Political and economic relations between Venice, Byzantium and Southern Italy (1081-1197)

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The candidate confirms that the work submitted is his own and that appropriate credit has been given where reference has been made to the work of others.

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Abstract

This thesis analyses the evolution of the political and economic relations between Venice, Byzantium, and Southern Italy from 1081 to 1197. These years were mostly characterised by hostile relations between the Eastern Empire and the rulers of Southern Italy, which led to a series of conflicts. In the early ones, Venice fought alongside the Byzantines. This happened because Venice obtained significant commercial concessions in Romania, and worried that the same monarch might hold both shores of the Strait of Otranto, thus potentially hampering its Mediterranean trade. However, from the mid-twelfth century, the Byzantine attempt to acquire land in the Adriatic worried the Venetians, who thus decided not to help the Eastern Empire in its attempt to recover land in Southern Italy.

Even though, politically, Byzantine-Venetian relations had already worsened by 1155, the scale of Venetian trade in Romania kept increasing until 1171, when it suddenly stopped after the Byzantine decision to incarcerate all the Venetians who were in the Eastern Empire, and to have their goods confiscated. This measure led to a dozen years of hostility between the two, and to continued reciprocal scepticism, and to the strengthening of the political bonds between Venice and the Kingdom of Sicily.

After 1183, Venetian trade in Romania resumed (albeit on a limited scale), but the political bonds between Venice and Constantinople were only strengthened when the Byzantine Empire was facing serious military threats from the West. The best indication that a partnership between Venice and Byzantium could no longer be formed can be seen by looking at what happened in 1185. In this year, William II of Sicily followed in his ancestors’ footsteps by attacking the Balkans, and Venice did not intervene militarily alongside the Byzantines.
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Abbreviations


ASVe = Archivio di Stato di Venezia

BZ = *Byzantinische Zeitschrift*

CDB = Codice diplomatico barese

CDI = *Codice diplomatico istriano*, ed. by Pietro Kandler, 2nd edn, 5 vols (Trieste: Tipografia del Lloyd Austriaco, 1862-65)

CDP = Codice diplomatico pugliese

CDRG = *Codice diplomatico della Repubblica di Genova*, ed. by Cesare Imperiale di Sant’Angelo, FSI 77, 79, 89, 3 vols (Rome: Istituto storico italiano per il Medio Evo, 1936-42)

CDRCSD², 1 = *Codex diplomaticus Regni Croatiae, Slavoniae et Dalmatiae*, aa. 743-1102, ed. by Marko Kostrenčić, Jakov Stipišić, and Miljen Šamšalović, 2nd edn (Zagreb: Izdavacki Zavod Jugoslavenske Akademije Znanosti i Umjetnosti, 1967)

CDRCSD, 2 = *Codex diplomaticus Regni Croatiae, Dalmatiae et Slavoniae*, aa. 1102-1200, ed. by Ivan Kukuljević Sakcinski, Monumenta spectantia historiam Slavorum meridionalium (Zagreb: Albrecht, 1875)

CFHB = Corpus fontium historiae Byzantinae

CSHB = Corpus scriptorum historiae Byzantinae


DCV = Documenti del commercio veneziano nei secoli XI-XIII, ed. by Raimondo Morozzo Della Rocca and Antonino Lombardo, 2 vols (Rome: Regio istituto storico per il Medio Evo, 1940), vol. 1

DOP = Dumbarton Oaks Papers

Falcandus = Pseudo Hugo Falcandus, De rebus circa Regni Siciliae curiam gestis, ed. and trans. by Edoardo D’Angelo, RIS³, 11 (Rome: Istituto storico italiano per il Medioevo, 2014)

FRB = Fontes rerum Byzantinarum

FSI = Fonti per la storia d'Italia

FZ = Famiglia Zusto, ed. by Luigi Lanfranchi (Venice: Il comitato, 1955)

Italia pontificia = Italia pontificia: Sive, repertorium privilegiorum et litterarum a Romanis pontificibus ante annum MCLXXXVIII Italiae ecclesiis, monasterii, civitatibus singulisque personis concessorum, ed. by Paul Fridolin Kehr, 10 vols (Berlin: Weidmann, 1906-1975)

John the Deacon = John the Deacon, Istoria Veneticorum, ed. and trans. by Luigi Andrea Berto (Bologna: Zanichelli, 1999)

Kinnamos = John Kinnamos, Epitome rerum ab Ioanne et Alexio Comnenis gestarum, ed. by August Meineke, CSHB (Bonn: Weber, 1836)

Malaterra = De rebus gestis Rogerii Calabriae et Siciliae Comitis et Roberti Guiscardi Ducis fratri eius auctore Gaufredo Malaterra monacho benedectino, ed. by Ernesto Pontieri, RIS², 5/1 (Bologna: Zanichelli, 1927)

MGH Briefe d. dt. Kaiserzeit = Monumenta Germaniae Historica, Die Briefe der deutschen Kaiserzeit

MGH Const. = Monumenta Germaniae Historica, Constitutiones et acta publica imperatorum et regum

MGH DD = Monumenta Germaniae Historica, Diplomata regum et imperatorum Germaniae

MGH Epp. sel. = Monumenta Germaniae Historica, Epistolae selectae in usu scholarum

MGH Leges, Capit. = Monumenta Germaniae Historica, Leges, Capitularia regum Francorum
MGH SS = Monumenta Germaniae Historica, Scriptores (in Folio)

MGH SS rer. Lang. = Monumenta Germaniae Historica, Scriptores rerum
Langobardicarum et Italicarum saec. VI-IX

MGH SS rer. Germ. = Monumenta Germaniae Historica, Scriptores rerum
Germanicarum in usum scholarum separatim editi

MGH SS rer. Germ. N.S. = Monumenta Germaniae Historica, Scriptores
rerum Germanicarum, Nova series

MPG = Patrologia Graeca, ed. by Jacques-Paul Migne, 161 vols (Paris:
Imprimerie Catholique, 1857-66)

MPL = Patrologia Latina, ed. by Jacques-Paul Migne, 221 vols (Paris:
Imprimerie Catholique, 1844-64)

MSHSM = Monumenta spectantia historiam Slavorum meridionalium

NDCV = Nuovi documenti del commercio veneto dei sec. XI-XIII, ed. by
Antonino Lombardo and Raimondo Morozzo della Rocca (Venice: Deputazione di
storia patria per le Venezie, 1953)

OMT = Oxford Medieval Texts

REB = Révue des études byzantines

RHC = Recueil des historiens des Croisades

RHGF = Recueil des Historiens des Gaules et de la France

RIS = Rerum Italicarum Scriptores

RIS² = Rerum Italicarum Scriptores, 2nd edn

RIS³ = Rerum Italicarum Scriptores, 3rd edn

SGET = S. Giovanni Ev. di Torcello, ed. by Luigi Lanfranchi (Venice: Alfieri,
1948)

SGM = S. Giorgio Maggiore, ed. by Luigi Lanfranchi and Bianca Lanfranchi
Strina, 4 vols (Venice: Il comitato, 1968-2016)

Tafel-Thomas = Urkunden zur älteren Handels- und Staatsgeschichte der
Republik Venedig mit besonderer Beziehung auf Byzanz und die Levante, ed. by
Gottlieb Lukas Friedrich Tafel and Georg Martin Thomas, 3 vols (Vienna: Aus der kaiserlich-königlichen Hof- und Staatsdruckerei, 1856-57), vol. 1
I. Introduction

The aim of this work is to provide an analysis of the evolution of the political and economic relations between Venice, Byzantium, and Southern Italy from 1081 to 1197. These were crucial years for the expansion of Western Europe. Indeed, while the First Crusade marked the beginning of the political expansion of the Westerners into the Eastern Mediterranean, this conflict was preceded by the beginning of the commercial penetration of the Italian merchants into the Central and Eastern Mediterranean. The first extensive commercial concessions for Venice were granted by Alexios I Komnenos before 1095, probably around 1081, as a reward for some highly-needed naval help. It was in this year that Robert Guiscard, the Norman Duke of Apulia and Calabria, began his campaign against the Byzantine Balkans.¹ Some of the main consequences of the commercial penetration of the Italian cities into the Eastern Mediterranean in the High Middle Ages were much better connections within the whole basin, and the increased wealth and power of Venice, Genoa, and Pisa. In particular, a century of commercial expansion made it possible for the Venetians to have the means to provide ships for a huge Frankish army when the Fourth Crusade was called, and, later, to enable the survival of the feeble Latin Empire of Constantinople for almost sixty years. 1197 (and not 1204, when Constantinople was conquered by the crusaders) has been chosen as the chronological end to this work because, following the death of Henry VI of Hohenstaufen in this year, Southern Italy could no longer pursue a strong foreign policy due to the minority of Frederick, Henry’s only son, and his heir to the Sicilian throne.

One of the aims of this thesis is that of outlining the evolution of Venetian-Byzantine relations when the Eastern Empire was ruled by the Komnenoi and by the Angeloi, and of analysing the role of Southern Italy in their development. This is one of the main differences between this work and an important monograph by Donald M. Nicol. Also because of its wider chronological range (from the eighth

¹ The dating of the chrysobull will be analysed in depth in the following chapter. Most of the recent scholars suggest that this charter was issued in 1082: Silvano Borsari, ‘Il crisobullo di Alessio I per Venezia’, Annali dell’istituto italiano per gli studi storici, 2 (1969-70), 111-31; Thomas F. Madden, ‘The Chrysobull of Alexius I Comnenus to the Venetians: The Date and the Debate’, Journal of Medieval History, 28 (2002), 23-41; David Jacoby, ‘The Chrysobull of Alexius I Comnenus to the Venetians: The Date and the Debate’, Journal of Medieval History, 28 (2002), 199-204. However, Peter Frankopan, ‘Byzantine Trade Privileges to Venice in the Eleventh Century: The Chrysobull of 1092’, Journal of Medieval History, 30 (2004), 135-60 has recently argued that the chrysobull was issued in 1092.
century until the Ottoman conquest of Constantinople in 1453), Nicol’s book mainly relies on previous secondary works, and hence does not analyse the period 1081-1197 in detail. Furthermore, Southern Italy only plays a secondary role in this monograph. A similar lack of interest in the relevance of the Mezzogiorno can be found in another key publication on the topic, Ralph-Johannes Lilie’s Handel und Politik zwischen dem byzantinischen Reich und den italienischen Kommunen Venedig, Pisa und Genua in der Epoche der Komnenen und der Angeloi (1081-1204). Furthermore, Lilie’s book also analyses the political and economic relations of Pisa and Genoa with the Byzantine Empire, which will not be covered in detail in this work. The triangular relationship between Venice, Byzantium, and Southern Italy has not been analysed by the main publications regarding trade either. Indeed, Borsari has focused on Venetian commerce in the Byzantine Empire, and not in Southern Italy. By contrast, the parts of Abulafia’s The Two Italies that deal with Venice focus on the mercantile activity of its inhabitants in Southern Italy, rather than in Romania.

Therefore, the primary aim of this thesis is to fill this historiographical gap. While doing this, some more specific aspects will be analysed. Amongst them, we shall ask whether the granting of trading concessions was the only reason why Venice intervened alongside Alexios Komnenos when Robert Guiscard invaded the Balkans in 1081. Furthermore, we shall see what led to the two main steps that marked the end of the Byzantine-Venetian alliance. The first one was the signing of an agreement between Venice and William I of Sicily in the mid-1150s, on the eve of a Byzantine attempt to recover part of Southern Italy. The second event was Manuel’s order, on 12 March 1171, to have all the Venetians that were found in the Eastern Empire arrested, and to have their goods confiscated. We shall then focus on what led to the beginning of a considerably lengthy period of peace between Byzantium and the Kingdom of Sicily in 1158. Finally, we shall ask ourselves why the Eastern Empire and Venice reconciled in the early 1180s, and whether this led

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4 Silvano Borsari, Venezia e Bisanzio nel XII secolo: I rapporti economici (Venice: Deputazione di storia patria per le Venezie, 1988).  
to the resumption of Venetian trade in Romania at a scale similar to that of before 1171.

Even though Venice, Byzantium, and Southern Italy are the three main foci of this thesis, in order to have a clearer picture of the events, we shall also briefly deal with the relations between these polities and other powers which nevertheless played an important role in these years. Such is the case of the Western Empire, the Kingdom of Hungary, the Papacy, the Crusader States, and the maritime republics of Pisa and Genoa.

The main problems with which such a research project has to contend are the patchy chronology of most of our main narrative sources, and the limited number of the commercial documents. Indeed, the Byzantine sources seldom follow a chronological order, thus making it difficult to have a clear sequence of the events. A similar issue can be found in most of the Venetian chronicles, with the addition that the most substantial of these texts (Andrea Dandolo's *Chronica extensa*) was written in the mid-fourteenth century, a long time after these events had taken place. Finally, the sources from Southern Italy provide an extensive coverage of only limited time ranges. For instance, while there are multiple and extensive sources on the mid-to-late eleventh century, there is a lack of chronicles for the early decades of the following century.

Most of the commercial documents come from the *Archivio di Stato* of Venice, and have been published since the 1940s by Morozzo della Rocca and Lombardo, and by Lanfranchi. However, unlike in Genoa, these charters do not represent the totality (or even a sample) of the whole documentation of Venetian trade in the eleventh and twelfth centuries. Indeed, all these documents (less than four hundred) have survived because they were donated to a monastery, which preserved them in its archive, until the charters moved into the *Archivio di Stato*. Furthermore, technically they are contracts concluded between an investor (*socius stans*) and a travelling merchant (*socius procertans*), or, more frequently, *securititates*, i.e. quittances to previous contractual obligations. Therefore, they are notarial documents, rather than properly commercial charters, and hence record a commercial operation only in cases which were preceded by some financial transaction. This means that, while we have a considerable amount of information regarding the merchants and their commercial destinations, we generally know very little about the goods that they traded. In most cases, the charters record a *colleganza* contract, or a quittance with regard to such a contract. The way this kind
of agreement worked was based on elements of Roman and Byzantine law; two parties agreed to become commercial partners and to invest some money on some trade that was to be carried out in another city. The colleganza could be unilateral or bilateral; while the latter was initially preeminent, the former would begin to be used later, but would completely replace the bilateral colleganza by the thirteenth century. In the former case, the socii stantes would invest all the capital, and would remain in the place where they lived; they would then obtain three fourths of the profits. The socii procertantes would not invest any money, but would sail to the trade destination, and then obtain one fourth of the gains. On the other hand, in the case of the bilateral colleganza, the stans could invest two thirds of the money, the procertans the other third, and then they would equally divide their gains (or losses). It is worth outlining that, by this period, not all of the commercial charters from Venice record colleganza contracts. We also have surviving evidence of ordinary loans (with an annual twenty percent interest rate), maritime loans (with a higher interest rate, but fewer responsibilities for the debtors who conducted trade; their expiry date corresponded with the end of the journey of the merchant), exchange contracts (a merchant is given a certain amount of money by a creditor in one location, and then pays it back in a second location, with the currency in use in this place, and adding an interest rate to the amount he owed), donations, and compagnie. This final kind of agreement, which started to be used in the twelfth century, was a partnership amongst brothers or relatives. They generally invested the same amount of money, and traded together until they agreed on dissolving the compagnia. After this, the partners would then divide proportionately their gains or losses.6

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II. The Dating of Alexios I’s Chrysobull

The long century beginning with Alexios I Komnenos’s usurpation (1081), and ending with the death of the German emperor and king of Sicily Henry VI of Hohenstaufen (1197) was characterised by a series of conflicts between the Byzantine emperors and the rulers of Southern Italy (or, at least, a portion of it). Since the disputed area in these wars was mainly the Lower Adriatic, Venice, being the main naval force of the region, often took part in these conflicts.

For a long time, the granting of commercial and territorial privileges has been considered as the main reason why Venice decided to side with the Byzantines in the first of these conflicts (1081-85), and in some of the following ones.¹ This is mainly due to the long-held belief that the cornerstone of these concessions, Alexios I Komnenos’s chrysobull, was issued in 1082.² However, Peter Frankopan has recently suggested that this charter was issued ten years later, in 1092.³ We shall now sum up the scholarly debate over the dating of this chrysobull, and give our own interpretation on when it was issued, in order to understand whether the commercial concessions granted to Venice were the main reason that led the Adriatic city to fight against Robert Guiscard alongside Alexios I.

At some point during the earlier part of his reign, Alexios issued an extremely important chrysobull, which granted several privileges to the Venetians. The Doge of Venice and the Patriarch of Grado (and their successors) were respectively granted the titles of protosebastos and hypertimos, and the corresponding stipends. In addition, the churches of Venice were to receive a yearly amount of money from the Byzantines and from the Amalfitans who had a workshop in Constantinople. Furthermore, an area within the city and some of its anchorages were awarded to the Venetians, and Venice also received the property and revenues of the church of St Andrew in Dyrrachion – modern Durrës/Durazzo (except for the goods that were stored there for the Byzantine navy). Finally, and most importantly, the Venetians were granted a complete exemption from taxes when they traded in most of the Byzantine Empire. In the event that any of these concessions were not respected by an imperial officer, the Venetians would be the recipients of a fine of ten pounds of gold, and of a compensation worth four times

¹ Nicol, Byzantium and Venice…, pp. 55-57.
³ Frankopan, ‘Byzantine Trade Privileges…’, pp. 135-60.
the value of the misappropriated goods. The chrysobull did not include any obligations on the Venetian side.\footnote{I trattati con Bisanzio: 992-1198, ed. by Marco Pozza and Giorgio Ravegnani, Pacta Veneta, 4 (Venice: Il cardo, 1993), no. 2, pp. 37-44; Jacoby, review of I trattati con Bisanzio: 992-1198, ed. by Marco Pozza and Giorgio Ravegnani, Mediterranean Historical Review, 9 (1994), 139-43 (pp. 141-42); Frankopan, ‘Byzantine Trade Privileges...’, pp. 138-39; Borsari, Venezia e Bisanzio..., pp. 3-13.}

While there is a general scholarly consensus on the importance of the grant of these concessions to Venice (and especially for its consequences on trade in Byzantium), there has been a lengthy discussion regarding when Alexios issued this chrysobull. This is due to the problematic dating of the sources which mention this agreement, or record its text. The main issue is that the original manuscript of Alexios’s decree has not survived, and its text can only be found in the Latin copies of two chrysobulls that were later issued for Venice, respectively in 1148 by Manuel I, and in 1187 by Isaac II. We do not have the original of either text; however, the earliest surviving copies were written a few decades after their issue: the oldest copy of Manuel’s document is from the late twelfth or the early thirteenth century, while the earliest copy of Isaac’s charter was transcribed in the thirteenth century. The main major discrepancy in the two texts is the dating, as the year of issue (but not the month, May) differs. According to Manuel’s charter, Alexios issued the chrysobull in the Byzantine year 6200 (692 CE), while, according to Isaac’s, Alexios issued it in the Byzantine year 6600 (1092 CE). While the former year is clearly wrong, the latter one is also problematic. This is because, according to both texts, the chrysobull was issued during the fifth indiction year, which did not fall in 1092, but rather in 1082 (or 1097).\footnote{I trattati con Bisanzio..., no. 2, pp. 44-45; Madden, ‘The Chrysobull...’, p. 38; Jacoby, ‘The Chrysobull...’, pp. 200-01.}

The granting of a Byzantine imperial dignity to the doge is also mentioned by a few narrative sources. According to Andrea Dandolo’s Chronica brevis, Domenico Selvo was granted a chrysobull, which appointed him as \textit{protosebastos}.\footnote{Dandolo, Chronica brevis, p. 363.} A different version of the events can be found in Andrea Dandolo’s extended chronicle: at the beginning of Vitale Falier’s dogeship (1084?-95), Andrea Michiel, Domenico Dandolo, and Jacopo Aurio were sent as legates to Constantinople to ask that the jurisdiction over Dalmatia and Croatia be granted to the Venetians. They succeeded in their diplomatic mission, and Alexios also granted the imperial dignity of \textit{protosebastos} to the doge.\footnote{Dandolo, Chronica extensa, bk 9, ch. 9, p. 217.} A detailed account on the privileges granted...
to the Venetians by Alexios I can also be found in the Alexiad. Here, Anna Komnene records that her father convinced the Venetians to intervene against Robert Guiscard in 1081 thanks to his ‘promises and bribes’. The emperor immediately rewarded them, and promised to remunerate them further once their fleet arrived in Dyrrachion, and engaged in naval combat against Robert. In addition, following a naval victory over the Normans in October 1081, the Venetians were rewarded by Alexios with large sums of money for the doge and for his officers. Anna later adds that, with the promise of a large sum of money, her father persuaded the Venetians to intervene again in the Balkans after Robert’s return for the second stage of his campaign in 1084. Finally, after her account of a Venetian victory near Butrint, Anna writes what seems to be a summary of the terms of the chrysobull, which ends by outlining that the Venetians were given a privilege allowing them to trade throughout the Byzantine Empire without paying any dues, and that they would be ‘free of Roman authority’.\(^8\)

Depending on their different interpretations of these sources, modern scholars have suggested three possible years of issue: either 1082, 1084, or 1092.\(^9\) However, most of the late twentieth-century scholarship was eventually convinced by Borsari, who suggested that the chrysobull was issued in 1082.\(^10\) According to Borsari, the Venetian government had to have received the Constantinopolitan properties that were granted with the chrysobull before 1092. He used some written documentation as the main evidence to support his hypothesis. 1092 was not considered the correct date because two years earlier, in 1090, some of the properties that Alexios had ceded to the Venetians when he had issued the chrysobull had already been sold by Doge Vitale Falier to the monastery of San Giorgio Maggiore. In addition, Borsari argued that 1084 is not an acceptable date either because Doge Domenico Selvo was already indicated as imperial protosebastos in two charters issued in 1083. Borsari also tried to explain Anna


Komnene’s and Andrea Dandolo’s accounts (which suggest that the charter was issued in 1084) by suggesting that the chrysobull might have been re-confirmed to Doge Falier after Selvo’s deposition.¹¹

The scholarly discussion on the dating of Alexios’s chrysobull resurfaced in the first decade of the twenty-first century. In the first of these articles, Madden has noticed that the archival evidence outlined by Borsari is not an undisputable proof for dating the chrysobull to 1082. Firstly, since emperors often handed out imperial dignities without issuing an official charter, the document written in 1083 in which Selvo used the title protosebastos does not prove that the chrysobull was issued in 1082. In addition, Madden notes that the contract issued in 1090 refers to land granted by Alexios through cartulae, which might suggest that the emperor issued either more than one praktikon (a ‘transmission document’ that registered all the pieces of property that were granted by a basileus), or more than one chrysobull for Venice. In the latter case, it would be possible that the only surviving charter of those issued by Alexios summed up all the previous donations, thus making the contract an ‘ambiguous document’. Madden also suggests that Andrea Dandolo’s narrative accounts do not provide any decisive conclusion regarding the dating of this chrysobull: Dandolo’s Chronica brevis is not reliable, while his Chronica extensa probably refers to another imperial charter issued in 1084, which only granted jurisdiction over Dalmatia and Croatia to Venice. However, Madden notes that in no surviving Venetian document issued before 1094 did Vitale Falier use the title of Duke of Dalmatia and Croatia, and thus he suggests that this charter must have been issued later, after July 1090. Therefore, Madden insists on the necessity of a textual and palaeographical analysis of the charter in order to date it correctly. Since the indiction coincides in both copies of the chrysobull, and is ‘always correct’ in Venetian copies of imperial charters, he suggests that the wrong dating element in the charter is the Byzantine year. He believes that in the lost original Latin copy of the decree the letter X in ‘\(\overline{V} MDXC\)’ (that is, 6590) was compressed. This led both scribes to miss the X, and to write ‘\(\overline{V} MDC\)’ (6600) instead of ‘\(\overline{V} MDXC\)’ (6590). In addition, one of the scribes also misread ‘\(\overline{V} MDC\)’ as ‘\(\overline{V} MCC\)’. For all

these reasons, Madden suggests that the chrysobull was issued in 1082, confirming the opinion of previous scholars.\textsuperscript{12}

Madden’s article was soon followed by a rejoinder by Jacoby. Even though Jacoby agrees with the 1082 dating of the chrysobull, he rejects Madden’s conjecture according to which the document issued in 1090 might refer to one chrysobull that summed up previous donations of property. In fact, Jacoby notes that, from the late eleventh century until 1192, any time the Byzantine emperors issued a chrysobull to grant privileges to an Italian city, they coupled each one with one \textit{praktikon} only, and thus comes to the conclusion that the word \textit{cartulae} used in the text refers to one chrysobull and one \textit{praktikon}. In addition, Jacoby also has some remarks on the palaeographical evidence. He notes that the scribe who transcribed the text of Manuel’s chrysobull issued in 1148 also dated John II’s chrysobull to Venice incorrectly. In both cases, the Roman letters ‘CC’ were used instead of ‘DC’. This happened because the Venetian scribe was used to writing ‘CC’ while dating the charters that he had to issue during his lifetime, in the early thirteenth century, while using the Common Era style. Furthermore, Jacoby explains that both copyists omitted the Roman letter ‘X’ before ‘C’ while they were writing the text of Alexios’s chrysobull because they were both transcribing the text from a previous copy which has not survived, and in which the Roman numeral ‘X’ was also erroneously omitted. Finally, according to Jacoby, the familiarity of the Venetian chancery with the indiction year suggests that we should consider this element the only reliable dating factor of all the chrysobulls for Venice. This hypothesis is corroborated by the evidence of Isaac II’s 1187 charter: its scribe miswrote the Byzantine year (but not the indiction) of at least two other earlier documents included in it. Therefore, according to Jacoby, 1082 is still to be considered the correct year of issue of Alexios’s chrysobull.\textsuperscript{13}

However, only a few years after Jacoby’s article, Frankopan suggested that the chrysobull was actually issued in 1092. Frankopan believes that the Venetian scribes miswrote the indiction cycle year while they were transcribing the Latin copy of the text of the chrysobull from the Greek one. Thus, they wrote fifth indiction instead of fifteenth (in Greek, five is ‘ἐ’, while fifteen is ‘ἰξ’). Frankopan also notes that, if the chrysobull had been issued in 1082 or in 1084, it would probably mention the Venetian obligation to continue fighting against Robert Guiscard. However, the text only mentions the support that Venice had provided against the Normans in

\textsuperscript{13} Jacoby, ‘The Chrysobull…’, pp. 199-204.
Dyrrachion, thus possibly implying that, by then, the conflict had ended, or, at least, that the Byzantines had recovered this city. This suggests the chrysobull was issued no earlier than 1083. The inclusion of a church in Dyrrachion amongst the donations handed over to Venice also makes it probable that the concessions were not granted in May 1082, when the city was under Norman control. Frankopan also believes that Anna Komnene’s frequent chronological inaccuracies warn us to take her account with a grain of salt, and that she ‘misplaced her account of the concessions’ when she linked it with events that were taking place in 1085. Furthermore, Frankopan believes that the fact that Crete, Cyprus, any Aegean islands (except for Chios), and Smyrna are not mentioned in the charter is key evidence that the charter was issued in 1092. The former two islands revolted in 1091, and the Byzantines were only able to recover them in the second half of 1092. Furthermore, in this period all of the Aegean islands (except for Chios) were ruled by the Turkish emir Tzachas, who was based in Smyrna. As for the arguments pointed out by Borsari, Frankopan emphasises that the chrysobull did not confer the title of protosebastos on a single doge, but entitled him and all his successors to use it. Therefore, Doge Selvo could have received this dignity as a personal appointment before 1083, which would explain why he is mentioned with this title in charters issued in this year. In addition, the doge owned some property in Constantinople in 1090 because, while Alexios’s chrysobull granted some new properties to the Venetians, it also re-confirmed other previous ones. Thus, the doge had previously received some land in Constantinople, probably as a reward for helping the Byzantines against the Normans. Frankopan also notes that Alexios’s chrysobull does not mention that the emperor appointed the doge with the title of Duke of Croatia. However, since this title is not used in any Venetian charter issued by 1090 (it was first used in 1092), Alexios probably granted this title with another charter, now lost. Finally, Frankopan suggests that the information provided by Andrea Dandolo, according to whom the Patriarch of Grado Giovanni Saponario died in Constantinople in 1092, can be interpreted as evidence that the cleric was there in this year in order to witness the signing of the treaty between Venice and the Byzantines which was sanctioned by the chrysobull. To sum up, for all these reasons, Frankopan suggests that the chrysobull was issued in 1092, and that it does not have to be associated with the Norman attacks in the Balkans. It was actually a commercial treaty, aimed at attracting foreign capital to the empire, and at stimulating its economy. The almost contemporary introduction of a new coinage system, in September 1092, shows that Alexios had a consistent
programme of economic revival, and meant to increase commerce in his empire with both measures. In addition, Alexios granted free trade to the Venetians in the Aegean area in order 'to induce Venice beyond the Adriatic' to help him recover the territories that Byzantium had lost to the Turks.\footnote{I trattati con Bisanzio..., no. 2, p. 37; Dandolo, Chronica extensa, bk 9, ch. 9, p. 218; Frankopan, ‘Byzantine Trade Privileges...’; pp. 140-55, 158, 160; Jean-Claude Cheynet, ‘La Résistance aux Turcs en Asie Mineure entre Mantzikert et la Première Croisade’, in Eupsychia: Mélanges offerts à Hélène Ahrweiler, 2 vols (Pairs: Publications de la Sorbonne, 1998), i, 131-47 (pp. 145-46); Paul Gautier, ‘Déflection et soumission de la Crête sous Alexis Ier Comnène’, REB, 36 (1977), 215-27 (pp. 218, 220-22, 225-27). Neither Andrea Dandolo nor Frankopan has the name of the patriarch that died in Constantinople right: according to the former, it was one Domenico (but Domenico Cerbone had already died by 1084), while according to the latter it was Pietro Badoer (but he was Giovanni Saponario’s successor).}

Frankopan’s arguments are for the most part convincing. Furthermore, there is an important palaeographical and textual element which strongly suggests the chrysobull was issued in 1092. In fact, both Jacoby and Madden omit to mention that in the surviving copies of the document the Byzantine era and the indication year are both written in letters, and not in Roman numerals.\footnote{ASVe, Secreta, Patti, Liber Pactorum 1, cc. 66v, 71v; ASVe, Secreta, Patti, Liber Pactorum 2, cc. 108v, 113r; ASVe, Secreta, Patti, Liber albus, cc. 8r, 12 r; ASVe, Secreta, Miscellanea ducali e atti diplomatici, b. VI, no. B5.} Therefore, their suggestion that the copyst of the document might have omitted to write, or to see an ‘X’ while transcribing the chrysobull is hardly plausible. In addition, it would assume that the subtractive notation of Roman numerals was used, while this system was not extremely common in the central Middle Ages.\footnote{Charles Burnett, ‘Ten or Forty? A Confusing Numerical Symbol in the Middle Ages’, in Mathematics Celestial and Terrestrial: Festschrift für Menso Folkerts zum 65. Geburtstag (Halle: Deutsche Akademie der Naturforscher Leopoldina, 2008), pp. 81-89 (pp. 81-82); Charles Burnett, ‘Algorismi vel helcep decentior est diligentia: The Arithmetic of Adelard of Bath and His Circle’, in Mathematische Probleme im Mittelalter: Der lateinische und arabische Sprachbereich, ed. by Menso Folkerts (Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz, 1996), pp. 221-331 (pp. 234, 264);} Thus, it is quite likely that, when the Latin version of the decree was transcribed, the year was never written down in Roman numerals. These considerations suggest us that an error was made while reading the Greek numerals, and, since the subtractive notation is not used for these numerals, this makes it much more likely that the indication year was miscopied in both versions of the chrysobull (and that the Byzantine year is correct in the text included in Isaac II’s decree).

Yet, some other aspects analysed by Frankopan are less convincing. In particular, the one regarding the absence of Crete and Cyprus seems rather weak, as a series of cities were included in the list even though the Byzantines had lost
control over them. The most striking case is that of Antioch, which had been conquered by the Seljuk Turks in 1084 after a decade of rule by autonomous Armenian lords. It is also unclear why the chrysobull list includes the cities of Laodikeia, Mamistra, Adana, Phokaia, and Ephesus, since by 1092 they had all been lost to the empire. While most of these cities were important economic centres or ports, and Venice might have been interested in obtaining commercial privileges there in case of a Byzantine reconquest, this explanation is still weak.  

Another aspect that is unconvincing is that Frankopan almost ignores the many narrative texts that suggest that the privileges to Venice were issued during the conflict against Robert Guiscard. While Frankopan discards the collocation of Anna Komnene’s words due to her frequent errors in chronology, he does not take into consideration that John Kinnamos also associated the concessions with this war. Kinnamos, who was Manuel I’s secretary, and thus had access to official documents, wrote that, when Robert Guiscard invaded the Balkans, Alexios rewarded the Venetians for their military help by granting them a quarter in Constantinople, and by allowing them to pay no taxes on commerce.

Therefore, while the textual elements of the chrysobull suggest that the decree was issued in 1092, according to the Byzantine historians the concessions were granted during Robert Guiscard’s campaign. Yet, these elements are not necessarily in conflict with each other. During the conflict against the Normans, the


Venetians obtained privileges on two different occasions, first following their initial intervention against Robert Guiscard, and then when they sent another fleet after the Norman leader returned to the Balkans. Yet, a chrysobull that included the two privileges granted in the 1080s (the cartulae to which the text refers), possibly together with new ones, was issued in 1092, probably in the presence of a Venetian legation led by the Patriarch of Grado. It is quite likely that this decree was drawn up because the Venetians asked for a charter that would protect their merchants from the abuses of the hands of imperial tax collectors (as indeed had been the case with the Pactum Lotharii signed with the Western Empire in 840, and with Basil II’s chrysobull in 992). The concessions that were not augmented were left unchanged, and this is probably why the cities over which Alexios had in the meantime lost control, were nevertheless included amongst the places where the Venetians would pay no taxes on trade. Since Crete and Cyprus were part of the empire in the first half of the 1080s, their absence from the chrysobull is not due to their rebellions, but rather to geopolitical reasons. Allowing the Venetians to trade there without having to pay any dues would have also given them the chance of opening the yet-unexplored sea route that connected the Central Mediterranean to Palestine and Egypt. This would have created a Venetian commercial monopoly in the Mediterranean, and the Byzantines were not willing to allow this to happen.  

Therefore, while the surviving chrysobull was issued in 1092, the Venetians had already obtained their privileges in the 1080s, as a reward for their intervention against Robert Guiscard.

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III. The Context of the Venetian-Byzantine Alliance of 1081

As we have just seen, the rewards promised by Alexios I facilitated the Venetian decision to join forces with the Byzantines against Robert Guiscard. However, especially since we do not know exactly what commercial concessions Venice obtained when Robert Guiscard was still attacking the Balkans, these privileges cannot be considered as the only reason why Venice provided its help to Alexios Komnenos.

Indeed, the mere existence of these concessions does not explain why, of all the Mediterranean powers, the Byzantines asked Venice for help. Had there already been some previous Venetian military interventions alongside the Eastern Empire, or was this an isolated event? Furthermore, we need to ask ourselves whether, in addition to the promise of obtaining commercial privileges, the Venetians had other reasons for being interested in preventing the Norman leader from conquering the Balkan coast. A common answer is that they were afraid that, if Robert had controlled both shores of the Strait of Otranto, he might have soon built a strong fleet to connect his possessions. This navy could have then bottlenecked the Venetian ships in the Adriatic, thus preventing them from trading in the Mediterranean. This would imply that Venice was already significantly involved in commerce in the Mediterranean (and especially in Byzantium) before 1081. We shall here try to answer these questions by analysing the evolution of Venetian policy (especially with regard to the Adriatic) and trade in the two centuries before 1081.

1) Political and Diplomatic Aspects

Venice, due to its peculiar geographic position, had been militarily involved in the Adriatic for centuries before its intervention alongside Alexios I in 1081. It had in particular engaged in naval warfare in the Adriatic, and, at times, also in the Western Ionian Sea. While most of the interventions along the western shores of these seas took place following a Byzantine request for help, the Venetians tried to pursue their own policy in the Eastern Adriatic.

i) Until c. 950

Even though Venice had already managed to obtain internal political autonomy in the eighth century, when the Byzantines had allowed local doukes to rule over the city, its external policy remained partly dependent on the Eastern
Empire during the following centuries.¹ In particular in the early ninth century, the Byzantines had often asked the Venetians for naval help in the Adriatic in order to counter raids from the Arabs, and to prevent the fall of their Southern Italian lands. In this period, due to the decline of their naval strength, and to a difficult situation on the Balkan and Anatolian/Syrian borders, the basileis could not afford to send fleets to defend the Mezzogiorno against Saracen attacks.² Therefore, Venice sent its own ships to fight the Arabs on three different occasions (all unsuccessful) between the late 820s and 841. According to the sources, the Venetians were asked to intervene alongside the Byzantines; however, they might have actually been forced to do this. Sending a fleet when asked might have been an obligation of the Venetian doges after their marriage to a Byzantine wife, and after receiving imperial dignities (the ruler of Venice would become a hypatos, or a spatharios).³

However, the failure of 841 was followed by a lack of Venetian interventions alongside the Byzantines for over 150 years. Since Saracen raids had not ended, possibly the Eastern Empire had not asked Venice for help. The conclusion, in 840,


² Regarding the *Pactum Lotharii* and Basil II’s chrysobull, see *Documenti relativi alla storia di Venezia anteriore al Mille*, ed. by Roberto Cessi, 2 vols (Padua: Gregoriana, 1940-42), i, no. 55, p. 105; *I trattati con Bisanzio...,* no. 1, p. 23; Annamaria Pazienza, 'Venice beyond Venice: Commercial Agreements and “Pacta” from the Origins to Pietro II Orseolo', in *The Age of Affirmation: Venice, the Adriatic and the Hinterland between the 9th and 10th Centuries*, ed. by Stefano Gasparri and Sauro Gelichi (Turnhout: Brepols, 2017), pp. 147-76 (pp. 153-54).


of the Pactum Lotharii, the first Venetian treaty with the Western Empire, might have led to the end of such military collaborations. Indeed, this pact marked the beginning of closer relations with the Western Empire, to the point that Venice even promised to provide naval help to Emperor Lothar I, if needed. However, even though the Venetians did not intervene alongside the Byzantines, they nevertheless maintained their role as patrollers of the Adriatic Sea, as in the following decades they twice intervened autonomously (and successfully) against the Saracens. The Arabs were defeated near Taranto in the 840s, and in the 870s they were repelled while they were raiding Grado.⁴

Yet, until the end of the tenth century the relations between Venice and Byzantium had generally remained quite good. This is shown by the recurrent diplomatic journeys to the Bosporus made by sons of doges, and by the frequent exchange of gifts between the two cities.⁵ In addition, the doges, beginning with Orso I Participazio in 879, were given a higher imperial dignity than in the past (that of protospatharios), which made their status similar to that of other autonomous rulers of Southern Italy. Indeed, Constantine VII Porphyrogennetos’s De Cerimoniis, written in the mid-tenth century, indicates that the same inscriptio and type of seal were to be used in the correspondence with both the doge of Venice and the rulers of the Mezzogiorno. Another analogy between these areas is that all these rulers issued charters dated by the regnal years of the Eastern emperors, and that their intitulatio included their Byzantine title.⁶


These clashes with the Arabs were not the only military activity in which the Venetians were involved, as in the ninth and tenth centuries they often engaged in naval battles off the Dalmatian coasts and islands. The Venetians were interested in this region mainly for technical and geophysical reasons. Medieval ships had a limited stowage capacity, and thus had to stop frequently to get provisions (especially fresh water). Several factors made it easier for ships to sail along the Eastern Adriatic coast (rather than by the western coast) when they had to traverse this sea, and reach the Mediterranean from Venice for commercial and diplomatic reasons. Amongst them, we can mention the several natural harbours that can be found in Dalmatia, the direction of the winds, and the presence of nearby mountains which acted as ‘visual markers’ for sailors before the invention of the compass. However, the topography of this region, and the weakened Byzantine control over its coast, had led to the settlement of pirates on the southern shores of Dalmatia in the ninth century. The Narentan Slavs, based on the river mouth of the Narenta (now Neretva) and on the nearby islands, were the most troublesome threat for Venice.

After some minor skirmishes, the Venetians launched their first expedition against the Narentans in 839; however, they only managed to achieve some significant success some decades later, when Doge Orso I Participazio (864-81).

References:


8 Constantine Porphyrogennetos, De administrando imperio, ed. by Gyula Moravcsik, trans. by Romilly James Heald Jenkins (Budapest: Pázmány Péter Tudományegyetemi Görög Filológiai Intézet, 1949), chs 29, 32, 36 pp. 124-27, 156-57, 164-65. The Venetians might have been interested in this area also due to its late Christianisation, which allowed them to engage freely in the slave trade. See Johannes Hoffmann, ‘Die östliche Adriaküste als Hauptnachschubbasis für den venezianischen Sklavenhandel bis zum Ausgang des elften Jahrhunderts’, Vierteljahrschrift für Sozial- und Wirtschaftsgeschichte, 55 (1968), 165-81 (pp. 167-72); Johannes Hoffmann, ‘Venedig und die Narentaner’, Studi veneziani, 11 (1969), 3-41 (p. 29).
forced the Croats (who, until then, had supported the Narentans) to sign a treaty, which led to a considerably lengthy period of peace with the kingdom of Croatia.\textsuperscript{9} This made it possible for Orso’s successor, Giovanni II Participazio (881-87), to focus on the Western Adriatic shore, where the doge obtained the subjection of Comacchio, the main commercial rival of Venice in the area.\textsuperscript{10} Yet, the Narentans had not been completely subdued, and the attempts made by Pietro I Candiano in 887 were notably unsuccessful, for the doge himself was killed in this conflict.\textsuperscript{11}

Venice was once more active in the Eastern Adriatic starting in the 930s. In 932 the Istrian city of Iustinopolis (modern Koper), agreed to pay an annual tribute. This was an extremely advantageous move for the Venetians, as it gave them access to the Istrian woods, and thus to a quality of timber that was particularly good for shipbuilding. In addition, in 948, despite an initial defeat, Doge Pietro III Candiano (942-59) managed to defeat the Narentans, and to force them to sign an agreement.\textsuperscript{12} This led to the end of hostilities between the Venetians and the Narentans until the early eleventh century.

While it is interesting that Venice was already involved in the Adriatic area (both assisting the Byzantines, and acting autonomously) in the ninth and in the first half of the tenth centuries, it is the Venetian foreign policy of the century that preceded Robert Guiscard’s campaign in the Balkans that needs to be analysed in more detail. This will show that the intervention alongside Alexios I was not an isolated event.

\textbf{ii) C. 950-1081}

Relations between Venice and Byzantium seem to have deteriorated in the second half of the tenth century, especially during the dogeship of Pietro IV

\textsuperscript{9} John the Deacon, bk 2, chs 40, 46, 49, 51, bk 3, chs 2, 14, 16, pp. 120-26, 130, 136-38; Dandolo, \textit{Chronica extensa}, bk 8, chs 3-5, pp. 148-49, 150-52, 155, 159.
\textsuperscript{11} John the Deacon, bk 3, ch. 33, p. 146; Dandolo, \textit{Chronica extensa}, bk 8, ch. 7, p. 163.
Candiano (959-76). However, even if Pietro conducted a generally pro-Western foreign policy (with military involvement in Northern Italy, which was intended to secure access to its agricultural production), he nevertheless still recognised some form of Byzantine sovereignty. Possibly out of fear of Byzantine reprisals if he had refused to do so, the doge abided by the order of Emperor John I Tzimiskes to issue a ban on the trade of strategic goods (wood and metal) to the Saracens.\(^\text{13}\)

However, the final years of Candiano’s dogeship were marred by internal tensions, probably due to the presence of two opposing political factions in Venice, one pro-Western and the other pro-Byzantine. The Venetians seem to have neglected the Adriatic area (except for the renewal of the pact with Koper), due to the turn in their foreign policy, and to internal problems: Candiano himself was murdered, while during Tribuno Menio’s dogeship (979-91) a civil war between the two factions broke out, also leading to tensions with the Western emperor Otto II. However, Tribuno Menio managed to put a halt to this crisis in his final years as a ruler, when he also resumed relations with the Byzantines by sending a legation to Constantinople.\(^\text{14}\)

The negotiations were concluded by the agents of Pietro II Orseolo (991-1008), and led to the Venetians being granted a chrysobull by Emperor Basil II. The Venetians were asked to help the Byzantines to cross the Strait of Otranto in case of a campaign in Southern Italy (which eventually never took place). While this charter is an important milestone for its military and commercial terms, it also interestingly refers to the Venetians as *extranei*. This term is a translation of the Greek word εξωτικοί, which was used to define imperial subjects living outside Constantinople. Therefore, we may conclude that, at the end of the tenth century, the Byzantines still considered Venice to be formally a part of their empire.\(^\text{15}\)


Empire, and to strengthen those with Byzantium. The doge twice sent his son Giovanni to Constantinople as an envoy; Giovanni also ended up marrying a Byzantine noblewoman, and being made a patrician. Pietro also renewed the traditional Adriatic policy of his city by launching new expeditions in Dalmatia, and by helping Basil II against the Arabs with his fleet.\(^{16}\)

Since the first two Venetian embassies each preceded a Dalmatian expedition, it is possible that these campaigns were planned in Constantinople. Dalmatia had been recently occupied by the Croats, whose new king had abandoned his predecessor’s pro-Byzantine policy, becoming a supporter of the Bulgarians. Thus, the Venetian expeditions in this region are probably to be associated with the contemporary Byzantine-Bulgarian conflict that lasted for most of Basil II’s reign, until his final success in c. 1018.\(^{17}\) If we trust John the Deacon, according to whom in 1000 Zadar was already under Venetian rule (while in 996 probably it was not), the Byzantines might have ceded it to the Venetians in order to facilitate their naval enterprise, or, perhaps, as a pledge for the completion of Giovanni Orseolo’s marriage to his Byzantine fiancée.\(^{18}\)

A renewal of hostilities with the Croats led to a first Venetian campaign in Dalmatia in 996, which only achieved limited success, and to a second intervention in the region (in 1000), which was much more effective.\(^{19}\) According to John the Deacon, this second campaign was a reprisal for Croatian and Narentan

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\(^{17}\) John the Deacon, bk 4, ch. 31, pp. 176-78; Dandolo, Chronica extensa, bk 9, ch. 1, p. 195; Margetić, Le cause della spedizione veneziana...’, pp. 231-40; Paul Stephenson, Byzantium’s Balkan Frontier: A Political Study of the Northern Balkans, 900-1204 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), pp. 58-60.


\(^{19}\) John the Deacon, bk 4, ch. 40, p. 184; Dandolo, Chronica extensa, bk 9, ch. 1, pp. 195-96.
harassment against the citizens of Zadar (which, as noted above, was then under Venetian control). However, this intervention was probably also a diversionary move elaborated by the Byzantines in order to recover the Balkan hinterland from the Bulgarians. The Bulgarians might have been afraid that Dyrrachion was the target of Orseolo’s expedition. This city, then under Bulgarian control, was strategically extremely important due to its location opposite the Strait of Otranto, and at the western end of the Via Egnatia, which ended in Constantinople, passing through Thessalonica. Thus, the Bulgarians would have gathered most of their army there, making the undefended Balkan hinterland an easier prey for the Byzantines. Therefore, this expedition was probably agreed during the talks between the Venetians and the Eastern Empire, rather than being, as suggested by Nicol and Ferluga, a ‘completely independent enterprise’ by Venice. Yet, this campaign was nevertheless a major success for Pietro II Orseolo. Most of the Dalmatian cities and islands submitted to him, and the doge also received the homage of ‘Surigna’ (the brother of the Croatian king, probably to be identified with Krešimir, who himself became king before 1008). Furthermore, several Narentan nobles were captured, and were only released after a Narentan princeps swore that he and his fellow countrymen would stop asking the Venetians for tribute, and would no longer harass any Venetian travelling in this area. Therefore, this campaign was extremely successful for Pietro Orseolo, as he obtained relevant military results, and significant prestige. Indeed, the Narentans kept their word, and remained at peace – no Venetian chronicle mentions them after this campaign. Furthermore, although Dalmatia was not actually conquered by Venice, but remained formally under the Byzantine Empire, following this expedition both


22 John the Deacon, bk 4, chs 45-54, pp. 186-94; Dandolo, Chronica extensa, bk 9, ch. 1, pp. 197-99.
chronicles and charters started to refer to Pietro II as *dux Veneticorum et Dalmaticorum*.23

Some years later, Pietro II Orseolo was once more militarily active alongside the Byzantines. Indeed, in September 1002, another Venetian naval expedition led to the successful relief of the Byzantine city of Bari during the Saracen siege.24 We cannot exclude that Basil II rewarded Orseolo for his help by giving his consent to the marriage between the doge’s son Giovanni and an imperial noblewoman.

The collaboration between Venice and Byzantium continued during the dogeship of Ottone Orseolo (1008-26), a son of Pietro II. In 1018, Basil II finally secured victory over the Bulgarians, while since the Dalmatians were being harassed by the Croats, Ottone launched a new successful expedition against this region, probably after a preliminary agreement with Constantinople. On his way back to Venice, Ottone also obtained a promise that Venice would receive a yearly tribute from some of the cities of the Kvarner Gulf.25 That the intervention was arranged by Basil II seems highly likely because it was followed by the submission of the Croat king to Byzantium (and not to Venice), and by a strengthened imperial control over Dalmatia. In the years following this, after an initial subjection to Byzantium, the Croatian *toparchs* of Zadar and Split was imprisoned by Emperor


Michael IV (1034-41), who obtained direct control over Zadar. By contrast, after 1018 Venice soon lost its relevance in Dalmatia, mainly as a result of the internal tensions between the Orseolos and their rivals. Between 1024 and the early 1030s, Ottone was deposed and exiled twice, and reinstated once, and Domenico, a relative of his, was installed as doge, but soon overthrown. This internal turmoil led to a reduced interest in Dalmatia, and thus the Venetians probably stopped receiving the tributes and honours that they had been granted in 1018.

Relations with Byzantium improved once again during the dogeship of Domenico Contarini (1043-71). Contarini was conspicuously honoured by the Byzantines, who first made him first a patrikios, then a protosebastos, and finally an anthypatos. Furthermore, according to Andrea Dandolo, Emperor Constantine X (1059-67) also awarded him with the high-ranking dignity of magistros. The existence of such privileged relations was well-known. Indeed, the Papacy tried to take advantage of them by entrusting the Venetian Patriarch of Grado, Domenico Marango (1043-71), with the task of acting as mediator in a mission which unsuccessfully attempted to reunite the Greek and Roman Churches.


The Venetian association with Byzantium also led to a renewed military collaboration in Dalmatia. The Croats had taken advantage of the military and internal crisis which had struck the Eastern Empire in the early 1060s, to conquer most of Dalmatia (a feat that was facilitated by support from Rome, as the Kingdom of Croatia had become a vassal state of the Papacy). The Byzantines wanted to recover this region, and asked the Venetians to send a fleet to this region. Contarini abided by this request, and, since the expedition was successful, the Eastern Empire recovered control over Dalmatia, to hold it until c. 1069.

This privileged relationship continued during the dogeship of Domenico Selvo (1071-84). In 1072, the doge married a sister of Michael VII Doukas (1071-78), probably Theodora, and received the titles of proprotoedros, formerly very prestigious, but which was widely granted by this time, and of magistros. In addition, Selvo was particularly active in the Southern Adriatic. During his dogeship not only did the Venetians fight against the Normans alongside Alexios I, but they also took part in another campaign in Dalmatia. In the early 1070s, Dalmatia had been recovered by the Croats, whose king Peter Krešimir IV had then supported the pro-Slavic/Glagolitic clergy, thus falling out of favour with the pro-Roman clergy and, consequently, with the pontiff. Pope Gregory VII (of whom the Kingdom of Croatia was formally a vassal – see fn. 30) then tried to solve this issue by trying to

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convince a *super partes* candidate who was loyal to the Church to intervene and depose Peter Krešimir. The choice eventually fell on a Danish prince, but since he never reached Croatia, the pontiff had to send Gerard, the Archbishop of Siponto, to Dalmatia to act as his legate. Probably on Gerard’s invitation – which apparently had not been approved by the pope –, Amicus of Giovinazzo, who might have already attempted an expedition in the Balkans around 1066, intervened militarily in Dalmatia in 1074 or 1075. Amicus was a count whose lands neighboured the legate’s diocese, and a member of one of the most important Norman kin groups of Southern Italy. He had recently led an unsuccessful rebellion against the Duke of Apulia and Calabria, Robert Guiscard, and could obtain the support of a prelate because, unlike Robert, he was not an excommunicate. Amicus’s second Dalmatian expedition was initially successful, as by November he had captured the king. However, his intervention led to a Venetian reaction: Doge Selvo sailed to Dalmatia, put the Normans to flight, and, if this charter is not a forgery, in early 1075 or in early 1076 received an oath of fealty from the Dalmatian cities together with a promise not to invite the Normans into their region. In addition, Demetrius Zvonimir, the leader of the pro-Roman faction, was crowned King of Croatia.33

This Venetian intervention in Dalmatia was probably not a response to a Byzantine request: the empire was facing a political and military crisis, and, even

though it would successfully suppress revolts in its territories (for instance, in Macedonia), it did not have the resources to attempt a new expansion in the West. Furthermore, in contrast to previous instances, after this campaign no Byzantine officials are recorded in Dalmatia.\textsuperscript{34} Nor is it likely that the Venetians wanted directly to conquer Dalmatia; they were more interested in holding rights over this region, rather than in exercising them. Indeed, in the oath of 1075/76, which does name the doge as Duke of Dalmatia and \textit{senior} of the four Dalmatian cities, while the inhabitants of the region swore not to allow any Normans to settle there, they made no mention of the Croats.\textsuperscript{35} Therefore, the Venetians intervened in Dalmatia in the 1070s only in order to expel the Normans.

This analysis seems to suggest, therefore, that, in addition to the granting of commercial privileges, Venice assisted Alexios I in 1081 mainly for two other reasons. First, there was the existence of a long tradition of collaboration with Byzantium. Indeed, many doges had obtained imperial dignities, but, in return, they had to provide military help in the Adriatic area when needed. Secondly, a Norman conquest of the Balkan coast would have had negative consequences for their interests in Dalmatia. As can be noticed when analysing Amicus’s expedition, the Venetians did not want to lose their prerogatives over this region, and their access to its goods and natural harbours; thus, they intervened militarily in order to prevent this from happening. Therefore, it is unsurprising that the Venetians were similarly scared when Robert Guiscard invaded the area around Dyrrachion. This region is dangerously close to Dalmatia, and its conquest would have enabled the Norman duke to control the Lower Adriatic, and hence to block the Venetian sea routes towards the Mediterranean.

This second reason leads us to ask a further question: how much was Venice involved in trade in the Mediterranean before 1081?


\textsuperscript{35} Dandolo, \textit{Chronica extensa}, bk 9, ch. 8, p. 215; Mandić, ‘Gregorio VII e l’occupazione veneta…’, p. 462.
2) Commercial Aspects

If we suggest that Domenico Selvo intervened to assist Alexios I out of fear that the conquest of Epirus by Guiscard might block the Venetian sailing routes, we imply that Venice was already very active in sea trade before 1081. Yet, was this the case? We shall try to answer this question by analysing the scale of Venetian commerce in the Mediterranean and Lower Adriatic before 1081.

As was correctly observed by Roberto Sabatino Lopez, the ‘Pirenne thesis’, according to which trade and communication in the Mediterranean diminished as a result of the Islamic conquests, is quite difficult to prove due to the scarcity of the surviving written documentation. In fact, even though archaeological finds have been extremely useful in reassessing the ‘Pirenne thesis’, they are not as helpful in the ninth century, or when it comes to tracking down trade routes. Indeed, most of the finds are from much earlier periods, and furthermore it is impossible to identify accurately the place of origin of the later amphorae. Therefore, we still need to rely mostly on written sources to assess the scale of Mediterranean trade during the ninth and tenth centuries.

Similar considerations apply if we consider the extent of specifically Venetian trade at this period. While the political and diplomatic history of this city, especially in the tenth and very early eleventh centuries, is well-covered by John the Deacon’s chronicle, the documentation on trade is fragmentary until the mid- to late tenth century. However, the surviving sources nevertheless suggest that, already in the ninth century, the Venetians were acting as middlemen, transporting into mainland Northern Italy goods probably produced in Byzantium and in the

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37 Hodges and Whitehouse, Mohammed..., pp. 24-33, 56-76.


