The Management of the Mobilization of English Armies: Edward I to Edward III

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ABSTRACT

This thesis examines government administrative action that can be described as 'management', in the context of the logistics of mobilizing royal armies during the reigns of Edward I, Edward II and Edward III. Its purpose is to contribute to understanding of how fourteenth-century government worked.

Mobilization required the issuing of detailed instructions for administrative actions to be taken by individuals. The actions covered recruiting, arranging transport, and providing for supplies. Government's objective was to assemble armed forces at a particular place and time. Merely issuing the instructions did not guarantee that all would be fulfilled, or achievement of the overall objective. Government had to make on-going arrangements to try to ensure that orders were obeyed, to correct failures, to monitor progress, and, if necessary, to modify plans in good time. Those arrangements, and consequent actions, are the 'management' that is studied.

The detailed management of mobilizations for eight selected campaigns, from Edward I's Second Welsh War (1282-3), to Edward III's Reims campaign in 1359-1360, is described. Recruitment, transport and supplies are considered, first in relation to each other for individual mobilizations. They are then considered as separate themes, followed by a discussion of the coordination of planning, in Chapter 9.

The thesis shows that in mobilizing armies Edwardian government made good use of practical management techniques. Planning was coordinated. Plans were by and large based on realistic, deliberately collected, quantitative information. Progress and other reports were required, and acted upon. 'Progress chaser' appointments were made to supervise executive action. 'Privatisation' was used pragmatically, particularly in 1359.

Chapter 10, 'Conclusion', argues that, though in mobilization as in other fields, what are remembered are administrative failures, in fact Edwardian government was managerially sophisticated enough to be able to mobilize its armies effectively. This ability to manage effectively may therefore be more true of its general administration than sometimes appears.
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### ABBREVIATIONS

<table>
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<td>BIHR</td>
<td>Bulletin of the Institute of Historical Research</td>
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<td>BL</td>
<td>British Library</td>
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<td>CCR</td>
<td>Calendar of Close Rolls</td>
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<td>CFR</td>
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<td>CPR</td>
<td>Calendar of Patent Rolls</td>
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<td>CVChR</td>
<td>Calendar of Various Chancery Rolls</td>
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<td>EcHR</td>
<td>Economic History Review</td>
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<td>EHR</td>
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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

This thesis addresses the government’s management of the logistical aspects of fourteenth-century mobilizations. A simplified description of the process that had to be managed could run as follows.

Once the king, usually with the support of his council, had decided to raise an army, obviously planning would have to take place. First, numbers to be mobilized, where the muster should be, and when, had to be determined. It seems reasonable to assume that these decisions would be the province of the royal command. Next, a consequential view had to be taken of what supplies, and how much of each, the government should provide. For a campaign overseas, a calculation of the transport needed had to be made. These estimates would be worked out by experienced household and central staff. The staff would then subdivide the total figures; detailed allocations of what should be required of each would be made to a large number of individuals. Orders would be sent to them via chancery writs. The writs carried instructions as to quantities, place, timing, as appropriate. The recipients of these instructions would then obey them, taking the necessary action. The result, in theory, would be that the mobilization took place as planned.

It is a seemingly universal experience that, especially in large-scale administration, something will go wrong. It was not sufficient merely to issue orders: steps had to be taken to try to ensure that instructions were obeyed, to monitor progress and to correct failures - that is, to manage. That management is the subject of this thesis.

The action to be managed comprised recruiting and assembling suitably equipped soldiers, arranging for at least their initial supplies, providing transport, and planning the appropriate coordination of these operations. Individuals' performance of their allocated tasks had to be watched, controlled and, if inadequate, admonished and corrected. These are the matters with which this thesis is concerned. It does not study the processes of the taking of the original policy decision and the consequent issuing of orders. Nor does it consider, except incidentally, wider issues such as war finance, military obligation, campaign success or failure, or the economic and political context of war. Its objective is to examine how, once the implementing orders had been issued,
the process of mobilization of armies was managed, through what agencies, and with what degree of sophistication and success.

By comparison with the time of Henry III the next three reigns, from the accession of his son in 1272 to the death of his great-grandson in 1377, were a period of frequent, large-scale wars. Preparing for and conducting them absorbed much of the energies and attention of the royal government. Its efforts to command the human, financial and economic resources of England for these wars had wide-ranging consequences: J. R. Maddicott says of the period 1294-1341, '...the pressure brought by war, particularly the pressure of taxation, shaped the economic and political development of England.' Discussion of the Edwardian wars has therefore concerned itself primarily with the changing nature of warfare itself, with the wars' implications for the balance of constitutional and political power, with their social and economic effects, and usually only incidentally with the administrative details of the actual mobilization of the armies.

In the 'Introduction' to The Medieval Military Revolution the editors A. Ayton and J. L. Price write 'It has become customary to see the late thirteenth century as marking the start of a "new age" of war, as paid armies were mobilized for ambitious, large-scale wars and the costs of war soared to levels not previously experienced...'. However, they comment also, 'Just how far the later thirteenth century marked a watershed in European warfare is open to debate.' In this debate, attention naturally tends to be directed to the nature, size and components of the armies that took the field, rather than to the management of the process that brought them there. That aspect is not one of the subjects of the essays edited by Ayton and Price. C. J. Rogers is primarily concerned with the part played by the development of the use of artillery in battle. General histories of medieval warfare, being mainly interested in war itself like

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3 M. Prestwich discusses the origins of and participants in this debate in the final chapter of his Armies and Warfare in the Middle Ages. The English Experience (London, 1996), pp. 334-346, under the heading 'Conclusion: A Military Revolution?'
those of Oman\(^5\) or Contamine,\(^6\) touch only incidentally on recruitment. The same is broadly true of the essentially narrative histories of the Hundred Years War such as those of C. T. Allmand\(^7\) and J. Sumption.\(^8\)

M. R. Powicke's detailed examinations of the processes of recruitment come in studies of the bases of military duty,\(^9\) and so see them more in that context than as expressions of the mechanics of administration. N. B. Lewis's articles\(^10\) are particularly concerned with the discharge of feudal obligation and the content of indentured service. A. E. Prince's study of recruitment\(^11\) looks at the numbers of men in the armies, and his general survey\(^12\) covers the range of administrative orders issued for actions to mobilize men and ships. J. E. Morris's 'truly pioneering'\(^13\) account of the Welsh wars, which analyses an Edwardian army,\(^14\) is concerned with its composition, internal organisation and fighting qualities, not the significance for the structure and efficiency of administration of the means by which it was raised. In his work on the reign of Edward I,\(^15\) M. Prestwich notes that 'The need to organise the supply of men, money and


\(^14\) Ibid., pp. 35-109.

materials prompted a development of administrative techniques, putting them in the context of general political and constitutional issues. This is also naturally the focus of G. L. Harriss' *King, Parliament and Public Finance*. H. J. Hewitt, on the other hand, concentrates in detail on the material requirements of both the offensive wars of Edward III and the concomitant defensive arrangements that were made.

Research and writing on the English armies and wars under the three Edwards have naturally recognised the vast amount of administrative action required. Interest in its management has, however, been largely incidental to concentration on other themes. If, instead, the government's on-going management of the administrative process of mobilizing armies is observed as it was carried out, and as it changed over time, a number of aspects of the medieval English state might be illuminated.

R. W. Kaeuper described developments from the last decade of the thirteenth century thus: 'Kings harnessed the full power of the state for the purposes of war on a grander scale and over longer periods than previously was thought possible.' How effective was this harnessing of the 'full power of the state'? One measure may be seen in the degree of success and the nature of the arrangements for mobilizing armies. The greatest change by the end of our period was that by then the whole army, from the Black Prince down, was at royal pay. This in itself must be evidence of limitation on the crown's power: it had to pay for military service for the sort of wars it fought, because it could not command that service by simply summoning subjects to a duty of arms. Of course, the finance for that payment was still extracted from the country by the crown; to achieve this finance the royal government often had to accept an increasing amount of prior communication and consultation, to put it at the least, with

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16 Ibid., p. 282.
20 And from the Italian bankers; but the English king's ability to raise the loans (on some of which he defaulted in due course) was derived from the existence of a history of general taxation going back to the Danegeld, taxation that provided the 'security' for them. Indirect taxes applied in particular to the rich wool trade in one form or another were a substantial security resource, enabling the crown to accumulate and anticipate future revenues in a way necessary to meet the cost of war. (See Harriss, *King, Parliament and Public Finance*, passim.)
formal assemblies of its subjects. Though the crown retained freedom of action, often by citing urgent necessity, E. B. Fryde (among others) points out that parliamentary sessions nevertheless provided opportunities to air complaints about 'the hurts done to common people'. Thus the change in the way armies had to be raised modified the relationship between crown and community.

Still, it is far from clear that the need to finance wars led to a substantial reduction in Edward III's authority. W. M. Ormrod sees in the twenty years after 1340-1341 a recovery not only in the popularity but also in the power of the crown, to an extent unknown since the time of Edward I. Military victories buttressed the monarchy's prestige, enabling it to preserve its rights and obtain from parliament grants of the taxes needed without making forced concessions. Edward III's deliberate cultivation of the commitment of the magnates to his wars facilitated an atmosphere of cooperation, not conflict, with his policies. G. L. Harriss concludes his survey of the debate over that question with this judgement: 'The crown's authority cannot be measured simply in terms of its ability to command and enforce, for it ruled through its capacity to invoke and mobilize the participation of the political elite.' An obvious demonstration of that is the way in which many magnates and others became, in effect, willing 'recruiting sergeants' for Edward III. They contracted with the crown to provide (at the crown's expense) and to lead armed men recruited and organised by them in their indentured retinues, for the armies and expeditions that fought in France. This was delegation to subjects - perhaps 'privatisation' might even be an alternative, if

21 Harriss, *King, Parliament and Public Finance*, Ch. IV, Ch. XVI; Powicke, *Military Obligation*, Ch. XII.
25 Ibid., p. 56.
26 The history of the development of the indentured retinue has been described by, among others, B. D. Lyon, 'The Money Fief under the English Kings, 1066-1485', *EHR*, LXVI (1951), pp. 161-193; J. W. Sherborne, 'Indentured Retinues and English Expeditions to France 1369-1380', *EHR*, LXXIX (1964), pp. 718-746; and N. B. Lewis (above, p. 8 n. 10).
anachronistic term - of the task of managing the mobilization of a major element of the armies.

Powicke, following Stubbs, argued that Edward I's aim was that 'the host should be again the whole nation in arms'. At the risk of over-simplifying a long and complex evolution, the problem of achieving such an objective might be described as one of integrating two theoretically distinct sets of military obligation. The first, and older, was the natural requirement for all men of a particular community to join in providing defence against a raiding enemy. By the nature of the event, this requirement would usually be needed only for a limited time, and in a limited area. The second was the obligation to serve the king in arms in return for the grant of rights to lordship over a holding of land. This obligatory service, limited to forty days, would not be restricted to a locality, though, possibly by conflation with the older communal defensive obligation, there remained the question of whether it included service outside the realm. Of course, as Kaeuper, for example, points out, even under the Anglo-Saxon kings, and certainly after them, English forces were of mixed origin. They could include men serving by obligation only, men serving by obligation but paid, volunteers, conscripts, and genuine hired mercenaries. And as S. Reynolds demonstrates, the concepts of feudalism, including their consequences for the relationship between land tenure and military obligation, do not necessarily describe the real world. Mobilizing an effective and coherent army against this background of somewhat ambiguous rights and duties presented a substantial challenge to the government's ability to manage.

This was particularly the case because the Edwardian wars were not fought to defend England against invasions or raids. Incursions did take place, by the Welsh into the march, the Scots across the border, and the French and their allies against the coasts, but usually these did not initiate the conflicts. Edwardian wars were mostly aggressive. In order to be able to keep armies in the field for the greater length of campaign involved in offensive wars, and to make fuller use of the manpower of the nation, the king had to concede increasingly that the army had to be paid.

This was a gradual and erratic progress. Powicke considered that 'The army of Edward I achieved a balance between contractual, feudal and communal troops, which

27 'General Obligation to Cavalry Service', p. 814.
28 Powicke, Military Obligation, Chapters 1-3, gives an account of the process.
29 War, Justice and Public Order, p. 34.
exceeded anything achieved before or after. As far as the communal troops were concerned, there were, over time, variations in the points from which royal pay was conceded to the levies from the counties. Normal practice was for pay from the time they left their home county. However, in 1322 the force raised from the levy of one man per vill was to serve for forty days after the muster at the charge of the vill: an earlier scheme of that year had intended that levies from the counties should only be at the king's wages from the time of the muster of the whole army at Newcastle. M. Prestwich's survey of 'Cavalry Service in Early Fourteenth-Century England' shows how various were the terms of summons and service. N. B. Lewis contrasts Edward III's reliance in 1336 on obligatory service for the nucleus of mounted troops with his use in 1337 of magnates as recruiting agents. Examination of procedures for recruiting for different wars can perhaps suggest whether the progress towards a contract army entirely at pay was a sustained policy derived from the practical need for planning certainty, the consequence of evolution, or fundamentally an *ad hoc* response to differing circumstances and experience, requiring different management arrangements.

Once the decision to put an army into the field had been taken by the central royal authority, it had to be communicated to the population at large. A substantial number of men had to be nominated for the task of selecting and collecting troops, firstly piecemeal, and then to bring them together to the muster. Small units on their way to the muster could feed themselves with provisions carried with them, supplemented with purchases (and no doubt theft) from locals *en route*. On the other hand, specific arrangements were required to have bulk quantities of supplies available for the army assembling at the place of muster. This in turn necessitated some attempt at quantification and planning. When the war was to be fought overseas, planning and quantification were even more necessary to coordinate, however approximately, the assembly of troops with that of maritime transport.

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31 *Military Obligation*, p. 97.
32 see below, Chapter 4, p. 72.
34 'The Recruitment and Organisation of a Contract Army', pp. 5-6.
35 In 1325 Richard Damory and Richard de Stapeldon were appointed to deal with 'felonies...by men-at-arms, mounted and on foot...coming to Plymouth to go on the king's service'. *CPR 1324-1327*, p. 65.
For the normal administrative routine of the realm, sheriffs and the permanent shire officials - escheators, coroners, constables and bailiffs, to name but a few - were the mechanism through which the central government acted in the counties; in the incorporated towns the borough officers performed the same role. When an army had to be mobilized, the permanent officials were increasingly supplemented by ad hoc appointees to carry out or supervise the many tasks involved. Who the latter were to be, why they were needed, how responsibility was divided between them and the permanent officials, and how central control was enforced, constituted a managed process that illustrates medieval government in action.

Mobilization in particular can illustrate how long administrative arrangements took to be implemented. '...Upon [a prompt and reliable system of communication] depended the power to enforce the king's justice, demand the king's revenues, and summon the feudal army or the estates of the realm.' For this purpose a number of messengers were maintained by the crown, and their time to deliver orders for mobilization arrangements to sheriffs and other agents of the crown would be only one of the factors that planners needed to take into account. In many cases those who

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36 An impressive list of government officers (which includes some strictly neither 'permanent' nor local) is given in the commission of oyer and terminer of 18 November 1341 'touching complaints against the king's justices, escheators, sub-escheators, coroners, sheriffs, under-sheriffs, taxers, admirals of fleets, keepers and constables of the peace and castles and land on the coast, takers and receivers of wool, sellers, assessors and receivers of the ninth and other subsidies, barons of the exchequer, clerks of the chancery, exchequer and of the receipt and other of his places, keepers of forests, verderers, clerks and other ministers of forests, chases and parks, collectors and controllers of customs, troners, butlers and their substitutes, receivers, keepers of his horses and their grooms, stewards and marshals of the household..., clerks of the market, purveyors of victuals, purveyors of his household, and of the households of Queen Philippa and Edward, duke of Cornwall..., keepers of gaols, electors, triers and arrayers of men-at-arms, hobelers and archers, bailiffs itinerant and other bailiffs.' CPR, 1340-1343, pp. 363-4.

37 One can make '...the broad assumption that borough officers are the king's officers.' 'Chester and London had sheriffs who were locally appointed and controlled.... They were royal administrators behind city walls.' E. T. Meyer, 'Boroughs', in EGov.atW, Vol. III, pp. 110-111.

received the orders would then have to delegate at least initial action to subordinates. The amount of time allowed between the date set for a muster and the date of issue of orders for recruitment of county levies should give a picture of how quickly government expected to be able to act through this administrative chain. Whether muster dates were met, and what action was taken if they were not, should describe how well the whole operation was managed.

The regular meeting of the county court was the main forum for official pronouncements; it was the first named in the list of places where sheriffs were ordered to make proclamations. Further, 'The novelty of the fourteenth century lay...in the intensity of the government's efforts to influence opinion and in the activity in public affairs of a well attended county court.' Proclamations were one of the means used to induce public opinion to support English claims on France. Prayers and preaching, and of course the statements made to parliaments explaining and justifying the need for financial grants, were others. From the meeting together at the county court originated many petitions to parliament, and on parliament's cooperation depended the ease with which the crown obtained the taxes needed as the basis for financing its wars. As the recruiting of men for the army came to be a matter of quotas to be found county by county, the county court became, from the 1290's on, the place in which the county's quota was broken down and allocated to individual hundreds. Often, therefore, writs of military summons and the appointments of men to recruit the quotas had a preamble designed to create a favourable climate of opinion. Thus the detailed administration of the process of recruiting had a connection with the recognition of the importance of public opinion.

Recruitment of armies that would stay in the field for longer periods than previously withdrew labour from more productive activity. K. B. McFarlane sees it as '...unlikely that the raising of armies caused any great dislocation of the labour market.' To assess the scale of this dislocation M. M. Postan added estimates of other manpower supporting the field armies to the number of those actually in arms. Whether

40 Maddicott, 'The County Community', p. 43.
41 Ibid., p. 42.
42 Ibid., p. 29.
even this total had a significant economic effect has been much debated.\footnote{e.g. M. M. Postan, 'The Costs of the Hundred Years War', \textit{Past and Present}, XXVII (1964), pp. 34-53: A. R. Bridbury, 'Before the Black Death', \textit{Economic History Review}, Second series, XXX (1977), pp. 393-410; K. B. McFarlane, 'England and the Hundred Years War', pp. 3-13.} Even though there were frequent wars in this period, their impact on manpower available for peaceful economic activity must have been much less than that of the Black Death. However, other aspects of the process of mobilization must also have been damaging. To the withdrawal of manpower should be added the duration, and perhaps also importantly the uncertainties, of the whole operation of preliminary array and purveyance. The disruptive effects on communities with relatively little surplus resources of stocks, equipment and, after the plague, men, may have been greater than might appear from looking solely at the size of the armies themselves. The timing in relation to the agricultural calendar of withdrawal of labour and draft animals could be particularly damaging. Like almost any large-scale administrative action, the recruiting of Edwardian armies gave rise to confusions, negotiations, delays, bribery and corruption, as J. R. Maddicott shows.\footnote{The English Peasantry.} How the royal administration reacted to or tried to anticipate these problems has a bearing on views of its general effectiveness and managerial control.

Though the Statute of Winchester of 1285 was primarily a police measure, it created a reserve of manpower, theoretically at least equipped according to wealth with, and accustomed to, arms, from which armies could be raised. Powicke points out that it was Edward I who 'introduced the systematic use of commissioners of array for the assembling of selected communal troops under his standard.'\footnote{Military Obligation, p. 118.} These commissioners, unlike the permanent shire and borough officials, held \textit{ad hoc}, temporary appointments. This delegation to local men of responsibility for effecting central authority's wishes, which is paralleled by the increasing use of local worthies as keepers and justices of the peace,\footnote{B. H. Putnam, 'The Transformation of the Keepers of the Peace into Justices of the Peace, 1327-1380', \textit{TRHS}, Fourth Series, XII (1929), pp. 19-48. G. L. Harriss writes 'In the matter of public order the interests of the Crown and its justices were challenged by the claim of the landowning class for a greater share in the legal as well as fiscal and administrative government of the shire.' \textit{King, Parliament and Public Finance}, p. 401.} is arguably a characteristic of the development of English government.
Therefore it is significant to observe who the commissioners of array were, how they carried out their task of seeing to the selection and recruitment of soldiers, what powers of further delegation they had, what sanctions were available to them, to what extent they were themselves supervised, and how the permanent local officials, especially the sheriffs, cooperated with them.

In so far as it may be possible to describe in detail what were the stages that brought a man from his manor to the muster, some flesh may be added to the bones of administrative procedures. On whose orders were the able-bodied villagers from whom the army was to be drawn assembled? Who actually made the selection? What happened to the conscripts when the selection had been made? Who made sure they kept together, and reached the place of the general muster, and by the date set in the original orders to the commissioners? Was the government able to keep track of them? What sort of things went wrong? How and, in particular, how quickly did the administration react to manage the consequences?

The size and make-up of Edwardian armies, the numbers of heavy cavalry, men-at-arms (a sometimes ambiguous category), hobelars, crossbow-men, mounted archers, foot archers, spearmen and others, are difficult to determine with precision. This is so particularly when feudal elements served without pay. The instructions to commissioners of array, however, do give the specific numbers of communal troops sought, as do those to town officials. Comparison of the total and the separate quotas of these recruiting orders can indicate which was set first, and therefore at what level of authority. Also the shire quotas may show whether there was any consistent policy to determine which areas should, or could, supply greater or smaller numbers. Where pay figures are available for identifiable levies, comparison of actual with originally specified numbers will reflect the efficiency of the system. If a fairly consistent figure for the proportion of 'wastage' appears, it might be possible to infer that this could be something planners would take into account in setting the original quotas. It would still, however, leave the intriguing question of why a particular size of army or expeditionary force was considered practical, or indeed appropriate, for a particular campaign. O. Coleman says firmly 'It is nonsense to pretend that any part of the

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48 'when in 1324 the sheriffs were asked to send in lists of knights and men-at-arms in their counties, they did not all use the same criteria to define the latter.' Prestwich, Armies and Warfare, p. 17.
49 A. E. Prince, 'The Strength of English Armies', gives assessments in some detail for the period 1334-1369.
50 In this thesis no attempt is made to answer that question.
country's business, from that of the national exchequer to that of the manorial reeve, could have been conducted by people with no sense of numbers.\textsuperscript{51} Evidence that, in the development of the administration of recruiting and provisioning armies, use was being made of statistical records could reinforce that judgement.

This thesis studies the management of the mobilization of armies for planned offensive war, not the administration of defensive aspects of military activity. However, the latter can have some bearing on the former. Garrisoning of castles in the north, and subsequently in France, involved relatively permanent, predictable and continuous arrangements. These could reflect the degree of sophistication of administrative procedures.\textsuperscript{52} Defence of coasts and ports, should there be an invasion, required a different structure, since what was needed was an organisation to respond to less predictable circumstances. Magnates were appointed as keepers of the maritime lands, with which specific inland counties were associated. The keepers had defined responsibilities. They had to see to the maintenance of warning signal fires. They made suitable appointments of arrayers, to ensure that all fencible men were properly armed according to the Statute of Westminster. The arrayers had to lead the men in the event of attack. The keepers directed the military action. Coastal defence, being essentially reactive in its nature, therefore did not necessitate such complicated logistical prior planning to effect it, and so throws less light on how issues of planning and provisioning were handled. Nevertheless, the ways the government reacted to the deficiencies of its plans for defence, revealed by some bitter experience, could be relevant to an assessment of its ability to adapt its management of military arrangements.\textsuperscript{53}

As A. E. Prince points out, transport of troops and supplies was the primary function of the naval effort.\textsuperscript{54} The right of the crown to arrest shipping for the purposes

\textsuperscript{51} 'What figures? Some Thoughts on the Use of Information by Medieval Governments', in D. C. Coleman and A. H. John (eds.), \textit{Trade Government and Economy in Pre-industrial England} (London, 1976), p. 105. She points out that '...in 1334 the Exchequer proved perfectly capable of using its own records, and issued the rolls of 1332 to the new assessors to guide them in striking their bargains with the localities.' Ibid., p. 102.

\textsuperscript{52} The use of contracts to organise garrisons could relate interestingly to their more general use as time passed.


of war, not merely for the defence of the realm of England, does not seem to have met with much, if any, theoretical opposition based on arguments about customary limits on obligation; in this it contrasts with the insistence on the limited unpaid service obligation of county levies. Obligation may not have been denied, but might be evaded; how evasion was met by the crown's officers and agents has a bearing on judgements of the effectiveness of their management.

The general administration of the naval effort involved the central authority and the agents it sent out, as well as the sheriffs, the local port officials, and the admirals. It should thus describe something of the operating relationships between these various powers. Though there were some king's ships, they were very few in number. The fleets required for war had to be assembled from impressed merchantmen; J. S. Kepler's article 'The Effects of the Battle of Sluys upon the Administration of English Naval Impressment 1340-1343' describes what was involved. Impressed ships had to be adapted not only to be able to defend themselves, but also, when the war was to be fought on the continent, especially to carry the large number of horses the army needed. The division of responsibility for these tasks, and making sure they were carried out, was a critical part of the managerial requirement for waging these wars.

Although the principle of impressment of ships was not challenged, this did not mean that in practice it would always proceed without difficulty. The withdrawal of ships from commercial activity would naturally have an adverse effect on trade, and so there would be evasion of arrest, by the obvious means of putting to sea. Requisitioned ships could be out of action for lengthy periods, giving rise to complaints, and requests for permission to sail, on a promise to return by a given date. The extent of such passive resistance, and the government's response, both to try to prevent and in action to punish it, could provide another comment on the management of naval mobilization.

Material relevant to the particular issue of quantitative planning may emerge from looking at the assembling of fleets. Where there is evidence of negotiation, between the ports and the officials sent by the crown to obtain ships, over how many an individual port should supply, a number of issues might be suggested. Was the government trying to assemble a specific number of ships? If so, can this be shown to be related to a calculation of how many were needed to transport the assembling army?

56 *Speculum*, XXXVIII (1973), pp. 70-77.
57 K. B. McFarlane plays this down in 'England and the Hundred Years War', p. 5.
Or was the king sometimes merely collecting as many as he could? When, as certainly did happen, defined numbers were sought from individual ports, how was each number arrived at? Answers to such questions will add to knowledge of the amount, and the sophistication, of planning. There may even be evidence as to by whom and where it was done. What M. Prestwich suggests was 'a Scheme in 1341' for an expedition to be led by the king, which was probably drawn up for discussion by the council, gives a number of significant clues: it has quantified details of retinues, ships, sailors and calculations of costs.

An important factor in planning for foreign expeditions was the coordination of assembly of troops and availability of suitable transport. Imprecision in arranging this would not only waste time and money, but would also run very real risks of collapse of such discipline as there was, and of desertions by masters with their ships, by sailors, and by soldiers. If there was a substantial delay between the coming together of the various contingents at the final muster and the availability of sufficient shipping, one major problem would be that of feeding the army while it waited to embark. This could put a considerable strain not only on administration, but also on the local population. Just as the process of assembling an army at the final muster was a protracted one, so the bringing together of each of the fleets would take several weeks. To integrate the two must have necessitated allowing a considerable margin of error: whether as time passed this was reduced might show the administration learning how to improve its management of this aspect of mobilization for foreign expeditions.

Adequate supplies of food had to be organised for the army as it assembled at the muster. One basic mechanism was extension of the royal right of prise, for the maintenance of the king's household, into purveyance, the compulsory purchase of victuals for the king's armies. What had been purveyed had then to be moved to the place where the army was assembling. There it had to be stored, and in due course issued to the troops. Obviously the whole process provided ample opportunities for corruption and profiteering by those making the compulsory purchases. The burden fell disproportionately heavily on the peasants, as Maddicott points out, both because the richer and more powerful were better able to avoid demands, and because the poorer had fewer surplus resources. Moreover, although payment was intended by the crown, in fact it often did not take place. Given the inevitable degree of uncertainty as to how big the force to be fed would be, only very approximate figures of what was needed to

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59 'The English Peasantry', passim.
be purveyed could be set. Prestwich\(^{60}\) records that definite standards of diet were used by the king's wardrobe to work out requirements for garrisons.\(^{61}\) While the size of garrisons could obviously be known with much more precision than how many men would appear at the muster, this practice might have formed some sort of basis for central calculation of what should be purveyed. If records of orders to purveyors supported this belief, it would further buttress Coleman's assertion of the ability of medieval administrators to plan quantitatively. As with allocation of quotas of levies, consistency or variation in the quantities of provisions to be obtained in different counties might suggest something of their use of records.

H. J. Hewitt summarised the basic process of securing initial supplies for a large expedition.\(^{62}\) A rough estimate of total needs was made and subdivided by counties. The sheriffs had to secure their county's quota and deliver it to the king's receiver of victuals at the place of muster, or, for expeditions overseas, at the designated port. This identifies two key officials, the sheriff and the receiver of victuals, but of course purveyance required a more elaborate administration, which also had to be managed. The sheriffs and their staffs were not left to make the purveyances on their own. Members and agents of the central administration, such as king's clerks from the chancery or exchequer, sometimes others from the household such as sergeants-at-arms, were also used in these tasks. The work included arranging intermediate storage and transport as well as final delivery to the receiver of victuals. Purveyance could be used to provide victualling for the ships assembled to make the war-time fleets, whose admirals were also given powers to organise supplies. The relationship between the local permanent officials and the royal clerks or others appointed \textit{ad hoc} when purveyance for the war was needed, and perhaps the change in the balance of responsibilities over time, could reflect change in the importance of the sheriffs' previous central role in general administration. From the 1340's, as Maddicott describes,\(^{63}\) authority to purvey began to be given also to merchants. They were given power to appoint deputies, arrest those who resisted them, and hand over those arrested to the sheriffs to be imprisoned. There is something of a parallel here with the


\(^{61}\) Ibid., p. 536, referring to a specific instance in 1300.

\(^{62}\) \textit{Organisation of War}, pp. 53-54.

\(^{63}\) \textit{The English Peasantry}, p. 54. The reason for the change is there suggested to be that merchants were more likely to know where supplies could most easily be obtained.
'privatisation' of recruiting: the detailed management was being done by men who were not permanent shire officials, though the social classes involved differed somewhat from those recruiting armed retinues.

The receivers of the king's victuals were the key appointments for the reception, unloading, storage and dispersal of purveyed supplies. It would be interesting to be able to see whether their role extended from the purely administrative management of what was delivered to them to one of initiating, or at least advising on, planning decisions on quantities required. What action would, or could, a receiver take if the supplies delivered to him were proving inadequate for the army he was servicing? An answer might reveal something of the degree of delegation of independent action allowed to administrative officials. Provisioning was, however, not a matter merely of issuing rations. Food could be issued in lieu of pay; payment of wages to troops was so that they could buy food from the keeper of the king's victuals, just as they had to buy it from the merchants who were encouraged by proclamation to bring supplies to the place where the army was mustered. The importance of the supplies brought by these merchants makes it clear that the government did not attempt to manage the victualling of armies through its own administrative resources alone.

The detail of the processes of how English armies were recruited, assembled, provided with transport and provisioned so that they were available to set off to war, how the great administrative effort necessary actually worked in practice, how its management perhaps changed in response to the experiences of a century of war, and in particular how effective and controlled that management was, are the issues that will be examined in this thesis. Studies of mobilizations for a group of wars fought under the three Edwards will be used as material. The series includes both wars about which much has been written, and others that have received less attention. They are at intervals of approximately a dozen years - 1282, 1301, 1314, 1322, 1324, 1336, 1346, and 1359. The armies raised were for Welsh, Scottish and French campaigns, so that it will be possible to see the government dealing with mobilization for different theatres

Food and drink would not, of course, be the only things handled by the receiver of victuals. Even medieval armies had a need for a wide variety of supplies over and above the personal equipment which men, from the armoured earl to the ordinary foot-soldier, brought with them to the muster. H. J. Hewitt gives a summary account of the range, from cooking utensils to siege engines, and above all bows and arrows. (Organisation of War, pp. 64-74). It appears to have been the sheriffs, responding to specific orders, who usually obtained and delivered these.
of war. The method adopted in making these 'case studies' has been to take them in chronological order, and examine the administrative aspects of each. At least in theory, there should be a benefit from approaching the study of management of mobilization via such a series. It could make it rather more likely that, if there are pronounced differences or trends, they will reveal themselves: just as importantly, if there are not, there should be less risk of reading trends into the empirical data. A chronological approach has also been used within each case, as far as clarity of exposition permits. The aim of this is to recognise the interrelationship of the different elements of the process. Whether coordination between them was actually achieved would be evidence as to the effectiveness of management: it must almost certainly have been the case that plans for the various administrative actions were developed in relation to each other.

Those plans for the mobilization of armies can be studied from primary sources. The fundamental material is that which records the government's orders to its various agents and officials. These are contained in the chancery rolls, some published in the form of calendars, and some in manuscript. Dated and quantified orders for the general array and selection of county levies, with the names of the commissioners of array, are an obvious starting point for examination of the administration's planning, and of its ability to achieve its objectives. Because the corresponding arrangements for muster of cavalry, whether in the form of traditional feudal summonses or in more flexible terms, rarely specify the force required or expected from the individual magnates to whom they are addressed, they cannot be used for a straightforward quantitative comparison of intention with achievement. Nevertheless, as with the commissions of array, their dates of issue and the muster dates they promulgate are relevant to the government's planning in terms of timing. Chancery writs provide material on the orders to individuals specifying their special tasks, often in relation to purveyance or the assembly of shipping. The background of many of these individuals helps to identify the administration's resources of personnel. Some writs are of particular interest in that they concern corrective action for failure to obey instructions. Chancery material specifically related to Wales, in the form of the Welsh roll, is a valuable source for the Second Welsh War. The Scotch, and particularly the manuscript Gascon and Treaty

65 References to them in the Patent and Close Rolls note other tasks they undertook. Social standing can in relevant cases be established from biographical compilations, e.g. C. Moor, *Knights of Edward I* (5 vols., Harleian Society, 1929-1932).
66 *CVChR*, pp. 157-382.
rolls contain many instructions and arrangements for men, supplies and ships for the wars with Scotland and France. They reveal the great detail involved in ordering the mobilization of armies and fleets.

Something of what was actually achieved by these orders, and therefore how effectively the mobilizations were managed, is visible from financial accounts. When the king himself was with the army the office of the wardrobe accompanied him. This 'department' of the royal household functioned, as Harriss describes, as a mobile treasury, the war-chest on campaign, and the paymaster of the army. Its records of week-by-week payments to the various elements of the armies provide numbers that can often, in the case of county levies, be directly compared with originally ordered quotas. Fluctuations in the numbers can give an impression, at least, of the scale of desertions. The dates when pay began show whether dates for arriving at the muster were met or missed. Payments to leaders of retinues make possible assessment of the numbers of men-at-arms. These accounts are therefore a valuable check on such matters, as well as covering other details of the process.

In respect of supplies, the accounts of the receivers of victuals contain valuable information. Sheriffs' administrative accounts provide many more details, particularly of their activity in obtaining and delivering victuals, equipment for ships, bows and arrows, and other necessities for the armies and fleets. Chronicles can sometimes put flesh on the bones of such administrative records. In particular the chroniclers make illuminating comments on the adequacy of provisioning arrangements for the armies. As, however, the government did not rely solely on purveyance for the provisioning of the armies, the quantified instructions to sheriffs, clerks or king's merchants to buy victuals, and the surviving records of what was actually obtained, are therefore not the whole story. They can only permit a limited assessment of the effectiveness of the management of this aspect of mobilization.

68 C61.
69 C76.
70 King, Parliament and Public Finance, p. 201; Ch. IX, Ch. X.
71 E101/393/11, BL Stowe Ms. 553, BL Add. Ms. 7967.
72 e.g. E101/20/4, E101/8/14, E101/25/16.
73 E101/550-598.
Collections of documents supplement these various records of orders to officials and their actions. P. Chaplais's, for the War of Saint-Sardos,\textsuperscript{75} has correspondence from Nicholas Hugate complaining of the quality of provisions received at Bordeaux. The Black Prince's Register\textsuperscript{76} has useful material, some of it dealing with detailed matters of managerial control. The major compilations by Rymer, Palgrave and Bain\textsuperscript{77} are other valuable sources.

There is therefore a substantial amount of primary evidence, in increasing quantity and detail for the later wars. This can be drawn upon to examine how these mobilizations were organised, how what happened in practice sometimes differed in detail from what had been planned, and in particular how, or in some cases even whether, government reacted to or tried to anticipate such incidents. It is of course most unlikely that all were recorded (or even noticed). Therefore caution will be necessary in an attempt to generalise from these studies about the degree of sophistication of the administration's control of the management of the process. Conversely, it must also be borne in mind that surviving records are inherently unlikely to draw attention to those arrangements, probably the majority, that proceeded as intended.

The central aim of this thesis is to describe how the management of the processes involved in mobilizing armies for the Edwardian wars was conducted. Chapters 2 - 8, on individual wars, are case studies of mobilizations under each of the three Edwards. The final chapters, 9 and 10, analyse the themes that emerge from the case studies, and draw conclusions as to the royal government's management of mobilization. How sophisticated in terms of quantification and use of records was the planning process? What was done, what failed to be done in spite of the government's instructions? What steps were taken to monitor progress? How did government react to administrative failures? How, and how effectively, was the management of the

\textsuperscript{75} The War of Saint-Sardos (1323-1325). Gascon Correspondence and Diplomatic Documents, ed. P. Chaplais (Camden Society, Third Series, LXXXVII, 1954).

\textsuperscript{76} Register of Edward, the Black Prince (4 vols., London, 1930-1933).

\textsuperscript{77} Foedera; Parl. Writs; Calendar of Documents Relating to Scotland, ed. J. Bain (4 vols., Edinburgh, 1881-1888).
mobilization of armies handled? Did changes happen dramatically, systematically, or erratically in *ad hoc* response to circumstances?

What emerges from these case studies should also have relevance to other aspects of the times, some closely associated with the prosecution of war and some of more general, if distant, interest. Did the emergence of the paid army, raised largely by indentured contracts, happen by policy, or by accidental evolution? How great was the power of the state to secure the resources it needed? How great a control did the centre have over its local agents? How, and why, did the allocation of responsibility between permanent officials, such as the sheriffs, and men of local importance change? What is the relationship, if any, between the changing techniques of management of mobilization, and the demands of the 'military revolution'? What relationship might there be between the management of mobilization, and the wider subject of the reach of medieval government in other spheres?
CHAPTER 2

THE SECOND WELSH WAR, 1282-1283

The Second Welsh War, unlike the first, was instigated by an unexpected Welsh attack. Previously Edward I had had time to prepare and mobilize, since the war of 1277 was, in military terms at least, an English initiative:¹ in 1282 he had to react, and quickly. Though this presented the administration with slightly different problems in managing the mobilization of the necessary resources, the outcome was even more successful. M. Prestwich suggests that concern about supplies was one reason for Edward's decision to allow Llewelyn a negotiated settlement in 1277;² with victory in 1283 and the deaths of Llewelyn and David ap Gruffydd, the semi-independence of the Principality came to an end.

The first war had shown that the resources of England,³ properly mobilized and determinedly applied, would not be defeated. Sir Maurice Powicke, contrasting Edward's success in 1277 with Henry III's failure, wrote, 'In substance the arrangements were the same - the dispatch of paid forces under household knights, the marshalling of local shire levies by the sheriffs, the impressment of woodsmen, carpenters and diggers, the concentration of supplies from quarters far and near,...the gathering of ships from the Cinque Ports and other ports, all these and other measures are familiar.'⁴ In general terms that observation applies also to the war of 1282-1283. This chapter describes the administrative activity that made those arrangements, and some developments in its structure.

Appointment of the high military command came first. Within days of David ap Gruffydd's attack on Hawarden on 21 March 1282, writs of 25 March appointed three captains, following the pattern of 1277. Roger Mortimer, as before, commanded the

³ including the ability to call on 'Welsh friendlies' and Gascon mercenaries. Morris, Welsh Wars, p. 149.
forces in the marches of Wales. Reginald de Grey, justiciar of Chester, had responsibility for Chester and Flint, and Robert Tibetot, a companion of Edward's on the crusade of 1270 and justiciar of West Wales since 1280, was to command there. Bogo de Knovill, a household knight and much used agent of the king, carried the king's instructions to them. Mortimer and Grey were to be supported 'with horses and arms' by named individuals and by counties adjacent to their commands, whose 'knights, sheriffs and whole community' were ordered to assist them. Tibetot was to be supported by the earls of Gloucester and Hereford and 'the knights and all others' of West Wales.

Royal messengers were sent out in numbers during the first weeks of April. The rapidly issued orders of 25 March were quickly followed by the summoning of a council to meet at Devizes on 5 April, and a call for more troops. The preparations for the war of 1277 had begun with writs dated 12 December 1276 summoning the feudal host to muster six months later, on 1 July. This time, presumably reflecting the different and urgent circumstances, on 6 April an 'affectionate request' went to six earls and one hundred and fifty-one others to muster at Worcester in six weeks time, on 17 May. They would serve ad vadia nostra, a phrase unprecedented in writs of military summons.

On 20 and 24 May, however, the traditional summons were issued for the servicium debitum of the tenants-in-chief, to muster at Rhuddlan by 2 August. Morris argues that it was political pressure from the earls of Gloucester and Hereford that led the king now to call out the feudal host, just as earlier he had had to acknowledge Hereford's rights as constable and to subordinate Robert Tibetot to Gloucester. He points out that it was previous, and later, practice to give some six months' notice of muster when a formal feudal summons was issued: in this instance Edward was only

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5 Mortimer by Shropshire, Worcestershire, Staffordshire, Herefordshire and Gloucestershire: Grey by Chester, Lancaster, West Derby and parts of the Peak and of Flint. CVChR, p. 212.
6 Ibid.
7 E101/308/5.
9 Morris, Welsh Wars, p. 155.
11 Welsh Wars, p. 158. He argues that the baronage was now insisting on its rights, in reaction to the king's quo warranto examination of their franchises.
giving some two and a half months. This implies that if mobilization of the *servicium debitum* had always been his intention it would have been called for much earlier, in March or April. Morris also dismisses the possibilities that the war was 'more serious than he first thought', and that the response to the 6 April call had proved inadequate and therefore had to be supplemented by the summons of 20 May. In fact there was a steady assembly of fighting men, including those from the household and from the response to the 6 April request for paid service, during the first two or three months of the war. Morris estimates that by June-July 'in the whole of Wales 800 [cavalry] must have been serving,' and calculates the number of foot on 15 June as 7,000, all from English counties. The latter would presumably have been conscripted in obedience to the writs of 25 March, ordering the sheriffs, knights and communities of various counties to provide support for the three captains. The foot would therefore have been collected by the sheriffs themselves, as in 1277.

Detailed arrangements for obtaining supplies for the forthcoming armies had been quickly put in hand. On 10 April William de St Clair and William de Hamilton, keepers of the Bishopric of Winchester, were instructed to provide various victuals to Chester by 8 July. Protection for the shippers, Thomas Purchaz [to whom 400 quarters of wheat and 200 of oats were delivered], John de Soldon of Ore [200 of barley and 400 of oats], and Roger Balner of Southampton [60 of wheat and other goods], was not recorded until 15 June, which may be an indication of how long collection of supplies could take - a good two months to deliver them to shippers and some three weeks to sail from the south coast to Chester.

On 14 April appointments were made to obtain provisions from many other areas. Nicholas de Carevill, one of the king's sergeants, was sent to Ireland with orders for the bishop of Waterford, justiciar of Ireland, to supply to Chester as quickly as possible specified quantities of wheat (2,000 quarters), oats (2,000), peas and beans (400), barley (500), wine (600 tuns), 1,000 salted salmon, cheese and meat. A 'faithful and discreet' local was to be selected to assist de Carevill. Elias Tolosan, a king's

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12 Ibid., p. 157.
14 *CVChR*, p. 212.
15 *CCR 1279-1288*, p. 150.
16 *CVChR*, p. 226. In this the date for delivery is 'before St. Peter ad Vincula' (1 August), implying perhaps that it was being accepted that setting the earlier date had been impractical.
17 Ibid., p. 214.
clerk, was sent to Ponthieu, whose seneschal, Thomas de Sandwich, was to cause to be bought 2,000 quarters of wheat and of oats, 300 of peas and beans and if possible meat and cheese. The supplies were to be ready at Crotay by 9 June. What had been bought and where it was stored was to be notified to the warden of the Cinque Ports, Stephen de Penecestre, for him to arrange shipment.18 In England, the sheriffs of five south-east counties from Essex to Hampshire were each ordered to assist another of the king's clerks, John de Maidenstone,19 including providing a reliable man from their staff to work with him. He was to obtain 1,500 quarters of wheat, 2,000 of oats, and peas, cheese and other victuals. Maidenstone was to receive money for the operation from Matthew de Columbariis, the king's butler.20 This set of orders indicates not only coordinated but also rapid planning: it was only three weeks since the unexpected attack on Hawarden.

These arrangements also show the administration using central government and household staff, both lay and clerical, to work with, and, significantly, supervise and urge, existing local officials. The tasks were centrally and specifically quantified for each area.

Government collection of supplies was accompanied by simultaneous measures to direct merchants to bring their goods to places where the armies could buy them. On 15 April the sheriff of Shropshire was ordered to proclaim throughout his shire that markets for corn and victuals should only be held at Whitchurch or where Roger Mortimer was. The sheriffs of Gloucestershire, Herefordshire, Staffordshire, Lancashire and Derbyshire and the justiciar of Chester made similar proclamations in respect of the force at Chester, and the sheriffs of Somersetshire, Devon and Cornwall for Gilbert de Clare and the army in West and South Wales. The sheriffs of Cumberland and Lancashire were also to send men to the Scottish march to obtain quantities of salt fish, which were to be taken to Chester.21

On 17 April the seneschal of Gascony and the constable of Bordeaux were instructed to assist a team of purveyors sent to Gascony. Poncius Amati, another king's clerk, with Bernard Francoun and Elias le Carpenter, had oral orders from the king to

18 Ibid.
20 CVChR, p. 217.
21 Ibid., pp. 248-9, dated 15 April. The prohibition of other markets did not apply to the South-West.
secure wheat (2,000 quarters), peas and beans (300 quarters), oats (1,000 quarters),
wine (500 tuns), honey (20 tuns), 1,000 bacon pigs and other victuals. The constable
was told to have the supplies bought and delivered to the three purveyors, but if he did
not, they were to make the purchases themselves. Money was to be provided to them by
Matthew de Columbariis. A force of 12 mounted and 40 foot crossbowmen was to be
provided by the seneschal to come to England with the supplies. 22 Here too the
purveyors were given defined quantities to obtain, though it is not possible to know
whether they were related to an assessment of how much would be needed from all
sources, or to an estimate of availability in the various areas. Either way the practice is,
again, witness to quantified central planning.

The different dates for delivery - 8 July, 'with all speed', 9 June at Crotay - make
it clear that what was being set up was not a supply dump to be ready for an army to be
mobilized on the Welsh border by 17 May in response to the 'affectionate request' of 6
April. These supplies must have been intended as provisions for the on-going campaign
in Wales, where very limited local supplies, if any, could be found. 23 If, as Morris
suggested, supply had been a problem in 1277, the management of the mobilization of
sources of supply in 1282 shows that the lesson had been learned.

As Morris records, not insubstantial armed forces were already in the field,
together with household units, in response to the first summons to serve at pay, within
two or three months of the revolt. 24 These might reasonably be seen as an immediate
military response to the Welsh rising: a full-scale counter-offensive would require the
mobilization of non-military support cadres as well. This too had been quickly ordered
alongside the other measures. On 15 April nineteen sheriffs covering twenty-eight
counties, from Northumberland to Wiltshire, were told to send a total of 1,010 diggers
and 345 carpenters to Chester by 1 June. Each sheriff was to appoint one of his men to
conduct them there. 25 The summoning of these workmen must have been part of
deliberate and comprehensive planning based on the April arrangements for a May

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22 Ibid., pp. 216-7.

23 Continuity of supply also involved merchants from Gascony: on 8 March 1283
Peter Johannis de la Roquay, 'citizen and merchant of Bayonne' received a licence to
bring various victuals from abroad to the king's army of Wales (CPR 1281-1292, p. 59).
In April 1283 John de Bardus, another merchant of Bayonne, was granted protection for
three years 'because he first touched with his cargo of wines at Aberconewey in
Snaudon, while the king was there.' Ibid., p. 64.


muster, and so provides additional evidence that a formal feudal muster for 2 August was not a part of the original intention. As Morris describes, the offensive was already beginning in June/July.26

Widespread orders for securing provisions continued to be issued. On 2 June William Bagot27 was appointed to secure corn for the king's armies in Wales from Gloucestershire, Worcestershire, Shropshire and Staffordshire; presumably proximity to Wales made their supplies available quickly. The corn was to be taken to Shrewsbury, Montgomery and Oswestry, 'for the munition of the said armies coming thither'. Sheriffs and officials of those counties were to 'be intendent...to William or to his certain order, when he cannot be present in person'.28 (The phrase 'his certain order' might be seen as designed to inhibit corrupt requisitioning of grain.) On 12 June all bailiffs were told to assist the king's pantler, Robert la Wane, and the king's other sergeants sent to 'divers places and counties of the realm to buy victuals and carry them' to the army.29

From 17 May begins a long series of safe conducts for those taking corn and other supplies to the army. Three of the four May entries involved shipping; two were for supplies coming from Ireland and Bridgewater, and one for deliveries from the Channel Islands ordered by Otto Grandison.30 The greatest number of these protections - 39 - were in June: one was for John de Orbek, 'merchant of Rouen'.31 There were 15 in July, 11 in August, one of which was for merchants of Lucca, and another 11 in September, 8 in October, 6 in November, and, not surprisingly, only one in December. If the gap between the recording of the safe-conducts and the arrival of the goods might be guessed to be some three or four weeks,32 the protections suggest that the bulk of supplies would be available to the armies by, say, mid- to end July, by which time the campaign was under way.

The safe-conducts were paralleled by a shorter, but still lengthy, series of protections against having corn, other victuals, horses and carts requisitioned. These

26 Welsh Wars, p. 160 etc.
27 This is probably the knight Sir William Bagot. CCR 1279-1288, p. 134.
28 CVChR, p. 224.
29 Ibid., p. 225.
30 Ibid., pp. 221-2.
31 Ibid., p. 226.
32 as is suggested by that protection for Roger Balner, issued on 15 June in respect of a delivery required originally by 8 July, referred to above.
protections were often for ecclesiastics. The first was recorded with a date of 24 May, which is probably evidence that requisitioning was already taking place within two or three weeks of its being ordered; Maidenstone's appointment was dated 14 April. Later in the year, on 8 November, William Bagot was appointed again, to act with the sheriffs of Shropshire, Staffordshire, Nottinghamshire and Derbyshire to buy corn and arrange its transport to Chester. An additional part of his task was to prevent profiteering, by requisitioning corn from merchants who had bought up supplies from others so as to 'thus sell their own corn afterwards more dearly'. In eight other counties no external appointment was made: the sheriff 'with one of the more lawful knights of the county to be chosen by the sheriff for this purpose' was to see to this himself. In another order of the same date, sheriffs of approximately the same list of counties were told to arrest anyone interfering with itinerant vendors (tranterii) and others bringing victuals and other necessities to the king and his army in Wales. Additionally, they were to ensure that there was a regular arrival at Chester or Rhuddlan of such vendors and transporting carts. The importance of the availability of carts for victualling the army is shown by the sending of Matthew Checker to obtain carts from abbeys and priories, by the forceful and threatening order of 16 December to various abbots and priors, and the justiciar of Chester, to send all their cars and carts (carris et caretis) to Chester, and also by the number of explicit protections needed against such requisitioning.

As the war continued, therefore, maintaining a flow of supplies to the armies involved a wider casting of the net, and use of many reliable agents - royal clerks, sergeants, household officials, sheriffs, and finally knights. Provisioning was a feature

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33 e.g. CVChR, pp. 235 (abbot of Bruern), 236 (abbot of Woburn, canon of St Chad's), 241 (prior of Norton), 242 (prior of Dunstable) etc.
34 Ibid., p. 221.
35 Above, p. 28 n.14.
36 Again, counties more or less nearer to Wales - Worcestershire, Herefordshire, Gloucestershire, Oxfordshire, Northamptonshire, Lancashire, Warwickshire and Leicestershire. CVChR, p. 245.
37 Ibid.
38 Ibid., pp. 257-8.
39 E101/351/9, m. 1.
40 CVChR, p. 277.
41 Above, p. 30 n. 23.
of the war of 1282-1283 to which sustained management attention was successfully directed.

The picture of administrative flexibility is visible in the use of the king's clerks in carrying out many different tasks. For example, William de Perton was used in a wide variety of roles during the war. As early as April he was ordered to purvey two horses for Giles de Fenes and John de Weston, and in May to pay Robert de Tatteshale, and receive others to the king's wages. He received money at Chester with which to pay soldiers' wages. In an order issued in September he was associated with Thomas de Gunneys, controller of the king's wardrobe, in making £500 available to Roger Mortimer. Typically, later he had several different tasks. In December it was Perton who, with others of the king's household, was to say what was to be done with the abbots' carts. He was ordered to send the king the 12,000 quarrels in his keeping, and, with another king's clerk, Richard de Abingdon, to send corn, flour, salt, iron and nails to Anglesey, as in a letter sent to Geoffrey Meriun. He sent tents, timber and carpenters from Chester to Rhuddlan as instructed by John de Dorset. He sent nails and two smiths with iron and their tools to Bangor. He saw to the loading of ships at Chester with timber for Rhuddlan, as instructed by Kok Breton. He was told to pay wages to carpenters brought by Richard de Grey, provide William the king's attiliator with money for cross-bowmen's equipment, provide sawyers with their saws to Master Richard the Engineer, and so on.

Richard de Abingdon worked with another of the king's clerks as well as with Perton: an undated fragment orders him, with John de Maidenstone (the latter being in charge of the supply centre at Chester), to redirect some victuals to Rhuddlan. Maidenstone himself was used for a variety of work during the war. Besides his April task of collecting supplies, in August he was to pay wages to William le Butiller's force of footmen (but not to John de Grey's). In December he had instructions, with Perton

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43 E101/351/9, m. 1.
45 Ibid., passim.
46 Prestwich, War, Politics and Finance, p. 120.
and Abingdon, to see to the loading of timber at Chester,\(^{49}\) and in 1283 other arrangements to make for moving and delivery of different items.\(^{50}\)

Thus the range of actions, great and small, financial and administrative, assigned to these royal clerks illustrates their flexibility and absence of narrow specialisation, as well as underlining their importance to the coordination of activity. The day-to-day management of the complex administration of the war depended importantly on them.

As in 1277, control of Anglesey and its harvest was an important aspect of Edward's strategy. For this the ships due by the Cinque Ports were the main resource. On 10 April the barons and bailiffs were ordered to be with the king at Danewell with their service by the feast of St John the Baptist, 24 June.\(^{51}\)

On 15 April the barons of the Cinque Ports were ordered to send 'eight or six...of the com-barons' of each port to meet before the warden at Romney on 12 May, to hear from two of their number, William Marlepas and Laurence de Windsor, what they had been told by the king as to the service required of them, and to prepare to perform it. Some ships were to serve in Wales, and others were to remain for the custody of the coast.\(^{52}\) Morris records 28 ships beginning their service from Rhuddlan on 10 July, joined a few days later by twelve more ships and two great galleys. The galleys were from Romney and Winchelsea.\(^{53}\)

On 28 May the warden was told to have the barons of the Ports choose 'ten or twelve' carpenters skilled at making barges and punts to be at Chester by 23 June or earlier if possible.\(^{54}\) The warden was also to provide two large barges and their crews to

\(^{49}\) Ibid., p. 262.
\(^{50}\) Particulars of his account show he bought wheat from seven suppliers, in lots ranging from 60 to 100 quarters, and oats in lots from 23 to 400 quarters. He paid wages for men carting, guarding and grinding the wheat, and even for keeping it safe during a storm at sea. E101/4/5b.
\(^{51}\) CVChR, p. 247.
\(^{52}\) Ibid., p. 249. On 13 April Gregory de Rokesley, keeper of the exchange in London, was instructed to have made and deliver to the barons of the Cinque Ports 4,000 quarrels, 1,000 immediately to those about to set out to the king's army at Chester. Foedera, Vol. I, div. ii, p. 604.
\(^{53}\) Welsh Wars, p. 173.
\(^{54}\) CVChR, p. 251. Their wages from the time they set out were to be paid by 'the aforesaid John', presumably John de Maidenstone, who had been ordered to the south-east to collect supplies. The warden was told that Maidenstone would communicate the king's wishes to him.
come to Wales with the service from the Cinque Ports. Another order with the same date tells Maidenstone to 'provide...according to the ordinance and discretion of Stephen de Penecesture' 200 strong and agile men, well armed, from the the Cinque Ports in addition to the Ports' service, and pay their wages as far as Danewell. It seems certain the barges, carpenters and these men were to enable a bridge across to Anglesey to be made; on 18 August 'all the king's barons and subjects of the Cinque Ports in his garrison at Anglesey' were told to assist Luke de Tany to make a bridge there.

Another reference to ships wanted at Chester is in a letter to the king, attributed to June-July 1282 by Edwards. It pointed out that although the sender and Renaud Alard of Winchelsea (a baron of the Cinque Ports) had been ordered 'to bring 40 barges (escutes) to Chester' this was impracticable. The boats would be too heavy to be transported by sea. The letter suggested that if such boats were needed the bailiffs of the Cinque Ports should be told to send carpenters to Chester to make them there. This suggestion might be related to the 'ten or twelve' carpenters mentioned above. Though the order for them was dated 28 May, possibly the 'anonymous' letter was earlier than Edwards' June/July date. If that were so, these skilled 'ships' carpenters' may have been intended to oversee the work of some of the 345 carpenters summoned to be at Chester by June. The 40 barges under discussion may have been part of the plans for the bridge.

The series of orders issued in April within a period of two weeks had covered the needs of an aggressive response to the Welsh revolt. In parallel with the mobilization of soldiers, the administration had dealt with securing continuity of supplies through a variety of agents, providing a naval force from the feudal service of the ships of the Cinque Ports, and conscripting carpenters and diggers, via the sheriffs, to support the army. The speed and comprehensiveness with which it had acted is impressive.

In June more support cadres were summoned. On 1 June the sheriff of Hereford was required to find 200 wood-fellers and charcoal burners, and Grimbald Pauncefoot, keeper of the Forest of Dean and one of the household knights, to find 100 more, for Gilbert de Clare. On 8 June the sheriff of Shropshire was to find men to clear two

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55 Ibid.
56 Ibid.
57 Ibid., p. 235.
59 Above, p. 30 n. 25.
60 CVChR, p. 251.
passes under the orders of William le Botiler of Wemme, captain of the garrison at Whitchurch.61 On 15 July a number of sheriffs and the keeper of the Forest of Dean were ordered to select several hundred wood-fellers in the presence of the clerk William de Percy, whom the king sent to oversee the choice.62 Those selected were to be led to Chester, and then to Rhuddlan, by one of each sheriff’s men. Nicholas de Bassingburn had the same role as de Percy with regard to men to be chosen by the sheriffs of Leicestershire and Warwickshire, and Nottinghamshire and Derbyshire. The total number of wood-fellers asked for was 1,000, the various sheriffs' individual quotas being either 100 or 200. The men were to be at Rhuddlan by 8 August.63

A few months later a writ of 11 December required a different procedure. A number of sheriffs, the keeper of the forest of Dean, and Reginald de Grey, justiciar of Chester, were to assemble wood-fellers at times and places determined by William de Percy. This time it appears he himself was to select the men, with the assistance of local bailiffs, and bring them to the king. Quotas were again 100 or 200, making 800 in total.64 Possibly the increasing degree of responsibility of William de Percy reflected dissatisfaction with the response of the local officials. It also again underlines the general reliance on royal clerks for the administrative actions to support the army.

Subsequently appointments of magnates were made to select reinforcements of soldiers. On 30 July the bailiffs and other officials of Lancashire were ordered to help William le Butler de Warrington, a baron,65 choose 1,000 'men-at-arms' (sic).66 This appointment was followed on 19 August by a mandate to Maidenstone to arrange for their payment from 20 August to a few days - the precise date is missing in the text - after the feast of St Bartholomew (24 August), when they arrived at Chester.67

61 Ibid., p. 253.
62 William de Percy was well-connected, being the brother of Sir Henry de Percy. He was granted the Prebend of Thockrington, which was in the king’s gift, in 1265, and was witnessing as a canon of York in 1268. (C. T. Clay, York Minster Fasti, Yorkshire Archaeological Society Record Series, CXXIV Vol. II, [1959], pp. 74-5.) In 1286 a protection was issued for Inin, among many others 'going beyond seas with the king'. CPR 1281-1292, p. 240.
63 CVChR, p. 232.
64 Ibid., p. 277. Lancashire, Nottinghamshire, Derbyshire, Leicestershire and Warwickshire which had to find woodsmen in the first requisition were replaced by Chester and Wiltshire.
66 CVChR, p. 233.
may be an indication of the sort of time, some four weeks, needed for men to become available for action. On the other hand, later in 1282 a letter from the sheriff of Lancashire, Henry du Lee, gives a picture of a very much shorter time-scale, at least as apparently expected by the king. The sheriff, addressing himself to Robert Fitz John, the king's marshal, and - somewhat surprisingly - the clerk William de Perton, says he cannot assemble the 500 men required of him and bring them to Chester by Friday 16 October, as he only received the order on the preceding Wednesday, 'for the county is eighty leagues [sic] in length.68 That would have been so unreasonable an order that there must have been some other factors, the simplest of which might be a delay in delivery of the instruction to the sheriff. Possibly the reference to Perton indicates that he might have been arranging the troops' pay, as Maidenstone had been for those selected by William le Butler.

On 24 November the bailiffs of Archenfield, Herefordshire, were ordered to be at Hereford on 18 December to agree days and places for assemblies of 'men at arms', from whom Hugh de Turberville would choose 100, with a constable, and bring them to the king.69 The bailiffs of nine other lands in adjacent areas in the marches of Wales received the same order. A writ of aid for de Turberville, dated 6 December, gave the numbers he was to select, which totalled 1,400, but described them as footmen.70 Similarly William Wyther, another household knight, was sent to choose 300 footmen from Nottinghamshire and Derbyshire, Geoffrey de Langley 200 from Lancashire and Richard de Bois 1,000 from Staffordshire and Shropshire.71 Like Richard de Bois, Hugh de Turberville was a knight of the household and an important and much used servant of the king, both before and after the war.72 In these arrangements the permanent local officials carried out the administration at the behest of the knights of the household, but now the latter made the selections.

68 Ibid., p. 161.
69 CVChR, p. 276.
70 Ibid., p. 259. Round numbers, ranging from 100 to 300, were allocated to each of the nine.
71 Ibid.
This change is contemporary with the transfer of selection of wood-fellers from the sheriffs to the king's clerk William de Percy; possibly there was diminishing confidence in the willingness of local officials to be objective in selecting men for service. There were other indications of this. When on 12 November military dispositions of cavalry were being ordered to reinforce William de Valence in West Wales, instructions went not only to thirty-nine individuals but also to certain sheriffs to choose an additional 'ten of the strongest and bravest knights at arms'. (This implies that the sheriffs had previously been involved in selecting knights for the army, though in this writ they are only to 'admonish and induce,. [knights to serve]...by all means in their power'.)\textsuperscript{73} Significantly, the sheriff of Somerset and Dorset received a special warning to desist from accepting bribes from the 'strong and powerful for arms' not to choose them. Concern about the application of pressure or inducements of various sorts to persuade sheriffs not to be even-handed in selective processes is seen again in writs of 24 November. These, addressed to the sheriffs of five northern counties and to those of thirty-two others, required them to assemble all £20 land-holders, strong and able 'men in arms' not already with the expedition to Wales, at York and Northampton respectively. The names of those each sheriff was assembling were to be given to four knights of the county, to be reported at York and Northampton. Explicit warning was given not to give way to pressure to spare or defer 'through love, favour, reward or fear' anyone who was qualified.\textsuperscript{74}

On 21 March 1283 de Turberville was again commissioned, with Grimbold Pauncefoot, to raise some 2,500 foot from lands in the Welsh march.\textsuperscript{75} Another writ of the same date shows that he and Pauncefoot were given wide authority to appoint their own men to see that things were done. The officials and communities of Herefordshire, Gloucestershire and Worcestershire were ordered to do what they were told by them, 'or John Sapyn or another to be deputed by Hugh and Grimbold', to provide tree-fellers, diggers and others, and to provide corn and means of transport for it. The writ also says that the king's instructions have been given to 'Hugh and Grimbold by word of mouth', which would make it very difficult for any of their orders to be questioned.

