over time (Myhill 2012, p.15). Social Identity Theory (SIT) provides a psychological explanation for such memberships, as belonging to groups shape our identities and relationships (Tajfel & Turner 1979).

Thus, through group memberships, individuals establish their normative beliefs, attitudes, and behaviours (Billig & Tajfel 1973; Hogg et al. 1995). This sense of membership and association highlights that there is a psychological underpinning to whom, what or where (and at times when) one associates oneself with. To belong or to avoid is a psychological and behavioural process. Consequently, for this thesis, ‘community’ in CE is a psychological notion, the underpinnings of which need addressing in order to guide human behaviour.
'Engage' means to 'occupy or attract someone’s attention or interest', to 'involve someone' or to 'participate or become involved', to 'establish a meaningful contact or connection', and to 'pledge or enter into a contract to do something'. Therefore, engagement involves or refers to a psychological state, which induces 'commitment' or 'motivation' (Schaufeli 2013). Vocabulary around engagement in the literature also expands to concepts such as 'participation', 'consultation', 'outreach', and 'partnership'. Considering this, this thesis views the term 'engage' in the same light as Schaufeli (2013). As such, this thesis argues that effective CE (and CTCE) is dependent on psychological processes, as the willingness to cooperate like other forms of behaviour is reliant on the psychological needs that must be met, thus making the strategy effective and prevention possible.

1.3 The Problem

In their report, which looked at community thresholds for reporting potential violent extremism and terrorism, Thomas et al. argued that “an overwhelming majority of respondents wanted to report [concerns of radicalisation and extremism] to their local police, not counter-terrorism specialists” (Thomas et al. 2017, p.7). They may be right about to whom people prefer to report their concerns of violent extremism, but they could also be dismissing the possibility that this preference is context-dependent, which is influenced by various factors. Moreover, Thomas et al. provided participants with hypothetical scenarios and in some sense there is an assumption that people will do as they say. However, what someone says they would do in a hypothetical situation may not match what they actually do in real life. The literature on human decision-making illustrates that humans are not rational, even in instances where there is self-interest (Kahneman & Tversky 1979).

Thomas et al. continue to explain that “as the preventative arm of counter-terrorism policy and operating in the pre-crime space, it is a moot point as to whether Prevent at the local level should welcome or be equipped to receive local expressions of concern about possible violent extremist activity or recruitment” (Thomas et al. 2017, p.38). Although there are controversies around Prevent, as presented earlier in Denmark the CT practitioners at the Info-House had managed to persuade families and vulnerable people to report to them and seek assistance. Therefore, this begs the question of context. For this thesis, context refers to the delivery of CTCE, relationships, internal and external factors, and access to information (i.e. awareness of the help available). Moreover, Thomas et al. argue that although young adults expressed a willingness to consider talking to teachers or lecturers about their concerns of radicalisation/extremism, “all respondents were
dubious about sharing concerns with GPs/Health staff, whom they saw as inappropriate or lacking subject matter knowledge about these issues” (Thomas et al. 2017, p.81). As for approaching local government, Thomas et al. suggested that their respondents were uncertain about the practicalities of doing so. Although people may have limited options in terms of to whom they report, the research by Thomas et al. suggests they have a preference. Whom one approaches with concerns of extremism is influenced by context, a person’s concept of self and relationships with others, which, in turn, are shaped by perception. Reporting is a behaviour. A key factor that guides behaviour is perception: an individual’s interpretation and mental representation of the world, which is argued to be based on their past experiences and theories (e.g. social norms and stereotypes) about one’s environment (Medin 1989). In other words, perception is the brain’s way of interpreting ambiguity with the most likely explanation possible (Berns 2010). It is through the perception of one’s environment that one can understand and identify who one is, as well as making sense of others based on the reasons for their actions (Rangel & Keller 2011). Not only does perception contour one’s sense of identity, but also the identity of others, which subsequently shapes how one feels about a group (e.g. legitimacy) and behaviour towards the said group.

Thomas et al. (2017) do not explore the context dependency in reporting behaviour, especially when discussing preferred choices. However, in the above quotation, they do capture the consequence and complexity of relationships and perceptions that guide this reporting behaviour. In their research, they suggest that, should the reporters wish to escalate their concerns by approaching local police, they would rather do so in person to engage in discussion and ensure their concerns are taken seriously. Therefore, this suggests that the reporter has needs they wish to address when reporting, including the expectation that their concerns elicit action. This thesis seeks to expand on Thomas et al.’s (2017) research by exploring the role of CTCE in reporting radicalisation and extremism, as well as its importance. Therefore, the thesis also seeks to challenge and push the margins of the above statement by exploring the impact of CTCE on reporting. It is important to address this problem, as CTCE is about engaging with people, and knowing the underlying psychological factors that shape behaviour can assist in informing better CTCE practices. As such, behavioural insight can guide effective prevention of radicalisation and extremism through CTCE.

Additionally, Thomas et al. (2017) go further suggesting that to report concerns of violent extremism, ‘intimate reporters’ — a term used to describe those close to the vulnerable individual such as family, friends and community insiders — need to overcome certain
barriers, triggers, and thresholds before making the grave decision to report their concerns to the police. This thought process will often include attempting to dissuade the vulnerable individual, as well as seeking counsel and guidance from family members, friends, trusted lecturers/teachers, and community leaders. These barriers, triggers, and thresholds suggest a personal element linked to emotions, relationships and needs, which shape the context for the reporter. As explained earlier, perceptions of self and others influence behaviour, based on the stereotypes (see Chapter 3) associated with an adopted identity (e.g. a mother protecting her child is a stereotype of the mother-child relationship). Thus, this thesis argues that identity can shape and influence the decision to report, as it is through this medium that perceptions are formed and used as lens to interpret the surrounding world. Therefore, this research seeks to explore the threshold of reporting through the process of decision making. By understanding reasoning behind the decision to report, the thesis can explore what role identity plays in the decision to report, and why it is important in the application of CTCE. Again, this is vital to gaining behavioural insight into how reporting behaviour is shaped in order to tailor the CTCE and reporting process to be more effective in encouraging reporting of radicalisation and extremism.

Furthermore, the UK government research shows (see Figure 1) that the vast majority of initial formal radicalisation and extremism reports (89%) come from professionals (primarily education services, providing 33% of the reports), with very few intimate reporters (3%). Moreover, only a small fraction of these reports receive Channel support or make it to intervention programmes or meet their thresholds. As presented in Figure 1, those discussed at Channel indicates that those reports have met the required threshold — i.e. identified risk associated with radicalisation, extremism, or terrorism. Whilst those who received Channel support only refer to those who accepted to voluntarily join the programme. There are others who refuse to take part in Channel even if they have met the risk assessment threshold. Consequently, this thesis seeks to explore the impact of CTCE on reports — especially those from relatives and close associates. It argues that if CTCE is delivered effectively (i.e. if it connects with one’s sense of identity), this may result in an increased number of reports from this cohort. It is important to address this problem, as relatives and close associates are usually best placed to spot the early signs of radicalisation or extremism. The earlier the intervention is introduced, the earlier risk management can be put in place.
Although it is fair to argue that not all those reported should necessarily receive intervention support from programmes such as Channel, as risk assessments evaluate the vulnerability, severity, and the validity of reports. Nevertheless, the high volume of reports from professionals with only a small number needing to receive the non-compulsory intervention service, may suggest a problem of evidential quality in these reports. Therefore, the thesis explores the factors that influence and the reasoning behind professional reporters’ decisions to raise concerns as well as the role and importance of CTCE in improving such reports. This is important for identifying barriers and problems in the service that are damaging the effectiveness (e.g. the volume of reports putting a strain on the resources and quality of service provided).

The problem becomes clear: how can authorities, through CTCE, encourage people to report their concerns while ensuring good quality reports, as well as encouraging reports from relatives or close associates? See Chapters 7, 8, and Appendix O. This thesis argues that if CTCE is implemented in a way that connects with the individual on a personal level (identity), then reporting can be increased, especially from intimate reporters. In addition, if CTCE is need-focused, it can improve the quality of reports.
Another problem is the notion of prevention. How can prevention or its effectiveness be measured? How can the (in)effectiveness of CTCE be identified? In cases where direct measurement of an outcome is unavailable and/or unobservable due to lack of data, but the desired outcome is known, a proxy measure is commonly used. A proxy is an indirect measurement of a strong correlation that indicates a relationship with the outcome (i.e. prevention). For the purpose of this thesis, reporting behaviour is considered a proxy measure, as it has an indirect relationship with prevention, since an intention of sharing information is to stop a situation from escalating.

1.4 Bridging The Gap

Despite the recognition that public cooperation is vital to CT, this is an under-researched area. Most research in the CTCE context has focused on gathering intelligence (Innes 2006) and improving police cooperation and legitimacy (Dunn et al. 2016; Briggs 2010). This research differs to that of Dunn et al. (2016) in measuring the impact of CE in a CT context, as this thesis does not directly measure attitudes to and trust in police, especially the within ‘Muslim’ community, nor does it measure the level of community members’ awareness of CT initiatives. Instead, this thesis focuses on reporting behaviour (i.e. reasons and barriers to reporting) and the impact CTCE might have on it, as it illustrates the possible intent to prevent alleged criminal activity or behaviour. Therefore, this thesis contributes to knowledge by exploring CTCE and cooperation from a different angle — i.e. from the perspective of reporters and frontline practitioners. The niche lies in the former group, as they have reported concerns of radicalisation and extremism — a cohort that thus far (at least this thesis did not identify such literature) have not been explored for many reasons including access to participants due to security and sensitivity of the topic.

Similarly, the literature on reporting behaviour, particularly in CT context, was limited. Research on other crime reporting behaviour (e.g. sexual assault) is focused on victims reporting crime rather than looking at various sources of reports. Moreover, in the context of current terrorism and extremism (notably post 9/11) literature on reporting of radicalisation and extremism is scarce, with research focusing on two different aims: a) communication strategies that encourage reporting of suspicious behaviour such as the ‘See It, Say It. Sorted’ campaign (Parker et al. 2017; Pearce et al. 2019); and b) thresholds of reporting, which looks at community respondents (Thomas et al. 2017).

The latter is where the current study can be situated. However, it differs from Thomas et al. (2017), as it explores the reasoning behind the decision to report radicalisation/extremism, as well as looking at the impact of CTCE on reporting
behaviour. Moreover, unlike Thomas et al. (2017), this thesis does not focus on particular ‘communities’ (e.g. ‘Muslim’ or ‘marginalised White British’). Rather it is concerned with those who have actually reported concerns of radicalisation and extremism. This is important, as people outside a specific community —e.g. ‘Muslim’— also report such concerns. It would also be interesting to see if there was a difference in how this process (i.e. the decision to report) differed for professional reporters (e.g. teachers) to that of relatives and close associates. This will provide behavioural insight and create an opportunity for practitioners to understand why people come forward, and based on that they can encourage and improve reporting of radicalisation, which ultimately can lead to prevention.

Additionally, the gaps in the literature suggest that the research on decision-making in criminology thus far has primarily been dominated by behavioural economics, such as the use of rational choice theory in crime prevention research (Cornish & Clarke 1986). The psychology literature on preventive reasoned action and behavioural change seems to be dominated by health behaviour research (Montano & Kasprzyk 2015; McAfee et al. 2019). Similarly, behavioural economics explores the notion of reasoned action and decision-making from the consumer perspective (Hui et al. 2009; Varki & Colgate 2001). Although advances have been made in these fields in understanding behaviour and decision-making, there remains a question as to the reasons and the need for reporting radicalisation and extremism, and how this decision-making process is shaped. More importantly, what role does CTCE play in influencing this reporting behaviour or addressing the needs of reporters? The work described in the following chapters attempts to understand how each of these fields can inform a better understanding of behaviour and decision-making — in the context of reporting of radicalisation and extremism — through fusion and integration of the available theories.

Therefore, this thesis seeks to contribute to existing knowledge by addressing these gaps through the application of behavioural insight to CT policing, and reporting of radicalisation/extremism. This is significant because this research can be used to better inform policy and practice, as well as the existing literature in relevant disciplines. As a result, this contribution is multifaceted. The core, original contribution of the thesis is in its findings, which deepen understanding of why people in different contexts report concerns about radicalisation/extremism, and how CTCE is relevant, and translate this into recommendations in terms of strengthening CTCE.
Additionally, there are secondary contributions. First, the thesis takes an interdisciplinary and multidisciplinary approach (see Chapter 4): it looks at the prevention of radicalisation and extremism (a key focus for criminology and political science) through the lens of behavioural science (a discipline that is informed by theories of psychology, cognitive science, anthropology, and economics). This is significant because the research takes a multi-layered approach in understanding CTCE and reporting radicalisation and extremism, as well as the relationship that may exist between them. As such, through the application of behavioural insights, a new perspective is provided to understand these phenomena. Therefore, the result of this research can provide an evidence-based approach to a style of CTCE that may encourage and improve reporting of radicalisation/extremism, which ultimately may result in prevention.

Second, this research seeks to contribute to the further development of existing psychological models. One of the models advanced is the Integrated Behavioural Model (IBM) (Montano & Kasprzyk 2015). The thesis seeks to add additional psychological factors to IBM, which influence behaviour — in particular, reporting of radicalisation and extremism — by exploring the literature on criminology, psychology, and behavioural economics. The significance of this contribution is that this research can further advance psychological theories and understanding of reasoned action, in addition to criminology theories of reporting behaviour and citizen participation. Consequently, the contribution made by this thesis can be significant, as it not only incorporates existing models and theories for better insight, which is infrequently done, but also advances existing theories by applying a behavioural dimension. This is discussed in Chapters 7 and 8.

Third, the methodological approach that this thesis utilises is a multi-method design, with an added comparative dimension, which has a focus upon delivering policy and practice impact. Therefore, the thesis has to some extent adapted the Transformative Research Design (TRD) (Mertens 2005; Mertens 2012), to afford a different approach and starting point — the reporters and those concerned about radicalisation and extremism — to encourage social justice and change (i.e. policy and practice that reflects the needs for reporting of radicalisation and extremism). This is also done through learning from comparative study of practices and experiences in two sites (West Yorkshire, UK and East Jutland, Denmark).

Stigma associated with radicalisation, extremism, and terrorism can create an unclear, alienated, fearful, and vulnerable environment that elicits inequality in accessing support and empowerment. Unlike other forms of crime (e.g. rape, murder, assault etc.),
radicalisation and extremism are vague concepts for non-specialists; it is a grey zone, a knife-edge that leaves the concerned individual (reporter) in the dark — experiencing doubt, uncertainty and not knowing what to look for. For example, these hunters in the dark do not know if someone’s conservative religious beliefs or racist world view may be associated with radicalisation or extremism, as not every person with such ideologies has been radicalised or is an extremist since these ideologies may not lead to criminality. They do not know what signs to look for or the accumulation of what events could be a cause for concern. This is the information that CT professionals posses, as they work with such cases on daily basis, particularly when it is in a pre-criminal space.

Although there is stigma associated with other forms of crime, there is still a sense of victimhood associated with those who are harmed. However, in cases of radicalisation and extremism, victimhood is usually associated with those who are harmed by acts of terrorism or extremism. The stigma not only brings about shame and alienates the concerned individual, but they are also not recognised as a victim, especially families who are worried about a loved one being radicalised or at risk of extremism. These families (not to mention the vulnerable individual) are victims of crimes such as grooming, and in some cases human trafficking. In some cases, they may be viewed as part of the problem. Therefore, the help offered to this group is not as available or evident in comparison to that offered to victims of other forms of crime.

In this sense, reporters and those concerned about radicalisation and extremism are marginalised. Therefore, this thesis is informed and guided by TRD, as the design focuses on such marginalised groups. Its “philosophical worldview focuses on the needs of groups and individuals in our society that may be marginalised or disenfranchised” (Creswell 2014, p.10). Hence, by keeping the focus on the needs of this group, this thesis aims to create change in CTCE practice that benefits this cohort. The data from the multi-method design of this research design can be used to introduce change, allow tailoring of CTCE practice with the needs of reporters in mind alongside prevention. A service should be influenced and informed by the people it is designed to serve. Therefore, the significance of this methodological contribution is twofold: (a) to illustrate the flexibility of TRD by amending it without sacrificing social justice in order to meet the needs of this research and; (b) to ensure the impact of research (see Chapter 4). Additionally, the thesis seeks to advance some arguments on the use of multiple case studies and research questions. In its design, the thesis adapts (in small ways) Robert Yin’s notion of case studies, which makes the use of case studies in research more diverse by suggesting exploratory questions can also be explanatory (see Chapter 4).
Further, this research seeks to contribute to the field of CT policing and cooperative behaviour research by providing data from reporters. The significance of this is the demonstration of the relationship between academia and CT policing, in particular getting access to data deemed impossible by some in academia. This is not to say access is not challenging. However, it opens doors for future collaborations and research. Additionally, focusing on delivering change that benefits the reporters is more likely to encourage their participation in further research. This is a significant step in CT research, as access to participants is usually limited. Finally, this research seeks to inform CT literature and is distinctive in that it adopts a comparative approach to the policies and practices in East Jutland (Denmark) and West Yorkshire (UK) that impact reporting of radicalisation and extremism. This broad audit of processes has not been studied previously in the context of CT and CE, through the lens of behavioural insight. The aim is to learn about best practice and its appropriate application to other geographical regions.

Comparative studies highlight what has not been effective and why. As part of this comparison, it is possible to explore how policies are resisted in practice or changed to achieve the end result. Identification of these barriers and problems provides insight for future policy and practice, a significant output that is evidence-based and may be cost-effective in the long run. This comparison provides an English language insight into the CE practices in East Jutland, as most of the literature is presented in Danish. Consequently, this research seeks to address these gaps empirically (through the use of qualitative and some secondary statistical data to challenge or support assumptions) and interpretively (meaning attached to behaviour) by exploring the CE strategies and practices in East Jutland and West Yorkshire. Also, it explores the reporters’ reasons for reporting radicalisation/extremism to inform the reporting behaviour model. The thesis seeks to identify the needs of both reporters and practitioners to inform practice and policy with reporters’ needs in mind.

1.4.1 Behavioural Insights as a Policy and Practice Tool

This section is about introducing the importance and benefits of using behavioural insights as a policy and practice tool. It is not an assessment of the effectiveness or impact of behavioural insights on policy or practice. The use of behavioural science in policy and practice is a new concept, but a vital one in the evidence-based era. Consequently, the aim of this section is to illustrate how the data from this thesis can be used to better inform policy and practice through behavioural insight.
Behavioural insights or behavioural science — informed by a growing body of social and cognitive psychology, as well as behavioural economics — assists with understanding and predicting behaviour. The approach stems from questioning the assumption of ‘rationality’ in decision-making. The methods of behavioural insights are derived from psychology, which involves identifying patterns of behaviour in an empirical format. As a result, behavioural science bridges the natural sciences (how the brain works) and social sciences (how people work together) in order to provide insight into how behaviour is shaped. Chapters 2 and 3 of this thesis focus in detail on these natural and social sciences in the context of reporting behaviour and public cooperation to gain an holistic understanding of factors that shape reporting behaviour.

Behaviour can be a key element for successful policy initiative, as policy-making can gain greatly from understanding people’s behaviour and how it is shaped. The application of behavioural insights to policies is possible whenever there is a behavioural element present (Bavel et al. 2013, p.6). More importantly, people are at the heart of social issues, and to address these problems there is a need to understand what drives these behaviours or decisions. Behaviour is a by-product of our environment, influenced by internal and external factors that guide personal biases (also referred to as heuristics — mental shortcuts). As such, in behavioural science, the complexity of human beings becomes the fundamental unit in understanding the problem more holistically, as behaviour is not black-and-white. This insight in return can help with better-informed policies that can meet the desired outcomes; and behavioural science is increasingly being used across public services — as well as private — for this purpose (Bavel et al. 2013, pp.6-10; Halpern et al. 2004, p.31; Halpern 2015, p.217). Thus, policy and practice are evidence-based.

When policies are introduced without taking into consideration the behavioural evidence, there is a gap between the law and actual behaviour, due to lack of understanding of how behaviour works. There is a naive assumption that people will automatically support desired behaviour regardless of other factors in play. It assumes that people will ‘rationally’ consider the cost, which will outweigh other pressures and concerns. Unsurprisingly, such uneducated assumptions do not elicit the desired effect and lead to policy implementation failure or ineffectiveness. For example, there was strong opposition from some educational services — particularly universities — to introduction of the Prevent Duty. It was argued that the Prevent Duty limited freedom of thought and expression in an educational setting for fear of being considered an ‘extremist’. Moreover, the Duty assumed that these practitioners know the signs of radicalisation/extremism
that the reports made would be supported by sufficient evidence and intelligence, and that the relationships and processes in place encouraged such cooperative behaviour. Consequently, there was a lack of support for the Prevent Duty and some academics refused to view prevention of radicalisation/extremism as a safeguarding issue.

There are instances where such intervention has worked, and that can be seen when the desired behaviour is understood better, and the inhibitors are in place. Behavioural change and behavioural influence is possible with a surprisingly light touch, as long as one knows what that touch ought to be. If the intention is to affect behaviour, then one needs to make it easy, attractive, socially acceptable, and timely (Service et al. 2014, pp.4–5), but in order to do that one needs to understand the behaviour itself. For example, a national two-week weapon surrender in 2014 resulted in over 6,000 weapons being handed in directly to the police (BBC, 2017). This campaign urged people to anonymously surrender unwanted or illegal weapons at designated police stations across the UK without facing prosecution. Of course the campaign was communicated across the nation (and the effectiveness of its communication perhaps can be studied elsewhere), but the campaign was effective because it understood the barriers that would stop an individual from handing in a weapon. By removing the fear of prosecution and identifying safe discarding zones, as well as creating a social environment led by the example of others, the police successfully managed to remove lethal weapons from society — the desired outcome.

It is important to note that although behavioural insights can be beneficial, it should not be expected to solve problems that it is not intended to address, but rather used as a complementary tool. Therefore, behavioural science, like any other field, has its limitations. For example, in the case of the Prevent Duty, it is not for behavioural science to say whether safeguarding of vulnerable individuals should be the duty of practitioners from education services. However, it can shed light on how such policies can be effective in eliciting cooperation from this group. This also raises another question about the use of behavioural science: if human behaviour is irrational, then how can behaviour be explained or predicted? There are many attempts in scientific literature to provide explanations, considering many factors (see Chapters 2 and 3). However, there is no homogeneous model of behaviour that encompasses all theories, which can then be used to predict behaviour. Behaviour is context-dependant, and any attempt at explaining behaviour is reliant on the dynamics of a particular context (not to mention the medium used to interpret that context), which requires specific empirical observations. Therefore, the insight from one particular context cannot be used in a different context to elicit the same desired response, although the insight can be used broadly, if applicable, to provide
a foundation for understanding factors that may be at play in a given context. This can be argued to be a positive element of behavioural science that encourages behavioural observation in isolation but also holistically through recognition of the multifaceted nature of context and behaviour, which intertwine and interact with one another. Thus, promote reality checks in researching social phenomena that requires understanding of behaviour, which is essential for evidence-based policies and practices.

This thesis seeks to provide evidence-based insights into reporting behaviour in a given context to create an opportunity for implanting change. This thesis primarily focuses on reporting behaviour in a CT context and how this behaviour is shaped. It considers the needs of reporters and how they can be met through CTCE. It identifies similarities and differences in threat perception and reporting behaviour of reporters that are family members and those that are professionals e.g. teachers. Thus, the thesis tries to understand why people report, their thought processes, the context they were in, and the relationship CTCE has in shaping reporting behaviour. This is with the intention to bring forth the needs of reporters. The cohort that CT needs to promote and achieve prevention is the same cohort that is marginalised with excessive expectations and limited support, to encourage and improve reporting of radicalisation and extremism. Consequently, the thesis aims to encourage change in CTCE policy and practice that benefits this cohort and meet the axiological expectations of TRD.

1.5 Positioning the Research: Research Question, Objectives, and Approach

The thesis is a theoretically informed empirical study. The analytical and conceptual framework developed to explore the impact of CTCE on reporting behaviour is drawn from different disciplines. These are synthesised to permit and promote the analysis of the relationship between CTCE and reporting behaviour, as part of wider prevention strategies in a CT context. From a preliminary reading of these literature and disciplinary traditions, an overarching research question was derived: What is the relationship between CTCE and the reporting of radicalisation and extremism, and why does this relationship exist?

To answer this question, the following specific research questions (which were also presented in brief in Section 1.1) will be addressed through collection and analysis of primary and secondary data:
1. What is CTCE in the broader context of prevention, and how do the police and their partner agencies (e.g. local authorities) explain its use and delivery in East Jutland and West Yorkshire?
2. How effective is CTCE in encouraging people to report concerns of radicalisation/extremism, and what are the reasons for this?
3. What are the reasons and barriers for people reporting or not reporting radicalisation/extremism, and how can CTCE address these needs?
4. How, if at all, can the existing literature and current data explain the existence of any relationship between CTCE and reporting behaviour?
5. What lessons can be learnt from East Jutland and West Yorkshire in shaping CTCE practices that encourage and improve reporting of radicalisation and extremism?

As mentioned earlier, this research uses TRD and case studies to address the above questions. For this study, the end-user perspective is important in shaping the service, which is based on their needs. Hence, TRD is best-suited to this project, as it encourages transformation for social justice purposes. Chapter 4 discusses this in relation to epistemology, ontology, and axiology.

As for the case study, the research took place in East Jutland (mostly Aarhus) and West Yorkshire (mostly Leeds, Wakefield, and Kirklees). These two locations were selected as case studies for this research for several reasons: (a) both police organisations use CE for CT, and have relatively similar approaches to the prevention of radicalisation/extremism, as well as CE; (b) prior to the start of this research the Aarhus Model in East Jutland had made headlines for preventing foreign fighters leaving Denmark and rehabilitating them back into society; (c) the Prevent strategy experienced a highly negative public image and backlash from some sections of the public, including organisations such as universities; and finally (d) considering the similarities of the CT approach adopted by the two regions, their different receptions indicated that there might be a difference in application and delivery of CE. Therefore, different experiences of CTCE might provide insights as to how different approaches may have different impacts, and to inform better practice.

Statistics and other relevant documents were collected from both sites. Twenty-six semi-structured interviews were conducted with the local authority (LA), police CE and CTCE practitioners, reporters, as well as three case studies of relative reporters. It was difficult to encourage direct participation of relative reporters due to the stigma attached to
terrorism. The data was collected between June 2017 and August 2018. The methodology of this research is discussed in detail in Chapter 4.

1.6 Structure of the Thesis

The thesis consists of eight chapters, including the introduction. Each chapter aims to address the research questions set above. The next two chapters review different aspects of the relevant literature and provide the context of the thesis for the reader in understanding CTCE and citizen participation (i.e. reporting), upon which the thesis builds. The aim is to set the scene for the development of a theoretical framework to contextualise the empirical work. Chapter 2 seeks to answer the first part of Question One by conceptualising CTCE and its importance in prevention. This is to illustrate the evolution of CTCE, and the importance in using communities and partnerships in CT. Thus, it provides the 'why' for the use of CTCE as a preventive tool. Chapter 3 seeks to present the underlying (more importantly psychological) factors that influence cooperative and reporting behaviour, which is crucial to this thesis as it explores the 'how' of behaviour formation and decision-making. It draws upon literature from different disciplines to set the foundation, primarily for Question Four of the thesis — i.e. the use of existing literature to explain any relationship between CTCE and reporting behaviour. It also partly addresses Question Three, as it provides background knowledge of how cooperative behaviour is shaped and the contributing factors of citizen participation and reporting behaviour.

Chapter 4 delineates and explains the methodology of this study and provides a rationale for the research approach adopted, arguing that TRD and case studies were most suitable approach to answer the research questions. Chapters 5 through 7 present the empirical research findings and their analysis. They seek directly to address the research questions through the presentation, interpretation, and discussion of the data collected. Chapter 5 addresses the second part of Question One by describing CTCE practices in each site. It expands by answering Question Five by comparing and analysing both CTCE strategies. As such, Chapter 5 has three core parts: CTCE practices in East Jutland, CTCE practices in West Yorkshire, and comparative analysis. Thus, it lays the foundation for learning from each strategy and contributes to the later discussions in Chapters 7 and 8 about the effectiveness of CTCE and reasons why.

Chapter 6 explores the experience of reporters, addressing Question Three while laying the ground for Questions Two and Four. The chapter focuses on the experiences of reporters who come from professional backgrounds (e.g. teacher), and those that of
relatives or close associates. As such, this chapter provides insight into the reasoning for and the experience of reporting. It focuses on the reasons and the barriers of reporting and connects them back to literature presented in Chapter 2, as well as identify areas of recommendations for Chapters 7 and 8. Chapter 7 draws upon previous chapters, as well as the empirical data, to address the overarching question — i.e. the role of CTCE in reporting behaviour and the importance of this relationship. Consequently, the chapter addresses Question Two, Four, and Five and develops a theoretical framework used to explain the relationship between CTCE and reporting behaviour, which are mostly informed by Chapters 5 and 6. The final chapter concludes the analysis and considers the implications of the study for policy and practice. It makes recommendations for CTCE practices — outlined in medium- and long-term suggestions — in order to improve and encourage reporting of radicalisation and extremism, as well as considering the future direction of research in this field.
Chapter 2
On The Origins of Counterterrorism Community Engagement

2.1 Introduction

The aim of this chapter is to demonstrate the evolution of CE and CTCE through the literature on policing, crime prevention, and political science. It explores the evolution in crime perception and how it developed preventative approaches. Consequently, this chapter addresses the first part of Question One, which is to conceptualise CTCE and its importance in preventive policing. This is important to the aim of this thesis as it highlights the role of CTCE in prevention and the logic behind the use of communities and partnerships in CT.

Policing terrorism is a local and regional response to a national and global threat. To tackle the problem of terrorism, governments have three broad responses: the military, criminal justice, and the community response (Staniforth 2014, p.84). Policing terrorism falls under the community response, with the influence of criminal justice as guidance in identifying crimes committed. The police play an integral role in countering terrorism and extremism (Stuart 2015, p.4). In a CT context, policing organisations have the most to lose, both in terms of community relations and public reliance on the police (Pickering et al. 2008, p.25). A major challenge the authorities involved in CT is engaging or working with families, considering that the police are known to arrest those in the community involved in criminality. This also applies to specific communities that come from oppressive countries where police and the like are viewed as the oppressive hand. Given that the police are very often well connected to other networks (such as education services, social services, mental health services, intelligence services, and communities), they are, therefore, key players in engaging and networking with communities — although this is by no means straightforward or taken for granted, as the long history of community policing (CP) show. Thus, the police have the advantage of obtaining community intelligence through trusted relationships within communities (Innes 2006), with which to prevent crimes such as terrorism and extremism.

There is a philosophical consensus that policing is most successful when it is community-oriented, as through policing with consent and inclusion, policing can have a greater reach
and depth (Skogan 2006b; Sarre 1996). Policing through consent is equally relevant to CT (Briggs 2010). There is a broad acknowledgement that prevention of radicalisation and extremism, as well as CT, relies upon communities for intelligence, as well as interventions (Radicalization Awareness Network 2018, p.9). According to some, there is a need for grass-roots work in policing, CE and community cohesion (Blackwood et al. 2016). There has been an international debate on whether CE should be used or integrated within the sphere of CT. Sceptics are concerned with securitisation and militarisation of the police and social issues such as community cohesion, as well as widening the trust gap between the police and the public (Pantazis & Pemberton 2009; Thomas 2014; O’toole et al. 2016).

Considering the argument that there are various underlying factors that shape crime and criminal behaviour — not to mention radicalisation and extremism — it would be illogical to disregard the fact that these issues are interconnected and overlapping. There is evidence to support the success of using CE in CT, as direct contact with the community — especially the ‘Muslim community’ — and close relationships increased trust and awareness (Dunn et al. 2016). It is also argued by research comparing both state and NGO CTCE practices that lack of insight, contact, interaction with communities can backfire and prevent effective efforts to stop extremism and terrorism (Radicalization Awareness Network 2018, p.9).

To present an insight into evolution of CE and CTCE, this chapter situates this thesis within the broader policing and CT literature, by primarily focusing on the use of CE as a CT strategy. It examines the nature and progress of CE in the context of crime prevention and how change in perception of crime influenced the birth of this strategy. This is followed by exploration in the emergence of multi-agency partnership in preventive work and once again its link to perception of crime. The chapter then reveals the evolution of CTCE and factors that inform and shapes its practice and use. Here, the aim is to illustrate how policy and at times theories form the practice of contemporary preventive policing through the perception and comprehension of crime. In turn, a foundation is laid for the reasoning behind the use of CTCE in prevention. Finally, the chapter presents literature and arguments around the impact of CE on prevention and the implications of applying it to a CT context.
2.2 The Rationale for Community Engagement in Counterterrorism

2.2.1 Preventive Policing: The Rise of Community Engagement and Multi-Agency Partnership

Crime prevention differs in meaning for different people, but most often the term refers to efforts to prevent crime or criminality. One such effort is CE. In recent years CE has increasingly developed a high profile in policing and wider government policy (Myhill 2012; Skogan 2004; Sherman 2006), especially in the CT context (Staniforth et al. 2010). This is due to CE being recognised as preventive policing, which has a proactive rather than a reactive approach to crime control. It is argued that crime control “has its roots in a new collective experience of crime and insecurity, an experience which is itself structured by the distinctive social, economic and cultural arrangements of late twentieth-century capitalism” (Garland 2000, p.347). In Section 2.2.2 the thesis discusses how this collective experience of terrorism and insecurity has resulted in harmonised preventive action at international level. Crime control and crime prevention share a common goal, but crime prevention differs from crime control in that it typically operates outside the confines of the formal justice system i.e. pre-criminal space (see Section 1.2) (Welsh & Farrington 2010). In this respect, alongside the institutions of police, courts, and correctional facilities, prevention is regarded as the fourth pillar of crime reduction (Waller 2006).

In its simplest form, crime prevention is introduced via three different, connected approaches: punitive corrective and protective. The punitive arm of crime prevention is concerned with the law and applied through criminal justice system. The corrective approach focuses on providing mentoring, counselling, employment and education support in order to rehabilitate the individual back into society. The protective element is the proactive arm of prevention and is usually delivered through CE, Neighbourhood Watch, public education etc. to ensure the three elements of crime (desire, ability, and opportunity) are distributed, hence working as a deterrent. Moreover, there are three types of prevention: primary, which focuses on individual- and family-level factors that are deemed to be correlated with criminality; secondary prevention, which focuses on at-risk individuals/groups or potential opportunities that may foster criminality; and finally tertiary prevention, which takes place once a crime has been committed to reduce re-offending and re-victimisation (the implementation of tertiary measures can be seen after terrorist attacks, for example). The CT strategies studied in this thesis take all three approaches and types, as shown in Chapter 5.

This classification of perception was further expanded through a second dimension: the target group of crime prevention strategies (Van Dijk & De Waard 1991), which was
influenced by the Routine Activity Theory (Cohen & Felson 1979). The key contribution of this two-dimensional typology was that crime prevention efforts must consider the victim or potential victim alongside the offender and place. Additionally, four major prevention strategies were introduced to distinguish between efforts (Tonry & Farrington 1995): Developmental Prevention (early interventions aimed to prevent criminal activity in individuals, especially those at risk) (Farrington & Welsh 2007); Situational Prevention (interventions designed to reduce opportunities for offending) (Cornish & Clarke 2003); Criminal Justice Prevention (traditional interventions, deterrents, incarceration, and rehabilitation operated by law enforcement and criminal justice system agencies) (Blumstein et al. 1978); and Community Prevention (interventions focused on changing social conditions e.g. families, social norms etc.) (Hope 1995). It is worth noting that community prevention tends to overlap with Situational and Developmental Prevention, and although the latter two can be delivered in a community setting, they do not address community processes and thus are not regarded as community approaches (Bennet 1998).

Although the emergence of CE and preventive policing was not smooth, this thesis will focus on some major milestones assisted in shaping this strategy, which are relevant to this thesis. At the heart of preventive policing sit Utilitarian philosophical discussions by the likes of Marquis Cesare Beccaria and Jeremy Bentham who argued that it is better to prevent crimes than to punish them, which is the chief aim of every good system of legislation (Marin 1981, pp.18–19).

Preventive policing initially emerged in 1798, pre-dating the Metropolitan Police — the ‘new’ police linked to the Peelian principle — in the form of the Marine Police Force (also known as the Thames River Police, with Patrick Colquhoun being instrumental in its establishment). It was formed to counter theft of cargo by having a continual presence on the riverfront to act as a deterrent, and disrupt crime in progress through intervention (Harris 2004). Other supporters of preventive policing argued that prevention is better than punishment and more cost-effective for a criminal justice system that is overburdened by the prosecution of crimes (Chadwick 1829). This led to the formation of policing by consent (Peelian policing), and prevention became the primary aim of the ‘new police’ to keep social order and control. The aim of prevention was described in the mission of the new police in 1829 in Sir Charles Rowan and Richard Mayne’s direction to the police, which subsequently informed what became known as the Peelian principles (Schafer 2013). As a result, prevention was twofold; a) for the state to ensure crime did not pay, given the consequences; and, b) for citizens to adopt behaviours such as rational
thinking to prevent them from criminality (Crawford & Evans 2017, p.789). However, it was primarily the role of the police to ensure detection, arrest and prosecution of criminals, with little attention being paid to the social environment in which the crime took place (Crawford & Evans 2017, p.789).

Fast forward, it was not until the 1940s that the concept of Situational Crime began to gain a platform. It was argued that crime was a consequence of either historical behaviour or situational/environmental factors (Sutherland, 1947). However, the concept of ‘situational’ factors was abandoned until the 1970s, when it regained interest due to rising crime rates, causing practitioners and policy-makers to look elsewhere for new policing style (Home Office 1977). Consequently, the focus was on the context in which the crime took place (physical and social settings in addition to societal arrangements), instead of the perpetrator (Clarke, 1983). Clarke’s argument was based on the assumption that situational opportunities ‘host’ crime. This changed the arguments around criminal agency, and examination of criminal behaviour started to slowly take a more holistic approach to understand crime and criminality. Critiques of the Situational Crime Prevention argue that crime can be displaced rather prevented, as this approach does not address offenders’ criminal disposition (Wortley 2010). This means that the approach does not promote social reform or rehabilitation; instead, the aim is to tackle the immediate crime. Others argue that Situational Crime Prevention diverts attention from the underlying causes of crime, and is a ‘conservative’ approach to crime control with a tendency to blame victims (Clarke & Bowers 2017).

Central to the Situational Crime Prevention Theory were the theories of rational choice (as the offender needs to weigh the risk and benefits of committing the crime), the routine activity (a likely offender, a suitable target, and absence of control), and the Theory of Crime Pattern (the interaction between the activity space of an offender and victim gives rise to crime) (Felson 1994; Clarke & Felson 2004; Clarke & Cornish 1985; Felson et al. 1998; Cohen & Felson 1979). These theories started to look at crime differently, meaning perception of crime changed from being focused only on the individual (e.g. an immoral act, committed by an innately bad person) to a more holistic view of various factors that can create an environment for criminality. The change in crime perception suggested that crime has causal and underlying factors known as risk factors (psychological and environmental conditions), which can be mitigated (Luthar 2003). These risk factors are multifaceted (see Figure 2), ranging from circumstances that influence the lives of individuals and families as they grow up to local environments, and the situations and opportunities that facilitate victimisation and offending (United Nations Office on Drugs
Risk factor perception is a reflection of Developmental, Situational, and Community prevention strategies. Developmental Prevention efforts in recent years have targeted early risk factors related to offending. These risk factors are regarded as prior factors that enhance the vulnerability to, and the frequency, duration and persistence of offending (Kazdin et al. 1997).

Risk-focus prevention was introduced to criminology from public health, and the idea is to identify key risk factors for offending and implement prevention methods (Welsh & Farrington 2010, p.7). However, some problems are associated with risk-focused prevention, for example, which risk factors are causes and which are markers or correlated with causes (Farrington 2000); or how mediators between risk factors and outcomes are established (Baron & Kenny 1986). In principle, through the identification of the factors associated with various types of crime, preventive strategies and programmes may be developed — such interventions are targeted. This approach acknowledges that crime is an holistic problem, multifaceted and that preventing crime is not just the role of the criminal justice system. Instead, it needs a solution that reflects the nature of the phenomenon itself.

Figure 2: Factors influencing the risks of crime and violence (United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime 2010, p.10).
This change in perception of crime and criminality created a preventive turn in policing that focused on problem-solving and tackling the root cause of crime to prevent it. This led to calls for public cooperation, and the concept of partnership with local agencies and communities became the key of new crime prevention, firmly asserted in the 1980s and later in the Crime and Disorder Act 1998 advocating a partnership approach (Garland 1996; Crawford & Evans 2017, p.800). The Crime and Disorder Act reinsert community into policing through the process of a local audit of crime, as well as determining local priorities and involving hard-to-reach groups in addressing crime (Hughes et al. 2002), encouraging an inter-agency and multi-agency approach to crime prevention. The idea was to identify 'link personnel' within the different organisations whose professional expertise was relevant to crime prevention (Crawford 1999, p.119). As such, this multi-agency partnership resulted in putting everybody's role into perspective, which entails a division of labour in which different organisations and actors contribute different things that add collective value to prevention (Crawford 1999, p.119).

This, in turn, gave rise to ‘responsibilisation’ strategy in the new mode of governing crime, wherein the central government sought crime prevention “not in direct fashion through state agencies (police, courts, prisons, social work, etc.) but instead by acting indirectly, seeking to activate action on the part of non-state agencies and organisations” (Garland 1996, p.452; Crawford & Evans 2017). This approach, developed by the UK government, used key phrases such as ‘partnership’, ‘multi-agency approach’, ‘activating communities’ and ‘active citizenship’ to devolve responsibility for crime prevention onto agencies and individuals outside the state (Garland 1996, p.452). The state uses various techniques including policies (e.g. the Prevent Duty) to encourage action on the part of non-state parties, either by stimulating new forms of behaviour (e.g. reporting of radicalisation or extremism by education and health services) or by stopping established habits (e.g. getting retailers to reduce retail crime by threatening to shift the cost of prosecution onto retailers) (Riley & Mayhew 1980, p.15).

The first step in ‘responsibilisation’ is to identify parties that have the ability to reduce opportunities associated with a given crime (e.g. terrorism), and to assess if these parties have a responsibility in place already, and if so, whether it needs to be enforced (Hough et al. 1980, p.16). The rationale and recurring message of this approach is that crime is not just the responsibility or a matter for the police or the state alone (Garland 1996, p.453), but rather a problem for all, given its roots in social issues outside the ambit of police action, supporting the notion of partnership (Edwards 2005, p.313). For example, fear of crime affects trade in shopping centres, which improved security and joint practices can
help with. Consequently, crime prevention is “part of the routine day to day practice and culture of all agencies and individuals” (Home Office 1993, p.16). Therefore, it is believed that partnership (coordinated, concentrated effort of individuals and organisations affected by and concerned with the problems) is needed in reducing crime and disorder (Skogan 2004, p.6).

It should be noted that ‘responsibilisation’ does not ‘off-load’ the state’s responsibility for controlling and preventing crime. Rather it is a new mode of governing crime, in which exclusive reliance on the state (or criminal justice) is reduced to an attempt to elicit non-state crime prevention effort (Garland 1996, p.454). In this light, “publicity campaigns are used to raise public consciousness, interpolate the citizen as a potential victim, create a sense of duty, connect the population to crime control agencies, and help change the thinking and practices of those involved” (Garland 2001, p.125). This is an approach that the UK government took during the 1980s and 1990s Troubles. Adverts encouraged reporting of extremism among family members and close associates of those involved in such activity. According to a BBC documentary, this resulted in a 729% increase of legitimate reports overall (BBC 2018). Garland (2001, 137) argues that this is a criminology of the self, which routinises crime through fear and promotion of preventive action. However, there are practical problems involved in responsibilisation, which create obstacles for multi-agency working. These include resistance, diverse interests in crime control, resources, practices, information sharing barriers and so on (see section 2.2.4 in relation to CTCE). Responsibilisation is still a new concept and it is likely to develop further in years to come.

This focus on non-state participation in crime prevention solidified with more policing strategies such as Problem-Oriented Policing (POP) or CP, also referred to as CE. The POP strategy focused on the identification, analysis, and solution of specific crimes (Goldstein 1979). As such, a ‘problem’ was not considered a single incident, but rather a cluster of similar, related or recurring incidents (Goldstein 1990). The concept of POP focused on tailor-made policing that fitted the needs of the local problems. Hence, POP requires detailed crime analysis, appropriate prevention strategies based on crime analysis, a partnership between agencies and residents/targeted population, implementation of strategies, and the evaluation of the effects (Crawford 1998, p.163; Ekblom 1988). POP recognised that much criminal activity could be prevented by establishing and maintaining a working partnership between police and the community (Miller 2006, p.17). Therefore, POP is a proactive approach, as it aims to address specific problems through an emphasis on broad roles for the public in identifying, prioritising and solving
problems to prevent future crimes. However, there are criticisms that application of POP, like Situational Crime Prevention, can result in crime displacement, as crime may be reduced in the targeted area only, shifting to other jurisdictions. Some critiques suggest it is only logical to evaluate the effectiveness of POP by determining the extent to which crime and disorder has been reduced (Weisburd et al. 2010). It is argued that POP “should be measured not on the results of each application but rather on the degree to which its process and principles improve the prospects for more effective policing, particularly as compared with alternative policing approaches” (Scott 2010, p.137). Others argue that POP can sometimes over-simplify a problem and its significance (Tilley 2010). Many argue that POP in practice bears little to no resemblance to its original concept (Eck 2000; Clarke 1998).

Like POP, CE, has community at its heart. The main driving force behind CE was a sense that policing had become detached from the community it is supposed to serve — in particular the disadvantaged and alienated sections of the community (Skogan 2004), relying on a cooperative community to ensure prevention of crime (Murray, 2005, p.348). The next sections will focus on application of CE in CT.

2.2.2 Evolution of Counterterrorism Community Engagement

Countries across the world have experienced terrorist attacks from groups such as ISIL and Al-Qaeda, with approximately 380 attacks in 2017 alone being committed by ISIL (Story Maps 2017). The impact of terrorism varies over the globe, with some countries being affected more than others (Institute for Economics and Peace 2016). Every country has its distinct history of terrorism; however, the events of 9/11 on American soil were a catalyst for global collaboration and reform of CT policing (Deflem 2010). This is due to terrorist attacks across the world starting to take on a new form i.e. multiple countries being under attack by the same terrorist groups. These attacks made clear the strategic dimension of terrorism, and changed the notion of terrorism from a ‘national’ to an ‘international’ threat (Zimmermann & Wenger 2007). As such, the need for international cooperation to counter terrorism became evident.

More specifically, the European Union (EU) became the harmonising body for its member states due to concern at international terrorism, and the fact that only six out of fifteen EU member states had separate incrimination for terrorist acts as part of their criminal law; the other states prosecuted terrorist acts as common offences (Dumitriu 2002). The UK was one of the six countries, and due to its history of dealing with terrorism it was a lot more advanced. The EU used this advancement in informing CT legislation at the time to
harmonise CT across the EU. As a result, anti-terror legislation such as the Framework Decision (Council of the European Union 2008; Council of the European Union 2002)\(^1\) and EU Plan of Action on Combating Terrorism were introduced (Walker & Lennon 2015). The latter became a monitoring instrument for member states that identified the measures, the responsible body, and the deadline to adhere to (Murphy 2012).

Additionally, both the Madrid bombings and the 7/7 London attacks raised concern at home-grown terrorists, which highlighted the complex web of radicalisation. At a European level radicalisation and extremism was viewed as issues that were embedded in communities, as those that recruited vulnerable individuals were integrated within their communities — i.e. being a local level issue for the authorities to address. Grievances used by terrorist and extremist groups to recruit and radicalise vulnerable individuals were believed to be risk factors centred on socio-economic issues (LaFree & Dugan 2004; Koshrokhavar 2005). These, like any crime-facilitating risk factors, were believed to be key vulnerabilities that made individual receptive (Christmann 2012). This is in line with the Community Regeneration Theory, which suggests that socioeconomic factors lead to delinquency (Taub et al. 1984; Bennet 1998). It was also recognised that these risk factors might differ based on geographical location and culture. To identify such differences, authorities needed to engage with the community that they served — as such, policing terrorism became community oriented through the use of community-based prevention strategies that addressed local issues, which facilitated radicalisation and extremism. Therefore, there was a need for the prevention of terrorism to connect with and empower the communities with the resources and information that they needed to be resilient to radicalisation/extremism. It is argued that governments can build community resilience in the face of violence through “supporting existing community initiatives and building a sound economic base for the communities there” (Briggs et al. 2006, p.64). This is in line with Community Empowerment Theory, although it also overlaps with community regeneration theory. Community Empowerment Theory is concerned with sharing the power of decision-making and management activities with residents in the social conditions believed to sustain crime in the neighbourhood (Welsh & Hoshi 2006). This will be further discussed in Chapter 3, which is focused on contributors to cooperation.

Briggs (2010, p.972-973) argues that there are four ways in which communities contribute towards effective CT: a) as an important source of information and intelligence;

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\(^1\) This is a type of EU legislation that does not require the involvement of the European Parliament and is only passed and activated when there is a unanimous vote by all members of the Council (in this case, the Justice and Home Affairs Council). It is the member states’ own responsibility to incorporate the provisions in this Framework into their domestic legislation (Lowe 2015).
b) communities are good at recognising warning signs and diverting vulnerable individuals; c) communities can tackle grievances that may lead to violent crime (e.g. poverty, education, racism, segregation, discrimination, etc.); and d) the Police and Security Service cannot act without the consent of the communities they are there to protect. Without their consent there will be pushback that could influence the effectiveness of prevention. The Community Intelligence-Based Model also supports the argument that terrorism can be prevented and deterred through community intelligence feeding into CP (Innes 2006, p.222). Additionally, by engaging with communities, a problem-oriented approach is adopted to address issues associated with radicalisation/extremism. Hence, working with communities became a key foundation in tackling terrorism and extremism, and local responses to an international threat.

From a CT perspective, this was vital, as it started to outline the EU’s Counter-Terrorism Strategy to harmonise the member states’ approach to CT at local, regional, national, and international levels. This led to the EU calling for CE and a cooperative approach, not just between states but also various agencies, to encourage a partnership approach to countering terrorism and extremism (Council of the European Union 2005). There was an emphasis on municipal initiatives that stemmed from the realisation that a multi-agency partnership and collaboration with communities were best placed to detect and prevent radicalisation and extremism (Council of the European Union 2014, p.5). Therefore, prevention of radicalisation and extremism was no longer just the job of policing and security agencies, but also other authorities and bodies that operated within the framework of safeguarding vulnerabilities. This is in line with the responsibilisation theory discussed earlier, devolving responsibility onto non-state parties and encouraging action. As a result, the prospects of success were believed to be greater (Rabasa et al. 2010).

This community response was one of three broad responses to terrorism; the other two were military and criminal justice responses (Staniforth 2014, p.84). This community-level response was an alternative approach that considered the causes of terrorism, and the inherent risk of criminalisation and suppression that informed traditional CT policing (Pickering et al. 2008, p.25). Therefore, CTCE was a soft approach to the prevention of radicalisation and extremism (Aly & Green 2010). The notion of ‘soft’ policing refers to “the non-coercive aspects of police-led social control encompassing the provision of a visible presence of authority, persuasion, negotiation and community interaction” (Innes 2005, p.157). Hence, it focused more on the persuasive mode of social control rather than enactment. A ‘soft’ CT approach aims to prevent and reverse the process of radicalisation,
“usually by providing a stable support network, probing their [the vulnerable individual at risk of radicalisation/extremism] original reasons for radicalising, and divorcing them from their extreme beliefs and social contacts” (Stern 2010, p.108). It also tries to provide the public with relevant information for safeguarding.

It is also argued that CT can work better when there is an integration of CP into CT apparatus, which can assist in building trust between minorities and the police to enhance the flow of community intelligence (Innes 2006, p.224; Dunn et al. 2016). As such, this approach requires high visibility-reassurance policing, as well as expanded community-contact through engagement that can assist in building trust in addition to understanding the difference in communities, individuals, and community tensions. This CTCE utilises and expands on existing community interfaces to increase the flow of community intelligence, as well as putting in place preventive strategies that address risk factors associated with terrorism (Lowe & Innes 2008). By directly interacting with the community, law enforcement can identify and engage with citizens as partners in addressing community grievances that may lead to extremism (International Association of Chiefs of Police 2014). As such, it is argued that communities, if supported and guided, may be able to prevent radicalisation/extremism (Briggs et al. 2006, p.15).

Post-9/11 events have led international institutions such as the EU, to harmonise the fight against terrorism, not only at an international level but also local, regional, and national. As a result, more attention was paid to socio-economic risk factors and their impact on radicalisation and extremism, and ways in which CE could be used by multiple agencies for prevention purposes. This, highlights the complex nature of radicalisation and extremism, and why addressing some socio-economic issues may overlap with security issues — and crime prevention in general. More importantly, prevention of radicalisation and extremism needed to be tailored to the needs of communities, geographical locations, and risk factors; resulting in active engagement with the general public, organisations, authorities, vulnerable individuals and their families.

2.2.3 Impact of Community Engagement on Prevention

Just like POP it is only logical to ask about CE’s success in prevention, and whether it is the right response to crime prevention, especially in a CT context. These question, although legitimate, are complex due to the diversity in the application of CE, local context and culture, type of crime, and the range of outcomes concerned (e.g. better police-public relationships), as well as a limited number of robust evaluations (Bullock 2014, p.111). Nonetheless, there are some studies that can be used to draw insight (Rosenbaum &
While there is evidence to suggest the use of CE has reduced the fear of crime, improved problem-solving, and enhanced perceptions of and relationships with the police, evidence for its impact on crime reduction is limited. This could be due to what method is used to measure the impact on prevention or how prevention is viewed, as the term is very complex and difficult to evaluate. There is a need to establish the ‘input’ before an intervention is introduced — e.g. how many people could/would have been radicalised if an intervention was not introduced? Establishing such input is vague and difficult.

Considering this challenge, there is still evidence that suggests CE is effective in crime prevention (Skogan & Steiner 2004), including in a CT context (Dunn et al. 2016). It is argued that CE can be effective when a variety of different strategies is adopted to encourage citizen participation in comparison to relying on one method of engagement (Mackenzie & Henry 2009, p.5). This is not to say that there is strong evidence to suggest CE has a major impact on ‘social capacity’ — i.e. individual willingness to intervene or increased voluntary activity. Some argue that CE is thought to be effective and easy to implement when communities are organised to some degree (Walker 1999, p.190). Nevertheless, there is evidence to suggest positive changes in crime, anti-social behaviour, feelings of safety, and public confidence in police (Tuffin et al. 2006), although the long-term impact of CE is still in need of further research (Quinton & Morris 2008).

As evident, an evaluation of CE and its impact on prevention is difficult to achieve. It is argued that some of this difficulty may be due to the flexibility in design and implementation of CE, which is guided by specific needs of the local communities and crime; thus a more locally-focused research design may be better in evaluating the impact (Mason 2009; Bullock 2014, p.112).

2.2.4 Implications of Application of Counterterrorism Community Engagement

The thinking behind the use of CE in CT policing is that communities can assist in preventing or mitigating radicalisation and/or extremism (Tahiri & Grossman 2013). Although the terrorist threats come from a small minority, nevertheless these individuals are integrated within communities (Briggs 2010). One major criticism of CTCE strategy revolves around a political issue regarding selection: which segments of the community are to be contacted and consulted (Murray 2005; Skogan 2004)? However, the notion of communities is complex (see Chapter 1). The controversy mainly surrounds the idea of a ‘suspect community’, a notion that repeats in history, creating mistrust.
The notion of ‘suspect community’ was first mentioned by Hillyard in the analysis of the impact of the Prevention of Terrorism Act (PTA) 1974 to 1989 on Irish communities. The concept is explained, as a process of threat identification and signs of abnormality:

“A person who is drawn into the criminal justice system under the PTA is not a suspect in the normal sense of the word. In other words, they are not believed to be involved in or guilty of some illegal act [...] people are suspect primarily because they are Irish and once they are in the police station they are often labelled an Irish suspect, presumably as part of some classification system. In practice, they are being held because they belong to a suspect community.” (Hillyard 1993, p.7)

Hence, it has been argued that racial profiling, which is used in CT strategies to identify individuals based on their religion, ethnicity, and culture, encourages victimisation of communities (Awan & Blakemore 2013). As such, these stereotypes can leak into the public domain, which can be a risk to community cohesion as it leads to the social exclusion of communities. In turn, communities are stigmatised, which consequently can result in difficulties for the police to build relationships or collect intelligence. For example, Robert Lambert (former undercover policeman) in an interview highlights the experiences of the Irish community in the 1980s in London:

“In the 1980s, some police raids on London Irish families began to cause alienation from the police because they gave the impression that the police regarded Irish Catholic communities in London with suspicion. This was often caused by operational counter-terrorism activity that was insufficiently focused on terrorist targets [...] Also, bear in mind how much confidence in the police was damaged as a result of the miscarriages of justice cases involving the Guildford Four and Birmingham Six. This was similar to the problem Lord Scarman identified after the Brixton riots in 1981, when London’s black community felt unfairly targeted by police, felt under collective suspicion.” (Jackson 2008, p.294)

Since the post 9/11 ‘war on terror’, some parts of the ‘Muslim communities’ feel targeted by CT strategies (Pantazis & Pemberton 2009). In the case of ‘suspect communities’, in the current years, Muslims are associated and labelled as a terrorist (Spalek & Lambert 2007; Powell 2011). For example, study of the experiences of Kurdish Londoners visited by MI5 in 2010-2011 found that the processes and practices in place criminalised Kurds as the collective subjects of security policing, or ‘suspect community’(Sentas 2016). Despite the
significant resources being invested in prevention of terrorism programmes at the community level, there has been backlash from parts of the society as it is argued that such strategies and policies tend to marginalise and alienate some sections of the community (Kundnani 2009). Scholars argue that many ‘Muslim communities’ have been subjected to and scrutinised by national and international government CT policies; thus, the ‘Muslim community’ is no longer just a ‘community suspect’ but an ‘international suspect’ (Awan and Blakemore, 2013). Therefore, these scholars claim or imply that state practices have a direct influence on Muslims (i.e. how they are perceived and how they perceive themselves) (Ragazzi, 2016). It is worth noting that others have found that mainstream ‘Muslim community’ views of the police have remained stable, relatively positive and consistent since Prevent implemented (Innes et al. 2011, p.9). They found that in comparison to young men in the general population and in other ethnic minorities, the negative attitude of young Muslim men had only slightly increased. Other research have found that although there were signs of alienation, most British Muslims were satisfied with and trusted CT policies, the government and the police in addition to presenting a high level of willingness to take action against terrorism (Shanaah 2019).

Similarly, studies of other countries argued that there was a cause for concern in the implementation of such CT strategies and their impact on specific communities. For example, one study focusing on the Danish radicalisation prevention argued that “the developing practice regime of radicalisation prevention revolves around logics of ‘repressive liberalism,’ which holds that radical identities can be prevented by shaping and disciplining adolescents with illiberal and undemocratic beliefs into liberal democratic citizens”(Lindekilde 2012, p.122). As such, such practices aim to influence the individual’s free will not through power but through incentives, information, empowerment, and challenging interventions. The study found that the Muslims from a targeted milieu were sceptic about the effectiveness of such measures.

Studies focusing on the UK Muslim communities identified that many local communities have serious concerns and grievances about government and police efforts in CT (Lakhani 2012, p.190). These grievances revolve around three issues: funding that focused on community cohesion rather than CT; preventative approach; and allegations of spying upon ‘suspect community’. Briggs (2010, p.973) argues that these real and/or perceived grievances need to be addressed for CE to be effective:
"The government is to gain the confidence of Muslim communities; it must work hard to maintain the moral high ground and show it is committed to tackling the injustices faced by Muslims both here and abroad”.

This argument echoes the reasoning introduced by the Broken Window Theory, which argues for an indirect causal link between crime and disorder, which needs a ‘zero tolerance’ policy that encouraged the police and other agencies to aggressively pursue minor infractions to deter greater crimes (Serewicz, 2009). In this case, when CE can address insecurities that threaten social identities, the police may be in a better position to have the cooperation of the public in countering terrorism. By addressing these grievances through community engagement, radicalisation and extremism can be prevented in the long run, as terrorist messages that resonate among those who might be swayed to terrorism are muted (Briggs 2010). However, the notion of a ‘suspect community’ is not supported by all scholars. Walker (2012) suggests that the adoption of a ‘suspect community’ should be treated with great caution. The concept of the ‘Muslim community’ in itself is a broad and vague term; hence it cannot be defined as a single cohesive ‘community’ since Muslims come from diverse ethnic, cultural, social and economic standings, and even differs in terms of religious beliefs (Walker 2012). This supports the psychological theory of Social Identity and Categorisation (see Chapter 3).

