Writing the Global:
The Scottish Enlightenment as Literary Practice

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Abstract

This thesis presents the Scottish Enlightenment as a literary practice in which Scottish thinkers deploy diverse forms of writing---for example, philosophical treatise, essay, autobiography, letter, journal, and history---to shape their ideas and interact with readers. After the unsuccessful publication of *A Treatise of Human Nature* (1739-40), David Hume turns to write essays on moral philosophy, politics and commerce, and criticism. I argue that other representatives of the Scottish Enlightenment such as Adam Smith, Adam Ferguson, and William Robertson also display a comparable attention to the choice and use of literary forms. I read the works of the Scottish Enlightenment as texts of eighteenth-century literature rather than a context for that literature. Since I argue that literary culture is an essential component of the Scottish Enlightenment, I include James Boswell and Tobias Smollett as its members.

In diverse literary forms, Scottish writers refer to geographical difference, and imagine the globe as heterogenous and interconnected. These writers do not treat geography as a distinctive field of inquiry. Instead, geographical reference is a feature of diverse scholarly genres. I suggest that literary experiments in the Scottish Enlightenment can be read as responding to the circulation of information, people, and things beyond Europe. Scottish writers are interested in the diversity of human beings, and pay attention to the process through which different groups of people in distant regions encounter each other and exchange their sentiments as well as products. The geographical scope of writing in the Scottish Enlightenment encompasses the whole surface of the earth. And Scottish writers explore the emergence and consequences of global interconnection. The construction of this global vision is evident across genres and it is a constitutive element of the Scottish Enlightenment.
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Declaration

I declare that this thesis is a presentation of original work and I am the sole author. This work has not previously been presented for an award at this, or any other, University. All sources are acknowledged as References.
1. Hume’s “Literary Pursuits”: A Model for Understanding the Scottish Enlightenment

In “My Own Life,” David Hume (1711-1776) recollects that “almost all [his] life has been spent in literary pursuits and occupations” (xxxi). This autobiography was written just four months before his death in 1776 and posthumously published in 1777. At that time, he was known as an eminent philosopher, essayist, and historian in Britain. In the autobiography, he presents himself as a “man of letters” who has been “seized […] with a passion for literature” since his childhood (xxxii-xxxiii, xxxvi). This love of “literature” is indeed “the ruling passion of [his] life” (xxxii-xxxiii). His phrase “literary pursuits” covers diverse kinds of intellectual activities including epistemological, moral, aesthetic, and political inquiries. As James A. Harris points out, eighteenth-century writers and readers did not see “literature” as a specific field of writing associated with the product of imagination (Hume 15). Philosophical and historical writings were part of this domain in the eighteenth century. Hume was a writer who wrote on diverse subjects in various literary forms (by “forms” I mean to refer to the vehicles of inquiry which he chose). In addition to the essay, he made use of history, dialogue, and autobiography. His writing was also engaged with diverse genres of writing such as moral philosophy, politics and commerce, religion, and criticism (by “genre” I mean to refer to eighteenth-century classifications of knowledge).

As a man of letters, Hume was keen to attract a wide readership and continuously concerned about his reception in the publishing market. “My Own Life” dramatizes the disappointing response to A Treatise of Human Nature (1739-1740) as his first “literary attempt,” which “fell dead-born from the press” (xxxiv). He felt that Treatise had been ignored, or at least misunderstood, by readers. The autobiography presents this unfortunate
reception of the *Treatise* as the primary cause of his turn to essay-writing. He thought that the failure of his first publication “had proceeded more from the manner than the matter” (xxxv). The first part of *Treatise* was thus reshaped into *Philosophical Essays concerning Human Understanding* (1748). Prior to this recasting, the favorable reception of *Essays, Moral and Political* (1741-1742) convinced him that essays were a proper form for his literary pursuits, which would enable him to write on diverse subjects in an appropriately discursive manner. In the first edition of *Essays, Moral and Political*, for instance, the scope of Hume’s discussion covered aesthetics, politics, religion, and ethics. The essays included “Of the Delicacy of Taste and Passion,” “Of the First Principles of Government,” “Of Superstition and Enthusiasm,” and “Of Moral Prejudices.” After his success as an essayist, Hume continued to experiment with the use of different forms of writing. He was appointed as a librarian by the Faculty of Advocates in 1752, and started writing *The History of England* (1754-1762). Before his death in 1776, he also prepared the posthumous *Dialogues concerning Natural Religion* (1779) in addition to composing his autobiography. In total, his writing engaged with five literary forms: treatise, essays, history, dialogue, and autobiography. Each of these has its distinctive structure of narrative.

I call Hume’s intellectual pursuits described above “literary practice.” In other words, this means the act of communication by the use of diverse literary forms. This process includes shaping ideas, crafting narrative, and diffusing opinions. I choose the term “practice” to emphasize that Hume’s writing is not the product of speculation in solitude but the outcome of active participation in various kinds of social exchange. To shape ideas, he converses, exchanges letters, and reads books. His “practice” also involves meeting publishers, interacting with readers, and paying close attention to reviews of his books. The term therefore highlights the way in which Hume’s act of thinking and writing is embedded in a wider process of communication in society. His practice is “literary” in the sense that his writing opposes being confined within one specific category of knowledge, and his “practice”
is thus embodied in his wide-ranging activity as a man of letters.

My conceptualization of “literary practice” as an analytical term is indebted to three research strands in eighteenth century studies. Firstly, biographical approaches in Hume Studies have highlighted the significant role of the man of letters in the production and diffusion of philosophical ideas in eighteenth-century Britain. Jerome Christensen’s *Practicing Enlightenment: Hume and the Formation of a Literary Career* (1987) directed my attention to “practice” as a crucial term to understand Hume’s intellectual pursuits. Christensen argues that Hume’s social identity as a man of letters embodies his philosophical vision of society itself, and thus his pursuit of developing a literary career is “a symbolic practice” to explore and represent the principles of the “commercial society” where he lives and writes (4). I think that the role of man of letters as Hume’s profession is crucial in examining his relation to other Scottish thinkers including Adam Smith (1723-1790).

Secondly, print culture approaches to Hume and his fellow Scottish thinkers have stimulated my interest in the way in which the act of writing was embedded in broader processes of communication in eighteenth-century Britain. In *The Enlightenment and the Book* (2010), Richard B. Sher reveals Hume’s active involvement in “every aspect of the publication” including “the format, timing, paper, quantity, printing, publishing, and marketing, as well as textual content, of his books” (45). This study presents Hume as a representative eighteenth-century author paying keen attention to the material conditions of circulating his ideas in the publishing market. Jon Mee’s *Conversable Worlds: Literature, Contention, and Community 1762 to 1830* (2011) emphasizes the significant role of Hume as an essayist in the formation of eighteenth-century ideas and practices of conversation (57-67). In addition, David Allan’s *Making British Culture: English Readers and the Scottish Enlightenment, 1740-1830* (2008) highlights the extensive scope of communication mediated

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by the circulation of print.

Thirdly, sociology of knowledge approaches to eighteenth-century texts have enabled me to grasp the idea of “literature” in this period as an extensive field of human activities beyond generic boundaries. In *The Work of Writing: Literature and Social Change in Britain 1700-1830* (1999), Clifford Siskin explains Hume’s turn to essay-writing in terms of social change in the division of labor (2, 49-51). This study has lead me to explore Hume’s use of diverse literary forms in relation to the professionalization of knowledge. Mary Poovey’s *Genres of the Credit Economy: Mediating Value in Eighteenth- and Nineteenth-Century Britain* (2008) is another example of sociology of knowledge approaches. Her examination of the heterogeneity of economic writing before the nineteenth century reveals the process through which the idea of literature changed into a distinctive branch of writing associated with imagination.

I see Hume’s literary pursuits as an exemplary model for describing the Scottish Enlightenment itself. I suggest that his intellectual endeavor is typical of the production and circulation of diverse kinds of writing in Scotland between the 1740s and the 1770s. Hume and his fellow Scottish thinkers shared their active participation in communication mediated by print. Adam Smith (1723-1790), for instance, contributed articles to *The Edinburgh Review* (No.1 1755, No.2 1756), while lecturing on moral philosophy at Glasgow University in the 1750s. Even though he developed his career as a professor in the university, he was keen to circulate his ideas among a wide audience. The first outcome of this ambition was the publication of *The Theory of Moral Sentiments* in 1759. Nicholas Phillipson suggests that its successful sales in Edinburgh and London enabled Smith to establish himself as “a man of letters” (160). As *The Theory of Moral Sentiments* was based on his lectures at Glasgow, it was an outcome of communication as well as a catalyst for polite conversation.

William Robertson (1721-1793) responded to Hume’s historical writing. With the successful publication of *The History of Scotland* (1759) and *The History of the Reign of the
Emperor Charles V (1769), he transformed himself into an eminent man of letters comparable to Hume (Sher, *The Enlightenment and the Book* 214, 259-60). Along with Smith, he was actively involved with the launch of *The Edinburgh Review*. He thought that the enhancement of writing and reading would contribute to establishing polite society in Scotland. He differed from Hume and Smith in his affiliation to the religious world. As a leader of the moderate party in the Church of Scotland, his intellectual pursuits sought to locate religion in modern commercial society. He saw print culture as an emerging space for elaborating and sharing theological opinions. In *Church and University in the Scottish Enlightenment* (1985), Richard B. Sher points out that members of the moderate party actively participated in *The Edinburgh Review* to advocate their religious views (68-70). As Jeffrey R. Smitten notes in *The Life of William Robertson: Minister, Historian, and Principal* (2018), Robertson’s intellectual exchange was not limited within the circle of fellow-believers (103). As a member of the Select Society, for instance, he enjoyed discussion with Hume and Smith. Pairing Robertson and Hume, therefore, enables us to explore a wide network of intellectual exchange in which Scottish thinkers expressed and shared their different attitudes towards philosophy, politics, and religion.

Adam Ferguson (1723-1816) established his literary fame by the favorable reception of *An Essay on the History of Civil Society* (1767) in Edinburgh and London. Thanks to German and French translations of the *Essay*, he was known as an eminent man of letters throughout Europe. Fania Oz-Salzberger points out that major figures of the European Enlightenment including Voltaire and Herder admired Ferguson’s work (Introduction xvi-xvii). He was a friend of Hume, and they shared a wide variety of intellectual interests in the matters of civil society across epistemology, moral philosophy, politics, and history. Ferguson’s essay-writing explored topics also discussed in Hume’s essays including human nature, national characters, and the progress of the arts and sciences. In *Society and Sentiment: Genres of Historical Writing in Britain, 1740-1820* (2000), Mark Salber Phillips suggests that Ferguson’s *Essay*
“[brought] together a philosophical portrait of human nature, an anthropology of ‘rude nations,’ and a moralist’s preoccupation with the weaknesses of contemporary society” (179). This heterogeneity of the *Essay* resisted the modern division of knowledge, while Ferguson synthesized different elements under the name of the study of civil society. Ferguson wrote it as a coherent narrative of the rise and decline of civil society, while Hume just mentioned a loose connection between his own essays. The comparative study of Hume and Ferguson will show their different understanding of the practice of essay-writing.

2. Literary Practice, Geography, and Scottish Networks

In *The Cambridge Companion to The Scottish Enlightenment* (2003), Alexander Broadie describes the Scottish Enlightenment as “a remarkable intellectual flourish that lasted for much of the eighteenth century” (Introduction 1). Since William Robert Scott coined the term in 1900, there has been a continuous disagreement among scholars about the understanding of the Scottish Enlightenment (Sebastiani, *The Scottish Enlightenment* 1). The points of their disagreement include the matters of identifying its period, space, members, and subjects. Still, the opening of Broadie’s *The Scottish Enlightenment* (2001) outlines the broad consensus among scholars about the definition of the Scottish Enlightenment.

During a period of a few decades on either side of 1760, Scotland was home to a creative surge whose mark on western culture is still clearly discernible. That creative surge is now known as the Scottish Enlightenment. It was a moment when Scots produced works of genius in chemistry, geology, engineering, economics, sociology, philosophy, poetry, painting. The list is long. (1)

Broadie sees the Scottish Enlightenment as a movement in which Scots were actively involved in the production of diverse kinds of knowledge in the mid eighteenth century. My
discussion uses this framing as a working definition. My contention, understanding the Scottish Enlightenment as literary practice, contributes to eighteenth century studies by exploring the significant role of writing in the production of knowledge during the period. This interpretation suggests that the representatives of the Scottish Enlightenment were distinctive writers whose skillful prose both entertained and edified readers.

The Scottish Enlightenment and Literary Culture (2016) edited by Ralph McLean, Ronnie Young, and Kenneth Simpson shows the recent scholarly interest in locating the movement in the history of writing. The focus of the book is the relation between Scottish philosophy and “imaginative literature” in the mid eighteenth century (Introduction 1). On the one hand, their study succeeds in highlighting the presence of poets and novelists in the Scottish Enlightenment. On the other hand, their discussion tends to see the works of Hume and Smith as a context for understanding eighteenth-century literature, as these thinkers did not write imaginative literature but theorized imagination (2-3). I rather read the works of Scottish thinkers as a constituent of eighteenth-century literature. Understanding Scottish thinkers in this way will contribute to filling the gap between scholarly interest in reading their writings and identifying the social and cultural circumstances of their works. The philosophical examination of their ideas, the structural analysis of their narratives, and the historical survey of their contexts, of course, complement each other.

My study of the use of diverse literary forms in the Scottish Enlightenment involves the close reading of representative texts written by Hume, Smith and other Scottish thinkers. I examine the way in which each literary form shapes the structure of expressing ideas. The study of literary forms also helps us to recover some contexts of the Scottish Enlightenment by directing our attention to the process of the diffusion of ideas. In The Enlightenment and the Book, Richard B. Sher presents a detailed analysis of the production and circulation of books in the Scottish Enlightenment. I then aim to show how the understanding of these material circumstances can help us to interpret its representative works. My approach,
therefore, overlaps with Mark Salber Phillips’s attempt to “join the contextualizing methods of intellectual history to the formalist concerns of literary analysis” in Society and Sentiment (xi). His inquiry begins with the study of Hume as “the single figure who most centrally marks out the ambitions and vocabularies of the historiography of Britain” (xv). I am sympathetic to his exploration of “the ways in which historians, biographers, antiquarians, memorialists, literary historians, and others sought to represent the social world of everyday life as well as the inward world of the sentiments” (xii). I differ from Phillips in locating literature, rather than history, as my primary field of inquiry. I also confine the scope of my argument within the Scottish Enlightenment, while he broadens it into the British Enlightenment.

In Geographies of the Book (2010), Miles Ogborn and Charles W. J. Withers emphasizes “how deeply geography is involved in the production, distribution and consumption of books” (Introduction 5). Scottish thinkers sometimes went to London to meet English publishers. For instance, Andrew Millar, a publisher of Scottish books in eighteenth-century London, launched Hume’s essays (Sher, The Enlightenment and the Book 280, 285). In addition to their journey, their books circulated among English readers, or even European readers. David Allan’s Making British Culture reveals that the space of the Scottish Enlightenment was not limited within Scotland. (4-9). The practice of British and European readers also defined it.

This reconceptualization of the space of the Scottish Enlightenment enables me to discuss Tobias Smollett (1721-1771) and James Boswell (1740-1795) along with Hume, Smith, and other Scottish thinkers. As the absence of substantial discussion on Boswell and Smollett in The Cambridge Companion to the Scottish Enlightenment shows, their intellectual pursuits have been relatively marginalized. This is partially because they were London-based writers. I should also note that there are some scholarly attempts to use the Scottish Enlightenment as a context to discuss Boswell and Smollett, examples of which are Gordon

The contrast between Smollett and Smith conceptualizes two different responses to the Humean model of literary pursuits. As an eminent man of letters in the mid eighteenth century, Smollett wrote as a novelist, editor, reviewer, translator, historian, and traveler. After moving from Glasgow to London in 1739, he shaped his multi-layered identity as a Scot, Briton, and European. Along with Hume after the publication of the *Treatise*, Smollett was actively involved with the use of diverse literary forms. He established himself as a professional writer in the publishing market, while Smith chiefly lived as a professor in the university. Smith critically developed Hume’s ideas in moral philosophy, politics, and criticism, and aspired to write systematically. He continued to develop Hume’s original ambition of writing philosophical treatises, a literary form embodying the system of knowledge.

Boswell lived as a Scot, Briton, and cosmopolitan. He was born in Edinburgh and studied at Edinburgh University between 1753 and 1759. In addition to cultivating a friendship with other students, he enjoyed going to the Edinburgh theatre in the Canongate and sharing the company of actors. It was the time of the *Douglas* controversy in which Scottish thinkers including Ferguson and Robertson aimed to vindicate drama as an embodiment of polite culture. In 1759, Boswell was sent to Glasgow University by his father to concentrate on legal studies, and encountered Smith as an impressive teacher. In 1762, just before moving to London, he started keeping a journal in an attempt to transform himself from a provincial Scot into a polite Briton. He then traveled around the Netherlands,
Germany, Switzerland, Italy, and France. Based on this experience, he was proud of describing himself as “a citizen of the world” (*Journal of a Tour to the Hebrides* 10). The geographical mobility and the perception of diverse places characterized his practice as a diarist. I think that Boswell’s journal-writing is comparable with Hume’s essay-writing in terms of their ways to express geographical experience.

By including Smollett and Boswell as members of the Scottish Enlightenment, I can clarify its internal diversity, which included both professional writers and academic professors. Some of its members lived in Scotland, others outside. Professors including Smith and Ferguson were involved with the publishing world. London-based Scots including Boswell actually moved back and forth between London and Edinburgh. I intend to argue that the unity of the Scottish Enlightenment is based upon this extensive network of Scottish human relations. In London, Smollett enjoyed conversation with Scottish physicians and men of letters, such as William Hunter, at the British Coffee House. Boswell walked around London with Scottish friends and sent his journals to another friend in Scotland. Members of the Scottish Enlightenment “knew each other, interacted with each other, ate, drank, [and] argued with each with other” (Broadie, *The Scottish Enlightenment* xi).

The circulation of information, people and things went beyond Europe in the Scottish networks. As sailors, clerks, international traders, and soldiers, Scots in the eighteenth century went to non-European worlds in pursuit of their ambition for financial success. In *The Inner Life of Empires: An Eighteenth-Century History* (2011), Emma Rothschild presents the family history of the Johnstones whose sons and daughters “grew up in Scotland in the 1720s and 1730s and made their way, in imagination or in reality, to the extremities of the British, French, Spanish, and Mughal empires” (1). By exploring this family’s friendship with Hume, Smith, and Ferguson, Rothschild reveals “a connection […] between the enlightenment and the empire” (211). Even though most representatives of the Scottish Enlightenment did not travel beyond Europe, conversation and reading mediated their
secondhand encounter with the rest of the globe. The geographical imagination constitutes narratives across a wide range of genres in the Scottish Enlightenment. In “Of the Rise and Progress of the Arts and Sciences” (1742), for instance, Hume mentions that “CHINA is one vast empire, speaking one language, governed by one law, and sympathizing in the same manners” (122). In “Of National Characters” (1748), he notes that “[t]he FRENCH, GREEKS, EGYPTIANS, and PERSIANS are remarkable for gaiety” (208). His geographical interest is not confined to a particular region but covers diverse parts of the globe.

In “Toward a Historical Geography of Enlightenment in Scotland” (2000), Charles W. J. Withers argues that geography constituted the primary system of knowledge in the Scottish Enlightenment. In universities and other public spaces, eighteenth-century Scots studied geography as “useful knowledge and polite learning” (88). On the one hand, I follow his contention that the Scottish Enlightenment is “a geographical matter” (63). On the other hand, I do not entirely follow Withers’s interpretation that geography was a distinctive field of knowledge in the Scottish Enlightenment (64). In the exploration of major texts in the Scottish Enlightenment, we encounter geographical reference in diverse forms including Hume’s essays, Smollett’s novels, Boswell’s journals, and even Robertson’s histories. Geographical inquiries and description were not confined to any specific form and genre of writing.

3. The Summary of Argument
In this thesis, I will present the use of diverse literary forms as an essential feature of the Scottish Enlightenment. My argument is that the Scottish Enlightenment has to be approached at the level of ideas, but that we also need to think about the importance of different forms of writing in the diffusion of ideas. Scottish thinkers reflect on how to discuss as well as what to discuss. I deploy the phrase “literary practice” to draw attention to this self-critical awareness of and engagement with writing in the Scottish Enlightenment. To analyze
the use of diverse literary forms in the Scottish Enlightenment, I particularly focus on the way in which geographical reference shapes diverse kinds of narrative. Instead of becoming a distinct discipline, geography is incorporated into diverse genres of writing in the Scottish Enlightenment such as moral philosophy, political economy, and history. Hume refers to the condition of non-European people as a case study to establish the general principles of human nature, while he does not present geography as a branch of the science of man. His use of geographical reference is particularly significant in “Of National Characters” (1748). Adam Smith also refers to the diverse condition of societies across the globe as a means of developing his theory of commerce in *The Wealth of Nations*. Geographical reference appears in diverse subjects in various forms of writing such as philosophical treatises, essays, journals, and novels.

My discussion will show that the presence of geographical reference in diverse forms across different genres of writing brings into focus two themes: diversity and connection. In their pursuit of the uniform principles of human nature, Scottish writers developed their understanding of diversity. In the mid eighteenth century, Britons were exposed to information about distant lands in the New World, Oceania, Asia, and Africa. In their encounter with such a remarkable diversity of social and cultural practices, Scottish writers aspired to grasp not only culturally particular detail but also the universal foundations underpinning it. In moral philosophy, this theme emerges as a question of moral judgment across social conventions, a case in which the European observer forms a moral judgment on the conduct of non-European people. In political economy, the theme arises as an inquiry into the different rate of accumulation of wealth in different regions of the earth.

In their writing, some of the Scottish men of letters are aware that the world is not only diverse but also interconnected. Geographical reference is a constitutive feature of discourse on commerce, as international trade is seen as a major driving force of this interconnection in the Scottish Enlightenment. Hume’s essays in *Political Discourses* (1752), such as “Of
Commerce,” inquire into the nature and consequences of the emergence of this interconnected world. The battlefields of the War of the Austrian Succession (1740-48) and the Seven Years War (1756-63) stretch out beyond Europe. In a period of imperial expansion, writing on this idea of “connection” also potentially becomes a critique of the British empire. The seventh chapter of book four of *The Wealth of Nations* is entitled “Of Colonies.” The theme of interconnection is explored in essays and treatises. The connection between distant regions is imaginary as much as physical in the sense that individual subjects in the metropole imagine their connection with distant regions based on their exposure to the movement of people, commodities, and information. Since connection cannot be physically grasped, it needs to be imagined. For this reason, the idea of connection is also important in forms of imaginative literature such as the novel.

This thesis examines six Scottish writers: David Hume, Adam Ferguson, Adam Smith, William Robertson, Tobias Smollett, and James Boswell. In my inquiry, Hume’s intellectual pursuits as a man of letters help to give rise to literary experiments in mid eighteenth-century Scotland. Following Hume, Ferguson develops essay-writing as a means of articulating the principles of human nature. In *An Essay on the History of Civil Society* (1767), he argues that the study of “rude nations” in the non-European world is the only way to establish the principles of human nature solely based on “observation.” This is a pivotal statement in which the use of geographical reference is theoretically situated as part of the process of theorizing human nature. This critical awareness about the function of geographical reference in writing is Ferguson’s contribution to the Scottish Enlightenment as literary practice.

In the history of philosophy, Smith is often seen as a successor to Hume, developing a moral theory of sympathy. In terms of the practice of writing, however, he differs from Hume to a certain extent. Contrary to Hume’s turn to essay-writing, Smith writes his two major works almost as philosophical treatises. The aspiration to produce a systematic account seems to determine the forms of writing he chose. Smith’s writing is also characterized by the way
in which it deploys geographical reference to survey the world from an Olympian perspective. In his view, the contemporary world is not only diverse but also interconnected. Coming to terms with global interconnection is a performative act of imagining this immense network of interaction. It is also a matter of inventing a viewpoint from which an individual subject in the metropole can synthesize his/her fragmentary experience of encountering faraway spaces. Global interconnection is not only the material condition of the world based on international trade and imperial conquest, but also the consciousness of metropolitans that their urban space is both physically and imaginatively connected with the rest of the earth through the wider circulation of people, things, and information. Diverse forms of writing articulate this global consciousness and encounter in a different manner. Boswell’s journal-writing expresses his individual fascination with Captain Cook’s voyages in the 1770s. Instead of imagining a detached viewpoint like Smith’s philosophical treatise, the journal form represents Boswell’s individual experience of secondhand global encounter.

4. “The Scottish Enlightenment”: The History of its Scholarship

There is a consensus among scholars that the Scottish Enlightenment first became a distinctive subject of scholarly inquiry in the 1960s.2 Hugh Trevor-Roper’s “The Scottish Enlightenment” (1967) is often credited as foundational. It was a paper presented as a lecture to the Second International Congress on the Enlightenment in 1967, and was published in *Studies on Voltaire and the Eighteenth Century* in the same year. Trevor-Roper describes the Scottish Enlightenment as the “efflorescence of intellectual vitality which suddenly became obvious after the defeat of the last Jacobite rebellion in 1745, but whose causes must lie deeper in the past” (18). He understands it as a “sudden Scottish revival [] after its dark age in the seventeenth century” (17). The principal task of his paper is, therefore, to identify the

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causes of this significant upheaval in eighteenth-century Scotland.

Trevor-Roper suggests that seventeenth-century Scotland “suffered from a double isolation. Cut off from France by religion, from England by politics, refreshed mainly by the stale waters of Calvinist bigotry fed to it through the narrow conduits of Utrecht and Sedan and Geneva, it was also further insulated behind the barricades of a defensive nationalism” (23). The rise of the Scottish Enlightenment is, then, construed by Trevor-Roper as a consequence of “the breaking down of these barriers, the reopening of old contacts with Europe, [and] the discovery of fresh streams of thought” (23). Eighteenth-century Scotland is characterized by the confrontation between the old and new. Trevor-Roper contends that this presence of two different worlds in the same society led Scottish thinkers to conceptualize “human progress,” and this idea of progress and its analysis are “the peculiar contribution of the Scottish Enlightenment” (33). The last paragraph of his paper concludes:

The idea of progress does not occur to a uniformly primitive society which seeks only to conserve ancient traditions. It could never have occurred to Covenanting Scotland. The problem of progress does not impose itself on a mature society, which too easily assumes its own virtue. How little direct impact it made on whig England! It is when a society finds itself faced, whether from outside or within itself, at the same time, by two distinct and strongly contrasting worlds, a world of antique custom inherited from the past and world of rapid movement inspired by new ideas from abroad, that thinking men are force to speculate on the social ambience of man and the mechanism of its change. ("The Scottish Enlightenment” 33)

From our present perspective, a half century after this paper was written, Trevor-Roper’s analytical language may sound naïve and some of his assumptions can easily be criticized.
For instance, his description of seventeenth-century Scotland as experiencing a “dark age” can be questioned. The unreflecting use of the word “progress” and the idea of backwardness in his study can be also interrogated by postcolonial criticism. The schematic contrast between England and Scotland might be complicated by emphasizing the interaction between them at that time, or the presence of Scots in London. Later scholarship contextualizes the Scottish Enlightenment much more fully than Trevor-Roper. Still the framework of his discussion remains informative, and my own approach aims to develop his conceptualization of the Scottish Enlightenment as an outcome of the experience of encounter between two different worlds.

Along with Trevor-Roper, Duncan Forbes also contributes to the foundation of Scottish Enlightenment Studies by recognizing “The Progress of Society” as “the central and characteristic idea of the Scottish Enlightenment” (Hume’s Philosophical Politics xi). As one of the pioneering figures of the Cambridge School of the History of Political Thought before John Dunn and Quentin Skinner, Forbes particularly shows his keen interest in reading Hume’s writing on politics in its historical contexts. This project is crystallized in Hume’s Philosophical Politics (1975) whose introductory preface clearly explains the process of the development of his approach to the Scottish Enlightenment.

Some years ago I wrote a general study of the eighteenth-century Scottish thinkers, which began with Hume, the idea being to bring out the differences between Hume and the others, and between the others themselves, and this was done, and the whole thing given some sort of thematic unity, by showing how the idea of social progress meant different things in all of them, when it was seen in the light of their respective systems, the difference being at times a matter of subtle nuance. I called this “The Progress of Society” . . . (xi)
Forbes’s inquiry begins with his specific interest in the unique features of Hume’s thought. Despite his original focus on the difference between Hume and other contemporary Scottish thinkers, his study of their ideas of social progress comes to emphasize their similarities. “The Progress of Society” works as a conceptual framework to discuss these eighteenth-century Scottish thinkers. In this process, Hume comes to be counted as a representative of an intellectual movement rather than as an exceptional figure among Scottish thinkers. Hume’s representative status is emphasized.

More recent scholars emphasize Forbes’s contribution to the institutionalization of the study of the Scottish Enlightenment. Prior to the publication of *Hume’s Philosophical Politics*, his intellectual pursuit of the ideas of social progress in eighteenth-century Scotland “formed part of a Special Subject at Cambridge on the Scottish Enlightenment” in the 1960s “though in fact [he] was not allowed to call it that, because in those days the Scottish Enlightenment was still a somewhat backwoods kind of affair: it had to be ‘Hume, Smith and the Scottish Enlightenment’” (Forbes xi). This suggests that studies of Hume and Smith as eminent thinkers of the age provided the basis for Scottish Enlightenment Studies in its early stage of institutionalization. The title of the special subject “Hume, Smith and the Scottish Enlightenment” may give an impression that Hume and Smith are outside of the circle of the Scottish Enlightenment, even as it announces the relationship between them and the intellectual movement. As the quoted passages show, Forbes himself was inclined to locate Hume and Smith within the Scottish Enlightenment as its major representatives. This basic assumption has been questioned by some later scholars such as Richard B. Sher.

After the Second World War, philosophers often dismissed the idea of the Enlightenment and its social practice, assuming that it was a “project” to construct and diffuse an ideology of triumphant European modernity over the rest of the world, and one of

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3 See John Robertson, “The Scottish Contribution to the Enlightenment” 37.
Karen O’Brien’s *Narratives of Enlightenment* (1997) challenged this argument, and presented the Enlightenment as “narration” rather than “project.” She contends that the Enlightenment was “the elaboration of a common descriptive model for the history of Europe through separately periodised ancient, medieval, early modern, and enlightened modern stages” (11). The scope of her discussion went beyond the Scottish Enlightenment by examining Voltaire, Gibbon, and David Ramsay as well as Hume and Robertson. Her focus was the way in which these eighteenth-century historians attempted to “modify or transform their readers’ sense of national self-awareness through the writing of narrative history” (1). O’Brien’s idea of “Narratives of Enlightenment” enables us to see the Scottish Enlightenment as the pursuit of new ways of describing emergent realities in the eighteenth century. The key point which I wish to make is that the Scottish Enlightenment production of new categories of social analysis was inseparable from forms of literary innovation. This is why I refer to “The Scottish Enlightenment as Literary Practice.” To understand the Scottish Enlightenment, it is necessary to consider that *how the Scottish literati wrote* matters as well as *what they wrote.*

I also want to emphasize that the pursuit of new models of description went hand in hand with the expansion of the geographical scope of Scottish Enlightenment writing. O’Brien touches on this point regarding the introduction of “cosmopolitan” perspectives into historical writing, when she examines the course of Robertson’s career as a historian.

Robertson’s writing career took him from the locally specific *History of Scotland* (1759) to broader histories of Europe (*The History of the Emperor Charles V*, 1769) and its colonies (*The History of America*, 1777). He was the most insistently cosmopolitan of all eighteenth-century historians, in part because he felt that

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4 See Robertson, *The Case for the Enlightenment* 1.
persistent tensions between Scottish and English cultural and political identities could only be resolved through a reappraisal of their common European frame of meaning. (*Narratives of Enlightenment* 3)

O’Brien presents the expansion of geographical perspective as a feature of Robertson’s writing. Developing this claim, I will contend that such an expansion characterizes the writings of the Scottish Enlightenment more broadly. Other Scottish literati such as Hume, Smith, and Ferguson were also involved with expanding and transforming their geographical perspectives in the course of pursuing new models of description. Their background as Scots helps to bring this expanded geographical perspective into their writings. Whereas O’Brien’s reading primary focuses on the move from a national to a European framework, my own approach to the Scottish Enlightenment rather aims to explore how the expansion of its geographical frame of reference goes beyond Europe. I intend to suggest that its attempt to describe emerging realities is bound up with an enhancement of the understanding of relations between Europe and the rest of the world.

J. G. A. Pocock’s *Narratives of Civil Government* (1999) is more explicit about the expansion of the geographical scope of eighteenth-century historiography. He describes “the Enlightened narrative” as a preceding “norm” of writing with which Edward Gibbon needed to negotiate (1). This narrative “recount[s] the emergence from the ‘Christian millennium’ of the political, social and cultural orders in which the Enlightened historians believed themselves to be living and to which they applied the term ‘Europe’” (2). In this context, Scottish literati, such as Hume, Robertson, Smith, and Ferguson, not only consolidated the idea of Europe but also problematized it (2). As part of this critical reflection on the idea of Europe, their writings became partially conscious of “contacts between ‘Europe’ and worlds beyond it” (3). Pocock points out two ways in which attention to contact with the extra-European world called into question the definition of Europe itself.
[Firstly,] The Russian state was believed to have been Europeanised, and to have set out on the conquest of Central Asia as far as the borders of China, leading to the final subjugation of the steppe nomad peoples who had so often invaded Roman and post-Roman Europe, enlarging the meaning of the term ‘barbarian’ beyond its Gothic and Germanic associations. Secondly, the peoples of the Atlantic coastlands---‘Europe’ in its narrowly Latin sense---had embarked on a conquest of the global ocean, leading to commercial empires in Asia, the colonisation of the Americas and the massive forced diaspora of enslaved Africans. (3)

Pocock keenly makes it clear that the expansion of geographical horizons entailed the transformation of geographical understanding itself. For these enlightened historians, writing the contemporary world transformed the way in which people viewed their own space of living. Their daily world was subsumed into a larger picture. Rather than developing this point, Pocock’s concern is establishing a context for discussing Gibbon’s *Decline and Fall.* In the following chapters, I will examine the issue which Pocock broaches.

5. The Outline of Chapters

The first two chapters examine Hume’s intellectual pursuits as an exemplary model of literary experimentation in the Scottish Enlightenment. Chapter 1 discusses literal and metaphorical mobility in Hume’s life and thought by reading his autobiography, letters, and philosophical treatise. In his life as a man of letters, he moves back and forth between Edinburgh and London, Britain and other European countries. This movement shapes his multilayered identity as a Scot, Briton, and cosmopolitan. I suggest that the experience of being away from Scotland and thus being exposed to difference is an essential component of the Scottish Enlightenment. Chapter 2 focuses on the global scope of Hume and Ferguson’s
essay-writing. The essay was a common literary form for Scottish thinkers to diffuse their ideas. The link between the essay and the geographical imagination can be traced back to Addison’s Spectator No. 69 in which Mr. Spectator imagines London as the metropolitan hub of global encounters. Scottish writers admire Addison and endorse the role of the essay as an effective form for apprehending global interconnection.

The subsequent two chapters examine the use of fiction in the Scottish Enlightenment. Chapter 3 discusses Smith’s system-building and construction of a comprehensive view of the interconnected world. His two major works, The Theory of Moral Sentiments and the Wealth of Nations, are not essays, but more akin to philosophical treatises. I interpret this feature of his writing as his aspiration to system-building, which Hume the essayist had abandoned. In a global context, his system-building is an attempt to imagine a detached perspective from which he can grasp the expanding world of international trade as a whole. His moral philosophy emphasizes the function of imagination in the construction of this spectatorship. Chapter 4 presents Smollett’s epistolary novel, The Expedition of Humphry Clinker as a work of the Scottish Enlightenment. I emphasize Smollett’s experience of Glasgow and encounter with London as a Scot. He shares a conceptual vocabulary with Smith, and represents conflicted views of global interconnection through the form of his epistolary novel.

The last two chapters examine the way in which Scottish writers respond to the global circulation of information, people, and products. Chapter 5 locates Boswell in the Scottish Enlightenment. As a diarist, he observes and participates in conversation in the metropolis where people talk about imperial conquest and conflict. His London Journal shows the emerging awareness among Britons of a connection between their daily lives in London and distant regions of the globe. In addition, Boswell converses with Scottish thinkers and observes the social landscape of the Scottish Enlightenment. Chapter 6 traces the process by which Robertson expands the geographical scope of his historical writing. After embarking
on the history of sixteenth-century Europe, he comes to pay acute attention to encounters between Europe and the rest of the globe. His *History of America* presents the history of human beings in terms of their movement and settlement across the globe. He develops this global vision by responding to print culture and conversational circles in Edinburgh.
Chapter 1

Movement Back and Forth:
David Hume’s Life as a Man of Letters

1. Introduction

My suggestion is that we take seriously Hume’s description of himself as having intended from the beginning to live the life of a man of letters. He is best seen […] as a man of letters, a philosophical man of letters, who wrote on human nature, on politics, on religion, and on the history of England from 55 BC to 1688. (Harris, Hume 2)

James A. Harris’s Hume: An Intellectual Biography (2015) opens a new horizon of Hume studies. It is written as “the first intellectual biography of Hume […] an attempt to give a complete picture of Hume’s ideas as they are expressed in the full range of his writings on philosophical, political, historical, economic, literary, and religious subjects” (Harris vii). Harris consciously pays much effort to distinguish his intellectual biography from E. C. Mossner’s The Life of David Hume, which has been the primary biography for Hume scholars since its first publication in 1954 (subsequently the second edition was published in 1980). In the preface of the first edition, Mossner summarizes “the basic plan of [the] book” as follows: “the man predominates, but the ideas provide the rationale of his actions” (xi).

[T]he biographer must present enough of the thinking of his subject to be able to interpret his actions without, at the same time, going so far as to overburden the narrative with systematic exposition, making it difficult of comprehension for a
reader less interested in the ideas than in the man. (Mossner xi)

Mossner’s primary aim as a biographer is to present the life of David Hume as a “man,” not to present a systematic account of the intellectual development of his “ideas.” This is why Harris refers to his own work as “the first intellectual biography of Hume.” His intellectual biography “is written for the reader less interested in the man than in the ideas” (Harris ix). At present, there are two opposite kinds of biography in Hume scholarship. I intend to point out that Hume scholars do not necessarily have to accept the dichotomy, choosing the man or ideas. Thanks to Mossner and Harris’s achievement, it is not difficult to examine the interplay between Hume’s life as a man and the development of his ideas. This dynamic interaction is the focus of my inquiry.