As an additional means of ensuring obedience the sheriff had to report in person to the king that all required had been done, and this on the day before that on which

\textsuperscript{73} CVChR, p. 258.
\textsuperscript{74} Ibid., pp. 275-6.
\textsuperscript{75} CVChR, p. 280. The writ ordering this also told officials, bailiffs of various lords and others, to meet de Turberville and Pauncefoot to set places and times for assembling men from whom specified numbers were to be chosen.
completion was specified, an administratively effective technique.\textsuperscript{76} Also on 21 March the officials and whole community of Shropshire and Staffordshire and many others were ordered to assist Richard du Bois not only to select 2,500 foot, but also to make provision for corn, victuals, and their carriage to Montgomery.\textsuperscript{77} At the same time the sheriffs of several counties were told to proclaim that all with victuals for sale were to bring them to Montgomery to sell to the army. The sheriffs had, again, to report to the king that they had carried out the order; they had also to report the names of any men who had refused to do as asked.\textsuperscript{78} These requirements for reports show that it was recognised that effective management involves following up as well as issuing orders.

The task of overseeing and ensuring supply of both workmen and provisions was now being given not to clerks but to important knights. Perhaps by this late stage of a war that was almost over in military terms the king’s clerks were returning to their more routine tasks in the chancery and exchequer.

Mobilization for the Welsh war of 1282-3 was rapid and effective, and required the use of many different resources. Straightforward high military command had to be in the hands of the realm’s magnates, as was evident in the early appointments of Mortimer, de Grey and - after the short interval of Tibetot - Gloucester (the latter being soon replaced by William de Valence).\textsuperscript{79} The first build-up of cavalry forces was achieved by writs of summons to tenants-in-chief, directly to individual magnates, and via sheriffs to others. Sheriffs were also responsible for raising levies of foot, but were supplemented before the end of the year by special appointments of knights close to the king, such as Hugh de Turberville, Grimbald Pauncefoot, William de Butiller, Richard du Bois, William Wyther and Geoffrey de Langeley.

Though later some at least of these notables were given responsibility for raising supplies of victuals, the first appointments for this purpose involved several of the king’s clerks - notably Maidenstone, Tolosan, and Amati. (Amati’s associates in Gascony, le Carpenter and Francoun, are not described as clerks, whereas Amati himself is.) The task of provisioning was also given to the king’s sergeants, including de Carevill on his mission to Ireland, and the king’s pantler, la Warre. The existing local officials, sheriffs and bailiffs, were almost always required to give support, advice and assistance to such special appointees. The sheriffs themselves, notably in

\textsuperscript{76} Ibid., p. 281.
\textsuperscript{78} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{79} Ibid, p. 222.
association with a 'lawful knight of the county', had to gather supplies. Similarly, across
the Channel the seneschals of Ponthieu and Gascony, and the constable of Bordeaux,
had to cooperate with Tolosan, Amati and the others.

The sheriffs were the channel of general communication to their shires. They
arranged for the proclamations directing merchants to bring supplies to the armies; they
proclaimed the feudal summons of 20 May, the requirement of 26 May that £30
landholders should have ready a strong horse suitable for arms, and the countermanding
writ of 22 June permitting fining instead, in view of the shortage of great horses in the
realm. On 2 July sheriffs of various counties were to proclaim certain changed
destinations for the *servicium debitum* previously summoned to Rhuddlan.

The sheriffs also had a major role at first in providing conscripted bands of
workmen and labourers, but in this too at least one clerk, William de Percy, came to
play an important part, as did Nicholas de Bassingburn. Later de Percy, and in March
1283 the knights de Turberville and Pauncefoot, seem to have been given still more
authority in this respect.

The king's clerks carried out a wide variety of ad hoc tasks, especially Perton,
Maidenstone and Abingdon. They moved from the financial to the logistical with
apparent easy flexibility, responding on occasion to instructions brought to them by
John de Dorset, Kok Breton or Geoffrey de Meriliun, men whose names appear only
briefly. Other established officials of the household such as the king's butler, de
Columbariis, Rokesley, keeper of the exchange, and Thomas Gurney, controller of the
wardrobe, played their parts. As far as shipping was needed, the warden, Penecestre,
and the barons of the Cinque Ports formed an experienced and capable organisation.

The administrative structures described in the preceding paragraphs worked
satisfactorily. The six weeks allowed for the response to the summons of 6 April seem
to have been about right, as judged by the amount of cavalry available by June. Collection of supplies of victuals may have taken rather longer, but was well organised: the absence of complaints of shortage is evidence of its successful management.

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81 *CVChR*, pp. 252, 253. In May William de Beauchamp, earl of Warwick, and
Walter de Beauchamp were authorised to bring 36 'great horses' from France. Ibid., p.
217.
82 Ibid., p. 254. Important lords received their orders direct. On the same date
new service instructions were given to Hugh de Curteney and ten other individuals, and
on 15 July to the earl of Oxford. Ibid., pp. 253, 254.
Purveyance gave opportunities for corruption and profiteering, as always, but the administration does seem to have been aware of the need to try to inhibit it. The admonitions to sheriffs warning them against showing favour and taking bribes in the selection of both soldiers and workmen show similar awareness. They may be significant in the light of the trend towards moving sole responsibility for such recruiting away from the sheriffs; that trend, coupled with Edward's apparent attempt in April 1282 to raise cavalry without the traditional formal feudal summons may, however, indicate growing recognition that efficient mobilization required new management arrangements.
CHAPTER 3

THE SCOTS WAR OF 1301

The English army that had ended the semi-independence of Wales in the war of 1282-1283 had been assembled by broadly, but not completely, traditional measures. Subsequent Welsh revolts in 1287 and 1294 failed in the face of the effective mobilization of superior force.¹

Scotland proved a more determined opponent. The 'Great Cause', the issue of the Scottish succession, had enabled Edward I to act as 'superior lord', and from 1292 treat the successful claimant, John Balliol, and Scotland accordingly. Scottish resentment, and the opportunity given by Edward's conflict with France from 1294, led to a brief war, ended by the English victory at Dunbar in April 1295 and Balliol's submission in July. Open resistance to English domination broke out again in May 1297. William Wallace and Andrew of Moray's defeat of Warenne at Stirling Bridge in September put them in control. Edward returned from Flanders in March 1298, made sure of the support of his magnates, and mustered a powerful force at Roxburgh in June. He marched north in July, but was on the point of withdrawing to Edinburgh, partly because of supply difficulties,² when the opportunity to bring the Scots to battle resulted in his overwhelming victory at Falkirk. It was only a battlefield victory: most of Scotland remained beyond his control. Another campaign in 1300, with an army still including cavalry formed from the traditional feudal levy, and supported by a fleet from the Cinque Ports and others, had no success beyond the capture of Caerlaverock castle. At the request of King Philip of France Edward agreed to a truce with the Scots in October 1300.

¹ Sir Maurice Powicke says the response to Rhys ap Maredudd's rising in 1287 provided 'proof of the ease with which troops and equipment were directed from every part of Wales and the shires on the border in well-ordered combination...', and that in 1294 'In a few weeks he (Edward I) had three armies comprising in all more than 31,000 foot soldiers.' Thirteenth Century, pp. 439,441.
² Ships carrying stores were delayed - a precursor of Edward II's problems in 1322. (See below, Chapter 4, p. 79.)
That truce being due to end at Pentecost, 21 May 1301, he began planning in good time to be ready by midsummer, 24 June, to renew the war. In view of what actually happened (in particular later changes that strengthened the secondary army at Carlisle, the fact that the campaign only lasted effectively till October, and the early truce, ratified in January) it seems that the war was, or became, essentially a limited, consolidating operation. Nevertheless it had involved elaborate preparations.

The elements that would form the cavalry were called upon first, being given some four months' notice. On 14 February writs of summons using the words *affectuose requirimus et rogamus* rather than formal feudal terms, but without reference to pay, were issued to eighty-four individuals, including six earls, to muster at Berwick at midsummer. Roger Bigod, earl of Norfolk and marshal of England, was ordered to come to the king there with as many horses and arms as possible. If he was not well enough to come himself, he was to send someone appropriate to fulfil his office as marshal. On 12 March, William de la Zouche and others were told to be at Berwick; they were to be at the king's wages.

Arrangements had been put in hand for naval support. Also on 14 February, fifty-eight ships with crews and their supplies, to be at the king's wages, were ordered from mainly east coast ports, but including two from Bristol and one from Haverford, to be at Berwick at midsummer. The writs defined how many vessels were to be sent by each port - for example six from Yarmouth, two from Ipswich, one from Harwich - and were addressed to the ports' officials and commonalty, leaving them to take the necessary action. Similarly dated and addressed orders to six Irish ports summoned twelve ships to Dublin for 4 June, thus giving time for them to transport Irish support across to England. On 2 March the warden of the Cinque Ports, Robert de Burgersshe, was told the barons and men of the Cinque Ports had also been ordered to send twelve ships to Dublin for 4 June; he was to make sure the orders were obeyed and tell the king when the ships were ready for sea. The constable of Bristol castle and the bailiff of Haverford were told, also on 2 March, to send the ships due from those two ports to

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4 Ibid., p. 694.
6 *CCR 1296-1302*, p. 482.
7 Ibid., p. 486.
9 Ibid.
10 *CCR 1296-1302*, p. 486.
Dublin. The central government recognised that it was desirable not to rely entirely on local port officials. Specific appointments were made to expedite the assembly of these fleets, and individuals were named in letters patent of 27 March for the task - Ralph de Sandwich and Geoffrey atte Shire, John de Thorp and Peter de Dunwich for ships from various ports for Berwick, and Richard de Aston and the sheriffs of Sussex, Hampshire, Somerset, Dorset, Devon and Cornwall for seventeen ships from their counties for Dublin. Obedience to these orders was not universal: in August 1302 Peter de Dunwich, with Thomas de Worbelton, had to be commissioned to punish sailors from a number of south coast ports who had failed to send ships to the war.

The assembly of these fleets at Dublin was to support the second army being mobilized under the Prince of Wales at Carlisle. Writs of 1 March using the same language as those of February, vos affectuose requirimus, summoned the earl of Lincoln and a score of other magnates to be there by 24 June, and the sheriffs of Lancashire, Cumberland and Westmoreland to send to the prince horse and foot ad arma potentes from their shires. Next month the destination of more cavalry was changed from Berwick to Carlisle: on 4 April Humphrey de Bohun, earl of Hereford and Essex and constable of England, and on 12 April Robert de Monte Alto and sixteen others, were told to attend the Prince of Wales's army.

As a precautionary measure, presumably in case of a Scottish raid before the main army was assembled, on 8 April the barons, knights and other potential fighting men of Northumberland were ordered to move up towards the march of Scotland.

Purveyance of provisions for the two armies had been agreed at the Lincoln parliament. Specific quantities to be supplied by the communities in a number of counties were defined in letters issued on 1 March. With the exception of Cambridgeshire and Huntingdonshire, two men, one clerk and one knight, were nominated to give instructions in each county. The pairings of individuals was such that clerks had often to deal with more than one knight; for instance the clerk Peter de

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11 Ibid., p. 487.
12 CPR 1292-1301, pp. 583-4. E101/9/7, dated 16 March, refers to seventeen ships due at Dublin.
15 Ibid.
16 Ibid., p. 357.
17 CPR 1292-1301, p. 587.
Dunwich worked with the knight Robert de Fitzwalter in Essex, but with John Botetor in Norfolk and Suffolk, Master Richard de Havering with Thomas de Burnham in Lincolnshire but with Thomas de Furnivall in Nottinghamshire and Derbyshire. For Cambridgeshire those nominated were the sheriff Robert Hereward and Walter Langton, bishop of Coventry and Lichfield, the treasurer. Corresponding orders of 3 April for Huntingdonshire associated the sheriff Robert Hereward with Thomas de Cambridge, a clerk of Edward of Carnarvon, and for Lancashire Robert de Latham with Richard de Loughborough, a clerk of the exchequer. The purveying orders of 18 April appointed Walter de Huntercombe, knight, and Master John de Weston, clerk, for Northumberland; William de Mulcaster, the sheriff, and James de Dalilegh, clerk, for Cumberland; and Nicholas de Clypburn, the sheriff, and again James de Dalilegh for Westmoreland. The latter played a prominent part, receiving and issuing supplies as keeper of the king's victuals at Carlisle. The provisions from the eastern counties were to be at Berwick, and those from Lancashire, with others from Ireland, at Carlisle, by midsummer. Two of the king's clerks, Adam de Brom and Richard de Wardington, were sent to Ireland to supervise purveyances there. The Prince of Wales was to be written to, to have victuals from Wales and Chester brought to him at Carlisle. During April and May appointments were made of receivers for the provisions being purveyed in Lincolnshire, Nottinghamshire, Essex, Norfolk and

19 As seen above, later, on 27 March, he was to expedite the delivery of ships, but it is not clear whether this was an additional or a changed task.
20 CPR 1292-1301, p. 578.
22 Ibid., Vol. II, p. 84, note 2.
23 CPR 1292-1301, p. 579.
24 e.g. E101/8/14 (receiving supplies from the mayor of Newcastle-upon-Tyne); E101/8/27 (receiving supplies from Chester, and, via a ship, from Bayonne); Cal. Docs. Scotland, ed. J. Bain, Vol. II, p. 308, (issuing victuals and wine to the clerk of the Prince of Wales's buttery), and p. 309, (an acknowledgement by Robert de Towny of receipt at Ayr from Dalilegh 'keeper of the king's victuals coming from Ireland.')
25 Instructions were given on 3 April to the justiciar, treasurer and chancellor of Ireland to forward specific quantities of wheat, flour, oats, malt, beans and peas, wine, salt and fish, half to Skinburness and half to Arran by midsummer. Cal. Docs. Scotland, ed. J. Bain, Vol. II, pp. 305-6.
26 Ibid., p. 305.
27 Ibid.
Suffolk, and Yorkshire. They were the sheriff, supported by a named clerk, different in each case except that of Yorkshire from the one named to organise the purveying. 28 It is made clear in the 18 April writ of aid for Simon de Kyme, the sheriff of Yorkshire, and the clerk Ralph de Dalton, that they were responsible for shipping the supplies to Berwick as well as receiving them. 29 Another entry of the same date on the patent roll illustrates the sort of problems and compromises involved. In this the king agreed to accept from 'the good men, religious and commonalty' of Essex a lesser quota than the original one. However, though he was told by the purveyors that the men of Essex, concerned about payment, wanted only to hand over their wheat to persons named to collect the granted tax and pay for what had been taken, the order said they had to deliver the wheat. It was needed immediately, and the tax collectors would not be named until Michaelmas. The king did however say he would give them further security, if necessary, via the two purveyors and the newly appointed receivers, the sheriff and Hugh de Burgh, the king's clerk. 30

In all these plans the orders for each port or county specify the precise number of ships or of quarters of wheat, oats and other provisions to be supplied. This is evidence of centrally determined and quantified planning. The objective of the orders for purveyance was clearly to create supply dumps ready for the armies as they assembled, as the dates for the musters and delivery of the provisions were the same, i.e. midsummer (24 June). Taken together the orders for cavalry, ships and supplies show that planning was centrally coordinated in detail and timing.

In the logistical arrangements the management of the execution and administration of orders used a variety of agents - existing local port officials, sheriffs, knights and royal clerks. Purveyance in particular suggests interesting issues of how responsibility may have been divided. The 'purveying' clerks usually had a wider geographical remit than the knights for their joint role of 'giving instructions' to the communities; probably the royal clerks brought the orders for defined quantities that had been determined centrally, and communicated them, perhaps with some discussion about practicality, to the knights. These, presumably not always or necessarily in person, used the weight of their local position to make it clear to minor local officials and unwilling communities, or individuals of some standing, that the foodstuffs must be delivered up. The wording of the writs, in that the mandates to purvey were addressed

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29 Ibid., p. 587.
30 Ibid., p. 589.
to the 'commonalty' of the counties, indicates that the actual purveying was not done by the knights or the clerks themselves. J. R. Maddicott describes the subsequent action. The county court would divide the quantity required among the hundreds (or wapentakes): the consequent quotas were sub-divided among the villages roughly according to their size by two knights of the hundred; the village community then decided individuals' shares, sometimes via two of their number, sometimes together. This process would be bound to take some time. Sheriffs and different clerks (that is, different from those seeing to the purveying, and, possibly, different not for any particular reason except for who was available some six weeks later) collected and transported what had been bought. The sheriffs and their staffs, having established dealings with local officials and communities, could conveniently make arrangements for collection, and the clerks sent to work with them would have kept progressive count of quantities. As the reduction in the Essex men's quota following their protest shows, keeping overall count could be important.

Adequate supplies of food for the armies were not obtained just by purveyance, though this did at least give assurance of some availability at a particular place and time. On 11 April in several counties sheriffs and other officials, including the mayor, bailiffs and aldermen of London, were told to proclaim that merchants with victuals to trade should take them to the king's armies for sale, and to encourage them to do so. Sensibly, the merchants of counties in the east, from Essex to Northumberland, were to take their goods to Berwick, and those of the south coast counties theirs to Skinburness. The order to the sheriff of Cornwall of 12 April described action that went beyond a mere proclamation. He was told that the king had asked the bailiffs and men of Bodmin, and of other towns with harbours, to 'induce and require' merchants with victuals to bring them to Skinburness, by sea, for sale, and he was to proclaim this. Further, he was to deliver to Skinbuniess any of the king's corn in his own custody.

Thus sheriffs were playing an important part in the detailed implementation of several aspects of the logistics of securing provisions.

Some were also heavily involved in the collection of county levies, though they were not acting alone. Cavalry, shipping and supplies having been put in hand, on 12 May orders for the levying of foot soldiers began to be issued. Richard de Harle, the sheriff, and Richard de Immere were to select 900, adequately armed, from Shropshire

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31 Ibid., p. 578.
32 The English Peasantry, pp. 24-5.
33 CCR 1296-1302, pp. 488-90.
34 Ibid., pp. 487-8.
and 600 from Staffordshire: Richard Talbot, the sheriff, and Robert de Norwico 700 from Gloucestershire and the Forest of Dean: Miles Pychard, the sheriff, and Richard de Brightwell, another clerk, 600 from Herefordshire and 500 from Worcestershire: Thomas Malet, Walter Goushull and Henry de Creystok, a clerk of the chancery, 1,000 from Nottinghamshire and 1,000 from Derbyshire: John de Byron, Robert Ughtred and Ralph de Dalton, the clerk who was one of the purveyors, 4,000 from Yorkshire: Hugo Golyou, William de Felton and Robert de Barton 2,700 from Northumberland. Writs of aid in their favour were simultaneously issued for sheriffs, and on 13 May mandates issued to the arrayers themselves pressed them to proceed with urgency. The writs said the men were to be ready to set out against the Scots, but when and where they would be told. These levies called for a total of 12,000 men, which is such a round figure that it too must have been centrally determined, and then sub-divided among chosen counties.

It is noticeable that by and large the counties supplying provisions were not asked to supply foot soldiers as well, and the counties along the south coast, from Kent to Cornwall, were only asked for ships. Though this looks like deliberately planned use of the varying resources of different parts of the country, it also, in broad terms, reflected geographical considerations.

The levying clearly did not in the event proceed to Edward's satisfaction. On 15 July he appointed teams of three investigators to look into the taking of bribes, and to arrest deserters. Significantly, perhaps, these investigators did not include the sheriffs. On the other hand, individuals, described as clerks, who had been assigned to the task of recruiting were appointed to the teams - Richard de Brightwell for Herefordshire and Worcestershire, Ralph de Dalton for Yorkshire, Henry de Creystok for Nottinghamshire. This suggests that in the other cases where a name recurs but the

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35 Later, on 6 June these three were authorised to select as many constables and horses and arms as needed for their levies (CPR 1292-1301, p. 596). Mounting the leaders of troops of infantry was usual.


37 CPR 1292-1301, p. 594.

38 Ibid.

39 The exceptions were Nottinghamshire, Derbyshire, Yorkshire, Lancashire and Northumberland.

40 Parl. Writs, Vol. I, p. 360. Things seem to have been particularly bad in Staffordshire; men had received money and provisions, but had then been replaced by others less useful. Deserters' goods were to be seized. Ibid., p. 359.
individual's status is not defined - Robert de Norico⁴¹ for Gloucestershire, Richard de Immere for Shropshire and Staffordshire - these individuals also were clerks. The structure of the commissions therefore makes it seem likely that it was the sheriffs, with their local relationships, who were suspected of having been less than objective in choosing men. Perhaps anticipation of this was one reason why clerks had been involved in the original selection. It would be consistent with a growing recognition of the desirability of not relying primarily on sheriffs to see to the raising of levies.

Mobilizing the army required more than just selecting men; they had to be brought to the assembly point. Documents recording payments for foot for periods running into July appear to indicate that at least Richard de Immere was involved not only in selecting men but also in bringing them to Berwick.⁴² Richard de Brightwell and Henry de Creystok also helped conduct recruits to the muster.⁴³ This is probably the case with Robert de Norico too, though the entry in the account only implies it.⁴⁴ The clerks clearly had an executive as well as an administrative role in the assembly of the army.

Numbers obtained were not exactly as ordered in detail, and far less in total. Henry de Creystok received pay for a contingent of 484 foot archers coming from Nottinghamshire and Derbyshire; Richard de Brightwell had 340 archers coming from Worcestershire, and 361 from Herefordshire; Richard de Immere brought 554 foot from Shropshire and 346 from Staffordshire.⁴⁵ These are the first figures recorded, being for pay from 3 July, 22 and 24 June respectively, and so most probably represent the initial numbers brought to the muster. They compare with the quotas of 2,000 for Nottinghamshire and Derbyshire together, 1,100 for Herefordshire and Worcestershire, and 1,500 for Shropshire and Staffordshire. The wide variations in the numbers in separate units underline the uncertainty of the whole process, and explain the need for the commissions to deal with bribery and arrest deserters: Herefordshire's 361 were made up of units of 79, 61, 65, 66, and 90. Staffordshire's 346 were in units of 59, 53, 92, 54, and 88.⁴⁶

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⁴¹ Robert de Norico is definitely a clerk, being so described in the wardrobe account. BL Add. Ms. 7966a, f.116.
⁴² E101/9/17.
⁴³ BL Add. Ms. 7966a, f.116.
⁴⁴ It refers to pay for John de Colevall (described as sheriff of Gloucester) 'coming with Robert' to Berwick. Ibid.
⁴⁵ Ibid.
⁴⁶ Ibid., f.117.
The pay roll for the king's army in Scotland for the period 12 July - 29 September totalled approximately 7,000 foot, including a few crossbowmen, archers, hobelars and men in garrisons. As the areas from which the county levies came closely match those in the 12 May writs, that compares with the figure of 12,000 in those orders alone. In 1301 the central government's existing management arrangements were not able to fulfil its recruiting plans by a wide margin.

During May other military preparations had continued. John de St John, a much used and trusted officer, was appointed the king's lieutenant for Cumberland, Westmoreland and Lancashire on 12 May, and the sheriffs and men of those areas were ordered to obey him. On 21 May the justiciar of Ireland, John Wogan, was authorised to pardon two-thirds of the debts to the king of those 'coming to him with horse and arms', with the other third offset against wages.

At the end of May and the beginning of June new instructions for strengthening the army at Carlisle were issued. Theobald de Verdun was told on 28 May to join the Prince of Wales, or alternatively send his son to the prince. He was to let the king know which it would be. On 1 and 2 June writs ordered up men from Wales. In the 12 May writs three arrayers were appointed when the number to be levied was in four figures; the numbers appointed for the Welsh areas indicate that some thousands were expected. William de Caumvill, Warinius Martyn and Morgan ap Meredylc, or any two of them, were to lead contingents from South and West Wales to be at Carlisle for 30 June. They would be told the number required. Richard de Macy, William de Sutton, Griffinus Cloyt, Hugh de Leominster and Iwani ap Howell, or any two, three or four of them had the same responsibility for North Wales. Hamo de Macy and William Trussel, with another discreet knight of the county of Chester whom they were to choose, were appointed for the men of the county of Chester and a number of cantreds.

50 CPR 1292-1301, p. 585. Earlier, in March, the justiciar and other Irish officials had been given authority to make arrangements with the magnates of Ireland with a view to requesting them to come to the king's army. Ibid., p. 583.
51 CCR 1296-1302, p. 491.
Hamo and the knight were to lead these men to the prince.\textsuperscript{52} Walter Pederton was to see to the paying of William de Caumvill's men, and William de Melton to the paying of Hamo de Macy's and Richard de Macy's.\textsuperscript{53} Subsequently a writ dated 19 October 1301 ordered the collectors of the fifteenth in the county of Hereford to pay the wages of certain Welshmen in the king's army in Scotland. It was accompanied by six acknowledgements, by John de Langford and others, of the receipt of money from the collectors for the payment of Welshmen in the company of the Prince of Wales, in Scotland, from 30 August to 2 January. Two clerks, Peter de Abynton and Robert de Chigwell, were referred to as appointed by letters patent to pay wages to the Welsh.\textsuperscript{54} A writ dated 22 June appointed Robert Holand and Master Richard de Hoghton, sheriff of Lancashire as deputy for Earl Thomas of Lancaster, to choose 600 men to be at Carlisle by 5 July.\textsuperscript{55}

This batch of arrangements gives something of an impression of uncertain and rather improvised planning. All other orders aimed for concentration of ships, supplies and armies by midsummer; in one of these cases choice of the third arrayer was left open; only two weeks were allowed for the selection and arrival at Carlisle of the Lancashire contingent; numbers required were not specified in the writs.

Arrangements had also been made for the availability of carts. The sheriffs of Lincolnshire, Nottinghamshire and Derbyshire, and Norfolk and Suffolk, received orders issued on 12 May to purvey specific numbers of carts. They were to deliver them to Berwick by midsummer at the latest, with horses and drivers. They were to certify that payment would be made by Michaelmas, and to tell exchequer officials the prices of the carts and the names of the owners.\textsuperscript{56} An indication of the scale of the requirement can be seen in a record of receipt of carriages and carts at Berwick for the Scottish war.\textsuperscript{57} They totalled 118 carts and 654 horses, and came from Nottinghamshire and Derbyshire, Yorkshire, Lincolnshire and Northumberland. The sheriffs needed to obtain carts also to carry out their responsibility for collecting purveyed provisions and

\textsuperscript{53} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{54} E101/9/26.
\textsuperscript{56} CCR 1296-1302, p. 446.
\textsuperscript{57} E101/9/22.
delivering them,\textsuperscript{58} so that it seems appropriate that they should be given the task of finding carts for the army.

Of course, after the date of midsummer fixed for the coming together of men and supplies, provisions continued to be needed, and similar arrangements were made. On 14 August the sheriffs of ten counties were once more ordered to encourage the bringing of victuals to the king's armies for sale. Among them the sheriffs of Lincolnshire, Nottinghamshire and Derbyshire, Yorkshire, Essex, and Norfolk and Suffolk were appointed, each with one of the king's clerks, to receive defined quantities of provisions and bring them to Berwick at the king's charge. It was made clear that speed was needed.\textsuperscript{59} The sheriffs remained important to the carrying out in practice of what was required.

The first administrative arrangements for mobilization for the war of 1301 dealt with the basic requirements in a practical, coherent and coordinated way. Approximately four months' notice was given to the magnates and others who would have to make up the numbers of the household force of cavalry. A similar amount of time was allowed for the assembly at the forward bases, Berwick and Carlisle, of supplies obtained by purveyance. Quantities of provisions to be obtained were centrally defined and divided among specific counties. Responsibility for delivering them was allocated to specific persons. Other individuals were made responsible for ensuring that the shipping ordered in detailed, centrally determined numbers from the officials of individual ports, would be available according to the timetable. Some six weeks were allowed for the recruiting and delivery to the muster of the main county levies.

The numbers obtained, however, fell annoyingly short of the requirement. Edward's administration did not, in 1301, merely issue orders to the sheriffs; it made additional associated appointments of royal clerks to work with them. It took action, it seems, to be able to follow up its orders. Importantly, it is clear that inadequate performance was not permitted to pass unnoticed or unpunished. The fact that the investigative commissions were issued on 14 July, so soon after the muster date of 24 June, speaks of speedy, and therefore fairly certainly pre-planned, assessment, and rapid response to failure. The management of the various aspects of the mobilization involved, sometimes, knights appointed by name, as well as royal clerks and the local

\textsuperscript{58} For example, under the heading 'expenses for provisions for Scotland' the sheriff of Nottinghamshire used twelve carts and thirty-six horses 'and for each cart two oxen'. E101/580/3.

\textsuperscript{59} \textit{CCR 1296-1302}, p. 498.
permanent officials. The clerks played a particularly important part in executive as well as administrative terms. Though the sheriffs were still an indispensable part of the administrative process, it had become increasingly desirable at least to monitor, if not yet replace, their central role in the raising of levies.
CHAPTER 4.

EDWARD II, SCOTLAND, AND THE WAR OF 1322

Bannockburn

For Edward I Scotland had been an obstinate problem; for his son, notwithstanding the mobilization of large armies in 1314 and 1322, it provided military disaster and humiliation.

Edward I had crushed Sir William Wallace's revolt in 1303, only apparently sealing victory with the capture of Stirling castle in 1304. Robert Bruce took up the resistance, narrowly survived through 1306 and made himself Scotland's undisputed leader by killing John Comyn. In May 1307 he defeated the earl of Pembroke at Loudon Hill. It was on his way north in response to attempt, again, to bring Scotland to submission that Edward I died, on 7 July 1307.

Edward II rapidly abandoned the expedition, leaving Bruce room and time over the next few years to consolidate and extend his hold. The English king's protracted political conflict with his magnates occupied his attention. Though he was in Scotland in October 1310 and in the north until the middle of 1311, most of the English earls would not join him, and little difference was made to Bruce's progress. In 1311 and 1312 Scottish raids terrorised northern England, and one after another English-held castles in Scotland fell.

Early in 1313 the strategically important stronghold of Stirling was besieged. In the middle of the year its governor, Sir Philip Mowbray, obtained from Edward Bruce terms that would require its surrender if no relieving army had come within three

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1 Powicke, Thirteenth Century, pp. 708-710.
2 Ibid., p. 713.
3 Ibid., p. 719.
leagues by midsummer day, 24 June, 1314. Honour as well as strategic considerations impelled Edward II to respond to the siege. He was, in 1313, in a politically better position than recently. Reaction to the killing of Gaveston in July 1312 had already brought the earl of Pembroke, together with other magnates, to side with him. He felt strong enough to attempt to raise an army to go to Scotland in force.

The orders for the feudal cavalry were issued on 23 December 1313. Those addressed to Earl Thomas of Lancaster, seven earls and 87 others summoned them in fide et homagio to be at Berwick by 10 June themselves, cum toto servitio nobis debito. The archbishop of York, 18 bishops, 25 abbots, abbesses and priors were also required to present their service. Sheriffs were ordered to summon the service due from all holding by military service or sergeanty, including other ecclesiastics, widows and other women. Thus about six months' notice was given via established channels. Edward had not, however, first obtained the consent of parliament for war, as according to the Ordinances he should have done. Consequently a number of earls - Lancaster, Warenne, Warwick and Arundel - refused to go, even though the king argued 'urgent necessity'. Except for that lack of consent Powicke describes the recruitment - feudal, national, contractual - for what became the Bannockburn campaign as 'impeccably conservative'. J. E. Morris calculated, from the protections issued, that there would have been c.2,000-2,500 heavy cavalry, largely made up from the magnates loyal to the king and their retinues, and from the household.

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6 McKisack, Fourteenth Century, p. 34.
7 A different reason for Edward II's decision, in late 1313, to attack Scotland is advanced by McNamee. 'In November 1313 Robert I proclaimed that his enemies had one year in which to come to his peace, or suffer perpetual disinheritance', thus encouraging Edward's supporters in Scotland to desert him unless he reacted with force. C. McNamee, The Wars of the Bruces. Scotland, England and Ireland 1306-1328, (East Linton, 1997), p. 61.
8 McKisack, Fourteenth Century, p. 28.
9 Foederar, Vol. II, div. i, pp. 238-239. This order, with only slight variations, was repeated on 13 April. CCR 1313-1318, p. 97.
10 Ibid., p. 86.
12 Powicke, Military Obligation, p. 141.
In spite of those earls' refusal, the king continued preparations to relieve Stirling. The organisation of supplies for the army began with a number of orders dated 10 March, in which royal officials were assigned a leading role. Nicholas de Tykehull, a clerk, was given power to requisition horses, agreeing a price with men of the place from which he was taking them. This order was specially addressed to abbots and priors, as well as to sheriffs, bailiffs and other 'faithful men', indicating that the ecclesiastical establishments were a prime source for horses.\textsuperscript{14} Master Walter le Ferrour, \textit{valettus}, was to obtain nails and horse-shoes in Northumberland, Durham and Yorkshire.\textsuperscript{15} A number of clerks were to buy wheat in five eastern counties, apparently under the general supervision of Alexander le Convers,\textsuperscript{16} and Stephen le Blound was to do the same in Northumberland and Durham.\textsuperscript{17} The sheriffs of the counties were to see to the delivery of these purchases to Berwick by Easter.\textsuperscript{18} Almost immediately, on 14 March, another clerk replaced Convers;\textsuperscript{19} he was sent to Ireland to help arrangements being made there for both men\textsuperscript{20} and supplies.\textsuperscript{21} The arrangements of 10 March for obtaining provisions were quickly cancelled. Instead, on 18 March Antonio Pessagno\textsuperscript{22} of Genoa, the king's merchant, was assigned to buy wheat and victuals in the eastern counties and ship these supplies to Berwick, and authorised to nominate buyers.\textsuperscript{23} The buying authorities for those previously appointed in the 10 March orders were cancelled

\textsuperscript{15} Ibid.  
\textsuperscript{16} For several counties he was associated with the other clerk named. Ibid., pp. 114b, 115a.  
\textsuperscript{17} Ibid., pp. 114b, 115a.  
\textsuperscript{18} Ibid., pp. 115, 115b.  
\textsuperscript{19} Ibid., p. 116b.  
\textsuperscript{20} Ibid., p. 118a, dated 22 March.  
\textsuperscript{21} Ibid., p. 122b. With Richard de Castelyn he was to supervise and hasten the delivery to Skinburnness of defined quantities of victuals to be obtained by the Irish officials. The delivery date for these was 1 August. Presumably Edward was anticipating continuing the campaign once Stirling had been relieved.  
\textsuperscript{22} N. Fryde, ‘Antonio Pessagno of Genoa, King’s Merchant of Edward II of England’, in \textit{Studi in memoria di Federigo Melis} (2 vols., Rome 1978), Vol. II, pp.159-178, summarises his standing as the chief royal creditor and supplier for the royal army 1312-1320, who also served Edward II as diplomat, administrator and soldier. Ibid., p.159.  
\textsuperscript{23} \textit{Rot. Scot.}, p. 117a.
on 1 April, and they were told to return what they had obtained.24 In orders also dated 1 April the sheriffs of Somerset and Dorset, Gloucester, Devon and Cornwall, were told to buy and deliver defined amounts of victuals to Skinburness by 2 June, by the view and testimony of royal clerks.25 As usual, the governmental organisation of supplies was accompanied by proclamations encouraging merchants to bring supplies of arms and victuals to be sold to the king and the army.26

One other aspect of organisation of the army's needs - carts - is worth notice, though according to the orders' recorded date they could not have been available in time to be of use to the force that went to relieve Stirling; nor, the orders being dated 6 June, could they have been replacements for a baggage train lost after the battle. Thirteen sheriffs, including the sheriffs of such southern counties as Essex and Hereford, were told to buy 236 carts. They were to be delivered to Berwick by various dates in July and August - e.g. some in quindena Sancti Johannis Baptistae, others within a month of the festival - under the supervision of half a dozen clerks.27 This both underlines the necessity of carts to an army - the Vita Edwardi Secundi says the wagon train that left Berwick stretched for twenty leagues28 - and again illustrates the supervisory role of the royal clerks in relation to the executive action of local officials.

March had also seen the issue of orders for the collection of the other elements of the army, and for maritime support and transport. On 12 March John Sturmy and Peter Bard, valettos nostros, were appointed as joint captains and admirals, and Sturmy was given authority to choose men and sailors for five king's ships.29 On 22 March the local authorities of a number of ports of the south and west were asked - vos affectuose requirimus et rogamus - to provide specific numbers of ships - 38 in all - by 26 May. The ships were to go to an assembly point at the ports' cost, and thence in the fleet at the king's cost. Two of the king's clerks were to supervise this, and reports were to be made via them. The sheriffs of the ports' counties were told to assist the business.30 A later order of 12 May to the two royal clerks to arrest, crew and arm ships as soon as possible could well be evidence of the ports' tardiness in complying: it could also show that

24 Ibid., pp. 122b,123a.
25 Ibid., p. 122b.
26 Ibid., p. 116a, dated 12 March.
27 Ibid., p.127a,127b. Each sheriff was given a precise quota.
28 Vita Edwardi Secundi, ed. Denholm-Young, p. 50.
30 Ibid., p. 117a,117b.
progress (and lack of it) was being managerially monitored. Other indications of problems can be seen in an order to many masters of ships going to Scotland to stop engaging in robbery and taking bribes, a request to the bailiffs of Sutton and Plympton to send at least one of the two ships for which they had been asked, and an order to the mayor and bailiffs of Southampton to make good the inadequate equipment of their three ships, by indenture with the clerk Robert de Helliwell. In the management of the mobilization of shipping it does seem that, though the port officials were expected to take the necessary action, supervision by royal clerks was essential. The detailed allocations to individual ports implies a centrally held view of the capacity of each. The fairly standard 'supporting' order to sheriffs presumably made their authority available should it be needed; it could also be a medieval recognition of the good management principle - keep the incumbent official informed of action to be taken by others in the area for which he is responsible.

The first order for infantry was dated 9 March, though it only required the bishop of Durham to send 1,000 men to Newcastle by 31 March, to go thence at the king's wages. Edward also sought to draw on Ireland. On 22 March several lords were asked to bring as many men as they could. Richard earl of Ulster was to be the captain of whatever force was raised. The justiciar of Ireland was told to choose 4,000 foot archers, and have them ready by Easter, 7 April, to go in John of Argyle's western fleet, at the king's wages. The treasurer of Ireland was to provide sufficient ships for the earls and magnates. How many Irish actually served is not clear, though a number of instructions at the end of April and early May to send ships to Ireland suggest that transport was needed. Mostly these orders were addressed to the local

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31 Ibid., p. 126b.
32 Ibid., pp. 123b,124a.
33 Ibid., p. 125b.
34 Ibid., p. 126a.
35 The Cinque Ports also were told to provide their service to Skinburness by 24 June. CCR 1313-1318, p. 98.
36 Rot. Scot., Vol. I, p. 114b. On 20 April he was asked for 500 more. Ibid.
38 Ibid.
39 Ibid., p. 122a, dated 28 March.
40 Ibid.
41 Ibid., pp.125a,125b,126b.
authorities, though the 12 May order referred to above went to the king's clerks John de Merton and Robert de Helliwell. 42

On 24 March levies were summoned from English counties and Wales, to be at Newcastle by 28 April. Griffin ap Rees was to bring 2,000 men from North Wales, and Walter Hakluyt 1,000 from the south. Arrayers were named to select and bring 5,000 from six counties, and Hugh Audley, its justiciar, 500 from Chester; the relevant sheriffs were to pay wages from the county border to Newcastle, from the county revenues. 43 As usual the sheriffs were to assist the 'selectors and leaders'. 44 40 men were summoned from Hope castle, and 40 crossbow-men and 60 archers from Bristol. 45

Gilbert de Clare, earl of Gloucester, and five other magnates with holdings in Wales were 'asked' - vobis mandamus rogantes - for 1,900 soldiers, to join the king at Newcastle, where he would be cum equis et armis et toto servitio nobis debito, from Easter. Specific numbers, in round hundreds, were sought from each. The men's wages, from the day they set off, would be paid by the chamberlain of South Wales. 46

On 20 April another 9,500 men were to be chosen from the same English counties, plus Warwickshire and Leicestershire (500), Lancashire (500) and Lincolnshire (3,000). This time the selection was to be made by the sheriff and a named clerk; the sheriffs were empowered to nominate additional selectors, but warned to show no favours in the selection. 47

Finally, on 27 May all infantry were summoned to be at Wark-on-Tweed by 10 June, so that Stirling could be relieved by the due date. 48 Though there are differences between the list in that order and the previous ones - the biggest being that it does not include the first 1,000 or the second 1,500 allocated to Northumberland - the total summoned must have come to around 20,000. 49 J. E. Morris's estimate that in fact the

42 Above, p. 57 n. 29.
43 Rot. Scot., Vol. I, p. 120. The counties were Northumberland, Yorkshire, Nottinghamshire, Derbyshire, Shropshire and Staffordshire.
44 Ibid., p. 120b.
45 Ibid., p. 120a,120b.
46 Ibid., p. 119b.
47 Ibid., p. 124a,124b.
48 Ibid., p. 127a.
49 Morris, Bannockburn, p. 40, sees the figure as 21,540. He also suggests that the 27 May order indicated impatience with the progress of the muster. As previous orders had required the levies to come to Newcastle by the end of April, and Wark-on-
actual number of foot who appeared was only some 15,00050 is accepted by Barrow51 and Prestwich.52

Inevitably the crushing defeat at Bannockburn colours any assessment of how well the 1314 mobilization was managed. The number of foot fell short of the number that had been summoned, but this was by no means unusual. The actual incidents of the battle itself underlined the lack of discipline apparently inherent in feudal cavalry, as well as the inadequacy of the English tactics. Whether all the arrangements for supplies would have provided sufficiently for a prolonged war can not be known, as the campaign ended quickly and disastrously, only two weeks after the muster. Nevertheless the mobilization did achieve its main objective, the arrival of a large army within three leagues of Stirling by the date stipulated to prevent the automatic surrender of the castle.

The War of 1322

In the years immediately following Bannockburn Robert Bruce and the Scots naturally held the initiative. Though their attempt to take Ireland was ultimately defeated in 1318,53 in that same year Bruce had taken Berwick and raided Northumberland and Yorkshire. Political changes in England had seen a formal, if only superficial, reconciliation between Thomas of Lancaster and the king. This made it possible to make a serious effort to recapture Berwick by siege in 1319, but Sir James Douglas's diversionary raid into Yorkshire, where he won a complete victory at Myton-in-Swale, led Lancaster and the northern earls to insist on returning south. The siege of Berwick was abandoned, and in December 1319 a truce to last two years was agreed.54

Tweed is some 40 miles further north, it may simply have marked the real start of the campaign.

50 Bannockburn, p. 41.
51 Barrow, Robert Bruce, pp. 293-4 puts the figure summoned at 21,640, but agrees Morris's estimate of 15,000 as the actual number.
52 Prestwich, Armies and Warfare, p. 117.
53 McKisack, Fourteenth Century, pp. 43-44; McNamee, Wars of the Bruces, pp. 166-199.
54 Ibid., pp. 56-57.
This expired at the end of 1321. A Scottish raid reached as far as Richmond in January 1322, signalling that war had begun again. However, Edward II's attention was focussed on dealing with the internal challenges to his authority. Serious military arrangements to counter the Scottish threat, other than general defensive warnings, would have to wait. Though the ferocious intentions of the Scots were invoked in writs summoning the English forces, the muster at Coventry, set for 28 February by a series of summonses and instructions to sheriffs and others, has to be seen as really directed against internal enemies. Of course the possibility of alliance between the Scots and the contrariants was a real as well as a propaganda one, but Coventry could not have been a practical starting place for an offensive war in the north.

Thanks importantly to the rebels' own lack of unity, and particularly to the political incompetence of Earl Thomas of Lancaster, the king was able to defeat them piecemeal. Only after the death of Hereford and the capture of Lancaster at Boroughbridge on 16 March could war with Bruce become the primary objective of planning.

As Natalie Fryde observes, 'the campaign which followed was one of the worst failures of the reign.' No major battle was fought, so there is little evidence by which to judge whether the organisation of recruiting produced an effective military force, either for a major set-piece battle or for some other strategic objective - if indeed Edward had one. Arguably it is this absence of a strategic objective that was responsible for the ignominious course and end of the war. It probably also had some bearing on the changes that took place in administrative arrangements for recruiting policies. Nevertheless, though the size of the army that assembled was again substantially less than theoretically called for in the original commissions of array, this was not unusual, as the experience of 1314 shows; it was still a large force, at well over 20,000. In terms of planning it was the arrangements for keeping the army adequately supplied with provisions, especially once it had entered Scotland, that seem to have failed to a disastrous degree, and in this respect too overall strategy was inadequate.

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57 Trokelowe, Annales, ed. H.T. Riley, pp. 124-5; Expenditis siquidem victualibus per terram, et per mare ubique deficientibus, maxima copia exercitus fame tabefacta numerosaque multitudo praevit inopia, proh dolor! peritus extincta.
The writs of military summons to assemble armies to invade Scotland - as distinct from orders to prepare defensively against Scottish raids - began to be issued on 25 March 1322.58 Musters were set for 13 June at Newcastle and Carlisle; presumably, therefore, most of the forces that had responded to the earlier call for muster at Coventry on 28 February against the contrariants would have disbanded, and not been kept in arms for a war with Scotland some three months later. The combination of civil war, preparation for possible defensive action, and now a new aggressive posture must have produced some administrative confusion, if the following orders addressed to Cornwall from February to May were in any way an example.59

On 7 February, in common with many other counties, the sheriff of Cornwall was to array the county forces, and have them ready to move. On 23 March he was told they could stay in the county, but should be ready to move at three days' notice. In the 25 March series of summonses for the 13 June muster Thomas Lercedekne and Reginald de Botereux, with the assistance of the sheriff and bailiffs, were to select 500 armed men from Cornwall to go to the muster: from Newcastle they would be at the king's wages. This was reinforced on 26 March by a writ to the barons, knights and free men of Cornwall emphasising that, as they had not hitherto been of help, they would do well to cooperate now. However, on 7 May Lercedekne and Botereux were told that if the king's clerk Alexander le Conyers (who was now organising a western transport fleet) certified that naval help was forthcoming from Cornwall, they should not levy conscripts. Nevertheless, on 16 May, as the York Parliament had granted one foot soldier per vill, they were told to stay the levy, and any money taken in pursuance of the earlier commission was to be returned to the communities, or used to arm the men now to be recruited. Botereux, this time associated with Henry de Chambernon, had to select, with the advice of the bailiffs of the lords of the towns concerned, the one foot soldier per vill. Perhaps Cornwall was a special case, but this does give an impression of very short-term management, absence of longer-term planning, and confusion.

The first writs of summons of 25 March, addressed severally to the archbishop of York, sixteen bishops, Edward earl of Chester the king's son, the earls of Norfolk, Kent, Richmond, Pembroke, Arundel, Surrey, Oxford, and Angus, and seventy-four other magnates, required each to present his *servicium debitum* at Newcastle on 13 June.60 Additionally, all sheriffs were ordered to proclaim that everyone who owed

such service should do likewise. A second set of writs dated 26 March asked these
magnates to bring as much extra force as they could, as well as their service. To raise
footmen specific numbers were required by other writs, to be chosen from individual
counties and led to the king to go against the Scots. In a departure from the more
normal practice of being paid by the crown once they left their county boundary, these
levies would only be at the king's wages from the muster at Newcastle. The
commission to Lercedekne and Botereux for 500 from Cornwall already referred to was
one of these writs, which like those to the magnates were also dated 25 March.
Including that for Cornwall, they totalled 27,900 from twenty-five shires to be at
Newcastle, with another 11,000 from six for Carlisle. In most cases the major towns
were excluded from this levy - for example Exeter in the case of Devon, Salisbury from
Wiltshire, Norwich and Bury-St-Edmunds from Norfolk and Suffolk. Forty-one towns
were later, on 5 April, asked individually for help against the Scots. From the
counties the two biggest quotas were 7,000 from Yorkshire (excluding York itself,
Beverley, Craven and Richmondshire), and 4,000 from Lincolnshire (excluding Lincoln
and Stamford). The smallest were 100 from Middlesex and 300 from Worcestershire
(excluding Worcester). Most were for 500 or 1,000. As many men as possible should
be armati, and the rest furnished with adequate arms. The contingents from
Cumberland, Westmoreland, Lancashire, Derbyshire, Staffordshire, Herefordshire,
Richmondshire and Craven were for Carlisle.

The arrayers themselves, (two for each area except Yorkshire with four, and
Lincolnshire, the Forest of Dean and Richmondshire with three each), included some
dozen named as being sheriffs in 1322. For Middlesex, Northumberland and Rutland
the appointments were 'the sheriff' and Roger de Brek, William Ridel and John Hakelut
respectively. It can be inferred that the arrayers' authority required there to be at least

62 Ibid.
63 Ibid., Vol. II, div. ii, pp. 559-60.
64 Ibid., p. 563.
65 having some protective armour: the instructions to the Cornish arrayers
specified a padded tunic, light helmet, iron glove and a suit of clothing. The wardrobe
accounts distinguish payments to peditis armatis from those of the peditum nudorum.
BL Stowe Ms. 553, ff. 82v, 81r.
66 The arrayers' names are from Parl. Writs, Vol. II, div. ii, pp. 559-60, and the
sheriffs' from Lists and Indexes, Vol. IX, List of Sheriffs for England and Wales (Public
Record Office, 1898).
two of them acting together; where four are named their powers are explicitly for all, or three, or two of them. Where there are three, power is for all, or two. Arrayers would be men of local importance, frequently called upon, as Michael Powicke points out, to be of use to government in one way or another. For instance, Thomas Ughtred, one of the Yorkshire arrayers, had been a commissioner of array since 1319, a knight of the shire in 1320, and keeper of Scarborough and then Pickering castles. John Morice was a member of parliament for Bedfordshire in 1327. John Tempestone, one of the arrayers for Richmondshire and Craven, held land in Keighley and Skipton and went from Yorkshire to the great council in 1324. Ralph Gorges had been on missions abroad in the king's service. Robert Waddesley had already been an arrayer in 1318. William Ridel was a keeper of the truce in Northumberland in 1320. Richard Egge baston and Thomas le Botiller were assessors and collectors of the eighteenth in 1319. William de Isney was assigned to gaol delivery in Lincolnshire in 1320.

Existing local officials, sheriffs and bailiffs, were ordered to assist the arrayers, whose role would be basically that of supervising the local action to select men, and defining an assembly point in the county to which the levies should be brought. An earlier set of instructions, for an array in August 1314 to resist the invading Scots, goes into considerable detail. Its context was not identical with that of 1322, but if these details were applied more generally the process of array was a thorough and controlled process.

In that 1314 order two individuals were appointed to choose horse and foot. They were to tell the sheriff to proclaim in cities, boroughs and other market towns a day and place in each wapentake where all men from 15 to 60 years old should assemble, with the arms to which they were sworn. The penalty for non-attendance would be imprisonment. The assembly was to include the valetti and sergeants of

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69 Ibid., Vol. III, p. 201.
73 *CCR 1318-1323*, p. 191.
74 *CPR 1317-1321*, p. 348.
75 Ibid., p. 53.
abbots and priors. The constable of each vill was to have a roll of the names of all within the 15 to 60 age range. The two deputed selectors were to enroll the names of all suitable to bear arms, and of the leaders who would bring them to Aymer de Valence. They were also to enroll the names of all who had failed to come before them, and send the list to the council at York, or to the chancery, so that a commission of oyer and terminer could be appointed to punish the defaulters. The two selectors were warned to show no favours and take no bribes, under pain of imprisonment for a year and a day, and ransom at the king's will.

These arrangements are not only clear and workable, but also buttressed by the availability in usable form of the necessary information. Additionally, they included provision of the information necessary for effective follow-up action. Bannockburn had been a military, but apparently not an organisational, disaster.

The men selected in the array ordered in March 1322 were to be grouped into (often approximate) twenties, hundreds and constabularies. It is clear from the Liber Cotidianus of the king's household for the period 1 May 1322-19 October 1323\(^{77}\) that possibly the centenars, and particularly the vintenars, of the county levies were essentially part of their unit, not external appointments: they seem often to disappear from the army at the same time as their group of twenty.\(^{78}\) The levies thus organised were then to be led to the army's muster. Some eleven weeks, between 25 March and the assembly at Newcastle-upon-Tyne on 13 June, were allowed for completion of these processes. However, as in the case of Cornwall, subsequently writs of 16 May cancelled the instruction for these levies, substituting the recruitment of the one man per vill granted by the York parliament.\(^{79}\)

Measures to begin to accumulate supplies in the north were taken in March. As a preliminary, on 18 March a mandate to the bailiffs of Kingston-upon-Hull ordered them, as the king was coming to York for an expedition against the Scots, to proclaim that both native and foreign merchants could come safely with victuals and goods to sell, and that none would be taken without due payment.\(^{80}\) On 21 March similar orders

\(^{77}\) BL Stowe Ms. 553.

\(^{78}\) Ibid., ff. 81r, 81v. As the numbers being paid are recorded declining over time, the vintenars sometimes reduce in number as does the body of the foot, and are in fact counted in with them, as e.g. Northamptonshire: 30 July 440 foot, of whom 22 were vintenars; 11 August 240 foot, of whom 13 were vintenars. (Ibid., f.81r.) (This is an untypically large drop.)


\(^{80}\) CPR 1321-1324, p. 84.
to the mayor and bailiffs of Newcastle and the sheriffs of Lincolnshire and fourteen other counties went out, encouraging merchants to come to York and the north.\textsuperscript{81} Continuing this theme a series of protections were issued for men, presumably merchants, though not always explicitly described as such, and for the ships they were sending south to buy corn and victuals to bring to York and Newcastle. Ten were dated 25 March, some for more than one ship; those who received them had to have found sureties that they would not deliver their cargoes elsewhere, and would not communicate with the Scots - or the Flemings.\textsuperscript{82} This was an early recognition that the latter were to be a major problem. More protections were issued on 6, 7 and 8 April\textsuperscript{83} and many more in subsequent months.\textsuperscript{84} The total number of ships in these protections reached well over one hundred. In addition to these independent merchants there were others acting specifically for the king to obtain and transport supplies. Manautus\textsuperscript{85} and John Franciscus, and Bernard Armigus, merchants of Florence whom the king was sending overseas to buy corn and bring it to the king for the war with the Scots, received safe-conducts on 3 April.\textsuperscript{86} So did Selo Susse, 'the king's merchant', on 6 April, who was sent to obtain oats.\textsuperscript{87} Raymond Merkades of Penne in the Agenais, a king's merchant conveying wine, armour and victuals, was given a protection on 20 April. Three king's merchants bringing more wine, armour and victuals by ship for the maintenance of the king and his subjects in the north were given protections dated 28 April.\textsuperscript{88} Another foreigner was Godekin de Revel, 'merchant of Almain' who was 'conveying victuals and other wares from beyond the seas for the sustenance of the king and his lieges in the north, and of those coming to the north.'\textsuperscript{89} The condition in the protections for independent merchants that required them to give undertakings that the

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{81} CCR 1318-1323, p. 534.
\item \textsuperscript{82} CPR 1321-1324, p. 85.
\item \textsuperscript{83} Ibid., pp. 86, 87.
\item \textsuperscript{84} Ibid., pp. 109, 115, 116, 118, 134.
\item \textsuperscript{85} He delivered 1,198 quarters and 5 bushells of corn to Henry de Shiroles, receiver and keeper of victuals at Newcastle on 22 August. E101/16/18.
\item \textsuperscript{86} CPR 1321-1324, p. 90.
\item \textsuperscript{87} Ibid. On 4 May a safe-conduct was issued for the men of 'Siglavus Susse', king's merchant, with two ships going to buy and bring corn to the king in the north. Ibid., p. 107.
\item \textsuperscript{88} Ibid., p. 111.
\item \textsuperscript{89} Ibid., p. 118.
\end{itemize}
supplies they would bring north would not be taken to the Scots, suggests perhaps a rather surprising suspicion about loyalty and good faith.

No delivery dates being specified, the general purpose of this encouragement of merchants to bring supplies would seem to be the maintenance of a flow of provisions towards the army, rather than the setting up of an initial supply dump for the Newcastle and Carlisle musters.

The accumulation of such a store of supplies in readiness for the assembly of the army at Newcastle was put in hand on 24 March, by mandates for a number of sheriffs to purvey various victuals. Quantities of the different provisions - wheat, oats, barley-malt, hogs, beans, peas, and stockfish, small salt and salt of Poitou - were defined for each sheriff. The goods were to be sent, as they were bought, to be at Newcastle by 13 June, the current date for the muster. One of the king's clerks, allocated by name for each area, was sent to supervise the process. The clerk's role would seem to have been to keep an eye not only on the progress of the purveying, but also in particular on the despatch of the provisions and their delivery. The process took some time: the account of the sheriff of Essex, Nicholas Engargne, includes payment to the king's clerk John de Percebrigge for eighty-eight days from 9 April to 7 July for both videre provisiones predictas et eas festinare. Thomas de Eggefeli, the chancery clerk who was assigned to John Haward, sheriff of Norfolk and Suffolk, was paid for this task from 7 April to 22 August.

Naturally all this involved a series of arrangements, which were included in some detail in the mandates to the sheriffs. The sheriff of York was to purvey in Holderness specific quotas of wheat, oats, and barley-malt. The wheat was to be ground into flour and the flour put in barrels marked with their contents. 500 quarters of wheat and 800 of oats (the latter against a quota of 1,000 quarters) were purveyed in Essex. The actual buying of the grain was done, it appears, by the knight John de Lifton and another clerk, John de Crossety. The wheat was milled into flour, having been transported at the charge of the sheriff from the various places where it had been collected, to store in a granary at Chelmsford. Barrels were bought for the flour. These provisions were transported to ships, the freight costs, the wages of various officials and

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90 CPR 1321-1324, p. 90.
91 On 3 April sheriffs were ordered to pay these clerks, some at 2 shillings and some at 18 pence per day, for this work. CCR 1318-1323, p. 431.
92 E101/556/9.
93 BL Stowe Ms. 553, f. 41r.
94 CPR 1321-1324, p. 90.
other expenses being paid by the sheriff. The cost of the provisions was £410, and the wages and expenses amounted to another not inconsiderable £54/14/6. Nicholas Engargne had been succeeded as sheriff by Thomas Gobion at Michaelmas 1322, and it is the latter's figures that are in the Liber Cotidianus.95

The sheriffs were to make the purveyances out of the issues of their bailiwicks; this resulted in surer and more immediate payment to the owners than did the issue of tallies against the wardrobe or exchequer, and would have made the task much easier.

Only some counties, mainly those in the east, were included in this set of orders. Besides Holderness in Yorkshire, these were Lincolnshire, Norfolk and Suffolk (whose sheriff had to obtain the stockfish and salt from Great Yarmouth), Cambridgeshire and Huntingdonshire, Essex, Kent, Nottinghamshire and Derbyshire, Surrey and Sussex, Lancashire and Hampshire.96 To add to the stores at Newcastle, the seneschal of Gascony and the constable of Bordeaux were told on 1 April to obtain 2,000 quarters of wheat and 1,000 tuns of wine, also to be there by 13 June. The people of Gascony having already been asked for a money subsidy for the war, those officials should accept the supplies in lieu, or use money from the subsidy to pay for them. If neither course was practicable, they should pay out of the issues of the duchy.97 This concern for arranging payment echoes the instructions to the English sheriffs to use the issues of their own shires, and reflects consciousness of the desirability of reassuring suppliers about payment.

The total quantities of the three main victuals in these requisitions for Newcastle were 7,200 quarters of wheat, 7,500 of oats, and 2,000 of barley-malt. Newcastle was the mustering place for the magnates' serviciurn debitum and what extra they would bring, as well as, in theory, for the 27,900 foot from the commissions of array. The ratio of supplies to these numbers of mouths bears no particular relation to what was specified at this same time for the muster at Carlisle.98

95 BL Stowe Ms. 553, f. 44r.
96 CPR 1321-1324, p. 90.
97 Ibid., p. 94.
98 However, as described above, the safe-conducts for merchants and ships fetching supplies envisaged them delivering them at Newcastle, which could substantially augment what would be available there. Nevertheless, the apparently clear absence of correlation between virtually simultaneous planning numbers for men and those for supplies suggests that - surprisingly - the need for it was not properly recognised.
For this muster the commissions of array of 25 March sought 11,000 foot from Cumberland, Westmorland, Lancashire, Richmondshire and Craven, Derbyshire, Staffordshire and Herefordshire.\textsuperscript{99} Writs of 3 April summoned additional forces from Ireland to Carlisle. Richard de Burgh, earl of Ulster, was asked to come with his force at his own expense: Thomas earl of Kildare and thirty-three others were 'affectionately required and asked' to bring as much force as they could, and assist the justiciar, John de Birmingham earl of Louth, in what was required of him. He, with the help of the other nobles of Ireland, was to choose and bring to Carlisle for 13 June 300 men-at-arms, 1000 hobelars, and 6000 armed foot.\textsuperscript{100} The treasurer of Ireland was to pay their wages, from leaving Ireland, from the Irish treasury.\textsuperscript{101} Thus, in theory, the explicitly planned number to be at Carlisle was 18,300.

Ireland was also to be drawn upon for supplies. On 24 March the justiciar and treasurer of Ireland were told to purvey defined quantities of wheat, oats, barley-malt, beans, hogs, wine and salt to be delivered to the receiver of supplies at Carlisle by 13 June. Payment was to be made out of the issues of Ireland.\textsuperscript{102} Obtaining the quantities required gave rise to some difficulties, as may be seen from an order of 16 April. This empowered the justiciar and the treasurer to make the purveyances in the best way they could, even in privileged towns and markets. The supplies were urgently needed, or the Scottish expedition would be delayed. Though the king was not certain there was enough money to pay quickly, he promised that this purveyance would not make a precedent. City authorities were asked to permit this purveyance, in spite of their privileges.\textsuperscript{103}

With the additional 1,000 quarters of wheat, 1,000 of oats and 40 tuns of wine that Thomas de Lercedekne was to obtain in Cornwall and convey to Skinburness,\textsuperscript{104} this totalled 7,000 quarters of wheat, 5,000 of oats and 1,000 of barley-malt. For a theoretical two-thirds the number of men at Newcastle, the purveyances were for two-thirds as much oats, two-fifths as much barley-malt, and almost the same quantity of wheat.

\textsuperscript{99} excluding the towns of Derby, Stafford, Lichfield, Hereford and Leominster.


\textsuperscript{100} Ibid., p. 562.

\textsuperscript{101} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{102} CPR 1321-1324, p. 94.