To regard the ‘Muslim community’ as a homogenous group, disregards of other identities: heritage, nationality, ethnicity, race, class, gender, geography, immigration generation, political views, and religious practices (Briggs et al. 2006, p.60). Therefore, there is a problem with using ‘the community’ in this way, especially in CT policies since it disregards ‘super-diversity’, as ‘community’ is usually regarded as referring to racial groups (Rowe 2004, p.147). It is argued that “the majority of ‘white communities’ are fairly good at grasping how minority communities differ from the majority, but not nearly so good at understanding how they differ from one another” (Briggs et al. 2006, p.60). Additionally, Greer argues that the thesis by Pantazis and Pemberton (2009) is built upon a “series of analytical, methodological, conceptual, logical, empirical, evidential and interpretive errors” (Greer 2010, p.1171). Greer points out that there is no hard evidence for any official policy or sanctioned practice in that direction.

For Pantazis and Pemberton, the notion of a ‘suspect community’ addresses people’s experiences of the law. As such, they argue in response to Greer that CT policy and practices affect social identities and produce a distorted sense of community. In their suspicion pyramid, at the top of the pyramid lies formal suspects, controlled through
surveillance. In the middle, stop and search powers are used for informal suspects; and at the bottom, the ‘entire Muslim community’ is targeted by media, political and civil society discourse (Pantazis & Pemberton 2011). Awan & Blakemore (2013) also suggest that CT policy put community cohesion at risk, as it leads to the social exclusion of communities and, as a result, makes it difficult for the police to gather evidence and build trust. For example, a study on the effects of CT policing on cooperation illustrated that procedural justice is a direct cause for American Muslims to cooperate; while legitimacy shapes cooperation indirectly (Tyler et al. 2010), discussed in more detail in the next chapter.

Other studies found that defining the ‘Prevent space’ within the police organisation had a negative implication for public relations, which is worsened by a lack of understanding how it is positioned between Pursue CT policing and community policing (Innes et al. 2011, p.18). It is argued that the “lack of standardisation of implementing CT practices and policy across the UK's institutional bodies reflects on community groups' inability to work coherently with said bodies” (Silverman 2017, p.1097). Moreover, although communities are seen as of value to CT, there is also a recognition that the current approach is incapacitating to community organisations and institutions. As such it is argued that community-level work can be strengthened by real CE that works towards building ongoing and permanent relationships, which involves inclusion in decision making at local level, rather than a reactive and top-down response (Silverman 2017, p.1101). It is suggested that there is not enough transparency around CT strategies; increased transparency of such strategies and their delivery can help in reducing the fear that closed doors can incite (Center for Human Rights and Global Justice 2012). Silverman (2017, p.1097) further suggest that the positive aspects of CT strategies need to be highlighted in order to change perceptions and increase transparency around such policies to encourage dialogue and reduce barriers to engagement.

Further on the distinction between Prevent and Pursue some criticism arises from the fact that some Prevent interventions have resulted in constructing the opportunity for interdiction and disruption, which is related to Pursue. Pursue operate in the criminal space, whilst Prevent is concerned with pre-criminal space. Prevent focuses on counter radicalisation, de-radicalisation, and managing community cohesion/tension. As such the work is predominantly at community level. Studies have found that some of these community level engagements have resulted in community-led disruptions (Innes et al. 2017, pp.271–273). It was identified that when the police could not Pursue extremist groups and their activities through prosecution, since some activities although highly undesirable they were not illegal, they used local communities to help disrupt such
activities. Such collectivised community-led disruptions usually involve tactics such as pressure, alienation, and setting up organisation and community councils to ensure a clear consensus that these groups are not welcomed in the community. These activities are informal social control by the local community that disrupt the unwanted activities identified by the police but the community takes ownership in addressing it. Such collectivised approach is supported by the police. Consequently, such examples highlight that it is "important in capturing some of the complexities and nuances associated with the practical delivery of Prevent interventions ‘on the ground’ these days" (Innes et al. 2017, p.272). Additionally, Innes et al (2017, p.273) identified that the police were also in support of diversionary activities set up by communities (e.g. football event) in support of pre-emptive crime risk reduction efforts, which is argued to be a crime prevention activity that is routinely applied (Bjørgo 2015).

The CE activities also result in gathering intelligence, which can then be used to Pursue extremist groups and activities, as well as Prevent interventions. For example, a police Inspector explained how the intelligence gained from community in relation to ‘person of interest’ resulted in the individual being informally warned that they may be subject to police surveillance and possibly more assertive interventions if they continued their activities (Innes et al. 2017, pp.268–269). Such disruption tactics are favoured by Prevent officers for managing behaviours that may be indirectly increasing threat but are not in violation of the law. However, the fear remains that such Prevent interventions only move the problem from one area to another, and it may be only a short-term local ‘fix’. It is also argued that Pursue operations "frequently shape and influence the context in which Prevent is delivered", which can have negative consequences for the community (e.g. community gets bombarded by negative media coverage once a person is found to be up to no good) (Innes et al. 2017, p.274).

Moreover, this issue of policy and practice in addressing violent Islamic extremism is found to be similar across Europe, where "authorities perceive such extremism is a problem of the incorporation of Islam and/or the integration of the Muslim population in European societies" (Vermeulen & Bovenkerk 2012, p.185). It is argued that in order to achieve these policy goals, engagement strategies are used (Vidino 2010). Such engagement is believed to come with new policy dilemmas, one of which is representativeness. It is argued that "when authorities want to engage with Islamic population through religious organisations they want these organisations to represent the community", albeit the knowledge that these communities are not coherent (Vermeulen & Bovenkerk 2012, p.188). Other dilemmas are defining the enemy and identifying suitable
partners for engagement, as well as identifying to what extent authorities provide extremist organisations a public platform by engaging with them. Those countries with value-based approach seek out organisations that have similar values to those of mainstream Western society for engagement purposes, whilst those with means-based approach tend to be willing to engage with non-violent extremism organisations, as this engagement could be effective in fighting violent extremism (Vermeulen & Bovenkerk 2012, p.189). The value-based approach does not provide public platforms, whilst the means approach countries need to find a balancing act for providing such public platforms for engagement. Chapter 5 presents how UK and Denmark are operating within the value-based and means-based spectrum,

Some comparative studies also argued that lack of evolution in such CT strategies was a problem. For example, a comparative study between America and UK CT strategy argued that American CT policy needs to learn from the UK's approach, as the latter had evolved its strategy through "several publicly debated version into an all-inclusive philosophy that incorporates soft-power resources from the whole of government to augment hard-power practices of counterterrorism" (Stewart 2017, p.68). However, to truly understand the implication of CT strategies better evaluation designs and frameworks are needed, as a comparative study of CT strategies found there to limits to the extent to which evaluation practice has advanced and grown evenly across all areas of CT (Bellasio et al. 2018, p.76). In their study, Bellasio et al (2018, p.76) argue that some of these evaluation, by design, undermine the ability to come to robust conclusions about an initiative's impact.

2.2.5 Implications of The Role of Law in Practice

As noted previously policies can have both implications in practice. There is a wide literature on criticism of such policies and their impact on individuals and institutional behaviours. For example, in the case of the UK's Prevent Duty, it is argued that "the Prevent Duty has both accentuated the limitations of the Prevent strategies, while at the same time also creating new problems" (Barrett 2016, p.1). Such problems include the creation of further alienation of minority groups or being in conflict with other policies. In one case, it is argued that only 8% of pupils leaving school in Tower Hamlet had 5 A-C's at GCSE in 1990 (Barrett 2016, pp.11–12). As a result the Tower Hamlet council took action under the Public Sector Equality Duty (which requires public authorities to eliminate race and religion discrimination and promote equality) to seek to improve this situation by working with children who did not have English as a first language and to work with local mosques due to the area's large Muslim population. In contrast, Prevent requires
authorities to be vigilant and identify risks in order to take appropriate measures for prevention. This can be problematic for public authorities as it leads them having a dual identity. Thus it is argued that improving poor attendance as well as being viewed through the equality lens can now also be viewed by Tower Hamlets’ Council “through a radicalisation lens and see it as evidence of failed integration, alienation, marginalisation and rejection (all signs of radicalisation) and take steps to counter-radicalise” (Barrett 2016, p.12).

Furthermore, the Counter-Terrorism and Security Act 2015 is argued to offer a response to radicalisation and extremism which is lower than that which justifies arrest and prosecution, but simultaneously seeks interventions falling short of deprivation of liberty (Blackbourn & Walker 2016, p.870). For example, it is argued that free speech in higher and further education is on the wane, while the Prevent Duty will increase the tendency toward risk aversion, this is due to the government repeatedly highlighting the fact that 30% of convicted terrorists in the UK had attended universities (Blackbourn & Walker 2016, p.864). Additionally, it is argued that while the seizure of travel documents was introduced to stop individuals from travelling to conflict zones, the Temporary Exclusion Orders were designed to keep foreign terrorist fighters in exile (Blackbourn & Walker 2016, pp.843–856). Such policies are argued to disproportionately affect the Muslim community and limiting the freedom of choice for the individual in question, as well as voluntary return to the country. A contrary viewpoint is that this is not a loss of liberty, and many anguished parents have expressed support for such interventions.

Others have argued that the definition of extremism needs to be carefully drafted, as it can limit the right for activism, which is crucial to liberal democracy as it encourages healthy debate, even though activism may hold radical views in oppose to the mainstream opinions (Lowe 2017). This notion of clarity on definitions is further explored by others who argue that Prevent and Counter Extremism policies suffer from destabilisation in two ways: first, each policy lacks internal stability, which is acquired through solid agenda-setting, policy formulation, and decision making; and second issue arises from the inability of certain concepts like extremism, terrorism and radicalisation to be fully or precisely defined, as such they leave uncertain borders and make the interaction between these two policies instable (Walker 2018). The criticism of such policies and their influence on liberal democratic societies also include the conscription of the public into CT work. It is argued that legal duties introduced through CT policies conscript citizens into CT efforts, these duties appear in domestic legislation, such as financial reporting measures or even wider duties not to withhold information (Walker 2010).
2.3 Discussion

This chapter demonstrated the evolution of CE and CTCE through literature focusing on policing and crime prevention, as well as political science. It argued that although crime prevention is not new, its application has become more targeted and refined over time due to a greater understanding of crime and criminal behaviour. Prevention is now better understood, as it aims to deal with root cause problems that may lead to criminal behaviour. It is about understanding crime more holistically and finding appropriate solutions for its prevention. This change in how crime is viewed led to new insight into what prevention meant and needed to consist of, but also created a softer approach to policing.

Prevention is about disturbing the crime formula (desire, ability, and opportunity). Community-based prevention can assist in addressing the needs of the residents and local issues, which could facilitate infestation of crime but also tackle some of the risk factors that may be local or regional issue. It is as a result of a positive public-police relationship that information-sharing and discussion about residents’ concerns and priorities become easier. Civic engagement is usually used to enhance community safety. Research suggests that overall CE has potential benefits on crime reduction (although this result varies in terms of different crimes) and public cooperation.

Prevention is no longer just the responsibility of the police but various organisations within the community (e.g. schools, health providers, social services, etc.) in addition to the general public. Community is now at the heart of prevention, as it enables using its resources (i.e. residents) to tackle crime collectively and holistically. As such, prevention and its provision are a co-production — “the process through which inputs used to provide a good or service are contributed by individuals who are not ‘in’ the same organisation” (Ostrom 1996, p.1073). In other words, the direct and joint involvement of both private citizens and public agents in the delivery of prevention services is vital (Joshi and Moore, 2004).

Although there are positives to the use of multi-agency partnership in crime prevention, Crawford (1999, p.298) suggests that there are some dangers involved, due to inherent diffusion of responsibility, which is the result of increasingly shifting and blurred boundaries between the state and other intra-organisational networks involved in crime prevention (the public, the private, the voluntary sector). Edwards (2005, p.314) also argues that apportioning accountability in a multi-agency approach can be difficult, because, if a project fails, various arms involved will seek to shift responsibility. Others
suggest that multi-agency partnership in crime prevention implies that crime is a local problem, which is to be managed locally — not necessarily prevented or reduced — for people to feel better and more in control (Hughes et al. 2002, p.71).

This chapter also demonstrated how community-based partnership approaches to prevention are vital for preventing terrorism. More importantly, it presented how policies at European level started to shape the fight against terrorism at the local level. As explained earlier, CE is a localised and targeted approach to a global security risk: terrorism. This stems from one particular concern, which is the risk posed by domestic radicalisation and extremism (Cherney & Hartley 2016). Without active engagement and earned consent, it may be challenging for the police to acquire public cooperation, which in turn may have detrimental consequences for countering terrorism. This way, the police-community relationship extends beyond CT agenda and is community oriented to promote prevention. Community orientated policing addresses the needs and issues of the community to prevent future crimes, including terrorism and extremism, through early and proactive interventions. As such, CE can assist with building a positive relationship between the police and the public, where information is shared, and resources are accessible to empower the community to prevent crime.

Often, CE is dealt with as if it is separate from general CT work (Briggs et al. 2006, p.25). Briggs and colleagues (2006, p.25) argue the CE is somehow perceived to be a job for ‘community and diversity’ staff, while CT remains the ‘real action’ of the covert police and intelligence services. To think that CT and CE should be separate can only hold back countering terrorism. It is valid that the aim and practice of intelligence services differ to those of the police, but it would be foolish to disregard the overlap in their work, and the events of 7/7 in 2005 made that very clear (if one was to disregard the Troubles in the 1970s and 1980s). The idea that security does not involve a community approach due to its covert nature is redundant. This is not to say that the use of CE in CT has not been challenging and problematic. In fact, the use of CE in the context of CT has experienced some controversies, primarily surrounding the notion of a ‘suspect community’; where it is thought that the policing agencies use racial profiling to target specific parts of the community when tackling terrorism (e.g. the ‘Irish’ and the ‘Muslim communities’). Despite the notion of a ‘suspect community’ being a well-worn concept in the literature, this chapter explored areas of concerns and limitations around the concept of the ‘Muslim community’. This will be discussed in detail in the next chapter while exploring the issue of legitimacy as a factor contributing to cooperation. The next chapter will explore
contributing factors that influence public cooperation, and delve into interdisciplinary theories that shape these arguments, with CTCE in mind.
Chapter 3

A Mind in Motion: The Contributors to Citizen Participation and Reporting Behaviour

3.1 Introduction

Thus far, the thesis explored the origins and evolution of CE and CTCE, which highlighted how the change in perception of crime and prevention has led to working with communities. This chapter will focus on the importance of citizen participation and the contributors that shape this behaviour, in particular reporting, to set the foundations for Questions Two to Five (the effect of CTCE on reporting, reasons and barriers for reporting, and lessons to be learnt), primarily Question Four (the relationship between CTCE and reporting). This is because this thesis is using reporting behaviour as a proxy measure, which allows indirect observation between CTCE and prevention, as by sharing intelligence there is a possible intent to stop a situation from escalating. This chapter begins by presenting an understanding of the contributors to citizen participation by exploring criminology literature. Next, the chapter highlights various psychological contributors to citizen participation and reporting behaviour — or more specifically, how behaviour is shaped.

The purpose of exploring public cooperation through these specific bodies of literature is to present how the decision to cooperate is influenced by personal and social factors. This chapter argues that identity sits at the core of these factors, as identity is used as a medium to guide individual behaviour through attitudes, values, respect, relationships, the perceptions of others, and senses of agency and responsibility. As a result, the costs and benefits of reporting are formed through the lens of identity and manipulation of perception. The theories on these principles can assist in addressing the overarching thesis question, as they can explore and identify contributing factors that may impact reporting behaviour, and how CTCE can positively influence these factors.

3.2 Understanding the Contributors to Citizen Participation

It is generally agreed that citizen participation is essential to a healthy democracy (Bullock 2014, p.25). It is argued that participation can develop and sustain democracy, and that participation in associational life creates social capital (Putnam 1995; Putnam 2000),
defined as “features of social organisation such as networks, norms, and social trust that facilitate coordination and cooperation for mutual benefit” (Putnam 1995, p.67). It is believed that disconnection from social capital and associational life can have negative consequences for civic engagement and trust (Putnam 1995, p.77).

Effective policing and crime prevention require public cooperation (see Chapter 2), without it prevention can be challenging. The public can assist the police by being their ‘eyes and ears’, working in partnership, sharing information, and reporting crimes promptly when they occur, as well as representing their community by serving on advisory boards (Skogan 2004). Therefore, ongoing public support and voluntary cooperation are required for successful policing (Murphy et al. 2008, p.136). However, it has been questioned whether civil society is capable of sustaining participation (Blaug & Schwarzmantel 2000), especially concerning crime control (Bullock 2014, p.43).

It is thought that citizens who are concerned about the fear of crime and social disorder in their neighbourhoods, are motivated to protect their neighbourhood from the spiral of deterioration with the support of their local police (Zhao et al. 2002). Therefore, it can be argued that in the context of crime, CE has an advantage: crime is very important to people, and it has a clear impact on the communal quality of life, and as such, people may be more keen on being involved to tackle crime (Duffy et al. 2008). In a review of crime and communities in Britain, it was identified that 36% of the public believe that they and the local community had a responsibility to take action on crime prevention in their communities (Casey 2008, p.72), while only 16% said they could assist in fighting crimes such as anti-social behaviour, Duffy et al. (2008, p.65) also reported that although a large proportion of people are willing to help, they would not get actively involved when it came to it. This suggests that greater emphasis on maintaining a range of levels of engagement is needed to actively involve citizens (Duffy et al. 2008, p.65). To unlock this potential army of volunteers and maintain levels of engagement, a better understanding of the barriers that currently stand in the way of stronger public involvement is needed (Casey 2008, p.75).

### 3.2.1 Awareness

It is believed that sophisticated advertising can increase awareness among citizens and encourage participation. For example, Skogan and Steiner (2004, p.6) found that awareness of participation opportunities had increased among citizens by 80% post campaign. Similarly, another study found increased in awareness, as a result of campaigns — 40% of citizens in the pilot areas reported that they had heard of the public meetings,
in comparison to 22% in control sites (Tuffin et al. 2006, p.73). However, it should be noted that high levels of awareness do not guarantee participation (Bullock 2014, p.112). For example, Tuffin et al. (2006) found large differences between sites, ranging from 12-32% of resident participation in meetings. Similarly, another study discovered that although aggressive campaigning had increased awareness, participation in meetings was around 12-14% (Skogan et al. 2000).

3.2.2 Crime Rate

Research reveals mixed results in terms of drivers of citizen participation in crime prevention. Although some studies show that crime and disorder may motivate citizen participation (Lavrakas & Herz 1982; Skogan 1989; Pattavina et al. 2006), others found the opposite. For example, some studies have found that high crime rates can weaken trust between the residents by creating suspicion, thus hindering a collective response to the implementation of crime prevention interventions (Hourihan 1987; Rosenbaum 1987; Laycock & Tilley 1995). The argument is high crime rates stimulate a collective response to crime prevention (Skogan 1989, p.439). Pattavina et al. (2006, p.228) argue that citizen participation is evident in high-crime areas, and when the residents felt part of the community and believed the police were invested in getting to know residents. In areas with low to moderate crime rates participation was more complex, fuelled by differences based on home ownership and whether they had been victims of crime before.

Moreover, Skogan (1989) outlines that in areas of high and low crime rate, residents may deter from participation, as they might find the intervention inappropriate for the crime, but in areas of average crime rates resident may be more motivated to participate. Hence, there is a ‘curvilinear’ relationship between crime rates and citizen participation in crime prevention. It has also been suggested that the perception of crime problems is of importance and can have a positive impact on citizen participation (Frank et al. 1996). Therefore, concerns about crime give reasons and incentives for participation (Skogan & Steiner 2004, p.ii; Bullock 2014, p.115).

3.2.3 A Question of Social Class and Inequality

There is evidence to suggest that social class and inequality have an impact on citizen participation. Research shows that areas that are characterised by low income, citizens with limited formal education, and where state institutions fail to serve their citizens tend to attain the highest rate of participation (Skogan & Steiner 2004). It is argued this could be linked to the crime rate in the area, as low-crime areas have less incentive to participate in an organised collective response to prevent crime (Skogan 1989). Another
explanation is that middle-class areas may have the resources to protect themselves by investing in private security or resolving problems informally (Bullock 2014). Similar observations revealed that participation in community crime prevention was not prevalent in the wealthiest, low-crime areas (Pattavina et al. 2006). However, research on neighbourhood watches has identified a negative relationship between neighbourhood watch membership and deprived or disadvantaged areas (Yarwood & Edwards 1995; Husain 1988; Hope 1988; Shernock 1986). This indicates that in these disadvantaged areas, there are both reduced opportunities for participation and less intention for residents to be involved when the opportunities are available (Hope 1995). Nevertheless, Skogan (1989) argues that while there may be more opportunities for participation in wealthier neighbourhoods, the effect of disadvantage is diminished because people from wealthier areas have fewer reasons to participate. What needs to be considered here is the resources available to wealthier areas. Having fewer reasons for participation does not indicate that opportunities are limited. In cases where wealthier areas get more financial investment, this has an impact on what is available to the residents, while poorer areas will not get the same level of opportunity — for example, the number of police officers allocated to each area.

On the subject of inequality Skogan (1995) found that engagement in US was more visible in predominantly white areas in comparison to the black or hispanic beats, leading citizens residing in the white areas to be more likely to participate in CP. This was believed to be the result of (a) the white population taking advantage of the resources that programme brought to their community; and (b) the officers having the freedom to invest in populations and areas where they felt efforts were most likely to be welcomed and effective. Other studies found that officers tended to engage with those already known to the police for having an interest in organised collaboration — i.e. the ‘good citizens’ (Parks et al. 1999). Due to these contradictory findings, it is important to consider neighbourhood disadvantage as a contributor in conjunction with citizen participation.

### 3.2.4 Age, Gender, Race, and Education

Individual characteristics are thought to have some influence on citizen participation. For example, age is considered to have positive associations with participation and level of awareness of such community-level activities (e.g. older people are more likely to collaborate) (Skogan & Steiner 2004; Bullock & Sindall 2014). Additionally, gender is also to be a contributing factor to citizen participation. However, the results are mixed. For instance, studies have found that participation of men and women is about equal (Skogan
& Steiner 2004; Kitchen et al. 2006; Pattavina et al. 2006) while others found that men were more likely to participate, even though women are more aware of the activities in their local policing teams (Bullock & Sindall 2014). Studies have found that race is another factor that has an impact on citizen participation. There is evidence to suggest that Black and Minority Ethnic (BAME) communities are more likely to engage and participate in CP in comparison to white citizens (Lavrakas & Herz 1982; Skogan 1989; Frank et al. 1996; Pattavina et al. 2006). However, these results have also been mixed. For example, Skogan and Steiner (2004) illustrated that citizen participation was highest in African-Americans areas, although they did not see the same results in non-English-speaking beats. Similarly, Bullock and Sindall (2014) revealed that white citizens were no more likely to participate than BAME citizens. Finally, the level of education was a facilitator for citizen participation in volunteer activities (Wilson 2000) and civic consultation (Kitchen et al. 2006), those with a college qualification were more likely to be aware of, and participate in, CP (Skogan 1995; Frank et al. 1996; Skogan & Steiner 2004).

3.2.5 Legitimacy: That’s the Sound of da Police!

Central to the discussion of the rationale for citizen participation sits the notion of legitimacy. In Chapter 2, this is presented how application of CTCE and CT strategies has impacted legitimacy. Police legitimacy and lawfulness are paramount to any democratic policing model (Rogers 2016). It is argued that the legitimacy of legal, political, and social structures is important for their long-term survival (Bullock 2014, p.43). Here, legitimacy is defined as those not in power granting the right to hold and be in power to those in a commanding position (Coicaud 2013, p.40), “through which power and obedience are justified, transforming the latter into the consent of the governed” (Coicaud 2013, p.40). It was previously thought that compliance with the law It was previously thought that compliance with the law ‘good citizens’ (Tyler 1990). It has been argued that people grant legitimacy to institutions (like the police) because they represent particular normative and ethical frameworks, rather than cooperating through good behaviour (Beetham 1991). The notion of legitimacy derived from an observation that through authoritative power relations alone, compliance cannot be guaranteed (Weber 1968; Murphy et al. 2008). Legitimacy takes on the notion that “human beings are norm-users, whose interactions with each other depend on mutually recognisable patterns that can be articulated in terms of right versus wrong conduct, or of what one ought to do in a certain setting” (MacCormick 2007, p.20). This is in line with the social psychology of societal norms. Social norms are informal rules within the society that guide behaviour and maintain order, as well as organising groups (Huang & Wu 1994).
It is argued that legitimacy is not simply instrumental; rather, it reflects a social value orientation towards authority and insinuations — a normative, moral, or ethical feeling of responsibility (Sunshine & Tyler 2003, p.514). Durkheim's pioneering work (Durkheim 1961; Durkheim 1984) on social solidarity suggests that the communities evaluate the agents of criminal and penal law (e.g. police) based on whether they and their actions represent the community's moral values. As such, people are happy to belong to and be respected by groups whose authorities follow fair procedures (Sunshine & Tyler 2003). In other words, the practice of authority by these authorities communicates to communities the normative group values. In the literature, legitimacy centres on evaluative assessments of police services. Beetham (1991, 2013) has been significant in driving a contemporary understanding of the application of legitimacy to criminal justice. Beetham argued that in order understand legitimacy; it is vital to study the foundation upon which legitimacy claims are based on and their credibility to relevant actors within a particular social and historical context (Beetham 2013, p.19). In other words, "every application of law or action in the name of the law . . . must stand up to a test of rightness" (Tamanaha 2001, p.241). As such, Beetham notes that power can be considered legitimate as long as it is exercised within the established rules and delivered by those who are accepted as the rightful source of authority. Thus, legitimacy is considered to be a factor that can promote public support and cooperation (Murphy et al. 2008) by providing a moral basis for compliance and/or cooperation. It has been demonstrated that public perception of fairness (especially that of the justice system) shapes police legitimacy and can influence cooperation (Tyler 1990). Tyler's (1990) findings suggest that procedural justice (the idea of fairness and respectful treatment that follows the rules) is very important for public cooperation. It is argued that this sense of moral authority is central, and a necessity for a legitimate authority (Beetham 1991).

Police legitimacy has been described as the right to rule, and the recognition by the ruled of that right — i.e. the state gives the police the right to rule, but the public also needs to recognise this right for legitimacy to exist (Rogers 2016). Studies have demonstrated that legitimacy changes the basis on which people decide to consent and cooperate with legal authorities (Tyler & Huo 2002; Tyler 2001). For example, Tyler (1990) found a significant relationship between compliance with the law, and attitudes and behaviours towards these agencies (legitimacy). This study was replicated in another city, and similarly it was found that legitimacy had a strong impact on citizen's reaction to the police, with the perception of fairness being the precursor of legitimacy (Sunshine & Tyler 2003). More importantly, cooperation with the police was more likely when police were viewed as
legitimate (Sunshine & Tyler 2003; Hough et al. 2010). It is evident that people are less inclined to cooperate when they have had experiences of disrespectful behaviour from the police (Paternoster et al. 1997; Tyler & Smith 1998; Tyler 1997; Tyler 1990). As such, it is argued that disrespect may also result in resistance, therefore making it more challenging for authorities to fulfil their responsibilities (White et al. 1994).

Hough et al. (2010) reported that the experience of procedural fairness induced feeling of trust, which resulted in perceived legitimacy. This is because treatment of citizens communicates information about their status, and so when the police treat the citizens with fairness there is a statement of power and equality, which is used by citizens to align themselves with the police and perceive them as legitimate (Hough et al. 2010, p.206). In contrast, if the treatment of the police is deemed unfair, both legitimacy and compliance are influenced negatively, resulting in citizens becoming cynical about the justice system, which in turn may lead them to believe certain norms are not personally binding (Hough et al. 2010, p.207). This concept, which underlines relationships, is vital for procedural justice (Lind & Tyler 1988). People care about how they are treated by police agencies and other authorities (procedural justice) because those experiences affirm whether they are valued or not. Cooperative behaviour may be influenced by how the police and procedural justice are perceived (Bradford 2014). It is argued that confidence and legitimacy encourage people to cooperate with the criminal justice system, which can enable the more effective functioning of criminal justice (Jackson et al. 2009).

It is thought that particular sections of the population have significantly lower levels of confidence in the police (Allen et al. 2006). In a British Crime Survey, it was identified that British Pakistanis and Bangladeshis, in comparison to all other ethnic groups, had lower levels of confidence in the police and were more likely to perceive themselves as a victim of a racially-motivated crime (Clancy et al. 2001). The Independent Police Complaints Commission (IPCC) reported that a section of society that were ‘highly disengaged’ from the police, majority consisting of young males from ethnic minority and less affluent backgrounds, perceived all police officers with great suspicion and distrust (Inglis & Shepherd 2007, p.12). A more recent report showed that although the confidence of the BAME groups had risen in many areas, they remained lower in confidence than the general public across a range of issues: making complaints, trust in fairness, fear of negative consequences of complaining, and so on (Ipsos Mori 2016). The 2007 report identified that since 7/7 and 9/11, ‘Asian’ and Muslim participants felt increasingly targeted by the police (Inglis & Shepherd 2007). Young Muslims (16-24-year-olds) are reluctant to report terrorist-related issues to the police due to distrust and fear of
Research has shown that a sense of identification with the state or social group has a bearing on how effective procedural can be. It is less effective in cases where people identify less strongly with the dominant groups/authorities representing them (Huo 2003). Central to this argument is the notion that the more the individual identifies with their sub-group and its culture, customs, and values, the less likely they are to identify with key social institutions in mainstream society or regard their operations as being in their own interest (Lind & Tyler 1988). For example, one study found that cooperation in CT was more likely when Muslims who identified more with British society viewed the police as legitimate (Huq et al. 2011). Similar results were found in a study exploring the relationship between willingness to cooperate in CT and self-identification with Australia in Arab-speaking citizens (Cherney & Murphy 2013). Therefore, the police can be used as a vehicle for individuals to understand their past and their future, as well as expressed collective identities (Loader & Mulcahy 2003; Bradford 2014) — in Chapter 7 some examples are presented in relation to CTCE. Conclusively, perception plays a key role in shaping legitimacy and cooperative behaviour (see Section 3.3.1). When the police are viewed as dangerous, the citizens are reluctant to take the personal risks involved in safeguarding the social order of the community (Silver & Miller 2004). It is suggested that police illegitimacy and untrustworthiness makes the community more likely to “view their neighbourhood as collectively efficacious” (Sargeant 2015, p.3). This is in line with the study presented by Bottoms (2006), who demonstrated that police illegitimacy and ineffectiveness leads to negative control signals, which leads to community withdrawal.

Whereas citizens’ willingness to engage and intervene is encouraged by positive control signals (Bottoms 2006). Without cooperation, there is no public intelligence. It is this lack of voluntary intelligence that has been argued to further prompt the emphasis on overt ‘low’ CP in an attempt to miraculously solve the issue of police legitimacy and community relations (Thiel 2009, p.38; Innes 2006). It is thought that people are more satisfied with procedures when their participation is valued, and their views are recognised by the

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2 Fear of reprisals from terrorist, too, hindered the young Muslims from approaching the police.

However, they did say that the activity would be reported to a trusted Imam.

3 A ‘control signal’ is defined as ‘an act of social control that communicates an attempt to regulate disorderly and deviant behaviour’ (Innes 2004, p. 556; Sargeant, 2015). Therefore, negative control signal indicates lack of control and positive signal indicates control (Sargeant, 2015).
authorities (Skogan & Frydl 2004) (Chapters 5-7 provide examples of this in CTCE). It is this level of consideration by decision-makers (i.e. the public) that induces comfort for participants. This in turn suggests that there is neutrality, as objective indicators are used for decision-making rather than personal views, which enhances the perceived fairness (Skogan & Frydl 2004). Additionally, being treated with respect and dignity suggests to the people that their rights are acknowledged. Therefore, if people feel that the authorities care about their rights, they will view the procedure as fair and trustworthy. Research suggests that individual encounters with police officers can enhance and/or damage police legitimacy (Skogan & Frydl 2004; Murphy et al. 2008). It has been found that police officers' actions and behaviours, rather than the general legitimacy of the policing institution, influence people's views and attitudes towards police legitimacy (Tyler & Darley 2000). Also, whether encounters are initiated by the police or the public, show mixed results in terms of police legitimacy (Mccluskey 2003; Tyler 1990).

Other research found that individuals who had no contact with the police rated them on average more highly than those who did have such contact (FitzGerald et al. 2002; Allen et al. 2006; Skogan 2006a). As such, personal experience seems to reduce an individual's confidence in the police and although several studies have suggested that the police can do little to enhance public confidence, it is during these personal contacts with citizens that damage can be done if not careful (Skogan 2006a). In contrast, numerous studies argue that confidence in the police can be improved through outweighing negative experiences with positive ones (Bradford et al. 2009; Myhill & Bradford 2012). Although it is vital to ensure the service provided meets the needs of the public, using public confidence as a performance indicator can be problematic, as it may not be a true reflection of actual performance. However, it is suggested that negative encounters with the police have a greater impact on levels of satisfaction than positive ones (Lloyd & Foster 2009). This is because negative encounters weigh more than the positive experience (Skogan 2005). People's view of their experiences is emotionally driven, and therefore may lack objectivity. This is in line with psychological findings that remembered experiences dominates actual moment-based experience i.e. evaluation of the total experience of an episode can be dominated by the recollection of a specific part of the experience, regardless of the full experience (Kahneman 2000). For example, one might enjoy dining in a specific restaurant, but upon recalling that they waited an hour for a table, which was unpleasant, that recollection may override any pleasant experiences.

Another psychological theory that explains such subjectivity is the affected heuristic, which uses emotions (sadness, fear, pleasure, etc.) to influence decision-making (Finucane
et al. 2000; Zajonc 1980). It is a decision-making shortcut, which associates positive or negative feelings to risks linked a stimulus (e.g. the police) — as such risks and benefits are placed on a sensory thread and judgements are altered (Finucane et al. 2000; Zajonc 1980). Therefore, public confidence and public perception of police legitimacy is not a solid indicator of performance; however, the literature does suggest that these perceptions can influence citizen participation and cooperation. Participation is vital, as it enables citizens to share and communicate their views with authorities, which can influence the process of decision-making (Tyler 2004). As such, policing by consent may encourage public cooperation.

3.2.6 Snitches Get Stitches

Other literature that circles around the notion of public-police cooperation has highlighted that the culture of ‘snitching’ (telling on someone's criminal activity and cooperating with the police) has implications for community-based crime prevention (Clampet-Lundquist et al. 2015, p.265). This is because ‘stop snitching’ encourages or pressures the whole community to keep quiet, not to trust law enforcements or engage and cooperate with them. Although snitching was already viewed negatively within some communities and cultures, Clampet-Lundquist et al (2015, p.265-266) argue that the War on Drugs in America may have influenced the push for people to ‘stop snitching’. Some scholars argue that the ‘stop snitching’ movement is rooted in the “the manifestation of distrust created by continual use of police deception during search and seizure encounters” (Masten 2009, p.704). Moreover, it is argued that practices like ‘stop and search has created an environment for distrust in some neighbourhoods (Clampet-Lundquist et al. 2015, p.267).

As a result of War on Drugs, the American prisons witnessed an increase of 546% in drug offences between 1985 and 2000 (Mauer 2006), and by 2011 nearly half of the incarcerations were on drug charges (Carson & Sabol 2013). Consequent changes in the criminal justice system that created a leniency in prosecution of such crimes if defendants were of ‘substantial assistance’ (Brown 2007), which led the increased use of informants in criminal cases and subsequently saw a host of other negative outcomes at community level (Natapoff 2004; Clampet-Lundquist et al. 2015, p.267). In consequence, cooperation with authorities was deemed acceptable if the accused could receive less severe punishment. It is argued that the use of informants has resulted in criminal justice system being viewed as unfair and distrusting (Natapoff 2009, p.136). Moreover, it is argued that the disproportionate impact of War on Drugs policies on low-income, high-crime disadvantaged neighbourhood is not felt equally by other places in America (Petteruti &
Walsh 2008; Goffman 2009), resulting in shaping everyday routines of the affected communities through the sense of being wanted and under surveillance (Goffman 2014).

Others have argued that in socially isolated communities there is a ‘code of the street’ that discourages the use of law and authorities in favour of a more immediate and localised dispute, as such settling matters in a way (including violence) that exerts informal control, garners respect, and maintains reputations (Hannerz 1969). The ‘stop snitching’ phenomenon, other than being seen as cultural norm (Cohen 1997), is also thought to be a “collective attempt to resist the overpolicing–underpolicing paradox and mass incarceration” (Rios 2011, p.60). This distrust in formal authorities to resolve conflict was also seen in teens. This erosion of trust, as presented in this Chapter, is a theme that impacts procedural justice. Clampet-Lundquist et al. (2015, p. 281-283) argues that contrary to popular belief, cooperation with the authorities is not always prohibited in high-crime neighbourhood; instead individuals use variety of personal rules to assess when to cooperate. With exception of talking about drugs to the police (as this was seen as a means to earn income), the respondents reported that they were able to call the police for rape, domestic violence, gun violence, or harm to young children (Clampet-Lundquist et al. 2015, p.279). The study also found that experience of police within these disadvantaged communities shapes their legal cynicism, which influence the decision not to cooperate.

3.3 Considering the Psychology of Reporting Behaviour

3.3.1 Why do Beliefs, Attitudes, and Values Matter?

When considering reporting behaviour, perceptions of the police and others are factors in reporting decision-making (this is further illustrated in Chapters 6 and 7). People’s internal attitudes and values are, too, motivational influencers of behaviour (Tyler & Blader 2000, p.51). It is thought that attitudes may be useful in predicting people’s behaviours. Therefore, there is the assumption that if attitudes are altered, this enables altering behaviour. Internal attitudes and values are argued to be important elements in voluntary cooperation through discretionary behaviour (Tyler & Blader 2000, p.53). Attitudes are an evaluative judgement of a given entity, defined as “a psychological tendency that is expressed by evaluating a particular entity with some degree of favour or disfavour” (Eagly & Chaiken 1993, p.1). Simply, reporting of an attitude involves deciding on liking or disliking a particular entity, be it an issue, person, or an object (Maio & Haddock 2014, p.4). As a result of this perspective, conceptual models of the attitude were generated; one of the most influential models has been the multi-component model
(Rosenberg & Hovland 1960). According to this perspective, attitudes are a three-component evaluation of an entity: cognitive (the person's knowledge or belief about the entity), affective (person's feelings about the entity), and behavioural (action taken based on other two components). For example, "the police are racist" (cognitive); "I am scared of the police" (effective); therefore, "I will stay away from the police" (behaviour). As a result of their synergetic relation, when an individual holds positive beliefs about an entity (e.g. the police), they will typically have positive affective and behavioural associations with that entity (Maio & Haddock 2014, p.38). However, the degrees to which people's attitudes are based on effective or cognitive components differ, suggesting there is an element of individuality to consider. In one set of studies on attitude and behaviours, it was discovered that some people based their attitudes on the favourability of their beliefs (thinkers) rather than of their feelings (feelers), while other feelers had their attitudes heavily driven by their feelings rather than their beliefs (Huskinson & Haddock 2004).

Attitudes serve a function, one that parallels the utility of stereotypes (Smith et al. 1956). They are a frame of reference that helps in organising and structuring of one's environment (Katz 1960). According to Smith et al. (1956), attitudes server three primary functions: object-appraisal, social-adjustment, and externalisation. The first refers to the ability to collate and summarise all the negative and positive attributions associated with an entity in our social world. These attitudes can help people decide to approach things that are beneficial for them and to avoid harm (Maio et al. 2004). This is very relevant to the cost-benefit analysis of reporting concerns. Social-adjustment, on the other hand, can assist with identifying with people whom one associates with and like while avoiding people whom one dislikes and disassociates with. Both social identity and categorisation theory can be linked to social-adjustment (see Section 3.3.3). Through association with groups and self-categorisation, inter and intragroup relationships are formed (Kelman 1961; Kelman 1958). For instance, one's relationship with others may be mediated by one's attitude toward the death penalty because the issue symbolises what that attitude is perceived to express about the self (Tyler & Weber 1982).

Another function is externalisation, which serves as a self-defence mechanism against internal conflicts. This means that attitudes can assist in distancing the self from threatening entities by projecting one's unacceptable impulses onto them (Shavitt & Nelson 2002). This can generate prejudices (Katz et al. 1956). Consequently, it is through these attitudes that the individual may express their self-concept and central values, as such attitudes serve as a value-expressive function entity (Maio & Haddock 2014, p.44). Values are people's general ideas, which are used as guiding principles for appropriate
behaviour in addition to being overarching goals that people strive to obtain (Maio & Olson 1998). Obedience and cooperation are motivated by personal values (Skogan & Frydl 2004). Should these values agree with the law, participation and cooperation will be voluntarily extended regardless of legitimacy. Conversely, compliance can be undermined by contrary values (Murphy et al. 2008, p.137; Tyler & Darley 2000). However, some studies have found that attitudes do not always guide behaviour. For example, a review of forty studies examining the relationship between attitudes and behaviour found that attitudes were relatively poor predictors of behaviour (Wicker 1969). This lead to psychologists asking when does attitude predict behaviour, which resulted in the more optimistic conclusion that attitudes do predict behaviour, but in some conditions more than others (Maio & Haddock 2014, p.68).

The Stereotype Content Model (SCM), a social psychology theory, can provide a reasoning foundation as to how legitimacy can influence cooperation. The SCM model argues that judgements are made based on two dimensions: warmth (perceived competition) and competence (perceived status) (Cuddy et al. 2008). Therefore, a combination of characteristics that fall on these two dimensions can have emotional and behavioural consequences that can influence decision-making. The theory posits that the stereotypes held about other social groups (e.g. the police) elicit specifically-associated emotions, which predict distinct behaviours: active, passive, facilitate, and harmful. The Behaviours from Intergroup Affect and Stereotypes (BIAS) map (Figure 3) demonstrates how the warmth dimension can predict active behaviour, and the competence dimension can result in passive behaviours (Cuddy et al. 2008). For instance, when discussing police legitimacy, it is possible that in an event where the police lack legitimacy, they are rated low on warmth and high in competence, this may elicit negative emotions and uncooperative behaviour (Cuddy et al. 2007).
It is argued that on the dimensions of warmth-by-competence, the stigmatised group will be negatively stereotyped in the majority of cultures (Fiske 1998). Furthermore, various social groups tend to be associated with different threats and emotions (Cottrell & Neuberg 2005). Studies using warmth-competency have identified that in Western societies Muslims are stereotyped as cold and incompetent (Asbrock 2010). Others have illustrated how both Muslims and Muslim-Americans are perceived as violent and untrustworthy. Given that a Muslim person might see how they are perceived, they are less likely to cooperate with the group (e.g. the police) that they feel is targeting them, whether this targeting is imagined or real. It is argued that if there is a belief that the police offer such groups little in the way of protection, this in turn influences cooperative behaviour from that group in addition to them being reluctant to approach the police for support (Thiel 2009, p.38).

Based on the literature presented here, it is fair to say that personal attitudes and values shape and predict behaviour. It is suggested that if there is a requirement and need for discretionary cooperative behaviour, CTCE must be concerned with developing and sustaining a climate that promotes favourable attitudes and strong values (Tyler & Blader 2000, p.65). Tyler and Blader (2000, p.66) found that people engage in extra-role or prosocial behaviours when they hold positive attitudes about a group. For example, in a study of crime reporting behaviour, it was found that a positive attitude towards the police predicted the victims’ decision to report sexual assault and robbery (Boateng 2016). Other studies have, too, found that individuals who have favourable attitudes of the police will
be more likely to report a crime to the police in comparison to those that hold less favourable attitudes (Rosenbaum 2005; Anderson 2000; Watkins 2005).

### 3.3.2 Investment: What's In It for Me?

The decision to cooperate and report involves a cost-benefit analysis. In exploring various factors that may influence cooperative behaviour, scholars have identified that people make choices based on risk and benefit (Tyler & Fagan 2009). This perspective is underpinned by notions of deterrence sanctions (e.g. fines or custodial sentences) or social control (Murphy et al. 2008, p.137; Nagin 1998), although the effectiveness of deterrent strategies is argued to be an insufficient basis for an effective system of social regulation due to deterrent effects being modest and the certainty of punishment being low (Skogan & Frydl 2004, p.296). It is suggested that cooperative behaviour can be divided into two forms: discretionary and mandatory (Tyler & Blader 2000). Engaging in a behaviour that is dictated or required by rules or norms is recognised as mandated cooperation. In contrast, when the behaviour is not directly required by rules or norms, this is considered to be a discretionary behaviour. Although the mandated behaviour is required, it is nevertheless a cooperative behaviour, as there is an element of freedom that the individual possesses in deciding how to behave.

Efforts have been made to attempt to understand why some individuals choose to report a crime while others do not. It is suggested that victims’ decision to report crime is dependent upon their assessment of the cost and benefit associated with reporting (Bowles et al. 2009). This assumption stems from rational choice theory, suggesting that the decision to report criminal incidents is a complex process of evaluating the likely cost and benefit of the action (Kaukinen 2002; Felson et al. 2002). The theory stipulates that crime is reported by the victim if they find the benefit of reporting greater than the associated costs (Tarling & Morris 2010). Conversely, if the cost of reporting is deemed high, then the victim will be discouraged from taking such action (Kaukinen 2002). In an effort to explain the reasoning behind an individual’s choice to report a crime, a two-dimensional theoretical framework was presented. First, it distinguishes ‘situational’ from ‘contextual’ determinants that influence reporting decision; second, it differentiates ‘rational’ reporting decisions from those that are ‘normative’(Goudriaan et al. 2006; Schnebly 2008, p.225). Situational or micro-level factors “refer to the immediate crime scene or the face to face interaction between the victim and the offender”, which may influence reporting to the police (Goudriaan 2006, p.147). These may include injuries to
the victim, the physical location of the incident and the state of the offender, e.g. armed (Schnebly 2008, p.225).

While contextual elements are largely geographically defined and include any social aspects of the location in which a crime occurs outside the immediate face-to-face situation (Goudriaan 2006, p.147), these often represents community-level characteristics. These may include the community’s relationship with the police, levels of collective efficacy and social cohesion, or residents’ willingness to assist each other in maintaining order (Schnebly 2008, p.225). The collective efficacy theory explains that social control is only achieved when residents trust one another and are willing to intervene and cooperate together (Sampson 2012). Collective efficacy constitutes of informal social control and social cohesion (Armstrong et al. 2015). Informal social control operates in two ways: willingness to intervene as a form of prevention and the ability to extract resources and respond to cuts in public spending (Armstrong et al. 2015; Sampson et al. 1997). Informal control is very much dependent on social cohesion — in communities where there is mutual trust and respect, residents are more likely to exercise social control (Armstrong et al. 2015). Fear created in the minds of residents will consequently result in individuals withdrawing from the community, weakening social control; this subsequently has a cyclical effect on disorder and crime: disorder causes crime, which produces more fear and disorder (Kelling & Wilson 1982). This approach, too, aims to form a psychological connection between the residents and the police. This may be in the shape of the legitimacy of the police or empowerment of the residents. This theory is in line with the Systemic Model of Community Attachment, a social psychological model. According to this model, societal ties have determinates (e.g. social participation, community sentiment, kinship, friendship, and associational ties) (Kasarda & Janowitz 1974). These societal ties enable the community to put into practice social control (Sampson et al. 1997; Sampson & Groves 1989; Sherman et al. 1994).

According to Goudriaan et al. (2006), the rational model of reporting behaviour is a cost-benefit calculation. It is argued that the victim is more likely to report a crime if the benefits of reporting outweigh the costs; therefore, it is a transactional behaviour. For example, an injured victim reasons that by reporting the crime to the police, the chance of future/additional injury by the offender is reduced (Singer 1988). In contrast, normative responses represent the norms that coexist in the social context — the societal and/or cultural standards that guide an individual’s decision of reporting a crime. For example, “Crimes should be reported to the police,” “this is not a case for the police,” or “I should deal with this myself” (Goudriaan 2006, p.148). These cost-benefit calculations and
normative responses may differ with the situation (e.g., the seriousness of the crime) and also with the context (e.g., the country) (Greenberg & Ruback 1992; Ruback et al. 1999; Goudriaan et al. 2006). Therefore, Goudriaan and colleagues (2006) conclude that the decision to report to the police is influenced by the rational and normative considerations, which vary in any given situation or context. These arguments are similar to the theories of reasoned action and planned behaviour (Figure 4).

The theory of reasoned action (Fishbein & Ajzen 1975) argues that behaviour is the result of intention, which is a function of an attitudinal component a normative component. An attitudinal component refers to how favourable an outcome is perceived to be by the individual; while normative suggest what others think the behaviour should be. Many previous studies focusing on the relationship between attitude and behaviour were concerned with the attitude towards the object. However, what Fishbein and Ajzen (1975) did was to distinguish between the attitude toward the object (e.g. police or cancer) and the attitude toward the behaviour (e.g. reporting or getting a mammogram). It was
concluded that the attitude towards behaviour was a better predictor of behaviour. They have illustrated the importance of a degree of “correspondence between measures of attitude, norm, perceived control, intention, and behaviour in terms of action (for example, go get), target (for example, a mammogram), context (for example, at the breast screening centre), and time (for example, in the next twelve months)” (Montano & Kasprzyk 2015, p.69). Thus, a change in any one factor may result in different behaviour. The theory of planned behaviour is an integration of the theory of reasoned action and is one of the most frequently applied and tested theories in behavioural research. The theory suggests that there are three types of beliefs concerning the outcome of the behaviour, which influence the intentions to perform a particular behaviour: “beliefs about the probable positive or negative consequences of performing the behaviour (attitudes), beliefs about the expectations of others with regards to performing the behaviour (subjective norms), and beliefs about the ease of accomplishing the behaviour (perceived behavioural control)” (Viki et al. 2006, p.288).

The theory of reasoned action and planned behaviour suggest that every action has a reaction, and there is a value attached to it. Based on these values and consequences, the behaviour is planned and reasoned. Behaviour is argued to be skewed when negative emotional beliefs have a stronger impact on intentions than positive non-emotional beliefs (Maio & Haddock 2014, p.93). Therefore, when these beliefs are collectively assessed or considered, it is argued that the behavioural beliefs elicit attitudes towards the behaviour, while normative beliefs produce subjective norms concerning the behaviour and control beliefs result in perceived behavioural control (Bamberg et al. 2003). As such, the person’s intention to perform a particular behaviour is influenced by attitude, subjective norms and perceived behavioural control (Ajzen & Fishbein 2005). Hence, holding positive beliefs on all of the three factors can increase the likelihood to intend to perform the behaviour in question (Viki et al. 2006). As a result, behaviour can be argued to be the outcome of the evaluation of ‘likelihoods’ and what one associates those likelihoods with, therefore creating an avenue to guide decisions in situations of uncertainty (Passer & Smith 2007). Through integration, the theory of planned behaviour distinguishes “between personal and social antecedents of intention in the attitude and subjective norm constructs and elements from social cognitive theory with perceived behavioural control closely aligned with self-efficacy” (Hagger & Chatzisarantis 2014, p.63). However, the theory of planned behaviour lacks insight into the belief-based antecedent of intention. Consequently, recent reach has adopted self-determination theory (SDT) to provide a foundation for source of belief in the theory of planned behaviour, as the motivational
orientation in SDT leads the individuals to form beliefs based on the planned behaviour theory’s components — attitudes, subjective norms, and perceived behavioural control (Hagger & Chatzisarantis 2009). The SDT is a need-based organismic motivation theory that distinguishes between autonomous motivation and controlled motivation. Instead of viewing motivation as a unitary concept that can be increased and decreased, SDT explores different types of motivation (Deci & Ryan 1985). Autonomous motivation is guided by interest, enjoyment, and value; therefore, there is a sense of personal choice and autonomy. Autonomously motivated behaviour does not depend on external reinforcement and is more likely to persist on own merit.

In contrast, controlled motivated behaviour is guided by external pressure, obligation, and demand. The behaviour that is guided by control motivation can only last as long as the controlled contingencies are presented; once the incentive is removed, the behaviour will cease. Research has found that motivation is greater when the individual is autonomously motivated in comparison to controlled motivation. From a prevention perspective, autonomous motivation may be vital in promoting concern reporting and cooperative behaviour that aim to prevent radicalisation and extremism. The second distinction is the argument that all humans have a set of basic psychological needs. The SDT argues that these basic needs are: competence (feeling confident and effective in relation to the task/behaviour), relatedness (feel cared for by others, able to care for others, and feeling a sense of belonging, especially in/with groups that are important to one), and autonomy (a desire to be the causal agent in one’s choices). Autonomy has already been discussed, but now it is recognised as a need, which must be satisfied for optimal performance. If this need is not satisfied, then there are negative psychological consequences.
There are two types of autonomous motivation: intrinsic and extrinsic. Intrinsic motivation is self-desire, an internal cause that is self-determined and perceived to increase competence (Ryan & Deci 2000a). Extrinsic motivation comes from external influencers; it leads to a separable consequence (Ryan & Deci 2000b). It is usually the extrinsic motivation that is used to encourage outcomes that a person would not get from an intrinsic motivation — common extrinsic motivations are rewards or punishments. However, it is found that extrinsic motivations can also be intrinsic when the individual identifies and values the external influencer. Consequently, when the external influencer is integrated so that it is viewed as part of oneself, the outcome will be very positive (Ryan & Deci 2000a, p.62). The premise of SDT is important for this thesis as it argues that the decision-maker needs to feel as if they are the maker of their own behaviour, and they
actively seek to satisfy this need for autonomy (Deci & Ryan 2000). Additionally, the IBM (Figure 5) combines the theory of reasoned action and planned behaviour to provide a theoretical framework with which to understand behaviour and identify specific beliefs to target. At the heart of the model is the intention; however, it is argued that four other components affect behaviour.

The first is knowledge, as the individual needs knowledge and skill to carry out the required behaviour. Second are the environmental constraints, which make the behavioural performance difficult or impossible (Triandis 1980). Third, behaviour ought to be salient to the person (Becker 1974). Finally, it is argued that intention is less important if the behaviour is habitual (Triandis 1980). According to the model, behavioural intention is guided by three components: attitude toward the behaviour; perceived norm; and personal agency (Montano & Kasprzyk 2015, p.79). Personal agency in the model consists of self-efficacy and perceived control. Perceived control is considered as the amount of control or agency one has over behaviour, determined by one's perception of how various elements make the behaviour easy or difficult to perform. In contrast, self-efficacy is “one's degree of confidence in the ability to perform the behaviour in the face of various obstacles or challenges” (Montano & Kasprzyk 2015, p.79). While the model does not specify, these factors are linked to SDT’s intrinsic motivation and autonomy, as well as competency.

### 3.3.3 The Role of Identity

Identity defines people and their relationships with others. There is a need to explore how the concept of identity can influence cooperation. Recognising how people define, resist or adapt their identities is important in understanding how they engage with their fellow citizens, and with the government (Gilchrist et al. 2010). Identities are fluid, complex and multiple, evolved and expressed in response to shifting needs at an individual level or group level (Rangel & Keller 2011). This, in turn, can create a sense of belonging. Both identity and the associated relationships may reflect, at any particular moment, a sense of family, community, loyalty, historical division or wider structural

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4 The IBM argues, that it is important when applying the model to conduct interviews with the population that is “being studied to elicit information about the behavioural, normative, efficacy, and control beliefs for that behaviour and population” (Montano & Kasprzyk 2015, p.81). Once such information is obtained, IBM can be designed for that particular behaviour. Although theories of reasoned action and planned behaviour, as well as IBM, are sometimes criticised as ‘Western’ and inapplicable to other cultures (Airhihenbuwa & Obregon 2000), the elicitation process enables the model to be applicable to all cultures (Montano & Kasprzyk 2015, p.81). The model suggests other communication and behaviour change theories to guide strategies to change those target beliefs and behaviour.
inequalities (Gilchrist et al. 2010). This is vital for community engagement, especially in the context of CT, as it needs to address the complexities involved in policing such multifaceted phenomena.

Two key psychological theories focused on identity are the SIT and Self-categorisation Theory (SCT). Recently, the notion of social identity is being rediscovered in criminology and how it can influence the issue of legitimacy. Bradford (2014) suggests that Social Identity may explain the causal link in the processes of perception, legitimacy, trust, cooperation and compliance with the law agencies. These theories argue that individuals can develop two principal identities: personal identity (self-defined in idiosyncratic personal relationships and traits) and social identity (self-definition based on group membership) (Tajfel & Turner 1979). As such, the concept of self is related to the normative beliefs, attitudes, and behaviours associated with social group membership (Billig & Tajfel 1973; Hogg et al. 1995). These prototypes, married with membership values, are referred to as ‘social identities’ (Tajfel 1978). Thus, social identity is simultaneously individual and social. SIT explains that social identity is shaped by group membership and intergroup relations, which are dependent on three components: a) self-categorisation, b) social comparison and c) self-definition in terms of in-group defining properties (e.g. prototypes associated with being a woman) (Hogg 2006; Turner 2010; Tajfel & Turner 1979). SCT builds upon SIT through the expansion of the first component: self-categorisation. It explains that the process of self-categorisation shapes social identity and group and intergroup behaviours. These intersect between identities, which leads to flexibility and collection in our identities (e.g. being John equates to being male, a dad, a sports fan etc.), which combine and modify each other in the process (Gilchrist et al., 2010). Depending on the situation and the individual, certain identities are less negotiable. This in turn affects how that person, and those around them, act and react to challenges (Gilchrist et al. 2010). To promote positive self-distinctiveness, these social identities are used for comparison between groups (Abrams & Hogg 1990). As a result, stereotyping and stigmatisation are inevitable for such categorisations to occur (Lapinski & Mastro 2000). Stigmatisation is used to maintain, and justify the hierarchical social system through the use of values in a given culture to discriminate against others (Kramer & Jost 2002; Jost & Banaji 2004; Hinshaw 2009). Therefore, it rationalises the existence of social order (Kunda & Oleson 1995; Hoffman & Hurst 1990). As such, stigma is behaviour that aims to discredit and exclude an individual or group (Major & Eccleston 2004; Major & O’Brien 2005; Goffman 1963). Groups and/or individuals are more likely to be stigmatised when certain characteristics or attributions are devalued in the societal context (Crocker et al. 1998).
This in turn influences positive collective behaviours such as integration, cooperation, and cohesion.

Both social identity and SCT are important functions that shape the portion of our identity, which projects an image that develops out of the groups one belongs to. Therefore, it is argued that one’s self-evaluation is linked to how the status of the group one associate with is perceived. Identity theory also provides the basis for a link between the self-identity and intended behaviour. The theory suggests that the self is not a distinct psychological entity, but a social construct (Terry et al. 1993). As such, each social role that is adopted brings with it distinct components of self (Stryker 1987; Stryker 1968). Therefore, the self becomes a collection of identities that reflect the roles a person occupies in the social structure (Terry et al. 1999). Subsequently, these role identities imply action (Callero 1985). Thus, the behaviour is an indicator of a person’s role as a member (Terry et al. 1999; Callero 1985).

These theories (identity theory, planned behaviour, and reasoned action) have many similarities to SIT and its extension to self-categorisation (Tajfel & Turner 1986; Terry et al. 1999; Turner 2010). Like identity theory, SIT recognises that the self is socially defined, which mediates the relationship between self and the wider social groups. However, they do differ: identity theory is focused on role identities (identities which may be to some extent universal, such as motherhood), while social identity is concerned with identities that emanate from group memberships (identities inclusive to a specific group, such as British nationality). Moreover, social identity focuses on intergroup perceptions and behaviours and intragroup influence, which can impact the intent of membership (Terry et al. 1999). Nonetheless, they both construct a ‘definition’ for who the self is. Terry et al. (1999) argue that identity theory provides a clear justification that self-identity is a predictor of intention, given that intention is a key predictor in both theories of reasoned action and planned behaviour. This notion is supported by studies that explored the relationship between intent, identity, and particular behaviours e.g. voting (Granberg & Holmberg 1990), staying in school (Biddle et al. 1987), donating blood (Charng et al. 1988) and consuming of organic food (Sparks & Shepherd 1992).

As illustrated, identity can influence social ties based on categorisation and stigmatisation. In a study exploring social cohesion implications in relation to the discourse of suspect community on the everyday lives of the Irish and Muslim communities evidence suggested that it was enough to be identified as or assumed to be, Irish or Muslim in order to be

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5 Role here refers to a set of expectations as to what is deemed appropriate.
treated as ‘suspect’ (Hickman et al. 2011). Therefore, this stigma results in communities feeling that they are ‘othered’, which can result in reactive behaviours and attitudes that impact the individual’s social identity (Esses et al. 2001; Cottrell & Neuberg 2005; Aviram & Rosenfeld 2002). This suggests that there is a possibility for the development and implementation of community-focused approaches to be problematic if not delivered effectively, as trust in the police and the community can be shaken (Spalek 2012). Without trust community intelligence-gathering would be very difficult. Some scholars (Innes et al. 2007) have discussed how low trust in the police can result in a lack of willingness from the public in passing community intelligence to the police for effective national security (Demos 2007). Thus, the breakdown of this vital relationship can have serious consequences for the information flow that may enable CT (Hillyard 2004; Hillyard 1993).