In this chapter, I aim to contend that movement back and forth characterizes Hume’s life and work. As a man, he moves back and forth between Ninewells and Edinburgh, Scotland and London, Britain and other European countries particularly France. Movement back and forth also appears as a crucial trope in his writing. In the conclusion of the first book of the Treatise, movement between sociable conversation and solitary contemplation works as a driving force to continue philosophical inquiry after a skeptical crisis. This movement characterizes Hume’s essay-writing as well. The essayist moves between the worlds of “learning” and “conversation.” My focus on movement back and forth will show the way in which Hume’s ideas and his life as a man interact with each other.

Hume’s Philosophy of Common Life (1984) by Donald W. Livingston and A Progress of Sentiments (1991) by Annette C. Baier provide a point of departure for me to thematize “movement.” Both Livingston and Baier examine the transformation of the idea and practice of philosophy in Hume’s writing. Baier aims “to present Hume’s work as exhibiting a progress of thought and sentiments” (viii). For her, A Treatise of Human Nature is “a dramatic work” in which there is a “dialectical” development in Hume’s understanding of
philosophy (Baier 27). Livingston points this out as well:

The relation between philosophy and common life, for Hume, is a dialectical one: the philosopher exists both within and without the world of common life. He exists within insofar as he presupposes the order as a whole. He exists without insofar as his thought is aimed at understanding ultimate reality. […]

True philosophy has a positive task and a negative, therapeutic task. The positive task is to explore the structure of common life through empirical and a priori analysis and to speculate about the real within the confines of common life. The negative task is that of purging common life of the alienating effects of false philosophy. (3).

Livingston traces the process through which the outline of “true philosophy” emerges from the critique of “false philosophy.” And he shows that the transformation of the idea of philosophy is a product of a changing relation between the philosopher and common life. Both Livingston and Baier concentrate on the interpretation of Hume’s philosophical writing. I will deploy their perspective to examine his life. Livingston’s focus on the relation between philosophy and common life is particularly useful to analyze Hume’s experience of mental breakdown.

I choose three events in Hume’s life, which Harris tends to underestimate by treating them as anecdotes: (a) his experience of mental breakdown in the early 1730s, (b) his resolution to become an international trader and the resulting failure of this in Bristol in 1734, and (c) his stay in Paris between 1763 and 1766 as a secretary to Lord Hertford after establishing his international fame as a man of letters. I will argue that the experience of mental breakdown leads him to recognize stasis as harmful not only to his life as a man but also for his philosophical pursuits. A new understanding of health reshapes his idea of
philosophy as well as the course of his life. He seems to understand that movement keeps both his life and philosophical pursuit healthy. His aspiration to become an international trader after his illness is crucial to understand the construction of his persona in writing, both the *Treatise* and his later works. In Harris’s narrative of the development of Hume’s ideas, those two events are treated as marginal because Harris’s main focus is what Hume read and responded to before writing the *Treatise*. I want to emphasize, however, that those events are important to understand the larger process through which Hume reshapes the idea of philosophy itself in the early stage of his life. Therefore, my discussion of the two events contributes to understanding his ideas as well as the man himself. As for Hume in Paris between 1763 and 1766, Harris presents it as an event after “the end of Hume’s career as an author”:

[Hume] wrote only a handful of short and minor pieces during the remaining thirteen years of his life. He was in Paris for more than two years, and became friends with many of the great men and women of the French Enlightenment, but nothing there inspired him to write anything new. (409)

As is shown in this passage, Harris focuses on Hume’s encounter with French philosophes. My discussion, however, deals with Hume’s epistolary exchange with Adam Smith and other friends in Scotland about where to settle down. Hume did not write any major work in the mid-1760s, but wrote several important letters, which expressed the tension between his identities as a Scot and a cosmopolitan man of letters. In my interpretation, Hume’s life in Paris is an important period during which he planned to cease moving back and forth.

My contribution to Hume scholarship is to emphasize the importance of the three events in his life as a means to understand his idea and practice of philosophy. His life as a man is crucial to grasp the intellectual development of his ideas, particularly the process
through which his distinctive idea of philosophy is shaped. My argument will help Hume scholars to sidestep the question of whether to focus on the man or ideas. My examination of the interplay between his life as a man and the development of his ideas will show that movement back and forth characterizes both of them. Hume as a man moves, and his prose also embodies this movement. This point also has larger implications for our understanding of literature and culture in eighteenth-century Britain. Hume’s geographical movement is a notable example to grasp the way in which a man of letters in the eighteenth century thinks and writes while crossing regional and national borders. His experience of living in Paris in the 1760s helps us to think about the cosmopolitan ideal in the republic of letters, a community of men/women of letters beyond national boundaries.

2. Philosophical Pursuit and Mental Breakdown

In 1711, as the second son of Joseph Home, a lawyer who owned the estate of Ninewells in Berwickshire, David Hume was born in Edinburgh. Hume spent his childhood at Ninewells near the Anglo-Scottish border and went to Edinburgh University in 1721. After pursuing philosophy and general learning, he left the University in 1725 or 1726. Even though his family expected him to proceed to the legal profession, he continued to devote himself to philosophical speculation and reading classics based on his ardent passion for literature. Following his mental breakdown in 1729, however, he changed the direction of his life to becoming an international trader. In 1734, he went to Bristol as an apprentice to a sugar merchant, but this ended up with a quarrel with his master within a few months. He then returned to philosophy and stayed in France between 1734 and 1737 during which the substantial part of the *Treatise* was written.

The above is a concise summary of a common narrative of Hume’s early life presented by his biographers including Harris and Mossner. As the outset of framing his biographical narrative, Harris emphasizes “[t]he paucity of evidence” during the period between Hume’s
student days in Edinburgh and stay in France (36). In the absence of any new evidence, Hume scholars follow the conventional narrative. In *The Life of David Hume*, Mossner spends almost one hundred pages explaining the minute details of Hume’s early life such as the preceding family history of the Humes (Homes) of Ninewells, the social landscape of Edinburgh and Bristol, and his friendship and personal encounters. Mossner’s interest in Hume as a man dominates his extensive account of that period. Harris, by contrast, spends less than fifty pages examining Hume’s early life in his intellectual biography. He pays greater attention to Hume’s ideas than to his life, and concentrates on what Hume read and wrote in this period. Hume’s response to Shaftesbury’s *Characteristicks* is a key moment in Harris’s account of his development as a thinker.

The first really significant event in Hume’s intellectual life may have been an encounter with Shaftesbury’s *Characteristicks of Men, Manners, Opinions, Times*. Hume bought, or was given, a copy in 1726, and his earliest letters give the impression that he spent the next two or three years working very hard to follow Shaftesbury’s instructions as to how taste, and character, should be formed. Hume seems to have done his best to turn himself into a kind of Stoic, albeit one of a modern and polite sort. The experiment was not a success. It helped to bring on a physical and mental breakdown in the autumn of 1729, and by the time Hume was on the way to recovery, he had a completely new sense of his intellectual vocation. He no longer shared Shaftesbury’s admiration for the moral philosophy of the ancients, and believed that there was a need for a completely fresh start in the study of human nature. (Harris 25-26)

Harris shows that there was a transformation of Hume’s idea of philosophy itself in the late 1720s. At first, he aspired to live and think as a Stoic in the modern world with his
philosophy concerned to present how human beings should behave. The failure of this intellectual attempt led him to pursue philosophy as an anatomist of human nature. His new idea was that philosophy was an analysis of “human nature as it revealed itself to experience,” an empirical inquiry into “what human beings were actually like” as opposed to “what moralists and religious apologists wanted them to be like” (Harris 36). Harris presents this turn as a process in which Hume established a critical distance from Shaftesbury’s moral philosophy. I want to emphasize that the shift is also determined by Hume’s experience of illness. Therefore, it represents a notable interplay between the course of his life as a man and the development of his ideas.

My contention is that Hume shaped his own idea of philosophy through his experience of mental breakdown: he found that trying to be a modern Stoic was bad for his health. Hume subsequently realized that the lack of the movement between sociable and speculative lives led philosophical inquiry in the wrong direction. As a result of this illness, movement emerged as a crucial theme in his thinking and writing as well as his life itself. To explore further this pivotal moment in his intellectual life, I will closely examine his letter to a physician in London written in 1734 before starting his apprenticeship in Bristol. In this letter, he gave an account of his illness and passion for philosophy and sought professional advice from the physician. As Harris points out, “there is no evidence that [the letter] was actually sent”: it “exists only in draft form” (37). In addition, Hume scholars disagree about the identity of the physician. J. Y. T. Greig, the editor of *The Letters of David Hume*, conjectures that it is Dr. George Cheyne, while Mossner contends that Dr. John Arbuthnot is “the only candidate perfectly fulfilling all the qualifications laid down and implied in the letter” (84). Hume addresses the physician: “I am your Countryman, a Scotchman” (*Letters* 1:12). And the physician is “a man of Letters, of Wit” (1:12). Even though there is uncertainty about some background of the letter, it nonetheless helps us to understand Hume’s transforming idea of philosophy.
In the letter, Hume presents himself as a man who has kept “a strong Inclination to Books & Letters” since “earliest Infancy” (1:13). He intends to describe the brief history of his life so far while leaving the letter anonymous. He announces: “I [….] shall give you a kind of History of my Life, after which you will easily learn, why I keep my Name a Secret” (1:13). The letter expresses that he was dissatisfied with the present condition of knowledge and learning after attending Edinburgh University: “[e]veryone, who is acquainted either with the Philosophers or Critics, knows that there is nothing yet establish[ed] in either of these two Sciences, & that they contain little more than endless Disputes” (1:13). Before his mental breakdown in 1729, he had a certain intellectual ambition to reform this chaotic disorder in the sphere of learning. He aspired to “seek out some new Medium, by which Truth might be establish[ed]” (1:13).

Hume’s health began to decline during the midst of that intellectual pursuit.

After much Study, & Reflection […] when I was about 18 Years of Age, there seem’d to be open’d up to me a new Scene of Thought […]. I cou’d think of no other way of pushing my Fortune in the World, but that of a Scholar & Philosopher. I was infinitely happy in this Course of Life for some Months; till at last, about the beginning of Sep[tember] 1729, all my Ardor seem’d in a moment to be extinguis[h]ed, & I cou’d no longer raise my Mind to that pitch, which formerly gave me such excessive Pleasure. (1:13)

Hume’s language here solicits close reading. He felt “infinitely happy” in the philosophical pursuit. And such an intense immersion in reading and thinking without any restriction gave him “excessive Pleasure.” These phrases seem to present his intellectual involvement as shading in to overindulgence in some degree. Hume’s emphasis on excess in this passage suggests that he understands his mental breakdown not as an unfortunate interruption of his
philosophical inquiry but as a consequence of it.

In the letter, Hume suspects that his “having read many Books of Morality, such as Cicero, Seneca & Plutarch” might have been the cause the breakdown (1:14). He was “smit with their beautiful Representations of Virtue & Philosophy,” but they drained his “Spirits” (1:14). Hume then distinguishes between the active and speculative lives.

These [books of morality] no doubt are exceeding useful, when join’ed with an active Life; because the Occasion being presented along with the Reflection, works it into the Soul, & makes it take a deep Impression, but in Solitude they serve to little other Purpose, than to waste the Spirits, the Force of the Mind meeting with no Resistance, but wasting itself in the Air, like our Arm when it misses its Aim. This however I did not learn but by Experience, & till I had already ruin’d my Health, tho’ I was not sensible of it. (1:14)

In this passage, Hume identifies the period of his intensive study as the time when his health began to decline. There were no obstacles to his studies at this time but the absence of any form of “resistance” was itself problematic. He realizes that philosophical speculation which is unconnected to active life is not only barren but also dangerous. As Jerome Christensen argues in his reading of this letter, Hume’s account of his failure to follow the ancient philosophers allows him to ground “a philosophy which can rest neither on hypothesis nor authority”: it is experience that “makes it possible for Hume to write any philosophy at all” (Practicing Enlightenment 59). Writing the experience of his disease represents a significant moment in which Hume transforms himself from an admirer of ancient philosophy into an anatomist of human nature whose philosophy is solely based on experience. Christensen argues that “Hume […] devises a remedy for his illness that is simultaneously a technique for writing” (17). Following Christensen’s reading, I want to emphasize that Hume’s experience
of his breakdown introduces two crucial insights into his life and thought: (a) the distinction between the active and speculative lives, (b) the agency of writing. Writing about himself provides a way of doing philosophy and developing his ideas. In other words, writing the diseased self is the origin of his philosophy.

Christensen argues that “[t]he metaphorization of symptom,” the process in which Hume abstracts his diseased “body [...] into discourse,” is the core of the letter (18, 63). But I want to point out that his reading overlooks the way in which movement is introduced as a crucial theme in the letter, and then his life and thought. In the course of analyzing the nature of the breakdown, Hume realizes “that as there are two things very bad for this Distemper, Study & Idleness, So there are two things very good, Business & Diversion” (HL 1:17). Therefore, he has “resolved to seek out a more active Life” (1:17). I want to emphasize that his resolution is not a statement about the renunciation of the speculative life. In the letter, Hume clearly articulates the point: “I cou’d not quit my Pretensions in Learning, but with my last Breath, to lay them aside for some time, in order the more effectually to resume them” (1:17). Hume plans to move back and forth between two worlds, the active and the speculative. And he expects that this movement will enable him to resume philosophy in a proper manner.

The movement back and forth between two worlds, the speculative life in solitude and the sociable life in company, also underlies his narrative at the end of the first book of Treatise where he articulates the consequences of his inquiry into skepticism. He presents his current situation as “a man, who having struck on many shoals, and having narrowly escap’d shipwreck in passing a small frith, has yet the temerity to put out to sea in the same leaky weather-beaten vessel, and even carries his ambition so far as to think of compassing the globe under these disadvantageous circumstances” (1.4.7.1 SB263-64: 172). Hume’s philosophical investigation begins with his ambition to establish the science of man, and proceeds to examining the nature of human faculties so as to provide a foundation for
knowledge. His study, however, reveals the uncertainty of our sensory experience, and therefore, of our knowledge. This outcome potentially undermines the possibility of the science of man itself. His preliminary inquiry ironically subverts the prospect of his whole project. This state of affairs “strikes [him] with melancholy” (1.4.7.1 SB 264: 172).

I am first affrighted and confounded with that forlorn solitude, in which I am plac’d in my philosophy, and fancy myself some strange uncouth monster, who not being able to mingle and unite in society, has been expell’d all human commerce, and left utterly abandon’d and disconsolate. (1.4.7.2 SB 264: 172)

His situation here is somewhat similar to when he suffered from mental breakdown. This is a point where there is an interplay between his life and thought. Philosophical contemplation has made him melancholic, and removed him from sociable interaction in conversational space. This is another version of the contrast between the speculative and active lives. His philosophical argument at the end of the first book presents the necessity of movement between these two worlds. Even though “reason is incapable of dispelling” this gloom in solitude, “nature herself” becomes a driving force to lead him back to conversation in company in the midst of which he no longer cares about the issue of the uncertain condition of knowledge (1.4.7.9 SB 269: 175).

I dine, I play a game of back-gammon, I converse, and am merry with my friends; and when after three or four hour’s amusement, I wou’d return to these speculations, they appear so cold, and strain’d, and ridiculous, that I cannot find in my heart to enter into them any further. (1.4.7.9 SB 269: 175)

It is not external but internal forces that provide the means to cure this philosophical
melancholy. This move is analogous to his resolution to quit philosophy and become a merchant. *Treatise* also presents the subsequent process after the engagement with the sociable life, his return to the speculative life. The movement between two worlds is not necessarily one-way.

... I am tir’d with amusement and company, and have indulg’d a *reverie* in my chamber, or in a solitary walk by a river-side, I feel my mind all collected within itself, and am naturally *inclin’d* to carry my view into all those subjects, about which I have met with so many disputes in the course of my reading and conversation. ... I feel an ambition to arise in me of contributing to the instruction of mankind, and of acquiring a name by my inventions and discoveries. These sentiments spring up naturally in my present disposition ... and this is the origin of my philosophy. (1.4.7.12 SB 270-71: 176)

As a philosopher, he carefully manages both his distance from and connection to the sphere of common life where other people enjoy sociable interaction. He tries to keep a distance because he is aware that conversation can turn into empty chatter. The sociable life itself does not provide him a place of thinking. The sense of boredom from being with other people leads him to return to solitude. At the same time, this passage does not entirely deny the value of conversation itself. Thanks to his former conversation, he now has subjects for critical reflection in his solitary life. Being involved with common life is, thus, an essential part of the development of his philosophical thinking. The movement between two worlds can be a driving force of this narrative. The philosopher is somewhat distant from common life, but still keeps his connection with it, as his inquiry aims to contribute to improving the condition of “mankind.”
3. Becoming an International Trader in Bristol

In 1734, I went to Bristol, with some recommendations to eminent merchants, but in a few months found that scene totally unsuitable to me. I went over to France, with a view of prosecuting my studies in a country retreat; and I there laid that plan of life, which I have steadily and successfully pursued. [. . .]

During my retreat in France, first at Reims, but chiefly at La Fleche, in Anjou, I composed my Treatise of Human Nature. After passing three years very agreeably in that country, I came over to London in 1737. (David Hume, “My Own Life” xxxiii-xxxiv)

In the early 1730s, Hume chose to become a merchant and went to Bristol for his apprenticeship. From this resolution onward, his life was characterized by several kinds of movement. Firstly, he moved between the speculative and active lives. Like the sceptic back in the sociable world after a period of solitary inquiry in the Treatise, Hume enjoyed the conversational world of Bristol with his friends. And he resumed his philosophical pursuit again after abandoning his plan to become a merchant. Secondly, he moved geographically between Scotland and England, and between Britain and France. His life was determined by the experience of crossing regional and national borders, and of becoming a stranger, whether as a Scot in England or a Briton in France. Such geographical movements posed philosophical questions about the existence or otherwise of “national character,” and the possibilities of cosmopolitanism. Thirdly, he moved between diverse professions. After his failure to become a merchant, he aspired to live as a philosopher. As a result of the unsuccessful publication of the Treatise, however, he moved toward becoming an essayist following the Addisonian ideal of politeness in literary culture. He temporarily worked as a tutor and a secretary to a military embassy as well. Fourthly, there was a movement in his
writing as he began to compose essays rather than self-consciously “philosophical” works. In the "Treatise," he wrote as an “anatomist,” who observed and described human nature without any colorful exaggeration. In his subsequent works, however, he tried to entertain and affect readers.

In this section, I will closely examine the philosophical and literary implications of Hume’s failure to become a merchant in Bristol. He fails to participate in commerce but starts instead to write about commerce afterwards. In addition, his essay-writing performs the social commerce of sympathy. Even after his life in Bristol, his persona as a merchant helps us to understand his idea and practice of writing. In other words, commerce matters in his life and thought in two respects. Firstly, the nature and consequences of commerce become an object of his philosophical inquiry. Secondly, as an essayist, he presents writing as a kind of commerce, the exchange of information, opinions, and sentiments between the writer and reader. Movement characterizes his writing, as he intends to move readers psychologically. And his experience of geographical movement is incorporated into writing as well.

My focus on the trajectory of Hume’s career is indebted to Jerome Christensen’s "Practicing Enlightenment: Hume and the Formation of a Literary Career" (1987), which contends that his “career” fully embodies “an epistemology based on a deontologized system of representation, an ethics reducible to sympathetic exchange, and a social anthropology anchored in convention” (3). The pursuit of his literary career means a continuous attempt to shape his social identity by the performative agency of writing. In Christensen’s original study, Hume’s self-fashioning as a man of letters is construed as a microcosm of his theory of human nature itself. My discussion shares Christensen’s premise that Hume’s life itself articulates his thought.

At different times Hume was a student of the law, a clerk to a Bristol merchant, a writer of philosophical treatises, a tutor, a military adjutant, a librarian, a composer
of belles lettres, a historian, an embassy secretary, and a Parisian saloniere. He intermittently resided at his family estate of Ninewells, in Edinburgh, in Reims, in London, and in Paris. That the personal identity which underwent those changes was anything but fictitious we can safely doubt [. . .]. We can safely doubt because of our assurance that Hume’s social identity was continuous [. . .].

For Hume “man of letters” offered a social identity of great resilience and power because it was at every point congruent with the marvelously adaptive idea of society that Hume composed in his works. (3)

The starting point of my inquiry is the same as that of Christensen’s; that Hume was involved with different kinds of profession in the course of his life, and that this also entailed his geographical movement from place to place. But the direction of my argument is different from that of Christensen’s. His focus is on the way in which the performative agency of writing consolidates the different dimensions of his social persona. I am more interested in the nature of his movement between different professions/places itself than the imaginative force which ensures the consistency of his sense of self. In other words, Christensen examines the union of Hume’s fragmented selves in his life and writing, and I explore the transformation of his identity that was facilitated by his mobility.

In 1734, Hume left Ninewells and probably took a sea voyage from Berwick to London (Mossner 81). Harris presumes that Hume then moved from London to Bristol by stagecoach (76). His move from Ninewells to Bristol via London was his first experience of exposure to English society and its polite manners. His working experience under an English merchant would lead him to become aware of his socio-cultural background as a Scot. It was also a moment of his involvement in Britain’s commercial empire. As E. C. Mossner points out in The Life of David Hume, Bristol in this period served as “the chief port for the West India trade”; Hume’s employer, Michael Miller, was “[a] sugar-merchant importing from the West
Indies” and “also involved in the slave-trade in accordance with the customary practice of the lucrative triangular voyage” (88). This biographical detail helps us to read his discussion of commerce. We can trace very limited details of his life in Bristol as a merchant. Mossner’s biography mentions two notable events. Due to “the futility of getting Englishmen to pronounce Home as Hume,” he “change[d] the spelling of his surname to conform to the pronunciation” (90). In addition, he had a “quarrel with his master at the counting-house” because of his “corrections of grammar and style in Miller’s letters” (90). Both points confirmed the beginning of his consciousness of being a marginal Scot in English society.

Mossner summarizes Hume’s experience of being in Bristol as one of disappointment:

So, Hume, despite his romantic anticipation in the letter to Dr Arbuthnot of the life of a supercargo---“to toss about the World, from the one Pole to the other”---became just another clerk in a counting-house in the homeland. Whether this was by his own choice or not cannot be ascertained; but, in later years at least, he acknowledged himself such a poor sailor as to be unable to cross even the Firth of Forth without getting seasick. Perhaps the coastal voyage to London had already given him some inkling of that weakness. (88)

Hume originally imagined his future active life in which he would go back and forth between different places. In his apprenticeship as a merchant, however, he himself did not move actively. His work as a clerk was rather to manage the circulation of things and the movement of other individuals. In this respect, his own exposure to the imperial/global network was imaginary rather than actual. And this implies that movement in his life and philosophy has a symbolic aspect as well as a spatial one.

Hume never returned to work as a merchant after leaving Bristol. In the course of pursuing his literary career after his apprenticeship, he sometimes suspended philosophical
speculation in solitude and participated in some active scenes of common life. In such a situation, he chose professions other than a merchant, such as a tutor and a secretary to an embassy. In this respect, Hume moved away from the world of merchants. At the same time, however, he to some extent retained the persona of a merchant even when he began to commit himself to literary pursuits. The work of the merchant functions as a crucial metaphor to conceptualize the nature of his writing.

In “Of Essay-Writing” (1742), he presents the initial task of the essayist as “promot[ing] a good Correspondence” between “the learned and conversible Worlds” (535). The distinction between the speculative and active lives in the letter to the physician re-appears here as the distinction between learning and conversation. On the one hand, the learned world comprises people who are devoted to speculative labor in “Solitude” detached from common life (533). On the other hand, the conversible world comprises people who are in the common world and involved with intellectual labor based on “a sociable Disposition” (533). Therefore, “the Company and Conversation of our Fellow-Creatures” is the foundation of their activities (534). Hume points out that “[t]he Separation of the Learned from the conversible World seems to have been the great Defect of the last Age” (534). The lack of the interaction with the learned possibly turns conversation into a mere indulgence: people just enjoy “gossip[ing] Stories and idle Remarks” (534). In addition, Hume also emphasizes that “Learning has been as great a Loser by being shut up in Colleges and Cells, and secluded from the World and good Company”: “Philosophy […] became as chimerical in her Conclusions as she was unintelligible in her Stile and Manner of Delivery” (534-35). Its lack of connection to the sphere of conversation means that philosophical speculation in solitude develops ideas not rooted in experience, therefore they become “chimerical.” Essay-writing is then an effective means to resume the communication between these two worlds. The central theme in “Of Essay-Writing” follows and rehearses the theme in his preceding writing.

Hume as an essayist describes himself as “a Kind of Resident or Ambassador from the
Dominions of Learning to those of Conversation” (535). He moves from the speculative world into the sociable world. In addition to his own movement, he also facilitates the interaction between these two dominions by writing essays.

I shall give Intelligence to the Learned of whatever passes in Company, and shall endeavour to import into Company whatever Commodifies I find in my native Country proper for their Use and Entertainment. The Balance of Trade we need not be jealous of; nor will there be any Difficulty to preserve it on both Sides. The Materials of this Commerce must chiefly be furnish’d by Conversation and common Life: The manufacturing of them alone belongs to Learning. (“Of Essay-Writing” 535)

The interaction between the two worlds is imagined as international trade in this passage. Hume works as a merchant to “import” the product of philosophical speculation from the world of learning into the world of conversation, with a vision that the outcomes of learning will afford company appropriate topics for conversation; and therefore, this international trade is expected to advance the practice of conversation. As an international trader, Hume resides in the world of conversation, and collects materials of philosophical speculation there for exportation to the world of learning. The production of knowledge is described as a process necessarily entailing exchange. There is a division even in intellectual labor. This vision also articulates Hume’s empiricism. Philosophical speculation needs to be based on the experience and observation of common life.

Hume emphasizes the reciprocity in intellectual exchange between the two worlds by saying that “[t]he Balance of Trade we need not be jealous of.” At this moment, international trade is deployed as a crucial metaphor to characterize his idea and practice of writing as an essayist. In his later work international trade becomes a subject of his inquiry. After the
publication of the two volumes of *Essays, Moral and Political* (1741-1742), in which “Of Essay-Writing” was collected, he published a new collection of essays on commerce titled *Political Discourses* in 1752. One of its essays was “Of the Balance of Trade.” As Eugene F. Miller points out, *Political Discourses* was “so successful that a second edition was published before the year was out, and a third in 1754” (Foreword xiii). In “My Own Life” written in 1776, Hume recollects:

In 1751, I removed from the country to the town, the true scene for a man of letters. In 1752, were published at Edinburgh, where I then lived, my Political Discourses, the only work of mine that was successful on the first publication. It was well received abroad and at home. (xxxvi)

Hume does not explain why *Political Discourses* was so successful in its reception. But it deployed a strategy of writing which enabled his essays to be accessible to readers unfamiliar with the discussion of commerce. Harris points out that “Hume wrote as a person of liberal and learned education seeking liberal and learned readers” (*Hume* 283). The subject of *Political Discourses* is the nature and consequences of international trade, but Hume’s writing deploys a style influenced by his passionate study of literature. “There were no tables of figures in the *Political Discourses*, and nothing in the way of detailed examination of the state of trade, […] or even of the current amount and cost of the national debt” (Harris 283). Hume’s writing combines a range of genres not usually associated with the study of international trade.

Harris also points out another unique feature of *Political Discourses* in terms of the relationship between the writer and his readers which Hume intends to establish.

Hume had no particular doctrine or theory of trade to argue for. He wrote first and
foremost with the intention of stimulating surprise, puzzlement, and reflection in
his reader. Part of the point of calling the book a set of discourses was, perhaps, to
highlight the fact that topics are treated there, as in a talk given to a club or society,
in a manner intended to provoke further discussion. (Hume 282)

Instead of developing and presenting his own principles of international trade, Hume invites
readers to think and talk about his topics. His writing aims as much to inspire as to persuade
them. While Hume here approaches the subject of international trade in a manner very
different from a contemporary such as Adam Smith, his practice in Political Discourses is
consistent with the idea of essay-writing which he expressed in Essays, Moral and Political.
In Political Discourses, his intellectual labor is devoted to importing interesting topics from
the study of commerce for the benefit of non-specialists. His persona continues to be that of a
merchant, and he expects that his essays on international trade will promote sociable
exchange in the world of conversation.

In “Of the Balance of Trade,” Hume intends to interrogate a prevailing view about the
negative consequences facing any nation which imports more than it exports. “[E]ven in
nations well acquainted with commerce,” Hume finds that there is “a strong jealousy with
regard to the balance of trade, and a fear, that all their gold and silver may be leaving them”
(309). He comments that “all calculations concerning the balance of trade are founded on
very uncertain facts and suppositions” (310). In the construction of his counterargument, the
flow of money is compared to that of water. “All water, whatever it communicates, remains
always at a level” (312).

Can one imagine, that it had ever been possible, by any laws, or even by any art or
industry, to have kept all the money in SPAIN, which the galleons have brought
from the INDIES. […] What other reason, indeed, is there, why all nations, at
present, gain in their trade with SPAIN and PORTUGAL; but because it is impossible to heap up money, more than any fluid, beyond its proper level? (“Of the Balance of Trade” 312)

Hume imagines the movement of wealth in a wider geographical scope including imperial connections between Europe and the rest of the world. As a result of his failure to become an international trader, he does not participate in facilitating such movement. But the world of international trade still provides the basis for his philosophical thinking. This act of imagining the world of international trade is underlain by his experience of being exposed to the social dynamics of Bristol. As an apprentice to a sugar merchant involved with the West India trade, he would have recognized the imprint of the movement of wealth on everyday life in Bristol.

Hume’s study of commerce expands the sphere of common life, which provides raw materials for his essay-writing. His essay on international commerce shows that the scope of common life even covers non-European regions. In “Of the Balance of Trade,” he also mentions the distance between Europe and China.

[T]he immense distance of CHINA, together with the monopolies of our INDIA companies, obstructing the communication, preserve in EUROPE the gold and silver, especially the latter, in much greater plenty than they are found in that kingdom. But, notwithstanding this great obstruction, the force of the causes abovementioned is still evident. The skill and ingenuity of EUROPE in general surpasses perhaps that of CHINA, with regard to manual arts and manufactures; yet are we never able to trade thither without great disadvantage. And were it not for the continual recruits, which we receive from AMERICA, money would soon sink in EUROPE, and rise in CHINA, till it came nearly to a level in both places. (313)
In his analysis of the connection between Europe and China, Hume also discusses the way in which European colonies in the New World mediate the interaction between those two regions. In developing his account of spatial relations, Hume therefore broaches the concept of the “network,” as a means of understanding the integration of different regions. In such a manner, writing on commerce expands the geographical scope of his philosophical speculation.

4. Movement and Settlement

Hume moved back and forth beyond national borders. He wrote the \textit{Treatise} in France after his failure to become a merchant in Bristol, and went back to London in 1734 to publish it. In 1748, He attended General St. Clair’s military embassy to Vienna and Turin as a secretary. In “My Own Life,” he recalls this moment: “I then wore the uniform of an officer, and was introduced at these courts [of Vienna and Turin] as aid-de-camp to the general” (xxxv). As part of his experience in another profession, he encountered a polite world of conversation in foreign countries. In 1763, he was also invited to attend Lord Hertford’s embassy to Paris. He found “a real satisfaction in living at Paris, from the great number of sensible, knowing, and polite company” (“My Own Life” xxxix). He even “thought once of settling there for life” (xxxix). He enjoyed such a cosmopolitan life while keeping an emotional attachment to his homeland, both Ninewells and Edinburgh.

Hume did not write any philosophical treatise or essay on cosmopolitanism. There was no systematic account of that subject in his writing. But some scholars argue that a cosmopolitan perspective is nonetheless a distinctive element of his writing. In his interpretation of \textit{Political Discourses}, Harris contends that Hume was “willing to consider the politics of trade from a historical and markedly cosmopolitan perspective” (269). This made Hume’s work “novel” because preceding literature on commerce in English usually
expressed “the exclusive and obsessive concern with British interests alone” (269, 270). In addition, Karen O’Brien construes Hume’s *History of England* as an Enlightenment project to write “cosmopolitan history” along with Voltaire, William Robertson, and Edward Gibbon (*Narratives of Enlightenment* 2). Hume presents a national history “within a European historical framework [. . .] with subtly ironic detachment” (O’Brien 3). He writes as a cosmopolitan when he discusses commerce and history.

Hume’s adoption of the persona of a cosmopolitan is a product of the interplay between his life and writing. In this section, I focus on Hume’s experience of being in Paris as Lord Hertford’s secretary in the 1760s, and closely examine his epistolary exchange with friends in Scotland, Adam Smith in particular. It was a moment in which Hume was wondering where to settle. In preceding years, he moved back and forth between Ninewells and Edinburgh, Edinburgh and London, and London and other European cities. After accepting an invitation to join the Embassy to France, Hume thought that Paris could be his permanent home, though he eventually went back to Britain in 1766. Over the course of this period, Hume experienced a tension between his aspiration to move and desire to settle, and between an ideal and reality of cosmopolitanism. Hume studies pays relatively little attention to the period between 1762 and 1769, mainly because its biographical details do not help scholars to re-interpret his major texts, which had already been published by this time. And, as Harris notes, his enthusiastic experience of being in the heart of the French Enlightenment did not prompt him “to write anything new” (33). Nonetheless, I want to point out that the study of Hume’s later life enables us to think about a philosophical and historical problem, regarding the possibility or otherwise of becoming a cosmopolitan in the republic of letters.

After a certain success as an essayist writing on commerce, Hume embarked on writing *The History of England*, whose final two volumes were published in 1761.  

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“The History of England made Hume rich” and “left him unsure what to do next” as well (33). What he did soon after this was to purchase a fixed property in Edinburgh. In July 1762, He wrote to Gilbert Elliot of Minto:

I have hitherto been a wanderer on the face of the earth, without any abiding city; but I have now at last purchased a house, which I am repairing, tho I cannot say that I have yet fixed any property in the earth, but only in the air: for it is the third story of James’s Court, and it cost me five hundred pounds. (HL 1:367)

Hume’s sense of humor underlies the whole tone of this letter. He jokes that his apartment is not fixed “in the earth” because it is not on the ground floor. His sanguine voice expresses his pleasure at being settled. He no longer has to move back and forth between different places unless he wants to move. In a playful manner, he presents his past life as “a wanderer on the face of the earth, without any abiding city.” The movement back and forth had been a driving force, enabling him to think and write after his mental breakdown. In 1762, however, he started to think about retirement, and about staying in one place. At least, he did not have to write anymore. In “My Own Life,” he recalls his desire for retirement at that time:

[…] I was become not only independent, but opulent. I retired to my native country of Scotland, determined never more to set my foot out of it; and retaining the satisfaction of never having preferred a request to one great man, or even making advances of friendship to any of them. As I was now turned of fifty, I thought of passing all the rest of my life in this philosophical manner. (xxxviii)

also Mark Salber Phillips, On Historical Distance (2013) 61-78.

2 Hume scholars often quote this letter. For instance, see Mossner 409, and Harris 408.
Hume tries to detach himself from the active scene of life, with which he was formerly involved as a man of letters. This plan of retirement is not the abandonment of his philosophical pursuit. He equates retirement with life lived in a “philosophical manner.” He now has less aspiration to write, but still favors thinking.

Like his plan to be an international trader in Bristol, this retirement plan was not realized. He was invited to attend Lord Hertford’s embassy to France. In August 1763, he told Adam Smith that he had accepted this invitation even though he was too old to “be entering on a new Scene” (HL 1:391). He “resolvd [sic] to give up [his] future Life entirely to Amusements” and “there could not be a better Pastime than such a Journey, especially with a Man of Lord Hertford’s Character” (HL 1:391-92). He returned to an active scene of life, although he chose to observe than participate in it.

A few days after his arrival in Paris, Hume wrote to Adam Ferguson that he encountered a favorable “reception from all ranks of people” there (HL 1:411). Mossner points out that Hume enjoyed a “vogue in Paris,” which “lasted throughout the entire twenty-six months of his stay” (445). Hume was welcomed as a prominent man of letters.³ At Versailles, he was “presented to the Dauphin’s children” and “the eldest, a boy of ten years old […] told: “how many friends and admirers I had in this country, and that he reckoned himself in the number, from the pleasure he had received from the reading of many passages in my works” (HL 1:416). Mossner suggests that “[t]he several translations of his works had brought him many readers” in France (423).

Before his leaving from Britain, Hume told Adam Smith that he “had indeed struck Root so heartily” in his flat in Scotland and was unwilling to “transplant[]” himself (HL 1:394). After his arrival in France, however, Hume gradually changed his mind. On 1

December 1763, he wrote to William Robertson:

[…] you see I am beginning to be at home. It is probable, that this place will be long my home. I feel little inclination to the factious barbarians of London; and have ever desired to remain in the place where I am planted. […] I cannot forbear observing, on what a different footing learning and the learned are here, from what they are among the factious barbarians above-mentioned. (HL 1:417)

Hume revisits the question of where to settle down. He is inclined to live in Paris as a cosmopolitan. The international circulation of his works opens up such a possibility. Print culture, therefore, consolidates the foundation of this cosmopolitanism. The culture of the salon in Paris seems to attract Hume’s attention in his vision of desirable retirement. In London, he finds that conversational interaction turns into “factious” clashes. As Mossner describes, Hume grasps the “democratic” feature of salon society in Paris: “all were expected to learn gracefully and unobtrusively; all were accepted as artistic, intellectual, or social equals” (448).

In November 1765, after spending two years in Paris, Hume wrote to Adam Smith: “I am much in Perplexity about fixing the Place of my future Abode for Life”

Paris is the most agreeable Town in Europe, and suits me best; but it is a foreign Country. London is the Capital of my own Country; but it never pleasd [sic] me much. Letters are there held in no honour: Scotsmen are hated: Superstition and Ignorance gain Ground daily. Edinburgh has many Objections & many

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4 My discussion is limited to Hume’s perception of the salon. For its actual features in eighteenth-century France, see Antoine Lilti, The World of the Salons. As part of his study of worldliness, Lilti examines a quarrel between Hume and Rousseau in the 1760s (178-91).
Allurements. My present Mind, this Forenoon the fifth of September, is to return to France. (HL 1: 521)

In his reply to the letter, Smith persuades Hume to change this resolution.