\textsuperscript{103} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{104} Ibid., p. 90.
These comparisons are, of course, only of the planning figures at the end of March for preparations to invade Scotland. If the numbers of men specified were intended to be taken seriously, the contemporary purveying arrangements for their supplies, though spelt out in such detail, do not suggest the existence of calculated logistical planning. There may, of course, have been other factors known to those managing the mobilizations, for example different levels of stocks already at the two muster points. On the other hand, a different interpretation is suggested by Powicke: perhaps the large numbers of men to be levied were specified in order to induce the York parliament to make the grant of one better-equipped man per vill, in return for the abandonment of what would have been an onerous and costly burden, since the communities customarily bore part of the costs.105

Although Edward's intention was to invade Scotland after gathering his army together in June, it could not be assumed that Bruce would wait passively behind his border to be attacked. Arrangements had to be made to defend the march of Scotland against a sudden raid. Andrew Harclay, earl of Carlisle, was appointed captain and keeper of the northern counties of Yorkshire, Lancashire, Cumberland, Westmoreland and Northumberland, and of the bishopric of Durham, with power to array all their forces against the Scots. Sheriffs and constables and keepers of castles there were ordered to obey his orders should that need arise. The bishop of Durham was to return to his bishopric, array its forces, and have them ready for Harclay's orders.106 Writs of 6 April to Yorkshire wapentakes and various towns made appointments for the arraying of all men between the ages of 16 and 60, checking their equipment against the Statute of Winchester, punishing defaulters, organising them into the usual 20's, 100's and constabularies, and having them ready to go on Harclay's order. This was expressly stated as being to protect the march while the army was assembling at Newcastle.107 It is difficult to believe that such orders, reinforced as they were on 3 May by the instruction to be ready as the Scots were about to invade,108 did not to some extent affect and even confuse the preparations for raising the county levies ordered on 25 March, even before the counter-orders of 16 May caused them to be reversed.109

105 Powicke, Military Obligation, p. 103.
107 Ibid., p. 564.
108 Ibid.
109 The reversal included instructions to commissioners who had been appointed to collect a fine of 600 marks from Buckinghamshire and Berkshire to return any money
Efforts to obtain more troops for the Newcastle muster had continued. On 4 May London and forty other towns were asked for help against the Scots, in men or in some other way. On 9 April orders were issued for the recruiting of Welsh foot. The justiciar of Wales, Edmund earl of Arundel, or whoever was in his place, was to have the men chosen and led to the king at Newcastle by 13 June. The leaders were to be Griffin ap Rhees, as in February, for those from North Wales, and the king's valletus Rhees ap Griffith for those from South Wales. If they were not available the justiciar was to appoint others. As in the 25 March writs, specific numbers were allocated, 3,900 to counties, 3,400 to keepers of lands in the king's hands and 2,200 to individual marcher lords. Although the totals were large, the writs pointed out that the detailed allocations were for small numbers, to ensure that those chosen would be fit and strong. In all 10,000 were called for: in the event, as usual, this was not achieved. Those recorded in pay from various dates from mid-July numbered a little under 7,000. The combination of the round figure total, 10,000, and its very detailed and considered breakdown, is, however, evidence of central planning trying to use apparently reliable knowledge of local circumstances.

The Welsh could be marched to Newcastle, but for the forces coming from Ireland sea transport had to be found. The 3 April order to John Birmingham promised that a fleet from the south of England would be sent, 'as accustomed', a phrase suggesting again a well-informed central planning resource. On 3 April the bailiffs and men of Bristol and eleven other western ports were told to prepare ships to send to Dublin; on 14 April their destination was changed to Drogheda. On 24 April coordination of the raising of ships for duty in the west was delegated to that experienced clerk Alexander le Conyers, by a writ of aid in his favour to the sheriffs of already taken. The fine was made to be excused the 25 March levy of 500 men. Ibid., pp. 566, 575.

Ibid., p. 563.
111 Ibid., p. 565. The grand total came to 10,000, which included 500 from lands of Arundel himself and some others.

Ibid., p. 565. The grand total came to 10,000, which included 500 from lands of Arundel himself and some others.

112 BL Stowe Ms. 553, ff. 80r,80v.

114 CCR 1318-1324, pp. 530-31. They were to prepare as many as possible, to carry horse and foot to Carlisle on the orders of the justiciar of Ireland. The king was to be told how many they would provide, and for how long at their own expense. After that they would receive wages from the king.

Ibid.
the south-western counties.\(^\text{116}\) The region's ports were ordered on 25 April to tell him what they were doing to provide ships for transport between Ireland and Carlisle.\(^\text{117}\) He must have been an effective and reliable manager; the abbot of Beaulieu had to certify to Conyers that he was following an order to send his ships to Drogheda.\(^\text{118}\) on 7 May commissioners of array in the south-west were told to stay the levy if he certified that the ports were promising naval help.\(^\text{119}\)

Assembling an adequate amount of shipping proved difficult. On 15 May the justiciar of Ireland was told, as well as being notified of the new date of 24 July for the muster, that there was a shortage of ships to take the men and provisions to Carlisle. He was therefore to recall all Irish ships capable of this task. All suitable Welsh ships had correspondingly been ordered to Ireland.\(^\text{120}\) An extra problem was the danger from enemy ships. On 19 May he was told to keep those provisions he had been ordered to purvey in safe custody near the coast: the sea was infested with the king's enemies, and the provisions should wait until Robert de Leyburn came to convoy them to Skinburness.\(^\text{121}\) Robert de Leyburn, who was appointed on 19 May admiral of the fleet in the western sea,\(^\text{122}\) was eventually ordered, on 19 June, to go to Ireland with all the ships that were now ready and that he could obtain quickly, to convey troops from Ireland.\(^\text{123}\) This series of augmented arrangements may appear unsatisfactory, but it does at least suggest that a count was being kept of what shipping was becoming available, and being matched to needs.

Although it appears that the orders to the justiciar of Ireland were not in principle affected by the decisions at the York parliament at the beginning of May, the

\(^{116}\) CPR 1321-1324, p. 102.

\(^{117}\) CCR 1318-1323, p. 534.

\(^{118}\) Ibid., p. 531.


\(^{120}\) Ibid., Vol. II, div. ii, p. 570.

\(^{121}\) CPR 1321-1324, p. 126. The shipping of victuals and men from Ireland is seen in E101/15/36 - provisions, wine and other victuals sent to Skinburness from Waterford and Dublin in ships from Teignmouth and Ilfracombe, and E101/16/6 - account of John Cassel and Jordan Bretnagh of victuals provided at Drogheda and taken to Skinburness for the Scots war between 14 May and 18 August. In E101/16/16 there is a list of eight ships at Drogheda, and another twenty-one at Dublin paid for the freighting of a force of 73 men-at-arms, 304 hobelars and 93 foot.

\(^{122}\) CPR 1321-1324, p. 113.

\(^{123}\) CCR 1318-1323, p. 461.
those for the raising of forces in England were drastically changed. The earlier writs of 25 March calling for very large numbers of foot - 38,900 in all - to come to Newcastle and Carlisle at the expense of the counties were cancelled. They would have borne very heavily on the counties, and as noted above, Powicke suggests they may have been intended only as a bargaining counter. Probably it was in return for cancelling them that the government was able to obtain from parliament the grant of one armed and armoured foot-soldier from each vill that answered before the justices in eyre.

The time between the new date, 24 July, for the muster (the original one having been postponed 'at the request of the magnates in Parliament') and its general promulgations on 11 and 15 May allowed the same time as from 25 March to 13 June, almost ten weeks. To select the new force granted by parliament, commissioners were appointed in all the counties. As has been seen in the account of the variations in the requirements from Cornwall, they were to make the selection with the advice of the bailiffs of the lords of the vills or of the liberties. The bailiffs could be present if they so chose. Sheriffs were enjoined to assist the commissioners, one of whom was nominated to lead those selected to the muster. The commissioners were explicitly not to be paid their expenses by the vills or the counties, but were to receive them from the king. Since they were also to make a return under their seals of how many vills there were in their areas, that might have been in part at least to diminish the likelihood of local extortion or corruption. (The requirement to make the returns might also be seen as obtaining more potentially useful information at the centre.) The expense of providing the man would be substantial. He was not only to be properly equipped with both arms and modest defensive armour, but also, in an innovation, to serve for forty days after the muster at the charge of the vill.

Some of the commissioners appointed, but by no means all, were the same as for the 25 March levies. For Devonshire, Bedfordshire and Staffordshire both commissioners were the same as before, but these are exceptions. In thirteen cases one name recurs from earlier, but in the remaining eighteen the names are new. There were half-a-dozen sheriffs, of whom four were involved in March. In eight instances counties that were paired in March were allocated separate sets of commissioners in May. These administrative inconsistencies within a few weeks could well indicate that

124 Above, p. 70, n. 105.
127 The commissioners for Northamptonshire reported that one town was so impoverished that it could not provide anyone. Ibid., Vol. II, div. ii, p. 577.
the collection of the men granted by the York parliament was recognised as requiring special arrangements. The subdivisions of the pairs of counties tends to support that view.

Returns of the number of vills did not take long: Buckinghamshire's was dated 2 June.\textsuperscript{128} A number of writs read as if more than one man was required from many vills, though extra pressure had often to be applied to obtain them. Truro was told quite explicitly to send an extra two:\textsuperscript{129} a list of seventy-one vills was asked for another 273 men.\textsuperscript{130}

This may not necessarily be the correct interpretation. The order addressed to Henry de Chambernon and Reginald de Botereaux, and referring to the parliamentary grant, said that 'cities and boroughs' were excluded.\textsuperscript{131} A writ of 8 June said the king expected greater aid from certain places, in the words \textit{de quibus quidem civitatibus et burgis maius auxilium huius hominum armatorvm habere intendimus ut est iustum},\textsuperscript{132} and so told the Cornwall commissioners to induce, and if necessary compel, various boroughs to supply the one, two or three men assessed on them.\textsuperscript{133} Major towns had been excluded from the 25 March levies, and forty-one had been separately asked for help later, on 5 April. In May several of them, and Newcastle, were thanked for providing not inconsiderable numbers of armed men at their own expense. Spalding provided twenty.\textsuperscript{134} Exeter, Northampton, Cirencester, Oxford, Derby, Winchester, Leicester, Bedford, Cambridge and Newcastle provided numbers ranging from four to fifty.\textsuperscript{135} These towns were presumably responding to requests for support separate from the parliamentary grant.\textsuperscript{136}

Nevertheless, in the list of the payments to the 6,793 \textit{peditibus armatis} 'from the cities and vills of England serving at the cost of the towns and vills for forty days', men from some of these cities are added in with those from the whole county: Oxfordshire

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{128} Ibid., Vol. II, div. ii, p. 576.
\item \textsuperscript{129} Ibid., Vol. II, div. ii, p. 579.
\item \textsuperscript{130} Ibid., Vol. II, div. ii, pp. 580-1.
\item \textsuperscript{131} Ibid., Vol. II, div. ii, p. 573.
\item \textsuperscript{132} Ibid., Vol. II, div. ii, p. 581.
\item \textsuperscript{133} CPR 1321-1324, p. 130.
\item \textsuperscript{134} Parl. Writs, Vol. II, div. ii, p. 568.
\item \textsuperscript{135} CCR 1318-1323, p. 553.
\item \textsuperscript{136} From Norwich the king preferred to have £200, rather than 60 foot. Ibid., p. 554.
\end{itemize}
and Oxford are shown as one figure of 180, Devon and Exeter as 222, though Canterbury's twenty are counted separately from Kent's 240.137

Superficially at least this new procedure produced a worthwhile force: it numbered almost 7,000 properly equipped foot-men, obtained at little cost to the crown.138 On its own, however, it would not have been adequate for a major offensive, and the established procedure of levies on the counties was resumed in writs of 8 June. Arrayers, including some reappointments, were named for seventeen counties, or pairs of counties, from Yorkshire southwards through the east and centre of England to Sussex. As usual sheriffs were ordered to help in the process of selection by assembling men from whom the levy would be chosen. The commissioners were given power to punish recalcitrants. Quotas per county were mostly less than on 25 March: Yorkshire was asked for 2,000 rather than 7,000, Lincolnshire for 1,000 not 4,000, Warwick and Leicester for 600 not 800. The total came to 10,000,139 who were to be ready to go from Newcastle at the king's wages.140 Even so, the total of foot paid from, in most cases, 30 July was not quite 4,000, reducing during August by about 600. It included 186 foot-archers from Sussex, and 54 from the Forest of Dean; the 436 from Norfolk were better equipped, being noted as cum aketone. Otherwise the rest, the vast majority, were described as pedites nudi.141 To the contribution from these commissions of early June should be added 300 foot archers, selected from Kent and Sussex by Richard de Echingham from arrays arranged by the sheriff. Echingham was given authority also to supervise the selecting by the commissioners for those two counties of the pedites armati from the parliamentary grant,142 in what appears (from the absence of mention of anything similar) to be a unique arrangement at this time.

If the gap between the 10,000 summoned and the 4,000 recorded as in pay properly represents failure of the arrays, that failure may have been partly the consequence of roughly coincidental but conflicting orders. There were a large number

137 BL Stowe Ms 553, f. 82v.
138 Of course it too suffered from the unreliability of such conscripts; the sheriff of York was told to find and imprison some who had received their pay and then deserted, and to send their names to the king. Parl. Writs, Vol. II, div. ii, p. 602.
139 10,000 is the same round number as in the demands on the Welsh; the planning procedure must have begun, as one would expect, with the total wanted, which was then subdivided.
141 BL Stowe Ms. 553, ff. 81r,81v.
of discrete instructions for arraying the whole forces of various areas to defend against forecast or actual Scottish raids into England. These instructions went variously and at various times to local lords or knights, like for example Henry de Percy on 1 May, John Bustard and Thomas Fairfax in the Wapentake of Ainsty on 15 May, and again on 15 June and 6 July, John de Wisham and John de Ryther in the West Riding on 3 June, or to the sheriff of Nottinghamshire, the bishop of Durham, the earl of Richmond, and John de Penrith keeper of Northumberland, on 15 June. Such measures did cut across the muster programme. Following Bruce's incursion in the north-west late in June, on 2 July Andrew Harclay was ordered not to bring the levies of Cumberland, Westmorland and Lancashire to Newcastle, but to stay behind to defend the march. In that case, therefore, it is reasonable to assume that those troops were being raised originally for the muster at Newcastle. In the cases of the many other orders to assemble all the local force, including all men from 16 to 60 years old, and

144 Ibid., Vol. II, div. ii, p. 571.
149 Ibid., Vol. II, div. ii, p. 598. His contingent that eventually joined the main army late in August consisted of 2,069 foot, 1,435 hobelars, of whom about one quarter of the hobelars were paid 2d per day more than the rest - Fryde (Tyranny and Fall, p. 128, n. 46) suggests only they were mounted - and 58 men-at-arms. (BL Stowe Ms 553, f. 82v.) It is not clear how this force may have related to any numbers resulting from the call of 15 June to him as keeper of Cumberland and Westmorland to raise men of 16 to 60 years for defence. (Parl. Writs, Vol. II, div. ii, p. 586.) However, it seems fairly certain that Harclay had with him men resulting from the parliament's grant of one per vill, which was specifically for the Newcastle muster: Robert de Brampton and Richard de Denton who had charge of that levy in Cumberland had been ordered on 2 July not to send it to Newcastle, but to follow Harclay's orders, and the same order went to Westmoreland and Lancashire. Ibid., Vol. II, div. ii, p. 599.

150 Another possible instance is the instruction on 15 July to the men seeing to the collection of the one man per vill in the wapentakes of Yorkshire, to obey the orders of John de Wisham and John de Ryther. (Ibid., Vol. II, div. ii, p. 601.) The latter had been put in charge of the forces raised from general defensive levies in the wapentakes. Ibid., Vol. II, div. ii, pp. 584-5, 600.
have them ready to resist Scottish invasions, there is no mention of Newcastle or the muster on 24 July; they are thus probably not to be seen as part of the planned process of recruiting and assembling the army.\footnote{151} It might not be unfair to see all this as military panic producing managerial confusion.

Central government administrative machinery was not responsible for organising detailed response to the summons to the muster of \textit{servicium debitum}, or to the associated requests for as much extra force as possible, which had been promulgated either direct to important individuals or via sheriffs. However, on 20 June sheriffs were ordered to proclaim, and communicate to individuals as far as possible, that all bannerets, knights, esquires and mounted men-at-arms who were not already in the retinues of others, should come to the king. Threats of displeasure in the event of failure to respond to the proclamation were accompanied and underlined by the instruction that the sheriffs should report to the king the names of those to whom they had communicated the order.\footnote{152} This is another instance of collection of information at the centre for possible future action.

A final group of orders to raise foot for the muster from the Welsh march, though requiring their presence by 1 August, not 24 July, was issued on 15 and 16 July. Philip de Middleton, keeper of Montgomery, saw to three contingents of 100 and John Wrothe, keeper of Ewyas Lacy, to another 100. These were included in the count of c.7,000 Welsh foot.\footnote{153}

The total force assembled at Newcastle in August from all these arrays came to some 20,000, if the 2,069 foot whom Harclay had with him are included. To them must be added the cavalry force from the summons of the magnates and others, with their own retinues, counted by N. Fryde as totalling 'just under 300 knights, including earls, barons and other bannerets, and about 950 other fully armoured and equipped men-at-arms'.\footnote{154} Some 2,000 hobelars are also recorded, Harclay's 1,435 and some 600, in

\footnote{151} There is a possibility that the Yorkshire defence forces were added to the main army later. On 20 July the supervisors of the arrays in the three ridings were ordered to march their men to the king. (Ibid., Vol. II, div. ii, p. 602). The list of foot paid from 30 July and 1 August does include respectively 140 from the East and 170 from the West Riding. (BL Stowe Ms. 553, f. 81v). Confusingly, there is also a writ to John de Sutton and five others to choose 2,000 men from the East Riding, to be at the king's wages. \textit{Parl. Writs}, Vol. II, div. ii, p. 601.

\footnote{152} Ibid., Vol. II, div. ii, p. 586.

\footnote{153} BL Stowe Ms. 553, ff. 80r, 80v.

\footnote{154} Fryde, \textit{Tyranny and Fall}, p. 128.
small units. Additionally there were the 200 Gascon crossbowmen and lance-throwers, with the king from 27 July, and the 300 archers from Kent and Sussex chosen by Robert de Echingham. Other small units appear in the pay records: 29 crossbowmen from the queen's household, two soldarii ad arma with their five socii and twenty hobelars, and two other such small groups, who sound like mercenary troops. One record of the account of 'wages and expenses of Irish soldiers in the Scotch war' under John de Birmingham the justiciar, lists 73 men-at-arms, including four bannerets and six knights, 189 hobelars, 93 foot, and 115 others. The account says the wages are for the seventy-six days from 18 August, when they left Ireland; is it possible that this refers only to those who remained with Edward when he recrossed from Scotland to England in September? Did the large force of 6,000 foot, 1,000 hobelars and 300 men-at-arms Birmingham was told on 3 April to bring to Carlisle never materialise? Alternatively, as the writ ordering the justiciar to raise them said they were to be paid by the Irish treasury from leaving Ireland, they would not have appeared in the English accounts of Waltham. The group that does might be John de Birmingham's own retinue, paid separately by the crown. Even without an Irish contingent of some 6,000 this was a large army.

It achieved nothing except losses, and these due not to military action but to failure of supplies, as John de Trokelowe bemoaned, and the authors of Scalacronica and the Lanercost Chronicle agreed. A variety of arrangements had

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155 BL Stowe Ms. 553, ff. 82v, 82r.
156 Ibid., f. 83r.
157 Ibid.
158 Ibid., f. 82r.
159 Ibid., f. 83r.
160 Ibid., f. 82v.
161 E101/16/16.
162 Above, p. 61 n. 57.
been used to obtain provisions. Orders to sheriffs for purveyance and delivery to Newcastle by 13 June had been issued in March.\textsuperscript{165} In May they were told that they should adhere to that timetable, although the later muster date had been set.\textsuperscript{166} The same instruction went to John de Birmingham in respect of his purveyances for Carlisle. As has been seen, protections to many independent merchants to ship supplies to the north, without specific delivery dates, were being issued continuously. A protection was issued on 22 July for Henry le Kyngesfissher and John de Mounely, buyers in gross of victuals for the king and the army chosen by the commonalty of Lincoln, and another to Thomas de Secheforde and Geoffreys de Kelleston, similarly chosen by the town of King's Lynn on 10 August.\textsuperscript{167} On 16 July there was a writ of aid for Henry de Shirokes, receiver of victuals at Newcastle, appointed to purvey hay, oats and victuals in anticipation of the king's coming there.\textsuperscript{168} On 21 July a general order went to all bailiffs and officials to provide carriage by land or water, and give safe-conducts for the king's clerk Gilbert de Wygeton and others making purveyances to be sent to Scotland.\textsuperscript{169} On 23 July protection was issued for Robert Roterhyring and Walter de Cakehowe, purveying corn, fish and other victuals for the king in every market town.\textsuperscript{170}

In spite of this multiple effort to provision the army, John de Trokelowe describes it as short of supplies even before it entered the scorched earth of Lothian: Rex...exercitum magnum... contra Scotos congregavit. Quibus absque victualibus... in partibus Borealis ordinatis, et ad Novum Castrum super Tynam congregatis Rex cum suis regnum Scotiae hostiliter est ingressus.\textsuperscript{171} The shortage was then compounded by the failure of sea-borne deliveries, whether because of storms or possibly bad faith, and most probably because of interruption by hostile ships, especially the Flemings.\textsuperscript{172}

Edward's naval arrangements in the west have been referred to above.\textsuperscript{173} The east was obviously the more important, and most hazardous, sector, and considerable

\textsuperscript{165} Above, p. 67 n. 90.
\textsuperscript{166} \textit{CCR 1318-1323}, p. 555.
\textsuperscript{167} \textit{CPR 1321-1324}, p. 195. Leaving purveyance to men chosen by relatively responsible local communities could have had the effect of improving cooperation in a process that was inherently unpopular.
\textsuperscript{168} Ibid., p. 177.
\textsuperscript{169} Ibid., p. 192.
\textsuperscript{170} Ibid., p. 195.
\textsuperscript{172} McNamee, \textit{Wars of the Bruces}, p. 215.
\textsuperscript{173} Above, p. 71, n. 114; p. 72, nn. 116, 120, 121.
effort went into trying to protect it. As early as 1 March ports were told to prepare as many ships as possible to go to the Humber against the Scots.\footnote{CCR 1318-1323, p. 524.} Once the Newcastle muster had been set for 13 June, the Cinque Ports were asked on 25 March to provide their service, with a double complement of men, at Tynemouth by that date.\footnote{Ibid., p. 533.} On 1 April the men from the south-east coast ports north of the Thames were ordered to meet the bishop of Norwich and Walter de Norwico, keeper of the treasury, to agree suitable help for the war.\footnote{Ibid., p. 536.} They responded with offers of ships to come to Tynemouth for 13 June, and serve for two months at their own expense, for which the king thanked them.\footnote{Ibid., pp. 546-7. Great Yarmouth offered six for forty days at its expense; the king asked that to be changed to two months and that more should be made ready, to be at the king's charge, in case they were needed.} On 20 April the Cinque Ports, Great Yarmouth and the ports of Norfolk and Suffolk were told to prepare ships and be ready for the king's summons, to counter the danger from the Flemings.\footnote{CPR 1321-1324, p. 102.} On 24 April more ships were sought for Tynemouth from Waynefleet and another seven ports,\footnote{CCR 1318-323, p. 531.} and Hastings and the south-east ports were told on 10 May to recall ships at sea and have them ready to be there by 13 June.\footnote{Ibid., p. 550.} On 25 June, there being danger from enemy ships - typically of Edward's whole effort in this war of 1322 the initiative had been lost to the enemy - the east coast ports were told to recall their ships serving the king, and have them in port armed and ready to set out again when ordered by John Perbroun, the admiral. More ships were sought from these ports, on 25 June the sheriff of Norfolk and Suffolk also being told to raise five from other towns.\footnote{Ibid., pp. 462-3.} Generally, however, the provision of ships for his fleet had been sought directly from the ports' authorities.

It would probably be unfair to attribute the impression of administrative confusion over the mobilization for Edward II's invasion of Scotland in 1322 - typified by the account at the beginning of this chapter of the orders for Cornwall - to a failure of detailed management. The war became a humiliating failure partly because of an inappropriate strategy. The large numbers of foot recruited were not the most

\begin{footnotes}
\footnote{CCR 1318-1323, p. 524.}
\footnote{Ibid., p. 533.}
\footnote{Ibid., p. 536.}
\footnote{Ibid., pp. 546-7. Great Yarmouth offered six for forty days at its expense; the king asked that to be changed to two months and that more should be made ready, to be at the king's charge, in case they were needed.}
\footnote{CPR 1321-1324, p. 102.}
\footnote{CCR 1318-323, p. 531.}
\footnote{Ibid., p. 550.}
\footnote{Ibid., pp. 462-3.}
\end{footnotes}
appropriate type of force to deal with Bruce, and by their very numbers accentuated the problem of provisioning the army. Though not as many as asked for in the traditional commissions actually appeared, possibly because of confusion caused by defensive arrays, those who did assembled at the muster broadly on time. Responsibility for seeing to this was clearly put upon local knights and, in by no means all cases, the sheriff, whereas royal clerks were much involved in the purveying of provisions, and particularly in the movement of purveyed supplies to the north and the army. Local knights and some sheriffs also saw to the carrying out of the grant of one man per vill, which seems to have been quite successful, though such a judgement is hazardous in the absence of knowledge of the potential number of eligible places. In terms of administrative planning and performance it does appear that, in the absence of command of the sea, too much reliance was put on sea transport. Trokelowe described the consequence as victualibus...per mare ubique deficientibus, with the result that his quotation from Vegetius foretold: Saepius enim penuria quam pugna consumit exercitum & ferro savior fames est.\textsuperscript{182} The mobilization of naval support does not appear to have been well planned, giving the appearance of a series of hurried improvisations rather than of a considered strategy. The same uncertainty of strategic policy over the whole campaign could not have been compensated for by even superlatively efficient management.

\textsuperscript{182} Trokelowe, Annales, ed. H. T. Riley, p. 125.
The general historical interest of the War of Saint-Sardos lies primarily in the way its origins illustrate the ambiguities surrounding ducal rights and territory, and the inherent juridical weakness of the king of England in his feudal relationship, as duke of Aquitaine, with the French monarchy. As a military episode the war involved little more than a few skirmishes, several surrenders of towns, an uneventful siege ended by a truce, no major English campaign, and no set-piece battle. In spite of Edward II's bluster about his intentions to come personally to the aid of his duchy with a great force of men and supplies, no effective military action was taken. However, the flurry of changing plans gives some picture of the methods and resources used by the crown for the raising and movement of troops, and of how well or badly they worked. The records of purveyance of supplies demonstrate the attention to detail that was necessary. Throughout, the initiative - legal, political, and military - was held by the French. Consequently the English administration was faced several times with the need to amend its plans for the recruitment, timing of muster and destination of its forces, adding to the inherent difficulties of implementing them.

It is perhaps helpful first to summarise the sequence of events to which it had to respond, before analysing the responses in detail. The immediate origin of the conflict came in November 1323 at Saint Sardos with the affront to the French king's authority by Raymond de Montpezat. The failure of English Gascon officials to respond to the consequent French summons early in 1324 was aggravated by the efforts in April of the English embassy of the earl of Kent and the archbishop of Dublin to secure

1 The longer term origins - the difficult feudal relationship of the kings of England, as dukes of Guyenne/Aquitaine, to the king of France, apparently settled in 1259, the willingness of French officials and the Parlement in Paris to hear appeals by Gascons from ducal judgements, the uncertainties about the transfer of territory under the treaty of 1259, and the reserved rights of the privilegiati not to be transferred against their will - are set out in, among others, War of Saint-Sardos, ed. P. Chaplais, M. G. A. Vale, The Angevin Legacy and the Hundred Years War (Oxford, 1990) and Sumption, Hundred Years War.
postponement of Edward's homage. By May 1324 the need to be able to defend
Edward's French lands was becoming recognisable, and preparations to do so had
begun. In June Charles IV formally declared Gascony and Ponthieu forfeit. In July
appointments were made to the command of a small English force to go to France, and
the earl of Kent was appointed Edward's lieutenant in Gascony. When Charles de
Valois' invasion began in August Kent was unable to offer any material resistance.
Besieged in La Reole from 25 August, in September 1324 he had to surrender the
town. Because the French had problems with Flanders, he was, however, able to secure
a truce that would last six months, until March 1325. Consequently the larger scale
preparations for an English expedition, which were being made in August, were
abandoned. New plans for assembling and embarking a substantial force to recover the
duchy had therefore to be made, at first to sail in March 1325. In February, at the
request of the English magnates, who said that the planned 17 March embarkment date
gave them too little time to prepare, Edward postponed the general embarkation to 17
May 1325. Advance detachments under the earl of Surrey departed earlier, reaching
Bordeaux on 10 and 11 May. By May 1325 negotiations through Queen Isabella were
leading towards agreement, so that on 1 May 1325 the general passage was postponed
again, to 2 August, and in July the muster was effectively cancelled.

There were thus several virtually distinct plans for the raising of an armed force
during the period from May 1324 to July 1325, the administrative arrangements for
which will be examined in this chapter. It appears that at first Portsmouth and
Plymouth were intended as the ports for embarkation of an expedition, to sail in June
1324. Almost immediately Plymouth was preferred, and a later date had to be chosen.
In the event, a small fleet sailed from Plymouth in September. In August orders
envisaged assembly of a new larger army to sail from Portsmouth, at dates successively
postponed and then ultimately, on 17 September 1324, abandoned. Finally, at the end
of the year writs were issued for the large army that would be necessary if Aquitaine
were to be recovered by force. Though a small contingent did reach Bordeaux in May
1325, successive prorogations of the muster date, and its ultimate cancellation, meant
that this force never assembled.

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The first plan envisaged fleets at both Portsmouth and Plymouth: the logistics of preparing to support the duchy naturally depended upon organisation of shipping to carry men, horses, arms, supplies of all sorts and money to Gascony. As the impending threat became obvious, on 10 May 1324 two sets of instructions went out to assemble transport. Mayors, bailiffs and the whole communities of one list of thirteen ports were told to prepare and crew 41 of 'the greatest ships of the town', specific numbers being allocated to each port. These ships were to be at Portsmouth by 10 June. The other list, also of thirteen ports, was to provide 23 ships, to be at Plymouth by the same date. These orders of 10 May went direct to the town officials, who were told to report to the king the names of the ships and their masters.

The ships were to act as transports for men-at-arms and their mounts, and other men; some therefore had to be specially equipped to carry the horses. The orders stated that the sheriff of Hampshire had been ordered to provide the necessary gangways and hurdles, both for the ships destined for Portsmouth and for those for Plymouth. He was to be responsible for the carriage of that equipment to those two assembly ports. Additional writs make it clear that the arrangements for equipping the ships involved other officials as well. A writ of aid, also of 10 May 1324, for two king's clerks, John Devery and Nicholas Acton, described them as appointed to purvey with the king's money gangways and hurdles for the ships recently ordered to Portsmouth. Further, under the same date, the sheriffs of Hampshire, Surrey, Sussex and Wiltshire, and the keeper of the bishopric of Winchester, were ordered to let the two clerks have timber, poles and other things for that purpose. The important coordinating role of the clerks can be seen in the instructions to Devery, assumed to have a May date. He was to go to the ports from Southampton westwards (which suggests that Nicholas Acton would have had similar instructions for the easterly ports), to see that all the ships were readied and manned. The scale of manning was precisely defined. A ship of 240 tons

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7 CCR 1323-1327, pp. 182-3; pp. 186-7. Both explain that action is necessary 'as the king understands that certain men are endeavouring to usurp his rights in the duchy of Aquitaine and to attack the duchy with armed force.'

8 Ibid.

9 CPR 1321-1324, p. 413.

10 Ibid., p. 417. Devery, who was being sent to prepare and hasten the ships, was ordered on 27 May to be paid 100 shillings towards his expenses. (CCR 1323-1327, p. 110.) Nicholas Hugate's accounts, (BL Add. Ms.7967, f. 2r), show a payment, via John Devery, assigned to certain ships of Hampshire, Somerset, Devon and Cornwall, of 66s 8d.
was to have a master and a crew of 60 mariners, of whom two were to be constables, and a ship of 60 tons (the smallest) a master and a crew of 21 including one constable.\textsuperscript{11} Devery was to check with the men of the ports what the ships' carrying capacities were for men and horses, and advise the sheriffs responsible for the purveying of the special equipment as to what was needed. He was to report to the chancellor or treasurer as he proceeded the names of the ships, their ports, their masters, and the crew numbers, 'for the more precise payment thereof...'(i.e. their wages in advance for twenty days' sailing) 'and better purveyance of their victuals in time.' He was also to report to them any official who defaulted, so that they could take appropriate action. Taken together these arrangements seem, not surprisingly, a very practical procedure, assuming of course reasonable degrees of cooperation and communication between port officials, the two clerks and the sheriffs. In particular the clerks' instructions to report the crew numbers so that appropriate amounts of provisions could be obtained shows that such calculations were being made. One aspect that looks a little odd is in the allocation of ships to the two assembly ports: seven eastern places - Hastings, Romney, Harwich, Ipswich, Dunwich, and even Great Yarmouth and Little Yarmouth - were to send their ships to the more westerly rendezvous, Plymouth.\textsuperscript{12}

Before the end of May variations in these plans were being made, Plymouth becoming the only assembly port. The local officials - mayors and bailiffs - and the communities of the ports originally told to send their ships to Portsmouth were told on 20 May to send them to Plymouth, certifying 'without delay' the names of the ships and their masters.\textsuperscript{13} Weymouth, one of these ports, was ordered, also on 20 May, to send six ships there, instead of as previously ten to Portsmouth.\textsuperscript{14} These orders were reinforced by instructions to the sheriffs of Hampshire, Sussex and Dorset to go in person to the ports of the original 'Portsmouth' list in their counties (Sandwich, Winchelsea, Faversham and Rye were not to receive a similar visit) to hasten the preparations. The sheriffs of Dorset, Devon and Cornwall were similarly to go to the western ports of the 'Plymouth' list. The king would be now be arranging for the gangways and hurdles to be brought from Southampton to Plymouth.\textsuperscript{15}

Less than a week later, on 26 May 1324, still more changes were put in hand. The local officials and communities of Lyme, Plymouth, Teignmouth and Exmouth had

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{11} CPR 1321-1324, pp. 417-8.
  \item \textsuperscript{12} CCR 1323-1327, pp. 186-7.
  \item \textsuperscript{13} Ibid., p. 186.
  \item \textsuperscript{14} Ibid., p. 187.
  \item \textsuperscript{15} Ibid., p. 187, dated 20 May.
\end{itemize}
to provide two ships each instead of just one. The buying and delivery to Plymouth of the gangways became the responsibility of the sheriffs of Dorset and Devon, in whose counties these ports were.\textsuperscript{16} Boldre, Lymington and Keyhaven (the two latter towns had not been in either of the 10 May lists) were required to supply two ships 'instead of one', and Southampton two, not six. Gangways would be supplied by the sheriff of Hampshire, who was to make similar provision for equipping the ships from Yarmouth in the Isle of Wight, and Hamble and Hamelok. The sheriff of Cornwall was to provide equipment for the ship from Fowey, the sheriff of Devon for those from Dartmouth, and the sheriff of Dorset for those from Weymouth, Poole and Wareham. The sheriffs were to purvey the equipment 'by the view and testimony of John Devery, or of a person to be deputed by John'.\textsuperscript{17} Thus there is the same basic procedure: direct orders to local officials in the ports, supplementary action by the various sheriffs in whose shires the ports were, and a coordinating and overseeing role given to the king's clerk.

The net effect of these changes of 20 May and 26 May was to make Plymouth the assembly point for 34 ships from ports west of Portsmouth; the local officials of Portsmouth and ports to the east were told, on 26 May, not to send their allocated numbers of ships to the king's service, but 'the said ships and other ships of that town to be at the king's service when summoned'.\textsuperscript{18} The reference to 'other ships of that town' would seem to refer to a blanket order of 10 May to all ports, including ports in Wales and Ireland, to have ready to set out in the king's service at three days' notice all ships capable of carrying 40 tuns or more of wine. As before, these orders were addressed to the ports' local officials, who were to report their numbers of ships to the king. When needed these ships would form the fleets of the two admiralities, from the Thames northwards and from the Thames southwards.

The planned assembly at Plymouth ran into difficulties. Hearing of the intention to requisition them for royal service, masters of ships from various western towns in Dorset and Devon took their vessels out of port. On 5 June, expressing intention to punish the defaulters, orders went now to the sheriffs themselves to make up the

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{enumerate}
\item Ibid., p. 186.
\item Ibid., pp. 187-8.
\item Ibid., p. 188. The supercession of the orders to the eastern ports presumably explains why the clerk Nicholas Acton ceased to be mentioned - the east, it was suggested above, would have been his area - while his colleague John Devery continued to be heavily involved.
\end{enumerate}
\end{footnotesize}
numbers from the other ports of these two counties, to assemble by 24 June. The sheriff of Somerset and Dorset, Thomas de Marlberge, was explicitly told to obtain replacement shipping from Melcombe, and Nicholas Hugate's account records that he did. However, on 13 June, orders went to the sheriffs of all the counties sending ships to Plymouth to tell their owners and masters that the assembly was prorogued to 8 July. The sheriffs were ordered to have the gangways and hurdles delivered there before that date.

The entry in Hugate's account gives details that fill out the picture of the sheriffs' actions. Thomas de Marleberge was acting by authority of an order under the great seal, and the view and witness of John Devery. Two ships from Poole and three from Weymouth were equipped at his charge to carry horses; the other from Weymouth, two from Melcombe and one from Lymm were for men. The sheriff of Cornwall brought wood from Liskeard via Lostwithiel to equip the Fowey ship for horses. The sheriff of Devon, acting by order of the treasurer, the bishop of Exeter, and of Richard Damory, seneschal of the household, provided a long list of material - wood, beams, hurdles, nails and so on - for '41 ships coming to Plymouth. The sheriff of Hampshire fitted out five Southampton ships and one each from Lymington and Hamble, also for horses. Thus, as these changes from the original orders of 10 May to the two sets of ports proceeded, the role of the sheriffs became increasingly important.

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19 Ibid., p. 194. In this order the previous assembly date for ships from Weymouth, Poole, Warham and Lyme is referred to as the octaves of Holy Trinity, i.e. 17 June.

20 BL Add. Ms. 7967, f. 8r.

21 CCR 1323-1327, p. 194. Additionally, on 19 June the sheriff of Southampton was told to find and equip an extra two ships. Ibid., p. 195.

22 BL Add. Ms. 7967, f. 8r.

23 Ibid. On 20 May the 41 ships originally ordered to be at Portsmouth were redirected to Plymouth. (CCR 1323-1327, p. 186.) (It is possible that, in spite of the identical number, this is not a reference to them, as also on 20 May Weymouth was told it could reduce its number from ten to six [CCR 1323-1327, p. 187], which reduced the total from 41 to 37, and at that time it seems that another 23 ships from other ports were still expected at Plymouth. However, on balance the simple connection should probably be accepted.)

24 BL Add. Ms. 7967, f. 8v.
The earliest measures to recruit and assemble troops expressly to be taken to Aquitaine were dated 4 June 1324. These ordered arrival at Plymouth by 8 July, made no reference to Portsmouth, and were immediately followed on 5 June by orders for ships to assemble on 24 June; they do not seem, therefore, to be related to those first orders of 10 May requiring ships to be at both ports by 10 June. Although in theory it is possible to envisage an intention to have ships waiting for nearly a month to embark the troops as soon as they came to Plymouth, it seems more likely that a two week gap - like that now planned, from 24 June to 8 July - would have been considered adequate. Not until 8 August was there an order for any troops to report to Portsmouth, and this required their arrival there by 27 August in a new and different operation.

It may be that the 10 May instruction to assemble 41 transport ships at Portsmouth by 10 June is evidence of a rapidly abandoned scheme. Together with the question of what was the purpose of simultaneously allocating another smaller fleet to Plymouth, from some ports as far away as Great Yarmouth, this may be early evidence of the vacillating planning that bedevilled the conduct of the war of Saint Sardos. The changes, described above, in numbers of ships required from individual ports, and in responsibility for equipping them, suggest consequent management uncertainty.

The recruiting order of 4 June appointed commissioners in thirteen counties for the selection of 2,070 foot archers, to be marched to Plymouth by 8 July to go to Aquitaine. Three commissioners were appointed to select 500 from Kent, Surrey and Sussex combined. Elsewhere two were appointed per county. In Somerset and Dorset one of the selectors was, unusually, the sheriff. The selections were to be made from assemblies of potential recruits, organised by sheriffs of the counties at times and places determined by the commissioners. One of each set of commissioners was named to lead those selected to Plymouth. A week later, on 11 June, revised orders were issued to the commissioners. Their contingents were to be marched first to various staging points - Wells, Westminster, Winchester, Exeter and Dunstable - by 1 July (or in some cases a day or so later). There they would be arrayed - inspected for both numbers and equipment - and paid. They would then be marched on to Plymouth, in several

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instances under a different leader. On 14 June still further changes were ordered. At the staging points selections were to be made from each contingent, to a new reduced total of 1,060 men. Those making the selection were to act by the advice of the sheriff, except in the case of Gloucester, where the adviser was Robert de Sapy, keeper of the castle of St. Briavel and of the Forest of Dean. Each selected contingent was then to go to Plymouth under one of the selectors, nominated as the leader for the journey.

These three sets of orders were issued within two weeks, on 4, 11 and 14 June. They not only successively varied the instructions of their predecessor, they also, even within this short space of time, often gave new responsibility to new men. For example, on 4 June in Somerset and Dorset the sheriff and William de Fauconberge were told to choose 330 foot archers, and de Fauconberge was to lead them to Plymouth. On 14 June, de Fauconberge was told to take them to Exeter, but from there 100 Somerset men chosen by John de Clyvedon and John de Lortye were to go to Plymouth under de Lortye, and 70 chosen from the Dorset men by John Latymer and John Peverel were to go under the latter.

Seventeen individual commissioners were named in the 4 June orders, nineteen in those of 14 June. Eleven of these were not in the 4 June list, while twelve of that list have disappeared from the 14 June names. The decision of 11 June to insert staging points into the march to Plymouth, to be reached a week before the final muster date, would have had the practical benefits of facilitating payment of wages, and more importantly gave an opportunity to correct any inadequacy of numbers or equipment. On the other hand, the need also to make such wholesale changes in the allocation of responsibilities does suggest, yet again, rushed planning and inadequate forethought. Worse, the 11 June orders to go via the staging points still spoke of the original total of 2,070 men to be marched to Plymouth, only for the figure to be halved three days later.

29 CCR 1323-1327, pp. 199-200.
30 CPR 1321-1324, p. 430.
31 Ibid., p. 424.
32 Ibid., p. 430.
33 On 15 June Nicholas de Hugate 'receiver of the money to be paid for the matters touching the duchy of Aquitaine' was ordered to have men at each of the staging points to pay the usual wages 'to the footmen archers and to their conductors' when they march to Plymouth.' CCR 1323-1327, pp. 123-4.
The net result of these elements of this first plan to reinforce the duchy would have been to have at Plymouth by the second week of July some 1,000 or more foot archers, and some 34 large ships. 34 ships were capable of transporting far more than that number of foot, and of course many had been specially equipped to carry men-at-arms and their horses as well.

On 16 July two appointments were made for this expedition. John de Segrave the elder and Fulk Fitzvarin were 'to be captains and leaders of the barons, knights, men-at-arms, footmen and others for the duchy assembling at Plymouth'.35 This demonstrates that a respectable body of cavalry was expected, though government records do not show how this was being raised. One or two of the seventy or so obtaining protections are recognisable as leaders of the foot archers.36 One possibility could be that individuals would make contracts with the king, as John de Warenne, earl of Surrey, did in March 1325. No general appeal or order to magnates and others owing service had been made, there being as yet no 'war', since Charles de Valois did not invade the duchy until early August. Hugate's account records payment of wages to Segrave, Fulk and many others from dates around the beginning of August; the commencing date is described as when their horses were valued at Plympton in the presence of Richard Damory, steward of the household, John de Felton, marshal of the army and Nicholas Hugate, clerk.37

Also on 16 July John de Crombwell was appointed admiral of the fleet and captain of the sailors going on the king's service to the duchy.38 This was an appointment separate from the later major appointments, about August,39 of Robert Bendyn as admiral of the fleet of the Cinque Ports and other ports to the west, and John

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34 The earl of Arundel, justiciar of Wales, also was told to recruit and arm 100 or 200 footmen from South and West Wales to be taken to Plymouth by 8 July to go to Aquitaine. (CCR 1323-1327, p. 113.) On the other hand, not all the archers finally chosen to go to Plymouth actually came there. The sheriff of Gloucester was told on 3 August to arrest and imprison men from the Forest of Dean and Berkelehirnes who had returned without licence. CCR 1323-1327, p. 205.

35 CPR 1324-1327, p. 5.

36 There are some 70 protections for named individuals explicitly described as going to Aquitaine (or 'Gascony' or 'the duchy'), with dates from 10 June to 18 July. CPR 1321-1324, p. 428 etc.; CPR 1324-1327, p. 3 etc.

37 BL Add. Ms. 7967, ff. 30r et sqq.


39 CPR 1324-1327, p. 11.
de Sturmy as admiral for the fleet from the Thames northwards. It therefore indicates that the forces assembling at this time, from mid-July 1324, at Plymouth were not intended as the major expedition.

It is not easy to construct a description of confident, coordinated planning from the orders issued in May and June. Those of 10 May for assembly of two small fleets and for having ready the rest of the 40-ton ships were not accompanied by orders to levy foot soldiers. The rapid abandonment of the collection of a fleet at Portsmouth and the changes in orders to individual ports give an impression of ill-considered arrangements. The postponements of assembly at Plymouth, on 5 June to 24 June, and then on 13 June to 8 July, may have been partly determined by the failure of some ships to obey instructions.40 However, the date for assembly of foot archers, 8 July, was set on 4 June, the day before the first postponing order for the small fleet, which suggests that perhaps there was an intention to coordinate the two. If departure in early July was the aim, it was badly missed. Hugate’s accounts show not only that the cavalry was not assembling at Plympton until the beginning of August, but also that Devery was paid from 28 May until 8 August for his coordinating commission.41 Another entry refers to the royal clerks William de Wetwang, Robert de Driffield and William de Hugate. They had been assigned to Plymouth to see to the unloading of ships from Southampton bringing victuals, and to the issuing of them to men-at-arms and foot, by order of the lords of the treasury and the seneschal of the household, and were occupied in this as late as August and September.42 This expedition from Plymouth eventually began to board ship on 15 September 1324.43 It carried John de Segrave and Fulk Fitzwarin, commanders of the force assembling at Plymouth, and Nicholas Kiriel who was designated on 14 June leader of the Kentish contingent to Plymouth.44 Its preparation took a lot longer than apparently originally intended.

In August larger-scale preparations for combating the French threat were put in hand, the seriousness of that threat now being obvious. Thus on 1 August the preamble to the commissions of array issued for all counties 'pursuant to the late proclamation

40 Above, p. 86 n.18.
41 BL Add. Ms. 7967, f. 8v.
42 Ibid., f. 7v.
43 Ibid., f. 1r.
44 Nicholas Hugate's letter to Hugh le Despenser. (War of Saint Sardos, ed. P. Chaplais, pp. 59-60.) This gives the date of sailing as 18 September, not 15th as in his accounts. (BL Add. Ms. 7967, f. 1r.) A possible explanation may be that it took three or four days for all the ships to be filled and then sail.
and the statute of Winchester... in defence of the realm' included the explanation 'especially now that the king of France is gathering a great army against the king and the duchy of Aquitaine.' These commissions seem to have been primarily a census: they required a return of the numbers of horse and foot to be armed with steel armour, and of the residue of all fencible men. They were followed on 6 August by orders, to the same commissioners, to see to the establishment of a force of a specific number of footmen in each county, excluding the chief cities. A defined proportion of each force - about one-fifth - was to have available better armour than specified in the Statute of Winchester. The extra armour, provided at the expense of the commonalty of the county, was to be kept by the towns. Two features of the specific numbers are noteworthy. Each is a multiple of twenty, the basic module of the organisation of foot. More importantly, the total comes to the round figure of 20,000. Obviously, therefore, the central authority decided this first, and then allocated it between the counties.

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45 CPR 1324-1327, pp. 8-10.

46 Paying for this equipment gave rise to some complaints. On 25 September the Norfolk commissioners were told not to try to make the men of Blakeney who had contributed to the cost of ships for the king's service contribute also to the cost of the armour. (CCR 1323-1327, p. 225.) A similar order went to Devon on behalf of Teignmouth. (Ibid., p. 233, dated 30 October.) In fact, on 19 September a general order went to all the commissioners of 6 August. They were to restore to the towns money they had levied with which to buy the extra arms themselves. Purveying of these arms was to cease. In carrying out the array the commissioners were to associate with themselves two men of each hundred, who were to subdivide the county's quota among the hundreds. Men were to be chosen in each town, who were to assess the citizens and buy arms and armour. (CPR 1324-1327, p. 29.) Powicke suggests that the changes of 19 September were not just administrative, but reflected discontent at 'the extension of the obligation and the fact that it was at the expense of the people.' Military Obligation, pp. 147-8.

47 As usual, the commissioners were to array the men in twenties and hundreds.

48 What the basis of allocation was is a matter for speculation. It is unlikely, of course, in orders issued on 6 August, to have been based on returns asked for as recently as 1 August. Records of previous arrays could perhaps have been used as one factor. The 160 from Cumberland and 80 from Westmoreland no doubt reflect population size. As two of the largest allocations were 1,040 each to Kent and Norfolk, it is possible that another consideration may have been exposure to invasion from France.
Except for Norfolk, with four commissioners, and Leicestershire and Northamptonshire with three, two were named for each county. The arrangements did not parallel shrieval organisation: Somerset and Dorset, like Shropshire and Staffordshire, Surrey and Sussex, and the other twinned counties, were separated. Yorkshire was sub-divided into its Ridings, Kent into East and West, and Lincoln into Lindsey, Kesteven and Holland, each sub-division having two commissioners. Familiar names reappear, experience like that of Thomas Ughtred of Yorkshire\(^{49}\) being of undoubted benefit in the task of arraying. However, a comparison with those nominated to raise forces of foot archers a few weeks earlier, in the first half of June, shows no particular pattern. In Hampshire John de Ticheborne and Edmund de Kendale functioned on both occasions, as did Nicholas Gentil and John de Ifeld for Sussex.\(^{50}\) Ralph Sauvage again in Kent, Philip de Aylesbury in Buckinghamshire and Walter Gracelyn in Wiltshire had different associates in August. Alan de Boxhull, who in June helped to select the men from Surrey and Sussex and led them to Plymouth, in August was an arrayer for Dorset. To complete the comparison, three of the sets of recruiters of 4 June, those for Essex, Gloucestershire, and Oxfordshire and Berkshire, supplied no-one to the arrayers of 1 and 6 August. Thus it is difficult to see any substantial consistency or continuity in these arraying arrangements by counties, just as there is very little in the personnel in the 4 and 14 June appointments. Although it is a general observation that the crown was accustomed to use men of local standing for a variety of purposes, this small degree of continuity seems likely to have been unnecessarily inefficient.\(^{51}\)

\(^{49}\) in 1322 constable of Pickering castle, raising men in Yorkshire in March, in June surveyor of the array in the East Riding, in July leading the East Riding levies against the invading Scots, again an arrayer for Yorkshire in April 1323. _CPR 1321-1324_, pp. 135, 97, 131, 192, 274.

\(^{50}\) In the 4 June orders they were associated with Roger de Bavent, and the three of them recruited from Surrey and Kent as well.

\(^{51}\) It is not easy to see why there should have been such an _ad hoc_ air about the promulgated appointments, involving so many changes from those recently made. Subsequently to the promulgation replacements were ordered where the original nominee was unable to serve for such reasons as illness, old age or other duties (cf. the changes to commissioners of array of 4 October [_Parl. Writs_, Vol. II, div. ii, p. 679]), but this does not adequately explain why new names appeared in the first place. Avoiding over-loading particular individuals who might raise objections could possibly
The intention of these orders of 6 August was to make the realm ready for
defence, not to assemble an army to go to Aquitaine. In preparation for that, writs of
military summons had gone out on 4 August to Thomas earl of Norfolk, marshal of
England, and other magnates, including eight earls. These asked the recipients to
prepare both horse and foot *quanto potentius poteritis* to be ready to set out with the
king for the defence of his kingdom, noting that the king of France had assembled a
large army to attack the duchy. They were to report what size of force they would
provide. On 28 July ports were told to send their ships to the king's service to
Portsmouth, for 27 August. For an army collected from the whole kingdom,
Portsmouth would presumably be a more appropriate mustering location than Plymouth.
Ports from the Thames north formed one fleet under John de Sturmy, and those from
the Thames west the other, under Robert Bendyn, possibly as much to inhibit trouble
between the rival seamen as for strategic purposes. These two 'captains and admirals'
received authority on 6 August to see to the selection of men for the ships, as did Robert
Bataille, a baron of the Cinque Ports, and Stephen de Padeham for the ships of
Winchelsea 'appointed for the king's service', on 8 August.

The major cities had been excluded from the 6 August orders for the raising of
numbers of foot for defence. However, on 8 August nine of these cities were asked *in
fide et dilectione* to raise foot themselves, but these men were not for defence: they
were to go to Portsmouth. They were to be there by 27 August, where the fleet would
be ready to sail. The total was only 800, but as in the case of the counties there was
an allocation of a specific number to each town, ranging from London's 300 to
Rochester's 20. Similarly, as for the counties, all allocations were multiples of twenty.
The raising of these men was to be undertaken not by specially appointed
commissioners, but by the towns' officials themselves, for example the mayor and
sheriffs of London.

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53 C61/36, m. 29.
54 *CPR 1324-1327*, p. 11.
55 London, Canterbury, Rochester, Winchester, Salisbury, Southwark,
56 Ibid. It is worth noting that the ships and this admittedly small body of troops
were to be at the port at the same time, i.e. the plan was not to have the ships there first.
Not for the first time, the timetable was very soon changed, 27 August for reporting to Portsmouth becoming, on 20 August, 10 September.\textsuperscript{57} This was followed on 21 August by writs appointing commissioners to raise extra bodies of foot archers to be at Portsmouth for the new date.\textsuperscript{58} A total of 900 were to be selected in Kent, Surrey and Sussex, Hampshire and Gloucester.\textsuperscript{59} Again, the appointments show no particular pattern. Neither James de Norton nor John de Scures, the sheriff, had been given responsibility for recruiting in Hampshire in the June or early August arrangements. Ralph Sauvage and Nicholas Gentil were appointed again for Kent and Surrey and Sussex respectively, but with new associates.

On the other hand, William Tracy and Robert Seliman had jointly organised the 14 June selection of 200 foot archers in Gloucestershire, and, as then, William Tracy was now to lead the men selected to Portsmouth. This reappointment could be argued to show considerable tolerance on the part of the government, or possibly a shortage of potential commissioners. The June selection of men from Gloucester had been badly handled. Footmen, having received wages and arms from the towns, had failed to report to Plymouth, and on 13 July the three responsible for selecting them - Tracy, Seliman and Robert de Sapy - had been ordered to give ‘the sheriff of Gloucester’ the names of the defaulters.\textsuperscript{60} The sheriff was ordered to arrest and imprison them,\textsuperscript{61} then on 13 August to release them, provided they found mainpernors that they would now report to Portsmouth for 27 August,\textsuperscript{62} and finally on 18 August, to tell them the new date, 10 September, to be there, and to rearrest any who refused to find mainpernors.\textsuperscript{63} As William Tracy had been responsible for leading them to Plymouth, and the sheriff’s authority had had to be brought in to deal with his failure, his appointment to take the new levy of 300 to Portsmouth is surprising. In fact, on 7 September both William

\textsuperscript{57} Ibid., Vol. II, div. ii, p. 671.
\textsuperscript{58} Ibid., Vol. II, div. ii, pp. 672-3.
\textsuperscript{59} The total was allocated in specific detail to each of the counties, but unusually the allocations were all multiples not of twenty but of fifty. The figures were Kent 150, Surrey and Sussex 250, Hampshire 200, and Gloucester 300.
\textsuperscript{60} CCR 1323-1327, p. 202.
\textsuperscript{61} Ibid., p. 205 (3 August). Gloucester levies proved unreliable again in 1325. The sheriff was told in April to arrest 108 men who had refused to be conscripted (Parl. Writs, Vol. II, div. ii, p. 711), and then to deal with 121 who had deserted from Portsmouth after receiving their wages. Ibid., Vol. II, div. ii, p. 713.
\textsuperscript{62} CCR 1323-1327, p. 211.
\textsuperscript{63} Ibid., p. 215. But Tracy was the sheriff! PRO Lists and Indexes, Vol. IX, p.49.
Tracy and Robert Seliman were replaced, because they 'cannot attend to the business', by Thomas le Botiller and William Walsh.\textsuperscript{64}

By this time the muster date for the contingents of foot from the counties and cities had already been postponed again, on 3 September, to 24 September.\textsuperscript{65} On 17 September the muster was abandoned, the men being ordered to be kept in readiness to defend England against possible invasion.\textsuperscript{66} On 21 September the town officials, mayors, sheriffs, bailiffs and communities of London and forty-eight other places were ordered to choose (if they had not already done so under previous orders!), and provide arms for, specified numbers of foot. The arms were to be ready by 11 November, 'the king desiring to make himself strong by land and sea to resist the king of France.'\textsuperscript{67}

The earl of Kent surrendered La Reole and agreed the six month truce on 22 September 1324.\textsuperscript{68} New preparations for a military recovery of the lost lands of the duchy had therefore now to aim at March 1325.

The first steps sought to have men ready for service by Candlemas, 2 February, anticipating embarkation on 17 March. The Irish magnates were written to on 30 October 1324, asking them - \textit{affectuose requirimus et rogamus} - to have as many horse and arms as seemed proper ready by that 2 February date.\textsuperscript{69} On 17 November commissioners were appointed for all English counties. Their orders were to array knights, esquires other men-at-arms and all fencible men to be similarly ready. They were also, with the assistance of the sheriff and the arrayers of foot, to find out what knights, esquires and men-at-arms there were, and by whom they were retained. In a revealing addition they were 'to spare no one nor take bribes as others have done.'\textsuperscript{70} Though readiness by 2 February 1325 was the stated requirement, it is clear from commissions of 23 December to many of the same men in certain counties that embarkation on 17 March was intended: these recite 'their late appointment to array men-at-arms to be at Portsmouth by mid-Lent Sunday (17 March) for embarkation to Gascony.'\textsuperscript{71}

\textsuperscript{64} CPR 1324-1327, p. 27.
\textsuperscript{66} Ibid., Vol. II, div. ii, p. 675.
\textsuperscript{67} CCR 1323-1327, p. 226. The London quota was 300, to be chosen and provision made for their arms by the view of two citizens of each ward.
\textsuperscript{68} McKisack, Fourteenth Century, p. 109.
\textsuperscript{70} CPR 1324-1327, pp. 53-5.
\textsuperscript{71} Ibid., pp. 77-8.
A comparison of the appointments of 6 August with these of 17 November shows, for the same counties, only nine among the forty-six named on 17 November. A small random sample of the latter is evidence that they included men of considerable experience in royal service. Matthew de Bassingbourn had been sheriff of Cambridge and Huntingdon in 1318-9; William de Bayou and Roger Bavent had been knighted with Edward in 1306; John Charnells had been overseas for the king in 1313; Thomas de Pipe was an assessor of the subsidy in Staffordshire in 1322; Ralph Sauvage had been sheriff of Kent in 1321-2; John Sutton had been a commissioner of array in Yorkshire in 1314. It is possible, therefore, that it was recognised that this set of commissions to deal with knights and esquires required men of greater weight than did the arraying of foot.

In December orders for the assembly at Portsmouth on 17 March of a quantified force of men-at-arms, archers, hobelars and foot were issued. On 22 December the same commissioners of array appointed on 6 August to select 20,000 foot were, for once in the obviously most efficient arrangement, to choose 5,000 from among them, excluding Lancashire, Northumberland, Cumberland and Westmoreland. They were to bring them to Portsmouth, being themselves also suitably armed. Different commissioners, for Lancashire and ten other counties, were to raise an additional 270 hobelars and 550 archers. Another 670 hobelars were requisitioned from ten more counties, via some of the same and some new commissioners. The 23 December commissions referred to above went to the commissioners appointed on 17 November in thirteen counties, now ordering the selection of 1,340 archers. They were also to choose 135 men-at-arms not retained by, nor owing service to, anyone. Progress was to be reported by 2 February, which thus seems to be a date on which a general assessment may have been intended, allowing six weeks to correct any inadequacies. These orders to thirty-four separate counties made it explicitly clear that the archers and hobelars were to be recruited in addition to the 5,000 foot. Another set of orders of 23 December

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73 *Parl. Writs*, Vol. II, div. ii, pp. 685-6. This time, however, the quotas per county were not all multiples of twenty: some were for 250, one for 150 and one for 50.
75 including Northumberland, Cumberland and Westmoreland.
76 *CPR 1324-1327*, pp. 78-9 (23 December).
to the 17 November commissioners in twenty-one counties was for 350 more men-at-arms.77

Altogether, the counties were thus to provide through commissioners 5,000 foot, 1,890 archers, 940 hobelars and 585 men-at-arms. The quotas for the men-at-arms ranged from 5, for Rutland, to 60 for Yorkshire, suggesting a possibility that they had been determined in the light of the returns asked for on 17 November.

To add to these numbers, the officials of forty-four towns were asked for a total of 1,800-1,900 armed foot,78 the earl of Arundel, justiciar of Wales, was to provide 200 men-at-arms and 1,000 foot,79 the bishop of Durham was asked to send as many men-at-arms, hobelars and archers as possible,80 and in an earlier request of 23 November the earl of Chester, Edward the king's son, had been asked for 60 hobelars and 120 archers.81 To add to these variously conscripted men, all sheriffs were to issue a proclamation seeking volunteers at defined rates of pay,82 and another offering liberation from gaol and pardons to criminals who would find sureties that they would go with the army from Portsmouth.83 On 7 January 1325 another proclamation by the sheriffs summoned all pardoned rebels to fulfil their promise to serve when asked, by reporting to Portsmouth for 17 March.84

Even without the unquantified numbers of volunteers, pardoned criminals, pardoned rebels and the bishop of Durham's force, these arrangements were for an army of over 11,500. Its recruiting was to have used a variety of administrators: commissioners of array for foot from the counties, different commissioners for men-at-arms, town officials, and the three 'palatine' powers the bishop of Durham, the earl of

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77 Parl. Writs, Vol. II, div. ii, p. 688. This includes another 20 from Surrey and Sussex, counties which were also in the list finding men-at-arms (20) and archers.

78 Ibid., Vol. II, div. ii, pp. 688-9. It is not clear in this how many were to come from York, Beverly and Hull.


80 Ibid., Vol. II, div. ii, p. 690. He too was asked to report by 2 February how many he would raise, adding to the evidence suggesting that this was a date for an administrative review.


82 Ibid., Vol. II, div. ii, p. 690. Pay ranged from 2s per day for knights to 3d per day for foot.

83 Ibid., Vol. II, div. ii, p. 690. 90 criminals were in the earl of Surrey's force. E101/17/3.

Chester and the justiciar of Wales. The English sheriffs' role was essentially that of communication and support.