39 John the Deacon, pp. 8-20.
Eastern Mediterranean.40 However, such ware could sometimes remain in Venice, as part of the patrimony of the élite of the city.41

The most significant text regarding the importance of Venetian commerce in the ninth century is arguably in the Pactum Lotharii. This is a treaty that Venice originally signed with the Western emperor Lothar I in 840, and which was then renewed by most of Lothar’s successors. Indeed, amongst the other clauses, the Venetians were granted full freedom of movement along the rivers of Northern Italy, and promised not to enslave the inhabitants of the Kingdom of Italy, nor to sell them to the ‘pagans’. Furthermore, in the prologue of this treaty, it was pointed out that the agreement was valid in many cities of the Western Central Adriatic (from Comacchio all the way down to Fermo). These three elements suggest that by the mid-ninth century, Venetian traders were already quite active in Northern and Central Italy, and were probably also trading with the Arabs – the ‘pagans’ of the treaty are probably to be identified with the rulers of Northern Africa. The Venetian position in Northern and Central Italy was further consolidated in the following century, when a series of commercial treaties with neighbouring cities was signed. Yet, the event that was arguably the most relevant took place in 932. In this year, following decades of hostility, Venice eventually managed to destroy its main commercial rival in the Adriatic, Comacchio.42

The text that better documents the existence of frequent Venetian contacts with Africa is arguably the Translatio Sancti Marci. Even though in the 810s the doge had implemented the decrees of Leo V the Armenian (813-20), which forbade Byzantine subjects to enter Syria and Egypt, and banned trade with the Arabs, this disposition (which appears to suggest that the Venetians were already involved in

40 Notker the Stammerer, Gesta Karoli Magni Imperatoris, ed. by Hans F. Haefele, MGH SS rer. Germ. n. s., 12 (Berlin: Weidmann, 1959), bk 2, ch. 17, p. 86; ‘S. Colombano di Bobbio’, ed. by Andrea Castagnetti, in Inventari altomedievali di terre, coloni e redditi, ed. by Andrea Castagnetti and others, FSI, 104 (Rome: Istituto storico italiano per il Medio Evo, 1979), nos. 1-2, pp. 138, 159; Pseudo-Odo of Cluny, ‘De vita Sancti Geraldii Auriliacensis Comitis libri quatuor’, in MPL, cxxxi, bk 1, ch. 27, col. 658. Yet, the first text was written around a century after the life of Charlemagne, and its author mainly relied on oral sources, while the life of St Gerald of Aurillac was probably written in the 1020s, hence (once more) around a century after the events narrated. See, respectively, Matthew Innes, ‘Memory, Orality and Literacy in an Early Medieval Society’, Past & Present, 158 (1999), 3-36 (pp. 6-36); Mathew Kuefler, The Making and Unmaking of a Saint: Hagiography and Memory in the Cult of Gerald of Aurillac (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2014), pp. 9-11, 23-26, 31-34.
41 Documenti relativi…, I, nos. 45, 53, 60, pp. 75-78, 96, 117.
commerce with these areas in the early ninth century) was not respected for long. Indeed, already in 828, some Venetian merchants stole the relics of St Mark in Alexandria, and took them to Venice. The dynamics of this theft (the relics were covered with pork in order to get through an Arab inspection) also seem to suggest a familiarity with Muslim customs. This could be better explained if we take into consideration that the Translatio was written much later, probably during Pietro IV Candiano’s dogeship (959-76), when Venetian commerce with the Arabs was much more common.

While there is some scarce evidence regarding Venetian commercial contacts with Byzantium and the Eastern Mediterranean, we have by contrast very little information about the importation of goods from Dalmatia. In fact, even though it has been suggested that Venice was involved in the slave trade, the actual evidence for this seems to refer to an import from Moravia, while the documentation regarding Dalmatia is extremely weak, and mainly made up of bans on this commercial activity. In addition, even though other products (especially timber, but also a limited amount of wine and oil) were probably imported from this region,
we have no actual record of this. Possibly, the reason for this lack of evidence of trade in Dalmatia is that the frequent conflicts in this area prevented the Venetians from creating a commercial network here. If this were the case, the clashes with the Narentans would mainly be the consequence of their piratical actions, which prevented the Venetians from sailing into the Mediterranean, rather than from trading in Dalmatia. Hence, since the Venetian fleet was unable to subdue the Narentans, the Venetian merchants were often forced to limit their range of action to the Western Adriatic.

These sources seem, therefore, to suggest that already before 950 it was possible to find luxury goods imported from the East in Venice. However, even though very little can be determined regarding the scale of Venetian trade with the Mediterranean, there are two elements that seem to suggest that commerce was quite limited. These were the rivalry with Comacchio, and the threat posed by the Narentan pirates, which made navigation towards the Mediterranean extremely perilous.

The year 950 seems to be a turning point, as thereafter there is a slight increase in the documentation of Venetian trade in the Lower Adriatic and Mediterranean. While this might be mostly due to the production and survival of more written sources, it is probable that the scale of trade nevertheless increased. This is linked with the improved conditions of Northern Italy, where the end of the Hungarian raids, and the political stability under the Ottonians (which came after a century of continuous conflicts between claimants to the Kingdom of Italy) had led to growing prosperity in this region. Furthermore, the agreements with the Western emperors signed by Venice, together with the looser economic bonds between the North Italian cities and their neighbouring countryside, facilitated trade in this area. This meant that the Venetians could have a larger network of potential

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buyers not only for their own local products (mainly salt), but also for the exotic goods that they imported from the East, which could be exchanged for the foodstuffs that did not grow in the lagoon. Furthermore, the Arab loss of the main Mediterranean islands between the tenth and the eleventh centuries played an important role in the decrease in Saracen corsair raids, thus making this sea much safer for Christian ships. In particular, the Byzantine recovery of Crete and Cyprus seems to have had major consequences. The former island was the mandatory gateway for all the ships that wanted to sail not only to and from the Eastern Mediterranean, but also from its Northern to its Southern coasts. Further East, the shores of Cyprus were also approached by almost all the vessels that were sailing to or from Syria and Palestine.48

Regarding commercial activity in the Mediterranean, many elements suggest an increase in its scale. First of all, there is more numismatic evidence from this period: a considerable number of Byzantine and Arab coins, with a preponderance of late-tenth/eleventh century Byzantine anonymous bronze folles (bronze coins), has been found near Venice. Although slightly higher, the overall quantity of Byzantine coin finds still does not necessarily prove direct communications between the Venetian merchants and to the Eastern Mediterranean, as the coins could have reached Venice in other ways.49

More significant evidence comes from the written sources. In particular, a ban on the trade of some strategic materials with the Saracens, issued in 971 by Pietro IV Candiano on the request of the Byzantine emperor John Tzimiskes, suggests that Venice was frequently trading with the Muslim world. In addition to the ban itself, this charter provides some direct information on commercial contact with the Arabs. In fact, the doge allowed the owners of two ships to sail for Megadia – modern al-Mahdiyya, in Tunisia -, and those of a third vessel to leave for Tripoli,

48 Pryor, Geography..., pp. 94-96, 107-11; Hodges and Whitehouse, Mohammed..., p. 168; Rösch, Venezia e l'Impero..., pp. 228-29. Before the thirteenth century, when though most of the agreements between Venice and the main North Italian centres were signed, any mercantile activity between these areas would be regulated by the pacts concluded between Venice and the Western Empire. See Rösch, Venezia e l'Impero..., pp. 169-97.
in Syria, with a very small quantity of wooden treadles of weaver's looms, beams, basins, bowls, and other minutilia.\(^50\)

There is also an increase in mentions of trade in the narrative sources. In the celebrated account of his second voyage to Constantinople in 968, Bishop Liudprand of Cremona wrote that a Venetian ship (probably a mercantile one) was about to leave Constantinople in June of that year. Even more interestingly, the bishop complained about the confiscation by Byzantine officials of five extremely precious purple cloths that he had purchased. When he was asked why he owned such goods, the export of which was prohibited, Liudprand replied that Venetian and Amalfitan merchants were accustomed to import (that is, to smuggle) them into Italy.\(^51\) Another case of illegal conduct by a Venetian can be found a few decades later. During the dogeship of Tribuno Menio, Pietro Centranico stole the relics of St Sabas from a Constantinopolitan church. Since he was there ‘with his ship’, he had probably originally reached Byzantium for commercial reasons.\(^52\)

Although even before 992 there is more evidence of Venetian commerce with Romania, this year marks a definite turning point, with the issue of a chrysobull for Venice by the co-emperors Basil II (976-1025) and Constantine VIII (976-1028). Following a complaint by some representatives from Venice, the emperors decided to reduce the passage fee that each Venetian ship had to pay when she sailed past Abydos (i.e. through the Hellespont) from more than thirty to seventeen solidi. Furthermore, the Venetians would have to pay the passage fee only to a specific Byzantine official, the logotheta de dromo. This official was also the only one who could inspect the Venetian ships (which could be held anchored in an imperial harbour for a maximum of three days). If any goods belonging to merchants from other places were found, then the logothete would confiscate the whole cargo of the ship. The document also stated that the Venetians were not allowed to carry any goods owned by Amalfitans, Jews, Lombards from Bari, or indeed by any other

\(^{50}\) Tafel-Thomas, no. 14, pp. 25-30; Dandolo, *Chronica extensa*, bk 8, ch. 14, p. 178; Maria Pia Pedani, ‘Venezia e il Maghreb nei documenti dell’Archivio di Stato di Venezia’, *Quaderni di Studi Arabi*, 10 (1992), 159-73 (p. 159).


Basil II issued this chrysobull mainly for military and economic reasons. Inviting the Venetians to trade more often in his lands would have led to a stronger political bond with the empire, out of fear that access to the imperial territories might be lost to their competitors. Thus, it would have been much easier to obtain Venetian involvement in the conflicts against the Bulgarians and the Arabs.\footnote{Holmes, Basil II..., pp. 49-50, 493.} Furthermore, not only would an increase in the number of merchants have enriched the empire itself, but it would have also encouraged the Venetians to trade in Constantinople rather than in Egypt, which after the Fatimid conquest in 969 had become an extremely prosperous commercial centre.\footnote{Jacoby, ‘Venetian Commercial Expansion...’, p. 390.}

Basil II’s chrysobull, possibly together with a greater availability of precious metals, probably imported from Germany and, secondarily, from Africa, seems to have led to an increase in Venetian trade in Constantinople. Starting from the first half of the eleventh century, we have the first surviving charters that record the presence in Byzantium of merchants from Venice. Most of these are Venetian private charters, for example the grant of two receipts to Leone da Molin for the purchase from fellow Venetians of, respectively, cheese (probably in 1022) and cloth (probably in 1031).\footnote{DCV, nos. 2, 7, pp. 2, 6-7, also see pp. xxvii-xxviii (both charters are only dated after the month and indiction; therefore, they might have been issued fifteen or thirty years later than supposed); Jacoby, ‘Venetian Commercial Expansion...’, pp. 376-77. Regarding the import of metals from Germany (albeit in a later period), and of gold from Africa, see, respectively, Rösch, Venezia e l’Impero..., pp. 132-34; 140-41; Michael F.}

That Leone was significantly involved in maritime trading
is also confirmed by his being the recipient of a receipt for the loan of two anchors, probably in 1030.\textsuperscript{57}

The presence of Venetians is recorded not only in Constantinople, but also in other areas of the Eastern Empire. An example comes in a passage from Niketas Stethatos’s life of Symeon the New Theologian, probably written between 1054 and c. 1090. Niketas wrote that the servant of the hegumen of St. Stephen’s monastery on Mount St Auxentius, near Chalcedon, had been instructed to carry Symeon’s icon back to this monastery during the celebration of the saint’s exile to Chrysopolis, but instead sold the icon to a Venetian (merchant?). The sacred image was nevertheless eventually recovered by the monastery. If we trust this text, then it probably refers to the presence of Venetian traders near Chalcedon between 1022 (the year of Symeon’s death), and 1052, when the saint’s relics were translated from Chrysopolis to Constantinople.\textsuperscript{58}

In addition to this narrative text, there are also some Venetian documents which refer to the presence of Venetian merchants in Methoni, and in Thebes. More specifically, a trader who was travelling from Alexandria in the early 1070s stopped at Methoni on his way to Venice.\textsuperscript{59} The evidence regarding Thebes is more significant, as two colleganza contracts issued in the early-1070s refer to trade in this city. The documents record that, following a colleganza contract, in 1072 Domenico Zopulo issued a quittance to Giovanni Barozzi for a total of seventy-five pounds-worth of goods invested in a taxegium (voyage) to Thebes by a ship captained by Leone Orefice. One year later, Giovanni Lissado da Luperio and Sevasto Orefice agreed upon a similar contract for a future taxegium to Thebes.\textsuperscript{60} These charters do not mention the import of any specific goods, but, since this city had an important role in silk manufacture in the mid-twelfth century, the traders might have imported this fabric.\textsuperscript{61}


\textsuperscript{58} DCV, no. 5, pp. 4-5; Jacoby, ‘Venetian Commercial Expansion…’, p. 377 fn. 32. For the dating of this charter, see the considerations made in the previous footnote.


\textsuperscript{60} DCV, no. 11, pp. 10-11.

Some evidence of Venetian trade with Crete may come from a letter from the Geniza archive written in the 1060s or early 1070s by a Maghrebi merchant. Indeed, some merchants from Venice who were trading in Alexandria were possibly involved in commerce with this island as they might have been selling the same goods as Cretan merchants.\(^\text{62}\) There are also some hints that Venetian merchants may have been trading in Antioch. It is quite likely that the sailors from Venice (οἱ ξέργον θελατισκοπείν) who, in 1074, according to John Skylitzes continuatus, freed Bodin (the son of the Prince of Zeta – modern-day Serbia) were actually merchants.\(^\text{63}\) Furthermore, Jacoby has suggested that the letters that the patriarch of Grado, Domenico Marango, exchanged with Patriarch Peter III of Antioch in 1054 might have been transported by Venetian traders.\(^\text{64}\) Finally, according to Anna Komnene, in 1081 a colony of Venetians was residing in Dyrrachion. However, since the Alexiad was written over half a century later, Anna might have been referring to the demographic situation of the city in her own time, the mid-twelfth century.\(^\text{65}\)

As mentioned above, despite the ban on the trade of strategic goods to the Muslims, the Venetians nonetheless remained involved in commerce with the areas under Islamic control, especially Egypt. Even though the surviving sources only explicitly mention that the Venetians imported alum from there, if the pattern of the Venetian trade in North Africa was the same as the contemporary one of the Amalfitans, then wax, spices, and gold were probably also imported.\(^\text{66}\)
The first evidence of Venetian trade in Northern Africa may be found in Thietmar of Merseburg’s chronicle (written between 1012 and 1018), which recorded that four Venetian ships were wrecked in 1017 while they were carrying *pigmenta* (dye stuffs or coloured cloth?). Although Thietmar did not mention from where the ships were coming, Jacoby has suggested that they might have sailed from Egypt.67 Some more specific evidence can be found in the life of St Symeon of Trier, written in the second half of the 1030s, which mentions that, on the River Nile (probably in 1026 or 1027), a Venetian mercantile ship was attacked by some pirates.68 There are two more pieces of evidence regarding Venetian trade with Egypt. The first is the passage (already mentioned) in a letter from the Geniza archive, which mentions the presence of merchants from Venice in Alexandria in the 1060s or early 1070s.69 The other document is a private charter issued in Venice, in which Domenico Roso attests the rights of his namesake *nepos* over nine bags of alum. A merchant named Domenico Serzi had carried these bags from Alexandria to Venice via Methoni on a ship owned by Pietro Bollo, and then Giovanni Martinacio de Castello had sent them to Domenico Roso *nepos*, since he owed the senior Domenico Roso some money.70

Finally, there is now some further evidence that Venice was involved in the slave trade in Dalmatia. Another prohibition of such trade was issued in 960 by Doge Pietro IV Candiano. Captains of Venetian ships were not only not to transport slaves on their ships, but nor were they to carry slave traders. Furthermore, they were not allowed either to ask any Greek to buy slaves for them, or to purchase them on behalf of any Greek or Beneventan.71 It has also been suggested that the

70 DCV, no. 11, pp. 10-11. This charter might be a forgery: it seems to refer to Doge Domenico Contarini as alive (terms like *quondam* or *bonae memoriae* are not used in connection with Contarini), while he had actually died in 1071; see Andrea Dandolo, *Chronica extensa…*, bk 9, ch. 8, p. 214.
71 CDI, no. 76, pp. 166-68; Dandolo, *Chronica extensa*, bk 8, ch. 14, p. 175; Verlinden, *L’Esclavage…*, pp. 131-33. The ban might have been preceded by a similar one issued in 945. See Tafel-Thomas, no. 12, p. 16.
prisoners taken by the Venetians in 996 were enslaved, and the Venetians might have had the same intention when they captured the Narentans in 1000 (but they eventually released most of them). The oath that he would prevent the ‘sale of men’ in his kingdom taken by Demetrius Zvonimir when he was crowned king in 1075 or 1076, also suggests that the slave trade was quite common in Dalmatia – and perhaps hints at a Venetian involvement in it.

This cumulative evidence suggests that after 950 it became quite common for the Venetian merchants to be involved in commerce in the Mediterranean, and that trade with Egypt and, even more, with Byzantium was on the rise since the 1070s. Even though the decree issued by Basil II in 992 had provided them with a lower toll only if they wanted to reach Constantinople, since the 1070s the Venetians had also started to trade in other imperial cities. Thus, Robert Guiscard’s invasion of the Balkans would have been doubly disadvantageous for Venice. In addition to the possible maritime threats by the Normans, a successful attack would have also created economic and political instability in the whole empire, and thus worsened commercial conditions for the Venetian merchants.

In addition, the frequent commercial contacts with Egypt suggest that the Venetians were still trading strategic goods to the Muslims despite the trade ban of 971. In fact, by the eleventh century, the once-extensive tree stock of the Arab world had been exhausted, and areas where this may still have remained, such as the Antioch region and the islands of Crete and Cyprus, had been lost. Thus, the Saracens needed to import timber, and probably obtained it from the Venetians, who could fairly easily obtain it in Istria and in Dalmatia, which was extremely rich in forests. This, once again, shows how important it was for Venice to maintain a form of overlordship over Dalmatia, as this region provided the Venetians not only with plenty of natural harbours, but also with a large supply of timber, of which the Islamic world was in constant need.

73 CDRCDs 2 1, no. 109, pp. 139-41; Hoffmann, ‘Die östliche Adriaküste…’, p. 180.
3) Conclusions

Since the chrysobull of Alexios, issued in 1092, mainly confirmed privileges that Venice had previously obtained in return for its intervention against Robert Guiscard, the granting of commercial concessions was not the only reason why Venice decided to join forces with Alexios when the Normans invaded the Balkans. Fear of a Norman settlement in the Balkans was probably the most compelling aspect that Doge Selvo took into consideration in 1081. Such an event would probably have had negative consequences for Venice, as it would have threatened its privileged status in Dalmatia. Furthermore, following a hypothetic conquest of Epirus, the Normans would have had to build a strong fleet in order to ensure constant communications between the two shores of the Strait of Otranto. Such a possibility would have had major negative consequences for the Venetians. Their maritime predominance in the Adriatic and Ionian region would have been threatened, and this would have hampered their expanding Mediterranean trade. Furthermore, any conquest in the Balkans would have created havoc and instability in the whole Eastern Empire, where the Venetians were increasingly involved in commercial activities. The final aspect to consider is that providing help against Robert Guiscard also meant following in the footsteps of a long tradition of military and political alliance and partnership between Venice and Byzantium.
IV. The Venetian-Byzantine Alliance, 1081-1118

1) Political Outline

We have just seen that in the years that preceded 1081 Venice was generally an ally of the Eastern Empire. It is safe to say that this situation continued until roughly 1118. Throughout this period, Venice was arguably the most important partner of the Byzantines, and intervened alongside them whenever a Southern Italian army invaded the Balkans.

i) Robert Guiscard’s Campaigns in the Balkans

In the spring of 1081, just a few weeks after Alexios I Komnenos had deposed Nikephoros III and become emperor, Robert Guiscard initiated his campaign against the Balkans. Eventually, the war ended in 1085, with Robert’s death in Kephalonia, and with Alexios managing to defend his Western provinces successfully. In this chapter, we shall especially analyse why Guiscard attacked the Balkans, and what role Venice played during this conflict.

a) Robert Guiscard’s motivations for invading the Balkans

The main reason why Guiscard attacked Byzantium in 1081 is because he was aware of its political and military weakness. The revolt that had led to Alexios Komnenos’s usurpation was only the last of a series of rebellions. Many of these had been led by the governors of Illyrikon. Since only the Strait of Otranto separated Illyrikon from Southern Italy, this region was a natural bridgehead for any invasion of the Southern Balkans from the Mezzogiorno. Furthermore, since the main town of this region, Dyrrachion, lay at the beginning of the Via Egnatia (which led to Constantinople through Thessalonica), controlling Illyrikon meant posing a serious threat to the capital city of the empire.¹ Therefore, Robert tried to take advantage of the weakness of the Byzantines by attacking Dyrrachion. He probably hoped that the Byzantine governor of Illyrikon, George Monomachatos, might support his enterprise. Indeed, Monomachatos had been named governor of Illyrikon by Nikephoros III, and, since he was afraid that Alexios might march

against his province to remove him from his post, he had asked Guiscard for help against the new emperor.²

The appearance in Southern Italy in 1080 of a Greek monk named Raiktor who claimed to be the deposed emperor Michael VII Doukas (1071-78) also gave Robert a pretext for his campaign: restoring a legitimate monarch to the Byzantine throne. However, even though a few contemporary writers thought that Raiktor was indeed Michael VII,³ Robert was undoubtedly aware that the monk was an imposter, but nevertheless thought that he could take advantage of his presence for his own plans.⁴

The former emperor, Michael VII, who needed help to secure his position, and possibly hoped to obtain military support against the Turks, had agreed to a matrimonial alliance with Robert. Guiscard’s daughter Olympias/Helena had indeed been betrothed to Constantine Doukas, Michael’s son and heir. Both members of the couple were to receive the title of basileus (even Helena, who was a woman), while Robert was also given the dignity and pension of nobelissimos (the third highest Byzantine dignity after emperor and kaisar), the right to appoint one of his sons as kouropalates, and the privilege to distribute to his men forty-three other dignities and pensions.⁵

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² William of Apulia, bk 4, ls 215-17, p. 216.  
⁴ Alexias, bk 1, chs 12, 15, pp. 41-42, 49-50; Alexiad, pp. 35-37, 43-45; Guillaume de Pouille, La Geste de Robert Guiscard, bk 4, ls 160-71, p. 212.  
Yet, once Nikephoros III Botaneiates had taken the throne in 1078, he annulled the engagement, and probably confined Helena in a nunnery. Thus, Robert could justify conducting a campaign against Byzantium, and went on with his plan even after Nikephoros was himself deposed by Alexios I Komnenos in March 1081. Indeed, Guiscard knew that Alexios would not have agreed to the celebration of the marriage between Constantine Doukas and Helena: according to Orderic Vitalis, as soon as Alexios became emperor, he swore that he would have never allowed the empire to be restored to Michael VII, who had previously handed it to the ‘enemies of the empire, [the] treacherous Normans’. However, this seems more a pretext than a motivation for a Balkan campaign, as no sources suggests that Robert attacked Byzantium in order to force Alexios I to renew the matrimonial agreement.

There has also been a considerable scholarly debate over the goals of Robert’s campaign. Some of the almost contemporary chroniclers, and also a considerable number of modern historians, suggest that Robert wanted to conquer the whole empire. Yet, while this might have been his original plan, he probably changed it once he crossed the Strait of Otranto. Indeed, the advance of the Norman armies did not follow the Via Egnatia (the road that, starting from Dyrrachion, reached Constantinople via Thessalonica), and Guiscard’s men mainly tried to secure control of the coast of Epirus, and of the region of Thessaly, lower Illyria, and western Macedonia.

Another possibility is that Robert’s main aim was the conquest of Illyrikon, possibly in order to install his firstborn son, Bohemond, who was the duke’s second-in-command during his father’s Balkan campaigns, as its ruler. Such suggestion is based on the fact that Bohemond had been deprived of his succession rights after his father’s first marriage had been annulled on the grounds...
of consanguinity. This meant that, following Guiscard’s death, Bohemond was not to receive any of his father’s land (which would be distributed between his half-brothers and relatives).

That Guiscard had a limited goal in the Balkans is also confirmed by Anna Komnene. Even though, in the first book of her Alexiad, she stated that Robert wanted to conquer Constantinople, later in her work Anna wrote that, after Robert gained control of Southern Italy, he decided to attack Illyrikon and then, in case of a success, ‘extend his operations further’. Therefore, it is possible that acquiring some lands for Bohemond was indeed one of the reasons that led Robert to attack the Balkans.

Other suggestions have been made as to why Robert wanted to conquer the Illyrikon region. This might have been a way to prevent further Southern Italian rebels from receiving shelter there (as had already happened), and a way to appease his nobles by granting them some land in the Balkans. However, both Geoffrey Malaterra and, even more, William of Apulia suggest that, despite the opportunities that such a campaign could potentially create for them, the Balkan expedition was quite unpopular amongst South Italian nobles, who in some cases perceived it as extremely risky. In particular, the die-hard rebel Count Amicus (whose presence in the Balkan campaign was probably due to Robert taking this precaution to prevent him from causing trouble in Italy) might have been one of these disgruntled peers.

Finally, Robert might have felt the need to increase his territories in order to be able to recruit a bigger army. In this case, he had probably realised that expanding eastwards would have been less troublesome than doing so in the Abruzzo. This region was indeed formally under the pope, and Robert had been

10 Alexias, bk 4, ch. 1, pp. 121-22; Alexiad, pp. 110-11.
11 Theotokis, The Norman Campaigns…, p. 142; McQueen, ‘Relations…’, pp. 440-41.
13 Alexias, bk 4, ch. 6, pp. 132-35; Alexiad, pp. 120-23.
excommunicated at least three times between 1074 and 1080 for his incursions into papal territory.\(^{14}\)

To sum up, Robert probably tried to take advantage of the parlous state of the Byzantine Empire to invade the Balkans, and secure as much land as possible in this region. However, he hoped that this expedition might be relatively easy, and, possibly, that some cities might spontaneously open their gates to him due to the presence, alongside his army, of a man claiming to be the former emperor Michael VII. However, when he realised that such a ruse was not working, and found out the many obstacles that made his expedition much more difficult than he initially thought, Robert probably downgraded his lust for conquest. Consequently, his main aim became that of conquering \textit{Illyrikon}, possibly in order to secure it for his son Bohemond, who would have created his own principality in this region.

b) The Military Role of Venice

While the Normans and the Byzantines were the main protagonists during the conflict, both obtained help from allies, who were thus involved in the military confrontation. The Serbs of Duklja maintained a duplicitous attitude, and appeared to have provided some military support to Robert Guiscard. He probably needed some external help in order to obtain indirect control over some wealthy regions that had hitherto been under Byzantium by installing there some people loyal to him as local rulers. This would have allowed him to exploit better the resources of these areas\(^{15}\). Evidence of a Byzantine-Dukljan hostility may be found at the very beginning of Alexios's reign, when the imperial governor of Dyrrachion, George Monomachatos, deserted to Duklja when he heard that he was to be replaced by George Palaiologos. Yet, this hostility probably temporarily ceased after the Dukljan ruler received imperial dignities following an agreement which granted an amnesty

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to Monomachatos.\textsuperscript{16} Indeed, according to the \textit{Alexiad}, the Dukljans were supposed to provide military help to the Byzantines in one of the battles during the Norman siege of Dyrrachion.

However, after they took part in an early skirmish, the Dukljans decided not to fight alongside the Byzantines in the main battle, as, according to Anna Komnene, would only have done so if they had seen that ‘victory was going to the emperor’.\textsuperscript{17} Furthermore, William of Apulia appears to provide evidence that the Dukljans eventually took part in the conflict alongside the Normans. According to William, at the beginning of Robert’s invasion, the ‘Dalmatians’ had sent some ships to the duke, who had asked for their help to transport his army to Corfu. He also adds that, in the early stages of Robert’s campaign (July 1081), the ‘Dalmatians’, together with the people of Dubrovnik, fought a naval battle against the Venetians.\textsuperscript{18} Yet, it is quite likely that the writer used this term to define the Dukljans. Indeed, the region of Duklja was also known as \textit{Dalmatia Superior}, and the antipope Clement III clearly used this word to mean part of Dukljan territories.\textsuperscript{19} Furthermore, William of Apulia’s ‘Dalmatia’ appears to have extended as South as Epirus. Indeed, the writer refers to ‘Dalmatia’ as the target of an attack that Count Amicus had planned to launch before 1074-75. This campaign is probably to be identified with an aborted expedition against \textit{Illyrikon} by Amicus’s cousin Godfrey, which is mentioned by Lupus Protospatharius.\textsuperscript{20} Therefore, it seems quite likely that William was actually referring to the Dukljans when he wrote ‘Dalmatians’ (especially considering that no source mentions the involvement of the Croats in this conflict).\textsuperscript{21}

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\textsuperscript{17} \textit{Alexias}, bk 4, chs 5-6, bk 6, ch. 7, pp. 130, 135-36, 183; \textit{Alexiad}, pp. 118, 123, 167; Tibor Živković, ‘Two Questions from the Time of King Bodin’s Reign’, in \textit{Forging Unity…}, pp. 275-92 (pp. 275, 289, 290 fn. 5).
\textsuperscript{18} William of Apulia, bk 3, Is 393-95, bk 4, Is 134-37, 302-05, pp. 184, 210, 220.
\textsuperscript{21} Yet, Cowdrey, \textit{Pope Gregory VII…}, p. 443; Košćak, ‘Gregorio VII e la Croazia…’, p. 264 believe that it was the Croats who fought alongside the Normans.

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The contribution of Alexios’s allies was much more relevant: the basileus was joined by some Norman deserters, and obtained help against Robert Guiscard both in Italy, and in the Balkans. Among these deserters, who thus joined a group of previous Norman expatriates including the likes of Roussel of Bailleul, Constantine Humbertopoulos, and, probably, Abelard (Robert’s nephew), we need to mention the two sons of a Dagobert, Roger and Raoul. The former deserted to the Byzantines just before the Normans invaded the Balkans, and informed Alexios about the preparations of this campaign; he was later made a sebastos, and his descendants would achieve significant positions in Byzantium. Raoul was the envoy who had informed Robert Guiscard that Alexios had become emperor in Byzantium, and that Michael VII was still living in Constantinople. He probably deserted to Alexios in the early 1080s, and he would have an important role as an imperial advisor during Bohemond’s Balkan campaign.22 Yet, other Normans deserted and joined the Byzantines during Guiscard’s two years and a half of absence from the Balkans, when he had to deal with urgent matters in Italy. Indeed, Alexios learned that the Norman counts had not been paid what they had been promised for their role in the Balkan expedition. He used this information to his advantage by convincing the counts to ask Bohemond for the money they had been promised from his father. If they were not to receive it, Alexios let them know that they were free to choose whether they preferred to join the imperial army, or to return to Southern Italy through Hungary. This strategy appears to have paid off, as, following more desertions, Bohemond was also forced to return to Southern Italy, to ask his father for some money to pay his army.23

The absence of Robert from the Balkans was mainly a result of Alexios’s diplomacy, which forced Guiscard to return to Italy. Indeed, one of Alexios’s first counter-moves after the Balkans were invaded was to send letters to Herman of Cannae, Archbishop Hervé of Capua, the pope, and to the German Emperor Henry IV, asking each of them for help. According to the Alexiad, Henry IV, who had entered Northern Italy in spring 1081, was offered extremely valuable gifts and a


23 Alexias, bk 5, chs 5, 7, bk 6, chs 1, 5, 8, pp. 153, 160-61, 169-70, 175, 183-84; Alexiad, pp. 139-40, 146, 154-55, 159, 167; McQueen, ‘Relations...’, pp. 444-45.
huge amount of money to attack Southern Italy, where Abelard (who was probably already there, acting as a Byzantine agent) would hand these gifts to him. Yet, Henry ended up only attacking Rome, and thus Robert did not immediately return to Italy, despite Pope Gregory’s request for help.

Robert was eventually forced to return to Italy in April 1082 as a rebellion had broken out in Apulia. Its ringleaders were Abelard, his half-brother Hermann, Geoffrey of Conversano, and Prince Jordan I of Capua – these last two were also nephews of the duke. Even though they were probably assisted by funds from Alexios, they were eventually defeated by Robert in a series of campaigns which probably ended in late 1083. It was only after suppressing the revolt in the Mezzogiorno, that Robert decided to face Henry IV in Rome. The duke entered the city three days after the German ruler had left it, for Henry knew that his army was too small to face Guiscard’s. Even though he had not been able to undertake a Southern Italian expedition, he was probably quite satisfied with the outcome of his expedition, since he had achieved his main aim, being crowned as emperor by the pope – even though the pontiff in question was not Gregory VII, but rather Clement III, who had been elected in opposition to Gregory by the pro-imperial Council of Brixen in 1080.

Yet, in order to face the Normans, Alexios mainly needed naval help, and obtained it from Venice. The Byzantines persuaded the Venetians to intervene by pledging them some immediate rewards, and by promising some more if they promptly sailed to Dyrrachion to defend the town and to fight against Robert’s army. The Venetians arrived after Robert’s men had already captured Avlona (modern Valona) and Corfu – the main Eastern terminal for ships that wanted to cross the Southern Adriatic – and routed a Byzantine army led by Alexios I himself.

25 Gregory VII, Register, II, bk 9, no. 17, pp. 597-98; Cowdrey, Pope Gregory VII..., pp. 435-36.
near Dyrrachion. The North Italians encamped two miles away from the Norman army that was besieging Dyrrachion, and, probably in autumn 1081, obtained a crushing victory in their first confrontation with the fleet from Southern Italy, and subsequently won a land battle with the help of a Byzantine contingent, thus returning to their ships full of booty. This success made it possible for Venice to blockade Robert’s army, which was still besieging Dyrrachion, and did not manage to obtain any reinforcements from Italy. According to Anna Komnene, the Venetians were once more victorious over the Norman fleet in the following spring, and continued to blockade Robert’s army.²⁹

However, in the first half of 1082, the Normans had managed to conquer Dyrrachion thanks to its betrayal by Domenico, one of the many Venetians whom Alexios had entrusted with the defence of the city.³⁰ The numerous Venetian casualties during the Norman attack led to ‘dismay and anger’ in Venice, probably contributing to the forced abdication of Doge Domenico Selvo, who was succeeded by Vitale Falier (c. 1084-96).³¹

Yet, the Venetians continued to be an important ally of the Byzantines. According to William of Apulia, they had a key role in the recapture of Dyrrachion in the summer of 1083. Taking advantage of Robert’s return to Italy, they managed to reacquire the city (except for the citadel, which remained under Norman control), and set up their camp near its harbour. After this feat, many Venetians returned to their homeland as their property had been neglected for a long time. Furthermore, their fleet was probably no longer needed because most of the Norman navy had accompanied Robert back to Southern Italy. Indeed, as was noted above, Robert had returned to the Mezzogiorno in April 1082 to subdue a rebellion that the

³¹ Dandolo, Chronica extensa, bk 9, ch. 8, p. 216; Marin, ‘Venice, Byzantium…’, p. 197; Gasparri, ‘Dagli Orseolo…’, pp. 806, 823 fn. 66; Agostino Pertusi, ‘Venezia e Bisanzio nel secolo XI’, in La Venezia del Mille, pp. 117-60 (p. 139); Nicol, Byzantium and Venice..., pp. 58-59.
Byzantines had stirred up. During Guiscard’s absence, there seem to have been some unsuccessful peace negotiations between the Byzantines and the Normans, which were presumably started by Alexios, and conducted near Thessalonica. The only source which mentions these talks is a *typikon* issued by the Byzantine general Gregory Pakourianos in Thessalonica in December 1083. According to the text of this document, Alexios I had given Patriarch Euthymios of Jerusalem the task of brokering peace negotiations with the Normans.

Although Robert was forced to remain in Southern Italy for more than two years by this further rebellion and by Henry IV’s campaign against Gregory VII, he managed to return to the Balkans in autumn 1084. This led the Venetians once more to be asked for help in return for a reimbursement of their expenses and the conferral of further benefits. According to Anna, the Venetians engaged in three battles, and were successful in the first two (of which the *Alexiad* is the only source). However, thanks to the help of a Venetian renegade, Robert prevailed in the third one, after which he allegedly tortured many of the Venetians, and then unsuccessfully tried to initiate peace talks. Alexios nevertheless rewarded the Venetians for their loyalty with extensive commercial concessions, and by granting generous stipends to the doge and to the Patriarch of Grado. According to Anna Komnene, the Venetians took part in one more naval battle against the Normans. The battle was fought near Butrint, and it was ‘a conclusive [Venetian] victory’.

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34 *Alexias*, bk 6, ch. 5, p. 176; *Alexiad*, pp. 160-61. Alexios I probably ceded the control of Dalmatia to Venice; see Dandolo, *Chronica extensa*, bk 9, ch. 9, p. 217; Marin, ‘Venice, Byzantium…’, pp. 197-98.
Finally, after Robert’s death in July 1085, Alexios I persuaded the Venetians who resided in Constantinople to write to their fellow countrymen in Dyrrachion, who were unwilling to cede this city back to the Byzantines. The letter of the Venetians of Constantinople and the money of the emperor eventually persuaded them and the other inhabitants of Dyrrachion to hand the city back to Alexios.36

This event led to the end of the first attempted Balkan invasion by the Normans of Southern Italy. Even though this attack came to an end mainly because of Robert’s death, Venice undoubtedly had an important role in contesting the advance of the invading army. In particular, the Venetian navy had a crucial role in 1081. Its victory against Robert’s fleet prevented the duke from receiving supplies and reinforcements from Italy until the following year, thus slowing down the Norman advance in the Balkans.

However, two further pieces of evidence seem to suggest that there was a faction among the Venetians that did not support an alliance with the Byzantines. The first hint seems to be the deposition of Domenico Selvo after the Norman conquest of Dyrrachion. Anna Komnene in particular suggests that after this event the Venetians withdrew their navy, and that they sent it to Epirus once again only after a new series of concessions and promises by Alexios. The second indication seems to be the presence in Dyrrachion in 1085 of a nucleus of anti-Byzantine Venetians, who did not want the city to be handed over to the basileus after Guiscard’s death. Yet, even though the leader of this faction appears to have been the same Domenico who had betrayed the Venetians, and allowed Robert Guiscard to enter the city, it is quite likely that in this case he wanted to keep Dyrrachion for himself, rather than hold it for the Normans.37

ii) From 1085 to 1107

In the following two decades, no conflict took place between the main protagonists in the Balkan war that had ended in 1085. Roger Borsa’s disputed inheritance meant that mainland Southern Italy was no longer united, and this effectively prevented any offensive foreign policy in the East. By contrast, while the Byzantines had suffered a new and serious military crisis around 1090, they soon managed to resolve it. Alexios succeeded in restoring Byzantine authority in the Balkans after defeating the Pechenegs and the Cumans. In 1091-92 he had also reconstructed the imperial navy, thus being able to defeat the Turkish emir

36 Alexias, bk 6, ch. 6, pp. 180-81; Alexiad, p. 164.
37 Alexias, bk 6, ch. 6, pp. 180-81; Alexiad, p. 164.
Tzachas, and to put an end to his frequent raids against the Aegean islands. Finally, despite the later struggles with the new Frankish states in the East, the First Crusade helped the Byzantines to recover control over most of the Western coast of Anatolia. The economy had also recovered thanks to a serious of fiscal measures, and to the confirmation (and, possibly, augmentation) of the commercial concessions to Venice, which was aimed at attracting foreign capital into the empire. Even though the Venetians and the Byzantines did not engage in any conflict together until 1107, they nevertheless maintained good relations. These relations also manifested themselves in the presence of Greek craftsmen in Venice. In particular, in 1105, one of them made some considerable additions to the Pala d’Oro, an extremely precious altar piece that Pietro II Orseolo had ordered from Constantinople in the late tenth century, and which has remained in St Mark’s Basilica ever since – though its current aspect is the result of some later additions from the early thirteenth, and from the fourteenth centuries.

However, Venice’s main political concerns during these years were not directly linked either with Byzantium or with Southern Italy. They were rather the Hungarian conquest of Dalmatia, and the First Crusade.

a) Venice and the Hungarians

The end of the eleventh century witnessed the political rise of Hungary in Central Europe. After initially struggling to defend their lands against the ambitions of the German Empire, in the final decades of this century the Hungarian monarchs expanded their kingdom into the Balkans by annexing Croatia. As a result, at the turn of the eleventh and twelfth centuries, Hungary became an important political entity in the Western Balkans, and in the Adriatic area.

Hungarian involvement in Dalmatia began as a consequence of the wedding between Demeter Zvonimir (who was not yet King of Croatia), and a sister of the then-Hungarian duke Ladislaus, which took place in the 1060s. Since Demeter Zvonimir died with no issue in 1089, his brother-in-law, who had since become King


Ladislaus I of Hungary (1077-95) intervened to claim Croatia for himself. Ladislaus conquered most of the inland areas of Croatia, but did not manage to reach Dalmatia, as a Cuman raid forced him to return to Hungary. Yet, he nevertheless imposed his own nephew Álmos as the new King of Croatia. Since in this same year the Cumans had fought alongside Alexios I against the Pechenegs, the emperor may well have invited them to attack Hungary in order to prevent Ladislaus from conquering Dalmatia, which was still formally under imperial control. It is interesting to note that, even though by 1092 the Doge of Venice had received the investiture over Croatia from the Byzantines, the Venetians did not intervene against the Hungarians. Perhaps Doge Vitale Falier did not want to pursue an aggressive policy in the Adriatic area so soon after the loss of many men in the conflict against Robert Guiscard. Nor can we exclude the possibility that the Venetians would have intervened only in case of an actual Hungarian conquest of Dalmatia, which in the event did not take place.

After a Croatian noble named Peter had forced Álmos out of Croatia, and replaced him as king, the Hungarians reacted by attacking Croatia again in 1097, under King Coloman (1095-1116). The Hungarians killed Peter, and managed to conquer Croatia; yet, they only captured a few Dalmatian cities. Amongst these, we can probably include Zadar, as in 1097 Busilla (Roger I of Sicily’s daughter) landed in this city while on her way to Hungary, where she married King Coloman.

This time, the Hungarian campaign in Croatia was followed by a Venetian intervention in Dalmatia. A Venetian fleet (possibly before reaching the Holy Land to join the First Crusade) stopped in Split, where the priors and the people of the

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42 Dandolo, Chronica extensa, bk 9, ch. 9, p. 217; Frankopan, ‘Byzantine Trade Privileges...’, pp. 154-55.
43 Simon of Kéza, Gesta Hungarorum, bk 2, ch. 64, pp. 138-40; Malaterra, bk 4, chs 24-25, pp. 102-03; Fine, The Early Medieval Balkans..., p. 284; Makk, The Árpáds and the Comneni..., p. 12.
city recognised Doge Vitale I Michiel (1096-1101) as their lord. They also swore to prepare one *sagina* (a kind of ship that employed both oars and sails, and was particularly suited for piratical and commercial activities) or two galleys, ready to join the Venetian fleet when it arrived there. Since a similar pact appears to have been signed in Trogir in 1097 or 1098, it is quite likely that the Venetians stopped there before they reached Split.\(^ {44} \) It was probably following this intervention in Dalmatia that Venice and Hungary reached an agreement (in 1098 or 1101) which appears to have defined their respective spheres of influence. Coloman of Hungary probably recognised the Venetian overlordship over Dalmatia, since he referred to Vitale Michiel as ‘Duke of Croatia and Dalmatia’, while Venice in return probably recognised the Hungarian sovereignty over the rest of Croatia.\(^ {45} \) According to both Paolino da Venezia (the author of a chronicle written in the first half of the fourteenth century) and Andrea Dandolo, this treaty was soon followed by a joint Hungarian-Venetian expedition against some Apulian cities. Yet, we shall see that it would make much more sense to date such a campaign to 1108, and hence, this earlier expedition probably never happened.\(^ {46} \)

Despite this agreement, King Coloman nevertheless annexed Dalmatia between 1105 and 1107.\(^ {47} \) Yet, the Venetians decided not to intervene, probably mainly because they were mostly preoccupied by the situation in the Holy Land and in Northern Italy. Yet, another factor to take into consideration is that between 1104 and 1105 Hungary and Byzantium had agreed on a matrimonial alliance – Alexios’s

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\(^ {44} \) Tafel-Thomas, no. 26, pp. 63-64; *CDRCDS*, 1, nos. 167-68, p. 207-09; Dandolo, *Chronica extensa*, bk 9, ch. 10, p. 221; Pryor, *Geography*,..., pp. 32, 63; Barbara M. Kreutz, ‘Ships, Shipping, and the Implications of Change in the Early Medieval Mediterranean’, *Viator*, 7 (1976), 79-109 (pp. 101-03).


son and heir-apparent John married Ladislaus’s daughter Piroska. Therefore, the Venetians were possibly afraid that, if they had intervened in Dalmatia against the Hungarians, they would have severed their ties with the Eastern Empire, as Alexios Komnenos would not have approved such a military action.\footnote{John Zonaras, \textit{Annales}, ed. by Moritz Pinder and Theodor Büttner-Wobst, CSHB, 3 vols (Bonn: Weber, 1841-97), iii, bk 18, ch. 24, pp. 747-48; Kinnamos, bk 1, ch. 4, pp. 9-10; Stephenson, \textit{Byzantium’s Balkan Frontier…}, pp. 199, 202; Makk, \textit{The Árpáds and the Comneni…}, p. 14; Alexiad, p. 521 fn. 20. According to Marquis de la Force, ‘Les Conseilleurs…’, pp. 154-55, Piroska was the daughter of King Coloman and of his first wife.}

\section*{b) Venice and the First Crusade}

Even though the First Crusade was a major event for most of Western Europe, most scholars have suggested that Venice only reluctantly took part in it. The Venetians, it has been argued, were afraid that a major involvement in the crusade might compromise their good commercial relations with the Byzantines and with the Muslim world, especially in Antioch. Indeed, while it was obvious that the Turks and the Arabs were enemies of the crusade, not even Alexios I looked at this expedition in a favourable light. He was especially afraid that the actual goal of most of its leaders, and in particular of Guiscard’s son Bohemond, was Constantinople, rather than Jerusalem. Therefore, even though some Venetians may have joined the crusade earlier, a significant number of ships left Venice for the Levant only in 1099. The Venetians probably decided to intervene after realising that it was highly likely that the Christian expedition would achieve its goals, and out of fear that, if they failed to act, the Pisans and the Genoese might exercise a duopoly on trade with the Christian Holy Land.\footnote{DCV, no. 24, pp. 27-28; Mike Carr, ‘Between Byzantium, Egypt and the Holy Land: The Italian Maritime Republics and the First Crusade’, in \textit{Jerusalem the Golden: The Origins and Impact of the First Crusade}, ed. by Susan B. Edgington and Luis García Guijarro (Turnhout: Brepols, 2014), pp. 75-87 (pp. 78, 85-87); Elena Bellomo, ‘The First Crusade and the Latin East as Seen from Venice: The Account of the \textit{Translatio Sancti Nicolai}, \textit{Early Medieval Europe}, 17 (2009), 420-43 (pp. 420-21); Gasparri, ‘Dagli Orseolo…’, p. 809; Nicol, \textit{Byzantium and Venice…}, pp. 70-71; Donald E. Queller and Irene B. Katele, ‘Venice and the Conquest of the Latin Kingdom of Jerusalem’, \textit{Studi veneziani}, 21 (1986), 15-43 (pp. 17-19).} However, this view has been recently disputed by Pryor. He argues that if the Venetian fleet left the Adriatic so late, this was due to the considerable duration of the preparations. Indeed, the scale of the naval involvement during the First Crusade was unprecedented, and a considerable effort was needed to organise such an enterprise. In the case of
Venice – which by then did not have a strong enough navy –, this meant that it had to build many ships specifically for this purpose.\textsuperscript{50}

Once their fleet was ready, the Venetians stopped in Zadar and in Split (where the representatives of this city recognised its submission to Venice), then they wintered near Rhodes. There, according to the author of the \textit{Translatio Sancti Nicolai}, the Byzantines with threats and gifts tried to dissuade them from helping the Frankish States in the Levant. This attempt was unsuccessful, as, following a persuasive speech by a cleric, the Venetians decided to continue their expedition. However, their first military actions were apparently not undertaken against the Muslims. Indeed, even though the veracity of the sources mentioning this naval battle have been called into question by Pryor, the Venetian fleet probably first fought (and prevailed over) the Pisans, who were bothering them and the Byzantine ships. Then, the Venetians stopped in the Anatolian town of Myra, where they captured those relics of St Nicholas that had not already been taken by the citizens of Bari in 1087, as well as the body of Nicholas’s homonymous uncle. Only after this did the Venetians assist the crusaders. While, despite this belated help from Venice, the Christians failed in their attempt to conquer Acre, the Adriatic city did contribute to the conquest of the small port of Haifa, and obtained one third of this town. The Venetians were also granted trade exemptions in Haifa itself, in Jaffa, and in Bohemond of Hauteville’s principality of Antioch. The ships then set sail towards Venice, returning there in December 1100.\textsuperscript{51}

\textbf{iii) Bohemond’s Campaign in the Balkans}

\textbf{a) Bohemond’s Motivations for Invading the Balkans}

In order to explain why Bohemond attacked the Byzantine Empire in 1107-08, we need to look at the previous relations between Robert Guiscard’s son and Byzantium. The surviving sources disagree on whether when he joined the

crusade, Bohemond had already planned to attack Byzantium, both in order to complete his father’s unfinished business, and to exact revenge against Alexios I. Bohemond initially seemed (or, more likely, pretended) to be willing to cooperate with the basileus, and even to serve under him: Robert’s son unsuccessfully asked to be appointed grand domestikos of the East, and then Alexios seems to have been willing to grant him an extensive appanage which was located beyond Antioch, and was still under Muslim control. Yet, soon afterwards, in February 1098, during the siege of Antioch, some explicit hostility towards the Byzantines arose. Tatikios, the imperial general who was accompanying the crusaders, left the besiegers, promising to return with more armed forces. Yet, Tatikios failed to keep his oath, and did not return with reinforcements, but the Westerners nevertheless eventually managed to capture Antioch (but not its citadel) on their own. Relations with the Byzantines worsened even more after Alexios Komnenos, who was supposed to join the Westerners with reinforcements, eventually decided to retreat, and abandon them, when he found out that the crusaders were about to be attacked by a huge Turkish army. However, the Christians, led by Bohemond, managed to defeat their enemies, and also to obtain the surrender of the garrison that still controlled the citadel of Antioch. Bohemond then took advantage of this situation, and of the prestige he had acquired, to take over Antioch for himself, making it the centre of a principality. Since Antioch had been under direct Eastern imperial control until a few decades earlier, and the crusade leaders had sworn to hand over to Alexios all the cities that had been under eastern imperial control, the


Byzantines deeply resented Bohemond’s action. The Norman leader nevertheless refused to hand the city over to Alexios. He claimed that the emperor had not kept his word to provide military help to the crusaders, thus making the agreements concluded in Constantinople void.\textsuperscript{54}

As a result, while most of the leaders of the expedition continued their march, and eventually conquered Jerusalem, a conflict broke out between Bohemond and his nephew Tancred, and Alexios I. In addition to Antioch (which the emperor claimed for himself), the other disputed territories were mainly the port of Laodikeia, and the region of Cilicia, both extremely important for strategic and economic reasons.\textsuperscript{55}

After the Turkish victory at Harran in May 1104, the situation for Bohemond seemed to be extremely bleak, as many towns which were previously under his control rebelled against his authority. Furthermore, the Byzantines had recovered control over both Cilicia and Laodikeia (except for its citadel). The difficult situation that his principality was facing led Bohemond to decide to return to Western Europe to recruit a new army.\textsuperscript{56} He eventually arrived in Italy in the first months of 1105, and, according to Anna Komnene, just before the end of his voyage, whilst in Corfu,
he informed Alexios that he would soon attack Romania with a huge Western army.57

Yet, before he began to prepare this expedition, Bohemond, accompanied by a papal legate, went to France, as he had made a vow while he was being kept imprisoned by the Turks (1100-03). He had sworn that, if he had even regained his freedom, he would have gone on a pilgrimage to St Leonard’s sanctuary in Noblat. In addition, while in France, the prince married Constance, a daughter of the French king Philip I, and launched an extensive campaign of anti-Byzantine propaganda. His aim was to recruit men for a crusade against Alexios I, whom he deemed to be the main responsible for the recent setbacks of the Crusader States.58 Bohemond had probably managed to convince Pope Paschal II (1099-1118) of Alexios’s hostility towards the Christians by presenting to him some non-Christian Scythian prisoners who had fought alongside the Byzantines. Furthermore, the prince may have convinced the pontiff that his expedition was aimed at replacing Alexios, a usurper, with a legitimate and pro-Western ruler: a man who claimed to be the son of Emperor Romanos IV Diogenes (1068-71), and who, according to Orderic Vitalis, had accompanied him during his French journey. Thus, the pontiff appears to have given his consent to Bohemond’s crusading plans.59

b) Bohemond’s Invasion

Bohemond eventually sailed eastwards from Apulia in October 1107. However, the Byzantine Empire was now much stronger than it had been when Robert invaded the Balkans in 1081. Alexios was now firmly on the Byzantine

57 Alexias, bk 11, ch. 12, pp. 357-58; Alexiad, pp. 330-31; Russo, Boemondo..., pp. 155-56.
59 Papsturkunden für Kirchen im Heiligen Lande, ed. by Rudolf Hiestand (Göttingen: Vandenhoec & Ruprecht, 1985), no. 7, pp. 102-04; Alexias, bk 12, ch.8, pp. 379-80; Alexiad, pp. 352-53; Orderic Vitalis, Historia ecclesiastica, vi, bk 11, ch. 12, pp. 68-70; Georgios Theotokis, ‘Bohemond of Taranto’s 1107-8 Campaign in Byzantine Illyria – Can It Be Viewed as a Crusade?’, Rosetta, 11 (2012), 72-81 (pp. 74-80); Brett Edward Whalen, ‘God’s Will or not? Bohemond’s Campaign against the Byzantine Empire (1105-1108)’, in Crusades – Medieval Worlds in Conflict, ed. by Thomas F. Madden, James L. Naus, and Vincent Ryan (Farnham: Ashgate, 2010), pp. 111-25 (pp. 111-17); Russo, ‘Il viaggio…’, pp. 134-37; McQueen, ‘Relations…’, pp. 458-63. This view is opposed by John Gordon Rowe, ‘Paschal II, Bohemund of Antioch and the Byzantine Empire’, Bulletin of the John Rylands Library, 49 (1966-67), 165-202 (pp. 167-82, 192-93), who believed that the letter edited by Hiestand was written in 1108, thus after the beginning of Bohemond’s campaign.
throne, and was also ready to face an attack from Southern Italy: he had spent many months between 1105 and 1106 in Thessalonica, where he had organised the Byzantine forces in the Western Balkans, and appointed his nephew Alexios Komnenos as the new governor of Dyrrachion. Furthermore, to judge by the time of Guiscard’s attack, the emperor had also gained the alliance of the Hungarians, after his own son John had married Piroska, a Magyar princess.60

Alexios nevertheless resorted to a defensive strategy, and thus ordered the commander of his fleet, Isaac Kontostephanos, to try to prevent Bohemond’s convoys from crossing the Strait of Otranto. However, the order was disobeyed, and Kontostephanos instead attacked Otranto itself, only to be defeated by the Normans. Isaac did not even manage to prevent Bohemond from reaching the Balkans, and so the prince of Antioch could easily disembark in Avlona. He plundered most of the coastline, besieged Dyrrachion, and conquered some of its neighbourhoods. However, despite a long siege, Dyrrachion did not fall to Bohemond, who was decisively defeated by the Byzantines in two pitched battles. This forced him to surrender, and to sign the Treaty of Devol in September 1108. Bohemond obtained the title of sebastos with a pension of 200 pounds of gold per year, and became a vassal of Alexios and of his son John. In addition, Bohemond was formally granted control of Antioch and of some of its surrounding areas as a personal (and not inheritable) gift from Alexios. Bohemond was also forced to appoint a Greek patriarch in Antioch, and to promise to wage war against his nephew Tancred until the latter ended his hostilities against Byzantium.61

In addition to the timely preparations, another important aspect that made it possible for Alexios to prevail over Bohemond was the success of his diplomatic activity. While even in this case (as we shall see below) the emperor obtained some help from Venice, on this occasion the Byzantine agents also achieved significant success when they tried to stir up discord in Bohemond’s army. The main plan appears to have been that a Byzantine messenger approached the Norman leader pretending that to be a deserter. He handed over to the prince some letters which had been written ‘as though in reply to some of Bohemond’s most intimate friends’, who included Guy of Hauteville (another of Guiscard’s sons) and Richard of the Principate (a nephew of Robert), but were actually fraudulent. In

60 Alexias, bk 12, ch. 4, pp. 368-69; Alexiad, pp. 340-42; Theotokis, The Norman Campaigns..., p. 204; Frankopan, ‘The Imperial Governors…’, pp. 97-100.
these epistles Alexios promised very generous gifts to the addressees, thus trying to deceive Bohemond into thinking that his main commanders were betraying him. However, the plan of the basileus (which has significant similarities with some stratagems written by Polyaenos in the mid-second century CE, and by Emperor Leo VI the Wise in 903-04) did not work out as well as he hoped. After Bohemond opened the letters, he made sure that the supposed recipients of the imperial letters were guarded, but in the end decided not to punish any of them.\textsuperscript{62}

