Kināyah as a figure of speech in the Qur’an: an analysis of four English translations

Riyad Abdallah M. Naseef

Submitted in accordance with the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy

The University of Leeds
Faculty of Arts
School of Languages, Cultures and Societies

November, 2018
The candidate confirms that the work submitted is his/her own and that appropriate credit has been given where reference has been made to the work of others.

This copy has been supplied on the understanding that it is copyright material and that no quotation from the thesis may be published without proper acknowledgement.

The right of Riyad Abdallah M. Naseef to be identified as Author of this work has been asserted by him in accordance with the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988.

© 2018 The University of Leeds and Riyad Abdallah M. Naseef
This work is dedicated to:

My dearest mother and father, my beloved wife, and my cherished children
Acknowledgements

First and foremost, all praise and thanks are above all due to Allah, the Almighty, the Most Gracious and Compassionate, the Lord of mercy and the universe, for giving me the opportunity, strength, knowledge, perseverance, and ability to carry out this study and to complete it in a satisfactory manner. Surely, without His blessings this accomplishment would not have been possible. Hence, any rightness and soundness in this study are due to His grace and blessings, and any flaws are down to our unfortunate oversight.

Then the utmost respect, warmest love, and eternal gratitude goes to my dearest and best ever parents in the world, Prof Abdallah Naseef and Shamma as-Sayyid. No matter what I do, I will not be able to reciprocate the continuing forbearance, affection, devotion, prayers, guidance, and generosity they gave me. Thus, I will always be deeply indebted to them. I also owe my lovely wife, Nouf al-Malki and our four children, Abdallah (Mstr.), Reemas (Ms.), Reenad (Ms.), and Salman (Mstr.) a deep debt of gratitude for their undying love and patience. They constantly fill my life with overwhelming joy and are my inspiration, motivation, and strength. My beloved wife’s zealous support, encouragement, and passionate care not only helped substantially ease my health condition and stress, but it made it possible for me to complete this study, despite the fact she is also completing a postgraduate programme. My deepest thanks and gratitude also go to my siblings, Khalid, Omar, Zaki, and Mariah for their boundless prayers and support, and for being there whenever needed. In particular, I am much obliged to Khalid as well as Zaki.

One of the well-known sayings of the Prophet Mohammad, peace be upon him, is that ‘whoever does not thank the people [for any sort of favours, support, assistance, kindness, and the like, even if it was something small] has not thanked Allah’. Consequently, I have great pleasure in acknowledging my undying gratitude to my supervisor, the one and only Prof James Dickins. He is such an extraordinary person. Prof Dickins is not just an esteemed professor of Arabic and a prominent figure in translation studies, but he is an inspiration, a pillar of support, and a friend to all of his students and the people surrounding him. His continuous benevolence, feelings, and concern about my health and family have consistently bolstered and kept up my morale and spirits. The wholehearted support, infinite patience, encouragement, guidance, meticulous scrutiny of drafts, and invaluable notes Professor James has provided throughout my academic journey has
made this study practicable. Indeed, it is a great privilege to work under his benign supervision.

Correspondingly, I owe special sense of cordial gratitude to my esteemed co-supervisor, Dr Mustapha Sheikh for his sincere support and encouragement. Likewise, I would like to offer my heartfelt thanks to Mrs Karen Priestley (Education Service Officer - Postgraduate Research) for her dignified cooperation and administrative assistance. The same applies to Prof Ingrid Sharp (Postgraduate Research Tutor). Special thanks go to the School of Languages Cultures & Societies, in general, and the department of Arabic, Islamic & Middle Eastern Studies, in particular, for having me. With privilege, I extend my grateful thanks to the examiners, Prof El Mustapha Lahlali (University of Leeds) and Dr Farah Aboubakr (University of Edinburgh), for their rigorous scrutiny, invaluable comments, and professional advice.

My acknowledgement would be incomplete without expressing my gratefulness to my dearest friends, Muhammad al-Qahtani, Hisham al-Dekhayil (Head of Saudi Airlines - UK & Italy), Dr Faisal al-Mijfil, Abdallah al-Shihri, Dr Badr at-Tamimi, Dr Ayman al-Musharaf, and Fayeza al-Malki, including my brothers-in-law Abdallah and Abdulrahman al-Malki, who in their own ways have kept me going on my path to success, assisting me by whatever means possible, lifting my spirits, and ensuring good times keep flowing. A special appreciation to my friend and relative, Prof Sulaiman al-Harbi, for sharing his wisdom and providing me with valuable advice whenever needed. Also, I would like to extend my sincere gratitude to Mahdi Manaa’ al-Aseeri for his extraordinary understanding and cooperation.

In addition, I would like to offer my gratitude to my UK dearest friends, Olivia Edwards and James Dodd, for their love, thoughtfulness, convivial nature, invaluable friendship, and support. Similarly, I must acknowledge with appreciation my fellow postgraduates, Dr Badr at-Tamimi, Dr Komail al-Herz, Abdulrahman Albeladi, and Dr Bashar Almaani, for their invaluable advice at various stages of this study. Thanks also to Abdallah al-Turki, who also did not hesitate in helping me with PowerPoint.

Last but not least, I am sincerely grateful to the Government of Saudi Arabia for their generous sponsorship – may God protect this wonderful nation, its king, and people, and bless them, and the rest of the nations, with peace and prosperity.
Abstract

Since figurative expressions involve a double interpretation and are easily misinterpreted, they can pose a serious problem in translation. Kināyah, a central figure of speech in the Arabic rhetorical tradition, is extensively employed in the Qur’an. While several existing studies examine how Qur’anic figurative expressions are translated into English, this is to my knowledge the first substantial study to focus on kināyah.

The study first considers the main Arabic figures of speech (ʾistiᶜārah, tashbīh, majāz al-mursal, kināyah) plus the main English ones (metaphor, simile, metonymy, synecdoche), demonstrating that there is no equivalent figure to kināyah in English. Forty-five Qur’anic kināyah expressions are then chosen, pursuant to al-Jurjāni’s definition of kināyah and the majority of Qur’anic exegetes. Using authoritative Arabic and English dictionaries and exegeses, these expressions are analysed contextually in order to understand the meaning and purpose of each kināyah. This is followed by a target text (TT) analysis of four well-known English Qur’an translations: Ali, al-Hilali & Khan, Saheeh International, and Abdel Haleem. The study examines: (1) how the four translations render each kināyah, (2) the intelligibility of the renditions, (3) whether there is any loss of meaning, (4) whether the renditions maintain the function of the ST kināyah, and (5) consistency in rendering the same kināyah when it occurs in different ʾāyahs (Qur’anic verses).

Underlining the fact that kināyah has no equivalent in Western rhetoric, the study shows that while majāz mursal has similar features to the western metonymy and synecdoche, kināyah does not. Therefore, the use of the terms kināyah and majāz mursal for ‘metonymy’ and vice versa, as in most dictionaries and some studies, is incorrect. The study also shows that although the selected Qur’anic translations are largely source-oriented, the translators were able to render most of the kināyah expressions successfully. However, the translations were frequently not able to maintain the functions of the kināyah, apart from the euphemistic one, demonstrating that they prioritise meaning over function. In cases where there is a probable loss of the intended meaning, the translators employ footnotes, paraphrasing, or explicitation. The translations of Saheeh International and particularly Abdel Haleem are more intelligible than the rest due to their choice of contemporary and idiomatic vocabulary. Hence, they use footnotes and paraphrasing much less than Ali and Al-Hilali & Khan. For the most part the translations are consistent, especially Saheeh International and Abdel Haleem.
Table of Contents

Acknowledgements ................................................................................................... iv
Abstract ..................................................................................................................... vi
Table of Contents .................................................................................................... vii
List of Tables ........................................................................................................... xii
List of Figures ......................................................................................................... xiv
List of Abbreviations .............................................................................................. xv
Transliteration Symbols for Arabic Characters ................................................ xvii
Chapter one: Background of the study ................................................................. 1
  1.1 Introduction .................................................................................................. 1
  1.2 Statement of the problem ............................................................................. 1
  1.3 The reasons for choosing this topic .............................................................. 4
  1.4 Aim, objectives, and questions of the study ................................................. 4
    1.4.1 The objectives .................................................................................. 5
    1.4.2 Questions of the study ...................................................................... 5
  1.5 Scope and limitation ................................................................................... 6
  1.6 Procedural framework .................................................................................. 6
  1.7 Structure of the study ................................................................................ 7
Chapter two: Kināyah and metonymy are they one and the same? ..................... 9
  2.1 Introduction .................................................................................................. 9
  2.2 Arabic rhetoric ............................................................................................. 9
    2.2.1 Rhetoric (balāģah) and eloquence (fašāhah) ........................................ 10
    2.2.1.1 Eloquence ................................................................. Error! Bookmark not defined.
    2.2.1.2 Rhetoric ................................................................. Error! Bookmark not defined.
  2.3 Ḳilm al-bayān [Science of elocution] .......................................................... 15
    2.3.1 Tashbīh (Arabic simile) ................................................................. 16
    2.3.2 Majāz (Figurativeness) ................................................................. 17
      2.3.2.1 Majāz ʿaqīli (cognitional figurativeness) ............................ 19
      2.3.2.2 Majāz lughawī (Lingual figurativeness) ............................ 20
      2.3.3.2.1 Ḳistiʿārah (Arabic metaphor) ....................................... 21
      2.3.3.2.2 Majāz mursal (Arabic metonymy/synecdoche) .............. 23
  2.4 Kināyah ...................................................................................................... 25
    2.4.1 Classifications of kināyah .................................................................... 34
      2.4.1.1 Kināyah from an objective perspective .................................... 34
      2.4.1.2 Kināyah from a context and medium perspective ............... 36
Chapter three: Qur’an, kināyah, and translation ........................................... 69

3.1 Introduction ................................................................................................ 69

3.2 The nature and status of the Qur’an ........................................................... 69

3.3 The legitimacy of translating the Qur’an .................................................... 72

3.3.1 Ruling of translating the Qur’an word-for-word (interlinear translation) .......................................................... 73

3.3.2 Ruling of translating the Qur’an literally ............................................. 74

3.3.3 Ruling on explanatory translation of the Qur’an ................................ 75

3.4 Translation of the meaning of the Qur’an ................................................ 76

3.5 Western translations of the Qur’an ............................................................ 77

3.6 English translations of the Qur’an ............................................................. 79

3.6.1 English translations of the Qur’an by non-Muslims ...................... 79

3.6.2 English translations of the Qur’an by Muslims ............................. 81

3.7 A brief overview of the four selected translations .................................. 84

3.7.1 Abdullah Yusuf Ali (2001) ............................................................ 84

3.7.2 Muhammad Taqi-ad-Din al-Hilali and Muhammad Muhsin Khan (1417 H. [1996]) .......................................................... 87

3.7.3 Saheeh International (1997/2004): ................................................. 90

3.7.4 Muhammad A. S. Abdel Haleem (2005): ...................................... 92

3.8 Comprehension, the Qur’an’s genre, translation, and Qur’anic exegeses . 95

3.9 Kināyah and Qur’an ................................................................................. 104

3.10 Kināyah and translation studies ............................................................. 105

Chapter four: The concept of equivalence in translation ......................... 110

4.1 Introduction .............................................................................................. 110

4.2 Introduction to equivalence ...................................................................... 110
4.2.1 Vinay and Darbelnet’s concept of equivalence ............................ 112
4.2.2 Roman Jakobson’s equivalence: .................................................. 116
4.2.3 Eugine Nida’s theory of equivalence ........................................... 118
4.2.4 Peter Newmark’s theory of equivalence ...................................... 124
4.2.5 Beekman and Callow’s notion of equivalence ............................. 135
4.2.6 Mildred Lason’s concept of equivalence ..................................... 143
4.2.7 Mona Baker’s notion of equivalence ........................................... 153

Chapter five: ST Analysis ..................................................................................... 156

5.1 Introduction .............................................................................................. 156

Kināyah 1 and 2 .......................................................................................... 157
Kināyah 3 and 4 .......................................................................................... 158
Kināyah 5 and 6 .......................................................................................... 160
Kināyah 7 and 8 .......................................................................................... 162
Kināyah 9 and 10 .......................................................................................... 163
Kināyah 11 ..................................................................................................... 165
Kināyah 12 ..................................................................................................... 166
Kināyah 13 and 14 ....................................................................................... 168
Kināyah 15, 16, and 17 .................................................................................. 170
Kināyah 18 and 19 ....................................................................................... 173
Kināyah 20 ..................................................................................................... 175
Kināyah 21 ..................................................................................................... 178
Kināyah 22 ..................................................................................................... 179
Kināyah 23 and 24 ....................................................................................... 181
Kināyah 25 and 26 ....................................................................................... 183
Kināyah 27 ..................................................................................................... 185
Kināyah 28 ..................................................................................................... 187
Kināyah 29 and 30 ....................................................................................... 188
Kināyah 31 ..................................................................................................... 189
Kināyah 32 ..................................................................................................... 190
Kināyah 33 ..................................................................................................... 191
Kināyah 34 ..................................................................................................... 192
Kināyah 35 ..................................................................................................... 193
Kināyah 36 ..................................................................................................... 194
Kināyah 37 ..................................................................................................... 195
Kināyah 38 ..................................................................................................... 196
Kināyah 39 ..................................................................................................... 197
Chapter Six: TT Analysis ............................................................................................................... 205
  6.1 Introduction .......................................................................................................................... 205
  Kināyah 1 ................................................................................................................................. 206
  Kināyah 2 .................................................................................................................................. 207
  Kināyah 3 and 4 .......................................................................................................................... 209
  Kināyah 5 and 6 .......................................................................................................................... 210
  Kināyah 7 and 8 .......................................................................................................................... 212
  Kināyah 9 .................................................................................................................................. 216
  Kināyah 10 ................................................................................................................................. 217
  Kināyah 11 .................................................................................................................................. 218
  Kināyah 12 .................................................................................................................................. 221
  Kināyah 13 .................................................................................................................................. 221
  Kināyah 14 .................................................................................................................................. 224
  Kināyah 15 and 16 ....................................................................................................................... 226
  Kināyah 17 .................................................................................................................................. 227
  Kināyah 18 and 19 ....................................................................................................................... 230
  Kināyah 20 .................................................................................................................................. 231
  Kināyah 21 .................................................................................................................................. 234
  Kināyah 22 .................................................................................................................................. 235
  Kināyah 23 and 24 ....................................................................................................................... 235
  Kināyah 25 and 26 ....................................................................................................................... 237
  Kināyah 27 .................................................................................................................................. 239
  Kināyah 28 .................................................................................................................................. 241
  Kināyah 29 and 30 ....................................................................................................................... 243
  Kināyah 31 .................................................................................................................................. 246
  Kināyah 32 .................................................................................................................................. 247
  Kināyah 33 .................................................................................................................................. 248
  Kināyah 34 .................................................................................................................................. 250
  Kināyah 35 .................................................................................................................................. 251
  Kināyah 36 .................................................................................................................................. 252
  Kināyah 37: .................................................................................................................................. 254
List of Tables

Table 2.1: Typical definitions of metonymy, synecdoche, kināyah, majāz mursal, and istiᶜārah ................................................................................................................. 65
Table 2.2: Forms and semantic relationships of majāz mursal, metonymy, and synecdoche .................................................................................................................. 67
Table 4.1: Vinay and Darbelnet’s translation procedures ........................................ 113
Table 4.2: Comparison of Newmark’s semantic and communicative translation .... 128
Table 4.3: Newmark’s translation procedures .......................................................... 130
Table 4.4: Beekman and Callow’s four types of translation .................................... 136
Table 4.5: Larson’s seven types of translation ......................................................... 144
Table 4.6: Some of Baker’s common types of non-equivalence ............................. 154
Table 6.1: Translations of Kināyah expression 1 .................................................... 206
Table 6.2: Translations of Kināyah expression 2 .................................................... 207
Table 6.3: Translations of Kināyah expressions 3 and 4 ....................................... 209
Table 6.4: Translations of Kināyah expressions 5 and 6 ....................................... 210
Table 6.5: Translations of kināyah expression 7 .................................................... 212
Table 6.6: Translations of kināyah expression 8 .................................................... 214
Table 6.7: Translations of Kināyah expression 9 .................................................... 216
Table 6.8: Translations of Kināyah expression 10 ................................................ 217
Table 6.9: Translations of Kināyah expression 11 ................................................ 218
Table 6.10: Translations of Kināyah expression 12 .............................................. 221
Table 6.11: Translations of Kināyah expression 13 .............................................. 221
Table 6.12: Translations of Kināyah expression 14 .............................................. 224
Table 6.13: Translations of Kināyah expressions 15 and 16 .................................. 226
Table 6.14: Translations of Kināyah expression 17 .............................................. 227
Table 6.15: Translations of Kināyah expression 17 that implies sex with men ...... 228
Table 6.16: Translations of Kināyah expressions 18 and 19 .................................. 230
Table 6.17: Translations of Kināyah expression 20 .............................................. 231
Table 6.18: Translations of Kināyah expression 21 .............................................. 234
Table 6.19: Translations of Kināyah expression 22 .............................................. 235
Table 6.20: Translations of kināyah expressions 23 and 24 .................................. 235
Table 6.21: Translations of kināyah expressions 25 and 26 .................................. 237
Table 6.22: Translations of kināyah expression 27 .............................................. 239
Table 6.23: Translations of kināyah expression 28 .............................................. 241
Table 6.24: Translations of kināyah expressions 29 and 30 .................................. 243
| Table 6.25: Translations of kināyah expression 31... | 246 |
| Table 6.26: Translations of kināyah expression 32... | 247 |
| Table 6.27: Translations of kināyah expression 33... | 248 |
| Table 6.28: Translations of kināyah expression 34... | 250 |
| Table 6.29: Translations of kināyah expression 35... | 251 |
| Table 6.30: Translations of kināyah expression 36... | 252 |
| Table 6.31: Translations of kināyah expression 37... | 254 |
| Table 6.32: Translations of kināyah expression 38... | 255 |
| Table 6.33: Translations of kināyah expression 39... | 257 |
| Table 6.34: Translations of kināyah expression 40... | 258 |
| Table 6.35: Translations of kināyah expression 41... | 259 |
| Table 6.36: Translations of kināyah expression 42... | 260 |
| Table 6.37: Translations of kināyah expression 43... | 261 |
List of Figures

*Figure 2.1:* Major disciplines of Arabic rhetoric. ................................................................. 10
*Figure 2.2:* Categories of ‘Ilm al-ma‘ānī. ................................................................. 14
*Figure 2.3:* Categories of ‘ilm al-bayān. ................................................................. 15
*Figure 2.4:* Forms of majāz mursal and their semantic relationships. ...................... 25
*Figure 2.5:* Classifications of figures of speech made by the majority of Western classical rhetoricians. ....................................................................................... 45
*Table 6.38:* Translations of kināyah expressions 44 and 45.................................. 261
*Figure 7.1:* The relationship between kināyah, majāz mursal, metonymy, and synecdoche. ..................................................................................................... 265
*Figure 7.2:* Statistics of types of translation, additions, omissions, footnotes, implicitness, and explicitness for the four selected translators. ..................... 268
*Figure 7.3:* Number of euphemistic failures. ........................................................... 270
**List of Abbreviations**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Definition</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>SL</td>
<td>Source Language</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ST</td>
<td>Source Text</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SLT</td>
<td>Source Language Text</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SLC</td>
<td>Source Language Culture</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TL</td>
<td>Target Language</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TT</td>
<td>Target text</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TLT</td>
<td>Target Language Text</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TLC</td>
<td>Target Language Culture</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TS</td>
<td>Translation studies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OED</td>
<td>Oxford English Dictionary</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
## Transliteration Symbols for Arabic Characters

### Consonants

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Arabic</th>
<th>Transliteration</th>
<th>Arabic</th>
<th>Transliteration</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ء</td>
<td>ʾ</td>
<td>ض</td>
<td>ẓ</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ا</td>
<td>a</td>
<td>ط</td>
<td>ḥ</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ب</td>
<td>b</td>
<td>ظ</td>
<td>q</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ت</td>
<td>t</td>
<td>ع</td>
<td>k</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ث</td>
<td>th</td>
<td>غ</td>
<td>l</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ج</td>
<td>j</td>
<td>ف</td>
<td>m</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ح</td>
<td>ḥ</td>
<td>ق</td>
<td>n</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>خ</td>
<td>kh</td>
<td>ك</td>
<td>h</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>د</td>
<td>d</td>
<td>ل</td>
<td>w</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ذ</td>
<td>dh</td>
<td>م</td>
<td>y</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ص</td>
<td>ṣ</td>
<td>ال</td>
<td>al-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Short vowels

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Arabic</th>
<th>Transliteration</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>أ</td>
<td>a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>إ</td>
<td>i</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ء</td>
<td>u</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Long vowels

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Arabic</th>
<th>Transliteration</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>أ</td>
<td>ā</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ء</td>
<td>ū</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note that, in this research, Arabic vocalisation is mainly applied to Qur’anic extracts. The rest of the Arabic examples are usually written without vocalisation.

Note also that some of the names, words, or terms that are lexicalised in English, such as Allah, Hajj, the Qur’an, and suchlike will be written as they have become known in English dictionaries. In other words, they will not be transliterated.
Chapter one: Background of the study

1.1 Introduction

This introductory chapter introduces this study and its components. The chapter comprises the statement of the problem, rational for choosing this particular topic including the significance and originality of the work, aims and objectives, main questions of the study, scope and limitation, how the study is going to be conducted, and an outline of the chapters.

1.2 Statement of the problem

The main objective of translation is “the transformation of a text originally in one language into an equivalent text in a different language retaining, as far as is possible, the content of the message and the formal features and functional roles of the original text” (Bell, 1991, p. xv). This might be a simple task if the intended message in the source text (ST) is explicit, but when it is implicit, it becomes harder. In some cases, it becomes an obstacle, especially when the ST is linguistically and culturally different from the target language (TL). For instance, Arabic and English are linguistically and culturally different, belonging to two different families. Arabic is a Semitic language, belonging to the Afroasiatic phylum, whereas English is a West Germanic language, belonging to the Indo-European phylum. These differences, to a considerable extent, contribute to the difficulties in translation between the two languages. Figures of speech, which are a form of expressions used to convey specific intended meanings implicitly to achieve a special effect, are amongst the difficulties that a translator could encounter, particularly when the figure of speech is culture-specific. Newmark agrees with this and argues that they could pose a problem for translators (1988, p. 104). In general, figures of speech form an integral part of our language; they can be found in religious texts, political speeches, oral literatures, poetry, and basically in everyday speech. Kināyah is one of those figures of speech in Arabic.

Kināyah can be a problematic issue for translators due to a number of reasons. First and foremost are the components that form the kināyah. Without noticing that there is another meaning intended behind the literal meaning, a translator could misinterpret the kināyah expression by rendering it literally, since the literal meaning of a kināyah may sound true. In other words, a kināyah may hold two meanings, a literal meaning and a figurative meaning. Thus, a translator can be easily deceived by the literal meaning of the kināyah.
Also, in most cases, the relationship between the intended meaning and the literal meaning is cultural-specific. Consequently, a translator must be aware of the semantic and cultural features in a kināyah in order to understand the intended meaning and to find an appropriate expression in the target language (TL). Furthermore, kināyah, like its fellow figures of speech, is used for specific purposes to achieve special effects. Amongst the purposes (functions) of kināyah are euphemism, brevity, clarity, and hyperbole. Overall, if a translator goes for the literal meaning (proper meaning) and, unintentionally neglects the intended meaning (figurative meaning) of the kināyah then this will mean that the message of the ST along with its function will be misrepresented in the target text (TT).

The type of text plays a big role in the difficulty of translating figurative expressions in general and kināyah specifically. Religious texts are sensitive and their translation should be approached cautiously. The central religious text of Islam is the Qur’an. Muslims believe that the Qur’an is miraculous and inimitable. They believe that Qur’anic discourse has its own unique genre. Abdul-Raof states that “the Qur’an as a genre in its own right is marked by prototypical features, as well as rhetorical features, that are hardly to be found in any type of writing throughout its history” (2003, p. 305). This uniqueness of the Qur’anic discourse has led to a perennial argument among many Muslim clerics about whether it is possible to translate the Qur’an from both the linguistic and religious points of view. They are concerned about the ethical side of translating the holy text, mainly because they believe that the formal side of the Qur’an contributes much to its meaning. Rendering such a text will bring into question the degree of fidelity with which it is transferred. Consequently, they have raised some religious, ethical, and linguistic objections to translating it. This fact is clearly reflected in the fatwa on the ruling of translating the meanings of the Qur’an (The Permanent Committee for Scholarly Research and Ifta’, 2013). This fatwa, clearly, suggests the impossibility of translating the Qur’an literally due to its unique style, which comprises linguistic features that make it impossible to convey its meanings accurately in another language. It considers

---

1 “It is impossible to translate the intended meanings of the Qur’an as a whole or even partially. Literal translation of the Qur’an is not even permissible as it will alter and distort its meanings. A person may translate whatever meanings they can understand, rules they may deduce, morals and ethics they may learn, and so on, into foreign languages, such as English, French, Persian or any other language to spread the meanings understood and call people to abide by them. It will be like explaining the Qur’an in Arabic, provided the person in question has the required qualifications to do so and is capable of communicating the rulings and morals contained therein accurately. Whoever lacks these conditions or lacks the means and resources that help understand the Qur’an should not embark on this endeavour, lest they should distort the Words of Allah or change their meanings, thus defeating their purpose”.

-2-
translation to be a process that ‘distorts’ its meaning, and the aim of translation is not to textually render the holy book but to disseminate its meaning for teaching purposes.

It is beyond doubt, for those who know the Qur’an, that it is, indeed, linguistically and rhetorically rich. In addition, its āyahs2 [verses] are presented in such a unique form and style that they leave a strong impact on people who read or listen to them recited, and especially those who comprehend and infer their meanings. Thus, a translator will inevitably face serious difficulties in conveying the effectiveness of the original together with a comparable, let alone equivalent, style. Arthur J. Arberry, a British orientalist who translated the Qur’an, states that:

[T]he rhetoric and rhythm of the Arabic of the Koran are so characteristic, so powerful, so highly emotive, that any version whatsoever is bound in the nature of things to be but a poor copy of the glittering splendour of the original (1980, p. 24).

The rhetorical features of the Qur’an, such as kināyah, along with other linguistic features contribute significantly to the uniqueness of the Qur’anic discourse. Moreover, Abdul-Raof (2003, p. 113) argues from a textual analysis point of view, that the figures of speech (such as kināyah) employed in the Qur’an richly “act as cohesive constituents in the Qur’anic texture. The rhetorical features in the Qur’anic discourse are considered Qur’anic-specific and therefore, in some come cases, they can be a problematic issue for a translator (ibid, p. 68).

To sum up, kināyah is employed in the Qur’anic discourse abundantly not only for stylistic reasons, but more importantly to serve other significant purposes. These purposes can be recognized through the functions of the kināyah. When it comes to translating Qur’anic kināyah expressions, we would like to borrow Newmark’s quote (1988, p. 104) and claim that while “the central problem of translation is the overall choice of a translation method for a text, the most important particular problem is the translation of” kināyah. That is because kināyah can hold both literal and figurative meanings, and therefore can easily deceive a translator. Also, in addition to its being mainly culture-specific, kināyah serves a particular purpose, such that it could be challenging to convey the intended meaning and at the same time maintain the same function as the original especially given that the Qur’anic genre is believed to be unique.

---

2 Āyahs is used as the plural of ʾāyah [verse].
1.3 The reasons for choosing this topic

The rationale for conducting this study is mainly based on the following considerations:

- *Kināyah* has not received much attention compared to other Arabic figures of speech, such as *ʾistiʿārah* (Arabic ‘metaphor’), specifically within translation studies (TS).

- The majority of English-Arabic-English dictionaries, if not all, translate the term ‘metonymy’ as *kināyah* and *majāz mursal*, and at the same time they refer to the term ‘synecdoche’ as *majāz mursal*. This clearly means that the concept of *kināyah* is still ambiguous in English.

- *Kināyah* is a figurative expression, i.e. its intended meaning is concealed, or in other words implicit. However, unlike *ʾistiʿārah* (Arabic ‘metaphor’), its constituents usually sound as if what is being expressed is the proper sense, which can easily deceive the translator. Therefore, its translation requires careful consideration to reveal its implicit meaning, which most likely relies heavily on the SL cultural background, which also differs from one language to another.

- Curiously, we have noticed that some Qur’anic *kināyah* expressions have been translated differently by various translators; some even render the intended meaning directly. In other words, it appears that there is some sort of discrepancy among the translators when translating Qur’anic *kināyah*. This leads us to the assumption that each translator adopts a different approach in reproducing *kināyah* in the TT. Also, it seems that some of the functions of the *kināyah* are not maintained in the TT. This raises the question whether *kināyah* is translatable, i.e. whether it is possible to render the intended meaning implicitly with a similar image to the original, and simultaneously preserve the same original function.

- More than 2.1 billion people follow the Qur’an as a code of worship and ethics, most of whom do not read Arabic. Misinterpretations reflected in the translations of the Qur’an might lead to misunderstanding the real intent of the texts

1.4 Aim, objectives, and questions of the study

The principle aim of this study is to understand the concept of *kināyah* and to investigate how *kināyah* expressions in the Qur’an are translated into English. Hopefully, this study will shed light on this beautiful Arabic figure of speech, which has been long mistaken for metonymy on the one hand and has been neglected in TS on the other. This work will attempt to demonstrate that *kināyah* is not metonymy; and simultaneously contribute to
filling the gap in TS, since there is a clear lack of work devoted to the translation of *kināyah* expressions. This work will thus contribute positively to Arabic-English TS in general, and to Qur’anic studies and Qur’an translation in particular.

### 1.4.1 The objectives

The study also seeks to achieve the following objectives:

- To explore whether *kināyah* and metonymy are one in the same, since most scholars and dictionaries refer to *kināyah* as ‘metonymy’.
- To explore whether the translators were able to recognise the implicit meaning, i.e. intended meaning, of the *kināyah*, since its literal meaning can be true and may deceive the translator.
- To compare and contrast how the selected *kināyah* expressions are rendered by the selected four translators.
- To examine and identify the methods employed by the translators in rendering *kināyahs* from the Qur’an.
- To explore whether the translators were able to overcome the cultural boundaries, if any, and what procedures were employed by them.
- To examine whether the translators were able to convey the intended meaning of the *kināyah* implicitly and maintain its function as in the original.

### 1.4.2 Questions of the study

The study seeks to answer the following main questions:

- Is metonymy the equivalent English figure of speech for *kināyah*? If not, then:
  - a- Which is the closest Arabic figure that has similar features to metonymy?
  - b- Which English figure of speech is equivalent to or at least shares some of the features and functions of *kināyah*?
- If there is no equivalent English figure of speech for *kināyah*, then were the translators able to render the intended meaning of the original implicitly as in the ST and simultaneously maintain the *kinayah* function? If not, then why?
- What translation methods do the translators tend to employ in rendering Qur’anic *kināyah*?
- What translation procedures do the translators adopt to compensate for any loss in translation?
Were the translators consistent in translating the same *kināyah* in the event it occurs in other parts of the Qur’an?

### 1.5 Scope and limitation

Initially, figures of speech emerged as rhetorical devices, since their studies, both in English and Arabic, began from a rhetorical perspective. Abdul-Raof affirms that the Qur’anic discourse is full of such devices, this type of language being proptotypical in the Qur’an (2003, p. 95). That said, it would be impossible to cover and analyse all of the large number of *kināyah* expressions employed in the Qur’an due to the available time. Therefore, this work will be limited to the analysis of forty-five *kināyah* expressions extracted from various parts of the Qur’an. The selection of the *kināyah* expressions will be based on al-Jurjānī’s definition of *kināyah* and on the consensus of the majority of Qur’anic exegetes (see 5.1). Furthermore, the study will be limited to the translations of Ali (1998), al-Hilali and Khan (1417 H. [1996]), Saheeh International (2004), and Abdel Haleem (2005) (see 3.7 for a brief overview and the rationale for selecting these translations).

### 1.6 Procedural framework

The study is more or less divided into two parts. The first part substantiates the claim that *kināyah* is not metonymy as the majority of dictionaries and scholars claim it to be, and that *majāz al-mursal* is the closest Arabic figure of speech to metonymy and synecdoche. This requires a careful consideration and comparison of the main Arabic figures of speech (*ʾistiʿārah*, *tashbīh*, *majāz mursal*, *kināyah*) as well as the English ones (*metaphor*, *simile*, *metonymy*, *synecdoche*).

The second part is composed of a twofold analysis. First, a ST analysis will be conducted. That is to say, the selected *kināyah* expressions will be analysed linguistically and contextually in order to understand the meaning and purpose of each *kināyah*. When the same *kināyah* expression is used in a different āyah, we will identify these āyahs and examine them to see whether they differ from each other in terms of meaning and purpose of use. This will involve reliance on authoritative Arabic and English dictionaries (including Qur’anic dictionaries) and Qur’anic exegeses, particularly those exegeses that approach the Qur’anic text from a linguistic and rhetorical perspective. This is followed by a comparative TT analysis of the four selected English Qur’an translations. The examination will take into consideration: (1) how the four translations render each
kināyah, (2) the intelligibility of the renditions, (3) whether there is any loss of meaning, (4) whether the renditions maintain the function of the original kināyah, and (5) consistency in rendering the same kināyah when it occurs in different āyahs (Qur’anic verses). We underline that this comparative analytical phase, and indeed the whole work, is by no means a judgement aimed at undermining the efforts made by the translators. From an equivalence perspective, this study attempts to provide a descriptive linguistic insight into how this crucial Arabic figure of speech, kināyah, is rendered from the Qur’an into English.

1.7 Structure of the study

The study comprises seven chapters with each chapter focusing on a certain aspect of the research. Chapter one, as indicated earlier (see 1.1), is mainly introductory and provides the reader with a broad idea about the topic, including its significance and originality, and how it will be conducted. It encompasses the statement of the problem, reasons behind choosing this topic, aims, objectives and research questions, scope and limitation, procedural framework, and a brief outline of each chapter. Chapter two looks carefully at the main Arabic figures of speech, ʾistiᶜārah, tashbīh, majāz mursal, and kināyah, along with the main English figures of speech: metaphor, simile, metonymy, and synecdoche. The main aim of this chapter is to substantiate the claim that kināyah is not metonymy and to demonstrate that majāz mursal is the closest Arabic figure of speech to metonymy and synecdoche. Chapter three casts light on the nature and status of the Qur’an, the legitimacy of its translation, and a brief historical background of its English translations. It also discusses the role of Qur’anic exegeses in understanding and translating the genre of the Qur’an. This includes a brief overview of the Qur’anic exegeses used in the study, followed by some insight into the employment of kināyah in the Qur’an. The chapter also demonstrates how kināyah is very much neglected in TS and no substantial work has been devoted to its translation. It also shows that even the handful of works that touch upon kināyah do not realise that it has no equivalent English figure of speech, since the majority refer to it as metonymy. Chapter four touches upon some of the equivalence theories in TS, such as those of Vinay and Darbelnet, Jakobson, Nida, Newmark, Baker, Beekman and Callow (1974), and Larson (1998), with a specific focus on the last two. It critically discusses their concepts and approaches towards equivalence in translation, with some attention given to translating figurative expressions. Chapter five is devoted to examining the selected forty-five original Qur’anic kināyah expressions linguistically and
contextually. It discusses the intended meaning of each *kināyah* used in the Qur’an and its purposes, including the views of several Qur’anic exegetes. **Chapter six** compares the translations of the selected *kināyah* expression made by Ali (1998), al-Hilali and Khan (1417 H. [1996]), Saheeh International (2004), and Abdel Haleem (2005). It is mainly a descriptive and critical examination. The analysis will define how these translators deal with *kināyah* in the TT, and examine whether they were able to convey the intended meaning and preserve its purpose (function), and whether they were consistent in translating the same *kināyah* in the event it occurs in other parts of the Qur’an. **Chapter seven** provides a synopsis of the study. It includes the findings and conclusion of the work. It also offers some suggestions for further research respecting the translation of *kināyah*. 
Chapter two: *Kināyah* and metonymy are they one and the same?

2.1 Introduction

In this chapter we will attempt to find out whether *kināyah* and metonymy are the same in terms of features and functions (purposes of use). To achieve this, we will first discuss the main Arabic figures of speech, *ʾistiʿārah*, tashbīh, majāz mursal, and *kināyah*. This will involve a bird’s-eye view of Arabic rhetoric, especially if we take into consideration that the study of Arabic figures of speech is part of rhetorical studies. Also, in a similar manner, we will briefly look at Western rhetoric. Then, we will present the main English figures of speech, metaphor, simile, synecdoche, and metonymy, with special interest on the latter in order to find out whether it is equivalent to *kināyah* in terms of concept, semantic relationships, features, and purpose of use.

2.2 Arabic rhetoric

The emanation of Arabic rhetoric was through Qur’anic sciences (ʿulūm al-Qur’ān) along with the sciences of syntax and morphology/linguistics (ʿilm an-nahū wa as-ṣarf) and the science of literature (ʿilm al-ʿadab). The scholars of Qur’anic studies during the formation of Islamic studies were rhetoricians as much as they were exegetes or linguists. Furthermore, the science of rhetoric emerged to enhance the understanding of the Qur’an and the sayings of the Prophet of Islam and to explore their beautiful style. Early linguistic and rhetoric savants such as abū ʿUbaydah bin al-Muthannā (d. 208 AH/823 AD), abū ʿUthmān ʿAmrū bin Baḥr al-Jāḥiẓ (d. 255 AH/868 AD), abū al-Ḥasan ar-Rammānī (d. 384 AH/994 AD), abū Hilāl al-ʾAskarī (d. 395 AH/1004 AD), ʿAbd al-Qāhir al-Jurjānī (d. 471 AH/1078 AD), and others participated in laying down the fundamentals of rhetorical science by writing books such as, *al-Bayān fī ʾIʿjāz al-Qurʾān*, *Maʿānī al-Qurʾān*, and *al-Fawāʾid al-Mushshawiq ʾilā ʿUlūm al-Qurʾān wa ʿUlūm al-Bayān*. Their argumentations and demonstrations were mainly extracted from the Qur’an. In view of the foregoing, it suffices to say that the relationship between rhetoric and Qur’anic sciences is not only germane but absolutely solid.

---

3 There are other early scholars who made a remarkable contribution in laying the groundwork of rhetorical science such as al-ʾAkhfash Saʿīd bin Musʿada (d. 215 AH/830 AD), az-Zajāj (d. 311 AH), ʾAbū Bakr Muḥammad bin al-Ṭayib al-Bāqīlānī (d. 403 AH), and abū Muḥammad ʿAbd Allah ibn Sinān al-Jawzīyah (d. 751 AH). For more historical details on Arabic rhetoric in English see Abdul-Raof (2006, pp. 31-74).
It is believed that rhetorical science reached its apex through ‘Abd al-Qāhir al-Jurjānī (d. 471 AH/1078 AD). Most of the books on rhetoric written by scholars in the wake of al-Jurjānī were summarisations and commentaries, mainly on al-Jurjānī’s books and views in addition to some other early savants’ books. This is suggested by the fact that most, if not all, the examples used in all the books on rhetoric are the same. This could be marked as a negative point in Arabic rhetorical studies. But it is worth mentioning that a couple of these scholars, such as az-Zamakhsharī and as-Sakkākī, added distinctly new views to the theories of Arabic rhetoric, for instance, the classification of the rhetorical disciplines (see figure 1), particularly the classifications of kināyah that was initially presented in detail by as-Sakkākī.

Before setting sail into the ocean of ʿilm al-bayān (Science of expressions [lit. Science of clarity]) and particularly kināyah, it is sensible to go through some practical definitions such as the definitions of faṣāḥah (eloquence), ʿilm al-maʿānī (semantics/word order), and ʿilm al-badī (Science of embellishments).

![Figure 2.1: Major disciplines of Arabic rhetoric.](image)

2.2.1 Rhetoric (balāḥah) and eloquence (faṣāḥah)

Arab linguists and scholars who are conversant with Arabic rhetoric will notice that there was an on-going debate amongst rhetoricians regarding the two concepts of rhetoric and eloquence; and that it engrossed their minds for generations from the outset of rhetorical studies. Many rhetorical scholars do not differentiate between the two notions of rhetoric and eloquence. For instance, abū Hilāl al-ʿAskarī, a well-known Arabic rhetorical figure, proclaims in his book ‘aṣ-ṣināʿatayn’ that “balāghah (rhetoric) and faṣāḥah (eloquence) refer to the same thing even if their origins are different. That is because both terms, balāghah and faṣāḥah, denote ʾibānah (clarity, making clear) and ʿizhār

---

4 For a more detailed argument on al-Jurjānī’s theory and classifications of Arabic rhetoric in English see Abu Deeb (1979) and Larkin (1995).
Al-Hāshimī also indicates the following:

Al-Jurjānī and some who preceded him consider faṣāḥah (eloquence), balāġah (rhetoric), bayān (elocution), and barāᶜah (proficiency) as synonyms. They believe these synonyms do not characterise individual lexical items but describe a sentence, provided that the sentence structure conforms to Arabic syntax, grammatically and meaningfully (Hāshimī, 2005, p. 10 [my translation]).

In relation to this matter, Abdul-Raof asserts, in his book, Arabic Rhetoric: A pragmatic analysis, that al-Jurjānī considers rhetoric and eloquence as two sides of the same coin. He adds that the difference between the two, as al-Jurjānī sees it, is that eloquence “is attributed to the lexical item but not to signification while rhetoric is attributed to both the lexical item and signification” (2006, p. 95). Fakhr ad-Dīn ar-Rāzī (d. 606 AH), a posterior scholar to al-Jurjānī, agrees that “most rhetoricians barely differentiate between eloquence and rhetoric” (ibid, p. 10). Likewise, al-Jawharī (d. 393 AH/ 1002 AD), a linguist and the author of the famous Arabic dictionary ‘aṣ-Ṣiḥāḥ’, indicates that “eloquence is rhetoric” (ibid, p. 10). In the main, eloquence is generally concerned with utterance while rhetoric is concerned with meaning (cf. ᶜAbd Rabbuh, 2005). For example, a parrot may pronounce words correctly but without meaning; therefore, the parrot might be described as an eloquent (faṣīḥ) bird but not as (balīgh) rhetorical. In a nutshell, every rhetorical speech is eloquent, but not every eloquent speech is rhetorical. The following synopses will briefly illustrate the difference between eloquence (faṣāḥah) and rhetoric (balāġah).

In general, faṣāḥah in Arabic rhetoric refers to lexical items that are clear, understandable, and commonly used amongst penmen and poets, due to their beauty and flexibility. Al-Hāshimī (2005) posits that eloquence could be attributed to a single lexical item/word (lafḍah/kalimah), statement/utterance (a speech in all its forms, written or spoken) including its syntactic structures (kalām), or a text producer (mutakallim). The latter is considered eloquent, only if s/he is of an erudite bent and has a great ability to produce any form of discourse eloquently at any time. The other two aspects, single lexical items or whole statements, should be free from certain imperfections to be regarded as eloquent. According to al-Hāshimī (ibid.), an eloquent single lexical item should be free from: (1)
phonetic incongruity/cacophony [of the letters] (tanāfur al-hurūf), (2) strange usage (gharābat al-istiʾmāl), (3) transgression of Arabic inflectional morphological rules (mukhālafat al-qiyyās), and (4) distasteful sounds (al-karāhatu fī as-samʿī). Additionally, Al-Hāshimī suggests that an eloquent utterance/statement should be free from: (1) incongruent/cacophonous word-combination sounds (tanāfur al-kalimāti mujtamiʿatan), (2) syntactically poorly-formed structure (daʿfu at-taʾlīf), (3) complex structure (at-taʾqīd al-lafẓī), and (4) semantic ambiguity (at-taʾqīd al-maʿnawī). The latter, i.e. semantic ambiguity is mainly expressing a specific meaning implicitly, as in figurative expressions, using words that lead to a meaning other than the intended meaning. For instance, using a kinayah to denote a meaning other than its conventional meaning.

As for balāğah, linguistically the term balāğah derives from balagha, which means to reach, arrive at, get to, or attain the aim/goal/end/extreme limit (Lane, 1968; ibn Manẓūr, 1980; cf. Qāsim & Dīb, 2003, p. 8). Both Lane and ibn Manẓūr seem to suggest that the sense of balāğah is the same as that of faṣāḥah. Lane, however, asserts that the difference between the two terms is that faṣāḥah “is an attribute of a single word and of speech and of the speaker”, whereas balāğah “is an attribute only of speech and the speaker” (Lane, p. 251). Lane also adds that “بﻼغة in the speaker is A faculty whereby one is enabled to compose language suitable to exigency of the case, i.e., to the occasion of speaking [or writing], with chasteness, or perspicuity, or eloquence, thereof” (ibid, author’s italics). According to al-Hāshimī, the general sense of balāğah is “expressing a significant meaning clearly by using proper and eloquent expressions that have a spellbinding impact on one’s soul, while simultaneously being appropriate to the situational context and the recipients” (al-Hāshimī, 2005, p. 29, my translation; cf. Qāsim & Dīb, 2003, p. 8; ᵐAbd Rabbuh, 2005). Furthermore, a speaker is described as ‘rhetorical’ when s/he has the ability to employ the major disciplines of Arabic rhetoric (see figure 1) in order to conquer the hearts and minds of the recipients. To come to the point, rhetoric and eloquence are closely related to another. It is known that in statements/speeches, eloquence is a major requirement to achieve rhetoric, while rhetoric is not at a requirement to achieve eloquence. Therefore, one could say that every rhetorical speech is eloquent, but not every eloquent speech is rhetorical.
2.2.2 ʿIlm al-maʿānī [Science of meanings]

ʿIlm al-maʿānī, which literally means ‘science of meanings’, corresponding somewhat to what is known in modern linguistic studies as ‘semantics’, is one of the main disciplines of Arabic rhetoric. It is the discipline that deals with composite utterances (word order/grammatical structure). In other words, the order of the syntactic constituents of an utterance or speech, i.e. statement. Additionally, it intersects with other linguistic fields, that is, it reveals the correlation between word order, semantics, syntax, and pragmatics in forming an eloquent discourse with a rhetorical effect on the addressee. ʿIlm al-maʿānī is known by Arab rhetoricians as:

The knowledge of the conditions, rules and norms which governs the congruency of the utterance (the structure of the statement) with the requirements of the situation in accordance to the purpose it is composed for (al-Hāshimī, 2005, pp. 37-38; my translation).

In other words, the knowledge of the conditions and laws that enables one to compose a speech appropriately in accordance to the situational context and the recipients it is intended for. According to their understandings of as-Sakkākī’s works, Bekkum, et al. claim “the main purpose of the ‘science of meanings’ [ʿilm al-maʿānī] is the avoidance of errors” (1997, p. 263). ʿIlm al-maʿānī is possibly the largest rhetorical discipline and it is divided into several categories as shown in figure 2. It is believed that early Arab linguists and rhetoricians scrutinised the Qur’an through, inter alia, ʿilm al-maʿānī to comprehend its inimitability (ʾiʿjāz), such as its skilful structures, superior representation and expression, delicate brevity, and so forth. They also examined the rhetoric and eloquence in Hadith and in Arabic prose. Though the signification of ʿilm al-maʿānī has been featured by a number of scholars who preceded al-Jurjānī, several modern rhetoricians take it for granted that al-Jurjānī is the one who laid the foundations of this science through his book Dalāʾil al-ʾIjāz (cf. Braginsky, 2001). Nonetheless, it is believed that it was az-Zamakhsharī (d. 538 AH) who first used the term ʿilm al-maʿānī in his book al-Kashshāf; his ideas were developed later by as-Sakkākī (d. 626 AH) and al-Qazwīnī (d. 739 AH).
2.2.3 'Ilm al-badī [Science of ornamentation]

'Ilm al-badī is the rhetorical discipline that is concerned with the linguistic mechanism of embellishing a speech. 'Ilm al-badī is defined as:

A science through which we can understand the mechanism of embellishing a discourse, provided that the discourse maintains its compatibility with the requirements of the situation and is semantically unambiguous (al-Qazwīnī, 1996, p. 383; my translation).

By exploiting various features of 'ilm al-badī, the text producer could present an aureate speech that has a rhetorical impact on the addressee. This rhetorical discipline is divided into two categories, semantic ornamentations - al-muhassināt al-ma‘nawīyah - and lexical ornamentations - al-muhassināt al-lafḍīyah. Each category is subdivided into several forms; and each form has a distinctive beautifying rhetorical aspect. In semantic ornamentation, a discourse preserves the beautifying aspect of semantic ornamentation even after the replacement of a given lexical item by its synonym. Whereas, in lexical ornamentation, its beautifying aspect disappears if a given lexical item is replaced by its synonym. However, both categories of ornamentation are considered as tools for the text producer to embellish his/her speech in order to achieve an impact on the addressee.
2.3 *İlm al-bayān* [Science of elocution]

Literally *İlm al-bayān* means ‘the science of clarity’; and linguistically, *bayān* means uncovering -*kashf*- and clarification -*ʾiḍāḥ* (al-Qazwīnī, 1996). Moreover, the word, *bayyin-* which derives from the same root as *bayān*, means eloquent (ibn Manẓūr, 1980, p. 407). Lane points out the word *bayān* signifies “the means by which one makes a thing [distinct], apparent, manifest, evident, clear, plain, or perspuous”. He also addds that it is “making the meaning apparent to the mind so that it becomes distinct from other meanings and from what might be confounded with it” (Lane, 1968, p. 288). He goes on to say, *bayān* “is also applied to language that discovers and shows the meaning that is intended: and an explanation of confused and vague language” (ibid.). On top of that, Lane provides a full description of this rhetorical discipline, which includes the the technical meaning of *İlm al-bayān* known amongst Arabic rhetoricians:

A faculty, or principles, [or a science] whereby one knows how to express [with perspicuity of diction] one meaning in various forms [some of the Arabs restrict the science of *al-bayān* to what concerns comparisons and tropes and metonymies; which last the Arabian rhetoricians distinguish from tropes; and some make it include *rhetoric* altogether] (ibid., author’s italics).

As generally understood, *İlm al-bayān* is an Arabic rhetorical science devoted to figures of speech. It is categorised into three main figures of speech, *tashbīh* (Arabic ‘simile’), *majāz* (figurativeness), and *kināyah*, as shown in figure 2.3 (for more details on *İlm al-bayān* and its categories see Lāshīn, 1998). But since *kināyah* is the core of this study it

---

5 The science through which we can state a single meaning clearly in different ways” (al-Qazwīnī, 1996, p. 246; my translation).
will henceforth be discussed in detail separately in section 2.4. As to the rest of the Arabic figures of speech, their definitions and types will be presented briefly in this section. It is worth noting that this discipline is at times referred to in English as the science of figures of speech and at other times as the science of expression.

### 2.3.1 Tashbīḥ (Arabic simile)

The term ‘tashbīḥ’ is the verbal noun derived from the verb *shabbaha* (to liken, make resemble), and its basic linguistic meaning is *tamthīl* (likening). There are various definitions of *tashbīḥ*, but they all share the concept of resemblance. For example, al-Qazwīnī (1996, p. 248) provides the following definition:

> Tashbīḥ: refers to the sense that one thing shares an element of meaning with another. (My translation)

‘Amīn (1982, p. 15) also states that this figure of speech is defined by the scholars of *ʿilm al-bayān* as:

> بَيْنَاءَ عَلَى مَشَارِكَةٍ أَمْرٍ لَأُخَرِ فِي مَعْنَى

> Tashbīḥ: the indication that one thing shares an element of meaning with another. (My translation)

Scholars of *ʿilm al-bayān* define *tashbīḥ* by saying: it is the indication that something is shared with something else in terms of a common [element of] meaning by using one of the *tashbīḥ* tools⁶ (particles) explicitly (mentioned in the statement/expression) or implicitly (that can be understood through the context)” (My translation).

Likewise, al-Hāshimī (2005, p. 206) provides the following definition:

> التشبيه عند علماء البيان: مشاركة أمر لأمر في معنى بإدراك اثنين منهما

> Tashbīḥ is defined by the scholars of *ʿilm al-bayān* as: linking one thing to another in terms of meaning by using known tools (particles), such as when one says: ‘education is like illumination in guidance’. Here ‘education’ is the *mashīh* (like), ‘illumination’ is the *liyān* (likened), ‘point of resemblance’ and the *simile tool/particle* is the letter *k* (kaṣr). So, there are four basic elements of *tashbīḥ*, which are: ‘mashīh’, ‘liyān’, ‘liyān to’, (both the ‘liyān’ and ‘liyān to’ are referred to as *tarafay at-tashbīḥ*)

---

⁶ The ‘simile tool’ may be a particle (such as *ka* and *kan*), a noun used adverbially (such as *مَلَحْوَة* and *مَلَحْوَة*), or a verb (such as *مَايَكُمْ* and *مَايَكُمْ*).
The classification of *tashbīh* is mainly based on its basic elements, the ‘two ends of the simile’, ‘the point of resemblance’, and ‘the simile tools’ (For more details in Arabic, see Amīn, 1982, pp. 17-57; al-Hāshimī, 2005, pp. 207-232; and in English see Abdul-Raof 2006, pp. 200-208.)

*Tashbīh* is regarded as an artistic and aesthetic stylistic feature, which achieves the rhetorical function of hyperbole. Thus, it is also known as *fann at- tashbīh* (the art of resemblance/likening). The general intention of this figure of speech is to clarify an idea or to show the resemblance of one thing to another. The text producer resorts to *tashbīih* to achieve specific pragmatic functions that serve the simile element, the likened, such as:

1- To clarify the image of the ‘likened’
2- To exhibit the mood/case of the ‘likened’. In other words, to identify a specific feature of the ‘likened’.
3- To praise/beautify the ‘likened’.
4- To satirize/disfigure the ‘likened’.

The degree of the rhetorical stylistic feature of *tashbīh* depends on the presence of its elements in the speech. The more omitted simile elements in a given speech, the more rhetorical it is. In other words, the speech is highly rhetorical in terms of *tashbīh* if the ‘likened’ and ‘likened to’ are only mentioned, without the ‘simile tool’ and ‘the point of resemblance’ such as in محمد أسد – Muḥammad is a lion (what is meant is that Muḥammad is brave like a lion).

### 2.3.2 Majāz (Figurativeness)

The common noun ‘*majāz*’ is derived from the verb *jāza* which means ‘to cross - pass through - penetrate - traverse’ (جارٍ أحمد الجسر - Aḥmad crossed the bridge). Rhetorically, *majāz* (figurativeness) goes beyond the basic meaning of the word, i.e. *majāz* indicates a meaning that is not the ‘real’ meaning/’proper’ sense of the word. Thus *majāz* is regarded as the antithesis of properness (حققة *haqīqah*). *Haqīqah*, on the other hand, refers “to truth, reality, things as they truly are” or as Larkin describes it as ‘ontological truth’ (1995, p. 86). She also points out that *haqīqah* “is used, in contrast to *majāz*, to refer to literal speech (ibid.). The following definitions of *haqīqah* (properness) and *majāz* are noted by al-Asmar (1998, p. 35):
Properness is using the utterance in its real meaning/true sense, as in ‘The donkey eats barley’ (My translation).

Majāz is using the utterance to indicate a sense other than its true sense due to a relationship between the two meanings, such as in ‘the news shook my nerves’ (my translation).

As-Sayūṭī (cited in Šabbāgh, 1998, p. 243) provides a linguistic definition for majāz as follows:

Majāz is from the verb jāza, which means to cross a place to another and thus it is called [in rhetoric] majāz, because the meaning of a word is transferred from its true meaning to another one (my translation).

As for al-Jurjānī (ibid. p. 243), his definition of majāz is:

Every word that is used to indicate a meaning other than its true meaning due to a relationship between the indicated and the true meaning is called majāz (my translation).

For his part, as-Sakkākī (ibid. p. 243) provides the following definition:

Majāz is the usage of a word in a sense that has a relationship with the proper meaning, with a cue that precludes the proper meaning (My translation).

Regardless of the various definitions, they all indicate that majāz is a product ascribed to a process of transferring a proper meaning of a word to another intended meaning due to a relationship between the two meanings. This semantic relationship is highly significant.

---

7 Some rhetoricians suggest that the relationship should be looked at from the true meaning; others, like al-Jurjānī, suggests that it should be looked at from the intended meaning; some, also suggest that it should be looked equally from both sides (al-Hāshimī, 2005, p. 237). However, the relationship between the basic (true) and secondary meanings is essential so that the addressee could imagine and understand the intended meaning.

8 The word ‘proper’ is probably the closest equivalent term for ḥaqīqah. However, in this context and in general, it refers to the ‘non-figurative’ meaning, in other words, the ‘literal’ meaning.
for two reasons. The first reason is that it is through this semantic relationship, between the proper meaning and the intended meaning, that the addressee can understand the meaning aimed by the text producer. The second reason is that it determines the type of majāẓ. In other words, if the semantic relationship is based on similarity then the majāẓ is called isti‘ārah (Arabic ‘metaphor’), and if not then it is called majāẓ mursal (Arabic ‘metonymy/synecdoche’). That said, majāẓ in Arabic rhetoric is divided into two main categories, majāẓ ʿaqālī (cognitional figurativeness) and majāẓ lughawī (lingual figurativeness). The latter includes isti‘ārah and majāẓ mursal.

2.3.2.1 Majāẓ ʿaqālī (cognitional figurativeness)

In his introduction to al-Jurjānī’s book, Kitāb asrār al-balāghah, Helmut Ritter states that “[t]ropical meaning (majāẓ) can appear in a sentence in two ways. It may consist either in the ascription of a certain action to a certain subject, or in the ascribed thing itself” (al-Jurjānī, 1954, p. 23). He also adds:

If the trope lies in the ascription of an activity to a subject, it lies in the logical judgment expressed therein and thus belongs to the domain of reason (ʿaql). If the figure lies in the thing ascribed it belongs to the domain of the use of the language, the vocabulary (lughā) (ibid, p.23).

Accordingly, it is clear that majāẓ ʿaqālī is concerned with figurative representation on the sentence (syntactic structural) level, more precisely with the ascription of the verb to majāẓ to a figurative subject. For example, in the sentence بنى البناؤون مكتبة جديدة – The constructors built a new library - the subject بناؤون (constructors) are the actual persons who built the new library. The ascription of ‘building’ to the subject ‘constructors’ is then a proper predication, i.e. the predication of the verb بنى (built) to the subject بناؤون (constructors) is proper/intrinsic and not majāẓ. Whereas in the sentence بنى جامعة ليدز مكتبة جديدة – University of Leeds built a new library - University of Leeds - is an improper subject because the actual building was done by constructors. But the action of building would have not been done in the first place without the request of the university. So the ascription of ‘building’ to the subject, University of Leeds, is majāẓ ʿaqālī. In other words, the prediction of the verb بنى (build) to the improper subject جامعة ليدز, University of Leeds, is majāẓ ʿaqālī.

Consequently, majāẓ ʿaqālī is related to the prediction of a verb to an agent other than the actual doer. The following definition will give us a clear concept of majāẓ ʿaqālī:
Majāz ‘aqlī takes place in predication, to wit the prediction of the verb, or whatever replaces the verb, to an agent other than the proper doer. It is called majāz ḥukmī (judgemental figurativeness) and is also known as ‘isnād majāzī (figurative predication). It only occurs in a syntactic structure (ʿAfīq, 1980, p. 337; my translation).

Another definition of majāz al-ʿaqlī provided by Ḥ. Amīn (1982) explains that there should be a cue that precludes the proper predication and that there should be a relationship between the verb and the improper subject:

المجاز العقلي هو: إسناد الفعل، أو ما في معناه، إلﻰ غير صاحبه، لعﻼقة، مع قرينة تمنع أن يكون

Majāz ‘aqlī is the predication of the verb, or whatever replaces the verb, to an agent other than the proper doer, due to a relationship, with a cue/context that precludes the proper predication (ibid, p.81; my translation).

Cause (sababīyah), time (zamānīyah), and place (makānīyah) are types of relationships between the verb and the improper subject in majāz ‘aqlī, in addition to infinitive (maṣdarīyah), subject (fāʿilīyah), and object (mafʿūlīyah) relationships. For instance, in the foregoing ‘University of Leeds’ example, the relationship between the verb بني (build) and the subject جامعة ليدز (University of Leeds) is a cause relationship (ʿilāqah sababīyah), because, as has been pointed out above, the process of the building was carried out by constructors and not by the university itself; but that would have not happened without the request of the university. So, the University of Leeds was the cause of this action. Therefore, the ascription of the verb بني (build) to the subject جامعة ليدز (University of Leeds) was due to a cause relationship.

2.3.2.2 Majāz lughawī (Lingual figurativeness)
Unlike majāz ‘aqlī, majāz lughawī is concerned with the utterance level and not the sentence level. The usage of an utterance in its improper meaning due to a semantic relationship between the proper and improper meaning is known as majāz lughawī. As mentioned previously, this semantic relationship is highly significant for two reasons. It is important because it helps the addressee to understand the meaning aimed at by the text producer; and it determines whether the type of majāz (figurativeness) is istiʿārah (Arabic ‘metaphor’) or majāz mursal (Arabic ‘metonymy/synecdoche’). If the semantic relationship is based on similarity the figurative meaning is known as istiʿārah; otherwise it is known as majāz mursal.

9 Whatever replaces the verb, such as a nominalised noun, active participle, or passive participle.
2.3.3.1 *ʾIstiᶜārah* (Arabic metaphor)

*ʾIstiᶜārah* is one type of majāz and it is referred to in English to as metaphor. Generally, *ʾistiᶜārah* is based on analogy and resemblance, as is also *tashbīh* (Arabic ‘simile’). Some rhetoricians aver that *ʾistiᶜārah* is a branch of *tashbīh* and some even confuse between the two figures of speech to the extent that they consider both of them one figure of speech. (ʿAṭīyah, 2004, p. 62). *Tashbīh*, as mentioned earlier in section 2.3.1, is considered highly rhetorical when the two ends of the simile are mentioned, the ‘likened’ and ‘likened to’, without the simile tool/particle (*adāt at-tashbīh*), such as in محمد أسد (Muḥammad is a lion).

*ʾIstiᶜārah* goes beyond the limit of *tashbīh* in terms of rhetorical level, i.e. in *ʾistiᶜārah* only one end of the ‘two simile ends’ is mentioned and of course without the simile tool/particle, as in رأيت أسد ‘I saw a lion’ (what is meant is that I saw a person brave as a lion). Thus, as-Sakkākī’s definition of *ʾistiᶜārah* is as follows:

الاستعارة أن تذكر أحد طرفين التشبيه وتريد الطرف الآخر مذعوًا دخل المشبه في جنس المشبه به دالًا على ذلك بإثباتك للمشبه ما يخص المشبه به.

*ʾIstiᶜārah* is mentioning one end of the ‘two simile ends’ while on the contrary you mean the other end, claiming that ‘the likened’ is of the same genus as the ‘likened to’ in order to transfer and evoke a specific character from the ‘likened to’ to the ‘likened’ (cited in ʿAfīq, 1980, p. 368; my translation).

Linguistically, the verb أَعَزَرُ (to lend/borrow) is the origin of the term *ʾistiᶜārah*. The concept of the term *ʾistiᶜārah* is also derived from استعار المalım: طلبه عارية - *astᶜāra al-māl: ṭalabahu āriyah*- (He lent money: he requested a loan). Generally speaking, it is known that no one would lend someone something or give a loan to another person unless if there is some kind of acquaintance or relationship between the two persons. This kind of acquaintance or relationship is applied in *ʾistiᶜārah*, i.e. between the proper meaning of the utterance and the figurative meaning. In other words, there has to be some kind of semantic relationship between the proper meaning and the figurative meaning in order to borrow and transfer a specific feature from one to the other. The aforementioned can be inferred through the following definition of *ʾistiᶜārah* by ibn al-ʿAthīr:

عرفها ابن الأثير بقوله: (الاستعارة نقل المعنى من لفظ إلى لفظ لمشروكة بينهما مع طن ذكر المتقول إليه).

ibn al-ʿAthīr defines *ʾistiᶜārah* as transferring a meaning from one utterance to another, because of a common relationship between the two, and without

---

10 For discussion in English regarding al-Jurjān’s theory of *ʾistiᶜārah* and *tashbīh*, and the relationship between the two see Abu Deeb (1979) and Larkin (1995).
stating the ‘transferred to utterance’” (Cited in ᵜAfīq, 1980, pp. 368-369; my translation).

ckAtīq (ibid, pp. 367-368) provides various definitions of ʾistiᶜārah made by several rhetoricians, as follows:

abū al-Ḥasan ar-Rammānī defines ʾistiᶜārah as using an expression in a sense different from its original meaning in the language (my translation).

Abū Hilāl al-ᶜAskarī defines ʾistiᶜārah as transferring an expression from its original usage in the language to another for a purpose (my translation).

ckAbd al-Qāhir al-Jurjānī defines ʾistiᶜārah as an expression, which has a well-known specific original meaning, and is used in a context by a poet or anyone else in a sense different from its original sense temporarily as if borrowing the original meaning (my translation).

By all accounts, some rhetoricians believe that ʾistiᶜārah is originally a tashbīh (simile) in which one of the ends of the simile is omitted, and that there is a cue, lexical or circumstantial, that precludes from intending the proper meaning. If we take this into account, then ʾistiᶜārah is also, like simile, formed of three components; the components of ʾistiᶜārah being: mustaᶜār lahu, the borrowed to (equivalent to the ‘likened to’ element in simile), mustaᶜār minhu, the borrowed from (equivalent to the ‘likened’ element in simile, and mustaᶜār, the borrowed (which is the semantic relationship borrowed, and it is equivalent to the ‘point of resemblance’ in simile). The following example will illustrate the aforesaid:

```
I met the lion in his office.
```

The proper meaning is: I met Aḥmād, who is brave like a lion, in his office.

```
The ‘borrowed to’ is: Aḥmād
```

```
The ‘borrowed from’ is: the lion
```

```
The ‘borrowed’ is: bravery
```

The cue that precludes intending the proper meaning is: ‘in his office’
It is important to note that one of the components of ʾistiᶜārah, ‘borrowed to’ or the ‘borrowed from’ should be omitted. Otherwise, if both are mentioned then this will be considered a ‘rhetorical simile’ (تشبيه بليغ). That is to say, it will be regarded as a highly rhetorical simile and not as ʾistiᶜārah, since it may look like as if what is only omitted are the simile tools/particles. Also, the components are related to the classification of ʾistiᶜārah. In other words, the types of ʾistiᶜārah are based on its components. For instance, the previous example is ʾistiᶜārah taṣrīḥīyah (an explicit metaphor), where the omitted element is the ‘borrowed to’ and the preserved element is the ‘borrowed from’.

For more details of the types of ʾistiᶜārah in Arabic see ʿAtīq (1980, pp. 370-386) and in English see Abdul-Raof (2006, pp. 219-224).

Arabic metaphor, ʾistiᶜārah, is regarded as the master trope of figures of speech by a majority of rhetoricians and linguists. As a result, other figures of speech have mainly been neglected in the realm of TS, especially Arabic-English translation studies, or at least have not received the same attention as metaphor. However, all figures of speech should have significant attention because they together form bayān in Arabic rhetoric; and since al-Jurjānī is considered the pioneer, who laid the grounds of Arabic rhetoric, then let us not forget his following statement:

اِذَا اجْعَلْتُ الْكُنْدَارَ عَلَى الْأَنْثَى فَأَلْبَغْنَ مَنْ الْإِعْصَامَ، وَالْعَرْضُ أُولَىٰ مِنَ الْتَصْرِيحِ، وَأَنَّ لَلْعَسْتَعَارَةَ مَزْبَةً وَفَضْلًا، وَأَنَّ الْمَجْزَ أَبْدًا أَلْبَغْنَ مِنَ الْحَقِيقَةَ.

There is a unanimous agreement that kināyah is more rhetorical than enunciation, taʳūḏ (allusion) is more effective than proclamation, ʾistiᶜārah (metaphor) has excellence and merit, and that majāz (figurativeness) is without any doubt more rhetorical than proper sense (al-Jurjānī, 1995, p. 69; my translation).

2.3.3.2.2 Majāz mursal (Arabic metonymy/synecdoche)

Although most English/Arabic dictionaries translate synecdoche as majāz mursal, some translation scholars see majāz mursal as synecdoche. Reem al-Salem (2008), in her PhD research, Translation of Metonymy in the Holy Qur’an: A Comparative, Analytical Study, considers majāz mursal to be metonymy, which is in agreement with what Larkin asserts:

---

11 The irony is that one can notice that some dictionaries, such as Al-Mawrid: a modern English-Arabic dictionary by Munir Baalbaki (1985), translate ‘synecdoche’ as majāz mursal and at the same time the translation of ‘metonymy’ is kināyah and majāz mursal (cf. Baalbaki & Baalbaki, 2013). Also one can notice in Al-Mawrid: a modern Arabic-English dictionary by Rohi Baalbaki that the translation of ‘kināyah’ is ‘metonymy’ and the translation of ‘majāz mursal’ is ‘metonymy’ and ‘synecdoche’.
majāz mursal is the term for metonymy used by later scholars” (Larkin, 1995, p. 87). So what is majāz mursal in Arabic rhetoric?

As mentioned earlier, majāz is a product ascribed to the process of transferring the ‘proper’ meaning of a word to another intended meaning due to a relationship between the two meanings; and that the semantic relationship between the ‘proper’ and intended meanings determines whether the figurative meaning is 'isti'ārah or majāz mursal. If the semantic relationship is based on similarity then the tropical meaning is 'isti'ārah, as shown in the previous section, and if the semantic relationship is based on non-similarity then the tropical meaning is majāz mursal.

al-Asmar provides the following definition for majāz mursal:

majāz mursal is the usage of a word in its improper meaning due to a non-similarity relationship (between the proper and improper meaning) with a cue that precludes the proper meaning, as in: ‘I drank the Euphrates’ water’ (1998, p. 74; my translation).

Al-Asmar (ibid) explains that what is meant in the aforesaid example is that the person drank a cup or several cups of the Euphrates’ water and not the whole Euphrates River, because that is impossible. He added that the relationship between the proper and improper meaning is a ‘part-whole’ relationship. In other words, the ‘whole’ (Euphrates’ water) is mentioned to indicate a ‘part’ (a cup or several cups of the Euphrates’ water), and that the verb ‘drank’ is the cue that precludes the proper meaning, i.e. prevents us understanding that the whole Euphrates was drunk.

The following example of majāz mursal in [Q. 40:13] shows what is known as ‘result’ relationship between the figurative meaning and the proper meaning of the utterance:

It is He who shows you [people] His signs and sends water down from the sky to sustain you, though only those who turn to God will take heed” [Q. 40:13] (Abdel Haleem, 2005, p. 302).

The phrase يَنْزُلُ لَكُمْ مِنَ السَّمَاءِ رِزْقًا (lit. He drops for you livelihood/boons from the sky) in fact means that God sends us rain from the sky, and as everyone knows that rain (water) is one of the essential sources of life; rain, as a result, causes the growth of food and the existence of fresh water and so on. Therefore, the relationship between the figurative meaning and the proper meaning is a ‘result’ relationship. The noun ‘sky’ is the cue which
precludes the proper meaning ‘livelihood/boon’ and through it the addressee can understand the intended meaning which is ‘rain’.

**Figure 2.4: Forms of majāz mursal and their semantic relationships**

With regards to the types/forms of relationship in majāz mursal, it is said that rhetoricians, early and modern, have mentioned approximately twenty-five relationships (‘Aṭīyah, 2004, p. 117). ‘Aṭīyah, states the following relationships: sababīyah, musabbabīyah, juzʾīyah, kullīyah, lāzūmīyah, mutlaqīyah, muqayyadyāyah, ‘umūmīyah, khusūṣīyah, ḥālīyah, maḥallīyah, zāʾidīyah, nāqīsīyah, ḍiddīyah, ālīyah, mujāwarīyah, wasfīyah, ‘ītibāriyah limā kān, ‘ītibāriyah limā yakūn (cf. figure 2.4).

### 2.4 Kināyah

The first person to touch upon kināyah was the linguist al-Khalīl al-Farāhīdī (d. 175 AH). He mentions kināyah in his dictionary, muᶜjam al-ᶜayn, which is viewed as the first Arabic dictionary to see the light of day (Ṭilib, 1997, p. 131). Thereafter kināyah was discussed by other linguists such as Sibawayh (d. 180 AH) in his book al-kitāb, al-Farāʾ Yaḥyā bin Ziyād (d. 207 AH) the author of Maᶜānī al-Qurʾān, and ‘abū ṣUbaydah bin al-Muthannā (d. 210 AH) in his book Majāz al-Qurʾān. The concept of kināyah, according to the foregoing linguists and other early linguists, is ‘to conceal, to cover, to hide, or to veil. A nickname, alias, or even a pronoun is also regarded as ‘kināyah’ because it conceals the true identity, i.e. the person or thing is not mentioned directly and explicitly (see Kaḥīl, 2004, pp. 21-28; Ṭilib, 1997, pp. 131-138).

---

12 Taken from Abdul-Raof (2006, p. 225). Notice that the semantic relations he demonstrates are the same as those presented by most Arab rhetoricians, but in English. However, bear in mind, Abdul-Raof refers to majaz mursal as ‘hypallage’, which is quite bizarre. We would advise not to rely on some of his terms, since they appear to be incorrect and are very likely to cause confusion.
 Tilîb (1997, p. 133) comments on al-Farâhîdî’s concept of kînâyâh as follows:

al-Farâhîdî defines kînâyâh linguistically as: saying something to infer something else, such as jîmâᶜ (sexual intercourse), ghâʾîṭ (defecation), and rafath (sexual intercourse). He also talks about the kunyah (alias/nickname) as in abû ‘Abd Allah. Furthermore, he regards third-person pronouns as kînâyâh like other grammarians (my translation).

In addition, Tilîb (ibid, p. 136) indicates that the grammarians had two notions of kînayâh; the first is “naming something other than its true name for a particular reason, such as to conceal the explicit meaning or to euphemise a word or expression” (my translation); the second is that “any pronoun is a kînayâh, and not only the third-person pronoun as most people imagine” (my translation).

Some argue that al-Muthannâ (d. 210 AH) was the first writer to mention kînayâh. The reason may be because his view of kînayâh is slightly different from previous grammarians. Although he agrees with his fellow grammarians that a pronoun is considered a kînayâh, al-Muthannâ adds that kînayâh is related to text, context, and cognition (ibid, p. 137; Khîlîl, 2004, p. 29). In other words, kînayâh is an implicit word or expression that could be comprehended through visualising and contemplating the context. In short, grammarians were interested in kînayâh from a linguistic perspective (the meaning of kînayâh) rather than a technical one (Al-Hajîjaj, 2004, p. 84).

On the other hand, the perusal of kînayâh and other tropes from a technical perspective was represented by rhetoricians. Of course, like other concepts, the concept of kînayâh developed gradually. Al-Jâḥiẓ (d. 255 AH/868 AD) was one of the first scholars who took an interest in kînayâh, as is evident in his books, al-Bayân wâ al-Tibîyân and al-Ḥayawân. In the main, al-Jâḥiẓ mentions kînayâh alongside târîd (allusion) as if they were synonyms with no difference between them semantically (Khîlîl, 2004, p. 30). However, al-Jâḥiẓ considers kînayâh the opposite of ‘declaration’ (taṣrîḥ) and ‘enunciation’ (‘îfṣâh). Ātîq (1980, p. 398) asserts that al-Jâḥiẓ “sees kînayâh in its general sense, which is expressing a meaning through allusion and not through declaration or enunciation whenever the situation requires this (my translation). Although al-Jâḥiẓ’s views on kînayâh are rather general, they are without any doubt far more comprehensive than the grammarians’ views. They are tinged with some rhetorical features, such as text, context, and state of addressees. Moreover, Khîlîl (2004, p. 31) argues that al-Jâḥiẓ infers that the
concept of *kināyah* is cognitional and requires visualising and contemplating. However, if we were to take ṢAtīq’s notes into consideration, we might claim that some shortcomings are found in al-Jāḥiẓ’s conception of *kināyah*. ṢAtīq (1980, p. 399) argues that *kināyah*, according to al-Jāḥiẓ’s statements and examples, encompasses “all types of figurative representation, simile, metaphor, and allusion” (my translation), i.e. al-Jāḥiẓ does not differentiate between *kināyah* and other figurative expressions. Furthermore, Shawqī Dayf (cited in Kahīl, 2004, p. 31) notes that al-Jāḥiẓ was not interested in rhetorical rules as much as in representing rhetorical examples.

On the other hand, Muḥammad bin Yazīd al-Mubarrid (d. 285 AH), one of al-Jāḥiẓ’s students, classifies discourse into three types. He believes that a speech involves either properness (i.e. using the words in their true sense), *kināyah*, or simile (Kahīl, 2004, p. 37). It is true that al-Mubarrid does not present a definition of *kināyah*, but he is probably the first person to discuss it in terms of ‘functional scope’. He points out in his book *al-Kāmil* three types of *kināyah*: blinding/disguising and concealment, euphemism, and aggrandisement (grandiloquence). It is clear that al-Mubarrid’s classification of *kināyah* is based on usefulness and purpose, i.e. functions of *kināyah*.

Qudāmah bin Jaᶜfar (d. 337 AH) discusses the concept of *kināyah* in his book *Naqd ash-Shiᶜr* (Criticism of Poetry) but under the term ‘*irdāf*’ (substitutability). He sees ‘*irdāf*’ as a type of concord between utterance/word (*lafḍah*) and meaning. He presents the following definition:

> الإِرْدَافُ أن يَرِيدُ الشَّاعِرُ دَلَالةً عَلَى مَعْنَىٰ مِنَ الْمَعَانِي، فَلَا يَانِيُ باللَفْظِ الدَّالُ عَلَى ذَلَّكَ المَعْنَى، بل بِالْفَظِّ يَدُلُّ عَلَى مَعْنَىٰ هُوَ رَدَفُهُ وَتَابِعُهُ، فَإِذَا دَلَّ عَلَى التَّابِعِ أُبَانَ عَنِ السَّبِيَّةِ

‘*Irdāf*’ (substitutability) occurs when a poet wants to indicate a specific meaning, but rather than using the [original] word that conveys that proper meaning, he opts for an alternative word that is considered ‘appositional’/adjacent to the proper meaning (cited in ṢAtīq, 1980, p. 400; my translation).

The examples presented by Qudāmah of ‘*irdāf*’ (see Kahīl, 2004, pp. 44-45) such as ‘long eardrops’ to describe a women with a long neck13 (which is a sign of beauty in Arab culture) alongside his definition shows that he considers *kināyah* and ‘*irdāf*’ to be one phenomenon or more precisely synonyms. Furthermore, Yūsuf abū al-ᶜAdūs points out that the ‘mediums’ or ‘vehicles’ leading to the meaning of ‘*irdāf*’ are similar to those in *kināyah* (cited in Kahīl, 2004, p. 47; the specific interpretation is mine). It is worth noting

---

13 “The semantic adjacency or the semantic entailment of the expression stems from the fact that if the woman's earring ornament is long then this entails that she has a long neck” (Al-Sharafi, 2004, p. 24).
that a ‘medium/vehicle’ functions through ‘semantic adjacency’ which helps the addressee to understand the intended meaning of the expression rather than the ‘proper’ sense. Having said that, the relation between ‘mediums’ and ambiguity is a ‘direct relationship’. In other words, the more ‘mediums’ embedded in the *kināyah* expression the more visualisation and contemplation are needed by the recipient to clear the ambiguity and comprehend the meaning intended by the text producer.

One can notice that *kināyah* is discussed by early rhetoricians under several terms, such as *tarrīḍ* (allusion) and *ʾirdāf*. Abū al-Hilāl al-Askarī (d. 395 AH), the author of *al-Ṣīnāʿ tayn*, is one of those who mixed between *kināyah*, *ʾirdāf*, *tarrīḍ* and other terms. al-Askarī provides the following definition (cited in Ṣatīq, 1980, p. 402):

\[
\text{الكتابة والتعريض أن يكني عن الشيء ويعرض به ولا يصرح، على حسب ما عملوا بالتورية عن}
\]

*Kināyah* and *tarrīḍ* (allusion/innuendo) is to conceal and allude something and not to mention it explicitly as in paronomasia/pun (my translation).