It gives me the Greatest pleasure to find that you are so well contented with your present situation. I think however you are wrong in thinking of settling at Paris. A man is always displaced in a foreign Country, and notwithstanding the boasted humanity and politeness of this Nation, they appear to me to be, in general, more meanly interested, and that the cordiality of their friendship is much less to be depended on than that of our own countrymen. (To David Hume, September 1765: *The Correspondence of Adam Smith* 107-08)

This advice presents Smith’s balanced view of the possibilities and limitations of living as a cosmopolitan away from one’s native country. Smith does not necessarily deny that sympathy can extend beyond national boundaries. There is a certain kind of hospitality which a stranger can enjoy in a foreign country. Smith is, however, skeptical about the origin of such cosmopolitan sentiments. His choice of the phrase “the boasted humanity” implies that he has a realistic understanding of the nature and intensity of affection beyond national boundaries. Unlike an intimate affective tie between fellow countrymen, cosmopolitan sentiments come from the politeness which members of civilized society are expected to show. Due to this, cosmopolitanism has a weaker foundation. Smith’s emphasis on the irreversibility of displacement opposes Hume’s claim that France can be his home. For Smith, individuals cannot find any home outside of their native country. He continues:

The Clamour against you on account of Deism is stronger, no doubt, at London
where you are a Native and consequently may be a candidate for everything, than at Paris where as a forreigner [sic], you possibly can be a candidate for nothing [. . .]. In short I have a very great interest in your settling at London [. . .]. Let us make short excursions together sometimes to see our friends in France and sometimes to see our friends in Scotland, but let London be the place of our ordinary residence. (108)

Smith thinks that Hume’s hospitable and enthusiastic reception in France is a consequence of his status as a foreigner. As people pay less attention to strangers than their own countrymen, Hume can avoid being blamed for his writing. It is not certain how far Smith’s advice was influential in Hume’s final decision, but Hume abandoned his original plan to settle in Paris and went back to Britain.

As an essayist and a historian, Hume introduces cosmopolitan perspectives into his writing. His writing interweaves different geographical scales, regional, national, and international perspectives. His life embodies this co-existence. He lives as a Scot, Briton, and cosmopolitan. His favorable reception in France as an eminent man of letters suggests that print culture establishes the republic of letters beyond national boundaries. The international circulation of his works provides a foundation for his cosmopolitan life. He is impressed by the world of the salon where people converse in a polite manner. This politeness, however, may also constitute an obstacle to cosmopolitan exchange. Smith points out that Hume is welcomed to polite society as a guest but that his actual interactions there are superficial. On the one hand, politeness is a basis for hospitality towards foreigners, and therefore for the possibility of cosmopolitan life. On the other hand, politeness acts as a constraint, to the extent that visitors are treated as no more than guests. In such a situation, there is no cordial collision of opinions between friends. Hume’s geographical movement usually entails his experience of such productive interaction with people from different social and cultural
backgrounds. And this collision becomes a point of departure for his thinking. But politeness undermines this creative collision.⁵

5. Conclusion

Hume moves back and forth between two modes of life, active and speculative. This movement embodies his own idea and practice of philosophy. He thinks that philosophy requires the stimulus of contact with everyday life. As a philosopher, he finds examples for contemplation in the world of sociable interaction. This link between philosophy and daily life is a basis for his empiricism. He is a resident of the conversable world, but keeps a certain distance from worldliness to develop those examples into philosophical principles. Movement back and forth shows the way in which he balances active participation and detached observation.

As a man of letters, Hume facilitates movement in addition to his own movement. He imagines essay-writing as symbolic commerce. In his youth, he aspired to be an international trader, who traveled across the globe and facilitated the flow of wealth from one place to another. Even though he fails to become a merchant, his writing still embodies that vision. In print culture, his persona as a writer to some extent resembles that of a merchant. His works are translated and circulated beyond national borders. And this international dissemination of his ideas provides the basis for his cosmopolitan life. His movement is geographical as well as symbolic. He lives as a Scot, Briton, and cosmopolitan. The movement in his life and writing generates a cosmopolitan perspective.

Hume’s experience of suffering from mental breakdown, choosing his profession, and thinking about where to live underlies the development of his philosophical ideas. Health, work, and home become essential themes of his philosophical speculation. For this reason,

Hume biographers do not have to follow the dichotomy established by Mossner and Harris between the man and his ideas. Understanding Hume as a man entails a critical examination of his ideas, particularly his idea of philosophy. And without understanding his life as a man, our attempt to grasp his intellectual pursuits remains partial. Hume scholars need to move back and forth between his life and thought to examine his writing in a comprehensive manner.
Chapter 2

Essay-Writing and Geographical Reference:

Addison, Hume, and Ferguson

1. Introduction

[...] Hume’s thought was informed to some degree [...] by an awareness of the world beyond Europe. Indeed, the frequent presence of non-Western themes in Hume’s writings, even though they are rarely a central concern, is significant in itself, since it is suggestive of the pervasive impact of the European confrontation with foreign societies in the consciousness of eighteenth-century thinkers.

(Frederick G. Whelan, *Enlightenment Political Thought and Non-Western Societies* 7)

David Hume does not conceptualize geography as a distinctive field of inquiry in his study of human nature. He does not write any treatise or essay on geography as such. But he sporadically refers to the diversity of peoples and societies on the earth. In “Of the Rise and Progress of the Arts and Sciences,” for instance, Hume mentions that “CHINA is one vast empire, speaking one language, governed by one law, and sympathizing in the same manners” (122).¹ In “Of Polygamy and Divorces,” he describes a custom in “TONQUIN,” the northern region of Vietnam: “it is usual for the sailors, when the ships come into harbour, to marry for the season” (182).² In the same essay, he also refers to the domestic conditions

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¹ This essay first appeared in the second volume of *Essays, Moral and Political* (1742).
² This essay first appeared in the second volume of *Essays, Moral and Political* (1742).
of “TURKS” and “PERSIANS” (184). His attention is not directed to any particular region of the earth. Instead, his imagination “run[s] over the globe” to present case studies to help him explore the principles of human nature (“Of National Characters” 204). As is shown in the various titles of the essays cited above, Hume’s writing interweaves geographical reference with various subjects including moral philosophy, aesthetics, politics, and commerce.

Hume’s imaginary survey of the globe is also characterized by an awareness of the interaction between Europe and other regions of the earth. This consciousness is particularly explicit in his writing on politics and commerce. In “Of the Balance of Trade,” he discusses the flow of “gold and silver” from the New World into Europe (312). He is interested in the connections between different regions of the globe as well as the diversity of peoples and societies on the earth. Therefore, I contend that Hume is a pioneering analyst of global interconnection. As David Armitage points out in Foundations of Modern International Thought (2013), “global possibilities for thought opened up for the generations of thinkers writing after the mid eighteenth century” such as Adam Smith (24).

Hume’s encounter with the non-Western world is secondhand. As I have shown in the first chapter, the actual movement in his life is limited to Europe. Even though he writes about the New World, the Middle East, and Asia, he does not travel there. His geographical imagination is mediated by print culture and sociable conversation. He knows people with experience of the extra-European world via their roles as merchants, clerks, travelers, or military officers. As Linda Colley suggests in Britons (1992), Scots worked as agents for the construction and expansion of the British Empire after the Union (126-30). “A British imperium […] enabled Scots to feel themselves peers of the English in a way still denied them in an island kingdom” (Colley 130). In her study of the family history of the Johnstones,

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3 This essay first appeared in Political Discourses (1752).

4 In his essays, Hume is not explicit about where his geographical knowledge comes from. For print culture and geography in eighteenth-century Scotland, see Charles W. J. Withers “Toward a Historical Geography of Enlightenment in Scotland” 72-74.
The Inner Life of Empires (2011), Emma Rothschild reveals the connection between the worlds of global commerce and the Scottish Enlightenment. The sons and daughters of the Johnstones “grew up in Scotland in the 1720s and 1730s and made their way, in imagination or in reality, to the extremities of the British, French, Spanish, and Mughal empires” (Rothschild 1). Hume and Adam Smith were connected to this family. Rothschild points out that “Hume wrote twenty-one letters to the older James Johnstone over the course of a few months in 1745-46” (214). The non-Western world was in many ways bound up with daily life in eighteenth-century Scotland.

In “Toward a Historical Geography of Enlightenment in Scotland” (2000), Charles W. J. Withers suggests that geography was a proper subject for polite conversation as well as practical knowledge taught at schools and universities in eighteenth-century Scotland (74-76). There were public lectures on geography whose printed advertisements were circulated among coffee houses in Edinburgh (75). Learning geography was “a way of promoting polite sociability through description of foreign countries and use of the globes” (76). This use of the globe in teaching shows the way in which instruments mediate the geographical imagination and the global vision.

Withers’ historical geography of the Scottish Enlightenment is an example of the sociological approach to ideas. He discusses the intellectual environment of eighteenth-century Scotland in which Hume and other Enlightenment thinkers developed their geographical imagination. As a result, his study is less engaged in the interpretation of the Scottish Enlightenment’s major texts such as A Treatise of Human Nature and The Wealth of Nations. Instead, he examines diverse historical documents such as the outline of university curriculums, maps and geography books, the description of public lectures, and the record of sociable meetings. In such a manner, his approach is contextual.

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5 See also Withers “Situating Practical Reason” (2002).
Silvia Sebastiani’s *The Scottish Enlightenment* (2013) presents a more textually focused approach to geographical reference, and Hume’s essay, “Of National Characters” (1748), becomes its key text. She argues that the essay marks the emergence of “a comparative method” in the Scottish Enlightenment, which presents “a sort of sociological explanation of the diversity between peoples” (20, 24). She understands Hume’s geographical reference as a part of his comparative study of diverse societies, which focuses on “the functional interrelation of economic, political, and social factors” (Sebastiani 20). Some Scottish thinkers after Hume, such as Adam Smith and Adam Ferguson, she argues, develop “a stage scheme for interpreting the historical evolution of legal, social, and political systems” (Sebastiani 45). This stadial theory presumes that “society advances through successive stages”: “the stages of hunting, herding, agriculture, and commerce” (Sebastiani 6). Those Scottish thinkers who appeal to stadial theory use geographical reference to substantiate their claims.

In addition to diversity, the connection between distant regions is also a crucial matter of Hume’s geographical reference. Istvan Hont’s *Jealousy of Trade* (2005) examines Hume’s global vision with a close reading of his essays on commerce, most of which are collected in *Political Discourses* (1752). The phrase “jealousy of trade” comes from the title of one of Hume’s essays, and raises “a pathological conjunction between politics and the economy that turned the globe into a theatre of perpetual commercial war” (Hont 1,6). With a close attention to “the interdependence of politics and the economy,” Hont aims “to identify political insights in eighteenth-century theories of international market rivalry” (Hont 4). Hume’s writing on commerce plays a distinctive role here, because he develops “a cosmopolitan theory of commercial globalization” (Hont 66-67). With the emphasis on the reciprocity of international trade, his theory intends to distinguish the political logic of war and the economic logic of commerce: “war [is] a one-way affair, with a winner and a loser” but trade is based on “mutual benefit” (Hont 6). Hume contends that the jealousy of trade is
“groundless” (“Of the Jealousy of Trade” 327).

I agree with Hont that Hume has a certain vision of the global in his theory of international trade. Whereas Hont intends to situate this vision in the history of political and economic thought, I want to emphasize that Hume’s narrative of global interconnection is a distinctive product of eighteenth-century literature as well. Hume expresses his geographical imagination by writing in the essay form. This link between his global vision and the form of writing that he uses to express this helps us to understand some essential features of eighteenth-century prose. In this chapter, I examine the way in which geographical reference is deployed in the essay form. A wide-ranging geographical sweep is a component feature of some essays. I will argue that this global purview in turn determines the nature of essay-writing.

This chapter is divided into three sections. Firstly, I discuss Joseph Addison’s periodical essays as a model for Hume’s essay-writing. In “Of Essay-Writing,” as I have shown in the first chapter, Hume presents the essay as a form mediating philosophy and the experience of daily life. As an essayist, he collects examples from everyday life to establish philosophical principles. And the scope of daily life is sometimes extended into the wider world due to the agency of international trade. This idea and practice of essay-writing originate in Addison’s The Spectator. I particularly pay attention to Spectator No. 69 (Saturday, May 19, 1711) in which Mr. Spectator articulates his cosmopolitan sentiments in his aesthetic exposure to the vivid scene of international trade at the Royal Exchange.

Secondly, I will examine Hume’s use of geographical reference in his essay-writing. Following Sebastiani’s The Scottish Enlightenment, I present “Of National Characters” as a key text for situating Hume’s geographical interest in the study of human nature. Scholars tend to focus on its notorious footnote on the natural inferiority of black people when they discuss “Of National Characters.” In Eighteenth-Century British Literature and Postcolonial Studies (2009), for instance, Suvir Kaul interprets the footnote as an embodiment of “the
colonialist underpinnings of Enlightenment sociology and historiography per se” (111-12). Sebastiani points out that the footnote was added in the later edition (1753-1754), and therefore its revision process shows the development of Hume’s idea of diversity (24). In my interpretation of his essay on national characters, however, I emphasize that the footnote does not necessarily summarize his whole argument. We should pay attention to other parts of the essay as well. As part of framing his comparative study of society, Hume mentions “[t]he propensity to company and society” (“Of National Characters” 202). I will contend that the idea of sociability is essential for thinking about the global scope of his essay-writing.

Thirdly, I turn to discuss Adam Ferguson’s *An Essay on the History of Civil Society* (1767) as a text that reshapes the function of geographical reference in essay-writing. In his study of the progress of society “from rudeness to civilization,” Ferguson converts spatial remoteness into temporal distance. He argues that the present condition of non-western peoples helps us to think about the past of modern Europeans. This is a foundational moment of anthropological discourse because anthropologists use time and space in this manner to construct their object of study. This new understanding of the relation between space and time makes Ferguson’s *Essay* very different from Hume’s. In terms of its geographical scope, Ferguson’s essay-writing aims to cover the whole surface of the earth, too. In *Narratives of Civil Government* (1999), J. G. A. Pocock points out that Ferguson incorporates “a body of literature describing the hunting, herding, and farming peoples of Siberia and Central Asia” into his discussion (333). In Ferguson’s survey of the globe, then, Siberia is presented as “the cradle of world history” (Pocock 330). Ferguson’s geographical reference shows that Scottish thinkers in the mid-eighteenth century did not necessarily confine their geographical interest to the New World. The global scope of Hume and Ferguson’s essay-writing suggests that wide-ranging geographical reference is a constitutive element of narratives of the Scottish

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6 See Johannes Fabian, *Time and the Other* 6-7.
Enlightenment, even though geography is not established as a distinctive field of their inquiry into human nature.

2. Addison’s Periodical Essays and the Geographical Scope of Daily Life

Most of these ESSAYS were wrote with a View of being publish’d as WEEKLY-PAPERS, and were intended to comprehend the Designs both of the SPECTATORS and CRAFTSMEN. (David Hume, Essays, Moral and Political iii)\(^7\)

In the advertisement to the first volume of Essays, Moral and Political (1741), Hume refers to Joseph Addison and Richard Steele’s periodical essays in The Spectator (1711-14), as one of the two models for his writing. As Donald F. Bond points out, “[t]he periodical essay was a unique genre of the eighteenth century: there was nothing quite like it before” (Introduction xiii). As essayists, Addison and Steele aim to transform their readers, middle-class people in urban space, into “‘polite’ citizens in society” (Copley and Edgar ix). They associate politeness with particular fields of knowledge and conduct such as manners, morals, and aesthetics (Copley and Edgar ix). In his analysis of the literary form of periodical essays, Scott Black contends that “the daily press, the essay, and the city were mutually defining”: The Spectator was “written at the convergence of three early-modern phenomena […] a new use of print technology, a new literary form, and a new social space” (“Social and Literary Form in the Spectator” 21). In this manner, scholars of eighteenth-century literature and thought understand the emergence of periodical essays as a new form of writing that was

\(^7\) This passage is often quoted by scholars who discuss the nature of Hume’s essay-writing. See Harris Hume 144; Stephen Copley and Andrew Edgar’s Introduction to David Hume Selected Essays ix.
bound up with social transformation. The essay form is closely tied with the “new social space.”

In the first number of *The Spectator* (Thursday, March 1, 1711), Addison constructs the persona of the writer of periodical essays as a man who “live[s] in the world, rather as a Spectator of Mankind, than as one of the Species” (4). Mr. Spectator detaches himself from “any Practical Part in Life” (4). Addison situates the essayist outside of the division of labor in which members of each profession work for money. The portrait of Mr. Spectator then helps to conceal the reality that essay-writing is professional labor in the marketplace. He lives in the “City” and is “frequently seen in most publick Places” (3). In his life, worldliness coexists with detachment. He thinks and writes in the urban space where people meet and converse with each other. He often visits several coffee houses in London to “overhear the Conversation of every Table in the Room” (4). Even though Mr. Spectator does not participate in such sociable exchange, he is an observer who is still a member of society: “where-ever I see a Cluster of People I always mix with them, tho’ I never open my Lips but in my own Club” (4). The scene of daily life is the source of his thinking and writing.

Addison conceives of his periodical essays as a by-product of the conversation of others. He also writes essays in order to stimulate further conversation. In *Spectator* No. 10 (Monday, March 12, 1711), Mr. Spectator states that his periodical essays are for those who “do not know what to talk of” (46). He intends his essays to mediate between readers and the circle of conversation. He expects that his writing connects people and promotes the social exchange of opinions and sentiments in urban space. His essay-writing aims to “[bring] Philosophy out of Closets and Libraries, Schools and Colleges, to dwell in Clubs and Assemblies, at Tea-Tables, and in Coffee-Houses” (44). In such a manner, Addison conceptualizes periodical essays as the conversational form of writing whose foundation lies in everyday life.

The geographical scope of Mr. Spectator’s world is vast. In the first number of *The
Spectator, Addison presents the personal history of Mr. Spectator to satisfy readers’ “Curiosity” (1). Mr. Spectator was a great traveler. After studying at university, he “was resolved to travel into Foreign Countries” (2). He visited “all the Countries of Europe” but found nothing “new or strange to be seen” (2). “Curiosity” then made him travel further “to Grand Cairo, on purpose to take the Measure of a Pyramid,” as he was interested in “the Controversies of some great Men concerning the Antiquities of Egypt” (2-3). Finally, he “returned to [his] Native Country with great Satisfaction” (3).

The distinction between the exotic and the domestic is not stable in Addison’s periodical essays. The exoticism of the non-European world is incorporated into the daily scene of urban space. In A Taste for China (2013), Eugenia Zuroski Jenkins examines the process by which Chinese objects such as “porcelain, furniture, and tea” were transformed into “an essential component of the English self” in the early eighteenth century (12). The non-European world may have been imaginatively distant for people living in eighteenth-century London. But non-European travelers and things came to London, and the exotic became an element of daily life. As the world of everyday life is The Spectator’s main area of concern, non-European people and things can be seen as constitutive of Addison’s periodical essays.

Spectator No. 69 (Saturday, May 19, 1711) represents London as a cosmopolis where people coming from different regions of the globe meet. The Royal Exchange is depicted as the primary location of such encounters. In this number, Mr. Spectator expresses the pleasure he feels at being exposed to the vivid scene of global commerce there. “There is no Place in the Town which I so much love to frequent as the Royal-Exchange” (292). This active scene of commercial exchange exemplifies how, in Mr. Spectator’s imagination, “this Metropolis” becomes “a Kind of Emporium for the whole Earth” (293). The use of the phrase “the whole Earth” suggests that his view aspires to a kind of global vision. The practice of commerce lays the foundation of global interconnection.
Factors in the Trading World [...] negotiate Affairs, conclude Treaties, and maintain a good Correspondence between those wealthy Societies of Men that are divided from one another by Seas and Oceans, or live on the different Extremities of a Continent. I have often been pleased to hear Disputes adjusted between an Inhabitant of Japan and an Alderman of London, or to see a Subject of the Great Mogul entering into a League with one of the Czar of Muscovy. I am infinitely delighted in mixing with these several Ministers of Commerce, as they are distinguished by their different Walks and different Languages: Sometimes, I am justled among a Body of Armenians: Sometimes I am lost in a Crowd of Jews, and sometimes make one in a Groupe of Dutch-men. (293-94)

People are divided by land, sea, and language. Mr. Spectator imagines that the agency of commerce overcomes those barriers. International trade opposes the fragmentation of the globe. Commercial transactions in the Royal Exchange are depicted as harmonious and peaceful. In this vision, commerce is the source of social energy, and it does not become a cause of conflict between peoples from different countries. Mr. Spectator does not think about the negative consequences of global commerce.

Mr. Spectator imagines that “the Natives of the several Parts of the Globe might have a kind of Dependance upon one another, and be united together by their common Interest” (294-95). He also points out that the ongoing process of “this mutual Intercourse and Traffick among Mankind” is experienced as a daily reality (294). Such interconnection is especially evident at the dinner table.

The Food often grows in one Country, and the Sauce in another. The Fruits of Portugal are corrected by the Products of Barbadoes: The Infusion of a China
Plant sweetned with the Pith of an Indian Cane: The Philippick Islands give a Flavour to our European Bowls. (295)

This passage describes a division of labor which takes place on a global scale. Countries such as China and India are far away from England. But the daily scene of the dining table in London is impossible without their produce. Mr. Spectator makes his readers aware that their everyday life is inflected by global processes of commercial exchange. He states that:

The single Dress of a Woman of Quality is often the Product of an hundred Climates. The Muff and the Fan come together from the different Ends of the Earth. The Scarf is sent from the Torrid Zone, and the Tippet from beneath the Pole. The Brocade Petticoat rises out of the Mines of Peru, and the Diamond Necklace out of the Bowels of Indostan. (295)

Mr. Spectator’s interest is in how Britain’s position at the center of world trade ensures the prosperity of the nation and its people. He is less interested in the condition of the non-European world itself. For instance, he does not talk about what kind of dress women in China or India wear. His global vision does not incorporate any ethnographic description of social and cultural life beyond Europe. The diversity on the globe is a marginal subject for him. In addition, he also disregards the way in which global commerce transforms people’s lives in the non-European world. Even though he emphasizes that such commerce is reciprocal, he is not explicit about how it benefits non-European people.

As Jenkins points out in A Taste for China, cosmopolitanism shapes English national identity in Spectator No. 69 (16-17). In this interpretation, “the display of acquired, foreign

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8 This passage is quoted in Suvir Kaul, Eighteenth-Century British Literature and Postcolonial Studies 90.
things within English spaces” is a pivot of Mr. Spectator’s narrative (Jenkins 18). In the opening paragraph, Mr. Spectator presents himself as “an Englishman” (292). His pleasure at being exposed to global commerce is linked with his patriotic pride. In the Royal Exchange, he imagines himself as “a Citizen of the World” (294). This cosmopolitanism does not undermine his English identity, but rather contributes to defining Englishness. He imagines that English people are agents as well as beneficiaries of global interconnection, and that the daily scene of London life is the world in microcosm.

If we consider our own Country in its natural Prospect, without any of the Benefits and Advantages of Commerce, what a barren uncomfortable Spot of Earth falls to our Share! Natural Historians tell us, that […] our Melons, our Peaches, our Figs, our Apricots, and Cherries, are Strangers among us, imported in different Ages, and naturalized in our English Gardens […]. Our ships are laden with the Harvest of every Climate: Our Tables are stored with Spices, and Oils, and Wines: Our Rooms are filled with Pyramids of China, and adorned with the Workmanship of Japan: Our Morning’s-Draught comes to us from the remotest Corners of the Earth: We repair our Bodies by the Drugs of America, and reposes our selves under Indian Canopies. (295)

Mr. Spectator emphasizes here that the import and domestication of foodstuffs and other commodities have created the nation’s prosperity. His reference to climate and soil anticipates the rise of the Enlightenment discourse on national character and environmental determinism in the mid-eighteenth century as well. Mr. Spectator emphasizes that English soil is not fertile, and therefore English people almost have no option but to become merchants. English people are defined by their technological capability of improving the land as well as their commercial spirit. The English garden is presented as the embodiment of this
capacity to transplant and domesticate exotic plants.

Addison’s periodical essays are characterized by their focus on daily life in which people actively participate in conversation. Mr. Spectator thinks and writes through observing the minute details of the everyday world. As he expresses an ambition to bring philosophy to coffee houses and beyond in Spectator No. 10, his essays reconceptualize philosophy as a form of conversational practice. For him, conversation is the source of philosophical speculation, and the function of philosophy is in turn to mediate conversation as well.

3. “If We Run Over the Globe”: Hume’s Essay on National Characters

Scots in the eighteenth century were avid readers of Addison’s periodical essays. Even before the first publication of Hume’s essays in 1741, Scottish writers inspired by Addison and Steele were keen to launch periodicals. As Harris points out, Hume was one of the Scottish writers who aspired to realize polite culture in Scotland (144). For them, Addison’s essay-writing provided a model for improving the moral and literary culture of eighteenth-century Scotland.

Following Addison, Hume also sees essays as a conversational form of writing, both the outcome and the medium of social exchange. As I have shown in the first chapter, “Of Essay-Writing” summarizes Hume’s ideal. He conceptualizes essay-writing as a philosophical labor to develop abstract principles based on the observation of the daily world where conversation takes place. Conversation, daily life, and detached observation continue to shape the distinctive feature of the essay form. At the same time, there are also notable differences between Hume and Addison. For instance, Hume emphasizes that essay-writing is

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9 See Robert Crawford, Devolving English Literature 18-21.

10 See Harris, Hume 508 n.3. He presents The Echo: or, Edinburgh Weekly Journal (1729-1732), The Reveur (1737-1738), and Letters of the Critical Club (1738) as chief examples of Scottish periodicals before Hume’s essay-writing.

11 See John Dwyer, Virtuous Discourse 10.
a means to earn money: writing is a profession, and therefore, essay-writing is located within the division of labor. This point is explicit in “My Own Life” where Hume states that his “life has been spent in literary pursuits and occupations” (xxxi: emphasis mine).

Hume writes essays on diverse subjects, as the title of his Essays suggests. He conceives of essays as a form of writing but not a genre of writing. Rather, the essay form crosses several genres such as moral philosophy, literary criticism, and politics. In this respect, Hume’s essays function as an interface between different kinds of knowledge, and their connection is presented in a non-systematic manner.

“Of National Characters” (1748) exemplifies Hume’s use of the essay form as an interface between different fields of knowledge. In this essay, he aims to interrogate the opinion that “the air and climate” determine the national character of each country (198). His case studies make both geographical and historical references. The comparative study of society in the essay shows the way in which he refers to politics. The essay also interweaves moral philosophy into its narrative when it discusses a sociable disposition in human beings to examine the process in which national characters are formed. Due to such heterogeneity, the essay cannot be classified as any one genre of writing.

The structure of the essay on national characters is also notable. Hume contrasts two accounts of the determinations upon national character. The clash between them is a driving force of his narrative. The concept of sociability works as a theoretical basis for his argument, which is supported by examples from history and geography. The flow of his narrative is sometimes not straightforward. At the end of the essay, for instance, he refers to “the passion for liquor” (215). In addition to persuading his readers, Hume tries to entertain them with anecdotal and ethnographic descriptions. Diverse customs across the globe might arouse readers’ curiosity. In such a manner, Hume’s essay embodies and mediates social exchange, staging a conversation between different fields of knowledge, between the writer and readers, and between readers. In Conversable Worlds (2011), Jon Mee contends that Hume “retains
more room for collision” in his model of conversation than Addison (65-66). As an essayist, Hume invites readers to disagree. This introduces a “sometimes provocative and often paradoxical style” into his writing (Mee 66). Hume’s essays both embody and mediate collision as a feature of vibrant conversation. “Of National Characters” locates essay-writing as collision in a global context. Hume imagines the globe as a space of collision between heterogeneity and homogeneity.

Along with Montesquieu’s *The Spirit of the Laws* published in 1748, Hume’s “Of National Characters” posed the question of the influence of climate on human nature. This notable debate among Enlightenment philosophers, which began in the late 1740s, was the consequence of their theoretical attempt to reconcile the idea of the uniformity of human nature with the recent discovery that various kinds of people and society subsisted in the different regions of the globe. Their central task was to explain how such variety had emerged from the supposedly uniform character of human nature. The Scottish thinkers read *The Spirit of the Laws* as a possible answer to this crux, engaging with its claim that climate was the essential factor determining this difference. By writing “Of National Characters,” however, Hume intends to deny this kind of climate theory, and identifies the origin of difference in “the nature of the government, the revolutions of public affairs, the plenty or penury in which the people live, the situation of the nation with regard to its neighbours, and such like circumstance” (198). His essay emphasizes that social conditions are more important than the natural environment in determining difference between human beings.

The climate debate seems to show how the circulation of knowledge and information influences the making of Scottish Enlightenment thought. In *The Great Map of Mankind*, P. J. Marshall and Glyndwr Williams point out that the age of the Enlightenment corresponds to the growing British perception of the world outside Europe represented by maps and travel accounts (1). It was the condition of non-European societies and people that led the Scottish philosophers to think about the origin of difference. Although Hume does not think that
geography is an independent branch of the study of human nature, “Of National Characters” includes various references to the condition of the world outside Europe. His first counter-argument to the climate theory is based on the social uniformity of the Chinese Empire. Hume points out that “the CHINESE have the greatest uniformity of character imaginable: though the air and climate, in different parts of those vast dominions, admit of very considerable variations” (204). The cases found in non-European regions are no longer a marginal issue but become an important object of inquiry which potentially reshapes the theoretical framework of the Enlightenment.

“Of National Characters” has engaged wide scholarly interest because of its notorious footnote in which Hume addresses the natural inferiority of “the negroes.” When this essay was first published as a part of Three Essays, Moral and Political in 1748, it included no such statement. Hume added the footnote as part of the process of revision before the publication of Essays and Treatises on Several Subjects (1753-54). In this new addition to the text, Hume insists that “the negroes, and in general all the other species of men” are “naturally inferior to the whites” (629). It is worth pointing out that Hume referred to “four or five different kinds” of non-whites in the 1753-54 edition of the essay (629). Hume revised this footnote in the 1777 edition, as Eugene F. Miller indicates in variant readings of “Of National Characters” (629). In this later version, Hume just compares “whites” and “negroes” and no longer mentions other non-whites.

In The Limits of the Human, Felicity Nussbaum considers the footnote as a notable example of how racial discourse was entangled with the definition of the boundary between humans and animals, as Hume associates the educated “negro” with a parrot which learns to speak a few words (136). Furthermore, she clarifies the ambiguous status of “negroes” in Hume’s essay-writing by pointing out the coexistence of his antislavery sentiments with the denial of their intellectual capability (137). In The Politics of Sensibility, Markman Ellis also discusses “Of National Characters” and the footnote referred to above in the context of the
contemporary debate about the slave trade (52-54). For Ellis, Hume’s essay shows how the political debate about slavery “often invoked a host of related problems, such as colonial administration, notions of racial and cultural difference, or climatic theories of meteorological or environmental determinism” (52). The process of Hume’s revision of the essay seems to represent a crucial transitional moment in the development of the idea of difference in which his essay-writing becomes gradually involved with racial discourse. In *The Complexion of Race*, Roxann Wheeler shows that this change also indicates the emergence of an intellectual current in which Africans are singled out as a special subject in the Enlightenment’s articulation of difference.

Those interpretations suggest that the essay and its notorious footnote illuminate Hume’s changing understanding of diversity. Their studies also suggest that the footnote embodies the way in which Hume’s writing is underlain by the wider intellectual and social discourses. At the same time, however, their approach potentially confines scholarly interest in “Of National Characters” to this footnote, as if the essay itself does not need to be examined. Despite the addition and revision of the footnote, Hume does not substantially change the main body of the essay. His main argument itself does not change between the 1748 and later editions.

The whole essay is devoted to explaining the determination of “national characters,” the process in which people in the same society come to share a certain temper. As an example of national character, Hume points out that French people are known for “wit and gaiety” (“Of National Characters” 198). He acknowledges that “each nation has a peculiar set of manners, and that some particular qualities are more frequently to be met with among one people than among their neighbours” (197). His subject has two dimensions. Firstly, it is a question about the emergence of homogeneity among people in the same group. Secondly, it is also a question about the emergence of diversity between societies. One group of people becomes different from other groups of people despite the uniformity of human nature.
Hume’s essay shows the collision between homogeneity and heterogeneity.

Hume presents sociability as the founding principle of national characters.

The human mind is of a very imitative nature; nor is it possible for any set of men to converse often together, without acquiring a similitude of manners, and communicating to each other their vices as well as virtues. The propensity to company and society is strong in all rational creatures; and the same disposition, which gives us this propensity, makes us enter deeply into each other’s sentiments, and causes like passions and inclinations to run, as it were, by contagion, through the whole club or knot of companions. Where a number of men are united into one political body, the occasions of their intercourse must be so frequent, for defense, commerce, and government, that, together with the same speech or language, they must acquire a resemblance in their manners, and have a common or national character, as well as a personal one, peculiar to each individual. (202-03)

The sociable disposition in human beings promotes the exchange of sentiments between people in the same society. The frequency and intensity of this exchange homogenizes those people’s temper. Hume’s narrative in the quoted passage moves from one genre to another: from moral philosophy to politics. The sociability of human beings mediates the contagion of sentiments within the circle of conversation and interaction. This is an expression of the mechanism of sympathy, the inquiry of which constitutes Hume’s moral philosophy. The scope of social exchange is then limited and expanded by political activities. The political body determines the way in which people find their company. In such a manner, sociability is a crucial concept across genres. In Hume’s writing, discussing sociability enhances the heterogeneity of his narrative.
Following speculative discussion about the imitative nature of the human mind, Hume seeks to prove his own thesis that climate is not the cause of the differences found among human beings:

If we run over the globe, or revolve the annals of history, we shall discover everywhere signs of a sympathy or contagion of manners, none of the influence of air or climate. (204)

In addition to cases derived from historical records, the condition of each region of the contemporary world is counted as further proof of his opinion. This statement, therefore, indicates that geographical information can be a legitimate object of his inquiry. The phrase “run[ning] over the globe” expresses the vast scope of his geographical reference. He even mentions the condition of “the nations, which live beyond the polar circles or between the tropics” (207). In “Of National Characters,” the inquiry into human nature is not limited to the study of European societies, but Hume’s attention is expanded into almost every part of the globe. In this respect, the quoted passage represents a new global consciousness in the study of human nature. Its central assumption is that the principle of uniformity of human nature is applied to every part of the globe, and therefore societies and peoples in non-European regions need to be examined, or at least referred to, in order to validate the universality of Hume’s thesis.

His global consciousness, however, does not necessarily entail a critical way of understanding and interpreting these distant societies and peoples:

Shall we say, that the neighbourhood of the sun inflames the imagination of men, and gives it a peculiar spirit and vivacity. The FRENCH, GREEKS, EGYPTIANS, and PERSIANS are remarkable for gaiety. The SPANIARDS, TURKS, and
CHINESE are noted for gravity and a serious deportment, without any such
difference of climate as to produce this difference of temper. (208)

In this comparison of national characters, the reference to different countries lacks any
substantiating evidence. What is more, Hume is not concerned to judge whether such a
representation of different nations is accurate. In contrast to his careful reading of classical
documents in the field of historiography, he seems to just accept the common image of
various nations in contemporary geographical representation. His blind rehearsal of circulated
information is also evident in his claims about the inferiority of particular groups of people
outside Europe. For instance, he points out “[t]he poverty and misery of the northern
inhabitants of the globe, and the indolence of the southern” (207). Even before the revision of
the essay, he does not hesitate to say, “You may obtain any thing of the NEGROES by
offering them strong drink” (214). Although the 1748 edition does not ascribe this kind of
inferiority to their natural or racial character, his argument based on stereotypical
representation potentially prepares the moral justification of Empire in which European
expansion into other parts of the globe is understood as a beneficial agency to improve the
condition of indigenous people.

Hume does not explicitly insist that these “inferior” people should be improved by
European influence, but the “contagion” of national characters caused by the intercourse
between distant societies becomes the key issue of his essay. Although Hume was neither an
active advocate of imperial expansion nor its critical opponent, the realities of empire inform
his speculation on the diffusion of manners even in the 1748 edition of “Of National
Characters”:

The same set of manners will follow a nation, and adhere to them over the whole
globe, as well as the same laws and language. The SPANISH, ENGLISH,
FRENCH and DUTCH colonies are all distinguishable even between the tropics.
(“Of National Characters” 205)

The “fact” that the metropole and colonies share the same national character despite the difference in climate is considered to deny the influence of geographical variation. This argument presupposes the idea that the European Empires are now stretching over the globe. The choice of the phrase “the whole globe” expresses his global consciousness. “Of National Characters” imagines an ongoing process in which the European Empires stretch out over all other parts of the world.


In An Essay on the History of Civil Society (1767), Adam Ferguson presents a historical account of the social progress of human beings from a rude state into a civilized one. As a political thinker, he is particularly concerned about the way that civil society encounters corruption and decline in the course of its commercial prosperity and the progress of its polite culture. Silvia Sebastiani points out that the aim of his Essay is “to identify the ills of the modern world and try to remedy them, understanding how the decline of political systems could be avoided” (55). Unlike Hume, Ferguson does not explicitly explain why his history of civil society is written in the essay form. Even though his work is titled “An Essay,” it is very different from Hume’s essays. In Ferguson’s Essay, six parts constitute one essay, and more than two hundred pages are devoted to examining one subject, the progress and decline of civil society.

The fact that the Essay achieved a wide readership both in Britain and on the Continent might explain Ferguson’s decision to write it in essay form.¹² He wants to address his view

¹² See Fania Oz-Salzberger, Translating the Enlightenment 98.
of polite society to the general public, not a particular group of people. As the success of Addison’s *Spectator* shows, the essay is an effective form to circulate opinions across diverse professions and social divisions. Ferguson is a pamphleteer who knows the political agency of print culture. Prior to the publication of the *Essay*, Ferguson participated in defending John Home’s play *Douglas* (1756) by writing a pamphlet, *The Morality of Stage Plays Seriously Considered* (1757). It is perhaps ironic that Ferguson writes on the decline of civil society in the essay form, because both Addison and Hume deploy essays as a means to promote the progress of civil society. The essay form is defined as a medium to transform its readers into polite citizens. In this respect, depicting the corruption and termination of civil society potentially conflicts with the original ideal which the essay form embodies. Due to his diagnosis and narrative of corruption, Ferguson’s *Essay* notably reworks the idea and practice of essay-writing.

The *Essay* can be seen as a critical response to Hume’s “Of National Characters” because Ferguson examines the influence of climate on human beings with reference to various regions of the globe such as Africa, China and India. The first section of the third part of the *Essay* is titled “Of the Influences of Climate and Situation.”

The modern description of India is a repetition of the ancient, and the present state of China is derived from a distant antiquity, to which there is no parallel in the history of mankind. The succession of monarchs has been changed; but no revolutions have affected the state. The African and the Samoiede are not more uniform in their ignorance and barbarity, than the Chinese and the Indian, if we may credit their own story, have been in the practice of manufacture, and in the observance of a certain police, which was calculated only to regulate their traffic, and to protect them in their application to servile or lucrative arts. (Ferguson 109)
In this geographical description, Ferguson’s primary focus is the form of polity and its influence on the social and cultural condition of people’s subsistence. His historical perspective emphasizes the lack of genuine progress in India and China. The comparative study of society highlights “ignorance and barbarity” as a common feature of people’s life outside of Europe. The boundary between Europe and non-Europe is more than geographical. Ferguson’s use of the word “credit” is crucial to understand this hierarchical division. The records of European travelers are referred to as a reliable source of information in the Essay, while non-European people’s capability to represent their society and history is potentially undermined in the quoted passage.