Another element that identity induces is sense of respect. Respect is described as “a basic form of social evaluation that emerges in group interactions and that it plays an important role in shaping not only social engagement in group life but also the self-esteem and physical well-being of the individual” (Huo & Binning 2008, p.1582). A lay person perceives respect as a variety of attitudes ranging from deference to social rules to the distribution of power in groups and concern for others (Langdon 2007, p.469). Like many psychological phenomena, respect is hard to define with distinct criteria, as it is unclear if respect should be regarded as an emotion, attitude, or behaviour (Hedinger 2000). Furthermore, when comparing people of different nationalities, there are broad differences in what is considered respectful behaviour (Sung 2004). Langdon (2007, p.470) identified four recurring themes across the psychological literature of respect: (a) social power, (b) social rules, (c) caring, and (d) equality and accepting differences.

There is an argument that respects represents power and status. Therefore there is an element of obedience to authority (Ingersoll-Dayton & Saengtienchai 1999; Piaget 1932). Furthermore, social norms, as explained previously, set out rules that indicate appropriate behaviour required of an individual in a social context. As such, normative social rules are used to define respect; for example being treated politely and with dignity (Tyler & Lind 1992; Heuer et al. 1999) or being friendly and considerate (Simon & Stürmer 2003). In a study with no pre-established definition, respect was measured through prototypes of caring and loving (Frei & Shaver 2002) while others found several behavioural definitions, which indicated that respect is found in acceptance and equality (Jones 2002) and is given to all beings (Sennett 2004; Lawrence-Lightfoot 2000). Research has shown that respect has an impact on our behaviour and attitude. For example, communicating respect has been found to motivate cooperative behaviour, which illustrates the importance of
perceived and received respect in deciding to cooperate or not (de Cremer 2002). Other research has illustrated a negative correlation between perceived respect and bullying (Langdon 2007, p.473; Langdon & Preble 2003) or a negative correlation between respect and violent behaviour (Leary et al. 2005). Social psychologists have demonstrated that when respect is manipulated, it affects emotions, such as shame and pride (Spears et al. 2005; Ellemers et al. 2004). Respect has also been linked to procedural and social justice (De Cremer & Tyler 2005).

It is evident from these different lines of thinking about respect that they have a shared understanding that what is at stake is people’s relationships to groups and that it matters to people because it satisfies two core motives of social life — striving for status and the need to belong (Huo & Binning 2008, p.1571). As a result, the Dual-Pathway Model of Respect (Figure 6) relies on these two core motives as organising principles and two evaluative pathways (liking and status evaluation) “through which respect feedback from the group shapes attitudes and behaviours that affect the welfare of the collective (social engagement) and of the individual (self-esteem and health)” (Huo & Binning 2008, p.1572).

The social engagement aspect of this model argues that people’s perception of to what extent they are respected can be a predictor of when and why people choose to engage with each other (Huo & Binning 2008, p.1574). For example, studies have found that feeling respected by authorities was linked to compliance, commitment, and engaging in

![Figure 6: Dual-Pathway Model of Respect (Huo and Binning, 2008, p.1572)](image-url)
extra-role behaviour (Tyler et al. 1996). Other studies have found that perceived respect from the community predicts higher levels of self-reported civic engagement, such as attending neighbourhood meetings (Boeckmann & Tyler 2002). Key to the current research, two studies found that when one feels that others respect one's ethnic subgroup in the broader community, it can predict support for political institutions and student participation in school engagement (Huo et al. 2010; Huo 2006). This is important because, as previously mentioned, the current climate of CT has hurt some Muslims, which can impact their level of social engagement if they feel that their social identity (ethnicity or religion) is not respected.

Given the evidence presented in the literature, the present study suggests that the notion of identity and its sub-elements (i.e. respect) are key to understanding crime-reporting behaviour, especially in the context of CT, because individuals live in communities and have a collection of identities and roles, which imply what actions they should take in a given context.

3.3.4 Responsibility

Two other factors to note when discussing attitudes and values as regards cooperative behaviour are accountability and responsibility. Both accountability and responsibility suggest there is an element of liability. The main difference between the two is that while responsibility can be shared, accountability cannot. Accountability, too, can influence cooperative behaviour. To hold residents/community members accountable, two conditions are needed: a) residents need to acquire the same level of knowledge (and in some cases, skill) as service providers; and b) locally appropriate structures need to be taken into account (Mistry 2007). As such, effective crime prevention needs community-based policing to engage the public in ways that enhance and enable cooperative behaviour, especially in the context of CT. Additionally, studies have shown that responsibility can also have an impact on how an individual behaves. For example, interpersonal relationships can increase the feeling of responsibility in cases of emergency; particularly if there is a special bond or commitment to the victim (Moriarty 1975; Geer & Jarmecky 1973), or if the victim is dependent on the individual (Berkowitz 1978). Other studies have found that how responsible a person feels for the environment is a promising predictor of that person's ecological behaviour (Kaiser & Shimoda 1999).
3.4 Discussion

What is known about citizen participation and behaviour, particularly reporting behaviour? It is known that identity is used as a medium to make sense of the world around us. Identity is not a singular entity; rather, it is multifaceted and complex. Each social identity or role that one adopts comes with various stereotypes and stigmas, which shape and guide our relationships/group memberships, beliefs, attitudes, values, and sense of respect and responsibility. Also, the literature highlights that legitimacy is one of the key factors that influence citizen participation and cooperation. This is in line with psychological theories focused on inter-group relationships. Based on the identities that one associates with, the perception of whom one ought to cooperate with is guided through attitudes, beliefs, and values that are shaped by stereotypes. As the BIAS map illustrated, stereotypes help to categorise whom one associates with more and whom one feels most threatened by. It is based on such categorisations that one's behaviour and relationships with others is guided. Therefore, if one perceives the police to be of threat, according to the BIAS model, one is less likely to approach them.

Additionally, the literature suggests that a sense of respect can also influence how and when an individual may decide to engage with others. This, too, can also be explained through a sense of identity and application of BIAS, and how it impacts behaviour. It is also known that the decisions one makes are based on the evaluation of what benefits or may hurt us. How one perceives these costs and benefits is again dependant on the notion of identity. It is as a result of this evaluation that one forms the intention to respond to a situation and subsequently act upon it. The literature on behaviour illustrates that intention is the key to performing the behaviour. It is also evident that one's intention is formed through motivations, which are either internal or external — both of which are again shaped by individual’s interpretation of context through one's sense of identity. The concept of identity is vital to behaviour outcome, as it guides one's perception and interprets one’s existence in the world.

The current chapter presented the contributing factors for citizen participation and behaviour. The theories presented here suggest that there are 'push' and 'pull' factors that influence the decision to cooperate. Behaviour is complex and interconnected. Activating action from non-state agencies requires connecting at an individual level — a psychological state, which may encourage cooperation. Therefore, this thesis argues that to achieve public cooperation, psychological needs (e.g. recognition of fear, responsibility, agency, and social membership) have to be addressed through engagement. From a
prevention perspective, and the purpose of this research, understanding contributors to citizen participation and behaviour is vital to prevention. This is because, to encourage cooperation, it is critical to know what the ‘push’ and ‘pull’ factors are. This is vital to CTCE strategy, as presented in Chapters 1 and 2. The findings from this literature review will assist this thesis in informing a CTCE model that is behaviour-conscious, especially in the context of cooperation and reporting.
Chapter 4

Research, Social Change, and The Space In Between: A Reconstructed Methodology

4.1 Introduction

The purpose of this chapter is threefold. First, it explains, justifies, and reflects on the methodological and design approach underpinning the assumptions and reasoning for this study. Second, it applies the methodological literature to the thesis reasoning and assumptions, as well as the planning and the implementation of the research. Third, it challenges some of the broader methodological theories and provides to guide future research. It is through these three processes that the researcher can be reflective and identify the purpose of the research, as well as its strength and limitations based on the methodology adopted (see Chapter 8).

The chapter begins with the introduction of the study's aims and research questions; this is followed by the ontological and epistemological scaffolding of the thesis. Next, it explains the reasoning for the adoption of a primarily qualitative strategy and justification of using multiple case studies; this also covers reasons for selecting East Jutland and West Yorkshire as case studies. The processes of access, data collection, conducting interviews, and participation sampling are discussed in detail. The following section covers the rationale for methods of data analysis. It also highlights the management of ethical considerations. Finally, the chapter discusses research dissemination and the pathway to impact, as well as providing concluding observations in which original contributions to methodological literature are presented. Throughout, the chapter highlights how this research has made contributions to methods.

4.2 Research Aim, Questions and Summary of Data Collected

As set out in Chapter 1, this research aims to explore the use of CTCE by two police forces (East Jutland and West Yorkshire) and how this relates to reporting of radicalisation/extremism. Thus, the overarching question this research aims to answer is what is the relationship between CTCE and the reporting of radicalisation and extremism? Based on prior knowledge (discussed in Section 4.3) of behaviour and the
psychological processes that shape it, as well as the difference in reception of CT strategies in these two locations, it was hypothesised that CTCE could influence the internal and external variables of reporting behaviour or citizen participation if it was delivered in a particular way suggesting a relationship between CTCE and reporting of radicalisation/extremism. The null hypothesis implies no relationship between CTCE and reporting because CTCE cannot influence reporting behaviour. To test this hypothesis and to answer the overarching question of the thesis, the following questions were used to guide the research:

1. What is CTCE in the broader context of prevention, and how do the police and their partner agencies (e.g. local authorities) explain its use and delivery in East Jutland and West Yorkshire?
2. How effective is CTCE in encouraging people to report concerns of radicalisation/extremism, and what are the reasons for this?
3. What are the reasons and barriers for people reporting or not reporting radicalisation/extremism, and how can CTCE address these needs?
4. How, if at all, can the existing literature and the current explain the existence of any relationship between CTCE and reporting behaviour?
5. What lessons can be learnt from East Jutland and West Yorkshire in shaping CTCE practices that encourage and improve reporting of radicalisation/extremism?

The above questions highlight two key elements that guide the research design and methodology of this research: reporting and CTCE strategies. The first factor suggests that there is a need to understand reporting behaviour, and therefore it is vital to take the end-user perspective, which means taking the reporters and practitioners’ platform as the starting point to inform how to encourage and improve this behaviour through CTCE. As there is a need for transformation, TRD was chosen to help guide the focus on reporters and their needs (see Section 4.4). The second factor, CTCE, requires an understanding of the strategy, and to explore its relationship with reporting behaviour and citizen participation, a comparative analysis can be insightful. As a result, case studies are used to identify significant similarities and differences that could inform effective practices in relation to reporting radicalisation and extremism. The study took place in East Jutland and West Yorkshire, in collaboration with the East Jutland Police and West Yorkshire Police (see Section 4.5.1). The decision to research in this manner was guided by a variety of assumptions, which are explained in the following sections.
4.3 Epistemology and Ontology

This section outlines the epistemology and ontology that informed the research design of this thesis, guiding the reader through theoretical framework and contribution to knowledge. For researchers, epistemology is an important tool that provides reasoning and justification for the theory of knowledge. The theory of knowledge for this thesis is grounded in a priori knowledge in psychology — specifically, in cognitive and social psychology — and behavioural economics. This knowledge provided the understanding that there is a link between identity and behavioural economics. These two disciplines provide insight into human behaviour that is independent of experience. This suggests that there is a process in place that explains reasoned action (i.e. reporting behaviour), a multifaceted process that results from the marriage and interaction of various personal, social, and contextual elements.

As explained in Chapter 1 and Section 4.2, the a priori knowledge that shaped this theory was that, theoretically, the Aarhus Model and the Prevent strategy are similar, in that their work is in the pre-criminal stage and focuses on rehabilitation of the vulnerable individual through a voluntary process. However, the former had received positive feedback from the international audience while Prevent experienced negative backlash. Additionally, the Aarhus Model had allegedly decreased the number of foreign fighters leaving for conflict zones, and had managed to attract the returnees to directly contact the Info-House (where the model was operated from). These reports were made either by the returnees themselves or their relatives. This raised a question about how the Aarhus Model, or Info-House, engaged with the public to encourage a cooperative relationship, especially from those affected (i.e. vulnerable individuals and their relatives). Were they delivering this engagement differently to the delivery in the UK? My prior experience of auditing organisational practices and processes indicated that there were potential bottlenecks that needed further examination. Moreover, my background in psychology and insight in behavioural economics also suggested that reasoning is shaped by various internal and external factors such as identity and cost-benefit analysis of action. However, empirical knowledge was needed to explore the relationship between CE and reporting behaviour, to challenge or support the assumptions made based on prior knowledge.

Ontology is also vital to answering and understanding fundamental questions related to theory. It is about looking at a question through an holistic and multi-layered lens to identify other factors that influence the formation and existence of a possible answer. Therefore, through ontology, researchers are required to acknowledge the existence of
these factors, exploring the relationships between them to provide a better-informed answer. It is through the inclusion of these factors that creation, reproduction, and modification of the structures and systems that exists within society are made possible, thus providing a framework (Giddens 1984). This is crucial to problem-solving in a social context, for example, as various elements feed into the given context. Additionally, through ontology, one can distinguish and categorise the embedded factors, as well as identify their relational hierarchy.

This is relevant to this thesis, as CE, CT, CTCE, reporting, prevention, radicalisation, and extremism are complex and interconnected phenomena and thus, in need of an holistic approach for understanding and problem-solving. It is by understanding the interaction of factors that influence these phenomena that scholars can modify, reproduce, and create structures and systems to promote the prevention of radicalisation and extremism through CTCE. In this thesis, it is evident that reporting and CE are two objects within a social context, and they each have various trajectories. At the forefront of CE, there is an individual interaction premise that deserves scrutiny: what kind of interaction is it? What does that interaction mean for the parties involved? How does the interaction influence these parties? What is the need or aim of the interaction? And so forth. From a reporting aspect, this thesis is more focused on the individual and the internal processes that shape behaviour through interactions of internal and external factors. The research asks what the elements and processes that guide specific behaviour are. Consequently, this research is about exploring the interaction and relationships of objects that affect reporting behaviour through the medium of CE. Therefore, this research, through the application of ontology, is using an holistic and multi-layered lens to gain behavioural insight of reporting radicalisation/extremism.

Ontology enables comprehension of truth fluidity, which is associated with an object in different domains. For example, in the theological domain, the creation of the world is viewed differently to the view taken by some scientists. Therefore, this fluidity is about the exploration of reality from a more holistic angle. This thesis is exploring how CE is understood and viewed by practitioners and reporters. Also, the thesis is exploring how reporting is viewed by these parties. Essentially the thesis is also concerned with how the risk of a given situation and/or reporting is viewed not only by reporters but also practitioners. Without consideration of such questions, factors, and relationships, the research lacks a solid theoretical foundation. Understanding these ontological questions and the relationship between CE and reporting of radicalisation/extremism requires an understanding of how CE is delivered. To do that it is necessary that practitioners, senior
leaders, as well as managers, are interviewed because these individuals have first-hand knowledge of the practice, importance, impact, and value of CE. These practitioners who inform, interpret, implement, and apply CE policies, as well CT policies, can offer unique and valid insight into the factors that form CTCE practice and its impact on reporting behaviours, and ultimately prevention. Therefore, interviews with this group provide expert insight into a phenomenon that they are intimately familiar with (Beyers et al. 2014; Froschauer & Lueger 2009).

Research on CTCE is limited. Here it is explored through CT practices and policies, rather looking through the application of CE. Additionally, the CE literature has not delved deep into the link between CE styles of practice and prevention, and most of the studies around CE are dominated by American practice. More importantly, research has not yet explored the relationship between CE and reporting of radicalisation/extremism. As a result, the first-hand experience of these experts is under-researched and is in need of discussion, as the concept of CT, prevention, and CTCE, more specifically around raising awareness, has become increasingly popular in policy and practice.

By understanding the practice and CE structure, the thesis can see how formal rules tend to shape practitioner behaviour — for example, in the police (Dixon 1997) — such as changes in recording requirements that may also result in behavioural modification (Collier 2001). However, it is important to consider both informal and formal rules in place, to comprehend how these norms shape practice and practitioners’ behaviour in addition to the reporters, as it is believed that informal factors such as situational incentives also guide practice (Workman-Stark 2017; Waddington 1999). As explained in Chapter 1, the meaning of CE varies from user to user. Since the approach is a ‘soft’ form of policing (i.e. not punitive), there is a need to explore what this means in practice for practitioners, senior leaders, as well as managers, and its interpretation into action to assess practices in place (Fielding 2006a). As a result of this mixed interpretation, there is ambiguity and possibly confusion among practitioners and policy-makers as to the best possible form of CE practice. Therefore, there is a need for a methodological approach that examines perceptions, feelings, and lived experiences (Guest et al. 2012). Thus, this research can reflect on attitudes and values, situation factors, and organisations structures that contextualise the work of these practitioners.

Similarly, reporters of radicalisation/extremism are a cohort that is yet to be explored. Their experience of reporting, CTCE or CE can be very helpful in getting an insight into their world view. Although there have been some recent studies into thresholds of
reporting (Thomas et al. 2017), there is still a lack of first-hand experience. Thomas et al. predominantly focus on a limited group (i.e. young Muslims and marginalised white British) and ask these groups hypothetical questions around whether they would report someone close to them if they had concerns of radicalisation/extremism. This is not to argue that their research has no value, but rather to point out the simple fact that their study did not focus on first-hand experiences of reporters. Also, there is a need to inquire what was meant by ‘reporting’ in the context of CT, to be able to identify what is being influenced, and also who was considered a reporter (e.g. professional, relatives, and the general public)? However, the thesis does not argue that interview with experts and reporters necessarily uncover the ‘truth’ about the relationship between CE and reporting. The data may be skewed or incomplete, due to gaps in knowledge, the mood of the participant (Berg 2009), fear of repercussion (Sapsford 2007), inaccuracy or bias, the relationship between the researcher and the researched, participants being untruthful about their reasoning or practices, or simply that the researcher might have asked the questions differently (Cresswell 2007). Through this integrated approach, an holistic lens enables the researcher to understand how practitioners (and reporters) experience and comprehend the structure, as well as create meaning and make decisions (McConville et al. 1991). It is through answering such questions and approaching them holistically that this study was able to connect practices informed by both organisational structures and personal interpretations, to the experiences and actions of those who engage with it. Therefore, the research can connect the social, personal, and historical dimensions of the given context (Mills 2000). Subsequently, this research’s original contribution to knowledge (the application of behavioural insight to CT policing, and reporting of radicalisation/extremism) is, in essence, an ontological question. By answering the questions presented in this section, the thesis can address matters that are linked to other and wider disciplines and knowledge.

4.3.1 Policy Transfer

Decision-makers in CT are increasingly interested in the age-old wisdom of cross-national experiences, which has encouraged ‘policy transfer’ and ‘lesson-drawing’ from other nations facing similar problems. In order to develop a policy that addresses a particular policy issue/problem, jurisdictions, international organisations, agencies, and alike initiate policy transfer (Dolowitz & Marsh 2012, p.340). As such, policy transfer is about importation of ideas from abroad, and this transfer can assist in understanding the movement of political ideas and policies (Newburn & Jones 2007, p.1). Hence policy transfer is an ontological and epistemological phenomenon. This process of learning is a
comparative one, it is about comparing and contrasting the ways in which a country responds to, in this instance, terrorism, extremism, and radicalisation with those practiced elsewhere. As explored in Chapter 2, the EU used policy transfer to learn from countries like the UK and enforced these policies on EU member states to ensure appropriate actions were taken in countering terrorism at global, national, regional, and local levels. The EU also encouraged this knowledge transfer and learning between member states, ensuring evidence-based practices and policies.

Therefore, policy transfer and comparison require understanding and interpreting what those in other places are actually trying to do (Nelken 2009, p.291). This is where this thesis aims to provide insight into CTCE practices and interpreting their impact on prevention, with the intention of identifying effective CTCE practices but also of providing an interpretation of terms such as CTCE. Through policy transfer and comparison it is possible to re-evaluate ontological and epistemological assumptions, meaning that there is the possibility to recognise that radicalisation, extremism, and terrorism may be viewed differently by others, and to influence the response to these phenomena at national, regional and local level. Consequently, ethnocentric assumptions are challenged. As such policy transfer and lesson-drawing are not about copying what others do but to learn under what circumstances and to what extent programmes effective elsewhere may also work here (Rose 2005, p.1). This learning process is not just about what works but also failures, which can be far less costly politically and financially. This thesis utilises a multi-method design, with the interest in delivering policy and practice impact. The next section will discuss in more detail about other methodological strategies used in this thesis to encourage policy transfer and lesson-drawings through comparative study of West Yorkshire and East Jutland CTCE practices and policies, as well as the adaptation of TRD to inform the focus on reporters and their needs.

4.4 Methodological Strategy

This section explains the methodology used in this research and presents the limitations and challenges faced. As explained in Chapter 1 and based on the ontology and epistemology of this thesis, a multi-method design with a comparative dimension was deemed suitable. The justification for the adaptation of TRD will be expressed in this section, but first, it is important to establish what TRD is. This ‘transformative paradigm’ is a human-centred framework that seeks to ‘transform’ mechanisms in place, through an interdisciplinary process, to form socially progressive ends. Therefore, there is an element of concern around issues of inequality and injustice in society (Mertens 2014, p.212).
Specifically, this paradigm focuses on “the existence of unequal power relationships (which leads to tensions within and between communities) and the strengths of communities when their rights are respected (presented as a strong alternative for the ‘deficit perspective’ of researchers and evaluators who only focus on problems)” (Baur 2010, p.276). As such, the transformative paradigm provides a framework for the examination of assumptions surrounding issues of power, social injustice, and embedded complexities that construct a social context or norm.

The TRD surfaced during the 1980s and 1990s in response to issues within research: a) dissatisfaction with the existing and dominant research paradigms and practices; and b) “the white, able-bodied male perspective” had formed much of the sociological and psychological theory which lay behind the dominant paradigms, not to mention that these theories were “based on the on the study of male subjects” (Mertens 2005, p.17). This also applies to other fields such as criminology and political science. As such, TRD believes that the “agendas of agents of interest need to be inquired into, to introduce an action agenda that may change the lives of the participants, and the institutions in which individuals work or live” (Creswell 2003, pp.9–10). Also, most research restates the status quo due to the nature of the funding and grant models, which can result in reaffirming existing inequalities. Moreover, most research starts from the basis of the researchers’ need rather than the needs of the end-user. Therefore, TRD encourages the researcher to move out of their sphere and into the researched context. Consequently, TRD starts from the perspective of the end-user. In this thesis, there are two groups of end-user: a) receivers of CTCE, who are encouraged to use the pre-criminal services, including the reporting service; and b) practitioners who deliver CE, because their voices are usually unheard due to the organisational hierarchy. They are knowledgeable about the needs of the public through their engagement. The framework produces results that are useful to stakeholders: reporters (professional, relatives, and the general public), practitioners, and policy-makers.

By adapting this approach as guidance and using it in conjunction with comparative study in addition to the focus on policy transfer and practice, the research takes into consideration axiology (the theory of value), which is often overlooked. Therefore, axiology incorporates ethics for the research and the researcher. From the TRD perspective, through the focus on social justice, the researcher is held accountable for how research is conducted — accountability means ensuring researchers are not restating the

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6 Communities here does not only refer to geographical or cultural entities but also various other in-groups and out-groups such as authorities, professions and so on.
status quo. For example, notions that right wing-extremism is carried out by ‘white marginalised middle-aged men’; or that Islamist extremism is carried out by Muslims with specific characteristics such as orthodox clothing or brown skin; or the Muslim community have a specific representative within the community that they go to. These examples highlight the biases associated with specific groups and how they shape our way of thinking. Right-wing extremism has wider group memberships that include other ethnic groups as well as genders. The ‘Muslim community’ is not one homogenous group; it has various factions and trajectories that come from a diverse range of cultures and ethnicities, which collide with each other. Therefore, when describing the ‘Muslim community’, to whom do we refer to? Is this more an issue of racism and/or lack of knowledge of ethnicity and cultures? Believing that ethnic groups such as ‘Muslims’ have a leader or representative in the community restates the colonial and tribal view of ethnic minorities (Easby 2016). When discussing issues of radicalisation, extremism or terrorism, a report by MI5’s Behavioural Science Unit stressed that there is no single profile for this group of people, based on several hundred in-depth case studies (Travis 2008). The people from this group come from various social and economic backgrounds, ethnicities and religions.

If research predominantly focuses on the ‘Muslim community’ or the ‘marginalised White British’ group to understand a phenomenon, that research is fundamentally unethical and skewed, as well as reinforcing the status quo and biases that oppress and stigmatise such groups. Such research is not helping to improve social inequality or injustice, but rather maintain it, which results in questionable research axiology. If one desires change, one cannot follow the same exhausted routes. Thus, TRD challenges the epistemology, ontology, and axiology of research, and assists with the removal of restrictions on the lived experiences of the end-user. This is because critical paradigms such as TRD focus on “empowering and removing oppressive structure[s] around research subjects” (Kivunja & Kuyini 2017, p.38). Accordingly, this thesis aims to remove this oppressive and limiting structure by not focusing on a faction of the community or reporters; rather it observes reporters as a whole entity (i.e. demographically diverse), and practitioners are not limited to only the police. The research asked for the involvement of those practitioners that deliver CE, especially in the CT context. Otherwise this research, too, would have reaffirmed the existing biases, and failed to approach the question holistically.

Subsequently, through using the social justice design and methodology such as TRD, the researcher is accountable for how the research outcomes are used and returned to end-users. These strategies question and reflect on the space between the researcher and the
researched, as well as questioning the very foundation of the research. Consequently, it holds the epistemological, ontological and axiological foundation of the research tightly.

This thesis aims to develop better practices and policies (see Policy Brief in Appendix O). The current research’s pathway to impact has so far been involved in drafting policy papers for practitioners and policy-makers, providing them with suggestions on how to improve and encourage reporting through introducing a new style of CE and reporting process that is faithful to the needs of future reporters.

The characteristics of TRD can be summarised as a social justice methodology that is an interventionist strategy, which operates within the parameters of knowledge by interacting with all disciplines. The argument for TRD is that social research cannot be comprehensive without social justice methodologies. Such research needs to apply social sciences, both empirical and theoretical. Through this strategy, the personal and contextual factors that impact and influence the end-user, which result in the creation of inequalities, can be explored.

From an ontological perspective, reporters are fundamental to the understanding of reporting reasoning, as they allow us to understand the personal and contextual factors associated with reporting radicalisation/extremism. This is also in line with TRD because this thesis is drawing upon TRD by taking the end-user’s perspective in conjunction with data from comparative analysis to transform the service to impact them positively i.e. provide them with what they need to be at ease in raising their concerns of radicalisation/extremism. This ensures that a key contribution is delivering policy and practice impact.

Therefore, a multi-method approach supports the ontological and epistemological argument for the theory of knowledge, as it provides an holistic perspective, recognising that when examining any phenomena, a multi-faceted perspective (multidisciplinary and interdisciplinary) is necessary. This research recognises that ‘cause’ and effect’ are the result of a collection of embedded factors that contribute to phenomena, which all needs to be addressed. As such, by using TRD as guidance, an interdisciplinary theoretical-based framework is used to deal with the determinants surrounding the problem at hand, subsequently widening the methodological imagination. Moreover, the ontological questions also welcome a comparative approach to exploring these relationships in different environments (i.e. East Jutland and West Yorkshire). Through comparative analysis, the thesis can explore what works and what does not in a given context, as well as identifying other existential factors that could influence the relationship between CE
and reporting behaviour. More importantly, through comparing and evaluating the reader has the opportunity to draw their own conclusions.

4.5 Research Design

This section explains and justifies the research design for this thesis. It begins by explaining why a multiple case study approach was taken. This is then followed by justifications for using a qualitative approach through semi-structured interviews. Next, the chapter discusses access to participants and data before outlining sampling and interview scheduling.

4.5.1 Justification and Application of Comparative Case Studies

A case study is commonly used for organisational research (Leonard-Barton 1990; Crompton & Jones 1988). A case study is described as “a strategy for doing research, which involves an empirical investigation of a particular contemporary phenomenon within its real-life context using multiple sources of evidence” (Robson 1993, p.146). This thesis explores a contemporary phenomenon using historical events to make sense of real-life contexts (the needs and barriers of reporting in a CT context and the influence of CE on these variables). Therefore, this thesis argues that the definition of the case study should also describe and reflect the ontological aspects of ‘contemporary phenomena’, as they are the by-product of historical events. Yin (2009, p.18) adds to this definition by suggesting that case studies are an in-depth (Berg 2009) investigation, especially when the boundaries between phenomenon and context are unclear. This then allows for the exploration of many more variables of interest (Thomas 2011; Yin 2014). This is in line with the ontological and epistemological aspect of this thesis, which argues for a more holistic approach to research. Case studies are seen best suited to research that investigates through ‘how’ and ‘why’ questions (Yin 2003; Stake 2005). Therefore, case studies can be exploratory, descriptive, and explanatory (Yin 2009, pp.5–9). In fact in areas where case study is used for exploratory reasons is because not enough is known about the area i.e. one cannot design a questionnaire unless one knows what questions to ask, or design an experiment unless one holds some insight into how the participants are going to respond within the bounds of experimental manipulations.
Thus, case studies are open techniques that welcome, but are not limited to, exploration. As a result, case studies can be descriptive and explanatory, as the researcher begins to understand the ‘how’ and the ‘why’. For example, case studies can show why people do certain things, how they explain their behaviour, and what are the proceeding activities that lead the individual to behave in a certain way. Consequently, these observations provide an explanation of the process and the outcome. Therefore, Yin (2009, p.6) argues against case studies being only a preliminary research method and stresses that some famous case studies have provided causal explanations through explanatory and descriptive case studies (Allison & Zelikow 1999). As a result, ‘how’ and ‘why’ answers might take the form of simple causal models, as well as illustrating the complexity of people’s reasoning and feelings. Additionally, it is believed that the case study relies on multiple sources of evidence and the triangulation of data to provide insight into phenomena (Yin 2009, p.102).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>METHOD</th>
<th>(1) Form of Research Question</th>
<th>(2) Requires Control of Behavioral Events?</th>
<th>(3) Focuses on Contemporary Events?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Experiment</td>
<td>how, why?</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Survey</td>
<td>who, what, where, how many, how much?</td>
<td>no</td>
<td>yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Archival Analysis</td>
<td>who, what, where, how many, how much?</td>
<td>no</td>
<td>yes/no</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>History</td>
<td>how, why?</td>
<td>no</td>
<td>no</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Case Study</td>
<td>how, why?</td>
<td>no</td>
<td>yes</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 7: Yins’s Relevant Situations for Different Research Methods (Yin 2009, p. 8)

There are three conditions that can assist with identifying three types of methods suitable for a case study: “a) type of research question posed, b) the extent of control an investigator has over actual behavioural events, and c) the degree of focus on contemporary, as opposed to historical” (see Figure 7) (Yin 2009, p.8). ‘What’ research questions are considered by Yin to be exploratory, while the ‘how’ and ‘why’ questions are more explanatory. Considering this thesis, the ‘why’ and ‘how’ are asked through Questions Two (how effective is CTCE in encouraging reporting behaviour?) and four (how current data and existing literature explains existence of any relationship between
CTCE and reporting behaviour?), as well as parts of Questions One (how do the police and partners explain use and delivery of CTCE?) and Three (how can CTCE address the needs of reporters?), as well the second part of the overarching question, which asks why a relationships (if any) would exist within CTCE and reporting behaviour. Questions Three (what are the reasons and barriers for reporting and not reporting?) and Five (what lessons can be learnt?), as well as parts of Questions One (what is CTCE?), Two (what are the reasons for CTCE being effective?), and Three (what are the reasons and barriers for reporting and not reporting?) are considered ‘what’ queries. This thesis argues that these questions are of exploratory and explanatory.

Question Two is querying the existence of a relationship between CTCE and reporting as well as why there is such a relationship. Therefore, this thesis argues that although interviews were used to ‘explore’ if practitioners believed such relationships existed, supportive comparative annual reporting statistics were also obtained to ‘explain’ this relationship or a relationship. This is not to say that research was able to measure or explain the strength of the relationship, but rather that it exists because of the increase in reports after engagement with communities and relatives, in particular in East Jutland. Consequently, through the use of multiple sources of evidence, the research question is both exploratory and explanatory. Similarly, Question Three seeks to identify the needs in, and barriers to reporting, thus providing an ‘explanation’ for what could be hindering reporting or reducing its quality; what it is that reporters need to come forward; and how these issues can be addressed. Finally, Question Five, through comparison, aims to identify practices that can inform a CTCE strategy, which can encourage reporting of radicalisation and extremism. Therefore, through comparative analysis, the research ‘explores’ in order to identify these factors, while using them to ‘explain’ their importance in relation to citizen participation and reporting behaviour. As a result, this thesis disputes that ‘what’ questions can only be exploratory, and makes an original contribution to knowledge by proposing these small adjustments to Yin’s theory of case study.

Additionally, it is suggested that a theoretical proposition is needed for case studies, as they can assist in defining relevance and in testing or developing that theory (Yin 2009, p.35). As mentioned in Section 4.3, there were some prior knowledge that guided the formation of the research hypothesis, which shaped the theory for this thesis and was used as template to compare with the empirical results i.e. if CTCE is delivered in a particular way, then there is a possible relationship between CTCE and reporting of radicalisation/extremism. Alongside the fact that this research is seeking organisational and behavioural insight, a case study was deemed appropriate. This is because not much
is known about the relationship between CTCE and reporting of radicalisation/extremism; how CTCE is delivered in East Jutland and West Yorkshire; or the reporters’ experience of reporting. Thus, the thesis started with a theoretical proposition, which was investigated through the ‘how’, ‘what’, and ‘why’ research questions.

Consequently, a multiple case study design was adopted as a form of qualitative research, and allows for identification of likenesses and differences between similar phenomena, organisations, practices, and contexts (Dion 1998). Further, according to Yin (2009, p.38), under this mode, analytic generalisation is possible, as it can use a previously developed theoretical proposition and test it against empirical data. Therefore, it is argued that the evidence from multiple cases can be regarded as compelling, resulting in the study being considered more robust (Herriott & Firestone 1983). Also, multiple cases studies follow a ‘replication’ design testing the same theory, similar to that of multiple experiments, which Yin (2009, p.53-54) argues challenges the mistaken analogy of the past where multiple cases were considered “to be similar to the multiple respondents in a survey (or to the multiple subjects within an experiment)” i.e. a sampling design. However, it is important to note that the validity of generalisation of the developed theory can be enhanced with an increased number of cases and/or replications. For example, a multiple case study looking at the experiences of academics and research groups, and why their advice appears not to have helped municipalities tackle urban challenges (Szanton 1981). Szanton cleverly uses multiple case studies to argue forcefully that a) failure to implement was not only inherent to academia but also research groups; b) universities had successfully helped other sectors and businesses other than the city government; and c) those who had managed to help city governments were focused on implementation and not just the creation of new ideas. It was concluded that city governments had a particular need for receiving advice but also putting such advice into practice. This is a great example of theoretical replication and analytic generalisation through use of multiple case studies.

On the utility of comparative analysis, such studies attempt to reach conclusions beyond single cases studies whilst setting boundaries for analysis based on structural, cultural, political, territorial, functional, or temporal qualities systems (Esser & Vliegenthart 2017, p.3). Comparative studies perform several important functions; specifically they enhance the understanding of one’s own society through contrasting familiar routines and structures against those of other systems. Esser & Vliegenthart (2017, p.2) argue that, through this process, insight is gained on systems, cultures, and patterns of thinking and acting, creating awareness and opportunities to test diverse theories, thereby contributing to the development of universally applicable theory (generalisation). Comparison studies
also prevent over-generalisations by challenging claims that maybe based on scholars’ own experiences. Comparative studies provide the opportunity to gain access to a wide range of alternative solutions that can reveal new ways of addressing similar problems at home.

This research compares East Jutland’s and West Yorkshire’s CTCE and its impact on reporting. One justification is that the Aarhus model has a somewhat different reputation in terms of CE to that of the UK, and so the comparison generates insights in terms of how different approaches may result in different outcomes. In the aftermath of 9/11 attacks on America, the EU attempted to harmonise the collective efforts in CT amongst its member nations (see Chapter 2), however, differences in approach still remained. Although the CT practices of UK and Denmark appear to be similar, when faced with similar threats they do have differences, such as CTCE, which is predominantly a local CT response, and this thesis aims to explore it. The two countries, apart from being an EU member and facing threats from Islamist terrorism, have broadly comparable police, intelligence, policy and practices (see Chapter 5). Such comparative studies are able to build insight into the role of culture, norms, and institutions shaping CT responses (Foley 2013, p.9).

Similar to other countries studied comparatively for their CT approach, there is a shared perception in how policymakers in the UK and Denmark see themselves as one of the designated Islamist terrorism targets (Crenshaw 2001; Katzenstein 2003; Foley 2013, p.2). While terrorism has led these countries to converge in some respects (e.g. emphasis on preventive CT), they do continue to display significant differences in their responses and practices, such as rehabilitation of returnee foreign fighters, engagement with families, and certain policies that influence prevention (see Chapter 5). Thus, comparative studies can provide insight into such differences and possibly explore the reasons. As such, comparative studies also provide explanatory opportunity that takes into consideration how context can shape phenomena in different settings (Esser & Vliegenthart 2017, p.3). This recognition that contextual conditions can have causal significance is one of many reasons why comparative research can be valuable, as it extends beyond the mere descriptive comparison (Mancini & Hallin 2012).

Moreover, the decision to select these two sites was made because they differed in the range of measures: geographical location (which is important in a connected CT world, especially within the EU, which enforced CT policy that is then interpreted into national practices), organisational practices, different public response to CT strategy, and differences in outcome. Therefore, as the research hypothesised that there was a
difference between these two entities, theoretical replication was deemed possible through multiple case studies. Additionally, this research also explores reporter experiences in these two locations. Therefore, this is a multiple case study consisting of embedded cases (Yin 2009, p.59). Through the investigation of these two entities, the researcher has been able to connect CT CE practices to reporting behaviour. Moreover, through a multiple case study and the set hypothesis, the researcher was able to focus on specific areas, such as the notion of identity and how it is incorporated into practice. By using a comparative approach, the research can explore differences and similarities in definitions and practice in both entities. Thus, it is able to reveal unique aspects of a CE, as a form of CT policing that would be virtually impossible to detect otherwise (Mills et al. 2006, p.621). Since 9/11 and recent terrorist attacks in Europe, the EU has encouraged member states to learn about each other’s CT strategies to have a more coherent approach towards the prevention of terrorism. Such comparisons have received much attention (Roach 2011; Butt & Tuck 2014; The Cordoba Foundation 2012; Riezen & Roex 2009). It has been suggested that comparing fairly similar countries may prove useful, practically to inform regionally-based policy (Hantrais 1999). Consequently, this thesis may be an addition to the field of CT policing and assist in the formation of such concepts in East Jutland and West Yorkshire.

4.5.2 The Justification of Qualitative Methods: Interviews

Transformative and multiple case study researchers are able to use qualitative and quantitative data collection and analysis methods. However, it is believed that a mixed method approach provides TRD with a structure that may result in “more complete and full portraits of our social world through the use of multiple perspectives and lenses”, which allows for “greater diversity of values, stances and positions” (Somekh & Lewin 2005, p.275). While TRD can use quantitative methods, it cannot be meaningful enough on its own in interpreting social dilemmas. Therefore, it is recommended to use quantitative methods and analysis in conjunction with qualitative methods. At the very least, TRD needs to be qualitative to provide an understanding of the social phenomenon of study.

This research takes a qualitative approach to generate rich, contextual and natural data (Patton 2015) because social and psychological phenomena need freedom of expression. Additionally, it is suitable for the application of TRD and multiple case study research. Qualitative research is a non-statistical (Strauss & Corbin 1990) form of social enquiry focused on people’s interpretation of their experiences and the world in which they live; it aims to understand social realities at the levels of individual, groups, and cultures. Such an
approach is used to understand behaviour, perceptions, and feelings in a given context that cannot be free from time and place. The basis of the qualitative research lies in this interpretation of social reality, which is in line with the epistemology, ontology, and axiology of this research (see Section 4.3 and 4.4).

Although experimental processes or fixed questionnaires allow for some evaluation, they are considered to be limiting. Rather than restricting expression to questionnaires and Likert scales, this thesis wishes to enable the participants to present their world view more freely through the semi-structured interviews, which allow for a subject to be introduced and create flexibility within the interview context that provides some power to the participant to introduce new topics or add relevant information. Other research on reporting of radicalisation/extremism have also used interviews to understand how and what people believe, think and act (Thomas et al. 2017).

Interviews are defined as a conversation initiated by the interviewer “for the specific purpose of obtaining research-relevant information and focused on content specified research objectives of systematic description, prediction or explanation” (Cohen & Manion 1989, p.307). These conversations provide the opportunity to explore concepts or ideas in a given context. There are varieties of formats that interviews take, including structured, unstructured, and semi-structured. Semi-structured interviews are flexible; thus allow obtaining rich and illuminating data by conducting them in a face-to-face manner where the interviewer can respond to the non-visual cues as well as elaborate or modify their questions, without straying too far from the topic of study (Robson 1993, p.229). In a semi-structured interview, open questions are explored, and the interviewer has the privilege to modify the order in which questions are asked, change the wording, ask additional questions or leave out questions as deemed appropriate. Similarly, the interviewee can be more expressive.

Finally, it is argued that for an in-depth analysis of the data, interviews should be recorded (Lofland et al. 2006), as one cannot rely on the recollection of conversations (Sacks 1992b). Furthermore, recordings can be replayed and transcriptions improved, which allows for the conversations to be studied again and again (Sacks 1992a, p.622). This also enables the researcher to be more present and responsive during the interview, which is vital when sensitive issues are discussed. The field notes may be used to assist the researcher in reflecting upon any issues or vital factors that may have impacted upon the way the interview was conducted.
4.5.3 Obtaining Access

The researcher’s supervisors had an existing relationship with the West Yorkshire Police, and a former colleague had an affiliation with the East Jutland Police. Contact was made with both forces, which resulted in meeting with West Yorkshire Police and Crime Commissioner Mark Burns-Williamson and West Yorkshire Police representatives (Wright 2015), as well as with East Jutland Police Commissioner Helle Kyndesen and Info-House representatives. During those conversations, the collaborating partners agreed to provide access to the researcher. This access was dependant on the security clearance of the researcher. Unlike the experience of some researchers working with the police (Fielding 2006b; Lynn & Lea 2012), the current researcher did not experience suspicion while accessing or collecting data. In fact, the Danish collaborators consistently stated that they “trusted” the researcher. Due to high police staff turnover in West Yorkshire, access had to be renegotiated a few times. There were concerns around having access to reporters, as this was a sensitive group that did not want to be identified. It was agreed that the identities of reporters would be protected and they were not going to be pursued or pressured to take part in this study, as doing so would be unethical, as well as jeopardising the relationship between the police and the reporters.

The researcher had limited control in the recruitment of any given participant. The Police and the Counterterrorism Unit (CTU) in both regions were in charge of recruitment. The researcher had initially asked to have access to 15 reporters, which was met by concerns that it would be extremely difficult to encourage this group to take part. However, it was promised that they would provide the researcher with as many reporters as they could recruit for the research. Additionally, the researcher asked for approximately six police officers involved in CE to be interviewed, as well as three senior staff (e.g. management). This was a particular issue for East Jutland, as they did not have this many officers in those roles. Therefore, it was agreed that access to as many willing participants who were involved in the delivery of CE would be granted. The researcher stressed that a sample of 12 (this included at least two reporters) was needed to provide meaningful data.

Accessing reporters was very challenging, as mentioned earlier. East Jutland had provided access to three reporters, two professionals and one relative. After several agreed interview dates and failed meetings, it became evident to the researcher that one of the professional reporters was hesitant to take part. This individual never expressed concern about being involved in the research, they showed eagerness to book further meetings and to help with the research, but then simply either cancelled meetings or failed to attend them. It was believed that pursuing this individual was unethical, given that the
individual was a professional reporter and might have felt pressure from their senior to be involved in research (Miller & Boulton 2007). Therefore, continued cancellations of meetings were interpreted, as unwillingness to participate and the individual was not contacted again.

Similarly, in West Yorkshire, the CTU found it difficult to recruit relative reporters but had more success with professional reporters, although this could be because a few were involved with Prevent in some way. It was agreed that the CTU could provide access to reports of cases where relatives had made the report; however, the researcher was not allowed to look at the system in which they were recorded. The CTU representative read out the reports and discussed it in detail with the researcher. This was done without identifying anyone involved in the cases.

4.5.4  Collecting Data and Conducting Interviews

The data was collected through digitally-recorded semi-structured interviews, undertaken from June 2017 to June 2019. Access from East Jutland was granted first, and West Yorkshire data collection started in December 2017. The majority of the interviews were conducted in person, and only a few were completed over the telephone (as requested by participants). The purpose of the research and the right to withdraw or refuse to answer questions were explained to the participants at the outset. They were informed that participation in the study was entirely voluntary. All participants were provided with an information sheet about the study and consent forms. In cases where it was not possible to obtain a physical signed copy of consent form, verbal consent was sought from participants. This mainly applied to the phone interviews, as the participant had not submitted the consent form before the interview. Interviews were digitally recorded and lasted between 30 minutes to 2 hours, with average interview duration of approximately 1.5 hours.

All interviews began with short demographic questions and a brief job description if they were practitioners. This was followed by the semi-structured interview questions, which were designed on the basis that respondents within different organisations or roles would provide information from different perspectives (see Appendix A), as would reporters (see Appendix B). For practitioners, this included a series of questions based on the key themes of the study, such as: what was their understanding of CE and dialogue, how did they practise it, how did they build relationships with the community, how did they believe the community perceived them, from their experience why did people report
individuals at risk, what did they think about current reporting processes and their effectiveness, and so forth.

The reporters were questioned about the reasons behind reporting and their experience of CE. They were asked, without exposing the individual reported, describe the context of the report, what led them to report, how they perceived the police, what was their relationship with the police, how was their experience of making the report, whether they experienced stigma and prejudice, and whether they had any support prior to, during, and post reporting. The questions were designed in a way that allowed the interviewees to explore a phenomenon and limit the possibility of acquiescence bias (Watson 1992). At the end of all interviews, all participants were given the opportunity to add anything further that they thought was important and what they felt needed more improvement to encourage and improve quality reporting.

It is argued that for an in-depth analysis of the data, interviews should be recorded (Lofland et al. 2006), as one cannot rely on our recollection of conversations (Sacks 1992b). Furthermore, recordings can be replayed and transcriptions improved, which allows for the conversations to be studied again and again (Sacks 1992a, p.622). This also enables the researcher to be more present and responsive during the interview, which is vital when sensitive issues are discussed. The field notes may be used to assist the researcher in reflecting upon any issues or vital factors that may have impacted upon the way the interview was conducted.

Both collaborative partners were happy to provide the researcher with the information needed, as long as it was within the security clearance and legal boundaries. The researcher had asked for comparative years that illustrate reports coming from professionals, relatives/friends, and the general public. Additionally, the researcher asked for explanations for any variances. This set of data was requested, as explained, to illustrate the change in reporting of radicalisation/extremism and provide a tool explaining the relationship between CE and reporting behaviour. This was primarily to address research Question Two: How effective is CTCE in encouraging people to report concerns of radicalisation/extremism, and what are the reasons for this?

4.5.5 Sampling

Case studies

The East Jutland Police force covers Randers, Norddjurs, Syddjurs, Favrskov, Aarhus, Odder and Samsø municipalities, with four policing divisions. Aarhus is the largest city in
the district. Each municipality has a LA referred to as a Kommune or municipality. The district is the second largest in Denmark and has a physical area of 3.505 km$^2$, with approximately 580,000 inhabitants. Each police district in Denmark serves around 500,000 citizens and has 8,000-900 staff, except Copenhagen and Bornholm which have more inhabitants. The West Yorkshire Police force is the fourth-largest force in England and Wales, with over 5000 officers. This police force is responsible for the West Yorkshire region, which consists of five policing districts and LA (Leeds, Bradford, Wakefield, Kirklees, and Calderdale). Leeds is the largest city in the district. There are eight policing divisions in five policing districts. The physical area, of some 2000 km$^2$, has approximately 2.2 million inhabitants.

These two locations, as explained in Chapter 1, were selected as case studies for this research for several reasons. First, this was a collaborative ESRC project, which was funded to primarily compare the prevention of radicalisation/extremism in East Jutland and West Yorkshire. Next, both regions use CE for CT, and their approach to the prevention of radicalisation/extremism is somewhat similar. Additionally, the Aarhus Model, a rehabilitative and preventing strategy had made headlines for its success in stopping the recruitment of foreign fighters. On the other hand, the Prevent strategy had a toxic image, as a result of negative public reaction from some factions of the public. The similarities of the approach and different experiences suggested that there might be a difference in the application and delivery of CE. Therefore, these two regions were critical cases for this study.

The East Jutland interviews were conducted first, primarily because access was granted first. Twenty-seven semi-structured interviews were conducted with practitioners who had personal experience of CE, eleven of whom were Municipality/LA representatives, and ten were police, and reporters (two family reporter and four professionals), as well as three case studies of relative reporters, as reporters were reluctant to participate directly. These reporters, who were primarily relative reporters, understandably wanted to leave the horrific incident behind and were fearful of being identified. Due to ethical reasons, they were not pursued further and instead the CTU provided details of their reports and discussed the reports in detail with the researcher.

**Participants**

The study is mainly concerned with the experiences of those who deliver CTCE and those who report radicalisation and extremism. Therefore, recruitment focused primarily on these groups. There is little guidance on sample size for qualitative thematic research
(Onwuegbuzie & Leech 2007; Emmel 2013; Guest et al. 2006). The suggestions vary greatly from 6 to over 400 and are dependent on the type of data and the type of project (Fugard & Potts 2015; Braun & Clarke 2013). Given the sensitive nature of the research and availability of participants, the East Jutland West Yorkshire Police allocated individuals for the interviews. The only requirement for facilitator participation was to have reported radicalisation/extremism and to have delivered or been involved in CE. This was so that they could provide insight into this experience, as well as being able to recollect the events or experiences in detail (Foddy 2001). It was requested from each force that a minimum of twelve participants were needed from each country for meaningful research, considering the length of time available to complete the PhD. This number was chosen because it is believed that a sample of twelve participants is sufficient for exploring perceptions and experiences of a subject (Guest et al. 2006). This meant that at least a total of 24 participants were needed to accumulate meaningful data. This is in line with the suggestion that 20-30 participants may be sufficient for a study (Baker & Edwards 2012). However, Baker and Edwards (2012) also advise that 50 participants are needed for interview-based research. This thesis argues that, given the limitations of access and the sensitivity of the subject studied, 20-30 participants is sufficient for exploration of this phenomenon. The researcher was able to obtain access to 27 participants for semi-structured interviews (see Table 1).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Police Practitioners</th>
<th>East Jutland</th>
<th>West Yorkshire</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Local Authority/Municipality Practitioners</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Professional Reporters</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Relative Reporters</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 1: The number of participants by role and organisation.
*This number consists of one reporter that was based outside of West Yorkshire (UKR1).

In West Yorkshire, it became difficult to recruit families or relatives who had reported their concerns due to wanting to leave the traumatic events behind them. Therefore, when a family reporter from the UK made contact via Twitter and was willing to take part in this research, their participation was deemed valuable and accepted. Additionally, due to this lack of participation in West Yorkshire, access was given to three recent case studies. Although the level of exploration is not the same as an interview, nevertheless such cases studies, allow interpretation of the data to inform decision-making theories (Carroll & Johnson 1990).
4.6 Data Analysis

This section describes how the data was organised, coded and analysed through a thematic framework. The thematic framework is a method of analysing qualitative data and reporting pattern (themes) within the data (Guest et al. 2012). Through thematic analysis, themes are identified across the data set, which can assist in understanding the description of a phenomenon (Daly et al. 1997). This method uses a systematic staged approach, also known as phases, moving from familiarisation with data to coding, summarising, and interpretation of data in the final report (Braun & Clarke 2006, p.5). The analysis in such a context involves constant moving back and forth between the entire data set, coded extracts, and the produced data (Braun & Clarke 2006, p.5). Unlike statistical analysis, writing is an essential part of thematic analysis in that it is not something that takes place at the end; rather, it is practised at the beginning with jotting down ideas and potential coding schemes. Coding is deemed to be an integral part of thematic analysis, as it recognises vital moments in the data and encodes it before interpretation (Boyatzis 1998). This then leads to the identification of emerging themes relevant to the research questions (Saldaña 2013).

Recorded interviews were listened to twice to ensure accurate of transcription, and to allow the researcher to become familiar with the data (Ritchie & Spencer 2002). Excel was used to code and categorise the data, which helped to identify relationships within the data (Cresswell 2007). Some codes and themes were specifically selected to identify data, which were related to the theoretical proposition of the thesis. This also supported the argument that social research, as well as case studies, can both build and test theories (Yin 2009, p.39; Thomas 2011).

Thematic analysis is a flexible and useful research tool, which “potentially provides rich and detailed, yet the complex account of data” (Braun & Clarke 2006, p.5). Using thematic analysis can assist with providing links between themes and aims of the study, to guide and develop analytical claims. It is argued that themes can only have full significance when they are linked to form a coordinated picture (Bazeley 2009, p.6). It is for this reason that it is a useful approach when exploring new or under-researched areas and is particularly relevant to CT policing and reporting behaviour. As such, all interviews for this thesis were analysed using a thematic approach and were synoptically coded. Additionally, notes were taken during the interviews and during transcription, which was used to inform analysis (Liamputtong 2009). There was also a triangulation of the statistical data obtained and the interview data in relation to effect of CTCE on reporting behaviour. The
practitioners were asked if they believed CTCE had an effect on reporting behaviour and how they explained this impact. The responses were overwhelmingly positive. Therefore, statistical data was used to illustrate if there was an increase in reports. As mentioned, East Jutland and West Yorkshire are not like-for-like comparisons. However, the design of interview questions and a similar sample of participants have allowed for a comparative analysis of CTCE practice and reporter experience, and to some application of some policies.

### 4.7 Ethical Considerations

This thesis underwent comprehensive ethical scrutiny at the University of Leeds to ensure the research was within its guidelines taking into consideration safety; methods to maintain confidentiality, privacy, and anonymity; consent; participants' right to withdrawal; respect; and data security. As a result, this thesis submitted to the ethics board draft research context, consent forms, information sheets, and a safe data storage proposal. This was a dual process, as access to the requested reporter participants meant additional ethical scrutiny. First approval was gained for interviewing practitioners involved in CTCE. Second approval was sought for interviewing the reporters, and a third approval was sought for extending the recruitment outside West Yorkshire to accommodate the reporter who made contact on Twitter. This section will address two main non-prohibitive ethical considerations for this research, which were necessary to protect the participants.

#### 4.7.1 Confidentiality and Anonymity

The research engendered a legal and ethical obligation towards participants, as well as the collection and storage of the data. Given the sensitivity of the subject and wishes of the participants, confidentiality and anonymity were of paramount importance for this research. Consequently, the thesis has used codes (Table 2) to mitigate and/or eliminate the risk of identification through specific quotes or locations that might be tied to a participant by ensuring that the details of their role, their specific location, name, and in some cases gender were not shared within the thesis.
Table 2: The breakdown of participants by broad role description, seniority, organisation, and code.

Table 2 illustrates how identification has been prevented through not sharing details of their roles or the departments, participants belong to. Additionally, some participants asked not to reveal their specific location. Thus, the thesis has avoided revealing such information for all participants. However, the difference in views between the senior staff and frontline practitioners was believed to be significant and needed to be presented. Therefore, when the participant was senior staff, it has been made clear. Also, with reporters, no demographic or background details are provided — they are categorised into relative (i.e. family/close associate) and professional reporters only. Additionally, no identifiable personal information was shared about the vulnerable individuals reported. It is important to note that numbers allocated to participants do not reflect the order of the interviews. Moreover, personal pronouns have been altered in quotations, and some informative quotations have not been shared in a thesis on the basis that they might identify the individual.

The process by which participants were recruited meant that the recruiters at the CTU and some managers knew who had been interviewed. The interview schedules, some organised by the CTU and some by myself, meant that some of the colleagues who worked together were also aware of who participated in the research. This highlights a big challenge to anonymity when researching organisations, and the research being dependant on another party for recruitment of participants. The digital statistical data obtained were anonymised. It was ensured this data was safe to share if it was not previously published, by confirming it with participants. At the earliest opportunity, all data (digital stats, digital recording, and transcriptions) was stored securely on the university server and held there after that. These files are accessible through a single password. The consent forms, which were the only form of identification of the reporters, were kept in secure storage only accessible by me. The data will be only kept for two years.
after completion of the PhD, to allow time for publication of research findings; thereafter, it will be disposed of.

4.7.2 Consent

As mentioned earlier, consent was sought from participants prior to data collection. They were given the opportunity to withdraw from the research at that moment or at a later stage. It was explained to the participants that they could reach out to my supervisors and me at any time to share their concerns about the research. Therefore, the contact details for all parties were shared. The information sheet and the consent form (see Appendix C) explained to the participant the purpose of the research and the interviews, as well as what was required from them. Before recording the interviews, the aims of the research and the rights of the participants were explained (the same information as presented in the information sheet and consent form), and participants were asked if they were happy for the researcher to start recording. Once the recording commenced, the participants were notified that the recording had started.

As discussed in section 4.5.3, given that the researcher did not have much control over the recruitment of participants, this might have influenced the participants and their consent. This is because when senior staff/management are involved in recruitment, there is a power dynamic (Miller & Boulton 2007). For example, as mentioned in Section 4.5.3, one reporter consistently cancelled interview appointments or did not show up, but at the same time was conveying that they were eager to help with the research. This behaviour indicated that the participant might have been reluctant to participate and therefore had not really consented to participation. As a result, it was decided that it was unethical to pursue this participant any further.

4.8 Summary

This chapter outlined, explained, and justified the underpinning assumptions of the research, as well as the decisions on designing and conducting the research. It started by presenting the research aims and questions. This was followed by setting a strong research foundation by highlighting the epistemological and ontological arguments of the theoretical framework. The theory of knowledge was shaped by prior knowledge (psychology, behavioural economics, and organisational audit) and empirical findings. The latter was used to challenge or support the assumptions made based on the prior knowledge. Additionally, this chapter discussed the holistic approach taken by this study, by addressing the ontological factors, and how they reproduce and modify the structures
and systems that exist within the context. The discussion focused on the notions of truth fluidity and how one object could be viewed differently by different domains. This was applied to the understanding and experiences of CE, reporting, and risk of a given situation. As a result of this holistic approach, a more comprehensive framework for problem-solving has been developed. Consequently, it was concluded that to be able to identify a relationship between CTCE and reporting of radicalisation, there was a need to interview those who were involved in CE and those who had reported radicalisation/extremism. Therefore, through an holistic and multi-layered lens, this research gained behavioural insight into reporting radicalisation/extremism, as well as the interaction between CE and reporting.

The chapter also presented strong arguments from an axiological point of view to illustrate the current study's accountability to the end-user and the use of the data set, by focusing on social justice. It was argued that TRD provides flexibility as an application, as long as the foundations of the methodology are intact — i.e. creating social justice and considering the end-user's perspective. Therefore, by using TRD to inform and guide this study in conjunction with the comparative dimensions of this research, the thesis is able to focus more on delivering policy and practice transfer, whereby an original contribution to knowledge is made.

Next, the chapter discussed the reasoning for using multiple case studies thorough theories presented by academics such as Robert Yin. It was argued that although Yin's categorisation of relevant situations for different research methods, based on research questions focusing on 'what', 'why', and 'how', is valuable, it is nevertheless somewhat incomplete. This is because Yin suggests that 'what' questions are exploratory, while 'why and how' questions are explanatory. This thesis, however, argues that not all 'what' questions are merely exploratory if they are used in conjunction with multiple sources of data and the aim of finding a solution for the problem at hand by considering the factors identified through the 'what' questions. This adjustment to Yin's theory of case study, it is argued, provides an original contribution to knowledge. Moreover, the chapter highlighted the limitations of this thesis and how some of these were addressed. More importantly, it was argued that although generalisation might be deemed as a limitation of the research, in fact, it is not necessarily so when it comes to analytical generalisation. This is because by having a theoretical proposition, the thesis was able to test and challenge that theory by replication through multiple case studies. Likewise, it was argued that small sample size, when considering case studies, is not potentially a costly limitation when exploring decision-making (Carroll & Johnson 1990).
The chapter covered the processes of data analysis, challenges of access, ethical considerations, and data management. The aim was to present to the reader with the steps this thesis had taken to minimise any risk of the identification of participants. Therefore, issues of anonymity were discussed in detail. Nevertheless, this research has managed to collect high quality and informative data, as the following chapters will demonstrate. The data illustrates how some policies influence CE practice and reporting behaviour. More importantly, the data enables inferences to be made that refer to the relationship between CE and reporting behaviour, as well as how reporting can be encouraged and improved through the application of the CE model presented in this research.
Chapter 5

A Tale of Two Strategies: Counterterrorism Community Engagement in Practice

5.1 Introduction

The remaining chapters present and discuss the empirical findings, and seek to address the study’s research questions. They explore the role of CTCE and its impact on reporting radicalisation and extremism through practices of CTCE, as well as the experiences of reporters of radicalisation and extremism. The aim of this chapter is to compare the CTCE strategies practised in East Jutland and West Yorkshire in order to learn something new about the strategies that can help inform CTCE practice. This is not an analysis of who does CTCE best; rather, it is an assessment of good practice, which can inform better CTCE practice in relation to improved reporting behaviour. This chapter aims to answer the second part of research Question One:

What is CTCE in the broader context of prevention, and how do the police and their partner agencies (e.g. LA) explain its use and delivery in East Jutland and West Yorkshire?