On this account, one can deduce that al-Askarī considers *kināyah* and *tarrīḍ* as the same phenomenon. He exemplifies his definition through examples from the Qur’an, Arabic poetry, and men of letters (see Tilb, 1997, p. 148). One of the examples he provides is:

\[
(\text{يا أيها الذين آمنوا لا فَزَعُوا الصَّلَاةَ وَلَتُنَضِّفُوا مَا تُؤْلِفُونَ وَلَا جَلِّبُوا إِلَّا عَابِرِي سِبْلٍ} \\
\text{حَتَّى تُغَلَّبُوا وَإِن كُنتُمْ مُرْضِيْنَ أَوْ عَلَى سُرْفٍ أَوْ جَاءَ أَحَدٌ مَّنِّ الْيَتَابِعِ أَوْ لَامُسْتَفْتَنَّ الْيَتَابِعَ إِلَّا فَمَنْ تُدْخِلُوا} \\
\text{مَا فَتَيَّمَتْ صُنُعًا طَيِّبًا فَأَفْسَخُوا يَوْحُوْهُمْ وَأَنْبِيُّهُمُ إِنَّ اللَّهَ كَانَ عَفَوًّا غَفُورًا) (النساء: 43).}
\]

(You who believe, do not come anywhere near the prayer if you are intoxicated, not until you know what you are saying; nor if you are in a state of major ritual impurity – though you may pass through the mosque – not until you have bathed; if you are ill, on a journey, have relieved yourselves, or had intercourse, and cannot find any water, then find some clean sand and wipe your faces and hands with it. God is always ready to pardon and forgive) [Q. 4:43] (Abdel Haleem, 2005).

Both words, *al-ghāʾiṭ* and *lāmastum* are used euphemistically, which is one of the functions of *kināyah*, to indicate the meanings of ‘defecation’ and ‘sexual intercourse’ respectively (see chapters five and six). Al-Askarī also talks about *ʾirdāf* (substitutability) and *tawābīr* (appositional/adjacent to the proper meaning) in a separate chapter in his book, *al-Ṣīnāʿ tayn*, and presents the following definition:

\[
\text{آن يريد المتكلم الدلالة على معنى، فيترك النشط الدال عليه الخاص به، ويأتي بلفظ هو رده وتابع له،} \\
\text{فينجعله عبارة عن المعنى الذي أراده.}
\]
[‘Irdāf and tawābiᶜ is when] the text producer seeks to indicate a specific meaning by choosing a substitutive word that is adjacent to the proper/true meaning as an expression for the intended meaning, rather than using the ‘original’ word that denotes the true sense (cited in Kahîl, 2004, p. 50; my translation).

According to Kahîl (ibid., p. 50; Tilb, 1997, p.149) al-ᶜAskarî’s definition of ‘irdāf and tawābiᶜ actually signifies the concept of kinâyah. As a consequence, one can suggest that there is some kind of inconsistency in al-ᶜAskarî’s views of kinâyah. The reason for saying this, besides his definition of ‘irdāf and tawābiᶜ, is that the examples he uses to exemplify his views were known, later on, as examples of kinâyah, such as كﺜير الرماد (having] a lot of ashes - a kinâyah for generosity), بعيدة مهوى القرط (having] long eardrops - a kinâyah for a women with a long neck), and طويﻞ النجاد (having] a long sword-scabbard/sheath - a kinâyah for a tall person).

The concept probably remained ambiguous until al-Jurjânî came up with a clear solid rhetorical definition. But it is worth mentioning that the first noteworthy attempt to capsulise kinâyah in the rhetorical sphere was by ᶜAbd Allah bin Sinân al-khafâjî (d. 466 AH) the author of Sirr al-faṣāḥah (Secret of Eloquence). Though he did not come up with a clear definition of kinâyah, he linked kinâyah to the basic principle of rhetoric, which is ‘requirements of the situation’ (context of situation). al-Khafâjî (cited in: Kahîl, 2004, pp. 78-83; Tilb, 1997, pp. 153-156) argues that there is a ‘style of expression for each situation’, hence kinâyah should only be used when the ‘situation’ is appropriate; for instance, expressions concerning ‘jesting, impudence, and stating rarae aves’ are advisable to use ‘directly’ rather than through kinâyah. Concisely,al-Khafâjî believes that kinâyah is one of the bases of eloquence and one of the stipulations of rhetoric whenever it is used appropriately (ibid).

It is not surprising to find that the first clear rhetorical definition of kinâyah was at the hands of al-Jurjânî, since modern rhetoricians agree that he is the one who laid the grounds of Arabic rhetoric. Al-Jurjânî’s definition is as follows:

Kinâyah is the process in which the text producer seeks to substantiate a specific meaning without mentioning it directly through its known (original/conventional) word in the language. Instead he opts for a meaning (word) that is ‘associated’ and adjacent to the true meaning (proper sense) in
order to allude to and attest the meaning intended; for example: ‘He is long
of sword-scabbard’ to indicate that he is tall in stature, ‘[having] a lot of
cooking-pot ashes’ to mean very generous, and ‘forenoon sleeper’ to indicate
a woman who is self-indulgent, living in great luxury and being served (al-

Al-Jurjānī considers kināyah a stylistic expression to substantiate and attest a distinctive
characteristic of a person/thing (al-Jurjānī, 1995, pp. 69-70, 203-205). He argues that the
association between the substitutive word/s and the ‘original’ word is necessary to verify
the meaning intended. This verification is accomplished through a cognitive process by
the addressee. For example, in order to understand the meaning intended in the expression
‘She is a forenoon sleeper’, the recipient ‘imagines’ and ‘wonders’ why a woman would
keep sleeping until just before noon (especially given that in Arabic traditional life, a
woman wakes up at dawn to attend to household matters if she is a housewife or prepares
to go out to work) unless she has nothing to do because she is living in great luxury and
being served. Abu Deeb explains kināyah in the eyes of al-Jurjānī:

The relationship between the “intended meaning” and the conveyed
[expressed] meaning is described by al-Jurjānī as a relation between one
meaning and another which is “corollary of the first and whose existence is
conditional on the first being conceived of”, the latter being the one actually
conveyed by the linguistic form. The process by which the relationship is
revealed is expressed by “the indication and suggestion through the expressed
meaning of the non-immediate meaning … Unlike istrāra [sic], kināyah
presents a picture which is not fused or identified with the entity to which it
refers. The two entities stand apart, their relationship being determined not by
the linguistic or immediate context, but by the social, cultural context, on the
one hand, and a set of logical or factual links relating them, on the other. It is
due to this pattern of relationships that kināyah “has an effect on the soul”
which a direct statement of the meaning does not have. For the same reason
its effect is conditional on “interpreting” the conveyed [expressed] meaning.
Yet the artistic value of kināyah does not spring entirely from the statement
it makes. Al-Jurjānī emphasizes that two pictures expressing the same non-
immediate meaning are not equivalent to each other, but are each an origin
and separate category or type. He clearly believes that the value of the image
resides in the series of the associations and concrete and visual details it
evokes (1979, p. 165-166).

It is worth noting that in his book, Dalā’il al-iʿjāz (ibid, pp. 235-241), al-Jurjānī sheds
light upon two types of kināyah but without detailed classification: kināyah of affinity
(nisbah) and kināyah of an attribute (ṣifah). However, the first person to differentiate
between kināyah and taʿrīḍ (allusion) is probably az-Zamakhsharī (d. 538 AH). He states
that *kināyah* is “expressing something through a word other than its conventional word” and *taᶜrīḍ* is “to express something in order to lead/allude to something else not mentioned” (cited in Tilb, 1997, p. 169; my translation).

as-Sakkākī provides a slightly different definition of *kināyah* in which he introduces the concept of ‘entailment’, involving *lāzīm* (entailing) and *malzūm* (entailed):

الكناية هي ترك التصريح بذكر الشيء إلى ما يلزم، لينتقل من المذكور إلى المتروك، كما تقول: فلان طويل النجاد؛ لينتقله منه إلى ما هو ملزم وهو طول القامة.

*Kināyah* is to avoid expressing something explicitly, but rather stating what it entails in order to shift the exposition of what is expressed to what has been left implicit, such as in saying ‘so-and-so is long of sword-scabbard’ where the meaning of ‘a long sword-scabbard’ [the entailing] is shifted to ‘the entailed’ which is tallness in stature (cited in Kahīl, 2004, p. 121; my translation).

The salient contribution by as-Sakkākī is that he provides a detailed classification of types of *kināyah*, which is followed by the majority of modern rhetoricians (see 2.4.1). Ibn al-ʾAthīr (d. 637 AH), from his part, criticises some early scholars for not differentiating between *kināyah* and *taᶜrīḍ*. He defines *taᶜrīḍ* as:

اللفظ الدال على الشيء عن طريق المفهوم، ﻻ بالوضع الحقيقي أو المجازي.

“The expression that indicates a meaning through conception, not through proper or figurative expressions (cited in ʿAfīq, 1980, p. 238; my translation).

Ibn al-ʾAthīr also argues that *kināyah* occurs in single and complex forms (lexemes), while *taᶜrīḍ* only involves complex forms (lexemes), because *taᶜrīḍ* could not be understood directly through a true/proper sense nor through a figurative expression, but only through all the words in the statement (ibid. 239). As for *kināyah*, he defines it as:

كل لفظة دلت على معنى يجوز حمله على جانبي الحقيقة والمجاز.

An expression that holds both meanings, its proper sense and its figurative sense (cited in Kahīl, 2004, p. 129; my translation).

Ibn al-ʾAthīr notes that there should be a generic relationship between the literal meaning (proper sense) and the figurative meaning. He exemplifies his argument with several examples from the Qurʾan, one being the following *āyah*:

إن هذا أخي لما تبتغ وتشغون نعجة ولي نعجة واحده... [ص: 23]

(This is my brother. He had ninety-nine ewes and I just the one …) [Q. 38:23] (Abdel Haleem, 2005).
Ibn al-ʾAthīr believes that the meaning of the word ‘ewe’ in the āyah is a *kināyah* for women; the generic relationship is that both a women and ewe are female; hence the meaning can be taken from both sides, literally and figuratively. The final definition of *kināyah* in this section belongs to al-Qazwīnī (d. 739 AH). He defines *kināyah* as follows (1996, p. 365):

*Kināyah* is an expression “used to entail something semantically concomitant with it, with the possibility of intending the literal meaning” of this expression (translation is taken from: Al-Sharafi, 2004, p. 27).

Al-Qazwīnī’s definition combines ibn al-ʾAthīr and az-Zamakhshari’s views of *kināyah*, i.e. he uses the notion of ‘concomitance’ (*lāzīm* and *malzūm*) and the possibility of intending the literal meaning, respectively. But what is remarkably interesting in ibn al-ʾAthīr and al-Qazwīnī’s concepts of *kināyah*, in addition to some other scholars’ views, is that they all refer to the possibility of intending the literal and figurative senses of the *kināyah* expression. This brings us to the rousing debate among some rhetoricians, namely in the wake of al-Jurjānī’s definition of *kināyah*, whether *kināyah* is a figure of speech or not.

Some scholars, such as ar-Rāzī, (Kaḥīl, 2004, pp. 4-6), do not consider *kināyah* a figurative expression, arguing that it merely represents a true sense. They present two justifications; their first justification is that there is no contradiction in the *kināyah* expression with its literal meaning, i.e. the literal meaning of the *kināyah* is actually true unlike *istiᶜārah*. For example, the metaphorical word ‘lion’, as in ‘I saw a lion in my office’ means ‘I saw a person brave as a lion in my office’; therefore, under no circumstances may the literal sense of ‘lion’ be true. By contrast, according to the some scholars, the *kināyah* expression طويﻞ النجاد (*long of sword-scabbard*) to denote the meaning of a ‘tall person’ is in reality true, because that person has a long sword-scabbard. With regards to *kināyah*, this excuse is in some ways true, but not always; for example (Ṭilib, 1997, pp. 181-182), the *kināyah* ‘long of sword-scabbard’ could be used with a tall person who does not actually have a sword-scabbard, consequently the true sense (literal meaning) is not actualised. Also, it is absolutely impossible to intend the true sense in *kināyah* of affinity (الكتابة عن النسبة) (see 2.4.1), as in ‘stinginess is in Sami’s blood’. There is another situation where it is impossible to intend the true sense of *kināyah*, particularly those related to God (Allah), as in the following examples (ibid; Kaḥīl, 2004, p. 6):
(The Lord of Mercy, established on the throne) [Q. 20:5] (Abdel Haleem, 2005)

(These people have no grasp of God’s true measure. On the Day of Resurrection, the whole earth will be in His grip. The heavens will be rolled up in His right hand – Glory be to Him! He is far above the partners they ascribe to Him!-) [Q. 39: 67] (Abdel Haleem, 2005)

The kināyah in the first āyah is to indicate the ‘authority’ and ‘superiority’ of God (Allah) through ‘sitting firmly on the throne’; the kināyah in the second āyah is to indicate God’s mightiness and exaltedness through ‘the gripping of the whole earth in one hand’. It is impossible to ascribe ‘sitting’ and ‘gripping’ in reality to God; hence it is impossible to intend the true sense. In such situations, the true sense of kināyah is intended in a stylistic way only, but not on its own. In other words, it is merely a means of reaching the meaning intended.

The second justification of those scholars who consider kināyah as an expression of true sense rather than a figurative expression is related to the notion of ‘entailing /concomitant and entailed/concomitee’ (lāzim wa malzūm). The transference of this notion in figurative expressions is from the ‘entailed’ (malzūm) to the ‘entailing’ (lāzim), whereas in kināyah it is the other way round. Tilb (1997, p. 182) points out that there are some situations where the concomitance is equal, i.e. the ‘concomitant’ and the ‘concomitee’ are equal; In other words, in senses, the literal meaning and the meaning intended, are concomitant to each other. Tilb states that if this equality occurs, then there is no difference between a kināyah and majāz, and that the only thing that differentiates the two is that in kināyah the literal sense could possibly be true.

No matter what these scholars say about kināyah, in the end kināyah is an expression that represents a meaning other than its literal meaning, and the possibility of intending its literal meaning is merely a tool to reach and substantiate the actual meaning intended. That said, the majority of rhetoricians affirm that kinayah is a figure of speech that belongs to ʿilm al-bayān (for more details on this matter as well as a historical view on the development of kināyah in Arabic see al-Qatān, 1993; in English see Al-Sharafi, 2004, pp. 22-28). Ibn al-ʾAthīr and al-Qazwīnī perceived this; hence they added to the definition of kināyah ‘the possibility of targeting the original meaning’, i.e. its literal sense.
Consequently, *kināyah* remains one of the essential tropes of *ʿilm al-bayān*, alongside *ʾistiʿārah*, *tashbīh*, and *majāz mursal* (cf. Lāshīn, 1998).

### 2.4.1 Classifications of *kināyah*

It seems the majority of rhetoricians, if not all, agree on the classification proposed by as-Sakkākī and followed by al-Qazwīnī. As-Sakkākī looks at *kināyah* from two main perspectives. First, from an objective perspective, i.e. the type of attribution as intended by the text producer. Second, from the perspective of context and medium, i.e. the context and medium leading to the meaning of the *kināyah*. These two perspectives of classification will be discussed at length below (cf. al-Qatān).

#### 2.4.1.1 *Kināyah* from an objective perspective

Based on the type of attribution intended by the text producer, this perspective subsumes three types: *kināyah* of an attribute (*kināyah ʿan al-ṣifah*), *kināyah* of an attributed (*kināyah ʿan al-mawṣūf*), and *kināyah* of an affinity (*kināyah ʿan al-nisbah*). These types can be explained and exemplified as follows:

**Kināyah of an attribute (kināyah ʿan al-ṣifah):** The objective of this type of *kināyah* is to indicate a specific characteristic trait, ‘an attribute’ such as generosity, courage, or beauty (c.f. Abdul-Raof, 2006, p. 236). The attributed and the affinity expression(s) are mentioned without the attribute in order to lead to the ‘attribute’ intended. In other words, the *kināyah* expression consists of an attribute(s) that is semantically associated with the attribute intended. The addressee reaches the attribute intended through this association. For example, the phrase كُثِير الرماد ‘has plenty of ashes’ as in حَسِيم كُثِير الرماد ‘Sami has plenty of ashes’ indicates generosity (كَرِم), because in Arabic culture, a person who is generous normally hosts many guests, and traditionally they are provided with hot drinks and food. Before the modern era there was no gas or electricity, and all the cooking was done on firewood which leaves ashes behind. So, plenty of ashes means plenty of cooking which, in turn, means a lot of guests and that implies generosity. Another example is طَوْيِل النجاح ‘long of sword-scabbard’ to indicate any person who is tall in stature, because wearing a long of sword-scabbard requires a person who is tall.

Moreover, as-Sakkākī classifies *kināyah* of an attribute into two categories (ʿAṭīyah, 2004, pp. 134-135; Kahīl, 2004, pp. 8-9; Mahdi, 2009, pp. 14-15; al-Hāshimī, 1999, p. 371; cf. al-Qatān, 1993) based on the number of mediums or concomitants needed to reach the meaning of the *kināyah* (the meaning intended): a close/near *kināyah* and a
distant *kināyah*. *Kināyah* expressions such as ‘long of sword–scabbard’ for a tall person and ‘long of eardrops’ for a woman with a long neck are examples for a ‘close’ or ‘near’ *kināyah*. It is called a close *kināyah* because the addressee reaches the meaning of the *kināyah* without any mediums, i.e. the cognitive-shifts of the addressee do not need any medium to understand the *kināyah* meaning. By contrast, in a ‘distant *kināyah*’ the cognition of the addressee, from the *kināyah* expression to the meaning intended, goes through one shift or more, based on the number of mediums, in order to understand the meaning intended. For example, the *kināyah* expression ‘having a lot of cooking-pot ashes’ for generosity, requires several mediums in order to reach the meaning intended. That is to say, the addressee’s cognition shifts from ‘a lot of ashes’ → ‘a lot of embers’ → ‘a lot burning’ → ‘a lot of cooking’ → ‘a lot of guests’ in order to reach the meaning intended, which is hospitable and generous. As a result, the more mediums there are, the more cognitive shifts are required by the addressee to understand the meaning of the *kināyah* (cf. al-Qatān, 1993, p. 197).

**Kināyah of an attributed (kināyah ‘an al-mawṣūf):** In this type of *kināyah* the objective is to indicate an attributed. The attribute, which is strongly associated with the attributed, is mentioned along with the affinity ‘expresssion(s)’ and without the attributed. The association between the ‘attribute’ and the ‘attributed’ is so strong that sometimes the attribute stands as a symbol for the attributed, such as the ‘Nile’ for ‘Egypt’, ‘10 Downing street’ for the ‘British Prime Minister’, ‘the eastern star’ (*كوكب الشرق*) for the late Egyptian singer ’Umm Kalthūm, and ‘the place of secrets’ (*موطن الأسرار*) for ‘the heart’. The following example will further illustrate this point:

تجولت في المدينة القديمة علﻰ سفينة الصحراء – I toured in the old city on ‘the ship of the desert’ (camel)

The phrase ‘ship of the desert’, which is an attribute for a camel is mentioned; the affinity words (the words on which the interpretation of سفينة الصحراء are predicated), which are ‘Toured … on’ are also mentioned, while the attributed ‘camel’ is not mentioned. In the *kināyah* of an attributed (*kināyah ‘an al-mawṣūf*), the attribute must be a feature or quality belonging typically to the attributed (a person or object) (cf. al-Qatān, 1993).

**Kināyah of an affinity (kināyah ‘an al-nisbah):** In this type of *kināyah* expression the objective is to affirm or deny a specific characteristic to the attributed. In other words, the attribute and the attributed are mentioned while the affinity is left out, although it is the required element, for the purpose of specialising a specific characteristic to the attributed.
The attribute is predicated to something that is associated with the attributed (al-Hāshimī, 1999, p. 372; Abdul-Raof, 2006, p. 237; 'Amīn, 1982, p. 162; Mahdi, 2009, p. 13; Kaḥīl, 2004, pp. 12-13). The following example further illustrates this point:

البخﻞ في دم سامي

Stinginess is in Sami’s blood

The intention of the text producer is to affirm implicitly that Sami has the quality of stinginess (ungenerousness); instead of saying directly ‘Sami is stingy’ or ‘ungenerous’, it is indirectly implied through the nominalised attribute (البخﻞ - stinginess) by referring to it through the attributed noun (Sami) figuratively by using something that is associated with the attributed which is Sami’s blood. Therefore, the addressee can understand that the person dispraised and described as ‘stingy’ is only Sami since the ‘blood’ belongs only to him and no one else (cf. al-Qatān).

2.4.1.2 Kināyah from a context and medium perspective.

Based on a context and medium perspective, kināyah according to al-Sakkākī ranges from taᶜrīḍ (allusion), to talwīḥ (waving), ramz (indicating), and ‘imā’ or ‘ishārah (gesticulation or pointing) (Kaḥīl, 2004, pp. 15-18).

Taᶜrīḍ (Allusion): This is an expressional statement which indicates a meaning that can be only understood through the context. For example, ‘The [true] Muslim is one from whose tongue [other] Muslims are safe’, which is part of a Hadith, means indirectly that Islam repudiates the injuriousness of others. Thus a person who harms others by any means is not considered a Muslim. Another example of an allusive expression (taᶜrīḍ) is: ‘I came to greet you and look at your generous face’, which is a statement said by an indigent person to his host to ask for help implicitly. A third example of taᶜrīḍ is the ‘āyah which informs us what the notables among Noah's own people said when they refused to follow him:

﴿لاأن نرى لكم عيننا من فضل بن نظلكم كاذبين﴾

(But the prominent disbelievers among his people said, ‘We can see that you are nothing but a mortal like ourselves, and it is clear to see that only the vilest among us follow you. We cannot see how you are any better than we are. In fact, we think you are a liar) [11:27] (Abdel Haleem, 2005)

Taᶜrīḍ here is ما نرَآكُ إلاّ بشرًا مُذَّنًا، which means indirectly that ‘we are more entitled to the prophecy than you’. As a result, all examples clearly show that the meaning intended in an allusive statement can only be understood through the context and not literally. Therefore, kināyah, from the context and medium perspective, is called taᶜrīḍ (allusion)
when its intended meaning is only reached through the context. One may also notice that *taᶜrīḍ* is much more of a whole statement (sentence) and not a word or phrase, and therefore, some rhetoricians see it as an independent figure of speech. However, the majority of rhetoricians suggest that *taᶜrīḍ* is a type of *kināyah* (for more details see al-Qatān, 1993).

**Talwīḥ (waving):** Literally, the meaning of *talwīḥ* (waving/displaying) is to beckon to someone else, especially from a distance; rhetorically, from the perspective of context and medium, a *kināyah* is called *talwīḥ* when it has plenty of cognitive shifts (cf. *kināyah* of an attribute) and without *taᶜrīḍ*. An example of *talwīḥ* is "كﺜير رماد القدر" for generosity, because it contains several cognitive shifts in order to arrive at the intended meaning.

**Ramz (indicating/symbolizing):** Unlike *talwīḥ*, *ramz*, literally, is to beckon someone else nearby secretively through eyes, eyebrows, lips, or mouth. Rhetorically, it is a *kināyah* that has fewer mediums, concealment of its concomitance, and without *taᶜrīḍ* (allusiveness). In other words, it is a *kināyah* expression that needs fewer cognitive shifts in order to arrive at the intended meaning. *Kināyah* expressions, such as ‘his nose is in the sky’ for a person who is haughty, ‘thick of liver’ (i.e. thick-livered) for a person who is hard-hearted, ‘wide of pillow’ or ‘wide of nape’ for a person who is stupid, and ‘proportional of limbs’ for a person who is intelligent do not need several cognitive shifts to arrive at the intended meaning as in *talwīḥ*.

**ʾImāʾ or ʾishārah (gesticulation or pointing):** ʾIshārah (pointing), sometimes called ʾimāʾ (gesticulation), is when the *kināyah*, according to the perspective of context and medium, has few cognitive shifts, involves explicit concomitance, and is not a *taᶜrīḍ*. An example of this type is the following line of poetry:

```
مني تخلو تميم من كريم     ومسلمه بن عمرو من تميم
When will Tamīm run out of a hospitable [person]      and Muslimah bin ʾAmr is from Tamīm
```

Tamīm is a well-known tribe which Muslimah bin ʾAmr belongs to. The poet is describing bin ʾAmr as a hospitable person, but instead of saying this directly, he implies it through ʾAmr’s tribe. As is clear from the example, the addressees do not need several cognitive shifts to reach the intended meaning, and it is not expressed in a *taᶜrīḍ* manner.
2.4.2 Functions of *kināyah* (purposes of use)

*Kināyah*, in Arabic rhetoric, serves a variety of purposes. According to ‘Aṭīyah (2004, p. 147), *kināyah* is used to serve the purpose of praise and dispraise, clarity, demonstrating the state or quality of the attributed, and concealment. However, the most common functions of *kināyah*, particularly in the Qur’an, are as follows (‘Aṭīyah, 2004, pp. 145-147; al-Hajjaj, 2004, p. 97):

**Euphemism:** There are some words that seem unpleasant or impertinent; through *kināyah* they are expressed in a pleasant and acceptable way, as in:

(...) or one of you comes from the place of relieving himself or you have contacted women ... [Q. 5:6] (Saheeh International, 2004)

**Elegance:** There are some words that can be expressed more elegantly through *kināyah*, as in:

(And whoever turns his back to them on such a day, unless swerving [as a strategy] for war or joining [another] company ...) [Q. 8:16] (Saheeh International, 2004)

**Reminding and warning of God’s (Allah) greatness and power,** as in:

(He will enter to burn in a Fire of [blazing] flame (And his wife [as well] - the carrier of firewood) [Q. 111:3-4] (Saheeh International, 2004)

**Reminding and warning of fate,** as in:

(But if you do not - and you will never be able to ...) [Q. 2:24] (Saheeh International, 2004)

**Brevity** as in:

(B) If you do not - and you will never be able to ...) [Q. 2:24] (Saheeh International, 2004)

**Hyperbole:** The intention of exaggeration, as in:

(And his wife [as well] - the carrier of firewood) [Q. 111:3-4] (Saheeh International, 2004)
(And the Jews say, "The hand of Allah is chained." Chained are their hands, and cursed are they for what they say. Rather, both His hands are extended; He spends however He wills …) [Q. 5:64] (Saheeh International, 2004)

2.5 Western rhetoric

Western rhetoric appeared a long time before Arabic rhetoric. It was during the classical Greek and Roman era when this branch of scholarshiop began to flourish, namely through the renowned philosophers Plato (428–347 BCE), Aristotle (384–322 BCE), and Cicero (106–43 BCE) (Kennedy, 2001; Prosser, 2009). There is a supposed conviction that the pioneers of rhetoric were the two Sophists of Sicily, Corax and Tisias (Clarke, 1996, p. 1; Enos & Fahnestock, 2001, p. 50; Johnstone, 2001, p. 260; Murphy & Katula, 2003, p. 24). Nevertheless, the majority believe that Plato laid down the first principles of rhetoric, especially given that the Greek term ῥητορικός (rhētorikē) initially appeared in his work Gorgias (Kennedy, 2001b, p. 105; Kennedy, 1994, p. 3).

From the early definitions of classical rhetoric we can deduce that the central focus of rhetoric was persuasion through discourse. One of the earliest definitions of rhetoric may be found in Plato’s dialogue Gorgias, in which Socrates and the sophist Gorgias discuss the nature and moral implications of the use of rhetoric. Gorgias defines rhetoric as “the artificer of persuasion” used primarily for legal and judicial purposes (Plato, 1994). However, Plato (through the voice of Socrates) objects to this narrow definition, suggesting that rhetoric is “an art which leads the soul by means of words, not only in law courts and the various other public assemblages, but in private companies as well” (Plato, 1994). While the study of rhetoric in its origin was conceived of as an activity restricted to public oratory and the courtroom, an awareness developed within the classical period that it affected all aspects of discourse (ibid.). In the Gorgias, Plato was highly critical of the persuasive agenda of the Sophists and of rhetoric in general, believing it to be fundamentally immoral.

Aristotle, a Greek philosopher who belonged to Plato’s Academy (Kennedy, 1994, p. 51), is known for his effective treatises on rhetoric, such as Rhetoric and Poetics. Through his treatises, Aristotle established and developed the classical concept of rhetoric. Aristotle considered rhetoric as the counterpart of dialectic (Timmerman & Schiappa, 2010, p. 97; Prosser, 2009, p. 105); in other words, rhetoric, according to Aristotle, is another means of finding the truth. Thus, his definition of rhetoric is the ability to find the available means of persuasion (Aristotle, 2007, p. 37). Though Aristotle belonged to Plato’s
Academy, he pursued a different perspective in studying rhetoric to the extent that his work is recognised as the “first systematic treatise” on rhetoric (Johnstone, 2001, p. 260). George Kennedy notes that rhetoric in Aristotle’s view also has a theoretical element and in addition clearly does often “produce persuasion, speeches, and texts” (Aristotle, 2007, p. 16). Aristotle’s theoretical contribution to rhetoric was explicit; he introduced different rhetorical classifications. For example, based on the audience (the hearers of speeches), Aristotle suggested that there are three genres of rhetorical texts or type of speeches, deliberative, judicial, and epideictic (Aristotle, 2007, p. 46; Lanham, 1991, p. 164). In general, Aristotle’s role was influential and salient; credit goes to Aristotle for being one of the first scholars to discuss rhetoric from a theoretical perspective, and for his remarks on style, arrangement, metaphor, and simile (see 2.6.1 and 2.6.2).

The increase of interest in rhetoric and the power of oratory, in the Roman period, appears to have come about also as a response to political trials and prosecutions that attracted public attention (Calboli & Dominik, 1997, p. 3). Therefore, the study of rhetoric was expanded and formalised by Roman philosophers or rhetoricians, most notably by Cicero and Quintilian, but under the term ‘oratory’. Lanham (1991, p. 105) defines oratory as “public speech” and points out that rhetoric “usually means the theory of oratory”. For Cicero and his Roman contemporaries, rhetoric was an art of persuasion that could be effectively learned and studied by systematically breaking it down into its composite parts. These parts are: invention, arrangement, expression (style), memory, and delivery (Cicero, 1949, p. 19); they are known as the five branches/canons/offices of rhetoric. Cicero, Quintilian, and other Roman rhetoricians focused on the importance of these branches of rhetoric and regarded them as the spine of rhetorical education and therefore a system and guideline to produce powerful speeches and writing. However, Cicero’s rhetorical theory is mainly focused on the concept of ‘eloquence’; a concept which only appeared clearly through Cicero’s ideas. The relevance of eloquence to rhetoric, according to Cicero, is as follows:

There is a scientific system of politics which includes many important departments. One of these departments – a large and important one – is eloquence based on the rules of art, which they call rhetoric” (Cicero, 1949, p. 13/15).

Cicero considers eloquence as an art and therefore “two of Cicero’s mature works define eloquence in the sense of artistic expression” (Fantham, 2001, p. 251). Furthermore,
Cicero defines the function of eloquence as “to speak in a manner suited to persuade an audience” in order to “persuade by speech” (Cicero, 1949, p. 15).

Unlike Arabic rhetoric (see 2.2), we can notice, in general, that the definition of Western rhetoric has become a controversial issue. At times, rhetoric is described as an art and sometimes as a technique, and at other times as a faculty. The development of interest in language, which has caused the emergence of new disciplines in the linguistic field, such as semiotics, pragmatics, stylistics, and so forth, has made the definition of rhetoric even more controversial (Wales, 2001, pp. 344-346). One of the definitions of eloquence given in the Oxford English Dictionary (OED) is “rhetoric” (4. OED), while on the other hand the definition of rhetoric includes the following: “the study of principles and rules to be followed by a speaker or writer striving for eloquence” (1.a OED). Probably one of the most comprehensive books on rhetoric and its definitions and descriptions is Introduction to the Study of Rhetoric by Rev. Francis Cuthbert Doyle (1893). The reason for this is that Doyle clarifies the meaning of ‘art’ and ‘faculty’ before clarifying rhetoric. He indicates that faculty is “a power bestowed upon us by God, which power enables us to do anything whether corporal or intellectual. Thought, imagination, memory, are faculties”; whereas ‘art’ is “an habitual power, that is to say, a power not born with man, but acquired by means of a system of well-approved precepts” (ibid., p. 1). Afterwards, Doyle asks whether the power of persuasion is a faculty or an art, and notes the following:

The power of persuasion may be regarded either as a faculty or as an art. As a faculty, it is called Eloquence, and is defined to be ‘The power of moving others to act, by convincing their intelligence, by moving their hearts, and by bending their wills’. As an art, it is called Rhetoric, and is defined to be: ‘That body of rules or precepts by which the faculty of eloquence is guided so as more securely to obtain its end’ (ibid.).

According to Doyle, etymologically the term ‘rhetoric’ means “the art of speaking well” and it can be defined as the “body of rules and precepts by which the faculty of eloquence is guided more securely to obtain its end” (1893, p. 4). Another definition of rhetoric is “the art of speaking and of writing well” (ibid.). Doyle also notes that directing “the talent of those who have received the faculty of eloquence” is regarded as the purpose or objective of rhetoric (ibid.).

However, at the beginning of the 20th century, due to the development of linguistics, as mentioned earlier, a renewed focus on communication and systems of discourse resulted in new approaches to rhetoric. In recent years, modern rhetorical theory has shifted the
focus onto persuasion, meaning that the study of rhetoric now comprises a number of key elements of speech or text. These include the intentions and agency of the speaker himself, the role of the audience, the discourse and symbols that underpin the situation and the cultural context in which the situation is addressed (Foss, 2009, p. 856; Bitzer, 1968). In short, rhetorical theory, as Foss notes, is “[n]o longer confined to simply the study of speeches or discourse, it is generally viewed as the study of any kind of symbols”; therefore, the terms ‘rhetoric’ and ‘communication’ are often used interchangeably by scholars of rhetoric (Foss, 2009, p. 855). Suffice it to say that rhetoric, from the 20th century onwards, is no longer a discipline that stands alone by itself, i.e. modern rhetorical theory has become an inter-disciplinary field. In other words, modern rhetoric has become an important area of study in linguistics and other language-specific disciplines, such as literature, philosophy, and translation studies (cf. Campbell, 2001, pp. 517-527).

As for the relationship of tropes or figures of speech with rhetoric, it seems that it was at first, specifically in classical rhetoric, slightly vague and complex in terms of their features, functions, and classifications (cf. Leech, 1969, p. 74). Rowe (2001, p. 125) points out that Quintilian reported that there was an irresolvable disagreement among grammarians and philosophers as to the correct number and categorization of tropes. As a consequence, it is not surprising that “there are names for more than 60 tropes and figures identified by rhetoricians from the fifth century BC through to the early Christian era” (ibid. p. 121). Nevertheless, tropes were initially seen as an element of style. Hence most of the discussions on tropes were located under the rhetorical part, which is concerned with expressions and word choice, known as ‘style’ (see 2.5.1). However, if classical rhetoric developed due to the development of linguistics and other language-specific studies, then traditional tropes have too, ipso facto, developed (see 2.6).

### 2.5.1 Classifications of Rhetoric

Early rhetoricians, such as Aristotle, Cicero, and Quintilian, believed that rhetoric was an art of discourse that can educate orators to produce a successful and persuasive speech. Rhetoric as an art was categorized systematically into five branches known as the ‘canons’ or ‘offices’ of rhetoric; they are called respectively: Invention, Arrangement, Style, Memory, and Delivery. It is said that some scholars tend to omit the last two canons

---

14 For more details on the classifications of rhetoric see Doyle (1893); and for details on the canons of rhetoric see Porter (2001).
from the list; some might consider them already included in the canon of style (cf. Doyle, 1893, p. 5) or “being matters more of nature than of art” (Clarke, 1996, p. 24). However, these five canons form, as a whole system, classical rhetoric theory; and according to classical rhetoricians, an orator should gain mastery in these rhetorical branches in order to produce a successful and powerful discourse that has an impact on the receiver.

So, what are the significations of these canons? In general, invention, which is the first canon, refers to “discovery” (Heath, 2001) or in a more proper sense finding the appropriate contents, material, data, or information that support an argument and gives it value and essence. Doyle points out that as a faculty, invention is defined as “the power or ability which the speaker or the writer has of discovering those materials out of which he weaves his discourse”; and as an art or a part of rhetoric, invention is defined as “the art which supplies rules and precepts to aid the speaker or the writer to discover these materials” (1893, p. 6).

The second canon of rhetoric is ‘arrangement’. It is defined as “the ordering of the substance of what was accomplished in the process of εὑρεσις/inventio [invention] for the purpose of serving the partiality/utilitas in the discourse’s aim” (Wuellner, 2001, p. 51). Arrangement is the process of how the contents, data, or material of an argument are put together. In other words, arrangement is regarded as the organizational structure of an argument or discourse. The cohesiveness and coherence of a discourse depend heavily on organizational structure. Furthermore, the standard of persuasion is also affected by the way the discourse is arranged. The importance of this part of rhetorical theory is noted by Wuellner:

> Arrangement is the necessary complement to εὑρεσις/inventio [invention] with focus on arrangement of thoughts or ideas, but also of the order and choice of words, both as to their style (λέξεις/elocutio) and their delivery (ὑπόκρισις/actio)—in terms of their appropriateness (aptum) for the adopted partiality, and in terms of the ‘parts of speech’ (ibid. p. 51).

The third part or canon of rhetoric is ‘style’. Elocutio is the Latin term for style, and according to Doyle elocution or elocutio “is that part of Rhetoric which teaches the orator how to express in a suitable manner the thoughts which he wishes to lay before his audience” (1893, p. 71). Style or elocution is the part of the rhetorical theory that is related to the way the discourse is expressed in order to stir the emotions of the audience. Johnson reports that “style is defined primarily in terms of how diction, sentence structure and arrangement, and the use of the figures contribute to the speaker's or writer's intention to
move the understanding, the imagination, the passions, and the will in particular ways” (Johnson, 2001, p. 543). Accordingly, word choice, composition of sentences, and the usage of tropes and figures are stylistic elements that enhance the discourse and contribute to the impact on the audience. The aforementioned stylistic elements are mainly discussed under certain virtues or principles: correctness, clarity, ornamentation, and propriety (Rowe, 2001, p. 121). It is worth noting that the canon of style seems similar to the three major branches of Arabic rhetoric: ʾilm al-maċānī, ʾilm al-bayān, and ʾilm al-badīḥ.

Memory is the fourth canon in Western rhetorical theory. Memory in this context is not used in the sense of memorizing word by word; this canon refers to the capability to understand, grasp, absorb, and memorize the content of a discourse. Doyle defines memory as “a faculty by which our soul is able to recall the ideas of things, of which the intelligence at some previous time has been cognisant” (1893, p. 104). On the other hand, Olbricht quotes a classical definition concerning the function of memory: “Memory is the firm retention in the mind of the matter, word and arrangement” (2001, p. 160).

The last part of rhetoric is delivery. This canon is more related to oral than written discourse. It is about the techniques that a speaker can use while transmitting his speech through voice and gesture. Delivery, according to classical rhetoricians, “is the graceful regulation of voice, countenance, and gesture” (ibid. p. 160).

2.6 Western (English) tropical representations

A tropical representation (figurative expression) is presented through the use of a specific device known traditionally as a trope, which nowadays is known as a figure of speech. Etymologically, the term ‘trope’ is derived from the Greek word ‘τρόπος’ (tropos) which means a turn, turning or direction (OED; Doyle, 1893, p. 80; Lanham, 1991, p. 154; cf. Anderson, 2000, p. 121; cf. Wales, 2001, p. 398). What is meant by a ‘turn’ is that the meaning of a single word or phrase deviates from its literal or basic or proper sense to another intended meaning which is called a figurative meaning. In classical rhetoric, tropes were regarded merely as stylistic devices to beautify a discourse for persuasive reasons. Quintilian states that “the name of trope (tropos) is applied to the transference of expressions from their natural and principal signification to another, with a view to the embellishments of style” (Quintilian III, 1921, p. 351); Quintilian also mentions that most grammarians define trope as “the transference of words and phrases from the place which is strictly theirs to another to which they do not properly belong” (ibid.).
Today, the term ‘trope’ is a synonym of ‘figure of speech’, i.e. the two terms are interchangeable; but in classical rhetoric, the term ‘figures of speech’ refers to a comprehensive category which is divided into sub-categories that includes tropes and other rhetorical figures (see figure 5). However, this classification, in classical rhetoric, was “often arbitrary and differs in different handbooks” (Kennedy, 2001b, p. 122; cf. Fahnstock, 1999, p. 9-15).

Figure 2.5: Classifications of figures of speech made by the majority of Western classical rhetoricians.

The distinction between tropes and schemes, according to classical rhetoric, is that the former involves a change in the meaning of words, whereas the latter involves a change in forms without any ‘semantic significances’ (see Müller, 2001, p. 773). A scheme, according to Lanham, is “[a]ny kind of figure or pattern of words … a figure of arrangement of words in which the literal sense of the word is not affected by the arrangement” (1991, p. 136)\textsuperscript{15}.

As for tropes, which is the main interest of this study, specifically metonymy, they carry a common feature which is a secondary meaning apart from their literal interpretation. Tropes include simile, metaphor, metonymy and synecdoche, among others, and can be so often used within an everyday context that they may be said to retreat into ‘transparency’. As a result, tropical representations (figurative expressions) are unconsciously absorbed within our speech and are indicative of the broader culture or sub-culture inhabited by the speaker (cf. Lakoff & Johnson, 1980). In general, traditional classifications of figures of speech, in addition to the confinement of tropes as merely embellishment devices, has dramatically changed with the revolution in linguistic studies.

\textsuperscript{15} For more information, definitions, and examples differentiating tropes and schemes, see Leech (1969), and on traditional figures of thought and figures of word see Wales (2001), Lanham (1991), Kennedy (1984), and Plett (2001).
in the twentieth century. The emergence of several linguistic-related disciplines, such as semantics, pragmatics, semiotics, sociolinguistics, and cognitive linguistics, has contributed significantly in reshaping our thinking towards figurative language. For instance, in her article, *Figurative language and the semantics-pragmatics distinction*, Anna Papafragou states the following:

> It is by now a commonplace in the pragmatic and psycholinguistic literature that the so-called “figures of speech” such as metaphor or metonymy are not mere linguistic devices serving ornamental or literary purposes but correspond to mental “figures” grounded in cognition (see Lakoff 1987, Sperber & Wilson 1986/1995, 1990, Gibbs 1994) (1996, p. 179).

Accordingly, it is believed that works by Searle (1979), Lakoff and Johnson (1980), Lakoff (1987), Gibbs (1994), and other inter-disciplinary scholars (such as philosophers and psychologists of language) have broadened the horizon of tropes – a horizon which considers tropes such as metonymy “to be ubiquitous aspects of language, not simply fringe elements” (Tyler & Takahashi, 2011, p. 598). In other words, tropes are no longer limited to rhetoric and literature; they are within our everyday language. Aspects of this horizon on metonymy, in addition to the traditional one, will be presented in this section after defining other central tropes, namely simile, metaphor, and synecdoche.

### 2.6.1 Simile

It is clearly noticeable that two matters, comparison and metaphor, are almost always associated with discussions of simile, particularly the latter. As for the former matter, the majority of simile definitions tend to describe simile as a form of comparison. For instance, Freeborn defines simile as “[a] comparison of one thing to another, especially as an ornament in poetry and rhetoric” (1996, p. 62); similarly, Alm-Arvius defines simile as “a trope which like metaphor describes one thing by comparing it with another” (2003, p. 125). That is true to some extent, because similes use constructional elements or what are known as ‘similarity indicators’, such as ‘like’ and ‘as (… as)’; but that does not mean using such indicators always create a simile, in spite of being a form of comparison, i.e. there is a literal comparison and a non-literal comparison. Consider the following examples:

a- *Britain is like France*, they are EU countries.

b- *Britain is like a fridge* in the winter season.
Both examples ‘a’ and ‘b’ are comparison statements, literal and non-literal comparisons respectively. Accordingly, example ‘a’ is not to be regarded as a simile, while ‘b’ is. The comparison in ‘a’ is made between two similar types of things, i.e. both Britain and France are countries, whereas in ‘b’ it is obviously between two totally different types, i.e. ‘Britain’ is a country whereas a ‘fridge’ is an electrical appliance to keep food and drinks cool. An important issue, that has to be pointed out, is that the two different types compared to each other must share a salient feature or otherwise the simile will not be intelligible; in other words, the comparison will not be understood, for example, ‘Britain is like a cup’ would make no sense (see Dickins, 1998, pp. 292-295; Glucksberg, 2001, pp. 29-51). But the problem is what makes two things alike and how one can identify the similarity or shared feature(s) between each other (the likened and likened to)? This notion of similarity is difficult to define and highly subjective. According to Israel, et al. this is “a matter of construal”, which largely hinges on what exactly is being focused on, i.e., which attribute the comparison is based on (2004, p. 126). No wonder Dickins said that it might be impossible to draw a clear definite line between a literal and non-literal comparison (1998, p. 292). However, one of the comments made by Israel, et al. on the differences between literal and non-literal (simile) comparisons\(^\text{16}\) is as follows:

Similes … [are] really are a kind of comparison. Unlike metaphors, they require individuation of both source and target concepts, and an evaluation of what they have in common, but unlike literal comparisons, they are figurative—comparing things normally felt to be incomparable, typically using vivid or startling images to suggest unexpected connections between source and target (2004, p. 124).

Israel, et al. elaborates upon the differences by saying the following:

As a figure of comparison, similes serve the basic rhetorical functions of description and evaluation … Basically, a simile is just a way of describing a target by asserting its similarity to some unexpected entity. The figurative nature of similes, however, has consequences which set them apart from literal comparisons. Most obviously, similes may be evocative in a way that literal comparisons cannot, prompting associations which go beyond whatever property they explicitly highlight Moreover, similes may be interpreted in ways which differ systematically from literal comparisons (2004, p. 126).

In general, from common definitions of simile, especially in dictionaries, one can deduce that the term ‘simile’ denotes a trope whereby two objects are explicitly compared

through the use of ‘like’ or ‘as’, such as in ‘as white as snow’ or ‘soft like baby thighs’. From such definitions, it may be asserted that the primary features of simile use are that it is explicit, and involves the presence of two identifiable objects; and that it is figurative, meaning that the comparison must be made between two objects that are not conventionally compared. The common definitions requiring the use of ‘like’ or ‘as’ promotes a rather restrictive understanding of the term\textsuperscript{17}, as it fails to acknowledge the breadth of grammatical constructions in which simile might be adopted. For example, ‘buying that car is the equivalent of throwing money down the drain’ may be construed as an acceptable simile in common parlance. Therefore, it suggested that they are able to take a range of constructions that express an explicit comparison (ibid, p. 125).

In addition to this, to make an explicit comparison effectively, the two objects referenced must be “fully individualised”, meaning that both the source and target concepts must refer to a discrete entity (ibid, p.125). For example, in ‘she was as cool as a cucumber’ both ‘she’ and ‘cucumber’ are fully individuated, distinguishable, and convey the idea that the person is relaxed and calm\textsuperscript{18} (ibid, p.125). Furthermore, in order to classify as a figurative comparison, as opposed to a literal one, the two objects should not be easily compared, i.e. they should be fundamentally different as previously mentioned; and above all the comparison between the two objects should be provoking to the mind, senses, and imagination\textsuperscript{19}.

On the other hand, the second matter which is noticed when it comes to discussions on simile is its association with metaphor. Most scholars, if not all, mention metaphor in their discussion of simile, but normally not the other way round. Alm-Arvius’ definition of simile (2003, p. 125), which was mentioned earlier, is an example. Other noted scholars have too made this association, such as Leech (1969, p. 153/156), Leech & Short, (1981, 17 Perhaps Wales recognised this issue and therefore provided a more or less comprehensive definition: “simile is a FIGURE OF SPEECH whereby two concepts are imaginatively descriptively compared: e.g. My love is like a red, red rose; as white as a sheet, etc. Like and as (… as) are the commonest connectives” (2001, p. 358; author’s emphasis and italics ). One can notice that she does note that the constructional elements mentioned are the commonest, which means that there are others. In addition, unlike with most simile definitions, metaphor was not included as part of the definition.

18 It is important to note that some figurative comparisons cannot be rendered to another language literally because of culture-specific reasons (cf. Lakoff & Johnsen, 1980; Dickins, et al., 2002). For instance, the comparison ‘as cool as a cucumber’ would not necessarily convey the idea that the person is relaxed and calm in another language as it would in English. In that case, one has to find the most appropriate figurative expression in the TL that delivers the same features as in the ST; for that reason, in addition to others, this research exists.

19 Remember that some figurative comparisons may become, over a period of time, so common that the literal meaning is supplanted unnoticeably; idioms are an example of this metamorphosis.
Definition and discussion of simile has often been inextricable from that of metaphor, as the two tend to be defined in relation to one another. This tradition dates back to Aristotle himself, who notes that “the simile is also a metaphor…the difference is but slight” (cited in Israel, et al., 2004, p. 123; see Anderson, 2000, p. 38). As a result, there is a relative paucity of literature or academic debate concerning the attributes and function of simile. Where simile is discussed, it is frequently with a simultaneous focus on metaphor. This has resulted in the common misapprehension that simile and metaphor essentially have the same function (that of comparison) albeit through two different methods. That is why quite a few scholars believe that simile is an explicit version of metaphor; and that a simile can be transformed into a metaphor and vice versa. This is frequently true but not in all cases\textsuperscript{20}.

### 2.6.2 Metaphor

Metaphor was regarded as a predominant trope ab ovo. Today, this thought is still maintained by some rhetoricians and scholars. That is clearly evident in the fact that the word ‘metaphorical’, which originally means an expression containing metaphor, is often used as a synonym for the word ‘figurative’ to denote a non-literal expression – an expression that contains other tropes besides metaphor. Aristotle, in his discussions on metaphor, believes that simile is a type of metaphor (Anderson, 2000, p. 38) and specifically an explicit version of metaphor (Ritchie, 2013, p. 4). Furthermore, in Aristotle’s definition of metaphor, which is “giving the thing a name that belongs to something else; the transference being either from genus to species, or from species to genus, or from species to species, or on grounds of analogy” (cited in Punter, 2007, p. 12), we can notice that the types of metaphor or ‘metaphorical transference’ he mentions belong to other tropes such as synecdoche and metonymy (Leezenberg, 2001, pp. 33-34; Al-Sharafi, 2004, p. 13). In other words, the first two transferences, from genus to species and from species to genus, apply to the trope known today as synecdoche, whereas the third transference, from species to species, applies to metonymy (ibid.). That is to say, the attention devoted to metaphor over other tropes is immemorial; nevertheless, Aristotle’s views on metaphor in terms to the ‘predominance’ issue cannot be used as a yardstick; after all, Aristotle’s concise deliberations on metaphor scarcely “add up to a full-fledged theory of metaphorical language” (Leezenberg, 2001, p. 31). In his

discussion of textual metonymy, Al-Sharafi argues that the reason behind this predominance of metaphor is that:

[r]hetoricians and philosophers were interested in the poetic use of language they regarded metaphor as primary to the figurative domain and neglected metonymy because it does not involve symbolism and double-unit signification as there is no transfer on the semantic plane. This observation applies to the western as well as the Arabic rhetorical traditions because both traditions were preoccupied with the study of poetic language (2004, p. 11).

Fass (1997, p. 47) also points out that the connection involved in metaphor is across two conceptual domains, whereas in metonymy it is within a single domain. Moreover, Lakoff & Johnson (1980, pp. 36-37) believe that understanding is the primary function in metaphor, and though metonymy has the same understanding function to some extent, its primary function is referential. Accordingly, many scholars, especially in translation studies, have the idea that metaphor is the most important trope and that it poses a more problematic issue in translation than other tropes. For example, Newmark states that “[w]hilst the central problem of translation is the overall choice of a translation method for a text, the most important particular problem is the translation of metaphor” (1988, p. 104). On the other hand, Dickins et al (2002, p. 146) say that all tropes “are of interest in translation”, but “metaphor is by far the most important, both because it is the most widespread, and because it poses the most challenging translation problems”. To a certain degree, these viewpoints may be true, but the blossoming of linguistic studies after the mid-twentieth century, especially cognitive linguistics, yields the insight that other tropes, and in particular metonymy have a similar prominence to that of metaphor (see Croft & Cruse, 2004; Ruiz de Mendoza Ibáñez, 2000; Dirven & Pörings, (eds.), 2003; Goossens, 1995), this being one of the reasons why this research has been carried out. However, since there are many research works, books, and papers on metaphor, we will only state one or two definitions.

There are several definitions of metaphor, each one being mostly associated with its own theory of how metaphors are identified, understood, and used21. On the other hand, most of the conventional definitions of metaphor are based on some of the common features of metaphor: similarity, comparison, and resemblance. For example, Dickins et al (2002, p. 147) define metaphor as “a figure of speech in which a word or phrase is used in a non-

21 See Ritchie (2013, pp. 3-24)
basic sense, this non-basic sense suggesting a likeness or analogy with another more basic sense of the same word or phrase”. Goatly on the other hand, provides a more comprehensive but complex definition, as follows:

Metaphor occurs when a unit of discourse is used to refer unconventionally to an object, process or concept, or colligates in an unconventional way. And when this unconventional act of reference or colligation is understood on the basis of similarity, matching or analogy involving the conventional referent or colligates of the unit and the actual unconventional referent or colligates (1997, p. 8).

Goatly also provides another definition of metaphor, but this time from a cognitive perspective; he states that metaphor “can be briefly defined as thinking of one thing (A) as though it were another thing (B), and linguistically this will result in an item of vocabulary or larger stretch of text being applied in an unusual or new way”22 (2007, p. 11).

There are several theories of metaphor, but the turning point in metaphor studies probably occurs with the cognitivists. At first, they considered metaphor as a mode of perception, and later on as a mode of thought, rather than a rhetorical device, and from here conceptual theories of metaphor began to emerge. For example, Burke defines metaphor in terms of perspective as “a device for seeing something in terms of something else” (1969, p. 502; author’s italics), which is quite similar to Goatly’s definition above. The conceptual theory of metaphor became more mature through George Lakoff and Mark Johnson in their work *Metaphors We Live By* (1980). According to Lakoff and Johnson, metaphors are deeply ingrained in our lives without us noticing them. This can be illustrated by the fact that metaphors are very often used in the attempt to define metaphor without realising it. For example, terms such as ‘device’ and ‘vehicle’ which literally refer to a ‘tool’ or ‘machine’ are used unconsciously in defining metaphor (see Ritchie, 2013, pp. 5-7). Lakoff and Johnson believe that metaphors have such a great influence on our lives that not only do they form our communications, but they also form the way we think and act. The contrast between the traditional and contemporary views of metaphor are summed up by Lakoff and Johnson as follows:

Metaphor is for most people a device of the poetic imagination and the rhetorical flourish – a matter of extraordinary rather than ordinary language.

---

22 Goatly notes that the term ‘apply’ in his definition “covers various pragmatic and semantic relations such as reference, modification, predication and complementation of prepositions” (Goatly, 2007, p. 11).
Moreover, metaphor is typically viewed as characteristic of language alone, a matter of words rather than thought or action. For this reason, most people think they can get along perfectly well without metaphor. We have found, on the contrary, that metaphor is pervasive in everyday life, not just in language but in thought and action. Our ordinary conceptual system, in terms of which we both think and act, is fundamentally metaphorical in nature (1980, p. 3).

Since this research is related to the translation of the meaning of the Qur’an, it is worth noting that Almisned (2001) in his research, *Metaphor in the Qur’an: an assessment of three English translations of Surat Al-Hajj*, points out that metaphorical expressions along with other rhetorical expressions are one of the basic features of the Qur’anic text. Hence they should not be neglected while rendering the Qur’an into English (2001, p. 145). Almisned believes that some Qur’anic features cannot be transferred to the TT, and therefore “some translations do not have the same impact as the source text in terms of metaphorical usage” (ibid, p. 1). Consequently, explaining or paraphrasing the metaphorical expression into English is considered the most appropriate way (Ali, et al., 2012) to avoid loss of the intended meaning. In addition, Almisned believes that the ultimate approach to translating the Qur’an into English is by having an Arabic native speaker alongside an English native speaker (2001, pp. 328-331).

### 2.6.2 Synecdoche

The term ‘synecdoche’ is derived from the Greek/Latin term “συνεκδοχή/ intellectio” (Anderson, 2000, p. 112; Rowe, 2001, p. 127) which according to Lanham (1991, p. 148) means “understanding one thing with another”. Synecdoche, as described by Quintilian, “is adapted to give variety to language by letting us understand the plural from the singular, the whole from a part, a genus from the species, something following from something preceding, and vice versa” (cited in Geeraerts, 2010, p. 6; Murphy, 2003, p. 220). Traditionally, synecdoche is defined as a substitution where the part stands for the whole, genus stands for species, or vice versa (Lanham, 1991, p. 148), for example, ‘wheels’ for a ‘car’ or ‘creature’ for ‘people’. To put it simply, synecdoche can be considered a trope that references a concept by indicating a part or aspect of it. Most theorists, however, have suggested that the most obvious case of synecdoche involves a part-whole relationship. Nonetheless, it seems that there is a considerable amount of confusion, and obscurity as to both the nature of synecdoche and its relationship to other closely related tropes, and particularly metonymy. It is noticed that very often synecdoche is either neglected or assimilated to metonymy, and at times is regarded as a subtype of
metonymy. Nerlich (2010, pp. 297-298) and Schofer & Rice (1977, p. 122) point out that the confusion between synecdoche and metonymy is also mirrored by that between synecdoche and metaphor, while the Rhétorique générale of the Groupe de Liège considered synecdoche as the master trope “on which metaphor and metonymy both depend”23. On account of this, considerable debate exists regarding the definition of synecdoche and the way in which it ought to be classified in relation to other related tropes; some scholars regard synecdoche as a trope that exists apart from metonymy, whereas others regard it simply as a subcategory of metonymy. In his paper, Distinguishing Synecdoche from Metonymy, Seto claims that the reason behind this confusion is due to the ambiguity of the definitions conventionally employed, and therefore it is sometimes difficult to distinguish synecdoche from metonymy or even metaphor (1999, p. 91). He ascribes this ambiguousness to the lack of success in understanding the ‘whole’ and ‘part’ notions distinctly. Seto argues that the comprehension of metonymy, i.e. understanding the differences between ‘taxonomy’ and ‘partonomy’, leads to the disambiguation of ‘whole’ and ‘part’, and ultimately clarifying the differences between metonymy and synecdoche (ibid. pp. 92-95). The difference between taxonomy and partonomy, as Seto describes it, is as follows:

[T]axonomy is a ‘kind-of’ relation while partonomy is a ‘part-of’ relation. In other words, taxonomy is the relation between a more comprehensive category and a less comprehensive one, while partonomy is the relation between an entity and its parts, such as the relation between a table and its legs (ibid. p. 93)24.

In consequence of this, Seto disagrees with traditional views that synecdoche is characterized by a semantic or referential relationship of inclusion, and he believes that synecdoche is characterized only by semantic inclusion, i.e. he considers that the referential relationship is a feature belonging to metonymy and not synecdoche. Therefore, Seto removes from synecdoche its long well-known trademark, the part-whole relationship, and subsumes it under the metonymic qualities, leaving only the genus-species relationship for synecdoche. Relying on his postulation of taxonomy and partonomy, Seto, therefore, defines synecdoche as “a conceptual transfer phenomenon based on the semantic inclusion between a more comprehensive and a less comprehensive

---


24 For more details on Seto’s theory of taxonomy and partonomy in clarifying the differences between metonymy and synecdoche see Seto (1999, pp. 91-120) and Nerlich (2010, pp. 306-316).
category”, while metonymy is “a referential transfer phenomenon based on the spatiotemporal contiguity as conceived by the speaker between an entity and another in the (real) world” (1999, pp. 91-92).

Excluding the well-known trademark of synecdoche, the part-whole relationship, and subsuming it under the metonymic qualities, seems to be a trend followed by other modern linguists, particularly cognitive linguists, and especially those imitating or influenced by Lakoff and Johnson’s proposition that our conceptual system is on the whole metaphorical. There are, however, other scholars and linguists who disagree with this trend; some even go further to exclude a metonymic character, container for contained, and subsume it under the synecdochic qualities as in Schofer & Rice’s (1977) attempt in reclassifying tropes.

The disagreement over characterising and defining synecdoche has had an impact of the analysis of other aspects of synecdoche, mainly its types, but also its function in discourse (cf. Nerlich & Clarke, 1999). Therefore, as we mentioned earlier, the new trend represented by cognitive linguists does not include the ‘part-whole’ relationship. The following classifications of synecdoche are made by two different approaches, bearing in mind that this is not at all exhaustive:

A- The classification made by Seto (1999), who we can consider as an advocate of the new trend. His classification of types of synecdoche is as follows (cited with examples in Nerlich, 2010, pp. 311-312):

1- Genus for species: for example, “man (‘a human being’ → a male)”.
2- Species for genus: for example, “to earn one’s daily bread (→ food)”.
3- Type for token: for example, “This jacket is our best-selling item (→ this type of jacket)”.
4- Token for type: for example, “We both drive a Honda Accord (→ two tokens of the same type of car)”.

B- Classification made by Schofer & Rice (1977, p. 142). Their classification of types of synecdoche with examples is as follows:

1- Physical (or spatial) synecdoches:
   a- Physical part for the whole (head for body).
   b- Physical attribute for the whole (black for Negro).
   c- Object or physical attribute for possessor (crown for king).
   d- Material or physical attribute for object (steel for sword).
   e- Container for contained (stein for beer, Paris for Parisians).

2- Conceptual (or abstract) synecdoches:
It is worth noting that even if the ‘part-whole’ relationship is excluded from synecdoche, it seems that it remains an important trope that stands by itself. Nerlich and Clarke point out the following:

In conclusion one can say that the genus-for-species synecdoche plays a vital part in language and life. On the conceptual level it reflects and exploits the order in our categories, on the linguistic or structural level it exploits semantic relations, and on the communication level it brings order into texts and into social relations (1999, p. 210).

2.6.3 Metonymy

As we can notice from the previous sub-sections, the subject of metonymy has been broached in several contexts, particularly metaphor and synecdoche, which proves that the boundaries between metonymy and its fellow tropes are narrow, especially that with synecdoche. It goes without saying that ancient rhetoric as a discipline has played a significant role in literary and language studies, namely in tropes or what are known today as figures of speech. In spite of that, the features of metonymy were most of the time discussed under metaphor, as in Aristotle’s definition of metaphor (see section 2.6.2). It is believed that the first definition of metonymy, as a trope on its own, appeared in the Rhetorica ad Herennium: “a trope that takes its expression from near and close things and by which we can comprehend a thing that is not denominated by its proper word” [Koch’s translation] (Koch, 1999, p. 141). ‘Metonymy’ as a term is derived from the Greek term ‘μετωνυμία’ (Latin: denomination), and means the “[u]se of one term (of a related object or concept) for another, e.g. substitution of Greece for Greeks, container for contents” (Anderson, 2000, p. 77). Since then, metonymy has been thought of as a concept in a ‘stand for’ relationship based on association or contiguity between two referents, the literal word/phrase used (source) and its intended meaning (target). An example is, ‘10 Downing Street’, which is the locale address for any British prime minister, and more importantly, is his/her official residence and office where crucial decisions concerning Britain, whether they are domestic or international, are made. Therefore, based on this association or contiguity between the locale and the prime minister/British government it may be said that ’10 Downing St.’ (source) is a metonymy
that stands for the British prime minister or government (target). Another example is ‘table five’ in ‘table five wants the bill’, which means the person(s) sitting at table five and obviously not the table itself or the person(s) sitting at other tables; hence ‘table five’ (the source) in this sentence stands for the person(s) sitting at it (target). This vision of metonymy is known as the ‘stand for’ relationship or ‘substitutional theory’, where someone/something stands for or replaces another person/thing. This prolonged portrayal of metonymy as a referential phenomenon remained constant over the past years. Geeraets (2010, p. 27) provides a more or less similar definition to the one in *Rhetorica ad Herennium*; he sees metonymy as “a semantic link between two readings of a lexical item that is based on a relationship of contiguity between the referents of the expression in each of those readings”. Geeraets makes clear that the ‘contiguity’ relationship which metonymy is based on “should not be understood in a narrow sense as referring to spatial proximity only, but broadly as a general term for various associations in the spatial, temporal, or causal domain”.

However, in the last 30 years or so new disciplines have arisen and became integrated within the linguistic field. As a result, studies of tropes have gradually shifted from the fields of literature and rhetoric to linguistics, which has led to the emergence of various definitions and characterizations of metonymy, each one approaching metonymy from a different perspective or revolves around a specific aspect. Yule’s (2010, p. 121) analysis, for example, revolves around the relationship between words which form metonymy. He claims that the relatedness of meaning found in metonymy relies on “a close connection in everyday experience”; these connections can be built on a “container–contents relation (bottle/water, can/juice), a whole–part relation (car/wheels, house/roof) or a representative–symbol relationship (king/crown, the President/the White House).” On the basis of the assumption that relations in metonymy are formed through ‘everyday experience’, one might assume that metonymies are conventionalised and hence easy to comprehend. This assumption is nevertheless misleading. For example, ‘*Have you finished your Halliday?*’ or ‘*The strings are too quiet*’ for a person who is not familiar with the linguistic field or orchestral music respectively would be baffling. Therefore, Yule states that comprehending such expressions “often depends on context, background knowledge and inference” (ibid.).

In his attempt to distinguish metonymy from synecdoche, Seto (1999, p. 91) focuses on the terms ‘contiguity’ and ‘whole-part’. He defines metonymy as “a referential transfer phenomenon based on the spatio-temporal contiguity as conceived by the speaker
between an entity and another in the (real) world”. Seto points out that the term ‘closely associated’ that appears in a typical definition of metonymy needs to be clarified or otherwise it will be too broad and may include other tropes such as metaphor or any “other rhetorical terms where meaning transfer takes place”. This is true, simply because the association in itself is not enough; all figurative expressions in metonymy, metaphor or synecdoche have an associative relationship with their literal senses. The differences between them is the grounds that their relations rely on, i.e. the relationship between the figurative expression and its literal sense is based on either contiguity (metonymy), resemblance (metaphor), or inclusion (synecdoche). The terms ‘contiguity’, ‘part’, and ‘whole’, which commonly appear in discussions on metonymy or synecdoche are, according to Seto, often miscomprehended; hence the confusion between metonymy and synecdoche. He claims that this confusion is due to a misunderstanding of the differences between partonomy and taxonomy (see 4.33). Both partonomy (also called a part-whole relation, part-of relation, or meronymy relation) and taxonomy (also called a hyponymy relation, kind-of relation, or class-subclass relations) deal with semantic relations based on the senses of expressions through a hierarchical system. The former is “a sense relation between expressions such that the entities denoted by one expression represent parts of the entity denoted by another e.g., blade/knife. The relationship can be paraphrased as X is a part of Y, thus a blade is a part of a knife” (Delahunty & Garvey, 2010, p. 271). The latter is “a sense relation between expressions such that the entities denoted by one expression are included among the entities denoted by another, e.g., teaspoon/spoon. The relationship can be paraphrased as X is a kind of Y, thus a teaspoon is a kind of spoon” (ibid, p. 270). According to Seto, metonymic relations are understood through partonomy and synecdochical relations through taxonomy. Based on this distinction, Seto develops his classifications of synecdochical and metonymic relations.

However, the ambiguity of the term ‘closely associated’, as Seto claims, is beginning to fade, as recent definitions tend to include the type of association or contiguity. For example, Bussmann (1996, p. 746), in his definition of metonymy, points out three types of semantic connections associated with metonymy: causal, spatial, or temporal. He defines metonymy as “[t]he replacement of an expression by a factually related term. The

---

25 The confusion between metonymy and synecdoche that Seto refers to is that synecdoche is frequently considered a subtype of metonymy which is characterised by a ‘whole’ and ‘part’ relationship.

26 For more recent details on ‘taxonomy’ and ‘partonomy’ see Khoo & Na (2006), Delahunty & Garvey (2010), and Hahn (2013).
semantic connection is of a causal, spatial, or temporal nature and is therefore broader
than synecdoche, but narrower than metaphor.” Geeraerts (2010, p. 27) holds a similar
view, and stresses that the contiguity notion associated with metonymy “should not be
understood in a narrow sense as referring to spatial proximity only, but broadly as a
general term for various associations in the spatial, temporal, or causal domain.” Further
to the aforementioned metonymic relations, Preminger and Brogan (1993, p. 783) add to
their definition of metonymy the notion ‘conceptual’, which alludes to the belief that
metonymy is not merely a referential phenomenon, but also a conceptual one: metonymy
is “a figure in which one word is substituted for another on the basis of some material,
causal, or conceptual relation.”

It is believed that metonymy as a conceptual phenomenon was first introduced into
cognitive linguistics by George Lakoff and Mark Johnson, in their work Metaphors We
Live By (1980). Lakoff and Johnson’s conceptual theory touched upon the concept of
metonymy, and though it was mainly focused on metaphor, it nonetheless provoked
renewed interest in metonymy. Lakoff and Johnson believe that metonymy, like
metaphor, is not a matter of a name of a thing, nor is it a purely linguistic device to
substitute one term for another; metonymies, like metaphors, are deeply embedded in our
conceptual system without us noticing them, and they therefore influence the way we
think, act, and communicate. Accordingly, the use of metonymic expressions is mainly a
reflection of general conceptual metonymies (Radden & Kövecses, 1999, p. 18) which
are gained from our experience, physical or causal, in the real world (Lakoff & Johnson,
1980, p. 39). For example, using ‘Hiroshima’ as an expression for the atomic bombing in
WWII (Place for Event) is, according to Lakoff and Johnson, “grounded in our experience
with the physical location of events” (ibid, also cf. Truszczyńska, 2003); or for instance,
using the term ‘Shakespeare’ as an expression for a literary work done by William
Shakespeare “is based on the causal (and typically physical) relationship between a
producer and his product”, and so on. Lakoff and Johnson’s discussion of metonymy is
basically focused on the types of metonymic relations and on the differences between the
concepts of metaphor and metonymy. Lakoff and Johnson define metonymy as “using
one entity to refer to another that is related to it” (ibid. p. 35) which enables us “to
conceptualize one thing by means of its relation to some-thing else” (ibid. p. 39).

On the whole, cognitive linguistics has participated quite adequately in the studies of
metonymy, giving rise to a number of new definitions. For example, Evans (2007, p. 141)
defines metonymy as “[a] conceptual operation in which one entity, the vehicle, can be
employed in order to identify another entity, the target, with which it is associated”.

Another, more or less similar, definition is provided by Radden and Kövecses (1999, p. 21): “Metonymy is a cognitive process in which one conceptual entity, the vehicle, provides a mental access to another conceptual entity, the target, within the same idealized cognitive model”. Lakoff (1987) approaches metonymic contiguity and the relations between the source/vehicle and target through his theoretical framework of Idealized Cognitive Models (ICMs). He believes that the aforementioned relations should belong to the same ICM in terms of metonymy, whereas in metaphor, they belong to two different ICMs (1987, p. 78). According to Lakoff, his theoretical constructs was inspired by Lakoff and Johnson's theory of metaphor and metonymy (Lakoff & Johnson, 1980), Fillmore's frame semantics (Fillmore, 1982), Fauconnier's theory of mental spaces (Fauconnier, 1985), and Langacker's cognitive grammar (Langacker, 1986). In his detailed account of ICMs, Cienki points out the following (cf. Evans, 2007, p. 104; Croft & Cruse, 2004, p. 7-39):

ICMs are proposed as a way in which we organize knowledge, not as a direct reflection of an objective state of affairs in the world, but according to certain cognitive structuring principles. The models are idealized, in that they involve an abstraction, through perceptual and conceptual processes, from the complexities of the physical world. At the same time, these processes impart organizing structure – for example, in the form of conceptual categories. The use of models in cognitive processing that are idealized … makes sense from an evolutionary perspective. They provide an advantageous means of processing information because they are adapted to human neurobiology, human embodied experience, human actions and goals, and human social interaction (2007, p. 176).

Lakoff (1987, p. 284) itemizes the following as five types of ICMs: image-schematic, propositional, metaphoric, metonymic, and symbolic. However, regardless of various terms used in different cognitive theories that correspond to ICM, such as ‘domain’, ‘schema’ (Lakoff & Turner, 1989), ‘frame’ (Blank, 1999), ‘domain matrix’ (Croft, 2003), or ‘scenario’ (Panther & Thornburg, 1999), they generally concur that metonymy involves the exploitation of relations inside one domain, while metaphor involves the integration of two disparate domains27 (Nerlich & Clarke, 2003, p. 577).

Within cognitive linguistics, but from a slightly different perspective, Barcelona provides an interesting definition of metonymy, which, according to him, is a ‘schematic

---

27 For more critical discussions on the role of domains in metaphor and metonymy see Panther & Radden (eds., 1999), Dirven & Pörings (eds., 2003), and Burkhardt & Nerlich (eds., 2010).
definition’. He defines metonymy as “an asymmetrical mapping of a conceptual domain, the source, onto another domain, the target. Source and target are in the same functional domain and are linked by a pragmatic function, so that the target is mentally activated” (Barcelona, 2013, p. 15; cf. Barcelona, 2010, p. 272; Barcelona, 2003, p. 246). Barcelona claims that his definition is a “consensus, uncontroversial cognitive linguistic definition” (2012, p. 254). Barcelona (2013; 2012; 2010) explains some terms in his definition; for example, the term ‘mapping’, which is equivalent to ‘conceptual projection’, pertains to the point that the source domain is linked to the target domain by imposing a perspective on it. Barcelona further points out that in metonymy the mapping is asymmetrical, whereas in metaphor it is symmetrical. As for the notion ‘functional domain’, Barcelona indicates that it is similar to Fillmore’s ‘frame’ (1982) and Lakoff’s ‘ICM’ (1987). Barcelona adopts Fauconnier’s (1997, p. 11) ‘pragmatic function’, in which the source domain is linked to/mapped onto the target domain within the same functional frame by means of a pragmatic function. For example, diners are matched with the food they order as in ‘The kebab wants an orange juice’, or authors are matched with the books they write. This type of mapping, according to Fauconnier (1997, p. 11), “plays an important role in structuring our knowledge base and provides means of identifying elements of one domain via their counterparts in the other”. As a result, pragmatic function mapping, in language use, enables an entity to be recognized through its counterpart (ibid.) as in the ‘kebab’ example mentioned above, when the waitress uses the type of food (kebab) to identify the diner who ordered it. Barcelona’s concept is something of a nutshell containing the prominent features of other cognitive scholars in terms of metonymy.

Regardless of the variety of definitions of metonymy, it is obvious that the essence of metonymy is the contiguity/association between the metonymic referents, i.e. the contiguity between the literal and figurative expressions.

2.6.3.1 Classifications of Metonymy

Classifications of metonymy have increased over the past years, especially with the development of linguistics. Doyle (1893, pp. 81-82), in his book *An Introduction to the Study of Rhetoric*, lists six types of metonymic relations:

- Cause for effect (e.g. “He lives by the labour of his hands.”)
- Effect for cause (e.g. “Don’t get hot under the collar!” for ‘Don’t get angry!’ (example cited in Chandler, 2007, p. 130)).
- Sign for signified (e.g. “He left the plough, to wield the sceptre.”)
- Container for contained (e.g. “He made the kettle boil.”)
Abstract for concrete (e.g. “Beauty is usually vain.”)
Place for thing (e.g. “He was carried to the house in a sedan.”)

Schofer & Rice (1977, p. 139) suggest the following metonymic relations:

- Cause for effect
- Effect for cause
- Agent for instrument (e.g. “Truman destroyed Hiroshima (the person ordering the act for the planes and bombs that performed it)”)
- Instrument for action (e.g. “Les Fords ont levé le pied (the cars for their drivers) / Il a le pinceau délicat (the painter's brush for his manner of painting)”)
- Action for instrument (e.g. “vengeance for sword”)
- Agent for action (e.g. “He pulled a Houdini. (the magician for the disappearing act he performed)”)
- Action for agent (e.g. “Voilà la belle Hélène, l'infamie des Grecs (the crime for the criminal)”)
- Producer for product (e.g. Have you finished your Chomsky. “the author for his work”)
- Product for producer (e.g. “Computers lose 10 points on Wall Street (the product for the company that produces it)”)

Lakoff and Johnson (1980) subsume the ‘part for whole’ relationship under metonymy, which traditional rhetoricians consider a type of synecdoche. The conceptual theory proposed by Lakoff and Johnson has influenced several linguists, and since then most linguists have followed Lakoff and Johnson in subsuming ‘part for whole’ under metonymy. Lakoff and Johnson (1980, p. 38) list the following types of metonymy with examples:

- Part for the whole (e.g. “We don't hire longhairs.”)
- Producer for product (e.g. “He bought a Ford.”)
- Object used for user (e.g. “The buses are on strike.”)
- Controller for controlled (e.g. Nixon bombed Hanoi.”)
- Institution for people responsible (e.g. I don't approve of the government's actions.”)
- Place for Institution (e.g. Wall Street is in a panic.”)
- Place for event (e.g. Pearl Harbor still has an effect on our foreign policy.”)

On the other hand, Chandler (2007, p. 130), who believes that the best definition of metonymy is “the evocation of the whole by a connection”, argues that metonymy is “based on substitution by adjuncts (things that are found together) or on functional relationships.” Chandler lists the following metonymic substitutions: effect for cause, object for user, substance for form (such as “plastic for credit card” or “lead for bullet”),
place for event, place for person, place for institution, and institution for people. In addition, Chandler notes that “Part–whole relationships are sometimes distinguished as a special kind of metonymy or as a separate trope”. Chandler also mentions three types of metonymy identified by Lakoff and Johnson: producer for product, object for user, and controller for controlled (ibid, p. 130).

Alm-Arvius (2003, pp. 162-163) identifies several types of metonymic relations under what she calls ‘metonymic shortcuts’. According to Alm-Arvius, the most common types of metonymic shifts or shortcuts, with examples, are as follows:

- Place/region—people (e.g. “church, country, England, house, room, school”)
- Time/period—people (e.g. “the Middle Ages, the nineteenth century, the Renaissance”)
- Place—activity (e.g. “church, college, market, school, theatre, university”)
- People—activity (e.g. “class, government, meeting, party”)
- Physical thing(s)—activity (e.g. “bed, football, lunch, meal, table, washing”)
- People/thing—time (e.g. “the bomb, Hitler, Napoleon, the Vikings”)
- Activity—establishment (e.g. “business, church, school, theatre”)
- Activity—product (e.g. “building, composition, drawing, improvement, organisation, painting, shopping, speech, writing”)
- Substance—product (e.g. “glass, iron, linen, marble, paper, tin”)
- Substance—type of (e.g. “brandy, tea, whisky, wine”)
- Producer—product (e.g. “Channel, Dior, Ford, Mozart, Porsche, Shakespeare, Turner”)
- Feeling—object of (e.g. “ambition, curiosity, love”)
- Sense modality—sense impression (e.g. “sight, smell, taste”)
- Container—contents (e.g. “bottle, box, casserole, cup, glass, purse”)
- Body part—part of article of clothing (e.g. “arm, breast, leg”)
- About experriencer—about situation or experience (e.g. “angry person—angry days/discussion, happy person—Happy New Year, sad person—sad event”)
- Activity 1—activity 2 (e.g. “cry, synonym of either weep or shout, breathe (deeply) or not breathe a word”)

However, Alm-Arvius points out that many of the foregoing metonymic shifts are “generally productive and predictable” due to their common use, and therefore “they can be considered cases of regular polysemy” (ibid, p. 163).

Seto (1999), on the other hand, provides a fairly similar typology of metonymy to that provided by some cognitive linguists but under a different categorisation. Seto believes that the types of metonymy depend on three major types of entity – spatial, temporal, and abstract – and the types of reference these involve (ibid, p. 98). Accordingly, Seto
subcategorises the most common types of metonymy under these three major types of entity. For example, the ‘whole-part’ relationships (object-component, organisation-member, and object-material), ‘container-contents’, and other spatial relations referred to as ‘adjacency’ are subcategorised under ‘spatial entities’ or ‘spatial metonymies’. Under ‘temporal entities’ come the ‘whole event-subevent’ type and ‘preceding-ensuing situation’. As for abstract entities, these include ‘object-property’ relations such as ‘abstract for concrete’ (for further details see Seto, 1999).

2.6.3.2 Functions of metonymy (purposes of use)
Most if not all linguists agree that the primary function of metonymy is ‘referential’. Lakoff and Johnson (1980, p. 36) point out that in addition to the referential function, metonymy also “serves the function of providing understanding”. However, what we mean by the term ‘function’ here is the purpose or reason for using metonymy. In other words, why do we use metonymy, or what do we gain by using metonymy?