Despite the failure of this plan, Alexios nonetheless managed to convince some of Bohemond’s commanders to desert and join his army. Among them were Robert of Montfort (a former vassal of King Henry I of England), Guy (who had already briefly joined the Byzantines some years earlier), William of Claret, and Marinus Neapolites, who is probably to be identified with a noble from Amalfi.\textsuperscript{63} All these men, together with some others from Southern Italy who had previously deserted to Alexios (Roger, Peter Aliphas, and Humbert, probably a son of Raoul), and along with Richard of the Principate (hence, he as well is likely to have deserted Bohemond), witnessed the signing of the Treaty of Devol as imperial delegates. Quite interestingly, all the signatories were Westerners (including some envoys from Hungary). Alexios probably felt that, by doing so, it was likelier that the terms of the treaty would be enforced in Western Europe. Possibly, the emperor also thought that Bohemond would only observe the agreement if some of his relatives and former allies had sworn to respect it. Finally, another reason why there were many Normans amongst the subscribers of the agreement was probably

\textsuperscript{62} Alexias, bk 13, ch. 4, pp. 394-97; Alexiad, pp. 366-69; Polyaenos, Stratagems of War, ed. and trans. by Peter Krentz and Everett L. Wheeler, 2 vols (Chicago: Ares, 1994), i, bk 3, ch. 9.57, bk 4, chs 2.8, 8.3, 11.2, bk 5, ch. 2.8, pp. 274, 320, 408-10, 420, 456, ii, bk 6, chs. 6.1, 48, bk 7, ch. 19, bk 8, chs 41, 50, pp. 568, 610-12, 662, 804-06, 822; Leo VI, Taktika, constitution 19, ch. 29, pp. 546-47; Margaret E. Mullett, ‘The Language of Diplomacy’, in Byzantine Diplomacy..., pp. 203-16 (p. 208). It is impossible to determine whether Alexios was inspired by these earlier writings, and thus tried to replicate these stratagems, or if Anna Komnene, due to her erudition and love for the classics, decided to add episodes that did not actually occur. See Penelope Buckley, The ‘Alexiad’ of Anna Komnene: Artistic Strategy in the Making of a Myth (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014), pp. 38-39, 290-91.

that Alexios wanted as many signatories as possible to come from Bohemond’s kin, in order to humiliate his enemy.64

c) The Military Role of Venice

As briefly mentioned above, the Venetians helped the Byzantines also on this occasion, although their role was not as prominent as it had been during Robert Guiscard’s Balkan campaigns. For once, the Alexiad is not the main source on the intervention of Venice in the conflict, as Anna Komnene only mentions that her father asked the Venetians (as well as the Genoese and to the Pisans) not to join Bohemond’s Balkan campaign.65 However, the Venetian sources provide more details. The Annales Venetici breves mention that the doge sent a fleet against Bohemond, while Andrea Dandolo reports that Alexios asked for help from Venice when he realised that Epirus was about to be attacked. Even though no specific concessions appear to have been granted to Venice and despite the difficulties of sailing in winter, Ordelaffo Falier nevertheless sent a huge navy that joined the imperial one in December 1107. The allies forced Bohemond to surrender.66

However, it is also possible that during this conflict Venice, together with the Hungarians, also conducted a campaign in Apulia against Bohemond. Simon of Kéza’s Gesta Hungarorum, written between 1282 and 1285, is the earliest source to mention this expedition, which, according to this chronicler, took place during Coloman’s reign, and under his command. According to this account, the Hungarians and the Venetians conquered the cities of Brindisi and Monopoli. The former raided Apulia for three months, and then their king sailed back to Dalmatia. Even though some Hungarian troops remained in Apulia under a captain, the

65 Alexias, bk 12, ch. 1, p. 359; Alexiad, p. 332; Russo, Boemondo…, p. 179.
control of the cities was handed over to the Venetians, who kept them until William
*iunior rex* of Sicily managed to conquer them back with the aid of the Pisans.67

In the early fourteenth century Paolino da Venezia ‘borrowed’ Simon of
Kéza’s account, but dated it to the reign of Emperor Henry IV (which ended in
1105), and then Andrea Dandolo and Pseudo-Pietro Giustinian copied Paolino’s
text into their chronicles, and placed this event at the end of Vitale I Michiel’s
dogeship (Vitale died in 1101).68 However, it is highly unlikely that this Apulian
expedition took place so early, just a few years after Coloman had married the
daughter of Roger I, who thus was Bohemond’s cousin. The only possible
explanation might be that Coloman had attacked Southern Italy to claim some of
the lands of his father-in-law – for Roger I had died in June 1101. However, this
explanation is hardly convincing, since Roger did not own any land in Apulia.69 In
addition, it seems much more likely that the Hungarians took part in a military
action against a power that was hostile to the Byzantines (even though, at this
point, not necessarily overtly) only after reaching an alliance with Alexios, thus after
1104-05. One might also be sceptical as to whether the Venetians actually had the
military strength to intervene in Southern Italy in 1100 or 1101. As previously
mentioned (see pp. 64-65), in 1099-1100 Venice was strongly involved in a
crusading expedition. Therefore, since the men who fought for the Adriatic city were
inhabitants recruited for the occasion, it seems rather unlikely that Venice had
enough men to engage in another contemporary military activity, or in one taking
place so soon afterwards.70

However, another and more plausible dating for this expedition has been
suggested. Some scholars have argued that it took place during the conflict
between Bohemond and the Byzantines. The main hint is that some Hungarian
legates witnessed the signing of the Treaty of Devol (which marked the end of
Bohemond’s hostilities with Alexios), thus suggesting that the Hungarians as well

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67 Simon of Kéza, *Gesta Hungarorum*, bk 2, ch. 64, p. 140; Gyula Kristó, ‘Latini, italiani
e e veneziani nella cronaca ungherese’, in *Spiritualità e lettere nella cultura italiana e
ungherese del Basso Medioevo*, ed. by Sante Graciotti and Cesare Vasoli (Florence:
Olschki, 1995), pp. 343-54 (pp. 344, 346).
68 Simon of Kéza, *Gesta Hungarorum*, pp. 140-41 fn. 2; Paolino Minorita, ‘Satirica
historia….’, ch. 224, col. 969; Dandolo, *Chronica extensa*, bk 9, ch. 10, p. 224; Pseudo-
Pietro Giustinian, *Venetiaria historia vulgo Petro Iustiniano Iustiniani filio adiudicata*,
ed. by Roberto Cessi and Fanny Bennato, Monumenti storici, n. s., 18 (Venice:
Deputazione di storia patria per le Venezie, 1964), ch. 28, pp. 87-88.
69 In mainland Southern Italy, Roger I only owned the southern part of Calabria; see
might have been involved in this conflict.\footnote{Alexias, bk 13, ch. 12, p. 423; Alexiad, p. 396; Makk, The Árpáds and the Comneni..., p. 15; Steindorff, Die dalmatinischen Städte..., p. 55.} Another point that supports the hypothesis that this Hungarian-Venetian campaign took place in 1107-08 (and not in the first half of the decade) is, as mentioned above, the sealing of a matrimonial alliance between Hungary and Byzantium, which had taken place a few years earlier. Last but not least, since Bohemond had set sail towards the Balkans from Brindisi (and Monopoli is not far from Brindisi), invading this area would have threatened Bohemond’s Apulian bases, and prevented the prince of Antioch from receiving supplies from Italy while he was in the Balkans.\footnote{Anonymous Barensis, ‘Chronicon’, a. 1108, p. 155; Russo, Boemondo..., p. 181.}

However, there are other elements which make the situation slightly more complex. In particular, Bohemond did not rule over either Monopoli or Brindisi in the early twelfth century. Even though in 1107 Bohemond issued from Bari an extensive privilege to the monastery of St Stephen near Monopoli, this town was not under his rule, and we should note that the monastery did not receive from Bohemond any exemption or concession in Monopoli itself in the privilege, but only in other Apulian areas (including Oria and Taranto).\footnote{I più antichi documenti del Libro dei privilegi dell’Università di Putignano (1107-1434), ed. by Antonio D’Itollo (Bari: Tipografica, 1989), no. 1, pp. 3-8; Jean-Marie Martin, La Pouille du Vie au XIIe siècle (Rome: École française de Rome, 1993), p. 766.} Monopoli was under the rule of Robert of Conversano (the grandson of one of Guiscard’s sisters), and he probably also held Brindisi, even though some documentary evidence hints that his mother Sikelgaita had an important role in Brindisi.\footnote{Regii Neapolitani archivii monimenta edita ac illustrata, 6 vols (Naples: Regia Typographia, 1845-61), v, nos. 509, 524, pp. 276, 307-09; ‘Urkundenedition’, ed. by Wolfgang Jahn, in Untersuchungen zur normannischen Herrschaft in Süditalien (1040-1100) (Frankfurt: Lang, 1989), no. 14, pp. 396-98; ‘Papsturkunden in Apulien: Bericht über die Reise des Dr. L. Schiaparelli’, ed. by Paul Fridolin Kehr, in Nachrichten von der Königl. Gesellschaft der Wissenschaften zu Göttingen: Philologisch-historische Klasse aus dem Jahre 1898 (Göttingen: Horstmann, 1898), pp. 237-89 (‘Apulian Papal Charters’, nos. 3-4, pp. 268-71); Lupus Protospatharius, ‘Annales…’, a. 1101, p. 63; Codice diplomatico brindisino, 1, ed. by Gennaro Maria Monti and others (Trani: Vecchi, 1940), no. 11, pp. 20-23; Martin, La Pouille..., p. 737; Jahn, Untersuchungen..., pp. 264-65.}

Furthermore, when, in 1089, a dispute had arisen over whether Oria or Brindisi should be a bishopric, Robert of Conversano’s father Geoffrey had backed the case of Brindisi against Bohemond, who had supported the case of Oria.\footnote{Bohemond had obtained Oria from his brother Roger Borsa in early 1086. See Malaterra, bk 4, ch. 4, p. 87; Andreas Kiesewetter, ‘La signoria di Boemondo I d’Altavilla in Puglia’, in “Unde boat mundus quanti fuerit Boamundus”. Boemondo I di...}
dispute re-emerged in the 1100s, during Robert’s rule over Brindisi. This suggests that Bohemond and the counts of Conversano were rivals, not allies. Despite Giordano’s suggestion that the Bishop of Brindisi might have moved to Oria because Brindisi had been occupied by the ‘Schiavoni’, there seems to be no evidence supporting this statement. Thus, it seems likely that the relations between Bohemond and Robert were quite strained in the second half of this decade. The extended concessions and exemptions of Bohemond’s privilege for the monastery near Monopoli, might also be interpreted as a challenge to Geoffrey’s authority in the area.

So, if we are to believe Simon of Kéza’s account, the Venetians and Hungarians actually attacked lands owned not by Bohemond, but by an adversary of his. Given also the problems about Simon’s dating of these events, there must be considerable doubt regarding the reliability of this account. In fact, Simon’s Gesta, written 150 years after the events, are the earliest source mentioning them. Despite the brevity of the Southern Italian chronicles dealing with the early twelfth century, and despite the scarcity of charters issued in those years in Monopoli and Brindisi, this seems quite suspicious. In addition, the passage from Simon of Kéza contains some other inaccuracies. The title of King of Sicily did not exist in the first decade of the twelfth century, nor had either the future William II or his father William I yet been born. A William who was then alive was Duke William of Apulia (whom Andrea Dandolo incorrectly called ‘King of Apulia’), but, since he was still a minor when he inherited his ducal title in 1111, he could not have led an army some years earlier. Therefore, this part of the chronicle does not seem to be reliable at all. This passage might have been added by Simon, who wrote his chronicle mainly for propagandist purposes, and whose work was mainly aimed at being read by an


77 Dandolo, Chronica extensa, bk 9, ch. 11, p. 226.
Italian audience, in order to emphasise the rights that Hungary claimed to have over the Adriatic area in the late thirteenth century.\textsuperscript{78}

To conclude, if the Venetians and the Hungarians did launch an attack against Apulia in the first decade of the twelfth century, an 1107-08 dating of this campaign seems to be the likeliest. However, the inaccuracy and the lateness of the main source about this military expedition does not allow us to draw any decisive conclusion.

iv) From 1108 to 1118

After the signing of the Treaty of Devol, there were no more direct hostilities between the Byzantines and Norman Southern Italy for around forty years. Yet, it has been suggested that the negotiations between Alexios and Pope Paschal II in 1112 might have also been aimed at testing the water for an attempt to try and regain Southern Italy for the Byzantine Empire.\textsuperscript{79} However, since he was then involved in conflicts in the East, it is extremely unlikely that the basileus intended to recover the Mezzogiorno at this time. Hence, Alexios’s negotiations with the Papacy are rather to be interpreted as an attempt to divert the pontiff’s attention from the Byzantine campaigns against the Crusader Principality of Antioch. The precedent of Bohemond’s campaign of 1107-08 was still a fresh wound, and the basileus wanted to prevent the pontiff from supporting a further anti-Byzantine expedition from the West.\textsuperscript{80} Until 1118 (when Alexios I died), Venice was not involved in any military activity against Southern Italian powers either. However, the Venetians did take part in some operations in the Holy Land, and fought against the Hungarians for control over Dalmatia.


\textsuperscript{80} Lilie, Byzantium and the Crusader States…, pp. 92-93; Harris, Byzantium and the Crusades…, p. 97.
a) Venice and the Frankish States in the Levant

After their late intervention in the First Crusade, the Venetians did not officially send further fleets to the Levant in the following decade. Both natural catastrophes – Malamocco, the old centre of Venice, was submerged – and their involvement in the Byzantine conflict with Bohemond, as well as in some other disputes that had emerged in North-Eastern Italy, prevented them from doing so. Indeed, while in August 1108 some Venetian ships took part in an unsuccessful expedition against Sidon, these vessels were probably owned by private traders and pirates from Venice. They were ‘not organized crusading fleets’.81

However, this situation appears to have changed in 1110, when, according to Andrea Dandolo, out of fear that the Pisans and the Genoese might establish a commercial duopoly in the area, the Venetians blockaded Sidon, and assisted in its conquest.82 Probably as a reward for their military help, the Venetians were granted some commercial and juridical concessions in Acre, where the Genoese had already established a colony. The Venetians probably insisted on obtaining these privileges in Acre, as this city was the important port of the Kingdom of Jerusalem. Furthermore, while most of the hinterland of Sidon is cut off by the mountains, the much better location of Acre facilitated commercial contact with the main Syrian market, Damascus, and with the spice route.83

82 Dandolo, Chronicca extensa, bk 9, ch. 11, p. 228; Queller and Katele, ‘Venice and the Conquest…’, p. 28. However, Albert of Aachen, Historia Ierosolimitana, bk 11, chs 30-35, pp. 804-08; Fulcher of Chartres, Historia Hierosolymitana, ed. by Heinrich Hagenmeyer (Heidelberg: Winters, 1913), bk 2, ch. 44, pp. 543-48 omit to mention the involvement of Venice in this naval campaign; hence, we can probably conclude that few Venetian ships took part in the blockade.
b) Venice and the Hungarians

The Venetian-Hungarian alliance did not last long. Venice probably felt that the advantages of directly controlling Dalmatia outweighed the benefits of an alliance with the country which ruled over this region. The Venetians were probably already planning an attack against the Hungarians in 1112. In this year, the Patriarch of Grado Giovanni Gradenigo (possibly together with Giovanni Morosini, who is referred to as a legate of the doge in a charter issued in Halmyros in 1112) visited Constantinople in order to obtain Alexios’s help in recovering Dalmatia.84 The Venetians possibly hoped that the Byzantines would be willing to provide some military help as some sort of compensation for the concessions that the Pisans had obtained in the empire in the previous year. Indeed, since the Pisans had had the kommerkion (a tax that was paid whenever goods coming from outside the empire, or from different customs jurisdictions within the empire, were traded) reduced from ten percent to four percent, this had marked the end of the Venetian commercial monopoly in Romania. Therefore, it is possible that Venice hoped to receive support as compensation for the consequent loss of revenue and commercial advantage. The emperor accepted this proposal, but suggested that the military operation be delayed, and in the end such an expedition was never launched.85

Alexios probably procrastinated because he did not want to break his own alliance with the Hungarians. Doing so would have probably had adversely affected his contemporary negotiations with the pope, who appeared to have recently recognised the Hungarian authority over Croatia at the Council of Guastalla in October 1106. Furthermore, undertaking a campaign in the West was hardly

84 Dandolo, Chronica extensa, bk 9, ch. 11, p. 229; ‘Annales Venetici breves’, a. 1112, p. 90; DCV, no. 35, pp. 37-38; ‘Vendita di un terreno ove già batteasi moneta, in S. Bartolomeo di Rialto, fatta dal doge di Venezia Ordelaffo Falier ad alcuni della famiglia Baseggiolo’, ed. by Benotti and others, in Programma dell'I. R. Scuola di Paleografia in Venezia pubblicato alla fine dell’anno scolastico 1861-1862, ed. by Bartolomeo Cecchetti (Venice: Tipografia del commercio, 1862), pp. 33-36. After 1092, we once more see a Patriarch of Grado acting as a political agent for the Venetian government: the patriarch had once more become a subordinate political ally of the doge, as had previously been the case under the Orseolos. See Daniela Rando, ‘Le strutture della Chiesa locale’, in Storia di Venezia, I, 645-75 (pp. 652-54); Cinzio Violante, ‘Venezia fra Papato e Impero nel secolo XI’, in La Venezia del Mille, pp. 45-54 (pp. 47-52).
85 Documenti sulle relazioni delle città toscane coll’Oriente cristiano e coi Turchi fino all’anno 1531, ed. by Giuseppe Müller (Florence: Cellini, 1879), no. 34, pp. 43-45, 52-54; Nicol, Byzantium and Venice..., p. 76; Lilie, Byzantium and the Crusader States..., p. 92; Giorgio Ravegnani, Bisanzio e Venezia (Bologna: Il Mulino, 2006), pp. 78-79. Martin da Canal, ‘Estoires de Venise’, part 1, ch. 15 <www.rialfri.eu/rialfri/PUBLIC/testo/testo/codice/martindacanal> [accessed 13 January 2017] seems to provide an incorrect dating for this agreement. According to him, the Venetians received part of Acre after the conquest of Haifa, therefore in 1100.
practical since Alexios was then involved in a conflict with the Principality of Antioch, and the Turks were also planning to attack his empire. In addition, the relations between Byzantium and Venice may well have worsened fairly recently, after a Venetian had stolen the relics of St Stephen, and taken them from Constantinople to Venice in 1110. This incident probably had a resounding echo in Byzantium, since a few decades later, it inspired an ethopoëia by Michael Italikos, and may have led to a more cautious imperial attitude towards Venice.

In the end, between August 1115 and May 1116, Doge Ordelaffo Falier twice led naval campaigns against Dalmatia, even without Byzantine military assistance, and conquered the whole region. However, when the Hungarians counterattacked in 1117 the doge was killed in battle. Despite Falier’s death, the Venetians nevertheless defeated the Hungarians, thus maintaining control over Dalmatia.

v) Conclusions

The years of Alexios I’s reign in the Byzantine Empire witnessed a great increase in Venetian political power in the Adriatic area. In the first half of the 1080s Venice played a crucial role in the Byzantine resistance to Robert Guiscard’s advance into the Balkans. The Venetian navy prevented the Norman duke from receiving supplies from Southern Italy, thus hindering Robert’s plans, and its help was essential for the recovery of Dyrrachion from the Normans. However, when Bohemond invaded the Balkans in 1107-08, the Venetians probably only played a marginal role, even though some later (and quite unreliable) sources suggest that, together with the Hungarians, they attacked Apulia.

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In these years, Hungary also extended its influence and territorial rule, and started to play an important role in the Adriatic area. During the early twelfth century, the Hungarians annexed mainland Croatia, and briefly extended their dominion over Dalmatia. At first, this expansion did not bother Venice, which signed a treaty with Hungary, and possibly joined the Hungarians in an expedition against Apulia. However, the Venetians eventually reacted militarily against the Hungarian supremacy over Dalmatia in 1115. Not only did the Venetians manage to assume control over this region, but they were also able to defend it against a Hungarian attempt at recovering it.

Venetian activity was not limited to the Adriatic area, for Venice also took part in the Latin expansion in the Levant. Some Venetian ships helped the Westerners in their conquest of Haifa in 1100, and of Sidon in 1110. This first intervention was highly praised in Venice since the Adriatic sailors returned to their homeland with some of St Nicholas's relics. The second expedition proved to be profitable commercially, for the Venetians were granted possessions and trade privileges in Acre, one of the most important centres of the newly-established Frankish States.

Alexios I died in 1118, and was succeeded by his son John II. The beginning of Alexios's reign had been marked by a series of serious military threats to the empire. However, the *basileus* had managed to defeat his enemies, and by the time of his death, Byzantium was politically much stronger than it had been in the early 1080s. However, these military victories had been achieved mainly thanks to an efficient use of diplomacy. Indeed, the Venetians, Henry IV, and the Norman rebels, provided crucial direct or indirect help when Alexios was under attack by Robert Guiscard, thus preventing the duke from penetrating too deep into the Balkans. Despite the issues regarding Antioch, Alexios also managed to use the First Crusade to his advantage, as the military help of the Western armies made it possible for him to recover most of Western Anatolia from the Turks. When Bohemond attacked the Balkans, the emperor was much more prepared to face him than he had been when Robert Guiscard had attacked him. Yet, the success of this conflict was also facilitated by the ability of Alexios's agents, who managed to persuade many of the key enemy commanders to desert Bohemond, and join the Byzantine army.

Following the Treaty of Devol, Alexios did not have to face any threat from Southern Italy, where Guiscard's heirs were struggling to keep the mainland of the
*Mezzogiorno* united, and did not have enough strength to launch a new campaign across the Strait of Otranto. There was nevertheless one main issue that Alexios had not solved, and that John II inherited from him, as the Byzantine sovereignty over Antioch was not to be accepted by any of the rulers or regents of the principality. Therefore, Antioch remained a thorn in the side of Alexios’s successor, and, due to the principality’s strong links with the West, both John II and, later, Manuel I would have to use a very extremely cautious approach whenever they wanted to undertake a campaign against Bohemond’s successors.
2) Commercial Relations

We shall here analyse the pattern of Venetian trade between 1081 and 1118. In particular, we shall focus on whether the commercial concessions granted to Venice led to an increase in the scale of mercantile operations in the Byzantine Empire. Despite the limited amount of data on commercial activities that we have, the surviving agreements suggest that Venice was nonetheless interested in acquiring a privileged commercial position not only in the Byzantine Empire, but also in the Crusader States.

As mentioned in the previous chapter, Alexios issued his chrysobull for Venice in 1092, although the commercial privileges contained therein had probably already been granted in the previous decade. Amongst the different clauses, the Venetian merchants were exempted from paying the kommerkion whenever they traded in many cities of the Byzantine Empire. The cities mentioned in the bull are Laodikeia, Antioch, Mamistra, Adana, Tarsus, Antalya (which are in Syria, Cilicia and Pamphylia); Strobilos, Chios, Ephesus, Phocaea (in the Eastern Aegean, or on the Western coast of Anatolia); Dyrrachion, Valona, Corfu, Bonitza, Methoni, Coron, Nauplia, Corinth, Thebes, Athens, Negroponte, Demetrias (in central and Southern Greece; the final city would however lose its importance at the expense of the nearby Halmyros, where agricultural goods were often bought to be resold in Constantinople); Thessaloniki, Chrysoupolis (in Macedonia); Peritheorion, Abydos, Rodostos, Adrianople, Aprus, Heraclea, Selymbria (in Chersonesos and Thrace); and Constantinople.

Even though most of the cities mentioned in the charter were ports, and a majority of them were in the European part of the empire, some inland cities were also included in this list. The most important of these was probably Thebes, where the Venetians were already involved in trade before 1081 (see p. 45). Silk and pottery were produced in Thebes, and this city was efficiently connected with the main trading towns of Southern Greece and of the Peloponnese. In addition, Corinth was an extremely important commercial centre, mainly exporting cotton, olive oil, and glazed pottery, and so was Athens. Furthermore, after the export of grain became quite common in the twelfth century, Halmyros and Rodostos were two of the main imperial markets of this commodity. The inclusion of Chrysoupolis

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89 I trattati con Bisanzio..., no. 2, pp. 33 fn. 15, 40; Borsari, Venezia e Bisanzio..., p. 8; Nicol, Byzantium and Venice..., p. 92; Alan Harvey, Economic Expansion in the Byzantine Empire, 900-1200 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), p. 222.
and Peritheorion might be linked to their vicinity to the estates of the monastery of the Theotokos, an important agricultural centre, which probably commercialised part of the goods that it produced. On the other hand, Smyrna, most of the Aegean islands, Cyprus, and Crete were not included in this list, mainly for geopolitical reasons. In addition, no city by the Black Sea was mentioned either, probably because the Byzantines did not want to lose their monopoly on the grain trade of this region. Finally, another town that was excluded from the list is Monemvasia, possibly because of its centuries-long autonomy within the empire, and due to its great engagement in seafaring. Finally, another interesting aspect is that the Amalfitans who had a workshop in Constantinople were subjected to Venice, as they had to pay a tribute to St Mark’s church. This measure is probably to be linked with Amalfi’s submission to the Normans (in 1073), which had made its inhabitants subjects of Robert Guiscard.

The number of surviving commercial documents providing evidence of trade in the Mediterranean and Adriatic areas during this period is extremely limited. However, most of these charters (thirteen out of sixteen) record Venetian trade taking place in the Byzantine Empire. This seems to suggest that the preferred external maritime markets of Venice were probably the ones under imperial control. Furthermore, amongst the cities under Byzantine control, Constantinople seems to have been the main centre of Venetian activity, as eight documents either were

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issued, or refer to trade, in this city.\textsuperscript{94} The charters provide evidence that Corinth too was an important commercial destination for the Venetian merchants. This is not entirely surprising, as the great number of stray copper coins from the eleventh and twelfth century that have been found in Corinth suggests that it was an extremely prosperous city in this period.\textsuperscript{95} Yet, the Venetians were also active in areas in which they had to pay the \textit{kommerkion}: a quittance issued in March 1111, for example, records trade taking place in Crete. Since open sea sailing from Crete to Egypt was not yet practised in the early twelfth century, this document seems to suggest that the Venetians were indeed interested in this market, and not just using Crete as a mere stop towards Alexandria or Damietta.\textsuperscript{96}

Another aspect to be taken into consideration is that there is very little evidence of Venetian trade in the years in which Venice was involved in major conflicts. This is mainly because, as was pointed out by William of Apulia, the men serving in the navy were not professionals, but ordinary Venetian inhabitants, including merchants, who had to serve in the navy when needed. Indeed, in the following decades, the Venetian government would often issue a decree ordering its traders to return to their homeland to fight for Venice.\textsuperscript{97} Thus, only one charter per conflict was issued when Venice was, respectively, fighting alongside the Byzantines against Robert Guiscard, and involved in the First Crusade.\textsuperscript{98} Furthermore, there is no direct surviving evidence for commercial activity either during Bohemond’s Balkan campaign, or at the time of Ordelaffo Falier’s Dalmatian campaigns.\textsuperscript{99} One exception to this pattern can be made for the Venetian involvement in the Levant in 1110. Indeed, around this time, the relics of St Stephen were transferred from Constantinople to Venice on a Venetian mercantile ship full of young Venetian nobles who were probably there to trade. In addition, there is also some direct evidence of the involvement of Venetians in trade in Byzantium in the form of private charters (one of which was issued by a man who


\textsuperscript{96} \textit{DCV}, no. 33, pp. 35-36; Jacoby, 'Byzantine Crete...'; pp. 525-26; Jacoby, 'Italian Privileges...'; pp. 352-54.


\textsuperscript{98} \textit{DCV}, nos. 15, 26, pp. 14-16, 29.

\textsuperscript{99} However, the doge donated some land in Constantinople to the Patriarch of Grado in September 1107: Tafel-Thomas, no. 32, pp. 67-74.
had been aboard the ship transporting the relics). This appears to confirm that Venice took part in this expedition with fairly limited forces, and not with anywhere near as many as the one hundred ships suggested by Andrea Dandolo.¹⁰⁰

However, the Venetians did not only trade in Byzantine cities. Some other destinations were under Muslim control: there is indeed evidence of Venetian commerce in Tripoli in 1083, in Antioch in 1095, and in Damietta in 1111.¹⁰¹ Thus, Venice was still involved in trade with the Muslims, both before and after the First Crusade.

The Venetians also obtained trading privileges in the newly-born Frankish States in the Levant. In 1098-99, they obtained some concessions in Antioch. However, the text of this document has not survived, so we do not know what exactly Venice obtained.¹⁰² The Venetians were also granted properties in the Crusader States. More precisely, they obtained half of Tripoli, and one third of Acre, while the Venetian church of St Mark obtained limited properties in Tripoli. In Acre, the Venetian merchants were also granted freedom and immunity from the authorities of the kingdom.¹⁰³

Despite the numerous concessions obtained in this area, only one charter, which was issued in early 1104, records evidence of an actual Venetian involvement in trade in the Crusader States. It refers to the transport of food (victualia) from Otranto to Antioch.¹⁰⁴ This charter is interesting for two other reasons. It suggests the existence of a commercial network linking the Italian and the Eastern possessions of the Hautevilles. Furthermore, it is one of a series of documents suggesting that, even though Venice fought against the rulers of Southern Italy, its merchants nevertheless conducted trade in the Mezzogiorno. Thus, in 1089, a Venetian merchant, Domenico Mastroscoli, was involved in commerce with both Constantinople and Lombardia (i.e. Southern Italy), while in 1118 one Viviano da Molin conducted some trade in both Sicily and...
Constantinople. Despite the frequent conflicts with the rulers of the Mezzogiorno, merchants from Southern Italy, and especially from Amalfi, nevertheless continued to trade in the Byzantine Empire. This is suggested by the clause in Alexios’s chrysobull which, in Constantinople, subjected the Amalfitan traders to the Venetians, and also by a series of charters. In particular, a document refers to a Venetian merchant attempting to travel from Halmyros to Constantinople on an Amalfitan vessel, and failing to do so because of a shipwreck. Further evidence can be found in three documents issued between 1089 and the following decade, which appear to record the presence of Amalfitan traders in Constantinople.

We also have evidence that some Venetian merchants were involved in commerce in regions geographically closer to their homeland. For instance, members of the Tiepolo family conducted trade in Sclavinia in the second half of the 1080s. In addition, a charter issued in 1095 refers to two Venetian merchants trading in the Colfo (i.e. in the Adriatic). Although neither document mentions what goods these merchants traded, we cannot exclude that they might have been slaves. Both contemporary and slightly later charters attest to the presence of Dalmatian servi in Venice. Yet, Venetian involvement in the slave trade is hard to demonstrate unequivocally since very few charters mention what goods were traded by the Venetian charters. The document issued in 1104, which refers to the transport of food from Apulia to Syria, is almost an exception. The only other charter mentioning what goods were traded was issued in August 1111. It records an agreement between a Venetian and a Greek merchant. The former was entrusted with some silk cloths in Constantinople that he was to sell in Damietta for an expected profit of 125 hyperperoi. We may recall that, according to Liudprand of

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107 DCV, nos. 17, 21, pp. 19-20, 24.
109 DCV, no. 30, pp. 32-33.
Cremona, in the mid-tenth century there was a ban on the export of purple silk from Constantinople. Since this charter records a Venetian merchant exporting silk to Egypt around 150 years later, we can assume either that this ban was no longer enforced, or that on this occasion the trader exported lesser quality silk.\footnote{110} Despite the paucity of documentation regarding the goods traded, some further assumptions have been made. It has been suggested that the Venetians mainly exported raw materials (timber, copper, iron, gold, furs, and leather) into the Byzantine Empire. These goods had originally reached Venice from the Alps and from Germany.\footnote{111}

Whilst not directly concerning traded goods, four charters, all issued in the 1090s, quite interestingly record the loan of part of an anchor for undertaking voyages in various Adriatic and Mediterranean cities. At a first glance these documents might suggest the limited wealth of some of the merchants who traded in the Byzantine Empire in this period. However, this is not necessarily the case, as anchors were extremely valuable goods back then, and were even included in dowries, as can be inferred from a charter also issued in the 1090s.\footnote{112}

This consideration leads us to ask ourselves whether we can point out people or families that were particularly active in trade. Unfortunately, the paucity of the documentation makes it extremely difficult do so. Yet, one exception can be made in the case of the Mastroscoli family. Between 1088 and 1112, two members of this family, both named Domenico (probably father and son), conducted five commercial operations in an area stretching from Southern Italy to Constantinople, but they were mainly active in Corinth. Even though they mainly acted as socii procertantes, the last of these documents records Domenico junior acting as the socius stans.\footnote{113} Furthermore, a certain Matteo Mastroscoli (probably a relative of the two Domenicos) was also active in trade a few years later, in 1119. While in Bari, Matteo rented, together with other two Venetians, an anchor, in order to sail to Damietta and to Constantinople.\footnote{114}

\footnote{110} FZ, no. 6, pp. 23-24; Liudprand of Cremona, ‘Relatio…’, chs 53-55, pp. 210-12; David Jacoby, ‘Silk in Western Byzantium…’, p. 496; Borsari, Venezia e Bisanzio..., pp. 105-06; Laio, ‘Monopoly…’, pp. 513-18.
\footnote{111} Luzzatto, ‘Capitale e lavoro…’, pp. 6-7; Dorin, ‘Adriatic Trade Networks…’, pp. 240-41; Borsari, Venezia e Bisanzio..., pp. 103-04; Rösch, Venezia e l’Impero..., pp. 132-34; 140-41.
\footnote{112} DCV, nos. 20-22, 24, 26, pp. 23-29; Borsari, Venezia e Bisanzio..., pp. 64-65; Luzzatto, ‘Capitale e lavoro…’, p. 5.
\footnote{113} DCV, nos. 18-20, 25, 35, pp. 20-24, 28-29, 37-38.
\footnote{114} DCV, no. 41, pp. 43-44.
Not all the relevant Venetian charters record mercantile activity, that is people importing and exporting goods; some other documents refer to properties within the Byzantine Empire that had been granted to the inhabitants of Venice. Even though we know that the Venetians also obtained land in the provinces – Alexios’s chrysobull explicitly mentions Dyrrachion –, we are best informed about the Constantinopolitan properties. These were areas that Alexios I had confiscated from private individuals and, probably, also from religious institutions, to donate them to Venice. Such confiscations were probably legitimate by Byzantine standards, as they were officially done in order to ‘protect the empire from external enemies’. Through these concessions, the Venetians had obtained lands located in the North of Constantinople, by the lower Golden Horn, close to Perama (the embarkation point for the suburb of Pera), and near the Saracen quarter. Amongst these donations, there was also a wharf named the *scala maior* or *scala communis*. The Venetians were granted land in an area which since Late Antiquity had only been of marginal importance, hence its value was limited. Furthermore, the *basileus* may have hoped that the arrival of foreign merchants would have led to an economic revival of the lower Golden Horn and of its quays. Yet, we must notice that, despite these concessions, the Venetian properties in Constantinople were probably not particularly extensive, and their size increased noticeably in 1148, following Manuel’s second chrysobull for Venice.

Unfortunately, even though a series of internal problems which struck Venice between 1106 and 1120 probably persuaded a significant number of its inhabitants to move to *Romania*, the surviving documentation regarding these properties is too sparse to allow us to make any estimate of the number of Venetians who lived in the Byzantine Empire in these years. Indeed, in the

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116 *I trattati con Bisanzio*…, no. 2, p. 39; Jacoby, ‘The Expansion…’, pp. 75-76, 78-79; Borsari, ‘L’organizzazione…’, pp. 191, 193 fn. 4; Magdalino, ‘The Maritime Neighborhoods…’, pp. 211-21. Yet, it is unlikely, as suggested by Martin, ‘The Chrysobull of Alexius I Comnenus…’, pp. 22-23, that the properties donated by Alexios were not adjacent to each other, and that we cannot properly refer to a Venetian quarter until 1148.

period taken into consideration here, most of the charters referring to Venetian properties in Byzantium record the concession of some of these to a religious institution. The earliest surviving document records the donation of some properties in Constantinople to the Venetian monastery of San Giorgio Maggiore, issued by Doge Vitale Falier in July 1090. Yet, this was not the first donation of Byzantine land to a Venetian monastery, as this charter mentions that some properties had been previously donated to San Nicolò del Lido. The doge had received these areas from Alexios I, probably as part of the concessions granted in the 1080s, and mentioned by Anna Komnene.\textsuperscript{118} The doges believed that granting properties and wealth to such a prestigious institution as the monastery of San Giorgio Maggiore was profitable for the interests of Venice. Indeed, religious institutions could still indirectly represent the authority of the Venetian State, which did not yet have direct diplomatic representation in the Byzantine Empire, and perhaps also take better care of the administration of these estates. Furthermore, all the notaries from Venice were actually secular clerics, and it was much more likely that they would preserve any written documentation. Moreover, since, by law, ecclesiastical properties could not be alienated, donating land to a religious institution should have prevented Venice from losing control over it. For all these reasons, it was fairly common and practical to donate land to the ecclesiastical institutions: indeed, a similar measure was taken in 1107 by Doge Ordelaffo Falier, who granted the church of St Akindynos in Constantinople to the Patriarchate of Grado.\textsuperscript{119}

To sum up, the commercial concessions that Venice obtained from Alexios I led the Venetian merchants to trade mainly in the Byzantine Empire. Indeed, even though the Adriatic city also obtained privileges in the Crusader States, its actual mercantile involvement here was minimal. Therefore, the concessions obtained in the Levant can probably be interpreted not so much as an attempt by Venice to exploit new markets, but more as a way to weaken its Italian commercial rivals (Genoa and Pisa), which had obtained generous privileges in Syria and in

\textsuperscript{118} SGM, ii, no. 69, pp. 168-75; Alexias, bk 4, ch. 2, p. 124; Alexiad, p. 113; Frankopan, ‘Byzantine Trade Privileges...’; pp. 155-57; Silvano Borsari, ‘L’organizzazione dei possessi veneziani nell’Impero Bizantino nel XII secolo’, in Studi albanologici..., pp. 191-204 (p. 194).
Palestine. Yet, even in the Byzantine Empire, between 1081 and 1118 there was only a limited increase in the scale of Venetian commerce, compared to the previous three decades. This was probably due to the many conflicts in which the Adriatic city was involved, which necessarily slowed down mercantile activities (as the men that Venice recruited for its navy were its own inhabitants), and to the limited economic strength of most of its population. Thus, the limited Venetian involvement in trade with Byzantium leads us to reconsider whether the refusal by John II Komnenos (1118-43) to confirm his father’s charter was the only reason that led to a conflict between Byzantium and Venice at the beginning of his reign.

120 Carr, Between Byzantium…’, pp. 79-81.
V. A Chameleon Relationship: Venice and Byzantium, 1118-56

1) Political Outline

i) The Conflict between Venice and John II Komnenos (1119-26)

After the death of Alexios I, the apparent harmony between Venice and Byzantium was to be short-lived. However, there had already been some hints that the collaboration between these powers was not as solid as it seemed. In 1112, the imperial request to postpone a campaign to recover Dalmatia from Hungary that the Venetians were planning to undertake, might suggest that Alexios valued his alliance with Hungary as much as (if not even more than) the one with Venice. As previously mentioned, the Venetians eventually conducted an autonomous and successful campaign in Dalmatia a few years later. Yet, even though this military action led to no reaction from Byzantium, it is quite likely that it was not seen favourably by Alexios and his son (and soon-to-be successor) John.

This is possibly one of the reasons why John II (1118-43) refused to renew his father’s chrysobull for Venice when, soon after he had become sole emperor, the Venetians sent an embassy to Constantinople to have the concessions confirmed. Furthermore, the Venetians had already caused some internal problems in Constantinople (they had stolen the relics of St Stephen in 1110), and the presence of an increasing number of merchants from Venice was possibly no longer felt necessary after the revival of the Byzantine economy. Finally, a military alliance with Venice was not considered crucial considering that in Southern Italy there were no potential threats for Byzantium. After Bohemond’s death in March 1111, in Apulia there was no strong leader who might launch a campaign into the Balkans. Furthermore, many nobles had managed to obtain autonomy in this region. They had taken advantage of the minority of Bohemond’s namesake son and heir, and of the lack of interest in Apulia shown by William, who had succeeded his father Roger Borsa as duke of Apulia upon his death in February 1111. Therefore,
with Southern Italy increasingly divided, the potential threat to the Byzantine Empire from this region had correspondingly diminished.

Yet, John II’s refusal to confirm the chrysobull does not appear to have had immediate negative consequences for relations between Venice and Byzantium. Indeed, even though merchants from Venice now had to pay the *kommerkion* throughout the whole empire, whereas until 1118 they were exempted from it in most imperial cities, the surviving charters show their continuous presence in Constantinople until 1121. However, the situation radically changed in this year. In 1119, in the Holy Land, the Frankish States had suffered a crushing defeat in the battle of the *Ager sanguinis* (1119), near Sarmada, in Syria. The outcome of this battle posed a serious threat to the survival of the Crusader States and in particular of the Principality of Antioch, due to the death of its acting ruler Roger of Salerno in the military confrontation, and to the ensuing succession crisis. Therefore, in 1121, a new crusade was launched by Pope Calixtus II, and Doge Domenico Michiel decided that Venice should join it. Since many men were needed to conduct this campaign, the doge ordered all his subjects who were in the Byzantine Empire and ‘elsewhere’, to return to Venice by Easter of 1121. The subjects who failed to obey this order, and did not return to their homeland by the deadline, had all their goods confiscated, as happened to Enrico Zusto. He had remained in *Romania*, and thus in November 1121 he was the recipient of this punishment.

Yet, most of the Venetians apparently returned to their homeland. Therefore, a fleet could leave for the Holy Land in the summer of 1122. The Venetians briefly

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2 *DCV*, nos. 41-42, 45-46, pp. 43-45, 47-49.
stopped in Dalmatia in order to enforce their control over this region, and then in Corfu, which they ended up putting under siege. Since the Venetian chronicles, which are the main sources on these events, do not mention any Byzantine refusal to allow the crusaders to disembark on Corfu, this was probably a premeditated attack, aimed at punishing John II after his refusal to grant commercial privileges to Venice, and, arguably, at forcing him to issue a new chrysobull. Since Corfu resisted the siege, the Venetians eventually wintered there, and only left the island in March 1123, after the news of the capture of King Baldwin II of Jerusalem had reached them. Even though some sources suggest that the Venetians also raided other Byzantine possessions (mainly islands) on their way to the Holy Land, it is more probable that these incidents took place when the Venetians were on their way back towards the Upper Adriatic.4

The crusaders eventually reached Acre in May 1123. Over the course of around a year, they destroyed the Egyptian fleet off Ascalon, and helped the Kingdom of Jerusalem to conquer Tyre. As a reward for their help, they obtained one third of this city, as had been agreed in the treaty known as Pactum Warmundi. On their way back, the Venetians wanted to winter in Rhodes, and thus stopped there in October 1124. However, the population of this Byzantine island refused to sell food to the Venetians. This led the Venetians not only to attack and sack Cyprus, but also to raid several other islands in the Aegean (notably Kos, Samos, and Chios), probably in order to destroy the shipbuilding facilities of the empire, and to disrupt the commercial communications between Constantinople and the

Eastern and South-Eastern Mediterranean. The Venetians ended up wintering in Chios, and used this island as a base for new attacks on Lesbos and Andros. The Venetians left Chios in March 1125, taking with them the relics of St Isidore the Martyr. Probably after a naval defeat in Lemnos (only mentioned by the Byzantine writer Prodromos in a poem that celebrated John’s triumph in 1133), the Venetians decided not to continue their attacks in the Aegean, but instead to sail westwards. Before the fleet returned to Venice in June 1125, its crew also raided the strategically important Byzantine city of Methoni, in the Western Peloponnese, and defeated the Hungarians in Dalmatia. Indeed, King Stephen II of Hungary had briefly recovered this region, taking advantage of the Venetian involvement in the East, and of its consequent lack of focus on Dalmatia. The success of the Venetian attacks is often thought to have been helped by John’s negligence towards the imperial navy following his naval reform. However, this was probably not the case. Indeed, despite Niketas Choniates’s unfavourable judgement concerning this measure, the reform actually made the Byzantine navy much more efficient and successful. However, this naval reform, which centralised the organisation of the Byzantine navy, rather than keeping it organised by themata, as it had been, was probably enacted after this conflict, which was when its ‘architect’, John of Poutze, was appointed protonotarios tou dromou. And while the existing structure of the navy may have contributed to the success of these Venetian raids, this was mainly due to Emperor John devoting little attention and few resources to countering to these hostile Venetian actions. Indeed, at the time as these attacks, the Byzantines were involved in military actions in two other border areas, following

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John’s decision to support the claims to power of, respectively, the deposed Sultan of Konya, and of the dethroned ruler of Duklja.6

Since John kept refusing to renew the privileges to Venice, and may have reacted to the raids by setting fire to the Venetian quarter in Constantinople, the conflict continued.7 A new fleet left Venice, and it was only after a raid on Kephalonia that John II eventually decided to arrange for peace with the Venetians, and issued a new chrysobull for them in August 1126. Even though John might have been influenced by economic factors (the absence of Venetian traders in the empire could have had a negative impact), it seems quite likely that he realised that renewing the privileges for Venice was the only way to prevent further raids. Furthermore, the basileus could not afford to continue this conflict since new threats had arisen in other areas of the empire, both a rebellion in Trebizond, and trouble on the Balkan borders. John therefore confirmed the privileges that were included in his father’s charter, and only added one clause to its text, which clarified that even the Byzantines who were trading with the Venetians were exempted from paying the kommerkion.8

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6 Niketas Choniates, Historia, ‘Βασιλεία Μανουηλ του Κομνηνου’, 1, pp. 55-56; Annals, pp. 32-33; Lau, ‘The Naval Reform…’, pp. 116-17, 119-21; Lau, ‘Rewriting the 1120s…’, p. 94; Hélène Ahrweiler, Byzance et la mer: La Marine de guerre, la politique et les institutions maritimes de Byzance aux VIIe-XVe siècles (Paris: Presses universitaires de France, 1966), pp. 228-31; Dionysios Stathakopoulos, ‘John II Komnenos: A Historiographical Essay’, in John II Komnenos, Emperor of Byzantium: In the Shadow of Father and Son, ed. by Alessandra Bucossi and Alex Rodríguez Sánchez (London: Routledge, 2016), pp. 1-10 (p. 2). Angeliki Papageorgiou, ‘The Political Ideology of John II Komnenos’, in John II Komnenos…, pp. 37-52 (p. 40) suggests that, when in these years the Byzantines engaged in negotiations with the Papacy, these might have also been aimed at convincing the pontiffs to persuade the Venetians to stop their raids. However, these two letters, ‘Die Auslandsschreiben der byzantinischen Kaiser des 11. und 12. Jahrhunderts: Specimen einer kritischen Ausgabe’, ed. by Otto Kresten and Andreas E. Müller, BZ, 86-87 (1993-94), 402-29 (no. 4, pp. 422-29); ‘Αυτοκρατόρων του Βυζαντίου Χρυσόβουλλα και χρυσά γράμματα: Αναφερόμενα εις την ἐνώσιν των εκκλησιῶν’, ed. by Spyridon Paulou Lampros, Νέος Ελληνομνήμων, 11 (1914), 94-128 (nos. 3-4, pp. 109-12), which are only dated after the indiction year, were probably written, respectively, in 1139 and 1141, as suggested by Alessandra Bucossi, ‘Seeking a Way out of the Impasse: The Filioque Controversy during John’s Reign’, in John II Komnenos…, pp. 121-34 (pp. 124-25), and not, respectively, in 1124 and 1126.

7 Dandolo, Chronica extensa, bk 9, ch. 12, p. 236. Yet, Dandolo might be misdating a fire that took place in 1130, and which was recorded by Moses of Bergamo, ‘Mosè del Brolo e la sua lettera da Costantinopoli’, ed. by Filippomaria Pontani, Aevum: Rassegna di scienze storiche, linguistiche e filosofiche, 72 (1998), 143-75 (p. 148).

8 ‘Historia ducum…’, ch. 6, p. 10; I trattati con Bisanzio…, no. 3, pp. 51-56; Kinnamos, bk 6, ch. 10, p. 281; Dandolo, Chronica extensa, bk 9, ch. 12, p. 237; Marin, ‘Venice, Byzantium…’, pp. 201-02; Lau, ‘The Naval Reform…’, p. 120; Lau, ‘Rewriting the 1120s…’, pp. 96-102.
To sum up, this conflict between Venice and Byzantium had negligible political consequences, as it ended with a return to the *status quo ante*. The Venetians re-obtained the same conditions that Alexios I had granted to them, and their merchants were able once again to trade in the imperial cities. What this war did do, however, was to make the Venetians aware of the strength of their navy, as not only had they conducted many successful raids on Byzantine land, but they had also destroyed the Egyptian fleet. In addition, the Venetians realised that they could influence the economic policy of the empire to their own advantage. Furthermore, even though, according to one of the two surviving texts of John II’s chrysobol, the Venetians were still imperial subjects (the charter refers to them as *duli* – a Latinisation of δοῦλοι, the Greek word for ‘slaves’), this conflict in practice set Venice free from its nominal centuries-long subordination towards Byzantium. This can be seen from the titles which the doges employed. Until the dogeship of Ordelaffo Falier, every ruler of Venice had used their Byzantine rank in all their charters – and in the 1080s Domenico Silvio was referred to as *protosebastos* even after he was deposed. Yet, neither Domenico Michiel nor any of his successors ever used the title of *protosebastos*, although that had been granted to them once more both by John II and by his successors. That such a victory was extremely significant for Venice can also be inferred from Domenico Michiel’s epitaph, which celebrates his victories in the Holy Land and against the Hungarians, and refers to him as *terror Graecorum*.

Another interesting aspect to consider is the possible involvement in this conflict of one of the local rulers from Southern Italy. An oath sworn by the Venetians, who in May 1122 promised to defend the citizens of Bari, might indeed suggest that one part of the *Mezzogiorno* was involved in this war. At first sight, considering the role that Venice had had in the Balkan campaigns of both Robert Guiscard and Bohemond, this agreement seems to suggest a radical shift of allegiances in the Adriatic area. However, this was not the case, as in the early 1120s Bari was no longer under Hauteville control. In 1085, Bari had been inherited by Roger Borsa, but he soon ceded it to his half-brother Bohemond, who appointed a catepan who would govern it. However, the almost contemporary deaths of Roger

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Borsa and of Bohemond, and the minority of their respective surviving sons, created a power vacuum in most of mainland Southern Italy, including Bari. This city was formally under the regency of Constance, the widow of Bohemond and mother of Bohemond II, but neither she nor the ducal Hautevilles managed to keep the situation under control, and, as a result, a civil war broke out between the main pre-Norman aristocratic families. If we believe the words written by Archbishop Riso of Bari in a charter, the problems began to arise in May 1113, but the situation had become even more serious by 1117. In September of this year, Riso was killed by Argyrus, a member of the pro-Norman faction of Bari, who had escaped after being held prisoner by Grimoald Alfaranites, the leader of the opposing group. Grimoald tried to avenge the death of the archbishop by launching an attack on Bari, in which his men destroyed two city towers. The sudden ending of the chronicle of the Anonymus Barensis makes it impossible to follow the later events in detail. However, the documentary evidence makes it clear that Grimoald managed to obtain control over Bari between November 1118 and June 1119, as suggested by two charters from, respectively, June and November 1123, which were both issued during the fifth year of Grimoald’s rule as dominus of Bari. Furthermore, we can infer that Grimoald was not an ally of the Hauteville because, for around a year from August 1119, Grimoald kept Constance of France imprisoned. Therefore, the Venetians signed an agreement with a city that was opposing the Hauteville, and thus we can safely argue that there was not a complete turnaround in the alliances in the Adriatic area.

As already mentioned, only the oath of the Venetians survives. Yet, it is very probable that the original agreement also included the obligations and concessions

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of the citizens of Bari towards the Venetians, but that this part has not survived. Indeed, one would expect Venice to take advantage of the signing of this agreement to obtain some commercial concessions, especially considering the significant increase of agricultural production in the Bari region in the twelfth century. Amongst these products, we can include wine and cereals. Yet, olives were the crop that was expanding at the largest scale at this time, and, as a result, the Terra di Bari became a major exporter of olive oil. This probably led to a Venetian interest in trade in this area, resulting in a moderate increase in commerce there. Furthermore, the (very limited) documentary evidence suggests that the merchants from Venice were mostly interested in acquiring the expanding crops, specifically food – victualia – and wine. Yet, Southern Italy never replaced Byzantium as the favourite commercial location for Venice. This was mainly due to the better commercial conditions applied in Romania, to the Venetians being more interested in trading the luxury goods that they could find in the Eastern Empire, rather than agricultural products, and to the almost constant warfare that affected Southern Italy for around a decade following the death of Duke William of Apulia in 1127.\footnote{DCV, nos. 31, 449, pp. 33-34, 440; Martin, La Pouille..., pp. 90, 331, 345-47, 356-65; Gherardo Ortalli, ‘Il Mezzogiorno normanno-svevo visto da Venezia’, in Il Mezzogiorno normanno-svevo visto dall’Europa e dal mondo mediterraneo: Atti delle tredicesime giornate normanno-sveve, Bari, 21-24 ottobre 1997, ed. by Giosuè Musca (Bari: Dedalo, 1999), pp. 53-74 (pp. 69-70, 73); Abulafia, The Two Italies..., p. 35; Graham A. Loud, Roger II and the Making of the Kingdom of Sicily (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2012), pp. 13-19, 26-36; Hubert Houben, Roger II of Sicily: A Ruler between East and West, trans. by Graham A. Loud and Diane Milburn (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), pp. 41-73. The only charters referring to trade in Southern Italy issued between 1126 and 1136 are DCV, nos. 50, 63, pp. 52, 66-67. To these, we might add FZ, no. 10, pp. 29-31 if, as suggested by Chryssa A. Maltézou, ‘Les Italiens propriétaires “terrarum et casarum” à Byzance’, Byzantinische Forschungen, 22 (1996), 177-91 (p. 179), the Palormus mentioned in the charter is actually Palermo.}

In addition to the commercial privileges that the Venetians might have obtained in Bari, it is probable that there were also some logistical and military conventions amongst the concessions granted to them. It does not seem unlikely that the Venetians obtained advantages similar to those that they had gained when Split had submitted to them in the late eleventh century, or, even more appositely, similar to those contained in the pact later made with Fano in 1141 – since Fano, like Bari, formally became an ally, rather than submitting to Venice. Both cities were to provide Venice with some limited naval help in case the Venetians were involved
in sea warfare in the Adriatic.\textsuperscript{16} Furthermore, Bari’s proximity to the Balkans would have also made its port a helpful base for the Venetians to retreat following raids against the Byzantine possessions in the Adriatic and Ionian seas. These considerations suggest, therefore, that the agreement with Bari was a militarily and economically strategic move made by Venice shortly before the beginning of its open conflict against Byzantium.

Another interesting aspect to take into consideration is whether the Dalmatian campaign by the Hungarians might be connected with the conflict between Venice and John II. The main counter-argument against this is that a Hungarian-Byzantine war broke out in 1127, just a year after John II had come to terms with the Venetians. The conflict was a consequence of the basileus providing shelter to the Hungarian duke Álmos following his failed attempt to secure the Magyar throne. Yet, while Álmos’s flight is generally thought to have taken place in 1125, the exact chronology of the events is quite uncertain. Thus, considering that hosting a rebel like Álmos was an extremely hostile act, it would be strange for Hungary to react not earlier than two years later after the duke had received shelter in Byzantium. This leads us to question whether we might postpone the dating of Álmos’s flight, and, consequently, the end of the good relations between Byzantium and Hungary. Indeed, before the trouble originating from John granting shelter to Álmos, both countries were concerned over the restlessness of the Serbs in the Balkans, and had a mutual enemy/rival in Venice.\textsuperscript{17} Thus, we cannot exclude that, while the Hungarians were still his allies, John Komnenos might have reached them, and suggested that they should attack Dalmatia in order to loosen the Venetian pressure over the Byzantine islands. This would have also meant restoring the territorial situation of 1115, before the Venetians had recovered Dalmatia despite Alexios’s refusal to assist them.