Additionally, the comparative analysis presented in this section is used to inform research Question Five, rather than answering it directly:

What lessons can be learnt from East Jutland and West Yorkshire in shaping CTCE practices that encourage and improve reporting of radicalisation and extremism?

This comparison is also used in Chapter 7 to identify barriers and problems in the services — i.e. a process in a chain of processes that, due to its limited capacity, reduces the capacity of the entire strategy. This chapter situates this thesis within broader CT strategies, CT policing, and partnership literature. Each area is studied in relation to how these patterns shape CTCE practice and its implementation. As a result, the current chapter focuses on presenting the background of the introduction of CTCE in East Jutland and West Yorkshire. This is followed by a description of CTCE practices in these two regions, informed by the data collected. Next, the definition of CE is explored by presenting interview data from practitioners and how they view CE to ensure that both
East Jutland and West Yorkshire practitioners have the same understanding of CE (otherwise, the research is not using the same ‘unit’ for exploration). Thereafter, the chapter provides a comparative analysis of the two CTCE strategies by exploring the similarities and differences between their CTCE practices.

It is important to note that although the CT and preventive strategies, such as the Aarhus Model and Prevent, are interesting concepts and in need of further examination, this thesis does not study these strategies as a whole. Rather, one particular aspect of these strategies is explored (i.e. CTCE). This is because the core aim of this research is to understand the impact of CTCE on reporting of radicalisation and extremism, and ultimately prevention. Therefore, this thesis is not an analysis of the Aarhus Model, Prevent, the Exit Programme or Channel, but instead an exploration of one the cogs (CE) in the broader CT machinery. Consequently, this study should be examined and understood on the basis of the application of CTCE for prevention through reporting concerns, and its impact on reporting behaviour.

The reader is reminded that the CTCE practices of these two regions do not represent how CTCE is implemented across Denmark or the UK. Hence, these cases should be viewed as examples of how CTCE may be practised. Furthermore, this comparative analysis is about learning from practices that are received better or have a more positive effect on reporting behaviour, as well as identifying problematic factors, to provide a better understanding of effective CTCE practices.

Finally, it is important to mention that although there has been some comparative analysis of strategies, this research is from a different angle. For example, this thesis is different from that of Radicalization Awareness Network (RAN) (2018), as it provides a review of how CTCE is delivered in the UK and Denmark. However, when exploring engagement, RAN (2018) did not provide insight into state-driven CTCE through the Prevent strategy, but rather looked at other organisations (e.g. NGOs) or projects within the UK that aimed to engage with communities. Their analysis of the Aarhus Model, although insightful, did not go in depth. In contrast, this thesis provides a more in-depth overview of CTCE using the Aarhus Model in East Jutland, as well as a comparison of these two practices. Also, this thesis had similar findings to that of Hemmingsen’s (2015) detailed overview of the Aarhus Model and their approach to the prevention of radicalisation and extremism; however, this research focused more on engagement and advanced evaluation of the strategy through insight into how the CTCE operates within the Aarhus Model, by
providing the Aarhus Engagement Model. Thus, detailed comparison of CTCE strategies and practices is an area in which this thesis makes an original contribution.

5.2 East Jutland

5.2.1 Counterterrorism Strategy Background

As a response to terrorist attacks post 9/11, a number of terror suspects being arrested in Odense in 2006, and a policy change within the EU, a pilot initiative called De-radicalisation – Targeted Intervention (aka the Aarhus Model), was launched by Denmark’s second-largest city, Aarhus, in 2007 (later anchored in 2011). It is argued that the Aarhus model was developed with the aim of targeting the phenomenon of foreign terrorist fighters through de-radicalisation and inclusion, rather than criminal prosecution and repression (Brière & Weyembergh 2018). This pilot strategy took inspiration from the Dutch project *Wij Amsterdammers* ('We Amsterdammers'), which focused on investing in 'social capital' and avoiding social expulsion of part of the population (e.g. BAME) in order to combat radicalisation and polarisation.

The aim of the Aarhus Model is to identify vulnerable individuals at risk of radicalisation or extremism. It worked with SSP cooperation (school, social authorities, and police) in the prevention and intervention of radicalisation and extremism. In addition to municipalities, educational services, social services and health services are increasingly responsible for spotting signs of concern. The Aarhus Model is a local component of a comprehensive national CT approach, not a new strategy. In fact, it is based on a thirty-year-old crime prevention philosophy and approach that the city has used: that is, to take a multi-agency approach and engage with communities and individuals to prevent crime and risky behaviour. However, the theoretical grounding for the Aarhus Model is ‘Life Psychology’, which has three core assumptions: 1) everybody aspires to a good-enough life; 2) having a good-enough grip on life means coping sufficiently successfully with the tasks life offers, which depends on having the necessary skills to handle them; and 3) every human being regardless of gender, cultural background, abilities and disabilities, life history as well as social situation is confronted with exactly the same fundamental life tasks (Bertelsen 2015, p.246).

General crime prevention strategies in East Jutland focus on stopping individuals from committing or getting involved in criminal activities by recognising that the process of prevention is not a single-handed approach and also the need for application of Life Psychology. Counter-radicalisation and extremism is no different, and working in multi-agency partnerships and incorporating activities into an existing structure is at the core of
the East Jutland approach. As such, the Aarhus Model is anchored in two agendas: protection of the state and society from any terrorist attacks; and the responsibility of the welfare state to protect the individual from self-harming (Hemmingsen 2015, p.15).

The pilot project established by the East Jutland Police and the municipality of Aarhus started on the basis that radicalisation is “a process that leads to a person increasingly accepting the use of violent and other unlawful means of achieving certain political or religious goals” (Aarhus.dk 2016). This meant recognising the process of radicalisation as a pre-criminal stage, as well as knowing how and when to intervene in order to prevent radicalisation and extremism. The efforts of the Aarhus Model included the Info-House assessing concerns, planning, and coordinating the prevention of radicalisation; counselling and advising professionals about radicalisation; providing information about radicalisation to the public; specialised mentoring for the prevention of or intervention in radicalisation; counselling, advice and exit programmes for individuals considering travelling to or returning from conflict zones; outreach to local communities and other actors in contact with such individuals; counselling and advice for the parents of radicalised young people and facilitating networks between them; and dialogue-based workshops for primary and secondary schools about radicalisation (Hemmingsen 2015, p.31). As of 2014, this strategy was adopted nationally (Hemmingsen 2015, p.18).

5.2.2 Counterterrorism Community Engagement in Practice

East Jutland’s prevention strategy falls into two types of activities: outreach, and exit and intervention. The former focuses on engaging with vulnerable individuals/groups that are not currently in any kind of trouble, and individuals/groups that are in contact with those in trouble or deemed to be at risk (Hemmingsen 2015, p.24); while exit and intervention are for individuals/groups that are already in trouble or deemed to be at risk. There are approximately 22 members of police staff that carry out crime prevention, with 1.5 staff working on a fulltime basis in Aarhus. East Jutland’s prevention strategy is divided into three hierarchical levels: general (at the bottom), specific and targeted (Figure 8). As such, the level of engagement varies across this model and it is delivered through a multiagency approach. The General Level or green zone is about engaging with the general public. This level is concerned with raising awareness in order to build resilience to prevent radicalisation and extremism. The engagement delivered at this stage is about building relationships and closing the gap between the authorities and the communities in addition to keeping the public informed. Most of the work at this level crosses over with general social development projects, such as community cohesion and empowerment or dealing
with social issues, but they also include Info-House workshop sessions for young people (aged 15 and over), where they are informed about radicalisation, extremism, and terrorism, as well as the relevant legal issues (i.e. what constitutes a crime). In these workshops, students are encouraged to engage in a dialogue about current issues and what they consider to be acts of terrorism or extremism and why. Most importantly, they also address issues of discrimination: the workshop is entitled Prevention of Radicalisation and Discrimination (Aarhus Kommune 2016).

The workshops and awareness briefings are evidence-based. The awareness briefings are presentations on radicalisation, what can be done about it and providing contact information for risk assessment. The workshop consists of two 45-minute interactive sessions about radicalisation, everyday democracy, and how to deal with bias. The workshop is informed by works of Preben Bertelsen (Psychology) (Bertelsen 2015), John Horgan (Psychology), Lasse Lindekilde (Political Science), Arie Kruglansky (Psychology), Tore Bjorgø (Social Anthropology). The work of Adam Bermingham et al. (2009) is used to raise awareness about online vulnerability to radicalisation. Two instructors from the Info-House deliver these workshops and awareness briefings (in schools, at least one permanent teacher is also present to ensure the class is under control). The workshop's overall method is a combination of communication, dialogue and exercises. The workshop contains four parts: introduction to the content and core concepts; knowledge of political

Figure 8: Aarhus Engagement Model.
and religious radicalisation, as well as extremism, terrorism and law; group work, in which where the students’ attitudes, roles and positioning are brought into play in relation to discrimination, digital behaviour, freedom of speech, prejudice and communities; and finally the students’ reflection on the workshop. Therefore, the dialogues at these workshops provide young people with critical thinking skills that enable them to distinguish between facts and prejudice and/or misunderstandings. Equally, it allows participants to comprehend how radicalisation and extremism influence the wider community, as well as those that can be affected through discrimination and stigmatisation, which could possibly feed the cycle of radicalisation. The awareness briefings and the workshops are free. The awareness briefings are offered to first-line practitioners, and community agents and the workshops are available to educational institutions. This is primarily an Aarhus effort, and not implemented at the national level.

It is important to note that there is no legal obligation for those involved in safeguarding or civil service to receive such training or awareness. However, there is a law that obligates all citizens, especially public servants to report concerns about the welfare of minors (17 years or younger) (see Appendix N). The reason for not providing the workshop and the awareness briefing to across all frontline practitioners is twofold. First, after the launch of the Aarhus pilot in 2007, practitioners invested greatly in CTCE and awareness briefings. As a result, in 2008 they had decided that in Aarhus there was a widespread awareness due to the briefings, but were faced with a limited taskforce with the expertise to do a risk assessment and specialised intervention. Second, it was decided that training all frontline personnel in radicalisation and extremism was disproportional to the size of the target group and not economically sound.

Other engagement at the General Level includes having dialogue and sharing information with families and the public about risk factors, such as ownership of certain flags or planning to travel to conflict zones. Respectful and assertive dialogue is used actively and religiously to address concerns, share information, and build relationships, as well as encourage cohesion by addressing social issues such as prejudice. As such, dialogue is the heart of East Jutland’s CTCE. Engagement within SSP also takes place at this level, where professionals discuss current social concerns at monthly meetings. These concerns could be anything from keeping the children entertained after school to gang crime,

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7 The Social Service Act (No. 573 of 2005) §154 and §153 highlights safeguarding obligations. §154 is the general obligation for all citizens to notify the municipality if they become aware of minors whose wellbeing is threatened, while, §153 highlights a special obligation for public servants who will have to report on unborn children as well. There is no obligation to report anyone over the age of 18, although one could.
radicalisation and extremism. As evident, the CTCE at this level is not only concerned with radicalisation and extremism but also broader social issues such as cohesion and interrogation, as well as general crime-related issues.

At the Specific Level (yellow zone), engagement is more specific, and targeted at the individuals or groups at risk of radicalisation and extremism, who have been identified through risk assessments carried out by the people working at the Info-House. It is at this stage that each case is handled individually, with tailored engagement and support. Therefore, the engagement at this level can be categorised in three types: a) individuals; b) relatives; and c) group(s) (e.g. mosques with Jihadi fighters). At this level it is about risk management, ensuring that safeguarding mechanisms, support and guidance are provided. Engagement at this level is focused on the individual and their immediate social surroundings in order to facilitate capacity-building for the individual and those in their immediate social surroundings. The tailored engagement approach requires a focus on identity, which becomes the driving force for addressing issues the vulnerable individual might have. As such, the individual may receive support from mentors, employment and education coaching, and access to other social and welfare services. The support given to relatives consists of a Parent Network, coaching on how to manage risk, as well as access to relevant resources and partners.

Engagement at the Specific Level also includes reaching out and entering into dialogue with communities that are deemed at risk of radicalisation and extremism. For example, at one point there were a large number of Somali foreign fighters leaving for conflict zones. The Info-House reached out to these communities and engaged in dialogue, which enabled them to build relationships and empower them to assist with the prevention of radicalisation and extremism. They worked with Somali parents, who requested a Somali Centre that would allow them to keep their children and community engaged and connected, whilst being more active in supervision of their children.

The Targeted Level (red zone) is aimed at those involved in criminal acts or at risk of being involved in such behaviour. The intensity of engagement at this level is heightened, and interventions such as the Exit Programme are introduced, which focuses on rehabilitating the individual. Engagement with the immediate social surrounding of the individual is essential to the prevention and rehabilitation of the individual. Targeted Level engagement is very similar to that of the Specific Level, but more intense. Again, the efforts at this stage are tailored to the needs of the individual identified through risk assessment and working with both the individual and the relatives. At this level, the
engagement is strongly focused on building powerful, trusting relationships with the individual and their relatives, through dialogue and active empowerment. For example, there have been cases where the returnees or those involved in such criminal behaviour were prosecuted and incarcerated. Some of these individuals had a family of their own with small children, and spending time with them was not possible given the prison environment. The practitioners at the Info-House arranged for families and imprisoned returnees to have lunch at the Info-House so that they could spend quality time together. This kind of approach has enabled the practitioners to be trusted by both the relatives and the individual, and it has resulted in many positive outcomes. Through such action and level of engagement, the practitioner’s goodwill and good intentions for the vulnerable individual and their families is made clear, creating warmth toward the practitioners and reducing fear.

As evident the key features of the CTCE approach by the Aarhus Model are inclusion, dialogue, working closely with relatives, support for relatives, and tailor-made approach. Therefore, the approach is very much identity-oriented, and actively seek to connect at a psychological level.

5.2.3 Info-House & Multi-Agency Partnership

Central to the Danish CT approach is the Info-House, a framework for local cooperation between the police and the municipal social service administrations and providers. It is a centre concerned with extremism and radicalisation, open to all. Therefore, the general public, practitioners, and vulnerable individuals can reach out to Info-House and share their concern, as well as accessing support. Info-House assesses the concern to identify if it is warranted. Once the concerns have been confirmed through assessment, the Info-House decides what actions need to be taken and by whom — this may include mentors, coaches, teachers, relatives etc. The response is therefore multi-agency and encourages sharing and accessing a wealth of information. This information-sharing is part of §115 of the Danish Administration of Justice Act (see Appendix N) (Hemmingsen 2015, p.28). Thus, the Info-House works as a connecting hub or centre that brings together all other networks (e.g. SSP, PSP, and KSP), professionals, and civil society, municipality, and intelligence services.

As a result, CTCE engagement at all levels is multi-agency. A multi-agency approach to prevention is not new, and it is based on three decades of cooperation between schools, social services and the police (SSP) sharing information and identifying future risks, as well as introducing preventive measures for early interventions. The formation of SSP in
the 1970s aimed to prevent young people engaging in crime. In 2009, an additional network was created that encouraged cooperation between the police, social services, and mental health services (PSP) to prevent individuals with mental health issues engaging in criminal activity. A year later, a formation of the police, social services and the prison and probation services (KSP) was launched to stop individuals released from prison re-engaging in criminal behaviour (Hemmingsen 2015, p.18). Collaboration between these networks and Info-House has facilitated information-sharing between different authorities.

5.3 West Yorkshire

5.3.1 Counterterrorism Strategy Background

The UK, like many other countries in the developed world, did not have a sophisticated or coherent cross-departmental strategy to counter international terrorism prior to 9/11 (Staniforth 2014, p.84). In the immediate aftermath of 9/11, UK introduced CONTEST, a national CT strategy in 2003. CONTEST is a risk reduction framework with four strands; Pursue (reduce terrorist capability); Protect (reduce national vulnerability); Prepare (reduce the impact of terrorist attacks); and Prevent (reduce individual intention to get involved in terrorism, extremism, and radicalisation). The Prevent strand of CONTEST is most relevant strand for this thesis.

![Figure 9: Shows the link between Prevent and Pursue objectives (Home Office, 2018, p. 29)](image-url)
Prevent is delivered through a number of different central government departments, with multi-layered police responses, and NGOs (Spalek et al. 2008). Since its inception, CONTEST has been reviewed and updated several times, with the latest being 2018. Both Prevent and Pursue focus on addressing and reducing the threat of terrorism. Although they overlap, they are not the same, but this similarity has resulted in some confusion and in the 2018 review of CONTEST, attempts were made to distinguish between the two more clearly (Figure 9). The 2018 framework (Home Office 2018a, p.31) highlights that safeguarding and support of vulnerable people are at the heart of Prevent. The objectives of Prevent are to a) tackle the causes of radicalisation and respond to the ideological challenge of terrorism; b) safeguard and support those most at risk of radicalisation through early intervention, identifying them and offering support; and c) enable those who have already engaged in terrorism to disengage and rehabilitate (Home Office 2018a, p.31). The third objective was new to Prevent.

This refreshed CT strategy introduces the Desistance and Disengagement Programme (DDP), which focuses on providing support to those that are already engaged in terrorism and extremism. The programme is provided to those who are subject to court-approved conditions i.e. offenders on probation licence related to terrorism, as well as those on Terrorism Prevention Investigation Measures, or those who are subject to Temporary Exclusion Orders. It also supports the returnees from conflict zones in Syria or Iraq. Prevent works at the pre-criminal stage by stopping vulnerable individuals from being drawn into radicalisation, which could lead them to support or commit extremism or terrorism. It also extends its support to those already involved in terrorism and extremism through rehabilitation and disengagement in order to prevent them from committing further crimes. The framework explains that although there is no single factor or profile that causes someone to become involved in terrorism, there are several factors that can converge to create conditions under which radicalisation can be more likely, such as an individual’s background, personal circumstances, previous criminal activity, initial influences (people, ideas, or experiences) and ideological receptiveness (Home Office 2018a, p.32). Therefore, Prevent aims to address such factors when trying to stop people being drawn into radicalisation, extremism, and terrorism.

The 2005 London bombings highlighted the importance of community and brought a community-based approach back to the centre, as community approach for the UK was not new (Briggs 2010, p.14). The UK used the community-based approach in Northern Ireland, but it was assumed to be a redundant response in the aftermath of 9/11, as the threat was thought to be an international, foreign and highly coordinated threat (Briggs
2010, p.14). In fact, community-oriented CT policing strategies evolved in Northern Ireland in order to work more effectively with Republican groups and paramilitary Loyalist groups (White & McEvoy 2012). It was the experiences in Northern Ireland that showed CE is the cornerstone of effective CT. ’Hardware’ is useless without ‘software’ (Briggs et al. 2006, p.17).

In the 1970s and 1980s there was a militaristic approach of suppression and criminalisation to tackle the Troubles in Ireland, which resulted in a negative consequences for police-community relations (Pickering et al. 2008, p.26). Policing a divided society was very difficult, as both Protestants and Roman Catholics had their own views on the institutions of the state (i.e. legitimate or illegitimate) (Weitzer 1987). In addition, both Republicans and Irish nationalists accused the Royal Ulster Constabulary (RUC) of being a discriminatory and one-sided, since the RUC was heavily Protestant and aggressive. The RUC was later reformed and renamed the Police Service of Northern Ireland (PSNI) with the philosophy 'policing with the community', distilled into five distinct categories: accountability, empowerment, problem solving, partnership, and service delivery (Topping 2008, p.380). As such, the PSNI took a proactive approach to policing instead of a reactive approach, although in “many areas of the Province policing largely mirrors the reactive style of policing characteristic of the Troubles” (Topping 2008, p.391).

The lessons from Northern Ireland and the events of the 2005 London bombings brought back community-based CT. Briggs (2010) argues that the government responses to both 9/11 and 7/7 matched the crime: a big, bold, and international response to 9/11; and a more localized and community-led approach for the London bombings. Soon after the attacks in London, the government acknowledged the need to work in partnership with communities to prevent terrorism. The Prime Minister held a meeting with 'Muslim leaders’ (Chapter 4 discussed why such terms are problematic) and the Home Office in order to launch its Preventing Extremism Together initiative (Briggs et al. 2006, p.14) and prevention began to be delivered by the police, LA, community organisations, health and education services, and other groups.

As part of working with communities and promoting integration and cohesion, the government released the Integrated Communities Strategy in March 20188. The Green Paper sets out an ambitious programme of actions to build strong integrated communities

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8 Online at: https://www.gov.uk/government/consultations/integrated-communities-strategy-green-paper
based on shared rights, responsibilities and opportunities. Communities are the cornerstone of Prevent, enabling CONTEST to address radicalisation and extremism at a local level. Prevent’s work is similar to programmes designed to safeguard vulnerable individuals from gangs, drug abuse, and physical and sexual abuse (Home Office, 2018a, p.31). Thus, operating in a pre-criminal space with the intention of protecting vulnerable individuals, it requires a similar multi-agency approach to prevention and safeguarding.

The government introduced the Prevent Duty under the Counter-Terrorism and Security Act 2015, for specific authorities (LA, education services, health sector, prison and probation, and the police) to have due regard to the need to prevent people from being drawn into terrorism. Section 36 of the Act requires LA and other partners to support people who are at risk of being drawn into terrorism prior to them committing an offence. This prevention process is known as Channel and sits within Prevent. It uses a multi-agency approach to identify those at risk, assess the nature and extent of that risk, and develop a tailored support plan for the individual. Channel panels are responsible for managing the safeguarding risk to both children and adults and, as such, there is a need to establish processes that complying with the Children Act 1989 and Working Together to Safeguard Children 2015.

It is under the Counter-Terrorism and Security Act 2015 that LA are required to establish a multi-agency Channel panel and meet regularly. The Statutory Channel Guidance guides Channel panels on their role, the delivery of Channel, why people may be vulnerable, and the support that can be provided to safeguard those at risk. The emphasis is on Channel’s core aim of safeguarding individuals at risk of radicalisation/extremism and de-securitising the process. The Home Office proposed changes to Channel, transferring responsibilities for some elements from the police to local government, sitting more closely with LA’s wider safeguarding responsibilities (Safer and Stronger Communities Board 2018, p.2). This is known as the Dovetail Pilot (Office for Security and Counter-Terrorism 2017). In late 2016 a 12-month trial was piloted in Brighton, Croydon, Haringey, Kent, Kirklees, Lancashire, Luton, Oldham and Swansea, with the intention of adopting Dovetail across the country from the end of 2017/18.

The elements of the model required the police to continue being a key partner and assess referrals (risk of terrorism; the individual is not currently under police investigation; and

10 Online at https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/channel-guidance
that referrals are not malicious, misguided or misinformed). LAs were responsible for gathering information about referred individuals, assessing individuals’ level of risk, commissioning support for individuals from approved intervention providers, reviewing progress/risk over time, as well as administering panels and updating databases. Following the evaluation of the pilots, the Home Office proposed the model’s rollout (Safer and Stronger Communities Board 2018, p.3). Other responsibilities include those of ‘the most appropriate person’, who may be a LA employee (e.g. caseworker, teacher, probation officer) making initial visits to the individual referred, and if need be securing consent to proceed with a Channel referral. This is an important move for Prevent because it places LA at the centre of prevention. Thus, Prevent is taking a social platform rather than a policing one to guide safeguarding against radicalisation/extremism. After all, Prevent’s role is to tackle the causes and risk factors that can lead an individual becoming radicalised, support those at risk through early intervention, and rehabilitate those who have already engaged with terrorism. The 2018 CONTEST revision emphasises this multi-agency approach to prevention, which influences practices of CE.

5.3.2 Counterterrorism Community Engagement in Practice

In West Yorkshire, there are approximately 16 Police Officers, Prevent officers, and Prevent Support Officers that work fulltime on prevention, with five being located in Leeds, the largest city in the region. The Home Office recognises LA areas across the UK on the basis on risk as either Priority (Tier 1 and 2) or non-Priority (Tier 3) areas. Tier 3 or non-priority areas receive no specific funding for Prevent activities. This is the case for some of the areas within West Yorkshire. The allocation of Prevent Officers is based on tiers. Tier 1 is considered top priority, there are less of those in the country but there is a lot more funding for those- for the LA and the police - which attracts more staff to cover that extra workload. Tier two in West Yorkshire has approximately five Prevent Officers; some of those might be Prevent Support Officers, which is a civilian role. They have a similar role to support the Prevent Officers but they are not warranted officers, therefore they cannot complete all the tasks that a warrant officer would do. A tier 3 in West Yorkshire might have one Prevent Officer.
The engagement is centred on three core aims: tackle causes of radicalisation, early intervention, and rehabilitation (Figure 10). The first two of the aims operate in a pre-criminal stage; it is about ensuring the individual does not commit a crime. Engagement on tackling causes of radicalisation is community-based engagement, which includes efforts to address social issues that converge to create the conditions under which radicalisation can occur. The CE delivered at this level aims to address those individual factors more broadly at the community level, which may require targeted engagements with various parts of the community in order to build resilience. Therefore, at this level,
the target audience is the general public and engagement can take the form of community events that focus on promoting cultural insight or organised sports events. This kind of engagement is focused on addressing socio-economic issues that might make community members feel disengaged, detached, segregated, and marginalised at a local and national level, rather just focusing on Prevent related issues. Prevent-related engagements were delivered in conjunction with raising awareness about other risks such as anti-social behaviour, speeding, littering, and so on. Engagement at this level is centred on inclusivity, cohesion, and integration. The practitioners focus on building trusting relationships and engaging in dialogue, as well as empowering the communities. As evident, engagement at this level is not necessarily CT related. In fact, practitioners deal with some mundane tasks such as parking in order to build those vital relationships between the community and authorities.

The delivery of engagement is all about making it relevant to the end-user and finding the right medium through which to communicate key messages. In the context of CT, key messages were communicated through engagement with education services, mosques, churches, social media, community-based events, open days, community centres and organisations, and community cohesion events, ensuring people feel that their voices are heard; their needs are addressed; and that they have access to support that encourages integration within the community. At this level, the practitioners raise awareness, both online and offline, of Prevent, radicalisation, extremism, and terrorism. The LA and the local police use their social media platforms to raise awareness of local issues and local community events.

This is multi-layered engagement that starts with general outreach dealing with daily issues, followed by dealing with specific issues impacting one community more than the other, issues that are not observed by the public or are ignored. At the top of sits more specific engagement focused on crimes that need to be addressed at the national level such as CT, modern day slavery, female genital mutilation (FGM), child sexual exploitation, etc. For the purposes of this thesis, CT related engagement is placed at the top of the pyramid. It is at this level that training is provided to those employees who are based in any of the listed ‘specified authorities’: LA; schools and registered childcare providers; higher education; the health sector; prisons and the probationary services (including under-18 secure environments); and the Police. However, this training is also available to those in a position to safeguard, such as religious institutions. Table 3 presents a list of training available to frontline practitioners and those in safeguarding roles.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Training</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Introduction to Prevent e-Learning package</td>
<td>An introduction to the risks of radicalisation and the role that professionals and practitioners can play in supporting those at risk.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prevent e-Learning training</td>
<td>An introduction to the Prevent duty and how it aims to safeguard vulnerable people from being radicalised to supporting terrorism or becoming terrorists themselves.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Workshop to Raise Awareness of Prevent (WRAP)</td>
<td>A workshop DVD that explains Prevent, the radicalisation process, how to identify at-risk students, how to raise concerns and what an appropriate response looks like. Local Prevent partners may be able to help organise a personalised WRAP training workshop if requested.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Channel General Awareness training</td>
<td>An online course that explains the Channel programme and how Prevent works to provide a proportionate response in supporting vulnerable people who have not committed a crime.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Counter-Extremism: Narratives and Conversations</td>
<td>An interactive video resource which lays out the principles applying to all forms of extremism. It helps with counter-extremist narratives and helps facilitate discussion on respect, tolerance, shared values and community cohesion.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prevent for Further Education and Training</td>
<td>Guidance, sample risk assessments, policies and procedures for people working in colleges and universities, along with resources and links to videos and other relevant websites.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 3: Types of CT training available to frontline practitioners and those in the position of safeguarding.

Early intervention engagement is targeted at those at risk of radicalisation/extremism, as identified through risk assessment and intelligence. Such engagement is targeted and tailor-made for the individual at risk, provided through Channel. Once a referral is received by a representative from local partnerships that delivers Channel and Prevent, they will carry out an assessment using Vulnerability Assessment Framework (VAF)\(^{11}\) of the referral based on the three Ms (Malicious, Misguided, or Misinformed) to ensure there is enough evidence supporting the case. This is similar to the process flow diagram provided by the Home Office (Figure 11).

\(^{11}\) VAF assesses whether individuals need to be supported and safeguarded against being targeted by terrorists and radicalisers. The framework complements the local practitioners’ professional judgement. The framework covers 22 factors that may cause someone to: engage with a terrorist group, cause or ideology, develop the intent to cause harm and/or, develop the capability to cause harm.
Once the referral is made, it is then forwarded to CTU, which have five days to assess the intelligence and risks associated to the case, and to decide whether the referral will go to Channel or not (this is also known as five days de-confliction). Both the CTU and local partnership representatives might liaise with the referrer, the vulnerable adult/child, their relatives (if necessary), social care, probation, housing, mental health services, and any other relevant agencies in order to gain more information. This is a snowballing style of questioning that looks at unearthing the thinking process behind the report to ensure that there is supporting evidence for such concerns. If the referral is deemed a case for safeguarding against radicalisation/extremism, the CTU will pass it to the Channel panel, a multi-agency partnership chaired by the LA, to provide tailor-made support to the vulnerable individual. This is a voluntary initiative that provides many types of support, addressing educational, vocational, mental health, and other vulnerabilities. Ideological mentoring is common. Therefore, the programme focuses on the individual’s identity and needs in order to empower and promote their progress within a cohesive society. Those who do not meet the requirements for Channel, are no longer a concern, or drop out of the programme, may be offered alternative forms of support by the LA or other providers (Home Office 2017, p.6). The rehabilitation level was introduced after the data collection for this thesis. Unfortunately, the thesis cannot provide material on this level of engagement, but the assumption is that a similar service to Channel is provided to those

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**Figure 11:** Prevent Process Flow Diagram (Home Office 2017, p.6)
who have committed terrorist and extremist-related crimes, with the intention to de-radicalise and rehabilitate these individuals.

5.3.3 Gold-Silver-Bronze Commands & Multi-Agency Partnership

Central to the engagement framework is a multi-agency (e.g. Police, Counter Terrorism Unit, Education Services, Mental Health, Social Services, etc.) structure known as the Gold-Silver-Bronze command\(^\text{12}\) (Figure 12), which oversees the implementation of the government’s CT strategy and guidelines. They decide how and what engagement is delivered.

The command structure is applied to the resolution of both spontaneous incidents and planned operations. There are two sets of Gold-Silver-Bronze command groups: the CONTEST group and the Prevent group. The former is more focused on the implementation of all strands of CT strategy (not just Prevent). It does, however, have several aims in relation to preventing extremism. The CONTEST group aims to address a lack of uniformity across the boroughs; provide for greater oversight of how money is being spent; make sure that all partners understand the nature of the threat; and improve transparency (Police and Crime Committee 2015, p.29). The Prevent group differs from the CONTEST group in that it only focuses on the implementation of Prevent and its guidelines. It is in place to bring together government and other agencies that are working on Prevent. This board provides a space in which to share good practice and discuss risks. It also works as a medium for senior officials to feed information about Prevent back to their local borough. Both command groups follow the same structure and meet on a frequent basis. The Gold board meets on a quarterly basis, whilst the Silver and Bronze meet every eight weeks, although their meetings may be more frequent should circumstances require.

\(^{12}\) The Gold-Silver-Bronze command structure is nationally recognised, accepted and used by the police, other emergency services and partner agencies to establish a hierarchical structure for command to control incidents of emergency and disaster. Whilst this framework was designed for emergencies, it has been successfully utilised for pre-planned operations. The command structure was introduced after Broadwater Farm riot in October 1985, which led to the murder of a police constable. The investigations highlighted that the usual rank-based command system was inappropriate for sudden events, as it was not clear who was actually in charge of the operation that fateful night. It was realised that three essential roles (gold, silver, and bronze) were required for these situations to highlight strategic, tactical and operational responsibilities and accountabilities. The framework allows processes to be established that facilitate the flow of information, and ensures that decisions are communicated effectively and documented as part of an audit trail (College of Policing, 2013a).
At the top of the hierarchy sits the Gold group, a strategic steering board that is responsible for oversight of delivering the Prevent objectives and action plan, based on the current and emerging terrorism risk for their district. The Gold commanders assume and retain overall command for the operation or incident, as well as being in control of their organisational resources for the operation. They oversee the parameters the Silver and the Bronze commanders have to follow. Although the Gold command does not make tactical decisions, they are held accountable for ensuring that any tactics deployed are proportionate to the risks identified, meet the objectives of the strategy, and are legally compliant (College of Policing 2013). At the Gold level, chief executives and the like from various organisations and authorities meet to discuss threats and vulnerabilities at district and national level, and try to implement standard practices at the very senior level. By setting these priorities, the Gold Group requests Action Plans from Silver group, asking what is being delivered in order to meet those priorities, providing evidence of impact and so forth.

The Silver group manages the command and coordinates tactical responses in line with the strategies set by the Gold group. Their main objective is to identify and manage terrorism risks to the district and the individual(s) through risk assessment and control measures set by the Prevent Action Plan. The Action Plan is developed and implemented through this multi-agency medium, which sets out clear, realistic and effective deliverables (owned by and delivered through the partnership) that address the issues raised in the Counter-Terrorism Local Profiles (CTLPs) and reduce the risk of
radicalisation in the district. It is through these Action Plans that performance is measured, assessed and actions going forward are agreed.

The Bronze command is the delivery and operational group and is usually the level that deals with referrals. It undertakes, coordinates, and monitors Prevent-related operational strategies and tactics set by the Gold and Silver groups. The delivery of tasks is in accordance with the priorities set by the Silver command, and the Bronze group take the operational decisions necessary to accomplish those tactical plans. At the Bronze level, training is frequently discussed, what is delivered, what needs to be delivered, and shortage of training. The Action Plans set by the Silver group are passed to the Bronze group and each division has an Action Plan e.g. the Neighbourhood Team has an Action Plan, as well as Prevent and Channel. The Bronze groups distribute these Action Plans to their partners and request feedback: e.g. what has been done in their area in relation to this objective. Once the Bronze group has all the feedback, they identify any gaps in the action plan. Any objective from the Action Plan not met will be rolled over onto the next upcoming Action Plan, as they get reviewed and updated frequently.

Although this might not be the case for every region, it is likely that all the partners sitting at the Bronze level will be on the Channel Panel. Hence, there will normally be a representative from the LA who chairs the Channel Panel. The Bronze Prevent Group, where the Channel Panel sits, discuss any live cases on Channel, support for individuals on a case-by-case basis, their progress, or bring new cases to the panel. For example, one of the objectives on the Action Plan might be to identify and assess threats. The Action Plan has set questions that partners need to answer. These may include ‘have any of your community/working environment came across any stickers with group logos like National Action, National Front, or any of these groups?; ‘have you picked up any of these stickers and where have these stickers been located?’ Therefore, the Gold-Silver-Bronze committee act as a harmonising mechanism that encourages the application of CONTEST and the Prevent strategy within different partner agencies. Additionally, it encourages multi-agency partnership in relation to CT at different levels of the organisational hierarchy. At these meetings, the committee is able to inform partners about current issues at national and local level, and identify appropriate interventions. All groups discuss the threat update and what has happened since the last meeting; internationally, nationally and specific in for West Yorkshire. This gives the partners an up-to-date view of the picture, and where they need to concentrate. Therefore, this can be a top-down approach to prevention. Once the information is gathered, the intelligence is fed back into the system by the Bronze team.
It is this structure that drives those operational relationships. It is necessary to have different areas of understanding and responsibility. Hence, this framework provides engagement at three major levels in organisations creating top-down and bottom-up information-sharing. The command structure operates top-bottom; however, through a bottom-up approach, it gains insight to amend strategies and tactics.

5.4 Comparative Analysis

5.4.1 Birds of A Feather: Defining Community Engagement

From the interviews, it was clear that although CE was referred to as outreach in East Jutland, nonetheless it had similar meaning for practitioners in West Yorkshire. Consistent with the definition presented in Chapter 1, both West Yorkshire and East Jutland practitioners viewed CE as a versatile and dynamic tool that facilitated interaction, involvement and exchange between the authorities and the community, as well as individuals. Practitioners agreed CE enabled building relationships, trust, identify problems, reach out to hard-to-reach groups, encouraged partnership, as well as informing and educating the community but more importantly help with prevention and safeguarding. It was also identified that dialogue was a major cog in CE and important for its effectiveness: "We have to talk to people and [...] Dialogue is very important for us and our work." (SP5) Although respondents from both regions expressed the importance of the dialogic element of CE, the East Jutland practitioner emphasised dialogue to a much greater extent in comparison to their counterparts in West Yorkshire, in some ways mirroring the CTCE strategy applied in each region (see Table 4). This is not to say that dialogue was not as important for West Yorkshire in CE; rather, East Jutland views emphasised more the importance of dialogue as a bridge-building tool and greatly invested in it, whereas, for West Yorkshire community was central to CE and greater emphasis was placed here.
### Table 4: Overview of CTCE in East Jutland and West Yorkshire

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Description</th>
<th>East Jutland</th>
<th>West Yorkshire</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Description</strong></td>
<td>Three levels of engagement: general, specific, &amp; targeted. The intensity of engagement &amp; target audience varies at each level.</td>
<td>Engagement is organised around three core aims: tackle causes of radicalisation, early intervention, &amp; rehabilitation. The intensity of engagement &amp; target audience varies at each level.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Target Audience</strong></td>
<td>1. First responders or practitioners 2. Local Community Organisations/NGOs 3. Youth/pupils/students 4. Parents 5. At risk individuals</td>
<td>1. First responders or practitioners 2. Local Community Organisations/NGOs 3. Youth/pupils/students 4. At risk individuals</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Central Infrastructure</strong></td>
<td>Info-House works as a central hub, where information and specialists are made available to the general public, practitioners, and vulnerable individuals. Additionally, it brings together partner agencies in a physical space and harmonises the work of prevention.</td>
<td>The Gold-Silver-Bronze committees work as a harmonising hand in the application of CONTEST and Prevent strategy in different organisations. It is a multiagency board, and enforces the appropriate practice at different levels of the hierarchy: strategic (senior managers and directors), tactical (managers), and operational (frontline staff).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Deliverables</strong></td>
<td>1. Workshop: formalized 2 X 45 min. interactive lessons about radicalisation, everyday democracy and how to deal with bias. The workshop is informed by research in fields of psychology, social anthropology, and political science. 2. Awareness briefings: presentation about radicalisation, what can be done about it and contact-information for risk assessment. The workshop is what most resembles WRAP in concept, while the awareness briefings most resemble WRAP in content.</td>
<td>1. Introduction to Prevent e-Learning package 2. Workshop to Raise Awareness of Prevent (WRAP) 3. Channel General Awareness training 4. Counter-Extremism: Narratives and Conversations (London Grid for Learning) 5. Prevent for Further Education and Training 6. Prevent e-Learning training This thesis failed to find information on how these training programmes were designed (See Table 3).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Pre-criminal stage prevention</strong></td>
<td>The Info-House provides early intervention support to the individual based on the risk assessment. These may include mental health, education, career, relations etc. Participation is voluntary. They also work very closely with relatives and provide them with guidance and support, e.g. Parent Network.</td>
<td>Channel provides early intervention support &amp; aims to safeguard the vulnerable individual based on risk assessment. These may include mental health, education, career, relations etc. Participation is voluntary.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Disengagement and Deradicalisation Engagement</strong></td>
<td>Exit Programme - participation is voluntary</td>
<td>Desistance and Disengagement Programme (DDP) — compulsory participation</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Moreover, CE was viewed by both as tailored and specific to the needs of individuals and communities, providing freedom in the level of participation whilst empowering individuals and communities in order to encourage their participation:

"CE is specific to the communities in which we serve, it is not generic. One model doesn't fit all. It is about understanding the community, in terms of the demographic, the geography of the areas, the tensions, looking at the politics. It's all about having a real deep understanding, in terms of what our community wants, needs, and what level of engagement they seek. [...] It is not just us that determines how we are going to engage our community, but also it is about empowering our communities. [...] We shouldn't just decide what we think works best. We should have meaningful conversations and have some really difficult conversations, as well." (SP1)

Similar to West Yorkshire, East Jutland practitioners agreed that CE was a tool that allowed both practitioners and communities, or individuals, to identify their own limitations in finding solutions to problems:

"CE allows us to encourage the community to work together and to get involved. Together with the community we talk about what they can do and identify problems, but they can also come back to us and say ‘can you do
something to help us solve this problem?” [...] It’s about talking to the community and getting them involved.” (SYS1)

Additionally, CE was viewed as a partnership that enabled a better problem-solving approach, as practitioners recognised that each partner could bring forth a different set of skills and resources. More importantly, it enabled the partners to share information, which assisted with prevention. It was believed that, with the appropriate level of intelligence and judgements, actions can be more calculated to address problems appropriately. As such CE was viewed as more effective when delivered through a multi-agency approach, as problems and prevention were believed to be multifaceted, and in need of an holistic approach (in line with Chapter 2 and existing CT strategies). Most importantly CE was viewed as a vital strategy that, if not delivered, could result in the gap between the public and authorities widening. Therefore, the use of dialogue through CE could help to build a closer community and identify a common goal:

“CE is crucial. If we don’t do it, if we don’t concentrate on it, it will very soon end in ‘us and them’. It is a question of bringing people together instead of dividing them, and this is a legitimate problem. How do you bring people together instead of dividing them? The answer is language, talking, most importantly making sure that you are talking about the same thing.” (MU1)

Moreover, the West Yorkshire practitioners like East Jutland explained CE to be multi-layered that was guided by the needs of the individuals and communities:

“CE from my perspective is multi-layered [...] and has to be based upon the needs of those individuals and the community groups.” (SP2)

These findings illustrate that East Jutland and West Yorkshire viewed CE in the same light. The similarity between how the practitioners defined, understood, and expressed CE provides a relatively clear indication of the aim of CE and what the practitioners hoped to achieve by implementing it. However, as the next section will present, there are similarities and differences in the way in which CE is practised in these regions. It was important to first establish that CE was defined in a similar way before such a comparison in practice was made. This creates a baseline line of what CE should be and how practitioners translate this into practice.
5.4.2 Similarities

Engagement in East Jutland and West Yorkshire is multi-layered and the intensity and the target audience varies at each level. Both styles of CTCE engage with the general public, those specifically vulnerable, and those who have already been involved in extremism. As part of their engagement, both East Jutland and West Yorkshire focus on empowerment, use of dialogue, and building relationships. Additionally, the use of training and workshops is evident in both entities as a form of engagement to raise awareness about radicalisation and extremism. They both take a multi-agency approach to the prevention of radicalisation and extremism, and have infrastructure in place that encourages this multiagency approach. For example, the Info-House works as a physical hub that brings together different partner agencies to work towards preventing radicalisation and extremism. Also, networks like SSP, PSP, and KSP also enforce multiagency practice. In West Yorkshire, the Gold-Silver-Bronze commands work as a harmonising infrastructure in implementing CONTEST and the Prevent strategy.

The pre-criminal stage interventions and engagement in East Jutland and West Yorkshire are similar, as they both assess the risk to and needs of the individual and provide tailor-made engagement and intervention. The participation of the vulnerable is completely voluntary at this stage. The targeted engagement is focused on rehabilitating those who have been involved in extremism and are put through the Exit programme. Similar to the previous level, engagement with relatives and parents is sought when possible. The Exit programme engagement is comparable to that of the UK’s DDP, which this thesis does not have information on. Both West Yorkshire and East Jutland focus on connecting with individual identity, although the Info-House practitioners seem to have a better understanding and grasp of the importance of using a psychological approach. Nevertheless, the two strategies invest in connecting with identities in order to build relationships. For example, a Youth Service representative in East Jutland explained:

"We have to sew a seed. You have to be very normal about a lot of things. You have to find a way in. You try to find one identity that you can match with them so that you can build a relationship. Especially at the start; because with each person you need to have something in common to have a connection with them. It’s like these youngsters can get a mirror and see themselves in you in some way. This method works.”(YS2)

The practitioner clearly highlights that building relationships is a process that needs specific skills. It requires the individual to be aware of the target audience and various
commonalities that can be used as a gateway to building relationships. It is important to strike a balance between being ‘normal’ and the ability to ‘mirror’, as it is about being genuine and using similarities to connect. Similarly, in West Yorkshire, others reported how they utilised identity and self-categorisation in building relationships. One way this was achieved was by sharing personal experiences that people could relate to in order to build commonalities, such as being a parent. By finding common ground through personal experiences, barriers were broken and rapport was built. For instance, it was explained by a CT Police Officer that some of the people they engage with are supporters of far-right ideologies. They come from white, rough, ex-miner areas. Engaging with these individuals is risky and challenging and consequently, practitioners try to engage with this group using humour or personal experience — sharing with them that their own family member was also a miner, for example — in order to connect with these individuals. Moreover, practitioners in both East Jutland and West Yorkshire explained that connecting with individuals also involved appearance. Practitioners realised that how formal they looked could have an influence on building relationships, especially at the beginning. For examples police officers mention that when attending community meetings they would avoid wearing their uniform to encourage engagement. They wanted people to feel comfortable approaching them to talk before the officer revealed that they worked for the police force. They explained that migrant communities did not have a good experience or perception of police forces. Generally, it was felt that being mindful of the target audience included thinking about how to present oneself:

13 “I’ve worked with right wing guys who were covered in tattoos, National Front stickers on their forehead [...] who came from a really White, rough, council estate with lots of poverty. [...] You knock on doors sometimes, and people have weapons for intense. There is knives on walls and flags, and you’re thinking ‘my God what am I doing here?!’ [...] I have to approach them from a different angle, try to be funny and make humour. [...] You try to look for something that you’ve got in common. Like on my grandparents were miners for instance, and they might be a miner and worked down the pit for years. Straight away [...] you can talk to each other because of that similarity in life. [...] So I bring in some of my own personal experience to build those relationships. I have a son who is 18 and I often use that as an example because sometimes you go in and you are a) a police officer, b) you’re a CT officer. They are really defensive of their child. They almost think you’re there to judge their parenting skills. To put them at ease I often say ‘you know, I’ve been in your shoes’, and I give an example of something that has gone wrong with my children, bad judgements [...] and try to get them at ease and talking.” (P2)

14 “We did have a problem with engagement around the uniform, is uniform a good thing or a bad thing? and where to play it? Depending on where we were going we had to change 3-4 times a day some times, because if you went in community centres sometimes you want to be identified as a police officer so that people could come to you and speak to you about different things. But if you go to the African communities with your uniform, they are out of the backdoor. So sometimes we go without uniform and talk to people. Once we’ve had a conversation with them we say ‘oh by the way I’m a police officer’ [...] By then you have broken the ice and spoke to them a little bit [...] and eventually you get to talk to them and you get to know all the coffee shops and places people go and meet.” (P2)
"For example, if I am meeting with a Muslim family and I know that the father is very religious then I would think about what to wear when I meet him. Or if I am hanging out with the youngsters then I wear jeans and sneakers. I think about my look and appearance." (CW1)

It is important to note that these practitioners are not required to change their clothes, but rather behave in this manner because they believe it helps them to connect with individuals much better.

Practitioners also engaged with people to investigate referrals. It was explained that the style in conversation, from appearance to the tone of voice, had an impact on the relationship:

“I've got a soft voice, and I don't like to go in uniform. Sometimes it is taking your tie off, a bit more easy on the eye when you are not so formal. Make them relax, get them a drink, make them comfortable and then you can start talking.” (P2)

Another similarity in connecting with an individual's identity that was seen in both West Yorkshire and East Jutland was that people delivering the CE needed to represent the structure of their communities i.e. the team needed to demographically represent the communities that they served. This was mainly seen in youth service and LA; the police practitioners did not mention this. It was believed that having practitioners from the same or similar background could speed the process of building close relationships. This was not to say that those from a different background were not capable of building a good, solid relationship, rather it might take a longer time for them to do so.\(^{15}\) It was often believed that colleagues from cultures and specific communities could provide insider insight to that culture and the best ways to interact with a said community due to sensitivities within those cultures and groups that would otherwise be unknown to the practitioners. It was argued that such insight could tailor the engagement in order to connect with identities, rather create barriers by causing offence:

\(^{15}\) "I think that it is very important for the youth workers to represent the actual community and their neighbourhood that they live in. This could be a positive thing for CE. Also, it helps the public build relationships with the municipality and the police. I think that the speed of how we can get a close contact would be a lot faster when we [...] use someone from their own background than using a young blonde Danish girl, for example, to build a relationship. I am sure the young blonde Danish practitioner could do the task; however, it could take a long time before the family actually accept and understand her. So it speeds up the process by having ethnic minority youth workers. Having all these ethnic minority youth workers can represent the general Danish community, not just Caucasian but also the multicultural Danish community, where we have all the immigrants in as well as the Caucasian Danish. It is good to have an organisation that mirrors the society." (SYS1)
“First of all you have to be aware who you are working with and sensitivities within those communities. Obviously, we have Asian employees, Polish employees, and so on. We ask them for assistance how would you communicate? What would you feel would be more appropriate or beneficial? So we have a lot of input from our own staff, and our community contacts.” (LA2)

Moreover, both entities used dialogue to build relationships, address concerns, and identify problems. However, again Info-House practitioners were more aware of the power of dialogue and it was a key component of their engagement approach. Whilst in West Yorkshire, the dialogue was used more in line with counter-narrative and challenging extremist ideologies, in addition to building relationships. Nevertheless, the dialogue was seen as vital to engagement by both parties. Both CTCE approaches were relationship-oriented and focused on building long term trusting relationships with communities and individuals. They both focused on empowerment and supporting the communities they served. In fact, some of this support had no connection to CT-related issues (e.g. parking or family-related issues), but these platforms were used to gain trust and build bridges.

The CE was problem-oriented in West Yorkshire and East Jutland, and through the identification of problems, the engagement was tailored, whether at the individual or community level. For example, the Info-Hose reached out to the Somali communities who argued that they needed a community centre for children and families entertained. Similarly, West Yorkshire had the same request from Kurdish and Syrian communities. By providing the community centres, the police practitioners were able to build strong relationships with them but also ensure prevention. Another example is when there was a fear of youth delinquency, and therefore a desire for a space for young people:

“There is a large construction work taking place in the area and the contractors, communities, and the police were very worried about what the young people would get up to. Would they spoil the machines? Or steal them? So I thought if we are to have control over the young people, I have to get a football field. Now I have the most beautiful football field in Aarhus, thanks to the Mayor, to keep the young people busy.” (MU1)

Finally, the data revealed that transparency is vital to a trusting relationship and prevention. Both West Yorkshire and East Jutland illustrated transparency in practice; however, it should be noted that the police in West Yorkshire were more transparent than
the LA. For example, due to fear of scaring people from attending awareness training, some LA would not openly advertise prior to the training session that they were also going to cover Prevent whilst talking about FGM and human slavery.

5.4.3 Differences

One key difference between the CTCE approaches is that the Info-House practitioners work closely with relatives of vulnerable individuals, including returnee foreign-born fighters. From the interviews, it became clear that the Info-House used their previous experience of working with parents in order to prevent young people from being involved in delinquency. It was clear that practitioners recognised that families were helpless in protecting their loved ones from radicalisation and extremism. These families did not receive support from other agencies or politicians such as the Intelligence Service or ministers, thus were left frustrated and powerless. The Info-House practitioners understood this void in services and started working closely with relatives. These families were desperate for help:

“I would meet with families and discuss the issues. They felt relieved because the authorities couldn’t help them but at least there was someone like me who would meet with them, who would listen to them, who knew something about these things [radicalisation and extremism], who could advise them on this stuff because of his experience. I would tell them ‘you are unhappy, this is a bad situation for you but you are not alone, we have others who are experiencing the same thing’; and somehow they feel like they have come to the right place.” (IHP2)

The practitioners repeatedly mentioned the importance of inclusion — especially families, empowerment and inducing a sense of responsibility when it comes to prevention of

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16 With radicalisation we started working with families when foreign fighters started leaving. Not every parent came to the police but others did. The parents were very frustrated, scared, and very angry. The problem was that their kids were 18-19 years old and did not need parental authorisation for travel, and at the time it wasn’t illegal for people to travel to conflict zones. [...] So the parents were helpless, they couldn’t do anything. They went to the foreign ministry and the Intelligence Service, they couldn’t help them. So it had to be us, and we had some previous experience working with the parents for prevention purposes. For example, we had a girl gang problem that didn’t do crime but if left, in the long run, they would have. So the method was to involve the parents and tell them what was going on and in that way you involve the family to do the crime prevention with you. Together with the school we invited the parents because the school was worried and we were worried. Both the school and I presented our concerns and what was going on. The parents knew that the girls were going out with some girls but they never knew what was going on. By having that meeting we alerted them and they took action. They started to make contact with each other, calling each other. It took one hour of our time, which enabled us to mobilise the parents to take care of the situation, to take care of their kids; and somehow the problem disappeared.” (IHP2)
radicalisation and extremism. Therefore, recognising the family could assist with the prevention of radicalisation and extremism rather being thought of as hindering, risky, or just a source of intelligence. Another example involved the Info-House, as part of the Exit Programme, working with the widow of a high-ranked Jihadist and her sons, as part of their Exit programme. The widow had a hard time leaving the Jihadist environment and the Info-House had helped her. As a result of this intervention and close working relationship, the ex-Jihadi widow reported her own son who was trying to leave for Syria and join his elder brother who was fighting for Daesh:

“His mother phoned me and said ‘I think my son is trying to deceive me. I think there is something going on and he is on his way to Syria’. Of course, I had to inform the Intelligence Services and he was arrested with another guy in Turkey trying to get into Islamic State. While they were in prison, I told her that ‘we will still try to help you, we will not leave you with this. We can help your son to have a good life once he is released from prison.’ [...] For her this was a much easier decision because she said ‘yes, my son is in prison but he is alive, I can visit him in comparison to him going to Islamic State and I never see him again or end up dead.’ So for her, this was acceptable given the circumstances.” (IHP2)

In fact, the Info-House practitioners not only worked with families in general, but they also worked closely with families of returnees, as well as extremist families in order to ensure the possibility of prevention. Although practitioners mentioned that some cases were harder than others, and working with families was not possible in all cases, nevertheless the Info-House does not shy away from working with such challenging cases. As part of supporting families and including them in the prevention work, the Info-House, created the Parent Network, which was designed for the use of parents and relatives of those who were radicalised or involved in extremism. Practitioners explained how the Parent Network had helped practitioners to gain the trust and support of the families, and in addition, had a positive impact on families directly reporting their concerns about their loved ones to the Info-house:

“Working with Parent Network helped us to build trust and this led to me getting a huge amount of information because those families knew what was going on in Syria. They wanted to inform me because they saw that we are in the same boat now, they trusted me and we were working together against
the extremists and terrorists. The information helped us to predict and prepare for when someone hopefully came back home.” (IHP2)

Unfortunately, in West Yorkshire, aftercare and support for reporters and specifically for relatives was non-existent. There are no workshops or networks designed specifically for relatives for further guidance and support. Working together with relatives was mainly for the purposes of intelligence-gathering. However, one senior police officer explained that although there is no formal structure in place to provide such support to families, there are bespoke approaches for some individual cases:

“I don’t know if we have a formal structure like the Parent Network delivered by the Info-House. We have individuals that are trained, as what we call Community Contact Officers. They will maintain contact with that family and provide support, a bit like the Family Liaison Officer. In individual cases, we would put families together to provide support to each other, but again it is very much a bespoke case and approach. [...] We have a number of projects that have got lots of experience dealing with radicalisation, and families have been involved in those projects and would have met other people who had been previously radicalised. (SP2)”

The interview also highlighted reasons for not being able to provide a formal Parent Network similar to the one delivered by the Info-House. It was explained that such networks could potentially be an environment where radicalisation is further spread. Moreover, it was argued because not many families from West Yorkshire travelled to conflict zones, there was no need to set up support within the region for relatives of those who were involved in radicalisation, extremism or terrorism. Moreover, it was agreed that the style of communication was key to connecting with the individual. It became

17 Family Liaison Officers (FLOs) are specially trained to provide a two-way flow of information between families and the investigation teams. FLOs are usually assigned in any situation where a point of contact between the family and the police is deemed essential. Since 1999, the UK Police has assigned FLOs to assist families who have lost relatives in terrorist attacks or major disasters. They help support the family through the police investigation, answer questions and gather important information about the person who has died. They also keep the family updated on the progress of the investigation.

18 “Our concern, I suppose, is that it is something that you’ve got to manage very carefully because you’re potentially putting two radicalised families together who are going to bounce off each other, and actually reinforce each other’s radical views in some respect. So it’s that balancing act, the support and the benefit of that. [...] In reality, we might have had one family where somebody travels from a particular city. Obviously the Syria issue particular impacts the Muslim communities. Muslim communities are quite geographically based and are quite self-supporting if you like. The support that’s been provided to people tends to be very local within their own community. But because we haven’t had mass number of families travel from Bradford or Dewsbury or Leeds there hasn’t been, I suppose, the sense of there being a need to setup something in the city where people could come together to talk about those issues.” (SP2)
evident that the Info-House practitioners consciously tried, to be compassionate and empathetic. For example, being close to the individual, touching their hand in comfort or showing empathy through language and tone of voice was thought to be of value when connecting with reporters, especially the relative reporters (in line with the warmth-competency theory discussed in Chapter 3):

"I was alone with the parents, just them and me in the room, and we were very close [...] It is about things like being near each other, sitting opposite them with open body language and welcoming [...] and maybe touching their hands to comfort them. It is about being close to each other and having that contact. They need to feel it [compassion, empathy, and authenticity]. We had to be close." (IPH2)

West Yorkshire practitioners also explained that they were sympathetic. However, during the interviews practitioners did not use specific language or examples like the Info-House practitioners. In contrast to West Yorkshire, the Info-House focused more on the individual and their immediate surrounding when it came to engagement, taking a more inclusive and comprehensive approach to prevention by ensuring the individual's environment was 'healthy'. Thus, it could be argued that their CTCE was 'heavier' at the specific and targeted level, whereas, the West Yorkshire CTCE was focused on engaging directly with communities and faith institutions, as well as NGOs that represented specific communities.

As a result of this individual focus, the Info-House practitioners explained that it was vital to know the individual and the elements of their identity, which could help build a relationship in order to help both prevention and the individual progress. For example, in one particular case, the vulnerable individual who had been receiving help from the Info-House was a father to a toddler, which the practitioners used to connect with him and
induce a sense of responsibility. Additionally, West Yorkshire does not have a physical hub centre like the Info-House in Aarhus, which is open to the general public, practitioners, and vulnerable individuals to discuss any concerns they may have about radicalisation or extremism. Both West Yorkshire and East Jutland practitioners held partnership meetings on a regular basis to discuss at-risk cases or current rising risks. However, this thesis identified that West Yorkshire’s ‘regular meetings’ in fact did not take place all the time. Instead, meetings were sometimes held based on the need at the time; hence at times, such meetings were postponed to a later date meaning that there were longer gaps in between each meeting. This involved all levels of the Gold, Silver, Bronze group.

In contrast to West Yorkshire, East Jutland has not invested or employed publicly available counter-narrative campaigns engaging in extremist or terrorist narratives. Instead, dialogue is a solid foundation for engaging in difficult conversations, and East Jutland has not shied away from controversies. For example, in collaboration with Strong Cities in 2015, the Info-House set up a conference on prevention of radicalisation and extremism. At this event, they had invited Imams from a controversial mosque in order to encourage dialogue. Additionally, Info-House actively sought media platforms to raise awareness about Info-House and what they did, and why.

Finally, unlike the UK’s Prevent strategy and the Channel programme, the Info-House and their approach to prevention are not practised across Denmark. Info-House was a pilot study, which is being considered for national roll out.