Ferguson’s geographical interest is not limited to politics as a genre of writing. On the one hand, his own narrative is neither discursive nor digressive. On the other hand, it is the outcome of interweaving different kinds of reference. In the second part of the Essay, “Of the History of Rude Nations,” he refers to custom in Siberia.

It was a proverbial imprecation in use among the hunting nations on the confines of Siberia, [t]hat their enemy might be obliged to live like a Tartar, and be seized with the folly of breeding and attending his cattle. Nature, it seems, in their apprehension, by storing the woods and the desert with game, rendered the task of the herdsman unnecessary, and left to man only the trouble of selecting and of seizing his prey. (94-95)

What he commits to doing is “the whole description of mankind” (Ferguson 94). In other words, his Essay offers “general representations of what mankind have done” and “the more minute description of the animal himself” (109). The human being as a social creature “has occupied different climates, and is diversified in his temper, complexion, and character”
“Man in his animal capacity, is qualified to subsist in every climate” and spreads over the globe. The social life of human beings is found everywhere, and this premise generates a global consciousness. With his focus on the interaction between human beings and their natural environment, the geographical scope of Ferguson’s essay-writing covers the whole surface of the earth.

Compared to his substantial discussion of the diversity among human beings on the globe, Ferguson is less involved with examining the homogenizing agency of international trade. He does not anticipate the emergence of the interconnected world in an explicit manner. But he is still conscious that Europeans are stretching out over the globe.

[…rude nations in general, though they are patient of hardship and fatigue, though they are addicted to war, and are qualified by their stratagem and valour to throw terror into the armies of a more regular enemy; yet in the course of a continued struggle, always yield to the superior arts, and the discipline of more civilized nations. Hence the Romans were able to over-run the provinces of Gaul, Germany, and Britain; and hence the Europeans have a growing ascendency over the nations of Africa and America. (93-94)

Ferguson’s essay-writing commits to not only the global survey of peoples and societies, but also to dividing the globe into two categories, Europe and beyond, almost corresponding to the distinction between civil and rude societies. This act of division is crucial for understanding his geographical imagination and narrative. In the middle part of the Essay, he suggests that “we must here bid farewell[1] to” the non-European world “to pursue the history of civil society (118). He generally sees non-European people as “inferior in the powers of the mind” (118). Ferguson has never been outside of Europe. But he experiences “restless”
life away from home as part of his military service.\textsuperscript{13} Appointed as chaplain of the Black Watch, a regiment of Highlanders, in 1745, he “was serving a continental tour of duty in the War of the Austrian Succession” (Fagg xxiii). Ferguson himself has a Gaelic background.\textsuperscript{14} This personal experience might underlie his perception of the world.

The opening section of the \textit{Essay}, whose methodological account is well-known as a critique of conjectural history, can be construed as the articulation of Ferguson’s own theory of writing. To begin with, he points out the philosophical and literary interest in the original state of human beings, which has captured the imagination of various kinds of people such as poets, historians and moralists (7). Opposing their intellectual passion to speculate on the “nature” of human beings distinguished from art, Ferguson claims that these attempts just produced “fruitless inquiries” and “many wild suppositions” which possibly caused further confusion (8). In contrast, he intends to conceptualize a new model of writing which is performed in the \textit{Essay}:

Among the various qualities which mankind possess, we select one or a few particulars on which to establish a theory, and in framing our account of what man was in some imaginary state of nature, we overlook what he has always appeared within the reach of our own observation, and in the records of history.

In every other instance, however, the natural historian thinks himself obliged to collect facts, not to offer conjectures. […] He admits, that his knowledge of the material system of the world consists in a collection of facts, or at most, in general tenets derived from particular observations and experiments. (Part I Section I; 8)

\textsuperscript{13} See Jane B Fagg’s biographical introduction to \textit{The Correspondence of Adam Ferguson} Vol. 1 xxii-xxxi.

\textsuperscript{14} See Michael Fry, “Ferguson the Highlander” in \textit{Adam Ferguson: Philosophy, Politics and Society}. 
His appreciation of the natural historian’s argumentation proceeds to reshape the relation between abstract principles and concrete examples in the writing of the Scottish Enlightenment. Argument usually starts with offering general presumptions. Hume’s essays can be seen as an instance of this kind of discussion due to his speculative narrative in which the abstract is assigned priority over the concrete. In contrast to these writing practices, Ferguson emphasizes the value of focusing on concrete examples. Unlike preceding writers of philosophical history, his writing aims to present particular facts concerning human beings rather than a hypothetical view. In short, Ferguson inverts the relation between abstract principles and concrete examples by dismissing the way of writing conjectural history.

This inversion in writing also reshapes the way of reading. As the initial task of natural historians is to present a collection of facts, Ferguson needs to show that his source of information is not the product of literary imagination but a much more trustworthy account. As a reader, Ferguson considers whether his source texts are facts or mere fiction. This distinction might affect the issue of literary genres, and create the possible distance between his own writing and imaginative literature. In addition, this leads him to use footnotes as clarification of reference. Compared to Hume, who uncritically uses information about distant societies in his discussion about national characters, Ferguson has a keen awareness that the writer is obliged to explain where his references come from.

To start writing the history of civil society, therefore, Ferguson needs to determine what kind of text is proper to mention as a reliable example in his own inquiry. To explicate the rude state of human society, the Essay refers to the social condition of North American Indians as observed by European travelers. His frequent reference to the travel writing of Charlevoix, a French missionary, implies that Ferguson quits collecting information about European ancestors, and focuses instead on detail relating to distant societies and peoples in the contemporary world. This is one instance where a question of historiography shaped Ferguson’s Enlightenment narrative of geography.
The turning from historical speculation about European ancestors to geographical description about primitive society in the contemporary world is based on a particular assumption about the relation between time and space:

The Romans might have found an image of their own ancestors, in the representations they have given of ours: and if ever an Arab clan shall become a civilized nation, or any American tribe escape the poison which is administered by our traders of Europe, it may be from the relations of the present times, and the descriptions which are now given by travellers, that such a people, in after ages, may best collect the accounts of their origin. It is in their present condition, that we are to behold, as in a mirror, the features of our own progenitors [. . .]. (Part II Section I; 80)

Ferguson projects the European past on the present condition of the Arabs or North American Indians, which is considered to be far from the civilized state. As he presumes that the progress of the European society is the same as that of non-European societies, this projection is an attempt to locate every society and people in a single timeline which flows “from rudeness to civilization.” This mapping practice might be regarded as a prelude to what Dipesh Chakrabarty criticizes as “historicism” in Provincializing Europe. It is “what made modernity or capitalism look not simply global but rather as something that became global over time, by originating in one place (Europe) and then spreading outside it” (7). In short, its essential core is a “‘first in Europe, then elsewhere’ structure” (7). In Ferguson’s narrative of the contemporary world, distant societies and people are presented as those who have “not” reached a civilized state “yet,” which the European societies have “already” achieved. Although Chakrabarty associates historicism with nineteenth-century writing such as John Stuart Mill’s essays, Ferguson’s representation of the global is potentially involved with this
narrative structure in the second half of the eighteenth century by presuming that the progress of non-European societies will follow the trajectory of that of European societies.

I call the *Essay* a prelude to historicism rather than the embodiment of historicism, because Ferguson’s confidence in the high degree of European civilization is paired with a haunting anxiety about its inevitable decline. He accepts the general principle that the polished “races of men . . . have in some cases returned to rudeness again” (107). This means that the current supremacy of Europe over other parts of the globe can be seen as a merely transitory event. The *Essay* imagines that “[t]he chieftain of an Arab tribe, like the founder of Rome, may have already fixed the roots of a plant that is to flourish in some future period, or laid the foundations of a fabric, that will attain to its grandeur in some distant age” (108). Ferguson does not think that only European people are capable of achieving a high degree of civilization. This haunting view of the possible downfall of civil society seems to distinguish Ferguson from other Scottish thinkers. The future of an expanding commercial society can become a nightmare of corruption, as “[t]he pavement and the ruins of Rome are buried in dust, shaken from the feet of barbarians” (108). This vivid image of primitive people triumphing over the vestiges of a preceding civilization illustrates Ferguson’s own idea about progress. The *Essay* shapes a new literary imagination which articulates a gloomy future for Europe, or for the ideal of civil society itself.

5. Conclusion

In the study of human nature, Hume makes the whole surface of the earth the object of his observation. Geographical information is one source for his speculation. Each society develops its distinctive form of subsistence as well as its form of government, normative codes, and social customs. Diverse groups of people live on the earth. Hume intends to reveal the process by which diversity emerges despite the uniformity of human nature. He undertakes this task based on geographical description and analysis across several subjects.
such as moral philosophy, politics, and criticism. The essay becomes an effective form to describe diversity on the globe and analyze those geographical discourses. For Hume, essays are the embodiment and medium of conversation. Therefore, he deploys the essay form as the interface between different kinds of knowledge. His essays represent one form of writing, but are not necessarily confined to one genre. Instead, he writes on diverse subjects in the essay form such as moral philosophy, politics, and criticism. In his writing, geography and the essay form are linked based on their discursive nature.

In his essays, Hume imagines the globe as the space of a collision between heterogeneity and homogeneity. On the one hand, as I have already pointed out, Hume is interested in the particular details of diverse societies and peoples on the earth. The globe is heterogeneous in the sense that human beings develop diverse forms of subsistence there. On the other hand, the interaction between different groups of people homogenizes their character. Hume is aware that European people stretch out into the non-western world. As the scope of international trade is expanding in his contemporary world, he develops the vision of the interconnected world under which what we might refer to as “globalization” is understood as an emergent and ongoing process. The globe gradually becomes homogenized as a consequence of imperial conquest and international commerce.

As an essayist, who takes his source material from daily life, Hume is surely committed to “writing the global.” In his essay-writing, the geographical scope of his observation is maximally expanded, and the globe is imagined as not only heterogeneous but also interconnected in a certain extent. This idea and practice of writing the global in the essay form originate with Addison’s periodical essays, particularly Spectator No. 69. Mr. Spectator’s aesthetic experience in the Royal Exchange shows that global interconnection constitutes the daily scene of polite society. He imagines London as a cosmopolis of international trade which embodies global flows of things and people. As an essayist, Hume follows Addison by discerning the connection between daily life and this commercial
dynamism. But he interrogates Addisonian euphoria about global commerce. As the embodiment of collision, his essays show that the ongoing process of globalization could cause people’s suspicion and concern. As his use of the phrase “the jealousy of trade” suggests, he is aware that globalization could perplex people. And his essay-writing aims to relieve them by clarifying some misunderstanding of the nature of global interconnection.

Ferguson subverts the Addisonian model of writing the global by depicting the corruption and decline of civil society in his Essay. He shares the global scope of the study of human nature with Hume, but he is less interested in developing a vision of the interconnected world. His initial interest is confined to diversity on the earth. The Essay articulates his ambiguous feeling about the progress of society from a rude condition to a polite one. He certainly supports the superiority of Europe over the rest of the globe. But his sense of superiority is provisional. The Essay envisages that European societies will necessarily decline as a result of their progress.
Chapter 3

Imagining the Spectator of the Interconnected Globe:

Adam Smith’s Writing as System-Building

1. Introduction

Adam Smith grew up in a small Fife seaside town, Kirkcaldy, that was both profoundly isolated from the metropolitan existence of Versailles and Westminster, and connected, especially by the licit and illicit commerce in goods and people of which both Smith and his father were the invigilators, to the wider worlds of the Baltic and the North Atlantic. He started the *Wealth of Nations* in 1764 in Toulouse—“I have begun to write a book in order to pass away the time,” he wrote to David Hume, of a provincial existence in respect of which his life “at Glasgow was a pleasurable, dissipated life in comparison”--- and he returned to his mother’s home in Kirkcaldy to complete it. (Emma Rothschild, “Global Commerce and the Question of Sovereignty in the Eighteenth-Century Provinces” 5-6)

As part of the rise of global intellectual history in the 2000s, some historians of political and economic thought come to see Adam Smith as a global thinker, who analyzes the emergence of an interconnected world and its consequences. Emma Rothschild’s “Global Commerce and the Question of Sovereignty in the Eighteenth-Century Provinces” (2004) is a foundational work in this respect. She argues that some economic thinkers in the 1760s and 1770s, including Smith and Turgot, tackled “the question of global commerce” which was about
“[t]he relationship between the local and the global, or between the ‘local situation’ of individuals and the great interconnected worlds of the statesmen” (4, 5). Her interpretation of the *Wealth of Nations* emphasizes that Smith’s provincial background underlies his vision and analysis of global interconnection. This contention helps us to grasp his distance from the Addisonian view of international trade. Rather than cosmopolitan London, it is the provincial circumstances of Kirkcaldy which shape his geographical imagination.

The experience of Glasgow also underlies Smith’s view of the contemporary world. He was a student at Glasgow University between 1737 and 1740, and taught there as a professor between 1751 and 1763. Eighteenth-Century Glasgow was the center of the international tobacco trade in which merchants actively participated in sociable exchange. Andrew Hook and Richard B. Sher distinguish the Glasgow Enlightenment from the Edinburgh Enlightenment in part because of the loose connection between professors at Glasgow University and men in the mercantile circles (“Introduction” 5). *The Glasgow Enlightenment* (1995) edited by them contributes to pluralizing the Scottish Enlightenment. Robert Crawford’s *On Glasgow and Edinburgh* (2013) continues to develop the contrast between these two cities. As Hume was not substantially involved with Glasgow’s conversational culture, the analytical framework of the Glasgow Enlightenment helps to highlight the difference between Smith and Hume. It also contributes to revealing Smith’s link with Boswell and Smollett, both of whom are usually not seen as members of the Scottish Enlightenment in eighteenth century studies. As Gordon Turnbull points out in “Boswell in Glasgow,” Boswell was “a privileged witness of […] Adam Smith’s course of lectures in moral philosophy” in his short student life at Glasgow between 1759 and 1760 (163). Smollett went to Glasgow University in 1735 and was exposed to the mercantile spirit of the city.¹ In *Tobias Smollett in the Enlightenment* (2011), Richard J. Jones points out Smollett’s

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¹ See Kenneth Simpson’s Oxford DNB entry on Smollett.
interest in Smith’s moral philosophy (63). In such a manner, the Glasgow Enlightenment helps us to think about the interaction between Scottish philosophy and literary culture in the eighteenth century.

Following Rothschild, Sankar Muthu and Jennifer Pitts develop her view of Smith as a global thinker. In “Adam Smith’s Critique of International Trading Companies” (2008), Muthu suggests that Smith’s understanding of the interconnected world is not entirely sanguine and its account is more complicated than commonly understood. His interpretation of the Wealth of Nations shows that Smith grasps “the rise of global commerce and communication” as the cause of “gross injustices” as well as of “great possibilities” (206). In other words, Muthu points out Smith’s concern about the emergence of destructive “passions and interests” as a consequence of the rise of global interconnection (206). His attempt to locate the Wealth of Nations in a global context reveals the link between Smith’s theory of political economy and moral philosophy. Exchange is a matter for moral sentiments as well as commerce. For Muthu, Smith is attentive to the way in which the emergence of the interconnected world affects the condition of the passions.²

In “Irony in Adam Smith’s Critical Global History” (2017), Pitts discusses The Theory of Moral Sentiments and the Wealth of Nations together to trace “the development of Smith’s concerns about moral judgment in a globalizing world” (143). In A Turn to Empire (2005), she also argues that his moral philosophy “attempts a delicate balance between a very general set of universal values and an understanding of moral judgment as grounded in concrete situation” (43). She reads The Theory of Moral Sentiments as the philosophical foundation of “cross-cultural judgments” (43). Her approach suggests that moral philosophy also constitutes Smith’s vision and narrative of the interconnected world. In addition, it also describes him as a skillful writer who makes use of irony in the critique of imperial expansion.

² Albert O. Hirschman’s The Passions and the Interests (1977) is a pioneering work to pose the question of this link between passions and commerce.
Smith did not write his major works in essay form. Both The Theory of Moral Sentiments and the Wealth of Nations are philosophical treatises, the form which Hume abandoned in the early stage of his literary career. Unlike him, Smith principally lived as a professor. He lectured on diverse subjects such as moral philosophy, jurisprudence, and rhetoric. In this chapter, I argue that the construction and critique of “system” is at the heart of Smith’s writing about moral philosophy and political economy, and therefore, his narrative of global interconnection. His intellectual passion for system is an aspiration to imagine a perspective from which he as an “impartial spectator” can grasp the interconnected world as a whole. It is an attempt to invent an Olympian view of the world. Even though Smith distinguishes his writing from works of fiction, it has an imaginative aspect. His appeal to the imagination connects him to novelists in the eighteenth century, particularly Tobias Smollett.

This chapter is divided into three sections. Firstly, I examine Smith’s idea and practice of system-building, which I distinguish from Addisonian and Humean essay-writing. His construction of systems aspires to establish a comprehensive view of the world across disciplines. At the same time, he is critical of any excessive passion for system-building. He acknowledges that the idea of a “system” is a product of imagination and sometimes conflicts with the particular details of reality. Both the aspiration to system-building and reflexive commentary on this endeavor are characteristic of his writing. Secondly, I aim to discuss the global setting in The Theory of Moral Sentiments. The diversity of human beings on the globe

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3 The Theory of Moral Sentiments is the full title of the first edition (1759). In the fourth edition (1774), Smith adds some phrases to the title: The Theory of Moral Sentiments, or an Essay towards an Analysis of the Principles by which Men Naturally Judge concerning the Conduct and Character, First of Their Neighbours, and Afterwards of Themselves. Even though this new title suggests that The Theory of Moral Sentiments is an essay, I do not take it at face value. There is no significant structural difference between the forth and former editions. The form of his writing continues to be very different from the Addisonian and Humean essays.

4 James Chandler sees Smith as a critic because of his substantial engagement with aesthetics, and argues that his theory and practice of art criticism are “an integral part of his larger system of thought” (“Adam Smith as Critic” 141).
provides case studies to test his model of moral philosophy. He also introduces a global scope into his writing as part of examining the influence of distance on the mechanics of sympathy. *The Theory of Moral Sentiments* is an attempt to imagine an impartial spectator of the globe overcoming distance and difference. Thirdly, I discuss the imaginative aspect of his writing in the *Wealth of Nations*. Imagination plays a central role in his writing on the interconnected world. His narrative of global interconnection is characterized by conflicts between abstract principles and concrete examples, hypothetical assumptions and historical propositions, and prescription and description.

2. System-Building and Comprehensive Views

Nicholas Phillipson describes Smith’s idea and practice of system-building as an attempt “to develop a genuine Science of Man based on the observation of human nature and human history” (*Adam Smith* 2). Phillipson sees *The Theory of Moral Sentiments* (1759) as “the first part of the superstructure of his science of man” (2). In its concluding passages, Smith clearly announces that *The Theory of Moral Sentiments* is part of his larger project.

I shall in another discourse endeavour to give an account of the general principles of law and government, and of the different revolutions they have undergone in the different ages and periods of society, not only in what concerns justice, but in what concerns police, revenue, and arms, and whatever else is the object of law. I shall not, therefore, at present enter into any further detail concerning the history of jurisprudence. (VII.iv.37: 342)

In the final section of the book, Smith divides the “rules of morality” into two kinds: (a) “the rules of justice […] which are precise and accurate” and (b) “those of all the other virtues” which are “loose, vague, and indeterminate” (VII.iv.1: 327). “Jurisprudence” treats the former
subject, while “Ethics” covers the latter (VII.iv.34: 340). In the finale of the construction of his own moral theory, Smith articulates the further necessity to move from ethics to jurisprudence. The concluding passage also announces his plan to introduce historical perspective into hypothetical speculation in the subsequent work. The balance between historical description and hypothetical prescription will be a matter in the next book. On the one hand, he plans to observe the form of government and law in each society from the past to the present. This will be the descriptive account of specific laws. On the other hand, he also intends to conceptualize “the natural rules of justice independent of all positive institution” (VII.iv.37: 341). Such “a theory of the general principles […] ought to run through and be the foundation of the laws of all nations” (VII.iv.37: 341). His attempt is to present theoretical prescription detached from positive laws and beyond national divides.

*An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations* (1776) partially realizes the plan for another discourse. It is a study of political economy, dealing with social organization, revenue, and arms.

Political economy, considered as a branch of the science of a statesman or legislator, proposes two distinct objects; first, to provide a plentiful revenue or subsistence for the people, or more properly to enable them to provide such a revenue or subsistence for themselves; and secondly, to supply the state or commonwealth with a revenue sufficient for the publick services. It proposes to enrich both the people and the sovereign. (IV. Introduction. 1: 428)

Smith defines the field of political economy from two perspectives, those of “the people and the sovereign.” This distinction entails the use of two different scales in his writing. On the one hand, he deploys a micro-perspective to depict how each individual subsists in society. On the other hand, he also presents a macro-perspective to analyze how the state manages
people’s subsistence as a whole. The definition of political economy in the passage shows Smith’s art of classification and signposting. Like the concluding passage in The Theory of Moral Sentiments, he intends to clarify how his subject is fitted into a wider picture. His systematic classification aims to offer a comprehensive view of the subject.

In the advertisement to the sixth edition of The Theory of Moral Sentiments (1790), Smith refers to the present condition of his endeavor to produce another discourse announced at the end of the first edition.

In the […] Wealth of Nations, I have partly executed this promise; at least so far as concerns, police, revenue, and arms. What remains, the theory of jurisprudence, which I have long projected, I have hitherto been hindered from executing, by the same occupations which had till now prevented me from revising the present work. Though my very advanced age leaves me, I acknowledge, very little expectation of ever being able to execute this great work to my own satisfaction; yet, as I have not altogether abandoned the design, and as I wish still continue under the obligation of doing what I can, I have allowed the [last] paragraph [of the first Edition] to remain as it was published more than thirty years ago, when I entertained no doubt of being able to execute every thing which it announced. (Advertisement 2: 3)

The passage expresses Smith’s aspiration to present his works from the past to the present as a single project. This aspiration is characterized by his keen sensitivity towards the relation between parts and the whole. He wants to present his writing in a comprehensive manner. For more than thirty years, he tries to realize the grand design of the project, which Nicholas Phillipson calls the science of man. This continuous effort makes a notable contrast with Hume’s turn to essay-writing after the unsuccessful publication of the Treatise. In the process
of becoming an essayist and man of letters, Hume abandoned his aspiration for system-building. His essays show the interconnection between different kinds of knowledge in a discursive manner, not in a comprehensive way. As he does not explicate the relation between essays, his writing remains fragmentary. Phillipson points out that “a sceptic’s distrust of systems of knowledge” underlies Hume’s manner of writing (Smith 70). His skepticism undermines the idea of wholeness itself.

Prior to the publication of the sixth edition of *The Theory of Moral Sentiments*, Smith mentioned his plan for subsequent works in his letter to Rochefoucauld (1 November 1785).

> I have not forgot what I promised to your Grace in an edition of the “Theory of Moral Sentiments,” which I hope to execute before the end of the ensuring winter. I have likewise two other great works upon the anvil; the one is a sort of Philosophical History of all the different branches of Literature, of Philosophy, Poetry and Eloquence; the other is a sort of theory and History of Law and Government. The materials of both are in a great measure collected, and some Part of both is put into tollerable good order. But the indulgence of old age, tho’ I struggle violently against it, I feel coming fast upon me, and whether I shall ever be able to finish either is extremely uncertain. (The Correspondence of Adam Smith 286-87)

The letter articulates his sense of uncertainty about the completion of the two books as well as his aspiration to undertake further intellectual pursuits. This prospect is almost similar to what he expresses in the advertisement to the sixth edition. He probably plans to transform his lectures on jurisprudence and rhetoric at Glasgow into two books. In sum, he seems to

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5 See Phillipson’s *Adam Smith 3*. 
imagine that four kinds of systematized knowledge—moral philosophy, political economy, jurisprudence, and rhetoric—constitute his single project.

In *The Theory of Moral Sentiments*, Smith’s system-building has three steps. Firstly, he establishes his own system of moral philosophy based on the model of human beings as sympathetic subjects. The book begins with a speculative statement: “How selfish soever man may be supposed, there are evidently some principles in his nature, which interest him in the fortune of others, and render their happiness necessary to him, though he derives nothing from it except the pleasure of seeing it” (I.i.1.1: 9). Smith thinks that the sympathetic disposition of human beings is “a matter of fact too obvious to require any instances to prove it” (I.i.1.1: 9). For this reason, the opening discussion has few references to actual examples. His theoretical model is tested in the later part of the book.

Secondly, Smith discusses the relation between his and preceding systems in the last part of the book, entitled “Of Systems of Moral Philosophy.” His review of some preceding theories of “the nature and origin of our moral sentiments” shows the process in which his own system is embedded in the history of moral philosophy. It signals the location of his book in a wider scale of arguments among philosophers. In *System* (2016), Clifford Siskin points out that Smith aspires to shape *The Theory of Moral Sentiments* as the “Master System” by “includ[ing] specific sections for comprehending the competition within a larger whole” (117, 118). Each system aspires to explain the foundational principles of morality. And the master system intends to present the comprehensive view of the relation between these systems.

Thirdly, Smith’s system building embeds *The Theory of Moral Sentiments* in his wider project in the concluding passage, as I have shown before. In system building, Smith’s intellectual labor as a writer is the reversal of the process of “the division of labor,” which he conceptualizes as the founding principle of political economy in the *Wealth of Nations*. As an example of the division of labor, he presents “the trade of the pin-maker” whose work “is
divided into a number of branches” (I.i.3: 14).

One man draws out the wire, another straights it, a third cuts it, a fourth points it, a fifth grinds it at the top for receiving the head; to make the head requires two or three distinct operations; to put it on, is a peculiar business, to whiten the pins is another; it is even a trade by itself to put them into the paper […]. (I.i.3: 15)

As each worker can concentrate on his specified task, the efficiency of pin-making is notably increased. At the same time, those workers only know their own part of the whole process of pin-making. The division of labor causes problems as well as generating productive efficiency. The view of each individual in this process becomes partial. No worker can imagine what is going on as a whole in their factory. In *English Literature in History* (1983), John Barrell points out that writers in the mid eighteenth century negotiate with a larger social uncertainty: the perception that their society could become too complex to “comprehend” (29). He argues that novels and poems in this period aspire to a comprehensive view in which the individual can grasp society and social knowledge “as a whole” (40). Along with novelists and poets, Smith participates in this intellectual endeavor. Instead of writing a work of fiction, he thinks that the collection of systems, “theory” as a genre of writing, recovers the comprehensive view. This point explains why Smith did not become an essayist. Unlike Hume, the focus of his writing is comprehending rather than connecting. Smith’s works are texts of eighteenth-century literature as well as a context for it. In *The Theory of Moral Sentiments*, theorizing becomes practice, the practice of representing the diverse and expanding world as a whole.

Siskin points out that *The Theory of Moral Sentiments* criticizes the excessive passion for system-building even though Smith extensively uses the idea of system in the construction of his own moral theory (*System* 85). Smith thinks that the potential danger of
system-building comes from our human nature to “take pleasure in beholding the perfection of so beautiful and grand a system” (IV.1.11: 185). The purpose of system-building is to grasp objects in a comprehensive manner and to improve the condition of our social lives. But the “love of system” could transform system-building from a means into an end (IV.1.11: 185). Those who are possessed by this “spirit of system” solely aim to “remove any obstruction” that possibly undermines the harmonious unity of the constructed system (IV.1.11: 185).

In the sixth edition of The Theory of Moral Sentiments, Smith develops this critique of system-building further. In his revision, he emphasizes that system is a product of the imagination. The danger of system building occurs when individual subjects forget this fictionality of the system. They become “intoxicated with the imaginary beauty of this ideal system” (VI.ii.2.15: 232). This blindness causes havoc particularly in the construction and maintenance of political institutions. “The man of system […] is often so enamoured with the supposed beauty of his own ideal plan of government, that he cannot suffer the smallest deviation from any part of it” (VI.ii.2.17: 233-34). The conflict between the whole and its parts, the system and the minute details of the everyday world is unavoidable. Smith finds that this clash opens the space for criticism.

In system-building, Smith differentiates his writing from works of fiction. He chooses non-fictional prose to construct his system of knowledge. In Virtuous Discourse (1987), John Dwyer suggests that Smith opposes “practical moralists” in Scotland, “active promoters of the novel as a vehicle for the cultivation of the moral sentiments” (141, 169). Henry Mackenzie is a representative figure who connects the novel and moral improvement in such a way (141). According to Dwyer, Smith sees their project as “unnatural and unrealistic” (169). Instead of the novel, he deploys theory for moral improvement. At the same time, his awareness that systems are the product of imagination also shows a connection between his writing and the novel, both of which are the product of an imaginary perspective on the world. For this reason, his relationship with eighteenth-century literature is much more
complicated. On the one hand, he shares with novelists and poets the task of writing, the recovery of the comprehensive view. On the other hand, he intends to differentiate the nature of his writing from that of the novel. This ambiguity shows the conflict between reality and imagination, fact and fiction in his writing.

3-1. Moral Philosophy in Global Settings (1): Difference

In The Theory of Moral Sentiments, Smith begins his argument with the construction of his model of sympathy, which is highly abstract. As the subsequent step of argumentation, however, he brings this abstract model into contact with specific case studies. This is the process through which he tests the workability of his system in diverse conditions. The scope of his writing moves from an abstract to a concrete level. His case studies are composed of diverse examples from history and geography. This is therefore a point where his moral philosophy has to engage with the diverse conditions of the peoples of the world.

Smith is aware that the world is populated by diverse peoples and that it is becoming increasingly interconnected. His revision of The Theory of Moral Sentiments shows the development of his global vision in tandem with the elaboration of his moral philosophy. In the first edition (1759), the global scope of his writing is substantially expressed in Part V “Of the Influence of Custom and Fashion upon the Sentiments of Moral Approbation and Disapprobation.” In the second edition (1761), he adds a thought experiment about a Chinese earthquake and a European observer to Part III “Of the Foundation of Our Judgments concerning Our Own Sentiments and Conduct, and of the Sense of Duty.” In the sixth edition (1790), he adds an entire new part titled “Of the Character of Virtue” between the fifth and last parts of the book. In this addition, he contrasts the condition of sentiments in “pastoral” and “commercial countries” (VI.ii.1.12, 13: 222, 223). He also discusses the idea of “universal benevolence,” which further expands the geographical scope of his moral philosophy. He emphasizes that “our good-will is circumscribed by no boundary, but may
embrace the immensity of the universe” (VI.ii.3.1:235). These points develop his former examination of distance and sympathy in the thought experiment of the Chinese earthquake. The opening passage of *The Theory of Moral Sentiments* expresses Smith’s theoretical hypothesis about human nature. Where this opening statement is concerned, there is no difference between the first and later editions.

How selfish soever man may be supposed, there are evidently some principles in his nature, which interest him in the fortune of others, and render their happiness necessary to him, though he derives nothing from it except the pleasure of seeing it. Of this kind is pity or compassion, the emotion which we feel for the misery of others, when we either see it, or are made to conceive it in a very lively manner. That we often derive sorrow from the sorrow of others, is a matter of fact too obvious to require any instances to prove it; for this sentiment, like all the other original passions of human nature, is by no means confined to the virtuous and humane, though they perhaps may feel it with the most exquisite sensibility. The greatest ruffian, the most hardened violator of the laws of society, is not altogether without it. (I.i.1.1: 9)

Smith does not talk about the disposition of a particular person but that of human beings as such. It is an establishment of a hypothetical framework in which he brackets the socio-cultural background of individual subjects. He begins to describe the mechanics of sympathy in a highly abstract manner. At this moment, he just suggests that every individual subject is inclined to pay attention to other people. To develop the model of the human being as the sympathetic observer of others, Smith also needs to focus on the relationship between the observer and the sufferer in addition to the natural disposition of the observer. This is the point at which difference and distance start to matter in his moral philosophy.
Smith emphasizes that “we have no immediate experience of what other men feel,” therefore “it is by the imagination only that we can form any conception of . . . sensations” of other individuals (I.i.1.2: 9). In this formulation, he conceptualizes sympathy as the process by which the individual subject imagines himself/herself in the “situation” of the sufferer (I.i.1.2: 9). We can sympathize with anyone, or even anything as long as we can imagine his/her/its situation. The limits of sympathy correspond to that of the scope of imagination.

This imaginative nature of sympathy means that the individual subject does not necessarily have to encounter the physical presence of a sufferer when the observer sympathizes with him/her. As long as there is something which mediates the passion of the victim, the observer does not have to witness suffering first-hand. Smith points out the experience of reading as an example in this respect:

We can sympathize with the distress which excessive hunger occasions when we read the description of it in the journal of a siege, or of a sea voyage. We imagine ourselves in the situation of the sufferers, and thence readily conceive the grief, the fear and consternation, which must necessarily distract them. We feel, ourselves, some degree of those passions, and therefore sympathize with them: but as we do not grow hungry by reading the description, we cannot properly, even in this case, be said to sympathize with their hunger. (I.ii.1.1: 28)

Literature in a broader sense is an effective medium which opens the imaginary space of encounter between the individual subject and the distant victim. The scope of our sensory perception of the world is very limited but the literary contact zone drastically expands the scope of our sympathy. In *An Archaeology of Sympathy*, James Chandler conceptualizes the subject of sympathy in Smith’s moral philosophy as “the literary spectator” because his/her
“sensorium” is “virtually embedded in a medium” (145, 166). Smith’s focus on the faculty of imagination links the experience of sympathy with that of reading, and their similarity is more than analogy. Both experiences are virtual to a large extent. The literary space mediates the subject and object of sympathy. The experience of reading reduces the peculiar conditions of the individual subject which block his/her imaginary identification with the distant victim. Literature as a medium adjusts both distance and difference. As for the problem of distance, its power of representation expands the scope of “sensorium” of the individual subject beyond his/her physical perception. As distance is a mental condition as well as a physical reality, literature as virtual space is able to negotiate with distance. According to Chandler, Smith’s model of sympathy helps us to understand eighteenth-century literature because it conceptualizes the “views” of spectators; “the world of fiction” is defined “by various lines of sight, some of them crossing, some of them matching, some of them reciprocated, some of them not” (An Archaeology of Sympathy 175). Each individual has his/her own perspective of the world, and writing/reading a fiction is an experience to gain a different perspective. The virtual space of literature also makes possible the coexistence of different (and sometimes conflicting) perspectives of the world.

In the fifth part of The Theory of Moral Sentiments, Smith discusses the non-western world as a substantial subject for his moral philosophy rather than using it as an imaginary point of reference to embody his abstract ideas. Where the fifth part is concerned, there is no major difference between the first edition and the subsequent editions. Non-European peoples appear as Smith’s contemporaries instead of his thought experiment’s hypothetical subjects. The focus of his discussion moves from the hypothetical model of human beings into specific groups of people on the earth. This is the process by which Smith intends to clarify and fill the gap between his theoretical model and the actual conditions of human beings.

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Smith acknowledges that there are “many irregular and discordant opinions which prevail in different ages and nations concerning what is blameable or praise-worthy” (V.1.1: 194). European observers of the non-European world have been surprised or even disgusted by unfamiliar and strange social practices which indigenous people regard as common and just. Smith’s argument has two steps. Firstly, he aims to clarify the way in which social custom has influence upon the judgments of members of society. He shows that we tend to justify our own opinions under the name of “reason and nature,” but that this is actually an outcome of our “habit or prejudice” (V.1.4: 195). Secondly, despite acknowledging the influence of custom, he contends that our moral judgments “are founded on the strongest and most vigorous passions of human nature; and though they may be somewhat warpt, cannot be entirely perverted” (V.2.1: 200). In A Turn to Empire, Jennifer Pitts contends that Smith’s moral philosophy “encourages open-mindedness toward unfamiliar values and practices,” and therefore “accepts the possibility of cross-cultural judgments” (43). My interpretation of The Theory of Moral Sentiments aims to develop this line of argument. In the construction of his moral theory, Smith’s response to the diversity of people on the globe is two-fold. Firstly, he just suggests that such diversity is a superficial matter in moral philosophy because he denies the substantial influence of custom on moral judgment. Secondly, he is still interested in the diversity of custom and attempts to argue that individual subjects can properly understand people in a different socio-cultural context by overcoming their own “prejudice.”

Smith grasps social practices performed in each society, which seem to be enigmatic and strange from the outsider’s view, as reasonable attempts to respond to the particular condition in which that society is located. This is a point where the dichotomy between civilization and savagery underlies his moral theory. He contrasts the condition of “civilized nations” whose “virtues . . . are founded upon humanity” with that of “rude and barbarous nations” which are based on “the virtues of self-denial” (V.2.8: 204-05). The relative absence of humane sentiments among these primitive people is not interpreted as a result of their
natural deficiency or ignorance in this argument. Instead, he suggests that such a moral attitude is a consequence of the “circumstances” in which members of a society are continuously exposed to various dangers such as hunger (V.2.9: 205). On the one hand, this depiction emphasizes the superiority of civilization over savagery based on the assumption that people have more comfort and convenience in a civilized society while rude and barbarous societies are always haunted by the fear of death. On the other hand, he encourages readers to find a hidden logic and necessity behind the unfamiliar social practice. This becomes the basis for proper cross-cultural judgments; European observers should not apply their own standards to judge the non-western world, but instead examine the degree of appropriateness of their social practice by speculating how far they successfully respond to problems which their particular circumstances impose. The rationality of each society is confirmed by the fact of its subsistence. (V.2.16: 211).

In the theoretical foundation of cross-cultural judgments, Smith is aware that the European observer of the non-western world does not always remain a spectator but becomes an active agent. The focus of his argument, therefore, moves from examining the proper way of judging unfamiliar social practices to the nature and consequence of the encounter between Europe and the rest of the globe:

Fortune never exerted more cruelly her empire over mankind, than when she subjected those nations of heroes [Africans] to the refuse of the jails of Europe, to wretches who possess the virtues neither of the countries which they come from, nor of those which they go to, and whose levity, brutality, and baseness, so justly expose them to the contempt of the vanquished. (V.2.9: 206-07)

His critique of slavery presents the view that the superiority of civilization over savagery does not justify intervention in other societies. Instead of relating how the miserable
condition of people in savagery can be improved, he is concerned with the unfortunate consequence of the encounter between societies which are in different stages of progress. As Jennifer Pitts points out, his narrative of history is characterized by a sense of “contingency” (*A Turn to Empire* 32, 34). The civilized status of Europe is just a consequence of contingent events, therefore does not imply any essential superiority over the rest of the globe. He criticizes such complacency as the cause of corruption and injustice in the history of European empires. This is one of the moments in which his theoretical reflection in the area of moral philosophy encompasses an inquiry into the nature and consequence of the history of encounter. He returns to this subject in the *Wealth of Nations*.