As well as all this, and whatever the Irish magnates would provide, there was, of course, the service due from the English magnates. This was required in fide et homagio by writs to Thomas, earl of Norfolk and marshal of England, and the others, issued on 21 December. In writs of the same date all sheriffs were to proclaim that the king intended to go to the duchy, and that all who owed service should muster in person, with all their service, at Portsmouth on 17 March. 85 However, the magnates persuaded the king that they were not given enough time to prepare properly, and on 17 February proclamations were issued proroguing the general embarkation to 17 May. 86 This did not take place, the negotiations for a truce leading to a second prorogation on 1 May, to 2 August, 87 and, with the treaty pending, to final cancellation of the muster on 10 July. 88

Though the large army envisaged by the orders of December 1324 was never assembled, a few of the units were transported to the duchy, arriving at Bordeaux on 10 and 11 May in two fleets, one sailing from Portsmouth and the other from Harwich. These units, totalling c.4,000 foot with c.300 men-at-arms, did not involve new recruiting. The Harwich force was naturally taken from the levies of the eastern counties, Norfolk, Suffolk, Essex, and Hertfordshire, 89 together with 140 of the Londoners, the other 160 going to Portsmouth. 90 John de Warenne, earl of Surrey, was appointed captain of the force going from there. 91 He himself had contracted with the king to go to the duchy with 100 men-at-arms, 92 and he had in addition some 200 more, the respondents to a 20 February request to a long list of individuals to be at Portsmouth to go with Surrey, mounted, armed and with as much force as possible. 93

In Warenne's small army there were several contingents from Wales. The instructions for their march to the port were issued in detail, showing that at this management level at least confident planning was possible. 200 foot from North Wales

92 CPR 1324-1327, pp. 97-8.
were to be at Bala on the Friday before mid-Lent, led there by the sheriffs, sub-sheriffs and four of the best men of each of the three northern Welsh counties. There they were to receive wages for two days, to take them to Shrewsbury for the Sunday. At Shrewsbury they would be joined by another 330, and seven men-at-arms. Thence they would be given wages for seven days for their march to Portsmouth, which was to be via Hereford. 200 foot from South Wales were to be led by Rees ap Griffith and Sir Roger Pikard, together with six men from the counties of Cardigan and Carmarthen and 'the stewardship'. At Hereford on the Tuesday there were to be another 250 foot and six men-at-arms.94 Giles de Beauchamp and Alan de Cherleton95 were appointed to inspect and array these levies (by inference at Hereford), and march them to Portsmouth, 'with their sheriffs, sub-sheriffs, constables, and leaders, so that they shall neither do nor receive any harm.'96

These details help to amplify what was probably generally involved in assembling the muster after the commissions for recruiting were issued and the men chosen. More 'leaders' than the commissioners themselves were needed, in addition to the standard one constable per 100 foot (as well as one vintenar in each 20, though these arrangements for the Welsh make no mention of vintenars, and some of the sub-units were not in twenties). The inclusion of 'staging points' was noted in the 11 June orders, at which points also inspection of the levies and payment of wages were to take place. The time, defined admittedly by the number of days' pay, allowed for march between these points - two days from Bala to Shrewsbury, another two from Shrewsbury to Hereford, seven thence to Portsmouth - makes the rate fairly consistently c. 20 miles per day. Finally, the concern for discipline during the march echoes the 11 July appointment of Richard Damory and Richard de Stapledon 'touching felonies...by men-at-arms, mounted and on foot...coming to Plymouth to go on the king's service,'97 and the passage in the general orders of 9 July to the bishop of Exeter, the treasurer, and Richard Damory, who were overseeing all arrangements for the passage from Plymouth,

94 CPR 1324-1327, p. 97.
95 Cherleton had been appointed on 22 December to select hobelars and archers in Shropshire and Staffordshire.
96 Ibid., p. 96. Another commission of the same date, 26 February, appointed Constantine de Mortimer and Richard de Perrers, respectively arrayers of 22 December for Norfolk and Hertfordshire, to survey and array the footmen reporting to Harwich, and hand them over to John de Stumpy, the admiral of the fleet that would carry them to Bordeaux. CPR 1324-1327, p. 99.
97 Ibid., p. 65.
telling them to 'hear and determine complaints of trespasses and injuries among men marching to Plymouth.'

The fleets that transported these small armies to Bordeaux also carried arms and much needed provisions and money. Chaplais' collection of documents contains many complaining of shortage of victuals, arms and provender for horses. Organisation of provisions was thus primarily directed at meeting the duchy's needs to supply the troops already there and arriving at different times. Though supplies were sought also from the Iberian peninsular, most had to come from England.

The primary responsibility for organising the obtaining of supplies, and their delivery to the ports, fell on the sheriffs. The victuals that had been unloaded at Plymouth in August and September 1324 had been at the charge of the sheriff of Hampshire. Sheriffs had to provide the equipment to prepare the ships summoned in May 1324 to carry horses. In the Gascon Roll there is an instruction, dated 22 November 1324, to the barons of the exchequer to issue, under the treasury seal, orders to all counties for supplies of victuals and materials of all sorts for the expedition.

Records relating to supplies for the duchy contain a series of references to the work of sheriffs. The sheriff of Cambridgeshire in providing corn for the expedition was not to take too much. William Tracy, sheriff of Gloucester, was allowed expenses for providing a range of foods, including the wages of several men with horses and carts, the costs of the granary and a man to receive and look after deliveries, costs of grinding corn, and portage to the river. The sheriffs of Yorkshire and Nottinghamshire and Derbyshire sent supplies to Hull, of Northamptonshire and Cambridgeshire and Huntingdonshire to King's Lynn, of Norfolk and Suffolk to King's Lynn and Yarmouth, of Essex to Maldon and Colchester. The work was not always left entirely to the sheriffs and their men. The king's clerk Robert de Nottingham was

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98 Ibid.
99 e.g. War of Saint-Sardos, ed. P. Chaplais, pp. 83, 107, 125, 149.
100 letters of 30 September 1324 to Prince John of Biscay (CCR 1323-1327, p. 314) and 7 May 1325 to Alfonso king of Portugal (ibid., p. 364); mandate of 19 November 1324 to Nicholas Hugate to buy supplies in Spain (CPR 1324-1327, p. 52).
101 BL Add. Ms. 7967, f. 8v.
102 C61/36, m. 21.
103 E101/17/4.
104 E101/17/4.
105 E101/16/40.
appointed in December 1324, in the place of Adam de Lymbergh, another king's clerk who had previously had the task, to survey and accelerate purveyances in Yorkshire and Lincolnshire for the passage to Gascony. Also in December, the admirals John le Sturmy and Robert Bendyn were appointed to survey and accelerate the buying of the victuals and other things 'ordered to be purveyed' for the expedition of the king's affairs in Gascony. What had been 'ordered to be purveyed' must have been quantified to the purveyors, possibly by the treasury to which went the instruction of 22 November to order purveyances in the counties, though the order to the Irish treasury that does give quantities - 5,000 quarters of wheat and 1,000 of beans - is dated 24 October.

The key links in the chain of organising supplies were the receivers of victuals and arms at the ports. William de Oterhampton, king's clerk, held this post at Portsmouth, at least by March 1325, when he had £5,000 to pay wages and freight charges for what Robert Bendyn's fleet was to transport. He travelled with the fleet, delivering to another king's clerk Nicholas Hugate, receiver at Bordeaux, £20,441 18s. 11d as well as the supplies of victuals and arms. The range of items

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106 He was assigned to superintend the receipt by Hugate at Bordeaux of money, arms and victuals from William de Oterhampton, receiver at Portsmouth, and others. C61/36, m. 6.
107 CPR 1324-1327, p. 64. His account adds Nottinghamshire to the two counties. E101/16/36.
108 CPR 1324-1327, p. 62.
109 C61/36, m. 22.
110 Among the arms for Gascony were springalds. A writ of aid of 28 December 1324 for the sheriff of Nottingham says he has been assigned to survey timber for springalds and quarrels specifically for the expedition to Gascony. (CPR 1324-1327, p. 80.) In December 60 springalds and 7,000 quarrels were ordered by the king's council to be made, to be ready by 2 February, the work being allocated to the sheriffs of Yorkshire, Nottinghamshire, Lincolnshire and London. (CCR 1323-1327, pp. 246-7.) The orders say they are needed 'for the defence of the realm', not specifically for the expedition to Gascony, though the recurrence of the 2 February date for readiness suggests some connection.
112 BL Add. Ms. 7967, f. 4r.
113 BL Add. Ms. 26891, f. 77r: corn, rye, beans, peas, oats, flour, wine, carcases of beef, bacons, salt; springalds, crossbows for one and for two feet, horse-shoes, nails, sheaves of arrows, shields, spades.
gives an indication of the complexity of the work of the purveyors. William de Kirkeby, another king's clerk, had the responsibility for organising the shipments by John Sturmy's northern fleet. Kirkeby was appointed on 16 February, with instructions as to how he was to proceed. The sheriffs of the eastern counties delivered their purveyances to various ports, and Kirkeby was to supervise the loading of these victuals by indentures between the masters of the ships of Sturmy's fleet and 'the keepers of the said victuals', who were therefore presumably at the ports. He was to act under the authority of Sturmy.\footnote{CPR 1324-1327, p. 96.}

The vacillating intentions of the government in the war of Saint-Sardos result in an appearance, particularly in the recruiting and assembly of troops, of order, counter-order and confusion. Within this, however, it is possible to see the different mechanisms for raising levies: commissioners of array for the counties appointed on an \textit{ad hoc} basis according to whether men-at-arms, hobelars, archers or foot were the objective; established local officials for the foot from cities and towns. In general cavalry was sought by direct resource to individuals, whether by request or by invocation of faith and homage, or due service. The proclamation seeking volunteers offered pay to all categories, from knights to foot. Levies of foot were usually marched to the muster under the orders of one of the commissioners, often having been 'reviewed' at designated intermediate points, where they received pay, arranged by king's clerks, to take them to the muster. Management of this element of the mobilization at least seems to have been planned in effective detail.

Sheriffs managed the major part of purveyance, seeing also to delivery of provisions and other materials to king's clerks appointed as receivers at the ports. These clerks in turn saw to the loading of the ships, though the two admirals had over-all authority.

Sea transport was obtained by orders direct to the port mayors and bailiffs, with the authority of sheriffs having to be applied to urge response. In the assembly of the first fleet at Plymouth the clerk John Devery had a central coordinating role. In this, as in the returns of numbers of armoured men to be made under the orders issued on 1 August, and the request to the magnates summoned on 4 August 1324 to prepare their forces to say how many men they would provide, the explicit collection of numerical information for planning purposes took place.

The desertions by the Gloucestershire levies and the absconding of ships from Dorset and Devon demonstrated that acceptance of conscription was not universal.
Warnings to conscriptors not to accept bribes 'as others have done' had to be made. Discipline of troops on their way to the muster had lapses. By and large, however, such incidents do not seem to have been a major problem.

In the administration of the war of Saint-Sardos the permanent local officials, sheriffs, mayors and bailiffs, remained indispensable. The king's clerks were effectively used to coordinate their logistical activity. The greatest failure of the government was its inability to make realistic time-tables and secure adherence to them; though, once more, any degree of management efficiency could hardly have been possible under, or made up for, the vacillations of strategy and policy consequent upon the failure to wrest the initiative from the French.
From the time Edward III established his personal rule in 1330 until the beginning of the wars with France in 1337, Scotland was his major preoccupation. In spite of a series of substantial military actions he failed to bring Scotland under the same sort of control as his grandfather Edward I had established over Wales. Perhaps the Scottish sense of national identity fostered by Robert Bruce was too strong; by 1313 Bruce 'had behind him something like a united Scotland', and after Bannockburn he 'became forthwith a national hero.'

Scotland was larger than Wales, and further away from the centre of English power. The resources and techniques necessary to maintain a sufficiently large force in Scotland for a sufficiently long period - probably to be measured in years rather than months - were considerable: as J. Campbell points out, the cost of an army big enough to hold down the hostile population was much greater than the revenue obtainable from the area. It is debatable whether, even without the intervention of the French king, Edward could ever have succeeded.

Edward Balliol, Edward III's theoretical vassal king, was ignominiously expelled in 1332, demonstrating the fundamental irrelevance of the victory of the 'disinherited' at Dupplin Moor. Edward III sought to re-establish English control by a series of destructive invasions. The campaign of 1333, which won the battle of Halidon Hill and took Berwick, only temporarily reinstated Balliol. A rising, encouraged by Philip VI's reception of David Bruce, expelled Balliol again in the autumn of 1334. The Roxburgh campaign in the winter of 1334-1335 achieved nothing to alter the situation. In the summer of 1335, against a background of increasing diplomatic difficulties with France, Edward III's invasion with a great force of some 15,000 men still failed to destroy Scottish resistance. Whether failure was due to the too-early demobilization of the

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1 McKisack, *Fourteenth Century*, pp. 33, 40.
army (the English levies departed home from late August), or to the defeat and death of David Strathbogie at Culblean on 30 November 1335, or to the developing French menace, the result was that '...the last hope that the Balliol cause might stand upon its own feet had been dispelled.4

An uneasy truce from 22 October5 was continued by a series of extensions, the last of which, made on 18 March 1336, ultimately expired on 5 May.6 Both sides had expected, and probably intended, that hostilities would be resumed at any moment.

From the beginning of the year the English administration was making preparations for defence. By orders dated 18 January archers were to be selected in Derbyshire, Lancashire and the liberties of Richmond and Howden. Detailed instructions were given as to who were to conduct the arrays, who were to bring the various contingents to Berwick, and by when (early to mid-February 1336). The appointees were given power to arrest and imprison archers who disobeyed them. This was supported by the standard instructions to sheriffs, bailiffs and other ministers to cooperate by assembling the men from whom the selection would be made, and by receiving and imprisoning the disobedient.7 Another order of 18 January to new East Riding arrayers ordered them to arrest named sub-arrayers appointed by Thomas Ughtred. Archers these sub-arrayers had been ordered to select had not yet set out. The new arrayers were to re-array the archers, if necessary, and have them, properly armed, at Northallerton by 30 January. There they were to be handed over, by indenture, to Thomas Meltham.8 He was appointed, in an order also of 18 January, to bring them to Berwick by 4 February.9 This failure by Ughtred's appointees had been reported by Ughtred himself; the incident suggests that sub-arrayers were not rigorously supervised.

These arrangements show by their common dating that coordinated and detailed planning took place, as would be expected. They also show that there must have been a procedure for monitoring progress, and that it could include written documentation. Although on 26 January, a week after these orders, the truce was extended to Easter, in February much broader plans were made. They covered border defence, coastal

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4 Ibid., p. 236.
7 Ibid., Vol. I, p. 395.
readiness to counter possible invasion, naval preparations, moves towards assembly of a royal army at Berwick, and supplies. The instructions were almost all dated within one week, again showing coordinated central planning.

For border defence, on 7 February Anthony de Lucy, justice of Lothian and keeper of Berwick, was told to array and prepare all men-at-arms, hobelars, archers and others in Northumberland and Scottish lands. Robert de Clifford, Ranulph de Dacre and Peter Tyliol had the same order for arraying the men of Cumberland and Westmorland. These orders had a preamble warning that some Scots were preparing to break the truce.

A coastal organisation to counter a possible sea-borne invasion was set up in orders dated 10 February. Keepers of ports, the coast and maritime lands (extending six miles inland) were appointed covering the whole country by groups of counties - for example Hugh de Courtenay, earl of Devon, and Philip de Columbariis for Devon and Cornwall: Robert de Insula, Roger de Kerdeston and Constantine de Mortimer for Norfolk, Suffolk, Cambridgeshire and Huntingdonshire: Robert FitzPayn and John de Clyvedon the elder for Somersetshire and Dorsetshire. All magnates, prelates and officials had to help in whatever was necessary to guard the coasts. Under the keepers arrayers were nominated for each county. Acting together or separately they were to array all fencible men, explicitly including knights and esquires, and see to them being mounted and armed according to status. The mounted men were to be organised into constabularies, and the foot into the standard 100's and 20's. Sheriffs had been ordered to assemble men, in this case again expressly including knights, as required by the arrayers or their deputies, for the array. In the event of an invasion the arrayers were to conduct their contingents according to the orders of the keepers, or of deputies appointed by them. (The nominated appointees were assumed to appoint sub-arrayers and deputies on their own authority; the problem of the dilatoriness of Thomas Ughtred's Yorkshire sub-arrayers in January may suggest that this structure was not necessarily efficient.) As part of these defence arrangements, the keepers of the coasts were told to prepare signal fires on the hills.

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A general instruction dated 16 February went to all sheriffs supplementing the more specific arrangements. The sheriffs were to proclaim that, in view of the Scottish threat, all men from 16 to 60 years old and able to fight, including knights and esquires, should arm themselves as required by the Statute of Winchester.17

Naval preparations were put in hand with another assertion that the Scots and others were preparing arms and ships to attack the realm. A comprehensive series of orders was issued. One set went to the barons of the Cinque Ports, sheriffs, mayors and other officials, and ships' masters and mariners. They were told that the royal clerks John de Wyndesore and Thomas de Gargrave, acting together or individually, were assigned to arrest ships of 40 tons and over of the Cinque Ports and ports to Southampton. Ships were to return to port, to be armed and double manned and ready to go to sea about 17 March. Sailors and armed men were to be found for them in the counties of Kent, Sussex and Hampshire. A report was to be made of the number of ships, and men who failed to cooperate were to be arrested. William de Clinton, constable of Dover and warden of the Cinque Ports, was to supervise and assist the operation.18 This managerial structure can be summarised therefore as two agents of the central government, supported by the authority of a major magnate, coordinating the actions of local officials.

In a similar way, though without nomination of a powerful supervisor, Ambrose de Novo Burgo and William de Werdale were appointed to requisition 40 ton ships from Southampton westwards. Jacob de Kingston and Ralph de Wylinglia requisitioned ships from the Thames and to the north;19 in their case they presumably had the support of the experienced Thomas Ughtred. He was now appointed captain and admiral of the northern fleet, with power to discipline and punish, choose men for the ships and arrest those who disobeyed. Sheriffs and other officials were ordered to assist him, and

17 CCR 1333-1337, p. 647.
19 These six, Wyndesore, Gargrave, Novo Burgo, Werdale, Kingston and Wylinglia, were of course all royal clerks of considerable experience. Wyndesore had been used in 1335 to requisition ships from the Cinque Ports; Gargrave had been a purveyor in 1333; Novo Burgo had conducted a major survey of North Wales castles; Werdale had requisitioned shipping, as had Kingston; Wylinglia had been a purveyor. CCR 1333-1337, pp. 430, 51, 354, 414; Nicholson, Edward III and the Scots, p. 188; CCR 1333-7, p. 255, respectively.
imprison those arrested. These ships were also to be ready by mid-March. All these writs were dated 10 February.20

A detail of local procedure may perhaps be added from an account of another survey of shipping, in which one of the clerks, William de Werdale, took part. A report of a survey of shipping based at Holkham records that twelve named local men gave Werdale and his colleague an account of the port's ships, including their burden, owners and masters.21 For the government to obtain information about local circumstances from a jury of locals in this way would be natural,22 and suggests that on occasions when a specific number of ships was required from individual ports the allocation was based, if possible, on reasonably reliable knowledge of their potential.

Two top naval appointments were also made on 10 April in obvious preparation for a major campaign. Geoffrey de Say was made admiral of the fleet from the Thames westward,23 and John de Norwico replaced Thomas Ughtred as admiral of the North, the masters and sailors of the respective fleets being ordered to obey them.24 As well as having power to discipline and punish, John de Norwico was also authorised to impress men to crew the fleet.25

Later, after the expiry of the truce, on 30 May Norwico received power to requisition both greater and lesser ships, and crew and arm them.26 On 6 June he was told to release ships in King's Lynn that were loaded by merchants to take provisions to the forces in Scotland,27 and on 18 June to release Thomas de Melchbourne's ship loaded with the victuals purveyed by William de Melchbourne.28 These two incidents perhaps arose from action taken by local officials simply following a general instruction, as usual showing the need for managerial monitoring. Active management

21 C47/2/25, m.18.
22 'just as 'The whole tradition of English finance, running back at least as far as Domesday, was to base all taxes and dues on the sworn statements of men in the neighborhood'. J. R. Strayer, 'Introduction' in EGov.atW, Vol. II, p. 37.
25 Ibid., Vol. I, p. 417, dated 22 April. On 5 May he had to be told not to impress men from Norwich for the fleet, as Norwich was an inland town.
can also be seen in the warning to the officials of London of the king's displeasure at their failure to provide the ships ordered for defence; they were told to have them ready for the admiral's orders. 29

As an additional naval measure, the keepers of the ports and coast of Wales were empowered to recall all the ships of those ports and prepare them for war service. 30 This gave rise to a demand by the sailors for payment of wages before they would sail: on 28 June the justiciars of North and South Wales were told to give them money, not as wages but as expenses. 31 In mid-July Geoffrey de Say was told to allow the ships mustered at Portsmouth to return to their home ports, where they had to remain and not leave without special permission. 32

Assembly of a royal army at Berwick was initiated by orders dated 12 February. As the (current) truce would be ending at Easter, 31 March, the king announced his intention to be at Berwick by 6 April. 33 He was therefore appointing men to choose archers and hobelars, the latter with specified arms and armour, to be brought to Berwick by that date. The totals came to 3,600 archers and 1,980 hobelars, allocated in detail to each of the areas which were to supply the men. The allocations ranged from Lancashire's 500 archers and 200 hobelars to 100 archers and 60 hobelars from Leicestershire. Appointments of two or three conscriptors were made, with power to arrest and imprison, for most of the seventeen counties involved, 34 though there were a few exceptions. 35 In several cases major towns, like Doncaster, Beverley and

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29 Ibid., Vol. I, p. 430, dated 10 June. On 5 July, however, at the request of John Pulteney they were allowed not to equip the ships for war, though they were to remain arrested. Ibid., Vol. I, pp. 435-6.


33 Ibid., Vol. I, p. 408.

34 The counties left out were mainly in the north-east, north-west and southwest. However 200 hobelars were required from the bishop of Durham, and 100 hobelars and 300 archers from the earl of Chester: they are included in the totals. Rot. Scot., Vol. I, pp. 408-9.

35 The exceptions were Lincolnshire with six, Lancashire with five, Surrey and Sussex with three to cover both counties, and Yorkshire, where each of the three Ridings had two. The number of conscriptors deemed necessary for each county was not simply related to the number of soldiers required; for example only two, Nicholas Langford and Roger Okoure, were to select 100 hobelars and 300 archers from
Pontefract in Yorkshire, and Leicester, Gloucester and Hereford, were excluded from this levy.

Some time must have been allowed for these instructions of 12 February to be put into effect. Although five weeks later, on 18 March, the truce was extended (to 5 May), no counter-manding orders were issued, suggesting that the levies possibly had not yet been made, let alone set off for Berwick. Also, in late March orders had to be sent to various arrayers telling them not to take soldiers from specific towns which were contributing men and ships. On 20 March the Lincolnshire conscriptors were told not to take hobelars from Barton-on-Humber, as the town had supplied a hundred sailors and others to Thomas Ughtred, the admiral of the North. Ughtred had testified to this to the chancery, which indicates the existence of an effective system for administrative communication via that office. On 25 March the Gloucestershire conscriptors were told not to take men from Bristol, because it was providing armed and manned ships. Even on 1 April the arrayers of Surrey and Sussex were reminded to observe the privilege of Shoreham to provide and man ships, rather than to supply hobelars and archers; this one in particular reads rather as if no concrete action had yet been taken by the arrayers.

What was presumably intended to be the final extension of the truce was made on 18 March. From the last week of March onwards orders gave clear instructions for the muster at Berwick. On 26 March Thomas Ughtred was appointed to choose 400 foot and 200 mounted archers, and bring them to Berwick by 20 April. Some of the conscriptors appointed on 12 February were to collect their quotas, and deliver 1,000 hobelars and 500 archers from them to Berwick by the same date. The rest of their men were to be kept in readiness to go when summoned. Those conscriptors who were not

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36 Ibid., Vol. I, p. 411. The order is warranted teste me ipso per consilium.
40 Ibid., Vol. I, p. 412, dated 27 March. The forces for 21 April were drawn from the more northern counties, Yorkshire, Lancashire, Derbyshire and Lincolnshire,
on this list were ordered to have their men arrayed and kept ready until required. It appears that arrival of the hobelars was of particular importance: in an order of 1 April the Lincolnshire conscriptors were told to deliver their contingent to Walter de Tirkingham who was to bring them to Berwick; the Lancashire 200 were to be brought by Adam Banastre; and Thomas Ughtred himself was to see to the delivery of the 200 from the three Ridings.

On 24 March an instruction was given to the treasury to pay sums ranging from 40 marks to £100 to twelve magnates about to go to Scotland, as wages for them and the men-at-arms in their retinues. The twelve included Edward Balliol, styled king of Scotland, and the earls of Warwick, Angus, Oxford and Buchan, as well as Henry of Lancaster. On 7 April, declaring that in view of the Scots' intention to attack, a large force, including the magnates and their retinues, other men-at-arms, hobelars, archers and footmen, was needed for Scotland, Edward appointed Henry of Lancaster its captain and leader. He was given power to judge and punish all men of the army, from earls to footmen. Lancaster was put in command of the force being raised by Anthony de Lucy in Northumberland and the Scottish lands under Lucy's authority, and of that of William de Bohun, already captain of the men-at-arms, hobelars, archers and foot of Cumberland and Westmoreland. Two of the arrayers appointed on 7 February for those counties were told to lead their arrayed men to William de Bohun 'to go in his company'.

The actions put in hand on 10 February to requisition ships had been continuing, as the excusing of Bristol and Barton-on-Humber from providing soldiers shows. Not surprisingly, difficulties did occur; the authority of the sheriff had to be called in to assist the masters of three ships on the king's service choose and embark sailors, and the mayor and bailiffs of Bristol had to be told to release some ships of the Cinque Ports they had arrested, so that they could return to be equipped and armed for war. This

as well as from Durham and Chester, possibly because they obviously were nearer and so could arrive earlier. Except in the case of Durham, they were not the whole of the 12 February numbers.

41 Ibid., Vol. I, pp. 413-4, dated 1 April.
42 Ibid., Vol. I, p. 413.
incident throws some more light on how the requisitioning of ships for the fleets was carried out. In this case, it was clearly the local officials, not the two central government men, or the county sheriff, who caused the ships to be held in port. It also shows that it was the responsibility of the ships' home ports to have them made ready, with both the men and the 'necessities' - arms, equipment and double manning, as set out in the 10 February orders[^48] - for war. The sheriffs of London were told to release a ship which they had arrested on its way to Gascony for wine, as the owner had provided surety that it would return for service for the king.[^49] Both incidents demonstrate that the process of assembling naval forces was being actively monitored and managed.

The assembly of the levies of hobelars and archers at Berwick by 20 April also did not go completely smoothly. The administration's response presents a similar picture of corrective action. Though some of the 600 mounted and foot archers Thomas Ughtred had been told on 26 March to select in Yorkshire had arrived, some had not. A commission of three was set up on 4 May to enquire of Ughtred's sub-arrayers and the sheriffs if all had been properly arrayed, if some had died, and who had refused to go. The missing number were to be replaced and taken to Berwick.[^50] That this failure to execute instructions fully was not peculiar to those arrayers appointed by Ughtred is shown by another order of the same date to the arrayers of Lancashire. Although wages had been given to the men at Newcastle, some had refused to go on to Berwick. The arrayers were to make up the numbers.[^51] These two follow-up orders show that there was a system of checking, which again seems to have been based on written documentation, if a Leicester record is typical. In this Richard Edgebaston reported to the chancery that the archers selected by himself and the two other arrayers appointed on 12 February[^52] had been properly equipped and delivered, by indenture, to John de Sigworth to be led to Berwick.[^53] These incidents show that progress reports were being sent to the chancery, and management action was taken on them, when necessary.

The truce formally expiring on 5 May, an invasion of Scotland being planned, and the threat of attack by the Scots or their allies therefore presumably increased, the realm was put on a war-footing.

[^49]: CCR 1333-1337, p. 657, dated 20 March.
[^51]: Ibid., p. 418.
[^52]: Ibid., p. 408.
All sheriffs were ordered on 4 May to proclaim a prohibition of tournaments and jousts, unless special permission was obtained, that no knight or man-at-arms was to go overseas without permission, and (on 8 May) that no victuals or armour should go to the king's enemies. On 6 May a virtual repeat of the comprehensive 10 February arrangements for keepers of the coasts was issued. Although there were differences (in a few instances the number of arrayers per county was changed, and Rutland was omitted from the list), in principle the system was exactly the same, including the setting up of signal fires. The most significant differences were practical administrative ones. The infirm were to be assessed to arms, and their substitutes arrayed. Most importantly, a precise date, 24 June, was given for the array to be completed, and detailed returns were required to be made 'to us'. These were to include numbers, and the names of the millenars, centenars and vintenars whom the arrayers were instructed to appoint to lead the 1,000's, 100's and 20's into which the men were to be organised.

Some of the orders' specific arrangements for the actual array help to fill in the picture. The arrayers, or deputies appointed by two of them together, were to set days and places for the fencible men, including knights and esquires, of each vill to be assembled. The assembly points were to be in the hundred or wapentake where the men lived. The sheriffs were to see to their assembly at the times and places required. Although the order to the three arrayers of Devon says explicitly that they, or two of them, are to have come before them all the fencible men, the reference to the nomination of deputies to set the dates suggests that such deputies might also carry out the inspection too. Only seven weeks covered the time between the date of the orders and the date by which returns had to be made: if the two arrayers for such counties as Suffolk or Gloucestershire had had to inspect every array themselves, they could have been fairly hard-pressed to cover the ground.

This series of arrangements in case of attack was augmented by the addition of the counties of Bedfordshire, Buckinghamshire, Oxfordshire and Warwickshire to the 10 February list, and an order to the mayor, sheriffs and community of London to arm to be ready to defend against the Scots and their allies when and as ordered. Array

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54 CCR 1333-1337, p. 671.
55 Ibid., p. 675.
57 Ibid., Vol. I, p. 422.
was ordered for the Isle of Thanet, were ordered on 12 June the mayors and bailiffs of twenty-nine towns were told to arm and be ready for defence. Lords of lands in south Wales were to arm their men, munition castles and guard them night and day, as the Scots and their allies were threatening. William de la Zouche de Mortimer and Gilbert Talbot had been made captains of the Welsh arrays, with powers to arrest and imprison.

The defence plans were followed by the summoning of 500 more soldiers to Berwick by 24 June in preparation for the invasion of Scotland. 100 of the 120 hobelars of Norfolk, ordered on 12 February to be arrayed and kept ready to move, were to be brought to Berwick by one of the 12 February arrayers. The hobelars were first to have been inspected and armed by two new appointees, named in the order. Another 460 archers from among those arrayed under the 12 February orders in Staffordshire, Leicestershire, Shropshire and Northamptonshire were to be led to Berwick by suitable men, whom the arrayers were to choose and depute for the purpose. The orders for these two contingents were dated 20 May. Bringing this force of archers to a round 500, Richard de St. Licio and Stephen de Wyttelsford were told on 26 May to choose 40 archers, and someone to lead them from Rutland to Berwick.

Some impatience over the delivery of these 500 is evident. On 10 June, only two weeks after the date of the orders, another to the same recipients urged them in a threatening tone to do what had been asked. This, warranted per consilium, was followed by another similarly threatening, dated 12 June, and warranted per ipsum regem. It included the same urging in relation to the Norfolk hobelars. Even as late

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60 Ibid., Vol. I, p. 429, dated 10 June.
62 Ibid., Vol. I, p. 433, dated 24 June. It is possible that the apparent increased sense of urgency in this order reflected fear that there might be some sort of Welsh rising.
64 Ibid., Vol. I, p. 435, dated 1 July.
67 Ibid., Vol. I, pp. 426-7. Perhaps this explains the omission of Rutland from the 6 May list of counties making preparations for defence.
as 27 June the two Staffordshire arrayers were written to again.\textsuperscript{70} Recognition of the need to pursue the carrying out of orders is also seen in the message to the keepers of the coasts to hurry up the setting of the signal fires, of which they had been reminded on 6 May.\textsuperscript{71}

The muster of these county levies in the north was accompanied by the assembly of the retinues of men-at-arms of a number of magnates. All but two of those to whom the treasurer had been told in March to make advances of money were recorded as in pay during May.\textsuperscript{72} Including the magnates themselves these retinues totalled some 429 men-at-arms in pay at that time.\textsuperscript{73} Together with another five retinues also in pay in May the total came to 501, by no means a particularly large army. Even the inclusion of those who are recorded as in pay in broadly the next three months only adds about 300,\textsuperscript{74} making a total of c.800. This compares with the figure of 2,480 men-at-arms in the great army of 1335 as counted by Nicholson.\textsuperscript{75}

The numbers of the county levies were similarly comparatively small. The total actually summoned to Berwick before the end of June was 2,700. As has been seen, not all of them had actually arrived. More were subsequently called for: Thomas Rokeby the sheriff was assigned on 1 July to bring all fencible men from Yorkshire\textsuperscript{76} (a task which met refusals to obey, requiring more orders for action);\textsuperscript{77} 100 hobelars and 300 archers had been ordered from the city of Chester (though by 8 July they had not yet set out,\textsuperscript{78} and were still being sought in August);\textsuperscript{79} 80 hobelars and 400 archers were summoned from Suffolk on 26 July to be at Berwick as soon as possible\textsuperscript{80} (the order for 80 hobelars was cancelled on 22 August, £100 of the money levied for their maintenance being passed to the bailiffs of Great Yarmouth for ships);\textsuperscript{81} 200 foot from

\textsuperscript{70} Ibid., p. 434.
\textsuperscript{71} Ibid., p. 422; p. 428 dated 2 June.
\textsuperscript{72} BL Cotton Ms. Nero C.VIII, ff. 240r, 241r. This account does not include Edward Balliol, who was included in the March recipients.
\textsuperscript{73} This figure is the sum of the first number recorded in each case. Ibid.
\textsuperscript{74} Ibid., ff. 241, 242, 243. Comings and goings make the figures fluctuate.
\textsuperscript{75} Edward III and the Scots, Appendix IV, p. 250.
\textsuperscript{77} Ibid., p. 439, dated 24 July.
\textsuperscript{78} Ibid., p. 436.
\textsuperscript{79} Ibid., p. 444.
\textsuperscript{80} Ibid., p. 440.
\textsuperscript{81} Ibid., p. 445.
South Wales and 300 from North Wales were required by an order of 14 August. Even with these additions, the effective total of hobelars, archers and foot seems unlikely to have reached much beyond 4,000, little more than one-third of the number in the army of 1335. The mobilization of 1336 was for a punitive expedition rather than for an army of conquest.

Orders for the gathering of supplies for the expected resumption of war with Scotland had been issued as part of the coordinated plans of the second week of February. Two orders of 12 February were for supplies to go to the receiver of victuals at Carlisle, Robert de Tybay, who was appointed on 10 February. (He formally took over responsibility for the stores from 11 March.) These orders went to officials (the sheriff of Cumberland was to deliver 600 quarters of oats, the treasurer of Ireland was to purvey and deliver by indenture 400 quarters of wheat) and may have been only routine arrangements for maintaining garrisons.

That of 13 February for supplies destined for Berwick seems both by its timing and by the urgency of its wording - 'with all speed' - to be related specifically to the forthcoming build-up of troops there. It used the merchant William de Melcheburne as an official purveyor, which included giving him authority to arrest and punish. Local officials were instructed to assist him, and anyone deputed by him for the task of acquiring the supplies. The order to him described in detail how he was to proceed. He or his deputy was assigned to provide 1,000 quarters of corn and 1,000 quarters of oats. They were to be obtained as conveniently as possible, but also with as little loss to the people as could be managed. He was to have some ground as quickly as possible and the flour put into casks. These, with the rest of the corn and oats, he was to deliver to the sheriff of Norfolk, by indenture. The sheriff was to send them on to the receiver at Berwick, the cost of transport being allowed in the sheriff's account. Payment for the corn and oats would be made at the treasury on 27 May. Robert de Tong, receiver at Berwick, was instructed to receive these supplies. Five weeks later, on 22 March, William de Melcheburne was told to send the flour, corn and oats to Berwick as soon as

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82 Ibid., Vol. I, p. 441.
84 E101/20/3.
85 Ibid.
86 CCR 1333-7, p. 548.
87 Ibid.
possible. At this point in time, 22 March, levies were being ordered to Berwick for 20 April. Although this appears to echo J. R. Maddicott's comment that purveyance was usually ordered one month before the campaign, the actual order had been issued several weeks earlier.

Several features of the administrative system can be seen in the order of 13 February. The use of a merchant to obtain the supplies may have been, as Maddicott suggests, because merchants were likely to know better certainly than royal clerks, and probably even than sheriffs, where provisions existed. It was a more flexible arrangement, as it did not need to specify quantities for individual counties, which would have been necessary if sheriffs were the purveyors. The concern that there should be as little loss to the people as possible recognised that purveyance could bear heavily on the peasants, and could give rise to unrest. The postponed payment was convenient for royal finances, though it is not clear whether this was reimbursement for payments Melcheburne was to make, or payment to those whose goods were taken. The power given to Melcheburne to appoint deputies to make the purveyances, though necessary, involved giving authority outside both officials and the landed class who normally, for example in arraying, exercised it. The use of the sheriff of Norfolk to arrange the transport to Berwick reflected the probable East Anglian source of the grain. The requirement to pass the supplies on by indenture, and the explicit order to Robert de Tong to receive them, showed a practical grasp of the value of reciprocal communication for administrative effectiveness and control. The obvious importance of whenever possible recording the movement of supplies for armed forces, which in any age are likely to be operating in conditions that make accounting difficult, was recognised in other instances also by explicitly requiring the taking of receipts or delivery by indenture.

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89 Ibid., p. 411.
91 Ibid., p. 54.
92 e.g. instruction to Robert de Tong to deliver £40 of victuals to John de Stirling for him and his garrison by indenture (Rot. Scot., Vol. I, p. 407); to give 40 marks worth of victuals to Michael de Wynes for him and his company as a gift from the king, obtaining a receipt (ibid., Vol. I, p. 411); to supply £50 of victuals to John de Stirling, obtaining a letter of receipt (ibid., Vol. I, p. 413); to release cross-bows, bows and arrows to John Stirling, constable of Edinburgh castle, by indenture. Ibid., Vol. I, p. 438.
Final administration of supplies for the forces in Scotland centred on the receivers of the king's victuals. The most important of these was the king's clerk Robert de Tong, receiver at Berwick. Although his post was usually described as keeper of victuals, in fact it involved a wide variety of supplies. These can be seen in his account covering the period from 30 September 1336.93

He was responsible for receiving and dispersing provisions; the account lists corn, oats, malt, flour, peas, wine, salt, salmon and other fish. He also held some stocks of weapons, bows and sheaves of arrows, though these were described as left from the preceding year. There were stocks of coal, Spanish iron, planks, boards of different sizes, spars of fir, and oars made of ash. Spurs, 2,028 horseshoes and 8,400 nails for them were recorded, as well as a catch-all category utensis.

Though the suppliers - purveyors, merchants or sheriffs - usually accounted for the delivery costs, the receiver arranged unloading and the hire of stores, granaries and cellars, and paid storekeepers. Robert de Tong's account included payment for men to measure wheat, moving it to mills to be ground, and sifting the flour. He organised the carriage of supplies to castles and the army, and to others,94 paying freighting and for armed guards to look after the safety of the materials. Besides what is shown in this account, there are a variety of illustrations in the records of the logistical role of the receiver of victuals. Robert de Tong was told to send supplies by sea to the constable of the castle of Couper in Fife,95 he was told to have the best corn ground into flour,96 he was to receive ten cartloads of iron to be bought by the sheriff of Derby and forwarded from Hull,97 he was even appointed to purvey £100 of victuals.98 The king's receiver of victuals' essential role was to be responsible for the handling of supplies from their arrival at his port.

Mobilization of men, shipping and supplies having been broadly achieved, the actual campaign of 1336 in Scotland, such as it was, took place from July. Its conduct necessitated further administrative arrangements to keep the army supplied with both

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93 E101/20/4.
94 For example, in January he was ordered to give 20 marks worth of victuals to Countess Alice, a cask of wine and ten quarters of corn to Countess Joan, and other victuals to the countess of Fife. Rot. Scot., Vol. I, p. 399.
97 CCR 1333-1337, p. 548.
98 Ibid., p. 607.
provisions and men. The later development of the threat from French naval forces led to more and intensified action to assemble shipping and to be ready to defend the coast. An account of what was done to meet these on-going needs may augment the picture of the nature of the active management involved.

On 3 June the merchants William de Melcheburne and Eudo de Stoke were ordered to purvey speedily 1,000 quarters of wheat, 1,000 of oats and 500 of peas and beans in the eastern counties (Norfolk, Suffolk, Cambridgeshire, Huntingdonshire, Lincolnshire, Northamptonshire and Bedfordshire), again without specification of how much in each; on 15 June the king's clerk, Robert de Emeldon, was appointed to purvey wheat and wine in Hampshire; on 12 July two sheriffs were told to buy supplies and send them to Scotland. The purveying of supplies, at least in war-time, could be carried out by a variety of routes.

The two sheriffs were those of Somerset, Walter de Rodeneye, and Gloucestershire, Richard de Foxcote. Their instructions contained some illuminating details. The materials they were to provide were specified in total, though not subdivided: enough corn to make 30 barrels of flour; 40 casks of wine; 60 quarters of oats; 24 bacons; 2,000 horse-shoes and nails for them. Payment was to be from the issues of their bailiwicks, to ensure speed. They were to arrest two ships, from Bristol or elsewhere in their shires, and equip them as warships, including double manning them, and arrest another two to transport the supplies. Thômas Crôss, one of the king's senior clerks, or someone deputed by him, was to supervise this, and pay the crews

\[99\textit{CPR 1334-1338}, \textit{p. 273}. A later order, dated 14 July, assigned these two, with Thomas de Melcheburne, to buy provisions to the value of 5,000 marks. The purchases were to be made according to the formula 'as conveniently as possible and with as little damage as possible to the people', by the testimony of the sheriffs. Payment was to be with the king's money, and details of the transactions were to be sent to the treasury by Christmas. (\textit{Rot. Scot.}, \textit{Vol. I, p. 438}.) However, this assignment was cancelled later. \textit{Ibid.}, Vol. I, p. 457, dated 3 October.

\[100\textit{Ibid., Vol. I, p. 274}. He was to keep it in store, for which the sheriff of Hampshire was to hire houses, until told what to do with it. It would be paid for in October. In fact on 14 July he was told to deliver £100 worth of the victuals in his custody to the masters of the ships in Geoffrey de Say's fleet (\textit{CCR 1333-1337}, p. 598), and again on 6 August. \textit{Ibid.}, p. 604.


\[102\textit{Cross was keeper of the great wardrobe. Tout, Chapters, Vol. III, p. 87}.
and guards for the supplies. The transports and their armed escort were to sail as
soon as possible via the coast of Ireland to Scotland. The sheriffs were to make
indentures with Cross for the supplies, including the prices and the time of the ships'
sailing. These instructions were matched with others of the same date to Irish officials,
telling them Thomas Cross was to obtain in Ireland 200 quarters of corn, 100 of oats, 10
casks of wine, and certain other victuals. The corn was to be ground into flour and put
in barrels. Two ships were to be prepared as warships, and two others chosen as
transports for these supplies. The four were to sail for Scotland with the four from
Bristol. A month later, on 14 August, Thomas Cross was told to deliver these
supplies to Ayr as soon as possible. These arrangements for supplies from Somerset,
Gloucestershire and Ireland, spelt out in such detail, and including over-all supervision
by one of the royal clerks, are evidence of a competent administration confident of the
managerial skill of Thomas Cross.

The need at this time for urgent delivery of provisions to the army in Scotland
was demonstrated by two other orders. One, dated 13 August, was to the sheriffs of
fourteen counties, including Yorkshire in the north, Essex in the east, Hampshire in the
south, Cornwall in the south-west, Gloucestershire in the west, and Nottinghamshire as
the only landlocked one. They were to proclaim in ports and other places that
merchants with victuals they wished to sell should go to Stirling or Perth to the army;
they would be paid in full, and quickly. The other, dated 20 August, appointed
Robert de Tong and John de Thyngden to buy as quickly as possible 1,000 quarters of
corn and 1,000 of oats in Northumberland and elsewhere, and send them to receivers of
victuals in Scotland, by indenture. By the autumn supplies of food for the army in
Scotland were running very short, not surprisingly in view of the activities of both sides.
Robert de Tong and John de Thyngden were told on 15 September to load whatever
they had ready on to ships, to be provided by the mayors and bailiffs of Berwick and
Newcastle, and collect the rest and send it as soon as possible, as men were leaving the

103 E358/4/5.
104 Rot. Scot., Vol. I, p. 437. By 30 August the ships were still in port. The
mayor of Bristol was told to pay the sailors, tell the sheriff of Gloucester the cost, and
the town would be reimbursed. Ibid., Vol. I, p. 449.
106 Ibid., Vol. I, p. 444. Payment would be made at the treasury on 2 November.
The supplies should be obtained in ways that did as little harm to the people as possible.
Sheriffs and bailiffs were to be involved.

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army because of lack of victuals. The bishop of Durham was told on 20 October to provide from his liberty 1,000 quarters of corn and 1,000 of oats and deliver them to the receiver at Newcastle, as the army was short of food. Though this was giving rise to complaints, he was told on 28 November that the supplies were still required. These dates perhaps give some indication of how long it might take for supplies to be obtained: indeed, if Robert de Tong had accumulated a worthwhile quantity in the three weeks that had elapsed, he would have done well. The reference to desertions due to shortage of food underlines the difficulty of keeping even an only moderately sized force supplied, when it could not rely on living off the land.

In Scotland what military action there was in the campaign of 1336 had taken place during July and August. Edward III himself left Newcastle for the north on 14 June, dashed from Perth to the relief of Lochindorb in mid-July, by the end of August had completed a foray of destruction, and was back at Perth. He returned to England for the council at Nottingham, held during September and October. In October he returned to Scotland, to Stirling and then to Bothwell, staying there until December, when he was back in England. It was noted above that 501 men-at-arms in retinues were in pay in May, and that over the next three months that covered the campaign there were only approximately another 300. About 100 of these were recorded under the heading 'knights of the king's household', coming into pay on dates after 14 June; 85 were the retinue of the king's brother John de Eltham, in pay from departure from Newcastle on 28 July; another 80 or so were in retinues of leaders described as in the king's comitiva. The numbers in individual retinues fluctuated; for instance William de

110 BL Cotton Ms. Nero C.VIII, f. 241r.
111 The area round Aberdeen in particular was laid waste. J. Sumption sees this as deliberate destruction of a possible landing place for the large French army of invasion that was being planned. Hundred Years War, pp. 161-2.
114 Ibid., f. 240r. Eltham died in September, according to this entry.
115 Ibid., ff. 241r, 241v.
Montacute's was under twenty in June, but up to 58 in mid-August,\textsuperscript{116} though none of the others showed such a variation, either absolutely or proportionately. Overall, however, the retinues that were in pay in May declined in total after September. Almost all of those categorised under knights of the household left by 10 December.\textsuperscript{117} Thus the size of the force of men-at-arms in the army reflected the presence or absence of the king himself.

No general calls for more hobelars or archers were made during the summer, though before the end of August Yorkshire, Chester, Suffolk and Wales had been ordered to send men.\textsuperscript{118} In October there were renewed demands for the Welsh\textsuperscript{119} and the men from Chester\textsuperscript{120} to be delivered. Some new additions to the army were also required. The Lancashire arrayers were to deliver 100 more archers to Berwick, keeping their remaining 100 in readiness;\textsuperscript{121} the Staffordshire arrayers were to deliver 150 archers, keeping their remaining 50 ready to go,\textsuperscript{122} and another 540 archers, 80 from each of the Yorkshire Ridings, and the rest in units of 50 from different counties, were to be chosen by arrayers, with someone to bring them to Berwick.\textsuperscript{123} All these were to be at Berwick by 1 November. The need to complain about the non-arrival of the Welsh and the men from Chester shows the continuing unreliability of the system, and the need for its active management.

In the middle of August a French fleet, collected for a possible crusade, was known to have been moved from the Mediterranean to Brittany and Normandy. On 16 August both admirals were ordered to recall and arm their fleets, to deal with the threat from the French galleys.\textsuperscript{124} The order also told them to stop the quarrelling between the Great Yarmouth and Cinque Ports men, a persistent problem.\textsuperscript{125} Local officials were

\textsuperscript{116} Ibid., f. 241r.

\textsuperscript{117} Ibid., ff. 242r, 242v.

\textsuperscript{118} Above, p. 116.


\textsuperscript{120} Ibid., Vol. I, p. 458.

\textsuperscript{121} Ibid., Vol. I, p. 456, dated 1 October. Their original 12 February quota was 500, of whom 300 had been required by the order of 27 March.

\textsuperscript{122} Ibid., Vol. I, p. 457, dated 3 October.

\textsuperscript{123} Ibid., Vol. I, p. 462.

\textsuperscript{124} Ibid., Vol. I, p. 442.

\textsuperscript{125} The rivalry between the ports was so bad that the two admirals had been told, in effect, to keep the fleets apart, and the two sets of ports to send three or four of their
necessary to implement the order to reassemble the fleets; the sheriffs of Cornwall, Devon and Hampshire and the mayor of Bristol were ordered to proclaim that the de-arrested ships were to sail to Geoffrey de Say off Sandwich to face the French galleys.\textsuperscript{126} In Hampshire particular arrangements existed. With the sheriff, John de Scures, the clerk Robert de Emeldon and Roger Norman were told on 4 September to supervise the arming and crewing of the ships of Southampton, Portsmouth and the Isle of Wight and send them to the admiral.\textsuperscript{127} Naval defences were increased further by an order of 18 August to the justiciar, chancellor and treasurer of Ireland to prepare, arm and crew ships to go with other ships of the fleets to seek out the French galleys.\textsuperscript{128} On 28 August the mayor of London, with three other citizens, was to see to the arming of three ships at the expense of the merchants, by the advice of John de Pulteney. This was not to be at the expense of the 'middling' people, other merchants or foreigners.\textsuperscript{129} As usual, willingness to be conscripted was not universal. On 20 August John de Norwico and Edmund de Grimsby were told to investigate, by the sworn evidence of honest and lawful men of Norfolk and Suffolk, which arrested ships went elsewhere, and why. The report was to be made to the chancery.\textsuperscript{130} On 6 September John de Scures and Roger Norman were told to establish what arrested ships within their area departed, who the owners and masters were, and seize their goods. Similar seizure was authorised for John de Norwico, acting this time with Simon de Drayton, against the recalcitrant of Norfolk and Suffolk.\textsuperscript{131} These were rapid responses to disobedience, and evidence of determined management.

The war at sea intensified in the autumn. On 2 October, with the preamble that enemy fleets were attacking ships in ports and at sea, powerful commissions of men of weight were appointed to arrest all ships suitable for war. William de Clinton, warden of the Cinque Ports in succession to Ralph Basset of Drayton, Basset himself, a loyal men to appear before the chancellor and others of the council for mediation. \textit{CCR 1333-1337}, p. 693.

\textsuperscript{127} Ibid., Vol. I, p. 450.
\textsuperscript{128} Ibid., Vol. I, p. 442.
\textsuperscript{129} Ibid., Vol. I, p. 447. This looks as if Pulteney, one of the richest, was organising a group of others to carry the cost.
\textsuperscript{130} Ibid., Vol. I, pp. 444-5.
and much used servant of Edward II as well as of Edward III, and Sir Richard Talbot were responsible for the ports from the Thames westward, including the Cinque Ports. Sir William de Deyncourt, Sir John de Ros and Sir Humphrey de Littlebury were responsible for ports from the Thames north. The arrested ships were to be prepared for war, and crewed with mariners, crossbow-men and archers, and put to sea. An incident at Boston may throw some doubt on the generalisation suggested earlier, that it was the local officials who took the steps to arrest ships. The sailors of three ships refused to sail for lack of victuals, and the mayor and bailiffs were told to supply them. The ships were described as having been arrested by William de Deyncourt and John de Ros.

Arrangements had had to be made for provisioning the fleets recalled by the order of 16 August. On 20 August the admiral, Geoffrey de Say, was authorised to requisition victuals for his fleet in the southern and western coastal counties from Kent to Gloucestershire, that is, the areas from which his ships came. Payment would be made to those from whom the supplies were requisitioned by indentures to be presented at the treasury on 11 November. Presumably relying on this authority, the masters of a number of ships of the Cinque Ports were told to obtain provisions as instructed by de Say, notifying the nature and price of what they took, for payment on that date. Robert de Emeldon, the clerk purveying in Hampshire, had been told earlier to provide victuals for this fleet. Again, on 4 September, he was given instructions to deliver provisions that he had bought by the advice of the sheriff of Hampshire, to the masters of ships arrested from ports in that county. He and the sheriff were to decide on the

132 Under Edward II he had been constable of various castles, seized Kenilworth castle for the king on the forfeiture of Thomas of Lancaster, been steward of Aquitaine, and governor of the Channel Islands. Under Edward III he was justiciar of North Wales. (Cockayne, Complete Peerage, Vol. II, pp. 2-3.) In August 1335 he personally communicated the king's wishes to the magnates of five counties. CPR 1334-1338, p. 207.


134 Ibid., Vol. I, p. 466, dated 24 October. On the other hand, this might only mean 'on the authority of' or 'by order of'.

135 Ibid., Vol. I, pp. 443-4. The barons of the Cinque Ports and the sheriffs of nine counties, mostly along the south coast, but - according to the text - with the addition of Lancashire, were told to assist. Ibid., Vol. I, p. 445.

quantity.\textsuperscript{137} On 25 August the sheriff of Kent was told to purvey 100 marks worth of victuals and deliver them to de Say for the men of his fleet.\textsuperscript{138} On 22 August the sheriff of Norfolk and Suffolk received instructions to buy and supply corn and other victuals, as ordered by the northern admiral, John de Norwico. He was to pay for them from the issues of his bailiwick, or if there was not enough money, payment was to be made by assignments on the treasury, on the same 11 November date as for de Say's debts.\textsuperscript{139}

Taken together, these various orders, most issued within a few days of the order to reassemble the fleets, indicate that the victualling of the fleets was under the general authority of the admirals; that the victuals would be obtained locally, with the cooperation of and sometimes via local officials; and that it seems that royal clerks did not play a very important part. The provisions bought and stored in Hampshire appear to be an isolated instance of prior central collection of supplies. For this fleet there was naturally no organisation analogous to the receivers of the king's victuals; the ships went from their home ports to assemble at sea.

The arrival of the French fleet in the Channel also led to another issue of orders to prepare for defence against invasion. As the French ships were at Brittany, Hugh de Courtenay, earl of Devon and keeper of its coast and ports, received orders dated 18 August to guard the ports and be ready in case of attack. Yet again the importance of setting up signal fires was stressed. Courtenay was to make regular reports 'to us'.\textsuperscript{140} Warnings of the possible threat to Scotland and England from the arrival of the French fleets went also to the earl of Chester and the bishop of Durham, requiring them to array forces in case of attack.\textsuperscript{141}

On 27 August all officials and arrayers in twenty-five counties were told to be ready with their men to follow the orders of the magnate appointed to be in charge of the defence of their county. Eight magnates were named for these responsibilities: William de Clinton; the earls of Hereford, Surrey, Devon, Arundel and Norfolk; William de Ros and Thomas Wake de Lidell. William de Clinton, constable of Dover castle, had responsibility only for Kent, and Arundel only for Hampshire. The earl of Norfolk, marshal of England, was responsible for the east from Norfolk to Essex.

\textsuperscript{138} CCR 1333-1337, p. 607.
\textsuperscript{140} Ibid., Vol. I, p. 443. This order was warranted \textit{per consilium}: it seems, however, reasonable to guess that, like reports for which the chancery was specified as the recipient, his reports would go there.
\textsuperscript{141} Ibid., Vol. I, p. 443, also on 18 August.
including Cambridgeshire, Huntingdonshire, Hertfordshire and Middlesex. 142 This set up a basic structure of command. It was followed by an order of 13 September, covering the same twenty-five counties, for the keepers of the coasts to compel all who owed service to protect the coasts to accept their duties. 143

Following the decisions at the council held at Nottingham an order was issued dated 3 October for an array of knights, esquires and others on a comprehensive scale. It covered all the counties of England, except Cumberland, Westmoreland, Northumberland and the palatinates of Durham and Chester. From assemblies organised as usual by the sheriffs, the arrayers and the deputies they appointed were to ensure that there was a defined number of men in each county armed and ready for defence. The men were to have sufficient victuals for three weeks, and carts to carry them. The total envisaged came to 83,400 men, to which would be added another 2,588 required of the towns by another order of the same date. The arrayers were to report their action by 11 November. 144 This was, of course, only an array for defence, though the inclusion of specific numbers and the references to provisions and carts made it seem purposeful. It was, however, cancelled on 8 November, and the arrayers told to return what money they had taken. 145

This survey of the more important administrative aspects of military and naval mobilization in 1336 suggests several points about its management. It is particularly evident that there was coordinated planning of the several aspects of the initial mobilization, shown by the close correspondence of the dates of the relevant writs. Men-at-arms came mostly in the retinues of the magnates, and from the king's household, so there was here little opportunity for active government management. On the other hand, levies of hobelars and archers, called from some counties for the expedition into Scotland via the arrayers and their deputies, did not always arrive in the numbers and timing required. Such failures brought quite rapid corrective responses, based it seems on a system requiring written reports to the chancery. King's clerks continued at first to play an important part in supervising the action of port officials in

144 Ibid., Vol. I, pp. 459-61. The writ was warranted per ipsum regem. The requirement to report was expressed as ad certificandum nos: presumably the reports were intended to go to the chancery, not to the king himself.
the collection of the fleets. Later the two admirals had an increasing role in this. As with the raising of levies, disobedience to orders met with firm action.

As far as the army was concerned, the initial obtaining of supplies of foodstuffs was by several routes, but merchants appointed as purveyors were increasingly important. The receivers of victuals played the major role in holding and distributing supplies. No corresponding organisation to the receivers of victuals existed for the fleets, for which victuals were obtained under the authority of the admirals, though the ships' home ports had responsibility for equipping them for war.

Perhaps the most significant feature is the evidence of recognition of the need to monitor performance and react quickly to actual or impending failure, and of the ability to do so.
CHAPTER 7

CRECY AND CALAIS

The themes of this chapter will be the mobilization of the army that fought the battle of Crecy, and its maintenance during the siege of Calais. How far the English expedition was planned with such major strategic intentions must be doubtful; the plan may well have been simply 'to march eastward to effect a junction with the advancing Flemings.' Edward III's conflict with Philip de Valois, his 'adversary of France', embraced, in addition to his theoretical claim to the French throne, the urgent defence of Gascony, opportunist intervention in Brittany and aggressive Flemish alliances. All three theatres involved English armed forces, though naturally the army led by the king himself to land at St. Vaast La Hogue on 12 July 1346 was much the largest.

The Truce of Malestroit of January 1343 was no more than that - a truce: there can be little doubt that Edward envisaged a resumption of war, and on a larger scale. The papacy-led conference at Avignon that lasted from October 1344 to February 1345 had no chance of bringing peace between England and France, as the English ambassadors' instructions were to insist on Edward's claim to the French throne. Though he did not formally renounce the truce until the middle of June 1345, preparations for war had begun well in advance. The evidence is that systematic planning took place.

In October 1344 commissioners were appointed to find by inquisition the names of those with holdings yielding defined levels of yearly net income of land and rent; religious holding by fee of the church were excluded. The returns show that this was not a precise assessment such as might be made for purposes of taxation, but a categorisation to establish the military resource available. In most cases three

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1 McKisack, *Fourteenth Century*, p. 133.
3 Sumption, *Hundred Years War*, pp. 441-4.
4 *CPR 1343-1345*, pp. 414-6.
5 100s., £10, £25, £50, 100 marks, £100, £150, £200, and so on to £1,000 and upwards. Ibid.
6 e.g. C47/2/41 (5): the 'value' against each name is given as exactly one of the set levels.
appointments, two of them knights, were made for each county. The counties were taken separately, even where the shrieval organisation, as with Surrey and Sussex, paired them. The survey covered only the midland and southern counties, and excluded Derbyshire, Nottinghamshire and the north. Presumably the intention was to leave the north to hold off the Scots, while the attack on France drew on the rest of the country. Returns from this census were required by Epiphany, 6 January 1345.

In a follow-up order of 9 January, a number of higher-ranking appointees were to inform themselves of the names of holders of lands of annual value up to £1,000 and more in the counties in the October list. They were to report their action by Sunday mid-Lent, 6 March. They included such magnates as Richard Fitzalan earl of Arundel, Hugh de Courtenay earl of Devon, and Thomas de Beauchamp, earl of Warwick. For the most part the counties were still covered individually, though Arundel had responsibility for Surrey, Sussex and Hampshire, and, with John de Leyburn and John Lestrange, for Shropshire as well. The important aspect of this order was its preamble, explicitly defining its purpose. Because of the threats from the French and the Scots, it was necessary for the king 'to have the armed power of the realm in readiness'. Therefore, 'with the advice and assent of the prelates, nobles and others,' he ordained that holders of land should be assessed to arms by the value scale set out for the earlier October inquisition. The specific levels of military obligation were defined in this

7 Smaller units - Rutland and the three divisions of Lincolnshire - have two names each. Middlesex, Somerset, Staffordshire and Devon have four. CPR 1343-1345, pp. 414-416.

8 Powicke, Military Obligation, p. 196, says '...the measure of 1344 was to apply to the whole country', though these northern areas were not in the list of counties for which commissioners were appointed.

9 CPR 1343-1345, p. 427.

10 One exception is Nottinghamshire, not in the October list, but, with Lincolnshire, allocated to John Darcy le pere in January. Bedfordshire is in the October list, but not in the January one. Ibid.

11 It is not easy to see a pattern in these appointments, except that they include men of higher rank. For instance, though Arundel had sole responsibility for three shires, he shared responsibility for Shropshire with two other men. The earl of Warwick shared responsibility for Warwickshire with the knight William de Lucy, and for Leicestershire with the knight William Motoun. Gerard de Braybrok had sole responsibility for Bedfordshire, but Gloucestershire was allocated to Thomas de Berkeley and Thomas de Bradeston. Ibid.
order of 9 January 1345. They were expressed not only as a requirement to serve in person but also as a requirement of those with £50 and above to provide soldiers as well as serve.\textsuperscript{12} They were now being imposed and related simply to wealth. It is also noteworthy that from the lowest category, the 100s. land-holder (who was to be assessed to arms as a mounted archer) up, all categories were to be, or be and provide, a mounted man or men.

These October and January actions describe what appears as deliberate preparation for planning and managing mobilization. Detailed information on potential was gathered first, over some ten weeks, by specially appointed commissioners, two-thirds of whom were knights. This was centralised. Immediately it was ready men of higher rank,\textsuperscript{13} including six earls, had to make themselves aware of it. Presumably they were to use their standing and authority to make the potential suppliers of soldiers in turn aware and accepting of their new specific obligations; the requirement to report what had been done would not only act as a stimulus to action but also provide valuable information as to the resources available.