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19 “You have to find where their pressure points are. [...] I know these pressure points and I use them. For example, we had a Jihadist [...] he had a family, a 3 years old son. [Before he went to gaol] I got in trouble with him, because when he became a father I knew he was planning to travel to Syria, and so I wrote a social report. The social services presented this report to him by mistake. So he called me one day through another person, not threaten me but he said you better be careful. [...] So I reached out to him, and said ‘don’t misunderstand this. I can understand why you are angry; my reason for this is that I’m not worried about you, because you can do whatever you like. But my only reason is there is child, and we have to take care of this. We have to take care of your wife and your kid. My hope for you is that you can bring up your kid and family in a secure and safe manner. This is my dream and this is why I did this.’ He accepted it [...] Anyway he went to gaol and his son was turning three-year-old, so I arranged a meeting for them in prison. His son was running around and looking at him, [...] you could see that they were very close before. [...] He and his wife were nearly not talking to each other. So when I was alone with him I told him that it really hurts me to see his son running around and doesn’t understand why his father is in this room. His personality is being shaped right now. I told him, ‘somehow I could see your story being told again. You spoke to me about how your father beat you and your mother, and left you. This is happening again now. You have to see this’. You know, I could see that was his pressure point and I w as using it because that vulnerability is the result of caring and compassion.” (IHP2)
5.5 Discussion

This chapter explored how CTCE was defined and practised in East Jutland and West Yorkshire, in order to gain a better understanding of CTCE and use this insight to inform better practice with the intention to improve and encourage reporting behaviour. This led to an exploration of the shape and details of each CTCE strategy. The chapter highlighted how 9/11 was a catalyst for each country to take a more comprehensive approach to develop CT strategies: Denmark introduced the Action Plan and the UK, CONTEST, which includes Prevent. More importantly, events in Europe such as the 7/7 London terrorist attacks that gave rise to concerns about home-grown terrorists and forced these countries to look at CT from a community lens. This is because it was believed these individuals were embedded within their communities, therefore communities were best placed to spot the signs.

This chapter revealed that although these events instigated the need for CTCE strategies, each country took a different approach to introduce them. In contrast to the UK, Denmark had pilot CTCE projects, one of which was in East Jutland. Unlike Denmark, Prevent in the UK is a national strategy, while the Aarhus Model in East Jutland is not practised across the country.

In both East Jutland and West Yorkshire, the data revealed that practitioners had a clear understanding of CE, and their definitions of CE was very similar to one another. This was a positive sign, as it illustrated that this thesis could compare these practices a lot more confidently, as it provided a clear baseline. The practices in these regions illustrated that CTCE is multi-layered and targeted, and needs dictate the intensity and type of engagement needed. The data revealed that CTCE needs to be multi-agency, as different partners can provide different resources, insights, and value in addressing the prevention of radicalisation and extremism. Therefore, partnership was seen to an influential factor to effective CTCE and was not limited to just working with other agencies.

The notion of partnership also links to community empowerment theory, which is concerned with sharing the power of decision-making and management activities with residents on those social conditions believed to sustain crime (Welsh & Hoshi 2006). As such, it is suggested that residents are more likely to be satisfied and take more interest, as well as responsibility for their residential area (Bennet 1998). This is because empowerment represents recognition of individual identity and concerns. This, in turn, induces a psychological state where the empowered resident views cooperation more positively and actively seeks it out. Such preventive methods can take shape in various
programmes that empower the community, for example after school recreation programmes (Welsh & Hoshi 2006). It is argued that citizens can play an active role in delivering a quality service, as the way agencies interact with the public can elicit cooperative behaviour and/or enhanced results that can improve the overall quality of the service (Ostrom 1996; Joshi & Moore 2004). This is because people are willing to share accountability and support a movement when it is in line with their personal values (Skogan & Frydl 2004). This is in line with the community empowerment theory presented in Chapter 2.

Myhill and Quinton (2011) argue that public support is very much conditional rather than universal, and it is highly dependent on expectations of the role of police as well as how police are deemed to act. They found that the most important factor motivating people to cooperate with police and not break the law was the legitimacy of the police. The key aspects of legitimacy were found to be trust and shared values, which were fostered by the perception of police fairness, rather than police effectiveness (Myhill & Quinton 2011). Moreover, the inclusion of communities also creates a sense of agency and responsibility. The ability of community members to create a sense of agency and assuming ownership for the state of their community is regarded as Collective Efficacy (Sampson et al. 1997), as discussed in Chapter 2.

One of the key factors that the data revealed when exploring CTCE was that there are psychological elements to CTCE. The practitioners revealed how they tried connecting with the individual or group identity in order to build trusting relationships. Both entities understood that identity was multi-layered, that it was not just focused on personality but also appearances, tone of voice, and style of communication. This supports the identity theories presented earlier in Chapter 3, and how they influence intergroup relationships and perception through stereotypes associated with different social identities that help with categorisation. These stereotyped categories drive and guide one's decision to interact with or to avoid the out-group.

This self-identification also enabled practitioners to have shared goals with the target audience and express compassion for the position these individuals were in (see footnote 19). By connecting to the individual through shared goal (e.g., the well being of his child), the practitioner is showing respect for the individual as a father and wants to support him to be a good parent. The practitioner further confirmed this notion by making it possible for the individual to have a private meeting with his family, creating an environment of trust, to ensure long term prevention. This approach is in line with warmth-competency
research presented in Chapter 3, as the individual’s behaviour is more positive if they are not threatened. Thus, by connecting to identity, not only was it possible to share compassion but also to identify avenues through which to create a sense of responsibility, which is vital in prevention as discussed in Chapters 2 and 3. By connecting the past to the present, the practitioner helped the individual to discover what kind of father he wants to be: one that mirrors his dad, an absent father, or an active one that helps to shape his son’s personality. Another example is when the West Yorkshire Police representative connected with the individual through self-association with miners (see footnote 13). Identifying as a miner brings about the association of pain, hurt, trouble, struggle, poverty, betrayal and sense of abandonment that these communities felt when the UK government closed coal mines in the 1980s. Therefore, the officer is no longer an outsider but a possible in-group that has shared an experience with these individuals. This is how the notion of social identity and categorisation theory, as well as warmth-competence, helps to understand the psychological processes of this action.

The importance here is that these practitioners are aware of how important it is to connect with the individual’s identity in order to become an in-group in building relationships. The keyword presented throughout the interviews is the ability to be a ‘mirror’ for the individual. Using a simple fact of daily life consciously is a novel social practice that is applied to CTCE. This is not to say that all practitioners practised this. In fact, there were comments on the type of person needed to deliver CTCE for this reason (see Chapter 7). This connection to identity is not unusual: one does this on a daily basis, whether it is in one’s professional or social life. However, for engagement this process needs to be more of a strategy, rather than a ‘nice’ skill to have. Therefore, this thesis argues that identity is central to building relationships. Thus the practitioners delivering engagement need to have the knowledge and skill for building relationships, as well as being able to spot the cues for self-identification. The literature has shown that one is more positive towards the in-group (the group oneself associates or belong to) than the out-group (Billig & Tajfel 1973; Tajfel 1978; Tajfel 2010; Tajfel 1969; Tajfel & Turner 1986). As such, it is important to recognise how being representative of a particular identity can influence relationships and behaviours. As mentioned in Chapter 3, studies have found that SIT can influence cooperative behaviour in policing (Bradford 2014). This thesis also supports this notion.

Here, it should be noted that there seemed to be a difference in the expression of compassion. The Info-House practitioners seemed to be able to give better and more examples, whilst the West Yorkshire practitioners did not illustrate with as much
emphasis. This is not to say they were not compassionate; rather it may have not been expressed as clearly or frequently (see Chapter 6). Another key difference between East Jutland and West Yorkshire is that East Jutland works very closely with families for the purpose of prevention. The East Jutland practitioners illustrated how parents want to keep their children safe, therefore it is important to recognise that need for support and act upon it. Prevention is about being proactive, and the officers recognised that by going beyond the person of interest prevention can be made possible. This is in line with the literature on CE (see Chapters 1 and 2) that the citizen can decide the level of participation. The level of support and engagement provided to these families makes the difference in the effectiveness of prevention strategies. When there is a recognition that these families are vulnerable and in need of help, a new platform is taken to prevent radicalisation and extremism. The stigma attached to radicalisation, extremism and terrorism usually isolates these individuals, and the lack of information makes the problem even more alien. To have someone who is willing to provide a helping hand creates a sense of trust, and this is exactly what the Info-House practitioners experienced with the Parent Network.

This level of support and inclusion was not evident in West Yorkshire. In fact, there seemed to be a gap in practitioners' knowledge about the type of help available to families who have had a member of their family involved in radicalisation/extremism. If there is support out there for these families, the practitioners are not aware of it (although, it was reported by West Yorkshire practitioners that families may be offered a contact or liaison officer). The fact that it is not mandatory to provide such support is to all families is problematic. Also, in order to identify if these roles are sufficient in supporting the families, it is vital to explore them further. Unfortunately, this thesis did not have access to such data. It is important to note that the Parent Network was not a compulsory service, but rather an initiative that the Info-House designed to address some of the emotional needs of these families. Appropriate emotional support can increase cooperation with the police, as experienced by Info-House where they have received increased reports from family members (in line with the warmth-competency theory discussed in Chapter 3). This strategy is no longer in place for reasons that will be discussed in Chapter 7.

As illustrated in Section 5.4.3, there were concerns from a senior police representative in West Yorkshire about what it would mean to provide a similar service like the Parent Network to these families (see footnote 18). This research believes such views are problematic, as presented in Chapter 6 through UKR1’s experience.
First, there is an assumption that all families that had one or more of their members involved in radicalisation/extremism/terrorism tend to also be radicalised; therefore, families are seen as a problem. This view is a prejudice these families face, and it does not assist with the prevention of radicalisation or extremism. However, there is an element of truth in that there is a possibility that these environments could be exploited by those who have unhealthy intentions. This has not been the case for the Info-House and their Parent Network, because it is supervised by practitioners at the Info-House. Second, the officer believes there should be a higher number of families affected by radicalisation/extremism/terrorism in order for such support to be made available. The aim of prevention is to ensure the elimination of the risk associated with radicalisation/extremism in the first place. If such services were available to people and families, where they could freely seek support and guidance without having to fear legal consequences, then there could be an argument that prevention is in place. Also, such services not only can help in the initial prevention but also to maintain it, as evident from the practices of the Info-House. This way support is provided to families empowers them in knowing how to continue preventing their loved one from being involved in criminality. This also applies to those cases of de-radicalisation, making sure the individual is disengaged from further involvement. Third, the above comment illustrated passing the buck in providing these families with support. In reality, there is a lack of understanding of minority communities. The officer asserts that minorities, like the Muslim communities, are self-supporting, but this was not the case for the relative reporter in East Jutland, who was looked at negatively and accused of wanting attention and being a sell-out. Of course, this is not a reflection of all communities; however, to suggest that these communities take care of themselves is not completely true either. By perceiving minorities as groups with tribal mentality is a colonial view that completely disregards the impact of globalisation, individual and cultural integration, and adoption of new identities. It diminishes the idea that these minority communities, for example, the Somali Muslim community, are complex with intra-group differences let alone different to other minority groups, e.g. Lebanese Muslims.

It was also evident from the data collected that dialogue was needed in order to build relationships, as well as identifying and addressing problems. For East Jutland practitioners, the dialogue was central to their work. Dialogue is an important, practical, everyday tool, which is accessible to everyone (Yankelovich 2001, p.15). Nonetheless, there is little scholarly research on how dialogue is used in police work and the effects it may have on the favoured outcome. The thesis in the coming sections and chapters
explores the use of dialogue in CTCE and its psychological importance for encouraging and improving reporting. Thus, this is an area where this thesis makes an original contribution to knowledge. Dialogue is a process of successful relationship building through respectable discussion directed towards the exploration of a particular subject or problem — recognising how everyone involved is affected (Yankelovich 2001, p.15). Therefore, a dialogue is not about you or me, rather about you and me. Yankelovich argues that dialogue is a highly specialised form of discussion that imposes a rigorous discipline on the participants. As such, when dialogue is done skilfully it can have extraordinary results: longstanding stereotypes dissolved, mistrusts overcome, mutual understanding achieved, visions shaped and grounded in shared purpose, bringing together people who were previously at odds with each other, new common ground discovered, new perspectives and insights gained new levels of creativity stimulated, and bonds of community strengthened (Yankelovich, 2001, p.16). From a policing perspective, dialogue is thought to enable the police to listen to the community and more accurately determine the needs of citizens (Trojanowicz & Carter 1988, p.8). It is through dialogue that the police can get closer to the community and learn that the public has a different — and more accurate — measure by which to assess officer competence and police satisfaction (Trojanowicz & Carter 1988, p.9). Through community consultation, the police can identify public priorities, provide the public with information on policing activities, and develop partnerships with the public. Therefore, dialogue creates an atmosphere in which status and power differences are minimised, where listening is encouraged, and opportunities are created to make assumptions explicit (Yankelovich 2001, p.102). Consequently, engagement and inclusion of communities create a genuine belief in equal partnership with the community (Murray 2005).

This study also found that East Jutland did not use counter-narrative campaigns or advertisements. Instead they engaged in dialogue to address complex issues like radicalisation and extremism. It is argued that the logic for this may be that the campaigns might be risky due to addressing problems on the general level (Hemmingsen 2015, p.25). The data also illustrated that West Yorkshire’s engagement, in theory, is both bottom-up (proactive) and top-down (reactive), but in reality, engagement is more reactive (see Chapter 7). The Info-House also has a reactive approach to engagement for similar reasons; however, their strategy is top-down. The individual at risk is used to guide the engagement with their surroundings and community. Therefore, engagements with communities are targeted in both entities. There is a risk that not everyone in the geographical parameters within East Jutland and West Yorkshire will receive engagement,
thus leaving sections of the community vulnerable to radicalisation and extremism, as well as failing to identify the emergence of new threats — e.g. new trajectory groups or ideologies that enforce violence.

Also, it should be noted that CTCE in East Jutland were more individual-focused whereas West Yorkshire was more community-focused on their engagement. This may be due to the Prevent strategy the individual engagement is separated from that of the community as the result of Channel and DDP. As such, community activities were more predominant in this research, as participation from practitioners who were involved in DDP or Channel was close to none in this research,20 whereas, the Info-House delivers engagement to both individuals and community (however, they work more closely with the vulnerable individuals and their families). This thesis argues that the municipality does more work on CE, not necessarily CTCE, that addresses community cohesion, crime issues, empowerment etc, and use those relationships in communities to connect with Info-House CTCE if needed. For example, in cases of connecting with hard-to-reach communities.

This study found that CTCE overlaps with none-CT-related CE, and sometimes are linked to issues such as social cohesion. Therefore, not all CTCE delivered was actually CT-related, but rather part of broader efforts at building relationships and addressing community problems (for example, keeping youth busy to prevent them from committing crimes (Newton 2001). This research also found that although both West Yorkshire and East Jutland were required to meet on a frequent basis (e.g. the Gold-Silver-Bronze command, and the SSP, PSP, KSP meetings), West Yorkshire failed to do so. This is in line with the finding of the Intelligence and Security Committee (ISC) who reported that nine Channel panel meetings took place between June 2016 and September 2017 discussing the Parson Green attacker — an active Channel case — but none were held between January 2017 and June 2017 (Intelligence and Security Committee of Parliament 2018, p.96). This thesis has failed to find an equivalent national audit of Info-House meetings or with the SSP, PSP, and KSP. This thesis recommends Channel panels and Prevent to meet on a monthly basis to discuss new and ongoing cases. This meeting is vital to information flow between the partners and various levels of command.

Considering the literature on CE and CCTE, as well as behaviour and cooperation, in addition to the data from this research, the following definition for CE in policing and CT is suggested with focus on prevention by adapting Myhill's (2012, p.19) definition of CE:

20 There was only one Channel representative.
A multi-layered, inclusive, tailored and specific multi-agency strategy, which involves a psychological process that requires connecting with the individual's and/or group's identity through the use of dialogue and stimulation of the sense of responsibility to encourage citizen participation in identifying and solving problems at their chosen level. This may range from providing information and reassurance to empowering them to identify and implement solutions to local problems and influence priorities and decisions strategic.

This chapter aimed to discussed how CTCE is practised in East Jutland and West Yorkshire, and has presented a clear picture of what may be considered best practice in order to inform a more holistic CTCE strategy. The following chapter will explore the reporters’ experience of reporting and use that insight to further advance the current understanding of CTCE practice and reporting behaviour.
Chapter 6

Hunters in The Dark: Reporting Radicalisation and Extremism

6.1 Introduction

To understand the impact of CTCE on reporting behaviour, there are two components, CTCE and reporting. The previous chapter explored how CTCE is delivered and various strategies used in order to encourage public cooperation. This chapter explores the reporters’ perspective and analyses the motivations, feelings, and experiences of reporters (professional, as well as relatives and close associates) with the aim to answer the first part of Question Three (i.e. reasons for and barriers to reporting). This chapter discusses how and to what extent different factors influence the decision to report by establishing reporters’ experience of reporting. This chapter is not intended as a comparative analysis of East Jutland and West Yorkshire; however, when appropriate differences will be highlighted. The current chapter has four core sections. The first section explores the reasons for reporting, followed by barriers to reporting. The third section examines the difference between professional reporters and close associates/relatives, particularly the way they report and perceive threat. The fourth section explores the reporters’ experience of reporting in an attempt to identify factors that can contribute to the decision to report, and ultimately set the ground for Chapter 7 where recommendations for service improvement are presented.

6.2 Reasons for Reporting

One of the questions asked of participants was why they reported. The data from both practitioners and reporters (professional and relatives) offered various rationales. The data is discussed under a number of sub-headings based on the themes that emerged from the interviews.

6.2.1 Threat, Uncertainty, and Fear of Consequences

The interviews highlighted prior to reporting, the reporters viewed the given situation (i.e. the vulnerable individual) in similar ways. They all recognised there was a threat that needed addressing, but felt uncertain. For example, foster parents of a teenage boy reported their concerns because one night, during dinner, the subject stated to his foster
parents that he was planning to become a suicide bomber, and wanted to blow up the
house. He also said that he did not like people from Pakistan because they were racist.\textsuperscript{21}
Though the foster parents had not seen the teenager present any other extremism-related
behaviours, they felt need for professionals to take a closer look. Similarly, a student who
was becoming isolated from his peers was reported to the authorities based on concerns
that he might attempt to travel to Syria:

“It was reported by other students who followed the individual on Facebook
that he had stated he ‘can’t wait to go Jihad, and leave this land of Kafars.’ [...] We didn’t know at that time if he really did want to go. It was later that his friends had left then we realised he was also at risk of leaving.” (WYR1)

Another reporter explained that a report about one of their tenants was made because of
the type of language this individual had used, the tone of conversation and the speed at
which the conversation changed from raising a concern about some Asian men using as
building as mosque to being extreme and inflammatory.\textsuperscript{22} This concern was enhanced by
the fact that the reporter did not have much information on this particular tenant:

“The gentleman in question was a tenant of ours. [...] He was reported to be
quite elusive. Not really engaging with other residents. People who lived
around him described him in their words as ‘odd’, ‘sometimes quite extreme
in his views’, and probably had ‘tendencies in the past to act erratically’. [...] We reported him because of the language that was used, the tone of the conversation, and how quickly the conversation deteriorated into something quite personalised and inflammatory. [...] We didn’t know this guy, if he was known to the police and other agencies [...] or if he had been involved in criminal behaviours before? If he had any mental health issues, where perhaps medication was an issue, or his personal circumstances, family breakdown etc.” (WYR2)

In another case, the reporter (EJR1) explained that the pupil reported had shown various
causes for concern.\textsuperscript{23} The student came from a troubled family with divorced parents, was
spending time with drug dealers and suddenly his group of friends changed to all Muslims.
He started spending a lot more time at the mosque, to play video games and have food. He

\textsuperscript{21} See Appendix G
\textsuperscript{22} See Appendix E
\textsuperscript{23} See Appendix K
converted to Islam, and started to recite prayers in Arabic in school, as well as watching beheading videos.

What these cases demonstrate is that the trigger point for threats perception is layered. It is a sequence and combination of events, information or even lack of information that create the notion of threat. It can be represented like a layered cake, each event adding a layer of concern, which accumulates to form the threat; the final trigger point is the cherry on top of the cake that encourages the need for action (see Figure 13). In each case the reporters explained it was not one isolated factor that led them to report, although the ‘cherry’ is the focal point. For the foster parents, the problematic behaviour of the teenage boy was a cause for concern that (the first layer), topped with the challenging relationship they have with him (second layer) and his comment about wanting to become a terrorist and blow up the house. Would this comment mean much to the reporters without previous context? The recent terrorist attacks in addition to the background of the

![Layered Cake Diagram](image)

**Figure 13:** Threat perception for reporters.

teenager as an Afghan refugee\textsuperscript{24} is argued to be of contributing factors. Therefore, the comments made at dinner table are just the cherry on top of the cake. Likewise, for WYR1 the initial concern was comments being made on Facebook, along with other factors as explained in Appendix D. The ‘cherry on top’ for the reporter was the confirmation that the student’s friends had left for Jihad. This certainly confirmed the threat perception for the reporter. Similar pattern can be seen with WYR2. Although the comments made by the tenant were extreme, in isolation they might not have been sufficient for reporting a case

\textsuperscript{24} Afghanistan has been and still is exposed to Taliban and Al Qaeda.
of radicalisation or extremism. It could arguably be a case for racism. However, the tone and the speed in which the conversation escalated added another layer of concern. This concern was further developed by learning some characteristics about the tenant’s personality from other residents. However, lack of information such as criminal or mental health history was the ‘cherry on top’ for the reporter. Finally, in the case of EJR1, it is possible to get a better picture of this layering of concerns that shape the perception of threat. At the very foundation sits the concerns that the student comes from a troubled background, which is then escalated by being in contact with negative influencers. Change of friends, conversion to Islam, and spending long periods of time at the mosque further provides cause for concern given the experience of having young people radicalised at a local mosque. The trigger point or the ‘cherry on top’ was when the student started to recite prayers in Arabic in school, as well as watching beheading videos.

In all cases, there is a level of uncertainty while trying to make sense of the situation. Not knowing enough information that could assist with calculating the cost or consequences of events also shapes how a threat is perceived and skews the sense of control. This indicates a need for confirmation or disapproval of what is being experienced or perceived. As a result of uncertainty, people tend to use biases (confirmation bias theory) and patterns as evidence to confirm their beliefs, and use those as heuristics to make a decision (Kahneman & Tversky 1974). Fear of consequences is another key factor that influences threat perception. The practitioners who dealt with such reports believed that people who reported their concerns of radicalisation/extremism were fearful of what the vulnerable individual might be capable of, which could have server consequences:

“[The fear is] that these individuals might commit an offence and go forward [...] I think the risks are often physical harm to themselves or other people. [...] They [reporters] genuinely think of the harm that this person could do to themselves or to other people. [...] Ultimately it’s because they [the vulnerable individuals] hold the potential threat or risk.” (CH1)

Another practitioner observed:

“When they have a genuine concern [...] about an individual and what that individual is capable of doing; worrying that something detrimental was going to happen to that individual or that individual was going to create something that wasn’t good for other people. And I think people get to the point of thinking that they need to report it.” (LA1)
Similarly, a reporter explained:

“I think the sense of implications did have a heavier weight on my decision to report. The risk of not reporting it was that his views would have been genuine, and might have wanted to seek retribution in some way. He had strong opinions, and not only to why the Asian men were there.” (WYR2)

Such comments highlight the recognition of the need for safeguarding and appropriate intervention by relevant agencies such as the police. For example, from WYR2’s comments, it is evident that the reporter felt powerless due to lack of knowledge about the subject and felt they could not judge the level of risk this individual posed. As the reporter explains, the belief was that the police had sufficient capabilities to deal with the situation appropriately. This need for intervention by relevant agencies suggests the reporter feels that they are not in a position of power to prevent and safeguard the individual.

Punishment was another consequence that was feared by professional reporters (e.g. teachers). For example, in case of WYR1, the risk of not reporting the individual was inadequate safeguarding, consequently failing the Prevent Duty because the appropriate actions were not taken. This in turn would have result in a bad Ofsted report:

“The risk of not reporting was that firstly we wouldn’t have protected the individual. Secondly, we would have failed our Duty. To not report something like that you are clearly not fulfilling the Prevent Duty. [...] I think we were all really worried about failing to meet the Duty because the sanctions in education for not meeting the Duty are very serious. So we were frightened to death about what we should and shouldn’t be doing. [...] Because, they have made it essential to have a good Ofsted around Prevent and Safeguarding. [...] It didn’t occur to me not to report it. [...] I think it is better to be safe than sorry. [...] The benefits were that we would hopefully clarify the situation; that we would mitigate or remove any risk to that individual and the cost didn’t really come in to it.” (WYR1)

The risks of not reporting were high, and because of that it became a case of 'better safe than sorry'. The reporter clearly highlights how costly it can be for education services if they fail to put appropriate safeguarding in place to protect the vulnerable individual. A poor or failed Ofsted outcome can ruin a school's reputation. As such this can weigh on the decision to report (see in Chapter 7). The above comment also suggests that people do not want to be responsible for making the wrong decision. This also feeds into the notion of
responsibility and accountability, which will be discussed in Section 6.2.2. The notion of ‘better safe than sorry’ continued to echo in the interviews with the professional reporters, and it seemed to be a push factor to report their concerns:

"I didn’t want to take the risk that this was just an erratic behaviour that had no substance to be of genuine concern. I felt the need to pass it on, [...] as it was not a normal behaviour. [...] I suppose it was all about passing on the information, and my trust that the police would do the right thing with that information.” (WYR2)

The fear of consequences can influence the cost and benefit of reporting and/or not reporting, which as a result contributes to reporting behaviour, as it shapes threat level. Similarly, another reporter explained that the experiences of the school principal had an impact on how the threat of the situation was perceived:

"The principal at the time was very nervous that this student would, within a short time, be at risk of joining an extremist group [...] because she had a previous experience with another student, whom she had taught from grade two, [...] that travelled to Syria and joined ISIS. The principal remembered his parents, and how a local Aarhus boy ended up being killed down there. She has had a closer experience of extremism; I had not experienced such things before.” (EJR1)

As explained earlier, context and historical experience or back-story matters in threat perception. Experiences provide knowledge, and one learns through experience. Experiences also assist in shaping heuristics (mental shortcuts), which provide a quick answer to a similar problem. Moreover, though experiences more stereotypes and biases are formed. One can also use the experiences of others to learn from and adopt them as one’s own. The above comment illustrates how previous experience of the principal shaped consequences and threat perception, but also how the reporter adopted this experience as his own since the comment is emotionally charged — the reporter is using terms or examples that he can associate with. For example, teaching a student for a long time, or knowing the devastation that it can have on a family that you have known for a long period. Moreover, fear of consequences was not just associated with the vulnerable individual but also the role of the reporter. For example, EJR1 explained how he feared that his close relationship with the student might cloud his judgement of the threat:
“I had to be careful of my relationship with the student so that it didn’t influence my judgement about him being at risk of being radicalised. Other teachers who didn’t have the same close relationship or knowledge about the pupil, like I had, were very worried and I can see why they were feeling that way. I didn’t want to be the person to put a blanket over the signs. I had to be careful not to neglect others point of view, because I wasn’t sure either. I mean how can you be? [...] Their point of view should have just as much attention [...] and because I had a senior position at the school, that gave me some sort of power [...] and I didn’t want my power to dominate.” (EJR1)

The reporter was very aware of his position not just as a senior member of staff but also as someone who had an emotional connection with the student. During the interview EJR1 was very empathetic towards this particular student in a professional context. Therefore, it is very important to being conscious of the consequences of these factors and how they can have an impact on analysis of the situation that can shape threat perception. Thus, perception of consequences and threats can be multifaceted.

These examples illustrate threat perception prior to reporting. In these cases, the reporters had managed to report early enough to allow intervention. But what happens in cases where the reporter is late reporting — i.e. the vulnerable individual has either left for conflict zone or has committed a crime? Does the same thought process hold? In two cases the reporters raised the alarm after they had discovered the vulnerable individuals had left for conflict zones — both of whom were relatives of the vulnerable individuals. Both reporters, EJR2 and UKR1,25 explained that although they had noticed differences in behaviour, religious practices, attitudes and beliefs, and interest in learning new skills — such as learning Arabic — it was not until they had discovered the vulnerable individuals were missing that they started to get really worried.

Although the formation of the threat perception is similar to those who report earlier, those who report later do notice subtle gradual changes that occur over a long period of time and in some aspects they are uncomfortable with such changes and challenge it, but perhaps not actively or aggressively as they are not sure if these vulnerable individuals are actually being radicalised. However, what seems to happen is that their concerns are muted by a sudden positive change in behaviour of the vulnerable individual, as if everything is back to ‘normal’. Another factor that causes a delay in reporting their concern is that, in cases of relatives and close associates, there is emotional charge and

25 See Appendix J
perception of control. They believe they can control the situation, and to some aspect the sudden positive change in the vulnerable person’s behaviour can be interpreted to the situation being under control:

“A year before she left, this guy who she knew from school asked my brother if he could marry her. My brother said no, she is too young. But I was like if they love each other then it is okay, they can still continue with their education. I could see she was going and I didn’t want her to go. I was trying to hold on to her, I thought maybe if she has one kid then maybe she will stay. [...] Before my sister went she was all okay [...] the night before she left we, including our friends, were up watching YouTube videos till early hours in the morning. We had such a great time. She was cuddling next to me, had her head on my shoulder. [...] We were just having a really good time. [...] The next day after she went missing, I realised she had gone [to Syria].”(EJR2)

Similarly, another reporter explained

“The changes weren’t consecutive [...] they took place over the course of a year and a half. [...] I confronted the changes in him, I found it difficult in the family life [...] but at the same time I was being his mother. [...] Particularly about six months before he left, [...] he had actually gone back to his normal self. He was joining in family celebrations. He was much [more like the] happy, fun, loving boy that he was before. And that is why it was like a bolt out of blue when he left. [...] What he did was to turn our eyes away from possibly thinking he may be going there [Syria].” (UKR1)

The reporters perceived that they had control through challenging or finding ways to distract the vulnerable individual (e.g. getting married and having a family). Similarly, they both experienced a distracting positive change in behaviour. To take the cake analogy, these reporters follow the same layering of threat perception; however, there is an extra layer of false hope due to misinformation/deception — thus miscalculating the threat level (see Figure 14). As such the lack of control is the ‘cherry on top’ — i.e. the trigger point.
This section provided an insight into how reporters perceived threats, and how the factors involved shaped their decision to report. Perception of threat has a layered thought process and the end result (action) is dependent on other layers. This section highlighted the three core elements that shaped the reasoning for reporting: threat perception, uncertainty, and fear of consequences. The following sections will present other contributing factors to reporting behaviour.

6.2.2 Responsibility and Accountability

A sense of responsibility and accountability play a big part in reporting concerns of radicalisation/extremism. The reporters felt a great sense of obligation. For professional reporters the obligation was personal and legal:

“I had a sense of obligation [...] as in the Duty. [...] I definitely recognised it [obligation] as a legal duty in that way [...] but I think the real moral obligation for me was to make sure that he was safe and supported. Somebody who is presenting those kinds of views, you want to make sure they're alright really. So I think it was that [safeguarding] first then obviously the Duty. [...] Later on, based on what we learnt, we thought 'thank goodness we had done everything right.' Because, if hadn't done that someone would have, surely, said 'if you knew this, then why didn’t you say something?’”

(WYR1)

Likewise, another reporter explained:
"I felt a sense of obligation, again a purely a professional obligation. [...] As a senior member of staff I felt that something wasn’t right, potentially, the local community could be at risk from that individual. [...] We had to share that intelligence, to make sure the police knew what we knew. [...] If something very significant did happen, and I or my organisation didn’t move the conversation on or didn’t report it then I think clearly that has great risks. [...] If I didn’t have this sense of professional obligation I would still have made the report, purely doing it out of personal values, personal sense of what is right and wrong.” (WYR2)

These views on sense of obligation were strongly echoed and espoused by other reporters:

“I felt a sense of obligation because if I didn’t report and something happened, [...] for me, as someone who works in education, [...] I could be putting people at risk. So it’s also a moral obligation as well as being part of my work.” (WYR3)

The sense of obligation is somewhat guided or influenced by fear of consequences — especially in cases of uncertainty. However, the sense of responsibility and accountability enforces liability, and the actions need to be justifiable. Therefore, there is a sense of control and duty to deliver, which makes one answerable for managing risks. Failure to do so suggests that the concern was not dealt with appropriately, and this may imply lack of control. Similarly, in the case of the foster carers reporting a teenage boy, they have a legal duty to safeguard the individual from harm. Although they may have a family role to play, they can also be considered professionals. Therefore, the reason for their decision and comfort in reporting may also be due to the fact they have a legal obligation, and possibly the emotional connection may be dynamic. Nonetheless, they operate in a family environment; therefore they cannot be considered a professional fully.

For close associate and relative reporters, the sense of responsibility was associated with their role (e.g. mother, sibling etc) and judgement by others:

“To be honest I was thinking that if I don’t do anything my mum would blame me because my sister used to live with me. So I thought now I have to be upfront and go to the police because it was my responsibility to take care of her, be her eyes. Because I knew my mum would say ‘it is your fault!’, and she

26 See Appendix G
did actually. [...] I am glad that I did report it. [...] I thought I was the only one that could bring her back when I talked to her but I couldn't. I didn't think my mum could convince her to come back because my sister had more of a close relationship with me than she did with her mum. [...] My sister would tell me everything, not my mum. I was like her mum, you know." (EJR2)

The above comments highlights the level of responsibility the reporter felt towards her sister. In fact, the intensity of this feeling suggest accountability more often rather than responsibility (responsibility can be shared, whilst accountability cannot). Her relationship with her sister was very close, and she was her carer, as they lived together. The reporter indicates that she had a mother’s role. As discussed in Chapter 3 the sense of responsibility and accountability suggest that there is an element of liability. Roles and stereotypes that one adopts as part of one’s identity shapes one’s attitudes and behaviour. For the reporter, she had taken the role of a carer and protector, factors she associates with motherhood, which lead to sense of accountability. This is linked to identity theories; how individuals tend to take on the stereotypes that come with a role, and subsequently identities shape behaviour. As such it was important for her to continue with that protective role. Again the reporter mentions that she felt she was the only that could bring her sister back. Another factor that heightens the sense of responsibility is the fear of being blamed for failing to prevent her sister from leaving (i.e. fearing consequences). This fear, as the reporter explains, induced her to report to show that she had not neglected her duties (i.e. fear of being blamed).

6.2.3 Agency and Control

A sense of agency and control also shaped the reasoning for reporting. For example, for EJR1, given that the school principal in a management position, the interview suggested that the reporter may have felt less control or power in this circumstance about deciding to include the student and his parents in the discussions. It is clear that the reporter would have reported the student whilst still keeping in line with the traditions and general practice. As explored earlier, EJR2, who reporter her sister, explained during the interview that although it was very hard for her to report her sister, she felt that the police had higher powers and she felt powerless:

“Actually, it was very hard for me to report her but I wanted her back, you know. I thought I could get her back through the police. [...] For me the police were the powers of the powers. If I couldn’t reach her then the police could, that is what I told myself. It was hard. [...] When I finally spoke to her, she
found out I reported her and she was mad. [...] Then she said, 'I know I hurt you and my mum but I will come back one day Inshallah. I told her 'No! No! I know Inshallah but you have to come back today and we'll come and get you from anywhere.'" (EJR2)

The reporter felt powerless to influence her sister’s decision to come back home. Not knowing the whereabouts of her sister added to this sense of powerlessness. She felt as though the police would have the authority and the ability to locate her and bring her back home. For the reporter, the risk of being disliked by her sister was trivial in comparison to losing her. The reporter clearly states how her sister viewed her negatively once she was aware of the report. This indicates internal conflict in the decision-making process. The reporter clearly refers to this tension by saying that the decision to report was very hard for her. The reporter comes from a religious background, and it was interesting to note in her comments that she felt Inshallah (God willing or if God wills) was not sufficient. Within her comments there is a suggestion that she felt the police were more able to make this reunion happen. She felt that by cooperating with the police she will have some answers, for example sharing the video call details with the police in order to understand her sister’s whereabouts. The reporter further explains that through reporting she would have access to information and support, as well as a sense of control by taking action:

“When you report, you can have information. If I didn’t report I wouldn’t have had any of the information I have now. I wouldn’t meet any people, those good people I met during my hard times. [...] Reporting gave me comfort, that I did something. I couldn’t just sit there and wait for her to show up one day. I was scared that she would be raped, [...] that she will be alone there with no one to protect her. I was scared of everything. [...] It would have hurt me to think that I could have done something. [...] That is why I did it. [...] But now I can say I’ve done it, you know. I tried to do everything in my power." (EJR2)

The comment highlights the need for some form of control over the situation. Lack of agency and control create a sense of desperation, with limited options. This is in line with the practitioners’ belief that relatives tend to make a report based on feeling powerless and not having any other options (see Section 6.4). Additionally, knowing that one has not much control over the situation encourages possibly raising the alarm earlier and cooperating more. For example, in two case studies provided by the West Yorkshire CTU, it was evident that families who were already in a position (having their son under mental
health care) that dictated their level of power and influence over their sons, which encouraged them to raise their concerns early on. Also the relatives were already in a state of high alert, because the subjects were psychologically unstable. Their parents were clearly aware that they could not sufficiently safeguard the individual on their own and needed external powers, as well as assistance (see Figure 14).

6.2.4 Knowing About Similar Cases and Available Help

One of the reasons for reporting was knowledge of available help. Reporters who had this knowledge found it easier to reach out to whomever (i.e. authorities) they had heard about. EJR1 explained that, because the school principal knew of an officer who worked at the Info-House, as they had met at a conference, she felt it was better to reach out to that officer for help and guidance in dealing with the vulnerable individual. Similarly, because EJR2 had previously seen others being prevented from going to conflict zones like Syria, she strongly believed that she will be reunited with her sister if she followed the same course of action. When asked if she was aware of any information that helped her to make the decision to report, the reporter explained:

"Before I reported my sister I knew of two people. One of my great-cousins who went there [Syria] too. [...] I knew there was support and I knew that they had a relationship with the officers at the Info-House because they mentioned them a lot. [...] His family were supported while he was gone. Knowing that they got support gave me motivation as well because both his mother and father reported their own son, and they have a good relationship and say a lot of good things about it [Info-House]. Before my sister went, I thought yeah, whatever, this is the police; I don’t care as long, as it does not affect me." (EJR2)

The reporter notes that having the knowledge that a family member had experienced similar case and were supported by the Info-House encouraged her to report. The fact that the reporter highlights how she was not really buying into the support from the police until the time had come is very revealing in how the information is used to change the state of internal dissonance.

The reporter further explained that knowing that the support was available to her sister gave her comfort:

27 See Appendix H and I.
“I was feeling like I was making her a criminal or something, and I asked the officer at the Info-House ‘now that I have reported her will you convict her?’ He said ‘no, we will help her to be part of the community again. If she hasn’t shot anyone or committed a crime we won’t convict her.’” (EJR2)

The confirmation and the new information provided by the officer assisted the reporter to further cooperate with the police in order to save her sister, because such information reduced the level of uncertainty and internal conflict. Knowing that there is support available for the vulnerable individual is essential, but this was balanced with the reality that there could be possible legal actions. The action of the officer indicates transparency and honesty, which in turn influenced how the reporter decided to further cooperate.

6.2.5 Dialogue and Informal Reporting

Dialogue and informal reporting also assisted in shaping the reasoning to report. Dialogue and informal reporting can overlap. Through dialogue reporters were able to discuss concerns and seek guidance, as well as confirmation:

“Because, as a pair, we were not sure what to do; or what was the right thing to do […] in the given situation […] we decided to seek help from the officer at the Info-House that the school principal was in contact with. […] We were told by officer to do an anonymous report. This was helpful that a professional helped us to do this [make that decision].”(EJR1)

Here informal dialogue took pressure off the reporters, as the responsibility of decision-making was shared with the Info-House officer. In this way, uncertainties were addressed through professional insight. Access to such informal processes can work as a heuristic (mental shortcut) since it takes the pressure away from the decision-maker. In addition, the new information provided through this process of dialogue can be used to justify the report. It is evident that this reporter felt more comfortable with making an anonymous report, given his concerns about not involving the family (a strong personal value) and the sense of betrayal he felt towards the student. The report was clear that the right decision was made, especially after talking to the officer; this illustrates how new information can assist in reducing dissonance or inner conflict that can ease the decision-making process.

The interviews made it clear that, for reporters, it was important to obtain some clarity, confirmation, and guidance. For example, one reporter, who was part of the Prevent Bronze committee, explained that although a formal report had been made, the reporter needed guidance to confirm that it was the right decision to report:
“Whilst I did a formal Channel referral, I did follow it up with a call to say ‘I’m concerned about this particular call, would you be happy to spend some time with me and we will play the call back for you?’” (WYR2)

This particular comment is indicative in that even for a person who is involved in prevention of radicalisation and extremism from the level of implementation, this person still needed confirmation of what was being experienced due to the intricacies of such situations. Given the complexity of radicalisation and extremism, situations in this context are not black or white. Reporters face grey areas of uncertainty and need to have access to dialogue and informal courses of action that allows them to express their thought, even if they are professionals who have experience of such cases. It was also reported that there are misconceptions about what prevention means and there is usually a fear of prosecution or punishment (see Section 6.2.1):

“They need to know that we are not punishing them [the vulnerable individuals], so we need to talk about it. That is very important because that way you feel safe and not scared when discussing your own child. It is important to discuss what your worries are. We talk about solutions and not punishment.” (MU1)

Instead of focusing on possible negative elements, the practitioners are able to make the reporter feel more secure by discussion the solutions and the support available. This is very important in shaping threat perception. Not having access to such resources can add to uncertainty and cost-benefit analysis of reporting. Informal conversations about concerns can reassure people that they are making the right decision, as issues related to radicalisation and extremism can cause panic due the cost of making the wrong decision:

“I have to say that 90% of the people I speak to feel so much more reassured and put at ease because they’ve had a conversation with me or my Prevent colleagues. Because they know that actually what they’re putting on the form is relevant […]. I think it is the not knowing; they have been a teacher for 20 years and haven’t come across this before. […] With the current situation of radicalisation and extremism they think ‘I can't get this wrong’ and people panic.” (CH1)

Clearly, informal dialogue allows for the reporter to reduce the levels of uncertainty and risk associated with the situation. Informal reporting and dialogue reassures the reporters and provides a sense of stability and control over the situation. As discussed in Section
6.2.1 when discussing consequences, the costs associated with radicalisation and extremism are high, especially if the threat evaluation is misguided. Therefore, access to practitioners can enable the reporters to have a better understanding of threat and risks that they are facing. Practitioners were able to reduce the risk of reporting by being comforting and providing advice. This is vital for ensuring that the information is handled appropriately:

"When the phone is rings I need to be very aware of what is going on because most of them [reporters] want advice, or counselling about the problem that they have. I mean they are insecure and unsure. For example, I get a call from a teacher who says 'I know this guy, he is a good pupil in my class but there is something I am concerned about and actually I don't know if I should report him or not'. Then we discuss what she sees and what she doesn't see because they don't always necessarily see the same things. So we try to guide and advise them." (IHP2)

The above comment, like that of CH1, highlights that insecurity is accompanied by uncertainty. The Info-House Officer explains the importance of injecting some security and control into the situation. This is vital for reducing risk and enabling the reporter to have a clearer vision of what is being experienced. Thus, it is about trying to reduce the fear of what might be and bring forth reality and control — crucial elements for healthy decision-making. Another practitioner similarly explained that they encourage reporters to discuss their concerns before they submit their referral formally. This way concerns could be addressed but also relevant information gained:

"We do that [informal reporting]; most of the time, through the telephone conversation because what we ask of people is that, before they send in a referral, to run things by us. Pick up the phone and have a conversation with us. Not always does that happen. [...] I contact the referrer to say 'is there any information you felt uncomfortable with putting in your referral form?' Because by putting that information in, it would be more relevant to us offering support down the line." (CH1)

The practitioners also explained that in such cases they encourage the reporter to seek more information in order to understand the full picture, as they would have done naturally in other situations. As the comment above illustrates, practitioners need to have access to the full picture, as the reporter’s threat perception may not always be accurate. However, the reporter will not be alone in gathering more information: practitioners
explained that further support was available to reporters if need be. Thus, having that guidance and support to induce sense of control over the situation is vital for threat perception and management. It was also noted by practitioners that although there was no official informal reporting in place, practitioners believed that people still reported their concerns informally. A Prevent referral was not made every time a concern was raised. The practitioner who received the information would make the judgement on whether there should be a formal report:

“There is no official process for informal reporting but there is a lot of informal reporting initially and that will come under the close long-standing relationships. One of my officers gets calls regularly in evenings, when he is not working, by people who say 'this is the situation, what do you think I should do?' So that is an informal conversation, which invariably ends up with the advice being given from that officer and ultimately you must submit a Prevent referral. It could be [...] the officer will triage from what has been said to him that there is no need for referral, he might stop it then and there. There are a lot of informal conversations that might instigate a formal referral further down the line.” (SP3)

It is evident that there is a need for such informal discussions and reporters actively try to seek them, even outside working hours. The comments from practitioners highlight that although not all discussions might lead to formal reports, nevertheless it creates a platform where the reporter can discuss concerns and gain certainty. Another aspect of informal reporting was anonymity. Practitioners explained that it was important for the public to know that they can be anonymous when making a report. It was thought that by being able to make an anonymous report, reduced the fear of some of the consequences and gained trust (see Section 6.2.6):

“I think it [Info-House] has convinced people that it is a secure system, and the risk of reporting is not so big, as they can actually do it without telling the police who they are and get the police to respect that.” (SYS1)

### 6.2.6 Trust

One of the factors (see Chapters 2 and 3) was the notion of trust and how that may influence people cooperating with the authorities. Trust was also seen as a contributing factor that shaped the reasoning for reporting concerns. The Info-House had managed to gain this trust by addressing the involvement of intelligence services with the reporters:
“Definitely trust is a big issue and that is why there is limited reporting from us to the Intelligence Service. The Intelligence Service wants us to pass everything we know to them but we put in a plug in that, and say in order for us to maintain trust in the communities we can't report everything. [...] If we have an accumulation of risk factors where we see that these people are dangerous or might have something going on then we will report it to them. We can’t as police or municipality sit on something like that. If something happened [...] we wouldn’t be able to live that down.” (IHM1)

The comment above illustrates that there is a need for balance when trying to gain trust from the public — especially in a CT context. The Info-House practitioner explains that although they have a duty to share information with the intelligence service, this is only done on a need-to-know-basis because not all cases reported will need the attention of the Intelligence Services. Also, and more importantly, the public may have concerns about the Intelligence Services being involved, which might prevent them from coming forward in the first place (this is in line with warmth-competency theory in Chapter 3). As such, it is vital for the public to be able to trust the practitioners and the system in place, and know that the information they share will not be passed on to the Intelligence Services unless it is necessary. This again, influences the risk-benefit analysis of reporting. From the reporter’s perspective trust can also be based on existing knowledge. For example, one reporter explained that she trusted the police because she knew how they had helped others in the same situation:

“I was the only one in my family that trusted the police [...] I actually forced my family to contact the police, because I sincerely thought the police would help us to stop them in time. A lot of people were saying when you inform the police everything will go downhill. I asked why and they said, ‘because you are a Muslim, they won’t help you’. I said that I trusted the police more than other people here because I grew up in Denmark and I know how the system works. I knew what the police were doing. I said I know that they have stopped people from leaving and have helped them. I know two of them. [...] So I was like ‘oh my God, how can you refuse the police?’” (EJR2)

The reporter mentions she was aware that others in similar situation had support from the police previously. This piece of information is vital for balancing the internal dissonance. Information, which can outweigh the inconsistencies in beliefs, may assist with changing the context in which the person views the situation. Therefore, for the
reporter, knowing the police could help and provide her with what she needed — i.e. to bring her sister back — outweighed the mistrust her community had towards the police, and confirmed her trust in the system. Also, this is in line with theories of attitude and belief shaping behaviour, as well as warmth-competency since the reporters believe the police can be trusted if they are not in a position of harm (see Chapter 3).

6.2.7 Training

For professional reporters, it became clear that one of the factors in influencing their decision to report was the training they had received on prevention of radicalisation and extremism:

“I am Home Office trained. In the WRAP training [...] they are very clear [...] that one of the factors that you need to be aware of sometimes is when someone states what they are going to do. That there is, normally, an intention to do what they say they’re going to do that. And it was such a definite that ‘I’m going to do this’ that it seemed, with that training in the back of our minds, there was an intent there.” (WYR1)

The reporter explains that the training guided their way of reasoning. Such information provided through training can be used as heuristics (mental shortcuts) when making decisions, as the answer for a problem is provided and thus there is no need to figure the solution out by oneself. Another professional reporter similarly espoused:

“As a Prevent Bronze member I thought it was sufficiently serious, alarming, and certainly concerning for me to refer it to the CTU and the Prevent Officer through a Channel referral.” (WYR2)

The above comment again suggests that having access to information about radicalisation and extremism through Prevent Bronze membership means the reporter is capable of recognising the seriousness of the situation and appropriate action. Again, access to such insight provides a mental shortcut to what is required to be done in such risky events and how to manage the risk.

6.2.8 Policy

Policy was another factor that shaped the decision to report. As mentioned earlier when discussing fear of consequences and accountability, the Prevent Duty in the UK has influenced professional reporters’ decisions to report through enforcing safeguarding and holding professionals accountable. In Denmark, during the interviews it was mentioned
that laws put in place meant that both the vulnerable individual and the reporter could feel at ease knowing that the conversation between them and the authorities would not be used to prosecute:

"The Danish law §115 make is easy for them to have this conversation because other units in the police (investigating and criminalising) can do their own work. If they [police] find something then they can arrest him, but the prevention is about helping them.” (MT1)

§115, as mentioned in Chapter 5, enables authorities to share information for prevention purposes only, without exposing the individual (see Appendix N). The information gained for prevention purposes cannot be used in a criminal court, as evidence for the prosecution. Hence, this reduces the risk of reporting and cooperating with the authorities. This is novel, as it shows how governments can assist with reducing fear of approaching authorities for help through legislations.

6.3 Barriers to Reporting

The data from the interviews revealed there were barriers to deciding to report. Similar to the previous section, several themes were identified that contributed to the reluctance of reporters and how the cost and benefit of reporting were viewed.

6.3.1 Threat, Uncertainty, and Fear of Consequences

Practitioners believed that many were reluctant to report their concerns due to fear of consequences, especially in cases of police involvement:

"We have a problem with people reporting crime because they are afraid of what would happen if they report it [concern] to the police. And that is actually one of the big topics in some area where we try to educate people." (SYS1)

It was also suggested that some of the fear around reporting was based on what people had heard from others i.e. misconceptions and misinformation:

"Of course, people fear that something might happen [...] to them or their family because of what others shout and threaten; [...] but from my experience such fears are not reality." (SMU2)
Again, similar to Section 6.2.1, uncertainty influenced how the cost and benefit of reporting was perceived. It was also highlighted by practitioners that people with such concerns were uncertain about whether their concern was legitimate:

“Some of them think ‘is this the right thing I am doing? Is he a radicalised person, or is it my way of thinking that is the problem? Am I allowed to do this?’” (SP4)

The above comment highlights the uncertainty and lack of knowledge around radicalisation and extremism, and how this can work as a barrier to people to coming forward. Similarly, it was highlighted that fear of consequences was also an inhibitor in deciding to report “Many are concerned about that they are calling the police and they think along the lines of I don’t want him arrested.” (IHM1) Another practitioner espoused that professionals were reluctant to report because they feared the CTU’s involvement in the process of prevention, since the connotations attached to CTU were that this was more serious, and therefore the consequences it might have for the vulnerable individual might also be more serious.28

This worry over sharing of information with police stems from how the police are seen as a punitive arm of the law, and therefore, the assumption is that the authorities will respond in way that is punitive and in support of prosecution. This suggests that people do not want to be responsible for making the wrong decision, or they fear that their actions could result in something dramatic. The uncertainty results in fear and feeling unsafe:

“The concerns that people have before reporting someone is that [they want to know] what is wrong with the individual? Second, how can I avoid any dangers or threats that could happen? Basically, how can we feel safe again because when you have a concern you don’t feel safe, you are worried. Of course, they fear that there is a risk that the person might be put in gaol and get convicted but what I have seen and heard from the parents who call and

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28 “People believe Channel is linked to [the] police. [...] I don’t know whether we would see an increase in referrals if the police withdrew completely from the whole process. [...] It does make me wonder sometimes, whether or not people are reluctant to refer to Prevent/Channel because of the connotations attached to CTU. Because when we mention CTU within training to frontline communities, everybody sits up and pays attention. [...] I think there is [a] reluctance maybe not from the public but from the professional point of view. [...] So ultimately their concern would be ‘this person hasn’t committed an offence, I’m really concerned about the vulnerability but if I send this in, it is likely that the CTU is going to see this individual who has been referred’.” (CH1)
say ‘oh my boy just got back home from wherever’, they know the risks,”
(MT1)

The above comment highlights that there is a need to protect and find answers, which highlights personal impulse and responsibility. Although, this sense of personal responsibility can be a reason to report (see Section 6.2.2), it can also work as an inhibitor or a mechanism that delays the reporting process, since the individual feels they need time to figure out what to do. This comment also highlights that although parents might fear prosecution, they eventually do report their concerns. Another factor that influenced the cost of reporting was negative reactions from the people around the reporter. For example, as discussed in section 6.2.3, EJR2 stated that she had much to lose once she reported her sister i.e. negative reactions from family and community members. Other risk associated with reporting was the fear of surveillance or involvement of police in daily life:

“The day after my sister left my mum said she wouldn’t go back to the police. [...] She said ‘they will take your telephone number, they will contact you, and I don’t want anything to do with the police. I don’t want be contacted by them.”(EJR2)

Another reporter explained that it is difficult for families to report because of the instability in their emotions, and such confusion and fear can be a barrier to reporting concerns:

“I think parents are in a chaotic state [...] their thinking and emotions are all over the place. I remember myself as well, you can’t think straight [...] and I can understand why some families don’t want to engage with Prevent because of the link to the police.” (UKR1)

### 6.3.2 Internal Conflict

One of the factors that shaped the reasoning for reporting concerns was reporters’ internal conflict. Some reporters had conflicting emotions and thoughts when considering reporting:

“For me the risk of reporting my sister was that I would criminalise her, [...] and that I would lose some of my family, as I knew I wouldn’t have my mum’s support if the police got involved. [...] She thought I had given up on my sister. [...] So there was a lot to lose. Except, I felt like I had lost everything
anyway. [...] But the benefit, no, the diamond of reporting her was that I
would have my sister back. [...] I took the decision to report on my own, but
I’m glad. The only person that supported me was my partner at the time.
Even without him I was already on my way, but I needed the support, you
know. I felt alone and responsible. I told my mum, ‘I hope you support me
one day.’ [...] I knew if I reported her, I would hurt my sister’s feelings, and
she would think I am a bad person. But I was trying to be a good person.”
(EJR2)

The reporter highlights her mother’s point of view. For the reporter and her mother,
reporting had a different meaning. For the reporter it was a must, and the only remaining
option, whilst for her mother it meant abandonment and not allowing nature to take its
course. The comments above show the mother felt the reporter had given up on her sister
because she was reporting her. This indicated the mother felt the vulnerable individual
still had the power of reason and would be able to return home without police
interference. This internal conflict, to some extent, echoes the practitioners’ viewpoint on
why relatives tend to hold back for a longer period before they decide to come forward
(see Section 6.4). The risk of betraying the person you are protecting can sometimes feel
too high. The reporter expressed how reporting her sister meant a great deal to her, as she
thought through reporting her sister would come back. This presents an example of
reasoned action/planned behaviour. As mentioned in Chapter 3, the theory of reasoned
action and planned behaviour suggest that an individual’s behaviour is guided by their
intention. In turn, intention is steered by attitude (how the individual feels about
something and its outcomes), subjective norms (how the individual regards the
importance of others’ approval about that particular thing), and perceived behavioural
control (how much control does the individual believe they have over the matter).

For the current reporter, her attitude was ‘I need to bring my sister back, otherwise I will
lose her to harm’. Therefore, there was a need for action — a purpose. The reporter
recognised that her views on reporting was not in line with those of her family (most
importantly her mother), yet for her this was outweighed by her motivation to bring her
sister back. As for her perceived behavioural control, as discussed earlier the reporter felt
a sense of accountability married with sense of powerless, and the need for urgency. The
accumulation of all three reasoning has guided her intent to report. It is also evident that,
for the reporter, having her sister back heavily outweighed the reporter’s fear of
criminalising her sister. This cost-benefit analysis highlights the process of coming to the
decision to report. Chapter 3 presented information on how people’s decision to
cooperate is linked to the risks and benefits of a given scenario. This is in line with rational choice theory, which suggested that the decision to report a crime by a victim is dependent on the benefit of the reporting being greater than the associated costs. Clearly for our reporter, this was the case, as in her previous comments she states that ‘diamond’ of reporting her sister was the possibility of having her sister back.

Moreover, the reporter suggests that there was a change in the relationship, as the reporter felt her sister was no longer who she used to be and they had lost her already. This raises the paradox of duality in the relationship, which is married with internal conflict and dissonance i.e. ‘you are no longer who you were but I still feel the need to protect you’. The comment indicates that the trust between the sisters has been broken, changing the dynamic of their close relationship. As such, there is dissonance in viewing her relationship with her sister; there is no longer a sense of ‘us’. The sister now takes a position of an outsider who could cause harm. This internal conflict is obviously very hard for the reporter, as she also wants to protect the person that she fears.

The inner conflicts are very evident in this comment. The reporter feels a sense of duty not only to her sister, but possibly to others too. This can be concluded from the phrase ‘trying to be a good person’. The reporter does not say she is trying to be a ‘good sister’, but a ‘good person’, which indicates obligation to a wider group. This dissonance between ‘betraying’ her sister by reporting her and simultaneously trying to protect her — and possibly protecting a wider population — made the decision difficult for the reporter.

Similarly, a professional reporter expressed internal conflicts when about reporting a vulnerable student:

"When you ask me how I felt when we reported the student, I actually felt that we chose to report him without involving him or his parents. But I actually think I could’ve reported him and been able to tell the pupil and his parents that I have reported. [...] I know now that we have done the right thing. But when you ask me how it affected me, I would have liked to have invited the pupil and his parents, and present them with our concerns. Not doing that did affect me."(EJR1)

The reporter clearly highlights the struggle he felt at the time. It is clear that the reporter felt a sense of obligation and responsibility to both the pupil, and his colleagues. Although the reporter recognised that reporting the vulnerable individual was appropriate, he expresses dissonance about the manner in which it was done. The reporter explained that
it is a norm to involve the students and parents in discussions about the problems the student is facing in order to collectively and inclusively solutions can be sought. Given the sensitivity of the situation and the past experience of the school principal, the reporter felt that it was appropriate not to involve the student or his parents.

6.3.3 Trust

A further barrier to reporting was lack of trust. Practitioners believed that there is a general distrust towards CT, primarily due to fear of punishment or totalitarian actions (this is in line with theories related to attitudes and beliefs, as well as warmth-competence presented in Chapter 3):

“It is trust and the whole CT thing. It’s been badged with CT that puts people off because they think they will get locked away, and they will have their doors kicked in early hours of the morning. It is a perception issue in relation to CT.” (P3)

Others also agreed that trust and confidence in authority figures influenced reporting behaviour. It was argued the perception of authority figures are shaped mainly by the media:

“I think, a lot of time, the reasons why people don’t report is the mistrust of the authority. For example, we know that hate-crime is under reported because people don’t trust the authorities, whether it is the council, the police, or whoever. A lot of time the media plays a big part in this, in that you only have to look at the young boy who said he lived in a ‘terrorist house’, which wasn’t what had happened, but because that is how it was portrayed that goes in the media and straightaway the schools are at fault, the councils are at fault, the police are at fault. You start putting these bodies in the bad category, then people will straightaway say ‘I’m not going to them’.” (LA2)

The comment above highlights how big a role media can play in influencing how authorities are viewed, especially when the information is not reported factually. The key here is how stereotypes and biases are shaped through such information, and at a later stage can influence the decision-making process. Disloyalty or a sense of betrayal was also seen as a consequence of reporting, and although it was not necessarily a dominant factor that inhibited reporters coming forward, it did play on their conscience. For example, both EJR1 and EJR2 expressed throughout the interviews that although they knew they would
hurt the individual by reporting (i.e. the individual would feel betrayed), they still decided to report but were uncomfortable doing so without the vulnerable individual’s awareness:

“I knew her and I didn’t want to hurt her feelings. [...] If I reported her to the police, it would have hurt her because she wanted to be there [in Syria] and I didn’t want her to be there.” (EJR2)

Similarly, WYR2 espoused that there had been cases of referral where some students had felt betrayed by the teacher that had reported them. This obviously shows the impact of reporting on student-teacher relationships. Likewise, for EJR1 this sense of betrayal can be seen in the internal conflict presented in the previous section.