In the first edition, Smith is conscious that individual subjects are interested in people outside of their own society. While social and cultural difference divides the inhabitants of the globe, the imaginative disposition of human beings sometimes overcomes this boundary. They might be curious to know how people in another society live and behave. The encounter between people from different societies does not straightforwardly develop into the exchange of sentiments in Smith’s picture. For instance,

> The savages in North America, we are told, assume upon all occasions the greatest indifference […]. Their magnanimity and self-command, in this respect, are almost beyond the conception of Europeans. (V.2.9: 205)

In his description of the encounter beyond social and cultural boundaries, Smith highlights the blockage of sympathy. The passage above suggests the situation in which the European observer cannot sympathize with the non-European individual. In this setting, the difficulty in sympathy becomes the problem of understanding. Europeans are perplexed, or even disgusted, by the behavior of non-Europeans. Smith’s philosophy aspires to understand the nature of this difference as well as overcoming the difference. Understanding different groups
of people expands the scope of sympathy.

3-2. Moral Philosophy in Global Settings (2): Distance

Smith’s model of sympathy itself is just a description of the mechanics of our mental faculty. After his formulation of sympathy as an imaginary exchange of positions between the subject and the object, Smith needs to explain (1) how it can be the basis of our critical judgment on our own or other people’s conduct, and (2) why such a judgment can be the foundation of morality. Sympathy becomes an issue of moral philosophy because sympathizing entails approval. He argues that we approve the conduct of another individual when we find the “perfect concord” between our and his/her emotions (I.i.3.1: 16).

The perfect concord between “I” and “he/she” is not always a fair criterion of appropriate conduct because any shared background or interest may distort its nature. To conceptualize sympathy as a moral principle, Smith discusses the invention of an imaginary perspective in the form of an “impartial spectator.” When we observe the conduct of another individual, what matters is not the concord between the agent and us (actual observers), but the concord between the agent and a person who has nothing to do with the event. Smith also refers to the impartial spectator as the “indifferent by-stander” and “the indifferent spectator” (II.i.2.2: 69, II.ii.2.4: 85). In the second edition of The Theory of Moral Sentiments, he explicates the concept of the impartial spectator by referring to the process through which we compare “a very small interest of our own” with “the greatest concern of another with whom we have no particular connexion” (III.3.3: 135). He presents a way of reconciling the clash between egoism and altruism.

Before we can make any proper comparison of those opposite interests, we must change our position. We must view them, neither from our own place nor yet from his, neither with our own eyes nor yet with his, but from the place and with the
eyes of a third person, who has no particular connexion with either, and who judges with impartiality between us. (III.3.3: 135)

The critical judgment comes from imagining the view of the third person. This is the pivotal point in which sympathy as a psychological process transforms into the foundation of moral judgment. In the first stage of Smith’s inquiry, there are only two different actors in his theory, the agent and the observer, or the self and the other. In the second stage, a third actor is introduced into this model, the disinterested spectator who is distant from both of them. The emergence of this triangular relation is the basis for Smith’s moral theory of sympathy. The impartial spectator is an abstracted individual, characterized by distance. Imagining the view of the impartial spectator is a means of putting aside our own subjective views based on our specific settings. Smith uses distance as a solution to the problematic partiality of the individual view.

In the second edition of *The Theory of Moral Sentiments*, Smith substantially examines the influence of distance upon moral judgment by adding a thought experiment about the Chinese earthquake. In *Performing China*, Chi-Ming Yang points out that this hypothetical case study shows the way in which Smith’s theoretical reflection is involved with geographical representation (161-67). It is the moment in which the abstract individual subjects in his model are put into a particular setting again.

Let us suppose that the great empire of China, with all its myriads of inhabitants, was suddenly swallowed up by an earthquake, and let us consider how a man of humanity in Europe, who had no sort of connexion with that part of the world, would be affected upon receiving intelligence of this dreadful calamity. He would, I imagine, first of all, express very strongly his sorrow for the misfortune of that unhappy people, he would make many melancholy reflections upon the
precariousness of human life, and the vanity of all the labours of man, which could
thus be annihilated in a moment. . . . And when all this fine philosophy was over,
when all these humane sentiments had been once fairly expressed, he would
pursue his business or his pleasure, take his repose or his diversion, with the same
ease and tranquillity, as if no such accident had happened. . . . If he was to lose his
little finger to-morrow, he would not sleep to-night; but, provided he never saw
them, he will snore with the most profound security over the ruin of a hundred
millions of his brethren . . . . (TMS III.3.4:136)

This hypothetical example of the Chinese earthquake presents both the possibilities and limits
of sympathy as the basis of our moral judgment. Smith assumes that the European subject is
capable of imagining the tragic condition of people in a distant region who have a different
socio-cultural background. The problem of distance, however, appears in the transient nature
of sympathy. The “tranquillity” of the European “man of humanity” after the expression of
“humane sentiments” represents the egocentric nature of human beings. Smith’s thought
experiment, therefore, shows two different aspects of distance. On the one hand, it is essential
to sympathizing with other individuals because it keeps the distinction between the subject
and object of sympathy. Without this kind of distance, the European observer cannot establish
his position as a detached spectator of the disaster. On the other hand, it weakens our
continuous attention to the circumstance of other human beings. Smith’s moral philosophy
needs to negotiate with this paradox of distance.

The goal of this thought experiment is not to reveal our tendency to give precedence to
our own concern over the suffering of distant and unfamiliar people. Instead, Smith supposes
that no one is actually “willing to sacrifice the lives of a hundred millions of his brethren” in
order to avoid injury to their own finger (TMS III.3.4: 137). His narrative of the hypothetical
Chinese earthquake, therefore, proceeds to discuss the way in which an individual subject
struggles to overcome, or at least adjust, such an egocentric perspective by inventing the view of an impartial spectator which embodies one’s “conscience.” It is “the inhabitant of the breast . . . the great judge and arbiter of our conduct” (TMS III.3.4: 137). It compares from a detached position the seriousness of losing one’s little finger with that of a calamity experienced by distant people, and so compels a revision of judgment.

In the beginning of *The Theory of Moral Sentiments*, Smith mainly examines how proximity distorts the appropriateness and objectivity of moral judgments. Sharing with objects of sympathy a similar socio-cultural background or any commercial/political interest might undermine the foundation of morality. In response, he conceptualizes the impartial spectator as the abstracted individual detached from that context. The hypothetical case study of the Chinese earthquake, then, clarifies the presence of another kind of issue in moral philosophy: how far should we accept/oppose our indifference to distant people? In the hypothetical setting, the European man of humanity is not responsible for the hazardous consequence of the earthquake at all; at least, he is neither an agent nor a perpetrator in this case. It is also notable that Smith does not proceed to discuss laws of nations in this thought experiment. His focus is the affective relation between European people and Chinese victims, not the relation between European countries and the Chinese empire. The subject of this inquiry is an individual rather than a nation. The hypothetical case study of the Chinese earthquake does not cover all issues of the condition of morality in an international setting but focuses on one particular aspect of it.

In *The Hypothetical Mandarin*, Eric Hayot suggests that the Chinese setting in this thought experiment enables Smith to embody the abstract problem of his moral philosophy in a concrete example (3-30). Modern Europe perceives China as a “contemporaneous civilizational other” (Hayot 9). Through choosing China, Smith can envisage a cross-cultural judgment beyond the European border without assuming an unequal relation. The hypothetical setting of this thought experiment can help to clarify Smith’s idea of the globe.
He presents “a man of humanity in Europe” as an individual who has “no sort of connexion with that part of the world [China].” Interestingly, Smith assumes that this figure might develop a particular reflection as well as expressing “humane sentiments” before going back to a state of tranquillity:

He would too, perhaps, if he was a man of speculation, enter into many reasonings concerning the effects which this disaster might produce upon the commerce of Europe, and the trade and business of the world in general. (TMS III.3.4:136)

According to the note of the editors of the Glasgow Edition, “[i]t is significant that for Smith, writing this passage in 1760, ‘a man of speculation’ would be liable to reflect on the economic consequences, not the theological implications, of the disaster” (136 n.5). Although European sympathy toward Chinese victims of the earthquake is transient, the destruction of the Chinese empire will have continuing repercussions for Europe. The phrase, “the trade and business of the world,” implies the presence of large-scale commerce beyond Europe. China is distant but not in a different world. The assumption that even a distant region of the earth has connections with Europe through commerce can be seen as an articulation of the idea of the global. This is the moment in which Smith’s narrative slips from a fictional setting, and starts to grasp the reality of his contemporary world.

This connection between Europe and China is the product of imagination as well as the material condition of the flow of things and people. The man of speculation is not in China but in Europe, and knows the circumstances of the Chinese earthquake. He probably

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7 The establishment of connection means that peoples in two distant regions share the same temporality. Due to this synchronicity, the global is an idea concerning time as well as space. In Time and the Other, Johannes Fabian conceptualizes “denial of coevalness” to “examine how Time is used to create distance” by modern anthropologists (28, 31). He argues that there is “a persistent and systematic tendency to place the referent(s) of anthropology in a Time other than the present of the producer of anthropological discourse” (31).
encounters this news by reading a newspaper or having a conversation with someone who has a connection with this region such as an international trader or a sailor. In this respect, his confrontation with the victims in the distant country is virtual in some degree because it is mediated by literary representation. Smith’s slip from the fictional setting into the reality of the contemporary world, then, shows how conceptions of the global are constituted by a combination of firsthand and secondhand encounters.

Smith’s assumption of the presence of large-scale commerce in this hypothetical question leaves a further question about the condition of moral sentiments in a global setting. In his model of moral judgments, the detached position of the spectator ensures the impartiality and objectivity of his/her judgment. In the case of the Chinese earthquake, the European man of humanity or speculation appears as an impartial spectator of this event because Smith emphasizes that he has no personal connection with China. It is ambiguous, however, whether this presentation of the man of speculation can be ultimately compatible with the assumption that commerce between Europe and China underlies the daily lives of his own society. The question is whether there is any position detached from this global interaction and circulation of things, peoples and information. Due to its nature, there seems to be no outside of the global system. How can the individual subject imagine a particular perspective on the global which ensures the impartial understanding of events and conducts in such a setting? In The Theory of Moral Sentiments, there is no further reflection on this question; instead, the Wealth of Nations provides a possible answer by examining the colonial history of the New World.

3-3. Writing the History of the Progress of Sentiments

As a result of Smith’s substantial revision, the sixth edition of The Theory of Moral Sentiments has a new part titled “Of the Character of Virtue.” This addition expresses his further reflection on the condition of sympathy in a concrete setting with geographical
reference. I understand its second section, “Of the Character of the Individual, so far as it can affect the Happiness of other People,” as an attempt to write about the history of the progress of sentiments, both in the individual subject and mankind. This attempt shows the way in which Smith interweaves hypothetical theory and actual history into his narrative. The beginning of his inquiry is hypothetical. Smith constructs a model of the progress of sentiments by analyzing the affective relation among family members. This is because, for each individual, “the members of his own family, those who usually live in the same house with him . . . are naturally the objects of his warmest affections” (VI.ii.1.2: 219). As they are the beings in closest proximity, the individual subject finds it easy to exchange his/her own situation with theirs based on the faculty of imagination. The primitive mode of sympathy emerges in the family relation. In this theoretical framing, Smith describes the extension of sympathy from close to distant objects, from familiar people to strangers.

As the second step of constructing his model, Smith examines the individual subject’s affective relation to relatives. Unlike his preceding description of familial affections, he denies the presence of “the force of blood” and contends that such an idea is merely a product of “some tragedies and romances” (VI.ii.1.11: 222). Instead, he explains the condition of the extended tie between relatives based on its function. At this point, his narrative of the progress of sentiments switches its focus from the idea of “nature” to that of “utility.” To argue that the affective tie with relatives cannot be attributed to human nature, Smith compares its different conditions in two kinds of society. “In pastoral countries,” the people who belong to the same tribe “are all, from the highest to the lowest, of more or less importance to one another” (VI.ii.1.12: 222). The scope of affection extends beyond family members as long as its object belongs to the same tribe. Smith emphasizes that this affective tie emerges because “the authority of law [in pastoral countries] is not alone sufficient to give perfect security to every member of the state” (VI.ii.1.12: 222). The tie exists not because it is natural but because it benefits each member of this social group.
“In commercial countries,” on the contrary, “the authority of law is always perfectly sufficient to protect the meanest man in the state”; “the descendants of the same family” do not find any necessity to live together, and therefore gradually come to “lose all care about one another” (VI.ii.1.13: 223). The contrast between pastoral and commercial countries is the moment at which Smith introduces concrete examples from history and geography into his theoretical framing:

It is not many years ago that, in the Highlands of Scotland, the Chieftain used to consider the poorest man of his clan, as his cousin and relation. The same extensive regard to kindred is said to take place among the Tartars, the Arabs, the Turkomans, and I believe, among all other nations who are nearly in the same state of society in which the Scots Highlanders were about the beginning of the present century. (VI.ii.1.12: 223)

Smith refers to the primitive life of clans in the Highlands as something now lost. Although he thinks that there are still surviving examples of pastoral society in his contemporary world, such a mode of affection is mostly found in non-European regions. Ian Duncan points out that “the temporal structure of a dislocation of origins,” the break between “then and now,” expresses the continuity between the Scottish Enlightenment and Romanticism represented by the Ossian controversy (“Edinburgh and Lowland Scotland”169). At the same time, I want to note that Smith’s narrative of this extinguished past does not display a nostalgic tone. His pragmatic understanding of affective ties is far from idealizing the past. His use of the phrase, “the same state of society,” reminds readers of his stadial theory, which suggests that each society on the globe is considered to follow the same trajectory of the progress of civilization. His reference to several societies including the Highlands assumes the correspondence between the condition of the affective tie with relatives, or affections themselves, and the
degree of civility. Aaron Garrett points out that anthropological inquiries in the Scottish Enlightenment emerged from the study of passions, the attempt to write “the history of sentiment” (“Anthropology” 83).

As the final step of his argument, Smith discusses affective relations beyond national boundaries. Under the authority of the same legal system and custom, people in the same society find it easy to share sentiments. As members of society share their circumstances, this shared social condition ensures the possibility of an imaginary exchange of positions between them within society. The problem is that shared national sentiments also become a barrier to the communication between different countries. Smith’s inquiry, therefore, focuses on the conflict (and the possible compatibility) between “[t]he love of our own country” and “the love of mankind” (VI.ii.2.4: 229). He firstly discusses the affective relation to neighboring countries, and then proceeds to examining the relation between national sentiments and distant countries as a subsequent subject.

As for neighbors, the love of our own country tends to generate “national prejudice” under which individual subjects “view, with the most malignant jealousy and envy, the prosperity and aggrandizement of any other neighbouring nation” (VI.ii.2.3: 228). In this formulation, Smith is particularly conscious about the long rivalry between England and France, both of which “have some reason to dread the increase of the naval and military power of the other” (VI.ii.2.3: 229). He still acknowledges the value of the competition among nations fostered by the love of one’s own nation because of its fruitful outcome: “improvements of the world we live in” (VI.ii.2.3: 229). Instead of proposing to abandon national sentiments, he seeks to control or channel them. Individual subjects should constrain their jealousy towards the prosperity of other nations. Smith suggests that British people do not have to worry about the opulence of France. The prosperity of their neighbor enhances the happiness of mankind beyond national boundaries.

In this critical response to the nature and consequences of national sentiments, Smith
introduces a prescriptive dimension into his narrative instead of concentrating on the
description of the mechanics of human psychology. He criticizes its natural disposition of
blocking the extension of sympathy beyond national boundaries. His attempt is to balance the
loves of our own country and those of mankind. His writing intends to reshape the natural
disposition of preferring the familiar over the unfamiliar, different, or distant object. At the
same time, he also acknowledges the positive value of the love of familiar objects. In the
examination of “universal benevolence,” he contends that “the care of the universal happiness
of all rational and sensible beings, is the business of God and not of man” (VI.ii.3.6: 237).

For distant countries, Smith does not have any serious concern about national prejudice
because a greater distance weakens the intensity of jealousy:

National prejudices and hatred seldom extend beyond neighbouring nations. We
very weakly and foolishly, perhaps, call the French our natural enemies; and they
perhaps, as weakly and foolishly, consider us in the same manner. Neither they nor
we bear any sort of envy to the prosperity of China and Japan. It very rarely
happens, however, that our good-will towards such distant countries can be
exerted with much effect. (VI.ii.2.5: 229-30)

The British/European indifference about the prosperity of Asian countries has a notable
relation to the hypothetical case study of the Chinese earthquake in the second edition. He
actually refers to Asia in the Wealth of Nations as well.

The initial task of The Theory of Moral Sentiments is not an analysis of global
interconnection or geographical description of the globe. But Smith refers to the diverse
condition of peoples and societies as case studies in his system-building. His theory brings
together abstract principles and concrete examples, actual history and hypothetical
assumptions. In the second edition, his thought experiment about the Chinese earthquake
locates the condition of sentiments in a global setting. And the European observer of the non-western world emerges as a crucial subject in his moral philosophy. Distance as well as difference matters. In the sixth edition, his former attention to diversity and global interconnection is reshaped into an attempt to write the history of the progress of sentiments. Smith becomes more concerned about national sentiments as the cause of the conflict among neighboring countries. He discusses the problem of proximity as the cause of jealousy in addition to the problem of distance as the cause of indifference.

4. Comprehending Global Interconnection

In the Wealth of Nations, Adam Smith presents exchange as an essential element of human activity, and examines how it determines the web of human relations. In the seventh chapter of book IV, he applies this conceptual framework to discussing the contemporary problem of colonial administration. Through combining theoretical reflection on human nature with practical diagnosis of the present issue of political economy, the Wealth of Nations shapes the language of encounter. In the micro level, it depicts individual subjects within the process of commercial interaction. In the macro level, it investigates European interaction with the rest of the globe, the New World in particular. To represent this imperial encounter, Smith strives to offer readers an Olympian view of such an immense process. Through writing the book, he imagines that the emerging vast structure of political economy comes to cover the whole surface of the earth. His writing is a literary experiment to open a new perspective on the contemporary world by which one can imagine it as interconnected. This also expresses his idea of the relation between space and time, because he assumes that the origin of global interconnection can be traced back to 1492. The Wealth of Nations is an ambitious project to frame a perspective which covers the enormous scope of both geography and history.

Smith started to consider writing a book which condensed “some of [his] thinking about jurisprudence, police and political economy” when he was in France in 1764.
(Phillipson, *Adam Smith* 188). After his travels around the European continent, he wrote the *Wealth of Nations* in Kirkcaldy between 1767 and 1773 (Phillipson 201). This was the exact period during which Britain experienced the new order and problems of the post-Seven Years War’s regime. After the Treaty of Paris (1763), Britain gained new territories outside of Europe as a result of its victory over France. In *Britons*, Linda Colley highlights the transformation of the British empire in this period from a comparatively “homogeneous” to a heterogeneous entity. The British empire became too vast to imagine as an empire of “a liberty-loving and commercial people” distant from bloody conquests (102). The security and management of these colonies needed considerable expense, which lead the government to plan to levy new taxes upon some of its colonial subjects. The dispute over the Stamp Act between 1765 and 1766 was one of the examples of this turbulence. When Smith decided to write the *Wealth of Nations*, this socio-political turbulence appeared as both a theoretical and highly topical subject. In terms of the theoretical dimension, Smith aspired to establish a framework to imagine the new order emerging in the contemporary world. In terms of the practical dimension, he aimed to suggest a possible solution to the tense relation between metropole and colony by examining the system of taxation and the abuse of monopoly in imperial economy. His initial task is to recover a systematic view of the world and to re-imagine it as harmonious. Due to this response to the heterogenous condition of Britain’s empire, “system” becomes one of the important words which link the content and form of his discussion.

The seventh chapter of Book IV is devoted to examining the process and consequences of the European encounter with the New World. This does not mean that its focus is limited to a particular region of the globe. Smith’s approach to colonial problems is rather comparative. It intends to clarify the distinctive character of European colonies in the New World by investigating their difference from ancient colonies. His inquiry proceeds to compare British colonies with other European territories in the New World. Finally, the corrupt condition of
American colonies is contrasted with the dynamic example of Asia. In *Reading the Global*, Sanjay Krishnan argues that through turning his perspective away from America to Asia, Smith “reimagines British imperialism as an ethical institution whose purpose is to enable its colonized subjects to freely partake in their material improvement through free production and exchange worldwide” (26-27). This shift also determines the flow of his narrative:

What the Cape of Good Hope is between Europe and every part of the East Indies, Batavia is between the principal countries of the East Indies. It lies upon the most frequented road from Indostan to China and Japan, and is nearly about mid-way upon that road. Almost all the ships too that sail between Europe and China touch at Batavia; and it is, over and above all this, the center and principal mart of what is called the country trade of the East Indies; not only of that part of it which is carried on by Europeans, but of that which is carried on by the native Indians; and vessels navigated by the inhabitants of China and Japan, of Tonquin, Malacca, Cochin-China, and the island of Celebes, are frequently to be seen in its port. Such advantageous situations have enabled those two colonies [the Cape of Good Hope and Batavia] to surmount all the obstacles which the oppressive genius of an exclusive company may have occasionally opposed to their growth. (IV.vii.c.100: 635)

Batavia, as a hub of international commerce, functions as a point of encounter between Europe and Asia due to its unique geographical location. As a major port for non-European merchants, it also connects South Asia with East Asia. Batavia is a center of interaction among local inhabitants as well as travelers from other Asian countries and European empires. As the narrative changes the scale of its focus, it moves from a macro- to a micro-perspective. Smith assumes that the colonies he mentions have evaded the evils of monopoly
which characterize European empires elsewhere. Although the quoted passage is a descriptive account of actual places, his narration actually slips from analyzing the current condition of the Asian market into imagining an ideal picture of the European encounter with the rest of the globe. Krishnan points out that Smith “creates a hierarchy by placing China and India on a different scale of civilization than Mexico and Peru” (29). Asian peoples are represented as those who are more civilized and therefore more capable of managing foreign commerce. By implying that there is a difference between peoples in the New World and Asia, Smith can argue that Europeans may be able to establish a reciprocal relation with local inhabitants in Asia. This is the recovery of the ideal which they failed to achieve in colonies in America. For the Wealth of Nations, Asia is presented as potentially closing the gap between the ideal of the British empire and its reality, which is exemplified by the American crisis.

The concept of a reciprocal relation between Europe and other parts of the globe introduces a dichotomy between necessity and accident as well as ideal and reality, individual and system, and macro- and micro-perspectives:

The discovery of America, and that of a passage to the East Indies by the Cape of Good Hope, are the two greatest and most important events recorded in the history of mankind. . . . By uniting, in some measure, the most distant parts of the world, by enabling them to relieve one another’s wants, to increase one another’s enjoyments, and to encourage one another’s industry, their general tendency would seem to be beneficial. To the natives, however, both of the East and West Indies, all the commercial benefits which can have resulted from those events have been sunk and lost in the dreadful misfortunes which they have occasioned. These misfortunes, however, seem to have arisen from accident than from any thing in the nature of those events themselves. (IV.vii.c.80: 626)
The first half of the passage above consists of a theoretical narrative of colonialism. Europeans expected to establish mutual benefits in their encounter with the other parts of the globe. This remained their ideal but was not realized in the actual process. The second half of the passage attempts to reconcile the ideal of encounter with what actually happened in the New World. Smith admits that indigenous people suffered from this encounter. At the same time, he intends to rescue the idea of reciprocal intercourse by arguing that the current situation is an exceptional case caused by accidental circumstances. This idea of historical contingency might secure the possibility of a harmonious relation, but also creates a rupture in his narrative between “what the European encounter ought to be” (prescriptive and theoretical) and “what the European encounter actually was” (descriptive and historical). Even at the end of the passage, it is still unclear whether this “is-ought” division can be negotiated. His use of the adversative conjunction twice (“however . . . however . . .”) in just two sentences symbolizes the unnatural flow of his argument itself. The use of “seem” also weakens the clarity of his assertion. Behind his confident statement about the possibility of a harmonious interconnected world, the (dis-)order of his language implies a sense of confusion and anxiety. Ironically, his narrative of harmony is not harmonious.

As the object of Smith’s inquiry is the idea of union among “the most distant parts of the world,” what this passage talks about is more than the interaction between two remote regions; he imagines the contemporary world as a whole. Every part of the earth is interconnected with other parts. As Krishnan points out, the sentence, “By uniting . . . their general tendency would seem to be beneficial,” articulates the idea of the “global” (27, 180 n.4). In the Wealth of Nations, this describes the present condition of the world shaped by the flow of commodities, information and human beings. Global interconnection is also an imaginary or virtual concept in the sense that no one can physically see what is going on in the contemporary world as a whole due to its enormous extent. Instead, people can comprehend it from an imagined perspective, an Olympian view of the whole world. Global
interconnection is thus the product of imagination as well as the material condition of the world.

Krishnan argues that Smith presents the global as “a representational style and form in which the disparate parts of the world and its diverse and heterogeneous peoples and actions are comprehended as a single, bounded, unified, and interconnected entity developing in common time” (28). This statement has two implications for situating the *Wealth of Nations* within a broader history of eighteenth-century literature. Firstly, Smith’s conceptualization of global interconnection shapes the frame within which his contemporary readers perceive the world. Krishnan recognizes the *Wealth of Nations* as “a revolutionary text” because “it does not merely provide another interpretation of the situation it describes: it seeks to change the very terrain on which description and evaluation take place” (28). Secondly, it leads contemporary readers of the *Wealth of Nations* to introduce historical perspective into the geographical imagination. For Smith, the perception of immense space is entangled with an encounter with an equally vast sense of time.

Prior to the attempt to reconcile the ideal and the reality of global interconnection, Smith identifies its historical origin:

The discovery of America, and that of a passage to the East Indies by the Cape of Good Hope, are the two greatest and most important events recorded in the history of mankind. Their consequences have already been very great: but, in the short period of between two and three centuries which has elapsed since these discoveries were made, it is impossible that the whole extent of their consequences can have been seen. What benefits, or what misfortunes to mankind may hereafter result from those great events no human wisdom can foresee. (IV.vii.c.80: 626)

For Smith, 1492, the moment in which Columbus “discovered” the New World, is the starting
point of global encounter. Due to its ongoing effect, 1492 is not in the distant past. This historical moment is still continuous with Smith’s contemporary world. Columbus’s discovery is not only a past event but also a present affair. To describe the emergence of the global world, Smith finds it necessary to consider a period covering three hundred years. He also argues that even this extended period is not enough to grasp the full consequences of 1492. He is aware of the potential limits of the Olympian view as a product of imagination.

Smith’s historical perspective on the rise of global interconnection also develops into a vision of the future. In addition to presenting the current condition of the interconnected word as a consequence of historical accidents, Smith imagines the shape of things to come:

At the particular time when these discoveries [of America and a passage to the East Indies by the Cape of Good Hope] were made, the superiority of force happened to be so great on the side of the Europeans, that they were enabled to commit with impunity every sort of injustice in those remote countries. Hereafter, perhaps, the natives of those countries may grow stronger, or those of Europe may grow weaker, and the inhabitants of all the different quarters of the world may arrive at that equality of courage and force which, by inspiring mutual fear, can alone overawe the injustice of independent nations into some sort of respect for the rights of one another. But nothing seems more likely to establish this equality of force than that mutual communication of knowledge and of all sorts of improvements which an extensive commerce from all countries to all countries naturally, or rather necessarily, carries along with it. (IV.vii.c.80: 626-27)

Since 1492, Europeans have continuously perpetrated injustice on the rest of the world. Due to the establishment of interaction between remote countries, particular regions of the globe have been exploited for the prosperity of European commerce. The present world “is”
suffering from this negative effect of global interconnection. In the future, however, a more equal relation between Europe and other parts of the globe “ought” to be established. Smith imagines that such an altered balance of power will prevent further injustice and promote reciprocal communication. For him, global interconnection is both the source of problems and the solutions to them. The switch of his narrative from “is” (descriptive) to “ought” (normative) shows how he intends to connect two different visions of the world. The encounter, or the potential conflict, between these two is embodied in his use of the auxiliary verb “may” and the adverb “perhaps.” The decline of Europe and the rise of non-European powers are presented as possible events, not as a necessary consequence or imperative of the progress of civilization, with the frequent use of “may.” The path from what the present world “is” to what the future world “ought” to be is not necessarily uni-directional. Instead, Smith assumes that there are different ways of regarding the progress of history even though both starting and ending points are fixed in this narrative.

5. Conclusion

As a writer, Smith strives to comprehend his contemporary world as a whole. Both his moral philosophy and political economy are committed to invent a spectator possessed of an Olympian viewpoint. As part of his system-building, he applies his model of the impartial spectator to specific geographical settings. In *The Theory of Moral Sentiments*, the impartial spectator becomes the European observer of the non-western world in his reference to diverse social customs. This transformation highlights his awareness that individual subjects pay attention to people outside of their own society. As part of conceptualizing the imaginary exchange of sentiments, Smith shapes a narrative of encounter between groups of people from different regions. In the *Wealth of Nations*, the global scope of his writing, an aspiration to cover the whole surface of the earth, also develops into a critical examination of global interconnection.
Smith endorses the value of theory, a collection of systems, as a form enabling a comprehensive view. He expresses a passion for systematic understanding of his subjects as well as connecting different fields of knowledge. This intellectual attachment to systems makes his literary practice different from that of Hume’s essay-writing. He is seriously concerned about the fragmented perception of a world whose web of interconnection becomes too complicated to grasp. In his system-building writing, Smith is conscious that systems are the product of the imagination and, therefore, constantly exposed to the conflict between actual reality and hypothetical assumptions, particular examples and abstract principles. This conflict produces the distinctive tone of his writing.
Chapter 4

Moralizing Commerce and Literary Culture in the Scottish Enlightenment:

Tobias Smollett’s *Humphry Clinker*

1. Introduction

In 1771, Tobias Smollett published *The Expedition of Humphry Clinker*, an epistolary novel depicting a fictional tour across Britain. In the opening of this story, Matthew Bramble, the protagonist of the novel, complains of “how hard I am to move” in his letter to Dr. Lewis (7). He suffers from gout, and now leaves Brambleton-hall in Wales to visit several cities in England and Scotland, hoping that his travels will help him to recover his health. In his journey from Bristol to London via Bath, however, his letters articulate disappointment and irritation. He laments that Bath has “become the very center of racket and dissipation” due to “the general tide of luxury” (34, 36). The hectic scene of this spa town negatively affects his temper. In his view, Bath is a “monster” composed of “intoxicated” people such as “[c]lerks and factors from the East Indies” and “planters, negro-drivers, and hucksters, from […] American plantations” (36, 37). Bramble also describes London as “an overgrown monster; which, like a dropsical head, will in time leave the body,” and suggests that “[t]he tide of luxury” has changed the landscape of the metropolis (86, 87).

In this story, Bramble not only records his own physical ailments but also observes the condition of the body of Britain as a whole, constituted by networks of commerce. There is a notable analogy between his physical body and the imaginary body of Britain. On the one hand, he suffers from gout and hopes that activity will provide an antidote to this disease, the result of problems of blood circulation. On the other hand, Bramble observes that the body of Britain itself experiences an overflow of wealth from its colonies. The proper regulation of circulation is understood as a key to solving the problem in this picture. Both a blockage and
an excess of circulation are problematic here. By deploying this medical analogy between the individual and the national body, *Humphry Clinker* diagnoses the present condition of the networks of commerce in eighteenth-century Britain.

Smollett’s epistolary novel aspires to imagine Britain as a whole, and to analyze its networks of commerce. The scope of this vision covers not only the field of political economy but also that of moral philosophy, because the novel presents the moral corruption of Britons as a consequence of the overflow of wealth. The structural problem of political economy is linked to the decline of moral consciousness among individual subjects. As a novelist, Smollett probes the conflicted relation between commerce and virtue through the form of fiction. Indeed, *Humphry Clinker* shows the way in which the literary culture of eighteenth-century Britain is involved with the intellectual and social project of moralizing commerce across different genres of writing. Reconciling virtue and commerce is a central task for Scottish intellectuals in the eighteenth century such as David Hume and Adam Smith, who are contemporary with Smollett. In their introduction to *Wealth and Virtue*, Istvan Hont and Michael Ignatieff argue that Smith’s “*Wealth of Nations* was centrally concerned with the issue of justice, with finding a market mechanism capable of reconciling inequality of property with adequate provision for the excluded” (2). In the larger intellectual context, moralizing commerce can be understood as an element of the Scottish Enlightenment. John Robertson contends that “moral philosophy, history, and political economy” are “the intellectual core of the Scottish Enlightenment” (“The Scottish Contribution to the Enlightenment” 46).

Alexander Broadie presents the Scottish Enlightenment as “a creative surge” taking place in Scotland “[d]uring a period of a few decades on either side of 1760” (*The Scottish Enlightenment* 1). This activity occurs across different fields such as “chemistry, geology, engineering, economics, sociology, philosophy, poetry, [and] painting” (1). Interestingly, in *Humphry Clinker*, Smollett depicts a scene in which Bramble encounters the Scottish
Enlightenment in his journey to Edinburgh and Glasgow. Bramble observes that “Edinburgh is a hot-bed of genius” (227). And he is glad to “be made acquainted with many authors of the first distinction; such as the two Humes, Robertson, Smith, Wallace, Blair, Ferguson, Wilkie, & c.” (227).

This chapter aims to argue that *Humphry Clinker* is a work of the Scottish Enlightenment, and to examine the way in which Smollett’s epistolary novel explores the relationship between virtue and commerce. Particularly, Smollett’s use of the medical trope of circulation suggests an overlap between his novelistic representation and Smith’s theoretical narrative of commerce. My approach will add two insights to the existing scholarship. Firstly, I argue that literary work, the novel in particular, is an important component of the Scottish Enlightenment. Even though Alexander Broadie emphasizes that artists and their communities are important for understanding the Scottish Enlightenment, eighteenth-century literature is often excluded from studies of the Scottish Enlightenment (*The Scottish Enlightenment* 4). In the introduction to *The Scottish Enlightenment and Literary Culture*, this general tendency is summarized as follows:

> When viewed in relation to the remarkable output in polite letters during the Scottish Enlightenment and groundbreaking achievements in moral and natural philosophy, medicine and natural history, and the critical arts, the imaginative literature of the period is often seen as relatively barren. David Craig once remarked that all Scotland’s Golden Age could account for in terms of literary output was a “striking dearth.” John R. R. Christie likewise called out the Scottish Enlightenment for its “lack of a substantial literary dimension,” particularly when compared to Enlightenment France, but also in relation to the “native” output of Allan Ramsay, Robert Fergusson, and Robert Burns […]. Although Christie’s aim was to display the relative fertility of science during the Scottish Enlightenment,
this context confirms how easily the imaginative literature of the period has been
dismissed by commentators. (1)

Smollett as a novelist is crucial to interrogate such an assumption about the relative absence
of literature in the Scottish Enlightenment. He is a Scottish writer living in London and
responding to Hume. I will present him as an extended member of the Scottish
Enlightenment. My argument is not only that the Scottish Enlightenment is an important
context for reading Smollett’s novels but also that Smollett’s novel itself can be seen as an
element of the Scottish Enlightenment.

Secondly, my reading of Humphry Clinker will show the active interaction between the
novel and non-fictional prose in the eighteenth century. Smollett’s use of the medical trope of
circulation suggests that the novel shapes its form of representation by incorporating
narratives from non-fictional prose such as philosophical writing. Indeed, David Trotter
points out that the metaphor of circulation is deployed to “grasp the ramifying sequences of
exchange which distribute wealth as a system” in the “analysis of wealth” from Thomas
Hobbes to Smith (Circulation 61, 63). When we read Humphry Clinker as a work of the
Scottish Enlightenment, we can see a shared background between the rise of the novel and
the flourishing of philosophical writing on commerce and virtue. Ian Watt contends that “the
novel is a full and authentic report of human experience, and is therefore under an obligation
to satisfy its readers with such details of the story as the individuality of the actors concerned,
the particulars of the times and places of their actions” (The Rise of the Novel 32). Bramble’s
letters in Humphry Clinker show that the perception of the flow of wealth constitutes his
experience of daily life. The conflict between commerce and virtue underlies Smollett’s
construction of the daily world and its experience in the novel form.

2. Smollett’s Life, Works and Scholarship
Smollett was born in Dunbartonshire, Scotland in 1721, just two years before the birth of Adam Smith in Kirkcaldy. As a Scot, Smollett was contemporary with representatives of the Scottish Enlightenment. He was sent to Glasgow University by his family for medical training in 1735 when he was fourteen. At that time, the merchants of Glasgow flourished in the international tobacco trade. The flow of commodities also catalyzed the wider circulation of ideas and print culture. Richard B. Sher and Andrew Hook point out that this “commercial prosperity . . . provided opportunities for the development of notions of enlightened progress and improvement” (Introduction 4). In other words, Smollett’s encounter with the “Glasgow Enlightenment” was framed by the progressive and practical atmosphere of international traders. The social landscape of Glasgow showed the way in which one regional city was connected to the wider web of commercial interactions and such a connection helped to transform urban space. Smith also embarked on his philosophical studies as a student of Glasgow University under the influence of Francis Hutcheson in 1737. In Tobias Smollett in the Enlightenment, Richard J. Jones points out that Smollett probably encountered Hutcheson’s teaching as well in the late 1730s (53). Between 1737 and 1739, both Smollett and Smith were in Glasgow, exposed to the culture of its regional Enlightenment. This shared experience is an important context for their deployment of similar tropes/narratives in their later works.

Smollett went to London to fulfill his literary ambition in 1739. In the same year, Hume published the first two volumes of A Treatise of Human Nature. Due to the successful publication of The Adventures of Roderick Random in 1748, Smollett established his literary fame as an eminent novelist. After moving from Glasgow to London, he kept his tie with Scots by participating in sociable conversation in “the Scottish coffeehouses of London” (Jones 5). He particularly enjoyed his company with “Scottish medical men and writers” in

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1 My description of Smollett’s life is based on his Oxford DNB entry. For Smith’s life, see Nicholas Phillipson’s Adam Smith.
London such as William Hunter. As an eminent writer of the age, he deployed various genres of writing in his literary output. He composed a verse satire *Advice* (1746), translated Lesage’s *Gil Blas* (1748), wrote *A Complete History of England* (1757-1758) and *The Present State of All Nations* (1768). In addition to working as a novelist, poet, translator and historian, he also edited *The Critical Review* from 1756 to 1763. As a review article on Adam Smith’s *The Theory of Moral Sentiments* appeared in the May 1759 issue of *The Critical Review*, scholars estimate that Smollett was familiar with Smith’s moral philosophy around that time.

After these various engagements with different genres of writing, Smollett published *The Expedition of Humphry Clinker* in 1771 and died in the same year. It is the culmination of his literary experimentation and incorporation of narratives from various genres including non-fictional prose.

Unlike the major representatives of the Scottish Enlightenment, Smollett experiences a firsthand encounter with the non-European world. He served as a naval surgeon in the imperial expedition to the West Indies (1740-41) in which Britain intended to undermine the Spanish dominance of Cartagena. After this imperial war, he married Anne Lassells in Jamaica, where her family managed plantations. This experience of the horrors of the imperial periphery and the cost of imperial ambition are rehearsed in his fictional writing. *The Adventures of Roderick Random* (1748) depicts the miserable condition of British sailors in this battle.