A final element that we need to take into consideration is whether the sources that suggest an involvement in the conflict of nobles from Southern Italy through a series of matrimonial alliances, are reliable. The first of these sources, the ‘Life of Calixtus II’, in the Liber Pontificalis, written a few decades after this

\textsuperscript{16} Tafel-Thomas, no. 26, pp. 63-64; Il patto con Fano, ed. by Attilio Bartoli Langeli, Pacta Veneta, 3 (Venice: Il Cardo, 1993), p. 46.
\textsuperscript{17} Kinnamos, bk 1, ch. 4, pp. 9-10; Niketas Choniates, Historia, ‘Βασιλεία Ιωαννού του Κομνηνου’, p. 17; Annals, pp. 11-12; Chronicon pictum, chs 156-57, pp. 153-55; Lau, ‘Rewriting the 1120s…’, p. 97; Makk, The Árpáds and the Comneni..., pp. 21-22; Stephenson, Byzantium’s Balkan Frontier..., p. 209; Angold, The Byzantine Empire..., p. 185.
Venetian-Byzantine conflict, mentions a wedding between Duke William and a daughter of the late Alexios Komnenos, which apparently took place in the early 1120s. This information is clearly unreliable. William had actually married Gaitelgrima, daughter of Count Robert of Caiazzo in 1116, and she outlived him.\textsuperscript{18} Another such marriage may perhaps have taken place in the early 1120s, for, according to the fourteenth-century Magyar \textit{Chronicon pictum}, King Stephen II of Hungary had married a noblewoman from the \textit{Mezzogiorno}, namely the daughter of \textit{rex Robertus Viscardus de Apulia}.\textsuperscript{19} Yet, this information is also extremely problematic, since no Southern Italian ruler possessed a royal title before 1130. In addition, since Robert Guiscard had died in 1085, when all his offspring had reached an adult age, Stephen’s wife cannot have been one of Robert’s daughters. If any of these had survived into the 1120s, they would have been well into middle age, and surely too old for such a marriage.

However, what if the woman mentioned in the \textit{Chronicon pictum} was the daughter of another nobleman from Southern Italy, also named Robert? The first possible candidate would be Robert Guiscard’s son Robert, who was of age by 1086, when he signed the first of two charters issued by his brother Roger Borsa, and around a decade later, in 1095 or 1096, he himself issued a charter which granted a privilege to a Calabrian abbey.\textsuperscript{20} What is extremely interesting is that three charters (issued between 1090 and 1102 or 1103) refer to him as ‘Robert Guiscard’.\textsuperscript{21} We do not know the date of Robert’s death, as the information that he


\textsuperscript{19} \textit{Chronicon pictum}, ch. 154, p. 152. Few scholars consider this information as reliable; amongst them, Stephenson, \textit{Byzantium’s Balkan Frontier…}, p. 204.


\textsuperscript{21} \textit{Antiquitates Italicæ Medii Aevi}, ed. by Ludovico Antonio Muratori, 6 vols (Milan: Typographia societatis palatinae in regia curia, 1738-42), i, 899-900; Archivio della badia della Santissima Trinità, Cava dei Tirreni, \textit{Arm. Mag.} C.42; ‘Urkunden und Regesten (1041-1297)’, ed. by Hubert Houben, in \textit{Die Abtei Venosa und das Mönchtum im normannisch-stauffischen Süditalien} (Tübingen: Niemeyer, 1995), no. 81, pp. 315-16. The 1090 charter is not included in the recent edition of the parchments from the \textit{Archivio Diocesano di Salerno}. See \textit{Le pergamene dell’Archivio Diocesano di Salerno}. 99
died in 1110 that can be found in one of the codices of the *Annales Beneventani* (which has probably led Bünemann to suggest that Robert died in this year) is clearly wrong. The copyists of the manuscripts erroneously wrote Robert’s name instead of Roger Borsa (the third manuscript correctly indicates the death of the latter in 1111). Regardless of this fragmentary information, since Robert, the son of Robert Guiscard, was an adult in the second half of the 1080s, and still alive in 1102, he could have well had a daughter who was of the appropriate age to be married in the early 1120s. Another possibility is that the wife of Stephen II was actually the daughter of Guiscard, a son of Roger Borsa, who is indicated as co-duke in some charters issued in the first decade of the twelfth century, but who died, probably at a fairly young age, in 1108. Since he was referred to as co-ruler as early as 1102, this probably means that in this year he was not a minor any more. Therefore, although this is perhaps unlikely, we cannot completely exclude the possibility that he might have had a daughter, who would have been a teenager in the early 1120s. A further possibility, suggested by Makk, is that Robert might actually be Robert I, who was Prince of Capua from 1106 until 1120. Finally, we cannot entirely exclude that this Robert might be the *Robertus miles de Apulia* mentioned by Albert of Aachen, a participant of the First Crusade who is probably to be identified with either Robert of Anzi or Robert of Courceval. Robert of Courceval probably briefly returned to Southern Italy to ‘collect his family and bring them back to the East’, but we cannot entirely exclude the far-fetched possibility that a daughter of his stayed in Southern Italy, and ended up marrying Stephen II of Hungary.

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24 Makk, *The Árpáds and the Comneni…*, p. 20.

However, all these hypotheses would seem to be extremely unlikely for a series of reasons. The main argument against them is that no Southern Italian source (and furthermore no text written within two centuries of this event) mentions such a prestigious wedding by a noblewoman from the Mezzogiorno. In addition, none of these men named Robert was so important to justify the chronicler’s mistake of referring to him as king, and the one who held the most prestigious title (the Prince of Capua) was not nicknamed ‘Guiscard’, nor was he based in Apulia. For all these reasons, therefore, a matrimonial alliance between the Kingdom of Hungary and a lord of the Mezzogiorno seems extremely unlikely actually to have occurred.

Despite its limited political consequences, the brief war in the early 1120s is not to be regarded as a minor event, as it was the first open conflict between the Venetians and the Byzantines. Additionally, the evidence appears to suggest that the hostilities were not limited just to the two main enemies, but that they also involved Hungary, and, indirectly, the autonomous city of Bari. This is not the first time that we can actually refer to the existence of an ‘Adriatic network’. Such was the case during both Robert’s and Bohemond’s Balkan campaigns – with the involvement of Venice in both, of Duklja in the former, and, possibly, of Hungary in the latter.

**ii) The Creation of the Kingdom of Sicily (1127-39)**

In July 1127, about a year after the end of the Byzantine-Venetian conflict, Duke William died in Southern Italy. Since William died childless, his distant cousin Roger II of Sicily claimed to be the legitimate heir to the mainland Mezzogiorno, and tried to conquer it. The 1130s are also characterised by a schism in Rome: after Honorius II’s death, two candidates claimed the Papal See. Roger tried to take advantage of this situation in order to obtain a regal title. We shall here analyse these events in detail, paying particular attention to how Venice and the Byzantines reacted to them, and to why they might have considered Roger II as a threat.

The years that immediately followed 1126 were a period of relative quiet for Venice. The Venetian sources seem to suggest that the Adriatic city did not pursue an aggressive external policy during these years. The only chronicler mentioning the involvement of Venice in foreign affairs is Falco of Benevento, who writes that he had ‘heard’ that, in 1133, the Venetians were willing to help Robert of Capua
against Roger II.\textsuperscript{26} However, no other source mentions the actual direct involvement of Venice in this stage of the South Italian civil war. Despite this, some further evidence might nevertheless suggest that Venice actually played an indirect role in this conflict. Indeed, Margetić has suggested that the Saracens that, according to the \textit{Vita beati Ioannis}, destroyed the city of Trogir in the first half of the twelfth century had been recruited by Roger. His men might have undertaken this campaign as an act of reprisal for hosting Count Alexander of Conversano, who had fled to ‘Dalmatia’ in 1133 before he ended up deserting to the ‘emperor’. Though Margetić believes that Trogir was then under Hungarian control, he also notices that there is no reliable information about this city between 1125 (when Venice recovered it after a brief period of Hungarian rule) and 1151. Thus, we cannot exclude that Trogir was then under Venetian (and not Hungarian) control.\textsuperscript{27} This possibility is supported by the (few) surviving private charters. They suggest that, until around 1136, Venice had maintained all its possessions in the area. Furthermore, we cannot exclude that it was the Venetians (and not the Hungarians, as suggested by Archdeacon Thomas) who appointed Peter, the local prior of Zadar, as \textit{comes}, for around a decade later the Venetians would back him after he obtained control of some islands in Dalmatia. Furthermore, the earliest document clearly indicating a Hungarian conquest of central Dalmatia (more specifically, Split) was issued only in 1142, as the charters that were apparently written in 1138 and 1141 are actually forgeries.\textsuperscript{28}

After around a decade of turmoil due to a series of conflicts against the Pechenegs, the Serbs, the Hungarians, and (of course) Venice, the situation on the Western border of the Byzantine Empire was also quite calm from around 1129 until 1134, and John II does not seem to have been interested in acquiring new

\textsuperscript{26} Falco, \textit{Chronicon Beneventanum}, a. 1133, p. 160.
\textsuperscript{28} \textit{CDRCSD}, 2, nos. 37, 39, 42, 49, pp. 26-27, 29-30, 35; Thomas Archdeacon, \textit{Historia Salonitana...}, chs 19-20, pp. 104, 105 fn. 4, 110; Stephenson, \textit{Byzantium’s Balkan Frontier...}, p. 205, 227; Makk, \textit{The Árpáds and the Comneni...}, p. 33. Ivo Goldstein, ‘Zara fra Bisanzio, Regno ungaro-croato e Venezia’, in \textit{Quarta Crociata: Venezia – Bisanzio – Impero Latino}, ed. by Gherardo Ortalli, Giorgio Ravegnani, and Peter Schreiner, 2 vols (Venice: Istituto veneto di scienze, lettere ed arti, 2006), I, 359-70 (p. 363) has suggested that Peter was actually acting as a Hungarian count. However, the lack of information about a Magyar conquest of Dalmatia in the Hungarian chronicles suggests that this region was still under Venetian control.
lands in Europe. The *basileus* could thus concentrate on the Eastern frontier of his empire, conducting a series of campaigns against the Turks in Anatolia.

Finally, following the death of Duke William in July 1127, the next eight years were marred by a series of conflicts in Southern Italy. Count Roger II of Sicily (Roger I's son and successor) laid claim to William's lands in 1127. In addition to his kinship with the deceased duke, Roger II's case was strengthened by the possessions that he already had in Calabria and Basilicata, which he had obtained partly by inheritance from his father, partly from William himself and from other nobles. Yet, Roger's claims were opposed by the Prince of Capua, by many other Southern Italian nobles, and by Pope Honorius II, who were, amongst other reasons, afraid that, by obtaining the ducal title, the count might become too powerful. Despite this, Roger II managed to be invested as Duke of Apulia by the pope in 1128 after a successful military campaign, and diplomatic agreements. After he had temporarily overcome most of the nobility of Southern Italy (including the Prince of Capua), Roger managed to become King of Sicily in 1130, using to his advantage the papal schism which took place after Honorius II had died earlier in the same year. He secured the consent of one of the rival claimants to the papal throne, Anacletus II, to his promotion to be King of Sicily — in return for his recognition of Anacletus as the rightful pope. Unfortunately, the pope whom he recognised ultimately lost the schism.

Roger's promotion as king inflamed the already unstable situation in Southern Italy, leading to a civil war. Furthermore, by 1133 Roger's opponents, backed by Innocent II, and led by Rainulf of Caiazzo (Roger's brother-in-law), the

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Prince of Capua, Grimoald of Bari, Count Alexander of Conversano, and his brother Tancred, had managed to obtain the support of some external powers. The main ones were the German Emperor Lothar III, who promised the other pope, Innocent II, that he would invade Southern Italy, and of the Pisans, who provided military aid to Robert II of Capua. Yet, despite the number of his enemies, by 1134 Roger had managed to defeat most of his revolting nobles.\textsuperscript{32}

Despite all these internal problems, Roger still attempted to conduct an aggressive Mediterranean policy, and this probably alarmed Venice and, even more, John II. According to William of Tyre, after the death of Prince Bohemond II early in 1130, Roger laid claim to the Principality of Antioch for himself, but eventually Raymond of Poitiers was preferred to him, both because of Roger’s need to focus his attention on the domestic situation in Southern Italy, and of his long-standing tense relations with the Kingdom of Jerusalem. Yet, even when his candidacy had become a blatant failure, the King of Sicily was unwillingly to allow Raymond to rule over Antioch. Indeed, in late 1135 or early 1136, Roger unsuccessfully tried to have Raymond of Poitiers captured when the latter was sailing by the shores of Southern Italy on his way to the Levant.\textsuperscript{33}

Furthermore, Roger also conducted an aggressive policy in the region to the South of Sicily, recovering Malta in the 1120s, and conquering Jerba (an island off the coast of Tunisia) in 1135, thanks to the deeds of his trusted commander George of Antioch. Jerba was a notorious lair of pirates, and, if we are to trust Ibn al-Athīr’s words, these pirates appear to have continued their activity after Roger’s conquest, possibly being authorised to do so by the Sicilians.\textsuperscript{34}

\begin{itemize}
These foreign military enterprises were received negatively by both the Venetians and the Byzantines, both of whom sought the support of the German Emperor, Lothar III. Both John II and Doge Pietro Polani (1130-48) sent envoys to Merseburg in 1135, asking for Lothar III’s help against Roger II. The Byzantines complained that Roger had, with the help of pagans, taken Africa, ‘the third part of the world’, from them, and that he had usurped the title of king. On the other hand, the Venetians complained that Roger’s men had plundered the goods of their merchants, to the value of 40,000 talents. Lothar, meanwhile, was unhappy with Roger, because he had ‘subtracted Apulia and Calabria’ from the German Empire – that is, he refused to recognise the claims of the Western emperor to be the overlord of Southern Italy. Should a German campaign on Southern Italy take place, the Byzantines were willing to help Lothar by providing him with an army and a fleet, and with great amounts of money. This Byzantine-German agreement (the so-called ‘Treaty of Merseburg’) was probably finalised in 1136, when the German legate Anselm of Havelberg was sent to Constantinople. John II probably had no offensive aims, and may have sought this alliance in order to allow him to conduct a campaign against the Principality of Antioch with no fear of having to face a contemporary Balkan attack. John’s renewal of the chrysobull that his father had granted to Pisa, in 1136, was probably a further diplomatic move to isolate the King of Sicily in order to prevent him from attacking Romania.

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36 Regesten der Kaiserurkunden des oströmischen Reiches von 565-1453, ed. by Franz Dölger, 5 vols (Munich: Oldenbourg, 1924-65), II, no. 1312, p. 60; Bernardo Maragone, Annales Pisani, ed. by Michele Lupo Gentile, RIS², 6.2 (Bologna: Zanichelli, 1936), a. 1137, p. 10; Lilie, Byzantium and the Crusader States..., pp. 115-16; Alex
However, while analysing the Byzantine hostility towards Roger II, we should ask ourselves whether Roger II was really a threat to the Byzantines in 1135. The main German sources (the so-called Annalista Saxo and the Annals of Erfurt) suggest so, but both written after 1147, when Roger attacked the Balkans, and may therefore have assumed with hindsight that this was always his intention, and indeed within his power to accomplish.\textsuperscript{37} Despite this cautionary observation, this does not necessarily mean that all the information that we can find in these two annals is unreliable. As we have seen, according to these texts, John’s envoys were complaining that the King of Sicily had usurped his royal title, and that he had taken Africa from the Byzantines. The former aspect makes perfect sense as a motivation for John’s enmity towards Roger. Part of Southern Italy had been under Byzantine control until less than a century earlier, and the Eastern imperial rhetoric would not recognise the Hautevilles as the rightful rulers of Southern Italy until the signing of a peace treaty between Manuel I and William I in 1158. However, the other complaint seems to be quite specious, as by this stage the Sicilians had only conquered a small island off the coast of Tunisia, and, furthermore, it had been many centuries since the Byzantines had lost control over Africa. However, the conquest of Jerba did show that Roger now had a strong fleet, and hence he had, potentially, the means to attack the Byzantine Balkans, something which may well have concerned John II.\textsuperscript{38} That Roger already had the ambition of following in Robert Guiscard’s and Bohemond’s footsteps can also be suggested by his taste for Byzantine culture and ideology, and by his desire to emulate it. This went so far as Roger being referred to as \textit{basileus} (the title of the Eastern emperor) by a Greek-speaking preacher, probably in 1131.\textsuperscript{39} However, while all this was true, the civil war in Southern Italy was not yet over in 1135, and even if Roger could afford to launch an expedition to North Africa, this was actually quite a minor campaign. It is unlikely, therefore, that the Sicilian king as yet had the means to attack Byzantium. Yet, especially considering the good relations between John and the

\textsuperscript{37} Loud, \textit{Roger II...}, p. 270; ‘Continuatio (Annales Erphesfurtenses Lothariani)...’, pp. 24-25.


Western emperor, Roger was nevertheless still probably the main Western threat to the Byzantine Empire.

As we have seen, according to the *Annales Erphesfurdienses*, the Venetian hostility towards Roger II was mainly motivated by the piratical activities of men acting on his behalf. However, the value of the goods that the Venetians lost seems to suggest that the actions of these corsairs were not only linked to Roger’s conquest of Jerba, but had been lasting for quite a long time. It is indeed possible that the Venetian complaints were mostly related to the destruction of Trogir by Roger’s Saracens, if we are to trust the words and the suggested interpretations of the *Vita beati Stefani*. Furthermore, Roger and Venice also supported opposite sides in the papal schism. Yet, the Venetian decision to back Innocent II was probably not a further reason for hostility with Roger II, but a mere consequence of this enmity. Indeed, in the papal conclave the Venetian cardinals had actually voted for Anacletus, but the doge had eventually decided to support Innocent II, mostly due to his discontent over Anacletus’s decision to appoint Roger as king. Yet, not even the Venetians were interested in undertaking an expedition against the King of Sicily, and their choice seems to have paid off. Indeed, in October 1136 Lothar nevertheless confirmed the pacts that his predecessors had granted to them. Furthermore, probably in 1139, the Venetians were also granted commercial concessions in the Kingdom of Sicily, possibly as a reward for their neutrality during the German invasion of the *Mezzogiorno*.

When Lothar did eventually launch a campaign against Southern Italy in 1137, he initially had the military support of the Pisans – however, this collaboration soon came to an end after a series of disagreements that took place during the siege of Salerno. During this expedition, which lasted for about five months, Lothar achieved some apparent success thanks to the help of some of the rebel nobles of Southern Italy, in particular of Robert II of Capua (who re-obtained his principality), and of Rainulf of Ciazzo, who was appointed as anti-duke of Apulia. Yet, after Lothar’s withdrawal from the *Mezzogiorno*, and following the death of Rainulf in early 1139, the rebels were no longer able to counter Roger, who

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managed to suppress the revolt later in the same year. His success was complete, as in July 1139, after the Hauteville had captured Innocent II (by now the generally recognised pope), the pontiff had been forced to recognise Roger as King of Sicily.\footnote{Loud, *Roger II…*, pp. 33-37; Houben, *Roger II…*, pp. 69-73.}

The Byzantines had not helped Lothar III in Southern Italy, and had instead launched a campaign against the Armenian Prince of Cilicia, and against the Principality of Antioch. John had previously tried to incorporate the latter entity into the Byzantine orbit. He had attempted to arrange a marriage between his youngest son Manuel and Constance, the infant daughter of Bohemond II, who had become the titular Princess of Antioch following her father's premature death. If John had succeeded in these matrimonial negotiations, Antioch would have actually been ruled by the son of the Byzantine emperor, and later by a son of his. However, John's proposal was not accepted, and Constance ended up marrying Raymond of Poitiers, who wanted to rule autonomously from Constantinople. Thus, John decided to undertake a military expedition. This campaign was successful, as the *basileus* defeated the Cilicians, and forced Raymond to surrender, and to accept the Byzantine formal sovereignty over his principality. The emperor then turned to fighting against the Turks, but did not manage to complete the siege of Shaizar due to difficulties with provisions, and to the Latin reluctance in taking part in this campaign. John nevertheless celebrated a triumph in Antioch, but, according to William of Tyre, after he asked to be granted the citadel of this city for himself, was forced to leave Antioch after an anti-Byzantine riot. Thus, John left for Constantinople in May or June 1138.\footnote{Kinnamos, bk 1, ch. 7, p. 16; William of Tyre, *Chronicon*, II, bk 14, ch. 24, bk 15, ch. 1, pp. 662, 675; Harris, *Byzantium and the Crusades*, pp. 87-93; Lilie, *Byzantium and the Crusader States…*, pp. 103-12; Phillips, *Defenders of the Holy Land…*, pp. 62-71; Alan V. Murray, *Constance, Princess of Antioch (1130-1164): Ancestry, Marriages and Family*, in *Anglo-Norman Studies, 38: Proceedings of the Battle Conference 2015*, ed. by Elisabeth van Houts (Woodbridge: Boydell, 2016), pp. 81-95 (pp. 84-88); Thomas S. Asbridge, *Alice of Antioch: A Case Study of Female Power in the Twelfth Century*, in *The Experience of Crusading, Volume Two: Defining the Crusader Kingdom*, ed. by Peter Edbury and Jonathan Phillips (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), pp. 29-47 (pp. 45-46); Papageorgiou, *The Political Ideology…*, p. 45; Martin Marko Vučetić, *Emperor John II’s Encounters with Foreign Rulers*, in *John II Komnenos…*, pp. 71-90 (p. 79-90); David Alan Parnell, *John II Comnenus and Crusader Antioch*, in *Crusades – Medieval Worlds…*, pp. 149-57 (p. 154).}

The emperor's decision to retreat was probably also a consequence of the fear that Roger II might take advantage of the death of Lothar III to attack the Balkans. That the *basileus* was following the development of the situation of
Southern Italy is also confirmed by John’s order to have a fleet built in Cyprus in order to prevent any attacks by Roger II. This measure is mentioned in an oration written by Nikephoros Basilakes sometime after 1138, when Roger was recovering ground in the Mezzogiorno, and thus becoming once more a threat to Byzantium.\textsuperscript{45}

To sum up, both Venice and the Byzantines were quite worried by Roger’s unification of Southern Italy, and by his Mediterranean policy. The Venetians were particularly worried by the piratical actions of the Sicilian fleet, which resulted in a substantial loss of commercial revenues for their merchants. Therefore, even though Venice was probably not involved in the civil war in Southern Italy, the Adriatic city nevertheless sided with Roger’s opponents at least until 1136. Yet, after this year, the Venetians maintained an absolute neutrality, possibly because Roger was no longer a threat to them, and because they were sceptical regarding the outcome of Lothar’s expedition. This attitude seems to have been rewarded by Roger, who, probably in 1139, granted some commercial privileges to Venice.

The unification of Southern Italy, and Roger’s minor achievements in the Mediterranean, led John II to worry that the Sicilian fleet might launch raids on the Western Balkans while most of his army was fighting in the East. Therefore, he convinced the German emperor Lothar III to intervene militarily in Southern Italy. This prevented Roger from attacking the Balkans, and also made it possible for the Byzantines to obtain some important success in Cilicia, and the recognition of some form of overlordship over Antioch.

\textbf{iii) 1139-46}

We shall now analyse the events that took place in the period after Roger’s coronation by Pope Innocent II, and before Roger’s Balkan campaign and the Second Crusade in 1147-48. We shall examine the reason why Roger decided to launch this campaign, and why the Venetians once more decided to back the Byzantines. We shall also see whether the foreign policy of Byzantium towards Roger II and Antioch changed after Manuel I succeeded his father John II in 1143.

The agreements signed with both John II and Roger II led to a brief period in which the foreign policy of the Venetian doge Pietro Polani could focus on the Adriatic area. However, these years were also crucial for the internal political

evolution of Venice, which, during Polani’s dogeship, transformed into a commune.\(^{46}\)

A strong new involvement of Venice in the Adriatic area began in early 1141, with the signing of an agreement with the town of Fano. The citizens of Fano were involved in a conflict with the neighbouring towns of Ravenna, Pesaro, and Senigallia, and obtained Venetian help in this war in exchange for a yearly tribute of oil and cash; the Venetians were also exempted from paying any dues when they traded there. Thus, we can rightfully state that, even though the pact between Venice and Fano was formally a reciprocal one, its actual consequence was the submission of Fano to the Venetians. Such situations had become quite common in the communal Northern and Central Italy, and indeed the structure of this agreement is very similar to other contemporary charters which formalised the submission of one Italian commune to another. The commercial conditions of this agreement also meant that Fano became a significant commercial base for Venice in Central Italy, especially for the acquisition of agricultural products.\(^{47}\)

Venetian involvement in the Adriatic area included military activity in Istria and, possibly, lower Dalmatia. The latter campaign is only mentioned by the fifteenth-century *Annales Ragusini*, according to which the Venetians unsuccessfully intervened alongside the city of Dubrovnik in its conflict against the Bosnians. The sources are much more reliable regarding the Istrian campaign, which took place in December 1143, and led to the submission of Pula and Koper. The inhabitants of Pula swore obedience to both the doge, and *tutum Venetie comune*; this is one of the earliest pieces of evidence that Venice had formally become a commune.\(^{48}\)

Despite the text of the submission of Pula, the transformation into a commune did not mean that the whole population of Venice was involved in the government of the city, but rather that it formally became an oligarchy. Indeed, the power was to be held permanently by a restricted group of Venetian families, amongst whom the members of the council of *sapientes* were elected. This change

\(^{46}\) Madden, *Enrico Dandolo…*, pp. 20-21, 24.


was also aimed at preventing the formation of ducal dynasties, and at restricting the power of both the doge and the clergy.49

Although the foreign policy of Venice in this period mostly focused on the Adriatic area, Doge Pietro Polani nonetheless did not neglect wider international affairs either. He appears to have maintained good relations with both Roger II and his enemies. Indeed, after signing a treaty with Venice, in 1144 the Sicilian king allowed the Venetians to rebuild a Greek church in Palermo, and to name it after St Mark. This move was probably part of Roger II’s diplomatic campaign to gain international legitimacy. He may have also hoped that maintaining good relations with the Venetians would increase his chances of having successful peace talks with their allies, the Byzantines. These negotiations had started in the final years of John’s reign, and were still continuing at the beginning of Manuel’s rule over Byzantium in 1143.50 The King of Sicily was probably aware that the Venetians were continuing to act as a mediator between the two empires, as can be seen in the correspondence exchanged by King Conrad III of Germany and John II between 1140 and 1142 (or 1143), which was also aimed at renewing an alliance in order to prevent any hostile action by Roger II.51

Meanwhile, John II felt that he still had unfinished business to deal with in the East, against both the Turks and Antioch. However, before conducting any further activity in the East, he had to secure his Western borders against a possible attack by Roger II. Therefore, in order to forestall such a threat, the basileus agreed on an alliance with Conrad of Germany, and engaged in negotiations with Innocent II. John and the German king agreed that the former’s son Manuel would marry Bertha, Conrad’s sister-in-law, while the latter confirmed his intention of conducting

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50 I documenti inediti dell’epoca normanna in Sicilia, ed. by Carlo Alberto Garufi, Documenti per la storia di Sicilia, ser. i, 18 (Palermo: Lo statuto, 1899), nos. 18, 39, 60, 86, pp. 44-45, 92-93, 149-50, 209; Kinnamos, bk 3, ch. 2, pp. 91-92; Romuald, Annales, p. 227; Houben, Roger II…., pp. 87, 162; Abulafia, The Two Italies…., pp. 135, 204; Loud, Roger II…., p. 44.

a campaign in Southern Italy.\textsuperscript{52} The Byzantine negotiations with the Papacy were probably triggered by Innocent’s recognition of Roger’s royal title, and by a bull that the pontiff had issued a year earlier, in 1138, for the Latins fighting in the Eastern imperial army. This bull had referred to the Byzantines as schismatics, and was aimed at dissuading the Latins of the Kingdom of Jerusalem from allying with them. Thus, John probably felt the need to persuade the pope of his own friendly attitude towards the Crusader States. He was perhaps afraid too that, should he fail to do so, Innocent might have encouraged the Sicilians (whom he wrongly deemed to have become the pope’s allies) to attack the Western Balkans in order to prevent John from achieving his Eastern military aims.\textsuperscript{53}

John’s successful negotiations with Conrad and with Innocent allowed him to march into Cilicia with no need of worrying over the safety of his Western borders. However, this expedition had to be abandoned after John’s death, officially in a hunting accident, in the spring of 1143. The final deathbed decision of the emperor was to appoint as his successor his youngest son Manuel, who had accompanied him on this final expedition. Manuel could not continue the campaign as he had to leave for Constantinople in order to prevent any attempt by his elder brother Isaac to depose him.\textsuperscript{54} Yet, once he had dealt with these urgent matters in Constantinople, Manuel returned to his Eastern domains, conducting campaigns against Antioch and the Turks, thus following in his father’s footsteps. However, his policy differed in that, while John had secured his Western border thanks to a series of negotiations with the Germans, Manuel was prepared to enter into talks


\textsuperscript{54} Kinnamos, bk 1, ch. 10, bk 2, chs 1-2, pp. 22-33; William of Tyre, \textit{Chronicon}, ii, bk 15, chs. 19-23, pp. 700-06; Parnell, ‘John II Comnenus...’, pp. 155-57; Lilie, \textit{Byzantium and the Crusader States...}, pp. 135-38, 142-43; Angold, \textit{The Byzantine Empire...}, pp. 188-89, 191-92; Magdalino, \textit{The Empire...}, p. 41. In addition to the envoys from Genoa, we know that in 1141 the Pisans also had a legate in Constantinople. It has been suggested that the same legate (Ugo Dudone) brokered an agreement with Manuel I at the beginning of his reign. However, I have not found any evidence supporting this suggestion. See \textit{Documenti sulle relazioni delle città toscane...}, no. 2, p. 4; Lilie, \textit{Handel und Politik...}, p. 396.
with Roger II. It is possible that these discussions, which were aimed at reaching a matrimonial alliance, had begun under John II. Possibly as early as in 1139, Roger had sent envoys to the basileus, asking for an imperial bride for his son, but without success. During the first years of Manuel’s reign, the negotiations resumed, for Roger hoped that the new Byzantine emperor might recognise his royal title. However, even though the imperial envoy probably granted Roger’s request, this recognition was not confirmed by Manuel. Even though both Romuald and Kinnamos depicted the initial granting of Roger’s request as an autonomous decision by the legate, this was a probably a subtle move by the emperor. Indeed, it is quite likely that he pretended to accept Roger’s claims in order to prevent the Sicilian king from attacking the Balkans while most of the Byzantine army and navy was still involved in conflicts in the East. However, attempts to link these negotiations and an attempted coup led by John Dalassenos-Roger (a second-generation émigré from Southern Italy, and Manuel’s brother-in-law), and backed by Robert II, the former Prince of Capua, which took place around the same time in Byzantium, seem rather far-fetched. The presence of Robert in Constantinople is not surprising, as, following his suppression of the revolts in Southern Italy, Roger II had (directly or indirectly) forced many of his rebel noblemen to flee. In the years following their departure from the Mezzogiorno, some of them, among whom we can mention Alexander of Conversano – who had already left in 1133 –, Roger of Ariano, and, indeed, Robert of Capua, played an important role as mediators between the two empires. Being aware of the emperors’ hostility towards Roger, they tried to lobby them to conduct an expedition into Southern Italy. They clearly hoped that they would have been generously rewarded for their diplomatic activity, and, even more, that a successful campaign would have allowed them to have their former possessions restored.

55 Kinnamos, bk 2, ch. 4, bk 3, ch. 2, pp. 36-38, 91-92; Romuald, Annales, p. 227; Tolstoy-Miloslavsky, ‘Manuel I Komnenos and Italy…’, pp. 48, 70-73; Kazhdan, ‘Latin and Franks…’, p. 93; Lamma, Comneni e Staufer…, i, 49-50. Michael Jeffreys and Elizabeth Jeffreys, ‘Who Was Eirene the Sevastokratissa?’, Byzantion, 64 (1994), 40-68 (pp. 40, 51-62, 64-66) have hinted at the possible involvement in the plot of Eirene, the wife of John II’s second son Andronikos. They have also suggested that Eirene might have had Norman origins, and that her marriage took place in the mid-1120s.

56 Otto of Freising and Rahewin, Gesta Friderici…, bk 1, chs 26-27, bk 2, ch. 11, pp. 172, 178-80, 300; Wibald of Corvey, Das Briefbuch, ii, no. 216, pp. 456-61; Corpus of Byzantine Seals from Bulgaria, Vol. II: Byzantine Seals with Family Names, ed. by Ivan Jordanov (Sofia: Bulgarian Academy of Sciences, Archaeological Institute with Museum, 2006), no. 150, pp. 115-16; Conrad III, Diplomata, ed. by Friedrich Hausmann, MGH DD, 9 (Vienna: Böhlau, 1969), no. 99, p. 177. To these men, we might add Alexander of Chiaromonte, Philip of Surris (probably Philip of Sorrento, an
That Manuel initially continued following his father’s policy is also suggested by his decision to launch a new campaign to obtain sovereignty over the Principality of Antioch in 1144. This expedition was a success, as it ended in the following year with a new submission to Byzantium by Raymond. However, this campaign also had consequences in other areas of the Levant, as the prince’s inability to assist Edessa had led to the attack and conquest of this city by Zengi, the ruler of Mosul and Aleppo. Manuel also engaged in warfare in Anatolia against the Turkish Emir of Konya: he destroyed Philomelion, and put Konya under siege, but then accepted a Turkish peace offer, and left for Constantinople. This decision might have been due to Manuel’s desire to focus on the West due to the spreading of rumours that Pope Eugenius III had called a new crusade following the fall of Edessa.\(^5\)

In the West, Manuel was also active in diplomatic talks with Conrad III; in 1144 or 1145, a Byzantine envoy asked for the assistance of five hundred knights, in exchange for ‘precious gifts’. In addition, according to Otto of Freising’s Chronica, the two rulers also agreed to form a confederatio against Roger II. Conrad replied by offering to Manuel two thousand knights led by himself, by sending to Byzantium some legates, most of whom were nobles from the Mezzogiorno, and by finalising the details of Manuel’s wedding to Bertha, whom Conrad had decided to adopt as his daughter. The German princess had been in Constantinople since 1142, but had not yet married Manuel probably because, whereas she might have been a suitable spouse for a younger son, she was not considered a worthy wife for the emperor of Byzantium, and also because Manuel wanted a richer dowry. If we can trust a passage by Kinnamos, this dowry might have eventually included the rights to parts of Italy. According to the chronicler, when Manuel and Conrad met in Thessalonica in 1148, the former reminded the latter that Bertha had been given Italia as a marriage-gift. Not long after this embassy, in early 1146, Manuel did

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\(^5\) Kinnamos, bk 2, ch. 3, pp. 33-35; Magdalino, The Empire..., p. 42; Harris, Byzantium and the Crusades, pp. 101-02; Tolstoy-Miloslavsky, ‘Manuel I Komnenos and Italy...’, p. 69; Angold, The Byzantine Empire..., pp. 192-93; Lamma, Comneni e Stauffer..., i, 47-49.
indeed marry Bertha. However, he did not, at this stage, plan any military intervention in the Mezzogiorno.58

The agreements between the two empires meant that Roger II could not conduct any campaign against the Byzantine Empire. Furthermore, even though he had been crowned king by Innocent II, Roger’s relations with the Papacy remained troublesome until he signed a seven-year truce with Lucius II in September 1144, and they worsened again in the following year after Lucius was succeeded by Eugenius III.59 Thus, Roger chose to concentrate his attention on the Maghreb, sending several naval expeditions to the region. In the end, his men conquered Tripoli and some minor neighbouring centres in the mid-1140s.60

Thus, the period after Roger’s royal investiture by Innocent II was a time of change, both for Venice and the Byzantines. At Venice, the formation of the commune meant that the doge could no longer take the most important decisions unilaterally, but had to rely on the support of the sapientes, who were in most cases members of the Venetian wealthy mercantile families. Yet, Venice nevertheless conducted an active foreign policy, obtaining the submission of Fano, Pula, and Koper, and maintaining its role as a mediator between Byzantium and the Western Empire.

In Byzantium, the death of John II did not result in any dramatic change of foreign policy, as Manuel followed in his father’s footsteps in dealing with Antioch. However, if we can trust Kinnamos, the emperor’s approach towards Southern Italy was more aggressive, as, even though Manuel did not plan any campaign against the Mezzogiorno, he nevertheless claimed his rights over parts of this region.61

Finally, Roger II’s political isolation in the West meant that he could not pursue an


61 Regarding John II’s reputation as an accumulator of wealth, see Niketas Choniates, Historia, ‘Βασιλεία Μανουήλ του Κομνηνου, 1’, pp. 59-60; Annals, p. 35.
aggressive policy towards the Byzantine Empire. Since he could not defeat Manuel, the king tried to obtain his support, and engaged in matrimonial negotiations with the emperor, but these were eventually unsuccessful. However, Roger still managed to obtain some military success in Northern Africa, with the conquest of Tripoli, al-Mahdiyya and other coastal ports.

iv) 1146-49: The Second Crusade and Roger’s Balkan Attack

The calling of the Second Crusade by Pope Eugenius III in late 1145, and Conrad’s participation in this enterprise, gave Roger II the chance to launch a campaign in the Balkans. We shall here analyse Roger’s plan, and why it eventually failed. We shall also try to understand the military importance of Venice in this conflict.

Roger II realised that the Second Crusade could be a new opportunity for him to try to free himself from the international isolation to which he had been confined, and to expand his power in the Mediterranean area. Roger offered his own ships and provisions to transport the army that the French king Louis VII was raising to rescue the Holy Land. However, when the legates of the main leaders of the crusade, of the Byzantine Empire, and of the Kingdom of Sicily met in Étampes in February 1147, Roger’s proposal was not accepted. The main reason for this refusal is that, for the crusaders, accepting Roger’s assistance would have meant obtaining no help from Manuel. However, Louis realised that the support of the Byzantine Empire was essential in order for the expedition to achieve some success. Furthermore, Louis was probably afraid that, due to Roger’s tense relations with both Eugenius III and Raymond of Antioch, a Sicilian intervention in the crusade might have eventually worsened his own highly-valued good relations with the Papacy and with the Antiochenes. Finally, as mentioned by Odo of Deuil, the King of France was obsessed with literally following in the footsteps of the men who had taken part in the First Crusade. Hence, he was probably not willing to sail towards the Levant with the Sicilian navy, as this would have meant not following the original path that had been taken by the holy warriors who had conquered Jerusalem.62

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After the failure of this plan, Roger II realised that he could still take advantage of the Second Crusade for his own personal goals, even without directly taking part in the enterprise. The Byzantine need to dispatch their army to escort the crusaders on their passage across Romania meant that the Western Balkans had to be left relatively unguarded, and this would have made it easier for the Sicilians to try to conquer and plunder parts of this region (in particular, Corfu and the Ionian coast of Greece). In addition, the massive German participation in the crusade also rid Roger of the threat of having his kingdom invaded by Conrad’s army.63 Furthermore, Roger may have perhaps hoped that Conrad’s participation in the Second Crusade would lead to the end of the Byzantine-German alliance due to the deep-rooted Eastern imperial mistrust towards such expeditions. If this was so, his expectations partially came true. The German crusade went on as intended despite some possible attempts made by Manuel to persuade Conrad to change his plans, and when the two armies came into contact in Romania, there were some minor skirmishes (although the fighting was probably not as severe as Kinnamos and Niketas Choniates depict it).64

While the passage of the Second Crusade was undoubtedly the occasion that led Roger to launch an attack on Byzantium, some other factors need to be taken into consideration in order to understand the actual reasons for this expedition. According to Kinnamos, Romuald of Salerno, and to the continuator of Sigebert of Gembloux’s chronicle, Roger had felt humiliated after the failure of his negotiations with Manuel, and thus decided to attack him in revenge.65 However, the failure of these negotiations was probably nothing but the last straw, and Roger’s actual motivations are better described by the Venetian sources. The

Historia ducum Veneticorum mentions Roger’s hatred towards Manuel and the ‘Greeks’, while Andrea Dandolo refers to the King of Sicily as Manuel’s emulus (emulator and/or rival). Indeed, we have previously mentioned that the Byzantines seem to have been worried about the possibility of an attack by Roger for over a decade. Therefore, it seems quite probable that the conquest of some Balkan lands had long been projected, as part of his aggressive Mediterranean policy. Robert Guiscard’s and Bohemond I’s legacy, coupled with a desire to reach a goal that his relatives had failed to achieve, was probably another important factor.

Finally, the suggestion that Roger’s attack was a counteroffensive move to prevent the Byzantines and/or the Germans from attacking his kingdom is not entirely convincing. Indeed, most sources suggest that, by 1147, the Byzantine emperors were not interested in acquiring or restoring any Western land. Both Romuald and the so-called ‘Manganeios Prodromos’ suggest that Manuel’s later aggressive policy towards Southern Italy was conducted as a reprisal following Roger’s raids in 1147-48. Furthermore, while Otto of Freising mentions the existence of a confederatio against Roger, this term probably referred to a defensive alliance, rather than to an offensive one. Thus, the only writer who claimed that Manuel had already set his eyes on Southern Italy before 1147 is Kinnamos, who refers to Italia as the dowry obtained by the basileus. Yet, since Kinnamos’s account was written over thirty years later, and was intended as an encomium of Manuel, it ought to be taken with a pinch of salt. Nor can we exclude that this passage was added to give the emperor a further legal claim over the Italian peninsula.

66 ‘Historia ducum...’, ch. 7, p. 12; Dandolo, Chronica extensa, bk 9, ch. 13, p. 242.
69 Romuald, Annales, p. 239; Kinnamos, bk 2, ch. 19, p. 87; Manganeios Prodromos, ‘Carmen de bello contra Siculos’, ed. by Emmanuel Clément Bénigne Miller, in RHC Historiens grecs, 2 vols (Paris: Imprimerie nationale, 1875-81), II, 280-82; Otto of Freising, Chronica..., bk 7, ch. 38, p. 355; Treadgold, The Middle Byzantine Historians,
It is by no means easy to determine exactly when Roger’s Balkan campaign started, as not all the evidence from the narrative sources is entirely reliable. For instance, a passage in the Annales Cavenses, according to which Roger’s navy captured Neapolis in 1146, might be interpreted as referring to Nauplion, thus suggesting that the Balkan expedition began in this year. However, the annalist clearly miswrote Neapolim instead of Tripolim, and thus referring to the Libyan city of Tripoli, which was indeed conquered in 1146. Another possibility, based on a passage by Kinnamos according to which a newly-built imperial fleet left Constantinople ‘in spring’, is that Roger’s Balkan campaign started in early 1147. However, considering how both Kinnamos and Choniates refer to an extremely high number of new ships built by Manuel, it is difficult to believe that this fleet could be ready in just a few months. Therefore, this passage is most likely to refer to the following year.

Yet, some other sources provide more reliable details on the chronology of this expedition, leading us to be certain that the campaign had begun by the late summer of 1147. The chrysobull that Manuel issued for Venice in October 1147, according to which the Venetians were to protect the empire from its enemies, suggests that a state of open war with Roger II already existed. Furthermore, a Venetian private charter mentions that in September 1147 Domenico Morosini and Andrea Zeno were acting as ducal legates at Manuel’s court. Since these negotiations had started as a consequence of Roger’s raids, the Sicilian attacks must have already begun before September 1147. Furthermore, Odo of Deuil wrote that Roger’s navy had already attacked the Byzantines when the French crusaders were approaching Constantinople, which they reached on 4 October 1147.

In the early stages of the campaign, Roger’s men, led by George of Antioch, conquered Corfu thanks to the treachery of the local population, after a series of raids on different locations. Almost all the chronicles which extensively cover these
attacks mention raids on Corinth, Euboea, and Thebes (from where silk workers—mostly Jews—were taken as captives). According to some sources, Kephalonia, Monemvasia, Methoni, and Athens were also attacked. Manuel himself marched to recover Corfu, but, while he was on his way towards the Western Balkans, he was forced to change his plans, as he was needed to counter the Cumans, who had recently crossed the Danube. Stephen Kontostephanos was left in charge of the siege of Corfu, but was killed by a stone thrown by the Sicilian defenders. The Byzantine counterattack was also hampered by tensions between the imperial army and the Venetians, who had been asked for military help. Yet, following Manuel’s arrival on the battlefield, Corfu was nevertheless recovered in 1149 after a long resistance by the Sicilians. In the meantime, Roger’s men had also been active in other parts of the Byzantine Empire. Indeed, if the accounts by Choniates and by Andrea Dandolo are reliable, and do not misdate a raid led by Maio of Bari around a decade later (and narrated in detail by the Pisan chronicler Bernardo Maragone), some ships from the Mezzogiorno reached the surroundings of Constantinople, and set fire to some of the wharves of Damalis. Even though the Byzantine sources make it difficult to understand the exact succession of the events that took place during this part of the campaign, this raid might have preceded a naval battle fought at Cape Malea near the south-eastern tip of Peloponnese. However, our sources disagree about its outcome, with Kinnamos and the Venetian chronicles referring to a Byzantine victory, and Romuald to a Sicilian success. Considering that, after this battle, some Sicilian ships probably intercepted a Byzantine fleet that was heading for Constantinople from Crete with the imperial tax revenue of the island, and then sailed towards Southern Italy full of booty, it is quite likely that Roger’s men were in fact victorious. 73

These raids and the probable Sicilian victory at Cape Malea are a testament to the strength of Roger’s navy (which in the meantime also conquered some Northern African cities), but also to the weakness of Manuel’s fleet. The numerous raids on the Western Balkan coast found little resistance from the Byzantine navy, which some years earlier had unsuccessfully tried to blockade Antioch. The

explanation provided by Michael the Rhetor that this was due to the Sicilian ships sailing quite far from the shore, which was closely guarded by Manuel’s vessels, is unconvincing. After this fiasco, as can be interpreted from the text of a chrysobull issued for all his bishoprics, Manuel was extremely worried by the success of Roger’s men, and he was thus forced to build a new fleet, and to ask for external support.74

Manuel obtained this support from the Venetians, who intervened against the Sicilians. Yet, there was no unanimous consensus over this decision. It was opposed by the Patriarch of Grado, Enrico Dandolo, whose relations with Doge Polani were already tense. According to Andrea Dandolo, the patriarch excommunicated the doge, and placed an interdict on Venice, due to its participation in the conflict alongside the ‘schismatics’.75 The internal dissension over the military intervention in the Balkans was also extended to the Venetian merchants. We indeed know that Pietro Polani had to order his men who were in Romania to serve in the navy, which meant putting a halt to trade in this region. Venetian reluctance in joining this conflict is further suggested by the fact that they only agreed to take part in this campaign after they obtained a new chrysobull from Manuel in September 1147. The Venetians, whose treaty with Byzantium had not been renewed by Manuel since his imperial coronation, obtained the rights of trading without paying any dues in Cyprus and Crete, two islands which had not been included in the previous chrysobulls.76 Yet, even after this charter was issued, the Venetians still did not set sail to Corfu, possibly because of internal dissension

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over the necessity of such a military intervention. They only joined battle after Manuel issued, probably at their insistence, a new chrysobull for them in March 1148. The Italian commune obtained an agreement that their military involvement would be time-limited, only until the following September, and it also received an extension of its quarter in Constantinople.77

Despite this chrysobull, some tension nevertheless arose between the Venetians and the Byzantines during their joint siege of Corfu. This was probably caused by the limited progress in the military operation, which meant that the Venetians were forced to prolong their cooperation until over the agreed time-limit, and possibly despite the reluctance of most of their men. The decision by the Venetians to continue fighting against Roger may have been taken after some further negotiations with the Byzantines. A letter written by King Conrad’s notary between the end of 1148 and May 1149 recalls the presence of some Byzantine legates in Venice around this time. It is quite likely that this is to be associated with discussions over the military partnership against Roger. Unfortunately, the circumstances that led to the incidents are unclear, especially because neither Kinnamos, who only briefly mentions them, nor Choniates, the only chronicler writing in detail about these events, provides any dating. We cannot even be sure about how serious this incident was, because Choniates, who wrote his chronicle almost sixty years later, after the Venetian-led Fourth Crusade, might over-emphasise its relevance. He nevertheless describes a fierce brawl taking place between the Venetians and the Byzantines outside Corfu. The commanders of both armies tried to pacify their men, but to no avail, so the imperial commander, John Axouch, attacked the Venetians, who fled to their ships, and set sail towards the Aegean. There, they attacked the Byzantine fleet that was lying at anchor in Euboea, setting many of these vessels on fire, and capturing the imperial flagship. The Venetians then adorned this vessel with imperial decorations, and mocked Manuel and his dark complexion by placing a coloured Ethiopian on board of the ship, and by acclaiming him as emperor. The incident ended after Manuel himself decided to grant an amnesty to the Venetians. However, Choniates concludes his account by adding that the basileus did not forgive the Venetians, but merely nursed his rancour until a fitting occasion to take revenge should occur.78

77 *I trattati con Bisanzio...*, no. 5, pp. 70-75; Giorgio Ravegnani, ‘Tra i due imperi: L’affermazione politica nel XII secolo’, in *Storia di Venezia*, II, 33-79 (pp. 38-40).
In addition to the Venetians, the French were also approached for help by both Manuel and Roger. Odo of Deuil is the only source briefly mentioning the failed negotiations between the Byzantines and Louis. Odo of Deuil who informs us that, when the French army was crossing Romania, a faction of Louis’s men, led by the Bishop of Langres, insisted on writing to Roger, and on letting him know that the French would have joined the Sicilian fleet in an attack on Constantinople. Apparently, the Byzantines became aware of this plan, as they grew suspicious towards the French. Eventually, King Louis decided not to follow the advice of the bishop and of his supporters. It is quite likely that this proposal for a French-Sicilian military alliance came from Roger’s men themselves. Indeed, the King of Sicily, whose father was born in Normandy, and to whom Odo of Deuil referred as nostrarum partium oriundus, had maintained good relationships with the French. Although he would intensify his contacts after the end of the Balkan campaign, he was already in correspondence with Abbot Suger of St Denis during the course of the Second Crusade. Suger was one of Louis’s most trusted advisors, and his regent while the king and his wife were leading the crusade. While the letters exchanged by Roger and Suger do not mention any military alliance, we cannot exclude the possibility that the King of Sicily was nevertheless trying to use the abbot as a means to persuade Louis to side with the anti-Byzantine faction of his army.

Despite Roger’s inability to convince the French to travel to the Holy Land on his ships, and to join his men in the conflict against Manuel, the King of France eventually returned from Palestine on a Sicilian vessel. However, he was intercepted by a Byzantine fleet, which had already captured his wife Eleanor. Louis only managed not to be taken as a prisoner himself by raising a banner of an ally of the Eastern Empire. Louis and Eleanor (who had in the meantime been

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79 Odo of Deuil, De profectione..., bk 4, p. 82; Lamma, Comneni e Stauffer..., I, 73-74.

80 Odo of Deuil, De profectione..., bks 3-4, pp. 58, 68-72, 78.

released by the Byzantines) were eventually taken to Southern Italy, where they were treated honourably, and possibly engaged in discussions on a joint expedition against Manuel.\textsuperscript{82}

Roger’s aim was to take advantage of the logistic difficulties that the Second Crusade brought to the Byzantine Empire in order to obtain control over the strategic island of Corfu, and to acquire as much booty as possible following his raids. Initially, the King of Sicily was successful; however, the lack of external support, the reorganisation of the fleet by Emperor Manuel, and the Venetian intervention alongside the \textit{basileus} eventually led to his defeat. The Venetians seem to have joined this expedition quite grudgingly. Some of Venice’s leaders were probably unwilling to worsen the recently-improved relations between their city and the Kingdom of Sicily, and probably only agreed to intervene in the conflict in exchange for considerable commercial concessions. Yet, the Venetians, mindful of the casualties that they had suffered in the four-year-long conflict against Robert Guiscard in the 1080s, only agreed to be involved in this new war for a limited six-month period. However, the strong resistance by the Sicilians meant that the conflict was not over by six months. Even though the Venetians nevertheless continued fighting after this time-limit had expired, this probably caused discontent amongst their army, eventually leading to the Venetian-Byzantine incidents in Corfu and in Euboea.

\textbf{v) 1148-56: The Treaty of Thessalonica, and the Byzantine Attempts to Recover Part of Southern Italy}

The Second Crusade was an utter failure, in particular for Conrad, who struggled to reach Asia Minor, only to be defeated by the Turks at Dorylaion. The lack of success of his expedition led the German king to accept Manuel's proposal to return to the Byzantine Empire, and to spend the 1147-48 winter there. However, to add insult to injury, while in Ephesus, Conrad also fell sick. Manuel heard of this, and, together with his wife, joined him there; the imperial family then convinced Conrad to leave for Constantinople with them. Manuel personally took care of the

king, and the alliance between the two monarchs was renewed with the marriage between a niece of the *basileus*, Theodora, and Conrad’s half-brother Henry of Babenberg. The German king stayed in Constantinople until March 1148, when he boarded a Byzantine ship, on which he reached the Holy Land. He did not stay there for very long, and, after the failure of the siege of Damascus, he boarded another Greek ship, which took him to Thessalonica, near the place where Manuel was wintering. There, before Conrad returned to Germany, the two monarchs agreed on a new anti-Sicilian pact, the ‘Treaty of Thessalonica’. According to Kinnamos, it was at this meeting that Manuel reminded Conrad that *Italia* had to be restored to the *basileus’s* wife as her dowry.83

However, this statement by Kinnamos is quite problematic. Firstly, the term *Italia* may be interpreted in different ways. The likeliest explanation seems to be that Kinnamos was using this term with the same connotation as the eleventh-century sources, as a synonym for *Longobardia*, the part of Apulia south of the Gargano peninsula. However, Kinnamos also refers to Robert of Capua as to an Ἰταλιώτης, thus implying that Capua was also part of Italia. This would mean that, when he mentioned Manuel’s claims, Kinnamos might have used this expression to mean the area that in the late tenth and early eleventh centuries used to form the Katepanate of *Italia* (roughly today’s Apulia, Basilicata, and Calabria), or even the whole of Southern Italy.84

If we are to take what Kinnamos wrote at face value, therefore, this means that Manuel implicitly accepted either the current German claims to suzerainty over part of the *Mezzogiorno*, or a previous German suzerainty over the whole of Southern Italy (depending upon which interpretation we give to the word *Italia*). Furthermore, Manuel’s claim over (part of) Southern Italy clearly differentiates his policy from that of his father. John II had no ambition for territorial conquests in the West (and especially in Italy), and his conflicts in this area were always defensive, and aimed at restoring the *status quo ante*.85

84 Kinnamos, bk 2, ch. 4, p. 37; Falkenhausen, *La dominazione bizantina...*, pp. 32-33, 44, 50-51.
However, many scholars have considered it extremely unlikely that Conrad might agree to concede Byzantine suzerainty over a region that he considered to be formally his own. Yet, as we shall see in more detail below, Conrad might have done something similar with regard to Ancona, which he claimed as part of the Western Empire, even if it was formally part of the patrimony of the Church. Despite this, the Byzantines obtained control over this city, which would soon become Manuel’s base in Adriatic Italy. Therefore, it is not entirely implausible that the German king might have been prepared to cede nominal control over parts of the Mezzogiorno to the Eastern Empire. Alternatively, Conrad might simply have agreed not to oppose, and maybe even to help, a possible later Byzantine conquest of a portion of Southern Italy.\textsuperscript{86} Finally, neither Kinnamos’s words, nor the Eastern imperial rhetoric, suggest that Manuel’s plans for Southern Italy were similar to those that he and his father had for Hungary and Serbia, where the main Byzantine aim was to install vassal monarchs who would formally be subject to the Constantinopolitan throne. Indeed, not only does Kinnamos seem to suggest that Italia would actually be under direct Byzantine control, but, in contrast to Hungary and Serbia, after Michael VII no Eastern emperor had ever actually recognised the legitimacy of any Norman ruler of Southern Italy.

Diplomatic talks between the two empires continued in the following years. In early 1150, Conrad tried to persuade Empress Irene to broker a marriage between his son Henry and a niece of Manuel. However, Henry’s death later in this year prevented the marriage from taking place. Conrad himself might have then tried to marry the Byzantine princess, but his death in 1152 led to the failure of this plan. While these negotiations clearly had the aim of strengthening the bonds between the two empires, it cannot be excluded that Conrad also had a second end. Indeed, he might have had the aim of re-obtaining, as a ‘counterdowry’, nominal control over the lands that he had granted to Manuel when the two rulers had met in Thessalonica.\textsuperscript{87}

After the surrender of Corfu, Roger, who was probably aware of the alliance concluded by Manuel and Conrad against him, tried to prevent the two rulers from undertaking any military activity in Southern Italy. The King of Sicily attempted to

\textsuperscript{86} Tolstoy-Miloslavsky, ‘Manuel I Komnenos and Italy...’, pp. 80-82, 84; Magdalino, The Empire..., p. 53; Lamma, Commneni e Stauffer..., I, 91-92 ; David Abulafia, ‘Ancona, Byzantium and the Adriatic, 1155-1173’, Papers of the British School at Rome, 7 (1984), 195-216 (p. 204).

