CONSERVATION OF CULTURAL HERITAGE IN THE ‘WESTBANK’;
UNDER OCCUPATION
The Case of the Old Town of Nablus

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To Hana, Ata and Ameed
CONSERVATION OF CULTURAL HERITAGE IN THE 'WESTBANK'; UNDER OCCUPATION.
The Case of the Old city of Nablus.

ABSTRACT

In the 'Westbank' (Palestine), political, social, economic and financial constraints, as well as the lack of any legislative powers have caused a crisis in the conservation of our cultural heritage.

It is therefore essential that an alternative, if necessary informal, framework of measures is urgently devised to protect our remaining monuments and settlements. Without the possibility of direct control over our affairs, and in order to carry this out, we must use the resources, such as they are, that we have at our disposal. These resources can be drawn out from the experience we have gained during the four or five decades of surviving the cultural genocide and physical occupation of Israel.

Since December 1987, the ongoing revolution of sticks and stones; the Intifada, has shown the world the reality of the brutal Israeli occupation. On the other hand, it has also helped to increase the Palestinian awareness of the great value of their cultural heritage. So, as with the case of the Intifada, we believe that the 'Westbank' today should develop its own conservation policies, and forms of organisation and management. We have the overwhelming motivation to try to defend our culture as well as our homes. Both are the visible and tangible evidence of our presence and our future; if we lose them, we lose our case.

This research will therefore examine, why and how we are being hindered from carrying out conservation and what practical and self help measures we have to take to protect, repair and conserve our cultural property, even under the constraints of occupation. We must be determined in our search for a way to counter the present neglect and deterioration of the many historic Palestinian settlements taking place today.
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<th>Full Form</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ALS:</td>
<td>Academic Link Scheme</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CBO:</td>
<td>Community Based Organisation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CDC:</td>
<td>Centre for Development Consultancy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CPD:</td>
<td>Central Planning Department</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ICA:</td>
<td>Israeli Civil Administration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IDF:</td>
<td>Israeli Defence Force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IEC:</td>
<td>Israeli Electric Company</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IMG:</td>
<td>Israeli Military Government</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JCO:</td>
<td>Jordan Cooperation Organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JD:</td>
<td>Jordanian Dinar</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NCC:</td>
<td>Nablus Conservation Commission</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NCCD:</td>
<td>Nablus Corporation for Conservation and Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SCCR:</td>
<td>Study Centre for Conservation and Reconstruction</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NCCT:</td>
<td>Nablus Centre for Conservation Training</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NGO:</td>
<td>None Governmental Organisation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NM:</td>
<td>Nablus Municipality</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OT:</td>
<td>Occupied Territories</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PECDAR:</td>
<td>Palestine Economic Council for Development and Reconstruction</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PHC:</td>
<td>Palestinian Housing Council</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PLO:</td>
<td>Palestine Liberation Organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PNA:</td>
<td>Palestinian National Authority</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PNC:</td>
<td>Palestine National Council</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PNM:</td>
<td>Palestine National Movement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PRDU:</td>
<td>Postwar Reconstruction and Development Unit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RIWAQ:</td>
<td>Centre for Architectural Conservation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UN:</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNDP:</td>
<td>United Nations Development Programme</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNL:</td>
<td>United National Leadership</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WZO:</td>
<td>World Zionist Organization</td>
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ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

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THE PREAMBLE

CONSERVATION OF CULTURAL HERITAGE IN THE ‘WESTBANK’; UNDER OCCUPATION
The Case of the Old Town of Nablus

DEFINING THE PROBLEM
This study is concerned with the issue of urban conservation in the ‘Westbank’ while being under Israeli military government (IMG) occupation for the last 27 years. The particular focus is on the formulation of urgent practical means that promote self-help measures to repair, protect and conserve our built heritage, that we have failed to organise partly because of the constraints of the occupation and our attempts to win political freedom. Now that the latter has begun to take shape it is time to give the conservation of our national cultural heritage top priority. We should not wait around any longer for the Palestinian State to be born to carry out the conservation task, but rather take up this challenge ourselves using our own resources. It can be an informal framework of measures to protect our remaining monuments and settlements. The first proposition can be summarised as:

Where the national demand is high and urgency is acute, we have to face realistically and practically the conservation task through the resources most readily available; the thousands of hands and the small financial resources of the residents themselves.

The second proposition can be summarised as:

How is it possible to develop a new and more appropriate approach to the challenge of conservation and rehabilitation of the historic housing stock, where the emphasis is based on the people and their immediate needs and resources, within the concepts of community development, self-help and an organisational framework of participation?

For almost thirty years, Israel has employed our environment as an effective medium

1 The State of Palestine would comprise the inland region known as the ‘West Bank’, the coastal region known as ‘Gaza Strip’ and the ‘corridor’ connecting the inland and coastal regions through Idna and Beit Hanon (Habitat, 1992). However, throughout this dissertation the author will write ‘Westbank’ like this meaning the inland region of Palestine.
for attacking our culture by creating their own exclusive new enclaves in the 'Westbank'. Not only has the conservation of historic buildings and areas been completely neglected under the Military Occupation, but worse Israel has, and continues to, deliberately destroy our Palestinian cultural heritage. At the same time, the Palestinians have been denied the opportunity to develop any form of conservation legislation or even to carry out conservation on a voluntary basis, as this has been considered as an action threatening 'security'. This mind-set of inactivity is what the Israelis have wanted us to adopt; we now have to fight it as we have fought for our liberation through the means of the Intifada. If we do not act now there is a real danger that more of the heritage of the Palestinian nation, will be lost for ever. And when we achieve our eventual liberation and Independence we will look around and wonder what we have left of our heritage that makes us Palestinians. We cannot let this happen, especially in these days, when we are trying to regain our place at the table of nations.

Partly due to the severe economic constraints suffered by our people during the long period of occupation, and partly due to our own negative attitude towards our heritage, we have neglected even the minimum of conservation work. This attitude must change. We have to start with an accepted minimum commitment, which every nation must make to its heritage if it wishes to survive into the future. Future generations who will see these last 30 years differently, will not forgive the loss of our heritage, as the result of short term economic thinking and wilful neglect. The history of conservation movements in other parts of the world shows that all decisions to conserve are in someway political decisions and not only economic ones. What counts, this study tries to realise, is the latent strength of social and cultural motivation for the conservation and reuse of cultural heritage as manifest in the built environment. Palestine is the one country, mid way between the West and the East that has been the cradle in which many cultures have been interwoven. Unlikely though it may sound today, this author can imagine that the Palestinian State could play a world role, in the future, as a place where conflicting ethnic groups, from around the world, can come and learn to live together; reconcile their differences and rebuild their societies destroyed in bloody and destructive wars.

While Israeli activity aimed at destroying our heritage, the mass of the Palestinian
people are not aware of the fact, that it is through their cultural and physical heritage that they can identify themselves; that architecture is the massive and tangible link between man, his land and his national subsistence.

It might be argued, however, that the conservation of our cultural heritage is the responsibility of the new Palestinian National Authority (PNA) and the Local Municipalities. But, the PNA still lives on external donations and the work of our struggling municipal governments, always limited in funds and competent personnel, are unable to cope with a fraction of the appalling problems that face them. This study deplores the authorities’ decision, that little can be done to upgrade and preserve our built heritage until the total economy grows substantially. The continuation of this attitude would in effect, destroy thousands of traditional historic buildings if not entire historic areas. This will not only affect the people who live there now, but subsequent generations and might even delay the entire development programme in the ‘Westbank’.

This study realises that the need to preserve our heritage must be recognised by the nation as a whole. But this must be combined with the remaking of the old central town areas by bringing new life and use to them. It is only when there is genuine and popular appreciation of our heritage and the values thus represented by historic settlements, that there is likely to be support and acceptance for their protection. We shall attempt to address how this may be achieved.

The third proposition can be summarised as:

\textit{The approach has to be ‘bottom-up’ rather than ‘top-down.’ It has to be based upon articulating the needs, aspirations and organising the resources of the people, upon working with community enterprises and development institutions in places and upon stimulating ‘self-help’ attitudes and voluntary work and funds.}

There is then an urgent need for ‘partnerships’ between the various ‘actors’ in the conservation and development process (the staff and politicians of local municipalities, local associations and professional practices, the educational institutions and citizen groups) on policies and programme formulations, not only at the planning stage but also
at later stages of implementation and maintenance. A campaign for local action by communication and participation within local communities should be initiated.

With the current peace process in train and with the prospect in the near future that we will see the rebirth of the Palestinian State this campaign for conservation and development takes on an added urgency. It is now that the people can exercise their rights to preserve their cultural heritage, which has been endangered and in need of practical and self-help conservation measures, backed up by the financial means to implement protection, conservation and development. We, the people, should not wait in the shadows any longer doing nothing but waiting for 'outsiders' to hold our hands and to suggest ready solutions or for a Palestinian State to be born and a national government to serve us and to solve all our urgent problems. Therefore, this study tries to realise that, we in the 'Westbank' today, should develop our own conservation movement and policies, and forms of organisation and management. We have the overwhelming motivation to try to defend our cultural heritage, that is the visible and tangible evidence of our presence and our future; if we lose this opportunity, we will lose our case for Independence in the eyes of the world.

FORMULATION OF THE STUDY

The origins of this research go back to 1989, when the author completed his Masters Degree and returned to the 'Westbank'. He was full of encouragement and enthusiasm to go back to his home town, Nablus, and get involved in the restoration of its Old Town, especially when he learnt that a Conservation Commission had been established to protect its architectural heritage but the Commission had been banned by the IMG. Something had to be done to protect the Old Town. Somehow he thought that large sums of money and a legislative and administrative framework would be the magic solution to the problem. Therefore, on his arrival at the Institute of Advanced Architectural Studies (IoAAS), at the University of York, in October 1992, his initial proposal was to develop a legislative and administrative framework for conservation in the ‘Westbank’. However, later, after reading and discussing his work he realised that more legislation was not necessarily the most effective solution to the problem. There
was not a legal system, or even a national government necessary for its implementation and enforcement.

This was the turning point in the way he approached his research. The problem had to be looked at from a more realistic and practical point of view if it was to have any impact. It had to take into account the IMG occupation and the constraints that created for all the residents and their activities. What were the alternatives? The question became, *How is it possible to protect, repair and conserve our built heritage, even under the constraints of the IMG occupation?* It was realised that, as with the case of our Intifada, our people had learnt how to stand and fight for our political rights and freedom, perhaps we had also to learn how to stand, work and fight for our cultural heritage. A kind of cultural *Intifada*.

**AIM AND OBJECTIVES**

Firstly, this study will attempt to provide the historical background to the development of Palestinian cultural heritage, focusing on its most prominent features, and the various political regimes which have ruled over us, each with its own policies and goals affecting our architectural heritage.

Secondly, it is the purpose of this study to investigate how Israeli colonial policies have been applied in our occupied areas. The investigation will show the Zionist framework of these policies, and finally we will discuss the way in which they have affected our built environment.

This study will also examine, the 'why' and 'how' we are being hindered from carrying out conservation, what damage is this causing and what self help measures we have to take, to protect, repair and conserve our cultural property, even under the constraints of IMG occupation. We must be determined in our search for a way to counter the present neglect and deterioration of the many historic Palestinian settlements taking place today.

In essence, this study will attempt to examine the following areas:
1. The philosophical and historical basis of conservation, in the context of the cultural heritage of the ‘Westbank’,

2. the impact of the Israeli military government (IMG) policy on the Palestinian built environment and cultural heritage,

3. practical self-help measures for protecting the existing stock of culturally significant buildings and areas,

4. a workable conservation framework that will establish a conservation service through out the country; under occupation, and

5. methods for improving the capability of the public sector in planning development and managing conservation and urban services.

However in examining the above areas the author will try to answer the question:

How is it possible to provide a workable emergency conservation framework, that will meet our immediate needs and that at the same time contributes and supports longer-term conservation policies?

This sort of question, of matching very short and longer term needs, is the crux of serious economic and social development work, and has been addressed in a number of conservation studies all over the world. The author is the first to acknowledge this will not be easy under the unique circumstances of the ‘Westbank’ Palestinians, still effectively under occupation, and in the absence of an effective national government, as well as the continuing Israeli policy that aims at destroying our cultural heritage. There is a need for the author to attempt to formulate his own answer to this question based on his own experience in the ‘Westbank’ and Nablus.

1 - Emergency Conservation Plan:

The factors responsible for the deterioration of the historic quarters will be classified. This classification will give an assessment of practical conservation measures necessary and the process for achieving them. Once this evaluation is produced for the Old Town of Nablus, as a model, a similar process and methodology could be generalized on a larger scale.

For the proper implementation of conservation the following points may be useful.
The Preamble

i) Establish central and local conservation cooperatives, that can
ii) empower small local public sector/private partnerships, to draw up and
manage their own programmes of conservation activities, using
iii) all types of local resources, to
iv) set and achieve agreed targets within an overall programme.

2 - Longer term Conservation Policies:
In order to establish an effective conservation framework that will ensure that there are
clear directions on repairs and restoration of our historic quarters, a series of guidelines
for regeneration will be examined. Such guidelines should be flexible to encourage
participation by as many actors as possible to share responsibility in conservation
programmes, so as to enable the role of partnerships involved to be decentralized,
thereby initiating a new working strategy in solving conservation problems. For such
strategy to be effective the following points may be useful:
   i) Formulate an effective conservation framework that will establish a
      conservation service throughout the country;
   ii) ensure that conservation policies are reflecting realistically the socio-
       economic, cultural, actual needs, resources and demographic conditions of
       the country;
   iii) aim at a sustainable process by slowly reducing the need for outside help
       and making the process as self-sufficient as possible;
   iv) ensure that the public are involved at all levels of the conservation process;
   v) take necessary steps to include conservation measures in the general
      education programmes at all levels.

THE SCOPE OF THE STUDY AND HYPOTHESES.
This dissertation sets out to catalogue and discuss the different constraints facing the
conservation movement in the ‘Westbank’ by examining the impact of both external and
internal forces, which have contributed to the deteriorating historic areas and buildings.
While the internal forces of the community have had their negative affect on the built
environment, the external force is the IMG occupation and mostly beyond the control
of the people. We will study in detail the case study of the Old Town of Nablus to see
how to correct and overcome these two major factors. We will conclude by drawing up a set of practical and hopefully effective conclusions and recommendations for a conservation and development programme in the 'Westbank' in general and the old centre of Nablus in particular. The field investigations and literature studies are at the hub of this study and are presented in support of the following hypotheses:

I. The 'external control' of all aspects of life, including the politics, development, economy, planning, land rights and land use, administration and legislation, and consequently conservation in the 'Westbank' has prolonged the deterioration of our Palestinian cultural heritage;

II. By 'empowering' the people and strengthening and organising community action, a conservation programme can be implemented which will arrest and reverse the decline of our cultural heritage.

There are many examples, throughout the world, of the failure of top down programmes imposed on a community that are neither involved in the process nor informed about the future of its environment and neighbourhood. It is our belief that the ideal approach is that which recognises the importance of the community and encourages it to have an active role in the decision-making and the implementation process. By this means it is intended that the residents will become more aware of and involved with their problems and their community's needs and priorities. These residents and group representatives can produce some genuine proposals and resources that could be justified and adapted to meet their specific situations.

In order to foster its acceptance and encourage participation and commitment by the community over a long period of time, it is imperative that the conservation programme be reflective of the needs and means of the community at which it is targeted. The assessment of the these needs and priorities is thus an important element for the successful establishment and implementation of a conservation programme. We realise that 'community development,' people involvement and 'self-help' are practical and realistic approaches that can animate a further great autonomy and control by the inhabitants over all matters affecting their lives. Our political leaders must not fear this, rather they must embrace it; using conservation as a vehicle to give new heart to a people depressed by years of occupation. And unless the local community is involved
in this process the results of our hard won political and economic freedom are likely, as with conservation, to be cosmetic and, therefore, short lived. We have fought and won the war now we must fight again for the peace. We can begin by rebuilding of cities while at the same time rebuilding our lives.

**STRUCTURE OF THE STUDY.**

In order to support the above mentioned hypotheses **Chapter One** introduces the 'Westbank' as the context within which this investigation was carried out. It gives an overview of the factors affecting the development of its built environment; the historical and political changes that have taken place since the beginning of the twentieth century and the social and cultural characteristics of Palestinian society.

**Chapter Two** discusses the theoretical perspectives on community participation and action, including its many interpretations, benefits, effectiveness, levels and constraints. It also reviews the theoretical basis of self-help, its definitions, types and forms. In addition it looks at the way self-help mobilises community resources and how to maintain these activities.

A description of the research methods adopted by the author follows in **Chapter Three**. It reviews the research methods used during the fieldwork. It explains the approach to the study, the strategy for investigation, the techniques adopted for collecting information and analysis. Moreover, it discusses the presentation of the analyzed data and concludes by pointing out the difficulties that faced the author in carrying out the fieldwork.

**Chapter Four** investigates the impact of the IMG occupation on the built environment in general and on our built heritage in particular. It examines the objectives, ideologies and strategies of the Israeli Authorities with respect to the 'Westbank'. It also explains the two approaches which the IMG have adopted to colonise the region: i) the control of development through administrative systems, planning policies and land expropriation and, ii) the transformation of the features of the built environment through Jewish settlements, new infrastructure, building demolition and military installations. And
finally it investigates the impact of these two approaches on our social and physical environments.

Transforming Palestinian society and politics follows in Chapter Five. It examines the impact of the occupation and the Intifada on transforming Palestinian society and politics. It starts by discussing the development of the Palestinian consciousness from the British Mandate to the present time. Then it examines how the Palestinians were mobilised under military occupation. It also analyses the Intifada and how it restructured the Palestinian society in the Occupied Territories. Finally, the Chapter examines the impact of this transformation on conservation.

Chapter Six provides a brief history of the conservation movement up to today. In addition it examines the challenges to, and why we should take care of our cultural heritage?

Chapter Seven will present the field work carried out in the Old Town of Nablus which, with its own objectives, supports the second hypothesis of this dissertation.

Chapter Eight introduces a set of recommendations for conservation in the ‘Westbank’ along with suggestions for empowering the local community to carry the conservation tasks in its own hands. Finally it introduces a set of practical recommendations for conserving the Old Town of Nablus.
CHAPTER ONE

Palestine; Continuity and Change from 1860s-1990s.
"The magic of this ancient land and its location at the crossroad of powers and civilization aroused ambitions and cravings, inviting invasions that led to the denial of political independence to its people. But the people’s perpetual adherence to the land gave the land its identity and breathed the spirit of the homeland into the people".  


1.0 INTRODUCTION

A look at the map of the Middle East shows that Palestine indeed has for thousands of years, had a strategic position in the world, from the religious traditional culture and economic point of view. The magic of this ancient land and its location at the crossroads of power and civilizations has meant that it has for long been the target of invaders and waves of immigrants, but our people have never ceased to defend her, seeking stability and security for their homeland. We discuss the geo political setting of Palestine and the development of its modern history under the four different regimes that have governed it since the middle of the nineteenth century.

This chapter goes on to explore the limited economic development choices, the current status under Israeli occupation and its evolution under the different regimes that have led up to the present situation.

We will review the infrastructure such as, power, water supply and sanitation, transport and housing, identify the issues and Israeli Military Government (IMG) policies. As local authorities are major institutions in the delivery of public services a review of their current situation and the constraints they encounter under IMG occupation will be examined.

We start by examining the physical, historical, political and development changes that have taken place under the four regimes that have governed Palestine. The next section looks at the cultural and demographic characteristics of the Palestinian people. The Palestinian development is examined in the next section. The recent history of the economic situation from the Ottoman period to the Israeli occupation is examined next.
Finally we look at the current country’s infrastructure, housing and land market, the role of local governments, and the social services.

Till now all efforts to correct the situation and to start the reconstruction and conservation process have been thwarted by the occupation. With the current Peace Process in train, there is an urgent need to address issues related to our historic settlements and put forward an environmental agenda and a conservation programme as part of the overall development plans for our towns.

Though most of these problems, that these sectors face, have been directly or indirectly caused by the occupation, they are expected to continue to hinder development and conservation in the post-occupation era, particularly in the first decade of the new Palestinian National Authority (PNA). Accordingly, it become imperative to work out solutions that would facilitate development and conservation under occupation and under the PNA.

There are still some opportunities that we should not miss. The Deceleration of Principles, which was signed in Washington between Israel and the PLO in September 93, will result in a phased withdrawal of the IMG and a gradual transfer of ‘limited’ power and authority to an elected Palestinian Council. This will offer us a unique opportunity to try to correct the current situation that our historic settlements are facing, even before a central government is in place. We must try to build on this unfortunate situation and treat the negative with care and sensitivity and not just as a mere technical exercise or another business venture. We have missed many opportunities in the past. We should work hard to ensure that this is not another one.

Prior to 1948, the so called ‘Westbank’ had not been constituted a separate geographical unit and the term ‘Westbank’ was not used; the area was the eastern portion of Palestine, under the British Mandate, and was undifferentiated from the rest of the country. Its distinctness developed following the 1948 Arab-Israeli war and Armistice Agreement between Israel and Jordan (NEWMAN, 1982) (Fig. 1.1). Even when the area was incorporated into the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, the term was used
informally since the ‘Westbank’ was the western portion of the Kingdom but had no separate identity officially. However, the name has remained in common use and reflects not only its geo-political distinction between the regions lying east and west of the Jordan River but also the perceived differences between the peoples and histories of the two banks. In this dissertation this author intended to use the proper name of our country: Palestine and only to use the ‘Westbank’ to assist the reader.

Since the 1967 war and the Israeli occupation of the ‘Westbank’ (as well as the Gaza Strip, Sinai Peninsula, and Golan Heights) the region has become better known because of its centrality to the Middle East peace process (Fig. 1.2). The Palestinian population, on the other hand, remains closely identified with the other Palestinians whether in Israel, Jordan, or scattered farther afield (HOFMAN and BEIT-HALLAHMI, 1979).

Since 1948, however, political affairs of the ‘Westbank’ have been directed by two non-Palestine regimes: the Hashemites in Jordan and currently the government of Israel
through military occupation (IMG). These experiences have generated many changes within our society. However, for the last millennium and a half the dominant influences have been Arabic in language and culture and Islamic in religion.

The term 'Judea and Samaria' have taken on political overtones as a result of their application to the southern and northern section of the 'Westbank', particularly, by Gush Emunim and other settlement activists, who lay claim to the whole of the historic 'Land of Israel'. Following the elections of the Likud government in 1977, the 'Westbank' has been known only as 'Judea and Samaria' in government statements, reports, and official papers. By general agreement 'Samaria' means the portion of the 'Westbank' north of a line above the city of Jerusalem; the area south of that line is considered 'Judea'.

The central highlands of formal Palestine are a small area of 2,200 square miles (over 5,575 square km), lying inland from the Mediterranean shore. They form a continuous
mountain range of 80 miles (130 km) running from north to south, with an average width of 34 miles (50 km), although they are sharply indented in the vicinity of Jerusalem (Fig. 1.3). To the east of these highlands is the Syrian-African Rift, that is the Jordan River; and to the southeast, the Judean Desert and Dead Sea. To the west is the coastal plain, containing the towns of Tulkarm and Qalqelia. The major population centres: Jenin, Nablus, Bethlehem, Jerusalem and Hebron- are located along the longitudinal axis of the mountain chain. Mt. *Ebal*, overlooking the city of Nablus, is over 3,000 feet (900m) high. South of Jerusalem the elevation of the Palestine increases gradually; Jerusalem at over 2,500 feet (750m), with the highest point just north of Hebron at 3,300 feet (990m) (NEWMAN, 1982) (Fig. 1.4). The southern region of the so called ‘Westbank’ is characterized by more rounded hills than the Nablus area, and the landscape is more bleak and rugged due to the lack of moisture and vegetation (KARMON, 1971; RICHARDSON, 1984).

Fig. 1.3: Block Diagram Across Central Palestine Shows the Topography of Land

The Jordan Valley is one of the world’s most dramatic features. It is the northern extension of the Great Rift Valley of Africa and is divided by the Jordan River, which has a total length of only 40 miles (64km) in the ‘Westbank’ as the crow flies but which twists and turns over a much greater distance before emptying into the Dead Sea. The valley reaches its lowest point in the Dead Sea Depression 1,300 feet (395m) below sea level.

Situated between 29°N and 33°N latitude, Palestine is part of a subtropical zone which
knows only two climatic seasons with a short periods of transition. BEAUMONT et al, (1976: 7), described the 'Westbank' as consisting of "extremely arid summers and a winter". The summer is a warm and dry season and winter is cool and wet. The latter lasts from mid October to the beginning of May, but 70 per cent of the rain falls between December and February (KARMON, 1971). Rainfall averages about 70 cm per year, with the highest proportion falling in the West (about 80 cm) per year, and the lowest in the Jordan valley and in the 'Judean' desert, west of the Dead Sea (about 20 cm) per year; snow is not uncommon. The average daily maximum temperature for June-October is 26°-29°C. The hottest period is made tolerable by a high diurnal range.

![Map of Palestine](image)

Fig. 1.4: The Mountainous Chain of Palestine.

Sometimes these days it is difficult to remember that the Ottoman Empire lasted 400 years and brought many changes to the area. The first years of Turkish rule brought new prosperity to the country, their military administration ensured security from bedouin raids, roads and khans were built and maintained, markets developed and repaired. Selim’s son Suliman the Magnificent (1520-66) reconstructed the walls of Jerusalem and reduced taxes on peasants to encourage agriculture. A number of censuses 1525 and 1573 showed a steady increase in the number of villages (over 1000) and their
population (KARMON, 1971). Many of our today’s towns and villages owe their existence to those times some 300 years ago.

However, in the second half of the nineteenth century today’s settlements pattern began to emerge as a result of changes in land registration and taxation, all land holdings had to be officially registered and taxes raised on them. To assist this process the countryside was divided into a number of districts and areas, many of which were under the control of local sheikhs and amirs (SMITH; 1984). Many peasants sold their lands to avoid paying heavy taxes. This naturally had a big influence on shaping the built environment and thus Palestinian society. Large tracts of unused land in western Palestine stimulated the extension of peasant settlements from the better-protected hill villages and towns. The standard practice was to erect temporary settlements in the plains called 'khirab' (sing., khirba), which were extensions of ‘parent villages’ higher up and were often inhabited on a seasonal basis as security permitted. The lack of adequate roads from the ‘Westbank’ to the coast, during this period, was a problem that affected development, since the Turks put few resources into building or maintaining roads, preferring railways which were useful for moving large numbers of troops and supplies to the more distant part of their empire. Proper roads were not built from Jerusalem to Jaffa and from Nablus to Jaffa until the early 20th century, although the Jaffa Jerusalem railway was completed in 1892 (GRAHAM-BROWN, 1982).

Unlike the coastal settlements, ‘Westbank’ villages tended to keep away from the main road. This may be explained by the villages being more or less self-sufficient in their agricultural needs, hence enjoying substantial autonomy. This isolation helped to protect them from external threats and later on from the caprices of the Ottoman rulers, who imposed agricultural taxation of ten per cent each year, which undoubtedly had a negative impact on the cultivation of the land. "Only where the inhabitants find that the labour of their hands is moderately safe from the grasp of the tax-gatherer do they cheerfully till the soil (LEES, 1905: 26).

As a result of World War I, Palestine was placed under the British Mandate. A great threat in this period of time, was the Balfour Declaration, a British statement in support
of the creation of a Jewish ‘national home’ in Palestine. Under the terms of the mandate, however, the British drew boundaries for Palestine for the first time. The initial boundary was drawn to include Transjordan, the region to the East of the Jordan River, but in 1922 the British authorities divided the mandated area at the river in order to create the Emirate of Transjordan for Emir Abdullah, a son of Sherif Hussein of Mecca (RICHARDSON, 1984).

The pressure on ‘Westbank’ Palestinian society as a result of the British mandate and implementation of the Balfour Declaration proved to be more than it could stand. The Westbankers and the rest of the Palestinian people became locked in to a struggle with the Zionist movement, which had many advantages over its Palestinian counterpart. The outcome of this struggle, however, was the dispersion of most of the Palestinian population and physical control by the Zionists over most of Palestine after the 1948 war.

The British Mandate, however, was the first direct contact with the West, and a new basis for institution building. The British fiscal system was in contrast to the previous Ottoman one, as it used the tax revenue for the development of the country (BIGER, 1992). The new British rulers came with military and civilian institutions much more capable and efficient than those of the Ottomans. Moreover, British investment policies, which concentrated on the plains, from the beginning had a very direct impact on daily life which resulted in the growing movement of villagers from the highlands to the coastal plains.

The British Mandate brought about a change in the cities, security improved rapidly, and along with other considerations, helped the expansion beyond the old town centres. Modernization brought municipal rule and urban planning, improved communications including roads, railways, ports and telegraphic services (Fig. 1.5 and 1.6). However, significant geographical outcome of the British differential treatment of Palestine, was the mass immigration of Jews into the area. The immigration was initially carried out with the help of the British administration and was a major factor in the changing landscape (BIGER, 1992). The result of the 1948 Arab-Israeli War was so destructive
for the Palestinian Arabs, as to make the despised British mandate seem almost attractive. On 15 May 1948, the mandate over Palestine officially came to an end, and the British High Commissioner and Administration withdrew from the country. The United Nations took no measures to ensure law and order pending a final decision on "the future government of Palestine."¹

The British decision to give up the mandatory responsibilities resulted in the creation of the State of Israel in an area about 8,000 square miles, or 77.40% out of 10,435 square miles instead of 56.47% allotted to the "Jewish State" under the Portion Plan (HADAWI, 1968) (Fig. 1.7). So with the exception of a tiny enclave around Gaza in

¹On April 1948, the Security Council, in Resolution No. 44, requested the Secretary-General, in accordance with article 20 of the U.N. charter "to convoked a special session of the General assembly to consider further the question of the future government of Palestine" U.N. Document S/714,II. The special session was never convoked.
the southwest, the only portion of mandate Palestine to remain under Arab sovereignty at the end of hostilities was what is now the 'Westbank'. King Abdullah, of Transjordan, moved swiftly to consolidate control of the 'Westbank'. During late 1948 and 1949, however, he took a number of steps to institutionalize this control and in April 1950 he officially declared the annexation of it to Jordan.

A significant development in the Palestinian arena, during this period, was the creation of the Palestine National Movement in December 1964.

During the Jordanian rule, however, the 'Westbank', for the first time, was severed from the plains and coastal areas by a cease-fire line. One description of the new situation portrayed the 'Westbank' as "an island isolated between Israel and the East Bank" (Quoted in RICHARDSON, 1984: 44)(Fig. 1.8).
Fig. 1.7: a. The United Nations Partition Plan, 1947.
b. Israel Expansion up to 1967.

Fig. 1.8: Frontier Village, Beit Safafa; Demarcation Line Cut the village Street in Two -Israel Left, Jordan Right.
Source: Mannin, (1965)
The 1948 war caused an overnight flood of refugees from west Palestine. The UNRWA set up 20 camps, equipped with educational and health facilities. The refugees did not become integrated into the social and economic framework of their surroundings and formed distinct settlement features in the physical and economic landscape of their respective areas (Fig. 1.9). Gradually, however, about half of them were able to settle in villages - although without land - or in towns, and found employment.

These camps were built outside the towns, with no related planning patterns and in different building materials. Accordingly, they negatively altered the traditional landscape of the 'Westbank'. On the other hand a small number of refugees were able to rent some abandoned houses in historic urban areas of the 'Westbank', this, to some extent, helped to maintain these buildings, as the new tenants repaired parts of them.

The Jordan Government concentrated on the development of the East Bank, more than the 'Westbank', which led to high emigration from the 'Westbank' to the East Bank. Town development in the Jordanian period was uneven and largely unplanned with an inadequate industrial base and public institutions. Contrary to the usual trend, the
highest population growth in the 'Westbank' during the Jordan period was in rural rather than urban areas.

In the final analysis, Jordan's efforts to integrate the 'Westbank' into the Jordanian system were only partially successful because of the distinctive Palestinian identity, pressures in the East Bank to keep the 'Westbank' at arm's length, and continuing influence of wider Arab politics (MISHAL, 1978). An additional physical dispersion of the Palestinians was the result of the 1967 Israeli Military Occupation of the 'Westbank'. Further refugee problems arose, during and after the 1967 fighting, however, almost 300,000 'Westbank' residents fled or were driven from their homes and sought safety in the East Bank. This had resulted in many historic properties being abandoned and allowed to deteriorate.

Unlike in 1948, however, two thirds of the 'Westbank' population stayed, electing to take their chances under the new and difficult circumstances, rather than to trade uncertainty on their own land for a different kind of uncertainty elsewhere. They understood that the only hope of maintaining Arab Palestine was to stay on the land; departures in 1948 had brought alienation from the land and subsequently a denial of return.

Nevertheless, the military occupation has permeated all segments of daily life. And while it is obtrusive in the political sector, it is much more insidious in economic life. The numerous examples cited by Palestinian farmers, citrus growers, labourers, merchants, and businessmen depict an economic colonialism governed by a concerted Israeli policy designed to benefit the economy of the occupier to the detriment of the occupied.

Since June 1967 when the 'Westbank' lost its contact with the East, the multiple pressures of military occupation, the people have worked hard to maintain their society and to live as normally as circumstances permit, as will be discussed in Chapter Five.
Palestine; Continuity and Change From 1860s-1990s

The Palestinian uprising (Intifada) in the ‘Westbank’ and Gaza is said to have begun on December 9, 1987. Intifada is the only Arabic word to enter twentieth century vocabulary of world politics. The time had come to start changing realities from the bottom up (SAID, 1989). As a result of the Intifada’s momentum and its success in creating a clear civil alternative to the Israeli occupation regime, King Hussein of Jordan had to withdraw his faltering and unpopular claims to the ‘Westbank’ in late July 1988.

On 15 November 1988, at the 19th session (extraordinary) of the Palestinian National Council (PNC), the State of Palestine was declared, with Jerusalem its capital. The Declaration of Independence was made "By the authority of international legitimacy as embodied in the resolutions of the United Nations Organisations since 1947" (quoted in DAVIS, 1991: 14). The Palestinian State has been recognized by over 100 members of the United Nations and granted varying levels of status and representations in various international organizations and agencies. Under the terms of the declaration of independence and the political statement of the 19th Session of the (PNC), the PLO recognizes Israel as a state in the region and its right to exist in peace and security under the UN Charter and all UN resolutions. But the PLO does not recognize Israel as a Zionist state in the region (DAVIS, 1991). As a result of the peace process in the Middle East, the PLO and Israel signed the Statement of Principles on the 13 of September 1993. Later, as a result of the Cairo Agreement, the Palestinians were given limited self-rule in Gaza and Jericho. In summary, it can be concluded that the ‘Westbank’ has been shaped and changed by its external rulers to their aims. They left their imprints on the built environment of the country and their impact provides a starting point for examining the environmental factors which have shaped today’s landscape.

1.1 THE PALESTINIAN PEOPLE.

For the last thirty years or so, due to economic and political reasons, no or little intervention, neglect and lack of maintenance was the case of our historic urban areas. This ends with the exodus of the well off residents from these areas for newly built and more comfortable areas and resulting in worse conditions for the poor remaining
residents. Despite this, however, our people have envisaged means to survive and to protect their historic properties against the IMG aggression, destruction and violence. In the case of the Old Town of Nablus, for instance, the IMG was unable to implement plans to remove large parts of the historic centre, for security reasons, during the Intifada, as the residents successfully mounted an intensive Arab and international campaign to protect it. Further, in 1950s the residents faced the municipality bulldozers with their bodies, and stopped a comprehensive plan of street widening throughout the Old Town. Moreover, an extensive socio-economic and physical survey in the town, revealed that the community wants to keep the historic quarters and protect them from the influence of modern technology. They showed a great interest, and enthusiasm in participating in its upgrading and conservation on voluntary basis (see Chapter Seven).

The lesson to be learned here, is that our historic areas may be better without the interaction of planners and policy makers. We strongly believe that with minimal intervention, communities would be capable of protecting their own historic properties and areas and transforming the activities according to their needs and lifestyles. Community participation rather than being a privilege, planners and politicians can present as a gift to the community, should be looked at in completely the reverse way. We need the community to help us make the right decisions (see Chapter Two).

We should always remember that our historic settlements were built by their communities without the help of planners. Therefore, these settlements should be allowed to grow and prosper and to serve their communities. This dissertation recognises that the role of the community in understanding, deciding and participating in their historic areas’ future is vital for its protection and upgrading. With this understanding it becomes necessary to look at the social and demographic characteristics of the Palestinian people, as they are asset for any development and conservation programme in the historic quarters.

The term Palestinians today refers to the Arabs, both Christian and Muslim, who have lived in Palestine for centuries. They are not, as is popularly believed, exclusively the descendants of the Islamic desert conquerors of 1300 years ago; they are, "...in fact mainly the descendants of the previous native population- Philistines, Canaanites,
Hittites, Jebusites, etc". They were long established there when the early Hebrews invaded the land in about 1500 B.C. and not only did they survive the Israelite occupation, but they retained possession of large parts of the country throughout the Israelite period, remaining in the land after the Hebrew dispersion, to be intermingled first with the Arab conquerors in the 7th century, then with the Crusaders in the 11th century. "They continued their occupation of the land in their Arabist character until the Zionist invasion of 1948" (HADAWI, 1968: 15).

The mountains and hills of the 'Westbank' have always contained the majority of the Arab rural population. The availability of good defensive sites against the Bedouins and other attackers that offered more scope for village expansion, the ability to build cisterns for water storage to supplement springs and wells, and the generally more healthful climate in contrast to the coastal plain, contributed to the earlier and more consistent settlements than elsewhere in the region (CANA’AN, 1932; BEAUMONT et al, 1976). The name Palestine is derived from the Philistines, a seafaring people from Crete who settled in the southern coastal area near Gaza and Ashkelon in 1,200 B.C. The country experienced a series of foreign rulers, including Assyrians, Babylonians, Persians, Greeks, Romans, and Byzantine (eastern Romans) before the Arab conquest in the mid-7th century A.D. (RICHARDSON, 1984). The incoming Arabs brought with them new but readily assimilated variants both of language and religion, for the people who had been in Palestine for several millennia, absorbing repeated foreign invasions but never abandoning the land.

The Arab ruled from 638 A.D until the Turks were victorious in 1517, with a gap from 1099 until 1187 when the Crusaders dominated the country. At the break-up of the Ottoman Empire, after the First World War, over 90% of the population of Palestine was Arab; a small indigenous Jewish population had lived there for generations. A new politicized community linked to the Zionist movement had begun to immigrate in the 1880s (HAJJAR et al, 1989).

The population can only be estimated. Even these estimates of the current numbers are fraught with uncertainty and vary considerably, as no census has been taken in the area.
Palestine: Continuity and Change From 1860s-1990s

Since 1967. Differences of almost 200,000 mark the estimates of the different agencies, since they make different assumptions as to whether to include the temporarily absent population working abroad, estimated at 150,000 in 1984.

HAJJAR et al, (1989), pointed out that today there are over five million Palestinians worldwide. About 40 per cent of them - nearly 2.2 million - still live within historic Palestine, under Israeli control, of them 960,000 live in the ‘Westbank’, including 125,000 in East Jerusalem. The great majority of this population is to the west of the north south watershed -ie, within the area of the highest rainfall and therefore of great agricultural productivity.

The average annual population growth rate up to 1974 was 2.4 per cent, between 1975 and 1981 it dropped to 1.5 per cent and is now running at about 2.7 per cent (COON, 1992).

Forced and voluntary emigration has always been the factor most affecting population rise, in particular, there were two main periods of migration to and from the ‘Westbank’. The first wave was after the establishment of the new Israeli state in 1948, when over 90% of the Arab population was expelled from their homes, of which around 360,000 came to the ‘Westbank’ (Fig. 1.10). This increased the population by more than 50% in one year. At present, about 100,000 refugees still live in 20 refugee camps around the main cities. The refugee camps have become prominent features in the built environment of the territory and have indeed been preserved as a declaration of the permanence of the problem and as a symbol for the eventual return. The second forced emigration was the exodus of almost 250,000 people to Jordan during the war of 1967 (NEWMAN, 1982; RICHARDSON, 1984). As a result of this mass emigration, many

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2 Those Palestinians who are working abroad are mostly holders of the West Bank identity cards, these identity cards are deposited at the border stations, where the Palestinians can claim them back whenever they decide to return.

3 Today: Israel, the ‘Westbank’ and Gaza Strip.

4 Since September 1967, population tables of the ‘Westbank’ have excluded figures for the population of East Jerusalem. This deliberate omission makes a difference not only to the total population figures but also to estimates of the growth rate of the population, since East Jerusalem has a different growth rate from the rest of the ‘Westbank’ area.
buildings and lands were left empty.

In addition, slow but continuous emigration has left its mark on the built environment with many abandoned properties in historic town centres and sometimes whole villages. During Jordanian rule, it is estimated that almost 400,000 persons (most of them males of 24-40 years of age) left the ‘Westbank’ in response to the Jordanian Government’s policy to accelerate economic investment and development in the East Bank at the expense of the West (BENVENISTI et al, 1986).

Since the Israeli occupation in 1967, almost 140,000 persons have emigrated from the ‘Westbank’ as a result of the Israeli government’s tight and punitive policies against the people. The majority of those immigrants were young, educated and professional people (Cited in SENAN, 1993).
"The causes of emigration are classic socio-economic 'push and pull' factors. It is commonplace to attribute emigration to the 'repressive Israeli regime', but the reasons are more complex. The political pressure and the occupation do not directly affect emigration, but by means of economic policy and variables" (BENVENISTI et al, 1986: 52).

Moreover, BENVENISTI (1984), and BENVENISTI et al, (1986) reached the conclusion that the population has been totally at the mercy of outside forces that have affected its size; he concludes:

"An analysis of demographic trends reveals that the Palestinian population is almost totally dependent on outside forces, which determine its size and its age distribution by controlling factors affecting migration. Between 1848-1967 the Jordanians created and maintained incentives that led to continued emigration. After 1967, when Israel opened its economy to labourers from the territories, emigration came to a complete standstill. With the worsening economic situation in Israel (1974) and the outbreak of the Lebanese civil war, which had effect of creating rapid growth in Jordan, there was a surge in emigration. Then as the economic situation in the oil-producing countries began to get tighter, Jordan's own growth slowed, the entry of young people was restricted (1983), and emigration from the West Bank diminished considerably" (BENVENISTI et al, 1986: 53).

Therefore, the future population of the 'Westbank' of Palestine will depend on whether natural increase continues at its present high rate and on its political future of the 'Westbank'. COON (1992). A recent study by the Centre for Engineering and Planning in Ramallah- Palestine, argues that two alternative demographic scenarios were considered: no net migration, and the return of 1.2 million Palestinians. Under these circumstances the population might reach between 2 and 3.8 million by the year 2010.

1.2 THE PALESTINIAN ECONOMY

While Israeli economists consider the economic interaction of Israel and the 'Westbank' as a common market, Palestinian economists define the relationship as empirical-colonial interaction. However, "The economic data do not easily fit either definition. The patterns of economic growth seem to economists unusual or [indeosytratic]" (BENVENISTI, 1984: 8)\(^5\).

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\(^5\) Italics are added.
The major source of income and the most stable sector of the 'Westbank' economy, until 1982 was agriculture. Its share of the Palestinian Gross National Product has fluctuated between 22-34 percent since 1968 (BENVENISTI, 1984). Productivity has increased due to changes in the methods of cultivation. The increased use of capital-intensive methods, however, has led to a decrease in the work-force, resulting in larger daily labour movement to Israel. However, there have been no fundamental changes in the agricultural sector's resource base since 1967. This is characterized by the Israeli aim to develop Palestinian agriculture without introducing structural changes, such as investment in physical infrastructure, agrarian reform, or support systems like marketing and credit (BENVENISTI, 1984).

The Israeli development strategy was termed improvement as opposed to transformation. Their implicit aims were discussed by BENVENISTI (1984: 14). He argues:

"Implicit in the improvement strategy are a freeze on the agricultural resources available to the Arab population and complete Israeli control over growth potential. Arab agriculture was allowed to develop as long as its development would not interfere with Israeli interests or put a fiscal and economic burden on the Israeli system. The "appropriate market forces" were allowed to operate only when they were harnessed to the Israeli economy and were beneficial to it".

Therefore, 'Westbank' agriculture was forced into unequal competition with Israeli agriculture. It has been made to fit into the demands of the "common market" created after the occupation. Naturally, the stronger and more developed economy gained the advantage over the weak and undeveloped one. Though some 40 per cent of the land area is cultivated, only 2 per cent is irrigated. Cultivated acreage contracts from year to year, depending upon variations in rainfall.

As a result of the occupation, the Palestinians have lost the use of some wells. Other water sources, both wells and springs, have suffered sustained reduced flows, due, presumably, to Israeli drilling and pumping from the same aquifers. According to ROY (1986), four fifths of the under ground water extracted from the 'Westbank' are used by Jewish settlements or pumped to Israel. "New Arab wells have (with very few exceptions) not been allowed since the occupation, nor may rates of extraction be increased, and many Arab wells especially in the Jordan Valley have been confiscated" (COON; 1992: 33). They have to rely almost exclusively on rainfall, which puts them
at the mercy of climatic conditions. Another factor which affected our farmers is that land either cultivated or used for grazing has been taken for Israeli settlements and/or ‘security’ purposes. Therefore, agricultural changes under the occupation have been determined by Israeli needs rather than those of the ‘Westbank’ population; in the case of a potential conflict the needs of the occupier take precedence. Agriculture is now faced with a decline in labour, land and water, despite the increased yields which have resulted from the introduction of new techniques and equipment.

The industrial sector has always been weak. It has suffered from its "...failure to attract capital investment" (NEWMAN, 1982: 13), while its location, both physically and politically, has entailed high transport costs.

At the time of the British Mandate, most of the large-scale industrial development occurred in the coastal cities and was concentrated in Jewish lands (KARMON, 1971). The mandate years saw the development of an industrial sector, in the ‘Westbank’, albeit small in scale and lacking significant invested capital (RICHARDSON, 1984).

At the beginning of the Jordanian rule, the ‘Westbank’ was initially more advanced in agriculture and industry, providing almost 40 per cent of the nation’s gross national product in 1965 (RICHARDSON, 1984). However, it was the policy of the central government in Amman to concentrate industrial development on the East Bank and to assign to the ‘Westbank’ the role of the provision of agricultural produce; thus in many cases, "...applications for construction of industrial enterprises, even in processing agricultural products, were rejected by the government" (KARMON, 1971: 312).

Since 1967 industry has not grown, on the contrary compared to normal patterns of growth, industrial production has declined. The development of the Palestinian industrial sector, under Israeli military occupation was discussed by GUBSER (1979). He argues:

"Since the Israeli military occupation in June 1967, very little economic and social development has occurred in the Occupied Territories. With two exceptions, most development indicators have remained largely stagnant, and some have declined. And this is at a time when rapid development progress is being observed in neighbouring countries such as Jordan and Syria- and Israel itself" (GUBSER; 1979; Quoted in JOURNAL OF PALESTINE STUDIES; Vol IX, # 2; 1980: 177).
This evidence was supported by BENVENISTI (1984), when he pointed out that the industrial sector's contribution to GNP fell from 9.0 percent in 1968 to 8.2 percent in 1975 and 6.5 percent in 1980. He also argues that the 'Westbank' economy may be described as non industrialized.

In general, industry is unable to confront Israeli competition, which enjoys massive protection as well as government subsidies and credit. Moreover, in recent years, our industry has had to compete with enterprises in close proximity in the new settlements in the 'Westbank', who enjoy far-reaching benefits.

The treatment by the IMG to Palestinian industry has been discussed by BENVENISTI (1984: 14). He argues:

"The different treatment has become ethnically rather than geographically defined. Under such circumstances, Palestinian industrial growth is not likely to occur, since it is dependent on, and controlled by, two industrial sectors- Israel and Jordan- that are developing very fast. It is likely that even the meagre growth so far achieved will be wiped out."

The current policies towards the 'Westbank' Jewish industries, are to build only capital-intensive, sophisticated factories in order to achieve two main objectives; to minimize the need for settlers to commute to cities and to limit Arab employment. Plans for industrialization are designed to meet almost 20 percent of the total industrial needs of Israel. The plan recommends that the government continue with existing policies of no "participation, financing and investment" in the Arab sector. It also calls for "restricting industrial development in the urban centres of Nablus, Ramallah, Tulkarm, Jenin, Bethlehem, Jericho, Hebron [to] prevent the development of [Arab] industrial areas near the urban centres," and the growth of Arab cities (Quoted in BENVENISTI, 1984: 18). Arab incentives should be dispersed outside the urban centres, and the development of small-scale workshop areas in villages should be encouraged.

The IMG collected both direct and indirect taxes; Direct taxes, include: income tax, municipal property tax, business tax and rural property tax. These taxes are based on Jordanian legislation with some revisions in rates. "Prime importance is attached to income tax since these monies go directly to the military government, while property
tax goes, for the most part, to the municipalities" (BENVENISTI et al, 1986: 203). Priority given to income tax is also evident in the fact that all our officers are managed by Israelis.

The latter include: import duties, excises on local products, supplementary excises (VAT), levies on goods in inventory, fuel, and stamp taxes on documents and permits. With the exception of stamp tax, all the indirect taxes, are imposed and collected according to Israeli laws and regulations. The rates on local products, which are identical to Israeli purchase and value added taxes, vary by military orders simultaneously with changes of rate in Israel. The only exception is the stamp tax which is collected according to Jordanian practice (BENVENISTI et al, 1986). According to the same author total taxes and levies gathered in the 'Westbank' in 1986, came to $62.5 million ($58.3 million by the military government and the rest by local authorities). In the same year, however, Palestinians working in Israel paid income tax and national insurance accounting to $31.2 million, including employees' contributions. Add to this that 'Westbank' residents also paid import duties and taxes on goods brought into Israel. However, none of the Palestinian workers in Israel benefit from the national insurance contributions, which they pay.

This critical review of the current economical situation in the 'Westbank' has proved that the IMG is not interested in the development or conservation of our historic settlements. In fact their policies have been determined by the Jewish settlers needs (see Chapter Four).

Further, the economic constraints accompanied the occupation had their greatest effect on our historic urban areas to the extent that even the minimum conservation and maintenance work has been left undone. However, only limited resources are available to us and any major change in the current economic situation at the moment is unlikely to occur. This should have the main effect of increasing concern over the scarcity of economic resources and of the need to search for an alternative approach to conserve our built heritage. We believe that if more functional, practical and socially desirable policies and programmes are to be achieved, they should be carefully detailed and
designed to stimulate and support available resources in order to enable our people to make a continuous investment in their historical areas, perhaps on a participatory basis. As with the case of our political Intifada, we believe that much can be achieved by the encouragement and enhancement of realistic and practical approaches.

Although lack of finance does in its own way inhibit the conservation process in Palestine, it must be realised that our people have shown great enthusiasm and encouragement to upgrade, develop and conserve their historic areas on a voluntary basis (Chapter Seven). Therefore, conservation in Palestine should be viewed in a somewhat different light. It should involve the interaction of the residents, local experts, local authorities and the PNA as well as NGOs if the mistakes of the past are not to be repeated. It has to be based upon the needs, priorities, aspirations, lifestyles and resources of our people, upon working with communities and institutions in place and upon the stimulated self-help and voluntary work.

1.3 THE PALESTINIAN DEVELOPMENT
The overall supply of urban land is generally determined by zoning. In aggregate, municipal boundaries, with some exceptions, have not been expanded since the start of the occupation, though the population has almost doubled since 1967 (COON, 1992). Furthermore, there is more pressure on rural lands in villages, where a substantial part of the population lives, as land seizing by Israel became a well known phenomenon. In addition, the lack of fully documented titles and the absence of an efficient and complete land registration system have further reduced the quantity of buildable land. It is estimated that as much as 50 percent of the land within the municipal boundaries where housing can not be legally constructed has title and registration problems (COON, 1992; WORLD BANK, 1993). Even on land where it should be possible to obtain a permit, a very restrictive practice of tying building permit issuance to compliance with other regulations, such as the payment of taxes, permit from the Israeli Archaeological Department, has limited the supply of permits for building or changes in land use. It is also virtually impossible to build outside municipal boundaries, a practice that has increased the demand for urban land (as we will discuss in Chapter Four).
Palestine: Continuity and Change From 1860s-1990s

Even on the land zoned for residential use, the weak fiscal position of local governments has meant that the supply of infrastructure has been quite limited. Usually, they are barely able to cover their recurrent costs, leaving virtually nothing for expansion or maintenance of their physical facilities (NAKHLEH, 1979). The development budget of the Civil Administration of the IMG has not been applied to distribution systems and local infrastructure within the municipalities to any great extent. Thus, the shortage of infrastructure has served to increase the price of available urban land (WORLD BANK, 1993).

Another factor that probably helped to increase the price of land is the absence of a formal financial system.

"Since no financial assets are available to store the wealth, and because the business environment has been uncertain and risky, the real estate sector has become the best investment for most people. Allow or zero tax on holding vacant land, and no taxation on income derived from such transactions, have made land the most attractive refuge for many savers and investors. Although a formal financial system may have also stimulated additional demand and, thus, higher prices, the considerable liquidity in the OT [Occupied Territories] already permitted the purchase of land and housing by many and that the net effect of the lack of safe financial investment has actually increased the effective demand for land and served to raise prices higher than would otherwise be the case" (WORLD BANK; 1993: 96).

The price of residential land in a report prepared by UNCHS just 3 or 4 years ago gives figures that vary from less than US $20,000 to more than US $100,000 per dunum (1,000 sq. m.) (HABITAT, 1992). But our investigations show that the current prices of some plots of less than one dunum in Nablus could reach US $1,125,000 near the city centre. These figures are in the last year going up all the time; the Peace Process has certainly brought the money into the open in the expectation of high profits. In the rural areas, on the other hand the prices can vary depending on the distance from urban centres, the distance from main roads and the availability of basic utilities. However, after the signing of the Statement of Principles between Israel and the PLO the prices of land increased by almost three times or more depending on its location. It is to be regretted that the priority seems to be for housing and not commercial investment.

The Municipalities and City Councils are the highest level of indigenous political institution with recognized legitimacy. By 1967, twenty-five municipal governments were established in the ‘Westbank’ (excluding East Jerusalem), as well as 87 Village
Councils (Fig. 1.11 and 1.12). No additional municipalities (or village councils) have been created since 1967 (NAKHELEH, 1979; COON, 1992).

Fig. 1.11: The ‘Westbank’: Built up Areas.

The legal basis of municipal activity is the Jordanian Law of Municipalities (No 29, 1955)(BENVENISTI et al (1986). According to that law, the municipalities are empowered to act in such distinctly municipal areas as water and electricity supply, the establishment of public markets and butcheries, schools and other institutions. "The municipalities may issue bylaws (subject to the approval of the Ministry of Councils)" (BENVENISTI et al, 1986: 155). The last municipal elections in the ‘Westbank’ were in 1963, during the Jordanian period. At the end of 1971, a new Military Order (No. 454) fixed the date for the conclusion of the Municipal Council’s term and for new elections in March 1972. In those elections pro Jordanian mayors were mostly elected, as the Israelis, the Jordanians and pro Jordanian mayors joined together to block supporters of the PLO, who threatened to create an alternative leadership. In 1976,
however, the last elections took place, when most of the Mayors elected were pro-PLO (Palestine Liberation Organization) who were committed, privately or publicly, to the PLO's leadership and opposed the Israeli continued occupation.

Fig. 1.12: The 'Westbank': Administration Districts.

Regarding the situation under which the municipalities operate and the constraints they are facing NAKHLEH (1979: 10) writes:

In the absence of a national government, the municipalities have of necessity assumed more responsibilities and faced more problems as well. The added responsibilities have placed a heavy financial burden on the municipalities, particularly in the areas of public services and developmental projects. Most of them operate in the red, a vast majority of the municipalities have had to turn for grants and loans to both the military government and to governments and cities through the Arab Word; the former carries with it political conditions, and the latter is subject to military restrictions. Often, the municipalities are left frustrated and helpless, with their people angry and their towns barely operating". 
The elected pro-PLO mayors constituted a challenge to the IMG. However, within six years of that heady period, in 1982, the municipalities were in disarray in the wake of deportations, unsolved bomb attacks that maimed the Mayors of Ramallah and Nablus, the dismissal of most of the other mayors, and the appointment of Israeli Jews to manage local affairs. The instalment of Israeli mayors of Arab towns facilitated Jewish settlement activity and increased economic control and land seizures (BENVENISTI et al, 1986).

Clearly, the municipalities had the potential for becoming the nucleus of a network of nationalistic, reformist local leaders and their activity. For this reason the IMG dismantled them over a period of the next few years. It is now unlikely that they will again be permitted as long as Israel maintains a physical presence. The loss to us in terms of leadership and morale was incalculable. "The vacuum thus created contributes to the decline of the 'Westbank' as a society confident of its institutions and optimism" (RICHARDSON, 1984: 101).

Furthermore, a wide gap exists between the theoretical or legal authority of local municipalities and the way they actually function. According to NAKHLEH (1979), Article 41a of Municipal Jordanian Law gives them the power to act in forty different areas. In practice, however, every action must have the prior approval of the IMG, otherwise it would be nullified by the authorities.

For all these reasons the municipal corporations and local councils operate under very difficult conditions. Their hands are tied by so many restrictions imposed on their actions and by the slowness that results from being forced to deal with the military bureaucracy. This means that the government of our towns and cities is well-nigh impossible, as, even the most straightforward civil operations become increasingly complicated.

This has significantly contributed to the expansion of the services that voluntary and charitable organizations provide in health, education, and welfare. Indeed, for the past decade indigenous and expatriate voluntary associations have often been the sole
One of the most significant and least publicized institutions functioning in the ‘Westbank’ is UNRWA, (the United Nations Relief and Works Agency), which was established in 1950 after the 1948 War, to meet the welfare, health and education needs of destitute refugees. As of the end of 1982, 340,000 out of the total ‘Westbank’ population of 710,000 (excluding East Jerusalem), were refugees registered with UNRWA (RICHARDSON, 1984).

The 20 camps are administered from five District Offices, at the head of each is an administrator directly responsible to a main field office. Each of the camps, on the other hand, has its own director who reports directly to the main District Office.

UNRWA assistance has replaced poor shelters in some refugee camps and improved living conditions in the camps through self-help projects. These projects have included black topping of roads; drainage; school repairs; construction of youth centres, cafeterias, play-grounds ....etc (NAKHLEH, 1979). At the same time, UNRWA has established youth activities for young refugees in several camps, including recreational programmes and leadership and training courses. Of additional significance is UNRWA’s professional staff, almost all of whom are Palestinian Arabs functioning as international civil servants in a highly structured and efficient bureaucracy. The Palestinian doctors, teachers, engineers, social workers, and office staff who administer UNRWA programmes in the ‘Westbank’ have transferable skills that could be applied under different political circumstances.

Later in the 1970s, the refugees had realised that their problem was going to take longer than they expected. They had to work hard to improve their physical and living conditions through self-help initiatives. In Camp No. 1 - west of Nablus - for example, and where the author grew up, the residents had contributed to the installation of the water and sewerage networks by their monies and labour. As well they paved the roads and alleys of the Camp through self-help projects; the UNRWA provided them with the
cement while they contributed the sand, aggregate and labour.

The 'Westbank' is served by a wide range of private charitable and philanthropic organizations, indigenous and non-indigenous, whose staffs are entirely or mainly composed of Palestinians (NAKHLEH, 1979; RICHARDSON, 1984). The indigenous groups, approximately 100 in number, are members of the Federation of Charitable Societies, and divided into three regional sections (Nablus, Jerusalem and Hebron). Activities include youth, education, social services, and health programmes.

Since 1981 the Israeli Civil Administration (ICA) policy has been to reduce the establishment of new charities as much as possible, as some of them are seen as fronts for subversive activities. The contribution from the ICA to these organizations is minimal, in 1983-84 only 2.7 percent of the administration budget was allocated to support them. To compensate, these organizations had to turn to grants and contributions from the Arab world and from religious and secular charitable institutions abroad. Their budget is five times greater than the administration's total welfare budget (BENVENISTI et al, 1986).

The important role that such charitable societies have performed has been discussed by NAKHLEH (1979: 39-40):

"In the context of occupation and the ravages of conflict and war, the charitable societies have performed an admirable task in improving needy Palestinians with the services most essential for their continued survival. These health, education, and welfare services have surely made life more tolerable, in spite of the obstacles of distribution and the misery of those most affected by war. These societies have acted in place of what would be, under normal conditions, government ministries or departments. Therefore, these societies possess within themselves an embryonic ministerial structure that could grow into a full-fledged national agency in charge of the inhabitants' massive health, education, and welfare needs".

Regarding cultural heritage, these indigenous charitable societies play a major role in maintaining both the tangible and intangible Palestinian cultural heritage, such as The Palestinian Arab Folklore Centre in Jerusalem and Ena'ash El-Usrah near Ramallah. The latter, for example, published a quarterly magazine on our heritage, which was closed down under pressure from the IMG. It also publishes pamphlets and books on
folklore, and maintains a documentary archive and museum of Palestinian heritage.

In addition, a large number of foreign relief organizations are active, supporting programmes parallel to those of the indigenous organizations; the foreign groups tackle additional areas such as economic development and legal aid (NAKHLEH, 1979; RICHARDSON, 1984). Voluntary organizations with local offices must receive authorization from the IMG for all activities they initiate. Without that approval they are not permitted to make contact with local bodies. On the other hand, the Israeli authorities are suspicious of the activities of the relief organizations and keep careful track of what they do. For that purpose, a special unit was established in 1983 to supervise the work of the international relief organizations (BENVENISTI et al, 1986).

"A consistent pattern in the Israeli project decisions on the West Bank has been approval of those in the social welfare category and disapproval of those intended to contribute to economic self-sufficiency, which would interfere with Israel's policy of tightening the West Bank- Israel connection" (RICHARDSON, 1984: 103).

An investigation of the Israeli government's selective policy in approving voluntary projects, reveals clearly that the IMG will attempt to block projects for the development of economic infrastructure, preferring those which improve services. This policy supports the political line taken by Israel, permitting individual prosperity but stifling community development. Furthermore, that policy decreases the budgetary burden upon the Civil Administration, for otherwise it would have to provide funding for access roads and water mains for domestic consumption. In addition to that, the IMG claims in its reports projects subsidized by voluntary agencies and the joint PLO Jordanian Committee as projects financed by the Civil Administration itself (BENVENISTI et al, 1986).

1.4 THE PALESTINIAN INFRASTRUCTURE

In the 'Westbank' there is little or no new investment infrastructure. In Jordan, Syria, or Israel itself one would expect to find a government-supported or owned Industrial Development Bank, a housing Bank, a Cooperative Bank, an Agricultural Credit Union

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6 For more information on the infrastructure of the West Bank and the Israeli policy towards it see for example: BENVENISTI, 1984; RICHARDSON, 1984; BENVENISTI et al, 1986; COON, 1992; WORD BANK, 1993; ABU ESHIEH, 1994).
or the like. In the ‘Westbank’ none of these are found. Indeed, no private Palestinian-owned Bank exists. Thus, the planning resources and more importantly the credit resources needed for economic and social development are not available to us. Along with the previously mentioned economic distortions caused by the military occupation, the lack of access to normal credit facilities is perhaps the most important impediment to development (Cited in JOURNAL OF PALESTINE STUDIES, 1980, VOL. IX NO 2).

"The absence of a modern, comprehensive banking and credit system on the West Bank is a major obstacle to development of any sector of the economy dealing primarily in money. Almost all West Bank maintain their principal accounts in Amman, which means that the capital flows toward the East Bank and is unavailable for investment in the West Bank. The establishment of the Jordanian stock exchange in 1979 in Amman has also made it attractive for West Bank residents to invest excess capital in the Market" (RICHARDSON, 1984: 142).

The level and the particularly the quality of the basic water supply, transport and power facilities and the services provided in these sectors, is below that generally found in countries with comparable incomes. Moreover, the poor state of the existing physical facilities for sewerage, water supply and solid waste disposal and drainage, has already placed a heavy strain on the environment.

Soon after the occupation, Israel began a substantial process of restructuring the transport and communications network of the ‘Westbank’, relinking them with Israel. It became increasingly easy to drive from Israel direct to the ‘Westbank’ Jewish settlements without passing through Arab population centres. There is a security function here that allows Jewish settlers to move freely without going through Arab concentrations of population, but the original intention was to meet the transport and communication needs and to create a network that would physically integrate the ‘Westbank’ with Israel proper. In the same manner, Israel took control of our water resources and integrated them into their national water system. It restricted the use of water by proclamation, and introduced meters to ration water consumption for agricultural use at its pre - 1967 level, thereby limiting the amount of expansion.7

7 Military Order 158 of 10 October 1967. No water installation is allowed without a licence from the military commander. Between 1967 and 1987 there were only five cases of Palestinians being allowed to sink new wells.
Israel also integrated the supply of electricity into the national grid; today electricity is supplied almost totally from the Israeli Electric Company (IEC) power system. In 1987, Israel took over the only independent Palestinian energy supplier, the Jerusalem Electricity Company. Thus, Israel took direct control of two vital ingredients of economic activity, water and electricity. The net result was to create total dependency by Palestinian municipal organizations.

Moreover, the WORLD BANK (1993: 1-2), summarized the reasons for the poor state of the physical infrastructure sector in the occupied territories:

"The basic reason for the poor state of the infrastructure sectors and the inadequacy of the services provided is related to the governance of the West Bank. First, the institutional structure to formulate, implement and manage investments is inadequate, and Palestinians are only weakly involved in the decision-making process. The lack of an effective mechanism for responding to the wishes of the population has resulted in formulation of policies and investments that do not serve the needs of the West Bank well. Second, there is no sovereign guarantor to enable international borrowing and formal financial sector, as mentioned above, to provide funding for maintaining and developing infrastructure services in response to the growing demand. Third, there is some evidence that not all tax revenues collected by the Israeli authorities have been made available to the Civil Administration for inter alia, investment and municipal services. Fourth, municipalities have been forced to siphon funds from the utilities to maintain municipal services. Consequently, utilities have had to finance almost all their investment from their remaining internal resources. Furthermore, these internal resources were further depressed by frequently low levels of efficiency which in turn were due to inadequate investment and industrial weakness" (WORLD BANK, 1993: 1-2).

More important than the Israeli integration of the Westbank's infrastructure was the manner in which they proceeded to control and use our people to work inside Israel. These workers were absorbed at the bottom of the occupational pyramid: they did what is known as 'black labour' - some Israeli call it 'Arab labour'. This policy had several advantages to them, it absorbed a number of otherwise unemployed Palestinians, thus reducing the potential for political ferment, by offering better wages it erected immense obstacles to the development growth and of local industries, both in terms of investment and markets for Palestinian products. In the absence of local employment alternatives it made between one - third and one - half of the Palestinian work force dependent for its livelihood upon employment by Israeli enterprises. It also allowed Israel to develop capital intensive industry to absorb the Jewish work force released from menial jobs (TAMARI, 1989).
The housing and urban land sector today "...exists in a policy of vacuum, where sector problems are compounded by the political environment" (WORLD BANK, 1993: 92), as a result of Israeli policy and restrictions. The IMG have for nearly 30 years deprived the Palestinians of the opportunity to establish and develop national institutions capable of and responsible for the planning, implementation and managing much needed housing activities. This is further complicated by a complex set of governing laws; including Ottoman, British, Jordanian and since June 1967 Israeli laws and military orders (as we will discuss in Chapter Four). There are restrictions on the development of existing small industries and the establishment of new ones, especially in the area of basic construction materials (HABITAT, 1992). We have been forced to buy most of our building materials from Israel. At present, there is no formal financial system to serve builders, home buyers or those who might provide other housing services.

During most of the occupation, the 'Westbank' has suffered from the virtual absence of any public or private housing sector and strong private construction sector for financing and delivering housing units.

"The only institutions which have been involved in various levels of housing development activities are the housing cooperatives and real-estate enterprises. Although a small number of cooperatives were established in the early 1950s, no significant activity took place within the cooperative housing sector until 1978 when the Hebron Housing Cooperative implemented the first cooperative housing project under occupation through a loan from the Jordan Housing Bank against a guarantee from the Central Bank of Jordan" (HABITAT, 1992: 10).

While over 100 housing cooperatives were formed and registered with the Jordan Cooperative Organization (JCO) in Amman, only 43 of these cooperatives, with a total membership of 1415, obtained loans through the joint committee and Jordan Housing Bank. Out of the 1415 units started, however, only around 450-500 units were completed and occupied (HABITAT, 1992).

Owner occupancy is high at an estimated 80-85 percent; 70 percent in urban areas, 90 percent in rural areas, reflecting the limited land market and the tendency for rural populations to hold on to property for economic and social considerations (HABITAT, 1992). Controlled rental accommodation is in short supply because, with the present tight controls, and low rents (around 5% of incomes) the construction of these units is
unattractive. Interestingly, the current, ‘fixed for all time’ rent control is derived from Jordanian law later amended in Jordan but not in the ‘Westbank’.

In recent years, the average annual rental for a typical 120-140 sq. m. apartment has gone up from about £200-300 for old properties to new rent of about £2,000-2,500, especially in Nablus and Ramallah. Recently, landlords have built multi story apartment blocks, either skeleton or finished (key), for sale rather than rent, by this they can guarantee immediate profits while avoiding the risk of being trapped into the "fixed for all time" rent control contracts. After the Peace Accord in September 1993, some joint projects between land-owners and investors have been undertaken; land-owners contribute land using the investors money. Mostly, the new apartments are for sale rather than rent.

The high demand for rental units has been made worse by the high inflation of recent years, especially after the drop in the value of the Jordanian Dinar (JD), which used to be the main currency in most rent contracts. In these circumstances, the nominally controlled rents pose an even greater disincentive for landlords (WORLD BANK, 1993). For commercial properties, this risk is being offset by requiring large 'key money' deposits at the outset of the lease. According to our investigation this 'key money' reached £40,000 in the down town of Nablus in 1994 and has going up since then. At least this shows that the commercial situation must be improving.

Construction costs at £150-200 per sq. m., are very high for a country with our average incomes. However, a World Bank report says that construction costs are high because standards are high; masonry construction with high level of finish. These high standards may be less the product of inappropriate regulation and more a measure of what the market can stand. Building materials such as stone, aggregates and some manufactured items are produced in the ‘Westbank’, though attracting very high Israeli taxes. Other items and raw materials come from Israel, where "...many items are priced above levels of neighbouring countries" (WORLD BANK, 1993: 95). In addition the very restrictive permits on about half of the new construction and which makes constructing a new dwelling take as long as 18 months, pushes up the costs per unit (as we will discuss.
in Chapter Four). High costs per sq. m. translate into high house prices because units are getting large (the floor area of a new unit in 1992 is from 140-180 sq. m.) and are built on large plots (minimum of 500 sq. m.).

There is a great demand for housing at present as a result of the Peace Process. After the signing of the statement of principles between the PLO and Israel, real-estate development activities including the construction of multi-apartment residential buildings for sale and rent, flourished in Nablus, Jerusalem, Bethlehem and Hebron. These activities have been carried out by individual investors, informal partnerships or formal real-estate development companies. According to recent estimates, the immediate ‘post-independence’ period will require between 250,000 to 350,000 housing units to satisfy demand from the natural population increase, the expected return of 250,000 to 750,000 Palestinians, the improvement of housing conditions of refugee camp residents and replacing the deteriorating housing units within the existing stock. If the maximum of 350,000 housing units are to be provided over a five year period, then an average of 70,000 units will be required every year, which is almost ten times the present average annual production. This is, of course, beyond our current Palestinian institutions and financial capacities (HABITAT, 1992). However, according to the WORLD BANK (1993), the least expensive new units sell for about £30,000, which is approximately four times the estimated median household income.

A simple calculation of the above figures reveals that £2.1 billion will be required to provide the needed 70,000 housing units every year. Suppose this money is available, then if only 5% of it goes to conservation this will be £105 million which is enough to conserve a substantial number of historic buildings. On the other hand if aided self-help programmes are considered then treble the amount can be conserved.