The sick and wounded were squeezed into certain vessels, which thence obtained the name of hospital ships, though methinks they scarce deserved such a creditable title, seeing none of them could boast of either surgeon, nurse or cook; and the

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2 See the “Medicine and Literary Apprenticeship, 1744-1748” section of Simpson’s Oxford DNB entry on Smollett.

3 See Jones 63, and Robert Crawford’s *Devolving English Literature* 65-66.
space between decks was so confined, that the miserable patients had not room to sit upright in their beds. Their wounds and stumps being neglected, contracted filth and putrefaction, and millions of maggots were hatched amid the corruption of their sores. (Chapter XXXIII.187)

Roderick Random, the protagonist of this story, is forced to join this imperial expedition as a surgeon. In the enclosed space of the ship, everyone is exposed to the risk of disease, injury, and death because there is no safe space. Even though Random is an observer of conflict rather than a participant, this does not assure his detached position. He recognizes how the lives of British soldiers are *consumed* to establish imperial dominance in a far away space. The word “corruption” connects the physical condition of wounded soldiers with a moral critique of this imperial ambition. Smollett’s medical description presents the vivid reality of imperial conflicts outside of Europe. It shapes his narrative of grotesque realism, which depicts the horrors experienced by servants of Britain’s empire. The physical body is associated with the moral condition of the expanding network. Empire is a monster which consumes human lives as it expands and seeks to consolidate its gains. This perspective continues to be developed in his later novel, *The Expedition of Humphry Clinker*.

Studies of eighteenth century literature have seen *Humphry Clinker* as an embodiment of a pivotal stage of the interplay between the socio-cultural condition of Britain after the Anglo-Scottish Union in 1707 and the rise of the novel as a new form of writing. The emergence of the novel form in the eighteenth century is construed as an attempt to represent the new socio-cultural reality of Britain shaped by the connective force of rising commerce. Britons felt that their world of daily experience was rapidly expanding and becoming more closely connected with distant places. The novel engages with the transformation of everyday life with a sense of both astonishment and anxiety. John Richetti suggests that the novel as “narrative institution” emerged as “a mode of regulation or realignment of [the divide
between fact and fiction]” (Introduction 2). It was a response to the transformation of
everyday life, which could shape perceptions of reality and therefore pose the question of the
authenticity of daily experience. In this respect, the function of the novel is critical as well as
representational, normative as well as descriptive. The act of writing a novel entails a process
of judgment in which the narrator sorts out different kinds of experience and perspective, and
authorizes the authenticity of some ahead of others.

_Humphry Clinker_ is recognized as a significant work in the history of the novel due to
its generic character as an epistolary novel. Robert Folkenflik contends:

_The Expedition of Humphry Clinker_ was a new departure not only for Tobias
Smollett, but for the eighteenth-century novel as well. Unlike the nearly
monolithic _Pamela_, this epistolary novel never lets any view dominate to the
exclusion of other perspectives. The letters, separate but read in a series, are the
perfect medium for Smollett’s central theme. _The Expedition of Humphry Clinker_
is a novel about the necessity of human relationships presented through the
medium of individual voices, and therefore any one perspective is partial,
inherently at the mercy of the ironies of a larger view. (“Self and Society: Comic
Union in _Humphry Clinker_” 195)

The epistolary form as a subcategory of the novel emphasizes that the subjectivity of each
individual character constitutes the sense and representation of reality. Smollett’s use of this
literary form deals with the possibility of reconciling different perspectives. Each individual
has a partial view of the world, and therefore, individual experience could remain merely a
fragment of the authentic reality which requires synthesis. The relation between a whole and
its parts is a matter of geography as well as epistemology. In the aftermath of the Anglo-
Scottish Union, the novel is potentially in a position to imagine “Britain” as a whole, a
harmonious synthesis of diverse regions. *Humphry Clinker* offers a travel narrative in epistolary form. Michael Rosenblum points out that *Humphry Clinker* problematizes the way in which “culture prescribes the rules for movement: who moves and who does not, and along what paths?” Bramble observes “the chaotic movement in and around Bath and London” from a distance as well as in the course of his own travels (“Smollett’s *Humphry Clinker*” 184, 185).

Postcolonial readings tend to construe *Humphry Clinker* as an anti-imperial novel due to the presence of Lismahago, a Scottish lieutenant who was seriously wounded in America. For instance, Tara Ghoshal Wallace contends that “*Humphry Clinker* participates in a polemical dialogue about the American colonies as refuge and opportunity”: Lismahago’s captive experience and his mutilated body are used to show that they “have damaged the home country much more than they have benefited it” (232, 250). The grotesque figure of this injured Scot is discussed as an epitome of “the human cost of empire” (Wallace 233). In Durham, a city near the Anglo-Scottish border, Bramble and his company encounter Lismahago. Jerry Melford’s letter summarizes it:

“Leddies, (said he) perhaps ye may be scandaleezed at the appearance my heed made, when it was uncovered by accident; but I can assure you, the condition you saw it in, is neither the effects of disease, nor of drunkenness; but an honest scar received in the service of my country.” He then gave us to understand, that having been wounded at Ticonderoga, in America, a party of Indians rifled him, scalped him, broke his scull with the blow of a tomahawk, and left him for dead on the field of battle [. . .]. (183)

James E. Evans points out that “through the adventures and speeches of Lismahago, Smollett connects the domestic plot of the novel more directly to British overseas expansion, though
he also invites skepticism about the ideology that legitimizes it” (484).

The course of Lismahago’s life in the imperial space is determined by the logic of commerce. He became an imperial agent of the British army because he “purchased an ensigncy thirty years ago; and […] rose to be a lieutenant” (185). A chain of commercial exchanges led him to be in the North American colonies. On the one hand, he appears in front of Bramble and his company as a man back from the imperial periphery of the non-European world. On the other hand, however, his economic status is very different from that of corrupted clerks in Bath. He remains poor because he “had no money to carry to market” and could not advance his “preferment” (185). His presence conceptualizes circulation as the pivot of the reconciliation between virtue and commerce, as his grotesque figure represents the failure of the fair distribution of wealth in imperial commerce. Some groups of people gain too much, while others have almost nothing. This blockage of circulation causes the uneven expansion of society. Bramble’s letters adapt the trope of the “monster” to represent the disease of the expanding world mediated by commerce. In the micro-level, the failure of circulation is embodied in Lismahago’s monstrous body mutilated in imperial space. In the macro-level, it also corresponds to the monstrous figure of London and Bath as unregulated urban spaces.

Lismahago’s captive experience articulates the horror of unregulated space in the wider scale. Colonial space is far from secure, as an imperial agent from Britain is easily swallowed by the indigenous community. The victim in this narrative is not non-European but in fact the British imperial agent. The vulnerability of Lismahago’s body to torture implies the instability of power-relations between British imperial agents and indigenous people. The British Empire does not necessarily secure its superior position in colonial space. Charlotte Sussman construes Lismahago’s captivity as a process of “transculturation” in which he loses his cultural background as a consequence of physical torture and is incorporated into another culture as a result of this encounter between two different communities (“Lismahago’s
Captivity: Transculturation in *Humphry Clinker*” 597-605). He “was elected sachem, acknowledged first warrior of the Badger tribe, and dignified with the name or epithet of Occacanastaogarora, which signifies *nimble as a weasel*” (Smollett 189).

His life as the sachem suddenly comes to an end “in consequence of being exchanged for the orator of the community, who had been taken prisoner by the Indians that were in alliance with the English” (Smollett 189). His transient status in this tribe is construed as a result of the blockage of circulation. Its recovery enables him to return to Britain. His captive experience potentially articulates another horror as well as the process through which commerce solves the problem of circulation. The exchange of Lismahago for the “orator” means that he becomes an object of a commercial transaction instead of its subject. As Sussman points out, “Lismahago is as much a commodity as one of his own furs” (“Transculturation in *Humphry Clinker*” 604). Lismahago emphasizes that his wound is “an honest scar received in the service of [his] country” and that he is “a gentleman” (Smollett 183, 185). This obsession with dignity seems to be a response to the horror of commerce in the imperial space where the distinction between things and individual subjects is blurred.

It should be noted that Lismahago himself does not express anti-imperial sentiments even though his captive narrative can provide a resource for postcolonial reading. Moreover, the significance of his colonial experience is marginalized by a subsequent sequence of events. His presence and narrative are incorporated into the main body of letters. Melford dismisses his narrative as comprising “unimportant occurrences,” and presents Lismahago’s figure in his letters for “entertainment” (Smollett 186, 196). He is “Don Quixote” (182). In Melford’s letters, the power of comedy regulates the arrangement of events, and it undermines the seriousness of the captive experience. A similar process of undercutting is evident in Bramble’s letters. Although his letter summarizes Lismahago’s view of commerce and virtue, Bramble emphasizes that “[t]he spirit of contradiction is naturally so strong in Lismahago” (197). The conversation between them is represented as a comical interaction
between two eccentric characters, as the seriousness of Bramble’s subjectivity is also undermined by Melford’s observation.

3. Smollett’s Novel and Smith’s Philosophical Prose

Bramble is concerned about the spread of luxury across the country. The focus of his narrative moves from a dismissive perception of newly rich people as individual subjects to imagining the imperial network behind them as a diseased body. His scope switches from the micro-perspective in which the behavior of individuals matters to the macro-perspective in which the whole structure of the circulation of people, things and wealth is interrogated.

Smith’s philosophical writing shows a similar trajectory. In *The Theory of Moral Sentiments*, he explores the influence of wealth on the behavior of the individual subject. He develops his concern about the conflicted relation between commerce and virtue into a critique of the British empire as an overgrown monster in the *Wealth of Nations*. The medical trope of circulation is crucial to the imagining and the analysis of the present network of commerce as a diseased body in both Smollett’s novel and Smith’s philosophical writing.

In Bath, Bramble continuously complains about his unpleasant stay in his letters to Dr. Lewis, which speculate about the changing social landscape of this spa town as well as reporting particular events there. He refers to the condition of some “decent families” with “small fortunes,” who once planned to reside in Bath “a dozen years ago” (55). At that time, people could afford their lives in Bath without extravagant expense.

[…] the madness of the times has made the place [Bath] too hot for them [decent families], and they are now obliged to think of other migrations—Some have already fled to the mountains of Wales, and others have retired to Exeter. Thither, no doubt, they will be followed by the flood of luxury and extravagance, which will drive them from place to place to the very Land’s End; and there, I suppose,
they will be obliged to ship themselves to some other country. Bath is become a mere sink of profligacy and extortion. (55-56)

Bramble talks about the spread of luxury over the country, and is apprehensive about restlessness as one of its negative consequences. From his point of view, the accumulation of wealth is destructive to social unity, because it destroys the organic relation between people and their land by impelling them to move. This letter points to a paradox of wealth: it originally has an agency to connect different individuals, distant regions, and even nations, but also disconnects established organic relations by appealing to people’s desire for luxury. In this respect, Bramble’s travels around Britain are not only a medical trial to recover his health but also a kind of field trip to observe the way in which wealth changes the social and cultural landscape.

Bramble expresses that there “is now a mushroom of opulence, who pays a cook seventy guineas a week for furnishing him with one meal a day” in Bath (56). This phrase, “a mushroom of opulence,” enables us to understand the exact object of his criticism. He does not necessarily dismiss the accumulation of wealth itself. Rather, he despises the frivolous behavior of those who pile up wealth in a short time. Such a rapid but unnatural accumulation of wealth becomes possible in imperial ventures outside of Europe. His disgust is mainly towards the newly rich coming from British colonies. This is a point where the moral diagnosis of wealth is subsumed into a vision of the interconnected world. For instance, he writes:

I have known a negro-driver, from Jamaica, pay over-night to the master of one of the rooms, sixty-five guineas for tea and coffee to the company, and leave Bath next morning, in such obscurity, that not one of his guests had the slightest idea of his person, or even made the least inquiry about his name. Incidents of this kind
are frequent [...] (56)

He also describes:

Clerks and factors from the East Indies, loaded with the spoil of plundered provinces; planters, negro-drivers, and hucksters, from our American plantations, enriched they know not how; agents, commissaries, and contractors, who have fattened, in two successive wars, on the blood of the nation; usurers, brokers, and jobbers of every kind; men of low birth, and no breeding, have found themselves suddenly translated into a state of affluence, unknown to former ages; and no wonder that their brains should be intoxicated with pride, vanity, and presumption. (36)

In Bramble’s view, the expansion of the British empire sets a stage for colonial agents to achieve such unprecedented wealth. His list of corrupted professions, however, does not include military officers. His critique is directed toward those who are engaged with imperial economy rather than colonial conquest itself. Commerce in the imperial space is identified as a potential cause of moral corruption.

People avidly pursue wealth in modern commercial society, but this aspiration potentially becomes a form of mania. The expansion of international trade transforms the social landscape of eighteenth-century Britain. This moral diagnosis of economic growth is a crucial subject for Smith’s *The Theory of Moral Sentiments* (1759) as well as Smollett’s *Humphry Clinker*. Smith presents the aspiration for wealth as an element of human nature rather than a feature of a particular group of people. In the fourth part of *The Theory of Moral Sentiments*, he refers to the way in which “people ruin themselves by laying out money on
trinkets of frivolous utility” (IV.1.6: 180). People stuff their pockets with a number of “little conveniencies” even when their “whole utility is certainly not worth the fatigue of bearing the burden” (IV.1.6: 180). As an example, Smith presents a story of “[t]he poor man’s son”:

The poor man’s son, whom heaven in its anger has visited with ambition, when he begins to look around him, admires the condition of the rich. He finds the cottage of his father too small for his accommodation, and fancies he should be lodged more at his ease in a palace. He is displeased with being obliged to walk a-foot, or to endure the fatigue of riding on horseback. He sees his superiors carried about in machines, and imagines that in one of these he could travel with less inconveniency. […] He is enchanted with the distant idea of this felicity [enjoying himself in the thought of the happiness and tranquility of his situation]. It appears in his fancy like the life of some superior rank of beings, and in order to arrive at it, he devotes himself for ever to the pursuit of wealth and greatness. To obtain the conveniencies which these afford, he submits in the first year, nay in the first month of his application, to more fatigue of body and more uneasiness of mind than he could have suffered through the whole of his life from the want of them. (IV.1.8: 181)

This man initially pursues wealth just as a means to realize happiness and tranquility, but it gradually turns into the end of his life itself. He becomes blind to the situation in which the pursuit of wealth actually causes greater suffering than he experienced before this attempt. The more he struggles to pursue wealth, the further away he becomes from happiness and tranquility. This is the psychological process in which the individual subject confuses happiness with wealth. Wealth might promise happiness to him, but wealth is not happiness itself. In the continuing part of the story, Smith depicts the miserable condition of this man’s
later life.

Through the whole of his life he pursues the idea of a certain artificial and elegant repose which he may never arrive at, for which he sacrifices a real tranquillity that is at all times in his power, and which, if in the extremity of old age he should at last attain it, he will find to be in no respect preferable to that humble security and contentment which he had abandoned for it. It is then, in the last dregs of life, his body wasted with toil and disease, [...] that he begins at last to find that wealth and greatness are mere trinkets of frivolous utility [...]. (IV.1.8: 181)

The man becomes conscious that wealth is not happiness itself. Ironically, the misery of his body and mind enables him to reflect on his past ambition. Even though *The Theory of Moral Sentiments* is not itself a work of fiction, this kind of story is sometimes deployed as a hypothetical example to illustrate Smith’s philosophy. This may suggest the way in which the philosophical inquiry into wealth incorporates an element of fiction into its own narrative. I also want to emphasize that Smith’s narrative here is descriptive, not prescriptive. His aim is to grasp the psychological process of confusing happiness with wealth. He does not offer advice as to how to avoid making this mistake.

Smith summarizes that people pursue wealth because of their “deception” (IV.1.10: 183). Nature deceives them to imagine wealth as “something grand and beautiful and noble, of which the attainment is well worth all the toil and anxiety” (IV.1.9: 183). He emphasizes a productive consequence of this deception. Although it prompts people to suffer from excessive work, this labor will contribute to improve their social and natural environment. The pursuit of wealth even transforms “the whole face of the globe” and establishes “the great high road of communication to the different nations of the earth” (IV.1.10: 183, 184). Smith’s narrative moves from a micro-perspective focusing on the individual subject to a
macro-perspective focusing on the globe. In *The Theory of Moral Sentiments*, he does not examine the interaction between the metropole and colonies. But his subsequent work, the *Wealth of Nations*, shows a keen awareness that these colonies become a crucial space for the pursuit and subsequent transmission of wealth.

In the *Wealth of Nations*, Smith examines the negative influence of “[t]he monopoly of the colony trade” for “[t]he industry of Great Britain” (IV.vii.c.43: 604). This analysis shows the way in which a huge amount of wealth flows from the colonies into the metropole. This is what Bramble perceives in Bath. Smith’s narrative of international trade deploys a trope which is also found in *Humphry Clinker*, Britain as an overgrown monster.

In her present condition, Great Britain resembles one of those unwholesome bodies in which some of the vital parts are overgrown, and which, upon that account, are liable to many dangerous disorders scarce incident to those in which all the parts are more properly proportioned. A small stop in that great blood-vessel, which has been artificially swelled beyond its natural dimensions, and through which an unnatural proportion of the industry and commerce of the country has been forced to circulate, is very likely to bring on the most dangerous disorders upon the whole body politic. (IV.vii.c.43: 604-05)

As in Bramble’s letters, circulation appears as a metaphor to connect the health of the individual body with that of the British empire itself. Smith’s concern is monopoly, which causes the unnatural development of the industrial structure of Britain. *Humphry Clinker* and *The Wealth of Nations* share this perception of an imbalance in the economic structure, which leads them to deploy a similar kind of trope. At the same time, Smith initially focuses on the channels of circulation rather than the amount of wealth. In other words, the problem he addresses is how, rather than how much, wealth flows from the colonies into the metropole.
The use of the metaphor of circulation also suggests that both Smollett’s epistolary novel and Smith’s philosophical works are attempts to grasp the whole structure of the network of international trade. The form of the epistolary novel enables the representation of individuals encountering this web of the interconnected world from their own perspective.

Smith’s philosophical narrative aims to establish an impartial view of the whole structure of this interconnected world. Smollett’s epistolary novel shows the way in which this structure shapes each individual’s daily experience and view of the world as well as depicting the way in which individuals imagine the interconnected world as a whole from their partial experience.

In “From Map to Network in Humphry Clinker,” Andrew Franta argues that *Humphry Clinker* surveys “a picture of society constructed in the service of an attempt to depict the networks of social relations that comprise it” (772). Some features of Smollett’s writing as a novelist, such as “flat characters, episodic plots, and a preference for satire and romance at the expense of realism,” are actually “key features of an approach to novelistic representation that emphasizes the systems and schemes that organize social relations” (773). Franta construes letters in *Humphry Clinker* not only as individual voices of each character but also as “formal markers of social connections” (773). Franta deploys the idea of the network to examine the construction of a vision of society in *Humphry Clinker*, but this approach is also useful for thinking about its vision of the wider world which is composed of the relation between the metropole and its colonies. My own question arising from Franta’s framing focuses on the way in which Bramble observes and responds to the network of the interconnected world.

In Bath, Bramble calls the new rich from the colonies a “mob,” or “a monster” (37). His letter expresses that he “never could abide, either in its head, tail, midriff, or members” (37). He aspires to be a distant observer of this chaotic assemblage, not a participant in it. His act of observation is observed by a travel companion, Jery Melford. He finds that “delicacy of
feeling . . . makes [Bramble] timorous and fearful” (29). From this perspective, he can be seen as a man who needs boundaries between him and others to regulate his excessive feeling. He continues to be reluctant to participate in sociable exchange after moving from Bath to London. His impression of London is almost the same as that of Bath. He is disgusted by “[t]he tide of luxury” transforming the capital into “an immense wilderness, in which there is neither watch nor ward of any signification” (87). The recovery of order becomes a theme of his journey in two respects. Firstly, Bramble himself needs to regulate his feelings in order to recover his health. Secondly, he thinks that the body of Britain, comprised by networks of trade, becomes ill due to the lack of any regulating force. His concern is that the intensive flow of wealth mixes different groups of people together and makes their interaction frenzied. At sites of public entertainment in London, he states, “there is no distinction or subordination left” (87). “The different departments of life are jumbled together” there (87). “All is tumult and hurry” (88).

4. The Unity and Heterogeneity of the Epistolary Novel

By deploying the medical trope of circulation, Smith suggests that the problem of the conflicted relation between virtue and commerce is not a product of the interconnected world itself but rather its structure. In this vision, the imbalanced distribution of wealth is identified as a cause of moral corruption. Returning to my attempt to read Humphry Clinker as a work of the Scottish Enlightenment, Smith’s alternative vision of this interconnected world poses the question of whether Bramble reaches a similar solution at the end of his journey. On the one hand, he becomes less and less dismissive of the flourishing of international trade on his way to the northern part of Britain by observing the way in which the power of commerce transforms a previously barren land into an energetic hub connecting distant places. He is particularly amazed by the prosperity of Glasgow as a city of merchants who “have a noble spirit of enterprise” (239). The transformation of his view reaches a Smithian solution. On the
other hand, Bramble’s last letter expresses his joy at returning to Brambleton-hall where he will enjoy Christmas dinner (336). He says, “It must be something very extraordinary that will induce me to revisit either Bath or London” (335-36). He clearly aspires at this point to separate himself from the interconnected world. Charles R. Sullivan presents the conflict between these interpretations as “the two Smolletts problem” (“Enacting the Scottish Enlightenment” 416-19). In the former, Bramble finally becomes an ally of Smith, assuming the possibility of a reconciliation between virtue and commerce. In the latter, Bramble remains a civic humanist denying the possibility of that reconciliation. It should be noted that Bramble is just one of the characters who express their views in the letter form in this novel. This means that his voice is not necessarily dominant in Humphry Clinker, and therefore, his view cannot be equivalent to the view of the novel itself or Smollett’s own opinion on commerce and virtue even if there might be continuity. The two Smolletts problem is actually the two Brambles problem.

Bramble dislikes people involved with commerce, accusing them of causing the chaotic disorder of the social and moral landscape of the capital. He becomes nostalgic about a past time, around thirty years ago, when “very few, even of the most opulent citizens of London, kept any equipage, or even any servants in livery” (87). In the present time, on the contrary, he sees that “every trader in any degree of credit […] maintains a couple of footmen, a coachman, and postilion” (87). Like former letters written in Bath, he is horrified by the emergence of a corrupt “mass” comprising people who pursue “luxury” (87). As an observer, Bramble thinks that he “[has] done with the science of men” (104). This phrase, “the science of men,” seems to allude to Hume’s A Treatise of Human Nature (1739-40), in which he presents his philosophical inquiry into human nature as “the science of man” based on “experience and observation” (4: Introduction 7 SB xvi).

Despite Bramble’s desire to detach himself from the world of commerce, however, it remains questionable whether he really succeeds in doing so. Following Dr. Lewis’s advice,
he “took some of the tincture of ginseng,” a medical plant, and “found it exceedingly grateful to the stomach” (151). This incorporation of an exotic commodity shows the way in which he actually participates in acts of consumption made possible by the network of the interconnected world. The condition of his body is partially improved thanks to a product imported from the wider world. Prior to this, when he is in Bath, he “[sends] to London […] for half a pound of Gengzeng,” (37). At this moment, he states:

I doubt much, whether that which comes from America is equally efficacious with what is brought from the East Indies. Some years ago, a friend of mine paid sixteen guineas for two ounces of it; and in six months after, it was sold in the same shop for five shillings the pound. In short, we live in a vile world of fraud and sophistication [. . .]. (37)

His disgust is not directed towards the incorporation of an exotic commodity into his body, but towards “fraud” taking place in the process of its marketing in London. Bramble’s negative view of commerce and consumption seems to come from his background as a man from the Welsh countryside who has his own estate. In another letter written in London, he “state[s] the difference between [his] town grievance , and [his] country comforts” (117). At Bramleton-hall, he “live[s] in the midst of honest men, and trusty dependants, who […] have a disinterested attachment to [his] person” (118).

As Sullivan points out in “Enacting the Scottish Enlightenment,” Bramble’s journey to Scotland shows the transformation of his opinion (426-27). Instead of dismissing all kinds of commercial activities as a cause of moral corruption, he comes to realize their potentially productive agency. He sees the process of improvement by which Scots struggle to negotiate with their barren environment by moving from agriculture to commerce. His letter on Glasgow is particularly notable as a pivot of this transition. He praises Glasgow as “one of
the prettiest towns in Europe; and [...] one of the most flourishing in Great Britain” (238). Indeed, “it is a perfect bee-hive in point of industry” (238). He writes to Dr. Lewis that “marks of opulence and independency appear in every quarter of this commercial city” (238). Unlike his negative account of merchants in Bath, Bramble is favorable to merchants in Glasgow, saying that “[t]he people of Glasgow have a noble spirit of enterprise” (239).

Bramble’s view covers the wider network of commerce, of which Glasgow is part, as well as the city itself. Merchants connect Glasgow with other places. For instance, he observes: “Alloa is a neat thriving town, that depends in a great measure on the commerce of Glasgow, the merchants of which send hither tobacco and other articles, to be deposited in warehouses for exportation from the Firth of Forth” (237). Commodities circulate across the country based on sea traffic. And this connective agency of commerce is presented as a cause of the growth of this town. The wider network is well ordered, and he does not find any evidence of its deformation. Bramble enjoys a conversation with John Glassford, one of the Glasgow tobacco merchants (239, 422 n.15). Bramble describes Glassford as “one of the greatest merchants in Europe” (239).

The two Brambles problem actually arises from his ambiguous position as a distant observer. The problem is a consequence of the clash between his aspiration to separate himself from the interconnected world and the impossibility of that aspiration. Even though he surely realizes the possible reconciliation between virtue and commerce based on his astonishing experience of Glasgow, this stance assumes that Bramble himself is outside of the process of circulation, emphasizing that his position is not that of an actor but an observer. As his incorporation of exotic medicine shows, however, he is also a consumer. After the recovery of his health, he looks forward to returning to Brambleton-hall, which he imagines as a place separated from the interconnected world. This finale subversively questions whether it is possible to get beyond the interconnected world. The whole plot of his journey thematizes an attempt to view the interconnected world from a distant position, and draws
attention to the nature of the epistolary novel itself, which presents individual perceptions of
the daily world. The two Brambles problem is not solved even at the end of the story, but the
presence of that problem suggests the impossible task of *Humphry Clinker*, imagining an
outside of the interconnected world and representing its totality from such a detached
position.

It should also be noted that Bramble’s view does not necessarily become the dominant
voice in the novel due to the presence of other characters and their letters. Among his
company, for instance, Jery Melford counters the negative account of Bath by emphasizing its
“variety” (47). It is a place where “a man has daily opportunities of seeing the most
remarkable characters of the community” (47). Melford recognizes the restlessness of this spa
town, but explicates the productive effects of the mingling of people from different social
classes, professions, and regions. He writes to Watkin Phillips, his friend in Oxford:

> Here we have ministers of state, judges, generals, bishops, projectors,
philosophers, wits, poets, players, *chemists*, *fiddlers*, and *buffoons*. If he makes
any considerable stay in the place, he is sure of meeting with some particular
friend, whom he did not expect to see […]. Another entertainment, peculiar to
Bath, arises from the general mixture of all degrees assembled in our public
rooms, without distinction of rank or fortune. This is what my uncle reprobates, as
a monstrous jumble of heterogeneous principles […]. But this chaos is to me a
source of infinite amusement. (47)

Melford suggests that what Bramble calls the monstrosity of Bath is just a negative account
of the social mixture taking place there. In Bramble’s gloomy view, the pursuit of luxury
destroys the established organic unity of the community. In Melford’s sanguine view,
however, this havoc generates the encounter of different groups of people originally divided
in the established social structure. This positive account presents restlessness as a productive force to dissolve social and cultural boundaries. As *Humphry Clinker* is not a philosophical dialogue but an epistolary novel, Bramble and Melford just express their views and there is no clear judgment of which is more plausible in the novel as a whole.

In addition to presenting a different view of particular scenes, Melford is also an attentive observer of Bramble whose “singularities afford a rich mine of entertainment” (29). He sees his uncle as a man with “a natural excess of mental sensibility” (18). Melford thinks that Bramble continuously struggles to regulate his excessive sensibility. This would explain why he is so anxious about the chaotic order of Bath while Melford rather enjoys its fluid social dynamics. He might want to protect his delicate mind from being affected in such a place, as the chaos of the social order would cause the disorder of his mind. Melford observes that Bramble’s “delicacy of feeling [. . .] makes him timorous and fearful” (29).

5. Conclusion

The novel is a literary form which seeks to grasp and represent the reality of daily life. The geographical scope of *Humphry Clinker* shows that the novelistic perception of the contemporary world in the mid eighteenth century reorganizes the interaction between domestic space and the wider world. In other words, distant colonial space, North America and India, impinges on daily reality in novelistic representation. In their travels around Britain, characters in *Humphry Clinker* are exposed to the socio-political dynamics by which they are connected to far away spaces.

*Humphry Clinker* can be seen as a work of the Scottish Enlightenment in the sense that Smollett deploys the medical trope of circulation to grasp the present network of commerce as a diseased body. The moral corruption of individual subjects is identified as a consequence of the unprecedented flow of wealth from colonial spaces into the metropole. This link between moral philosophy and political economy, the switch from a micro-perspective to a
macro-perspective, shows the shared background between Smollett’s fictional writing and Smith’s philosophical prose. Moralizing commerce is an intellectual venture across different genres of writing. Literary culture plays an active role in the reconciliation of virtue and commerce by presenting a vision of the alternative structure of the distribution of wealth in which individual subjects are not drawn into addicted consumption.

At the same time, the epistolary form explores the possibility/impossibility of imagining a detached position from which the individual subject might be able to view the interconnected world as a distant observer. Within the network of international commerce, people experience different kinds of reality, as with Bramble’s and Melford’s differing perceptions of Bath. The trope of the spectator connects Smollett as a novelist with Smith as a philosopher. The epistolary novel makes a distinctive contribution to moralizing commerce in its emphasis on the co-existence of different experiences, views, and realities within a world connected by the vast network of commerce.
Chapter 5

Circumnavigating the Globe:
James Boswell as Diarist in the Scottish Enlightenment

1. Introduction

On the 7th of July 1776, James Boswell (1740-95) visited David Hume in Edinburgh to talk to him about religion. Hume was just back from receiving medical treatment in London and Bath, and faced the terminal stage of his disease. He realized that there was no hope for recovery. Boswell was wondering whether this confrontation with death might make Hume reject his atheism. During this visit, he carefully observed Hume and recorded details of their encounter in his journal. He later expanded this record into “An Account of My Last Interview with David Hume, Esq.”

I found him alone, in a reclining posture in his drawing-room. He was lean, ghastly, and quite of an earthy appearance. He was dressed in a suit of grey cloth with white metal buttons, and a kind of scratch wig. He was quite different from the plump figure which he used to present. He had before him Dr. Campbell’s *Philosophy of Rhetoric*. He seemed to be placid and even cheerful. He said he was just approaching to his end. I think these were his words. (11)

Boswell depicts a vivid portrait of Hume approaching death. The passage above emphasizes his decline in health with describing his “ghastly” appearance. His “plump figure” no longer exists. If Hume’s physical condition has deteriorated, however, Boswell finds him in good spirits. He continues to be “cheerful” and calm in the face of imminent death. His mind remains active even if his body does not. Boswell did not write a biography of Hume to
match *The Life of Samuel Johnson*, but he shows a keen interest in both Hume’s ideas and his life. His journals are valuable sources for Hume studies. In *The Life of David Hume*, Mossner incorporates Boswell’s interview into Chapter 39, which he titles “Death Comes for the Philosopher.”

As a diarist, Boswell is also an attentive observer of eighteenth-century Scotland and its intellectual life. In 1773, Boswell accompanied Samuel Johnson to the Hebrides, and kept a record of the journey. Boswell’s *Journal of a Tour to the Hebrides* presents their encounter with Scotland, both the Lowlands and Highlands. As a Scot, Boswell acts as a guide for Johnson and corrects the latter’s prejudice against Scotland resulting from his background as an Englishman. In the beginning of his journal, Boswell expresses that he sometimes treats Englishmen including Johnson as “children” because of their “outrageous contempt of Scotland” (10). His journal writing intends to depict the process by which Johnson sheds his prejudice thanks to the new impressions of Scotland he received and to the mediation of his companion. For instance, he mentions an event during their visit to Glasgow:

> The professor of the university being informed of our arrival, Dr. Stevenson, Dr. Reid, and Mr. Anderson breakfasted with us. Mr. Anderson accompanied us while Dr. Johnson viewed this beautiful city. He had told me that one day in London, when Dr. Adam Smith was boasting of it, he turned to him and said, “Pray, sir, have you ever seen Brentford?” This was surely a strong instance of his impatience and spirit of contradiction. I put him in mind of it today, while he expressed his admiration of the elegant buildings, and whispered him, “Don’t you feel some remorse?” (29 October 1773: 364)

Boswell’s description is anecdotal. His journal is a collection of conversations between Johnson and Scots including Johnson and him. For readers, the journal is a medium between
them and Johnson’s perception of Scotland. Boswell himself works as a medium between Johnson and Scotland. He does not hesitate to point out Johnson’s misunderstanding and misperception regarding Scotland. As an observer, Boswell is interested in the personal character of Johnson and the Scots whom he met during his tour, in addition to the social and cultural landscape of Scottish cities. As he does not think of himself as a philosopher, he does not aspire to derive abstract principles from his travel experience.

Among modern readers, Boswell is known as the author of his *London Journal*. But he is neither a permanent resident of London nor an Englishman. He is a Scot who admires Addisonian London. He was born in Edinburgh in 1740 as the eldest son of Alexander Boswell, Lord Auchinleck.¹ He attended Edinburgh University between 1753 and 1759 where he enjoyed the conversational culture. In 1759, he was relocated to Glasgow University by Lord Auchinleck. His time at Glasgow was brief owing to his move to London in 1760. But he attended Adam Smith’s lectures on rhetoric during this period and remembered him as an impressive teacher. His *London Journal* was written between 1762 and 1763. After this convivial stay in London, Lord Auchinleck sent him to Utrecht for his legal education. He used this as a chance to travel around the European continent and to meet Voltaire and Rousseau. He went back to Britain in 1766 and started working at the bar of the general assembly of the Church of Scotland in 1769. But he aspired to go back to London. He returned to London between March and May 1772 during the court’s spring recess.

Boswell moved back and forth between Edinburgh and London. As a legal student and traveler, he also experienced European cities such as Berlin, Geneva, Turin, Rome, and Paris. In his *Journal of a Tour to the Hebrides*, he is proud of himself as “a citizen of the world,” and states that he “sincerely love[s] ‘every kindred and tongue and people and nation’” (10). He lived as a Scot, Briton, and cosmopolitan. He established his literary fame as a diarist and

¹ See Gordon Turnbull’s Oxford DNB entry on James Boswell.
biographer while developing his legal career. The publication of *An Account of Corsica* (1768) marked his substantial beginning as a writer. Unlike major Scottish thinkers, he was not a professor. He was a sociable man favoring theatrical performance, but also suffered from hypochondria. The course of his life demonstrates his similarity to Hume, even though Boswell is not a philosopher.

Boswell visited Hume in Edinburgh before his famous interview of 1776. On the 17th of December 1775, he drank “a fresh bottle of port” with Hume, who “had on a white nightcap and a hat above it” (*The Ominous Years* 200). Boswell states that he “had really a good chat with him this afternoon” and “thought also of writing his life” (201). He did not write Hume’s biography, but these passages show the active interaction between them. By emphasizing the link between Boswell and Hume, I do not intend to undervalue the friendship between Boswell and Johnson. In some conversations between Boswell and Hume, they refer to Johnson and his writing.

Drank tea with David Hume, having half a year’s rent of his house to pay him. He spoke of Mr. Johnson’s *Journey* in terms so slighting that it could have no effect but to show his resentment. He however agreed with him perfectly as to Ossian. (6 March 1775: 73)

As this passage exemplifies, Hume’s comment on Johnson is harsh. In his last interview, Boswell notes his unhappiness about Hume’s attack on Johnson.

I somehow or other brought Dr. Johnson’s name into our conversation. I had often heard him speak of that great man in a very illiberal manner. He said upon this occasion, “Johnson should be pleased with my *History.*” Nettled by Hume’s frequent attacks upon my revered friend in former conversations, I told him now
that Dr. Johnson did not allow him much credit [...]. (“An Account of My Last Interview with David Hume” 13)

Even though Boswell does not directly express his irritation to Hume, their casual conversation is far from cordial. Behind the interaction between Boswell and Hume, there is Johnson’s shadow. Exploring the friendship between Boswell and Hume alongside that of Boswell and Johnson also helps us to understand Boswell’s literary practice. Following Addison, Johnson writes periodical essays, and like Hume his essays take a distinctive form. I will argue in what follows that Boswell’s journal writing responds to their essay writing.

In this chapter, I aim to present Boswell as part of the Scottish Enlightenment. Along with Hume, he has a critical attention to the nature and use of different literary forms. In addition to biography, he often adopts the journal form. Through his literary practice as a diarist, he fashions a multi-layered self as a Scot, Briton, and cosmopolitan. In the metropolis, he presents himself as an observer of humankind akin to the Addisonian spectator. This model of spectatorship highlights his intellectual link with Smith as well. Like other contemporary Scottish thinkers, Boswell experiences a secondhand encounter with diverse parts of the globe, and is amazed by the great diversity of human beings and their societies. As he is not a philosopher, his writing is not committed to establishing a theory of human diversity. But his journals vividly depict forms of secondhand global encounter in the metropolis. This global consciousness and geographical interest emphasize that there is some shared ground between Boswell and Scottish thinkers.

This chapter is divided into two sections. In the first section, I examine Boswell’s practice of keeping a diary in his London Journal. He uses the journal as a medium to transform himself from a provincial Scot into a cosmopolitan citizen in the metropolis. The journal embodies a theatrical idea of selfhood. In addition, it is a repository of conversation taking place at venues in London such as taverns and theaters. For Boswell, listening to and
participating in sociable conversation are an effective way to recast himself as a polite writer. He started keeping a diary in 1762, at a time when the Seven Years War was approaching its end. This was arguably the first global war. Boswell’s *London Journal* shows some of the specific ways in which people in London experienced a secondhand encounter with the wider world through conversation.