\textsuperscript{87} Wibald of Corvey, Das Briefbuch, II, no. 216, p. 460, III, no. 387, p. 817; Roche, ‘King Conrad III...’, pp. 215-16; Houben, Roger II..., p. 90.
stir up trouble in Germany by hosting Duke Welf VI (the brother of Conrad’s sister-in-law, who had led a rebellion against the German ruler in the early 1140s), and granting gifts to him while Conrad was on his way back from the crusade. According to Wibald, Roger also gave Welf letters addressed to Frederick of Swabia (Conrad’s nephew and eventual successor as Frederick I) and to some of most prominent German nobles in the hope of persuading them to rebel as well. Welf did eventually start a revolt against Conrad, which was only suppressed in early 1150.\(^8\) Around this year, Roger may have also conducted unsuccessful peace talks with Manuel, if the dating of John Tzetzes’s letter to Manuel’s doctor Basil Megistos (1150) suggested by the editors of the Prosopography of the Byzantine World is correct.\(^\) 

Conrad’s plans for a joint expedition together with Manuel in the Mezzogiorno were also hindered by Pope Eugenius III, who may have been worried that a Byzantine intervention in Italy would also mean the restoration of the Constantinopolitan jurisdiction over the Southern Italian dioceses. Thus, the pope tried to bridge his differences with Roger by asking him, rather than Conrad, for help against the communal movement that was then trying to obtain political control over Rome. This Sicilian intervention was quite significant, leading to the destruction of the city of Rieti, probably in 1149. Furthermore, the pontiff unsuccessfully tried to dissuade the German king from remaining allied to the Byzantines, and to mediate between Roger and Conrad, hoping that the two would arrange a peace.\(^\) 

However, Eugenius’s hostility towards Byzantium was probably only limited to opposing Manuel’s plans to set foot on Italy. Indeed, the pontiff seems not to have supported the Franco-Sicilian plan (if there ever was such a project) of an

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expedition against Manuel, probably because he did not want to face Conrad’s hostility. Rumours of this plot against Byzantium, which was probably originally planned by Peter the Venerable, were heard by Conrad, who passed them on to Manuel’s wife Bertha. However, it is quite doubtful that King Louis of France was really keen on making this project come true. Indeed, while it is a fact that Roger’s relations with the Kingdom of France intensified after the Second Crusade, the French may not all have had such a negative opinion of Byzantium as Odo of Deuil’s account seems to suggest, and were probably unwilling to engage in another extremely expensive campaign just after the failure of the Second Crusade.\(^91\)

Thus, a joint Byzantine-German expedition against the Mezzogiorno immediately after Conrad’s return to Germany from the Second Crusade was unfeasible. However, things changed in 1151, when Roger II enraged Eugenius by crowning his son William as co-king without consulting the Papacy. This meant that Pope Eugenius was now prepared to back Conrad’s plan for an invasion of the Mezzogiorno. Therefore, the German king started planning an Italian campaign, aimed both at being crowned emperor by the pope, and, later, at attacking the Kingdom of Sicily. Conrad obtained the support of the higher ecclesiastical and lay aristocracy in Würzburg in September 1151, and also asked the Pisans for naval assistance. However, his project never materialised, as he died in February 1152 before he could leave Germany.\(^92\) In the end, therefore, Conrad did not actually contribute to the alliance against Roger. indeed, even the German troops that were installed in Corfu after this island was reconquered by the Byzantines in 1149 were probably mercenary forces, rather than troops sent by the emperor-elect.\(^93\)

Manuel’s plans for an invasion of Southern Italy were initially frustrated not only by Conrad’s problems. A storm which sank the ships that were attempting to cross the Adriatic, and, according to Kinnamos, the Venetian opposition to the project, were two key events that prevented a Byzantine counterattack soon after

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\(^{93}\) Niketas Choniates, *Historia*, ‘Βασιλεια Μανουηλ του Κομνηνου, 2’, p. 89; *Annals*, p. 52.
they had re-obtained control over Corfu.\textsuperscript{94} To Venice, Manuel’s plans were as threatening as were those of Roger, especially following the incidents that had occurred during the siege of Corfu. If hostilities with Byzantium had restarted, a Greek conquest of part of the Eastern Italian coast would have had serious consequences for Venice. Holding these new territories would not have been possible without frequent naval communications with the Balkans. The Byzantine fleet would have thus become a major rival of the Venetian ships, and, in case of the beginning of a conflict, this would have prevented the Venetians from sailing into the Ionian and Mediterranean seas. Such a threat may have seemed even more serious, as in 1149 the Byzantines had probably already obtained a form of protectorate over the city-state of Ancona. Formal control over this city might have been ceded to Manuel by the Germans, or, more likely, the Byzantines might have autonomously reached an agreement with the commune of Ancona. Considering the events from c. 1150 until 1180 (when this protectorate ended), the bond between Constantinople and Ancona was probably quite loose. The Byzantines were probably allowed military access into the city in order to use it as a bridgehead for an Italian campaign. Indeed, if we trust Kinnamos, Manuel planned to use Ancona both as the base for an imperial penetration into the Mezzogiorno, and to keep the Venetians in check. On the other hand, the Byzantines were probably expected to provide military help to Ancona whenever this city was under attack. However, the Anconitans were probably free to undertake any measure of internal and external policy as long as it was not hostile towards Byzantium.\textsuperscript{95}

What also prevented Manuel from attacking the Mezzogiorno around 1150 was a series of attacks by the Serbs and the Hungarians. The Byzantine panegyrist Prodromos suggests that their attacks were part of a plan orchestrated by Roger II, while Kinnamos also includes the ‘Germans’ (the Welfs?) in this anti-Byzantine scheme. Their suggestions make sense: Roger probably incited the Welfs against Conrad, and the Serbs and the Hungarians against Manuel, in order to divert the two rulers from their South Italian projects. The participation of the Serbs of Raška in this entente was probably a consequence of their alliance with the Hungarians,

\textsuperscript{94} Kinnamos, bk 3, ch. 6, pp. 101-02; Niketas Choniates, \textit{Historia,  Βασιλεια Μανουηλ του Κομνηνου, 2}, p. 89; \textit{Annals}, p. 52.
after the daughter of the Serbian ruler Uroš I had married the King Béla II of Hungary (1131-41). The Serbs of Raška were indeed the first to attack the Byzantine domains, but Manuel faced them with success, conducting some raids on the Serbian towns, and eventually forcing their king to submit to him.  

This Hungarian hostility towards Byzantium was a consequence of Manuel’s decision to shelter Boris, a son of King Coloman, and claimant to St Stephen’s throne, who had been previously hosted by Conrad. King Géza II reacted by financing Welf’s rebellion against Conrad, and by approaching Louis VII of France and Roger, joining their anti-Byzantine entente. The agreements between Roger and Géza were probably brokered by Gentile, the chancellor of the King of Hungary, who, subsequently, in 1154, became Bishop of Agrigento. The Hungarians attacked the Byzantines in 1150, but were defeated. Yet, this prevented Manuel from launching an attack on Southern Italy soon after the recovery of Corfu. Two minor naval victories (one in 1151 or 1152, and the other one in 1154) are the only concrete results that the Eastern Empire could achieve against the Sicilians. However, since these battles are only mentioned in two contemporary panegyrics (and not by Manuel’s ‘official’ historian, John Kinnamos), they can probably be downgraded to petty skirmishes.  

The timing of these battles may have been linked to Conrad’s contemporary plans to enter Italy, although we have no concrete evidence that a concerted attack was envisaged. Furthermore, Manuel probably did not launch a full-scale attack on Southern Italy because he was unwilling to leave the Balkans unprotected, as he did not entirely trust the Serbs and the Hungarians. In particular, the strong bonds between Dessa, the brother of the Serbian ruler (who would later briefly depose him thanks to the support of Hungary), and the Mezzogiorno might have scared Manuel. In 1151 the Serbian noble, who then ruled over some land in Southern Dalmatia, donated the island of Mljet (near Dubrovnik) to the monastery of Santa Maria di Pulsano, in the Gargano. Of course this is not

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98 CDRCSD, 2, no. 67, pp. 45-46; Michael the Rhetor, ‘Oratio ad Manuelem…’, no. 10, p. 163; Stephenson, Byzantium’s Balkan Frontier..., p. 245.
clear evidence of an entente between Dessa and Roger, but Manuel might have made this connection.

The plans to invade Southern Italy had to remain on hold in the following years too, due to the political situation in other border areas. In the East, Manuel tried to recover Cilicia (which had been taken by the Armenians), and, following the death of Raymond of Antioch, also tried to install a Byzantine regent in this principality. However, this project did not come to fruition since Raymond’s widow chose to marry Raynald of Châtillon, rather than Manuel’s candidate (the kaisar John Dalassenos-Roger). In the West, the emperor had to face the Hungarians in a series of intermittent conflicts which only ended in the spring of 1155. The Hungarians had probably been supported by Roger until his death in 1154, and later by Manuel’s renegade cousin Andronikos.

In addition, Manuel’s plans for a joint expedition together with the Germans had to be rearranged after the death of Conrad III. Indeed, the attitude of his nephew and successor, Frederick I, towards Byzantium was not as favourable as Conrad’s. Evidence of this can be found in a clause of the Treaty of Constance, signed in March 1153 between Barbarossa and Pope Eugenius. Frederick swore to the pontiff not to allow the ‘Greeks’ to obtain control of any land in Italy, and to try to make them flee the peninsula in case they might invade it. Frederick also swore not to sign a truce or a peace treaty with the King of Sicily without the consent and willingness of the Papacy, and promised to subjugate this kingdom to the pope and to the Roman Church. Frederick renewed his oath to the new pope, Adrian IV, in January 1155. However, under Barbarossa the exchange of correspondence between the two empires did resume, as did the talks about a matrimonial alliance (Frederick had recently separated from his first wife on the grounds of consanguinity). In the first of these letters, Frederick announced his intention of attacking ‘Apulia and Sicily’, but he did not appear to be willing to undertake any

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100 Stephenson, Byzantium’s Balkan Frontier…., pp. 229-34; Magdalino, The Empire…, p. 56; Makk, The Árpáds and the Comneni…, pp. 61-62.
plan for a joint expedition in the Mezzogiorno with the Byzantines. However, the
narrative sources recording the negotiations appear to depict a different picture.
Otto of Freising suggests that the negotiations were also aimed at ‘annihilating’ the
King of Sicily, while, according to Kinnamos, Frederick promised to fulfil all the
agreements previously arranged between Conrad and Manuel, which perhaps
included recognition of Manuel’s rights over parts of Southern Italy. 102 The most
plausible interpretation of this evidence is that Barbarossa was probably being
intentionally duplicitous, probably because he needed the temporary support of
both the Papacy and the Byzantines in order to obtain the imperial crown, to isolate
the Kingdom of Sicily diplomatically, and, possibly, to receive military assistance in
the Mezzogiorno. Yet, if Frederick had succeeded in conducting a military
expedition in Southern Italy, it is extremely unlikely that he would have ceded
control of this region to the pope, or any part of it to the Byzantines.

Barbarossa’s later negative reaction when Manuel attacked Apulia in 1155-
56 shows that he did not intend to accept an Eastern imperial presence in the area.
In 1154-55 Frederick conducted his first Italian campaign, during which he had a
chance to attempt the conquest of the Mezzogiorno. According to Otto of Freising,
Barbarossa even tried to get in touch with the Pisans in order to obtain their naval
help against the new King of Sicily, William I. Yet, despite Frederick’s wishes to be
crowned as emperor only after a successful expedition in Southern Italy, the
opposition of his princes forced him to head back to the North. 103 In late July or
early August 1155, after Barbarossa had left Rome for Ancona, he was approached
with gifts by some Byzantine envoys, who hoped that he would change his mind,
and invade Southern Italy. In case of a refusal by Frederick, the men of the
basileus would have begun a campaign without the Germans. Otto of Freising
mentions that, after receiving this legation, Barbarossa did indeed try, once more,
to persuade his men to attack the Mezzogiorno. He did so because there seemed
to be favourable premises for a successful campaign: Prince Robert of Capua, who

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102 Wibald of Corvey, Das Briefbuch, III, nos. 386-87, 411-12, pp. 814-18, 857-59;
Kinnamos, bk 4, ch. 1, pp. 134-35; Otto of Freising and Rahewin, Gesta Friderici…, bk
2, chs 7, 11, pp. 294, 300.
103 Otto of Freising and Rahewin, Gesta Friderici…, bk 2, ch. 29, p. 338; Helmod,
Cronica Slavorum, ed. by Bernhard Schmeidler, MGH SS rer. Germ., 32 (Hanover:
Hahn, 1937), bk 1, ch. 81, p. 154; Graham A. Loud, ‘The German Emperors and
Southern Sicily during the Tenth and Eleventh Centuries’, in “Quei maledetti normanni”:
Studi offerti a Errico Cuozzo per i suoi settant’anni da colleghi, allievi, amici, ed. by
Jean-Marie Martin and Rosanna Alaggio, 2 vols (Ariano Irpino: Centro europeo di studi
normanni, 2016), I, 583-605 (p. 604). However, Otto might be misplacing the
negotiations with Pisa conducted by Conrad in 1151-52.
had joined Barbarossa together with Manuel’s envoys, had easily recovered his former lands. This had happened because Robert’s former subjects had opened their gates to him as they thought that a German invasion was imminent (Robert was at this time acting as an envoy of Frederick). However, according to Otto, even given this seemingly favourable opportunity, Barbarossa was unable to convince his men to proceed southwards. Many of them were sick or wounded, and they wanted to return to Germany as soon as possible. Furthermore, Frederick must also have realised that a summer invasion of the Mezzogiorno with a relatively small army was extremely unlikely to succeed. Eventually, the Kaiser only sent his secretary, Wibald, to Constantinople as an envoy, while Manuel decided to attack Southern Italy on his own, despite the lack of support from Frederick.  

Meanwhile in Southern Italy, Barbarossa’s plan had prevented William I (1154-66) from conducting a policy as aggressive as his father’s – Roger II had slightly extended his African possessions as late as 1153. Indeed, the new king (or, possibly, his extremely powerful admiral, Maio of Bari) strengthened his defences in Apulia by assigning them to his newly-appointed chancellor Asclettin, and to Count Simon 'of Policastro'. In addition, William tried to end the diplomatic isolation that had characterised most of Roger’s reign. He eventually managed to sign a treaty with Venice, either in the final days of 1154 or in early 1155 (as we shall see below in more detail). William also unsuccessfully attempted to arrange for peace with Adrian IV, but initially the pontiff was not interested. However, the pope attempted an approach shortly later, but this failed as the king sent back the papal envoy once he found out that Adrian’s letters referred to himself as dominus of Sicily (instead of as rex). The pontiff was infuriated, and excommunicated

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William, who then sought revenge by having the papal city of Benevento besieged. Adrian reacted by recruiting the Southern Italian émigrés Robert of Capua and Andrew of Rupecanina to fight back against the Sicilians. The pope was also approached by the Byzantines. He apparently received a letter from Michael Palaiologos, who was acting as Manuel's agent in Ancona. Palaiologos offered his help in the form of a large distribution of gold, and of a Byzantine expedition that would annihilate William, and grant his lands to the Papacy. In return, Manuel's agent asked for three coastal cities in Apulia (two of them probably being Bari and Brindisi) to be handed over to the Eastern Empire. However, Adrian did not accept this offer, as he was unwilling to see parts of Southern Italy outside the jurisdiction of the Roman Church. Hence, there was an exchange of embassies concerning the reunification of the Churches, but the negotiations eventually failed due to the emperor's refusal to recognise the primacy of the Roman See, and to his insistence on the supremacy of the Constantinopolitan one. The Byzantine-Papal talks nevertheless alarmed William, who tried to submit to the Church, and to be forgiven by Adrian. However, these initial diplomatic efforts by the king were not successful (the Treaty of Benevento was only signed in June 1156).\footnote{Romuald, \emph{Annales}, pp. 237-39; \emph{Le Liber Pontificalis}, II, 389-90, 393-94; William of Tyre, \emph{Chronicon}, II, bk 18, ch. 2, pp. 810-11; ‘Annales Ceccanenses’, a. 1155, p. 284; Kinnamos, bk 4, ch. 5, pp. 146-47; George Tornikès, ‘Lettres et discours’, ed. and trans. by Jean Darrouzès, in George and Demetrios Tornikès, \emph{Lettres et discours} (Paris: Centre National De La Recherche Scientifique, 1970), no. 30, pp. 324-35; Otto of Freising and Rahewin, \emph{Gesta Friderici...}, bk 4, ch. 34, p. 586; Godfrey of Viterbo, \emph{Gesta Friderici et Heinrici imperatorum}, ed. by Georg Heinrich Pertz, MGH SS rer. Germ., 30 (Hanover: Hahn, 1870), chs 10-11, pp. 10-11, ll. 268-284; William I, \emph{Diplomata}, no. 12, pp. 32-36; Tolstoy-Milloslavsky, ‘Manuel I Komnenos and Italy...’, pp. 109-10; Anne J. Duggan, ‘\emph{Totius christianitatis caput}: The Pope and the Princes’, in \emph{Adrian IV the English Pope (1154-1159): Studies and Texts}, ed. by Brenda Bolton and Anne J. Duggan (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2003), pp. 105-55 (pp. 107, 118-20, 122); Magdalino, \emph{The Empire...}, pp. 59-60; Angold, \emph{The Byzantine Empire...}, pp. 203, 211; Lamma, \emph{Comneni e Stauffer...}, I, 158-60. Rowe, ‘Hadrian IV...’, pp. 11-14 suggested that the correspondence between Manuel and Adrian took place later, in 1157-58.}

At the same time, William also started negotiations with Manuel I, but these fared no better than the ones with Adrian. Even though the King of Sicily proposed to restore to the Byzantines all the goods and properties that Roger had taken during his raids in 1147-49, the \emph{basileus} refused this offer, probably because he wanted to take advantage of the difficulties of the new King of Sicily. Indeed, the Byzantine navy engaged, successfully, in naval warfare with the Sicilians during 1154.\footnote{Kinnamos, bk 3, ch. 12, pp. 118-19; Stephenson, \emph{Byzantium’s Balkan Frontier...}, p. 228; Magdalino, \emph{The Empire...}, p. 57; Lamma, \emph{Comneni e Stauffer...}, I, 151.}
In the following year, Manuel could finally put his plans to invade Southern Italy into practice. Before he launched his invasion against William, the basileus tried to obtain naval support from the two maritime powers of Venice and Genoa. Palaiologos was put in charge of the negotiations with both cities; he first went to Venice, probably in late 1154 (or in early 1155). Even though no source mentions that he negotiated an alliance with the commune, this was probably Palaiologos’s main aim. However, for several reasons, he was unsuccessful, and only ended up recruiting a mercenary army. This decision at first sight might seem quite strange, considering the involvement of the commune in the anti-Sicilian entente. Indeed, a charter issued in October 1151 mentions that the Venetians ships were still being harassed by the Sicilian navy, while in the second half of December 1154 Barbarossa had granted to Venice a confirmation of the privileges that most of his predecessors had issued for the Adriatic city.\textsuperscript{110} However, Venice had sided with the Byzantines in the previous conflicts with the rulers of the Mezzogiorno mainly out of fear that the same political power would control both shores of the Southern Adriatic. Now the Venetians were afraid that a similar situation could take place if the Byzantines were to conquer Adriatic Southern Italy. A Byzantine expansion in the Adriatic area was especially dreaded as the Venetians had shown renewed interest in this area in the late 1140s and the early 1150s. Venice had once more obtained control of Poreč, Pula, and Umag (the first two cities had briefly rebelled), and had managed to strengthened its positions in Dalmatia despite the loss of some cities to Hungary. A sign of this increased Venetian control over Dalmatia was that the see of Zadar was incorporated into the metropolitan province of Grado in 1155. Furthermore, the agreement that Venice signed with Ancona in 1152 outlined a Venetian determination to try to extend its commercial influence over the Western mid-Adriatic. According to the terms of this agreement, the Anconitans were allowed to trade in Venice and in all the places under Venetian control, in exchange for a promise of providing military help. The signing of this treaty meant that the rivalry between the two cities, which had been particularly strong in 1141 (when Venice had helped Fano against Ancona), had been temporarily put aside. The signing of this agreement was rather unproblematic in 1152, when Manuel had temporarily put aside his project of attacking Southern Italy. However, it is extremely likely that the different political scenario of 1155, when Ancona was used by the Byzantine armies as a base for their campaign in the Mezzogiorno, and

\textsuperscript{110} NDCV, no. 11, p. 14; Frederick I, Diplomata, I, no. 94, pp. 156-60.
Venice had signed an alliance with William I of Sicily, meant that this agreement only lasted a few years before its military terms were no longer acceptable.\footnote{CDI, I, no. 143, p. 280; ‘Pact with Ancona’, ed. by Giovanni Monticolo, in Le vite dei dogi, p. 235 fn. 2; Dandolo, Chronica extensa, bk 9, chs 14-15, pp. 244-46; CDRCSD, 2, nos. 74-76, pp. 51-55; ‘Historia ducum…’, ch. 12, p. 18; Thomas Archdeacon, Historia Salonitana..., ch. 20, p. 108; Il Patto con Fano..., pp. 54-55; Giunta, ‘Il Regno...’, pp. 12-13; Abulafia, ‘Ancona...’, pp. 198, 204 fn. 48; Silvano Borsari, ‘Le relazioni tra Venezia e le Marche nei secoli XII e XIII’, in Le Marche nei secoli XII e XIII, problemi e ricerche: Atti del VI convegno del centro di studi storici maceratesi (Macerata: Centro di studi storici maceratesi, 1972), pp. 21-26 (p. 23); Ravegnani, ‘Tra i due imperi...’, p. 43; Steindorff, Die dalmatinischen Städte..., pp. 75-77; Eugenio Dupré Thesedier, ‘Venezia e l’Impero d’Occidente durante il periodo delle crociate’, in Venezia dalla Prima Crociata..., pp. 23-47 (pp. 35-36); Rösch, Venezia e l’Impero..., p. 194; Makk, The Árpáds and the Comneni..., pp. 57-58; Dorin, ‘Adriatic Trade Networks...’, p. 245. Stephenson, Byzantium’s Balkan Frontier..., pp. 228-29; Steindorff, Die dalmatinischen Städte..., p. 79 suggest that Venice also had to face the defection of Zadar in 1155-56, but this rebellion probably took place later in the 1150s. See CDRCSD, 2, no. 90, pp. 66-67; ‘Historia ducum...’, ch. 12, p. 18; Sanudo, Le vite dei dogi, p. 271.}

Yet, Venice did not merely choose to remain neutral during the conflict, as the Adriatic commune signed an agreement that can be clearly interpreted as a radical political volte-face. We have seen how, except for the time of the brief war in the 1120s, the Venetians had been one of the main allies of Byzantium since the beginning of the reign of Alexios I, and had opposed any Southern Italian attempt to invade Southern Italy. Yet, in the mid-1150s, they clearly showed their opposition to the aggressive foreign policy of the Eastern Empire by signing a treaty with William I, the ruler against whom Manuel I was organising a military campaign. This agreement did not lead to the beginning of hostilities between Venice and Byzantium, but it can nevertheless be considered as a milestone in later relations between these two political entities.

The exact dating of the Venetian-Sicilian treaty is disputed, as the original charter has not survived.\footnote{William I, Diplomata, ‘Deperdita’, no. 4, p. 103; Marin, ‘Venice, Byzantium...’, p. 203. Some scholars prefer an 1155 dating: Geo Pistorino, ‘I Normanni e le repubbliche marinare italiane’, in Atti del congresso internazionale di studi sulla Sicilia normanna (Palermo 4-8 dicembre 1972) (Palermo: Istituto di storia medievale, Università di Palermo, 1973), pp. 241-62 (p. 251); Lamma, Comneni e Stauffer..., I, 156-57. Others suggest that it was issued in 1154: Ortalli, ‘Il Mezzogiorno normanno-svevo visto da Venezia’, p. 66; Ravegnani, ‘Tra i due imperi...’, p. 43; Nicol, Byzantium and Venice..., p. 93; Rösch, Venezia e l’Impero..., p. 61; Abulafia, The Two Italies..., pp. 87-89.} However, the narrative sources from Venice suggest that this agreement was reached before the beginning of Manuel’s campaign in Southern Italy. While the earliest of these texts, the Historia ducum Veneticorum, provides extremely vague information, later works provide more details. Andrea Dandolo and Marino Sanudo wrote that the agreement was issued after Frederick’s
charter to Venice (therefore, after 22 December 1154), but during Domenico Morosini’s dogeship. In addition, Morosini’s epitaph, included in the chronicles of both pseudo-Pietro Giustinian (written in the fourteenth century) and Sanudo, recalls that the doge had reached an agreement with the Sicilians, who, according to the former text, were then ruled by William. Pseudo-Giustinian also mentions that Morosini reached this agreement in the text of his chronicle, and adds that this pact was later renewed with some additions by his successor Vitale II Michiel. All this evidence seems therefore to suggest that the original treaty was signed by Morosini between 22 December 1154 and his death, and that it was renewed (possibly with some changes) by Michiel. However, the date of Morosini’s death is problematic. Dandolo dated it to February 1156, but we should note that the doge-chronicler post-dated the beginning of the dogeship of Vitale II Michiel. Documentary evidence shows that Michiel was already doge in July 1155, and this, combined with Dandolo’s information according to which Morosini died in February, suggests that the death took place in February 1155. This dating is also suggested by both epitaphs, which, however, misdate the indiction (February 1155 was in the third indiction, not in the fourth one). Hence, we may deduce that the treaty between Venice and William was concluded either in the final days of 1154, or in early 1155.

The negotiations between Venice and William are also mentioned by Pseudo-Hugo Falcandus, according to whom Robert of San Giovanni was sent as an ambassador to Venice while Peter of Castronuovo was capitaneus in Apulia. Falcandus characteristically does not provide any dating for this embassy, although we know that Robert was in Sicily at some point in 1156, before September, when he witnessed a donation. Jamison suggested that this embassy might have taken place between April 1156 and autumn 1157. However, her suggestion is not particularly convincing, as it is based on three rather fragile hypotheses: that the title of capitaneus mentioned by Falcandus was actually that of magister capitaneus, that a charter issued in late 1157 or early 1158 might refer to Peter of Castronuovo as such, and that Peter must have obtained this title after the imprisonment of

113 ‘Historia ducum...’, chs 10-11, pp. 16-18; Dandolo, Chronica extensa, bk 9, chs 13-14, pp. 245-46; Sanudo, Le vite dei dogi, pp. 235-38; Pseudo-Pietro Giustinian, Venetiarum historia..., chs 32-33, pp. 112-14; ‘Una donazione di Naimerio Polani alla dogaressa Michiel (1155)’, ed. by Vittorio Lazzarini, Archivio veneto, s. 5, 1 (1927), 181-85; ASVe, S. Zaccaria, Pergamene, b. 31., no. 13; Madden, Enrico Dandolo..., p. 43. For the dating of the chronicle of pseudo-Giustinian, see Şerban V. Marin, ‘St Daniel’s Prophecies and the Greeks as Grifoni: According to the Venetian Chronicles’, Bizantinistica: Rivista di studi bizantini e slavi, s. 2, 17 (2016), 177-222 (p. 177).
Chancellor Asclettin. Even if we accept Jamison’s argument, this does not clash with the evidence from the Venetian sources. Falcandus could indeed be referring to the second round of negotiations, which took place between William I and Doge Vitale II Michiel after Manuel’s men had been expelled from Southern Italy, and which can also be interpreted as a reaction to the signing of an agreement between Genoa and Byzantium (see below).

Therefore, the Venetian sources seem to provide the likeliest dating of the treaty between Venice and William I, which had probably already been finalised by the time Palaiologos had reached Venice. This was, then, a further reason for the Venetian refusal to assist Manuel’s men in their expedition, as the agreement might well have included a neutrality clause in case of a conflict between William and the Byzantines. This dating also suggests that the Venetians did not think that the plans of either Barbarossa or Manuel to invade Southern Italy would be successful, and possibly that they were not even expecting Frederick to invade the Mezzogiorno (otherwise they risked the Western emperor punishing them for their duplicity on his way back to Germany).

After failing to gain Venice’s support, Manuel’s men still tried to obtain some naval help from Genoa, offering in exchange some advantageous trade concessions. The ensuing agreement, which was concluded in October 1155 by Demetrios Makrembolites, was probably reached because the Byzantines wanted to obtain naval support, to block William’s Mediterranean supply line, and to diminish the Genoese commercial role in the Principality of Antioch. Yet, it is also clear that Manuel also wanted to punish Venice for its refusal to be involved in the conflict in Southern Italy. Indeed, the pact made Genoa a new commercial rival to the Venetians in Constantinople and in the rest of the empire, for the Ligurian city obtained a reduction of the kommerkion to four percent, instead of the usual ten percent (the same amount paid by the Pisans). In addition, the Byzantine agent slyly swore that the Genoese would obtain from Manuel a quarter in Constantinople near the Venetian and Pisan ones as long as also Palaiologos and Doukas (the Byzantine commanders) were willing to promise this. In exchange, the Genoese

swore not to ally with any power that was hostile towards Byzantium, and that their merchants residing in Romania would defend the Eastern Empire in case of an enemy attack. In addition to the advantageous conditions offered by the emperor’s legates, the Genoese decision to side with Manuel was also a consequence of Barbarossa’s plans of controlling Italy, and, even more importantly, of a shift in the commercial politics of the city (with a new emphasis on foreign trade) undertaken by the pro-Byzantine consuls in office in 1154. Furthermore, the entente was facilitated by the good relations, dating back from the 1130s, between Genoa and Prince Robert of Capua, who was trying to recover his lands, and by the long-lasting bad relations between Genoa and the Sicilian monarchs. Yet, despite this agreement, the Genoese were still much involved in commerce with Southern Italy, and continued trading there after the signing of the alliance with Byzantium, although they had never signed any formal treaty with the Kingdom of Sicily.

Therefore, we cannot exclude the possibility that signing a treaty with the Eastern Empire was a sly move by Genoa to force William to grant it commercial advantages in the Kingdom of Sicily.

As we have previously seen, Frederick I was unable to continue his Italian campaign, and, instead, returned to Germany. Despite this, the negotiations


between Manuel and Barbarossa had not stopped, with Wibald being sent to Constantinople. However, relations between the Germans and the Byzantines soon worsened. Otto of Freising mentions that, upon Wibald’s return, Frederick refused to receive Manuel’s envoys, allegedly because they had stolen some of his letters, which had his own seal. The envoys had then forged these letters, which seemed to prove that Barbarossa had granted the whole coastline to the Byzantines, so that the Eastern Empire would obtain nominal control of cities in Campania and in Apulia.\textsuperscript{118} Even though this is not entirely clear from Otto’s account, it seems quite likely that the German emperor was more upset about the Byzantine claim to obtain land that he felt that was nominally his own, rather than about the trickery itself. Frederick’s concern regarding a Byzantine penetration into Southern Italy is further evidenced by his plan to undertake an expedition there in order to drive Manuel’s men out of the \textit{Mezzogiorno} as soon as he heard of their ephemeral conquests.\textsuperscript{119} These elements seem to provide some evidence for the theory, mentioned above, that Frederick was only concerned to maintain his alliance with Manuel insofar as it served his own interests and ambition, and that he would have been unwilling to divide Southern Italy with the Byzantines after a hypothetical victorious joint campaign.

However, a second interpretation regarding Barbarossa’s non-involvement in this campaign has recently been suggested. It has been argued that it was Frederick’s return to Germany which led to an eventual Byzantine intervention in Southern Italy. Tolstoy-Miloslavsky suggests that Manuel did not want to divide this region with the Western Empire, especially since this would have meant replacing the Hautevilles with an even more powerful neighbour, and that, for this same reason, any nominal Byzantine support towards the previous German interventions in Southern Italy was not at all wholehearted.\textsuperscript{120} Thus, rather than being a complicating factor for the Byzantines, the lack of support from the Western Empire might well have been the decisive element that led Manuel to launch his campaign.

Despite the lack of support from either Venice or Barbarossa, Manuel could rely on some help from within the \textit{Mezzogiorno} itself, where two rebellions had broken out. One had taken place in south-eastern Sicily, while the other one had been started by Robert of Bassonville, a cousin of William I. Robert had been a favourite of Roger II, who, following the death of his two elder sons, had apparently

\textsuperscript{118} Otto of Freising and Rahewin, \textit{Gesta Friderici…}, bk 2, ch. 51, p. 382.
\textsuperscript{119} Otto of Freising and Rahewin, \textit{Gesta Friderici…}, bk 2, ch. 52, pp. 384-86.
\textsuperscript{120} Tolstoy-Miloslavsky, ‘Manuel I Komnenos and Italy…’, pp. 102-09.
made him second-in-line (after William) to the succession of the kingdom. Robert had also been granted the important County of Loritello by William, who had probably followed Roger’s recommendation to do so. However, in the months following this, relations between William and Robert had soon worsened. The new king had decided to deprive Robert of much of his power by entrusting the government of the kingdom to Maio of Bari (recently appointed as ‘admiral of admirals’), and then by dismissing the count from the command of the men that he had raised from his _feudum_. This had probably been a reaction to Robert’s refusal to besiege Benevento (a papal enclave), as the king had ordered him to do. Thus, Bassonville decided to rebel with the support of other disgruntled Apulian nobles, and to try (albeit unsuccessfully) to obtain Barbarossa’s backing. In addition to these rebellions, and to the Byzantine and German threats, William also had to face another danger, in the form of the return of two of the main nobles of Southern Italy, Robert of Capua, and Andrew of Rupecanina (the nephew of Rainulf of Caiazzo, who had become Duke of Apulia during Lothar’s invasion in 1133). These two men managed to obtain the support of the Papacy since Adrian IV preferred not to have a strong Kingdom of Sicily as his neighbour. Finally, the situation was even more critical as all these events took place simultaneously, and at a time when King William was stricken by a serious illness, which led to rumours of his death spreading throughout the kingdom.121

Despite their failure to obtain any external support, the Byzantines tried to take advantage of their centuries-long ties with Southern Italy to attempt to undertake a successful campaign in the _Mezzogiorno_. More specifically, Manuel was aware of the rebellion of Robert of Bassonville. Robert was met by a Byzantine

envoy, Alexander, the former Count of Conversano, who had unsuccessfully approached Barbarossa, and now offered Manuel’s support for this rebellion. Then, in Vieste, Robert finalised this agreement with Palaiologos: according to the Chronicle of Carpineto, the count agreed that coastal Apulia would be handed over to the Byzantines. The conflict was initially successful for Manuel’s men, who quickly conquered most of the coastal towns of Northern Apulia: Vieste, San Flaviano (modern Giulianova), Bari, Andria, and Trani (although this last was soon recovered by the Sicilians). The Byzantines then took advantage of the reinforcements sent by Manuel and led by John Angelos to penetrate into the interior, and capture Montepeloso and Gravina. Even if their achievements were soon afterwards marred by some minor misunderstandings with Robert of Bassonville, and by Palaiologos’s illness and death, John Doukas, who had now become the commander of the invading army, still managed to penetrate into Southern Apulia, and to conquer Mottola, Massafra, Monopoli (after quite a long siege), and Ostuni. Then, in April 1156, he besieged and captured Brindisi (apart for its citadel). While they also achieved a naval victory over the Sicilians, the Byzantines continued to focus their resources on their land army. Further reinforcements arrived, led by Anna Komnene’s son Alexios Komnenos Bryennios. Yet, William, who had in the meantime recovered from his illness, and suppressed the Sicilian revolt, could now face the Byzantines with a strong army. Despite their numerical inferiority, and Robert of Bassonville’s late arrival in Brindisi (which may have been deliberate), the Eastern imperial commanders, Alexios Komnenos Bryennios and John Doukas, unwisely decided to join battle with the Sicilians in late May 1156. They were routed and captured. William quickly recovered all his cities that the Byzantines had briefly held. Thus, with the exception of the imperial protectorate over Ancona, Manuel did not manage to retain any possession in Italy.122

122 The sources providing most information on this campaign are Kinnamos, bk 4, chs 2-13, pp. 136-69; Romuald, Annales, pp. 239-40; Alexander of Carpineto, Chronicorum…, bk 5, p. 79. Manuel’s Italian expedition is also briefly mentioned, amongst the other sources, by Niketas Choniates, Historia, ‘Βασιλεία Μανουήλ ου Κομνηνου, 2’, pp. 94-95; Annals, p. 55; Falcondus, pp. 70, 82-84; William of Tyre, Chronicon, II, bk 18, chs 7-8, pp. 818-19, 821; Otto of Freising and Rahewin, Gesta Friderici…, bk 2, ch. 51, pp. 382-84; ‘Annales Ceccanenses’, a. 1156, p. 284; Maragone, Annales Pisani, a. 1156, pp. 15-16; ‘Annales Palidenses’, a. 1156, p. 89; Le Liber Pontificalis, II, 394-95; Robert of Torigny, Chronicle, a. 1156, p. 188. A charter issued by Williams I in August 1156 mentions the devastation of Brindisi after his own victory over the rebels and the ‘Greeks’; see William I, Diplomata, no. 15, p. 43. Further evidence of the recovery of Troia by the forces loyal to the king can be seen in the dating after William’s royal year of a charter issued there in March 1156; see Les
Therefore, Manuel’s military invasion of Southern Italy, despite some initial ephemeral successes, ended up as an utter failure. The sources describing this campaign advance some explanations as to why the expedition was unsuccessful. Niketas Choniates merely suggested that bad ‘Fortune’ was the actual cause of the imperial defeat. Kinnamos, who is the most detailed source for this campaign, blamed the imperial generals for deciding to fight a pitched battle even though they were outnumbered. Pseudo-Falcandus, however, suggested that the Byzantine invaders had no other choice but to engage in this battle. This seems to suggest that Manuel’s men were defeated mainly due to a lack of manpower. Moreover, Kinnamos probably only blamed the commanders of the imperial army because his role as Manuel’s ‘official historian’ prevented him from criticising the basileus himself for not sending enough men to Italy.

In addition, the Byzantines were unsuccessful because the rebel front lacked cohesion and common motivation, and thus failed to unite under a strong leadership. More specifically, the key potential local ally, Robert of Bassonville, failed to unite his forces with theirs at Brindisi, and instead went to Benevento to support Pope Adrian, and failed to reach his Greek allies in Brindisi. Furthermore, Manuel’s troops probably obtained little backing from the local Italo-Greek population. Yet, the main issue that the Byzantines had to face was arguably their lack of external support, and in particular of naval help. Not only were the Venetians not involved in the conflict, but the alliance with the Genoese was not particularly fruitful. None of the sources mentions any involvement of Genoa in this conflict, or any attempt by its ships to prevent William from landing on mainland Italy. Genoa’s reluctance to be involved in this conflict might be a consequence of it not obtaining the quarter in Constantinople which it had been promised – we know that three Genoese brothers, the Della Cortes, went to the Bosporus as envoys in 1156, probably in order to press Manuel to hand this quarter over to their city. In addition, William I might have dissuaded the Genoese from intervening in the

\[\text{\footnotesize \textit{Chartes de Troia: Édition et étude critique des plus anciens documents conservés à l'Archivio Capitolare}, ed. by Jean-Marie Martin, CDP, 21 (Bari: Società di storia patria per la Puglia, 1976), no. 73, p. 235. In the eleventh century, the Byzantines had maintained strong ties with Amalfi; see Krijnie N. Ciggaar, ‘Families and Factions: Byzantine Influence in Some Italian Cities’, \textit{Byzantinoslavica}, 54 (1993), 13-20 (pp. 15-18).} \]
\[\text{\footnotesize 123 Niketas Choniates, \textit{Historia}, ‘Βασιλεία Μανουήλ του Κομνήνου, 2’, pp. 94-95; \textit{Annals}, p. 55; Kinnamos, bk 4, ch. 13, pp. 168-69; Falcandus, p. 82.} \]
conflict by promising to grant some commercial concessions himself in exchange for their neutrality, as he eventually did in November 1156. The Genoese part of the agreement (which was extremely generous towards the Ligurian city) included a clause according to which the citizens of Genoa were not allowed to fight against the Sicilians alongside the Byzantines. Barbarossa also failed to provide any military help, and once he received the news of the initial Byzantine success in the Mezzogiorno he showed hostility towards it. Indeed, he started to plan a new expedition to expel them from Italy.

This analysis assumes that Manuel either wanted to obtain some permanent conquests in Southern Italy, or to make it a client state. However, there is also the possibility, suggested by Tolstoy-Miloslavsky, that Manuel was only interested in a retaliatory attack against the Kingdom of Sicily after Roger’s raids in the late 1140s. While the Byzantine lack of manpower and siege engines during the campaign might make this theory superficially attractive, there are many elements that remain unconvincing. Tolstoy-Miloslavsky’s substantial degree of scepticism towards the chronicles that analyse Manuel’s motives is probably exaggerated, and other aspects also need to be taken into consideration. To begin with, why would the Byzantine commanders engage in a pitched battle in Brindisi when they were outnumbered, if the aim of their campaign was simply to retaliate after Roger’s raids? We must remember that, according to Kinnamos, the Greek army leaders chose to engage in combat with William despite their numerical inferiority. There are three possible answers to this question. Kinnamos’s account might not be accurate, or the Byzantine commanders might have been trapped by the Sicilians, and have had no choice but to fight against their enemies – as was suggested by Falcandus. However, even if most of the Byzantine fleet had probably returned to the Balkans to seek reinforcements, Brindisi had not been blockaded by William’s ships, and Manuel’s men probably still had an available maritime escape route. Alternatively, they might have disobeyed Manuel’s orders – thus making the emperor ‘angry’, and not only because of the defeat of his men. This second hypothesis should not be completely discredited, especially considering the high lineage of one of the commanders, Alexios Komnenos Bryennios. He was Anna

126 Otto of Freising and Rahewin, Gesta Friderici..., bk 2, ch. 52, p. 384.
127 Tolstoy-Miloslavsky, ‘Manuel I Komnenos and Italy...’, pp. 111-23.
Komnene’s son, and thus, if we trust Niketas Choniates’s account of his mother’s attempted coup in 1118, he might have overtried to achieve a glorious victory in order to earn some popularity amongst the army, which he could have later exploited in case of a dynastic crisis. Thus, Alexios might have insisted on fighting against William’s army even though he was outnumbered. Finally, the easiest explanation is that the Byzantine commanders might have decided to engage in a battle even though they were outnumbered due to their overconfidence in the arrival of the reinforcements promised by Robert of Bassonville – as was suggested by Kinnamos. None of these factors nevertheless explain Manuel’s decision to send reinforcements to John Doukas if his aim was just that of conducting raids.

We also need to take into consideration a charter, which incidentally Tolstoy-Miloslavsky misdates, issued in Siponto in October 1155, and dated according to the regnal year of the Byzantine emperor. This indicates that Siponto was then under Eastern imperial control, and that the Byzantine domination over this town was considered not to be temporary. For all these various reasons, Tolstoy-Miloslavsky’s hypothesis that the Byzantine campaign in Southern Italy was only aimed at raiding the Mezzogiorno, and that it is thus not to be regarded as unsuccessful, is quite far-fetched.

130 Regesto di S. Leonardo di Siponto, ed. by Fortunato Camobreco, Regesta chartarum Italae, 10 (Rome: Loescher, 1913), no. 41, p. 26; Tolstoy-Miloslavsky, ‘Manuel I Komnenos and Italy...’, pp. 114-15. The indication number clearly indicates that this dates from 1155, and not 1156. However, there are two objections against this view. The first one (rather weak) is that, after 1071, previous Apulian charters had used the reign of a Byzantine emperor as a dating element. In Siponto and its surrounding region, the latest such document had been issued in 1127 (though this charter is only dated with the indication that John II was the emperor, but since the charters issued in this area in the early 1140s are dated after Roger I’s regnal year, it is extremely unlikely that the correct dating is 1142), almost thirty years before this charter mentioning Manuel’s reign. Furthermore, the same notary who wrote this document had dated a charter from May 1155 according to William I’s regnal year. This indeed suggests a perceived change of rule. See Regesto di S. Leonardo..., nos. 2-3, 15-16, 18-19, 38, pp. 4-5, 11-13, 24-25. The other issue is that, according to this charter, in October 1155 Manuel was in his first regnal year, which of course he was not. Therefore, this might cast some doubts over the authenticity of the document. However, the notary was probably referring to Manuel’s first year of rule over Southern Italy.
vi) Conclusions

The years between the death of Alexios I in 1118, and the Byzantine defeat in Brindisi in 1156 are characterised by an independent and quite opportunist Venetian attitude towards the Eastern Empire. Venice was still willing to help Byzantium when Roger II was threatening to invade the Balkans, but refused to be involved in Manuel's attempt to restore Byzantine control over part of Southern Italy. The Adriatic city had even attacked some imperial possessions when John II had refused to renew their commercial privileges. Thus, it is quite clear that, for the years 1118-56, we cannot assume that there was a long-standing alliance between these two powers, as the Venetians were only willing to help the Byzantines in exchange for the granting of new trade concessions, or if their assistance was also advantageous to their own geo-political strategy. This is why, after being granted two privileges from Manuel I, Venice provided its fleet to the emperor when Roger had conquered Corfu, but refused to do so during the Byzantine expedition into Italy in 1155-56: if Manuel had managed to control Apulia, the Venetians would have faced the same risk of having their ships bottlenecked in the Adriatic as they would have done if Roger II had controlled both shores of the narrow Strait of Otranto. Therefore, Venice signed an agreement with William I, and remained neutral during the Byzantine invasion of Southern Italy. The lack of Venetian assistance forced the Eastern Empire, which still needed naval help for its campaign, to ask for Genoa's support. The Byzantines managed to reach an agreement with the Ligurian city by granting to it extensive commercial privileges, but in the event the Genoese failed to provide them with any meaningful military assistance during this conflict. Furthermore, this decision upset the Venetians, since it created a new commercial rival to them at Constantinople. This would lead to a deterioration of the relations between Venice and the Byzantine Empire.
2) Trade

The mid-twelfth century is characterised by a considerable increase in the commercial documentation of Venice. Was this due merely to the survival of more charters, or does this in fact suggest that there was an increase in the scale of trade? In addition, we shall try to see whether the worsened relations with Byzantium led the Venetians to prefer to trade in other areas, such as the Adriatic coast.

i) Trade within the Adriatic and Ionian Areas

There is only little evidence regarding the involvement of Venetian merchants in Southern Italy, but an analysis of the surviving data can nevertheless be made. Some Venetians traded with fellow countrymen in the Mezzogiorno, as was the case with three of them who were engaged in commerce in Bari in 1134. Some families were particularly active in trade there, and amongst them we can mention the da Molins, who had already been involved with commerce in the Ionian area for several decades. In 1119, Viviano da Molin, was amongst the people who, while in Bari, rented an anchor so that they could sail to Damietta and to Constantinople. Viviano, who had already conducted business between Sicily and Constantinople as a socius stans in 1118, was still active in the early 1130s, when he was involved in trade at Acre in the Holy Land. In addition, two other members of this family (Bonifacio and Bonfiglio) are recorded as being active in commerce with Sicily in 1127, and another in commerce with Arta, in Epirus, in 1131. Yet, Bonifacio’s activity does not seem to have been particularly successful, as a document issued in 1139 records his insolvency after he had been given a loan of twenty pounds of denarii by Pietro Morosini to trade in Alexandria in 1134. Despite this financial setback, the da Molins once again resumed their mercantile activity in the early 1150s. Yet, even though a charter suggests that a

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131 DCV, no. 63, pp. 66-67.
133 DCV, nos. 50, 61, 73, pp. 52, 64-65, 76-77. The one active in Arta was named Viviano, but, since he came from a different confinium, is probably simply a namesake of the Viviano da Molin that we have encountered in the previous footnote. In addition, in 1132 Enrico Zusto wrote his will while he was extremely sick in Palormus. Though the editors suggest that this city is to be identified with Panormos, in Achaea, it might well be Palermo. See FZ, no. 10, pp. 29-31; Maltézou, ‘Les Italiens…’, p. 179; Borsari, Venezia e Bisanzio…., p. 102, fn. 160.
few years earlier they had been active in Corinth, by this time they do not seem to have maintained their specialisation in commerce with the Ionian area.\footnote{134} As had already been the case before 1118, Corinth was a centre of great commercial importance to the Venetians, probably due to its role in silk manufacture.\footnote{135} Dobramiro Dalmatino Stagnario, a Croat \textit{servus} who had been freed by the Stagnarios in late 1125, and who died not before 1150, seems to have settled there in the mid-1130s. Even though one charter issued in 1140 records Dobramiro’s insolvency for a loan that he had negotiated in 1132, he nevertheless seems to have conducted a considerable amount of trade, albeit with a limited budget, in both Sparta and Constantinople in the Byzantine Empire, and in Alexandria in Egypt. His son Pangrazio was also active in Corinth in the 1140s and 1150s.\footnote{136} Dobramiro’s case is interesting since it provides evidence of the presence of Dalmatian servants in Venice – another one is probably the Dragomiro that Giovanni Badoer freed him in his will, written in 1148. Furthermore, Dobramiro exemplifies that even people who did not originate from Venice could integrate well in this city. Nor were Dobramiro and his son an isolated case, as, from the 1140s onwards, there are quite a few records of men from the Eastern Adriatic, and from Central and Southern Italy who were involved in trade together with Venetians. Moreover, even before this decade, a certain Bonsignore from Zadar, an inhabitant of the \textit{continium} of San Provolo, in Venice, seems to have taken part in the siege of Tyre alongside with the Venetians. A charter records that, on this occasion, in 1125, he negotiated a loan with a man from Venice.\footnote{137}

\footnote{134} \textit{DCV}, nos. 73, 94, 98, pp. 76-77, 95-96, 99-100. 
\footnote{136} \textit{DCV}, nos. 49, 51, 58, 65, 67-69, 72, 76, 80, 97, pp. 50-53, 61, 69-73, 75-76, 79-80, 83-84, 98-99; Borsari, ‘Il commerzio veneziano…’, pp. 991-92. Pangrazio was still involved in trade (as \textit{socius stans} based in Venice) in the late 1170s and early 1180s, mainly in Calabria, in the Holy Land, and in Egypt, and he is last recorded as being alive in a charter issued in 1197; see \textit{DCV}, nos. 292, 298, 300-01, 333, 357, 415, 420, pp. 286-88, 293-97, 329-330, 352, 406-07, 411-12; \textit{NDCV}, no. 25, pp. 27-28; ‘Appendice II: Documenti’, ed. by Silvano Borsari, in \textit{Venezia e Bisanzio…}, nos. 1, 3, 6, pp. 139-41, 143. Verlinden, \textit{L’Esclavage…}, pp. 550-51 refers to Dobramiro as a slave even if the term ‘\textit{sclavus}’ was first used in Venetian charters in the 1190s (the Venetian charter recording Dobramiro’s affranchisement uses the term ‘\textit{servus}’).
\footnote{137} \textit{DCV}, nos. 48, 82, pp. 50, 85-86; \textit{FZ}, no. 16, pp. 37-38. Dobramiro’s grandsons, especially Zaccaria, were also involved in trade (and, in 1192, in that of a Saracen slave) in the final decades of the twelfth century (and would continue their commercial activity in the early thirteenth century, when Zaccaria also held an important political position in Constantinople); see \textit{DCV}, nos. 357, 366, 370, 392, 411-12, 415, 420, 422,
These few examples comprise what evidence we have for Venetian trade in the Adriatic and Ionian trade at this period. Even though the problem of the survival of commercial charters in Venice cannot be underestimated, there is a major reason to explain this. Commerce with Southern Italy was probably limited, as Venice and Roger II only seldom had good relations (for instance, in 1144, when the Venetians were granted the concession of the church of St Mark in Palermo, following the granting of some commercial privileges). Both around the mid-1130s and then for some years following the Sicilian raids in the Balkans – probably due to the Venetian involvement in the conflict alongside Byzantium –, the Venetians complained about the loss of revenues due to the piratical deeds of men acting on Roger’s behalf. It seems, therefore, quite unlikely that the Venetians would be very active in commerce in Southern Italy when the political relations between these two powers were so strained.²³ Yet, the agreements signed by Venice in the first half and middle of the twelfth century with Bari, and more importantly, with Fano, Ancona, and the Kingdom of Sicily, nevertheless suggest that the Venetians were significantly involved in trade in the Adriatic region of Central and Southern Italy. The aim of Venice seems to have been to obtain tax exemptions in these areas, so that the foodstuffs and cotton that were produced there could be imported at a lower price. However, due to the limited amount of money involved in such transactions, very little documentation about them has survived. The increasing importance of the mid- and lower Adriatic region is probably to be linked not only with the demographic and economic growth of Venice, but also with a decrease in agricultural production in the Po basin, and with the protectionist measures taken by its cities in the eleventh and twelfth centuries. This led to a need to import grain, wine, and olive oil from other areas, specifically the Marche, coastal Greece, and Southern Italy. Here, in particular, in the twelfth century there was a large-scale development of the production of olive oil (in the Terra di Bari), and of wheat (in the Capitanata).²³³
Venice also seems to have been heavily involved in mercantile activity in Istria. The agreements concluded in 1145, and especially the one with Pula, which led to the establishment of a permanent Venetian representative there, signified the de facto conquest of Istria by Venice. The Venetians had thus secured a commercial monopoly in this region, which gave them easy access not only to the Istrian agricultural products, especially wine, but also to its woods – the timber of which was used for shipbuilding – and quarries.\textsuperscript{140}

The presence in Southern Italy of quite a few Venetian merchants whose final destination was the Eastern Mediterranean, such as Viviano da Molin in 1118-19, might suggest that these traders could also have been exporting goods from the Mezzogiorno to Constantinople (where already in the mid-eleventh century there is evidence of an import of Apulian olive oil, and of Southern Italian wine), to the Holy Land, or to Egypt.\textsuperscript{141} However, since many of the goods originating from Southern Italy could also be found within the Byzantine Empire, Constantinople probably obtained most of them from its provinces, and thus what was imported from Southern Italy was only a relatively small additional supply. In some cases, the role of middlemen was conducted by Italian merchants, who thus became commercial rivals of the Greek landowners. An example can be found in two charters from the early 1150s which mention the involvement of Venetians in the transport to Constantinople of olive oil that they had bought in Sparta from the local archontes. Yet, since very little is known about the goods that the Venetian merchants traded, and about the scale of internal commerce in the Eastern


Mediterranean, we cannot exclude that some of the imports did indeed come from Southern Italy.\textsuperscript{142}

\textbf{ii) Trade in the Mediterranean}

Despite the increasing importance of the Adriatic trade, most of the recorded Venetian commercial activity continued to take place in the Byzantine Empire. Why was there such an increase in the trade documentation in this period, and was this linked with the new properties acquired by the Venetians following Manuel's chrysobull issued in 1148?

Documentation regarding Venetian trade with Byzantium is extremely sparse in the early years of John II's reign (until the end of the 1120s). Constantinople often acted as a mercantile base for some traders, rather than as a market itself: many charters were issued there, but referred to commerce to Acre, which was, numerically, the most represented trade destination, or to Alexandria. Two reasons in particular, related to the political and diplomatic relationship between the two powers, suggest why so little mercantile documentation regarding trade in the Byzantine Empire has survived. First, John's refusal to renew the commercial privileges which his father had granted to Venice may have led most merchants to prefer to trade in other areas where their conditions were more advantageous. In addition, and more importantly, most of this commerce came to a halt after the Venetians were involved in two major conflicts: the crusade, and the war against John II. Indeed, we know that the merchants were asked to return to Venice to take part in the crusade, and that similar measures were taken whenever a major conflict broke out, since the Venetians lacked any professional navy crews. Furthermore, it makes even more sense that the Venetians would not be involved in trade in Byzantium when they were at war with John II.\textsuperscript{143} One charter provides specific evidence for this. Three merchants had negotiated a compagnia contract to trade in Romania and in Syria before the outbreak of the war. However, the conflict


\textsuperscript{143} DCV, nos. 42, 45, pp. 44-45, 47-48; FZ, nos. 8, 16, 21, pp. 25-27, 37-38, 48-50; Tucci, 'L'impresa marittima...,' p. 636. Yet, a few charters still record that some Venetians were involved in trade in Constantinople before the outbreak of the conflict; see DCV, nos. 41, 46, pp. 43-44, 48-49; FZ, no. 16, pp. 37-39.
had forced them to delay their commercial activity, until the *compagnia* was eventually dissolved in 1129.\textsuperscript{144}

Even though the Venetian charters can only hint at the scale of trade with the Eastern Empire in the 1120s, we can nevertheless advance one hypothesis. The concessions granted in 1126 by John II through his chrysobull to Venice were made not only so that John could focus on other theatres of war, but also both out of fear that the Byzantine Empire might lose its commercial prominence in favour of the Crusader States, and in order to revive the economy of the empire following some years of stagnation. The very wide commercial concessions that the Venetians had obtained in return for their help in the conquest of Tyre in 1124 probably alarmed the Byzantines. They were probably afraid that the Venetians would start to exploit massively the markets of Outremer, and that they would no longer trade in their territory. This would have had financial consequences for Byzantium since, even though the Venetians had not directly contributed to the imperial treasury (as they had been exempted from paying the *kommerkion*), they had done so indirectly via their (albeit financially limited) investments in Romania. Furthermore, John’s decision to exempt from the *kommerkion* his subjects who engaged in commerce with the Venetians (and not just the Venetians themselves, as had been the case in the previous decades) suggests that the Byzantines were the main trading partners of the lagoon merchants.\textsuperscript{145} Yet, despite the renewal of the commercial privileges, we have no surviving evidence of Venetian mercantile activity within the Byzantine Empire until March 1129, and the Crusader States seem to have remained the main commercial destination until 1130. While this might be the result of a mere loss of charters, we must also take into consideration some possible doubts as to the wisdom of trade in the Eastern Empire, as this had been enemy territory until a little while earlier, and even more towards conducting commerce with Byzantine merchants. Furthermore, some sources suggest that John II had set fire to the Venetian properties in Constantinople. The Venetians may, therefore, have had to make some significant repairs to their warehouses before they could once again use them for commercial operations.\textsuperscript{146}

\textsuperscript{144} *DCV*, no. 54, pp. 56-57; Maltézou, ‘Les Italiens…’, p. 188.