6.3.4 Training

The next two subsections are not necessarily barriers to reporting, but rather inhibitor of appropriate reporting or good quality reporting (in terms of timeliness, appropriateness, reliability, accuracy, and comprehensiveness of the information provided — see Figure 15). As such, the focus is primarily on professional reporters, since this was an issue that was highlighted in the interviews in relation to them.

![Figure 15: The Components of a Good Quality Report](Image)
As part of the training frontline practitioners are told to spot the signs, check them, and then report their concerns, if through checking they have obtained evidence to suggest there is a risk. However, the interviews revealed unfortunately this is not the case in practice. What tends to happen in most cases is that the signs are spotted, but the checking process is either skipped or misunderstood. This leads to poor quality reports.

As the Channel representative explained reporting a concern can be very subjective, and this is why evidence to support concerns is vital for escalation of concern. Without sufficient and appropriate evidence, the reports will not meet the threshold for intervention. Similarly, another practitioner espoused concerns about poor-quality reports and explained that education services tend to treat concerns of radicalisations and extremism like a 'hot potato', causing havoc:

“A lot of referrals come from schools and it could be something quite minor. The school has panicked, hit that button, and made a referral. [...] For example they might see a boy who is interested in school shootings; they panicked and thought ‘school shootings! That is terrorism! This is a Prevent referral!’ They’ve done nothing in the middle — what we call the checking stage. So now we try to re-educate some of the schools - what you need to do now is to look at the individual and see if he has said anything like that before, who are his friends, have you spoke to him? Have you asked him why? Have you had his parents in? All those things.” (P2)

One of the reporters similarly explained that colleagues failed to check what they have noticed, which had led to controversial reports because there was a gap in knowledge:

“We were hearing all these stories about all these schools, who were reporting anything that moved. You know, a person with a cereal box that looked like it might be a bomb, a terrorist house when it’s a terraced house. So we were really conscious of not over-referring. We really used the mantra: notice, check, and share. So what have you noticed? Check it out, check it

\[29\] “I would say that 80% of the referrals are what is called 3 Ms: malicious, misguided, or misinformed. Now often they are misinformed because what they are saying is that there is not enough evidence to state that this person is vulnerable to radicalisation/extremism. [...] VAF, for me, needs to be as detailed as possible. So whether there is a grievance, have they developed ideologies, has there been a transition period for that person. This is why the information-gathering needs to be so detailed and needs to be key, and this is the difficulty that I’ve got. Because I don’t get to see that individual prior to VAF being written. [...] the more factual information that I can offer the Channel panel then that leads to a more informative discussions, decisions, and interventions that need to be offered. [...] So for us to be able to provide the right level of support, we need to be provided the right level of facts in the first place.” (CH1)
thoroughly, and then make the decision as to sharing that information. [...] We took the checking really seriously. That really worked for us. [...] The stories that I was reading about and heard about in the media did the noticing and sharing. There was no checking, and that is the real gap.” (WYR1)

Other factors leading to poor reporting, in particular with education services, includes the need to pass along a concern in order to encourage the involvement of another partner in solving the problem. This in turn results in Prevent being a dumping ground for concerns that were rejected by other organisations, such as child services:

“[The] majority of the referrals come in from education, and what we do find sometimes is that they report their concern to Child Protection or Social Care, for example. However, they were told the concern did not meet the threshold, and the concern is bounced back to the school. I’m not saying this happens all the time but it does happen in some cases. So they think ‘where else can we get that support from? Ah, there is a tenuous link to Prevent. We’ll send the referral to Prevent’. Now ultimately down the line that’s not going to go anywhere.” (CH1)

6.3.5 Policy

Policy can be a double edged sword. As mentioned in section 6.2.8, policy can encourage reporting. However, it can also work as a barrier. It is evident from the previous section on training and fear of consequences (Section 6.2.1) that policy can have a negative impact, as it can induce a level of fear due to the punitive element of the policy. In case of the Prevent Duty, the professionals who work within the LA, education services, the health sector, prisons and the probation services, and the police can face penalties for failing to safeguard vulnerable individuals. Some practitioners recognised the impact of Prevent Duty on reporting: “Definitely, the Prevent Duty is why we’re getting referrals in.” (CH1) This fear, as illustrated can cause panic and result in the processes not being followed appropriately.

6.4 Professional vs. Family Reporters

One of the questions explored during the interviews with practitioners was whether there was a difference in risk of reporting for professionals over parents/family members. There was a general consensus that there was a difference. It was explained that there was
a tendency for professionals to report much faster, whilst relatives took longer to make the decision to report:

“There is a difference. Professionals tend to report these things more, [...] and they also report much smaller things. [...] For relatives it is much more difficult to pass that tipping point and to make that report. [...] They need to fear that perhaps something terrible could happen. [...] Sometimes in cases where they fear someone might go to Syria, I think, sometimes they [family members] close their eyes and think it might not happen. That is what we have seen. [...] Maybe it’s because they don’t know what to look for; for example, some of the signs they see, they just brush it off as the person being religious.” (IHP1)

The above comment highlights that some relatives might not report concern due to lack of knowledge of what to look for, or simply avoiding the problem. On the other hand the professionals tend to report smaller issues (as explored in Section 6.3.4). Another practitioner explained there was a difference in concerns between professionals and relatives. Although the professionals have a legal obligation to report individuals at risk of radicalisation/extremism, they were believed to be fearful of what would happen to their relationship with the child or relatives. However, they also fear what could happen to themselves:

“For professionals, their concern is about the relationship with the child and the parent — ‘what will happen if I make this report now?’ [...] Also they think about the security risks of ‘what will happen to me if I don’t report?’ In Denmark, most professionals by law have to do it [report]. End of story. [...] I think for a teacher it is easier in comparison to a parent but still somewhat difficult because they are so scared of losing the child’s trust, but it is not their child. It’s their work.” (CW1)

This brings to attention that professionals need to safeguard individuals from risks; hence they need to think within that spectrum. As such, they are aware of the punitive element that is attached to the legal requirement — this is evident in the above comment (“they think about the risks of what will happen to them”). Moreover, the comment highlights that although there may be emotional connection between the vulnerable individual and the educator, it is not on the same level as the emotional bond between a parent and a child. Also, the practitioners explained that the professional reporters reported early, and at times out of fear that they have a professional and legal duty to do so. This resulted to
professionals being over-cautious and 'trigger happy' when it came to reporting, even if they believed it was not a Prevent related issue (as discussed in Section 6.3.4.):

“The risk they talk about is their own accountability, should they have not acted on their concern. We have so many inspection frame works that people are subjected to across education, across different infrastructures of support. But if we are honest, they think if this is not Prevent-related but something does happen then I have not covered my back by not sending that referral in to the appropriate agencies. So they err on the side of caution.” (CH1)

Similarly, another practitioner espoused that professional reporters were seen as less certain when they had to report a situation that they believed was CT-related because they did not want to experience any backlash should they misjudge the situation:

“There is an element, from a professional perspective, of ‘if I haven't said this and it ends up going bad, I haven't shared this with anybody and I have to share it’. But in the training we tell people to notice, check, and share.” (LA1)

For relatives, reporting is more personal; people might feel they are being disloyal. This highlights the emotional conflict that parents might feel when reporting their child:

“For a parent it's much harder because it's their own child. No matter what, you must feel, somewhere deep in your heart, like a traitor because you are reporting your child.” (CW1)

Other practitioners expressed that relatives need to feel they have no other option, or are powerless, married with a sense of urgency, in order for them to take action in reporting their concerns:

“It is challenging, it is very challenging for them [relatives] to report. [...] What we have seen is that if they can see no other option, and they believe that there is some help to get, then they'll do it [report]. But I think it is challenging in general.” (IHM1)

This sense of urgency for immediate action and feelings of being powerless, as well as not having any other option was also highlighted by other practitioners:

“I think that they feel that they are powerless, [...] they don’t know what to do. They just want to stop the child now! [...] They think ‘what can we do? The police are our only option to stop our child.’ I think when parents report
their child to the police, it is because they have been pushed to their limit and they don’t see any other option but calling the police. [...] Even if they are from a background that doesn’t approve of approaching the police. This is the last step they can take. [...] They have no control over the situation, that’s why they need our help. [...] With radicalisation, parents might be more willing to do something radical to prevent their child from being harmed.”

(CW1)

The idea that the police hold higher power and ability to stop the situation from escalating can shape the decision to report and seek help from authorities (see Section 6.2.3). This sense of urgency married to a lack of options and feelings of powerlessness influences how a person tries to reduce the level of dissonance, and ultimately may lead to the individual making a report. As such, reporting might be a last effort to gain control over the situation.

It was also asked if the practitioners had experienced that relatives were more likely to report if the vulnerable individual was a convert. It was explained that, although parents tend to have similar concerns when reporting their child, parents of converts might not be under the pressure from their cultural communities in comparison to someone from a particular ethnic or religious background:

“If the child is a convert and the parents are not, it is sometimes easier for the parents to report because they are not part of a religious community, and they don’t have any strings attached or have to be careful. Of course, when you report someone from a specific community it is difficult. If you are not from that community then it maybe be easier to report because they think ‘it is not my community, it is sort of a bad community that damaged my child’. That is easier to report — sort of.” (CW1)

As the above comment shows, it is still challenging for a parent to report their child even if the vulnerable individual is a convert to a religion that the parents do not follow. However, it is also evident that the sense of identity through social categorisation and social identity creates an in-group and out groups — i.e. us vs. them — that can influence the decision to report. The comment also suggests that external pressures could increase the dissonance and prevent individuals from coming forth.

In West Yorkshire, most of the reports in relation to radicalisation and extremism came from the education services, with fewer reports from relatives. The practitioners believed
that there was a difference in the risk of reporting for professionals over relatives. It was believed that for relatives the risk was mainly to do with criminalisation of the vulnerable individual or being under surveillance, and they usually made their reports late:

"We've had some families who [...] had concerns when their children might have asked for their passports, for instance. So they had concerns but don't report it because they don't want to get their child in trouble. Then they will report it two days after they have gone missing. [...] They ask if their child will get into trouble. [...] What I say to them then is that they will be investigated but you've probably saved their lives. What is more important? It is a tricky one, really. Sometimes they are reluctant to share that information. [...] The earlier you do it the safer it is for that individual. So their fear is the criminalisation of the individual." (P2)

Another theme that became apparent was the need to protect. The practitioners highlighted that the relatives’ decision to report their child was a lengthy process and one that was a balancing act. The practitioners felt that the relatives, most of time, feared either losing their child forever (e.g. being killed after travelling to conflict zones):

"I think the main concern is that they are afraid that they are going to travel off to Syria and fight and die. It takes a long time before they decide to report; [...] they have many thoughts about it. [...] And, as parent you would do anything to protect your child even if it means that they have to go to prison." (SYS1)

The same view was echoed by other practitioners:

"Most parents who approach us have already thought it through. They say that 'I would rather have him in gaol than in Syria'. And many parents are actually very reflective about that, [...] their main concern is that at least this way my child has a better chance of surviving in prison. Their second thought is that the rest of the world is protected but their first thought is that he will survive! And you can’t fault anyone there." (IHM1)

"They know the risks can be higher so they balance the risk and think ‘well, I [would] rather this than have him die in Syria." (MT1)
As the comments above suggest, in order to protect their child, parents who reported tend to take on the risk of having their child in prison rather than in Syria or dead. As such, reporting is seen as a form of protection.

6.5 Reporters’ Experience of Reporting

In order to understand the user experience of reporting, it was vital to explore what their experience of reporting was, and whether they had received support from practitioners. This is because a positive experience is more likely to result in positive word of mouth, which subsequently may possibly lead to cooperative behaviour. Also, by exploring such experiences, bottlenecks in service can be identified, which can inform improvements in the service.

6.5.1 Dialogue and Informal Reporting

One of the main themes from the interview was informal reporting. For the reporters, this consisted of accessing to practitioners who could provide them with guidance. As such, reporters felt more at ease when they were able to talk through their reasoning with a CT specialist. This gave them confidence that they were making the right decision, and as a result felt empowered:

“It was an informal reporting initially, then it was made formal [...] I felt empowered. [...] I think that was supportive, being able to talk it through, being able to make decisions jointly, being informed at every step on what was happening. I guess just being in touch with people, you get that reassurance from people that you’re doing the right thing. [...] They were able to listen to my ideas, views, and comment appropriately on them — whether I was doing the right or wrong thing, rather than just go and put a referral in straight away. You can use them as a sounding board.” (WYR3)

Being able to share the burden or responsibility of making the decision with others, especially those involved in CT, helped the reporters feel more at ease and confident in what they were doing. Similarly, another reporter explained that prior to making an anonymous report they had held several discussions with the Info-House practitioners, which had helped them to understand their concerns better and to collectively make the decision to report — an opportunity that would not have been there if they had reported directly to the police:
“Reporting this way was different from calling the police, [...] we had several talks with the Info-House officer. [This] let him help us to see if we are making a big thing out of nothing, or if there was actually something vital. He helped us make up our own mind. Info-House wasn’t like a hotline; we were able to have a discussion and get advice. So it was really helpful. If Info-House wasn’t there, we would have had to make the decision ourselves. But [discussing the situation] with them they made us aware that some of the information we had about the case wasn’t a cause for concern, but others suggested a need for reporting. They helped us a lot to make a decision as a school. [...] If we reported it directly to the police there wouldn’t be a dialogue.” (EJR1)

However, in West Yorkshire it was recognised that access to such informal discussions was a luxury, as not everyone had this opportunity. In order to have such informal discussions, there was a need for an established relationship or contact (see Chapter 7).

6.5.2 Support

As evident in previous sections, knowing about available support can shape the decision to report. Therefore, the reporters were asked what kind of support they had received when reporting. An East Jutland reporter explained that the support she received was empathetic and had motivated her to continue seeking help. The reporter explained that she had direct access to everyone at the Info-House, and she was also offered counselling:

“I didn’t have any support before I made my report. [...] During the report they told me ‘not to feel bad about anything: ‘we are here for you, anything you need; don’t break down; you are bright’. They gave motivation, you know. They motivated me to come and see what we can do, to meet other people. They said ‘if you are having a hard time, come talk to us’. They even offered me [the chance] to speak to a psychiatrist. I told them ‘no, I don’t need them. I can manage. I will just call you if I need something. I have everyone’s [at the Info-House] contact on my phone’. Anything I need, I just call them.” (EJR2)

The same reporter, explained that she also had access to Parent Network, a group counselling and support mechanism discussed in Chapter 5, which she had found very helpful and comforting because there were other people with similar experiences:
“I went to the Parent Network that the Info-House had setup, and saw a lot of faces, a lot of different histories. And I thought, ‘oh my God! You guys have the same history but different.’ [...] It was very helpful.” (EJR2)

It was also important to understand if the reporter felt pressured at any time during her report. This would suggest an issue of power, which may have influenced cooperative behaviour. The reporter explained that she did not experience pressure from the police or social workers: “No, they were very supportive. If I didn’t want to talk about something, they would give me time and say, ‘let us stop here’. They were understanding.” (EJR2) This comment once again, suggests that the reporter felt respected for her decisions by giving her the space she needed. She again uses the word ‘understanding’ to illustrate this. The interviews from the UK were not fruitful in highlighting support provided to the reporters, or at least there seemed to be inconsistency. One reporter explained that although she was aware that some families were supported, she was not one of them. The reporter felt there was a lack of communication about the type of support available to her — i.e. FLOs — and decisions about such support were made on her behalf without informing her. This, the reporter felt, lacked transparency.

6.5.3 Feedback

Both East Jutland and West Yorkshire struggled to provide feedback once the report was made. Some reporters were happy that they received some feedback about the case they reported: “The Prevent Coordinator phoned me to let me know the outcome and what had happened.” (WYR3) Others expressed that although some of them were able to have an informal discussion before reporting, there was a lack of follow-up afterwards. Moreover, some had managed to get insight into how a report had progressed only because they were on the Prevent Committee:

“I didn’t get any follow up contact but now I’m thinking, nor did I expect really [...] I do know that it went into the intelligence profile, and [...] no

30 “The families that I am in contact with do acknowledge they had some support. [...] Apart from Prevent there isn’t an awful lot for families to support them. [...] In my case I wasn’t provided any support, not in that time — it was 2015. Unfortunately I wasn’t offered a liaison officer. The detective leading the case stepped into the role because of the relationship we had. There was no other person that was in the middle to support me, and I did ask at the time and I didn’t get much back to be honest. [...] And I told her ‘that’s not you role because how can you be my liaison officer and then be leading the case?’ I felt there was no transparency about that; I felt they should have said that. For me she was leading the case but behind the scenes they were saying ‘oh yeah you could be her family liaison’ but they didn’t communicate that with me in any form.” (UKR1)

31 “We had dialogue and discussion before reporting, but we didn’t have a follow-up after the reporting.” (EJR2)
significant action was taken afterwards. I know this because of my Prevent Bronze membership, [...] I found out more about the case purely from the professional setting; [...] so an officer didn't directly ring me to say this is what’s happened. But [...] through my membership I learnt about the progress, and reassured that it was in the system, and that other people were looking at it over and above myself.” (WYR2)

It was also reported that feedback was more of a privilege, as not everyone had access to such feedback because they were not in the ‘circle’:

“I recognise that professionally I am in a privileged position, [...] I think if I or my organisation weren’t within the CONTEST arena, as a standing partner at various levels of [the] Prevent agenda then yes I think we would lack that communication. I don’t think the police would be deliberately reaching out to us to talk about this issue if we weren’t already part of that audience.” (WYR2)

Another reporter explained that feedback was not available to them because of lack of intelligence and the fact the practitioners were swapped with other cases:

“I remember that the detective saying that ‘I’m asking you all these questions but you are getting little back from us’ because they had nothing to give [...] and they were inundated with requests at that point [...]. But I thought at least they were being honest about that.” (UKR1)

6.5.4 Being Judged

One of the concerns highlighted in the interview with the UK reporter was the sense of being judged. The reporter explained that families are looked at as though they are naïve or as if they are the criminals, leaving them to feel the need to justify themselves as a family:

“Sometimes there is a sense of judgement. [...] Because it’s your child, sometimes you get the impression that they think you’re being naïve about things, and that makes you think that you can’t make choices on how to do things. [...] One thing that comes up when I talk to other families is that they were made slightly to feel like they were the criminals. I’m not saying that is done on purpose, [...] but those comments land with the families and they feel like they need to justify themselves all the time.” (UKR1)
6.5.5 Other Negative Experiences

The reporter from the UK explained that there was a lack of consistency and continuity in practitioners that were in contact with the families. This in turn had resulted in families retelling their story of events, which caused them stress:

“...I was speaking to some families recently and they mentioned how many times they had to repeat the story, and all within a short time. So for example they might get a social worker and they have to tell them the story, but later they are assigned another social worker, which means they have to go through it again. [...] The problem with that is you are re-traumatising the person.” (UKR1)

It was also expressed that there was lack of empathy; that the practitioners were more interested in collecting intelligence, which meant they did not pay attention to the fact the person they were dealing with was going through a difficult time:

“...It's almost like an observation, and them always wanting something from you. I think sometimes it's just a simple case of listening to somebody, being with them. Because some get caught up in their role and [are] constantly risk assessing, so they forget the individual that is actually going through a really difficult time. [...] You can be bombarded with too many officials, and asking you questions, and you don’t get an awful lot back — and I’m not just talking about information, it's the support as well. [...] It was all about intelligence and the detectives were really honest about that. They constantly call me to see if I had spoken him.” (UKR1)

6.6 Discussion

This chapter sought to illustrate why people report concerns of radicalisation and extremism. This is important in prevention because what gets measured gets managed. If the concern is to prevent cases of radicalisation and extremism, one way of doing so is through encouraging reports of such cases. Knowing how to encourage this requires insight (measurement) into the behaviour (reporting) and why people take such actions, which can inform better practice to promote the desired behaviour (manage).

This chapter provided insights into this behaviour, some of which were in support of Thomas et al.’s (2017) and their findings, whilst others expanded on their findings or found contrary evidence by going deeper into how the reasoning to report is shaped. Findings in support of Thomas et al. included internal conflict (e.g. emotions vs. sense of
responsibility); the need to safeguard and to protect; the need to seek out information to ascertain whether their concerns were warranted; and the threat needs to be perceived as high in order to report — i.e. the cost of not reporting. However, this thesis departs from Thomas et al. by highlighting that people do seek and approach CT specialists for help, something Thomas et al. argued people did not want to do (see Chapter 1). Additionally, Thomas et al. argued that people are motivated to report because they care and are concerned about the vulnerable individual — i.e. emotional attachment. This thesis illustrated that the decision to report is complex and multi-layered, with caring for the vulnerable individual being both a motivation and a barrier to reporting.

For both types of reporters there were pull and push factors that shaped their reasoning to report. It was evident from the interviews presented in this chapter that radicalisation and extremism were alien concepts, which resulted in uncertainty. When the world is so radically alien, so in excess of uncertainty, there is fear; and more importantly there is a need for support and additional information that can create a safer environment. This is because uncertainty is the recognition that one’s beliefs and representations of the world do not accurately predict the future events (including those related to one’s actions) (Mushtaq et al. 2011). Uncertainty is a key factor that shapes threat perception. This chapter illustrated how threat perception is layered with various factors, with each layer adding to the interpretation of reality. Threat perception is not a single event but an accumulation of factors, such as fear of consequences, with a trigger point that causes a sufficient sense of urgency to act. Those who tend to report much later — which usually happens to be families/relatives — have a different threat perception and trigger point.

For this group, there is misleading or misguiding information that causes them to think that the threat has subsided and the trigger point is when they have realised this is not the case — i.e. lack of control. For others, the trigger point is a new set of information/action that confirms the set of beliefs that they had held previously about a situation — e.g. being worried about a risky behaviour and then witnessing a specific action that confirms such concerns.

In moments of uncertainty, heuristics and biases are used to identify the likelihood of possible outcomes in order to make the best decision possible. Heuristics are a problem-solving shortcut that use readily available information (usually from one’s experiences) to reach a quick and efficient judgement (Lewis 2008). Although heuristics can work well in some circumstances, they can also lead to errors as a result of biases and lack of information. These errors are believed to result from people confusing representativeness with probability (Kahneman & Tversky 1974). This is evident in cases of relatives who
report their concerns too late — i.e. thinking that they can manage the vulnerable individual on their own. In such situations the prototypes associated with the social identity (e.g. lack of trust or fear of punishment associated with the police or surveillance and CT, as discussed in Section 3.2.8) or context tend to be misused as the probability of a specific event to take place. Therefore, when making decisions in uncertainty people tend to look for patterns or evidence to confirm what they already believe, rather than looking for evidence that could contradict their beliefs — this is called confirmation bias (Passer & Smith 2007).

Moreover, uncertainty can also be a by-product of cognitive dissonance or internal conflict. In its simplest form, cognitive dissonance is when one's ideas, beliefs, or behaviour contradict and conflict with one another (Festinger, 1957, p.3). This inconsistency results in psychological discomfort, which motivates the person to try to reduce the dissonance (inconsistency) and achieve consonance (consistency) (Festinger 1957, p.3). According to the theory, there is an inner drive to hold all our behaviour in line with our beliefs and attitudes and avoid inconsistencies. In the presence of dissonance, the person will actively try to avoid situations or information that is likely to increase the dissonance. For example, people tend to use memory selectively, remembering only good outcomes and disregard the bad ones. Therefore, there is a need for change due to inconsistencies between attitudes and behaviours. This change can be achieved in three possible ways: acquire new information that outweighs the inconsistencies in beliefs (e.g. learning about similar cases and available help); reduce the importance of cognition (e.g. it is better to report my child to police and have him alive than never see him again); or change one or more behaviour or belief in order to harmonise the relationship (e.g. the police are bad but they can't be that bad if they provide support). The last is harder to achieve, as well-learned behaviour or deep rooted beliefs will take longer to transform. As such, reporting becomes a balancing act for the reporter due to cognitive dissonance.

This research found evidence of all three responses. For example when EJR2 discovered the support available to her, she was more open to seeking help. Thus, knowing about similar cases assisted with the decision to report. This thesis suggests that there is another factor, which can assist in reducing dissonance: the feeling of being powerless or helpless. As such, this thesis contributes to the theory of cognitive dissonance by expanding on other factors that may be at play. This thesis highlighted that parents/families who reported their concern did so partly because they felt powerless and believed they had no other alternative that to have the authorities involved. This also
supports the threat perception theory of the late reporters presented in this chapter (see Figure 14), which suggests that lack of control is a trigger point that demands action.

It became evident that reporters sought dialogue and informal reporting in order to a) seek advice and guidance from a professional; b) confirm or disconfirm their concerns; c) have a free dialogue without worrying about consequences; and d) in some cases share the burden of responsibility. This illustrates the importance of dialogue in reducing the cognitive dissonance and cost of reporting, which both practitioners and reporters agreed to be very beneficial, as it also allowed to them eliminate inappropriate reporting.

Another factor that influenced reporting behaviour was the sense of responsibility and accountability. As discussed in Chapter 3, a sense of responsibility is a predictor of behaviour (Kaiser & Shimoda 1999), especially in a case of emergency married with a sense of commitment or special bond towards the vulnerable individual (Geer & Jarmecky 1973; Moriarty 1975), or when the vulnerable individual is dependent on the reporter (Berkowitz 1978). This was also present in the case of the relative reporter EJR2, who not only felt responsible as a sister but also in a mothering role since she was a guardian to her sister. This is also in line with research that suggests a sense of identity is a predictor of intention (Viki et al. 2006). A sense of accountability and responsibility encourages cooperative behaviour, something that Mistry (2007) argues affects crime-prevention at a community level.

One barrier to reporting was lack of trust. The police were thought to be untrustworthy by some and not helpful towards ‘Muslims’. This is in line with Chapter 3, where police legitimacy is discussed in the context of suspect community. If people feel they are under threat, whether such grievances are real or perceived, as Briggs (2010, p.973) argues, they need be addressed in order for CE to be effective. Consequently, this may have an influence on reporting behaviour. Moreover, issues of trust were not only associated with authorities: some reporters illustrated a sense of betrayal, which suggests breach of trust. Although betrayal did not directly inhibit reporters from coming forward, the data revealed that it did add to their internal conflict and cognitive dissonance. For example, EJR1 illustrated a sense of betrayal because he made the report without involving the student or his parents. Such a sense of betrayal can add to the cost of reporting and possibly delay the individual coming forward quicker. It is important to note here that behaviour is motivated by emotion, as presented here and in Chapter 3, rather than reason (Baumeister et al. 2007). The data provided in this chapter shows that positive emotions trump negative emotions. Although there were fears of consequences, most
reporters sought redemption by knowing they had done something about the situation. Attitudes of ‘better safe than sorry’ or ‘at least I know I did everything I could’ all create this positive justification that enables the person to feel good about what they are about to do.

Reporters start out with an emotional commitment to a certain idea and then they will use their confirmation biases and experiences to confirm what it is they want to believe. For example, for professional reporters or foster parents there was a pre-conception that was emotionally driven, i.e. how they already felt about the vulnerable individual. They then used previous context or radicalisation signs to confirm what they believed. For relatives and close associates, their close emotional stance guides them to seek information that supports their beliefs — i.e. he/she is only being religious or trying to figure out life. Therefore, when they are provided with misinformation, they are more likely to accept it as reality. Thus, the partisan affiliation comes first, and then follows the reasoning process by which one justifies one’s beliefs. As such, reality is cherry-picked to support one’s version of the world, and it takes a big external shock to prove one wrong. This is evident in the relative reporters who expressed their shock when they discovered their loved one had left; it somehow felt unexpected.

Another interesting observation was the difference between professional reporters and close relatives/associates. The professionals had a tendency to report more quickly, and sometimes were hypersensitive to threat perception, resulting in reports of irrelevant cases. This was due to several factors, the most influential of which was the fear of consequences, especially those in relation to punitive action. This nervousness leads to missing the steps in the process of reporting. In the training, the professionals are taught if they notice something, they need to check it and make sure that there is sufficient evidence supporting that concern. Additionally, as mentioned earlier there is a sense of uncertainty around what radicalisation and extremism is and this is perhaps an issue of training because it is clear that those who had access to CT specialists or were more experienced were more confident in what they should report. In contrast, close relatives and associates were more likely to report later if they were not already in a position to be alert about safeguarding the vulnerable individual i.e. knowing that they cannot safeguard the individual on their own due to other factors such as mental health. This lateness was a result of fear of consequences, emotional attachment, and internal conflict. The data revealed that in some cases the families were more likely to accept having their loved one in prison rather at risk of harm (e.g. dead in Syria); consequently this caused them to cooperate and report the vulnerable individual. Those who knew there was additional
help for the vulnerable individual were believed to seek active role in prevention. This is evident in Chapter 5 in the discussion of a Jihadi reporting her sons to the Info-House, or other relatives coming forward to report their children. This illustrates that there is a sense of hope that the vulnerable individual will be able to live a ‘normal’ life after rehabilitation. This was only evident in East Jutland. In fact, when the experiences of reporters were explored, it became evident that close relatives/associates in East Jutland received more help and felt more included and respected in the process. This recognition that these families needed support, like victims of crime, encouraged a positive outlook from these reporters. This can be seen in EJR2.

In the UK, the reporter explained that families were thought of as naïve, part of the problem, or criminal. This induced the sense of being judged and not being part of a team to ensure prevention. The reporter explained that the relationships with specialists were more intelligence-related rather than supportive, and at times very clinical without empathy. This is very important as it can influence how word of mouth can shape the cooperation of others. For example, EJR2 explained how she had heard from others about the support they had received and how happy they were. Such experiences influence the relation between the authorities and those with concerns — especially families. The warmth-competency scale discussed in Chapter 3 illustrates how stereotypes and biases from such experiences can shape behaviour.

Another issue that was evident in the experience of reporters in both East Jutland and West Yorkshire was the lack of feedback from practitioners once a report was made. It became evident that those who were in the circle or in contact with relevant people were more likely to get feedback on the report. What is evident thus far is that there is a need for it. Feedback is crucial as it can highlight what the reporters need to look for, and reassure them that their concern is being dealt with (see Chapter 7).

This chapter illustrated the reasons for and barriers to reporting radicalisation and extremism. The thought process is multi-layered and there are needs that ought to be addressed to remove some of these barriers and encourage people to report their concerns both quickly and appropriately. The next chapter will discuss how reporting can be improved and encouraged through CTCE considering the reasoning presented in this chapter and literature review in Chapter 3.
Chapter 7

The Golden Thread: Improving and Encouraging Reporting

7.1 Introduction

The last two chapters presented this study's empirical findings on how CTCE is practiced in East Jutland and West Yorkshire (Chapter 5), as well as illustrating the reasoning behind reporting and its formation (Chapter 6). This chapter is the final empirical chapter. This chapter is complementary to Chapters 5 and 6. Improving and encouraging reporting behaviour is about the relationship between reasons for, and barriers to reporting, as well as the interaction with CTCE. Therefore, it is the marriage and the interface between these factors that this chapter explores in order to answer research Question Two on the effectiveness of CTCE on reporting of radicalisation and extremism, as well as research Questions Four (reasons for the existence of this relationship) and Five (lessons learnt to shape CTCE practice that encourages and improves reporting).

The findings thus far suggest that CTCE is multi-layered, multi-agency, focused on building relationships and trust, intended to solve problems, and proactive in prevention. Moreover, engagement is considered to be tailored to the audience, and can be targeted. Like CTCE, reporting behaviour is multi-layered and multifaceted. Previous chapters have asserted that identity is at the heart of it, as it guides perceptions and relationships. The purpose of this chapter is to develop models of reporting behaviour and CTCE for the purpose of encouragement and improvement of reporting of radicalisation and extremism. It argues that reporting behaviour can be encouraged if CTCE is delivered in a way that addresses the psychological needs and underpinnings that have been discussed thus far.

Through introduction of these models, the current chapter contributes to existing models of behaviour through merging several theories and models in order to provide insight into how reporting behaviour is shaped. A further contribution is the proposed CTCE model, which is informed through behavioural insight. This chapter also examines the barriers and problems in the service — factors that are believed to hinder efficiency of CTCE in the context of reporting of radicalisation and extremism — and argues reporting can be improved once these issues have been addressed. Consequently, this chapter examines
three ideas: the impact of CTCE on reporting of radicalisation and extremism, encouraging reporting, and improving the quality of reporting.

7.2 Impact of CTCE on Reporting

A part of this thesis explored if CTCE has any influence on reporting behaviour. This is because CTCE is about prevention and in order for prevention to be effective it needs the cooperation of the public, thus encouraging reporting is important. Practitioners were asked if CTCE had any influence on reporting behaviour. The current section attempts to explore this notion through qualitative data from interviews, married with some secondary statistical data obtained from each force as supporting evidence. Overwhelmingly, both East Jutland and West Yorkshire practitioners strongly believed that CTCE did have a positive influence on reporting behaviour for various reasons. Practitioners stated that CTCE enabled building trust with communities by being honest. Therefore, CTCE was believed to have helped increase reports through raising awareness and improving relationships:

“Yes, we have seen an increase since the outreach. There is an improvement from the first years to now. There is definitely an increase. When we spread awareness in the communities — even with limited outreach — we have seen a rise in reports. […] It [community engagement] has definitely helped people reporting concerns of radicalisation and this is because we were so open, and had such a concentrated effort on spreading awareness in the communities that we actually got [an] increase in reports of such concerns. […] Because we had this communication with people and actors and players in the community […] they trusted us and that is a big part of it. We were so transparent, this is what we do.” (IHM1)

“Undoubtedly community engagement has had an impact on reporting. I can only quantify it through the volume of calls we get. They are increasing year on year. […] The relationships that we’ve got, and the engagement we do is generating information from people. […] We’ve had more referrals in the first 6 months of this year than we’ve had in the whole of last 12 months. (SP2)

“If you had 1,600 referrals over a 21-month period you can read something into the figures there, so yeah obviously there is an impact. There are at least 1,500 people in less than 2 years that have trusted the system and done that [report]. […] For example, in one case the officer had worked in that locality
for 8-9 years working on the Prevent agenda and there were lots of interaction with a particular mental health hospital. Because of that local relationship [...] the rapport and trust are already there [...] so there has to be some value to it.” (SP3)

“Absolutely, community engagement has had an impact on reporting. [...] We’ve seen that our reporting has become far better and far more informed the more we engage with people. We have seen a real increase over the last sort of 18 months.” (LA1)

“From the Prevent perspective we have received a lot more calls, referrals. Most are from education, and the work that I did on going out and raising awareness had helped. There is obviously a spike.” (P3)

More importantly, the practitioners stated that CTCE had improved and encouraged reports from relatives and close associates, and this change was visible once engagement took place:

“The proportions of the reports are really changing, the vast majority come from the schools but we’ve seen increase in number of referrals from communities, and families because of engagement.” (SP2)

“We can see from the small number of figures that we’ve had from family and friends that it [community engagement] has helped. I wouldn’t say it has not helped. Clearly there are people in the communities that are still willing to contact the authorities.” (SP3)

“I think we had 15 referrals last year and we have 44 in quarter 3 this year [...] Out of the 44, we probably had 7 reports from community members. This is not exact numbers. We didn’t use to have community members coming forward before the engagement. So, yes there has been a real positive shift. [...] We are seeing more people feeling okay to come and talk about it. Feeling that they can trust the system, and they can get something back from that.” (LA1)

It was also argued that people reported more because CTCE illustrated the benefits of reporting, and induce confidence about the process that permitted the individual to access support and guidance without fear of punishment:
"Yes, community engagement helps people report cases of radicalisation and extremism because they can see it is good to share that information. It is not about punishing but a way to understand how to handle the vulnerable individual." (MU1)

"I think community outreach does have an impact on people reporting because more people call in when they know the police and how stuff like prevention works, you know what is the main goal? Because a normal civilian will think ‘what is in it for me? Why the hell should I [pick up] the phone? You just want to arrest my son and all that’. So it is important for people in the community to understand the difference between prevention and conviction, especially for minority group because [for them] any contact with the police means you are in trouble, and outreach helps with that.” (MT1)

It was noted that other factors, such as recent terrorist events, could also influence the increase in numbers of reports:

"Reports come in waves. When something happens in Denmark related to violent extremism, or terrorist attacks worldwide, we receive a wave of reports. So what happens globally effects how people approach us or at least the volume of people approaching us locally." (IHM1)

"Some of the reports are on the back of the attacks we've had this year, but this is only a personal view. That has clearly motivated people to raise concerns at early stage. "(SP2)

However, it was agreed that CTCE, overall, had a positive impact on reporting behaviour but also prevention, because, as mentioned earlier, CTCE created trust and confidence, which result in ‘actionable intelligence’. More importantly, unlike the some conventional belief, people trusted the police through such practices:

"Absolutely because community engagement creates trust and confidence, and trust and confidence creates what is called actionable intelligence. So people in our communities come up to me and say ‘you need to be aware of so and so’, or ‘we are aware of that a certain someone has had an argument with somebody else around the mosque issues.’ So there are a lot of benefits surrounding community engagement: getting actionable intelligence, preventing crime and disorder, and so on." (SP1)
“Certain people will say ‘nobody trusts the police, they won’t report concerns’ but we’ve had a 100% increase in referrals for the last year.” (SP2)

7.2.1 What Do The Statistics Show?

The CTUs from both regions were asked to provide statistical data that they had held on reports of radicalisation and extremism. This was more successful with East Jutland, as they had collected this data for several years. Unfortunately, this practice was not historically supported in West Yorkshire, and the data was limited at the time of this research collection. Consequently, other available secondary data was obtained from the Home Office’s public annual publications. The East Jutland data supported the claim that there had been a rise in reports (See Table 5). As evident, the numbers have increased since inception of the Info-House and their CTCE efforts. Although the majority of the reports are from professionals, nonetheless, there is an increase in reports from family/friends and the general public. In 2014-2015 reports from family/friends were just as high as professionals. In 2014 42% of the reports were from family/friends and 50% from the professionals, while in 2015 47% of the reports were from professionals and 43% from family/friends. There is a decline in reports in recent years due to what Info-House believes to be the result of effective prevention work through their CTCE.

The data revealed an average annual increase in reports from relatives and close associates between 2011-2017, after the implementation of CTCE, of 63%, with professionals at 26% and the general public increasing by 49%. This illustrates that CTCE has had a very positive effect on reporting behaviour, especially those of relatives and close associates.

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<td>60</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2015</td>
<td>150</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2016</td>
<td>105</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2017</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>580</td>
<td>315</td>
<td>190</td>
<td>75</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 5: Number of reports per year made to Info-House in relation to radicalisation and extremism

As for West Yorkshire the table shows an increase in reports, specifically from professionals (see Table 6). The increase in the professional cohort is believed to be due to
a) the introduction of Prevent Duty in mid-2016; b) the engagement with professionals to ensure they understood Prevent is a safeguarding issue; and c) in 2017 there was a real recognition from professionals that they had to commit to the process. There was a small drop in reports from the general public. The drop in the family/friends cohort stems from a couple of cases involving several individuals from two families, hence the larger numbers for 2016.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Yearly Totals</th>
<th>Professionals</th>
<th>Family/Friends</th>
<th>General Public</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2016</td>
<td>234</td>
<td>182</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2017</td>
<td>471</td>
<td>457</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>705</td>
<td>639</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 6: Number of referrals per year made to CTU in relation to radicalisation and extremism

One of the reasons for the drop in referrals from the family/friends cohort may be due to the cuts and the change of Prevent Officer/Prevent Engagement Officer roles that were introduced approximately 18 months prior to the interviews. Due to the cuts and changes in the role, less engagement was carried out (see Section 7.3.2). In order to uphold this argument more comparative years are needed. However, since the data has only been collected by authorities in more detail in recent years, similar effect should be seen nationally if the removal of Prevent Engagement Officer role is a factor. The secondary data made publicly available by the Home Office from 2015-2018 illustrates a drop in family reports at a national level too (see Appendix M).

7.3 The Actual and The Ideal

Thus far there is evidence to illustrate that CTCE has been more successful in East Jutland than West Yorkshire. Nevertheless, both entities believe CTCE has positively impacted reporting behaviour. However, this thesis has found some barriers and problems in the service at both sites, which can have negative influence on reporting behaviour. As such, this section focuses on marrying the literature review in Chapters 2 and 3 with the data obtained to provide insight into how CTCE can be enhanced in order to encouraged and improve reporting.

7.3.1 Encouraging Reporting

Understanding Psychological Factors Involved When Reporting Radicalisation and Extremism

One of the questions this thesis aimed to answer was to inform CTCE practice. This was also a need that was identified in the interviews: “I just think maybe we need a rethink on
how we actually deliver that [CTCE] to get people supporting what we are trying to do even more.” (SP3) In order to encourage reporting, it is vital to understand the behaviour. As explained in Chapters 1, 3, and 6, perception shapes not only behaviour but also the sense of self. It is based on who one perceives oneself to be, alongside an interaction with how one perceives others and the context in which one is situated, that gives rise to how one reacts to a given situation. Fascinatingly, perception fills the void in knowledge by creating stories from what is known. These stories help one to understand the world; one experiences day-to-day life in story mode, using biases and stereotypes that confirm what one wants to believe. These stories can turn reality into a hopeful tale or one of chaos and bleakness; and at the centre of each story sits the star of the show: the precious self. Consequently, the notion of one's identity plays a major role, as through this medium one experiences life. It is through one's identity that one's sense of responsibility, attitudes, values, respect, perceived control and power, relationships, and perception of others are formed. In turn, the cost-benefit of reporting, in a given situation, is shaped by these factors. This was very evident in Chapter 6.

What the data from this thesis has revealed is that the decision to report is guided by one's identity, which then uses feelings, beliefs, stereotypes, relationships, accountability, responsibility personal agency over behaviour and the situation, as well as how others are perceived in relation to oneself (warmth-competence) in order to set the foundation for the behaviour and contributes to the cost-benefit analysis of reporting (see Figure 16).
Figure 16: The Integrated Reporting Behaviour Change Model
Other factors that influence the cost-benefit analysis of reporting are whether the individual has access to the required skills or knowledge to deal with the problem at hand. This can at times be overestimated, especially in cases of families — similar to their sense of control over the situation. Once the cost-benefit of reporting is analysed, the intention is formed, which leads to the decision to report and the behaviour itself. Figure 17, illustrates a simplified cluster of psychological factors that shape the cost and benefit of reporting radicalisation and extremism, which supports the findings in Chapter 6. Therefore, the Integrated Reporting Behaviour Change model is, based on the collected data, a marriage of several different theories and models that were presented in Chapter 3 in order to advance and contribute to a behavioural model that is suited for reporting behaviour. These include IDT, SIT, SCT, SDT, theories of reasoned action and planned cost-benefit calculus, BIAS, multi-component model, dual pathway model of respect, and the IBM. Each of these, as explained in Chapter 3 and earlier, helps better understand behaviour and reasoning.

This behavioural insight can be used in shaping CTCE practice that is effective in encouraging reporting behaviour. As such, this thesis introduces the CTCE Logic Model (see Figure 18), which is an evidence-based approach to CTCE with the aim to increase reporting and assist with prevention by addressing the psychological factors highlighted above, as well as building a stronger public relationship with the authorities. The model has taken on the elements of how CTCE is delivered in East Jutland and West Yorkshire, which were presented in Chapter 5, as well as aspects that reporters needed or liked (presented in Chapter 6) in order to encourage reporting.
Figure 18: Counterterrorism Community Engagement (CTCE) Logic Model
Inadequate Policies

As explained in Chapter 6, there are both positive and negative implications of policies, despite their good intentions. As discovered in Chapters 6 and 7, the introduction of Prevent Duty increased the number of reports from professionals, but these reports are not necessarily of good quality. In Chapter 1, Figure 1 illustrated that only a small number of these reports get discussed at a Channel panel and an even smaller number received Channel intervention (although it is important to note that the latter is a voluntary programme, thus the former has a stronger ground for argument).

Chapter 6 showed that there were cases of professionals within the education reporting their concern due to fear of running afoul of Ofsted compliance standards or facing punishment. Subsequent effects were a) the reports did not meet Channel threshold; and b) reporters missed crucial step that is covered in training — i.e. obtaining evidence to support their concern.

In contrast, section 115 of the Danish Administrative Justice Act has helped to encourage individuals (including those that are vulnerable) to openly talk to authorities about their concerns without fear of prosecution. This is due to the fact the article enables sharing of information between partner agencies for prevention purposes but also prohibits its use by practitioners in a criminal court for prosecution. Therefore, through removing the fear of punishment a cooperative behaviour is encouraged. This supports findings in Chapter 6 in addition to figures 13, 14, and 16 which illustrate threat perception and the impact of threat on behaviour. Moreover, as presented in Section 1.3.1, by removing the fear of punishment the British police, in a two-week campaign, managed to recover over 6,000 unwanted or illegal weapons as they encouraged people to anonymously surrender them at designated police stations across the UK without prosecution (BBC 2017). Therefore, it is important to understand how policies can impact behaviour in order to reach desirable outcome.

Lack of Knowledge, Reporting Processes, and Access to Specialists

This thesis identified a need for informal reporting, that encourages open dialogue and access to specialists who can provide guidance and support. As explained earlier, radicalisation and extremism are grey areas that need clarification and confirmation for the salvation of the individual with concerns. Therefore, there the informal reporting of concerns and access to specialists allows such dialogue to take place, which is crucial to the decision to report. Reporters explained time and time again that the decision to report without that dialogue would have been very hard for them. For example, EJR1 explained:
“I don't know how to make it easier a part from it is really important to have a dialogue before the formal report; and it has to be a true dialogue between two parties who equally have concerns about the person being radicalised. Without that dialogue it would have been really hard for us to find out whether or not we should report him. The dialogue between us as a school and Info-House was vital for us to make a report, and afterwards feeling that we did the correct thing.” (EJR1)

Additionally, in Chapter 6, the thesis presented data and explored how perceptions of threat can influence judgement, and that almost all reporters that were interviewed found comfort in having had the opportunity to discuss concerns before formal steps were taken. Although these discussions can escalate to formal reports at the officer’s discretion, nevertheless access to such informal dialogues alleviates threat perception and uncertainty. As such, access to such processes and individuals provide the reporter with confidence that there is support to help them deal with the situation. A Channel representative explained that informal reporting can assist with transparency and using that opportunity to provide necessary and support to people:

“I love the idea of informal reporting because in order for Channel to be successful we’ve got to be more transparent with the public. [...] We’ve got to build that trust with the public, and be less risk adverse. Be clear on what we’re aiming to achieve. [...] I believe my expertise can be used in this informal way to educate people on vulnerabilities, and show them the resources available to them.” (CH1)

When the concept of the Info-House was explained to UK reporters and the reporters were asked if such organisation and process would help reporters, they responded positively. For example, one reporter explained: “I think Info-House is a fabulous idea. I think a lot of people would approach it.” (WYR3) Another reporter explained that there was a real need for support and free dialogue that provides choice:

“We need someone who can support us, someone that can listen so we can make sense of stuff. [...] that way we can feel we have choices. [...] The families I’ve spoken to say that they always feel like they have to justify [...] everything they think, everything they feel. [...] Because you do [feel you need to justify], you almost always need to tell people that I didn’t know, that we were a good family, I was a good mum. [...] So having that safe space where
you feel like you can just be yourself and open up, and without having to be questioned about it." (UKR1)

The above comment highlights the importance of a free dialogue, especially for relatives and close associates since they have the burden of explaining what has led to the event. This call for help and the need for support stems from seeking choices, as these individuals are uncertain about what route to take or if they have hit a dead end.

**Lack of Support and Inclusion of Relatives and Close Associates**

The Info-House managed to provide support to relatives and close associates of the vulnerable individual. However, this was not seen in West Yorkshire — at least as a standard procedure, in like East Jutland. The work that is carried out with families and relatives is mainly centred around intelligence-gathering.

"We work very closely with families because usually they can answer a lot of questions that needs answering around the original referral. [...] So the relationship with close family members is crucial to get that background information from those families." (SP3)

This is not to say that there was not a need for it or it was not practiced by all. One officer (P1) dealing with Prevent cases advocated working with parents and suggested that once they are on board then 50% of the hard work is done. However, the officer also recognised that there were also cases of troubled families and parents who supported or were the cause of negative behaviours. In this case it was argued that it was very difficult to involve such families. In response, a reporter explained that the lack of collaboration with families and support for them stems from the mentality that families are to blame:

"That comes from a framework that you are almost blaming the families. [...] They are putting those numbers of small families who have been radicalised in the same boat as the rest of us who have been left completely in shock. [...] These officers still need educating. [...] Sometimes I think they think families are naïve or that they don't really know best [...] but actually we do [...] and have a lot to contribute." (UKR1)

The above comment illustrated the frustrations families go through and the need to be involved. In East Jutland, the data illustrates that the Info-House has responded to this need. From the interviews it was clear that working directly with families had the benefits of not removing the responsibility or accountability from the parents. It was mentioned time and time again by the East Jutland practitioners that they were not there to be
‘second parents’. It was the responsibility of the parents to care for their children; however, it was recognised that when it came to prevention, this was not a job for just parents. Prevention was recognised as everyone’s responsibility. The delivery of aftercare illustrated by Info-House was in the form of the Parent Network and working closely with families. Unfortunately, the Parent Network has been dissolved due to lack of resources, and as of March 2017 no new family networks have been started, but a new network for the relatives of people that die in the Syria/Iraq conflict is being considered (Strong Cities Network 2017, p.6).

When asked how practitioners at the Info-House could make the service better, the relative reporter explained:

“They are doing a good job. I just want the Parent Network [to be reinstated], it has now shut down and I have seen some people like myself who need it. I have asked Info-House if they can start it again because I know people who are dying to come and talk to other people who experienced losing their loved ones. The people from the Info-House are there too, and peoples story stays there, it doesn't come out. You can empty your heart. I asked why they stopped it but they were so busy with the conference that the Info-House was helping to organise. I asked him again later and was told they will do it again but not sure when. I told him to do it soon because a lot of people need that. I need to hear other people's stories to comfort myself.” (EJR2)

The comment above highlights a few things: the urgent need for this service, and the lack of resources that has led to its demise. The reporter highlights that people at Info-House were busy with administrative work. The conference the reporter is referring to is one of two conferences organised by Info-House and the Municipality of Aarhus. The aim of these conferences was to promote the anti-radicalisation work that was being done by Info-House but also to raise awareness about radicalisation and extremism. These conferences were very large international events lasting 2-3 days. It is needless to say that the level of organisation and resources this kind of conference needs. Given the small number of practitioners at the Info-House, the comment above supports the practitioners concerns about lack of resources and how it is affecting delivery of service (see Section 7.3.2).
These views were also shared by practitioners. It was explained how the Parent Network had provided support to relatives, not just from practitioners but other relatives too. This in turn had created an environment where Parent Network worked as a promotional mechanism for Info-House through word of mouth, as well as having reports made through the Parent Network.

“I think the Parents Network has been really useful. There isn’t any group right now but we can activate it if we have parents that need it. Right now it is not going on but I think when it was, it was really effective and that was the only thing I heard from the people who were in it. It was really important to them. The relatives also found it really supportive, for both the ongoing cases and some of the cases that have been closed. They [relatives] said that all the teamwork and support had been really helpful. I have parents who still call me a year or two years after just to say hey or ask questions in general. They said that having a key worker to ask questions about so and so was really essential for them. [...] I think that they are a good help ambassador [for each other] because for them it [Parents Network] is just one big bowl of people who work together and for the same thing. [...] If they had a good experience with the Parents Network they would connect it to the Info-House, so that way it gave us good credit. The parents, who had been in the network, would go back to their community and spread the word. [...] We also have had people reported through the Parents Network.” (CW1)

Thus, the Parent Network worked as a go-to system where relatives have access to emotional support and information from professionals. The Network seems to have worked as a place where people could seek answers from a key worker. This need for interaction with one key person was vital to other reporters, as they explained it was very emotionally taxing to explain the same thing to several different people several times: “We need one central person to speak to, that’s what is really important.” (UKR1) When asked the same reporter if they would want a mechanism in place, like the Parent Network, to encourage reporting, the reporter responded that it would help.
“There needs to be some sort of middle organisation where people can go to. [...] Something like the Parent Network would help, definitely. [...] Siblings go through stuff as well, and I think having a young person’s group, like a sibling group, can help as well. [...] Things need to change before families can feel comfortable to speak about it, they are scared. Things have changed slightly recently, and they see that families are also victims of this [extremism]; [...] I think they have started to offer therapists. [...] I spoke to a sibling recently and she said that she had a telephone session with a therapist the other day but she still held back a bit because she didn’t know what the therapist was going to think. But when she spoke to me there was no filter because of what I had gone through. She thought she could just be herself and just speak. So counselling is offered, it has worked for some of them but it hasn’t been the right time for others. And with therapy you can’t force it on somebody they have to be ready to take it up. Sometimes they throw the counselling in straight away, and it has only been few day [since the incident] and that is actually the worst time to do that because people are still in shock. Sometimes the families might reject the counselling but take it on at some other time because it wasn’t the right time for them.” (UKR1)

The reporter explained that there was a need for “some sort of middle organisation” where the reporters, especially relatives and close associates, could feel comfortable. The Info-House and the Parent Network, although operated in collaboration between the Aarhus municipality and the East Jutland police, was not viewed as directly police or directly municipality: somehow it was separate.

Moreover, the reporter highlights that the need is not to just have counselling. It is also the timing that matters, since it can be crucial to whether or not the individual will take part. The reporter goes on to explain that there is also a need for siblings to have their own support group, not just parents, although siblings had to be over the age of 18 to come along to the Parent Network. It was explained that lack of support provided to the relatives and close associates can be costly, as less unhealthy options (e.g. CAGE) might be lurking, creating separation between the authorities and reporters of radicalisation and extremism through scaremongering:

CAGE is a controversial organisation, which promotes itself as an advocacy aimed to empower communities impacted by the War on Terror. They have been criticised for being a front for extremist groups like Al-Qaeda, as well as being linked to well known Terrorists such as Mohamed Emwazi or Jihadi John.
"If you don't support these families, like myself, [...] then they are left vulnerable with their emotions not knowing what to do; [...] and they are left vulnerable to other groups to lap that up. [...] Because if they don't engage with Prevent then they are vulnerable to other organisations that are not fully equipped and that can be problematic [...] as they don't really have solutions to offer [...] and grow that fear of Prevent through scaremongering [...] That is very easy to do because when you've gone through this and you've had so many people asking you questions it is very difficult to know who to trust, and the paranoia is increased [...] and it is natural thing."

(UKR1)

Moreover, it was suggested by one of the professional reporters that inclusion of the families and the vulnerable individual in the process of discussing concerns prior to formal reporting created an opportunity to explain why such concerns existed: "I would have loved to include or involve the pupil and his parents, and explained to them why we made our decision of making this report. "([EJR1] The data presented in this section illustrates the importance of supporting and including relatives and associates in prevention — especially providing the aftercare support that, as illustrated, can have a major impact on cooperation and relationships.

7.3.2 Improving Reporting

Right person

It was believed that one of the factors that influenced the effectiveness of engagement is having access to the 'right person'. This notion of 'right person' was a mix of personality, profile, and interpersonal skills. It was argued that engagement was not a job for just anyone, the right person needed to acquire the knowledge and skills, as well as experience of dealing with issues such as radicalisations. As such there was an indication that CTCE is a specialist role; one requiring specialist set of skills:

"You have to have the right person, not everyone can take this role. You have to know the science of radicalisation and you have to have the experience for it." (SP4)

"No, not everyone can do the job. I think you've got to have an open mind, [...] multifaceted, multi-skilled. [...] You've got to have a safeguarding understanding but ultimately you've got to have the ability to speak to people and the ability to network with people on all levels."(CH1)
Communication skills were also reported to be a must for engagement practitioners. It is through this set of skills that the practitioner can hold dialogue and deliver the message coherently:

“You've really got to have excellent communication skills, you've got to understand your audience, and you've got to be positive and proactive. You've got to be helpful, and you've got to have time and resources to give, and you have to have a level of professional expertise. You can't be a poor communicator or passive because nothing is going to get done”. (WYR1)

The above comment highlights the needs from a reporter and partnership perspective. It is important that the practitioner is able to share resources and show support. The reporter expressed that the practitioner needs to show control, not only of the situation but also in how communication is flowing — meaning they actively seek communication channels rather than wait for people to approach them. The reporter further explained this point:

“There are lots Prevent coordinators, leads, and Prevent people appearing but they've got to be the right people. The predecessor of a senior Prevent staff member in this area was really poor, and nothing ever happened. Once this new person came into place everything changed for better, he completely transformed everything we were doing.” (WYR1)

Moreover, it was noted that engagement practitioners need to be able to take control of the situation and manage the emotions of reporters. An East Jutland practitioner explained:

“My colleague is good at his work because he is very good at calming people and talking to them, and says that ‘this is not a report’. He says ‘tell me what it is and then we can see what we can do about’.” (IHM1)

The comment above highlights how a practitioner was able to notice the initial fear, which in this case related to the consequences of reporting, and had managed to empathically address that. In fact, practitioners agreed that being empathic and sympathetic is a must in CTCE. One officer in West Yorkshire explained that it was important to understand the stories behind the people being engaged, allowing staff to connect with them on individual level through their notion of identity:
“You need to have somebody who's got an understanding with the group that they're trying to engage with and have some sympathy for them. For example, with the Kurdish community, understanding that they want the country that was promised to them at the end of World War I. That's what they've been fighting for nearly 100 years. [...] Recognise if they come to the UK, they are going to be targeted as terrorists. It’s about being sympathetic and empathic to that.” (P1)

The above example clearly shows that the practitioner, through empathy and sympathy, has recognised the individual grievances associated with being Kurdish for this particular person. By doing so the practitioner was able to build strong relationship with this community. This is in line with the warmth-competency theory discussed in Chapter 3.

The reporters also expressed the need for empathy and how it had affected their relationship with their contacts. The reporter in East Jutland explained that although she had a good relationship and access to other practitioners, she felt most connected one:

“I got help from both the police and the municipality; everyone at the Info-House, but my relationship was mainly with one particular officer because I felt like I could talk to him. I could also talk to the others, but with him it was different. I don’t know, I felt he understands my situation more even though the others helped me equally. Maybe he is my favourite; [...] I had support from him every time I needed it.” (EJR2)

Another reporter in the UK explained that there were discrepancies in practitioners when it came to being genuine, empathic, or considerate, as well as knowledgeable:

“Some of the practitioners are really good. I know some really fantastic ones that genuinely want the best for the family. But some, it’s not that it is out of intention, I just think that they need to be more culturally sensitive — there is lack of insight sometimes about the true extent of what us families go through. [...] Some of them come in with their professional hat, try to make sure there are no risks but I think that is a problem. They forget the human level of this; [...] they need to connect on the human level by listening and believing them. [...] I think they know that as well, that some of them are like that [...] . There is a possible gap in training.” (UKR1)
Additionally, the right person will have passion. There needs to be a degree of enthusiasm and hunger to wanting to make a difference. This was evident in practitioners who delivered engagement.

“You need to have the right sets of skills and knowledge. You need the right response and enthusiasm to do this role. Somebody who is empathic. They can relate to people, they can talk; they have an understanding of the communities they work within. And wanting to actually make a difference within the community, as opposed to just doing a job. It’s not [just] a job.” (P3)

All practitioners delivering engagement presented this sense of passion and ownership — that they had the ability to make a difference during the interviews. However, the LA representative in West Yorkshire displayed this attribute less often. Another skill set was knowing the balance of when to approach for engagement and whom to approach. It was reported that the 'right person' will have the set of skills that will enable them to be able to recognise these social facilitators of engagement:

“If you don’t know the street then it is very difficult to talk and work there. It is important to have skills to know the streets. Some people have the skill to find a balance on who is approachable and who isn’t. [...] Sometimes when you are meeting a person out there you can talk alone normally, then ten minutes he is with his gang so the dialogue is out of question, as that is a different scenario. That is a difficult balance. But some people don’t have this skill and some can learn it but not everyone. [...] The service depends on whether or not you can deliver.” (SP4)

Profile was also believed to be an influential factor. Profile is expressed by this thesis as description of a person. It was argued that there was an importance for the profile of those involved in direct engagement to be representation of the communities that the serve:

“My staff are a picture of how the people are built up here, they represent the community. We need to [be like this] because then I can put people into the conflicts that I don’t understand.” (MU1)

For example, a Senior Youth Service representative explained that their team of youth workers included people of different background, which helped them solve problems more effectively:
"I have 14 youth workers; three of them are Arabs, one Somali, and one Turkish. They actually educate us all; telling us about their religion, traditions and what things we have to recognise or be aware of. If there is a problem, I approach them. [...] We use the knowledge of the individual’s culture and social understanding as a tool to help the parent understand and engage, and how they can help." (SYS1)

Furthermore, it was noted that personalities matter. For example, a Senior Police Officer in East Jutland explained that specific elements of personality like temperament can influence effective delivery of CTCE:

"Some of the police guys we have they cannot work on streets, as they do not have the temperament for it. In order for a person to deal with outreach on a daily basis, they need to have specific characteristics. So you have to be an open minded person, you have to be able to take all of this culture — diversity." (SP4)

Similarly another officer explained that personalities and lack of interest in community work, as well as awareness about the communities can have a negative impact on CTCE:

"It’s down to their personality. Some of them were really good. Some of them would sit there with their collar up, and hands stuck in their jacket or cross their arms and just look at the telly in the corner. They weren’t walking around, taking off their jacket, talking to people to make them feel at ease. So after a few times this guy told me ‘it’s a waste of time going to the surgery because nobody talks to me’. I said, ‘what efforts have you made to talk to them?’ Because all people see is that hi-vis jacket with police written all over it. Especially a lot of communities, [...] if you walked in there with your hi-vis jacket on and baton, they would run out of the back door. They would be scared. Its death, because they come from a country where the police are corrupt and the police would beat them. They are really, really scared and it takes a long time just to be able to talk to them." (P2)

A West Yorkshire Police Officer stated that CTCE is different to traditional policing, as in some ways it is similar to social work rather than prosecution:

"Engagement almost sits on the social work level. The ability to interact with partner agencies that do the work beyond and above our scale. It’s difficult
because people do have a mindset of lock up and it’s not about locking people up.” (P3)

Finally, it was suggested that to ensure the facilitation of accessing the ‘right person’ it is also crucial for organisations to take responsibility to provide these individuals with the right level of training, knowledge, and experience that they need:

“As I have mentioned a couple of times you need the right person, and the best way [...] is to train them. You can provide them with some courses with the police; you can sit together with them, do assignment learning, and show them what they need to look after, what they need to be aware of.” (SP4)

Lack of Resources and Lack of Engagement

The notion of resources was further explored in order to gain a better understanding how it may influence the delivery and quality of engagement, and preventive work. It was reported that engagement was limited, targeted, and reactive — especially with CT related issues — due to cuts in resources. This has lead to practitioners to just focus on the existing relationships that they have within the communities, which was believed to have a negative impact as such engagement was at risk of being considered not genuine.