We argue that one way to reduce the pressure on the housing sector is by encouraging the rehabilitation and upgrading of the existing housing stock and the restoration of abandoned older buildings. This will help to alleviate the increasing problems of overcrowding and declining housing conditions, and help to conserve our cultural heritage from further deterioration and loss (see Chapter Six).
In the final analysis, our people did not give up, they resisted the IMG and its policies whenever and wherever possible. They had tried hard to live as normal a life as the circumstances permitted. The municipalities had to run the cities and towns despite all economic and physical constraints. Infrastructure of organizations was born from the womb of the occupation itself as our people began to fill the gaps left by the IMG. This resistance was accumulated in the Intifada which had mobilized the broad range of the entire Palestinian community in an obvious deceleration of Palestinian antagonism to occupation. Ordinary people, women and men, children and adults, have confounded the IMG with their incredible courage and resourcefulness.

The Intifada was an informal restructuring process, based on the very limited resources available. Our people and their very limited financial resources. Self-sufficiency became a way of life, it was part of a wider strategy of reducing dependence on the IMG. Popular committees sprang up spontaneously in neighbourhoods, villages and camps and began to coordinate local resistance with the National Leadership. They not only provided services, they also became the authority in their localities.

In short community development and self-help became a way of life for our people (see Chapter Five). Thus, as with the case of our political Intifada we believe that any conservation policy in the ‘Westbank’ should be designed to stimulate participation and self-help activities in coping with the historic quarters conditions and preventing further deterioration in them, as well as in developing a sense of civic consciousness. It should be a realistic and practical approach to counter the enormous problems presented by the historic urban areas; to attempt to conserve largely through the resources most readily available - our people and their small financial resources.

1.5 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION.
This chapter has discussed the many changes that the economy and development underwent during the four regimes that have governed Palestine since the middle of the 19th century. We have looked at Israeli policy towards the Palestinian economy and development to try understand the difficulties of the current situation. It attempted to assess the current situation of the infrastructure and how the IMG policy affected all its
sectors.

We have argued that in the absence of major steps to strengthen institutional activities like banking and credit, the ‘Westbank’ economy and development will continue its deterioration unchecked. If the situation does not change our economy will similar and that might take years to repair.

Moreover, as a result of the uncertain political situation, there is little capital formation today, reflecting traditional practices compound by the difficulties created by the occupation. Many Palestinians limit their investment to land, commerce, and urban real estate, which means that industry and infrastructure are neglected.

Furthermore, IMG orders, policies, regulations, restrictions and constraints towards the construction on our lands have cause crisis in the housing sector. This has been made worse by the occupation definite policy regarding building materials and funding, a policy that stipulates the limitation of their upgrading and the prevention of the inflow of external funds. Housing is characterized by strong demand in the context of a restrictive supply system. The consequences are high relative prices of new dwellings and high levels of overcrowding especially for those of modest income. Accordingly, this author argues that one way to reduce the pressure on the housing sector is by encouraging the upgrading of the existing housing stock and restoration of abandoned old buildings.

We have argued that the IMG, through its polices and orders, has retarded the development of the different components of the Palestinian infrastructure in general, and has resulted in most cases in distortions and negative impacts on the available infrastructure. It has left us with fewer opportunities to stand up on our feet after any peace agreement. In fact, it has left us thirty years behind.

Under normal circumstances, however, municipalities prefer to spend their revenues in the new areas of the city rather than the old areas. In addition, politicians, administrators, and planners are all nervous about touching these areas. They postpone
dealing with the problem in aggregate in the face of inadequate resources and a shortage of technical administrative personnel. In Palestine planning has been carried out by an external force, the IMG, and we were not allowed to participate in the decision making. Add to this that the municipalities are operating under severe conditions and most of them are operating with budget deficit.

Therefore, we anticipate that the problem is going to worsen if the current situation continues. Furthermore, with the expected accelerated economic development, after the Peace Accord, our cultural heritage could be lost or damaged. And since all sectors of infrastructure are in urgent need of development and upgrading, this means that no place may be left, at the priority ladder, for the conservation of the existing housing stock, especially when we know that all donors give their donations with the expectation that they will be spent on new projects. Therefore, years may be elapse before planners and decision makers will start to think of conserving our cultural heritage especially when our destiny is left to the mercy of the donors.

Therefore, we would argue that an alternative, if possible informal, approach in dealing with the existing Palestinian housing stock is urgently needed, based on community development and self-help measures, and depending on the people and relying on them for its success. Therefore, the next chapter will discuss some aspects of community development, self-help and community participation.
CHAPTER TWO

Perspectives on Community Participation and Action
CHAPTER TWO

PERSPECTIVES ON COMMUNITY PARTICIPATION AND ACTION

"I know of no safe depository of the ultimate powers of society, but the people themselves; and if we think them not enlightened enough to exercise their control with a wholesome discretion, the remedy is not to take it from them, but to inform their discretion". (Quoted in HAMDI, 1991: 75).

2.0 INTRODUCTION

The previous chapter outlined the existing situation in Palestine and attempted to give a picture of its continuity and change under the different regimes that governed there, as well as presenting its assets and limitations. The long history of oppression, however, should not bring about defeatism, our people who faced guns with stones can defeat all weapons used against them and can prove to the whole world, as well as themselves that we can take care of our built heritage. We can prove that as we fought we can also work and if necessary continue to fight. The 27 years of occupation have strengthened our commitment to conserve our built heritage. And while the constraints of the occupation continue, conserving our historic urban areas, along with their economic revitalization, becomes a primary objective.

The economic constraints that accompanied the occupation have resulted in a long period of recession and high unemployment or underemployment in the historic quarters, where the majority of the residents are poor (see Chapter Seven). The effects of the occupation appear to have had their greatest impact on the historic settlements to the extent that even the minimum of conservation and maintenance work has been left undone. This has the main effect of increasing concern over the scarcity of economic resources and of the need to search for alternative approaches to conserve our built heritage.

In the light of the limited success of more conventional approaches to conserving and upgrading the historic cores and in dealing with the growing problems within these urban areas, self-help, community development and participation appear to have experienced a growth in acceptance. They are now widely seen as a viable adjunct to
the conventional approach, not only in developing countries but also in some over
developed industrialised nations.

Although it is a much slower process, especially in the beginning, the self-realisation
and action by society is by far the best method because the result is of its own making
and thus supposedly has a much better chance of acceptability on a wider scale than that
of established procedures. The recognition of the lack of government support for more
conventional policies has affected the community and commercial basis of many
historical towns and cities. It has led governments to search for alternative approaches
to urban improvement and conservation activity. Attention, within the recommendation
of the 'United Nations Conference on Human Settlements' held as long ago as 1976 in
Vancouver, was paid to all human settlements, stressing the need to make the
improvement of these areas a high priority and a continuing effort to upgrade the living
conditions in urban settlements; that the rights and aspirations of the least fortunate
inhabitants should be recognised and met. Finally, the cultural and social values
embodied in the existing fabric should be preserved (UNHS-HABITAT, 1984: 4).

In England, for example, strategies for the rehabilitation of the inner-city housing stock
are associated with community development, participation and involvement by those
affected in rehabilitating and improving their own living conditions. Community
development and residents organisations are seen as practicable strategies that encourage
greater autonomy and more control by the residents over those factors affecting their
lives (HARRIS, 1981). Self-help activities in the old areas range from improving and
repairing the existing properties, keeping the area clean, maintaining schools and even
dealing with delinquency. In this respect, the people themselves need to become
involved in the identification of needs, selecting their priorities and carrying out the
work.

Nevertheless, community participation, as projected in this dissertation does not only
include the physical participation of the members of a particular community, it also
includes a sense of partnership and responsibility towards the built and cultural heritage.
The idea stems from the understanding that conservation is not just a process of
recording, cleaning, consolidating and monitoring the built heritage, but also its use and reuse. The research also realises the importance of breaking down the barriers between the 'past' and 'present' by accepting the fact that history is not just trapped or contained in so called 'monuments,' it also flows in to the very fabric that supports community life. In other words, into the most humble, both culturally and environmentally, housing neighbourhoods, market places, religious buildings and open spaces and so on. It is in this context that community participation becomes viable and essential. Over the years, however, various efforts by a large number of agencies including concerned professionals, to find suitable mechanisms for involving communities and enabling them to be responsible for their surroundings and to mobilise local resources, have manifested themselves in various forms all over the world. It is the purpose of this Chapter, therefore, to study some appropriate aspects of community development, through self-help and involvement of the people.

The chapter is divided into five main parts. The first discusses some aspects of community development, its various approaches, benefits and limitations. The second examines the concept of self-help, how to facilitate it by mobilising and maintaining resources. Some aspects of aided self-help are examined in Part Three. Part Four analyzes the notion of community participation, its effectiveness and difficulties. Finally we look at the levels of participation as well as the advantages and disadvantages of this type of strategy in Palestine.

Lack of finance is said to be a major stumbling block to the development and conservation processes in Palestine. However, it would be an over-simplification of the issue if it were thought that the release of limitless funds would solve the problem. It has long been accepted that simply increasing the availability of finance for conservation only leads to an increase in costs. This is further compounded by the fact that there is a limited amount of funds available to the PNA and those are usually orientated towards new projects including new housing. In practice this in part operates via the stringent criteria imposed by donor countries, who have to be satisfied in order to make the funds available to our organizations. For instance, funds are given to the Palestinian Housing Council (PHC) on the expectation that they will be spent on new housing projects.
However, this should not be taken for granted and the PHC could devote a percentage to be spent on upgrading the existing housing stock (see Chapter Six).

Further, the level of investment in conservation has been inhibited for a number of reasons: firstly, the owners do not usually invest in rehabilitating their properties, it seems this does not usually provide the larger and faster returns that other investment opportunities, such as speculation in land and new buildings do. Secondly, the uncertainty of the political situation makes long term investment very problematic and causes both rich and poor alike to hesitate before parting with their money. Although the lack of finance does inhibit, in its own way, the conservation process, it must be realised that in the case of the Old Town, for instance, the majority of the residents have agreed to participate in the upgrading of their houses on a voluntary basis (see Chapter Seven). In fact this activity is not new to our people, self-help lies deep in our traditions, it has been a way of life for our people for thousands of years.

Housing provision and its maintenance was the responsibility of individuals and not governments. More than 70% of housing production was carried out by ‘master builders’, who were either technicians and or building tradesmen. Moreover, the construction process was a collective effort of family and community labour - *Ala'oneh* or self-help. This process was mostly demonstrated in the construction of the roof (Fig. 2.1), which was often a festive occasion in which all the neighbours joined, with women as well as men helping to carry stones and mortar and passing it up to the workers on the roof, under the supervision of the head mason (see for example, CANAAN, 1937; GRAHAM-BROWN, 1980).

Today, the construction of the roof is still a festive occasion in most rural areas, refugee camps and old quarters. The whole community helps in mixing concrete and passing it up to the workers on the roof, still under the supervision of the master builder (contractor).

The structure of our building industry, like many others including that of the UK, shows a large number of one-man firms, who do 25% of the work (by value) and a small
number of large contractors, who do the bulk of the work. Most small contractors are restricted both financially and technically and thus have little or no experience of handling large complex projects.

Fig. 2.1: Building a Stone House in a Palestinian Village by a Collective Effort.

We should not overestimate the capacity of our indigenous industry to implement the ambitious development and conservation needs even if we are asking for work to be carried out on a voluntary basis by the community. A range of training programmes will be necessary to provide the skills and organisations for the needed reconstruction process. An important aspect of this training will have to do with management and
running small businesses to ensure that precious funds are not wasted through bankruptcy. Management and organisational skills would also benefit the local residents and the various partnerships and teams that are formed. Support should be given for the use of traditional local materials and the adaptation of traditional techniques, as well as expressing reservations about the use of modern materials and components which we regard as inappropriate.

Conservation standards and regulations that can not be met are a considerable constraint; they often demand a level of expertise and expense that is not only economically unrealistic but also socially and culturally unrelated. With the peace process in train, we have the opportunity to look again at our conservation standards to see how they can be more tailored to our present reality. The origins of the ‘Cities, Villages and Buildings Planning Law No. 79, 1966’ can be traced back to the time of the British Mandate. Most of the specifications are now outmoded and need to be adapted and amended. We must now develop our own legislation to protect our built heritage and enforce it by the local authority.

The conventional view does not appear to take cognisance of the fact that the residents’ needs might differ from those of the officially designated conservation needs. As a consequence these officially recognised needs are considered somewhat artificial, as they appear to overlook the problem. These residents’ needs can vary considerably between different groups, but it is a variation that is not restricted to income. Other factors which act as variants are, for example, age, education and size of household. Furthermore, as climate, quality of the dwelling and the nature of the surrounding environment also affect needs, these needs may vary over a period of time for the same community, household or individual. At different stages in the family’s growth and development, some needs will be more pressing than others. Household needs, preference and aspirations are evolutionary and dynamic, often shifting and changing with economic and social circumstances. All this falls some way short of the standard and processes imposed by the planners, legislators and decision-makers in the belief that they are providing and doing "what the people want".
The conventional approach to conservation can be termed ‘one-dimensional’ in that it ignores the possibility that the residents regard their houses as something more than physical shelter. Conservation should be considered as a ‘multi-dimensional’ issue, with needs which cannot be defined absolutely and solely in terms of objective quantifiable physical criteria - but more to do with a combined set of attributes; the socio-economic and cultural needs and objectives of the inhabitants. Further there are some secondary non-quantifiable, but all the same vital attributes, such as support for and expression of identity, of security and of stimulus and opportunity. These are the innate needs, which are never absent and are never more than temporarily satisfied. Moreover, there may be different priorities for any particular person, household or community for a given place, at a particular time.

In the light of all this, a situation exists where the diversity of these needs and their consequences makes it necessary to think of conservation not just as a physical exercise but as part and parcel of the lifestyle of certain groups of people. Conservation becomes a collective of independent and dependent attributes, that makes its interpretation differ from community to community and household to household. In these terms conservation takes on an evolutionary and dynamic metaphysical characteristic; a process that has to take account of the continuous interaction between a community and its environment. It cannot and must not be treated as a mere physical exercise, as may be the case, when conservation is just associated with buildings and not also with the people who use them.

This difference in approach between the conventional and the progressive, is compounded by the belief that the users have little idea of their needs and how to go about achieving them. The participation of the residents in the designing, planning, management and implementation of conservation programmes should be encouraged. Thus, it should be emphasised that if conservation policies and programmes are to be more effective in meeting our needs, an approach that recognises the role of the residents and their representatives in the development, conservation and reconstruction processes must be taken. It is suggested that this role would be essentially a
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participatory one, involving the authorities, the residents and other actors in partnerships (see Chapter Eight).

In conclusion, the critical review of the current economical and developmental situation in Palestine (as highlighted in Chapter One), proved that the ruling authorities are not interested in the development or conservation of our cultural heritage, on the contrary the IMG used our settlements to attack our national culture (see Chapter Four). As such, planning and development policies have been determined by the needs of the Israeli Jewish settlers, rather than those of the indigenous population. Accordingly most, if not all of the development and conservation studies have not been allowed to happen or could not obtain the funding. If conservation is to continue in this approach experience shows that it will be ineffective. Any substantial investment will only come from abroad and in order to attract it we need to show what we can do on our own; very much as we did with the Intifada.

Little or no attention has been paid to alternative solutions which do appear to be making inroads in tackling the conservation problems of other developing countries, notably the various aided-self-help approaches, especially upgrading. If more functional and socially desirable policies and programmes are to be achieved, then the role of all actors within conservation partnerships must be to stimulate, support and marshal available resources in order to enable people to make a continuous investment in their historical environment, perhaps on a participatory basis. With a shift in emphasis from the conventional approach and attitude we could achieve much by the encouragement and enhancement of alternative approaches.

2.1. COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT

The notion of ‘community’ is a difficult concept to define sociologically out of a particular social and cultural context, and one which tends to attract over emotional connotations from the committed in everyday usage. Community, may under some conditions of social stability, involve the idea of containing the whole of life’s drama for a relatively small group of individuals. But it appears to be more useful to regard community as a convenient term for referring to, "....that group which exists most
immediately around the individual and serves for him [or her] the functions of helping
to define reality, providing emotional support and facilitating action which requires co-
operation with others" (THOMASON, 1969: 66).

Through time, in stable situations, the local settlement group performs its main functions
of providing meaning, giving support and permitting worthwhile social action. He goes
on to say:

"...it is seen to be distinguishable in its common *views* of the world around, in its
common *values* which it employs to evaluate events or behaviours, and in its
common *activities*". (THOMASON, 1969: 48).

For the past two or three decades, however, community action associations in urban
neighbourhoods have been the subject of debate, research and demonstration. Interest
in this form of social organisation has developed out of at least three different elements.
The first is the concept of community development, the second as the means; self-help
and the third as aided self-help where outside intervention is introduced to support the
whole exercise.

Many communities have had to rely on conventional local action to solve the problems
of poverty, underdevelopment, poor housing, etc. From time to time and country to
country, these initiatives have been recognized by many different titles. However,
although many of the local names are still used, the term that has come into common
usage is community development. The UN definition, perhaps indicates the essential
elements of the community development process:

"The term community development designates the utilization under one single
programme of approaches and techniques which rely upon local communities as
units of action and which attempt to combine outside assistance with organized
local self-determination and effort, and which correspondingly seek to stimulate
local initiative and leadership as the primary instrument of change.....
In agricultural countries in the economically underdeveloped areas, major
emphasis is placed upon those activities which aim at promoting the improvement
of the basic living conditions of the community, including the satisfaction of
some of its material needs". (Quoted in THOMASON, 1969: 10).

THOMASON (1969: 10) suggests that the three elements which might be singled out
for special emphasis in the above definition are: 1. the total involvement of the local
community group; 2. the role of external assistance; and 3. the primary emphasis upon improvement of material standards of living. Community development takes as its starting point the relatively low material standards of living of people who frequently are to be found in the non-industrial parts of the world or sectors of a country, and seeks to utilize the resources of the community itself to effect improvements in these material standards, without in so doing destroying the social fabric which gives meaning and support to the lives of the individuals involved.

To political activists and social workers who see themselves as community organizers and tribunes of the underprivileged, the term comprises, "...programs to improve deteriorating conditions in the inner city, evoking a community consciousness among residents and strengthening their local institutions in new cities and old". Moreover, APGAR, IV (ed) (1976: 3) continues that whether community development is seen as a vehicle for stimulating and guiding metropolitan and urban growth or for reversing urban decline, its fundamental goal is to, "...provide an efficient, attractive and supportive environment where people may live, work and enjoy their leisure, with maximum scope for individual choice".

"Community development' by public and private interests in both growth centres and declined areas is characterized by comprehensive planning to integrate social, economic and spatial objectives and activities; by a fundamental re-examination of basic assumptions about the purpose of cities and communities and the roles of public and private institutions in them; by some recognition of the need to improve community life as well as individual living conditions; and by changes in the established attitudes and procedures that have governed urban policies, construction methods, and management concepts". (APGAR, IV (ed), 1976: 1-2).

The form, location and scale of community development programmes are far less central than the process by which they are created. Therefore, for any community development programme to be effective and successful, it must be seen by all concerned in terms of a process rather than just a product. There are five distinctive features in this understanding, to the process of community development:

1. definition of development goals and objectives;
2. determination of activities required to meet those objectives efficiently, effectively and equitably;
3. continuous evaluation and reviewing to identify new needs and shortcomings in current programmes;
4. mobilization of a wide variety of public and private resources; and
5. ensuring unified organization that undertakes the entire development as a single project and manages it according to a predetermined strategy (APGAR, IV, 1976).

Nevertheless, though the term ‘community development’ is relatively new and often used with different connotations, there is an increasing trend toward adoption of urban community development in different parts of the world, as an approach to the solution of the deteriorating historic city centre problems. This implies that the notion of community development is no longer a matter of hypothesis or distant hope. "The positive effectiveness of community development has been demonstrated in new towns built and building throughout the world. It is clear that, ...it has been possible to set goals and work successfully toward their fulfilment" (ROUSE, 1976: XV).

Development by the community offers an alternative approach to solving more comprehensively the social, economic and physical needs of local settlements. This involves two fundamental ideas: the generation of an effective community spirit in conjunction with the introduction of self-help methods by citizen involvement in environmental affairs affecting their lives. In Britain, for instance, an approach towards more comprehensive rehabilitation of housing stock, has in certain circumstances, been best been achieved through some kind of community activity. Glasgow, Liverpool and Birmingham are examples where successful rehabilitation of old housing stock has been improved by the participation of the residents in the process. This has not only achieved an improvement in the living conditions of the residents but also restores self confidence and helps to build an integrated community. In fact it has become over the last years official government housing policy, with the formation of Housing Action Trusts (HATS).

Many years ago, one of the first community development programmes initiated in Britain was located in Batley. The Batley team identified four main objectives in their
work within the area (BUTTERWORTH, 1981). Firstly, to help establish community
groups on a neighbourhood basis, with the promotion of self-help methods by residents
participation. Secondly, effecting social change by undertaking various strategies in the
fields of housing, education, race relations, and unemployment. Thirdly, researching
alternative forms of social planning, more responsive to local needs, and finally
providing professional support and advice.

In this respect, it appears that the importance of applying community development
programmes in old urban areas, is that they not only look at specific needs of the area
but they can also cover a wide range of associated problems that the local community
is experiencing. In the United States, community efforts were directed to other problems
the inner-city areas were experiencing. For instance, in some areas there were specific
programmes geared to the problem of juvenile delinquency, where the self-help
neighbourhood approach was used to mitigate this behaviour (CLINARD, 1966). These
programmes involved the organisation of Neighbourhood Citizen Councils to engage the
residents in planning, supporting and operating constructive programmes that they would
regard as their own. Within these programmes issues such as training and utilisation of
local leaders to assure roles in developing these programmes, with consultation from
outside professionals were reasonably successful, though too often, it has to be said,
short lived.

The next step is to bring the components of community development programmes,
especially in urban areas, together with the resources both of the public and private
sectors as well as local NGOs. "The government and voluntary resources available to
stimulate self-help, and urban community organizers to locate and develop indigenous
leaders and to translate their problems in such a way that they can be adequately
interpreted by government and private agencies" (CLINARD, 1966: 125).

Palestinian NGOs and community-based organizations, as well as international NGOs
and other donor organizations may play a significant role in the development and
reconstruction process both as facilitators in addressing community needs and as
providers of some of these needs, particularly in the area of improving and upgrading
the existing housing stock. The long lasting Palestinian situation has in fact been the main area for the development of many community based initiatives, largely by the United Nations and local NGOs. However, it is essential that the activities of any new NGOs be closely coordinated with the PNA, local authorities and local communities in order to avoid unproductive duplication of efforts and to ensure their activities are consistent with political and national objectives and priorities. Also to ensure that the large pool of skilled and experienced manpower that has grown up over the decades is not undervalued or ignored altogether.

The fact that community organizations which were established during and as a result of the years of the occupation have already empowered themselves to take care of their communities is an asset we can draw from, support and reinforce in the process of development, reconstruction and conservation.

Proponents of community development applied to problems experienced in the historic city cores have put together a list of ‘golden rules,’ that should, where possible, be followed:

1. create a sense of neighbourhood cohesion and strengthen group interrelationships,
2. encourage and stimulate self-help through individuals in the community,
3. only use outside agencies when initiative for self-help is lacking,
4. rely upon persuasion rather than compulsion to produce change,
5. identify and develop local leadership,
6. develop civic consciousness and acceptance of civic responsibility,
7. use professional and technical assistance in direct support of the people involved,
8. represent and coordinate city services to meet neighbourhood needs,
9. provide training in democratic procedures that can result in greater decentralization of some government functions.
As a matter of fact all these rules, in someway or another, have been applied by our political *Intifada*. Accordingly, by following the steps of the Intifada we believe that most, if not all, of these golden rules can be achieved (see Chapter Five).

2.2. SELF-HELP

Perhaps one of the first definitions of self-help came from Samuel Smiles (1866), he pointed out:

"...the very opposite of what it really is...Although its chief object unquestionably is to stimulate youths to rely upon their own efforts in life rather than depend upon the help or patronage of others it will also be found...that the duty of helping one's self in the highest sense involves the helping of one's neighbours" (Quoted in ROBINSON & HENRY, 1977: 3).

In the debate about self-help it is not easy to define what its various proponents may mean, however, the generally agreed presumption is that "...people should do more for themselves. They should do a lot more of what other people are at present doing for them, and they should be encouraged to carry out themselves a lot of what they currently expect other people to do for them" (BURGESS, 1982: 57). As a process self-help is by no means a new concept. It has in fact been the way of existence and provision of basic shelter needs for the majority of the global population since time immemorial:

"In a traditional society, based for example on non-capitalist agricultural production for subsistence and on limited exchange with a very low level of division of labour, dwellings were built either by the family or jointly by the village, may be with the help of some local craftsmen. Local materials were used in conjunction with construction techniques that had been proven over a long period of time. The users were the builders and organizers of the labour process. Their motivation for construction was the direct fulfilment of their own needs. Houses were altered as needs changed and repairs were likewise done by the people who occupied them. There was a close relationship and match between buildings, their use and the life of the people using them. ...One could call this process "self-help housing", but since the prevailing mode of production was based upon local subsistence with little or no money involved, one could argue that all activities to sustain life could be called "self-help". (HARMS, 1982: 19).

Clearly, self-help is as old as human history, since it does not need sociologists, psychiatrists, historians etc. to draw attention to the simple fact that people who share a certain problem might have something to offer each other (ROBINSON & HENRY, 1977: 3).

*Italics is added by the author.*
More critically WARD (1982: 7) argues that, "as a sponsored process it became important in 'missionary' activities in rural areas of the Third World in the early 1960s and was a reaction for growing disillusionment and awareness that technology, and its transfer from the developed to the less-developed world, would not resolve the housing problem".

Some commentators emphasise self-help in groups and in the community, whilst others talk as though self-help is purely associated with the efforts of individuals. However, much of the available literature on self-help has concentrated on the activity of particular groups.

KATZ and BENDER (1976: 9) defined self-help as a group activity. They see that self-help groups are:

"...voluntary small group structures for mutual aid in the accomplishment of a specific purpose. They are usually formed by peers who have come together for mutual assistance in satisfying a common need, overcoming a common handicap or life-disrupting problem, and bringing together about desired social and/or personal change". (Quoted in ADAMS, 1990: 11).

Reflecting on the distinction between individual and collective self-help in our context the former seems to be the most common in Palestine. In some special cases, where the activity was a religious building, for example, undertaken activities were combined with group self-help used in support of individual self-help. In the context, SMITH (1984: 5) makes a useful contribution to our discussion concerning self-help methods in the 'Westbank', he says:

"...a strategy which makes the most of limited resources by enabling rural or urban communities to improve their situation using resources they can identify".

Taking up the question of the relationship between self-helper and professional. ADAMS (1990) argues that many writers are prepared to admit that professional guidance may play a legitimate part in self-help activity, though the structure and mode of operation must be under the members' control. In the same context, CARTNE and RIESSMAN (1984), pointed out that the potential for cooperation between professionals and self-help groups has been a topic of much discussion, ranging from optimism to the conclusion that some alliances are not workable, or simply unproductive. They add that,
noting the diversity of professional contacts with self-help groups, a few commentators have called for a more systematic exploration of possible styles of interaction.

A huge amount of the literature suggests many obstacles to this collaboration, simply because the very idea of self-help experience seems to rule out the need for a professional. The theoretical assumption is that the group itself holds the key to its own goals (WILLEN, 1984). The proponents of collaboration suggest that appropriate collaboration should lead to a powerful approach, because self-help groups can take advantage of consultations with professionals, while the professionals would undoubtably benefit from learning about the way the groups promote the interests of the public.

ADAMS (1990) distinguished three types of self-help activities: (1) Integral self-help, (2) facilitated self-help and (3) autonomous self-help, depending on the degree of resourcing, leadership and support which comes from the professionals and the nature of the relationship between them and the groups. The permanent form of integral self-help, however, assumes that people cannot cope without professional help or support in one form or another, but that, "...it needs to be provided in such away to minimise their dependence and maximise the quality of their lives". The transitional form involves movement along the continuum towards facilitated or even autonomous activity. Here, the term 'empowerment' is used sometimes to "...facilitate efforts to develop integral self-help which moves towards autonomous self-help". Further, ADAMS (1990: 47-50), pointed out that some of the main issues that may arise and need to be taken into consideration, in the practice of integral self-help are: clarity about conditions for effective self-help; recognition of self-help as a personal and collective process; maximum participation of self-helpers throughout the process; setting a long enough time scale; and finally learning from experience helped by professionals. He suggests that facilitated self-help is most desirable in conditions where effective self-help could not survive autonomously. At the same time, the activity can be effective without the high level of professional support and resourcing encountered in integral self-help. From the practical point of view ADAMS suggests that the following issues are essential for facilitated self-help to be effective: facilitation by social workers needs to be purposeful; minimising the risk of professional colonisation; maintaining a balance
between leading and facilitating; and finally, ensuring the blurring of professional and self-help roles.

Finally, in discussing autonomous self-help, ADAMS (1990: 67-75) identified two forms of this type: Firstly, self-help complementing or supplementing social work; "The essential features of this form of autonomous self-help are that it needs to form part of the continuum or network of services, rather than primarily challenging or offering a critique of these, although in one sense its very existence suggests a criticism of the shortcomings of services". Secondly, self-help as alternative to, or a substitute for, social work, regardless of the age of the group, it functions, implicitly or explicitly, "as a critical presence in the field of helping services. That is, in relation to social work, its presence implies more or less some criticism of existing services. This critical presence may be with regard to the practice of the individual social worker, the agency, the entire service, or indeed several services". Lastly, as with the two previous types, ADAMS (1990: 74-75) suggests three main issues that need to be considered from the practical point of view: sustaining autonomous self-help; maintenance and appreciation of the diversity of self-help and finally; developing and improving social work practice.

Reflecting the above discussion on the 'Westbank' context, facilitated self-help appears to be the most applicable form. Whether the actions it involves are carried individually or in groups, they should be for the resident's betterment. The leading role should belong with the participants, although the extent of their involvement may vary, from home care and maintenance at one extreme to conserving the whole property at the other. Support roles should be taken by the PNA, Local Authorities and other actors within the Partnerships. Support activities can take the form of programme development, or provision of funding and training. We strongly believe that the valuable support role is not so much in active promotion, but the removal of obstacles to self-help.

KNIGHT and HAYES (1981) argue that self-help should be a key feature of any strategy to revitalise the inner city. They claim that self-help can be important for people in the inner city to regain their confidence, and feel that they have a part to play
in shaping their own future. Also, there are limits to what state agencies can do for inner city neighbourhoods. And since much of what they do is poor and unsatisfactory, some of their operations should be reduced and handed over to people who might do it better and more cheaply.

When it comes to self-help resources, they suggest that to ensure maximum cost effectiveness, resources should be allocated to those who need them directly with a minimum of middle men. To support this argument they have cited many writers such as HODGKIN (1973), FOGGITT (1974, 1976) and KNIGHT, GIBSON and GRANT (1979) who reached similar conclusions. They see that nonprofessional or indigenous workers have a number of advantages over professionals: living in the same neighbourhood, they do not commute, and have a knowledge of their locality that can only come from living there. They are of the same social class as those they are trying to help, do not have narrowly defined professional roles, and can offer friendship rather than just a service. They are less threatening to local people because they do not have elements of control or power, or the association with the state, that workers in official social agencies have. Indigenous workers do have some drawbacks. They are less efficient at paperwork, often find it difficult to deal with professionals, and sometimes experience conflicts over the boundaries of their responsibility. They are also a tendency for non-professionals to take on too much work, and burn themselves out within a year or two.

People are a resource our urban historic areas are not short of. They should be considered assets and not liabilities and need to be mobilized. In the ‘Westbank’ in general and Nablus in particular there are many both young and old who, when brought together can make, perhaps for the first time in our dependent culture, many things happen.

Our people can be mobilised if we recognise the potential of the totally unqualified, in the academic sense, of those who want to help themselves. But those doing the organising must recognise them, give them credit and treat them with fairness and respect. There may be a tendency for those Palestinians who find themselves in charge
of people to simulate the attitudes of the Israelis after living under their disrespectful rule for so long.

Several factors are involved in the process of getting self-help started and ensuring its effective continuance. Somehow at the start there should be a big push. Those of us who will start activities need to be highly motivated to hold frequent meetings to mount campaigns of action. Social and recreational activities may help to improve our credibility among potential participants who should be involved in management, to the extent of employing them alongside other professionals wherever possible. Also a degree of credibility should be maintained with relevant professionals where this is important to the participants. That does not mean that self-help activities should be considered as competitor to professionals, rather as complementary with professional services and their support is valuable for maintaining the momentum of self-help activities.

The sufficient involvement of our people is the only way to enable the conservation programmes to proceed and the success of each of them will depend on more objective criteria such as a certain minimum level of commitment and participation, the diminishing of the emphasis on bureaucratic activity, formal meetings, reducing dependence on professional leadership and developing social events alongside the other purposes of the development and conservation activities. Political experience, knowledge and skill in running organisations, and negotiating for resources are required.

Finally, the move towards more obvious community work as experienced by our political Intifada, is one positive direction where we should move. In this context ADAMS (1990) cited eight stages that involve the process of community work:

1. contacting people and analyzing needs;
2. bringing people together, helping them to identify needs and developing the will to meet those needs;
3. adopting objectives;
4. creating a suitable organisation to this end;
5. helping them to form a plan of action;
6. helping them divide and carry out the consequent tasks;
7. helping them to feed results of the action, evaluate and adopt fresh objectives in the light of this;
8. the participants themselves take on the repetition of the last two stages and the facilitator withdraws.

2.3. AIDED SELF-HELP

There are numerous attributes associated with adopting aided self-help as an effective tool in tackling the current problems concerning our historic built environment. It has been realised that efforts undertaken through conventional approaches to conserve our built heritage, have usually failed to achieve this aim adequately. This is often due to concentrating solely on the physical aspects while ignoring the social ones.

By using the aided self-help approach, the earlier aversion towards the deterioration of urban historic areas will give way to admiration by the residents who will conserve them for their own benefits and thereby create a more livable environment to suit their specific needs, priorities, financial limitations, aspirations and lifestyles.

If any conservation policy in Palestine is to be more practical and more effective it will have to make a shift from a strategy of attempting to conserve for the people to one of assisting and/or supporting them to conserve for themselves. This approach promises a higher possibility of low cost, lower defaults by the beneficiaries and an increase in the number of properties to be conserved. It is a more appropriate approach to Palestine for:

1. the burden on public funds can be considerably less than for the conventional approach, if the conservation and upgrading programmes are designed using principles of affordability by the residents and the mobilization of popular actions;
2. the provision of people's participation in terms of savings and labour can be mobilized and directed to conservation and upgrading activities;
3. social and economical survival of historic urban areas communities depends to a large extent on community organization and neighbourhood relationships.

Despite the above, aided self-help projects are nonetheless developing and encountering some major difficulties regarding their implementation. These difficulties include the effects of the constraints of high standard resulting in high costs, lack of appropriate institutional mechanisms, lack of maintenance and lack of qualified staff.

Personal constraints are twofold; first those resulting from the divergent objectives and conflicting interests that may exist between the various ‘actors’ in the conservation process, and secondly, those due to the lack of understanding and experience of the process.

In the first instance, there are many groups of participants generally involved in the aided self-help process. They may range from the owners and occupiers to the Municipal Councils, planners, politicians, NGOs and international donors. Each one of these protagonists has a valid world view that can be defended and justified on its own terms. However, to suggest that all these objectives be pursued at the same time would be over-generous and somewhat unrealistic as the serious pursuit of some will compromise others, especially given the constraints of the components. Nevertheless, all these actors have important and useful roles. So much so that they wield sufficient power and influence to warrant their inclusion in the decision making process and their participation in decisions is vital if there is ever to be any hope of understanding a successful conservation programme in Palestine. Here comes the important role of integrating all actors into larger and possibly stronger partnerships, where the residents will have a chance to say what they want and what they need.

The lack of sufficient experienced personnel on the part of both the community and the authorities acts as a major restraint on the execution of an aided self-help approach. Aided self-help is in essence a ‘new’ and non-conventional approach. If it is to be adopted in Palestine, it has to develop a cadre of professional technicians. However,
training of personnel should not be limited solely to the staff of the conservation project. Training and education of community association members and their representatives in the principles of organisation and methods of co-ordination as well as in association management, is often neglected. If this process aims at the protection of our cultural heritage and improving the living conditions of our people in the old historic areas and promoting the development of a more integrated community, training is not only useful but indispensable.

In the absence of an adequately trained community, the exercise of rights and the understanding of duties, responsibilities and obligations can lead to misinterpretation of the meaning of participation and self-help concept. This in turn often leads to conflicts, delays, and general disappointments and withdrawal from schemes by community members.

Support provided through training programmes unquestionably has the effect of improving the ability of our people to carry out rehabilitation and conservation programmes. Training should be recognised as an important activity for self-help. It, too, brings results over the long term. Pamphlets or newsletters can be useful in informing residents of availability, use and success of conservation programmes. Written materials have educational contact, but less impact than training programmes. Their effects are long term and similar to those of training.

Unfortunately poor education or understanding often leads to waste of precious financial resources in needless maintenance or operating costs. Here, community groups can play a role through mutual self-help in improving the lot of the community. Again training programmes can help the residents about the more appropriate methods for maintaining their properties. The importance can be recognised by reference to the related question of the life expectancy of a property. These issues point to a real value of community involvement in the development in the rehabilitation and conservation processes. This being the case, training becomes essential. Based on an assumption of such a need, adequate time should be allowed for any change in resident group responsibilities in the conservation process. Programme changes should not be undertaken until training of
resident groups is completed. Better identification of the special needs of our people is essential. In this, greater local involvement should be stressed.

At the heart of the aided self-help concept is the fact that it runs rather contrary to conventional administrative attitudes and methods, with their deep rooted and entrenched traditions which have been based on a long term involvement with conventional paternalistic development and conservation programmes.

The complexities of aided self-help bring with them certain complications arising from participation. These include residents having to deal with a number of administrative departments and the probability that departments are relatively ignorant of and most likely unable to interact with the others. This all appears somewhat ironical given that the economists, architects, conservationists, planners, etc. have now become so accustomed to the idea of being servants of the State, that they have lost touch with the concept of the State being the servant of the people. Overcoming these conventions and hardened attitudes and paving a way for alternative procedure will no doubt require considerable efforts on all fronts (CHURCHILL et al., 1980: 10).

This predicament, combined with the fact that international experience with aided self-help process, has shown that the conventional institutions are often very cumbersome and slow to operate. Because of its novelty the process has given rise to a need for the creation of new administrative units with specific responsibility for such aided self-help programme.

Simply creating a new and integrated agency will not in itself solve the problem because the existing bureaucracy cannot be overlooked. Whilst the formation of a new 'conservation centre' might well be desirable, it must be capable of interacting positively with the existing bureaucracy, because the settlement under development is part of the greater urban community and as such cannot be divorced from it. In addition to this, the new 'conservation centre' would also be required to engage in a dialogue with the target population about the planning, organisation and implementation of the conservation programme, and this requires some form of community representational
structure. The participation of a highly organised resident group should not necessarily be considered a hinderance as its involvement can have a number of beneficial spin offs.

1. It can create more integrated urban communities - a much needed factor in this approach.
2. It can assist with the prevention of speculation in the conservation programme, as the needs, priorities and the aspirations of the people can be known.
3. It will increase the responsibility and awareness of residents and reduce the possibility of defaults.
4. The general assumption of responsibility in such matters as administrative and management will not only reduce the costs but will also enhance the maintenance of neighbourhoods and properties through collective efforts.
5. The participation of the community in the planning of development and conservation programmes would allow the residents to learn much along the way that would usefully contribute to the further development and success of this process.

The main issue remains to identify the extent to which aided self-help can contribute to meeting our conservation needs. The value of self-help has been noted for its economic and social benefits. Economic benefits, however, relate only to direct economic benefits accruing to self-help initiatives. These are additional to the social advantages, such as improved living conditions, pride of achievements, and satisfied residents who have a more distant economic benefits.

The involvement of our people in the rehabilitation and conservation of our urban historic areas appears to be the most appropriate approach. This approach must be carefully tailored so as to start with small scale projects which can be easily understood and directed by community self-help. We should not make lots of promises that will generate high expectations to what conservation partnerships can or should provide. When realistic programmes fail to satisfy unrealistic expectations or promises, the result can be disillusionment, discouragement, apathy, or obstruction, none of which assist in the aided self-help process. Success or the appearance of success is essential for good
self-help programmes. Negative perceptions of a programme or a record of failure, effectively inhibits self-help. It is important that the impetus of success, no matter how small, should be maintained. Lack of flexibility in programmes to respond to the problems of historic quarters, could be a major obstacle to conservation programmes through self-help. Bureaucracy, and insufficient local involvement or control, could be obstacles. Complementary programmes in information and standards should be revised to meet the needs, priorities and aspirations of our people. They need to understand clearly what programmes offer, and what is expected. Failure of communication could lead to widespread misunderstanding of the value and purpose of the conservation programme which could in turn lead to rapid damage to the partnerships credibility. Further, public participation in the development and conservation activities should not be seen as contradictory to contractors' interests. Interference or unfair competitions should be considered as areas of concern. Otherwise, self-help and contracting abilities should be complementary.

Self-help activities could be enhanced by the removal of obstacles such as programme complexity and financing arrangements. Clear communication matching the participants’ perspectives could lead towards more efficient and acceptable use of conservation programmes. They then could be related to a wider set of issues that encompass a broader environment than a mere physical fabric of the historic quarters.

MIDDLETON (1983) makes a valuable contribution to the above discussion by suggesting four main elements that any successful self-help conservation programme in Palestine should incorporate:

1. recognition of the value of self-help in its various forms;
2. clarification of the purpose of self-help programmes;
3. elimination of obstacles to this approach;
4. determination of positive programme initiatives in support of self-help.

He also identified four common elements that any successful self-help programme in Palestine should possess; 1. good group initiative; 2. good group communication; 3. good group mobilisation; and 4. a funding structure that supports these.
2.4. COMMUNITY PARTICIPATION IN THE ‘WESTBANK’

A major topic in the literature on community involvement is the definition of the term ‘community participation’, since it has many dimensions and may be approached in a variety of ways. SYAGGA et al. (1989) claims that within the realm of the social sciences, community participation remains an inadequate developed conceptual area. Thus, it is subject to various definitions which are not always compatible. In this regard, several writers argue that it is almost impossible to establish a universal definition of community participation. RAHMAN (1981) for example, argues that given its complex ‘nature’, participation can be explored but not contained in a formal definition (cited in OAKLEY & MARSDEN, 1984).

However, despite the diversity in the objectives sought through community participation, and the different ways in which the term has been understood and interpreted, a working statement or definition is necessary if the process of development and conservation is to be understood at all. The following statement seems to be the most appropriate one to our context:

"What gives real meaning to popular participation is the collective effort by the people concerned to pool their efforts and whatever other resources they decide to pool together, to attain objectives they set for themselves. In this regard participation is viewed as an active process in which participants take initiatives and action that is stimulated by their own thinking and deliberation and over which they can exert effective control. The idea of passive participation which only involves the people in actions that have been thought out or designed by others and are controlled by others are unacceptable".

(Underlining is original; Quoted in OAKLEY & MARSDEN, 1984: X).

We should not consider our people’s participation as some kind of quantifiable ingredient to be injected into a development or conservation project. It should be essentially considered as a qualitative process which, if it is to be meaningful, should imply some fundamental shifts in thinking and action. As well it should emerge as a result of some kind of bottom-up process.

The involvement of the population in the physical work of implementing a project can hardly be considered as community participation unless there is at least some degree of sharing of decisions with the community. When an outside agency remains in total control of the process, while the beneficiaries are asked to give their labour directly, one
cannot speak of community participation even when an element of self-help is involved. Public involvement requires identification with the movement, which grows only out of involvement in thinking, planning, deciding, acting and evaluating, focused on one purpose, namely socio-economic development. It is a mental process as well as a physical one (WHITE, 1982).

Nevertheless, it may be unrealistic to insist that 'true' community participation is only achieved where our people are in full control of the conservation process or decide entirely for themselves which activities should be embarked upon. In fact this seems too ambitious and we should recognise the difficulties in fully involving all the social, economic and political aspects and the consequent practical problems.

Our people, however, should be given the chance to make active decisions about their environment. This is a fundamental human need. It is a need to create and to control. If they have the opportunity to upgrade their historic environment, they will do it, enjoy it, and gain enormous satisfaction from what they have done. They should be given a chance to identify with the part of the environment in which they live and work; they want some sense of ownership, identity and territory.

We strongly believe that community participation should be considered as central to socio-economic development of our nation for four main reasons:

1. it enables the residents of the urban historic areas to make their needs felt to policy makers.
2. it may increase the resources required for development and conservation by harnessing and channelling local knowledge, skills, labour and capital to needs-satisfying programmes and projects.
3. it will ensure a more equitable distribution of the benefits of economic growth and development.
4. people desire and get innate satisfaction from active involvement in the making and implementation of decisions which contribute to the satisfaction of their basic needs.
Further, community participation in the conservation of our built heritage could, as with the case of our political Intifada strengthen interpersonal relationships, foster self-confidence, improves material conditions and reduce feelings of powerlessness and alienation. It could foster a sense of belonging and integration of communities and bring about psychological changes in the participants themselves that will better prepare them to participate in all changes that affect them and their political, social and physical environment which in turn could help them to contribute positively to our national development.

SMITH (1983: 51-52) makes a useful contribution to our discussion concerning community participation in Palestine; he suggests several issues that have to take place if it is to be effective:

1. allow the community to determine their priorities and needs and also to point out which of them are feasible given resource constraints.
2. encourage the community to participate at their own pace and in whatever form is convenient to them.
3. show successful projects where a community either initiated or implemented through participation.
4. enable the beneficiaries to decide whether to participate in an already given and identified project, telling them about how it is to be implemented, and how they can be involved.

Community participation should be recognised as a form of training in itself, which can ensure that 'project' outputs are not only achieved but maintained. It should be seen as a two-way process and not just a means by which our people can express opinions on alternatives set before them. An attempt must be made to give them a sufficient amount of information to make them aware of the wider implications of their choice. In other words, participation should be seen as an educative process.

As a social process community participation should aim at assisting our people to clarify and express their needs, and to take collective action in meeting them. It should aim at helping participants learn from each other and learn by doing their conservation tasks.
By this they learn to protect their own interests and tackle the lack of responsiveness among the officials towards their needs and aspirations. This requires that participants should share information. Efficiency in solving problems, however, depends on the quality of such information which should be of practical use to all participants. "...participation in the sharing of information depends on the genuine motivation to do so. The information should be sufficient to describe a given situation and should enable the participants to plan actions to deal with the situation. The information upon which participation can proceed should be acceptable and reliable" (BAQUER (1983: 37).

This could be achieved through programmes of action which bring together all actors within the partnerships so that formal and informal channels of communication are opened among and between them. Those of us who will be involved in the training process should know what to teach and should be capable of determining the content, methodology and setting of the training. All actors should collaborate with each other in devising such programmes and in taking decisions acceptable to all of them.

Further, the notion of training should not be confused with that of qualification. It is not necessary that trainees hold formal qualifications in the subject of their interest. "...The emphasis in training programmes should be on practical experience and only those who know about the problems of community participation, who care enough about them, and who are willing to explore new ways of finding solutions, should be given the responsibility of training programmes" (BAQUER, 1983: 39).

What Palestine needs at this stage are service and training programmes to set up developmental and conservational learning situations, to increase the existing capacities of its people, and to stimulate capacities that are dormant or suppressed. The partnership must be forged between all actors within it in order to improve the living conditions of our poor historic urban areas. Building the trust and cooperation required for this process often requires the use of skills and sensitivities new to all parties, from professional planners and City Councils to the residents themselves.
Finally, one major force that could give our people strong feelings about their historic
settlements is locality. The desire to improve and protect one's locality and home is
the major drive that compels all sorts of people to participate in official plans and
programmes. A locality that no resident would electively stir himself to improve or
defend must be the kind of settlement we endeavour to avoid.

2.5. LEVELS OF PARTICIPATION
ARNSTEIN (1971) has defined and analyzed the different types of participation into
eight levels. She has illustrated and arranged the eight levels in a ladder pattern, with
each rung corresponding to the extent of citizens' power in determining the end product.
These are divided into three categories: pseudo-participation, partial participation and
full participation in all levels. In the light of this confused issue she argues that
citizen's participation works at various levels.

At the bottom of her ladder of citizen participation is 'manipulation,' where the
participants are educated to see the goodness of the planning proposals before them, or
cured of the desire to protest. The ladder then rises through various degrees of tokenism
to citizen control at the top, where full managerial powers are placed in the hands of the
participants.

The higher up the ladder one gets, the more power is given to the user and more fruitful
the outcome is likely to be. There is also a threshold of involvement below which the
exercise is likely to be counterproductive. Precisely where the threshold lies depends
on the nature of the project (WATES and KNEWITT, 1987).

However, WILCOX (1994: 4,8) has simplified Sherry Arnstien's ladder of participation,
he suggests thinking of five levels or 'stances' which we believe could be followed in
Palestine in order to offer increasing degree of control to resident involvement in the
development and conservation processes.

1. Information; the least you can do is tell people what is planned.
2. Consultation; you offer a number of options and listen to the feedback you get.
3. Deciding together; you encourage others to provide some additional ideas and options, and join in deciding the best way forward.

4. Acting together; not only do different interests decide together what is best, but they form a partnership to carry it out.

5. Supporting independent community initiatives. You help others do what they want - perhaps within a framework of grants, advice and support provided by the resource holder.

The 'lower' level of participation keeps control with the initiator - but they lead to less commitment from others. However, WILCOX (1994) provides us with useful detailed discussion of each of these levels so that when we adopt them to our context, effective participation can be assured. He also identified four phases of participation; initiation; preparation; participation and continuation. And for participation to work best, all the stakeholder should be satisfied with the level of participation at which they are involved.

To maintain these levels of participation would not be easy, but our people and professionals within the conservation partnerships who then deal in the appropriate levels of participation, will see better results and higher standards of quality of life.

2.5.1 Participation in the Emergency Plan

I. Participation in Planning Design Stage

In rehabilitation programmes, participation has proved to be of prime importance for a successful outcome. This importance lies under the diversity of interests involved, therefore, participation through communication helps to avoid the conflicts between the different actors within the partnerships.

Our people shall be entitled to be 'informed' of planning and design proposals and must be given the opportunity to make representations on such matters.

"The design process and criteria should not be cloaked in mystery for this will only drive away the public or create misunderstandings. Public opposition will prevent preservationists from getting to first base while blind acceptance will last
Architects should learn to listen to professionals from other fields and to the public. The majority of our people are sensitive to their environment although they cannot discuss projects in architectural and conservational jargons. Those of them who say, "We know what we like" should not be discounted. Non-architects are often astute observers who are sensitive to the scale of the urban environment perhaps more so than architects who tend to look only at the problem of architectural statement and seldom at urban context (SYMONDS, 1980).

In the same context ALEXANDER (1984: 11) gives great support to our discussion concerning participation in the planning and design stage in Palestine when he suggests:

"All decisions about what to build or plan, and how to do it, will be in the hands of the public. ..., there shall be a public planning/design team for every proposed project; any group of the public may initiate a project or part of it, and only those projects initiated by the public shall be considered for funding; the planning staff shall give the members of the planning/design teams whatever patterns, diagnosis and additional help they need for their design. The time that the public need to do a project, shall be treated as a legitimate and essential part of their activities; the planning/design team shall complete their schematic design before any architect or planner begins to play a major role".

There are two methods of public participation in this stage: indirect, by responding positively to project surveys, and direct by expressing ideas and interests. However, in many instances surveys concentrate only on the economic and superficial social data. But well planned surveys can provide vital and specific data when the people are given the opportunity to express their ideas and feelings about their neighbourhood (Chapter Seven). The result of the survey, therefore, has to be discussed with the people in order to reach an agreement over those matters.

II. Participation In The Implementation Stage

Participation in the implementation of programs is not a new concept. In fact there has been considerable experience in the use of self-help to construct and improve the housing conditions. According to UNICEF (1982: 19), the idea of self-help was established in the 1950s for the simple reason of reducing the cost of housing for low-
income families where individual families could construct their dwelling according to a standard design. Another aspect of this is where co-operation between families to build each others houses took place. Nowadays, different forms of self-help are observed, which vary from the single independent self builder to mutual and organized co-operatives schemes.

However, TURNER (1985) argues that the involvement of the residents in the physical work of implementing rehabilitation projects cannot in fact be considered as community participation, if there is no sharing of the decision making process between the agency and the community, even in cases where the beneficiaries are called to give their labour directly.

Organizing self-help labour in the implementation of programmes requires different approaches with regard to the kind of work to be accomplished. This work could be divided into: work benefiting the individual or household; infrastructure work and; community facilities.

It is argued that participation in work benefiting the individual or household is perhaps the easiest to organise. While organising participation in implementation programmes where the community is benefiting is seen as the most difficult to accomplish (UNITED NATIONS, 1975). However, the long term benefits of participating in programmes where the whole community is benefiting, such as infrastructure services, are not only that maintenance of the facilities will be improved, but that when the community can be organized to participate in such work, it is likely to remain sufficiently organized to continue making improvements benefiting the entire community. Therefore, participation in the implementation stage is envisaged when it is based on the development of community organisation incorporating long term goals (see Chapter Eight).
2.5.2. Participation in the Longer Term Measures

I. Participation In The Post Implementation Management

It is fully recognised nowadays that besides the growing concern with the loss of the existing housing stock is the rising awareness of the fact that management and maintenance are as important as, or even more significant than the initial design, construction and even capital financing (UNITED NATIONS, 1975).

Generally speaking the importance of these aspects lies in the fact that within the conventional attitude and given that government resources are limited, most officials present on the site after the implementation phase are taken away leaving the residents to deal with the many different agencies and officials concerned. Frequently, these officials and agencies have little or no presence in the community. In this respect, it is envisaged that participation of the community in the post-implementation management can overcome many problems, especially when a significant level of control over the community affairs is exercised by the community itself.

According to VAN WIJK-SIJBESMA (1984), the public can make a real contribution in this stage, by providing volunteers for training as local operators or caretakers, by paying for operation, maintenance, repairs, replacement and extension, by taking responsibilities for the inspection, by reporting problems and through social control as individuals and groups.

However, community post-implementation management can take place through community organizations, i.e co-operative, tenant associations, owner associations or voluntary groups and so forth. Such organizations may also play a role in the implementation phase or be formed during the process. It is these organisations which were able to fill the gap left in public services by the IMG and which were behind the sustainability of our political Intifada.

II. Participating In The Evaluation Stage

The evaluation process is very important as a feedback for the next phase of the project or for any future projects. It offers an opportunity to evaluate the effectiveness of
participation. Those of us who will be in charge should be aware that the level of
participation is rarely consistent in all phases of the project, but that participation varies.
Evaluation can help determine whether the level of observed participation is due to
success in meeting people’s needs or is due to less desirable reasons, such as lack of a
voice in project control, lack of organization, or lack of incentives (WEGGE (1982: 11).

Our objective at the end is the creation of resident groups able to diagnose and analyze
their own problems, to decide upon collective action and to carry out such action to deal
with these problems, without direction form outside.

There is nothing new about this objective. One of the most common interpretations of
community participation, however, equates it with achieving power. Power here means
access to and control of resources. Participation which is authentically important for
the empowerment of our resident groups, must involve the redistribution of power to
users who will share responsibility for planning and decision-making.

In this regard, OAKLEY and MARSDEN (1984: 26) suggest that the understanding of
community participation in terms of "achieving power" comprise three major elements:

1. the sharing of power and scarce resources.
2. deliberate efforts by social groups to control their own destinies and improve
   their living conditions;
3. opening up opportunities ‘from below’.

This process of ‘empowering’ is linked materially to the creation of ‘assets’; that is in
the building up of a minimal economic base for resident groups in order to help them
achieve the means to intervene more powerfully in the development and conservation
processes. Therefore, attention should not be diverted from the continuing and serious
question of access to tangible resources.

"Community empowerment then is that process of learning how to fish. The first
step in learning is psychic ownership of the self and of personal potential
(owning the capacity to act, rather than to be acted on). A second step is the
acquisition of resources in the environment, including developing a capacity to
be active, cohesive and effective as communities". (THOMAS, 1985: 20)
This notion implies that outside agencies should do as little as possible to interfere with residents’ projects. An open-ended planning approach allows for spontaneity, diversity, flexibility, and local control. It permits the environment to evolve in complexity and to adapt to the changing needs of different groups of residents. When it involves self-help, self-helpers can empower others and be empowered themselves. The process of empowerment operates at the levels of the individual, group, family, organisation and community, and also in the different sectors of people’s lives.

Our people, as users of the historic environment, have the right and the obligation to be involved in its improvements. When the decisions concerning environment are made without them, they can turn out to be oppressive ones. Institutions should be developed to help them to take those decisions and not to have the decisions taken for them.

"The vital difference between organizations which use people and organizations which are used by people raises crucial issues at the policy level. If local decisions are made by central bodies, those decisions are bound to implement more or less standardized programs and projects for particular social groups in particular places and at particular times. But if local decisions are made by local people, those decisions must be ordered and supported by institutionalized services which must be open to all, in all places and at all times, within the normative framework of those institutions." (TURNER, 1972: 154).

The main challenge, therefore, is reorienting the behaviour of both administrative personnel in the Local Authorities and the PNA agencies and the local people and their own organizations, toward collaborative development with and for the people rather than one imposed on them.

This is not easy and has its own pitfalls, partnerships need to tread with utmost determination. While theoretically there are not many things that can go wrong, in practice it can lead to a very difficult situation for the planners and consequently for the people.

The concept of participation should not be distorted and used as a camouflage for political leaders, who encourage the people to work and join a political party, but have no particular interest in the general development. It should not be used as a way of legitimising and justifying for political interest, where politicians propose forms of
pseudo-cooperatives or self-help methods but they do not allow the people to express their own requirements.

The political framework is useful when it is necessary to define a doctrine in favour of participation, but it is unproductive when it does not achieve the ‘real’ forms of participation, and negates its concept in practice. In this context BUGNICOURT (1982: 60) defines the authentic meaning of participation and the real action of government as follows:

"In actual fact, it is only by sharing the life of the people and together with them - on the basis of their needs, their aspirations, and of relations of trust forged in the daily struggle of life - that one can determine whether or not a particular activity involves genuine popular participation".

On the other hand, institutions or organisations should not constitute a sort of ‘screen,’ where on one side of it they pretend to reflect the people’s interest, while on the other only the directors or the administrative staff have a degree of real intervention in the decision making. If participation means to share the power, then the structure provided to do that should allow people to get involved in their dimension and degree of development.

Another traditional limitation to community participation, is when the local people are considered less intelligent and disadvantaged in terms of culture. The technicians and professionals tend to think they are more capable of solving certain problems by taking important decisions by themselves; but perhaps the biggest potential for participation is rooted in the traditional knowledge of the people. Consequently they are cutting out an important source of information and cooperation.

"Project staff and authorities often treat the poor in an authoritarian manner, because professionals and administrators feel they know what is best for the poor residents". (Quoted in SYAGGA et al, 1989: 54).

Another confused issue of participation could occur when a foreign theory is used without previous studies of application and considered as an important aim of a local or national programme. It will not obtain good results, unless we make exact changes and adopt them to our particular needs, or we should predict the results otherwise.
A generalization of the concept of participation is another barrier. This is because the reduction of different realities to simple abstractions permits the creation of an order of priorities and issues, but it does not represent the real facts and situation of our people.

It has been proved, that certain kinds of participation fit in only one context and at a specific time. Therefore, community participation presents very particular issues according to different contexts, and it cannot be a generalized concept to solve almost every kind of problem raised by the people and cities' growth. Indeed many of the people's aspirations can be served, but they have to find systems that they can afford to provide their solutions. That is because if participation in development programmes is applied as a dogma and because of a generalized method, then serious difficulties have to be thought through and surmounted (BUGNICOURT, 1982).

It is clear now that the identification of obstacles to community participation is directly related to our perspective on it. In this respect OKALEY and MARSDEN (1984) argue that when participation is viewed as a means, it suggests a set of obstacles usually associated with the operational procedures of the task undertaken. When it is viewed as an end it suggests obstacles which are more associated with structural and institutional relationships, both at the national and local level.

2.6. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION.

This chapter has attempted to examine some alternative approaches to the development and conservation processes in Palestine. We have done this by assessing some of the potential of self-help and community participation, and touching upon the implicit value judgement. We have endeavoured to focus on the available literature on the topic and its applicability and adaptability to the Palestinian context. This allowed us to touch upon specific local issues across the country, as well as broad philosophical views on the value of self-help and community participation.

It has been argued that community development and people involvement are seen as practical approaches that animate a great autonomy and more control of the inhabitants over matters affecting their lives. Unless the local community is involved in the
conservation process the results are likely to be cosmetic and, therefore, short lived. Hence, the role of the professionals should be reviewed; rather than professional and experts taking exclusive control of the conservation process, the local community should be involved in the establishment of their priorities and immediate needs.

A poor track record of the conventional conservation approach in meeting the ever-growing conservation problems and needs of the historic urban areas, combined with the growing awareness of the substantial contribution that the informal self-help conservation approach has made in adding to the conservation and upgrading of the existing housing stock, have borne in their wake a concept of conservation by participation. Although still in the throes of its evolution, this concept is gaining momentum as a possible alternative for conventional conservation, especially in developing countries. It can offer the underemployed and unemployed people the opportunity to learn skills and thus improve their position on the labour market. The author of this dissertation encourages the self-help approach for conserving the Palestinian built heritage. He recognises that further action to strengthen Palestinians' ability to conserve their historic properties should meet broad support by all actors in the conservation process.

Only limited resources are available to us and any major change in this situation at the moment is unlikely to happen. Under such circumstances, for conservation programmes to be successful, attention should been paid to alternative solutions which could make inroads in tackling the problems of the historic urban areas, notably the various aided self-help approaches, especially upgrading. If more functional and socially desirable policies and programmes are to be achieved, then the role of all actors in the conservation process must be to stimulate, support and marshal available resources in order to enable our people to make a continuous investment in their historical environment, perhaps on a participatory basis. With a shift in emphasis from the conventional approach and attitude we could achieve much by the encouragement and enhancement of realistic and practical alternative approaches.
The integration of all actors into a larger and possibly stronger partnerships must be seen as a plus for the conservation movement and the historic urban environment. If this integration is to be achieved there must be recognition and acceptance of the role of the residents in the development, rehabilitation and conservation processes; for, given the complex nature of conservation needs and cultural dimension of it, the residents are most probably best qualified to identify and decide on priority needs. But this aspect of need cannot be taken in isolation, as it is affected for the worse by the ineffectiveness of the present situation.

With this understanding, we believe that it is time for us to think afresh and let our people be a part of the environment they live in. Should we try to use other alternatives to formal conservation? Should we try to use public participation and self-help measures? Our experiences in other fields, and during the Intifada, have shown positive results. Can we succeed in extending this experience to the field of conservation? This is what this research is going to investigate. Several questions will be answered; for instance: What has been the impact of the IMG in changing the identity of our historic environment? How did our people react to the IMG policies which are aiming at suppressing their identity and culture? How did they transform themselves to resist the status quo? What role did the Intifada play in this process of transformation? What is the impact of all this on the conservation movement in the ‘Westbank’? What is our people’s attitude towards their cultural heritage? What is their attitude towards the present approach in dealing with the historic urban areas? And what is their willingness to participate in upgrading and conserving their historic properties? But first we need to look at the way this research was carried out, therefore the next chapter is going to discuss the methodology and the design of the research that have been applied to test the hypotheses that have been put forward.
CHAPTER THREE

Research Design and Methodology
CHAPTER THREE

RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY

3.0 INTRODUCTION

The aim of this study is to devise an urgent framework of measures to protect the remaining monuments and settlements in the ‘Westbank’ - Palestine, which has been occupied since 1967. At the same time to examine what practical and self-help conservation measures we have to take, to protect, repair and conserve our cultural property, even under the constraints of occupation.

In this respect, the main focus of the present study is to develop a new and hopefully more appropriate approach to the problems of conservation and rehabilitation of the old housing stock, where the emphasis is to be based on the people and their immediate needs and resources, within the concepts of community development, self-help and a framework of participation. In order to assess and develop these concepts further, a ‘case study’ will be used to explore the main issues. This study is the result of years of experience in the field, the outcome of which will be presented later.

Moreover, the issues here are complex and longstanding. There are both external and internal forces, which have contributed to the deteriorating historic areas and buildings. The external force is the military occupation mostly beyond the control of people. While the internal forces of the community have their negative effect on the built environment. In addition, there are other factors, such as modernization and westernization, all of which affects the morale of the Palestinian nation. All these make the investigation difficult; no specific method is available to unravel what has become a deliberate policy of deterioration on the part of the IMG. Therefore, the approach and research methodologies have been tailored to suit the various aspects of the situation.

DAYARATNE (1992), pointed out the way to give a holistic understanding to research problems. He writes:

"The things which may be observed, the events which may be recorded, the interviews which may be conducted will only reveal parts of the whole; yet the whole is not merely the collection of these parts, and therefore need to be also
The investigation is concerned to bridge the gaps behind the reasons for the deterioration and decay of the historic housing stock. We will consider people's, as well as their political and social, attitudes towards the role of community development, self-help and citizen participation. For instance, the great majority of the residents of the Old Town of Nablus showed a high level of enthusiasm for participation in upgrading and preserving their town.

The present chapter defines and evaluates the methodologies that have been used to carry out the fieldwork. Furthermore, the positive and negative aspects involved in the study and how they interact with one another are examined. We describe the problems of sampling that arose and how to avoid misinformation and misinterpretation. We also explain the design of the questionnaire and the characteristics of the area under study, such as its quarters, location, political situation and people.

3.1 THE RESEARCH APPROACH

It is understood that the results of any research can be strongly affected by the clarity and insight with which the researcher is able to interpret key variables, within a theoretical framework, and in our case into practical policies and measures that can hopefully assist in reversing the present trends (BLALOCK and BLALOCK, 1982). In environmental studies, the methods and techniques are varied and numerous, however, the selection of any particular criterion is a reflection of the perspective from which the evaluation is made. In turn, this perspective may be influenced by the goals that are identified for a specific situation. Therefore, although there are no absolutely 'right' or 'wrong' ways, there are some ways that are more appropriate in a set of given circumstances. In Nablus because of its history over particularly the last 40 years or so many older people, such as those who have lived in the Old Town are disillusioned and demoralised about their situation. Now that the peace process is in progress it is hard for them to take seriously any suggestion that things can change, particularly by any action they can take themselves. Over their working life they have been heavily controlled and brutalised.
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It has frequently been pointed out therefore that a major weakness of any attempt to evaluate existing housing stock is that they tend to ignore the motivation held by those who, after all, are the very target of any housing rehabilitation or upgrading programme, namely the residents themselves. To compensate for that, the criterion of residents' satisfaction has been used with increasing frequency in a number of recent studies (GUTMAN and WESTERGAARD, 1974; MICHELSON, 1977; ANDERSON et al., 1983). It is hoped that this again will provide more reliable information about what the residents regard as acceptable quality for their houses, for instance, proper cooking, hygiene and play spaces and facilities. More importantly however this author believes that as he is of and from the community he is in a position to better appreciate what the respondents are saying.

In her discussion on the development of qualitative methods in research, LOW (1987) suggests: "...environmental design research as a field that includes qualitative methodologies, but that it relies on research and data generated by quantitative methods characteristic of the psychological and social science" (LOW, 1987: 279; Quoted in SENAN, 1993). This research relies mainly on the quantitative approach, but at the same time, provides some analysis and qualitative evaluation about the extent of the situation, assessing the validity of responses.

The first step was the selection of the case study, as a way of probing into specific situations and circumstances of the subject under investigation. In this study, the Old Town of Nablus was chosen to investigate different aspects of the Palestinian cultural heritage in crisis. We believe this has a number of advantages. Firstly, the scope of the research was more precisely targeted; and therefore within the resources of the D Phil, more manageable. Secondly, there is a desperate need to prepare plans to save this area from total collapse. Thirdly, this is an area whose people are well known to the author and that this being the case he will be able to cut through the most false or exaggerated answers from a well surveyed group.

The fieldwork was conducted between October 1993 and March 1994 when the Intifada was in full swing. Four main issues have been the focus for the investigation: the impact
of the IMG occupation on the Palestinian built environment; the current situation in the Old Town; the people's attitude to the present approach by the Municipality; and finally, their attitude to the concepts of community development, self-help and citizen participation.

The detailed investigation focused on the Old Town's environmental condition, the residents living conditions, their evaluation of the current services provided and previous experience about upgrading their area on a voluntary basis.

24 Fourth and Fifth year students in the Department of Architecture at An Najah National University in Nablus helped carry out the fieldwork; 18 males and 6 females. The team was given a one week intensive course about the intentions of community development, self-help work and citizen participation, which included the details of the present project, interviewing ordinary people as well as key figures, observing conditions against answers given, methods of data collection and the pitfalls of completing a questionnaire. The team then was divided into six equal groups of 3 males and a female. Each group was responsible for completing forty questionnaires and all relevant interviews in one particular quarter, of the six quarters, that formed the Old Town of Nablus.

The female interviewers were important for interviewing the women, especially when the householder was a female. They played an important rule in convincing female heads to complete the questionnaire and reply to the questions.

Since most of the team members were local they understood the social system, and knew who the important figures in the area were, they also understood many of the local conflicts and difficulties. What they didn't know, but had to learn on the job, was whether what they heard was within the range of plausibility. However, the author was able to accompany each team in the early stages to introduce them to the area.

At the beginning we had to expect, particularly in a town like Nablus, that the field teams, would be approached by some members of the community with all kinds of
personal and family problems. Should they have taken up such problems, they never would have been able to conduct the work effectively. For this reason, and in spite of the fact that the team members had been trained to be good listeners, and in spite of the importance of establishing individual rapport, it was necessary to concentrate on group problems and objectives, on longer term issues and not on immediate application of palliative measures (CLINARD, 1966).

Moreover, each of the six groups had to report back on a daily basis. These reports were discussed and new directions were given to the teams. In addition, each member of the six groups had to report about their own experience, impressions, and observations. Furthermore, each group had to write a final complete report about their experience, impressions, observations, feelings, findings and people's attitude towards the field study and its proposed concepts. Such reports were very important as they pointed out some of the problems met in conducting the survey, as well as exploring issues not mentioned in the questionnaire (some of these reports are presented in Appendix 3.1).

The investigation relied on both primary and secondary data sources, the former gathered from the case studies, and the Municipality of Nablus, and relevant private Palestinian institutions (Al-Haq Law in the Service of Man - Jerusalem; Jerusalem Centre for Strategic Studies; Centre of Arab Studies - Jerusalem; Riwaq, Centre for Architectural Conservation - Ramallah; CDC, Centre for Development Consultancy - Jerusalem). Secondary data compromised of a comprehensive review of documents, reports, papers and works done on the area either by Nablus Municipality or private people.

3.2 DATA COLLECTION PROCEDURE
The reasons behind the selection of Nablus are that:

1. Planners and practitioners have neglected the historic buildings in the city,
2. the author's own town, avoiding requesting Israeli permission to move,
3. easier to conduct the fieldwork research in the tense political atmosphere when the interviewee are not questioned by strangers.
The Old Town was divided according to its six quarters—known by the local people as "Harat" as follows: (see Figs. 3.1 and 3.2).

Fig. 3.1: The Old Town within the City of Nablus
Source: Nablus Municipality

Fig. 3.2: The Main Quarters within the Old Town of Nablus.
Source: Base Map, Nablus Municipality.
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1- Haret El-Hablleh, to the north-east.
2- Haret El-Yasmeneh, on the south-West.
3- Haret El-Qaryoun, on the south-east side.
4- Haret El-Qeisariyeh, on the south-east corner.
5- Haret El-Ghareb, on the west side.
6- Haret El-Hanableh, near "Haret" EL-Ghareb to the east.