Trade with Byzantium seems to have resumed on a reasonable scale in the 1130s, even though the Venetians were still involved in trade with both Egypt and the Frankish States in the Levant, where they could take advantage of the commercial privileges which they had obtained following the conquest of Tyre.\footnote{Diplomata regum Latinorum Hierosolymitanorum, I, no. 93, pp. 241-47. For Syria and the Holy Land, see DCV, nos. 56-57, 59, 62, 71, 75, pp. 58-62, 65-66, 74-75, 78. For Egypt, see DCV, nos. 65, 73, 75, pp. 69, 76-78; SGM, II, no. 196, pp. 405-06. Due to the survival of the Stagnoario archive, the most represented Byzantine city is Corinth, where Dobramiro had settled for some years; see DCV, nos. 65, 67-69, 72, pp. 50-53, 61, 69-73, 75-76.} There are, however, some interesting aspects of this trade that need to be considered. The Venetians were now also involved in commerce in cities and areas in which they had not been exempted from paying the kommerkion, notably at Arta and Sparta (the latter seems to have become an important commercial centre since the late ninth century) in mainland Greece, in Crete, and at Limassol in Cyprus.

This last might, indeed, have been used as a base to trade in Damietta, and in Crete. However, one charter suggests that Crete might have been a forced stop for the merchant (Ottone Falier) since his final destination was intended to be Syria. Alternatively, he might have stopped in Crete to buy local products (possibly cheese or wine), and export them to the Crusader States.\footnote{DCV, nos. 56-57, 61, 65, pp. 58-61, 64-65, 69; SGM, II, no. 196, pp. 405-06; Jacoby, ‘Byzantine Crete…’, pp. 529-30; Harvey, Economic Expansion…, pp. 175, 216-17. The importance of Crete as a centre for the production of cheese is confirmed by al-Idrisi, La Première géographie…, bk 4, ch. 4, p. 349.} These new destinations might mean either that the list of cities within the chrysobull was incomplete (as Alexios’s decree explicitly added that the concessions were also valid in omnes partes sub potestate nostra), or that the Venetians were involved in trade in many Byzantine cities regardless of whether they were exempted from the kommerkion. The latter seems to be the likelier explanation, as, otherwise, it would be difficult to justify why, on the request of the Venetians, Crete, Cyprus, and other cities were added in later confirmations of the chrysobull.\footnote{I trattati con Bisanzio…, nos. 2, 4, 11, pp. 40, 63-64, 130-31; Jacoby, ‘Byzantine Crete…’, p. 526. Jacoby, ‘Italian Privileges…’, pp. 351-56 unconvincingly supports the former case.} Another curious aspect is that only three charters issued during this decade record any trade with Constantinople. This paucity of documentation is difficult to explain, as Moses of Bergamo informs us that, already in 1130, there were regular communications between Venice and Constantinople: a ship would sail from the lagoon to the Bosporus every August. Thus, the easiest explanation is that very little documentation regarding commerce in Constantinople has survived. However, it
cannot be excluded that in the 1130s most of the Venetian quarter that had been
damaged or destroyed by the (new?) fire in January 1130 was still being rebuilt.150

The 1140s are marked by a slight increase in the commercial
documentation, as some twenty charters referring to trade and financial operations
in the Eastern Mediterranean survive. During this decade, the Byzantine Empire
seems to have become the main commercial centre, with only a minority of charters
recording trade in the Frankish States and in Egypt.151 Even though Constantinople
is the most represented city, it seems to have mainly acted as a financial centre
and base, as few charters refer directly to trade taking place here. Most of the
documents are loan contracts (or ensuing quittances) which do not explicitly
mention how the money was being, or had been, used. The other principal city
mentioned in these documents was Corinth, a major commercial and financial
market at the time thanks to its geographic position, and to its developing silk
industry.152

The surviving documentation suggests a major change in the scale and
pattern of Venetian commerce from the late 1140s onwards. As mentioned before,
trade almost came to a halt in 1148-49, when Venice was involved in the conflict
between Roger II and Manuel I, as the doge summoned all his citizens to serve in
the navy.153 However, despite this temporary interruption in the trade, the
Venetians were very advantageously rewarded by Manuel I for their decision to
side with him against Roger II. In 1147, Crete and Cyprus were added to the places
where the Venetians were exempted from the kommerkion, while in the following
year Manuel granted further properties and land to the Venetians, thus extending
their quarter in Constantinople.154 While the former concession does not seem to
have had major consequences (only one charter records trade in Cyprus between

150 DCV, nos. 62, 69, 75, pp. 65-66, 72-73, 75; Moses of Bergamo, ‘Mosè del Brolo…’,
151 For the Crusader States, see DCV, nos. 81-83, 90, pp. 84-86, 91-92; for Egypt, see
DCV, no. 77, pp. 80-81; FZ, nos. 14, 19, pp. 35-36, 44-45. Yet, there seems to have
been regular yearly communications between Venice and Damietta, as a charter
issued in August 1141 refers to a muda (i.e. a convoy of ships); see DCV, no. 77, pp.
80-81.
216.
153 Dandolo, Chronica extensa, bk 9, ch. 13, p. 243. A couple of charters nevertheless
seem to record that in these years some trade was still conducted in the Byzantine
Empire; see DCV nos. 92, 94 pp. 93-96. Amongst the Venetians that remained in the
Bosporus we can probably include Giovanni Badoer and the people mentioned in his
will, which was issued in Constantinople in May 1148; see ‘Testamento…’, pp. 118-21.
154 I trattati con Bisanzio…, nos. 4-5, pp. 60-65, 70-75.
1140 and 1147, while none at all survive for 1148-56), the latter seems to have been extremely relevant. Indeed, in 1150-56 there is no evidence of trade taking place in Egypt, and very little (only two charters) in the Crusader States. However, by contrast, despite the minor but perceptible political drift emerging between Venice and Byzantium, this same period is marked by a considerable increase in the surviving charters referring to Venetian commercial or financial operations in the Eastern Empire (over thirty). Most of the evidence comes from Constantinople itself, which was undisputedly the predominant centre for the Venetian merchants, both as a commercial destination, and as a financial base. We also have some evidence of what the Venetian merchants imported into the Byzantine capital. The commerce of oil from Sparta is mentioned twice (although in one case its transport could not be finalised because of piratical acts by the Sicilians), and the Venetians may also have had an important role in the trade of this commodity in Rodostos. Furthermore, one charter records the export of timber from Venice, and we also have evidence of pepper and alum being exported from Constantinople to the lagoon. The import of oil from Sparta is not the only evidence of Venetian trade in Greece. The surviving evidence suggests that it was fairly common for Venetian merchants to be involved in some imports from this region to Constantinople, or in commerce in Greece after they had concluded some preliminary financial agreements in the imperial capital. This kind of commercial activity was not necessarily conducted by sea; some of the contracts include specific clauses that forced the merchants to travel by land, possibly out of fear that the ships and their cargo could be intercepted by the Sicilians.

Beginning in 1147, there is also an increase in the documentation regarding Venetian properties within the Byzantine Empire. Some were located in Constantinople, and were ceded by the commune to private individuals or to churches, while other were situated in cities in which Venice had not been granted any property by the emperors. For instance, a Venetian was referred to as a citizen

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155 DCV, no. 82, pp. 85-86.  
156 The only charters were issued in 1150; the former records the dissolution of a compagnia that two Venetians had formed while they were in Lesfornies (Palestine); the latter refers to some trade to be conducted in Acre. See DCV, nos. 95, 98, pp. 96-100.  
157 NDCV, nos. 9, 11, pp. 11, 14; DCV, no. 118, pp. 118-19; SGM, II, no 224, p. 450; ‘Testamento…’, p. 118; Jacoby, ‘Mediterranean Food…’, p. 130.  
158 In addition to the first two charters in the previous note, see DCV, nos. 97, 110, 112, 117, pp. 98-99, 110-11, 117-18.  
159 FZ, no. 14, pp. 35-36 (though this operation was conducted in 1140); DCV, nos. 98 (which, however, does not explicitly mention any Byzantine city), 110, pp. 99-100, 110-11.
of Halmyros as early as 1129, and we know that a considerable number of Venetians owned properties throughout this town.160 Only in a few cases do we know the name of the previous owner of these houses and lands, but the few surviving charters mention that some houses in Halmyros had been bought from two Greeks, and that the Venetians owned adjacent properties here. It is quite likely that this was quite a common pattern, especially considering that al-Idrisi records that this city was used as a base by many Christian merchants.161 In addition, we have evidence of some Venetians renting properties that the commune had received from the emperors. In particular, shortly after Manuel’s first chrysobull, Doge Polani conceded some of the lands within the Venetian quarter to seven Venetians. This concession was later confirmed by the two immediate successors of this doge.162 A pattern that had already begun under Alexios I, and which continued in the following decades, was that of granting properties to religious institutions. By 1148, there were four churches in the Venetian quarter in Constantinople (three of them were probably built after 1092, while one, St Akindynos, would become a parish church by 1150). Venice also owned churches in other cities. However, despite the importance of Constantinople for the Venetians, the attempt to organise these churches into a single diocese (under the Patriarchate of Grado) was unsuccessful, and in the end no religious hierarchy was formed. Most of these churches in the empire were under the jurisdiction of the Venetian monastery of St George: notably those of St George and St Mary in Rodostos; St Blaise in Lemnos; and St George in Halmyros.163 In addition to replacing the commune in the direct administration of the properties of Venetian in Romania (a task that the churches had already undertaken during the reign of Alexios I), these religious institutions had a variety of other different functions, including holding the weights and measures that all the Venetians living in a specific city were to use (we know this in the case of Rodostos), and acting as depots.164 Furthermore, the notaries who wrote the Venetian charters issued in the Byzantine Empire were almost always clerics from Venice. Since some of them

160 DCV, no. 54, pp. 56-57; Harvey, Economic Expansion..., p. 222.
161 SGM, II, nos. 231-33, 271, pp. 463-70, 526-27; al-Idrisi, La Première géographie..., bk 5, ch. 4, p. 409; Borsari, Venezia e Bisanzio..., p. 35.
162 FZ, nos. 23-24, pp. 52-56; Borsari, Venezia e Bisanzio..., p. 36.
163 ‘Testamento...’, pp. 118-19; SGM, II, nos. 181, 216, 231-33, 244, 271, pp. 380-83, 437-39, 463-70, 486-87, 526-27; Borsari, Venezia e Bisanzio..., pp. 32-33, 38, 40-42. There was a Venetian church in Corinth as well (St Nicholas’), but it was not under the jurisdiction of St George; see DCV, nos. 88, 94, pp. 90-91, 95-96.
issued charters in different years, it is highly likely that they were the clerics of the Venetian churches in *Romania* (only in the case of one notary do we know that he was the priest of a local church, St Akindynos).\(^{165}\) Amongst the recurring names of Venetian clergymen acting as notaries, we can mention Vitale Vitaliano and the priest Giovanni *Pascasi* (both active in Corinth in the second half of the 1130s), and, in Constantinople, a subdeacon Giovanni da Noale (active from 1146 to 1169) and a priest Giovanni Toscano (active from 1150 to 1161).\(^{166}\) Yet, these clerics did not have any judicial authority, nor was there until 1198 a juridical or administrative structure for the Venetian inhabitants in *Romania*. Therefore, in the case of any legal controversy, it was either solved locally by *boni homines*, or by the legates of the doge whenever they were in the Byzantine Empire (as happened in 1147 and 1150).\(^{167}\)

### iii) Conclusions

The surviving commercial documentation allows us to draw some conclusions regarding Venetian trade in this era of political transition. Whereas since the late 1140s the political relations with Constantinople slightly worsened, *Romania* became the main Venetian commercial and financial market, and remained such until the end of the period here taken into consideration. While this might also be the consequence of a higher survival rate of the charters, and of a demographic and economic growth of the Eastern Empire, Manuel I’s chrysobulls nevertheless had a crucial impact. The significant extension of the Venetian quarter in Constantinople, together with an improvement in economic conditions in both Venice and the Byzantine Empire, led to an increasing number of traders in the Bosporus, and to a decline of commercial contact with areas outside the empire.\(^{168}\)

The years from 1119 until around 1140 seem to have witnessed an increase in Venetian trade in the Adriatic region; however, this area lost most of its

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\(^{165}\) *SGM*, II, nos. 231-33, pp. 465-70; Borsari, *Venezia e Bisanzi,* pp. 55-56.


importance in the late 1140s. Yet, the Adriatic region, despite this lack of documentation, was not completely neglected. Indeed, there was probably still a significant Venetian activity in this area, as was suggested by the three agreements signed with Fano, Ancona, and the Kingdom of Sicily. However, the few surviving documents suggest that until the mid-1150s Venice did not take full advantage of the commercial advantages deriving from these pacts. Regardless of this, these agreements were nevertheless extremely important, as they enabled the Venetians to obtain access to alternative markets, which were also geographically closer to their homeland.
VI. The Increasing Political Distance between Venice and Byzantium, 1156-97

1) Political Outline

We have seen that the Venetians signed a treaty with the Sicilians in the mid-1150s, and that they did not support Manuel’s Italian campaign. In the following decades, the foreign policy of Venice and Byzantium mostly differed, but these two entities sometimes reconciled. We shall now analyse this relationship, together with the role of Southern Italy, from 1156 until the end of political unity in the Mezzogiorno.

i) The Aftermath of Manuel’s First Italian Campaign, and His Second Italian Expedition (1156-58)

The outcome of the Battle of Brindisi led to a sudden change in the system of alliances that had preceded the Byzantine campaign in Southern Italy. The battle was soon followed by the Treaty of Benevento, which marked the beginning of a period of alliance between the Papacy and Sicily, and, consequently, of hostility between Rome and Barbarossa. Furthermore, after another unsuccessful military campaign in Italy, Manuel also came to terms with William I, and this resulted in the end of the decennial plans for a joint Byzantine-German intervention in Southern Italy.

We have already seen that the German Empire had not taken part in the 1155-56 Byzantine campaign in Southern Italy. Yet, this did not lead to lengthy tensions between Frederick and Manuel. Barbarossa had indeed accused the Greeks of stealing his seal in order to convince the cities from Southern Italy of an existing entente between the two empires, and had even planned to intervene militarily in Southern Italy against the Byzantines following their initial successes in this region.1 However, following the outcome of the Battle of Brindisi, relations became friendly again, and attempts were even made to try to resume collaborations between the Byzantines and the Germans. First, in July 1156, Manuel once more attempted to convince Barbarossa to marry his niece Maria (he was probably unaware of Frederick’s recent wedding with Beatrice of Burgundy), and to help him militarily against the Hungarians. However, the wedding proposal could not be accepted, as the German emperor had indeed already remarried. Furthermore, Barbarossa replied that he could not assemble an army to fight the

1 Otto of Freising and Rahewin, Gesta Friderici…., bk 2, chs 51-52, pp. 382-84.
Hungarians as quickly as Manuel was asking him. Yet, Frederick would later show his hostility towards the Magyar King Géza by hosting his exiled brother, who had unsuccessfully claimed the Hungarian crown, and by helping him to reach Constantinople via Venice. A new legation was sent by Manuel to the German emperor in September 1157, but Barbarossa was initially unwilling to receive the Byzantine agents, officially because of matters of etiquette. However, it is quite likely that Frederick actually took this decision after he was asked to take part in a joint Italian expedition, and reacted angrily when Manuel’s legates started making territorial claims over part of this region. Yet, the Byzantine agents were eventually allowed to meet Barbarossa, and they witnessed the knighting of the son of Conrad III.2

By contrast, Manuel’s relations with the Italian powers worsened soon after his defeat in Apulia. Following the Battle of Brindisi, William’s men began a successful counterattack against Pope Adrian, which led them to put Benevento under siege. The pontiff was thus forced to settle for peace with William, and in June 1156, with the Treaty of Benevento, recognised him as King of Sicily. This pact finally gave legitimacy to the Sicilian ruler, and made him an ally of the pontiff. On the other hand, despite Adrian’s efforts to remain on good terms with Frederick, the treaty also marked the worsening of tensions between the Western Empire and the Papacy. These relations would reach a point of no return in September 1157, following the Besançon incident, when Adrian used the word beneficium to refer to the imperial title in a letter to Frederick. After the imperial chancellor translated the word to Barbarossa as if Adrian meant that the empire was a papal fief, a riot resulted. Yet, Frederick must already have been aware that the agreement between the pontiff and William signed a year earlier meant that the pope would oppose any German attempt to conquer the Mezzogiorno. Frederick was even more upset because he also felt that, by concluding peace with William, Adrian IV had not respected the terms of the Treaty of Constance.3 The agreement with

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Adrian was not William’s only diplomatic success, as it was soon followed by pacts with both Genoa and Venice, which granted further international recognition and political stability to the king.⁴

Even though William was gaining allies, Manuel Komnenos nevertheless decided to try to launch a new Italian expedition, and thus in late 1157 sent some men led by Alexios Axouch to Ancona. The Byzantines, once more using this city as their base, started recruiting mercenaries in the neighbourhoods, and bought the loyalty of the citizens of Ravenna. It is unclear why Axouch, whose apparent goal was to conduct a campaign in the Mezzogiorno, went North to recruit mercenaries. Choniates and Rahewin even suggest that Axouch’s expedition was not aimed at making conquests in Southern Italy, but that his main goal was that of forcing William to sign an agreement. In this case, Axouch’s actions north of Ancona may be explained as an attempt to create a base to oppose Frederick’s plans to subjugate Lombardy. And indeed, this move did end up upsetting the German legates who had been sent ahead to prepare Frederick’s new Italian campaign. Barbarossa’s men questioned the activity of Manuel’s legates in Ravenna, and accused Axouch of having obtained Ancona’s loyalty through bribery. The situation became tense, as the two empires almost entered into an open conflict when Barbarossa’s men started besieging Ancona. However, after the Anconitans swore not to take up arms against the Western Empire, the Germans and Axouch eventually managed to reach an agreement. This prevented the beginning of a war between the two empires, and temporarily restored amicable relations between them. Axouch could continue his campaign, but had to give up the control of Ravenna. Following this incident, the Byzantines commenced a military campaign towards the South with the support of Andrew of Rupecanina and of the Roman opposition to the pontiff. Initially, the land operations were moderately successful – Andrew conquered Fondi and Aquino, and then defeated William’s men in Cassino –, but the Greek navy was defeated by the Sicilian fleet, which also raided some of the coasts of the empire, even reaching the shores of Constantinople.⁵

⁵ Kinnamos, bk 4, chs 14-15, pp. 170-72; Registrum oder merkwürdige Urkunden für die deutsche Geschichte, ed. by Hans Sudendorf, 3 vols (Berlin: Duncker, 1849-54), ii, no. 54, pp. 131-33; Chronica regia Coloniensis, ed. by Georg Waitz, MGH SS rer. Germ., 18 (Hanover: Hahn, 1880), a. 1158, pp. 96-97; Otto of Freising and Rahewin, Gesta Friderici…, bk 3, ch. 23, pp. 442-46; Manganeios Prodromos, Carmina [published as Theodoros Prodromos, De Manganis], ed. and trans. by Silvio
The conflict eventually ended in 1158, when, following an agreement brokered by Pope Adrian, William and Manuel agreed, according to the *Annales Casinenses*, on a thirty-year long peace treaty. All the Byzantine captives who had been taken in 1156 (but not the people from Corinth and Thebes who had been deported in the late 1140s) were released. Furthermore, according to Kinnamos, an alliance between the Byzantines and the Sicilians was reached, and sometime later (possibly in 1160 or 1161) Manuel recognised William’s royal title.6

The Sicilian naval threat, the German refusal to collaborate in the expedition, and the cost of the campaign were all undoubtedly significant factors that persuaded Manuel to settle for peace, but not the main ones. Furthermore, John Kinnamos is not reliable when he writes that the agreement was the result of private negotiations conducted by Alexios Komnenos Bryennios and by John Doukas to obtain their release.7 Indeed, the peace treaty was probably signed because new conflicts had broken out in the East, and Manuel did not want to be involved in simultaneous conflicts in different areas of his empire. Earlier in the same year, Princes Reynald of Antioch and Thoros of Lesser Armenia had conducted a naval raid on Cyprus, and by then the whole of Cilicia had been lost to Thoros himself. Therefore, probably in September, Manuel decided to sign a peace treaty with William, enabling him to focus on Cilicia and Northern Syria, where he hoped that he could obtain the support of King Baldwin III of Jerusalem, whose relations with Reynald were far from good.8 In addition, the *basileus* decided to put an end to his hostilities with William because of his own and of Pope Adrian’s fear

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of Barbarossa’s ambitions. The German emperor began his second Italian expedition in June or July 1158, and commenced the siege of Milan in early August, and both Manuel and the pontiff were probably convinced that he would succeed in subjugating Lombardy. As suggested by the imperial notary Burkhard, Barbarossa’s next move would have then been the conquest of the Mezzogiorno for himself. This would have made the Western Empire the dominant force in both the West and the Mediterranean, thus threatening Rome, and making a German offensive against the Balkans not so unlikely. Therefore, Manuel realised that Frederick, and not William, was the main threat to him, and decided to listen to Adrian’s pleas, and to sign an agreement with the King of Sicily.9

However, an interesting aspect to be taken into consideration is that the conclusion of the agreement with William I probably met with some internal opposition in Byzantium. Indeed, Niketas Choniates recalls that, in 1159, Andronikos Kamateros maliciously accused Theodore Styppeiotes, one of the most influential members of Manuel’s court, of sabotaging the emperor’s dealings with Sicily by forging the imperial correspondence with William I. It is extremely likely that, despite Niketas’ assertions, Styppeiotes (who was eventually blinded, and deprived of his tongue) was actually strongly implicated in this conspiracy, which, as suggested by Magdalino, possibly aimed at deposing Manuel, and at replacing him with his cousin Andronikos. Yet, Magdalino (together with Kresten) also believes that such a plot is to be interpreted as meaning that Styppeiotes was part of a pro-Sicilian faction in the Byzantine court.10 However, this analysis appears unconvincing. Since, in 1159, Manuel had already concluded peace with William I, Niketas’s passage suggests that Styppeiotes tried to sabotage the new and peaceful relations between the basileus and the King of Sicily. This seems to suggest that, just after the end of the conflict with William I, some of the members of the Constantinopolitan court were extremely unhappy with the signing of this agreement.

9 Burkhard, ‘Le lettere del notaio imperiale Burcardo intorno alla politica del Barbarossa nello scisma ed alla distruzione di Milano’, ed. by Ferdinand Güterbock, Bullettino dell’Istituto storico italiano per il Medio Evo e Archivio Muratoriano, 61 (1949), 1-66 (no. 1, p. 56-57); Tolstoy-Miloslavsky, ‘Manuel I Komnenos and Italy…’, pp. 149-57, 159-62; Lamma, Comneni e Staufer…, I, 275, 278.

Venice, however, continued to avoid involvement during this second phase of the conflict between Byzantium and the Kingdom of Sicily. Despite the agreement with William, the Venetians once again behaved duplicitously, as there are indications which suggest that they maintained reasonably good relations with Barbarossa, and, apparently, also with the Byzantines. Envoys from Venice attended the Diet of Besançon in 1157, and the Adriatic city also acted as a mediator during the transfer of Prince Stephen of Hungary from the Western Empire to Constantinople.\(^\text{11}\)

Pisa did not take part in the conflict either. Even though the *Annales Pisani* record that, during their naval raid, William’s men sacked the Pisan quarter in the Byzantine city of Halmyros, the Tuscan city almost certainly did not play an active role in the conflict. Indeed, the relations between Byzantium and Pisa had recently worsened, as, according to Bernardo Maragone, starting from 1157, Manuel stopped paying the yearly tribute that the Byzantines had been providing to the Pisans since 1111. This makes any Pisan involvement in Manuel’s campaign in 1157-58 extremely unlikely.\(^\text{12}\) Since Genoa had signed an agreement with William, not even the Ligurian city did provide any assistance to the Byzantines. Yet, the relations between Genoa and Manuel continued, as the Genoese sent an embassy to Constantinople in 1157, trying to obtain the quarter that they had been promised. However, Caffaro does not mention the outcome of this legation, and we may note that, in early July 1157, a Genoese merchant forbade his commercial partner from going to *Romania* unless he first returned to Genoa from Egypt. Thus, it is quite likely that Manuel only granted a quarter in Constantinople to Genoa in 1160, after another embassy reached Byzantium.\(^\text{13}\)

**ii) Byzantium, Venice, and the Sicilians United against Barbarossa (1158-67)**

From 1158 until 1161, following the peace treaty with William, the Byzantines were mainly involved in warfare in the East. Following a victory over the Seljuk Turks of Sultan Kilij Arslan II, and the forced submission of Thoros and Reynald, the emperor celebrated a triumph in Antioch. The *basileus* further strengthened his links with the principality as, following his wife Bertha’s death in

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\(^{11}\) Otto of Freising and Rahewin, *Gesta Friderici…*, bk 3, chs 10, 15, pp. 408, 426.


1160, in December of the following year he married Maria, a daughter of Prince Raymond of Antioch.\(^{14}\)

Despite this focus on the East, Manuel did not entirely neglect the West in these years. Quite interestingly, according to Rahewin, in spite of the agreement signed with William I in Sicily (which had by then caused a rift with the German Empire), the *basileus* had once more set his eyes on the *Mezzogiorno*. The chronicler records rumours that, in early 1160, Manuel replied to a legation sent by Frederick suggesting a joint Italian expedition; the Byzantines claimed the former *Pentapolis* (the area around Ravenna) and coastal Apulia for themselves. Frederick did not accept this proposal. According to the chronicler, he was unwilling to ravage Lombardy again so soon after his previous campaign. However, a different explanation of these event can be made if we consider that by this time a papal schism had begun. Following the death of Pope Adrian IV in September 1159, two rival popes had been chosen as his successor. Alexander III was supported by a majority of the cardinals, Victor IV only by a small group, but he had obtained Frederick’s backing at the Council of Pavia. Barbarossa possibly tried to persuade Manuel to support Victor by offering control over these two areas in Italy to the Byzantines (rather than the other way around, as was suggested by Rahewin). Yet, reaching an entente with the Germans would only have been advantageous for the Byzantines if Victor had eventually succeeded in becoming the generally-recognised pope. It would then have been almost certain that, as pope, he would have cut his ties with William I, thus making it possible for Barbarossa (or even encouraging him) to launch a campaign against the *Mezzogiorno*. Therefore, it was prudent for the *basileus* to resume negotiations with Frederick in order to prevent the Germans from eventually conquering the whole of Southern Italy.\(^{15}\)

Another occasion on which Manuel appears not to have wholeheartedly supported William I was during the insurrection in the Kingdom of Sicily sparked off by the murder of Maio of Bari in November 1160, which continued until 1162. The emperor did not send any troops, probably because he did not want to enrage


Pope Alexander, and as he was already involved in conflicts in other areas of his empire. Yet, it is extremely likely that Manuel realised that he could not even afford to remain neutral during this conflict, and that he thus decided to support the rebellion indirectly. The basileus might have chosen to do so in order to keep a closer eye on the Mezzogiorno so that he could send an army there in case of Barbarossa’s intervention in the conflict. Manuel could probably obtain first-hand information regarding the insurrection, as some of its leaders had had contact with him. While we cannot ascertain whether the action of these men was funded by Byzantium, the basileus allowed them to seek refuge into his empire following the failure of the rebellion. Indeed, two of the leaders of this insurrection were Alexander of Conversano and Andrew of Rupecanina. Neither appears to have initiated his action from the Eastern Empire, as Alexander had probably been captured and imprisoned in 1157 or 1158 during the second Byzantine campaign in the Mezzogiorno, while Andrew had joined Barbarossa in 1158. However, Andrew fled to Romania following the failure of this revolt, while the next surviving information that we have regarding Alexander and Roger Sclavus (another leader of this rebellion, who had had no previous contact with Byzantium) are of them being in Manuel’s service. Alexander would eventually have a long record as an imperial officer.\footnote{Falcandus, pp. 154, 186; Romuald, Annales, pp. 246, 248-49; ‘Annales Ceccanenses’, aa. 1158, 1160-61, pp. 284-85; William of Tyre, Chronicon, II, bk 20, chs 4, 14, bk 21, ch. 16, pp. 915, 927, 981-83; CDRCSD, 2, nos. 155-56, pp. 112-14; Peter Classen, ‘La politica di Manuele Commeno tra Federico Barbarossa e le città italiane’, in Popolo e stato in Italia nell’età di Federico Barbarossa, Alessandria e la Lega Lombarda: Relazioni e comunicazioni al XXXIII congresso storico subalpino per la celebrazione dell’VIII centenario della fondazione di Alessandria (Alessandria, 6-7-8-9 ottobre 1968) (Turin: Deputazione subalpina di storia patria, 1970), pp. 263-79 (p. 267).} Therefore, even if this does not clearly imply that Manuel was involved in the insurrection, it indeed seems to suggest that he was sympathetic to the rebels, possibly because he felt that they might be useful in case his relations with Sicily might worsen in the future. A letter that the basileus wrote to King Louis VII of France also provides more evidence of this. The letter, probably written in early 1162, mentions that William I had not allowed a Byzantine legate to pass through his kingdom while on his way to France, and that the letter could only be dispatched thanks to the mediation of Archbishop Henry of Benevento. This was clearly a hostile action by William I, and could be explained as a reprisal to what the king had probably perceived as Manuel’s indirect backing of the rebels.\footnote{Louis VII, ‘Epistulae Regis Ludovici VII et variae ad eum’, ed. by Michel Jean Joseph Brial and Léopold Delisle, in RHGF, xvi, no. 249, p. 82; Lamma, Comneni e Staufer…, II, 98-99. See p. 169 below for a discussion on the dating of Manuel’s letter.}
Manuel’s decision not to intervene directly in the Sicilian rebellion was probably also due to his simultaneous negotiations with Pope Alexander. The talks between the basileus and the pontiff probably started in mid-1161, following the beginning of Barbarossa’s siege of Milan. Alexander was in a very difficult situation, and the German notary Burkhard seems to suggest that the pope even offered to recognise Manuel as sole emperor. Whilst it is arguable whether on this occasion the initiative came from Alexander, the pontiff indeed took this idea into serious consideration, but with the indispensable condition that the Byzantine ruler reunite the Greek Church with the Roman one. Even though the refusal by the Byzantine clergy to ratify the Union led to the failure of these negotiations, Manuel appears to have been extremely keen on obtaining such recognition by the pope. While, following the negative outcome of his previous campaigns, Manuel was probably no longer interested in any territorial gains in Italy, he was nevertheless aware that maintaining good relations with the Papacy was crucial. This would have enabled him to continue his campaign against the Principality of Antioch with no risk that the pope might reach an agreement with Barbarossa. Should such an agreement have occurred, Frederick might well have obtained papal backing to launch a campaign in Southern Italy, and could also have obtained a pretext to invade Byzantium. Yet, Barbarossa’s claim over the Mezzogiorno was indissolubly linked to his imperial title; if he had been deprived of this, all his claims over Italy would have become null and void. Such an aspect needs to be taken into consideration especially after May 1162. The Kaiser’s successes in Northern Italy – and in particular the destruction of Milan –, together with his agreements with Pisa and, shortly afterwards, also with Genoa, had become alarming for Manuel as well. Both Kinnamos and the anonymous author of the Historia ducum Veneticorum suggest that the basileus was worried that Frederick might cross the Adriatic, and invade the Eastern Empire.18

The negotiations between Alexander and Manuel continued in 1163-64, and William I was also involved in them, thus showing that, despite the incidents during the rebellion in the Mezzogiorno, Byzantine-Sicilian relations nevertheless appear

to have remained cordial. In early 1163, William I provided ten of his galleys to transport and escort two Byzantine envoys who were on their way to sail to France. The sources suggest that their initial task was to obtain Manuel’s recognition as sole emperor from the pope (who had moved to France following the fall of Milan), and they seem to have temporarily succeeded in this. A passage from a text by Leo Tuscus suggests that the pontiff did at some point recognise Manuel as sole emperor, but that he soon ‘revoked his acknowledgement’. Alexander’s sudden change of mind appears to be a consequence of his simultaneous talks with Barbarossa. The pontiff probably realised that recognising Manuel as emperor would only lead to even tenser relations with the Kaiser. Furthermore, such a change of mind might be a consequence of Louis VII’s attitude towards this project. Initially, Louis too probably recognised Manuel as sole emperor, since a letter written by the former to the basileus, which refers to the latter as Romanorum imperator, was probably written at the same time as these negotiations. However, the French king later showed hostility to this project. It is possible that this change of mind was due to the fear that backing Manuel in this project could be interpreted by the Frankish States in the Levant (which were strongly bonded with the Kingdom of France) as an all-around support for the Byzantine foreign policy, and, therefore, as an act of treason towards them. This could have indeed been the case especially considering that the relations between the Principality of Antioch and the Byzantines had recently worsened, to the point that, around this time, Louis received a series of letters from Outremer, which referred to the Eastern Empire as a main threat to the principality. We cannot even exclude that Louis might have even been afraid that, if he had recognised Manuel as emperor, Barbarossa might invade his kingdom as an act of reprisal. Therefore, since the French king, who was Alexander’s host, eventually did not support Manuel’s recognition, the pope may have felt compelled to follow a similar political line.19

Manuel’s imperial recognition was probably only one of the two tasks that the Byzantine legates had. The other was the negotiation of an anti-Barbarossa

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coalition that would include themselves, the Sicilians, Alexander III, and Louis VII, and which was probably also aimed at restoring Alexander to Rome. William I appears to have been one of the main proponents of this alliance, and that was why he provided the galleys for Manuel’s agents. The king appears to have been particularly keen on obtaining the support of the French monarch, as the evidence suggests that he entrusted the Greek envoys to obtain letters for him from Louis VII. Yet, even in this case the French monarch was quite reluctant to undertake an action that was not particularly advantageous to himself. If such a plan had been successful, Louis would have both been involved in a conflict against Barbarossa, and would have lost most of the influence that he could exercise as Alexander III’s host. Therefore, despite the Greek legates urging him to provide the letters for William, Louis failed to give them to Manuel’s men, and thus the coalition never eventually formed.\footnote{Louis VII, ‘Epistulae…’, nos. 185-86, pp. 56-57; Lamma, Comneni e Staufer..., II, 88-102; Marcel Pacaut, ‘Papauté, royauté et épiscopat dans le Royaume de Sicile (deuxième moitié du XIIème siècle), in Potere, società...’, pp. 31-61 (p. 41); Tolstoy-Miloslavsky, ‘Manuel I Komnenos and Italy…’, pp. 244-47. Further evidence that Alexander tried to act as a broker in the negotiations between William I and Louis VII can be found in Alexander III, ‘Epistolae’, no. 153, pp. 825-26.} However, the negotiations probably did not end with a diplomatic incident between the Byzantines and the Sicilians, as has been suggested by Tolstoy-Miloslavsky. Indeed, there is no actual evidence that Manuel’s envoys were not allowed passage through the *Mezzogiorno* while on their way back to Constantinople. A Byzantine legate who was trying to reach France had indeed not been allowed passage through Southern Italy, but this seems to have happened before the round of negotiations that took place in 1163-64. As mentioned by Lamma, the text that mentions this incident is a letter in which Louis VII was informed of Manuel’s marriage with Maria, and thus it was written shortly after the wedding (probably in early 1162). Tolstoy-Miloslavsky has probably been led to his conclusion by the role of mediator played by Archbishop Henry of Benevento both in this case and in a series of events that took place in 1164. However, the most sensible explanation is that Henry probably acted as a mediator on two distinct occasions.\footnote{Louis VII, ‘Epistulae…’, nos. 183, 249, pp. 55-56, 82; Alexander III, ‘Epistolae’, no. 124, p. 814; ‘Documenti beneventani inediti del secolo XII’, ed. by Dieter Girgensohn, Samnium, 40 (1967), 262-317 (no. 9, pp. 302-04); Tolstoy-Miloslavsky, ‘Manuel I Komnenos and Italy…’, pp. 202-03, 249, 261-64; Lamma, Comneni e Staufer..., II, 96-99.}

Manuel’s negotiations with Alexander III continued in the following years. Probably in 1166, the emperor sent Jordan, a son of Prince Robert of Capua, as an...
envoy to Rome, to which Alexander had returned in the previous year. The choice as a legate of Jordan, the son of an émigré who had been captured and blinded during the 1156 rebellion against William I, is particularly interesting, and has led Lamma to suggest that this embassy took place after the death of William I. Indeed, one of the first moves of the Sicilian regents who were governing for William’s minor son was to attempt a reconciliation with the former rebels. Hence, Lamma does not exclude that, while in Italy, Jordan negotiated not only with the pope, but also with the Sicilians. Regardless of the chronology of these talks, and despite Jordan’s offers of financial support from Byzantium, Manuel still did not obtain papal recognition as sole emperor. Alexander was probably unconvinced by Jordan’s claims that the Eastern emperor would reunite the Churches. Indeed, in that same year, the basileus had tried to summon a council to reconcile the theological differences with Roman Christianity, but his plans had been met with a strong opposition from his own clergy.\textsuperscript{22}

In the meantime, in addition to negotiating with Pope Alexander, Manuel also maintained good relations with Sicily. The emperor did not try to take advantage of the death of William I, and of the minority of his successor William II (1166-89). According to Kinnamos, Manuel indeed refused to give his support to a brother of William I (probably Simon, an illegitimate son of Roger II), who asked for Byzantine help in order to try to obtain the throne. Furthermore, the basileus renewed his alliance with the new king, and even started negotiating a matrimonial alliance with the Sicilians: his then only daughter and heiress Maria was to marry William II. While these diplomatic manoeuvres were certainly aimed at strengthening the Byzantine-Sicilian alliance against Frederick, they are probably also linked with Manuel’s talks with Pope Alexander. Indeed, as clearly shown by Romuald’s account, in the eyes of a Westerner, William II would have become the heir to the Byzantine throne. Therefore, Manuel possibly also hoped that this marriage could be seen as a further testament to his good will towards the Western Christians, and that it might remove any obstacle to his recognition as sole emperor. However, these matrimonial negotiations eventually stalled, probably because the failure of the talks with the pope made such a marriage much less advantageous for Manuel. Furthermore, Maria was already betrothed to the brother and heir of the King of Hungary. Thus, Manuel might have eventually preferred to halt his negotiations with the Sicilians in order to prevent the breaking of the

\textsuperscript{22} Le Liber Pontificalis, ii, 412-13, 415; Tolstoy-Miloslavsky, ‘Manuel I Komnenos and Italy...’, pp. 269-73; Lamma, Comneni e Staufer..., ii, 128-43.
engagement, which would have destabilised the already-fragile relations between Byzantium and the Magyars.23

As mentioned above, despite the failure of the matrimonial negotiations, Byzantium and the Kingdom of Sicily nevertheless remained allied. This alliance, together with Barbarossa’s siege of Ancona, explains why Manuel conducted some diplomatic activity against Barbarossa during the Kaiser’s new Italian campaign of 1167. This time, Barbarossa’s campaign was not primarily aimed at Northern Italy, as Frederick spent little time in Lombardy before he besieged Ancona for about three weeks, until the city surrendered. Manuel still held a form of protectorate over Ancona (indeed, an Eastern imperial officer was in the city during the siege), and Barbarossa had decided to besiege it in order to get hold of the Byzantine money that he thought had been deposited there, and which would have been used for financing the Italian rebels. Frederick then entered Rome, where, as Alexander had fled for Benevento, he installed a new anti-pope (Paschal III), who crowned him emperor again. These were to be some preliminary moves before Barbarossa could attempt to achieve his main goal: taking advantage of William II’s minority to undertake an attack against the Mezzogiorno. However, an epidemic of bacterial dysentery struck Rome, and killed many of Frederick’s most trusted advisers, preventing Barbarossa from joining Andrew of Rupecanina and Robert of Loritello, who were already at the borders of the Kingdom of Sicily, and forcing him to return to Germany. Furthermore, in Northern Italy, Milan had been re-founded, and most of the Lombard cities had joined together, forming an anti-Barbarossa alliance (the Lombard League). This coalition soon allied with the League of Verona, which comprised the Veneto cities that had allied against the Kaiser.24 While Manuel

23 Romuald, Annales, pp. 254-55; Dandolo, Chronica extensa, bk 9, ch. 15, p. 249; Kinnamos, bk 4, ch. 15, p. 175; Chalandon, Histoire de la domination normande..., II, 307; Tolstoy-Miloslavsky, ‘Manuel I Komnenos and Italy...’, pp. 268-69; John Parker, ‘The Attempted Byzantine Alliance with the Sicilian Norman Kingdom (1166-7), Papers of the British School at Rome, 24 (1956), 86-93 (pp. 87-93).
(obviously) had nothing to do with the epidemic, he appears to have had an important role as a financier of the Lombard League. Indeed, a variety of sources suggest that Manuel provided financial assistance to the league, in particular for the rebuilding of Milan.\textsuperscript{25} The rivalry between the two emperors made it possible to restore good relations between Venice and Manuel in the first half of the 1160s, as the Adriatic commune had changed its policy towards Barbarossa even before Byzantium. Venice had started to keep a distance from Frederick in 1158, when it had felt worried by the plans for more direct imperial domination over Northern Italy that the Kaiser had revealed at the second Diet of Roncaglia. However, the point of no return had been the Venetian decision to support Alexander during the papal schism.\textsuperscript{26} The rift had turned into an open conflict in 1162, during Barbarossa’s second Italian campaign. While Frederick’s most trusted Italian ally, the Patriarch of Aquileia, unsuccessfully attacked Grado, the German emperor tried to besiege Venice with the help of the neighbouring cities of the Veneto. However, this attempt also failed, as the Venetians successfully counterattacked, and soon managed to persuade their neighbouring cities to desert Barbarossa, and to ally with them, thus forming the League of Verona (probably in August 1162). Manuel may have financially supported this coalition in order to hinder the German advance, but the only evidence of this comes from a passage by Kinnamos mentioning an embassy which has been variously dated by modern scholars. The chronicler mentions that the Greek envoy Nikephoros Chalouphes was sent to Venice ‘with money’, and that the Adriatic city promised to help the Byzantines against Barbarossa.\textsuperscript{27} It is

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probable that this legation took place in late 1167, as Chalouphe had been captured by the Hungarians in 1166, and appears to have been released in 1167, shortly after Easter. Furthermore, the legation to which Niketas refers was probably the same embassy mentioned by the *Annales Venetici breves* (which dated it to December 1167), and also by Andrea Dandolo. Finally, a further element supporting this hypothesis comes from an anti-Barbarossa agreement that, also in 1167, Venice signed with Ferrara, the Lombard League, and the League of Verona, according to which the Adriatic commune was only required to provide naval help against the Germans. This pact mentions that if Venice were to receive any money from the Byzantines (or from the Sicilians), this was to be divided equally amongst all the cities. This clearly suggests that the two leagues were expecting Manuel to help them financially, probably because they had recently obtained some economic assistance from him.28

However, one feature of Dandolo’s account that is most improbable, is that during these negotiations the Byzantines unsuccessfully asked Venice for military help against the Sicilians. Even though the matrimonial negotiations between Manuel and William II had not been successful, it is difficult to accept the chronicler’s statement that this led to renewed hostility between the two powers, for, as Romuald clearly points out, relations between the two rulers nevertheless remained extremely friendly. Furthermore, another element which makes Dandolo’s account even more unlikely is that Manuel was then involved in negotiations for a joint naval attack on Egypt together with the Kingdom of Jerusalem. Considering that the *basileus* had always tried not to be involved in two conflicts in different

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areas of his empire at the same time, it would be strange indeed for him to do
exactly the opposite on this occasion. In addition, some further possible evidence
of the existence of some hostility between Byzantium and the rulers of the
Mezzogiorno around the mid-1160s, has recently been discredited. The hints were
thought to be found in Michael of Anchialos’s inaugural lecture as ὑπατὸς τῶν
philosophōn, which, in one of its passages, refers to the Sicilian king being about to
be annihilated by Manuel. Yet, in a recent work, Ioannis Polemis has convincingly
suggested that this lecture was delivered shortly after 1151, and not in 1165-66, as
previously assumed by modern scholars. This means that Michael of Anchialos
was referring to Roger II, rather than to William I, as about to face destruction from
Manuel.

Venetian hostility towards Barbarossa differentiated this city from the other
naval powers from Central or Northern Italy, as Pisa and Genoa had by then
decided to support the German emperor. In 1162, Frederick reached an agreement
first with Pisa and then with Genoa, which both agreed to support his planned
expedition against William I. However, there is a major difference between the
Pisan and Genoese attitude towards the two emperors. The Pisans had been long-
time supporters of Barbarossa, and this had led to worse relations with Manuel.
Indeed, according to the Chronica regia Coloniensis, in 1162, after a fruitless Pisan
embassy to Constantinople in 1161-62, Pisa offered to assist Barbarossa in case
he might attack Byzantium. By contrast, the Genoese had decided to side with
Frederick with extreme reluctance, and the Ligurian city had supported Alexander
III in the papal schism until a few days before the signing of the agreement with the
German Empire. This political volte-face was the result of the Genoese fear that a
refusal to assist Barbarossa might have had extremely negative consequences.
Genoa was persuaded to support Frederick after being granted some valuable
prospective commercial advantages in Southern Italy, which would have further
improved the city’s already-intense mercantile activity in the area. In addition, the
Genoese were probably afraid that, if they had refused to assist Barbarossa, the

29 Dandolo, Chronica extensa, bk 9, ch. 15, p. 249; Romuald, Annales, p. 254; Lilie,
Handel und Politik..., pp. 470-72; Harris, Byzantium and the Crusades..., pp. 117-18.
30 Michael of Anchialos, ‘A New Source on Byzantine-Hungarian Relations in the
Twelfth Century: The Inaugural Lecture of Michael ὁ τοῦ Ἀγχιάλου ὡς “Ὑπατος τῶν
131-34); Ioannis D. Polemis, ‘Notes on the Inaugural Oration of the Patriarch Michael
of Anchialos’, Byzantinoslavica, 69 (2011), 162-72 (pp. 162-70). For the traditional
dating of Michael’s oration, see Makk, The Árpáds and the Comneni..., pp. 101-03;
Magdalino, The Empire..., p. 81.
Germans might have tried to force them to submit, as they had done in most of the rest of Northern Italy.31

However, the political alignment of Pisa and Genoa alongside Frederick was only possible after a truce between the two cities was reached with the mediation of the Germans in August 1162. While the conflict between Genoa and Pisa had been conducted mostly in Sardinia, it had probably broken out in Constantinople, where Genoa had obtained its quarter either in 1158 or, more likely, in 1160. According to Caffaro, the much more numerous Pisans attacked the Genoese, and prevailed over them thanks to the support of many Venetians and Constantinopolitan Greeks – Manuel does not appear to have provided any official backing. The Pisans pillaged 3000 hyperpera from the Genoese quarter, while the Genoese had to flee Constantinople. The conflict then moved to the Tyrrhenian Sea, and it finally ended when the Germans managed to broker a truce between the two cities.32 One of the consequences of the riot was that, in its aftermath, one of the commercial rivals of Venice, Genoa, no longer had a quarter in Constantinople. It has been suggested that Manuel took this decision in order to punish the Genoese. However, the surviving evidence suggests that he did not take any initiative following the riot, as Pisa does not appear to have faced any consequence immediately after this riot. The moving of the Pisan quarter to Pera or Scutari, and thus out of Constantinople (of which we are aware because, when Manuel issued a chrysobull for Pisa in 1170, he restored it to its original location), probably happened a few years later, and is not to be associated with this raid. By contrast, the Ligurian city did not re-obtain its quarter. However, this was probably a consequence of a Genoese decision not to try to recover the compound after the Pisan pillaging had led to a


The first substantial evidence of the existence of a Genoese quarter in Constantinople is a letter written by Alexander in August 1161, in which the pope was trying to make sure that the legates that he had sent to Manuel, had the support of the Genoese residents in Romania. See Italia pontificia, vi.2, ‘Civitas Ianuensis’, no. 25, pp. 327-28; Lamma, Comneni e Staufer…, ii, 65.
loss of internal consensus of the pro-Byzantine faction of the city.\textsuperscript{33} The Venetians did not face any consequences for their involvement in the riot either, and appear to have taken advantage of the absence of the Genoese to increase their commercial activity in the Eastern Empire.

The anti-German stance of the Venetians also meant that the Adriatic city remained allied with the Sicilians. If Frederick had succeeded in conquering Southern Italy, Pisa and Genoa would have undoubtedly obtained substantial commercial advantages, but Barbarossa never reached his goal (he had to return to Germany, and never led his army against William I). This meant that the decision by Venice not to break its alliance with the Sicilians was extremely wise. Indeed, the choice made by Pisa and Genoa of supporting Barbarossa’s planned expedition led to strained relations between William I and these two maritime republics, thus creating more commercial opportunities for Venice. The Pisans, due to the long-lasting and unconditional support they had given to Barbarossa, were more severely affected by the king’s hostility. Indeed, Bernardo Maragone records that in October 1162 the Sicilian king imprisoned all the Pisans that he could find in his kingdom, and had their goods confiscated; William also captured a Pisan ship that was returning from Constantinople.\textsuperscript{34} Even if the Genoese did not have to face such acts of wrath, their agreement with Frederick nevertheless had negative consequences on their trade with the Mezzogiorno. Commerce had already decreased in the previous years due to the political instability generated by the city’s conflict with Pisa, by the foreign threats to Sicily, and by the rebellion that had generated after Maio’s death. After 1162, while trade between Southern Italy and Genoa did not further diminish, its pattern significantly changed, as those involved in this commerce were no longer Ligurian merchants, but rather traders from Southern Italy who resided in Genoa. This was mainly due to a fear of reprisals by

\textsuperscript{33} Documenti sulle relazioni delle città toscane..., nos. 8, 34, pp. 10, 45, 54; Maragone, Annales Pisani, a. 1171, p. 54; Day, Genoa’s Response..., pp. 26, 93-96; Nicol, Byzantium and Venice..., pp. 94-95; Magdalino, The Empire..., pp. 90-91; Lilie, Handel und Politik..., p. 457; Smyrlis, ‘Private Property…’, p. 122. Based on Documenti sulle relazioni delle città toscane..., no. 10, pp. 11-13, Lilie, Handel und Politik..., pp. 458-59 fn. 181 has suggested that in 1166 the Pisan quarter was still in Constantinople. However, since the document is written using the Pisan style, and since it is unclear whether ‘post x’ should be interpreted as meaning ‘post Christum’ or ‘post decem’, its correct dating is either December 1165 or December 1175. The former dating is suggested by Peter Classen, Burgundio von Pisa: Richter – Gesandter - Übersetzer (Heidelberg: Carl Winter Verlag, 1974), p. 24, fn. 16; the latter by Charles Homer Haskins, ‘Leo Tuscus’, The English Historical Review, 33 (1918), 492-96 (p. 492 fn. 2).

William, coupled with internal problems, and with renewed hostilities with Pisa over the control of Sardinia.\textsuperscript{35}

\textbf{iii) The Byzantine Expansion in the Balkans (1161-67)}

We have seen how Byzantine diplomatic activity towards Italy obtained support from Venice. However, the policy that Manuel was conducting in the Balkans in the same years would lead to new tension with the Adriatic city, as soon as Venice no longer felt threatened by Barbarossa.

Even though Manuel and King Géza II of Hungary had settled a peace in 1155, and signed a five-year treaty in 1161, a new conflict between Byzantium and Hungary began in 1162 after Manuel was involved in a succession crisis, and then attempted to acquire some land that was under Hungarian control, especially Dalmatia and Bosnia. This would have allowed him to extend his control over the Eastern Adriatic, and thus to keep a closer eye on the possible threats coming from Italy. During one of the breaks in this conflict, Béla, the younger brother of the Hungarian monarch Stephen III, was handed over to Manuel, and betrothed to Maria, the daughter (and, at this stage, heiress) of the \textit{basileus}. Soon afterwards, he himself would even be designated as Manuel’s heir. The Byzantine-Hungarian war ended in 1167 with Manuel’s conquest of Dalmatia, Bosnia, and Sirmium (this town had already been acquired in 1165, and had become the capital of a new province, initially governor by Chalouphes). The Eastern Empire was to hold on to these areas until the early 1180s, not least due to a policy of fiscal exemption enacted by Manuel.\textsuperscript{36}

In addition to being involved in the conflict with the Byzantines, the Hungarians had probably also taken advantage of the rebellion of Zadar in 1164. The Dalmatian city had already unsuccessfully revolted against Venice in 1159,


when the doge had summoned all the Venetians who were in *Romania* and in Syria to return to their homeland to help to recover the city. Following the suppression of this rebellion, Doge Domenico Morosini’s homonymous son was appointed as *comes* of the city, in an attempt to strengthen the Venetian hold on the area, and to prevent further rebellions.\(^{37}\) This was successful, and in 1164, the doge reacted by leading a fleet to Zadar, but he failed to reconquer the city. The Venetians eventually managed to recover Zadar after a new expedition which was probably launched in 1165 following a preliminary agreement with Byzantium – the two powers were now united due to their mutual hostility towards Hungary –, and led by Morosini, who was reinstated as *comes*.\(^{38}\) While until this stage Venice appears not to have been actively hostile to Byzantium, this situation would soon change. Indeed, after the recovery of Zadar, the Venetians reconciled with the Hungarians; peace was sealed with a marriage between one of the doge’s sons and a Magyar princess. In addition, another son of Vitale II Michiel married a daughter of the Serbian ruler Dessa, who had by then fallen out of Manuel’s favour (and lost his throne) after he had recognised the King of Hungary as his lord.\(^{39}\) These marriages appear to suggest that Venice realised that the Hungarians and the Serbs were no longer dangerous to them. It was the Byzantines that had now become the most relevant power in Dalmatia. Their presence in the area could indeed be perceived as a threat to the Venetian possessions in the north of this region, and this probably led to the worsening of relations between Venice and Manuel. The embassy which took place in December 1167, and in which, according to Dandolo, the Venetians refused to provide naval help to Manuel, might be considered as the first sign of such a change in attitude. However, as already mentioned, this account is extremely problematic, as a Byzantine request for naval help against the Sicilians makes little sense in the political context of the time. Lilie’s suggestion that the Venetians were asked for naval help against Hungary (rather than against Sicily) cannot be excluded, but is not entirely unproblematic either. Such a refusal,

\(^{37}\) *Annales Venetici breves*, a. 1159, p. 94; *DCV*, no. 143, pp. 142-43; Dandolo *Chronica extensa*, bk 9, ch. 15, pp. 249-50; Nicol, *Byzantium and Venice…*, p. 94; Madden, *Enrico Dandolo…*, p. 43.

\(^{38}\) *Historia ducum…*, ch. 12, p. 18; Dandolo *Chronica extensa*, bk 9, ch. 15, pp. 249-50; Kinnamos, bk 5, ch. 12, p. 237; *CDRCSD*, 2, no. 93, p. 71; Stephenson, *Byzantium’s Balkan Frontier…*, pp. 255-56; Ferluga, ‘La Dalmazia…’, pp. 198-200, 203; Makk, *The Árpáds and the Comneni…*, p. 91.

together with the marriages between the sons of the doge and the Hungarian and Serbian princess, could indeed be explained as a Venetian political turnaround in the light of Manuel’s conquests in Dalmatia. Yet, the timing of this request for help makes this explanation not entirely convincing, as, by late 1167, the Byzantines had already decisively defeated Hungary, and do not seem to have been interested in continuing this conflict.\(^{40}\) However, we must admit that Lilie’s explanation still makes more sense than both the possibility that Dandolo’s account is entirely accurate, or that the chronicler misdated an actual Byzantine request for help against the Sicilians by at least a decade (for this might have happened either in 1155, or in 1185).