In the second section, I discuss Boswell’s fascination with Captain Cook’s circumnavigation of the globe during the 1770s. On the 2nd of April 1776, he dined with Captain Cook and was impressed by the careful manner in which he described people in distant lands (*The Ominous Years*: 307-09). Boswell also had a conversation with Samuel Johnson in which he expressed his enthusiastic “inclination to make the voyage” with Captain Cook (3 April 1776: 310). Johnson simply pointed out the vanity of such an aspiration. He is a man who is not amazed by the diversity of human beings on the globe but just finds people in different places experiencing a universal human condition. For Boswell, geographical curiosity saves him from melancholy. In London, Cook’s voyages promoted a rising interest in the South Pacific. In addition to the publication of a narrative of Cook’s travels, the visit of the Pacific islander Mai served to mediate this distant region for Londoners. Boswell shared the enthusiasm for information about the South Pacific with some Scottish thinkers, while remaining skeptical about the possibility of deriving philosophical principles from the firsthand observations of others.

2-1. The Theatrical Self and Conversation

The opening of Boswell’s *London Journal* refers to the famous dictum “Know thyself” (39). He started keeping daily records when he left Scotland for London in 1762. There is an essential link between his literary practice and his experience of being away from home. By

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the performative agency of writing, he intended to recast himself into a metropolitan man of
polite manners.

A man cannot know himself better than by attending to the feelings of his heart
and to his external actions, from which he may with tolerable certainty judge
“what manner of person he is.” I have therefore determined to keep a daily journal
in which I shall set down my various sentiments and my various conduct, which
will be not only useful but very agreeable. It will give me a habit of application
and improve me in expression; and knowing that I am to record my transactions
will make me more careful to do well. (39)

The focus of Boswell’s journal writing is his selfhood combining his inner sentiments and
external actions. His idea of the self is fluid. He thinks that the continuous practice of writing
a daily record affects his manner of behavior, and this improvement in action also polishes his
sentiments. He sees the self as an accumulation of habits, and therefore it is changeable. His
journal writing presumes that there is a model of the mutual interaction between the self and
the process of writing. The individual subject observes London and writes down his
experience, while this act of writing in turn shapes subjectivity. As a diarist, Boswell is both a
spectator and actor in London.

There are notable interactions between Boswell’s sentiments and the social dynamic of
the metropolitan landscape. He started writing his journal in 1762, towards the end of the
Seven Years War (1756-63). The socio-political climate of the early 1760s, characterized by
uneasiness about the consequences of this first global war and the rapid growth of Britain’s
territorial empire, sometimes prevents Boswell from being only a spectator of an event, and
forces him to reflect on his position. For instance, he faced the rising tide of Scotophobia when he went to see an opera on 8 December 1762.

At night I went to Covent Garden and saw *Love in a Village*, a new comic opera, for the first night. I liked it much. I saw it from the gallery, but I was first in the pit. Just before the overture began to be played, two Highland officers came in. The mob in the upper gallery roared out, “No Scots! No Scots! Out with them!,” hissed and pelted them with apples. My heart warmed to my countrymen, my Scotch blood boiled with indignation. I jumped up on the benches, roared out, “Damn you, you rascals!,” hissed and was in the greatest rage. I am very sure at that time I should have been the most distinguished of heroes. I hated the English; I wished from my soul that the Union was broke and that we might give them another battle of Bannockburn. (*Boswell’s London Journal* 8 December 1762: 71-72)

Boswell presents himself as “the most distinguished of heroes” due to his expression of anger at the jeering of his countrymen. This exemplifies the theatricality of the self in his writing. He transforms himself from being a passive spectator of the opera to an active participant in the theatre. The metropolis itself becomes a theatre where individual subjects respond to the scenes which they witness. In addition, Boswell is more than a spectator in the sense that he actively involves himself in conversation with others. As an avid reader of Addison’s periodical essays, he aspires to follow the figure of Mr. Spectator. But the combination of detached observation and active participation distinguishes his writing from *The Spectator*.

On the 9th of December 1762, Boswell described the day as “the great day of debate in

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the Houses of Parliament on the Peace” (London Journal 72). Citizens also exchanged their own opinions about this matter. At Child’s, in his record, a physician says:

Have not you had all that you wanted? Did you not begin the war to settle your boundaries in North America? And have not you got that done, as Mr. Pitt the great champion of the Opposition acknowledged in the House, better than could have been expected? (11 December 1762: 74-75)

Boswell responds:

Now, Sir, I grant you that we began the war with intention only to settle our boundaries in America and would have been satisfied with that and nothing more. But, Sir, we have had uncommon success. We have not only got what we intended, but we have also picked up some other little things, such as the Havana, Guadeloupe &c. (75)

This dialogue exemplifies the way in which conversation enables people in London to imagine their connection with the distant lands. Boswell’s journal is the record of diverse kinds of conversation. The idea and practice of conversation are central to his journal writing.

I shall here put down my thoughts on different subjects at different times, the whims that may seize me and the sallies of my luxuriant imagination. I shall mark the anecdotes and the stories that I hear, the instructive or amusing conversations that I am present at, and the various adventures that I may have. (39)

Boswell’s attention to “whims” and “sallies” suggests that there is no straightforward
direction to his narrative. As a diarist, he rambles. Due to the discursive form of his journal, he can move from one topic to another with ease. He can also insert information and anecdotes into the record, even if they are not related to his main point. His *London Journal* is a notable record of “conversation” taking place in the metropolis. Its anecdotes show the way in which individual subjects were exposed to the wider web of circulating information in the mid-eighteenth century. Even during his journey from Scotland to London, at the very beginning of the *London Journal*, he records a conversation about India. His travel companion, Mr. Stewart, “had made four voyages to the East Indies” (15 November 1762: 41):

> We chatted a good deal. Stewart told me that some blacks in India were attacking their boat in order to plunder it, and that he shot two with his own hand. In the afternoon between Stamford and Stilton there was a young unruly horse in the chaise which run away with the driver, and jumping to one side of the road, we were overturned. (43: 18 November 1762)

This passage shows the way in which conversation mediates the imagination of the world beyond Europe. In addition to print culture, personal connections work as a crucial factor. I also want to note that Boswell’s own comment and response to the anecdote are not in the journal. After describing Mr. Stewart’s tale, his writing moves to another story. He is not interested in using anecdotes as case studies for establishing and testing the principles of human nature. This highlights a distinctive contrast between his journal-writing and Hume’s essay-writing, even as the idea and practice of conversation underlie both. They embody conversation in different ways. As an essayist, Hume presents himself as “a Kind of Resident or Ambassador from the Dominions of Learning to those of Conversation” (“Of Essay-Writing” 535). He collects information and events from the everyday world to develop his
study of human nature. His essay writing analyzes and abstracts these examples into knowledge and universal principles. And he envisages that the outcome of this intellectual labor will be the “most agreeable Topics of Conversation” (“Of Essay-Writing” 535). The essay form is a medium for sociable conversation and a container of knowledge.

As a diarist, Boswell similarly characterizes his journal as a repository of conversation. The journal is a container of information, opinions, and knowledge. But they are not necessarily and distinctively his own. He is interested in keeping a record of circulated information and cheerful conversation, in Hume’s terms the raw materials of philosophical abstraction. Boswell detaches himself from theorizing.

Boswell has one specific reader in mind when he starts the London Journal. This is crucial for understanding the nature of his writing and how he uses the journal form to embody conversation.

I shall regularly record the business or rather the pleasure of every day. I shall not study much correctness, lest the labour of it should make me lay it aside altogether. I hope it will be of use to my worthy friend Johnston, and that while he laments my personal absence, this journal may in some measure supply that defect and make him happy. (40)

According to Pottle’s note, the “entire journal was written with Johnston in mind, and was sent to him through the post in weekly parcels, each accompanied by a letter” (40 n.4).

Johnston is a Scot living in Edinburgh and Boswell’s former classmate in “Robert Hunter’s Greek class in 1755” (Pottle’s Introduction 31) The journal is included with Boswell’s letters from London to Scotland.

2-2. Global Interconnection and the Condition of Sentiments
The first entry of the London journal, “Monday 15 November,” begins with an expression of Boswell’s excitement: “[e]lated with the thoughts of my journey to London, I got up” (40). There is no sense of sorrow at being away from home here. When he “came upon Highgate hill and had a view of London,” he “was all life and joy” (19 November 1762: 43). As he presents himself as a man born “with a melancholy temperament,” this continuous enthusiasm is remarkable (“Sketch” 1). London initially appears to be a place which enables him to cure his melancholia, though this recovery might be ephemeral. The interplay between the condition of his sentiments, his experience of the metropolis, and the agency of journal-writing, therefore, is pivotal to my interpretation.

Boswell encounters London through an Addisonian lens. He describes himself as “full of rich imagination of London, ideas suggested by the Spectator” (8 January 1763: 130). This ideal man of polite manners filters his experience and view of being in London. He walks around the metropolis all the while attempting to identify as Mr. Spectator.

The Spectator mentions his being seen at Child’s, which makes me have an affection for it. I think myself like him, and am serenely happy there. There is something to me very agreeable in having my time laid out in some method, such as every Saturday going to Child’s. (11 December 1762: 76)

Boswell acts like a performer in a theatre, and he aims to transform himself into a polite man with a good sense of taste. Being in London is analogous to being at the theatre. This might also signal a notable difference between Mr. Spectator and Boswell. The former is an observer of the metropolis, whose own position is detached from its social dynamics, while the latter is directly engaged as an actor in urban life. The crucial question here is to what extent Boswell remains a spectator of London.

The theatre is not only a crucial metaphor for grasping the nature of Boswell’s sense of
self but also an important place in his metropolitan routine. He is an enthusiast for dramatic performances, and his London Journal records of his frequent visit to theatres. Even on his first day in London after the long journey from Edinburgh, he “went to Covent Garden” to see Every Man in His Housmour and expressed his feeling of satisfaction; “[i]t was fine after the fatigues of my journey to find myself snug in a theatre, my body warm and my mind elegantly amused” (19 November 1762: 45). His enjoyment of the theatre as a metropolitan pastime is also significant in a Scottish context due to the Douglas controversy in the late 1750s. On the one hand, the socio-cultural fascination with playwriting and performance was not acceptable to the religious ethos of the Presbyterian tradition. On the other hand, the absence of any Scottish playwright who could be comparable with Shakespeare was understood as a mark of the cultural inferiority of Scotland to England by Moderates such as William Robertson. The theatre was a symbol of civilized society and the aesthetic experience of enjoying plays was seen as an important step on the way to becoming a man with polite manners. Therefore, it is a crucial place for Boswell’s attempt to transform himself from a parochial Scot into a metropolitan Briton.

The theatre is not only a place for dramatic spectacle but also for sociable conversation. On 27 November 1762, for instance, Boswell was introduced into “the Beefsteak Club” by Mr. Beard, the manager of Covent Garden Theatre; the members met in “a handsome room above the theatre” (London Journal 51). Among this company, Boswell refers to the presence of John Wilkes, “the author of The North Briton,” which suggests that the theatre and its conversable space is tied to the contemporary socio-political climate of the early 1760s (52).

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4 Adam Ferguson wrote The Morality of Stage Plays Seriously Considered (1753) to defend the stage production of John Home’s play. See Fania Oz-Salzberger’s introduction to Ferguson’s An Essay on the History of Civil Society. See xi.

5 Felicity A. Nussbaum argues that the theatre is a place of secondhand encounter between people in the metropolis and the wider world in the long eighteenth century. See “The Theatre of Empire: Racial Counterfeit, Racial Realism” in Kathleen Wilson’s A New Imperial History (2004) 71-90. After witnessing the English hostility towards two Highlanders in the Theatre, Boswell had a conversation with these officers and learned that they “were just come from the Havana” (London Journal 72). This
Boswell’s experience of London theatres does not always follow the Mr. Spectator model. His London journal sometimes presents the moment in which he realizes the existence of this gap. For instance, he “went to Drury Lane gallery and saw Macbeth” on 13 April 1763: “We [Boswell and Temple] endeavoured to work our minds into the frame of the Spectator’s, but we could not. We were both too dissipated.” (240)

On 19 January 1763, Boswell planned to “walk from the one end of London to the other” with his Scottish friends, Dempster and Erskine, to satisfy “a whim” (152). The beginning of this day is not favorable due to the shadow of his melancholia. In the morning, he “felt stronger symptoms of the sad distemper” though he “was unwilling to imagine such a thing” (152-53). He started this planned urban excursion without confiding this anxiety to his two friends.

We walked up to Hyde Park Corner, from whence we set out at ten. Our spirits were high with the notion of the adventure, and the variety that we met with as we went along is amazing. As the Spectator observes, one end of London is like a different country from the other in look and in manners. (153)

He presents their walking around London as an aesthetic experience of encountering diversity. Boswell imagines the metropolis as a microcosm of the wider world, saying that “one end of London is like a different country from the other.” His enjoyment of this variety somewhat cures his depression. The social energy of the urban space affects the condition of his sentiments. As he refers to Mr. Spectator in his narrative of his urban excursion, Addison’s ideal again frames his aesthetic experience of being in London

Boswell’s enthusiasm and depression should also be examined with reference to kind of conversation in the theatre mediates the geographical imagination.
another interlocutor, Samuel Johnson, as a writer of periodical essays and a man of letters who is skeptical of the value of travel. Boswell employs his persona as a polite metropolitan in London as a kind of theatrical performance. In this engagement with urban dynamics, he does not have a particular profession. He is an ambitious Scot living in London, but his aspiration is detached from economic success. It is therefore illuminating to read Boswell alongside Johnson, who, in the opening remark of *The Idler* No. 1. (15 April 1758), points out “the difficulty of finding a proper title” for a collection of periodical essays, and suggests that “man may be more properly distinguished as an idle animal” (3, 4). Such a character is “always inquisitive and seldom retentive” (5). Johnson states that “[t]he idler, who habituates himself to be satisfied with what he can most easily obtain, not only escapes labours which are often fruitless, but sometimes succeeds better than those who despise all that is within their reach, and think every thing more valuable as it is harder to be acquired” (3). This is a kind of paradox of the Idler. He is reluctant to participate in productive labor, but this laziness enables him to be a critical inquirer and present fruitful opinions. Compared to Addison’s Spectator, Johnson’s favorable account of his own social detachment appears highly self-conscious about the Smithian division of labor happening in his own society.

Boswell is also a kind of Idler in the sense that he is not involved with productive labor in the urban landscape. Notably, his enthusiasm about being in London does not extend to consumption rooted in leisure. On 5 December 1762, Boswell responded to a question about “whether London or Edinburgh was the most agreeable place to a Scotch gentleman of small fortune” (*London Journal* 68).

In reality, a person of small fortune who has only the common views of life and would just be as well as anybody else, cannot like London. But a person of imagination and feeling, such as the Spectator finely describes, can have the most lively enjoyment from the sight of external objects without regard to property at
all. London is undoubtedly a place where men and manners may be seen to the
greatest advantage. . . . Here a young man of curiosity and observation may have a
sufficient fund of present entertainment, and may lay up ideas to employ his mind
in age. (68-69)

Boswell emphasizes that the value of being in London cannot be simply reduced to the
enjoyment of urban pastimes. This also signals his difference from the figure of the Idler,
which can be related to his Scottish background. Boswell is not satisfied with “what he can
most easily obtain.” He constantly articulates the necessity for self-improvement, seeking to
transform himself into a metropolitan Briton.

Boswell’s view of London as a microcosm of the wider world is characterized by his
excitement at being exposed to a great diversity of human beings, their customs and manners.
This fresh sense of wonder could derive from his original background as a parochial Scot; he
is amused by London because he is a newcomer to this metropolis. This aspect of his fresh
sentiments helps to distinguish Boswell from Johnson, who from a moralistic perspective
emphasizes that similar virtues and vices repeat themselves everywhere. In The Rambler No.
6. (7 April 1750), Johnson satirizes those who aim to escape from their melancholy by
“change of place”: they are “always hoping for more satisfactory delight from every new
scene, and always returning home with disappointment and complaints” (32). This is a moral
critique of our common desire to find novelty and refresh ourselves from boredom. It is,
therefore, a challenge to the conventional distinction between here and there.

Johnson concludes this periodical essay as follows: “he, who has so little knowledge of
human nature, as to seek happiness by changing any thing, but his own dispositions, will
waste his life in fruitless efforts, and multiply the griefs which he purposes to remove”
(Rambler No.6. 35). Johnson’s use of the phrase “human nature” coincidentally enables us to
discuss the value of geographical knowledge along with discourses of the Scottish
Enlightenment. In Johnson’s presentation of the wider world, the idea of the uniformity of “human nature” leads him to grasp the whole of the earth as the site of comparable scenes. This is the main reason why he is very dismissive of the value of travel. He rehearses this view in different genres, as well as in his periodical essays.

Let observation with extensive view,
Survey mankind, from China to Peru;
Remark each anxious toil, each eager strife,
And watch the busy scenes of crowded life;

(\textit{The Vanity of Human Wishes} 91-92 Line 1-4)

This “extensive view” does not present a nihilistic attitude towards human lives. Instead, it introduces certain moral propositions about our own everyday life; we can find everything within our own world \textit{here}. Johnson suggests that his readers abandon an assumption that they can find something new and different in a distant place; there is no valuable discovery to be made by traveling.

Boswell as a diarist performs his metropolitan self by exposing himself to the socio-cultural dynamics of London. He describes an aesthetic experience of encountering a great diversity of human beings and their manners of life. This sense of wonder cures his melancholia. He grasps London as a macrocosm of the wider world because metropolitan spaces, notably theatres, mediate his secondhand encounter with the world beyond Europe. He presents his curiosity about geographical information and discoveries as a potential catalyst for his recovery from mental illness. His journal-writing can be seen as a literary project which indirectly considers the global influence on the condition of his sentiments. The \textit{London Journal}'s narration of these secondhand encounters with the rest of the globe adopts an Addisonian model of spectatorship. The socio-political climate of the Post-Seven Years
War, however, does not allow Boswell to remain detached from these global dynamics. Due to his Scottish background, he becomes a participant.

Boswell’s journal-writing somewhat embodies the perspective of Johnson’s *Idler* in the sense that he participates in the urban landscape without having any profession. He is outside of the Smithian system of the division of labor, while his participation as a metropolitan allows him to enter in the social dynamics of London. At the same time, I want to emphasize the distinctive difference between Boswell as a diarist and Johnson as a periodical essayist. Johnsonian idleness entails a moral message. Geographical curiosity is dismissed as a masquerade which blinds us to universal truth. Boswell is more interested in the particular details of human life rather than any universal principles behind them. This enthusiasm for minute details embodies another kind of conversation, which is different from the Humean conversation imagined as sociable commerce.

3. Captain Cook’s Circumnavigation and the South Pacific

The death of David Hume in 1776 indicates the end of one generation of the Scottish intellectual tradition. The publication of Adam Smith’s *Wealth of Nations* in the same year signals the birth and development of political economy as a new branch of knowledge. Whereas the Treaty of Paris (1763) represents one point of socio-cultural and intellectual discontinuity in the 1760s, the outbreak of the American Revolution in 1775 poses both theoretical questions and practical issues to these Scottish thinkers. Smith’s *Wealth of Nations* and William Robertson’s *History of America* exemplify how imperial administration and global exploration shape the modes and outcomes of philosophical speculation in the Scottish Enlightenment.

In the context of the global eighteenth century, we need to be conscious that the American crisis is one of several pivots to determining the socio-cultural and intellectual ethos of the 1770s. Cook undertook his second voyage between 1772 and 1775. In *Empire,*
Barbarism, and Civilisation, Harriet Guest points out that Scottish Enlightenment theories of civilization shape Cook and his crews’ experience and observation of the South Pacific. Although most major figures of the Scottish Enlightenment had previously shown little interest in the region, the visit of Omai, a Pacific Islander, to Britain facilitated by Captain Cook in 1774 triggered a growing social interest and cultural fascination. As Kate Fullagar argues in The Savage Visit, “Oceania began to replace America as the center of the New World in British minds” from the 1760s and “Britons . . . lose their interest [in so-called savages] from the 1780s” (2, 3). According to Fullagar, then, the 1770s is a crucial transitional period for the British geographical imagination.

Charles Ryskamp and Frederick A. Pottle title Boswell’s journal written between 1774 and 1776 The Ominous Years. Ryskamp describes it as “the account of one who hungered to know himself, the whole story of a man of feeling: his passions and pleasures . . .” (Introduction ix). Unlike the major Scottish thinkers, Boswell shows a transient but enthusiastic interest in “the celebrated circumnavigator” Captain Cook and the South Pacific (London, 2 April 1776: 308). He expresses “an inclination to make the voyage” (London, 3 April 1776:310). This enthusiasm provides an interesting example of how apprehensions of the wider world mediated by conversation may affect the condition of people’s sentiments in the metropolis. We should revisit Boswell’s sketch of his own character written in 1764: “I was born with a melancholy temperament” (“Sketch of the Early Life of James Boswell” 1). Boswell’s fleeting aspiration to sail with Captain Cook indicates his belief that exposure to the extra-European world can cure his melancholy, even if only ephemerally.

On the 2nd of April 1776, Boswell dined with Captain Cook “at Sir John Pringle’s” (308). Pringle (1707-82) is known as a military physician born in Scotland, and worked as president of the Royal Society between 1772 and 1778; he formerly had been joint professor
of pneumatics and moral philosophy at Edinburgh University. His status as a mediator of this conversation between Boswell and Cook suggests the way in which Boswell is exposed to the web of the circulation and production of knowledge, and how Scots are involved with this network of knowledge distribution in London.

Interestingly, Boswell’s record of this conversation is mainly devoted to describing Cook’s personal character, though information about the South Pacific and recollections of his travels follow it. He describes Cook as “a plain, sensible man with an uncommon attention to veracity” (308). This point may seem strange unless we understand that the veracity of the traveler’s account of the unknown world was a crucial issue in the 1770s. In Curiosity and the Aesthetics of Travel Writing, 1770-1840, Nigel Leask emphasizes “the fragile credit afforded to eighteenth-century travellers” by focusing on “the public’s disbelief”; if what these travelers had found in the non-European world was “morally unacceptable, the public preferred to condemn the reporter as a travel liar” (58). In this respect, it is very reasonable for Boswell to start with observing Cook’s character particularly from a moral perspective. Unless he is acknowledged as a reliable witness, Boswell cannot take his account of the circumnavigation seriously.

Boswell enjoyed his conversation with Cook and the relatively long record of the day expresses his intellectual enthusiasm, an antidote to gloom and melancholia.

I talked a good deal with him [Captain Cook] today, as he was very obliging and communicative. He [Captain Cook] seemed to have no desire to make people stare, and being a man of good steady moral principles, as I thought, did not try to make theories out of what he had seen to confound virtue and vice. He said Hawkesworth made his book a general conclusion from a particular fact, and

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6 See his Oxford DNB entry.
would take as a fact what they had only heard. (308)

This passage shows the two layers of the issue of credit. Firstly, as Leask has shown, the creditability of the circumnavigator is tested with regard to the moral implications of what he says. Cook is acknowledged as a reliable observer because his account offers nothing harmful to present social norms. Secondly, Boswell also pays attention to the utility of such information. If the traveler’s account is credited, does it contribute to any larger form of understanding? Boswell praises Cook for his anti-theoretical attitude: the experience and observation of the circumnavigation are interesting cases but they should not be used to construct any theory. This idea of the relation between the particular and the general has a close affinity with Boswell’s use of anecdotes in his journal-writing; information and stories about non-European worlds are interesting but should not be used as the basis for abstraction. A case is just a case.

This anti-theoretical attitude shows a vivid contrast with the attitude of most Scottish thinkers towards information about these unfamiliar regions. It is worth paying attention to the rest of Boswell’s narrative in which he mentions how Lord Monboddo responded to Cook’s discovery.

Cook, as Sir John had told me before, was a plain, sensible man with an uncommon attention to veracity. My metaphor was that he had a balance in his mind for truth as nice as scales for weighing a guinea. Sir John gave me an instance. It was supposed that Cook had said he had seen a nation of men like monkeys, and Lord Monboddo had been very happy with this. Sir John happened to tell Cook of this. “No,” said he, “I did not say they were like monkeys. I said their faces put me in mind of monkeys.” There was a distinction very fine but sufficiently perceptible. (2 April 1776: 308)
Boswell seems to use Pringle’s anecdote about Cook and Lord Monboddo to satirize a fallacy which philosophers sometimes fall into. They should frame a theory based on an analysis of each case, but they sometimes strive to find examples which can support their pre-existent theory. In short, the anecdote explores the relationship between general theory and individual examples. The cases must come first to assure the accuracy and truthfulness of any theory, but a desire for abstract principles sometimes sets this aside.

Boswell’s anti-theoretical attitude towards Cook’s circumnavigation differentiates him from the Scottish thinkers concerning the value of geographical discoveries and explorations. Boswell thinks that kind of information is valuable because it gratifies the public’s sense of curiosity, and should be treated no more seriously than this except when it is necessary to examine the creditability of these travel accounts. This playful approach to novelty has its literary analogue in the journal form. Most Scottish thinkers proceed in the opposite direction. They are keen to know more about the rest of the world, because they imagine that this new information will instantiate the principles of human nature. The circulation of geographical information becomes an arena in which the relation between the particular and the general may be radically re-examined. Here we can see the way in which geographical explorations, the experience of travelers, and the reception of their accounts in print culture are all closely involved in determining the epistemological and ontological conditions of knowledge.

The social enthusiasm for the South Pacific was catalyzed by not only the presence of Captain Cook as a celebrity in London society but also that of Mai, a visitor from Ra’iataea. As Harriet Guest has shown in *Empire, Barbarism, and Civilisation*, Mai attracted popular attention, prompting various journalistic responses and visual representations. Mai’s presence also stimulated the literary imagination and philosophical speculation. In her letter to Mr. Crisp (1 December 1774), Frances Burney explains her impression of Mai that “he appears to be a perfectly rational and intelligent man, with an understanding far superior to the common
race of *us cultivated gentry*” (172).7 She carefully observes Mai’s pronunciation and learning of the English language: “he can pronounce the *th*, as in *thank you*, and the *w*, as in *well*, and yet cannot say *G*, which he uses a *d* for” (171). In addition, the letter reports that “he called for some Drink” and also “for *port wine*” (171). This indigenous man is represented as a person who is capable of participating in British sociable life.

Kate Fullagar discusses this cultural phenomenon in the context of “Rousseauism in Britain”: she construes Burney’s astonishment as an “impulse to idealize Mai as a noble savage in order to criticize contemporary British life” (*The Savage Visit* 135). On the surface, this use of the stranger’s view could be a kind of Orientalism in which the non-European society and people are invented as an imaginary reference point from which to criticize British or European society. However, we should recognize that Mai is not a distant other but an actual visitor to London. He is keen to learn British manners and language and even to enjoy European commodities such as port wine. The experience of life in London continuously reshapes his character.8 In this respect, there is an interesting similarity between a non-European visitor such as Mai and a Scot such as Boswell. Both of them expose themselves to the social dynamics of London as a metropolis in order to reshape their identity.

Boswell also mentions Mai in his journal, but the initial difference of his account from Burney’s letter is that his journal is not a record of direct personal encounter. He refers to what Captain Cook said about Mai, thus helping us to think about how conversation mediated information about the unfamiliar regions of the globe.

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7 My quotation from Burney’s letter is extracted from *Empire and Identity: An Eighteenth-Century Sourcebook* edited by Stephen H. Gregg.

8 Fullagar points out that Johnson met Mai in 1776 and “Mai had become interesting because he was *no longer* a savage” (143).
carry home, begged to have two things for himself: port wine, which he loved the best of any liquor, and gunpowder; but the Captain said he would not let him have the power of fire-arms . . . [the Captain] said that for some time after Omai’s return home he would be a man of great consequence, as having so many wonders to tell. That he would not foresee that when he had told all he had to tell, he would sink into his former state, and then, the Captain supposed, he would wish to go to England again . . . (3 April 1776: 310-11)

Boswell does not idealize Mai as a noble savage. He sees him as an indigenous person who has learned British manners and taste by staying in London, though we should acknowledge that this passage is presented as a record of conversation rather than an expression of his own opinion. This narrative combines both essential and anti-essential ideas of difference. On the one hand, it assumes that a non-European individual can learn British manners and improve himself to become a civilized subject. On the other hand, it is suggested that such a civilizing process can only take place in Europe. Boswell, or Captain Cook, imagines that Mai will “sink into his former state” after telling others about the “wonders” he experienced. The self-improvement of the non-European subject is transient.

Boswell’s attention to the problem of credit in travel-writing suggests that there is a rising consciousness about the distinction between experience and understanding. Cross-cultural encounter does not necessarily entail mutual understanding. Even someone directly exposed to an unfamiliar socio-cultural environment might misunderstand its essential feature. This awareness of irreducible otherness is something new. I also want to emphasize that this critical distinction does not necessarily lead Boswell towards skepticism. He does not deny the possibility of mutual understanding and shares the view of many of his contemporaries that the study of foreign language is a key to achieve a proper understanding of this otherness.
We talked of having some men of inquiry left for three years at each of the islands of Otaheite, New Zealand, and Nova Caledonia, so as to learn the language and (I am now writing on Wednesday the 22 of May at Edinburgh) bring home a full account of all that can be known of people in a state so different from ours. (18 April 1776: 341)

In outlining this imaginary project, Boswell is not concerned with the problem of Britons “going native.” On the one hand, Boswell assumes the possibility that Mai can become like Britons. On the other hand, he thinks that Europeans are still Europeans on the other side of the world.

4. Conclusion

Boswell starts keeping a diary during the period that the Seven Years War shapes Britain’s consciousness of global interconnection between their metropolis and the rest of the globe. In addition to the expansion of international trade, they pay attention to imperial conquest. At various places, both public or private, such as coffee houses, taverns, and living rooms, people in London have conversations about distant regions. As a diarist, Boswell both observes and participates in the circulation of information in the metropolis. Unlike Adam Smith, he is not interested in comprehending global interconnection from a detached viewpoint. In the metropolis, he aspires to become a cosmopolitan with polite manners. The journal embodies his theatrical self and describes how external actions determine his sentiments. He performs selfhood in his literary practice, in which he also highlights the importance of the theatre as a space for mediating the geographical imagination.

In the 1770s, Boswell went back and forth between Edinburgh and London. He was fascinated by Captain Cook’s voyage. In his journal, his conversation with Captain Cook
exemplifies the secondhand encounter with the South Pacific in the metropolis. Geographical information stimulates his curiosity. The diversity of the globe affords pleasure to his imagination, and temporarily at least saves him from melancholia. His journal expresses the interaction between the condition of his sentiments and the geographical imagination, and between the individual subject and the circulation of information about the wider world.
Chapter 6

The Scottish Enlightenment, the British Empire, and the Global Eighteenth Century:

William Robertson on America and India

1. Introduction

No period in the history of one’s own country can be considered as altogether uninteresting. […] Even remote and minute events are objects of a curiosity, which, being natural to the human mind, the gratification of it is attended with pleasure.

But, with respect to the history of foreign States, we must set other bounds to our desire of information. The universal progress of science during the two last centuries, the art of printing, and other obvious causes, have filled Europe with such a multiplicity of histories, and with such vast collections of historical materials, that the term of human life is too short for the study or even the perusal of them. (William Robertson, The Preface to The History of the Reign of the Emperor Charles V ix)

William Robertson (1721-93) was an eminent historian and a leader of the moderate party in the Church of Scotland. As the principal of Edinburgh University (1762-93), he contributed to the intellectual and cultural flourishing of eighteenth-century Scotland. Along with David Hume, Adam Smith, and Adam Ferguson, he was one of the representatives of the Scottish Enlightenment. As part of their inquiry into human nature, these Scottish thinkers in the age of the Enlightenment showed their keen interest in the progress of society in different parts of the globe. Robertson began tackling this topic by writing the history of Scotland where he
discussed the progress of his own society. The geographical scope of his historical writing gradually expanded, from Scotland to Europe, and then from Europe to European Empires including their colonies: *The History of Scotland, during the Reigns of Queen Mary and of King James VI, till His Accession to the Crown of England* (1759), *The History of the Reign of the Emperor Charles V* (1769), *The History of America* (1777), and *An Historical Disquisition concerning the Knowledge which the Ancients had of India* (1791).

As a writer, Robertson sees history as a genre tied to the nature of the human mind. As the opening passage of *The History of the Reign of the Emperor Charles V* suggests, he thinks that human beings are naturally inclined to know their own past and read historical writings with pleasure. As history satisfies their sense of curiosity, it is circulated among people as an entertainment. Robertson also points out that history is the place where the distinction between home and foreign countries crucially matters, because people become less interested in events occurring in distant lands. This is what Adam Smith examines in his hypothetical example of the Chinese earthquake and European responses to it. In his attempt to write a history transcending national boundaries, Robertson expects readers to be aware that they live as Europeans under international connections and that the historical origin of this state of affairs can be traced back to the sixteenth century. The reign of the Emperor Charles V is the period in which “the several States of Europe [became] intimately connected” (x). By highlighting this connection, Robertson tries to generate cosmopolitan sentiments among his readers. He makes use of the affective agency of writing and reading. This generic understanding and practice of writing history is not necessarily his own but shared with other Scottish writers, particularly David Hume. In “Of the Study of History” (1741), Hume states that “history is a most improving part of knowledge, as well as an agreeable amusement” (566). History presents a “spectacle […] so magnificent, so various, so interesting” (566).

Compared to other Scottish thinkers traveling around Europe, the geographical scope of physical movement in Robertson’s life is more or less limited to Edinburgh and its
environ. He was born in 1721 in Borthwick where his father served as a minister of the parish. In 1733, his family moved to Edinburgh due to his father’s transfer to Lady Yester’s Chapel there. He enrolled at Edinburgh University in 1735 and studied divinity as a preparation for becoming a parish minister. In 1744, he was ordained to the parish ministry of Gladsmuir. In 1751, he helped to establish the moderate party in the Church of Scotland. His literary career as a historian extended the scope of his physical movement, because he needed to go to London to prepare for the publication of *The History of Scotland* (1759).

In diverse professions, Robertson acts as a center of conversational exchange. In the Church of Scotland, he participates in the moderate party, which emerges from the meeting of young Scottish ministers at a tavern in Edinburgh in 1751. In *The Life of William Robertson*, Jeffrey R. Smitten emphasizes that Robertson was avidly engaged with wider social interactions beyond church politics in the 1750s. In 1754, he became a member of the Select Society where prominent intellectuals in Edinburgh including Hume and Smith gathered to discuss philosophical subjects and improve their skill in debating (103). Secondly, Smitten highlights Robertson’s participation in the publication of the *Edinburgh Review* (1755-56) to which he wrote eight reviews (105). From 1762 onward, Robertson was also a point of connection between two different institutions in Edinburgh, church and university, working as Principal of Edinburgh University. He was a pivot of the circulation of information and the diffusion of knowledge.

The generic range of Robertson’s writing is less diverse than Hume and Ferguson’s. His masterpieces are all histories. But Smitten focuses on the publication of his sermon, *The Situation of the World at the Time of Christ’s Nativity* (1755), as a point of interaction between Robertson the historian and Robertson the minister (*The Life of William Robertson*

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1 My description of Robertson’s life is based on his Oxford DNB entry. See also Jeffrey R. Smitten’s *The Life of William Robertson*.

2 See Richard B. Sher, *Church and University in the Scottish Enlightenment* 50.
I want to point out that Robertson incorporates diverse narratives from other genres into his historical writing. He is not a philosopher embarking on the systematic establishment of principles, but still refers to some philosophical ideas in framing his own narrative of history. For instance, he begins *The History of America* by describing the movement of human beings across the globe. In its opening passage, the history of human beings is presented as “[t]he progress of men in discovering and peopling the various parts of the earth” (Book I: 1). He seems to think that movement and settlement are integral to human nature. When he comes to depict the European encounter with the New World, Robertson’s narrative is colorfully descriptive:

Columbus was the first European who set foot in the New World which he had discovered. He landed in a rich dress, and with a naked sword in his hand. His men followed […] all kissed the ground which they had so long desired to see. They next erected a crucifix, and prostrating themselves before it, returned thanks to God for conducting their voyage to such an [(sic)] happy issue. (*The History of America*, Book II: 91)

Robertson dramatizes Columbus’s landing on the unknown land by describing the scene of his crew’s erection of a crucifix. His story-like narrative may be somewhat embellished. Robertson’s narrative of the encounter also pays attention to the ecological change in the New World.

A few years after the Spaniards settled there, the herds of tame cattle became so numerous, that their proprietors reckoned them by thousands. Less attention being paid to them, as they continued to increase, they were suffered to run wild, and spreading over a country of boundless extent, under a mild climate, and covered
with rich pasture, their number became immense. They range over the vast plains which extend from Buenos Ayres, towards the Andes, in herds of thirty or forty thousand; and the unlucky traveller who once falls in among them, may proceed several days before he can disentangle himself from among the crowd that covers the face of the earth, and seems to have no end. (Book VIII: 394)

His description is vivid but might exaggerate the spread of wild cattle. The focus of this passage is the way in which European settlers interact with the natural environment of the New World and change its ecological system. It also expresses Robertson’s discursive geographical interest in historical writing. He talks about animals, climate, the topographical landscape. His historical writing is heterogenous, interweaving diverse subjects into his narrative of history.

In 2017, Jeffrey R. Smitten published The Life of William Robertson: Minister, Historian, and Principal as the first “book-length biography of William Robertson since Dugald Stewart published his Account of the Life and Writings of William Robertson in 1801” (Smitten vi). The long absence of a modern biography might indicate Robertson’s relatively marginal status in studies of the Scottish Enlightenment. In The Moral Culture of the Scottish Enlightenment, 1690-1805 (2015), Thomas Ahnert recognizes Robertson as an influential examiner of “the connection between religious beliefs and Enlightenment moral thought” (2). Ahnert emphasizes that “there were very few Scots thinkers whose ideas could be regarded as irreligious or atheistic” in the eighteenth century (1). The correlation between Robertson’s different professions—minister, historian, and principal—helps us to reconsider the picture of the Scottish Enlightenment.

The recent scholarly examination of Robertson’s writing can be traced back to Richard B Sher’s Church and University in the Scottish Enlightenment (1985) and Karen O’Brien’s Narratives of Enlightenment (1997). Sher discusses Robertson’s role as the leader of the
moderate party in the Church of Scotland, and the focus of *Church and University* is on the process of the institutionalization and exchange of knowledge in the Scottish Enlightenment from political and religious perspectives. O’Brien is more interested in Robertson’s literary output as a historian, which she presents as an attempt to write “cosmopolitan history” whose narrative “encapsulates an attitude of detachment towards national prejudice” (2).