How detailed and useful this information was can be seen in many later entries in the Treaty rolls. Several instances\textsuperscript{14} show that the information was not fully accurate, and could be successfully challenged. On 18 July 1346 the sheriff of Northamptonshire was told not to require Thomas de la More to provide one hobelar, because, though 'in the roll under the Great Seal sent to you' he was assessed to find one hobelar, witness to the council by trustworthy men had established that he did not have 100s. of land in the county.\textsuperscript{15} Change to the level of assessment was not only by way of reduction. The sheriff of Essex was told to make the knight Walter Eygoce provide one man-at-arms, one hobelar and one archer, though in the roll he had been wrongly assessed at just the hobelar and archer.\textsuperscript{16} This indicates that the information on the specific obligation of named individual holders of land in each county was recorded and sent to local officials in written form. They could also use it to make sure the obligation was fulfilled.\textsuperscript{17}

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{12} Powicke, \textit{Military Obligation}, pp. 194-5, discusses the precedents.
\item \textsuperscript{13} In only one county, Cornwall, was the task given explicitly to the sheriff, Henry de Tredewy. \textit{CPR 1343-1345}, p. 427.
\item \textsuperscript{14} \textit{Crecy and Calais from the Public Records}, ed. G. Wrottesley (London, 1898), e.g. pp. 142, 149, 151, 153.
\item \textsuperscript{15} C76/23, m. 25d.
\item \textsuperscript{16} C76/22, m. 17, dated 9 April 1346.
\item \textsuperscript{17} For instance, the sheriff of Suffolk was charged to warn the men 'named in a roll lately sent to him' to find the men-at-arms, hobelars and archers assessed upon them
\end{itemize}
Bedfordshire and Buckinghamshire some of those whose wealth made them liable to assessment to arms failed to present themselves before the arrayers. The coroners of those counties, provided with a roll containing the names of the malingerers, were ordered to make them appear, so that the supervisors of that array, Richard de la Vache and the clerk Walter Power, could make them either serve or find substitutes.\textsuperscript{18}

It is possible that the results of the October 1344 inquisition were also used to assess fines accepted instead of personal service. On 31 March 1346 supervisors of array, for all the counties of the January 1345 list except Nottinghamshire, Devon and Cornwall (but including Bedfordshire), were told to treat and agree such fines with those assessed for men-at-arms and hobelars but wishing to commut:\textsuperscript{19} The fines were to be set \textit{habita consideratione ad terras, tenementa, bona et catalla sua ac onera eis incumbentes}, phraseology roughly reminiscent of the instructions to the commissioners of October 1344.

As Powicke observes, surviving returns 'give a convincing demonstration of the thoroughness of the commissioners.' Further, the fact that the results, recorded in all

\textsuperscript{18}C76/22, m. 17.

\textsuperscript{19}Foedera, Vol. III, div. i, pp. 77-8.

\textsuperscript{20}Military Obligation, p. 196.
their detail,\textsuperscript{21} were available and used must surely be seen as evidence of a management system that recognised the value of precise information. This information facilitated mobilization of the expeditionary armies of 1345 and 1346, and probably the sustained reinforcement in 1346 and 1347 of the army besieging Calais. The obligations originally imposed were theoretically for defence, and so only 'a revision of the Statute of Winchester',\textsuperscript{22} but they were successfully extended in 1346 (in spite of objections that it was a new imposition)\textsuperscript{23} to provide men for service overseas.

From February 1345 more preparations for attacking France were made. The Dover authorities were to apply a prohibition on the export of horses, obviously a critical military resource. They were also not to allow men-at-arms to go abroad.\textsuperscript{24} Overseas expeditions required maritime organisation: Richard earl Arundel was appointed admiral of the West on 23 February. Robert Ufford earl of Suffolk had been admiral of the North from 15 June 1344.\textsuperscript{25} This appointment was repeated on 14 March 1345.\textsuperscript{26}

\begin{enumerate}
\item e.g. C47/2/41 (3) (which is set out by the county's hundreds), or C47/2/41 (5). With similar precision, returns of arrays name archers and which are the vintenars, name centenars, and define the arms possessed by each individual - e.g. C47/2/58 (18). At least one such return, that of the sheriff of Rutland (C47/2/34 [5]), is set out in a clear and organised form, listing the thirty archers he has selected in three neatly written columns of ten. All this is supporting evidence of well-ordered administration.

\item Povicke, \textit{Military Obligation}, p. 197.

\item 'Finally it became clear in the course of the summer [1346] that instead of this being a means of raising men for the royal expedition it was turning into a form of taxation as individuals and towns commuted their assessed obligation for money fines...The opposition to this is evident in the chronicles...and in the parliament roll.' Harriss, \textit{King, Parliament and Public Finance}, p. 392. Murimuth says \textit{...quod videbatur toti regno valde grave, et antea nunquam visum, et maxime ad transeundum extra regnum}. \textit{Continuatio}, ed. E. M. Thompson, p. 192.

\item This prohibition did not apply to horses of under 60s. value, or for personal transport. \textit{(Foedera, Vol. III, div. i, p. 30, dated 20 February.)} After his appointment as admiral of the West, the earl of Arundel was given instructions not to allow barons or men-at-arms to leave the realm without special licence. C76/20, m. 35, dated 25 February.

\item \textit{CCR 1343-1346}, p. 315.

\item C76/20, m. 35.
\end{enumerate}
Though Henry of Lancaster, earl of Derby, was apparently not formally appointed captain and the king's lieutenant in Gascony until 10 May, in February arrayers were being told to provide him with soldiers. Orders of 25 February appointed three arrayers to find 125 foot-archers in Staffordshire, four to find 125 in Derbysire, and four for 125 in Lancashire. As usual, the arrayers received authority to arrest those who resisted their orders, and for two or three - but not one on his own - to act for all. The Prince of Wales was to appoint three arrayers to select another 125 foot archers and have them ready to go with the earl of Derby. He was also to provide 500 Welshmen, 250 from North and 250 from South Wales. Half were to be armed with bows and half with lances. It is noticeable that this element of the force to go with Henry earl of Derby to Gascony was not mounted, and was drawn from areas not only apparently having connections with him, but also outside the October 1344 survey.

The first orders for sea transport for the 1345 reinforcement of Gascony were made on 1 March. The admiral of the West was to have at Bristol by the octave of Easter, 3 April, enough ships to carry the troops of Ralph Baron Stafford, seneschal of Gascony. The ships, thirteen of 40 tons burden, were to be handed over to two of the king's sergeants-at-arms. The latter were to receive them, and arrange for them to be equipped with gang-planks and hurdles so they could transport horses. The sheriffs of Somerset and Gloucestershire were to provide the equipment.

General instructions to have shipping available were given on 8 and 10 March. Ships and barges were to be at their ports, ready to sail at the king's charge, by the octave of Easter. To see to this four men, including a sergeant-at-arms, were named as deputies for the admiral of the West, and three for the admiral of the North. Reginald de Donyngton, a king's clerk, was appointed lieutenant to Ufford, admiral of the North,

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28 C76/20, m. 34.
29 His officials encountered difficulties, servants of the queen impeding the collection of these archers. The queen was required to halt this obstruction. Ibid., m. 20, dated 26 May.
30 Ibid., m. 34.
31 It seems that Stafford went earlier than and separately from the troops, as a ship was to be at Dartmouth for him by Palm Sunday. C76/20, m. 33.
32 Fourteen, according to Murimuth. Continuatio, ed. E. M. Thompson, p. 164.
33 Later, on 2 May responsibility for six ships was given to the sheriff of Gloucester, and for the other seven to the sheriff of Somerset. C76/20, m. 33.
34 C76/20, m. 34.
to see to the arrest of ships in ports from King's Lynn to Berwick. The sheriffs of the counties of the eastern sea-board and the mayors and bailiffs of the ports were instructed to obey and assist the admirals and the others in requisitioning ships.\(^\text{35}\)

Though formal over-all powers to requisition and equip ships and apply sanctions to the uncooperative - imprisonment in the Tower\(^\text{36}\) - were given to the admirals, the responsibility for the actual work lay with the appointed deputies, usually members of the central royal entourage. The role of local officials was to support - possibly as much not to obstruct - them.

The assembly of the levies for the earl of Derby's force was fixed for 14 May, at Southampton. The arrayers for Staffordshire, Derbyshire and Lancashire were told on 13 March to array their quotas now, if they had not already done so, and deliver them to Southampton themselves.\(^\text{37}\) The similar order for the Prince of Wales' Welshmen was dated 8 April.\(^\text{38}\) The sheriff of Sussex was told that he was to provide gang-planks and hurdles for 25 ships, the sheriff of Hampshire for 25, and the sheriff of Wiltshire for 20, a total of 70 ships due at Southampton by Sunday three weeks after Easter, 17 April.\(^\text{39}\) This then became 247 ships to be at Southampton by the vigil of Pentecost, 14 May, 100 to be supplied with their equipment from Sussex, 100 from Hampshire and the remaining 47 from Wiltshire.\(^\text{40}\) The sheriff of Sussex and his men encountered violent opposition in their task, and he was told to take and imprison those resisting him.\(^\text{41}\)

The expedition's departure was delayed by contrary winds. Not until 11 June were the sheriffs of London told to proclaim that Derby's horses were now being loaded at Southampton, and all who were to go with him should hasten there.\(^\text{42}\) This passage probably illustrates the problems of coordinating muster and transport, and the problems of keeping even an only moderately sized force together in a period of inaction. In fact Derby did not complete disembarkation at Bordeaux until 9 August.\(^\text{43}\)

\(^{35}\) Ibid., m. 33.
\(^{36}\) Ibid.
\(^{37}\) Ibid., m. 32.
\(^{38}\) Ibid.
\(^{39}\) Ibid., m. 31, dated 10 March.
\(^{40}\) Ibid. The entry in the roll gives no explanation for, or reconciliation of, these numbers. Sumption, *Hundred Years War*, p. 457, says Derby's fleet was 'more than 150 ships'.
\(^{41}\) C76/20, m. 24, dated 18 April.
\(^{42}\) *Foedera*, Vol. III, div. i, p. 44.
\(^{43}\) Sumption, *Hundred Years War*, p. 463.
Two smaller expeditions sailed in June. Sir Thomas Ferrers took about 100 men to Guernsey. The larger was that of William de Bohun, earl of Northampton, to Brittany. He had been named captain and the king's lieutenant in France and Brittany on 24 April. The terms under which he undertook this role were set out in the indenture of 27 April between the earl and the king. The king was to be told of all prisoners worth a ransom of £500, with right of first refusal. Northampton was to be paid wages and 'regard' for himself and his force quarterly while he remained in Brittany. His horses were to be valued for restor de chevaux by the king's clerk. The king was to provide shipping, equipped to carry horses, for both the passage to France and the return thence. Some ships were to remain with the earl at the king's charge: one of the king's clerks was to see to this. Northampton could leave Brittany if not paid promptly at the beginning of each quarter.

Hugh de Courtenay, earl of Devon, contributed men to go with Northampton's force. On 16 April the admiral of the West was told to provide sufficient shipping at Dartmouth, as determined by Courtenay, to transport his men and their horses, the sheriff of Devon supplying the necessary gang-planks and hurdles. Protections dated 17 May were issued for Northampton and some seventy others, and for John de Vere, earl of Oxford, and another fifty about to go with him, on 23 May. On 4 June the mayor and sheriffs of London were told to proclaim that all men-at-arms, archers and others going with Northampton to Brittany should be at Portsmouth by 6 or 7 June, ready to embark. By 11 June he had sailed with some 500 men.

This Brittany expedition, therefore, seems to have been a contract army recruited by the earls of Northampton and Devon themselves, without recourse to royal

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44 Ibid., p. 459.
46 Ibid.
49 Demonstrating the problems arising from the passage of groups of soldiers on their way to ports, on 7 May commissioners had been appointed to look into trespasses committed both by and against men on their way to Portsmouth. CPR 1345-1348, p. 113.
51 Sumption, Hundred Years War, p. 458.
52 The origins and the development of contracting for raising armies are discussed in Prestwich, Armies and Warfare, pp. 88-100. Cf. A. E. Prince, The
administration, that is, without troops raised by commissions of array and selection; the royal organisation was used to provide shipping, and of course the finance.

The fourth expeditionary force assembled in 1345 was that of the king himself, which sailed for Sluys at the end of June, returning by 26 July after the death of Van Artevelde. For this expedition also the army's muster date was set as the vigil of Pentecost, 14 May, and the port as Sandwich. The officials of the Cinque Ports were, on 14 March, told to send their service there by the Monday after Ascension, 9 May.53

On 20 March instructions were given for the muster. 1,000 Welshmen, half archers and half armed with lances, were to be sent by the Prince of Wales. 160 archers were to be provided by the mayor and sheriffs of London, who were to depute leaders to take them to Sandwich.54 With the same date, 20 March, selection was ordered of 1,940 archers across 28 counties.55 All were to be at Sandwich by the general muster date, 14 May. The archers were to be chosen by the sheriff or the arrayer from some 7,000 described as previously arrayed.56 A report of the names of those chosen was to be made to the chancery. Detailed allocations were made to each county, but exhibit no proportional pattern: for example 70 were to come from Suffolk's original 200, 50 from Worcestershire's 240, 40 from Somerset's 320, 100 from Shropshire's 140.57 Then, almost three weeks later, 'to relieve the people as much as possible', which may suggest that there had been some grumbling, the quotas for London and most of the counties were reduced, in total by almost exactly one half, to 80 from London and 975 from the counties. In the majority of cases the new figure was an exact half, though


53 C76/20, m. 31.

54 Ibid. A following order of 31 March warned the aldermen of London to assist the arrayers and not impede them (Ibid.). If this reflected the jealous guarding of their privileges by town officials, it was perhaps repeated, successfully, by Cambridge, whose mayor and bailiffs were given permission to select their nine of the county's 60 themselves. Ibid., m. 28, dated 8 April.

55 C76/20, m. 30.

56 This substantial array seems, from the identity of county numbers, to be that ordered on 13 May 1344. The preamble to that said it was necessary because Philip de Valois was acting contrary to the truce. (C76/19, m. 14.) It included more counties - e.g. Lancashire - than those now providing the 1,940 archers.

57 C76/20, m. 30.
Oxfordshire's, Warwickshire's and Somerset's were not changed. The date for arrival at Sandwich remained 14 May; a report was to be made a week before, the Sunday after Ascension, 8 May. The archers not sent under these reduced quotas were nevertheless to be kept in readiness.

These two orders, with their detailed numbers, show that the administration of planning could be very precise. There seems to be no way of knowing, at this distance in time, whether the non-mathematical relationship between the detailed breakdowns of the 1,940 and of the c.7,000 was haphazard, or - more probably - the result of awareness of varying local circumstances. However, the subsequent halving, both in total and in detail (with few but what look like deliberate exceptions) does have the clear appearance of administration done simply and efficiently by use of records. This is supported by the near coincidence of the order in which the counties were named. Effective administration is obviously facilitated by the keeping of coherent records. The requirement to make a report a week before the task was due for completion provided both an effective incentive to officials to perform, and an opportunity for central management to keep track of progress.

In the event the muster was postponed, first on 25 April to the octave of Holy Trinity, 29 May, and again, on 20 May, in angry sounding orders demanding delivery of the county archers by two weeks of Holy Trinity, to 5 June. This date was given to the special force of 50 mounted archers raised in Shropshire, Worcestershire and Herefordshire by the king's valettus, as the king's bodyguard. Delivery of the Prince of Wales' 1,000 Welshmen was urged, impatience being recognisable in the order that 'without delay' report should be made of their names and the action taken: clearly, progress was monitored. Inevitably, during April and May new arrangements had to be made to replace some originally designated arrayers, or leaders appointed to take the men to Sandwich. There would, of course, have been a variety of good reasons for this having to be done: however, where, as in the case of Guy de St.Clare, an arrayer for Huntingdonshire, the man appointed to see to recruits for the king's force mustering at

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58 Ibid., m. 29, dated 8 April.
59 Ibid., m. 27, prior reporting being now required by 14 May.
60 Ibid.
61 Ibid., m. 22. Another entry in the roll is addressed to the Leicestershire arrayers: vos gesseritis...tepide et negligentem. It continues ...eodem modo mandatum est singulis arrationibus sagittorum usque Sandwichum ducendorum mutatis mutandis sub eandem datam. Ibid.
Sandwich had actually gone with John de Vere, earl of Oxford, to Brittany,⁶² there may be evidence of the looseness of administrative control inherent in dependence on *ad hoc* appointments. New men were needed for Gloucestershire, Herefordshire, Norfolk, Suffolk, Hampshire, Essex and Derbyshire as well.⁶³

Just as the halving of the quotas of archers may have indicated a degree of unwillingness to be conscripted, there is concrete evidence of temporarily successful resistance. The halved quota for Thomas Pichard and the sheriff, William de Radenore, to find in Herefordshire was 40. Even so, they were so impeded that the quota was not produced in time. This resulted in an angry remonstrance dated 6 June, accompanied by orders to arrest and imprison those who had been rebellious, and to proceed to raise the required number and have them ready to go when and where they would be told.⁶⁴ The government reaction at least demonstrated what may have been even an immediate response, if the remonstrance dated 6 June was occasioned by the failure to meet the 5 June date for the muster. The impression of an administration watching the progress of its plans closely is supported by the 1 June instruction to Rees ap Griffith, the leader of the Welshmen, to bring his men quickly to Sandwich.⁶⁵

The ordinance of January 1345 had laid on individuals the obligation to provide themselves with defined arms and armour according to their assessment. It was the royal government's responsibility to secure an adequate replacement supply of bows, arrows and bowstrings, the armament that had become the critically effective English resource. The Tower of London was the central arsenal for them, where the king's clerk Robert de Mildenhall, keeper of the privy wardrobe situated at the Tower⁶⁶ had responsibility for holding the accumulated supply. In orders dated 20 March sheriffs of some twenty counties and London were each allocated specific quantities of bows, sheaves of arrows and bowstrings, to be obtained and delivered to the Tower by the vigil of Pentecost, 14 May. The totals came to 3,300 bows, 8,040 sheaves and 20,000 bowstrings, defined quantities which Robert de Mildenhall was told to expect.⁶⁷ This procedure showed the continued importance of the sheriffs' role in the obtaining of supplies. It would also not only give Mildenhall time to make any necessary administrative and physical arrangements for receipt and storage of the weapons, but

⁶² Ibid., m. 26.
⁶³ Ibid., mm. 20, 28, 26.
⁶⁴ Ibid., m. 7.
⁶⁵ Ibid., m. 17.
⁶⁷ C76/20, mm. 31, 26, dated 25 March.
would in addition set up a means of checking that the sheriffs had carried out their instructions. As with the mustering of the county and Welsh levies, the management of mobilization employed deliberate monitoring arrangements.

The date of 14 May for the delivery of the bows, the same as, at that point in time, the date for the earl of Derby's force to be at Southampton and the king's at Sandwich, points to an intentionally coordinated set of plans. In planning terms, the operations directed respectively at Gascony, Brittany and Flanders did succeed, in so far as all three expeditions left England roughly - except for the delays to that to Gascony caused by contrary winds - within a few weeks of the original date, and on the intended scale.

Defence of Gascony and intervention in the peninsula of Brittany in the far west were on their own unlikely to make a major impact on the balance of strength between Philip de Valois and Edward III. Nor could the latter's brief foray to Sluys with a force of perhaps a couple of thousand, which was sent to its homes on his return, to await further orders, have done more than draw attention to the continuation of England's Flemish connection. If Philip VI's position was to be destabilised a much more substantial effort was needed.

This must have been the intention even at the beginning of July 1345. As the king sailed for Sluys, orders dated 4 July went to the earl of Devon and a long list of individual barons, bannerets, knights and esquires, over 300 in all. They were to be with their retinues equis et armis et hominibus bene munitis by the feast of St. Laurence, 10 August, at a location to be told to them, ready to cross with the king, at his wages. This was followed on 3 August by instructions to the sheriffs covering all counties except Yorkshire and the north, to proclaim that all barons, bannerets, knights and esquires between the ages of 16 and 60 should arm themselves according to their status and be prepared to go on the king's service.

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69 Perhaps Edward genuinely intended to depose Philip and himself become king of France: perhaps he only intended to use that threat as a bargaining counter to obtain a secure hold on Gascony: perhaps he thought there might be a possibility of recovering Normandy as well. Whatever his aims may have been, halting the sustained growth of the centralising power of the French crown and its consequences for the English hold on Gascony necessitated major action.


71 Ibid., p. 55.
These two 'warning orders' made ready men-at-arms for mobilization. A date and port for embarkation must have been decided upon during August. On 28 August Richard earl of Arundel, admiral of the West, was told that the king had ordered a passage with a powerful force to sail three weeks from the feast of St. Michael, i.e. 20 October. Arundel was therefore to requisition all ships of thirty tons and above in ports of his admiralty to be at Portsmouth by the octave of St. Michael, 7 October. The same order went to the admiral of the North, to the admirals' lieutenants Philip de Witton and Reginald de Donyngton, and to Robert Flambard, who was to cover London's ships. These general orders were supported by instructions to officials to obey Witton and Donyngton and their deputies. The town officials of the east coast ports from Newcastle to Maldon had already been told on 26 August to obey Donyngton and the king's sergeant-at-arms Richard de Cortenhale, and the bishop of Durham received similar instructions dated 31 August. Perhaps to show that the arresting of ships would be enforced, on 29 August commissions were appointed covering most coastal counties. These were to find out, by the sworn evidence of lawful men, the names of ship-owners, masters and sailors who had broken their arrest (presumably for the June and July sailings), had stayed in their home ports, or had returned without licence. For the current operation a number of individuals were given authority to take sailors and others as necessary for crews, with power to arrest men who refused to be taken. Some named men refused to be taken for the king's galley by its master, and the sheriff of Kent was told to arrest and imprison them.

Orders to assemble an army for the proposed departure on 20 October were also issued on 28 August. The mayor and sherrifs of London were to find 320 archers and choose men to bring them to the muster; once again, the aldermen were told to assist and obey the arrayers. The mayor and sherrifs of London, like sherrifs and arrayers

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72 A later order of 8 September associated Richard Attwood with him. C76/21, m. 7.
74 C76/21, m. 10, dated 28 August.
75 Ibid., m. 8d.
76 Ibid., m. 11d.
77 Ibid., mm. 12, 10, 7, 6.
78 Ibid., m. 9d, dated 1 September.
79 Ibid., m. 8d.
in the counties,\footnote{Ibid., m. 12d.} were reminded of the 3 August proclamation relating to men-at-arms and that the date of the passage was fixed as 20 October. They were to identify all not in retinues\footnote{Ibid., m. 8.} and warn them to be at Portsmouth by then.\footnote{Anyone claiming to be already in a retinue was to show a letter proving it. Names of men-at-arms not in retinues were to be reported by 29 September. C76/21, m. 8.} The Prince of Wales was to select 4,000 Welshmen, as before half archers and half with lances, and appoint men to lead them to Portsmouth.\footnote{Ibid., m. 9.} Sheriffs and arrayers in the counties below Trent were allocated in detail a total of 3,700 archers to be selected, provided with bows and arrows, and brought to Portsmouth by 20 October.\footnote{He had also been required to select 100 archers in Cheshire in an order of 26 August. Ibid., m. 10.} The sheriffs of Lancashire and Staffordshire had to proclaim that all with pardons in return for a promise to serve should be at Portsmouth by 7 October, or they would have the pardons revoked.\footnote{Ibid., m. 9. The arrayers for the archers were also responsible, with the sheriffs, for the census of men-at-arms not in retinues.}

During September minor orders were issued, appointing more arrayers in some counties, defining individual responsibility for leading recruits to Portsmouth, recognising - again - the privileges of Cambridge to array its own men. At this time these orders still envisaged the 20 October date for departure. However, on 29 September all arrayers were told that that date was no longer possible, because the ships were not ready. Arrayers and leaders should therefore not bring their men to Portsmouth, but keep them ready for a new summons, and tell the chancery how many men-at-arms and archers they had.\footnote{CCR 1343-1346, p. 650.}

A good deal of light might be thrown on the practicalities of assembling a fleet for the transport of men-at-arms, archers, horses and supplies if it could be discerned why the ships for this expedition could not be ready in time.\footnote{C76/21, mm. 4, 4d.} It would, of course, have

\footnote{This assumes that unreadiness of ships was the real reason, and not just an excuse to conceal other problems.}
been a much larger expedition, at probably well over 10,000, than any of the others, and so would have needed a correspondingly larger fleet. Because merchant ships had to be modified to carry horses, there may have been too much pressure on labour and materials. Probably there had not been enough thought given to calculating how many would be needed, though this might be a little surprising given the precise numbers recorded in advance for the transport of Lord Stafford's men and Henry of Lancaster's force. Possibly the time allowed between the decision to requisition ships and the embarkation was not enough for the numbers involved. Stafford only needed 40 ships; these were apparently ready within the five weeks between 1 March and 3 April. Almost eleven weeks were allowed between the 8 March order for all ships to make themselves available for the earl of Derby, and his planned sailing date of 14 May in the 247 he was to use. About the same notice applied to Edward's sailing from Sandwich. Only seven-and-a-half weeks was now allowed between the 28 August orders to collect ships and the intended 20 October embarkation. Also there were five times as many men as in the earlier instances. When Edward did eventually sail, with a force admittedly probably even larger than that available in 1345, Thomas Hog's edition of Murimuth's chronicle described his ships as numbering 1,500.

The employment of ships to take armies to Brittany, Gascony, the Channel Islands and Flanders in the preceding three or four months would not have made the concentration at Portsmouth of the much larger number now needed any easier. The 29 August appointments to identify disobedient ships involved in those earlier operations may have reflected the consequent 'disorder'. In sum, the cancellation of the embarkation because shipping was not available has probably to be seen as the result of administrative inability to forecast and handle the scale and complexity of the task.


The date for mounting a major expedition from Portsmouth was merely postponed. The authorities involved in collecting shipping of 30 tons and above were told on 22 October that it was now required to be at Portsmouth by the quindene of the Purification, 17 February. Ships could meanwhile give securities to return there by then if they wished to sail: as usual the chancery was to be told the names. Though no doubt the long gap, some sixteen weeks, was mainly because the winter months intervened, it did allow more time for ships to be made ready. On 26 October two sergeants-at-arms, Walter de Hanleye and Griffin de Cadwallader, were appointed to secure more 30-ton ships from the ports from Chester to Carlisle and Chester to Chepstow respectively, to be at Portsmouth by 17 February. This, taken with later orders to requisition smaller ships, could support the view that the reason for abandoning the 20 October date was simply that there were not enough ships, rather than that they were not yet adapted for transport of horses. Two more sergeants-at-arms were named on 1 January to arrest 30-ton ships in the Cinque Ports, Kent and Sussex, and have them also prepared and at Portsmouth by 17 February. On 7 January Bartholomew de Burghersh, warden of the Cinque Ports, and Philip de Witton were told to have all 30-ton ships ready to be at Portsmouth for then. The names and the number of ships were to be reported to the chancery by 2 February.

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91 These were the two admirals, their lieutenants Donygton and Witton, Flambard and Attwood covering London, Thomas de Melcheburn and William de Nottingham in Flanders, the seneschal of Gascony and the constable and mayor of Bordeaux, who had all been told at one time or another to supply ships.

92 C76/21, m. 4.

93 Ibid., m. 5.

94 Ibid., m. 2. A point of some interest in these and previous arrangements for requisitioning ships is the frequency with which the royal agents were sergeants-at-arms. Tout describes the sergeants-at-arms as forming 'a little standing force of cavalry', numbering twenty in the ordinance of 1279, and thirty in 1318. 'Each of these troopers was a personage of importance.' *(Chapters, Vol. II, p. 135.)* Later he refers to 'the ubiquitous activities of the king's sergeants-at-arms, who collected loans and taxes, impressed men and ships, served on local commissions, and in all sorts of ways interfered with the course of local administration and justice' under Richard II. *(Ibid., Vol. IV, p. 44.)* Perhaps under the war-like Edward III soldiers of the household were increasingly likely to be used as emissaries of the central administration in the same way as the king's clerks.

95 C76/21, m. 1.
At this point the embarkation was still planned for 1 March, the date given in 12 November orders to the arrayers of Somerset to have their men-at-arms and archers at Portsmouth.\textsuperscript{96} They were told that if they had not yet selected the archers, they should now do so, and report the names of both men-at-arms and archers to the chancery by 2 February. The arrayers had had their task certainly since August, when the muster date was 20 October. The possibility that by mid-November they had not made the selection throws an interesting light on how long it could take. 1 March was still seen as the muster date as late as 3 January, when the sheriff of Lancashire was told to tell those with conditional pardons to be at Portsmouth then, and to imprison any still at home after that date.\textsuperscript{97}

The muster was soon changed to mid-Lent Sunday, 26 March. On 20 January the sheriffs of all counties \textit{citra Trent} were told to proclaim the new date,\textsuperscript{98} though orders dated 28 January to two sergeants-at-arms collecting ships from ports between King's Lynn and Berwick still maintained the 17 February ship assembly date.\textsuperscript{99} On 20 February, however, Flambard and Attwood, seeing to the ships from London and the mouth of the Thames, were told to have them at Portsmouth by 26 March.\textsuperscript{100}

Surviving records do not state a reason for the postponement from 1 to 26 March. A possibility may be that it had been decided to increase the size of the expedition, and more time was needed. So far it had appeared that the force was to be made up from the contingents originally planned for October. Now, on 10 February, substantial reinforcements were ordered. With a preamble describing the threat from Philip de Valois to the English kingdom and language, London and another 143 towns were told to supply some 1,750 armed men, with 100 more men-at-arms from London, to be at Portsmouth by mid-Lent Sunday, 26 March.\textsuperscript{101}

This date too had to be abandoned, because storms had dispersed the fleet. The sheriffs of the counties \textit{citra Trent} were told on 5 March to proclaim the new date, the quindene of Easter, 1 May, for all troops to come to Portsmouth.\textsuperscript{102} More ships, those of 20 tons and above, were requisitioned for Palm Sunday, 9 April. Power for this was

\textsuperscript{96} Ibid., m. 4.
\textsuperscript{97} \textit{Foedera}, Vol. III, div. i, p. 66.
\textsuperscript{98} Ibid., p. 67.
\textsuperscript{99} C76/22, m. 1.
\textsuperscript{100} \textit{Foedera}, Vol. III, div. i, p. 70.
\textsuperscript{101} C76/22, m. 3.
\textsuperscript{102} Ibid., m. 5.
given to the admirals and their lieutenants on 8 March, and to Gawain Corder and Robert de Bayldon, sergeants-at-arms, on 10 March. Donyngton's orders of 8 March were to have the 20-ton ships from ports from King's Lynn to Berwick at Orwell by Easter, 16 April, and at Portsmouth two weeks later. 20-ton ships requisitioned in Devon and Cornwall were to be at Portsmouth by 1 May. On 18 March an order was given to all those arresting ships to include vessels of 10 and 12 tons, and have them at Portsmouth by 9 April, except for those with furthest to come, which were to be there by 24 April. These successive orders for more and more ships, in the requisitioning and administrative organisation of which the king's sergeants-at-arms played an increasingly important part, suggest strongly that it was the quantitative planning of transport needs that was the weakest link. It is significant that none of the orders quoted specified a precise number of ships.

This contrasts with the detailed numbers of soldiers of various types allocated to counties and towns. Perhaps partly because the changes of the date for muster might have caused some confusion, very detailed orders, dated 28 March, were given to achieve the 1 May date for assembly of the army. That date was confirmed. Counties were arranged in fourteen groups. For each individual county a town and specific day were defined for the sheriff to assemble all the men-at-arms, hobelars and archers who had been arrayed. There they were to come before supervisors nominated two, three, four or five for each group of counties. The days were those around Palm Sunday. Confirmation of the names and numbers and of action taken was to be delivered by Easter, 16 April. Every set of supervisors included a clerk, presumably to make the returns. The men were to be at Portsmouth by 1 May. Any who were incapable of serving were to provide substitutes. The whole gives the impression of an administrative scheme carefully thought out, practical, with built-in monitoring and therefore susceptible of effective management.

Within a month slippage of the programme had to be acknowledged. On 20 April the sheriffs of the counties citra Trent were to proclaim that the king would embark on 1 May, and all men-at-arms and others should be at Portsmouth within

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103 Ibid., m. 2.
104 Ibid., m. 5.
105 Ibid., m. 7.
106 Ibid., dated 10 March.
107 Ibid., m. 5d.
108 Ibid., m. 15.
fifteen days of then.109 The same requirement was made of the Prince of Wales' Welshmen and the 100 Chester archers; if they had not yet been selected this must be done without delay.110 Eventually not even the 16 May was met, as the king did not embark until 28 June. Even then he was delayed by contrary winds. He at last reached Normandy at St. Vaast la Hogue on 12 July 1346.111

That this was so much later than his original intention was the result of several factors. It seems fair to judge that a part in the delays was played by inadequacies of the operation of the recruiting process itself. Though there had to be some adjustments of quotas112 and of obligations,113 these were not on a scale or of a frequency to have such a material effect as to necessitate additional and time-consuming arrangements. It is also arguable that some tardiness in the ultimate arrival of units could have been contributed to by the 'order, counter-order, disorder' caused by the various postponements. However, the references to making the selections 'if they had not already been made' suggest that promptness could not be assumed. The complaint of the Leicestershire arrayers' negligence and lukewarmness114 underlines the point. On

109 Ibid., m. 16d.
110 Ibid., m. 18.
111 Sumption, Hundred Years War, p. 500.
112 Between 3 and 24 March 1346 fourteen towns were allowed reduced quotas. (C76/22, m. 6d.) In May more paid fines. Towns whose quotas were reduced usually paid 5 marks per man for those they still provided. (CFR 1337-1347, pp. 501-2.) Towns which were excused meeting any of their quota usually paid sums, described as for the expenses of armed men, at the same rate. Bristol paid 200 marks for 40, Coventry £50 for 15, but most payments were for only one or two men. Ibid., p. 503.
113 Although arrangements had to be made to guard the coasts they are unlikely to have had much impact on the raising of the expeditionary forces. The decision by the council that all holding land within six leagues of the sea should stay there to defend the coast if necessary, and not be compelled to supply men for passage overseas, was described in September 1346 as 'recent'. (C76/23, m. 18d.) It should not have had much bearing on the 1345 recruiting. In August 1346 the sheriff of Kent was told to leave the men of Rochester to guard the coast (C76/23 m. 16d), well after the Crécy army had sailed. A scare of threats to the east coast in the previous year may have been more relevant. On 10 March the men of Holderness were told to stay to guard the coast, and appointments were made in Lincolnshire, Northamptonshire, Leicestershire and Rutland to array all fencible men to be ready in case of invasion. C76/22, m. 10.
114 Above, p. 138 n. 61.
the other hand, these episodes in themselves show that the central administration recognised the need to keep a close watch on things. The 28 March 1346 nomination of supervisors of the arrays could be seen as an expression of this.\textsuperscript{115}

There does not seem to be evidence that there was failure to collect and have available sufficient supplies of provisions or arms. The chronicler Henry Knighton speaks of the great quantity of material collected: *Eodem tempore rex Edwardus fecit congregare frumentum, brasium, avenas, bacones, et carnes bovinas salsas, vina, equos, et alia guerre necessaria, ad magnam summam.*\textsuperscript{116} Murimuth's complaint about the rapacity of the king's purveyors in 1346 is supporting witness to the intensity of their activity: *bona sua, scilicet bladd, fcenunz, literam, 61)6', b0ves, ducas et gallinas, çârentes et piscos, et quicquid mandi potuit, capientes, imo potius rapientes, nihilque solventes.*\textsuperscript{117} Both describe the wide range of provisions needed and collected, while Murimuth's words record the resentment aroused at the difficulty of obtaining payment for what was taken.

The key officials in the provisioning of the assembling armies were the sheriffs and their staffs on the one hand, and the receiver of victuals, William de Kelleseye, and his deputies on the other. An account of some of his receipts during 1346 gives a fair picture of the activity involved.\textsuperscript{118} His deputy at Hull acknowledged by indenture with the sheriff of Yorkshire receipt of 80 barrels containing 520 quarters of flour, 610 quarters of oats, 15 bacons and 91 quarters and 2 bushels of beans and peas. The sheriff of Essex and Hertfordshire produced flour, beef, bacons, carcasses of sheep. He charged also for buying barrels for the flour and for men's wages for preparing them, for new seals, carts for carriage to Chelmsford and transport on to Maldon, costs of water transport to London and of loading on to ships in the port of London, warehousing at Chelmsford and a man to guard the store. Kellesley's deputies at Hull and Boston received supplies from the sheriff of Lincolnshire; from Boston they were sent to Portsmouth. Sheriffs received many orders to obtain and deliver supplies. In February 1346 the sheriff of Norfolk and Suffolk was told to buy 20 lasts of herrings, at a

\textsuperscript{115} The process of raising levies could involve five categories of organiser - sheriffs and their officials to arrange the assembly of potential recruits, arrayers to check their readiness, electores to choose individuals, supervisors to monitor the process, and leaders to march those chosen to the muster.

\textsuperscript{116} \textit{Knighton's Chronicle,} ed. G. H. Martin, p. 54.


\textsuperscript{118} E101/25/16.
reasonable price, and the sheriff of Lincolnshire to buy 20,000 stockfish.\textsuperscript{119} The sheriff of Somerset and Dorset was to obtain a long list of specified quantities of different foods, as well as 40 cart loads of iron, 200 iron horse-shoes and 2,000 nails and deliver them to Corfe castle, paying for them with the king's money, or if this did not suffice, with tallies. While it may be that all this was destined not for the army but for the maintenance of the castle, the amount of detail is impressive.\textsuperscript{120} Sometimes a sheriff had to be urged to meet his order: on 28 March the sheriff of Cambridge was told to provide 61 barrels of flour at King's Lynn for William de Kelleseye's deputy, and on 15 April he received a command to be quick about it.\textsuperscript{121} A comprehensive order of 9 January defined specific quantities of victuals to be obtained by sheriffs covering twelve counties from London and Kent to Somerset, Dorset and Worcestershire. Where a sheriff had two counties, like Surrey and Sussex, he was told how much of each foodstuff he was to take from each county. The quantities were given in round figures, as in Kent 200 quarters of corn, 300 bacons, 20 carcases of salted beef and so on. The supplies were to be delivered to the receivers of victuals at the ports, and by a defined date, the feast of St. John the Baptist, 24 June. The over-all picture is therefore one of administration conceived and consequent orders issued in considerable detail. Whether the sheriffs were able to deliver their precise allocations must be very doubtful: sheriffs' administrative accounts usually record less rounded-figure quantities.\textsuperscript{122} Collecting the totals often involved a very large number of small lots. The particulars of account of the sheriff of Kent for 110 bacons records the names of many individuals who provided one or two each.\textsuperscript{123} An indenture between the sheriff of Lincolnshire and the collector

\textsuperscript{119} C76/22, m. 1.
\textsuperscript{120} Ibid., m. 2.
\textsuperscript{121} Ibid., mm. 17, 19.
\textsuperscript{122} e.g. Kent: 100 quarters of corn, but 112 of oats and 120 bacons (E101/566/20); Oxford and Berkshire: 210 quarters 2 bushells of corn, 144 bacons, 83 sheep (E101/582/16). On the other hand, John de Roche the sheriff of Wiltshire did deliver to Gilbert de Chishill, receiver of victuals, 200 quarters of corn. (E101/593/25.) The details of this record give another illustration of what the sheriff had to do to make the purveyances. He had two men riding round for fourteen days to buy the wheat and supervise its carriage from various places to Salisbury: 100 quarters were moved in special carts, 50 in 18 carts and 50 in 25. He had a man and a clerk at the granary at Salisbury, and two men to measure the wheat. Then there was the carriage to Southampton to arrange.
\textsuperscript{123} E101/566/20.
for the county, concerning creditors of the king for wheat whom the sheriff had paid, is set out by areas. In Lindsey 23 individuals were paid for 67 quarters, elsewhere 26 provided 49 (some as little as half a quarter), 16 provided 38 and so on.\textsuperscript{124} A Bedfordshire list has 83 names of people from whom 132 quarters of corn had been taken.\textsuperscript{125} These numbers show that obtaining the supplies, let alone keeping such voluminous records, must have been a complex and protracted task. They also show that it must have affected many poor men, making Murimuth's complaint understandable. Nevertheless, the operation seems to have been adequately efficient, in that there was sufficient to victual the ships for two weeks' sailing.\textsuperscript{126}

Sheriffs also organised the obtaining of bows, sheaves of arrows and bowstrings,\textsuperscript{127} and equipment for requisitioned ships.\textsuperscript{128} In the cases of these supplies they made the delivery to the keeper of the wardrobe at the Tower of London, and to the ports, respectively, as has been noted earlier; here too there is little evidence of slackness.

The management of the administration for the expeditions of 1345 and mid-1346 did not exhibit any abnormal weaknesses in recruiting, assembling or provisioning them. The census of October 1344 and the subsequent assessment to arms gave a solid base, in terms of recorded information of potential, for the recruiting. Purveyance provoked the usual, and often justified, popular objections,\textsuperscript{129} but also does not seem, given the absence of government complaints of shortages, to have failed to produce the supplies. Sea transport for the first expeditions of 1345 presented no problems. It was only when a many times larger army was to be moved that they became serious. They may have been the consequence of inability to allow for the problems of collecting and calculating what would be sufficient maritime transport for such a large overseas

\textsuperscript{124} E101/568/9.
\textsuperscript{125} E101/25/14.
\textsuperscript{126} '...the length of the passage to Gascony' (Sumption, \textit{Hundred Years War}, p. 497). 'It took five days to rest the army, disembark the horses and discharge the enormous quantity of stores from the ships.' Ibid., p. 502.
\textsuperscript{127} e.g. E101/571/21, E101/552/19.
\textsuperscript{128} e.g. E 101/585/24 - cables; E 101/585/25 - cables and hurdles.
\textsuperscript{129} In May 1345 Richard Talbot, steward of the household, was commissioned as justice to investigate complaints that the sheriffs of several counties had leaned heavily on the poor, and taken, or even extorted, bribes from the wealthy to be spared. \textit{CPR 1345-1348}, p. 113.
expedition. In particular, though the general policy was, sensibly, to have the necessary shipping arrive at the port of embarkation a week or more before the final muster date, insufficient time was allowed. The cost, in terms of disorder and local disruption as well as money and provisions, of keeping an army of several thousands waiting would be great. At least the administration was able to know in sufficient time that shipping would not be available, so that it was able to postpone the army's assembly, as it did in September 1345 and January 1346. There is also unsurprising evidence that, when eventually fleet and army were simultaneously ready, the embarkation involved the planned allocation of specific ships to specific units. Murimuth says that the king - presumably not necessarily in person, but by implication therefore the 'central command' - called the officers together, gave them pay due and for the next two weeks, and told them to board the ships assigned to them. The need for such administrative arrangements is obvious. While it would be very interesting to know who actually made them, the only hint seems to be that it might have been the royal clerks who would probably have dealt with the pay, for which purpose they would have had to have the necessary information as to numbers in each unit.

Edward III did land a formidable force in Normandy, win a dramatic victory at Crecy, and proceed to besiege and eventually to take Calais, where the first English soldiers arrived on 4 September. Maintenance of the siege produced another set of problems for administrative management to solve.

As Sumption observes, Calais was not to be taken by storm, but would have to be starved into surrender - '...an immediate assault on the town walls was out of the question. The English did not attempt it. Instead, they began to make methodical preparations for what was clearly expected to be a long siege.' A besieged town had two possibilities for successful defence. It could have a relieving army drive off its attackers; alternatively it could outlast them in ability to feed itself, while they exhausted the supplies obtainable from the countryside around. The French defeat at Crecy, and their failures in the south-west, meant that the first was militarily and politically extremely unlikely for some while at best. The issue therefore would depend on whether the 'ample stores' which Calais contained could be augmented, and

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130 Continuatio, ed. E. M. Thompson, p. 198: Et convocans omnes milites armatos et architenentes, tam Anglicos quam Wallenses, solvit eis vadia temporis praeteriti et pro quindena futura, praecipiens eis naves assignatas festinater intrare.
131 Hundred Years War, p. 537.
132 Ibid., p. 535.
whether, conversely, Edward's large army could be kept supplied with provisions that would have to be brought to it. Supply of victuals was the crux of the matter, as Murimuth recognised, writing. ...\textit{dominus rex noster cum suo exercitu villam de Caleys obsidere incepit. Versus quem locum venerunt sibi victualia de Anglia per mare. Quod percipientes inimici, venerunt xx. quinque galeae latenter et tres naves de Anglia una cum aliis parvis navibus victualia portantibus destruxerunt.}\textsuperscript{133} He adds ... \textit{dominus rex Angliae continuavit obsidionem apud Caleys; et venerunt sibi victualia, tam de Anglia quam de Flandria, competenter.}\textsuperscript{134} In turn delivery of these supplies depended, completely on the part of the French, and importantly for the English too,\textsuperscript{135} on command of the sea, or at least on ability not to be denied passage.

During July 1346 much of the concern of the English government had been directed at protecting coasts against anticipated French raids.\textsuperscript{136} In August, however, urgent and detailed arrangements were put in hand to assemble a fleet at Winchelsea by the Sunday after Ascension, 20 August. 100 great ships with double crews were to be collected from south coast ports, including the Isle of Wight, by Philip de Witton, assisted by Gilbert de Chishill, John de Baddely and William de Horwicke. The latter three were each allocated ports along a defined length of the coast. 80 more were to come from the east coast from Hull south, collected by two sergeants-at-arms, Philip de Barton and John Woline. Another sergeant-at-arms, John Dale, with Nicholas Pyke and Robert Wygan, was to take ships in the port of London, and Thomas Spigurnel those from the Cinque Ports. This order was dated 5 August, giving theoretically only two

\textsuperscript{133} \textit{Continuatio, ed. E. M. Thompson, p. 217.}
\textsuperscript{134} Ibid., p. 218.
\textsuperscript{135} 'Most supplies were brought overland from Flanders via Gravelines....But surprisingly large quantities came by sea from England.' Sumption, \textit{Hundred Years War}, p. 537.
\textsuperscript{136} Keepers for Southampton and the coast to the New Forest were appointed; instructions were given to the keeper of the Isle of Wight to array all ranks for defence (C76/23, m. 25); the bailiffs of Great Yarmouth were told to arm their shipping against enemy galleys; the admirals of North and West, their lieutenants and the ports in their admiralties were told the keepers of the coasts were to array men; Kent was warned of the threat from galleys, and to array and arm men, and arm ships (ibid., m. 24d); the sheriff of Surrey was told to let Hastings have 80 archers to help guard the town (ibid., m. 22d), and with others to array fencible men and report to the chancery by 15 August. Ibid., m. 22.
weeks for its completion. William de Radenhall and Thomas de Drayton of Yarmouth were given power to arrest and seize the possessions of any disobeying the officials assigned to collect the ships, and were also to accelerate the process of collection. An order of 13 August gave others power to impress men from the southeast ports of Winchelsea, Hastings, Rye, Pevensey, Romney and Hythe for crews.

It seems safe to assume that this fleet was to carry reinforcements, rather than just provisions, to France. Sheriffs of 17 counties and of London had been ordered on 26 July to array, arm and have ready some 1,230 archers. Specific numbers were required from each county by 13 August. On 8 August they were told that the soldiers were needed urgently, and to appoint men to lead them (in most cases) to Canterbury by 20 August. The sheriffs were to provide the appropriate, defined, number of days' pay from the issues of the county. They were also to proclaim that all who wished to come to the king should be at Canterbury by 20 August and that the king would provide ships for a prompt passage. (This followed up an order of 3 August to all sheriffs to proclaim that all men-at-arms, hobelars and archers and others who wished to aid the king should prepare themselves with arms and equipment.) By an order dated three days later, 11 August, the sheriff of Norfolk and Suffolk was told to have his quota of 180 archers at Orwell, not Canterbury as previously intended. From Orwell they were to go by sea to Winchelsea, where the fleet was assembling. They were to be there by the Wednesday after Assumption, 16 August. The same date for arrival at Sandwich was given for 100 archers out of 300 arrayed and equipped by Roger de Hopwell, lieutenant of the justiciar of North Wales. The instructions, dated 8 August, for their payment and that of the knight who was to lead them, Sir William de Breton, included the order that they should travel as quickly as possible and by long

137 Ibid., m. 21.
138 Ibid., m. 20, dated 6 August.
139 Ibid., m. 21.
140 Ibid., m. 22.
141 Ibid., m. 21. The sheriff of Middlesex was to send his archers to London; supervisors to take them to Canterbury would be provided by the council. The archers from Surrey and Sussex were to go to Winchelsea, as were those from Somerset and Dorset, who were to go via Southampton. In this order Hampshire and Wiltshire were included, though they were not in the instructions of 26 July. Kent and London, on the other hand, were excluded.
143 C76/23, m. 19.
marches, as the day for the passage would be soon.\textsuperscript{144} This apparently short amount of
time, coupled with the rapid change of intention, suggests that these August plans were
being made in a hurry. The 20 August orders to the sheriffs of Surrey and Sussex and
Kent reinforce this interpretation. They were to proclaim that, as the army was
assembling at Winchelsea, all fishermen and bakers should bring their produce there, to
be sold at a reasonable price.\textsuperscript{145} If the muster had been planned long in advance such
arrangements for food supplies would probably have been made earlier.

Thus, before the battle of Crecy had been fought, the administration in England
was making ready to deliver modest reinforcements to Edward's army. At the point in
time - the first week of August - when the orders for the assemblies of the fleet and the
troops were being issued Edward was moving inland towards Paris. It therefore seems
unlikely that a place for their landing could yet have been set.\textsuperscript{146} What is
administratively interesting about these orders is that it was usually the English sheriffs
who were given responsibility for seeing to the delivery of the contingents to the ports,
and choosing the men to conduct them from their counties; this may have been
necessary because of the absence in France of notables who would usually have
received commissions to array. Another - or possibly additional - reason may have been

\textsuperscript{144} \textit{Black Prince's Register}, Vol. I, pp. 13-14. The original order to have forces
of archers ready to leave for the war had been given to Hopwell more than a month
earlier; on 8 July he was told that, if he had not already done so, he was to have the 300
archers from Chester and Flint equipped and ready and a man-at-arms appointed to be
their leader, by 13 July. A similar order went to Roger Trumwyn to array 200 archers
from North Wales. The prince would send someone to whom they should be delivered.
Ibid., p. 7.

\textsuperscript{145} C76/23, m. 19d.

\textsuperscript{146} Sumption suggests that '...the reinforcements and supplies from England
...should have been waiting off the shore' when Despenser's detachment took the port of
Le Crottoy on 24 August. (\textit{Hundred Years War}, p. 525) This is just about consistent with
the setting of the date of 20 August for the muster at Winchelsea, but would have
required a most unusual efficiency in response to timing of plans, as well as no bad luck
with weather. Moreover, Edward did not begin to move back from Poissy, only some
15 miles from Paris, towards the north-east until 16 August. This, even allowing for the
probability that the decision to retreat had been taken earlier, could hardly have given
enough time to communicate with the council in England and determine a place and
approximate date for a rendezvous.
that urgency did not give time for *ad hoc* appointments to be made, and the established administrative resource had therefore to be used.

As soon as the siege of Calais had begun the supply of provisions to the army had to be assured. It is possible to infer from the passages from Murimuth quoted earlier that the first such arrangements were for supplies to come from England, which would be natural. As early as 6 September proclamations were ordered to this effect. There must have been very rapid communication from the king's army, and probably in fact an earlier decision to concentrate on Calais. The order went to officials of twenty-nine towns from Newcastle-upon-Tyne south, the bishop of Durham, the lieutenant of the constable of Dover, the warden of the Cinque Ports, and all sheriffs. The proclamations said that the army was now besieging Calais, and in need of provisions. All merchants and others with victuals to sell should take them to the army. Besides foodstuffs such as flour, bread, meat, fish, ale and wine the proclamation listed bows, arrows and bowstrings as well. Prompt payment was promised.\(^\text{147}\) Merchants were not necessarily left to find their own transport; on 9 September sergeants-at-arms and others were appointed to take ships from Southampton and the south and west, and from London, expressly to carry food supplies to Calais.\(^\text{148}\) At this stage, therefore, it appears that royal purveyance was not the first resort for supplies.

On 18 September six sheriffs were told to buy enough corn to be ground to provide specified numbers of barrels of flour, totalling over 100, and despatch them to Calais 'to those we depute to receive them.'\(^\text{149}\) In mid-September the Black Prince's officials were ordered to make purveyances of various supplies for the prince and his men. On 12 September Hugh de Ellesmere was told to obtain wheat, taking carriage for it; on the 15th Henry Fleming was told to deliver to the bearer of the order carts which had come from Cornwall; on 17th Thomas de Sandwich, the prince's scullery man, was told to purvey fuel; on 20th the messenger Dagenet was told to have threshed 200 quarters of wheat (but keep the flour until Christmas); on 21st the prince's clerk and receiver of victuals at Chester was told to buy 100 beasts at the Michaelmas fair and provide men to help drive them to London.\(^\text{150}\) (It is not explicit that all this was intended for the besieging army, though references to 'the prince and his men where he now is' imply it in some cases.)

\(^\text{147}\) \textit{C76/23}, m. 17d; \textit{Foedera}, Vol. III, div. i, p. 90.

\(^\text{148}\) \textit{C76/23}, m. 15.

\(^\text{149}\) Ibid., m. 18.

Supplies were on their way to Calais in the first two weeks of the siege. By 18 September arrangements were having to be made to protect the transport ships, which were already being attacked by enemy galleys. On that date Hugh de Audeley, earl of Gloucester, and the Prior of the Hospital of St. John of Jerusalem were told to bring men to protect the ships. John de Moleyns was ordered to collect as many men as he could and bring them to Sandwich to go to sea. 151 Alan de Killum and Thomas de Brynchele were told to take all sea-going ships of the Thames and have them at Sandwich as soon as possible, because the French were intercepting supplies for the army. Three sergeants-at-arms were assigned to take ships from the north-east coast ports. 152 A fleet was to be collected at Orwell, sea-going ships and barges from the mouth of the Thames to King’s Lynn being requisitioned by Thomas de Melcheburne, Thomas de Drayton and John Dale, sergeant-at-arms, under an order dated 18 September. 153 To provide armed men to man this fleet the sheriff of Norfolk was to proclaim that soldiers who wished to take the king’s wages should report to Orwell by 25 September. 154 Thomas de Stayning and his deputies were ordered to collect men-at-arms, armed men (armati) and archers from the towns and other places in Surrey and Sussex. They were to be at Sandwich by Monday 25 September to guard ships. 155 This flurry of responses to a dangerous and apparently unexpected situation indicates that the council had administrative resources capable of immediate and effective response, though it does not speak well of its ability to anticipate the enemy’s action. It also illustrates, again, the confidence with which the crown could command the maritime strength of the realm.

Besides the threat to their supplies, the besiegers had to guard against the possibility that Philip VI could raise an army to relieve Calais. This he attempted to do, issuing orders for a muster at Compiegne for 1 October. Though in practice it came to nothing, the English were aware of the intention, and reinforcements were summoned from England. 15 October was set as the date, and Sandwich as the port, for the assembly of soldiers and ships. A batch of orders for men-at-arms, armed men and archers was issued on 3 October. John earl of Kent was appointed their captain and leader, told to collect as many men-at-arms and others as possible, and only to bring

151 C76/23, m. 18; Foedera, Vol. III, div. i, p. 91.
152 C76/23, m. 17.
153 ibid., m. 16.
154 ibid., m. 14d, dated 20 September.
155 ibid., m. 18, dated 20 September.
horses necessary for transport;¹⁵⁶ war-horses were not needed for a defensive battle in the marshy land around Calais, and leaving them behind would presumably simplify the task of providing shipping. A number of individuals, including Reginald de Grey, William Botiller de Wemme, Marie de St. Pol countess of Pembroke and a score of others, were required to provide defined numbers of men-at-arms and archers, totalling over 200 and 400 respectively. Philip de Thame, Prior of the Hospital of St. John of Jerusalem, was asked for 100 men-at-arms and as many archers as possible. 306 armed men were to be provided by the officials of London and another fifteen towns. Sheriffs of twenty-six counties were to array, choose, and arm another 446 archers.¹⁵⁷ These were to be at Sandwich by 15 October. The sheriffs of all the counties citra Trent were to proclaim that all men-at-arms, armed men and archers were to be at Sandwich for 15 October, and that horses were not required.¹⁵⁸

This set of orders shows that only about half of this particular force was to be raised through levies by officials - mayors, town bailiffs and sheriffs.¹⁵⁹ The small numbers allocated in many cases are surprising. Four towns were asked for only six armati each, Worcestershire, Middlesex and Hampshire for only twelve archers. From the central point of view, dealing administratively with a greater number of small units is inefficient. It may have been judged necessary either because availability of manpower was over-stretched, or because the urgency of the need did not allow individual officials time to assemble larger numbers each. Whatever the reasons, the degree of detail required a functioning bureaucracy equipped with records.

A week after the orders for the reinforcements, other orders put in hand arrangements to provide transport at Sandwich. Though these were addressed to the two admirals, the task of raising shipping was as usual given to named and experienced

¹⁵⁶ Ibid., m. 14.

¹⁵⁷ Ibid., m. 13. As with the officials of each town, each sheriff was given a defined quota. The counties were those along the south coast, and in the south-east, East Anglia and the midlands. Requirements for men-at-arms and archers from individuals were mostly, like the total, for two archers per man-at-arms. On what basis the particular individuals were summoned is not discernible. It would not have been unreasonable, in view of the gap of only two weeks between the order and the muster, for some account to have been taken of how long it might take to reach Sandwich. The exclusion of Devon and Cornwall from the county levies would be consistent with that.

¹⁵⁸ Ibid., m. 13d.

¹⁵⁹ The earl of Kent and Philip de Thame having been asked to collect not a defined number of archers but as many as possible, a precise count is impossible.
servants of the crown, deputed to cover defined sets of ports. Thomas Spigurnel and Robert Monnieux, a sergeant-at-arms, were allocated to take ships of 20 tons and upwards from ports from London to Shoreham. Gilbert de Chishill was to take ships from 40 tons upwards from Shoreham to Lymington, including the Isle of Wight, and William de Ategang and John Dale, sergeant-at-arms, ships from 60 tons upwards from the Thames to King's Lynn. The preamble to these orders made it clear that their occasion was the need to transport reinforcements to meet the threat from 'Philip de Valois' and his projected new army. 160

Although that purpose was not explicitly stated, it could be possible that earlier urgent orders for men from Wales had the same origin. 161 On 12th September Thoma de Ferrers, justiciar of North Wales, and the justiciar of South Wales or his lieutenant, were told to raise 200 Welsh each, half armed with lances and half with bows. They were to have them at Dover by respectively 30 September and 7 October, as the Black Prince had need of them at Calais. 162 On 18 September three more small groups were summoned to Dover, in terms indicating some urgency. 163 Orders to provide transport to France for 200 Welsh were given to the mayor and bailiffs of Sandwich and Dover on 11 October, 164 the day after the orders to raise ships for the English reinforcements summoned for 15 October.

Those reinforcements did not sail on that date, as can be seen from the dates of later orders. On 24 October William de Depham and William Porter were told to provide enough ships, from the mouth of the Thames, for the troops and supplies of the Prior of the Hospital of St. John of Jerusalem. 165 On 6 November an order went to the

160 C76/23, m. 14, dated 10 October.
161 The orders for the French muster at Compiègne were made on 9 September (Sumption, Hundred Years War, p. 539), and might have been quickly known to Edward.
162 Black Prince's Register, Vol. I, p. 14. Ferrers seems to have aroused the prince's anger earlier, as this order told him to spare no-one for gift or favour, and not to be as tardy as on a previous occasion. Perhaps because of this, the sheriff of Flint, in which county the archers were to be found by Ferrers, was ordered to take part in their choosing. (Ibid.) One of the prince's clerks was assigned to arrange for their pay, and to buy green and white cloth for their uniforms, which they would be given at London. Ibid., dated 14 September.
163 Ibid., p. 18.
164 C76/23, m. 13d.
165 Ibid., m. 12d.
Prior and to the earl of Huntington, and another to the 100 London armed men, to come to Calais as soon as possible. Reginald de Grey was still in England at the end of November, when he and many others were given a new date, 18 December, to be at Sandwich. In fact, by this time the threat of a French relieving army had evaporated. On 27 October Philip VI disbanded those who had arrived at Compiègne; the Genoese and French galleys were laid up at the end of the month.

During November a number of small boats were collected from the Cinque Ports and the two admiralties. Quantities of ladders were supplied via the sheriffs of Kent, Surrey and Sussex, and Norfolk and Suffolk. The boats and ladders were taken to Calais for attacks on the town walls. The collection of the boats and their delivery was organised by the men who usually dealt with naval matters, Thomas de Drayton, William de Redenhall, Thomas Spigurnel and Philip de Witton. Carpenters being needed, presumably for the equipment and machines to be used against the walls, one of the king's clerks, Walter de Weston, was authorised to impress 40, with their assistants, from counties in the south-east. They were to be ready in London by 16 November, to go to Calais. This attempt to break Calais's defences failed, and Edward reverted to the strategy of maintaining the siege and starving out the defenders.

This required not only a regular supply of food to the English army, but also the maintenance of its strength through new drafts, partly compensating for losses through disease and desertion. The latter was a constant problem, leading to frequent orders to officials in England to take punitive action against men returning without permission.

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166 Ibid., m. 11.
167 Ibid., m. 7.
168 Sumption, *Hundred Years War*, p. 555.
169 C76/23, m. 9.
170 Ibid., m. 10.
171 Ibid., m. 8.
172 As early as 20 August the sheriff of Kent was told to arrest archers who had taken wages and then returned without licence. (Ibid., m. 15d.) On 12 September the officials of Southampton and many other towns, the constable of Dover and the sheriff of Kent, were to arrest deserters and confiscate their possessions, reporting their names, county and retinue to the chancery. (Ibid., mm. 18d, 17d). Kent was obviously the most accessible part of England for deserters, and its sheriff received similar instructions to arrest them, in October and again in December. (Ibid., mm. 8d, 7d.) Even the sheriff of Flint was told to arrest and seize the lands and goods of any who returned without licence. *Black Prince's Register*, Vol. I, p. 21.
The next substantial assembly for movement to Calais was set for 27 November at Sandwich for William de Clinton, earl of Huntingdon, and the Prior of the Hospital of St. John, and their men, and the 100 London armed men. Transport was to be in the 60-ton ships from the Cinque Ports. More reinforcements were ordered up on 30 November, to be ready to embark from Sandwich by 18 December. To ensure transport would be available, the clerk John de Watenhull was appointed supervisor of the shipping at Sandwich and neighbouring ports, and told to report on numbers and carrying capacity to the council. The reinforcements sought included some 1,000 Welsh under Rees ap Griffith, specified units of men-at-arms and archers from a number of individuals, including Reginald de Grey and the earls of Gloucestre, Hereford and Devon, 184 armati from 14 towns and the 446 archers raised by sheriffs in nineteen counties. The orders were repeated on 8 December, this time with more urgency, saying that if the 18 December date could not be met for the total required from each, they should come day by day and as soon as possible. In the case of the 1,000 Welsh this appears to have been not soon at all: under the date 12 April 1347 there is an order to Rees ap Griffith to bring 1,000 Welsh to Winchelsea by the day after Ascension, 11 May. As Murimuth observed, there came to the king at Calais ... victualia, tam de Anglia quam de Flandria, competenter. In November the sheriffs of nineteen counties were told to send quantities of flour, allocated specifically to each sheriff, to Calais via Hull, London and King’s Lynn. The king’s clerk Gilbert de Chishill and others were to obtain wine at various ports. John de Coventry was to buy 100 beef cattle, 500 pigs

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173 C76/23, m. 11.
174 Ibid., m. 10, dated 14 November, addressed to Thomas Spigurnel, Master John de Kermond and John Tyborn.
175 Ibid., m. 7, dated 12 December.
176 Ibid., m. 8, 7.
177 Ibid., m. 6. It is indicative perhaps of the variations between what was asked and what actually happened that the earl of Huntington, who had been asked on 6 November to come as soon as possible, and then on 12 November to be at Sandwich by the 27th, was asked on 8 December to come on 18th. or as soon as possible after. Ibid., m. 5.
178 C76/24, m. 15.
179 C76/23, m. 9.
180 Ibid., m. 8.
and 1,000 sheep across several south-east counties.\textsuperscript{181} The sheriff of Hampshire sent hay, and the sheriff of Norfolk hay and oats.\textsuperscript{182} The sheriff of Cambridge provided boats to take the victuals to the ports of King’s Lynn or Great Yarmouth, and the admiral of the North shipping to take them thence to Calais.\textsuperscript{183} The sheriffs of London supplied boats for victuals obtained by the sheriff of Essex.\textsuperscript{184} The December records of Walter de Wetwang, keeper of the wardrobe, show the expenses of various esquires (\textit{valetti}) and sergeants-at-arms of the household engaged in organising delivery of supplies - salt, oats, arrows, wine, charcoal - to Calais.\textsuperscript{185} All this was in addition to the 'private sector' response of merchants to the 6 September proclamation encouraging them to bring provisions. No doubt that response was intensified by the prohibition in October of export of corn except to the army.\textsuperscript{186}

Provisioning the army during its siege of Calais was not a matter of accumulating a supply dump, but one of maintaining a reasonably steady flow. After the first weeks, and the need to arm and protect the cross-channel ships had been recognised, this appears to have been achieved, importantly through the over-land route from Flanders. The main contribution of the English administration can probably be said to have been in ensuring the availability of shipping, at which it seems to have become increasingly experienced and efficient.