In classical rhetoric, metonymy, as well as other tropes, are mainly seen as stylistic devices to beautify a discourse for persuasive reasons. However, each trope has its distinctive features which enable it to serve specific purposes. In other words, metonymy, like other tropes, is not used randomly, but to achieve (a) specific purpose(s). Rubba (2006) suggests that metonymy serves several purposes, such as clarification, abbreviation, pragmatic focus, attribution or mitigation of credit or blame, and lexical operation of zero derivation. The purpose of clarification of identity of a referent, according to Rubba, is when metonymy is used to pinpoint a specific referent when confusion is possible. For example, a waitress distinguishes a specific person by his/her order, as in ‘The sheesh kebab wants an extra portion of chips’. Another purpose of metonymy is abbreviation. That is to say, metonymy can express or deliver a meaning to the addressee by using fewer words, and in some cases one word instead of a whole phrase; for example, ‘White House’ instead of ‘President/Administration of the United States of America’ or ‘Dickens’ instead of ‘the literary works of the novelist Charles Dickens’. Another purpose is pragmatic focus. In other words, metonymy can be used to focus on or highlight a specific part, as in the Part for the Whole relation, in order to provide understanding (Lakoff & Johnson, 1980, p. 37). For example, the term ‘wheels’ or ‘ride’ is used metonymically for a car, because it is either an indispensable part of the car or the purpose of the car respectively. Rubba (2006) also points out that attribution or mitigation of credit or blame is another purpose of metonymy. This type of metonymic
expression occurs when we would like to generalise praise or blame, i.e. shift the responsibility for something to someone else. For example, when we say that ‘The planning committee rejected my application’, it does not mean that all members of the planning committee have rejected the application; but since the committee’s approval or rejection is based on a majority vote, then any decision, approval or rejection, is referred to the body which represents its members. Accordingly, the blame, in the previous example, is shifted from the members of the planning committee to the body itself. Another example is when we say ‘Harry Truman bombed Hiroshima and Nagasaki’; though the bombs were not dropped by Truman himself, the blame is shifted to him because he was the one who ordered the bombing. The final purpose of metonymy stated by Rubba is ‘metonymy as a lexical operation of zero derivation’ or what is known as “conversion or functional shift”. This means that metonymy sometimes involves a functional shift of a word from one class (verb, noun) to another class (noun, verb). According to Rubba (2006), “when the metonymy becomes familiar and conventionalized, the new meaning is part of our mental ‘dictionary entry’ for that word. To illustrate this, Rubba gives an example of the word ‘butter’ in “to butter toast”; the nominal meaning of butter, which is a substance often spread over a toast of bread, is converted into a verbal meaning to stand for the action of ‘spreading’ the butter on the toast. The literal expression for the metonymic expression ‘to butter toast’ would be ‘to spread butter on toast’. So in this case, the noun ‘butter’ is converted to a verb.

Al-Salem (2008, pp. 53-58), in her PhD thesis, provides six functions (purposes of use) of metonymy: fantasy activation, interest arousal, achieving specific goals, expansion, as a basis for images, and brevity. The critical issue in Al-Salem’s discussion on the functions of metonymy is that she does not point out whether she is dealing with the English metonymy or the Arabic trope majāz mursal.

2.7 Metonymy, synecdoche, kināyah, and majāz mursal

From the discussion on Arabic rhetoric, we can notice Arabic tropes are discussed under the discipline called ‘ilm al-bayān (science of elocution). The main common feature between kināyah, tashbīh, istiᶜārah, and majāz mursal is that they all use expressions to indicate a meaning other than its true/proper (literal) meaning. The interesting part of this branch is that kināyah and tashbīh stand as separate tropes whereas istiᶜārah and majāz mursal are categorised under a sub-subcategory called majāz lughavī (lingual figurativeness). What differentiates istiᶜārah from majāz mursal pivots on the semantic
relationship between the proper and improper meaning, i.e. the literal and the figurative meaning, of the utterances; that is to say, if the semantic relationship is based on similarity then the figurative expression is considered \textit{isti\textasciitilde rah}, and if not then it is \textit{maj\textasciitilde z mursal}.

On the other hand, \textit{kin\textasciidetilde yah} has nothing to do with similarity or non-similarity in the utterances used in an expression (cf. Abu Deeb, 1979, p. 165). Some rhetoricians claim that \textit{kin\textasciidetilde yah} can be distinguished from other tropes (\textit{isti\textasciitilde rah} and \textit{maj\textasciitilde z mursal}) in that the utterance used can denote both meanings, the literal and the figurative. That is to say, in addition to the figurative expression/the intended meaning of the \textit{kin\textasciidetilde yah}, “the language of it does correspond to reality” (Larkin, 1995, p. 87). Larkin comments on the language of the \textit{kin\textasciidetilde yah} and the possibility of it denoting both literal and figurative meanings are:

The language of discourse, as a language, is doing exactly what is supposed to do. Ostensibly, the agreement between language and reality is undisturbed. The only thing is that the meaning intended is not ultimately the one conveyed by the words, but rather the one that is reasoned to from the meaning of those words (ibid.)

Though this may seem ostensibly true, it is not always so, even if the \textit{kin\textasciidetilde yah} sounds idiomatic. Firstly, there are \textit{kin\textasciidetilde yah} expressions, as pointed out in the section on \textit{kin\textasciidetilde yah} (section 2.4), where it is impossible to denote the literal meaning. Secondly, the utterance in a \textit{kin\textasciidetilde yah} is used to entail something semantically concomitant with it and not the utterance’s true meaning. Moreover, it is used to attest the meaning intended. Also, the purport of the utterance, in \textit{kin\textasciidetilde yah}, is of a great importance because it leads the addressee to the intended meaning. For example, the expression ‘so-and-so is long of sword-scabbard’ leads us to understand that the person is of a tall stature, because a short person would not wear a long sword-scabbard. In other words, the entailed meaning of ‘a long sword-scabbard’ is shifted to the non-mentioned notion, which is tallness in stature.

\textit{Table 2.1: Typical definitions of metonymy, synecdoche, \textit{kin\textasciidetilde yah}, \textit{maj\textasciitilde z mursal}, and \textit{isti\textasciitilde rah}.}

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Metonymy</th>
<th>“metonymy is the transfer of the name of a thing to something else that is \textbf{closely associated} with it - such as cause and effect, container and contained, possessor and possessed, and so on” (Bredin, 1984, p. 45).</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Synecdoche</td>
<td>“A kind of semantic change … that involves a part-to-whole relationship in which a term with more comprehensive meaning is used for a less comprehensive meaning or vice versa” (Campbell &amp; Mixco, 2007, p. 199).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>\textit{Kin\textasciidetilde yah}</td>
<td>“\textit{Kin\textasciidetilde yah} is the process in which the text producer seeks to substantiate a specific meaning without mentioning it directly through its known (original/conventional) word in the language. Instead he opts for a meaning”</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
From this fairly comprehensive consideration of the Arabic and English figures of speech, we can conclude that simile and metaphor are more or less equivalent to *tashbīḥ* and *istiʿārah* respectively. On the basis of its types and purposes of use (functions), we can, however, say that there is no equivalent figure of speech for *kināyah* in English. For example, euphemism is one of the purposes of *kināyah*, and we could even say that it is part and parcel of *kināyah*, specifically in the Qur’an; whereas euphemism in English seems to be a separate stylistic usage rather than being an essential feature or element of a particular trope as in Arabic. Some Arabic-English dictionaries translate the term *kināyah* as ‘metonymy’, which we have shown to be incorrect, especially given that the types and purposes of *kināyah* are totally different from those of metonymy. The reason behind the dictionaries’ error in translation may be the ‘stand for’ notion, which is one of the characteristics of metonymy and sometimes *kināyah*; but this notion may be applied to metaphor as well. For instance, metaphorically the term ‘lion’ stands for courage. The only feature that *kināyah* and metonymy might share, as can be noticed from the definitions of *kināyah* and metonymy (see table 2.1), is the notion of contiguity/association; apart from that, the concept of *kināyah* is totally different from metonymy. The mechanism of *kināyah*, according to Abu Libdeh (1991, p. 43), is quite similar to metaphor and analogy “in that it evokes a series of associations between two entities where A presents the reality of B”. This might be true, but the concepts of the two tropes are different, and all this shows is that *kināyah* is a salient figure of speech as is metaphor.

On other hand, *majāz mursal* seems to be the closest equivalent in the Arabic tradition to both metonymy and synecdoche in the Western. All three figures of speech share the same non-similarity relationship, i.e. the semantic relationship between the figurative expression and the intended meaning (see table 2.1). Another mutual feature above all
else is their types/semantic relationships (see table 2.2). The semantic relationships in *majāz mursal* (‘Amīn, 1982, pp. 93-108; ‘Aṭīyah, 2004, pp. 117-124; Abdul-Raof, 2006, pp. 225-232) such as ‘causality’, ‘result’, ‘whole-to-part’, or ‘place’ relationships are more or less similar to ‘cause for effect’, ‘effect for cause’, ‘whole for part’, or ‘place for institution/event/thing/activity’ in metonymy. This may also apply to synecdoche, considering the disagreement amongst some rhetoricians and linguists over the semantic relations involved in metonymy and synecdoche. Thus, Arabic-English dictionaries tend to render the term *majāz mursal* as both synecdoche and metonymy. Moreover, as we noted earlier, Larkin, in her discussion of al-Jurjānī’s categorisation of *majāz*, points out that the term in English for *majāz mursal* is metonymy (1995, p. 87). She also seems to realise there is no equivalent term for *kināyah* in English; she uses transliteration and refers to *kināyah*, between brackets, as ‘descriptive periphrases’ (ibid, p. 86). Overall, this demonstrates that there is no equivalent term or figure of speech for *kināyah* in English and, the frequent usage of the term ‘metonymy’ for *kināyah* is incorrect.

**Table 2.2 Forms and semantic relationships of *majāz mursal*, metonymy, and synecdoche.**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Majāz mursal</th>
<th>Metonymy</th>
<th>Synecdoche</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Result relationship.</td>
<td>Producer for product.</td>
<td>Type for token.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Whole-to-part relationship.</td>
<td>Product for producer</td>
<td>Token for type.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Part-to-whole relationship.</td>
<td>Object used for user.</td>
<td>Physical part for the whole.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Specific relationship.</td>
<td>Place for Institution.</td>
<td>Physical attribute for the whole.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Necessary requirement relationship.</td>
<td>Place for event.</td>
<td>Taking a part for the whole.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Past relationship.</td>
<td>Cause for effect.</td>
<td>The whole for a part.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Future relationship.</td>
<td>Effect for cause.</td>
<td>The singular for the plural.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Substituted relationship.</td>
<td>Sign for signified.</td>
<td>A certain number for an indefinite one.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Instrument relationship.</td>
<td>Container for contained.</td>
<td>The matter out of which a Thing is made, for thing itself.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>State relationship.</td>
<td>Place for thing.</td>
<td>Material or physical attribute for object.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Action for instrument.</td>
<td>Singular for plural.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Agent for action</td>
<td>Common name for proper name.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Action for agent</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Place/region—people.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Time/period—people.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Place—activity.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>People—activity.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Physical thing(s)—activity.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>People/thing—time.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Activity—establishment.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Activity—product.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Substance—product.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

-67-
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Substance</th>
<th>type of.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Producer</td>
<td>product.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Feeling</td>
<td>object.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sense modality</td>
<td>sense impression.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Chapter three: Qur’an, kināyah, and translation

3.1 Introduction

The prime source of data, where the kināyah expressions for this study are extracted from, is the Qur’an. Hence, it is vital that we briefly shed light on some issues related to this source, such as its nature, status, legitimacy of its translation, historical background of its English translations, unique genre, and the significant role of Qur’anic exegeses in its comprehension and translation. This chapter will also include a brief overview of the four selected translations that will be employed in the TT analysis. This will be followed by an overview of the employment of kināyah in Qur’an, then, a brief discussion on kināyah in translation studies.

3.2 The nature and status of the Qur’an

(Indeed, We have made it an Arabic Qur'an that you might understand) [Q. 43:3] (Saheeh International, 2004)

(We have made it a Qur'an in Arabic so that you [people] may understand) [Q. 43:3] (Abdel Haleem, 2005)

(Indeed, We have sent it down as an Arabic Qur'an that you might understand) [Q. 12:2] (Saheeh International, 2004).

(We have sent the Qur'an down in the Arabic tongue and given all kinds of warnings in it, so that they may beware or take heed) [Q. 20:113] (Abdel Haleem, 2005).

The Qur’an is the words of God revealed in Arabic. Lexically, the word Qur‘ān means ‘reading’ or ‘reciting’ (Lane, 1968, p. 2504; Abdel Haleem, 2005, p. xv), but as a proper noun, it is known as the scripture or the book that contains the sum of the words of Allah which have been revealed in Arabic to His messenger, Prophet Muhammad, peace be upon him (PBUH) (Graham, 2001, pp. 159-163) through His angel Jibrīl. There are
several āyahs which demonstrates that He is the one who revealed the Qur’an to His prophet, for instance:

(Indeed, it is We who have sent down to you, [O Muhammad], the Qur’an progressively) [Q. 76:23] (Saheeh International, 2004).

(We Ourselves have sent down this Qur’an to you [Prophet] in gradual revelation) [Q. 76:23] (Abdel Haleem, 2005).

(Indeed, We have sent down to you the Book, [O Muhammad], in truth. So worship Allah, [being] sincere to Him in religion) [Q. 39:2] (Saheeh International, 2004).

(It is We who sent down the Scripture to you [Prophet] with the Truth, so worship God with your total devotion) [Q. 39:2] (Abdel Haleem, 2005).

(Indeed, We sent down to you the Book for the people in truth. So whoever is guided - it is for [the benefit of] his soul; and whoever goes astray only goes astray to its detriment. And you are not a manager over them) [Q. 39:41] (Saheeh International, 2004).

(We have sent the Scripture down to you [Prophet] with the Truth for people. Whoever follows the guidance does so for his own benefit, whoever strays away from it does so at his own peril: you are not in charge of them) [Q. 39:41] (Abdel Haleem, 2005).

([This is] a blessed Book which We have revealed to you, [O Muhammad], that they might reflect upon its verses and that those of understanding would be reminded) [Q. 38:29] (Saheeh International, 2004).

(This is a blessed Scripture which We sent down to you [Muhammad], for people to think about its messages, and for those with understanding to take heed) [Q. 38:29] (Abdel Haleem, 2005).

Unquestionably, the Qur’an has to be viewed as an integrative entity. This is to say, utterance and meaning have to be joined together in order for the text to be properly understood as Qur’anic. By contrast, Prophetic sayings or narrations are not Qur’anic despite their divine meanings, because their wording is formulated by the Prophet (PBUH). Accordingly, Qur’anic translations and exegesis are not considered Qur’anic; and they are even not allowed to be recited in aṣ-ṣalawāt (prayers) [singular: aṣ-ṣalāh] (Ibn Taymīyah, 2004, p. 542; also cited in al-Ubayd, 2002, p. 11).
For Muslims, the Qur’an is not only the words of Allah and a divine text in all respects, but it is also a fundamental source of guidance for all aspects of life:

(And We will bring you, [O Muhammed], as a witness over your nation. And We have sent down to you the Book as clarification for all things and as guidance and mercy and good tidings for the Muslims) [Q. 16:89] (Saheeh International, 2004).

(...We shall bring you [Prophet] as a witness against these people, for We have sent the Scripture down to you explaining everything, and as guidance and mercy and good news to those who devote themselves to God) [Q. 16:89] (Abdel Haleem, 2005).

(And We have revealed to you, [O Muhammed], the Book in truth, confirming that which preceded it of the Scripture and as a criterion over it. So judge between them by what Allah has revealed and do not follow their inclinations away from what has come to you of the truth. To each of you We prescribed a law and a method. Had Allah willed, He would have made you one nation [united in religion], but [He intended] to test you in what He has given you; so race to [all that is] good. To Allah is your return all together, and He will [then] inform you concerning that over which you used to differ) [Q. 5:48] (Saheeh International, 2004).

(We sent to you [Muhammed] the Scripture with the truth, confirming the Scriptures that came before it, and with final authority over them: so judge between them according to what God has sent down. Do not follow their whims, which deviate from the truth that has come to you. We have assigned a law and a path to each of you. If God had so willed, He would have made you one community, but He wanted to test you through that which He has given you, so race to do good: you will all return to God and He will make clear to you the matters you differed about) [Q. 5:48] (Abdel Haleem, 2005).

Thus, Muslims are obligated to read and understand the Qur’an. But since the Qur’an is revealed in Arabic and the majority of Muslims are non-Arabs, it has become obvious that the translation of the meaning of the Holy Qur’an into different languages is now a necessity. As a result, numerous translations have been produced. Some of these were made by non-Muslim orientalists and some were by Muslims relying on their independent opinion or judgment. Generally, they were individual efforts which contained some errors
depending on the translator’s knowledge, goal, and purpose. Hence, most translations have been criticised by several Islamic clerics and scholars, which may, in fact, be the reason why they initially refused to allow the Qur’an to be translated in the first place.

3.3 The legitimacy of translating the Qur’an

The only text that is accepted to be Qur’anic, and is allowed to be used in ṣalāh, is the original Arabic text that Allah has revealed to His Prophet (PBUH), which has been undistorted and preserved for centuries. According to Allah’s words, it will remain undistorted for ever:

(Indeed, it is We who sent down the Qur’an and indeed, We will be its guardian) [Q. 15:9] (Saheeh International, 2004).

(We have sent down the Qur’an Ourself, and We Ourself will guard it) [Q. 15:9] (Abdel Haleem, 2005).

Accordingly, any translation of the Qur’an into another language, or even an interpretation to Arabic itself, will not be considered a Qur’anic text. The Qur’an was revealed as a miraculous divine scripture and has its own unique form of discourse that no one can ever produce a similar discourse even in Arabic. This uniqueness is part of its linguistic challenge to humankind; this challenge is demonstrated in the following āyahs:

(Say, “If mankind and the jinn gathered in order to produce the like of this Qur'an, they could not produce the like of it, even if they were to each other assistants) [Q. 17:88] (Saheeh International, 2004).

(Say, ‘Even if all mankind and jinn came together to produce something like this Qur’an, they could not produce anything like it, however much they helped each other’) [Q. 17:88] (Abdel Haleem, 2005).

(And if you are in doubt about what We have sent down upon Our Servant [Muhammad], then produce a Surah the like thereof and call upon your witnesses other than Allah, if you should be truthful [Q. 2:23] (Saheeh International, 2004).

(If you have doubts about the revelation We have sent down to Our servant, then produce a single sura like it - enlist whatever supporters you have other than God - if you truly [think you can]) [Q. 2:23] (Abdel Haleem, 2005).
This clearly suggests that no translation of the Qur’an can match the originality of the Arabic text of the Qur’an regardless of how competent and skilful the translator is. From this standpoint, there has been an on-going controversy between Islamic clerics on the validity of translating the Qur’an into another language. The ruling on this issue varies according to the type of translation (Siddiek, 2012, pp. 20-21; al-ᶜUbayd, 2002, pp. 13-26). To clarify this, it is necessary to look at some of the types of translation related and their rulings.

### 3.3.1 Ruling of translating the Qur’an word-for-word (interlinear translation)

In this translation method, the TL words are put immediately below the SL words (Newmark, 1988, pp. 45-46). The SL word-order is preserved, and the lexical items are translated without paying attention to their contextual meanings. Cultural words are also translated literally. Furthermore, this method “does not necessarily respect TL grammar, but has grammatical units corresponding as closely as possible to every grammatical unit of the ST” (Dickins, Hervey, & Higgins, 2002, p. 15). It is rarely used in translation from English into Arabic and vice versa for two reasons. First, English and Arabic differ in the direction of writing. Second, they differ in word order and many grammatical and lexical aspects. However, this method is effectively used in specific contexts, for example, when attempting to demonstrate the structure of the original text. So the translation of the Qur’an using the word-for-word method means rendering its system, style, and structure
without respecting the TL grammatical structure. This would result in a great deal of inappropriateness both in form and content. This can be illustrated by following example:

(Q. 17:29): ´(وَلاَ تَجَلِّئْ ِيَدَكَ مَعْطُورةً إِلَى ٱلْخَرِيجِ وَلَا تَبْسَطْهَا كُلَّ ِبَسَطٍ فَٱلْخَرِيجُ مُخَلِّصُواً)´

A word-for-word translation would result in:

(And no make hand-your cuffed/chained to neck-your and no stretch it all the stretch then sit blameful bared)

The prohibition or discouragement of being too mean or too extravagant is expressed by the figurative imagery, i.e. the hands chained to the neck or completely stretching it out, respectively, which is not conveyed in the word-for-word translation; thus, it is clear from the above example that the word-for-word method in translation from Arabic to English, especially from the Qur’an, is not only unidiomatic but also unintelligible. Therefore, all Islamic clerics strictly prohibit translating the Qur’an word-for-word.

3.3.2 Ruling of translating the Qur’an literally

On the face of it, it is appropriate to define the term ‘literal translation’. According to Newmark literal translation means translating SL words singly, out of context, whilst transforming the SL’s structure as closely as possible to the TL’s structure (Newmark, 1988, p. 46). Dickins, et al. (2002, p. 16) have aptly pointed out that:

In literal translation proper, the denotative meaning of words is taken as if straight from the dictionary (that is, out of context), but TL grammar is respected. Because TL grammar is respected, literal translation very often unavoidably involves grammatical transposition - the replacement or reinforcement of given parts of speech in the ST by other parts of speech in the TT [author’s emphasis].

It is obvious literal translation is very similar to word-for-word translation with the exception of the issue of grammatical structure. The following literal translation of the previous example will exemplify this point:

Literal translation: (And do not make your hand cuffed/chained to your neck, and do not stretch it extremely and then you sit [become] blameful and bared)

Yet again, the figurative meaning is not quite conveyed, though the grammatical structure of the TL is maintained. By the very nature of the case, Islamic clerics and scholars have also prohibited this type of translation of the Qur’an. They believe that some implicit meanings will not be conveyed through a literal translation, which is true, particularly if they are culture-specific and the two languages do not share the same cultural concepts.
However, this does not necessarily require generalising the prohibition of literal translation. In some cases, especially when the two languages share the same cultural concept, a literal translation could convey the actual meaning as the ST does. If for any reason there is a loss of meaning or ambiguity in the translation, this could be compensated for or clarified through several procedures as we will show later in this study. We incline to what Newmark’s suggests, that a combination of more than one translation approach is useful and the choice mainly depends on the type of ST expression (see Newmark, 1981, p. 40).

3.3.3 Ruling on explanatory translation of the Qur’an

An explanatory translation of the Qur’an can be divided into two forms (al-Ubayd, 2002, pp. 13-14):

- The translator renders the contextual meaning directly from the Qur’an into another language. This requires that the translator should be competent and has complete knowledge of the meanings of the Qur’an. Some Islamic clerics require that the translator should be highly qualified not only in both languages but also in Qur’anic exegesis. On that account, the translator renders the intended meaning into the TT using TL expressions in order to clarify what is ambiguous in the ST. Here the translator should not be committed to translating every utterance and to find its equivalent in the TL.

- The translation is done by rendering the Arabic explanatory of the Qur’an into the TL rather than directly from the Qur’an. In other words, translating the explanations which has been produced by other scholars of Qur’anic exegesis.

It is clear that any explanatory translation of the Qur’an is a translation of the meaning of the Qur’an and not as a Holy book; in fact, no translations of the Qur’an are to be considered a Holy book. Explanatory translation is not an attempt to reproduce the Qur’an in another language, but simply involves explaining the meaning and clarifying what is ambiguous. That is why the majority of Islamic clerics and scholars have agreed on the permissibility of this type of translation. However, the translator has to fulfil overriding conditions in order to be trustworthy to translate the meaning of the Qur’an. These requirements are (al-Luhaydān, 2002, pp. 12-13):

- The translator has to be well capable of understanding and explaining the exact meaning of each āyah.
- The translator has to be linguistically competent in both languages, i.e. they should know the exact meaning of different lexical items, sentence patterns, the relationship between the sentence elements, and the functional features as well as the cultural heritage of both languages.

- The translator should avoid the employment of illegitimate terms and expressions unless their use cannot be avoided.

Al-ᶜ-Ubayd (2002, p. 31-23) adds that any translator who attempts to render the Qur’an, especially if it was directly from the Qur’an, should be competent and familiar with required rules of Qur’anic exegeses. The translator should also rely on authoritative exegeses and render what the majority of exegetes agree on. If there is more than one opinion, it should be clarified in a footnote. Al-ᶜ-Ubayd (ibid; cf. al-Luhaydān, 2002, p. 31) highly recommends that any translation of the meaning the Qur’an should include in its preface the following:

- The explanatory translation is based on their best understanding of the meaning of the Qur’an.
- The translation does not include all the possible interpretations of the meaning of the Qur’an.
- The translation of the Qur’an, i.e. the Qur’an itself and not its meaning, is untranslatable due to the nature of the Qur’an itself.
- The explanatory translation does not convey all the Qur’an features, hence, it does not replace the Qur’an by any means whatsoever, and the Qur’an will remain indispensable.
- The title of the translation should include expressions, such as a translation of the Qur’anic exegesis from Arabic into English or explaining the Qur’an into English.

Presumably the reason why most scholars, if not all, insist that the title should clarify that the translation is an explanatory translation or the translation of the meaning of the Qur’an, is that the TT recipient may consider the translation as a replacement for the Qur’an like what happened with the translations of the Old and New Testaments.

3.4 Translation of the meaning of the Qur’an

The translation of the meaning of the Qur’an is considered an important element in stimulating people to enter Islam [darwah]. Some of the Islamic scholars who have approved the translation of the meaning of the Qur’an have stated that this type of
translation occurred during the Prophet Muhammad’s epoch. They believe it was through the letters sent by the Prophet Muhammad (PBUH) to the kings and leaders of other nations in his era to stimulate them to embrace Islam. It is believed that these letters, which included some āyahs of the Qur’an, must have been translated into the languages of those nations, for their leaders to understand (ash-Shāyaᶜ, 2002, p. 16). Furthermore, there is an account that Salmān al-Fārisī (one of the companions of the Prophet Muhammad [PBUH]) translated the meaning of sūrat al-Fātiḥah into Persian in response to some Persian Muslims (ash-Shāyaᶜ 2002, p. 16). The following āyah suggest that even the Prophet Muhammad (PBUH) interpreted the meaning of the Qur’an to his companions:

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{﴿} & \text{ِرُبُّزَل} \text{ل} \text{ِتُن} \text{ِف} \text{ِي} \text{ِم} \text{ِف} \text{ِتُكَرَكَر*} \\
\end{align*}
\]

([We sent them] with clear proofs and written ordinances. And We revealed to you the message that you may make clear to the people what was sent down to them and that they might give thought) [Q. 16:44] (Saheeh International, 2004)

(We have sent down the message to you too [Prophet], so that you can explain to people what was sent for them, so that they may reflect) [Q. 16:44] (Abdel Haleem, 2005).

In general, the translation of the meaning of the Qur’an into different languages is a necessity especially given that the majority of Muslims are non-Arabs. It is also indispensable that all non-Arab Muslims should learn Arabic because the recitation of the Qur’an in prayers is only permissible in Arabic.

### 3.5 Western translations of the Qur’an

The first translation of the meaning of the Qur’an in a western language appeared in Latin after approximately five centuries after Islam came to light. According to at-Tamsamānī (2002, p. 15), it all started in al-Andalus (Islamic Spain) at the beginning of the 12th century when Peter the Venerable, Abbot of Cluny, wanted to know more about Islam from a hostile and a polemical perspective (Tolan, 2002, p. 136). Thus he gave orders to translate the Qur’an. At-Tamsamānī claims the first translation was carried out by Robertus Ketenensis, an Englishman, in 1130, contrary to what is widely believed among scholars that it was in 1143 (2002, pp. 15-16; cf. ash-Shāyaᶜ, 2002, p. 17; cf. ṢAli, 2002, pp. 1-7). He adds that a second Latin translation was produced in 1143 by an Abbot.

---

28 Also known as Robert of Ketton or Robertus Retenensis.
of Cluny’s group (ibid, p. 16). In a footnote, he suggests that the latter translation was produced by Petrus Toletanus (Peter of Toledo). His assumptions were based on some of Peter the Venerable’s letters sent to Bernard of Clairvaux, in addition to the fact that Petrus Toletanus’ name is mentioned on the top of the first page of one of the translation manuscripts which are preserved in the National Library of France (Bibliothèque nationale de France). It is worth mentioning that John V. Tolan, like most scholars, believes that Robertus Ketenensis’ Latin translation of the Qur’an is the first western translation of the Qur’an and that it was produced in 1143. That is clear from his following statement:

In 1142–43 Peter travelled to Spain and assembled a team of translators. He had Robert Ketton produce a full, Latin version of the Koran, which was subsequently given extensive marginal annotations; it is the first translation of the Koran into Latin, indeed probably the first complete translation into any language (Tolan, 2002, p. 155).

George Sale (1888, p. vii), who translated the Qur’an and Samuel Zwemer (1915, p. 247) even believed that Ketton’s Latin translation in 1143 was produced with the help of his German friend Herman of Dalmatia. However, this Latin translation of the Qur’an remained concealed until it was published four centuries later in Basel in 1543 by Theodore Bibliander (Sale, 1888, p. vii; Zwemer, 1915, p. 247; Abdul-Raof, 2001, p. 19). It is widely believed that the Crusade’s main interest in Islam was to conquer Muslim lands including al-Andalus, to distort the image of Islam and convert Muslims to Christianity. In this connection, another Medieval Latin translation was produced in June 1210 by Mark of Toledo, deacon of the cathedral of Toledo, at the instance of Rodrigo Jiménez de Rada, Archbishop of Toledo (1208–47) (Tolan, 2002, p. 183). Furthermore, John of Segovia, a theologian, also made a Latin translation of the Qur’an in 1453, but there is no trace of it anymore (Almisned, 2001, p. 53). The Latin translations of the Qur’an were inspired by a hostile intention with the explicit aim of refuting the beliefs of Islam; hence they contained an abundance of erroneousness and misapprehension. Yet, they served, particularly Ketton’s translation, as “…the foundation of the earliest translations into modern European idioms” (Abdul-Raof, 2001, p. 19). Ketton’s translation was further translated into Italian, German, and Dutch.

In 1547, Andrea Arrivabene translated Ketton’s Latin translation into Italian, a translation which was censured by Sale for its absurdity and faultiness (Sale, 1888, p. vii). A German translation was made by Salomon Schweigger in 1616, derived from Andrea’s Italian
Schweigger’s translation was in turn translated into Dutch in 1641 and printed in Hamburg (Zwemer, 1915, p. 249).

A more recent Latin translation was probably done by Lewis Marracci in 1698. His version included the original text together with explanatory notes and refutations. Concerning the rejection of Islam, this Latin translation was no different from previous Latin translations, as is evident from the title of the introductory volume, *A Refutation of the Quran*.

The first French translation of the Qur’an was produced by Andrew du Ryer in 1647. Ryer worked as a French consular official in Egypt and he was conversant with the Turkish and Arabic languages. Nevertheless, his translation included countless errors. Sale criticised Ryer’s rendering, noting:

> ... mistakes in every page, besides frequent transpositions, omissions, and additions, faults unpardonable in a work of this nature. And what renders it still more incomplete is, the want of Notes to explain a vast number of passages, some of which are difficult, and others are impossible to understand, without proper explications, were they translated ever so exactly (Sale, 1888, p. viii).

Another French version appeared in 1783 by Savary, followed by Kasimirski’s version in 1840 which was also in French. A Russian translation appeared in 1776 at St. Petersburg. In 1857, a Hebrew translation produced by Hermann Reckendorf was printed at Leipzig followed a Swedish translation in 1874 by J. T. Nordling.

### 3.6 English translations of the Qur’an

Although the Qur’an is the Holy book of Islam, the early translations of the meaning of the Qur’an into English were rendered by non-Muslims. The interest of non-Muslims in the Qur’an stemmed from their desire to refute Islam and mainly, as mentioned earlier, to convert Muslims to Christianity. English translations of the meaning of the Qur’an can be categorised into two groups, by Muslims and by non-Muslims.

#### 3.6.1 English translations of the Qur’an by non-Muslims

*The Alcoran of Mahomet* is the first English translation of the meaning of the Qur’an by the Scotsman Alexander Ross in 1649. Ross’s translation was completely based on du Ryer’s distorted French translation. By the very nature of the case, Ross’s translation was
regarded as “an indifferent translation of an inadequate version” (Arberry, 1983, p. 37). Even Sale criticized Ross’s translation, noting:

The English version is no other than a translation of Du Ryer’s, and that a very bad one; for Alexander Ross, who did it, being utterly unacquainted with the Arabic, and no great master of the French, has added a number of fresh mistakes of his own to those of Du Ryer; not to mention the meanness of his language, which would make a better book ridiculous (Sale, 1888, p. viii).

Ross’s translation remained the only English translation available for English readers for nearly a century until a new translation by George Sale was published in 1734. Though Sale claims that his translation, *The Koran: Commonly called the Alkoran of Mohammed*, was translated direct from the original Arabic text contrary to Ross’s translation, others have suggested that his translation was based on earlier Latin translations (Irving, 1985, p. xxiii), specifically, Maraccins’ Latin translation (Hosni, 1990, p. 95; Almisned, 2001, p. 53; Abdul-Raof, 2001, p. 20; ‘Alī, ‘Abdullah Yūsuf, 1989, p. xxi). In his translation, Sale included a historical background to early translations of the Qur’an, in which he criticized all former translations without exception. He himself admits that his translation is also not free from errors (Sale, 1888, p. x), which in fact is true due to the fact “it abounds in numerous instances of omission, distortion, and interpolations” (Kidwai, 1987, p. 70). Nevertheless, Sale’s translation, which included explanatory footnotes, became renowned until the middle of the 20th century. It was edited and published several times. Even other European translations relied heavily on Sale’s rendition.

A third English translation of the Qur’an entitled *The Koran* appeared in 1861 by John Medows Rodwell, who served as a Rector of St Ethelburga's Bishopsgate in London from 1843-1900. Rodwell, like his previous fellow translators, was utterly convinced that the Qur’an was the production of Muhammad, the Prophet of Islam. His preface included wild imaginary allegations against the Qur’an, the Prophet Muhammad (PBUH), and the Prophet’s companions (see Rodwell, 1909, pp. 1-18). In addition to changing the order of the *sūrahs* to make them chronological, Rodwell’s translation suffers from a great number of mistakes and misinterpretations.

Nineteen years later, the Cambridge scholar Edward Henry Palmer translated the Qur’an for Max Muller’s Sacred Books of the East series. Palmer’s translation, *The Qur’an*, was published in London in 1880. According to Kidwai (1987, p. 70), more than 65 instances of omissions and mistranslations in Palmer’s translation were pointed out in A. R. Nykl's
article that was published in the Journal of the American Oriental Society. Palmer also believes that the Prophet Muhammad (PBUH) was the author of the Qur’an.

From 1937 to 1939, Richard Bell’s translation, *The Qur'an translated with a critical rearrangement of the Surahs*, was published in Edinburgh in two volumes. It seems that Bell followed Rodewll’s steps and wild imaginary views in such a manner that he also rearranged the order of the sūrahs and also believes the Prophet Muhammad (PBUH) was the author of the Qur’an.

The early English translations of the Qur’an were questionable, equivocal, and irksome until *The Koran Interpreted* of Arthur John Arberry, a well-known British orientalist and professor of Arabic and Islamic studies, appeared in 1955. Despite the fact that Arberry was a non-Muslim, many Muslim scholars admired his translation. Arberry understood that translating the Qur’an is not an easy task and he aimed as much as he could to maintain the style of the original text. Although his translation was not free of mistakes and mistranslations, Kidwai (1987, p. 71) points out that Arberry’s translation without doubt “… stands out above the other English renderings by non-Muslims in terms of both its approach and quality”.

Nessim Joseph Dawood, a Jew originally from Iraq, moved to England at the age of 19. He graduated from the University of London and later in 1956 he produced his translation of the Qur’an entitled *The Koran*. Dawood is possibly the latest non-Muslim translator so far. The earlier editions of his translation included a chronological order for the sūrahs which was avoided in his latest revised edition (2000). The Arabic text was also included in this edition for easy comparison and to present the modern reader with a comprehensible translation. Overall, Dawood’s translation does not reflect the prejudice of the earlier missionary religious biases, perhaps reflecting the fact that he was not a Christian. Many scholars regard Dawood’s translation as the most widely circulated non-Muslim English translation of the Qur'an.

3.6.2 English translations of the Qur’an by Muslims

The attempt to gravely damage the image of Islam by non-Muslim translators and their disrespect for the Qur’an encouraged Muslim scholars to take up the challenge and translate the meaning of the Qur’an into western languages. According to Nassimi (2008), Muḥammad ʿAbd al-Ḥakīm Khān of Patiala (India) was the first Muslim to translate the Qur’an into English in 1905. His translation, entitled *The Holy Qur’an translated with*
short notes: Based on the Holy Qur'an or authentic traditions of the Prophet, or New Testament or scientific facts, included commentary notes based on sources he mentioned in his subtitle. Khān also expressed the fact that he was not able to render the excellence and beauty of the language of the Qur'an (ibid, p. 51).

In 1912, two other translations were produced in the Indian Sub-continent, *The Qur'an: Arabic text and English translation* by Mirza Abū al-Faḍl and *The Koran: English translation* by Mirza Ḥayrat Dehlawi (Delhi, India). Abū al-Faḍl’s first edition included the Arabic text and the sūrahs were ordered chronologically. His later editions in 1916 and 1956 were published without the Arabic text but the sūrahs were presented in the traditional order. According to Nassimi (2008, p. 52), Dehlawi’s translation is “easy to understand even by those with basic education”. It said that Dehlawi, who was an Islamic scholar, had some assistance from other oriental scholars in translating the meaning of the Qur’an (Nassimi, 2008, p. 52; cf. Kidwai, 1987, p. 68). Kidwai (1987) also expresses the view that Dehlawi’s translation was regarded as an extremely thorough and complete reply to the miscellaneous criticisms of the Qur’an made by several Christian authors such as Sale, Rodwell, and others (ibid.). Kidwai believes the quality of these early translations is not remarkably high, since they were not rendered by well-known Islamic scholars, and adds that “these works are of mere historical interest” (ibid.).

In 1917, an English translation of the Qur’an was produced by Muḥammad ṣAli who is believed to be an Aḥmadi/Qādyānī. The Qādyāniyah have abandoned Islam, according to Muslim clerics, because of their heretical beliefs. This is presumably why Muḥammad ṣAli’s translation, *The Holy Qur’an: English Translation*, is considered by the Muslim World League an incorrect and deviant translation (Nassimi, 2008, p. 52). The Qādyāniyah have actively participated in translating the Qur’an into several languages, especially English. Amongst the popular Qādyāniyah’s distorted English translations are: *A Running Commentary of the Holy Qur’an*, by Khawajah Kamāladdīn in 1948, *The Holy Qur’an*, in 1962 by Mālik Ghulām Farīd, and *The Qur’an: Arabic Text and English Translation*, in 1970 by Ẓafr-Allah Khān (for more details on al-Qādyāniyah’s translation of the Qur’an see ṣAbd-al-Raḥman, 2002).

Before the end of the mid-20th century, other translations were produced that had a taste of a mature and scholarly effort and unlike the previous attempts are of historical interest, for example, *Translation of the Holy Qur’an from the original Arabic text* in 1920 by Hafiẓ Ghulām Sarwār, *The Meaning of the Glorious Qur’an* (London, 1930) by
Muhammad Marmaduke William Pickthall, *The Holy Qur'an: Translation and Commentary* (Lahore, 1934-37) by ʿAbd-Allah Yūsuf ʿAli (see section 3.7.1), and *The Holy Qur'an with English Translation and Commentary* (Lahore, 1941) by ʿAbd-al-Mājid Daryabadi.

Pickthall was an English novelist and journalist who embraced Islam in 1917. His translation of the Qur’an is considered the first English version produced by a Muslim whose first language was English. Pickthall produced a translation that was diligently close to the original Arabic text. Nonetheless, his translation was not free of mistakes but most of them were inconsequential (Nassimi, 2008, pp. 53-54). Also, Abdul Majid Daryabadi’s translation is regarded as a faithful translation. It included notes on “…historical, geographical, and eschatological issues, particularly the illuminating discussions on comparative religion” to help “dispel the doubts in the minds of Westernized readers” (Kidwai, 1987, p. 68).

From the mid-20th century onwards the translation of the Qur’an began to flourish. Several translations were produced and became popular and widely used because of their relative accuracy and simplicity. Others became popular only within the sectors that the translators belonged to. Amongst the popular and widely used translations of the Qur’an are those of Muḥammad Taqī-ud-Dīn al-Hilālī and Muḥammad Muḥsin Khān (see section 3.7.2). Also, *The Message of The Qur'an* by Muhammad Asad in 1980 is assumed to be popular within the academic circles. His translation is presented in a more idiomatic and unblemished language (Kidwai, 1987, p. 69; Nassimi, 2008, p. 60). Asad, formerly Leopold Weiss, was a Jewish Austrian journalist who converted to Islam and who departs from traditional exegetical approaches. This is clear from his translation were he doubts some events such as the throwing of Abraham into the fire and Jesus speaking in the cradle (Mohammed, 2005, p. 64; Nassimi, 2008, p. 60; Kidwai, 1987, p. 69). There are also quite a number of other translations that are considered popular and widely used. For instance, *The Qur'an: the first American Version* by T. B. Irving in 1985, *The translation of the meaning of the Qur'an: English meanings* by Şaḥīḥ International in 1997/2004 (see section 3.7.3), *Qur'an: A Modern English Version* by Majid Fakhry in 1997, *The Noble Qur'an, A New Rendering of its Meaning in English* by Abdalhaqq and Aisha Bewley in 1999, *The Qur'an: A new Translation* by Thomas Cleary in 2004, and *The Qur'an: A new Translation* by M.A.S. Abdel Haleem in 2004/2005 (see section 3.7.4).
3.7 A brief overview of the four selected translations

The four translations of the Qur’an that will be used in this study, namely in the TT analysis, are the translations of ʿAbd-Allah Yūsuf ʿAli29 (2001) [Amanah edition], Muḥammad Taqī-ad-Dīn Al-Hilālī30 and Muḥammad Muḥsin Khān31 (1417 H. [1996]), Şaḥīḥ International32 (2004), and Muḥammad Abd-al-Ḥalīm33 (2005). The rationale behind selecting ṬAli’s translation as well as al-Hilālī and Khān’s translation is due to their diffusion among non-Arabs, namely English speakers. Both translations are widely accepted by Muslim scholars and were well-known long before their espousal by Saudi Arabia. Nevertheless, Saudi Arabia played a significant role in their dispersal through the King Fahd Complex for the Printing of the Glorious Qur’an in al-Madīnah, distributing them free to millions of pilgrims every year as well as to non-Arabic countries. As for Şaḥīḥ International and Abd-al-Halīm’s renditions, the reason that led to choosing these two translations is that they can be seen as current translations, as well as the interesting background of the translators. Here is a brief overview of the four selected translations arranged chronologically:

3.7.1 Abdullah Yusuf Ali (2001)

Abdullah Yusuf Ali, also known as Yusuf Ali (1872-1952) (for biographical details see Sherif, 1994), was an Indian Islamic scholar, who studied English literature at Cambridge University (Al-Jabari, 2008, p. 11) and was cultivated and immensely knowledgeable in Western culture as he claims in his preface of his first edition of 1937 (Ali, 1937, p. iii). Therefore, Ali had a natural bent for the English language. His grasp of the English language is praised by several critics. For example, Kidwai, who offered several assessments on various English translations of the Qur’an, believes that Ali is undoubtedly “one of the few Muslims who enjoyed an excellent command over the English language”, which is noticeably reflected in his translation (1987, p. 68). Kidwai adds that though Ali’s method of translation “is more of a paraphrase than a literal translation … it faithfully represents the sense of the original” (ibid.). Additionally, Sadiq (2010, p. 7) claims that Ali’s translation “is couched in chaste English, with a choice of

---

29 Henceforth, we will refer to him as Abdullah Yusuf Ali without transliteration.
30 Henceforth, we will refer to him as Muhammad Al-Hilali without transliteration.
31 Henceforth, we will refer to him as Muhammad Khan without transliteration.
32 Henceforth, we will refer to them as Saheeh International without transliteration as stated in their translation, though the cover states Şaheeh International.
33 Henceforth, we will refer to him as Muhammad A. S. Abdel Haleem as written in his translation.
words that is close to the original and scholarly notes”. This led Ali’s translation to become one of the most popular and widely used translations.

However, like any other English translations of the meaning of the Qur’an, Ali’s translation received some criticisms. Some of these criticisms were made by his fellow translators of the Qur’an. For example, Thomas B. Irving (1985) notes that Ali’s translation is more acceptable as a commentary, but he accused Ali’s English of being overloaded with additional words that neither clarify the text nor embellish the meaning. True embellishment, according to Irving, “is a simple telling word that does not detract, but carries the mind directly to the meaning”. Furthermore, Marmaduke Pickthall disapproved of Ali’s style and some of his chosen vocabulary, such as the word ‘Apostle’ instead of ‘Messenger’ to refer to the Prophet Muhammad (Ahmed & Fatima, 2015). It is true that ‘apostle’ in old English (or the Latin apostolus) refers to a messenger, but then again in contemporary English it refers to “[T]he twelve witnesses whom Jesus Christ sent forth to preach his Gospel to the world” (OED). Therefore, Pickthall believes that a Muslim translator should not make such a mistake (cited in Nassimi, 2008; Ahmed and Fatima, 2015). With regards to Ali’s style and vocabulary, Iqbal (2000, p. 107) suggests that Ali’s attraction to the English Romantic poets had a great influence on Ali’s diction and choice of vocabulary in his translation. Iqbal additionally points out that Ali’s “commentary on the Qur’an includes 6311 footnotes, 300 pieces of running commentary in rhythmic prose, written in the style of blank verse” (ibid, p.108).

An interesting criticism is the one written by Arafat (1991), in which he claims he found four hundred incorrect equivalents in Ali’s translation. Kidwai, however, refuted Arafat’s claims in his article entitled Review of "Incorrect equivalents chosen by Yusuf Ali in translation" (Kidwai, 1992). Kidwai indicates that Arafat’s claims “sets out to find fault” and "of four hundred alleged incorrect equivalents there is literally not one worthy of serious consideration” (also cited in Nassimi, 2008; Ahmed & Fatima, 2015).

In addition, Ali’s translation of the Qur’anic text, according to Khaleel Mohammed’s view (2005), is acceptable, but there are comments in Ali’s copious footnotes, to be exact some of the notes towards the Jews, which are not. Mohammed claims that Ali “constructed his oeuvre as a polemic against Jews”, and that the footnoted comments on the Jews led the Los Angeles school district to prohibit the use of Ali’s translation at local schools. Mohammed argues that Ali’s translation is not popular as it used to be due to its outdated language and to the appearance of other contemporary translations. For what it
is worth, Ali stresses that in his translation and commentary he adopted the general sense of a number of exegeses (tafāsīr) belonging to different schools of thought, and that some of them express extreme views that he does not agree with. Among the works he referred to are those of at-Ṭabarī, az-Zamakhsharī, al-Bayḍawī, and ibn Kathīr, and others, as well as the Qur’anic dictionary, Mufradāt alfāḍ al-Qurʾān, by al-Asfahāni (Ali, 1937, pp. xii-xiii; Ali, 1998, pp. xix-xx; Ali, 2001, pp. xvii-xviii).

Jassem (2001), on the other hand, provides a constructive evaluation of Ali’s translation. In his article, entitled Abdullah Yusuf Ali’s Translation of the Quran: An Evaluation, Jassem describes Ali’s translation as “sincere and honest”. Jassem indicates that Ali’s translation contains 6,306 notes that explain the meanings of the translated verses. Some of these notes are linguistic, and provide several interpretations of certain words; some simply clarify the meaning of the āyahs, and some are “general and impressionistic”. What is constructive about Jassem’s evaluation is that he points out the features of Ali’s translation as well as a critical evaluation on the levels of language, discourse, style, translation method, writing mechanics, and typography. It is worth noting that Jassem’s description and evaluation of Ali’s translation were the editions that were edited and revised by the Presidency of Islamic Researches, IFTA, Call and Guidance, Saudi Arabia34 (Ali, 1410 H.) and Amana Publications, Maryland, USA (Ali, 1998).

In general, Ali’s translation of the meaning of the Qur’an remains one of the most popular translations regardless of the criticisms mentioned earlier. Apart from the first edition published by Shaikh Muhammad Ashraf, there are two popular editions. The first edition is the one published by the King Fahd Complex for the Printing of the Holy Qur’an, and the other is published by Amana Publications (a subsidiary of Amana Corporation) as noted earlier. Though the former institute did not mention the translator’s name, i.e. Abdullah Yusuf Ali, on the cover, it did however mention his name in the preface as well as the reason for choosing his translation. The reason is “its distinguishing characteristics, such as highly elegant style, a choice of words close to the meaning of the original text, accompanied by scholarly notes and commentaries” (Ali, 1410 H., p. vi). According to Jassem (2001), the editing and revision made by the Presidency of Islamic Researches, IFTA, Call and Guidance on Ali’s translation were in fact marginal. One can notice that

---

34 Edited and revised through four committees appointed by the Presidency of Islamic Researches, IFTA, Call and Guidance, and then published by the King Fahd Complex for the Printing of the Holy Quran, Al-Madinah Al-Munawwarah, under the auspices of the Ministry of Hajj and Endowments, Saudi Arabia.
the words ‘Apostle’ and ‘God’, which Ali was criticised for interpreting رسول الله have been changed to ‘Messenger’ and the transliteration ‘Allah’ respectively. The preface included other Arabic words that they believe cannot be translated correctly into English and therefore decided to transliterate them with a brief explanatory note for each word at its first occurrence in the text (ibid, p. xii; for a list of Arabic words explained see p. xiii). The obvious thing about this revised edition is that the poems and introduction for each sūrah that appear in the edition of Shaikh Muhammad Ashraf are omitted. However, It should be noted that the King Fahd Complex for the Printing of the Holy Qur’an have decided recently to espouse and subsidise another translation of the meaning of the Holy Qur’an, namely the translation of al-Hilāli and Khān.

As for the editing and revision made by the latter institute, i.e. Amana Publications, they are very similar to that made by the former institute, i.e. the King Fahd Complex for the Printing of the Holy Qur’an. The name of the translator, however, is printed on the cover; the poems and introductions are left untouched. The revisions were made by several committees, and the last review was made by the International Institute of Islamic Thought (IIIT, an organisation based in the USA). According to IIIT, they revised both the content and form, but most of the substantial changes were made in the explanatory footnotes and appendices (for more details see Ali, 2001, pp. ix-x).

3.7.2 Muhammad Taqi-ad-Din al-Hilali and Muhammad Muhsin Khan (1417 H. [1996])

Muhammad Taqi-ad-Din al-Hilali (1894–1987) was a Moroccan-born scholar of Tunisian descent. Al-Hilali received his education in Morocco, Egypt, and Germany, where he gained his doctorate from Berlin University. He was interested in Arabic grammar and tajwīd as well as Hadith, and worked as professor of Islamic Faith and Teachings at the Islamic University in al-Madīnah al-Munawwarah, Saudi Arabia. Al-Hilali had a good command of both English and German (Darussalam Publications, n.d.). Muhammad Muhsin Khan (born in 1927 in Qasur, Punjab Province, Pakistan, of Afghan descent) gained his degree in Medicine and Surgery from the University of Punjab (Lahore, Pakistan) and worked at the University Hospital for a period of time. He then went to the UK where he obtained his Diploma of Chest Diseases from the University of Wales. Later, Khan moved to Saudi Arabia where he worked as the Director of El-Sadad Hospital for Chest Diseases in Ta’īf, and then as the Chief of the Department of Chest Diseases at King Fahad Hospital in al-Madīnah. Finally, Khan worked as Director of the Medical
According to Nassimi (2008, p. 83), Khan later went back to the UK where he settled.

The collaboration between the two scholars first began approximately in 1969, in Madinah, when al-Hilali assisted Khan by editing his translation of *Ṣaḥīḥ al-Bukhārī* (Nassimi, 2008). Later, they both decided to translate the meaning of the Qur’an based on the exegesis of Ibn Kathīr accompanied by notes from *Ṣaḥīḥ al-Bukhārī*. This translation entitled *Explanatory English translation of the meaning of the Holy Qur’an: a summarized version of ibn Kathīr supplemented by at-Ṭabarī with comments from Ṣaḥīḥ al-Bukhārī* was, as Nassimi (2008) claims, first published in Turkey in 1974 after being “examined by a group of experts consisting of Dr. M. Amin al-Misri, Professor Abdul Rahim, and Mohiuddin H. Azami” (ibid, p. 84: cf. Jassem, 2014). According to Jassem (2014), this edition was later published in the USA in 1994. Jassem adds that this earlier edition “was later removed from circulation” and substituted by the one published in Riyadh (Saudi Arabia) in 1994 by Darussalam Publications after several editions and reprints. Regardless of this issue, what is sure is that both scholars continued to revise and edit their latest translation which came out (Nassimi, 2008) in 1985, with two revised editions, a detailed edition in nine volumes and a summarised edition in one volume. The latter was printed under the title of *Interpretation of the meanings of the Noble Qur’an in the English language: a summarized version of al-Tabari, al-Qurtubi, and ibn Kathir with comments from Sahih al-Bukhari Summarized in One Volume* (ibid; cf. Jassem, 2014).

It appears that later al-Hilali and Khan’s translation gained the admiration of the King Fahd Complex for the Printing of the Holy Quran, which therefore decided to adopt and subsidise al-Hilali and Khan’s translation instead of Ali’s (Wild, 2015). Al-Hilali and Khan’s translation was revised by a panel of four PhD holders, Faḍl ʾIlāhī Ẓahīr, ʾAmīn ad-Dīn abū Bakr, Wajīh ʿAbd-ar-Raḥmān, and F. ʿAbd-ar-Raḥīm, appointed by the King Fahd Complex (al-Hilali & Khan, 1417 H. [1996], p. II). It was then published under the title of *The Noble Quran: English Translation of the Meanings and Commentary* (al-Hilali & Khan, 1417 H. [1996]) after gaining approval from the Saudi Presidency of Islamic Researches, IFTA, Call and Guidance (ibid, p. I). Jassem (2014, p. 238) believes that the changes made by the four PhD holders “were few and non-substantial”; hence, the main text is no different from the one published by Dar-us-Salam Publications.

Though this edition (as well as the previous editions) is considered one of the most widely disseminated translations of the meaning of the Qur’an throughout the English-speaking
world, it was criticised like Ali’s and other translations. That said, one should take into consideration the constructive criticisms and pay no attention to those that seem destructive, biased against a specific religious denomination, or which do not add significance to the field of translation studies. It is unfortunate that there are some who might criticise a translation to achieve a hidden agenda, or just because it does not comply with his/her ideology. Lance Hewson (2011, p. 2) notes the following:

Highly negative comments are not just the prerogative of reviewers. Scholars who address the issue of translation from a wide variety of perspectives are also prone to pouring scorn on the translator’s work when the published translation does not conform to the scholar’s own poetics.

An example of a destructive criticism can be seen in Stefan Wild’s (2015) article entitled *Muslim Translators and Translations of the Qur’an into English*. Wild notes that Ali’s translation, which was adopted and subsidised by the King Fahad Complex, was grievously criticised by, what he calls, “Saudi Salafi scholars” without giving an example or even naming one of the so-called scholars. Furthermore, Wild states that Abdullah Yusuf Ali is a ‘Bohra Shi’ite’ and that Shi’ites are very unwelcome in Saudi Arabia. If that was true, as he claims, then why did the King Fahad Complex adopt and subsidise Ali’s translation in the first place? Moreover, while Wild agrees with Khaleel Mohammed (2005) comments on Ali’s work of being “a polemic against Jews”, he, himself, later accuses al-Hilali and Khan’s translation of being anti-Semitic and anti-Christian. In his attempt to prove his view, he compares al-Hilali and Khan’s translation of [Q. 1:6-7] to Ali’s translation indicating that the latter translation did not mention anything about Jews or Christians whereas as the former did, totally forgetting his previous comments on Ali. Wild should recognise that al-Hilali and Khan’s interpretation were based on traditional exegetical literature, and most importantly during the exegetes’ epoch, denominational conflicts did not exist like nowadays. Overall, it seems that Wild’s criticism towards al-Hilali and Khan’s work may be one-track minded, and is based mainly on Khaleel Mohammed’s views. He did, however, mention one assessment by Kidwai (1987) and another by Ahmad Zaki Hammad, after describing them as ‘conservative Muslims’. The only remarks made by Kidwai (1987) on al-Hilali and Khan’s work, in his Survey of English translations of the Quran, is that he did not consider them as well as some other works as significant ventures in the field of Qur’anic translations.

At this point we have to aver that this study is not in favour of a specific translation. One cannot say that al-Hilali and Khan’s translation, or any other translation, is flawless, since
“[t]here is no such thing as perfect, ideal, or ‘correct’ translation” (Newmark, 1988, p. 6). The former Saudi Minister for Islamic Affairs, Endowments, Da’wah and Guidance, and the Supervisor General of the King Fahad Complex, Dr Abdullah al-Turki, elucidates in the foreword of al-Hilali and Khan’s translation the following:

We are aware of the fact that the translation of the meaning of the Glorious Qur’an, however accurate it may be, must fall short of conveying the meaning that the miraculous text of the original conveys; and that the meaning conveyed by translation is only the sum total of what the translator has understood from the text of the Glorious Book of Allah, and cannot escape the defects and drawbacks that are inherent in every human endeavour (al-Hilali & Khan, 1417 H. [1996], p. iii).

Furthermore, al-Turki clearly requests every reader to provide “the Complex with any mistakes, omission or addition that he [sic] may find” in al-Hilali and Khan’s translation so that they be removed in following editions (ibid.).

As for constructive criticism, this can be seen in the works of Jassem (2008; 2014). Jassem’s views on al-Hilali and Khan’s work are based on academic analysis. In 2008, Jassem analysed the use of discourse markers in al-Hilali and Khan’s translation, and in 2014, he conducted a linguistic, stylistic, and discourse analysis. He reached the conclusion that al-Hilali and Khan’s work is filled with grammatical, lexical, stylistic, and discourse errors. Jassem argues that the translators were too faithful in adhering to SL norms, linguistically and stylistically, to the detriment of the TL norms. Therefore, the translation, in Jassem’s view, is too literal, fiddly, and unlike the original text, significantly detracting from the joy of reading and comprehension. He draws attention to the necessity of revising and reconstructing the translation according to the TL structure and, at the same time, maintaining the intended meaning of the source text (for more details see Jassem, 2008; 2014).

3.7.3 Saheeh International (1997/2004):

Saheeh International is group of three women residing in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia. It comprises Umm Muhammad, Aminah Assami (believed to be the primary translator), Amatullah J. Bantley (the executive director of Dar Abul-Qasim Publishing House), and Mary M. Kennedy (an English editor). They were respectively born in southern California in 1940, Rochester, Minnesota in 1966, Orlando, Florida in 1965, and embraced Islam in 1974, 1986, and 1985 (Saheeh International, 2010). It looks like all three are well educated. Umm Muhammad attended a two years intensive Arabic course and a one-year
Arabic grammar course at Damascus University (Syria) as well as adopting a self-learning process in the field of Islamic studies, such as *tafsir* and *fiqh*. Umm Muhammad has been lecturing in *tafsir* and the basics of *fiqh* at an Islamic centre in Jeddah since 1991, and has authored and revised several Islamic books in English (ibid.). Bantley holds a degree in Business Management, while Kennedy holds a degree in English/Business Pre-Law major from Florida State University.

In an interview, Saheeh International point out that when they commenced their translation project, they had two main objectives. The first was to present meanings compatible with the creed of the people of the tradition of Muhammad and the consensus of the community of Muslims (عَقِيَّة أَهْلِ السَّنَةِ وَالْجَمَاعَة). The second objective, was to present a simple and clarified rendition, which was ‘as close as possible to the Arabic wording’ for the students’ interest (Abul-Majd, 2012)\(^{35}\). Their translation, which is entitled *The Qur’an: English Meanings*, is not based on any other translation as some may believe it to be\(^{36}\); in fact, they preferred to start from scratch avoiding personal interpretations and relying on authentic explanations and Hadiths by the most knowledgeable of the Companions and followers of the Prophet Muhammad (ibid). They believe that they tried their best to avoid errors made by other translators, such as placing Hadiths or explanations within the text, which could cause some confusion. Additionally, Saheeh International draw attention to the significance of using proper grammar and punctuation in presenting an accurate meaning.


---

\(^{35}\) Another Interview was made with the primary translator (Umm Muhammad) by Faraz Omar (2015), which is available at: https://www.muslimink.com/feb-2015/180-interview-umm-muhammad-saheeh-intl

\(^{36}\) A couple of people based in Copenhagen (Denmark) claim in their online Quran Project that Saheeh International have based their work on al-Hilali and Khan’s translation (available at: http://al-quran.info/pages/language/english). Also, Clay Chip Smith, an American who converted to Islam, includes in his notes on English Quran translations the same view. He does, however, state that Saheeh International’s rendition is attractive and useable. (available at: http://www.claychipsmith.com/English_Translations.htm).
3.7.4 Muhammad A. S. Abdel Haleem (2005):

Muhammad Abd-al-Wahhab Muhammad Saeed Abd-al-Ḥaleem, who is mostly known as Muhammad A. S. Abdel Haleem, was born in Egypt and received his education at al-Azhar (Egypt) and the University of Cambridge (U.K.). He is currently a professor of Islamic studies at the School of Oriental and African Studies (SOAS), director of the Centre of Islamic Studies, member of the Centre for Translation Studies (CTS) at the University of London, and a member of the editorial board of the Journal of Qur'anic Studies. Abdel Haleem’s interest in Qur’anic studies can be noticed through his several publications, such as Context and Internal Relationships: Keys to Qur'anic Exegesis (Abdel-Haleem, 1993), Understanding the Qur’an: Themes and Style (Abdel Haleem, 1999), and Arabic-English Dictionary of Qur’anic usage (Badawi & Abdel Haleem, 2008). It appears that Abdel Haleem’s interest in the Qur’an is not something new. It is believed that his father, Muhammad Saeed, who was one of al-Azhar scholars, had a great influence on him, and was the person who encouraged him to memorise the whole Qur’an from his early years.

In 1965, Abdel Haleem began his academic career teaching Arabic at the University of Cambridge, where he gained his PhD degree in Arabic literature. After two years, he moved to SOAS and began teaching Arabic literature. In the mid 80’s, Abdel Haleem decided to devote most of his time to Qur’anic studies. He contributed to establishing the Centre of Islamic Studies at SOAS in 1995, and the Journal of Qur’anic Studies in 1999. In 2004, Abdel Haleem published his translation of the Qur’an and another edition was published the following year with some corrections. In his introduction, Abdel Haleem proclaims that this translation is meant to go further than the previous translations “in accuracy, clarity, flow, and currency of language” (Abdel Haleem, 2005, p. xxix). He asserts that he tried to avoid the use of cryptic language or archaisms and opted to use contemporary language along with an easy style, so that every English speaker can comprehend the translation without difficulty (ibid.). An example of his use of contemporary language, compared to some other previous works, can be seen in his interpretation of the kināyah phrase ارتدوا على كحولهم in [Q. 47:25]. Abdel Haleem’s rendition is ‘those who turn on their heels’ (back translation: هولاء الذين يرون على كحولهم), while Saheeh International, al-Hilali and Khan, and Ali’s renditions are ‘those who reverted back [to disbelief]’ (back translation: هولاء الذين يعودون للخلف [نعدم الإيمان]), ‘those who have turned back (have apostated)’ (back translation: هولاء الذين يقلبون للخلف [ارتدوا عن دين أو عقيدة]), and ‘those who turn back as apostates’ (back translation:}
respectively. The phrase ‘spin/turn on one’s heel’ is a contemporary expression referring to a person who all of a sudden turns away from someone, especially in an angry or rude way. Therefore, Abdel Haleem’s choice is contemporary, and can be easily comprehended within the context unlike the other translations, where some had to include explanations between brackets to convey the meaning.

Abdel Haleem did not only chose contemporary language, but style too, i.e. paragraphing and punctuation. He states that “[i]n order to clarify the meaning and structure of thoughts and to meet the expectation of modern readers, the present translation divides the material into paragraphs” (ibid, p. xxxiv). He also points out the Qur’an has its own system of marking pauses, which is different from today’s conventional system of commas, full stops, colons and semicolons, question marks, dashes, quotation marks, and suchlike. Therefore, he decided to introduce today’s conventional system of punctuation to make the translation more comprehensible.

Abdel Haleem’s introduction, in general, includes useful information on the importance of context, identifying aspects of meaning, Arabic structure and idioms, and pronouns while interpreting the meaning of the Qur’anic discourse. It includes information on some of the methods and tools that he used in his translation. For example, the classical Arabic dictionaries and exegetes consulted in his translation were *Lisān al-ʿArab*, *al-Qamūs al-Muḥīṭ*, *Muʿjam al-Wasīṭ* (ibid, p. xxxiii) and ar-Rāzī, Abū Ḥayyān, and al-Bayaḍawī respectively (ibid, p. xxxv).

Abdel Haleem’s translation has been admired by several scholars and intellectuals. For instance, Shah (2010) notes that one of the features of Abdel Haleem’s work is the brevity he applied in his translation, both in the number of words used in the rendition and footnotes. Correspondingly, in her review on Abdel Haleem’s work, Kolkailah (2010) believes that his translation transcends previous translations’ flaws in clarity, accuracy, and contemporaneity of language. She argues that unlike previous translators, Abdel Haleem avoids using archaic language or direct and literal translations that hinder the reader’s comprehension. Therefore, Kolkailah surmises that the language used by Abdel Haleem in his work is possibly one of his utmost endeavours. In her view, Abdel Haleem was able to merge ‘authenticity with originality’ and convey the meaning of the Qur’an from what she calls ‘classical Islamic works’ in a comprehensible language. Kolkailah is also impressed by the way Abdel Haleem deals with the shifts in pronouns that sometimes
exist within an ʾāyah that cannot be translated into English. She points out that Abdel Haleem tends to clarify these pronouns by inserting “bracketed notes of who is being addressed”. Rippin (2004) too is impressed by Abdel Haleem’s translation and seems to concur with its devotees, particularly Abdel Haleem’s avoidance of archaic words, such as the King James’s English “thee” and “thou.”

Khaleel Mohammed (2005), in his assessment of some translations of the Qurʾan, is also impressed with Adel Haleem’s command of the English language, yet he expresses some criticism that can be seen as bizarre. For example, Mohammed disapproves of Adel Haleem’s approach in writing his introduction, particularly the contents included in the introduction. In Mohammed’s view, Adel Haleem’s introduction “reflects the old-age Muslim tradition”. Above all, Mohammed questions the authenticity of the Muslim stories mentioned in the introduction, and posits that Adel Haleem, who is a Professor of Islamic studies, was not conscious of “the haziness of early Islamic history”. He claims that Adel Haleem incorporated his doctrinal bias into his translation; while on the contrary, it looks as if Mohammed is the one who is incorporating his doctrinal bias in his assessment. It also appears that Mohammed is influenced by the revisionist theories of Patricia Crone and Michael Cook (1976), John Wansbrough (1978), Andrew Rippin (1988), Michael Cook (2000), and Christoph Luxenberg (2000), and insists on the importance of incorporating such theories in elucidating the Qurʾan. In addition, it seems that Mohammed misinterprets Fazlur Rahman’s argument regarding the meaning of the word نفس in the Qurʾan (see Mohammed, 2005 and Rahman, 1980, p. 12). To elaborate, Mohammed claims that the word نفس should be rendered as ‘self’ instead of ‘soul’. He wrongly disapproves of Adel Haleem’s translation of نفس and accuses him of rendering it as ‘soul’ throughout his work, which is untrue. For instance, Adel Haleem translates نفس in [Q. 4:1], [Q. 2:72] and [Q. 2:155] as ‘soul’, ‘someone’, and ‘lives’ respectively drawing on their different contexts. It is worth pointing out that the word ‘soul’ in English, according to some dictionaries like Oxford English Dictionary (OED) or Longman Dictionary of Contemporary English can mean a person. Likewise, Rahman (1980, p. 120) points out in his glossary that نفس not only means ‘self’ but also ‘person’.

Additionally, we would like to point out that, throughout his translation, Adel Haleem translates the Divine name ‘Allah’ as ‘God’, which may be satisfying to some, such as Mohammed (2005). Mohammed claims that it is a clever choice and wonders why many Muslims do not accept the word ‘God’ as a ‘functional rendition’. According to his judgement, this refusal has led to the misapprehension that Muslims worship a different
God than the Judeo-Christian creator. This may not be true; a quick look at some dictionaries, for instance, OED, Cambridge English Dictionary, or Merriam-Webster, will show that the word ‘Allah’ is the name of God used by Muslims and Arab Christians. If Mohammed’s judgement were true, the majority of dictionaries would refer to the word ‘Allah’ as the God of Muslims only, which is not the case. Accordingly, we believe that there is nothing wrong with transliterating the Arabic Divine name ﷽ as ‘Allah’, especially if we take into consideration that the aim of translating the Qur’an, in the first place, is for non-Arabic speakers to perceive and appreciate its meanings (for information on the Divine names of Allah and their translations see Gamard, 1996/2010; Amjad & Farahani, 2013; Hashemi, 2014; Al Ghamdi, 2015).

3.8 Comprehension, the Qur’an’s genre, translation, and Qur’anic exegeses

The term ‘genre’ is commonly used within the linguistic sphere “to refer to a distinctive type of text” (Baker, et al., 2006, p. 77). Within the field of TS, concerning the translation of the Qur’an, the phrase ‘genre of the Qur’an’ is also widely used. Muslims, in general, whether translators, scholars, linguists, scientists, or theologians strongly aver the Qur’an is inimitable and has its own unique genre (cf. Abdul-Raof, 2001; Saeed, 2008; Khan and Jabir, 2016). The reason behind this is simply that the Qur’an is not the production of humankind, but the words of the Almighty Allah, as shown in the āyahs mentioned earlier in this chapter.

Abdul-Raof (2001) asserts that Qur’anic discourse is full of linguistic and rhetorical devices that interlock with each other to form its unique and eloquent genre (cf. Khan and Jabir, 2016). These linguistic and rhetorical features, of which kināyah is one, are Qur’an-specific, which makes them difficult or probably impossible to render in another language. Saeed (2008, p. 128) clarifies “that even if it were possible to translate individual words into another language, other stylistic, linguistic and rhetorical features of the Qur’an which are essential to its meaning would be lost”. Therefore, Muslim scholars, such as ʿṭṭiyah Ṣaqr, former head of the Azhar Fatwa Committee of Egypt, explains that the “translations of the Qur’an can never be considered as a Qur’an in itself, in its rulings and sacredness”. He adds that no matter how great an effect a translation has on one, “it can never have the same grandiloquent effect and beauty of the Qur’an itself” nor does it “enjoy the same lofty standard of the original one; it does not bear the sense of miracles initiated by Allah Almighty” (ibid.). This view is also appreciated by some
non-Muslim scholars, such as Forster Fitzgerald Arbuthnot, a British translator and orientalist, who states “… that though several attempts have been made to produce a work equal to it as far as elegant writing is concerned, none has as yet succeeded” (cited in Risha, 2015). Arthur J. Arberry, a British orientalist and former Professor of Arabic at Oxford, mentioned in the preface to his translation of the meaning of the Qur’an that “the rhetoric and rhythm of the Arabic of the Koran are so characteristic, so powerful, so highly emotive, that any version whatsoever is bound in the nature of things to be but a poor copy of the glittering splendour of the original” (Arberry, 1955, p. 24). Last but not least, Jacobus Naudé states that “[m]uch of the majesty and aesthetic appeal of the Qur’ān resides in its sound. No existing translation in English reflects the language-dependent nature of the performance of the Qur’ān” (Naudé, 2006, p. 462; 2010, p. 291).

In the light of the above, translating the Qur’an into another language and, at the same time, maintaining its whole style of discourse, including its syntactic, phonetic/prosodic, rhetorical, and structural features is quite impossible, and no one has ever fulfilled the challenge presented in the Qur’an. Correspondingly, translating the meanings of the Qur’an and maintaining its whole style is quite impossible too. However, translating the meanings and sacrificing some stylistic features, or vice versa, seems quite possible, but daunting. That is to say, one must lay out his/her priorities according to the purpose of one’s translation. The interlock of context and purpose of translation have an impact on the translation process (cf. Dickins et al., 2002, p. 25), as it “will often rule out some strategies and favour others” (Baker, 2011, p. 18). To put it differently, a competent translator with proper knowledge of both the SL and the TL, in terms of their linguistic, rhetorical, and cultural features, should identify the type of ST, fully understand it, recognise its salient features, and then clarify the purpose of the whole translation (cf. Dickins et al., 2002). Once these procedures have been pinpointed, the translator can ascertain what to translate, what to sacrifice, and how, according to the purpose of the translation. However, the translator should always remember that languages are in general asymmetrical, i.e. there is no such thing as “a perfect match between languages” (Nida & Taber, 1969, p. 5). This asymmetry is what causes the translator to come upon situations in the source language text (SLT) that are untranslatable into the target language text (TLT) or can be translated but poorly, which in both cases are a loss in translation. Therefore, it is said that loss in translation is generally inevitable (ibid., p.21-25; cf. Adab, 1996, p. 32), let alone the translation of the inimitable language of the Qur’an (for further information on loss in translation of the Qur’an see As-Safi, 2006; Abdelwali, 2007;
Abdul-Raof, 2011). However, such situations of non-equivalence can be managed by several translation techniques or procedures to compensate or reduce the amount of loss (see Baker 2001, pp. 18-44; Dickins, et al., 2002, pp. 18-25). One of the common translation procedures in Qur’ān translations is using a loan word plus explanation as in the translation of the word ‘الظالم’ in [Q. 25:27] by Al-Hilālī and Khān (1996):

وَيَوْمَ يَعْضُكَ الظَّالِمُ عَلَيْ يَدْهُ [الفَرْقَانُ: 27]

(And the Day when the Zalim (wrongdoer, oppressor, polytheist, etc.) ...) [Q. 25:27].

Another common translation procedure that can be found in Qur’ānic translation is explanatory translation (also known as translation by exegesis or translation by paraphrase). This method is useful to clarify certain phrases in a ST phrase that holds two meaning at once, or is not lexicalized in the TL. The explanation may be presented within the text or in footnotes. For example, the phrase ‘َحَمَالَةَ الْخَلَب’ (lit. carrier of firewood) in [Q. 111:4], according to the exegetical literature, it can refer to its literal meaning, and it could be a kināyah for back-stabbing/slander. Al-Hilālī and Khān (1996) present their explanation of the phrase between brackets and within the text, while Abdel Haleem (2005) presents his explanation in a footnote. Abdul-Raof (2001, p. 140) notes that “[a] footnote or even an extended commentary can function as a torch that can penetrate the fog of both language and culture-specific religious words and concepts; by doing so, we can guarantee that at least some misconceptions diminish”.

The loss in translation cannot be managed without fully understanding the ST. In the case of Qur’ānic translation, understanding the context is of paramount importance. Von Denffer (1984) stresses that decoding the words of the Qur’ān is one of the essential steps to understand the message of the Qur’ān. There are two main methods to decode and understand the meanings of the Qur’ān: through the Qur’ān itself and through Prophetic Hadiths. The contribution of the Prophet Muhammad in the explanation and interpretation of the Qur’ān is clearly stated in [Q. 16:44], which says ﴿وَأَنْزَلْنَا إِلَيْكَ الْذِّكْرَ لِتَلْبِeenَ اللَّهِ مَا نُزِّلَ إِلَيْهِ﴾ “We have revealed to you the Qur’ān so that you can explain to people what was sent down for them” (Abdul-Raof, 2010, p. xv). In addition to the Qur’ān and the Prophetic Hadith, classical Arabic lexicons and specialised Qur’ānic dictionaries are of great assistance in understanding the Qur’ānic phrases. On this account, this study has decided to consult one of the pre-eminent classical Arabic lexicons, Lisān al-ᶜArab by Ibn Manẓūr (1980). This not only provides semantic details on a lexical level, but in some cases, it presents details on a figurative level. Another dictionary used in this study and

Despite the great assistance such dictionaries provide in understanding Qur’anic phrases, of paramount importance is the exegetical literature. If dictionaries are seen as the soulmates of a translator, then exegetical literature is the ultimate soulmate while translating the meaning of the Qur’an. The pre-eminence of the exegetical literature is because the majority of such literature, if not all, includes all the elements required to comprehend the Qur’an: intertextual references, i.e. ʾāyahs explaining other ʾāyahs, Prophetic Hadiths, linguistic and rhetorical explanations, and in some cases the circumstances of the revelations (*asbāb al-nuzūl*) are included. Abdul-Raof (2001; 2010) notes that there are three prominent schools of exegesis: the Meccan School, the Medinan School, and the Iraqi School, led by ʿAbd Allah bin ʿAbbās, Ubay bin Kaᶜb, and ʿAbd Allah bin Masʿūd respectively. Abdul-Raof (ibid.) also explains that the main categories of exegesis are linguistic, philosophical and rationalistic, historical, intertextual, jurisprudential, and independent judgemental. Since this study is related to the translation of *kināyah*, the concentration will be mainly on exegetes who shed light on the semantic and rhetorical features of the Qur’anic discourse. This study will consult the following exegetical literature:

2- *Tafsīr at-Ṭabarī* (2001): Muḥammad bin Jarīr at-Ṭabarī (224 H. – 310 H.) is one of the eminent exegetes and the author of *Jāmiʿ al-Bayān ‘an Taʿwīl ʿāyi al-Qurʾān*. In his explanations, at-Ṭabarī tends to focus on the semantic features together with the shades of meaning of the words and structures of the Qur’an via “linguistic and syntactic analyses with heavy reference to classical poetry and grammarians’ views” (Abdul-Raof, 2001, p. 176).

3- *Tafsīr ar-Rāzī* (1981): Muḥammad ar-Rāzī (544 H. – 606 H.) also known as Fakhr al-Dīn ar-Rāzī (503 H. - 606 H.), a theologian, philosopher and the author of the well-known exegesis *Mafātīh al-Ghayb*, also known as *Tafsīr al-Kabīr*. Ar-Rāzī’s exegesis falls under the type of exegesis known as philosophical and rationalistic exegesis, that is “concerned with explaining and refuting philosophers’ views and arguments” (ibid.). Nevertheless, his exegesis sheds light on several rhetorical features of the Qur’an. He was interested in showing the elegance of style and composition in the Qur’an. Ar-Rāzī was influenced by al-Jurjānī’s theory of Qur’anic composition and this is reflected in his exegesis (al-Khāldī, 2008, pp. 483-484). One of the many books he wrote is *Nihāyat al-Ījāz fi Dirāyat al-Iᶜjāz* (ar-Rāzī, 2004) on Arabic rhetoric and its relation with the inimitability of the Qur’an. As a theologian and philosopher, ar-Rāzī was interested in several fields, such as Islamic Jurisprudence, Qur’anic exegesis, science of discourse (*ᶜilm al-kalām*), and Arabic rhetoric (adh-Dhahabī, 2012a, p. 253).

4- *Tafsīr Abū Ḥayyān* (1993): Muḥammad bin Yūsuf bin Ḥayyān (654 H. – 745 H.), also known as abū Ḥayyān al-Gharnāṭī/al-ʾAndalusī, was a notable linguist and the author of *al-Baḥr al-Muḥīṭ*. In his exegesis, Abū Ḥayyān provides a comprehensive syntactic and semantic explanation of Qur’anic structures and words. An-Najdī (1412 H., p. 38) argues that abū Ḥayyān expatiated on syntactic, morphological, and grammatical explanation of the Qur’anic structure to such an extent that his book seems as if it were a book of syntax rather than a Qur’anic exegesis. Nonetheless, abū Ḥayyān does not neglect jurisprudential matters and rhetorical aspects of the Qur’an (ibid.; Mārdīnī, 2009, p. 90). Moreover, he explains the different views of exegetes on these matters. He makes his exegetical approach clear to the reader in his preface (see Āl Jaʿfar & al-Sarḥān, 1980, p. 130; Abū Ḥayyān, 1993, pp. 99-101; al-Khāldī, 2008, pp. 443-446; adh-Dhahabī, 2012a, pp. 272-274).
5- **Tafsīr al-Qurṭubī** (2006): Muḥammad bin Aḥmad al-Ansārī, also known as abū ʿAbd-Allah Muḥammad al- al-Qurṭubī (d. 671 H.). His twenty-volume exegesis on the Qur’an is called al-Jāmiʿu li ’Aḥkāmi al-Qurʾān, wa al-Mubayyinu limā Taḍammanahu min al-Sunnati Wa āyi al-Furqān (al-Qurṭubī, 2006). Al-Qurṭubī’s work is considered a comprehensively detailed exegesis that concentrates mainly on jurisprudential issues with reference to Hadith and explicates the different views of other exegetes and theologians on these matters. However, his exegesis includes semantic/syntactic matters with some reference to classical poetry (an-Najdī, 1412 H., p. 25; adh-Dhahabī, 2012b, p. 402).