“We have lost some of that engagement because of the changes and the withdrawal of the resources and funding. [...] That front line engagement with communities [...] has been particularly difficult with the cuts that we are facing. [...] Less of it is being done in reality. [...] If you’re not being proactive, [...] you won’t necessarily be engaging with the community. [...] I think there is a massive influence on our relationships. [...] At one stage we had Prevent Engagement Officers who worked locally with communities supporting projects. [...] We lost about 1/3 of our officers going back three years due to lack of resources, so that really hampered our ability to do engagement. [...] So we have to be more targeted by focusing on some of the existing relationships. But when you’re more targeted it looks like you’re only coming to talk to people about the things that are important to you, and that in itself creates a barrier because it looks like you don’t genuinely care about the matters within the community. That’s a real challenge for us.” (SP2)

There was an awareness that CTCE was not being delivered sufficiently, which meant that the quality of information and engagement was at risk. It was explained that raising awareness had suffered because of the lack of resources:
"We don’t do enough of that [community engagement]. It sounds as if we do a lot of that but we don’t. We try to, but in general we don’t do so much of it. We bring people here [Info House] on monthly basis, which is not very much. Meeting 20 students a month, talking about what the police do. [...] We don’t meet too many people. We said no to meeting with the integration language school. They have to tell about the Danish model, so to speak, at these classes on their own. The police can’t do it, even though we wanted to do it, because of resources.” (IHP1)

The comment above highlights frustration at missed opportunities to engage with communities. Lack of resources also had a negative impact on obtaining intelligence. It was argued by practitioners that intelligence had decreased due to lack of resources, which inhibits practitioners engaging with the public actively:

"We are not getting the intelligence. We still know the communities but a year on from now we won't have those communities because those communities would have moved on. The people in charge of faith establishments, community centres, schools, you know people change and unless you are engaging with somebody regularly, they will forget who you are.” (P2)

Others explained that due to lack of resources, which had resulted in a smaller workforce, they had to rely on other partners for intelligence:

"Unfortunately, due to reduced resources, and shrunken workforce, now we have to rely on intelligence from other sources, which is the Police or the Housing Associations as well as some local community organisations to find out where the issues are surfacing. That way, we can deploy Youth Workers who are skilled to engage with those young people who are identified as [...] causing problems.” (YS1)

Others raised concerns about practitioners being tied down with bureaucracy rather than being hands-on:

"There aren’t enough people at the Info-House to raise awareness and do the outreach. Most of their work is not really hands on; it is more bureaucratic; pleasing some politicians, dealing with the media”. (MT1)
“As soon as you start pulling officers away to do other things, first of all the community are missing out because you are obviously not there. Second, the officers get fed up because they are pulled away to do other things; the morale drops. ‘I can’t do my job, I can’t do what I’m supposed to do, and I’ve got a crime work load that is getting out of hand.’ [...] Engagement, as I said before, needs to be a specialist role, be very good at what they do, left alone to do it, and have that ability and freedom to engage.” (P3)

The above comment highlights the frustration the practitioners feel when they are tasked to do the work that is not relevant to what they were hired to do — i.e. CTCE. This inconsistency and the rollercoaster in the job role stemmed from lack of resources where the practitioners were forced to take on other roles in addition to their own, which resulted in CTCE not being prioritised. There were real concerns about not being able to meet the requests and demands for engagement, and due to this lack of resources they had to focus more on targeted engagement. It was stressed that due to lack of resources they have too much work to do, which means CE is neglected and there are missed opportunities for better engagement:

“We haven’t been able to honour these responses and requests because of the lack of resources. And that is why our main two outreach efforts have been with the Somali community and this specific mosque in the area because that is where we saw actual problems, as young people were leaving for conflict zones in Somalia and Syria. So we reacted to that”. (IHM1)

“I mean we should have been doing it [engagement] but now we have too much to do. Now we have the communities reaching out to us. We have had mosques reaching out to us, I did it [engagement] once or twice but that is not enough [...] and you see there are a lot of opportunities to reach out. We have to, somehow, be part of the community”. (IHP2)

As a result of lack of resources, Info-House practitioners were not able to reach out to vulnerable communities, leaving many communities neglected. It was highlighted that CTCE takes time and it is information- and relationship-dependant, and lack of resources was inhibiting practitioners in appropriate delivery of CTCE:

“The lack of resources leaves certain areas suffering from lack of engagement. That is why we need more support. Ethnic minorities are not easy to reach because there are a lot of them, in a sense that you need to be
able to identify them and find out how to approach a specific minority group and that is a problem of resources.” (IHP1)

“Because of this lack of resource, a lot of the communities are definitely neglected when it comes to outreach. There are a lot of communities that we wanted to talk to in a proactive way; that is simply not possible with the resources we have. That is why the community outreach has been more reactive rather than proactive. The leg-work is time consuming it involves a lot of problem-solving. That is a problem of resource! Trying to bring together [Somali] clans was a resource issue, as it was very hard to meet with 12 different groups. We just wanted to know who could talk together so that we didn’t have to have so many meetings. And we had a good contact within the Somali community who sort of worked as an octopus or bridge builder between the different clans and he could move around everywhere, he helped us a lot.” (IHM1)

It was also added that CTCE is further neglected by the police during the ‘peace times’, where there is less conflict and fewer problems to solve. Consequently, other partners are left to pick up engagement work or completely left abandoned because there is no immediate threat. As such there was a recognition that CTCE needs to be continued:

“At the peace times, where nothing much is happening, we are not doing much engagement. The municipalities are doing more than we are. For example, we are doing less with the troubled mosques than what we were doing before because we don't have to react to an immediate problem. The Al Shabab problem is solved, it’s over. There are very few [people] going to Syria. We don’t really have a problem anymore [in that context] but it would be very nice to have an ongoing, proactive, preventive dialogue with these communities but we don't have the resources for it. Because the moment we don’t have to use resources for that we use the resources for the individual cases instead.” (IHM1)

It was also explained that when the demands were high during high security times, it was difficult to respond to every incident due to lack of resources. In the current times, although they are not facing similar security concerns, as before they still struggle to do
their 'basic job' and need to improvise.\(^{33}\) Another issue that was raised that the targeted engagement meant a majority of the available resources were being used on immediate concerns, such as Islamist related radicalisation and extremism, whilst other threats like right-wing extremism were left neglected:

“All of our resources are used towards the Islamist radicalisation and extremism. I think one of the five mentors we have is a right wing extremist but [the] majority are Islamists. These days because of the refugee crisis you will probably have the right wing popping up again and as a reaction to that you'll have the left wing. We’re not worried about that [right-wing extremism], we know it is a factor not to be concerned about but to be aware of”. (IHM1)

It was explained that CTCE is a cheap form of resource when it comes to prevention, but the lack of resource has meant that CTCE is delivered too cheaply and the reliance on the partnership with the municipality is to try to compensate for this shortage:

“It is not a matter of huge resources. The police resource in our police district is 1.5 full time employees. That doesn’t mean that the rest of the police is not aware of what we are doing, but in general the police resources in the preventive programme are less than 2 full-time employees, and that is too little. The community outreach and the municipality collaboration have helped us somewhat with this shortage of resources. From what I can see is that this [CE] is a cheap strategy but we are, right now, too cheap”. (IHP1)

This issue of low numbers of staff working on full-time basis on prevention of radicalisation and extremism was also raised by others.\(^ {34}\) Lack of resources and financing was seen to be symbolic of politicians not supporting the CTCE. It was felt that politicians focused on numbers rather than actual results. There was frustration among practitioners that measuring the success of preventive work or CTCE was unrealistic given that it is impossible to say how many people were aiming to be or were involved in a criminal act.

\(^{33}\) “For now we are not under pressure but in 2015 and 2016 with all the attacks taking place in Europe, we were under tremendous pressure. I mean we couldn’t follow every incident. Today, I have to improvise. By having resources and having enough people we could really do our basic jobs.” (IHP2)

\(^{34}\) “There are 22-23 people in the crime prevention section and a huge chunk of those are actually local police men in the local districts, which means that they are rural districts. And then we have six people here working on youth crime, and then we have four people working part-time on exit from organised crime programmes, two police and one municipality. And then we have two police officers and one municipality officer who work part time on anti-radicalisation, none of whom work full-time on anti-radicalisation and extremism”. (IHM1)
prior to engagement. Alongside the political climate meant CTCE had failed to obtain political interest and support:

“In general, the politicians are not confident that this is a strategy [the Info House and their use of CTCE] that works. So this is not a national strategy, even though there are discussions on prevention at national level that focuses more on safety. The problem is that the people above want to see results and written evidence and that is difficult. We can tell our experiences, so well. And some politicians say ‘oh, you’re only saying that, we need to see hard proof that this works, and that as you know is very difficult to provide”. (IHP2)

A practitioner from West Yorkshire expressed frustration in response to the removal of the Prevent Engagement Officer role. It was argued that the people higher in the organisational hierarchy and central government were short-sighted and were only interested in numbers rather than understanding the process in place to obtain the needed outcome:

“I think the biggest mistake they made 12 months ago was to getting rid of the Prevent Engagement Officer role, because it was all short-sighted. They were looking for the 10% of the Prevent actual work that was done but not the 90% of the work that had to be done to get that 10% and the intelligence. Also, the other departments like CTU could have used them [Prevent Engagement Officers] to share intelligence.” (P2)

This comment suggests that when it comes to Prevent and CT prevention there is a vast amount of engagement work that is done that is unseen and hard to quantify. It was explained that it was difficult to quantify and prove prevention work, something that superiors were interested in and that was important to getting funding. Another practitioner suggested that action needed to be taken higher up, as lack of resources was not only jeopardising national security but also impacting communities on various levels, including their expectations of the authorities:

“I really would like someone higher up within the government to take heed of this and say we really need to do something about this. Because the consequence is not just of national security but also communities living and working harmoniously together, and the relationships we did have, the ones we still continue to have. If we continue to have further reductions then it
will only have a negative knock on affect, [...] we will take ten steps back. [...] Without fruitful engagement and just paying lip service to our communities we are going to undo all the good work that has gone on in the previous years. [...] I do think the majority of our community have a greater understanding of the limited resources that we now face, and expect the same service.” (SP1)

The need for more resources was echoed by the Info-House Advisor, especially in the area of anti-radicalisation and extremism in order for the work to be proactive in building resilience. There was a need for CTCE to be a proactive approach:

“Community engagement in prevention of radicalisation and extremism needs more resources [...] because we should ideally have more time to go proactively into the communities and talk with them, as we do for individual cases and we don’t have that because prevention is being reactive. We would very much like to be proactive, talk to people, and find out how we can support building the resilience against radicalised ideologies and totalitarian narrative. How can we build resilience against these in society with lack of resources? [...] and the resource is lacking in both the municipality and the police; more the police than the municipality, with only 1.5 people working full-time”. (IHM1)

In addition to the police force, lack of resources also negatively had an impact on the LA — more specifically in relation to Prevent:

“Probably there is not so much engagement. We have 5 team members, and only two of us work on Prevent. Engagement it is done when we get funding; or unless we get a specific topic that we can add Prevent at end of it and discuss it. We probably don’t do, as much as we should or that we would like. But again it’s down to funding and capacity. Our engagement, I would say is less than 10% but I’m sure my colleague would disagree.” (LA2)

Similarly another LA representative explained:

“We have a very small team that deals with Prevent related issues, and we do everything from the training to Channel to referrals, so we do a bit of everything. Because of the size of the team and because we have shrunk considerably, as a senior member of staff I end up doing a bit of everything.” (LA1)
As explained previously, not all LA receive funding for Prevent, due to the risk associated with that area. Some areas are deemed less risky when it comes to CT-related issues. It was explained that due to this lack of funding a group of Muslim mothers could not receive training that they needed and had requested:

“We did look to get some training for these ladies on computers and some of the language and terminologies around the Prevent related issues. That hasn’t happened because of the timing and capacity issues. We are a very small team and we are not a funded area. So what we are doing is in and around our day job really.” (LA2)

This issue of not being a funded area also had a negative impact on educational services, as one reporter explained that lack of funding meant poor quality of training for students, and because the Prevent Duty had made raising awareness compulsory for education services, regardless of funding it had to get done:

“Because they have made it essential to have a good Ofsted around Prevent and Safeguarding, you have to do it [engagement around Prevent]. You must prioritise it; otherwise you will be shut down. Training providers have been closed down because they haven’t prioritised it. Colleges have been very clear from the beginning that they’ve got to do it. Now you can do it really well, or you can do it at the minimal. [...] So some students might get better experience because they have lots of money than students that haven’t got the money. But the thing is the students must understand what Prevent is, what radicalisation means, and we’ve got to do it. Because if we don’t do it, there are serious sanctions. So whether you can afford it or not you have to get on with it.”(WYR1)

Lack of Feedback

Another factor that was identified during the interviews for improvement was a lack of consistency when it came to feedback post-reporting. Feedback was thought to be valuable in providing insight and building trust, especially in cases where CT strategies are criticised. Thus, from the reporter’s perceptive, lack of feedback is costly, since it might discourage reporting:

“I think it would be valuable for reporters to be updated somehow and in some way, without too much detail given. I think if somebody is taking the responsibility to make that referral, I would expect that they would receive
contact and feedback [...] because if not, and I do know that the Prevent model or way of working can often be criticised from the outside about people not being too familiar about Prevent as a concept, as a model of working. I suppose it’s like anything, feedback[...] gains trust, it gains further insight; and maybe somewhere down the line that person be willing to report matters again if they feel that they are taken seriously. The danger is if no contact is made they might say ‘well why bother? Why should I report things because no action was taken last time’.” (WYR1)

Another reporter similarly explained that lack of feedback left them feeling uncertain about the case but also the future, i.e. not knowing what to report next:

“Well actually we haven’t been informed a lot, and it is not to say something bad about the Info-House but it would have been nice, now and then, to have a response from them on our report. Partly because it would be nice to know how the pupil is getting along but also to judge better next time, if we need to report next time. What sign we should look out for next time. Maybe in other cases we won’t have such a relationship with the pupil or know if they are attending mosques. In this particular case the pupil had some many obvious signs. We knew a lot about the pupil. But, what about next time this happens? So I think having feedback would be helpful in the future, and in trying to learn about what we should be aware of and look out for.” (EJR1)

This lack of feedback was also experienced with practitioners who also dealt with CTU, Prevent, and Channel. It was explained that feedback is scarce due to the processes in place, and that if feedback was actively provided to practitioners, then it could guide their engagement with the public more, knowing what has worked and what has not. There was recognition that there was a communication breakdown when it came to feedback.

“We'll never get an outcome, which can become a bit deflating for myself and my colleagues not knowing exactly what is going on — there is a bit of [a] communication breakdown. But I understand too, because obviously it's highly sensitive, the intelligence, in terms of national security. I just feel like there needs to be a bit of feedback, even if it is a generic outcome or update, will suffice. Sometimes we just don’t get anything. But it’s not our Prevent Officers fault because they do their utmost to engage and communicate with us. I think the process stumbles down a bit. If they did actively provide feedback then it would give my ward officer a little bit of bump in terms of
'oh, I’ve got updated. There was an outcome around that engagement. Let me see if I can get more information'.” (SP1)

As a LA representative explained this dam in feedback creates a domino effect that disrupts the flow of appropriate and much needed information to maintain relationships and encourage further cooperation:

“One of the things we are seeing at the moment is that when people are putting reports through to us, and we pass those to CTU, we don’t actually get feedback as to what has happened with it. So it’s the lack of the feedback from them that stops us from going back to the referrers to say ‘it’s been referred, it’s been reviewed, and they actually think it’s not suitable for Channel, there is no ideology behind it or yes we need to follow this up’. [...] For me if we are not giving that feedback to them they will say ‘what’s the point because we never hear anything from you’. But that’s not our blockages, its one further up, which we are trying to work on.” (LA2)

The blockage that is referred to in the above comment is highlighting one of many challenges of working in partnerships. This level of partnership is new to the UK. Whilst in East Jutland working in partnership has been going strong for over thirty years. During the interviews, it became clear that there was no sense of ownership and accountability in regards to providing feedback. Moreover, there was an issue with the volume of referrals versus manpower, which suggest that feedback is not a priority, given the lack of resources: “No, [we don’t provide feedback because] there are far too many referrals to do that. We rely on the fact that the referrer will come back to us.” (SP3)

The Issue of Training and Incentive Funding

In Chapter 6, both positive and negative impacts of training on reporting behaviour were explored. The aim of this section is to broadly focus on training and how it can be used to improve reporting of radicalisation and extremism. It was not the objective of this research to explore or examine the training processes in place for professionals and non-professionals. However, the data revealed there were some concerns around training. These discussions were mostly of concern for West Yorkshire practitioners rather than East Jutland practitioners, as they discussed them more. This is not to indicate there are no issues or as much concerns with training in context of East Jutland and this thesis can only explore this notion based on the data collected.
First, the interviews highlighted there was a need for training and insight into radicalisation and extremism, in line with Chapter 6 discussing issue of poor-quality reports. Some reporters thought they did not have adequate knowledge around the topic, which resulted in uncertainty, especially around the thresholds for intervention. Moreover, there was hunger for wanting to know what to do in the future:

“When you ask me this question right now [...] I think a short presentation about our case would be beneficial. [...] Not to go into detail about the pupil but more from a learning perspective for the future, and a reflection so that teachers in a similar situation could benefit from. For example, what lead to our report of the pupil and how can we make ourselves better at that process next time. I am sure if I called Info-House today they would show up next week; and I probably will. But [...] it shouldn’t be like this. [...] Maybe three months after the referral someone from the Info-House could come out and give us a feedback and help us learn.” (EJR1)

“More training could be more beneficial. We needed to be clear about what the thresholds are in order to refer to Channel.” (WYR1)

The interviews also revealed that not everyone has received Prevent training since the inception of Prevent. Due to fear of identification, no interview extract was provided. Prevent awareness is compulsory, and it was explained that these cases are usually evident in areas where there is no Prevent funding. In one particular case, this concern was presented to the Home Office, and the response seemed to illustrate that there was no homogenous approach when it came to Prevent. It was one rule for one, and a different rule for another.

Second, in contrast to East Jutland, it was reported that in the UK the Prevent training was no longer delivered by the police Prevent teams, as the new regulation to put LA at the forefront of Prevent does not allow it. Therefore, the responsibility for training has been placed on the LA to provide guidance to all those 'specified authorities' highlighted in the Prevent Duty. The interviews revealed that not everyone was in support of such practice because they believed LA did not really understand how to deliver WRAP training:

“In my opinion it is a ridiculous decision for LA to do the training because you are giving it to the people who stand up and read the script from start to finish. It’s horrendous and I’ve seen people do it; it has no impact other than build negativity. If it’s not delivered properly it is a waste of time.” (P3)
The above comment highlights the negative impact of poor training but also the inability of LA to deliver such training. Similarly, another officer explained the transfer of training delivery to LA has resulted in basic and generic training on a very complicated topic, as well as creating an environment for incentive funding:

“What has happened as a consequence of that is a very blanket approach through the WRAP training programme that provides a very generic, very basic understanding. The council talks about the number WRAP training they have delivered. What they won’t do, unless we challenge them, is to talk about the number of referrals or the number of engagement opportunities that has emerged, as a result of that training. So I question the value of that training. [...] Also the Home Office provided the funding based on the volume of the training sessions delivered rather than the actual outcome from that.” (SP2)

The data also revealed that partnership is encouraged and much needed. There was definitely advocacy for it; however, in practice Prevent training is delivered in separately by the partners, rather than together. In recent years, LA does the training. In East Jutland, the training was delivered by Info-House practitioners, in collaboration between the police and the municipality. It was reported by participants that Prevent training should be delivered in partnership between the LA and police. If not then specialists in the subject should deliver training. In fact, the CTU and the LA were working in collaboration to deliver Prevent training to frontline officers. This approach to training was reported to be received very well. A Channel representative explained that partnership delivery was important because each party comes at the issue from different angles:

“Because again we look at it from a different angle — LA is safeguarding, early intervention, and prevention. Police is criminal pursuit, and prevention. So although it is not always criminal pursuit, they're there to protect the communities from harm. I think it gives practitioners an understanding of their responsibility.” (CH1)

It was also reported that if training were to be delivered in partnership, then both LA and police had to meet prior to training to determine the training programme, and practice the presentation. It was agreed that the session could go terribly wrong if the presenters were not prepared or knowledgeable enough on the topic or the group they were presenting too. Participants reported that training is not sufficient if both Prevent and Channel are not covered together. Therefore, to train practitioners on Channel referrals is not
beneficial if the basics are not covered. Therefore, there was a sense that Prevent and Channel were approached separately instead of recognising their overlap. This view was explained as a result of thinking that people already know what Prevent is. It was reported by a Channel representative (CH1) that there was a Home Office initiative to roll out Channel Awareness trainings. It would be beneficial for future research to explore this training strategy and its impact.

The interviews also revealed that some training was short as 15 minutes. This happened in both East Jutland and West Yorkshire, mainly due to lack of resources:

“Sometimes what we found is because people are so stretched it is difficult to get someone in a meeting room for 2 hours. It is easier to say ‘can we come and give you a 20-minute input?’ And that is sometimes enough for us to give that information. We’ve been asked today to go and give a 15-minute presentation to a school, [to] which we have said yes, we can come and do that.” (LA2)

Another practitioner revealed that it is difficult to fit WRAP training into different schedules, as there are organisational time limits that to some extent Home Office have failed to recognise fully:

“WRAP training used to be 8 hours. Then WRAP 2 was about 2-3 hour session. Then WRAP 3 which is what we have now is an hour session. [...] Training others does not always fit into their working. For example, school kids have an hour class, and trying to fit that within an hour is difficult. [...] and Home Office says you will deliver this.” (P2)

Moreover, it became evident during the interviews that some of the East Jutland practitioners were able to receive some WRAP training around 2010 in order to learn from it. It was reported that they like the idea of a workshop, using video clips, talks, questions, and exercises. However, the East Jutland practitioner disliked the content, as it was a ‘lecture disguised as a workshop’ and manipulative, as opinions were guided rather expressed organically:

“The presenter from Prevent was waiting until people gave the answers that he expected, otherwise he would direct them towards the answers and once you reached that point then you could proceed. We thought this won’t play in the Danish educational context because in Denmark kids are raised as being very critical of the sources, which means if you try to manipulate them in that
way they would react negatively and say this is all just government stuff. That is not something we would want to achieve with them anyway, if we wanted to give them a lecture, we would just give them a presentation. [...] I thought the UK’s WRAP approach was manipulative. [...] We wanted a true workshop and not a lecture because true workshop for us means interaction with people; people’s own opinion is presented on ideas instead of being guided into what you should be thinking about this.” (IHM)

It is important to note that the comment above is more likely to relate to the first generation of WRAP training, rather than the most recent one. When the experience of the East Jutland practitioner was put to West Yorkshire practitioners, there was some agreement with the criticism that the first version of WRAP was awful, and through evolution WRAP 3 is more balanced, although not necessarily perfect. Another responded:

“Yes, I agree its patronising. I’ve never used it, I’m a WRAP trainer. It is good for certain segments, say if you wanted some nurses to say that they have some form of Prevent qualification and training. They can go on WRAP, tick a box, they have a good idea: what is prevent, what is a referral, how to do a referral — the basics. But I’ve always found that it doesn't work for everybody. So if you’re teaching junior school kids, or the community centre, which has been directly affected by terrorism, whatever groups it is you have to tailor that package for that individual.” (P2)

7.4 Discussion

The aim of this chapter was to illustrate the existence of the relationship between CTCE and reporting behaviour, in order to understand how it can be manipulated to encourage reporting of radicalisation and extremism. Across both cases a core finding is the belief that CTCE has a positive effect on reporting behaviour. The data presented here, illustrate, in case of East Jutland, an increase in reports, especially from family/friends and the general public once communities were engaged. The practitioners worked closely with troubled mosques (those with large number of foreign fighter recruits); engaging with specific hard-to-reach communities; and most importantly engaging with families to ensure an inclusive approach to prevention. This engagement was enhanced through the multi-agency approach, Info-House capitalised on the engagement carried out by other services such as youth services. Most importantly, as the result of engagement and their experience with Info-House, word of mouth from families and close associates helped others in the same situation to come forward. In the case of West Yorkshire the limited
data revealed that removal of the Prevent Engagement Officer role had a possible negative effect on the number reports, including those from relatives and close associates. When it comes to prevention of radicalisation and extremism, what more can one want other than people close to the vulnerable individual coming forward? After all, the family/friends are those who tend to spot the signs first, and with a little help and guidance they can be encouraged to come forward — and hopefully sooner.

However, what is evident from the data presented here is that the effectiveness of CTCE is conditional. This chapter presented the conditions and bottlenecks in the service that need to be addressed in order to encourage and improve reporting of radicalisation and extremism. Moreover, it used the literature review and the data collected from the interviews to present model of reporting behaviour (The Integrated Reporting Behaviour Change Model) and an ideal model of CTCE (the CTCE Logic Model) informed by the behavioural model in order to encourage reporting. The data highlighted that more engagement was needed in both East Jutland and West Yorkshire. It was also shocking to discover that although CTCE is meant to be a multi-agency collaboration, in West Yorkshire the LA indicated that only 10% of their engagement was around Prevent. This is not enough, especially given that the UK government is insisting on LAs leading Prevent and being in charge of training.

In order for CTCE to be effective it needs to be proactive. The current CTCE approach is very much targeted and reactive. Some of this was due to lack of resources in both East Jutland and West Yorkshire. Targeted engagement could mean that others miss out on information and support. It also could mean that there is room for other problems to rise due to limited CE. Engagement takes time to, acquire knowledge, and build relationships. Furthermore, since CTCE is currently used as a reactive strategy once a problem is deemed ‘solved’ the resources are allocated to other cases. As such the burden is dropped on other partners, for whom CTCE may or may not be a priority.

Furthermore, this thesis argues there is a need for an informal reporting process to be made available to the public. However, this process needs to be transparent. The Info-House practitioners and reporters highlighted that there was consistent honesty in what they would do and could do. This is not to say the West Yorkshire practitioners were dishonest, but rather to highlight the importance of transparency and honesty in the reporting process, as this information then enables the reporter to make an informed decision and feel at ease with it. Therefore, the decision to report is no longer a gamble, but rather a more intentional approach to cooperation. As discussed in Chapter 3,
intention is one of casual factors for behaviour. The interviews also highlighted that there are informal discussions, not necessarily an informal process, when it came to people raising their concerns. Practitioners explained that they did have conversations with people before any formal report was raised and in some cases there was no report made. However, this vital aspect of reporting — informal reporting — should not be left to the discretion of the officer.

Moreover, there needs to be a clear and concise reporting process in place to encourage people to come forward. The informal process that is created by the Info-House makes reporting simple — ‘You have a concern? Come to us for a chat over a coffee’. In order to make a desired behaviour possible, it needs to be made easy. Humans are not logical, rational beings, and do not do well with too many choices or in situations of uncertainty. Therefore, the path needs to be clear for them in order to help them utilise the information and resources at hand to make the decision that is best for them. It is also important to note that by sharing the steps involved, the possible outcomes, and the help and resources available to the individual, on an identity level, perception is influenced. The individual may no longer feel threatened (i.e. the warmth-competency scale of behaviour); they may also feel respected because through this inclusion process there is no perceived power struggle. This process can harmonise the sense of individual’s agency and control over the situation. The individual’s sense of responsibility is not taken away from them because the reporter has some sense of responsibility towards the vulnerable person. By informing and including the reporter in the reporting process they can still hold onto a sense of responsibility to ensure risks are eliminated. The Info-House seems to do a better job of inclusion, not just with reporters but also with all those involved with the vulnerable individual (see Chapter 5). There was also a belief that the current process of reporting was clear and concise. However, through the interviews presented thus far, it has been evident that the reporting process is neither clear nor concise. There are uncertainties around what should be reported, and what to expect. Although some LA might have the name of Prevent and Channel officers available on their website there is no information as to what happens once someone raises a concern, and what they should expect.

The data also revealed a need for inclusion and support of relatives and close associates. The Info-House had managed to provide such support, which included the Parent Network. Unfortunately, it is no longer running. It has been evident from the interviews that it was a form of promotion for cooperating with the police, as the relatives and close associates had heard about it and were encouraged to come forward. Also, the network
clearly highlights that these relatives are the forgotten victims of terrorism and extremism. They need support as much as a victim of other crimes such as rape and murder. It is a traumatic experience that these victims go through, as a society we need to recognise these victims and provide adequate support. Recognition of this fact is vital to prevention of radicalisation and extremism, as families are best situated to spot the warning signs. Such networks encourage sharing of intelligence, as highlighted by practitioners, which is essential for prevention. The Parent Network is clearly a platform for networking, engaging, sharing of information, promotion, gaining intelligence, and most importantly providing the support that is needed. This is an area that needs to be reconsidered; it is far too valuable to be left abandoned. Parent engagement in prevention has shown to have important benefits; for example, involvement of parents in their children’s schooling has resulted in positive academic achievement and behaviour (Sheldon & Epstein 2004). Other research has shown the benefits of involving parents, as part of family-based programmes, in dealing with issues such as youth substance use (Liddle 2004). Another example is the Youth in Iceland Model, which is based on the research of Harvey Milkman regarding addiction and substance use (Milkman & Frosch 1973). The research (and the model) takes a psychological approach, and has five central themes, which involved the inclusion of parents and gaining their pledge in keeping children occupied. The evidence from this programme, which involved up to 4,000 adolescents aged 14 to 16, shows a consistent decrease in usage of alcohol, cigarettes, and drugs (Volteface 2019).

One the reasons that this model works is due to family and parental engagement. The model creates a level of personal and social responsibility for children and parents. This connects with the individual’s sense of identity, and their association with responsibility. Parents are encouraged to spend more family time with their children, to discover them and their social life, as well as taking responsibility for their whereabouts. This model has also encouraged mobilisation of parents as a collective group. It is believed that through this kind of support and connection, problematic and risky behaviour is reduced in children.

In East Jutland, working with families is a one of key factors in crime prevention, especially with radicalisation, extremism, and terrorism. As explained in Chapter 5, East Jutland takes a 360-degree approach to prevention, which means they work closely with relatives and all those individuals in frequent contact with the vulnerable person. This has assisted with rehabilitation of vulnerable individuals and prevented of involvement in possible criminality or harm. This thesis argues that parental and family engagement is
vital for prevention of radicalisation and extremism. In fact, as presented in this chapter, by working closely and engaging with the families and parents, the Info-House managed to increase referrals from this cohort. Without the involvement of families, prevention of radicalisation is challenging, as the experience in the UK has illustrated. Also, through inclusion, transparency and respect are promoted. Again influencing the psychological underpinnings of cooperative behaviour, and specifically the individual’s interpretation of the situation based on how their notion of identity is affected.

As explained in Chapter 6 and 7, the experiences of reporters matter. The reporter from the UK (UKR1) explained that she was not given a FLO and in general the relationship between her and the investigators were very much one of intelligence-gathering. In contrast the reporter EJR2 in East Jutland expressed how satisfied she was with the support she had received, and had heard from others about such support being available. This word of mouth is key in attracting this cohort to come forward due to how they perceive the risks and benefits of reporting (see Chapter 6). This also highlights the importance of having a single point of contact (or at least as few staff as possible) involved in the contact with the family. It is evident from the data that emphasise on the individual relationship can build trust. Having too many people to interact with in a situation where the emotional state is already unstable can leave an individual more confused and on edge. Therefore, engagement is a specialist role. It is vital to ensure that the practitioners that deliver engagement are specialists when it involves radicalisation and extremism. Additionally, there needs to be an understanding of balance: how to be professionally committed but simultaneously use interpersonal skills to build relationships. This suggests that the assumed fixed borders or red line in roles are flexible within reason. To be able to provide guidance there needs to be a level of leadership and inclusion. It is important to recognise that CTCE is a specialist subject that needs specialist input. Practitioners within this realm need to ensure that they are actively sharing such knowledge, instead of being passively active — reactive only when approached. CTCE practitioners need to be empathetic and sympathetic. In order to respond effectively to emotions, there needs to be empathy and shared understanding of the fear. The data illustrated when empathy was experienced trusting relationships existed (e.g. EJR1), whilst in contrast lack of it presented distrust and distance (e.g. UKR1). This is in line with warmth-competency theory discussed in Chapter 3.

It is important for practitioners to be approachable. Closed or intimidating body language can have a negative impact on how practitioners are perceived. For example, a study found that when police engaged in behaviours that victims perceived to be caring,
compassionate, and personable there was a positive impact on victims’ emotional well-being and criminal justice system engagement (Greeson et al. 2014). It is important for practitioners to be open-minded in order to understand the fluidity, complexity and diversity of the communities and situations that they deal with. Therefore, this thesis argues that engagement officers need the right personality traits, as presented, in order to ensure engagement is effective. The ‘right person’ also requires the ‘right profile’ for the area that they are servicing. This is because the people from similar backgrounds may be able to associate and identify with them. Also, people from similar backgrounds are likely to be aware of cultural nuances, and use that insight to solve problems.

This chapter uncovered some serious concerns in relation to training provided by the LAs. It is also concerning that Home Office funding creates a situation of incentives to acquire further funding through the volume of training provided. Therefore, delivery is no longer about quality of training provided, but quantity. This obviously impacts the quality of reports, as well as the service provided to practitioners. Moreover, there was a lack of consistency in approach from Home Office when it came to training and funding. The thesis found not everyone received Prevent training, in particular those who did not receive funding. This is concerning, as crime and terrorism are forever changing. To only focus on what are primarily geographical locations based on previous intelligence will create a vacuum where other extremist activities will manifest. Not providing training for all can result in signs of new crimes/threats being missed. Also, as discussed previously the Prevent priority area style of funding that consists of no funding areas can only support the ideology that Prevent is biased towards specific communities. This thesis argues that bias is not from Prevent itself, as the real life practice illustrates all kinds of extremism is dealt with. However, the bias does exist and whether that is at government level, this thesis cannot tell.

The duration of training is also a cause for concern. Training that is set for approximately two hours is concentrated to fit a smaller time scale — some as short as 15 minutes — in order to address issues of resources, but also make the training short enough to fit within the schedule of trainees. It is also concerning that such short exposure to Prevent training is given to schools, a place entity where most referrals come from and has experienced some controversies in the past. This indicates that such training sessions lack quality and are not sufficient to provide frontline practitioners with the information that they need, especially on topics as complicated as radicalisation and extremism. This is also a concern for East Jutland. This suggests that although Home Office has made Prevent awareness compulsory without taking into consideration its application in reality. It is evident that
the time scale for WRAP training has changed over the years. That could possibly be a response to scheduling a training slot. Nevertheless, not all WRAP training is delivered based on the recommended time.

This chapter also illustrated that, although Prevent Duty has good intentions, by putting pressure on partners and organisations, the entire process of Prevent has somewhat turned into a tick-box practice. Instead of actually ensuring that the aim of such training is met, the process transforms into ‘we must have this done’. This thesis is not against compulsory training. In fact it is important to ensure that practitioners are getting the adequate training they need. However, this thesis argues that in order to differentiate between poor and good policy, the government needs to ensure that training is audited. This thesis argues that training is a must, and it needs better examination and investment.

Finally, lack of information and knowledge can influence reporting behaviour. For example, this chapter presented the importance of feedback, as not only it will inform the reporter of the outcome but it can gain trust of the people, as well as making sure that their voices are heard. People share information not just for the sake of sharing it, but because they expect to see it acted upon (Sharot 2017, p.6). However, feedback was not just an issue for reporters but also for practitioners. The data revealed a bottleneck in communication channels and processes in West Yorkshire, which inhibits information trickling down to relevant people. This finding supports the criticisms reported by the ISC, which released an analysis of the UK’s experience of terrorist attacks in 2017 and what needed to change. The report highlighted fundamental failings in practice, as well as information-sharing within the Home Office, Prevent and their partner agencies, including the police and LA. These resulted in mismanagement and miscalculation of the risks associated with the attackers, especially in the case of the Parsons Green attacker and the Manchester Arena attacker (Intelligence and Security Committee of Parliament 2018, p.3). This lack of feedback between partners was not evident in East Jutland. Feedback is important in order for people to be more confident in what they are doing and reporting, but also, as mentioned earlier, to know action has been taken on the information they have shared and that their voices are heard. As illustrated, the domino effect of not providing feedback not only has a primary impact on the reporter but also a secondary impact when there is an organisational hierarchy, i.e. a manager is not able to feedback to other staff or the organisation cannot report back to a member of the public.
Chapter 8

Conclusion

8.1 Introduction

There have been shifts in policy context since the start of this research. When work began on this thesis in 2015, foreign fighters joining groups like Daesh were a national security issue for governments. At the conclusion of the research, foreign fighters remain an issue, but from a different perspective. With a military pressure on Daesh in Syria and Iraq, more and more foreign fighters want to return home, leaving their home country in a dilemma, as they potentially pose security risks. While many of the home countries are reluctant to take back these foreign fighters, their family members are desperate to have them back, as seen in recent cases in which families have travelled to conflict zones (Embedded 2019) or sent money to bring back their loved ones — through which creating possible security risks (BBC 2019). Each side has valid concerns and arguments.

However, this is not a new situation, as explained in this thesis; the Info-House has been rehabilitating returnees and preventing extremism by working closely with families since 2011. This is not to say that those returning do not pose risks, but rather that those risks can be managed and the individuals safeguarded if the authorities work in partnership with families. As Info-House exemplifies, prevention does not discontinue at stopping the individual from becoming radicalised and being exposed to extremism, but active involvement continues with those surrounding the individual (i.e. family, school, friends, mentors etc.) to ensure that the individual is on the path to or a “good life”, the psychological philosophy that their approach is based on. Moreover, at the beginning of this thesis, concerns surrounding radicalisation and extremism were dominated by extreme Islamist ideologies, as the threats were coming from groups like Al-Qaeda and Daesh. At the time, the threats from far right-wing extremism were not as prominent, although the CT specialists did deal with such cases. However, by the end of this research, far right-wing extremism was no longer a simmering issue, but one that needed urgent attention, as extreme right-wing terrorist attacks started to emerge across the globe urging others to do the same (e.g. the Christchurch terrorist attacks).

This snapshot is revealing and relevant to the thesis in two ways. First, it is emblematic of the fluctuating nature of prevention, radicalisation, extremism, terrorism, and perceptions
of security risks. Security risks set the agenda for prevention, which in turn influences policy and practice, indicating that prevention needs to be proactive by highlighting what needs to be reported and managed. Second, it highlights the puzzle that this thesis has sought to address (see Chapter 1, Section 1.3) — how can authorities, through CTCE, encourage people to report their concerns of radicalisation and extremism to official organisations (especially reports on their relatives and close associates), while ensuring relevance and quality of the information that is being shared? (The key findings of this research were used to produce a Policy Brief providing policy and practice recommendations to encourage and improve reporting of radicalisation, see Chapter 7 and Appendix O). In tackling this issue, the thesis has an unusual genesis — psychology of reporting. It analysed empirically how CTCE is understood and delivered within East Jutland and West Yorkshire. It asked whether CTCE had an impact on reporting behaviour, what were the reasons for and barriers to reporting, and sought to identify ways to improve and encourage reporting of radicalisation/extremism based on reporters’ needs.

The study acknowledges that there may be a range of wider factors that influence the reporting of radicalisation and extremism, and that there are challenges with comparing two international practices when such strategies are not homogeneously exercised nationally. However, the study confirms the original hypothesis that CTCE does influence reporting behaviour, especially positively when CTCE is implemented in a way that connects with the individual at a personal level by addressing the individual’s psychological needs. This concluding chapter draws together and reflects upon the key findings from the previous chapters and draws out the salient themes to explore make recommendations for policy, practice and future research. The following sections will demonstrate by drawing on key findings how well the data fit the hypothesis by presenting a synthesised answer to each research question.

8.2 Reflection on Findings

8.2.1 Research Question One: Understanding CTCE, its use, and delivery in East Jutland and West Yorkshire

One of the aims of the thesis was to compare the practices in East Jutland and West Yorkshire to help the research develop from an exploratory phase to a more advanced theoretical model, through the identification of similarities and differences. This question aimed to explore whether the style of engagement delivered by Info-House in East Jutland differed to that of West Yorkshire, and how these strategies could collectively inform understanding of CTCE and its practice.
For purpose of clarity, the differences in CTCE practice between West Yorkshire and East Jutland are summarised below:

- Especially in case of engagement, the Danish initiative is fundamentally municipality based, whereas the UK scheme is more grounded in policing. The municipality partners such as youth services were active in general CE, whereas the Info-House (a municipality and police partnership) were more focused on targeted and specific CTCE. In contrast, in West Yorkshire the police were more active in CE in general, whilst the LA delivered Prevent related training. Other than these trainings, LA was not very active in delivery of CTCE.

- The East Jutland practice is more ‘psychologically literate’, whereas the West Yorkshire is more pragmatic in the sense that the former took initiatives to involve evidence based psychology in order to inform their practice. Whereas the UKs Prevent, as far as this research could tell, had not taken into account such research and their practice was based more on practical rather than theoretical.

- The Aarhus methodology focuses more on individuals and families, whereas the West Yorkshire approach has a more community base. A key difference was that the Info-House approach was very inclusive of families and worked closely with them for prevention. These families were empowered through the support and recognition that Info-House had provided them to ensure the safeguarding of the vulnerable individual. As a result of this inclusion, the sense of responsibility from parents was enforced. In the UK the families were mainly viewed as a source of intelligence rather partners in prevention.

In both regions, CTCE was understood as a ‘soft’, proactive strategy that allowed authorities to build relationships with the public and encourage the sharing of information. Practitioners recognised that CTCE operated in a pre-criminal space and was a vital tool (see Chapter 5). Additionally, CTCE strategies in both locations reflected priorities set by the EU, as well as national and international pressures. However, unlike West Yorkshire, the East Jutland approach (i.e. the Aarhus Model) started off as a pilot study and has not been adopted across the country. The West Yorkshire practices reflect the Prevent strategy, which is a nationwide approach, and consequently practices do vary across the country. Nevertheless, there were similarities. Both locations showed that CTCE consisted of multi-layered targeted engagements with the general public, institutions and organisations, individuals at risk, and those who have already encountered extremism. As such, the intensity and the target audience varied at each level. Both cases focused on empowerment, building relationships, and raising awareness through training and
workshops. More importantly, dialogue was found to be a vital strategy for building trusting relationships, problem-solving, and sharing information.

One of the key factors revealed by the current data was that there are psychological elements to CTCE. The practitioners revealed that when engaging in dialogue and building relationships, it was important that they connected on a personal level (i.e. identity) with those being engaged, which resulted in a new definition for CE. There was also a recognition that CTCE practitioners needed to demographically represent the communities that they were engaging with, in order to have insight into cultural differences that could shape problem-solving. Moreover, CTCE was a multi-agency, which required the partners to meet regularly to discuss new and ongoing cases and concerns. However, West Yorkshire failed to meet frequently, and some meetings with partners were postponed. This finding supports an investigation of Prevent, after the Parson Green attack, as they too found that these partnership meetings were inconsistent and infrequent (Intelligence and Security Committee of Parliament 2018, p.96). In West Yorkshire, CTCE was primarily delivered by the police. Although LA did carry out engagement, it was not as frequent as it was for the police. In contrast, in East Jutland, Info-House had initially started aggressively carrying out engagement to raise awareness. However, CTCE had slowed down by the time of this research, and the municipality was more active in general engagement and building relationships, while Info-House focused on targeted engagement. Thus, in both cases, there was an unspoken reliance on partners for engagement. The data revealed that although CTCE was viewed positively, it was not being delivered proactively or frequently, as both entities had adopted a reactive approach to engagement. There was a need for more CTCE to be delivered; this was a call from both reporters and practitioners. It was also revealed that, due to this reactive approach, opportunities for further and more cohesive engagement were missed.

8.2.2 Research Question Two: The Effect of CTCE on Reporting of Radicalisation and Extremism

Although comparative data were limited (unlike East Jutland, West Yorkshire did not collect historical data on number of reports, as a result there were only two years worth of data to compare with East Jutland's seven years) the results indicated that CTCE could positively impact reporting of radicalisation and extremism, especially from families and relatives once they were engaged with and supported (see Chapter 7). This was very clear from the result provided by Info-House, which showed an average annual increase of 63%
in reports from relatives and close associates. In fact, at one point there were approximately as many reports from families, as there were from professionals. Therefore, this thesis argues that working closely with families influences prevention. There were not enough data from West Yorkshire for a like-for-like comparison; however, further national information was sought from Home Office public data, which illustrated a decline in reports. This thesis argues that this decline coincides with the removal of the Prevent Engagement Officer. Finally, this thesis identified that for CTCE to be effective, it was important to connect on a personal level with those being engaged. Info-House illustrates that the close relationships built through connecting on a personal level and empathy were most fruitful. This is in line with the theories discussed in Chapter 3 including the warmth-competency theory.

8.2.3 Research Question Three: Reasons and Barriers to Reporting, and How CTCE Can Address Them

Analysis of the data has identified several factors (e.g. fear, sense of responsibility, personal agency, relationships, skills, knowledge etc.) that influenced the reporter's decision to report, which supported some of the findings of Thomas et al. (2017); however, this thesis delved deeper and departed from Thomas et al. by exploring psychology of reporting. First, Thomas et al. (2017) argue that threat needs to be perceived as high in order for an individual to report their concern. Although this thesis agrees, it argues threat perception varies across different types of reporters. Thus, it illustrates threat perception to be multi-layered rather than a single event; and at its heart sits uncertainty. Moreover, this thesis argues that threat perception moulds the cost and benefit of reporting, as the data revealed (see Chapters 6 and 7). Secondly, the thesis demonstrates that those who tend to report later — which usually happens to be families/relatives — have a slightly different threat perception and trigger point. For this group, the trigger is the realisation of lack of control, but for others, it is a new set of information that confirms their previously held beliefs. This suggests that reporters start with an emotional commitment to a certain idea and then they will use confirmation bias and experience to confirm what they believe (see Chapter 6). Therefore, knowing about these threat perception and trigger points, the thesis provides an insight into reporting behaviour and its psychology. For example, although this thesis agrees with Thomas et al. (2017) that internal conflicts influence reporting, it has gone further by explaining why and how (see Chapter 6 and 7).

The analysis highlighted that people took action because they wanted to feel they have done something about the situation at hand, and sometimes this overlapped with a sense
of control or power over the situation (see Chapter 6). Reporters reached a point where they all recognised that they were no longer in position to deal with the situation themselves and thus there was a need for ‘power of powers’ (i.e. the authorities), as one reporter put it, to take over. The sense of responsibility guided reporting behaviour, not only in a the sense that they felt obliged to protect others but also a sense of responsibility felt towards the vulnerable individual. This worked as a doubled-edged sword that both encouraged and discouraged reporting.

The data also identified that in contrast to relatives and close associates, professional reporters were much quicker to report their concerns. This was not necessarily positive, as such reports did not always meet the threshold for interventions, as reporters did not follow what their training. This eagerness to report quickly in West Yorkshire was primarily the result of fear at failing to meet the Prevent Duty requirements, which in turn would have a domino effect on other punitive actions. This illustrates the fragile nature of policies in practice and how they can have a negative impact. Although the Prevent Duty had helped increase reports from professionals, it did not necessarily succeed in ensuring high-quality reports.

One barrier to reporting was a lack of trust in authorities; there was a sense that authorities were not going to help and that they were a source of trouble. This particularly was an issue for relatives and close associate reporters. More importantly, the thesis revealed that people do report to CT specialists — a choice that Thomas et al. (2017) (see Section 1.3) suggested was not a preferred — and it is possible to encourage such behaviour. In fact, the data revealed that reporters wanted to be in contact with such specialists in order to discuss their concerns. Info-House illustrates informal dialogue helps reducing the risk of reporting for reporters. Thus, this thesis argues that by creating an informal process for reporting, dialogue is made possible, and there is a single point of contact, reducing the fear of reporting.

Finally, the relative and close associate reporters expressed that they wanted someone empathetic and human to alleviate their concerns, as they were already in a difficult situation. There was a real need for support, and once again Info-House illustrated that by giving families support (e.g. the Parent Network) reporting of radicalisation and extremism can be increased.
8.2.4 Research Question Four: How can the relationship between CTCE and reporting behaviour be explained?

This discussion draws from the literature and data from this research. In the simplest terms, the relationship between CTCE and reporting behaviour is that of psychology. This thesis has explained that reporting behaviour is multi-faceted, threat perception is multi-layered, and that CTCE strategy is a psychological process. When CTCE is delivered in a way that connects on an individual level, it breaks down the barriers of 'Us vs. Them'. The 'Us/Them' dichotomy is created by the perception of whether the 'other' is capable of harming or helping us (see Chapter 3). This was present in the data when both the practitioners and reporters suggested there was an element of trust at stake between the public and the police. For example, EJR2 and UKR1 explained how some people were reluctant to come forward because there was a lack of trust — i.e. preventive strategies were going to do harm rather than good, e.g. criminalisation (see Chapter 6). By becoming an in-group member, the reporters reaching out to practitioners no longer see them as police or the face of authority, or at least these perceptions are lessened. They become personable and relatable. The practitioner is no longer an outsider, but someone that can be trusted. This again was evident in the data when practitioners and reporters like EJR2 explained how they would discuss non-CT related matters such as marital problems and ask for guidance (see Chapters 5 and 6). This in-group transformation builds trust. In fact, being relatable and personable does not just stop at personality: sometimes it is important for demographics to match, as an 'Us/Them' bifurcation is deeply-rooted in the human psyche (Sapolsky 2018). This thesis also presented that practitioners believed some communities were more open to interacting with people of the same background (see Chapter 5).

Emotions are big drivers in behaviour (see Chapters 3 and 6). Having an emotional connection can help to break down barriers. This study found empathy to be yearned for and appreciated (see Chapters 5-7), resulting in empathy creating trusting relationships. This is in line with the warmth-competency theory discussed in Chapter 3. In contrast, fear can become an inhibitor in building relationships or reporting (see Chapter 6), and thus knowing how the perception of fear is shaped can assist in addressing those issues. Moreover, through the support provided by CTCE, reporters learnt to see authorities as those that can assist and guide, as well as being trustworthy. This transformation from negative to positive view can help shape the stories one tells oneself about those one interacts with, which influence how one behaves. There is also an issue of respect: where there is disrespect, a person can be viewed as an outsider (see Chapters 5-7). This thesis
found that by recognising differences in culture, communities, and so on, practitioners were more mindful and respectful towards identities. This, in turn, again, breaks down barriers that are preventing trusting relationships. For example, when practitioners in West Yorkshire worked the Kurdish community there was recognition of their identity and the historical meaning attached to it. This helped to build a strong relationship. Or when East Jutland reporters were given space to make their own decision and were not pressured, the reporters expressed they felt respected. Also, through inclusion and recognition, practitioners were communicating to that 'you matter; we see you'. Similarly, this creates a sense of respect. Additionally, through inclusion, practitioners are not removing the sense of responsibility from those that they engage with (see Chapter 5). Responsibility is essential to creating the desired behaviour and this thesis found responsibility was also a motive for reporting (see Chapter 6), but also it reinstates a sense of respect, as well as a sense of control. Once responsibility is removed, the message that is being communicated is that 'you are incapable', which can create a sense of being judged, reinforcing feelings of 'Us vs. Them' (as presented by UKR1 see Chapter 6).

By behaving in this way, practitioners are changing attitudes and perceptions of those that they engage with, resulting in the re-evaluation of the cost and benefit of reporting. Therefore, CTCE is about closing that gap, which creates division and the 'Us/Them' bifurcation. When practitioners are aware of what they can do through CTCE and how they should connect with those that they engage with, engagement can be effective. In East Jutland practitioners really understood the value of connecting on a personal level. In West Yorkshire, police practitioners had a better idea than the LA practitioners. Moreover, to encourage reporting, there is a need to understand why people report — the psychological underpinnings that shape the decision-making process. From a reporter’s perspective, there are needs that should be met to encourage reporting. There are also barriers that interfere with reporting behaviour. One cannot simply ask people to report and expect the reports to flow in. There needs to be an understanding of this transaction that happens when engagement takes place and its value.

8.2.5 Research Question Five: Lessons Learnt From East Jutland and West Yorkshire in Shaping CTCE Practices

The comparative analysis in Chapter 5 revealed that CTCE needs to be a multiagency proactive approach, this means that the issue of radicalisation and extremism cannot be solved by one party (e.g. police). It needs to be addressed holistically as other agencies such as mental health, employment, etc will be more appropriate to providing support which is in pre-criminal space. Also CTCE needs to be multi-layered, i.e. different intensity
of engagement with different target audience. As presented in Chapter 5 each target audience (e.g. vulnerable individual, public, family members) have different needs; thus, CTCE ought to have the flexibility in its intensity to address such needs. Therefore, CTCE needs to be tailored. Moreover CTCE has to be problem-oriented, as it allows for targeted interventions and engagement. This approach as presented in Chapter 5 can be helpful when there is shortage of resources, as it encourages investing in areas that are deemed more effective (e.g. working with families or a troubled mosque). Additionally, the practitioners revealed that by engaging with communities they were able to deal with issues that mattered to the community. Although not all these were CT related, it did help with building relationships.

The data also revealed that CTCE can benefit from being dialogue-centric, as it allows for difficult conversations to take place — preferably informal from reporters’ perspective as it reduces the fear of consequences. It was evident from the data there was a need for informal dialogue, as it helped to clear uncertainly about signs of radicalisation and extremism. Also, through dialogue CTCE was more inclusive, which had a positive effect. Thus, CTCE needs to be inclusive but especially inclusive of parents/families. This thesis found that East Jutland had managed to prevent vulnerable individuals leaving for conflict zones by working closely with their families and relatives.

It is also important for CTCE to be relationship focused. The practitioners in this study expressed how important these relationships were in prevention. Relationships are psychologically rooted, and practitioners illustrated how they tried to connect with personalities by mirroring the identities of those being engaged in order to build long, trusting relationships. These approaches allow one to connect on a personal level in order to identify problems, concerns, and get access to intelligence, as well as positively influence relationship and attitudes. The data also revealed that CTCE needs to be supportive and empowering in order to build strong relationships. This way the responsibility of prevention was not removed from individuals and a sense of respect was induced. The reporters showed that there was a need to act on their concerns, but they were not equipped with the right information or resources to do so. Thus, the support from the practitioners was welcomed. Additionally, CTCE needs to be delivered by the’ right person’, with specific set of skills that can deal with important aspects or practical details of a situation (see Chapters 5-7).

This thesis found that CTCE needs to be frequent and transparent. There was a real hunger from both practitioners and reporters to have more engagement. Also reporters
wanted transparency; they wanted to know the exact processes and to be kept informed. Consequently, this thesis believes that through application of CTCE Logic Model (see Figure 18 in Chapter 7), which is informed by the data collected, the cost and benefit of reporting are influenced and people can access relevant knowledge and skills. This is believed to encourage reporting, which in turn enables early detection, intervention, rehabilitation, and hopefully, an increase in the quality of life for the vulnerable individual. Subsequently, the distal effects will decrease in incidence, ultimately resulting in prevention.

8.2.6 Recommendations For Policy and Practice

The central focus of these recommendations is to ensure the need of reporters are met (i.e. social justice), as well as the need for prevention (e.g. better quality and more timely intelligence). Based on the current findings, the following recommendations are proposed, divided into short-term and long-term recommendations, based on the urgency of the reporters’ need and the ease in application. In essence these recommendations also summarise the evidence that they were derived from. Many of these recommendations are for central governments, and thus policy-focused. Some guideline recommendations are for LA, police, and practitioners with the intention to influence practice. These recommendations were elaborated and disseminated through a Policy Brief, which the Prevent team at the Home Office showed interest, and later resulted in a meeting with the Prevent campaign team at New Scotland Yard to inform their 2020 communication campaign — a website aimed to encourage reporting of radicalisation and extremism — a first step into series of campaigns.

Short-Term Recommendations

To improve and encourage reporting the data revealed that having a single point of contact from which information could be sought was vital to reporters. Therefore, it is recommended that a multi-agency information hub be created, where it is possible for members of the public, practitioners, and vulnerable individuals to seek guidance and support from CT professionals. The location of the hub is crucial, given that it needs to be easily accessible. Policing districts can be used as guidance. For example, in Aarhus, Denmark, this hub is on the police premises, operated by multi-agency staff. The environment of the hub needs to be welcoming and informal; this is to detach association with authorities, as reporters fear punitive actions from authority figures and need informal dialogue. The Info-House in Aarhus imitates a living room within a home, which takes away the formality and promotes a relaxed atmosphere where the individual can
discuss issues openly; their needs are signposted and provided the support required by the appropriate agency. This also creates transparency from the start and who is involved in the process.

It is recommended that the central government conduct audits of training to ensure the prioritisation of training quality. The current auditing process in place in the UK is insufficient, as it only seeks to identify if the organisation has received training, and the trainers have been certified. There is a need for a more thorough audit that seeks continuity in practice and service. There needs to be quality control assessment, especially since the ‘specific authorities’ mentioned in the Prevent Duty are not provided with a training package that the trainers could share with the people and organisations that they train. If any local training package was devised, it was the organisation delivering the training that would have put it together. It is also recommended that both central governments audit reporting processes for a better understanding of barriers and problems that reporters face, as they can identify areas of concern that are not picked up at when evaluating training and workshop sessions, as well as complementing those audits. The thesis accepts that this auditing will be costly; however, to merely make something compulsory for the purpose of accountability without sufficient funding, auditing, and checking it creates nothing but a thin veil, which can also be very costly in the long run, as well as putting national security at risk.

It is equally important for the central government to remove funding incentives that encourage increases in the quantity of training rather than quality. Furthermore, training programmes like WRAP are delivered differently across the country and organisations. Although this is acceptable and encouraged to some extent, this thesis argues that there needs to be some level of the audit to ensure that there are no gaps in training and delivery, as well as minimising difference in practices whilst considering the regional factors. There is a need for central governments to understand the organisational context better and recommend more suitable training scheme. For example, with students, prevention of radicalisation and extremism could be covered in citizenship-based modules, and be part of education assessment.

It is recommended that practitioners delivering CTCE adopt the CTCE Logic Model to engage with the psychological underpinnings of reporting and build closer relationships with relatives/close associates. Increase active CTCE and dialogue. It is through dialogue that concerns are addressed and through CTCE that opportunities are identified. It is important to understand that dialogue is not about changing opinions, but listening in
order to identify a common ground that parties can utilise to work together, which ultimately will aid prevention. Working with relatives/close associates is vital to an all-around approach to prevention. This thesis, as well as previous research, has illustrated that working with families can be highly beneficial, and that families request this.

**Long-Term Recommendations**

It is recommended that the practitioners and the central government improve the quality of training and awareness workshops through an evidence-based approach, which aims to inform better practice and be more effective. This research found that the workshops delivered by Info-House were to some extent based on research; however, it would be highly beneficial if research could identify the impact of such training and make improvements if need be.

Central governments need to invest more in youth services, as they can engage with young people and their families to raise awareness in addition to safeguard. In Denmark, youth services are very active in the prevention of radicalisation and extremism and work very closely with the Info-House and the police to ensure prevention. It is advised that the funding for CE and CTCE be more abundant and more targeted. For example, identifying which part of CTCE needs more funding, why, and by whom. Such targeted funding can be identified through a review of funding policies that negatively impact practice.