Although nothing had come of the French attempt in October 1346 to raise a relieving army, Philip VI tried again in the spring of 1347. This intention was, not surprisingly, known to the English, and the flow of orders for reinforcements was maintained and the numbers called for increased. The earl of Kildare and seven other Irish magnates were summoned on 26 January, to bring with them 110 men-at-arms and 170 hobelars to London by Easter, 1 April, or within the following week.\textsuperscript{187} In another

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{181} Ibid.
\item \textsuperscript{182} Ibid., m. 7.
\item \textsuperscript{183} Ibid., m. 5.
\item \textsuperscript{184} Ibid.
\item \textsuperscript{185} E403/339, mm. 24, 27.
\item \textsuperscript{186} \textit{Foedera}, Vol. III, div. i, p. 92. This limited export to Calais under an order dated 25 October. Export was extended to Gascony and Flanders on 30 October. C76/23, m. 12d.
\item \textsuperscript{187} C76/24, m. 36. The order to them was accompanied by another of the same date to the chief officials of Ireland, the justice, Walter de Birmingham (or his lieutenant), the chancellor and treasurer, with a preamble including the statement that
\end{itemize}

161
illustration of active management the earl and the others were reminded on 7 March of what was asked of them.\textsuperscript{188} On 19 February Walter de Warwick, sergeant-at-arms, and John atte Forde were told to deliver 200 archers from Somerset and Dorset to Calais as soon as possible.\textsuperscript{189} These were part of a large-scale levy of over 4,000 archers from twenty-nine counties who were to be ready by Easter, 1 April. The task was given to the sheriff and a number of others, two, three or four in each county.\textsuperscript{190} The arrayers were to report action to the chancery by Palm Sunday, 25 March.\textsuperscript{191} On 26 February lords of various Welsh lands were told to have 3,200 men ready by Easter, half armed with lances and half with bows. Englishmen resident in Wales should not be included. Rather unusually, the order for the 400 from the Prince of Wales' lands of South Wales named the centenars to be in charge.\textsuperscript{192} This writ is referred to in an entry in the Black Prince's Register telling Roger Tromwyn, lieutenant of the justice of North Wales, to array and choose 1,200 men in accordance with its instructions.\textsuperscript{193} In what appear as levies to be made on the prince's own authority Tromwyn and the sheriff of Flint were each to raise 100 men, and send them to the prince at Calais by Palm Sunday, 25 March. Payment of their 16 days' wages to Calais would be made by the chamberlain of North Wales.\textsuperscript{194} In an order of the same date, 6 March, Sir Thomas Danyers was to come to the prince according to his retainer, also by Palm Sunday, bringing 100 of the best archers he could find. Their pay to Calais would come from the chamberlain of Chester.\textsuperscript{195}

Philip de Valois was gathering an army, to urge those summoned to make haste. The treasurer was to pay their expenses as far as London. Ibid.

\textsuperscript{188} Ibid., m. 30.
\textsuperscript{189} Ibid., m. 35.
\textsuperscript{190} Lincolnshire was given nine, presumably reflecting its three sub-divisions rather than the number of archers, which was only 200, the same as in several other cases.
\textsuperscript{191} Foedera, Vol. III, div. i, pp. 107-8; C76/24, m. 28.
\textsuperscript{192} C76/24, m. 32.
\textsuperscript{193} Black Prince's Register, Vol. I, p. 52, dated 8 March. Another entry dated 6 March records, with a few differences, most of the other detailed quotas of the 26 February order. Ibid., pp. 55-6.
\textsuperscript{194} Ibid., p. 49.
\textsuperscript{195} Ibid., p. 50. John de Brunham, the prince's clerk, was told to provide pay and clothing for them and pay for Sir Thomas for 14 days (and for the men raised by the sheriff of Flint, for 15 days). He was to certify what he had paid out to both the prince's
In general these arrangements for levies made in February and early March might be regarded as preparing to meet an anticipated move by the French. Then Philip VI took the Oriflamme at St. Denis on 18 March 1347. He had intended to have his army ready by the end of April and announced his intention of marching against the English early in May.\textsuperscript{196} There followed a series of orders to English magnates. On 31 March Robert de Morley was requested to come to Sandwich with his retinue and as many others as he could supply, by the week after Easter, i.e. by 8 April; the same order went to the Prior of the Hospital of St. John of Jerusalem.\textsuperscript{197} On 12 April John de Audeley was told to bring his retinue and as many more as possible to Sandwich by Ascension, 10 May.\textsuperscript{198} In what has all the air of great urgency, on 14 May Henry of Lancaster earl of Derby, the earls of Oxford, Pembroke, Gloucester, Hereford, Devon and Surrey and some thirty other magnates were ordered to come to Calais by Pentecost, 20 May, without waiting for transport for their horses.\textsuperscript{199} The Black Prince's Register, too, under the dates of 17 May\textsuperscript{200} and 22 May,\textsuperscript{201} records summonses to many others to come with all haste with their men-at-arms, the latter entry being prefaced with the statement that the French intended battle. It is interesting that these summonses of magnates and their retinues were not accompanied by orders for new levies. Perhaps the perceived urgency of arrival of reinforcements meant that the process of array and selection would have taken too long to be useful, especially as such additional conscription might well arouse opposition. Magnates' retinues, on the other hand, in effect constituted a sort of standing army, with the advantages of immediate availability and, probably, greater military value.

council in London and the prince's treasurer of the wardrobe at Calais. (Ibid.) These detailed arrangements for pay, in which the number of days for each contingent was precisely defined, and the source of the money was determined by each contingent's origin, are evidence of the good administrative control exercised by the officials of a great magnate.

\textsuperscript{196} Sumption, \emph{Hundred Years War}, p. 560.
\textsuperscript{197} \textit{C76/24}, m. 18. If he could not come in person he was to appoint someone to lead his men.
\textsuperscript{198} Ibid., m. 16.
\textsuperscript{199} \textit{Foedera}, Vol. III, div. i, p. 120.
\textsuperscript{200} \textit{Black Prince's Register}, Vol. I, p. 80.
\textsuperscript{201} Ibid., p. 81.
Corresponding orders for transport were issued in April and May. The earl of Pembroke was to be provided with ships for his crossing.\textsuperscript{202} ships were ordered for the passage of the king's son John,\textsuperscript{203} and for the men and horses of the retinue of John Darcy le fils.\textsuperscript{204}

However, though there was a little skirmishing, no battle took place. Edward's force, '...the largest army that England sent overseas before the end of the sixteenth century',\textsuperscript{205} numbering probably some 26,000,\textsuperscript{206} and in prepared defensive positions, was far too strong to be attacked. Starvation decided the issue, and on 3 August Calais surrendered. Its ability to be supplied had been ended in April by the English naval activity and particularly the capture of the Rysbank, closing the harbour. The besiegers had continued to receive their supplies from Flanders and England \textit{competenter}, as Murimuth said.

Various supplies from England were organised by the sheriffs. The sheriff of Hampshire had to provide oats and peas and send them to Calais via Isle of Wight ports;\textsuperscript{207} the sheriff of Kent was to buy 200 quarters of corn from the issues of the county and send them via the \textit{valettus} Robert de Nottingham;\textsuperscript{208} the sheriff of Lincoln had to send 30 barrels of flour via Boston to the receiver of victuals at Calais;\textsuperscript{209} on 10 April over 250 barrels of flour were required from nine sheriffs, each given a specified quota, to be sent via various ports, London, Boston, King's Lynn and Hull;\textsuperscript{210} the sheriff of Somerset and Dorset was told to provide corn, beans and oats.\textsuperscript{211} Towards the end of the siege, on 23 July, merchants were again encouraged by proclamation to bring

\begin{footnotes}
\textsuperscript{202} C76/24, m. 14, dated 25 April.
\textsuperscript{203} Ibid., m. 12, dated 28 April.
\textsuperscript{204} Ibid., m. 10, dated 15 May.
\textsuperscript{205} Sumption, \textit{Hundred Years War}, p. 578.
\textsuperscript{206} Prestwich, \textit{Armies and Warfare}, pp. 117-8, suggests that such figures represent the numbers present at one time or another, not simultaneously. The same view is taken by Ayton, 'The English Army and the Normandy Campaign of 1346', in \textit{England and Normandy in the Middle Ages}, p. 267.
\textsuperscript{207} C76/24, m. 36, dated 30 January.
\textsuperscript{208} Ibid., m. 31, dated 22 February.
\textsuperscript{209} Ibid., m. 29, dated 14 March.
\textsuperscript{210} Ibid., m. 17. A separate order of the same date to the sheriff of Nottinghamshire and Derby told him to send his quota, with that from the sheriff of Warwickshire, to the receiver of victuals at Hull. Ibid., m. 16.
\textsuperscript{211} Ibid., m. 11, dated 30 April.
\end{footnotes}
victuals to Calais. It seems that the English army's supplies must have been more than adequate; the receiver of victuals, William de Kellesey, sold off surpluses at Hull and King's Lynn in October.

For the king's household itself supplies seem to have been bought separately. The king's servientes John de Coventry and Thomas de Weryaton obtained meat and fish specifically for the household, and William de Allerton, valettus, a variety of things. The Prince of Wales' servant John de Skirbek had to buy 100 barrels of wine 'for the prince'.

Adequate shipping was a necessity, not only to intercept French provisions intended for Calais, but primarily for transport of men and supplies. The council set about this in a systematic way. On 15 February officials of thirty-two ports were told to send men with knowledge of the state and availability of ships of each port to Westminster, for 7 March. Richard earl of Arundel, admiral of the West, or his lieutenant Philip de Witton, Robert de Ufford earl of Suffolk, admiral of the North, and the bailiffs of ports from Newcastle to Bristol were to arrest all sea-going ships and have them ready in their ports, as transport was needed.

With the agreement of prelates and magnates it was decided also to create a fighting fleet of 120 great ships, 60 from each admiralty, manned with 60 armed sailors and 20 good archers. It was intended that it should be at Sandwich on 2 April. On 15 March the officials of ports were told how many ships they were to supply. London's quota was two, Dartmouth's six, suggesting that quotas might have been allocated in the light of detailed information. The constable of Dover and the sheriffs of the counties in which the ports were, were told to help progress the obtaining of the ships. The timing proved over-optimistic, not for the first time. On 5 April the admirals were told that there were complaints that ships were being sought from places incapable of providing them. They should cease this, and also make places neighbouring the ports actually supplying ships, help. On 10 April a vigorous remonstrance went to officials

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213 E101/25/15. Some had putrified in the ships.
214 C76/24, m. 20.
215 Ibid., m. 19.
217 Foedera, Vol. III, div. i, pp. 105-6: C 76/24, m. 34d.
218 C76/24, m. 23.
219 Ibid., dated 16 March.
220 Ibid., m. 17; Foedera, Vol. III, div. i, p. 115.
of ports that were trying to avoid supplying their quota.\(^{221}\) Even on 16 May London and other ports had to be told, if their contributions were not yet ready, to crew and victual them and have them join the fleet at sea by 1 June.\(^{222}\)

As far as transport for men and provisions was concerned, many orders seem to indicate that the admirals were expected to provide shipping in an \textit{ad hoc} way. The admiral of the West was to see to ships taking supplies from the Isle of Wight and Hampshire;\(^{223}\) the admiral of the North was told to provide ships at Boston to carry 30 barrels of flour to Calais,\(^{224}\) and to release one or two ships to transport hay;\(^{225}\) the admiral of the West was to let the earl of Pembroke have ships for his crossing at a port to be determined by Pembroke,\(^{226}\) and to provide ships to take victuals to Gascóny;\(^{227}\) he or his lieutenant in Dover and Sandwich was to let the king’s sergeant-at-arms Thomas de Ferriby have enough ships for the passage of Henry of Lancaster.\(^{228}\) Other officials were similarly involved. The constable of Dover was to tell the ships that would transport the earl of Huntingdon to return for other magnates as soon as he had disembarked;\(^{229}\) the clerk Philip de Weston was to crew and victual ships from the Thames and send them to Calais;\(^{230}\) John Dale, sergeant-at-arms, Stephen de Padiham and William Walketale were to find ships for the passage of the king’s son John,\(^{231}\) for which the sheriffs of London were to victual ships and send them to Sandwich;\(^{232}\) the mayor and bailiffs of Dover and Sandwich were to provide transport for the men of the retinue of the earl of Northampton as they arrived.\(^{233}\)

The English administration’s logistical role in the siege of Calais might be summarised as ensuring the availability of shipping, maintaining some sort of supply of victuals, and responding to demands for reinforcements. English successes in south-

\(^{221}\) C76/24, m. 14.
\(^{222}\) \textit{Foedera}, Vol. III, div. i, p. 120.
\(^{223}\) C76/24, m. 35, dated 24 February.
\(^{224}\) Ibid., m. 29, dated 15 March.
\(^{225}\) Ibid., m. 21, dated 26 March.
\(^{226}\) Ibid., m. 14, dated 25 April.
\(^{227}\) Ibid., m. 11, dated 1 May.
\(^{228}\) \textit{Foedera}, Vol. III, div. i, p. 121, dated 19 May.
\(^{229}\) C76/24, m. 16, dated 5 April.
\(^{230}\) Ibid., m. 15.
\(^{231}\) Ibid., m. 12, dated 28 April.
\(^{232}\) Ibid., m. 10, dated 28 April.
\(^{233}\) Ibid., m. 8, dated 1 June.
west France, and the nagging pressure of Flemish attacks, had effectively nullified any French effort to relieve Calais by force. The capture of the town was, however, essentially dependent not on military brilliance but on logistical perseverance. Because of the sustained nature of the effort required it is less surprising therefore that much of the action to obtain provisions, and a good proportion of that to levy archers and armati, was in the hands of permanent officials: possibly, also, a fair number of local notables were with the army in France.\(^{234}\) In the potential military crises of October 1346 and, particularly, May 1347 the summoning of lords and their augmented retinues carried the air of greatest urgency, demonstrating the critical importance of this resource. Finally, even if the assembly of the special fleet of 120 ships did not proceed as planned, it does appear that any delays in arrival of troops during the siege were not due to non-availability of shipping.

A necessary requirement for effective management of the detail of complex operations is availability and use of reliable information: the survey in October 1344 was a deliberate step to establish the basis for that. The results were carefully recorded, and communicated to those who would need them, as were many subsequent reports. There were many instances in which an order for executive action to be completed by a specified date was accompanied by an instruction to report what was being done, by a date in advance of the completion date. This shows that there was a proper understanding of the need not to assume that everything would go according to plan, which is evidence of experienced and competent management. Remonstrances for failure to perform tasks on time show that the explicit arrangements to make monitoring possible were utilised.

Ultimately the embarkation of the army for Normandy took place months later than originally intended. This was partly due to administrative failure to have enough transport available, though that was more a matter of initial quantified planning than of the subsequent carrying out of plans. This apart, it seems fair to judge that the active management of the mobilization for these campaigns was, for its time, a deliberate and

successful user of carefully collected information. This was channelled through the chancery, and thus available to a decision-making council seemingly justifiably confident in its ability to command the realm's resources for the war.
CHAPTER 8
THE REIMS CAMPAIGN, 1359-1360

Victory at Crecy and the capture of Calais naturally invest the mobilization of resources for the campaign of 1346-1347 with the aura of a successful operation. The feature that was least efficiently managed was timing: what had been planned originally as embarkation in October 1345 eventually took place at the end of June 1346. The discussion in the previous chapter has suggested that there were varying reasons for the several postponements - first not enough ships were requisitioned, then (probably) the decision to increase the size of the expedition resulted in the need to find still more ships, then there were storms and, finally, unfavourable winds. The last two were unavoidable; the first two suggest inadequacy in the management of coordinated planning. Arrangements for what became the Reims campaign of 1359-1360 presented the same challenge - to plan and manage coordination of the different elements of the mobilization.

The defeat of the French and the capture of King John at Poitiers had put Edward III in an apparently overwhelmingly powerful negotiating position. Le Patourel, in 'The Treaty of Bretigny 1359.1 points out that the so-called 'first treaty of London' of May 1358, with its seemingly moderate terms, was not a final peace treaty. It only defined the conditions, which included a large ransōm, for John's release. When the first instalment of that ransom was not paid by the due date, 1 November 1358, preliminary orders for preparations for a renewed attack on France were issued.

The order for gathering ships was dated 6 December 1358.2 Sandwich would be the embarkation port, where a transport fleet was to be assembled by Palm Sunday, 14 April 1359. This did not breach the truce agreed in 1357 and due to expire on 9 April 1359. Embarkation in the spring also avoided the problems of crossing and campaigning in winter. The date of the order for ships allowed over four months for gathering them; perhaps the experience of having to postpone the Crecy expedition because of shortage of shipping was remembered.

1 J. Le Patourel, Feudal Empires, Norman and Plantagenet (London, 1984), Ch. XIII.
2 Foedera, Vol. III, div. i, p. 412; C76/36, m. 5.
The detailed instructions went to Guy de Bryan, admiral of the West, and Robert de Morle, admiral of the North. The instructions did not specify how many ships were required, but they did define the scope of requisitioning: ships of 76 tons burden and below. All such ships of the ports of each admiralty, whether in port or at sea, were to be made to give security via the owners and masters that they would be at Sandwich by 14 April. The admirals were to cause to be proclaimed defined rates of payment per horse carried (though nothing was said with regard to other passengers). 3 Certain towns and ports had already been ordered to make barges for the army's crossing. The two admirals were to warn their officials and communities that those barges as well must be at Sandwich by 14 April. 4

Practical and managerially efficient arrangements were made to ensure the carrying out of the instructions. As regards the barges, the admirals had been sent not only lists of the relevant towns and ports but also the number of barges ordered from each. To arrest shipping four royal sergeants-at-arms (Thomas Durant, Thomas Dantre, Walter de Harewell and Michael de Grendon) were assigned to Guy de Bryan and five (Richard de Cortenhale, William de Imworth, William de Wode, John de Haddon and John Mayn) to Robert de Morle. They were to operate under the orders of the admirals. 5 A separate communication dated 8 December to sheriffs, mayors, and owners, masters and sailors of ships, ordered them to obey and assist these individually named sergeants-at-arms. 6 The latter were to go to all the ports to arrest the ships and take the securities for appearance at Sandwich. They had powers to arrest and imprison all who disobeyed. Cortenhale and Imworth covered the ports from the Thames to King's Lynn, William de Wode and John de Haddon those from Hull to Berwick, and John de Haddon with John Mayn, 7 those from King's Lynn to Hull. A comprehensive report of the action taken was to be made by 27 January, under the seal of the admirals. 8

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3 Did this possibly recognise the cost of adapting ships to carry horses?

4 The communities were to be told that, if their barges were not yet ready, they should rectify this. (Ibid.). Therefore it seems obvious that a renewal of the war and the sending of an army to France had been expected - if not actually intended - and planning was already in hand.


6 Ibid.

7 Mayn is, for some reason, not mentioned in the other order, only in that of 8 December (*Foedera*, Vol. III, div. i, p. 413 - and C76/36, m. 5). No similar subdivision of areas is recorded for the western admiralty.

The report was to contain the number of ships arrested, their ports, the names of their masters (but not of their owners), the security taken, and from whom. It was also to report the dates of the proclamation and of the warnings, presumably about the rates of pay for carriage, and about delivery of the barges, respectively. It is interesting that the actual preparation of the reports seems to have been the responsibility of the sergeants-at-arms; the 8 December order to sheriffs and others, telling them to co-operate with Thomas Durant and his colleagues, said explicitly that the latter had been ordered to report to the chancery (as usual) by 27 January.

Several aspects of these arrangements are noteworthy. The sergeants-at-arms were the central resource applied to local action. The chancery was the communication centre. The information to be reported to it was such as to make possible follow-up action; the number of arrested ships would permit an assessment of whether enough would be available, or the tonnage criterion needed to be changed. Telling the owners and masters that the report contained their names and the security they had given would both allow sanctions against defaulters, and more importantly be a discouragement against default. The requirement for the report to be made about half-way between the beginning of the process and the final assembly date allowed time for corrective action. In all, the administration seems to have had a clear and firm grasp of how to manage the operation.

Supplies of bows and sheaves of arrows, 3,300 and 2,000 respectively, for the war with France were to be obtained and delivered by indenture to William de Rothwell, keeper of the privy wardrobe at the Tower, by 7 April. This was to be done by the sheriffs of various counties, specific quotas being allocated to each. They were to pay for them out of the issues of their counties.9

On 12 January, arrayers were appointed for 28 counties to select 2,600 archers. This was described as both for the French expedition and for the necessary defence of England, presumably as propaganda to make the array more palatable.10 Four, or more rarely three, arrayers were named for each county, one always being the sheriff. The defined quotas were to be chosen by 31 March, and equipped at the cost of the county with one suit of clothes, bows, arrows, knives, and appropriate arms. They were to be ready to come to the muster, also at the cost of the county, when summoned, and to go thence at the king's wages. There is a clear indication in the wording of the instructions that, though the arrayers had authority to arrest and commit the disobedient to prison, it

was the sheriff who had responsibility for keeping them imprisoned. The deliberate inclusion of the sheriffs in each commission of array looks like a clear and sensible policy of integrating the permanent local authority with the ad hoc appointees.

Also on 12 January, and for the same two declared purposes, the French expedition and defence, a total of 1,750 South-Welsh foot, two-thirds archers and one-third with lances, were ordered to be chosen. The order went to a list of lords with holdings in Wales, giving each a defined quota to have ready by the same 31 March date. The Prince of Wales' lands in North Wales were to provide another 830. In an apparently separate levy the lieutenant of the justice of Chester and the chamberlain were to choose, equip and have 300 archers ready to go, as the prince was considering crossing with a strong force. The mayor and sheriffs of London were told to select, clothe and equip 200 archers. Later, on 14 February, arrayers, again including the sheriff, were appointed to array, clothe and equip 200 archers from Lincolnshire. Four smiths (fabros) and forty miners were to be chosen from the Forest of Dean and Gloucestershire, to be ready to go when summoned; security was to be taken from them that they would not leave the county. These were also presumably for the expedition, though the text only says ad proficiscendum in obsequium nostrum.

Modifications of the original orders show that the raising of levies was still in progress during March. On 8 March the arrayers for Oxfordshire were told to reduce the city's quota to fifteen, as its mayor had pleaded that the original quota was too large: on 16 March the arrayers of Lincolnshire were told to allow the city to select the

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11 Ibid., Vol. III, div. i, p. 415: Et tu, praefate vicomes, omnes illos, quos vos, vel aliquis vestrum...arestaveritis, vel aresteaverit, in prisonis nostris salvo custodiri faciatis.

12 Ibid., Vol. III, div. i, p. 416. The individual quotas ranged from Roger Mortimer's 500 to John de Warre's 10: another illustration of detailed planning.

13 C76/36, m. 2.

14 *Black Prince's Register*, Vol. III, p. 331, dated 1 March. This order makes arrangements for leaders for these archers, naming Robert de Legh for those from Macclesfield, and instructing the lieutenant and chamberlain to choose leaders for the rest from knights of the county 'who are going with the Prince'.

15 C76/36, m. 2.

16 C76/37, m. 21. Lincolnshire was not among the counties listed on 12 January.


18 The county's full quota, 100, was still to be raised. C76/37, m. 20.
individually itself.\textsuperscript{19} as late as 23 March - ten weeks from the original order's date - the Hampshire arrayers were told not to take any men from Portsmouth.\textsuperscript{20}

Presumably because a muster date had not been set, the Treaty rolls do not show orders for the accumulation of provisions specifically for the expedition to France. Four entries around the end of 1358 refer to supplies for Calais, but should probably be seen as only routine maintenance for the town and garrison, not preparations for the imminent arrival of an army.\textsuperscript{21} Nor is there evidence, for example by the issue of protections, of arrangements for the assembly of men-at-arms from retinues of magnates.\textsuperscript{22}

In the event this expedition planned for early 1359 did not sail. The truce was extended to 24 June and new negotiations with King John took place. These concluded with what Delachenal calls the 'second treaty of London'.\textsuperscript{23} Edward III was to receive extensive territorial gains and a huge ransom of 4,000,000 crowns, in return for giving up his claim to the French throne. This treaty was, as Le Patourel describes it, 'preposterous'.\textsuperscript{24} He suggests it was negotiated by John as a delaying tactic to give the Dauphin time to strengthen his position. Certainly it was something France could not accept, and it was rejected by the Estates General at the end of May. Edward therefore

\textsuperscript{19} The quota was to be 'reasonably' assessed by the arrayers.

\textsuperscript{20} Ibid., m. 19. Two other ports supplying shipping, Great Yarmouth and King's Lynn, were also excused the levy of archers. (CCR 1354-1360, p. 555, dated 25 February.) These decisions seem more like after-thoughts, possibly in response to protests from important individual ports, rather than a general policy of not levying soldiers from ports supplying ships.

\textsuperscript{21} C76/36, m. 6: John de Middleton and John Broke to find in Kent ships to take 400 quarters of corn for the victualling of Calais (20 November); Thomas Dantre and John le Clerk to take ships from Southampton to transport corn and other supplies (3 December); the sheriff of Kent to deliver to ports corn bought for Calais (8 December); enough ships to carry 640 quarters of corn to be requisitioned. Ibid., m. 1, 20 January.

\textsuperscript{22} The reference in the Black Prince's Register to knights of the county 'who are going with the prince' does indicate that preliminary preparations for cavalry were made. Above, p. 172 n.14.


\textsuperscript{24} Feudal Empires, p. 30.
determined to invade France to achieve his aims by military means, saying according to Jean le Bel *qu'il y demourroit tant qu'il auroit fin de guerre ou paix a son honneur.*

According to Henry Knighton Edward's intention was originally to cross to France on 8 September, *ad Nativitatem Beate Marie.* The orders for the assembly of the fleet at Sandwich were dated 6 June. That to Guy de Brÿân defined the arrival date there as *in Quindena Nativitatis Sancti Johannis Baptistae,* i.e. two weeks from 24 June, 8 July. Keeping shipping tied up until 8 September at least, some nine weeks, seems rather cautious administratively, and expensive for the ship-owners; a decade later the Commons were complaining about ships being arrested for that length of time. It is therefore possible that when the order was issued on 6 June an earlier embarkation was envisaged. This is considered below in the context of the orders for troops.

The orders for collecting a fleet, assigning sergeants-at-arms to carry out the arresting of ships and taking of securities, and ordering officials and owners, masters and sailors of ships to obey them, were in essentially the same terms as those of 6 December. There were some differences. The date for assembly at Sandwich was, of course, now 8 July. The date for the report to the chancery was to be made within the preceding fortnight (*citra Quindenam praedictam*). A new sergeant-at-arms, John de Ellerton, replaced William de Imworth and John de Haddon. Significantly there was no upper limit on the size of sea-going ships to be requisitioned. A follow-up communication to the admirals dated 16 June - only ten days after the original order - reiterated the urgency of providing shipping; this adds to the argument that 8 September may not have been the originally intended date for embarkation.

Manning ships sometimes required impressment of sailors if their original crews had disappeared. Masters of seventeen named vessels were given power to choose and

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29 C76/37, m. 13.
place on their craft defined numbers ranging from 28 to 100, to stay there at the king's wages. 30

The admirals' role seems to have been not merely to organise assembly of shipping to Sandwich, but also to allocate it to other needs: since they had been told to requisition all sea-going ships, theoretically at least there would be none available without their permission. The admiral of the North was told to supply eleven ships from east coast ports for the Prince of Wales' officers to send supplies to Sandwich; 31 he had to provide single ships for Roger de la Warre, Edward le Despenser and John de Willoughby. 32 The admiral of the West had to provide ten ships, with a guard of archers, for the passage of the seneschal of Gascony and the constable of Bordeaux. 33 On 6 August he, or his lieutenant at Sandwich, was told to find two ships to escort vessels carrying grain to Calais, which was in urgent need of supplies. 34 By and large it appears that the administration was effective in mobilizing naval resources and applying them to its purposes.

An instruction dated 15 May had told the Devon arrayers to cancel the array of their 60 archers, 35 which might suggest that the resumption of the war was not immediately expected: the French Estates General had not yet met and rejected the 'preposterous' treaty. Other administrative actions, however, show that preparations continued. Peremptory letters, dated 16 May, to the sheriffs who had been told at the beginning of January to buy and deliver arrows by 7 April, admonished them for failure - de quo non inmerito commovemur. It ordered them to deliver their original quotas by 9 June, and substantial further quantities by 22 July. With the same date, 16 May, and the preamble pro expeditione nostrae Franciae, six more sheriffs were told to buy and deliver to the Tower another 4,000 sheaves. 36 The administration's failure to complain

30 Foedera, Vol. III, div. i, p. 428, dating one 7 June and the rest 18 July. In C76/37, m. 13, all are dated 7 June. A separate authority to the bailiff of Lemyngton to take sailors for the king's barge is dated 18 July.

31 Ibid.

32 Ibid., dated 20 and 27 July.

33 Ibid., m. 12, dated 12 July.

34 Ibid., m. 8.

35 Ibid., m. 16.

36 Ibid., m. 17. The sheriff of Norfolk and Suffolk was given the alternative of paying £25 into the treasury by 5 June, for the buying of arrows. The reference to the French expedition may only have been a clerk repeating a previous formula, but if not it looks like a revelation of intent even at that date.
earlier about the non-delivery of the first quotas may have been due to the agreement to extend the truce. Nevertheless it does illustrate the point that management could not assume that all would go according to plan.

By the beginning of June the decision to mount an invasion must have been taken, though the first orders to arrayers of the county levies did not yet specify a date for the muster of the whole army. These orders, dated 1 June, only named the date by which the men were to be ready to move. Fifteen of the counties told to provide levies in the January order, and Lincolnshire, which had been added in February, were to have their men ready by 14 July to be led to the king. Another twelve counties were told to have their men ready by 22 July. Devon's arrayers were told on 6 June that, though they had been notified of cancellation in May, new information meant that the array was reinstated. Their men too were to be ready by the earlier date, 14 July. The counties given that earlier date, 14 July, were those furthest away from Sandwich. The same point applied to the dates for London's contingent and the two from Wales: London's readiness date was 22 July, whereas that for the Welsh was the 14th. This would give the more distant counties approximately enough time for their levies' arrival to coincide with that of the levies from those nearer Sandwich (assuming that the orders to set off would be received simultaneously). This shows that plans for assembling this section of the army were deliberately coordinated.

The new orders to the county arrayers nominated which of them was to bring the men to the king, an indication of their serious intent. They contained a militarily important change. The archers, required explicitly for the expedition to France, were now to be mounted, but still at the cost of the county. In what must have been a necessary compensation the numbers were substantially reduced, to 990, compared with the former 2,800 (2,600 plus Lincolnshire's 200). The orders giving the new quotas repeated the original January figures. In both cases the quota was a multiple of ten, demonstrating that (though no doubt bearing in mind general local circumstances) it had been administratively determined. In broad terms original quotas were reduced by two-thirds, for example all five 60's becoming 20, and all 120's 40, suggesting the same point. Wholly unsurprisingly, it is clear that records were kept and used. This 'one-third mounted' formula was not applied to the London levy. The mayor, sheriffs and aldermen of the city were told that, as a consequence of the news (presumably that the French had rejected the treaty) mounted archers were required for France. They were

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37 Ibid., mm. 16, 15.
38 Ibid., m. 16.
39 Ibid., m. 15, all dated 1 June.
therefore to select 150 archers from the original 200 or others, to be supplied with horses as well as to be armed at the city's expense.\textsuperscript{40}

The foot soldiers to be brought from Wales were also reduced in number, but as they did not have to be provided with horses a higher proportion of the original levies was required. The South Wales lands were now to send 930, about half the first number, and North Wales a still higher proportion, 515 compared with 830.\textsuperscript{41} Specific new figures, stated as in the case of the English counties together with the previous quota, were defined for each lord of the land in question. The Welsh were still to be two-thirds archers and one-third armed with lances. The order giving the new numbers was dated 1 June and was followed by one dated 5 June appointing Rees ap Griffith to supervise the array of 1,060 (\textit{sic}) men from South Wales, replace any considered inadequate, organise them into 100's and 20's, and have them ready by 4 July to be led by either himself or by appointments he was to make, to the king.\textsuperscript{42} Two of the king's clerks were appointed to pay the wages of the Welshmen for their march to Sandwich, and to see to their accommodation, victualling and everything necessary for their safe arrival. Hugo Young's appointment, for those from North Wales, was dated 28 July, and Walter de Derby's for the South Welsh 3 August.\textsuperscript{43} In these arrangements still no date was given for arriving at Sandwich.

The June orders for having the county levies ready are paralleled in the Black Prince's Register. An order dated 10 June was for 50 archers to be ready by 1 August to go when summoned.\textsuperscript{44} On 28 June the chamberlain of North Wales was told to warn knights, esquires, 400 Chester archers and 50 Welsh 'who are going with the Prince to the war' to be ready to come when summoned. In this case an arrival date was specified: they were to be with the prince at Northbourne near Sandwich by 15 August.\textsuperscript{45}

As this order to be at Sandwich by 15 August is dated in June, it may be that 15 August was about the date originally intended for the general muster. It would have given the nearer English counties three weeks from their levies' readiness date, though it would still have meant the fleet would have been actually waiting at Sandwich for some

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{40} Ibid. The Londoners in the event paid £500 for remission of this obligation. \textit{CPR 1358-1360}, p. 256, dated 3 August.
  \item \textsuperscript{41} C76/37, m. 15.
  \item \textsuperscript{42} Ibid., m. 14.
  \item \textsuperscript{43} Ibid.
  \item \textsuperscript{44} \textit{Black Prince's Register}, Vol. III, p. 347.
  \item \textsuperscript{45} Ibid., p. 350.
\end{itemize}
five weeks, and 'under arrest' still longer. Two entries in the Close rolls seem to support this timing. On 26 June the sheriffs of Kent, Sussex and Essex were told to deliver a total of thirty gangways and 3,000 hurdles to Sandwich by 1 August for the shipment of horses for the passage.⁴⁶ On 22 July ships arrested for the passage in certain east coast ports were to be allowed to sail with cargoes of wool, provided they gave sureties to be at Sandwich by 15 August.⁴⁷ These could be consistent with an embarkation intention for mid-August.

If, as Knighton seems to imply, 8 September was from the start the date intended for the army to embark, the first orders for the fleet to be at Sandwich by 8 July seem as has been said unnecessarily early, especially if equipment to enable them to transport horses was not going to be ordered until the end of June, and then only for delivery by 1 August. Similarly, if embarkation was to be 8 September, assembly of the army as early as around 15 August - the date implied by the Black Prince's order - would mean keeping thousands of idle soldiers paid, fed and under some sort of control for three weeks. There are several indications, however, that postponements of what were the original plans did have to be made. The Black Prince's Register records an order dated 25 July to the lieutenant of the justice of Chester. He was to issue a proclamation and warning for all knights, esquires and archers 'who are retained with the Prince for the war' that although they had been told to be at Northbourne within three days of Assumption, i.e. by 18 August, they were now to be there by 24 August. The lieutenant was to set off by 10 August at the latest.⁴⁸

Then, dated 16 August, the chamberlain of Chester was to tell eight knights and their esquires, who had been retained by the Prince specifically for the war, together with 400 chosen archers, to be at Sandwich by 5 September at the latest.⁴⁹ This could be consistent with a new, 8 September, embarkation date. Significantly, on 4 August the county arrayers were told to deliver their mounted archers, by indenture, to a named leader, one of the arrayers, to bring them to Sandwich by 30 August; and this order was prefaced by the statement that it was necessary to accelerate the passage of the army - *passagium nostrum praedictum volumus, prout expedit, accelelari.*⁵⁰ Taken together,
these orders for ships and soldiers with their varying arrival dates suggest that originally in June, and still in July, an earlier sailing may have been intended. Things had not progressed as rapidly as had been hoped, and in August it was recognised that one in September would have to be accepted: this was the one Knighton recorded. If this interpretation is correct it tends to indicate that the ability of the administration to assess how long it would take for a major expeditionary army to assemble was, even at this date, very limited. Perhaps the fact that the whole process had begun in January and then been interrupted led to over-optimism about the speed with which it could, with changes, be re-commenced. More probably, as will be discussed later, the reason for the postponements may have lain in the nature of the make-up of the expedition.

In addition to fighting units, the army needed the equivalent of engineers and sappers. Miners from the Forest of Dean had been included in the earlier conscriptions; now, in July, other specialists were to be summoned as well. Fifty carpenters were to be chosen from London and seven counties in the south-east and assembled at Westminster by 16 August, ready to go to Sandwich. Thirty masons were to come from the same areas, plus Gloucestershire, Oxfordshire and Worcestershire. Twenty-five smiths were to be selected by Andrew le Fevre of the Tower of London, and four farriers by Thomas le Ferrour, a sergeant of the king's household. The date, 16 August, by which these groups were to be ready to set off suggests that by the time of this order, 10 July, it was recognised that the army's sailing could not be before the end of August.

The bulk of the army mobilized for the Reims campaign of 1359-60 was not formed from these levies from the counties and Wales, but from the retinues (usually referred to as companies in the records) of the magnates and others: Andrew Ayton counts nearly 400 such retinues. Some members of a magnate's retinue would be serving in it by virtue of existing obligations, while others would be contracted

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51 Foedera, Vol. III, div. i, p. 431. The order, dated 10 July, to choose the carpenters (not from fees of the church) was to William Herlond, the king's carpenter, John Berholte and John Havering. John de Sporle and Robert de Wenlynburgh chose the masons.

52 e.g. C76/38, mm. 17-18, recording protections, refer to the unit six times as retinëntia and nineteen times as comitiva.

53 Ayton, Knights and Warhorses, p. 268.

54 Such obligations could be set out in an indenture; The services it specified could be intended to last for the life of the retainer and, if so, they were generally for peace as well as war. But they could be for a more limited period, in most cases for a
specifically for this campaign. For example, the knight John de Hide was one of a number of the Prince of Wales' bachelors 'whom the Prince has retained for the war for one year from St Peter's Chains.' To the extent that such specific ad hoc agreements were essential to the construction of each company, this crucially important element of the army was one that depended on volunteers who 'negotiated' their service.

Mobilizing an army dependent on retinues formed in this way therefore depended on the making of essentially voluntary contracts between parties at one remove from the central authority. This must have presented the latter with complex problems of planning, and much uncertainty. Indeed this factor may well have been the reason for the difficulty in setting a date for the embarkation.

It would therefore have been illuminating to be able to know the dates on which commitments to serve in the forthcoming campaign were made between the captains of retinues and the crown, and whether they included a date for muster. In 1359 those commitments were not set out in written contracts, because this was an expedition led by the king himself; the office of the wardrobe was with the king and available to deal with the administration of pay, so there was consequently no need for formal contracts for leaders of companies to be supplied with sums with which to pay their men. Therefore evidence as to when commitments might have been made must be sought elsewhere.

Some indications can, arguably, be deduced from the dates of letters of protection for members of various indentured retinues. 'Indentures customarily stipulated that letters of protection and of general attorney should be granted;... The procedure was as follows. A captain wrote to the chancellor...asking him to make out letters of protection for the members of his retinue, whose names were specified.' The date of issue of protections thus would usually be several days, probably a few weeks, after the captain of a retinue had made his agreements with his recruits and with the king. Therefore they give an indication of the timing of those agreements.

Protections for the Prince of Wales' company were of various dates. Only four were earlier than 20 August, and those look like a special case, three being for three campaign or for a portion of a year.' J. M. W. Bean, From Lord to Patron. Lordship in Late Medieval England (Manchester, 1989), p. 13.


56 'Thus contracts were not needed for the great 1346-7 army, or for that of 1359, though there were no doubt informal understandings between the king and his main captains.' Prestwich, Armies and Warfare, p. 93.

57 Prince, 'Indenture System', p. 287.
members of one family.\textsuperscript{58} That for John de Hide was dated 20 August, like the majority. He was, as noted above, retained for the war for one year from St Peter's Chains, from 1 August; and earlier, dated 11 July, he was recorded as excused the first payment of a fine, so that he could go to the war with the Prince.\textsuperscript{59}

Early in July, therefore, the captain of the greatest retinue (after the king's household) was, at the least, negotiating with recruits specifically for this expedition, so he was himself by then, presumably, already committed to it.\textsuperscript{60} It might be expected that a request from the Black Prince for the issue of protections for members of his retinue would receive priority of treatment. Protections for members of other retinues having an earlier date than those for his retainers will suggest that the captains of those retinues had made their own agreements for service earlier than the prince had made his. They therefore may have been made before early July. Supporting evidence for such early commitments can be argued to come both from the dates of protections and from the record of their retinues coming into pay from the wardrobe before the Black Prince's company. Two members of the retinue of Ralph earl Stafford had protections dated 7 and 8 August;\textsuperscript{61} Stafford's company came into pay from 26 August.\textsuperscript{62} A member of the earl of Richmond's retinue had a protection dated 16 August:\textsuperscript{63} Richmond's company was paid from 30 August.\textsuperscript{64} John Brocas' company was paid from 22 August.\textsuperscript{65} Oliver his son and Bernard Brocas, members of it, had protections dated 15 August.\textsuperscript{66} Most protections for members of the Prince of Wales' company were dated later than these, 20 August, and it was not in pay until 2 September;\textsuperscript{67} probably, therefore, the commitments of those other companies were being made before his.

Thus there is reason to believe that contracts for the forthcoming expedition were being made during June and July, which would be consistent with the rejection of the 'second treaty of London' at the end of May. This might have led to too sanguine a

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\textsuperscript{58} Foedera, Vol. III, div. i, p. 443.
\textsuperscript{59} Ibid., Vol. III, div. i, p. 353.
\textsuperscript{60} As he required service from 1 August, it might be argued that he was at that time expecting to sail not too long after that.
\textsuperscript{61} Foedera, Vol. III, div. i, pp. 439, 440.
\textsuperscript{62} William Farley's wardrobe account, E101/393/11, f. 80.
\textsuperscript{63} Foedera, Vol. III, div. i, p. 442.
\textsuperscript{64} E101/393/11, f. 79.
\textsuperscript{65} Ibid., f. 82d.
\textsuperscript{66} Foedera, Vol. III, div. i, p. 440.
\textsuperscript{67} E101/393/11, f. 79.
}
hope that a sailing in August would be viable. The accuracy of chroniclers, particularly in attributing actual words to people, has to be treated with caution, but Jean le Bel's account, in which the news of the French rejection of the treaty leads the furious Edward to say that, before August was over, he would come powerfully to France also suggests that 8 September may not have been Edward's choice from the beginning.

Additional support for the view that Edward III had hoped to launch the campaign during August exists in the timing of recruitment of continental units. 'At the beginning of a campaign it was usual to issue proclamations offering inducements to all and sundry to serve in the wars.' The issuing in early June of the orders for the county levies and the Welsh makes it most likely that some such proclamation had been made about the same time, though possibly, as in those orders, only urgency rather than a specific date for the muster may have been communicated. As Le Bel says, it was well known in martial circles, including particularly the Low Countries and the Empire, that Edward wanted soldiers for an imminent campaign: Celle renommee issi par tous pays, en Alemaigne, en Brabant, en Haynau, siques chevaliers et escuiers se commencèrent à pourvoir de chevaux, de harnes, et de tous habillements de guerre. Farley's accounts record many men with names like Siffrid van Shoufelde, Henry van Werenwig, Hans Cifoos, and for none of these is there recorded payment for passage or repassage of horses, which is as would be expected for men joining the army at Calais from continental homes. They came into pay from dates in July and before the middle of August, it is very arguable that they were taken on at those dates to be available to reinforce an English army intended to land during August.

Le Bel described what must be seen as a consequence of the administrative and planning failure to determine, or even to know, when the expedition would be able to sail. Many of these continental volunteers waited at Calais for several weeks, having been told repeatedly that the king was coming. When he did not, they had to sell their horses and go home impoverished: Edward is said to have sent messages, after he had eventually landed at Calais, to tell them he had not enough money to meet their demands, and anyway had brought enough men with him.

68 Above, p. 174, n. 25.
69 Prince, 'Indenture System', p. 290.
71 E101/393/11, ff. 92-97.
72 The earliest is Siffrid van Shonfeld, who with his eleven companions was in pay from 1 July. Ibid., ff. 92, 92d, 93.
The initial date for service of a retinue was the day its first members arrived at the assembly port. Assuming this applied in 1359, it can be inferred from the dates in Farley's accounts from which retinues were paid, that the bulk of them arrived between the middle of August and the end of September. An approximate count of the bigger units, all of which are recorded in the first dozen membranes of vadia guerrae, shows that during the two weeks of the first half of September there were over half such arrivals, and during the second half of that month about a quarter of them. Any hope of coming 'powerfully to France' before the end of August must soon have been abandoned. Even the 8 September date in Knighton's chronicle would not have been realistic without Henry of Lancaster's six bannieres, 90 knights, 486 esquires and 423 archers, who were not in the wardrobe's pay until 20 September, let alone without the companies that arrived still later.

According to Farley's account the 'engineers and sappers' - masons, miners and carpenters - were only in pay from 16, 10 and 19 September respectively. This was about a month later than they were to have been ready at Westminster to set off to Sandwich, and though the date might have been due to delay in assembling them, it could have been a sensible administrative decision not to summon them and incur their cost until it could be seen that the fighting units were likely to have arrived. Another large group of conscripts, c.1,000 men from North Wales, were not in Farley's account until 23 September, though they were to have been ready to set off by 14 July. The 500 from South Wales only appear from 10 November. In an army in which the men-at-arms and mounted archers were the critical force it would be similarly proper not to summon these large numbers of foot, relatively inexpensive though they were financially (but logistically not in terms of provisioning) until the former were assembled. Interestingly, ten units of 100 archers and one of 40, described as from

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74 Sherborne, 'Indentured Retinues', p. 719.
75 E101/393/11, f. 79d.
76 Ibid., f. 116.
77 Ibid., f. 115d. They were under the orders of Owyn de Charleton and included ten constables, ten standard-bearers, ten 'proclaimers', and fifty vintenars. The figures of 1,000 from North and 500 from South Wales are the reverse of those taken from C76/37, m. 15! (Above, p. 177.)
78 E101/393/11, f. 115d.
79 Ibid., ff. 115, 115d.
various counties and presumably therefore mounted, are recorded as paid from dates between 17 August and 12 September.\textsuperscript{80}

The foregoing account of the process of mobilizing the whole army that eventually crossed to Calais with Edward III on 28 October\textsuperscript{81} does not present a picture of a successfully planned and executed programme. Even though some groundwork was laid at the beginning of the year, it was still almost five months from the 1 June orders for mounted archers from the counties before the expedition sailed. The summoning of the transport fleet to Sandwich for early July, together with other evidence, suggests that at first a crossing in August was intended. The soldiers and support elements that were obtained by conscription would have been able to meet such a date, given the dates by which they were to be ready to set off; indeed some did, proving that the 4 August order to them to be at Sandwich by the end of the month was practicable. It appears to have been the slower arrivals of the retinues, for which agreements had first to be entered into with the retinues' captains, who would also have to make their own agreements with their men, that caused the delays and consequent postponements. The fact that these arrivals were also spread over several weeks must have made planning even more hazardous. Perhaps, as would be sensible, the final orders for the Welsh and the masons, miners and carpenters to come to Sandwich were delayed until it appeared that the bulk of the retinues would have arrived; that arrival was something over which the king's administrators seemed to have uncertain, indeed not much, control.

What is particularly surprising is the apparent absence of any general promulgation of a date for the muster or for embarkation, both at this time and in the orders issued at the beginning of the year. Was this a recognition of that uncertainty?

The arrangements made for providing the shipping, including the specially ordered barges and the equipment to adapt ships to carry horses, have already been described. Besides the English vessels the transport fleet was augmented by ships hired from Flanders; protections were issued for them dated 26 August.\textsuperscript{82} The result, as

\textsuperscript{80} Another 40 archers, these being from the king's household, were paid from 29 September. Ibid., m. 115.

\textsuperscript{81} C76/38, m. 5: Hic transferavit Rex cum exercitu suo ad partes Franciae videlicet xxviii Ottobri...

\textsuperscript{82} Foedera, Vol. III, div. i, p. 445. The provision of these ships was ... pro competentī frettō eīs inde solvendo.
recounted by John of Reading, was the assembly at Sandwich of an impressive fleet - *terrifica classis* - numbering over 1100 vessels.\(^83\)

There is nevertheless some indication that there was inadequate transport for the crossing; and as K. Fowler suggests, the sending of Henry of Lancaster in advance of the rest of the army on 1 October, to deal with the problems caused by the foreign troops waiting impatiently at Calais, also reduced the pressure on shipping\(^84\) - provided that Lancaster's ships returned to Sandwich.

Both the men-at-arms and the archers in the expedition were mounted; their horses, together with those needed for the c. 1,000 baggage carts (according to Thomas Walsingham),\(^85\) must have strained the fleet's capacity. The promulgation of standard rates of payment for the carriage of horses, even in December 1358 before the decision that archers were to be mounted, may have been a recognition by the administration that this would be a problem that might be expensively exploited by ships' masters. Ayton, estimating that the army included almost 3,000 men-at-arms and 5,000 mounted archers, assesses the number of horses needed for them as some 16,000,\(^86\) and animals for the baggage would add to this. Though the bulk of the horses would be carried in the ships requisitioned by royal officers, Farley's accounts show payments to some captains for 'passage' to Calais of stated numbers of horses.\(^87\) Ayton argues that these payments, 25 in number in 1359, had to be made when transport was not in the royal fleet, in which case they are persuasive evidence that its capacity was inadequate.

Further, Ayton counts not only payments for passage of a total of 4,471 horses, but also payments for 'repassage' from France of 10,861.\(^88\) In most instances the

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\(^86\) *Knights and Warhorses*, p. 268.

\(^87\) e.g. to the Prince of Wales for 1369 horses. E101/393/11, f. 79.

\(^88\) *Knights and Warhorses*, p. 268. The Black Prince, for example, was paid for repassage of 2,114 horses, compared with passage of 1,369.
recipient of payment for repassage had not had to be paid for passage. These payments for repassage most probably represent the fact that the return to England at the end of the campaign would, for many, have to be in hired ships, not in vessels requisitioned for royal service. The fleet assembled at Sandwich in autumn 1359 would have dispersed by May 1360, and there are no records of orders to assemble a fleet at Calais for the return. Payments for passage to France could therefore also be seen to be for transport in ships other than those in the requisitioned fleet, and evidence that the latter's capacity had to be substantially supplemented. 4,471 horses must have needed a lot of ships.

Supplies for the expedition had to be organised, particularly the equipment for the militarily essential archers. The orders to sheriffs to obtain and deliver increased quantities of bows and sheaves of arrows to William de Rothwell at the Tower of London by 22 July have already been described. On 1 July he was told to pack into chests and deliver all his bows, arrows, bowstrings and winches for cross-bows to Sandwich, to Henry de Sneyth, clerk of the privy wardrobe of the household. Supplies had to continue to be supplied for the army when it was in France. On 8 November, with the preamble that large quantities of bows and arrows were needed quickly for the expedition, sheriffs of many counties in the south and midlands, and Yorkshire as well, were told to buy a total of 1,200 bows and 12,000 sheaves of well-sharpened arrows and deliver them by 7 December. As if recognising that it might be impracticable in the time, they were told that if they could not do this, they should pay sums of money calculated at the rate of £7/1/8 per 100 sheaves into the Treasury by the same date pro tot arcubus & sagittis providendis. As in either case the money was to come from the issues of the sheriff's bailiwick, and the total sum only about £1,000, it is clear this was not just a cash-collecting device. The money alternative was given probably because there was manufacturing capacity, particularly at the Tower, that might be able to make the bows and arrows more quickly than the sheriffs could obtain them. In fact all but

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89 A rough count gives a total of some 300 individuals receiving payments for repassage only. (E101/393/11, ff. 112, 112d, 113 etc.) Many of these are to people clearly not captains of retinues, but men on their own.

90 A risky calculation suggests 200 ships of average capacity; e.g. if two horses required as much space as five armed men, and the 1,100 ships were about enough for c. 16,000 horses and c. 12,000 men, on average each would accommodate about 20 horses or 50 men.

91 CCR 1354-1360, p. 574.


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six of the twenty-one sheriffs were ordered on 24 February to deliver the money by Easter so that William de Rothwell could be reimbursed for those he had had to buy.\textsuperscript{93} Taken together with the failure of the sheriffs to deliver in April the weapons ordered in January, this suggests that they were not expected to be a reliable mechanism,\textsuperscript{94} especially when speed was required. The Black Prince's Register gives evidence of an analogous experience: on 16 February the chamberlain of Chester had to be urged to proceed to obtain bows and arrows he had been told on 26 December to deliver as soon as possible.\textsuperscript{95}

Supplies of food had also to be available. A key figure for this would be the receiver of the king's victuals, and on 13 July the king's clerk Richard de Skydeby was appointed to be receiver and keeper of the victuals 'brought to Sandwich and elsewhere for the king's passage'.\textsuperscript{96} Although substantial quantities of provisions must have been required from mid-August until the end of October as the various elements of the army assembled, orders to officials to buy or supply provisions do not seem to be recorded during that time. The focus for obtaining and delivery of victuals seems to have been the opposite side of the Channel, and the means private commercial enterprise. On 18 October, before the king had crossed, the mayor and sheriffs of London, the warden of the Cinque Ports and all the ports of both admiralties were ordered to proclaim that all who wished should take victuals to Harfleur in Normandy: its officers would assist the king and the army with provisions.\textsuperscript{97} In November English port officials were told that merchants of Flanders were to be treated as friends in return for their kindness in bringing food to the army after its crossing.\textsuperscript{98} In December licences were granted to merchants to take various foodstuffs to Flanders and other places 'to make their profit'.\textsuperscript{99}

\textsuperscript{93} CCR 1360-1364, pp. 10-11.
\textsuperscript{94} This point is made by Hewitt, Organisation of War, p. 69.
\textsuperscript{95} Black Prince's Register, Vol. III, pp. 379,380.
\textsuperscript{96} CPR 1358-1361, p. 243.
\textsuperscript{97} CCR 1354-1360, p. 658.
\textsuperscript{98} Ibid., p. 662.
\textsuperscript{99} CPR 1358-1361, p. 312, dated 11-19 December. Supplying Calais from England was a regular arrangement; whether licences dated 16 October and 2 and 3 November to take wine and victuals there (C76/38, m. 7) were specifically related to provisioning the army cannot be known.
After the army had left England John Pledour and Richard Catoriis were appointed to purvey specific quantities of various victuals from specific counties, by tallies redeemable at the treasury at Easter. The supplies were to be delivered to ports at the king's charge. They were described as being obtained for defence as well as for Calais and the army in France. Ralph de Kesteven, clerk, and Thomas Staple, sergeant-at-arms, were given authority to take various victuals from ships or granaries in various ports, and arrest ships to take these urgently needed supplies to Calais. Walter de Kelby was given the same authority for other ports. In January the sheriffs of Northamptonshire, and Cambridge and Huntingdon, were to buy bacons for Calais. In certain circumstances, therefore, supply of victuals still involved officially conducted action. Once the army was on the march in France, of course, it would have to live largely off the land. In the train of carts were carried hand-mills, ovens, leather boats from which to fish, and hunting equipment, to enable this to be done. Thomas Walsingham says the army was divided into three columns propert victualiae. Presumably this was so as to spread the foraging, for which preparation had thus been made as the expedition was being mobilized in England.

The mobilization of the force to cross the Channel was followed by arrangements to mobilize the able-bodied manpower of the country to resist a possible enemy invasion. The first set of orders, dated 3 October, appointed arrayers, usually four or five per county, for thirty counties. They were to array all men between 16 and 100.

In an order dated 1 February 1359 'Rayling Pletouf' (sic) is referred to as 'Chief Purveyor of Wheat', and 'Richard Catour' (sic) as one of three purveyors under him. (CCR 1354-1360, p. 544.) It therefore seems likely that these are the same men.

C76 38, m. 6, dated 2 November.

Ibid., m. 1, dated 13 January. A few days later, 23 January, they and the mayor and bailiffs of King's Lynn were told to de-arrest corn and malt, as three merchants had undertaken to purvey defined quantities of various supplies as soon as possible, for delivery to the king's appointees to be taken to France. CCR 1354-1360, p. 607.

C76 38, m. 1. Later, on 20 February he was told to release corn and malt that was going bad, for merchants to sell. CCR 1360-1364, pp. 94-95.

C76 38, m. 3.

In an apparently analagous arrangement Henry of Lancaster assigned William Tubb of Leicester to acquire 500 quarters of corn to be taken via King's Lynn to Calais for the sustenance of the army. Ibid., m. 4, dated 12 November.


60, see that they were armed according to the Statute of Winchester, organise the mounted into constabularies and the foot into 100's and 20's, and have them prepared to go against any enemy attacking their county. Signal beacons were to be set up to warn of attack. The arrayers were to report numbers and the details of the array to the chancery by 30 November. A final section, perhaps indicating concern not to cause premature disruption, said that the men arrayed were not to be made to leave the hundred where they lived before the whole county was summoned to meet an invasion.108 The next set of orders, dated 16 November and originating from the council, went further.109 These orders included six more counties,110 added more arrayers for each county,111 and made it clear that the array did not stop at the £15 level of the Statute of Winchester but was to include everyone except those with the king. It required those well off, but too infirm to serve in person, to be assessed by the arrayers to provide money for arms for others who could not afford their own, and for the expenses of defence arrangements. The report to the chancery was to be made by 28 January, and include how many of the arrayed men were able to go outside their own county if needed. Sheriffs were being told to cooperate and, as usual, imprison the recalcitrant.112

The order's detail is remarkable. Its explicit reference to its purpose of correcting the inadequacy of the earlier order, which it said was noticed by members of the council, is evidence of a watchful administration. In addition to the appointments of arrayers directly by the council for the counties and London, Henry of Lancaster for his duchy, the Prince of Wales for Wales and Cheshire, the bishop for Durham, and the warden, Roger Mortimer earl of March, for the Cinque Ports and Dover, were to issue similar commissions.113 Thus the whole kingdom was included.

110 Cumberland, Westmoreland, Northumberland, Cornwall, Middlesex and Shropshire.
111 Sometimes as many as four, or in the case of Yorkshire, instead of the original four for each Riding, naming an extraordinary c. 140 wapentake by wapentake!
112 The order also included the minutiae of administrative issues, e.g. how to deal with individuals with holdings in several counties.
113 CPR 1358-1361, pp. 324-5. The Black Prince's Register, Vol. III, pp. 375-377, records his instructions to his senior officials to act according to the king's writ, which is included in the Register with its date of 16 November, though the date apparently associated with the entry is October.
These general arrangements were reinforced for certain counties by writs to five magnates to supervise the arrays and correct any defaults.\textsuperscript{114} The bishop of Durham, the earl of Angus and Ralph Nevill covered Yorkshire. Hugh de Courtenay, earl of Devon, saw to Devon, and the earl of Arundel to Sussex, Surrey and Hampshire, which would look like the taking of special precautions for the coast, were it not that Shropshire was in the latter's list, and no such appointment was made for Kent.\textsuperscript{115} This intention to mobilize the whole able-bodied male population, at least in terms of preparedness, was not an operation whose progress could be taken for granted. Writs dated 10 February went to the arrayers of almost all counties complaining that the task was not completed, \textit{dort nous sumes tresmal paiez et esmuz grantement}, and ordering them to apply themselves to it with \textit{toute votre peine et diligence}. They were to report by 20 April, and preferably earlier. All the details of the conduct of the array were repeated, with the further clarification that it was to include knights. This suggests there had at least uncertainty about this, and possibly resistance to it.

At this time, February, the council was, correctly, anticipating that a French landing was imminent. Regional meetings with emissaries of the council were called at which delegates were to treat with them for raising money for the expenses of defence.\textsuperscript{116} On 3 March, the French being known to be at sea, the arrayers of coastal counties were ordered to summon their men and take them to the coast. Neighbouring counties' arrays were to stand by to assist. Ports were to array their men and see that ships were drawn up away from the sea for safety.\textsuperscript{117} The archbishop of Canterbury was put in charge of the array and defence of Kent on 9 March.\textsuperscript{118}

In spite of all these preparations, a French raid in considerable force successfully took and sacked Winchelsea on 15 March.\textsuperscript{119} It was however only a raid, not a full scale invasion. The arrangements for mobilization against invasion were therefore not

\textsuperscript{114} \textit{CPR 1358-1361}, p. 324, dated 18 November.
\textsuperscript{115} Perhaps it was assumed that the warden of the Cinque Ports would see to that vulnerable shore; later the archbishop of Canterbury was given this responsibility.
\textsuperscript{116} \textit{Foedera}, Vol. III div. i, pp. 468-469, dated 10 and 12 February. The nature of the grants made by these regional assemblies is discussed in Harriss, \textit{King, Parliament, and Public Finance}, pp. 347-8, 396-400.
\textsuperscript{117} Ibid., Vol. III div. i, pp. 471-2.
\textsuperscript{118} \textit{CPR 1358-1361}, p. 411.
really put to the test, but they were used to provide armed men\textsuperscript{120} for the fleet hastily collected\textsuperscript{121} to go to sea against possible further attacks.

The preparations for the campaign of 1359-60 produced what contemporary chronicles saw as a militarily impressive expedition. Its failure to achieve Edward III's more grandiose political objectives was partly due to the Fabian strategy of the Dauphin, and perhaps arguably to the expedition's late timing. If Edward had been able to cross with his whole army in early September, and even more if such a crossing had been made in August, as may have been his original idea, he might have been more successful. The French government would have had less time to deal with its internal difficulties, Reims might have been less well prepared to resist the siege, and weather would have been more favourable for campaigning in autumn than in winter. These points probably apply with even more force to an expedition that might have been mounted at the beginning of 1359, had the negotiations over the 'second treaty of London' not intervened.

From this point of view the postponements and delays in departure that seem to have affected the expedition had considerable significance. The problems seem to have arisen from the administration's inability to apply precise scheduling criteria - and possibly also quantified logistical planning - to an army mobilized primarily from retinues that were formed by subordinate and essentially voluntary contracts.

This (admittedly crucial) aspect apart, the management of mobilization for the Reims campaign was on the whole well organised. It does not appear that failure to assemble shipping in time in broadly sufficient quantity was the primary problem. As

\footnotesize{\textsuperscript{120}} e.g. \textit{CCR 1360-1364}, pp. 9-10, dated 18 March. Arrayers in south-eastern counties and the mayor and sheriffs of London were told to have specific quotas at London by 23 March, to go to sea. They were to have wages paid for fourteen days, the money for which was to be borrowed and repaid from the tenth and fifteenth granted for defence. The arrayers of midland counties were to bring soldiers to various towns by 4 April, to set off two days later to the sea to join ships. They were to send servants ahead to obtain victuals to vision the ships. \textit{Ibid.}, p. 16, dated 26 March.

\footnotesize{\textsuperscript{121}} \textit{Foedera}, Vol. III, div. i, p. 476, dated 15 March, the very day of the raid. This orders Robert de Causton and John de Wesenham to requisition, arm and vision ships from the Thames northwards. Another order, dated 19 March, summons English ships from ports in Flanders. (\textit{Ibid.} p. 478.) John Pavely, Prior of the Hospital of St. John in England, was appointed captain and leader of the fleet. \textit{Ibid.} p. 479, dated 26 March.