7- **Tafsīr ash-Shawkānī** (2007): Muḥammad bin ʿAli bin ʿAbd-Allah ash-Shawkānī (1173 H. – 1250 H.). From the title of his commentary on the Qur’an, Fath al-Qadīr, al-Jāmiʿu bayna al-Riūyah wa ad-Dirāyah min ʿilm at-Tafsīr, ash-Shawkānī combines two methods of Qur’anic exegesis, ar-riwāyah and ad-dirāyah. The former is the act of explaining the Qur’an through traditional sources. Thus, it involves explaining the Qur’an through other parts of the Quran, Prophetic Hadith, or the sayings of the Companions. The latter is what is known as ijtihād (use of reason and mind) based on the aforementioned traditional sources to form an opinion-oriented exegesis (see ʿAwaḍ, 2010, p. 209). Though the greater portion of ash-Shawkānī’s exegesis is on jurisprudential matters, it also takes interest in linguistic matters with reference to classical poetry (al-Najdī, 1412 H., p. 53; cf. Mārdīnī, 2009, p. 107; adh-Dhahabī, 2012b, pp. 250-252).

8- **Tafsīr al-Alūsī** (1994): Maḥmūd bin ʿAbd-Allah al-Alūsī, also known as Shihāb-ad-dīn al-Alūsī (1217 H. – 1270 H.) Al-Alūsī’s exegesis entitled Rūḥ al-Maʿānī fī Tafsīr al-Qurʾān al-ʾAḍām wa as-Sabʿ al-Mathānī combines a summary of a number of previous exegetes, such as az-Zamakhsharī, ar-Rāzī, abū Ḥayyān, al-Bayḍāwī, ibn ʿAṭīyah, and abī as-Saʿūd (al-Khāldī, 2008, p. 460; Mārdīnī, 2009, pp. 96-97; adh-Dhahabī, 2012a, pp. 303-304). He does not entirely rely on these
exegetes, but also provides his personal views, especially when he disagrees with them (ibid.). Abdul-Raof (2001, p. 178) believes that al-Alūsī’s exegesis “is a mixture of a linguistic, intertextual, and jurisprudence type of exegesis, and it offers “a thorough syntactic account of Qur'anic structures with ample reference to classical poetry and proverbs” (cf. al-Najdī, 1412 H., p. 57-58).


11- **Tafsīr as-Ṣābūnī** (1981): Muḥammad bin ʿAlī as-Šābūnī, is a contemporary Qur’anic scholar and exegete. He is the author of several theological books, one of which is his commentary on the meaning of the Qur’an entitled Ṣafwat at-Tafāsīr. Though his exegesis is based on various previous exegetes, such as az-Zamakhsharī, at-Ṭabarī, ibn Kathīr, al-Alūsī, abū Ḥayyān, and others, his explanation of the meaning of the Qur’an is simplified and presented in a comprehensible manner. As-Šābūnī points out that one of his methods in explaining the meaning of the Qur’an is by highlighting the linguistic and rhetorical aspects (as-Šābūnī, 1981, p. 20). As-Šābūnī also wrote another book,
Al-ʾIbdāᶜu al-Bayānī fī al-Qurʾānī al-ʾAdīm (2009), devoted exclusively to the discussion on the rhetorical features of the Qurʾān.

12- *Tafsīr Riḍā* (1947): Muḥammad Rashīd bin ʿAlī Riḍā bin Muḥammad Shams- addīn al-Qalmūnī al-Ḥusaynī, known as Muḥammad Rashīd Riḍā (1282 H./1865 A. D. – 1354 H. – 1935 A.D.), is one of the well-known modern exegetes. Riḍā studied the Qurʾān under his mentor Sheikh Muḥammad ʿAbduh and then wrote his Qurʾānic exegesis, *Tafsīr al-Qurʾān al-Hakīm*, also known as *Tafsīr al-Manār*. Though Riḍā studied the Qurʾān under his mentor, he admits after the death of his mentor he took a different approach in explaining the Qurʾān. Riḍā adds that he began to rely more on the authentic Sunna while explaining an ʾāyah in terms of jurisprudential matters or linguistic structures (ar-Rūmī, 1983, p. 176). Riḍā’s exegesis is not an extensively detailed exegesis in terms of linguistic matters; however, he reveals the meanings of the ʾāyahs in a simple and comprehensible manner (an-Najdī, 1412 H., p. 64) by shedding light on some of the rhetorical aspects. Riḍā did not have the chance to complete his exegesis; [Q. 12:101] was the last ʾāyah he explained before he died.


14- *Tafsīr ath-Thāclabī* (2002): Ṭāḥṣib bin Muḥammad bin Ibrāhīm an- Nayṣābūrī ath-Thāclabī, also known as ṭāḥṣib Ḥṣāq ath-Thāclabī (d. 427 H.). It is believed that al-Thāclabī, the Islamic scholar and the author of the well-known Qurʾānic exegesis entitled *al-Kashf wa al-Bayān*, was the greatest exegete of his time (Al-Thaʿlabī, 2002, p. 5; adh-Dhahabī, 2012a, p. 197). In his introduction, al-Thaʿlabī explains that his work is based on the works of several well-known Islamic scholars, such as the exegeses of ibn ʿAbbās, Ḥikamah, al-Kalbī, Mujāhid, and the lexicons of al-Farrāʾ, al-Kisāʾī, az-Zajjāj, and other scholarly works (ath-Thaʿlabī, 2002, pp. 75-85). In his exegesis, ath-Thaʿlabī provides thorough details on jurisprudential issues with reference to Hadith, and on syntactic, semantic, and morphological issues with reference to classical poetry (ibid., p. 9; adh-Dhahabī, 2012a, p. 200).

-102-
15- *Tafsīr ibn Kathīr* (2000): Ismāʾīl bin ʿUmar bin Kathīr al-Basnawīyy al-Qurashī ash-Shāfīʿī (700 H. – 774 H.), known as Shihāb-adding abū al-Fidāʾ ibn Kathīr, is one of the pre-eminent Islamic scholars and exegetes. His work *Tafsīr al-Qurʾān al-ʿAzīm* is so widely accepted that several scholars have studied it and summarised it, for example, *Mukhtaṣar ibn Kathīr* by as-Ṣābūnī, *ʿUmdat at-Tafsīr* by Aḥmad Shākir, and *Taysīr al-ʿAliyy al-Qadīr li Ikhtisār Tafsīr ibn Kathīr* by Muḥammad ar-Rifāʿī. His method in explaining the meaning of the Qurʾān is through the traditional Sunni approach by referring to other parts of the Qurʾān, the Hadith, the sayings of the Companions, and the sayings of the Tābiʿūn (the generation of Muslims who were born after the passing of the Prophet but who were contemporaries of the Companions) (Maḥmūd, 2000, p. 223; Mārdīnī, 2009, p. 71). Ibn Kathīr’s exegesis provides simplified but detailed exegesis on jurisprudential matters, and rarely sheds light upon syntax or provides reference to classical poetry (Abdul-Raof, 2001, p. 177; an-Najdī, 1412 H., p. 40). However, there are a very few cases where ibn Kathīr sheds light on some rhetorical issues, including figures of speech.


17- *Tafsīr Ṭanṭāwī* (1992): Muḥammad Sayyid Ṭanṭāwī (28 October 1928 – 10 March 2010) is an Islamic scholar and one of the most recent exegetes; his exegesis is *at-Tafsīr al-Wasīṭ lil Qurʾān al-Karīm*. Ṭanṭāwī had a doctorate of philosophy in Hadith and Qurʾanic exegesis and was the Grand Mufti of Egypt and the Grand Imam of al-Azhar Mosque. In his exegesis, Ṭanṭāwī follows the traditional Sunni approach in explaining the Qurʾān. In addition, Ṭanṭāwī provides a thorough semantic analysis and highlights the rhetorical features of the Qurʾān. Ṭanṭāwī’s exegesis also provides some details about jurisprudential issues (cf. Ṭanṭāwī, 1992, p. 10).
3.9 Kināyah and Qur’an

Arabic scholars, particularly in the rhetorical field, assert that kināyah is one of the most eloquent and elegant rhetorical and stylistic instruments used in the Qur’an (cf. Shaykhūn, 1978; ʿAtīq, ʿAbd-al-ʿAzīz, 1980; al-Qatān, 1993; Lāshīn, ʿAbd-al-Fattāḥ, 1998; as-Suyūṭī, 1426 H.; ʿAṭīyah, 2004; Qaṣṣāb, 2012). One of the main distinctive features of a kināyah expression, apart from conveying a specific meaning implicitly, is the ability to depict the meaning intended eloquently through an expression which not only alludes to the intended meaning but substantiates or attests this meaning. Furthermore, the rhetorical image portrayed by the kināyah enables the recipient to imagine and comprehend the intended meaning expressively and clearly.

Let us take for instance the expression حمالة الحطب (firewood carrier) as in [Q. 111:4]. This expression, according to (al-Qatān, 1993, p. 208) and several exegetical works, refers to the person who spreads rumours or makes defamatory remarks about people in order to cause feuding and enmity amongst others (cf. al-Jurjānī, 1908, p. 8; al-Jurjānī, 2003, p. 54). The expression provides the recipient with an image of a person who carries firewood in the intent to inflame hatred between people, since the flames of fire are known to spread rapidly and destroy everything in its path. The fate of such a person will eventually be as fuel for Hell, that is to say, they will go to Hell. There is, however, another exegetical version which suggests that the wife of Abu Lahab used in fact to throw bunches of firewood-thorns into the path of the Prophet [PBUH] in order to harm him, and for that and other reasons she will be punished by being sent to Hell.

Some Kināyah expressions even depict certain meanings through corporeal gestures which normally accompany a specific psychological state. For example, غصن اليد (biting one’s own hand) in [Q. 25:27] and تصغير الخد (bending/turning one’s own cheek away from others) in [Q. 31:18] refer to a person who is filled with remorse and a person who is arrogant respectively (for more details on these expressions see kināyah 9/29 in chapters five and six). These physical gestures are typical reactions that normally come from a person who is remorseful or arrogant. Not only do such expressions or descriptions guide the recipient to the intended meaning, but they aesthetically substantiate and attest the meaning intended and simultaneously appeal to the senses.

Another example of a kināyah expression employed in the Qur’an is the word القارعة (the thundering strike [referring to the Day of Resurrection]) in [Q. 101:1-3]. ʿAṭīq suggests that القارعة is one of the kināyah expressions that amplifies the meaning and stimulates the
mind of the recipient and evokes their fear of the Day of Resurrection. He adds that the Qur’aṇ
does not only refer to the Day of Resurrection, but it substantiates this sense by depicting
one of its traits so that the recipient could imagine how intense that Day is (1980, pp. 224-
225).

Apart from an aesthetic purpose, Kināyah like other figures of speech, is used in the
Qur’an to appeal to the senses and deliver the intended meaning in a rhetorical manner.
One of the most common purposes or functions of kināyah in the Qur’an is euphemism.
‘Atīq (1980, p. 226) and al-Qaṭān (1993, p. 209) argue that out of all the figures of speech
kināyah is the most convenient, if not the only, trope to express taboo expressions.
Unpleasant, socially unaccepted, or impolite words/acts are mainly expressed in the
Qur’an through kināyah expressions (see Shaykhūn, 1978, pp. 101-107). Besides, the
purpose of euphemism, kināyah in the Qur’an has other purposes that are no less
important than euphemism (see the purposes of kināyah in the previous chapter; cf.
Qaṣṣāb, 2012, pp. 248-257)

3.10 Kināyah and translation studies

Regrettably, kināyah has not received as much attention in the realm of TS as much as its
fellow tropes, metaphor in particular. As far as Arabic-English translations are concerned,
there are insufficient works that focuses on the translation of kināyah. To our knowledge,
there are only a handful of such works, such as Al-Hajjaj (2004), Bani Khalid (2010),
Shehabat (2010), Al-Barakati (2013; 2014), and Muhammad (2017), and they all refer to
kināyah in their disquisitions as metonymy. This naming error is common amongst
scholars. For example, Abdul-Raof uses the word ‘metonymy’ for kināyah (2001) but
refers to majāz mursal as ‘hypallage’ (2006), though the forms of his hypallage and their
semantic relationships he presents are all similar to the English tropes, metonymy and
synecdoche (see ibid, p. 225; cf. Mahdi, 2009). Some other scholars interestingly use the
term ‘metonymy’ to cover both kināyah and majāz al-mursal as if the two Arabic figures
of speech are the same, or as if the English metonymy covers all the features of the two
Arabic tropes. For instance, in her study on translating majāz mursal from the Qur’an into
English, Al-Salem confusingly uses the word ‘metonymy’ for both kināyah and majāz
mursal despite her knowledge of the differences between the two:

The phenomenon labeled “metonymy” covers a wide range of categories.
However, the data extracted will be representative of only the ten types …
These do not include logical metonymies, complex metonymies, or cases of
metonymy where the literal meaning can be true (called as kinaayahs [sic] in Arabic) (2008, pp. 8-9)

One main difference between what is commonly known as “metonymy” and its Arabic correspondent المجاز المرسل is that the latter does not include cases where the literal meaning is not true. These are considered as belonging to another trope termed الكناية. As-Sakkaakiy … took concern to distinguish between metonymy and kinaayah. In the latter, the original meaning of the words is not against the facts of reality … In other words, in kinaayah [sic], both the literal and figurative meanings are true, whereas in metonymy, only the figurative meaning is true. In the Western literature on metonymy, such a distinction is not made and the corresponding examples of kinaayah are considered as clear-cut metonymies (ibid, pp. 45-46).

Others even address kināyah as metaphor, as Ali (2012) did in his article, ‘Ishkālāt Tarjamat Mafhūm al-Kināyah fi ʾĀyāt al-Qurʼān ʾilā lughati al-mallāwiyah: Dirāsah Tahliiliyah, published in what is claimed to be a periodical peer-reviewed journal. However, since there is no exact equivalent term for kināyah in English, naming it metonymy may not be that of an issue as long as one recognises: (1) the differences between kināyah and metonymy in terms of their distinctive features and functions, (2) the differences between kināyah and its fellow Arabic tropes, specifically majāz al-mursal, (3) kināyah stands alone as an independent figure of speech (4) majāz al-mursal is the closest equivalent Arabic figure of speech to metonymy and synecdoche rather than kināyah. The only concern is that Western recipients who are not conversant with Arabic figures of speech may get confused or misled. Another concerning matter is this would mislead others who are interested in the translation of kināyah to rely only on/compare with theories specified for metonymy.

Probably the only scholar who does not refer to kināyah as metonymy is Abu Libdeh (1991). As a matter of fact, his study (1991), A Discourse Perspective on Figurative Expression in Literary Works with Reference to English/Arabic Translation, does not focus entirely on kināyah, nor is it related to the translation of the Qur’an, as its title specifies. Nevertheless, throughout his discussion on figures of speech, Abu Libdeh refers to metaphor proper, simile, metonymy, and analogy as istīārah, tashbīh, al-majāz al-mursal, and tamthīl respectively and vice versa (ibid, p. 11). With regard to synecdoche, Abu Libdeh discusses this trope under the section entitled ‘(Al-Majāz al-Mursal) Metonymy’ as if the two are the same (ibid, pp. 38-39). Quite possibly, like several Western scholars, he believes that synecdoche is part of metonymy, especially given that they both are based on similar types of semantic relationships (relations of similarity and
contiguity), which is fairly reasonable. As far as *kināyah* is concerned, he writes it down as it is pronounced in Arabic, i.e. through transliteration, without providing an English equivalent figure of speech for it (ibid, p. 42-46). This clearly indicates that Abu Libdeh realises that *kināyah* has no equivalent term, word, or figure of speech in English. He argues that *kināyah* is “half literal, half figurative” (ibid, p. 49) and sees it as “a rather ‘fluid’ figure that belongs to neither [al-Majāz al-Lughawī nor al-Majāz al-ʿAqlī] but which is not less interesting” (ibid.). Additionally, He posits that between the figures of speech, “*kināyah* is the most deeply culture-based” trope. Abu Libdeh provides a full description of *kināyah*, which demonstrates that he has a thorough grasp of the trope:

Kināyah is a FOS [figure of speech] based on the same mechanism as metaphor, analogy, etc. in that it evokes a series of associations between two entities where A presents the reality of B. It also derives its logic from the meaning of the speaker rather than the meaning of the sentence. However, in kināyah the latter is invariably literally true, though insignificant. This insignificance creates some sort of irrelevance (when it is interpreted against its context) pushing the audience to burrow for some relation between the two layers of meaning: the meaning of the sentence and the meaning of the speaker. This relation is one of entailment, with the second being a (malzūm) corollary of the first, which is, in its own right, (lāzīm) factual and can be intended. Thus kināyah is a FOS based on a “smoother” kind of transference and which has one foot in (Ḥaqīqa) literal language and another in (majāzi) figurative language. For this reason the ES [enunciating speaker] has the status of someone who claims something and provides the evidence for its substantiation (ibid, pp. 43-440).

One of the substantial works that is related to the translation of Qur’anic *kināyah* expressions is that of Al-Barakati (2013; 2014). His study, however, only focuses on a specific part of one of the *kināyah* functions, which is euphemism, specifically sex-related euphemisms. Al-Barakati agrees with ʿAtīq (1980) and al-Qatān (1993) that euphemism in the Qur’an is expressed through *kināyah*, and concurs with Abu Libdeh that *kināyah* is culture-based:

For the Qur’an never elaborates explicitly on what are considered to be distasteful themes such as sexual matters and body effluvia, but rather employs a number of linguistic tools such as *kināyah* and *taʿrīḍ* which fulfil euphemistic functions. These are very culture-and language-specific, and their transfer to English inevitably poses a special difficulty for translators (2013, p. 1).
Also, in a roughly similar manner to Abu Libdeh, Al-Barakati refers to *kināyah* through transliteration in most parts of his study. However, in some other parts he refers to *kināyah* as metonymy (see ibid, pp. 21/23-26; 2014, pp. 148-149). Furthermore, surprisingly, he refers to *majāz* as metaphor rather than ‘figurative language’ or ‘figure of speech’ (2013). This clearly suggests that, unlike Abu Libdeh, Al-Barakati to some extent fails to distinguish *kināyah* from other different English tropes and overlooks the fact that it has no equivalent figure of speech in English. Perhaps the reason for this oversight is due to the lack of comparison between the features of the Arabic figures of speech on the one hand and between their equivalents in English on the other hand. Another reason could possibly be that Al-Barakati looks at euphemism from the English perspective where the euphemistic function is not specific to a particular figure of speech, unlike the Arabic, particularly in the Qur’an, where euphemism is mainly expressed through *kināyah*. Nonetheless, this does not by any means undermine the significance of Al-Barakati’s works. They remain a notable and fruitful pieces of work particularly for Qur’anic TS.

From a communicative, pragmatic and functional perspective, Al-Barakati succeeds in examining and evaluating the translations of twenty-nine Qur’anic sex-related euphemisms into English. He determines that the predominant procedure used in rendering these euphemistic expressions is literality (2013, pp. 198-199). According to Al-Barakati, “literality worked efficiently in fulfilling the euphemistic effect in the translations which could be attributed to the fact that euphemisms are often created by procedures such as generalisation which is lexical-based” (ibid, p. 199). He adds that a literal translation is the most appropriate procedure to adopt, in terms of functionality, when the expressions in the two languages “share similar meaning senses” (2014, p. 149).

Al-Barakati concludes that when some translators fail to comprehend the SL message they tend to convey the meaning of the SL expression semantically without preserving the euphemistic function (ibid, cf. 2013).

Another interesting disquisition is that of Al-Hajjaj (2004). His discussion of the translation of *kināyah* may seem generic, since his analysis of the *kināyah* expressions are extracted from Qur’anic, Prophetical and poetic texts. Nonetheless, in his attempt to search for effective procedures and strategies to employ in the translation of *kināyah*, Al-Hajjaj provides some noticeable insights. He concludes that the treatment of *kināyah* by Arab rhetoricians involves a semantic-oriented approach. That is to say, they focus on the semantic relationship between the literal and figurative meanings of the *kināyah*. He also believes the treatment of metonymy by English rhetoricians “is inflicted with many
drawbacks especially in its underlying theoretical framework” (ibid, p. 100). Hence, he asserts that now and then people are not able to distinguish “between metonymy, metaphor proper, and synecdoche in western rhetoric”. Conversely, he posits that the theoretical framework employed by Arab rhetoricians to differentiate between different types of figurative expressions is more adequate than the one employed by English rhetoricians. Moreover, Al-Hajjaj maintains that culture-specific kināyah expressions are difficult to translate and believes it is inevitable that some kind of semantic loss will occur. Regarding the translation of Qur’anic kināyah expressions, he declares that “readers can very easily feel that the spirit of the original is scarified or that the translation is full of inadequacies” (ibid.).

The sacrifice of this spirit or the ability not to maintain one of the kināyah functions, i.e. purposes of use, such as euphemism, in translation is possibly due to the fact that some translators are interested in conveying the exact message rather than style. In his examination of two Qur’anic translations, Muhammad believes that in most cases the translators were able to maintain lexical, semantic, and grammatical equivalences, “but without fully conveying the metonymic function produced by the formal structure of the SL (2017, p. 87). He asserts that this is mainly due the unique features that some of the Arabic expression have as well as to linguistic limitations of English (ibid.) Muhammad concludes that adopting ‘an exegesis-like translation style’ could solve some of the problematic issues related to the translation of kināyah, but it would come at “the expense of the metonymic effect and eloquence as provided by the SL” (2017, p. 87).
Chapter four: The concept of equivalence in translation

4.1 Introduction

Translation in general is not as easy a task as it may seem, especially when it includes translating from one language to another that belong to different and distant language families, such as Arabic and English. The differences are not confined to one factor, such as sentence structure, but involve also other factors, such as social, historical, and cultural that have a great impact on shaping our language. Bickley, et al. (2014) posit that “[L]anguage and culture are deeply connected, in that culture shapes language use and language conveys cultural meanings”. The translation task becomes even harder when it involves translating the Holy Qur’an as it is full of linguistic and figurative expressions that are considered culture-specific and may be difficult to render into the TL or are even probably untranslatable due to non-equivalence or lack of equivalence (cf. Abdul-Raof, 2001). Therefore, translators of the Qur’an should pay a great deal of attention to such expressions and aim for the intended meaning of the ST rather than merely finding the equivalent of a single word/phrase. In other words, a translator should try to make sure that their translations are semantically equivalent to that of the ST, namely in terms of conveying the same meaning/message.

This chapter will discuss and review the concept of equivalence in the realm of TS and how various translation theories conceive and approach this concept. However, it will not be possible to touch upon every theory of equivalence due to the profuse theories. Therefore, this chapter will try to cast light on the theories or approaches of the most prominent and innovative scholars in TS, such as Vinay and Darbelnet, Jakobson, Nida, Newmark, and Baker. This chapter will also pay specific attention to the theories of the John Beekman and John Callow (1974) and Mildred Larson (1998). Their theoretical aspects will contribute to facilitating and forming the foundation of an eclectic approach to be followed in this study concerning the translation of kināyah expressions. We would like emphasise that this study is concerned with the translation of the kināyah on the lexical (word/phrasal) and semantic level, i.e. on the micro-level, not the overall text where the expression is located.

4.2 Introduction to equivalence

According to Windle and Pym (2011, p. 16) and probably most translation scholars, the term ‘equivalence’ in relation to translation was first introduced by the works of Vinay
and Darbelnet (1958/1995) ‘Stylistique Comparée du Français et de l'Anglais’ (Comparative Stylistics of French and English). For others like Wolfram Wilss (1977), the roots of this relationship go back to ancient times (cited in Leal, 2012), perhaps way back to the days of Cicero and his translation principle, which was ‘sense-for-sense’ instead of ‘word-for-word’, a principle that the famous Bible translator St. Jerome believed in and employed in his translations. Cicero’s words concerning his translation of Demosthenes were as follows:

I translate the ideas, their forms, or as one might say, their shapes; however, I translate them into a language that is in tune with our conventions of usage. Therefore, I did not have to make a word-for-word translation but rather a translation that reflects the general stylistic features and the meaning of foreign words (quoted in Kregor, 2010, p. 13; Calaway, 2016, p. 261; cf. Long, 2007, p. 69; Munday, 2014 , pp. 71-72).

Irrespective of the date or time the concept began, what is for sure is that the concept of equivalence has become a debatable and controversial issue in TS over the past fifty eight years, namely after Roman Jakobson’s 1959 seminal essay ‘On Linguistic Aspects of Translation’. According to Mary Snell-Hornby (1988/1995, pp. 18-19), it was Jakobson’s “enigmatic statement”, which is: “[e]quivalence in difference is the cardinal problem of language and the pivotal concern of linguistics. Like any receiver of verbal messages, the linguist acts as their interpreter” (my italics) that unleashed the heated debate over the concept of equivalence. What is also for sure is that equivalence as a concept has been exhaustively discussed in TS. Peter Fawcett states that the amount of work written on this concept “has probably cost the lives of more trees than any other in translation studies” (1997, p. 53). Andrew Chesterman (1997, p. 9) too comments on the copious amount of discussions over equivalence and sees it as “the big bugbear of translation theory, more argued about than any other single idea”. So what is equivalence in TS? There is no one definition for the concept of equivalence that all theorists or scholars in TS can agree on. It is as Wilss describes it, “a vague, hard-to-define concept” (1996, p. 3). Nord also seems to agree with Wilss’ description when she posits that it “is one of the most ambiguous concepts in translation studies, and consequently has been interpreted in very different ways” (2005, p. 25). The term itself has also been referred to at times as ‘correspondence’ and at other times as ‘accuracy’, ‘adequacy’, or ‘fidelity’ (cf. Wilss, 1996, pp. 3-4). This ambiguity is probably due to the number of translation schools and theoretical backgrounds, since TS is a discipline (or interdiscipline) that borrows much from other academic disciplines, such as linguistics, literature, and even computer science. However,
‘equivalence’ as a common term in TS that can be defined generally as a “term used by many writers to describe the nature and the extent of the relationships which exist between SL and TL texts or smaller linguistic units” (Shuttleworth & Cowie, 1997, p. 49). It is a relationship that many theorists or scholars base their translation theories on and perhaps also their definitions of translation, such as Nida and Taber (cf. 1969/1982, p. 12) and Catford (cf. 1965, p. 20), regardless of the type or nature of equivalence. That said, not every translation scholar or theorist believes in the importance of equivalence in translation theory or practice. For example, Snell-Hornby scathingly notes that “equivalence is unsuitable as a basic concept in translation theory”. She adds that the term itself is “imprecise and ill-defined” and “presents an illusion of symmetry between languages which hardly exists beyond the level of vague approximations and which distorts the basic problems of translation” (1988/1995, p. 22). Baker and Zijian (2004) assume that much of the criticism or the rejection of the concept of equivalence began because equivalence was mostly dealt with as a ‘semantic category’; a category which they see as ‘static’. They do, however, point out that this criticism continued even with the emergence of various approaches which do not confine the concept of equivalence to the meaning of the content but extend it to include other aspects, such as equivalence of response (effect) or equivalence of functions and suchlike. Therefore, it seems the debate over equivalence will most likely continue no matter how the concept of equivalence is approached or whatever translation theory emerges.

4.2.1 Vinay and Darbelnet’s concept of equivalence

Based on a comparative discussion of French and English, Vinay and Darbelnet proposed two methods or strategies of translation along with seven procedures that can be employed in rendering from one language to another after carrying out specific analytical steps (for the initial analytical steps see Vinay & Darbelnet, 1995, p. 30; Munday, 2016, p. 94). The two main methods are called direct and oblique translation; the former is what some refer to as literal translation and the latter as free translation. The two methods include seven procedures, or as Pym (2014, p. 12) likes to call them ‘translation solutions’. The first three translation procedures, which are covered by direct translation method, are borrowing, calque, and literal translation. The other four procedures are covered by oblique translation, and they are transposition, modulation, equivalence and adaptation.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Direct Procedures</th>
<th>Oblique Procedures</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>1</strong></td>
<td><strong>4</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Borrowing</strong> (Loan)</td>
<td><strong>Transposition</strong> (Shift in grammatical categories)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A word or expression is transferred directly from the SL into the TL, in its form and meaning. This procedure is normally used when the TL has no equivalent word/expression for that in the SL. For example the words or expressions <em>Hajj</em> and <em>kiblah/qiblah</em>, and <em>Eid al-Fitr/Eid al-Adha</em>. Vinay and Darbelnet (1995, p. 32) posit that this procedure is useful when a translator would like to add some flavour or elements of the SL culture or style into the TT. For example, the words ‘falafel’, ‘hummus’, and ‘kebab’.</td>
<td>A translation process that involves changing the form/class of the SL word into another form/class in the TL but without changing the meaning of the SL message. For example, a SL a noun becomes an adjective in the TL. Though Vinay and Darbelnet note that transposition is sometimes obligatory and sometimes optional, it is very often a necessary procedure, particularly when translating between two languages that do not belong to the same family like Arabic and English.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>2</strong></td>
<td><strong>5</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Calque</strong> (Foreign word/phrase translated and incorporated into the TT)</td>
<td><strong>Modulation</strong> (Shift in cognitive categories)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“A borrowing of a foreign syntagm whose elements have undergone literal translation” (ibid, p. 340). Vinay and Darbelnet state that calque is a special kind of borrowing whereby a SL expression or structure transferred to the TT and then translated literally (cf. Dickins, et al., 2002, p. 31). According to them, there are two types of calques, lexical calque and structural calque. In the former, the TL syntactic structure is respected, for example the English expression ‘Compliments of the Season!’ is rendered into French as ‘Compliments de la saison!’; while in the latter, the SL construction is introduced into the TL as in the rendition of ‘science-fictions from English to French (Vinay &amp; Darbelnet, 1995, p. 32). Vinay and Darbelnet mention that both calques and borrowing sometimes, namely after a period of time, become ‘an integral part’ of the TL (ibid.)</td>
<td>“A variation of the form of the message, obtained by a change in the point of view” (ibid, p.36). In other words, a translation procedure that involves a change of the semantics and point of view of the SL, through a manipulation of thought rather than grammatical forms/classes as in transposition. This procedure is usually employed when a literal translation or a transposition would sound awkward or not natural in the TL, though grammatically it is correct (ibid, pp. 36-37/246-254;</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Such a procedure can be considered useful when rendering expressions that are culture-specific. For example, it is probably better to render ‘do not be tight-fisted’ instead of ‘do not make your hand shackled/tied up to your neck’ because a literal or transposition rendition would not sound natural nor would it convey the SL message idiomatically though grammatically is correct.

**Equivalence (Functional replacement)**

A translation procedure that reproduces the same situation as in the SL by using different wording (Vinay & Darbelnet, 1995, p. 342). It involves rendering the sense of the SL message with a different image. It is useful in rendering expressions that are culture-specific, for example, ‘those who turn on their heels’ for إلى ليات مات or ‘let bygones be bygones’ for.

**Adaptation (Shift in cultural aspects)**

Adaptation is producing “an equivalence of the same value applicable to a different situation” than that of the SL (ibid, p. 338). Vinay and Darbelnet refer to this procedure as “a special kind of equivalence, a situational equivalence” (ibid, p. 39). That is to say, adaptation seeks to render the SL message into the TL using a different situation than that of the SL but it is just as relevant and meaningful as the SL. Vinay and Darbelnet claim that this procedure is employed when the “type of situation being referred to by the SL message” does not exist or is unfamiliar in the TL culture (ibid.), or it does not have a similar relevance or connotations as it does in the SL (Shuttleworth & Cowie, 1997, p. 4; cf. Munday, 2016, p. 91). To put it differently, it is used when sociocultural realities are not shared between the two languages. An owl, for instance, in many Western cultures, is a symbol of wisdom, good luck, or femininity while in most Arabic cultures it represents bad luck, stupidity, or something whose image and sound are ugly. In this case, it would be awkward and incomprehensible to render ‘owl’ literally. Therefore, the cultural connotation of a reference to the owl in an English text should be rendered into Arabic using another reference that is accepted and known in the Arabic culture.

Vinay and Darbelnet believe that these seven procedures can be applied on three linguistic levels: lexis, grammar (syntactic structure), and text (message). They postulate that these procedures will enable translators to have control over their work to achieve natural equivalence. They suggest that translators should start with the direct method, namely literal translation, and work up and down the table to develop naturalness. Apart from these seven basic translation procedures, Vinay and Darbelnet also introduce a number of other procedures, most of which are considered as opposing pairs except for compensation and dislocation (inversion). Examples are explicitation and implicitation;
the former is a procedure that involves rendering what is implicit in the ST as explicit in the TT whereas in the latter is exactly the opposite. Vinay and Darbelnet note that an excessive use of explicitation could lead to what they refer to as ‘overtranslation’ (Vinay & Darbelnet, 1995, p. 342). Another example is generalisation and particularisation, where the former consists of rendering a specific word/phrase with a more general word/phrase whilst particularisation is the reverse process (for more examples see Fawcett, 1997; Molina & Albir, 2002; Pym, 2014).

As far as equivalence is concerned, the table above clearly shows that equivalence for Vinay and Darbelnet is a merely a procedure that belongs to the ‘oblique’ translation method which unlike the ‘direct’ method does not depend on the use of parallel categories existing in the SL and TL. It is a procedure that consists of only conveying the sense of the ST expression but not its image with completely different wording and an image known to the TL culture. Vinay and Darbelnet’s methodology for translation may seem, in general, to provide useful tools for a translator to the extent that it is believed it has inspired or influenced many others such as Alfred Malblanc (1961), Gerardo Vázquez-Ayora (1977), and probably Peter Newmark (1981), who retain similar procedures and perhaps even similar terminology. Yet, it has been criticised by others like Pym (2016), who questions Vinay and Darbelnet’s epistemology and describes their translation procedures as “distasteful” (ibid, p. xii). Another criticism is that of Jean Delisle (1988, pp. 72-73), who claims that their translation procedures are not convenient in finding ‘translation equivalents’ and believes that they cannot be applied to the “analysis of an expression” or the “verification of equivalences” (for a summary of criticisms of Vinay and Darbelnet’s translation procedures see Fawcett, 1997, pp. 50-52). Delisle’s words are as follows:

Vinay and Darbelnet’s translation procedures do not help the translator to find translation equivalents. A procedure is a method to obtain a result, a way of doing something, of carrying activity through to its conclusion. But these ‘procedures’ are in fact labels attached to results; the authors describe structural changes that occur in the translation process, or point out what does not change … the categories of comparative stylistics (and particularly the so-called translation procedures) cannot really be applied to the analysis and re-expression of messages, or even the verification of equivalences (cited in Pym, 2016, p. 205; Also see Martin, 2000; cf. Zabalbeascoa, 2000).
4.2.2 Roman Jakobson’s equivalence:

The arguments of the Russian-born linguist, Roman Jakobson, on the nature of meaning and equivalence have acted as a stimulus to theoretical approaches in translation ever since he introduced his concept of ‘equivalence in difference’ (Leonardi, 2000). In his essay, ‘On Linguistic Aspects of Translation’, Jakobson posits that the meaning of any word or phrase is a linguistic feature or to be more precise a semiotic fact (Jakobson, 1959/2000, p. 113). Following Saussure’s theory that language is “a system of signs that express ideas” (Saussure, 2004, p. 60), Jakobson states that there is no meaning (signatum) without a sign (signum). The ‘sign’, according to Saussure (ibid.), is arbitrary or unmotivated, and it is composed of a signified (concept) and signifier (sound-image or, as Munday (2016, p. 60) calls it, “the spoken and written signal”). Jakobson states that a meaning of a word cannot be deduced from a nonlinguistic acquaintance but through “the assistance of the verbal code”, and when there is an unfamiliar word a number of linguistic signs is required to unravel its meaning (1959/2000, p. 113). In other words, the meaning of a word is defined/explained through the word itself or other verbal signs. Consequently, it is the linguistic sign which provides the meaning of an object. Jakobson provides three ways of interpreting a verbal sign: intralingual translation, interlingual translation, and intersemiotic translation (ibid, p. 114). It is through his illustration of the first two of the three types in particular where he touches upon the term ‘equivalence’. His translation categories are as follows (1959/2000, p. 114):

1- **Intralingual** translation or **rewording** is an interpretation of verbal signs by means of other signs of the same language.
2- **Interlingual** translation or **translation proper** is an interpretation of verbal signs by means of some other language.
3- **Intersemiotic** translation or **transmutation** is an interpretation of verbal signs by means of signs of nonverbal sign systems.

Intralingual translation occurs within the same SL through the employment of synonyms, similar words, or the resort to a circumlocution or paraphrasing to describe the original word/phrase. With regards to the use of synonyms, Jakobson points out that they do not always provide complete equivalence. He exemplifies his statement with two words that are related to an unmarried man, ‘celibate’ and ‘bachelor’. Jakobson argues that “every celibate is a bachelor, but not every bachelor is a celibate” (ibid.). He believes that the only way to interpret a word or an idiomatic expression (which he refers to as ‘a code-unit of the highest level’) comprehensively is through “an equivalent combinations of code-units”. In other words, using the message that describes the code-unit, for
instance, “every celibate is bound not to marry, and everyone who is bound not to marry is a celibate” or “every bachelor is an unmarried man, and every unmarried man is a bachelor” (ibid.). Al-Barakati (2013, p. 93) disagrees with Jakobson and argues that complete synonyms do exist, and that they can provide complete equivalence if they are carefully chosen after taking into consideration their contexts of occurrence. Al-Barakati states the following:

In translation, we are normally dealing with a defined context; therefore, synonyms can easily act like full equivalents if carefully picked. Therefore, approaching equivalence by taking such a narrow view will only lead to drawing general and inaccurate assumptions. For example, to refute Jakobson's notion of equivalence … the verbs ‘begin’, ‘start’, and ‘commence’ may also be used interchangeably in various contexts without any noticeable loss of meaning as long as they collocate with the occurring lexical items in the sentence (ibid.).

Al-Barakati even supports his argument with some citations from John Lyons’ views (1981) on lexical meanings and synonymy, which seems quite odd because Lyon, himself, acknowledges that complete synonymy is quite rare among natural languages and it almost does not exist (cf. Lyons, 1981, p. 148).

Jakobson’s second type of translation, interlingual translation, is similar to intralingual translation in terms of how the SL word/phrase is rendered. The difference between the two translations is that the verbal sign in interlingual translation is replaced by another verbal sign in another language. That is to say, the rendition takes place between two different languages. This type of translation is the type which reflects the common understanding of the term ‘translation’. This probably explains why Jakobson also calls it ‘proper translation’. With this type of translation, Jakobson stresses that normally there is no complete equivalence between code-units (words) of different languages (Jakobson, 1959/2000, p. 114). This is mainly because languages differ from one another in one way or another. To overcome this problem of equivalence, Jakobson suggests that “messages may serve as adequate interpretations of alien code-units or messages”. The rendition involves replacing one entire message from one language in another rather than replacing separate code-units. So, in this type of translation, the translator attempts to recode the SL message using a different TL code that conveys the original message. It is a process that Jakobson describes as a type of ‘reported speech’ and which “involves two equivalent messages in two different codes” (ibid.). To illustrate his argument that there is no complete equivalence between words, Jakobson uses the word ‘cheese’ in English and its
Russian heteronym ‘сыр’ \[syr\]. He notes that the two words are not equivalent, particularly when referring to ‘cottage cheese’. That is because in Russian ‘cottage cheese’ is not ‘сыр’ \(syr\), whereas in English it is ‘cheese’. According to Jakobson, the common word for ‘cottage cheese’ in Russian would be ‘творог’ \[tvorog\] rather than ‘сыр’.

On the whole, Jakobson puts significant weight on grammar and structure to ascertain how languages differ from each other. He points out that some grammatical and structural differences can occur at the levels of gender, aspect, and semantic fields (Munday, 2014, p. 61; Jakobson, 1959/2000, pp. 117-118). Despite the differences between languages, Jakobson believes equivalence in translation is attainable. He presumes that every cognitive experience can be conveyed in any existing language (1959/2000, p. 115), and if by any chance there is a state of deficiency then this could be solved through the employment of “loan-words or loan-translations, neologisms or semantic shifts”, and circumlocutions (ibid.). For Jakobson, only poetry is ‘untranslatable’ but can be re-expressed through ‘creative transposition’ (ibid, p. 118). He posits that that each syntactic and semantic form used in poetry is there for a specific purpose and that they “carry their own autonomous signification” (ibid.).

**4.2.3 Eugene Nida’s theory of equivalence**

One cannot speak about ‘equivalence’ in translation without mentioning the works of Eugene Nida. There is no doubt that his ‘formal’ and ‘dynamic’ equivalence theory has played an important role in the heated debate on equivalence, and to be more precise his views on dynamic equivalence. Nida’s translation theory, according to Smith (2000, p. 11), is a major turning point for religious translation in general. It is his practical work and experience in Bible translation and mainly his aversion to “what he saw as classical revival in the nineteenth century, an emphasis on technical accuracy, an adherence to form, and a literal rendering of meaning” that led him to form and develop his equivalence theory (Gentzler, 2001, p. 45). Nida believes that as languages differ from each other there can be no absolute correspondence between languages. Hence, he posits that a fully exact translation is impractical (1964, p. 156). Yet, according Smith (2000, p. 11), Nida makes two underlying premises based on the ‘prevailing code-model of communication’. First, he postulates that any message can be transferred or communicated to any recipient as long as it is performed through the most effective form of expression. Second, he
claims that people share a core of universal experience that makes such communication feasible. This is clear in De Ward and Nida’s words (1986, pp. 43-44):

> All people share far more similarities than is usually thought to be the case. What binds people together is much greater than what separates them. In adjustments to the physical environment, in the organization of society, in dealing with crucial stages of life (birth, puberty, marriage and death), in elaborate ritual and symbolism, and in a drive for aesthetic expression (whether in decorating masks or in refining poetic forms), people are amazingly alike. Because of all this, translating can be undertaken with the expectation of communicative effectiveness (cited in Cuellar, 2008, p. 144).

In addition to linking ‘communication’ to the theory of translation, Nida also believes that the principles of a translation theory or model should be ‘primarily sociolinguistic’: “The model for such activity must be a communication model, and the principles must be primarily sociolinguistic in the broad sense of the word” (Nida, 1976, p. 78). As far as equivalence in translation is concerned, Nida argues that there are two theoretical approaches to translational equivalence: formal and dynamic. Nida and Taber describe formal equivalence/correspondence\(^{37}\) as a quality of translation “in which the features of the form of the source text have been mechanically reproduced in the receptor language” (1969/1982, p. 201). It pivots on “the message itself, in both form and content” (Nida, 1964, p. 159). This approach is considered more of a source oriented translation and closely resembles what Nida calls ‘gloss translation’ as it is concerned with rendering the form and content of the ST as literally as possible. According to De Waard and Nida, both form and content play a significant role in the overall message (De Waard & Nida, 1986, p. 13; Nida, 1976, p. 48), but apparently one can rarely reproduce both form and content in translation (Nida, 1964, p. 157). That is to say, trying to maintain the stylistic qualities of the ST will most likely sacrifice much of the meaning and also trying to rigorously adhere to the literal content will most likely sacrifice much of the stylistic flavour (ibid, p.2). The reason for this is mainly that no two languages are the same, particularly when the two languages belong to different families, such as Arabic and English. Therefore, the form is mostly sacrificed in order to maintain the content (message) (see Nida & Taber, 1969/1982, pp. 4-6). Nida goes on to say that there are, however, some cases in translation where the form is given a higher priority than the content (Nida, 1964, pp. 156-157), such as in poetry, but even in this case, the outcome will mostly fall short of reproducing an

equivalent emotional intensity and flavour to that of the ST (see Nida & Taber, 1969/1982, p. 5/13-14). That said, Nida argues that one should opt for formal equivalence when the translated text is going to be used for specific reasons, for example, obtaining some linguistic, structural, or cultural knowledge of the SL. This, however, will involve using a great number of footnotes for the TT audience to understand, which heavily depends on how distant the two languages are from one another in terms of culture, linguistics, and formal structure. An example of using such numerous footnotes can be found in Al-Hilali & Khan’s (1417 H. [1996]) rendition of the meaning of the Qur’an, which many might see as distracting and probably hindering the intensity and flavour of that of the ST.

Nida’s other approach towards translational equivalence is dynamic equivalence/correspondence\textsuperscript{38}, which is the opposite principle to formal equivalence. It is depicted as a “quality of a translation in which the message of the original text has been so transported into the receptor language that the RESPONSE of the RECEPTOR is essentially like that of the original receptors” (Nida & Taber, 1969/1982, p. 200). In such a translation, the focus is not on matching the TT with the different elements of the ST including form and context, but on matching the dynamic relationship of the text audience, i.e. the TT audience and ST audience, to the context/message. The dynamic relationship, according to Nida’s view, is that relationship which exists between the text audience and the message. In other words, the reaction of the TT audience towards the context/message should be to a great extent similar to that which existed between the ST audience and the context/message regardless of how the context is translated. In fact, Nida argues that in order for the TT audience to have a similar response to the original audience, the ST message should be rendered naturally and idiomatically according to the TL culture so that it could be fully comprehended, and this will happen if the translation reflects both the meaning and intent of the ST. Nida stresses that a dynamic equivalence approach achieves:

\begin{quote}
[c]omplete naturalness of expression, and tries to relate the receptor to modes of behavior relevant within the context of his own culture; it does not insist that he understands the cultural patterns of the source-language context in order to comprehend the message (1964, p. 159).
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{38} It is worth noting that in their book, \textit{From One Language to Another} (1986), De Waard and Nida decide to replace the term ‘dynamic equivalence/correspondence’ with ‘functional equivalence’. The reason for their doing so is that they believe “the expression ‘dynamic equivalence’ has often been misunderstood” and, hence, misused.
This may be true to a great extent, namely when rendering culture-specific expressions. Let us take, for instance, the Arabic *kināyah* expression دَخِلََهُ الرَّيْعُ (lit. to wry-cheek) mentioned in [Q. 31:18] for showing contempt with haughtiness, which is mainly culture-specific. A literal rendition probably would not convey the correct figurative image that would allude to and attest the meaning intended because such an expression is not known or used in English. Therefore, one can notice that some of the translators who went for a more or less literal rendition, such as Ali (1998), Al-Hilali and Khan (1417 H. [1996]), and Saheeh International (2004) had to include either an addition or footnote in their translations and some even used both techniques. On the other hand, if this figurative expression was rendered into English by using a natural and idiomatic expression within English culture, such as ‘turning one’s nose up at’ as Abdel Haleem (2005) did, then both a figurative image and the intended meaning would be grasped by the TT receptor without any complications or any additions and footnotes. Another example is the translation of ‘owl’, as used metaphorically. As we previously explained (see the above section on Vinay and Darbelnet’s adaptation procedure), it would be absurd to translate this literally from English to Arabic when it is used as a symbol of wisdom, good luck, or femininity. This is because in most Arabic cultures the owl represents bad luck, stupidity, or something whose image and sound are ugly. Hence, one must search for another word that is accepted and established in the Arabic culture.

For all that, achieving complete equivalence may seem quite impossible. Nida acknowledges this as can be noticed in his definition of the nature of translation in which he uses the expression ‘*closest* natural equivalence’ (Nida & Taber, 1969/1982, p. 12). There is, however, a serious issue with his dynamic approach, which has received a great amount of criticism, and to be specific, the cornerstone of his theory which is the ‘principle of equivalent effect/response’. This is a principle that, according to Newmark (1981, p. 132) was first coined by Paul Cauer (1896), though Nida only ascribes it to Dr Emile Rieu. Dr Rieu’s words regarding whether or not he had set for himself specific translational principles while translating the Gospels were as follows:

> When I came to the translation of the Gospels, I had already, through a great deal of practice in translation, equipped myself with at least one very general principle, the lodestar of the translator’s art, I call it, and that is the principle of equivalent effect; the idea being, that that translation is the best which
comes nearest to giving its modern audience the same effect as the original
had on its first audience. (Robertson, et al., 1954, p. 758) 39

Regardless of who coined this principle, ascribing the success or quality of a translation
to whether or not it is comprehensible to an audience might seems quite reasonable, but
to ascribe it completely to the response of the audience looks highly dubious. Therefore,
the latter criterion has been criticised by several scholars. Qian Hu, for example, considers
it ‘implausible’ and dedicated five papers (1992a; 1992b; 1993a; 1993b; 1994) to proving
its implausibility. Whang argues that theoretically it may appear smart, but in reality it
seems impractical (1999, p. 52). He also believes that Nida’s functional equivalence does
not have a sufficient ‘concrete method of comparison’ (ibid, p. 54). Marlowe describes
Nida’s theory as ‘half-baked ideas’ and believes that Nida’s focus was “myopic and
narrowly linguistic” (2012). Broeck (1978: 40) and Larose (1989: 78) believe it to be
impossible (cited in Munday, 2016, p. 69). Scholars such as Venuti (1995), Gentzler
(2001), and Chesterman (2002) too criticise Nida’s functional equivalence, with most of
the criticism revolving around the following:

1- How is it possible to measure an equivalent effect if both the ST and TT readers
have different cultures and exist in different time periods (see Whang, 1999;
Chesterman, 2002, pp. 11-12; Broeck, Raymond van den, 1978, p. 40, cited in
Panou, 2013, p. 3; Van Leeuwen, 2001; Porter, 2005; Marlowe, 2012)?

2- Which person’s ‘response’ or ‘effect’ is to be measured and how (see Whang, 1999:
Chesterman, 2002)? Not to mention, people differ from each other, for example,
one might be moved by a specific expression, or let us say a verse or ʾāyah, while
another might not. This can be clearly noticed during the late prayers in Ramadan.

3- In many cases, form and content are inseparable and there are meanings and
messages that rely heavily on the form itself; hence, it should not be overlooked.
Also, owing to the fact that languages are formed differently from one another, for
instance Chinese and English, it is logical to say that translation cannot produce
‘identical equivalence’ and to believe otherwise is merely “an unrealistic dream”.

39 This is originally a discussion conducted by Edwin Robertson from the BBC with Dr Emile Rieu and
Rev. John Phillips. Rieu was a translator and the founding editor of the Penguin Classics series and a
translator of the classics who also undertook the translation of the four Gospels. Phillips was a well-
known translator of the New Testament.
If this is the case, equivalent response or effect is too an unrealistic dream, hence, attainable in translation (see Qian, 1993b; see Van Leeuwen, 2001).

4- Nida’s theory is not based on science, but merely on a ‘Christian dogma’ “in order to proselytize readers, regardless of their culture, to endorse the ideas of Protestant Christianity” (Panou, 2013; see Venuti, 1995; Gentzler, 2001; Marlowe, 2012).

5- Some believe “there is a quality of cavalier spontaneity to” Nida’s work, which gives the “impression that he is often ‘winging it’” (Marlowe, 2012), particularly his ‘kernel-based model’ (deep structure analysis) (see Gentzler, 2001; Porter, 2005; Marlowe, 2012).

6- Too much space for subjectivity is given in a dynamic equivalence approach as it allows personal judgment and interpretation on the conception of the message (see Gentzler, 2001; Marlowe, 2012; Munday, 2016).

Furthermore, Whang (1999, pp. 55-58) points out that the ‘principle of ambiguity’, which by the way may include or lead to multiple interpretations, should be maintained in translation, and its comprehension should be left to the reader and not to the translator. This principle will obviously not be maintained if a translator were to choose a dynamic approach. This is because a translator who chooses a dynamic equivalence approach gets to decide for the readers which expressions need to be decoded and do it for them in any way he/she sees fit just to get the response required. Gentzler (2001, p. 59) posits that Nida “does not trust the readers to make up their own minds” and “in order to achieve the intended response, he has licence to change, streamline, and simplify”. In actual fact, any type of artistic licence is unacceptable when it comes to rendering scriptures, and no one has the right to change or elide the words of God for whatever reason. We sympathise with Marlowe’s opinion that one should provide “an accurate translation which requires the reader to do some thinking and learning” instead of keeping the reader in ‘perpetual tutelage’ (2012). Marlowe, the editor of Bible Research (a free educational site for students of the Bible), enunciates that he recommends the more literal and traditional translations of the Bible to all those who often ask him about which version should they use. Moreover, in his illustration of how Nida’s dynamic equivalence distorts the meanings of the Bible, Marlowe includes this interesting statement:

I would describe Nida’s theory as Quixotic, in the sense that it leads to many incongruous identifications. A translator should not be trying to bring the original message into a present-day context to make it directly ‘relevant,’ if
in fact it *does not belong* in the present. Cultural differences are not just an inconvenient barrier to conveying “the message” to modern people. The original message itself pertains to the original situation, and it cannot always be abstracted from its situation and transferred to another setting, as if the cultural context were just some accidental stage-scenery. The attempt to ‘naturalize’ a text that comes from so long ago, and so far away, is bound to come to grief. Readers should instead be conscious of a distance between themselves and the original receptors of the biblical writings, because an awareness of the differences as well as the similarities is necessary for right interpretation and application. Whether they realize it or not, all Bible-readers are *interpreters* of the Bible, and they *must* take into consideration the historical context. This is one more reason why the Bible should not be ‘naturalized’ in a translation (ibid, italics as in original).

In spite of the criticism Nida’s theory has received and the heated debate it has engendered, his translation theory has influenced several subsequent scholars in the field of translation studies.

### 4.2.4 Peter Newmark’s theory of equivalence

It seems that Newmark greatly admired Nida and was amongst those who were influenced by his work. He even got Nida to write the foreword to his book, *Approaches to Translation* (1981). However, as far as the concept of equivalence is concerned, Newmark’s major contribution is through his two suggested approaches to translation: semantic and communicative translation. In a semantic translation the “translator attempts, with the bare syntactic and semantic constraints of the TL, to produce the precise contextual meaning of the author”, whereas in a communicative translation, “the translator attempts to produce the same effect on the TL as was produced by the original on the SL readers” (1981, p. 22). A prima facie reading of Newmark’s description of semantic and communicative translation suggests it bears a resemblance to Nida’s formal and dynamic equivalence respectively. In truth, Newmark is not completely in line with Nida, particularly in terms of equivalent effect/response. He believes that the full achievement of an equivalent effect is ‘illusory’ (ibid, p. 39). In his opinion, it is “the desirable *result*, rather than the *aim* of any translation” keeping in mind that it is an improbable result “in two cases: (a) if the purpose of the SL text is to affect and the TL translation is to inform (or vice versa); (b) if there is a pronounced cultural gap between the SL and the TL text” (1988, p. 48). Additionally, Newmark criticises Nida’s dynamic approach and rejects “the increasing assumption that *all* translating is (nothing but) communicating, where the less effort expected of the reader, the better” (1981, p. 51). To
be more specific, Newmark does not disagree with the importance of intelligibility, especially while translating any performatives, but his main concern is that generalising such a method to all types of texts may seem paradoxical, as it might lead to ignorance. This is due to the fact that if everything is handed to the TT reader on a plate then we can expect that no effort will be made by the reader whatsoever, not even looking a word up in a dictionary or encyclopaedia. To put it in a different way, Newmark acknowledges the importance of striving for equivalent effect but not at all times and particularly not in all types of texts. He suggests that for each certain type of text there is a suitable translation method. That is probably why he omits the sense of producing the same effect while defining communicative translation in his book, *A Textbook of Translation*: “Communicative translation attempts to render the exact contextual meaning of the original in such a way that both content and language are readily acceptable and comprehensible to the readership* (1988, p. 47) [my italics].

Newmark’s theory is, therefore, concerned with the function of language (1988, p. 9) and draws on the ideas of Karl Bühler’s three basic functions of the linguistic sign, as modified by Roman Jakobson (ibid, p. 39). The three basic functions are: the expressive, the informative or ‘representation, and the vocative or ‘appeal/conative’ (ibid; for a précis of Bühler’s functional theory see Parpalea, 2011). The other three functions extended by Jakobson (Newmark, 1981, p. 16), which Newmark sees as minor functions are: the aesthetic, or ‘poetic’, the phatic, and the metalingual (1981, pp. 21-22; 1988, pp. 42-44). The expressive function is associated generally with the addressee (the mind of the speaker/the writer/the originator of the utterance), while the informative and vocative functions are related to objects and facts of the real world and to the addressee(s) and determine their behaviour respectively (ibid, p. 39-41). Newmark maintains that most texts usually have aspects of all three main language functions, but the significance of each function in may differ from one text to another. He does, however, underline that “the expressive function has no place in a vocative or informative text”; “it is there only unconsciously, as ‘underlife’” (ibid, p. 42). That being so, texts can be categorised as either expressive, informative, or vocative, according to the dominant function in each text. Newmark points out that expressive texts include serious imaginative literature (such as lyrical poetry, novels, and plays), authoritative statements (such as political speeches, documents, and the like made by ministers or party leaders; statutes and legal documents; scientific, philosophical and academic works written by acknowledged authorities), autobiography, and personal correspondence. Informative texts “are concerned with any
topic of knowledge, but texts about literary subjects, as they often express value-judgments, are apt to lean towards ‘expressiveness’” (a textbook, a technical report, a scientific paper, a thesis, an article in a newspaper or a periodical, and the like). Vocative texts can be found in “notices, instructions, publicity, propaganda, persuasive writing (requests, cases, theses) and possibly popular fiction, whose purpose is to sell the book/entertain the reader, as the typical ‘vocative’ text” (ibid.). As far as translation is concerned, conveying the nuance of meaning in expressive texts is far more important than the reader’s response, while in both informative and vocative texts, the priority is towards the response of the reader.

Knowing the type of text enables the translator to decide on which translation method to use. Certainly, there are several methods a translator can employ, but Newmark postulates that the semantic and communicative translation are the two methods that are suitable for all types of texts. He suggests semantic translation for expressive texts and communicative translation for informative and vocative texts (1988, p. 47), but because texts normally share aspects of all three functions at once, the translator is inclined to shift from one method to the other. Hence, his belief that semantic and communicative translations are suitable for all types of texts. Apparently, Newmark is not like most theorists who tend to favour one side of the translation pole/continuum over the other, usually towards a TL bias, i.e. free over literal, dynamic equivalence over formal equivalence, and the like; as a matter of fact, he inclines to both sides of his methods equally. This can be deduced from his following words:

Communicative and semantic translation may well coincide – in particular, where the text conveys a general rather than a culturally (temporally and spatially) bound message and where the matter is as important as the manner – notably then in the translation of the most important religious, philosophical, artistic and scientific texts, assuming second readers as informed and interested as the first. Further, there are often sections in one text that must be translated communicatively (e.g. non-lieu – ‘nonsuit’), and others semantically (e.g. a quotation from a speech). There is no one communicative nor one semantic method of translating a text – these are in fact widely overlapping bands of methods. A translation can be more, or less, semantic – more, or less, communicative – even a particular section or sentence can be treated more communicatively or less semantically (1981, p. 40).

To see if this is reasonable, let us take the Qur’an for an example, where the data of this research, i.e. kināyahs, will be taken from. All Arabic linguists and exegetes agree on the
following characteristics of the Qur’an: it is a religious text and above all the words of God, the quality of its literature is superior and authoritative, its manner and matter are fused, its expressions are ‘packed’ or ‘charged’ with meaning, and so is its style. Thus, if we were to follow Newmark’s criteria, the Qur’an may be generally classified as an expressive text, which means that it should be rendered semantically in order to convey every subtle nuance of meaning. Having said that, the Qur’an is also loaded with the following: standardized language, figurative expressions that have a communicative purpose and double meanings, such as *kināyah*, recommendations, instructions, and scientific subjects. Such features, according to Newmark, are aspects of either an informative or vocative text-type and they should be rendered communicatively. In this case, Newmark’s presumption may seem reasonable, that is, both methods coexist, and with respect to translating scriptures, he draws attention to the fact that “Bible translation should be both semantic and communicative” (1981, p. 45). For what it is worth, if there is any sort of partiality on the part of Newmark it would probably be his urge to put literal translation to use. He even devotes a whole chapter to literal translation (see 1988, p. 68-80). Newmark trusts that literal translation is ‘always the best’ as long as it offers the same semantic and communicative effect as the ST (1981, p. 21). He also affirms that it is “correct and must not be avoided, if it secures referential and pragmatic equivalence to the original” (1988, pp. 68-69). Needless to say, there is a difference between word-for-word translation and literal translation. In a word-for-word translation, the SL word-order is maintained and the words are rendered singly out of context into their most common meanings. The prime use of word-for-word translation, as Newmark indicates, is either to comprehend the mechanics of the SL or “to construe a difficult text as a pre-translation process” (ibid, p. 45-46). A literal translation is very much the same as a word-for-word one in terms of translating lexical words, but the SL grammatical formations, on the other hand, are translated into their closest TL equivalents. This, according to Newmark is useful as a pre-translation process to indicate the problems to be solved (ibid.). Additionally, Newmark distinguishes a semantic translation from a literal translation in that the former respects contexts, i.e. attempts to convey the exact contextual meaning of the original, while the latter does not. As Newmark explains, the translator’s prime concern or unswerving loyalty, in semantic translation, is with the author, but in literal translation, it is generally with the ‘norms of the SL’ (1981. P. 63).

On that account, if a semantic translation is somehow faithful to the ST, then what differentiates it from a faithful translation? Newmark expounds that both methods are
very much alike, but semantic translation is “more flexible, admits the creative exception to 100% fidelity and allows for the translator's intuitive empathy with the original”, while faithful translation is ‘uncompromising and dogmatic’ (1988, p. 46). On the other side of the translation pole, another distinction is made between two other translation methods which are also alike: communicative translation and idiomatic translation. Both methods are oriented towards the TT reader; a communicative translation, however, has more respect for ST’s form than idiomatic translation, as the latter “tends to distort nuances of meaning by preferring colloquialisms and idioms where these do not exist in the original” (ibid, p. 47). All in all, semantic translation and communicative translation belong to two opposite sides of the translation spectrum, i.e. SL bias or TL bias, just like their counterparts, such as faithful translation and idiomatic translation respectively. What differentiates them from the rest of their counterparts is that they are, in Newmark’s view, a type of conflict resolution for what he refers to as ‘the overriding problem in translation theory and practice’, which is ‘the conflict of loyalties, the gap between emphasis on source and target language’. Newmark believes that the gap could be narrowed by replacing the old terms with those of ‘semantic’ and ‘communicative’ translation (1981, p. 38). He draws the following diagram to show this gap (see 1981, p. 39; 1988, p. 45):

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>SL Bias</strong></th>
<th><strong>TL Bias</strong></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Literal translation</td>
<td>Free translation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Faithful translation</td>
<td>Idiomatic translation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Semantic translation/Communicative</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Above all, Newmark argues that semantic and communicative translation are the most suitable methods to achieve the aim of translation, which according to him, is accuracy and economy (ibid, p. 47). As to the differences between semantic and communicative translation, Munday (2016, p. 72) provides a concise comparison of the two methods:

**Table 4.2: Comparison of Newmark’s semantic and communicative translation**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Parameter</th>
<th>Semantic translation</th>
<th>Communicative translation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Transmitter/ addressee focus</strong></td>
<td>Focus on the thought processes of the transmitter as an individual; should only help TT reader with connotations if they are a crucial part of message.</td>
<td>Subjective, TT reader focused, oriented towards a specific language and culture.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Culture</strong></td>
<td>Remains within the SL culture</td>
<td>Transfers foreign elements into the TL culture</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
With respect to translating the Qur’an, Abu-Milha (2003) posits that a semantic approach is more appropriate than a communicative approach because it pays proper attention to the linguistic aspect “without losing sight of the contextual aspect”. To substantiate his assertion, he adds that the Qur’an’s message is universal and is not restricted to a specific time or place – a belief shared by all Muslims similar to the beliefs of Christians and Jews towards the Bible and Torah respectively – which means that its rendition should be addressed to all people – something which can only be attained through a semantic approach. Abu-Milha expresses the view that a communicative approach in terms of maintaining an effect on TT readers similar to that of original readers is dubious due to its inaccessibility – the same collective criticism highlighted previously. Abu-Milha’s substantiation might not be that firm, namely towards Newmark’s communicative approach, for a number of reasons. First, Newmark’s concept of equivalent effect is not exactly like Nida’s and he admits that the success of equivalent effect “can hardly be verified” (1981, p. 10). Additionally, Newmark avers that literal translation is the best procedure in both semantic and communicative translation and asserts there is “no licence to change words that have plain one-to-one translations just because you think they sound better than the original, though there is nothing wrong with it” (1988, p. 36). Secondly, there are parts of the Qur’anic text which can be categorised as either informative or vocative text-types and, according to Newmark’s views, the appropriate way to render such texts is through a communicative approach. That is to say, both translation approaches can be used in rendering the Qur’anic text and choosing which approach depends on the type of expression. As Newmark says: “There is no one communicative nor one semantic method of translating a text … A translation can be more, or less, semantic – more, or less, communicative” (1981, p. 40), it is just “a matter of difference...
of emphasis” (ibid, p. 62). Thirdly, we should always take into consideration that any translation of the Qur’an is not a Qur’an, and the renditions are merely a way for non-Arabic speakers or readers to understand the meaning of the Qur’an. No one can or will be able to produce an identical text to this Holy Scripture. Therefore, the translator’s concern, i.e. translating the Qur’an, should always be to convey the exact meaning whether through a semantic or communicative approach and try to compensate for any loss that may occur in the translation process.

Translating a ST into a TL semantically or communicatively and compensating any loss that might exist may involve different types of translation procedures. Newmark draws attention to the fact that translation methods are related to whole texts while “translation procedures are used for sentences and the smaller units of language” (1988, p. 81). The translation procedures that he suggests are as follows (1981, p. 30-32/75-76; 1988, p. 81-93):

Table 4.3: Newmark’s translation procedures.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Procedure Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td><strong>Transcription</strong>&lt;br&gt;(transfer, loan words, adoption)&lt;br&gt;A process that involves transferring a SL word to a TT. Newmark points out that this is similar to Catford’s transference and it includes transliteration (cf. Catford, 1965, p. 43). A translator may resort to this procedure when the TL does not have a lexicalized correspondence, or for stylistic and rhetorical reasons.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td><strong>Literal translation</strong>&lt;br&gt;The SL word-orders are translated into their closest TL equivalents, but the lexical words are rendered singly out of context. It may include one-to-one correspondence (for example, ‘the house’ for المنزل), clause to clause, or sentence to sentence as long as they have accurate TL correspondents.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td><strong>Naturalisation</strong>&lt;br&gt;Involves ‘anglicising’ foreign names. “This procedure succeeds transference and adapts the SL word first to the normal pronunciation, then to the normal morphology (word-forms) of the TL”.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td><strong>Cultural equivalent</strong>&lt;br&gt;An approximate translation in which a SL cultural word is rendered by TL cultural word. Newmark notes that cultural equivalents ‘are not accurate’, hence, ‘their translation uses are limited’; “the main purpose of the procedure is to support or supplement another translation procedure in a couplet” (1988, p. 83).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>The use of ‘a culture-neutral word’ in rendering cultural words. According to Newmark, this “procedure occupies</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

-130-
<p>| | | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Functional equivalent</td>
<td>the middle, sometimes the universal, area between the SL language or culture and the TL language or culture. If practised one to one, it is an under-translation … If practised one to one, it may be an over-translation. For cultural terms, it is often combined with transference” (ibid.).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Descriptive equivalent</td>
<td>A SL word is neutralised or generalised by explanation.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Synonymy</td>
<td>The use of a close TL equivalent. This procedure, according to Newmark, “is used for a SL word where there is no clear one-to-one equivalent, and the word is not important in the text, in particular for adjectives or adverbs of quality (which in principle are 'outside' the grammar and less important than other components of a sentence)” (ibid, p.84).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Through-translation (loan translation)</td>
<td>“The literal translation of common collocations, names of organizations, the components of compounds, and perhaps phrases” (ibid.).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Transposition (shifts)</td>
<td>It involves “a change in the grammar from SL to TL” (ibid, p. 85)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>Modulation</td>
<td>This involves a variation in point of view (see Vinay and Darbelnet’s translation procedures).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>Recognised translation</td>
<td>According to Newmark, one should support the use of an official or generally accepted translation of any institutional term, unless he/she disagrees with that version. If he/she does not agree with that version a footnote is required (see Newmark, 1981, p. 76; Newmark, 1981, p. 89).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>Translation label</td>
<td>This is an ‘approximate equivalent’ or ‘a provisional translation’ of a new institution. Such translation “should be made in inverted commas, which can later be discreetly withdrawn” if the term becomes acceptable. It could be done through literal translation” (see Newmark, 1981, p. 76; Newmark, 1988, p. 90).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>Paraphrase</td>
<td>“An amplification or explanation of the meaning of a segment of the text. It is used in an ‘anonymous’ text when it is poorly written, or has important implications and omissions” (Newmark, 1988, p. 90).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>“These are rather imprecise translation procedures, which you practise intuitively in some cases, ad hoc in others.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Reduction and Expansion</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---</td>
<td>-------------------------</td>
<td>-----------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>However, for each there is at least one shift which you may like to bear in mind, particularly in poorly written texts:</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>a- SL adjective of substance plus general noun, TL noun: <em>atteintes inflammatoires et infectieuses</em>, ‘inflammations and infections’; <em>science linguistique</em> (etc.), ‘linguistics’.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>b- For expansion, a not uncommon shift, often neglected, is SL adjective, English TL adverb plus past participle, or present participle plus object: <em>cheveux égaux</em>, ‘evenly cut hair’; <em>belebend</em>, ‘life-giving’” (Newmark, 1988, p. 90).</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Couplets and triplets</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Combining two different procedures (couplets) or three different procedures (triplets).</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Notes, additions, and glosses</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Additional information in a translation, whether within the text or at the end of the text, such as a footnote, endnote, or glossary.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Choosing the optimal method of translating a text, according to Newmark, can be extremely challenging but the most challenging part is translating metaphorical expressions. By a ‘metaphorical expression’, Newmark means any figurative expression (1988, p. 104). He sees a metaphor as a “figurative word used, which may be one-word, or ‘extended’ over any stretch of language from a collocation to the whole text” (ibid, p. 105). In his attempt to provide translation procedures for a metaphor, Newmark proposes a typology of metaphors. First, he divides metaphors into five types: dead, cliché, stock, recent, and original (1981, p. 85), while later on he adds ‘adapted metaphor’ to his typology to make six types of metaphors (1988, p. 106). In Newark’s perspective, the type of metaphor and the type of texts they are found in (expressive, informative, or vocative) have a great effect on how they can be translated. For instance, according to Newmark, a cliché metaphor should be retained in a vocative text, but in an informative text “where only facts or theories are sacred and, by agreement with the SL author, in public notices, instructions, propaganda or publicity” it should be reduced to sense or

---

40 The focus of this study is not on the typology of metaphor as much as the strategies of translating figurative expressions, namely, *kināyah*. Therefore, we will not discuss in detail Newmark’s typology. It is worth noting that some may disagree with Newmark’s typology or his concept of metaphor in respect of translation studies, such as Snell-Hornby (1988/1995), or Dickins, who provides a critique and revision of Newmark’s metaphor typology while providing both his full and simplified models for the textual analysis of metaphor in a translation context (2005; cf. Dickins, et al., 2017, pp. 194-210).

41 Newmark definition of cliché metaphors is “metaphors that have perhaps temporarily outlived their usefulness, that are used as a substitute for clear thought, often emotively, but without corresponding to the facts of the matter” (1988, p. 107).
replaced “with a less tarnished metaphor” (ibid, p. 107). He also suggests that original metaphors should be rendered literally in authoritative and expressive texts, whether they are cultural, universal, or obscurely subjective and that is because Newmark believes they: “(a) contain the core of an important writer's message, his personality, his comment on life, and though they may have a more or a less cultural element, these have to be transferred neat; (b) such metaphors are a source of enrichment for the target language” (ibid, p. 112). However, in most informative texts, original metaphors “are open to a variety of translation procedures, depending, usually, on whether the translator wants to emphasise the sense or the image” (ibid, p. 113). In general, Newmark proposes a number of procedures for translating metaphors:

1- Reproducing the same figurative image in the TL, “provided it has comparable frequency and currency in the appropriate TL register” (ibid, p. 108). For instance, (lit. glow of hope) could be reproduced in the TL as ‘ray of hope’ instead of ‘glimpse of hope’ or a literal translation. Another example is the Arabic word (lit. straw), which can be reproduced by using ‘thread’ as in (He is still in intensive care and his life is hanging by a thread).

2- Rendering the SL figurative image with another standard or established TL form, particularly when there is no similar image to that of the SL or it is not acceptable in the TL culture. For example, ‘selling coals to Newcastle’ for (or (carrying dates to Hajr (or Khaibar) to sell).

3- Converting the SL metaphor into a TL simile.

4- Converting the SL metaphor into a TL simile and also adding the metaphor’s sense.

5- Maintaining the SL metaphor and adding its sense; the addition is usually made to avoid any confusion or misinterpretation of the metaphor.

6- Converting the SL metaphor into sense. For instance, (lit. Every horse has a stumble) as in can be rendered as ‘we all have off days sometimes, therefore, try again and you will succeed’.

---

42 In the old days, both Hajr (a place in the eastern province of Saudi Arabia) and Khaibar (a small town in Madinah province) were well known for their great production of dates just as is al-Qaseem province currently. Therefore, such an expression is said to indicate taking something to a place where there is already plenty of it available.

43 What Newmark means by sense is “the literal meaning of the metaphor; the resemblance or the semantic area overlapping object and image” (1988, p. 105).
7- Deleting the metaphor including its sense, usually due to redundancy.

As to criticism, Munday argues “Newmark has been criticized for his strong prescriptivism” (2016, p. 74). Ghazala, on the other hand, disagrees with Newmark’s traditional typology of metaphor and believes such a classification “is not very useful, superficial and lacks in depth with regards to language analysis as much as translation” (2012, p. 58). He also disagrees with Newmark’s opinion that metaphor “always involves illusion; like a lie where you are pretending to be someone you are not, a metaphor is a kind of deception, often used to conceal an intention” (Newmark P., 1988, p. 104). Ghazala states that “[w]e do not lie when we use metaphors; we make concepts and thoughts clearer and sharper” (2012, p. 59). It should be noted that Ghazala’s comments are made from a cognitive stylistic perspective. He exemplifies his view using the expressions كلمة خبيثة كشجرة خبيثة (a good word is like a good tree) and كلمة طيبة كشجرة طيبة (an evil/malicious word is like an evil/malicious tree) from [Q.14: 24-26]:

[T]he ‘good word’ (الكلمة الطيبة) is set in similitude to the ‘good tree’ (الشجرة الطيبة) whose roots are firm, and branches in Heaven, and gives its fruits every now and then by the will of its Lord. On the other hand, the ‘evil word’ (الكلمة الخبيثة) is resembled to the ‘evil tree’ (الشجرة الخبيثة) which is uprooted from the earth and has no bed … … This exquisite similitude has not only clarified the concept of a ‘good word’, but extended it in an unprecedented way into a multi-productive concept of a uniquely ‘good, fruitful, and heavenly tree’, a completely different domain that has mapped, stretched, illustrated and encapsulated the conceptual domain of the ‘good word’. The same argument applies to the second similitude of ‘evil word’ and ‘evil tree’ (ibid.).

From a similar perspective to that of Ghazala, i.e. a cognitive-pragmatic perspective, Maalej too criticises both Newmark’s typology of metaphor and his procedures for metaphor translation. Maalej claims that Newmark’s typology is not useful in practice because the boundaries between each type are often fuzzy. He describes Newmark’s list of procedures as “a prescriptive recipe that offers very little in the sense of how any of the proposed procedures is motivated or justified”. He adds that “the translation of metaphor as a matter of procedures is not realistic” (2008, p. 62) and supports his claim with Snell-Hornby’s statement that the translation of metaphor “cannot be decided by a set of abstract rules, but must depend on the structure and function of a particular metaphor within the text concerned” (1988/1995, p. 58). Regardless of such criticisms, Munday posits that Newmark’s work, in general, provides significant insights into translation (Munday, 2016, p. 74).
4.2.5 Beekman and Callow’s notion of equivalence

Within the realm of TS, John Beekman and John Callow are mostly known for their contribution to Bible translation, namely through their co-authored book, *Translating the Word of God* (1974). It has been widely postulated that they are not only advocates of Nida’s dynamic approach but their theory of Bible translation is based on the principles of translation and foundations laid by Nida (see Smith, 2000; Weber, 2003; Doty, 2007; Floor, 2007; Foley, 2009; Gutt, 2010; Kerr, 2011; Marlowe, 2012). However, Beekman and Callow’s approach may differ slightly from that of Nida’s in that they ascribe the success or quality of a translation to the naturalness of language used in the TT and to the ease of its reader’s comprehension rather than to receptor’s response/effect. These two aspects, i.e. ‘naturalness of language use’ and ‘ease of comprehension’, constitute what Beekman and Callow refer to as a dynamically faithful translation (cf. Beekman & Callow, 1974, pp. 40-41; Shuttleworth & Cowie, 1997, p. 48), which is an essential part of their definition of a faithful translation:

A translation which transfers the meaning and the dynamics of the original text is to be regarded as a faithful translation. The expression *transfers the meaning*, means that the translation conveys to the reader or hearer the information that the original conveyed to its reader or hearer. The message is not distorted or changed; it has neither unnecessarily gained nor lost information. The expression, *the dynamics*, means that (1) the translation makes a natural use of the linguistic structures of the RL [receptor language] and that (2) the recipients of the translation understands the message with ease (1974, pp. 33-34, author’s italics).

According to Beekman and Callow, the appropriate way to achieve such a faithful translation is through adopting an idiomatic approach, which basically means relying more on the TL ‘natural and grammatical forms’ to render the meaning/message of the ST. Evidently, they do not provide a clear definition of ‘meaning/message’, but their elucidation of the expression ‘*transfers the meaning*’ suggests it is ‘the information that the ST conveys to its recipients’. The idiomatic approach is one of two basic translation approaches that are based on the type of linguistic form used in a translation. The other approach is the literal approach, which unlike the idiomatic approach adheres more to the linguistic form of the ST. Within the framework of these two basic approaches, Beekman and Callow suggest four types of translation, two of which are considered acceptable and the other two unacceptable (1974, p. 21):
The two unacceptable types of translation, highly literal and unduly free, stand polar opposite ends of a translation continuum. Beekman and Callow explicate that a highly literal translation reproduces the linguistic features of the SL with high consistency, ignoring the obligatory grammatical rules of the TL, such as adhering too closely to the word structure of the SL as in an interlinear translation. They argue this translation type would sound awkward and give rise to either ambiguity, balderdash, or wrong sense. Hence, it is an unacceptable type of translation for general use. They posit its usefulness is possibly limited only to demonstrating the structure of the original text, but one has to keep in mind that it “has the lowest communication value to those readers” who are not familiar with the original language (ibid, p. 22). On the polar opposite end of the continuum lies the other unacceptable type of translation, the unduly free, and though it fully exploits the linguistic features and grammatical rules of the TL it is still unacceptable. This is due to the distortion of content caused by the extraneous and unnecessary information the TT contains that was not in the ST and which the ST did not intend to convey or imply to its original recipients. Beekman and Callow assert that both highly literal and unduly free translations “share the same unacceptable characteristic of failing to communicate what the original communicated” (ibid, p. 23).

In between the highly literal and unduly free translations, on Beekman and Callow’s translation continuum, are the modified literal and idiomatic translations, which they consider acceptable translations. For Beekman and Callow, a modified literal translation is more of a slight deviation from the form of the ST by making minor or partial changes, possibly lexical or grammatical, to the TT that meets some of the compulsory grammatical rules of the TL. These changes assist in avoiding any grammatical errors in the structure of the TT. However, Beekman and Callow argue this type of translation does not entirely convey the ST message to the TT reader. They believe it will still produce a TT with some superfluous ambiguities and obscurities that may make it harder for some addressees, such as the uneducated or those who have just gained the ability to read and write, to fully comprehend the original message on due the following (ibid, pp. 23-24):

- The TT generally adheres more towards “the same grammatical forms as those that are found” in the ST.
Numerous occurrences of a given word are rendered “consistently without adequate regard to the context”.

- Numerous word collocations or combinations in the ST are ‘awkwardly retained’ in the TT.
- Some parts of the ST message or information that are implicit and are built on the SL linguistic features may be neglected or get lost in the TT.