Robertson’s writing career took him from the locally specific *History of Scotland* (1759) to broader histories of Europe (*The History of the Emperor Charles V*, 1769) and its colonies (*The History of America*, 1777). He was the most insistently cosmopolitan of all eighteenth-century historians, in part because he felt that persistent tensions between Scottish and English cultural and political identities could only be resolved through a reappraisal of their common European frame of meaning. Where Hume exposed the parochial and wayward behaviour of past generations of English and Scots, Robertson sought to transcend national and denominational prejudices in Britain by drawing attention to common patterns and affinities between the British and continental European journeys to modernity and empire. (*Narratives of Enlightenment* 3)

Whereas O’Brien examines the way in which Scottish identity is embedded in a European framework, I am more interested in the further expansion of the geographical scope of Robertson’s historical writing. His later works, *The History of America* and *An Historical Disquisition*, actually expand their narrative beyond Europe. *The History of America* is a critical study of the European colonization of the New World. In addition to its anthropological sketch of the New World, *The History of America* discusses the nature and consequences of encounter between Europe and the New World. Further, *An Historical Disquisition* embeds this study of European Empires and their colonial encounters in a larger
global framework. Finally, Robertson’s geographical scope goes beyond attention to European colonies, and he explores the crucial role of Asia in the process of the rise of global commerce.

In locating Robertson in imperial and global contexts, Jane Rendall’s “Scottish Orientalism: From Robertson to James Mill” (1982) is a pioneering work. She presents Robertson as a Scottish historian who detaches himself from “assumptions of intrinsic Western European superiority,” and explores a lineage of Scottish Orientalists between Robertson and James Mill, who undervalues “all that constituted Indian culture” (44). Like Robertson, Scottish Orientalists “apply a ‘philosophical’ framework to the history” (44). Although they accept “a common European assumption of superiority,” they still differ from Mill because of their relatively favorable understanding of the value of Indian civilization (44).

Following Rendall’s article, William Robertson and the Expansion of Empire (1997) edited by Stewart J. Brown aims to examine Robertson’s “contributions in shaping the European consciousness in the age of Enlightenment and empire” (Introduction 1). Subsequently, Brown also publishes an article on Robertson’s view of India, “William Robertson, Early Orientalism and the ‘Historical Disquisition’ on India of 1791” (2009). He points out that Robertson’s Historical Disquisition has received relatively little attention, and aims to discuss it “within the contexts of the Scottish Enlightenment, the early British orientalist movement, and the expansion of British dominion in India” (293). His interpretation emphasizes Robertson’s favorable account of Indian civilization and anti-imperial attitude.

In this chapter, I present Robertson’s work as a case study for thinking about the location of intellectual history in recent scholarship on imperial and global histories. The History of America helps us to reconsider the relation between the Enlightenment and European Empires. In the early 21st century, historians of political thought came to point out
anti-imperial sentiments in the European Enlightenment, but their object of inquiry was mainly French and German writing. By reading Robertson’s critique of the Spanish conquest of the New World, I highlight the way in which the Scottish Enlightenment is also involved with the critique of the European domination of the rest of the globe. In the last section of this chapter, the focus of my discussion moves from *The History of America* to *An Historical Disquisition*. It examines the process through which Robertson’s inquiry into European Empires is embedded in his vision of global interconnection.

2. The Geographical Scope of *The History of America*

In 1777, William Robertson published *The History of America* in London and Edinburgh. The book aims to present the historical process of the European colonization of the New World. Robertson’s plan to write a colonial history of America springs out of his former project to write about the social and political history of sixteenth-century Europe. He thinks that a full understanding of European society and its international politics in this period is impossible without a comprehensive account of the imperial ambitions as a result of which Spain, Portuguese, and Britain embark on the colonization of the New World. The link between tracing the emergence of modern European society and writing a colonial history suggests that the idea of Europe itself is determined by what happens beyond its perimeters. By writing *The History of America*, Robertson conceptualizes the dynamism of this interaction. Colonial history emerges as a means to consolidate the idea of civilized Europe as such.

*The History of America* is actually about much more than the history of America. The geographical description of the natural landscape and indigenous people in the New World is embedded into Robertson’s philosophical inquiry into human nature. *The History of America* starts with a general claim about the progress of human beings and their society.

The progress of men in discovering and peopling the various parts of the earth, has
been extremely slow. Several ages elapsed before they removed far from those mild and fertile regions where they were originally placed by their Creator. The occasion of their first general dispersion is known; but we are unacquainted with the course of their migrations, or the time when they took possession of the different countries which they now inhabit. Neither history nor tradition furnish such information concerning those remote events, as enables us to trace, with any certainty, the operations of the human race in the infancy of society. (1)

The scope of Robertson’s narrative covers the progress of the whole of humankind rather than that of any specific group of people. And Robertson presents the history of human beings as determined by the process in which they spread over the whole globe. The aspiration for movement and settlement characterizes human nature in this framework. This opening statement makes a general point without any specific reference. It is philosophical conjecture rather than historical description. As the quoted passage shows, Robertson is well aware that any inquiry into the early stages of human life comes up against the lack of any related historical evidence. This is why his hypothetical claim about the progress of human society is paired with his geographical analysis of the New World. For Robertson, the history of the European encounter with America provides much information about the primitive condition of human beings, as European travelers write substantial records of their observation of indigenous people. The pursuit of certainty in the hypothesis on human nature causes Robertson to turn to geography in his historical writing.

Edmund Burke, Robertson’s contemporary, endorses this geographical perspective. On 9 June 1777, he wrote to Robertson to express his approval of The History of America.

The part which I read with the greatest pleasure is the discussion on the Manners and character of the Inhabitants of that new World. I have always thought with
you, that we possess at this time very great advantages towards the knowledge of
human Nature. We need no longer go to History to trace it in all its stages and
periods. History from its comparative youth, is but a poor instructor. . . . But now
the Great Map of Mankind is unrolled at once; there is no state or Gradation of
barbarism, and no mode of refinement which we have not at the same instant
under our view. The very different civility of Europe and of China; The barbarism
of Persia and Abyssinia. The erratick manners of Tartary, and of Arabia. The
Savage State of North America, and of New Zealand. Indeed you have made a
noble use of the advantages you have had. (The Correspondence of Edmund Burke
Vol. III 350-51)

What Burke describes as “the Great Map of Mankind” articulates the consciousness, shared
by him and Robertson, that the whole globe offers an object of inquiry into human nature for
anyone seeking to understand the history of humankind. In this framework, mapping the
world presents the opportunity to introduce certainty into philosophical speculation on the
progress of human society. Burke’s phrase “the Great Map of Mankind” has attracted
scholars of eighteenth century studies, who have used the phrase to organize their accounts of
“British Perceptions of the World in the Age of Enlightenment.”³ Through reading Burke’s
letter, those scholars explore Robertson’s writing as a representative example of geographical
awareness in the Enlightenment.

The phrase “Great Map of Mankind” helps us to grasp the geographical scope of
Robertson’s historical writing. The titles of his major four works show its gradual expansion:
The History of Scotland during the Reigns of Queen Mary and James VI (1759), The History
of the Reign of Charles V (1769), The History of America (1777), and An Historical

Disquisition concerning the Knowledge which the Ancients had of India (1791). His literary career starts with an attempt to write the history of Scotland. This leads him to think about the Scottish connection with the European continent. As part of understanding the political climate of sixteenth-century Europe, the European colonization of the New World becomes a significant theme of his writing. This interest in the dynamic interaction between Europe and the rest of the globe also extends into his work on India. His project to write the history of European Empires is expanded and transformed into a vision of a global encounter whose geographical scope goes beyond European colonies and covers the entire surface of the globe.

I want to emphasize that the aim of Robertson’s narrative is not limited to classifying the degree of social progress in each region but also encompasses the nature and consequences of encounter between different regions of the globe. His historical inquiry does not offer a kind of area studies approach focusing on a specific region as such. He is rather interested in the connection between regions.

Robertson’s vision of the interconnected globe is interesting to consider in the light of Felicity A. Nussbaum’s call for a critical study of “the global eighteenth century” to complement the new imperial history:

Though one could make a case that imperial projects thoroughly infused the metropole and the periphery even as their impact was veiled or obfuscated, in the eighteenth century vast areas and groups of people were relatively untouched by empire. In addition, the focus of an historically specific global studies is to afford greater attention to non-European areas, to indigenous people and knowledges, to diasporic mobility, and to the social, economic, and ideological investments of colonialism on a worldwide scale. (Introduction from The Global Eighteenth Century 7-8)
Robertson’s move from writing the history of the New World to that of the intercourse between East and West shows the way in which his literary ambition to write a colonial history is transformed into a project to envisage a kind of global history. Some regions may have been relatively untouched by empire when he wrote these histories. But his geographical imagination may reach these untouched areas.

3. Enlightenment against Empire in the Scottish Context

Some historians of political thought reconsider the relationship between the Enlightenment and European Empires. In *Enlightenment against Empire* (2003), Sankar Muthu contends:

In the late eighteenth century, a number of prominent European political thinkers attacked imperialism, not only defending non-European peoples against the injustices of European imperial rule, as some earlier modern thinkers had done, but also challenging the idea that Europeans had any right to subjugate, colonize, and ‘civilize’ the rest of the world. This book is a study of this historically anomalous and understudied episode of political thinking. . . . This study aims both to pluralize our understanding of the philosophical era known as “the Enlightenment” and to explore a set of arguments and intellectual dispositions that reorient contemporary assumptions about the relationship between human unity and human diversity. (1)

Muthu intends to show one intellectual strand in the age of the Enlightenment which undermines the ideological justification of imperial expansion. He emphasizes the plurality of its thought rather than arguing that the Enlightenment as a whole is against the idea and practice of European Empires. Some thinkers in the eighteenth century criticize the civilizing project of imperial expansion, but this does not mean all Enlightenment thinkers are anti-
imperialists. Muthu’s argument can be summarized into three points. Firstly, anti-imperial thought is one strand of eighteenth-century philosophy. Secondly, this is more than an expression of humanitarian sympathy towards suffering indigenous people as the victims of European Empires. “Enlightenment anti-imperialism” intends to challenge the idea that Europeans are predestined to civilize people in other regions by colonizing them. Thirdly, Enlightenment anti-imperialism is involved with reconceptualizing diversity. Even though human nature, regarded as the universal foundation of human activities, is one of the main themes in eighteenth-century philosophy, this does not mean that Enlightenment thinkers dismiss the importance of the ideas of diversity, difference, and change. Enlightenment anti-imperialism emerges as an attempt to understand the relation between the diversity of human beings and the unity of human nature.

The scope of Muthu’s study covers both the French and German Enlightenments, with a close analysis of the writings of Denis Diderot, Immanuel Kant, and Johann Gottfried Herder, but it does not reach the Scottish Enlightenment. Even though his later article, “Adam Smith’s Critique of International Trading Companies” (2008), shows his extended interest, here he examines Smith as an individual thinker in the eighteenth century rather than as a representative of the Scottish Enlightenment. In Muthu’s study, therefore, the relation between anti-imperial thought and the Scottish Enlightenment is not discussed. Following Muthu, Jennifer Pitts’s *A Turn to Empire* (2005) adds eighteenth-century British philosophy to Muthu’s picture of Enlightenment anti-imperialism. The opening statement of *A Turn to Empire* can be seen as a paraphrase and expansion of Muthu’s thesis.

In the closing years of the eighteenth century, a critical challenge to European imperial conquest and rule was launched by many of the most innovative thinkers of the day, including Adam Smith, Bentham, Burke, Kant, Diderot, and Condorcet. They drew on a strikingly wide range of ideas to criticize European conquests and
rule over peoples across the globe . . . . While Diderot’s criticism of empire was among the most radical and thoroughgoing, skepticism about both particular imperial ventures and the general project of unlimited European expansion was, by the 1780s, widespread among intellectuals. Just fifty years later, however, we find no prominent political thinkers in Europe questioning the justice of European empires. (Pitts 1)

Compared to Muthu, Pitts is more interested in the decline of Enlightenment anti-imperialism in the nineteenth century, after which there was “the rise of imperial liberalism in Britain and France” (this is the subtitle of her book). Her study of Adam Smith suggests the possibility of locating eighteenth-century Scottish philosophy in the context of anti-imperial thought. But Pitts herself, like Muthu, does not substantially examine the Scottish context of Smith’s critique of colonial conquest. Instead, she focuses on the flow of Smith’s intellectual legacy into Burke’s political thought.

In Burke, we find a thinker and politician in sympathy with some of the key strands of Scottish Enlightenment thought, respected by and an admirer of Adam Smith, who undertook a critical engagement with imperial politics more wholeheartedly than any other figure in eighteenth-century Britain. . . . Burke’s belief that sympathy and moral imagination are essential for just international policy shared much with Smith’s moral philosophy. (Pitts 59)

Pitts is explicit about the Scottish Enlightenment’s engagement with the critique of imperial expansion. She thinks that the theory of moral sentiments in Scottish philosophy contributes to the development of anti-imperial thought in Britain. Robertson’s writing helps us to think about what is missing in Pitts’s picture, because he is a Scottish historian who writes about
empire but not a Scottish philosopher who theorizes about sympathy. Pitts’s study clarifies the relation between Enlightenment anti-imperialism and the theory of moral sentiments as one crucial component of the Scottish Enlightenment. My reading of Robertson, then, focuses on another strand of the Scottish Enlightenment, the rise and development of modern historiography which caused the expansion and transformation of geographical perceptions.

In existing work on the history of political thought, scholars are more likely to identify anti-imperial arguments in the work of French and German rather than Scottish writers. Their attention to Adam Smith is only its exception. This might be due to the more complicated relation between Enlightenment thinkers in Scotland and imperial activities. Scholars may face a certain difficulty in locating the Scottish Enlightenment in an anti-imperial context because of the active role of many Scots in the construction of the British Empire.

The representative thinkers of the Scottish Enlightenment, such as Hume and Smith, developed their ideas in an age of expansion and transformation. Since the Act of Union in 1707, ambitious Scots had been involved with the construction of the British Empire. The imperial peripheries of the East and West Indies were sites in which they could build a fortune as a clerk or merchant. And “the idea of empire” enabled Scots to identify themselves as Britons, “peers of the English,” in the imperial periphery (Colley 130). Some Scots in the eighteenth century moved between the British Isles and the wider world as well as between Edinburgh and London. Neither Hume nor Smith went outside of Europe, but it is highly likely that they knew many people who did. The Scottish literati thought and wrote within larger networks of the circulation of information, people, and things. In *The Inner Life of Empires* (2011), Emma Rothschild shows this connection between Empire and Enlightenment by writing the microhistory of the Johnstone family, whose sons and sisters “grew up in Scotland in the 1720s and 1730s and made their way, in imagination or in reality, to the extremities of the British, French, Spanish, and Mughal empires” (1). The family was also connected to some representatives of the Scottish Enlightenment. Its “dramas of empire
unfolded in the world of the philosophes, and the philosophes also lived in or were familiar with the Johnstones’ world of empire” (211).

This is the broader context in which *The History of America* is written. It combines a chronological account of the Spanish colonization of the New World with ethnographic descriptions of indigenous people. Postcolonial criticism might see Robertson’s “unsympathetic account of Native Americans” deriving from “his stadial thinking” as potentially justifying imperial violence there.\(^4\) The stadial understanding of the progress of society—-from hunting to shepherding, from shepherding to agriculture, from agriculture to commerce—- constitutes the social theory of the Scottish Enlightenment. Such a larger social discourse underlies Robertson’s emphasis on the primitive condition of indigenous people in the New World.

At the same time, we should think about whether Robertson exploits this stadial understanding to glorify imperial ventures. *The History of America* does not necessarily aim to support the European conquest of the New World nor to consolidate imperial ideology. As Karen O’Brien points out, it is rather “about the failure of the Spanish to implement in the New World the phase of social improvement inaugurated by the discoveries,” and “also about the catastrophic encounter between two races of people at widely differing stages of social evolution” (*Narratives of Enlightenment* 156). *The History of America* narrates the failure of the imperial project rather than its glory. Robertson thinks that the colonization of America spoiled the natural course of the social and economic development of Spain.

Wealth which flows in gradually, and with moderate increase, feeds and nourishes that activity which is friendly to commerce, and calls it forth into vigorous and well conducted exertions; but when opulence pours in suddenly, and with too full a

\(^4\) See Jeffrey R. Smitten’s Oxford DNB entry on William Robertson.
stream, it overturns all sober plans of industry, and brings along with it a taste for what is wild, and extravagant, and daring in business or in action. Such was the great and sudden augmentation of power and revenue, that the possession of America brought into Spain, and some symptoms of its pernicious influence upon the political operations of that monarchy soon began to appear. (Book VIII: 395-96)

The Spanish conquest of the New World generated a new flow of wealth to the metropole. But the intensity and speed of this economic stimulus potentially undermined the moral foundation of society. Robertson does not necessarily think that the European dominance of the rest of the globe is the natural course of the progress of society. Imperial expansion is rather understood as a cause of corruption in both the state and individual subjects. Robertson emphasizes that “[t]he Spaniards, like their monarchs, [became] intoxicated with […] wealth” (Book VIII: 397). His choice of the word “intoxication” presents the rise of a new imperial economy as an anomalous state.

Robertson embodies the spirit of European exploration in his description of Christopher Columbus as a hero who expands the scope of his maritime practice based on his study of the technology of navigation. Robertson presents him as a man of “curiosity” whose “active mind” finds the Mediterranean Sea “too narrow” (Vol. I Book II: 60). He is also depicted as a passionate man of learning and knowledge committed to improving his seamanship. The study of “geometry, cosmography, astronomy, and the art of drawing” in his youth leads him to embark on life as a sailor (Vol. I Book II: 59-60). In addition, Columbus’s marriage with a daughter of Bartholomew Perestrello also contributes to enlarge his naval knowledge, because his wife’s father is “one of the captains employed by prince Henry in his

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5 See also O’Brien’s quotation from The History of America in Narratives of Enlightenment 155.
Columbus got possession of the journals and charts of this experienced navigator [Bartholomew Perestrello], and from them he learned the course which the Portuguese had held in making their discoveries, as well as the various circumstances which guided or encouraged them in their attempts. The study of these gratified and inflamed his favourite passion; and while he contemplated the maps, and read the descriptions of the new countries which Perestrello had seen, his impatience to visit them became irresistible. (Vol. I Book II: 61)

The course of Columbus’s life works as a microcosm of the entire human history of movement and settlement itself. In such a manner, Robertson combines both micro-perspective and macro-perspective in his narrative. The History of America presents the enlightened education of Columbus, but it does not depict him as a man who is motivated by the idea of a civilizing mission; he is passionate to improve himself rather than help strangers in a distant land. Robertson’s Columbus might represent the figure of a hero, but this type of Enlightenment is not directly linked with imperial ambition. Curiosity is the driving force of exploration for Columbus in The History of America.

Robertson depicts the scene in which Columbus became “the first European who set foot in the New World” as a moment of “mutual astonishment” between Europeans and indigenous people (Book II: 91,92). The presence of Columbus’s ship caused “terror” among these natives because its “dreadful sound resembl[ed] thunder, accompanied with lightening and smoke” (II: 92). The scene is presented as the triumph of advanced European technology over the primitive people: “they began to respect their new guests as a superior order of beings” (II: 92). In this narrative of encounter, Robertson presents Columbus as a European explorer rather than as an imperial agent from Spain. Columbus’s landing is represented as a
symbolic scene of the encounter between two regions, Europe and the New World as a whole. Robertson’s narrative sometimes moves from describing Spaniards into talking about Europe. He seems to be less interested in emphasizing difference between the Spanish and British Empires than representing Europeans as a leading force of global encounter.

Robertson concludes the narrative of encounter with a contrast.

Towards evening, Columbus returned to his ships, accompanied by many of the islanders in their boats . . . . Thus, in the first interview between the inhabitants of the old and new worlds, every thing was conducted amicably, and to their mutual satisfaction. The former, enlightened and ambitious, formed already vast ideas with respect to the advantages which they might derive from those regions that began to open to their view. The latter, simple and undiscerning, had no foresight of the calamities and desolation which were now approaching their country. (Book II: 93)

Columbus is represented as an “enlightened” figure from Europe, while indigenous people are depicted as unable to foresee their future. Robertson’s narrative emphasizes their inferior capacity to understand the present situation by employing words such as “simple,” “undiscerning,” and “no foresight.” Their contrasting attitudes regarding the consequence of this encounter are the pivot of this passage. O’Brien interprets this scene as a dramatized representation of the “stadial mismatch” between two “incompatible stages of human development” (Narratives of Enlightenment 156). I want to point out that Columbus is not depicted as a civilizing subject who aspires to improve the indigenous people. Robertson presents Columbus as an enlightened man but not as an agent seeking to enlighten non-European people. Spaniards in The History of America are interested in the potential benefits derived from the New World, not civilizing agents.
The History of America is a critical study of the encounter between two distant regions of the globe. It is a problematic work in the sense that it articulates the superiority of Europe over other regions with emphasis on European advancement in technology. Robertson sees Europe as a leading force in the expansion of commercial interaction across the globe. He presents the aspiration for movement and settlement as an essential component of human nature, and therefore, European exploration beyond the borders of Europe is understood as the natural course of the progress of human beings. Robertson’s description of the inferiority of indigenous people in the New World, however, does not necessarily serve as the justification of imperial conquest. He thinks that Europeans are superior to indigenous people, but he does not think that they should improve the people whom they encounter. In his historical writing, European explorers are not depicted as enlightening subjects.

I contend that The History of America is written as a justification of international commerce rather than of imperial conquest. Robertson is aware of the troubling consequences of the encounter he describes. The Spanish conquest of the New World exemplifies an encounter which causes misery instead of establishing reciprocity. Robertson is critical of imperial expansion to some extent because he thinks that colonization establishes the “intoxicated” relation between Europe and the rest of the globe. The metropole is poisoned by the sudden flow of wealth from its colony, which itself suffered from brutal exploitation. The indigenous people were not ready for international trade when Europeans encountered the New World. But Spaniards forced them to engage in it by their intervention. Robertson’s work aims to distinguish global commerce from imperial conquest. And he keeps a certain distance from the discourse that glorifies colonizers as enlightening subjects.

4. India and Global Interconnection

Two years before his death, Robertson published An Historical Disquisition. It does not attempt to write a regional history of India, as its primary focus is the historical process of the
“intercourse” between India and Europe. His inquiry is a detailed study of historical documents in which Europeans in the past wrote about India. Another important feature of An Historical Disquisition is that Robertson writes it without any special knowledge about India. His solution to this problem is to see “some Gentlemen who have filled important stations, civil and military, in India, and who have visited many different parts of it” (vii). The book is thus a product of his conversation with imperial agents. The extensive network of Scots enables him to think about India without going there. He mentions that he “had recourse frequently to them, and from their conversation learned things which [he] could not have found in books” (vii).

In the last section of An Historical Disquisition, Robertson proceeds to thinking about the influence of the European discovery of the New World upon the commercial interaction between Europe and India. This is the moment in which his historical study of the intercourse between two regions is developed into his own vision of global exchange. As the outset of shaping his narrative, he points out the existence of “a continual drain of gold and silver” from Europe into India after the discovery of the new route to India round the Cape of Good Hope (Section IV:165). This new route enabled European traders to communicate with India “so much more [easily], that the demand for its commodities began to increase far beyond what had been formerly known” (IV: 164). To import more commodities from India, European traders needed to export more gold and silver. The colonization of the New World, then, offered a solution to this problematic drain.

. . . America opened her mines, and poured in treasures upon Europe in the most copious stream to which mankind ever had access. . . . and from that time to the present, the English and Dutch have purchased the productions of China and Indostan, with silver brought from the mines of Mexico and Peru. The immense exportation of silver to the East, during the course of two centuries, had not only
been replaced by the continual influx from America, but the quantity of it has been considerably augmented, and at the same time the proportional rate of its value in Europe and in India has varied so little, that it is chiefly with silver that many of the capital articles imported from the East are still purchased. (IV: 165)

Robertson presents the historical process in which the intercourse between Europe and India was embedded into a larger system of international commerce. This system connects more than two regions of the globe. His narrative of the emergence of the wider system of international trade shows the synthesis of his interpretation of the European encounter with the New World and that of the European intercourse with India. As the end of the quoted passage clearly articulates, Robertson assumes that the economic unification of the different parts of the earth produced positive effects on each region, mainly the stability of the balance of trade.

Robertson’s further discussion points out that America also “gave rise to a traffic with Africa” as well as “facilitat[ing] and extend[ing] the intercourse of Europe with Asia” (IV: 165-66). The focus on the interaction between America and Africa, in the form of the slave trade, potentially undermines his sanguine view of the balance of trade.

In every part of America, of which the Spaniards took possession, they found that the natives, from the feebleness of their frame, from their indolence, or from the injudicious manner of treating them, were incapable of the exertions requisite either for working mines, or for cultivating the earth. Eager to find hands more industrious and efficient, the Spaniards had recourse to their neighbours the Portuguese, and purchased from them negroe slaves . . . . In this practice, no less repugnant to the feelings of humanity than to the principles of religion, the Spaniards have unhappily been imitated by all the nations of Europe, who have
acquired territories in the warmer climates of the New World. (IV: 166)

In his description of the historical process of the emergence of the slave trade, Robertson is unclear about whether this is a necessary consequence of the expansion of international commerce. Gold and silver mined in the New World ensured the stable exchange between Europe and India, but this stability was actually based on bloody exploitation in another region. Even though Robertson expresses humanitarian sympathy towards the suffering of black slaves, he seems to be reluctant to examine the relationship between the development of international commerce and the horror of the slave trade. The passage cited just points out that Spaniards invented such an inhumane system and other European countries “unhappily” followed their way. This claim postpones any critical judgement on the negative effect of international commerce and simply emphasizes the role of contingency in the rise of slave trade. The whole quoted passage remains ambiguous.

Setting aside the further examination of the slave trade issue, his vision of global interconnection confirms the central position of Europe in the modern world.

Thus the commercial genius of Europe, which has given it a visible ascendent over the three other divisions of the earth, by discerning their respective wants and resources, and by rendering them reciprocally subservient to one another, has established an union among them, from which it has derived an immense increase of opulence, of power, and of enjoyments. (IV: 167)

Robertson imagines that the globe is divided into four regions: Europe, Asia, Africa, and the New World (America). His narrative suggests that the present world shows the intense interaction among these four divisions. He seems to think that his contemporary world has already became fully globalized in the sense that there is nothing outside of the unified
system of international commerce. He describes this condition in a positive manner. The reciprocal relation between Europe and other regions is presented as a fact of the modern world as well as a hypothetical assumption in this narrative. Robertson seems to assume that reciprocity is what international commerce has already achieved rather than what it aims for in the future. The concluding section of *An Historical Disquisition* appears to present Robertson’s contemporary world as a certain culmination of human activities of movement and settlement, which are understood as an essential feature of human nature in his philosophical history.

5. Conclusion

The critique of imperial conquest in *The History of America* is subsumed into Robertson’s vision of global interconnection in *An Historical Disquisition*. His narrative of international commerce aspires to cover the whole surface of the globe, not just European colonies. He envisages a process by which the separated parts of the earth are unified into one vast network of international trade. This narrative imagines the establishment of the reciprocal relation between Europe and the rest of the earth. Robertson’s historical writing understands the Spanish conquest of the New World as a failure to achieve this reciprocity. He seems to idealize the expansion of international commerce without conquest.

Robertson sees European agency as helping to bring about this unifying process. As a representative of the Scottish Enlightenment, his understanding of geography is underpinned by a stadial theory according to which the supremacy of Europe over the non-European world is assumed. This confidence comes from his applause for the notable development of learning and technology which enables Europeans to spread across the globe. Robertson embodies this view in his description of Columbus. This sense of European ascendency is however, not necessarily linked with the justification of European intervention into primitive society. He does not think that Europeans are civilizing subjects who are destined to enlighten people in a
different stage of social progress. This distinction between European ascendancy and
European intervention helps us to locate his writing in the anti-imperial strand of
Enlightenment thought. And his anti-imperial attitude springs from his larger alignment with
the discourse on international commerce in the Scottish Enlightenment.

The global approach to intellectual history is useful in grasping the geographical scope
of Enlightenment thought beyond European colonies. As the phrase “The Great Map of
Mankind” shows, Enlightenment thinkers are interested in the whole surface of the earth to
shape their theories of social progress. In Robertson’s case, critical attention to the innate
restlessness of humankind leads him to discuss the nature and the consequences of
connection between different parts of the globe. His critical study of this geographical
connection is elaborated as an inquiry into international commerce. Robertson’s vision of
global interconnection corresponds to the birth of political economy as one strand in a new
division of knowledge. In terms of imperial history, Robertson’s writing provides an example
that helps us to reconsider the relationship between the Enlightenment and European
Empires, and it suggests a possibility that the Scottish Enlightenment is bound up with the
anti-imperial strands of Enlightenment thought. In terms of global history, his work marks the
emergence of a distinctive kind of eighteenth-century global vision. When Enlightenment
thinkers discuss imperial themes, some of them are aware that the globe is now unified into a
single network.
Conclusion

1. Scottish Thinkers and Eighteenth-Century Literature

In this thesis, I have discussed the Scottish Enlightenment as a collection of texts helping to comprise eighteenth-century literature in a broader sense rather than as a cultural context for interpreting eighteenth-century novels and poems. Focusing on the Scottish Enlightenment as literary practice has allowed me to examine how Scottish thinkers make use of various forms of writing to diffuse their ideas and interact with readers. Hume’s turn from the philosophical treatise to essays in the 1740s exemplifies this keen attention to the function of literary forms shared among Scottish thinkers. In addition to essays, he also writes works of history, philosophical dialogue, and autobiography. The wide scope of his literary practice is distinctive, but I emphasize that he is not entirely an exceptional figure in the Scottish Enlightenment in this respect. Adam Ferguson writes an “Essay” and several pamphlets. Even though Adam Smith continues to endorse the form of philosophical treatise as part of his system building, he is also involved with the launch of Scottish periodicals and writes book reviews. In addition to natural and moral philosophy, political economy, ethnography, history, and biography are examples of the Scottish Enlightenment’s generic diversity. The extensive use of essays in the Scottish Enlightenment helps to make this diversity possible because it is a form which is engaged with diverse genres. Hume writes essays on moral philosophy and political economy, while Ferguson writes an essay on civil society, a kind of ethnography.

Three cities in Scotland---Edinburgh, Glasgow, and Aberdeen---are major hubs of the Scottish Enlightenment. But I point out that the space of the Scottish Enlightenment is not restricted to Scotland. Scottish thinkers go back and forth between Scotland and England, and between Britain and European countries. Their experiences and narratives of being exposed to London and Paris are elements of the Scottish Enlightenment. They live as Scots, Britons, and cosmopolitan citizens. Hume’s life and self-fashioning as a man of letters exemplify that.
In this light, I also see James Boswell as a member of the Scottish Enlightenment. As a diarist and biographer, his writing is committed to the use of different literary forms and contributes to the generic flourishing of eighteenth-century prose. The emphasis on his friendship with Johnson in Boswell studies potentially undervalues his conversational interaction with Hume. Due to his professional status, Boswell resides in Edinburgh after returning from his continental tour. He experiences London as a Scot and intends to transform himself into a Briton and cosmopolitan by the agency of journal-writing. The structure of his journal is influenced by Addison’s periodical essays, and therefore, I pair his journal writing with Hume’s essay writing. In addition to behaving as an actor who enlightens himself by the agency of writing, Boswell is an attentive observer of the Scottish Enlightenment by depicting the character of Scottish thinkers and the intellectual culture of the Lowland cities.

Like Boswell, Tobias Smollett comes to London after his study at Glasgow University. As a Scot, he is exposed to the social and cultural dynamism of the metropolis. London continues to be a key hub of his literary activity, while he keeps ties to Scotland by visiting Scottish coffee houses in London. Like Hume, he uses diverse literary forms such as the novel, poetry, history, and periodical essays. As a novelist, he observes and represents London, Edinburgh, and Glasgow in the form of fiction. Trained in medicine, he deploys the metaphor of circulation to depict the interconnection between the metropolis and distant regions of the globe. I present him as a member of the Scottish Enlightenment in the sense that he lives and writes as a Scot away from home, thinks about England, Scotland, and the wider world from a comparative perspective, and incorporates the discourse on virtue and commerce into novelistic representations. *The Expedition of Humphry Clinker* suggests that novelists and philosophers in the 1770s have a shared ground concerning their attention to the nature and consequences of imperial expansion and the enlargement of international commerce.

My interpretation of Smollett highlights the point that imaginative literature is a
component of the Scottish Enlightenment. Recent scholarship in eighteenth century studies
has paid more acute attention to the interaction between the Scottish Enlightenment and
literary culture. But scholars tend to locate literary culture outside of the circle of the Scottish
Enlightenment. This attitude comes from their understanding of the Scottish Enlightenment
as a context rather than a collection of texts. Looking at Smollett’s work helps us to
reconsider this emphasis, although I acknowledge that some Scottish thinkers, Hume in
particular, are reluctant to use the form of fiction in their writing. He is committed to write
essays on literature as a practice of criticism, but he does not write fiction. This might be
because he sees himself as a historian and wants to keep the distinction between history and
fiction. Smith does not write a work of fiction neither. But he is more aware that his system is
a product of imagination, and actively makes use of fiction in his writing.

In the Wealth of Nations, Smith conceptualizes the division of labor. I suggest that the
idea of the “profession” is important for understanding the feature of the Scottish
Enlightenment as literary practice. As a consequence of the division of labor, society is
composed of many specialized professions. In the mid eighteenth century, Britain becomes
more heterogenous as it expands its interests. Britons come to be aware that their metropolis
interacts with distant regions of the globe. The increasing awareness of this global
interconnection poses a question as to who is capable of grasping and representing the whole
world in a comprehensive manner. This global context undermines the conventional idea in
the preceding period that men without a profession, chiefly gentlemen, have a comprehensive
view of the world. Some Scottish writers think that literary activities imaginatively construct
the comprehensive view. For Smith, writing as system building negotiates with both the
possibility and impossibility of this imaginative construction. Smith lives as a professor and
critic. Despite his critical attention to the function of imagination in writing, he does not
aspire to be a novelist. In this respect, Smollett the novelist develops this Smithian approach
to the complicated and expanding world.
2. Geography, the Heterogenous Globe, and Global Interconnection

Scottish thinkers engage with geographical information in diverse genres. For most of them, geography is a discursive subject, a component of their writing, rather than a distinctive field of inquiry. They are interested in geography as a means of reconciling the uniformity and diversity of human beings on the globe. Hume’s “Of National Characters” is an example of this. In addition, geography provides Scottish thinkers with a setting in which they can test whether philosophical principles work properly in particular conditions. Geography is a connection between abstract ideas and concrete examples. In the construction of the theory of moral sentiments, for instance, Smith presents the European spectator’s response to the Chinese earthquake as a case study.

By locating the Scottish Enlightenment in a global context, I emphasize that its geographical interest is not confined to one particular region such as America or India. In the Wealth of Nations, Smith is deeply concerned about the British colonial administration in the New World. But he also refers to Asia to conceptualize the reciprocal relation between Europe and the rest of the globe. In The History of America, Robertson locates the European encounter with the New World in the wider history of human movement across the globe. His work is actually more than the history of America due to this wider geographical scope. In such a manner, the geographical interest in one region is embedded in the vision of the wider web of interaction. I point out the limits of discussing the Scottish Enlightenment in an imperial context because the interests of Scottish thinkers extend beyond imperial conquest.

The global scope of writing in the Scottish Enlightenment is important for two reasons. Firstly, it suggests that the geographical interest of Scottish thinkers covers the whole surface of the earth. Reading and writing are a means of making a virtual tour of the globe. Hume and Boswell view the heterogeneity of the world with a sense of curiosity. Exposure to the diversity of human beings cures Boswell’s gloom. Secondly, the global scope of Scottish
Enlightenment writing also means that it is attentive to the question of global interconnection. Political economy becomes the primary field in which this interconnection is examined, but the awareness of global interconnection is also shared in other genres such as history, novel, and travel writing. Some Scottish writers such as Ferguson are concerned about the potential conflict between the heterogeneity of cultures and societies across the globe and global interconnection as homogenizing force.

The global vision of the Scottish Enlightenment largely follows Addison’s view of the interconnected world in *Spectator* No. 69. In diverse forms and genres of writing, Scottish thinkers respond to the way in which Mr. Spectator imagines the Royal Exchange as an embodiment of global interconnection and expresses his awareness that daily life in London is underlain by the continuous interaction between Britain and the rest of the globe. Both Smith and Robertson focus on the movement of people, products, and information on a global scale. As a cosmopolitan idler in London, Boswell describes his secondhand encounter with the South Pacific through conversation with others. Some people in the metropolis even have a chance to dine and converse with a visitor from the non-western world. Such encounters, whether firsthand or secondhand, are a component of everyday life in the metropolis.

In their response to Addison, Scottish thinkers distance themselves from the idea that London is the center and embodiment of global interconnection. Even though they emphasize that Edinburgh and Glasgow prosper in polite culture, they do not claim that these Lowland cities are the center of the interconnected world. As Scots, they are aware of the ambiguous position of their home country within the distinction between the metropolis and the provinces, between the center and its peripheries. In the *Wealth of Nations*, Smith envisages that Asian cities will become hubs of global interconnection and equivalent to European cities, owing to the reciprocal relations of international trade. His conceptualization of contingency undermines the sense of European supremacy over the rest of the globe.
3. Conversation, Writing, and Diffusion

The Scottish Enlightenment is conversational. Scottish thinkers exchange their ideas in clubs and societies, at university and church, and in coffeehouses, taverns, theatres, and their own residences. Their conversations sometimes take place outside of Scotland. Scots live and meet each other in London, Paris, Utrecht, and so on. The network of their conversation extends beyond regional and national borders. Some Scots such as international traders, military officers, sailors, and clerks join the circle of conversation after their return from the wider world. Their stories and anecdotes mediate people’s secondhand encounter with the rest of the globe in Britain. Some people even have a chance to talk with an indigenous visitor from the South Pacific in London. Conversation mediates the process by which people in London, Edinburgh, and Glasgow imagine the heterogeneity of the globe and apprehend the interconnection of its parts. Print culture is intimately bound up with the idea and practice of conversation. Scottish writers communicate with each other by exchanging letters. Conversation also appears as a metaphor in various forms of writing. As an essayist, Hume presents his writing as a medium of conversation. As a diarist, Boswell conceives of his journal as a compendium of conversation.

As some Scottish writers move back and forth between Edinburgh and London, their idea and practice of conversation have influence over English writers as well. By the late 1790s, most of the representatives of the Scottish Enlightenment I discuss here have passed away. Smollett died in 1771, Hume died in 1776, Smith died in 1790, Robertson died in 1793, and Boswell died in 1795. To a certain extent, the deaths of these figures signal the end of the intellectual movement starting from Hume’s literary endeavors of the early 1740s. At the same time, their idea and practice of conversation diffuse into the work of English writers such as William Godwin (1756-1836) and William Hazlitt (1778-1830). As a social thinker and novelist, Godwin critically develops Humean ideas about both the possibilities and limits of sympathy, and merges the forms of philosophical treatise and novel. Hazlitt writes as an
essayist and also thinks about the interaction between philosophical ideas and forms of
writing. This diffusion of conversational practice outside of Scotland in the late eighteenth
and early nineteenth centuries will be the subsequent subject for my inquiry into the Scottish
Enlightenment in wider literary and geographical contexts.
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