Maps of these six quarters were used to choose a random sample of dwellings covering the whole area. With this method, the first sample member is selected from a list by a random number and subsequent numbers are selected according to the fixed sample interval. The sample interval is obtained by dividing the total number of names on the list by the required sample. In the present study, the impossibility of obtaining detailed information about the households living in the Old Town, or even a list of all the households within each quarter limited the choice of the sampling method. Different households from different social backgrounds live within the same quarter or even within the same housh (court) of houses. Consequently, the random of the sample selection is likely to be representative of all those living in the Old Town.

In the survey we wanted to obtain basic socio-economic data on the status of the residents to see if there was any significant correlation between their 'status' and their views on the main questions of satisfaction and participation.

The size of the sample was fixed with reference to the researcher's capacity to carry out the survey, while using the research exercise as a teaching technique for the students. It must be admitted that this may be not the most satisfactory way of carrying out the survey but our resources are limited and we are operating under some constraints. We also took into account the degree to which the population is homogeneous, since the research findings will be relevant on a qualitative basis of people's opinions and feelings concerning their residential environment, rather than being a set of quantitative predictions when experience has shown these are virtually meaningless in our present circumstances. It was considered appropriate to have a sample size of 40 questionnaires per quarter from the six quarters with a total of 240 households. However, to cover for
possible non-response from some sampled households, an additional 20 households were added. Thus, in total the survey intended to administer a total of 260 questionnaires. This sample size was thought to be adequate to yield effective representative findings. It would also keep the sampling error deviation within reasonable limits. In fact the number of respondents in the whole sample was 237 households.

The aim behind observation as a survey technique is to capture a picture of the elements involved in shaping the physical and socio-cultural environments; the shape and extent of the physical constructs, attitudes, life style and social relations. Observation helps to clarify the general situation and to act as a check on what was being said by the respondents.

PATTON (1990), pointed out the importance of data collection through observation. He writes: "The purpose of observational data is to describe the setting that was observed, the activities that took place in that setting, the people who participated in those activities, and the meaning of what was observed from the perspective of those observed. The description must be factual, accurate, and thorough without being cluttered by irrelevant minutiae and trivia" (PATTON, 1990: 202; Quoted in SENAN, 1993). BECHTEL and ZEISEL (1987), categorised the observer into four types: the naive, the participant, the hidden and the professional observer. The approach we adopted was aimed at professional observation within the limitations of the individual team members. The author specified the elements to be observed and the features to be studied.

In the event many contacts were made with community leaders of the different Palestinian factions and local key figures. Informal meetings and casual tours within the historic quarters of the Old Town were made over the course of three months where photographs, sketches and notes were taken. Observations made during these meetings and tours highlighted various aspects of the community life and gave useful information of the attitudes of some residents, and the common problems being faced within those quarters. Also observations of the internal layout of dwellings were carried out by the interviewing team. However, the validity of observation methods are subject to personal
bias, and this the absolute reliability of observational techniques was not even across the board, but they were a useful and necessary bonus to be added to the findings from the interviews.

In order to assess and test the proposed hypothesis, the acquisition of accurate and adequate information is vital. But the data collection technique mentioned earlier, observations, cannot be recognised as the most systematic and adequate way to address the problems under consideration, i.e. the study of the community. It was therefore important to supplement this technique with a more reliable method.

In the field, open ended interviewing has long been used as a systematic way of gathering information from large social groups. It is also used in obtaining objective and quantitative data as well as securing information about attitudes, behaviour, wishes and personal experiences. Furthermore, interviewing enables the researcher to check his observations and allows him to study motivations, emotional responses, uncover memories of the past and plans of the future (ABDUL-RAHIM, no date: 30-33). In the present study the purpose of the interviews was to broaden the area of investigation and to identify the impacts of both the IMG occupation, as well as collecting data about peoples' social process, attitudes and opinions.

Semi-structured interviews were conducted with officials, local practitioners, former mayors, municipal engineers, university teachers, archaeologists, city merchants, ordinary people, etc. as well as two Israelis; the manager of the National Trust in Jerusalem, and the head of Sadna, Architecture and Interior Design Workshop, Tel Aviv who was involved with the restoration of Old Jaffa. Discussions were also held with other individuals conversant with the issues of concern to this study, including those who had worked in Palestinian institutions but have retired or were dismissed by the IMG and those cadres well informed about the Palestinian situation.

The advantage of semi-structured interviews is that the respondents express themselves in their own way, the interviewer to contain the discussion and to keep the information
being sought in the forefront of the discussion. In addition, the interviewer can follow up on ideas expressed, discuss motives and sense feelings (EL-MASRI, 1992).

The purpose of the interviews was firstly, to identify policies and actions of the IMG have affected the built environment and secondly, how the Palestinians perceive their built cultural heritage. Thirdly, we wanted to know whether the Intifada helped to increase the Palestinian’s awareness towards their cultural heritage, how it transformed our society. The selection of the interviewees was based on their occupation, as well as their concern towards the topic under study. The time spent in each interview varied from one interview to another, however, the least time spent was about one hour while the maximum could be up to five hours.

Interviewing as a research technique has its pitfalls. For example, the interviewer may approach his respondents with a preconceived idea as to what the answers should be or he may record incorrect or incomplete answers. On the other hand, the respondents may lack reason, right or ability to articulate their views; poor interviews may lead to distorted information and jeopardise the conclusions. However, these difficulties can be overcome by clarifying the aims, arguments and propositions to the interviewers before hand and by a well designed questionnaire. But above all by using a pilot survey to iron out problems of recording and collecting information (JOHNSON, 1975)

3.3 THE QUESTIONNAIRE.

The questionnaire is a relatively quick and effective way of gathering information. It is usually designed to satisfy the goals of relevance and accuracy, with the aim of, obtaining relevant information for the purpose of the survey and, collecting this information systematically and evenly across all the interviews. In trying to ensure relevancy, the researcher tried to ensure clarity about the exact kind of data needed in the study. Accuracy was better judged with practice and when the motivation of the respondent was taken into consideration. This was realised in the design of the wording and sequence of questions. This was especially important when the questionnaire was translated into Arabic. To ensure co-operation of respondents and avoid distortion of
answers, the questionnaire was designed to be easy to answer, time-saving, not embarrassing and to maintain personal privacy.

ZEISEL (1981) has suggested that there are three critical issues in questionnaire construction: rapport, conditioning and fatigue. He proposes starting with general questions and moving to more specific ones because the interviewer can influence the responses by the order of the questions. He also proposed that fatigue can be reduced by grouping the questions on similar topics and using a similar response format. Such considerations have been taken into account during the design of the present questionnaire which contained a predetermined set of questions. Both closed questions, where the respondent is given a choice of several categories of response, and open-ended questions have been used.

It is a quite common experience that the design of the questionnaire is easier than the execution of it. A major problem when carrying out a survey is the respondent's fear of loss of privacy and dignity, especially in our society. There are many ways of approaching the subject, for example, by telephone, by post, self-administered questionnaire or by face-to-face interview, as appropriate depending on the prevailing circumstances. For complex or long questions, it is much better to use face to face interviews.

In the present research, the information has been gathered through face-to-face closed ended interviews structured through the questionnaire, carried out by the researcher and his team. Filling the questionnaires were usually conducted within the confines of the respondents' dwelling. There were, however, a few cases where the researcher was not admitted inside the dwelling and the interview took place at the door step. The average time for each form was about thirty minutes. However, there were some cases that lasted from forty five minutes to an hour or more, when the respondents wished to add his or her comments and were up to a point encouraged to do so.

The method of face-to-face of form filling provides an opportunity to motivate the subject's interest and to create a permissive atmosphere for discussion and hence the
interviewer can hopefully get more accurate and complete answers. This way also permits flexibility and can improve the quality of data by asking for added information when a response is ambiguous, irrelevant, or incomplete. Furthermore, a well designed questionnaire can be used to collect information from a wide social strata regardless of their literacy, education level, or visual acuity.

In the present survey, the study deals with communities where illiteracy, low levels of education and high concern for privacy were expected to be present. It was necessary, therefore, that the questionnaire should be designed with care and should be simple, clear, familiar and as specific as possible. The interview was ordered in such a way that the opening questions should motivate the respondents’ interest and give rise to his desire to answer. Also, questions about sensitive issues that deal with unpleasant or embarrassing topics, and yet are vital to the research, were not put at the beginning of the interview. They were introduced gradually and at a time when familiarity and trust for the interviewer and the study was more developed. The aim was to get the most accurate information possible.

The questionnaire was structured in such a way that it contained close-ended and a combination of both open and close-ended questions. In the closed-ended questions, which was the type most employed, some ready-made multiple choice answers were stated and the interviewee was then asked to select the answer that most matched his opinion. Such a type of question is on the whole easier to answer, and requires less skill to carry out though they maybe less accurate. It does have the advantage however; of shortening the numbers of answers, is economic in time, the responses are standardised, can be easily compared and simpler to code and analyze.

Open-ended questions, on the other hand, provide the interviewee with more opportunity for fuller expression. Although this type of interview frees the respondent from constraints, it can result in a wide range of half answers, this in turn, may make standardising and analyzing the data more difficult. Such questions were used as a change of pace or in situations when more detail was needed and/or the type of response could not be predicted. Such a situation in our survey was when the concepts of
community development and participation came up. These answers, later, were standardised, grouped and analyzed. The combined structure of open and close-ended questions was used when more detail was acquired or other answers than those in the schedule were expected. Check ups of indirect questions were embodied in the interview to produce comparable answers. In turn, this was used to evaluate the validity and consistency of the resulting data. It was necessary to make it clear for interviewers and state the significance and importance of non-directive phrases in getting accurate response. In that sense, each interviewee was asked to make and/or explain his or her other choice. The resulting data, after completion of standardisation, was then quantitatively analyzed and appears in the form of 33 tables (see Chapter Seven).

Later, a qualitative analysis and evaluation was sought to provide more information, assess the validity of the responses and whether they support or differ from the hypotheses introduced previously. Finally, the interpretation of findings was investigated.

II- The Structure and Design of Questionnaire.

The basic physical, socio-economical, socio-cultural, and behavioral aspects were taken into consideration in the design of the questionnaire. In this respect, four basic elements were recognised:

i) Basic information: covering introductory information, location and uses of property.

ii) Demographic and social information: it considers the household characteristics, the size of property, employment and income and tenure and ownership.

iii) Attitude towards the present approach: the residents particular attitude towards the municipality approach in dealing with the area under study, as well as their particular view and level of satisfaction with the current situation in the Old Town, was considered.

iv) Concept of participation: opinion, and particular attitudes of the residents towards the concepts of community development, citizen participation and self-help approach and their willing to participate and invest in any future upgrading of their town, was covered.
A copy of the questionnaire is produced in Appendix 3.2.

The information gained during the interviews was derived from factual objective questions and opinion subjective questions. The former concerned both the respondents and the setting being evaluated. The 'who' questions were designed to provide factual information about the population such as average age and number and age of children at home. Such data can be used in three ways. First, they make it possible to describe the population under investigation in very precise terms. Second, the data can help to explain why there may be variations among the reported behaviour or feelings of a population. Finally, the data can show how a study of population differs from or is similar to another one. The questionnaire also provides factual information about the objective environment, which may be described in physical, socio-cultural or organisational terms.

Whereas environmental characteristics for a particular physical setting can be described in much the same way as characteristics of occupants of that setting, the true value of environmental data is in their analysis vis-a-vis data covering the feelings, attitudes and behaviour of the people associated with that setting. While questions about the thoughts, attitudes and feelings of people and their behaviour were concerned mainly with different aspects of the internal organisation of their dwellings, roughly a third of the questionnaire dealt with residents' perception of their historic quarters and their neighbourhoods, as well as the maintenance and management of the existing housing stock in the Old Town as a whole. The results of this part of the survey are more qualitative than quantitative and include detailed accounts of the respondents' attitudes to both the present approach and the proposed concepts mentioned earlier in this Chapter.

In studying the users' response to a large and complex environment such as the historic quarters, the verbal response has the advantage of getting a broad view of the area of concern in a relatively short time. However, in addition to the questionnaire, a combination of different data gathering techniques was used in order to compensate for some of the deficiencies that might otherwise exist.
3.4 COMPILING AND ANALYZING DATA

Having obtained the information and data from the fieldwork, further analysis was needed to simplify the data and present it in the form of findings. In this regard, PATTON (1990: 371), in explaining the process of analysis in research, writes, "The process of data collection is not an end in itself. The culminating activities of qualitative inquiry are analysis, interpretations and presentation of findings. The challenge, therefore, is to make sense of a massive amount of data, reduce the volume of information, identify significant patterns and construct a framework for communicating the essence of what the data reveals".

In order to focus the information, the data collected from the interviews and observations had been categorised according to subjects and issues. For example, the impact of the Israeli policies on the Palestinian built environment were collected from all interviews; then the impacts of the administrative system were listed and so on. Moreover, an inductive approach was employed to extract the information and point out the elements which had been most frequently drawn or mentioned.

As far as the structured questionnaire was concerned, the first step of data analysis was grouping and standardising the raw data. The second step consisted of tabulating the data in order to identify response patterns. This step was carried out in two stages, the first stage involved tabulating the data for each quarter separately, while the second stage consisted of tabulating the data of the whole Old Town. This approach allows for comparison between each of the six quarters and the rest, and at the same time each quarter with the whole Old Town. After, reviewing distributional data covering survey responses, hypothesised relationships between variables were examined. The analysis involved the examining of relationships between the variables and conducting statistical tests of significance. The final step was the interpretation of the data in order to examine the influence of different factors which affected the existing historic housing stock.

The way the information and results are presented have an important impact on whether the information is used or not. Different disciplines and individuals are accustomed to
different ways of presenting material. For example social scientists are used to reading written reports, and designers respond better to visual presentation. REIZENSTEIN (1980) proposed that presentations should be specifically tailored to various purposes and audiences. She also suggested that evaluators should consider careful use of graphics. The presentation of the findings in the present study takes into account those considerations and the results are presented under two types of format: detailed written descriptions of the aspects being considered drawing on the tabulated data, supported by photographic records and graphic presentations of summarised results together with architectural drawings of the aspects being evaluated.

3.5 DIFFICULTIES IN CONDUCTING THE RESEARCH.

Conducting research has problems anywhere in the world. A study in the ‘Westbank’ however, has its own special problems. The political climate makes it difficult to conduct such a research or even any research openly and freely. The information and data collected could be considered subversive material by the IMG. Therefore, to avoid the risk the research was conducted quietly and over a longer period of time than would otherwise have been the case.

It is obvious that data collection in an area which is under occupation is confronted with more limitations and difficulties, either from the occupying power and/or from the inhabitants. On the one hand, available data and statistics were both inaccurate and hard to obtain because the IMG neither publishes its policies and plans, nor makes them easily accessible to the public. On the other hand, the Intifada had greatly heightened the atmosphere of repression. Strikes, curfews and military presence increased as the confrontation intensified. This became worse after the Hebron massacre on the 17 February, 1994. This delayed the fieldwork for weeks. In addition, many appointments had to be cancelled because of the curfews or the declaration of areas as closed military zones.

Another technical difficulty raised during the interviews is the fear of the respondents to express themselves freely. They were afraid or suspicious about giving information, because they thought it could harm them if it reached the IMG. In addition, some
respondents tried to make up information because they thought it would please the researcher or to give an impression that he was a nationalist. Carrying out this survey would have been a very difficult task without an intermediary. The reason lies with the people who mistrust these kinds of exercises that have been taking place many times over the years and without any positive results for themselves or their buildings, as one resident put it, "I want to complete this questionnaire, just for the sake of this town. We are fed up of all these interviews and endless questions, and the result, nothing has been done to us or to our beloved town, we feel that we are an experimental field of study, only a field of study. We waited for a long time, but no practical measures are seen on the ground or seem to take place in this lovely town in the near future, but it does not harm to answer your questions again". During the preparation for the present field study, the Director of the Conservation Unit at the Municipality of Nablus, offered the Unit's collaboration with our team in the form of supplying us with the maps needed to carry out the survey (when they were available). This assistance would have been valuable indeed, if the survey was concerned solely with the physical aspects of the situation. In addition the people were reluctant to talk about their personal matters, such as income, to anyone seen as a stranger by them. Therefore, the decision was to work with community leaders who are known to almost everyone in the study areas. We started with a small sample of twelve households, two in each quarter, as an exercise to test the questionnaire and to gain some experience. It was not as successful as we expected as the respondents were very uncooperative and mistrusting. However, this experience taught us how to approach the task in a better way; to work with community leaders and trusted figures who are well known and respected by the local community. Eventually, the team was introduced to the residents, from then on our task took place with more or less complete freedom. Unexpected problems arose because some household heads and especially female heads, did not properly understand the intention of the survey, despite our long explanation. Nevertheless, much better understanding was noticed from the young people, "Al-Shabab", who were a great help to us.

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1 Interview with a resident of EL-Qaryoun quarter by our field team in February 1994.

2 This unit was established lately in 1993.
We were being faced with three moods of people. They can be summarised in the following statement by one member of our team at El-Ghareb Quarter, he reported:

"The first group was encouraged by the concepts we are proposing, and gave it their highest attention, through helping us to complete the questionnaires, with an open mind and heart. Their clear enthusiasm for the Old Town and their interest in living in it, and preferring it to other parts of the city, either because they like the town's architecture and social life, or because they cannot afford to live out-side. They showed a significant interest in preserving and upgrading the Old Town.

The second group did not show any interest in the questionnaire, but they completed it because they were shy of refusing us. However, their position can be summarised in the following: a) Their despair of any possibility for preserving the Old Town; b) they can not see any fruitful results out of such studies; c) When they knew that we are students, their opinion was, that as students we can not do anything because we lack the potential, the power and the instruments to carry out any work in the town; and d) some of them do not like living in the Old Town, and they are waiting for their financial situation to be improved to leave.

The third group, which is very small, cooperated with us, and answered our questions because they thought that we are going to give them financial support. For that reason they talked about their poor economic situation for a long period of time".3

Furthermore, the country was facing a radical political change that affected all modes of communication. One of our field team said, "I wish that this survey took place in different times and under different circumstances; every one here is influenced to a certain degree by the political situation and the peace process".4

It was difficult to contact and/or move between institutions and departments to get information that would facilitate our work, especially after the Hebron massacre in February 1994. The political atmosphere was tense and people were suspicious about possible political informants. We avoided the use of English, a translated copy of the questionnaire into Arabic was used. We also needed architectural sketches of the

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3 A report by Mr. Mashaqe, a fourth year student from the Department of Architecture at An-Najah National University in Nablus for the academic year 1993/94 and one of our fieldwork team, in El-Ghareb quarter, in February 1994.

4 This statement was reported by Mr. Hamouz, one of our fieldwork team, at El-Qeisariyeh quarter, March 1994.
dwellings. In all these matters we were greatly assisted by various community leaders and others interested in the purpose of our investigations.

3.6 SECONDARY DATA COLLECTION.
Due to the limited amount of published information about the conservation in the ‘Westbank’ and because of the particular nature of the subject under study, it was agreed with the supervisor of the dissertation, that one way of developing the knowledge concerned with the authors understanding of the issues, would be through organising and participating in a number of conferences, workshops and seminars. These have proved very useful towards developing this research over the course of the last three years. The most significant of these events will be reported below, emphasising the way in which they contributed to the subject under study.

Though this seminar was not documented, it was of major value to the author. This value can be seen in three ways: Firstly, it was the first time that the author presented his research proposal in front of a number of scholars, researchers, professionals, as well as doctoral students both from the (IoAAS) and other schools of architecture. Thus, it was the first opportunity for the author to exchange ideas and develop the focus of his doctoral work. Secondly, proposals presented by other doctoral students and the discussion that followed each was very important to the author, in the way he learnt from the methods and techniques used by other students, especially those who were further ahead with their research. Thirdly, the most important outcome of this seminar was that the author was able to see more clearly his case from a politically conscious and socio-economic point of view.

The proceedings of this conference are well documented by the Institute. It was attended by more than 40 participants from all over the world. A number of interesting papers concerning architecture, development and conservation in the Islamic world were presented by acknowledged professionals. The author’s own contribution was a paper entitled 'Conservation in the 'Westbank'/ Palestine; Under Occupation: the case of the
Old Town of Nablus'. However, the ideas and concepts presented in the paper gained major support and encouragement from the participants. It helped to build the author's confidence regarding the approach to his research.

Moreover, it presented a good chance to meet, for the first time, a number of experts and professionals, only previously known through their writing. Furthermore, it helped to clarify the focus of the study.


The author was supposed to present a paper in this workshop entitled 'Challenges of Conservation in Palestine: the case of the Old Town of Nablus'. However, due to the political situation in Palestine the author was denied permission to enter Jordan and present his paper, and therefore, lost a good opportunity to get the expected feedback for his research. This of course was one of the constraints the author faced in carrying out his research.


This symposium was sponsored by ICOMOS- International Council for Monuments and Sites and Partners for Liveable Places UIA. The main theme of the symposium was, protecting and expressing valued cultural heritage through improved planning and management under conditions of rapid or dramatic social, economic and political change. The author had planned to attend the symposium, as it could be have been of significance to his research, but as a result of the Hebron massacre on the 17 of February 1994, the whole 'Westbank' was placed under curfew for more than two weeks. The great majority of Palestinians were denied permission to enter Israel or Jerusalem for, what was claimed to be, security reasons. As the city of Nablus came under this curfew, the author was trapped in his house and was prevented from attending the symposium, thus being denied one of his simple rights.

This workshop was organised by the author in order to get the needed feedback for his study, and to develop and discuss his ideas with others in the field of study. The presentations were divided into three main subject areas: a) Israeli Policies, b) Conservation Experiences, c) Special Issues. In the first category the speakers addressed the Israeli colonial policies towards the Palestinian built environment in general and cultural heritage in particular. In the second category the speakers pointed out the situation under which conservation takes place, and what was the specific situation in Palestine, and some of the conservation case studies of well known cities. In the third category, the speaker presented a paper entitled ‘Integrating Urban Renewal and Conservation of Historic Palestinian Towns as part of an Urban Development Policy’. The main conclusion, it was agreed, was that conventional methods of conservation were unlikely to work in the present context and foreseeable future of Palestine, and that therefore, informal approaches through the concepts of community development and voluntary self-help measures should be tried.

3.7 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION

The aim of this chapter is to explain the relationship between the objectives of the study, and the methods used for the investigation and data analysis. Each method helped to inform the author both about the context of his study as well as the people’s attitudes towards community development, self-help measures and citizen participation.

The two main factors to be taken into consideration in studying the conservation and regeneration of our cultural heritage were the survival and strength of the Palestinian people and the policies and actions of the Israeli colonial power.

The following chapter will discuss the IMG’s damaging and restrictive policies and examine their impact on the built environment and our cultural heritage.
CHAPTER FOUR

Occupation and Colonisation: Processes and Impacts
CHAPTER FOUR

OCCUPATION AND COLONISATION: PROCESSES AND IMPACTS

4.0. INTRODUCTION

In normal circumstances, a group of people live in a certain territory and control the development over it. This territory is called a homeland to that group. For that group, a homeland has its human and built environment, which in turn has its landmarks. These may be of high visibility and public significance, such as monuments, shrines and streets. These visible signs serve to enhance the people's sense of identity and they encourage awareness of and loyalty to the place.

Therefore, certain changes to the built environment, under critical social conditions, can lead to the gradual destruction of the culture and, therefore, to the loss of identity. The survival of that identity depends on the survival of the group and its culture.

The built environment has physical and cultural dimensions through which people express themselves and develop their way of life. In the 'Westbank', however, the political and the physical expressions have been influenced by an external force, namely the IMG occupation. The impact of this colonial presence and the use of its power has been reflected in the physical characteristics of the country, in addition to its social and psychological impacts on the people.

Since the IMG occupation of the 'Westbank' in 1967, its environment has been deliberately and dramatically changed. The occupying power has systematically distorted the development of the built environment which used to reflect the way of life of the Palestinian people and their culture. At the same time, in order to effect the full scope of colonisation of the 'Westbank' by Israeli settlers, Palestinians have been denied opportunity to plan their development or protect and conserve their settlements. The occupying power has employed the environment as an effective medium for attacking the culture of Palestinians by creating their own exclusive, new enclaves in the territory. In other words, this deliberate cultural and architectural vandalism, is intended to destroy the ethos of our people's culture. An understanding of environmental-cultural
Occupation and Colonisation: Processes and Impacts

relationships is basic to the colonisation process and its debilitating impact on the built environment of Palestine and its society.

This chapter characterises and investigates the damaging effects of the IMG colonisation policies and their impact on the Palestinian homeland. It starts by pointing out the IMG objectives and ideologies regarding the planning of the 'Westbank'. Then, it discusses the strategies adopted to implement these objectives. Finally, we examine the process of colonisation and its impact on the lives and settlements of the Palestinians. The chapter is divided into two main sections. The first section deals with development issues imposed through administrative systems, planning schemes and land expropriation. The second section examines the consequences of the implanting of Jewish fortress settlements and control Palestinian territory.

4.1. ISRAELI COLONISATION OF THE 'WESTBANK'

At the close of the 1967 war, Israel found itself with a dramatically altered territorial situation with a six-fold increase over its June 4, 1967 boundaries. Of all these new territories, however, the 'Westbank' was the "epicentre" of the Jewish association with Palestine, with its focus on East Jerusalem. The 'Westbank', according to Jewish lore, is the real location of the ancient and short lived state of Israel (ABU-LUGHOD, 1982).

East Jerusalem was considered special in every respect, therefore, on June 19, 1967 Israel annexed it to the Israeli portion of the city. Nevertheless decisions about what to do with the rest of the 'Westbank' became the subject of intense debate and discussion within the IMG and populace. ALGAZY (1985), argues that Israeli leaders did not conceal their feelings that they would have preferred large territories with few indigenous inhabitants. Some stated, according to him, that a golden opportunity was missed to drive out at least the majority of Arabs from conquered areas. But as this was not the case, the major debate between the Israeli "maximalists" and "minimalists" turned to be how best to incorporate the 'Westbank' without annexing its inhabitants (ABU-LUGHOD, 1982). To achieve this objective the IMG applied the concept of

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1 Israel had captured Sinai Peninsula, Golan Heights, Gaza Strip and the West Bank

The process of colonisation of the 'Westbank' started soon after the end of the 1967 war, with the Allon Plan\(^2\), as the official guide to proposed new Israeli settlements. The Labour Party, led by Golda Ma’eer, who were in power at that time, thus helped start a process that became known as "creeping annexation" - the gradual imposition of Israeli control and jurisdiction at all levels without a formal act of annexation (BENVENISTI, et al, 1986). It was under the Likud, however, that the status of the 'Westbank' was fundamentally altered. After the Camp David Accord in 1979, however, the pace of settlements accelerated to create more settlements on the ground. One month after the Accord the first master plan for settlements was completed\(^3\). The Likud then began to survey unregistered Palestinian land; introduced a new definition of state land; started massive construction of tens of new settlements; created Jewish regional and local councils; and finally, put in place a civil administration (for detailed information see for example; BENVENSTI, 1984; BENVENSTI et al, 1986; SHEHADEH, 1985).

Since 1990, at the beginning of Soviet Jewish immigration, the settlement process has been greatly accelerated and expanded, with no attention being given to their impact on the indigenous population and the effect upon their traditional settlements, nor to the demands of international law. In more recent years, however, Israel has concentrated on creating Greater Jerusalem and on expanding the existing 'Westbank' settlements and supporting them with a stronger infrastructure that connected them more directly with Israel proper.

TILLMAN (1978) argues that there is nothing new about these techniques: they are classic devices employed by the British in India and the building of many other colonial

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\(^2\) For more information about the Allon Plan see Benvenisti(1984).

\(^3\) Master Plan for the Development of Settlements in Judea and Samaria (1979-1983). The plan also known as the "Drobles plan," after its author Mattityahu Drobles- co-chairman of the WZO Settlement Department under the Likud.
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empires. All that is new about it is its revival in an age when the classical European colonial empires have all but vanished. Further, "...most of the methods it [Israel] has used are not recent inventions" (ABU-LUGHOD, 1982: 16), they had been developed, honed and refined over the preceding two decades (between 1948 and 1967) to reduce Israel’s own Palestinian population to an ‘internal colony’ (ADAMS, 1972; Cited in ZURIEK, 1979). This technique may be termed minorisation, by which the acquired area is flooded with immigrants from the colonial state, so as to make the captured society a minority without actual displacement or diminution (MEINIG, 1992).

Israel, as the colonial power, applied two methods in order to alter the identity of traditional Palestinian built environment: first, by attempting to adjust the cultural identity of the indigenous inhabitants, and second, by changing the physical characteristics of the region.

Israel is trying not only to change the Palestinian cultural identity and heritage, but to destroy it by all available means, through changing the people’s attitudes, both towards their settlements and even towards themselves and their aspirations. Accordingly, from the early days of the Occupation, Dayan applied the concept of "economic integration" and employed a large number of Palestinians in Israel. By this strategy Dayan assumed that the increase in living standards would compensate for the loss of political freedom thus achieving the double benefit of allying the Palestinians and enabling the Israeli economy to exploit a large reservoir of cheap labour (ARONSON, 1990).

Addressing the Israeli occupation’s impact on the cultural aspects of the Palestinians TAMARI (1978), pointed out that all aspects of cultural expression have been subject to extreme control. The scripts of theatrical plays, for example, must be submitted to the IMG censor for advanced approval. All references to Palestinian identity and expressions to our folk culture are frowned upon if not forbidden. Repressive measures, according to TAMARI, have been directed against those who articulated Palestinian national aspirations (Cited in TILLMAN, 1978). Summarising the overall effects of the

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4 Salim Tamari is Professor of Sociology at Bir Zeit University, in the West Bank.
Israeli colonisation policy DAKKAK\textsuperscript{5} said: "We are losing our property. We are losing the control of our destiny. We are losing our very culture"

Moreover, through the dominating interactions between Palestinian and Israeli policies, Palestinian attitudes and aspirations have been heavily influenced by Israelis. So unconsciously, we started imitating the ways of Israeli life, dress and most importantly making buildings. As the ruling power, the impact of the Israelis has been strong on the Palestinians as a result of the daily contact between them, especially Palestinian workers in Israel and Palestinian villages near the Green Line.

Secondly, to change the characteristics of the 'Westbank' as a region, Israel sometimes takes direct action such as bulldozing homes, trees, even mountains, and building settlements and military camps. They also take indirect action, such as enforcing tough planning policies, aiming to increase the dependence of the 'Westbank' on Israel proper, administrative systems and land expropriation. The main goal, however, is to transform and dominate the Palestinian traditional built environment for the benefit of the Jewish settlers and to control its inhabitants.

Faced with the varying demands of its coalition partners and the growing hawkishness of the electorate, the National Unity Government\textsuperscript{6}, who was responsible for developing policy in the occupied territories about what Israel would do with the land and the people it had conquered, refrained from taking any initiatives that would disrupt the coalition. A policy evolved "\textbf{deciding not to decide}" how far Israel was prepared to withdraw from the territories captured in 1967. The government, explained Foreign Minister Eban, "Has decided to leave basic questions open not to close them" (Quoted in ARONSON, 1990: 13).

\textsuperscript{5} Ibrahim Dakkak, is an engineer from East Jerusalem involved in the restoration of the Old City of Jerusalem.

\textsuperscript{6} Although the Labour party was the leader of the government coalition, the government had been broadened prior to the 1967 war to a "National Unity Government," that included the National Religious Party (NRP) and the Gahal faction (composed of Herut and the Liberal) of Manachem Begin, and the Labour Party of course.
This logic awarded primary importance to the maintenance of the status quo. And as long as Israel remained in the ‘Westbank’, this status quo could only serve the increasing influential elements favouring an active policy of integrating the ‘Westbank’ into Israel proper. And even though the Israeli society was divided between "maximalists," who believed that Israel should annex the ‘Westbank’ and the "minimalists," who believed in territorial compromise, all Israeli governments were in favour of the new settlements in the ‘Westbank’. Successive Israeli governments have differed only in their strategies where settlements are concerned. Accordingly, "It seems accurate and reasonable to define the Israeli settlement and occupation polices on the ‘Westbank’ as a regime of ‘colonisation’" (TILLMAN, 1978: 81). This resulted from the bone-deep conviction of Israel’s leaders that the ‘Westbank’- "Judea and Samaria"- is the patrimony of the Jewish people part of the flesh of "Eretz Israel"- Land of Israel-, the property of the Jewish by Biblical right, a gift from the Supreme Being which can not be revoked by "squatters"- even "squatters" who have lived on the land for 2,000 years (TILLMAN, 1978). Thus, significantly, the ‘Westbank’ was not regarded as occupied but as "liberated" in Israeli thinking (ABU-AYYASH, 1976). This was clearly expressed in "The Guidelines for Regional and Physical Planning in the West Bank 7, "...for the first time after 20 years, the West Bank of Jordan has become a natural entity" (EFRAT, 1970: 1). This allows us to argue that the Israeli colonization policy in the ‘Westbank’ is derived from the heart of Zionist movement that ideologically considers the ‘Westbank’ part of "Greater Israel." In 1972 EZER WEIZMAN explained:

"The moment we unite all of the territories with the State of Israel, since by then the Zionist values and vision will be stronger, and the problem of our right, a historical right, not the right of might to settle in Israel, will find its solution, and, as a result, immigration will rise" (Quoted in ARONSON, 1990: 18).

Further, Joseph Weitz, key architect of Zionist colonization in Palestine wrote:

"Between ourselves it must be clear that there is no room for both peoples together in this country: ....The only solution is Eretz Israel, ...., without Arabs...And there is no other way than to transfer the Arabs from here to the neighbouring countries, transfer all of them, not one tribe should be left..." (Quoted in DAVIS, 1991: 22).

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7 A government publication that received little publicity.
In brief, ALGAZY (1985) related the Israeli colonisation of the 'Westbank' to four Zionist ideological beliefs:

1. The "historical" argument which gives the Jews the right to settle "Eretz-Israel," because of the ancient link between the Jewish people and the 'Westbank', 4,000 years ago.

2. The "demographic" argument which aims at creating a non-Jewish minority in the 'Westbank', by promoting Jewish immigration that would assure a permanent Jewish majority.

3. The "security" argument which claims that the issue of the domination of the 'Westbank' is the key for the existence of the State of Israel.

4. The "territorial expansion" argument, which emphasises the need for the land for the future Jewish generations, and the immigrants who will 'return home'.

To these arguments NEWMAN (1984), added two sets of beliefs:

5. The "religious" belief which claims possession of the whole of the "Land of Israel," due to the Divine promise given to the Jewish people.

6. The "negotiation" argument in which peace with the Arabs can be obtained by the return of territories captured in 1967.

Moreover, SENAN (1993) added the "economic" argument to the beliefs of the Israelis, in which the 'Westbank' becomes a market for Israeli products, and a source of raw materials. In addition, some Israelis settled in the 'Westbank' because of the economic benefit they can get from the government with regards to loans, tax benefits and subsidised houses.

Without a clear understanding of Zionist ideology and practice, the current Israeli colonisation of the 'Westbank' is unexplainable. Zionism has represented a multiplicity of concepts, values, emotions, ideological assumptions, political strategies and tactics, closely interlinked with powerful networks of organization (SHANIS, 1975). However, the Zionist movement "were in no way averse to following the classical

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8 For information about Zionism see for example: DAVIS et al, 1975 (Israel and the Palestinians) especially section one; and DAVIS, 1991 (The State of Palestine) Particularly chapter 4.
colonial approach, based primarily on the exploitation of the indigenous population but by and large followed a colonial practice based on dispossession of natives and their political and economic exclusion" (DAVIS, 1975: 7-8)⁹.

During the past twenty seven years the IMG goal has remained to consolidate its hold over the ‘Westbank’. "Within this goal, the implanting of multiple centres of Jewish "settlement" has become an increasingly crucial technique in overall strategy of converting conquest into annexation" (ABU-LUGHOD, 1982: 17). However, the establishment of settlements in territories inhabited by over a million indigenous Palestinians, has necessitated widespread land expropriation and suppression of Palestinian social and economic development, accompanied by repression of Palestinian resistance to Jewish settlement (CASHDAN, 1989). The most explicit statement available of the Likud’s view of the settlement and demographic changes it sought to make in the ‘Westbank’, as well as the practical steps necessary to realize Greater Israel, are well demonstrated in Drobles Plan¹⁰. It proclaimed a grandiose vision of a permanent Jewish future in the ‘Westbank’, and confidently established a practical set of guidelines to achieve this goal. "It must be borne in mind" wrote Drobles, "that it may be too late tomorrow to do what is not done today." Therefore, new Jewish facts would have to be created on the ground, and sooner rather than later, in order to foreclose all possibilities other than those envisioned by Israel.

"...The best and most effective way to remove the slightest doubt about our intention to hold Judea and Samaria forever, is an accelerated colonization drive in these areas" (DROBLES, 1980; Quoted in ALGAZY, 1985: 66).

Moreover, Drobles reaffirmed the role of Jewish colonization as an instrument of "demographic transformation," and promoted the government to establish national housing priorities that were meant to direct Israel’s Jewish population away from the densely populated coasts into the Westbank’s highlands.

"...the demographical question that overshadows the horizon of the future generation is not, where will the boundary between Jews and Arabs inside Eretz-Israel be, but which population will fill the vacuum of Judea and Samaria. Will it be filled by the Jewish population who is pressed, almost cooking in the hot,

⁹ Underline is original

¹⁰ Mattityahu Drobles: is the co-chairman of the WZO Settlement Department and the author of the Plan "Master Plan for Development of Settlements in Judea and Samaria (1979-19830."
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moist plain in the west, or perhaps by an overpopulated Arab world rising as a threat from the east?" (DROBLES, 1983; Quoted in ALGAZY, 1985: 65).

Since Israel lacks the demographic capacity to support a credible long-term colonisation programme, the alternative that Israel is really counting on is that, "The unfavourable trend in the internal demographic balance will be offset by the accelerated out-migration from the West Bank, perhaps, accentuated by another round of hostilities" (HARRIS, 1980: 170; Quoted in ABU-LUGHOD, 1982: 52).

Therefore, in their planning guidelines for the ‘Westbank’, the Israeli planners task was no ordinary one; it was not to organize an existing entity so much as to carry out a process of transformation, both territorial and demographic (ABU-AYYASH, 1976).

However, the principal objectives of Jewish settlements in the ‘Westbank’, as stated in the WZO plan, are interconnection between existing Jewish areas to create continuity in Jewish settlement patterns; fragmentation of Arab settlements, and encouragement of Jewish settlement blocs (BENVENISTI, 1984; CASHDAN, 1989; COON, 1992). The main object of the plan of Jewish settlements was still to break up the physical continuity between centres of what the plan called the "minority Arab population". The Arab minority in the ‘Westbank’ at this time numbered more than 99 per cent (ARONSON, 1990). Both Labour and Likud understood the importance of preventing the consolidation of large Arab communities spanning the Green Line. The Drobles plan simply applied these same principles unambiguously throughout the ‘Westbank’.

"The state lands and the uncultivated rocky grounds in Judea and Samaria must be seized immediately, to settle the areas between the centres of the minority populations and also around them, in order to minimize the danger or development of another Arab state in these territories. Being cut off by Jewish settlements, the minority population will find it hard to create a territorial and political unity and continuity" (Quoted in ALGAZY, 1985: 65).

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11 Italics are original, as added by Abu-Lughod

12 Italics are added
Further, while this programme obviously cannot overcome the basic fact of an Arab majority, it can go a long way to fragment, control, and eventually drive out Palestinian residents.

"The new settlement framework had major implications for Samaria’s Palestinian population. In the long term the Arab community would be cut into isolated blocks, separated from one another by the Sharon lines (major highways connecting the settlements), from Judea by a Jewish outer ring around Jerusalem, and from the outside by the pre-existing Jordan Rift. On a West Bank segmented in this fashion it would be difficult to imagine any genuine self-government beyond the municipal level as a practical possibility" (Quoted in ABU-LUGHOD 1982:43).

Some analysts like Dr. SHAHAK\textsuperscript{13}, went further in explaining the pattern of Jewish settlements on the ‘Westbank’, by describing it as:

"process of ghettoization which... shows the intention not only of permanent occupation but of permanent ghettoization, of keeping the population in permanent subjection by keeping them in squares whose lines will be the divisions of the settlements...the settlements are established in order to achieve a colonial rule which will be easy" (Quoted in TILLMAN, 1978:75).

Therefore, the scheme Drobles outlined so straightforwardly, the fragmenting of the Palestinian population into increasingly smaller pockets among steadily expanding Jewish settlements struck at the territorial basis for any hope of Palestinian sovereignty. It is a disarmingly simple strategy. \textit{If enough Jewish settlements could be established and enough land seized and placed under Jewish control, the Palestinians would wake up one day to discover that they had lost their country} (Fig. 4.1).

In sum, the IMG has adopted two main strategies to colonise the ‘Westbank’: firstly, controlling of the Palestinian development through their administrative systems, planning schemes and land expropriation. Secondly, transformation of the physical features of the traditional built environment accomplished by planting Israeli settlements, demolishing Palestinian properties and intensifying the military presence.

The following sections will discuss these two strategies; their process, evolution and their impact on the Palestinian traditional built and human environment.

\textsuperscript{13} Dr Israel Shahak, professor of Chemistry, Hebrew University, Jerusalem; and a survivor of a Nazi Concentration camp.
4.2. THE CONTROL OF THE DEVELOPMENT

As soon as the Israeli occupation was a fait accompli, questions were raised at the United Nations and in the major political capitals about the occupier's duties towards the occupied territories under international law. COON (1992), argues that there is an agreement among governments, including Israel, that the Regulations of the 1907 Hague Convention IV are applicable to the 'Westbank'. At the same time, Coon pointed out that the vast majority of states agree that the Fourth Geneva Convention (1949) also applies to the 'Westbank'. However, Israel has argued that the Geneva Conventions do not apply to the 'Westbank' (Appendix 4.1). In fact Israel refuses to refer to the 'Westbank' as "occupied" at all, preferring to call it a "zone", the "administered" or "disputed" territories, or "Judea and Samaria", harkening to biblical terminology (MALLISON AND MALLISON, 1986).

Nevertheless, COON (1992), argues that among the many things that the international law required the occupying colonial power to establish in the 'Westbank', is a completely separate and effective administration, where one of occupier duties will be
to conduct the whole social, commercial and economic life of the country, which must include town planning and conservation.

Moreover, COON (1992), pointed out that town planning is a central concern of international law. In the ‘Westbank’, under international law town planning, which certainly must include conservation, should be regulated by the Jordanian town planning law put into effect in 1967, "That the local planning authorities should continue to function in accordance with that law, that the central administrative body established by the Israelis to implement the law should be separated from Israeli institutions and that the objectives of planning should be the promotion of social and economic interests of the Palestinian population" (COON, 1992: 37).

4.2.1. The Civil Administration

From the time of the IMG occupation of the ‘Westbank’ in 1967, Palestinians had been ruled by a Military Government. Thus, in the proclamation on Law and Administration (No.2) of June 1967, the commander of the Israeli Defence Forces (IDF) on the ‘Westbank’, stated: "Every governmental, legislative, appointive and administrative power in respect of the region or its inhabitants shall henceforth be vested in me alone and shall only be exercised by me or by persons appointed by me for that purpose or acting on my behalf" (Quoted in BENVENISTI, 1984: 37). In addition the following principle was agreed by the Israeli government on 11 October 1968: "The area commander is the exclusive formal authority within the area. He [sic] is the legislator, he is the head of the executive and he appoints local officials and local judges" (Quoted in CASHDAN, 1989: 60). This means that all Palestinian affairs, from planning policies including conservation to birth certificates, became the responsibility of a foreign military commander. All that he cares about is law and order and the benefits to Israel.

In 1981, a Civil Administration was created by Military Order 947 (November 8, 1981). This order has correctly been termed, by SHEHADEH & KUTTAB (1980: 18), "A unilateral declaration of constitutive change." The main objective of creating the civil administration in the words of BENVENISTI et al, (1984: 23), "Was an attempt to implement the Israeli version of the autonomy plan and create irreversible legal and
administrative conditions which would impose the Israeli plan on the Egyptians and Americans." The assignment of the Civil Administration, however, is to "...see to the civilian affairs of the local residents; this while paying heed to consideration of public order" (SHEHADEH & KUTTAB, 1982: 23).

The importance of creating the civilian administration, however, extends beyond its political and administrative significance. In the words of BENVENISTI (1984: 44), "Concealed in the legal phrases of Order 947 lies a fundamental turning point in Israel's system of control over the Palestinians in the territories; the Civilian Administration constitutes the *transformation from a temporary to a permanent system*\(^{14}\)."

The relationship between the civil administration and the Military Command is a case in point. According to Order No. (947), the Israeli army remains the source of all civil and military authority in the 'Westbank'. Assigning to the civilian administration only those nonmilitary powers that it regards fit (CASHDAN, 1989; ARONSON, 1990). Menahem Milson, the first head of the civil administration to be appointed by the Israeli army commander, described it as, "...not administration operated by civilians but administration dealing with the affairs of civilians" (Quoted in COON, 1992: 37).

COON (1992), identified four divisions in the Civil Administration in the 'Westbank': Administration, Interior, Infrastructure and Health. Each of these branches is headed by a military officer, and comprising below it a large number of departments (see for example, BENVENISTI et al, 1986). All departments are headed by "civilian staff officers" "on loan" to the civilian administration, who carry out professional tasks for the civilian authorities. Staff officers work in their own area of expertise, under the authority of their ministers (BENVENISTI, 1984). Many departmental functions, are administered partly according to the seven Military Governmental Districts into which the 'Westbank' was divided by Israel after the occupation (COON, 1992).

\[^{14}\text{Italics are original.}\]
As discussed earlier in Chapter One, by 1967, twenty-five municipal governments existed in the 'Westbank' (excluding East Jerusalem), as well as 87 village councils. On the local level these are the highest indigenous political institutions (see for example, NAKHLEH, 1979; COON, 1992). However, the creation of the Civil Administration meant that almost all public services in the 'Westbank' turned out to be its responsibility. The Civil Administration, on the other hand, is one way of fighting the elected Municipal Councils, accusing them of mismanaging the municipalities in order to pass its new policies and measures. But, in an important refutation of the charge of mismanagement, ZVI BAREL, a former official in the military government explained:

"The mayors in the West Bank have never stopped planning, developing, and extending the services which they wished to grant to the population. It is merely sufficient to cast a glance at the list of projects submitted by the municipalities for the approval of the Military Administration since their election into office in 1976, in order to learn that it was not the Municipal Council which has impeded development but the Administration which in most cases was the body which postponed, denied, or failed to uphold its obligations toward the municipalities"

(Quoted in ARONSON, 1990: 280).

This simple statement indicates that the Civil Administration was not created to facilitate the lives of the Palestinians, or to help the municipalities to carry out their duties in a proper way. On the contrary it is a great constraint to Palestinian development and to the municipalities. It put conditions and obstacles on the way the municipalities should spend their money and on the type of projects they are allowed to carry out. In 1988, for example when the Nablus Conservation Committee was established in order to look after the city's architectural heritage and to protect it from any further deterioration, the Military Commander called the Mayor of the city, who was the head of the committee, and asked him to discharge it within 24 hours otherwise all its members would face the consequences, and would end in jail15. On the other hand it took Riwaq-Centre for Architectural Conservation- in Ramallah 3 years to obtain a licence from the Civil Administration to operate as an NGO in conserving the Palestinian cultural heritage16. For architectural heritage and traditional buildings and sites 3 years are a matter of collapse or survival, and it could save the lives of so many historic buildings. But to

15 Interview with a member of the Nablus Conservation Committee who requested anonymity, 20 January 1994.

16 Interview with Dr Suad Amery- director of Riwaq January 1994.
the IMG Civil Administration what counts is Israel's benefits, even if it is at the expense of the Palestinian culture or even its survival.

Furthermore, COON (1992) argues that the provision of services- including town planning- to the Palestinians in the 'Westbank' - is not sensitive enough to take into account the views of Palestinians. He quoted from a report for the American Government that:

"Palestinians are not permitted to participate in significant public policy decisions concerning land resources, use and planning" (Quoted in COON, 1992: 39).

Throughout the years of the Occupation there has been no single attempt by any Israeli department concerned with matters of development, particularly, the Central Planning Department, to consult representative Palestinians groups on planning policies or procedures. Even when the will exists to consult Palestinian opinion, "...the articulation of representative Palestinian opinion is frustrated by the absence of any elected Palestinian forum, and by the prevalent restrictions on freedom of expression, publication, assembly, movement, travel and political association" (COON, 1992: 39).

On the other hand, Israeli settlers who live in the Westbank's Jewish settlements are considered citizens of Israel. While not outright annexing the 'Westbank', Israel extends its judicial and administrative system to the Jewish settlers, while applying strict military rule to Palestinian inhabitants (BENVENISTI, 1990).

Settlements are organized into municipal units and governed by local and regional Jewish settler councils. Military law permits the bylaws of these municipal units to incorporate much Israeli legislation, and provides that any changes in these Israeli laws will automatically take effect (BENVENISTI, 1984; CASHDAN, 1989).

Finally, the main purpose of the application of two bodies of law in the 'Westbank' (the Jordanian law and the Israeli military orders on Palestinians; and the Israeli civil law on Jewish settlers), by the IMG, is to enhance regional development and interaction between the Jewish settlements and to facilitate the planning for new ones, while at the same time restricting the development of Palestinian villages and cities. COON (1992)
argues that the Israeli policies towards Palestinian development are determined mainly by their policies for Jewish settlements.

4.2.2. Planning

Obviously, the quality of regional and town planning which takes into consideration the historic quarters of the country, is central to the success of any policy for development. However, while for many countries town planning is still of minor importance as a topic of political debate, not a matter of international concern and dispute, it has a greater impact on the quality of the lives of Palestinians in the 'Westbank', than it has on the inhabitants in almost any other country.

"For Palestinians the planning system is of vital concern because it affects not only their prospects of future prosperity, but their prospects of nationhood. Decisions made through the mechanism of town planning have for many years influenced social and economic development, transport, and the quality of environment. They have also determined not just where Palestinians may build their homes and their workplace, but whether they may be able to build at all. For many hundreds of Palestinians the town planning system has been the means of deciding that the homes they built should be bulldozed to the ground" (COON, 1992: 3,4).

Nevertheless, the Palestinian sector is hardly mentioned in any of the settlements plans, or in any of the planning schemes, despite the fact that it is the major constraint on the future development of Jewish settlements (BEN-ZADOK, 1985).

In their colonial plans, the Israelis have implemented "racially discriminatory policies" (COON 1991). Their aim, in their new town planning programmes, is to implant a particular racial group, (Jewish settlers), into the densely populated territory of another people.

COON (1991), on the other hand, questioned how these racial policies have been implemented in a land with a tradition of statutory planning almost as long as the British, in an area which under international law must be administered for the benefit of the local population, and above all, by an occupying power which prides itself on upholding the civic rights and democratic practices of Western countries.
Nevertheless, from the beginning of the occupation the aims of the Israeli planners were concentrated on two main concepts: "domination" and "integration" (ABU-AYYASH, 1976). Domination means the exploitation of the available natural endowment, which could not succeed without an efficient transportation network, which has been restructured to enable better control of the hinterland. Integration means the incorporation between Israel and the 'Westbank' into a larger single unit. The policy of integration has demanded the planting of new settlements and has necessitated the structural change in the transportation network to increase the flow of goods and people to and from the ‘Westbank’, in particular the flow of raw materials, as well as cheap labour from the ‘Westbank’ into Israel and the flow of manufactured goods into the markets of the ‘Westbank’ (ABU-AYYASH, 1976).

Such a strategy offered the IMG the best opportunity to enjoy the benefits of annexation (land, manpower, and resources) without its burdens (principally, the need to confer Israeli citizenship on hundreds of thousands of non-Jews). This formula, however, was the essence of Dayan’s strategy of "functional compromise;" and to which the objectives of the Labour Governments committed itself (ARONSON, 1990).

To achieve these objectives, the IMG authorities applied a dual policy, one for the Jewish settlers, where new plans for road networks, infrastructure...etc., that facilitate the establishment of new settlements were issued, and on the other hand Israel approved almost no plans for Palestinian development since 1967. The following section will discuss the Israeli planning schemes, their objectives and how they affected the Palestinian built environment.

Every statutory planning system consists of two central and inter-related components, "development plans" and "development control" (COON, 1992). Development plans are not an end in themselves. "They are a means of identifying desired directions of development and change, and enabling the planning authority to discriminate between development which is compatible with this (and to carry out or encourage such development), and development which is not compatible (and to prevent such development from taking place)" (COON, 1992: 63). The law provides for a hierarchy
of three development plans (regional, outline, and detailed plans) dealing mainly with land use, plus parcellation schemes, dealing with land ownership.

In the 'Westbank', COON (1992) identified three types of restrictions that the IMG applied on the manner in which the Palestinians make use of their land: firstly, land can be compulsorily taken into public ownership; secondly, limitations may be imposed on the transformation of land between citizens and finally, town planning controls may be imposed.

The IMG was aware of the enormous political importance of land use planning, in their policies they sought to achieve firm control over the entire 'Westbank' and severely to restrict Arab construction and development outside the nuclear towns and villages (BENVENISTI, 1984).

"Attendant changes in land planning and urban development in the West Bank have restricted development of Arab towns to "existing built-up areas," which assures a free hand for Jewish settlers in the vicinity" (RICHARDSON, 1984: 114).

Official land use planning and licensing procedures have been a major instrument in Israeli efforts to gain control over space in the 'Westbank', therefore, there exist two completely separate and superimposed systems of planning law, planning authority and local authority boundaries in the 'Westbank'- one for the Arab population and one for the Jewish settlers (COON, 1991)

Obligated under international law to uphold the prior law of the Occupied Land, Israel selectively uses a complex tangle -of Ottoman law, Jordanian law and British Emergency Regulations from the Mandate period- to confiscate the land on which it builds new settlements. Moreover, these overlapping legal systems have been drastically amended by over 1,300 Israeli Military Orders now in force (SHEHADEH, 1985; COON, 1992). However, the relevant planning law in the 'Westbank' is the Jordanian law No. 79 of 1966- The Law of Cities, Villages and Buildings. Moreover, planning legislation in the 'Westbank' has maintained in force all plans and regulations prepared under previous legislation. At the present time no register of plans or regulations is in
force (COON, 1992). The freezing of legislation in 1967, means that for almost 30 years the Palestinians have been denied any opportunity to develop any form of planning and conservation legislation, in a time when almost all countries in the world have developed some sort of conservation legislation.

The Jordanian law No. 79, however, defines three tiers of planning authority -High Planning Council, District Commissions and Local Commissions which comprises the Municipal or Village Councils (both of which were elected), (COON, 1992). However, Military Order 418 of March 1971, abolished the traditional hierarchical Planning Committees, and instead, all planning powers were vested in the High Planning Committee, appointed by the military commander and composed of Israel officials only. District Planning Committees were also abolished, licensing powers of Municipalities were restricted, and involvement of ‘Westbank’ inhabitants in the land use planning process became minimal, if it exists at all (BENVENISTI, 1984). Further, the municipalities were not allowed to amend the Jordanian law of 1966. The only authority by which it could be amended is the military commander by issuing military orders whose aims are to impose more restrictions on Palestinian development.

To accomplish their objectives, the IMG put into force two out dated plans, which were prepared almost half a century ago -during the British mandate. The Samaria Regional Plan (referred to as" S15" which covers the northern part of the ‘Westbank’ (most of Jenin, Tulkarm, and Nablus districts), and the Jerusalem Regional Plan (referred to as " RJ5")- which covers most of the rest of the ‘Westbank’ (COON, 1992). However, COON (1992) identified two fundamental differences of these plans to the current planning practice in the ‘Westbank’, firstly, they have never been replaced by updated plans; secondly, as these plans offer no opportunity for development in the late twentieth century, they have been used selectively by the IMG authorities to justify their policies of restricting and preventing Palestinian development outside existing towns and villages.

Both regional plans ("S15" and "RJ5") attempted to define land use zones within which only specific types of development would be allowed. Three main zones are defined in
their regulations as: "agriculture", "development" and "nature reserves". In addition plan "RJ5" identifies a fourth zone "state domain," (Fig. 4.2). However, since they have been discovered, Israel has been using them as a pretext for refusing permits for Palestinians and for demolishing Palestinian development in the 'Westbank' (COON, 1992).

Furthermore, regional plans "RJ5" and "S15" covenant that no more than one house may be built on an un-subdivided plot. Accordingly, since these plans cover the whole of the 'Westbank' outside the municipalities, where development areas are almost completely absent, this regulation has been used by the Central Planning Development to impose wide scale restrictions on Palestinian development. To complete the circle, and to prevent any type of Palestinian development, the IMG imposed severe restrictions on the subdivision of land. Consequently, the great majority of Palestinian land is thereby withheld from subdivision because, "it has not been formally registered or it was registered incorrectly, it is held by more than one person or by "absentees", or it has been seized by the military government" (COON, 1992: 120). This means that Palestinian development outside the municipalities is completely controlled by Israel.

![Fig. 4.2: Mandate Regional Plans](image)

Source: Coon (1992: 75)
"The combination of land acquisition, closure of areas for military purposes, and land use planning, roads, and infrastructure development, has already insured complete Israeli control over space in the West Bank"  
(BENVENISTI, 1982: 30-31).

The Mandate plans, on the other hand, do not provide a pretext for Jewish settlements, therefore, two amendments have been applied to them in order to facilitate the process of colonization. These amendments include (Regional Plan (1/82) and (Road Plan No. 50), it is to these two plans that we now turn.

Regional Plan (1/82) was the first attempt to amend the Mandate Regional Plans to allow Jewish settlements in the areas of the 'Westbank' around Jerusalem, it covers an areas of about 4,500 hectares, in a belt about 5 Km. wide to the east of the present municipality and wider areas to north and south (COON,1992) (Fig. 4.3).

COON (1992), also questioned how the development needs of the Palestinian towns and villages within the plan are to be catered for, as the plan gives no indication of that, taking into account that the plan area contains 48 Palestinian towns and villages with a total population around 150,000.

Fig. 4.3: Partial Regional Plan 1/82.
No Palestinian has been consulted in the preparation of the plan at any level. SHEHADEH (1985) committed on the plan:

"This plan (1/82) determines the use of the land outside the municipalities and villages within the area it covers. The boundaries of these population centres have been fixed by the plan. Some villages have been left out altogether. The areas surrounding the Palestinian towns and villages are designed either as agricultural areas in which building is almost entirely prohibited or special areas comprising approximately 35% of the area which are not defined by the plan but which are implicitly for the expansion of Jewish settlements"

(Quoted in SENAN, (1993: 126).

"By this means the Israelis have scrupulously avoided repealing the Mandate regional plan in force when they occupied the area, but have magically transformed it from one which provides virtually no opportunities for any sort of development to one which provides carte blanche for extensive Jewish development unconstrained by Jordanian law or by Palestinian agricultural activity or developments needs"

(COON, 1992: 189).

A new regional master plan for roads in the ‘Westbank’ "Regional Partial Outline Plan for Roads- Order No. 50- was declared in 1983 and published in February 1984 (COON, 1992, ABU-EISHEH, 1994). The new plan was based on the National Highway Master Plan (T/M/A/3) which was prepared soon after the IMG occupation of the ‘Westbank’, considered the linkage of the ‘Westbank’ with Israel as priority. During the 1967-1977 period, three major north-south roads were constructed: the Jordan Valley Road, the Dead Sea Road, and the Allon Road, which were for military purposes and motivated by the Israeli security claims and the Jewish settlements colonial needs. Moreover during 1976 and 1980 two important east-west roads were constructed, known as "Trans Judea Road" and "Trans Samaria Road". The new plan policies were also guided by the (1983-1986) World Zionist Organization (WZO) which gave high priority to road construction, suggesting some 346 Km., especially for promoting settlement activities (ABU-EISHEH, 1994), (Fig. 4.4).

The plan classified four types of "main" and "regional" roads.(Table 4.1). The estimated total length of the road network proposed by the plan is 1873 Km.(ABU-EISHEH, 1994).

The width of roads range from 40-120 m with a total right- of-way width of at least 240 meters. Accordingly, the estimated total areas within the right-of-way of roads included
in the plan is 37,200 hectares, forming 6.7% of the total area of the ‘Westbank’, in other words, not much less than the total built-up areas of the ‘Westbank’ (BENVENISTI & KHAYAT, 1988; ABU-EISHEH, 1994).

According to the plan, the existing and planned highway, emphasized the strategy of east-west linkage, through eight corridors linking the ‘Westbank’ with Israel’s highway network, and forming an integral part of it. The plan suggests only minor improvements to the existing north-south (Jenin-Hebron) road and Jordan Valley-Dead Sea road (COON, 1992; ABU-EISHEH, 1994). SHEHADEH (1985) described the objectives and the impacts of the plan. He writes:

"The plan (Plan No.50) is clearly designed to serve Israelis local, regional and national interests while Palestinian transportation needs are ignored or are served as a by-product of Israeli interests. The plan is also intended to restrict Arab development by restricting building along a width of 100-150 meters on each side of the road"  
(Quoted in SENAN, (993: 127).

To impose more restrictions on Palestinian development, the Central Planning Department in the Civil Administration commissioned a private planner, in 1981 to prepare physical plans for 183 villages, and in 1984, 100 villages were added. The
village schemes were based on faulty and inaccurate surveys both demographic and physical and were therefore shelved (BENVENISTI et al., 1986).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Highway Type</th>
<th>Highway Width (Meter)</th>
<th>Set Back From Centre-line of Highway (Meter)</th>
<th>Length of Highways (KM)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Express Highways</td>
<td>120</td>
<td>150</td>
<td>93.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Main Highways</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>120</td>
<td>517.5</td>
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<td>Regional Highways</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>636.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Local Highways</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>626.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>1873.0</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 4.1: Extent of Road Network in the ‘Westbank’ According to the Israeli Regional Road Master Plan of 1983.

The plans faced widespread objection from both the Palestinians and the Civil Administration, therefore, in 1986 the latter commissioned Israeli and Palestinian planners to prepare schemes for 55 villages. By 1987 not a single scheme had passed the initial phase of approval (deposition for objection). The reason is that the Israeli planning authorities preferred to keep a free hand in granting building permits. Therefore, approval of these schemes will secure the building rights of Palestinian residents and make them less dependent on the Israeli authorities, which determined to use planning as a tool of punishment and reward for political and security purposes (BENVENISTI et al., 1986).

According to COON (1992), the most significant feature of these schemes is the ‘plan boundary’:

"The "plan boundary" was drawn to include most of the existing urban development, and to exclude virtually all significant areas in which development had not yet taken place; hence in many cases the Plan Boundary is zoned to show housing (in three densities), public institutions, industry, cemeteries and
open space. No distinction is made between existing or proposed uses, though in practice virtually all institutions (ie. schools), industry (ie. workshops), cemeteries and plain space already existed....It seems clear that the purpose of the plans is not to provide for development, but to confine development” (COON, 1992: 85-86).

4.2.3. Land Expropriation

Issues concerning land ownership in the ‘Westbank’ are the key factor in the Palestinian-Israeli struggle. Shortly after the 1967 war, the IMG began the process of expropriation and colonization of Palestinian land. Since then it has been accelerated. As understood by the Israeli leaders the key to success with Jewish colonial settlements in the ‘Westbank’ lay in obtaining land, directly when possible but if necessary indirectly through a process of first denying it to its Palestinian owners and then making it available to Israelis for their purposes.

The IMG techniques for breaking Palestinian control of the ‘Westbank’ land and then Justifying Israeli utilization of it are numerous. Direct purchase of ‘Westbank’ land had been the preferred method, but relatively little land has changed hands with this method because of Palestinian resistance to selling land to the Israelis, reinforced by a Jordanian law making it a capital crime to do so (RICHARDSON, 1984; SHEHADEH, 1983) Nonetheless, through a variety of techniques developed by the Israelis, Palestinians willing to sell land are able to do so in ways that provide anonymity for sale. Israeli regulations complicating land inheritance have been enacted to encourage the sales of Arab land (SHEHADEH, 1983).

From the beginning of the Occupation until 1979 Israel seized most land in the ‘Westbank’ by military orders, declaring that Israel needed the land "for military purposes" (SHEHADEH, 1985).

From 1979 on, the IMG began to confiscate land by first declaring it not to be private land (LUSTICK, 1981), and then placing it in state ownership as an indirect way of expropriation. Sharon (1981) - the Israeli Minister of Housing - stated that:

"Israel has proposed that land (in West Bank and Gaza Strip) be placed in three categories: privately-owned, which would be under the local Palestinian authority;
I- Expropriation of Ownership

By virtue of the above proclamation by government of the 'Westbank'; firstly, through a combination of two Israeli laws passed in 1950\(^{17}\), plus a Military Order especially designed for the purpose\(^ {18}\), all property belonging to any one who has left the 'Westbank' before, during or after the time of the 1967 war was considered "abandoned" and was transferred to the Israeli "Custodian of Absentee Property". The burden of proof of ownership of "abandoned" land rests with the individual claiming rights (BENVENISTI, 1984; CASHDAN, 1989). Secondly, all land that was previously registered in the name of the Jordanian Government as "state land" immediately became the property of the Israeli state. Thirdly, the most successful method of land expropriation was adopted in 1980, whereby all uncultivated, unregistered land is considered liable for declaration as "state land" by virtue of an Israeli interpretation of Ottoman Land Code of 1855 (BENVENISTI et al, 1986; CASHDAN, 1989). Declarations of state land are not made through judicial process of land registration, but rather preempt it. The only judicial redress open to inhabitants is appeal to the Review Committee, composed of military officials (CASHDAN, 1989). According to Jordanian land registration records, only about 13% of the land in the 'Westbank' was in fact state land prior to 1967 (SHEHADEH, 1985). But while 30% of the land was in private use, only about one-third of this private land was formally registered. Since 1967 Israel has closed land registration to the public (BENVENISTI, 1984; COON, 1992). The unregistered land, however, was divided-by earlier Ottoman law- into a combination of unregistered private property, land held in trust for religious purposes, village common pastures and form lands, and land used for public purposes, such as roads and cemeteries (Appendix 4.2).

\(^{17}\) Absentee property law No. 28 (1950) and Development Authority (Transfer of Property) Law No. 62 (1950), (cited in Shehadeh, 1985: 34)

\(^{18}\) Military Order 58, (July 1967).

\(^{19}\) "State land" should not be confused with "declared state land" which we are going to discuss later in this section.
It is Israel's policy to consider all of these categories "state land" (SHEHADEH, 1985), but to eliminate the private Arab citizen's rights to use it. "State land" is automatically removed from private Palestinian use and, since its new categorization was usually initiated in the first place to serve Jewish settlements, it was promptly reassigned for settlement or related construction.

The final method of expropriation of ownership is based on a Jordanian law,20 which allows land expropriation for public use, as long as this is in the "public" interest (CASHDAN, 1989). This method is thus used to acquire land for arterial and access roads which bypass Arab towns and villages (BENVENISTI et al, 1986), as well as public buildings in the Israeli settlements. These acquisitions are justified as being in the interest of a rapidly expanding Jewish public (CASHDAN, 1989).

II- Seizure of Possession:
This is effected in individual cases by Military Order. The area commander is free to declare an area of land "closed" for reasons of "military security" or to seize possession of land for "military purposes" (see for example BENVENISTI et al, 1986).

III. Restriction on use:
These are also contained in Military Orders. Restrictions range from prohibitions on building and construction, to restrictions on cultivation without express permission to restrictions based on the statutory zoning plan and the prohibition on rebuilding demolished houses. In addition, certain areas of land have been declared "nature reserves" or "combat zones", in the latter case the authorities disclaiming any responsibility for damage incurred by military action (see for example BENVENISTI et al, 1986).

Before the occupation in 1967 only 0.5% of the ‘Westbank’ was in Jewish ownership (ABU-LUGHOD, 1982). In 1980, Israel had taken possession of 27% of the total land area of the ‘Westbank’, this increased to some 38% in 1982 (SAHILYAH, 1982). By

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1984, Israel controlled over 52 percent of the area of the ‘Westbank’ -41 percent of the area, is under Israeli possession, and 11 percent placed under severe restrictions (BENVENISTI et al, 1986). In the period from January 1990 to July 1991, 7.8% of the ‘Westbank’ land area was seized for exclusively Jewish use (AL-HAQ, 1991). By mid 1991, it is estimated that about 60% of the ‘Westbank’ had been seized by Israel (COON, 1992), (Fig. 4.5).

Fig. 4.5: Israel Colonisation of the ‘Westbank’.
Source: Benvenisti,(1984: 85)
In a recent study (August, 1994) by The Arab Studies Society, it estimated the total area seized by the IMG since the signing of the Declaration of Principles (13-September, 1993) was about 67,000 dunums, totalling of 74% of the total area of the ‘Westbank’ (AL-QUDS, 1994b).

As we have seen, since its occupation of the ‘Westbank’ the IMG has applied all types of restrictions to control the development of the Palestinians. At the same time it used all available power and law to facilitate the life of the Jewish settlers at the expense of the indigenous Palestinian inhabitants. Even when the Civil Administration was created its implicit goal was to serve the interests of the colonial power and to control Palestinian citizens. Therefore, the strategy of the administrative system is to postpone, delay and even refuse all applications, in order to make life intolerable for the Palestinians and consequently, to force them to leave the ‘Westbank’ to create a demographic balance in favour of the Jewish settlers.

4.3. THE IMPACT OF THE CONTROL OF THE DEVELOPMENT

This Israeli policy has its impact on both the Palestinian and their traditional architectural environment. This section will examine the implications of the IMG administrative system, planning schemes and land expropriation policies. The information is based on the available literature, and on observations and interviews conducted by the author during his fieldwork in the ‘Westbank’ in 1993-94, as well as his own experience as a Palestinian growing up under Israeli occupation.

It is a well known fact that the essence of colonialism is the imposition of alien rule upon an indigenous population. Nevertheless, although the IMG claims that its occupation of the ‘Westbank’ is a benevolent one, benevolent or otherwise, that is what it is. The ‘Westbank’ Palestinians still do not wish to be ruled by a foreign intruder in their ancestral homeland. This contradicts the naive Israeli assumption that time will take its course, and the Palestinians will come to accept the situation and change their attitude in a positive direction.
Changing the Palestinians' attitudes, however, is not an end in itself. The Israeli aim is to destroy Palestinian social and cultural life which will in turn lead to the destruction of their architectural and national identity. This fits with ZIEGLER's et al (1974) argument that architectural and human decay go hand in hand; one helps to cause as well as feed upon the other. Reduce one and you deter the other.

Perhaps the most profound impact on Palestinian society came as a result of adopting the policy of "economic integration" by Israel, especially in the first years of the occupation. This strategy had the immediate advantage of providing Israel with cheap labour power which was in short supply, while assisting in the long run with "freeing up" land for eventual Israeli settlement (ABU-LUGHOD, 1982).

The effect of the altered economy gradually filtered down to social and cultural facets in the Westbank's community. The Palestinian population is not only going through an accelerated process of proletarianization, but a class which sociologists call "peasant proletariat", living in the village and working in the city, has been created (ALGAZY, 1985). Such patterns of employment no doubt swayed many peasants away from the agricultural land in the direction of relatively high-paid unskilled wage labour.

The domination of the Israeli economic system namely, wage labour, brought about numerous change in the social structure of the Westbank's urban community. The demand for unskilled and manual workers in Israeli industry, evened out the salary distribution across various classes. The white collar class- a case in point- gave away their Jordanian civil service jobs to Israeli employees. This accelerated the emigration of ex-civil servants and the educated classes, along with the bourgeois land owners from the 'Westbank', whose land was confiscated, into Western (mainly USA) and neighbouring Arab countries (ABU-LUGHOD, 1971; ABU AYYASH, 1981).