Notwithstanding the professed shortcomings, Beekman and Callow deem this type of translation acceptable, chiefly for those who are well-educated or willing to access further reference works. For other addressees, they recommend an idiomatic translation, which enables the meaning of the ST to be conveyed accurately and naturally to the recipients by employing the natural lexical and grammatical forms of the TL. They accentuate that certain expressions in the ST could be rendered in a number of ways into the TT “so as to give the most accurate sense and the most natural word combination in each context” (ibid, p. 25). They suggest that this type of translation does not only enable the exploitability of the ‘discourse and stylistic features’ of the TL in a natural way, minimise ‘ambiguity and obscurity’, but most of all it produces a text for everyone, including the uneducated, to comprehend the ‘essentials of the message’ that of the ST (ibid.). Therefore, Beekman and Callow strongly recommend the idiomatic approach to be used in translations that are aimed for general use. In general, they believe this method achieves the goal of translation, especially in translating the word of God:

[T]he goal should be a translation that is so rich in vocabulary, so idiomatic in phrase, so correct in construction, so smooth in flow of thought, so clear in meaning, and so elegant in style, that it does not appear to be a translation at all, and yet, at the same time, faithfully transmits the message of the original (ibid, p. 32).

So, from Beekman and Callow’s discussions, one can deduce that the modified literal approach may render the same meaning as the ST, but it may not convey it as clearly and idiomatically as the ST does. By contrast, the idiomatic approach is the method that is able to achieve accuracy, clarity, and idiomaticness, the key features of fidelity.

With respect to fidelity in scriptural translation, Beekman and Callow state that it involves both fidelity to the meaning and to the dynamics of the ST. The latter relies on exploiting the linguistic features of the TL to deliver a natural rendition and ease of understanding
similar to that of the ST, as pointed out earlier. The former relies heavily on exegesis and includes fidelity to historical and didactic references. Any ST information, such as objects, places, persons, animals, customs, and suchlike, related to historical references should not be substituted by local TL equivalents, because, according to Beekman and Callow, the “Christian faith is firmly rooted in history” (ibid, p. 35). Additionally, any scriptural information that has a didactic function should also be preserved. However, Beekman and Callow indicate that sometimes it is not that simple: “[often a translator realises that an attempt to be faithful both to the historical and to the didactic function of a cultural referent will inevitably lose some of the dynamics of the original illustration. He will find himself in a dilemma” (ibid, p. 36). Therefore, they claim that cultural substitutions or adjustments to the ST cultural items are permissible only if they cause ambiguity or obscurity and hinder communicating the didactic information to the TL addressee. In their discussion on ‘Lexical equivalence across languages – when things or events are unknown to the RL [receptor language]’ (ibid, pp. 191-211), Beekman and Callow suggest that a cultural substitution should be a last resort. Footnotes or slightly modifying the substituted expression can be used together with substitution to compensate for any loss of fidelity to meaning. The first two options in approaching lexical equivalence, aside from cultural substitution, are the use of a generic word and the use of loan words. Both approaches may very much involve some addition of descriptive modification to provide specific meanings absent from either the generic word or the loan word. Beekman and Callow stress that the translator should bear in mind that “didactic fidelity takes precedence over fidelity to the historical nature of the imagery” and remember that “fidelity to meaning takes precedence over dynamic fidelity” (ibid, p. 37).

In so far as expressions with multiple senses, and specifically figurative expressions, are concerned, Beekman and Callow have devoted almost four chapters to discussing some of their translation issues. They provide a general guideline which suggests that rendering a figurative expression may involve one of the following (ibid, p. 104):

1- The sense of the figurative expression can be rendered straightforwardly.
2- The original figurative expression can be maintained along with a direct rendition of its sense.

---

44 In so far as the Qur’an is concerned, the decoding of the meaning of the Qur’an is principally through itself and the Hadith. However, authoritative exegeses are also an essential tool to completely comprehend its meaning and are part and parcel of the translation task (see the section 3.8 on Translation and Understanding the Qur’an’s Genre in chapter three).
3- The original figurative expression can be replaced by a TL figurative expression that has the same meaning.

The figurative expressions that Beekman and Callow deal with are metonymy, synecdoche, hyperbole, euphemism, idiom, metaphor, simile, and symbolic action. Two of the four chapters that discuss the translation of figurative expression are dedicated to metaphor and simile, which is not a surprise, since the two figures of speech are tight-knit even in Arabic. Hyperbole, euphemism, and symbolic actions are discussed separately as if they were independent figures of speech, though Beekman and Callow do state that hyperbole is metonymy or synecdoche and that euphemism is generally based on metonymy and occasionally on metaphor (ibid, p. 118/119). What is remarkable, however, is that it seems as if hyperbole has a specific function of its own, which is to produce ‘vivid effect’:

The ‘exaggeration’ [hyperbole] is deliberately used for effect, and is not to be understood as if it were a literal description … hyperbole is often based on the group of part-whole relations, but in reverse order, i.e. the whole is used for the part … … This is why, of course there is liable to be confusion between hyperbole and synecdoche, as both are based on the same relationship. It is difficult to make any rigid distinction; all one can say is that when there is an element of ‘overstatement’ for vivid effect, the figure is hyperbole (ibid, p. 118).

In Arabic, hyperbole and euphemism are simply aspects of kināyah, as pointed out earlier in this study, and not so often euphemism in particular may be an aspect of ʾistiʿārah (Arabic metaphor). Based on Beekman and Callow’s definition, English and Arabic may share similar concepts about euphemism: “[euphemism is] the substitution of an acceptable, inoffensive expression for one that is socially unacceptable, offensive, or which may suggest something unpleasant” (ibid, p. 119). Yet, they are not entirely the same with respect to their use in the Bible and the Qur’an. Beekman and Callow state that euphemistic expressions, in the New Testament, “are mostly used to refer to God, death, the Gentiles, and sex” (ibid.). The use of euphemism for death or anything related to sex is impeccable logic and very common in the Qur’an, but it seems quite bizarre to use euphemism for God or any person who is not Jewish. Beekman and Callow do, however, mention that numerous languages do not use euphemistic expressions for God or the Gentiles as in the Bible. Still, we believe it is outrageous, especially in Islam, to think that mentioning God (Allah) or one His names is unacceptable, offensive, or unpleasant and

---

45 This comment is stated in a footnote.
needs to be euphemised. Also, there is completely nothing offensive or unpleasant about people who are not Jewish; therefore, they do not need to be euphemised too. In the Qur'an, God is referred to by either His name or one of His qualities, known in Arabic asأسماء الله الحسنى and in English as ‘The ninety-nine attributes/most beautiful names of Allah’. What is mystifying is that the examples of euphemistic expressions used for God provided by Beekman and Callow do not seem euphemistic rather than attributes of God, for example, ‘Blessed’ and ‘most High’:

John 19:11 where Jesus tells Pilate that he would have no power over him ‘except it were given thee from above,’ where ‘from above’ is euphemistic for God (ibid, p. 20).

In translation, it is important to have good knowledge of the cultures of both languages in order to recognise what should be expressed euphemistically and what should not be in the TL. Some languages may share similar expressions and some might not, but if they share similar expressions that does mean they have the same meanings. For instance, according to Beekman and Callow’s illustration, adultery is not euphemised in the New Testament and is referred to directly, whereas, in other languages, such as Chinantec and Trique of Mexico, Zoque of Mexico46, or Tagabili of Philippines47, it is referred to as ‘to talk to another women or to another man’, ‘to deceive her husband or his wife’, or ‘stepping on his or her partner’ respectively (ibid, p. 105). In Arabic, adultery may be referred to in different ways, such asزنا orفاحشة. Beekman and Callow also demonstrate the following:

The opposite process, i.e. of rendering a euphemistic statement with one that is not euphemistic, is often necessary. For example, the euphemism in Acts 1:25; ‘he went to his own place’, needs to made specific in most translations or it is understood to mean he went to his home or farm” (ibid.).

Some gestures and symbolic actions are also similar to other figures of speech because their primary or literal senses are not the intended sense but, rather, a figurative sense is intended. In translating these gestures, Beekman and Callow suggest that one should pay attention to the fact that some of these actions may represent a historical reference; hence, one should denote the actual form of the gesture (ibid, p. 121).

In some cases, however, this could be tricky. Sometimes referring to the actual form or action may misinform the TT recipient. As a matter of fact, some cultures may share the

---

46 Chinantec, Trique, and Zoque are languages used by particular people in specific regions of Mexico.
47 Tagabili or Tboli is a language spoken in southern Philippines.
same significant gesture but not the same meaning or function associated with it. For
instance, ‘sitting in sackcloth and ashes’ in [Luke 10:13] is considered a token of
penitence, while among the Cuicateco speakers in Mexico ‘sitting in ashes’ is a token of
laziness (ibid, p. 122). Another example is ‘reviled him, wagging their heads’ in [Mathew
27:39] where shaking the head is a token of hate or derision and insult, or even mockery
as in [Psalm 22:7], but amongst Ch'ol speakers in Mexico it indicates a firm ‘no’, the
shaking is from side to side, and a sign of ‘joy’ if it is up and down (ibid.). In Arabic,
wagging the head from side to side would probably be a sign of ‘no’, ‘disapproval’, or
‘sympathy’ depending on the context.

On this account, a literal rendition of the form of the symbolic gesture may convey a
whole different meaning than that of the original. Adding the intended meaning to the
literal rendition is probably not an ideal solution as well, and perhaps will bewilder the
TT reader even more due to what Beekman and Callow call ‘a semantic clash’ (ibid.). To
exemplify, let us take for instance عض اليد/الاصبع (biting one’s hand/finger). In the Qur’an,
such an expression is used to express rage or remorse, whereas amongst most English
cultures it is more of a sign of anxiety or emotional stress. That is to say, the symbolic
action in the TL culture has a different meaning than that in the SL culture. In Beekman
and Callow’s view, a literal rendition would not convey the intended meaning, i.e. rage
or remorse, because the recipient would understand it as a sign of anxiety or emotional
stress rather than remorse or rage. Also adding the intended meaning to the literal
translation, as in ‘he bit his hand in remorse’, would not erase the sense of anxiety or
emotional stress. It would probably confuse the TL recipient even more, since the
association between biting one’s hand/finger and anxiety or emotional stress are already
firmly established in the TL culture.

Beekman and Callow suggest two ways to solve such an issue. One way requires the
translator “to drop specific reference to the symbolic action” and use instead a generic
term that covers the action, such as ‘he showed’, ‘he did that which showed’, or ‘he
expressed’. Simultaneously, one can keep explicit the intended meaning of the action
(ibid.). For example, ‘he showed that he was remorseful’ instead of ‘he bit his hand in
remorse’; the same could be said for ‘wagging/shaking the head’ in the biblical verses
[Mathew 27:39] and [Psalm 22:7]: ‘reviled him, expressing their derision’ and ‘they
express their mockery’ respectively. According to Beekman and Callow, using such a
generic expression “still leaves it possible for teachers and preachers to explain the
different customs prevailing elsewhere without introducing a semantic clash into the
translation itself” (ibid.). An alternative solution is to render the symbolic gesture literally and clarify in a footnote that this gesture is used in the SL culture to refer to such-and-such.

On the other hand, if the gesture does not have a symbolic significance in the TL culture or has not been heard of before, then the form of the action should be rendered literally. It is more than likely the TT recipient will comprehend the intended meaning from the context, because there is no other established meaning for this action in the TL culture to get confused with. Nonetheless, if a translator thinks that the intended meaning is yet not clear then she/he should add the intended meaning after the literal translation or clarify it in a footnote.

As to metaphor and simile, Beekman and Callow have also paid a great deal of attention to their translation issues. They believe that at times literal translations of metaphors and similes found in the Scriptures have a propensity to be misunderstood in the recipient language version. According to Beekman and Callow, this misunderstanding could be for various reasons. For instance, the TL culture is unfamiliar with the ‘vehicle’ (which Beekman and Callow refer to as the ‘image’), or has a specific meaning/several meanings different from the one in the SL culture. Also, the implicitness of the ‘tenor’ or ‘subject’ (which Beekman and Callow refer to as the ‘topic’) can cause a misunderstanding. Specifically, Beekman and Callow presuppose that any misunderstanding that may come up can be related to following (ibid. p. 137-141):

1- “The image [vehicle] may be unknown”.
2- “The topic is implicit”.
3- “The point of similarity [also known as ‘grounds’] is implicit”.
4- “The items compared have no plausible resemblance in the RL”.
5- “The metaphorical meaning is excluded in the RL”.
6- “New metaphors are no longer being formed in the RL”.

Beekman and Callow, therefore, recommend that a translator should avoid a literal translation whenever he/she realises that it communicates wrong, obscure, or ambiguous meanings. One way to figure this out is by carefully asking the TT recipients. Once this failure of communication has been confirmed, then the translator can ascertain whether the problem derives from the parts of the figure of speech, i.e. the subject, the vehicle, the grounds, or something else related to the TL and try to solve it.

Beekman and Callow maintain that the status of metaphor and simile being dead, alive, a thematic image, and symbol have a great impact on their translation. For instance, they
believe that there is no point in retaining the ‘image’ in the TL if a metaphor is dead, because it is of no value, hence, it can be left out and the translator can only express explicitly the ‘subject’ and ‘point of similarity’. On the other hand, if at all possible, the ‘image’ should be maintained whenever the metaphor is alive or is considered to be a thematic image or symbol (ibid, p. 144). Beekman and Callow state that in some cases it is permissible to modify the literary form of a metaphor or make “explicit some part of the implicit information” carried by the figurative expression to convey the exact message (ibid.). They also propose the following guideline, taking into consideration that the first three factors are sequential:

1. Maintaining the metaphorical form in the TL.
2. Transforming the metaphor into a simile.
3. Employing a nonfigurative form.
4. Combining any two forms of the above.

On the whole, we believe Beekman and Callow’s translation approach is reasonable compared to that of Nida, especially the way they deal with holy figurative expressions, namely symbolic gestures. Unlike Nida, they call attention to the TT recipient’s understanding of ST message with ease, rather than their response. In addition, they provide some guidelines or procedures that seem useful in translating such expressions. One may criticise Beekman and Callow’s work as being limited only to Bible translation, i.e. they do not try to generalise their approach, as Zahri assumes (1990, p. 59). However, Larson’s (1998) work is believed to be an expansion of Beekman and Callow’s approach to cover non-biblical literature as well (cf. Gutt, 1990).

### 4.2.6 Mildred Lason’s concept of equivalence

The works of Beekman and Callow as well as Nida had a profound influence on Larson, especially the former (see Larson, 1998, p. x). Her book (1998) ‘Meaning-Based Translation: A Guide to Cross-Language Equivalence’, closely resembles Beekman and Callow’s (1974) ‘Translating the Word of God’, except that it covers other literature translation besides Bible translation. As a matter of fact, Beekman and Callow and Larson have much in common, in that they both believe the meaning or message of the ST should be rendered in an idiomatic manner by exploiting the linguistic features and grammatical rules of the TL. However, Larson, unlike Beekman and Callow, refers to the facet of ‘recipient’s response’ while explaining what is meant by the ‘dynamics’ of the ST in her idiomatic approach:
The underlying premise upon which this book is based is that the best translation is the one which (1) uses the normal language forms or the receptor language, (2) communicates, as much as possible, to the receptor language speakers the same meaning that was understood by the speakers of the source language, and (3) maintains the dynamics of the original source language text. Maintaining the ‘dynamics’ of the original source text means that the translation is presented in such a way that it will, hopefully, evoke the same response as the source text attempted to evoke (1998, p. 6; cf. p. 36).

From the title of Larson’s book, it is self-evident that she is not an advocate of any sort of literal translation. She suggests there are two main kinds of translation: form-based and meaning based translation. The former is also known as literal translation and it strives to follow the form of the SL. The latter, on the other hand, strives to convey the meaning or message of the SL using the natural forms of the TL and is known as idiomatic translation (ibid, p. 17). Literal translations, according to Larson, “often change the meaning, or at least result in a form which is unnatural in the second language” (ibid, p. 10). Therefore, she states that as far as translation is concerned, meaning should always have precedence over form: “It is meaning which is to be carried over from the source language to the receptor language, not the linguistic forms” (ibid, bold as in original). Larson believes this can be achieved only by adopting an idiomatic approach. That is because implementing an idiomatic translation allows the translator to exploit the natural forms of the TL, not only in grammatical constructions but also in the choice of lexical items (ibid, p. 18).

Larson puts forward a translational continuum consisting of seven types of translation, ranging from very literal, to literal, to modified literal, to inconsistent mixture, to near-idiomatic, to idiomatic, to unduly free.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Translator’s goal</th>
<th>very literal</th>
<th>literal</th>
<th>modified literal</th>
<th>inconsistent mixture</th>
<th>near-idiomatic</th>
<th>idiomatic</th>
<th>unduly free</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

There is something rather curious about Larson’s translational continuum, and to be precise, it is her listing of ‘very literal’. Although she places this type of translation on her continuum, she does not define it or at least clarify the difference between it and literal translation. Even if we would like to think that what she means by ‘very literal’ is an interlinear translation we cannot because she states that “interlinear translation is a completely literal translation” (ibid, p. 17). So, what precisely is a ‘very literal’
translation? We believe it remains elusive. The same could be said regarding Larson’s ‘inconsistent mixture’ and ‘near-idiomatic’ translations. Larson claims it is not that easy to constantly translate idiomatically and even if a translator would like to do so, he/she is bound to go back and render some parts literally (ibid, p. 19), which means that the outcome is a mixture of idiomatic and literal translations. If that is the case, then what is a ‘near-idiomatic’ translation? We presume that it is a translation which is not entirely idiomatic, in other words, a mixture of literal and idiomatic translations. Therefore, it seems as if both ‘inconsistent mixture’ and ‘near-idiomatic’ translations are alike.

The rest of the translations on Larson’s continuum, however, are clarified and it looks as if most of them are very much the same as those of Beekman and Callow. For example, Larson’s ‘literal’ translation is similar to Beekman and Callow’s ‘highly literal’. Also, her ‘modified literal’, ‘idiomatic’, and ‘unduly free’ translations are similar to Beekman and Callow’s ‘modified literal, ‘idiomatic’, and ‘unduly free’ translations respectively. There is, however, a difference between Larson and Beekman and Callow in terms of what is an acceptable or unacceptable translation. Larson clearly proclaims that an idiomatic translation should be the translator’s only goal. She also overtly states that unduly free translation is unacceptable and, by implication, the rest of the translation types are too unacceptable. Beekman and Callow, on the other hand, assert that highly literal and unduly free translations are unacceptable while modified literal and idiomatic translations are acceptable.

It is worth noting that though Larson refers to the facet of ‘recipient’s response’ in her definition of ‘dynamics’, she does not prefer the pursuit of such a response at the expense of conveying the same meaning as that of the ST. This can be deduced from her comments on unduly free translations:

Unduly free translations are not considered acceptable translations for most purposes. Translations are unduly free if they add extraneous information not in the source text, if they change the meaning of the source language, or if they distort the facts of the historical and cultural setting of the source language text. Sometimes unduly free translations are made for purposes of humor or to bring about a special response from the receptor language speakers. However, they are not acceptable as normal translations. The emphasis is on the reaction of those reading or hearing it and the meaning is not necessarily the same as that of the source language (ibid, p. 19, italics are mine).
Besides types of translations, Larson suggests that there are three kinds of meanings that are of great interest to translation. The first type is called ‘referential’ meaning, and this can be defined as the sense of a word or phrase that “refers to a certain thing, event, attribution, or relation which a person can perceive or imagine” (ibid, p. 41). The second type is ‘organizational’ meaning, which refers to the organisation of the referential meaning into a semantic structure, putting “referential information together into a coherent text”. According to Larson, organizational meaning is “signaled by deictics, repetition, groupings, and by many other features in the grammatical structure of the text” (ibid, pp. 41-42). The third type of meaning is called ‘situational’ meaning, which Larson believes is essential to the comprehension of any text. It refers to the situation encompassing the production of the message. Thus, it is related to the relationship between the author and the recipient, their age, sex, social status, and cultural backgrounds, when and where the communication takes place, and “the presuppositions that each brings to the communication” (ibid, p. 42). All three types of meaning can contain or communicate either explicit or implicit information, that is, information or meaning which is “overtly stated by lexical items and grammatical forms” or information which “is not stated in an explicit form in the text” but it is “part of the total communication intended or assumed by the writer” respectively (ibid, pp. 43-44). Therefore, a translator should always take into consideration that, in some cases, he/she needs to make such implicit information explicit in the TT, because leaving it implicit would produce an unintelligible text. Whether this is the case all depends on the information and concepts shared between the SL/SC and TL/TC, such as language structure, common experience, culture, and suchlike. Thus, when two languages do not have anything in common, then it is more than likely the translator is required to render implicit information that is in the ST explicitly to make the TT intelligible.

Larson’s views are broadly similar to those of Beekman and Callow. For instance, in her discussion of finding lexical equivalents for concepts that are unknown in the TL culture, Larson suggests three basic ways to provide an equivalent expression (ibid, p. 179):

1- The use of a generic word with a descriptive phrase.
2- The use of a loan word with a descriptive phrase.
3- Cultural substitution.

She also agrees with Beekman and Callow that cultural substitution should only be used as a last option, i.e. when neither a generic word nor a loan word is possible as a
translation equivalent. Larson also stresses that one should be fairly cautious when translating documents that are of a historical nature. That is to say, historical facts should not be distorted, and as Larson maintains, the use of cultural substitution with historical documents could be ‘anachronistic’, in other words, “something is introduced which did not even exist at the time or in the place referred to in the” ST (ibid, p. 188). The employment of cultural substitution is more likely acceptable with documents that are of a didactic nature. That said, Larson notes that when a document contains both historical and didactic references one should be consistent in how to choose a lexical equivalent:

If there is a historical part of the document which refers to *fig trees*, and so they are going to be introduced by a descriptive phrase of some kind [instead of cultural substitution to avoid distorting historical facts], then the same may as well be used in the didactic portion of the same document. There should be concordance of lexical equivalents (for the same sense of a word) throughout the document (ibid, p. 189, author’s italics).

In respect of translating expressions that are of a figurative nature, i.e. metonymy, synecdoche, hyperbole, euphemism, idiom, metaphor, simile, or a symbolic action, Larson shares the views of Beekman and Callow. She even uses the same definitions and frequently refers the reader to the works of Beekman and Callow. For instance, Larson’s defines euphemism as “the substitution of one word for another or one expression for another … euphemism is used to avoid an offensive expression, or one that is socially unacceptable, or one that is unpleasant” (ibid, p. 126; cf. Beekman & Callow, 1974, p. 119). Larson does, however, indicate that euphemism is also used to substitute certain words for the ‘supernatural’ and illustrates that Jews avoid the mention of the name of ‘God’ using the word ‘heaven’. She also points out that the phrase ‘senior citizen’ is used euphemistically for the elderly in the United States. On the other hand, we believe the words ‘God’ or ‘old people’ are certainly not among the unpleasant, offensive, taboo, or socially unacceptable expressions to be euphemised. Therefore, in our opinion, using the word ‘heaven’ for ‘God’ or the phrase ‘senior citizen’ for the elderly could be out of respect, but by no means is it a euphemism. Nonetheless, Larson proposes three general ways in which figurative expressions are to be translated (ibid, p. 124):

1- The sense of the expression could be rendered directly. In other words, the intended meaning is rendered plainly in a non-figurative sense.

2- The original figurative expression can be maintained along with a direct rendition of its sense. According to Larson, this is a better procedure “if there seems to be
3- The original figurative expression can be replaced by a TL figurative expression that has the same meaning.

With regards to translating metaphors and similes, Larson suggests that finding out whether the metaphor (or simile) is ‘live’ or ‘dead’ is the first step to providing an adequate translation. She believes that if the metaphor is ‘dead’ (as in an idiom) “then the image [the thing that is being compared with] does not need to be kept, but the meaning can be translated directly, i.e. nonfiguratively” (ibid, pp. 177-18). We, on the other hand, would probably disagree and believe that if the TL has an equivalent ‘dead’ figurative expression, then why not use it instead of translating the meaning directly. As for ‘live’ metaphors, Larson puts forward the following guidelines:

1- “The metaphor may be kept if the receptor language permits (that is, if it sounds natural and is understood correctly by the readers);
2- A metaphor can be translated as a simile (adding like or as);
3- A metaphor of the receptor language which has the same meaning may be substituted;
4- The metaphor may be kept and the meaning explained (that is, the topic and/or point of similarity may be added); and
5- The meaning of the metaphor may be translated without keeping the metaphorical imagery” (ibid, p. 179; italics as in original)

As we described before, in general, Larson’s views are similar to those of Beekman and Callow, if not the same. There are, however, certain aspects of Larson’s work that may distinguish the two works from each other. The first is that Larson frequently highlights, in most of her discussions, the element of culture and its significance for translation and communication. There are several expressions in one language which may seem to have equivalents in another language while in fact they do not, because they have different connotations due to different cultural backgrounds (ibid, p. 149). Larson indicates, “When a source language text is from a culture very different from the culture in which the receptor language is spoken, it is often difficult to translate in such a way that the results will communicate the same message” (ibid, p. 36). Consequently, translators should always take into consideration they are not only dealing with two languages but also with two cultures. Larson’s argues that:

All meaning is culturally conditioned. And the response to a given text is also culturally conditioned. Each society will interpret a message in terms of its own culture. The receptor audience will decode the translation in terms of its
own culture and experience, not in terms of the culture and experience of the author and audience of the original document. The translator then must help the receptor audience understand the content and intent of the source document by translating with both cultures in mind (ibid, p. 470).

The second aspect which Larson highlights is the significance of form and function while searching for lexical equivalents when concepts are unknown in the receptor culture. According to Larson, a translator should first understand clearly the ST word or phrase and its use in the context. To do so he/she should provide answers to the following questions:

1- “What are the most important meaning components of the word or phrase being translated?”
2- “What is the original author trying to communicate in that particular context?”
3- Is the author more concerned with the form or function of the thing or event?

The answers to these questions provide a clear insight into the word or phrase and its use in the context, which will also assist in the method of using a generic word as a basis for constructing an adequate equivalent, as discussed earlier. According to Larson, there are four possibilities in relation to form and function. The first is when a ‘thing’ or ‘event’ in one language and culture has the same form and function in another language. For instance, ‘ear’ has the same function, which is ‘hearing’, in all languages and cultures (ibid, p. 181). In this case, there is no difficulty in finding an equivalent word for ‘ear’. The second possibility is when the form could be the same but the function is different. For example, the word ‘bread’. Larson illustrates this as follows:

“Bread may be found in two cultures and a word for bread in both. However, in one culture it may be the main food, the staple that is eaten at every meal; whereas, in another culture it may be a special treat and served only as dessert or as a food for parties. The form is the same but the function is different. In a context like the Lord’s Prayer ‘Give us this our daily bread’, the word bread with the function of ‘party food’ would not be appropriate. It would be better to translate with the more generic word food to avoid a wrong significance” (ibid, emphasis as in original).

---

48 Larson believes that comprehending the correspondence of form and function is of crucial importance in finding accurate lexical equivalents. What is meant by ‘form’ is ‘the physical aspects of a particular thing or event’, not the linguist form, and what is meant by function is “the significance of the thing or event, that is, the reason for it or its purpose, or in some cases, the usage of the thing” (1998, pp. 180-181).
The third possibility is when the same form of a thing or event does not occur but the function does. For instance, ‘bread’ and ‘manioc/cassava’. They both have the same function in both cultures but with different forms. The fourth possibility is that a word for a thing or event in one language and culture may not have an equivalence of form or function in another language and culture. The sacrifice of a sheep or camel in Eid al-Adha, for example, does not exist in other cultures, and, as Larson claims the animal sheep does not occur in the tropical forests of the Amazon. In such a situation, the appropriate method in translation, according to Larson, is to “use a descriptive phrase for both the form and function” (ibid, p. 182). As a consequence, the use of a generic word (and its modification) as an equivalent lexical item may involve one the following (ibid, p. 183):

1- The form is made explicit.
2- The function is made explicit.
3- Both the form and function are made explicit.
4- Modification with a comparison to some ‘thing’ or ‘event’ that does exist or is known in the TL.

The third distinctive aspect of Larson’s work is that she provides useful steps to take before commencing a translation project. Before taking on any translation work, Larson stresses that answers should be provided to the following questions: What is to be translated? For whom? By whom? With what resources? She discusses these steps under what she refers to as ‘the four T’s’, the text, the target, the team, and the tools (see Larson, 1998, chapters 5 & 35). What is meant when talking about ‘text’ is that the translator should determine the “reasons for choosing the text and the potential for its use” (ibid, p. 51) by the TL recipient. Knowing who the translation is for and whether or not it is going to be used in a school, office, mosque, or at home is also essential. Larson states “[q]uestions of dialect, educational level, age level, and bilingualism affect the form of the receptor language which will be chosen for the translation” (ibid, p. 510). ‘Team’ refers to the persons that are going to be involved in the translation project. Even if the work is going to be translated by one person who is competent in both the SL and TL and their cultures, Larson suggests that others should be available for evaluation and consultation (ibid, p. 52). The tools include the written materials needed for references in

---

49 According to Larson, the staff of life for many language groups of the tropical forest area in South America is ‘manioc’. 

-150-
studying the ST and culture, such as exegetical literature, in addition to dictionaries, lexicons, cultural descriptions, and suchlike of both the SL and TL (ibid, p. 52/517).

The fourth distinctive aspect is that Larson provides certain steps related to the translation process, which include preparation, analysis, transfer, initial draft, reworking the initial draft, testing the translation, polishing the translation, and preparing the manuscript for the publisher (see Larson, 1998, chapters 36 & 37). What is notable in Larson’s discussions is that she reiterates the importance of the ST, not only in the analysis process but in the whole translation procedure. It is crucial that the ST is placed under rigorous scrutiny in order to recognise the exact meanings of the key words or figurative expressions which will enable choosing the appropriate lexical equivalents in the TL. Evidently, in this step, the consultation of dictionaries, lexicons, encyclopaedias, and, in the case of Qur’anic texts, authoritative exegetical literature is often required (cf. ibid, p. 521). Larson underlines the following:

The analysis of the source text will include resolving ambiguity, identifying implicit information, studying key words, interpreting figurative senses, recognizing when words are being used in a secondary sense, when grammatical structures are being used in a secondary function, etc. … … The translator carefully studies the source language text and, using all the available tools, determines the content of the source language message, the related communication situation matters, and all other factors which will need to be understood in order to produce an equivalent translation (ibid, p. 53).

The ST is also relevant in the testing or evaluation process, and as it happens, it is a process which is among the aspects that distinguishes Larson’s work from that of Beekman and Callow, particularly Larson’s testing techniques. Her evaluation is based on a threefold purpose: accuracy, clearness, and naturalness (see ibid, pp 529-547). That is, the translation should (1) communicate the same meaning as the ST, (2) be comprehensible to the TT recipients, (3) and have natural form and vocabulary that is easy to read and does not sound foreign. For accuracy, Larson urges translators to compare their translations with the ST constantly “to be sure no additions, deletions, or change of information have crept in” (ibid, p. 54). Translators should also aim for clarity. According to Larson, a translation may be accurate but not clear enough to communicate to the TT recipient. Furthermore, translators should check whether the expressions and grammatical forms used in the translation are idiomatic and typically used in the TL or not. That is because, as Larson explains, a translation could be accurate and clear, possibly even comprehensible, yet not easy to read and possibly not sound right or as natural as
the ST was for its recipients (ibid, p. 531). Larson suggests a number of evaluation techniques: comparison with the ST, back-translation, comprehension checks, naturalness and readability testing, and consistency checks (see ibid, pp. 533-546). Of most interest to this study are probably the comparison with the ST, back-translation, and consistency checks. A brief overview of Larson’s testing techniques is as follows:

**Comparison with the ST:** Comparing the translation with the ST is done to make sure that the exact message is conveyed, and to ensure that no information is added, omitted, or is different from the original.

**Back-translation into the SL:** According to Ivir (1981), back-translation is “a check on the semantic context” (cited in Shuttleworth and Cowie (1997, p. 15), “which can be used to reveal instances of formal correspondence” (ibid). However, Larson points out that back-translation helps the translator and whoever is reviewing the translation, such as a consultant, to make a careful comparison with the ST, in search of differences in meaning. Back-translation is a useful tool for those who do not speak the SL in order to comprehend “what is being communicated by the translation”, but one has to keep in mind that “back-translation focuses on meaning rather than naturalness” (Larson, 1998, p. 536).

**Comprehension checks:** According to Larson, performing a sufficient comprehension test is “the key to good translation” (ibid, p. 537). The aim of this test to ensure whether the TT recipients understand the translation as they should in a clear and natural form, or not. It can be conducted by the translator him/herself or by someone else as long as the person is well aware of the translation principles and the goals of an idiomatic translation and most of all avoids subjectivity. The test is done by asking a set of questions to the TL recipients provided that they are fluent speakers (for more details and the type of questions see ibid. pp. 537-542).

**Naturalness and readability testing:** It is always useful to have fresh pairs of eyes to look at the translation. The aim of this test is twofold, as suggested by the terms ‘naturalness’ and ‘readability’. First, the test ensures that the form employed in the translation is natural and the style is appropriate. Accuracy can also be checked at this point too. Second, the test makes sure that the translation can be read and understood easily. Whoever is doing the naturalness test should have sufficient knowledge or training about translation principles, in addition to a certain amount of skill in writing in the TL. As for the readability test, it can be done by the translator or by someone else, though it
is more useful if it is done “with persons who will be the users of the translation” (ibid, p. 545; for more details see pp. 542-545).

**Consistency checks:** One of the objectives of consistency checks is to ensure that the lexical equivalents used for certain expressions or key terms are the same elsewhere in the text, when they refer to the same meaning. Larson states:

“If the meaning is the same and there is nothing in the context to indicate that a different term should be used, the translator will want to use the same term in each occurrence. A check should be made of such terms to be sure that the same term is indeed used or that there is a special reason for using a different term in a certain context” (ibid, p. 546).

### 4.2.7 Mona Baker’s notion of equivalence

The term *equivalence* is adopted in this book for the sake of convenience – because most translators are used to it rather than because it has any theoretical status (Baker, 2018, p. 5, author’s italics).

The first impression that might come to one’s mind while reading this statement in the introduction of Baker’s book (2018), *In Other words*, is that she may not consider the notion of equivalence that significant, or as Mannaa (2011) puts it, she is ‘rather dismissive’ of this notion. Panou (2013), on the other hand, believes that Baker adopts a neutral approach in her argument over equivalence. The truth is probably quite the opposite, and apart from the fact that Baker discusses several types or levels of equivalence (equivalence at word level, equivalence above word level, grammatical equivalence, textual equivalence, pragmatic equivalence, and semiotic equivalence), she acknowledges the significance of equivalence in TS and asserts the following:

The notion of equivalence is important because it is used in defining translation itself. This also makes it problematic because it is circular – translation is defined in terms of equivalence and equivalence is at the same time used for assessing and describing actual translation acts … … Given that the notion of equivalence has been so central in translation studies (it is both used to define translation itself and is taken as a given in attempts to elaborate other theoretical notions), it is somewhat worrying to find it discredited in so much of the recent literature on translation (2004).

Baker discusses translation problems that may come up due to lack of equivalence at each level and suggests several translation procedures to overcome these problems, but for the purpose of this study we will only throw light on her views concerning equivalence at word level. A ‘word’, according to Baker, is the smallest unit or “any sequence of letters with an orthographic space on either side” that has an individual meaning (2018, p. 10).
In a bottom-up approach to translation, Baker implies that a translator probably focuses first on seeking equivalence at word level. That is to say, during the translation process or analysing the ST, translators are likely to look first at individual words in search for their equivalents in the TL. At this stage, translators may experience some difficulties where some SL expressions do not have direct equivalents in the TL. Baker outlines the most common types of non-equivalence (see 2018, pp. 19-24) and suggests some translation procedures, which she refers to as ‘strategies’, to overcome such difficulties.

**Table 4.6: Some of Baker’s common types of non-equivalence.**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of Non-Equivalence</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Culture-specific concepts</td>
<td>A SL word that expresses a concept which is unknown to the TL culture. Baker explains that the concept of the English word ‘speaker’ (of the House of Commons), for instance, is unfamiliar to many languages, such as Russian, Chinese and Arabic. It is frequently translated into Russian as ‘chairman’, but “does not reflect the role of the speaker of the House of Commons as an independent person who maintains authority and order in Parliament” (ibid, p. 19). Another example is the Arabic word محررْ, which refers to a person who is unmarriable due to either kinship relations, such as a nephew and aunt, or relatives on the maternal side, such as a husband and mother-in-law.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The SL concept is not lexicalized in the TL</td>
<td>A SL word that expresses a concept which is known to the TL culture, but has no equivalent TL word. For example, the word ‘standard’ “meaning ‘ordinary, not extra’, as in standard range of products” conveys a concept which is easily understood, but there is no equivalent word for it in Arabic (ibid, p.20). Another example is the Arabic word ضريرْ, which refers to a fellow wife of a polygamous marriage, but has no equivalent word in English.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The SL word is semantically complex</td>
<td>A SL word that expresses a more set of meanings, sometimes, than a whole sentence. For instance, the Arabic word عمة regarding women, which refers to a specific period of time during which a divorcee or widow is not allowed to remarry. Another example is the word ثميدة, which refers to the parents’ sacrifice of a sheep/camel when they are blessed with a newborn child.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The SL and TL make different distinctions in meaning</td>
<td>The TL “may make more or fewer distinctions in meaning than the” SL. “What one language regards as an important distinction in meaning another language may not perceive as relevant” (ibid, p. 20). For instance, Arabic makes a distinction between the sister of one’s father (أمة) and the sister of one’s mother (خالة) or the brother of one’s father (عم) and the brother of one’s mother (خال), whereas English uses only ‘aunt’ and ‘uncle’. On the other hand, English makes more distinctions when referring to temperature degrees than Arabic. For example, the words ‘cold’ and ‘cool’ are typically described in Arabic through only one word بارد.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The TL lacks a superordinate</td>
<td>A TL may have a word of more specific meaning but no general or superordinate word to head the semantic field (ibid, p. 21). Compared to English ‘uncle’ Arabic lacks a superordinate, requiring the English-Arabic translator to choose either عم or خال.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The TL lacks a specific term (hyponym)

A TL may have general words but do not have specific ones. For instance, the words  ﻰ̲ح ﻭﹶٓﻀ ﻁﹶﹾل, which refer to specific times during the day (related to prayer times), have no equivalents in English. Also, the words  حﹶل ﻲﹶب and  ﻰﹶط ﻰﹶر that refer to specific growth phases of dates have no equivalents in English and they are referred to as only ‘dates’.

It is worth noting that more than one type of non-equivalence may occur in one single word. For instance, the concept of  ﻰَق ﻰَع is cultural-specific, and not lexicalized in the TL, and the word itself is semantically complex. The following are common translation procedures that Baker believes are used by professional translators, which are not far from the ones proposed by Newmark, Beekman and Callow, or Larson (for more details see ibid, pp. 25-46). They are:

1- Translation by a more general word (superordinate).
2- Translation by a more neutral/less expressive word.
3- Translation by cultural substitution.
4- Translation using a loan word or loan word plus explanation.
5- Translation by paraphrase using a related word.
6- Translation by paraphrase using unrelated words.
7- Translation by omission.
8- Translation by illustration.
Chapter five: ST Analysis

5.1 Introduction

The aim of this chapter is to examine the Qur’anic kināyah expressions before investigating their translations in the following chapter. This examination will hopefully provide us with the necessity information in perceiving the intended meaning of each kināyah used in the Qur’an and their purposes. It is worth mentioning that the kināyah expressions extracted from the Qur’an are pursuant to al-Jurjānī’s definition of kināyah presented earlier in this study. There are two main reasons for choosing al-Jurjānī’s definition. Firstly, modern rhetoricians agree that al-Jurjānī laid the grounds of Arabic rhetoric, which is not a surprise since he was the first rhetorician to present a clear comprehensive rhetorical definition of kināyah. Secondly, some prominent rhetoricians following al-Jurjānī, such as al-Qazwīnī, believe that kināyah can carry both meanings, the literal and figurative sense. That is to say, the literal meaning of the kināyah is true, and the implicit figurative meaning, which is the intended meaning, is also true. This is sometimes the case, but as we stated before there are examples where the literal meaning of the kināyah could never be true, specifically with attributes related to God. Nonetheless, in order to understand the meaning and purpose of use (function) for each kināyah, we have to look at the kināyah and its surrounding context, i.e. the meaning of the whole āyah and not the kināyah on its own. Therefore, we will resort to authoritative Arabic and English dictionaries (including Qur’anic dictionaries) and Qur’anic exegeses, especially those exegeses that approach the Qur'anic text from a linguistic and rhetorical perspective. Furthermore, whenever the same kināyah expression is used in a different ʾāyah (Qur’anic verse), we will point out these āyahs and examine them to see whether they differ from each other or not in terms of meaning and purpose of use. Bear in mind the arrangements of the chosen kināyah extracts in this chapter and the following chapter, i.e. chapter six, are not based on a specific categorisation. The only recognised categorisation of kināyah are those which are proposed by as-Sakkākī and al-Qazwīnī (see 2.4.1). However, in an attempt to cover all types of kināyah, and to present the layout of the ST and TT analysis in a comprehensible manner, we have tried as possible as we

---

50 “Kināyah is the process in which the text producer seeks to substantiate a specific meaning without mentioning it directly through its known (original/conventional) word in the language. Instead, he opts for a meaning (word) that is ‘associated’ and adjacent to it in order to allude to and attest the meaning intended. For example, ‘He is long of sword-scabbard’ to indicate that he is tall in stature, ‘[having] a lot of cooking-pot ashes’ meaning very generous, and ‘forenoon sleeper’ to indicate a person who is self-indulgent living in great luxury and being served” (al-Jurjānī, 1995, p. 66; my translation).
can to place *kināyah* expressions that have similar intended meanings or functions close to each other\(^{51}\).

**Kināyah 1 and 2**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Kināyah 1 (من نفس واحدة)</th>
<th>Kināyah 2 (فلما تفضلاها)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(بَيْنَ أَيْنَاءهما أتَتَوا رُكِّبُوك أَئِذِّي خُلْقُكَ مِنْ نَفْسٍ واحِدَةٍ حَلَّقَهُ مِنْ نَفْسٍ واحِدَةٍ حَلَّقَهُ وَجَعَلَ مِنْهَا زَوْجَاهَا وَبَتَتُ مِنْهَا رَحَالةً كَثِيرًا) 1</td>
<td>(وهَوَّدَةُ الَّذِي أَشَآَكَ مِنْ نَفْسٍ واحِدَةٍ فَمَسْتَقَرَّ وَمَسْتَوْدَعُ) 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>[Q. 4:1], [Q. 6: 98], [Q. 7:189], and [Q. 39:6]</td>
<td>[Q. 7:189]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>سورة الْفَاتِحَة</td>
<td>سورة الْفَاتِحَة</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The word *نفس* occurs in the Qur’an in different **āyahs** and with various meanings (cf. Badawi & Abdel Haleem, 2008, pp. 954-955). Linguistically, one of its general and conventional senses are: “a soul, a living soul, or person” (Penrice, 1991, p. 149; cf. Ibn Mandhoor, 1980, pp. 4500-4501; Lane, 1968, pp. 2827-2828). However, on its own, i.e. out of context, the word *نفس* or even the phrase *نفس واحدة* (one soul/person) may not refer to a certain thing/person, while in [Q. 4:1], [Q. 6: 98], [Q. 7:189], and [Q. 39:6] it refers to Adam. Apart from pretty much all exegeses stating that the phrase *نفس واحدة* means ‘Adam’\(^{52}\), one can deduce this just by reading the **āyah(s)**. That is to say, the surrounding context, such as the *أَشَآَكَ مِنْ نَفْسٍ واحِدَةٍ* or *تَحَلَّقَكَ مَنْ* (created/produced you from) will lead the ST recipient to comprehend the intended meaning of *نفس واحدة* in these **āyahs** as Adam.

---

51 For example, *kināyahs* 5 and 6 refer to miserliness and generosity, *kināyahs* 9, 11, 12, refer to remorse and sorrow, *kināyahs* 13-28 (apart from *kināyahs* 19, 25, and 23) refer to sexual intercourse and have the same function, *kināyahs* 29-34 refer to contempt or arrogance, and suchlike. That said, there are some **āyahs** that include *kināyahs* with different referents and functions as in [Q. 7:189] (see *kināyah* 1 and 2).

52 It is worth noting that some online dictionaries prove to be helpful and identify the intended meaning of the words and phrases in the Qur’an directly, especially given that some of them rely on authoritative exegeses. For example, almaany.com gives the meaning (i.e. referent) of *نفس* in *نفس* as ‘Adam’ (Available at: http://www.almaany.com/quran/4/1/#VTZ9mOwbfU)

-157-
Moreover, the exegetical literature infers that the purpose of use for the phrase 'نفس واحدة' as an expression for Adam is admonition, or to more precise, a warning and reminder of Allah’s greatness and ability. For instance, the general understanding of [Q. 4:1] is that Allah is urging us to remember what He is capable of. Though people may not look alike, all humanity are created from one soul, one person that is Adam, even Eve herself. To put it another way, Allah has created Adam and then from Adam He created Adam’s wife (Eve), and from them He then produced the rest of humankind. Therefore, human beings should respect one another as they all descend from the same person, Adam, and keep in mind that since God has the power to create the human race from one soul they should always fear His punishment and try not to disobey Him. The other three āyāhs are quite similar in terms of God reminding humankind of His capability, powers, and creation of humankind from only one soul (Adam).

The last and fourth āyah, i.e. [Q. 7:189], contains also the kināyah expression تغطى which linguistically means ‘to cover’, or ‘to come upon’ (Ibn Mandhur, 1980, pp. 3261-3262; Penrice, 1991, p. 2261). Mu’jam Alfād al-Qur’ān al-Karīm [A dictionary of Qur’ānic expressions] (1989, p. 815), and all exegetes indicate that what is meant by تغطى in this context is sexual intercourse. Similarly to the previous kināyah, taking تغطى out of context may not lead to its intended meaning, and the same may apply to most of the kināyah expressions except for those which are lexicalised, such as الغائط. Anyhow, the reader can reach the sense of having sexual intercourse through the context, that is, through the phrases تغطى لحما و خفيا and لبسنا إليناها. The purpose, however, of using تغطى as a kināyah for sexual intercourse is euphemism (Riḍā, 1947; aṣ-Ṣābūnī, 1981; Ṭantāwī, 1992; abū Ḥayyān, 1993; al-Alūsī, 1994; ath-Thaᶜālabī, 1997; az-Zamakhsharī, 1998a; al-Qurtubī, 2006). It goes without saying, one can never find any taboo words or terms that are culturally or socially unaccepted in the Qur’an. Any such words are replaced by kināyah expressions (cf. Al-Barakati, 2013)

**Kināyah 3 and 4**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Kināyah 3:</th>
<th>فَإِنَّنِّي لَمْ نَفْعَلْ وَلَنْ نَفْعَلْ (in Q. 2:24)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Kināyah 4:</td>
<td>فَإِنَّنِّي لَمْ نَفْعَلْ وَلَنْ نَفْعَلْ (فَإِنَّنِّي لَمْ نَفْعَلْ) (in Q. 2:24)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(W)ān kātum fī rubbīni mā nūzūnā ʿalā ʿināna fāṭūna uṣūri mān taghūna wadghūn sīhāna qam min nīn illā innā lā in kātum maṣācafīn 3.1. If we are not going to do anything, and we will not do anything (Q. 2:24-25)
In order to appreciate the two *kināyah* expressions, it is essential to understand both āyahs [Q. 2:23-24]. According to exegetical literature, the two āyahs were revealed because the unbelievers in Madinah claimed the Qur’an is Muhammad’s words and not Allah’s, similarly to what the unbelievers of Makkah claimed. In [Q. 2:23], Allah is addressing those who do not believe the Qur’an is His words and claim that it is the words of the Prophet Mohammad. Therefore, Allah is challenging those unbelievers, polytheists, and whoever doubts the Qur’an is not His words to come up with a *sūrah* similar to the one in the Qur’an. Allah asks them to seek help from their idols (statues) that they worship to come up with a similar *sūrah*. Challenges of this kind can also be found in different *sūrahs* of the Qur’an, namely in [Q. 10:38], [Q. 11:13], [Q. 17:88] and [Q. 52:33]. Needless to say, the Qur’an is regarded as one of the signs of Allah’s inimitability and miraculousness; therefore, no one whatsoever can produce such *sūrahs*. In [Q. 2:24], Allah continues to dare and excite these disbelievers, and says: ‘if you would not produce/come up with a comparable *sūrah* [in terms of merit, excellence, and eloquence,] and you will never produce/come up with a comparable *sūrah*, then fear the fire prepared for the unbelievers [on Judgment Day] whose fuel is people and stones’. In other words, since you are not able to produce a similar *sūrah* and have, therefore, lost the challenge then leave aside the pertinacity and wilfulness of making false accusations, i.e. claiming that the Qur’an is not Allah’s words; otherwise you will face the consequences on Judgment Day.

As far as the *kināyah* expressions is concerned, they are إن لم تَفْعَلُوا وَلَن تَفْعَلُوا (lit. if you do not and you will never do) and اَلْمَلَّاءُ الْأَلَّافُ (lit. fear the fire). The exegetes explain that both expression are used figuratively for the purpose of brevity (al-Ṣābūnī, 1981; Ṭantāwī, 1992; abū Ḥayyān, 1993; al-Alūsī, 1994; az-Zamakhsharī, 1998a; al-Bayḍawī, 1998; cf. Badawi, 2005, p. 174). To be specific, the verb ‘to do’ (the deed/act), in the former *kināyah*, is used in lieu of the performance itself, which is ‘coming up with a comparable *sūrah*. So, rather than repeating the act, as in ‘if you do not come up with a similar *sūrah* and you will never come up with a comparable *sūrah*, the expression إن لم تَفْعَلُوا وَلَن تَفْعَلُوا will suffice. This process, if we recall Al-Jurjānī’s definition of *kināyah*, is to substantiate the activity of ‘coming up/producing a similar *sūrah*’ without stating it directly. Instead, the act (verb) of doing, which leads to the activity, is used to allude and attest to the activity itself, especially given that the activity is part of the doing, and therefore they are associated and adjacent to each other.

The same applies to the other *kināyah* expression, اَلْمَلَّاءُ الْأَلَّافُ. Rather than saying ‘[Obey Allah and] refrain from your pertinacity and wilfulness regarding the false accusations
that the Qur’an is not from Allah’, the phrase ‘كانو يفتشوا الله’ will suffice. It is believed that such pertinacity and wilfulness is a deed that leads to the fire of Hell on Judgment Day, and evidently anyone who would obey Allah will refrain from such acts. In his exegesis, az-Zamakhsharī (1998a), explicates that fearing the fire of Judgement Day is associated with obeying Allah and evidently refraining from such pertinacity and wilfulness. Therefore, it is safe to say that ‘كانو يفتشوا الله’ is used in order to substantiate, allude to, and attest the intended meaning, which is ‘(obeying Allah by) refraining from pertinacity and wilfulness regarding the false accusations that the Qur’an is not from Allah’. In addition to the purpose of brevity, exegetes argue there is a rhetorical image through picturing and relating the gravity of such gross pertinacity and wilfulness with the fire of Hell on Judgement Day.

**Kināyah 5 and 6**

| Kināyah 5: من يرشق يقذف | in [Q. 5:64] and [Q. 17:29] |
| Kināyah 6: بسط اليد | in [Q. 5:64] and [Q. 17:29] |

(وقالت اليهود: يا الله مغفلونا! غلت آبائكم وغُلِّنُوا بما قالوا! بل يداه مسَّوطنان يَنفِق كَذَٰلِكْ يَبْشَأُ ۗ وَليَزِيدَ بِكَ كَثِيرًا مِّنْهُمَّ مَّا أَنْزَلَ إِلَيْكَ مِنْ رَبِّكَ مَعَنَا وَكَفِّرْنَا أَلَٰٰذَةَ وَالْبَغْضَاءَ إِلَى يَوْمِ الْقِيَاءَةِۢ كَمَا أَنْفَقْنَا نَارًا لِّلْحَرِبِ أَطْفَأَاهَا اللّهُ وَبِضَعَنَّ في الأَرْضِ فِي نَاسٍ فِي نَاسٍۢ. ۖ اللّهُ لا يُحِبُّ الْمُفْسِدِينَ) آية 1 سورة المائدة [Q. 5:64]

(وَلا تَجْلِلْ يَدَكَ مِّنْهُمْ إِلَى عَفَّاقٍ وَلا تَتَبَسْطِهَا كَلِبَ السَّبَاطِ فَتَفْخَضُ مَعَوْمًا مُّحْمِشًا) آية 2 سورة الإسراء [Q. 17:29]

According to the Qur’anic exegeses, [Q. 5:64] was revealed when some of the noblemen of Judaism and their followers (during the era of the Prophet Muhammad) accused Allah of miserliness. Most of the Jews, at that time, were blessed with wealth and prosperity, and later that blessing began to vanish after disobeying Allah and denying excessively the prophecy of the Prophet Muhammad. Accordingly, they said in a mocking way that Muhammad’s God has deprived them of wealth, blessing, and prosperity and insolently accused Allah of being miserly. Allah then says غلت آبائكم وَغُلِّنُوا بما قالوا as a prayer or supplication against the Jews who insolently accused Him of miserliness. There are two interpretations regarding what is meant by غلت آبائكم. The first interpretation is that it is a prayer, supplication, or curse against the Jews to be miserly in their lifetime. The other version is that those who insolently accused Allah will indeed be presented on Judgment Day with their hands shackled/tied up.
The clause بل يدّاء مُبسَطُ طَنَانٍ يَفْقَحُ كَيْفَ يَا يَاهُ تَزْعُمُ ٌ refutes the previous insolent accusations and informs us, through the expression يَدّاء مُبسَطُ طَنَانٍ, that to the contrary of what has been said, He (Allah) is extremely generous and bountiful. Naturally, the meaning of the word يَا يَاهُ (His hands) is not Allah’s physical organ, since it is beyond our imagination to depict God’s physical image (cf. Ridha, 1947; Al-Tha‘alibi, 1997); therefore, it is used figuratively with مُبسَطُ طَنَانٍ (laid out/spread out) to indicate the sense of generosity. In addition, the phrase يَفْقَحُ كَيْفَ يَا يَاهُ (He graces/blesses as He wishes) should help in deducing the intended meaning of the figurative expression. There are, however, several interpretations for the duality of مُبسَطُ طَنَانٍ. According to Qur’anic exegeses, such as the ones produced by ath-Tha‘alibi (1997) and abu Hayān (1993), one of the interpretations is that it refers to Allah’s blessing and graces in this life and the hereafter. Another version is that it refers to both patent and latent blessings and graces of Allah. A third version suggests that is dual and not singular because Allah’s blessings and graces are uncountable (at-Ṭabarī, 2001). Moreover, az-Zamakhsharī (1998a) argues that البسط مُبسَطُ طَنَانٍ in يَا يَاهُ is dual while يَا يَاهُ مُغَلَّوْلةٌ in عَلَى الْيد يَا يَاهُ is singular is to refute the insolent accusations made by the Jews against Allah. He adds that repudiating such accusations is more eloquent and attests to Allah’s utmost degree of generosity and disproof of miserliness. Az-Zamakhsharī’s view might be more accurate since one of the purposes of using kināyah is to achieve eloquence and hyperbole.

The expressions of عَلَى الْيد and البسط اليد in the other ʾāyah, [Q. 17:29] are also the same in terms of meaning, i.e. miserliness and generosity. This ʾāyah urges thriftiness. That is, it interdicts niggardliness and urges generosity but not to the extent of profligacy. This sense can be deduced from context of the ʾāyah, such as عَلَى الْيد (to your neck) and البسط (spread it all/lay it all out). That is to say, when your hand is tied it prevents you from moving it freely, let alone when it is tied to your neck. Therefore, as we mentioned earlier, just as the shackling of a hand represents miserliness, the shackling to the neck represents excessive miserliness. On the other hand, since the laying out or spreading of the hand represents generosity, then obviously laying it out completely represents profligacy. However, both peculiarities, i.e. miserliness and profligacy, are generally unaccepted. Therefore, whoever is miserly or profligate will be left blameworthy or destitute respectively as Allah says: فَقِلْ عَلَى مَلْوَى مَهْسُورٍ (then [you] become blamed and denuded [insolvent]).

From a linguistic perspective, مُغَلَّوْلةٌ derives from the verb عَلَى, which means ‘to shackle/to tie up’, whereas البسط derives from the verb البسط, which means ‘to spread
out/lay out (Lane E. W., 1968; Wehr, 1976; ibn Manẓūr, 1980; Penrice, 1991; Farid, 2006). When the words "بسط اليد" or "lay out" collocate with "غِلِ النِّفَات" in [Q. 60:2] they indicate the meaning of ‘niggardliness’ or ‘to give generously’ respectively (ibid.; Riḍa, 1947; ar-Rāzī, 1981; Ṣābūnī, 1981; Ṭantāwī, 1992; al-Alūsī, 1994; az-Zamakhsharī, 1998a; al-Bayḍāwī 1998). That is because the nature of being generous or miserly is to do with giving or not giving; and normally the physical act of giving is associated with hands. Through this association, in addition to other words in the context, the addressee can comprehend this figurative expression. Therefore, we can notice that all Qur’anic exegetes agree that "غِلِ النِّفَات" (shackling of a hand) and "بسط اليد" (spreading/laying it out) are figurative expressions for miserliness and generosity respectively. It is worth mentioning that a quite similar association between hands and miserliness or generosity exists in English. For example, the idiomatic expressions ‘tight-fisted’ represents miserliness and ‘open-handed’ represents generosity.

**Kināyah 7 and 8**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Kināyah 7</th>
<th>Ｂسط اليد in [Q. 5:11]</th>
<th>Ｂسط اليد in [Q. 60:2]</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(لا يَأْتِي الَّذِينَ أَتْنَا أَنْفُكَ أَنْفُكَ؛ْ وَلَعَلَّاللَّهُ يُؤْتِيْكَ مَا كَنتَ لَهُمْ فَكُنْتَ أَيْتَمِينَ عَنْكَمْ وَلَقْوَ)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(وَلَعَلَّاللَّهُ يُؤْتِيْكَ مَا كَنتَ لَهُمْ)</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>(يَفْتَرُوكَمُ يَتَفْرَوكَ أَنْفُكَ أَنْفُكَ أَنْفُكَ)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(وَلَقْوَ)</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>(أَنْفُكَ أَنْفُكَ أَنْفُكَ)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

We have just shed light upon the phrase "بسط اليد" and pointed out that it is a *kināyah* expression for generosity in [Q. 17: 29] and [Q. 5:64]. However, this does not indicate that the expression "بسط اليد" or its derivatives are always a *kināyah* for generosity. So, apart from its literal sense (to spread/lay out the hand), at times it may refer to another *kināyah*, which is ‘to assault’ as in [Q. 5:11]. This interpretation, however, depends mainly on the Qur’anic exegetical literature and on the surrounding context of the expression. That is to say, the addressee could comprehend whether the meaning of "بسط اليد" is literal, generosity, or assault, through its surrounding context. Of course, the exegetical literature will clear up any ambiguity.

For example, in and the words "بِالتَّلُكَةِ لِتَلَكَ (to kill me/to kill you) in [Q. 5:28] and "بِالتَّلُكَةِ لِتَلَكَ (with evil) in [Q. 60:2] should lead the addressee to understand that the intention of
spreading out the hand is to make some sort of assault. Another way to realise that بسط اليد is a kināyah for ‘some sort of an assault’ and not ‘generosity’ is through the prepositional phrase ‘إلى’ (towards you). Therefore, whenever the expression بسط اليد is collocated with such prepositional phrases then it is a kināyah for an assault as in [Q. 5:11], [Q. 5:28], and [Q. 60:2]. Speaking of collocation, the word ‘بسط’ and the aforesaid prepositional phrases also collocate with the word اللسان (the tongue) to form a kināyah for insult or verbal assault as in [Q. 60:2] (see the exegesis on [Q. 5:11] by ar-Rāzī, 1981; Ṭanṭāwī, 1992; abū Ḥayyān, 1993; al-Alūsī, 1994; az-Zamakhsharī, 1998a). In order to identify the exact type of assault or insult, if not mentioned in the ‘āyah, one must turn to the Qur’anic exegesis. For example, the exegetes point out that the type of attempted assault in [Q. 5:11] was intended to kill/assassinate (Riḍā, 1947; ar-Rāzī, 1981; Ṭanṭāwī, 1992; abū Ḥayyān, 1993; al-Alūsī, 1994; ath-Thaᶜālabī, 1997; az-Zamakhsharī, 1998a; ibn Kathīr, 2000; Aa-Ṭabarī, 2001; ath-Thaᶜālabī, 2002). Ṭanṭāwī (1992) and al-Alūsī (1994) add the attempt ‘to destroy’ too. Based on this, the interpretation of ‘إذا فَلَمْ تَقُلُوا إِلَيْكُمَ أُيُّدُّوا مِنْ أَذْيَادِهِمْ’ will be ‘when people intended/planned to kill/assassinate [and destroy] you). Furthermore, almost all exegetes agree that the type of evil assault and insult in [Q. 60:2] is ‘to kill’ and ‘to swear and blaspheme’. Aṣ-Ṣābūnī (1981) adds to the physical assault ‘to beat’ also ‘to kill’, whereas abū Ḥayyān (1993) adds ‘to torture’. Ar-Rāzī (1981), on the other hand, only mentions ‘to beat’. In view of this, the interpretation of ‘إذا فَلَمْ تَقُلُوا إِلَيْكُمَ أُيُّدُّوا مِنْ أَذْيَادِهِمْ’ will be ‘they will [beat you] kill you and swear at you [verbally insult you]’.

**Kināyah 9 and 10**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Kināyah 9: عَضُّ الْيَدِ</th>
<th>Kināyah 10: عَضُّ الأَنْتَامَل</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>[Q. 25:27]</td>
<td>[Q. 3:119]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>وَيَوْمَ يُعَضِّنُ الْظَّالِمُ عَلَىٰ يَدِهِ يَقُولُ نَبِيٌّ يَا نَبِيَّيُ الْخَلْدُ بِالرَّسُولِ مُبَيِّنًا مُسْتَفَقِّرًا لِّيَتَبَيَّنَ لَهُمْ مَا نُحْدِثُ فَلَانَا ۚ خَلَبَلِإۢ أَيَةٌ ۚ ۚ أَيَةٌ ۚ ۚ أَيَةٌ ۚ ۚ أَيَةٌ ۚ ۚ أَيَةٌ</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ۚ وَإِذَا لَقَوْكُمُ قَالُوا أَنَا وَإِذَا خَلَوْا عَضُّا عَلَىٰ لَبَنَانِ الأَنْتَامَلِ مِنْ الْخَيْبَةِ فَلَمْ مَوْتُوا يُطِيقُمْ ۚ ... أَيَةٌ ۚ ۚ أَيَةٌ ۚ ۚ أَيَةٌ ۚ ۚ أَيَةٌ</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In general, āyah [Q. 25:27] indicates whoever abandons the path of Islam will, on Judgment Day, be filled with remorse. The majority of exegetes believe that the wrongdoer (الظالم) in this āyah refers to ʿUqbah bin abī Muʿīṭ (a man from same tribe that the Prophet Muhammad belonged to, which is Quraysh). It is said that after ʿUqbah announced his embrace to Islam, his best and closest friend (الخليل) (most reports say
it was ʿUbay bin Khalaf and others say it was ʿUmayyah bin Khalaf) became infuriated. Thus, ʿUqbah apostatised in order to please his best friend; not only this, but he also went and insulted the Prophet. Both ʿUqbah and his friend were later killed, in the battles of Badr and Uḥud respectively. The exegeses goes on to say that this wrongdoer will, on Judgement Day, face his consequences and wish that he had never followed his friend’s wishes, by deserting and turning down the Prophet Muhammad. It is worth noting that some exegetes believe that ظالم refers to any wrongdoer, in general, and that خليل refers to Satan. That is to say, any person who fulfils the desire of Satan and deserts the path of the Prophet Muhammad will eventually regret their actions on Judgement Day (see ath-Thaʿalabī, 1997; az-Zamakhsharī, 1998a: ibn Kathīr, 2000; al-Qurṭubī, 2006). As regards to [Q. 3:119], it demonstrates one of the characters that belong to hypocrites who pretend to be sympathetic, friendly, and followers in the presence of Muslims, while in fact they are merely concealing their true feelings, which are full of bemoaning and rage in every respect.

The depiction of remorse in [Q. 25:27] and rage in [Q. 3:119], according to the majority of exegetes and lexicons, is demonstrated through the *kināyah* expressions عض اليد (biting one’s own hand) and عض الأذن (biting one’s own fingertips) respectively. ʻṬanṭāwī (1992), abū Ḥayyān (1993), and az-Zamakhsharī (1998a), claim the gestural expression عض اليد is not only a *kināyah* for remorse/regret, but it can be used as a *kināyah* for anger/rage as well, or for both remorse and rage together, just like biting one’s own fingertips, falling onto one’s hand (السقوط في اليد), and gnashing one’s own teeth (قرع السن). They also add that these *kināyah* expressions are used for eloquence reasons. Whether biting one’s own hands/fingertips or gnashing one’s own teeth, all of these are considered a reality-based physiognomy or mien of a remorseful person or who is full of rage. Sometimes when people recognise that they have done something wrong or feel fury they unintentionally bite either their hand, fingertips, or lower lip. In other words, such psychological body gestures do exist in real life. To tell whether the *kināyah* is for remorse, rage, or both one needs to consider the context. For instance, the particle of desire يِ 'I wish that I' or 'would that I' (Penrice, 1991, p. 135; cf. Lane, 1968, p.

---


54 Riḍā (1947) and ar-Rāzī (1981) claim the same in their explanation of [Q. 3:119].
2683) in [Q. 25:27] would suggest a deep feeling of being sorry or guilt for wrong doing, and the prepositional phrase ‘out of/in rage’ following عض الأنامل in [Q. 3:119] would imply a sense of rage.

**Kināyah 11**

One of the four stories reported in sūrat al-Kahf is about two men – a poor man and a rich man. Allah has granted and blessed the rich man with both prosperity and beautiful and fruitful gardens. Unfortunately, this rich man became extremely engrossed in his wealth and completely forgot that this wealth was a gift and blessing from God. So, the poor man told him to thank God, but the rich man became ostentatious, self-conceited, and overweening and claimed that his prosperity would never perish. Moreover, not only did he have doubts about Judgment Day but he also claimed if that day were to come he would find even better wealth. The next day, the rich man realised his two gardens had been completely destroyed due to his ungratefulness to God. So, he began bewailing and felt remorseful over what he had spent on his gardens and wished he had not associated others with God in worship.

All exegetes agree that the emotion of bewailing and especially remorse in this ʾāyah is conveyed through the expression of ِهَيَّفَةٌ (lit. turning the palms [of his hand] inside out). However, some note it is a kināyah for contrition and remorse55 (see ar-Rāzī, 1981; aṣ-Ṣābūnī, 1981; al-Alūsī, 1994; Ṭanṭāwī, 1992; az-Zamakhsharī, 1998a), some for remorse only (see abū Ḥayyān, 1993; al-Bayḍāwī, 1998, ash-Shawkānī, 2007), and others, such as ibn ʾĀshūr (1984), see it as a kināyah for contrition alone. This differentiation is probably marginal and insignificant, since contrition, remorse, sorrow, repentance, and regret are near-synonyms. After all, let us not forget that some words in one language could convey more senses or less than their putative equivalents in another language (cf. Baker equivalence at word level). What is significant and interesting, and may be relevant to the translation analysis in the next chapter, is the differentiation between some exegetes on how they depict the movement of the hand itself. Abu Ḥayyān (1993) provides a comprehensive commentary. Apart from twisting the palms [of the

hand] inside out repeatedly, he points out that some suggest that تقلب الكفرين is either placing or clapping the palm of one hand on the back of the other and vice versa. Al-Alusi does, however, affirm that regardless of how the gesture is physically performed, تقلب الكفرين remains a kināyah expression for contrition and remorse.

As far as linguists or rhetoricians are concerned, they too indicate that this phrase represents grief, sorrow, repentance, or penitence (see Lane, 1968; Mujamma al-Lughati al-ʿArabiyyah, 1989; Penrice, 1991; ʿUmar, 2008; az-Zamakhshari, 1998b [Part 1]; as-Sabūnī, 2009; al-Hayānī, 2014). Lane even points out that it is like other expressions that represent repentance or grief, such as السقوط في اليد, similar to what most of the exegetes have highlighted:

فاصبح يقلب كفليه ظهراً ليتَلُبّى [And he began to turn his hands upside-down, or to do so repeatedly.] in grief, or regret: ... or he became in the state, or condition, of repenting, or grieving: for تقلب الكفرين is an action of him who is repenting, or grieving; ... and therefore metonymically [sic] denotes repentance, or grief, like السقوط في عَضَّ اليد [and and therefore the aforementioned expressions is that this is only a spoken expression which cannot be performed physically like the rest.

Kināyah 12

The people of Prophet Mūsā (Moses) decided to make a statue of a calf out of their trinkets to worship during the time Moses was away in the mountain (believed to be Mount Sinai) talking to God. When Moses returned from the mountain his people realised they had committed a huge mistake and that they had gone astray. Therefore, they felt deep remorse for their wrongdoing. The feeling of remorse is conveyed through the kināyah expression السقوط في اليد. As we have previously highlighted, several exegetes, rhetoricians, and lexicons point out that this kināyah is similar to تقلب الكفرين السقوط في اليد, جل عض الالئام جل عض اليد, and therefore the aforementioned expressions is that this is only a spoken expression which cannot be performed physically like the rest.

Literally, the meaning of السقوط في اليد is ‘fall into the hand’. At-Ṭabarī (2001) explains that السقوط في اليد are eloquent and that the Arabs used to say them to whoever is in a state of regret or helpless to do anything. He states that the expression comes from
The astiṣṣarat (surrender) is when one man hits another or brings him down to the ground, captures him, and ties him up. The person who has been thrown down becomes in the hands of his thrower. Hence, every person who is incapable of doing anything or is struggling because of his inability is described as a person remorseful for his neglect. Az-Zamakhsharī (1998a) adds another interpretation and reveals that whoever is in a state of contrition or remorse usually bites his hand in anguish, which originally means that the mouth or bite fell into the hand, but the subject ‘hand’ or ‘mouth’ is omitted (also stated in al-Alūsī, 1994 and ibn Manẓūr, 1980, pp. 2038-2039). He expounds that demonstrates the intense contrition and remorse of the people of Moses for worshiping the calf. In addition, az-Zajjāj notes that سقط في أيديهم means the emotion of remorse fell in their hearts and soul, but because a person’s fate is a usually a consequence of their own doing, in other words, by their own hands, this is expressed through ‘fell into their hands’ (stated in az-Zamakhsharī, 1998; ar-Rāzī, 1981; ibn Manẓūr, 1980, pp. 2038-2039). Regardless of how the expression originated, what is for sure is that it is culture-specific, and more importantly exegetes and rhetoricians agree that it is an expression for contrition and remorse. Some exegetes, such as Riḍā (1947), aṣ-Ṣābūnī (1981), abū Ḥayyān (1993), al-Alūsī (1994), az-Zamakhsharī (1998a), al-Bayḍāwī (1998), even say it is a kināyah for intense contrition and remorse. Various lexicons, such as Lisān al-ᶜArab (ibn Manẓūr, 1980), al-Muᶜjamu al-Wasīṭ (Mustafa, et al., 2004), Muᶜjam al-Lughati al-ᶜArabiyati al-Muᶜāṣirah (ᶜUmar, 2008), Muᶜjam al-fāḍ al-Qurʾān al-Karīm (Mujammaᶜ al-Lughati al-ᶜArabiyah, 1989), A Dictionary and Glossary of the Kor-ân (Penrice, 1991), and Dictionary of the Holy Qur’an (Farid, 2006), also agree with the rhetoricians and exegetes.

However, speaking of culture-specific features, Lane provides a comprehensive comment on سقط في أيديهم in which he remarkably believes that this phrase was unknown to the Arabs before the revelation of the Qur’an:

There was a falling, and there was a making to fall, upon his hand: i.e., of his hand upon his hand, or of his teeth upon his hand, by reason of repentance, and grief, or regret; meaning] he repented, of what he had done; and grieved for, or regretted, an act of inadvertence; or, and became confounded, or perplexed, and unable to see his right course: or both signify, or signify also, or the former signifies also, he slipped; fell into an error, or a fault; committed a mistake. Hence the saying in the Kur [vii. 148], وَلَا سَقَطَ فِي أَيْدِيْهِمْ... And when they repented: or struck their hands upon their hands, by reason of repentance; or repented greatly; because he who repents, and grieves, or
regrets, bites his hands in sorrow, so that his hand is fallen upon [by his teeth]: the phrase was not known to the Arabs before the time of the Qur-ān: … it has also been read as though the dām were understood; i.e. like as you say, likening what comes into the heart, and into the mind, to what comes into the hand, and is seen with the eye: and this, as well as the former, is tropical” (1968, p. 1380, author’s italics, bold is mine).

**Kināyah 13 and 14**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>) أَلَوْ كَفَرَتْ بِيَدَيَّ الْمَيْتَةِ الْزَفَفُ إِلَى نَسَبُفِّهِ هُنُ لَدَيْنَا لَكُمْ وَأَنْتُمْ لَدَيْنَا لَهُنَّ عَلَى الَّذِينَ أَكْمَلُوا تَحَتَّاهُمْ أَنْفَسُكُمْ فَأْلَمَّنَِّمْ رَبُّكُمْ وَأَشَبَّهُهُ وَأَنْفَاعُوا مَا كَتَبَ الَّذِينَ كُلُوهُ وَأَشَبَّهُوا حَتَّى تَبِينَ أَنْفَسَ الْحَيَاةِ الْأَيَّامِ مِنَ الْحَيَاةِ الْأَيَّامِ مِنَ الْفُجُرِ فَأَنْفَعُوا مَا كَتَبَ الَّذِينَ كُلُوهُ فَأَنْفَعُوا مَا كَتَبَ الَّذِينَ كُلُوهُ وَأَشَبَّهُوا حَتَّى تَبِينَ أَنْفَسَ الْحَيَاةِ الْأَيَّامِ مِنَ الْحَيَاةِ الْأَيَّامِ مِنَ الْفُجُرِ فَأَنْفَعُوا مَا كَتَبَ الَّذِينَ كُلُوهُ فَأَنْفَعُوا مَا كَتَبَ الَّذِينَ كُلُوهُ وَأَشَبَّهُوا حَتَّى تَبِينَ أَنْفَسَ الْحَيَاةِ الْأَيَّامِ مِنَ الْحَيَاةِ الْأَيَّامِ مِنَ الْفُجُرِ فَأَنْفَعُوا مَا كَتَبَ الَّذِينَ كُلُوهُ فَأَنْفَعُوا مَا كَتَبَ الَّذِينَ كُلُوهُ</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Āyah [Q. 2:187] clearly identifies for those who are fasting when they are allowed to eat, drink, and copulate during Ramadan, i.e. during fasting. Fasting, however, does not pertain only to Ramadan; Muslims can fast voluntarily on other days besides Ramadan. The main point is that during fasting, Muslims refrain from eating, drinking, and sexual relations just before dawn until sunset. When Muslims were first ordered to fast, they thought they could perform such actions only between sunset (maghrib) and when the red thread or twilight has disappeared from the sky (‘ishā’). There are some versions that say a Muslim was allowed to eat, drink, or have sexual relations with his/her spouse after maghrib until ‘ishā’ or he/she sleeps, i.e. if he/she sleeps before ‘ishā’ then they are not allowed to perform such actions until the next sunset, which was a great hardship for many Muslims (az-Zamakhshari M., 1998a; ibn Kathīr, 2000; abū Hayyān, 1993; ath-Tha'alabī, 1997; at-Ṭabarī, 2001). It is said that some of the Companions of the Prophet (Ṣahābah) contravened this order by having sexual relations with their wives after ‘ishā’; accordingly, some repented of what they had done and came to the Prophet to enquire how to be granted remission [from Allah] for their sins. On this account, it is believed that this āyah was revealed to show that fasting starts from dawn (fajr) and continues until sunset (maghrib) (ibid.). In other words, eating, drinking, or having sexual relations with a spouse are permissible between maghrib and fajr.
As to the kināyah expressions used in this āyah, they are ُنِبَاشِرُوهُنَّ َلِزنَفَتَ إِبْنِسَانِكُمْ. According to the exegetical literatures56, the first expression ُنِبَاشِرُوهُنَّ َلِزنَفَتَ إِبْنِسَانِكُمْ is a kināyah for ‘sexual intercourse’. Some exegetes believe it is includes any type of erotic talk or amatory behaviour that usually happens between husband and wife (see Riḍā (1947), al-Qurtubī (2006), and ash-Shawkānī (2007). That is because, linguistically, one of the meanings of the word ُنِفَتَ is obscene and amatory behaviour (Lane, 1968; Wehr, 1976; Penrice, 1991; Farid, 2006). Farid adds “all acts and talks leading to and including coition such as amatory talk, kissing, caressing, embracing, compressing, etc.” (2006, p. 334). However, some exegetes explain that since ُنِفَتَ is followed by the preposition َيَنُوْرُ ُهُنَّ ِبْنِسَانِكُمْ to mean ُنِفَتَ he went to (أُفْسِي إلِى) [his wife] which he lead to the sense of performing sexual intercourse. Hence, it used as a kināyah for sexual intercourse for euphemistic purposes just like ُبِنَاشِرُوْهُنَّ َلِبَرَصَتِ إِبْنِسَانِكُمْ in this same āyah or like: (وَعَدَ أُفْسِي إلِي ُبِبَرَصَتِ إِبْنِسَانِكُمْ) [Q. 2:222], [Q. 2:237], [Q. 4:21] (فَنَفِي أُفْسِي إلِي ُبِبَرَصَتِ إِبْنِسَانِكُمْ) [Q. 2:223], [Q. 4:24], [Q. 4:43], [Q. 4:40], [Q. 7:189] (Riḍā, 1947; ar-Rāzi, 1981; abū Ḥayyān 1993; al-Alūsī, 1994; az-Zamakhsharī, 1998a; al-Qurtubī, 2006). Moreover, az-Zamakhsharī (1998a) argues that the reason for using ُنِفَتَ as a kināyah for sexual intercourse despite its possible original vulgar meaning, and contrary to the other euphemistic expressions, is to censure the act of those who were unfaithful to themselves (كَتَبَ نَفَتُوهُمْ أُفْسِي إلِي ُهُنَّ [his wife]) before lawfulness.

The word ُنِفَتَ appears again in [Q. 2:197], an āyah related to Hajj. Exegetes, such as ar-Rāzi (1981), abū Ḥayyān (1993), ath-Thaʿālabī (1997), ath-Thaʿlabī (2002), and ash-Shawkānī (2007), imply that the great majority of authorities believe that ُنِفَتَ here is also used for sexual intercourse. The exegetes do, however, point that some believe that it is only related to lewd/erotic talk or amatory behaviour. Abū Ḥayyān (1993), ibn Kathīr (2000), at-Ṭabarī (2001), and ath-Thaʿlabī (2002) explain that some say that ُنِفَتَ is a comprehensive word that encompasses whatever a man wants from his wife and could include embracing, flirtation, or foreplay. Abū Ḥayyān argues that all the suggested previous meanings revolve around sexual intercourse or something that is not decent for a person in ِيَحَرَم (garment of a Makkah pilgrim)/performing Hajj due the sanctity of the Hajj, which we believe is a logical opinion similar to that of az-Zamakhsharī.

The other kināyah in [Q. 2:187] is and while talking about earlier, we mentioned that some exegetes pointed out that is a kināyah for sexual intercourse similar to other euphemistic expressions which included沮丧ون. Linguistically, the verb has several meanings, such as to undertake, pursue, practice, perform, or carry out (Lane, 1968, p. 207). However, the object that occurs with the verb باشر determines its meaning. For example, when the word واضحة occurs with باشر, then the meaning of باشر will be one of the aforementioned conventional meanings; but with the word زوجة (spouse/wife) as in باشر زوجته then the meaning of باشر refers to sexual intercourse. As a result, the phrase بشهر زوجته in this context apparently means ‘to have sexual intercourse’ because in this word is an Arabic plural feminine object pronoun ‘them’ that refers to ‘spouses’.