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T. J. Runyan says 'A naval force could be created and assembled in less time than a military force.'\textsuperscript{122} This aspect of mobilization was efficiently managed. Arrangements began in good time, included clear allocation of responsibilities, and made provision for intermediate monitoring and correction of problems; they did not give rise to the sort of administrative complaints of tardiness that were justifiably levelled at the sheriffs over supplies of arrows, though in this also there was managerial action that shows monitoring of performance and correction of problems. The orders for having the county levies of archers ready by dates in mid-July allowed a workable margin for an August embarkation, and took account of the different journey times needed. The changes to quotas when it was decided that the county archers should be mounted clearly used recorded numbers, and there do not seem to have been complaints of the reduced quotas not being fulfilled. Information was channelled through the chancery, and used. The conscription of the miners and other craftsmen, and the dates for their arrival at the port, as in the case of Welsh, seem to have been deliberately delayed as the magnates' retinues' failure to arrive in time for an August or September sailing became obvious. In all these respects - other than the planning of timing for a contract army of retinues - mobilization was, in 1359, effectively managed.

CHAPTER 9

ANALYSIS

Introduction

Chapters 2-8 looked at the management of the administration of eight of the many mobilizations under the three Edwards. Their occasions ranged from suppression of an unexpected, sudden, localised rebellion in 1282, to a deliberate, planned attempt to obtain the French crown by force in 1359. Though such different situations affected how the government set about its task, the fundamental issues involved in management of a mobilization were necessarily constant. When there was no standing army 'preparation of forces for active service'\(^1\) required the recruitment and collection at a mustering point of armed men, transport and supplies, in numbers, quantities and with the timing planned as appropriate for the particular occasion.

This analysis has those main themes: recruitment, transport, supplies, and planning. Within them issues such as organisational structure, use of records, authority and sanctions, effectiveness, and coordination, will recur and overlap. The particular focus of attention is, however, how the day-to-day practicalities were monitored and progressed: that is, how the active management\(^2\) of the interrelated processes was carried out.

The thirteenth and fourteenth centuries are a period in which historians have seen substantial, and even revolutionary, changes in the conduct of war. There were technical changes in arms and consequently in tactics.\(^3\) At least as importantly, changes took place in the scale and duration of conflicts, with lasting consequences for state activity. The importance of these has naturally led to particular emphasis on them in historical accounts. They are seen as giving rise to, and arising from, significant social and political developments. The growth of the importance of parliament, due partly to the crown's need to raise taxes to finance the increasing duration and consequent cost of

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\(^1\) The Concise Oxford Dictionary's helpful definition of mobilization.

\(^2\) Colloquially, 'management' might be defined as 'seeing that things get done'.

\(^3\) Above, pp. 7-8.
these wars, draws attention to their constitutional consequences.\textsuperscript{4} The Edwardian wars have been intensively studied in the context of the declining use of the formal summons of the feudal \textit{servicium debitum}, and its eventual replacement by the raising of armies by contracts for indentured retinues,\textsuperscript{5} which related to changes in the nature of social structures. Though the absolute numbers of men actively involved in the campaigns may not have been critical in relation to the size of the population, the economic effects of their withdrawal from productive activity, of the need to supply them, and of the wars themselves, is a central theme of some studies.\textsuperscript{6} These major issues, let alone the dominating subject of the military aspects\textsuperscript{7} of strategies, campaigns, battles and tactics often relegate the day-to-day management of the initial mobilization to incidental comment.

Though that day-to-day management tends to be more or less taken for granted, it is, nevertheless, an essential part of such large-scale and complex operations. The more efficiently management ensures that orders and plans are carried out, the less likely it is to be noticed; conversely, inadequate management can handicap, sometimes critically, ambitious strategies as well as more modest plans. Edwardian mobilizations were substantial undertakings, requiring a number of different tasks to be performed, over wide areas, involving large numbers of people, and with a need for coordinated, or at least congruent, achievement. To be successful, therefore, they had to be actively managed, not merely put in motion. How this was done was one expression of the nature and techniques of English medieval government; its examination is potentially of some value to the history of the period.

The method used has been to examine each of the eight chosen mobilizations as a separate case study. It has been adopted particularly in order to facilitate observation of the interrelation of the various tasks involved. The efficiency with which each task was carried out would have an effect on the others, and so on the mobilization itself - as well as sometimes on the subsequent campaign. The chronology of the arrangements for each mobilization is of especial interest, both in respect of the timing of the issuing

\textsuperscript{4} e.g. Prestwich, \textit{War, Politics and Finance}; Harris, \textit{King, Parliament and Public Finance}.

\textsuperscript{5} Prestwich, 'Cavalry Service'; Powicke, \textit{Military Obligation}; Lewis, 'Last Summons of the English Feudal Levy'.

\textsuperscript{6} e.g. in particular Maddicott, \textit{The English Peasantry}; Postan, 'The Costs of the Hundred Years War', pp. 34-53.

\textsuperscript{7} The military aspects of the Edwardian wars are discussed at length in the works referred to in Ch. 1, e.g. nn. 3 - 8.
of the centre's instructions to its officials and appointees, and in what can be discerned of the timing of the latter's consequent action, and its results. The first can paint a picture of the degree and coherence of the government's planning. The second, looked at in relation to the original orders, can provide a commentary on the government's ability to plan realistically, to control and to manage. Taking each mobilization as a separate study helps to place these matters in their relationship to each other.

These case studies are used to describe the practical steps the government took to try to ensure that its orders were obeyed, to monitor progress, and to correct failures or adapt plans if things were going wrong: as Maddicott\(^8\) and Kaeuper\(^9\) have described, many actions unintended by government were taken by its agents.

This chapter discusses in turn the management of the recruitment of soldiers, the provision of transport, and the organisation of supply. It concludes with examination of the government's management of the problems of integrating these in terms of the planning and coordination of mobilizations.

The concluding chapter will consider the detailed management techniques and resources used in mobilization in a more general context, in relation to the operation of English medieval government in other fields.

Recruitment

Some element of quantification of the size of the army is a first and necessary component of the planning of a mobilization. In reaction to a defensive emergency this could take the basic form of calling out in the threatened areas all men able to bear arms, as in the early stages of the Welsh rebellion in 1282,\(^10\) in 1322, when orders were issued to array all men between 16 and 60 years old to be ready to defend the Scottish march,\(^11\) or in the preparations for defence of maritime lands in 1359.\(^12\) Recruitment for an offensive war, on the other hand, required more detailed and selective planning. How this operated is most clearly seen in the arrangements for raising levies of foot, and later of mounted archers, from counties and towns.

\(^8\) The English Peasantry.
\(^9\) Kaeuper, War, Justice and Public Order.
\(^10\) Above, p. 27.
\(^11\) Above, p. 70.
\(^12\) Above, p. 188.
The individual numbers ordered to be found in each county sometimes added up to a very round figure. This indicates that, often, a total to be conscripted had been determined, and quotas then assigned to those nominated to raise the levies.\textsuperscript{13} In May 1301, 12,000 foot were ordered to be raised,\textsuperscript{14} and in June 1322, 10,000;\textsuperscript{15} in February 1345, 500 archers were wanted for Henry of Lancaster's expedition to Gascony.\textsuperscript{16} On other occasions the totals were less obviously rounded: in February 1336 Edward III asked for 3,600 archers (and 1980 hobelars),\textsuperscript{17} and in January 1359 for 2,600.\textsuperscript{18} For the Bannockburn campaign 21,540 foot were summoned.\textsuperscript{19} The proposed array of March 1322 was for 27,900 men to go to Newcastle, and 11,000 to go to Carlisle.\textsuperscript{20} Such numbers indicate that it was not just a matter of taking a large round figure, and roughly subdividing it: the allocations to individual counties and towns had to relate sensibly and fairly to their ability to produce their quota, or the process would fail. The allocation of specific numbers to each of nine cities in 1324\textsuperscript{21} is one instance of several.\textsuperscript{22} A writ of April 1322 appears implicitly to claim that the very detailed breakdown of the 10,000 Welsh summoned had taken account of comparably detailed knowledge of local circumstances.\textsuperscript{23}

The existence and use of the recorded detail that would make such planning possible is attested by an administrative instruction of August 1314. This described how a local array and selection of men was to be managed.\textsuperscript{24} The references to recorded information on who should have attended the array, who failed to attend, who

\textsuperscript{13} This could also apply to preparatory defensive arrangements; orders in 1336, made when the French crusade fleet was transferred to the Channel, defined numbers for each county and town involved. (Above, p. 127). In August 1324 a defence force totalling 20,000 was to be formed, a specific number being required in each county. Above, p. 92.

\textsuperscript{14} Above, p. 48.

\textsuperscript{15} Above, p. 75.

\textsuperscript{16} Above, p. 134.

\textsuperscript{17} Above, p. 110.

\textsuperscript{18} Above, p. 171.

\textsuperscript{19} Above, p. 59, n. 49.

\textsuperscript{20} Above, p. 63, but these may not have been intended seriously. Above, p. 70.

\textsuperscript{21} Above, p. 94.

\textsuperscript{22} e.g. above, pp. 98, 137, 153.

\textsuperscript{23} Above, p. 71.

\textsuperscript{24} Above, p. 64.
were selected, and who were to lead them to the muster are particularly significant: they demonstrate both that the information was accessible, and that it was intended that it should be used for the systematic management and monitoring of this array. The arrangements were obviously practical and potentially efficient; they probably therefore represented established and well-tried practice. Further, there seems to be little reason why they should not have been followed in the future.\textsuperscript{25}

There are many instances of both the recording and the use of statistics for military purposes in these eight case studies. In 1322 the commissioners supervising the raising of one man from each vill had to report the number of vills;\textsuperscript{26} in 1324 commissioners were appointed to make a return of the number of fencible men available for defence;\textsuperscript{27} a census of holders of land of defined values ordered in 1344 was subsequently used to determine military obligations;\textsuperscript{28} in June 1359, when quotas were changed from foot to mounted archers, they were reduced by a mathematically constant proportion\textsuperscript{29} - implying again the existence and use of recorded quantified information.

Taken together, these observations present a picture of an administration that recognised the value of collecting, being equipped with, and using recorded, quantified and quite detailed information. Though it would surely be wrong to attribute rigorous accuracy to that information, its existence would have provided a basis for planning and managing the mobilization of armies.

The administrative mechanisms for collecting foot soldiers varied. For Edward I's first Welsh war in 1277 recruitment was not carried out by any systematic use of temporary or permanent officials. Morris records the employment of several types of agent - 'troopers of the royal household', at least one sheriff, the constable for the king at Builth, the steward of Abergavenny, and others.\textsuperscript{30} Similarly, probably because the second war in 1282 also was not in origin a pre-planned offensive, the management of the mobilization of levies of foot appears rather as a series of \textit{ad hoc} arrangements.

\textsuperscript{25} In 1359 orders to lords of a number of lands in Wales specified how many men each was to raise: the detail into which the central administration was able to go is striking. C76/36, m. 2.
\textsuperscript{26} Above, p. 73.
\textsuperscript{27} Above, p. 92.
\textsuperscript{28} Above, pp. 129-133.
\textsuperscript{29} Above, p. 17.
\textsuperscript{30} Welsh Wars, pp. 125, 128, 131-2.
Knights of the household were certainly sent to raise specific numbers of foot. These were chosen from assemblies organised on the knights' instructions as to time and place by permanent local officials. At least one sheriff, Henry du Lee of Lancashire, was required to collect and deliver a specific number of men. The sheriffs' responsibility for finding and delivering auxiliary workmen, the tree-fellers and others so important to campaigning in Wales, also shows that they and their staffs were the major organisational resource, though increasingly royal clerks were required to supervise them.

The preparations made in 1301 for the king's army mustering at Berwick did have a systematic structure, and what appears to have been an in-built provision for managing the mobilization. The commissioners of array who were appointed included a royal clerk in each team; these clerks were then involved in subsequent, very necessary, investigative commissions. The arrangements constituted a coherent scheme. All the appointments were issued at once; a total of men to be recruited was defined; the number of arrayers for each county was broadly related to the size of its quota - in three cases of under 1,000 per county just the sheriff and the clerk, for larger numbers two commissioners and the clerk. The structure of commissioners of array, with the sheriffs acting in local executive support, set the basic operational pattern, though at this time some sheriffs were also nominated as arrayers. The immediate and subsequent roles of the clerks are particularly interesting in that they indicate deliberate provision for managerial monitoring. The same operational pattern continued in the mustering of footmen for the Bannockburn campaign. In March 1314 arrayers were appointed to raise men from six counties and Chester, and the sheriffs were told to assist these 'choosers and leaders'. In April the sheriffs of those counties, with a royal

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31 Above, p. 37.
32 Ibid.
33 Above, p. 38.
34 Footmen for the Prince of Wales's army at Carlisle were collected by another, slightly later, and rather less precise, set of orders. Above, pp. 50-51.
35 Some of the clerks named are recorded as being paid for conducting men there. Above, p. 49.
36 There was a substantial difference between the numbers sought - 12,000 - and the number - c. 7,000 - actually obtained. Above, p. 50.
37 Above, p. 4.
clerk, were themselves to select additional men. In May the sheriffs were told to see to the delivery of the totals. In this mobilization, therefore, the sheriffs' role remained central. Similarly, for Edward II's invasion of Scotland in 1322, at first two or more arrayers were appointed per county, the sheriff being one of them in some cases, and local officials, bailiffs and sheriffs, were ordered to assist the arrayers.

Subsequently in May 1322 these recruiting arrangements were cancelled and replaced by parliament's grant of one armed and armoured man from each vill. This involved some new elements. Commissioners, of whom six were sheriffs, were appointed for all the counties, but unusually shires paired according to their shrievalties were given separate arrayers. The commissioners' expenses were to be paid by the king, not the vill or county; as this point was made explicitly, it therefore probably implies that this was not normal practice, and was perhaps a way of preventing corruption.

The force raised in this unusual way was then augmented by soldiers supplied by towns, Ireland, and Wales, and via a new levy from counties; the commissioners of array for these county levies included only three sheriffs. The trend towards placing the authority and ultimate responsibility for raising the county levies on specially appointed commissioners, rather than on the sheriffs, continued in the first appointments for the War of Saint-Sardos, though as usual sheriffs organised the assemblies from which the recruits were chosen. Sheriffs also advised the commissioners when subsequent orders required only a proportion of them to be sent on to Plymouth. In early August more commissioners were appointed to make a return of the number of fencible men available for defence, and then to select 20,000 footmen, with a specific number in each county. Structurally, like the arrangements for collecting the one man per vill, the scheme dealt separately with individual counties.

39 Ibid., pp. 124a-124b
40 Ibid., p. 127. The wording of the writ was 'exasperes, festines & compellas'.
41 Above, p. 63.
42 Above, p. 73.
44 Nicholas Gentil of Surrey and Sussex, John Haward of Norfolk and Suffolk, and John Darcy of Nottinghamshire and Derbyshire. (Parl. Writs, Vol II, div. ii, pp. 578-579.)
45 The appointments included only one sheriff.
46 Above, p. 89.
even when pairs had one sheriff for both.\textsuperscript{47} When commissioners were appointed to raise 900 foot from four of the counties, to go to France, only one sheriff, Hampshire's, was included, and that by name, not by office, among the arrayers. This appears to be the culmination of a process, begun by Edward I, of placing steadily increasing reliance on specially appointed commissioners, to the ultimate exclusion of sheriffs, for the supervisory management of the raising of county levies.

Edward III's arrangements in 1336, both for offensive war with Scotland and for defence in case of a French landing, followed this system. For the Scottish campaign, the recruitment of archers and hobelars from the counties was put in the hands of arrayers, who were given power to arrest and imprison the disobedient. For defence, magnates were appointed as keepers of the maritime lands, and under them arrayers to see to the array, arranged by sheriffs and local officials as instructed by the arrayers;\textsuperscript{48} when these arrangements were effectively repeated in May, the arrayers were required to make detailed reports not only of total numbers, but also of the names of the millenars, centenars and vintenars chosen to lead the various units, a means of facilitating a managerial follow-up investigation if necessary.\textsuperscript{49} Thus in 1336 the sheriffs' role in relation to the levying of foot was limited to administrative support of the commissioners of array. This seems to have been a development that evolved, not one instituted all at once.

It was reversed in the arrangements made in 1345. In March the sheriff was once again, but now systematically, included as one of the two or three in each county selecting men for Edward III's expedition to Sluys: probably the reason for this was that those selected were to be paid out of the county issues. The inclusion was clearly on an \textit{ex officio} basis, as the order appointing the selectors referred to him not by name but as 'the sheriff'.\textsuperscript{50} Similarly, the arrangements made at the end of the year for 3,700

\textsuperscript{47} This writ was accompanied at the same time by an order to a long list of magnates, including eight earls and the marshal of England, to prepare both horse and foot for defence, in view of the French threat to the duchy, and, again, to report what size of force they would provide. These schemes provide another instance of the collection of quantified information. Above, p. 94.

\textsuperscript{48} Above, p. 107. The arrayers were also to see to the organisation of all fencible men into units of specified sizes.

\textsuperscript{49} Above, p. 114.

\textsuperscript{50} C76/20, m. 30.
archers from several counties again included 'the sheriff' (sic) in the three or more arrayers appointed per county.\textsuperscript{51}

These orders had given dates for the muster which had subsequently, for various reasons, been postponed. In March 1346 a firm date, 1 May, was set for the passage, and new and detailed administrative arrangements were made for coordination of the assembly of all the county levies already chosen.\textsuperscript{52} Powerful teams of supervisors\textsuperscript{53} (each team responsible for one or more counties) would make sure all was in order. The writ defined the places and dates for the men to come before the supervisors; sheriffs, as usual, were responsible for assembling the selected soldiers. A report was to be made via the clerk who was one of the team. These orders demonstrate that the administration was aware of what was necessary for effective control, monitoring and management.

During Edward's campaign in France reinforcements of archers and other foot were repeatedly summoned from England. In almost every case permanent local officials were involved in raising them. As far as those of the towns and the justiciars of Wales were concerned, this was long-established practice; unusually, in July\textsuperscript{54} and October 1346\textsuperscript{55} the sheriffs alone did the recruiting in the counties. The reasons for placing the responsibility on the sheriffs on these occasions could have been both that the numbers were not large, so the sheriffs' own staff would be sufficient, and probably that as only a short time was allowed between the date of the order and the required delivery of the men, the simpler the recruiting structure the better.\textsuperscript{56} When in February 1346 twenty-nine counties were to provide some 4,000 archers, and the men needed only to be ready by Easter, teams of arrayers were appointed, though each included the appropriate sheriff.\textsuperscript{57} The inclusion of the sheriff in each team of arrayers continued in January 1359, in preparation for the expedition to France.\textsuperscript{58}

\textsuperscript{51} C76/21, m. 9.
\textsuperscript{52} Above, p. 146.
\textsuperscript{53} For example, Richard Talbot, seneschal of the household was included in one, and John Darcy \textit{le Pere} in another. C76/22, m. 15.
\textsuperscript{54} Above, p. 153.
\textsuperscript{55} Above, p. 157.
\textsuperscript{56} In July the order was dated 26th. for 1,230 men from seventeen counties and London to be ready by 13 August. On 3 October twenty-six counties were told to produce 446 archers by 15 October! Above, pp.156-7.
\textsuperscript{57} Above, p. 162.
\textsuperscript{58} Above, p. 171.
This survey of the administrative mechanism for collecting foot soldiers has shown that throughout the sheriffs, their staffs and local officials were essential to the assembly of the potential county recruits. Responsibility for overseeing the process and the selection seems to have been given increasingly to the specially appointed commissioners during the first half of our period. Reasons for this development could have included reduction of the risk of local connections resulting in corruption of the selection process, and, possibly, the additional advantage of having the selection controlled by increasingly experienced commissioners, concerned only with military considerations.

In 1345 and 1359 the sheriffs were integrated again, but now systematically, into the mobilization process. This could be read as recognition of the need to have a more tightly organised administrative machine. Two other observations support the view that the government was sensitive to such considerations. In 1359, while orders gave all the arrayers the usual authority to arrest the recalcitrant, the sheriffs were explicitly told it was their responsibility to imprison those arrested.\(^59\) Though it might be questioned why that particular order should have to be made so firmly at this time (as if, perhaps, previously the sheriffs had not easily accepted that duty?) it could be seen as an alert administration closing a loop-hole sometimes exploitable by sheriffs in response to pressure or bribes. Also in 1359, when the orders for defensive arrays issued in October were repeated and elaborated in November, this second set of orders went into great detail as to how the scheme was to be operated (they said that some points were made because members of the council had recognised inadequacies in the earlier writs).\(^60\) The integration of the permanent local officials with the temporary commissioners of array in the structure was important to its effectiveness. This suggests that by this time the government had a good grasp of the practicalities and problems involved in its management of mobilization, and was dealing with them.

Those problems were substantial: in particular, numbers mustered sometimes fell well short of intention. The levy of 1301, which should have produced 12,000 men, yielded, according to the pay records, only some 7,000, with large variations in the shortfalls in different counties.\(^61\) Over 20,000 were summoned for the Bannockburn

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\(^{59}\) Above, p. 172, and n. 11.

\(^{60}\) Above, p. 189. It is interesting to speculate that this could have been the result of feedback from the arrayers, for which the six weeks between the first and second promulgations could have given sufficient time.

\(^{61}\) Above, p. 49.
campaign, but only some 15,000 appeared. In 1322 the county foot ordered up in May should have numbered 10,000, but only 4,000 were in pay at the end of July. Nor were dates met; in 1336 not all the 2,700 foot summoned to be at Berwick by June had arrived in time. 1,000 Welsh sent for in November 1345 had to be summoned again in April 1346. Though some of the failures might be put down to changes of plans and consequent conflicting orders, as in 1322, others were due to inability to deal effectively with the unwillingness of men to be conscripted, or the tendency to desert, and sometimes with levies' simple refusal to do as ordered. Additionally, putting extra strain on management, there was the long time necessary for the whole process - appointment of sub-arrayers by the arrayers; preliminary liaison between the arrayers and the sheriffs to determine times and places for assemblies of potential recruits; the summoning of those assemblies; the selection itself, including inspection of weapons; organisation into nominal twenties and hundreds; nomination of vintenars and centenars; choice of those who were to lead the recruits to the muster, if this had been left to the commissioners - even before the march began. If the levies were required to be ready to set off, but only on receipt of a later order, there would be further delays while the selected men were reassembled. Changes of arrayer during such a lengthy process, for varieties of reasons, would not be conducive to efficient management. Inevitably some arrayers would be less than zealous and efficient. Nor was it possible to rely entirely on the honesty of those appointed to manage the raising of the levies. It is not surprising, therefore, that the centre had on occasion to urge completion

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62 Above, p. 59.
63 Above, p. 75.
64 Above, p. 116.
65 Above, p. 160.
66 Above, pp. 75-6.
67 Above, pp. 113, 139
68 Above, p. 95.
69 Above, p. 113.
70 This was standard practice. E.g. above, p. 106.
71 Alternatively leaders would be named by the original orders. E.g. above, p. 88.
72 Above, pp. 89, 138.
73 The case of Guy de St. Clare seems to show loose central administration.
Above, pp. 138-9.
74 The Leicestershire arrayers in 1346 were told 'vos gesseritis...tepide et negligent'. Above, p. 138, n. 61.
of instructions if that had not already taken place, the phraseology used indicating some lack of information and therefore of control. 75

Nevertheless, the repeated admonitions to sheriffs and others not to take bribes, 76 show favour, or give in to pressure, 77 in finding men for military service demonstrate that the government was aware of malpractice, and did try to prevent it. The failure to deliver the numbers sent for in 1301 was clearly regarded as due to dishonesty; in a rapid reaction teams of investigators were appointed to enquire into the taking of bribes by the arrayers 78 and to punish deserters. Even though this was after the event, it is evidence of management awareness which must have been based on early availability of information, for which it seems likely the inclusion of the same royal clerks in the teams of arrayers and of investigators was responsible. 79 In 1336 there were many instances of recognition of the necessity to maintain pressure on commissioners of array. 80 Other evidence of a central administration aware not only of failure to meet dates for delivery of men, but also of the value of urging performance so that failure would not occur, can be seen in 1345: 81 the general array for defence that was set up at the end of 1359 required a report by the end of January, and on 10 February writs went to the arrayers of most counties complaining of their dilatoriness. 82 Thus the government in its management of recruiting of levies from the counties did make efforts to correct, and to anticipate, endemic inadequacies.

The recruiting of heavy cavalry - mounted men-at-arms, as distinct from hobelars - depended much less than that of footmen on administrative structures. Consequently it generally involved no detailed governmental action to monitor and progress assembly of the forces summoned. Indeed, bureaucratic management would have been inappropriate, and probably unacceptable, for an obligation to military service which was derived originally from personal feudal relationships.

The first obvious difference, from the point of view of the managerial process, is that evidence of initial central determination of the specific number to be sought is rare.

75 Above, pp. 96, 135.
76 Above, p. 96.
77 Above, p. 38.
78 Might it be significant that many sheriffs were among the arrayers?
79 Above, p. 48.
80 Above, pp. 106, 115.
81 Above, p. 138.
82 Above, pp. 189, 190.
There do exist two records of a number being considered before any summons was issued. The first is the council's memorandum, printed in Chaplais' collection of documents relating to the War of Saint-Sardos as 'Advice given by English prelates and magnates on the King's [Edward II's] proposed expedition to Gascony', suggesting *a meyns que mille homnes darmes.* The second is the memorandum, the 'Scheme in 1341' described by M. Prestwich, which '...sets out the forces to be provided by the royal household, and gives details of the retinues of various magnates.' Neither was implemented, so that they do not provide a picture of how the actual mobilization of a pre-determined number might have been attempted; nevertheless, they are evidence that, as would be expected, some broad consideration of the size of cavalry forces could take place.

Without the change from 'obligation' to 'pay and contract', setting - let alone meeting - a reliably precise target would be an administratively horrendous task. The size of the force that would be produced by the summons of the *serviciumdebitum* is unlikely to have been knowable in advance with accuracy. Uncertainties about obligations would be compounded, for example, by the accepted option of replacing one knight by two sergeants, or by the independent decisions of some to bring more than their formal obligation. The 40-day limit on obligatory service, after which some might stay on for pay, others stay voluntarily and unpaid, and others depart, would also make quantitative planning uncertain. The later development of armies raised by quantified and timed contracts, and fully paid, should theoretically have helped to reduce these difficulties. Also, of course, any planning to be able to meet the cost of a paid army necessitated planning its size; this was an explicit part of the 'Scheme in 1341'.

Facilitating planning might have been one of the considerations leading to Edward I's request of April 1282 to a chosen list to serve at wages, but even this defined no numbers, asking only that each respondent should come *cum equis et armis decentiori et meliori modo quo poteritis.* In 1301 the 'request' formula was used again,

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83 *War of Saint-Sardos*, ed. P. Chaplais, p. 89.
84 C47/2/33.
85 M. Prestwich, 'English Armies in the Early Stages of the Hundred Years War', p. 102.
86 as well as 'producing discipline and ... subordination of commands.' Morris, *Welsh Wars*, p. 68.
without reference to pay or to numbers.\textsuperscript{88} Other deliberately unquantified requests for cavalry were made: in 1314 to the Irish magnates;\textsuperscript{89} in 1322, to the English magnates and, via the sheriffs, for all not already in retinues;\textsuperscript{90} and in 1324, to magnates, in the phrase \textit{quanto potentius poteritis}. On this occasion at least, they were to report what size of force they would provide. Though this suggests that this was not known, at least not accurately, and possibly not at all, at the time, it also, of course, shows that the government recognised the value of quantitative information.\textsuperscript{91}

It is significant, then, that the 'Scheme in 1341' did name the size of the retinues expected to be brought by individuals. If the king's administration now had such knowledge, even if it was inexact, it could aim at an approximate number of men-at-arms by deciding which particular retinues to summon. The moderately sized army\textsuperscript{92} that was raised in 1336 seems to exemplify this. In addition to the knights of the household, the retinue of the king's brother and the retinues of others in the king's \textit{comitiva}, there were only another fifteen retinues listed in the pay records.\textsuperscript{93} The retinues of some 300 barons and lesser nobility provided the much larger number of men-at-arms for the Crecy campaign.\textsuperscript{94} As reinforcements were called up for the siege of Calais some individual lords were even asked to provide specific numbers of men-at-arms, which presumably was based on some reasonable view of their potential to deliver them\textsuperscript{95} (though later urgent orders sought retinues and as many more men as possible).\textsuperscript{96} There is therefore a case that the administration did acquire some idea of the military potential of lords' retinues. Because recorded quantified objectives for the mobilizations of heavy cavalry do not exist, unlike those for mobilizations of conscripted foot, they are not susceptible to judgements as to their effectiveness in terms of government management. Nor were they carried out by specially appointed government agents or officials, being dependent on the action of the military tenants delivering their due service, and later of the barons and others bringing their established

\textsuperscript{88} Above, p. 43.
\textsuperscript{89} Above, p. 58.
\textsuperscript{90} Above, p. 62.
\textsuperscript{91} Above, p. 94.
\textsuperscript{92} Above, p. 116.
\textsuperscript{93} Above, pp. 112, 116.
\textsuperscript{94} Above, p. 140.
\textsuperscript{95} Above, p. 157.
\textsuperscript{96} Above, p. 163.
retinues, or specially raised indentured companies. Such magnates would not have taken kindly to supervision of their response to a call to arms.

The administrative mechanism for summoning these units was usually a direct communication to their leader, defining the date and place of the muster, as in 1282, 1301, 1314 and 1322. In March 1322 this was supplemented by a proclamation through the sheriffs that everyone who owed service should present it at the muster. In June 1322, somewhat unusually, the sheriffs were involved more fully, being required not only to proclaim that all mounted men-at-arms not in retinues should come to the king, but also to pass the order directly to individuals, and even report their names. Similar action was taken in 1345. There was, in fact, an instance in 1282 of certain sheriffs acting directly to recruit knights; but otherwise, in general, the organisation of mobilizing the heavy cavalry involved neither permanent officials nor specially appointed arrayers. (Arrayers appointed in 1336 to make the realm ready for defence were given authority over knights as well as other fencible men in the event of a sea-borne invasion, but this would be a reactive response, not a preparatory mobilization.)

Mobilization of the heavy cavalry was thus not a process under the day-to-day administrative control of the royal government. Once the individuals who would constitute this element of the army had been told the date and place of the muster, they were themselves responsible for meeting that timing; what 'management' there was, was essentially ex post facto, in that it consisted of recording the various dates of arrival so that pay could begin and horses could be valued. The size of the following each leader would bring was, subject to a minimum figure related to his feudal obligation, determined by him, not by an instruction from the king - until, of course, the practice of contracting for a specific number was used.

Contracts included, as well as numbers of men and rates of pay, the duration of service (as in the case of the Black Prince's retainer of Sir John de Hide 'for the war for one year'). They thus facilitated not only the making of some financial planning (an

97 Above, pp. 27, 43, 55, 62.
98 Above, p. 62.
99 Above, p. 77.
100 Above, p. 140.
101 Above, p. 38.
102 Above, p. 107.
103 Above, p. 90.
104 Above, p. 180.
integral part of the 'Scheme in 1341') but also more confident undertaking of prolonged campaigns. As far as the management of the initial mobilization is concerned, however, it was suggested in Chapter 8 that the problem of controlling the timing of the assembly of all the independently contracted retinues was too much for the administration in 1359, with arguably fatal consequences for the success of the campaign.

Perhaps the development of raising whole armies, rather than merely minor, 'non-royal', expeditions such as Northampton's in 1345, by contracting for indentured retinues, should be seen as primarily an evolutionary consequence of the need to plan and manage the increased scale and duration of wars fought overseas.

**Transport**

Transport on land for the soldiers themselves was not an issue for government. Men walked, or rode their own horses, or used mounts provided by a levy on the local community. What needed action was provision of the large number of carts to carry the army's provisions, and its equipment. This was an essential requirement, not only to facilitate the collection of bulk supplies at the muster, but also to form the baggage train that accompanied the army on campaign. The scale of the need is suggested by Jean le Bel's report that Edward Reims expedition in 1359 was accompanied by 6,000 carts brought from England; even the more credible figure of 1,000 given by Thomas Walsingham is impressive.

It seems a reasonable assumption that units, both the levies of foot and the lords' retinues, would use their own carts (and pack-horses) on the way to the muster. Marching or riding encumbered with heavy arms and armour would be unnecessarily

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105 Above, p. 136.
106 'In addition to the burden of wages, the counties might be expected to provide other things: in particular arms and armour, horses and victuals...the local communities had an ancient duty to support their representatives, at least within the county.' Powicke, *Military Obligation*, p. 200.
107 As well as provisions, arms and armour the baggage train would have to carry the sort of equipment needed for an army living off the land - hand-mills, ovens, hunting equipment and even leather boats from which to fish (above, p. 188) - other cooking utensils, tents and so on. Thus many carts were needed.
108 Above, p. 185 and n. 85. The *Vita Edwardi Secundi* says the wagon train that left Berwick in 1314 stretched for twenty leagues. Above, p. 57.
slow and inefficient: a peasant agricultural economy would have carts available. The
defensive array ordered in October 1336 provides supporting evidence for this
assumption; it required that the forces made ready in each county should have with
them provisions for three weeks, and carts to carry them, but said nothing about
supplying the carts. 109

The collection of a 'supply dump' of victuals for the assembling army from
supplies brought by merchants or by the king's purveyors necessitated making
arrangements for safe and sufficient carriage. This was usually the sheriffs' 
responsibility: in 1282 they were told to ensure that there was a regular arrival of carts
carrying provisions at the bases, Chester and Rhuddlan, and to arrest anyone interfering
with those bringing supplies to the army; 110 in 1324 the sheriff of Gloucester paid the
wages of men with horses and carts; 111 in 1346 the sheriff of Essex bought carts to
transport provisions. 112

Sheriffs bought carts to be delivered at the muster, with horses and drivers, to
form part of the baggage train. The most important source for obtaining these was
ecclesiastical establishments. In anticipation of being turned to, in 1282 many sought
and obtained protections against having not only their stocks of food but also their
horses and carts requisitioned; 113 certain abbots and priors were told directly to send all
their carts to Chester. 114 In 1314 an order went to abbots and priors giving the king's
clerk Nicholas de Tykehull authority to requisition horses, underlining how important a
source of draft animals for land transport the ecclesiastical establishments were. 115 In
1301 and 1314 116 specific numbers of carts were allocated to be purchased by
individual sheriffs. Though it is not possible to tell what the bases of calculation for the
total, or for the allocations, were, the order in 1314 did specify for each sheriff how
many carts requiring four or eight draft animals he was to provide, and by which of

109 Above, p. 127. The order cancelling it did instruct the arrayers to return any
money they had taken, which might imply that they could have used it to supplement
equipment, including carts.
110 Above, p. 32.
111 Above, p. 101.
112 Above, p. 148.
113 Above, p. 32.
114 Above, p. 32. '...as the king greatly needs carriage for victuals to him and his
subjects staying with him in his army of Wales.' CVChR, p. 277.
115 Above, pp. 55-6.
116 Above, pp. 51, 57.
various dates they were to be at Berwick.\textsuperscript{117} These details, and the appointment of royal clerks to oversee the operation, indicate a considered, informed and managed plan; it is unlikely to have been the only one.

The mobilization of ships and sailors was necessary to carry supplies, to transport armies and to form fighting fleets.

Carriage of supplies by sea was arranged in several ways. It would often be in the merchants' own ships, in which case government action was merely to issue protections for them, as in 1282 and 1322.\textsuperscript{118} Protections issued in 1282 for named shippers bringing victuals supplied by the keepers of the bishopric of Winchester\textsuperscript{119} imply that these ships were hired, not requisitioned. As with inland deliveries, sheriffs were sometimes made responsible for shipment by sea of provisions bought by the king's purveyors, for example in 1301 and 1347.\textsuperscript{120} Sheriffs accounted for freightage of supplies to Newcastle in 1322.\textsuperscript{121} The warden of the Cinque Ports arranged transport of supplies purveyed in France in 1282.\textsuperscript{122} In 1314 the king's merchant Anthony Pessagno arranged shipment himself for his purchases,\textsuperscript{123} and in 1322 royal clerks supervised transport of purveyances made by English sheriffs.\textsuperscript{124} When the siege of Calais began in September 1346, royal sergeants-at-arms requisitioned ships to bring provisions to the besiegers,\textsuperscript{125} and in November the admiral of the North had to make ships available to carry supplies from the east coast ports.\textsuperscript{126} In 1359 the admiral of the West provided an escort for ships bringing grain to Calais, and the admiral of the North made ships available to take the Prince of Wales's supplies to Sandwich.\textsuperscript{127} Thus the carriage of supplies by sea was managed mostly piecemeal, and via a variety of different \textit{ad hoc} authorities, though by 1359 it seems to have been centralised under the two admirals. The war-time collection and control of the realm's maritime resources was increasingly,

\begin{thebibliography}{99}
\item Above, pp. 31, 67, 79.
\item Above, p. 28.
\item Above, pp. 47, 160.
\item BL Stowe Ms. 553, ff. 40r, 44r.
\item Above, p. 29.
\item Above, p. 56.
\item Above, p. 67.
\item Above, p. 155.
\item Above, p. 161.
\item Above, p. 175.
\end{thebibliography}
certainly from 1345, exercised under the authority of these two officials, via members of the central administration specially appointed to act under their orders.128

More systematically managed arrangements were necessary to assemble fleets to transport armies. Keeping soldiers waiting too long at the port risked desertions, shortage of food and disorder, and it would have been militarily foolish for an expedition to arrive overseas in penny numbers.

When forces from Ireland had to be brought across for campaigns in Scotland shipping was arranged by the crown. In 1301 orders went to officials of ports in Ireland and England, including the Cinque Ports, to send specific numbers of ships to Dublin. Other officials, the sheriffs of the ports' counties, the warden of the Cinque Ports, and nominated individuals, were given responsibility for ensuring that the orders were obeyed.129 In 1314 Irish foot archers were to be transported in John of Argyle's fleet. The treasurer of Ireland was to provide ships for the magnates,130 and port officials were told to send ships; two royal clerks were also told to requisition, crew and arm some.131 Local port officials were told in 1322 to send as many ships as possible, and an experienced royal clerk was to coordinate the action.132 This was the basic structure—direct orders to local port officials to provide ships, with central government agents given a supervising role.

This structure continued for the armies sent to France. The allocations of responsibilities in the various orders of May 1324 describe coordinated management by the government. Ports, each told to provide a specific number of ships, had to report names of the ships and of their masters. Sheriffs were made responsible for providing the equipment necessary to enable horses to be carried. The scale of manning for ships was defined. A royal clerk, supervising the whole process, was to check the capacities of the ships, and report their names, ports, masters and crew numbers - the latter so that victualling could be arranged. He was also to report any officials who failed to

128 Above, pp. 134, 170, 175.
129 Above, pp. 43-4. The ships of the fleet ordered to Dublin for 4 June were, like others summoned to Berwick, primarily intended to support the armies campaigning from Carlisle and Berwick respectively, but it must be likely that they were also to bring the Irish to the muster ordered for 24 June at Carlisle.
130 Above, p. 58.
131 Above, p. 57.
132 This did not raise enough shipping, and the Irish justiciar was told to summon more from Irish ports. Above, pp. 71-2.
Subsequent vacillations of intention during the War of Saint-Sardos, requiring changes of action enforced by sheriffs, reflected inadequacies of strategic direction, not of the management of shipping; the basic procedure for this was now established, detailed and effective.

In 1345 general orders were issued for all ports to have their ships ready to sail at the king's charge. Overall authority now lay clearly with the two admirals, with supervision of the action of the port officials by their deputies. Transport to take Stafford's force to Gascony was provided from the ships under the control of the admiral of the West, in a calculated and coordinated arrangement. He was told to deliver thirteen vessels of 40 tons to two of the king's sergeants-at-arms, who arranged for their equipping to carry horses, the necessary material being supplied by two sheriffs. He also provided ships for the earl of Devon's force, part of Northampton's expedition to Brittany, the earl of Devon determined the number needed. 247 ships were assembled for the earl of Derby's small army sent to Gascony. This, like the other sea-borne expeditions of the first half of 1345, including Edward III's to Sluys, seems to have had no problems as far as the availability of sufficient ships was concerned. The management of their provision, both in apparently deliberately calculated numbers and in timing, has therefore to be seen as efficient and successful.

However, the sailing of the great army planned for 20 October had to be postponed, the reason given being that the ships were not ready. Orders to the admirals and their deputies, and to Robert Flambard for London, to requisition all 30 ton ships to be at Portsmouth by 7 October, had been issued at the end of August. The postponing order was dated 29 September, so that - assuming that the fact that the ships were not ready really was the reason for the postponement - the administration must have been receiving and interpreting information on the progress of the requisitioning, and taking appropriate action based on a conclusion that the 7 October date would not be met. The date of the postponing order is evidence of good management information and its use: the order had to be issued in time to prevent the assembly of the large army that would otherwise have been kept waiting. The discussion in Chapter 7 of the possible reasons why arrangements for transport had failed concludes that it was

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133 Above, pp. 84-5.
134 Above, p. 134.
135 Above, p. 136.
136 Above, p. 135
137 Above, p. 142.
138 Above, pp. 142-3.
most probably because not enough ships could be assembled, in the relatively short time allowed, to accommodate the unusually large army being raised. This is supported by the subsequent issue of orders for more and more ships, including those of 20 and as little as 10 tons burden.\footnote{Above, p. 146.} An air of increasing urgency, rather than of calm planning, is given by these later orders. Probably the use of sergeants-at-arms to see to the requisitioning signalled the government's need, as usual, for more rapid and reliable action than the port authorities might produce. In the event, however, the expedition was provided with sufficient ships to carry men, horses, equipment and ample initial provisions to France; management of the process had ultimately been effective.

Before the army had fought the battle of Crecy, and afterwards, especially during the siege of Calais, the English administration was organising transport for reinforcements to go to France. The way it was managed assumed that all shipping continued to be available for the king's service. Assembling a fleet was a matter of assigning to each nominated emissary of the central government, often a sergeant-at-arms, a number of ships of defined size to be collected, usually, from ports along a particular stretch of coast.\footnote{Above, pp. 152, 158.} The men requisitioning the ships were sometimes told to make transport available for particular units of reinforcements, like those of the earl of Pembroke, the king's son John, or John Darcy. It is, unfortunately, not possible to see how this was done:\footnote{Was it, for instance, by sending ships from their home ports, or by allocating those already assembled at the embarkation ports?} it would have thrown more light on how the detailed use of the requisitioned shipping was organised, and by whom. When the army embarked in June 1346 particular units were assigned to specific ships, not left to make their own arrangements, so that it is clear that use of the transports was being deliberately managed.\footnote{Above, p. 151.} That there was management control is also proved by the appointment in December 1346 of a king's clerk to supervise the shipping at Sandwich, and report numbers and capacity to the council, and by the summons to Westminster in February 1347 of knowledgeable men from 32 ports to report on the state and availability of the ports' ships. The successful conclusion to the siege of Calais was due in no small part to the ability of the council to manage efficiently the utilisation of the realm's ships.

This was demonstrated again in the plans for renewal of war with France in early 1359. Ample time, some four months, was allowed to assemble the necessary transports at Sandwich. A report, to the chancery, on numbers available was required...
well before the assembly date, thus giving time, if necessary, to extend the range of ships - initially limited to those of 76 tons and under - to be requisitioned. The reports also had to give details of the ships' names, their ports, their masters, and the security given, by whom, as guarantee of appearance. Thus, by implying effective punishment for disobedience, default would be inhibited. Responsibility for arresting the ships, imprisoning the uncooperative, taking the securities and making the reports was given to teams of sergeants-at-arms, working of course under the authority of the two admirals, whose seal was required on the reports.  

This set of arrangements therefore defined the task, assigned direct responsibilities, set up senior control (the admirals), collected intermediate information so that progress could be followed-up, facilitated application of sanctions, and allowed enough time for execution. It demonstrates very competent management.

The extension of the truce meant that the expedition for which these plans were made did not take place. The assembly of transport for the sailing in the autumn was organised in essentially the same way, though there is evidence that some units had had to make their own arrangements for shipping (for which the crown nevertheless paid). The fleet was said to have numbered 1,100 vessels, an indication of the size of the management task that had been accomplished. An additional point suggesting that use of maritime resources was by now very well managed is that there are several instances of requirements for ships for particular purposes being met via the two admirals, not by separate orders to other officers. This procedure would contribute to maintaining logistical control.

Fighting, as distinct from transport, fleets were needed, sometimes as support for the army, sometimes to face naval threats from the enemy. For the campaigns in Wales little more than the feudal service of the Cinque Ports was used, primarily to secure control of Anglesey. The two fleets raised to support the Berwick and Carlisle armies in 1301 were summoned by orders direct to the ports' officials. The orders specified how many ships each had to supply, which indicates knowledge of the ports' capacities. A number of different authorities were made responsible for expediting the deliveries, the sheriffs of the counties along the south coast for ports in their counties, the warden of the Cinque Ports for them, the constable of Bristol castle and the bailiff

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143 Above, pp. 170-1.
144 Above, p. 174.
145 Above, p. 185.
146 Above, p. 175.
147 Above, p. 33.
of Haverford for those towns, and nominated individuals for the east coast ports sending ships to Berwick.\textsuperscript{148}

In 1322 ships were raised to support the army, and then to counter the threat from Flemish ships, almost entirely by direct requests to the ports,\textsuperscript{149} there appear to have been no appointments to supervise their action. The fleets summoned during the War of Saint-Sardos were primarily to transport intended expeditions to Gascony, but it is interesting that, as was described earlier, orders direct to port officials were this time accompanied by others nominating clerks to supervise and coordinate their preparation. In early 1336 responsibility for mobilizing ships - preparing them for active service - was again that of centrally appointed individuals, royal clerks, who were to see to the arrest of vessels, and ensure they were crewed, armed and ready to go to sea.\textsuperscript{150} The port officials continued to have to take the action.\textsuperscript{151} Later the admiral of the North was given power to requisition more ships, though how this was to be exercised is not described; the keepers of the coasts of Wales were to recall ships of their ports and prepare them for war service, and when the French crusade fleet came north, the justiciar, treasurer and chancellor of Ireland were told to provide ships to go with the main fleets to face the galleys.\textsuperscript{152} In the late autumn, when the enemy were attacking ports and ships at sea, six magnates, including the warden of the Cinque Ports and Ralph Basset of Drayton, were appointed to requisition all ships suitable for war.\textsuperscript{153} The usual order to all officials to assist and obey them indicates that their role must have been to enforce action in detail by the ports' officers.

It is clear that the crown could assume that, in principle, it could call on all the maritime resources of the kingdom, whether for transporting supplies or soldiers, or for naval warfare. Once the order had been made that ports should have their ships ready to be summoned, it seems a fleet could be quickly gathered, if orders of August 1346 were at all realistic, simply by sending agents to collect them. Those orders, dated 5 August, appointed nine men, including several sergeants-at-arms, to requisition 100 great ships from allocated stretches of coast, to be at Winchelsea by 20 August. This, coupled with related empowerments to impress crews, and two appointments with powers to arrest

\textsuperscript{148} Above, p. 44.
\textsuperscript{149} Above, pp. 79-80. The exception was an order to the sheriff of Norfolk and Suffolk to raise five ships. Ibid.
\textsuperscript{150} Above, p.108.
\textsuperscript{151} Above, p. 110.
\textsuperscript{152} Above, p. 124.
\textsuperscript{153} Above, pp. 124-5.
the disobedient,\textsuperscript{154} implies that the administration had confidence in its ability to manage rapid mobilization of the country's shipping. While this fleet was primarily intended to carry reinforcements to France, the requirement that the ships should be double manned suggests that it was expected they might have to defend themselves. Once the siege of Calais had begun, and the French were attacking ships carrying supplies to the besiegers, similar arrangements were made to provide escorts. Orders to collect ships, those from the north to be concentrated at Orwell and those from the south at Sandwich, were dated 18 September; orders to have soldiers to go on them said the men should be at the two ports by 25 September;\textsuperscript{155} the ships were obviously expected to be there very quickly.

In the absence of records of complaints that these two urgent plans had not been met, it might be assumed that the confidence expressed in the timing was not misplaced; perhaps the fact that the need was to defend other shipping made cooperation more willing. On the other hand, a plan agreed by the prelates and magnates to form a fleet of 120 great fighting ships by 2 April 1347, orders for which were dated 15 March, gave rise to considerable difficulties. Port officials had been given specific quotas, and sheriffs of their counties told to expedite progress, but as late as 16 May London and other ports had still not supplied their ships.\textsuperscript{156} Though it might be tempting to attribute this managerial failure to the change from specially appointed 'progress chasers' to reliance on sheriffs, other reasons could be that the ports saw the need as much less urgent, or that by now the enormous demands on shipping had nearly exhausted resources.

This survey of mobilizations of fleets for battle has shown that they came to be managed in the same way as transport fleets were collected, by using a small number of reliable and often very experienced agents of central government - frequently clerks, and later sergeants-at-arms - to supervise and coordinate the action of port officials to arrest and equip the ships of their own port. The terminology of later orders to these agents seems to imply that the action to arrest the ships was taken by them themselves, but in spite of the reference in 1336 to Boston ships as 'arrested by Sir William de Deyncourt and Sir John de Ros',\textsuperscript{157} this must be doubtful in view of purely practical considerations of time and distance. In another incident in 1336 the Bristol officials were told to release ships of the Cinque Ports so that they could return home to be

\textsuperscript{154} Above, pp. 152-3.
\textsuperscript{155} Above, p. 156.
\textsuperscript{156} Above, p. 166.
\textsuperscript{157} Above, p. 125 and n. 133.
equipped for war; it would be surprising if it were not a general rule that the responsibility for that too was that of ships' home ports.

Those organising the requisitioning of ships were routinely given power to arrest and imprison any who disobeyed their orders. Nevertheless, disobedience and resistance did take place in various ways, but were not allowed to pass unnoticed or unpunished. Commissioners were appointed in 1302 to deal with those who had failed to supply ships the year before: in 1314 the mayor and bailiffs of Southampton had to be told to make good the inadequate equipment of their ships; in 1324 masters of a number of ships simply put to sea before they could be taken, and were to be punished. In 1336 the sheriff had to support the masters of ships exercising the instruction to impress crews, the London officials had to be reprimanded for failure to provide their ships, Welsh sailors refused to sail unless paid first, and ships from East Anglia that had been arrested sailed away, so commissioners were ordered to find out their names and confiscate the goods of their owners and masters.

These and other recorded instances are no doubt only some of many that took place; but they show that the authorities were aware of what was happening, and taking appropriate action.

The general picture is of an administration exercising successful managerial control, increasingly centralised under the two admirals, of the mobilization of the realm's ships for the various purposes of war.

Supplies

Writing on the arrangements for supplying armies mobilized for expeditions under Edward III, Hewitt comments 'It is not known that any were delayed for lack of victuals.' This is, of course, not to imply that the supply aspect of mobilization was, or could have been, managed with rigorous and precise calculation. The arrangements for victualling castles in Scotland described by M. Prestwich do establish that military administration had definite standards for calculating requirements per man.

158 Above, p. 112.
159 Above, pp. 44, 58, 86.
160 Above, pp. 112, 110, 124.
161 Above, pp. 44, 57-8.
162 Organisation of War, p. 51.
Similarly, illustrating mathematical calculation of total needs, in 1324 the king's clerk
John Devery, who was overseeing the preparation of ships, had to report crew numbers
to the chancery 'for the better purveyance of their victuals'.
However, established
castle garrisons and ships' crews, and consequently their needs, would be precisely
quantifiable in a way that those of a forthcoming muster of the army would not be. The
inherent uncertainty of the total number that would report to the muster would in itself
have made accuracy impossible. Moreover, assembly of the force would be spread over
some weeks and at an uncertain rate. The earlier arrivals had to be fed while they were
waiting for the rest to appear, and often the whole army while it waited for a delayed
outward march or embarkation; the timing of the latter in particular could involve much
uncertainty, because of its dependence on collection of enough ships, let alone a fair
wind. Nevertheless, it was obviously essential that there should be a supply dump of
provisions available.

Thus the management of supply for a planned mobilization had the problem of
providing for an uncertain number of men for an uncertain amount of time,
compounded by the risk of deterioration of perishable commodities. In logistical
terms the administration had also to try to take into account the actual geographical
availability of foodstuffs and means of transporting them, and how long collection and
movement would take. Only approximate knowledge of these matters, derived
presumably largely from previous experience, would exist: nevertheless, quantified
plans must have been made, since instructions to purveyors necessarily had to define
how much of each foodstuff they were to obtain. Hewitt described the process as 'Some
rough estimate of total needs is made and county contributions to achieve this aggregate
are worked out.'

The supply of food to the armies as they were being mobilized did not depend
solely on official purveyance, though it is not possible to suggest what proportion might
have been contributed by this route. Proclamations regularly encouraged merchants

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164 Above, p. 85.
165 Nicholas Hugate reported that 200 quarters of wheat sent to Bordeaux in
1324 had perished, and another 100 quarters were in poor condition. (War of Saint-
Sardos, ed. P. Chaplais, p. 108.) In 1346 William Kellesley sold supplies that had
become unfit for consumption. Hewitt, Organisation of War, pp. 57-8
166 Organisation of War, p. 53.
167 Hewitt records that between 1347 and 1361 some 90% of various foods
received at Calais were from purveyance (Organisation of War, p. 61), but this was a
special case and so not necessarily typical.
to bring provisions for sale to the place where armies were mustering. Encouragement could be quite forceful, as when, in 1283, sheriffs were to report the names of merchants who failed to heed the proclamation to bring victuals to sell to the army, or, in 1301, orders to officials told them to 'induce and require' merchants to bring provisions to Skinburness. Also, there seems to be no evidence that the royal government assumed responsibility for ensuring availability of supplies to units as they journeyed to the muster, other than to restrict markets or to discourage profiteering by those who sold victuals to soldiers en route. The order in 1336 that levies to be raised for defence should provide themselves with three weeks' provisions illustrates a similar principle. It must therefore be fairly certain that soldiers arrived at the muster bringing some provisions with them.

In practice, it is nevertheless probable that a good proportion of food supplies for the mobilizing armies was usually obtained by purveyance, that is to say, through compulsory purchase. In many instances arranging the 'executive' action was the responsibility of the permanent officials - the justiciar in Ireland, the seneschal of Gascony, the constable of Bordeaux, and the English sheriffs - but the orders specifying how much of the various items was to be obtained, and where, tended to be directed to specially appointed agents from the centre. It is, however, interesting that when in 1314 the merchant Anthony Pessagno was assigned to buy wheat and victuals in nine counties through buyers he nominated, quotas were not specified for the individual counties in which he was to operate; the previous orders to clerks, which had specified how much was to be found in each of five of the counties, were

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168 Above, pp. 29, 47, 52, 65.
169 Above, p. 39.
170 Above, p. 47.
171 Above, p. 29.
172 Organisation of War, p. 45.
173 Above, p. 127.
174 Prestwich, Armies and Warfare, pp. 258-259, illustrates this.
175 Above, pp. 28, 29, 65, and the bishop of Durham or the Prince of Wales in their Palatinates.
176 Above, pp. 29, 31, 44-5.
178 Ibid., p. 114b
Pessagno and his buyers were not restricted in detail as to where to buy the provisions, because they were not acting through local officials. This is supported by the instructions in 1336 to the merchant William de Melcheburne to purvey 'as conveniently as possible' quantities of corn and oats, but without limitations as to where. In June, with Eudo de Stoke, he was to buy more supplies, this time in a specified list of counties, but again without definition as to how much in each. Using merchants rather than sheriffs as purveyors avoided the need to subdivide the total quota by areas - since of course a sheriff would only work within his own shire - and was therefore a much more simple and, importantly, more flexible arrangement.

When royal clerks or other officials were appointed to purvey supplies, it would appear that their role was essentially that of managing - that is to say monitoring and urging on - the process. In 1301 county communities were told that instructions related to the quantities they were to provide would be given by named pairs of a royal clerk and a knight. The arrangement that associated individual clerks with more than one knight and county suggests that the clerks were to supervise rather than act executively. The two sent to Ireland were explicitly to supervise the purveying, as were the clerks named in 1322 when sheriffs were collecting supplies for the army mustering at Newcastle. The phrase describing the work for which two clerks were paid - *videre provisiones predictas et eos festinare* - neatly sums up their managerial function, as it does that of the clerk Robert de Nottingham, appointed in 1324 to survey and accelerate purveyances for the Gascony expedition. Such supervision was not limited to royal clerks; sergeants-at-arms, the king's pantler, even the two admirals (presumably not in person, but through staff) could have this task.

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179 Ibid., p. 122b. The clerks were ordered to return to the owners what had been taken, as supplies were being obtained by other means.

180 Above, pp. 117, 120.

181 Above, pp. 44-5. Because the *Articuli Super Cartas* of 1300 had limited purveyance to the needs of the royal household, large-scale supplies for the army had to be 'negotiated', rather than be obtained by simply sending writs to sheriffs ordering them to purvey the quantities required. As Prestwich observes, the negotiated quantities were what the government had wanted. *War, Politics and Finance*, p. 132.

182 Above, p. 45.

183 Above, p. 67.

184 Above, pp. 101-2.

185 Above, p. 31.

186 Above, p. 102.
There is not much more than occasional evidence of the extent or degree of success with which such purveyance for victualling was actively managed - that is to say, whether action was taken to correct failures to produce individual, let alone total, quotas, either in quantity or to a timetable.

Delivery dates were sometimes specified, as in 1282, 1301, 1314, 1322, or 1346, but of course circumstances could alternatively require that delivery should be implicitly or explicitly 'as soon as possible'. In 1301 and 1322 the orders for purveyance specified as the delivery date for supplies the same date as was set for the muster, and in 1314 the order of 1 April required delivery by 2 June, one week before.

Though other instances do not show the same explicit evidence of matched dates for both muster and delivery of supplies, the often close correspondence between the issue dates of the two sets of orders strongly suggests that coordinated planning took place, as would be expected.

By comparison with the pressure put on arrayers to deliver their levies, there is in the records a lack of corresponding remonstrances to purveyors of victuals. While

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<td>Order for Muster</td>
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<td>14/2/1301 (p. 43)</td>
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<td>1/3/1301 (p. 44)</td>
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The message dated 15 April 1346 urging the sheriff of Cambridge to deliver barrels of flour he had to obtain can hardly be due to his dilatoriness: the order to obtain the flour was only dated 28 March. (Above, p. 149.) With similar timing the sheriffs ordered on 24 March 1322 to deliver their quotas by 13 June received a reminder dated 14 April, but this merely urged them to be diligent in their purveying. (CPR 1321-1324,
it is possible that this was because their performance was vastly more efficient, it is still rather surprising, whether it implies efficiency, or unconcern on the part of the government; though Maddicott, in a section on purveyance, does suggest that 'The central government had no means of ensuring that its orders were carried out in the shires.'

In the same paper Maddicott describes the timing of orders for purveyance as usually about one month before the campaign. It is possible to point to instances in which the time between the issue date of the orders for purveyance, and that of the actual muster of the army, is a good deal greater, at some three months. Orders in 1282 to the keepers of the bishopric of Winchester to deliver supplies to Chester by 8 July were dated 10 April. In 1301 the muster was to be on 24 June; orders for purveyance were dated 1 March. The muster date for the Bannockburn campaign was 10 June 1314; though the first orders for purveyance were dated 10 March, for delivery by 7 April, they were cancelled and replaced by others dated 1 April ordering delivery by 2 June. For Edward II's Scottish campaign of 1322 the army was to assemble by 13 June (later postponed to 24 July): orders for supplies from English counties, Ireland and Gascony were issued on 24 March and 1 April. It is ironic that this campaign, in spite of the postponement of the muster, proved to be one in which shortage of food supplies was a major problem. Though this was particularly disastrous during the campaign, one chronicler implied scarcity even at its outset. Why this might have happened is not clear. Perhaps the mis-match between the quantities ordered for Berwick and Carlisle respectively, and the numbers of men originally destined (theoretically) for the two musters, is evidence of disorderly planning, confused by

\[ p. 94 \). The merchant William de Melcheburne's buying authority was dated 13 February 1336: on 22 March he was urged to deliver the supplies as soon as possible. Above, p. 117-8.

\[ 194 \] The English Peasantry, p. 29.

\[ 195 \] Ibid., p. 24.

\[ 196 \] Above, p. 28. Protection for the shippers was dated 15 June, which seems consistent with the three months' schedule being achieved.

\[ 197 \] Above, p. 44.

\[ 198 \] Above, pp. 55-6.

\[ 199 \] Above, pp. 61, 67, 68.

\[ 200 \] Above, p. 79. The postponement was of course not because of supply issues, but the consequence of recruiting changes agreed at the York parliament in May. Above, p. 73.
politic considerations. Nevertheless, with the possible exception of 1322, an initial shortage of victuals at the beginning of Edwardian campaigns seems not to have been a problem. Probably the combination of levies and retinues arriving with their own supplies, merchants responding to encouragement to bring their produce, and official purveyance of victuals over several weeks before the muster, resulted in sufficient food to avoid trouble from men unlikely to expect generous feeding.

The arrangements for collecting purveyed supplies and moving them into store at the places where the armies were to assemble were generally the responsibility of the sheriffs and the 'receivers and keepers of the king's victuals'. The latter had a very important function. Although there were occasions when they were named as purveyors, their work was primarily administrative: the receipt, storage and dispersal of supplies. They were based at the main supply bases, like James de Dalilegh at Carlisle in 1301, Henry de Shirokes at Newcastle in 1322, Robert de Tong at Berwick and Robert de Tybay at Carlisle in 1336, or at the ports, as with William de Oterhampton at Portsmouth and Nicholas de Hugate at Bordeaux in 1324, William de Kellesey 'in the county of Southampton and other counties' in 1346, and Richard de Skydeby at Sandwich in 1359. The receivers at the main bases had deputies at what are best described as the 'feeder ports', for example Hull, King's Lynn or London, even for Scottish wars transport of bulk commodities by sea being easier, and - subject to weather and enemy interception (which was probably an important factor in 1322) - faster than by land. Inland water transport was similarly the preferred method of movement to the ports from collection warehouses, to which the supplies would have been brought by pack-horses and carts. Arrangements for this collection and movement were regularly made the responsibility of the sheriffs.

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201 Above, p. 69.
202 These officials are sometimes described as receivers, sometimes as keepers, and sometimes as 'receiver and keeper.' Above, p. 187.
203 Above, pp. 78, 119.
204 Above, p. 119.
205 Above, pp. 45, 79, 117, 102.
206 E101/25/16, m 2.
207 Above, p. 187.
208 Above, p. 148.
209 Above, p. 161.
While the physical aspects of the logistics of collection and delivery of supplies of provisions are easily described, it is not so clear how, or rather whether, the operation was managed, in the sense of being monitored and controlled. Goods delivered by the sheriffs to the main or subsidiary receivers of victuals were of course recorded by detailed indentures. Theoretically, if these had been quickly and progressively assembled centrally, they could have made such management possible, but as the purpose of these indentures was primarily accounting, not logistical, it seems unlikely that this took place. Reference has been made above to the role of clerks in

211 Hewitt gives a comprehensive account. *Organisation of War*, pp. 53-55.
212 Above, p.148. E101/25/16, recording receipts by William de Kellesey in 1346, is a typical example.
213 There were instances of messages to accelerate deliveries, but considering how close their dating was to the original order - two-and-a-half, three and five weeks - they do not read as if they were occasioned by knowledge of slow work by the purveyors; in two cases no delivery date, only haste, had been specified originally, and the other merely urged diligence. (Above, n. 193.)