Few references to traditional heritage and religious codes were made, as these ceased to be a source of consultation. The general attitude was one in which the Palestinian community wanted to convince itself that preserving their heritage was the last resort to maintaining social cohesion in the ensuing political turmoil. Advocates of this
attitude never attempted to adopt Western values, even those values which could be accommodated into the traditional religious heritage. The advocates support is believed to be on the increase in the absence of the psychological, social and cultural background (DAKKAK, 1981b).

In addition to the disruption of the local economy, other modes of social life have altered, even the manifestation of change was uneven, tentative, ambiguous and contradictory (HELLER, 1980). The result of an overall exposure to a foreign economy and culture was in itself a challenge to the indigenous Palestinian culture. The most obvious of reactions was the feeling of bewilderment and adoption of non-traditional outward styles of behaviour such as dress, sexual laxity and the easy-going behaviour of the Israelis in the months which immediately followed the occupation.

This emotional surge was later modified, and in recent years reversed. SHEHADEH (1971) remarks that all values, norms and beliefs were put to the test and were relatively shaken. The progress and modernity of Jews were viewed as inevitable determinants of their victory. The community in a muted manner admired the freedom and individualism of the Israelis, yet their deep-seated tradition tells it that there is something fine about its heritage which should be preserved and appreciated.

The effects of social changes were felt most amongst East Jerusalem Palestinians. Conflicts between parents and children became more exacerbated soon after the enforcement of Israeli law there, and as a result the Islamic religious hierarchy lost much of its power over the "delinquent" social behaviour of the young generation (ATA, 1984). Further, the enforcement of the Hebrew curriculum in the schools of East Jerusalem has assisted in making the Israeli culture more accessible to school children. Their exposure and contact with the other culture made them envious of the permissive liberal life-style of the Israeli youth. Resentment of sex role constraints, traditional parental control and lack of freedom have contributed to a change of thinking and

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21 This point has been emphasised by many interviewers of them; Mr Najami- 42 years old and Mr. Salem-36 years old both from Camp No. 1 near Nablus, Mr. Abu-Saleh from Nablus, Mr. Dawood from Tell, a village near Nablus.
feeling. It has indeed contributed to abandonment of what they see as superfluous aspects of their heritage. In HELLER’S (1980) own words:

"The challenge obviously does not stem from the inherent attractiveness of Israel. Israel does, however, embody certain Western cultural forms and values that have long inspired sectors of the West Bank population and especially the counter-elite intellectuals and party activists that grew up during the Jordanian period. In other words, the forces undermining tradition are not specifically Israeli but they are greatly strengthened by the Israeli presence on the West Bank"

(HELLER, 1980: 199).

The emphasis on the archaeological significance of Eastern side of Jerusalem made the Palestinian more aware of the Zionist colonial policy of disregarding him and his habitat as a living potential. The dilemma became exaggerated as the Palestinian obtained:

"....an identity card which enables him to reside in Israel and gives him the right to take part in local (but not in parliamentary) elections and the right to benefit from his social rights as a resident. He also had a Jordanian passport with all the rights of citizenship involved in holding such a passport.

These are the contradictions the Jerusalemite has to take into account as he decides what is a safe course to steer if he is to avoid coming into collision with the (security) conditions of either party. He anxiously tries to discover a common denominator in the day-to-day conduct of his affairs and has to rely on the indulgence now of the Jordanian, now of the Israeli side"


Such an atmosphere of contradiction is exacerbated as the rest of the Arab world pressures the Jerusalem community to preserve their identity, with little backing for the national institutions to withstand Judaisation of East Jerusalem.

The Israeli occupation of the ‘Westbank’ is an intrusive phenomenon in the lives of the Palestinian people. The military administration aggravates the oppression of the population through arrests and collective punishment and deprives it of elementary human rights: the right of association and assembly, freedom of expression, freedom of movement, the right to protest etc. Further, the occupation has subjected the society to more strains than a sophisticated, developed society could absorb and yet survive intact. It forces individuals to make choices that would not be required under normal circumstances, such as weighing personal and family considerations against larger political issues.
As we shall see in the next chapter, in recent years we have witnessed the emergence of a national movement whose aim was to reactivate traditional values. This "reactivation" phenomenon was intensified in order to protect tradition and to control the structural changes which the society was exposed to. Feeling threatened by the Israeli acculturation, many have turned to traditional manifestations, chief amongst them is a return to the religious attire or Sharia (ATA, 1984). With regards to intellectuals and university students, their objective has been to change the Palestinian mentality that focused on social and economic needs into controversial issues related to cultural identity under occupation.

First, the IMG colonial policy of confiscating Palestinian land left thousands of dunums under the direct rule of the military establishment. This has resulted not only in many Palestinian farmers left without jobs, but thousands of dunums of land being uncultivated that have consequently become barren in our harsh climate. In fact, these lands could have been developed and cultivated if they had stayed in Palestinian hands. Add to this that almost all land used communally for pasture or grazing has been seized, which means that the phenomenon of grazing animals in these lands, which is a natural pasture in the Palestinian landscape, no longer exists.

Second, as we have seen earlier almost 74% of the land of the 'Westbank' has been seized. This means that these lands are no longer under Palestinian control and therefore can not be developed by them. The only way that these lands can be used, is for colonial Israeli settlements which in turn affects the whole image of the Palestinian traditional environment. This point has been emphasised by Mr. ALI from Morda near Nablus, when he said: "Not only can we not look after the 200 dunums they took from our land, but we can not cultivate the land near it too. Look at the colour of the olive trees in this land [not seized], and those near the fence of the settlement, isn't it sad. Look how the construction's dust from the Israeli settlement has turned the trees near the fence to gray, the leaves cannot breath. Whenever we wanted to reach them the bullets were faster than us"
Third, the result of controlling the water resources are very harmful to the future development of 'Westbank' agriculture, particularly in view of the fact that 95% of the cultivated land is utilized for dry farming (olive, grain) and only 5% is irrigated. In view of this control over our water resources, new investment in irrigation to increase the cultivable area is unlikely to occur. These restrictions have resulted in a further decline in the cultivated land, which accordingly will affect the whole image of the 'Westbank'. Moreover, these restrictions have resulted in bulldozing many irrigated farms by their owners because they have become too dry. "I never wanted to do it", said Mr. Yasin from Tulkarm, "it is as valuable to me as my sons, but when you see your beloved horse suffering you shoot him in the head to rest him. This is what happened with me, I felt my soul was taken out of my body with every tree being uprooted from the farm, but I had to do it, simply because I want to feed a family and I can not compete with the Israeli citrus farms." If we add to this the number of trees that the Israeli military and the Jewish settlers uproot every year as a collective punishment to the Palestinians, this means the elimination from our landscape of trees.

As a result of the IMG full control of Palestinian development, especially by controlling planning, our observation revealed that urban design, being that part of the planning process which deals with the visual quality of urban environment, is widely, and often seriously, deficient in the 'Westbank', if it exists at all. It was also observed that the condition of many urban places is now quite unsatisfactory due to the continuing neglect. This has resulted in the serious neglect of our traditional urban heritage. To continue this tradition and to help to prevent the worst excesses of an imposed planning system we must promote a new livable environment that will accommodate growth while at the same time restore and renew the old. We must again study the physical and social needs and determine the specific qualities of each site. These include the physical appropriateness and the kind of functions a building can best accommodate, based upon its position, topography, vegetation, soils and climate. This is an elementary procedure for every society, but it has been completely denied to us by the Israeli planners, whose chief goal has been to destroy the Palestinian traditional environment and to divorce the Palestinians from their origins.
It is a common fact that the visual character of a site, both in itself, and in relation to the larger perceptual lands and townscape of the region, is one aspect of its capacity for accommodating future growth. The crucial role that specific visual determinates have played in our building tradition make it imperative that this tradition must continue to be a central feature in determining future urban form. The reasons for this are not only visual, but correspond to densities and building forms associated with a way of life which the Palestinians of the ‘Westbank’ consider appropriate and desirable. There is a distinct cultural landscape.

The Israeli colonial planners, who are supposed to be professionally involved with visual matters, replaced visual determinants with the inevitable imposition of colonization and Jewish settlement building has left the Westbank’s form to chance and a consequence of their objectives. Unfortunately, if the past experience is any guide, ‘open-ended form’ and ‘on-going colonisation process’ in concrete terms means visual chaos and out of place environmental desolation. This phenomenon is evident in East Jerusalem and its vicinity.

The 25 municipalities operating in the ‘Westbank’, are responsible for preparing "outline" plans for approval by the Israeli High Planning Council. However, despite the fact that most of these municipalities have hired consultants to prepare "outline" plans since the beginning of 1980's, only one case (Beit Jalla) has been approved by the Civil Administration (COON, 1992). Nevertheless, the plan does not take any of the present constraints into account nor does it satisfy the long term needs of the town. On the contrary commercial development can take place anywhere, and is encouraged along main vehicular approaches to the town; there are no proposals for public facilities, no local open spaces. In short there is nothing in the plan for future human needs. Further, the density and building height regulations, instead of conserving the old town, will allow it and its charming hill-top setting soon to be obliterated.

The depressed economy, the limited resources of the municipalities and the absence of any machinery for planning has resulted in many deficiencies of the planning system, including the disastrous lack of care for historic quarters (COON, 1992). If we add to
this the IMG constraints on the planning of public projects; it is clear that the kind of
development that occurs under occupation, is a denial of Palestinian culture; a kind of
physical genocide on our very way of life.

The IMG in all its plans has aimed at the fragmentation of Palestinian settlements, both
rural and urban, in order to prevent any territorial and political unity between them.
This has been achieved by confiscating all the land surrounding them, which has
resulted in their isolation and weakens their relationship with each other. Further, little
effort is made to coordinate activities between Arab and Jewish settlements in the same
sub-region. This lack of relationships between the two groups and the development of
a dual system causes more waste and generates disorder and confusion.

The rich and diverse heritage of the 'Westbank' is among the main casualties of these
occupation policies. This control over our development and the freezing of legislation,
at a time when most countries of the world have developed some kind of legislative
system for protecting and preserving their heritage, finds us living in a totally degraded
architectural environment that is deteriorating at an alarming rate. Particularly
unforgivable is the state of neglect of our old buildings all over Palestine. Valuable
historic towns, buildings, archaeological sites and whole neighbourhoods are being
bulldozed or abandoned and allowed to collapse to be replaced by new constructions that
unrelated to our historical environment and are aimed at removing our collective cultural
memory. Village land confiscation around most of the Khirab (sing., khirba), which
were erected during the Ottoman period, as well as many of the circular shelters or
(qusor), built of dry stonework for guarding farms in the summer, were put directly
under Israeli control; most of them have been destroyed or are deteriorating fast as a
consequence of ignorance and neglect, Khirbet Abu-Awad is but one among tens of
examples.

The IMG colonial policies towards land planning and development, which restricted the
development and expansion of the Palestinians settlements, have restricted the
development of Palestinian towns and villages to the "existing built-up areas," which
bottles up the Palestinian towns and villages and assures a free hand for Jewish settlers
in the vicinity. Since ribbon development has been a characteristic of Arab town growth, Israeli Planners now require very wide clearways (100-150 meter wide) on either side of the road so as to discourage if not to block new Palestinian buildings. These clearways also jeopardize agriculture in the steep or narrow valleys where fields border the roadway. Except for very rare examples no municipality boundaries have been expanded since 1967. The same thing with more constraints, from the Israeli High Planning Department, has been applied to Palestinian villages. Accordingly, this has concentrated Palestinian development (mostly housing) in the cores of existing settlements, and in some cases frozen development completely. This means that normal modes of Palestinian settlement city growth have been reversed; further continuing the population in already over crowded quarters, in addition planning restrictions outside the municipalities have created awkward alignments to the boundaries of villages, because the priorities were not the villages, but rather the nearby Israeli settlements (Fig. 4.6).

As a result our settlements have become over populated areas and started to lose their traditional and historical image. The people have now been forced to either demolish their old buildings in order to build new houses or to add rooms on their roofs tops, which usually involves different building materials, forms and texture which distort the traditional fabric of the historic settlements.

Fig. 4.6: Normal Modes of Development have been Reversed
Source: the author
At this scale, we can see that colonial policies and the administrative system have affected the appearance of our houses. Firstly, direct control by Israel, through their integration policy, has resulted in the borrowing of some Israeli architectural elements, which do not belong to our architectural vocabulary, especially in the areas near the Green Line like Tulkarm and Qalqelia. This has been made worse by these elements being introduced to the historic quarters through new addition or extensions. Secondly, as a result of denying the Palestinians building permits in the villages or as a result of economic hardship in the cities people have started adding rooms, usually of a cheap quality, on top of their old buildings, which has destroyed the homogeneity of the townscape (Fig. 4.7a). Thirdly, as a result of the imposed general economic hardship the people avoid building better quality houses when there is the risk of them being demolished. People out of necessity have started to build with cheaper concrete materials instead of stone— the traditional building material. This of course has ruined the whole image of Palestinian settlements which became increasingly shabby and makeshift (Fig. 4.7b).

Fig. 4.7 (a): Cheap Building Materials are Replacing Stone the Traditional Material.
(b): Additions to Old Buildings Spoiled the Image of the Traditional Settlements.
Source: the author

4.4. THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE BUILT ENVIRONMENT
The most dramatic and provocative aspect of the IMG occupation of the ‘Westbank’ has been the establishment of colonial Jewish settlements. Although there is no explicit Israeli authoritative document, or decision which outlines its settlement policies and
objectives in the 'Westbank', several plans have been proposed and used as guides by the occupying government\textsuperscript{22} (CASHDAN, 1989).

The strategies Israel has applied to colonize the 'Westbank' have been diverse, the differences and changes give emphasis to the specific necessities and characteristics of separate subareas (ABU-LUGHOD, 1982). Accordingly, six main phases can be distinguished, reflecting different government attitudes under changing circumstances (Fig. 4.8). The first phase (1967 to 1973), the Allon\textsuperscript{23} Settlement Plan of the Labour Party, saw the Jordan River as Israel's security border where they established a chain of settlements, 10-15 km, in width, along the Rift Valley (SHAFIR, 1985), (Fig. 4.9a). The second phase, the Amanah Plan of Gush Emunim (blocks for the faithful) (1973-1977), witnessed a redirection to the heart of the densely populated areas of the 'Westbank' (ABU-LUGHOD, 1982), (Fig. 4.9c). The third phase (1977-1983) has seen a switch in emphasis, under the right-wing Likud government, to a policy of maximising Jewish settlements throughout the 'Westbank' (NEWMAN, 1982). In this period, policy has been guided by the Drobles Plan of 1978 (Fig. 4.9b) and Sharon Plan of 1980 (Fig. 4.9a). The fourth phase, (the One-Hundred Thousand Plan), was drawn up in 1983 by The World Zionist Organization (WZO). The Plan called for the settling of 100,000 Jews in the occupied territories by 1986; the establishment of non-agricultural settlements in the Jerusalem and Tel Aviv metropolitan areas; the provision of infrastructure for them; and the creation of a maximum spread of Jewish settlement areas all over the 'Westbank', in order to surround and fragment Palestinian communities (BENVENISTI, 1987), (Fig. 4.9d).

The fifth phase, known as the "Seven Stars Plan" was declared in 1991 by the Likud Housing Minister Ariel Sharon (COON,1992). This plan aimed to establish new major town settlements along the Green Line, with the objective of connecting large Jewish settlements with existing Israeli cities by a road network, in order to encourage the


\textsuperscript{23} Eigal Allon, was the deputy Prime Minister of Israel between 1968-1977.
potential growth of Jewish communities on both sides of the Green Line, and to erase the psychological deterrent of Jewish colonization (COON, 1992; cited in SENAN, 1993). The first stage of this plan started in 1992, with the aim of constructing 16,000 housing units. An additional 31,000 units were planned for subsequent years (AL-QUDS, 1992b: 8).

Fig. 4.8: Phases of Israeli Settlements.
Source: Benvenisti (1984: 93)

The final phase, started after the election of the new Labour government, headed by Mr Rabin, promised to cut back the programme of new settlements. However, Rabin has not entirely repudiated the Likud policies. Rather, he has concentrated less on building in remote ‘Westbank’ areas, which he calls "political" settlements, and continues to settle Jews on land near Jerusalem, by expanding the existing settlements (HELM, 1993). Observers criticise Rabin's new settlement policy on three grounds: first, it is "delayed" not immediate; second, it is "partial" and does not cover all the occupied territories; and third, it is only a "slow-down" and not a halt (cited in HELM, 1993).
However, the most important part of the new policy is what can be termed the "war of Jerusalem". Since he was elected, Rabin has defined a new Jerusalem boundary, which goes far wider than the existing municipal boundary, calling it "greater Jerusalem" (HELM, 1993). It stretches from Ramallah in the north to near Hebron in the south. This strategy has been accelerated since the signing of the "Declaration of Principles," which doubled its acceleration since the "Cairo Agreement" (AL-QUDS, 1994a,b).

It is worth mentioning, that the changing attitudes and emphasis of the settlement colonization policy under different parties and governments, has not resulted in any basic transformation of the nature of the final goals (Fig. 4.9e,f). In fact, all Israeli governments since 1967 are in favour of constructing Jewish settlements in the 'Westbank'. However, there are differences in their respective strategies. On the contrary, Israeli governments intend the colonial settlements to support the formation of the physical and emotional attachment of the Israelis to the 'Westbank', and thus change the demographic balance in favour of the Jews (cited in SENAN, 1993). This has involved a wide range of institutional actors, of whom the principal figures are, 1) government agencies; 2) institutions affiliated to the World Zionist Organization (WZO); 3) settlers pressure groups; and 4) private sector business firms (RICHARDSON, 1984; COON, 1992). All four groups have undertaken settlement activity with or without consultation with each other.

Demographic data on Jewish settlements in the 'Westbank' is inaccurate, because it is not collected in a systematic and objective fashion. There are signs that the data is inflated, for both political and monetary reasons so as to demonstrate 1) a strong momentum of settlement, and 2) to justify demands for public assistance (BENVENISTI, 1987). Before the Occupation, the only Jewish community outside East Jerusalem, was an insignificant number of Samaritans in Nablus (COON, 1992). Since then Jewish population has increased rapidly. While in 1975 there were approximately 1,800 Jewish settlers (excluding East Jerusalem) (BENVENISTI, 1984), it rose to 185,000 persons in 1989, of whom 85,000 were outside East Jerusalem and the other 100,000 in the East Jerusalem area. Furthermore, depending on available population trends the estimated
number of Jewish settlers, by the end of 1991, were about 115,000 (excluding East Jerusalem (COON, 1992), (Fig. 4.10b).

On the other hand, information on the number of settlements is of doubtful validity, due, partly to the difficulty of defining what is meant by a separate settlement (COON, 1992). In 1968 the only Jewish settlements beyond Jerusalem were three small ones in the Etzion Block (between Bethlehem and Hebron), and the "illegal squatters" from Gush Emunim who had occupied parts of Hebron (ABU-LUGHOD, 1982). In 1977, the
end of the elected Labour government period, the number of settlements reached 24, since then it has increased rapidly under the Likud government. By 1992, according to the Settlement Council, the number of settlements was 142 (AL-QUDS, 1992a). They claimed that out of the 142 settlements, 13 are big settlements with a total of 66,850 settlers and 129 smaller settlements with 44,000. However, the Israeli "Peace Now" political movement, confirmed in 1992 that the total number of settlements was 157. It added that in 105 of these settlements the number of families were less than one hundred (AL-QUDS, 1992a) (Fig. 4.10a).

After the Labour government was elected in 1992, it concentrated on the completion and expansion of the already existing settlements, and increasing the number of Jewish settlers Rabin -the Prime Minister- made it clear, when he was elected, that before he introduced any new curbs he would allow completion of 11,000 buildings, which he says were started under the previous government and should be finished (HELM, 1993). "The result is that at the moment it seems like a massive building boom out there," said one Western diplomat. Just filling the 11,000 units would increase the Jewish population in the 'Westbank' and Gaza by 60,000 (cited in HELM, 1993).

Fig. 4.9: (e)- Jewish Settlements Strategy for 1986.
The buildings are going up mostly in the larger settlements. But tiny settlements in remote areas are also being quadrupled in size. The Jewish settlement of Eli near Nablus, for example, has 70 lived in units, and another 400 are under construction according to figures produced by Peace Now, the Israeli pressure group (cited in HELM, 1993). According to the same Peace Now report, not only has house building continued but also road building. An 8-km road has been completed since June 1992 between Eli and its neighbouring settlement of Shilo and a new road is being completed between the main road and Shilo.

Finally, COON (1992) summarized some of the characteristics of the Jewish settlements; some are close to Palestinian populated centres, and one is in the centre of Hebron town. The majority of them are in isolated locations on mountains and hill-tops. However, the physical manifestation of the separation between Jewish settlements and the surrounding area, can be traced from the following quotation:

"The entire settlement is surrounded by a series of high, electrified barbed wire fences with intervening minefields. Mounted at intervals are highly-sensitised TV-radar installations for visual observation of would-be intruders. Computer-controlled night cameras, thermal imageries and fine sound-sensors detect and visually identify any movements at the inter-fence zone, even on the darkest of nights. The border zone will have been sprayed with defoliants and poisoned to keep off local Arab pastoralists with their flocks and herds. Armed guards operate the gate into the settlement"  (Quoted in COON, 1992: 171-172).

It is worth pointing out that these settlements are in contradiction to the Article 49(6) of the Fourth Geneva convention. The illegality of these settlements is indicated by the clear and explicit language of the Sixth Clause of Article 49 of the Fourth Geneva
Convention: "The Occupying Power shall not deport or transfer parts of its own civilian population into the territory it occupies" (Quoted in TILLMAN, 1978). There are "no qualifications or exceptions to this provision."

As we have seen earlier, the conquest of the ‘Westbank’ areas in the week of the 1967 war, gave Israel a golden opportunity to colonize it by implanting Jewish settlements in its heart land. However, Jewish settlements required more than land, government services, and army protection. they also need a sense of legality and institutional identity with Israel itself. As well as the creation of legal and administrative institutions identical to those operating in Israel proper (ARONSON, 1990). Above all, Jewish settlements require infrastructure to serve them. “Wherever they settle, the Jews carry the Israeli administrative, political, and welfare system.... They have built their own high-level physical infrastructure (BENVENISTI, 1984: 40).

In addition, the Jewish Councils are involved in all high level decisions on infrastructure and on legal, economic, security, and land and water matters. Therefore, upon the Council’s request the plans are oriented towards developing this infrastructure separately from that which serves the Palestinians, the latter being neglected in the main (CASHDAN, 1989). Despite the above facts, Israeli policy from the beginning has aimed at dominating the Palestinian infrastructure for its own benefit, in the words of Dayan in 1968: “We have a chance,...., to link up the electric grid and water supply, to set up a joint transportation network and to deal with agriculture in the region as a whole" (Quoted in ARONSON, 1990: 24). (More about the Israeli policy towards the Palestinian infrastructure has been discussed in Chapter One).

Moreover, the military establishment’s basic doctrine, which is based on high mobility, considers the existence of an efficient interconnected network of transportation essential for national security. After the occupation, the Israeli transportation network was restructured to facilitate the integration of the Occupied ‘Westbank’ into Israel’s regional structure. New roads were constructed to link the settlements established in the ‘Westbank’ with the major roads and highways. The function of some roads has been
changed and new axes of interrelationships have emerged as major nodes in the network structure (ABU-AYYASH, 1976, ABU-EISHEH, 1994).

To sum up, the new roads are meant to serve Israel’s local, regional, and national interests, while Arab transportation needs are ignored or are served as a byproduct of Israeli interest. In fact, Israeli roads are planned to restrict Palestinian spatial sprawl. Road alignments (100-150 meters wide) are planned in such a way as to restrict the expansion of Palestinian towns and villages and to prevent ribbon development along the roads.

One of the most destructive impacts of the IMG policies is most clearly seen in the thousands of Palestinian houses that have been demolished by the Military Occupation since 1967. However, before discussing this policy any further, it is worth remembering that the Fourth Geneva Convention stipulates that Israel for instance, does not have this authority. The language of article (53) of the Convention is clear:

"Any destruction by the occupying power of real or personal property belonging individually of collectively to private persons, or to the state, or other public authorities, or to social or cooperative organizations, is prohibited, except where such destruction is rendered absolutely necessary by military operations"

(Quoted in BUTTERFIELD and TILLEY, 1992).

Nevertheless, the IMG gives itself the right to demolish houses according to the "Emergency Regulations (1945)," which gives the Military Commander the power to confiscate and destroy houses (for more details about the Emergency Regulations (1945), see BENVENISTI et al, 1986: 85-86).

Shortly after the end of the war, (in August 1967), the Israeli authorities mercilessly eradicated the three Palestinian villages of Emmuas, Yalu, and Beit Nuba in the Latrun Salient, driving their 10,000 residents from their homes and their 20,000 dunums of agricultural land. They were even prevented from taking their belongings with them (Cited in ARONSON, 1990).

The Israeli novelist Amos Kenan, who witnessed this forced removal while serving in the army, described one of these villages. He wrote:
"Beit Nuba is built of fine quarry stones; some of the houses are magnificent. Every house is surrounded by an orchard, olive trees, apricots, vines, and presses. They are well kept. Among the trees there are carefully tended vegetable beds" (Quoted in THE INSTITUTE OF PALESTINIAN STUDIES, 1972: 65).

Emmuas, on the other hand, has been situated on sloping ground west of Jerusalem and much of its land was planted with fruit and olive trees. On the ruins of this village a park (Canada Park) has been laid out (Fig. 4.11). Michael Adams - a British journalist visited the area in 1968. He noted:

"Without a guide, I should probably have driven straight through without realising that there had been villages at all. The demolition squads had been thorough. But when we stopped the car and got out to look, there were plenty of tell-tale signs; it is not easy, even in six months, to wipe out a thousand years of history without leaving a trace. There were a few pieces of masonry, a broken tile, the cactus hedges- a sure sign that people had once lived here" (ADAMS, 1991, Quoted in SENAN, 1993: 150).

In order to create more installations on the ground and to serve its objectives of transforming the Palestinian traditional built environment for the benefit of Jews, the IMG continues its policy of the destruction of villages, refuge camps and urban quarters. According to John Reddaway, Deputy Commissioner General of UNRWA; the Al-Moughrabiya area adjacent to the Wailing Wall, near to the Old City of Jerusalem was demolished to be used as a parking lot for cars and for some services for prayers and visitors (Cited in THE INSTITUTE OF PALESTINIAN STUDIES, 1972). The total area that was expropriated for this purpose was 116 dunums including 595 buildings, 104 commercial stores, 5 mosques and 4 schools, according to a report by Ibrahim Dakkak24. Next to go were some 600 Arab owned homes in the former Jewish Quarter, were al-Shuraf Quarter and its environs was completely destroyed25, and approximately 4,000 Palestinians were expelled to make possible the reconstruction of an enlarged and completely "Jewish" Jewish Quarter.

In Qalqelia alone, at least 850 out of 2,000 dwellings have been bulldozed. Between

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24 Interview by the author with a member of the Jerusalem Committee, who requested anonymity on 17 March 1994. Ibrahim Dakkak is an engineer from East Jerusalem.

25 Ibid
the end of October 1967 and December 6, 1967, the villages of Shuyoukh in Hebron, Jiftlik and Agarrich camps and Nuseirat village in Jordan Valley were destroyed (CITED IN THE INSTITUTE OF PALESTINIAN STUDIES, 1972). These are just a few examples to show the massive scale of destruction at the first years of the Occupation.

Until about 1985, however, most of this demolition was justified by the IMG for "security" reasons. The other reason for demolition is the supposed lack of a "building permit". Almost all demolitions under this category have been outside the municipalities, and the vast majority of them (95% in 1989) are houses (COON, 1992).

To achieve its goals of controlling Palestinian land, especially outside the municipal areas, and to control planning and development, Israel, made it almost impossible for Palestinians to get a building permit. In a comprehensive study, COON (1992) identified three principal phases for obtaining building permits outside the municipalities: Firstly, the provision by the applicant for information about the site (Provision of Information), secondly, the issuing by the planning authorities- the Central Planning Department- of the regulations which restricted the type of development which will be allowed on that particular site (Preliminary Approval), and finally, the consideration by the authority of the applicant's plans in relation to these regulations (Final Approval), (Fig. 4.12).

Apart from the fact, that it is very difficult to obtain a building permit, it is costly and takes about two years at the minimum. It costs a Palestinian about as much to seek planning permission for a new house, as it costs an Israeli to purchase his home in a Jewish settlement (COON, 1991). COON (1992), estimated the number of rejected applications at 80%. In 1989, according to him, 1586 Palestinian residents applied and only 358 of them were given a permit. In other words, the number of planning consents granted by the IMG to Palestinians is about one-tenth of what would be necessary to keep pace with the population growth. Further, the number of Palestinian houses bulldozed by the IMG is because they lack building permission has, in recent years, been more than the number of houses granted planning permission (COON, 1991 & 1992)(Fig.4.13).
Fig. 4.11: The Site of Emmuas Village before and after the Demolition. Source: Adams (1991, Quoted in Senan, 1993).
Nevertheless, between 1967-1978, 1,224 houses were demolished or sealed (BENVENISTI et al, 1986). In addition, COON (1992) pointed out that, according to official sources, 1,700 demolition notices were issued in 1980 and a further 2,000 houses without permits were discovered in 1986. Between 1989 and 1991, the IMG razed 1,648 Arab homes and other structures in the Occupied Territories (BUTTERFIELD & TILLEY, 1992). A report by the Arab Studies Society in Jerusalem indicated that Israel had destroyed 210 Palestinian houses in East Jerusalem alone since 1986. The report also added that Israel was demolishing Palestinian houses in East Jerusalem at a rate of 50 houses annually (AL-QUDS, 1994a). Further, the PALESTINE TIMES (1994) claimed that the demolition of houses for the lack of a building licence had increased recently in the northern ‘Westbank’ territory.

Fig. 4.12: Procedure for Obtaining a Building Permit (Outside Municipalities)
Other demolition of properties included farm buildings, factories, storage sheds, shops, clinics, mosques and churches. In addition thousands of trees have been uprooted. Between 1989-1991 alone, 114,507 trees in the Occupied Territories have been uprooted (BUTTERFIELD & TILLEY, 1992), and since the agreement between the PLO and Israel 14,111 trees have been also uprooted (AL-QUDS, 1994a).

4.5. THE IMPACT OF THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE BUILT ENVIRONMENT

In the past twenty seven years of its occupation of the ‘Westbank’, Israel has systematically planned and operated a complex set of policies designed to absorb the ‘Westbank’, while simultaneously expelling, subjugating or containing its inhabitants who they were forced to "take" along with the land. The settlements created by the IMG in the ‘Westbank’ involved far more than the replacement and subordination of the indigenous people. They incorporated values of supremacy and domination that attempted to reshape the way the people lived and used their environment. The expansion of the Israeli colonial settlements involved the expropriation of the Palestinian land and the destruction of their society along with the annihilation of their values. The new landscape was a foreign (mainly Western) landscape, in which immigrant Jews settled the ‘Westbank’ and dominated its traditional environment at the expense of its indigenous inhabitants. The implications of this IMG strategy for the linkages between economic dependency, land confiscation, population "displacement," the implantation of
settlements and the provision of the highways network to connect each and every Jewish settlement is now well known to the people. ABU-LUGHOD (1982), argues that land confiscation and the establishment of Jewish settlements were made on the assumption that even if there were insufficient Jews to populate the zone, control over the majority could be better exercised if the Palestinian population were compressed into smaller and smaller "pockets," interspersed by surveillance "front towns," and if the livelihood of Palestinian residents could be made increasingly dependent upon Jewish enterprises.

The Israeli aim of seeing a purely Jewish ‘Westbank’, with no Palestinians, was not a hidden one. The Israeli Energy Minister Mordechai Zippori, summed up the government view in a 1982 speech:

"...The presence of an Arab majority in the West Bank should not prevent the Israeli authorities from accelerating the settlement process in the occupied territories...I was born in Petah Tikva, which was surrounded by many Arab villages such as Kufir Anna, Abu Kisheh, and Khayriye...and no trace has been left of those villages today, but Petah Tikva has remained"

(Quoted in Matar, 1983: 120).

In summary the IMG transformation of the Palestinian built environment has influenced our attitudes towards our traditional environment, our culture, our houses and our way of life. It has affected the identity of the ‘Westbank’ as a whole, and changed its cultural landscape radically.

This section discusses how the changes affected both the human environment and the physical environment. The information is based on the visual observations and interviews conducted by the author during his fieldwork in 1993-1994, as well as the available literature on the subject.

The impact of the Israeli settlements is constantly felt beyond the confiscation of Palestinian land for Jewish settlements. It has necessitated the accommodation of the Palestinian population to Israeli settlement and suppressed the resistance and destruction of our society and culture. This author argues that the IMG always has had an active interest in breaking down the stable continuous development of the Palestinian social identity.
This section will show how some of these policies have affected the Palestinian inhabitants in the 'Westbank'. Our argument is that any conservation action should focused at the people and depend on them for its success. By trying to destroy Palestinian self identity through destroying our architectural built environment, the whole of our culture may be destroyed. Therefore, we must counter this tendency and regain our strength and purpose through restoring our cultural heritage. The people themselves must organise to rebuild our communities both socially and physically.

We must counter the numerous recorded incidents of Israeli settler attacks on Palestinian persons and property, often including the use of arms (ABU-SHAKRAH, 1985). Even though as BENVENISTI (1987) has pointed out Israeli settlers have at least 10,000 firearms and are part of the Israeli army. They are granted the authority to suppress; to act as policemen, to punish and harass us. They also have the right to stop Palestinians, demand our identification cards and to arrest us. The perpetrators of these attacks, are not perceived as offenders in the usual sense. Attacks against institutes of education, and cultural sites have become common practice. Destruction of crops (including poisoning of grape vines, uprooting of trees and burning wheat fields) are also very common (Cited in COON, 1992), as is the burning and destruction of Palestinian properties (included cars and houses). These are just a few examples of how more and more pressure is put on us to force us to leave our homeland. We will never leave but we have to start rebuilding as well as resisting.

This continuing psychological war on us to abandon hope is clearly understood from the paradoxical attitude of the Palestinians who work in Israel. While they do not wish to be ruled by Israel, they are having to construct houses for Israeli immigrants, often on land which has been confiscated from Arab owners. Sometimes, they find themselves working as hired labour on farms which they themselves once owned. They see those immigrants coming in to take their land and their houses and no one can move to protect them. We walk in Jerusalem and see people coming from all over the world with the belief that our country is theirs. The Palestinians on the other hand, are being daily deported and denied their human rights. With every new wave of immigrants we
know that more land is going to be seized, more restrictions imposed and the walls and fences of our prison close in.

It is not surprising that people became afraid to invest in development projects or unwilling to restore their old buildings. As one Palestinian from Nablus, put it, "Our experience has taught us that, the only two things that we can carry with us, where ever we go, is our cash and our education, we are not able to carry our buildings, for example." But this is a defeatist attitude. If we are determined to move we don't have to carry our buildings; but we do have to look after them. They are ours.

Economic strangulation is something we must overcome. As TAMARI (1980) has argued, economic factors have become more important than the settlements in bringing about our subjugation. But we must put what resources we have into our recovery. We should not wait for a foreign assistance. We must take up a constructive attitude towards our future again.

Palestinian settlements have developed naturally following the culture, traditions and the Muslim religion of our citizens. They have similar characteristics, in their space structure and homogeneous silhouette with the use of traditional materials, they are well integrated with the surrounding landscape (Fig. 4.14). Our organic vernacular architecture provides fine examples of a fundamental characteristic of the art of architecture- the way in which the specific quality of a place, its light, its materials, topography, history are instinctively understood and reflected in the spatial organization, the structural order and use of materials, texture, and colours in our buildings and our towns. We must revive this consciousness through our own efforts. No one else can do this for us.

The Israeli planners and architects, dominated by their colonial ideologies, virtually ignored all planning and architectural determinants which involve human perceptions or feelings, and which are sympathetic with the surrounding environment. In doing so, they fail to recognize, the peoples' needs whose fulfilment should be the professional planner's and architect's basic goals. Accordingly, the Israeli settlements neither fit with
the natural environment, nor with the surrounding villages. On the contrary they speak of their embattled situation and their moral bankruptcy, symbolising, as they do, hill top fortresses against human rights. This, of course, has destroyed the natural development of the region (Fig. 4.15).

![Fig. 4.14: Huwara a Stone-Built Palestinian Village in the hills South of Nablus. Source: Graham-Brown (1980: 36).](image)

FRACTION (1991: 16), a British journalist, gave a colourful picture of how the Israeli settlements had destroyed the cultural landscape of Palestine. He wrote:

"From above, the West Bank looks like a many coloured chess-board: standing out against the greenery and rocks are ever more numerous splashes of the red and ever scarcer dots of white. The red splashes are the Israeli settlements, unmistakable by the red tile roofs of the houses. The white dots are the flat roofed houses of the terraced Palestinian villages. The Israeli settlements display a bit of the ostentatiousness of new arrivals not quite sure of themselves. The Palestinian villages melt familiarly into the surrounding hills"

(Quoted in SENAN, 1993: 112).

The Palestinian village is patterned typically by the needs of a rural community, with the houses bunched close together, surrounded by gardens and with the paths radiating into the orange groves and fields. On the hill slopes, which were terraced to prevent erosion, olive trees were mostly grown. Accordingly, the landscape was treated not merely as the backdrop to a building; the two formed an organic unity (Fig. 4.16).

On the other hand, the Israeli settlement patterns and their housing lay-out are based on the concept in which land is owned individually and houses are dotted along the roads in close proximity to their plots. Their landscape shows no sign of an organic, lyrical or civilized relationship between the buildings and their surroundings. They are strategically grouped to afford the maximum security for their occupiers and the community as a whole (Fig. 4.17 and 4.21).
Traditionally, settlements in the 'Westbank' tend to keep away from the main roads. This may be explained by the fact that the villages were more or less self-sufficient in their life style. They are located on rising grounds, dug into the sides of high grounds. The valleys are generally uninhabited, being left free for intensive cultivation.

In more mountainous regions that are less accessible, we find settlements seeking security when they felt themselves threatened or who simply wished to develop their own culture free of outside influences. The development of these settlements usually
occurred as an extension of existing ones. Such is the case of the Samaritans on the summit of Mount Gerzim to the South of Nablus.

Fig. 4.17: Aerial Photograph Shows the Settlement Patterns and Housing Lay-out of an Israeli Settlement

Fig. 4.18: The Jewish settlement Giv'at Za'eef near Ramallah.
Photo by Hisham Zu'bi for the author (1995).

Nowadays Israeli settlements dominate Palestinian settlements, forcing them to inhabit the less strategic valley (Fig. 4.18). Israeli settlements contradict the traditional Palestinian pattern as they have been dictated by their essentially colonial ideology.
While the IMG authorities have introduced new forests and plantations around and within their settlements, they have destroyed the beautiful natural landscape, with its balanced environment and fine traditional architectural elements. The typical and beautiful rocky landscape and stone terraces, are daily being bulldoze in favour of constructing new Israeli roads or settlements. Old evergreen trees planted decades ago are carelessly uprooted for the same reason (Fig. 4.19). Many areas have been bulldozed for military training or neglected as military zones.

Finally, the landscape of new roads introduced obtrusive new elements into the environment. For example, the signs on the roads are written in big letters in Hebrew and English but in small letters in Arabic (Fig. 4.20). Where cross roads occurred they were characterised by the existence of houses but the new regulations clear ways on both sides of the main roads. As a result these houses are now fast disappearing (Cited in SENAN, 1993).
Sewers frequently drain from the elevated Jewish settlements into the nearby valleys perhaps cultivated and inhabited by Palestinians. In Beit Sourik the untreated sewage from Giva'at Haradar flowing through orchards for over a kilometre has killed many of the trees. The Jewish religious school Shafoubanieem, in the Old City of Jerusalem, has been allowed to drain onto the roof and then into the house of a Palestinian family, 13 members of who live on the ground floor directly under the school.

As a result of this sort of violence from the settlers in the Old City of Jerusalem, for example, the Jerusalem Committee was forced to cover courtyards and windows of many traditional houses with wire meshes, in order to protect Palestinians families from the excrement and stone throwing of the settlers. This has spoiled the historical image of these houses. In addition many of the roads leading to the outside of old cities have been closed by barrels filled with concrete to prevent youths from throwing stones at the soldiers. These actions have increased since the beginning of the Intifada which started in 1987 (Fig. 4.22). Further, many of the higher buildings have been forcibly occupied and used as observation posts flying the Israeli flag. In other cases, military observation posts have been constructed to overlook Palestinian settlements (Fig. 4.23a). Doors and windows in many old buildings that belonged to suspect persons have been blocked by concrete as a collective punishment (Fig. 4.23b). This again has contributed to the degeneration of our historical Palestinian areas.

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26 The site of this house has been visited by the author and the supervisor of the theses in January 1994.

27 Ibid
Fig. 4.22: Closed Streets by Military Authorities.
Source: (a) Coon (1992); (b) Locman & Beinin (1989)

There are countless examples of this kind of aggressive environmentally destructive behaviour known about but so far we have not been able to do much about them. With the so called peace process we must start again to demand our human rights. Somehow we must regenerate our indignation at these disgraceful acts of vandalism by the settlers. We have lived under the role of occupation for so long now that we have come to accept these things. We, especially those Palestinians who know and care about the built environment, must have our own Intifada on behalf of our built heritage. We must somehow get our voices heard, come together with the people and devise and take effective action to reverse this situation. Some action along these lines is being taken. The Jerusalem Committee with its very limited resources is carrying out some conservation work to our cultural heritage in A’oqbat el-Khaledia. Though the work is not of the high standards it is a step forward.

4.6. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION.
This chapter has explored the processes of the IMG colonisation of the ‘Westbank’. To comprehend the meaning of these processes, we have explained how Israeli priorities have shifted over time, and how colonial activities are related to each other; for example, settlement policies are related to other policies such as the legal process,
land and water expropriation, collective punishment and heavy handed military governance. It has shown that, while colonial methods vary, the non-negotiable goals remain the same; the incorporation and eventual annexation of the ‘Westbank’ into Israel. We have tried to show the effects of all this on our built heritage.

Fig. 4.23:(a). Military Observation Posts.
(b). Windows of old Houses, in the Old Town of Nablus, Closed by Concrete Blocks by the Military Authorities.
It has been argued that the IMG planning policies in the 'Westbank' were designed to enhance regional development and interaction between the Jewish settlements and to facilitate the planning for new ones, while at the same time restrict the development of Palestinian settlements. In fact, "The Israelis have used all the powers at the disposal of an army of occupation to ensure that its policies for Judaisation of the West Bank are not constrained by the obligation to provide and effective town planning administration for the benefit of the Palestinians" (COON, 1992: 204).

Not only has the conservation of historic buildings and areas been completely neglected under Military Occupation, but Israel is deliberately destroying our Palestinian cultural heritage whenever it impinges on their priorities. At the same time the Palestinians have been denied any opportunity to develop any form of conservation legislation or even to carry out conservation on a voluntary basis. This would be considered as an action threatening security. This is plainly ridiculous now that the peace process is in train.

I have argued that the IMG has two main strategies to colonise the 'Westbank'; the control of the development and the transformation of the Palestinian traditional built environment. These strategies have resulted in the Palestinian settlements being fragmented, as islands within the Sea of Jewish settlement, disconnected and constrained, their expansion fixed within prescribed boundaries, outside which no building development can take place. While many countries have strategies to conserve their heritage through development policies, both Palestinian conservation and development are denied by the military authorities.

Finally, under the severe conditions of occupation that the Palestinian nation has to endure, the conservation of our Palestinian cultural heritage is not only a necessity but more importantly, it is now a matter of national continuity and political survival. Identity and culture are threatened when there is a rapid change combined with the strong influence of an occupying power. In such cases, the oppressed people must take up "defensive structure" by concentrating on a few key elements to maintain their cultural identity. This structuring process is what we are going to discuss in the next chapter.
CHAPTER FIVE

Transforming Palestinian Society and Politics: the Impact of the Occupation and the Intifada.
5.0. INTRODUCTION

In the previous chapter we discussed the implications of the IMG colonisation on the Palestinian people and on their traditional built environment. We have argued that Israel has used all the power at its disposal as an army of occupation to enforce the "full scope" of this colonisation.

Under this peculiar situation, conservation in the 'Westbank' takes its motivation from nationalism. Nationalism is normally an idea, but also a force. The Palestinian people have continued to articulate their nationalist demands whenever, wherever, and however they are able. Organized nationalist sentiment has been the chief driving force in our society during this century. Thus, no study can be made of mass mobilization outside the context of developments of the Palestinian national movement, both within and outside the 'Westbank'.

People who share a common identity will, within a certain configuration of circumstances, tend to act as one unit and mobilise as a coherent mass movement. Two processes were underway among Palestinians; first, a rebuilding effort (called 'restructuring') began, similar to that which had earlier taken place in the Diaspora, and in a continuation of it. The other process, initiated by the Israelis, was a gradual encroachment upon Palestinian resources, demonstrated by the seizure of land and the establishment of Jewish settlements in the Occupied areas. In time, it became clear that Israel intended to annex these areas and de facto, to make them part of the Jewish state. Palestinians began, after 1967, to perceive the occupation as a threat to their cultural identity and even to their survival. Some thing like this had happened before. Unlike 1948, however, Palestinians did not run, but stayed and fought. It is to this process of construction that we now turn.
Transforming Palestinian Society and Politics: The Impact of the Occupation and the Intifada

It is the aim of this chapter to explore the development of Palestinian consciousness and to study the mechanisms used by Palestinian activists to mobilize the masses, in an attempt to collectively resist an oppression, whose outstanding features were a peculiar combination of colonial exploitation and military rule. The evolution of the Intifada, its strategies, stages, structure, leadership and most importantly the way it affected the mass of the Palestinian people in the ‘Westbank’ to the extent it became a way of life. By analyzing this phenomena we intend to benefit from the way Intifada restructured and reorganized Palestinian society so as to adopt similar mechanisms to mobilize the masses to carry out conservation of their built heritage.

This chapter is divided into four main sections. The first section attempts to trace the development consciousness through the years after the mandate to the present time. The second section discusses the mass mobilization and examines the role played by the PLO, and the educated Palestinians. It also points out how this process of mobilization was able to form the infrastructure needed to fill the gap resulting from the absence of a national authority through the establishment of grass-roots organizations. In the third section, the evolution of the Intifada, its structure and leadership and how it developed a sense of community development, self-help and self-sufficiency among the people, are examined. The final section, however, examines the impact of all this on the conservation and reconstruction process.

5.1. THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE PALESTINIAN ENTITY-CONSCIOUSNESS.
Our national identity has always existed both as a part of a national ideology and a personal identity. The history of Palestinian identity can be traced back through political, military and historical developments, back to the first time when such an identity was claimed during the period of the British Mandate. Under that oppression the Palestinian Arab developed both a sense of identity and his link with the Arab world as expressed by his relationship with the independent movements of other Arab countries. Following the Mandate period, the Palestinians found themselves stateless at a time when the other Arab people had achieved independence. If they were to obtain their own state, it became all the more important for them to consolidate their links with the Arab world, which was their major strategic reserve and source of support for their
struggle. After 1948, the Palestinians, therefore, demonstrated their loyalty to the Arab nationalist cause by attaching themselves to pan-Arab groups (*Qawmiyya*) and organizations and by taking part, to some extent, in the battle for consolidating the independence of some Arab countries, and making an important contribution to the socio-economic development of others (AL-SHUAIBI, 1979).

The word 'Palestine' was being erased from the international map mostly by Israel, who occupied three-quarters of its territory in the 1948 war, while Jordan annexed the remainder. The hope of Israel and the Western powers was to absorb the Palestinians into other Arab countries, especially Jordan. These Arab societies were unable to absorb them for the lack of sufficient economic and social opportunity, and because the Palestinians themselves appreciated their identity, maintained a consciousness of their uniqueness as a people, and insisted on their rights to return instead of resettlement in the Arab countries (UNESCO, 1969; PERETZ, 1971; NAKHLEH, 1975).

5.1.1. Entity Consciousness: Decline and Birth

The first opportunity to establish a Palestinian state was missed in 1947 when the Arab Higher Committee rejected the United Nations Partition Plan. From one point of view, and regardless of the justice or injustice involved in this international document, HUNTER (1991) argues that, it did affirm the right of Palestinian Arabs to establish an independent state within a specific geographical framework on an incontrovertible legal base. It should be noted, however, that there is no evidence to indicate that any of the Arab states that participated in the 1948-1949 war had any intention of helping a genuine Palestinian leadership to establish itself in Palestine even provided it was "liberated" from the Jews to become an independent state.

"There is much evidence, however, that those Arab states which were to control what was left to the Arabs from Mandatory Palestine- Egypt and Jordan- actually prevented such an independence form materializing, both during and after the War". (SCHUEFTAN, 1979: 130).

After the mandate and the establishment of the State of Israel in 1948, the idea of establishing a Palestinian entity, both political and civil, in what remained from formal
Palestine encountered the stiff opposition of the Kingdom of Transjordan, which officially declared the annexation of the 'Westbank' to Jordan in April 1950. By this move King Abdallah erased the identity of Palestine, and in March 1950 he instructed that the word ‘Palestine’ be removed from all maps and official statements (McDOWALL, 1989). The curtain thus fell on the first Palestinian attempts to create an independent entity.

"It was against this background, compounded by their deceived defeat at the hands of the Jews, that the Palestinians, as an independent political factor, disappeared almost completely from the scene for as much as a decade". (SCHUEFTAN, 1979: 131).

Against this background of severance from the natural development of the life of the people, the aspiration of the Palestinians concentrated on the goal of returning to their homes. This hope was not necessarily associated, in the general Palestinian consciousness, with the idea of returning to an independent sovereign homeland. AL-SHUAIBI (1979) argued that at the most this hope for return was without any specific theoretical stipulations regarding the nature of the entity they would live in. Although Palestinian identity was psychologically important to Palestinians, the real-life situation of many was taking another direction which was dictated by their need to survive. In addition, we can argue that the fact that the Palestinians had no previous experience of their own nationhood with its political expressions, was an important factor.

5.1.2. The Renewed Call for an Entity

In the late 1950s and early 1960s another concept of ‘Palestinian entity’ which shifted the question from humanitarian towards the national dimension was introduced. The ‘Palestinian entity’ (Al-Kiyan al-Filastini) suggested that the Palestinians, always a separate and distinct people (Sha'b) within the Arab nation (Umma), had a right to its homeland i.e., Palestine (SCHUEFTAN, 1979). This period is also characterized by the birth of Fateh, (The National Movement for the Liberation of Palestinian), which came secretly as an underground movement in 1958. AL-SHUAIBI (1979) argued that Fateh
played a significant role in developing the Palestinian entity, through its magazine-\textit{Filastinuna\textsuperscript{1}}.

But, despite all these statements by \textit{Fateh}, SCHUEFTAN (1979) in reference to \textit{Fateh} and other small Palestinian groups, argued that:

\begin{quote}
'None of them was strong enough to translate the slogans of the 'Palestinian entity' and the 'liberation of Palestine' into a concrete and politically implementable commitment that would assure a dominant role for an independent and genuine Palestinian leadership in the determination of the struggle for the cause'.
\end{quote}

(SCHUEFTAN, 1979: 133).

However, a fundamental stage in the political and social life of the people was the establishment of the PLO in 1964, as an institution to embody Palestinian national consciousness. From this date on the PLO was decisive in the changes that took place in the political and legal situation and in the radical transformation in the Palestinians' position as one of the main parties to the Arab-Israeli conflict.

At this stage, the period when the PLO was established, \textit{Fateh} started the armed struggle against Israel. Thus, these two factors, the establishment of the PLO and the start of the armed struggle, played a more influential part than anything else in all the subsequent developments, in the period preceding the 1967 war.

5.1.3. The 1967 \textbf{WAR}.

The 1967 war with Israel proved to be a watershed in the development of the Palestinian national movement as it demonstrated the bankruptcy of the Arab regimes. This convinced the Palestinians that they were to be left to their own devices (HILTERMANN, 1991).

The occupation that resulted from the war \textbf{united} about a million and a half Palestinians in the 'Westbank', Gaza, and those in the Triangle and Galilee in the north, who had been prevented from contacting each other by the establishment of Israel in 1948. The occupation also contributed to the armed struggle against Israel through a wave of popular support (AL-SHUAIBI, 1980).

\textsuperscript{1}\textit{See for example Filastinuna\textsuperscript{, No.1, 1959; No.9, 1960; No.11, 1960; and No.18, 1961.}
However, despite the reinforcement of Palestinian institutions outside the ‘Westbank’, there was no parallel emphasis on Palestinian entity. AL-SHUAIBI (1980), argued that there were four reasons why no kind of particularism grew at the same rate as the expansion of the structure of Palestinian institutions. First, the extreme novelty of these institutions. Second, insistence on a balanced relation between Arabism and Palestinianism. Third, mobilization in the battle to maintain the Arab character of the land and to prevent its being Judaized was a more important goal of Palestinian politics than advocating Palestinian control of the recently occupied territories. Finally, the immensity of the Palestinian liberation programme, and the difficulty of achieving it in the foreseeable future, led to a decrease in emphasis on the idea of the establishment of a Palestinian state as an immediately practicable policy.

5.1.4. Jordan and the ‘Westbank’

Despite the disappearance of its sovereignty over the ‘Westbank’, the Jordanian government insisted on its right of sovereignty over the ‘Westbank’ and regarded its inhabitants as Jordanian citizens. Accordingly, the Jordanian government decided to continue to pay the salaries and approve both the annual and extraordinary financial allotments to various economic, social and municipal institutions. McDOWALL (1989) discusses this issue when he writes:

"On the ground Husayn [Hussien] worked to maintain the loyalty of the municipal structure, which remained in place after the Israel’s occupation, through subsidies and through Israel’s open bridge policy, which in addition to relieving the pressures on the West Bank population, gave him considerable control over a large proportion of the population. Since they held Jordanian passports, it followed that those wishing to work or travel outside the West Bank had to pass over the bridge. Only a fool or a very determined and principled Palestinian was ready to jeopardize that crossing by openly opposing Husayn’s claim over the West Bank". 

(McDOWALL, 1989: 72).

On the other hand, the Israeli military occupation kept Jordanian laws in force and maintained the Jordanian Dinar as a recognised currency. This helped the Jordanian government to maintain contacts and influence in the ‘Westbank’ (MISHAL, 1980; McDOWALL, 1989).

For their part, the inhabitants of the ‘Westbank’ had no objection to Jordan’s regaining its old position among them and insisting on its right to negotiate in their name. On the
contrary, they made every effort to consolidate and entrench Jordanian influence through a variety of moves and statements made by the most prestigious political figures of the population (AL-SHUAIBI, 1980). This issue of cooperation between the traditional leaders of the ‘Westbank’ and Jordan was discussed by MISHAL (1980):

"Instead, Palestinian leaders in the West Bank were willing to work economically and politically with the regime of Amman. Such cooperation with Amman existed despite the fact it had a negative effect on the West Bank political leadership by restricting it to local bases and to day-to-day political issues".

(MISHAL, 1980: 172).

5.1.5. Identity Crisis.

Identification is a two-way relationship: it is determined by the individual’s attitude towards the communities around him, and the attitude of the communities towards the individual. In the case of the ‘Westbank’ Palestinians, especially the refugees, the complexity of their situation was identified by the fact that they felt themselves belonging to a number of existing entities, without being able to fully integrate into any one of them (SHAMIR, 1980). Shamir pointed out that these entities may be schematically described in the form of five circles, each accommodating the next. The first, and largest circle is the Islamic world community, Islam being the religion of the majority of the people, and people look on themselves as part of the Muslim Umma. The second circle of identity is the Arab World, people of the ‘Westbank’ have always seen themselves as part of the great homeland (al-Watan al-Kabir). The third circle, is that of the Jordanian State, the polity to which they had formally belonged for almost two decades (small homeland al-Watan al-saghir). The fourth circle is the Palestinian identity Palestine (al-Watan). Finally, the inhabitants of the ‘Westbank’ constitute the innermost circle.

However, despite the dispersal and statelessness of Palestinians, somehow our national identity not only has been maintained but grown as well. Its characteristics are still clear in many features of people’s lifestyle and their traditional built environment. It is argued that the military rule of the Israeli occupation has accelerated the widespread adoption of a Palestine self-identity in place of other political or religious identities (MIGDAL, 1980).
5.1.6. The Local Political Leadership In The 'Westbank'.

It was the Westbank's destiny, that Israel, Jordan and the PLO, each for its own reasons and to the extent of its means tried to hinder the emergence of a local political leadership for its inhabitants. However, the following paragraphs highlighted the reasons that stood behind the opposition of each of the three parties to the emergence of a local leadership there.
The PLO, for its part, believed that the emergence of any local leadership in the ‘Westbank’ would create two separate Palestinian problems, one for the Palestinians living under occupation and another for those refugees in exile.

For its part, in working against the establishment of a local political leadership for the ‘Westbank’, the Jordanian government was acting in accordance with its traditional policy since its annexation of the ‘Westbank’ in 1950. It is obvious then, that its continued insistence on sovereignty and representation of the inhabitants required that there should be no local leadership to challenge its own role (MISHAL, 1980; RICHARDSON, 1984; McDOWALL, 1989).

Israel fought the idea of the emergence of a local Palestinian leadership, in order to maintain its hold on the ‘Westbank’, and to allow the full scope colonisation of it without any resistance.

5.1.7. From Outside to Inside: the Right Decision.
Outside the ‘Westbank’, the Palestinians like others were shocked by the consequences of the 1967 war. So, their national programme rejected the defeat and called for a long-term people’s war for the national liberation of Palestine (whole Palestine). It did not, therefore, call for a ‘Palestinian entity’ in the occupied areas, and those who launched such calls in that climate were contained, isolated and boycotted (ABDUL-HAMID, 1973). At this time, the battle of Karameh in the spring of 1968 firmly established Fateh as an available alternative to the Arab governments, and Fateh subsequently succeeded (at the fifth PNC meeting in Cairo in February 1969) in taking control of the PLO, which from then on headed the Palestinian national movement.

By the end of the same year, the PLO had nevertheless built up new, distinctly Palestinian institutions. The ranks of the resistance organizations, along with their military, para-military and civilian institutions, had been thrown open to larger numbers of commandos, militiamen and members. The Palestinian popular organizations had also expanded greatly through the federation of workers, students, women and youth
organizations, which worked among the people who had until then lost their Palestinian Identities through Jordanian institutions and organizations (AL-SHUAIBI, 1980).

This situation, which took clear shape by the beginning of 1970, led to the creation of a situation of dual authority between the PLO and the Jordanian government, which led in turn to the creation of conflicting popular loyalties toward the two competing systems. This led the Jordanian government to make numerous attempts to recover much of its authority, which resulted in the full scale clash on September 17, 1970 - known afterwards as 'Black September'. As a result of this war, the PLO was forced to reorganize its cards and to redefine its goals and methods. At the same time it was responsible for far-reaching and widespread developments in the growth of a specifically Palestinian consciousness. This war reinforced the trend for self-organization in the 'Westbank'. In LESH'S (1980: 38) words, the shock of the defeat, "...jarred the residents into searching for new political strategies and more sophisticated political conceptions."

According to QUANDT (1973: 145), "West Bankers, who had long hoped for the end of the Israeli occupation, came to realize that outside forces could do little to bring this about. While continuing to hope for political settlement, 'Westbank' Palestinians also seemed to realize that the occupation would not end soon." Thus a new perception emerged in the early 1970s, the perception that Palestinians would have to take their fate into their own hands and cease to rely on assistance, let alone liberation, from the outside (LESCH, 1980). They realized that there had to be a force that could counteract the actions of the occupation on a local level. This force, is what the following sections will try to highlight.

5.2. MASS MOBILIZATION UNDER MILITARY OCCUPATION

In December 1987, the Palestinian population rose in mass protest (Intifada) to reject and undo the structure of Israel’s military occupation, coordinating its collective effort through the very infrastructure of popular organizations that had come to constitute the backbone of Palestinian resistance to Israel’s military occupation.

Many questions then arose about what changes took place within Palestinian society that allowed the Intifada to happen, given that "mass mobilization is a complex
phenomenon requiring that numerous stages of recruitment, organization, and perceptions of common interest reach levels of sufficient cooperation to ignite and sustain a national movement" (HILTERMANN, 1991: 4). However, the question of why the Intifada started when it did becomes secondary, when other questions of how elements necessary to enhance it to take place at all, emerged within the specific socio-economic formation of the ‘Westbank’ and the Gaza Strip as well.

Palestinian history witnessed a number of crises, as a result of which, we would argue that the development of the Palestinian movement was different from other movements that may present a more conventional pattern. These crises stem both from the wars and from an active policy of the occupier to further deprive the population, resulting in large parts of Palestinian territory being divorced from Palestinian control, and in the consequent eviction and scattering of thousands of our people.

The first crisis, the war and subsequent establishment of Israel in 1948, referred to by Palestinians as the Disaster (al-Nakba), altered the terms of conflict in the area. Fatah, which took control of the PLO in the late 1960s, lacked the harmonious societal base that other movements of national liberation found in their home societies, and it was forced to use the entire Arab world as a base for its operations, recruiting supporters from among the Palestinian masses in the refugee camps of Lebanon, Syria, and Jordan. The second crisis, the June war of 1967, for the first time, made it possible to oppose the colonial enemy from within, as two populations, Israeli and Palestinians, became progressively interspersed during the next two decades of the occupation of the ‘Westbank’ and Gaza.

In the 1970s, a national movement began to emerge in the ‘Westbank’, but had to exist in the shadow of the pre-existing, overarching Palestinian movement led by the PLO. According to HILTERMANN (1991), this local movement consisted of two branches:

"The underground military-political branch, whose members adhere directly to one of the factions of the PLO and carry out resistance operations on the orders of their commanders, who are usually outside the area; and the semi legal social political branch consisting of institutions and popular organizations set by local activists who have attempted to mobilize the Palestinian masses by offering services that were otherwise not available, while articulating nationalist concerns and aspirations as part of their day-to-day work. It is especially the second branch, the popular movement in the Occupied Territories, that provided the
local institutional infrastructure as well as the leadership for the uprising that began in December 1987". (HILTERMANN, 1991: 5-6).²

At this stage, Palestinian societies and women's organisations, made a considerable effort to preserve Palestinian heritage, by collecting and recording our folklore, and raising women's awareness of the importance of their cultural heritage. For example, one of the committees of the In'ash al-U'sra Society (Family Rejuvenation), in al-Bireh, is the Palestinian Folklore Committee - that collects and records our folklore, participates in various Arab and international panels on folklore, and publishes studies and a periodical, al-Mujtama' wa al-Turath (Society and Heritage). At the same time the Society runs a Palestinian cultural museum.

At this period, also, many Palestinian organizations shifted their interests and started to concentrate on heritage, as they became more and more aware of its importance for the continuity and survival of the society under the brutal measures taken by the occupying forces. For example, a permanent exhibition of traditional customs was established in Nablus by al- Nadi al-Thaqafi al-Reiadi (Athletic- Cultural Club), as well as a Palestinian Arab Folklore Centre (Markaz al-Turath al-Sha'bi al-Arabi al-Filasteni) in Jerusalem funded by Dar El-Tifi El-Arabi and many others (See Fig. 5.3).

The third crisis, that concentrates on the constant and unevenly matched fight between Israel and its supporters on the one hand and Palestinian nationalism and its supporters on the other hand, is when Israel invaded Lebanon in full force in 1982. This aggressive action produced not only the horrors of the siege of Beirut but the exodus of the Palestinian national movement from Lebanon and its scattering all over the Arab world. And later, the massacres of Sabra and Shatila refugee camps, where almost three thousand Palestinians were killed, in front of Israeli soldiers, in three days. However, it was later admitted by an Israeli spokesmen that:

"a) The real battle was for the West Bank and Gaza, and the PLO had to be destroyed utterly because of its representative status; and b) because it had become internationally responsible- having observed a UN-monitored truce on the Israeli-Lebanon border for eleven months before the June 1982- the PLO had to be attacked". (SAID, 1989: 10).

²Italics are added.
Fig. 5.3: Views from the Palestinian Arab Folklore Centre - Jerusalem.
The fourth crises is the Israeli policy that pressed down on Palestinians in the 'Westbank'. Although it was frequently referred to, especially in the West, as a benign occupation, the Israeli presence hurt more and more Palestinians as time passed. Some of the aggressions, which became part of the daily life of Palestinians, were summarized by SAID (1989), he wrote:

"Students were forced to endure the extended closing of schools and universities. Workers who depended for their livelihood on intermittent piecework inside Israel faced daily reminders of their subservient status: they were paid less than Jewish workers, had no union to support them, were required to be kept under lock and key any time they stayed overnight inside the Green Line. Some were burned alive as a consequence, many others referred to themselves as 'slaves'.

There was a proliferation of over a thousand laws and regulation designed not only to enforce the subaltern, rightless position of Palestinians under Israeli jurisdiction, but also to rub their noses in the mud, to humiliate and remind them how they were banned. The colours of the Palestinian flag were outlawed; even the word 'Palestine' could earn its user a jail sentence. Administrative detentions were common, as were the dynamiting of houses, torture, collective punishments and harassments, complete with rituals of dehumanizing behaviour forced upon unarmed Palestinians.

Yet Palestinians on the West Bank and Gaza were required to pay Israeli taxes (but had no one to represent them), to submit to the increasingly cruel whims of settlers who did what they wanted with impunity, to face their alienation from their own land. To plant a tree required a permit. To hold a meeting required a permit. Entry and exit required permits. To dig a well required a permit- one that was never given". (SAID, 1989: 6-7).

Moreover, for the last two decades the itinerant day labour in Israel constituted the backbone of the 'Westbank' economy (see for example, BENVENISTI, 1984; HUNTER, 1991). From the migration wage-labour force stemmed the Palestinian labour unions, which arose, in part, from the failure of organized labour in Israel to protect the rights of Palestinian workers. These unions have proven particularly clever in linking the workers’ daily experience to the military occupation, thereby placing their programmes within the overall nationalist framework. Through association with other sectors of the population they became the corner stone of the national movement (HILTERMANN, 1991). Like the other sectors of Palestinian society, these unions are engaged in raising the workers’ awareness to their heritage by organising lectures and exhibitions that express the importance of our heritage for our cultural, social and national survival.

According to PAIGE (1975), one prerequisite for successful mobilization and collective action, is the presence of a political structure that can provide the organizational and
ideological framework for a popular movement. In the case of the 'Westbank', this framework exists in the form of the PLO and its institutions. In addition, some local political structures that already existed from the pre-1967 period were mobilized for the national cause, while activists who identified with the PLO began organizing the masses in new structures in the mid-1970s (HILTERMANN, 1991). Another precondition for mass mobilization, is the lack of local economic development. In the case of the 'Westbank', however, and as discussed earlier in Chapter One, the Israeli authorities laid obstacles in the path of any economic development, especially where any products competed with Israeli production (see for example BENVINISTI, 1984; TAMARI, 1989; HUNTER, 1991). This has brought collective hardship to the Palestinian community and thereby reinforced alliances across class lines. In the early 1970s, for example, trade unions suspended the class struggle and instead engaged in a 'national alliance of classes' with the Palestinian managerial sector, creating social peace as the perquisite environment for mass struggle against the common enemy (HILTERMANN, 1991). This alliance became stronger during the Intifada and still holds.

Furthermore, social and economic changes brought about by the occupation, led to the growth of a new elite that began to challenge both the colonial power and the traditional sources of authority. When Israel occupied the 'Westbank' in June 1967 there were two elites competing for power, the traditional landed families and a new group of urban traders. However, Israel backed the former for support, which helped push the new elite into the nationalist camp. This accounts for the strong representation of the pro-PLO elite in the municipal elections of 1976 (see for example, NAKHLEH, 1979; RICHARDSON, 1984; BENVENISTI, 1984; HILTERMANN, 1991).

All these economic and social changes eventually have given rise to a generation of grass-roots organizations that provided those services to the population that were not provide by anyone else, like Aletehad Elnisa'y in Nablus, for example (NAKHLEH, 1979; RICHARDSON, 1984). Although the trade unions played a significant role it was the educated Palestinians that took the lead in initiating organizations other than trade unions. Some of the first grass-roots organizations, for instance, were Voluntary Work
Committees that sprang up from the community work programmes, sponsored by Palestinian Institutes of Higher Education.

Expanding education, in the 'Westbank', drew youths from all levels of society. Fees were low and scholarships numerous in the 1970s and early 1980s. Therefore people from all sectors found it possible to send their sons and daughters to continue their higher education in one of the Westbank's institutions (HUNTER, 1991). According to MAR'I (1979), the potential to become a university student was 85 percent; it became "the Palestinian phenomenon". Today, fees are relatively higher but this potential is still high.

At universities, unrestrained by family responsibilities, young people engaged in open political debate and learned how to organize themselves (HUNTER, 1991) and engaged in community work programmes, harvesting olives, paving streets, planting trees, etc. Such voluntary or 'outreach' work, a mandatory part of education at many universities, reinforced the bonds that tied students to their society, and gave the budding youth movement a certain credibility (HUNTER, 1991). For example no student can graduate from An-Najah University without completing 35 hours of community work. Most importantly, students also worked to preserve Palestinian culture by organizing different cultural programmes and other activities dealing with the Palestinian national heritage.

The student unions in the different Palestinian institutes organize annual exhibitions for the Palestinian heritage, in a kind of rotation, so that it can be easily accessible to the majority of the Palestinians from the North to the South, and, at the same time, allowing them to be displayed for the longest time possible. Such activities play a major role in raising awareness. Many times, however, these exhibitions, which were open to the public, were subject to the Israeli assault, where all the exhibited objects were seized.

In 1980 the first Palestinian Department of Architecture was established in Nablus, as part of the Faculty of Engineering at Al-Najah University. A few years later, another department was started at Bir Zeit University and a third at the Polytechnic in Hebron. These architectural departments have played, and continue to play, a significant role in
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graduating a generation of architects who are somehow aware of the importance of their architectural heritage. At An-Najah’s Department of Architecture, for example, and where the author is a member of staff, special courses are offered on Palestinian traditional architecture and its history, also many design courses are carried out in the Old Town of Nablus and the villages around the city and the region. As a result of the many visits by students and staff, the inhabitants themselves have become more and more aware of the importance of their cultural heritage. One senior architect from Nablus said: "It is to the Department of Architecture at An-Najah University and to its students and staff that I owe the shift in my thinking from 'modern architecture' to appreciation of the traditional forms. I hope and expect many architects in the city to follow my path." In addition, the department’s approach of concentrating on traditional architecture has influenced the local municipality, which has begun to make some attempts to preserve features of the Old Town of Nablus (See Chapter Six).

In addition, many of the graduate projects are carried out in the Old Town of Nablus or other historic areas under the supervision of the author or other members of staff, for the conservation of particular buildings. For example; upgrading the Qaser Touqan in el-Qaryoun Quarter and the Minaret Square (Sahet el-Manara); the restoration of the Roman amphitheatre north of the Old Town of Nablus, and many others. Although these schemes have not been implemented, they have prompted the students to work with and care for their local architecture in a sympathetic way. This work has increased their awareness and loyalty to their past and has enhanced their abilities to deal with their cultural heritage in a sensitive and imaginative way. In addition, we carry out detailed documentation of the buildings and sites and most importantly raise local inhabitants’ awareness to their heritage. But over the years, has this work resulted in much achievement?

To touch the core of our thesis, what mechanisms are able to translate mass mobilization into collective action in the environmental field, as witnessed in the political field with the Intifada? Is it a population, that has acquired a shared perception of its situation,

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3 Architect Hani Arafat, a senior architect, member of Nablus’ municipality council, and a former municipality architect- Nablus 1993.
and is ready to let itself be organized for the accomplishment of a common goal to surpass the situation it finds unbearable, that is the basic of all ingredients for collective action?