Some exegetes suggest that the sense of intercourse in باشر comes from the fact that derives from the word البشر (skin), and the meaning of البشرة المرآة originally is touching the skin of the woman, which surely happens with intercourse (ar-Rāzī, 1981; Ṭanṭāwī, 1992; abū Ḥayyān, 1993, al-Alūsī, 1994; al-Bayḍāwī, 1998; at-Ṭabarī, 2001; ath-Thaʿlabī, 2002; al-Qurṭubī, 2006). Therefore, a few suggest that باشر in this āyah refers to touching rather than intercourse (cf. ʿUmar, 2008, p. 207), but the exegetes confirm it is used for intercourse.

Most dictionaries also indicate that باشر in this context refers to sexual intercourse (see ibn Manẓūr, 1980, p. 287; Mujammaʿ al-Lughati al-ʿArabiyyah, 1989, p. 133; Penrice, 1991, p. 17; Farid, 2006, p. 70). Lane provides the following:

وبشرة باشر المرأة، and باشرة باشر المرأة man was, or became, in contact with the woman, skin to skin; or in the sense of he was, or became, in contact with the woman, skin to skin: he enjoyed [contact with] her skin: both being in one garment or piece of cloth: he lay with her, [skin to skin; or in the sense of]” (Lane, 1968, p. 207, author’s italics).

Kināyah 15, 16, and 17

لا تقرَبُوهُنَّ؛ كَيْنَى: 15؛ كَيْنَى: 16؛ كَيْنَى: 17

(أتيت بالمرأة أو الرجل) أَوَّهُنَّ: 17

وَمُسَلَّمْتُكَ عَنِ الْمُحِيضِ فَلَنَّ أَدْفَعَ ﻃَارِظَةِ الْنِّسَاءِ فِي الْمُحِيضِ وَلَا تَقَرَّبُوهُنَّ ﴿۱۵﴾ حَتَّى يَتَطَهَّرْنَ إِذَا تَطَهَّرُنَّ ﴿۱۶﴾ فَأَقْضُوهُنَّ مِنْ حَيْثُ أَمَرَكُمُ اللَّهُ ﴿۱۷﴾ ﴿۲:٢٢٢﴾ آية 222-223, سورة البقرة [222-223]
The *kināyah* expressions here are رفَت و لا تَنْطَوُهُنْ إِغْتَرُوْلاً النِّسَاء, and , ْمَبَارِشةُ الزُّوْجَة. Similarly to رفَت, and all three expressions here are too related to sexual intercourse, which means that euphemism is also the purpose of usage (Ridā, 1947; ibn ʿĀshūr, 1984; Ṭanṭāwī, 1992; al-Alūsī, 1994; al-Baḍāwī, 1998; az-Zamakhsharī, 1998a; ash-Shawkānī, 2007). Az-Zamakhsharī (1998a) and other exegetes or rhetoricians have pointed out that such expressions and other similar ones are one of the courteous *kināyah* expressions and favourable indirect references used in the Quran for sexual intercourse (cf. al-Ḥayānī, 2014, pp. 82-109; aṣ-Ṣābūnī, 2009). This is evident in most of the exegetical literature. Some dictionaries also show that what is meant by these expression is sexual intercourse. For example, Farid mentions that اَتَّلَقَ اَنْفَا means either “[h]e came to her” or “he lay with her” and that اَتَّلَقَ اَنْفَا means “[d]o you commit sodomy with males” (2006, p. 5; cf. Lane, 1968, p. 15; Mujammaᶜ al-Lughati al-ᶜArabiyah, 1989, p. 14; ʿUmar, 2008, p. 58; Mustafa, et al., 2004, p. 4). Additionally, for Lane state that فِرْقَيْتُ اَلْمُرَأَةَ is “a metonymical [sic] phrase, meaning *I compressed the woman*” (1968, p. 2504; cf. Farid, 2006, p. 689; Mujammaᶜ al-Lughati al-ᶜArabiyah, 1989, p. 889; Mustafa, et al., 2004, p. 723).

As to the brief understanding of the whole context, various exegetes suggest the men of the pre-Islamic age used to distance themselves from their spouses during their menstrual period just like the Jews used to do (cf. abū Ḥayyān, 1993; az-Zamakhsharī, 1998a; ath-Thaᶜālabī, 1997; ibn Kathīr, 2000). That is to say, a man would refrain from sitting, eating, drinking, sleeping in the same bed, and some even say living in the same house with his spouse when she was going through menstruation. The Prophet Muhammad was asked by his Companions about this situation and therefore *āyah* [Q. 2: 222] was revealed to the Prophet to show that the discharge of the menstrual period is squalid and harmful. Hence, sexual intercourse during menstruation is prohibited, and is only permitted once the wife takes a shower after the end of her menstruation. Apart from intercourse, there is no harm or reason for the husband to abandon his wife. Some exegetes, such as ath-Thaᶜālabī (2002), az-Zamakhsharī (1998a), and abū Ḥayyān (1993), claim that there is another version regarding the revelation of this *āyah*. They asserted that the Christians used to pay no heed to menstruation and continue to have intercourse with their wives during their menstrual period whereas the Jews (ath-Thaᶜālabī and az-Zamakhsharī included the Majus) used to distance themselves and leave their wives in the lurch without help. On account of that, the *āyah* was revealed to guide men to be moderate, that is to say, neither should they totally distance themselves from their wives during their menstruation nor leave them in the lurch nor should they have sexual intercourse. In other words, men
should live together with their wives during their menstruation as usual but without any physical intercourse. Furthermore, at-Ṭabarî (2001) adds another version for the revelation of this āyah. He states that men used to avoid having sexual intercourse with their wives through the vagina during menstruation, and perform anal intercourse instead. So, they asked the Prophet regarding this matter and, therefore, the āyah was revealed to the Prophet.

The expressions اعتزلوها النساء (lit. seclude yourselves from women), and لا تقتربوا منهن (lit. do not approach/come near or close to them [women]) could literally refer to the sense of distancing oneself from the spouse during her menstruation if the expressions were taken out of context. Doing so would in fact support the actions of the men during the pre-Islamic era, hence the āyah was revealed to prohibit such actions. However, the clauses إنكم لنتأثرون الرجال شهوة من دون النساء (lit. approach them [have intercourse] from where Allah has ordered you) and إنكم لنتأثرون النساء حزش لَكمْ أثاثكم (lit. your women are [like] tilth [place of cultivation] for you, so come to your tilth however you wish) can serve as indicators or clues for the recipient to comprehend the actual intended meaning. The women are likened to cultivated land in terms of producing babies, or as Lane describes it: the wives “are thus likened to places that are ploughed for sowing” (1968, p. 542). This shows that the main purpose of having intercourse is to have children, and since the vagina is the only place where the sperm can be ejaculated for pregnancy, then that should help in understanding that the intended meaning of اعتزال الزوجة, والاقتراب من الزوجة is sexual intercourse. It also demonstrates that intercourse is permitted only through the woman’s vagina, which is also evident in the Prophet’s saying (Sunni hadīth) mentioned in the exegetical literature. The clause إنكم لنتأثرون النساء في المحيض could also help the addressee reach the intended meaning. According to abū Ḥayyān (1993), some say that the mīḥāṣ refers to the place of menstruation, i.e. the vagina during menstruation, rather than period itself (cf. ar-Rāzī 1981). It is worthy to mention that the word أثاث in the sense of performing intercourse (but with men, i.e. sodomy) also occurs in the following āyahs:

Both [Q. 4:43] and [Q. 5:6] are quite similar in terms of meaning related to the requirements of performing prayer. That is to say, they both instruct Muslims about what state they should be in in terms of purity (ablution) before performing prayers. The first āyah slightly differs from the second by including the prohibition of performing prayers while being intoxicated (drunk), because in a drunken state a person would not understand the meaning of what he/she is saying. It is worth mentioning that this āyah was revealed before the complete prohibition of alcoholic consumption as in [Q. 2: 219] and [Q. 5: 90-91]. However, Muslims are obligated to be in a purity state to perform prayer, and therefore there are some actions that are known to revoke this purity. For example, the discharge of urine, excrement, or wind, which are known in the principles of Islamic jurisprudence as ḥadath aṣghar (minor ritual impurity), revokes a person’s state of purity and requires that person to wash some parts of his body which is known as waḍū’ (performance of ritual ablution) before performing prayers. Also, menstrual and postnatal periods, sexual intercourse, discharge of semen, and suchlike, which are known in the principles of Islamic jurisprudence as ḥadath akbar (major ritual impurity) revoke a person’s state of purity, but in this situation that person must wash his/her complete body in order to perform prayers. It is worth mentioning that sexual intercourse, the discharge of semen (due to sexual intercourse or not), or the woman’s ejaculation of fluid due to orgasm (due to sexual intercourse or not) are called janābah. In this case, he/she is obligated to perform a “total ablution” (Lane, 1968, p. 465) which is known as ghusl or igtīsāl (ibid: 2259) in order to perform prayers. Both [Q. 4:43] and [Q. 5:6], however, instruct Muslims to perform tayammum (dry ablution), if water is not available or there is a serious reason for not being able to use water, in both types of ritual ablution, i.e.
waḍūʾ or ghusl. Tayammum is to strike both palms of your hand on clean ground, sand, soil, rock, stone, or suchlike and then swipe your palms on your face from the top of the forehead, and then swipe the hands from the wrist to the tip of the fingers.

As we have noticed in previous kināyah examples, the Qur’an never uses filthy, indecent, and immodest words, or terms that are culturally or socially unacceptable. On that account, the discharge of urine or excrement is referred to by the kināyah expression الغائط (see Riḍā, 1947; ibn ʿĀshūr, 1984; Ṭanṭāwī, 1992; abū Ḥayyān, 1993; al-Alūsī, 1994; at-Ṭabarī, 2001; ath-Thaᶜlabi, 2002; ash-Shawkānī, 2007). According to Lane (1968, p. 2309), ibn Manẓūr (1980, p. 3316), Mustafa, et al., (2004, p. 666), and Farid (2006, p. 628) the original meaning of the word الغائط is a wide low piece of ground. In former times, when a person wanted to discharge any type of excrement, i.e. urine or faeces, he/she used to go to a low depressed area of ground away from the eyes of others. From that sense, the word الغائط became a kināyah for the discharge of urine, excrement, and wind (ibid.) and through time it became lexicalised. So, the clause ‘ِئآَغْلِمِكِّنَمَّ’(lit. one of you came from low depressed area of ground) refers to the discharge of any type of excrement including wind (Mujammaᶜ al-Lughati al-ᶜArabiyah, 1989, p. 828; ʿUmar, 2008, p. 1651).

The other kināyah is لَآَمَسْتُمُّ النَّسَاء (lit. you touched women). According to ibn Manẓūr (1980, p. 4072), one of the main literal meanings of the word لَآَمَسْتُمُّ النَّسَاء, or لَآَمْسُنَّ or لَآَمْسُنَّ is ‘to touch’, and it is also used as a kināyah expression for sexual intercourse. The majority of the Qur’anic exegetes agree that لَآَمْسُنَّ in this context is a kināyah for sexual intercourse, but they do, however, point out that there are a few scholars who argue that لَآَمْسُنَّ is not used figuratively, and the intended meaning is its actual literal meaning, i.e. to touch (Riḍā, 1947; ibn ʿĀshūr, 1984; Ṭanṭāwī, 1992; abū Ḥayyān, 1993; al-Alūsī, 1994; al-Bayḍāwī, 1998; ibn Kathīr, 2000; at-Ṭabarī, 2001; ath-Thaᶜlabi, 2002; ash-Shawkānī, 2007). Those who support the latter opinion have also different views. Some argue that the meaning of ‘touching’ in both āyahs comprises any type of touching between a male and female, including a kiss, and that they have to perform waḍūʾ to regain purity. Others claim that it is touching with sexual desire (without intercourse). Some believe that it is the touching of a man’s skin to a woman’s skin (for example, a handshake) who he can be married to (a non-mahram), and vice versa.

On the other hand, the majority, who believe that لَآَمْسُنَّ in this context is a kināyah for sexual intercourse, claim that the Qur’an never contains taboo words or words that are not socially or culturally acceptable and they are replaced by kināyah expressions for
euphemistic reasons. They believe that the word لامس as a kināyah for sexual intercourse is not only used in the above to āyahs, but also in [Q. 2: 237] and [Q. 33: 49] through the synonym مس (as we will later see). Furthermore, they provide several statements that support their argument. For example, one of the traditional Sunni sayings from ʿĀ’isha (one of the Prophet’s wives) says that the Prophet sometimes used to kiss her after performing wadā‘ which indicates that touching or even a kiss does not revoke wadā‘. The following popular archaic Arabic expression for a woman who engages in adultery and fornication supports the former opinion of scholars due to the use of one of the derivatives of the word lams to refer to sexual intercourse:

وكان ابن عباس يقول: اللسان واللسان والفعلنَّة كذآبة عن الجمع، وَمما يندفع به على صحة
( ibn Manṣūr, 1980, p. 4072, my emphasis)

One says, of a woman who commits adultery, or fornication, or acts viciously, لا تمنع بيد لامس فلانة لا ترد بيد لامس or فلاة لا ترد بيد لامس, but the latter is at variance with the authorities, the former being the phrase commonly known, [properly signifying, Such a woman does not repel the hand of a feeler;] meaning, such a woman commits adultery, or fornication, and acts viciously, not repelling from herself anyone who desires of her that he may lie with her; and she is suspected of easiness, or compliance, towards him who desires of her that he may lie with her” (Lane, 1968, p. 2674, author’s italics).

Additionally, if we go back to al-Jurjānī’s definition of kināyah we can notice that ‘touching’ is associated with sexual intercourse, especially given that there is no intercourse without one touching the other. Besides, janābah or its derivative jumub, as mentioned in the āyahs, is one of the results of intercourse. Therefore, we can conclude that the word لامس in this context is used in order to allude to and attest the sense of ‘intercourse’.

Kināyah 20

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Kināyah 20:</th>
<th>مس (lams) in [Q. 3:47], [Q. 19:20], [Q. 2:236-237], [Q. 33:49], and [Q. 58:3-4]</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>قالت أنّي يكون لي ولدّ ولم يعمسنني بيصرّ قال كذالك الله يحلّ ما يشأ إذا قضى أمهُ فإنما يقولُ لهُ كَنْ في كُنْ (Q. 3:47, سورة ال عمران)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>قالت أنّي يكون لي غلام ولم يعمسنني بيصرّ ولم كُنَّ بِعَلِمٍ (Q. 20:20, سورة مريم)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>لَوْ نَجَاهُمْ عِلْيَمُهُمْ إِنَّمَا لَمْ يَعْمَسُنَّهُمْ أَوْ لَمْ تَضَرَّعْنَهُمْ أوَ لَتَضَرِّعْنَهُمْ فِي الْفُرُضِينَ لَهَكذا فَرَضَتْنَهُمْ لَهُنَّ فِي مَا فَرَضْتُوهُمْ، إِنَّمَا تَمَسَّكُوهُمْ أَنْ يُؤَخِذُوْنَهُمْ (Q. 3:47, سورة ال عمران)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The first two āyāh extracts, i.e. [Q. 3:47] and [Q. 19:20], show Mary’s astonishment when she was told by one of God’s angels that she was going to get pregnant with a boy called Jesus. Obviously, Mary was astounded to hear this news especially given that she had never got married and neither had she slept with any man in her entire life. That is to say, Mary had never experienced any type of intercourse, and since pregnancy normally occurs only through intercourse, she questioned, in an astonished way, how she got pregnant while she was still a virgin.

As for the third extract, [Q. 2:236-237], it discusses an issue related to one of the woman’s rights after divorce. It elucidates what the bridegroom owes his bride if the divorce occurs before they have slept together, i.e. copulating with each other, in terms of mahr (Islamic dowry or bridal gift)\(^7\). The difference between the two is whether the amount of mahr has been decided on or not before copulation. For instance, if a man and woman get married legally (obtain a contract of marriage) and they have agreed on a specific mahr, then decide not to go through the marriage and get a divorce before they copulate (have intercourse) with each other, the bride is entitled to half the mahr. On the other hand, if they have not agreed on a specific mahr then the groom shall grant the bride whatever he considers is acceptable depending on his capability. However, the key issue here is whether they had sexual intercourse or not. That is because if they did have sexual intercourse it would affect the adjudication according to the principles of Islamic jurisprudence.

The fourth extract, [Q. 33:49], is also pertinent to the adjudication of divorce in general and to the previous extract in particular. As we pointed out in the previous extract, copulation is the key factor and it would affect the adjudication according to the principles of Islamic jurisprudence, namely the ‘iddah of the woman\(^8\). Accordingly, this āyah

\(^{7}\) Mahr or “bridal gift” is “the gift which the bridegroom has to give to the bride when the contract of marriage is made and which becomes the property of the wife” (Bosworth, et al., 1991, p. 78)

\(^{8}\) ‘Iddat al-mar’ah is “[t]he days of menstruation of a woman, which she numbers, when she has been divorced, or when her husband has died; [until expiration of which she may not marry again; the period being; in case of a divorced woman, not pregnant, that of three menstruations]; or [in case of a pregnant

-176-
extract explains that there is no ʿiddah for a divorced woman if no sexual intercourse was performed between the husband and wife.

Again the fifth extract, [Q. 58:3-4] is related to the adjudication of divorce. During the pre-Islamic period, some men who wanted to divorce their wives used to liken their wives to their mothers by saying the following: ‘you are to me as the back of my mother’ which is called ẓihār (Lane, 1968, p. 1927; see ibn Manẓūr, 1980, p. 2770). That is to say, “the man who uttered this sentence estranged himself from his wife” (Lane, 1968, p. 1927).

According to the Qur’anic exegetes, a woman came to the Prophet Muhammad and complained to him that her husband said to her the aforementioned sentence and the Prophet said to her that she was no longer marriageable to him. The discussion between the woman and the Prophet went on and the Prophet insisted that she was unmarriageable to her husband anymore, so she forwarded her complaint to God to seek help to resolve the situation. On account of this, sūrat al-Mujādilah was revealed and presented a solution for ẓihār. The solution states that if a man utters ẓihār and then decides to go back on it, he should pay kaffārah (atonement) before he is allowed to return to his wife and perform copulation. The atonement required by the husband is to free a slave, or if one cannot do that then he should fast for two months continuously, and if he also cannot do that, then he is required to feed 60 persons who are poor before the couple are allowed to perform intercourse.

Based on the above, and according to the exegetes, the expressions لَمْ يَمْضِسْنِيُّ بْشَرَّ (no person has touched me), ما لَمْ نَمْسُوهُمْ (you have not yet touched them), قُلْ أَنْ نَمْسُوهُمْ (before you touch them), and قُلْ أَنْ يَمْسَاهُمَا (before they touch each other) are kināyah expressions for sexual intercourse (ibn ʿĀshūr, 1984; Ţanṭāwī, 1992; al-Alūsī, 1994; al-Ḥayānī, 2014, pp. 92-95; aş-Ṣābūnī, 1981; Mujammāʿ al-Lughati al-ʿArabiyyah, 1989, p. 1044). Consequently, the word ‘massa’ (to touch; to feel) and some of its derivatives are used as a kināyah for sexual intercourse (Lane, 1968, p. 2711; ibn Manẓūr, 1980, p. 4201) and it is considered a synonym of the word ‘lams’. The use of both words as a kināyah for sexual intercourse is obvious and logical in Qur’anic discourse since touching is unavoidable in intercourse.
This āyah pertains to the marriage law in Islam. It sheds light on the women whom men are forbidden to marry due to parentage, kinship, affinity, and relations the like, such as mothers, stepmothers, sisters, stepsisters, aunts, daughters, stepdaughters, daughters’ in-law, nieces, and so on. The kināyah expression stated in this āyah is دخلّت بهُنّ (lit. you entered in to them) and it is to indicate having ‘sexual intercourse’ with the women you have married (al-Ḥayānī, 2014, p. 96). Generally, the phrasal verb دخل بـ (to enter into …), used with a female object, indicates the meaning of sexual intercourse as in دخل زوجته (he entered in to his wife) or دخل بمرأة (he entered in to a woman).

As we mentioned earlier, this āyah pertains to judgments related to laws of marriage; therefore, there is no room for misinterpretation. Yet, some scholars suggest that بٌسانيمان the latter دخلت بهنّ indicates marriage; others say that it refers to disrobing and not necessarily having intercourse. Lexicons provide various meanings. For instance, Muṣāmmah al-Lughati al-ʿArabiyyah say it means becoming alone with them in a married state (1989, p. 396). Mustafa et al. indicate that when دخل collocates with ‘bride’ دخل بالعروس it refers to being alone with her (2004, p. 275). Umar provides two meanings: he was alone with her and he got married to her and had sexual intercourse (2008, p. 727). Badawi and Abdel Haleem believe it means to consummate marriage (2008, p. 301).

Lane, on the other hand, provides a detailed explanation that supports the view refers to the sense of performing intercourse:

[... دخل عليها ... He came in upon him: and also he came upon him: i.e. invaded him.] And دخل بالعروس. دخل بالعروس and دخل بالعروس i.e. He went into his wife or woman, is a metonymically [sic] phrase, denoting the جماع, the general, whether it be such as is allowed by the law or such as is forbidden, generally such as is lawful [see what is said in explanation of the term دخلة ... ] (1968, p. 858).

In his explanation of دخلة, Lane provides the following:

And one says, دخل, inf. n. دخلة He was, or became, alone with his wife: but [properly speaking, according to the law,] the term دخلة in دخلة صحية in
this case] is not used unless it be with the enjoyment of دخُول بِهِنْ، and then it has the effect upon the circumstances of the marriage [by its rendering obligatory the payment of the dowry, though consummation has not taken place]: if with consummation, the act is termed دخُول " (ibid., p. 803, author’s italics, my boldness)

Al-Ḥayānī (2014, p. 97) asserts دخُول بِهِنْ, which is clearly a خنَّایة for sexual intercourse, but at the same time the sense of الدخُول (entering/going in) in this expression holds both the canonical (basic non-figurative) meaning and the figurative meaning. The true meaning is in ‘entering/going into’ which, according to al-Ḥayānī, refers to ‘going into bed with your wife’, which leads to the figurative meaning ‘having sexual intercourse’. In other words, the canonical meaning here is a medium to reach the intended meaning. (ibid.).

Nonetheless, those who suggest that الدخُول refers to marriage and not ‘sexual intercourse’ should take into consideration [Q. 2: 236-237], [Q. 33: 49], and [Q. 58: 3-4] (discussed in the previous خنَّایة), which shows the importance of ‘having sexual intercourse’ in decisions related to the state of marriage. As a whole, the majority of exegetes (see ar-Rāzī, 1981; abū Ḥayyān, 1993; al-Alūsī, 1994; ath-Thaᶜālabī, 1997; az-Zamakhsharī, 1998a; al-Bayḍāwī, 1998), however, agree that الدخُول بالمرأة indicates ‘having sexual intercourse’.

**Kināyah 22**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Kināyah 22 in [Q. 4:21]</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>فَإِنَّ أَرْزَعْتُ أَسْتَبِداً زَوْجٍ مَكَّانٌ زَوْجٍ وَأَتَّبَعْتُ إِخْتِذَاً قِطَارًا فَلاٍّ تَأَخَّذُونَهُ مَنْ شَيْئًا؟ أَتَأَخَّذُونَهُ بِهِتَانَا وَإِلَيْهَا مَيْتُ يَا أَبْنَيَا <em>وكَيْفَ تَأَخَّذُونَهُ وَفَدُ أَفْضَى بُضَاعَةً إِلَى بَضْعَٰٓ أَوْحَشَانَ مَتَّكِمَ مَيْتًا غَلِيطًا</em>) آية 20-21، سورة النساء 4-20</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The above āyahs makes clear that no man has the right to take back from his wife the mahr or any wealth given if he chooses to divorce her and marry another woman unless she has committed an evident act of adultery with substantiation. Without such a shameful act, the husband has no justification to claim the mahr, specifically after intimacy and sexual relations between the couple, not to mention the covenant between the two.

The sexual relation is expressed through أَفْضَى إِلَى بَضْعَٰٓ (lit. trans.: you have [already] came to be in the space of one another). Linguistically, the word أَفْضَى is derived from the word فُضْا which is ‘a spacious empty space or place’ (Lane, 1968, p. 2414; ibn Manẓūr, 1980, pp. 3430-3431). However, when the verb أَفْضَى is connected to the preposition إِلَى (to) it means ‘to reach’ as in أَفْضَى فِلَانٍ إِلَى فِلَانٍ (X reached Y), which
originally means that X came to be in the sight, place, or quarter of Y (ibid.). Additionally, if X is considered as a male person and Y as a female person that means that X secluded himself with Y, that is to say, he came to be alone with her in a private place. This sense suggests that X had some sort of skin-to-skin contact with Y in private, which implies sexual intercourse, as in إفﻀﻰ الرجﻞ إلﻰ امرأة (he copulated with his wife) (ibid.; Farid, 2006, pp. 656-657). In virtue of this construal, the great majority of exegetes believe that كفيف تأخذونا وقد أفضى بغضكم إلى بغض ‘is a kināyah for sexual intercourse (see Riḍā, 1947; ar-Rāzī, 1981; aṣ-Ṣābūnī, 1981; al-Alūsī, 1994; ath-Thaᶜālabī, 1997; ibn Kathīr, 200; aṭ-Ṭabarī, 2001; ath-Thaᶜālabī, 2002). Therefore, some dictionaries give the same sense (cf. ibn Manẓūr, 1980, p. 3430; Penrice, 1991, p. 111; ᶜUmar, 2008, p. 1720; Badawi & Abdel Haleem, 2008, p. 716). In spite of the unanimous agreement above that the expression is a kināyah for intercourse, ar-Rāzī (1981), abū Ḥayyān (1993), Riḍā (1947), al-Alūsī (1994), ibn al-Jawzī (2002) and others point out that there are some clerics who relate it only to ‘seclusion’ (خلوة), irrespective of whether sexual intercourse occurs or not. Still, they assert that it is a kināyah for sexual intercourse.

Ar-Rāzī provides a convincing argument as to why كفيف تأخذونا وقد أفضى بغضكم إلى بغض is not خلوة but a kināyah for intercourse. He claims that أفضى بغضكم إلى بغض means that the man came to be in the quarter of that woman or her lap, which, in reality, only happens during sexual intercourse. Additionally, ar-Rāzī explains that the preposition إلﻰ after the word إفﻀاء interprets an action that is done and finished, while in a mere خلوة there is no action completed from one person to another (cf. Lane 1968, p. 2414). Ar-Rāzī also clarifies that the phrase إفﻀاء إلﻰ is stated in an admonitory manner within an exclamatory sentence (وكتيف تأخذونا وقد أفضى بغضكم إلى بغض). He believes that intercourse is one of the signs that reflects a strong bond and affection between a husband and wife, which would not occur in a mere khalwah; hence the censure and exclamation regarding those men who dare take back what they have given after this intimate relationship. Therefore, ar-Rāzī affirms that this is a kināyah for sexual intercourse.

Al-Alūsī makes a similar argument. He explicates that the Arabs tend to state implicitly any words that are rude, shameful, taboo, or socially unacceptable, such as those referring to sexual intercourse, i.e. they express such notions through kināyah. Accordingly, he believes there is nothing wrong with khalwah خلوة, hence no need to express it through a kināyah. That is to say, people are not abashed by uttering khalwah explicitly, while on the contrary they would be in relation to sexual intercourse. Therefore, al-Alūsī believes that there is no doubt that أفضى بغضكم إلى بغض is a kināyah for sexual intercourse.
Al-Ḩayānī (2014, pp. 86-87) also agrees that ًفَضْلُكَ إِلَى يَغِيب ًis a *kināyah* for intercourse without question. However, al-Ḩayānī points out that sexual intercourse is not the only sense conveyed through this figurative expression. He argues that the act of intercourse conveyed here is mutual. In addition to this mutuality, the image of intimacy, affection, and passion, which is gained through marital companionship, is conveyed too. On the other hand, these images of marital companionship do not exist in a mere *khalwah*, which demonstrates that the expression is a *kināyah* for intercourse, especially given that the context is related to divorce. As a result, the āyah expresses censure of those men who decide, after all this companionship, to slander their wives in order to take back the *mahr* or any wealth given to them.

**Kināyah 23 and 24**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Kināyah 23</th>
<th>Kināyah 24</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>النشورُ (الزوجة/الزوج) in [Q.4:34] and [Q.4:128]</td>
<td>هجر الزوجة في المضجع: in [Q.4:34]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(الزوجانَ قُوِّامُونَ على النساء، بما فضَّل الله بغضُّهم على بعضٍ... fas-salāhabit fātiḥat)</td>
<td>(وَإٰخِرَتِ الأَنْفُسِ السَّحْحِ، وَإٰخِرَتِ الأَنْفُسِ السَّحْحِ، وَأَخَذَتِنَا وَأَخَذَتُنَا فَإٰنَّ اللهُ كَانَ بَالَّٰغِيًا، أَيَّة ٣٤، النساء [Q.4:34]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>فِيْنَ أَمْتَنَكُمْ فَلاَ تَبْغَوا عَلَيْهِمْ سَبِيلًا ۚ إِنَّ اللهَ كَانَ عَلِيًّا كِرِيبًا) أَيَّة ٣٤، النساء.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In general, both āyahs are related to the relationship between husband and wife. The first āyah, according to the exegetes, illustrates that men in the main are responsible for the protection and sustaining of women. This is mainly due to the general nature of men, in terms of physical or mental endurance and suchlike. This dominion given to men, however, should be used according to the Sharia. That is to say, men should not abuse this authority and oppress, scorn, or disparage women in any way. In return, women should be loyal, compliant and dutiful to their husbands as long as this does not involve wrongdoing in terms of the Sharia. Furthermore, they should preserve their chasteness, and maintain their husbands’ wealth and rights, especially during their absence. If by any chance, a wife becomes vainglorious, insolent, egocentric, or defiant to her husband, he, the husband, then should take three disciplinary measures. At first, he should advise her and remind her to fear God and not to disobey His directives concerning the woman’s obligation towards her husband. It is said that the husband should remind her of the Prophetic Hadith that says: “If I were to command anyone to prostrate themselves (سجودُ سجدة: kneeling with both hands and forehead touching the ground) before anyone, I would have commanded the wife to prostrate herself before her husband, because of the
enormity of his right upon her” (abū Ḥayyān, 1993; al-Alūsī, 1994; ibn Kathīr, 2000). If she fails to comply, then he should opt for the second step which is to avoid sleeping with her, i.e. having intercourse with her. If she still insists in her ill-mannered behaviour towards him, then he should go for the third step which permits him to strike her. The third step, however, should be according to the Sharia, that is to say, the striking should not be on the face, nor intensely, and definitely not injuring her. Ibn ʿAbbās states that the striking should be via a siwāk (a small twig the size of a pencil used as a toothbrush) or something similar (abū Ḥayyān, 1993 ; al-Alūsī, 1994). This shows that by no means is the husband allowed to injure his wife. If the wife, at any stage, returns to her senses, i.e. stops her misbehaviour towards her husband, then he should forgive her and not take any advantage of the whole situation. However, the āyah following the first extract, i.e. [Q.4: 35], demonstrates that if the couple fear that their dispute may lead to a divorce, then they should resort to two wise men, one from each side, to arbitrate their dispute.

The defiance of the wife is conveyed through the *kināyah* expression `nashūz`. Linguistically, `nashūz` is derived from the word `nash`, which is more or less similar in terms of sense to ‘high ground’ (ibn Manẓūr, 1980, p. 4425), in other words, “a high, or an elevated, place; … high, or elevated ground; … what rises from a valley to the [adjacent] ground” (Lane, 1968, p. 2795). Accordingly, when a woman is depicted as `nashūz` it means that she is defiant, especially with her marital obligations. That is because normally when a woman sees herself more elevated than her husband, in an ill-mannered way, her actions become vainglorious, insolent, or egocentric which leads to her to being disobedience. Similarly, when a man is depicted as `nashūz` it means that he sees himself more elevated than his wife, hence dislikes or mistreats her and neglects to fulfil his marital responsibilities, such as protection and provision. Therefore, according to the exegetes, the expression of `nashūz` in the first extract is for a disobedient wife, and in the second extract is for husband who mistreats his wife and distances himself from his marital duties. The way that `nashūz` is used as a *kināyah* for defiance reminds us of how *al-gaț* became a *kinayah* for the discharge of urine or excrement. One is from high ground while the other from low ground.

The other *kināyah* expression is `ahzōrūn` (lit. forsake them in bed). Linguistically, `ahgzi is the antonym of `waṣal, ‘to connect; to join; to unite’ (Lane, 1968, p. 3054; Wehr, 1976, p. 1072; ibn Manẓūr, 1980, p. 4616). In other words, `ahgzi means “abandonment, forsaking …; avoidance, abstention” (Wehr, 1976, p. 1019). In addition, linguistically the word `mṣmūj` is “a place in which, or which, one lies upon his side [or in any manner, or sleeps]; … [a bed]” (Lane, 1968, p. 1770). Although the majority of the
exegetes agree that what is meant by forsaking a wife in bed is mostly avoiding intercourse, some exegetes, if not all, shed some light on other explanations made by some clerics. The other explanations, apart from avoiding intercourse, are as follows:

- You should turn your back towards your defiant wife in bed; some add to this explanation the avoidance of copulation, and some argue that you should not speak with them too.
- You should only avoid speech and it should not exceed more than three days; some include the avoidance of copulation.
- You should not lay down with your wife in the same bed; some even believe that you should abandon the room where she sleeps.

The word ُهجر ْجَر with its current diacritical marks has several meanings in the Arabic lexicon, a fortiori with different diacritical marks. For example, ُهجر ‘hujr’ means ‘to speak harshly’, and thus some clerics argue that the above expression means ‘to speak harshly to your defiant wife in bed’ (see abū Ḥayyān, 1993). Furthermore, one of the meanings of ُهجر with a different diacritical mark as in ُهجر ‘hajjur’ is ‘to tie, or restrain’. Accordingly, some believe that the expression means ‘to coerce your defiant wife to have intercourse’ (see az-Zamakhsharī, 1998; Riḍā, 1947). Nonetheless, Riḍā (1947) argues that the expression is clearly a ُكنية for avoiding ‘sexual intercourse’ (cf. aṣ-Ṣābūnī, 1981; al-Alūsī 1994; az-Zamakhsharī , 1998), and therefore other explanations besides this are unacceptable. He adds that any other punishment, such as abandoning the bed itself or the whole room, is not authorised by Allah and it may in fact increase the aversion or estrangement between the couple instead of strengthening the relationship.

**Kināyah 25 and 26**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Kināyah 25: قاسرات الطرف</th>
<th>Kināyah 26: طمث المرأة</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>[Q. 37:48], [Q. 38:52], and [Q. 55:56]</td>
<td>[Q. 55:56] and [Q. 55:74]</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The above Qur’anic extracts describes one of the characters of women in heaven. Apart from being extremely beautiful, they are believed to be loyal, pure, and chaste. The
contentment, faithfulness, and modesty of these women in heaven are expressed through قاصرات الطَّرَف. Linguistically, the word قاصر is derived from قصر, which has several meanings, one of its typical meanings being ‘to shorten’, ‘to confine’, or ‘to restrain’ (Lane, 1968, p. 2532). As for the word الطَّرَف, it holds the meanings of ‘closing the eyelids on to each other’, ‘the movement of the eyelids while looking’ or mainly ‘sight’ (ibn Manẓūr, 1980, p. 2657), as well as the sense of ‘an eye’, ‘a glance’, or ‘sight of the eyes’ (Penrice, 1991, p. 90; Badawi & Abdel Haleem, 2008, p. 562). However, when the two words collocate, they describe a person who restrains his/her sight, a trait that usually belongs to a person who is faithful and modest (see Lane, 1968, p. 2535; Mujammaᶜ al-Lughati al-ᶜArabiyah, 1989, p. 706; Penrice, 1991, p. 90; Mustafa, et al., 2004, p. 739; Farid, 2006, p.696; Badawi & Abdel Haleem, 2008, p. 760; ᶜUmar, 2008, pp. 1821-1822;). In other words, قاصرات الطَّرَف in this context describes the women in Heaven, who, in spite of their outstanding beauty, do not look at anyone else besides their husbands, due to their faithfulness and modesty (aṣ-Ṣābūnī, 1981; ar-Rāzī , 1981). Al-Ḥayānī (2014, p. 102) argues that controlling the emotions and behaviour, of those women in heaven, is one of the physical characteristics of being content and modest. He believes that the kināyah expression in قاصرات الطَّرَف is an affective image of faithfulness and modesty of women in heaven and allows us to picture such contentedness. This visualisation is one of the features of kināyah that enables the addressee to picture one of the characters of women in heaven.

Another quality that women of heaven are known for is their continuous virginity. The notion of virginity, i.e. not having had intercourse before, is conveyed through the kināyah expression، لم يُطمَّثْنِ (no one has deflowered them). According to ibn Manẓūr (1980, p. 2701), the original meaning of الطَّرَف is ‘menstruation’, and sometimes it refers to ‘the beginning of menstruation’. He also states that ‘touching’ is one of the meaning that الطَّرَف holds, which touching itself is an expression for sexual intercourse (cf. Badawi & Abdel Haleem, 2008, p. 571). Moreover, ibn Manẓūr points out that الطَّرَف also signifies ‘blood and sexual intercourse’, i.e. intercourse with the causing of bleed, or, to put it in another way, sexual intercourse with a virgin, considering that the breakage of a hymen normally causes bleeding and deprives a woman of her virginity. This understanding is also widely held by some dictionaries; for instance, Penrice describes طَّرَف as deflowering a virgin (1991, p. 91). Farid states that the meaning of طَّرَف the woman mensruated or menstruated for the first time (the primary signification being that of ‘devirgination’ i.e. coition with the causing to
bleed). He devirginated her causing her to bleed or simply he cohabited with her (جامعة (2006, p. 526).

Other lexicons also describe the notion of 'virginity' as sexual intercourse (see Mujamma al-Lughati al-Arabiyah, 1989, p. 713; Mustafa, et al., 2004, p. 565; Umar, 2008, p. 1414).

Although the majority of the exegetes consider the notion of 'virginity' as sexual intercourse with a virgin, ath-Tha'labī (2002) suggests that it refers to touching. at-Ṭabarī (2001), in his discussion, indicates that some construe the notion of 'virginity' as touching but the majority as sexual intercourse. However, touching, as we have seen earlier, is used as a kīnāyah for intercourse. Aṣ-Ṣābūnī (1981) believes that لَمْ يَطْمَثُهُمْ إنَّ فَتْنَتَهُمْ ولا جَانٌ means 'no one has touched nor had sexual intercourse with them before', but these females are actually maidens. However, in his explanation, ar-Rāzī (1981) argues that the Qur’an expresses the act of sexual intercourse through various kīnāyah expressions, for example, مس (to touch) in [Q.2: 237], but none of them encompass the notion of 'virginity' that the women of heaven own. Therefore, he believes that the word الطمث in this context is not a figurative expression. This may be true, since the word itself is not a shameful or taboo word, and at the same time holds the notion of virginity. However, according to the explanations of [Q.56: 36], this notion of 'virginity' is not any typical virginity; it is an eternal virginity (see aṣ-Ṣābūnī, 1981; al-Alūsī, 1994; ath-Tha’labī, 1997). That is to say, in heaven, each time husbands approach their wives they find them in a state of virginity.

**Kināyah 27**

| Q. 12:23 | سورة يوسف | 1 |
| Q. 12:26 | السورة يسوع | 2 |
| Q. 12:30 | السورة يسوع | 3 |
| Q. 12:32 | السورة يسوع | 4 |

Sūrat Yūsuf, [Q. 12] recounts the story of Prophet Yūsuf (Joseph), the son of Prophet Yaʿqūb (Jacob). According to the Qur’anic exegetes, one night in his sleep, Yūsuf saw a vision in which eleven stars, the sun, and the moon prostrated before him, and later told his father about this vision. His father, Jacob, knew that his son Yūsuf would become of great eminence and therefore told Yūsuf not to mention this vision to his brothers. It is
believed that Yusuf had eleven brothers and that his father loved him more than the rest. His brothers were so jealous of Yusuf that they wanted to separate him from their father out of spite. Some of his brothers thought of killing him, but they agreed to take him far away and throw him into a well. They went ahead with their plot and told their father that a wolf had attacked them and eaten Yusuf. Later, a caravan of travellers on their way to Egypt stopped to get some water from the well and found Yusuf. They took him with them to Egypt and sold him as a slave to a high-ranking minister named ʿAziz. It is believed that Yusuf was quite personable and exceedingly good-looking. This handsomeness of Yusuf attracted the minister’s wife and drove her to try and seduce him into performing an immoral act with her, i.e. she fell in love with Yusuf and tried to entice and tempt him into having sexual intercourse with her. According to al-Jurjānī (2003, p. 54), is a kināyah that expresses sexual temptation. In their explanations on [Q. 12:23], abū Ḥayyān (1993) and al-Alūsī (1994) believe that is a kināyah for requesting or seeking sexual intercourse through deception. Ibn ʿĀshūr (1984), Ṭanṭāwī (1992) and ath-Thaʿālabī (1997) see it as a kināyah for sexual intent. The opinions of Qur’anic dictionaries and lexicons are also similar. For example, Penrice states that means “[s]he desired to lie with me”. He also adds that “it means simply to solicit” (1991, p. 61). Farid suggests that means “[s]he desired or sought of him a sinful act against his will, using blandishment or artifice for that purpose against his will, or she induced or tempted him to do the sinful act against his will; she endeavoured to entice him and to make yield to her gainst [sic] his will” (2006, p. 249). Ibn Manẓūr (1980, p. 1774), Mujammaʿ al-Lughātī al-ʿArabiyah (1989, p. 521), Mustafa, et al. (2004, p. 381), and ṬUmar (2008, p. 958) all suggest that it holds the sense of requesting sexual intercourse through temptation, apart from Mustafa et al. who just say that it is a request for intercourse. Lane provides the following senses:

[raʿudatana ʿannafsi] [in the Kur xii. 23] She desired, or sought, of him, copulation, or his lieing with her, using blandishment, or artifice, for that purpose; she tempted him to lie with her [more literally, she endeavoured to turn him, by blandishment, or deceitful arts, from his disdain, or disdainful incompliance, and to make him yeild himself to her:] and ʿaraḍha ʿannafsi he desired, or sought, of her, copulation (1968, p. 1184, author’s italics).

We need to bear in mind that is not always used in the sense of seeking sexual desire through temptation. It can also be used in the sense of ‘to endeavour’ or ‘to
persuade’ someone to do something by blandishment, deceitful, or artifice manner as Lane explained and similar to its usage use in [Q. 12:61]59, and [Q. 54:37]60.

Linguistically, the root of the word رُدُودُ رَأوَذْ which means ‘to ask/to want’ (ibn Manẓūr, 1980, p. 1771). Ar-Rāzī (1981) points out that رُدُودُ is a derivative of الإرادة, a near synonym for the metatlābilā (asking someone to do something). Ar-Rāzī, in his comments on [Q. 12:23], illustrates that the metatlābilā is used when asking for tangible items, as in طالب محمد عمر أ رأوذه عن المساعدة (Muhammad asked Omar for the Dirhams), whereas المراوده is only used for an act, as in (he asked him to help); the former uses the preposition ‘بـ’ while the latter uses the preposition ‘عن’. Mujamma` al-Lughati al-ᶜArabiyah (1989: 521-522) shows that 据 رأوذه عن الشيء means ‘he asked him to do something’, and that 据 رأوذه على الشيء means ‘he endeavoured in asking’ with the sense of ‘luring’, that is to say, through blandishment or deceitfulness. To be clearer, if is between a male and female and vice versa then ‘coaxingly request’ usually refers to seduction, i.e. persuading someone to have sexual intercourse; otherwise it only means ‘coaxing’ or ‘to endeavour by blandishment’.

Kināyah 28

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Kināyah 28: حفظ/حصن الفرج</th>
<th>in [Q. 21:91], [Q. 66:12], [Q. 23:5], [Q. 70:29], and [Q. 24:30-31]</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| Q. 21:91  
(وَأَلْتَيْ أَخْصَصَتْ فُرْجَهَا فَخُنِّصْنَا فِيهَا مِن رُوحًا وَجَعْلَهَا وَآبَنَّا آيَةً لِلْعَالَمِينَ) آية 91, الأنيبياء | 1 |
| Q. 66:12  
(وَمَرَّمَ آيَتَنَّ عِنْصَرًا آلَةٍ أَخْصَصَتْ فُرْجَهَا... آيَةٍ 66, التحريم) | 2 |
| Q. 23:5  
(وَالَّذِينَ هُمْ لِلْفُروجِ حَافُظُونَ إِلاَّ عَلَى أَزْوَاجِهِمْ... آيَةٍ 5, المؤمنون) | 3 |
| Q. 70:29  
(فَقَالَ اللَّهُ عَزَّ وَجَلَّ: مُقَسَّمُنَّ مِنَ الْمَوْمِلِينَ وَبَحْفَظُنَّ فُروجَهُنَّ... الْآيَاتِ 30-31, سورة القدر) | 4 |
| Q. 33:35  
(وَالْحَافِظُونَ فُروجَهُمْ وَالْحَافِظُونَ وَالذَّاكرِينَ اللّهُ كَبِيرًا وَالذَّاكرِينَ آيَةً لِلْمُعْتَفِرِينَ وَأَخْرَجُوا عَلَيْهِمَا) | 5 |

Linguistically, the word فُرْجُ (أ. فُرْج) originally refers to a slit, cleft, orifice, or opening between two things (ibn Manẓūr, 1980, p. 3370). Accordingly, it is used euphemistically as a kināyah for the private parts for both male and female. However, though the word فُرْج is actually a kināyah, most people would not even notice that due to
its common use in everyday language (see al-Alūsī, 1994 regarding [Q. 21:91] and [Q. 66: 12]). That is to say, فَزَجُ has become a conventional kināyah (lexicalised) for the private parts in general, and the female’s vulva in particular.

The word فَزَجُ, together with its plural form فَزُوجُ, as a kināyah for the private parts, occur in the Qur’ān seven times. However, the kināyah فَزَجُ or its plural form فَزُوجُ transforms into another kināyah for chastity or restraining from carnal desires whenever it is collocated with words referring to preservation, maintaining, or keeping, such as حفَظُ or حفاظُ. For example, in [Q.21: 91] and [Q.66: 12] the expression أُخْصِصْتُ فَزْجَهَا refers to the fact that Mary preserved or guarded her chastity; in [Q. 23: 5] and [Q. 70: 29] the expression فَزِّعْتُمُ خَافِطِينَ indicates the meaning of restraining their carnal desires or refraining from extramarital sexual intercourse. Concerning the exegesis of [Q. 24: 30], az-Zamakhsharī (1998a) points out that ibn Zayd believes that all the expressions of حفظُ الفرج (preserving the private parts) in the Qur’ān are about fornication except for the one mentioned in [Q. 24: 30] which refers to maintaining modesty in terms of covering oneself.

Kināyah 29 and 30

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Kināyah 29: تصصر الخد</th>
<th>Q. 31:18</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Kināyah 30: المشي معداً</td>
<td>Q. 31:18 and Q. 17:37</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Q. 31:18</th>
<th>Q. 17:37</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>لا تُصصر خذاك للناس ولا تمس في الأرض مَرَحاً إن الله لا يحب أن يلتح لمعان فذور</td>
<td>لا تمس في الأرض مَرَحاً إن الله لا يلتح لمعان فذور</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>لفسان</td>
<td>لفسان</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The above excerpts from the Qur’ān clearly condemn the act of being disdainful and arrogance. This inadmissible act is depicted through a physical behaviour that usually emanates from persons with this character, which is turning their face away from people or putting on a contemptuous mien while someone is talking to them. Not only that, but this movement of the face or the contemptuous mien is compared to a disease known as torticollis that some camels may be affected with (al-Ḥayānī, 2014, p. 176). It is believed that when this disease strikes the neck of a camel it causes obliqueness in the camel’s face, i.e. the head becomes persistently turned to one side (cf. ibn Manẓūr, 1980, pp. 2447-2448; Lane, p. 1689). Therefore, the expression of كَسَرَ خذاك للناس as in ولا تَصصر خذاك للناس [lit. and do not bend your cheek] is used to censure such an abhorrent act which is considered that of a social pariah (cf. ibn ʿĀshūr 1984).
The act of being disdainful, arrogant, and conceited is depicted through another physical movement, المشي في الأرض مرحًا [lit. walking on earth exultantly]. What is meant by walking exultantly is actually strutting/swagging, i.e. striding or swinging the shoulders while walking in a way that shows self-importance or arrogance. Such a walk or manner usually comes from a person who is very confident or conceited. In general, these behaviours are unacceptable; therefore, Islamic precepts and mores censure such attitudes completely and on the other hand encourage humbleness and modesty (see ibn Kathīr, 2000). That is evident in both the Qur’an and the Sunna of the Prophet.

**Kināyah 31**

The trait of vanity and arrogance is once again depicted but this time through the *kināyah* expression ثنى عطفه (lit. turning his side) (Ṭanṭāwī, 1992; as-Ṣābūnī, 1981; al-Alūsī, 1994; al-Ḥayānī, 2014, pp. 179-180). In [Q. 22:9], the *kināyah* phrase ثنى عطفه refers to that person who arrogantly disputes monotheism, i.e. the unity of Allah, without even any rational cognizance, logical facts, or a Holy Book from God to demonstrate his pretext. The aim of his pretext, which is based on ignorance, is to mislead others so that they can go astray from the Path of Allah. His arrogant action or posture by turning away and disregarding the facts of Allah’s unity is conveyed through the *kināyah* phrase ثنى عطفه.

Linguistically, one of the common meanings of ثنى is ‘to bend’, ‘to turn’ ‘to turn away’ (Lane, 1968, p. 356). As for the word العطف، one of its basic meanings is ‘the side’ or “the side of a human being, from the head to the hip” (ibid., p. 2080; ibn Manẓūr, 1980, p. 2997). As a result, the literal meaning of ثنى عطفه would be ‘turning his side (away)’, which, according to the majority of exegetes, is a body gesture of vanity and arrogance. Ar-Rāzī (1981), ath-Thaʿalabī (1997), and az-Zamakhsharī (1998a) point out that ثنى العطف is similar to ثنى الحيد (lit. the neck) in terms of their intended meaning (cf. al-Bayḍāwī, 1998). To put it in another way, they are all gestures or, to be more accurate, *kināyah* expressions for vanity and arrogance.

Although exegetes highlight other explanations, they all lead to the same meaning, which is vanity and arrogance. The difference between these explanations is related to which...
part of the body that is twisted or turned away. For example, some, such as ibn Zayd, believe that the phrase "ثاني عملته" used in the āyah means the person arrogantly refused to accept the facts of Allah’s unity by turning his head away (cited in at-Ṭabarī, 2001). Others, such as Mujāhid and Qutādah, believe it is by twisting the neck away (cited in abū Ḥayyān, 1993; ībn Kathīr, 2000; at-Ṭabarī, 2001; ath-Thaᶜlabī, 2002). Another difference is that some believe it is a kināyah for rejection (cf. al-Qurṭabī, 2006), and some believe it is for rejection along with vanity and arrogance. Nonetheless, the majority of exegetes agree that "ثاني عملته" is an expression that visualises the trait of vanity and arrogance. Qur’anic dictionaries and lexicons also express the same view, though some add the sense of rejection to arrogance (cf. Lane, p. 2080; ibn Manẓūr, 1980, p. 2997; Mujammaᶜ al-Lughati al-ᶜArabiyah, 1989, p. 209; Penrice, 1991, p. 25; Farid, 2006, p. 578; Mustafa, et al., 2004, p. 101; Badawi & Abdel Haleem, 2008, p. 149; ᶜUmar, 2008, p. 330).

**Kināyah 32**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>النآي بالجانب: Kināyah 32</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>﴿وإذا أُعْمَنَّا على الإنسان أُغْرِضْن ونأي بجانبه وإذا سمحة الشرَّ كان يُؤوسا﴾ آية 83, الإسراء</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The context of [Q. 17:83] displays the state of some human beings during times of well-being and distress. There are some people, who when they are blessed or gifted by God with good things, such as welfare, success, or prosperity, become arrogant and start to abandon God and deny that such well-being is God’s blessing. What is meant by abandoning God is to abstain from thanking, obeying, and worshiping God, and probably abjuring faith in Him. Furthermore, when they fall into a state of hardship or privation they experience great despair.

According to the majority of exegetes, the state of abandonment is clear in the word "أُغْرِضْن" and that "نأي بالجانب" is to attest and visualise this abandonment (cf. al-Ḥayānī, 2014, pp. 181-182). Linguistically, "نأي بالجانب" is ‘to go far away’ or ‘to distance oneself from’, but it is used together with "الجنب" to convey the sense of a person who rejects something and turns away in an arrogant manner (ibn Manẓūr, 1980, p. 4314; Mustafa, et al., 2004, p. 895; ᶜUmar, 2008, p. 2151). Some Qur’anic dictionaries also indicate that "نأي بالجانب" refers to arrogance or haughtiness (Mujammaᶜ al-Lughati al-ᶜArabiyah, 1989, p. 1072; Badawi & Abdel Haleem, 2008, p.913). The exegetes suggest that "نأي بالجانب" is a kināyah for the trait of vanity and arrogance and it visualises that person who despises or disregards
God’s grace (ar-Rāzī, 1981; aṣ-Ṣābūnī, 1981; Ṭanṭāwī, 1992; abū Ḥayyān, 1993; al-Alūsī, 1994; az-Zamakhsharī, 1998a; al-Qurṭubī, 2006). Moreover, ar-Rāzī (1981), Ṭanṭāwī (1992), abū Ḥayyān (1993), ; al-Alūsī (1994), and az-Zamakhsharī (1998a) indicate that the talk is similar to the talk of the hypocrites, which is common. In other words, the two kināyahs, which are synonyms. For those, who believe that the talk of the hypocrites indicates only rejection and not arrogance should know that the word kināyah on its own conveys that sense. The phrase shows a physical gesture or movement that is commonly done by a person who rejects something in an arrogant manner.

**Kināyah 33**


Hypocrites in Islam are those who pretend to be true believers while deep in their hearts they are not. Therefore, the Qur’an touches on some characteristics of the hypocrites and the dangers of those hypocrites, as in sūrat ‘The Hypocrites’. Āyah [Q.63:5], for example, demonstrates one of the personality traits of the hypocrites that proves their stubbornness and persistence in incredulity towards Islam and disbelief in God. This is clear in the hypocrites’ refusal to come before the Prophet and declare their repentance so that he can ask God to forgive them. The hypocrites’ refusal was associated with contempt, disdain, and presumption. This is all expressed through the kināyah expression لَوْنَا رَوْسِسِهِمْ.

Linguistically, the word لَوْنَى on its own means ‘to twist’ (ibn Manẓūr, 1980, p. 4107). In addition, the word لَوْنَى together with the word رأس (head) forms a phrase that refers to the twisting of the head and turning away. It also means that the person twisted, i.e. shook, his head from side to side (ibid., p. 4108) as if he/she were saying ‘no’ with his/her head. However, this gesture of twisting the head from side to side is associated with a sense of contempt, disdain, and presumption. It is a common physical movement that is performed by an arrogant person, similar to the ones we mentioned earlier. Therefore, Ṭanṭāwī (1992) and al-Alūsī (1994), clearly state that لَوْنَا رَوْسِسِهِمْ is a kināyah for turning away from advice with disdain and presumption (also see al-Ḥayānî, 2014, pp. 177-178; cf. az-Zamakhsharī, 1998a; al-Bayḍāwī, 1998; ibn Kathīr, 2000). Al-Alūsī adds that some believe the intended meaning of لَوْنَا رَوْسِسِهِمْ is its canonical (non-figurative) meaning. That is to say, the hypocrites actually moved their heads away but in a ridiculing manner.
Hence, some exegetes, such as abū Ḥayyān (1993) and ash-Shawkānī (2007) suggest that the expression refers to derision. Aṣ-Ṣābūnī, in his explanation, believes that it includes both the senses of derision and mockery. However, even if mockery was the intended meaning, the āyah clearly indicates that the hypocrites turned away arrogantly.

To a certain extent, this kināyah is similar to the kināyah in [Q. 31: 18] in terms of meaning and physical action. The difference between the two is that in لي الرأس the head is twisted or turned from side to another, while in تصعير الخد the head is only turned to one side. Both kināyahs convey the sense of disdain and arrogance but the former also includes the sense of refusal or turning away from the truth. In addition, both meanings enable the addressee to visualise a personality trait of a hypocrite.

Kināyah 34

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Kināyah 34: ﻰَطَمَتْيَ</th>
<th>in [Q. 75:33]</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>فلا صنَّف ولا صُلِّي (ولكن كُتِبَ وتُوَلِّي) ُه ذهب إلى أهله يَطَمَتْيَ) الآيات 31-33, القيامة 75:31-33</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The āyahs 31-33 of sūrat al-Qiyāmah reports the state of a non-believer, i.e. a person who denies the existence of Allah and His Prophet, and visualises how that non-believer walks in a self-conceited manner. Exegetes believe these āyahs were revealed in relation to abū Jahal who was known for his arrogance and undue pride in himself for defying the Prophet. According to exegetes, not only did abū Jahal deny the existence of Allah and the prophecy of the Prophet Muhammad, but he went on swaggering and bragging, i.e. in an arrogant and self-conceited manner, about his denial and defiance. This swaggering of abū Jahal, according to the exegetes, conveys the sense of arrogance, since this type of walking is a typical trait of an arrogant person.

The original form of the word يَطَمَتْيَ is believed to be يَتَمَطُّي. With regards to its lexical meaning, Lane (1968, p. 2721) states the following: “He stretched himself: he walked with an elegant, and a proud, and a self-conceited, gait, with an effected inclining of his body from side to side, and stretching out his arms” (author’s italics). Lane adds that the word يَتَمَطُّي is a synonym for يَتَمَطَّرَ, which means ‘to swagger’. In addition, it is said that the word يَتَمَطَّرَ is derived from the word المطا which signifies ‘the back’, “because he who so walks twists his back” (ibid.). We can notice that both original forms of the word يَتَمَطُّي signify the meaning of ‘to swagger’, which reflects the personality traits of a

**Kināyah 35**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Kināyah 35: زهق النفس</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Death is mentioned in several parts of the Qur’an and in various ways. Sometimes death is mentioned literally and at times indirectly. For example, one of the expressions that refer to death indirectly is the *kināyah* تَزَهَّقُ أَنْفُسَهُمْ in [Q. 9:55/85]. According to the exegetes, both *āyahs* are related to the hypocrites, and were addressed to the Prophet Muhammad, specifically, and to the believers, in general. The two *āyahs* report that we should not be fascinated by the wealth and luxurious life of the hypocrites. These were given to them as a type of enticement to punish them in this worldly existence and die while they are in a state of being unbelievers. The image of death is conveyed through the phrase تَزَهَّقُ أَنْفُسَهُمْ. Ibn Manẓūr points out that linguistically the word *زهق* hold the meanings of to become null/abolished, destroyed, or to fade away (1980, p. 1879). Additionally, Lane (1968, p. 1262) notes that the primary meaning of *زهق* is to go forth, pass forth, or depart with difficulty. We can notice these meanings in the familiar Arabic proverb ظهر الحق و زهق الباطل (the truth came out/emerged and the falsehood faded away/vanished) which is taken from [Q. 17:81]62. However, when the word *زهق* is collocated with the النفس (the soul), the whole phrase holds the meaning of ‘to die/pass away’ (see Farid, 2006, p. 366; Umar, 2008, p. 1004; Badawi & Abdel Haleem, 2008, p. 405). This is because when a person’s soul leaves or departs his/her body it means that they are dead. This departure of the soul could be with difficulty (Riḍā, 1947; Ṭanṭāwī, 1992; al-Alūsī, 199463; Mustafa, et al., 2004, p. 404) as a punishment, because naturally there is a difference between dying quickly and dying in pain. This interpretation is probably

---

62 *وَقَدْ جَاءَ الْحَقَّ وَزَهَّقَ البَاطِلَ إِذْ لَبِينَا كَانَ زَهَّقًا* (آية 81), سورة الإسراء
63 In their explanation respecting [Q. 9:55]
reasonable, since the meaning of death is expressed in various ways in the Qur’an, as we will see in the following three kināyah expressions. In this case, the death is visualised or depicted in a way that shows the suffering of the unbelievers.

**Kināyah 36**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>[Q. 15:99]</td>
<td>(واعبَدْ رَبَّكَ حَنَّىٰ لِلَّذِينَ يَتَّبِعُونَ الْأَمْرَ) آية 99 من سورة الحجر</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>[Q. 74:47]</td>
<td>(قلِ أَيُّهَا أُنَامَانَ الْبَلَاغُ) آية 47 من سورة المدثر</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The word أَلْيَمِينَ (lit. the certainty/inevitable) in [Q. 15:99] and [Q. 74:47] is another kināyah expression for death. It is logical to say that every person is eventually going to die; in other words, death is an absolute certainty. Therefore, it is not strange that the famous Islamic scholar al-Ḥasan al-Baṣarī (642-728 AD) said he had never seen an unquestionable certainty such as death (cited in al-Jurjānī, 1908, p. 8; al-Jurjānī, 2003, p. 56). In view of this, أَلْيَمِينَ is obviously associated with death. In addition to this association, it is also an attribute for death. Therefore, it is considered a kināyah of an attributed (كتابة عن صفة). Through this attribute, along with the surrounding context, the addressee can arrive at the intended meaning, i.e. the attributed thing/person, which in this case is ‘death’ (see abū Zalāl, 2001, p.200-201). The surrounding context, for example in [Q. 15:97-99]64, informs us that God directed the Prophet Muhammad to praise, glory, and prostrate to Him, especially whenever he, i.e. the Prophet, is feeling sad or depressed. God also ordered the Prophet to continue worshiping Him until the absolute certainty, which is the inevitability of death, comes to him. Correspondingly, the surrounding context in [Q. 74:42-47]65, acquaints us with the fact that the Companions of the Right (the true believers) wondered why those who are guilty of wrongdoing (culprits) are in Hellfire. The culprits replied that they did not perform their prayers, nor did they feed the (the true believers) wondered why those who are guilty of wrongdoing (culprits) are in Hellfire. The culprits replied that they did not perform their prayers, nor did they feed the destitute; they used to indulge themselves in absurd acts or discourse and they denied the Day of Recompense (Judgement Day). They used to perform one or all of these wrongdoings (az-Zamakhsharī, 1998a) until the inevitability of death came to them. So, to put it briefly, أَلْيَمِينَ is a kināyah for death since death itself is an absolute certainty (see ar-Rāzī, 1981; Ṭanṭāwī, 1992; abū Ḥayyān, 1993; al-Bayḍāwī, 1998; ath-Thaʿlabī,

---

64: ولقد نعلم أنكِ تضيعين ستاركِ بما يقولون في سبيل يهديكِ وقيل من الشاذلين: أو أعد أن تكِ حنّىٰ لِلَّذِينَ يَتَّبِعُونَ الْأَمْرَ | 65: ما سلكت في سفسفِ قلواً لم تكن من المُصلِّينَ. ولم تَنْصِمَ المُستَكَبِرُ. وَكَانَتْ نَخْوَشَ مَعَ الْخَاطِئِينَ. وَكَانَتْ لَكِ بَيُومَ الْآخِرِ. حَيْثُ أَلْيَمِينَ |
According to the exegetes, [Q. 102:1-2] refers to those who used to compete with each other in issues related to worldly gain and neglected to fulfill their duties towards God. Some exegetes say that these issues were related to proliferation, i.e., size of population (abū Ḥayyān, 1993; al-Alūsī, 1994; Az-Zamakhsharī, 1998a; aṭ-Ṭabarī, 2001; ath-Thaᶜlabī, 2002), and some exegetes argue that the rivalry was in gaining worldly wealth in general (ar-Rāzī, 1981; ibn ᶜĀshūr, 1984; ath-Thaᶜlabī, 1997; Ṭanṭāwī, 1992; aṭ-Ṭabarī, 2001). It is believed that the rivalry was between two different tribes, and that they used to vie in boasting with one another over the size of their population or in the wealth they had. This rivalry caused them to neglect their duties towards God until they died. That is to say, they were busy in increasing their worldly wealth and neglected their religious duties until each one of them was buried in the grave.

According to the exegetes and particularly aṣ-Ṣābūnī (1981; 2009) (lit. until you visited the graves) is a kināyah for death (to die). Possibly the reason that death is expressed through visiting the graves is because the deceased stays in the grave for only a limited time until the Day of Judgment (ibn ᶜĀshūr, 1984; Ṭanṭāwī, 1992). Furthermore, ar-Rāzī (1981) indicates that expressions such as زار قبره (lit. he visited his grave) and زار رمسه (lit. he visited his grave) are commonly said about a person who dies. There are similar expressions in Arabic that expresses the meaning of death, such as حان أجله (lit. His time has come) and عطاك ﷲ عمره (lit. Allah gave you his life). These expressions are normally used for euphemistic reasons. However, every expression provides a different depiction to convey a specific meaning along with death.

---

One of the stories of the prophets recited in the Qur'an is the story of Prophet Ṣāliḥ. In this story, the people of Thamūd refused to listen to the Prophet Ṣāliḥ and insisted that he should come up with a miracle to prove his prophecy. Accordingly, God provided them with a unique and wondrous she-camel. The she-camel was so unique that it is believed it was able to provide the whole people of Thamūd with milk. The Prophet Ṣāliḥ asked his people not to harm the she-camel in any way and to leave it to pasture peacefully, and warned them that if they did harm it, they would be punished by God. Arrogantly, some of the people of Thamūd decided to brush the Prophet’s warning aside and cruelly kill the she-camel.

The act of killing the camel is conveyed through the kināyah expression عقر الناقة. Linguistically, one of the meanings of the word عقر is to cut or wound one of the hamstrings, feet or legs of an animal, normally a camel, sheep, or goat just before the slaughtering process it to prevent the animal from running away (ibn Manẓūr, 1980, p. 3034). It is held that Abū Bakr aṣ-Ṣiddīq, one of The Rashidun Caliphs, gave a precept to his army which included the prohibition of hamstringing a sheep or camel except for butchering for food, because such an act is considered torture. Therefore, since hamstringing an animal was always performed for the sake of butchering, it gradually became a term, or as ibn ᶜĀshūr (1984) states, a kināyah for the act of slaughtering/killing, while generally it refers to the slaughtering of an animal (Lane, 1968, p. 2107; cf. Riḍā, 1947; ar-Rāzī , 1981; Ṭanṭāwī, 1992; abū Ḥayyān, 1993; al-Alūsī, 1994).

---

67 In his comments on [Q. 7:77].
68 In their comment on [Q. 7:77].
This āyah, [Q. 19:4], which includes the words of the Prophet Zachariah’s supplicant while invoking God, is full of figurative expressions. It contains *kināyah*, *majāz mursal* (Arabic synecdoche/metonymy), and *istiᶜārah* (Arabic metaphor). The metaphorical expression is *ءَشْنَيْنَاَ لَهُمْ رَأْسَانَ شَمْنِيَّة* (lit. the head is aflame with hoariness), which means that his hair is full of hoariness. This indicates that he has become old in age. As for the phrase *ءَنَّى وَهُنَّ اَلْعَظْمُ مَنِي* (my bone is weakened), it is, as a whole, a *kināyah* but within it there is a *majāz mursal*. All exegetes, such as ibn ʾĀshūr (1984), abū Ḥayyān (1993), al-Alūsī (1994), az-Zamakhsharī (1998a), and ibn al-Jawzī (2002), agree that the intended meaning of *ءَنَّى وَهُنَّ اَلْعَظْمُ مَنِي* is the loss of strength, which indicates that the body has become weak. The exegetes (ibid.) point out that *ءَنَّى اَلْعَظْمُ* (the bone) is used in its singular form to signify the whole body, because the plural form *ءَنَّى اَلْعَظْمُ* would only signify some of the bones and not the whole body. This is quite true unless the plural word *ءَنَّى* would signify the whole body. In view of this, we can notice that the word *ءَنَّى* according to the semantic relationship, is one of the forms of *majāz mursal* (Arabic synecdoche/metonymy), which is a part-to-whole relationship (cf. Abdul-Raof, 2006, p. 225). That is to say, the bone, which is the part, refers to the whole, which is the body. As a result, the whole expression *ءَنَّى وَهُنَّ اَلْعَظْمُ مَنِي* is a *kināyah* for the lack of strength and weakness (physically) (aṣ-Ṣābūnī, 1981, 2009, p. 196; al-Alūsī, 1994), which together with *ءَشْنَيْنَاَ لَهُمْ رَأْسَانَ شَمْنِيَّة* portrays an image of a person who has grown too old and become weak.

**Kināyah 40**

Previously, we shed light upon a *kināyah* expression involving the colour black, and once more, in [Q. 12:84], we can notice another *kināyah* expression but this time involving the colour white, in *ءَينِي وَءَنَّى اَلْعَظْمُ مَنِيَ وَءَشْنَيْنَاَ لَهُمْ رَأْسَانَ شَمْنِيَّة* (lit. His eyes whited from grief). Ar-Rāzī (1981) argues that the whitening of the eyes is a *kināyah* for ‘weepiness’ (lachrymosity), i.e. crying a lot/ crying overwhelmingly, and not for blindness as some may claim. The reason
for these tears is clearly mentioned in the āyah, which is the suppressed grief that the Prophet Jacob was going through. That is to say, one of the natural results of grief, especially if it concerns the loss of a loved one, is the shedding of tears. If a person tries to subdue their grief and prevent tears from being shed, you would notice the tears welling up in their eyes and covering the iris of the eye, which makes the colour of the eye look as if it was white. The majority of exegetes, for example az-Zamakhsharī (1998a), al-Bayḍāwī (1998), al-Qurṭubī (2006), and ash-Shawkānī (2007) agree with this interpretation. However, some exegetes, such as abū Ḥayyān (1993) consider the whitening of the eyes (إيضاض العينين) as a kināyah for not being able to see, i.e. blindness (cf. al-ʿAlūsī, 1994). Ibn Ashur (1984) believes that the continuance of grief had an effect on the brain, which caused the disruption of the nerves of the eyes and led to blindness. The exegetes who support this construal, for instance, abū Ḥayyān (1993), claim that [Q. 12:93]69 and [Q. 12:96]70 proves the Prophet Jacob was blind during his grief and that his eyesight returned once he realised his son, Prophet Yusuf (Joseph) was alive. Some Qur’anic dictionaries and lexicons too believe that عينه مسودًا refers to blindness (see Mujammaʿ al-Lughati al-ʿArabiyah, 1989, p. 173; Mustafa, et al., 2004, p. 78; Badawi & Abdel Haleem, 2008, p. 122).

**Kināyah 41**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Kināyah 41:</th>
<th>سواد الوجه in [Q. 16:58]</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(عندما يبكي أحدهم بالأنثى ظل وجهه مسودًا وهو كفيف)</td>
<td>(Q. 16:58) سورة النحل</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Colours, such as white and black, are mentioned in several parts of the Qur’an, mostly to describe the state of people, the believers and non-believers (see al-Ḥayānī, 2014, pp. 110–116). For example, in [Q. 16:58], the phrase ظل وجهه مسودًا (his face became blackish) expresses the state of the polytheists or pagans, in the pre-Islamic age, when they realise they have been endowed with a baby girl. Though they hideously claim that the angels are the daughters of God, as described in [Q. 16:57]71, they so hate being endowed with baby girls they will bury their daughters alive, as described in [Q. 16:59]72. Their hate and dejection is conveyed through the kināyah ظل وجهه مسودًا (ار-ر자ئ, 1981; abū Ḥayyān, 1993; al-ʿAlūsī, 1994; al-Bayḍāwī, 1998; al-Qurṭubī, 2006; ash-Shawkānī, 2007). Ar-Razī

---

69 [Q.12:93] أَخَذَوا بِمَيْسِرِهِ هَذَا فَلَوَّاهُ عَلَى وَجْهِهِ أَبِي يَتَّلَبَّ بِيَصِيرَ (ایَة 93 سورة بوبسف)

70 [Q.12:96] فَلَوَّاهُ عَلَى وَجْهِهِ فَارْتَبَتْ بِيَصِيرَ (ایَة 96 سورة بوبسف)

71 [Q.16:57] وَيَبْعَثُونَ إِلَى الْأَلْبَاتِ سَبَحَةً وَلَهُمْ مَا يَسْتَقْلِعُونَ (ایَة 57 سورة النحل)

72 [Q.16:59] وَيَبْعَثُونَ إِلَى الْأَلْبَاتِ سَبَحَةً وَلَهُمْ مَا يَسْتَقْلِعُونَ (ایَة 59 سورة النحل)
(1981), abū Ḥayyān (1993), and al-Alūsī (1994) demonstrate that when a person is blissful, the spirit of his/her heart spreads to the extremities of the body, specifically the face, due to the strong connection between the heart and brain, and therefore the face would seem shining and bright. On the other hand, in a state of an extreme sorrow or miserableness, that spirit is confined within the heart and the face turns yellowish and black, i.e. a pallid and gloomy complexion. Therefore, it is believed that one of the entailments or concomitants of bliss is the brightness and glitter of the face, and pallor and gloom is for sorrow. Hence, the use of the brightness/whiteness or gloom/blackness of a face as a *kināyah* for bliss or sorrow respectively (ibid.). In addition, white and black colours of the face are used in our everyday utterance in Arabic to express good and bad deeds. For example, the phrases بِيَبِيضِ اللَّهِ وَحِيْلَكَ (May God brightens your face) in the sense of *May Allah bless you with joy/cheerfulness* or سَوْدَ اللَّهِ وَحِيْلَكَ (May God blacken your face) in the sense of *May Allah grant you sorrow/disgrace* are said to a person in response to his/her good or bad deeds respectively.

There are other *āyahs* where the colours of white and black are used to describe the state of the believers and non-believers, particularly on Judgement Day, such as [Q. 3:106-107]. According to some exegetes and scholars, for instance al-Bayḍāwī (1998) and al-Ḥayānī (2014, pp. 110-113), these colours are *kināyah* expressions too, where white represents bliss and black represents sorrow (cf. Badawi & Abdel Haleem, 2008, p. 122).

On Judgement Day, it is believed that every single person is going to be asked about his/her actions, even the slightest ones, they have done during their lifetime. On that account, the exegetes who support this construal, such as ath-Thaᶜlabī (2002), al-Qurṭabī (2006), and al-Shawkānī (2007), argue that the whiteness of the face conveys bliss due to the rewards a person is going to have from God in return for their obedience to Him and the good deeds done in their lifetime. The blackness of the face, however, conveys sorrow, hate, and dejection (see Mujammaᶜ al-Lughati al-ᶜArabiyah, 1989, p. 607; Farid, 2006, p. 420; Mustafa, et al., 2004, p. 460; Badawi & Abdel Haleem, 2008, p. 464) due to the punishment a person is going to have from God in return for their disobedience to Him and the bad deeds done in their lifetime.

On the other hand, a considerable number of exegetes, such as ar-Rāzī (1981), ibn Ṭāṣāfūḍ (1984), Ṭanṭāwī (1992), al-Alūsī (1994), and az-Zamakhsharī (1998a), argue that that the
whiteness or blackness of the face, specifically in situations related to the afterlife and the Judgement Day, should be construed in their canonical, i.e. non-figurative, meaning. Those who support this view contend that there is no reason for a figurative construal because faces on Judgement Day actually acquire either a bright and shining complexion or a pallid and gloomy complexion. Al-Alūsī (1994) even presumes that this colouring affects the whole body and not only to the complexion. He adds, the faces were only mentioned because normally when you look at a person you look at his face, and the face is generally considered the noblest part of the body. Moreover, ibn ʿĀshūr (1984), Ṭanṭāwī (1992), al-Alūsī (1994), and az-Zamakhsharī (1998a) posit that the colouring of the complexion is considered a mark to distinguish the believers from the non-believers and culprits. This view can be justified through [Q. 39:60] and [Q. 55:41], especially if we take into account that one of the ways of understanding the meaning of the Qur’an is through the Qur’an itself.

**Kināyah 42**

According to exegetes, the above extract, [Q. 68:42-43], reveals that on Judgement Day everyone is asked to prostrate themselves before God. Those who had been worshiping Allah sincerely in the lifetime will be able to do so. The unbelievers and hypocrites, on the other hand, will be punished by not be able to do likewise, no matter what every effort they make, because they had refused to prostrate themselves to Allah in their lifetime. Once they realise their wrongdoings, they will feel ashamed, regretful, and depressed, and suffer this ignominy.

Judgement Day, or the Day of Resurrection, is depicted throughout the Qur’an by various *kināyah* expressions. Each expression describes or visualises one of the characteristics or qualities of that day. For example, the *waqīfa* (lit. ‘which is coming’ or ‘the occurrence’) in [Q. 56:1] and [Q. 69:15] is used to depict the Day of Resurrection because it is a fact;

---

74 [Q. 68:42-43]
75 [Q. 55:41]
76 [Q. 56:1-2]
77 [Q. 69:15]
whether you like or not, this day is inevitably coming. Additionally, 79, 80, 81, 82, are other *kināyah* expressions that allude and attest to the Day of Resurrection by providing one of its distinctive features for the recipient to visualise and conceptualise that day. The expression *نيَّمُ يَكْشِفُ عَنْ سَاقٍ* (lit. the day *the shank will be bared*) is amongst these *kināyah* expressions. This is an expression used to show how tense, nerve-wracking, and dire is that day (as-Ṣābūnī, 1981, ibn ʿĀshūr, 1984; abū Ḥayyān, 1993; as-Ṣābūnī, 2009), particularly for those who have failed to worship God properly and sufficiently. It is known that traditionally Arabs used to say about a person in dire straits: كَفَّ عَسَاقَهِ. Apparently, it is also used in some Arabic poetry, according to some exegetes, to indicate the same sense (al-Alūsī, 1994; Al-Qurṭabī, 2006; cf. ar-Rāzī, 1981; ibn ʿĀshūr, 1984)82. This is because someone who was dealing with a difficult matter or was in dire states used types to bare their shanks, i.e. lift up their garment, to prevent themselves from being tripped over or to avoid any impediment or hindrance. It is through this that the phrase originated and then became a *kināyah* to express any dire straits (Al-Hayani, 2014, p. 258). Mujammaʿ al-Lughati al-ʿArabiyah also proposes that كَفَّ عَسَاقَهِ is a *kināyah* for the matter becoming tense and ominous due to the gravity and magnitude of the Day of Resurrection. However, they claim that the sense of the phrase originated from the fact that women used to bare their shanks to flee a battle when it became dire (1989, p. 967; cf. Farid, 2006, p. 125). A similar phrase, شَمِّرُ عَنْ سَاقِهِ (he rolled up his sleeves), is also said today in our daily life, to indicate the state of someone in dire straits or about to face a difficult issue, similarly to ‘gird (up) one's loins’ in English. Al-Hayani (ibid.) adds that the purpose of the usage of this *kināyah* is to amplify and stress how serious the situation will be on the Day of Resurrection.

It is worth noting that the ignominious state of the unbelievers and hypocrites on the Day of Resurrection and their submission is depicted through the *kināyah* expression خُشُوعُ أَصْصَرُوهُمْ (their eyes downcast). The phrase تَرَهَّفُهُمْ ذَلَّةٌ (overwhelmed with shame and disgrace) illustrates the downcastness. Usually when someone has done something wrong and ignominious they walk with their heads down, bowed in shame. Therefore, Ṭanṭāwī (1992) and al-Ḥayānī (2014, p. 157) argue that خُشُوعُ أَصْصَرُوهُمْ is a *kināyah* for shame and
disgrace. Ṭanṭāwī adds the sense of fear to shame and disgrace. In their comments on [Q. 54:7], ibn ʿĀshūr (1984), abū Ḥayyān (1993), and az-Zamakhsharī (1998a) also agree that it is a *kināyah* which portrays shame and disgrace.