This might just possibly not apply to that to the merchant William de Melcheburne in 1336: in this case the original order to him to buy the supplies had also contained a warning to the receiver of victuals at Berwick to receive them (above, p. 117). The date of the order to accelerate delivery (22 March) was only four weeks before the current date, 20 April, for the muster, so the receiver, worried that the supplies might not arrive in time, might have complained that they had not appeared. Although delivery instructions to purveyors sometimes only named the town to which the supplies were to go, (e.g. ‘for the use of our armies assembling at Berwick and Carlisle’ [CPR 1292-1301, pp. 578-9] they often added ‘to our receiver’ (e.g. *receptori nostri* [Rot. Scot., Vol. I, p. 117]; ‘for delivery to the king’s receiver of stock’ [CPR 1321-1324, pp. 93-94]), and occasionally named him (e.g. *CCR 1333-1337*, p. 548). These forms of words do not, of course, of themselves prove that the receiver was told of the existence of the order, administratively sensible though that would have been. It is, however, possible to point to cases in which one official was ordered to deliver supplies to another, who, the deliverer’s instructions said explicitly, had been told to accept them. Robert de Tong was to send supplies from his stores at Berwick to Stirling castle, whose constable *mandatus est ut victualia praedicta recipiat* (Rot. Scot., Vol. I, p. 465); Richard de la Pole was to deliver wine to the receiver of victuals *cui mandavimus quod illa vina a vobis recipiat* (ibid); the receiver at Berwick was told to expect a delivery of iron (above, p. 119); the keeper of the privy wardrobe at the Tower
supervising and hastening delivery of supplies. In 1301 teams of sheriffs and clerks were appointed explicitly to collect purveyed supplies and deliver them to Berwick; although in 1314 the merchant Anthony Pessagno's assignment was to deliver as well as buy, in different orders of 1314 sheriffs had to see to deliveries, but under the apparent supervision ('by the view and witness') of royal clerks. In 1322, again, clerks supervised the sheriffs' actions, and in 1324 other officials were appointed to survey the purveying.

It seems obvious that these 'supervising' clerks would have to keep themselves informed of how things were being progressed by the sheriffs with whom they were associated, and thus put at least informal pressure on the sheriffs. There is, however, only a little evidence that if problems were being encountered, the central authority - presumably the council - would be told and a decision sought. In 1301 the knight and clerk appointed to purvey supplies in Essex reported that the people wanted to deliver what was required only to the tax collectors, so as to be more sure of payment. This would have meant delays, and the request was refused (though a reduced quota was conceded). In 1336 the bishop of Durham was told that, in spite of complaints, his full quota of corn and oats had to be delivered (though the wardrobe would pay was given notice of supplies of archers' equipment ordered to be sent to him (above, p. 139). Taken together, these references suggest a case can be made that the arrangements for movement of supplies could often include warning the recipients that the goods were on the way. In the case of the receivers of victuals at the main supply bases in particular, this would enable them to report late delivery. (It would also have the practical advantage of enabling them to make some arrangements for availability of storage for perishable foodstuffs likely to arrive in bulk.)

A practice that orders to obtain supplies were accompanied by a simultaneous warning to the receivers to expect them - whether by a specific date or not - would be an example of another good and effective managerial procedure.

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214 Above, p. 57.
215 Above, p. 67.
216 Above, pp. 101-2.
217 Above, p. 46. The reduction was not very great - from 500 quarters of wheat, 500 of oats, and 20 of malt, to 1,000 of wheat.
218 Above, p. 122.
reasonable costs, including carriage).\textsuperscript{219} It would be dangerous to infer from such evidence that an overall progressive count was being kept centrally on the totality of the purveyances, though it may be possible to draw the lesser conclusion that the centre would be informed of potentially significant failures, and take appropriate action.

Orders for official purveyance, and for proclamations directing merchants in general to bring supplies of victuals for sale, show account being taken of geography, as would be expected. The proclamations ordered in April 1282 defined for each county involved the geographically appropriate market to which merchants should go.\textsuperscript{220} When one of the armies was mustering at Carlisle, that was the destination of purveyances from Ireland,\textsuperscript{221} and for merchants from south coast towns, while those from the east were directed to Newcastle.\textsuperscript{222} In 1336 William de Melcheburne and Eudo de Stoke bought supplies in eastern counties for the army at Berwick, while supplies for the receiver at Carlisle were to come from Ireland and Cumberland.\textsuperscript{223} For armies going to, or in, France such discrimination was naturally inappropriate, though the northern counties, with the occasional exception of Yorkshire,\textsuperscript{224} were not required to meet purveyances. This, however, was as much to do with the effects of the troubles with Scotland as with any geographical considerations. It is difficult to make an argument that there was any general policy of rotating demands, the same counties being involved several times; indeed, in 1346 seven out of eight called upon in September were included again in November.\textsuperscript{225}

Though writs would say, quite sincerely, that there should be as little loss to the people as could be managed,\textsuperscript{226} the management of the supply of food for the armies naturally put the armies' needs first.

The central government's involvement in managing the supply of military weaponry in bulk did not include personal armour or what Hewitt categorises as cutting weapons - 'knives, lances, spears, swords'.\textsuperscript{227} Henry II's Assize of Arms of 1181 and subsequent related modifications had established that it was accepted as the

\textsuperscript{220} Above, p. 29.
\textsuperscript{221} Above, p. 69.
\textsuperscript{222} Above, pp. 67-8.
\textsuperscript{223} Above, p. 117.
\textsuperscript{224} Above, p. 148.
\textsuperscript{225} C76/23, mm.18, 9.
\textsuperscript{226} Above, p. 117.
\textsuperscript{227} Organisation of War, p. 63.
responsibility of the individual and the county to ensure that men were equipped with these weapons. Government activity was directed to providing the large engines of war and the materials necessary to make them, particularly iron and timber, and, at the other end of the scale, trying to ensure the armies' supplies of items used up in large numbers - nails, horseshoes, bowstaves, bows, bowstrings, arrows, quarrels.228

Stocks of these weapons were usually held centrally, as Hewitt describes, particularly at the Tower.229 Some indication of the scale may be inferred from the order during the Welsh war of 1282 to the king's clerk William de Perton (who was probably at Chester), to send the king the 12,000 quarrels 'in his keeping'.230

New supplies of bows, arrows and quarrels were obtained by the sheriffs, who would receive instructions to buy specific quantities and, usually, deliver them to the Tower to the keeper of the privy wardrobe there.231 Orders of 20 March 1345 were spelt out in detail to each sheriff, defining which was to obtain bows, sheaves of arrows or bowstrings, and how many.232 Orders for selection of archers had the same date;233 it is tempting to suggest that the buying orders might have been calculated in relation to the number of archers (after presumably taking into account existing stocks). If this were so, taken together with the knowledge of potential sources implied by the detail of the orders to the sheriffs, it would suggest the existence of a well-managed planning system, but this may be unlikely, given the absence of other evidence.

The equipment ordered on 20 March 1345 was to be delivered by 14 May. In 1359 sheriffs were told on 2 January to supply quotas of bows and arrows to the Tower by 7 April,234 but in spite of the greater length of time allowed they failed to do so. This may have been due to misunderstanding arising from the extension of the truce with France, but the king's clear expression of anger indicates that, even if the original

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228 Winches for crossbows were also supplied, at least in 1359. (Above, p.186.) Springalds were among the supplies delivered to Nicholas Hugate at Bordeaux in 1325. Above, p. 102, n.113.

229 Organisation of War, p. 65-73.

230 Above, p. 33. At the beginning of that war Gregory de Rokesley, keeper of the exchange in London had been told to have 4,000 quarrels made and delivered to the barons of the Cinque Ports (Foedera, Vol. I div. ii, p. 604); perhaps stocks had already been concentrated conveniently near Wales.

231 Above, pp. 139, 171.

232 C76/20, m. 31.

233 Above, p. 137.

234 Above, p. 171.
planning was well-managed, subsequent administration was not, at least on this occasion.\footnote{235 Above, p. 175.}

Unlike most orders for purveyance of victuals, orders to sheriffs to buy these weapons did not involve clerks as supervisors of the process; the possible administrative confusion in 1359 may underline both the need for such supervision, and the clerks' value as administrators. (Later in February, 1360 fifteen out of twenty-one sheriffs were unable to provide their quotas of bows and arrows in the time required, though as they had only been given four weeks it was not surprising.)\footnote{236 Instead they had to send the money they would have spent on the equipment to the treasury, to reimburse the keeper of the privy wardrobe at the Tower for his expenses in providing them. (Above, p. 187.) Probably there was a general shortage; the Black Prince's chamberlain also received a message urging speedy delivery at about the same time. Ibid.}

Of course armies needed a wide range of equipment as well as weaponry; the lists of stores held at Berwick in 1336, and those delivered to Nicholas Hugate in 1325, illustrate what the receivers had to handle.\footnote{237 Above, pp. 119, 102 n.113.} The arrangements for obtaining these items varied. Horseshoes and nails were to be bought by Walter le Ferrou (described as \textit{valettus}) in 1314, by two sheriffs under the supervision of a clerk in 1336, and by a sheriff in 1346.\footnote{238 Above, pp. 56, 120, 149.} The latter was also told to obtain cartloads of iron, as was the sheriff of Derby in 1336.\footnote{239 Above, p. 119.} The Derbyshire iron was to be sent via Hull to the receiver at Berwick, who was told to expect it; similar advance notice of incoming supplies of archers' equipment was given to Robert de Mildenhall at the Tower in 1345.\footnote{240 Above, p. 139.}

The basic arrangements for the supplies and equipment needed for war-time shipping have been described above, in the section on transport. Immediate responsibility for making vessels ready for their tasks rested with the officials of their home ports,\footnote{241 Above, pp. 57, 71, 79-80, 84, 86, 108.} though supervision by royal clerks or sergeants-at-arms, and sometimes pressure from sheriffs,\footnote{242 Above, p. 85.} was necessary.
Equipment, gang-planks and hurdles and the materials for making them, to adapt merchant ships to carry horses, was supplied by sheriffs, again under the coordinating management of clerks or sergeants-at-arms.243

The victualling of ships summoned to naval service appears in the early years of this period to be left implicitly to their home ports - in so far as the orders for them were addressed direct to the ports' officials as in 1301, 1314, and 1322,244 in 1336, in the case of Boston, this was explicit.245 It may not always, however, have been the practice. The requirement that the clerk John Devery, overseeing the requisitioning of ships in 1324, should report crew numbers to the treasury or chancery 'for the more precise payment thereof and better purveyance of their victuals in time'246 implies something more than mere accounting, but exactly what is difficult to see. Contemporary accounts of various sheriffs for equipping ships include construction materials, but not provisions.247

In August 1336 authority for requisitioning victuals for the fleets was given to the two admirals, Geoffrey de Say and John de Norwico.248 This may have been an innovation, or possibly an order making explicit something previously not so clear. In 1324 admirals were given power to select crews,249 but without explicit mention of requisition of victuals; nor, earlier, in 1336, did John de Norwico's authority to requisition, crew and arm ships specify victualling them.250 Although the admirals' explicit authority to victual ships was applied through various channels - ships' masters, sheriffs, and one king's clerk - in 1336,251 in 1345 admirals' general powers to requisition ships and have them ready to sail from their home ports once more did not make particular reference to provisioning them.252 It seems therefore that victualling ships remained the responsibility of the officials of their home ports, under the supervision of admirals' deputies and others. The situation in August 1336 may have

243 Above, pp. 84, 87, 134.
244 Above, pp. 43, 57, 71.
245 Above, p. 125.
246 Above, p. 85.
247 Above, p. 87.
248 Above, p. 125.
249 Above, p. 94.
250 Above, p. 109.
251 Above, pp. 125-6.
252 Above, pp. 134-5.
been that the urgency of reassembling the fleets to meet the threat of the French
galleys\textsuperscript{253} required special action.

The management of the processes of arranging supplies for these campaigns can
not be described as rigorous; perhaps it did not need to be, given that the timings of
arrival and departure of armies and fleets were themselves subject to margins of error.
Nevertheless, as is to be expected, the government was aware that it was necessary to
do more than just issue often quite detailed orders to permanent local officials. It had
available, and used, its central staff - particularly the royal clerks and sergeants-at-arms
- for the additional supervision, progress-chasing and coordination that was needed.

Planning

The timings of the mobilizations of the armies studied in Chapters 2-8 were determined
by differing circumstances: the need to react at once to the Welsh revolt in 1282; the
French threat to Gascony in 1324; the anticipated expiry of the truces with Scotland in
May 1301 and May 1336, and of the truce with France in March 1325 (and in April
1359);\textsuperscript{254} the commitment to surrender Stirling if it was not relieved by mid-summer
1314; the French rejection of the 'second treaty of London' in May 1359. In 1322
Edward II only set about raising the army to invade Scotland when he had overcome his
opponents in England; Edward III had already determined on continuing the war with
France in spite of the truce of Malestroit,\textsuperscript{255} though he did not renounce it until June
1345. The planning of the mobilizations reflected their origins.

Obviously, in 1282 immediate action rather than advance planning was
undertaken. Within a couple of weeks regional commanders were named, cavalry
summoned, agents and orders for gathering a flow of supplies sent out, and preparation
of naval support put in hand.\textsuperscript{256}

In 1301, with knowledge of the May date for expiry of the truce, early planning
could take place. Some four months' notice was given of the date of the muster, 24
June, for cavalry, ships and supplies to come together, by orders issued within a few

\textsuperscript{253} Above, p. 123.
\textsuperscript{254} This was overtaken by the negotiations leading to the 'second treaty of
London'. Above, p. 173.
\textsuperscript{255} McKisack, \textit{Fourteenth Century}, p.131.
\textsuperscript{256} Above, pp. 26-7, 28, 34.
days of each other. It is interesting also that, later, orders for county levies of foot went out with the same date, 12 May, as orders for the purchase of a large number of carts, both levies and carts to be at the muster by 24 June. This adds to the picture of different elements of mobilization being considered together, and therefore of coordinated planning.

The same coordination can be seen in 1314 in the orders preparing the army to relieve Stirling, for which the muster date was set as 10 June. Magnates having been summoned, on 23 December, to present their service then, writs dated from 22 March to 1 April called for ships, and for levies from the counties, Wales and Ireland, and appointed purveyors for supplies. In 1322 a series of orders dated 24 and 25 March were for infantry, cavalry, supplies and ships. In 1336, at a point when the truce was due to expire at Easter (in March it was extended to 5 May), writs dated from 10 to 13 February ordered defensive schemes, summoned ships, and appointed arrayers for hobelars and archers to be brought to Berwick.

The clear picture of coordinated planning thus visible in the mobilizations of 1282, 1301, 1314, 1322 and 1336 tends to be obscured in the 'on and off nature of the preparations for expeditions during the War of Saint-Sardos. Nevertheless, it can still be seen in the aborted arrangements for an embarkation on 27 August 1324, and in those for the similarly postponed and ultimately cancelled one originally set for 17 March 1325. The musters called for 14 May 1345 for both Henry of Lancaster's expedition to Gascony and Edward III's to Sluys were planned in a group of orders with a wider spread of dates; but even here those for ships and men for Lancaster were issued between 8 and 13 March, and those for Edward's force between 14 and 20 March. Originally 20 October 1345 was the embarkation date for what later became the 'Crecy' campaign; the orders for ships and men were both dated 28 August. Preparations for resumption of war in 1359 came in two stages, the first (in orders of 6 December 1358

\[257\] Above, pp. 43-6.
\[258\] Above, pp. 47, 51.
\[259\] Above, pp. 55, 57, 58, 56-7.
\[260\] Above, pp. 61, 62, 67, 80.
\[261\] Above, pp. 107, 108-9, 110.
\[262\] Shipping was ordered up on 28 July, a preparatory 'census' of available soldiers on 1 August, the magnates' retinues on 4 August, selection of ships' crews on 6 August, and infantry on 8 August. Above, pp. 94, 91-2, 94.
\[263\] Above, pp. 134-5, 137.
\[264\] Above, p. 141.
for ships, 2 January for armaments, and 12 January for soldiers) being interrupted by new negotiations. The second, following the French rejection of the new treaty in May, began with orders on 1 June to have the Welsh and county levies ready to march, and on 6 June for raising a fleet to be at Sandwich by 8 July.\textsuperscript{265}

It would, of course, have been surprising if such coordinated planning had not taken place, but it is reassuring to have so much evidence that it did. Similarly, it is possible to see the considerable extent to which arrangements were made for orders to be followed up, and plans altered if necessary - that is, how much 'management' took place.

The preceding sections on the purveyance of victuals and, particularly, the assembly of shipping, have referred to numerous instances of the appointment of royal clerks and sergeants-at-arms to supervise and progress executive action by permanent local officials. In itself this establishes that the government recognised the necessity for such 'managerial' activity; it is arguable that the development of the practice of appointing commissioners of array, whose role could be described as originally to arrange and manage the actions of sheriffs, bailiffs and their staffs, makes the same point.\textsuperscript{266}

There is also the frequency with which writs ordering action to mobilize armies and fleets included the requirement for reports. In 1301 the warden had to report when the ships of the Cinque Ports were ready to sail; in 1322 sheriffs had to report the names of bannerets and other men-at-arms they had summoned; in 1336 detailed reports were required of numbers of ships, and of action taken to implement defence plans.\textsuperscript{267} Sometimes interim reports had to be made on progress towards completion of orders, as by 2 February 1325 in respect of the muster on 17 March; by 8 May 1345 for the muster on 14 May; by 16 April 1346 for the muster on 1 May; by 25 March 1347 for readiness of archers by Easter (1 April); by 27 January 1359 on action to assemble a fleet by 14 April.\textsuperscript{268} Though the need to make reports might in itself encourage the completion of tasks, the government could use them to pursue inadequate performance: it must be

\textsuperscript{265} Above, pp. 169, 171-2, 176, 174. However, possibly because of the apparently uncertain and unpredictable dates of arrival at Sandwich of the contracted retinues, there does not seem to have been a more precise or coordinated plan for the Reims campaign. Above, p. 184.

\textsuperscript{266} The role of the clerks associated with sheriffs in the raising of levies in 1301 can be seen in the same light. Above, pp. 47-8.

\textsuperscript{267} Above, pp. 43, 77, 108, 114.

\textsuperscript{268} Above, pp. 97, 138, 146, 162, 170.
fairly certain that the strong remonstrance of 10 February 1360 was occasioned by what was learned from the reports required by 28 January of the lack of progress of defensive arrangements.  

In several cases it was explicitly stated that the reports were to be made to the chancery, which by this time could be said to be acting as the general secretariat of the council; thus there was at least the potential for not only following up individual cases of actual or potential failure, but also, admittedly rarely, for the taking of major decisions on the basis of a general view of the progress being made.

That failures were not left unnoticed is shown by the investigative commissions of 1301, the order in 1324 to arrest the disappearing Gloucester footmen, the complaint of the delayed departure of Yorkshire archers in January 1336, the appointment of three commissioners in March 1336 to find out why some had not arrived, or the rapid remonstrance of 6 June 1345 to Herefordshire arrayers because their men were late.

Reminders to arrayers and others of the dates by which their tasks were to be completed were also issued. On 10 June 1336 some were impatiently pressed to deliver their men by the muster date of 24 June; those made responsible on 26 May 1336 for setting up signal fires were urged on 2 June to do so; the leader of Welsh levies was reminded on 1 June 1345 to deliver them quickly to the muster at Sandwich; in March 1347 Irish magnates were again told of the urgency of bringing their forces to London by 1 April.

Instances of major changes to plans, clearly made because of knowledge of the inadequate progress of key elements, occurred in 1345 and 1346. In 1345 the successive postponements in April (to 29 May) and then in May (to 5 June) of the muster originally ordered for 14 May were obviously due to the anticipated late arrivals of county levies; in 1346 the cancelling in September of the embarkation due on 20

269 Above, p. 190.

270 e.g. arrayers in 1345; admirals' deputies taking security from ships in August 1345; arrayers in March 1347; sergeants-at-arms in January 1359 and again before 8 July; arrayers for defence in November 1359 and January 1360. (Above, pp. 137, 141, 162, 171, 174, 189.) The 1336 report to the chancellor by the Leicestershire arrayer that his selected archers had been duly passed on, by indenture, to be led to Berwick, possibly illustrates the terms in which such reports were made. Above, p. 113.


272 Above, pp. 48, 95, 106, 113, 139.

October was explicitly attributed to knowledge that the ships would not be ready in time.\textsuperscript{274}

Postponements of dates for muster and for the embarkation of expeditions were of course commonplace during these wars. They were, however, usually not due to administrative failure to monitor and progress the orders for mobilization. Various other circumstances could give rise to the delays: political considerations (as probably in the case of the negotiations for the levy of one man per vill in 1322),\textsuperscript{275} the changing diplomatic situation in 1324 and 1325; military decisions to increase the size of the army, and simple adverse weather in 1346,\textsuperscript{276} the problems arising from dependence on contract retinues in 1359 with their erratic arrival pattern.\textsuperscript{277}

The mobilization of armies under the three Edwards did not find the royal governments without understanding of the need to manage as well as simply issue orders. They had and used appropriate techniques, such as the use of records, coordinated planning, the appointment of reliable agents to supervise and progress action, the requirement for reports to a communications centre. With them they could at least try to ensure that orders were obeyed, monitor progress, and apply corrective measures when necessary - that is, to manage the processes of mobilization.

\textsuperscript{274} Above, pp. 138, 142.
\textsuperscript{275} Above, p. 70.
\textsuperscript{276} Above, p. 145.
\textsuperscript{277} Above, p. 183.
CHAPTER 10

CONCLUSION

The records of mobilizations described and analysed in the preceding chapters have shown that Maddicott’s comment, ‘The central government had no means of ensuring that its orders were carried out in the shires’, should not be taken to mean the centre made no attempt to follow up the execution of its instructions by managerial action.

The central government whose management of mobilization has been studied was that of the king. The king’s council - as the word makes clear - was in origin, and under Henry III still was, ‘a group of advisers; from the formal and constitutional point of view it did not act’. An executive council was ‘the outcome of the developments, political, military, administrative and judicial, of the reign of Edward I’. It had acquired its executive powers because of the practical necessity of handling increasingly complex administration. The core of the council therefore usually consisted of the judicial and administrative officials. It was supplemented by barons particularly when the importance of the issues to be considered made this necessary. Their presence reflected the continuance of the idea that the tenants-in-chief were the king’s most appropriate counsellors.

Military mobilizations were not only great administrative undertakings; politically, they required the king to enlist the cooperation of the major magnates. They would be included in the council with which the king consulted when he decided upon mobilization for war, and thus would be in a position to influence strategic decisions as to numbers and timing. The consequential detailed plans would be worked out by the household and departmental staff, and receive at least tacit approval.

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1 The English Peasantry, p. 29.
3 Ibid., p. 121.
4 Ibid., p. 136, perhaps in much the same way as the executive directors of a company are reinforced by externally influential non-executives when take-overs or acquisitions are concerned.
5 Baldwin, The King’s Council in England, p. 460.
6 e.g. the ‘Advice given by English prelates and magnates on the King’s proposed expedition to Gascony’, War of Saint-Sardos, ed. P. Chaplais p. 89.
from the king or council. Implementation of these plans required the issuing of orders to many individuals, spelling out what action was required of each. The orders were sent out principally by the chancery.\(^7\) In his chapter ‘The Chancery’ in \textit{The English Government at Work},\(^8\) Wilkinson quotes a letter of Edward III of 1335. It authorised the council to have letters (summoning the magnates to Newcastle on the feast of the Trinity) made in the chancery and brought to the king to be sealed, the decision that they ought to be so summoned having been made originally by the council.\(^9\) That letter illustrates three points central to mobilization: the recognised and necessary authority of the king, the strategic planning role of the council, and the function of the chancery in communicating administrative instructions.

Mobilizing armies for war was a task that was inherently more demanding of government’s managerial efficiency, particularly in terms of timing, than were most other administrative functions of the medieval state. The delivery of justice, organised largely on the basis of the regular sessions of courts, could take place without ‘deadlines’. Delayed collection of taxes, though payment into the exchequer was theoretically due by specified dates,\(^10\) would be neither disastrous nor unusual. Levying of customs charges on exports was a continuous process,\(^11\) as was, in a very different field, the maintenance of law and order. By contrast, final plans for the muster of the army or the assembly of a fleet had to specify a completion date. The possibility of actually achieving it depended in the first case on its being based on roughly realistic knowledge of logistical considerations. These included such matters as how long particular tasks would take, distances and the time needed to cover them, and numbers of men or ships locally available. Without such information the detailed orders to individuals could prove to be impracticable. Fulfilment of the plans also depended on the ability of the government to supervise and monitor the action of the recipients of those orders, keep track of the progress of the whole operation, and take corrective action when necessary.

\(^7\) ‘Many of the letters as we find them in the close rolls and patent rolls are...marked with attestations such as \textit{per regem et consilium}, \textit{per consilium}, \textit{per petitionem de consilio}, \textit{per privatum sigillum}, etc....An act in which the council evidently participated is warranted by the king, or by privy seal; whether an order is marked by authority of the king and council or simply by council seems to be a matter of indifference.’ J. F. Baldwin, ‘The King’s Council’, in \textit{EGov.at W}, Vol. I, p. 157.
\(^8\) Vol. I, pp. 162-205.
\(^9\) Ibid., p.180.
In these respects mobilization necessitated particularly deliberate planning and, especially, management.

In attempting to judge the overall degree of success or failure of the management of these mobilizations it is not the outcome of the subsequent campaign that is the critical factor to be considered. Edward II’s disastrous defeat at Bannockburn does not nullify the fact that a large army of both horse and foot had been mobilized in time to be able to reach Stirling before it was due to be surrendered.¹² Nor is it the wisdom of the original strategic policy, or the consequences of variations resulting from new political or diplomatic circumstances, that should determine conclusions about the efficiency of the management of the detailed administration. The War of Saint Sardos illustrates how vacillating royal decision-making could create an unfair picture of administrative confusion.¹³

The more relevant issues are these. Were plans for mobilizations realistic and practicable as a result of being based on reliable information? Was there a mechanism to transmit knowledge of how their implementation was progressing, to the king and the council? Was effective use made of such knowledge? Were sufficient arrangements made to supervise the detailed executive action? Was the net result of the government’s management that plans were adequately, even if not completely, fulfilled?

**Quantitative Practicality of Plans**

There is little reason to believe that the sizes of the armies, or of the contingents allocated to individual counties or towns, were generally out of scale compared with practical possibility. In 1322 Edward II originally asked for nearly 40,000 men from the county levies, which would have been a very heavy demand; but that scheme, abandoned in return for agreement to the levy of one specially equipped man from each vill, appears in fact to have been intended only as a bargaining counter.¹⁴ An array ordered in 1336 envisaged some 86,000 men; it was specifically for defence, and moreover was very quickly cancelled.¹⁵ The often quite substantial short-falls, described in Chapter 9, between intended and actual numbers in the county levies¹⁶ reflect inefficiencies in the system, but do not necessarily invalidate the conclusion that the numbers were viable: none of the campaigns for which mobilization has been

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¹² Above, p. 60.
¹³ Above, p. 104.
¹⁴ Above, pp. 69-70.
¹⁵ Above, p. 127.
¹⁶ Above, pp. 202-3.
discussed was aborted for lack of sufficient force. Nor, apart from resistance arising from a natural disinclination to be conscripted for military service, is there any significant evidence that there were justified complaints that the numbers sought were an unbearable burden. The reduction in the size of the levies for the expedition to Sluys in spring 1345 had a preamble that said it was 'to relieve the people as much as possible', which might appear to imply that the original figures were excessive. It was, however, a reduction from only 1,940 archers (to 1,055), to be drawn from over a score of counties. Both numbers were small compared with those required on many other occasions. The occasions when arrayers were told not to take soldiers from towns supplying ships or sailors imply a government willingness not to be unreasonable in its attitude (especially in relation to established practices).

In general, demands on individual areas and towns appear to have been realistic, practicable and acceptable. They must therefore have been planned on the basis on quite detailed information.

Planning Information

Written records were essential to provide a practicable basis for planning. As M. T. Clanchy describes, over centuries documents proliferated, and became recognised - slowly - as desirable records. 'Making documents for administrative use, keeping them as records, and using them again for reference were three distinct stages of development which did not automatically and immediately follow from each other.' It is not possible to prove that the planners of these Edwardian mobilizations did explicitly use the recorded information of previous arrays to determine their allocations for the next. Accounts of the sort of discussions that must have taken place, or the reasons that must have been advanced for whatever was proposed, are not preserved. What do still exist in profusion - and therefore were available, even if not easily accessible, at the time - are the conclusions: the orders for conscription of specified numbers of men, or ships, from named places. It would be very surprising if experienced administrators took no account of, at least, the records of what had previously been tried, and to what extent it had been successful, even if the latter was only known approximately. The order to ports to provide a specific number of ships

\[\text{Added Footnotes:}\]

\[\text{17 Above, p. 138.}\]
\[\text{18 Above, p. 111.}\]
\[\text{19 'Documents do not automatically become records,' M. T. Clanchy, From Memory to Written Record 1066-1307, second edn. (London, 1993), p. 145.}\]
\[\text{20 Ibid., p.154.}\]
each in 1324 implies an already held view of their individual capacities.\footnote{Above, p. 84.} In 1336 a king’s clerk collected information from the jurors of Holkham on that port’s vessels,\footnote{Above, p. 109.} and in 1347 representatives of 32 ports were called to Westminster to report on the availability of shipping.\footnote{Above, p. 165.} There were several indications of the intention to have figures on which plans could be based. In 1316 the 	extit{Nomina Villarum} survey was made in preparation for the proposed levy of one man per vill.\footnote{H. M. Jewell, 	extit{English Local Administration in the Middle Ages} (Newton Abbot, 1972), p. 88.} The census of 1344 was carried out expressly to provide information on the ‘armed power of the realm’.\footnote{CPR 1343-1345, p. 427.} There were a good number of examples of the administration requiring quantified returns from commissioners of array.\footnote{Above, p. 197.} These are practices that add to the case for seeing the government as increasingly concerned to be able to base its quantitative planning of mobilization on hard facts, and fairly effectively doing so.

Another field in which it would have been obviously desirable for government planning to be based on reliable numerical information was finance. Making budget forecasts to relate income and expenditure does not, however, seem to have been a process central to medieval government. Michael Prestwich makes the point that, at least under Edward I, there is no evidence of serious budgeting, in which future estimated expenditure was compared with probable income.\footnote{Prestwich, 	extit{War, Politics and Finance}, p. 204.} E. B. Fryde’s study of Edward III’s attempts to finance his activities in the the Netherlands in 1338-1340 reveals a hopeless failure to relate commitments to realistic expectation of revenue.\footnote{E. B. Fryde, 	extit{Studies in Medieval Trade and Finance} (London, 1983), Ch. VII.} Calculations of military expenditure were made,\footnote{Prestwich, 	extit{War, Politics and Finance}, p. 204. The ‘Scheme in 1341’ worked out the cost of the forces assumed over 40 days, and of the transport fleet, and outlined how it might be met from an ad hoc levy on wool. Prestwich, ‘Scheme in 1341’, p. 102.} but were not related to anticipated revenues. As J. R. Strayer writes ‘...even when the government had discovered more or less adequate sources of revenue it was never able to collect as much as might have been expected’ because it ‘lacked both information and personnel.’\footnote{Strayer, ‘Introduction’, in 	extit{EGov.at W}, Vol. II, p. 4.} Until 1334 individuals’ liability to taxes on moveables was made by the sub-assessors on the sworn information of township juries, the results being then enrolled, one part to be used by
the collectors and the other kept by the chief taxers.\textsuperscript{31} Judging that the information was becoming increasingly unreliable, in 1334 the government negotiated with each community a lump sum, which the community allocated to individuals, and which could be continued to be, and was, used thereafter as the base liability.\textsuperscript{32} This could be seen as an example of recognition of the planning value of having reliable information - though it was, also, a confession of the limits of the government's power and resources to collect it.

**Progress Reports**

Effective management required not only that detailed instructions for mobilization should be based, as far as possible, on reliable information as to what was practicable, but also that the centre should know how well the process was going, in case plans needed to be changed. There is both explicit and implicit evidence that reports were sought by and made to the central authority. In many cases they were to be specifically to 'the chancery',\textsuperscript{33} in others, which sought a report 'to the king',\textsuperscript{34} they would presumably have followed the same route, the chancery being the centre of out-going and in-coming administrative communication.

Reports could have different purposes. Some were intended simply to record that the action had been taken, for example that a proclamation had been made,\textsuperscript{35} or that comprehensive arrangements for coastal defence had been completed.\textsuperscript{36} The mere requirement in the original order for such reports could act as a spur to performance, besides enabling progress to be monitored as they were received. More effective still for the management of the mobilization would be orders that sought interim reports on progress towards completion of tasks. These not only acted as reminders, and encouraged timely action by the official reminded, but also, mostvaluably, could allow time for reassessment of the original plan if it seemed that was likely to become necessary. In 1283 sheriffs who had been told to assist in the collection of workmen, corn, and transport for it, had to report completion of their tasks, though only by the day

\textsuperscript{33} Above, p. 233.
\textsuperscript{34} Above, p. 38.
\textsuperscript{35} Above, p. 39.
\textsuperscript{36} Above, p. 114.
before the final date.\textsuperscript{37} In 1322 ports, told to provide ships to bring troops from Ireland, had to report to the king’s clerk Alexander le Conyers, who was supervising all the arrangements, what they were doing to meet the order.\textsuperscript{38} In 1325 a progress report on the selection of archers and men-at-arms for a muster on 17 March was to be made by 2 February.\textsuperscript{39} In 1345 a report on selection of men who were to be at Sandwich by 14 May was to be made by 8 May.\textsuperscript{40} In 1346 details, including names and the number of men, of action for the muster on 1 May, were to be reported by 16 April.\textsuperscript{41} In 1359, when plans were for a transport fleet to be assembled by 14 April, very detailed reports were required by 27 January.\textsuperscript{42}

The record of the chancery being told in 1336 that a levy in Leicester had been successfully raised, and the men passed on to be led to the muster, with an indenture recording the transfer,\textsuperscript{43} suggests the possible existence of an almost routine procedure capable of being used for monitoring progress. It may be significant that an exchange of indentures, like that recording the handing on of responsibility for those Leicester archers from the arrayer to the next ‘officer’, also took place between East Riding arrayers and Thomas Meltham, who was to take the men on to Berwick.\textsuperscript{44} These might be surviving examples of a fairly general practice, which it would be in the interest of arrayers to observe for their own protection, in case of subsequent desertions or delays, and consequent royal anger. If so, the system would have had the potential to keep the centre very well informed. Even if confirmation of the hand-over was not always sent to the chancery, the existence of such a procedure would facilitate later investigations to punish deserters: both considerations might be illustrated by the problems in 1324 of dealing with the disappearing Gloucestershire levy.\textsuperscript{45}

Reports have not only to be required: they have to be seen and used. There is ample evidence that in the management of mobilizations this took place. Reports were seen and used to give rise both to detailed corrective action, and on occasion to major changes to plans. It is, of course, unlikely that each and every report would be

\textsuperscript{37} Above, pp. 38-9.
\textsuperscript{38} Above, p. 71.
\textsuperscript{39} Above, p. 97.
\textsuperscript{40} Above, p. 138.
\textsuperscript{41} Above, p. 146.
\textsuperscript{42} Above, p. 170.
\textsuperscript{43} Above, p. 113.
\textsuperscript{44} Above, p. 106.
\textsuperscript{45} Above, p. 95.
considered by the council or the king. How they were processed can only be guessed. Probably the chancery clerks would draw the chancellor's attention to evidence of impending failure to meet particular objectives, so that he could take, or seek from the council or king, authority for issuing new orders. For example, in 1336 the administration was aware of deficiencies in numbers delivered by certain arrayers, who were ordered to make them good. Reports of some sort must have been the origin of a realisation that orders were necessary to accelerate the performance of tasks already allocated. In 1336 impatient writs, dated 10 and 12 June, successively urged the completion of arrays authorised two or three weeks previously. As those June writs were warranted the first per consilium and the subsequent one per ipsum regem they are strong evidence that progress was being actively monitored, or at least reported, at the highest level. It is clear from the postponement of the embarkation planned for 20 October, announced on 29 September 1345 with the explanation that shipping would not be ready, that a running count must have been being kept of the prospective amount of transport capacity. Action in 1314 to correct slow delivery of ships seems to make the same point. Reports also implied and facilitated the punishment of disobedience to orders. Though it was not stated explicitly that the inclusion of clerks in the commissions of array in 1301 was so that they could quickly provide returns of short-falls of men, the arrangements for the subsequent investigations make it seem probable. Reports were certainly made of the names of the masters, and sometimes of the owners, of ships requisitioned for fleets, or of those giving sureties for their later appearance. In 1283 sheriffs reported the names of merchants who declined to bring victuals for sale to the army. In the order of 1314 for local arrays, even the names of individuals who were listed among those who should have attended, but were absent, were to be enrolled and sent to the council or chancery. Though the latter two processes could only work as a deterrent to future disobedience, taking the names of the ship's masters might inhibit some from flouting the arrest of their vessel; management action to discourage that would be more useful than later punishment. These are some

46 Above, p. 113.
47 Above, p. 115.
48 Above, p. 142.
49 Above, p. 57.
50 Above, p. 49
51 Above, p. 85.
52 Above, p. 40.
53 Above, p. 64

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of the observations from the mobilizations surveyed that demonstrate that the government was accustomed to react - sometimes very quickly - to what was revealed by the reports it was receiving.

There were limits to the amount and timely availability of those reports. The number of references to selection of troops to be made 'if that had not already taken place'\(^{54}\) shows that the administration was aware that its information was by no means complete. Quite apart from the matter of whether comprehensive reports were actually sent, or even always sought, there was the time it would take for them to be delivered. Such time-lags were inevitable, even in the relatively urgent circumstances of mobilization. In the context of other centrally ordered but locally executed administrative action the government's ability to know that things were happening as it intended, and react quickly if they were not, must have been even more restricted.

Mobilizations, with their requirement for action to a time-table with a completion date, made reports necessary in a way that most other state functions did not. It would be wrong to suggest that the long-established twice-yearly accounting at the exchequer by sheriffs was any more than a very distantly analogous example of recognition that efficient administration involves keeping track of on-going performance. The exchequer's collection in 1354-5 of four returns of the rate of income from customs was not a monitoring procedure, but a device to facilitate more reliable assignment of that revenue to repayment of debt.\(^{55}\) Mobilization may have been a special case, but it does show that the government could and did employ practical managerial techniques to try to keep in touch with how its activities were progressing.

Supervision

An obvious arrangement aimed at ensuring that a large number of agents, to whom detailed action has been assigned, do carry it out, is to appoint others with a watching or supervisory brief. The accounts of the raising of county levies in preceding chapters have emphasised that permanent local officials played an essential part throughout the period.\(^{56}\) The practice of giving the ultimate responsibility to special commissioners only increased gradually. At first they were appointed just in some counties, while

\(^{54}\) Above, p. 204.


The practice was extended slowly until it became the normal, though not always the universal, rule. This suggests that the development could be seen as originally an administrative and managerial measure to deal with particular local circumstances requiring a supervisory arrangement, rather than as a deliberate and general policy with a new purpose (to have selection made by military 'experts'). The fact that the commissioners of array named in the list of appointments would appoint sub-arrayers strengthens the argument for seeing the named commissioners not so much as militarily expert individuals who had to carry out the arrays in person, but more as managers responsible for seeing that the work was done and the selected levies led to the muster.

The same point - that a managerial structure evolved, somewhat erratically, because of recognition of the need to supervise local action - can also be demonstrated in respect of the mobilization of fleets (except that the 'supervisors', very few in number, could not sail with the ships requisitioned from each port). The detailed action to arrest, equip and provision ships continued to be taken by the authorities of their home ports. Though the orders for this went directly to the port officials, in 1301 appointments were made expressly to expedite their performance. Among those appointed were some sheriffs. In 1314 supervision of assembly of the fleet was made the responsibility of two royal clerks, with sheriffs merely acting to support them. In April 1322 the clerk Alexander le Convers had a similar coordinating role for western ports. For assembly of an eastern fleet in that year there was no general appointment to supervise the ports, though two sheriffs were deputed to raise ships from some towns. In 1324 two clerks exercised responsibility for supervising local officials, with supporting action by sheriffs: ports received the orders to provide ships, but were vigorously monitored. In 1336 royal clerks covered the requisitioning, in the south-

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57 Above, p. 47–8.
58 Above, p. 153.
59 Above, pp. 106, 104.
60 Arrayers appointed in 1314 were referred to as 'choosers and leaders'. Rot. Scot., Vol. I, p. 120b.
61 Above, p. 108.
62 Above, p. 44.
63 Above, p. 57.
64 Above, p. 71.
65 Above, p. 80.
66 Above, pp. 84–5.
east under the supervision of the warden of the Cinque Ports.\textsuperscript{67} In March 1345, in a further organisational development, over-all responsibility for mobilizing naval resources was placed on the two admirals, under whom teams of royal clerks and sergeants-at-arms managed the executive action. This structure continued in August, in October 1346 and in 1359.\textsuperscript{68}

In this way the management of the assembling of fleets, made up essentially of requisitioned merchant ships, was developed ultimately into a clear and effective hierarchical structure bringing the operation under close central control. It had begun, however, in an \textit{ad hoc} way that showed the government recognised the need to supervise the action of local officials. The number of ports being much smaller than the number of vills, and therefore fewer supervisors being needed, it was possible for the latter to be largely government employees - royal clerks and sergeants-at-arms - and therefore able to be particularly objective in their local dealings.

Arrangements for supplies, particularly of victuals, for the armies and fleets developed no such systematic structure, either for action or for its supervision. There were, of course, many instances when members of the central administration were given an explicitly supervisory responsibility in relation to the local officials who were seeing to the actual purveyance.\textsuperscript{69} In other cases it is not clear whether the former's role was fundamentally supervisory, or actually executive.\textsuperscript{70} In 1346\textsuperscript{71} numbers of sheriffs were instructed to obtain and deliver supplies, without any associated nomination of royal clerks or sergeants-at-arms to 'view and witness' their action. In 1336 some purveyance was put in the hands of merchants who operated across shrieval boundaries, with power to appoint deputies.\textsuperscript{72} This seems to imply that, though sheriffs and bailiffs were told to assist them, the purveying would not necessarily be done by these permanent officials. Appointments were, therefore, not consistently made to monitor the performance of those responsible for obtaining supplies. This may be an indication that a precise

\begin{footnotes}
\item[67] Above, p. 108.
\item[68] Above, pp. 134, 141, 158, 170.
\item[69] Above, pp. 44, 67, 101-2, 120.
\item[70] e.g. the instructions to John de Maidenstone, who was to be supplied by the sheriffs with staff to assist him (above, p. 29), and the same to the king's pantler. Above, p. 31.
\item[71] Above, pp. 155, 164.
\item[72] Above, pp. 117, 120. These merchants were to raise the supplies across several counties; this is another reason for believing that the government did not have detailed knowledge of local availability.
\end{footnotes}
quantity of government-organised supplies was not seen to be a critical factor in a mobilization, for the reasons suggested in Chapter 9.\footnote{Above, p. 223.} Such an attitude could also explain the infrequency of records of government criticism of the quantities obtained compared with what had been sought. The variations in the way purveyances were made, and in the extent to which local action was supervised, add to the general picture of managerial arrangements being made in \textit{ad hoc} response to circumstances.

The urgency inherent in effecting a mobilization encouraged the central government to make use of managerial techniques, such as the requirement for reports and the imposition of supervisory arrangements, to ensure the satisfactory performance of the existing permanent officials. The desirability of this may have reflected in part reservations about these officials’ objectivity in relation to imposing extra burdens on the communities in which they had to continue to live. To a greater extent, looked at from a managerial point of view, it may have recognised that the carrying out of a major task outside their routine and regular responsibilities, risked a conflict of priorities in which the requirements of the mobilization might not always be put first. It is possible to see the commissioners of array, king’s clerks and sergeants-at-arms in their varying temporary roles in relation to the permanent local officials, as closely comparable with those special appointments today called ‘progress chasers’ - expressed in the fourteenth-century in the instruction \textit{videre provisiones predictas et eas festinare}\footnote{E101/556/9.} - and an illustration of the government’s recognition of the need for active and realistic management.

\textbf{From supervision of officials to privatisation}

In the fourteenth century the role of the sheriff and his staff as the local \textit{factotum} on behalf of the central government of the king was already in decline. W. A. Morris saw this as happening more than a hundred years earlier.\footnote{W. A. Morris, \textit{The Medieval English Sheriff to 1300} (Manchester, 1927), p. 72.} By 1327 escheators dealt with the ‘feudal’ work, keepers of royal manors with estate management, and collectors of subsidies with newer taxes. Keepers of the peace had a role in the fields of justice and policing.\footnote{H. M. Cam, ‘Shire Officials: Coroners, Constables and Bailiffs’, in \textit{EGov.atW}, Vol. III, p. 143.} These developments can be said to have one thing in common: they were all examples of dividing the responsibilities of the sheriff and allocating individual tasks
to specialists. The constitutionally and organisationally significant point is that, as Helen Cam pointed out, the specialists had contacts with the central government that were outside the sheriff's control.\footnote{Ibid.} As has been seen, one expression of this was that, though the executive action for the conscription of levies from towns and counties remained in the hands of local officials throughout this period, they usually had to carry it out under the managerial control of commissioners of array appointed by and responsible to the central government. A still further departure from dependence on the permanent administrative structure of sheriffs, town bailiffs and their staffs was very evident in the mobilization of the expedition for the Reims campaign in 1359.

A substantial part of this army was assembled and brought to the war without the involvement of either local officials or agents appointed by the central government. In response to the Scottish wars the military importance of mounted archers had been established; in 1335, in the army of 13,000-15,000 men there were c. 3,500 mounted archers, of whom only 1,095 were in retinues.\footnote{Ayton, \textit{Knights and Warhorses}, pp. 12-13.} The census of 1344 that assessed holders of land to arms according to their wealth, required them not only to serve, but also to provide defined additional men, all to be mounted.\footnote{Above, p. 131.} This must have accelerated the trend to mixed retinues, combining mounted archers with men-at-arms. In 1359, the account of the keeper of the wardrobe, William Farley, for the wages paid to retinues in the Reims campaign,\footnote{E101/393/11, pp. 79 et sqq..} shows that this time substantial numbers of mounted archers - some 3,800 - were included in them.\footnote{Archers are included in the retinues of Englishmen; it is interesting that the many 'foreign' knights whose names appear from page 91 on do not have archers with them. Ibid.} This figure compares with now only 1,140 mounted archers to be levied in the traditional way from English arrays, with another c. 1,000 Welsh foot archers and c. 500 Welsh armed with lances, for that campaign.\footnote{Above, pp. 176-7.}

Mobilization of the most important element of the retinues, the magnates, knights and esquires who were the elite men-at-arms, for the armies of Edward I, Edward II, and Edward III's in 1327, depended on the response of those individually summoned to come with their \textit{servicium debitum}, and on their responses to requests in such unquantified terms as \textit{cum equis et armis decentiori et meliori modo quo poteritis}, or \textit{quanto potentius poteritis}.\footnote{Above, p. 206.} Thus those summoned in these ways did not have to meet instructions to bring a specific size of following with them, which put limits on

\textit{Ibid.}
\footnote{Ayton, \textit{Knights and Warhorses}, pp. 12-13.}
\footnote{Above, p. 131.}
\footnote{E101/393/11, pp. 79 et sqq..}
\footnote{Archers are included in the retinues of Englishmen; it is interesting that the many 'foreign' knights whose names appear from page 91 on do not have archers with them. Ibid.}
\footnote{Above, pp. 176-7.}
\footnote{Above, p. 206.}
the possibility of quantitative government planning. The terms in which requests were put - e.g. *vos rogamus...in fide homagio et ligeancia quibus nobis tenemini* in 1333⁸⁴ - expressed an ethos that precluded active bureaucratic management of the mobilization of this element of the army.

Following the census of 1344, on 4 July 1345 some 300 individuals had been ordered to have their retinues ready by 10 August.⁸⁵ The government should therefore have been able to estimate, on the basis of the census, with some accuracy how great a force would be raised, which indeed had been the census's explicit purpose. The government could also monitor whether individuals' required obligation had been fulfilled. If it had not, action could be taken via the appropriate sheriff, as in the case of the Essex knight Walter Eygoce.⁸⁶

Enforcement of this form of military obligation, however, aroused opposition, which resulted in a promise in 1352 that it was not intended as a precedent.⁸⁷ No formal order is recorded for the preparation and assembly of retinues of cavalry for the Reims campaign. It must therefore be assumed that they came as the result of commitments entered into by their captains.

Debate about the origins of the development of formal systems of retaining places considerable weight on managerial and administrative considerations, particularly 'the need for magnates to acquire the service of highly professional estate managers and other servants', in a way 'which enabled the lords to obtain service without the concomitant liabilities involved in feudal tenure'.⁸⁸ A temporary payment out of revenue is often a more prudent method of purchase than is alienation of capital. Formal contracts with the crown for military service were similarly designed originally to meet administrative needs, being 'normally made for service away from the king's side',⁸⁹ because the officials of the household were not there to deal with administration. In 1294, for example, when magnates led forces in Gascony, 'It made sense to pay these great men large sums...so avoiding the bureaucratic complexities involved in payment of wages to a large number of men on a regular basis.'⁹⁰ When the king and the household were with the army, 'indentures for war' between the crown and leaders of retinues were not needed to deal with the administration of pay. It is

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⁸⁵ Above, p. 140.
⁸⁶ Above, p. 131.
⁸⁸ Ibid., p. 89.
⁸⁹ Ibid., p. 92.
⁹⁰ Ibid., p. 91.
therefore not surprising that A. E. Prince found no evidence of 'formal written indentures' for Englishmen in the Flemish expeditions of 1338-1340, and that written indentures for Crecy were 'not extant'.

The same absence of indentures with the crown applies to the army of 1359. This did not necessarily mean that the captains' retinues themselves did not include men recruited by means of formal indentures specifically for the campaign - certainly the Black Prince's retinue did in 1359 - as well as others serving under longer term agreements.

In the absence of records, it is not possible to know whether the 'informal understandings' Prestwich assumes existed between Edward and the leaders of each retinue in 1359 defined specified numbers and categories of soldiers to be brought to the army. If they did (which seems probable in view of the practice when contracts were made for service where the king was not present) reliance on retinues of a defined size and composition should have facilitated more secure quantitative planning.

Possibly this influenced the decision to halve the numbers of archers to be selected from the counties; to limit the number to c. 1,000 for a campaign to seize the French crown strongly implies confident expectation that a sufficient number more would be available from other sources. In so far as the terms of agreements by which captains formed their retinues could include a commitment to serve for a specific period, additional certainty in planning could have been obtained. Most valuably, this 'privatisation' of the recruiting of archers into the armed retinues of lords and experienced captains must have had the advantage of introducing some greater element of willing participation, and of military expertise, among both the recruiters and the recruited. It was still the case, of course, that the archers included in the retinues were essentially conscripts, not volunteers.

The Black Prince's instructions to his officials in 1359 were that archers should be 'chosen, tested and arrayed', and tested and arrayed 'without sparing any'.

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92 Ayton, Knights and Warhorses, p. 11.
93 Above, p. 178.
94 Armies and Warfare, p. 93.
95 In 1337, when an army was being collected for Scotland, in the absence of the king, a list was drawn up of soldiers available for the Scotch war; N. B. Lewis described this as a rare example of a preliminary estimate of a projected force. 'The Recruitment and Organization of a Contract Army', pp. 6-7.
96 Above, p. 176.
100 Ibid., p. 347.
Beyond these considerations it is not easy to suggest that, at least in the Reims campaign of 1359, formation of a major part of the army on the basis of retinues, rather than of levies, had made the management of its mobilization easier or more efficient. The absence of evidence that a date for the muster of the army was set makes it impossible to say that the meeting of a timetable was either facilitated or hindered. Nor is there any recorded basis for a comparison of the total numbers delivered with some government target. The only evidence is qualitative rather than quantitative: Jean le Bel wrote that Edward sent away continental volunteers, saying not only that he could not afford them, but also that he had brought enough men with him. 101

The important change in the government's attitude to management of the mobilization, was that now apparently it was content that not only the heavy cavalry but also the majority of the mounted archers should be recruited, organised and brought to the army independently of the royal administration's managerial control. A substantial part of the process of mobilization could be said to have been 'privatised'.

A Military Revolution?

Can this development in the method of managing the mobilization - apparent reliance on mixed retinues provided by 'private' individuals rather than government appointees - be seen as in some way part of general changes in the nature of the organisation and conduct of war - as one expression of a 'military revolution'? 102

Superficially, the increased combination of archers and men-at-arms in retinues in 1359 might appear to reflect battlefield considerations - particularly the tactics in which the two types of soldier were organised in mutually supporting formations. 103 Without more understanding than is currently available of how retinues of widely different sizes and composition might have been integrated and reorganised when battle was imminent, that interpretation is difficult to sustain. Of course, that the bulk of the archers should be mounted rather than foot soldiers was appropriate for the mobile campaign that Edward intended (though his move on Reims was only achieved at an average of six miles per day). 104 While in battle both archers and men-at-arms fought dismounted, horses were still needed for subsequent pursuit or flight.

101 Above, p. 182.
102 Prestwich, Armies and Warfare, p. 336.
103 For example, in 1359 the earl of Richmond's retinue included 2 bannerets, 35 knights, 162 esquires and 200 archers. Thomas de Berkeley's was 3 esquires and 4 archers. E101/393/11, ff. 79r, 82v.
104 Prestwich, Armies and Warfare, p. 190.
Inclusion of archers in every retinue does not seem, however, to have been an essential element of military retinues in 1359. The English units included mounted archers, but even the larger non-English ones - like Arnold van Enfelswe’s, with ten esquires or Michael van Convy’s, with two knights and thirty-two esquires - did not. The 1,140 mounted archers to be provided by the county arrayers were, obviously, not recruited as part of a policy of deliberately employing only units of men-at-arms and archers integrated for tactical reasons (if that were what the purpose of the mixed retinue was suggested to be). Inclusion of mounted archers in the English retinues might have been an implicit and evolving, rather than explicit and calculated, response to the theory and practice of mid-fourteenth-century tactical developments, but it is not easy to argue that the mixed retinue must be seen as a consequence, let alone a necessary condition, of the way English armies would now be drawn up for battle, or therefore as an expression of a military revolution.

Arguments for seeing a military revolution in the fourteenth-century changes in warfare include more than the change in tactics. That change itself, coupled with the increasing duration of campaigns fought, as far English armies were concerned, abroad, meant that effectiveness required more explicitly professional soldiers. Professionalism had to be expressed in military skills, acceptance of discipline, and in commitment to longer continuity of service than the traditional feudal ‘forty days’.

Conscription by permanent local officials, whether acting on their own, or supervised by commissioners of array, could not be a reliable way of forming forces of that professional nature from the population at large, in a short time. The militarily successful and, for many, profitable wars of the preceding years must have left a legacy of experienced and even enthusiastic ‘other ranks’ who were available to be used. It was beyond the government’s managerial resources to know who and where they were, let alone recruit them specifically; that knowledge was with the men themselves, and those who had previously campaigned alongside them. The practice of leaving it to the leaders of other expeditions, those operating without the presence of the king and the household administration, to contract to raise and provide specified numbers was well established. It cannot have been difficult, in 1358-9, for the government to ask the magnates, and the captains of previous campaigns, what following they would bring to a royally-led army. Those who were asked had politically little choice but to respond positively, and anyway, like others quickly aware of the intended expedition, would do so with alacrity, especially given how fresh would be the memory of the spectacular

\[105\] E101/393/11, ff. 91v, 92r.

\[106\] Is it possible to see the addition of more archers as in part a less expensive way of appearing at the muster with a numerous and impressive following?

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success (and profit) of the Black Prince at Poitiers only two or three years earlier. Their responses would enable the government to know that a large number of probably experienced archers would accompany the men-at-arms in the retinues.

It remains, nevertheless, difficult to see the mobilization in 1359 as one deliberately conceived as a process relying on contracts for mixed retinues. The mere fact that about a quarter of the army was raised by levies from the counties, the towns and Wales argues against that view. Nor can the argument be sustained by reference to theoretically improved planning and management considerations. The ambiguity and uncertainty surrounding Edward’s intended date for crossing \(^{107}\) could even have been a consequence of the government’s exclusion from the process of managing the collection and arrival of a large proportion of the expedition - particularly its inability to monitor their progress and pursue incipient failure.

On the other hand, heavy cavalry had always been mobilized more or less successfully without detailed official management. There was no reason to refuse the proffers of mixed retinues, which had been in existence for decades. In 1359 traditional conscription was still undertaken. The government’s mobilization for the Reims campaign has the appearance of a pragmatic combination of convenient practices.

**Limits to government’s resources**

There is, of course, nothing particularly surprising or unusual in pragmatism as a response to the need to handle the management of increasingly complex objectives: Edwardian governments had to use the means that were available. Kaeuper made the crucial point: ‘... the rulers of England created a centralised government before they created a bureaucracy.‘\(^ {108}\) As the demands on government increased, it needed more agents to deal with them, but it could not yet afford to employ enough as paid, and therefore dependent, servants. As with mobilization, it was willing to make increasing use of subjects as executive managers, even though this involved augmenting the influence of particular social classes.

A very important field in which demands grew, was that of responsibility for administering justice, and maintaining law and order. ‘The late thirteenth and fourteenth centuries witnessed a great expansion in the quantity of business, and the

\(^ {107}\) Above, pp. 177-179.

\(^ {108}\) War, Justice and Public Order, p. 282.
range of social classes, accommodated in the royal courts. Society increasingly recognised that an effective national system of law was desirable, even though many of its members continued to behave lawlessly. B. A. Hanawalt characterised the fourteenth century as one in which men readily turned to crime as an instrument of conflict resolution: homicide was common, with jurors often willing to acquit; there was widespread theft of property when food was short; all classes were involved in crime; the criminal law was regularly used as a weapon of social conflict. Social stability was disturbed both by natural crises - famine early in the century and then plague - and by what might be called the by-products of a period of war: returning soldiers habituated to violence and pillage, the corruption and dishonesty apparently inevitably associated with supplying armies, and the periodic preoccupation of rulers with external conflict rather than its internal elimination. Whether because there was an increasing amount of disorder, or an increasing general intolerance of it (or both), there was pressure for counter-action, which the central government was expected to provide.

Its response was 'a period of much judicial experimentation and improvisation,' as it attempted to find effective means to deliver royal justice in the shires. The unwieldy general eyres were abandoned because their omnicompetence meant they became over-loaded. While much of their civil and criminal work was carried out by regular assizes and gaol delivery, commissions of oyer and terminer and trailbaston were essentially 'short term and mainly reactive expedients'. An important element of the eventual solution came with the development of the powers of the keepers and justices of the peace, who were mainly men of local standing, knowledge and presence.

Some crown authority and action was thereby passed to particular classes of subjects, though their exercise of it was somewhat moderated by efforts to involve men learned in the law in their work. Although there were many ways in which both powerful and less powerful interests could and did influence, manipulate and pervert

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110 Ibid., p.11.
113 Ibid., p. 47.
114 Ibid., p. 49.
117 Ibid., p. 41-2.
justice,\textsuperscript{118} there was nevertheless thereby established ‘a permanent judicial presence by the crown in the localities’.\textsuperscript{119} Without the revenue to pay for a standing army and police, the crown was dependent on the nobility and gentry for law enforcement, and had to tolerate some abuse of their powers.\textsuperscript{120} So long as their interests and the crown’s coincided - militarily in the prestige and potential profit of successful wars under a powerful king, socially in the changed economic circumstances after the plague - it was, somewhat like the recruitment of archers by the leaders of retinues, a pragmatic, workable and therefore acceptable arrangement.

In fiscal administration as well, the crown had to face very much the same problems. Meeting the costs of war ‘changed the financial basis of the crown’,\textsuperscript{121} necessitating new and increased sources of revenue. A succession of lay subsidies raised by direct taxation of movables had to be assessed and then collected. However, ‘There were never enough paid civil servants to collect the king’s revenues, and thousands of unpaid collectors and assessors had to be pressed into service.’\textsuperscript{122} Assessors and sub-assessors, naturally likely to be influenced by their relationships with their neighbours, had a tendency to undervalue liabilities, and both the assessed and the net yield declined from the higher levels of the early 1290’s.\textsuperscript{123} To correct this, in 1334, a permanent assessment was agreed with communities as a lump sum for them to allocate to individuals, the negotiations being carried out in each county by a high-ranking clergyman and a government-paid civil servant. As in the requisitioning of ships, when the numbers needed were small enough to be met from central staff,\textsuperscript{124} the government recognised the desirability of using its own men to manage the process. The subsequent allocation of the liability to individuals was not made by officials, but left to the leading men in each community. This can be seen as another example of government willingness to adopt an administratively convenient and inexpensive arrangement.\textsuperscript{125}

\textsuperscript{125} The process was quicker, because it did not consume the time of government staff in making new assessments each time the subsidy was authorised.
even though it placed some of its authority for the detail of management in the hands of private subjects.

The developments in the administration of another branch of revenue, the customs, show that the government was theoretically aware of the importance of trying to supervise the local agents on whom it had to depend. Customs officials were notorious for embezzlement and corruption, as Baker describes. Many corrective approaches were devised, but they were not consistently or rigorously applied.\textsuperscript{126} He concludes that it had proved impossible to find fundamentally trustworthy controllers to reside in the ports and thus provide an effective check on the collectors. The position was unattractive to the central staff, the king's clerks and yeomen, because it was badly paid, and, more importantly for the ambitious in any century, took them away from the centre of government where careers were made;\textsuperscript{127} it was only acceptable to them as a sinecure.\textsuperscript{128} Nevertheless, under William Edington, treasurer of the exchequer from 1344, and later chancellor, some improvements were achieved,\textsuperscript{129} showing that determined leadership had the potential to override the difficulties inherent in the government's unavoidable use of men with local interests.

The fourteenth-century monarchy could not afford to pay enough civil servants to administer its increasing responsibilities. Consequently, in the levying of taxes, in the collection of customs charges, in the effort to maintain law and order, as in mobilization for war, it had to develop the ability to draw upon 'the loyalty and cooperation of local notables [by making] the king's cause the common cause'.\textsuperscript{130} The reign of Edward III, in particular, showed that with a politically adept, powerful, and militarily successful king, this could be achieved.

Management

Management has been defined in this thesis, in the context of mobilizations under the three Edwards, as the steps taken to try to ensure that instructions were obeyed, to monitor progress, and to correct failures. The mobilizations studied involved many examples of arrangements and actions by government that had these objectives. It is not surprising that this is so: the fundamental techniques of effective administration -

\textsuperscript{126} \textit{The English Customs Service}, passim.
\textsuperscript{127} Ibid., p. 50.
\textsuperscript{129} Ibid., pp. 30-32.
\textsuperscript{130} Baker, \textit{The English Customs Service}, p. 51.
information, practicable instructions, on-going communication, and flexibility when necessary - are constant and obvious. Success in their application depends, of course, on the ability and assiduity of individuals, and particularly on the number and the nature of agents that can be used. In these respects the Edwardian government faced handicaps that were not peculiar to assembling armies and fleets. Inevitably it was failures and aberrations - late and non-arrivals at musters, social disorders and perversions of justice, peculation and corruption on the part of tax collectors - that were more likely to be recorded, than what went according to the original intention.

The practical techniques employed in the management of mobilization, by governments willing to be pragmatic in their acceptance of the necessity to devolve some responsibility to competent subjects, did produce armies, their supplies, and fleets, very broadly when and, mostly, on the scale envisaged. It is evidence of competence in the exercise of active management in Edwardian administration. That evidence of competence argues for a modification of views that belittle successive governments’ degree of control of the fourteenth-century realm.
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