However, the human base alone, without the **mechanism** to organize it is not enough, as when people operate in a social vacuum they will have little chance of realizing their goals. How can individuals overcome their dependence on others? The answer to this will help shape their sense of what is possible. From the individual experience, the process goes up one step to the group experience. For HILTERMANN (1991) the crucial link between the individual and the group is the transformation of what he called the "common sense". However, are the organizers of the 'Westbank' Palestinians who acquired a consciousness and an awareness of their situation, willing to make the necessary sacrifice to promote change? Mostly, they were educators or those in the process of being educated. In all cases organizers attempted to make a link between people's daily experience and the military occupation, and while offering the needed services to their members, they firmly placed their organizations' programmes within the overall nationalist framework. For example, the Conservation Unit at Hebron Polytechnic is directed by a Palestinian architect who graduated from The Institute of Advanced Architectural Studies (IoAAS), at the University of York in 1988. Today, he is working with others on the documentation of the Old Town of Hebron. It all takes time but we do not have so much time; the buildings from neglect and deliberate destruction are fast disappearing. We must, as part of the peace process, have resources of all kinds made available to us by the Israelis, to repair the damage and restore our cultural heritage and its symbolic representation of our way of life and national pride.

It had been apparent from the beginning of the military occupation that the occupier was not simply negligent in providing basic services to the population, it was actually seen to be disrupting the existing infrastructure. In the words of GIACAMAN (1987):

"The first ten years of the occupation or so everybody worked very hard to inhibit the breakdown of the infrastructure- the economic, social, health, educational, and political infrastructure in the West Bank. It was clear to Palestinians that this attempt on the part of the Israeli military to break down the social and economic infrastructure really meant a fight for survival."
That infrastructure, we all knew, was crucial for the reconstruction of Palestinian society in the future. We knew that much. We knew that the Israeli military was out to possess the land without us people. We knew that, too. What we didn't know was how to mobilize under occupation, when it was becoming particularly impossible to move and to do anything at the political or other levels without being subjected to arrests or attacks from the Israeli military”. (GIACAMAN, 1987: 3).

Moreover, TELLY (1978) points out that, mobilization marks the extent to which a population succeeds in gaining collective control over resources, which includes such factors as land, labour, and capital. However, according to TELLY, the effectiveness of mobilization can be measured by determining the sum of the market value of these factors of production that are in the mass control of the population and the population’s ability to make these resources available for use when needed. In a wider definition of resources, it could be argued, that the number of organizations, their membership size and commitment, as well as the quality of services they provide, can be added.

In the case of Palestine, writes HILTERMANN (1991: 12):

“A conscious decision was made by the PLO in the 1970s to begin mobilizing the masses in the Occupied territories in popular organizations. The PLO sought to set up new organizations and, more importantly, to infuse the existing ones with a new ideology- to transform them in the service of nationalism. During the following years, an intensive recruitment drive took place among students, workers, professionals, and others around issues of common concern. Organizations proliferated not only in the urban centres but in the rural areas as well. Their membership increased dramatically, and their activities expanded. By the mid-1980s one can speak of existence of a network or infrastructure of organizations that had a popular base and were able to provide the basic services lacking in the community, and also to lead the masses in times of direct confrontation with the occupier”.

Furthermore, the beginning of the 1980s witnessed the start of the NGOs activities. According to EDGE (1993), Palestinian NGOs play a crucial role when it comes to foreign aid. In the absence of centralised institutions, big donors such as the European Community or the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) give substantial aid contributions directly to these local organizations. Some of these NGOs concentrated on the conservation of Palestinian architectural heritage. One example,

4 Italics added by the author.
is the Centre for Development Consultancy (CDC), which concentrates, among its other activities, on the conservation of the Old City of Jerusalem. It also gave funds for the restoration of Hammam al-Jededih in Nablus (Fig. 5.4). Another example, is Riwaq (Centre for Architectural Conservation) in Ramallah, established in 1991, to protect and conserve Palestinian cultural heritage. In the last four years Riwaq was involved in small conservation projects, especially in the Ramallah area. Recently, it is trying to organise a National Register of the historic buildings in the Occupied Territories. But these NGOs are facing many difficulties, mostly because of the constraints imposed on them by the Israeli Civil Administration as well as financial difficulties (see Chapter One).

To sum up, to be effective, the organizations that provide services to the population must be able to operate openly. This means that they should work within the existing legal framework. In the ‘Westbank’ the continued absence of a Palestinian national entity has meant that basic services not provided by Israel have to be furnished informally by Palestinians themselves. These organizations have provided the economic, social and political infrastructure of today’s Palestinian society. They have "out-administered the Israeli occupation by reaching those areas of daily life the occupier couldn’t reach, and by mobilizing people whose loyalty the occupier could never gain" (HILTERMANN. 1991: 13). While these organizations became an institutional infrastructure, they also groomed a new leadership, one that gradually created the initiative from within the Palestinian movement in the territories of Palestine by the organizing of the Intifada in December 1987.

5.3. THE INTIFADA

Every revolt requires a spark, an event that later can be called the first expression of a new chapter on the people’s history. In the ‘Westbank’ and Gaza, although this spark was provided when an Israeli truck hit a car on 8th December 1987, killing the four occupants from the Jabalia Camp, the Intifada can be seen as part of a continuing struggle waged for almost a century between the Zionist Jews and the Palestinian Arabs over the same piece of land. This long-standing conflict has been fought over every tree, hill and historic site. It has been accompanied by the development of stereotypes on both
Fig. 5.4: Hammam al-Jededih in the Old Town of Nablus, Before and After Renovation.
Source: Photos By Mr Hishan Zu'bi for the Author.
sides to dehumanize and de-legitimize the other. In fact, everything has become a weapon, and now with the Intifada, even children.

In the authors view, the Intifada is undoubtedly the most significant political development in our history so far. It has succeeded in uniting all Palestinians in a common endeavour. Where the PLO failed to find a fruitful means for liberation, the Intifada evolved a philosophy for a real people's war which, by its emphasis on civil disobedience, attacked the enemy at its weakest point.

However, if the political victories of the Palestinian people have been duly noted and even celebrated internationally, the more profound social and moral achievements of this amazingly courageous anti colonial revolt require full recognition (SAID, 1989).

The following sections will explore the impact of the Intifada on the Palestinian people making it. We will show how we have transformed ourselves, discovering new dimensions of cohesion and resourcefulness. The aim, however, is to learn from the experience of the Intifada in mobilising our resources for the conservation and development of our past and future cultural heritage.

5.3.1. THE BEGINNINGS OF THE INTIFADA

In the beginning the Intifada was a simple reaction to the occupation. "Down with the occupation", read the Arabic graffiti scratched on the walls of the Old Town of Nablus. The initial message was very simple, we cannot abide the occupation any more. At first, and in the absence of central direction, demonstrations were often arranged at the local level by youths who belonged to many different organized groups. These were not essential; ‘leaders’ existed everywhere:

"Every quarter has its own leader, who is usually some major personality. He will be known for his high political consciousness, for his charisma, and will not have to do that much persuasion, for the situation helps him, and he will just have to give the signal. Every one of these leaders has already become a symbol. In a large quarter, there will be two or three leaders...The leader creates around himself an organized mass which at any time can go and do whatever is necessary".  
(Quoted in HUNTER, 1991: 63).
Such organization was very efficient. The occupiers did not really know who the protagonists were. There is an instruction, and everyone goes out, quite spontaneously. It was the first time that mass political protest had occurred on this scale in twenty years of occupation. The Intifada could still not have lasted long without coordination and overall direction. The following section, therefore, will study the structure of the Intifada, where this structure can be adapted to the needs of conservation and development, especially when it involves the community.

The Intifada began, then, as a revolt by the young people of Palestine. Its initial spontaneity had concealed a sophisticated 'organization' with deep roots that went back to the restructuring and the process of conscienceless raising carried out during the occupation. The youth were the first generation to be born under occupation and their uprising was harnessed by the older and more experienced group of PLO faction leaders, who were drawn mostly from the professions, and some students, all of whom made up the shadowy group known as the United National Leadership (UNL), (ABU-AMR, 1989). At the same time, local Popular Committees were being formed, largely out of necessity, but also in accordance with instructions from the UNL. The members of these Committees were the participants or supporters of local factions, or even ordinary people disassociated with any political organization. The UNL and the Popular Committees developed the leadership and the participants of the Intifada.

5.3.2. THE UNITED NATIONAL LEADERSHIP

The Intifada presented the PLO with an unmistakable challenge. "Never before had the Palestinian community in the territories taken its future into its own hands as tenaciously as they did at the beginning of December 1988" (ARONSON, 1990: 328). The Intifada represented the political coming of age of the new generation of militant young, in their determination to force a change in the status quo on the ground and eventually in the diplomatic arena.

The unprecedented character of the new leadership, however, soon became apparent. The United National Leadership (UNL), (in Arabic, al-Qiyada al-Wataniya al-
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Muwahhada), quickly emerged claiming authority for its direction. The UNL made itself known through issuing of an unnumbered leaflet exactly one month after the Intifada began. Two days later, a second leaflet appeared under its name, bearing the No. 2 (all subsequent leaflets were serialized). The UNL to provide central direction for the Intifada. But unlike previous political leaders, this group concealed the identity of its members to try to avoid arrest. It was widely assumed that the UNL was composed of local representatives of the main factions of the PLO (McDOWALL, 1989). Each of the four major groups of the PLO was represented, probably by one delegate each who frequently rotated. This is one reason why the Israeli military regime resorted to indiscriminate mass arrest (STORK, 1989). Furthermore, the cohesion of the four local PLO factions into one unified leadership was itself a significant achievement. ABU-AMR (1989) argued that the UNL of the Intifada exceeded all previous terms of cooperation among them. Its establishment represented a victory over the divisions endemic in the Palestinian national movement and matched the unity being exhibited by the general strikes and demonstrations in the camps, villages and cities. The integrity, credibility and standing it accomplished was due to the centralization of command and the overriding need for unity. The UNL was wise in that it proposed a variety of forms for the protests and diversified the location of the demonstrations (HUNTER, 1991).

Contrary to the expectations of many, the UNL proved very skilful and authoritative in directing the mass protests; Israel was unable to locate and destroy it.

The popular structure advocated by the UNL soon proved its resilience. Popular Committees (Lijan Shaabiya), quickly appeared in the neighbourhoods and quarters of many towns, villages and refugee camps, and took control of their areas. Like the UNL itself these committees remained unidentified but authoritative, and proved difficult to contain by the authorities. When Israeli troops arrested every member of a Popular Committee in one of the localities a new committee was in place within a couple of days to continue the co-ordination of popular action (McDOWALL, 1989). These grassroots structures initially based upon the younger elements of the population, may have arisen, according to KUTTAB (1989) out of the need to provide aid to camp residents being starved into compliance by strictly enforced curfews. Mutual support was widespread, with committees in villages sending vegetables and other produce into the
camps under curfew, while their counterparts inside these camps distributed them. Medical Committees were also organized to go from door-to-door in the camps, villages and neighbourhoods to maintain the health of the inhabitants. Calls for aid resulted in such a huge response, that Committees had large surpluses left over once the curfews ended (HUNTER, 1991).

However, Popular Committees were not entirely composed of youths, many previous political prisoners took part (JERUSALEM POST, 1988), as did other older people of all kinds. HUNTER (1991), argued that the main function of these popular committees was to keep the Intifada going in their localities, at a time when the Israelis were predicting the end of the Intifada. The Committees were able to maintain the original intensity of the Intifada by organizing strikes and demonstrations in the face of the policy of extended curfews, detention, increased troops presence, tear gas, live ammunition and other means used by the Israeli army.

After sometime of continuous action the Intifada acquired a kind of normality. Accordingly, the UNL declared that the Popular Committees, "Are more than just temporary committees which will operate for a limited period of time. They represent a permanent structural change in the form of organization of Palestinian society" (Quoted in HUNTER, 1991).

The formation of popular committees was widely established throughout the neighbourhoods and camps and operated across particular sectors, such as agriculture, commerce, education, and security. In the words of a senior Israeli Defence Force (IDF) officer, describing the Popular Committees, "....these people have been the operational hard core of the uprising." And when he was asked why the IDF did not simply arrest the leadership of these committees, the officer replied, "...we do not want to have more detainees than inhabitants" (Quoted in ARONSON, 1990: 332).

5.3.3. STRIKE FORCES (AL-QUWA AL-DARIBBA)
The UNL was also responsible for the Strike Forces (in Arabic al-Quwa al-Daribba). These groups, composed of young activists represented the peak of the organizational,
ideological, and operational infrastructure of the \textit{Intifada}. Their objectives were to give momentum to the \textit{Intifada} by sustaining the confrontation with the institutions of the occupation, to attack collaborators and strikebreakers and to recruit youths over the age of fifteen into their ranks etc. They were the long arm of the Popular Committees (ARONSON, 1990).

As experience was gained the bottom of the organizational pyramid of the Strike Forces were locally based cells, drawing their members from individual neighbourhoods or streets. Each cell had a dispersed and compartmentalized leadership, so that they were difficult for the Israeli intelligence to penetrate or for Palestinian collaborators to compromise. A number of cells formed into groups composed of an entire village or camp. The Units, combined groups in an entire region in turn reported to the \textit{Team of the Guardians of the Uprising}, which was immediately subordinate to the UNL of the \textit{Intifada} (ARONSON, 1990). The Strike Forces, therefore, formed the 'nucleus of the Popular Committees'. The large number of cells and the absence of any single organizational centre made it possible for the strike forces to function in spite of the enormous number of arrests and detention by the Israeli forces. In fact, the capability of the UNL to withstand the Israeli efforts to penetrate or otherwise neutralize its authority, stands as its most singular achievement. No other Palestinian political movement under occupation survived such devoted Israeli attention to destroy it (ARONSON, 1990).

In January 1988 another group of leaders appeared. These were the 'brokers' or public personalities, a group of prominent Palestinians who issued a document in the name of "Palestinian Nationalist Institutions and Personalities from the 'Westbank' and Gaza"; the document was known as the Fourteen Points or 'Jerusalem Programme', a kind of political manifesto. The subsequent acceptance of the Fourteen Points by the UNL made it a \textit{consensus document of the Intifada} that brought these personalities into the movement, not as equal partners with the members of the UNL and the Popular Committees, but as important participants showing their solidarity with the movement (HUNTER, 1991).
The UNL and the Popular Committees were underground, so the brokers could only serve the revolt in a managerial role. HUNTER (1991), pointed out that this limited role had the following uses:

"When a press conference had to be held or some other public task performed, the brokers made the arrangements or carried it out. Consequently, these figures were sometimes thought to have more power than they really possessed. By giving interviews and issuing statements the brokers helped shape and mould public opinion in Israel and abroad. As many lived or had offices in East Jerusalem, they also served to highlight its Palestinian character and demonstrate that it was part of the West Bank rather than Israel proper." (HUNTER, 1991: 77).

5.3.4. THE STRATEGY AND TACTICS OF THE INTIFADA

From the beginning of the Intifada, it was decided not to use firearms or explosive devices. Stones would symbolize the revolt. "Mass political struggle without conventional arms reflected an understanding of how to confront a military power like Israel, so heavily dependent upon outside aid and touted in the West as the only democracy in the Middle East, hence, presumably, a respecter of human rights" (HUNTER, 1991: 60). The Intifada's aim, of course, was to draw the attention and sympathy of world opinion to the dilemma of the Palestinians, and also to avoid a bloodbath that would smother the Intifada and no doubt bring it to a quick end.

Moreover, the leadership of the Intifada was able to benefit from Palestinian structures and organizations that were already in place. Shabiba, the Fateh-affiliated youth movement was strong in the 'Westbank' and provided the Intifada with a disciplined, politicized, organized corps of young people. Grass-roots organizations also played an important role, especially women's organizations which shifted their focus from charity work to social and national issues. Voluntary work committees had been established to promote the idea of self-help and to provide services. The Medical Relief Committees had emerged to dispense preventive health care in camps and villages. The student movement also gained importance. These various organizations had branches in camps, villages and cities throughout the territories, and when the Intifada broke out, it was able to feed into the network already established (ARONSON, 1990; HILTERMANN, 1991).

Another tactic, was the use of places of worship from which to originate marches. Such marches were launched on Fridays from mosques and Sundays from the church,
Christians, Muslims and non-believers participated in them all. These places of worship were simply the (relatively) safest and most convenient places for people to gather (JOHNSON et al, 1989). In addition, the Palestinians seized every opportunity to expose their suffering. They understood the media, and took full advantage of its presence to show the whole world the brutal means that the Israelis used to collectively punish them, all before the eyes of the rolling TV cameras.

Finally, the UNL followed a two-track policy. On the one hand, it began issuing calls for non-cooperation and civil disobedience. The acts to be undertaken, specified in the leaflets, reflected a wider policy. For the first time in many years, words have a direct bearing on individual and collective action. Ordinary people shared their daily lives around the announcements of general strikes, demonstrations and assignments to different sectors.

To this end it became clear that the Intifada did not emerge full-blown in a day or even a month. Rather, it developed in stages. In the beginning it was mostly a revolt of youth, where mass demonstrations and commercial strikes, were its main components. At the outset, the mass of the Palestinians did not participate in it directly. However, the Israeli response of employing collective punishment against all segments of the population, brought everyone, young and old, rich and poor, male and female into the struggle. The second stage of partial disobedience began by boycotting Israeli goods, manufacturing their own products, growing vegetable gardens and building health-care and other institutions. The Intifada thus became a way of life for everyone, and a model for the others to follow.

The boycott was then extended from Israeli products and businesses to the Israeli governing apparatus. COMMUNIQUE No. 9 of late February 1988, appealed to employees of the civil administration and police to resign. Later, the appeal for resignation was expanded (in COMMUNIQUE No. 11), to include employees of the civil administration handling taxes, customs, and still later traffic, licensing, planning, housing, identity cards, and labour (COMMUNIQUES, 17 of May 24, and 20 of late June, 1988). Members of all municipal and village councils appointed by Israel were
also asked to resign. Hundreds of police did resign and a popular boycott of the civil administration and Israel-run municipalities and councils was started (ARONSON, 1990). However, more and more Popular Committees for all sectors were formed to fill the gap created by these resignations.

The next stage of the Intifada was retrenchment, rationalization and self-help to achieve more effective self-reliance. Accordingly, self-reliance increasingly became the main theme of the communiques. Students and teachers were urged to organize and develop alternative forms of education as a response to Israel’s closing of schools (COMMUNIQUE No. 9 of 1 March 1988). Furthermore, people were urged to plant gardens, raise chickens, and keep animals in (COMMUNIQUE No. 8 of 22 of February, 1988). Those with applicable experience were asked to give advice and help. In a similar way, doctors, engineers and academics were asked to help on the areas of their expertise (COMMUNIQUE No, 13 of 12 April, 1988). Lawyers too were urged to form Legal Committees to help detainees.

Therefore, the dominant means for the self-reliance were the Popular Committees, hailed as a "key prelude to civil disobedience" (COMMUNIQUE No.16, of 12 May, 1988). The UNL stressed in most of its communiques, the need to organize and expand such committees. The goal of these efforts, as one Palestinian activist put it, "... was to end as much as possible the relations between Israel and the territories, economically and politically." The intention of the civil disobedience movement went further, according to Shmuel Goren, coordinator of activities in the occupied territories, "... it was to establish an alternative system to the existing authority, to set up a parallel system unconnected to the regime" (Quoted in ARONSON, 1990: 336).

At this stage, therefore, the Palestinians realized from their long experience under the military occupation, that they could survive their disengagement only by moving to a subsistence standard of living, and by organizing themselves economically and socially in the expectation of supplying their essential needs and diminishing their dependence on Israel. A crucial step was taken when the upper and middle classes decided to cooperate:
"The upper and middle class complained, because they believed that the Intifada had no future. When the Intifada picked up momentum, this eroded internal complaining. 'I'll lower my expectations,' people began saying. 'Maybe something will come out of this.'..... Complaints that were first heard no longer existed, because the upper segments [of society] realized that the Intifada had a great value and so they co-operated and not from coercion. People began to say 'This is the way it should have been all along'.


This did not only mean postponing their children's education, or letting one of their cars stay in the garage without a licence, but it also meant considerable financial sacrifices. At the same time the shift to a *subsistence economy* and organizing for greater self-sufficiency required a high degree of co-operation. However, these were exactly the conditions forced upon them. Owing to the very tense situation, Palestinians travelled less, shopped only on certain days and in markets close to their localities. So, with the children at home all the time and fathers spending more time at home, families and neighbourhoods were brought close together. They knew who the needy people in their areas were; they did not know this before.

"People had acclimatized themselves to the new way of life. There grew up a sense of mutual consciousness, so people helped each other by any means. If some shabab had to leave a village, people in a nearby village put them up. Everyone was ready to help each other. Efficiency in mutual relations was very high. Solidarity was growing. Differences and hindrances usually found were overcome".  

(Quoted in HUNTER, 1991: 130).

The transition to a subsistence standard of living was associated with the re-emergence of the domestic economy. Production came to be centred upon the household, or a number of households, and consumption based largely upon what could be produced locally. However, this shift to household production while marking a radical change for many Palestinians, was not something wholly foreign to our culture. Prior to the Israeli occupation, we had mostly been producers, but during the 1970s we became greater consumers, working for wages and spending our earnings to buy goods and other products made in Israel or imported from abroad.

There were local committees, who provided organization for society and a structure to sustain local resistance to the occupation. Guard teams were established in many places. Youths on bicycles scouted the area and reported on any suspicious movements. Night watches were done by older people, who also performed other kinds of guard duties.
Moreover, committees were formed to clean the streets, collect garbage, educate children, gather and store food, medicine and first aid equipment, supply medical treatment and provide assistance to the poor and needy. Each of these committees had subcommittees for agriculture, first-aid training, and so on. Traffic committees, social committees (to resolve disputes) and relief committees were also available (HUNTER, 1991). In short, popular committees not only provided services; they also became the authority in their localities. The presence of faction members on the committees meant that a kind of communication could take place between the top and the bottom. Once a decision had been reached by the UNL, the members of each of the four constituent organizations would pass the word to their followers at the base.

5.3.5. THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE INTIFADA.

Usually, people do not find the courage to fight continually against as powerful an army as Israel's without some reservoir, some deeply and already presented fund of bravery and revolutionary self-sacrifice. Palestinian history furnishes a long tradition of these, and the inhabitants of the 'Westbank' have provided themselves generously from it. Yet, in the words of SAID, (1989: 20);

"What is new is the focused will, the creative and voluntary nature of the people themselves... the leaflets of the Intifada have been concise, concrete and, above all, implementable; each was a nida' ("an appeal") and neither an order nor a pronouncement. Above all, what is most impressive is the sense that the Intifada demonstrated of a collectivity of community finding its way together. The source of this is the organic nationhood that today underlines Palestinian life. For the first time Palestinians exposed themselves to its imperatives. Instead of individuals and private interests, the public good and collective will predominated. Leaders were never identified. Personalities were submerged in the group".

Moreover, SAID (1989), argued that the Intifada has accomplished a number of extraordinary things, which is going to influence the future of the Middle-East as a whole, and Palestine and Israel will never be the same again because of them. First, collaborators with the occupation were encircled and gradually rendered ineffective, as the entire mass of the population in the ‘Westbank’ came together in a bloc that resisted the occupation. Even the class of the shopkeepers played a significant role in this transformation. Secondly, the old social organizations that depended on notables, on family, on traditional hierarchy all these were marginalized. Thirdly, the role of women was considerably altered. The Palestinian woman who had been seen basically as a
helper, a housewife, a secondary person in a male dominated society, came to the front as an equal partners in the struggle.

In the same context, TAMARI (1989), argued that what was new about the Intifada, is both its scale and character. Secondly, it signifies a shift in the centre of gravity of Palestinian politics, from Palestinian diaspora communities in Lebanon, Syria and Jordan to the occupied territories. Thirdly, the Intifada is significant also because it involved not only the ‘Westbank’ and Gaza but, for the first time, full participation of Israel’s Palestinians. A fourth and very important consequence of the Intifada, also according to TAMARI, is that it created an instrument of political unification for all the various Palestinian factions that have so far been divided. Furthermore, the revolutionary rhetoric of the intifada is matched by an intensely pragmatic grasp of what the masses can and cannot do. It sets the limits of popular participation but also assumes that its scope will move in ever-widening circles. Finally, at the political level, TAMARI believes that the Intifada has defeated the notion that the physical, economic, infrastructure integration of the ‘Westbank’ and Gaza into the body of Israel creates irreversible facts.

Therefore, the Intifada is more than an uprising against an intolerable status quo or a movement of defiance. It is also a movement of construction, the harbinger of the formation of an Independent Palestinian State. That State already existed in the hearts and minds of those who have taken to the streets and, by the fierce and irrepressible resistance and determination, taken their destiny into their own hands.

Finally, despite the accomplishment of local organizers in sustaining the Intifada, and given the probability that the military occupation will not end soon, a word of caution about the limitations of the mass based organizations in the ‘Westbank’ is called for. There are two main threats to the survival of the popular organizations; internal contradictions and the continuing military occupation.

5.4. THE IMPACT ON CONSERVATION
There are mainly two methods by which society gets itself involved in any public issue. The first is that individual members slowly become aware of particular problems and
one or more incidents may precipitate their awareness into concern which may ultimately lead to remedial action. The second method is the inductive approach in which an outside agency helps society to become aware of a particular problem and acts as a catalyst or even manager to generate enough concern and action to improve the situation (see Chapter Two).

Our experience has proved the failure of the second approach to overcome any of our problems. This was clearly demonstrated by our Intifada which was a pioneering experiment in popular participation which has raised the confidence of the people and provided them with the right climate for participation at different levels as well as opening channels between the inhabitants, the representatives, community leaders and the decision-makers. In the same context, any conservation approach which is imposed on the people will not work. Conservation should be introduced gradually into the daily life of our society.

Moreover, the last few years have shown us that protecting our built heritage through legislation and restrictions is not enough. There must be further initiatives from individuals, local communities and groups to make conservation more acceptable through better understanding and collective efforts.

To this end, it has been realised that the reinforcement of public pride in the quality of our historic quarters and the development of a strong desire or enthusiasm for conserving a unique irreplaceable heritage is an important factor in conserving our built heritage. Also, it has been realised that the establishment of a climate of participation is the key to preserving our built heritage. Our Intifada has opened up ways by which to establish similar communal participation through informing, enabling, involving and educating the local inhabitants.

This emphasizes the role of the local community and the need for popular participation in providing for the continuity of the traditional environment. During the Intifada, pride in old buildings and areas and the traditional way of life has been reestablished. The
emphasis on the historic quarters by community leaders, as more secured areas, has given the population confidence in what they have.

A close relationship between the public and the private sector, essential for conservation by community action, was established. As well, continuous effective communication between community representatives, community leaders, local authorities and the public was also established. Well defined 'institutional arrangements' to facilitate communication as a main corner stone in any prospect of maintaining the traditional character in the 'Westbank' are now available. The many youth, family, religious, and women's voluntary societies, which were established before or during the Intifada, can play a major role in spreading consciousness between several members of society in order to enhance and promote conserving our cultural heritage. They need to be involved as part of the basic communicative and informative institutions in order to sustain the continuity of the conservation efforts.

However, in any project where community participation is sought, the first contact with the community is of great importance. It is the quality or sincerity of this contact that may decide the ultimate fate of the project. In the 'Westbank' this contact has been successfully established by the Intifada. This will save us from facing the distrust of the community in the beginning. Moreover, our experience with the Intifada has taught us that if the process of community participation is to succeed and continue it should be a two way process and allow both the local authorities and the community to put forward their point of view. An administrative back-up needs to be carefully created to respond to this need.

Further, the Intifada raised the awareness of our people to the importance of conserving our built heritage. This was demonstrated by the establishment of the Nablus Conservation Committee in 1988. Although this Committee was discharged by the Israeli authorities, its establishment at that critical time can be considered as a step forward. Another example, is the Jeffna village near Ramallah where the community of the village has initiated a self-help group in order to restore old buildings there.
The economic hardship suffered by our people during the Intifada has helped to rediscover the economic dimension of restoring and reusing old buildings. Rents in new areas were high and people couldn’t afford them. They turned to old buildings and started to restore them with minimum standards. This has proved that traditional technology and local scale production can create a fertile environment which self-help policies could begin to germinate. Self-help and popular participation are essential for community development and reconstruction and conservation efforts.

Finally, the author would argue that a climate of confidence, very much needed for the success of any conservation programme in the ‘Westbank’, was established during the Intifada. What took others longer time can take us less. All the ingredients for conservation by community action are there. All they need is activation by a dedicated group of our people.

5.5 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION.

This chapter was an attempt to contribute to the understanding of the transformation of the Palestinian society, both social and political, and the sources and reasons behind this transformation, through a study of the development of the Palestinian entity, consciousness and their mass mobilization under occupation, and most importantly through the study of the Palestinian Uprising-the Intifada.

I have argued that, a particular conjunction of forces is required for mass mobilization to occur in any social situation successfully to culminate in collective action. This conjunction of forces was present in the ‘Westbank’ in 1987. The peculiar combination of settler-colonialism and military rule engendered a process of integration of the ‘Westbank’ into Israel. The effects of Israeli actions were felt by us in our everyday lives. In that kind of situation it is impossible not to have a heightened awareness of one’s own objective predicament. On the level of consciousness, therefore, nationalism found a fertile breeding ground in the population of the ‘Westbank’.

On the structural level, too, I have argued that nationalism could be a powerful force for change, as economic and political violence perpetrated by the colonial occupying power
affected all sectors of the population. This unified all segments of the population against the occupation. Where professionals provided the leadership for the national movement, the unions organized the masses and raised their national consciousness. The PLO then provided the impetus that gave direction to the movement inside the 'Westbank'. This happened when the PLO shifted its focus and gave the green light to activists in the 'Westbank' to start building institutions and organizing their own society to ensure that, as TAMARI (1989), argued, "when the Palestinian state arrives it will not arrive in a vacuum. It will already have the infrastructure of political and civic institutions to support it".

Furthermore, the infrastructure of organizations that emerged was born from the womb of colonialism itself, as we began to fill in the gaps left by the occupying power. Institution building, however, had as its purpose not only preparing Palestinian society for a state system, but also, on a very basic level, securing the society's survival.

In this context, the most significant impact of the Intifada has been on the Palestinians making it. They have transformed themselves, discovering new dimensions of cohesion and resourcefulness.

Moreover, I would argue that the organizational work of trade unions, women's committees, and other grass-roots organizations over the past fifteen years has accounted for Palestinians' ability to sustain the Intifada beyond the highly visible but relatively unproductive street demonstrations. Activists in the popular organizations were able to deploy their resources at the moment they were most in need.

Accordingly, I would argue that the model of the Intifada, which proved successful in mobilizing the masses of the Palestinians under very difficult circumstances, and in rewriting the political equation of the Middle East, can be adopted to mobilize the same people for the conservation of our cultural heritage. Especially, as the Palestinians became more and more aware that their architectural heritage is their own history written in stone, and its preservation is essential for continuity and national survival.
Furthermore, the women's committees and organizations as well as the Palestinian grass-roots organizations and societies, which were able to fill the gap that the occupation created in the public services, and which also played a considerable role in preserving the Palestinian heritage, even under the constraints of the occupation, as well as their standing behind the sustainability of the Intifada and the organization of the Palestinian masses and mobilising them in a collective way to resist the occupation, and which provided the basic infrastructure for any future 'Palestinian authority', can play a major role in conserving the Palestinian cultural heritage, taking into account the following points:

a). The peace agreement between the PLO and Israel, for a limited self-rule, assumes that the constraints of the occupation, at least within the areas under the Palestinian control will be minimal.

b). The major efforts that were concentrated on resisting and opposing the occupation and mobilising the people for this cause, can be redirected towards other important issues, namely conservation, when a peace deal is achieved.

c). In the presence of a ‘National Authority,’ it is assumed that the services or at least part of the services that these grass-roots organizations were forced to furnish under occupation, will be the responsibility of the new ‘National Authority’. Therefore, the money and the efforts, that these societies used to spend on these services can be used to conserve the Palestinian cultural heritage.

d). Many of these societies and organizations played a considerable role in preserving the Palestinian heritage, even under occupation. Now, their role can be expanded to include the conservation of the Palestinian architectural heritage.

Nevertheless, even if a peace deal is not be achieved, the Palestinian people should use all the available resources to conserve their cultural heritage. We should not wait until this peace deal is reached, simply because moments count when it comes to conservation of cultural heritage, especially when that culture is the most threatened in the whole world. However, despite the occupation and its iron fist, the Palestinians of the
'Westbank' have attempted to conserve parts of their cultural heritage, whenever, however and wherever possible. Therefore, the following chapter will discuss the attempts of the Palestinians to conserve their cultural heritage even under the constraints of the occupation.
CHAPTER SIX

Conservation in the Context of the New Palestine
CHAPTER SIX

CONSERVATION IN THE CONTEXT OF THE NEW PALESTINE

6.0 INTRODUCTION

As we have seen in the previous Chapter, the Palestinian nation was in possession of a national and political consciousness long before the preservation of our cultural heritage became a necessary activity. This happened at the end of 1970s and the beginning of the 1980s as a by-product of the increased awareness of the importance of preserving our cultural heritage from Israeli destruction, and our national survival. Only then, did we start to turn to the nation’s cultural heritage and to think of its conservation in order to propagate and strengthen the feeling of national identity.

The Palestinian nation, which is young from a political point of view, but old culturally speaking, is in great need of strengthening its national identity in support of its political legitimacy. The situation of the ‘Westbank’ under military occupation, where our culture has been consciously suppressed, if not erased, signifies that the importance of its heritage cannot be taken for granted. The physical remains of our cultural heritage are the most significant medium for creating a national consciousness, especially, when the colonial power itself has no interest in conserving the local cultural heritage, as this stands against its policy of cultural genocide.

The Palestinians have consistently been denied the opportunity to build up their institutions and to carry out the activities necessary for their cultural survival, including those of conservation. This has contributed to the desire for Independence. This desire has tended to overshadow all other aspects of life, including due care of our cultural heritage. Moreover, the economic constraints and the severe restrictions imposed by the IMG occupation have forced survival as a first priority. As a result the ‘Westbank’ is one of the poorest countries in the Middle East, with very limited resources which is a serious constraint on even minimal official conservation measures. Nevertheless, in most other respects our predominately Islamic Palestinian culture has continued to play a significant role, even under the IMG occupation.
With this understanding, there are two points of departure for postulating the necessity for safeguarding our cultural heritage. Firstly, it must be seen as a national and political necessity, intimately associated with our legitimacy as a nation struggling for Independence. Secondly, the people even today are living, and have been living under the IMG occupation for almost thirty years, where development has been completely controlled and where very severe economic constraints have placed our physical cultural heritage under enormous pressure. Our people’s attitudes and aspirations have been given new values. For the majority, the conservation of our cultural heritage is not seen as something necessarily positive, but often, in fact, as a hindrance to development.

Moreover, our relationship with our cultural heritage is, to a great extent, coloured by the fact that for most of us, it is often an affair of the heart rather than the head; it is an emotional relationship. But, if our message is to reach the decision-makers, especially after peace, we must put our thoughts into actions. It would be a big mistake if the decision-makers think that conservation of our cultural heritage is by no means an important political subject, especially in the first years of the new Palestinian National Authority (PNA). Therefore, we must try to convince the PNA that conservation is so important that they have to take it into account. At the same time we have to find other alternatives to official conservation, if necessary informal measures, in order to protect our historic city centres from further deterioration.

Their value lies in what they signify for our people. Those of us who have grown up in the last thirty years and have a strong interest in our cultural heritage understand their own particular need for preserving or strengthening our Palestinian identity. After all 30% of our entire population have known nothing else; they were born in the last 30 years or so.

This Chapter will attempt to trace the development of the concept of conservation in the 'Westbank'. We have tried to analyze it in four ways: firstly, by relating it to the concept of conservation in the West and the Third World. Secondly, by tracing its evolution from the Ottoman period to the present time. Thirdly, by pointing out what has been done in the field and by whom. Finally, we have endeavoured to explain the
reasons why we should take care of our cultural heritage and what benefits we can gain from that.

6.1 CONCEPTS OF CONSERVATION

Until the middle of the twentieth century few countries in the world appreciated the value of their historic cities. In the West, only a mere twenty years ago, historic quarters were the target of large scale "redevelopment". Throughout Europe valuable historic buildings or entire neighbourhoods were demolished in the name of clearance and development schemes. Conservation was limited to the most notable ancient and medieval remains. Attention was paid to individual monuments divorced from their surroundings (LAWLESS, 1980). It was the Second World War in particular, and the extent of the destruction of the historic fabric of major European cities, which started an awareness both of the monuments and their urban settings. In recent years, however, conservation has become a special form of planning involving a more comprehensive approach for dealing with areas or quarters of cities as opposed to just individual buildings and sites (LAWLESS, 1980).

Reviewing the history of conservation in European cities we find that although, in reality, both historic conservation and neighbourhood conservation can be interpreted in their social, political and economic senses, conservation has become focused on the valuable traditional urban environment as a whole. Conservation in Great Britain in particular, falls into two main categories of thinking: physical conservation (see for example, SUDDARDS, 1982; DOE CIRCULAR 8/87, 1987; ROSS, 1991; STOPS et al, 1992; HAREGREAVES, 1992), and social conservation (see for example, CIVIC TRUST, 1967; NEKEAN, 1977; LARKHAM, 1985). Physical conservation can be classified as landmarks and neighbourhood conservation. Social conservation, on the other hand, tends to involve economic revitalisation, more public participation in the planning process and community development, where high unemployment and the closure of industry has resulted in the dilapidation of the physical environment.

The existence of a legal instrument is only a first step: the determining factor is public policy with respect to the salvaging of a particular monument, an ensemble or a city
Physical conservation does not lack for strong opinions as to what should be conserved. The Listed Buildings process precisely shows the subjectivity of many conservation decisions. In Britain, until the 1980s, not one Victorian town was considered worthy of study for conservation (TARN, 1985). Even the conservationists could not agree on what should be preserved. The simple and common resolution tended to be 'the older the better.'

In the last fifteen years conservation has served the needs of tourism and economic revitalisation. Many historic urban environments have been turned into open air museums. By 1988, in Britain, there were about half a million buildings which had been Listed; about one in every fifty. Heritage has become an industry (HEWSION, 1988). Not only do the listed buildings and cities cost millions to restore, but also hundreds of government and non-government organisations are involved with conservation and the preservation of heritage. The heritage industry by 'showing history' is actually disguising the true history. One main value is "vision" or sightseeing.

In the so called developing countries with their long histories, conservation has developed through a slower process that is directed more towards the monumental, rather than concern for the vernacular. Conservation, in many countries, is still focused on great monuments and antiquities, as isolated objects, divorced from their milieu, their context or even site. In architecture, values attached to cultural heritage other than the major monuments, are likely to be acquired only slowly. But as the culture changes traditional, indigenous and vernacular architecture may seem increasingly inappropriate and decades may elapse before their qualities are acknowledged and appreciated. By then there may be little left and we will be in the absurd situation of having to recreate it all.

RODGER (1982), in discussing conservation of buildings in developing countries, points out that there is a great willingness to restore national" monuments" for their tourist
appeal, prestige, attraction of international funding and possibly their cultural identity, but, he argues, cultural identity may be as well expressed in traditional, small scale buildings and areas. He also points out that the central problem is cultural rather than technical. This issue was also tackled by OLIVER (1982), who states that every conservation issue in developing countries has to be met by a careful consideration of all the factors involved. He argues that the technical problems may be considerable, but they may, and probably can, be overcome. This point was also made by STEPHEN (1971), when he emphasised that the conservation problems today are not technological but social in nature:

"Until [the] present time, we have acquired some knowledge to restore single objects. A very different situation exists when we try to consider the meaning of art work in a social context, or the preservation of an environment. There we have confidence that the answer lies within the grasp of existing technological competence. The situation is similar to that of medical science at the present time. Where we can employ our fabulous technological skills, as in surgery, we can expect continued progress, but we are helpless to cure most social and psychological illnesses of human beings. In both cases the reliance on technology to solve all problems has become a negative factor in preventing us from facing the more difficult and mysterious social problems". (STEPHEN, 1971: 79).

There is a basic problem in the Western view of conservation which assumes the cultural context, and seldom has need to consider it explicitly (OLIVER, 1982). This isolation of conservation from cultural context, according to Oliver, is not serious when conservation is a part of the cultural values of the society, as in Great Britain, but may become so when polices are applied in cultures where concepts of conservation are unfamiliar.

Moreover, as conservation is a new concept in most developing countries, introduced perhaps by mostly European planners, art historians and architects, we should not ignore the danger of the possible adoption of Western ideas of conservation. The little experience and small number of specialists in the field could lead some governments to blindly adopt international if not Western models, without any thought about their own specific background.

In this context, OLIVER (1982) argues that conservation policies in the developing countries, where they have been directed to the preservation of buildings of importance, have been shaped largely by Western attitudes to art and architecture. Western cultural
values place considerable importance on the building as an object, reflecting an interest in it as a valuable entity. In many countries, values and attitudes towards their past are often imposed from the West, though they may have been subsumed into the international codes and treaties. However, it has been shown, through previous experiences, that the desire to imitate Western building styles and techniques, although often not climatically suitable or fitting the user requirements, can have other negative effects on social and cultural life in these nations. Further, the use of advanced and sophisticated production and building techniques often suffers from a lack of cultural and environmental integration. The Western mind tends to give emphasis to conflicts between what is old, such as the existing vernacular style and the newly imported modern style. The drive to modernize is a characteristic of many developing economies and this rapid assumption of technological introductions from abroad too often brings with it a resentment against their own cultural heritage in the broadest sense.

In this context, and about the introduction of Western architecture, WARREN (1976: 20) stated:

"The introduction of Western philosophy of conservation, which is accepted without question of its origin, is in itself a very positive pressure on nations whose whole economy and much of its thought process is subject to rapid change. Sheer imitation of established Western procedure will sometimes lead an emergent regime to copy-lock, stock and barrel conservation ideas (and even legislation) used on Western models without serious analysis of their relevance".

The deployment of policies of comprehensive Westernisation has not solved the problems and in the same way, policies of conservation alone, will be threatened by the failure. Therefore, it would be a great mistake, if conservators adopt the same procedure by copying and transferring the conservation strategies applied in the West to the "developing" nations. Some studies concerned with appropriateness, adaptability and re-adjustment of these imported notions and techniques must be carried out. The use of conservation, in its widest definition, as an integral part in local, national and even international policy, should be pursued and strengthened for the future success of conservation in these countries. In other words, conservation should be used as an asset for development rather than a liability. Conservation policies have to be defined with other strategies forming an inter-related development basis.
Many third world cities today have experienced a growth in population and an expanding urbanized area which is far beyond the capacity of the public authorities to plan and manage. In some of these cities, urban and city planning has failed for almost 20 years (GAYE, 1992). Moreover, where in most of these countries there is a struggle between the creation of wealth "development" and the need to preserve the environment, it would appear that most have opted for the former at the expense of the latter. In contrast to development interests conservation has not established a powerful set of institutions, any significant power base, or any real political power or track record of achievement. The interests and aspirations of national governments, the tourist industry and those involved in the construction industry, are often in direct conflict with conservation. It will require much convincing argument and pressure from those concerned with preservation of the environment in all disciplines, to change the present destructive approach to much development in developing countries. ADWALE (1992), suggests that measures are needed to preserve the environment. One of the most effective ways to ensure such protection, according to him, is to leave it in the hands of the ordinary citizens. In the same context, AYSAN (1982) states that the solution to the problem of conservation in developing countries is not only the allocation of money by the governments but through enforceable regulation. What is needed is the awareness and appreciation by our people of their old settlements, buildings, culture and lifestyle.

This recognition of the failure of conventional policies, which concentrate solely on the physical aspects while ignoring the social ones, has led to the search for more practical and alternative approaches to conservation (see Chapter Two).

While many parts of the Middle East are struggling to preserve some sense of continuity with their traditions this effort is particularly true of the 'Westbank'/Palestine. We live in the most threatened area, whereby the need for mere survival has become the major priority that overshadows all other activity.

However, under the unique circumstances of the Palestinian nation, dispossessed, uprooted and oppressed, one would assume that arguing for architectural heritage and its preservation is totally a controversial and paradoxical issue, out of time and place.
Yet, this is not true and should not deter us or bring about a defeatist attitude. On the contrary having suffered so much destruction we need now to repair the damage to our villages, town and cities and thus to our morale. It is our convention as Palestinians that it is through relating to our ancestral past that our identity is strengthened and maintained. A correct evaluation and integration of the historical forms is the first step towards the restoration of identity. We should not produce dead records and museums of the past, but see such forms as a vital reflection of our traditions that have given us birth and shelter for centuries (SAHHAR, 1984). The search for identity and stability is now the most important need for our people, and the success of conservation is directly related to these aims. If spectacular conservation schemes are proposed, they are bound to fail at birth, as no financial or legislative support can be expected from central government. In the early stages conservation projects should be clearly aimed at the people and depend on them for their success.

On the other hand, experiences in other parts of the world have shown that comparatively little can usually be done by private initiative alone. But, we should learn to live within our ‘de facto’ situation. The Palestinian’s will can defy all odds, and we can achieve a great deal when we are sufficiently aware to appreciate the issues at stake. This occurs only when conservation proves economically and socially feasible. We cannot now afford to wait any longer for major changes in our political circumstances to be effective. It will be years before a Department of Antiquities or Conservation is established. The new Palestinian National Authority must then attract voluntary funds that can be used for restoring specific monuments of our cultural heritage. This could take time. But we must start now, as there is a moment of opportunity. We must take advantage of the social and economic cohesiveness of the community and the strong public participation and motivation, so crucial to successful conservation. What seems to be required is an alternative approach that works on a step by step measure. There are individuals and families who are prepared to release funds for the restoration of their houses. We must build on these small projects. Examples will be the evidence that things can happen. Larger projects will come forward if realistic, practical and affordable objectives are set, and there is a partnership between both public and private interests, which will have some hope for continuity. Publicity for small achievements
are what is needed in the beginning.

If we are to enjoy the improved environment brought about by conservation designed to maintain Palestinian cultural heritage, both the tangible and intangible, it is difficult at this stage to imagine it coming about through national legislation. That can be introduced when we have some experience. The past few decades have shown that passive conservation based on a strict aesthetic conception of cultural property may in some cases prolong the life of buildings but cannot really guarantee their protection. The power of the past lies in the identity the building or area confers and a sense of continuity it provides (UNESCO, 1975: 36).

Both short-term and long-term programmes can gradually be defined as experience grows. One of the aims should be to document those buildings in the worst state of repair, as well as, to have a gradual effect on and the control of new development, by creating new designs based on the traditional knowledge, experience and values in the context of new life for the Palestinians.

"Conservation ought to be integrated into the regular planning process. It should mean something to the man in the street, involve the community, and above all be compatible with contemporary ways of living and with changes that are taking place. Conservation must be part of organic process if it is to have any role in the future of our countries". (KHAN, 1983: 29).

Moreover, "to be successful, conservation ought also to improve the living conditions for ordinary people. That is why housing has been the centre of attention in all successful conservation work" (WARREN et al, 1983: 38). The intention, however, is to point out paths along which enquiries can be made rather than suggest immediate solutions.

6.2 A BRIEF HISTORY OF CONSERVATION IN THE ‘WESTBANK’

The ‘Westbank’ has a heritage of thousands of years some of which has to be protected, preserved and developed. But, despite the fact that Palestine has had a long history of statutory town planning, almost as long as that in Britain (COON, 1991, 1992), conservation has come quite late in comparison to other countries.
Until World War I, construction was undertaken by the Ottoman authorities, who had little or no concept of town planning other than in military terms. However, a system of building permits was established by the Turks in urban areas (EFRAT, 1984). During the height of the Ottoman Empire there was new prosperity, a more effective administration, new roads and old khans were build and repaired. Between 1537 and 1541 Sultan Sulayman I reconstructed the walls of Jerusalem that still stand today (WALLS and ABU HAJJ, 197?). In addition, an endowment system, waqf, secured the maintenance of important public buildings. When a mosque or a religious building was being funded, money was also made available to build one or several commercial establishments, such as hammams or shops that could be let. The revenue from the commercial establishments paid for the upkeep of the public buildings.

During this and subsequent periods till the present time, some concern has always been shown by the rulers for the large monuments, especially the great mosques. At the same time, care has been demonstrated by some wealthy families or individuals or a group of individuals for the repair and maintenance of religious shrines and mausoleums; this to obtain God's blessing and to gain access to paradise. Their maintenance has ensured their preservation as cultural symbols up to the present time (Fig. 6.1).

Apart from the above, a system of yearly maintenance by the tenants existed, the frequency was a function of family size. This was a sort of collective "dala" (the turn), where each member of the family took part in repairing the walls and ceilings and applying a coat of lime wash whitewashed to interior walls. During religious feasts or when the condition of the houses required, the interiors, the courtyards, as well as the bazaars, were painted, preferably a few days before the fasting month of Ramadan.

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1 In Turky itself the Ottoman town planning did focus on the Kulliye/the central group and it does exist on that sence.

2 Interview with Mr Zuhir Al-Dube'e; editor of Nablus Newspaper, the leader of Al-Unaia mosque and a member of the Nablus Conservation Committee- which was discharged by the Israeli authorities, February 1994.

3 Ibid

4 Ibid

5 Ibid
Fig. 6.1: Two Examples of Well Maintained Buildings in Old Nablus;
a. Jami' en-Naser - the Victory Mosque
b. The Protestant Church
Source: The Author
The owner calculated the expense, which was then divided between the different families.

However, this would exclude those with a very low income and elderly people living alone, where a baby-sitting function was asked of them instead. Under the British Mandate that started in 1922, a new approach to town planning was introduced. "The British in contrast to the Turks, combined an urban culture of [the] highest standard, with a romantic attachment to the Middle East" (EFRAT, 1984: 208). Town planning during this was regulated by the Town Planning Ordinance of 1921 and 1929 (LUKE & KEITH-ROACH, 1934), and later by Town Planning Ordinance of 1936. In 1945, the Town and Country Planning Ordinance of Palestine was published (SHIBER, 1968; COON, 1992). Though this ordinance was never enacted, Article 17 of the Schemes Section, deals with preservation of objects of archaeological interest or beauty, and buildings or places used for religious purposes or cemeteries, or concerned with religious veneration. Article 19, deals with the control of siting, size, height, design and external appearance of buildings (for more information about this Ordinance see Appendix 6.1).

The High Commissioner had the power to appoint a Central Commission in order to set limits to an area or district and declare a Town Planning Area. Local commissions, like the Engineering Department of the Municipality, prepared a scheme for the development and reconstruction of an area. The scheme was based on the Central Commission's advice and consultations with the Department of Antiquities (LUKE & KEITH-ROACH, 1934), (see Appendix 6.2 for Antiquities Ordinances). Such schemes may have contained provisions for construction, alteration of streets, allocation of land for roads, public gardens, and the division of an area into building zones, and types of drainage, street lighting, water supply, and preservation of objects of historical interest and natural beauty (LUKE & KEITH-ROACH, 1934).

Special attention and controls were given to Jerusalem, when the city started to extend...
outside the wall of Sulayman. The first plan was in 1918 (Mclean), and the last, the Kendal Plan in 1944 (DAKKAK, 1981b; EFRAT, 1984; COON, 1992). The government also founded the Pro-Jerusalem Society in early 1920s, whose aims included the preservation of the beauty of the city and the furthering of its planning development (EFRAT, 1984). In spite of this Western influence Jerusalem retained its Middle Eastern cultural and economic life. The British tried not to interfere with the management of the Moslem shrines (BENVENISTI, 1976). Further, the British tried to preserve the historical character of Jerusalem by exercising careful control over its development and by assisting the communities in necessary repair work.

According to EFRAT (1984), the Mandatory Government’s main contribution to the development of towns was the creation of the Town Planning Commissions, whose main function was to establish the administrative machinery for building control. He adds, that the control was decentralized, and based on Local, Municipal and District Commissions. The legislation which gave legal authorization to the functions of these commissions was enacted in 1936 (for more information about 1936 Town Planning Ordinance, see COON, 1992 Chapter 3). Finally, while the Government was aware of the problems relating to town planning, and knew how to develop towns according to established European practice, "it applied this knowledge only to those areas in whose development it had a special interest" (EFRAT, 1984: 210).

Under the Jordanian rule special attention was given to the preservation of supreme religious monuments like the Dome of the Rock and Al-Aqsa Mosque. The King of Jordan is said to have given the highest attention and contributed to their preservation from his personal finances. His last contribution was US $ 8 million in 1992 for the preservation of the Dome of the Rock.

Due to the special status of Jerusalem it soon became the main centre of tourist activity with all the paraphernalia of hotels, souvenir shops, guides, transport, etc. As a result tourism soon became the major source of income throughout the 'Westbank'. Bethlehem for example, became the centre for the souvenir industries; Ramallah developed as a summer resort; Jericho as a winter resort. The number of tourists
visiting Jordan, i.e. mainly the holy places of the ‘Westbank’ rose from 104,000 in 1952 to 387,000 in 1964 and 617,000 in 1966 (KARMON, 1971). Jordan’s income from tourism, which dependent to a great extent on the ‘Westbank’, totalled about 11 million Jordanian dinars or about US $32 million in 1966 (ABU-AYYASH, 1976). This could be the other main reason, beside the religious reason, why Jordan concentrated on the historical religious buildings especially Jerusalem. Jordan played a major role in nominating the buildings and wall of the Old City of Jerusalem on the World Heritage list. It was listed on 30 October 1981 under the State of Jordan.

Under the Israeli Military Occupation, and as we have seen in Chapter Four, the conservation of historical buildings and sites has been completely ignored. Conservation of the national cultural heritage meant the preservation of the sites which only have reference to the tangible cultural heritage of the occupier, without due consideration to whatever cultural properties the country had possessed during the last twenty centuries. Worse, Israel aims at destroying our cultural heritage by all available means. Not only this, but the occupying authorities are willing to erase any archaeological or historical site to prove its historical arguments. "[The] link between cultural and political battle has become strong and prominent chiefly in the modern era. For those nations eager for expansion and predominance have devised effective means for destroying cultures of dominated peoples" (VON GRUNEBAUM, 1962: 160).

In an interview with a member of the Jerusalem Committee, some of the Israeli policies towards the conservation of the Palestinian cultural heritage in the Old City of Jerusalem were summarized. He said:

"Of the obstacles that the occupation puts in the face of conservation in Jerusalem, are the following:
1. The Israeli authorities do not allow the Arab Palestinians to carry out the needed preservation works for the traditional properties.
2. The Israeli Department of Antiquities refuses to co-operate with the Palestinians to conduct any form of historical, architectural and structural studies, about the old city of Jerusalem, and to publish these studies.
3. The Israeli Authorities had carried out excavations to repair the sewage network, which caused cracks to not less than 40 per cent of the properties around these excavations.

7 Interview with a member of the Jerusalem Committee who requested anonymity on 17 March 1994 in Jerusalem. The Jerusalem Committee is now responsible for carrying out some conservation work for Palestinian properties.
4. Not only does the Israeli Authority close its eyes, but it also supports any one who tries to cover up or destroy traditional buildings and build new ones in their place.

Further, and regarding the impact of the Jewish settlers on the Palestinian cultural heritage and its preservation, he pointed out:

"The settlers are the militia for implementing the occupier objectives which aim at evacuating the Old City of Jerusalem from its indigenous Arab Palestinian inhabitants, and to take over their properties. They have committed many offenses against the law to implement their objectives, of which:

1. They played with the foundations of some traditional buildings near their settlements core.
2. They tried to falsify the ownership’s documents of some buildings and seized others by force.
3. They spoil and destroy the cultural and architectural features of the buildings they seize.
4. They have dug many tunnels underneath traditional buildings and consequently destroyed many traditional cisterns which in return shake the foundations of many traditional buildings."

6.3 CONSERVATION IN THE ‘WESTBANK’ TODAY.

Several attempts have been made in the ‘Westbank’ in the last 10 - 15 years, despite Israeli policy and the imposition of severe economic constraints. These attempts are clearly visible in cities like Jerusalem, Nablus, and Hebron and be understood under the following headings:

1. Al-Awqaf (Islamic Archaeological Department) - is responsible for mosques and the waqf donation, deriving its funds from commercial rents in its ownership. It was also supported by Jordanian Government. Since September 1994, Jordan has stopped its support to the Palestinian Waqf department, putting the responsibility for funding in the hands of the new Palestinian National Authority.

2. Official conservation takes place under the auspices of the municipalities, or other local bodies. For example, in 1986 the Municipality of Nablus renovated the covered cloth market, Suq al-Qumash in the old town (Fig. 6.2). Many local and foreign professionals referred to it as a destructive work and not conservation. Others, like BURGOYNE (1987: 5) saw the work as having some good results. He wrote:

8 Some of these sites have been visited by the author and the supervisor of the thesis on 4 January 1994.
"The result is very successful. The place looks bright and attractive, the shop keepers report that the business is booming and their costumers enjoy shopping there".

3. Private conservation is carried out by individual efforts by the owners, usually without outside help, for example the Dar (house) Naiem Touqan and Dar al-Tamimi in Nablus. Mrs Tamimi, who owns the house, still keeps the traditional beds,
wardrobes, tiles, and doors. In an interview she said that the house is, "... my life, it is my passport to the past, the present and the future". She also added that she carries an annual maintenance on whatever repairs are needed. "It is cheaper when you do it on regular basis and on time, but if you leave it to the end, it will be very expensive, and may be you will not be able to do anything about it" (Fig. 6.3 a,b).

4. Conservation by NGOs, such as the Centre for Development Consultancy (CDC), which supports small conservation projects, but mainly concentrates its efforts in the Old City of Jerusalem.

In March 1994, the author had a long discussion with the director of the CDC, who is also the Managing Director of the Palestinian Housing Council (PHC), about the possibility of using 5% of the PHC budget for the preservation of our best traditional houses. Normally of course donors give to the PHC on the expectation that it will be spent on new housing projects, but the Director promised to try and get agreement for a percentage of the monies to be spent on preservation. The author also prepared a first draft of a pre-study of the benefits of conserving the existing Palestinian housing stock for the CDC on which he will continue to work on his return to the ‘Westbank’.

In the first half of 1994 the Welfare Association in London, contracted the PRDU at the Institute of Advanced Architectural Studies at the University of York to prepare an action plan and funding proposal for the protection of the Arab-Islamic Heritage of the Old City of Jerusalem (REVIVAL, 1994). This proposal covered four main areas of action:

a) priority project for restoration,
b) emergency repair and property protection programme,
c) preparation of a conservation plan leading to the establishment of an information system, and
d) training, skill-building and progressive articulation of technical standards and guidelines for restoration work.
Fig. 6.3: a. Al-Tamimi House in Old Nablus; a House Preserved Well by its own Owners. Source: Photo by Mr Hisham Zu’bi for the Author
Fig. 6.3: b. Al-Nabli House in the Old Town of Nablus; a House Preserved Well by its Owners
Source: the Author
REVIVAL (1994) added that the proposal with a total value of $5,095,750 has been agreed by the Arab Fund for Social and Economic Development and the Welfare Association has started work on an executive plan. Another active Palestinian NGO in the field of conservation is RIWAQ (Centre for Architectural Conservation) based in Ramallah. The Centre works on a number of levels to protect the fabric of Palestinian cultural heritage. Among its objectives is the conservation and protection of historic towns and villages, archaeological and natural sites, monuments and buildings. RIWAQ is also concerned with the development and promotion of an indigenous Palestinian style of architecture based on firmly rooted traditions and techniques.

At the beginning of 1994 RIWAQ started a National Register for the historic buildings in the ‘Westbank’. The aim was to start with three cities where some of the work has been already done. The author participated in three of Riwaq’s Friends meetings, while conducting field work, aimed at designing a proper format for Register. At one of these meetings a conference for the preservation of the Palestinian cultural heritage was proposed. It took place on 3 - 4 June 1994 with the title "Towards a General Policy for Conservation in the West Bank". There were a number of lectures, in addition to five workshops; tourism and the management of cultural resources; promoting public awareness to the importance of preservation; municipalities and their role in safeguarding the historic areas; planning and housing policies towards conservation; the technical dimensions of conservation (ALMUHANDIS ALFALESTINI, 1994), (for more information about this conference see Appendix 6.3; and 6.4 for more projects carried out by Riwaq).

5. For documentation of projects carried out by the Departments of Architecture at An-Najah National University, Bir Zeit University and Heron Polytechnic (see Appendix 6.5).

6. Personal contribution, this type is well demonstrated in the case of Al-Aqsa Mosque and the Dome of the Rock in Jerusalem. In 1992, for example, both King Hussein of Jordan and King Fahid of Saudi Arabia competed to finance the preservation work of the Dome of the Rock. The completion of this work caused King Hussein to
sell his own villa in the vicinity of London, which was estimated at around $ 8 million. Another simpler example is the preservation of \textit{Qaser Al-Qasem} (Al-Qasem Palace) in the village of \textit{Beit Wazan}, near the city of Nablus. The owners of this building donated it to An-Najah University for preservation and use as part of the University. One suggestion is that after the proper renovation the building could be used by the School of Architecture. However, after a visit by the author and the supervisor of the thesis to the site of the building, it was suggested that the building become a Study Centre for Conservation and Reconstruction (SCCR), crucially needed for the 'Westbank'. Later the dean of the Faculty of Engineering at An-Najah University visited the Institute of Advanced Architectural Studies (IoAAS) at York University to discuss the possibilities of initiating a joint programme to train staff in conservation and reconstruction methods.

A Palestinian businessman - Mr Munib Al-Masri - promised to cover the costs of the conservation work. At the same time the author and another two of his colleagues prepared a proposal requesting of technical assistance from UNESCO. It is worth pointing out that the author did the documentation of this building, as part of his studies in 1983, when he was an undergraduate student at Al-Najah University (for the drawings of the building see Appendix 6.6).

6.4 CHALLENGES TO CONSERVATION

The 'Westbank' is faced with many practical constraints preventing comprehensive conservation policies and programmes. There are a number of factors contributing to the present situation that deserve our consideration.

Among all the problems resulting from the deterioration of the Palestinian infrastructure, economic constraints and the high demand for housing, we must ask if it is really ethical to consider conservation. At the national level can we afford an allocation of national funds to conservation, especially when most if not all the municipalities are operating with budget deficit. Sadly, conservation is not considered among the top priorities for the inhabitants who are struggling to feed, educate and provide a decent shelter for their families. Nor perhaps is it going to be a first priority of the "infant" Palestinian National Authority, who still live on donations from rich countries and who are
struggling to maintain the basic infrastructure to provide health care and to create jobs for its people. These are the national priorities, and it is hard for conservation issues to be heard.

Therefore, this country which contains many of the greatest elements forming the world's architectural heritage is faced with a lack of resources to finance conservation programmes. Conservation must be considered as a new concept for using Palestinian resources made available by the Palestinian people themselves for its success. Conservation can be used as a strategy for the fulfilment of the national desire to show the world that we are a responsible society, proud of our built heritage.

As we have mentioned earlier, there is a great willingness to restore and conserve national monuments (single distinguished buildings such as mosques, palaces, hammams), for their prestige and to attract some international funding. However, the Palestinian cultural identity is not only expressed by a group of monuments, but it may also be reflected in traditional small scale buildings and areas. Therefore, any conservation decision should clearly distinguish between conserving monuments and the less dramatic but equally important cultural and traditional areas.

The conservation concept was first brought to the 'Westbank' by Western professionals, and then by Palestinians mainly educated in the West and developed until the present time through "monumental conservation." If this process is to continue, many buildings and large historic areas will be swept away and the main focus of conservation will be restricted to single objects. Nevertheless, if conservation is to be effective and provide the sense of continuity embodied in our traditional settings, all historic areas should be taken into consideration. It is only then that our people will realise that conservation is, first of all, for their own benefit, and we can then rely on them for its success.

It is interesting to notice that conservation in the 'Westbank' is seen by the general public as being the problem of the municipalities. Here, we are concerned with an official conservation rather than with a popular one. The municipalities and other NGOs
and local bodies at the moment are only responsible for safeguarding the monuments. This attitude, which does not encourage public investment in conservation and repair works, has eventually led to the public neglect by the people of their properties. Like many other countries in the developing world, there is a continuing lack of respect for traditional buildings that modernization, development and technological advances (as we shall see later) has greatly encouraged. In the ‘Westbank’, however, and as we have seen in Chapter Four, this has been caused by the presence of the Israeli occupation and its policies aimed at destroying our social and cultural identity in order to control and dominate us.

Tragically, for many people, architectural heritage and its conservation is seen as an obstacle to economic and social development. Thus, we cannot expect people living in very poor conditions and in places that are regarded by many as primitive, to express their desire to remain in them or even care about repairing them. Add to this, that areas of historical value are mainly occupied by poor indigenous people, as most of the rich families have left for other wealthier areas outside the historic cores, and, to a lesser extent, by migrants who have recently moved in from the rural areas and do not feel any great attachment to their houses or neighbourhoods. For them, these areas are not much better than the areas they left, so they do not express any interest in conserving them.

Therefore, if we want to develop the conservation movement in the ‘Westbank’ and change the present attitude of the public, a re-evaluation of conservation objectives should be conducted in parallel with social objectives for conservation, which are a higher priority than either historical or aesthetic objectives. In the same context, this author argues that as long as conservation is only conducted towards the monumental dimension and concentrates on a few particular sites, the attitude of society, as represented by the general public, will remain unchanged.

In order therefore, to establish a series of proposals and practical measures for conservation, an evaluation of the present social/human problem is deemed essential. As man has been the creator of his own abode, it should only be expected that the healing
process for its problems should ultimately be considered through them. In order to achieve this, it will be necessary to trace the attitudes and aspirations that have caused such serious problems to the fabric of the built environment, as well as giving a direct blow to our traditional architecture. Links with the past are easily cut and the sense of continuity now seeming more important to the Palestinian people than ever, is fading into oblivion.

There is no harm in change if it denotes a lively continuity aiming at something new and perceived as better, and when it fulfils certain needs and requirements. But if change occurs just for the sake of it, then it can be quite a serious issue. In addition, change has to be a result and gradual. When change is too rapid, it can provoke more resistance than acceptance, with the result that the built environment suffers instead of benefiting.

"... most of the social and cultural problems originate through the fast speed and the high amount of uncoordinated changes taking place in a city because this confuses the identification of the inhabitants with their environment and disturbs the image of the city"

"Recognizing these factors of change suggests that more adequate administrative, legal, economic and psychological means of preservation and protection of ones architectural heritage must be developed to cope with these destructive forces".  
(Arckerknecht, 1993: 6,7).

Two factors have altered the Palestinian attitude towards the built environment; the Israeli government control of planning, development and land use and because of environmental need, modernization. As the first has been discussed thoroughly in Chapter Four, only the second factor will be discussed below.

While it is generally accepted that man does not change culture, but culture changes man, there is little doubt that man is held responsible and certainly contributes to the change of his environment (cited in SAHHAR, 1984). It is obvious that insufficient awareness of the public towards their architectural heritage, be it a monument or a simple dwelling, has allowed the destruction of fine examples of our architectural heritage.
Therefore, while the Israeli policy aims at destroying the Palestinian cultural heritage, the mass of the Palestinian people are not aware of the fact, that it is through their cultural and physical heritage that they can identify themselves; that architecture is the massive and tangible link between man, his land and his national subsistence.

BRUNSKILL (1978), clearly defines vernacular architecture, as "one of the ways in which regional and national character survived the various political amalgamation which make up the present nation" (Quoted in SAHAR, 1984: 77).

Moreover, it would be only fair to put part of the blame on the occupying authorities that have literally done nothing to protect the architectural heritage of the "Westbank", as the Palestinian historic areas were completely neglected under occupation. The fact that,"any desire and determination to maintain the fabric of historic towns, villages and buildings draw on very deep psychic sources in national consciousness" (SHANKLAND, 1975: 25), may perhaps reveal a deliberate neglect on behalf of the occupying authorities whose intentions are far from conservation.

Modernity has become a virtue but,"it may be what we call modern is nothing but what is not worthy of remaining to become old" (FATHY, 1973a: 24). In contrast to the past, where our ancestors achieved their dwelling their objectives in housing through inspiration and originality. Today we dwell upon aspirations for a modern concrete house, these aspirations have been adopted but scarcely adapted to our climate, social environment and temperament. Nevertheless, in the framework of our minds, they are perceived as modern, therefore desirable and "perfectly" applicable.

"The impact of the forces of modernity tends to erode the older patterns of life without creating any new, viable social or institutional settings of stable patterns of behaviour to which people are committed, instead merely creating a situation of social disorganization, fluidity and anomie"


Though the Palestinian nation is familiar with such lack of social standards it must guard against all forms of social disintegration. For people who are in search of identity and stability, the survival of their historic buildings and tradition offers an important link with their past, in that they are distinguishable and have their own personality and character.
Finally, I would argue that, though the military occupation does not change the people's attitude directly, it has put them in direct contact with the west, which in turn accelerated the process of modernization in the 'Westbank' as we have discussed earlier in chapter four.

6.5 THE GROWING CONCERN FOR CONSERVATION

Conserving our cultural heritage nowadays is widening beyond simply maintaining historic monuments. Several initiatives have been emerging in the 'Westbank', giving a new dimension to the conservation movement, that might be a first step in moving from a static to an evolutionary attitude towards conservation. In the Old Town of Nablus, for example, while the process started through the restoration of some minor structures, it ended by the rehabilitation of Suq Al-Qumash - the Cloth Market - as a whole. Nevertheless, though in theory, the restoration of the entire urban fabric is seen as worthy of protection and conservation, and many studies have been carried out in this direction, in practice the 'Westbank' did not reach this level, most probably because of its peculiar situation under military occupation.

Furthermore, conservation is being included within education programmes at the university level. This subject is winning considerable support and interest from the lecturers and students. As a result, several academic works were scheduled and others carried out on the subject of conservation. Adding to this, conservation is being introduced progressively into the architectural education programme for graduation and some opportunities are available for further research and studies in this field.

Recent years have been marked by a great will and commitment on the part of the municipalities, in many Westbank's cities, to consider the present situation of the historic and traditional areas, in order to remedy their accelerated deterioration through the establishment of new strategies of intervention. However, all this seems to be in theory as these municipalities lack the necessary funding for any form of intervention.

Several isolated programmes are being scheduled, involving education, training and
investments. This new philosophy is meant to be oriented more towards the reuse of the existing urban fabric through various actions.

Workshops and conferences are being set up to advise and encourage the professionals and the general public on how best to maintain the traditional buildings and the historic quarters. The first workshop was held by the Engineering Union in 1993. The author participated in that workshop by giving a lecture on the challenges to our traditional architecture. The last conference was in June 1994 and it was discussed earlier.

Experience in the past has shown that well devoted members of a society can achieve a great deal in supporting the preservation of their cultural heritage and the continuity of their tradition. For instance, the foundation of the "Association for the preservation of sites and old buildings", by concerned Lebanese citizens in 1959 is an eminent example in the Middle East that many could follow (RAGETTE, 1974). Not only do such associations play an immense role in educating the public to appreciate the architectural values of its environment, through publications, exhibitions and films, but also they can develop inventories of significant buildings - as did the Lebanese association. It is indeed a praiseworthy fact that the publication of the "Habitat in Lebanon" by the association provided much inspiration for further studies launched by the American University of Beirut (Cited in SAHHAR, 1984). Such inspirations have produced practical achievements in many other parts of the world, and in Britain abundant examples of public interest in conservation of historic places are widespread such as in Chester, York, Bath, Bristol, etc. It is, therefore, those examples of public interest that should form the model for our incentives and guidelines.

In the ‘Westbank’ and as with the case of the Intifada, the first stage in approaching the problem, perhaps, would be to consider all the possibilities of making use of the already available institutions in the ‘Westbank’. However, it is a known fact that the deep knowledge and understanding of the problems that conservators are to face is the direct way towards their solution. So, in view of the absence of awareness by the public as well as the official sector towards the importance of our cultural heritage, it has proved of great urgency to initiate its study and research. The Palestinian Universities which
are abundant in numbers, are the most suitable institutions for such research by making use of the student potential under the supervision of experienced members of staff. Documentation as well as the study of existing data can be achieved with relative success if efficient programming and systematic research is to be incorporated with the academic programs of the faculties concerned. Fortunately, this process has already started at some of these universities and it is hoped that it will develop and continue.