**iv) New Byzantine-Papal Negotiations, and Manuel’s Hostility to Venice (1167-72)**

Barbarossa’s disastrous Italian expedition in 1167 was an important turning point not only in the Byzantine relations with Venice, but also in those with the Papacy. Mutual hostility towards the German emperor had indeed been the only element that could lead Manuel to work with the other two powers. Therefore, after Frederick had (temporarily) abandoned his project of forcing Northern Italy to submit, Pope Alexander was no longer ready to recognise Manuel as sole emperor. Furthermore, the Venetians, especially following Manuel’s conquests in Dalmatia, began to consider the Byzantines a direct threat to their interests.\(^{41}\)

Alexander III would be the first to keep a distance from Manuel. In 1167 or 1168, the pope turned down a new Byzantine offer to re-unite the Churches, and to provide military help to the pope, in exchange for the recognition of Manuel as sole emperor. Furthermore, probably around the same time, the pontiff, afraid of the increasing Byzantine power in the West, successfully dissuaded the Lombard League from offering Manuel suzerainty over Lombardy. The dating of such project is rather dubious, but one indication seems to suggest that these negotiations took place early in 1168. While the pact sworn by the members of the Lombard League in December 1167 mentioned the possibility that Manuel might finance the coalition, such a clause was not included in the new oath that was taken by the

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Italian cities in March/April 1168. If indeed such an offer had been made to Manuel, and then withheld, it would seem quite natural for the basileus to react by ceasing to finance the League.42

Relations between Venice and the Eastern Empire also dramatically worsened following the failure of Barbarossa’s Italian campaign. The Germans were no longer considered a major threat to the independence of the communes, and thus the Venetians could once more focus on the situation in the Adriatic area. Since the Eastern Empire now ruled over a portion of Dalmatia, and still held a form of overlordship over Ancona, it had become a major power in this region. This, coupled with the Venetian matrimonial alliances with two of Manuel’s traditional enemies in the area (the Hungarians and the Serbs), led to a major rivalry between the Byzantines and the Venetians over the control of the Adriatic.43

This rivalry soon transformed into open tension. However, the Venetian and Byzantine sources make it difficult to examine how the situation evolved, as they both omit a part of the account of the development of the events, making it difficult to analyse them. Yet, it is highly likely that the first consequence of the tension was an order of repatriation issued by the doge a few years before 1171, which is only mentioned by the Venetian sources. However, most scholars have suggested that this ordinance was generally ignored by the Venetians in Romania, as the scale of their trade there skyrocketed in the years immediately preceding 1171 (despite a brief but significant diminution between December 1168 and September 1169).44 Yet, as explained by Lilie, the scale of trade soon increased again as this order was withdrawn soon after it had been issued. The sources are rather unclear regarding what led Vitale Michiel II to recall his subjects to Venice. In November 1168 there had been a military confrontation between some Anconitan and Venetian ships. The former, who had conducted some piratical activity against the Venetians in the Adriatic, were defeated; five ships from Ancona and their crews were captured, and two crew members were hanged. Even though since the late 1140s the Eastern Empire had protected Ancona in case of foreign attacks, and used this city as a military base for its own troops, it is unlikely that these piratical deeds were directly

43 Freed, Frederick Barbarossa… p. 354; Magdalino, The Empire…, p. 93; Nicol, Byzantium and Venice…., p. 96; Pertusi, L’Impero Bizantino…’, p. 83; Abulafia, The Two Italies…., pp. 141-42; Ravegnani, ‘Tra i due imperi…’, p. 50.
44 Dandolo, Chronica extensa, bk 9, ch. 15, p. 249; Nicol, Byzantium and Venice…., p. 96; Madden, Enrico Dandolo…., p. 51; Ravegnani, ‘Tra i due imperi…’, pp. 50-52.
related with Byzantium. Furthermore, even if the raids by the Anconitans were orchestrated by Manuel, the sources seem to consider the naval confrontation as a minor skirmish. Therefore, this does not justify a reaction as strong as the withdrawal of all the Venetian merchants from Romania, which was clearly undertaken as a first step before launching a full-scale military campaign. A more likely explanation is that the turning point in this relationship was the unsuccessful Byzantine embassy of December 1167. The more convincing explanation is that a diplomatic breakout took place. The Greek envoys probably did not ask the Venetians to provide a fleet to assist the Eastern Empire, but rather ordered them to do so. They probably stressed that Venice was supposed to provide military assistance since it was part of the empire. This deeply offended the Venetian government, which did not want to help a rival to solidify its positions in Dalmatia, and, even more importantly, was proud of its own political autonomy. Therefore, rather than helping the Byzantines, Venice decided to launch an expedition against the Eastern Empire.

However, in this case, open conflict was avoided, as Manuel realised that he was in serious trouble, and that he had better come to terms with the Venetians. The emperor was indeed aware that, since at that time he was planning a naval expedition against Egypt, his fleet was not strong enough to face Venice as well. The treaty that Pisa signed with Dubrovnik and Split in May 1169 possibly suggests that Manuel might have tried to obtain the support of the Tuscan city in case he could not appease Venice. However, if this move had some consequences, it was probably only that of creating a bigger rift with the Venetians, who did not appreciate the involvement of Pisa in a region in which their commercial presence was predominant. Therefore, Manuel realised that the best way to avoid a crushing defeat was to reconcile with Venice, and he eventually did so (it is likely that this happened in the summer of 1169). The emperor probably accepted all the terms of


47 Kinnamos, bk 5, ch. 17, bk 6, chs 4-5, p. 248, 263, 265; ‘Annales Venetici breves’, a. 1167, p. 94; Dandolo, Chronica extensa, bk 9, ch. 15, p. 249.
his enemies, possibly with the idea of reneging on them later, once he was no longer in such a difficult situation.\footnote{Dandolo, \textit{Chronica extensa}, bk 9, ch. 15, p. 250; 'Documenti intorno alle relazioni commerciali fra la Toscana e gli scali adriatici dalmati', ed. by Gino Guarnieri, appendix to: Gino Guarnieri, 'Intorno alle relazioni commerciali marittime nel Medio Evo fra la Toscana e gli scali adriatici dalmati', \textit{Archivio storico italiano}, 125 (1967), 352-64 (no. 1, pp. 359-60); Marin, ‘Venice, Byzantium…’, p. 203.}

According to the \textit{Historia ducum Veneticorum}, Manuel even granted a commercial monopoly in \textit{Romania} to the Venetians, but this passage has been given very little attention by scholars, with the exception of Lilie, who believes it to be unreliable.\footnote{‘Historia ducum…’, ch. 17, p. 28; Lilie, \textit{Handel und Politik…}, pp. 476-79.} Yet, some evidence suggests that this account is to be trusted, and that it meant that the Venetians became the only Italians who could have a quarter inside Constantinople. The previously mentioned agreement which Pisa signed with Dubrovnik and Split in May 1169 provides a key element supporting this suggestion. Indeed, the Pisan commercial involvement in Dalmatia is highly likely to have caused Venice to request those conditions to Manuel when the reconciliation took place. Furthermore, the text of the agreement between Pisa and the two Dalmatian cities twice refers to the figure of a Pisan \textit{vicecomes Constantinopolitanus}. It can be argued that in Medieval Latin \textit{Constantinopolitanus} was often used as a synonym for ‘Byzantine’, but this is not entirely true. Indeed, its main use was as an attribute after \textit{imperator}. However, the only reason why such term was used was because the Byzantine emperor was based in Constantinople. Therefore, \textit{Constantinopolitanus} was actually a synecdoche that was skilfully preferred over the problematic alternatives (\textit{Graecorum} or \textit{Romanorum}). For the same reason, it would be extremely strange for the Pisans to use this term for their \textit{vicecomes} unless he was also based in Constantinople, rather than somewhere else in the Eastern Empire. Hence, this means that, in May 1169, the Pisan quarter was still in Constantinople, and that the relocation of the Pisan compound across the Golden Horn took place sometime later. Indeed, it is very likely that this move is to be associated with the implementation of the terms on which Manuel agreed with Venice. Finally, even though the same person (Burgundio) was in charge of the negotiations in both Dalmatia and Constantinople, we cannot exclude that he returned to Pisa between the two embassies. Otherwise, he might have originally been entrusted to engage with talks with Manuel in order to obtain compensation for not having received the yearly tribute that the Byzantines were to provide to the Pisans according to the terms of the chrysobull of 1111. Yet, since in the meantime
the Pisan quarter had been moved, he may have ended up negotiating about this as well.\textsuperscript{50} Furthermore, when Genoa re-obtained its quarter in October 1169, this was also established outside Constantinople for exactly the same reason. This is also why Genoa also obtained significant limitations when it reached a new agreement with Manuel. In particular, the Genoese could neither trade silk in Thebes, nor could their commercial ships sail to two specific locations (Rhosia and Matracha, lying, respectively, on the shores of the Black and Azov Seas). Finally, outside of Constantinople, they were to pay the full-rate kommerkion (instead of the reduced amount that they had been granted in 1155). All these conditions are consistent with the promise of granting a commercial monopoly to the Venetians.\textsuperscript{51}

The Byzantine reconciliation with Venice was not Manuel’s only attempt to improve his relations in Italy, as the basileus also tried to improve his relations with Alexander III by arranging a wedding between his own niece Eudokia and Oddone Frangipani, one of the main Roman allies of the pope. Furthermore, as we shall soon see in more detail, the Eastern emperor began talks with Pisa and Genoa, the other two main naval powers of Italy, who had, respectively, previously supported Barbarossa, and maintained a duplicitous attitude towards him. In addition to trying to dissuade these two cities from backing Frederick’s plans of acquiring Southern Italy, Manuel may have hoped that these cities might support him if there were to be a Byzantine-Venetian conflict. The basileus probably also hoped that his involvement in naval operations in Egypt alongside the Kingdom of Jerusalem might encourage both Pisa and Genoa, who had strong commercial bonds with the Crusader States, to undertake negotiations with him.\textsuperscript{52}

However, the main factor that led to good relations between Manuel and both Pisa and Genoa being restored was the temporary end of Barbarossa’s plans to subjugate Italy, following his disastrous 1167 expedition. Both cities sent a legation to William II, but only the Pisan one bore fruit – a treaty was signed in

\textsuperscript{50} ‘Documenti intorno alle relazioni commerciali...’, no. 1, pp. 359-60; Maragone, Annales Pisani, a. 1172, p. 54; Penna, The Byzantine Imperial Acts..., p. 117; Classen, Burgundio..., pp. 22-28. If we accept the dating suggested by Classen, Burgundio..., p. 24 fn. 16, then also Documenti sulle relazioni delle città toscane..., no. 8, p. 10 provides evidence that the Pisan quarter was not moved out of Constantinople just after 1162, as it was still there in late 1165.


1169. Furthermore, in October of the same year the Genoese obtained a colony across the Golden Horn, together with a reduction of the kommerkion that they had to pay when they traded in Constantinople (four percent instead of ten percent). In return, the Ligurian city was to provide military help against Egypt. However, these conditions were probably not entirely accepted in Genoa, and were soon renegotiated. Eventually, in May 1170 Genoa re-obtained its original quarter in Constantinople (the Coparion, located directly to the East of the original Pisan compound, and also comprising a wharf, and some land where a church was to be built). It was also granted reparations for the losses that it had suffered in 1162.\footnote{CDRG, II, nos 48, 50, 52, 53, pp. 99-102, 104-23; Oberto Cancellario, ‘Annales’, aa. 1168, 1170, pp. 213-14, 233-36; Maragone, Annales Pisani, aa. 1168, p. 44; Marco Tangheroni, ‘Il Mezzogiorno normanno-svevo visto da Pisa’, in Il Mezzogiorno normanno-svevo..., pp. 95-109 (p. 105); Day, Genoa’s Response..., pp. 26-27, 95-98, 136-38; Abulafia, The Two Italies..., pp. 136-40; Madden, Enrico Dandolo..., p. 52; Lamma, Commeni e Stauffer..., II, 185-86, 189; Jacoby, ‘Italian Privileges…’, pp. 360-61; Freed, Frederick Barbarossa..., pp. 313-14.}

This grant of a compound in Constantinople to the Genoese was, in effect, a breach of the earlier agreement concluded between Manuel and Venice. Yet, as we have seen, the emperor had been forced to grant the prerogatives to Venice while he was already involved in military operations in Egypt, and thus did not want to face naval raids from the West. However, once the situation had become calmer, he felt that, since he was not involved in any other conflict, he would be able to repel a possible attack from Venice with considerable ease. Furthermore, we know that in 1170 Manuel received a legation from Frederick’s arch-chancellor, Archbishop Christian of Mainz, probably aimed at reaching a reconciliation between the two empires. Even though we do not know when exactly this embassy reached Constantinople, by the time Manuel granted his new concessions to Genoa, he may have been aware that Barbarossa was planning to undertake a new expedition into Italy. Thus, Venice would have had more immediate threats to face, rather than worrying over the loss of its commercial monopoly in Constantinople. Finally, Manuel hoped that, in case of a violent reaction by Venice to such decisions, Genoa could provide some naval help in return for the concessions that it had obtained.\footnote{‘Annales S. Petri Erphesfurtesenses maiiores’, ed. by Oswald Holder-Egger, in Monumenta Erphesfurtesia..., a. 1170, p. 60; ‘Cronica S. Petri Erfordensis moderna’, ed. by Oswald Holder-Egger, in Monumenta Erphesfurtesia..., a. 1171, p. 186; Tolstoy-Miloslavsky, ‘Manuel I Komnenos and Italy…’, pp. 299-300; Lilie, Byzantium and the Crusader..., p. 201; Freed, Frederick Barbarossa..., p. 354.}
The disastrous outcome of Barbarossa’s 1167 Italian expedition also led Pisa to try to restore good relations with Frederick’s enemies. In addition to the treaty with William II, the Tuscan city strengthened its bond with Byzantium. The first hint of this was the signing of the previously mentioned agreement with both Dubrovnik and Split, which was concluded in May 1169. It is highly probable that this pact (which was probably signed before Manuel’s reconciliation with Venice) was also aimed at countering the strong Venetian commercial presence in Dalmatia. Furthermore, we have already noticed that this charter provides key evidence that the Pisan quarter was moved out of Constantinople following the date of issue of this document (May 1169). Yet, the Pisan quarter was soon restored in its original location, as this was one of the concessions that Manuel granted to the Tuscan city in July 1170. The agreement between Pisa and Byzantium can most likely be explained as a consequence of the one that had just been negotiated between Genoa and the Eastern Empire. One would guess that the Pisans vigorously protested once they found out that their rivals, the Genoese, had obtained a quarter inside Constantinople. They undoubtedly insisted on obtaining similar conditions, as they did not want to be the only main Italian commercial power left out of the main Byzantine market. This agreement also made it possible for Pisa to develop fully the trade route that connected Tuscany with Constantinople via Dalmatia and, possibly, Ancona.

It is fair to say that the new concessions granted to Pisa and Genoa were not positively received by the Venetians, for whom they meant the end of their commercial monopoly. The coexistence of the three quarters soon became troublesome, and, according to Kinnamos, the Venetians (probably with some help from the Pisans) devastated the Genoese compound shortly after it was re-established. Since the agreement with Byzantium was ratified by the Genoese parliament in July/August 1170, the devastation of the quarter must have happened either after, or just before, this ratification (and also after the restoration of the Pisan compound, as the Tuscans were also involved in the riot). Following this

55 ‘Documenti intorno alle relazioni commerciali…’, no. 1, pp. 359-60; Maragone, Annales Pisani, aa. 1170, 1172, pp. 49, 54; Documenti sulle relazioni delle città toscane…, no. 34, pp. 45, 54; Abulafia, The Two Italies…, pp. 139-40; David Abulafia, ‘Dalmatian Ragusa and the Norman Kingdom of Sicily’, The Slavonic and East European Review, 54 (1976), 412-28 (p. 415); Abulafia, The Two Italies…, p. 150; Classen, ‘La politica di Manuele Commeno…’, p. 223; Gino Guarnieri, ‘Intorno alle relazioni commerciali marittime nel Medio Evo fra la Toscana e gli scali adriatici dalmati’, Archivio storico italiano, 125 (1967), 352-64 (pp. 353-54).
violent action, Manuel asked the Venetians to rebuild the houses that they had destroyed, and to pay for the damage that they had inflicted upon the Genoese. The Venetians, however, refused, and threatened to attack the Eastern Empire. While none of these events is narrated by the Venetian sources, two of them record that two envoys from Venice reached Constantinople. This legation is probably to be identified with the one mentioned by Kinnamos. However, the Venetian chronicles do not record that Manuel asked the legates for reparations, but rather that the emperor persuaded them that he intended to grant further and more extended privileges to the merchants from Venice. The legates heard rumours that Manuel was plotting something against their fellow citizens, but they eventually decided to trust the basileus after a series of assurances of his good will. If the information of each narrative source is partial but true, then, following the Venetian refusal to pay damages to the Genoese, the basileus probably pretended that he wanted a further reconciliation with the Adriatic commune, just as he had done a few years earlier. Yet, on this occasion, the rumours heard by the legates were actually true. Manuel indeed ordered the arrest of all the Venetians that were to be found in the empire, and the confiscation of their goods. This order was successfully carried out on 12 March 1171.

This explanation suggests that Manuel decided to grant extended privileges to the Venetians only because he was in a very difficult situation. Once he was no longer involved in another conflict, he changed his mind, since he was now confident that his fleet, which was still strong despite the loss of many vessels on their way back from Egypt, would be able to counter a possible reprisal by Venice. Yet, it is unclear whether he genuinely hoped that the Venetians would not react to his decision. Though it is extremely unlikely that the emperor already had a ‘grand anti-Venetian strategy’ ready when he first reconciled with Venice, his decision to reinstate both the Pisans and the Genoese into Constantinople was not particularly wise. Even though, in contrast to the earlier incident in 1162, the Greek population was not directly involved in the riot, there was still some strong popular resentment towards the Italians. Evidence of such a hostility can be seen not only in the events of 1162, but also in the anti-Latin reaction following the pro-Roman decisions taken

57 Kinnamos, bk 6, ch. 10, pp. 280, 282.
58 ‘Historia ducum…’, ch. 18, pp. 28-30; Dandolo, Chronica extensa, bk 9, ch. 15, p. 250; Madden, Enrico Dandolo…, p. 52.
during the Constantinopolitan synod of 1166. Although the Greeks had sided with the Venetians in 1162, more than one chronicler recalled how the latter were deemed arrogant and greedy by many Byzantines. Therefore, we can safely say that the restoration of the Pisan and Genoese quarters, rather than pouring oil on troubled waters, created a time bomb.\(^{60}\)

While Manuel’s behaviour before the pillaging of the Genoese quarter was probably naive, it is fair to say that the basileus had already planned his revenge when he met the legates from Venice after the destruction of the Genoese quarter. It is not entirely clear why Manuel decided to take such a drastic decision. We have already seen that the Venetians had probably been offended by the Byzantine envoys who, in December 1167, had not acknowledged their autonomy. However, Manuel was probably also irked by the Venetian refusal to recognise his own authority, and thought that the Adriatic city deserved a significant punishment. Perhaps this was just one of the results of the emperor’s change of attitude towards Westerners. This might have originated after the birth of his son Alexios in 1169, and the ensuing relegation of his daughter Maria and, more importantly, of her Hungarian fiancé Béla-Alexios from being the heirs to the Constantinopolitan throne. Indeed, his decision to appoint a ‘barbarian’ as his own successor appears to have been opposed by part of the Byzantine hierarchy, and Manuel’s later decision to reverse it may have given encouragement to an anti-Latin faction of the Constantinopolitan court. In turn, the presence of this group might have persuaded Manuel to take such a strong measure against the Venetians following their devastation of the Genoese quarter.\(^{61}\) In addition, Manuel probably thought that, since Barbarossa was apparently planning to attack Italy again, and as he himself was holding so many Venetian citizens as hostages, Venice would be unwilling, or unable, to react violently to the imprisonment of its countrymen, out of fear that the city would be left undefended, and that the captives might be killed. Such


\(^{61}\) Niketas Choniates, Historia, ‘Βασιλεία Μανουηλ του Κομνηνου, 4-5’, pp. 137, 169; Annals, pp. 78, 96.
circumstances would therefore lead the Venetians to decide to come to terms with Byzantium, and to yield to the emperor’s conditions.62

Manuel was indeed quite right. The Venetians did not react drastically to the news of the imprisonment of their citizens, most of whom were detained in the Byzantine prisons and monasteries – only a limited number of them some were soon liberated, or managed to evade arrest by fleeing Romania in a hurry. The doge’s first reaction was to send legates to the Bosporus to ask why their merchants had received such treatment. Yet, before the envoys could leave for Constantinople, twenty ships that had managed to leave Halmyros unharmed, arrived in Venice. Soon, news spread of what had actually happened, and the Venetian population forced the commune to attack the Byzantines. They demanded the building of a new fleet, and, once it was ready, around four months later, the doge was given the task of leading it against Manuel.63

The Venetians also persuaded the Serbs to revolt in order to force (albeit unsuccessfully) the Byzantines to focus on two fronts. In addition, Venice attacked Trogir and Dubrovnik, capturing the former, but probably not the latter. The Venetians then began to besiege the capital of Euboea. However, they halted the hostilities when the governor of the island offered to broker talks between the doge and Manuel in exchange for calling off the siege. A Greek envoy was thus sent to Constantinople together with two delegates from Venice, while the rest of the fleet, led by the doge, moved to Chios to winter there. However, Manuel refused to receive the legates until the Venetians stopped attacking his lands, and sent his envoy to Chios. The imperial agent, once he was there, advised the Venetians to send a new embassy to Constantinople, and so they did. The envoys soon returned to the fleet (most of which had moved to Panagea due to an epidemic that had struck Chios), with news that the emperor had refused to listen to them, but that he had promised that he would do so if a third embassy were sent. This new legation was duly despatched, but the Venetians were still unable to speak directly to Manuel. The emperor was probably aware that, in the meantime, the fleet led by the doge had sailed back towards Venice, and was no longer an immediate threat to his empire. Indeed, the doge had returned to Venice in late 1172 after having

62 Madden, Enrico Dandolo…, p. 53.
obtained the subjection of Dubrovnik. Soon after his return to Venice, Vitale II Michiel was stabbed to death by a ‘thief’, who was probably frustrated with the outcome of the expedition that the doge had launched against Manuel. Eleven of Michiel’s most trusted advisors were chosen to appoint his successor, and eventually Sebastiano Ziani was elected as doge. Ziani followed the strategy of his predecessor in negotiating with Manuel to secure the release of the imprisoned Venetians, but, as the basileus kept playing for time, he too failed to reach an agreement.

Procrastination had indeed proved to be an extremely efficient strategy for Manuel while the Venetian fleet was in the Aegean. It had made it possible for the emperor to reorganise his navy (indeed, according to the Greek sources, the arrival of a Byzantine fleet had been the main reason why the Venetians had retreated), and to engage in diplomatic talks. The Byzantines were meanwhile negotiating both with the Kaiser, and with the Sicilians. Talks with Frederick commenced in 1170, probably with the aim that their success would lead to an end of the German threats to the Eastern Empire. They continued in the years following, with Manuel unsuccessfully offering to arrange a marriage between his daughter Maria and Frederick’s son Henry. However, at around the same time, the same matrimonial proposal was made to William II. The support of the Sicilian king would have been helpful against both Barbarossa (in case Manuel’s negotiations with the Kaiser were unsuccessful) and Venice. The basileus possibly hoped that William’s navy would have supported his own when the Venetians were conducting their retaliatory actions in the Adriatic and Aegean. In this case, everything seemed to be going as planned, but in May 1172 William II was eventually left waiting in Taranto for his fiancée, who never arrived. Yet, this probably happened after the Germans had refused the proposal to have Henry VI married to Maria Komnene. Thus, the reason why Manuel did not send his daughter to Apulia does not appear to be

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64 ‘Historia ducum…’, chs 20-22, pp. 32-36; Dandolo, Chronica extensa, bk 9, ch. 15, pp. 251-52; Kinnamos, bk 6, ch. 11, pp. 286-88; Marin, ‘Venice, Byzantium…’, p. 205; Madden, Enrico Dandolo…, pp. 54-56; Abulafia, ‘Dalmatian Ragusa…’, pp. 419-22.
65 ‘Historia ducum…’, chs 23-26, pp. 36-42; Dandolo, Chronica extensa, bk 9, ch. 15, bk 10, ch. 1, pp. 252-53, 259-61; Marin, ‘Venice, Byzantium…’, p. 207.
linked with these negotiations.\textsuperscript{68} Moreover, the dating of the retreat of the Venetian fleet from the Aegean Sea is probably contemporary with the refusal to allow Maria’s wedding with William II. The marriage was not concluded because the Byzantines no longer needed William’s naval help against the Venetians. We shall also see that this aborted marriage led to worse relations between William II and Byzantium.\textsuperscript{69}

\textbf{v) The German-Venetian Siege of Ancona, and the New Venetian-Sicilian Alliance (1173-75)}

Not only was Manuel’s proposal for a matrimonial alliance between his daughter and Barbarossa’s son rejected, but it also led to new tensions between the two empires. Indeed, Frederick sent Archbishop Christian of Mainz to Italy, with, amongst his aims, that of occupying Ancona, which, as a Byzantine protectorate, was an important centre of opposition against the Kaiser. As outlined by the chronicler Boncompagno da Signa, the German emperor probably felt that, because of the strategic importance of this city, and of the ensuing loss of influence in Italy of the Eastern Empire, acquiring control over Ancona was the key to the success of a new full-scale Italian campaign. Therefore, his men began the siege of Ancona in 1173, so that in the following year, when Barbarossa was planning a new descent to Italy, this city would have been under German control.\textsuperscript{70} Yet, Frederick and his men knew that the only way to make Ancona submit was to besiege it not only by land, but also by sea. Therefore, they asked for, and

\begin{footnotes}
\item 69 However, that in 1173 William’s men attempted a naval raid against Manuel, as suggested by Andrew F. Stone, ‘A Norman Shipwreck in 1173’, \textit{Thesaurismata, 27} (1997), 19-25 (pp. 20-22, 24), is no more than a suggestive hypothesis based on a rather imaginative interpretation of two orations by Eustathios of Thessalonica.
\item 70 Boncompagno da Signa, \textit{The History of the Siege of Ancona, ed. and trans. by Andrew F. Stone, Archivio del Litorale Adriatico 6} (Venice: Filippi, 2002), ch. 3, p. 8; Tolstoy-Miloslavsky, ‘Manuel I Komnenos and Italy...’, p. 292; Antonio Carile, ‘Federico Barbarossa, i Veneziani e l’assedio di Ancona del 1173: Contributo alla storia politica e sociale della città nel secolo XII’, \textit{Studi veneziani, 16} (1974), 3-31 (pp. 5-6, 29). The \textit{Chronica regia Coloniensis}, a. 1171, p. 121 misdates the German siege of Ancona of 1171, and erroneously suggests that the city was eventually taken.
\end{footnotes}
obtained, naval help from the Venetians, who were more than happy to provide such assistance against a commercial rival over which Byzantium had a strong influence. The Venetians, therefore, temporarily reneged on the oath that they had taken together with the other members of the Lombard League, according to which they would not fight alongside Barbarossa, and their navy intervened alongside Frederick. The doge did not personally take part in the blockade, but we are aware of the active involvement of Romano Mairano, a Venetian merchant who had suffered a serious financial setback after his goods in Romania had been confiscated in March 1171. This suggests that some of the people who had been harmed by Manuel tried to seek their revenge on the basileus by trying to deprive him of what was perceived as his Italian bridgehead. In addition to enlisting the naval support of Venice, Barbarossa probably also hoped that, following the aborted Sicilian-Byzantine matrimonial negotiations, William II might join him against Manuel. It is probably with this aim that Frederick approached the Sicilian king, trying to reconcile with him, and offering him the hand of one of his own daughters. Yet, the proposal was not accepted, as William was aware that Alexander III would have strongly objected to it. Moreover, Ancona also obtained substantial military support from both within and outside Italy. In particular, the Byzantine governor of Dalmatia, Constantine Doukas, had arrived in Italy once he found out that Christian of Mainz was marching towards Ancona. We know that he was given considerable financial means, with which he managed to obtain military assistance from Aldruda Frangipani, the Countess of Bertinoro (whose relative Oddone had married Manuel's niece), and from Guglielmo Marchesella, a nobleman from Ferrara. The support of these Italian allies, who would both be later generously rewarded by Manuel for their help, and the bad weather conditions that forced the Venetian fleet to return to the lagoon in the winter, prevented Christian of Mainz from gaining control of the city. Indeed, after seven months, the Germans lifted their siege of Ancona, possibly (as suggested by Romuald of Salerno) after receiving a tribute from the defenders. Therefore, Manuel kept his protectorate over Ancona, and in return granted commercial privileges to its loyal inhabitants.71

The failed siege of Ancona made one of the main aims of the Venetians, reconciling with Byzantium, even more difficult. Indeed, Manuel did not feel any need or urgency to concede anything to Venice, especially after its involvement in hostile activity against his protégé. Therefore, even though Doge Sebastiano Ziani was still attempting to reach a diplomatic solution to the hostage crisis, he also approached William II to obtain a renewal of the privileges that the commune had received in the Mezzogiorno around twenty years earlier. Furthermore, the Venetians hoped that an agreement with the Sicilians might have persuaded Manuel to seek a reconciliation with them, out of fear that, otherwise, he would have remained politically isolated in the Adriatic. Ziani sent the first envoys in 1173, but the legates were recalled when Byzantine legates approached the doge, persuading him that a reconciliation with the basileus seemed imminent. However, despite these new embassies, no agreement with Manuel could be reached. Since this meant that the Byzantine markets remained off limits, the Venetians realised that they had to conduct a different policy, and stop considering a reconciliation with Byzantium as their only diplomatic priority. Therefore, in 1174 two legates went to Alexandria, where they managed to conclude an agreement with the Muslim ruler of Egypt, Saladin, who possibly granted to the Venetians a mercantile warehouse in the city. In the following year, the Venetians also reached an agreement with William II: the treaty that had been originally concluded in 1154 or 1155 was now renewed for twenty years.72

These treaties concluded by Ziani’s legates, together with the anti-Ancona agreement signed by Venice and Rimini around 1175, and, most importantly, Manuel’s plan to undertake a campaign in Anatolia against the Turks, persuaded the basileus to try once again to reach an agreement with Venice. The Byzantine

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Constantine Doukas at the Siege of Ancona, 1173’, *Thesaurismata*, 35 (2005), 9-17 (pp. 10, 13-16); Carile, ‘Federico Barbarossa…’, pp. 6-7, 13-14; Dupré Thesеider, ‘Venezia e l’Impero d’Occidente…’, pp 37-38; Tolstoy-Miloslavsky, ‘Manuel I Komnenos and Italy…’, p. 296.

ruler was probably afraid that the Venetians might take advantage of a lack of imperial forces in the West to launch a new naval raid, and so he made some conciliatory moves. He sent his own legates to Italy, promised to pay fifteen *kentenaria* of compensation (i.e. around twenty-five percent of the total losses) to Venice, and, as an act of good will, he released some of the Venetians who were still imprisoned. This did result in a minor improvement in relations between the two powers, to the point that some Venetians were once again active in trade in Romania in 1175-77. However, even though according to Niketas Choniates an agreement was reached, this was not the case, probably because Manuel in the end failed to send the promised money to Venice. Indeed, Andrea Dandolo relates that Doge Ziani, having finally had enough of the dilatory tactics that the Byzantine envoys employed, dismissed Manuel’s agents.\(^7^3\)

The agreement that Venice and William II signed in 1175 suggests that the Venetian participation in the siege of Ancona alongside the Germans did not hinder the diplomatic position of Venice in Italy. Furthermore, the involvement in military operations alongside Christian of Mainz meant that Venice had also restored good relations with Barbarossa. We shall see that this was one of the reasons why two years later the Adriatic city would be chosen to host the peace talks between Frederick and his enemies.

By contrast, despite his military success in Ancona, Manuel’s diplomatic position in Italy changed appreciably in the early 1170s. After the confiscation of Venetian property, Genoa appears to have become the main commercial partner of Byzantium. Probably in 1172-73, the Genoese agreed to provide thirty galleys to the empire in return for a considerable amount of money, and for improved commercial privileges in the empire. Not much later, probably in the early months of 1175, the Genoese required (and probably obtained) from the Byzantines the reparations that they were owed following the riots of 1162 and 1171, and other minor events. In addition, Manuel maintained good relations with the Kingdom of

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Jerusalem and with the Antiochenes thanks to the wedding of his own grandnieces Theodora and Maria with, respectively, Prince Bohemond III and King Amalric I. However, he could not restore good relations with the other political powers of the Italian peninsula, as he was unable to effect a reconciliation with either Barbarossa or Venice, and he had enraged William II of Sicily with the aborted marriage talks. Even the Lombard League had turned its back to Manuel, possibly due to the latter’s hostility towards Venice. Indeed, around 1170, a new member of the anti-Barbarossa alliance (possibly Ezzelino da Romano) had taken an oath that he would not conclude any agreement with the basileus.

vi) Myriokephalon, the Peace of Venice, and the Final Years of Manuel Komnenos (1176-80)

Despite the failure of the siege of Ancona, Barbarossa nevertheless attempted another Italian campaign (1174-76). Venice decided not to support this military expedition, and initially fought against the Germans, but soon concluded an agreement with Archbishop Christian of Mainz. Frederick suffered another defeat at the Battle of Legnano, and then realised that the time had come to seek a reconciliation with his long-time foes: the Lombard League, Pope Alexander, and the Kingdom of Sicily. Barbarossa had already tried to open talks with the pontiff in 1175, when Cardinal Humbald of Ostia had unsuccessfully suggested to the emperor that he also conclude peace with William II and Manuel. Barbarossa had then planned to attack both rulers, and had given Christian of Mainz the task of commencing a campaign against Southern Italy. Even though the archchancellor had achieved some limited success, as he had managed to enter the Kingdom of Sicily, and to defeat William II’s men, the outcome of the Battle of Legnano had forced him to return to Northern Italy. Barbarossa thus re-opened peace talks with Alexander, whom he had still not recognised as the legitimate pope. In November 1176, legates of the two met in Anagni. A preliminary agreement was reached: a truce was to be observed, and a peace council would be organised in the near future. As his representative had suggested in the previous year, the pope insisted that Frederick was to conclude peace not only with the Lombard League (which was not included in the truce, and upon which a settlement was to be imposed.

75 Gli atti del Comune di Milano…, no. 79, pp. 115-16.
76 ‘Historia ducum…’, chs 28-29, pp. 44-46; Dandolo, Chronica extensa, bk 10, ch. 1, p. 261. Evidence of this agreement does not appear to have survived in any charter.
without its direct representation), but also with both William II and Manuel.
However, the peace council could only be organised in 1177, as the Lombards did not want a treaty to be imposed upon them, and Barbarossa and the pope struggled to agree on its location. Eventually, the pope, the German emperor, the Lombard League, and the Sicilians (represented by Romuald of Salerno and Roger of Andria, who had accompanied the pope in his naval voyage from Vieste to Venice in early 1177) agreed on meeting in Venice, as long as the doge did not allow Frederick to enter the city without Alexander’s permission.\(^77\)

Barbarossa did not directly take part in these negotiations, and remained in Ravenna until he was allowed to go to Chioggia. There, he was approached by some Venetians, who tried to convince him to come to Venice, where they would have helped him to obtain better terms with both the Papacy and the Lombard League. Even though most of his subjects were favourable to this proposal, the doge refused to consent to it. Furthermore, the Venetian government was also faced with a threat to have its commercial privileges in Southern Italy withdrawn should Frederick be invited into the city. After lengthy negotiations, the pope eventually allowed him to enter Venice, where Barbarossa humiliatingly reconciled with the pontiff, and agreed, amongst other things, to a six-year truce with the Lombard League, and to a fifteen-year peace with Sicily. Frederick also renewed the centuries-long commercial agreement between the Western Empire and Venice, and concluded a peace treaty with the doge.\(^78\)

In the preliminary agreement of Anagni, it had been decided that Barbarossa should also sign a treaty with Manuel, and this was also one of the clauses accepted by the Kaiser in Venice. However, the Byzantines played no part in these negotiations. The choice of Venice as the site of the conference, and the fear that this might jeopardise the other negotiations, probably prevented Alexander from insisting on including the Eastern Empire in the peace talks. Indeed, it is highly likely that the Venetians, who were still at war with Manuel, would have refused to host Byzantine representatives in their city. The Sicilians might also have opposed the presence of Greek legates at the conference, as William II was probably still irked with Manuel following his sudden change of mind regarding the wedding of

\(^77\) Romuald, Annales, pp. 266-67, 269-75; Le Liber Pontificalis, ii, 427-38; Thomas Archdeacon, Historia Salonitana..., ch. 21, p. 122; Frederick I, Diplomata, iii, no. 658, pp. 161-65; Freed, Frederick Barbarossa..., pp. 379-401.

\(^78\) Romuald, Annales, pp. 275-93; Le Liber Pontificalis, ii, 438-43; ‘Historia ducum...', chs 30-34, pp. 48-52; Frederick I, Diplomata, iii, nos. 689, 694-95, 708, pp. 206-08, 216-22, 242-43; Freed, Frederick Barbarossa..., pp. 401-16.
his daughter. In addition, after concluding peace with Barbarossa, the Sicilian king had little interest in restoring an alliance with the Byzantines. Since the Germans were no longer a threat to him, William II would not need the support of the basileus to prevent the Kaiser from attacking him. Finally, not even Frederick felt any urgency to reconcile with Manuel. By contrast, he might have felt that his renewed imperial legitimacy, and his good relations with the Italian powers, might have helped him to have a possible anti-Byzantine campaign endorsed by the pope, and militarily supported by the Venetians and the Sicilians.⁷⁹

Yet another reason why Manuel was not invited to send representatives to Venice was because, shortly after the Battle of Legnano, he had sustained an embarrassing defeat at Myriokephalon. The Eastern emperor had presented this campaign as aimed at reopening the land route to the Holy Land, and had thus obtained the support of Alexander III, who had called for a crusade. Manuel hoped that, if he had been successful, he would have strengthened his bond with the Frankish States. However, the plans of the Byzantine emperor came to nothing since the Turks routed him (and came to close to capturing him) at Myriokephalon. This military defeat was probably not as serious as it first appeared, but it lost Manuel a lot of prestige. In a letter that the Eastern emperor wrote to Frederick, which was probably sent soon after this battle, Manuel omitted to mention the outcome of this battle in it, and indeed claimed that the Turkish sultan had submitted to him – which was partially true, as the Byzantines had subsequently been successful in a series of minor confrontations. However, the Turkish sultan had previously informed Frederick that Manuel had been routed in Myriokephalon. Therefore, Barbarossa probably felt teased that Manuel’s letter was intended to deceive, and replied sarcastically. Needless to say, the two emperors did not manage to come to terms.⁸⁰

⁷⁹ Frederick I, Diplomata, III, no. 687, p. 204; Freed, Frederick Barbarossa..., pp. 418-19.
In the years following, even though his military activity was mainly focused on the East, Manuel continued to be deeply involved diplomatically with the West.\(^{81}\) The \textit{basileus} was afraid that the Germans, who were once more active in Italy, ostensibly with the aim of restoring Alexander in Rome, and of crushing the opposition to the pope, might attempt to conquer Ancona, possibly in order to use this city as a base for an attack against the Eastern Empire. Therefore, the \textit{basileus} continued helping Ancona financially, and tried to hinder Barbarossa's plans in Northern Italy. In 1177 or shortly afterwards, he persuaded the Marquis of Montferrat to desert the \textit{Kaiser}. This agreement was extremely effective, as the marquis' own bonds with Genoa helped to cement Genoese-Byzantine relations, and Conrad, a son of the marquis, managed to capture Christian of Mainz in Camerino (considering the location of this town, Ancona may have been used as a base for the negotiations between the Montferrats and the Byzantines). The marquis was generously rewarded, and another son of his, Renier, married Maria (the daughter of the \textit{basileus}, and second-in-line to Manuel's succession). According to Robert of Torigny (a writer who is unfamiliar with Byzantine customs), Renier in return obtained the fief of Thessalonica, but we cannot exclude that he was merely granted the dignity of \textit{doux} (military commander and governor) of this city. In addition, Genoa also played a crucial role as a mediator in the Byzantine negotiations with the French, which eventually ended with the betrothal of Manuel's son and heir, Alexios, to Agnes, a daughter of the King of France. The Genoese provided the ships for the transport of Agnes to Constantinople.\(^{82}\)

In addition, Manuel improved his relations with Pisa, as his niece Eudokia, whose first husband Oddone Frangipani had since died, remarried to a Pisan


nobleman named Guelfo da Porcaria. However, even though Manuel’s ally, Genoa, had concluded a twenty-nine year-long peace treaty with Venice in 1177, a Venetian-Byzantine rapprochement did not take place. Indeed, Madden has convincingly argued against the suggestion made by other historians that in 1179 the basileus released some of the Venetians that he still kept as prisoners. As we have seen, this had probably happened some years earlier, around 1175.

These were the final events of Manuel’s reign, as the emperor died in September 1180. If compared to his predecessors, Manuel, in particular since the 1160s, had had much better relations with the Crusader States. This is exemplified both by his matrimonial alliances (in particular, his own wedding with Mary of Antioch), and by his military collaborations with the Kingdom of Jerusalem. Yet, despite this, the situation in the Middle and Near East was not as tranquil as it may have seemed. Indeed, a major threat was looming on the Frankish States in the Levant, as Saladin was becoming more and more powerful in the Near East. Furthermore, even though the Battle of Myriokephalon was followed by a moderately successful counteroffensive, Manuel had been unable to recover much territory in Anatolia, and most of this region remained under Turkish control.

In the West, by contrast, the land borders of Byzantium were under no serious threat, as Manuel had secured a network of personal alliances mainly thanks to a series of dynastic marriages. However, the empire had extended considerably, including many different ethnic groups, which, though quiet under a strong ruler, could rebel in no time under a weak basileus. Furthermore, while Manuel still had a solid diplomatic network in the West, this mainly included powers that, with the exception of Genoa and Pisa, were geographically distant from the

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85 See Lamma, Comneni e Staufer…, II, 307-27 for an analysis on the judgement of Manuel by the contemporary writers.
86 Lilie, Byzantium and the Crusader…, pp. 220-21; Magdalino, The Empire…, pp. 104-05; Brand, Byzantium Confronts…, pp. 16-18, 22; Harris, Byzantium and the Crusades…, p. 126.
Byzantine lands, and had not engaged much (either in war, or in commerce) with the Eastern Empire. By contrast, the basileus had failed to maintain good relations with either the Germans or the Sicilians. Not only had these powers, which were geographically closer to Manuel’s lands, previously been involved in military activity against the empire, but they were now allied with each other. Even though none of them was apparently attempting to attack Byzantium, this was a clear diplomatic failure by Manuel. While for most of his reign he had tried to form an entente against his possible attackers in order to prevent any hostile action against himself, now they had all coalesced together.  

Finally, when analysing Manuel’s dealing with the Venetians, it can be said that the emperor brilliantly played the role of a cynical and masterful puppeteer. This was possible because, during the latter half of Manuel’s reign, the Venetians always needed to have good relations with Byzantium in order to exploit the markets of Romania. On the other hand, Manuel did not have to face many threats, especially from the West, and thus most of the time had no need of maintaining good relations with Venice. Therefore, Manuel could follow the same strategy that he and his father had used in their relations with the Papacy and the Germans (which intensified whenever they wanted to undertake a campaign against Antioch). This became apparent since the late 1160s, when the Byzantine conquest of Dalmatia, and the imperial embassy to Venice of late 1167 led to a rift between Constantinople and the Adriatic commune. Indeed, the basileus would only grant concessions to the Adriatic city when his army or navy was engaged in wide-range military operations in the East. This is what happened in 1169, when Manuel was about to send his fleet to Egypt, and then in 1175-76, when he was preparing his (eventually ill-fated) attempted recovery of Anatolia. After 1171, on all the other occasions, the emperor pretended to be open to reaching an agreement with Venice, but actually pursued a policy of procrastination. He was indeed aware that the Venetians would always be willing to engage in negotiations because of how important it was for them to re-obtain their commercial privileges, and to have their fellow countrymen liberated. Furthermore, he was probably confident that, in case of a Venetian attack, his army and navy would be strong enough to repel it.

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Manuel’s policy was dangerous, but eventually successful, mainly because a lack of external threats to the empire allowed him masterfully to play this role of puppeteer, and to compromise only whenever he wanted to conduct an aggressive policy.

vii) The Reigns of the Final Komnenoi, and of the Angeloi

Manuel’s death left the Byzantine Empire in a difficult position because of the minority of his son and heir, Alexios II, who was only eleven, and thus needed a regent.88 We shall here see how relations between Venice and Sicily evolved as a result of this.

After the death of the basileus, and the succession of his minor son, most of the personal bonds that Manuel had secured with foreign rulers lapsed. This was especially the case with the Frankish States. Relations with Antioch deteriorated, as Bohemond III divorced from his Byzantine wife Theodora in 1180, and conquered Tarsus in the following year. Furthermore, the Kingdom of Jerusalem no longer needed Byzantine support as it had signed a two-year truce with Saladin in 1180. The lack of Byzantine influence in Jerusalem was also a result of Baldwin of Ibelin’s unsuccessful bid to marry Sybilla, the heiress-apparent to the kingdom.

Baldwin had strong bonds with the Eastern Empire as, when in 1179 he had been captured by Saladin, the Byzantines had ransomed him. However, Sybilla ended up marrying Guy of Lusignan, who, instead, had no links with Constantinople.89 In the West, Pisa had already signed a treaty with Venice in October 1180. Though this agreement did not contain any anti-Byzantine clause (apart from forbidding the Pisans to sail from Venice to Romania as long as Venice was still at war with the Eastern Empire), we can sensibly presume that this agreement was not well-received in Constantinople.90 Furthermore, in the Balkans, Sirmium and Dalmatia were soon recovered by the Hungarians. In the latter region, a Byzantine official,

88 The sources provide different views on whether Manuel appointed a panel of regents. See Niketas Choniates, Historia, ‘Βασίλεια Μανουηλ του Κομνηνου, 7’, ‘Βασιλεία Αλεξιου του Κομνηνου’, pp. 220, 223, 253-54; Annals, pp. 124, 127, 142; William of Tyre, Chronicon, ii, bk 22, chs 5, 11, pp. 1013, 1020; Michael the Syrian, Chronique, trans. by Jean-Baptiste Chabot, 3 vols (Paris: Leroux, 1899-1905), iii, bk 21, ch. 1, p. 381; Eustathios of Thessalonica, La espugnazione…, pp. 18-19; Brand, Byzantium Confronts…, p. 27; Harris, Byzantium and the Crusades…, pp. 126-27.
90 Documenti sulle relazioni delle città toscane…, no. 18, pp. 20-23; Lilie, Handel und Politik…, pp. 527-32.
Rogerius Sclavone (probably to be identified with Roger Sclavus, an illegitimate son of Count Simon ‘of Policastro’ who had left Southern Italy in the early 1160s) is last recorded in this region in 1180, and the Hungarians had certainly regained control over Split by July 1181. Interestingly, the Magyar king in these years was Béla, who had once been Manuel’s heir, whom the basileus had later helped to obtain the Hungarian throne.\(^91\) Finally, the Byzantine protectorate over Ancona seems to have ended around 1180. Indeed, no source mentions any form of military or financial help provided by Byzantium to Ancona (or vice versa) after Manuel’s death.\(^92\)

The Eastern Empire also faced a complicated internal situation. Alexios II’s mother, Mary of Antioch, formally became the regent for her son with the assistance of her lover, Manuel’s nephew Alexios Komnenos the protosebastos, who became the de facto ruler of the empire. In February 1181, their pro-Latin measures, and the fear that the protosebastos might replace Alexios II as emperor, led some of the main court aristocrats to organise a coup which was led by Manuel’s daughter Maria Komnene. The plot failed, as Mary and Alexios had the support of the imperial guards and of the Latin population. An armistice was reached thanks to the mediation of the patriarch, and Maria and her husband were granted an amnesty.\(^93\)

Even though a solution seemed to have been reached, Manuel’s cousin, Andronikos, who had been recently pardoned, and had been granted extensive land in Paphlagonia in return for his obedience, and for recognising the rights of Alexios II, tried to take advantage of the chaotic situation.\(^94\) Andronikos, claiming to

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\(^91\) CDRCSD, 2, nos. 155-56, 164, 166, pp. 112-14, 117-18, 121; Falcandus, pp. 154, 164-66, 170-72; Romuald, Annales, pp. 248-49; Thomas Archdeacon, Historia Salonitana..., ch. 22, p. 130; Dandolo, Chronica extensa, bk 10, ch. 2, p. 268; Kinnamos, bk 6, ch. 11, pp. 286-87; Ferluga, ‘La Dalmazia…’, pp. 207-10; Stephenson, Byzantium’s Balkan Frontier..., pp. 281-82; Mak, The Árpáds and the Comneni..., pp. 115-16.

\(^92\) Leonhard, Die Seestadt Ancona..., p. 85 fn. 545; Natalucci, ‘I rapporti di Ancona…’, p. 61.


\(^94\) Niketas Choniates, Historia, ‘Βασιλεία Ἀλέξιου του Κομνήνου’, pp. 225-28; Annals, pp. 128-30; Eustathios of Thessalonica, La espugnazione..., pp. 28-29; William of
be acting in accordance with the oath to protect Alexios II that he had taken when Manuel had pardoned him, assembled an army, and marched towards Constantinople, camping near Chalcedon. The protosebastos sent a naval force in order to block the passage of the Bosporus to Andronikos; however, the commander of the fleet defected to Andronikos, and offered to escort him into Constantinople, where his partisans had already managed to take control of the city. Alexios the protosebastos was imprisoned, and then sent to Andronikos, who had him blinded. Andronikos soon gained power in Byzantium, first as Alexios II’s regent, then as co-emperor, and finally, after he had the boy killed, as sole basileus (he even married Alexios II’s fiancée, Agnes of France, in order to obtain some legitimacy). Andronikos’s regime was a reign of terror, as, with the help of a select group of collaborators, he either exiled or had physically eliminated most of his Constantinopolitan opponents (this was the case, in particular, of Mary of Antioch, Maria Komnene, and her husband Renier).

Yet, even before Andronikos himself had entered the city, the Italian population of Constantinople had been attacked by his troops. The sources suggest that Andronikos claimed that such an action was needed in order to save Byzantium from the Latins. However, even if he did order the massacre, Andronikos took advantage of it to gain greater popular support, for the Italian merchants were disliked by many of the Constantinopolitan Greeks. Furthermore, the usurper might have been afraid that the Genoese and the Pisans, who enjoyed extremely good relations with the regency, might try to prevent him from taking

Tyre, Chronicon, II, bk 22, ch. 12, p. 1021; Hendy, Studies in the Byzantine Monetary Economy..., p. 133; Brand, Byzantium Confronts..., p. 28.


control of the city out of fear that a new regime would not be as favourable towards them, and that it might seek a reconciliation with Venice. The Genoese and the Pisan quarters were destroyed (the Ligurian city would later claim a significant financial loss), and, even though most of their dwellers managed to flee before the attack was launched, there were nevertheless some victims, including a papal legate. All the survivors fled Constantinople as soon as they could, and spread the news of the massacre throughout the Mediterranean, especially in the Latin East.97 That the situation was extremely serious for every Westerner is confirmed by a charter issued in June 1182, which recorded that some Venetians who were sailing towards Constantinople had to divert their voyage to Alexandria out of fear that their lives might be in danger.98 A final element which may have led to further Latin hostility towards Andronikos was a probable misunderstanding of the nature of his negotiations with Saladin. In the West, the chronicler Magnus of Reicherberg had heard rumours that Andronikos had agreed on an offensive alliance with Saladin. According to Magnus, the Byzantines would have obtained control of Jerusalem and of most of the Palestinian coast had they helped Saladin to crush the Crusader States. However, since Andronikos had to face many threats from the West, it is highly unlikely that he would have sought to conduct such an aggressive policy in


98 DCV, no. 331, pp. 326-27. In addition to the riot of 1162, and to the imprisonment of the Venetians in 1171, we may two other cases of anti-Latin hostility in Byzantium during Manuel’s reign. The first one is the popular anti-Western rage that spread following the pro-Latin decisions of the synod of 1166, which resulted in Hugo Eterianus being almost lynched by the Constantinopolitans. The other one is the hostility encountered by the executors of a Pisan citizen following his death (either in late 1165, or in late 1165), though this is probably to be interpreted as an act of greed by a single tax collector, rather than as an anti-Latin event. See Hugo Eterianus, ‘Lettre à Pierre de Vienne...’, p. 481; Documenti sulle relazioni delle città toscane..., no. 10, pp. 11-13; Haskins, ‘Leo Tuscus’, p. 492 fn. 2; Classen, Burgundio..., p. 24 fn. 16.
the East. Thus, Magnus’s assertion is probably incorrect, as has recently been suggested by Harris and Neocleous. Yet, it is quite probable that similar rumours of an alliance between Byzantium and Saladin had spread throughout Europe, further worsening Andronikos’s reputation in the West.99

Even though the pogrom had led to the end of most of the alliances that Manuel had cultivated in the West, the lack of any significant Venetian presence in Constantinople at the time of the pogrom made it possible for Andronikos to improve his relations with Venice. Furthermore, the basileus had probably realised that an alliance with Venice could come handy in case of a naval attack against the empire, especially if William II had already started planning a Balkan campaign.100 Therefore, Andronikos, trying to rid himself from his international isolation, engaged in negotiations with the Venetians as soon he obtained his regency. In addition to Andronikos’s offers, which were probably too good not to accepted by the Venetians (see below), what had made a reconciliation possible was the recovery of Dalmatia by Hungary, which meant that the Eastern Empire was no longer an Adriatic rival of Venice. Finally, since the Pisans and the Genoese no longer had a quarter in Constantinople, successful negotiations with the new emperor would have given Venice a commercial monopoly in the empire. Andronikos did indeed make some extremely favourable concessions to Venice. However, since the chrysobull that he issued (probably in early 1185) has not survived, we are only aware of them thanks to the Venetian chronicles. The emperor had already made a conciliatory move in 1183 by releasing all the Venetian still in captivity. Eventually, after three legates were sent to the Bosporus by the doge to make an inventory of the properties of the Venetian citizens and ecclesiastical institutions, Andronikos restored the quarter to the Adriatic city. The quarter was located by the Golden Horn, in an area close to Perama that is now part of the former district of Eminönü in Fatih, Istanbul. The Amalfitan, Genoese, and Pisan quarters also lay (or used to

100 Harris, Byzantium and the Crusades…, p. 132. The finding of a seal issued by Orio Mastropietro in a monastic complex in Constantinople might suggest that some Venetians had found refuge there during the 1182 pogrom. See John William Nesbitt, ‘Doge Orio Mastropietro (1178-1192) and Kalenderhane Camii’, Thesaurismata, 33 (2003), 9-13.
lie) in the same area, but slightly to the East, in positions that were not as favourable as the one occupied by the Venetians. Andronikos also agreed with the Venetians on the compensation that the empire owed them, and promised to pay it in yearly instalments. Finally, the doge was granted the dignity of protosebastos.¹⁰¹

Despite the success of his negotiations with Venice, Andronikos still had to face many external problems. Isaac Komnenos, a great-nephew of Manuel, took control of Cyprus, which, from then on, he would rule independently from Constantinople. Andronikos did not even attempt to recover it. Furthermore, the Hungarians and the Serbs, whose rulers had been strongly supported by Manuel, had started penetrating deep into the empire, claiming that they were avenging Alexios II.¹⁰²

Yet, the most dangerous of all the threats against Andronikos came from the Sicilians, who attacked the Balkans in June 1185. William II took advantage of Andronikos’s lack of any potential support from the West (except for that of Venice), as the rulers of the other powers that had previously engaged in commerce in Byzantium hoped that the usurper might be overthrown, so that they could possibly resume trade in Romania. However, not even the Venetians were willing to intervene in case of a Sicilian campaign against Byzantium. Such an intervention would have meant the end of the alliance between the Adriatic commune and the Kingdom of Sicily. Furthermore, the Venetians were possibly doubtful that William would have been more successful than his predecessors, who had only achieved some ephemeral success when they had tried to attack the Balkans. In addition to the neutrality of Venice, William’s campaign was further facilitated by the circumstance that no Italian power threatened him at this time. In particular, in 1184 he had further consolidated his alliance with Frederick I; his own aunt Constance


had been betrothed to Barbarossa’s son and heir Henry, and had been recognised as William II’s heiress to the kingdom should she outlive him. In addition, William already had a strong fleet at his disposal, as, since his coming of age, he had already launched two important (albeit unsuccessful) naval expeditions, first against Alexandria (in 1174), and then against the Balearics (in 1181). Furthermore, William hoped that some of the Eastern imperial army might defect to him. Indeed, the Byzantine exile Alexios Komnenos the Cupbearer (probably one of Manuel’s nephews or grand nephews; his ancestry is unclear) had reached Sicily to ask for his help to replace Andronikos on the throne, and would join William’s men during the campaign. Finally, the appearance in Sicily of a boy pretending to be Alexios II also made it possible for William to claim that his expedition was aimed at defending the rights of a deposed pro-Latin emperor. While it appears that William realised that an attack against Andronikos stood a good chance of success, his actual goals are rather unclear due to a lack of detailed sources from the West. Did a raid initially aimed at punishing the Eastern Empire for its past faults (Manuel’s raids, and the failed Byzantine-Sicilian marriage) eventually turn into a war of conquest due to its initial success? Or did he rather attempt to proceed as close to the Bosporus as he could, and possibly even to conquer Constantinople (as suggested by the Annales Ceccanenses and by Eustathios of Thessalonica)?