Finally, those involved in communicating the message and intention of CT and prevention can invest in advertising that connects with individuals’ core social identity (e.g. being a parent) and any sense of responsibility associated with that role, with focus on facts about services and the support available to them. Publicity can be used as a form of engagement and sharing of information, as direct face-to-face engagement is not possible at all times. Advertisement promotes not only the services, support, and resources available to people but also creates an opportunity to address misinformation. As discussed in Chapter 2, during the Troubles in the late 1980s and 1990s to the Good Friday Agreement, the UK government, in an attempt to win the hearts and minds of the public and to stop the violence, invested £3million into commercials. What was supposed to have been aired on the BBC as a documentary was instead presented as 25 public service commercials. The Northern Ireland Office began to commission these public ads to influence public opinion by delivering the government’s message directly into their homes. Advertising producers David Lyle and Julie-Anne Bailie created psychological adverts (highly emotionally charged) designed to encourage people to call the Confidential Telephone Line and report suspicious activity by paramilitaries (BBC 2018). Their first advert, entitled “A Future”,
was aired in January 1988 and resulted in 729% increase in genuine and useful calls to the hotline. The narrative of the ad was based on a young man, fed up with how the violence in Northern Ireland had hindered his life, who decided to provide information. The film is graphic and powerful; it used the aftermath footage of the Enniskillen bombings. The commercial places responsibility on the viewer’s hands. The commissioned researchers identified their core target audiences and made sure that each of those target audiences was in the frame. They found that as well as appealing to innocent members of the public, they also needed to reach the terrorists and their families to encourage them to cooperate, which required a different approach, as Bailie explained during a BBC documentary: “There was absolutely no point in us just capturing the moral high ground, that was never going to be enough. Popularising, the security forces were never going to be enough. Demonising terrorists wasn’t going to work.” (BBC 2018) They started to work with the psychological theory of cognitive dissonance (a topic this thesis has addressed and included in the models, see Chapters 6 and 7), to present to the paramilitaries that their love for violence will destroy the other things they love most in their life, their family. In the adverts targeting families, they presented families (mothers and children) queuing outside prison, highlighting the painful reality of what happens after extremists are arrested. They gave profound insight into what terrorism was doing to the families. Other adverts were aimed at fiancés, wives, or girlfriends of extremists and illustrated cases where two newlywed women on opposing political sides were suffering from the same pain — losing their partner to either an attack or to prison. Similarly, adverts targeted at fathers focused on their role in shaping their children’s future. All were highly emotional and identity oriented, with the aim of creating a sense of personal responsibility. All factors, which this thesis has covered in relation reporting behaviour.

This thesis suggests that by investing in such commercials that focus on sharing the facts about reporting someone they are concerned about, connecting with the individual’s sense of identity, and responsibility, the government has a better chance of reaching a wider audience (although this do not take away from the importance of the CTCE in general).

8.3 Research Importance, Contribution, and Implications

Not disregarding the limitations, which are discussed in the coming section, this thesis has sought to provide a different viewpoint when considering CTCE, and the prevention of radicalisation and extremism, especially from a research point of view. The thesis adds to the existing corpus by looking at prevention through the lens of reporting behaviour.
Thus, instead of focusing on the vulnerable individual, the thesis is focusing on the people around the individual. By understanding how people operate when they start having concerns, steps can be taken through CTCE to encourage reporting behaviour to ensure early intervention and prevention. Consequently, prevention efforts no longer discontinue at the vulnerable individual but extend further to provide a 360-degrees approach to prevention.

This thesis has identified the needs of service users (reporters) and how these needs can be met through CTCE. More importantly, this research has shone a light on a forgotten cohort — families and close associates of the vulnerable individuals — who are also are victims of radicalisation, extremism, and terrorism that need support. As this research has illustrated, these families are not always regarded positively or involved in prevention, particularly in the UK. Thus, it is by investing in this cohort that CTCE and prevention can be more effective. Hence, the findings from this thesis can encourage policies and practices that are end-user focused.

From a research perspective, this thesis has tried to change the conversation around CT and methods used. Thus far, CT research has been dominated by critical studies of strategies and policies, and although they provide valued arguments, which this thesis has used as building blocks, it is time to move the discussion on with innovative and constructive solutions that not only benefit the vulnerable people but also ensure national security and civil liberties. Similarly, other CT studies have focused on communications from different campaigns and how effective they have been for intervention and mitigation. However, focus on the families of those vulnerable individuals is still lacking, and although this group was not necessarily the primary focus of this research, it has provided some insight into the importance of this group. This thesis hopes to have opened up avenues for future research to access these groups and work in collaboration with CTUs in order to explore CT, radicalisation, extremism and terrorism. Additionally, this thesis has introduced a new definition for CE, informed by other definitions of CE, inclusive of behavioural insight and recognising the psychological element of this interaction. This, again, brings to the table new conversations about CE and CTCE, how they should be viewed, and what should be considered. As a result, through the use of this definition, interdisciplinarity and multidisciplinarity are encouraged in future research, as CE or CTCE no longer stays a criminological and political science topic, but rather one that is connected deeply with psychology and other behavioural sciences.
This research also contributed to criminology through the introduction of the CTCE Logic Model, as it presented an evidence-based approach to engagement and prevention. The model breaks down the valuable characteristics of CTCE and how the process works towards prevention. This model can be used by future researchers to test the processes proposed, as a guideline that is informed by the marriage of different existing corpuses of research. Moreover, through the introduction of the Integrated Reporting Behaviour Change Model, the thesis has merged the current data with several behavioural science theories: the multi-component model of attitudes, BIAS, collective efficacy theory, cost-benefit analysis, theories of reasoned action and planned behaviour, SDT, IBM, SIT, SCT, identity theory, and the dual-pathway model of respect. Each of these models and theories individually addresses different behavioural and personal characteristics. However, through this marriage, these theories and models can be used collectively to understand the decision-making process and the reporting behaviour.

This thesis also contributed to understanding threat perception by introducing the threat perception models (see Chapter 6), which were informed by the data collected. The models illustrate the multi-layered experience and trigger points for reporting. This is of value in policy and practice when trying to encourage people to come forward, especially family members. This can be used in the advertisements to illustrate what one goes through when one is unsure about concerns that they have about radicalisation and extremism.

This research has also contributed to the methodological approach in terrorism research. As stated by other scholars, research on terrorism has long suffered from methodological issues whether it is over-reliance on secondary data, associated literature reviews, the sacristy of statistical data, or lack of collaborative work (Horgan 2017; Silke 2001; Merari 1991; Schuurman 2018). This thesis that was informed by merging together comparative case studies and TRD, adapting these methodologies in a way that accounts for some of the limitations faced doing CT research. Though this research has limitations, nevertheless it has taken a new approach to studying terrorism-related topics in the hope of encouraging a social justice approach to CT research and ensure delivery of axiology. Finally, this thesis hopes to have encouraged the use of behavioural insight as a tool to further policy, practice, research, and impact. More importantly, it has demonstrated that by staying true to its epistemology, ontology, and axiology, it has contributed to knowledge.
8.4 Reflection on Research Limitations

The primary limitation of the current findings is generalisability, as a common concern of case studies is that their findings are not sufficient for scientific generalisation (Thomas 2011). However, generalisation has two forms: statistical and analytical. To generalise statistically, claims are made based on statistical probabilities of a population sample. It is argued that this type of generalisation is commonly recognised because researchers "have ready access to quantitative formulas for determining the confidence with which generalisations can be made" (Yin 2009, p.38). On the other hand, in analytical generalisation, research uses an in-depth analytical investigation to generalise a particular set of results to some broader theory (Yin 2009, p.43). Analytical generalisation is defined as a two-step process: a) conceptual claim that is informed by the findings of the case study; and b) the application of the theory to connect to a context in which similar experiences might occur (Yin 2010). The former applies to this thesis. Through multiple case studies, analytic generalisation is made possible and increases accuracy (Bulmer 1988), as replication through cases is used to confirm or challenge the theory (Yin 2009, p.38). Therefore, claims made by case studies may not be 'proof' in statistical terms; rather, they form theoretical premises that can be utilised to make assertions about the studied phenomenon. Further cases that replicate outcomes can support and strengthen the construction of the theory (Lincoln & Guba 2002; Yin 2009, pp.38–44). It is also argued that the empirical findings of a case study can be strengthened when replication supports the same theory but do not support an equally plausible, rival theory (Yin 2009, p.39).

However, another element of generalisation could be that the readers interpret the practices of East Jutland and West Yorkshire to be representative of CTCE practice across each nation. This is not the purpose here. First, although both the UK and Denmark practice CP, they differ in practice and philosophy. The UK practice aspires to take the Peelian approach, of policing by consent (Harris 2004), while the Danish proximity policing is focused on building a close relationship with the community by ensuring the same officer serves the area for several years (Holmberg 2002). Both strategies in simplest term focus on the public, but the practice differs partly due to resources and political agendas. In West Yorkshire not many officers serve the same area for a long term, as they get promoted or move on — in fact, some practitioners were frustrated for this reason. Whilst in East Jutland having the same person serving the same area was vital and valued. It presented service continuity. Second, East Jutland and West Yorkshire are not necessarily representative of all forces or LA across each country. This is because
demographics will vary across the countries, shaping organisational cultures, relationship with communities, crimes, and priorities that direct the purpose of each agency in the region (Carrington et al. 2003); not to mention the impact of funding and austerity (HMIC 2012; Home Office 2018b). Yet there were similarities as the Police and the LA have to fill the same fundamental role, guided by the same national legal controls and policies (Reiner 2010). Moreover, there were similarities in CT strategies since both countries are within the EU, an institution that has since 9/11 tried to harmonise CT strategies across the member states. Consequently, in this homogenous view caution is needed in the application of the current study, which can be partially transferable and inform practices of an equivalent organisation (Lincoln & Guba 1985; Flyvbjerg 2006), and especially policies (Jones & Newburn 2007).

It should be noted that one limitation of the comparative international study was that the case studies presented were not like-for-like comparisons due to social, economic, political, and demographical structure, as well as the practices in place. Additionally, both the UK and Denmark have various police forces and LAs across the country who operate differently based on their geographical needs. Therefore, caution is needed when considering the practices in place, as they do not represent how other regions operate. For example, West Yorkshire was not able to provide full comparative reporting data, unlike East Jutland; they only provided two years’ worth of data. However, that does not mean lessons cannot be learnt from such comparisons, as they can illustrate different methods of practice.

Another limitation was that of language. Since the UK and Denmark do not share the same language, and I relied upon English language, there were some constraints in accessing and interpreting CE and policing in East Jutland. Information on the Aarhus Model was much more accessible in English. Therefore, this research predominately obtained knowledge of CE through the practitioners, and when possible, Google translate was used to translate policing information into English. Freedom of expression for the participants was also a by-product of the language barrier. Although the participants spoke English, fluency varied, which meant some participants found it challenging to communicate their thoughts freely. Thus, they used words that they thought were close to what they were intending to express, limiting their freedom of expression. This is crucial for qualitative data, as it is through the thematic analysis that themes and meanings are identified. Therefore, during the interviews, the participants were encouraged to use Google translate when there was a perceived difficulty in expression.
A methodological challenge, which is also an ontological limitation, is access to reporters, primarily relatives and close associate reporters. This is because, as explained in Section 4.2, such reporters were reluctant to participate in the study, as they wanted to leave the traumatic event behind them and feared identification. It would have been unethical to pursue them further. Although the research managed to gain access to two relative reporters, reporting behaviour cannot be understood fully without input from relative reporters. This thesis addressed this limitation in three parts. First, reporting reasoning was explored from the experience of practitioners who dealt with reporters, asking why relatives report do or do not report? Examples and insight were gained about reasoning and fears that were involved. Second, in cases where relative reporters refused to take part, the CTU was asked to provide case studies and talk through the cases in detail, without exposing the identity or any information that could lead to the identification of the reporter or the vulnerable individual reported. This way, the thesis was still able to explore who made the report, and make some inferences about possible reasons for reporting. Third, the research accepted participants who approached me for participation through social media and the like. This mainly happened at the later stage of the thesis, after the introduction of a Policy Brief based on this thesis. This, too, had some limitations, as those wanting to participate were not necessarily from the sampled regions (i.e. West Yorkshire and East Jutland). However, this thesis deemed their input to be of value, given that they were relatives and close associate reporters.

The data collected about the first-hand experience of two relative reporters still provided valuable insights. Such a small sample is a limitation of this thesis; however, without having this first-hand experience this thesis would not able to understand the psychological underpinnings of reporting behaviour in the context of CT. Therefore, even such small samples have a similar value to individual case-studies for research. In fact, single case studies can be used to inform decision-making theories (Carroll & Johnson 1990). Moreover, the two relative reporters are at the very least representative of the female family members. The three case studies used including the ones discussed with practitioners were also predominantly cases that were reported by female family members. Not to mention, the study is also representative of the professional reporters. Additionally, this thesis, as explained, has attempted to balance this limitation by obtaining parallel data about the reporter’s reasoning by exploring three case studies where relatives made a report. This thesis hopes that the outcome of this research will encourage future participation of relative reporters.
It is also important to note that when exploring why people did not report, that it is impossible to explore this notion in detail. First, one needs to identify those individuals who were aware of the risk but did not raise their concerns. Without reports, there is no trail to the source. Second, the thesis could have carried out a survey that focused on this group, but this was not within the immediate scope of this thesis, as well as not being feasible due to workload. This is a factor that could benefit from further meta-ontological analysis.

Although the application of TRD is very valuable to social research, it did present some challenges for this thesis. Since TRD takes the end-user’s platform and approaches them to guide the research, this thesis was not able to approach the reporters of radicalisation/extremism before designing the study. This was mainly due to issues of access. The research had to know who these people were in the first place; however, given the nature of CT, such data are not publicly available. Therefore, the research was highly dependent on the access provided by the CTU. Once access was obtained, during the interviews with the reporters (and practitioners), they were asked what they needed from CE, and how they believed the reporting process could be improved to meet these needs and encourage reporting. Through this action, the research managed to reel in their world view and what was important to them when it came to reporting radicalisation/extremism. Hence, the research uses data to inform better practice and policy. This thesis illustrates that TRD is flexible in application and that researchers can adjust the margins as long as the foundations of the methodology are intact — i.e. creating social justice and considering the end-user’s perspective. As a result, the research contribution is the application of TRD method and how it can be adjusted to address research limitations.

Additionally, this thesis did not explore the notion of ‘community’ directly, meaning it did not ask the CE practitioners to define community. This is because, as explained in Chapter 1, the notion of community is complex and has a different meaning in a different context. The community has overlapping geographical and identity dimension. Given that there is no fixed definition for ‘community’, it was of little value to ask practitioners to define it. The aim of this research was not to explore what the notion of the community meant in the context of CE. Thus, instead of questioning practitioners on how they defined community, they were asked to explain how they learnt about the communities they served, and how they tried to apply that knowledge in their practice? In this way, the participant was given a platform to freely express their understanding of whom were they serving, which also highlighted geographical and identity factors.
A possible ontological limitation of this thesis could be that it has not directly explored the relationship between political views and reporting reasoning, which could be a confounding factor. This is because political views, in the context of CT, are associated with strategies in places such as Prevent or the Aarhus Model. Although this thesis agrees that political views are a by-product of our attitudes and beliefs, which could feed into the behavioural processes, it concluded that such views could be explored in the risks associated with reporting. Therefore, through the ontological processes, the thesis identified political views of reporters as part of the risk of reporting category, and possibly quite low in the hierarchy of importance. Reporters were given the opportunity to express their thought process about reporting, and within that, they have the freedom to express thoughts about Prevent or the Aarhus Model. Subsequently, if such concerns were raised, these could have been explored further, as the interviews were semi-structured. However, this is an area where future research could expand.

Due to the nature of the study and CT, direct access was not available to subjects for recruitment purposes. Consequently, a limitation was that the CTUs in West Yorkshire and East Jutland were in charge of providing participants, without any input from the author other than the numbers of participants required and the type (i.e. practitioners that deliver CTCE from all partner agencies and reporters of radicalisation/extremism). However, it was stressed how vital it was to have access to relative reporters for a better understanding of reporting reasoning, as professional reporters have a professional legal duty of care. Thus, it can be argued that since the CTU had the power of choice, they could have been selective in terms of who they wanted to be involved in the study, to indirectly create a more favourable outcome for CT strategies or agencies involved. This is a concern; however, some comfort could be taken from the fact that the data from these participants did not illustrate a skewed view of the systems. In fact, there were both positive and negative world views, which identified barriers and problems in the service.

8.5 Future Research

This thesis gave rise to several avenues for future research. One of the areas that could be further explored is reports from education services. The Department of Education in 2015 released departmental advice for schools and childcare providers, as part of Prevent Duty. The document notes that professionals can follow three routes when raising a concern (Department for Education 2015, p.10). First, if a member of staff in a school has a concern about a particular pupil, they should follow the school’s normal safeguarding procedures. This includes discussing the matter with the school’s designated safeguarding lead, and
where deemed necessary, with the child’s guardians. If the school is within a Prevent priority area, then the staff can also contact the Prevent Lead. Second, the member of staff could report their concern directly to local police or dial 101 (the non-emergency number), where they can discuss the issue in confidence, and access support and guidance. Third, the Department for Education has a dedicated telephone helpline to enable staff and governors to raise concerns relating to extremism directly. Concerns can also be raised by email.

The interviews mainly suggested the first approach for reporting concerns was the most common. However, it would be highly beneficial for future research to investigate more fully which route is commonly taken by educational professionals and why. This could provide a better insight into the reporting of radicalisation and extremism in education services, and how it can be further improved. Not much is known about the available information in Denmark that guides professionals in reporting. There is a hotline, but the Info-House in Aarhus is the central hub for information. Researchers should further investigate this to inform future efforts and maximise the effectiveness of the processes in place.

Another issue that was identified in this thesis was the quality of the reports since if there is not enough evidence the investigators will waste their time in investigating people who are not vulnerable in a CT context; or if the evidence is irrelevant, the investigators may dismiss people who are at risk. Concern can be very subjective; this is why evidence to support concerns is vital for the escalation of a concern because, without sufficient and appropriate evidence, the reports will not meet the threshold for intervention. In the UK, the VAF is used to assess whether individuals need support and safeguarding. As explained in Section 5.3.2, the framework covers 22 factors that may indicate whether an individual is vulnerable. The framework was introduced in 2012 by the government, and it is four pages in length, with only two pages of information and bullet-pointed characteristics. The document is vague in terms of guidance that is designed to assist practitioners to identify characteristics associated with the three core dimensions. Due to this lack of information, it is likely that risk assessment will be subjective rather than objective. The quality of information is not based on opinions but as many facts as possible.

The aim of this thesis was not to explore the implementation of VAF and how it functions in reality. However, this would be a great opportunity for future research to explore. It would be beneficial to explore whether VAF is covered in detail during the WRAP training.
for example. Given the hours allocated to WRAP, this thesis believes an in-depth coverage of VAF may be lacking from the WRAP training.

In relation to referrals, this thesis found that at times, Prevent can be a dumping ground for a variety of concerns that are not CT-related. There were concerns that reporters, such professionals, would report cases that might be in need of safeguarding, but they were not CT-related; or that they would report concerns without supporting evidence, just so that they had passed on the issue. There was a sense of 'it is better to report than not to'. Researchers may also wish to explore such referrals further, as it would be beneficial to explore how many of the Prevent referrals were previously referred to other services. Future research can explore the relationship between such reporting and the institution that the report was generated by (e.g. schools, mental health, etc.). Furthermore, it would be beneficial to see how many of those Prevent referrals that did not meet the threshold but were signposted to other services were also previously reported to these services and whether they received the support needed. The results of such research can inform barriers and problems in other services and their domino effect on services like Prevent and Channel. As mentioned earlier, this thesis did not explore the procedures of reporting. However, to better understand reporting, it is vital for future research to focus on the procedures of reporting and identify areas for improvement.

When looking at the data presented in this thesis, it is hard not to think about the issue of resources and what it could mean for a healthy partnership. It would seem that the municipality/LA can deal with social elements, while the police deal with the criminal justice aspects. However, due to a lack of resources, the Info-House seems to be dependent on general CE carried out by the municipality or the old contacts established within the community. In contrast, the LA in West Yorkshire were not very active in CTCE or they were done in conjunction with other forms of engagement such as FGM. It would be interesting to explore further what such dependency could mean for the partners. Future research might want to focus on the pressures, accountability, and ownership when delivering CTCE, a strategy that this thesis found to be vital to be carried out by both the municipality and the police. Additionally, it would be beneficial for future research to audit and explore the type of engagement carried out by different partners to comprehend what is being done, how much is being done and by whom, to measure the impact of such engagement, and identify areas for improvement.

This thesis also highlighted how the issue of resources is affecting CTCE. It would be beneficial to understand how different viewpoints at different levels can affect resourcing
CTCE. Additionally, researchers should explore if people in positions of power are aware of the amount of labour, resources, and time involved in building relationships and engaging with communities? Have they tried to measure the time allocated to such activities? How do they value CTCE? Moreover, the issue of resources highlighted the lack of support from politicians. This is vital and needs further exploration. Future research might explore politicians' views on CTCE and how they may influence funding. Is there an alternative way of measuring the effects of CTCE on prevention (such as looking at reporting behaviour) that could assist politicians with their need for quantifying results? Likewise, it would be beneficial for future research to explore funding from central government. Researchers could explore how the Home Office allocates funding to each region for CT purposes, especially CTCE, and whether the Home Office takes into consideration local differences when rolling out agendas for the police, LA, education service, and the like. There may be biased when it comes to funding.

The thesis also discovered some differences in how training programmes like WRAP and the Info-House Workshop had developed. Future research might explore and identify the impact of such evolutions and formations. It would be highly beneficial to understand if, and how much of, these training programmes were based on evidence; and whether they meet the needs of practitioners and prevention. Finally, researchers of behaviour and decision-making are welcomed to assess and evaluate the models presented in this thesis in a lab environment to further improve them through the identification of confounding/other factors. Although the current models were based on already examined concepts, it would be highly beneficial to have experiments that test the concept as a whole.

8.6 Three Final Thoughts

If this thesis had to be encapsulated in a single phrase, it would be “CTCE is an effective strategy to encourage reporting behaviour, especially when working with families.” At the inception of this thesis, the quote from Hussen Abase, the father of Amira Abase (one of the Bethnal Green trio), illustrated the hunger of families to work in partnerships with government to prevent radicalisation and extremism, and this thesis asked if such preventive collaboration is possible. The answer is yes! At the beginning of Chapter 1, this thesis queried what was happening when Info-House had managed to stop vulnerable individuals from travelling to conflict zone, and what were the practitioners doing to encourage reporting by parents. This thesis revealed that practitioners believed this was the result of working closely and honestly with families, and providing them with the
support that they needed. It was the inclusion of families that advanced prevention. Engagement on its own is not enough to encourage cooperation, as illustrated in this thesis. There are needs to be met. Engaging with the general public can be positive overall, but if the idea is to prevent radicalisation and extremism, then families are best situated to spot the signs early and intervene. Therefore, engaging and working with families can be a beneficial, targeted engagement, which Info-House has illustrated to be an effective preventive strategy. It is surprising that in the UK not much work has been done with these families.

Second, CTCE needs to adopt a psychological approach to engagement. This thesis has an unusual genesis in that it is based on the storytelling of the mind in the context of reporting radicalisation and/or extremism. As presented, the decision to report is a multi-layered and interconnected psychological process. This might sound complicated, but the reality is humans interact with one another on a psychological level every day. Successful interaction is achievable when it is done mindfully. The practitioners at the Info-House mindfully sought to connect with individual’s identity to understand their concerns and needs for effective prevention. Therefore, a psychological approach to CTCE is about training the staff to be aware of such cues during engagement.

Finally, empathy is essential! It is important for CTCE to be human and empathetic, especially when dealing with families. It is that sense of warmth that creates trust and draws the relationship closer. The thesis found that some practitioners struggled with the balancing act of when to put on their professional ‘hat’ and when to be an empathic human that is not restricted by red tape. The truth is they do not have to choose: they can be both. The Info-House practitioners (and some in the West Yorkshire) had managed to strike balance, and such empathic responses had resulted in strong relationships.
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Appendix A: Semi-Structured Interview Questions for Practitioners

Questions for Frontline Practitioners

1. Can you please describe your day at work – from the moment that you start work until you finish.

2. How much of your daily work is actual foot patrol?

3. How do you show your availability to members of the public?

4. What is your understanding of community engagement?

5. What do you think your superiors in the police hierarchy see community engagement as?

6. Do you practice engagement in your daily work? How?

7. How do you build a relationship with members of the community?

8. How do you think the local people perceive the police?

9. How do you think the local people perceive you, as a police officer?

10. Do you think there is a difference between how the local people, in general, perceive you and those living in the community who you have daily contact with? Please explain.

11. In the context of counterterrorism, how do you use engagement?

12. How do you think the ethnic minorities in the neighbourhood perceive you?

13. How do you, as part of community engagement, differentiate between identities and communities within a neighbourhood?

14. How do you think the young members of the community perceive you?

15. How do you approach younger people in the community? Can you give me an example?

16. Is there a difference in how you approach younger members of the community in comparison to the rest of the community? Can you give me an example?

17. What about the ethnic minorities? Do you approach them differently? How?

18. How do you engage with other agencies in the community e.g. schools, health providers, religious institutes etc.?

19. For you what is the most important aspect of engagement? Why?

20. Can you give me an example of when community engagement has worked for you?
21. Do you think community engagement has any impact on crime-reporting behaviour? What about in the case of reporting individuals at risk of radicalisation/extremism?

22. How do you try to make cooperation with police more appealing through community engagement?

23. What do you think community engagement should be about?

24. What do you think the community needs from engagement so that it can be effective in preventing crime?

25. From your experience, how do you think the public perceives the risks of reporting to the police?

26. From your experience, which part of the community is MORE likely to cooperate and engage with the police? Explain.

27. From your experience, which part of the community is LESS likely to cooperate and engage with the police? Explain.

28. Is there anything relevant that you wish to add or believe to be of importance?

**Questions with more senior police**

1. Could you please explain what your understanding of community engagement is?

2. Is rapport building with residents important for community engagement? Explain.

3. How should this rapport be built?

4. What is your understanding of prevention?

5. How is community engagement relevant to the prevention of terrorism, extremism and radicalisation?

6. Do you believe community engagement is having an impact on public cooperation?

7. What do you think community engagement should be about?

8. Do you believe community engagement has had any impact on prevention of terrorism, extremism, and radicalisation? How?

9. How does community engagement take into consideration the complexity of community?

10. How does community engagement recognise the different identities and communities within a neighbourhood?
11. Is there anything relevant that you wish to add or believe to be of importance?
Appendix B: Semi-Structured Interview Questions for Reporters

1. Without exposing the individual reported (e.g. name), can you tell me:
   a) About the case you had reported?
   b) How are you related to this person?
   c) How would you describe your relationship with this person?
   d) To Whom did you report?
   e) Why did you report to them?
   f) What specifically led you to report the individual?

2. As a .... (Muslim, teacher, parent etc) what did the reporting of this individual mean to:
   a) You
   b) The individual and your relationship with the individual
   c) The community and your relationship with the community
   d) The neighbourhood and your relationship with the neighbours
   e) The family and your relationship with the family
   f) Anyone else that was involved

3. How did you feel about reporting this person? Specifically your emotions.

4. What did you think at the time of reporting/decision to report? Specifically your thought process.

5. Did you experience (whether perceived or actual) stigma and prejudice (judgement) for wanting to/making the report?
   a) How did that make you feel?
   b) Did it have an impact on your reporting?

6. Was any support available to you before, during and after making the report?
   a) What kind of support and from whom?

7. Were you aware of the support available to you before you made the report?

8. Did having/lacking support have any effect on your decision to report this individual? Please explain
9. Was there a sense of obligation for reporting this person? If so, where or who this sense of obligation came from?

10. If you hadn't have this sense of obligation, would you still have made your report? Please explain.

11. What is your general attitude towards the police?

12. In what scenarios would you approach the police for help?

13. In the scenarios you've explained will the relationship (e.g. friend, neighbour, parent, sibling, children, distant relatives etc) you have with the offender make you more reluctant to report? Could you explain why?

14. Can you give a brief example of when you've had either direct or indirect experience with the police?
   a) How do you judge your experience with the police on the basis of how you were treated?
   b) Would you say your previous experience with the police had an influence on your decision to report the individual? If so please explain.

15. What were the risks of reporting this individual? (e.g. to yourself, the individual, the family)

16. What were the benefits of reporting this individual? (e.g. to yourself, the individual, the family)

17. Did any of these risks or benefits specifically influence your decision to report? If so, which risk or benefit was specifically the driving force behind your report?

18. In general, how much contact did you have with the police in your daily life before making the report?

19. Before making the report, did you have any form of contact or relationship with the community engagement officers in your area?

20. How good are the police at getting to know the community?

21. Do the police meet with schools and community groups?
   a) Would you want to be in those meetings?

22. Are there any police on the beat/patrols on foot in your neighbourhood? Does that matter to you? Why?

23. Do you think that, if you talked to most of the people in your neighbourhood, you would find you agreed on many everyday issues?

24. Do you think you are respected in your neighbourhood or are you targeted? Please explain.
25. Do you feel strong ties to your neighbourhood? Explain.

26. Do you agree with this statement:

"I agree with many of the values that define what the people in my community stand for in their lives"

27. Do you feel strong ties to your community? Explain

28. Do you feel your community is welcomed in your neighbourhood? Explain

29. Community engagement is a policing strategy that is based on building relationships with the community, which enables a two-way information flow. This, in turn, allows the community to be more engaged in policing itself.

   a) Have you experienced this?

   b) What would you like engagement to involve?

   c) Do you think if engagement with the community was carried out the way you have described it, would it have any impact on your decision to report or how you made the report?

30. A dialogue is a balanced two-way and cooperative communication method. Its purpose is to exchange information and build relationships. Is this what you experienced before, during and after making the report?

   a) Did this dialogue have an impact on your decision to report the individual?

   b) How would you describe the quality of dialogue between yourself and the police/the agency the report was made to?

31. Is there anything relevant that you wish to add or believe to be of importance when it comes to reporting someone at risk of radicalisation or extremism?
Appendix C: Information Sheet and Consent Form

Information

This research project is being conducted by Neda Nobari Nazari, a doctoral researcher based at School of Law, University of Leeds, UK. The project examines how radicalisation and extremism is policed West Yorkshire (UK) and Aarhus (Denmark). The interviews are aimed at learning more about why people report vulnerable individuals at risk of radicalization/extremism and explore how they feel about community engagement; hence, these interviews will be recorded through audio and general notes. By understanding why people report and what they think about community engagement, we can give citizens the opportunity to get heard about this policing strategy, which may potentially inform policies and practices. The data may have to be shared with the regulatory authorities.

This project has been ethically approved by the University of Leeds (Ethics Reference: AREA 16-046). Any confidential questions or concerns about the research can also be directed to Neda's supervision team: Professor Adam Crawford (a.crawford@leeds.ac.uk) or Professor Edward Newman (e.newman@leeds.ac.uk).

Participant Consent

Please tick

1. I confirm that I have read and understood the above information about the research and have had the chance to ask any questions

2. I voluntarily agree to participate in the research on policing of radicalisation and extremism in UK and Denmark

3. I agree that my anonymised interview with Neda will be recorded, transcribed, and archived

4. I agree that my interview responses and/or shadowing observation may be used in Neda's doctoral thesis and research publications or reports and future research which are related to the project

5. I understand that my participation in the research is voluntary and that I am free to withdraw at any point before 01/12/17

6. I understand that should I not wish to answer any particular question or questions, I am free to decline
7. I am aware that my identity is kept anonymous at all time, unless I ask otherwise.

Signature of participant: ........................................ Print name: ........................................

Email: ..................................................... Date (dd/mm/yyyy): ..............................

Signature of researcher: ................................. Print name: NEDA NOBARI NAZARI

Email: n.nobari1@leeds.ac.uk .......................... Date: (dd/mm/yyyy): ..............................
Appendix D: WYR1 Incident

A teenage male student at college, from an Asian background was reported by the college due to having posted concerning material on Facebook. It was reported by other students who followed the individual on Facebook that he had stated he "can't wait to go Jihad, and leave this land of Kafars". The college worked closely with the Counter Terrorism Unit and Prevent Officer, and had arranged a meeting with them and the student to discuss what had happened. They also met with the parents, who were supportive.

To begin with, the student denied he had written the statement, and that his account was hacked. He later said that he had in fact written those comments. The college representative and the officer questioned the student about his understanding of what was happening in Syria. His answers revealed that he did not know much factual information. He did not know who Assad was. He did not understand certain factions of Muslims were killing other Muslims. He was saying that he did not believe that Muslims should kill but in the next breath would say he was going to Syria to kill. He believed that the British army were responsible for the whole thing, even though, at the time, the British army were not present in Syria. He was clearly very surprised at the gap in his knowledge.

The college holds an online profile of its students, and the staff had reported the subject had a good attendance, had good relationships with teachers, was very popular in the class, and had a good friendship group. However, this had dropped away a little. It was decided at the time that he did not need a referral, and the subject did not go through Channel. The reason for this was that both the college staff and the officer met with the subject, who had accepted that his version of the truth might not be right and that there may be alternatives. The college met with him a few times and he was assigned a progress coach. The student seemed almost relieved that he was being mentored and guided.

Subsequently, the college found out that two of his close friends (who were not students at the college) had gone to Syria, and that the subject had previously planned to go with them, but the intervention had helped him change his course. However, after this incident he was taken into Channel as his friends had kept in touch with the student, and passed their goodbye notes to him. In addition one of his friends died in Syria, and they were like brothers, which led to the subject struggling with guilt that he had not gone with his friends to Syria.
Appendix E: WYR2 Incident

A charitable housing organisation received a call from one of their tenants through their call centre. The subject provided his name and address to the call-handler, and reported concerns about what he described as “suspicious and funny goings” at a property across the road. He described 6 or 7 Asian men frequenting a local takeaway shop and coming out several hours later. The caller had concerns about what these men were doing there. He felt that the premises were being used as an illegal place of worship. He did not have enough information to say which particular religion, but often described it as a mosque.

This was an unusual call for the organisation, as they usually received calls relating to housing issues. The organisation would have usually passed the recording from the call to the police for intelligence. However, the call started to take a different turn as the subject’s attitude changed completely. He moved from reporting his concern, to using volatile language. His views became more far right and racist in nature. He made assumptions as to why these Asian men were there and that they had taken residence. He became short-tempered, hostile, intimidating, and his use of language made the call handler uncomfortable.

The incident quickly moved from reporting a concern, which the subject did not feel was a police matter but wanted to make the organisation aware of, to language that was inflammatory and extremely opinionated. This caused concerns for the call-handler, who gave several warnings to the subject that the call would be terminated if he continued his manner. The subject failed to cooperate, and the call was ended.
Appendix F: WYR3 Incident

A teenage male student had been referred to Prevent on two separate occasions. The subject was considered to be both a troubled individual and to be vulnerable.

The student was a member of the Youth Parliament; however, there were some incidents that required investigation, which both the council and the college felt the individual was not the kind of voice that was representative of the students in West Yorkshire. He was also involved in setting up fictitious businesses from his parent’s address and creating debt. He had lots of issues with his parents; they tried to support him as much as possible, but the student rebelled against that.

The first report was made by the college because it was believed he had participated in creating a website with another student that promoted anti-Muslim ideologies. Through the website, the students at the school were sent emails trying to encourage the students to sign up to their site and campaign against Muslims. It was also believed that he had hacked the college IT network and was being monitored closely. The IT specialists were brought in to investigate which students were involved, but they could not do so due to creators of the website having advanced knowledge. The second referral was due to the Youth Parliament council being contacted by the student under several different names, and the council was worried, given the history of the student and his ideologies.

Both the council and the college believed the student to be vulnerable and needed to be referred to Channel. The second referral was made just after the student had left for university; as such, the university was kept informed.
Appendix G: Family Reporter Case Study 1

The foster carers of a teenage Afghan boy reported concerns to the manager of the foster carers at the LA who passed it to the Prevent coordinators and the Counter Terrorism Unit were subsequently contacted.

The individual had been living with his Pakistani foster parents for the last couple of years. One night, during dinner, the subject stated to his foster parents that he was planning to become a suicide bomber and wanted to blow up the house. He also said that he did not like people from Pakistan because they were racist.

The subject was debriefed by couple of Prevent Officers; he explained he was attempting to be humorous. His foster parents agreed that they had not seen anything of a CT nature. They felt that ordinarily he can be problematic and that they dealt with majority of issues but due to the current climate they thought they needed a professional to take a closer look. Based on the balance of probabilities and the evidence, the CTU accepted the subject was attempting to be humorous. They provided the foster carers with guidance and support, as well as noting they should contact them if they had further concerns.
Appendix H: Family Reporter Case Study 2

The mother of a male mental health patient reported concerns to the therapist who had been working with him. The vulnerable individual had posted material on Facebook that demonstrated extreme right wing views and conflicting Islamist ideologies. The subject seemed to be showing interest in the extreme right wing but he had also done a lot of research on Islamic State. Once these concerned were raised with the mental health partner, it was forwarded to Counter Terrorism Unit.

As a result, the subject’s medication was changed, this made a vast improvement and the individual seemed more calm and relaxed. This then enabled the Prevent Officer to hold a conversation with the subject. He explained that he was really interested in world affairs and saw himself more as an online political activist. He clarified he was generally troubled around a whole host of different problems, including ethnic cleansing that was taking place in Myanmar. He expressed that only in the last few weeks since his medication had been changed his outlook on life had changed considerably. He had realised that at the time his medication was not working but he seemed to be unaware of the rhetoric that he was expressing. As a result of the debrief we the Prevent Officer found there were no serious terrorism or extremism related concerns at that point and did not see a need for Channel intervention, although initially the concerns were there.

The individual is now out of the mental health accommodation and is being supported by the mental health partners. He is intending to seek a college placement to further his academic studies.
Appendix I: Family Reporter Case Study 3

This case involved an Asian Muslim male, within a secure mental health organisation. He came from a single parent family. He had been detained under the Mental Health Act.

The subject had been making comments that were seen as extreme by his family members who were visiting him. The mother stated that he was viewing and listening to sermons online of a known hard-line Islamist extremist. This concern was reported by the mother to the mental health profession, who then contacted the Counter Terrorism Unit.

The individual was undergoing treatment and was not in a fit state for officers to interact with him. Once he was deemed fit, the officers spoke to him and his mother. As a result the threat was assessed and he entered the Channel programme. He has now exited the process with a successful conclusion. He is now in full-time employment, leading a more stable lifestyle, living at home with his mother.
Appendix J: UKR1 Incident

A mother reported her teenage son after realising he had left for Syria. She described her son's radicalisation as something that occurred over a course of a year. As he grew older he became interested in religion and politics. His parents saw a shift in his approach to the world, which they put down to teenage transition and expression. He started going to a different place of worship, and withdrawing from the family life. He was not sharing his feelings any longer but was more confrontational. He seemed ignited and wanted to do something about situation in Syria, which his parents said he could do plenty from the UK.

However, just months before he left for Syria, all his passion seemed to have evaporated and he no longer had an opinion on anything. His mood had lifted and was close to the family again. The parents thought that he had come out of the phase he was going through, and they felt relieved. One morning he left the house and was not expected back until late. It was until they could not reach him that the parents started to panic and think something might have happened to him. They contacted various hospitals and reported him missing.

It was a few days later when the mother received a text from her son in Syria. The parents directly went to headquarters this time and reported the incident to the CTU.
Appendix K: EJR1 Incident

A senior teacher was involved in the reporting of a teenage pupil, whom he had a close relationship with and mentored. The reporter was part of a group of teaching staff that had discussed the reporting of this individual. The reporter was not the actual person who reported this incident. It was the school principal. This is because there is a process in place and also the school principal was already in contact with the Senior Prevention Officer from a previous meeting. However, the reporter was involved in the reporting process.

The schoolboy was from a troubled background, with divorced parents. The reporter started to notice changes in him. He started hanging out with drug gangs and was no longer with his usual friends. Then he started attending mosque prayers. He converted to Islam and was spending a lot of time at the mosque, and his new-found friends from minority backgrounds. He would cite Arabic prayers at school and watched beheading videos.

The school were concerned and so were his parents. The school had several meetings amongst themselves, as well with the Info-House practitioner. The school principal had previously taught a student who travelled to a conflict zone. This experience made the school principal uneasy. The team collectively made the decision to report the boy without informing the student or his parents, an unusual practice as in Demark they almost always include students and parents in the decision-making process.
Appendix L: EJR2 Incident

The sister reported her teenage sister who had travelled to Syria without telling her relatives. They used to live together, and the reporter was her guardian. A year or two, prior to her leaving, she lost her father. From then she became more religious, but the family did not see anything that caused concern. She started having views about what was happening in Syria and her sister (the reporter) challenged her on those views. She regularly attended mosque. She started learning Arabic, becoming fluent within a year and was concerned about learning the right dialect.

Meanwhile, there were cases of people who had left for Syria, including her friend and cousin. This had caused some concern. However, just before she left for Syria, she was back to ‘normal’. The night before she left, there was a gathering with her friends. She was very affectionate towards her sister and they stayed up until early hours in the morning watching YouTube videos and having a great time.

The next morning she had left the house very early without waking anyone. There was an assumption that she had gone to an event at the mosque. However, she was not answering her phone and that caused concerns. The reporter found her sister’s set of keys in the post-box and immediately recognised that her sister had left for Syria. She called her sister’s friend and realised she was missing too. She called their mother but her mother did not want to go to the police. By the time she had convinced the family that making a report was the right thing to do it was already midnight. Unfortunately by the time the report was made, it was too late to prevent the vulnerable individual from travelling to a conflict zone.

The officer at the police station was very blunt about what could have happened to the vulnerable individual, and told the family she was likely to be a sex slave. This was very hard for the reporter to hear and caused emotional distress. The officer said there was nothing they could, as the Info-House was closed until 9am the next day. They were advised to come back in the morning. The next day she went to the Info-House by herself and reported the case.
Appendix M: Publicly Available Home Office Data on Prevent referrals from 2016-2018

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Appendix N: Danish Legal Materials – Citation of Key Measures with Google English Translation

Relevant to p.105 and elsewhere, Bekendtgørelse af lov om social service (eg as consolidated by No. 1096 of 2010) (Social Services Act):

s. 153. Socialministeren kan i en bekendtgørelse fastsætte regler, hvorefter personer, der udøver offentlig tjeneste eller offentligt hverv, skal underrette kommunen, hvis de under udøvelsen af tjenesten eller hvervet får kendskab til forhold, der giver formodning om, at et barn eller en ung under 18 år har behov for særlig støtte.

Stk. 2. Socialministeren kan i en bekendtgørelse fastsætte regler om underretningsplicht for andre grupper af personer, der under udøvelse af deres erhverv får kendskab til forhold, som bevirket, at der kan være anledning til foranstaltninger efter denne lov.

Stk. 3. Socialministeren kan i en bekendtgørelse fastsætte regler, hvorefter personer, der udøver offentlig tjeneste eller offentligt hverv, skal underrette kommunen, hvis de under udøvelsen af deres tjeneste eller hvervet får kendskab til en gravid kvinde med alvorlige misbrugsproblemer, der giver formodning om, at der er behov for støtte. Socialministeren kan i en bekendtgørelse fastsætte tilsvarende regler for andre grupper, der under udøvelsen af deres erhverv får kendskab til sådanne forhold.

Stk. 4. Socialministeren kan i en bekendtgørelse fastsætte regler, hvorefter

1) praktiserende læger, speciallæger og andre, der virker inden for social- og sundhedsvæsenet, kan videregive oplysninger om børn og unge under 18 år med nedsat synsfunktion til John F. Kennedy Instituttet – Statens Øjenklinik, for at klinikken kan varetage sine behandlingsmæssige og administrative aktiviteter, og

2) John F. Kennedy Instituttet – Statens Øjenklinik kan videregive de oplysninger, der er nævnt i nr. 1, til social-, sundhed- og undervisningsmyndigheder for at sikre, at nødvendige foranstaltninger til afhjælpning af nedsat synsfunktion kan iværksættes.

s. 154. Den, der får kendskab til, at et barn eller en ung under 18 år fra forældres eller andre opdragers side udsættes for vanrøgt eller nedværdigende behandling eller lever under forhold, der bringer dets sundhed eller udvikling i fare, har pligt til at underrette kommunen.

English Translation

s. 153. The Minister of Social Affairs may, in an executive order, lay down rules according to which persons who perform public service or public office must notify the municipality if, during the performance of the service or profession, they obtain information that presupposes that a child or young person under 18 needs special support.

PCS. 2. The Minister of Social Affairs may, in an executive order, lay down rules on the obligation to provide information for other groups of persons who, in the course of their profession, become aware of circumstances which may give rise to measures under this Act.
PCS. 3. The Minister of Social Affairs may, in an executive order, lay down rules under which persons performing public service or public office must notify the municipality if, during the performance of their service or duties, they become aware of a pregnant woman with serious abuse problems who presumes that support is needed. The Minister of Social Affairs may, in an executive order, lay down similar rules for other groups who, in the course of their occupation, gain knowledge of such matters.

PCS. 4. The Minister of Social Affairs may, in an executive order, lay down rules according to which

1) GPs, specialty physicians and others working in the social and health care system may disclose information on children and adolescents under the age of 18 with visual impairment to the John F. Kennedy Institute - State Eye Clinic so that the clinic can handle its treatment and administrative activities, and

2) The John F. Kennedy Institute - State Eye Clinic may disclose the information referred to in paragraph 1 to social, health and education authorities to ensure that necessary measures to remedy vision impairment can be implemented.

s. 154. Anyone who becomes aware that a child or young person under the age of 18 is being subjected to neglect or degrading treatment by parents or other caregivers or is living in conditions that jeopardize its health or development are required to notify the municipality.

Relevant to p.107 and elsewhere, the Danish Bekendtgørelse af lov om rettens pleje (consolidated 1139 of 2013) (Administration of Justice Act)

s.115 Politiet kan videregive oplysninger om enkeltpersoners rent private forhold til andre myndigheder, hvis videregivelsen må anses for nødvendig af hensyn til

1) det kriminalitetsforebyggende samarbejde (SSP-samarbejdet),

2) politiets samarbejde med de sociale myndigheder og social- og behandlingspsykiatrien som led i indsatsen over for socialt udsatte personer (PSP-samarbejdet) eller

3) samarbejdet mellem kriminalforsorgen, de sociale myndigheder og politiet (KSP-samarbejdet) som led i indsatsen over for

   a) dømte, der løslades fra institutioner under kriminalforsorgen,

   b) dømte under 18 år, der løslades fra institutioner m.v. uden for kriminalforsorgen, hvor de er anbragt i henhold til § 78, stk. 2, i lov om fuldbyrdelse af straf m.v., og
c) personer, der løslades fra varetægtsfængsling eller anden frihedsberøvende foranstaltning efter kapitel 70, hvis de skønnes at være radikaliserede eller i risiko for at blive det.

Stk. 2. I samme omfang som nævnt i stk. 1 kan en myndighed videregive oplysninger om enkeltpersoner til politiet og andre myndigheder, der indgår i de former for samarbejde, som er nævnt i stk. 1. Oplysningerne må i forbindelse med de nævnte former for samarbejde ikke videregives med henblik på efterforskning af straffesager.

Stk. 3. Inddrages selvejende institutioner, der løser opgaver for det offentlige inden for social-, undervisnings- og beskæftigelsesområdet eller social- og behandlingspsykiatrien, i de former for samarbejde, som er nævnt i stk. 1, kan der i samme omfang som nævnt i stk. 1 og 2 udveksles oplysninger mellem myndighederne og institutionerne.

Stk. 4. De myndigheder og institutioner, der indgår i de former for samarbejde, som er nævnt i stk. 1, er ikke forpligtet til at videregive oplysninger efter stk. 1-3.

s.115a Politiet kan videregive fortrolige oplysninger vedrørende personer, der er fyldt 18 år, til forældre eller andre, herunder familiemedlemmer, der har lignende tætte relationer til den pågældende person, hvis videregivelsen må anses for nødvendig som led i en kriminalitetsforebyggende indsats over for personen.

English Translation

s.115 The police may disclose information about individuals' purely private matters to other authorities if the disclosure is deemed necessary for the sake of

1) crime prevention cooperation (SSP cooperation);

2) police cooperation with the social authorities and the social and treatment psychiatry as part of the action against socially vulnerable persons (PSP cooperation) or

3) cooperation between the Prison and Probation Service, the social authorities and the police (KSP cooperation) as part of the action against

(a) convicted persons released from institutions under the Prison and Probation Service;

(b) convicted persons under the age of 18 who are released from institutions, etc. outside the prison, where they are placed in accordance with section 78 (2). 2 of the Act on the Enforcement of Punishment, etc., and

(c) persons released from custody or other custodial measure under Chapter 70 if they are deemed to be radicalized or at risk of becoming so.

PCS. 2nd To the same extent as mentioned in paragraph 1.2. In accordance with paragraph 1, an authority may disclose information about individuals to the police and other authorities involved in the forms of cooperation referred to in paragraph 1.1. In
connection with the aforementioned forms of cooperation, the information must not be disclosed for the purpose of investigating criminal cases.

PCS. 3rd The self-governing institutions that solve tasks for the public in the social, educational and employment or social and treatment psychiatry are included in the forms of cooperation referred to in paragraph 1.1, to the same extent as mentioned in paragraph 1. Paragraphs 1 and 2 exchange information between the authorities and the institutions.

PCS. 4th The authorities and institutions involved in the forms of cooperation referred to in para. 1 is not required to disclose information pursuant to subsection (1). 1-3.

s.115a The police may disclose confidential information regarding persons over the age of 18 to parents or others, including family members who have similar close relationships with the person concerned, if the disclosure is deemed necessary as part of a crime prevention action against the person.
Better Reporting To Prevent Radicalisation, Extremism, and Terrorism

By Neda Richards

New empirical research findings recommend changes to policy and practice, in relation to counterterrorism community engagement, to encourage and improve the reporting of radicalisation and extremism.
Policy Brief

Key Findings & Recommendations

1. Poor quality reports of radicalisation and extremism, including those lacking supportive evidence, persist despite policy changes intended to encourage reporting from professionals, and despite the training available to this group.

2. Most reports about radicalisation and extremism are made by professionals, notably education and mental health services, and very few relatives or close associates report concerns.

3. Community engagement has proved to be effective in encouraging reports from relatives and close associates.

4. To help with prevention, the Counterterrorism Community Engagement (CTCE) Logic Model provides a framework to encourage and improve reporting behaviour through community engagement, with a focus on relatives and close associates.

5. Those seeking to encourage reporting must be aware that (a) reporting needs to be made easy and feasible by reducing the cost of reporting and making the reporter knowledgeable – for example better training; (b) the psychological underpinnings of reporting behaviour needs to be addressed in order to encourage people to come forward.

6. It is recommended that the policy and practice related to counterterrorism community engagement - including radicalisation and extremism awareness trainings – to reflect the need of reporters.

Context and Importance of the Problem

Prevention of radicalisation, extremism, and terrorism relies upon good quality intelligence. One source of intelligence is through formal reporting of concerns. Research shows most reports come from professionals, and very few from the relatives and close associates. Moreover, only a small fraction of these reports make it to Channel or meet Channel thresholds. Practitioners argue that this is because the majority of referrals are "malicious, misguided or misinformed".

Currently, the problem is that professionals report too quickly, without having the appropriate supporting evidence, fearing
repercussions, which leads to poor quality reports that do not meet the Channel threshold. While relatives and close associates are too slow to report. This poses a serious question for the prevention of radicalisation, extremism, and terrorism: how can authorities encourage people reporting their concerns, whilst ensuring good quality reports, in addition to increasing reports from relatives or close associates? The latter group is more likely to first notice the signs in a vulnerable individual, and time is often vital to the prevention of an act of criminality.

The Components of a Good Quality Report

The report meets the threshold for intervention
The feedback is robust, informed, with good intention and supported by evidence
The shared concern is passed on
Motivation for report is not malicious - intentionally disruptive or targeting individual or groups
Measures have been taken to communicate with the individual at risk
Not misinformed - incorrect facts presented resulting in unjustified concern

There is evidence that the application of psychological interventions in the delivery of community engagement may be helpful in addressing fears of reporting – a major factor in influencing the decision to report.

Encouraging Reporting

Contrary to some belief, those worried about radicalisation or extremism do want to be able to raise and discuss their concerns. However, there are various barriers that make it challenging for reporters - especially relatives and close associates - to come forward. These include:

1. Lack of understanding of psychological factors involved when reporting radicalisation and extremism – Psychological factors that influence this behaviour have mainly surrounded the notion of one's identity, as through this medium one manoeuvres in life. Identity influences responsibilities, attitudes, values, respect, perceived control and power, relationships, and how people perceive others (e.g., are they going to harm or help us?). In turn, these factors shape the cost-benefit of reporting in a given situation.

Jutland has managed to increase reports of radicalisation and extremism through community engagement and working closely with relatives.

The comparative study of East Jutland (Denmark) and West Yorkshire (UK) found that although other confounding factors may be involved, the Info-House - a multiagency prevention approach - in East
UK government in the early 1990s managed to increase legitimate reports of Irish related terrorism by 700% by releasing advertisements that addressed psychological underpinnings associated with identity.

The CTCE Logic Model (Figure 1) is an evidence-based approach to community engagement with the intention to increase reporting and assist with prevention by addressing these psychological factors, as well as building a stronger public relationship with the authorities.

2. **Inadequate policies** – There are both positive and negative implications that result from policies, despite their good intention. For example, although the Prevent Duty has increased reports from statutory authorities (e.g. education services), these reports are not necessarily good in terms of quality.

Professionals within the education services sometimes report for the fear of running foul of Ofsted compliance standards or facing punishment. As such, this hastiness results in the reporter failing to obtain evidence to support their concern - a crucial step that is covered in training. Policies that have helped with reporting are

![CTCE Logic Model](source2.png)

**Figure 1:** Counterterrorism Community Engagement (CTCE) Logic Model, source 2.
also S. 115 of the Danish Administrative Justice Act, as it allows sharing of information between partner agencies for prevention purposes but also inhibits the use of information obtained for purpose of prevention in a criminal court for prosecution. This, in turn, has enabled concerned individuals, as well as at-risk individuals to talk openly about their situation.

3. **Reporting processes & access to specialists** - there is a need for informal reporting processes that encourage open dialogue and access to a specialist who can provide guidance and support in relation to radicalisation and extremism. Fear of consequences has a major impact on reporting behaviour. Reporters do not want to make a mistake of reporting apparent ‘ghosts’ or not reporting.

Being able to spot the signs of radicalisation and extremism is very difficult - especially for a lay person. Therefore, access to such processes and individuals provide the reporter with confidence that they are free to raise their apprehension without having to fear that formal action will take place. Most reports show that concerns are not necessarily counterterrorism-related. Therefore, user-friendly reporting processes are vital. The Info-House in East Jutland is open to everyone who is in need of help and guidance. It is an information hub, as well as a place where reporters can access support and advice more informally.

4. **Lack of public knowledge and awareness** - there is uncertainty around counterterrorism strategies and the practices. There is a lack of knowledge in what kind of support is available to those in need, and where it can be sought from. Access to user-friendly and appropriate information is vital to shaping a better understanding of the investigation and rehabilitation process in the pre-criminal stage. This induces transparency, as well, as assists with gaining trust and confidence in the system.

5. **Lack of support and inclusion of relatives of the vulnerable** – Parents Network set up by Info-House and close working relationship with this group raised awareness about support available to them through word of mouth. This led to an increase in reporting from this cohort, where parents informed the agency directly of the return of their child from conflict zones. By treating relatives and close associates in this way, relevant authorities are able to identify their needs better and provide them with the support needed. Knowledge and access to such support decrease the fear and cost of reporting.

6. **Resource** - Lack of resources has resulted in a reactive engagement, short exposure to raising awareness, and support for reporters. Without sufficient funding or inadequate staff the quality of service declines with negative implications for reporting. For example, some areas, which are not deemed priority to Prevent funding but are still required to raise awareness, fail to do so comprehensively.

As a preventative strategy, Community engagement may help address these barriers to reporting. Currently, counterterrorism community engagement is reactive rather than proactive, inconsistent, and is not evidence-based.

**Improving Reporting**

Inhibitors to good quality reports include:

1. **Some professional reporters do not follow the training provided** (for the reasons explained earlier). This leads to skipping crucial steps prior to reporting. Professionals (e.g. teachers, doctors, and mental health practitioners) are required to spot the signs, check them by gaining evidence to support their concern, and then report them. However, what happens is that checking for evidence is missed. This leads to reports not meeting threshold required to be recommended for early intervention programmes such as Channel, as well as excessive reporting.
2. **Lack of feedback results in uncertainties for the reporter.** The study revealed there is a lack of feedback to reporters, which may be due to the volume of reporting and lack of resources. For example, this includes 'have they reported the right concerns?', 'what other information could have improved the report?', 'why the report did not meet the threshold?', and 'was their view valued?' Feedback provides guidance, support, and inclusion that is needed to encourage better quality reports. Such lack of inclusion can have a negative impact on reporters' morale and self-esteem, with implications for whether they might report in the future.

3. **Lack of comprehensive and appropriate training for practitioners and statutory agency professionals.** Not all Prevent training is delivered by specialists (e.g. Prevent or Channel Officers) who deal with radicalisation and extremism, and its assessment on daily basis; this may be ineffective. The training process currently, allows for managers in organisations to be trained, and are then required sharing that knowledge with their staff within their organisation through training. This results in Chinese-whisper style of training with gaps in knowledge and skills. Training is not provided based on guidelines or for an appropriate length of time (e.g. a minimum of two hours). Local authorities deliver training as short as 20 minutes to cover counterterrorism awareness, which is not sufficient to address complex issues such as radicalisation and extremism and results in a ticking process. Additionally, these individuals do not have the expertise to answer any specialist queries, resulting in inadequate training. Finally, workshops and training that are evidence-based have been found to be more effective in Aarhus, Denmark.

4. **Stop incentive funding.** This is linked to the issue of resources and training, as well as policy issues. Due to the pressure to raise awareness and lack of funding, the research has found that some Local Authorities deliver short awareness training, like a ticking process. Therefore, the quality of training drops for the sake of receiving funding through the quantity of training delivered. As mentioned earlier, poor training can result in poor reports, and this is not a risk that can be afforded in the counterterrorism context.

**What Needs To Be Done?**

**Short-Term Recommendations**

- Create a multi-agency information hub, where it is possible for the members of the public, practitioners, and vulnerable individuals to seek guidance and support from counterterrorism professionals. In Aarhus, Denmark, this hub is on the police premises, operated by multi-agency staff. The hub imitates a living room within a home, which takes away the formality and promotes a relaxed atmosphere. It is recommended for the UK to adopt a similar approach, as it enables the individual to discuss issues openly in a comfortable environment, their needs are signposted and provided the support required by the appropriate agency. Also, from the start, there is transparency in who is involved in the process.
- Conduct audits of training sessions for professionals tasked with identifying and preventing radicalisation to ensure the prioritisation of quality.
• Remove funding incentives that encourage increases in the quantity of training rather than quality.
• Apply the CTCE Logic Model to community engagement practices to engage with the psychological underpinnings of reporting, and build closer relationships with relatives/close associates.
• Increase active community engagement and dialogue. The UK needs to be less risk-averse when it comes to having “difficult conversations”. More needs to be done in identifying opportunities to have dialogue. It is important to understand that dialogue is not about changing opinions but to listen in order to identify a common ground that parties can utilise to work together that ultimately will help with prevention.
• Working with relatives/close associates is vital to an all-round approach to prevention. For example, in Iceland inclusion of parents in the prevention of youth anti-social behaviour has been positive, as well as the works of Info-House with parents of vulnerable individuals.

**Long-Term Recommendations**

• Improve the quality of training and awareness workshops through an evidence-based approach, which aims to inform better practice and be more effective, as well as useful training.
• More investment in youth services is needed, as they can engage with young people and their families to raise awareness and safeguard. In Denmark youth services are very active in prevention of radicalisation and extremism.
• Funding for community engagement needs to increase but also needs to be more targeted. Review funding policies that negatively impact practice – these may be identified through an audit.
• Audit training sessions, delivery of workshops, and reporting processes for a better understanding of bottlenecks.
• Invest in advertisements that connect with individual’s core social identity (e.g. being a parent) and sense of responsibility associated with that role, and focus on delivering facts about the services and the support available to them. Publicity can be used as a form of engagement and sharing of information.

**The Author**

This Policy Brief has been prepared by Neda Richards, a PhD researcher at the University of Leeds. She has a background in social science, and auditing organisational practices and processes. This Policy Brief includes findings from her comparative and behavioural insight research study of community engagement practices, and experiences of reporters in East Jutland (Denmark) and West Yorkshire (UK).

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**Source 1:** Home Office (2018) ‘Individuals referred to and supported through the Prevent Programme, April 2016 to March 2017’

**Source 2:** Neda Richards, (forthcoming), Preventative Counterterrorism Policing: The Impact of Community Engagement on Public Cooperation, University of Leeds.