6.6 WHY DO WE NEED TO TAKE CARE OF OUR CULTURAL HERITAGE?

Although it is not easy to give a clear and simple answer to this question, we believe that the necessity for active and workable conservation measures with regard to the Palestinian cultural heritage of the ‘Westbank’ has a variety of reasons. The following paragraphs will discuss these reasons.

Conservation in the ‘Westbank’ means much more than cultural value. It means national and cultural survival. Therefore, the need for conserving the Palestinian cultural identity which hitherto has been neglected or taken for granted, is now beginning to be felt as a threatened value to be defended and asserted. This situation is heightened by the political climate, where the common Islamic Palestinian culture is being eroded and destroyed not only by the impersonal forces of economic and cultural domination, but also by the active forces of colonial military occupation. For instance, the Israeli authorities demolished three historic houses in the Old Town of Nablus in 1988. One of these buildings was part of one of the most significant buildings in the town, Qasr Touqan, Touqan Palace. As a result of using explosives, sixty one adjacent buildings were influenced, six of them were badly damaged. As a result their occupiers had to leave them.

Israel is trying to absorb the Palestinian culture and to claim it as a Jewish culture, or, at the best, the culture of the minorities within the Jewish state. One visit to Ha’aritz - The Country Museum - in Tel-Aviv, for example, is enough to establish this claim completely. There, all the Palestinian culture and folklore is exhibited as Jewish culture.
and tradition⁹ (Fig. 6.4). Another example that highlighted this claim is that the Israeli Airline Company "El Al", has designed a "first class dress" for its hostesses and it claimed that this design is derived from the Israeli culture. However, this dress turned out to be the Palestinian traditional dress which is still in common use in rural and urban areas of the 'Westbank' (AL-FAJER, 1980).

Fig. 6.4: Palestinian Heritage is being Displayed at Ha'aritz Museum in Tel-Aviv as Israeli Heritage.
Source: the Author

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⁹ This museum has been visited by the author in 1986, as part of his research about the Palestinian culture, where almost all objects Palestinian heritage and their traditional way of life are claimed as Jewish.
With this understanding, conservation in the 'Westbank' should be considered as top priority and urgent action taken to protect this culture from any further deterioration and destruction and thus protecting the Palestinian national identity which is well presented in their cultural heritage that stands as chapters of history written in stone and lime.

The historic quarters are unique because of their cultural value and the sense of place and the meaning they convey. "The old city exemplifies the human scale, individuality, care and craftsmanship, richness and diversity that are lacking in the modern, plastic, machine-made city with repetitive components and large-scale projects" (APPLEYARD, 1979: 19). The flavour of our historic cities and quarters is set largely by its social and economic past and by its architecture, which is a remnant of that past. These remnants are related to the landscape, to street patterns, palaces (qusor), open spaces, places and cemeteries. It is this combination of architecture and place that makes our historic cores unique. Still, these historic quarters play an important role in the life of our contemporary society. They have remained a focus of the traditional elements of our society. All possess rich reserves of architectural elements and townscape with distinct flavour and identity. It is the uniqueness of our historic cores which distinguishes them any where else place elsewhere, and make its restoration and preservation a target goal. By adapting a strategy for upgrading and conserving our historic quarters, their identity and personality will be maintained, while at the same time many Palestinian families, who are in urgent need of housing will find proper accommodation.

"I think that a city and especially a historic centre, contains the essence, or the "spirit", of a culture; it acts as a collective memory for the society; it is an expression of shared attitudes and common patterns of life, and as such it is a source of identity and inspiration. If the fabric is disrupted or destroyed, the sense of wholeness and consistency of life vanishes, together with the physical coherence of the environment" (BIANCA, 1984: 21).

In view of the absence of any governmental housing development, as a result of the occupation and the absence of any national authority, and since land is very scarce and its costs are disproportionately high, the housing shortage has become an acute problem. The majority of the Westbank's Palestinians live in housing density of over 3 persons per room (HABITAT, 1992). Housing development still depends on the private sector and individual investments to meet the housing need. If we add to this the severe
restrictions on the Palestinian development imposed by the IMG and its Civil Administration, this means a massive housing crisis.

For all this, we believe that the conservation of the existing housing stock is an appropriate, practical and effective way of addressing the housing shortage. From a conservation point of view this could be a virtue in that it controls vast developments that tend to swiftly erode the character of the ‘Westbank’. Moreover, the great demand for housing at present could be well exploited to achieve the goal of conservation. In view of such a demand, the available space potential in the redundant traditional old houses could be readily exploited if people were presented with this alternative, and rehabilitation could then become the dynamic moving force for conservation. It could contribute not only to the survival of our cultural heritage for cultural, political and ideological reasons, but also for practical ones as well. There is little doubt that the rehabilitation of a vast number of old houses in the ‘Westbank’, can partially solve the housing problem if their full economic potential is to be realised, and the historic cores, with all their huge investment in infrastructure, are to be regarded as assets, not liabilities.

Conservation projects can create jobs for hundreds of Palestinians. This comes in a time when the Palestinian National Authority is trying to find worthwhile projects that can create jobs for as many Palestinians as possible, and in a time when the IMG is controlling the destiny of thousands of daily Palestinian workers in Israel proper, either by sealing the occupied territories and, therefore closing the neck of the bottle and, not allowing the Palestinians to cross the Green line, or by not granting work permits to Palestinians it presumes suspect.

Any conservation programme that can be adopted should preserve both the container and the contained, by improving and promoting democratic participation in all decision-making. Moreover, if this programme is to work effectively, it should, as did the Intifada, depend on the mass of the Palestinians for its success, and use the Westbank’s resources as they are, without waiting for a magic solution to be imposed on them, either by higher policy makers or by donor countries who want to dictate the way in
which their donations are expended.

Finally, the sense of community development, as we have seen in Chapter Five, is very high among our people. Self-help has been the way of living for two thousand years. It is these concepts which need to be activated and promoted in order to see the Palestinian cultural heritage effectively maintained and protected, while at the same time avoiding the imposition of. Our *Intifada* is a good example to demonstrate this. It succeeded where the PLO with all its organizations failed, because it was well organised and it put things in the hands of the people. It depends on them and works for their own benefit. When we follow the same example and put things in the hands of the people, when we educate and train them and consider them our main target, then they will realize that conservation is for their own benefit and for their buildings' survival, and they will work for it. Only then conservation in the ‘Westbank’ will be effective.

### 6.7 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION

This chapter has aimed at studying the conservation movement in the context of the ‘Westbank’, through discussing its historic development, its concept, challenges and benefits.

I have argued that, while high attention has always been paid to the part played by Westbank’s Palestinians to the safeguarding of highly religious and symbolic "monuments", the record is significantly poor in the conservation, restoration, rehabilitation and re-use of entire historic quarters in our built environment. Moreover, citizen participation in historic preservation, which has been responsible for the success of historic conservation efforts in Europe and North America, is absent in the ‘Westbank’.

The peculiar situation of the ‘Westbank’ under military occupation, and the economic constraints imposed on its inhabitants by this colonial power, and the lack of resources are supposed to be the principal obstacles to more and better conservation in the ‘Westbank’. But the history of the conservation movement, in other parts of the world, shows that all decisions to conserve begin and end with cultural decisions not economic
ones. What counts, I would argue, is the strength of social and cultural motivation for the conservation of cultural heritage.

Therefore, our view of the many options in both policy terms and detailed measures concluded that the philosophy of the approach has to be ‘bottom-up’ rather than ‘top-down’. It has to be based upon the needs, aspirations and resources of the people, upon working with communities and institutions already in place and upon stimulated ‘self-help’ and voluntary work.

It might be argued, however, that the conservation of the Palestinian cultural heritage is the responsibility of the Palestinian National Authority and its institutions, mainly the municipal governments. But, we must ask ourselves whether conserving our cultural heritage is among its prominent declared aims, and suppose this to be the case whether the level of commitment it has toward the preservation of our cultural heritage is able to lead to more than piecemeal actions that benefit only highly symbolic monuments? This no doubt will be at the expense of the humbler, yet more widespread, more environmentally vital, historic cores. Whenever this is the case, however, it is not surprising that the popular response to conservation is limited, and it will be a terrible uphill struggle to mobilize people to safeguard their cultural heritage while they are not benefiting from it.

Municipal governments, always limited for funds and competent personnel, are unable to cope with more than a fraction of the appalling problems that face them, especially after twenty seven years of military occupation that has resulted in destroying the essential infrastructure of the ‘Westbank’, and where its upgrading becomes an urgent necessity.

With this understanding, we believe that any decision that little can be done to upgrade and preserve the existing housing stock in the ‘Westbank’, until the total economy grows substantially, would in effect, erode thousands of traditional historic buildings if not entire historic cores, which will not only affect the people who live their now, but the subsequent generations and might even delay the entire developmental programme.
Therefore, a solution must be found, one that is likely to result in substantial upgrading not for a few highly symbolic "monuments" or religious buildings, but for thousands of humbler, but environmentally and culturally vital, buildings and historic cores, not for the future but for the immediate present. Such solution/plan must be realistic in terms of the enormity of the problem, the density and rapid growth of the population, and the limited financial resources available.

Therefore, community development conservation projects should be initiated in the 'Westbank', primarily because we believe that something can and must be done to safeguard our cultural heritage. So enormous are the problems of the Westbank’s historic quarters, so limited the resources, and so urgent the time factor that some measures would have to be found to deal with the situation. With the rapidly changing circumstances and the urgent need to develop and upgrade every single sector of the Westbank’s infrastructure it will take a long time for the ‘infant’ Palestinian National Authority and the Municipal Governments to meet the physical and social needs of the historic cores. The cost of any comprehensive programme for conservation would require colossal sums of money, far more than the National Authority, which still exists on donations from developed countries, could ever raise. However, because of the magnitude of the task, large-scale upgrading projects of the existing housing stock are clearly beyond the capacity of the Palestinian National Authority at this time, and most probably for the next ten years to come.

With this understanding, we believe that any conservation project in the ‘Westbank’ should be designed to stimulate citizen participation and self-help activities in coping with the historic quarters conditions and preventing further deterioration in them, as well as in developing a sense of civic consciousness. It should be designed as a realistic and practical approach to the enormous problems presented by the Westbank’s historic quarters; to attempt to upgrade largely through the resources most readily available- the thousands of hands and the small financial resources of the inhabitants themselves.

The next chapter will attempt to test the applicability of the concepts of community development, citizen participation and self-help and practical measures, to the context
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...of the 'Westbank'. It will do so by taking the old town of Nablus as a case study and presenting the results of the analyzed data that has been gathered during the Field Survey.
CHAPTER SEVEN

The Survey of the Old Town of Nablus
CHAPTER SEVEN

THE SURVEY OF THE OLD TOWN OF NABLUS

7.0 INTRODUCTION
In Chapter Three, it was pointed out that there are both external and internal forces, which have contributed to the deteriorating historic areas and buildings. The external force which is the IMG occupation mostly beyond the control of the people, while the internal forces of the community have their negative effect on the built environment. The former has stronger influence on our people and built environment. In fact most of the internal forces are affected by it. Accordingly, it was decided to deal with it first. Chapter Four has examined the IMG polices and their impact on our people and built environment in order to support the first hypothesis of this dissertation. It has been argued that the IMG has used all the powers at the disposal of an army of occupation to ensure its hold of the ‘Westbank’. Not only has the conservation of historic areas and buildings been completely neglected under the IMG occupation, but Israel is deliberately destroying our Palestinian cultural heritage whenever it impinges on their priorities. This process can be termed as a ‘destruction’ process.

However, in response to this process, our people took up ‘defensive structure’ by concentrating on the key elements to maintain our cultural identity. This structuring process has been dealt with in Chapter Five. Our people have carried out conservation where and whenever possible. Chapter Six therefore, has examined our attempts to conserve under the IMG occupation as well as the challenges to the conservation movement; mostly internal forces. In that Chapter it has been concluded that any conservation project in the ‘Westbank’ should be designed to stimulate citizen participation and self-help activities in coping with the historic quarters conditions, and to develop a sense of civic consciousness. It should depend on the people and rely on them for its success.

In order to test this conclusion and to support the second hypothesis of this dissertation, a case study was taken; the Old Town of Nablus. The aim of the investigation was to
assess people’s willingness to contribute to the upgrading and conserving of their historic quarters on a voluntary basis. Because it was seen to be unrealistic to present the results of the investigations in a vacuum, it was found essential to study the socio-economic and physical living conditions of the people, which may have influenced their attitudes to the Municipality and to the concepts of community development and self-help activities.

The objectives of this chapter are aimed at getting the socio-economic data on the status of the residents of the Old Town of Nablus: their attitude towards the current approach in dealing with the area under investigation, their priorities, as well as their particular attitude towards the concepts of community development, citizen participation, self-help and their willingness to participate in any future upgrading of their town.

The main task here is to study the possibility of providing a workable emergency conservation framework that will meet the immediate needs of the present and prospective residents of the Old Town of Nablus, through the investigation of a sample, which could be generalized and applied to similar areas in the ‘Westbank’. This conservation framework strategy takes into account the parameters to restore the existing housing stock and protect it from further deterioration, and gives priority to the improvement of the residents’ living conditions. Thus any recommendations will emerge from the analysis and evaluation of the actual situation in the surveyed area.

This assessment will take into account various factors, such as social, cultural, economic and physical, and will give a clear picture of the situation and illustrate the magnitude of the conservation problem. All previous interventions have been mainly concerned with the physical aspects of the problem, little or no attention has been paid to the social characteristics of the situation.

Past conservation strategies have been and still remain largely ineffective as the experience of the last 20 years shows. There has been a general failure by all concerned to make any progress on the ground.
It is the aim of the present study, therefore, to devise an alternative, if necessary an informal, framework of measures to protect our remaining monuments and settlements, even under the constraints of the occupation. This framework, it must be clear, aims at the people of Nablus and depends on them for its success within the concepts of community development, participation and self-help framework.

In order to assess and develop this concept further, a 'case study' will be used to present the main issues. This study is the result of our fieldwork, and the results are presented below.

The field survey was conducted in the Old Town of Nablus between October 1993 and March 1994. We believe this has two advantages. First, the scope of the fieldwork research was limited and therefore more manageable. Second, there is a desperate need to prepare plans to save this area from total collapse (see Chapter Three).

The size of the sample was fixed with reference to the author's capacity to carry out the survey, whilst using it as a teaching technique in which students from the Department of Architecture at An-Najah National University in Nablus were involved. A sample size of 40 questionnaires per quarter from the main six quarters was considered to be appropriate. This came to a total of 240 households. However, to cover for possible non response an additional 20 households were added. Thus, the survey intended to administer a total of 260 questionnaires. The number of respondents in the whole sample reached 237 households (see Chapter Three).

The interviews were carried out mostly in the afternoons, to make sure that the households were available, during three successive months. An important amount of information was gained through photographic records and sketches of different types of physical traces left in the external environment.

The detailed investigation focused on the town's physical situation, people's living conditions, as well as their attitudes to the Municipality and the services it provided, and
finally their opinions about community development, self-help and participation, as well as their willingness to contribute to the upgrading of their town on a voluntary basis. Within each level, major elements were identified for examination by employing different research techniques, such as interviews, observations and the use of a questionnaire (see Chapter Three).

This chapter falls into seven sections. The First explores the surveyed area and its characteristics and gives a portrait of the Nabulsi people. The Second will discuss the physical conditions of the old town of Nablus. The Third will analyze the information collected about the households, their structure and size; the living conditions are discussed when the housing density and rates of occupancy are analyzed. The Fourth looks at the households’ occupations and income, as well as income distribution within the households and the ability of the household heads to save out of the total family income. Matters concerning the complicated forms of tenure and ownership along with the owners’ contribution to the improvements of the dwellings and the relationships between the tenants and the owners and between the tenants themselves, are tackled in the Fifth section. The Sixth section discusses the residents level of satisfaction with the current municipal services in the area under investigation. The Final, and most important section, is concerned with the response of the residents to the introduction of the concepts of community development and their willingness to invest and participate in any future conservation projects.

7.1 THE SURVEY SITE AND ITS CHARACTERISTICS.
The area chosen for the pilot study is the historic city of Nablus. It is a unique Arab city in central Palestine, in a pass between Mount Ebal (940 metres) to the north and Mount Gerizim (870 metres) to the south. It is situated some 500 metres above the sea level. Jerusalem is 67 kilometres south and the Mediterranean Sea is 42 kilometres west.

It has a clear urban character and a long tradition of serving as an urban centre. That is manifest in the Old Town, much of which is in a very poor physical condition and
it seems would be further abandoned if the existing residents could afford to move. The dilapidated housing stock, and gross overcrowding combined with poor social and infrastructural facilities, sadly characterise this area.

As our concern is to study the involvement of the community in their environment, it is necessary to work with a limited but representative sample to seek their opinions concerning their attitude to improving their conditions through helping themselves and using their own funds to do so. We also wanted to know whether they would participate with other residents to clean up and repair the public spaces.

"Nablus is one of the oldest towns in history. It was founded long before Jerusalem was built and even before Jacob's time". (CARPENTER, 1925: 175).

The name of the city was derived from the old Latin name "Neapolis," or New City, built in A.D 72 by the Roman Emperor Vespasian. It remained a Christian city until A.D 636 when it was captured by the Arabs for Islam. In 1099, the Crusaders took possession of the city. After the battle of Hattin in 1187, Nablus came under Muslim rule again, but this time under the Ayyubids. In 1242, it appears again to have fallen into the hands of the Crusaders, though two years later it was recaptured by the Mamluks. 273 years later, in 1517, the Ottomans took over the city from the Mamluks and their rule was to last exactly four hundred years. As a result of World War I the city, like the rest of Palestine, came under the British Mandate at the end of which, in 1948, the state of Israel was established. At that time Nablus and the rest of the 'Westbank' came under Jordanian rule. However, as a result of June 1967 War it was occupied by Israel and has remained so since then1.

"Nablus is the most beautiful, perhaps it might be said the only very beautiful, spot in central Palestine" (STANLEY, 1896: 233).

1 For more information about the history of the city see for example Nimir (1975) and Qamhieh (1992).
Nablus has a distinctive and rich indigenous architecture, "...be it the very humble architecture of a house, or the very sophisticated and ornate architecture of some mosques, ...the architecture is ...from many compelling local, indigenous factors: climate, structural limitations, sociology, building materials and local traditions" (SHIBER, 1967: 218). It has a dynamic reason explaining why it is in this location. It possesses a definite anatomy and has a clear-cut urban form; it has a distinct overall plan in relation to the regional landscape it occupies. It has definition and boundary due to the natural formation of the valley which provides it with distinct social, cultural and religious patterns (Fig. 7.1).

![Fig. 7.1: Sketch Map of the Situation of Nablus Source: Stanly (1896).](image)

At the beginning of the 20th century, most of the old town was situated on the southern slopes of Mount Gerizim, in the Nablus valley. It was shaped as a north-west to south-east rectangle, with a length of about 800 meters by about 500 meters wide. The layout is similar to other Eastern Mediterranean cities such as the old sections of Hebron, Jaffa, Acre, Damascus and Jerusalem (SHINAR, 1970), (Fig. 7.2).

The historic quarters of the Old Town consist of a most introverted and crowded construction. The city has no wall, but the walls of the houses round the boundary are built one next to the other, thus the houses themselves become a kind of city wall, with 9 gates, opening in various directions allowing entry to the city at either end of the rectangle (CONDER & KITCHENER, 1882).
Fig. 7.2: a. Panorama of Nablus from Mount Ebal, in 1926
   b. Panorama of Nablus from Mount Ebal, in 1940s
The Old Town streets are very narrow, and few are just winding alleys. The streetscape stemmed from the limited room to build in and thus the intensive use of land available to the town. The street pattern is characterised by a hierarchy that is expressed through the activities located along them and their physical dimensions. They are divided into three main groups; public use, semi-public streets, or private use. The first cross the town from the east to west, passing through the centre where the main commercial activities are. The private streets or *zeqaq* are cul-de-sacs serving a particular group of houses. The semi-public or semi-private streets, usually run across the line of the valley connecting the other streets that make for easy access to all parts. (Fig. 7.3). Parts of the streets are roofed by bridging houses (*qannater*), and the central area of the main bazaar, *Suq el-Qumash*, is roofed with cross vaults to ease activity throughout the year.

![Street Pattern Within the Old Town of Nablus](image)

*Fig. 7.3: Street Pattern Within the Old Town of Nablus*
*Source: Base Map, Nablus Municipality*

Stone dome roofs using 'cross vaults' are a very characteristic expression of the houses of Old Nablus. The shape and size of the domes vary - some are semi-spherical, and
some look more like a flat bubble. The use of flat and pitched roofs began only at the end of the 19th and the beginning of the 20th century (Fig. 7.4).

The main market-places, bazaars, are located along the two main streets which cross the town from the east to the west. Within the bazaars, a functional specialization exists; textiles in Khan al-Tujjar or Al-Khan el-Qadeem and food along en-Naser Street and along the semi-public streets that connect the two parallel bazaars. The historic quarters are undoubtedly still the most charming parts of the city in spite of this rather depressing lack of maintenance. One could imagine they could be made attractive to visitors as they have visual and sensory impacts on the pedestrian. In general, these quarters look like sculpture consisting of mosques, arcades, domes, and minarets, as well

Fig. 7.4: Stone Dome Roofs are a very Characteristic expression of the Houses of Old Nablus. Source: Courtesy of Mr. Rami Shakhsheer, Nablus 1992.

2 For more information about the city bazaars see for example Awad, 1989 and Yousof, 1989.
as the covered bazaars, shops and small workshops all interwoven with each other and the houses where people live.

Looking at the town from the air, one is impressed by its almost lace-like cellular form. For the traditional house is typified by its interior courtyard where, frequently, a fountain is placed and some trees, flowers and creepers planted. This provides the shelter and a central private meeting place for the family, very necessary with the high temperature for five months of the year (see Fig. 7.5).

Looking at the town at ground level, it is generally not flat, punctuated here and there by the needles of the minarets and the hemispheres of the domes of the mosques. From the courtyard, one can see the blue sky - the blue that contrasts with what is often a drab brown environment. Internally, the town is busy: artisans at work; shoppers and visitors frantically occupied in merchandising; and 'lazy' people relaxing in the coffee house (kahwa).

The Minaret Square - Sahat el-Manarah, is still the focal point of the town. It is important because of its surroundings of religious, administrative and commercial buildings - 'Jami' en-Naser,' the Victory Mosque to the west; the Ottoman Government House, 'Dar el-Hukoma' or el-Saraya, to the south; the New Bazaar 'el-Khan el-Jadid' to the east and the main bazaar 'el-Khan el-Qadeem,' to the north as well as en-Naser commercial street - creating with the old areas a kind of city within a city, full of subtle variations and architectural surprises. Sahat el-Manarah with its Clock Tower remains the focal landmark in the city (Fig. 7.6).

As we have mentioned earlier in Chapter Three, the Old Town is divided into six main quarters or Harat (pl. Harah), each Hara containing several neighbourhoods - Ahwash (pl.Hawsh), each Hawsh having several families or one big family. Figure (7.7), shows the location of these quarters.
Fig. 7.6: The Minaret Square - Sahat el-Manarah - the main open space in Old Nablus.
Source: Photos are by the Author, Base Map Nablus Municipality.
Till the end of the 19th and the early 20th century the Old Town was the whole city, with all the public facilities; religious, administrative, educational, commercial, industrial, health and recreational institutions. However, when the exodus from the town started in 1918, little by little it began to lose its importance in favour of the new city.

Though the mosques still dominate the skyline, many of them have been converted from ancient churches or temples: Jami' el-Kabir and Jami' en-Naser for instance, were converted from ancient churches. Today, of the twelve mosques only two are new. Beside the mosques there are two Christian churches and five other shrines. Figure (7.8) shows the location of the different religious buildings. Today there are also five working public schools. Two of them are new, one of which, the Zafer el-Masri primary school, was constructed in the quarter of Haret Al-Qeisariyeh (Fig. 7.9).

The chief industry of Nablus was the manufacturing of soap which is renowned for its quality throughout the Middle East. This soap made from pure olive and favoured by Muslims, comes mostly from local groves and is processed with alkali in vats. In 1913,
for example, there were 29 soap factories (Masaben), in the city (AL-DABBAGH, 1970), employing an average of 5-6 workers each. Labour was hired on a contract basis by the ‘ra’is’ or supervisor who also controlled production (GRAHAM-BROWN, 1980). Figure (7.10) shows the location of these Masaben within the old town. Beside soap factories there were other smaller industrial activities in the town, but they were carried out in the ordinary shops. Today there are only 6 soap factories still in production. The buildings were purpose made and could be converted into other uses. They are full of character. There were eight public baths, hammamat, in the Old Town. One of them Hammam el-Jadidah was recently renovated in 1992 and is still in use.

![Map of the Old Town of Nablus](image)

1. Jami' Al-Kabir
2. Jami' En-Naser
3. Jami' Al-Tinah
4. Jami' Al-Bayk
5. Jami' Al-Hanbali
6. Jami' Al-Saton
7. Jami' Al-Khadir
8. Jami' Al-Khadrah
9. Jami' Al-Anbiya'
10. Jami' Al-Masakeen
11. Jami' Ajaj
12. Jami' Saadeddin
13. The Protestant Church
14. The Greek Orthodox Church

Fig. 7.8: Religious Buildings within the Old Town.
Source: Base Map, Nablus Municipality

The only important khan in the Old Town is Khan el-Naqeeb or Khan el-Tujjar at the centre of Suq el-Qumash the Cloth Market. This khan was fully described by Rogers (1865: 260). She wrote:

"...an extensive khan, well planned ...It is an uncovered square space, enclosed by a two storied range of buildings. The ground floor was well adapted for lodging camels and other beasts of burden, but the upper chambers are so dilapidated that they afford but little shelter...."

Nowadays, the khan is a sweet factory and store.
Fig. 7.9: Al-Qeisariyeh Primary School was Built on the Only Open Space in El-Qeisariyeh Quarter. Source: Photo by Mr Hisham Zu'bi for the Author, 1994.

Fig. 7.10: Soap Factories - Masaben - within the Old Town Source: Base Map, Nablus Municipality.
The only Wakalah in the town, however, is Wakalet el-Farrokheyyah, also called el-Wakalah el-Garbeyyah, in the western part of the town near the western gate. It was built by the Mamluk Prince Farrokh in 1620 (NIIMIR, 1975). This complex opens through a monumental portal, into an open court with two-story arches behind which are rooms; the lower level was occupied by shops and store rooms, and the upper by living rooms. Each room could be reached from open arcade galleries set around the rectangular courtyard. In 1927 most of its parts were destroyed as a result of an earthquake.

Like the rest of the ‘Westbank’, Nablus’ society consists of families who have their roots in the city, families of migrants from rural areas and refugees from greater Palestine after 1948.

Nablusi society, as you might expect is hierarchical, based upon certain important families and clans that have formed around them, and structured along lines of personal inter dependency and obligation. The city’s old distinction between town and countryside, gives rise to quite different lifestyles and values, which have by no means entirely disappeared. The more or less complete dependence of the individual on his family and his integration into it, suggests that Nablusi culture was and still is rightly termed ‘a kinship culture,’ with power and authority distributed according to age and sex (ATA, 1984). As a consequence, elderly males had the highest form of authority and status and asked for and exercised the most dependency and repression. On the other hand, the traditional extended family did provide its members with economic and social security amongst many other advantages. Additionally, the hamayel system, or the combination of families, headed by a representative of the most powerful and elitist family, existed throughout the Nablusi society.

Today Nablus society is comprised three main communities, classified according to their faith. The Muslim community, which constitutes the majority of the population; the Christian community is the second in terms of numbers, and finally the Samaritans
which is, "...the oldest and smallest sect in the world" (MILLS, 1864: vii) and unique to Nablus and Holon.

"I was surprised to find that there were any Samaritans living. I had supposed that they had been swallowed up by the people of other faiths. I find, however, that there are about two hundred in Nablus, and that they practise the same religion as they did when Christ came."

(CARPENTER, 1925: 150).

Nevertheless, the Islamic culture has been the culture of the Nablusi people for the last fourteen hundred years, and Arabic the main language.

Through our history the Nablusi people are known as successful business men. The family name, however, is of great importance and could be the first step to success (Khatib, 1985). Trade itself, was dominated by a small number of traditional notable families, most of whom owned soap factories. The Tuqan family along with Abdul-Hadi and Al-Nimri families owned and rented out most of the shops in the bazaars of Nablus. Increasingly, they also rented out the houses above the shops as more and more of them moved out to newly built homes on the slopes of Mount Ebal (GRAHAM-BROWN, 1982).

7.2 PHYSICAL CONDITIONS

The physical and ecological environment of the historic quarters of the Old Town are in a state of crisis and confusion resulting from decades of piecemeal and even rapacious exploitation, neglect and short sighted incremental planning and building as the result of a long history of foreign occupation over the last four hundred years. Due to the present political situation and its implications, the old town of Nablus as a piece of urban creation, is a sad 20th century example of missed architectural opportunities.

We will now turn to the physical and environmental conditions that have resulted due to this neglect.
7.2.1 Street Conditions

Most of the streets of today's old quarters of the Old Town were designed for pedestrians, with the quarters planned as self-contained communities in which most activities took place in and through pedestrian-scale narrow streets and alleys. With the arrival of the car, at the beginning of the 20th century, the street pattern was inevitably found to be inefficient and often totally unsuitable. Over the last sixty or so years Nablus has undergone drastic physical changes primarily to cater for the car, lorry and bus. Many streets were widened, whenever the conditions allowed. This was facilitated as a result of the 1927 earthquake when the Municipality took advantage of the opportunity and widened additional streets wherever old buildings had collapsed (Fig. 7.11). Flagstones were replaced by asphalt, which had a negative impact on the urban historic fabric of the city. There was little or no comprehensive plan to create harmony and to assure the appropriate use and preservation of its public open spaces. Consequently, the streets have become parking lots and neighbourhoods have lost their human scale and suffer from excessive pollution and noise (Fig. 7.12).

![Fig. 7.11: Streets were Widened after the 1927 Earthquake. Source: Courtesy Mr Salim Jadallah, Nablus 1989.](image-url)
Fig. 7.12: a. Flagstones were Replaced by Asphalt.
b. Streets have Become Parking Lots.
Source: The Author
As far as the maintenance of the streets is concerned, our survey revealed that they were generally neglected in the whole of the Old Town. Regular maintenance work is seldom carried out and absent altogether in some streets. Therefore, there are certain negative feelings among the residents, expressed by a lack of individual or collective concern for the deplorable conditions of these public spaces. Many residents claimed that this situation became much worse during the Intifada, especially when the town was under long curfews.

Since January 1994, over much of their length the street surface has been dug up from work on the installation of new drainage, water supplies and other underground services. Apart from being difficult to sweep, they are often filled with domestic waste or rain water, and cause great difficulties for pedestrian and vehicular movement (Fig. 7.13).

![Image of a street with people walking and a car parked on a dug-up street surface.](source)

**Fig. 7.13:** Street Surface has been dug up, causing difficulties for Pedestrian and Vehicular Movement. Source: Photo by Mr Hisham Zu'bi for the Author, Nablus 1994.

The local municipality does carry out routine maintenance and repairs, sweeping some of the streets and clearing rubbish from houses and markets. Some people claimed that,
"...even the most important streets received little maintenance...", others are left without paving and become difficult to walk along in winter, when it is raining.

Bringing water to each house has affected the street-scape. By laying the pipes on the ground and fixing then with concrete-boxes the historic appearance has been damaged (Fig. 7.14). In a similar way graffiti covers almost all the walls of the old town, along with television antennae and the introduction of telephones and electricity cables (Fig. 7.15). Clearly improvements in the Old Town must combine those necessary for both the public and private spaces. Area rehabilitation of this kind must be carried out if we want to generate a new public awareness and stimulate the residents to make improvements to the conditions in their dwellings. The residents co-operation and contribution will no doubt depend on the Local Authority initiatives to improve the deteriorating conditions of the streets and open spaces. The question is, can they introduce these initiatives and then maintain them on a regular basis and thus encourage the residents to take a more positive attitude towards improving their own conditions?

Fig. 7.14: Al-Agaba Stairway before and after laying Water pipes on it. 
Source: Courtesy Mr Zuhir Dube’e, Nablus 1992.
Fig. 7.15: a. Graffiti Covers Most of the Walls of Old Nablus
   b. Telephone and Electricity Cables Spoil the Street-scape and the facades of the Buildings
   c. Television Antennae and Water Tanks Spoil the Skyline of the Town

Source: The Author
7.2.2 Building Conditions.

The buildings of the old town of Nablus are in urgent need of repair and maintenance. Our observations reveal that the overall condition of the buildings has been deteriorating at a greater rate over the last ten years. The external appearance is not necessarily an accurate guide to their internal condition. In some cases a poor exterior combines with a well-maintained interior, in other cases this situation is reversed.

The buildings in the survey area vary in age and styles, from Byzantine, Mamluk, and Crusaders' structures though most are from the Ottoman period. The extension of property starts, usually, with the purchase of a flat roof space, on which new rooms are built. This new floor does not necessarily follow the plan of floors beneath, and seldom make any attempt to follow the style, quality or finishes of the surrounding building. This is how so called 'communal houses,' where each floor belongs to a different family, come into being. Despite this range of styles there is a formal unity in the town due to the stone structures of different ages, and construction quality.

The survey classified the buildings into different categories according to their state of repair (Fig. 7.16). We examined the different components such as roofs, walls, finishes as well as the main structure. The following categories are presented for the six quarters:

**Category A**: buildings in a good condition and state of repair. This category represents 18% of the total sample.

**Category B**: buildings with slight defects; lack of paint, small cracks etc. This category forms around 28% of the total sample.

**Category C**: buildings that are deteriorating and need more repair than would be provided in the course of regular maintenance. They have one or more defects of intermediate nature that must be corrected if the building is to continue to provide safe and adequate shelter. These buildings constitute around 38% of the total.

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*Interview with Mr Zuhir Dub'ee; the editor of Nablus Weekly Newspaper, and a member of Nablus conservation committee which was discharged by the Israeli authorities, in February 12 1994.*
Category D: dilapidated buildings, which do not provide safe and adequate shelter. They have one or more critical defects to their structure, or have a combination of intermediate defects in sufficient number that require extensive repair or rebuilding. They include those with serious cracks in the walls, damaged roofs or that part of the building is in ruins. This category represents 12% of the total sample.

Category E: buildings that are in ruins and beyond repair and must be pulled down and rebuilt; represent around 4% of the total sample.

The problems that the buildings in the Old Town face are the accumulation of faults and negligence over decades. Their general survival despite time and neglect is perhaps a testament to the solid nature and stability of their construction.
Older generations saw the house as the family home and a necessary factor in holding the family together and a place to bring up successive generations.

Recent household heads know less of traditional building techniques, and even less about maintenance. Though they inherited the houses, they did not take the responsibility of keeping them in good condition, perhaps because family values were changing and new residential standards were being introduced particularly since the beginning of the British Mandate.

The residents we surveyed resorted to off-hand solutions and the use of new materials such as Portland cement, which made the situation even worse. This was very evident from looking at roof maintenance, where previously an annually applied layer of lime mortar on the domes and cross vaults would suffice to keep them waterproof, although these successive additional layers have tended to block the rain-water spouts. The addition of cement in recent years has not helped. The result, of course, was water penetrating through the roof and eventually into the rubble filled walls, causing dampness in the core and cracking of stone outer walls.

The original materials had a great capacity to absorb the effects of diurnal and seasonal movement; cement is much less flexible and the mortar more brittle.

The other cause of water and moisture penetration is the result of the failures in the wall structure caused by natural weathering. We observed that direct water penetration is obviously possible through decayed joints. But where such joints have a cement mortar, water can find its way along the capillaries formed by shrinkage. This, combined with the pressure of the wind on a wall wetted by rain, assisted by capillary attraction, and by internal warmth, can help to draw the moisture to the inside surface where it condenses. This encourages vegetation growth in the joints (quite a common phenomenon in most buildings in the Old Town), which in turn conducts water into the core of the wall. Where walls consist of two faces of masonry with a rubble core in between, years of water penetration washes out the earth and lime mortar from the cores,
The Survey of the Old Town of Nablus

thus weakening them. In addition, with the high water table, where such walls are in contact with ground or built against the slopes of Mount Gerizim they become very damp and cause vertical damp penetration. The action of acids in the ground water due to sewerage leaks and interaction with chemicals in the masonry, forms salts which removes the plaster to a height at which the ground water can reach.

Our investigations revealed that new building materials such as corrugated iron sheets and reinforced concrete pillars and walls, are frequently used for renovation, repair and construction (see Fig. 7.17). We have observed that concrete has been exclusively used in new extensions additions, enabling the creation of new ‘modern’ forms that are aesthetically unpleasing, and inefficient as insulation in our hot climate. The introduction of over-large windows in a blind imitation of western designs has the effect of creating greenhouses throughout most of the year and reduces the privacy so much needed in our culture. All this adds up to a chaotic situation, the control of which could make a major contribution to the preservation of the character of the area.

Fig. 7.17: Concrete and Concrete Blocks have become Main Building Materials in Old Nablus
Source: The Author
The introduction of sanitation facilities, while necessary, can also damage the street-scape, as this can be seen in most parts of the historic quarters, where plastic pipes are placed on the exterior (Fig. 7.18).

![Image of plastic pipes on exterior facades](image1.jpg)

Fig. 7.18: Plastic Pipes Placed on Exterior Facades Damage the Street-scape of Old Nablus.
Source: The Author

Very little effort is or has been made to design the buildings to fit into the architecture of the historic quarters. A good example of this is the elementary school built in the Al-Qeisariyeh Quarter, for apart from occupying what was once open space, it in no way integrates into its surroundings (Fig. 7.19).

![Image of school in Al-Qeisariyeh Quarter](image2.jpg)

Despite the town’s appalling situation no serious action has been taken to arrest and reverse it. Lack of finance is said to be a major stumbling block to the conservation process in the town. However, it would be an over-simplification of the issue if it were...
thought that release of limitless funds would solve the problem. It has long been accepted that simply increasing the availability of finance for conservation only leads to increase of its costs and therefore whatever gains are made are quickly lost. This is further compounded by the fact that any substantial conservation is beyond the capacity of the Municipality and the PNA which still live on donations.

Fig. 7.19: El-Qeisariyeh School does not Integrate into its Surroundings. Source: Photo by Mr Hisham Zu’bi for the Author, 1994.

Attention, therefore, should be paid to alternative solutions which do appear to be making inroads in tackling the conservation problems of other developing countries, notably the various aided-self-help approaches, especially upgrading. If more functional and socially desirable policies and programmes are to be achieved, then the role of all actors in the conservation process must be to stimulate, support and marshal available resources in order to enable people to make a continuous investment in their historical environment, perhaps on a participatory basis. With a shift in emphasis from the conventional approach and attitude we could achieve much by the encouragement and enhancement of alternative approaches.
The nature of the resulting approach will spring from those who live in the town and their attitude will shape it. It has the potential to release individual, family and community responsibility and initiatives. The programme of action would take as its reference the needs, aspirations, priorities, lifestyles and resources of the residents as the basic criteria against which options are measured. This approach has the further potential of not only satisfying the needs within the potential resources but also of improving the quality of the historic cores living through economic and health deprivation. By drawing the residents together in the conservation process through aided self-help under a community development programme, the social objectives can be linked and more readily achieved. In the light of this, the following sections will attempt to study the socio-economic conditions of the residents of the Old Town as well as their attitudes to the Municipality and participation.

7.3 THE SOCIAL AND LIVING CONDITIONS:

Introduction.

One of the characteristics of households in many developing countries is that many families do not consist simply parents and their children; they tend to be extended families. Low-income households often share a dwelling space in order to give support to each other. This must be taken into consideration when formulating and designing recommendations and proposals. This kind of social structure can influence family participation in the wider community. In many cultures it is very common that nuclear families live in close proximity to their extended family. This means that the sharing of a common compound by the extended family, even in the urban setting, is the custom.

More frequently, it is important for urban residents to form social relationships with their neighbours. Such relationships, which form the basis of the community, develop only slowly over time through mutual help and neighbourly contact. The neighbourhood is also important to the development of a personal life. It hardly needs saying that healthy and cohesive residential communities are essentially the basis for the social stability that is necessary for the well being of both cities and nations.
Communities with a strong sense of belonging, such as can be found in Nablus, are hopefully able to build on trust and mutual dependence to survive and protect themselves. In this way they contribute to the wider public order and personal safety of residents and visitors. Strong and cohesive communities are able to undertake co-operative projects that improve their living conditions and over-all well being. Communities are able to pool their efforts and improve the conditions of streets, build schools and community service centres, and to some extent, develop their infrastructure and basic services as well.

7.3.1 Family Size and Structure.
It is important here to distinguish between two types of families, when assessing their position and role in the community. Firstly, the nuclear family and secondly, the traditional or extended family. It can not be over emphasised how important it is to consider the family and community situation, before any intervention concerning the conservation of its town or neighbourhood.

<table>
<thead>
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<td>No. %</td>
<td>No. %</td>
<td>No. %</td>
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Table: 7.1: Family Types in the Old Town
Source: Survey conducted on the site, the author; February, 1994.
Our survey, contrary to common opinion, shows that there are different types of families in the Old Town of Nablus, from the single family to the large extended family but with a preponderance of nuclear families. Table (7.1) above summarizes the distribution of families according to the family relationships; any family related to another is considered as one large family or a family compound. This evaluation gives a total of 237 families of which 157 (66.2%), are nuclear families and 80 (33.8%), are extended families. The table below also summarizes this distribution of families in the six quarters that formed the Old Town of Nablus in our study.

The survey also revealed that these family relationships are mainly direct; in other words an extended family is mainly composed of households where the heads are brothers, or where parents and their children (adults) are still living together.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>FAMILY SIZE BY NO. OF PEOPLE PER FAMILY</th>
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<td>32</td>
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<tr>
<td>3</td>
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<td>237</td>
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</table>

Table: 7.2: Family Size by No. of People Per Family.
Source: Survey conducted on the site; the author; February, 1994.

The size of the families, or rather the number of persons per household, provides a key component in determining the demands for housing space and the physical size of the community. Almost everywhere the demand for houses, where it is represented by the
number of separated households, is relatively greater than where it is assessed according to the general changes in the population size.

In 1984 the average family size in the 'Westbank' was 6.6 persons/family, while in a city like Nablus it was 5.3 persons/family (KHAYYAT, 1985: 33; quoted in QAMHIEH, 92). In 1989, and within the city of Nablus, the average family size was about 5.75 persons/family, while it was higher within the Old Town; 6.46 persons/family. (ZA'NON, 1991).

More up to date information of family size is represented in Table (7.2) above. From the above figures it is clear that there is a substantial difference in the size of households. The average household size is 7.9 persons per household.

Households composed of between 3 and 11 persons represent the highest proportion, 183 households (which represent 77.2% of the total), and households ranging between 12 and 14 persons represent 32 (13.5% of the total) compared to the low percentage of (8%) of households with 1 to 2 persons and a percentage of (1.3%) of households with 15 persons and more.

As a consequence of the changes in the family size, many of the traditional big houses, once used to accommodate one large extended family, have been divided into smaller housing units by local people. This came as a result of the urgent demand for basic housing and the economic constraints that people are facing within the Old Town of Nablus. As a result, the whole urban fabric of the town has been affected. These changes and their consequences will be discussed elsewhere in the study.

7.3.2 Household Characteristics.

As it was expected, out of the sample of 237 households, a very large proportion of household heads were males, representing 89.7% of the total. 10.3% were widows or divorced females. Table (7.3) below shows that in the six quarters under study, the male-headed families dominate, where female-headed families are often modified nuclear
families, in which the male is absent or has died. Table (7.4) below, gives the proportion of single-person households to the proportion of married-persons households. The information revealed from the case study, and presented in the table below, indicates that, out of the 237 households interviewed, a total of 197 (83.1%) are married-person households, while 25 (10.6%) are single-persons households. The rest of the sample 15 (6.3%), are widows.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Quarter</th>
<th>Sex</th>
<th>Male No.</th>
<th>Male %</th>
<th>Female No.</th>
<th>Female %</th>
<th>Total No.</th>
<th>Total %</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
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<td>88.6</td>
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<tr>
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<td>40</td>
<td>100</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>40</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>El-Haballeh</td>
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<td>77.5</td>
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<td>22.5</td>
<td>40</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>El-Qeisariyeh</td>
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<tr>
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<td>04.4</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>El-Hanableh</td>
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<td>90.0</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>10.0</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>214</td>
<td>89.7</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>10.3</td>
<td>237</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table: 7.3: Sex of Household Heads.
Source: Survey conducted on the site: the author; February 1993.

It surprising to see that the ‘divorced’ category is represented by zero (0.0%). This cannot be taken as an indicator that there are no divorced women in the Old Town. Yet, in an Islamic culture, like that in the case study, this is not strange, especially when local traditions also govern. For example, when a woman is divorced she moves to live with her extended family; if her parents are dead she moves to live in the house of her older brother, as it is a bad custom to leave a divorced woman to live on her own. In some cases, when a divorced woman chooses to live on her own, the larger family may practice a boycott against her, and in many cases she may be forced to move and live with them or she faces unexpected problems. The percentage of ‘widow’
led households may seem a bit high, but taking into account the number of people who have been killed by the Israelis during the Intifada the figure becomes understandable.

### MARITAL STATUS

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<tr>
<td>El-Qaryoun</td>
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<td>35 79.6</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>4 9.0</td>
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<tr>
<td>El-Yasmeneh</td>
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<td>36 90.0</td>
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<td><strong>197 83.1</strong></td>
<td><strong>-</strong></td>
<td><strong>15 6.30</strong></td>
<td><strong>237 100</strong></td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Table: 7.4; Marital Status.
Source: survey conducted on the site; the author; February 1994.

### AGE OF HOUSEHOLD HEADS.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Age-Period</th>
<th>El-Qar. No. %</th>
<th>El-Yas. No. %</th>
<th>El-Hab. No. %</th>
<th>El-Qes. No. %</th>
<th>El-Gha. No. %</th>
<th>El-Han. No. %</th>
<th>Total No. %</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>20-29</td>
<td>4 9.11</td>
<td>9 22.5</td>
<td>7 17.5</td>
<td>7 16.3</td>
<td>9 29.3</td>
<td>5 12.5</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30-39</td>
<td>6 13.7</td>
<td>7 17.5</td>
<td>8 20.0</td>
<td>5 11.6</td>
<td>7 23.3</td>
<td>6 15.0</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>40-49</td>
<td>18 40.9</td>
<td>6 15.0</td>
<td>9 22.0</td>
<td>8 18.6</td>
<td>3 10.0</td>
<td>7 17.5</td>
<td>51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50-59</td>
<td>9 20.4</td>
<td>9 22.5</td>
<td>6 15.0</td>
<td>16 37.7</td>
<td>5 20.0</td>
<td>15 37.5</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>60-69</td>
<td>7 15.9</td>
<td>8 20.0</td>
<td>8 20.0</td>
<td>5 11.6</td>
<td>5 20.0</td>
<td>4 10.0</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>70-up</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1 2.5</td>
<td>2 5.0</td>
<td>2 4.65</td>
<td>1 4.4</td>
<td>3 7.5</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td><strong>44 100</strong></td>
<td><strong>40 100</strong></td>
<td><strong>43 100</strong></td>
<td><strong>30 100</strong></td>
<td><strong>40 100</strong></td>
<td><strong>40 100</strong></td>
<td><strong>237 100</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table: 7.5: Age of Household Heads.
Source: Survey conducted on the site; the author; February, 1993.
Using information derived from the case study, Table 7.5 above shows the proportion of young householders to old. It shows that most of the household heads are persons of average age of 50-59 years. They make up 60 (25.3%) heads of the total of 237 interviewed. The most important information that Table 7.5 shows is that out of the sample surveyed, 80 (33.75%) heads are young, under the age of 39; important because those young household heads are more likely to play a major role in any future community development projects in the Old Town.

In the quarters studied, it has been usual that families interviewed came from different backgrounds. Many of them had to move to the area after they were forced to leave their homes by the Israeli forces in 1948, the year when Israel was founded.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>FAMILY ORIGIN.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Quarter</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>El-Qaryoun</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>El-Yasmeneh</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>El-Haballeh</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>El-Qeisariyeh</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>El-Ghareb</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>El-Hanableh</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 7.6: Family Origin.
Source: Survey conducted on the site; the author, February 1994.

Table 7.6 shows that those refugees represent 22.4% of the total population of the Old Town. On the other hand, migrants from the villages only comprise 5.9% of the total population. Households from the same city comprise 71.7% of the total population, indicating that the majority of the households are still living in the Old Town and have not moved out, which was not expected. An explanation for this could be that the rich
members of the large families moved out, while the low income members stayed in the Old Town, because they could not afford to move to other newer parts of Nablus city.

From our sample data, it appears that almost three quarters of the households in the Old Town, have resided there at least for the last twenty years; 167 (70.5%) out of 237 households, of which a total of 53 (22.4%) have lived there for more than fifty years. A total of 31 (13%) for 10 years, while the remaining 39 (16.5%) have lived in the Old Town for less than 10 years. Table 7.7 below shows the households' length of residence in each of the six quarters. The information revealed together with that revealed in the previous section, provides us with a clear and stable picture; that almost three quarters of the Old Town's inhabitants are originally from Nablus, though some of them do not own the property they live in.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Quarter</th>
<th>Period No.</th>
<th>1-9 No.</th>
<th>10-19 No.</th>
<th>20-29 No.</th>
<th>30-39 No.</th>
<th>40-49 No.</th>
<th>50-up No.</th>
<th>Total No.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>El-Qaryoun</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>44</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>El-Yasmeneh</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>40</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>El-Haballah</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>40</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>El-Qaisariyeh</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>43</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>El-Ghareb</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>30</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>El-Hanableh</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>40</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td><strong>39</strong></td>
<td><strong>31</strong></td>
<td><strong>55</strong></td>
<td><strong>28</strong></td>
<td><strong>31</strong></td>
<td><strong>53</strong></td>
<td><strong>237</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 7.7: Length of Residence
Source: Survey conducted on the site; the author, February 1994.
7.3.3. Age of Population.

Information concerning the age of the population is very useful when assessing their role in any future upgrading or development to their town. Using information derived from the case study, Table 7.8 below shows the proportion of different age-groups, both males and females residing in the study area. The data from this table shows that the male population is 57% and the female’s 43%, of the total population interviewed.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Period</th>
<th>0-5</th>
<th>6-15</th>
<th>16-25</th>
<th>26-35</th>
<th>36-45</th>
<th>46-55</th>
<th>55-65</th>
<th>66-up</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Quarter</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>F</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>F</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>F</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>F</td>
<td>M</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EL-Qar.</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>1010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>16</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>10</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>El-Yas.</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>164</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>84</td>
<td>86</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>12</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>El-Hab.</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>123</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>27</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>17</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>El-Qei.</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>163</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>10</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>27</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>El-Gha.</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>96</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>91</td>
<td>91</td>
<td>101</td>
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<td>102</td>
<td>95</td>
<td>93</td>
<td>91</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>El-Han.</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>132</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>175</td>
<td>175</td>
<td>199</td>
<td>193</td>
<td>219</td>
<td>189</td>
<td>193</td>
<td>199</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>171</td>
<td>145</td>
<td>247</td>
<td>156</td>
<td>189</td>
<td>107</td>
<td>864</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>62</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>216</td>
<td>189</td>
<td>294</td>
<td>191</td>
<td>236</td>
<td>145</td>
<td>650</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table: 7.8: Age of the Population
Source: Survey conducted on the site; the author, February 1994.

Furthermore, the average age of the surveyed population sample which was 1514 persons in total, was 27.8 years; 27.1 years for males, 864 persons and 28.8 years for females, 650 persons of the total sample interviewed. This indicates the large percentage of young people that live in the Old Town and who may be expected to play prominent roles in any future upgrading schemes.

Table 7.8 above also shows that, 71% of the male and 67% of the female inhabitants are within the working age of 16-65 year olds. Only about 2.3% males and 3.6% females persons were elderly persons i.e. over 65 years old, a very small but increasing
portion resulting in the improvement in medical care (KHATIB, 1985). At the other end of the age range, table 7.8 shows that 26.7% of males and 29.4% of females are persons under the age of 15 years old, and still need caring for by the parents.

It would be useful to compare the proportion of male population between 16-35 years (50.5%) with that of the females (40.5%) in the same age group. One explanation of the difference is that this age is likely to be the marriage age for females, who usually move to live in the husband’s house, which could be outside the Old Town. For both sexes it was found that people within this age group are 46.2% of the total population surveyed. This age group is naturally the most active and therefore the most likely to be enthusiastic about improving their situation and living conditions.

7.4 LIVING CONDITIONS.
7.4.1 Occupancy Level and Overcrowding.

In this study of existing residential settlements it is useful to understand about acceptable and unacceptable occupancy rates, and how this is likely to change over time. Cultural traditions, attitudes towards privacy and the relationships between men and women, young and old, all play a part in determining how rooms are shared among the family. It was observed during the course of the survey that feelings of overcrowding and residents’ tolerance of it vary from one household to another according to their particular family relationships. However, the survey revealed that the need for space and feelings of being overcrowded are expressed more by residents when the dwelling is occupied by households not related to each other. The explanation that emerged can be seen in the following statement by a woman from the El-Yasmeneh Quarter:

"When you live with an extended family, there is always a possibility of many wives coming from different backgrounds. This will cause many problems, for example, between the mother and the daughter-in-law, as each one of them wants to manage the house in their own way, but if the extended family comes from the same background, then we feel, whether we like it or not, that there is more space to share while safeguarding our private life and privacy."

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5 This statement was given by a woman in El-Yasmeneh Quarter in an interview in January 1994, and was reported by Mr. Haytham Riatrou; a fifth year student in the Department of Architecture at An-Najah National
The houses, or dwellings, in the Old Town of Nablus, were originally designed for extended families involving different generations and a number of dependent households, consequently, we found that the space within the house is shared totally, and there was little evidence of conflict over privacy and other socio-cultural factors. These big houses were left to the immigrants who came in the 1950s to replace the original families, most of whom moved to other often better off areas outside the Old Town. Those still in the hands of a single family, are half-deserted, ill-maintained, and often crumbling with subdivided and rented family rooms, or split into small apartments, gathering several independent units around a single courtyard, which is also divided up to provide privacy for each tenant family. In other cases additions were built on top of old buildings, increasing the number of occupants by many times. (See Fig. 7.20).

In assessing the rate of occupancy and overcrowding we faced major difficulties of surveying the inhabitants and the number of rooms they occupied. It appeared from the first test of the survey that some families exaggerated the numbers of their children because they thought that we were from some Palestinian institution who might provide them with financial support, depending on the size of their families. Furthermore, it appeared from the various visits we made to the Old Town that the need for space has meant that the original big rooms were divided into two or even more rooms. However, we persisted as we felt that this was probably the only available and up to date criteria in Palestine, due to the difficulties of working in the tense political situation here.

While the size of the houses in the Old Town have been reduced, the situation is reversed in the new areas of the city. In 1979, the average size of the Westbank’s houses was 113 sq.m., this increased up to 124.3 sq.m. in 1984. In the same year, the average area of Nablus’ houses outside the old Town, was about 130 sq.m. (Khayyat, 1985; quoted in Qamhieh, 1992: 132).

University for the academic year 1993/94; a member of the field study team.
Fig. 7.20: 

a- Additions on Top of Old Buildings.

b- Extensions of Kitchens and Bathrooms in the Courtyards of Traditional Buildings.

Source: the Author
Table 7.9 below reveals some interesting information concerning the size of the dwellings. The great majority of the houses were composed of 1 to 3 rooms (206 out of 231 dwellings surveyed), of which 84 (36.4%) consisted of 1 room and 87 (37.7%) dwellings had 2 rooms, the remaining 35 (15.2%) had 3 rooms. Dwellings with more than 3 rooms were in a minority with only 25 (10.8%) out of 231 dwellings, of which 16 (6.9%) had 4 rooms and 9 (3.9%) had 5 rooms or more.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No. of Rooms Quarter</th>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>4</th>
<th>5</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Total No of Rooms</th>
<th>Average per House</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>El-Qaryoun</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>2.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>El-Yasmeneh</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>2.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>El-Haballeh</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>1.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>El-Qeisariyeh</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>111</td>
<td>2.58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>El-Ghareb</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>2.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>El-Hanableh</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>1.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td>84</td>
<td>87</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>231</td>
<td>472</td>
<td>2.04</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table: 7.9; Number of Rooms Per House
Source: survey conducted in the site; the author, February 1994.

Furthermore, we found that there was a relationship between the length of residence in the dwelling and the number of rooms it had; the longer the household head had been living in a dwelling, the more rooms in the dwelling were found. This of course was due to the fact that those who had been living in the town for more than 50 years usually own their houses, which were built to accommodate large extended families and now is the accommodation of one single family.

Overcrowding within the Old Town of Nablus, as shown in our survey, revealed that the whole sample population of 2319 persons was accommodated in a total of 754 rooms.
including living and guest rooms, of which 472 were bedrooms at night. This gives a level of occupancy of 3 (3.08) persons per room during the day time, but during the night time the level of occupancy increases to almost 5 (4.91) persons per bedroom. Even this level may rise if we consider that one bedroom should be reserved for the parents. There were, however, many critical cases recorded with a very high occupancy rate. For example, in some houses in El-Hanableh Quarter there were cases of 12 persons living in two rooms and where one of the two rooms was used as a joint guest and bedroom at the same time. Cases where 12 persons were living in 3 rooms were recorded, other cases where 10 and 11 persons were living in 2 rooms were also recorded in our survey. If we agreed that the maximum acceptable number of people in one average sized room is 3, though a more suitable number would be 2, but in the Old Town of Nablus, 3 remains acceptable. Therefore, all houses in the case study with the level of occupancy over 3 are considered overcrowded. Table 7.9 shows the number of rooms per household, while Table 7.10 below shows the total number of persons in the six quarters and in the Old Town as a total; it also shows the total number of rooms in the same study area.

Concerning the level of overcrowding in that area, Mr. Arandy\textsuperscript{6} reported:

"One socio-cultural problem in the Old Town is the high number of persons living in the same household. This of course is accompanied by many financial problems and at the same time a decline in the level of education among the family members, who usually live in very small houses not large enough to accommodate them. The problem will be worse because of the low level of income for these families. Add to this that the majority do not exceed the Preparatory or Secondary level of education, especially women."\textsuperscript{7}

Drawing on the author’s own experience in the town it appears that the problem of overcrowding is to do mostly with the distribution of the population within the town.

\textsuperscript{6} Mr. Arandy is a fourth year student at the Department of Architecture - An Najah National University-in Nablus for the academic year 1993/94, and one of our field study team.

\textsuperscript{7} There are three levels of education in the West Bank; Elementary Level for 6 years, Preparatory Level for 3 years, and Secondary Level, for 3 years, total 12 years.
since we find small houses with a large number of people, while at the same time big houses with a small number of residents also exist.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Quarter</th>
<th>Population</th>
<th>Total No. of Bedrooms</th>
<th>Ave. Person Per Bedroom</th>
<th>Total No. of Rooms</th>
<th>Ave. Persons Per Room</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>El-Qaryoun</td>
<td>504</td>
<td>96</td>
<td>5.6</td>
<td>162</td>
<td>3.11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>El-Yasmeneh</td>
<td>410</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>5.39</td>
<td>109</td>
<td>3.76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>El-Haballeh</td>
<td>282</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>4.7</td>
<td>103</td>
<td>2.73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>El-Qeisariyeh</td>
<td>496</td>
<td>111</td>
<td>4.47</td>
<td>154</td>
<td>3.22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>El-Ghareb</td>
<td>231</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>3.16</td>
<td>116</td>
<td>1.99</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>El-Hanableh</td>
<td>396</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>6.39</td>
<td>110</td>
<td>3.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>2319</td>
<td>472</td>
<td>4.91</td>
<td>754</td>
<td>3.08</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table: 7.10; Level of Occupancy.  
Source: survey conducted in the site; the author, February 1994.

7.4.2. Sanitation and Services in the Dwellings.

Having analyzed the social situation in the area under study, the task now is to focus on the characteristics of the inhabitable space, including kitchens, bathrooms and services in the dwellings e.g. the water supply, sewage disposal, electricity supply as this will reveal another very important aspect of the housing conditions that will have to be tackled in any upgrading scheme. Families are moving out of the historic centre because of the lack of services. But on the other hand the high density could make it more economical to service families here than when become spread out.

Traditionally, cisterns (abar) were usually dug in the courtyard one year before the construction of the house. This had two advantages: first the stored rain water of the first year serves the needs of building; and secondly the water which in the first year is brackish is replaced in the second year (CANAAN; 1937: 244). The survey revealed that
the majority of the houses have wells, but today they are very little used. The introduction of the mains water supply in 1933 has meant that portable drinking water is supplied from the reservoir by Nablus Municipality to every house in the area. However it seems that over the years, water pipes have deteriorated due to the lack of maintenance and the limitations of the IMG and now it is estimated that almost 60% of the supply is lost through seepage. During our survey almost every household head complained about contaminated drinking water; many cases were reported by the local hospitals because of polluted drinking water, due to seepage from the old sewerage pipes. The lack of maintenance and repair of both mains water supply and sewerage system has led to almost everyone suffering from this unhygienic situation. In January 1994, the UNDP and Nablus Municipality started the first phases of Upgrading of the Nablus Old City Water Network project, which was scheduled to be completed by June 1995 (see Fig. 7.21). No doubt this project will help to restore part of the residents' confidence of their town. As one resident put it, "...now we will have less things to worry about,....it is a step in the right direction. We hope that something will be done about the other deteriorating conditions of our town". As well, the quality of water will be much better and above all the water loss will be minimised.

Fig. 7.21: Sign of the Contract for Upgrading the Water Network in Old Nablus.
Source: the Author

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8 Personal communication, a meeting with Mr. Maher El-Hanbalee, Nablus' Municipality Engineer, February, 1994.

9 Almost each member of our fieldwork reported about people's complaints regarding polluted water.
The existence of basic amenities in the dwelling will be discussed below. Traditionally, the cooking space was in the courtyard \( (el\-housh) \), the toilet was in the garden and the bathroom as a wash place hardly existed as men, women and children used the public-bath-houses, \textit{hammams}. But from the beginning of the nineteenth century this situation has been changing and today all the above mentioned facilities have become essential.

According to our survey, 'kitchens' were found in almost all houses surveyed. A total of 215 (90.8%) households had at least one cooking space, while only 11 (4.6%) households lacked any cooking facilities; instead cooking took place in the common space in front of their rooms. (see Table 7.11).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>NUMBER OF KITCHENS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Number</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Quarter</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>El-Qaryoun</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>El-Yasmeneh</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>El-Haballeh</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>El-Qeisariyeh</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>El-Ghareb</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>El-Hanableh</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table: 7.11; Number of Kitchens Per Dwelling
Source: Survey conducted on the site, the author: February 1994.

Despite these figures, we noticed that only very few families have spaces that could be identified as kitchens. The only exceptions were reconstructed dwellings, where a new kitchen was provided through internal alteration. Where houses are rented as a series of single family rooms, the cooking space is included inside the rooms or a shelter is added in the courtyard near the door to be used as a kitchen and/or a bathroom. Where
the rented room is on the upper story, then a room is added on the top of the dwelling to be used as a kitchen and/or a bathroom. (See Fig. 7.22).

![Image of courtyard with shelters](image)

**Fig. 7.22: Shelters are Added in the Courtyards to be Used as Kitchens and/or Bathrooms.**
*Source: The Author*

As was mentioned earlier the need for a private bathroom was not seen as important by the residents, because traditionally people used the public baths. Beside its obvious function, the public-bath-houses or *hammams* play an important part in the social life of the community. Like the mosques, the *hammams* are places to exchange gossip and for keeping contact with nearby neighbourhoods. In the Old Town of Nablus, there are 8 *hammams*, only one of which is still in service; the *Hammam E-Jeddedeh* has been reinstated and repaired very recently. (see Fig. 7.23).

Our survey revealed that 196 (82.7%) households were provided with a single bathroom, while 14 (5.9%) houses had two. On the other hand, Table 7.12 shows that only 27 (11.4%) houses had no bathroom facilities. But these figures should not be taken for granted, as we found from our observations, that the existing bathrooms (or what the
tenants thought to be bathrooms), cannot be considered as 'bathrooms' in the accepted sense.

Fig. 7.23: Location of Bath-Houses Hammams within the Old Town
Source: Base Map Nablus Municipality.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Quarter</th>
<th>No.</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>No.</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>No.</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>No.</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>El-Qaryoun</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>18.2</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>70.4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>11.4</td>
<td>44</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EL-Yasmeneh</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>7.5</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>87.5</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>5.0</td>
<td>40</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EL-Haballeh</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>92.5</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>7.5</td>
<td>40</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EL-Qeisariyeh</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>7.0</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>90.7</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2.3</td>
<td>43</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>El-Ghareb</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>20.0</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>80.0</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>30</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EL-Hanableh</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>23.1</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>75.0</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>7.5</td>
<td>40</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>11.4</td>
<td>196</td>
<td>82.7</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>5.9</td>
<td>237</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table: 7.12: Number of Bathroom Per Household.
Source: survey conducted on the site; the author, February, 1994.
Our study revealed that a total of 210 (88.6%) households had only a single toilet, while 23 (9.7%) had none at all, only 4 (1.7%) households had 4 toilets.

Electricity had been installed in all the surveyed houses. The network had been introduced to the town in 1950s, all cables had been fixed to the exterior walls and not in an under ground channel which had negatively affected the street-scape and the fabric of the town apart from the fact that it is very dangerous (Fig. 7.24).

![Electric Cables had been Fixed to the Exterior Walls of Old Nablus. Source: The Author](image)

7.5 ECONOMIC CHARACTERISTICS.

This section will report the occupational pattern of households, the regularity of employment and family income levels.

7.5.1. Income Levels

As we mentioned earlier in this chapter, enquiries about income levels are very difficult, as most of the respondents tend to avoid or give misleading information about their real income. We therefore, had to be very careful in the way we asked our questions, and...
often had to ask a sequence of questions concerned with expenditure in order to arrive at the family income level. Mr. Abdul Azis pointed out this problem when he reported:

"We always felt that certain household heads tended to underestimate their income level; they even used to discuss that among the family members before they come out with their figure"10.

Mr. Mashaqi pointed out another problem that faced the survey team, as he reported:

"A small group of family heads collaborated with our team, and completed the questionnaire because they thought that we were going to give them financial assistance. That is why they kept talking about the deterioration of their financial status"11.

Contrary to this some families would not want to talk about their financial situation.

"During our survey we noticed that there were many families who are facing financial problems and who are in real need of assistance, but they did not show that and they welcomed the idea of self-help and citizen participation"12.

We therefore found it more useful to work out these figures within ranges of income as shown in Table 7.13 below. The Table shows that as much as 27% of the household heads interviewed refused to answer the question related to their monthly income. The largest proportion 34.2% of household heads' monthly income ranged from £100 - 200. The range from £1 to 100 represented 6.3%; this level of income is very low especially when we take into account the average household size of (9.89) persons. Household heads in this income group were mainly unskilled workers, retired persons and divorced or widowed women, receiving very low pay for the jobs they were able to get. Household heads with an income range of £100-199 make up the majority, 34.2% of the total representative sample. Earning between £200-299 make up 16.5% of the same

10 Mr. Abdul Aziz, is a fifth year student in the Department of Architecture at An-Najah University for the academic year 1993/1994, and a member of our survey team.

11 Mr. Mashaqi is a fourth year student in the Department of Architecture at An_ Najah National University, for the year 1993/1994, and a member of our survey team.

12 Ibid
sample. The high income category of £300-399 are 10.3% of the sample, and are mainly self-employed and run their own businesses. Those with a monthly income level of £400 and more make up 6.2%, are generally skilled workers, administrative, and clerical staff.

From this information it was concluded that most of the Old Town’s population were in the low income group and as a result the poor physical condition of their properties was evidence of this.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>INCOME PERIOD</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Income (£)</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>No Ans.</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>El-Qaryoun</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>El-Yasmeneh</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>El-Haballeh</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>El-Qeisariyeh</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>El-Ghareb</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>El-Hanableh</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

source: survey conducted on the site; the author, February, 1994.

7.5.2 Income Contribution Within the Household.

Our survey confirmed the generally accepted notion that, as the number of persons per household increases, there was a corresponding increase in the level of family income. Though this will of course depend on their ages, especially those of the males. However, a reasonable proportion 41.7% of household members did contribute to the general family income, as illustrated in Table 7.14 below.
## Contribution From Other Members of the Family

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Quarter</th>
<th>Helped No.</th>
<th>Helped %</th>
<th>Not helped No.</th>
<th>Not helped %</th>
<th>Total No.</th>
<th>Total %</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>EL-Qaryoun</td>
<td>20 45.5</td>
<td></td>
<td>24 54.5</td>
<td></td>
<td>44</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EL-Yasmeneh</td>
<td>20 50.0</td>
<td></td>
<td>20 50.0</td>
<td></td>
<td>40</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EL-Haballeh</td>
<td>15 37.7</td>
<td></td>
<td>25 62.5</td>
<td></td>
<td>40</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EL-Qeisariyeh</td>
<td>17 39.5</td>
<td></td>
<td>26 60.5</td>
<td></td>
<td>43</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>El-Ghareb</td>
<td>9 30.0</td>
<td></td>
<td>21 70.0</td>
<td></td>
<td>30</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>El-Hanableh</td>
<td>18 45.0</td>
<td></td>
<td>22 55.0</td>
<td></td>
<td>40</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>99 41.7</td>
<td></td>
<td>138 58.3</td>
<td></td>
<td>237 100</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 7.14: Contribution From Other Members of the Family
Source: Survey conducted on the site; the author, February, 1994.

## Size of Contributed Income From Other Family Members and Other Sources

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Size (£)</th>
<th>Quarters</th>
<th>No reply No.</th>
<th>No. %</th>
<th>1-100 No.</th>
<th>1-100 %</th>
<th>101-200 No.</th>
<th>101-200 %</th>
<th>201-300 No.</th>
<th>201-300 %</th>
<th>301-Up No.</th>
<th>301-Up %</th>
<th>Total No.</th>
<th>Total %</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>EL-Qaryoun</td>
<td>2 10.0</td>
<td></td>
<td>14 70.0</td>
<td>14 70.0</td>
<td>3 15.0</td>
<td>3 15.0</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1 5.0</td>
<td>1 5.0</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>EL-Yasmeneh</td>
<td>1 5.0</td>
<td></td>
<td>13 65.0</td>
<td>13 65.0</td>
<td>3 15.0</td>
<td>3 15.0</td>
<td>2 10</td>
<td>2 10</td>
<td>1 5.0</td>
<td>1 5.0</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>EL-Haballeh</td>
<td>4 26.0</td>
<td></td>
<td>8 53.3</td>
<td>8 53.3</td>
<td>1 6.7</td>
<td>1 6.7</td>
<td>1 6.7</td>
<td>1 6.7</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>100</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>EL-Qeisariyeh</td>
<td>-</td>
<td></td>
<td>9 52.9</td>
<td>9 52.9</td>
<td>6 35.2</td>
<td>6 35.2</td>
<td>2 11.8</td>
<td>2 11.8</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>El-Ghareb</td>
<td>2 22.2</td>
<td></td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>4 44.4</td>
<td>4 44.4</td>
<td>2 22.2</td>
<td>2 22.2</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>El-Hanableh</td>
<td>4 22.2</td>
<td></td>
<td>10 55.6</td>
<td>10 55.6</td>
<td>4 2.2</td>
<td>4 2.2</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td></td>
<td>13 13.1</td>
<td></td>
<td>54 54.6</td>
<td>54 54.6</td>
<td>22 22.2</td>
<td>22 22.2</td>
<td>7 7.1</td>
<td>7 7.1</td>
<td>3 3.0</td>
<td>3 3.0</td>
<td>99</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 7.15: Size of Contributed Income From Other Family Members and Other Sources.
Source: survey conducted on the site; the author, February 1994.
Most of the household heads without any income or with very low wages were supported by their sons living in the same house, though we also learnt that more important were the incomes contributed from relatives living away, although few cases were recorded in our survey. (see Table 7.15 above).