The Sicilian attack was initially extremely successful. Thanks to the ineptitude of Andronikos and of his generals, William’s commanders managed to capture not only the islands in the Ionian Sea and Dyrrachion without any opposition, but even all the territories as far as Thessalonica. This city was also conquered (in August 1185), and its sack has been described in detail by both Eustathios of Thessalonica and Niketas Choniates. Part of the Sicilian contingent then started marching towards Constantinople, threatening its inhabitants. This, together with Andronikos’s unpopular measures, soon deprived him of all the support of which he had taken advantage a few years earlier. It was, therefore,

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fairly easy for one of his relatives, Isaac Angelos, to rebel successfully, overthrow Andronikos in September 1185, and have him killed. Once Isaac II starting ruling, the tide of the war turned. The Annales Casinenses mention that William’s men were defeated by Greek trickery and strength. While this might at first be seen as an example of a long Western tradition of blaming the diplomatic cunning of the Byzantines, on this occasion there appears to be more than an element of truth. Indeed, the Annales Ceccanenses relate that Alexios Branas, whom Isaac had put in charge of repelling the invaders, persuaded the invading generals to march back towards the Ionian Sea. He told them that they could not advance any further, but that he would allow them to march westwards in safety. However, the general deceived the Sicilians, and captured their commanders, who were taken to Constantinople as prisoner. Niketas Choniates also confirms this view. He wrote that, following some minor Byzantine victories, the Greeks were convinced that the Sicilian attempt to negotiate for peace was a stratagem. However, the Byzantines soon attacked and routed their unprepared enemies, also capturing their generals, in a battle fought by the Strymon River in early November 1185. Therefore, it is quite likely that they had deliberately (and dishonestly) told the Sicilians that they wanted to accept the terms that had been proposed so that they would face an unprepared enemy. William’s men fled Thessalonica on their ships, and soon withdrew from Dyrrachion, which was recovered by the Byzantines. Alexios Komnenos the Cupbearer was captured and blinded. After the defeat of William’s land troops, the Sicilian navy, which had been sent to attack the empire jointly with the army, and had reached the vicinity of Constantinople, decided not to go any further. The ships nevertheless managed to raid the Dardanelles and some neighbouring islands, and then returned to Southern Italy.104

Despite the failure of this expedition, the Sicilian hostile activity against Byzantium continued in 1186, with a series of naval operations conducted by the Greek pirate Margaritus of Brindisi. Margaritus, who had been hired by William, raidied some of the Aegean islands, and intervened militarily in Cyprus alongside its rebel ruler Isaac Komnenos. Then, on his way towards Italy, he tried (apparently

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unsuccessfully) to obtain some relics in Patmos, and, once more, raided other Aegean islands. His activity in Cyprus led Isaac II’s expedition to recover Cyprus to fail. Margaritus, probably summoned by Isaac Komnenos, reached the shores of this island, where he destroyed the imperial ships that he had found empty as all the men had disembarked. Isaac II’s men were then captured by Isaac Komnenos, and handed over to Margaritus, who took them to Sicily. In addition to his activity in the Aegean and in Cyprus, we cannot exclude that, probably before leaving for Patmos, Margaritus had conducted some naval operations in the Ionian Sea. Indeed, Kiesewetter and, subsequently, Carito have suggested that, already in 1185 or early 1186, Margaritus had begun the occupation of Zakynthos, Kephalonia, and ‘Serfent’ (probably Ithaca). Yet, this suggestion is mainly based on Robert of Auxerre, according to whom, in 1187 (and not in 1186, as indicated by Kiesewetter), Margaritus ‘devastated and occupied many of the islands of the Constantinopolitan emperor’. Yet, while we cannot exclude that these might be the Ionian islands, it is much more likely that that this passage refers to Margaritus’s Aegean raids. Indeed, there is no clear reference to Margaritus’s rule over the three Ionian islands before 1191.105

Despite Kiesewetter’s suggestions, I am inclined to believe that Margaritus took control of the Ionian islands sometime later, probably after the Byzantine-Sicilian peace treaty of 1187. At the beginning of his reign, Isaac realised that he was unable to overcome the many different external threats that he faced. Therefore, in order to be able to focus on the war against the Sicilians, he had to

pay a tribute to the Turks (who had invaded the Byzantine lands in Anatolia), and come to a compromise with the Serbs and, in particular, with the Hungarians. Indeed, Isaac recognised Hungarian control over almost all the regions that Manuel had conquered from them in the 1160s, and only recovered some land near the Morava River as part of the dowry that he obtained when he married Béla III’s daughter. We cannot exclude that something similar happened when Isaac and William concluded their peace treaty. The emperor was also facing a Vlach-Bulgar revolt, and Alexios Branas’s usurpation attempt, which had led to a subsequent unsuccessful popular reprisal against the Italian colonies as Branas had been supported by Italian mercenaries. The Byzantine emperor had to deal with many issues, and thus probably accepted a rather disadvantageous agreement. It is likely that he ceded three Ionian islands to William, who then handed them over to Margaritus as a reward for his services. In return for this, Isaac received, amongst the other things, a considerable number of weapons and sets of armour, which would be later presented to Saladin as a gift. There may, indeed, have been another clause in this treaty. If we can trust the Byzantine orator Sergius Colypa (the veracity of whose statement has admittedly been disputed by Kiesewetter), the Sicilian king was also to provide a fleet to the Byzantines whenever he was requested to do so.

Yet, the advantageous agreement leading to the cession of some of the Ionian islands was not the only reason why William II chose to conclude a peace with the Byzantines. The recruitment for this expedition, and the campaign itself, had been extremely expensive, and the king could no longer afford to continue this


conflict: Eustathios of Thessalonica suggests that the Sicilian king was near bankruptcy.\textsuperscript{108}

Furthermore, William probably realised that continuing to attack Byzantium might eventually lead to tension with the Venetians. In addition to the other reasons mentioned above, the Adriatic commune had remained neutral in the conflict also because it was preparing an expedition to recover Zadar, which had once again revolted and joined Hungary in 1180. However, the Sicilians might have been afraid that their ships were the real target of the fleet that the Venetians were building. In addition, Isaac II probably realised that, if he had managed to sign a treaty with Venice, he would have further worried the Sicilians, and thus he started negotiating with the Adriatic commune. An agreement was reached in February 1187. Venice obtained trade exemptions in the empire, together with Isaac’s assurance that the compensation that Andronikos had promised them would be paid, albeit with some delay. Yet, another chrysobull was drawn up, which, for the first time, mentions the duties of the Venetians towards Byzantium, showing that this agreement was a military alliance \textit{inter pares}. Indeed, the \textit{basileus} had probably recognised that Venice could provide some help to make up for the weakness of his own fleet. In the years immediately before this, the Byzantines had been unable to patrol the Aegean waters, which had become a nest of Greek pirates – before Margaritus, a certain Sipantos had played an important role during the siege of Thessalonica. This problem had become even more serious after the imperial fleet had been destroyed during Isaac II’s attempt to recover Cyprus. If the Byzantines were not able to patrol their waters in times of peace, this clearly meant that they were completely unprepared in case of a foreign naval attack. Therefore, Isaac tried to prevent this potential problem by signing an agreement with Venice, which, in return, obtained extensive commercial concessions. The emperor stipulated that, within six months of a foreign attack by a navy of forty to one hundred galleys, the Venetians would provide the same number of galleys to him. These ships would be under the command of a Byzantine admiral, and their number could not be superior to that of the Greek vessels. The emperor himself would pay all the expenses needed for supplying the galleys with arms, and could recruit for the crews up to three-quarters of the Venetians living in the Byzantine Empire. Yet, since the Germans and the Sicilians were allied with Venice, the agreement was not to be

valid if the Byzantines had to face either fleet (although, if the Sicilians were the attackers, Venice would still have to provide fifteen ships within three months).  

Even though Isaac would find it difficult to pay all the compensation that he promised to Venice, this agreement made a reconciliation possible between Byzantium and both the Venetians and, indirectly, also the Sicilians. However, in the West, Isaac still had to face the revolts of the Serbs and of the Bulgarians, and furthermore the Cumans had made some incursions over the Danube. This problem was to become even more serious when the areas where these rebellions had taken place were crossed by Frederick Barbarossa’s huge crusading army, which set off for the Holy Land in May 1189. This expedition was part of the Third Crusade, which had been summoned by Pope Gregory VIII following Saladin’s conquest of Jerusalem in October 1187. Barbarossa, King Richard I of England, and King Philip II of France had all decided to join the crusade. The passage of Frederick’s army across the Balkans created some considerable problems to the Byzantine Empire. At a certain point, the Kaiser was so upset with Isaac’s opposition to his plans that he took into consideration the idea of diverting the crusade. In fact, he sent a letter to his son Henry, who was still in Germany, asking him to try to obtain naval support from Genoa, Pisa, Venice, and even Ancona (which was no longer a Byzantine protectorate) for an attack against Constantinople. Yet, the two emperors eventually reached an agreement, and their open hostility was limited to some minor skirmishes.
Despite this tension with the Germans, Isaac nevertheless managed to take some measures to ensure that, unlike during the Second Crusade (when Roger II had attacked the Balkans), this time the passage of a huge crusading army did not have further serious consequences for Byzantium. The basileus concluded a treaty with Venice in June 1189, which was facilitated by the limited role of the Adriatic commune in the crusade. An agreement was reached over the payment of the compensation that the Venetians were owed following the confiscations of 1171. Isaac promised to pay the full compensation, including the kentenarion that had already been deposited by Andronikos: two and a half kentenaria were to be paid immediately, followed by six yearly instalments. In addition, the Venetian compound in Constantinople was extended to include the quarters which had been granted to the Germans and to the French, which were probably located slightly to the West of the original Venetian compound, and were seldom used. This pact assured Isaac that the Venetians would not take advantage of the passage of the German crusaders to launch a raid on his empire. Furthermore, Isaac hoped that, in case any other power might conduct a naval attack against Constantinople, Venice would abide by the military alliance that had been agreed upon two years earlier, and intervene against the enemy fleet.112 This clause was never implemented, since no other naval power attacked Constantinople.

A matrimonial alliance with the Hungarians (Isaac married Margaret, the eldest daughter of King Béla III), and this agreement with Venice were only the first moves undertaken by Isaac II to normalise relations between the Eastern Empire and its Balkan and Italian neighbours. Indeed, after a Byzantine victory over the Serbs, Isaac arranged a marriage between his own niece and the son of their ruler Stefan Nemanja (in 1190/91). In 1192, the emperor also renewed the commercial agreements that Byzantium had made with Pisa and with Genoa.113

Alliance in the Late Twelfth Century’, in Byzantium, 1180-1204…, pp. 83-95 (pp. 85-86, 89).
112 I trattati con Bisanzio…, no. 9, pp. 105-10; ‘Historia de expeditione…’, p. 70; Tafel-Thomas, no. 73, pp. 204-06; Dandolo, Chronica extensa, bk 10, ch. 2, pp. 270-71; DCV, nos. 378, 380, pp. 371-74; Nicol, Byzantium and Venice…, pp. 115-16; Magdalino, ‘The Maritime Neighborhoods…’, p. 223.
In addition to the precautions taken by Isaac II, other reasons prevented the Sicilians from attempting to replicate the hostile actions undertaken by Roger II at the time of the passage of the Second Crusade. The Sicilian treasury had probably been exhausted by the previous military enterprise against Byzantium, and, even more importantly, in November 1189, William II died with no legitimate issue, leaving a disputed succession. According to the terms of the agreement concluded before their wedding was celebrated in January 1186, Constance, Roger II’s posthumous daughter, and her husband Henry of Swabia were to inherit the kingdom. However, many members of the nobility of the Mezzogiorno, and almost all those of the royal court were reluctant to accept a German king, and elected their own king, Tancred of Lecce, an illegitimate cousin of William II. Thus, the only way Henry could obtain Southern Italy on behalf of his wife was by conducting a military campaign. Yet, since his father Barbarossa had left for the crusade, Henry had been left in charge of administering German affairs, and thus could not immediately attempt to conquer the Mezzogiorno. Frederick’s death in Cilicia in June 1190 would further postpone any such intervention, since Henry needed to consolidate his position in Germany before he could undertake an expedition to Italy. However, even though Tancred of Lecce had the support of Pope Clement III, he nevertheless had to face a certain amount of internal opposition, led by Roger of Andria. Roger had also managed to obtain the support of Henry VI, who unsuccessfully tried to back him by sending an army to Southern Italy. Furthermore, Tancred had to face another opponent in Richard I of England, who stopped in Sicily on his way to the Holy Land. Richard only left the island once Tancred had released Richard’s sister Joan (William II’s widow), whom he had previously imprisoned, and had handed over all of Joan’s dowry to the English king.114

Appears?...’, pp. 40, 42-43. Even though Isaac signed an agreement with both Genoa and Pisa, the piratical actions conducted by some Genoese and Pisans against the Byzantine ships would lead to some minor tension between the emperor and these cities in the following years. See CDRG, III, no. 35, pp. 101-07; ‘Acta et diplomata imperatorum...’, nos. 6-7, pp. 37-46; Documenti sulle relazioni delle città toscane..., no. 41, pp. 66-67.

Soon after the departure of Richard I, Henry VI undertook an expedition to be crowned emperor in Rome, and then to conquer Southern Italy, which he regarded as his wife’s rightful inheritance. Even though the Genoese had once more decided to side with the Germans with a considerable amount of reluctance, and Venice remained neutral throughout the course of this confrontation, Henry had managed to obtain naval support from both them and the Pisans by confirming the privileges that his father had issued to them. However, despite some initial success, the emperor’s naval allies were defeated by Margaritus (who had decided to support Tancred). Furthermore, an epidemic struck many of Henry’s men, forcing them to return to Germany following the rebellion of Barbarossa’s cousin Henry the Lion. Finally, Constance, who had remained in Salerno, was handed over to Tancred, who kept her imprisoned.¹¹⁵

Even though Constance was released in 1192 thanks to the mediation of Pope Celestine III (who, in return, recognised Tancred as king), the Sicilian monarch still had to win over all the peninsular nobility, and to deal with the garrisons that Henry VI had left in the border regions of the kingdom. Therefore, Tancred tried to obtain support from Byzantium by having his son and co-king Roger III married to Isaac II’s daughter Irene. This was made possible by the mutual hostility towards the Germans, and, possibly, by Tancred’s links with the Eastern Empire in the 1150s and 1160s. However, the marriage was short-lived because Roger died late in 1193, followed, two months later, by Tancred himself. The latter was succeeded by his younger son William, but, since he was still a child, he could not exercise real power, and Tancred’s widow had to act as regent. Henry VI, aware of this situation of weakness in the region, once more attempted a campaign to conquer the Mezzogiorno with some naval help from Genoa and Pisa. The political difficulties of the Kingdom of Sicily, and Henry’s prosperous financial state thanks to the ransom that he had received to release Richard I of England (who had been captured while he was on his way back from the Holy Land) made it


After his conquest of the Kingdom of Sicily, Henry VI tried to undertake another project that his father had failed to accomplish – recovering Jerusalem. While he was preparing this campaign, Henry undertook an aggressive diplomatic policy towards Byzantium. Here, Alexios III had overthrown, blinded, and incarcerated his brother Isaac II when the latter was fighting the Bulgarians. According to Choniates, Henry had already asked Isaac for the ‘cession’ of the land from Dyrrachion to Thessalonica that his predecessor William II had briefly held. However, Loughis has outlined that relations between the two rulers were friendly, and that the Western emperor had probably merely asked to obtain a form of indirect suzerainty over this area. It was after Alexios III rose to power that Henry demanded that the Byzantines provide financial and military backing for the crusade, threatening the basileus with an attack on the Balkans if he did not obtain it. Even though after further negotiations the proposed financial contribution was substantially reduced, Alexios III still feared an attack, and started to amass the money that was being demanded by levying a new tax (the alamanikon), and by plundering the tombs of his deceased predecessors. Yet, Henry VI’s death in September 1197, before he could sail to the Holy Land, meant that the tribute was never delivered to the Western emperor.\footnote{Niketas Choniates, Historia, ‘Βασιλεία Ισαακιου του Αγγελου’, 3’, ‘Βασιλεία Αλεξιου του Άγγελου’, 1’, pp. 428-31, 434-37, 446-53, 475-79; Annals, pp. 236-40, 245-49, 261-63; La Continuation de Guillaume de Tyr..., chs 172-76, pp. 181-85; ‘Texte de Florence’, ed. by Margaret Ruth Morgan, in La Continuation de Guillaume de Tyr..., pp. 180-84; Otto of St Blasien, ‘Chronica’, ch. 43, pp. 128-30; Annales Marbacenses’, aa. 1194-95, pp. 188-90; MGH Const., 1, no. 375, pp. 523-24; Loughis, ‘The Fate...’, pp. 91-92.} Even though Henry’s demands might be interpreted as evidence of his plans to conquer at least a part of the Eastern Empire, it has been convincingly suggested that this was not in fact the case. They
were probably mere threats aimed at ensuring that the Byzantines would assist the crusade, as Henry realised that this aid would greatly enhance the expedition’s chances of success.\textsuperscript{118}

There are many reasons why Henry’s threats were effective, the main one being the military strength of the Kaiser. Yet, Alexios also felt that the German threat was so serious because his predecessor Isaac and Henry had had rather friendly relations, to the point that Otto of St Blasien relates that the former had asked for German help during Alexios III’s rebellion. Furthermore, the Kaiser’s brother Philip of Swabia had married his niece Irene (Isaac II’s daughter, and Duke Roger’s widow) in 1196/97. This meant that the Western emperor could present himself as Isaac’s avenger, and pretend that his campaign was also aimed at restoring the previous basileus to the throne.\textsuperscript{119} In addition, while the treaty of 1187 meant that Isaac II could have responded to such a situation by trying to obtain naval support from Venice, Alexios III had changed his policy towards the Adriatic commune. After his seizure of power, he had suspended payment of the reparations promised to the Venetians (the Byzantines still owed them a significant amount of money), and withdrawn their tax exemptions. Furthermore, according to Niketas Choniates, even though talks on the confirmation of Isaac’s concessions to Pisa would only begin in 1197, Alexios III had nevertheless sided with the Tuscan city when a Pisan-Venetian conflict broke out in 1195 following a new Venetian attempt to recover Zadar (the Dalmatian city had been allied with Pisa since 1188). According to the Greek chronicler, the hostility between the two Italian cities reached Constantinople as, after the emperor incited the Pisans to attack the Venetians, there were skirmishes between the two groups of Italians. This is possibly the reason why for a few years we have no surviving documentation regarding Venetian trade in the Byzantine Empire. However, possibly out of fear of a Venetian fleet stationed in Abydos in March 1196, Alexios soon began to negotiate with Venice. Yet, Doge Enrico Dandolo (1192-1205) conducted such talks extremely cautiously. He ordered his legates to postpone any discussion if the Byzantines wanted the treaty to include a Venetian obligation to provide naval help to them in case they were attacked by the Sicilians or by the Germans (i.e. by

\textsuperscript{118} Graham A. Loud, ‘The German Crusade of 1197-1198’, Crusades, 13 (2014), 143-71 (p. 171); Harris, Byzantium and the Crusades, pp. 159-60.
Henry VI). Dandolo conducted the negotiations (which ended with the granting of a new chrysobull in November 1198) in such way because he did not want this agreement with Byzantium to damage his good relations with Henry. Indeed, during his brief reign, Barbarossa's son took many favourable measures towards the Venetians. Not only did he renew the concession of the Palermitan church of St Mark to the Venetians, and would he confirm the pacts between the Western Empire and Venice, but he also acted as a mediator in the Venetian-Pisan peace talks, and a ten-year agreement was eventually signed in September 1196. He hoped that after the end of this conflict both cities would provide naval help to his forthcoming crusade. Yet, we also need to consider that a successful campaign would have made Barbarossa's son the ruler of most the central Mediterranean, thus potentially hampering Venetian maritime trade. Dandolo nevertheless supported Henry, probably because, while he thought that the Kaiser might raid parts of the Byzantine Empire, he did not expect him to conquer any land. This further confirms the interpretation that Henry's threats to the Byzantines were aimed at obtaining their collaboration, and that Barbarossa's son was not interested in conquering the Eastern Empire.

The death of Henry VI was followed, just over a year later, by that of his widow Constance, who had acted as regent for their son Frederick, and who had conducted an anti-German policy in the Kingdom of Sicily. Since Frederick II was only a small child when his mother died, he could neither obtain the support needed to become King of Germany (and thus emperor-elect), nor could he effectively rule over the Kingdom of Sicily. Indeed, the Mezzogiorno was marred by years of conflict amongst German and Southern Italian nobles who unsuccessfully tried to claim the regency over the child Frederick for themselves. This loss of political unity meant that, in contrast to the previous decades, the Kingdom of Sicily could no

longer conduct a strong foreign policy. Therefore, the Mezzogiorno temporarily lost its role as a Mediterranean power, and its diplomatic and political contacts with both Venice and Byzantium significantly diminished.121

viii) Conclusions

The years from 1156 to 1197 saw increased contact between Byzantium and Venice. Until the late 1140s, the Adriatic city had mainly had a minor role in international politics, often acting as a mediator between the two empires, or providing naval help to the Eastern Empire when its Balkan coastline was under threat. However, from the second half of the 1150s, Byzantine interest in the Adriatic area made the empire a potential rival to Venice. This initially led to the end of military collaboration between the two, and tension later increased following the conquest of Dalmatia by Manuel I. Conflict was about to break out while the Byzantines were planning an expedition against Egypt, so, to safeguard the latter enterprise, the basileus managed to effect a reconciliation with the Venetians by granting them some extremely advantageous concessions. Yet, once the Byzantines were no longer involved in warfare in the East, these concessions were withdrawn. When the Venetians attacked and destroyed the Genoese quarter in Constantinople, Manuel exacted his revenge against his rivals by having all the Venetians who were in the empire incarcerated, and by confiscating their properties. After an unsuccessful military reprisal by Venice, Manuel’s coup evolved into a long series of diplomatic exchanges in which the emperor postponed any definite concessions unless he was politically or militarily involved in other foreign entanglements. Such was the case of 1175-76, when, after the conclusion of a Venetian-Sicilian alliance that could be worrying for Byzantium, and before the ill-fated campaign in Asia Minor, a temporary reconciliation was reached.

While Manuel managed to keep the Venetians under his thumb, his immediate successors failed to do so. Indeed, Byzantium significantly lost Western support after the Latin massacre that had inaugurated Andronikos’s regime. Therefore, the only way this emperor could achieve some international recognition was by obtaining a reconciliation with Venice. This meant not only releasing the incarcerated Venetians, but also repaying them for the damage that they had suffered. This latter aspect would be a constant and problematic issue in Byzantine-Venetian relations up until the Fourth Crusade. On the one side, the various emperors were willing to pay the Venetians part of the compensation only

121 Palumbo, Tancredi…, pp. 194-207.
when they were facing other threats, but they nevertheless increasingly lacked the resources to find this money; thus, the problem of compensation was left unresolved. On the other side, the Venetians tried to take advantage of the Byzantine need for their support to reobtain properties and commercial concessions in the Eastern Empire.

Relations between Byzantium and the Kingdom of Sicily mainly developed as a consequence of the Byzantine unwillingness to undertake a conquest of part of the Mezzogiorno following the campaigns of 1155-58, and of Barbarossa’s offensive policy. An alliance between Manuel and William I was therefore concluded in 1158, and the two political entities would maintain good relations until the beginning of the reign of Andronikos I. Yet, after Andronikos rose to power, William II realised that he could take advantage of the emperor’s lack of both external and internal support to attack the Balkans, with at the very least the hope of conquering part of them. This campaign proved to be both unsuccessful and extremely expansive; thus, the King of Sicily eventually gave up his Balkan ambitions, and came to terms with Isaac II; he only maintained control over the Ionian islands.

Following William’s death, his successor Tancred found himself in an extremely difficult position, as the Germans had allied with both Pisa and Genoa to try to conquer Southern Italy. Therefore, since Venice maintained an absolute neutrality between Henry and Tancred, the latter, who desperately needed international support, concluded a matrimonial agreement with Byzantium. Yet, this alliance was to be of short duration, as Tancred’s son Roger III died soon after his wedding with a Greek princess, soon followed by Tancred himself. The resulting lack of leadership enabled Henry VI to conquer the Mezzogiorno with ease, and to be crowned King of Sicily in late 1194. Henry maintained good relations with Isaac II, but, following the latter’s deposition, he tried to take advantage of the weakness of Alexios III. Indeed, the main goal of the Western emperor was that of undertaking a crusade to recover Jerusalem for Christianity, and he realised that such an enterprise would be considerably aided by the support of Byzantium. Therefore, Henry started blackmailing Alexios III to obtain his collaboration, and the basileus had no choice but to bow to the requests of the Kaiser. Yet, in the event, only a preliminary expedition, and not a full-scale crusade, could be launched, since Henry VI died in 1197, soon followed by his wife. The lack of an adult ruler led to a long period of internal problems in Southern Italy, and to the Mezzogiorno consequently losing political strength and prestige.
Finally, the Venetians maintained good relations with the Kingdom of Sicily for most of his period. This was facilitated by the significant distance that the Venetians kept towards Barbarossa (except in 1173). In the following years, Venice conducted a careful political approach towards the Kingdom of Sicily. Whenever Byzantine-Sicilian relations were tense, the Adriatic commune remained neutral in each controversy, while trying to take advantage of the Eastern Empire’s need for external support to recover and enhance its commercial privileges there. Such a strategy was continued when Henry VI attacked the Mezzogiorno, and when, following its conquest, he started (in effect) to blackmail Alexios III.
2) Trade

We shall here analyse the evolution of Venetian commerce in the Adriatic and Eastern Mediterranean in the years 1156-97. In particular, we shall see to what extent the economic relations between Venice and Byzantium followed, and were influenced by, their political relationship. Furthermore, we shall focus on how the patterns of trade changed following Manuel Komnenos’s coup in 1171, and on whether the scale of Venetian commerce in the Byzantine Empire after the reconciliation of the 1180s was similar to that of the 1160s.

i) 1156-71

The fifteen years that preceded the confiscation of Venetian property by Manuel I in 1171 can arguably be considered the golden age of Venetian trade in Byzantium due to the concurrence of the privileged commercial conditions in Romania, and of the economic expansion of both the Eastern Empire and Northern Italy. Venice and Constantinople were the main bases of commercial activities conducted by a significant number of merchants throughout the Eastern Mediterranean. Despite the Venetian agreement with William I, only two charters (issued, respectively, in 1159 and 1160) which directly record trade in Southern Italy have survived. Yet, a third document issued in Abydos is even more interesting, as it records a commercial operation to be conducted in Constantinople using a ship de Longobardis (probably an Apulian vessel), captained by a certain Pagano from Messina. The Byzantine cities and islands (in addition to Constantinople, Halmyros, Thebes, Corinth, and Crete) were the most popular locations of trade, but commerce was also conducted in Syria, mostly in Acre, where two charters mention that the Venetians traded iron and luxury cloths, but also in Tyre and in Egypt. It is not uncommon to find merchants being involved in a commercial voyage that would lead them to trade both in Romania and in the

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122 Rösch, ‘Lo sviluppo mercantile’, pp. 131, 133-35. Indeed, Romano Mairano, as many colleagues of his probably had done, or would later do, appears to have been based in Constantinople for some years in the second half of the 1150s. See Borsari, Venezia e Bisanzio…., p. 119.
123 DCV, nos. 136, 141, pp. 135-36, 140-41. Yet, I documenti inediti…., no. 39, pp. 92-93 suggests that, by the mid-1160s, a Venetian colony had formed in Palermo around the church of St Mark, and that some of its members conducted trade in the Southern Mediterranean and in Dalmatia.
Eastern and/or South-Eastern Mediterranean. This is mainly a testament to the
diplomatic ability of Venice, which made it possible for the Adriatic city to maintain
good relations with both the Latin East and the Muslim rulers of Egypt, and to take
advantage of the favourable commercial conditions in Byzantium. Since we have
just mentioned Egypt, we cannot omit that the main commercial target for the
Venetians who were trading in this region was Alexandria, followed by Damietta.
Even though the political centre of Fatimid Egypt was Cairo, Alexandria
nevertheless maintained its role as the most important Egyptian Mediterranean
port. This was due to the physical advantages of its harbour (if compared to that of
Rosetta), to the presence of the still-functioning Hellenistic lighthouse, which
significantly helped the sailors while they were sailing near the shore of Alexandria,
and to the difficult navigation conditions of the western ‘Rosetta branch’ of the Nile
delta. Furthermore, even though by the Middle Ages the ‘Alexandria branch’ of the
Nile had already silted, Alexandria was nevertheless connected to Cairo thanks to a
canal that connected these two cities, and which was generally open and navigable
for around three months a year. By contrast, the choice of Damietta is rather
interesting. Indeed, due to the difficult navigation conditions in the ‘Damietta
branch’ of the delta of the Nile, the main port of the area was not Damietta, but
Tinnis (until Saladin forced its population to evacuate it, and to move to Damietta in
1192-93). However, Damietta was nevertheless chosen as a commercial
destination by some Venetian merchants. This was because Damietta was the
main fortification of the region, and because of its location at a short distance from
the border with the Kingdom of Jerusalem. This probably led to the commercial
growth of the city due to the frequent exchange of goods between Christian
Palestine and Islamic Egypt.

125 See, amongst the other charters, DCV, nos. 123, 125, 134, 143, 148-49, 154-55,
142-43, 147-48, 152-59, 164-65, 179-80, 182-84, 186-97, 199-202, 204-05; SGM, III,
no. 320, pp. 60-62. In the 1160s, Benjamin of Tudela referred to Halmyros as being
inhabited by many Venetians, Pisans, and Genoese, and to the presence of Venetian,
and trans. by Marcus Nathan Adler (London: Oxford University Press, 1907), pp. 11,
76.
126 Evidence of the good relations between Venice and the Crusader States, and of the
Venetian commercial interest in the area can be found in Tafel-Thomas, nos. 59-61,
pp. 140-50.
127 John P. Cooper, The Medieval Nile: Route, Navigation, and Landscape in Islamic
Egypt (Cairo: American University in Cairo Press, 2014), pp. 52-57, 117-22, 148, 195-
96, 201-02, 204-05, 214, 216-17, 222-23.
The ships that allowed most of these commercial activities to take place were in some cases captained by the *socius procertans* himself (generally when he was sailing on his own vessel). Yet, many times the ships were captained by a *nauclerus* who was not directly involved in the trading activity. A third solution was that the merchant travelled with a *muda*, a naval convoy organised by the Venetians to connect regularly their homeland with Constantinople, and with the Eastern Mediterranean: there could be up to four *mude* per year.

Despite the increasing importance of centres like Acre and Alexandria, *Romania* nevertheless remained the main area in which the Venetian merchants were involved. Even though few charters record what goods were traded, some charters record that, in the late 1160s and shortly before 1171, Venetian merchants were involved in the commerce of cotton, luxury cloths, spices, and copper in Constantinople, and of oil in Sparta. Furthermore, in the early 1160s, there is evidence of horsehair being exported from Constantinople to Alexandria. The scale of commerce in the Eastern Empire appears to have reached a first peak in 1167-68, when over twenty charters concerning trade in some part of it were issued. Yet, starting from December 1168, the documentation suddenly decreased for almost a year: indeed, from then until September 1169 only three documents were issued. From the following month, the scale of trade once more increased, and reached a new peak until February 1171: over twenty charters were issued in these months. This data can be explained by the order to return to Venice issued by Vitale II Michiel following the break-down of Venetian diplomatic relations with Byzantium, and by the ensuing reconciliation between Manuel and the Adriatic city. The Venetian merchants clearly took advantage of the renewed political harmony, and the scale of their commercial activity did not decrease following the reinstatement of the Genoese and of the Pisans in Constantinople.

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132 DCV, nos. 149, 159, pp. 148, 156-57.
133 DCV, nos. 179, 182-203, 205-10, pp. 179-80, 182-209; NDCV, nos. 21-23, pp. 24-26; FZ, no. 25, pp. 56-58.
134 DCV, nos. 212-13, pp. 210-12; SGM, iii, no. 321, pp. 62-63.
136 See above, pp. 180-85.
Indeed, even though the estimate provided by the *Historia ducum Veneticorum* that 20,000 Venetians went to the Byzantine Empire following the reconciliation between Manuel and the Adriatic commune is clearly an exaggeration, there were nevertheless quite a few Venetians in Romania. Considering the total amount of money that Venice obtained once an agreement over compensation for the confiscations was reached, and the average claim of each person, probably around 6000 Venetians were in Romania in 1171.¹³⁷

It was not only merchants that profited widely from the reconciliation and from the extensive privileges, but also religious institutions. We know from two later charters that, in October 1169, the Patriarch of Grado subcontracted the collection of the Constantinopolitan incomes of his patriarchate to the Venetian merchant Romano Mairano.¹³⁸ Such a move suggests that the Patriarchate of Grado owned so many properties in Constantinople (many of which were then rented out) that it was more convenient to subcontract the collection of the incomes, rather than to collect them autonomously. The above-mentioned Romano Mairano is arguably the best-documented twelfth-century Venetian merchant. In most of the charters in which he appears, he is mentioned as a *socius procertans*, and he often captained the ship in which he sailed. In the early 1170s, he owned an extremely large ship nicknamed *Totus mundus*, with which he fled from Constantinople in March 1171, and which he used during the blockade of Ancona in 1173.¹³⁹ Before conducting a specific mercantile voyage, Mairano (as well as other *socii procertantes*) often concluded commercial agreements with more than one *socius stans*. This became a fairly common operation, which, on the one hand, increased the scale of the commerce conducted by the *socii procertantes*, and, on the other, allowed even people who were not extremely wealthy to become *socii stantes*, despite only having a limited amount of money to invest.¹⁴⁰ Yet, this structure of trade also had its disadvantages, as will be evident when we analyse what happened following Manuel’s *coup*.

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¹³⁸ *DCV*, nos. 245, 249, pp. 238-39, 244-45.


In addition to Constantinople, Thebes remained an important commercial destination. Although little is known regarding the goods traded there, it is quite likely that the merchants were active in the commerce of silk. Indeed, even after the deportations during the raids orchestrated by Roger II, Thebes remained an important centre of the silk trade. This can be inferred from a letter written by John Tzetzes between 1148 and 1154, from the account of Benjamin of Tudela, who visited the city in the early 1160s, and from the chrysobull that Manuel I issued for Genoa in October 1169, which banned the Genoese from buying silk in Thebes.\(^{141}\) Amongst the Venetian merchants who were based in Thebes, we can mention Marino Serzi, who, between the late 1160s and 1170, conducted several commercial operations with his brother Giovanni (who was based in Constantinople). When they traded together, Giovanni was always the socius stans, while Marino was later to obtain the money from the procertans.\(^{142}\) Yet, Marino had previously conducted autonomous activity as a socius stans at least once, in September 1165.\(^{143}\)

Another merchant who appears to have been based in Thebes for most of the 1160s was Vitale Voltani. The early documents record him as a socius procertans on different occasions. His wealth, and the massive scale of trade conducted by Voltani can be inferred as, around the mid-1160s, he even hired another man (Marco Betani) to act as his assistant in Tyre for two years.\(^{144}\) Yet, Voltani, just like many other merchants, would switch to being a socius stans in a couple of commercial operations conducted in the early 1170s, when he had reached a more advanced age (and acquired a considerable wealth).\(^{145}\) Indeed, while it is quite rare to see members of the richest Venetian families acting as socii procertantes, they were often involved in trade as socii stantes. This is especially the case of the Zianis. This family gave Venice two doges between the second half of the twelfth century and the early thirteenth century (Sebastiano – 1172-78 – and his son Pietro – 1205-29).\(^{146}\) Another interesting figure was Giacomo Venier. A


\(^{142}\) *DCV*, nos. 214-17, 219, 221-23, pp. 212-20.

\(^{143}\) *DCV*, no. 168, p. 165.

\(^{144}\) *DCV*, nos. 129, 166, 199-200, pp. 129, 163-64, 197-99.

\(^{145}\) *DCV*, nos. 234, 239, pp. 228-29, 233-34; Rösch, 'Lo sviluppo mercantile', p. 142.

Saracen *servus* of Marco Venier, he was freed in Halmyros in September 1158, and in the following decade he conducted trade on his own. Unlike Dobramiro Dalmatino Stagnario, there is no evidence that his descendants were also active in commerce.\(^{147}\) Finally, two documents interestingly show that the same person could both issue a charter, and draw it up as a notary, the men in question being Giovanni Rustico and Ottone Cipriano.\(^{148}\)

**ii) 1171-97**

The most striking difference between Venetian trade before and after March 1171 is that, understandably, commerce in the Byzantine Empire almost stopped until Andronikos I reached a settlement with Venice. Yet, even after the reconciliation with Byzantium, the scale of Venetian trade in the Eastern Empire did not reach the peaks of the years that had preceded Manuel's *coup*. Furthermore, there were also some changes in the pattern of commercial operations.

The main issue addressed in the several commercial charters of the period is that of the credit of the Venetians. Indeed, following the suspension of Venetian commerce in the Byzantine Empire, many *socci stantes* who had loaned money, or agreed on a *colleganza* to trade in Romania in late 1170 or in early 1171 would have to wait for many years to recover their capital from the *procertantes*.\(^{149}\) Other charters refer to those who had been deprived of their money, goods, properties, or revenues following the confiscations in 1171, and who were entitled to compensation after first Andronikos I and then Isaac II had reached an agreement with Venice. Yet, these were partial payments as the emperors only paid some instalments of the compensation, corresponding roughly to five percent of the total sum.\(^{150}\) Being a debtor did not prevent merchants from conducting new commercial operations, as in the case of Romano Mairano. Mairano had to repay several creditors as he had failed to complete some mercantile operations in Constantinople because of the confiscations. Yet, in the following dozen years, he

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\(^{148}\) DCV, nos. 137, 164, pp. 136-37, 161-62.

\(^{149}\) This is the case of Romano Mairano, who only in July 1183 received the final quittance for a commercial operation initiated before Manuel's *coup*. See DCV, nos. 249, 252, 256-57, 267-68, 280, 288, 329, 341, pp. 244-45, 247-48, 251-53, 261-63, 275-76, 283-84, 325, 337-38.

remained extremely active in trade, conducting commerce mainly in Alexandria and in Acre, but also in Dalmatia and, with very limited success, on the Western coast of Northern Africa.\textsuperscript{151}

Even though relations between Venice and Byzantium only normalised in 1182, there is nevertheless some evidence of Venetians being active in the Eastern Empire years before a reconciliation was reached. A later charter mentions that Fazio Totulo and Pietro Rambaldo were in Paphos (Cyprus) sometime before March 1173, but the presence of the latter is not so strange as he was the *nepos* of a citizen of Paphos itself. Furthermore, Vitale Voltani was involved in commercial activity in Thebes between 1175 and 1176.\textsuperscript{152} In addition, as was recorded by two Venetian charters and by a Pisan one, a few people from Venice had returned to live in Constantinople between 1176 and 1177.\textsuperscript{153} This can probably be correlated with the overtures towards Venice that Manuel made around the mid-1170s, after the Venetian agreement with William II, and before his own expedition in Asia Minor. Some further possible evidence that trade in the Byzantine Empire might have resumed shortly after 1171 might come from the edict on prices issued by Doge Sebastiano Ziani in November 1173. This document mentions the price of meat imported not only from *Sclavinia* (presumably Dalmatia), but also from *Romania*.\textsuperscript{154} Yet, as a normative text, this edict does not necessarily reflect the situation of commerce at the time when it was issued. Thus, *Romania* was probably included not because the Venetians were still importing meat from the Eastern Empire, but rather because they had done so until recently. Another possible explanation might be that petty trade between Venice and Byzantium continued, but that it was not recorded in commercial contracts. This would also explain the paucity of documents regarding mercantile activity in Dalmatia, both before and


\textsuperscript{152} DCV, nos. 273-75, 455, pp. 267-71, 444-45; Jacoby, ‘La dimensione demografica…’, p. 688. Voltani had had some money confiscated in 1171. In the early 1180s he appears to have been active in Apulia, but he seemingly relocated in Thebes after the appeasement between Andronikos I and the Venetians: DCV, nos. 308, 325, 353, 379, pp. 304-05, 321-22, 347-49, 372-73.

\textsuperscript{153} SGM, III, no. 375, pp. 132-33; SGET, no. 64, pp. 96-98; Documenti sulle relazioni delle città toscane…, no. 10, pp. 11-13.

after 1171. Finally, the most striking document is arguably a charter which records that some Venetians were conducting business at their own (extremely high) risk in Constantinople in May 1171, just two months after Manuel’s coup.

It was hardly surprising that, due to the problematic conditions in Byzantium, most Venetian merchants preferred to trade elsewhere. From 1176, there is a slight increase in the documentation regarding commerce in cities of the Kingdom of Sicily, namely in Brindisi, Squillace, Cotrone, Messina, Trani, Siponto, and (possibly) Pescara. The Calabrian cities and Messina acquired a significant importance as stopovers for Palestine or Egypt, and as exporters of wheat for those lands. The choice of these cities was sometimes a necessity due to the risks of sailing by the Eastern Adriatic shore, which was mostly under the Byzantines. However, Southern Italy was not the main area in which the merchants from Venice conducted their activity, as the Frankish States in the Levant and Alexandria became the main destinations of Venetian trade. In particular, since the early 1170s, the Egyptian city appears to have supplanted Constantinople as the main centre of Venetian trade outside of the Adriatic. The importance of this market for the citizens of Venice following the rise of Alexandria as a spice market was undoubtedly the main reason that persuaded the Venetian government to conduct negotiations with Saladin. The Adriatic commune obtained commercial privileges in the lands of the sultan, and its subjects appear to have been moderately active in Alexandria following this agreement. As usual, little is known about what goods were traded in this city, although a few charters issued between the early 1170s and the late 1180s mention the export of timber, and the import of pepper and alum. The other important area in which the Venetians were involved in trade was the Christian Levant. Unlike in the previous decades, and despite the conclusion of an agreement with Bohemond III in 1167 (which was annulled in 1183), there is no evidence of Venetian commerce in Antioch. While this might be

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155 The only possible surviving evidence from 1155 is 1171 can be found in I documenti inediti..., no. 39, pp. 92-93, while DCV, nos. 291, 334, pp. 286, 330-31 record activity in 1178 and 1182, respectively.

DCV, no. 244, pp. 237-38; Borsari, Venezia e Bisanzio..., pp. 22-23.


linked with the fairly good relations that Byzantium and the principality had throughout most of the 1170s, the paucity of documentation regarding the activity of Venetian merchants in Antioch throughout the second half of the twelfth century suggests that this city was no longer an appealing destination for the Venetian traders mainly for commercial reasons – probably due to a change in the spice route. Instead, the Frankish city in which merchants from Venice were mostly active in the 1170s and early 1180s was Acre.

Following the reconciliation between Venice and Constantinople, Venetian trade in the Byzantine Empire resumed. Yet, even though for around a decade Venice had what was virtually a monopoly on trade with Romania due to the limited presence of Genoese and Pisans, the scale of Venetian trade in the Eastern Empire remained limited if compared to the situation before 1171. This is because, in the years in which the Venetians had been prevented from trading in the Eastern Empire, they had found alternative markets, and their involvement in commerce there did not cease after the resumption of relations with Byzantium in 1183. In particular, after a break in the documentation during and following William II’s Balkan campaign, the Venetians resumed their commercial activity in Southern Italy in the late 1180s and early 1190s, during Tancred’s reign. On one occasion, commerce was conducted together with a merchant from the Mezzogiorno, who was the owner of the ship. However, Henry VI’s invasion would lead to a new break in Venetian trade in Southern Italy. The Eastern Mediterranean also remained an important destination for merchants from Venice, with Alexandria maintaining its preeminence until 1185. After this year, the scale of trade with this city diminished. A possible explanation for this is that Saladin’s conquests eventually persuaded

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162 Just eighteen charters refer to trade in the Byzantine Empire between 1183 and 1197: DCV, nos. 345, 347-48, 353, 368, 375, 381, 388, 392-93, 399-401, 409, 413, 421, 423, 426, pp. 341-44, 347-49, 362, 368-69, 374-75, 381-82, 385-86, 391-94, 400-01, 404-05, 412-15, 418-19. See also Jacoby, ‘Italian Privileges…’, pp. 361-65. Amongst these, DCV, no. 401, pp. refers to the export of copper to Corfu, while DCV, no. 368, p. 362 mentions the import of linen from Alexandria to Constantinople. Furthermore, DCV, no. 331, pp. 326-27 mentions the attempted export of oil, copper, cloths, soap, and food to Constantinople, while DCV, no. 371, pp. 364-65 seems to suggest the Venetian involvement in the commerce of garments and swords in the same city.


Venice to abide by the ban on the export of strategic goods into the lands of the sultan that Pope Alexander III had issued between 1179 and 1181. This would have deprived the Venetian merchants of the chance of conducting commercial activity by barter in Egypt, thus hampering the continuation of large-scale trade in Alexandria. In the following decade, instead, there is more evidence of commerce taking place in the Frankish States. The main commercial centres were Tyre and Acre; yet, between 1187 and 1191, the Venetians were seldom active in these cities since Venice did not initially support the lord of Tyre Conrad of Montferrat, while Acre was in the hands of Saladin. Interestingly, a charter issued in Tyre in 1192 is the earliest Venetian document which clearly refers to the slave trade, as the ambiguous term servus, often used in similar cases, was here replaced by sclavus. Ironically, the person who sold this Saracen slave is Giannone Stagnario, who was himself the grandson of a freed Dalmatian servus (Dobramiro Stagnario). The other reason why commercial activity in Byzantium was limited between 1183 and 1197 is probably that the Venetian merchants still did not feel confident trading there. They were probably afraid that a sudden unfortunate turn of events might lead to new confiscations, or to another anti-Latin pogrom. Furthermore, especially at the beginning of the reign of Alexios III, reaching Constantinople was probably quite dangerous as, due to the lack of a Byzantine fleet patrolling the nearby waters, the Aegean Sea had become infested by Pisan pirates. It is this, rather than Alexios III’s hostility towards Venice, that explains why trade in Constantinople appears to have stopped in 1195-96. The Venetians were nevertheless still active in Romania. There is evidence of trade in other areas of the empire, notably at Corinth, Thebes, and Skyros, and some charters which refer to changes of ownership of Constantinopolitan properties were issued in these years.

Therefore, what probably prevented trade in the capital city of the Eastern Empire was the dangers of reaching it by sea, rather than the hostility of the *basileus*.*^{168}\)

Furthermore, in this period, Romano Mairano, the merchant whose career is best documented, appears to have significantly reduced his commercial activity. After 1171, he only appears to have traded in the Byzantine Empire once, in 1190.*^{169}\) Other merchants were, indeed, more active in the 1180s and 1190s. For instance, Pietro da Molin, who had been imprisoned in 1171, and had had some of his goods confiscated, was extremely active in both the Byzantine Empire and the Frankish States in the Levant for around a dozen years after his release (which probably took place in 1182, as the first subsequent charter he issued was in January 1183).*^{170}\) Pietro Tiepolo and his son Giacomo also conducted a significant number of commercial operations both within and without *Romania*.*^{171}\) Another interesting aspect is that, while in most cases Venetian commercial documents were written by notaries who had moved to the Eastern Mediterranean (and who were always clerics), there were nevertheless some notaries who followed the merchants during their voyages, and wrote charters for them. Indeed, many of the documents regarding Romano Mairano were drawn up by a priest who was probably a relative of his, Pietro Mairano.*^{172}\) Despite the fluctuating nature of the political relations between Venice and Constantinople, there is nevertheless some evidence of a commercial partnership between the Venetians and the Byzantines. In 1192 some Greek merchants were trading in Cairo using a Venetian ship.*^{173}\)

While the evidence for Venetian trade in *Romania* is quite sparse, and we have no raw data regarding the number of people from Venice in the Byzantine Empire after 1182, other kinds of documents nevertheless suggest a renewed and significant Venetian presence in the Eastern Empire. Some Venetians are clearly

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*^{169} DCV, nos. 383-87, pp. 376-81.


mentioned as *habitatores* (i.e. dwellers) in Constantinople, or Thessalonica. This might mean that these people lived in Constantinople outside of the Venetian quarter. Furthermore, several Venetians died, or at least wrote their last will, in a Byzantine city. Yet, this does not necessarily suggest that they had permanently moved to the Eastern Empire; it is quite possible that they died while they were temporarily in *Romania* in order to conduct some business operations.

Further evidence of the settlement of people from Venice in the Byzantine Empire comes from a series of contracts in which Venetian citizens rented some land or a house in Constantinople. In the 1180s, the religious institutions managed to recover the extensive properties that they had obtained before 1171, and they continued to rent some of them out to increase their incomes. Most of the surviving charters refer to properties owned by the Venetian monasteries (both in Venice and in Constantinople), or rented out to private individuals, who sometimes sublet them. Only on a few occasions would the properties be directly rented out by a private citizen, or by the commune. Although the properties of the religious institutions were undoubtedly extensive, the main reason why so many documents regarding them have survived is that these institutions were accustomed to preserve their charters to make sure that all dues were paid to them, and that nobody could claim their lands. The latter was quite a serious problem in the case of the properties in *Romania*. The dozen years when there was no Venetian presence in the Constantinopolitan quarter had led to many controversies regarding the ownership of the various properties. Moreover, the Venetian colony did not have a juridical structure, and, until 1171, the trials were judged either by the legates (when they were in town), or by a commission of *boni homines*. This was no longer a viable solution, and the commune probably took action, as, from the mid-1180s onwards, the presence of Venetian judges is recorded in Constantinople. Yet, these judges only had juridical powers, and not executive, and thus could not prevent acts of

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rebellion like that of a fleet anchored off Abydos, whose crew refused to obey the
doge’s orders, and to return to Venice.\(^{178}\)

iii) Conclusions

To sum up, the Venetians continued to trade in Byzantium as long as it was
not too dangerous to do it, or they were forcibly excluded. This is why in the 1160s,
when the political contrasts between Venice and Manuel I had significantly
increased, the scale of Venetian trade in the Eastern Empire did not decrease. It
was indeed quite the opposite, as the 1160s appear to have been the decade in
which Venetian merchants were most active in Byzantium (apart from a brief hiatus
in 1168-69).

However, commerce in the Eastern Empire did almost cease in 1168-69,
after Vitale Michiel issued a decree ordering his citizens to return to Venice, and
then again for around twelve years between 1171 and 1183. Finally, there is no
evidence of Venetian traders reaching Constantinople in 1195-96, when navigation
in the Aegean Sea was hampered by Pisan pirates. While in the first and in the
third case, there is little evidence of commerce overall, twelve years was too long a
break for the Venetian merchants not to look for different commercial destinations.
Therefore, there was a significant expansion of trade in Alexandria and in the
Crusader States.

Moreover, although, following the reconciliation with the Byzantine Empire
during the reign of Andronikos I, the Venetians did once again trade in Romania,
the scale of this trade was appreciably lower than before 1171. This was both
because merchants from Venice continued to remain active in the markets that they
had exploited in the 1170s, and because the political instability in Byzantium
probably discouraged some of the traders from being too strongly involved in the
Eastern Empire. Therefore, from 1183 to 1197, the Venetians conducted commerce
in a variety of locations in the Byzantine Empire and in the Eastern Mediterranean.
Beginning with the second half of the 1180s, this pattern slightly changed as there
is little evidence of Venetian trade in areas that were under Muslim control. This

\(^{178}\) DCV, nos. 348, 362, 372, pp. 343-44, 356-57, 365-66; SGM, III, nos. 462, 483, 487,
514, 581, pp. 242-44, 271-73, 278-80, 311-14, 399-401; Tafel-Thomas, no. 77, pp.
216-25; Ferluga, ‘Veneziani fuori Venezia’, p. 705; Madden, Enrico Dandolo…, pp. 84,
86-88; Borsari, Venezia e Bisanzio…, pp. 58-60; Maltézou, ‘Venetian habitatores…’, p.
238. Even though in the dating of this charter the indication and the anno Domini do not
 correspond, the problematic relations between Byzantium and Venice at the beginning
of the reign of Alexios III suggest that this document was issued in 1196, rather than in
1194.
may be associated with the expansive strategy and conquests by Saladin. The Venetians possibly decided to stop providing the sultan and his heirs with strategic materials, out of fear that, if they had not done so, they would have been indirectly responsible of the demise of the Latin States in the East.
VII. General Conclusions

The years from 1081 to 1197 were characterised by complex, changing, and often problematic relations between Venice, Byzantium, and Southern Italy. In particular, the Eastern Empire was involved in many conflicts with the rulers of the Mezzogiorno, and the Venetians decided whether or not to side with the Eastern Empire due to a combination of factors. Initially, they chose to intervene in the conflict alongside the Eastern Empire due to their longstanding good relations with Byzantium, to the promise of obtaining commercial privileges in Romania, and to their fears that a Norman conquest of part of the Balkans would destroy the status quo in the area, and thus hamper the Venetian plans of maritime hegemony in the Adriatic. Similar motivations led Venice to intervene against Roger II when the King of Sicily attacked Byzantium in the late 1140s. However, the commercial concessions soon became a double-edged weapon. The main Venetian interest was no longer that of maintaining a political alliance with Byzantium, but merely continuing to have privileged commercial conditions in Romania. This was clearly evident when, after the privileges granted by Alexios I were cancelled by John II Komnenos, the Venetians suddenly broke their centuries-long tradition of alliance with the Eastern Empire, and launched a series of naval raids against its islands and coastal areas. By this time, Venice had also obtained relevant commercial concessions in the Holy Land, and thus probably felt that it had nothing to lose from attacking Byzantium. If the Venetians had won the war, they would have re-obtained their commercial concessions in Romania, while a defeat would not have deprived them of their newly-acquired trading privileges in the Holy Land.

Eventually, the Venetians were victorious, and thus managed to re-obtain commercial advantages in Byzantium, and, soon later, to restore good relations with the Eastern Empire. The second reason why the Venetians had decided to side with Alexios I against Robert Guiscard (maintaining the status quo in the area) became the main factor that led Venice not to intervene when the Byzantines tried to launch an offensive against Southern Italy. The Venetians had no interest in taking part in this conflict alongside Manuel I Komnenos, as they would have had nothing to gain in case of a Byzantine victory. Therefore, they showed some hostility to Manuel’s project by agreeing on an alliance with William I, the man whose lands were about to be invaded by Byzantium, and the descendant of the rulers against whom Venice had fought in many conflicts. However, despite the signing of this agreement with the Kingdom of Sicily, the Venetians did not take part in the conflict alongside William I, probably out of fear that such an intervention
would have led to the cancellation of their privileges in Byzantium. The Venetian opposition to Manuel’s aggressive foreign policy, together with the growing wealth of the Adriatic commune, eventually irked the emperor, who was unwilling to recognise that Venice had achieved complete political autonomy from Byzantium. Therefore, in 1171, Manuel had all the Venetians who were in the Byzantine Empire imprisoned, and their goods confiscated. Even though the Venetian military reaction was not extremely energetic due to the fear that commencing a full-scale conflict would have led to the execution of their fellow countrymen who were imprisoned in Romania, Venetian trade in Byzantium nevertheless almost stopped until 1183, when all the captives were released. The agreement of 1183 was the first of a series of treaties that Byzantium signed with Venice in the following fifteen years. Due to the difficult political situation of the empire following the death of Manuel I (especially when the Balkans were invaded by William II in 1185-86), the following emperors felt the need of pacifying with Venice. However, the Venetians were only willing to accept an agreement as long as the emperors swore to compensate them of all the losses that they had encountered in 1171. Such negotiations would take place many times until the end of the century, as the Byzantines were never able to fulfil their promises, but often felt in danger; hence, due to its condition as a creditor, Venice was often able to dictate the terms of all the new agreements. Despite this, the scale of Venetian trade in Romania after 1183 appears to have been significantly smaller than that of the years that had preceded 1171. This was probably the consequence of a series of factors, including the political instability of the Eastern Empire, the lack of mutual trust between the Byzantines and the Venetians, and the latter continuing to trade in the alternative markets in the Holy Land that they had started to exploit at a higher scale after 1171.

Taking Southern Italy into consideration is vital to understanding Venetian-Byzantine relations. Indeed, the extensive commercial concessions that Alexios I granted to Venice were a direct consequence of the first Balkan attacks by Robert Guiscard, while the significant extension to the Venetian quarter in the late 1140s was a consequence of Roger II’s attacks and raids. Therefore, omitting the Mezzogiorno from the conversation would also mean not explaining the origins of the commercial growth of Venice in the Mediterranean. Furthermore, since the 1150s, maintaining good relations with the Kingdom of Sicily was one of the main political goals for both Venice and Byzantium. The Venetians felt that, by doing this, they could limit Manuel I’s western political ambitions, and that they could obtain
better commercial conditions in the markets of Southern Italy. By contrast, the
Byzantines were mainly interested in an alliance with the Sicilians in order to form a
coalition against Frederick Barbarossa. By the late 1150s, Manuel I had realised
that the Kaiser, rather than William I, was the main threat to the western territories
of the Byzantine Empire. Indeed, many contemporary sources suggest that, if
Barbarossa had managed to obtain control of Southern Italy, he would have then
attempted to attack the Balkans. While Frederick I did not manage to conquer the
Mezzogiorno, his son Henry VI did accomplish this goal. The marriage between
Irene Angelina and Roger III of Sicily can probably be interpreted as a last-minute
try to form an alliance that might dissuade the Germans from trying to conquer
Southern Italy, and thus becoming the hegemonic political power in the
Mediterranean. However, on this occasion this strategy, which had been successful
in the 1150s and 1160s, failed miserably due to the political weakness of both the
Sicilians and the Byzantines.
Appendix:

The Komnenoi and Angeloi (emperors in bold)

An incomplete family tree of the Komnenoi and Angeloi
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