**Kināyah 43**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Kināyah 43:</th>
<th>الإفرط في جنب الله</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>[Q. 39:56]</td>
<td>لَأ يَكْتُمُونَ اللَّهَ وَلَا يَنظُرُونَ إِلَيْهِمْ</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

According to [Q. 39:56], those who do not abandon their bad deeds and turn to God with sincere penitence will regret their undutifulness and disobedience towards God, specifically when His punishment suddenly befalls them. This negligence of obedience is expressed through the expression *(lit. I neglected in Allah’s side)*, in which the phrase *(Allah’s side)* refers to the matters and obligations related to Allah, and hence is a *kināyah* for fulfilling one’s obligations or duties towards God, in other words, obeying God. Linguistically, the word *(the side)* means the side of a person’s body (ibn Manẓūr, 1980, p. 691). However, it is also used to indicate the area or direction of someone or something. For example, derivatives of *(the side)*, such as *(by/at the side of)*, means ‘he became by/at the side of X, or close to X’ (ibid.; Lane, 1968, p. 465). Therefore, some exegetes, for instance ash-Shawkānī (2007) and ath-Thaʿālabī (1997), highlight that the phrase *(Allah’s side)* signifies attaining closeness to God or that which is God’s right. Other exegetes, such as az-Zamakhsharī (1998a), aṣ-Ṣābūnī (1981; 2009, p. 282), abū Hayyān (1993), al-Alūsī (1994), and al-Bayḍāwī (1998), clearly state that *(Allah’s side)* is a *kināyah* expression for obeying God. This construal seems more accurate because in order to gain God’s gratification or attain nearness to God, one has to obey Him by fulfilling what is His right, which is following Islamic law along with the Sunna of His Prophet. Moreover, in his comments, al-Bayḍāwī suggests the expression in this context is used for hyperbolical reasons, while aṣ-Ṣābūnī claims it is for elegance.

**Kināyah 44 and 45**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Kināyah 44:</th>
<th>لا يَكْتُمُونَ اللَّهَ</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Kināyah 45:</td>
<td>لا يَنظُرُ إِلَيْهِمْ</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
According to the Qur’anic exegetical literature, there are several versions regarding the circumstances of the revelation (asbāb an-nuzūl) of [Q. 3:77]. The first is that there was a man named al-Ash‘ath bin Qays who went to the Prophet Muhammad to complain about a Jewish man who had deprived him of his land. The prophet asked al-Ash‘ath if he had any proof and he said ‘no’, so the Prophet asked the Jewish man to swear an oath; al-Ash‘ath said, ‘If he swears an oath then I will lose my land’. In reply, the Prophet said, ‘He who swears an oath to acquire the property of a Muslim unjustly will meet Allah and He will be angry with him’, and then God revealed [Q. 3:77] (for other Hadiths respecting this construal see ibn Kathīr, 2000). The second version is that there was a seller who swore falsely to a buyer that he was selling him his merchandise at less than he originally bought it. A third version is that a buyer came to buy some merchandise at the end of the day and the seller swore falsely that earlier he had refused to sell it at the price the buyer asked for. Another version is related to the Jews, who altered the scripture of the Torah respecting the Prophet, and decided to sell their covenant with God and their oath and not to obey Him in believing the Prophet (abū Ḥayyān, 1993; ibn al-Jawzī, 2000).

Accordingly, āyah [Q. 3:77] informs us that whoever performs such acts will face God’s wrath on the Day of Resurrection and will not gain His mercy. In other words, that person will not have his/her share of God’s grace in the Hereafter; neither will he/she be spoken to endearingly and tenderly by God, nor will he/she be looked at by God with leniency and mercy, because God prohibits such actions. In view of this, the phrases لَا يَكُلُّمُهُمُ اللَّهُ أَيَّامَهُمْ (God will not talk to them) and لَا يَنْظُرُ إِلَيْهِمُ (God will not look at them), according to Riḍā (1947), ar-Rāzī (1981), ibn ĖĂşūr (1984), Ṭanṭāwī (1992), abū Ḥayyān (1993), al-Alūsī, and az-Zamakhsharī (1998a), are kināyah expressions to convey God’s wrath towards those who break His covenant and their oaths. According to ar-Rāzī (1981), this is definitely the intended meaning of both phrases; and we cannot construe them literally, because this would be contrary to what God says in [Q. 15:92-93]84 and [Q. 7:6]85. Additionally, we can deduce that the purpose of the kināyah in this context is to remind and warn people of their fate and the consequences they will face if by any chance they perform such acts. Moreover, this notion of ‘not talking’ or ‘not looking at’ is also used
in everyday life to express anger, discontent, or disappointment because of breaking promises. An example of this can be seen between two spouses when one of them breaks the marriage vows; the reaction would very possibly be ‘I do not want to talk to you’ or ‘I do not want to see you’ to express their anger.
Chapter Six: TT Analysis

6.1 Introduction

Forty-five kināyah expressions extracted from the Qur’an were analysed in the previous chapter, linguistically and contextually, based on several authoritative Qur’anic exegeses and well-known classical Arabic and Qur’anic dictionaries. This initial or first-phase analysis, which included a componential and contextual analysis, was important in order to comprehend the semantic (as opposed to pragmatic) meaning of the element(s) that form each kināyah expression, along with its surrounding context, which can lead to the precise intended meaning. This chapter, however, will descriptively and critically examine the renditions of the chosen forty-five kināyah expression in the TL, i.e. English, made by Ali (1998) [Amanah’s edition], al-Hilali and Khan (1417 H. [1996]), Saheeh International (2004), and Abdel Haleem (2005). The examination will focus, in general, on how these translators deal with the renditions of kināyah, whether they were able to convey the intended meaning and maintain its purpose (function), and whether they were consistent in rendering the same kināyah in the event it occurs in other parts of the Qur’an.

Note that whenever the term ‘literal translation’ is mentioned in this TT descriptive analysis it is in conformity with Beekman and Callow (1974) and Larson’s (1998) modified literal translation. In other words, it means that “the denotative meaning of words is taken as if straight from the dictionary (i.e. out of context), but TL grammar is respected” (Dickins, et al., 2017, p. 14). It should not be confused with what Dickins, et al. (ibid. p. 13) refer to as interlinear translation. Additionally, what we mean by a semantic translation is that the translator attempts to convey what the original expression is trying to communicate apart from its literal meaning, that is to say, the author's intention in using the expression. It may involve paraphrasing or explicitly stating the intended meaning of the kināyah. Finally, what we mean by idiomatic translation is that the translator renders the original expression, whether its literal meaning or the intended meaning, using TL expressions that sound natural to the TT recipient. In other words, the recipient is familiar with these expressions. This could include expressions or idioms which are already established in the TC that may convey the same sense as the original expression does.
Table 6.1: Translations of Kināyah expression 1.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Literal translation: (from one soul)</th>
<th>Intended meaning (referent): Adam</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Ali</strong></td>
<td><strong>Purpose of use:</strong> Reminding and warning of God’s (Allah) greatness and power</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>[Q. 4:1]: … who created you from a single person …</td>
<td>[Q. 4:1]: … who created you from a single person (Adam) …</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>[Q. 6:98]: … He Who hath produced you from a single person …</td>
<td>[Q. 6:98]: … He Who has created you from a single person (Adam) …</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>[Q. 7:189]: … He Who created you from a single person …</td>
<td>[Q. 7:189]: … He Who has created you from a single person (Adam) …</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>[Q. 39:6]: He created you (all) from a single person …</td>
<td>[Q. 39:6]: He created you (all) from a single person (Adam) …</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Hilali &amp; Khan</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>[Q. 4:1]: … who created you from a single person (Adam) …</td>
<td>[Q. 4:1]: … who created you from a single person (Adam) …</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>[Q. 6:98]: … He Who has created you from a single person (Adam) …</td>
<td>[Q. 6:98]: … He Who has produced you from one soul …</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>[Q. 7:189]: … He Who has created you from a single person (Adam) …</td>
<td>[Q. 7:189]: … He who created you from one soul …</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>[Q. 39:6]: He created you (all) from a single person (Adam) …</td>
<td>[Q. 39:6]: He created you from one soul …</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Saheeh International</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>[Q. 4:1]: … who created you from one soul …</td>
<td>[Q. 4:1]: … who created you from a single soul …</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>[Q. 6:98]: … He who produced you from one soul …</td>
<td>[Q. 6:98]: … He who produced you from one soul …</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>[Q. 7:189]: … He who created you from one soul …</td>
<td>[Q. 7:189]: … He who created you from one soul …</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>[Q. 39:6]: He created you from one soul …</td>
<td>[Q. 39:6]: He created you all from one soul …</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Abdel Haleem</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>[Q. 4:1]: … who created you from a single soul …</td>
<td>[Q. 4:1]: … who first produced you from a single soul …</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>[Q. 4:1]: … who first produced you from a single soul …</td>
<td>[Q. 4:1]: … who first produced you from a single soul …</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>[Q. 7:189]: … He who created you all from one soul …</td>
<td>[Q. 7:189]: … He who created you all from one soul …</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>[Q. 39:6]: He created you all from a single being …</td>
<td>[Q. 39:6]: He created you all from a single being …</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The phrase من نفس واحدة, as a kināyah for Adam, occurs in four different parts in the Qur'an, [Q. 4:1], [Q. 6:98], [Q. 7:189], and [Q. 39:6]. None of the four translators attempt to render the intended meaning of the kināyah directly. Instead, they decide to render it almost literally, except for Saheeh International who opted for a purely literal translation. Abdel Haleem’s rendition also can be considered an exact literal translation (in three of his translations, [Q. 4: 1], [Q. 6:98], and [Q. 7:189]). To put it in another way, it appears that all translators were faithful to the ST, but Saheeh International and Abdel Haleem were too faithful. This is clearly evident if we apply a back translation (BT) to the renditions. For example, the BT of Saheeh International’s rendition in all four āyahs as well as Abdel Haleem’s in [Q. 7:189] is من نفس واحدة, which is exactly as the ST. The rest of Abdel Haleem’s rendition seems to be the same too, though he translates the adjective واحدة as ‘single’ that holds the meaning of ‘one’, but also includes the sense of ‘only one and not one of several’, which is close to the intended meaning. Unlike the rest of his translations and without significant reason, Abdel Haleem renders the word نفس in [Q. 39:6] as ‘being’ instead of ‘soul’, notwithstanding that both ‘soul’ and ‘being’ may refer to a person.
Both of Ali and Hilali and Khan’s translations are alike, that is, they both render the *kināyah* as ‘from a single person’ (BT: من شخص واحد), which is almost literal. The only difference between the two translators is that Hilali and Khan add the implicit intended meaning ‘Adam’ between brackets at the end of the phrase. This type of addition is what Baker and Olohan (2000) refer to as explicitation, which is “the spelling out in a target text of information which is only implicit in a source text”. Translation by addition is a typical procedure in translation in which the translator adds something to the TT that does not explicitly exist in the ST (Dickins, et al., 2017, p. 21; also see Pym, 2014, p. 14). However, we must say that there is probably no reason for not using the word ‘soul’ for نفس, especially given that it does in fact hold the meaning of an individual person; besides, the word ‘soul’ may have a more religious connotation than ‘person’ (for details on denotative and connotative meanings related to Arabic-English translation, see Dickins, et al., 2017, pp. 73-105). It seems that Hilali and Khan’s addition is not really necessary, because the reader may discern that the intended person is Adam, particularly from the surrounding context. Most importantly, a literal translation (from one/a single soul) in this case is quite sufficient; not only does it convey the meaning but also the purpose of the *kināyah* as well as the rhetorical image. Let us not forget al-Jurjānī’s definition of *kināyah*:

*Kināyah* is the process through which the text producer seeks to substantiate a specific meaning without mentioning it directly through its known (original/conventional) word in the language. Instead he [sic] opts for a meaning (word) that is ‘associated’ and adjacent to the true meaning in order to allude to and attest the meaning intended (al-Jurjānī, 1995, p. 66; my translation).

Accordingly, if a literal translation can convey all the aspects of a *kināyah*, then why not use it? After all, Newmark asserts that a “literal translation is correct and must not be avoided, if it secures referential and pragmatic equivalence to the original” (1988, pp. 68-69). As for the consistency of the translators, it is to be noted that all of them, apart from Abdel Haleem, were consistent. It is also worth noting that Abdel Haleem’s inconsistency did not affect the intended meaning, purpose, or image of the *kināyah*.

**Kināyah 2**

*Table 6.2: Translations of Kināyah expression 2.*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Referent: sexual intercourse</th>
<th>Purpose of use: Euphemism</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Literal translation:</strong> (when he covered her) <strong>in [Q. 7:189]</strong></td>
<td><strong>علمًا تغشها</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
As pointed before, throughout Qur’anic discourse, it is quite impossible to come across a word or term that is culturally or socially unacceptable even when the idea expressed is taboo. Such expressions are always expressed euphemistically, i.e. indirectly, as in this context through the *kināyah* غشية. The table above shows that the translators have attempted to render differently. Ali, for example, avoids a literal translation and tries to render the intended meaning euphemistically. In spite of this, his rendition of لَمَّا/عندما يكونوا متحدون seems to be quite strange. It is true that the word ‘unite’ could mean the joining of a person with another in marriage, which is rarely used, but it does not standardly convey the meaning of intercourse; neither do its other conventional meanings, such as joining or combining two things or persons to form a single entity or body (OED), carry the meaning of intercourse.

As for al-Hilali and Khan, they too avoid a literal translation and opt for the intended meaning. Although their rendition, ‘when he had sexual relation with her’ (BT: لَمَّا/عندما قام بعﻼقة جنسية معها), does in fact convey the intended meaning, it falls short in achieving the purpose of the *kināyah* used in this āyah, i.e. euphemism, because it includes the word ‘sex’. The more standard usage in English is also ‘have sexual relations’, rather than ‘have sexual relation’. If there is a possibility to achieve both the intended meaning of the *kināyah* and its purpose of use then the translator(s) should go for this. For example, Abdel Haleem’s choice to render the *kināyah* as ‘lies with his wife’ (BT: يتمدد/يﻀطجع مع زوجته) not only conveys the rhetorical image and intended meaning but also achieves the purpose of the *kināyah*. It is worth noting that the phrase ‘lie with’ in the sense of sexual intercourse is also used in Bible translations possibly for euphemistic reasons too. In some cases a literal rendition may be sufficient and conveys the features of a *kināyah*, but not always. This can be perceived in Saheeh International’s choice to render the *kināyah* literally, as ‘when he covers her’ (BT: لَمَّا هو يغطيها/يغشاها). The rendition does not tell the reader with what did the husband cover his wife. In other words, did the husband cover his wife with a blanket, sheet, or his body? That is to say, the Arabic phrase evokes the image of the husband lying over his wife, whereas the English phrase does not. An addition to the literal translation, a translation such as ‘he covered her with himself’ may evoke this image and convey the intended meaning of the *kināyah* as well as its purpose.

<p>| | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Ali</strong></td>
<td>... when they are united ...</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Hilali &amp; Khan</strong></td>
<td>... when he had sexual relation with her ...</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Saheeh International</strong></td>
<td>... when he covers her* ...</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Abdel Haleem</strong></td>
<td>... when one [of them] lies with his wife ...</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Therefore, given the obscurity the expression may have, Saheeh International places a footnote stating that it is “[a]n allusion to sexual intercourse” to clear up any ambiguity.

**Kināyah 3 and 4.**

*Table 6.3: Translations of Kināyah expressions 3 and 4.*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Literal translation:</th>
<th>Referent:</th>
<th>Purpose of use:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| 1) If you do not do and you will never do.  
2) Fear the fire. | 1) If you do not produce/come up with a comparable sūrah and you never will.  
2) [Obey Allah and] Refrain from your pertinacity and wilfulness regarding the false accusations that the Qur’an is not from Allah. | Brevity |
| **Ali** | But if ye cannot- and of a surety ye cannot- then fear the Fire ... | |
| **Hilali & Khan** | But if you do it not, and you can never do it, then fear the Fire (Hell) ... | |
| **Saheeh International** | But if you do not - and you will never be able to - then fear the Fire ... | |
| **Abdel Haleem** | If you cannot do this - and you never will - then beware of the Fire ... | |

We must stress that in order to comprehend the two kināyah phrases, إن لم تفعلوا وَلَن تَفْعَلُوْا وَلَن تَفْعَلُوا (فَاتَقُوا النَّارَ) in [Q. 2:24] one must read the preceding āyah that is [Q. 2:23] (see their contextual analysis in the previous chapter). The main purpose of use for both kināyahs is brevity, which means that most of the information related to the intended meaning is omitted to avoid repetition, particularly in the first Kināyah. That is to say, the request or challenge addressed to the unbelievers to come up with a similar sūrah is implicit in إن لم تفعلوا وَلَن تَفْعَلُوْا وَلَن تَفْعَلُوا. The act of [obeying Allah by] leaving aside the pertinacity and wilfulness of making false accusations to avoid the fire of Hell is also implicit in إن لم تفعلوا وَلَن تَفْعَلُوْا وَلَن تَفْعَلُوا (فَاتَقُوا النَّارَ).

All translators have decided to render both kināyah phrases literally and maintain the purpose of the kināyah. The only significant differences between the four renditions are the choice of words and some slight additions. For example, Ali chooses to use some archaic words, such as the pronoun ‘ye’ instead of ‘you’. Hilali and Khan as well as Abdel Haleem add some words while translating the first kināyah, such as the pronouns ‘it’ and ‘this’ respectively to their renditions. This addition may help the reader to comprehend what is meant by ‘if you do not/cannot’. In other words, these pronouns, which refer to the request or challenge mentioned in the previous āyah help in clarifying the conditional phrase and remove any ambiguity. Hilali and Khan decide to add the word ‘Hell’ between
brackets to explicate the meaning of fire while rendering انَّا النَّار, which, in our opinion, is probably unnecessarily because the recipient would understand that the fire here refers to Hell.

In general, the literal translation of both kināyah expressions by the translators maintains the intended meaning as well as its purpose of use. That said, Abel Haleem’s rendition reads more easily and smoothly than the rest due to his choice of contemporary words.

**Kināyah 5 and 6**

*Table 6.4: Translations of Kināyah expressions 5 and 6.*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Literal translation:</th>
<th>referent:</th>
<th>Purpose of kināyahs:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ali</td>
<td>[Q. 5:64]: (Allah’s hand is shackled/tied up), (His hands are spread out) [Q 17:29]: do not make your hand shackled/tied up to your neck and do not spread it/lay it all out</td>
<td>غﻞ اليد for miserliness; بسط اليد for generosity</td>
<td>Elegance and hyperbole</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hilali &amp; Khan</td>
<td>[Q. 5:64]: (…Allah's hand* is tied up), (both His hands are widely outstretched) [Q. 17:29]: Make not thy hand tied* (like a miser’s) to thy neck, nor stretch it forth to its utmost reach …</td>
<td>الدَمَال for Commodity; التَفَارُق for Difference</td>
<td>Elegance and hyperbole</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Saheeh International</td>
<td>[Q. 5:64]: (…“The hand of Allah is chained”…), (…both His hands are extended …) [Q. 17:29]: do not make your hand [as] chained to your neck* or extend it completely* …</td>
<td>الدَمَال for Commodity; التَفَارُق for Difference</td>
<td>Elegance and hyperbole</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abdel Haleem</td>
<td>[Q. 5:64]: (God is tight-fisted), (God’s hands are open wide) [Q. 17:29]: Do not be tight-fisted, nor so open-handed …</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Ali, Hilali and Khan, and Saheeh International have attempted to render the two kināyah expressions غﻞ اليد and بسط اليد literally, with a slight difference in choice of words made by the latter. This literal rendition may not convey the intended meaning of the kināyah nor its purpose of use. The hand being tied up and stretched out could indicate a person not being able to do something and being very welcoming or helpful respectively, but they do not connote the meaning of miserliness and generosity. It is true that literally الدَمَال (stretching out the hand) is a synonym of the Arabic phrase بسط اليد but culturally they do not have the same implication. Therefore, Ali, in his translation of [Q. 5:64], clarifies
in a footnote what is meant by Allah’s hand being tied up. He also points out that ‘hands widely outstretched’ is a figurative expression for extreme generosity:

… Allah’s hand are tied up. He is close-fisted. He does not give!’ This blasphemy is repudiated. On the contrary, boundless is Allah’s bounty, and He gives, as it were, with both hands outstretched – a figure of speech for unbounded liberality (2001, my emphasis).

It is clear that Ali is fully aware the TL has an idiomatic epithet for miserliness, ‘close-fisted’, yet he favoured a literal approach, which is common among scriptural translators (cf. Marlowe, 2012), i.e. Qur’anic or Biblical translators. Nonetheless, the procedure Ali chose is similar to what Beekman and Callow (1974) or Larson (1998) suggested chiefly when the ST gesture does not have a symbolic significance in the TL culture or has not been heard of before.

Again, in his translation of [Q. 17:29], Ali places a footnote in which he compares this expression with the one in [Q. 5:64] in terms of the sense of miserliness. Also, in his comments, he clarifies that what is meant by both kināyah expressions in general is that one should be careful and wise while spending money; not to be a miser nor a spendthrift. In addition to his footnote, Ali adds between brackets the phrase ‘like a miser’ almost transforming the kināyah into a simile, to explain the tying of the hand. This procedure is again similar to what Beekman and Callow (ibid.) and Larson (ibid.) referred to.

Hilali and Khan also adds an explanatory information between brackets while translating [Q. 5:64] to explain what is meant by ‘Allah’s hand is tied up’. In their translation of [Q. 17:29] they add two comparative phrases ‘like a miser’ and ‘like a spendthrift’ to convey the meaning of miserliness and generosity, almost transforming the two kināyah expressions into a simile like Ali’s approach while rendering [Q. 17:29].

Saheeh International’s rendition is quite similar to that of Ali as well as Hilali and Khan’s in terms of being literal. The only difference is that Saheeh International chose to use ‘to chain’ and ‘to extend’ instead of ‘to tie up’ and ‘to stretch’ respectively. These choices of words also do not convey the intended meaning. Therefore, in their rendition of [Q. 5:64], they decided to explain in a footnote that ‘Allah’s hand is chained’ carries the implication of “inability to give or stinginess”. Also, while rendering [Q. 17:29], they provide explanations in a footnote for ‘the hand chained to the neck’ and for it ‘to be extended completely’. However, what is interesting about Saheeh International’s translation of [Q. 17:29] is that they strangely add the word ‘as’ between square brackets! This addition
appears to be of no use; especially in this location, and although it may be intended to convey a comparison, the use of ‘as’ in this context is not clear in English. In other words, if you compare the rendition with the ST, you will notice that not only is there no Arabic equivalent of ‘as’ in the ST, but the location where they have placed it does not make sense, either as an adverb, conjunction, or preposition.

As for Abdel Haleem’s translations, it looks like he attempts to convey the referent of miserliness and generosity through a target-oriented approach by using idiomatic (i.e. idiom-like) TL epithets. Both epithets ‘tight-fisted’ and ‘open-handed’ are commonly used in English to connote miserliness and generosity respectively, though their literal meanings do not do this. Therefore, it may be fair to say that these epithets are similar to the original kināyah expressions in terms of producing a rhetorical image and conveying the referents indirectly. In other words, the English epithets ‘tight-fisted’ and ‘open-handed’ can be considered appropriate idiomatic equivalent expressions for غﻞ اليد and بسط اليد. As to Abdel Haleem’s inconsistency in rendering بسط اليد, possibly it is because ‘open-handed’ does not convey the dual form of بسط which gives the sense of extreme generosity. Hence, he preferred to translate it as ‘hands are open wide’. Above all, Abdel Haleem’s choice of words is more convenient; not only it is much more intelligible, which meant no need for footnotes or explanations within the text, but it conveys the intended meaning implicitly and more or less portrays an image of miserliness and generosity like the original expressions does.

**Kināyah 7 and 8**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 6.5: Translations of kināyah expression 7.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><img src="image" alt="Table 6.5: Translations of kināyah expression 7." /></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Literal translation:**

[Q. 5:11]: (... when people intended/planned to stretch their hands towards you, [Allah] restrained their hands from you)

[Q. 5:28]: (If stretch your hands toward me to kill me, I am not stretching my hands towards you to kill you)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Referent: assault (kill)</th>
<th>Purpose of use: Elegance</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| Ali                     | [Q. 5:11]: … when certain men formed the design to stretch out their hands against you, but (Allah) held back their hands from you.  
 [Q. 5:28]: If thou dost stretch thy hand against me, to slay me, it is not for me to stretch my hand against thee to slay thee.  
 Hilali & Khan           | [Q. 5:11]: … when some people desired (made a plan) to stretch out their hands against you, but (Allah) withheld their hands from you.  
 [Q. 5:28]: If you do stretch your hand against me to kill me, I shall never stretch my hand against you to kill you. |
The *kināyah* phrase بسط اليد does not always refer to generosity as has been pointed out in the previous chapter. In some cases, it can be a referent for an assault as in [Q. 5:11] and [Q. 5:28]. As far as their translations is concerned, it seems that Ali, Hilali and Khan, and Saheeh International maintain the same technique they chose in translating بسط اليد as a referent for generosity. That is to say, they render بسط اليد whether it is a referent for an assault or generosity in a similar way, which is literal. Ali, for example, as well as Hilali and Khan employ the word ‘stretch’ for بسط, while Saheeh International use the word ‘extend’ in both kināyah expressions. Saheeh International do, however, avoid a literal translation while rendering the preposition إلى in the kināyah phrase; they decide to translate it as ‘against’ instead of ‘towards/to’. It is obvious that they wanted to be faithful to the ST but at the same time, they wanted the recipient to understand that the act of stretching out the hand, in this context, is in an assaultive way and not in a helping way as the rendition without ‘against’ may suggest. This may be the reason why Saheeh International adds the prepositional phrase ‘in aggression’ between square brackets so that the reader would not get the wrong impression about stretching out the hand. It is, of course, true that the hand is used in both Arabic and English expressions to connote miserliness, generosity, and assault, but they are used differently. Therefore, like the previous kināyah, a literal translation may not connote the image of an assault as the Arabic phrase would, even with the addition of ‘in aggression’, particularly when the type of assault is not mentioned. The appropriate way to overcome such an issue is to look for an idiomatic TL expression that connotes a similar image and referent, assuming the priority is to convey the message and not something else. The renditions of Abdel Haleem to connote miserliness and generosity through idiomatic TL expressions, such as ‘tight-fisted’ and ‘open-handed’ respectively are good examples, especially given that these TL expressions include the hand as the SL does. Strange to say, Saheeh International were aware of such an approach and yet they have decided not to apply it consistently. To be specific, Saheeh International renders بسط اليد to [Q. 5:11] almost literally as Ali and Hilali and Khan did, but in rendering the same kināyah in [Q. 5:28] they
opt for a target-oriented approach. They choose to use the idiomatic TL expression of raising one’s hand to/against that implies ‘a threat to assault’, ‘actual assault’, or ‘being about to assault someone’. This TL expression could be seen as the closest equivalent of the Arabic expression in terms of depicting the image and meaning of an assault or expected assault, not to mention the fact that it includes the use of the hand as the Arabic expression does. Besides, raising one’s hand to/against may sound more elegant than stretching out/extending.

As for Abdel Haleem, once again, he applies a target-oriented approach on renderingفي يُسْطَعْتُ إِلَيْكُمُ أَيْدِيَكُمُ... in [Q. 5:28] rather than a literal approach. He too uses the TL expression of raising one’s hand to/against to signify the image and meaning of an assault. Though Abdel Haleem and Saheeh International use the same TL expression in [Q. 5:28], Abdel Haleem’s rendition may be more elegant and reads much more smoothly. For example, Saheeh International’s rendition (BT:لَتُقْتْلِي ضَدِي يَدَكَ إِلَيْكُمُ لوْ رَفْعَتْأَ يَدَكَ... ) includes the preposition ‘against’ while the infinitive verb ‘to kill’ is quite sufficient. In addition, it repeats the ‘possessive determiner + hand’ (your/my hand) while this can be avoided by using the possessive pronoun ‘mine’. Contrariwise, Abdel Haleem’s rendition (BT:لَتُقْتِلُكَ إِلَيْكُمُ، أَنَا لَا نَرْفَعُ يَدَكَ لَأَقْتُلُكَ... ) has only the infinitive verb ‘to kill’, which is sufficient to infer that the hand is (about to be) raised aggressively against another person. If this infinitive verb, i.e. type of assault, was not mentioned, as in [Q. 5:11], then the preposition ‘against’ would have to be included. Furthermore, the possessive pronoun ‘mine’ is used to avoid the repetition of the ‘possessive determiner + hand’ (your/my hand).

Moreover, another kināyah can be formed with the word بسط when it collocates with اللسان (tongue) to depict the sense of swearing. This can be seen in [Q. 60:2] when both hands and tongue collocate with بسط as a referent for assault and insult (verbal assault) (see table below). As for its rendition, all four translators chose to render the whole phrase (both kināyah expressions together) literally apart from the prepositional phraseإِلَيْكُم. 

**Table 6.6: Translations of kināyah expression 8.**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Literal translation: (…stretch out their hands and tongues towards/to you with evil ...)</th>
<th>Referent: insult (swear and blaspheme )</th>
<th>Purpose of kināyah: Elegance</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ali</td>
<td>stretch forth their hands and their tongues against you for evil ...</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hilali &amp; Khan</td>
<td>stretch forth their hands and their tongues against you with evil ...</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Ali as well as Hilali and Khan continue to use the word ‘stretch’ to express the meaning of بسط as they did previously. The difference between the two is related to the rendition of the preposition ‘بـ’ accompanying the prepositional phrase بالسوء, i.e. the type of assault and insult. Ali renders the preposition ‘بـ’ as ‘for’ while Hilali and Khan render it as ‘with’. In this case, it seems that the preposition ‘with’ is more appropriate than ‘for’ because it describes the physical state or the means of stretching out the hands and tongue, whereas ‘for’ may refer to the purpose of stretching out the hands and tongue. Furthermore, both translators continue to render the preposition phrase إليكم (towards/to you) as ‘against you’ instead of its literal rendition ‘towards/to you’ to show that the intentions of stretching out the hands and tongue are not friendly but antagonistic.

Saheeh International also continue to use the word ‘extend’ to express the meaning of بسط and render the preposition phrase إليكم (towards/to you) as ‘against you’. As for Abdel Haleem, strange to say, he opts for a literal rendition instead of a target-oriented approach as he did in rendering بسط اليد in [Q. 5:11] and [Q. 5:28]. This time, he decides to render بسط as ‘stretch out’. Perhaps the reason behind this decision is the lack of an idiomatic TL expression that infers a similar image and referential meaning to that of بسط اللسان. Also, the reason could be that he had already mentioned the action or intent of the hand in translating إن ينقظكم يكونوا لكم أعداء, the beginning of the اية, as “[I]f they gain the upper hand over you, they will revert to being your enemies”. Nonetheless, in the TL, the word ‘tongue’ may occur in several idiomatic expressions/phrases that refer to a special meaning different from their literal meaning, but none of them are similar to the Arabic kināyah. For example, the expressions ‘have a forked tongue’, ‘sharp tongue’, and ‘keep a civil tongue (in one’s head)’, indicate dishonesty/deceitfulness, speaking in a harsh or critical manner, and a request to speak decently and politely respectively. The closest TL expression could be ‘sticking one’s tongue out (at someone)’, which indicates contempt or insult, yet it does not include the sense of swearing and blasphemy as the kināyah in [Q. 60:2] does. This is possibly why Abdel Haleem chooses to render the kināyah literally. At the same time, he does render بالسوء using the word ‘harm’ rather than ‘evil’, which could hold both types of inflections, physical or emotional, so that the rendition of the kināyah can be read smoothly and intelligibly.
Kināyah 9

Table 6.7: Translations of Kināyah expression 9.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Literal translation: (And the day the wrongdoer bites on his hands, he will say I wish ...)</th>
<th>Referent: Remorse</th>
<th>Purpose of kināyah: Elegance and hyperbole</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Ali</td>
<td>The Day that the wrong-doer will bite at his hands, he will say, &quot;Oh! would that I ...</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Hilali &amp; Khan</td>
<td>And (remember) the Day when the Zalim (wrong-doer, oppressor, polytheist, etc.) will bite at his hands, he will say: &quot;Oh! Would that I ...</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Saheeh International</td>
<td>And the Day the wrongdoer will bite at his hands [in regret] he will say, &quot;Oh, I wish ...</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Abdel Haleem</td>
<td>On that Day the evildoer will bite his own hand and say, ‘If only ...</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

It appears that all four translators have decided to render عض اليد literally. However, Ali and Hilali and Khan render the preposition على as ‘at’ rather than ‘on’. It is true that the two propositions are close to each other in terms of meaning, but the appropriate equivalent preposition for على, in this context and in the event of applying a pure literal translation, would be ‘on’, exactly like the translation of Saheeh International. However, unlike the rest, Abdel Haleem omits the preposition على and adds the word ‘own’ after the possessive pronoun ‘his’. That said, this addition only emphasises that the hands belong to the wrongdoer (الظالم) and, therefore, it may not affect the general meaning of the ST or the referential meaning of the kināyah. Nonetheless, what is interesting and may affect the literal meaning is his attempt to render يدين (in the dual form) as ‘hand (singular form) rather than ‘hands’ as it is in the ST (BT: [الخاصة به] يعض يده). According to Quṭb (2003, p. 2560), the wrongdoer might not only bite one hand but might bite both hands alternately, or due to his deep regret, he might bite both hands at once. However, Quṭb’s interpretation should not be taken literally if we remember that kināyah expressions are used figuratively to allude to and attest a specific meaning. Nevertheless, Abdel Haleem should not make such changes, especially given that ‘hands’, i.e. the plural form referring here to two things, is grammatically acceptable in the TL.

As for a literal rendition of the kināyah and whether or not it implies a similar referent of that of the ST, this is, of course, somewhat debatable. Probably there is no doubt that the TT recipient will comprehend the intended meaning of ‘biting their own hands’ through the context of the āyah, but there would be a possibility of misunderstanding it if it were to be on its own. The reason for this misunderstanding may be culture-bound. That is to say, expressions or gestures such as biting their own hands (عض اليد) or fingertips (عض)
may imply a specific meaning in one culture but not in another (see the analysis of the next kināyah). To dispel any misunderstanding, Saheeh International add the prepositional phrase ‘in regret’ between square brackets. According to Beekman and Callow, such an addition is not ideal and would possibly confuse the TT recipient because the biting of one’s hand already exists in the TC with a different sense than remorse.

Kināyah 10

Table 6.8: Translations of Kināyah expression 10.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Literal translation:</th>
<th>Referent: Rage</th>
<th>Purpose of kināyah: Elegance and hyperbole</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(... and when they are alone they bite their fingertips in rage at you ...)</td>
<td>... when they are alone, <strong>they bite the tips of their fingers at you in rage</strong> ...</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Ali</strong></td>
<td>... when they are alone, <strong>they bite the very tips of their fingers at you in their rage</strong> ...</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Hilali &amp; Khan</strong></td>
<td>... when they are alone, <strong>they bite the tips of their fingers at you in rage</strong> ...</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Saheeh International</strong></td>
<td>... when they are alone, <strong>they bite their fingertips at you in rage</strong> ...</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Abdel Haleem</strong></td>
<td>... when they are alone, <strong>they bite their fingertips in rage at you</strong> ...</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

As with the rendition of عض اليد, a literal translation was used by translators to render عض الأنامل. The only odd rendition amongst the four is the one made by Ali. Bizarrely, he adds the words ‘off’ and ‘very’ that may lead to a totally different meaning (BT: يقطعون عليكم مهبض ضعف، وظايف أصابعهم (أناملهم) تحديداً في [حالة] غضبهم). The phrase ‘bite off’ suggests removing or separating, i.e. cutting off, something from another, which in this case involves the fingertips. In addition, there is no explanation for him adding the word ‘very’, since there is absolutely no reason to emphasize the fingertips. Also, there is no need for adding the possessive determiner ‘their’! Generally, Ali’s rendition may lead the TT recipient to visualise a different image to that of the original kināyah.

Once more, the ability of the TT recipient to understand the intended meaning of this kināyah is roughly similar to their understanding of عض اليد. In fact, it may be more difficult, especially if we take into consideration that the nails are located in the fingertips and biting the nails in most, if not all, Western cultures implies a sense of anxiety and not remorse. That said, there is no equivalent TL expression that implies a similar image and referent as the Arabic kināyah. In contrast, the translation of عض اليد literally is possibly more acceptable than translating عض الأنامل literally because biting the fingertips is definitely an established gesture in the TC for anxiety. Though the āyah states clearly that
the biting was done in a state of rage, it would probably confuse the TT reader and cause what Beekman and Callow refer to as a ‘semantic clash’. The solution to avoid such confusion, according to the views of Larson or Beekman and Callow, is to drop the specific reference to the symbolic action (عض الأذن) and use a generic word (with a descriptive phrase). However, we suggest the same approach as used by the translators, but with a footnote that explains that this gesture in the SC is known also as a sign of remorse, unlike in the TC where it could refer to anxiety.

**Kināyah 11**

*Table 6.9: Translations of Kināyah expression 11.*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Literal translation: (His fruits were encompassed thereby he began inverting/turning his palm about over what he has spent on it...)</th>
<th>Referent: Remorse and sorrow</th>
<th>Purpose of kināyah: Elegance and hyperbole</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Ali</strong></td>
<td>So his fruits (and enjoyment) were encompassed (with ruin), and he remained <em>twisting and turning his hands</em> over what he had spent on his property...</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Hilali &amp; Khan</strong></td>
<td>So his fruits were encircled (with ruin). And he remained <em>clapping his hands with sorrow</em> over what he had spent upon it…</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Saheeh International</strong></td>
<td>And his fruits were encompassed [by ruin], so he began to <em>turn his hands about [in dismay]</em> over what he had spent on it...</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Abdel Haleem</strong></td>
<td>And so it was: his fruit was completely destroyed, and there he was, <em>wringing his hands</em> over what he had invested in it...</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

It appears that the four translators have rendered differently in terms of word choice or approach. What is interesting, however, is that they all render the word كف as ‘hand’ rather than ‘palm’, which is the inner surface of the hand, even those who chose a literal approach, such as Saheeh International. Perhaps the reason for this is that they considered the palm and the hand as one organ, i.e. one part of the body, and that any physical movement of the palm will obviously involve an exactly correspondingly movement of the hand and vice versa. Even if this was true, however, there is no excuse not to render كف as ‘palm’ unless it sounds unidiomatic or there is an appropriate idiomatic TL expression including the word ‘hand’ that is equivalent to that of the ST in terms of referent and function (i.e. purpose of use). That said, there might be some idiomatic English phrases, proverbs, or idioms that may describe or involve the meaning of regret as in ‘kicking oneself’ or ‘no use crying over spilt milk’. However, such expressions might not be formal or appropriate to use in this type of text. The other TL expressions (or gestures) that one might think of are ‘clapping a hand [briefly]
against/over/to/across a forehead, cheek(s), or mouth’ in a token of dismay or regret. For example, ‘Tom clapped his hand to his forehead when he heard that he had failed the exam’. The other is ‘wringing one’s hand’, as in ‘Tom then wrung his hands together and buried his face into his hands’. The underlined phrase, i.e. bury one’s face into their hands, also involves ‘hands’, but generally all three expressions suggest the sense of dismay, distress/agitation/exasperation, or embarrassment/shame respectively more than the sense of remorse or regret. This shows us that not all expressions in a language, particularly those involving gestures, exist or have the same referent in another language. So how did the four translators handle the rendition of a kināyah that involves a gesture as a referent of remorse as well as sorrow?

It looks like Ali decided to render it literally (apart from the word كف) and, strangely, add the word ‘twist’ [BT: فظﻞ يلوي ويقلب يديه]. Regardless of whether the words ‘twist’ and ‘turn’ are synonyms or near-synonyms in English, adding the two words ‘twist’ and ‘turn’ together does not help the TT reader in comprehending or conceiving the kināyah. In other words, there is no reason for this addition. In fact, it may confuse the reader, not to mention the fact that ‘twist’ and ‘turn’ are normally used together in the TL as a phrase to imply a meaning other than يقلب يديه. That is, the phrase ‘twist and turn’ expresses a total different meaning in the TL, for example, it could mean that a road, path, river, or suchlike has a lot of bends, as in ‘the road twists and turns throughout the mountain’. It could also mean complicated dealings or circumstances, as ‘the party are concerned with the twist and turns of their leader’s political career’. Therefore, mentioning either ‘twist’ or ‘turn’ by itself would have been more appropriate. Saheeh International applied a literal approach too but with an addition that describes the state of turning about the hands. In spite of this, a back translation (BT: في في خيبة أمﻞ/بأسﻰ) will show that Saheeh International’s rendition is roughly more faithful to the ST, and probably sounds more idiomatic than Ali’s. The downside, however, with Saheeh International’s rendition is to do with the addition they have placed between two square brackets to explain the reason for this gesture or the state while producing it. What they have mentioned does not correspond with any authoritative exegetical literature nor does it lead the TT reader to the actual intended meaning of the kināyah. Therefore, since they have decided to make an addition, they should have at least included one of the referents (remorse, regret, or sorrow) to show the actual state of that person who is turning his palms about and more importantly for the TT reader to conceive what this expression is used for in the SL.
With respect to Hilali and Khan’s rendition, it is quite obvious they have relied on one of the exegetical works, which is without doubt part and parcel of the Qur’anic translation process (see the textual and contextual analysis of this *kināyah* in the previous chapter). Nevertheless, their rendition is considered a partial interpretation. Among the exegetes who described the movement of تَقليب الكف as ‘clapping’ without further information are ibn Kathīr (2000) and aṭ-Ṭabarī (2001). The majority of the exegetes who in their description of تَقليب الكف mentioned ‘clapping’ or ‘striking’ clearly indicate that one hand strikes over the other hand, i.e. on the back of the other hand; are ar-Rāzī (1981), abū Ḥayyān (1993), and ath-Thaᶜlabī (1997) describe in meticulous detail that the palm of one hand strikes over the back of the other hand. That is why Hilali and Khan’s rendition is incomplete even with their addition of the phrase ‘with sorrow’. In fact, the two phrases together do not make sense. Normally when a person is clapping, it is as a token of approval or praise, and in some cases, sarcasm but never as a token of remorse or sorrow. Probably it would have been acceptable if they had rendered the *kināyah* as ‘remorsefully (or sorrowfully) he remained clapping one hand on the back of the other’ or ‘he remained clapping one hand on the back of the other with remorse (or sorrow)’ since they have opted for an exegetical rendition. At least this way the TT recipient would read and understand one of the authoritative exegeses of تَقليب الكف properly.

Unlike the other translators, Abdel Haleem attempts to render the *kināyah* by applying a target-oriented approach. It seems, however, that his effort is to some extent unsuccessful. One of the gestures of agitation or exasperation is rubbing and twisting the hands together, in other words, wringing one’s own hands. For that reason, the phrase ‘wringing one’s own hands’ has become an established TL expression to describe a person who is worried, anxious, distressed, irritated, and suchlike, chiefly when they are powerless to change the situation. In a way, it may hold the sense of sorrow to some degree, but certainly not deep regret or guilt for a wrongdoing as the ST phrase does. Therefore, since the twisting of the palms or striking them over the back of the other hand is not an established gesture with a specific meaning in the TC, the translators should probably have translated the expression literally along with an addition or footnote that explained the intended meaning or emotional state. If they had done this, there would not be any semantic clash and at least the TT recipient would have a knowledge of the gesture and its intended meaning.
## Kināyah 12

### Table 6.10: Translations of Kināyah expression 12.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Literal translation:</th>
<th>Referent: Remorse</th>
<th>Purpose of kināyah: Elegance and hyperbole</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(When it fell in their hands and they perceived that they went astray ...)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Ali</th>
<th>Hilali &amp; Khan</th>
<th>Saheeh International</th>
<th>Abdel Haleem</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>When they repented, and saw that they had erred ...</td>
<td>And when they regretted and saw that they had gone astray ...</td>
<td>And when regret overcame them* and they saw that they had gone astray ...</td>
<td>When, with much <em>wringing of hands</em>, they perceived that they were doing wrong ...</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In direct contrast to their renditions of the three previous kināyah expressions for remorse, Ali, Hilali and Khan, and Saheeh International have decided to avoid a literal approach in rendering سُقط في أَيْدِيْهِمْ وَرَأَوْا أَنْهَاً فَضَنَنُوا..... It seems they have realised that a literal rendition, in this case, would make no sense even if they were to apply additions or omissions to it, this being probably due to the culture-specific nature of the kināyah, and because السقط في اليد is more of an expression to express a specific reference rather than a gesture. Furthermore, the lack of an appropriate TL phrase holding a rhetorical image and/or at least a referent similar to the original kināyah left the translators with no choice but to state the intended meaning of the kināyah explicitly. There is no doubt by doing so the TT loses the rhetorical features and function the ST phrase, i.e. kināyah, has but most importantly the intended meaning is maintained and delivered to the TT recipient. Saheeh International do, however, add a descriptive footnote in which they provide a literal translation and meaning of سُقط في أَيْدِيْهِمْ: “Literally, ‘When their hands had been descended upon,’ i.e., bitten by them out of severe regret”. Interestingly, despite all this Abdel Haleem decides to render سُقط في أَيْدِيْهِمْ using the same approach, i.e. target-oriented with exactly the same TL expression (wringing one’s own hands) which he used in rendering يُقَلِّبُ كَفَّيْهِ. As we have illustrated previously, this TL phrase is commonly used to express agitation or exasperation but never the sense of remorse. Hence, using this expression will certainly cause a loss in meaning, which will lead to a miscomprehension of the kināyah specifically and the proper meaning of the whole āyah in general.

## Kināyah 13

### Table 6.11: Translations of Kināyah expression 13.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>وَأَحَلَّ لَكُم لِيَلَةَ الصَّيْامِ الْزَّرْقَةِ إِلَى تَسَافَكِم ...</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

-221-
As has been explained in the previous chapter, there are no disagreements among the exegetes consulted in this study that the word ﴿ in [Q. 2:187] as a kināyah for copulation. There are, however, some disagreements regarding its referent in [Q. 2:197]. The majority believe it is also used figuratively as a kināyah for sexual intercourse, but some say it holds its literal sense (lewd/obscene language) and some believe it may hold both the literal and figurative meanings at the same time. We are not at liberty to decide which one of the interpretations is truer, but probably the majority view is more convincing since the act of indecent speech is already included in the word ﴿ (immoral or sinful behaviour).

With the exegetes’ opinions in mind, one can notice that the rendition of the word ﴿ in both ʿāyāhs is consonant with the exegetes’ views. To put it another way, the renditions of ﴿ made by the four translators in [Q. 2:187] indicate or refer to the sense of sexual intercourse, but the renditions differ in [Q. 2:197] concurring with the exegetes’ views (as did the exegetes’ views). For example, Ali’s rendition of ﴿ in [Q. 2:187] evidently shows that he avoids a literal rendition and tries to convey the referent (intended meaning) semantically through the word ‘approach’ in order to achieve a euphemism. The word

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Referent: Sexual intercourse</th>
<th>Purpose of kināyah: Euphemism</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Ali</strong></td>
<td>[Q. 2:187]: Permitted to you, on the night of the fasts, is the approach to your wives ...</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>[Q. 2:197]: ... no obscenity, nor wickedness, nor wrangling in the Hajj ...</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Hilali &amp; Khan</strong></td>
<td>[Q. 2:187]: It is made lawful for you, during the nights of fasting, to have sexual relations with your wives ...</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>[Q. 2:197]: ... he should not have sexual relations (with his wife), nor commit sin, nor dispute unjustly during the Hajj ...</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Saheeh International</strong></td>
<td>[Q. 2:187]: It has been made permissible for you the night preceding fasting to go to your wives [for sexual relations] ...</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>[Q. 2:197]: ... no sexual relations and no disobedience and no disputing during Hajj ...</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Abdel Haleem</strong></td>
<td>[Q. 2:187]: You [believers] are permitted to lie with your wives during the night of the fast ...</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>[Q. 2:197]: ... no indecent speech, misbehaviour, or quarrelling for anyone undertaking the pilgrimage ...</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
‘approach’ by itself does not indicate or refer to a sexual relation, but the TT reader may perceive the intended meaning through the context. It usually refers to a sexual relation when collocated with ‘sexual’, as in ‘sexual approach’, but if Ali had added the word ‘sexual’ then a euphemism would have not been achieved. There are better or more idiomatic TT phrases that refer to sexual intercourse indirectly and politely, i.e. in a euphemistic manner, than ‘approach’. Even if Ali were to insist on using ‘approach’ then it would have been better to use ‘approaches’ instead, especially given that he used the noun form. At least the word ‘approaches’, the synonym of ‘advances’, denotes a behaviour or attempt to initiate a sexual relation with someone. On the other hand, Ali’s rendition of زَفَحُ in [Q. 2:197] is quite different. It is obvious that he is in favour of the exegetical literature that believes the phrase الزَفَحُ holds its literal sense; hence, his rendition is ‘obscenity’.

In almost the same way, Abdel Haleem renders the phrase الزَفَحُ disparately. That is to say, he decides to render the phrase زَفَحُ in [Q. 2:187] based on its figurative sense, and in [Q. 2:197] based on its literal sense. Nonetheless, Abdel Haleem’s translation in [Q. 2:187] is quite distinct, due to his selection of words. Abdel Haleem chose the TL phrase ‘to lie with’ (الاضطجاع مع) to express sexual intercourse, which not only expresses the referential meaning of the kināyah idiomatically, but also euphemistically as the ST phrase does. It is worth noting that the phrase ‘lie with’ is also used in some English biblical versions, for example, the King James Bible or Douay–Rheims Bible, to express sexual intercourse euphemistically (cf. Leviticus 18:22).

Turning to the renditions of Hilali and Khan along with Saheeh International, both translators appear to believe that الزَفَحُ is used in both āyahs figuratively as the majority of exegetes do. Accordingly, their renditions of الزَفَحُ in both āyahs refer to the referential meaning. Apart from the addition of ‘with his wife’ in [Q. 2:197], Hilali and Khan’s translations are consistent, unlike Saheeh International. That said, their translations may look like as if they have made the intended meaning explicit due to the use of the TL phrase ‘sexual relations’. One might argue that the adjective ‘sexual’ is not taboo and that the expression of ‘sexual relations’ is in fact a euphemistic expression for having sex. This may be true, but why use such an expression when there are other much more euphemistic expressions that denote sexual intercourse without including the word ‘sex’, such as the technical or scientific terms ‘copulation’, ‘coitus’, or more general terms such as ‘coupling’, ‘carnal knowledge/relations’, ‘intimate relations’, ‘intimacy’, ‘to lie with’, ‘sleeping with’, ‘going to bed with’, ‘lovemaking’, and the like? Moreover, adding the
phrase ‘with his wife’ in [Q. 2:197] has no proper justification either. This is because extramarital intercourse is prohibited at all times, let alone during an important sacred ceremony such as the Hajj, which means that the intercourse issue is marital-related unless stated otherwise. This is strange, since Qur’anic translators usually are aware of this matter; or else why render مَثَلُكُمُ السَّاَنِيَّةُ, following الرَّفَثُ, as ‘your wives’ and not literally as ‘your women’?

Saheeh International render زَفَثُ in [Q. 2:197] in the same way as Hilali and Khan apart from the unnecessary addition of ‘with his wife’. Therefore, the argument made about Hilali and Khan’s rendition can be applied to Saheeh International’s rendition of [Q. 2:197]. As for their rendition of زَفَثُ in [Q. 2:187], it seems that Saheeh International thought that their construal (to go to your wives [BT: إلى زوجاتكم] may confuse the TT recipient, and probably cause them to misapprehend the intended meaning. Hence, they decided to add the intended meaning explicitly between square brackets, though, according to OED, the verb ‘go’ with the prepositions ‘in, to, or unto’ refers to ‘sexual intercourse with a particular woman’, in addition to the fact it is used frequently in the Hebrew Scriptures such as Genesis 38:8. Therefore, if they just had added the phrase ‘bed with’ to the end of ‘to go to’, their translation would have been appropriate and easily to comprehend without explicitness. Had they done so, they would have produced a euphemistic vernacular expression, in other words, idiomatic, for sexual intercourse (to go to bed with [الذهاب للفرائش مع]).

**Kināyah 14**

*Table 6.12: Translations of Kināyah expression 14.*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Referent: Sexual intercourse</th>
<th>Purpose of kināyah: Euphemism</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Ali</strong></td>
<td>… so now associate with them … do not associate with your wives while ye are in retreat in the mosques …</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Hilali &amp; Khan</strong></td>
<td>… So now have sexual relations with them … And do not have sexual relations with them (your wives) while you are in I'tikaf …</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Saheeh International</strong></td>
<td>… So now, have relations with them … And do not have relations with them as long as you are staying for worship in the mosques …</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Abdel Haleem</strong></td>
<td>… now you can lie with them … Do not lie with them during the nights of your devotional retreat in the mosques …</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Literal translation:

( …and now have skin-to-skin contact with them … … do not have skin-to-skin contact with them while devotionally confining yourselves in the mosques …)
The word َرَشَبُ, which is another kināyah for having sexual intercourse, is mentioned twice in the same āyah, [Q. 2:187], where the word الزَّفْتُ occurs. It appears that the translators have decided to adopt the same approach in rendering the two kināyah expression, َراهشَبُ and الزَّفْتُ. That is to say, they all try to avoid a literal translation and attempt to convey the intended meaning. However, what is interesting is that though the two words have the same referent and occur in the same āyah, the translators, apart from Abdel Haleem, render them differently. Ali, for instance, renders َرَشَبُ as ‘associate with’ (عَارِشُ), a plain general TL phrase, to convey the sense of sexual intercourse euphemistically [BT: فَالآن عاشَروْنُهُنَّ... وَلَا تُعَشِّرُوا زُوجاتَكُم]. According to OED, one of the meanings of ‘associate’ as a verb is “to keep company or have intercourse (with)”. Therefore, it is quite sensible to say that Ali’s translation is more or less a success in terms of delivering the intended meaning of َرَشَبُ euphemistically, and even if the TL phrase ‘associate with’ is not often used in this sense or manner, the TT recipient is able to arrive at this sense through the context.

We could have said the same thing to Hilali and Khan’s translation if they had just used the same expression in rendering الزَّفْتُ cited in the same āyah, but unfortunately we cannot because of the word ‘sexual’. As we explained before, there are several idiomatic TL expressions to convey the sense of sexual intercourse without including the word ‘sex’. The word ‘relations’ without the word ‘sexual’ would have relayed both the intended meaning and the function of the kināyah, especially given that the context of the āyah revolves around spousal relationships, which was exactly what Saheeh International did in their rendition. Additionally, if Hilali and Khan were to assume that the word ‘relations’ on its own does not refer to intercourse, it would still have been sufficient because the type of relation has already been mentioned previously in rendering الزَّفْتُ, which was ‘sexual relation’. Therefore, there was no need to add the word ‘sexual’. Also, there was no need to add the phrase ‘with his wife’, because the context of the āyah is obviously about spousal relationships.

As for Abdel Haleem’s translation, it appears that he is the only translator to be consistent in rendering the kināyah expressions in [Q. 2:187] that have a sexual intercourse referent. That is to say, Abdel Haleem renders the act of intercourse in [Q. 2:187], represented by the words َراهشَبُ and الزَّفْتُ, exactly the same way by employing the same idiomatic TL expression ‘to lie with’, which as we pointed out before is also used in some English Biblical translations.
### Kināyah 15 and 16

#### Table 6.13: Translations of Kināyah expressions 15 and 16.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Literal translation:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(They ask you [Prophet] about menses, say it is harmful, hence, <strong>seclude yourselves from women</strong> during menses and <strong>do not approach them</strong> until they are cleansed/purified …)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Referent:</strong></td>
<td>Avoid sexual intercourse</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Purpose of kināyah:</strong></td>
<td>Euphemism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Ali</strong></td>
<td>They ask thee concerning women's courses. Say: They are a hurt and a pollution: So <strong>keep away from women</strong> in their courses, and <strong>do not approach them</strong> until they are clean …</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Hilali &amp; Khan</strong></td>
<td>They ask you concerning menstruation. Say: that is an Adha (a harmful thing for a husband to have a sexual intercourse with his wife while she is having her menses), therefore <strong>keep away from women</strong> during menses and <strong>go not unto them</strong> till they have purified (from menses and have taken a bath) …</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Saheeh International</strong></td>
<td>And they ask you about menstruation. Say, It is harm, so <strong>keep away from wives</strong> during menstruation. And <strong>do not approach them</strong> until they are pure …</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Abdel Haleem</strong></td>
<td>They ask you [Prophet] about menstruation. Say, ‘Menstruation is a painful condition, so <strong>keep away from women</strong> during it. <strong>Do not approach them</strong> until they are cleansed …*</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

It appears that all four translators have decided to be too faithful to the ST and render both *kināyah* expressions, and not literally. The employment of such a technique here does in fact conceal the phrase ‘sexual intercourse’ just as the SL words do, and that is probably because the context helps. However, it may mislead the TT reader about the intended meaning. Thus, rendering **keep away** and ‘do not approach’ may lead the reader to understand that a man should literally avoid being close to a woman at all times during her menses rather than only not having intercourse. It seems that the translators, apart from Ali, were aware of this possible misinterpretation by the reader. Therefore, they have clarified the intended meaning, i.e. sexual intercourse, either through a footnote or between two brackets within the TT. For example, Hilali and Khan place the following explication between brackets after the word **السَّاَيِّة** (harmful): “a harmful thing for a husband to have a sexual intercourse with his wife while she is having her menses”, though their rendition ‘go unto’ is a well-known expression for intercourse used frequently in the Hebrew Scriptures such as Genesis 38:8.

In a footnote, Saheeh International explain that the exact meaning of ‘keep away from wives’ is “refrain from sexual intercourse”. Also in a footnote, Abdel Haleem states the following: “The Arabic expressions used here are clear euphemisms for ‘do not have
sexual intercourse with them”’. If they had rendered the intended meaning by using a euphemistic TL expression, as they did with previous *kināyah* expressions, they would have not needed to add any explications or comments. Also, the referent would have be conveyed comprehensibly as well as euphemistically, but it is quite obvious that they wanted to be faithful to the ST. Note also that it appears that Saheeh International have decided to render النّاساء as wives, which we think is unjustifiable because it is quite clear the sexual intercourse would be between spouses.

**Kināyah 17**

Table 6.14: Translations of *Kināyah* expression 17.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Literal translation: (… and then when they are cleansed/purified, come to them from where Allah has ordered you ﷽ Your women are [as] tilth for you, so come to your tilth when/wherever you desire …) [Q. 2:222-223]</th>
<th>Referent: Sexual intercourse</th>
<th>Purpose of <em>kināyah</em>: Euphemism</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Ali</strong></td>
<td>… And when they have purified themselves, then come to them from where Allah has ordained for you … ﷽ Your wives are a tilth* unto you; so approach your tilth when or how ye will …</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Hilali &amp; Khan</strong></td>
<td>… And when they have purified themselves, then go in unto them as Allah has ordained for you (go in unto them in any manner as long as it is in their vagina) … ﷽ Your wives are a tilth for you, so go to your tilth* …</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Saheeh International</strong></td>
<td>… And when they have purified themselves, then come to them from where Allah has ordained for you … ﷽ Your wives are a place of sowing of seed for you, so come to your place of cultivation however you wish …</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Abdel Haleem</strong></td>
<td>… when they are cleansed, you may approach them as God has ordained* … ﷽ wives are your fields, so go into your fields whichever way you like* …</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The phrase ّنُهُوَنَّ is another *kināyah* expression mentioned at the end of [Q. 2:222], where the previous *kināyah* phrases لا نُقْبُوْهُنَّ and اغْتَزِلُوْا النّاساء do not occur. The same translation method used by the translators in rendering the two latter phrases is also employed in rendering ّنُهُوَنَّ, i.e. literal rendition. It is worth noting that the comments and footnotes used by some of the translators in [Q. 2:222] to clarify that لا نُقْبُوْهُنَّ and اغْتَزِلُوْا are expressions related to sexual intercourse also include the phrase ّنُهُوَنَّ.

The word ّأَنَى أَنَى as a referent for intercourse (particularly between spouses) is also repeated in the āyah following [Q. 2:222], i.e. [Q. 2:223], and it too is rendered literally using ‘come to’, its synonym ‘approach’, or near-synonym ‘go to/into’. Hilali and Khan along with Saheeh International use the same rendition, ‘go into/to’ and ‘come to’ respectively,
in both āyāhs. That is to say, they are consistent in their rendition of the word أنتم تأتون الزجال. Ali and Abdel Haleem, on the other hand, are not quite as consistent as the other translators and decide to use ‘come to’/‘approach’ and ‘approach’/‘go into’ respectively. It is safe to say that the expressions ‘come to’, ‘go to/into’, and ‘approach’, in the current context, all convey both the intended meaning and purpose of the kināyah, particularly the last two expressions. It is worth noting that both Hilali and Khan and Abdel Haleem have added a footnote in [Q. 2:223], which either clearly identifies or implies that what is meant by فاتا حزكم is sexual intercourse. It is evident that the reason for this footnote is to the comparison of women with tilth and that the appropriate intercourse is through the vagina and not the anus.

### Table 6.15: Translations of Kināyah expression 17 that implies sex with men.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Literal translation:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>[Q. 7:81]: (Indeed you come to/approach men with lust without women …)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>[Q. 27:55]: (Do you come to men with lust without women …)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>[Q. 29:29]: (Do you come to men and cut of the roads [rob travellers/wayfarers])</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>[Q. 26:165]: (Do you come to males of all creatures)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Referent: Sexual intercourse (sodomy)</th>
<th>Purpose of kināyah: Euphemism</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Ali</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>[Q. 7:81]: For ye practise your lusts on men in preference to women…</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>[Q. 27:55]: Would ye really approach men in your lusts rather than women? …</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>[Q. 29:29]: Do ye indeed approach men, and cut off the highway? …</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>[Q. 26:165]: Of all the creatures in the world, will ye approach males</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Hilali &amp; Khan</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>[Q. 7:81]: Verily, you practise your lusts on men instead of women…</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>[Q. 27:55]: Do you approach men in your lusts rather than women? …</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| [Q. 29:29]: Verily, you do sodomy with men, and rob the wayfarer (travellers, etc.)!
| [Q. 26:165]: Go you in unto the males of the 'Alamin (mankind) |
| **Saheeh International**             |                             |
| [Q. 7:81]: Indeed, you approach men with desire, instead of women… |
| [Q. 27:55]: Do you indeed approach men with desire instead of women? … |
| [Q. 29:29]: Indeed, you approach men and obstruct the road … |
| [Q. 26:165]: Do you approach males among the worlds |
| **Abdel Haleem**                     |                             |
| [Q. 7:81]: You lust after men rather than women! … |
| [Q. 27:55]: How can you lust after men instead of women? … |
| [Q. 29:29]: How can you lust after men, waylay travellers … |
| [Q. 26:165]: Must you, unlike [other] people, lust after males |

The word also appears in the phrase تأتون الزجال as a referent for intercourse (but in the sense of sodomy) in four other āyāhs, [Q. 7:81], [Q. 27:55], [Q. 29:29], and [Q. 26:165].
Strikingly, Ali avoids a literal translation of the *kināyah* in \[Q. 7:81\] and decides to convey the meaning of intercourse by expressing the exercise of sexual desire: ‘practise your lusts on men’ [BT: تمارسون شهواتكم في الرجال]. It is quite strange because a literal translation, as in ‘approach men’, would have sufficed, especially given that the word شهوة describes the intention of approaching with lust. There is no explanation why he chose this method in rendering this āyah, and did not opt for a literal translation as he did with the same expression in \[Q. 27:55\], \[Q. 29:29\], and \[Q. 26:165\]. In addition, Ali’s translation of تألون الرجال في [Q. 27:55] is slightly odd, but it has nothing to do with the rendition of the *kināyah*. It involves the translation of the word شهوة: ‘approach men in your lusts’ [BT: تأتون الرجال في شهواتكم]. There was no need to add the possessive determiner ‘your’ nor pluralise the word ‘lust’. A simple literal translation and the addition of the proposition ‘with’, as in ‘go to/approach men with lust’ would have been sufficient; or rendering the word شهوة in the adverbial form ‘lustfully’ as in the original text, as in ‘go to/approach men lustfully’, probably would have been more adequate. Despite all this, Ali’s renditions of \[Q. 27:55\], \[Q. 29:29\], and \[Q. 26:165\] do in fact render the meaning of intercourse (sodomy) in a euphemistic manner.

Hilali and Khan’s translations are also striking, specifically when rendering [Q. 7:81] and \[Q. 29:29\]. Apart from being inconsistent, their translation of تألون الرجال in the former āyah and in \[Q. 27:55\] is exactly like Ali’s; therefore, the oddity we noted concerning Ali’s translation is the same here. The oddity also extends to Hilali and Khan’s translation of تألون الرجال in \[Q. 29:29\] because of the word ‘sodomy’. Using this word not only renders the act of intercourse with men explicitly but also contradicts the purpose of *kināyah*. Due to its hideousness, the word is not even used in biblical translations. If Hilali and Khan had placed the word ‘sodomy’ between brackets, as they usually do in such cases, or in a footnote, to explain the type of intercourse then probably it would have been acceptable. The question that has no answer is why they did not use the same rendition as they used in \[Q. 27:55\] or \[Q. 26:165\], specifically the latter. Not only does the phrase ‘go in unto’ convey ‘sexual intercourse’ implicitly and euphemistically but it is also an idiomatic TL expression which is used in biblical translations.

As for Saheeh International and Abdel Haleem, they are both consistent in their renditions of تألون الرجال. Saheeh International continue to apply a literal translation in rendering the word آتى, but this time they use the word ‘approach’ instead of ‘come to’, which in fact delivers the intended meaning implicitly as the ST does. With respect to Abdel Haleem’s renditions, not only do they not deliver the intended meaning but they can be considered
distortional. Using the TL phrase ‘lust after’ only indicates a strong sexual attraction to someone, but it does not include the sense of having sex with a person. Therefore, there is a significant loss of meaning, i.e. the act of intercourse, in his renditions and most of all they are misleading, since they only convey the sense of the desire and not the performance [BT (Q. 29:29). Another fact about their misleading nature is that the SL word مشتهى (lust) is not mentioned explicitly or implicitly in [Q. 29:29] nor in [Q. 26:165], yet Abdel Haleem insists on interpreting الإتيان as lusting.

**Kināyah 18 and 19**

*Table 6.16: Translations of Kināyah expressions 18 and 19.*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Referent: 1-Urination or defecation 2- sexual intercourse</th>
<th>Purpose of kināyah: Euphemism</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Ali</strong> [Q. 4:43] and [Q. 5:6]: ... one of you cometh from <em>offices of nature,</em> or ye have been <em>in contact with women ...</em></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Hilali &amp; Khan</strong> [Q. 4:43]: ... one of you comes after <em>answering the call of nature,</em> or you have been <em>in contact with women (by sexual relations)</em> ...  [Q. 5:6]: ... any of you comes from <em>answering the call of nature,</em> or you have been <em>in contact with women (i.e. sexual intercourse)</em> ...</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Saheeh International</strong> [Q. 4:43] and [Q. 5:6]*: ... one of you comes from <em>the place of relieving himself</em> or you have <em>contacted women [i.e., had sexual intercourse]</em> ...</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Abdel Haleem</strong> [Q. 4:43]: ... have <em>relieved yourselves,</em> or had <em>intercourse ...</em> [Q. 5:6]: ... has just <em>relieved himself,</em> or had <em>intimate contact with a woman ...</em></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

It is quite obvious that all four translators tried to avoid a literal translation of the word مشتهى and chose to render the intended meaning semantically. This is because a literal translation would not convey the intended meaning, in addition to the fact that مشتهى has been lexicalised. All four translators use established idiomatic TL expressions to convey the meaning of urination or defecation. Saheeh International and Abdel Haleem’s renditions are quite similar as they both opt for the TL phrase ‘relieve oneself’. One difference between the two renditions is that Saheeh International try to adhere to the ST as far as they can by adding the word ‘place’ before. Another difference is that Saheeh International use the same pronoun “himself” in both their renditions in [Q. 4:43] and [Q. 5:6], whereas Abdel Haleem uses the pronouns ‘yourselves’ and ‘himself” in [Q. 4:43]
and [Q. 5:6] respectively. It is worth noting that the second person pronoun ‘yourself’ might be more appropriate since it is neutral in terms of gender, while the third person singular pronoun ‘himself’ is confined to a male addressee. Hilali and Khan use the phrase ‘the call of nature’, which is also a well-known euphemistic TL phrase that expresses the need for urination or defecation. Ali uses the phrase ‘office of nature’. Despite the fact that this phrase is not widely used as the previous expressions, i.e. ‘the call of nature or ‘relieve oneself’, but following OED it conveys the same sense as these expressions convey. That is, ‘office of nature’ expresses the meaning of “[T]he function or action of defecating or urinating; excretion” (OED). This in turn, justifies the translator’s use of this phrase.

As for the translation of the kināyah phrase لامستْنَمَل, it appears that the translators, apart from Abdel Haleem, have decided to go for a literal approach. In other words, they render the kināyah literally, and it looks like some of the translators, specifically Hilali and Khan as well as Saheeh International, have decided to state the intended meaning explicitly between brackets or through a footnote to leave no room for confusion or ambiguity regarding the intended meaning of contacting a woman. Hilali and Khan add ‘by sexual relations’ and ‘i.e. sexual intercourse’ in their rendition for [Q. 4:43] and [Q. 5:6] respectively, whereas Saheeh International state ‘i.e., had sexual intercourse’ in both renditions, once within the text and the other through a footnote. Stating the word ‘sexual’ explicitly within the text, even between brackets, may contradict with the purpose of using the kināyah, but probably it would not do so if it was placed in a footnote, as Saheeh International did in their rendition of [Q. 5:6].

Abdel Haleem too provides a literal rendition with an addition in translating لامستْنَمَل in [Q. 5:6]. Nonetheless, his rendition is considered euphemistic since the adjective ‘intimate’ indicates a sexual relationship implicitly. However, in his rendition of لامستْنَمَل in [Q. 4:43], Abdel Haleem avoids a literal translation and interestingly decides to render the intended meaning, i.e. sexual intercourse, taking into consideration the function of the kināyah, i.e. euphemism. This is noticeable since he only states the word ‘intercourse’, which suffices for delivering the intended meaning euphemistically without mentioning the word ‘sex’.

Kināyah 20

Table 6.17: Translations of Kināyah expression 20.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Kināyah phrase</th>
<th>Translation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>لامستْنَمَل</td>
<td>in [Q. 3:47]</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
**Literal translation:**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ref [Q. 3:47]</th>
<th>[Q. 3:47]: How shall I have a son when no man hath touched me?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ref [Q. 19:20]</td>
<td>[Q. 19:20]: How shall I have a son, seeing that no man has touched me</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ref [Q. 2:236-237]</td>
<td>[Q. 2:236-237]: (as long as you have not touched them …۞ And if you divorce them before you have touched them …)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ref [Q. 33:49]</td>
<td>[Q. 33:49]: (…divorce them before ye have touched them …)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ref [Q. 58:3-4]</td>
<td>[Q. 58:3-4]: (…before they touch each other …۞ …before they touch each other …)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Referent:** sexual intercourse  
**Purpose of kināyah:** Euphemism

- **Ali:**
  - [Q. 3:47]: How shall I have a son when no man hath touched me?  
  - [Q. 19:20]: How shall I have a son, seeing that no man has touched me  
  - [Q. 2:236-237]: …before consummation …۞ And if ye divorce them before consummation …  
  - [Q. 33:49]: … divorce them before ye have touched them …  
  - [Q. 58:3-4]: before they touch each other …۞ … before they touch each other …

- **Hilali & Khan:**
  - [Q. 3:47]: How shall I have a son when no man has touched me  
  - [Q. 19:20]: How can I have a son, when no man has touched me  
  - [Q. 2:236-237]: …while yet you have not touched (had sexual relation with) them …۞ And if you divorce them before you have touched (had a sexual relation with) them …  
  - [Q. 33:49]: … divorce them before you have sexual intercourse with them …  
  - [Q. 58:3-4]: before they touch each other …۞ … before they both touch each other …

- **Saheeh International:**
  - [Q. 3:47]: how will I have a child when no man has touched me?  
  - [Q. 19:20]: How can I have a boy while no man has touched me  
  - [Q. 2:236-237]: … you have not touched* …۞ And if you divorce them before you have touched them …  
  - [Q. 33:49]: … divorce them before you have touched them [i.e., consummated the marriage]  
  - [Q. 58:3-4]: before they touch one another …۞ … before they touch one another …

- **Abdel Haleem:**
  - [Q. 3:47]: how can I have a son when no man has touched me?  
  - [Q. 19:20]: How can I have a son when no man has touched me?  
  - [Q. 2:236-237]: … you have not yet consummated the marriage …۞ If you divorce wives before consummating the marriage …  
  - [Q. 33:49]: … divorce them before you have touched them …
The word ْسَمَّٰنَ as a kināyah for sexual intercourse occurs in different forms in seven āyāhs. All of the four translators have decided to render َيَفِسْتَنِي literally as ‘touch me’ in [Q. 3:47] and [Q. 19:20], which is reasonable, because the context clearly indicates that what is meant by touching is intercourse, particularly given that they all also decided to render ِنَّبَرَ as ‘man’ instead of ‘human being’. In other words, touching a woman clearly refers to sexual intercourse especially given that pregnancy or having a child cannot occur without it.

Āyah [Q. 2:236-237] and [Q. 33:49] is related to marital intercourse. Despite the fact that the context is clear and that the reader could easily deduce that ُهَوِي ْسَمَّاَتَ لَمْ نَمْ تَسْوَهُنَّ is related to intercourse, Ali and Abdel Haleem decided to use the word ‘consummate’ in their rendition of [Q. 2:236-237], which is more of a technical term. The word ‘consummate’ formally means making a marriage complete by having sexual intercourse, and nowadays it is more generally used for having sexual intercourse (OED). There is nothing wrong with using this word, specifically given that it fits the context, i.e. divorce without/before the spouses having intercourse, though a literal translation would have been sufficient, particularly if we take into consideration Newmark’s opinion that a literal translation is ‘always the best’ as long as it offers the same semantic and communicative effect as the ST (1981, p. 21). However, since [Q. 2:236-237] and [Q. 33:49] discuss the same issue in terms of the state of marital intercourse, why did Ali and Abdel Haleem not use the word ‘consummate’ again in [Q. 33:49] as they did in [Q. 2:236-237]? Instead, they went for the literal translation ‘touch’, as they did in their translations of ْسَمَّٰنَ in [Q. 58:3-4]. It is noticeable that Abdel Haleem adds the phrase ‘the couple may’ before ‘touch one another’, when there was no need for this, but possibly he does it for stylistic reasons.

Saheeh International employ a literal translation throughout their renditions of ْسَمَّٰنَ. They do, however, place a footnote in [Q. 2:236] in which they indicate “[t]he marriage has not been consummated”. Also in [Q. 33:49] they add “i.e., consummated the marriage” as an explanation between square brackets.

As for Hilali and Khan, they translate ْسَمَّٰنَ in [Q. 58:3-4] literally, as they did in [Q. 3:47] and [Q. 19:20], and by doing so, they convey the intended meaning of the kināyah and maintain its purpose of use. In [Q. 2:236-237], they adopt the same method. However,
they fail to maintain the euphemistic function because they include the word ‘sexual’ in their explanation, which they place between brackets within the text. There translation would have been a success to a certain degree in terms of euphemism had they omitted the word ‘sexual’ from their explanation. In [Q. 33:49], not only do they fail to convey the intended meaning of <التحرمت عليكم امهاتكم وبناتكم ... و أمهات بنتكم وبناتكم اللاتي في خيامكم من نساءكم اللائي دخلتم بهن فإن لم تكونوا دخلتم بهن فلا جناح عليكم ...> implicitly, but they also fail to maintain the euphemistic function, because they have stated the intended meaning directly.

**Kināyah 21**

*Table 6.18: Translations of Kināyah expression 21.*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>Literal translation:</strong> (Prohibited to you [for marriage] your mothers and daughters ... your mothers-in-law and your step daughters who are in your laps [guardianship] [born from] of your women whom you had gone into them, but there is no sin upon you if you have not gone into them …)</th>
<th><strong>Referent:</strong> sexual intercourse</th>
<th><strong>Purpose of kināyah:</strong> Euphemism</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Ali</strong></td>
<td>Prohibited to you (For marriage) are:- Your mothers, daughters ... your wives’ mothers; your step-daughters under your guardianship, born of your wives to whom ye have gone in,- no prohibition if ye have not gone in ...</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Hilali &amp; Khan</strong></td>
<td>Forbidden to you (for marriage) are: your mothers, daughters ... your wives’ mothers; your step-daughters under your guardianship, born of your wives to whom you have gone in – but there is no sin on you if you have not gone in them (to marry their daughters), ...</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Saheeh International</strong></td>
<td>Prohibited to you [for marriage] are your mothers, your daughters … your wives' mothers, and your step-daughters under your guardianship [born] of your wives unto whom you have gone in. But if you have not gone in unto them, there is no sin upon you</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Abdel Haleem</strong></td>
<td>You are forbidden to take as wives your mothers, daughters … your wives’ mothers, the stepdaughters in your care - those born of women with whom you have consummated marriage, if you have not consummated the marriage, then you will not be blamed ...</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

It appears that Ali, Hilali and Khan, and Saheeh International have decided to render الدخول بالمرأة literally using ‘go in/unto’, which is a well-known TL expression for intercourse even used frequently in the Hebrew Scriptures. As we have previously explained (see *kināyah* 16 in this chapter), this TL expression delivers the intended meaning of sexual intercourse implicitly in a euphemistic manner as does the original *kināyah*. On the other hand, Abdel Haleem again chose to use the modern technical expression ‘consummate’, which also conveys the referent semantically but in a euphemistic manner. Taking into consideration the type of marital intercourse mentioned...
in the āyah, Abdel Haleem’s choice might be reasonable. To put it differently, the phrase ‘consummation of marriage’ designates a specific type of marital intercourse compatible with what is mentioned in [Q. 4:23], though the use of ‘go in/unto’ would have conveyed the intended meaning implicitly and maintain the euphemism.

**Kināyah 22**

*Table 6.19: Translations of Kināyah expression 22.*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Literal translation: (And how do you take it and already some of you have reached the other and they [wives] have taken from you a solemn pledge) in [Q. 4:21]</th>
<th>Purpose of kināyah: Euphemism</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Referent:</strong> sexual intercourse</td>
<td><strong>Purpose of kināyah:</strong> Euphemism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Ali</strong></td>
<td>And how could ye take it when ye have gone in unto each other, and they have Taken from you a solemn covenant?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Hilali &amp; Khan</strong></td>
<td>And how could you take it (back) while you have gone in unto each other, and they have taken from you a firm and strong covenant?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Saheeh International</strong></td>
<td>And how could you take it while you have gone in unto each other and they have taken from you a solemn covenant?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Abdel Haleem</strong></td>
<td>How could you take it when this is unjust and a blatant sin? How could you take it when you have lain with each other and they have taken a solemn pledge from you?</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

It is clear that all four translators have decided to render أفضِى بعضكم إلى بعض semantically rather than literally, since the latter would confuse the reader and lead him/her to miscomprehend the intended meaning. The translators chose idiomatic TL expressions, which are also used in some versions of the Hebrew Scriptures. Ali, Hilali and Khan, and Saheeh International again use the phrase ‘gone in unto each other’, whereas Abdel Haleem uses ‘lain with each other’. Most importantly, the expressions they have used convey the intended meaning of sexual intercourse implicitly and euphemistically as the original expression does.