7.5.3. Expenditure, Savings and Underemployment.

According to our survey, one half to two thirds of household income was spent on food alone, with barely any left for such other basic needs as clothing, transport and schooling. Only 31 (13%) household heads said that they could save from the family’s total monthly income. (see Table 7.16).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Quarters</th>
<th>Can Save</th>
<th>Can't Save</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>No.</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>No.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>El-Qaryoun</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>29.5</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>El-Yasmeneh</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>20.0</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>El-Haballeh</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>12.5</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>El-Qeisariyeh</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>7.0</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>El-Ghareb</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>El-Hanableh</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>5.0</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td><strong>31</strong></td>
<td><strong>13.1</strong></td>
<td><strong>206</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table: 7.16: Saving From Family’s Monthly Total Income.
Source: survey conducted on the site; the author, February, 1994

While job seekers in the industrialized nations are buffered by social security benefits, and most middle and upper income families have parental savings and other means of support during protracted periods of unemployment. In the ‘Westbank’ nothing of this is available; taxes are collected by the IMG but few if any benefits given in return. Family members were likely to accept any odd job, though they were not related to their
qualifications. This may help to explain why the rate of unemployment, as we have seen earlier in this Section, is not as high as might be expected. The major problem was underemployment and the fluctuating nature of incomes. Most individuals working in the informal sector were thought to be underemployed.

More than half the household heads in the Old Town did not have permanent jobs or a stable income and were under the threat of becoming unemployed. Also, their incomes depend on family members obtaining or having jobs in the Israeli sector; a source of work that can be halted at will by the IMG.

7.6 TENURE, OWNERSHIP AND RESPONSIBILITY.

The ownership of properties in the Old Town are divided into three main categories. First, those that belong to Da'eat El-awqaf (Islamic Archaeological Department), i.e. mosques, shops and mausoleums. Second those in the private sector; melk properties, that might belong to an individual or have been inherited by a group from the same family, which they could be rented out or owner occupied. The third category is represented by the waqf properties, left by religious people for the benefit of coming generations of the family or for charities; they can not be sold, although they can be rented.

---

13 BERGNE (1978), gave the following description to 'Awqaf' (arabic plural of the single noun Waqf): The system of Awqaf or religious endowments, dates from the very earliest years of Islam. Basically, Awqaf were of two sorts.

-Awqaf kheiriyah, whereby a person might leave money or a property, the income from which was to be used for the upkeep of a religious or charitable foundation like a mosque or a school.

-Awqaf Ahliyah, whereby a property was endowed, but the income arising from it continued to be enjoyed by specified beneficiaries and their descendants. Not only were awqaf ahliyah exempt from confiscation but they also provided greater flexibility than the Islamic system of inheritance. For these reasons a good deal of property was disposed of this way. Despite its advantages, the fact that the act of endowment was irrevocable gave the land tenure pattern a degree of inflexibility that was to militate strongly against development, as the property could not be sold. In practice therefore, waqf property tended to deteriorate.

Questions of ownership pose other problems even buildings regarded as 'national property' can be privately owned and can involve many members of a family. The protection and maintenance of these can be prevented through their lack of agreement, or for want of a single person taking responsibility for them.

As a result of the division of inherited properties, often a house will not form one unit; a substantial number of them belong to a group of owners who may own a part, usually purchased or inherited at some time in the past. The multiplication of owners and the subdivision of houses between several families, which are in some cases not related to each other, is evident by the tendency to neglect traditional practices of maintenance and evolutionary improvements. Added to this are financial difficulties due to the low-income of the inhabitants and shared responsibilities between owners, some of whom are absent. Finally, these days there is the near impossibility of continuing to practice traditional methods of maintenance; times have changed and the procedures and practices are no longer common (YOUSOF, 1989).

Concerning the survey site, it is important to mention that certain common factors can be found but they do not necessarily concern the totality of the properties. For instance, dilapidated houses are found side by side with those in a good state of repair or renovation. Shared houses are next to houses inhabited by a single family. Thus, it is impossible to indicate zones, sectors or blocks that are more derelict than others. We were therefore obliged to consider all zones of traditional housing as homogeneous and presenting the same basic problems. Only with the analysis of each building is it possible to evaluate the total state of a block or area of the Old Town.

7.6.1. Building Tenure.
The first evaluation concerns the proportion of rented to owner-occupied houses; Table 7.17 below, shows the proportion of rented was higher than owner-occupied houses. Where 108 (43.5%) households were owner-occupied, 134 (56.5%) were rented but only

\[\text{Ibid.}\]
in three of the six quarters. In the other three quarters it was the opposite. Our investigation also revealed that there were a significant proportion of half owned and half rented properties.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Quarter</th>
<th>Own the house</th>
<th>Rent the house</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>El-Qaryoun</td>
<td>22 50.0</td>
<td>22 50.0</td>
<td>44 100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>El-Yasmeneh</td>
<td>25 62.5</td>
<td>15 37.5</td>
<td>40 100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>El-Haballeh</td>
<td>13 32.5</td>
<td>27 67.5</td>
<td>40 100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>El-Qeisariyeh</td>
<td>22 51.2</td>
<td>21 48.8</td>
<td>43 100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>El-Ghareb</td>
<td>07 23.3</td>
<td>23 76.7</td>
<td>30 100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>El-Hanableh</td>
<td>14 35.0</td>
<td>26 65.0</td>
<td>40 100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>103 43.5</td>
<td>134 56.5</td>
<td>237 100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table: 7.17: Tenure and Ownership.
Source: survey conducted on the site; the author, February 1994.

Throughout the survey area there were no publicly-owned properties (both houses and public buildings), nearly all the properties were privately owned with the exception of 6 (2.6%), that were owned by the Awqaf.

A complicating factor was the number of owners of one particular property; this may have arisen because of inheritance mentioned above. The question of the number of owners is important because we found that the level of maintenance reflected the type of ownership of the property. A landlord who does not live in his property with his tenants will usually be interested only in maximising his profit from rent. Most landlords have a short term view and sadly can see no gain from maintaining and improving their
property. This disastrous view will have to be overcome if any progress is going to be made in the future.

For instance, when a property belongs to a group of people it is more liable to decay than one owned by a single individual; the survey clearly confirmed this. When the residents were questioned concerning the number of owners, the answer was, in most cases, "Kather", which means a group but with an indeterminate number of owners.

The survey revealed that the majority of rented houses were owned by more than two people at the least. However, Table 7.18 shows that 97.4% of the households are in private hands, while 2.6% are in Awqaf ownership. The Table also shows that owner-occupier properties number nearly half (45.9%) of the total and in most cases belonged to a group of related people. The rented properties all with absentee owners were just over half with 51.5%.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Quarters</th>
<th>Private No.</th>
<th>Private %</th>
<th>Awqaf No.</th>
<th>Awqaf %</th>
<th>Owned No.</th>
<th>Owned %</th>
<th>Total No.</th>
<th>Total %</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>El-Qaryoun</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>50.0</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>50.0</td>
<td>44</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>El-Yasmeneh</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>30.0</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>7.5</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>62.5</td>
<td>40</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>El-Haballeh</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>52.5</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>5.0</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>42.5</td>
<td>40</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>El-Keisariyeh</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>48.9</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>51.1</td>
<td>43</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>El-Ghareb</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>69.2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3.9</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>26.9</td>
<td>26</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>El-Hanableh</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>65.0</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>35.0</td>
<td>40</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td><strong>120</strong></td>
<td><strong>51.5</strong></td>
<td><strong>6</strong></td>
<td><strong>2.6</strong></td>
<td><strong>107</strong></td>
<td><strong>45.9</strong></td>
<td><strong>233</strong></td>
<td><strong>100</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table: 7.18: Types of Tenure
Source: survey conducted on the site; the author, February, 1994.
As we have said rented housing accounted for just over half of the total households interviewed, including houses rented by single families or a group of families or where houses were shared by the owner and his tenant families. The rent varies considerably from one property to another, based usually on the number of rooms, and the date when the family first paid rent. It ranged from less than £50 per annum to more than £500 for more rooms per family, with the average annual rent of £292.94. We found some tenants were not paying any rent or the rent was exceptionally low, for others there was no landlord to pay. This was usually because the group owners had died or because they were forced to emigrate as a result of the 1967 war. Table 7.19 shows an even spread through the range of rents charged. As we shall see in detail in the section concerned with the residents involvement with the improvement of their properties, there are no new arrangements concerning additional payment by tenants to provide the owner with a fund for use on maintenance and improvement.
7.7 MAINTENANCE AND IMPROVEMENT OF HOUSEHOLDS.

Following the social changes and the subdivision of houses into smaller units for renting, especially those with absentee owners, the housing stock has suffered a significant physical damage and general dereliction. The absence of the owner-occupiers has considerably diminished the sense of responsibility and community spirit that once existed, the latter has been made worse by the general lack of environmental care and dilapidation of the Old Town, due to tenants unwillingness to repair and maintain their houses. It is difficult to see how rents can be raised; the regulations for renting were amended in Jordan, but not in the ‘Westbank’, perhaps because of the very hard years of the Intifada\textsuperscript{16}. We found that the longer the dwelling had been rented to a particular household(s) head(s), the lower the rent was likely to be. However, years of deterioration have encouraged the occupants to believe they get progressively less than they pay for. On the other hand, dwellings were improved, to a certain degree, by having resident landlords.

Our survey shows that 78.2\% of those interviewed claimed that the owner (landlord) did not take any measures to restore or improve their rented houses, while only 4.5\% of the same sample believed that he did. Of the same sample 17.3\% of them refused to answer our question. Table 7.20 below summarizes these results.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>IMPROVEMENTS OF RENTED DWELLINGS BY THE OWNER</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Old Town</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\textbullet Table: 7.20: Improvements of the Rented Dwellings by the Owner
\textbullet Source: survey conducted on the site, the author; February, 1994.

\textsuperscript{16} The ‘Westbank’ is still using the Jordanian renting system, though the ‘Westbank’ is under the Israeli occupation.
Our survey also revealed that 53.2% of the household heads interviewed have asked the owner to improve the properties where they live. At the same time, as few as 20% of the of the same household heads have been asked to vacate their rented house by the owners, at least once.

Table 7.21 shows the number of household heads who debate problems related to their living conditions among themselves. It was found that 102 (43%) households heads claimed they debate and discuss their living conditions and the bad environmental situation in the Old Town with other household heads, while 117 (49.4%) had never debated these problems. The rest refused to answer. We expected that the main reason for the deterioration in the condition of rented properties would lie, not only in the uncooperative relationship between the tenants themselves, but also and more significantly between the tenants and the owners. The latter would not be willing to improve his property as he would gain nothing from it; the tenants on the other hand, would be unwilling to increase the rent simply because they could not afford to do so.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Quarters</th>
<th>Answer</th>
<th>Yes No.</th>
<th>Yes %</th>
<th>No No.</th>
<th>No %</th>
<th>No Answer No.</th>
<th>No Answer %</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>El-Qaryoun</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>45.5</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>50.0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>No</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>50.0</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>50.0</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>El-Yasmeneh</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>47.5</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>52.5</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>--</td>
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<td>21</td>
<td>52.5</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>El-Haballeh</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>17.5</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>62.5</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>20.0</td>
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<td>No</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>62.5</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>62.5</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>El-Qeisariyeh</td>
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<td>28</td>
<td>65.1</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>34.9</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>No</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>34.9</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>34.9</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>El-Ghareb</td>
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<td>16</td>
<td>53.5</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>30.0</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>16.7</td>
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<td>No</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>30.0</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>30.0</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>El-Hanableh</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>30.0</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>62.5</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>7.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>No</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>62.5</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>62.5</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>102</td>
<td>43.0</td>
<td>117</td>
<td>49.4</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>7.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>No</td>
<td>117</td>
<td>49.4</td>
<td>117</td>
<td>49.4</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>No Answer</td>
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<td>7.6</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>7.6</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table: 7.21: Debates Among the Tenants
Source: survey conducted on the site; the author, February 1994.
Much to our surprise therefore, our survey revealed that 50% of tenants interviewed claimed to maintain good relationships with their owners, and 36.8% of the same sample claimed to maintain very good relationships. In other words almost 87% of the surveyed tenants had at least a good relationship with the owners, while only 10% of them claimed to have bad or very bad relationships; an even spread throughout the quarters. As few as 3% of the sample refused to answer our question.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Quarters</th>
<th>V.Good No.</th>
<th>V.Good %</th>
<th>Good No.</th>
<th>Good %</th>
<th>Bad No.</th>
<th>Bad %</th>
<th>V.Bad No.</th>
<th>V.Bad %</th>
<th>No. Reply No.</th>
<th>No. Reply %</th>
<th>Total No.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>El-Qaryoun</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>59.1</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>31.8</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>9.1</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>El-Yasmeneh</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>26.7</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>40.0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>13.3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>6.7</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>13.3</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>El-Haballeh</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>37.0</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>55.6</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3.7</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3.7</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>El-Qeisariyeh</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>33.4</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>47.6</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>9.5</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>9.5</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>El-Ghareb</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>21.8</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>69.6</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4.3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4.3</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>El-Hanableh</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>38.5</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>50.0</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3.8</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>7.7</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| TOTAL         | 49         | 36.5     | 67       | 50.0   | 6       | 4.5   | 8         | 6.0     | 4            | 3.0       | 134       

Table: 7.22: Relationships Between the Tenants and the Owners.
Source: survey conducted on the site; the author, February 1994.

Our survey revealed that the majority of the tenants claimed to maintain good relationships with each other. Table 7.23 below shows that 88.3% of the tenants maintained at least good relationships with other tenants, 46.9% of them claiming to have very good relationships. As few as 6.3% had poor relationships, while 5.4% refused to answer our question.
### RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN TENANTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Answer</th>
<th>V.good (%)</th>
<th>Good (%)</th>
<th>Bad (%)</th>
<th>V.Bad (%)</th>
<th>No-And. (%)</th>
<th>Total (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Quarters</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>El-Qaryoun</td>
<td>59.1</td>
<td>36.4</td>
<td>4.5</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>El-Yasmeneh</td>
<td>50.0</td>
<td>42.9</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>7.1</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>El-Haballeh</td>
<td>35.0</td>
<td>42.5</td>
<td>10.0</td>
<td>7.5</td>
<td>5.0</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>El-Keisariyeh</td>
<td>55.8</td>
<td>37.2</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>2.3</td>
<td>4.7</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>El-Ghareeb</td>
<td>36.7</td>
<td>56.7</td>
<td>6.6</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>El-Hanableh</td>
<td>45.0</td>
<td>32.5</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>22.5</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td><strong>46.9</strong></td>
<td><strong>41.4</strong></td>
<td><strong>3.5</strong></td>
<td><strong>2.8</strong></td>
<td><strong>5.4</strong></td>
<td><strong>100</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table: 7.23: Relationships Between the Tenants.
Source: survey conducted on the site; the author, February, 1994.

#### 7.8 ATTITUDES TOWARDS THE MUNICIPALITY

An attempt was made in our survey to establish attitudes to the present approach by the Municipality in dealing with the lack of services in the Old Town, and their reason(s). It appears from the answers that there is a high degree of dissatisfaction with the services provided. Table 7.24 shows that 168 (70.9%) of householders said that they were not happy while 68 (29.1%) said they were satisfied. Though there was some variation between the quarters, with El-Yasmeneh and El-Haballeh showing the most dissatisfaction. Our study revealed that the great majority of the household heads interviewed believed that the Municipality was not doing enough work in the Old Town. Table 7.25 below shows that almost three quarters of the household heads interviewed are completely dissatisfied with what the municipality has done towards the cleaning, restoration or street maintenance of the area under study.
### DEGREE OF SATISFACTION WITH THE SERVICES IN THE OLD TOWN

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Quarters</th>
<th>Satisfied</th>
<th></th>
<th>Dissatisfied</th>
<th></th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>No.</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>No.</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>No.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>El-Qaryoun</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>36.6</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>61.4</td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>El-Yasmeneh</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>12.5</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>87.5</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>El-Haballeh</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>15.0</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>85.0</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>El-Qeisariyeh</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>39.5</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>60.5</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>El-Ghareb</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>36.7</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>63.3</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>El-Hanableh</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>52.5</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>67.5</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>29.1</td>
<td>168</td>
<td>70.9</td>
<td>237</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table: 7.24: Degree of Satisfaction With the Services in the Old Town.
Source: survey conducted on the site; the author, February, 1994.

### DEGREE OF SATISFACTION WITH THE MUNICIPALITY SERVICES IN THE OLD TOWN

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Answer Quarters</th>
<th>Cleaned the Area</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Yes No. %</td>
<td>No No. %</td>
<td>Yes No. %</td>
<td>No No. %</td>
<td>Yes No. %</td>
<td>No No. %</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>El-Qaryoun</td>
<td>13 29.5</td>
<td>31 70.5</td>
<td>13 29.5</td>
<td>31 70.5</td>
<td>19 43.2</td>
<td>25 56.8</td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>El-Yasmeneh</td>
<td>6 15.0</td>
<td>34 85.0</td>
<td>6 15.0</td>
<td>34 85.0</td>
<td>7 17.5</td>
<td>33 82.5</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>El-Haballeh</td>
<td>11 27.5</td>
<td>29 72.5</td>
<td>17 42.5</td>
<td>23 57.5</td>
<td>10 25.5</td>
<td>30 75.0</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>El-Qeisariyeh</td>
<td>25 58.1</td>
<td>18 41.9</td>
<td>10 23.2</td>
<td>33 76.8</td>
<td>13 30.2</td>
<td>30 69.7</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>El-Ghareb</td>
<td>13 43.3</td>
<td>17 56.7</td>
<td>10 33.3</td>
<td>20 66.6</td>
<td>10 33.3</td>
<td>20 66.6</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>El-Hanableh</td>
<td>17 42.5</td>
<td>23 57.5</td>
<td>11 27.5</td>
<td>29 72.5</td>
<td>10 25.5</td>
<td>30 75.0</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>85 35.9</td>
<td>152 64.1</td>
<td>67 28.3</td>
<td>170 71.7</td>
<td>69 29.1</td>
<td>168 70.9</td>
<td>237</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table: 7.25: Degree of Satisfaction With the Municipality Services in the Old Town.
Source: Survey conducted on the site; the author, February, 199
Trying to find out the reasons behind this dissatisfaction, we investigated the possible offence(s) that the households might have committed. We noticed during the survey that the residents have constructed extensions, additions, subdivisions and modifications, and undertaken temporary repairs where ceilings were coming down etc. Most of these construction activities were without permission from the municipality and have resulted in an ever increasing number of people being accommodated. This has inevitably caused extreme overcrowding.

Our survey revealed that a small percentage of the residents had made completely new additions to their houses. Table 7.26 below shows that 43 (18.1%) of household heads claimed to have added parts to their houses recently, while the rest of the sample, 194 (81.9%), claimed that they had made no recent additions.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Quarters</th>
<th>Answer</th>
<th>Yes</th>
<th>No</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>No.</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>No.</td>
<td>%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EI-Qaryoun</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>34.1</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>65.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EI-Yasmeneh</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>20.0</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>80.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EI-Haballeh</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>7.5</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>92.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EI-Qeisariyeh</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>16.3</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>83.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EI-Ghareb</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>10.0</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>90.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EI-Hanableh</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>17.5</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>82.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>18.15</td>
<td>194</td>
<td>81.9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table: 7.26: Recent Additions in the Old Town.
Source: survey conducted on the site; the author, February, 1994.

Out of 43 household heads who added parts to their houses recently, only 18 (41.9%) consulted architects or engineers before they started, while the rest, 25 (58.1%), did not ask for advice. Furthermore, 15 out of the 18 household heads who had consulted an
architect or engineer claimed that they had completed the process and obtained a building licence from the Municipality for the work. When we asked them about the reasons for not taking professional advice or getting permission, one said:

"It was only a small kitchen and a bathroom, so where was the need for the engineering and architectural work or building permission? If we had the money, we could add a new room instead of hiring an architect or spending the money on worthless building permission. You see everybody is adding without obtaining a permission, why should I?"

Others said: "It was only a small addition, and it was within the boundaries of the house where permission was not needed". Others replied, "It was only a single room" and so forth.

In our believe this has been facilitated by the political situation and the hard years of the Intifada, as well as the absence of a municipal council; the appointed mayor was asked to resign by the Intifada leaders. Many residents took advantage of this chaos situation and started to build without permission, not only in the Old Town but in newly built areas as well.

7.9 ATTITUDES TOWARDS PARTICIPATION.

The general aim of this part is to assess people's views about their involvement and participation in any new scheme to make improvements to their living conditions within a community development framework.

7.9.1 Attitudes to Citizen Participation.

We had discussions with some professionals and officials during our survey in the Old Town of Nablus, concerning the idea of community development and the involvement of the users in the rehabilitation and upgrading of their proprieties through self-help measures. We explained how we thought it was necessary to take into account the feelings of those involved as an alternative to the current practice. Our argument was that the conventional approaches in dealing with the traditional housing stock in the Old Town of Nablus had failed to fulfil the aspirations of most of the town's inhabitants.
An alternative to this present approach would be to extend the peoples' initiatives in dealing with the problems and the decaying social and structural conditions, but this time with the assistance of professionals and technicians, as that this has proved to be a valuable alternative in other countries. What is needed, as TURNER (1985) argued, is a system oriented towards people, towards the development of human resources, and towards the development of service procedures that can be controlled by the people.

We tried to explain to the professionals that self-help groups arise to fulfil services not being currently met in society by other systems. People sought out self-help groups because they perceived the world they lived in as not containing appropriate resources to meet their particular needs and conditions. But the idea of involving the public in the conservation work appears not to be an acceptable alternative to the majority of the professionals that we met, as they see the rehabilitation of the area as being strongly associated with 'professional' business.

The introduction of this concept to the residents of the Old Town was carried out in two stages; firstly with the community leaders, secondly with the families surveyed and the residents. The introduction of this concept to the local community was based on the failure of the conventional approaches. In general the local community, as we showed in our sample survey, was aware of this situation that greatly affects their lives and many expressed little hope that much could be done. All said every means should be tried to improve this unfortunate situation.

In the field of conservation, and particularly in the conservation of multi-ownership areas, general confidence is required. Some experiences were explained to the residents in order to stimulate their interest and to encourage them to see what a community can achieve if given the opportunity. It was explained to them, that through the concepts of community development and citizen participation, they would be able to say what kind of community they wanted and how it should develop; and they would be able to do so in a way that is positive and first-hand. They must know that they can influence the shape of their community so that the town in which they live, work, learn and relax may
The Survey of the Old Town of Nablus

reflect their best aspirations. It was also emphasised, that participation offers them the opportunity of serving the community and thereby becoming involved in its life, contributing to its well-being and enriching its relationships.

In matters concerning the decaying social and structural problems, participation goes much further by generating jobs, more educational opportunities and learning skills through participation and so forth. The necessity to work closely with professionals and technicians, especially at the beginning, was explained to them, as they would need advice and help from the latter for education, for learning skills and for rehabilitating and repairing their buildings.

7.9.2 Community Views and Attitudes.

The conventional approach to conservation by local authority involvement alone has not succeeded in being a major source for conserving the Old Town of Nablus. Furthermore, it has been realized that, in the absence of a national government, the municipalities have of necessity assumed more responsibilities and faced more problems as well. The added responsibilities have placed a heavy financial burden on them, particularly in the areas of public services and development projects. This of course will postpone dealing with the conservation problems and make them not of the first priority, as the authority prefers to spend its revenues in the new areas of the city. Therefore, any project in conservation in the 'Westbank'/ Palestine, should clearly be aimed at the people and depend on them for its success.

In a similar context, BIANCA (1978: 37) argues that the success of the conservation of the Medina will ultimately depend largely upon the involvement of everyone concerned:

"The task is enormous, when one considers the size of the medina; it will certainly not be finished overnight, nor will it be resolved by government action alone. Its success will ultimately depend largely upon the involvement of everyone concerned. The most important thing, then, is to encourage initiative, cooperation and a sense of responsibility among the owners and residents, and put them into a position where they assume the responsibility of improving their habitat themselves".
The people and their contribution is our target, we tried to assess their view and attitudes towards the concept of participation, and their willingness to offer their time to contribute to the improvements and upgrading of their neighbourhood. Within the sample of 237 households interviewed, the great majority showed a high concern for and interest in their built environment and very much welcomed the idea of their contributing to its upgrading. This group represents 200 (84.4%) of the total households interviewed and is composed mainly of people who have developed a sense of care for and belonging to the Old Town. Some 20 (8.4%) of the sample, although they welcomed the idea, remained doubtful with regard to the success of such an approach. As far as the remaining 17 (7.2%) households were concerned, interest in their area is very ambiguous and they were opposed to any form of community organization and local contribution in the rehabilitation of the town’s quarters. Although explanations were put forward to them, their insistence as to the impossibility of the success of such an approach was evident. Their main argument was, "How can a community with very limited resources, bring about changes where the municipality has failed?". In this regard Mr Mashaqi reported:

"As far as the concept of community development is concerned, it was found that the concept was acceptable to the great majority of the population interviewed. But we were able to write down the following notes:

One group of household heads enthusiastically liked the concept, and showed their willingness to participate in any work or provide the community with workers. A second group, said that the concept itself is very good, but still the preservation of the Old Town is not an easy job. A third group said that the concept is good, but they have no intention of participating with the neighbourhood residents in their work and that they had never participated in any voluntary work."17

Another view expressed was reported by Mr Magbol:

"A very small group of household heads interviewed show their willingness to participate in the upgrading of the housing stock, on the condition that they got paid for their work."18

17 Mr Mashaqi is a fourth year student in the Department of Architecture at An Najah National University-Nablus for the academic year 1993/94, and one of our field work team.

18 Mr Magbol is a third year student in the Department of Architecture at An Najah National University-Nablus for the academic year 1993/94, and one of our field work team.
However, Table 7.27 below summarizes the different views of the town’s residents towards the community approach to conservation.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ATTITUDE OF HOUSEHOLD HEADS TO COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT AND CITIZEN PARTICIPATION</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Attitude Quarters</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>El-Qaryoun</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>El-Yasmeneh</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>El-Haballeh</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>El-Qeisariyeh</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>El-Ghareb</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>El-Hanableh</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table: 7.27: Attitude of Household Heads to Community Development and Citizen Participation.
Source: survey conducted on the site; the author, February 1994.

Our survey also revealed that 205 (86.5%) household heads said that they would be interested in living in the Old Town and contribute to its improvement, as Table 7.28 below shows. It was perhaps not surprising to see that only 116 (50.2%) of household heads would still want to stay in there in preference to moving to other parts of the city. Their reasons for this can be seen in the following comments by some residents: "I am proud of the Old Town, and I will never leave it"...."The town, with its mosques and houses, is a complete chapter of Nablus' history"...."Our roots are here, our origins started from here, besides the social life is stronger here".... and "The Old Town is the soul of our lives".
On the other hand some comments from those who would prefer to move are: "Whatever improvements are done in the Old Town, it will continue to decay. Add to this it is very dirty and full of insects"...."I want to see the light, and outside it is cleaner".

| PEOPLE'S WILLINGNESS TO LIVE IN THE OLD TOWN AND CONTRIBUTE TO ITS IMPROVEMENT. |
|---------------------------------|--------|------|------|--------|
| Answer Quarters                | Yes    | No   | Total |
|                                |        |      |       |
|                                | No.    | %    | No.   | %      | No.   |
| El-Qaryoun                      | 39     | 88.6 | 5     | 11.4   | 44    |
| El-Yasmeneh                    | 38     | 95.0 | 2     | 5.0    | 40    |
| El-Haballeh                    | 29     | 72.5 | 11    | 27.5   | 40    |
| El-Geisariyeh                  | 38     | 88.4 | 5     | 11.6   | 34    |
| El-Ghareb                      | 25     | 83.3 | 5     | 16.7   | 30    |
| El-Hanableh                    | 36     | 90.0 | 4     | 10.0   | 40    |
| TOTAL                          | 205    | 86.5 | 32    | 13.5   | 237   |


Regarding the reasons that prevent people from leaving the Old Town, Mr. Haytham Ratrout reported:

"The reasons behind the people’s willingness to stay in the Old Town can be summarized in three main reasons; one, because it is their place of birth and the family roots, two, their houses are in strategic situation, inside the Old Town, near to the household head’s work, and three because they can not afford to live outside the Old Town due to their severe economic situation"19.

Mr. Ehab Dawoud, however, reported:

19 Mr Ratrout is a fifth year student in the Department of Architecture at An Najah National University for the academic year 1993/94 and one of our field work team.
"A very small group of the household heads interviewed, show their anger about the Old Town and said that they are waiting for the day to leave it and move to live in other wealthier parts of the city."

7.9.3. Attitudes to Voluntary Work

Our next task was to assess the scope for voluntary work by the residents. Table 7.29 below shows that almost three quarters of the household heads interviewed, 171 (72.2%) of the total of 237, had in the past participated in voluntary work in their neighbourhood or elsewhere, while the remaining 66 (27.8%), had not. Furthermore, our study revealed that out of the 66 household heads, who had not participate in any voluntary work, only 21.3% had been invited to participate and refused, while the remaining 78.7% had never been invited.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Quarters</th>
<th>Participated</th>
<th></th>
<th>Didn't Participate</th>
<th></th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>No.</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>No.</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>No.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>El-Qaryoun</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>75.0</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>25.0</td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>El-Yasmeneh</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>85.0</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>15.0</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>El-Haballeh</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>55.0</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>45.0</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>El-Keisariyeh</td>
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<td>93.0</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>7.0</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>El-Ghareb</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>66.7</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>33.3</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>El-Hanableh</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>55.0</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>45.0</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>171</td>
<td>72.2</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>27.8</td>
<td>237</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table: 7.29: Participation in Voluntary Work.
Source: survey conducted on the site; the author, February 1994.

20 Mr Dawoud is a fourth year student in the Department of Architecture at An Najah National University for the academic year 1993/94, and one of our field work team.
GERALDINE (1969: 23) confirms the important role voluntary groups can play in filling some of the gaps that a municipal government can not easily fill:

"They are one means by which the community itself can participate in discovering and meeting the needs of its members; also, since voluntary workers do not need to concern themselves with administrative distinctions they can ignore the boundaries between services, and concentrate on human needs".

Our survey revealed that 185 (78%) household heads said that they would participate in activities such as cleaning or conserving their respective neighbourhoods if they were asked to do so. However, 50 (21.1%) said they were not willing to participate in any voluntary work. 2 (0.9%) refused to answer our question. (See Table 7.30).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Quarter</th>
<th>Answer</th>
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<th>No</th>
<th>No Answer</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
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<td></td>
<td>No.</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>No.</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>No.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>El-Qaryoun</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>88.6</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>11.4</td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>El-Yasmeneh</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>95.0</td>
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<td>5.0</td>
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<tr>
<td>El-Haballeh</td>
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<td>47.5</td>
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<tr>
<td>El-Qeisariyeh</td>
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<td>83.7</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>16.3</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>El-Ghareb</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>83.3</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>16.7</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>El-Hanableh</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>70.0</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>27.5</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>185</td>
<td>78.0</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>21.1</td>
<td>237</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table: 7.30: People's Willingness to Participate in Voluntary Work.
Source: survey conducted on the site; the author, February, 1994.

Our study tried to assess the number of hours that would be contributed per week (see Table 7.31 below). It shows that a total of 73 (36%) household heads out of 203 who agreed to participate in voluntary work, could spare between 1 to 5 hours per week. A total of 62 (30.5%) of the same sample could contribute from 6 to 10 hours weekly, while the remaining 68 (44.5%) would work from 11 to 20 hours each week. We can
see here that there is a worthwhile commitment to contribute to the improvement of their town through voluntary work and that this, if sensitively organised could make a significant contribution.

### HOURS THAT HOUSEHOLDS CAN SPARE PER WEEK

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Quarters</th>
<th>Hours 1-5</th>
<th></th>
<th>Hours 6-10</th>
<th></th>
<th>Hours 11-15</th>
<th></th>
<th>Hours 16-20</th>
<th></th>
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</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>No.</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>No.</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>No.</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>No.</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>No.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>El-Qaryoun</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>25.6</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>33.3</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>30.8</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>10.3</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>El-Yasmeheh</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>32.4</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>16.2</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>21.6</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>29.8</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>El-Haballeh</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>85.0</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>15.0</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>El-Qeisariyehe</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>13.9</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>22.2</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>63.9</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>El-Ghareb</td>
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<td>15</td>
<td>65.2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4.4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>17.4</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>El-Hanableh</td>
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<td>32.1</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>50.0</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>10.7</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>7.2</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td>73</td>
<td>36.0</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>30.5</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>23.2</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>10.3</td>
<td>203</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table: 7.31: Hours that Households can Spare/ Per Week  
Source: survey conducted on the site; the author, February 1994.

Perhaps the most important thing that the Nablusi people can offer is their time; providing service to their own town and people to an extent which could never be achieved solely by the employment of paid staff. They are giving their time free from the feeling that their output of work must justify the salary they are paid. Their relationships with the residents would be more relaxed and informal than those of paid workers: they can devote a great deal of time to one particular project if this seems desirable. They are permanent residents of the town, and often would be able to provide greater continuity in relationships with other residents than paid workers, who have a scarcity value which encourages mobility.

In the same context, our survey also revealed that participation was not limited to one's neighbourhood or even the quarter. On the contrary, 184 (77.6%) household heads claimed that they intended to participate in other parts of the Old Town as well. This
indicates that those who have the intention of participating will agree to participate in upgrading and improving the Old Town as a whole, though there are those who are not happy to participate even in front of their houses. (See Table 7.32).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Quarter</th>
<th>Yes</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>No</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>El-Qaryoun</td>
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<td>81.8</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>18.2</td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>El-Yasmeneh</td>
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<td>90.0</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>10.0</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>El-Haballeh</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>57.5</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>42.5</td>
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<td>El-Qeisariyeh</td>
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<td>81.4</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>18.6</td>
<td>43</td>
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<tr>
<td>El-Ghareb</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>93.3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>6.7</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>El-Hanableh</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>65.0</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>35.0</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>184</td>
<td>77.6</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>22.4</td>
<td>237</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table: 7.32: People’s Willingness to Participate in other Parts of the city.
Source: survey conducted on the site; the author, February 1994.

Our study revealed very useful information regarding the number of people who have skills such as; stone building, plastering, painting, stone dressing, plumbing, carpentry.....etc., that could contribute to the conservation of the Old Town. Table 7.33 shows that 127 (53.6%) of the 237 household heads interviewed, or members of their families, have building skills and would be prepared to use them.

7.10 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION
The results of this Field Survey have produced evidence of the less obvious points that contribute to the deterioration and decline of the traditional residential quarters in the Old Town of Nablus, in addition to new information directing and guiding the process of safeguarding these areas. These notions about self-help, even though they were introduced to a limited number of households could, on the basis of our findings be developed and applied on a much wider scale. A more difficult exercise is how to
generate sufficient activity to enable the process of conservation, and how to manage community development programmes and public participation on a sustainable basis. There have to be rewards and penalties of sufficient momentum to carry through such a complex and long drawn out operation if it is to be successful.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Quarters</th>
<th>Yes</th>
<th>No</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>No.</td>
<td>%</td>
</tr>
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</tr>
<tr>
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<td>El-Yasmeneh</td>
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<td>62.5</td>
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<td>60.5</td>
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<tr>
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<td>39.5</td>
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<tr>
<td>El-Ghareb</td>
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<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>127</td>
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</tr>
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<td>46.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>237</td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table: 7.33: Residents’ Skills
Source: survey conducted on the site; the author, February 1994.

In the representative sample, we found a wide range of social situations and physical structures. Considering the population distribution, there was wide diversity, from vacant buildings to some that were clearly overcrowded. The buildings were differently occupied with some being rented, others owner-occupied. Furthermore, ownership itself was not straightforward, from buildings owned by a single person to some buildings with a very large number of owners. All these situations will only complicate the task and specific action will be needed in each case. These actions should perhaps consider the buildings individually and as a result establish some general principles that consider the area as a whole.
This analysis has shown that any action aiming for conservation through redevelopment of the traditional residential areas should start with some preliminary studies and investigations in order to prepare the site for such interventions. On this basis, the studies should take into account the whole range of problems causing severe deterioration, to which these areas are presently exposed. Such analysis, that considers the social, cultural, economic situation as well as the physical, will lead to the determination of the necessary steps and stages under which an intervention could develop, aiming at successful results by satisfying the residents' needs and at the same time conserving the character of the area. Once established on a small scale, this can be revised to be applied elsewhere according to different parameters and circumstances.

However, prior to formulating any final recommendations it is necessary to recapitulate the most important findings, concerned with the proposed concepts, that can help to draw up appropriate guidelines. All approaches to the rehabilitation and conservation of the housing stock should give emphasis to the socio-economic revitalization of the area and involve those affected in the process.

It has become evident that there must be participation of the residents in programmes aimed at improving the social and physical condition of existing housing. This is equally true, not only for squatter settlement and site and services projects, but also for the rehabilitation and repair of the old housing stock. Housing improvement and rehabilitation has been hampered by shortages of specialized skills. Training and learning skills have to be a part of the process. This should include programmes for transmitting skills to the people through community work, adult education programmes and similar activities.

Our analysis shows that there is a major economic problem for most household heads. There is unemployment and underemployment resulting in low, fluctuating incomes. The main thrust of the proposed conservation programme must therefore be inextricably linked to enhancing the household income of those who participate in the programme.
From our investigations participation appears to be accepted in principle, but awareness and further encouragement of the residents will have to start with a pilot scheme. Results, no matter how small, speak louder than promises and exhortations and should be initiated before committing resources to larger programmes.

The present tenure and ownership patterns demand to be rationalised, since our evidence shows that these play a significant role in the deterioration and decay of the existing housing stock in the Old Town of Nablus. This is a matter that could be taken up by the Local Authority, who in any case must be persuaded into a partnership role should these notions of participation be taken up.

Finally, our proposals concerning the future of the area surveyed, are set out in the following chapter. These recommendations will be introduced with those that tackle some other aspects related to the conservation movement in Palestine. In other words, any intervention on a small scale should be set within the general context of problems and situations to be found across the country.
CHAPTER EIGHT

Conservation Intifada
Positive Mass Action by the People
CHAPTER EIGHT

CONSERVATION INTIFADA
Positive Mass Action by the People

8.0 INTRODUCTION
The desire for political Independence and survival have overshadowed all other aspects of life in the 'Westbank', including sadly the care of our built heritage. Until recently, the combination of settler - colonization and military rule, have been behind the process of integrating Palestine with Israel proper. Eventually, this forced the Palestinian people to act as one and mobilise to counter this process which successfully culminated in the Intifada in 1987 and some kind of agreement to lift the occupation in 1995. The Intifada became a way of life for our people; the younger generation have transformed themselves, discovering new dimensions of cohesion and resourcefulness. This activity of using stones against guns has proved successful - the peace process was initiated in 1991. But more importantly for our case, we believe this initiative should be extended and adapted to win the peace. The State of Palestine has much to do but few resources to do it with; we must now, however, build on our achievements by rebuilding our settlements and thus our national heritage.

Every community should ask itself; what can we rebuild to show our pride and strength? The qualities of pride and strength that lay behind the sustained campaign of the Intifada can, by degrees be turned to reconstruction. We must show the world and the Israelis, not to mention ourselves, that we can cooperate purposefully and not only participate in confrontation. We therefore need, in this interim period, to plan a campaign of coordinated rebuilding; starting with the inherited symbols of our society; and our historic fabric and through that process reconstruct our peoples’ needs for housing, infrastructure and the supporting services necessary to provide the foundations for a prosperous and thriving society.

As a step towards achieving this, we must organise ourselves along the lines of a ‘conservation Intifada’, that mobilises the strengths of the Palestinian people to conserve and develop our built heritage. Each community and settlement must take the
future of their historic quarter and village into their own hands and work in cooperation for their own benefit. This would be a natural extension of the political Intifada and a realistic and workable approach for conserving and developing our Palestinian cultural heritage.

In previous chapters we have outlined the situation of the 'Westbank' under the IMG occupation and the Palestinian reaction to it. We have also pointed out our attempts to rebuild whenever possible. These attempts, no matter how small, have concentrated on the physical aspects, while little attention has been given to the associated socio-economic dimension. We have attempted to illustrate:

- That the occupying power has employed the environment as an effective medium for attacking our culture by creating their own, new enclaves,
- how Israel is controlling all aspects of our lives, including physical planning, development administration, land ownership and use, the legal system and legislation,
- the deliberate destruction of our settlements where and whenever they impinge on their priorities,
- the denial of opportunity to build up our institutions and our cultural survival,
- how self build among ordinary citizens has been largely limited to the refugee camps,
- that the cost of larger-scale urban development projects are beyond the capacity of the new PNA and local municipalities, and
- that the mass of people are not aware of the value of their built heritage.

Therefore, we believe that a kind of 'conservation Intifada' is a practical and affordable approach to achieving a rebuilding programme, this extension of our revolutionary political Intifada would be acceptable to residents, the PNA and the municipal authorities.

If this is a valid approach, and for the purpose of this study we believe it is, then how should we set about realising it? A start should be made with the limited resources available. A 'step by step,' carefully tailored and sensitive start, with one or two
demonstration buildings in those historic quarters that showed the most enthusiasm is the only tenable approach in our circumstances. Too much, too soon, as well as too many undelivered promises, will produce a counter productive reaction from the people, and be damaging to the very credibility of the new partnerships with the residents. On the other hand, a too gradualist approach would also be a mistake. Maybe the most difficult step is not the first but the second, third and fourth. We must plan targets to meet and then reschedule them in the light of experience.

The constructive involvement of the residents at all stages, is probably the best way of promoting and ensuring the highest degree of support and participation. By this means we could form the basis for a grass-roots’ movement through which the participatory process can be organised and programmes implemented.

The resulting approach will spring from those who live in the historic quarters and their attitude will shape it. The method must have the potential to generate and maintain individual, family and community responsibility and initiative. The programme of action would take as its reference the needs and resources of the residents as the basic criteria with which to judge various options. By drawing the residents together in the conservation process through supported self-help, under a coordinated community development programme, the social objectives can be linked with the physical ones.

The First Section of this chapter is a series of guidelines illustrating an approach to conservation. The Second Section discusses the key contributors to the process of enabling the local community to carry out the various tasks. And the Third Section will highlight the opportunities for further economic developments and conservation in the Old Town of Nablus.

8.1 GUIDELINES FOR REGENERATION

I- Promote Public Interest in Conservation

Educating the public to understand and appreciate the values of our cultural heritage is an important step in the conservation process. The present attempts to deal with the
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conservation of the historic housing stock lack an important element of sensitising and making the local residents aware of the options and objectives to be carried out in these areas. This lack of communication between the local authorities and the residents has created mistrust in all their dealings within their areas, but especially those that have to do with conservation. What is perhaps needed to start with is an information campaign aimed at the public, explaining the goals of a conservation project, the reasons for starting it, its advantages etc.

The education of the residents would be an on-going process. It is envisaged that the local authorities, the Area Officers, together with the Area Committees and other resident organizations with the help of the proposed Study Centre for Conservation and Reconstruction (SCCR) (Chapter Six), undertake in the early stages educational campaigns for a cleaner and healthier environment, through reminding the residents and the city authorities alike of their respective responsibilities and the benefits to all. To this end the conservation bodies and the leading agencies should:

i) Initiate hard hitting educational programmes in order to overcome the apathy and the carelessness of the local residents towards their environment;

ii) increase awareness among the general public through the most appropriate media and means;

iii) accompany education of the public about their cultural heritage by more general activities to provide appropriate motivating information;

iv) plan and provide training programmes for school teachers, environmental health workers, architects and other professionals, building technicians, craftsmen and contracting enterprises;

v) take necessary steps to include conservation measures in the general education programmes at all levels;

vi) take the opportunity of national events, especially the anniversary of the Intifada and Independence Day to publicise our Palestinian heritage;

vii) consult with the Awqaf Department so that Friday Mosques can be used to send out the message to the public to take much better care of their built heritage and their local environment.
II - Conservation through Development with the People and for the People

It is very common for conservation and development programmes to be formulated and all the decisions to be made without any popular participation or even mobilization. In other words, there is little or no contact between the decision-makers and the communities affected by the decisions. Therefore, such a situation inevitably leads to misunderstanding and a general lack of interest in or confidence by the public toward the work of the authorities, as well as toward any proposed plan for their area. There are many examples throughout the world of the failure of such programmes, that are imposed on a community that are neither involved in the process nor informed about the future of its environment and neighbourhood.

Here we suggest that the ideal approach is that which recognises the importance of the community and encourages it to have an active role in the decision-making and the implementation process. By this means it is intended that the residents will become more aware of their problems and their community’s needs and priorities. These resident groups and their local representatives can produce genuine arguments and proposals that could be justified and adapted to their specific situations.

"People themselves are the world’s greatest experts on their needs and priorities, even when their inherited culture and traditional skills are badly damaged or eroded. In any case, as insiders, they are in the best position to make the most economic use of basic resources: land and living spaces, time, skills, and energy" (TURNER, 1988; As Quoted in HERNANDEZ, 1990: 47).

In order to foster acceptance and encourage participation and commitment by the community over a long period of time, it is imperative that the conservation programme be reflective of the needs and means of the community at which it is targeted. The assessment of these needs and priorities is thus an important element for the successful establishment and implementation of a conservation programme (Chapter Two).

Thus the most essential step in the upgrading process must be the preparation of the community to take part in the rehabilitation process. A period of time must be allowed for developing community awareness and confidence before any decisions should be
made. When the community is aware of the problems and involved in formulating the solutions to them, only then can the evolution and progress of the programme be confirmed. To help achieve this it is necessary that:

i) Local authorities and various social and conservation bodies must take the necessary steps to restore confidence among residents, not only in the historic quarters but in newly build areas as well;

ii) the community must share with officials in deciding on matters affecting their lives;

iii) people must be persuaded to be more willing to participate in actual project implementation to upgrade their particular community;

iv) public involvement can have the effect of educating those not directly involved such as politicians, planners and administrators and conservationists to develop a better perception of the community’s actual needs and the prospective impact of projects;

v) the actual process of community participation can build self-confidence and community spirit and encourage residents to believe in their ability to improve their living conditions in cooperation with the local authorities.

III - Conservation for Contemporary Living Standards

Conservation can be a stimulant to improve standards of contemporary urban life. We must aim at converting to new uses the continuity provided by the historic quarters, so that they begin to represent contemporary urbanised entities. Conservation should not be seen as a theory, distinct from the public; nor as an exercise in nostalgia nor as a museum to a passed era; it should rather enrol itself in the community’s contemporary social aspirations and on which it should depend for its actions. There is no wish to put the clock back; neither is there a desire to imprison new life in old conventions. It is a situation where we must not live in, but learn from the past. The thread of tradition that has been snapped, in the upheavals of our recent past and under the peculiar situation of the Palestinian people, should be reestablished by conserving the existing historic stock; recording it, learning from it, and thus maintain the continuity of our tradition. In this way, we will be able to sustain our unity and build our identity.
One of our traditions is the pedestrianisation of our historic city centres. This will not only affect their appearance, but their residential and commercial functions and the social and business relations. Traffic-free zones in the historic quarters, at certain times, should be introduced to restore their unity and homogeneity, not to say their environmental viability.

i) For conservation to contribute to our economic future it should use old buildings for contemporary ways of living;

ii) Ways and means must be found for those using the city centre to have rights of access despite restrictions;

iii) Commercial premises need to be serviced by motor vehicles. This is an exercise that has had to be faced in historic centres all over the world and needs to be studied;

iv) Residential parking is another issue involving the motor vehicle though for the time being this is a less urgent problem.

The understanding principle in dealing with these problems is to face the residents with the issue and engage them with the potential solution.

IV. Conservation for the Sustainable Development in Historic Areas.

The concept of sustainable development has become a subject of growing international concern. The historic quarters of the ‘Westbank’ must be seen as a priceless asset, making their recycling not a sentimental exercise but a commercial necessity. The present rapid expansion coupled with the severe scarcity of land has put tremendous economic pressure for the reuse of the historic housing and commercial stock. Tourism can be a service that both supports conservation and contributes sustainable economic development.

It is a growing reality that the historic quarters, with all their huge investment in infrastructure are to be regarded as assets and not liabilities.

- They remain the centre of communication, mass media, many monuments and cultural institutions and the centre for tourist activity;
- With improvements land values can rise thus repaying owners and
entrepreneurs who contribute investments.

Adapting buildings to new uses is as old as civilization itself. It was the characteristic mode of energy conservation for preindustrial societies. Buildings that were not abandoned went through a never-ending process of alterations to serve new uses. Fitch suggests that their imaginative reuse "....is often the only economic way in which old buildings can be saved, by adapting them to requirements of new tenants" (FITCH, 1982: 47). The goal, however, is not to convert historic quarters into museums. It is acknowledged that the existing historic housing stock will have to be occupied by the present residents for the foreseeable future, and their adaptation will have to be made to allow for changing needs of the residents, while retaining the atmosphere, scale and street-scape of the original neighbourhoods. It is therefore recommended that wherever possible the historic structures be used for their original purpose, but when this ceases to be feasible, new uses must be found.

The conservation and development programme should accept the reuse of historic buildings as an attractive and characterful way to provide space for new users and uses:

i) Old buildings are often energy saving in operation;

ii) reuse of old buildings can help to revitalize deteriorated and degenerated areas;

iii) conservation of old buildings is often labour-intensive and can create new jobs;

iv) they maybe already supplied with some services;

v) with current inflation rates the reuse of buildings can be economical;

vi) reducing the number of empty buildings will increase safety, security and health in the historic quarters;

vii) reducing the demand for more land and will be good for property values;

viii) providing homes in city centres relatively quickly at reasonable costs;

ix) contribute to small scale business activity.
V.- Conservation Standards Should be Congruent With the Socio-economic Condition of the Historic Quarters.

Physical conservation and upgrading of the historic housing stock must not only reflect the actual needs of the residents but must also be adjusted to their resources and abilities. It seems inappropriate to apply conservational standards and building regulations which are beyond the affordability of the residents and are inappropriate for their present situation. Instead, flexible ‘performance standards’ which allow for progressive improvements also allow immediate work to take place.

Building standards and regulations are instruments of control but in our case they should be the means to permit and encourage investment. They can be useful guidelines if formulated and applied appropriately, but they can also be restrictive if they create obstacles to the conservation process. It is necessary, therefore, to revise the restrictive character of conservation standards, and make them more congruent with conditions of the generally low-income historic areas. Unless the setting of standards is related to our conservation objectives, aspirations and needs of the local community, they can create more problems than they solve. The result may be to restrict the residents from participating in the upgrading process. Controls should therefore be through:

i) Standards that encourage and contribute to an acceptable and affordable physical conservation;

ii) a set of standards which must be dynamic, flexible and allow for subsequent improvements;

iii) standards which should reflect the socio-economic patterns of the historic quarters, otherwise they will be of little relevance to such areas;

iv) realistic, continuous evaluation of their performance.

VI- Demonstrate and Discuss Past Experiences

Demonstration of success is an important component of the process of conservation by community action. If we wish the public to participate, past experiences should be discussed. Public reaction may not be immediate but the organisers of such publicity campaigns will begin to know what the public wants and the discussion can provide an
opportunity to explain the advantages of conservation in particular. Selective presentation of individual buildings can serve as demonstrable examples that can have a positive impact on public opinion, without whose support further progress will not be possible. Local conservation bodies should select their first pilot project as early as possible. The overall project should be divided into smaller short-term projects, requiring less funding and effort in order to make them easier to implement. Showing examples of rehabilitation is undoubtedly a key factor in getting the improvement programmes off the ground. There are ways to demonstrate to both the public and officials that preservation is more desirable and cheaper than clearance and redevelopment.

There is a need, especially at the beginning of the process, to reduce the gap between the residents and the conservation bodies and partnerships involved in the process. These bodies have to communicate actively and sensitively with the residents in order that these latter could understand the issues and options available to them. This can best be achieved by:

i) Locating the offices of conservation bodies in the historic areas, especially in the already rehabilitated buildings;

ii) making the rehabilitated buildings accessible to the public, especially at the early stages of the conservation process;

iii) public opinion not only being swayed by preaching, speeches and mere words, but by the people seeing the reality for themselves;

iv) the restored examples which will hopefully provide the necessary encouragement for more people to actively participate, thereby helping to set up a chain reaction.

VII - Effective Network between the Conservation Organisations and the People.

Today, most of the conservation bodies in the ‘Westbank’ are working as separate entities, with no coordination between them or between them and the public. Clearly an effective network should be established. The proposed Study Centre for Conservation and Reconstruction (SCCR) could play a role as coordinator between the different bodies
and the people. We strongly believe that if the conservation bodies continue to work separately, this could cause any new initiatives to be less effective and more wasteful of scarce resources. However, it will not be easy to bring people together over night. This will be a gradual process whereby we hope organisations will come together to learn from each other's experience. There is a need then to establish an efficient network of information and learning.

i) By establishing a growing network the different agencies can formulate common working practices through experience.

ii) The network can also begin to provide an evaluation service as projects are completed, and this captured experience can be fed back into local training schemes.

iii) The network can help to gather and use all local resources including skills, equipment, materials and management, thus reducing dependence on external support to a minimum.

iv) The network can take groups to see completed and in-progress projects. and

v) It can engage the interest and participation of the media.

8.2 POLITICAL OBJECTIVE TO CREATE PUBLIC/PRIVATE PARTNERSHIPS.

The conservation task is clearly beyond the capacity of any one Local Authority with their very limited resources and funds. In the beginning the conservation and rehabilitation of the housing stock has to be tackled with the resources most readily available; the thousands of Palestinian hands, and the small financial resources of the residents themselves, topped up by what can be made available by other public and private bodies. The Palestinian people who showed the world how they can stand and fight, must now show how they can work and fight. Work for themselves repairing their own pride, place and independence on a little-by-little basis. We must put what resources we have control over into our own recovery. We need not and should not wait for foreign assistance. In fact this is one of the principles we can learn from the Intifada. We must take up a self build attitude towards our future again. This is easy to say, but how can we realise these sensible aspirations?
Ideally there should be partnerships between the various ‘actors’ in the conservation and rehabilitation task (the local authorities, local businesses and professional practices, the educational institutions, the SCCR, NGOs and most importantly residents groups) on policies and programme formulation, as well as implementation and maintenance. A relationship of cooperation and partnership should be established by means of linking the availability of PNA funding groups, who have formed themselves into partnerships to achieve specified ends.

Such partnerships are greatly needed to strengthen our national identity in support of our political legitimacy. They will ensure, as did our Intifada, that everyone is involved in the development and reconstruction process, after peace. They will set the base line for similar cooperation in other fields like health and education. As well, when the time is correct, they will set the foundation for a multi party government that governs on a democratic basis and where people will have the final word to say.

8.2.1 The Role of Local Councils
Since the Israeli occupation of the ‘Westbank’ in 1967, municipal and local councils have been either dissolved, replaced by military councils, or forced to resign. All issues related to planning, land use, development and financial policies were placed under the jurisdiction of the Military Authority and its Civil Administration. For all these reasons the municipal governments and local councils operate under very difficult conditions. Their hands are tied by so many restrictions imposed on their actions and by the slowness that results from being forced to deal with the military bureaucracy. This means that the government of towns and cities of the ‘Westbank’ is well-nigh impossible to administer effectively, as the most straightforward civil operations become increasingly complicated (see Chapter One).

As a result, the municipalities and local councils are not equipped as adequately as they should be to collect, collate and analyze information needed for planning and development. The municipalities are usually so busy with routine and time consuming

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1 In Nablus for example, Israel dismissed the last elected Mayor Mr Basam Shaka'a and replaced him by an Israeli officer from March 1982 to December 1985, when a Palestinian Mayor Mr Zafer el-Masri was appointed.
paper work, with granting building licences, that no time is left for actual planning. Though most of these problems have been directly or indirectly caused by the occupation, they are expected to continue to hinder municipal service in the post-occupation era, particularly in the first decade of the new PNA. Accordingly, it becomes imperative to work out solutions that would facilitate municipal services under occupation and under the PNA. Till now all efforts to correct the situation and to start the reconstruction process have been thwarted by the occupation.

With the peace process in train, Municipal Councils are expected to take the major responsibilities and workload during the interim period. Although they have coped under the most difficult conditions since 1967, they lack managerial, professional and technical expertise to be able to deal with the tasks now expected of them, especially in the fields of development, planning and reconstruction. It is important, therefore, that an immediate assessment is made of the existing processes and practices of municipal management and the available professional, technical and managerial resources in all local councils. The academic institutions should assist in this process and in the restructuring of the future municipal councils, including the provision of research and training facilities. It is about time that the municipal councils realise that no arrangements in the process of reconstruction, development and conservation can be expected to endure without the cooperation of local communities and their leaders and of this our Intifada is the best possible demonstration.

8.2.2 The Role of the Private Sector
The private sector, which comprises businesses, small builders, larger contracting companies and subcontractors, corporate real-estate developers, and industrial enterprises, is expected to play a major role in the development, reconstruction and conservation processes. At the moment businesses are looked on as partial financial providers, but they will generally only invest where they stand to gain. But with reduced public funds for development and conservation, and with the severe economic situation, there is an important role for the private sector in the 'Westbank'. It should be encouraged to invest in certain projects, perhaps through paying in a levy to a revolving fund, in order to help get work started. Further, the private sector's
contribution to improving what is after all their own built environment, and conserving their built heritage could also be more substantial, through promoting the adaptation of old buildings for contemporary uses.

8.2.3 The Role of the Community

The most encouraging outcome of the Palestinian Intifada is the heroic role of the community organizations. Palestinian, international NGOs and CBOs have been providing essential services and support for the Palestinian Community virtually in every field (see Chapter One). Our people and their organizations know more about the needs and priorities for the development and reconstruction process than most experts and professionals. It is therefore essential that these organizations continue to play a main role in the development and reconstruction process and be given the financial and technical support needed to carry out their task. One other positive aspect of the role of the community in the conservation and reconstruction process, is the leading role taken by our Palestinian women, particularly during the years of the Intifada which should also be taken into consideration when conservation and development plans are drawn.

Palestinian NGOs and community-based organizations, as well as international NGOs and other donor organizations may play a significant role in the development and reconstruction process, both as facilitators in addressing community needs and as providers of some of these needs, particularly in the area of improving and upgrading the existing housing stock. However, it is essential that the activities of all NGOs be closely coordinated with the PNA, local authorities and local communities in order to avoid unproductive duplication of efforts and to ensure their activities are consistent with political and national objectives and priorities.

The fact that community organizations which were established during and as a result of the years of the occupation, have already empowered themselves to take care of their communities, is an asset we can draw on for support and reinforcement in the process of development, reconstruction and conservation. While it is easy to talk about plans and policies, it is more difficult to appreciate that this offers a unique challenge to
decision-makers and professionals.

I- Enabling the Community for Conservation

In order that a degree of meaningful participation and control over the historic quarters be realised on a residential basis, and communicated to decision makers by the inhabitants, an effective and integrated residential community organization and residential community representation should be established. This can be arranged along a number of lines:

- There is a need for a residential hierarchical structure (as experienced during the Intifada; see Chapter Five) ranging from the household level to the quarter level, up to the level of the town.
- There is the associated series of representative bodies whose function would be to communicate across the needs and priorities of the various levels of the residential hierarchy (see the structure of the Intifada; Chapter Five).
- There are the community development committees (see Popular Committees the Intifada section; Chapter Five).

We strongly believe that our people will work hard to improve their living conditions if they have access to the necessary resources. By working directly with them through Community-Based Organizations (CBOs) more can be achieved with less. To inform them, a ‘local community development team’ might be established. Its task would be to stimulate community organization by working with residents, local authorities, conservation bodies and professionals. The team should be aware and have the skills necessary to assemble local resources. The team’s main duties would be both to understand the residents needs and aspirations and to enable them to create an organization which will act as a lobby for their interests.

It is certain that the more people are concerned in decision taking, the more pressure is put on the authorities to respond to the residents demands. We suggest that the extent of the local authorities consideration of the need to listen and discuss frankly with the community and its representatives, will influence in turn, the pattern of community involvement in the decision making process. By this sort of means, a creative working
relationship can be developed for a frank exchange of views between local authorities and residents. In aid of these ideas we need to consider:

i) Proposals for legally based community conservation cooperatives through which the people would manage their own efforts and tackle any conservation tasks;

ii) the establishment of a conscious interventionist policy by informing, sensitizing and encouraging partnerships between the population and the local authorities;

iii) stimulating and convincing local communities to rally together to make decisions and develop initiatives for achieving their objectives;

iv) aims to carry out work with the minimum disturbance of the existing social activities in the historic quarters, and

v) engaging residents on a rotational basis in the different stages of the work, while teams of architects, technicians and facilitators are on site permanently.

II- Educating and Enabling the Public towards Self-Help Conservation Tasks

Mutual help amongst Palestinians is as old as our culture. The practice of self-help construction has always been an integral part of our tradition. However, despite the undermining of the socio-cultural basis by a long period of Military Occupation and colonisation (see Chapter Four), the traditional method of construction, ‘self-help,’ can be found in most ‘Westbank’ villages, cities and refugee camps. Building houses and other facilities such as mosques, for example, were a communal activity. When a man wished to build a house, all his family, relatives, friends and neighbours helped him to build it, and he was expected to help them in turn. This system works very well when people belong to the same area, and know each other. This helps to reduce the cost but can tend to draw out the completion time.

The promotion of a loose co-operative method implies the mobilization of the self-help potential and other resources within the community, not only for the purpose of building but also for more general mutual assistance, training and organization through the development of such services and facilities (see Chapter Two).
Whatever the final shape of this model, it would be one in which the professionals, local experts and technicians participate alongside local communities where the residents gradually become the dominant actors. This is not meant to imply absolute freedom of action, even though it is certain that some minimum controls will need to be established in order to guide both parties to work together. The aim here is to:

i) Make a shift in conservation policy, from one that was imposed on people to one that enjoins with the people;

ii) encourage learning through experience, regarding the tasks, responsibilities and duties of all parties.

III- Training for Conservation by Community Action

Participation and the involvement of the local community through aided self-help are innovative concepts that have to be experienced before being fully understood. Innovation combined with limited awareness, understanding and experience by most, if not all the actors, highlights the need for an integral training programme. The programme would involve the different actors concerned to play a role in promoting, boosting and disseminating examples of successful cooperation and compromise. "As far as programmes in participation are concerned, it is recommended that the trainers and the trainees should collaborate with each other in devising such programmes and taking decisions acceptable to both sides. There cannot and should not be any fixed blue prints for training people and promoting community participation" (HABITAT, 1982: 39).

Training should be a continuous process of learning lessons on the job, by all those who have tasks to perform in order to bring the project to a successful conclusion. To this end it is envisaged that the proposed Study Centre for Conservation and Reconstruction (SCCR) can play a primary role in formulating these learning/training principles into workable guidelines.

Aspects such as planning, finance, construction methods and management should be included as well as short courses aimed at how to learn-on-the-job. These courses could be set up with the help of personnel seconded from one of the Social Services and
higher education establishments such as the Department of Architecture at Nablus and the proposed SCCR who would be experienced in aided self-help. The same teaching staff could then be utilised on the site during the early stage of the project, before handing over to trained personnel. It is recommended that the teaching staff develop the short course curriculum needed for further personnel training. Here we can perhaps benefit from the Academic Link Scheme (ALS), discussed earlier, through the programme of cooperation with the Institute of Advanced Architectural Studies in the U.K.

From time to time one day conservation workshops can be held. The workshop format has been successful in some other experiences. They can introduce problems encountered and bring the parties together to discuss various solutions. It is very important, however, that the timing and venue of the workshops should encourage an informal atmosphere and participative style. A workshop format can help to break down the conventional approaches often found in professional and bureaucratic circles which tend to inhibit a more participative approach (PASTEUR, 1979). Role play and the experience of others in similar situations can be introduced with less likelihood of under mining the received wisdom promoted by those in authority. We firmly believe that the key for the upgrading and conservation of the historic quarters lies in good relationships between the residents and the conservation bodies.

8.2.4 The Role of the Professionals

It can be taken as an indictment of the authorities that overcrowding is a severe problem and housing supply is very scarce, while hundreds if not thousands of traditional buildings are deteriorating and collapsing. Many architects are disillusioned with the conventional way of thinking, that nothing can be done in the absence of a central government. The younger generation have to find out what they can contribute to this situation and how they can assist our objectives. They can directly tell people about what the possibilities are for rehabilitation. Once the people become aware of the various issues, they will start questioning. This in turn can have an increased impact on more professionals. When the people and professionals gather enough strength, their combined impact on the decision makers will be higher. From experience it seems
much more effective and long lasting than a small group of similar professionals trying to plead with the local authorities and decision makers to change their attitudes. "...architects should learn to listen to professionals from other fields and to the public. Many persons are sensitive to their environment although they cannot discuss projects in architectural jargon. The person who says, 'I know what I like' should not be discounted. Non architects are often astute observers, who are sensitive to the scale of the urban environment perhaps more so than architects, who tend to look only at the problem of the architectural statement and seldom at urban context" (SYMONDS, 1980: 209-210).

We believe that all types of professionals must act as 'catalysts' taking part in community affairs but not making decisions on their behalf. The widely accepted role of the architect engaged in community architecture is to help and enable the community to reach its objectives.

However, the difficulties in understanding the cultural values of a community remain. The gap between poor communities and professionals such as architects seems to be ever increasing. From this point it can be valuable to remind ourselves that: "The architect [and any other professional] must be aware of the real conditions of low-income, marginal settlements getting rid of the prejudices of his conventional background" (Quoted in MONTOYA, 1986: 61). The professionals who will be involved in making the people conscious of the various issues will learn, and have to unlearn, much during the process.

To participate positively, however, architects must primarily be open-minded and willing to learn from people. However, it would be a mistake to limit their participation. "The architect can not limit his participation to help and enable the community to learn by themselves, and to learn the people's codes and expertise to be able to understand them. The Architect can propose (but never impose) innovations consistent with their indigenous patterns, supported by his experience and skills. He can help to raise the level of consciousness of the community about different possible alternatives. In this way the dweller can expand the range of possibilities they might have to improve the
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built environment hence their living conditions" (author's emphasis, Quoted in MONTOYA, 1986: 63).

In the circumstances we found ourselves in, it is the duty of the architects, therefore, to make the people conscious of various conservation issues. The question remains, if the architects don't do it, then who will? They should not complain that they are not able to do anything because public awareness on conservation is absent. In summary, making people aware of conservation issues is an 'architectural' activity, in reality a revolutionary activity. Even if architects don't do it, the people will realise it later. They do not have to go to a school of architecture to understand the importance of preserving their built environment, but for the people to learn it themselves will take time and support.

8.2.5 The Role of Educational Institutions

Having realized the importance of adult learning in extending the awareness of the individuals about their culture, one can assume that the educational institutions could be held responsible for initiating such an understanding, as well as to carrying out studies on implementation of conservation work. The chaotic situation that prevails in the 'Westbank', where no official body has adequately shown interest in searching our built heritage and initiating its conservation, leaves to the universities of the region the 'Saviour' role for action. Better programming and planning, therefore, can make research, survey and study of our built heritage possible. Not only can this result in the academic accumulation of records and documentation, much needed, but could also be quite influential on public opinion. Such studies would not necessarily mean an additional financial burden on the universities limited budgets; such programmes can be incorporated within their academic programme. Further, it is the role of the educational institutions to research the built environment which it serves if they are not to become a mere transmitter of rigid information and alien knowledge, without actually promoting cultural understanding within their own institutional environment. Some suggestions towards this are:

i) Adequate planning and right use of student and staff potential in cooperation
with the SCCR and the local authorities, resulting in educational achievements as well as successful implementation of conservation;

ii) use of examples of restoration and rehabilitation from all over the world to motivate both public and private incentives for investment in conservation and to generate positive impact on public opinion;

iii) providing manpower for various activities to be organised by the action conservation teams by including some of these activities as part of their curriculum;

iv) using expert advice on various aspects of the conservation process;

v) the possible transfer of a part of the academic activity to the historic quarters using some historic buildings thereby conserving them;

vi) the possible provision of facilities for holding meetings with various municipal and national officials.

8.2.6 The Role of the Study Centre for Conservation and Reconstruction (SCCR).

One of the first steps to stop the deterioration in the historic areas and to upgrade and conserve them is to quickly develop the Study Centre for Conservation and Reconstruction SCCR in Biet Wazan village, near Nablus to carry out sharp studies, to control and supervise the work undertaken on a single building and on the whole area.

The proposed SCCR should be involved in the decision-making concerning the future of the historic quarters. It would have other duties in addition to its coordinatory function between the different task forces directly involved with the conservation process and other collaborating bodies.

i) To develop and update, conservation policies, in conjunction with the local communities and municipalities;

ii) To formulate flexible regulations and control procedures to protect and develop our built heritage;

iii) To carry out immediate detailed studies, to the problems and obstacles to conservation and rehabilitation of single buildings, as well as conservation areas;

iv) To undertake in conjunction with appropriate bodies conservation, restoration
and rehabilitation work;

v) To be a party to the management of funds allocated for conservation in conjunction with community representatives and local authorities;

vi) To advise on applications for building permits in the historic quarters;

vii) To catalogue and establish archives, surveys and records of the historic and neighbouring areas;

viii) To monitor and evaluate the changes being carried out;

ix) To prepare and publish information on conservation uses, methods and results;

x) To perform a mediating function where necessary;

xi) To provide organisational and technical help; and

xii) Devise and carry out learning/training activities;

xiii) To provide a forum for taking initiatives to start new projects.

8.3 THE OLD TOWN OF NABLUS; OPPORTUNITIES FOR DEVELOPMENT THROUGH CONSERVATION

Since the Israeli occupation of the ‘Westbank’ in 1967, its environment has been deliberately and dramatically undermined. The IMG has systematically distorted the development of the built environment which used to reflect the way of life of the Palestinian people and their culture all over the ‘Westbank’ by being subject to strict planning laws and regulations. These have hampered our ability to expand our towns, improve our buildings, extend the services network and infrastructure, protect our environment and conserve our built heritage. In fact Israel has employed the environment as an effective medium for attacking our culture by creating their own exclusive new enclaves in the territory (see Chapter Four).

Although municipal councils were retained, they were marginalized and their powers and authority severely restricted. All planning levels came under the control of the IMG or officers appointed by it, with virtually no local Palestinian representatives at any level. The local community has been deprived of any effective mechanism, through which it can represent its needs, aspirations and priorities. Accordingly, planning became very hard to conduct with efficacy and fairness, when viable political representation is not
available and when public participation and expression of opinion are forbidden. Further, all issues relating to planning, building permits, land use, development and financial policies were placed under the jurisdiction of the IMG and its Civil Administration. The authority of the municipal and local councils, which is now confined to their municipal boundaries, is limited to issuing building permits for small residential and commercial projects, and even this can be revoked at any time. (see Chapters One and Four).

The deterioration in the social and economic conditions of our Palestinian towns has been accompanied by environmental degeneration. The IMG has not shown any environmental responsibility. There are no regulations for the protection of the environment or the inhabitants or a programme to raise environmental awareness among our people.

While the historic settlements suffered from lack of funding and maintenance and the appalling impact of the military clashes and demolitions of valuable property, much of the historic fabric remains intact but in deterioration (see Chapters Four and Six). However, this situation is rapidly changing, as owners are encouraged to pull down or convert their property due to the shortage of land and the absence of conservation regulations and programmes. Today, the physical condition of our historic settlements is serious, but there is still an opportunity to save them and arrest this decay state of affairs. With the current peace process, there is an urgent need to address these issues and put forward an environmental agenda and a conservation programme, as part of the overall development plans for our Palestinian towns.

The Declaration of Principles, which was signed in Washington between Israel and the PLO in September 93, will result in a phased withdrawal of the IMG and the gradual transfer of 'limited' power and authority to an elected Palestinian Council, which was supposed to have been elected in June 1994.

There are still some opportunities that planners and decision-makers should not miss. The fact that power and authority will be transferred gradually to the elected Palestinian
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Council will offer us a unique opportunity to train, restructure and empower the local authorities, even before a central government is in place. We must try to build on this unfortunate and deliberate situation, and treat it with great care and sensitivity and not just as a mere technical exercise or another business venture. We have missed many opportunities in the past; we should work hard to ensure that this is not another one missed.

Under the peace process there is much talk about correcting the situation of our infrastructure and development deliberately retarded under the Military Occupation. Here we suggest that conservation is an integral part of economic development. Conservation and development should not be viewed as opponents; rather they should both go hand-in-hand in order to ensure a balanced economic growth and reinstatement of our cultural identity. The historic housing stock should not be considered as a liability but as an asset that can be rehabilitated with relatively little foreign intervention. Development should not precede without conservation; this will create further large holes in the historic fabric of the cities. Thus they will lose their remaining coherence and turn into unmanageable masses of people and buildings, so destroying the valuable economic possibility of their tourist potential.

Therefore our perception of conservation and development should be changed. Development can occur through conservation; by maintaining the continuity of the tradition in the historic quarters, and improving the living conditions to meet contemporary needs and aspirations of the residents. This is what we mean when we say, 'development through conservation'.

The problems of the Old Town of Nablus (see Chapter Seven) are complex, and not easy to resolve. They are the outcomes of accumulated time, economic constraints and long period of Military Occupation. The preceding Chapters have covered a wide range of interlocking factors not least of which is the political development that will play such a major part in the success or otherwise of the conservation of Nablus. Do we become a beautiful and thriving city? Or, through our inability to act cooperatively and decisively, do we remain on the margins of Middle Eastern life in the 21st century?
We now draw together the conclusions we have reached, and set out a possible plan of action comprising the following:

- Financial considerations.
- Institutional upgrading and innovation.
- Programme of projects.

I - Financial Considerations

Throughout the years of the occupation Local Councils in all cities, towns and villages have been deprived of funds, technical staff, training and any form of government support. Furthermore, until recently, and especially during the Intifada, the occupation authorities imposed severe restrictions on the local council's ability to receive any outside funding from donors and external investors. Also until recently, there were no financial institutions in the 'Westbank', and all Arab Banks were closed after the occupation. There were no other institutions to give financial assistance, offer investment guidance or saving and credit facilities for the local Palestinian residents. High taxes, severe import and export restrictions also discouraged local residents and other Palestinians from investment (see Chapter One).

Perhaps the most sensitive issue that we have to face in the formulation of conservation programmes and strategies is the question of the means of financing them. The inability of the Local Authorities and PNA to finance colossal conservation programmes has been realized. Thus, we suggest that the alternative and even, at the start, the preferred approach, would be to assume that residents cannot expect any subsidies and that what is to be provided will have to be financed entirely from the collective resources of that community, however meagre. This it seems, is a more politically realistic and honest attitude to the problem, with the starting point coming from the people themselves and what they can agree to and pay for. They will need the maximum reassurance and safeguards against corruption and the disappearance of their savings. This last point is fundamental to the success of the whole exercise.

Our Intifada taught us that things work best within a framework of public-private partnership. Such a partnership is needed to mobilize every possible resource, to deal
with socio-economic and legal problems, and to attract private resources and initiative. Above all to provide reassurance that the funds collected will be in safe hands.

Community participation can help to lower costs if the task is essentially left to the agreed community groups or teams and the nature and extent of outside intervention is clearly defined. Any financial arrangement should be combined with adapting conservation standards that are congruent with the socio-economic means of the inhabitants. It is anticipated that, in the early stages, the principal contributors may be from the private sector; primarily owners who can see the value of potential returns from their investments.

However, if partnerships can be quickly established with the public sector, the Nablus Municipality (NM), the Nablus Corporation for Conservation and Development (NCCD), and/or other donars, then so much the better. But the more players the longer things take. Later an international appeal can be launched when there is a track record of successfully completed schemes.

Some suggestions concerning the raising of finance from outside sources:

- Actual financial support: from agencies organisations and associations like the Aga Khan Foundation, Arab Fund for Social and Economic Development etc,
- Funding for technical assistance: from PEC DAR, CDC, ODA, USAID, UNDP/ World Tourism Organisation etc.
- Sponsorship for individual buildings can be targeted at national and international banks, multi national companies, etc.
- Fund raising and publicity throughout the Arab World.

The NCCD should launch a National Campaign for fund raising by: organising sports cups days, using Friday Mosques and Sunday Churches to collect donations, encourage rich families to restore one of their buildings to be used as a family gathering place (Dewan), local banks, insurance companies industrial and commercial organisations could be asked for sponsorship and the el-Zakah Department to restore one building for
use as its main office.

We realise that fund raising is only part of the task, more importantly it is what achievements can be shown from using funds. There is no more important task than to safeguard these funds from mismanagement. One small mistake or corrupt action and the funds will dry up. On the other hand the successful management of the funds will pay high dividends and result in them being multiplied on a voluntary basis. There is nothing that succeeds as much as success.

II - Institutional Upgrading and Innovation.
Under the occupation, major changes were imposed on the judicial system which made it sub-ordinate to the area military commander and deprived it of any significant power. The Israeli officer in charge of the judiciary has been vested with the all powers and privileges of the Minister of Justice under the Jordanian law. Thus, there is now no independent judicial system, nor is there an independent legal profession, which are the main requirements for an effective legal system (see Chapter Four).

A particular difficulty in bringing about action in the Old Town of Nablus at present is the absence of, or under-resourced nature of, existing institutions. Nablus Municipality which is under the law should carry out conservation in the Old Town, is overloaded with the normal tasks of local administration and development. The newly appointed council has many tasks and challenges that no real attention can be given to conservation. The absence of Municipal Council for a long period of time coupled with the hardship years of the Intifada, meant that development and maintenance in the whole city were totally neglected. This required more sums of money from the municipality and put extra pressure on it. Therefore, it is unrealistic to assume that it should carry out simultaneous revitalization and protection of the Old Town. The newly born Palestinian National Authority (PNA), on the other hand, still lives on donations and has many other calls on its resources and attention as well as the Old Town of Nablus.

i) A Nablus Conservation Commission (NCC), should be established as soon as possible to develop and administer support programmes for development and
conservation of the Town’s cultural resources. We suggest that the NCC should include archaeologists, local historians, architects, architectural historians, urban planners, engineers, member from the municipality and members of the SCCR. Other members should be representatives of local communities, business, developers and private conservation groups.

The general role of the NCC is to develop and promote conservation activities within the Old Town:

i) Preserve, protect and enhance cultural resources for the benefit of the Town and for future generations;

ii) encourage appreciation of cultural heritage through conservation activities, education, and public awareness programmes, in order to strengthen the sense of the community and identity of place;

iii) ensure that conservation considerations are integrated into the continuing planning process;

iv) formulate a precise plan for the historic conservation element in the general plan of Nablus;

v) promote community conservation by acting as an information source for other city departments, boards, and agencies in matters concerning the historic quarters, and by generating new ideas and support concepts for programmes which will enable the historic quarters to remain viable elements in the whole city;

vi) promote and enduring educational and cultural activities in schools and throughout the city which will assist citizens to recognize, understand and appreciate their built heritage. This role will require significant coordination with the SCCR, educational institutions, and private conservation groups;

vii) promote community conservation by: approval of proposed action, conducting public hearings, making recommendations and supporting community initiatives.

ii) Nablus Corporation for Conservation and Development (NCCD):
A voluntary non-profit charitable cooperation, the Nablus Corporation for Conservation
and Development is to be established in Nablus. The corporation will be primarily a catalyst for conservation and development in the Old Town in particular and the whole city in general. It should include members of Nablusi people’s friends both in the ‘Westbank’ and exile. Its duties are to:

i) Lead the whole conservation effort;
ii) influence decision-makers;
iii) advise the Municipality on conservation issues;
iv) provide publicity and guidance to encourage restoration of existing historic stock;
v) raise and administer funds;
vi) encourage the establishment of Associations of the Friends of Nablus in exile.

iii) Study Centre for Conservation and Reconstruction (SCCR):
This study centre was discussed earlier, however, it is anticipated that it will play a major role in conserving the Old Town of Nablus. The centre should have an operational office in the Old Town, in one of the buildings that have been restored by community efforts. This building should be used as a show house and accessible to the public (a concept discussed earlier). The SCCR should work with full coordination with the Nablus Municipality (NM), An-Najah University, the NCCD and most importantly the local community. The duties of the SCCR discussed earlier can be applied to the Old Town.

iv) Nablus Centre for Conservation Training (NCCT)
A training and skill improvement centre should be jointly created by the SCCR, NM, NCC and the NCCD. We argued in the previous sections that such training in building conservation skills is very essential to increase the capability of the residents to carry out the task of conserving their traditional buildings in their hands and to reduce the reliance on external help and experts to the minimum. We also noted possible links to economic and physical revival of the historic quarters.
III - Programme of Projects.

The revisions and amendments to the Jordanian laws, issued in Jordan since 1967, have never been implemented in the 'Westbank'. The Israeli authorities made little effort to pass laws with the aim of protecting the lives and property of Palestinians or the environment as required by international law in which we live (see Chapter Four).

Laws and regulations controlling all aspects of our environment, have not been upgraded or revised since 1966 to conform to international standards. There are also no clear regulations for the conservation and protection of our historic settlements and monuments. With the absence of Palestinian legislative and executive authorities, a great deal of damage and abuse has been inflicted on the urban environment. Under the peace process and the gradual transfer of 'limited' power and authority we must do what we can to put these matters right in the light of our realistic needs in the process of reconstruction.

Concerning the issues covered in this research there should be:

- Full consultation with the residents and their representatives, as well as an information campaign aimed at explaining to the local community the reasons behind the following actions and what benefit will occur as a result:
  - An immediate development freeze, throughout the area defined as the Old Town of Nablus. This will stop all building works and demolitions other than essential maintenance.

- Nablus Municipal Council should examine the applicability of the "Cities, Villages and Buildings Planning Law No. 79, 1966" to the Old Town, and adjust its provisions to aid the implementation of the self-help conservation strategy.

They should introduce emergency measures to protect the architectural heritage in the historic areas. Eventually a new progressive law should be drafted.
i) **Ongoing Beautification Programme**

Up to the present time, the problems that are facing the Municipal councils can be attributed to three major issues: first, the IMG occupation and the political, psychological, economic, social and strategic constraints; second, the outdated municipal laws and ordinances; and third, the vague source of legal authority under which Municipal Councils have operated since 1967 (NAKHLEH, 1979).

The Municipal Councils are the highest level of indigenous political institutions in the ‘Westbank’, and by virtue of leadership and structure they are prepared and expected to play a significant and perhaps a central role after peace. The Declaration of Principles of the ‘Peace Accord,’ however, will result in a phased withdrawal of the IMG occupation and the transfer of ‘limited’ power and authority to an elected Palestinian Council. Some of the issues that had a direct impact on development will be transformed almost immediately to the new Palestinian entity, such as; banking, insurance, taxes and financial matters. Municipal Councils are expected to take the major responsibilities and workload, after the implementation of this phase. A redeployment of the IMG army is scheduled to take place sometime in 1995 and the affairs of the cities will be transferred to Municipal Councils. The PNA must take all possible measures to re-empower the municipalities, so that they can carry out their tasks in a better way.

One of the first tasks of the Nablus Municipality would be to carry out a beautification programme covering tidying up and carrying out minor repairs and small improvements to the Old Town as a whole. This can be seen as a joint programme between the University and the Municipality while at the same time involving the Local Community. This programme is essential to restore the confidence of the residents of their town as well as the whole Nabulsli people in the pride of their historic quarters. It will demonstrate to the people that by their determination their quarters can be conserved and when they care, their town will remain healthy and clean. Some of the suggestions are:

- Clearance of rubbish in public spaces, streets and alleys, waste sites and private property;
- Removal of any disused poles, wires, steel bars, notices or other clutter;
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- Removal of unsightly small areas of concrete patching on stairways or in public spaces, like that at the middle of El-Qaryoun Quarter, and making good holes on pavements;
- Consolidate ruined buildings and, where appropriate, convert into parks and open spaces;
- Planting productive trees, orange, lemon etc., in the courtyards of the houses and in empty pavement planters;
- Painting doors, widows and shop fronts etc. with range of colours to give special character and identity to Old Nablus.
- Ensure streets and alleys are cleaned regularly

ii) Ongoing Streets and Open Spaces Upgrading Programme

As part of the gradual and progressive improvement of the physical conditions and the environment of all public spaces, roads and stairways, we suggest 6 phases of work:

- **Phase One**: could include the following demonstration projects:
  1. The rehabilitation of *el-Aqaba* stairway in *el-Qiesareyah* Quarter;
  2. the pedestrianisation and improvement of *Sahat el-Manarah* - The Minaret Square - in front of the Victory Mosque;
  3. improving and pedestrianizing the open space in front of *el-Nimir Palace* in *El-Haballah* Quarter.

- **Phase Two**: could include the improvement and pedestrianisation of another three demonstration projects:
  1. the Old Bazaar - *el-Khan el-Qadim*;
  2. *En-Naser* Street, from the West Gate near *el-Fatemeyah* School to the Great Mosque in the East.
  3. *El-Musalabah Street* from *en-Naser* Street to the North to *el-Sabannat* street to the South.

- **Phase Three**: could include the pedestrianisation and improvement of:
  1. *El-Sabbanat Street*;
Phase Four; could include the pedestrianisation of the north-south alleys connecting en-Naser Street with the Old Bazaar.

Phase Five; could include the pedestrianisation and improvement of:

i) The street connecting el-Musalabe to the end of el-Yasmeneh Square including the square itself.

ii) north-south alleys connecting en-Naser Street with el-Sabbanat Street.

Phase Six; would include the continuation with the same gradual and progressive way, of street pedestrianisation and improvement by removing asphalt and replacing it with flagstone until the whole Old Town will be pedestrianized.

We also propose that each of the above stages must be combined with the rehabilitation of public water fountains within its boundaries and bring them back to use for the benefit of the residents and visitors, especially during summer.

Ongoing overall building conservation programme

A similar phased approach like that of the improvement and pedestrianisation of streets and open spaces is proposed for an overall building conservation programme. The progress of the programme and the speed of the phases will depend on the enthusiasm and cooperation of the residents. It has been realized from the previous chapter, however, that the high majority of the residents are willing to participate in upgrading and conserving the historic quarters on voluntary basis. Further, the Nablusi people are well known throughout the Arab World for their high building skills. On the other hand, more than half of the household heads interviewed said they, or members of their families, have building skills and would be prepared to use them.

Phase One; the University and the Municipality should carry out:

i) A comprehensive survey to identify buildings of urgent need of restoration and to draft a restoration priority list.
ii) training and educational programme on conservation work.

- **Phase Two**: to stop any further deterioration to buildings of first-degree of urgency (see Chapter Seven), by securing them against vandalism, until such time that the implementation of the necessary restoration work is feasible.
  
  i) Twelve buildings, two from each quarter, could be used as demonstration buildings for this stage. The selection of the buildings will depend on the detailed negotiations with the owners and the degree of urgency stated in the comprehensive survey.

- **Phase Three**: a pilot project for a residential area improvement scheme that will test and illustrate how restoration and improvement by community participation and self-help concepts can work in the historic quarters. The proposed project hopefully would upgrade the quality of life and environment of the whole residential area, not only in terms of housing standards, but in terms of provision and a greatly improved townscape setting. The project would include:
  
  i) The properties around *El-Qaryoun* open space - *Sahet el-Qaryoun* - in *El-Qaryoun* Quarter.

The rehabilitation of this residential area would provide a real demonstration of how other areas of Old Nablus could be reviewed, and make a major contribution to the restoration of the historic character of the Town. Further, since this scheme is going to be the pilot scheme for the town-wide conservation programme, we suggest that careful involvement of the residents and the local community, after training them, will be an essential mechanism that will inspire the whole town, so that the same mechanism can be set up to carry out similar implementation throughout Old Nablus.

- **Phase Four**: could include two demonstration projects; 15 properties each.
  
  i) around *El-Yasmeneh* open space (*Saha*); and
ii) in El-Haballeh Quarter.

- **Phase Five**: a similar process will continue on quarter basis, so that the residents will not think that we are preferring one quarter over another.

- **Phase Six**: hopefully by this time most of the community cooperative organisations would be established, and most of them would have the essential training in conservation and improvement work. Thus, a new phased approach, ‘courtyard approach’, is suggested where people sharing the same main courtyard will be organised to carry out the essential upgrading to their properties. This approach will encourage the restoration of residential and commercial buildings by their owners and residents through the concept of self-help and community development. We suggest that a test pilot scheme for such an approach will be ‘Hush el-Jettan’ - el-Jettan Court in El-Qaryoun Quarter.

iv) **Ongoing new uses for old buildings programme**

The importance of adapting old buildings for new uses has been realised. To provide replacement uses for old buildings will ensure their maintenance in the future. The cost of maintenance is becoming increasingly high and traditionally skilled building craftsmen have decreased in number, so such old buildings have been decried as more users seek comfort and convenience of modern buildings. New and more economic uses have to be found.

- **A Museum and Heritage Centre Project.**

Since the money for this project is available, we suggest that instead of constructing a new building one of the soap factories in Old Town of Nablus can be converted into a museum and heritage centre, for example, Touqan Soap Factory in EL-Qaryoun Quarter.

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2 Mr Sabih el-Masri, a Nablusi businessman in Saudi Arabia, donated 1 million Jordanian Dinars, equally divided on four years, to establish a museum and heritage centre in Nablus.

3 The author has discussed this issue with 3 members of the committee which was appointed to carry out the work; they liked the idea and promised to work in that direction.
Quarter or el-Masri Soap Factory. The development of one of the soap factories buildings as a Museum and Heritage Centre would provide the first step in developing tourism and also provide an example of the restoration of high architectural quality, both inside and outside.

"Sabbanat," soap factories, buildings are arguably the most interesting old buildings in Old Nablus, both architecturally and historically. They are decidedly the best of the largest buildings in the Town. Thus, it would be appropriate to make this project the initial focus for building conservation in the Old Town and provide an example of future conservation. This project would also create a demand for traditional skills that are necessary for its implementation, and hence for certain conservation training courses.

Hotel Project
The Old Town of Nablus has no hotel or restaurant facility suitable for tourists or day visitors. Historic buildings, such as the many palaces and big houses, are a potentially important means of providing accommodation and services to tourists and visitors after conservation adaptation. Such a reuse would support economic revival of the town. It would be a very effective generator of employment and spending power. The new uses on the other hand will guarantee the buildings’ regular maintenance. We suggest that this project can be sponsored by Nablus Cooperative for Conservation and Development NCCD or by encouraging one of the wealthy families in the city to sponsor such a project for its benefit.

Proposed Other New Projects
i) Female hostel for An-Najah University - to be sponsored by the University, suggested building: one of the palaces;

ii) Male hostel for An-Najah University - to be sponsored by the University, suggested building: one of the palaces;

The are several reasons behind the selection of this example:

i- The open space in front of the building

ii- Mr Hafiz Touqan was a member of Nablus Conservation Committee which was discharged by the Israeli Civil Administration in 1988, so he will help in the detailed negotiations with the owners from his own family.
iii) Fine Arts Department for An-Najah University - to be sponsored by the University, suggested building: one soap factory and an adjacent building;
iv) Offices for the NCCD - to be sponsored by the NCCD;
v) Operations office for the SCCR;
vii) Office for the Municipality's Conservation Unit, to be sponsored by the Municipality;
vii) Nursery for children under five - to be sponsored by one of the NGOs;
viii) Crafts centre - to be sponsored by one of the NGOs - suggested building: Wakalet el-Farokheyyah;
ix) Family Rehabilitation Centre - to be sponsored by one of the NGOs;
x) Public Library, clubs, information centre.

8.4 CONCLUSION
Through the literature survey, the fieldwork and the case study, this study has attempted to identify the impact of both internal and external forces, which have contributed to the deterioration of our historic areas and buildings in the 'Westbank'. We have tried to show that a new approach to the opportunities provided by the peace process for rehabilitation and conservation of the historic city centre, will bring the needs of the people and their resources together. Here we have to introduce the concepts of development partnerships, self-build groups and a framework of political cooperation.

A conservation Intifada has to be started in the 'Westbank'. It has to be a 'bottom-up' rather than 'top-down' approach. It should stimulate citizen participation and self-help activities in coping with the historic quarters conditions and preventing further deterioration in them, as well as in developing a sense of civic consciousness. It should be designed as a realistic and practical approach to the enormous problems presented by the Westbank's historic quarters; to attempt to upgrade largely through the resources most readily available- the thousands of hands and the small financial resources of the inhabitants themselves.

The conservation approach should involve re-orientating the imposition/paternalism
relationship between the local authorities and the residents by establishing one of cooperation and partnership, which is not limited to consultation and the physical aspects of the conservation programme but which includes other aspects of planning, decision making, administerial, managerial, financial and maintenance, and replacing the current dogmatic attitudes of meeting conservation needs by initiating small scale pilot projects before committing resources to larger programmes. These should be monitored and the public reaction determined to ensure the maximum acceptability of the recommended measures in the selected communities.

Concentrating on an action area (pilot-scheme study) could be seen as a good opportunity to get a small scale project under way, and to show the seriousness of intentions of the conservation bodies, including the municipalities, to conserve the historic housing stock.

The reuse of old buildings is numerous. A building can be restored and saved and providing a new use and living, thus a voiding further new buildings and environmental pressure, while making maximum use of land which is very scarce in the ‘Westbank’. A successful adaptation of one building can encourage others to follow suit. These projects can transmit conservation skills to residents through community work, thus reducing the needs for external experts to a minimum.

Embarking on an aided self-help programme offers the chance to make a positive turn, in that it not only lays the foundation stone for a more meaningful conservation process that involves the population at large, but also provides the opportunity to redress the present deteriorating situation of the existing historic stock and creates the possibility of a better environment for future citizens of the ‘Westbank’.

Implementation of conservation could be successful as well, if adequate planning and the right use of student potential in cooperation with the municipality and other conservation bodies (SCCR, NCCD) are to be considered. Here comes the role of the several educational establishments and the universities of the ‘Westbank’ in initiating conservation efforts. The Westbank’s universities should play a major role in
establishing an information bank of the built heritage, as well as utilizing students potential in documenting and maintaining some of the traditional settings.

Establishing a community training centre to give advice for the local residents on how to adapt, renew and properly maintain their properties, can act as a communicative medium to pass information and encourage debate and collaboration between the experts, the local authorities and the residents. It can provide the right communicative link to pass on the local knowledge and expertise to the decision makers and the researchers. It can transmit skills from craftsmen to local residents, thus smoothly transferring the responsibility to the community as the project becomes sustainable without outside help.

The role of the media is another aspect to explored. The written word and audio visual message could play an important part in spreading consciousness of the cultural role of the ‘Westbank’. Developing an information campaign by using all available vehicles, could provide the right climate for participation. The education of the public, especially at schools, can promote more understanding and pride in the traditional environment.

The several social and non-profit organizations, such as in women, youth and family associations, could play a major role in spreading awareness across society in order to initiate local pressure groups concerned with the enhancement and the continuity of the traditional heritage. The involvement of such voluntary associations as part of the basic communicative and informative institutions can sustain the continuity of the conservation efforts.

A continuous monitoring and evaluation of the conservation project are essential steps in the execution as well as in the design and implementation of future programmes. Because of the strengths or weaknesses in the programme’s structure and the success or failure of its operation, it can stand as a model to be followed, limited or avoided by future programmes. Monitoring and evaluation should be regarded as part of an ongoing process alongside the various stages and activities of the programme. The main purpose is to provide information concerning the impact on the intended beneficiaries,
and to assess the output, of the programme.

All the ingredients are there for a conservation Intifada. All that is needed is a spark, by a committed group to set up the corner stone of the conservation process in the ‘Westbank’. The conservation Intifada seeks to conserve the built and cultural heritage of the ‘Westbank’ by making it a part of the normal day-to-day activities of the residents, by making them realise that it forms a part of their individual and collective identity, by making it a part of the development. Conservation here is being used as a vehicle for development, not as an excuse for freezing development to glorify the past.

In conclusion, conservation, in this unusual circumstance of the transition from occupation to the recovery of self-rule, offers the opportunity to stimulate national awareness and self respect, to provide empowerment, alleviate housing shortage, reuse monuments and prepare for tourism. The method suggested is a grass-roots activity in which the citizen plays the leading part. The proposals in this study form a programme of architecturally and socially balanced operations which are offered as a creative response to a rare and important opportunity in the life of any nation.


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APPENDICES

APPENDIX 3.1
Samples of the Reports by the Fieldwork Team in the Old Town Nablus.

A. Report by Mr. Mashaqi

[Text of report in Arabic]

[Translation]

[Text of report in English]

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B. Report by Mr. Arandi

آثار الستينات الذي قد تمت تحقيقه في هيئة البلدية العامة من البلدية الغريبة من بني مازا في 1980. إن صناعة نموذجية هنالك أثر بات في السابق و مثل ذلك.

- تتم التعبير عن البلدية عطلة método إضافات على المضخة في البلدية، حيث تزداد البلدية من الناحية السياحية والريفية.

- هناك مساحة مشاكل اتجاه عيد و عمليات متعددة.

- تعدد الأنواع داخل الرسم حيث كان لعدد كبير من الرسوم الأولية.

- عددهم من 173 و 142 الإعدادية في عدد الارباع في مساحات جافة.

- وهم في بعضها للتعليم العالي حيث تغبي هذه الحالة التي يقوم بعدها إغلاباً للعائدين. وبذلك يمكن أن يكون بعدها دائماً ما يستلزم عملية التعليم الشاملة والثانية، وخاصة في حالة البتات.

- هناك عدد كبير من البيوت التي تنتمي لحلف الأرجاء و خاصة البيوت المطلقة والتي لا تم فيها المباني أو الاعتمادات، والتي تم تجديها إما أن يتم البيوت أو تتم مهاجمتها. أم تتم منها بيزك جيبي على البيوت الواقعة وصاحبها.

- يشكل المصرف إلى البلدية الخرجة زياً على الضغط على الريبيات حيث يتم إعادة بعدها تجديها.

- مشكلة أخرى تتكون في العلاقات بين المبانى القائمة بطريقية مشاركة.

- يوجد إستشارة مضايف في بها يعشك رسمياً على المبانى و خطأ على إنقلاب المناط الريبيиру الذي بيده في هذا الاستشارة والهيد الملمية.

- سوء تقدم الصناعة والديمومة الذي يتطلب مساعدة أو مواقف ترفية أو أماكن التسليه والترفيه خاصة للأطفال.

- نبت بعض سكان المنطقة منها المشاكلة في مثال هذه الاستيئات و تفاوت البعض عن الجماعة التي تتم جعل مهتمتهم المشاكلة و مشكلة الكثير من الاداري من أن حالة الاستيئات سبب تساهم بأي عمل لخدمة البلدية.

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APPENDIX 3.2
The Questionnaire

QUESTIONNAIRE

STUDY AREA: OLD CITY OF NABLUS- WEST BANK.

LOCATION:

Date: ____________________________ Time: ____________________________

Name of Quarter: ______________________________________________________

Address of the Unit: _____________________________________________________

USES:

Present Use:

(a)- Residential [ ] (b)- Commercial [ ]
(c)- Cultural [ ] (d)- Others [ ]
(e)- Vacant [ ]

Previous Use(s) When Known: ___________________________________________

DEMOGRAPHIC AND SOCIAL INFORMATION:

I. Household characteristic:

(a)- Sex [ ] (b)- Age [ ] (c) Marital status [ ]
(d)- Family number [ ]

Origin: ____________________________ Type of family: ______________________

No of Children: __________________________________________________________

Their education: Sex Age Education

1- ___ ___ _______________________________
2- ___ ___ _______________________________
3- ___ ___ _______________________________
4- ___ ___ _______________________________
5- ___ ___ _______________________________
6- ___ ___ _______________________________

II. Size of property:

No. of: (a)- Bedroom(s) [ ], (b)- Living-room(s) [ ], (c)- Guest-room(s) [ ]
(d)- Kitchen [ ], (e)- Bathroom [ ], (f)- Toilet [ ]
(g)- Staircase [ ], (h)- Courtyard [ ].

Is the property enough for you and your family? [yes], [no]
If there is a courtyard, do you share it with other families? [yes], [no]
If yes how many families? [ ].

How is your relation with them?

[V.good], [ good ], [ bad ], [V.bad ]

Do you like the courtyard to be yours only?, [yes], [no].
If yes, why? ____________________________________________________________

III. Employment and Income:

What is your occupation? ________________________________________________
Is it in the formal/informal Sector? _________________________________
Do you exercise any other activity? ________________________________
What is your annual rent in JD? [______].
Can you save any money? [yes], [no]. If Yes how much per Month in JD? [______]
Monthly income in JD [______]
Are you helped by any other member of the family to pay the rent? [yes], [no]. If yes, How much is the help in JD. [______].

IV. Tenure and Ownership:

How long have you been here? [______].
Do you?:
Own the property? ________ Rent it? ________________________________
If the house is rented, what kind of tenure is it?
   (a)- Public [______], (b)- private [______], (c) Awqaf [______], (d)- Others [______].
Do you contribute to improving the house? [Yes], [No]
If yes how? ________________________________ If No
Why? ________________________________ Are there any sections in the rent contract that prevents you from doing any alteration or modification to the house? [yes], [no].
If no did you make any alteration or modification? [yes], [no].
If no, why? ________________________________ How is the relationship between the owner and the tenants?
   (a)-V.good [______], (b)- Good [______], (c)-Bad [______], (d)- V.bad [______]
Does he/she take any measures to restore or improve the unit? [yes], [no]
If yes, how?

If no, did you ask him to do so?[yes], [no]
What was his response?

Have you ever been asked to vacate the house by the owner? [yes], [no]
If yes, why?

How is the relation between the tenants?
   (a)-V.good [______], (b)- Good [______], (c)-Bad [______], (d)- V.bad [______]

Have your relation activities changed over the period of time you have been here?
Have you debated any problems related to your living conditions? [yes], [no].
If yes, examples:
   1. ________________________________
   2. ________________________________
   3. ________________________________

If no, is there any reason(s)?
   1. ________________________________
   2. ________________________________
   3. ________________________________

ATTITUDE TOWARDS THE PRESENT APPROACH:
Are you happy with services in the area? [yes], [no]
If no, can you give some reasons?
   1. ________________________________
   2. ________________________________
   3. ________________________________

Do you think that the municipality is doing enough to;
   (1)- Clean the area, [yes], [no]
(2)- Restore the area, [yes], [no]
(3)- Maintain the streets, [yes], [no]

Have you added any part to your house recently? [yes], [no]
If yes, did you consult an architect(engineer), [yes], [no]
If no, why?  __________________________________________________________

Did you get a licence (permit), to do that? [yes], [no]
If no, why?  __________________________________________________________

PARTICIPATION:
[Explanations and discussion about the concept take place first]

What do you think about this approach? __________________________________________________________

Will you be interested in living in the area and contribute to its improvement? [yes], [no]
If yes, what if you have the chance to live outside the old city, is it still the same? [yes], [no]
If yes, is there any reason(s) behind that?
   1
   2
   3
If no, why?  __________________________________________________________

Have you done any voluntary work in the city, or neighbourhood? [yes], [no]
If yes, Please give some examples?
   1
   2
   3

If no, did anyone invited you to participate in any voluntary work? [yes], [no].

If you have been asked to participate in cleaning or preserving your neighbourhood, would you participate? [yes], [no].
If yes how many hours can you give in the week? __________________________________________________________

Do you or any member of your family have any skills -building, plastering, etc.- that contribute to the conservation of the city?
Are you willing to participate in other parts of the city, rather than your neighbourhood? [yes], [no].
If no, is there any reasons for that?
   1
   2
   3

What are the priorities that should be tackled first?
   1
   2
   3

Would you be willing to invest if the tenure is secured? [yes], [no].

Thank you for your time
APPENDIX 4.1
Israel's Arguments for the Legality of its Occupation of the West Bank.

Israel makes several different arguments in support of its view: First, the "Legitimate Sovereign" argument, in which Israel argues, that the law of belligerent occupation does not apply unless the occupying power is replacing a "legitimate sovereign" of the territory occupied. Since Jordan was not the legitimate sovereign of the West Bank in 1967, but was in effect occupying power itself, then Israel is not bound by the terms of the Fourth Geneva Convention (see for example, BENVENISTI, 1984; MALLISON & MALLISON, 1986). Secondly, the "Self-Defense" argument; Israel argues that it conquered the territories in a defensive action and that therefore its legal claim to the West Bank is superior to any other (JENNINGS, 1963). Thirdly, the "Long Duration" argument; Israel argues that the Geneva Convention was only intended to apply to short-term occupations and that it is not relevant to the unusual situation of the occupied West Bank, now occupied for nearly twenty-seven years (GERSON, 1973). Finally, the "Benign Intentions" argument; Israel argues that, even if the Fourth Geneva Convention does apply to its occupation of the West Bank, it is not violating the convention by building Jewish settlements in the West Bank. It argues that the prohibition contained in article 49(6) is only intended to prevent an occupying power from bringing its own nationals for the purpose of displacing the indigenous population. And Israel argues that its settlements and settlers do not displace the local Palestinian population. However, a fifth argument; the "Not the Low" argument can be added; Israel's own high court offered another argument to reject the Fourth Geneva convention. The court argued in one case in 1978 that the provisions of the Forth Geneva convention dealing with the transfer of population from the occupied territories or into it, are not part of the international law (Cited in BUTTERFIELD and TILLEY, 1992).
APPENDIX 4.2

Categories of Land in Palestine.

1. 'Mulk,' Freehold, owner exercising complete rights of ownership and disposition, except, so far as Moslems are concerned, devise by will, which is limited to one third of the testator's mulk property; the remaining two-thirds devolving on the heirs of the holder.

2. 'Miri,' property owned by the State but the right of occupation or usufruct is enjoyed by private individuals who can sell, mortgage or lease but cannot bequeath part of it by will. If it remains uncultivated for three years without excuse it reverts to the State. On death of the holder it devolves upon his heirs in accordance with the Inheritance Law. Most of the land in Palestine is of this class. It is held as 'masha'a,' undivided common share of land.

3. 'Waqf,' Mortmain property, which has been dedicated to some religious or charitable object or family trust. It is mainly derived from Mulk or Miri lands. However Waqf of Mulk is the only true Waqf which is governed by religious law. (This flourished due to the protection given by the religious authorities when no secular protection was value).

4. 'Metruque, Public property left to the inhabitants of a certain town or village as a body. This cannot be held individually, sold, inherited, or be used for any other purpose to that which is assigned to it.

5. 'Mewat' Unowned land, should be at least one and half mile outside town or village. Most of the unoccupied land falls within this class. Most of the unoccupied land falls within this class. It is also governed by the Code applicable to Miri lands. (It was forbidden to occupy any piece of this land without Government's permission).
APPENDIX 6.1

Section from the Town and Country Planning Ordinance of Palestine (1945)

IN RETROSPECT: THE TOWN AND COUNTRY PLANNING
ORDINANCE OF PALESTINE

(Enacted by the High Commissioner of Palestine, with the advice of the Advisory Council — 1945)

Over fifteen years have passed since the enactment of the latest and last Town and Country Planning Ordinance of Palestine. These have been hectic, boom and speculative years for the Arab city, which has grown wildly, untamed, to become a large, unwieldy and labyrinthine conglomeration of streets and buildings, of forms and colours of cacophony and kaleidoscopy hard to describe, quantify or appraise. Cities like Beirut and Kuwait grew with the benefit of only the most lax and primitive regulations, controls, practices and codes in town planning and architecture.

It is for this reason that one has elected to examine, in retrospect, highlights of part of the 1945 planning legislation which was actively in force in one Arab country over a decade-and-a-half ago, and leave it to the imagination to pry into the possible urban form, shape and configuration of the Arab World, had such legislation been universally in force throughout the Arab World in 1945, and had this legislation benefitted throughout the past fifteen to sixteen years from the advances in planning and architectural thought and practice encountered in the advanced countries of the world.

In this paper, the writer will attempt to bring out the main provisions of the Palestine Town and Country Planning Ordinance enacted in 1945. Of course, due to the length of the ordinance, only the main points of interest will be brought out. Since Palestine has been a British Mandated Territory, this ordinance has quite a lot of things in common with English ordinances, only that it has been drawn up with help of native planners and out of experience in the country itself. Since the ordinance also treats building codes and laws which deal mostly with technical standards and specifications, that part of the ordinance will not be discussed in this paper.

Before going into the various parts of the ordinance, it might be useful to mention a few terms that occur in the ordinance, and give their interpretation as set forth in the ordinance. Some such terms are the following:

"authorized scheme" means any scheme for the putting into force of which authority has been granted under this Ordinance or any Ordinance repealed by this Ordinance.

"non-conforming use" in relation to any land or building, means the use of such land or building for any purpose other than a purpose for which it is permitted to be used (whether specifically or as being land or a building situated in any particular area) under any authorized scheme, by-law or rule, in force under this Ordinance applicable to, or affecting, such land or building, or under any permit issued in respect thereof under the provisions of this ordinance or of any Ordinance repealed by this Ordinance.

"scheme" includes any outline scheme, detailed scheme or parcelisation scheme and any modification of an outline scheme, detailed scheme, or parcelisation scheme as the case may be.

"zone" means an area of land shown on the plan of a scheme by distinctive colouring, hatching or edging, or a combination thereof, for the purpose of indicating the use to which the lands and buildings on such area may be put and the regulations prescribed therefor under the scheme.

The various provisions in the Ordinance will be discussed succinctly in the order in which they occur in the complete Town and Country Planning Ordinance. Due to the exactness of the language of the Ordinance and the legal terms used, the writer has found it rather difficult at times to render the provisions in simpler terms; consequently, quite a lot of expressions and terms have been used as they occur in the original.

Commissions.

Commissions as established by the Ordinance are of two kinds: District and Local. For each district of Palestine, a District Planning and Building Commission shall be established to consist of:

(a) The District Commissioner, who will be Chairman,
(b) A representative of the Attorney General,
(c) A representative of the Director of Medical Services,
(d) A representative of the Director of Public Works.
(e) The Town Planning Advisor.

Three members constitute a quorum, and in case of equality of votes, the Chairman shall have a second or casting vote.

When an area has been designated as a planning area, then,

(1) If such a planning area includes the area of a municipal corporation, or any part thereof, the Council of such municipal corporation shall be the Local Planning and Building Commission for such planning area.
(2) If such a planning area includes the area of a local council, or any part thereof, the Council of such local council shall be the Local Planning and Building Commission for such planning area.
(3) If such a planning area

(a) Does not include the area of a municipal corporation, or any part thereof, or
the District Commission for the district in which such planning area is situated shall nominate and/or select from time to time from a panel nominated by them, not more than seven persons, at least two of whom are not officers of the Government of Palestine, to be the Local Planning and Building Commission for such area, which shall consist of four members. In case of equality of votes, the chairman shall have a second or casting vote.

Every Local Commission is responsible for the District Commission and shall furnish the District Commission from time to time, with the needs of the planning area as regards road widenings, road proposals, probable direction and nature of the development of the neighbourhood, etc.

It is within the powers of the Local Commission to, regulate the construction and demolition of buildings, the widening and arrangement of roads and other matters provided for in the Ordinance. It can take all steps necessary to ensure the provisions of the Ordinance and of any authorized scheme, by-laws or rules constituted thereunder are complied with. If a Local Commission fails in its duties, especially after notification by the District Commission, then the District Commission, vested with the powers of the Local Commission, may take the necessary steps, recovering whatever expenses incurred from the Local Commission.

Planning Areas.

Upon application upon that behalf made by a District Commission, the High Commissioner may order that any area within the district shall be a planning area. Such order must be published in the Gazette and, if the Planning area includes the area of a municipal corporation, or any part thereof, or the area of a local council, or any part thereof, shall, in addition, be posted at the municipal or local council offices, as the case may be. It shall come into force seven days after date of publication in the Gazette, unless another date is fixed therein. Limits of a Planning area shall be fixed by the District Commission.

After a planning area is constituted, the following provisions shall apply within such an area unless modifications or exceptions are approved by the District Commission:

1. No person shall lay out or construct or close, or attempt to lay out or construct or close, any road without a permit to that effect first obtained from the Local Commission.
2. No building shall be erected, pulled down or reconstructed, and no alteration, addition or structural repair (other than non-structural internal repairs) shall be made to any building without a permit to that effect first obtained from the Local Commission.
3. No building or land shall be put to any non-conforming use, and no non-conforming building may be erected, without a permit to that effect first obtained from the Local Commission, and approved in writing by the District Commission.

Schemes.

Probably the closest equivalent term in the United States or elsewhere to "scheme" as understood in Palestine is a comprehensive Master Plan. It is prepared by Local Commissions within such time as may be prescribed by the District Commission, dealing with all or any of the lands contained within a planning area, with the general purpose of controlling the development of the land comprised in the area, of securing proper conditions of health, sanitation, communications, amenity and convenience in connection with the laying out and use of land and of preserving existing buildings or other objects of architectural, historic or other interest and places of natural interest or beauty, and generally of protecting the existing amenities.

Although the idea and contents of a Master Plan might have slight modifications in various parts of the world, yet in general, the general purport of a Master Plan as understood ordinarily is more or less uniform. For the purposes of comparison, the main contents of a detailed scheme, as constituted by the Planning Ordinance, may deal with all or any of the matters listed below:

1. Construction of new roads and the construction, diversions, widening, alteration and stopping up of existing roads;
2. The establishment of building lines and set-backs;
3. Drainage, including sewerage;
4. Water supply;
5. Limitation of zones within which special trades or industries may or may not be carried on, or which are reserved exclusively for residential or other purposes;
6. The imposition of conditions or restrictions in regard to the size of any lot of land upon which any building may be erected, the open space to be maintained about any building and the height, size or character of any building to be allowed in any zone or specified area;
7. The demarcation of public and private open spaces and nature reserves;
8. The reservation of land sites for aerodromes;
9. The reservation of land for cemeteries;
10. Subject to the provisions of the Town and Country Planning Ordinance, the delegation of any of the powers conferred upon them by the scheme to the Chairman of the respective Commission or any other person or to both, or to a Committee, for the purpose of carrying out the objects of the scheme.

In addition are the following items:

11. The plotting-out of land as building areas and sites and the shape and minimum frontages of building plots;

12. Allotment of land for public purposes of all kinds, including roads, open spaces, gardens, schools, places of religious worship, recreation grounds, car-parks, aerodromes, markets, slaughter houses and cemeteries;

13. Dedication of roads or open spaces to the public;

14. The prohibition, regulation and control of the deposit or disposal of waste materials and refuse;

15. Lighting and electric power, and the siting of electric power reserves;

16. The determination of the situation of buildings for specific use, the demarcation of areas subject to restrictive conditions;

17. The preservation of objects of archaeological interest or beauty, and the buildings or places used for religious purposes or cemeteries, or regarded with religious veneration;

18. The abolition and reconstruction of overcrowded and congested areas;

19. The control of the siting, size, height, design and external appearance of buildings;

20. The planting and preservation of trees;

21. The allocation of plots to any owner dispossessed of land in furtherance of the scheme;

22. The special powers to be vested in the Local Commission or any other person for the purpose of carrying out all or any of the objects of the scheme;

23. Any special conditions for the exercise of such powers as regards notice or otherwise;

24. The cost of the scheme.

Copies of a scheme, whether outline or detailed, and the plans annexed thereto, shall be available at the Local Commission office, for free inspection of any interested person. Notice of such availability shall be published in the Gazette. Any person is entitled to lodge objection to such a parcellation scheme; if his property or interests are adversely affected, within two months of the date of the publication in the Gazette of the notice of deposit of the scheme in the office of the Local Commission. Such objections are forwarded to the District Commission, failing which, the Local Commission may decide on the merit of the case. After the period for lodging objections has elapsed, the District Commission submits the scheme to the High Commissioner accompanied by comments and remarks (if any) by members of the District Commission, for authority to put the scheme into force. The High Commissioner may at his discretion grant such authority to put the scheme into force, with or without modifications; this decision shall be final. When authority is granted, notification shall be published in the Gazette, and copies shall be posted in places conveniently accessible to the public, and copies of authorized scheme and plans shall be deposited at the offices of the Local Commission for free inspection by interested persons.

Any scheme, from time to time, may be modified, suspended or annulled by the District Commission, with the authority of the High Commissioner. Notice to this effect should be made by same means as when a scheme is published.

Parcellation schemes, the equivalent of subdivisions elsewhere, may, and if required by the Local Commission shall, be submitted by the owner of any property lying within any area included by an authorized outline or detailed scheme, failing which, the Local Commission may refrain from granting a building permit unless such a parcellation scheme is prepared, submitted and approved. Notification of such a parcellation scheme shall be publicized through the Gazette and other means, and copies shall be deposited in the office of the Local Commission for free inspection. Objections to such a parcellation scheme could be lodged within six weeks of the date of publication in the Gazette at the office of the Local Commission, which comments on them and refers them to the District Commission, which either rejects the objection or modifies the scheme as a consequence of the objection.

After a scheme comes into force, the Local Commission may, and if required so to do by the District Commission, shall, prepare a list of all non-conforming buildings within the area included by the scheme, and the maximum period of non-conformity during which such buildings may continue to be put to such non-conforming use shall be determined. This is done with due consideration to the following factors:

1. The probable effective physical life of each building; having regard to its age and condition;

2. The probable effective economic and income producing life of each building; and

3. The degree and nature of the non-conformity.

An owner may not discontinue a non-conforming building or use before the expiration of the maximum period of non-conformity, unless the Local Commission is authorized by the District Commission that such non-conforming use be discontinued. The owner, under such circumstances, is eligible to compensation.

Permits.

A permit to execute any kind of work in an area constituted as a planning area is granted to the person by whom it is sought by the Local Commission if the contemplated work for which the permit is sought:

1. Is in accordance with the rules applying to such area made under the provisions of the Ordinance;
Expropriation.

After an outline or detailed scheme has come into force, the District Commission, after consultations with the Local Commission, may require the latter to proceed to the expropriation of all or any of the lands and buildings mentioned in the scheme as destined for expropriation, or of all or any of the lands required for any road work or land for playgrounds and recreation as set forth in the scheme. If the Local Commission fails in taking steps for expropriation within a time specified by the District Commission, then the latter proceeds with the expropriation; all expenses, costs, etc., incurred as a result are recoverable from the Local Commission. Expropriation shall be carried out in accordance with the Land (Acquisition for Public Purposes) Ordinance of 1943, or any Ordinance amending that Ordinance, or substituted therefor, as though the High Commissioner had authorized the Local Commission to exercise all the powers and perform all the obligations conferred or imposed on the High Commissioner under the provisions of that Ordinance for the purpose of, or in connection with, the acquisition of the land, or buildings to be expropriated.

The Local Commission has the right to offer the pecuniary value of the land expropriated to the owner, or to agree with the said owner in full or partial satisfaction of all claims arising as a result of such expropriation for paying back in land, whether or not within the area of the scheme, and in the case of the expropriation of the land of a number of adjoining owners, it shall be equally competent for the Local Commission, instead of paying back in money to agree with said owners for the transference to them or to any of them, either jointly or severally, of other land, whether within the area of the scheme and not needed for expropriation, or outside the area of the scheme. Such agreements shall in all cases be subject to the approval of the District Commission. If the owner refuses to accept the exchange of land for his expropriated land, then the Local Commission is competent to refer the matter to arbitration. The arbitrator or board of arbitrators decides whether the owner ought or ought not to be compelled to accept the land offered as compensation, instead of its monetary value. If the arbitrator, or board of arbitrators, is satisfied that the land offered as compensation is of at least equal value with the land to be expropriated and fully equivalent to the said land in nature, quality, situation and convenience, and the refusal of the owner to accept it is unreasonable and vexatious, then he may order that the land so offered, instead of its pecuniary value, shall be transferred to the owner.

In the case of land expropriated for road purposes, the Local Commission is competent to expropriate the land without compensation, provided that not more than one quarter of the area of the plot belonging to the owner is expropriated. However, if it is established that hardship would result to the owner if he is not compensated for his land, the High Commissioner may in his discretion direct the Local Commission to pay for the land taken. In all circumstances, if more than one quarter of the land is expropriated, the part in excess of one quarter of the land shall be compensated for. If a building is included in the expropriated area, it shall be compensated for. If the land so expropriated is not to be used right away, the maximum period of postponement is two years, during which interval the owner continues to possess and enjoy his property. All expropriated property shall be put to the use described by the scheme, unless this entails the displacement of people living in dwelling houses on the expropriated land, in which case satisfactory housing must be provided for the would-be displaced persons, and subject to the satisfaction and approval of the District Commissioner.

In the event that the expropriated land is not going to be put to the purposes of the scheme, then the original owner has first priority of buying his land back at a price not higher than he was obliged to sell, unless some benefits accrued to the property as a result of improvements carried out under the scheme, and in case of disagreement, such a price is determined by arbitration.

Cost of Scheme.

The cost of a scheme shall include:

1. All sums payable by the Local Commission under the provisions of the Ordinance (1945);
2. All sums spent or estimated to be spent by the Local Commission in the making and execution of the scheme;
3. All legal and technical expenses of the Local commission incurred in the making and in the execution of the scheme.

If any land has been reclaimed by the Government, or by a municipal corporation or local council, or by any other public body, and such reclamation has been completed within a period of one year prior to the date on which a scheme is put into force under the provisions of the Ordinance, such reclaimed land may, with the High Commissioner's approval, be included in such scheme and the costs entailed thereby, in whole or in part, as directed by the High Commissioner, be part of the cost of the scheme.

Planning Rates.

After the declaration of a planning area, the Local Commission may, and if required by the District Commission, shall, impose, within the planning area or in any part of it, a general, or a particular planning rate, or both.

1. A general planning rate may be imposed to meet the expenses incurred, or to be incurred, by the Local Commission in preparing and executing all schemes in the area within which it is imposed, and any other expenses incurred, or to be incurred, by the Local Commission in connection therewith, and shall be levied upon all owners of land in that area.
2. A particular planning rate may be imposed to meet the expenses incurred, or to be incurred, by the Local Commission under, or in connection with, any scheme on any of the following works or matters and shall be levied upon all owners of property affected thereby:

(a) The construction or improvement of roads, including footpaths, road widenings, tree planting, road-side benches and other items of town furnishing;

(b) The acquisition of land, property or rights;

(c) The layout and construction of public recreation grounds and children's playgrounds;

(d) The layout, construction and planting of public gardens, squares and boulevards;

(e) Measures for the prevention of soil erosion in the immediate vicinity of built-up areas;

(f) The reservation of areas as nature reserves, and their planting, protection and maintenance;

(g) The clearance, rebuilding and replanning of reconstructed areas;

(h) Any other matters which, in the opinion of the District Commission, will improve the general amenities, health and living conditions of the locality.

Also, the Local Commission shall, subject to the approval of the District Commission:

1. Prescribe the amount of any planning rate;

2. Prescribe the manner in which such rate is to be payable by owners;

3. Assess the amount of rate to be paid by each owner;

4. In the case of a particular planning rate, decide what property is or will be affected by the work or other matter in respect of which the rate has been imposed, so as to render the owners thereof liable under above sections to pay the rate.

In assessing the rate to be levied on the owner, the Local Commission may take into consideration the area of the plot of the owner, the extent of frontage of his plot, and any other factor which in their opinion has relevant importance. The District Commission has the right to increase, decrease or modify the planning rates arrived at by the Local Commission.

Once a particular planning rate has been imposed in furtherance of proposed scheme, and it is intended to levy such a rate, before the expenses of the scheme have been incurred, the following procedure shall be observed:

1. The Local Commission submits, for approval of District Commission, names of owners affected by the scheme with a provisional assessment of the amount of rate to be shouldered by each owner.

2. Local Commission must publish a notice in the Gazette (and other local newspapers) and post notices in public and accessible places, stating its intention of carrying out the scheme.

3. Within one month of the publication of the notice any affected owner may lodge objection at the Office of the Local Commission on the ground that his name or that of any other person has been wrongly included in, or excluded from, it, but on no other grounds.

4. The objections, together with comments, will be forwarded by the Local Commission to the District Commission whose decision on the matter shall be final.

On the completion of the work or other matters under a scheme for which a planning rate has been imposed, a statement of the exact costs shall be prepared by the Local Commission, with a schedule setting out the names of the owners of property affected, and make a final assessment of the amount to be paid by each owner. The procedure followed above (1, 2, 3, 4) followed for provisional assessments shall be followed in the final assessment referred to in this paragraph. The necessary adjustments between the provisional and final rates is made by the Local Commission, and where there is a difference the owner is refunded if he paid more originally, but will have to pay more if he paid less on the basis of the provisional assessment. The owner is served notice by the Local Commission with regard to the planning rate he has to pay. He must pay within thirty days of the service of the notice (either lump sum or in annual or other periodical instalments), failing which the Local Commission may proceed to recover the rate in the same manner as it may recover municipal or local council rates under the Municipal Corporation of Local Council Ordinances, as the case may be. If the Local Commission is not a Municipal Council or the council of a Local Council, it may recover the rate in the same manner as a civil debt.

Compensation.

Aside from injuries incurred on a person by the effectuation of a scheme (other than by expropriation) and owner can, within six months from the date at which the scheme comes into force, lay claim for compensation by writing to the office of the Local Commission. The Local Commission forwards a notice of claim to the District Commission with an estimate of the sum claimed as compensation. If no agreement is reached through the District Commission, the matter is referred to arbitration.

Property shall not be considered injuriously affected as a consequence of the scheme on account of any provision inserted therein which:

1. Prescribes the space about buildings;

2. Limits the number of buildings;

3. Regulates, or empowers the Local Commission or any other person to regulate the size, height, design or external appearance of buildings;

4. Prohibits or restricts building operations pending the preparation and approval of an outline scheme;

5. Prohibits or restricts building operations permanently on the ground that, by reason of the situation or nature of the land, the erection of buildings thereon would be likely to involve
danger or injury to health or risk to life or danger from flooding or erosion, or excessive expenditure of public money in the provision of roads, sewers, water supply or other public services; or

6. Prohibits (otherwise than by way of prohibition of building operations) the use of land for a purpose likely to involve danger or injury to health or risk to life, or serious detriment to the neighbourhood, or restricts (otherwise than by way of restriction of building operations) the use of land so far as may be necessary for preventing such danger, injury, risk or detriment; or

7. Restricts the manner in which buildings may be used; or

8. Fixes in relation to any road or proposed road a line beyond which no building abutting on that road or proposed road may project; or

9. In the case of erection of any building intended to be used for purposes of business or industry, requires the provision of accommodation for loading, unloading or fueling vehicles with a view to preventing obstruction of traffic on any highway.

However, the High Commissioner’s decision as to whether any provision in any of the above-mentioned items as to whether such provision is reasonable, shall be final.

Offences and Penalties.

A person becomes guilty of an offence, and is liable on conviction to a fine not more than 50 Pounds ($200 in 1945) or for a term of imprisonment not exceeding three months, if he, within any planning area:

1. Carries out any work or non-conforming use for which a permit is required under the Planning Ordinance, or under any by-law, rule or authorized scheme made, or deemed to have been made under the provisions of the Ordinance, without conforming with the permit; or

2. Carries out any such work or non-conforming use otherwise than in accordance with any by-law, rule or authorized scheme made, or deemed to have been made, under the provisions of the Ordinance; or

3. Fails to comply with the provisions of any by-law, rule, authorized scheme or order made, or deemed to have been made, under the provisions of the Ordinance (1945) or made under the provisions of any other Ordinance as to the demolition of any dangerous structure; or

4. Fails to comply with any condition attached to a permit issued under the Ordinance, or under any by-law, rule or authorized scheme made, or deemed to have been made, under the provisions of the Ordinance.

If the offender continues in the offence, he shall be liable to an additional fine not exceeding 5 Pounds for every day during which the offence is continued after written notice from the Local Commission of such offence or after conviction. The court before which such a person is convicted may order the “offender” to pull down all work carried out in offence. Or, the Local Commission may be called upon to carry the demolition of the work and collect its expenditures from the owner as a civil debt. The court also may specify the time within which any order may be carried out. If a person fails to comply with the court’s order, he is liable, on conviction, to a fine not exceeding 200 Pounds or to imprisonment for a term not exceeding three months, or to both such penalties, and to an additional fine not exceeding 5 Pounds for every day during which such failure of neglect is continued after the expiration of such specified or reasonable time.

Any wrong information provided by any person and presented to the authorities (whether Local Commission, District Commission, Municipal or Local Council, or any of their officials) for obtaining the approval of a scheme or a permit is guilty of an offence and is liable, on conviction, to imprisonment not exceeding six months, or to a fine not exceeding 100 Pounds or to both these penalties; any such approval or permit obtained by such crooked means is deemed void and of no effect. If a person fails, refuses or neglects to pay the fees legitimately due for obtaining a permit, he is fined, upon conviction, double the amount of such fees. Any work that might have been carried without a permit, or under a false permit, the court has the power to order that the building structure shall be pulled down.

This is an Ordinance the like of which does not exist, yet, in any Arab city in 1961. To achieve good city planning, either the government plans everything as in the USSR, or the government must enact enlightened legislation while exercising stringent controls to obtain due conformance. The public health, welfare and safety of people warrant the use of the police power. It is high time for the planless Arab cities to come of age in municipal and urban affairs—comprehensively—and to stop being coy about codes, controls and urban conditions. (For comparisons, see recent planning legislation in the Sudan and Jordan: Appendices 17 and 22).

Kuwait, June, 1961.
APPENDIX 6.2

Antiquities Ordinances

1. Antiquities Ordinance (From the Laws of Palestine) An Ordinance to Provide for Control of Antiquities (1-30) 31 Dec. 1929.

2. Antiquities Rules (from the Laws of Palestine) 1 Feb. 1930 (Article 1-6)

3. Antiquities Ordinance to Regulate Certain Premises Occupied by the Department of Antiquities. 15 August 1935 (1-4).


Article 21
The Mandatory shall secure the enactment within twelve months from this date, and shall ensure the execution of a Law of Antiquities based on the following rules. This law shall ensure equality of treatment in the matters of excavations and archaeological research to the nations of all States Members of the League of Nations.

(I) "Antiquities" means any construction or any product of human activity earlier than the year A.D. 1700.

(II) The Law for the protection of antiquities shall proceed by encouragement rather than by threat.

Any person who, having discovered an antiquity without being furnished with the authorization referred to in paragraph 5, reports the same to an official of the competent Department, shall be rewarded according to the value of the discovery.

(III) No antiquity may be disposed of except to the competent Department, unless this Department renounce the acquisition of any such antiquity.

No antiquity may leave the country without an export licence from the said Department.

(IV) Any person who maliciously or negligently destroyed or damaged an antiquity shall be liable to a penalty to be fixed.

(V) No clearing of ground or digging with the object of finding antiquities shall be permitted, under penalty of fine, except to persons authorised by the competent Department.

(VI) Equitable terms shall be fixed for expropriation, temporary or permanent, of lands which might be of historical or archaeological interest.

(VII) Authorization to excavate shall only be granted to persons who show sufficient guarantees of archaeological experience. The Administration of Palestine shall act, in granting these authorization, act in such a way as to exclude scholars of any nation without good grounds.

(VIII) The proceeds of excavations may be divided between the excavator and the competent Department in a proportion fixed by that Department. If division seems impossible for scientific reasons, the excavator shall receive a fair indemnity in lieu of a part of the find.
Appendix 6.3

Extracts from the Conference "Towards a General Policy for Conservation in the West Bank.
Source: Al-Mumhandis Al-Falastini, 1994)

وقائع المؤتمر الأول للحفاظ على التراث العضوي في فلسطين

د. أحمد الزعبي / م. رشاد الجابري

venir et faire la paix entre les deux clans ennemis. Il fallait que cette paix soit acceptée par tous les groupes politiques et sociaux pour être efficace.

ولعبت الصحراء الشرقية دورًا مهمًا في بناء الدولة العربية في فلسطين. تم اكتشاف العديد من الآثار التاريخية HERE (HISTORY) في هذه المنطقة، بما في ذلك الأثار الأثرية والآثار المعمارية. هذه الآثار تشير إلى تاريخ طويل من الاستعمار والتعلم.

وقد تميزت المملكة العربية في فلسطين بتنوعها الثقافي والديمغرافي. كانت هناك أدوات جديدة للتعليم والخدمة العامة مثل المدارس والمستشفيات. بالإضافة إلى ذلك، كانت هناك أيضًا خدمات صحية وتعدينية مهمة تقدمها الحكومة. اليوم الأول:

أزيت اليوم الأول بحث أن يكون يومًا رائعًا للوقوف وتجربة العادات والتقاليد المحببة. سيظهر الناس فنون مثل الخط العربي البديع، والطفولة، وعادات أخرى تعكس تاريخ وثقافة المملكة العربية. اليوم كان يومًا رائعًا للوقوف وتجربة العادات والتقاليد المحببة. سيظهر الناس فنون مثل الخط العربي البديع، والطفولة، وعادات أخرى تعكس تاريخ وثقافة المملكة العربية. اليوم كان يومًا رائعًا للوقوف وتجربة العادات والتقاليد المحببة. سيظهر الناس فنون مثل الخط العربي البديع، والطفولة، وعادات أخرى تعكس تاريخ وثقافة المملكة العربية. اليوم كان يومًا رائعًا للوقوف وتجربة العادات والتقاليد المحببة. سيظهر الناس فنون مثل الخط العربي البديع، والطفولة، وعادات أخرى تعكس تاريخ وثقافة المملكة العربية. اليوم كان يومًا رائعًا للوقوف وتجربة العادات والتقاليد المحببة. سيظهر الناس فنون مثل الخط العربي البديع، والطفولة، وعادات أخرى تعكس تاريخ وثقافة المملكة العربية. اليوم كان يومًا رائعًا للوقوف وتجربة العادات والتقاليد المحببة. سيظهر الناس فنون مثل الخط العربي البديع، والطفولة، وعادات أخرى تعكس تاريخ وثقافة المملكة العربية. اليوم كان يومًا رائعًا للوقوف وتجربة العادات والتقاليد المحببة. سيظهر الناس فنون مثل الخط العربي البديع، والطفولة، وعادات أخرى تعكس تاريخ وثقافة المملكة العربية. اليوم كان يومًا رائعًا للوقوف وتجربة العادات والتقاليد المحببة. سيظهر الناس فنون مثل الخط العربي البديع، والطفولة، وعادات أخرى تعكس تاريخ وثقافة المملكة العربية. اليوم كان يومًا رائعًا للوقوف وتجربة العادات والتقاليد المحببة. سيظهر الناس فنون مثل الخط العربي البديع، والطفولة، وعادات أخرى تعكس تاريخ وثقافة المملكة العربية. اليوم كان يومًا رائعًا للوقوف وتجربة العادات والتقاليد المحببة. سيظهر الناس فنون مثل الخط العربي البديع، والطفولة، وعادات أخرى تعكس تاريخ وثقافة المملكة العربية. اليوم كان يومًا رائعًا للوقوف وتجربة العادات والتقاليد المحببة. سيظهر الناس فنون مثل الخط العربي البديع، والطفولة، وعادات أخرى تعكس تاريخ وثقافة المملكة العربية. اليوم كان يومًا رائعًا للوقوف وتجربة العادات والتقاليد المحببة. سيظهر الناس فنون مثل الخط العربي البديع، والطفولة، وعادات أخرى تعكس تاريخ وثقافة المملكة العربية. اليوم كان يومًا رائعًا للوقف...
وقال المهندس خالد بسيم البسيم الذي يهتم بمراجعة الأدوات المتاحة، نحن نعمل على تحسين وتعزيز الاستجابة الفورية للمشكلات المحتملة في مجال التكنولوجيا. ونحن نعمل أيضًا على تدريب وتدريب الفئة المعنية على كيفية التعامل مع الأخطار وتجنب المخاطر المحتملة.

1. تطوير حلول هامة لمواجهة التهديدات من الأخطار المحتملة في مجال التكنولوجيا.
2. تحسين المهارات اللازمة للتعامل مع الأخطار المحتملة في مجال التكنولوجيا.
3. تدريب الفئة المعنية على كيفية التعامل مع الأخطار المحتملة في مجال التكنولوجيا.
4. تطوير حلول هامة لمواجهة التهديدات من الأخطار المحتملة في مجال التكنولوجيا.
5. تحسين المهارات اللازمة للتعامل مع الأخطار المحتملة في مجال التكنولوجيا.
6. تدريب الفئة المعنية على كيفية التعامل مع الأخطار المحتملة في مجال التكنولوجيا.
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8. تحسين المهارات اللازمة للتعامل مع الأخطار المحتملة في مجال التكنولوجيا.
9. تدريب الفئة المعنية على كيفية التعامل مع الأخطار المحتملة في مجال التكنولوجيا.
10. تطوير حلول هامة لمواجهة التهديدات من الأخطار المحتملة في مجال التكنولوجيا.

11. تطوير حلول هامة لمواجهة التهديدات من الأخطار المحتملة في مجال التكنولوجيا.
12. تحسين المهارات اللازمة للتعامل مع الأخطار المحتملة في مجال التكنولوجيا.
13. تدريب الفئة المعنية على كيفية التعامل مع الأخطار المحتملة في مجال التكنولوجيا.
14. تطوير حلول هامة لمواجهة التهديدات من الأخطار المحتملة في مجال التكنولوجيا.
15. تحسين المهارات اللازمة للتعامل مع الأخطار المحتملة في مجال التكنولوجيا.
16. تدريب الفئة المعنية على كيفية التعامل مع الأخطار المحتملة في مجال التكنولوجيا.

National register - 1 - عمل مسجل وظام للمواقع التاريخية
2 - القيام بجمع الدفعت التراثية في مواقع التراثية الأثرية.
3 - تطوير النشاطات التراثية على مستوى البلاد.
4 - تطوير النشاطات التراثية على مستوى البلاد.
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12 - تطوير النشاطات التراثية على مستوى البلاد.

Appendices
строة الأوضاع الرائدة للتحديات التاريخية.
1 - ضعف المشاكل والانقطاع الذي يعترض له تزايد
2 - وضع إجراءات وحل لهذه المشكل.
3 - تطبيق الدكتور في مساحة النظرية. وقد يوجد أن الدكتور يكون مهتمًا بالاستخدام، في كل الاستخدام، في كل الاستخدام، على سبيل المثال، هو الدكتور، وذلك للبحث.

فيما يتعلق ب الفرنجيات وال adoles، فقد يكون الدكتور، على سبيل المثال، هو الدكتور، وذلك للبحث.

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أفضلت محاسبات التحقق في الهيدرودعم عمام نوع عرض فيها مشروحة قرد تصميمًا مماثلة للكثير من التحقيقات الدقيقة في هذا المجال. عاماً، نحن نستخدم نظم تحديد الأتصالات في خطة التطور، ونستخدم نظاماً ممتلئاً.

وفي فحص الحوز، فقد الدكتور، على سبيل المثال، هو الدكتور، وذلك للبحث.

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Projects Currently Undertaken by Riwaq

Source: As in Riwaq brochure, Ramallah, West Bank.

1. El-Bireh Cultural Centre: Al-Hashimieh building is a high school in the centre of El-Bireh closed by military rule in 1984. The importance of Al-Hashimieh lies deep in the history of the life of the town as thousands of young men have graduated from here. The objective of the project is the restoration of the building and its conversion into a community cultural centre. This will be undertaken in association with the El-Bireh municipality.

2. THE MUD BRICK PROJECT: Due to high costs of land and building materials in the Occupied Territories the majority of the population are living in substandard accommodation. Coupled with the poor infra-structure, a housing shortage and high housing densities, prevailing conditions are poor. The objective of this project is to produce a new durable mud brick with good physical and thermal properties capable of competing favourably with the expensive building materials currently available. A civil engineer has already begun research with the ultimate hope of producing evidence of the feasibility of using improved mud brick for construction. We then hope to build a community centre from the improved mud brick in the Gaza Strip demonstrating methods which aim at reducing building costs.

3. JOINT PROJECT WITH THE PALESTINIAN YOUTH UNION (PYU): In normal society the younger generation represents the moving force in the development process. Youth play and important role in defining the nature of economical, social, political and cultural changes. Young Palestinian men and women in particular have an important role in shaping future developments whether these stem from local or international factors. Under occupation, a large number of activities which allowed young people to use their free time and develop their interests and hobbies have been prohibited. The PYU believes that there should be more investment in the needs of youth and their education, interests and social and cultural aspirations.

The aim of this project, therefore, is to encourage Palestinian youth to establish their own centres through supervised voluntary restoration of old buildings in their villages. This will also serve to raise awareness of local cultural heritage and help slow down the escalating destruction and decay of the village.

4. TRAINING COURSES IN BUILDING PRESERVATION AND RESTORATION: As part of its educational programme, Riwaq, is organising a number of specialised training courses. The acute lack of experience in building preservation amongst local architects and civil engineers makes this a most important project. The target group for these courses are practising architects and civil engineers, new architectural graduates and employees of institutions such as municipalities and housing departments. As major policy makers it is hoped that they will be influenced positively towards conservation, preservation and the integration of traditional architectural styles.

5. REVIVAL OF THE USE OF THE TRADITIONAL TILE PATTERNS: Perhaps more than any other aspect of Palestinian material culture, traditional architecture is experience a rapid loss of its distinctive character. Three or four decades ago craftsmen produced and used a wide range of floor tiles. Now the production of these tiles, like most other building crafts, has been discontinued.

With this project, the revival and use of traditional tiles, it is hoped to raise awareness amongst architects and builders of the significance and importance of understanding and using traditional building alternatives. The project is in two phases. We have already carried out extensive documentation of existing tile patterns in old buildings. This is currently being followed by production and experimentation of samples which, if successful, will result in mass production of cost effective new tiles.

6. JIFFNA RESTORATION PROJECT: The community of the village of Jiffna have initiated a self-help group in order to restore old buildings there. On completion of the restoration, the buildings will be used for a variety of community needs. Riwaq is currently providing technical expertise on the project.
7. LIBRARY AND AUDIO VISUAL ROOM: The objective of this project is to establish a specialised library of books, slides and video film focusing on issues related to vernacular architecture, archaeological heritage of the region, alternative building technology and materials, interior design and cultural topics. A library of this nature would not only be a great asset to RIWAQ but also for those concerned individuals who have no access to such a facility elsewhere.

8. EL-WASITI ARTS AND CRAFTS CENTRE: The restoration of an old building in Jerusalem to be used as an Arts and Crafts Centre. (in collaboration with the Society of El-Wasiti). El-Wasiti building was one of the study cases that we dealt with during the first training course which was taught by Dr. Bourgoyne. In this study technical descriptions of the physical and cultural structural conditions of the building were taken. RIWAQ then prepared the tender for El-Wasiti group and will continue the supervision of the renovation process.

9. CHILDREN’S TOYS: The aim of this project is to educate children about their architectural and cultural heritage through Play. It will also provide children with the opportunity to enjoy toys which are made, and reflect the culture of, their own country. This will be achieved by producing toy models of a partnership with the Tamer Institute for Community Education, these models will be locally produced and marketed for children in two age groups; 3-6 years old and 6-10 years old.
APPENDIX 6.5

Samples of the Documentation at the Old Town of Nablus by the Department of Architecture at An Najah National University.
Source: Drawings by Miss. Hanen Saddar, Nablus.

Ground Floor of Suq el-Naser
Heights of Building in Suq el-Naser

Condition of Buildings in Suq el-Naser
Isometric of Suq el-Naser
APPENDIX 6.6

Drawings of Qaser Al-Qasem in the Village of Bit Wazan Near Nablus
Source: the Author.

Ground Floor Plan of Qaser al-Qasem
First Floor Plan of Qaser al-Qasem
Second Floor Plan of Qasr al-Qasem
North Elevation of Qaser al-Qasem

West Elevation of Qaser al-Qasem