**Kināyah 23 and 24**

*Table 6.20: Translations of kināyah expressions 23 and 24*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>[Q. 4:34]: (and [those wives] whom you fear their elevation, advise them and forsake them in bed) in [Q. 4:128]: (And if a woman fears an elevation from her husband)</th>
<th>Purpose of kināyah:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Referent:</strong> (النشوز الزوجة/الزوج) The ill-behaviour of the spouse towards the other partner and not fulfilling their marital responsibilities.</td>
<td>(1) Exaggeration (2) Euphemism</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
To avoid having intercourse with the wife.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Translator</th>
<th>Excerpt</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ali</td>
<td>[Q. 4:34]: ... As to those women on whose part ye fear <strong>disloyalty and ill-conduct</strong>, admonish them (first)*, (Next), <strong>refuse to share their beds</strong> ...</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>[Q. 4:128]: If a wife fears <strong>cruelty</strong> ...</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hilali &amp; Khan</td>
<td>[Q. 4:34]: ... As to those women on whose part you see <strong>ill-conduct</strong>, admonish them (first), (next), <strong>refuse to share their beds</strong> ...</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>[Q. 4:128]: And if a woman fears <strong>cruelty</strong> ...</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Saheeh International</td>
<td>[Q. 4:34]: ... But those [wives] from whom you fear <strong>arrogance</strong> - [first] advise them; [then if they persist], <strong>forsake them in bed</strong> ...</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>[Q. 4:128]: And if a woman fears from her husband <strong>contempt</strong> ...</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abdel Haleem</td>
<td>[Q. 4:34]: ... If you fear <strong>high-handedness</strong> from your wives, remind them [of the teachings of God], then <strong>ignore them when you go to bed</strong> ...</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>[Q. 4:128]: If a wife fears <strong>high-handedness</strong> ...</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In respect of the translation of **نُشْوَز الزوجة/الزوج**, the translators seem to have decided to avoid a literal rendition and opt for a semantic one, which is a wise decision since the former method of rendition would not make sense, and hence, confuse the TT reader. What is interesting is that though the translators adopted the same method of translation, the outcome differs in different cases. Perhaps this diversity is ascribed to the way the different translators interpret the spouses’ act of defiance based on Qur’anic exegesis. Ali, for example, chooses the phrase, ‘disloyalty and ill-conduct’ to describe the wife’s defiance in [Q. 4:34] and the word ‘cruelty’ for the husband’s defiance in [Q. 4:128]. Apart from the word ‘disloyalty’, Hilali and Khan’s renditions are similar to Ali’s. Saheeh International also choose different words to describe the wife and husband’s defiance towards each other, ‘arrogance’ and ‘contempt’ respectively. Unlike the rest of the translators, Abdel Haleem decides to be consistent in his rendition of the spouses’ defiance by using a general expression, ‘high-handedness’. This phrase, however, may seem appropriate for a husband’s attitude more than that of his spouse, since authority and the family’s provision are traditionally one of the husband’s marital responsibilities, though currently these responsibilities have become mutual. Abdel Haleem usually uses contemporary vocabulary, hence, the usage of ‘high-handedness’, but in order to avoid any misunderstanding he explains through a footnote the meaning of **نُشْوَز** and states the following:

The verb *nashaza* from which *nushuz* is derived means ‘to become high’, ‘to rise’. See also verse 128, where the same word is applied to husbands. It applies to a situation where one partner assumes superiority to the other and behaves accordingly (2005, author’s italics).
As to the renditions of the other kināyah, the translators, except for Saheeh International, opt for a semantic rendition rather than a literal one. Ali and Hilali and Khan’s renditions are similar, but their interpretation differs from the actual intended meaning, i.e. to avoid having intercourse with the wife. Apparently, they have decided not to follow what the majority of exegetes had to say concerning this kināyah and opt for one of the other exegetical versions, which suggest avoiding sharing the same bed with the wife (see the previous chapter). Unlike Ali and Hilali and Khan, Abdel Haleem follows the interpretation of the majority of exegetes. His rendition suggests that the husband could share the same bed with his wife, but his use of the word ‘ignore’ delivers the meaning of disregarding any activity with her in a euphemistic manner to a certain degree as the ST phrase does. Differently from the rest of the translators, Saheeh international opt for being faithful to the ST and render the kināyah literally. However, the TT reader may comprehend their literal rendition either as abandoning intercourse or literally abandoning sleeping in the same bed with the wife as a minority of exegetes presume.

**Kināyah 25 and 26**

*Table 6.21: Translations of kināyah expressions 25 and 26.*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Referent:</th>
<th>Purpose of kināyah:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1- قاصرات الطَّرَفِ:</td>
<td>1- Elegance and exaggeration.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2- ضَمَتْ المَرَأَة:</td>
<td>2- Euphemism and exaggeration.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Literal translation:</th>
<th>[Q. 37:48]: (And with them [women of] restrained eyes/glances and beautiful wide eyes)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>[Q. 38:52]: (And with them [women of] restrained eyes/glances [and of] equal age)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>[Q. 55:56]: (In them are [women of] restrained eyes/glances whom no man had touched/menstruated them before nor jinn)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>[Q. 55:74]: (No man had touched/menstruated them before nor jinn)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ali</th>
<th>[Q.37:48]: And besides them will be <strong>chaste women, restraining their glances</strong>, with big eyes* (of wonder and beauty)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>[Q. 38:52]: And beside them will be <strong>chaste women restraining their glances</strong>, (companions) of equal age</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>[Q. 55:56]: In them will be (Maidens), *<em>chaste, restraining their glances</em><code>, whom no man or Jinn before them has touched</code></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>[Q. 55:74]: Whom <strong>no man or Jinn before them has touched</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

---

1- *طَمَتْ المَرَأَة* refers to the women’s virginity.
With regards to the renditions of فَقَرَّاتُ الْطُرُفِ, Ali and Saheeh International render the *kināyah* literally. Saheeh International, however, add a footnote in their translation of [Q.37:48] explaining that what is meant by ‘limiting [their] glances’ is “chaste and modest, looking only at their mates”. Saheeh International also provide similar notes in their translations of [Q. 38:52] and [Q. 55:56]. Ali, by contrast, explicitly adds the intended meaning of the *kināyah* to his literal translation. Ali’s translations are also accompanied by footnotes which have an exegetical sense. In his footnote related to [Q. 55:56], Ali states: “[t]heir purity is the feature chiefly symbolised”. One of the procedures, i.e. either a literal translation or explicitly stating the intended meaning, would suffice, or at least pointing out the intended meaning in a footnote like Saheeh International.

On the other hand, both Hilali and Khan and Abdel Haleem avoid a literal translation. Hilali and Khan, interestingly, decide to borrow, i.e. use as a loan word (phrase), فَقَرَّاتُ الْطُرُفِ and transliterate it into the TT along with an explanation inserted between brackets.
Their explanation is virtually the same as the literal renditions provided by Ali and Saheeh International, apart from the additions ‘desiring none except their husbands’. Therefore, it seems that there was no need to borrow the ST phrase into the TT especially given that their literal rendition and additions could deliver the intended meaning of the *kināyah* sufficiently. Abdel Haleem provides a semantic rendition in [Q.37:48] and [Q. 38:52], but in [Q. 55:56] he opts for a literal translation accompanied by an addition similar to Ali’s. Probably Abdel Haleem thought that his description of the women as maidens along with a literal rendition was sufficient not to approach the ST expression semantically. However, there is no reason for this inconsistency, i.e. why he did not apply the same method in his previous renditions? Moreover, his translation of قَصَرَاتُ الْمُرْفَعُ (نَظْرَةٌ حادقةَ خِجْوَةٍ بِحَيَاةٌ) is not as idiomatic as ‘lowering/dropping one’s eyes/gaze’, and therefore does not, to a certain degree, convey the intended meaning of the original expression.

In respect of the renditions of لنِّيَطْمَثِينَ, all the translators, except for Hilali and Khan, have decided to provide a literal rendition, which adequately conveys the intended meaning euphemistically as does the original expression. Though the expression of a woman not having been touched by a man before clearly suggests that she never had sex before, hence, a virgin, Saheeh International explain in their translation of [Q. 55:56] that لنِّيَطْمَثِينَ literally means “they have not been caused to bleed by loss of virginity”.

On the other hand, Hilali and Khan, strangely once again decide to borrow the ST expression into the TT, and explain in a footnote that the meaning of طَمَتُ is “opening their hymens with sexual intercourse”. Obviously, there was no need for this borrowing especially given that a literal rendition could have delivered the intended meaning in the same way as the original expression. Even if we were to assume that they have employed this procedure to add some flavour or elements of the SL culture in the TT, or for stylistic and rhetorical reasons, it would not make sense, because their translations, in general, are more of an exegetical nature rather than a stylistic one.

**Kināyah 27**

*Table 6.22: Translations of kināyah expression 27*

| (وزوادته التي هو في بيتها عن نفسه وغفلت الأذى وقاتلت هي؟ ... (Q. 12:23) | (قَالَ هِي رآوْدُونَهِ عَنْ نَفْسِي ... (Q. 12:26) |
| (وَقَالَتْ رآوْدُونَهِ عَنْ نَفْسِه ... (Q. 12:30) | (ثُمَّ رآوْدُونَهِ عَنْ نَفْسِه فَاستَخْضَمَ ... (Q. 12:32) |

| Literal translation: | |
[Q. 12:23]: (she coaxed/cajoled him [the person] who is in her house about/from himself and closed the doors and said come here …)

[Q. 12:26]: (He said, she coaxed/cajoled me about/from myself …)

[Q. 12:30]: (And women in the city said, al-Azīz’s woman (wife) is coaxing/cajoling her young [slave] man about/from himself …)

[Q. 12:32]: (… and I did coaxed/cajoled him about/from himself and he resisted …)

**Referent:** Seduction: to persuade someone, gently and in a deceptive way, to have sex with

**Purpose of kināyah:** Euphemism

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Translator</th>
<th>Translation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ali</td>
<td>[Q. 12:23]: But she in whose house he was, <strong>sought to seduce him</strong> from his (true) self: she fastened the doors, and said: &quot;Now come, thou (dear one)!&quot; … [Q. 12:26]: He said: &quot;It was she that <strong>sought to seduce me</strong> - from my (true) self.&quot; … [Q. 12:30]: Ladies said in the City: &quot;The wife of the (great) 'Aziz is seeking to seduce her slave from his (true) self … [Q. 12:32]: … I did <strong>seek to seduce him from his (true) self</strong> but he did firmly save himself guiltless! ….</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hilali &amp; Khan</td>
<td>[Q. 12:23]: And she, in whose house he was, <strong>sought to seduce him</strong> (to do an evil act), she closed the doors and said: &quot;Come on, O you.&quot; … [Q. 12:26]: He [Yusuf (Joseph)] said: &quot;It was she that <strong>sought to seduce me</strong>,&quot; … [Q. 12:30]: And women in the city said: &quot;The wife of Al-'Azīz is seeking to seduce her (slave) young man … [Q. 12:32]: … I did <strong>seek to seduce him</strong>, but he refused …</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Saheeh International</td>
<td>[Q. 12:23]: And she, in whose house he was, <strong>sought to seduce him</strong>. She closed the doors and said, &quot;Come, you.&quot; … [Q. 12:26]: [Joseph] said, &quot;It was she who <strong>sought to seduce me</strong>.&quot; … [Q. 12:30]: And women in the city said, &quot;The wife of al-'Azeez is seeking to seduce her slave boy … [Q. 12:32]: … And I certainly <strong>sought to seduce him</strong>, but he firmly refused …</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abdel Haleem</td>
<td>[Q. 12:23]: The woman in whose house he was living <strong>tried to seduce him</strong>: she bolted the doors and said, ‘Come to me,’ … [Q. 12:26]: but he said, ‘She <strong>tried to seduce me.</strong>’ … [Q. 12:30]: Some women of the city said, ‘The governor’s wife is <strong>trying to seduce her slave</strong>! … [Q. 12:32]: … I <strong>tried to seduce him</strong> and he wanted to remain chaste …</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

All of the translators have agreed to translate المراودة عن النفس semantically using the phrase ‘try/seek to seduce’. Choosing the word ‘seduce’ is wise because it implies the same sense
as the intended meaning of the original expression, which is persuading someone, in a
gentle way and not too directly to agree to have sex with you. Therefore, since ‘seduce’
on its own is sufficient to convey the intended meaning of the ST expression, there is no
need for any additions to the translation, as made by Ali, especially given that his
translations of [Q.12:23] and [Q. 12:26] were accompanied by exegetical footnotes, or to
add any explanations, as Hilali and Khan did in their translation of [Q. 12:23].

**Kināyah 28**

Table 6.23: Translations of **kināyah** expression 28.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Literal translation:</th>
<th>Referent:</th>
<th>Purpose of <strong>kināyah</strong>:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>[Q. 21:91] and [Q. 66:12]: (fortified her slit/opening/orifice [private parts (pudendum)])</td>
<td>﴿اَلْفَرِج﴾ in [Q. 21:91] and [Q. 66:12]</td>
<td>The purpose of using ‘الفرج’ as a <strong>kināyah</strong> for the private parts is euphemism. The purpose of the whole phrase, i.e. ‘حصن/حفﻆ الفرج’ is euphemism and elegance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>[Q. 23:5] and [Q. 70:29]: (they whom preserve their slits/openings/orifices [private parts])</td>
<td>﴿وَالَّذِينَ فَزَعُوهُمْ حَافِظُون﴾ in [Q. 23:5] and [Q. 70:29]</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>[Q. 24:30]: (preserve their slits/openings/orifices [private parts])</td>
<td>﴿بِفَوْقَاهُمْ فَزَعُوهُمْ﴾ in [Q. 24:30]</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>[Q. 24:31]: (preserve their slits/openings/orifices [private parts])</td>
<td>﴿بِفَوْقَاهُمْ فَزَعُوهُمْ﴾ in [Q. 24:31]</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>[Q. 33:35]: (who preserve their slits/openings/orifices [private parts])</td>
<td>﴿الَّذِينَ حَافِظُونَ فَزَعُوهُمْ﴾ in [Q. 33:35]</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ali</th>
<th>[Q. 21:91]* and [Q. 66:12]: … guarded her chastity …</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>[Q. 23:5]: Who abstain from sex*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>[Q. 70:29]: And those who guard their chastity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>[Q. 24:30]: … guard their modesty* …</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>[Q. 24:31]: … guard their modesty* …</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>[Q. 33:35]: … who guard their chastity …</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Hilali &amp; Khan</th>
<th>[Q. 21:91] and [Q. 66:12]: … guarded her chastity …</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>[Q. 23:5] and [Q. 70:29]*: And those who guard their chastity (i.e. private parts, from illegal sexual acts)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>[Q. 24:30]: … protect their private parts (from illegal sexual acts) …</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>[Q. 24:31]: … protect their private parts (from illegal sexual acts) …</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>[Q. 33:35]: … who guard their chastity (from illegal sexual acts) …</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Saheeh International</th>
<th>[Q. 21:91] and [Q. 66:12]: … guarded her chastity …</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>[Q. 23:5] and [Q. 70:29]: … who guard their private parts</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>[Q. 24:30]: … guard their private parts* …</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>[Q. 24:31]: … guard their private parts …</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>[Q. 33:35]: … who guard their private parts …</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
If one takes into consideration the translation of the SL word الفرج on its own, one notices that most of the translators have avoided a literal rendition and decided to render it semantically. However, if one takes into account the rendition of the whole phrase حصن/حفظ الفرج, which is the essential part because it leads to the intended meaning, one realises that they use a semi-semantic method. That is to say, the translators render half of the phrase literally, ‘guard’ for حصن/حفظ and the other half semantically, ‘chastity’ or ‘private parts’ for الفرج. The only slight issue is that though the word ‘guard’ is a near-synonym of ‘preserve’, the latter would probably sound more accurate, namely with ‘chastity’ than ‘guard’. That is because chastity is not something tangible that can be guarded, such as one’s private parts, but it is more of a principle or state that can be preserved or maintained.

All of the renditions produced by the translators do in fact succeed in conveying the intended meaning, but we cannot say the same with regards to the purpose of the kināyah usage. In other words, not all of the renditions succeed in delivering the referent in the same manner as the ST did, i.e. euphemistically. For instance, in his rendition of [Q. 23:5], Ali uses the word ‘sex’ which eliminates the euphemistic function. The question is why Ali did not render [Q. 23:5] the same way he rendered [Q. 70:29], especially given that both āyahs are exactly the same. Another question is why did Ali use the word ‘modesty’ rather than chastity in his translations of [Q. 24:30-31]? Possibly the reason for this using ‘modesty’ is that, according to OED, ‘modest’ can refer to the human’s private parts; it can also refer to the common meaning, which is dressing or behaving scrupulously to avoid impropriety or indecency, mainly to avoid drawing sexual attention. Both meanings can be employed, according to a few Qur’anic exegetes. The answer to this question may lie in the following comments, which Ali placed as footnotes:

The rule of modesty applies to men as well as women. A brazen stare by a man at a woman (or even at a man) is a breach of refined manners. Where sex is concerned, modesty is not only “good form”: it is not only to guard the weaker sex, but also to guard the spiritual good of the stronger sex [in Ali’s rendition of (Q. 24:30)].
The need of modesty is the same in both men and women. But in account of the differentiation of the sexes in nature, temperaments and social life, a greater amount of privacy is required for women than for men, especially in the manner of dress and the uncovering of the bosom [in Ali’s rendition of (Q. 24:31)].

It is probably clear from Ali’s notes that what he meant by ‘modesty’ is the behaviour rather than the actual private parts, which is not exactly compatible with what the majority of exegetes have argued. Therefore, in our view, ‘chastity’ is more adequate in this context than ‘modesty’. Saheeh International, in their translation of [Q. 24:30], went along with the majority of exegetes, but in a footnote they refer to the sense of unlawful acts.

Hilali and Khan also fail to achieve the function of euphemism in most of their translations due to the use of the word ‘sexual’ in their added explanations. They could have easily avoided this by placing their explanations in a footnote instead of placing them within the text.

**Kināyah 29 and 30**

Table 6.24: Translations of kināyah expressions 29 and 30.

| Ali | [Q. 31:18]: And swell not thy cheek* (for pride) at men, nor walk in insolence through the earth; for Allah loveth not any arrogant boaster
| Hilali & Khan | [Q. 31:18]: And turn not your face away from men with pride, nor walk in insolence through the earth. Verily, Allah likes not each arrogant boaster*
| Saheeh International | [Q. 31:18]: And do not turn your cheek [in contempt] toward people* and do not walk through the earth exultantly. Indeed, Allah does not like everyone self-deluded and boastful
| Abdel Haleem | [Q. 31:18]: Do not turn your nose up at people, nor walk about the place arrogantly, for God does not love arrogant or boastful people

---

-243-
Concerning the translations of the first *kināyah* expression، the translators have produced different renditions from one another, though some of them have used similar translation techniques. For example, on a prima facie account, Ali attempts to render the first half of، semantically and the second half literally (though in fact the whole phrase is probably rendered semantically as will be discussed below). His mixed-translation method, mainly his choice of words, have led the outcome to be more or less confusing. The word ‘swell’, which Ali chose, along with ‘thy (your) cheek’ and the addition of ‘for pride’ does not generally convey the sense of bending or turning the cheek, nor does it express the feeling or emotion of being insolent and haughty. The word ‘swell’ generally indicates inflation, distension, an increase of something, such as size, amount, and suchlike. It may, however, indicate the sense of ‘to curve’ or ‘making something curve’ as in ‘strong winds swelled the sails’, but it seems highly improbable that it will have this sense when it is used with ‘thy (your) cheek’. The appropriate way to use the word ‘swell’ in relation to the feeling or emotion of pride, anger, arrogance, insolence, haughtiness, and the like is to use it in the phrasal form ‘swell with’ followed by such personal characteristics; for instance, ‘do not swell with pride’. However, if Ali had done this, the rhetorical image of bending/turning the cheek to people to express insolence and haughtiness, which the SL expression holds, would be lost. Apart from Ali’s usage of ‘swell’, there is another issue related to the word ‘cheek’ that he chose to render، At first glance, one might think that Ali renders، literally, which is natural because the word ‘cheek’ is indeed the English equivalent word for، but following a close look at his footnote one would probably think otherwise. Ali notes that “[t]he word ‘cheek’ in English، means arrogance or efferentation, with a slightly different shade added, viz.: efferentation from one in an inferior position to one in a superior position. The Arabic usage is wider, and includes smug self-satisfaction and a sense of lofty superiority” [my italics and boldness]. Based on Ali’s note, particularly his usage of ‘too’, we can deduce that his intention in rendering the word، as ‘cheek’ was probably semantic rather than literal. If we assume this to be true, then his usage of ‘thy’ (your) is incorrect, and he should have chosen the preposition ‘with’ instead, along with the word ‘pride’. In short, Ali could have avoided this confusion by rendering the whole *kināyah* either literally as Saheeh International did or semantically using the appropriate collocations.
Saheeh international’s rendition, on the other hand, is purely literal. They do, however, show between brackets the purpose of such demeanour, i.e. the turning of the cheek towards people. They also add a footnote explaining that one way to respect a person is by directing one’s face and attention to them. Their addition and footnote is probably to remove any ambiguity in their literal rendition in case is a culture-specific expression and gesture. Hilali and Khan’s rendition is very similar to that of Saheeh International. The difference between the two is that Hilali and Khan do not render the *kināyah* phrase literally as does Saheeh international, but they literally render the whole physical act that involves turning the cheek towards others. That is to say, when a person turns his cheek to another person, he does so by turning his face away. However, turning one’s face away, in the TL, is not necessarily a sign of insolence or haughtiness. Sometimes a person turns their face away because they are shy or to avoid seeing something they do not like, and sometimes they do so out of respect, for example, when someone is changing his/her shirt. Therefore, Hilali and Khan add the phrase ‘with pride’ to their rendition to avoid any misunderstanding. They also add a footnote asking the TT reader go back to the Hadith mentioned in their footnote related to the *kināyah* expression in [Q. 22:9] (see the following *kināyah*), in which they present a Hadith that demonstrates the stance of Islam towards a person with too much pride.

Unlike the rest of the translators, Abdel Haleem avoids using both translation methods, literal and semantic, and decides to render using an idiomatic TL expression. The phrase ‘turn up one’s nose (at something)’ that Abdel Haleem chose is normally used in the TL informally to show disdain or contempt, but there is another idiomatic TL expression, which is more formal, that shows a haughty or disdainful manner, which is ‘with one's nose in the air’. Perhaps Abdel Haleem was in favour of the former expression because it includes the word ‘turn’, which conveys the meaning of . Nonetheless, Abdel Haleem’s translation does in fact convey the intended meaning of the original expression but with a different image. The image of the original expression is associated with a disease which when a camel is infected with it, it is forced to bend its neck. Therefore, the image of depicting contempt and arrogance as a disease is not conveyed through ‘turn up one’s nose (at something)’.

As for the translations of , it appears that the translators, apart from Saheeh International, tried to render the intended meaning explicitly, specifically with the word, in both of its occurrences, [Q. 31:18] and [Q. 17:37]. Ali chose the word ‘insolence’ in both his translations. The common meaning of ‘insolence’ is disrespectful,
offensive, impudent, or rude behaviour. It may also refer to a person being arrogantly contemptuous or overbearing, but it is rarely used in this sense. Despite the slight differences in these meanings, Ali puts an end to any ambiguity, if there is any, by pointing out in a footnote in [Q. 17:37], where the expression first occurred, that arrogance or undue elation are also included.

In their rendition of the same ST expression, namely in [Q. 17:37], Hilali and Khan chose to state the referent ‘conceit and arrogance’ explicitly. In the translation of [Q. 31:18], their rendition was precisely the same as Ali’s, which is quite surprising and raises the question of their inconsistency. As for Abdel Haleem, he too chose to translate the referent directly, but used only the word ‘arrogant’ in its adverbial form in both of his renditions. What is interesting about Abdel Haleem’s rendition, in [Q. 17:37], is his use of the word ‘strut’ instead of ‘walk’. The word ‘strut’ and its near-synonyms, such as ‘swagger’ and ‘prance’, mainly refer to the way a person walks proudly and confidently, though ‘swagger’ is the most common word used to show disapproval. Therefore, one might wonder why Abdel Haleem did not use the word ‘strut’ or ‘swagger’ again in his rendition of [Q. 31:18]. Also, why did not the other translators who chose a semantic translation method use one of these words, specifically ‘swagger’, as it is usually used to show disapproval? That is to say, the words ‘strut’, ‘prance’ or ‘swagger’, and particularly the last, would have been a suitable choice for those who chose to apply a semantic rendition.

In contrast to the rest of the translators, Saheeh International render المشي في الأرض مرجحاً literally in both of its occurrences. In its first occurrence, [Q. 17:37], Saheeh International accompany their rendition with a footnote stating that “[m]an, for all his arrogance, is yet a weak and small creature”. Therefore, the TT reader would definitely understand that what is meant by walking upon the earth exultantly is an arrogant person, in case the translation was not clear enough.

**Kināyah 31**

*Table 6.25: Translations of kināyah expression 31.*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Kināyah expression 31.</th>
<th>Literal translation:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(Turning his side [away] to mislead [people] from Allah’s path …)</td>
<td>(Turning his side [away] to mislead [people] from Allah’s path …)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Referent:</td>
<td>contemp with arrogance; Insolence and haughtiness.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Purpose of kināyah:</td>
<td>To exaggerate impolite demeanour or behaviour</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

-246-
In respect of the interpretation of word 

cīfah, it appears that two of the translators, Hilali and Khan and Saheeh International, have decided to follow the exegetical works that suggest the part of the body that is twisted or turned away is the neck. The other two translators, Ali and Abdel Haleem, have decided to follow the other exegetical interpretation that suggests it is the person’s side. They do, however, agree on adding the state of turning one’s side/neck explicitly. Though the chosen words to describe the state of contempt or haughtiness are different from one another, they revolve around the same sense. These additions are probably an attempt to enable the TT reader to understand what is meant by turning one’s side (or neck) away, especially given that such a gesture in the sense of contempt and arrogance is not known in the TL culture. Hilali and Khan also add a footnote in which they present the following Hadith that demonstrates the stance of Islam towards such an insolent act:

Narrated Abdullah bin Mus‘ūd: Allah’s messenger صلی الله عليه وسلم said, “Whosoever has pride in heart equal to the weight of an atom (or a small ant) shall not enter Paradise.” A person (amongst the audience) said, “Verily, a person loves that his dress should be beautiful, and his shoes should be beautiful.” The Prophet صلی الله عليه وسلم remarked, “Verily, Allāh is the Most Beautiful and He loves beauty, (الكبر: بطر الحق وغمط الناس) Pride is to completely disregard the truth, and to scorn (to look down upon) the people.

( Sahih Muslim, Book of Faith, Vol.1, Hadīth No. 164)

Apart from this addition, suffice it to say that Ali and Abdel Haleem’s renditions can be described as literal renditions, despite Abdel Haleem’s omission of the singular possessive pronoun (ـه). On the other side, Hilali and Khan and Saheeh International’s renditions are not quite literal. Hence, they can be seen as semi-semantic renditions because they employed the word ‘neck’ instead of ‘side’.

**Kināyah 32**

*Table 6.26: Translations of kināyah expression 32.*

<p>| | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ali</td>
<td><em>(Disdainfully) bending his side,</em> in order to lead (men) astray from the Path of Allah …</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hilali &amp; Khan</td>
<td><strong>Bending his neck in pride</strong> (far astray from the Path of Allah), and leading (others) too (far) astray from the Path of Allah …</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Saheeh International</td>
<td><strong>Twisting his neck [in arrogance]</strong> to mislead [people] from the way of Allah …</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abdel Haleem</td>
<td><strong>turning scornfully aside</strong> to lead others away from God’s path …</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Literal translation:**

(وإذا أفعنا على الإنسان أعزمن ونأى بجانبه وإذا سنة الشر كان يولون) in [Q. 17:83]
(And when We bestow [grace/favour] on humankind, he turns away and distances [himself] through his side [or withdraw aside], and when evil touches him he becomes in despair.

Referent: Insolence and haughtiness; contempt with arrogance

Purpose of kināyah: To exaggerate impolite demeanour or behaviour.

---

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Translator</th>
<th>Translation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ali</td>
<td>Yet when We bestow Our favours on man, he turns away and becomes remote on his side (instead of coming to Us [sic]), and when evil seizes him he gives himself up to despair!</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hilali &amp; Khan</td>
<td>And when We bestow Our Grace on man (the disbeliever), he turns away and becomes arrogant (far away from the Right Path). And when evil touches him he is in great despair</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Saheeh International</td>
<td>And when We bestow favor upon man [i.e., the disbeliever], he turns away and distances himself; and when evil touches him, he is ever despairing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abdel Haleem</td>
<td>When We favour man he turns arrogantly to one side, but when harm touches him, he falls into despair</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Both Ali and Saheeh International employ a literal method in rendering the *kināyah* expression النأي بالجانب, particularly Ali. The difference between the two renditions is that Ali adds an explanation between brackets whereas Saheeh International do not. Another difference is that Saheeh International omit any equivalent of the phrase بجانبه from their rendition. Perhaps the reason for Saheeh International’s omission is so that the TT can read fluently, because rendering the SL preposition ‘ب’ literally, using ‘on’, ‘at’, or ‘through’, along with ‘his side’ would probably hinder the fluency. Rendering بجانبه as ‘to one side’ (distances himself to one side) seems an appropriate way to overcome this problem, if a translator wants to be more faithful to the ST. On the other hand, Hilali and Khan have decided to render the intended meaning of the *kināyah* explicitly, using the word ‘arrogant’. However, they strangely add an explanation to their rendition, which the TT reader can get a grasp of through the context. In other words, Hilali and Khan’s addition is not necessarily. Abdel Haleem also attempts to render the intended meaning of turning to one’s side. However, we can deduce that Abdel Haleem considers the acts of ‘turning away’ and ‘distancing oneself to one side’ are more or less similar to each other. Hence, he decided to merge the words الإعراض النأي بالجانب together and render explicitly the state of that person who refuses to obey Allah and turns away from His obedience.

**Kināyah 33**

*Table 6.27: Translations of kināyah expression 33.*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Surah</th>
<th>Ayah</th>
<th>Arabic</th>
<th>English</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Q.63: 5</td>
<td></td>
<td>ُوَأَلَّا تَخَفَّفُوا عَنْ رُسُولِنَا لِيُؤْمِنُوا نَفْسَهُمْ وَرَأَيْنَا رُؤْوَىٰهُمْ وَرُوُسُوْسَهُمْ وَهُمْ مَسْتَكْبِرونَ</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
(And when they are told, ‘Come, the Messenger of Allah [will] ask forgiveness for you’, they twist their heads away, and you see them turning away arrogantly)

| Referent: contempt with arrogance; ridicule and haughtiness. |
| Purpose of kināyah: To exaggerate impolite demeanour or behaviour. |

<p>| | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ali</td>
<td>And when it is said to them, &quot;Come, the Messenger of Allah will pray for your forgiveness&quot;, <strong>they turn aside their heads</strong>, and thou wouldst see them turning away their faces in arrogance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hilali &amp; Khan</td>
<td>And when it is said to them: &quot;Come, so that the Messenger of Allah may ask forgiveness from Allah for you&quot;, <strong>they turn aside their heads</strong>, and you would see them turning away their faces in pride*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Saheeh International</td>
<td>And when it is said to them, &quot;Come, the Messenger of Allah will ask forgiveness for you,&quot; <strong>they turn their heads aside</strong> and you see them evading while they are arrogant</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abdel Haleem</td>
<td><strong>They turn their heads away in disdain</strong> when they are told, ‘Come, so that the Messenger of God may ask forgiveness for you,’ and you see them walking away arrogantly</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The *kināyah* expression of لَن تَرْأَى الْرَّأْسَ الْأَيُّ بِالجَابِلِ is similar to the idea of contempt and arrogance in terms of the meaning intended. It is clear that the translators have all rendered this *kināyah* purely literally. Interestingly, the translations of Ali, Hilali and Khan, and Saheeh International are free this time from any additions. We have noted that most of their previous translations of the expressions that involve gestures of contempt or arrogance were accompanied by additions or footnotes. Abdel Haleem, on the other hand, maintains his consistency in adding an expression that describes the intention of the physical gesture, in other words, rendering the intended meaning explicitly. There are two possible reasons for Ali, Hilali and Khan, and Saheeh International not adding anything to their rendition, but we cannot say for sure which one is correct. The first possible reason is that they may have felt the TT reader can deduce the intended meaning through the context, especially given that the state of turning away, which is arrogantly, is mentioned at the end of the context. Thus, they possibly thought that there is no need for repetition. The other possible reason is that they might have followed some of the exegetes who believe that لَن تَرْأَى الْرَّأْسَ الْأَيُّ is used in a literal sense rather than a figurative one. Whatever the case may be, Abdel Haleem’s rendition is most likely to be more accurate, if we take into consideration لَن تَرْأَى الْرَّأْسَ الْأَيُّ is used in its figurative sense. By changing the structure in the TT and preposing the rendition of the *kināyah* expression, Abdel Haleem was able to maintain both meanings of the *kināyah*: contempt and arrogance, without even affecting the whole meaning of the ST.
Kināyah 34

Table 6.28: Translations of kināyah expression 34.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Literal translation:</th>
<th>(Then [he] went to his people, stretching his limbs [arms and legs])</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Referent:</td>
<td>Self-conceit and arrogance.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Purpose of kināyah:</td>
<td>To exaggerate impolite demeanour or behaviour.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ali</td>
<td>Then did he <strong>stalk</strong> to his family <strong>in full conceit</strong>!</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hilali &amp; Khan</td>
<td>Then he <strong>walked in conceit (full pride)</strong> to his family <strong>admiring himself</strong>!</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Saheeh International</td>
<td>And then he went to his people, <strong>swaggering [in pride]</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abdel Haleem</td>
<td>Walking back to his people <strong>with a conceited swagger</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

It is worth noting that the expression ﴿ِهِلَأَي﴾ in [Q. 75:33] has the same referent as الممشى في الأرض مزحماً، which is self-conceit and arrogance. In spite of this fact, the renditions of the expression appears to be quite different from الممشى مزحاً، particularly in terms of word choices, even though the method(s) of translation employed by the translators are fairly similar. Some of the word choices had an impact on the whole rendition of the āyah, which led some of the translators to omit words, such as ذهب, from their translation. This omission could have been avoided simply by choosing an appropriate word as Saheeh International did. To illustrate, Ali chose to render the whole āyah semantically, and chose the word ‘stalk’ along with the phrase ‘in full conceit’ to convey the sense of walking in a self-conceited and arrogant manner explicitly. By doing this he omitted any equivalent of the word ذهب (went) from the TT. Regardless of whether or not the word ‘stalk’ is the correct choice, he could have easily avoided this omission simply by placing it at the end of the sentence, as in ‘he **went** to his family **staking in full conceit**’. Furthermore, it is true that one of the meanings of the word ‘stalk’ in its verbal form is ‘striding in an angry or a proud manner, and often used disparagingly, implying haughtiness’, but usually it is accompanied by one of the adverbs ‘out’, ‘in’, ‘off’, or ‘away’. That is to say, Ali’s rendition in its current state lacks one of the adverbs, namely ‘off’. It should have been, at least, as follows: ‘he **stalked off** to his family in full conceit’. Ali’s addition of the phrase ‘in full conceit’, is probably understandable since the word ‘stalk’, in this current situation, does not only imply haughtiness but also sullenness, hence, the addition is made to avoid any confusion between the two possible interpretations. It is worthy of note that Ali also added a footnote in which he refers to both traits, conceit and arrogance. Hilali and Khan’s rendition of the whole āyah including the kināyah expression is also similar to Ali’s. That is, they too decide on rendering the whole āyah semantically, in an attempt to render the intended
meaning of يتمطى explicitly. In this process, they also omit the ST word ذهب from the TT. The differences between the two renditions are related to the choice of words and the amount of additions made in the translation. Hilali and Khan chose the word ‘walk’ along with the additional phrases ‘in conceit’ and ‘full pride’, most likely an attempt to convey the whole referent, i.e. self-conceit and arrogance. They strangely added a third additional phrase ‘admiring himself’ to the end of their rendition. Frankly, there is no need for this last addition because the previous two additions already indicate self-admiration; hence, it is merely a repetition. Again, Hilali and Khan could have easily avoided this third unnecessarily addition and the omission of the ST word ذهب if they just had rendered the āyah literally and the kināyah expression semantically, as in ‘he went to his family walking in conceit (full pride)’, ‘he went to his family admiring himself’, or at least as ‘he went swaggeringly to his family’

Concerning Saheeh International and Abdel Haleem, they have both chosen the TL word ‘swagger’, which not only is an established idiomatic TL expression but also the closest equivalent TL expression to يتمطى in terms of both referent and physical behaviour. Both of their renditions were accompanied by additions. Saheeh International add the phrase ‘in pride’ between square brackets, whereas Abdel Haleem adds the phrase ‘with a conceited’ within his rendition just before the word ‘swaggering’. As it happens, there is no need for these additions as the word ‘swagger’ already represents the sense of a person walking or behaving in a self-conceited and arrogant manner, with a disparaging association, similarly to the original expression. It is noteworthy that Abdel Haleem omits any equivalent of the ST word ذهب from the TT, like Ali and Hilali and Khan, which simply could have been avoided had he rendered the āyah as literally as possible like Saheeh International.

**Kināyah 35**

*Table 6.29: Translations of kināyah expression 35.*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Referent: To die.</th>
<th>Purpose of kināyah: Euphemism, also reminding and warning of fate.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Ali</strong> [Q. 9:55] and [Q. 9:85]: …their souls may perish in their (very) denial of Allah</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Hilali &amp; Khan</strong> [Q. 9:55] and [Q. 9:85]: …their souls shall depart (die) while they are disbelievers</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Literal translation:</th>
<th>Referent: To die.</th>
<th>Purpose of kināyah: Euphemism, also reminding and warning of fate.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(…their souls perish/depart [with difficulty]/exit/fade away while they are disbelievers)</td>
<td><strong>Ali</strong> [Q. 9:55] and [Q. 9:85]: …their souls may perish in their (very) denial of Allah</td>
<td><strong>Hilali &amp; Khan</strong> [Q. 9:55] and [Q. 9:85]: …their souls shall depart (die) while they are disbelievers</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
All four translators have agreed on rendering تَرْهَقُ أَنْفُسَهُمُّ literally. Ali chose the TL word ‘perish’ in both of his translations, while the rest of the translators chose the word ‘depart’ in both of their translations. The word ‘perish’ is more likely to be closer to the literal sense than ‘depart’. Nonetheless, both words sufficiently assist the TT reader to comprehend the intended meaning of the kināyah, but not the image of departing with extreme difficulty. However, Hilali and Khan as well as Saheeh International seem to doubt that the TT reader would reach the intended meaning and therefore decided to add some information to their renditions in an attempt to help the reader to understand the referent. Hilali and Khan add the word ‘die’ between brackets, which is the referent. In other words, they state the intended meaning of the kināyah explicitly, telling the TT reader that what is meant by the departure of the soul is dying. Saheeh International, on the other hand, add the phrase ‘at death’ between square brackets. Saheeh international’s addition, however, does not imply the exact intended meaning as does that of Hilali and Khan, but rather the phase in which the soul shall depart, which is evident and known to the TT reader. Since both Hilali and Khan and Saheeh International employed the translation by addition technique, they should have at least added the phrase ‘from/this life’, as in ‘their souls shall/should depart from/this life’, instead of ‘die’ or ‘at death’ respectively, especially given that it is an idiomatic TL phrase for ‘die’. Be that as it may, it seems strange that the translators did not choose the word ‘exit’ as they have decided on a literal rendition, particularly those who chose the word ‘depart’. Not only is ‘exit’ a near-synonym for ‘depart’, but also, according to OED, it can be used in figurative contexts to signify the meaning of ‘to die’, similarly to the SL phrase: “fig. and in figurative contexts; spec. (literary) to die, to depart from life” (OED).

**Kināyah 36**

*Table 6.30: Translations of kināyah expression 36.*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>[Q. 9:55] and [Q. 9:85]: … their souls should depart [at death] while they are disbelievers</th>
<th>[Q. 9:55]: … for their souls to depart while they disbelieve</th>
<th>[Q. 9:85]: … their souls should depart while they disbelieve</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Saheeh International</strong></td>
<td><strong>Abdel Haleem</strong></td>
<td><strong>Hilali and Khan</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Referent: Death | Purpose of kināyah: Euphemism, also reminding and warning of fate.

Literal translation: [Q. 15:99]: (And worship your Lord until the certainty comes to you) [Q. 74:47]: (Until the certainty comes to us)
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Translator</th>
<th>[Q. 15:99]: And serve thy Lord until there come unto thee <strong>the Hour that is Certain</strong>*</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ali</td>
<td>[Q. 15:99]: And serve thy Lord until there come unto thee <strong>the Hour that is Certain</strong>*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hilali &amp; Khan</td>
<td>[Q. 15:99]: And worship your Lord until there comes unto you <strong>the certainty (i.e. death)</strong>*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Saheeh International</td>
<td>[Q. 15:99]: And worship your Lord until there comes unto you <strong>the certainty (i.e., death)</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abdel Haleem</td>
<td>[Q. 15:99]: worship your Lord until <strong>what is certain</strong> comes to you</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The four translators provide different renditions from one another in respect of ُنِقَّيْنُ despite using largely similar translation methods. Ali, for example, renders the *kināyah* expression literally, but uses the word ‘certain’ in its adjective form (rather than the noun ‘certainty’) instead. He also adds the word ‘Hour’ to his rendition and abnormally capitalises it, which seems very peculiar, as it may mislead the TT reader to think it is the Judgement or Resurrection Day. The reason for this possible misinterpretation by the recipient is because ‘the Hour’ is one of several *kināyah* expressions used in the Qur’an for the Day/Time of Judgement or Resurrection. In an attempt to avoid such a misinterpretation, Ali points out the intended meaning explicitly through a footnote stating: “*Yaqīn*: Certainty: the Hour that is Certain: death”. However, this footnote might confuse or further mislead the TT reader, instead of clarifying the situation. That is to say, based on this footnote the TT reader would probably mistake the ‘Hour’ for death, in other parts of the Qur’an, while in fact it is the Day/Time of Judgement or Resurrection.

Abdel Haleem also renders ُنِقَّيْنُ in [Q. 74:47] in a similar way to Ali, in terms of capitalisation and employing a literal translation method along with an addition. Though Abdel Haleem’s addition of ‘end’ is possibly more acceptable than Ali’s addition of ‘hour’, in terms of conveying the sense of death, it still may confuse the TT recipient due to his capitalisation of the phrase just like Ali’s translation. The capitalisation of ‘Certain End’ might suggest to the TT reader that this certain end is the Time or Day of Resurrection and not death alone. Therefore, a footnote, similar to like Ali’s would clarify any possible ambiguity. As for Abdel Haleem’s rendition of [Q. 15:99], he also uses the word ‘certain’ in its adjective form, but this time without any additions. However, due to his use of ‘certain’ in its adjective form he had to add ‘what is’ (ما هو) for the text to be read smoothly.
With regards to Hilali and Khan and Saheeh International’s renditions, they are similar to each other. Hilali and Khan render نِيَقَيْنَ literal using ‘certainty’ and ‘certain’ along with the word ‘death’ inserted between brackets in [Q. 15:99] and [Q. 74:47] respectively. Saheeh International use ‘certainty’ consistently with the addition of the word ‘death’ inserted between brackets in [Q. 15:99] and [Q. 74:47] respectively. It is noteworthy that the word ‘certain’ collocates with ‘death’ forming the phrase, ‘certain death’, which is an idiomatic TL expression, but by doing so the one of the functions of the kināyah, i.e. euphemism, is lost in the TT.

\textit{Kināyah 37:}

\textit{Table 6.31: Translations of kināyah expression 37.}

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Referent:</th>
<th>Purpose of kināyah:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Death</td>
<td>Euphemism, also reminding and warning of fate.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>&amp;</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Literal translation:</strong> (Until you visit the graveyards)</td>
<td><strong>Referent:</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ali</td>
<td>Until ye visit the graves*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hilali &amp; Khan</td>
<td>Until you visit the graves (i.e. till you die)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Saheeh International</td>
<td>Until you visit the graveyards*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abdel Haleem</td>
<td>until you go into your graves*</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

There is a slight difference between قُبُور (plural: مقابر [graveyards]) and قَبْر (plural: قبر [graves]). The former is a burial area where people are buried, while the latter is a place in the ground, a pit, where a corpse is buried. In other words, a graveyard is where you can find a number of graves, yet, Ali, Hilali and Khan, as well as Abdel Haleem have all decided to render Al-Maqār using the word ‘grave’ rather than its literal rendition, i.e. ‘graveyards’. Saheeh International, on the other hand, have opted for the exact literal rendition. The word ‘grave’, according to OED is seen as “the natural destination or final resting-place of” every person, hence, it is sometime used to deliver the sense of being dead or death. For example, the phrases ‘to the grave’ or ‘to find one's grave’ mean ‘till death’ or ‘to meet one's death’ respectively (OED). Longman Dictionary of Contemporary English also notes that the expression ‘the grave’ is used in literature for the meaning of death. That being so, rendering Al-Maqār as ‘graves’ seems more appropriate than ‘graveyards’, particularly in this context in order to deliver the sense of death similarly to the original expression.

As for the first part of the \textit{kināyah}, i.e. زَارَ (visit), all the translators, except for Abdel Haleem, have rendered it literally. Abdel Haleem, on the other hand, chose a semantic rendition using the TL phrase ‘go into’. He did, however, cite in a footnote that the literal
rendition of the āyah is “until you visit the graves”, and added that “[T]heir stay in the grave is like a short visit”. The word زَارَ (visit) conveys the image that a person after death remains in the grave for a period of time until the Day of Resurrection, which is a fact all Muslims believe. Nonetheless, the actual referent of زِيَاءَةُ الْقُبُورِ is ‘death’, which it seems only Ali and Hilali and Khan recognise, unlike Abdel Haleem and Saheeh International. This is clear from their notes or additions. For instance, Ali states in a footnote: “… until the time comes when you must lie down in the graves and leave the pomp and circumstance of an empty life”, while Hilali and Khan cite between brackets, within the TT, the intended meaning explicitly ‘till you die’. On the other hand, Saheeh International’s footnote is similar to Abdel Haleem’s; they state the following: “i.e. remain in them temporarily, meaning until the Day of Resurrection”. Therefore, even if the TT recipient who is reading Saheeh International’s rendition is able to comprehend the actual intended meaning, they would be misled into thinking otherwise because of such notes.

**Kināyah 38**

Table 6.32: Translations of kināyah expression 38.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Literal translation:</th>
<th>Referent: Kill (slaughter an animal)</th>
<th>Purpose of kināyah: Euphemism; elegance</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>[Q. 7:77]: (So they hamstrung the she-camel and turned away from their Lord’s commandment …)</td>
<td>[Q. 7:77]: Then they hamstrung the she-camel, and insolently defied the order of their Lord, …</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>[Q. 11:65]: (And then they hamstrung her, thereupon [he] said: enjoy [yourselves] in your homes for three days …)</td>
<td>[Q. 11:65]: But they did hamstrung her. So he said: &quot;Enjoy yourselves in your homes for three days …</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>[Q. 26:157]: ( So they hamstrung her then [they] became regretful)</td>
<td>[Q. 26:157]: But they hamstrung her: then did they become full of regrets*</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>[Q. 91:14]: (So they denied him and then hamstrung her)</td>
<td>[Q. 91:14]: Then they rejected him (as a false prophet), and they hamstrung her* …</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ali</th>
<th>Hilali &amp; Khan</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>[Q. 7:77]: Then they hamstrung the she-camel, and insolently defied the order of their Lord, …</td>
<td>[Q. 7:77]: So they killed the she-camel and insolently defied the Commandment of their Lord, …</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>[Q. 11:65]: But they did hamstrung her. So he said: &quot;Enjoy yourselves in your homes for three days …</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arabic Text</td>
<td>English Translation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-------------</td>
<td>---------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>[Q. 11:65]: But they killed her. So he said: &quot;Enjoy yourselves in your homes for three days …&lt;br&gt;&lt;br&gt;[Q. 26:157]: But they killed her, and then they became regretful&lt;br&gt;&lt;br&gt;[Q. 91:14]: Then they denied him and they killed it …</td>
<td>[Q. 11:65]: But they <strong>killed</strong> her. So he said: &quot;Enjoy yourselves in your homes for three days …&lt;br&gt;&lt;br&gt;[Q. 26:157]: But they <strong>killed</strong> her, and then they became regretful&lt;br&gt;&lt;br&gt;[Q. 91:14]: Then they denied him and <strong>killed</strong> it …</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| Saheeh International | [Q. 7:77]: So they hamstrung the she-camel and were insolent toward the command of their Lord …<br><br>[Q. 11:65]: But they hamstrung her, so he said, "Enjoy yourselves in your homes for three days …<br><br>[Q. 26:157]: But they hamstrung her and so became regretful<br><br>[Q. 91:14]: But they denied him and hamstrung* her … | [Q. 7:77]: and then they hamstrung the camel. They defied their Lord’s commandment …<br><br>[Q. 11:65]: But they **hamstrung** it, so he said, ‘Enjoy life for another three days<br><br>[Q. 26:157]: But they **hamstrung** her. In the morning they had cause to regret it<br><br>[Q. 91:14]: but they called him a liar and **hamstrung** her |

| Abdel Haleem | [Q. 7:77]: and then they hamstrung the camel. They defied their Lord’s commandment …<br><br>[Q. 11:65]: But they hamstrung it, so he said, ‘Enjoy life for another three days<br><br>[Q. 26:157]: But they hamstrung her. In the morning they had cause to regret it<br><br>[Q. 91:14]: but they called him a liar and **hamstrung** her |

It appears that Ali, Saheeh International, and Abdel Haleem chose to render عقر الناقة literally in all of its four occurrences. The TL word ‘hamstring’ carries the sense of being incapacitated or disabled but not being killed or slaughtered. Even the surrounding context in the TT does not imply that what is meant by hamstringing the she-camel is killing it. Hence, suffice it to say the intended meaning of the kināyah is lost in the rendition. In some cases where the rendition causes either a loss of meaning or confusion, the translators attempt to add some information within the TT (with or without brackets) or as a footnote to compensate or clarify this loss or confusion respectively. Abdel Haleem did nothing of the sort. Saheeh International, on the other hand, do in fact place a footnote in their translation of [Q. 91:14] and indicate that the she-camel is then killed. The only issue with Saheeh International’s clarification is that they only placed it in [Q. 91:14]. So, if we assume the TT reader is reading the Qur’an from the first sūrah, he/she will not understand the intended meaning of ‘hamstring’ cited in [Q. 7:77], [Q. 11:65], and [Q. 26:157] until they reach [Q. 91:14]. In other words, Saheeh International were supposed to place their clarification in each āyah where ‘hamstring’ is cited as a rendition for ‘عقر الناقة’, or at the very least in their rendition of [Q. 7:77] where it was first cited. In his renditions of [Q. 26:157] and [Q. 91:14], Ali too places footnotes, but they are merely exegetical. To put it another way, Ali’s footnotes are not intentionally placed to clarify
the intended meaning of ‘hamstring’ specifically, though the phrase ‘killing the she-
camel’ is mentioned in his exegetical footnote in [Q. 26:157].

On the other hand, Hilali and Khan have decided to avoid rendering the *kināyah* literally
and instead they render the intended meaning directly, even if this is at the expenses of
the *kināyah*’s function or image. Probably the reason for them doing this is that they
thought the TT recipient would not be able to grasp the intended meaning of the *kināyah*
through the word ‘hamstring’ or the surrounding context, which is probably true to a great
extent. Nonetheless, it should be noted that there are other TL words or phrases that
express the meaning of killing with a less unpleasant association, such as ‘take the life’,
‘end the life’ or ‘terminate’, assuming that the word ‘kill’ is too harsh or distasteful to cite
explicitly.

*Kināyah 39*

**Table 6.33: Translations of kināyah expression 39.**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Literal translation: (He said: My Lord, I indeed the bone [have] weakened from me and the head is flamed with grey/white)</th>
<th>Purpose of kināyah: Elegance</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Referent:</strong> Loss of strength</td>
<td><strong>Ali</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Praying: &quot;O my Lord! infirm indeed are my bones, and the hair of my head doth glisten with grey …</td>
<td><strong>Hilali &amp; Khan</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(He said: “My Lord! Indeed my bones have grown feeble, and grey hair has spread on my head …</td>
<td><strong>Saheeh International</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>He said, &quot;My Lord, indeed my bones have weakened, and my head has filled with white …</td>
<td><strong>Abdel Haleem</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lord, my bones have weakened and my hair is ashen grey …</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

At first sight one would probably think that Saheeh International and Abdel Haleem’s
renditions of وَفَخَّ أَرْضَمُ نَحْلَمُ (قَالَ رَبِّ إِنِّي وَفَخَّ أَرْضَمُ نَحْلَمُ) in [Q. 19:4]
sound pure literal. However, in fact they are not, and neither are
the renditions of Ali and Hilali and Khan. Regardless of the auxiliary verbs used and the
renditions of وَفَخَّ أَرْضَمُ as ‘infirm’, ‘grown feeble’, or ‘weakened’, the translators have rendered
the word أَرْضَمُ as ‘bones’ instead of ‘bone’. That is to say, they chose a plural form rather
than a singular form, despite what the exegetes have explained regarding the significance
of أَرْضَمُ being in its singular form (see the previous chapter for more details). The ST word أَرْضَمُ in its singular form represents all of the body’s bones, i.e. the whole body and to
deliver this meaning in the TT the translators should have at least said ‘all of my bones’,
‘every single bone of mine’, or ‘every single one of my bones’. So, the method of
translation adopted by the translators in rendering the whole kināyah expression is more
or less literal but not purely literal. Having said that, the renditions do deliver the intended meaning, i.e. the loss of strength due to age, adequately, particularly with the surrounding context, which without question assists the TT reader in grasping this referent.

**Kināyah 40**

*Table 6.34: Translations of kināyah expression 40.*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Referent: blindness; Weep (shed tears; cry)</th>
<th>Purpose of kināyah: Elegance and exaggeration</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Ali</strong> And he turned away from them, and said: “How great is my grief for Joseph!” And <strong>his eyes became white</strong>* with sorrow, and he fell into silent melancholy</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Hilali &amp; Khan</strong> And he turned away from them and said: “Alas, my grief for Yūsuf (Joseph)” And <strong>he lost his sight</strong> because of the sorrow that he was suppressing</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Saheeh International</strong> And he turned away from them and said, “Oh, my sorrow over Joseph,” and <strong>his eyes became white</strong>* from grief, for he was [of that] a suppressor</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Abdel Haleem</strong> and he turned away from them, saying, ‘Alas for Joseph!’ <strong>His eyes went white</strong> with grief and he was filled with sorrow</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

As explained in the previous chapter, there is a polarity of opinion amongst exegetes on the referential meaning of الابيضت عينيّة. Some believe it is crying and others believe it is the loss of sight. Apparently, this polarity did not have a great effect on the translators’ renditions of the kināyah, since the majority of the translators, i.e. Ali, Saheeh International, and Abdel Haleem, have decided to render it literally. Ali and Saheeh International’s translations included footnotes in which Ali implies indirectly that الابيضت عينيّة refers to crying whereas Saheeh International clearly note that the intended meaning is the loss of sight. Abdel Haleem’s translation was free of any notes leaving the TT reader to deduce the intended meaning.

Unlike the rest of the translators, Hilali and Khan have decided to avoid a literal translation and render the intended meaning directly. Most likely they thought a literal method would not convey the intended meaning of the kināyah. This is probably because the general notion that a blind person’s eye turns white may not be that common in the TL culture. Regardless of the scientific facts, there a few who believe it might turn to white, grey, or cloudy white; otherwise why would motion pictures sometimes present a blind person with such an eye colour. In this case, why not use a literal translation,
especially given that it does not sound exotic, and most importantly it may convey the rhetorical image and function of the *kināyah* simultaneously. If there is any doubt respecting the TT’s reader’s ability to grasp the referent, this can be solved by a simple footnote as Saheeh International did with their translation.

**Kināyah 41**

*Table 6.35: Translations of *kināyah* expression 41.*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Literal translation: (When one of them is given [good] news of a [newborn] female, his face remains blackened/blackish with suppressed anger/grief)</th>
<th>Referent: Sorrow</th>
<th>Purpose of <em>kināyah</em>: Elegance and exaggeration</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Ali</strong></td>
<td>When news is brought to one of them, of (the birth of) a female (child), <em>his face darkens</em>, and he is filled with inward grief!</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Hilali &amp; Khan</strong></td>
<td>And when the news of (the birth of) a female (child) is brought to any of them, <em>his face becomes dark</em>, and he is filled with inward grief!</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Saheeh International</strong></td>
<td>And when one of them is informed of [the birth of] a female, <em>his face becomes dark</em>, and he suppresses grief</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Abdel Haleem</strong></td>
<td>When one of them is given news of the birth of a baby girl, <em>his face darkens</em> and he is filled with gloom</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Here is another *kināyah* expression that involves the use of colour, but this time with the colour black. The use of the word ‘black’ to describe one’s expressions or feelings is not something exotic in the TL. For instance, phrases like ‘black look’ or ‘black mood’ are usually used to show anger or unhappiness. Yet, all four translators have decided not use the word ‘black’ or one of its derivatives in their translations, and instead, employ the word ‘dark’ or its derivative ‘darkens’, which in some cases is also used for describing a person's countenance or disposition, as in ‘The news plunged him/her into abject/thick/deep darkness’. Therefore, the word ‘dark’ may, in some cases, be a near-synonym for ‘black’. There is, however, another word which not only includes in its sense the shade of black or darkness but is also commonly used to show one’s dejection and that is the word ‘gloom’. Having said that, all three words, ‘black’, ‘dark’, and ‘gloom’ (and their derivatives) are used to show dejection, though the last two may seem more common than ‘black’. Interestingly, Abdel Haleem employs the word ‘gloom’ instead of ‘grief’ when translating وَهُوَ كَظَمَم, possibly to express the state of one’s face darkening and taking advantage of the that ‘gloom’ has both the senses of darkness and great sadness.
Kināyah 42

Table 6.36: Translations of kināyah expression 42.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Translator</th>
<th>Translation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ali</td>
<td>The Day that the shank shall be laid bare*, and they shall be summoned to prostrate in adoration, but they shall not be able</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hilali &amp; Khan</td>
<td>(Remember) the Day when the Shin shall be laid bare (i.e. the Day of Resurrection) and they shall be called to prostrate themselves (to Allāh), but they (hypocrites) shall not be able to do so</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Saheeh International</td>
<td>The Day the shin will be uncovered* and they are invited to prostration but they [i.e., the disbelievers] will not be able</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abdel Haleem</td>
<td>On the Day when matters become dire*, they will be invited to prostrate themselves but will be prevented from doing so</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Apart from the differences of ‘shin’ and ‘shank’, Ali, Hilali and Khan, and Saheeh International have employed a literal translation method in rendering the kināyah expression of ‘كشف الساق’. Abdel Haleem, on the other hand, has decided to explicitly render part of the general meaning of the original expression semantically. That is to say, Abdel Haleem attempts to describe the meaning of the kināyah idiomatically rather than rendering it literally as do the rest of the translators. Abdel Haleem does, however, explicate in a footnote that ‘On the Day when matters become dire’ is “the meaning of the Arabic expression ‘when shins are bared’”, but he does not explicitly explicate to the recipient that that the time when matters become dire is related to the Day of Resurrection, possibly because the recipient could deduce this sense from the capitalised word ‘Day’. Perhaps the reason that led Abdel Haleem to avoid a literal rendition is that he thought it would not convey the general meaning of the ST expression, which apparently is true because the Arabic expression is culturally specific. Probably this explains why all of translators have decided to accompany their renditions with a footnote. Through these footnotes, the TT recipient understands that the original expression refers to the Day of Resurrection and the dire straits that one might face on that day. Hilali and Khan explicitly state within brackets that this day is the Day of Resurrection. They also provide a footnote that contains narrated Hadiths about this day. Both Hilali and Khan and Saheeh international’s footnotes indicate that ‘the shin’ might refer to that of Allah as a minority of exegetes believe.
Kināyah 43

Table 6.37: Translations of kināyah expression 43.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Literal translation:</th>
<th>Referent:</th>
<th>Purpose of kināyah:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(... Woe is me for what I have neglected regarding Allah’s side ...)</td>
<td>Allah’s behest/due/rights; obey Allah.</td>
<td>Elegance</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Ali

... Ah! Woe is me!- In that I neglected (my duty) towards Allah …

Hilali & Khan

... Alas, my grief that I was undutiful to Allāh (i.e. I have not done what Allāh has ordered me to do) …

Saheeh International

... Oh, [how great is] my regret over what I neglected in regard to Allāh …

Abdel Haleem

... Woe is me for having neglected what is due to God …

It is clear that all four translators chose not to fully render ‘جنب الله’ literally and preferred to either render the original expression semantically or explicitly state the intended meaning. It seems that they have noticed that adopting a literal translation method would not only confuse the TT recipient but most importantly it would not convey the referent. Therefore, Ali, Hilali and Khan, and Abdel Haleem have all decided to render ‘جنب الله’ semantically. Additionally, Ali and Hilali and Khan’s translations include some additions. The former adds ‘my duty’ between two brackets whereas the latter explain what they mean exactly by being ‘undutiful to Allāh’. Abdel Haleem’s rendition is free from any additions or footnotes, and this is because he decided to render the referent explicitly choosing the appropriate words. Saheeh International, on the other hand, only chose to delete the word ‘جنب’, which seems more or less sufficient with the presence of ‘in regard to’, though it may look as if the rendition generalises the meaning of the referent. In other words, ‘in regards to Allāh’ includes the feeling, attitude, or behaviour towards Allāh in every aspect and not only obedience to Allāh or the fulfilment of Allāh’s rights.

Kināyah 44 and 45

Table 6.38: Translations of kināyah expressions 44 and 45.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Literal translation:</th>
<th>Referent for both</th>
<th>Purpose of kināyah:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(Indeed, those who barter the covenant of Allah and their oaths for a small price will have no share (of good/benefit) in the Hereafter; and Allah will not speak to them and not look at them on the Day of Resurrection …)</td>
<td>Allah’s wrath</td>
<td>Elegance and a reminder and warning of fate.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(إن الذين يشترون بعهد الله وإيمانهم ثمنا قليلاً أولئك لا خلقهم في الآخرة ولا يكلموهم الله ولا ينظر اليهم يوم القيامة)
All four translators have made an effort to render the *kināyah* literally, which is not strange because phrases such as ‘not speaking’ or ‘not looking’ to/at someone are also used in the TL to express wrath or displeasure. However, their renditions of the *kināyah* are not purely literal due to the word choices related to the Arabic negative particle *ﻻ* and coordinating conjunction *و*. Apart from Abdel Haleem’s use of the word ‘God’ (الَّٰهُ) for ‘Allah’, his and Hilali and Khan’s renditions are probably the closest to being purely literal because they have avoided the use of English conjunction ‘or’ (ْأَوْ), though it can be used in sense of ‘and not’; namely after a negative verb or when the first alternative is negated by ‘neither’. One may also notice that Ali adds the phrase ‘deign to’ between brackets, which implies that Allah will not talk down to/look down on those who disobey Him with any leniency or mercifulness due to His disappointment with their actions. There is no need for this addition since a refusal to speak or look at someone is a general sign of disappointment or wrath.

A brief overview of the entire TT analysis shows that the translators were trying to be faithful as much as they can. A literal approach has been employed whenever it conveys the intended meaning implicitly as the ST expression. This approach appears to comply with Newmark’s assertion that a literal translation is the best method “if it secures referential and pragmatic equivalence to the original” (1988, pp. 68-69). Larson, on the other hand, who prefers an idiomatic approach, claims that literal translations “often change the meaning, or at least result in a form which is unnatural in the second language” (ibid, p. 10), which is to a great extent is true. Therefore, you would probably notice that in some *kināyah* expressions the translators apply a semantical approach to convey the meaning, even if this requires sacrificing the function of the *kināyah* or making implicit
information explicit. This is due to them prioritising meaning over function, which is practically compatible with Larson (see 4.2.6; cf. ibid, p. 495) and Beekman and Callow’s suggestions (see 4.2.5: cf. Beekman and Callow, 1974, pp. 104/144). In the event of any type ambiguousness or loss in the translation, the translators employ varies of techniques, such as additions, omissions, and footnotes, for compensation.
Chapter Seven: Conclusion and Recommendations

7.1 Introduction

This chapter will conclude the study, by presenting answers to the main questions of the study. The chapter will also comment on the strategies employed by the translators in rendering *kināyah*, including procedures involving compensation for any sort of loss during the translation process. This will be followed by suggestions and recommendations to take into consideration in any future research related to the translation of *kināyah*.

7.2 Summary and findings

The central focus of the present work was on *kināyah* and its translation, a crucial Arabic figure of speech that has been frequently referred to incorrectly as ‘metonymy’ on the one hand, and has been neglected in TS, compared to its fellow figures of speech, on the other. Figures of speech are employed in everyday speech and they form an integral part of our language. One can find them in all sorts of texts – religious, political, poetry, literature, and suchlike. Nonetheless, the study has decided to extract its *kināyah* examples from the Qur’an. There are several reasons for choosing this source specifically. It is an attempt to contribute to Qur’anic studies and Qur’an translation since the Qur’an is considered the central religious text of Islam and a fundamental source of guidance for Muslims. Also, in view of the fact that the majority of Muslims are non-Arabs and the original language of the Qur’an is Arabic, translating its meanings has gradually become fundamental. Furthermore, the examples that early Arabic linguists, grammarians, and rhetoricians used to employ in their discussions or theories were usually extracted from the Qur’an (cf. Thackston, 2000). Therefore, choosing the Qu’an as the main source of data is more or less like catching two birds with one stone.

This study was carried out with the following questions in mind, which attempt to achieve the aims and objectives of the study:

- Is metonymy the equivalent English figure of speech for *kināyah*? If not, then:
  a- Which is the closest Arabic figure that has similar features to metonymy?
  b- Which English figure of speech is equivalent to or at least shares some of the features and functions of *kināyah*?
- If there is no equivalent English figure of speech for *kināyah*, then were the translators able to render the intended meaning of the original implicitly as in the ST and simultaneously maintain the *kinayah* function? If not, then why not?
- What translation methods do the translators tend to employ in rendering Qur’anic *kināyah*?
- What translation procedures do the translators adopt to compensate for any loss in translation?
- Were the translators consistent in translating the same *kināyah* in the event it occurs in other parts of the Qur’an?

To **answer the first question**, the study had to look into the main Arabic figures of speech as well as the English ones (see chapter one). The examination shows that metonymy and *kināyah* are in fact not one in the same. *Majāz mursal* is probably the closest equivalent Arabic figure of speech to metonymy and synecdoche, since they share similar forms or semantic relationship between their literal and figurative meanings (see figure 7.1). Concealing the intended meaning and evoking a specific image of that meaning in the recipients’ mind are the only aspects that *kināyah* shares with metonymy and synecdoche. However, nota bene that these are general characteristics of all figures of speech, not only metonymy and synecdoche. It is the relationship between the literal meaning and the figurative that differentiates figures of speech from one another and how that specific image is evoked. Overall, this part of the study demonstrates that there is no English figure of speech that is similar to *kināyah*, which substantiates the study’s hypothesis that the common usage of the term ‘metonymy’ for *kināyah* is actually incorrect.

![Figure 7.1: The relationship between *kināyah*, *majāz mursal*, metonymy, and synecdoche](image)

After establishing the fact that *kināyah* and metonymy are not one and the same, forty-five *kināyah* expressions were extracted from various parts of the Qur’an. Then a contextual analysis of the original expression was performed, linguistically and descriptively, in order to gain an understanding of each *kināyah* used in the Qur’an and their purposes. A number of authoritative Arabic and English dictionaries (including Qur’anic dictionaries) and Qur’anic exegeses, particularly those that approach the
Qur'anic text from a linguistic and rhetorical perspective, were used in the ST analysis. Subsequently, the translations of the Ali (1998) [Amanah’s edition], al-Hilali and Khan (1417 H. [1996]), Saheeh International (2004), and Abdel Haleem (2005) were selected. There are several translations of the meaning of the Qur’an on the bookshelves, but the reason for selecting the translations of Ali and al-Hilali & Khan is due to their widespread use among non-Arabs, specifically English speakers. In addition, the King Fahd Complex for the Printing of the Glorious Qur’an (al-Madīnah, Saudi Arabia) has adopted their translations and complimentarily distributed them to millions of pilgrims every year as well as to non-Arabic countries. They are also pretty well accepted by a substantial number of Muslim scholars. On the other hand, the reason for choosing Saheeh International and Abdel Haleem is that they are current translations and their backgrounds seem interesting (see 3.7). A comparative TT analysis of the four selected English Qur’an translations was performed, taking into account the following: (1) how the four translations render each kināyah, (2) the intelligibility of the renditions, (3) whether there is any loss of meaning, (4) whether the renditions maintain the function of the original kināyah, and (5) consistency in rendering the same kināyah when it occurs in different āyahs. With some of the kināyah expressions occurring in more than place, the total number of expressions that were examined was eighty-seven.

It seems that none of the translators were deceived by the literal meanings of the kināyah expression and were able to recognise its intended meaning. This is because the translators have consulted some of the Qur’anic exegeses, which as we have previously noted are considered an essential source for understanding the Qur’anic text (see 3.8). For instance, Abdel Haleem affirms that he made use of various Qur’anic commentaries, particularly those of ar-Rāzī and abū Ḥayyān (2005, p. xxxv). Abdel Haleem also asserts that in obtaining semantic information and identifying the meaning of some of the Qur’anic words he relied on several classical Arabic dictionaries, such as ibn Manẓūr’s Lisān al-ᶜArab, al-Fayrūz Ābādī’s, al-Qāmūs al-Muḥīṭ, and Mujammaᶜ al-Lughati al-ᶜArabīyah’s (the Arabic Language Academy in Cairo), al-Muᶜjam al-Wasīṭ (ibid, p. xxxiii). Similarly, Saheeh International aver that:

Each verse was reviewed in Arabic with reference to several works of tafseer [Qur’anic exegesis] and grammar. Where differences arose, explanations were generally taken from an authentic hadīth [Prophetic saying] or, in the absence of such, those by the most knowledgeable of the sahābah [companions of the Prophet] and tābiᶜūn [companions of the sahābah] as quoted by Ibn Katheer (2004; author’s italics and transliteration).
Ali seems to have done much the same as Saheeh International (cf. ʻAlī, 1989, pp. xv-xvi). The King Fahd Complex’s edition of Hilali and Khan’s translation does not precisely note reliance on exegeses as do other translations, but it does name a number of scholars and clerics who have revised the translation. Undoubtedly, Qur’anic exegesis were used in the revision, as the complex’s website contains a section on Qur’anic exegeses including the commentaries of at-Ṭabarî, ibn Kathīr, al-Baghawī, as-SA‘dî, and *tafsîr al-muyyasar*[^86]. It is worth noting that the revisions the four translations underwent virtually comply with Larson’s suggestions for establishing a translation project, i.e. steps related to the translation process (see 4.2.6; Larson, 1998). So, by all accounts the selected translators were able to identify the intended meaning of the *kināyah*, and were not misled by its literal meaning.

This leads us to the **second question**: whether the translators were able to render the intended meaning of the *kināyah* expressions implicitly as in the ST and simultaneously maintain their function. The examination shows that not all of the original messages were rendered implicitly as in the ST. Among the four translators, Saheeh International and Abdel Haleem were able to render equally most of the original messages implicitly. Surprisingly, the translation of Ali comes next. In fact, the number of messages Ali was able to render implicitly is fairly close to that of Saheeh International and Abdel Haleem (see below, figure 7.2). Hilali and Khan had the least number in terms of implicitness, despite the fact that their translation is similar to Ali’s. The reason for this is their excessive use of additions within the TT. There are some cases where their translations were sufficient in terms of conveying the message implicitly and at times the function as well, particularly euphemism, yet they decided to add the intended meaning explicitly within the TT, usually inserted between brackets. That is to say, there were situations where the additions were unnecessary. This explains why they had the highest number of additions employed in TT (see below, figure 7.2). It seems that they were keen to convey as far as they could the precise meaning of the Qur’an with no room for any ambiguity or obscurity on the part of the TT reader. This excessive number of additions, however, could hinder the flow and readability of the TT. Therefore, some might describe their work as an exegesis rather than a translation, but let us not forget that all of the translations

[^86]: *Tafsîr al-Muyyasar* (simple exegesis) is a Qur’anic exegesis composed by elite scholars and published by the King Fahd Complex for the Printing of the Glorious Qur’an (available at: [http://qurancomplex.gov.sa](http://qurancomplex.gov.sa)).
of the Qur’an are merely interpretations of its meanings as is usually indicated in their preface. That said, Hilali and Khan were the only translators amongst the four that were able to render all of the *kināyah* messages with no loss of meanings. This is demonstrated in the translation of the word عَقر (see *kināyah* 38, chapter six). Hilali and Khan have decided to render the intended meaning directly, which is ‘kill [the she-camel]’, while Ali, Saheeh International and Abdel Haleem translated the *kināyah* literally as ‘hamstring’, which does not convey the intended meaning, as discussed in the previous chapter. Note that Saheeh International do in fact refer through a footnote that the she-camel was ‘then killed’, but this note was placed in the last occurrence of the *kināyah* in the Qur’an, to be precise in [Q. 91:14] and not in its previous citations, which are [Q. 7:77], [Q. 11:65], and [Q. 26:157]. If they preferred a literal rendition, then Saheeh International should have placed this note in all of the other three citations or at least when it was first cited, that is in [Q. 7:77].

![Figure 7.2: Statistics of types of translation, additions, omissions, footnotes, implicitness, and explicitness for the four selected translators.](image)

As we mentioned not all of the original messages were rendered implicitly as in the ST, mainly because some of the *kināyah* expressions are culture-specific. When a cultural concept is shared between two languages it becomes much easier to render it from one language to the other in the same manner, but when it is not shared it may become an obstacle. One of the methods to overcome such an obstacle is to use a TL expression that could convey the intended meaning the same way as the original does, whether by using an established TL expression, paraphrasing, or addition. If this is not possible or could
cause ambiguity or obscurity then there is no choice but to render the intended meaning directly (see 4.2.5 [Beekman and Callow] and 4.2.6 [Larson]).

As far as maintaining the functions of the *kināyah* while simultaneously rendering the intended meaning implicitly as the original is concerned, apparently the translators were not able to achieve this in all of their renditions. There are several reasons for this. Possibly one of the reasons is related to the unique genre of the Qur'an. Thus, some of the functions of *kināyah* are Qur'an-specific, particularly those related to elegance and hyperbole. Therefore, it appears that the translators were more interested in conveying the message than in maintaining some of the functions. In other words, they prioritised meaning over function, which is quite reasonable especially if we take into consideration that the main aim of their translations of the Qur’an is to deliver its meaning to the TT reader. This also complies with one of the guidelines that Larson suggests regarding making implicit information explicit: “when necessary for correct and clear expression of the source text meaning” (1998, p. 495). It is also compatible with what the suggestions of Beekman and Callow (see previous chapter 4.2.5: cf. Beekman and Callow, 1974, pp. 104/144). Another reason is related to the differences between the SL and TL in terms of culture again, as well as the whole concept of *kināyah* functions. For example, the function of brevity is shared between the two languages, hence, this function is maintained in the translations. Euphemism is another function that is shared between Arabic and English and therefore it should be easily preserved. That said, not all of the translators were able to maintain euphemism in the TT, apart from Abdel Haleem (see figure 7.3 below). This is mainly due to some of their word choices. Abdel Haleem’s employment of idiomatic expressions not only enabled him to maintain the euphemistic function in the TT, but also allowed him to produce an intelligible TT with the least number of footnotes (see figure 7.2 above). Perhaps exploiting idiomatic expressions makes the TT more readable and intelligible, but preserving euphemism may not be contingent upon it. Ali, whose translation contains quite a number of archaic words, and Saheeh International have both opted mostly for literalism in their translations, yet they were able to maintain euphemism in the greater part of them. Therefore, we would like to emphasise that it all goes back to word choice when it comes to maintaining euphemism, specifically when the expressions are based on concepts shared by the two languages. Overall, the answer to the second question is that the translators were able to a great extent to render the meanings of the *kināyah* expressions, but not all were rendered implicitly along with the function as in the original expressions.
With regards to the third question about what types of translation methods translators tend to employ while rendering Qur’anic *kināyah*, the study reveals that the translators chose to render the Qur’anic *kināyah* expressions either literally (including pure and modified) or semantically. As we have clarified in the previous chapter (6.1) what is meant by the latter is conveying what the original expression is trying to communicate apart from its literal meaning, that is to say, the author’s intention in using the expression. It may involve paraphrasing or explicitly stating the intended meaning of the *kināyah*. It is worth noting that for no given reason Hilali and Khan have used loan words in some of their translations. However, from figure 7.2 one can notice that Saheeh International are the translators with the most literal translation. They are then sequentially followed by Ali, Hilali and Khan, and Abdel Haleem. Though some translation schools may not prefer a literal approach, Newmark stresses that a “literal translation is correct and must not be avoided, if it secures referential and pragmatic equivalence to the original” (1988, pp. 68-69). With regards to Saheeh International’s methodology, they state in their introduction:

> Without going to excessive detail, a word is due about the methodology of this abbreviated edition. Three main objectives served as guidelines for this work:

1- To present the meanings, as far as possible, in accordance with *ʿaqeedah* of Ahl as-Sunnah wal-Jamāʿah
2- To simplify and clarify the language for the benefit of all readers
3- To let the Qur’ān speak for itself, adding footnotes only were deemed necessarily for explanation of points not readily understood

Figure 7.3: Number of euphemistic failures
or when more than meaning is acceptable (2004; Authors italics and transliteration)

Consequently, it seems that Saheeh International believed that a literal approach could to large extent serve their objectives, hence, a large proportion of their translations were literal. This explains the number of footnotes that were present in their translations. Ali also employed literalism and his translations too had a quite few footnotes. We have to mention, though, that in most parts his footnotes were more of religious explanations while Saheeh International’s were brief and do in fact clarify what they have indicated in their methodology.

Although Newmark argues that if literal translation conveys the referential and pragmatic equivalence of the original then it should be used, Larson believes that “[a] translation may be accurate but still not communicate to the people who are to use it” (1998, p. 531). She adds that it may also “be accurate in that the translator understood correctly the source text and is attempting to communicate that information, and it may even by [sic] understandable, and yet the forms may not be the natural idiomatic forms of the receptor language” (ibid.). Therefore, she highly recommends that one should use the natural idiomatic forms and expressions of the TL. Therefore, Abdel Haleem is the translator who most adopts a semantic approach and makes use of idiomatic expressions. He notes the following:

Throughout this translation, care has been taken to avoid unnecessarily close adherence to the original Arabic structures and idioms, which almost always sound unnatural in English. Literal translations of Arabic idioms often result in meaningless English (2005, p. xxxi).

Despite his use of natural idiomatic forms and expressions in the TL, Abdel Haleem was not successful in rendering إتيان الرجل in [Q. 7:81], [Q. 27:55], [Q. 29:29], and [Q. 26:165]. Unlike, the rest, for no reason he decided not to render إتيان الرجل as he did with إتيان المرأة and preferred to use the TL expression ‘lust after’, which does not exactly convey the intended meaning of the original expression (see kināyah 17, chapter six).

The rest of the translators also used a semantic approach in rendering some of the kināyah expressions. The reason that they turned to this approach seems to be that some of the original expressions are either culture-specific or they wanted to convey the intended meaning of the kināyah implicitly and a literal approach could not achieve either of these goals.
As for the procedures used by the translators to compensate for any loss in translation, which is related to the fourth question, it varied from additions, omissions to footnotes. Some of the additions were necessarily but some were not, particularly those that were inserted between brackets in the TT. Footnotes was a wise solution, particularly when they are concise and to the point as in the cases of Saheeh International and Abdel Haleem.

Respecting the fifth question on consistency, the translators were most of the time consistent. Larson highly recommends that consistency should be maintained specifically “when the same meaning is to be communicated” (1998, 546). Abdel Haleem generally agrees: “It is important for the translator to recognize when it is appropriate to be consistent in the translation of a repeated term, and when to reflect the context” (2005, p. xxxi).

In essence, this study concludes the following:

1- Kināyah is an independent Arabic figure of speech and there is no similarity between kināyah and metonymy nor synecdoche. The closest Arabic figure of speech to metonymy and synecdoche is majāz mursal. As a result the mainstream academic tendency to refer to kināyah as metonymy or at times as synecdoche is indubitably incorrect.

2- Translators should have sufficient knowledge of Arabic figures of speech and their features. They should pay careful attention and not be misled by their literal meanings, especially given that a literal meaning may sound true as in kināyah, or as Larkin puts it, “it does correspond to reality” (1995, p. 87). The translator should also have good cultural knowledge of both languages, because quite a few kināyah expressions are culture-specific.

3- Qur’anic kināyah expressions are mainly translatable; however, not all can be rendered with same features as the original, i.e. conveying the intended meaning implicitly and at the same time preserving their function. Thus, if the meaning intended cannot be rendered implicitly, then it could be made explicit in the TT, particularly when the primary aim of the translation is to translate the actual meaning of the ST as in Qur’anic translations.

4- When it comes to translating the meaning of the Qur’an it is vital that one should consult the appropriate authoritative Qur’anic exegeses and dictionaries.
7.3 Suggestions and recommendations

In the light of the findings of this study, we strongly suggest that the mainstream approach referring or translating *kināyah* as ‘metonymy’ should be corrected. *Kināyah* should be referred to in English through transliteration or at least it should be assigned a new term. For instance, Larkin transliterates *kināyah* and refers to it as ‘descriptive periphrases’ (1995, p.86); whether we agree with this term or not, at least the reader would not get confused or misled into thinking that it is metonymy. Referring to *kināyah* as metonymy is not only incorrect, but it also misleads and confuses both Arabic and English readers, particularly those who are interested in their translation studies.

Moreover, *kināyah* like other figures of speech, are employed in everyday speech. They are used in poetry, literature, political speeches, and suchlike. Therefore, we recommend that further studies should take an interest in how *kināyah* are rendered in such types of texts.
Bibliography


-274-


